Journal of Advanced Military Studies
vol. 12, no. 1
Spring 2021

 

 

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From the Editors

 


Political Warfare and Propaganda:

Political Warfare and Propaganda: An Introduction

James J. F. Forest, PhD

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201001

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Abstract: The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. This introductory essay provides a brief examination of terms, concepts, and examples of these efforts and concludes by reviewing how the articles of this issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies contribute to our understanding of political warfare and propaganda.

 

Keywords: information operations, digital influence, political warfare, psychological warfare
 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
James J. F. Forest is a professor at the School of Criminology & Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell and a visiting professor at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. He has published more than 20 books in the eld of international security studies, most recently Digital Influence Warfare in the Age of Social Media (2021) and Digital Influence Mercenaries (2021).

 


 

FAKE NEWS FOR THE RESISTANCE

The OSS and the Nexus of Psychological Warfare and Resistance Operations in World War II

Daniel de Wit

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201002

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Abstract: The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II, is best known for its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines. However, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency. This article will show how organizational relationships imposed by theater commanders, who often had little understanding of psychological warfare or special operations, could serve to enable or hinder the sort of coordinated subversive campaign that OSS founder General William J. Donovan envisioned. This history offers important lessons for contemporary campaign planners in an environment where psychological warfare is playing an ever-larger role in the conduct of military operations.

 

Keywords: psychological warfare, unconventional warfare, information operations, influence, the human domain
 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Daniel de Wit is an operations support officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency, an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve, and a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. The views presented here are his alone and do not reflect the position of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the U.S. Marine Corps.

 


 

ALL WOMEN BELONG IN THE KITCHEN, AND OTHER DANGEROUS TROPES

Online Misogyny as a National Security Threat

Kyleanne Hunter, PhD, and Emma Jouenne
JAMS vol. 12, no. 1

https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201003

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Abstract: Online misogyny is an under-studied form of information warfare. Often dismissed as “boys will be boys,” online misogyny has been allowed to percolate and create communities that have far-reaching impacts. The impacts of online misogyny are not confined to the internet. In this article, the authors show how the ubiquitous nature of online misogyny poses a national security threat. We explore three diverse case studies: the United States military, the incel movement, and ISIS to demonstrate the far-reaching nature of the security threat. Though the nature of the security threats is different, the intervening cause—unchecked online misogyny—is the same.

 

Keywords: misogyny, online radicalization, security

 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr. Kyleanne Hunter is an assistant professor of military and strategic studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, a nonresident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University, and a senior adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security. She is a Marine Corps combat veteran and former chair of the Employment and Integration Subcommittee of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. e views presented are her own and do not represent her employer or the Department of Defense. Emma Jouenne is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University. She is the associate editor for gender and international relations at the Georgetown Security Studies Review.


 

CONSISTENCY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES

The Defensive Mode in Cyber

Glen Segell, PhD

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1

https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201004


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Abstract: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has four battle threats, where cyber is equitable to conventional (state), subconventional (nonstate), and nonconventional. An escalation in one could lead to an overall escalation in all. In the political areas and, by extension, in civil-military relations (CMR), the IDF has a defensive mode as routine, while an offensive mode is manifest rarely in emergencies and war. The IDF is engaged in a total war in a defensive mode yet a limited war in the offensive mode as Israel’s adversaries do not share the same policies with regular cyber and terror attacks against civilian, government, and military targets. There is consistency in all four threats. Fencing, active defense, and preventive and preemptive strikes dominate.

 

Keywords:
Israel Defense Forces, IDF, civil-military relations, CMR, cyber, limited war, total war, deterrence, defensive mode

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Glen Segell is a research fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel, and in the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. He specializes in intelligence studies, civil-military relations, and strategic communications. He holds the rank of brigadier general (Reserves), where he also consults as an expert for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He was in active intelligence and offense operations in Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan, and Libya.

 


 

RUSSIAN CYBER INFORMATION WARFARE

International Distribution and Domestic Control

Lev Topor, PhD, and Alexander Tabachnik, PhD

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201005

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Abstract: Cyber information warfare (IW) is a double-edged sword. States use IW to shape the hearts and minds of foreign societies and policy makers. However, states are also prone to foreign influence through IW. This assumption applies mainly to liberal democratic societies. The question examined in this article is how Russia uses IW on other countries but protects itself from the same activities. The authors’ main argument is that while Russia executes influence operations and IW in cyberspace, it strives for uncompromising control over its domestic cyberspace, thus restricting undesirable informational influence over its population.

 

Keywords: cyber warfare, information warfare, IW, Russia, cyber policy, sharp power

 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Lev Topor is a senior research fellow at the Center for Cyber, Law and Policy, University of Haifa, Israel. Dr. Alexander Tabachnik is also a senior research fellow at the Center for Cyber, Law and Policy.

 


 

PROPAGANDIZED ADVERSARY POPULATIONS IN A WAR OF IDEAS

 

Donald M. Bishop

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201006

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Abstract: Disinformation, the disruptive effects of social media, and the prospect of information warfare increasingly preoccupy national security thinkers. In the twentieth century, years of prewar and wartime propaganda by the Axis powers and the Soviet Union made the World Wars and the Cold War longer and more costly. In this century, China and North Korea represent two nations that have propagandized their populations for 70 years, hardening them against informational initiatives. What are the lessons? How should the United States assemble a strategy to counter propaganda’s effects?

Keywords: propaganda, informational power, operations in the information environment, information operations, influence operations, public diplomacy, information warfare, political warfare, gray zone, hybrid war, war of ideas, indoctrination, active measures, social media, World War I, World War II, Cold War, China, Russia, North Korea

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Donald M. Bishop is the Donald Bren Chair of Strategic Communications in the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. After serving in the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam, Korea, and on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy, he was a public diplomacy officer in the Foreign Service for 31 years. He led U.S. public diplomacy in Bangladesh, Nigeria, China, and Afghanistan, and he was detailed to the Pentagon as the foreign policy advisor to the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James T. Conway. The author thanks John Thomson and Dr. William Morgan for their reviews of drafts.


 

SOCIAL ANTIACCESS / AREA - DENIAL (SOCIAL A2 / AD)

Colonel Phil Zeman, USMC
JAMS vol. 12, no. 1

https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201007

 

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Abstract: Social antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) describes the threat posed to U.S. and Western security by sociopolitical and socioeconomic means, primarily by China and Russia. is concern focuses on actions by China and Russia designed to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and creating economic dependencies—in many cases capitalizing on target nation propensities to accomplish strategic ends. rough these ways, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to aggressive acts.

 

Keywords: national security, antiaccess/area-denial, A2/AD, China, Russia

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Col Phil Zeman has served in the U.S. Marine Corps for more than 27 years in infantry, reconnaissance, strategy, and planning posts.

 


 

REPRESENTATION OF ARMED FORCES THROUGH CINEMATIC AND ANIMATED PIECES
Case Studies

Michael Cserkits, PhD

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201008

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Abstract: In this article, the author will examine the representation of armed forces in cinematic productions and anime, with case studies of the United States and Japan. e sample will consist of a movie that has a clear involvement of the United States armed forces and of an anime series that was cofinanced by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The analytical method used will be textual analysis, in combination with videography, a method that supports interaction analysis of moving images. In comparing those two different approaches of the armed forces of Japan and the U.S. military, the author hopes to shed light on not simply the representation of the groups but also desired self-identification of the respective armed forces.

Keywords: propaganda, cinema, videography, Japan, U.S. military

 


ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Michael Cserkits, PhD, serves in the Austrian Armed Forces and is an independent postdoctoral researcher. He graduated from the Austrian Military Academy, holds an MA in sociology, an MA in social and cultural anthropology, and a PhD in African studies. He is currently working in the research fields of military sociology/anthropology and security issues relating to the Sahel zone.


 

STREAMING THE BATTLEFIELD

A Theory of the Internet's Effect on Negotiation Onset

First Lieutenant Anthony Patrick, USMC

JAMS vol. 12, no. 1
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20211201009

 

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Abstract: This article explores the effects of social media penetration and internet connectivity on the likelihood that parties within a conventional intra-state conflict will enter negotiations. The proliferation of advanced information communications technologies, coupled with violent political collective action, calls for further examination of how these variables intertwine to affect conflict patterns. Beginning with a discussion on communications technology and the bargaining model of war, the author presents a theoretical model that seeks to create a foundation that can be used for future empirical testing.

 

Keywords: negotiation onset, intrastate war, internet, communication technology

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
1stLt Anthony Patrick is currently a graduate student at the University of North Carolina Wilmington enrolled in the Conflict Management and Resolution Program. He is an active duty intelligence officer in the U. S. Marine Corps. His past work has focused on low-intensity conflict and national security policy.


 

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