Rwanda 1994
A Failure of Leadership and a Preventable Genocide
Paolo Tripodi, PhD
DOI: 10.56686/9798987849125
ABOUT THE BOOK
Rwanda 1994 provides evidence that, although small in number and poorly equipped, the military force deployed in Rwanda as part of UNAMIR could have stopped the genocide. Yet, they failed to appreciate and properly deal with the military situation on the ground, while they were distracted by political and diplomatic events. What was missing at some crucial point was not manpower or ammunition, but the determination, competence, and professional experience of key senior leaders to use force when it was necessary, to provide clear guidance, and to fully appreciate the tactical situation and its requirements. Military leaders failed to understand that what they were facing on 7 April was a military situation and not a political or a diplomatic one. During that crucial day and those following, a military response to the crisis would have sent a strong message to the perpetrator of the genocide.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Select Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms
Introduction
Chapter 1. The Birth of Two Military Organizations: The Forces Armées Rwandaises and the Rwandan Patriotic Front
Chapter 2. From the Invasion to Arusha
Chapter 3. Setting up the Mission
Chapter 4. Club Méditerranée
Chapter 5. The Longest Day
Chapter 6. Mounting Violence as the Mission Collapses
Chapter 7. A Few Hundred Peacekeepers and a Fading Hope for Rwandans
Conclusion
Select Bibliography
Index
About the Author