HomeOutreachMarine Corps University PressMCU JournalJournal of Advanced Military Studies Vol 11. No2

Journal of Advanced Military Studies
vol. 11, no. 2
Fall 2020

 

 

pdf 
ePUB


From the Editors

 


NAVAL INTEGRATION AND THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE

 

The Unity of the Operational Art:

Napoleon and Naval Integration

Matthew J. Flynn

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102001

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

Abstract: On 29 March 2019, a ceremony at Marine Corps University (MCU) marked the opening and full operational capability of the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity. The conception, birth, assignment of permanent staff, funding, and now-robust schedule of activities of the Krulak Center came after some years of gestation, providing a case study of organizational change. The Marine Corps has long valued innovation and creativity, but the impetus to establish such a center had its origins in the decennial accreditation process of MCU by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). This article looks at the early conceptualization of a Center for Applied Creativity (CAC), the organizational starts and stalls, the thoughts about goals and organization that came together for the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, and finally the initial years of its activity.

 

Keywords: naval power, seapower, Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson, Napoleon, Trafalgar, continental system
 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Matthew J. Flynn, PhD, serves as professor of war studies at Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. He specializes in the evolution of warfare and has written on topics such as preemptive war, revolutionary war, borders and frontiers, and militarization in the cyber domain. Dr. Flynn runs the website Newconflict.org, which is dedicated to examining the new conditions shaping global conflict.

 


 

SAME WATER, DIFFERENT DREAMS

Salient Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War for Future Naval Warfare

Andrew Rhodes

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102002

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

Abstract: American officers considering the role of the sea Services in a future war must understand the history and organizational culture of the Chinese military and consider how these factors shape the Chinese approach to naval strategy and operations. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 remains a cautionary tale full of salient lessons for future conflict. A review of recent Chinese publications highlights several consistent themes that underpin Chinese thinking about naval strategy. Chinese authors assess that the future requires that China inculcate an awareness of the maritime domain in its people, that it build institutions that can sustain seapower, and that, at the operational level, it actively seeks to contest and gain sea control far from shore. Careful consideration of the Sino-Japanese War can support two priority focus areas from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance: “warfighting” and “education and training.”

 

Keywords: Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), China, seapower, naval history, naval strategy, People’s Liberation Army, Qing Dynasty
 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Andrew Rhodes is a career civil servant who has worked on Asia-Pacific affairs in a variety of analytic, advisory, and staff positions across the Department of Defense and the interagency. He earned a BA in political science from Davidson College in Davidson, NC, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and an MA in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. He is an affiliated scholar of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, which provided valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article. The contents of this article reflect the author’s own personal views alone and are not necessarily endorsed by the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

 


 

SEA CONTROL

Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning, USMC
JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102003

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

Abstract: As the United States faces a rise in credible antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) started developing counteraccess denial strategies early in the twenty-first century. Access denial strategies are not a new defensive strategy; what makes access denial challenging on the modern battlefield is the dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area. Through a historical review of Japanese naval battles during the early twentieth century, a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain is possible. Control of the maritime domain is the prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. In this article, recommendations for achieving success in this new operating environment are offered, including investing in low-cost technology that extends ranges of A2/AD capabilities.

 

Keywords: sea control, antiaccess/area-denial, A2/AD, Japanese naval history, defense in depth, Chinese sea denial

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
LtCol Michael F. Manning was commissioned in 2004 after graduating from Saint Louis University, MO. After completing The Basic School, LtCol Manning attained the military occupational specialty of ground supply officer. Manning is serving as the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, G-35, future operation branch head, Camp Smith, HI. He operationally deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–11), and has completed Western Pacific deployments in support of the 11th and 13th Marine Expeditionary Units.

 


 

NAVAL INTEGRATION

An Old Approach for a New Era

Colonel Scott Erdelatz (USMC, Ret), Colonel J. D. Canty (USMC, Ret), Colonel Mark Desens (USMC, Ret), and Captain Chris Senenko (USN)
JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102004


PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

 

Abstract: Current debates on naval integration mostly focus on whether the naval Services’ warfighting concepts are on target—the why of naval integration—or whether integration efforts are jeopardizing the Marine Corps’ ability to fulfill longstanding roles and missions. An underappreciated aspect of this topic is the process, or the how, of naval integration. The actions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period are a positive example of naval integration and indicative of the long-term effects that can follow. Many current developments, in particular the growing partnership of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and fleet commands, are examples of effective naval integration and will help ensure that the Services arrive at the proper end state.

 

Keywords: naval integration, naval expeditionary operations, fleet operations, Navy operations, Marine Corps operations, amphibious operations, sea control, sea denial, deterrence, interwar period, composite warfare, command and control

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Col Scott Erdelatz, USMC (Ret), is a former Combat Logistics Regiment commander and chief of staff at Marine Corps University. He currently works for the university’s College of Distance Education and Training (CDET). Col Jeremiah D. Canty, USMC (Ret), is a former Marine Aircraft Group commander. He is currently a research fellow at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. Col Mark Desens, USMC (Ret), is a former Marine Expeditionary Unit commander and director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He currently works for CDET. Capt Chris Senenko, USN, formerly commanded the USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) and currently serves as the director of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School at the Naval War College.

 


 

THE JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMAND AND THE MARINE CORPS

Integrate to Win the Black SeaFight

Major Michael Kohler, USMC

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102005

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

 

Abstract: Marine integration with the Navy contributes to meeting vital U.S. naval operational requirements, especially when organized as a Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) in the Black Sea against Russian threats. The global operating model addresses integration across escalating levels of competition and conflict called contact, blunt, and surge layers. In the contact layer, Marine integration allows the JFMCC to maintain regional access, assure allies, and counter expanding Russian influence. In the blunt layer, Marine integration supports the JFMCC’s operational objectives of denying Russian sea control and freedom of movement. Finally, in the surge layer, a Navy and Marine integrated JFMCC gains a greater ability to project power against a robust antiaccess and area-denial network and decisively defeat Russian aggression. This article contends that naval integration is also an important component of defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region.

 

Keywords: Joint force maritime component command, JFMCC, Navy and Marine Corps integration, Black Sea, Russia, global operating model, antiaccess, area denial

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maj Michael Kohler is a Marine Corps infantry officer. He is a graduate of the Naval War College’s Maritime Advanced Warfighting School and is now serving as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force planner for II Marine Expeditionary Force.

 


 

CARRIERS AND AMPHIBS

Shibboleths of Sea Power

John T. Kuehn, PhD

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102006

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

 

Abstract: This article argues that American naval force packages built around aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships no longer serve maritime security interests as effectively as in the past. It further claims that the current commitment in the published maritime strategy of the United States to the twin shibboleths of “carriers and amphibs” comes from a variety of attitudes held by senior decision makers and military leaders. This commitment betrays both cultural misunderstanding or even ignorance of seapower—“sea blindness”—as well as less than rational attachments to two operational capabilities that served the United States well in the past, but in doing so engendered emotional commitments that are little grounded in the facts.

Keywords: aircraft carrier, amphibious readiness group, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, sea blindness, maritime security

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
John T. Kuehn, PhD, currently serves as the Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King Visiting Professor of Maritime History for the Hattendorf Historical Center at the U.S. Naval War College. He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 after 23 years, serving as a naval flight officer. He authored Agents of Innovation (2008), A Military History of Japan (2014), Napoleonic Warfare (2015), America’s First General Staff (2017), and coauthored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D. M. Giangreco as well as numerous articles and editorials and was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History in 2011. His latest book, The 100 Worst Military Disasters in History, was published this year, coauthored with David Holden.

 


 

FIRST TO FIGHT
Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps
Major B. A. Friedman, USMCR

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102007

 

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

 

Abstract: General David H. Berger’s tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps has set the stage for drastic change toward a Marine Corps more focused on maritime operations. The Commandant has called on these changes to be concept driven and capabilities tested, driving experimentation, wargaming, analysis, research and development, and acquisitions. The Marine Corps is pursuing or developing a number of concepts but lacks an overarching concept that provides context and coherence for conceptual exploration. The author proposes advanced force operations, a concept designed to be broad enough to link together modern concepts like expeditionary advanced base operations and distributed operations, while building on the Marine Corps’ traditions and strengths. Advanced force operations envision Marine Corps forces acting as a vanguard force, competing for maritime access, shaping naval campaigns, and enabling the introduction of Joint forces.

 

Keywords: amphibious operations, expeditionary advanced base operations, National Defense Strategy, Marine Corps concepts

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj B. A. Friedman is a field artillery officer and the division cell office in charge, 6th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, and a civilian military analyst in support of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He is the author of several books, including 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy (2015), On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (2017), and the forthcoming On Operations (2021). He holds a BA in history from The Ohio State University, an MA in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and is pursuing a doctorate in nineteenth century naval strategy and amphibious operations through King’s College London.

 


 

THE PROBLEMS FACING UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS

Steven A. Yeadon

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102008

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

Abstract: There are calls by some experts to accept that an amphibious assault of coastline is simply too risky to attempt due to current threats. So, what are the challenges facing amphibious assaults? Is the amphibious assault still a viable type of military operation in the current threat environment? These questions are at the heart of the mission and role of the United States Marine Corps. This analysis delves deep into the problems facing amphibious assaults, and it serves as a primer for future discussions pertaining to improving amphibious assault capabilities.

Keywords: amphibious operations, amphibious assault, antiaccess/area-denial, A2/AD, near-peer competitors, threats, vulnerability

 


ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Steven A. Yeadon is an independent scholar living in Florida. He has been published in several military-related publications, including MCU Journal (now JAMS), Fires, Army Aviation Digest, Armor, and Infantry. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Central Florida in Orlando.

 


 

LOSING THE INITIATIVE IN THE FIRST ISLAND CHAIN

How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals

Major Matthew C. Ludlow, USMC

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102009

 

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF​
 

Abstract: Much has been written of renewed great power competition and the characteristics of a potential armed conflict with the People’s Republic of China. This article surveys the strategic environment and the features of the current military strategies, detailing how such a conflict might be waged. In preparation for a potential conflict with China in which defense of the first island chain is required, the Joint force, and in particular the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, have invested heavily in technology intended for amphibious expeditionary operations. However, most of the investment has centered on intricate and expensive aviation technology. Meanwhile, surface expeditionary technology has continued to age and now significantly lags its aviation counterparts such as the MV-22 Osprey and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. As a result, a strategic gap in capabilities has emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy.

 

Keywords: Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey, Marine Corps organization, Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council, MROC, deputy commandant for aviation

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Matthew C. Ludlow is a recent graduate of the U.S. Naval War College’s Advanced Strategist Program. He is currently serving as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force planner assigned to I MEF.

 


 

MARINE CORPS FORCE DESIGN 2030 AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS

Case Norway

Lieutenant Colonel Terje Bruøygard and Lieutenant Colonel Jørn Qviller, Norwegian Army

JAMS vol. 11, no. 2
https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102010

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

Abstract: Force Design 2030 describes major organizational changes to the U.S. Marine Corps. Arguably, these changes will affect the Joint force, allies, and partners. The United States, and in particular the Marine Corps, is an important part of the deterrence and defense of many countries, especially Norway. Thus, the Norwegian Armed Forces should adapt to these changes to increase interoperability and strengthen the common warfighting capability. A comprehensive implementation plan, including allies and partners to operationalize the changes in the Marine Corps as well as the new U.S. Service and Joint concepts, is needed to succeed in creating an advantage over China and Russia

Keywords: Force Design 2030, operating concept, expeditionary advanced base operations, EABO, distributed maritime operations, DMO, multidomain operations, MDO, great power competition, antiaccess and area-denial, A2/AD, China, Russia, United States, Norway

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LtCol Terje Bruøygard is a Norwegian cavalry officer and a graduate from Expeditionary Warfare School and Command and Staff College (CSC) at Marine Corps University (MCU). He served as the commanding officer of Telemark Battalion and deployed to Iraq with his unit before serving as military faculty advisor at CSC. He is currently serving as the J5 at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. LtCol Jørn Qviller is a Norwegian infantry officer who graduated from the School of Advanced Warfighting after serving as the commanding officer of the Norwegian Army Border Guard Battalion at the Norwegian/Russian border and is currently serving as military faculty advisor at MCU’s Command and Staff College. Opinions in this article are the authors alone and not those of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Marine Corps University, or the U.S. Marine Corps.

 


LITERATURE REVIEW

REVIEW ESSAY

 

BOOK REVIEWS