U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
in the First

WORLD WAR

ANTHOLOGY, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY,
AND ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE
Cover: Marine Sentry on duty on the Rhine River during the occupation of Germany.
Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
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This printing represents as closely as possible the original works as they were published at the time, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. In some instances, we have retained the original spelling of specific places and things as they represent the accepted spelling for the historical period.
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PREFACE

The aim of this collection is to give readers the broad historical strokes to U.S. Marine Corps participation in World War I, as well as to show that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Brigade. World War I created the modern-day Marine Corps; an adaptive force-in-readiness even when seemingly relegated to ship and barracks duty.

When selecting the articles for the anthology, a pattern emerged and it seemed fitting to maintain that pattern. Part I reflects the articles that Marines were reading before and during the war. These men were well read—they were eager to learn what combat was like in trench warfare, to understand the new dangers found in chemical warfare, and to try to understand their new allies against the Germans. These men returned home and quickly put pen to paper. They were keen to tell of their exploits and achievements in France, Germany, and elsewhere. There was no one better to tell that story than the veterans themselves. While World War I has faded from collective memory with the passing of the last of its veterans, a few stalwarts took up the torch to remind everyone of these brave Marines, as well as to understand the long-term impacts of the war on the Corps. Part II of the anthology looks at the war through the lens of devotees who have kept these stories alive.

Lastly, a simple order of battle would not suffice. Part III offers prolific users of, and fans of, Gordon L. Rottman’s *U.S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle* (2001) an annotated order of battle with appendices as the perfect bookend of this work. The order of battle includes descriptions of most of the smaller detachments and various shore duties of the Corps in direct support of the war. This volume concludes with a selected bibliography that was modified and updated from Jack B. Hilliard’s 1967 publication, *An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marine Corps in the First World War*. It now includes record repositories and relevant Web sites to aid researchers.

This book could not have been possible without the contributions and encouragement from several members of the Marine Corps History Division, including Deputy Director Paul J. Weber, the late Dr. Stephen Evans, and Mr. Robert V. Aquilina formerly with the Reference Branch. I extend particular gratitude to my very supportive colleagues, and “lunch bunch” members Dr. Nicholas Schlosser and Mr. Paul Westermeyer. Research cannot be achieved alone and, therefore,
I must thank Mrs. Cindy Evans, Mrs. Lindsay Grose, and Mrs. O’Dell McGuire of the Library of the Marine Corps, as well as Mrs. Alisa Whitley, Mr. Greg Cina, and Mr. Chris Ellis of our Marine Corps Archives. The staff of the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute also deserves every accolade I can bestow—and more! Additionally, I must thank Major John M. “Jack” Elliott, USMC (Ret), and Mr. Al Barnes (Army Combined Arms Support Command)—both men, whose own enthusiasm for the topic and willingness to read drafts and to share treasured finds, kept me motivated more than either of them know. I remain most grateful to Senior Editor Angela Anderson and Visual Information Specialist Vincent J. Martinez for making me sound and look good. We gratefully acknowledge the permission received from Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, and Naval Institute Proceedings for allowing us to reprint their articles. Lastly, I sincerely thank my dear friends for listening to me ramble about the topic for reading drafts, for allowing me to spend my vacation with them and still work, and so much more—Laura J. Levi and Peter M. Wood.

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INTRODUCTION

The significance of the First World War on the U.S. Marine Corps cannot be overlooked. When the United States declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, there were just 462 commissioned officers, 49 warrant officers, and 13,214 enlisted men on active duty in the Marine Corps; of those, 2,236 were already forward deployed outside the continental United States. When hostilities ended in 1918, approximately 30,000 men had been assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and another 1,600 for naval duty ashore. During the course of the war, the Corps fielded a combat brigade, consisting of two infantry regiments and a machine gun battalion, for duty on the front lines; another brigade of two regiments and a machine gun battalion was used to keep the forces fed, clothed, and moved into and out of the combat zone as part of the Army’s Services of Supply. Furthermore, the Corps provided two aviation squadrons for service with the Navy for antisubmarine warfare duty in the English Channel and in the Azores. Aside from those forces in direct combat and in support of those same forces, additional Marine detachments were detailed to guard radio stations, naval magazines, ammunition depots, warehouses, cable stations, and for other naval activities. In less than two years, the Corps had more than doubled in size to 52,819 officers and men—the largest it had ever been. It took another 23 years and another world war to reach the same level again.* The Corps met the challenges put before it, proving that it was a force-in-readiness that was prepared for any clime and location.

The purpose of the anthology is two-fold; first, to provide readers with a quick and broad overview of Marine Corps participation in the First World War. This is not a combat narrative nor is it a lengthy narrative history; this work is meant as a quick reference guide to aid those researching Marines in the First World War. Second, the collection is meant to educate the general populace to the fact that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Brigade. Most of the histories produced focus heavily, and rightly so, upon the combat actions of the Marines in the 4th Brigade; however, of the 30,000 Marines with the American Expeditionary Forces, two thirds were in locations other than the 2d Division’s area of operations in France. The contributions of these “other” Marines have been glossed over by historians with passing references. While this work is not meant to provide detailed histories, it does serve as a point of reference for family members of the veterans attempting to understand their relative’s role in the war.

This work is divided into three parts, each having subordinate sections that organize the material into easily digestible chunks of information, starting with the anthology of articles, then an annotated order.

Introduction

of battle, and lastly the selected bibliography. Each section could easily stand alone as a smaller individual publication; however, combining each into a single volume seemed a better option for researchers looking for a single-source reference work.

Articles in the anthology were chosen for their ability to provide details not found in other locations, or they clarified and amplified information found in other sources. Part I’s articles were written by Marines and other veterans of the war—it is their point of view used to understand the war and their achievements. Historians 100 years later can provide a sterile and objective idea of the war, but the veterans lived through the battles and their first-hand accounts are often more accurate and gripping. The war is presented via the articles in three phases—prewar, the war itself, and postwar peace and occupation duty.

Articles found in Part II were authored by historians, archivists, Marines, and other interested parties and provide the reader with more details on individual battles as well as information on commanders and lesser-known aspects of the war, such as awards and decorations. These articles were chosen to “round-out” the historical perspective of the volume itself and to fill in some of the gaps left by the articles in Part I.

The annotated order of battle came as a direct result of the research conducted to create the order of battle. Over the years, numerous reference requests regarding the small, lesser-known Marine Corps units in the war have been collected in notes and scraps of paper and, with the coming of the centennial, it seemed the time to compile those notes into a single publishable work. The result is herein, even though it is acknowledged that there are likely gaps that remain due to the lack of available information or records. The source material for the annotated order of battle starts with Major Edwin N. McClellan’s *The United States Marine Corps in the World War* supplemented by various articles, History Division and secondary publications, oral history interviews, muster rolls, and documents found in the Historical Reference Branch’s working files. The materials were generally readily available within the History Division, but scattered through various files and books making research time consuming. Therefore, a single location has been created.

The selected bibliography is not all encompassing; it was not intended to cover every article ever written on the subject of Marines in World War I. The bibliography takes the foundational work produced by Hilliard in 1967, subtracts works not exclusive (or nearly exclusive) to the First World War or Marine Corps in the war, and adds those produced since its publication. In addition to the newer works published, the bibliography also includes the most relevant oral history interviews of World War I veterans (several who became Commandant of the Marine Corps) and personal paper collections—all of which are still maintained by the Marine Corps History Division. Outside repositories of collections most relevant, such as photograph collections and state record collections on World War I veterans, are also included to provide a wider resource pool for researchers.

The appendices supplement the information found in the order of battle. The list of acronyms found with the muster rolls from the war—used to decipher the supplemental casualty rolls—provides details on such units as depot divisions and field hospitals that were not found in the course of researching the order of battle. Information on the medals and decorations awarded to the men who fought was included because awards, such as the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Cross, were born from the government’s and commanders’ desire to appropriately decorate these men. Lastly, a list of valor awardees from the Marine Corps Reserve is included. This was compiled by Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret), as part of his research on the creation of the Marine Corps Reserve.
PART I
MARINES AND VETERANS ANALYZE
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
"With the 2d Division."

Courtesy of C. Leroy Baldridge, Marine Corps Archives
READYING FOR WAR
Precepts and Duties of the Foot Soldier

Precepts of a Foot Soldier
The Infantryman is Victory's Workman

All arrangements having been made, the men fallen in, and everything being in readiness; the general sends his infantry into action.

Thenceforward, in the midst of shot and shell, they will scarcely hear any orders, and will see no reinforcements; they will be alone, but people are counting on them. They are victory's workmen.

Everyone, to the Humblest,
Is Responsible to His Country

In these decisive hours, the man who is the hope of his country often does not think about that. The battle is limited to the immediate surroundings of his shelter; he thinks that he does not amount to much, concludes that his effort is almost useless, and sometimes says to himself: “What's the use of exposing myself any longer for so little?” Since there are no officers, because they are scattered here and there along the line, there is nothing to rouse the skirmisher and carry him along; he excuses himself by saying that he is doing as everyone else, and in this way the battle becomes stationary because the ultimate fractions no longer move.

When the skirmisher finds himself alone, and out of sight of his leaders, his country is still looking at him; whether he advances or falls, it blesses him.

In Battle, Fight

On the field of battle there are, first of all, the real combatants: those who do harm to the enemy. But there are also timid persons who lose their heads and think only of blotting themselves out in some hole. These latter appear for the sole purpose of furnishing useless corpses.

Whatever you may do, your life is exposed to danger; at least let it serve some useful purpose and be paid for in advance.

Live and Conquer

There is no question of getting yourself killed bravely and disappearing; you must live and conquer. In order to preserve their lives, cowards try not to expose them, but brave men rely upon their valor to protect themselves.

The coward is strongly tempted. It is more agreeable to stay in your hole than to advance amongst bullets, but the coward has no self-control and becomes foolish. This is why, if he succeeds in preserving his life once or twice, he finally makes a false move, which, in war, is paid for with one's life.

The brave man is cunning; he dares to look in the face of danger, knows when to scorn it in order to advance, and when it would be rash to face it. He is not afraid of the enemy, because the enemy is a man whom he can always get at with boldness and skill.

A good rifle, nimble legs, a clear eye and a cool head; that is the charm to take you through bullets and enable you to kill your enemy.

Brave Men Make Good Soldiers

The man who is not a good soldier has no self-respect. In order to follow one's chiefs into danger, one must have respect and affection for them; the riff-raff has neither faith nor rule; it respects nothing, and loves itself only.

When the chief is gone and the soldier finds himself alone, what drives him along the path of duty in spite of all his agony and fear: his conscience.

Complete Victory

Many Frenchmen have already given their lives for victory. Henceforward, has anyone the right to say he is tired and to stop? No; for one cannot profit by the sacrifices of one's comrades without bringing to
an end the task for which they have died. No peace
without complete victory, even at the cost of all your
limbs.

Germany wanted war, and her claws must be
drawn for a long time; people will bless us for it.

The Duties of the Soldier

Follow the Chief

The chief is the rallying point; it is not necessary for
him to watch his troops, for they should follow him
blindly. If he falls, they keep on without him and
avenge him.

Never abandon the body of an officer to the en-
emy; his troops carry it away or come back to look
for it.

Avenge Your Dead

When he thinks about past combats, the combatant
sees again his comrades who sleep in every patch of
ground where the regiment has stood.

They have fallen, and others have taken their
places in the company. They, so strong and brave,
can do no more, but their memory lives and their
sacrifice has not been in vain.

They are always in the hearts of those who re-
main and, at this thought, every man feels a cold
rage mount in him and render his arm stiffer
and his eye clearer.

In the trench and in battle, you must not rest
until you have made the enemy pay very dearly for
the stricken comrade.

The dead cry for vengeance. No rifle shoots so
straight as the rifle of a dead man.

Bury the Dead, Succor the Wounded

One should give honorable burial to one’s dead
comrades. You must have enough heart, in spite of
fatigue and the oppression of danger, to bury them
otherwise than in the first hole with a little earth on
top of the body.

You must bind up the wounded and, when you
cannot leave your station, put them under cover un-
til the occasion allows you to take them to the rear,
even though you are ready to drop with fatigue and
sleep.

Do Harm to the Germans

This idea should always be awake in the heart of
the combatant. It gives him that silent and ferocious
ardor, which is the real thing; if he is ready to faint,
it sustains him. When you are suffering and you feel
your courage ebbing, put a cartridge in your rifle
and aim straight.

Conduct toward Prisoners

You must spare the enemy who surrenders, while al-
ways on guard against the treacheries [that] are cus-
tomy among the Germans. To massacre for the
pleasure of killing is a cowardly barbarism, which
dishonors the troops.

However, in the mêlée, so long as resistance
continues and there is risk of the enemy regaining
the upper hand, there must be no quarter, for mercy
often costs dear.

The wounded enemy is an unfortunate who
should be succored, and you must no longer be con-
scious of the hated uniform.

Always Remember That You Are a Frenchman

In a word: if the foot soldier asks himself how he
should behave, let him always remember that he is
a French soldier.

When Is a Man Timid or a Coward?

Trials are awaiting the soldier at every step on the field
of battle; he must be well acquainted with them in order
to resist them, and to bring back to the straight path
the comrade who abandons himself to the temptations
of fear.

You are not timid or a coward because you are
afraid or feel sick; so if you should feel that way, do
not get discouraged and lose confidence in yourself.

Danger always makes a strong impression
on people, and no one ever gets used to shot and
shell; it is too contrary to human nature. However,
as you become seasoned to war and become better
acquainted with danger, you will be less rattled be-
cause you will know when there is something to be
afraid of and when you can sleep in peace.

Sometimes a man feels out of sorts; his body
suffers and his mind is sick. For instance, you find
yourself suffering under the influence of bombard-
ments or of violent combats; you remain motionless in the mud and cold and rain; the hours pass slowly; the war is long, and you speculate on the unknown of tomorrow. Then you get bad ideas in your head: this is the “blues.” A man who has the “blues” is not a coward; he becomes one if he lets himself go, if he continually whimpers over his miseries and thenceforward tries to find some way of leaving his post. He is a brave man if he says to himself: “I’m not worth much lately, but that will all pass by; let’s wait, work, or sleep.”

The Timid Man

The timid man is a soldier who is afraid of a shadow.

He fires in the air or lets go over the parapet without showing his head. He trembles, thinks himself lost, and falls back as soon as he sees an enemy advancing toward him; he cannot stand the sight of an adversary because he always believes he is stronger than himself.

When he is on sentry go, he hears and sees Germans everywhere.

When on patrol or on picket (and this is when he is at his best), he is always imagining that a German is about to pounce upon him; if he hears a noise, he runs away at full speed, breathless, shouting that the enemy is advancing, and terrifying all hands; now, it is a cow moving about, or a wounded man moaning as he drags himself toward our lines.

The Coward

The coward is the man who abandons his post for any reason. He accompanies the wounded without orders, not to help them, but in order to get to the rear and stay there.

If he gets a slight wound or a scratch, he is perfectly happy and takes advantage of it to save himself and leave his comrades to face the worst of the danger.

*It is absolutely forbidden to leave your post without authority.*

He does not dare throw a grenade or fire a shot for fear of the reply.

Men who run away are cowards.

Those who surrender without having used all their cartridges, or without having done everything possible to escape from the enemy, are cowards.

The Riff-raff

These are those few individuals who have the well-advertised idea of not doing their duty or of committing some bad action.

*Soldiers who get under cover:* they sneak off and hide when their chief is not looking and only appear several days later after the battle is over, saying that they got lost.

In former wars, when those men came in to eat in the evening, their messmates used to pass judgment on them and whip them till the blood flowed.

Men of this class do not want to expose themselves; they think of living later in peace and happiness, while brave men have brought peace with their blood.

This trickery is not to be tolerated; everybody must move on.

When Is a Man Brave?

Most soldiers are brave; a great many of them do not even know it.

Trench Fighting

The foot soldier in the trenches is not over-fond of work; he often prefers to curl up in the mud under indifferent shelter to taking a little trouble. So, when he is subjected to bombardment, he has no cover to get under.

Furthermore, the foot soldier considers that he is in the trench merely to keep the enemy from getting through if he attacks. Since the enemy does not attack every day, the fighting habit is lost, and the enemy is left to plant entanglements and dig his shelters without molestation, so that, when the time comes to attack him, you will have to go up against thoroughly prepared defenses, which must be taken by main force.

The enemy that you do not kill beforehand will perhaps kill you on the day of the assault.

What the Foot Soldier Should Do in the Trenches

1. Be careful of himself.
2. Train himself and get seasoned to war.
3. Destroy Germans.
How to Take Care of Yourself

To get yourself killed or wounded in the trenches through carelessness or negligence is sheer stupidity because you have not been of any use. A soldier can never be replaced. Therefore build yourself a good shelter so that you can laugh at bombardments and sleep in peace. Do not do the imprudent things with which everybody is so familiar. Watch over your comrades who are careless, and especially over newcomers and young soldiers who want to see everything and are ignorant of trench customs.

How to Get Seasoned to War

In the trenches, people fall into ways that are bad in battle. They stay continually in the shelters; when they move about, it is nearly always in the zigzags, so that they find it very disagreeable to have to pass through open spaces where the bullets are whistling.

You must fortify yourself so as not to let any bullet bother you on the day of attack. To this end, go on patrol at night, and plant entanglements in front of the first line.

You should profit by your stay in the trench to learn skill [that] is your surest protection in battle.

Every day fire a carefully aimed string at the enemy’s trench; study the point of aim of your rifle for different ranges; practice quick aiming to prepare yourself for firing at close range.

Every soldier familiarizes himself with the throwing of the different types of grenades; he should interest himself in everything charged with explosives, the methods of priming bombs, trench weapons, etc.

How to Destroy Germans with Your Rifle

You may pass months in front of an enemy’s trench without seeing a single German; consequently, it is difficult to do them any harm.

However, with skill and patience, you will succeed in getting good results.

Begin by carefully watching the adversary’s trench and learn exactly where you can get him if he shows himself for half a second.

Places Where the Enemy Hangs Out

Loopholes: all of these are not manned. Those [that] are too easily seen are simply to attract attention. Loopholes for rifle fire are often at the level of the ground, in which case they are only just wide enough to let the rifle through and are masked with sods or a tuft of grass.

In order to recognize the loopholes that are really manned, it is necessary to draw fire by showing a hat above the parapet, while other men to the right or left keep a lookout.

Shelters: there are always people about the entrances to the shelters; these are places where someone can always be surprised.

Shelters are indicated by an extra elevation of the parapet. Generally, the enemy has the stupidity to cover his shelters with an excess of sandbags, which are visible even from outside the trench. A peephole is often to be found immediately alongside the shelter. Finally, escaping smoke is the best indication of the inhabited part.

Observation posts: these are indicated by an accumulation of sandbags and the regular appearance of periscopes. The periscopes do not extend much above the parapet and are often wrapped in grass or a sandbag, but minute observation of everything all the time will reveal their cautious appearance.

When the enemy artillery is firing or when his trench mortars are at work, that is the time when you can observe some fleeting movement in the observation posts.

Times When the Enemy Is Out of Doors

In the morning and on cold sunny days, everybody is out of doors.

At mess time in fair weather; this period is often indicated by a slackening of the rifle fire.

When our trenches are under bombardment, the enemy gathers about the loopholes to amuse himself.

At night, the enemy leaves his trenches to repair the damage to his defenses or entanglements caused by our artillery fire.

Reliefs: the time of relief can be recognized by the slackening of the rifle fire, the sound of voices, silhouettes at certain points when the zigzags are impracticable.
You can always tell when relief has taken place by the change in the attitude and habits of the enemy. By repeating the observations, it is possible to learn the days for relief.

To mishandle the enemy arriving on relief is the best way of intimidating him during his stay in the trenches.

Organization of the Look-out
1. In order to observe a given spot, watch through a small peephole. The peephole is simply a hole made in the parapet with a stick or a pipe placed inside the trench and pointed at the spot to be watched. A few sods are placed at the outlet of the peephole so that it may not look too regular. Avoid looking continuously through wooden peepholes or through the shields, as these are often spotted by the enemy.

2. To watch a part of a trench, look through a peephole arranged on the bias in the parapet or use a periscope. Use a small piece of a mirror on the end of a stick, stuck in the reverse of the trench, for getting a general view of the enemy’s trench.

Observation through binoculars (chief of section’s glasses): as a rule, the enemy’s trench appears to be completely deserted, but when looked at through binoculars, it is astonishing how many details are revealed. From time to time, you see the eye of the enemy lookout at his peephole, close up, or the haze of a cigarette.

The binocular is useful for observing a determined point; not a single movement of the enemy escapes, and the rifle fire becomes instantaneous and deadly.

In observing through a peephole, look through only one side of the binocular.

Organization of Fire
It is necessary to be able to fire without danger at a single determined point, and at parts of the enemy’s trench outside of the marked spots.

1. In order to fire instantly at a marked spot (peephole of an observation post, etc.), keep a loaded rifle pointed at it all the time.

Hence, it becomes necessary to construct a rest capable of resisting the recoil of the rifle without disturbing the aim. A rudimentary rest (a sort of vise) can be built from materials to be found in the immediate vicinity of the trenches. All that is needed is two boards to form the jaws, a hinge to hold them together, a foot to which the end of one of the boards is securely nailed, and a strong bolt to close the jaws.

Put a piece of cloth between the jaws and the rifle.

To fire a little more to the right or left, use small wooden wedges.

A peephole is located beside the rest; if the lookout sees a shadow pass by the slot in the enemy’s shield, a simple pressure of his finger sends a bullet straight to the mark.

Use perforating bullets against the enemy’s shields, so that if you miss the slot you will be sure of hitting the enemy by penetrating the shield.

2. In order to be able to fire at an enemy who may show himself outside the limits of the spot marked down, make wooden loopholes diagonally in the parapet, so as to be protected against shots coming from in front of you (the most frequent). These loopholes are used without a rest.

The lookout detailed to these loopholes is chosen from among the best shots; he watches a section of the German trenches, and if he sees an enemy suddenly show his head, he takes aim and fires.

How to Make the Enemy Show Himself
In order to enable the marksmen stationed at the loopholes to fire at the enemy, he must be made to show himself.
A number of methods of accomplishing this may be thought of:

An attack may be simulated by opening a sudden fire, shouting, and firing grenades. This will make the enemy spring to his loopholes.

A cap or a hat shown from time to time in the loophole or on a level with the parapet will draw the fire of the enemy’s lookout, who immediately receives several shots in his own loophole.

The earth of the parapets or the saps* may be stirred about.

A number of tricks can be contrived, among others, decoy fires, at nightfall. Straw is lighted, shouts are uttered, and dummy figures moved about; the enemy, without fail, will rush to his loopholes to enjoy the show and mock his adversary. When it is estimated that his loopholes are manned, fire into them.

How to Use the Rifle-grenade to Inflict Daily Losses on the Enemy

There is no question but that the use of rifle-grenade is capable of inflicting greater losses upon the enemy than a bombardment.

* Short trenches that were dug from the front-trench into no-man’s land. The sap heads, usually about 30 yards forward of the front line, were then used as listening posts.

The rifle-grenade arrives unexpectedly and without any noise; it bursts before there is time to get away from it. It is not used at fixed times, like the bombardment and, furthermore, the enemy cannot avoid it continuously by taking refuge in his shelters. When he moves about, his mind is always under a strain to keep on the lookout. This perpetual threat makes the enemy’s stay in the trench extremely trying.

Before firing grenades, it is first necessary to observe the enemy’s trench closely in order to find out the places where he hangs out and where it is sometimes possible to reach him, such as shelters, sniper’s posts, zigzags, trench crossings, latrines, etc.

The officers indicate the direction and the approximate range of points that cannot be seen directly.

Rifles are secured in the rests facing the most important points, and a grenade fired at intervals day and night. In this way, it is possible to surprise a sentry, a smoker in his shelter, a noncommissioned officer, or a cook circulating in the trench.

Sometimes the enemy attempts to reply, in which case the fire must be redoubled in violence and kept up continuously. As soon as the enemy feels that he is the weaker, he will think of nothing but getting under better cover.

In certain cases (enemy reliefs, supply parties, working parties, gathering of troops before an attack), instead of executing a slow and continuous individual fire, it is preferable to open a sudden and
violent surprise fire with the greatest possible number of rifles. The firing begins with a volley and is afterward continued at will.

When the artillery has broken down parts of the enemy’s trenches and made breaches in his entanglements, he takes advantage of darkness to repair the damage. He may be considerably worried and subjected to losses by raining grenades upon the places [that] have been torn up during the day.

The Attack on the Trench

In case of an attack, everybody goes promptly to his battle station. Sometimes, when the attack is preceded by a violent bombardment, the station is wiped out; the trench is nothing but a mass of holes and hillocks. You must then take such shelter as you can find; a solid trench is not necessary in order to fight.

Sometimes, it also happens that the enemy succeeds in getting into your trench and pushing by before the defenders can get out of their shelters. You must not think that all is lost; make a space around the shelters with grenades and shoot the enemy in the back. By working in this way, intrepid garrisons have annihilated whole German companies, which had already pushed beyond the first trench.

Protection against Asphyxiating Gases

How to foresee a gas attack.

The attack takes place in quiet weather with a light wind.

The enemy remains quiet in the sector for several days.

From time to time, a noise of sheet iron being moved about is heard in the enemy trench. Work may be observed going on along the whole line of the trench.

Trial balloons or smoke rising behind the enemy’s lines, to show the direction of the wind, are valuable indications.

When the attack is launched, you hear a prolonged whistling sound; this is one of the only indications at night.

Measures of Protection

Always place the mask where it can be found instantly without searching for it.

When an attack is foreseen, put the goggles on your forehead and hang the mask around your neck so that you can adjust it quickly.

As soon as the attack is let loose, give the alarm; put on your goggles first, and then your mask.
Get to your battle station and open fire to prevent the enemy [from] advancing and to break up the gas cloud.

Carry out the general instructions that have been given in advance by the noncommissioned officers.

Do not take off your mask as soon as the gas cloud has gone by, for a new one may come along.

Do not touch food that has been exposed to the gas cloud.

Never wet your mask, and do not take it out of its box unnecessarily.

The Battle

What does the infantryman do in battle?

It is always and everywhere the same thing:

After the artillery has demolished the enemy's defense and terrified the defenders, the infantryman dashes forward to the assault and clears out the position.

He pursues as far as he can in order to gain as much ground as possible at one stroke.

He sticks like a porous plaster under the fire of the big, high explosive shells, so as not to give up an inch of what he has taken.

Therefore:

Close up to within assaulting distance of the enemy (between 100 and 200 meters);

Assault;

Pursue;

Hold tight.

If not already within assaulting distance, close in on the enemy, whether by night or by day.

By day, the approach is made under cover of the artillery. You must advance smartly and not slow-up under shell fragments; the longer you stay in the rain, the wetter you get.

However, when the enemy’s rifle fire becomes hot and accurate as, for example, at close ranges, it is not possible to advance in exact alignment; you must run at top speed and keep firing in order to kill your enemies in advance.

From that moment you are no longer information; you can no longer hear orders in the din, and you cannot always see your leaders.

This is the time when the soldier, instead of thinking himself lost and stopping, takes the initiative with his comrades and keeps going; sometimes watching for his chance a long time, running, digging, firing, throwing grenades. This is the subject of the following pages.

The Bombardment

Raw troops are very much upset by shell fire, especially by shells of large caliber. Seasoned soldiers do not like it any better, because the din and whistling of the violent explosions confuse and addle the brain.

Seasoned soldiers, however, know that the shell often makes more noise than it does harm, and that after a terrifying bombardment everybody is not wiped out, by a long shot.

How to Be Safe against Shell Fire

The heavy “soup kettle” (Marmite*), which is so terrifying, is in reality only dangerous if it falls on the spot where you happen to be, because all the fragments go up in the air.

Therefore, lie down when the “soup kettle” arrives. Even if you are quite close to it, you run no risk.

Avoid getting up immediately after the explosion, especially when within 200 or 300 meters of the burst, because the pieces do not come down for a long time afterward.

The helmet and the knapsack (with an inside padding formed by the jacket or the folded blanket) are fairly effective as a protection against shrapnel balls.

How to Escape Shell Fire

In Battle

Advance as rapidly as possible, so as to get out of the marked zones. Some men completely lose their heads and, no longer having the strength to advance, lie face down on the ground; they will be wiped out on the spot.

Get close to the enemy. In this way, the enemy heavy artillery will have to cease firing for fear of

* Marmite is a vitamin-rich spread included in soldiers’ ration packs.
Readying for War

...putting the shells indiscriminately among their own and our men.

When the artillery fire is violent, it causes disorder and confusion in the ranks. Each soldier has ears only for the approaching shell; he slows down, and is strongly tempted to get under cover. In this way, many units break up, running pell-mell or stopping. Disorder means massacre.

Therefore, advance exactly in your place in ranks and keep in alignment. If you see anyone wavering, give him a crack with your fist and keep him in ranks.

In the Trench

Dig shelters. Do not wait till the last minute, as often happens, through indifference.

If you cannot dig deep shelters, carry the line of the trench close to the enemy under cover of darkness.

How to Use Your Rifle

The rifle is used to destroy the enemy at long range, so as to be able to approach him without risk. Every soldier as he advances thus clears a space ahead of him, and he has every interest in making a complete job of it.

In order to use your rifle efficiently, you must:

- Take up a good position and be on the watch;
- Take the point of aim of your rifle;
- Keep your eye on the enemy;
- Know just when to fire.

How to Post Yourself

(See examples of construction of a firing post.)

In order to fire effectively, you must be sheltered. A soldier who is continually in danger of being hit is nervous in his motions; he hurries, and the enemy simply laughs at his wild shots.

The first care of the sharpshooter about to open fire should, therefore, be to construct or arrange a safe and comfortable firing post.

This will consist of an earth embankment to protect him against bullets coming from in front and a loophole. The loophole, however, instead of being directed straight toward the enemy is arranged obliquely; consequently, fire is not opened at first upon the enemy directly opposite, but upon the adversaries more to the right.

In this way, you do not run the risk of being shot in the forehead, as frequently happens when you have just arrived in a new shelter and the enemy has his eye on you. All bullets coming from the front bury themselves in the embankment without doing you the slightest harm.

Avoid disclosing your position to the enemy, for if bullets are continually striking around the rifleman, they will end by worrying him and getting his nerve. Therefore, do not change the appearance of natural cover or shelter (hummocks, tufts of grass, etc.), behind which you have stopped; hide any earth you disturb, and work cautiously in order not to attract the enemy's attention. The shelter should merge itself into the surroundings.

The rifle very often reveals the sharpshooter's post. Avoid raising the rifle in loading; slide it along the loophole at the level of the ground, without ever raising it.

Mask the barrel, which should never project beyond the embankment.

Take care that the discharge of the rifle does not raise any dust. To this end, arrange some bunches of grass toward the muzzle.

To Take the Point of Aim of Your Rifle

The sight-settings for 200 and 400 meters are not sufficiently accurate to allow [for] always hitting a small object, such as the head of an enemy under cover; it is necessary to aim a little above or below the mark. Determining the point at which it is necessary to aim in order to hit the desired object is called “taking the point of aim” of the rifle. In order to do this, fire at a target the same distance away as the objective and so situated that it is easy to spot the shots (a clump of earth).

How to Keep a Lookout on the Enemy

Even at short range, the German sharpshooters are hard to make out; their position is most often indicated by the visibility of their shelter and by their rifle, as has been said before.
As soon as you have marked down an enemy, bring your rifle to your shoulder, wait till he shows himself, and fire as soon as he appears. Do not pay any attention to another until the first is put out of action. After getting rid of one adversary, pass on to the next, going from right to left. In this way, you will expose yourself to frontal shots only by degrees, and as you become master of the situation.

When You Must Fire
When no enemy is in sight, watch and wait; fire only when he appears, that is to say, when he uncovers himself to fire or to advance. You will generally be warned by the raising of his rifle.

When a movement occurs, or is about to occur, in our line, the adversary does not fail to fire, and is obliged to show himself.

In firing at an enemy who is running, do not try to hit him on the fly; aim at a spot over which he must pass and fire just as he is about to reach it.

When the enemy takes flight, fire and keep firing; finally, when the enemy ought to be destroyed, he will leave only a few men on the ground. Set your sight carefully; in this way, even if you get nervous and only fire “into the brown,”* your fire will be murderous.

When you are hidden and the enemy advances without misgiving, hold your fire until he gets close up (to be used against patrols).

What to Fire at
The rifleman ordinarily fires at the adversary whom he has picked out in the place which has been indicated to him, but he must abandon the indicated objective on his own initiative under the following circumstances:

APPEARANCE OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS
They are recognized by their gestures, because they are generally in the center of groups, and because they are the first to start out. Fire at them to put them out of action and to make their neighborhood untenable.

ENEMY GROUP IN MOTION
Concentrate your fire on these groups.
You can tell when the enemy is preparing to make a dash by the movements occurring in his line and by the guns [that] stick up.
After the enemy has made a rush, keep a sharp lookout for there are always men who have fallen behind who will try to catch up or new groups about to start.

ATTEMPT AT INFILTRATION
At times, the enemy tries to creep up singly or in small groups, either running or crawling along. Watch each man as he starts out and arrives.

MACHINE GUNS
Fire immediately at every machine gun that is being mounted or [that] comes into action.

SIGNALLERS AND RUNNERS
Fire at any enemy making signals, as well as at every lone man moving about the field of battle, because he may be passing orders or a noncommissioned officer.

THE ENEMY PRESENTING HIS FLANK
Take advantage of every opportunity to fire into the flank of an enemy fraction. In order to do this, advance or move laterally if necessary. The fire of a single man upon the enemy flank can force a whole line to bend back.

Examples of the Construction of a Firing Post
In order to fire well, it is necessary to begin by using your shovel well.

I. Skirmishers’ Holes
The skirmishers help each other with the shovel, working side by side, and one digging while the other fires.
II. Manner of Approaching a Crest

The rifleman should not lie down directly at the summit of the crest, but should approach it very carefully by crawling. Dig behind the crest and push the earth forward until you can see the enemy (from 1 to 2).

How the Skirmisher Approaches the Enemy

Some soldiers have only one idea: to hide themselves.

You come on the battlefield to fight. Consequently, you should make use of the accidents of the ground only for the purpose of:

- Posting yourself advantageously and firing effectively.
- Getting to grips with the enemy without getting yourself killed.

When to Advance

Skirmishers think that they must wait for orders before advancing; now, since the chiefs of sections are sometimes absent and often can neither be seen or heard, it happens that groups of men remain immobile for entire days.

The skirmisher should advance on his own initiative whenever he has cover [for] a few paces, or a few dozen paces, ahead. He must always be trying to gain another inch of ground.

Difficulty of Advancing on One’s Own Initiative

It is very trying to advance by short stages. When the skirmisher has gotten into a hole, he breathes; at least he is under cover. It seems to him that the whole air over his head is full of bullets; they graze him and make him flatten out still more. He has the impression that he will certainly be shot through and through if he gets up in this rain of lead.

Where is the enemy? He is not to be seen, and yet, as soon as the skirmisher shows himself, the bullets begin to smack. Those invisible but ever watchful rifles worry him and he no longer dares to venture into the open. Furthermore, the next cover seems an extraordinary distance away; his equipment weighs him down and encumbers him, he finds himself heavy and clumsy when he would like to have wings to get up and run.

Besides, the skirmisher is comfortable in his shelter and, when he has fixed it up, he has no idea of leaving it.

III. Construction of a Breastwork

Note that this rifleman is letting the muzzle of his rifle project outside, which is incorrect.

IV. Utilization of a Tree Trunk

Note that this rifleman avoids showing the muzzle of his rifle in loading.
Skirmishers must not be discouraged if they experience these trying impressions. The moment of starting out is hard, but when you are on your way and running, you no longer hear the bullets whistling. However, if you stop advancing and remain hidden, cowardice sets in.

When Must You Advance?
In order to reach a cover that you have your eye on, you must begin by destroying or terrifying with your rifle every body who might bother you while you are making for it.

You can dash forward without risk:

As soon as the enemy has ceased firing, or as soon as his bullets begin to pass very high. (This, however, is difficult to be sure of, because the skirmisher always thinks that the bullets are just grazing his ear.)

You can also make an unexpected dash during a lull or a let up in the fusillade; the enemy, who is no longer paying any attention, springs to his rifle and fires, but too late; however, look out for those who delay and the shots that follow.

Above all, take advantage of the moments when the enemy’s position is being bombarded by your own artillery.

The Rush
Before starting, fix carefully the place where you are going to post yourself.

When the movement has not been ordered by a noncom, have an understanding with your comrades as to the starting signal, so that there will be no tardies.

Warn your neighbors to be ready to fire if the enemy appears.

Do not attract the enemy’s attention by raising your rifle or standing up.

Close your cartridge pockets and secure your tool well at your belt.

Run as fast as you can during the rush.

Open out.

As soon as you arrive, arrange your cover, then enlarge it so that others can join the new line.

Infiltration
Sometimes it is possible to gain a new position without having to cross open ground.

When there is a trench, which allows of reforming on a more advanced line, the skirmishers glide gradually along the trench to the new line.

If the trench is not continuous, it is completed by digging at the open parts.

Avoid with the greatest care going into a shelter one after the other, either running or crawling, when the enemy may see. The first man passes by but the second stays on the way.

V. Utilization of a Heap of Stones

One is at times separated from the enemy by a wide stretch of open ground. In this case, it is difficult to take a position at short range from the enemy to prepare for the assault. Every man who remains motionless on open ground is quickly put out of action. Under these conditions, fill your sandbag before leaving the last cover, before quitting the last cover, putting a few stones in the middle of the earth to better stop the bullets. The sandbag carried under the left arm during the rush will, when you stop, give you the start of a shelter, which it will be easy to complete.

The Skirmishers at Ypres
(7 November 1914)

On 7 November 1914, our attacking line had stopped 300 meters from the German trenches, from which a heavy and accurate fire was being maintained. Our men threw themselves pell-mell into the shell holes and old trenches; they were decimated and replied ineffectually to the enemy’s fire, firing at random from the bottom of the shelters and accomplishing nothing beyond cutting the willow branches over the heads of the Bavarians.
Two skirmishers had succeeded in establishing themselves in a shell hole in advance of our line. One of them prepared to fire toward the flank, carefully working a loophole on the bias in the earth bordering the excavation, without changing the appearance of the shell hole so as not to attract the enemy’s attention. He then took the point of aim of his rifle and began to watch. He soon marked down an adversary well to his right, aimed at the place where he had disappeared, and waited. Each time the enemy appeared, the skirmisher got off a quick and accurate shot. In this he passed in review in succession, from right to left, all the heads that appeared. The Bavarians could not understand where the bullets were coming from, and redoubled the intensity of their fire upon the shelters where our line was huddled. Then, becoming more prudent, they took off their helmets, and no longer showed more than a corner of their eyes, but, even so, their appearance was often too long. In their turn, they cut the branches over the heads of the French, their fire slackened, and finally died out completely.

Meanwhile, the two skirmishers took turns in digging and firing, and enlarging their hole so that two more men were able to join them. The construction of the trench was continued rapidly, and finally, when the shelter was large enough, a group of non-coms and about 15 men joined them in a rush. Facing them, the fire from the German trench, after a few quickly suppressed attempts to reply, seemed to be smothered, silence gradually spread over this corner of the battlefield, and a lull occurred.

About noon, the group suddenly rose and, in two rushes at full speed over open ground, they reached a line of old abandoned French shelters 30 meters from the enemy. The Germans, in their surprise, fired only at the last moment, wounding two men. Throughout the day, this weak group succeeded in maintaining themselves at close range from the Bavarians, who did not dare to drive them out, with a loss of only one wounded.

At night, under the protection of this group, the whole company glided forward and dug silently, their rifles beside them with bayonets fixed. At daylight, the furious Germans could see a whole trench, which had been dug under their very noses, and the points of the bayonets sticking up out of it.

This shows what can be done, almost without loss and under critical circumstances where most people would have lost their heads and given up, by the skill and audacity of, at first, two skirmishers, and then a small group.

**Grenade Fighting**

The grenade is the weapon of the foot soldier as well as the rifle and the bayonet.

In action you must always have grenades in your haversack and know how to handle them well.

**Use of the Grenade**

On the defensive, the grenade is used to establish in front of the trench a barrier that the adversary cannot get by.

In an attack, the grenade serves to drive the enemy from a trench, a shelter, a machine-gun nest, a house, or a cellar.

**Preparation for an Assault by Use of the Grenade**

Sometimes, in the course of action, an intrepid group succeeds in getting very close to an enemy trench; artillery preparation cannot be carried out, and assault under these conditions is dangerous. The attempt is then made to overcome the enemy with grenades in order to attack him with the bayonet afterward.

A few skirmishers provided with grenades try to get within throwing distance of the enemy, by utilizing all the accidents of the ground, shell holes, and abandoned enemy trenches, and completing their path by use of the tool where necessary. If it is not possible to approach by day, they wait until darkness to creep silently into a cover very close to the enemy.

Meanwhile, the rest of the group awaits under cover the moment for the assault.

The bombers smother the enemy under a continuous hail of well-directed grenades and force him either to evacuate the place or to take refuge in his dugouts. Then is the time to assault.

The group stands-by and fixes bayonets. At a signal, all stand up together. They dash forward without shouting, fall upon the surprised enemy,
and bayonet or shoot him in his holes before he has thought of defending himself.

Grenade Fighting in a Zigzag or Trench

At times, in the course of battle, one is obliged to progress through trenches or zigzags.

The enemy must then be driven back step by step and all the barricades he has established taken in succession by grenade fighting.

Use of the Sandbag in Advancing

The skirmishers are then divided into three groups:

A point;
A supply chain;
A group to fill sandbags.

The point is composed of:

One man (rifleman) armed with rifle or revolver, whose sole duty is to prevent the passage of the enemy and protect the bombers.

Fight in a Zigzag

Two bombers (throwers) who throw grenades upon the enemy’s barricade and upon the portion of the zigzag in rear to prevent bringing up supplies.

Grenade charges or Cellerier bombs thrown by hand (fused by a group in the rear) may be used to advantage in blowing up sandbag barricades.

The supply chain is composed of a few men placed several paces apart so that they can get out of the way without bothering one another. They pass grenades in haversacks or bags.

The third group fills sandbags so that a barricade can be quickly established. It fires rifle-grenades to interfere with the enemy’s supply and to bar his lines of retreat.

The most profound silence is kept and all noises coming from the enemy are carefully noted. When the point judges that the enemy is overcome, one man crawls forward in the smoke, looks around the corner, and signals to his companions. Progress is made in this way from turn to turn and from traverse to traverse.

It is easy enough to protect yourself against the enemy’s grenades; you see them coming, they do not burst immediately, and you have time to throw them into a corner; besides, a good many grenades fall outside the trench.

However, the formation of close groups must be avoided. When a grenade arrives, everybody squeezes together and the grenade kills all hands.

When the enemy has a momentary advantage, the sandbag barricades must be multiplied, and the trench obstructed either by piling up the sandbags or by tumbling in the trench walls. In this way, the enemy’s advance is slowed up; he delays to clear the passage, which often gives you a chance to regain the supremacy, or else he must show himself in the open where he is exposed to the rifles.

Imitate the cries of wounded men to draw the enemy into an ambuscade.

Precautions to Be Taken in the Fight Inside the Trenches

Look out for long, straight portions of trenches; they are a snare laid for the assailant, who rushes into them thinking that he is sheltered and gets himself massacred. These parts of the trenches are often enfiladed by rifles or by machine guns placed in the traverses.

Likewise, you must pay attention to places where connecting trenches or zigzags cross. The enemy often retires to the bottom of a lateral branch. When the assailant advances rapidly in the zigzag, he sometimes neglects these branches, which open into the side of the zigzag being followed. The enemy comes out of his hiding place, and traps the assailant when he has passed by. The Germans sometimes mask the entrance to these refuges with a piece of canvas.

When you come to a new zigzag, throw in a few grenades; explore it, and barricade it, leaving one man on watch, if it is not considered necessary to advance by it.

The Assault, the Mêlée, and the Pursuit

When a strong attacking line has succeeded in establishing itself about a hundred meters from the enemy (in order to allow the artillery to fire), and the artillery has made sufficient preparation, the assault is delivered.
The Assault

The infantry dashes forward in successive lines of skirmishers, which are called waves. Each wave leaves the trench at a walk; they take their dress, then advance at the double, making a number of rushes according to the distance. In spite of the running, of the bullets, and of those who fall, they remain aligned like a wall to the end. It is necessary to reach the entanglements without firing a shot, so as not to delay.

The first entanglement, if it is in existence, is crossed, and the line reformed on the far side. The line again advances; at 60 meters from the trench, charge; come to charge bayonets with one motion and spring upon the enemy.

Each man runs straight for the point of the trench which is ahead of him; watches the loopholes and the parapet and, if a head or a rifle appears, he drives it back with a shot and then leaps upon the parapet. He clears away everything that blocks his path with rifle and bayonet. You must not leave behind you anyone who may shoot you in the back, as has often happened. Make sure that the Germans lying at the bottom of the trench are really dead.

If all the enemy surrender at once, do not massacre them, but disarm them quickly. Men detailed in advance and the trench clearers alone look out for prisoners, because skulkers are in the habit of showing great readiness to gather in the prisoners they have not captured.

Machine Guns

A machine gun opening fire should become the target for all hands; it must be subjected to a hail of bullets.

The Mêlée in the Enemy’s Position and the Pursuit

The trench, cleared of its defenders in a few seconds, is crossed without stopping; the assaulting force lies down 10 meters beyond it and opens fire on the second trench. The line being reformed, it again takes up the assault, in careful alignment as at first.

It is absolutely forbidden to enter the zigzags; it is a great temptation, but you never come out of them again, and a handful of men will stop the progress of a company for hours. Men detailed in advance follow the zigzags according to a fixed itinerary and prevent the enemy from enfilading the space between two trenches.

The violence of the assault creates great disorder among the enemy, who does not know who is holding out and who has fallen.

Advantage must be taken of this confusion to go as far as possible; if there is any delay, the barrier fire will soon be started.

However, the men must not go out in disorder, singly, like maniacs; they would be at the mercy of the slightest fusillade* or the least counteroffensive.

Hence:

Always rally about the company noncoms;
Reform a line of skirmishers while on the march;
Advance quickly on the heels of the adversary, in good order, keeping a sharp lookout, and the rifle ready.

Certain men are detailed to crawl rapidly in advance; they cover the rally and the advance of the lines of skirmishers. It is their duty to seize important points (crossings of the zigzags, etc.), whose occupation will prevent the arrival of reinforcements and cut off the retreat of certain groups of defenders.

Every soldier should be well acquainted with the plan of the enemy’s trenches; he must be able to head for such and such a shelter, such and such a machine gun, or such and such trench crossing.

Where to Take Information

Before starting out, every soldier must know exactly where he will surely find someone who will quickly stop the fire of his artillery when it is firing short, or cause it to commence firing when the occasion presents itself.

* Simultaneous or continuous discharge of firearms.
Failings [that] Every Soldier Must Prevent

During the mêlée and the pursuit, a certain amount of confusion sometimes occurs among the assaulting troops. A small number of bad soldiers is enough to cause disorder.

The timid spread alarm by shouting: “They are coming back . . . asphyxiating gases . . . the company is wiped out . . . all the officers are killed . . . we are trapped.”

These men must be made to keep still; if they fall back, jump on them and make them advance, to avoid a panic.

Skulkers profit by the confusion and the disappearance of the leaders to stay hidden in rear under some pretext or other; they are anxious to accompany the wounded or prisoners, pretend to be putting the trench in a state of defense or say that they were lost. All these people will be picked up by the police details.

Enemy Counterattacks and Flanking Fire

Scattered groups of skirmishers have a tendency to retreat precipitately before the slightest counterattack or when subjected to flanking fire, because their leaders have fallen, and because they are few in number and are afraid of being surrounded. A single soldier who falls back is enough to carry the others with him.

Ground [that] has been gained is to be bitterly defended; you must not retreat. When there are no officers or noncoms left, there are still intrepid soldiers to stop those who tremble, and shout at them: “I’ll kill the first man who hesitates.” Isolated groups of skirmishers should entrench themselves in the corner of a trench; if they are surrounded, they must defend themselves to the last cartridge, and then use German rifles and cartridges.

FOUR RESOLUTE MEN UNDER COVER, WHO FIRE ONLY WHEN SURE OF A HIT, ARE ABSOLUTELY UNAPPROACHABLE.
The following notes and impressions of the writer are the result of his recent presence in Europe, both on the western front and elsewhere. The observations made pertain particularly to artillery activities, and other matters outside of that sphere were merely incidental. The impressions obtained resulted from visits to training and school centers of the English artillery in England; to the schools, ammunition parks, ordnance repair shops, and operations of intelligence, balloon and airplane services behind the British lines in France; the operations of the artillery staffs at British Great Headquarters, Army Headquarters, Corps Headquarters, and Divisional Headquarters; also visits to all types of British artillery in position and firing, forward observing stations, and general scenes of activity at the front from Ypres [Belgium] to Armentières [France]. This front was the scene of the successful Wytschaete-Messines [ridge] attack on 7 June 1917 last and the further advance in this region since 4 August of this year. Embraced also in this visit was a trip to the French front in the vicinity of Rheims, covering the sector of Craonne-Moronvilliers.

The writer was particularly struck with the operations at the Wytschaete-Messines battle referred to above, as they constitute one of the most, if not the most, successful offensives of the Allies to date. This battle resulted in forcing back the German line for an average depth of 2,000 yards, over a 10-mile front, and destroyed the southern face of the troublesome Ypres salient. It was accomplished with a minimum loss of men, which was due in a great measure to the power and efficiency of the British artillery; which after a seven-day bombardment, covering every objective in the area selected for assault, succeeding in overmastering the German artillery and causing the withdrawal of its guns. With its own divisional guns, the British then formed, on the day of the assault, a rolling barrage and a standing barrage for its infantry. The infantry followed this rolling barrage, at a distance varying from 50 to 100 yards, and captured the ground above described. It will be seen, then, what a controlling influence on any offensive the artillery exercises in this war. The French and British now possess a formidable artillery, both in numbers and efficiency, and it is still being augmented. Such an artillery is secured by the mobilization of all national industries to produce the materiel and the most thorough organization and training of the personnel. Our task is the same as that of the Allies.

Our present artillery organization is believed to be very satisfactory in many respects until we get beyond the regimental organization. We have yet to create the artillery staffs for the higher units. Abroad, the artillery staffs of the armies, corps, and divisions are quite numerous and might seem, when listed, to have an excessive number of officers. But in both British and French armies, it can be safely said that there is not one too many officers to coordinate the complex activities of the artillery, especially during such an offensive as above described. Organizations for such staffs will undoubtedly be evolved for us. It is regretted that data on this subject must be excluded from an article such as this.

The subject of training or instruction is most important. The training of officers and men ceases only during the time when actually engaged at the front. Before going to the front, there is intensive instruction for both the new officers and the new men. Immediately upon the withdrawal from the front for purposes of rest, selected officers and men are at once sent to various schools behind the lines and there instructed. This applies not only to the artillery, but to all branches of the Army. Behind the French and British lines, there are schools of application for every form of military activity. Every British Army has its artillery school, and at this school officers are given the training [that] will keep them ready to employ the methods of the “moving battle” (war of maneuver), as well as the methods of trench warfare. The article by Colonel

* From Field Artillery Journal, which was first published in 1911 by the U.S. Field Artillery Association in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and was an official publication of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Corps.
[Henry J.] Reilly in the April–June [issue] of the Journal described the French artillery school at Fountainebleau, giving some idea of the extent and thoroughness of just one phase of this training. It was the writer's privilege to visit and inspect this school thoroughly. It is sufficient to say that it turns out 9,000 fairly well-trained artillery officers a year. It is impossible to give here the results obtained by these intensive methods of instruction, but the writer can say that he has seen field batteries [that] were trained in three months from raw recruits. He saw them when they were ready to go to the front, at which time they conducted service practice and executed mounted drill in a very creditable manner. There is no doubt that a system [that] can turn out efficient troops in such a short time is a growth. By this time, a great corps of instructors, drawn from officers who by reason of wounds or other disabilities are no longer fit for the front, is available for this work. Such a corps is lacking with us at present. By the return of officers to this country, after a certain service at the front, for duty as instructors, the work of instruction can be greatly expedited.

In the conduct of artillery operations, trench warfare has produced many changes. The normal appearance of a field battery in position is quite different from what one would expect, judged by the open battle methods taught in all armies before this war. The guns are kept in pits or surrounded by trees to such an extent that distant aiming points are impossible. No caissons are with the guns, the ammunition being in racks in the pits. These pits have little or no covering, usually only sufficient head covering to resist shrapnel or shell splinters. The limbers and horses are ordinarily one to two miles in the rear of the guns; the BC [or battery commander's] station, if such exists, is in the battery itself.

All observation of fire is made from the posts of the forward observing officers (FOOs), which are called observation positions (OPs) and are in masked and carefully protected positions located near the first line of trenches. If possible, they avoid putting the OP in the front line trenches themselves. These OPs are connected by telephone with their batteries, and from them the fire is conducted, usually by the captain, during an important action. During “Peace Time War,” as the English call the normal conditions along the front, the duty of FOO is taken in turn by each of the battery officers for a certain length of time. This duty at times is, of course, extremely dangerous.

The personnel at the battery usually have dug-outs constructed wherein they can take refuge when bombarded. It is expected that they take refuge in these dug-outs whenever the battery is bombarded, unless they are engaged on some special or important gun service, such as delivery of a barrage. In such case, they must remain at their posts, whatever may be the cost.

Over each gun is stretched a canopy of netting to which are tied tufts or strips of burlap painted green, yellow, and brown. These nets form the camouflage for the guns and diminish the chances of their detection by aerial observers. Every British light gun carries on it as part of its equipment one of these nets. Extra ammunition is scattered around everywhere in the vicinity of the battery (“dumps”). Every such “dump” is camouflaged with brush or by paulins thrown over them and painted the various colors required by that particular terrain. The art of camouflage is one of the most interesting products of this war. It calls to its service everything from the work of artists and sculptors down to that of day laborers. It is regretted that this article cannot more fully describe its activities.

The wire communications of a battery in position are a very complex thing. There is frequently a telephone exchange in the BC station, which makes it possible for the BC to talk to his division commander, to his battalion commander, to his FOOs, and to the commander of the infantry whose front he protects. To many of these officers, he has alternative routes of communication besides the direct lines thereto. All telephone wires are buried six to eight feet in the ground until the area of the trenches is reached, where, if it is no longer possible to bury them, they are pinned on to the side of the trenches. All telephone lines in the trench area have the double metallic circuit, as the ground return permits the enemy to read all messages by means of detectors created for the purpose. For the same reason, messages at the front are sent in buzzer code instead of by voice. Both sides forbid the use of spoken messages over the telephone where the lines are located in the trench district except in the greatest emergencies.
It is not an uncommon sight in the posting of batteries to see the guns posted in tiers. The firing of artillery over personnel in its front is taken as a matter-of-course procedure. Batteries in the lower tier of guns usually have a parados [or protective berm] in the rear of each gun as a partial protection from premature bursts of guns in the rear.

The writer cannot recall having seen the employment of a distant aiming point in any battery, light or heavy. The siting of the guns usually forbids this. The normal procedure seemed to be to establish the direction of the directing gun by the use of the map or compass bearings, then establish parallel fire in the battery and give each gun its own aiming post not more than 50–100 yards away. Another method was to establish by some form of survey the line of fire for a sort of sight bar set up close beside a gun and then by means of a reflecting apparatus on the gun sight secure parallelism of the gun with the sight bar.

It will be seen, from the extent of the communication system of a battery, that a great number of men will be needed in the BC detail. British batteries, including signalers, have about 21 men. Our own details will have to be materially increased and signaling must be carefully taught, using all the various kinds of materials—large flag, small flag, telephone, buzzer, daylight lamp, daylight shutter, etc.—depending upon conditions. Every known means of communication has been, and may often have to be, employed, including such things as rockets, flares, carrier pigeons, and dogs. So great is the need for many and thoroughly expert signalers that every British battery endeavors to maintain a competent understudy for every signal man in the detail.

As regards the technique of firing, the following were noticed as among the most important features:

The widespread use of firing by the map;
The frequency of firing by compass;
The methods of conducting “airplane shoots” (conduct of fire from airplanes);
The calibration of guns to compensate for loss of muzzle velocity due to wear of the guns;
Corrections for atmospheric conditions;
[and]
Corrections for map’s distortion.

It will be seen from the above that a large amount of the work of the guns partakes of the character of bull’s-eye shooting, particularly when charged with the destruction of small material targets. At any rate, every precaution is taken to ensure the shot falling in a small zone.

Three great kinds of work exacted of the artillery may conveniently be grouped as follows:

“Destructive shoots”;
Counterbattery work; [and]
Barrages.

The “destructive shoot” is firing undertaken to demolish various hostile structures, such as firing trenches, communication trenches, wiring, dugouts, depots, dumps, etc. These “destructive shoots” may be performed by all classes of guns, but are usually the function of the heavier calibers. Counterbattery work is usually the function of the heavy guns and howitzers. Like the subject of camouflage, a detailed description of the various activities of counterbattery work extends far beyond the scope of this article. The head of a counterbattery service calls to his aid for the location of hostile batteries the assistance of the intelligence, flash-spotting, balloon, airplane, and aerial photograph services, to say nothing of the map department. He assigns to his batteries for destruction all targets located by the foregoing instrumentalities.

Barrage firing may be a curtain of fire [that] rolls along the ground at a predetermined rate. This is called the rolling barrage. Behind it marches our own infantry at such a sufficiently short distance that they are able, after a barrage has rolled over a trench, to rush into that trench before the defense can come up from their dugouts and line the parapet with their machine guns. It goes without saying that, during the intensive bombardment, the defense cannot remain in their fire trenches and live. They must take refuge in their dugouts.

The standing barrage is a curtain of fire [that] moves by a series of lifts or bounds, varying in amount, having some definite objective at each lift. Its principal duty is to bring fire to bear on certain areas in advance of the rolling barrage from which ruinous fire might be delivered upon our attacking infantry as, for example, machine guns posted
in suitable places and fired by indirect fire through our rolling barrage into our infantry. The standing barrage, by the use of smoke shell, also masks the progress of the attack from the enemy.

All barrage fire is a function of the divisional artillery. It seems well established that infantry, after proper artillery preparation, can advance under the cover of a well-regulated barrage, but its advance is limited to the range of the guns. When the extreme limit of the barrage has been attained, the infantry must consolidate and wait until the guns can be pushed to the front. A multitude of details must be cared for when making the arrangements for barrage firing for a great attack. The coordination of these details finds its expression in the barrage maps prepared and issued by each corps and in the firing schedules prepared by every battery commander. In doing all the foregoing, the need for the numerous high artillery staffs already spoken of becomes apparent. Once supplied with his barrage map, every battery commander must make out for each of his guns a timetable for firing in the barrage. This table is far more exacting than that of any railroad train, for every gun must during every designated minute of time fire a certain number of shots with a certain set of firing data different for various times.

The infantry in the front line trenches has a certain amount of divisional artillery told off to defend its front. Infantry in the front line trenches, which suspects an attack, sends in to its supporting artillery an SOS call. Censure awaits any battery [that] fails to respond by fire within 30 seconds after the call is sent. The response has come in 17 seconds. The fact that guns are, when not otherwise employed, always kept laid on their SOS positions and that the sector for each gun is so small simplifies this performance somewhat.

Undoubtedly there will be evolved some “doctrine” of training for all our artillery, designed to give instruction in all that it is needful to know in this present war. It is believed that this instruction will involve the following subjects for artillery officers, some of which had not attained before the war the importance [that] they now have, viz.:

More instruction in map and compass firing;
- The preparation of battery battle charts;
- The calibration of guns;
- Correction for atmospheric conditions;
- Greater proficiency of officers in all kinds of signaling;
- Aerial observation of fire;
- The conduct of fire at service practice from OPs;
- Camouflage;
- The preparation of barrage maps and timetables; [and]
- Methods of counterbattery work.

In the pursuit of these studies the instruction must never lose sight of the principles covering artillery in the open battle as laid down in our drill regulations.
Nothing can be more dangerous than to attempt new or unusual minor tactical methods in the face of the enemy. Until soldiers in the mass are so drilled in the desired minor tactics that their conduct under the stress of battle is practically instinctive, their fighting value is very uncertain. Even the Roman soldiers, of whom it has been said that “the exercises were battles without bloodshed, and their battles bloody exercises,” were not proof against terrible defeats when this rule was violated. History furnishes many examples of disasters following upon well thought out schemes [that] had the one fatal defect of changing tactical mechanism at the moment of opening battle.

Students of the careers of great leaders are often prone to overlook, or to lay little stress upon, the fact that Philip II of Macedon fashioned the army with which Alexander conquered the world; that Hamilcar Barca bequeathed a veteran army to his son Hannibal; that Frederick the Great owed his achievements, in great measure, to the well-organized and experienced army of his father. Changes in drill tactics, in actual fighting methods, were made by these captains, not on the battlefield, but by unremitting drill and instruction in garrison and in camp. Their victories were due to splendid conceptions in grand tactics, based upon confidence in the minor tactical skill of their subordinates.

The leader whose officers and men lack instruction in the minor tactics of field service is placed in an unhappy dilemma. Being unwilling, or unable, to trust to his subordinates the details of outposts, plans of reconnaissance, etc., he tries to do all himself; he succeeds principally in destroying initiative, self-confidence, and willingness to assume responsibility among the members of his command. Who, with experience in field service, has not seen captains and lieutenants leading squads, field officers directly commanding sections and companies? At the time that trained intelligent action was demanded, it was felt that instruction in even the rudiments had to be given. Only ignorance, lack of numbers, and deficient morale of the enemy made such procedure possible.

The demands made upon the Marine Corps for men for expeditionary service frequently—in fact, almost continually—reduce home garrisons to the point where any instruction beyond close order drills and target practice is looked upon as hardship. The difficulty of finding time for field service exercises does not reduce the importance of conducting them; it does, however, make imperative the selection of methods of instruction that utilize every moment of the few available hours. Necessary, useful, and interesting labor is never considered hardship by troops: it is inefficient and wasteful methods that arouse discontent and resentment.

A number of years ago, a book (Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal, Von Arnim, [1897]) was published, detailing a method by which the difficulties of teaching minor tactics in garrison were surmounted. The exercises were most elementary and, though the distances and tactics no longer conform to requirements, the method is as useful and interesting today as it was on the date of publication. There is hardly a post in the Marine Corps that has not in its immediate vicinity as many topographical features for exercises as the post discussed in Von Arnim’s book.

The Army Service Schools have recently published two booklets upon this same subject: Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915, and Captain [A. W.] Bjornstad’s Small Problems for Infantry [1916]. The problems in both of these studies are conducted on maps. It is only in the preface of Captain Bjornstad’s book that emphasis is laid upon the fact that the importance of this kind of study is in the method taught. Misunderstanding of the true relation of map problems to the training of enlisted men may lead to attempts to instruct noncommissioned officers by having them study the problems given in these books.

Considerable imagination is required to convert conventional map signs into mental pictures of what the ground actually looks like. Special training in map making, map reading, and tactical exercises is necessary before a student can properly conduct minor tactical exercises on a map. To the average
noncommissioned officer, the map problem might just as well be written in Sanskrit or Russian. Attempts to conduct map problems with enlisted men are more harmful than good, for the most simple maneuvers are swathed in a cloak of mystery that confuses and discourages the men and causes them to lose self-confidence.

There is a clear line of demarcation between the proper use of map problems and exercises on the actual terrain. When the maneuvering troops cover too large an area to be swept by the eye, the plans must be laid out on the map. The relation of the details of the problem to each other can be truly appreciated only in this way, and the use of the map, whether for instruction or in active campaign, becomes natural and proper. When, however, the problem is so restricted in scope that all of the troops concerned and the essential surroundings can be actually seen by the leader, the problem should be conducted as an exercise on the ground. It is inconceivable that a squad leader would ever be called upon in campaign to post a sentry or to conduct a patrol on the map. Why, then, should he be required to go through the forced and unnatural process of conducting such problems on the map?

Noncommissioned officers—and all men trained for scouting—should be trained to read road maps, to be able to pick out prominent topographical features on such maps, and to make sketches of restricted areas, outguard positions, fords, etc. Beyond that, map work is largely a waste of time, unless they are to be educated as topographers instead of squad and section leaders. This should not be separate from other forms of instruction. Map reading, the sketching of fords, noting the characteristics of bridges, etc., should be coincident with exercises in reconnaissance. Instruction sketching of outguard positions should be a part of every outpost exercise. With Americans, it is necessary to teach why as well as how.

Those who have read Von Arnim’s book will recall that, in each of the exercises described, the men were marched to a selected point and then conducted through the posting of an outpost, an attack, etc. Every detail was carried out in full and the reasons for the dispositions explained to the men. Throughout all of the description is apparent the fact that the ground had been carefully studied beforehand, and the exercises selected to fit the ground.

The proper planning of an exercise in minor tactics involves much more labor than its subsequent conduct. It is not sufficient to decide that a certain position on a road is a good place for a sentry squad. The ground to right, left, and rear must be reconnoitered to ensure that it is such as would be chosen as part of a general outpost line. If defense against attack on the outpost is to be part of the exercise, the ground in front must be reconnoitered to determine from which direction the enemy should properly attack. When all of the details have been provided for, a short but clear and complete story must be concocted, leading up naturally to the tactical situation with which the exercise begins. This is essential to arouse interest and to impress upon the squad leader the relation of the duties of his squad to the larger duties of the company and the regiment. Instruction proceeds most rapidly and satisfactorily when the men are made to feel at every step the importance of their individual work to the success of a whole campaign. All of this requires, on the part of the company officers, imagination, ingenuity, and hard work, but it is valuable and intensely interesting practice. Indeed, they will usually find themselves reaping far greater benefits than do the men. Napoleon attributed his almost uncanny skill in quickly solving tactical situations to the fact that he thought about them always.

The training of enlisted men for field service should be systematized, not only for ease in carrying it out, but also in order to ensure placing elementary instruction before more complicated exercises. To avoid loss of time in the field, a certain amount of instruction must be given indoors, but it should be reduced to a minimum. The object here is to impart information to the soldier, rather than to test his knowledge. Instruction should therefore be given in the form of lectures and discussions; rarely by recitation methods. The principles governing minor tactical situations are best impressed upon the memory by applying them, during the lecture, to simple problems similar to the ones to be solved later in the field. The theory of topographical sketching must also be taught, but indoor work cannot ordinarily go much beyond drill in the use of instruments and conventional signs. If a B-H relief map
is available, sketching methods can be practiced to a certain extent, and tactical problems can be well illustrated. The relief map is, however, only an improvement on the flat map; it can be used, not as a substitute for field exercises, but only to lead up to them.

While this preliminary work is going forward, the company officers should read and study the problems in—let us say—patrolling, in the two Army Service School publications already mentioned. In connection with this study, they should be read what the Field Service Regulations have to say on the subject of reconnaissance. Having thus refreshed their minds on the points involved in leading a patrol, they should go together out a road in the vicinity of the post and select points at which various incidents might happen to a patrol in actual campaign in that kind of country. Every detail should be carefully examined in order that nothing unnatural be included. Incidents should be chosen to emphasize underlying principles—such, for example, as the reasons for adopting particular formations, the importance of sending back information, etc. In order to sustain interest, the situations should follow each other in an ascending scale of excitement to the climax of a fight. On the way back to the post, a story that throws a glamor about the whole affair can be composed and perfected. What the men have been taught can also be compared with what they should know before undertaking such an exercise, and any deficiencies noted and corrected. Not until then will all be ready.

The patrol exercise is suggested as the first to be undertaken as it covers the greatest amount of ground and will give, both in the preparation and in the conduct, opportunities to pick out positions for exercises in advance and rear guards, outposts, etc.

Where two or more companies are stationed at a post, it is preferable that the company officers plan independently the exercises for their men. There will be greater variety in the use made of the terrain, and greater opportunity to display ingenuity and resourcefulness.

The advantage of this method of instruction lies in the fact that what has been done several times in practice becomes the natural and normal thing to do in the serious business of war. Perplexity and uncertainty are eliminated and the soldier gains confidence from the feeling that he is competent to meet any situation that may arise. The terrain exercise, carefully and naturally conducted, approaches very nearly the real thing in war experience, and experience is one of the things that men do not readily forget.
In the first line trenches, each battalion section has one or more regimental aid posts [in care of] of [the] RMO [regimental medical officer].

1. **Infectious Diseases**: all cases showing fever are immediately evacuated to [a] rest station, where they can be observed and isolated, and from there sent to casualty clearing stations, from where they are evacuated to the base. Contacts to mumps and measles, trench fever, and hemorrhagic jaundice are not interfered with. Those from diphtheria and cerebrospinal meningitis and scarlet fever are sent back in quarantine. Those from scarlet fever are kept for 10 days, those from diphtheria and cerebrospinal meningitis until bacteriologically clear on two consecutive negatives at least 24 hours apart.

The underlying principle is to get all infectious cases out at the earliest possible moment from the well.

2. **Water Supply**: (a) in petrol tins carried up with rations from 200-gallon twin reservoirs, at nearest point possible to lines. Twin to facilitate alternate chlorination; (b) from farm wells in neighborhood, always chlorinated; (c) from wells approximately 500 yards back in bays off communication trenches; (d) water bottles brought in filled from chlorinated designated sources as men go into trenches; (e) in strong points, a store of chlorinated water is always kept in rum jars. In tin cans objectionable tastes develop; (f) in one place, water was carried from highest point up stream to a three-by-four-by-two-feet deep box filled with clean sand, [then] run into a twin reservoir where it was chlorinated; (g) in another area, pipes were led into trenches from supplies in the back area.

3. **Food Supply**: (a) each man is supplied with three days’ “iron rations,” to be used in emergency only; (b) otherwise carried up every night. The fresh meat is cooked in the reserve area and brought up in labeled sandbags to be warmed up for each platoon. Coke is supplied for warming up in trenches, also to make tea; (c) in the winter, hot soup or cocoa or tea is brought up in two-gallon insulated petrol tins for use after 0100; 10 ounces for each man.

4. **Sullage Water** and ablution water collected in tins to be carried back and emptied on soil or in holes where it will not be a nuisance.

5. **Refuse**: is collected in sandbags hung up at intervals in trenches, to be carried back and buried in the night—usually within 200 feet of the trenches. In some cases, it has been carried back by the ration parties to be burned in the “rest area.”

6. **Excreta**: collected in petrol drums flyproofed with 1 percent cresol solution; the feces pails in addition are provided with improvised automatically falling covers; “chloride of lime” is freely scattered around about. At night, the feces and urine are buried inside of 200 feet of the trenches generally.

7. **Bodies**: generally are not buried locally but brought back to cemeteries usually from 1,000 yards on from the trenches. They are covered with three feet of earth, at least when possible.

8. **Vermin**: the men are supplied with a powder to dust into clothes and an ointment to rub into seams of underclothes and breeches; the active principle there is crude petroleum.

9. **Rats**: these are a great nuisance and numerous traps, dogs, cats, and ferrets are used for their destruction, and the men kill many of them. We have not used poisons or virus; we are afraid of the virus (too closely related to enteric group), and the men are too closely associated with the rats. In case plague should come about, we would have to; perhaps more rigid destruction of rats would protect us against trench fever, so called.

10. **Trench Feet**: (a) drain trenches as much as possible; (b) use “waders,” kept in trench stores, thigh high. Puttees** are removed on coming into trenches always. Each man brings with him two pairs dry socks; each night, two additional pairs are brought up with rations in watertight bags. Men wash and dry feet at least once every 24 hours, using


** A strip of cloth that is wound around the lower leg from knee to ankle.
afterward a talcum-camphor powder; care is taken to have them move about. Each platoon officer is responsible for the carrying out of these precautions.

11. Inspection is done each day by the regimental medical officer. The responsibility of keeping the trenches clean and sanitary rests on the commanding officer and his staff. The medical officer has advisory capacity only.

12. Personnel: each company supplies a sanitary squad and is aided by a sanitary fatigue when necessary.

Reserve Areas: usually about 1,000 yards behind front line. (1) Vermin: as in trenches. (2) Food: can usually be cooked without hindrance. (3) Water Supply: water carts brought up here, chlorinated always from designated sources. Local wells not used at all if can be avoided. (4) Milk: no local milk is used; either condensed or milk powder used. (5) Excreta: flyproofed always; tin biscuit cresol solution in cans, buried. In dry alluvial soils, pits are dug and boxes enclosed in wooden boxes with automatically falling covers; closed seats placed over them, the area fenced off. Kept dark, these pits do very well one and a half feet wide at top, two feet wide at bottom, four by five feet deep, but thoroughly covered. When unit goes out, these are thoroughly filled in and marked. (6) Refuse: still has to be buried. (7) Sullage water: radiating shallow trenches filled with old tin cans and covered with earth are used. A tin box filled with grass or straw with chloride of lime scattered through it deals with this very well. The trenches are one foot wide, two feet deep and long, according to the absorbing quality of the soil.

Cemeteries: usually in this area very well kept.

Rest Area: usually four or five miles back from the front lines. Huts, billets, or tents. There are three field ambulances per division. One of these is in rest generally, one is conducting a “rest camp” for the care of noninfectious temporarily sick and has one section for the reception, sorting and distribution to casualty clearing stations of infectious cases. Scabies cases are usually treated at the rest camp. The other field ambulance has charge of the advance dressing stations and the main dressing station of the division.

Convalescent Camp: in charge of a combatant officer; looks after the chronic sick room visitant and light duty men. From this, fatigues are supplied for all kinds of odd jobs.

1. Chlorination and Distribution of Water. In the Camps: each 500 men has a water cart assigned them with a constant water detail in charge, who always carries his own supply of calcium hypochlorite in quarter-pound tins with him on his cart and always does his own chlorinating. There is a standard measure in each tin. A tin is used for four days only, then discarded. Tins with wet or colored contents are immediately replaced. The supply of these tins is got with the rations of the unit. It is the “water detail’s” duty to keep his cart in good repair and clean. There is a driver to look after the horses. Water is to be taken from approved and assigned supplies only, and always to be chlorinated—no chances are taken. By frequent tests, using the iodine tester, the number of measures to be used to the standard cart (100 gallons) with each water [container] is prominently indicated on signboards at each source, where a special detail usually from the Sanitary Section is placed to see that the “water detail” men do the chlorinating. A record of each cart, the hour of taking, the unit, whether supplies are with them, whether the water tank is clean, and whether the “water detail” accompanies the cart. It is the “water detail” man who puts the chlorine into the cart. In many of the areas, there are well-organized piped, hydranted or water-tanked systems. The standard canton flannel filters and alum chlorifiers are practically never used. They soon deteriorate and get out of repair and generally on the rough roads tear the water-cart tanks all to pieces. Some of the waters require one measure, some as high as four.

2. Reduction of Fly and Insect Pests: (a) Mosquitoes: all ponds and stagnant waters, whether used for washing water or horse-drinking water, are in the mosquito season oiled once a week, using about four ounces of coal oil for each 200 square feet of surface. (b) Flies: all refuse is burned daily. Horse manure also and human feces either burned or buried. Food stores are screened as much as possible. Some have tried the biothermic method of disposing of horse manure. It is not a success in camps; no one will take the necessary trouble required. Strong solutions of borax or cresol frequently sprinkled on manure have been tried but have not been bril-
Liantly successful. With all refuse and horse manure burned, the flies nearly disappear.

3. **Campaign against Rats**: no serious campaign against rats has been undertaken. They are a great nuisance, but they are fine scavengers. The men kill them on every occasion. The cats and dogs and ferrets of the trenches get rid of a good many of them. Traps are used, but are not very successful. Poison has been proposed, but we have enough self-inflicted wounds already, and there is a general objection therefore to use poison. Rat-infecting bacteria have been advised, but these organisms are so closely related to the colon group of organisms that we do not use them; of course, if plague were to come on the scene, steps would have to be taken to meet the rat pest, but so far nothing serious has been done.

4. **Disposal of Kitchen and Ablution Water**: this is most satisfactorily done by using the can-filled radiating trenches as with the disposal of urine but, in addition, to place alternate layers of straw or grass and a liberal allowance of calcium hypochlorite in a straining tin at the hub of the trenches. When soiled, the straw or grass is burned in the incinerator.

**Destruction of Body Vermin**:
(a) bed bugs are almost unknown among the troops; (b) head lice cases are rarely encountered. As a preventive, the hair is kept clipped; as a remedy, Vaseline or coal oil is used, being careful to prevent blistering; (c) body louse infection is frequent. For their destruction: (1) a powder for dusting into the clothes and an ointment for application to the seams of underclothes and trousers is supplied. The active principle of both these preparations is crude petroleum. It is fairly effective, but there is some difficulty in getting the men to intelligently and regularly use it; (2) baths, usually shower baths, are given as frequently as possible, usually every three weeks, after which the men are given a clean set of underclothes and shirt, but since from 25 to 40 percent of the lice on each individual are present in the crotch seams of the trousers, respreading soon takes place. To meet this contingency in the smaller bath places, whilst the men are taking their baths, the trouser seams are ironed with hot flatirons. This helps out very much; (3) one large central bath is usually provided for each division, where from 1,000 to 1,500 men can be bathed each day. Some of these are provided with a Fodden disinfector—two large pressure steam sterilizers on a motor lorry, the steam being supplied by the boiler of the lorry. A temperature of 100–110°C is attained in these, but when men's clothing has to be put through them at a rate of 100–150 sets per hour, it is too slow and only the most seriously infested sets are done. The Belgians at their two main bath houses put the men's clothes, each in his own bag, through the same process, but use a much larger disinfector supplied from a large stationary steam boiler with convenient mechanical devices for quick handling, and get the best of results. For our troops who are continuously on the move, the Belgian apparatus is too cumbersome and the boilers too heavy to be portable; (4) to rid men completely of their lice, it is necessary that all their clothing be done at one time, including even their greatcoat and, where possible, their individual blankets, and this should all be done when they are taking their bath, in a matter of from 25 to 30 minutes. Many of the units have put up disinfectors after the following plan, and with almost complete success, even under the difficulties of active service. Two contiguous rooms, double walled, sawdust filled, 6 feet wide, 10 feet long and 6-and-a-half feet high, with a door at one end and a 1-foot wide 3-foot long window at the other end, with hooks from the ceiling on which to hang a numbered wooden holder for the clothes of each man. Around the walls are placed five rows of radiating two-inch steam pipes, kept continuously hot by circulating steam supplied usually by a standard threshing machine boiler. In the center of the floor, with a protecting shield over it, is placed a free steam outlet, all regulated from the outside. The clothes, turned inside out, are hung in this chamber as the men go into the bath, free steam is admitted from the floor outlet, the door and window slightly open until the air is pretty well driven out (1 minute), then are closed and the steam flow continued for 5 minutes, and shut off, the whole then allowed to stand for 10 minutes more, then the window and door are opened wide and the clothes taken out as soon as can be and shaken. They are dry and deloused and the eggs destroyed. The clothes are then handed to the men and can be immediately put on. Having two chambers, the work can go on alternately in one, then the other, and the whole process not take more than 25
Readying for War

Disinfection of Clothing and Bedding: (1) by steam in a Thresh disinfecter, by the same process in the magnified Thresh or Fodden disinfecter, or in the flowing steam room described as above; (2) by sulfur gas, either from liquefied sulphurous acid containers or from that supplied by the Clayton disinfecter; (3) a very effective method of dealing with body lice is by the hot air process. All that is needed is a thick wall tempered say 10 by 10 by 7 feet high. A dugout would do, or any small room, provided it is insulated; clothing could be hung in this, and into the room a brazier placed and the door closed. The small window will allow for observing the effect of the heat on bits of paper hung here and there; if the paper browns, then air should be let in, but as a rule it does not. A temperature of 85° C is easily got and with this temperature lice and their eggs are destroyed quite certainly in 15 minutes.

Construction of Bathhouses and Laundries: usually it is one bathhouse and one laundry on the same ground for each division, as near the center of the area as possible. For outlying concentrations, additional small bathhouses are put up. Sometimes these conveniences are set up in buildings already existent (breweries), in other cases are new constructions. (a) Bathhouse: one put up last summer in ———— salient combined the wants and the experiences of a couple of years. A small stream was dammed for a plentiful supply of water, the water was pumped by a small steam pump to an overhead tank [that] could serve for the laundry as well, also for fire protection. A water heater, on the plan of a Daisy water heater, was provided to supply hot water to a second tank to meet cold water, and from there be distributed to a set of rose-sprays piped overhead in a room roofed with corrugated iron, duck-boards on top for the men to stand on; no cubicles provided. All the men bathe in one room, 40 at a time. A man from the platform regulated the tempered water and the supply to avoid wastage; the drainage went to a reception tank, where it could be treated before entry into the stream with the laundry water further down. In the anteroom, provided with wall and center benches, the men undressed, their valuables were looked after by a noncommissioned officer, their soiled underclothes being collected into baskets to be washed and their jackets, trousers or breeches and greatcoats and blankets, if they have brought these last with them, were taken by attendants, a number being given to each man, and they were put through the steam disinfecter whilst the men went on to the shower bath. After their bath, by another passage they went into a dressing room where they dried up and were given clean underclothes, shirt and socks, and then got each their disinfected jackets, trousers, etc. Reinfection with vermin was thus avoided—the whole process took from 25 to 30 minutes. (b) Laundries: in general, the arrangements were as follows: hot water in an overhead tank heated by exhaust steam or by a Daisy heater piped over the tubs; also cold water was piped there. Women hired locally washed the clothes in the ordinary tubs of the country, using washboards and soft soap, usually made up from bar soap (15 bars yellow soap, 30 pounds washing soda, 9 pails water, boiled together). The clothes had been previously disinfected either in a Fodden or in the chamber disinfecter used for delousing. The floors were of corrugated iron leading to a central drain, thence to the reception tank. The women stood on duckboards. The clothes were then wrung either by hand or put through a roller wringer (power driven).
and hung outside to dry in suitable weather; otherwise they were dried in drying huts heated by stoves down the center, the clothes hung closely on wires. The heated saturated air was periodically extracted by fans and, when properly handled, the clothes dried in eight hours. After this, the clothes were sorted and folded, not ironed, those needing mending being sent to the mending room. In winter, 15,000 pairs of socks were washed and dried daily.

From the fact that the stream water had to be used again down below, the dirty water had to be purified. The following method gave satisfaction. Twin tanks of 6,000 gallons capacity each were provided. When 3,000 gallons of fresh laundry and bath water had reached this, one pound of hypochlorite of lime was added with thorough mixing to each 25 gallons of the stuff and then left standing for at least six hours, and whilst the twin tank was filling a thick, light scum of calcium soap enmeshing much fluff and other debris rose to the surface. This was skimmed off, mixed with sawdust, and burned in an incinerator. The clean fluid left was run into another tank to be used over again and again when water was scarce, or after running up through a sand screen, it was discharged into the stream below. It was expensive, but it gave satisfaction; other methods and other chemicals might have done better, but they could not be procured. Hypochlorite of lime is supplied to us freely. The buildings for bath and laundry purposes are generally built of rough, cheap lumber and covered with tar paper and roofed in with corrugated iron.

Additional Rest Areas: when a division has been in action several months in any one section and whose corps is not to be moved from there, it has been found useful to get it at a point further back out of gunfire and out of the noise of the front where the men could do light training and rest.

The sanitation of any area is the duty of the OC in that area—his medical officer is his sanitary adviser. In addition to this, we have a Sanitary Section composed of 27 men and a captain in charge—the business of this section is to coordinate the sanitation of the area and to inspect it. It is not their duty to do the fatigue work, they are there to instruct and to inspect—the OC of the Sanitary Section reports to the ADMS [assistant director of medical services] of the division, and through him any recommendations reach the units concerned.

Our corps has, besides this, a sanitary adviser coordinating the work of the Sanitary Sections of the divisions of the corps. The army in which a corps is situated has a DADMS [deputy assistant director of medical services] in sanitation, whose duty it is to supervise the sanitation of the corps and the divisions in the area. Daily reports of the infectious diseases arising in each corps area are sent to the DMS [director of medical services] of the army in which they are. In this way, knowledge is had of incidence of infectious diseases in the whole area daily; the DADMS sanitation goes then wherever there is indication of trouble. There is a mobile laboratory in each corps area to look after any analysis and bacteriological examinations when required in that area. Civil authorities reciprocate with the local military authorities in reporting infectious diseases amongst the civil population, and measures are taken accordingly in case of major infectious diseases. The patients are removed from the area and the homes from which they came put out of bounds for troops. The civil authorities look after the disinfection, etc. The military and civil sanitary authorities also reciprocate in the control of the es-taminets; in many of the areas, it is required of the proprietors of these places that all drinking utensils be properly sterilized with boiling water after use by each customer. If we adopted the French method of carrying (each soldier his own cup), this difficult task—the controlling of spreading disease by drinking cups—would be very much reduced. The French soldier carries his cup with him always and, when he drinks wines or beer, drinks from his own cup.
As train travelers on the trunk line between Washington and Richmond approach a station 34 miles south of the national capital and 80 miles north of Richmond, they perk up and take notice nowadays of a new “point of interest” along the route—Quantico, Virginia, city of the Soldiers of the Sea. By daylight, there is a view from the car windows of the drill grounds and the barracks of a post of 7,000 United States Marines. In the evening, the 350 buildings climbing a hillside and scattered over a flat between this high ground and the nearby banks of the Potomac River are as ablaze with lights as a factory town.

Six months ago, Quantico’s chief “interests” were fishing and mining. The town was little more than a whistling station in the woods. When a platoon of Marine pioneers landed at the town’s rickety dock from a steamboat one afternoon in the middle of May, only a small field, now part of the parade grounds, was cleared; all the rest of the tract’s 6,000 acres was in forest. The platoon spent the night in a deserted dancing pavilion on the river bank and, when the lunch the men carried in their haversacks was gone, they had to buy up all the edibles on the shelves of the village post office and general store.

Though the actual work of clearing and building did not begin until well along in May, it went ahead with a rush once it got under way. In another six weeks, the construction contractors had cleared upward of a 100 acres of forest, and a small city of one-story wooden barracks was open to receive a regiment of Marines, which arrived to begin training for service overseas. These Marines did their part to help police the company streets of stumps and construction litter, but the heaviest of the work was complete before they arrived. Water from artesian wells in the hills was flowing in the new city’s water mains, the sewage system was in operation, and telephones installed. The electric light plant was working, though the engines, as yet, had no roofs above them.

From a signal tower on the highest western hilltop, the construction company took “progress pictures” every week to show the speed with which new buildings were sprouting up in the clearing. On the hillside just below this tower, great blocks of quarters for the enlisted men of the infantry regiments kept creeping steadily southward. Each company was assigned to a group of six of these buildings—four for living quarters (50 men to a “shack” 98 feet by 20 feet), one building for a mess hall, one for a washroom.

At the foot of the hill, a long, broad street—Barnett Avenue—was laid out, and as soon as sufficient quarters for the enlisted men had been completed a row of living quarters and offices for the commissioned officers began to spring up along the avenue’s eastern curb line.

Then, in the center of this row, appeared a large building for the YMCA New Britain, Connecticut, made this $10,000 present to the sea soldiers of Virginia for use as a reading and writing room and entertainment hall. As part of the gift, the generous New Britains included the services of reading-room attendants, physical instructors, and a teacher of French.

By the time this article sees print, the YMCA building will be part of a cantonment community center. To the east of the YMCA will rise a structure with a floor space 110 feet by 232 feet, to be used either as a gymnasium or as an auditorium, [with a] seating capacity [of] about 3,000. In an alcove annex to this, a circulating library will be installed. There is a possibility that the Knights of Columbus will soon add to the group another soldiers’ clubhouse. The military post office is next door to the YMCA, and two public service buildings, the powerhouse, and the cold storage plant are at the eastern edge of the group.

A little way east of Barnett Avenue, the railway bisects the cleared land of the post. Across the tracks lies the parade ground—a “flat” of sand and clay. One of its virtues is that it drains well. An hour or two after a rain, it is dry enough for drill. The artillery camp and a group of hospital buildings border the parade ground on the south, with a river making...
a big shining semicircle behind them. The riverbank at the eastern edge of the drill grounds drops off rather steeply, but there is a sandy beach below for swimming parties and for the tables of the clothes scrubbers. In midsummer, swimming was part of the Quantico finishing school's regular course, and it was not rare at the close of the afternoon drill period to see a thousand or more Marines splashing in the Potomac at once. All enlisted men who did not know how to swim were put through dry-land swimming drill—a “minnow school”—by a physical director from the YMCA.

On a choice site beside the parade grounds and overlooking the river is the old dancing pavilion, transformed now into an officers' clubhouse. Its floor dimensions are 40 [feet] by 80 feet; it has two fireplaces, a smoking room for the men, a dressing room for the ladies, and an email kitchen to provide buffet luncheons.

Concerning a smaller clubhouse in the immediate neighborhood, the writer has no information beyond the authoritative statement that this is to be “a strictly stag affair.”

Potomac Avenue—the “main street” of old-time Quantico and the “downtown section” of today—starts westward from the wharf, bounds the parade grounds on the north with restaurants, barber shops, a drug store, clothes pressing establishments, a bank, a military outfitting shop, some pool halls, and the two-story brick building [that] it headquarters for the post commandant and the assistant paymaster. Once, this was the only brick structure in town, but the prosperity of Quantico finally took away this cherished distinction.

After Potomac Avenue crosses the railway tracks, it mounts a wooded hill to a high crest, which in Civil War days was the site of a fort. Today, nothing remains of the old defenses but a half-filled trench and a dismantled cannon. The hill is capped now with a covered reservoir and a new 35-room brick hotel. A dozen bungalows dot the slopes close around. The Quantico Hotel puts on rather metropolitan airs, and boasts eight more bathrooms than the Commercial House of Tonganozic, Kansas. The rates are metropolitan also—$90 to $95 a month for one person, American plan; $155 to $160 for two. Furthermore, you are warned to make your reserva-

The scarcity of quarters in Quantico has caused many officers to commute to Fredericksburg, 20 miles south. A few have even been making daily excursions to Washington. The monthly commutation rate to Fredericksburg, on a card that permits the holder to make as many trips a day as he pleases, is $9. The rate to Washington commuters is $11.50 for a coupon book containing 26 round-trip tickets. The train schedule for Quantico fits in well with the time of the drill periods.

Each junior officer is provided quarters in the row of barracks fronting Barnett Avenue—a room furnished with an iron bedstead and a mattress, a five-drawer dresser, a washstand, a table, a chair and a steel locker. In the center of each of these barracks is a larger room for a meeting place, provided with a table, chairs, a stove, and a telephone. [Behind] the barracks are washrooms with hot-water showers.

In the pioneer era of life in Quantico, six months ago, there were more reasons than there are at present for wishing to join the commuters. The early settlers in the cantonment can recall the days before the hotel was opened and before feminine society came to town, the days when there was only one brick building downtown, no paved streets, no bank, no drug store, no military clothes shop, no clean restaurants. We can look at the contrast now and marvel at the transformation.

The Quantico Marines do not hesitate nowadays to match their barracks in a prize contest against any other rush-order cantonment in the land. Though it is not so large as the Army's new camps, it is a model of its kind. We have 350 buildings of various types and sizes; five miles of concrete paving; a water supply from five artesian wells; two auditoriums in which to provide entertainments, which are given every weekday evening; two clubhouses for officers; a highly efficient system of lights and telephones; a model range, well screened by trees from winter winds (48 rifle targets and 8 pistol targets), and a miniature battlefield, with trenches, emplacements, bombproofs [sic] and camouflage, all patterned after the latest fashions in France. As
for our health record, the books on that are open
too, and anyone who may have feared that this sec-
tion of the Potomac valley would prove a pest hole
of malaria will discover that the sanitary precau-
tions kept malaria down to 0.016 of 1 percent.

All this has not been brought about without
labor and sweat and skillful planning. The natural
obstacles—forests and swamps—may have spurred
the soldier citizens of Quantico to do a better job
than they would have made of it if the task to face
had been easy. This, just as in the case of larger citi-
ties—Chicago, for example—built better and bigger
because of the stimulus of having to fight swamps,
and a Kansas City or a Seattle recruit thrives on
the job of leveling down the clay banks. No doubt
a good many Marines took real satisfaction in peel-
ing off their shirts and going out to battle with the
stumps in their company streets.

That “bit of Flanders in Virginia”—Quantico’s
miniature battlefield—is another piece of work,
which costs a lot of arduous labor and which is all
the more cherished accordingly. No imported en-
gineer corps did the planning or the construction;
Marines laid it out, dug it, revetted it, chopped
down trees for the roofs of its bombproofs, and even
put on the finishing touches of camouflage.

The students of the Officers’ Training School
did their “bit” in trench digging, tree chopping, and
the like. From their camp at the south edge of the
cantonment, they trooped out two days a week to
the battlefield and learned how to do by actually
doing. This school is a story in itself, which may
claim its just dues of space in The Gazette in a fu-
ture issue. The present writer need do no more than
record that the school set a high mark of efficiency
in its first course of three months’ training. A large
proportion of the graduates of the first Quantico
camp were students who had had previous military
training, and the pace these picked men set left
some of the less fortunate of us gasping for breath
at the finish.

Concerning the personnel and equipment of
the artillery camp, this magazine, like the rest of the
press in war time, is not privileged to speak without
restrictions. It is permissible to say that the approxi-
mate population of the camp is a thousand men,
and that these thousand established for themselves
an enviable reputation for quickness to learn their
trade and for soldierly smartness. The artillery camp
has one of the choicest sites in the cantonment—
and has made the most of its advantages.

Down by the railway station is the big shed of
the Quartermaster’s Department (500 [feet] by 60
feet) and of the commissary (250 [feet] by 60 feet).
In the same neighborhood is a garage for a fleet of
35 motor trucks. Business is on a big scale in this
big cantonment, but the machinery has run swiftly
and smoothly throughout.

No other of Uncle Sam’s “outfits” can complain
that the Quantico Marines have caused them a
minute’s delay, for the “first to fight” have also been
the first to stand by, ready for the signal to shove
off. All things considered, the teamwork of this, the
largest of Marine encampments, has been quite as
good as that of smaller units, and that is saying a
good deal.

The Quantico finishing school, training for
duty overseas, rounded into its present state of ef-
ciciency with the minimum loss of time. While the
forests were still being mowed down and only half
of the barracks had mushroomed up in the clear-
ing, the first fighting forces arrived and began to
 drill. As fast as quarters were ready, more companies
poured in. While dynamiters blasted stumps out of
the ground and the big guns at Indian Head roared
and splattered shells up and down the Potomac, the
Quantico Marines were perfecting themselves in
close-order drill, were learning new tricks of trench
warfare, practicing new bayonet strokes on dumm-
ies in the company streets, and acquiring skill in
the art of hand-grenade throwing.

Graduating classes departed for service over-
seas; other classes from the recruit depots took their
places. The artillery camp began to set up a compe-
tition of noises against the bombardments of Indian
Head and Winthrop. Strange, new tractors, some-
thing like baby “tanks,” began to cavort around the
cantonment; steam rollers, high-power trucks and
ambulances, pop-pop motorcycles, and machine
gun fusillades added to the din of many prepara-
tions to give a right royal welcome to certain repre-
sentatives of the imperial German government.

We are all proud to have played a part in these
preparations; and though Quantico is not yet a de-
light to the eye of a landscape architect, we are all a little proud of Quantico. For, above all, this city, hacked out of the forest, is distinctively ours—with the stamp of the Soldiers of the Sea upon it, a little more snug and shipshape and complete than anything else of the sort that we know about on this side of the Rocky Mountains.
Editor’s Note
This article is published because it gives an excellent description of the work performed in our principal training camp during the war, when the Parris Island depot was increased to many times its normal size.

In what I have to say, I would like you to remember that the one point that is foremost in my heart as the very necessary thing for the American people to do is to effectively put into practice a system of universal military training for all Americans. Against this proposition in the past has been raised the objection that, as a nation, we would be unwilling to give from one to three years of the productive life of our young manhood when anyone could see that our splendid isolation rendered an invasion unlikely. The message I bring to you is that, during the period of the war, the United States Marine Corps trained infantry soldiers whose performance was not excelled by the troops of any nation. They were equipped, outfitted, and trained in eight weeks, and often effectively in the trenches in four weeks more, and when I tell you the story of the work done at Parris Island [South Carolina] you will agree with me that the same system put into effect 100 percent in every section of this country would be of lasting benefit to the moral and physical well-being of our people, and an immense power in furthering the cause of right and justice in the world.

I landed in Parris Island on a midsummer day, with 250 boys from all points east of the Rocky Mountains, and this was the day’s intake of raw material. Overalls, boots or short-waisted coats, straw hats and canes, with coats and without coats, it was a conglomerate cross-section of the American continent. Volunteers, all of them, mostly under 21 [years of age], with a sprinkling of middle-aged businessmen; they travelled many days, many of them. “Snap out of your dope and fall in column of fours” was the word through a four-foot megaphone from the cheerleader as we approached the dock. For the next few days, the megaphone played a big part in handling the applicants, and for all the time of their training, from hit-the-deck in the morning to lights-out at night, and often in between, “Snap out of your dope” was the word they heard and readily learned to heed. Five minutes saw them on the road to the receiving barracks, which they reached about 1930, to find a wash and hot supper awaiting them. Their numbers had been telegraphed ahead, and there was a place for every man. A suit of pajamas, a towel, soap, sheets and a blanket were issued immediately after supper and, in the process, they doffed civilian garb, and for the next few days looked like a Chinese crew in the white cotton drill of the issue garment. A bunk to sleep in was their introduction to reveille the next morning and, after chow and policing their quarters, they were introduced to [Edwin] Denby [later secretary of the Navy]. Daily at 1000 seven days in the week and 12 months in the year, Denby, himself a war enlistment, as sergeant, lieutenant, and afterward major, delivered the goods for two hours in a most soul-stirring talk on snap, spirit, morale, and Americanism. Never twice alike, rarely repeating himself, always moving his hearers, Denby delivered the goods, and many a man was so moved by his sermon that afterward, as penitent, he told Denby, as father-confessor, such little items of his past life as he had neglected or failed to declare. These items ran all the way perhaps from a wife and family heretofore unmentioned, to such items as fines for speeding, which he thought should be on the record. To see the fire in this man as he stood talking to his Chinese-looking crew, with shaven heads and white pajamas, was indeed an inspiration. I heard him four times, and would like to have heard him many more. After which [came] the doctors. And the organization was wonderful. Each man was painted, chest and back, with iodine his own distinguishing number, so that no one passed his examination for him. In this semitropical climate, an abundance of clothes was not necessary, and outside, under a mulberry tree, this wholesale examination went forward. In columns of twos to the doctor with the stethoscope, with their heads

PARRIS ISLAND IN THE WAR*
by Major W. R. Coyle, Member of Congress

* Speech delivered 11 April 1919.
turned right and left so as not to breathe on him, four to six taps, breathing as ordered, in time to the word of command given by the assistant, an average of 10 to the minute passed under his listening ear, and occasionally one was laid aside for further investigation, and as they marched away, another doctor watched them for length of leg and coordination of physique and build. Scars and distinguishing marks for future record were noted. Eyes, throat, ears and, most particularly, feet, every single item examined, recorded, passed on and inspected, and last, but not least, the iodine stamp which showed one more “leatherneck” accepted for his country’s cause. From noon to noon, the day’s intake was handled by the doctors, and occasionally one was rejected, and occasionally the signs, “If you don’t know, you get killed,” would scare off another one. Every man was impressed with the seriousness of the work, and the doctor’s organization worked 24 hours to the day, recording, classifying, and card-indexing. Three shifts in this and many other departments, so that the whole might steadily move, and at noon of the second day they were turned over to their sergeant, who commanded 66 of them, never tiring, and for eight weeks he [would] sleep with them—I was going to say swear at them—but that was rare. There was all too much swearing, but not by those in authority, and we were able to instill into fine young noncommissioned officers, most of them trained since the outbreak of the war, that spirit of the football field, which leaves the discipline to the coach and requires of the captain to give the signal to the team to jump as one man. As the sergeant took his men to the quartermaster’s storehouse, the likeness of the place to a Ford factory was more apparent. As the white-clad or unclad men walked into the issue room, experienced hands would call out to the workers up aloft among the shelves, “Shirt two, short; trousers one, long.” A blanket placed on the counter had fired at it underclothes and socks, and as it was pushed along the slippery top, the applicant donned his nether garments as he moved forward, trousers and shirt followed to the counter, and even the shoes he put on hopping on one foot to keep up with the crowd. A hat landed on top of his head, and cap followed of the same size, at which point an inspector, and for the shoes a doctor, went over the man and his garments, and as they came in at one end raw material, they came out the other veritable khaki-colored Fords. Every day for the period of the war, a full complement of clothes, rifles, equipment and cleaning gear, even to bathing suits, razors, and blanco,* most difficult of all to obtain, was available to every man who reported for training at the Marine Corps station. On the second day, always equipped, he was ready to start for my camp. His clothes marked with name and company, and packed in his canvas sea bag, went ahead by motor track, and about 1900 every evening, six miles over the road, they marched to the lower end of the island, where I played the same part toward the Marine Corps that the parochial school plays toward the catholic church. I got them while they were young and molded their future.

At the entrance to the maneuver grounds, the officer commanding the battalion received his billeting schedule, his assignment to mess hall, and drill schedule for the following day, and the evening gave them an opportunity to get settled in tents and dispose their new-found possessions, in general, according to rule, but in particular according to the definite requirements of each battalion commander. Two days later, an inspection of 200 tents in the battalion streets would fail to disclose any lack of uniformity or precision. Of course, this depended on the officer in charge of the battalion, and we endeavored to eliminate at this point the careless or heartless officer. That evening for five minutes, their battalion commander or camp commander addressed them for a few moments, generally on the necessity of writing a letter home. They were also advised that the camp was run, as far as possible, according to traffic signs, that we endeavored to avoid arbitrary rules, and we covered the camp with signs to “Seek the tidy tin.” We found it got better results with the men we had than issuing voluminous orders and attaching various fines and penalties. This was the last admonition on the schedule for eight weeks except for their contact with their own officers and noncoms. On the morning of the fourth day started the daily routine of instruction. At 0730 in the morning, breakfast and camp police being over, they began the facings, marchings, and school

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* Boot polish.
of the soldier. Physical exercise, swimming, and personal combat, scrubbing clothes, and kitchen police. For three weeks, we had them at this camp and, as I watched one day, 5,000 pass in review at sunset parade, it was difficult to believe that none of them had served [more than] four weeks, and many of them only two. At every point, they were handled by expert coaches, and everywhere the spirit of the football field was the spirit that maintained. In these three weeks, they acquired most remarkable precision in close order drill and snap I have seen at no other point in the manual of arms. They learned assurance with their bayonet. They learned to scale a 9-foot wall and climb a 30-foot rope. Ninety-five percent learned to swim, and all learned to keep themselves clean, and between times had the typhoid inoculation and coned their Morse's Manual [Morse code], and as they marched away at the end of three weeks to the training camp, the station band at the head of the column, frequently at the close of an evening parade, and always singing, “We are coming over,” it made one feel that the inspiration that led them into this service would surely tell on the battlefield. In the next two weeks at the training camp, they perfected their drills, learned interior guard and extended order, something of boxing and wrestling, and always five weeks from their arrival saw them at 0600 in the morning on the rifle range, the recruit battalion, ready to begin the serious work of an infantry soldier. Daily, 2,400 men, for seven hours, in two shifts, worked at the 66 targets, as recruits, juniors and seniors, their schedule was laid out and planned. Specialists handled them in the early stages and modifications of sighting and position drill that again marked a considerable advance, and in their last two weeks in working with service charge, always with the same coach, and each man with his own coach, they studied and mastered the problem. For the period of the war, 1,200 men per week at 66 targets, 89 percent qualified, an unparalleled record in any Service in the world, and the quiet major who ran this camp played his part in winning the war. The rifle coaches, some 300 of them, all expert shots, would make any organization or any city a leader. Windage, sight-setting, the art of blackening the sights, and always holding on the target and correcting the sights to reach it were points thoroughly covered. The results that these coaches accomplished should go to their everlasting credit, and this organization was built up largely after our entry into the war.

I saw the process of taking these men from among the experts of the week before, and the officer charged with responsibility had always to vary his tactics. He described shipboard and Navy Yard West Indies, South America, recruiting duty and officers’ training camp, painting a glowing picture of the pleasures of each, and asked for volunteers for each in turn, and after a small group had fallen for several or all of these details, he turned almost as though it were inadvertently to those who were left, and said, “And what do you men want to do?” Taken off their guard, the answer was almost unanimous, “We want to go to France,” and from those men they picked the rifle coaches, because only the man who wanted to go to France was effective for training others to go.

To the countless hundreds, high adventurers for God and country, who in their own minds have missed the glory that comes only of battle service, this record and tribute is offered. Their esprit and patriotism was expressed on that false armistice day, when the only shouts and cheers at Parris Island came by phone from Charleston; a sergeant of 20 summers and two of them on Parris Island said to me, “As long as I live, I’ll never live down the fact that I did not get to go to France. But I’m glad it’s over for the boys over there,” and to him and to you few thousand others my answer was and is, “You offered your life on your country’s altar when you joined the Marines. If, as coach or company commander, the full sacrifice was not required, you yet will live and die inspired by the same high motives which took you into the Marines, and even as those who died on ‘far-flung battle line,’ you will live and die for America, Semper Fidelis.”
OVER THERE
The object of this article is to present to the readers of the Gazette in simple terms some of the difficulties experienced by machine gun companies of the 4th Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps, operating with the 2d Division in France, and to touch briefly some of the many questions arising about the proper method of training, equipping, and using machine guns in the field. It is desired to avoid all technical terms and discussions. For those who wish to go fully into the subject of machine gun work, there are complete pamphlets covering machine gunnery in all its phases, which can be obtained and studied.*

In general, machine gun subjects may be divided into two classes: (a) tactical employment of guns, and (b) organization and direction of fire. The principles of (b) are true regardless of what guns are used, while (a) differs with all the conditions that may normally change tactical situations and is a complete study in itself. A knowledge of it is necessary for the higher commander while it is not necessary for him to know the functioning of guns or how to organize or direct their fire from a technical standpoint.

In view of the fact that there is a general misunderstanding throughout the Service of the difference between automatic weapons and machine guns, it might be well at the start of this article to point out the difference and to give definitions for each arm, which will apply to all references used herein.

An automatic rifle is a light hand arm capable of sustaining automatic fire, air cooled, without a tripod mount, usually fed from a magazine, and carried by the infantry soldier himself.

The machine gun is a relatively heavier weapon, water cooled to make it capable of prolonged fire at high rates, mounted on a suitable tripod to make it capable of being used for direct and indirect fire, usually fed from a belt, having a crew of from three to nine men, and on account of its weight being carried on some form of wheel transportation.

Thus the light Browning is a Browning Automatic Rifle and the heavy Browning is a Browning Machine Gun. While the fire of the automatic rifle and machine gun is infantry fire and similar in many respects, the functions of these two arms are widely dissimilar and it is not the intention to discuss the automatic rifle.

When the 5th Regiment went to France, one machine gun company was a part of the organization of each infantry battalion. This organization was changed later and the machine guns of the 4th Brigade were: a four-company battalion coming immediately under the command of the brigade commander, and a regimental company to each of the infantry regiments. The battalion commander of the Machine Gun Battalion was in addition, the brigade machine gun officer, and as such was the tactical adviser of the brigade commander in all machine gun matters, being on his staff for this purpose. (G. O. No. 82, Hdq. AEF, 28 December 1917, Par. 3) He, however, had only the administration of his own battalion and, while he could recommend a course of training to be followed by the regimental companies, the actual training of these companies was the responsibility of the regimental commanders unless the brigade commander saw fit to place it in the hands of the commanding officer of the Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. This method of instruction and training for special units, such as machine guns, was carried out sometimes in the 2d Division. Prior to the Saint-Mihiel drive, all 14 machine gun companies of the division were assembled at one camp and placed for instruction under the command of the division machine gun officer.

In the line, while fighting was in progress, the machine gun companies that were attached to the

* Army War College, Machine-Gun Drill Regulations (Provisional), 1917; War Department, Provisional Machine-Gun Firing Manual, 1917; War Department, Supplement to Machine-Gun Drill Regulations (Provisional), 1917, and Provisional Machine-Gun Firing Manual, 1917; U.S. Army, Handbook on Fire Control Instruments for Machine Guns, 1918; machine gun manuals for all the various types of guns; confidential notes issued on machine guns from time to time during the war by the Army War College.
infantry battalions came under the tactical control of the infantry battalion commander, while administratively they remained as before. The machine gun commanders of companies so detailed to infantry battalions thus became the tactical advisers on machine gun matters of the battalion commanders of infantry.

Where machine guns were used in batteries or groups, these batteries came under the battery commanders: officers detailed for this work, and operating directly under orders from the brigade or division machine gun officer. In this way, the actual tactical command of the regimental machine gun companies might come under the command of the battalion commander of the brigade machine gun battalion. In an attack, the guns may start in batteries in putting down barrage fire, but in the final assault some at least accompany the infantry and assist in consolidating the position gained. These guns may or may not be with the advance wave of infantry, but they are under command of the infantry battalion commander, and the captain of the machine gun company should be with or in close liaison with the infantry battalion commander.

The duties of the battalion commander of a machine gun battalion, when he has lost the tactical control of his guns, are to coordinate all the machine guns on the brigade front; seeing that the fire of guns overlap on the flanks of the battalions; “hooking up” his line with adjoining troops; assuring ammunition supply; changing, with the infantry battalion commander’s knowledge, any guns [that] have been badly placed; keeping headquarters informed of the positions of guns and similar duties.

The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was organized in the United States in August 1917, and consisted of the 77th and 81st Companies. In January 1918, after arrival in France, the 15th and 23d Companies were attached. These last two companies had left the United States as machine gun companies, but [were] assigned to the infantry battalions of the 5th Regiment. On reorganization, they were placed in the 6th Machine Gun Battalion while the 8th Company was held in the 5th Regiment as its machine gun company, and the 73d Company was the regimental company of the 6th Marines. This completed the machine gun organization of the 4th Brigade. The 7th Company had left the United States as a machine gun company, but was held at Chaumont [France] on special duty until October 1918, when the company was broken up and the men used as replacements for other machine gun companies of the 4th Brigade.

The Marine machine gun companies went to France armed with the Lewis Automatic Rifle fitted with a tripod and carried on the “Cole” carts. This equipment did not fit in with the Army plans and the Lewis guns were turned over to the Army for use by their forces, being replaced by the standard French Hotchkiss equipment, the Hotchkiss being a heavy gun and having all the attributes of a machine gun except one—the fact that it was air cooled. At first, the Hotchkiss did not meet with favor, but as time wore on it was seen that it was an excellent weapon, thoroughly dependable, of greater range than the Lewis, easier to conceal, but harder to carry when necessity required the moving of guns by hand. Its big fault was the fact of its being air cooled, which on prolonged barrage fire cut down its rate of speed to approximately 25 rounds a minute. A slightly greater rate can be maintained, but the heat causes the barrels to get cherry red and makes the handling extremely difficult.

On the reorganization of the 4th Brigade along the lines decided upon by General Headquarters AEF, all units went in training and the machine gunners perfected themselves in the various kinds of fire, signals, etc. During this training, they were handicapped by lack of fire control instruments and were forced to improvise. This really turned out to be a blessing in disguise, as it taught the men more of the theory of fire than they would have had had they all of the latest equipment. It may be noted here that the fire control equipment taken to France with the Lewis guns was largely improvised; that used with the Hotchkiss was much better and was capable of being used for very accurate work. The final fire control outfit issued with the Browning was excellent in design and quality but short in quantity.

In March, the division moved to the trenches near Verdun and here the brigade received its first real fighting, and while this sector, an old organized trench sector, was at that time considered a very quiet one, it was an excellent way to break in the units to actual fighting conditions. Here the machine gun companies were assigned as follows: 15th Company...
with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines; 23d Company with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; 77th Company with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; 81st Company with 2d Battalion, 6th Marines; 8th Company with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; [and] 73d Company with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. In all operations hereafter in which it became necessary to assign machine gun companies to infantry battalions, these companies always went with the same battalions, except at Belleau Woods and at Soissons, as will be explained later. The wisdom of keeping the same machine gun company with the same infantry battalion is apparent. The officers and men know each other and have confidence in each other’s ability. This reduces the amount of orders and instructions necessary upon the joining of a new company. As frequently attack orders are received a very short time before the actual attack is made, it is of great assistance to the infantry battalion commander to know that he has a machine gun company commander who thoroughly understands what his ideas are and what is expected of him, without having to be told in minute instructions.

In this trench work, the machine gunners learned much, although no drills and instructions were held. Emplacements were built under camouflage, and experience was gained in securing protection against observation by enemy avions, caring for animals and equipment under the most adverse conditions, supplying ammunition, the rationing of companies, etc. At first, the units went into the line with French officers, the French troops being held in support. However, the Boche attack of March 1918, having gained so much headway, it became necessary for the French to remove as many of their troops as possible, and in consequence the lines of the 4th Brigade were greatly extended and the units given full control of their sectors.

At first, an attempt was made to have each machine gun company cook its own rations, but this was soon found to be a mistake. The gun positions were so far apart that the men carrying the rations were exhausted by the long trips through the mud of the trenches. As the system of defense was a series of strong points and the machine guns were always with the infantry, the method of having the machine guns rationed with the infantry was worked out. Rations would be turned over to the infantry companies at the dump; this company would then ration certain of the machine gun positions with certain of its own platoons; in other places, the machine gun companies would furnish the cooks and ration the infantry. It was not unusual for machine gun companies to have three or four different galleys and yet have many of its men rationing with other companies. The supply échelon of each machine gun company was in the rear and was charged with getting up the rations, which was always done at night under the supervision of a company train officer. This officer was also charged with the care of all animals, equipment, and the maintenance of the ammunition supply in case of attack. His post was at the station of the supply échelon and, needless to say, the company train officer, or supply officer as he is sometimes called, acting as he does under general instructions only, must be a reliable man of quick judgment, possessed of abundant initiative, cool and courageous. While the position of train officer is not a popular one, one of the best lieutenants of the company should be placed on this detail. This is one of the many things learned at this time.

Here also were learned many tricks of the machine gun trade, which up to this time had not been found in textbooks; how to establish mechanical means of covering certain areas with fire at night; safety precautions to keep from shooting into our own patrols or working parties; how to furnish sentry and ration details and still get the maximum amount of rest; liaison, a subject which up to this time we had not really understood, and one which is a complete study in itself; and best of all, how to give general directions to platoon and section commanders and to trust to them for the execution of the details to carry these out. Probably the most valuable item of all those learned in this sector was the self-reliance acquired by platoon and section commanders, which taught them to rely on their own judgment and gave them confidence in their own ability to handle their own units under any conditions that might arise. This initiative and self-confidence, coupled with strict discipline, are essentials of the best efficiency of machine guns, and are well illustrated in the making of a smooth relief.

In order to make a relief at night, it is necessary that the arrangements be made carefully and carried out with clock-like precision. The incom-
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ing company has only to get in place by daylight, but the outgoing company must be clear of enemy aerial observation by this time. In order to accomplish this, the relief usually starts as soon after dark as possible, guides meet incoming sections at previously designated places and conduct them to the gun positions [that] had been reconnoitered the day before by platoon commanders, and if possible section chiefs. This necessitates the breaking up of the relieving company shortly after it starts its march toward the front, with a consequent loss of control on the part of the company commander. In the case of machine guns, where sometimes single guns are widely scattered, it can be very readily seen that the noncommissioned personnel must be thoroughly competent to take charge in emergencies. The company commander, on the breaking up of his company, goes direct to the PC of the old company and there takes over the defense plans, orders, trench stores, etc. Each section or platoon goes to its designated place and its chief takes over from the old chief. When the new chief is satisfied, both chiefs make a written report to their respective company commanders that the relief is complete. The old runner then takes the new runner to report to the PC of the company commander, showing him the route. One or more noncommissioned officers are left with the new section or platoon and the old section or platoon marches out, going to a previously appointed rendezvous. As the last section reports the relief complete, the two company commanders report to the infantry battalion commander and an officer is left with the new company commander for 24 hours, or until such time as relieved by him. The old company commander then collects his details and leaves to rejoin his company, which may not be assembled until it is miles behind the line, depending on the probability of artillery fire and observation. At first, an attempt was made to collect these companies together and march them to their new billets, which was discovered to be a mistake, as it kept the tired men of the first sections relieved waiting on the road for many hours. There is no advantage in forming a company prior to their arrival in billets, and to do so really only exposes it to the possibility of being shelled. There is a tendency on the part of machine gunners to avoid the fatiguing work of carrying heavy guns by hand, particularly through winding trenches deep in mud, and to avoid this an attempt is frequently made to exchange guns with the incoming company, the old company leaving its guns in position and picking up the guns of the new company at the point where the gun carts are farthest advanced. This is a mistake and should not be allowed, as each company is taking its material, sight unseen, and each may be called upon, prior to an opportunity for a careful examination, to resist an attack. There is also a tendency to neglect the care of guns, when it is known that these guns will be turned over in a few days to someone else.

Where a company is marching assembled on roads liable to shellfire, a 50- or 75-yard interval is left between sections or Platoons. On dark nights, this places the sections out of sight of each other, and guides must be left at all turns; strictest march discipline is necessary; noises or lights are forbidden. It is very difficult to prevent men from surreptitiously smoking on a long night march; however, if they have once been shelled or bombed for this reason, additional instructions are usually unnecessary. If the enemy suspects a relief is to be made, he will shell the roads and approaches with a resultant large casualty list. The night of a relief, no one gets any sleep. The train comes forward to get the guns and material [that] are being brought out, that part of it which belongs to each section being taken to the point most accessible. The kitchens and cook force are kept in readiness and an estimate made of the time of arrival of the first sections, when a hot meal should be in readiness. Upon receiving this meal, all men are turned in for rest and sleep, the mule drivers feeding their animals first. About noon the day following the relief, all equipment is completely overhauled and made ready for immediate action. Lists of missing parts, breakages, [and] damaged equipment are submitted to the supply officer who takes the necessary steps to replace them. All this became second nature and the only instructions necessary were the time of relief and where the guides were to meet. All else was done as a matter of course.

In the middle of May, the 2d Division was relieved from the trenches and went to the rear for rest. The last of May, hurry up orders came to move to the front, and on 31 May, it embussed the ma-
chine gun companies taking their guns and as much ammunition as could be handled, all gun carts reporting to the supply or train officers and moving together as a battalion train or regimental train, or as part of the regimental train for the carts of the regimental machine gun companies. Travelling by camion is hard on machine gunners, as it means that all movement on debussing must be made by hand, with the weight of guns, tripods, ammunition, etc., quickly tiring the men out, so that when they should be really fresh they are usually nearly exhausted. This fact soon became very patent to machine gunners, but was a feature apparently did not enter into staff consideration until we had had much more experience; for this reason also, machine gunners should be armed with pistols only, as the carrying of rifles is a great mistake that results in a consequent diminution of ammunition supply. The French machine gun regulations prescribe that the packs of machine gunners shall be carried on the gun carts in order that the men may arrive at the last stage of the advance as fresh as possible. In practice, it is necessary under almost all conditions to carry guns and ammunition some distance by hand in order to avoid observation and to save men and animals. On arriving at Montreuil-aux-Lions, orders were received as to where the line was to be formed to stop the German advance toward the Paris-Metz road. The machine guns were formed into groups, the 15th and 23d Companies forming the left group and the 77th and 81st forming the right group. These groups were further subdivided into batteries. Both groups were connected to battalion PC by telephone and operated entirely under the command of the machine gun battalion commander, the regimental companies remaining with the regiments. At the time of the formation of these groups, the French had not fallen back to this line, so the establishment of the groups was a simple matter. This group formation did not take into consideration the possible later use of machine guns with the infantry battalions, and therefore when the group system was broken up by the necessities of the tactical situation, machine gun companies were not with the infantry battalions to which they belonged. The group system remained in force until after the first attack of the Germans, when the right group particularly did terrific execution; however, gaps in our line were filled, infantry moved forward to get better positions, attacks by parts of our line caused a breaking up of the group system and soon companies became intermingled. On 6 June, [First] Lieutenant [Jack S.] Hart of the 81st Company had with him in the attack on Bureches and in the consolidation of Bureches after its capture, two guns of the 81st Company, four guns of the 73d Company, and four guns of the 77th Company. This intermingling caused much confusion in the supply of rations, ammunition, etc., as well as throwing officers and gun crews together who were not known to each other. Had the group system originally been smaller and had we been more experienced, the problem of keeping companies together would not have been so difficult. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to keep these machine gun companies with their proper infantry battalions, the companies themselves not even being kept intact. This taught us the principle of small groups and unity of command and the lesson was well learned at this time. Only once after this were companies intermingled and then it was done in verbal orders a few minutes before an attack when no other disposition was apparently possible.

Liaison between these groups of machine guns and infantry was poor at times, the infantry frequently not knowing where the machine guns were—a dangerous practice. It is essential that the infantry commanders know where the machine guns are at all times and equally essential that the machine guns know the infantry dispositions in order to properly support them with fire. This lack of liaison was due largely to an attempt to keep the tactical command of all machine guns under the battalion commander of the machine gun battalion and to lack of a proper understanding of the principles of liaison. Later on in the war, this practice might have been possible, but at this time the art of liaison was not sufficiently developed to make it possible, and it is doubtful whether under the best conditions this system can be carried to as efficient results as that of giving the tactical command of the machine guns to each battalion commander. The reason for this is evident when it is remembered that each regiment has only its own front to keep liaison with, and for this purpose has a regimental headquarters group. Should both regiments of the
brigade be in line, the machine gun battalion would then have to keep liaison with the whole of the brigade front, or double the front of a regiment, and its facilities are less than those of one regiment. Then again, the infantry battalion commander is entirely responsible for the sector occupied by his battalion and it is only reasonable that he should have complete control over all infantry weapons occupying that sector or which by their fire aid in its defense. Again we find a very valuable lesson was learned—one which stood us in good stead later—we saw the lack of harmony and cooperation in our units [that] was due to this poor liaison and bad teamwork and a desire on the part of the machine gunners to make a separate arm out of their weapon. We had had our lesson, and thereafter the infantry and machine guns worked smoothly like a beautifully tuned motor, each depending on the other to do his own job and letting the other alone in its execution.

This and other observations of a similar nature are not intended in the light of criticism but are merely a statement of facts as they occurred. It must be remembered that machine gun companies were more or less of a new departure for Marines and, while we had had them before, never had they been used in the manner developed in this war. In addition, principles [that] were acknowledged to be correct were daily being changed to meet new conditions and new developments in the art of warfare. We may consider that we were fortunate in making these errors early in the game, recognizing them when made, and correcting them immediately.

The operations around Belleau Woods were particularly hard on the machine gunners; the infantry battalions were in line for several days at a time and then would come out for a rest of a few days. The machine gunners, as above explained, not being at this time attached to any infantry battalion, remained in the line; two companies were constantly on the front for 22 days, and on being relieved were absolutely exhausted.

About 5 July, the machine guns were relieved by the guns of the 26th Division and went back to the reserve lines where they rested by constructing machine gun emplacements on the “Army Line,” as the support trenches then under construction were called. Here they were held until after the July drive of the Boche had been stopped, when orders suddenly came to embuss on camions. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion started to march on the afternoon of 16 July and, after a hike of about 16 kilometers, halted and waited for camions, the train forming and starting the march for the new area under the battalion supply officer, the regimental machine gun companies moving with their regiments. At about 0400, the battalion embussed and continued on the road until about 1500 the following day, when it debussed not far from Taillefontaine. Here orders were received from a French regulating officer to go into camp in a certain spot in Villers-Cotterêts woods. This necessitated a march of several kilometers, the already tired men carrying the guns and ammunition by hand. In this movement, the battalion carried more ammunition than usual (under instructions) and several trips had to be made before all ammunition was gotten into camp. Just before dark, orders were received to attack at 0435 [on] 18 July, the following morning. After some delay, liaison was made with the 5th Regiment (which was the assaulting regiment), plans for the attack were received, and the battalion put in march as early as possible, about 2230 after a short consultation with the company commanders. This march through the woods was the worst the battalion ever experienced. The roads were packed with men and transport; going was slow; it was raining; and the men had had practically no rest since 1700 the day before.

The 5th Regiment made the attack on time, the machine guns failing to get to the jump-off trench by H-hour, but joining the 5th Regiment on its break from the woods. This lateness in joining was in no way detrimental to the attack, as the first part was made through thick forest where automatic fire was really the function of automatic rifles and not machine guns, and very little could have been done. Consolidation of the first objective was made about 1500 on 18 July, which necessitated the scattering of all machine gun units. At about this time, orders were received to attack with the 3rd Brigade at 1700. All companies were called in and the attack made. Upon reaching the objective, the guns were placed in the reserve. At daylight on 19 July, orders were received to attack at 0800 with the 4th Brigade, which was done, two companies attacking and two in support. These orders to attack were received at the last minute, so that verbal instructions were still
being given to unit commanders at about 0754, 15 minutes before the attack was to take place. One machine gun company was immediately available and was assigned to cover the entire front, this being the only other incident already referred to in which the machine gun companies did not operate with the infantry battalions to which assigned, and in this case the assaulting battalion of the 6th Regiment was that to which the scattered machine gun company belonged. Reinforcements had to be sent up from time to time owing to extremely heavy casualties, until practically the entire battalion was in line or in close support. Thus the original company was widely scattered. However, all other companies were kept well intact. No attempt was made to get up rations to the front line companies on 19 July, owing to gas and extremely heavy shellfire, machine gunners rationing at this time from emergency rations carried by the men themselves. At dark on 19 July, orders were received for a relief by the French, which was finally effected about 0200, [with] the companies marching out to Bois de Retz where they bivouaced about daylight [on] 20 July.

On the night of 18 July, the battalion got some rest. Except [for] this brief period, they had been on the move under trying conditions from 16 July at 1700 until 20 July at about 0700.

During this time, the 6th Machine Gun Battalion had lost 97 men, killed and wounded, all of whom were casualties of 19 July. The advance on the eighteenth had been very rapid against a surprised enemy who gave little resistance. This was the start of the Allies’ offensive, which terminated with the Armistice.

The entire attack had been secretly and swiftly done. It was not known until almost dark on 17 July that the attack was to be made; maps were few; no one knew much about the plans; and considering these facts the execution of the attack was smooth. All caissons, gun carts, and rolling kitchens had been left far to the rear and neither the battalion supply officer nor the battalion commander had any knowledge of where they were going. On arrival, the battalion supply officer had to find the battalion in all the masses of thousands and thousands of men [that] were banked in the woods; to locate the position of the companies on the line; locate the ration dumps, ammunition dumps, etc.; place the battalion train in the best position possible for supplying the battalion; and to communicate with the battalion commander for instructions. The train officer through a representative reported his position and arrival before noon on 19 July, giving the precise location of all company kitchens, ammunition, caissons, etc., and being prepared at that time to immediately get up a hot meal in the event of necessity. One company being in support at that time was furnished with a hot meal—none of the others got it.

Platoon and company commanders had difficulty in reporting the position of their guns due to lack of maps; PCs were hard to find due to rapid movement and lack of maps; runners had to display the greatest amount of ingenuity; telephone lines were not run and could probably not have been maintained in the heavy shellfire of 19 July. Hot food was ordered prepared, the kitchens to meet the companies on relief; however, low flying aeroplanes bombed the kitchens, puncturing the coffee boilers of one of them, and the train was ordered to the rear by some officer unknown. As a result, the battalion got no food until late in the day. It is absolutely essential that someone in authority be with the train in order to prevent such occurrences as this. This bombing and machine gunning of the kitchens and trains by low flying aeroplanes caused us to put antiaviation brackets on many of the caissons. The spare guns of each company were carried on the caissons and whenever there was a prospect of encountering low-flying German planes, guns were mounted on these antiaviation brackets and tracer and armor-piercing ammunition carried available for immediate use. Had we had this disposition during the Soissons drive, we might have accounted for several Boche planes, provided, of course, the four mules hitched to the caissons felt so disposed. It is probable that one of the support companies brought down an enemy aeroplane while he was machine gunning our front line, as he was being fired on by many guns and came down in no man’s land.

Upon coming out of the fighting in Soissons, the 2d Division shortly found its way to billets in rear of Nancy where the 4th Brigade remained until the night of 5–6 August, when the first of the units relieved the French in the Marbache sector, Pont-à-Mousson. This, like the trench sector near Ver-
dun, was a quiet sector and was looked upon in the nature of a rest. Here the machine guns went into old established gun positions, many of them being concrete pill boxes or reinforced concrete positions in the cellars of houses in which the gun crews lived in comfort with even electric lights. Those guns fortunate enough to be thus placed had no trouble in maintaining their galleys at or nearly at the gun positions themselves. Rations were easy to get up and the work light. Some guns were not so fortunately situated, but even the worst positions were better than the average positions at Verdun.

The only activities in this sector were two attempted trench raids by the Germans, both of which failed—one on the night of 7 August, which was accompanied by heavy artillery preparation, resulting in the wounding of two men of the 23d Company, the only casualties sustained by the machine guns in this sector. The system of defense here was a series of strong points, two or more guns being in every strong point with about a platoon of infantry. On the first raid, the guns of one strong point with one each from adjacent strong points opened fire to protect the wire and fired for about one hour and 12 minutes, the raid being repulsed with heavy loss to the Germans. This raid was discovered before it really started, the Boche having a premature explosion among their pioneers while attempting to blow up the wire, in addition to being discovered by our patrols in no man’s land while they were on the way over. This gave their position away exactly and that fact alone insured the failure of the raid. The second raid was attempted the following night against the positions along the canal, the machine guns of which were those of the 81st Company. This raid got in close enough for the Boche to throw their hand grenades across the canal into the infantry positions, but they were unable to take prisoners, although it is probable that some of the raiding party got into the positions themselves. The fact that the Boche were able to get so close and have no guns bear on them developed a faulty disposition of guns [that] was immediately changed. The 81st Company had relieved the French only on the night of 7 August and had taken over the French gun positions, therefore, had been in less than 24 hours when the raid occurred. Trench raiding was given up by the Germans after these two unsuccessful attempts.

On 18 August, the division was again relieved and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion with the regimental companies of the 5th and 6th Regiments marched to Camp Bois de l’Évêque, where they remained until 3 September, overhauling material, and training personnel under the charge of the division machine gun officer. Officers and noncommissioned officers went to school and worked out the organization and direction of fire on the range; group and battery work was drilled and the machine gun units brought up in efficiency. This training period was much needed, as many of the replacements did not know machine gunnery, and while they had picked up much, there was still much to learn. The older well-trained men had become rusty, and in general the efficiency of machine guns was at about its lowest ebb in spite of the fact that we had been continually fighting since June. Our experiences had taught us that continual actual fighting with practically no drills and schooling does not tend to keep the units up to a high state of efficiency. Due to casualties and sickness, changes are made so fast that sometimes it is almost impossible for a battalion commander to keep up with the officers of his battalion. Especially in some technical units like machine guns is it necessary to hold school and drills to keep the personnel up to their mark. The private of one day is the sergeant of the next, while today’s sergeant is tomorrow’s lieutenant. Gun corporals are potential platoon commanders and must know how to read maps, make out barrage charts, work out all classes of indirect fire, and in general understand how to handle guns tactically to the best advantage of the infantry, and to give the infantry maximum fire protection without having to call on them for assistance. While this and much more is necessary to create the best, efficiency can be taught the average corporal, he cannot very well learn it for himself with the limited facilities available at the front, unless some form of schooling and drill is used. On the other hand, it is much easier to teach the average man at the front than it is to teach the average man in barracks in time of peace; he knows the reasons for things and besides has a consuming interest in being able to inflict his
will on the enemy and to prevent the enemy from inflicting his on him.

During our stay at Camp Bois de l’Évêque, we had field maneuvers in the American style of fighting in the open. Soon it became evident from this and from rumors and preparations daily being made that we were about to go in for a fight. Men returning from hospitals told us of the talk in the SOS [Services of Supply] of the big drive on the Saint-Mihiel salient and in other places.

On 3 September, the brigade started moving, continuing by night marches, billeting in the woods during the day until 8 September when all were in rear of the lines near Limey. Here we received complete maps, attack orders, intelligence data, etc., for the Saint-Mihiel drive. Barrage charts were made out, gun positions reconnoitered and constructed, fire data worked out, and ammunition dumps established. This was all done at night by working parties from the companies.

On the night of 11–12 September, all companies moved into their previously prepared battery positions for the barrage, each company having three batteries of four guns each. Routes were marked out beforehand and the companies were able to get fairly close to the trenches by mule carts, the return routes for trains across fields being also selected beforehand, so as to avoid the congestion on the roads, all traffic being on the move to the front on the last night and the roads being filled with artillery. Barbed wire had to be cut on these return routes and the openings had to be found in the dark and the rain, no mean achievement in itself. It was done smoothly and all company trains got back safely without casualty.

The plans of attack for the 2d Division called for the 3d Brigade to make the assault, the 4th Brigade following in support; later the 4th Brigade was to make a passage of lines and continue the attack or hold while the 3d Brigade was to be drawn in support. The regimental companies of the 5th and 6th Regiment were held with their regiments to avoid any possible chance of getting lost, while the 4th, 5th, and 6th Machine Gun Battalions formed the batteries and put down the indirect overhead fire, covering all tender points in the enemy lines. The intelligence maps of the Boche lines were wonderful; we knew the location of every PC, dressing station, tank trap, dump, machine gun position, artillery position, etc.; how he made his relief and by what routes; therefore, we could estimate how he would retreat. All these points we had studied for days ahead, and the machine guns were placed where the batteries could best harass these points.

Each company was to open fire at H-hour and to continue until our infantry had advanced into the danger zone, when it would cease, pack up, and join its infantry battalion as it passed the gun positions. The companies were placed so they would be in the path of advance of these battalions.

All guns opened at H-hour, 0500, and fired from 40 to 50 minutes, depending on their positions, the fire being not only over our own assault waves, but also over some of the supporting waves. Companies averaged about 15,000 rounds fired or about 30 rounds a minute. Orders were to fire one strip (25 rounds) a minute, as it was not the desire to get the guns so hot they could not be handled. This brings up again quite forcibly the desirability of having water-cooled guns, as with water-cooled guns four or five times this amount could have been fired with ease.

All companies joined their battalions (companies had to wait for battalions), the first to advance taking up the march about 15 minutes after the completion of the barrage. In the advance, the method of going forward was the same in all companies and was the result of careful study of other advances, not only ours, but also those of the British and French. This system might almost be termed the standard system of advance and was used by the 4th Brigade wherever possible hereafter. One machine gun platoon advanced on line with the leading wave of the support company of each infantry battalion and on its right flank, one in a similar position on the left flank, and one just in rear of the center. Thus they were able to protect the flanks of the battalion, effect cross fire over the heads of the leading waves, and therefore give them more protection than if actually with them. They were close enough to the leading waves to advance and consolidate with them if necessary and advisable, and they were well in hand. The rear platoon protected the flanks of the other two platoons, acted as the support to the whole line, and was charged with the antiaircraft protection work of the battalion, preventing
low flying planes from machine gunning the advancing infantry, and to this end was equipped with tracer and armor-piercing bullets. The machine gun company commander was with or near the infantry battalion commander, while the platoon commanders were with their platoons. Where visibility was good, only one platoon would advance at a time, the other two being set up ready to fire. During the advance at Saint-Mihiel, this was not always possible, as the rate of advance, 100 meters in four minutes, was steadily maintained and, while the guns had no trouble in keeping up with the infantry, in order to do so it was sometimes necessary to move more than one platoon at a time.

On reaching the objective and on the passage of the lines of the 3d Brigade, the guns took consolidating positions on the final objective. The Saint-Mihiel drive being one of the limited objectives and these objectives being gained the first day, the mission of the guns was then solely that of consolidation and defense. However, small movements were made at several places in the lines to get better defensive positions to withdraw to the objective in some instances where it had been overrun, and for similar reasons.

One or two interesting incidents occurred during this process. On one occasion, the guns of one platoon covered the infantry, which was withdrawing to better positions just as a Boche counterattack was launched, by walking back two at a time, always having two guns firing—this being done smoothly without previous instructions, with the guns fairly well scattered and with the platoon commander badly wounded—a graphic illustration of the work of well-trained noncommissioned officers who know what to do and who do it without orders. This is at all times an indispensable quality in machine gun noncommissioned officers who, owing to wide distribution of guns, are sometimes placed entirely on their own, as in emergencies it would frequently be too late to act on orders if they were waited for, even from the platoon commander, unless he happened to be at that particular place himself.

Another example of excellent judgment and handling came when a platoon commander with two guns observed a Boche counterattack break from some woods toward his front, in such a way that the leading wave was at an angle to his guns. Instead of opening on this good target, he waited until they had advanced some distance from the wood and had come into perfect enfilade, when he opened fire with tracer bullets checking up on his estimate of the range. Both guns were maintained at their maximum rate of fire with the result that this wave of about a hundred men (estimated) was practically annihilated, breaking the attack.

The advisability of having tracer bullets was again demonstrated here when a Boche Fokker plane flew low over the support lines while bringing down a French plane. The guns of the two companies in support opened on him with the result that he immediately crashed, landing about 10 feet from one of the guns, the pilot being taken alive.

On the evening of the 15th of September, the last of the machine guns were relieved by men of the 78th Division and marched by easy stages at night to billets where they remained from 21–26 September, and training was again resumed.

The improvement in the use and handling of machine guns was very marked in the fighting at Saint-Mihiel, and this was largely due to the prior knowledge of the plans. However, the training prior to the attack, and a better understanding of the tactical handling of guns by both infantry commanders and machine gun officers themselves, contributed largely to their success. There was no friction between units or arms, all having confidence in each other and working together, further developing that spirit which made the 2d Division the wonderful fighting machine it was. This is not to be taken to mean that there was friction at other times; there was none, although the development of the attack did not always proceed as smoothly due to various causes: newness to the game, lack of understanding of the tactical use of guns, poor liaison, lack of complete orders and maps may be mentioned as a few of these causes. Liaison here was fair, the battalion and regimental PCs being connected by telephone liaison between the company and battalion PCs by runner. It is interesting to note that all telephone communications between the 6th Machine Gun Battalion units and from battalion PC to brigade PC were made and maintained by battalion headquarters liaison men, this insuring quicker communication and relieving the [U.S. Army] Signal Corps of that work.
Over There
The rapid advance and road congestion, due
largely to artillery movement, made the ration supply difficult, again demonstrating the necessity of
good supply officers. The ammunition supply was
excellent, the company trains establishing dumps
in rear of the lines on the evening of the first day,
the caissons and carts being held further to the rear
with more ammunition in reserve.
On 27 September, the machine guns were again
on the move, entraining for an unknown area. Detraining on the morning of the twenty-eighth at
Vitry-la-Ville, march was made to Sarry [at a distance of ] 20 kilometers; after billeting that night
march was resumed on the morning of the twentyninth and continued for 14 kilometers when, as the
brigade was arriving in the zone of aerial observation, halt was made until night, then the march was
resumed until daylight when the 6th Machine Gun
Battalion camped in the Bois de Courtisal, north
of Suippes—distance marched, 46 kilometers. The
regimental machine gun companies in all these
movements moved with the regiments.
On 1 October, orders were received to advance
toward Somme-Py and to relieve the French there;
as this advance was to be made at night over the old
trench area of the Champagne in which the roads
were not well denned and the chances of getting
lost were great, and as no definite instructions had
been received as to dispositions, it was assumed the
machine gun disposition would follow that generally employed by the French, and the machine gun
companies were ordered to join their infantry battalions before or during the advance. Liaison was
established with the infantry and rendezvous decided on. This again brings up the advantages of
having machine gun companies always assigned to
the same infantry battalions; though no information had been received, yet companies were able to
join battalions with a certainty that should they be
so employed they were properly placed.
In order to make clear the difficulty of maintaining liaison with machine gun units, the following extract from the history of the 6th Machine
Gun Battalion is quoted. This, as will be seen, is
merely a log of events:
At 3.00 P.M., October 1st the 15th Company
established liaison with the 3rd Battalion, 6th

Marines. At 6.00 P.M., this date, it broke camp
and marched along the Souain-Somme-Suippes
road, where it joined the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines.
About 4.00 A.M., October 2nd, at a point
about 2 kilometres south of Somme-Py, position was taken in Trench de Gottingue.
The 23rd Company joined the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, at 5.45 P.M. at 267–270.0
(Tahure map), and marched with them at 7.15
P.M., via the Route Nationale to Somme-Py,
arriving there at about 2.00 A.M., October 2nd
and relieved the French in the support positions along the railway running through the
southern edge of the town; left of company at
railway station, and the right along embankment at 269.0–277.0 (Tahure map).
The 77th Company joined the 3rd Battalion,
5th Marines, on the Chaussere-Romaine road,
and marched with it. Relieved the French units
in reserve line Trench de Gottingue at 275.6–
268.5 (Tahure map), two platoons relieving the
French in Gottingue and one platoon relieving the French in Trench Stuttgart [at] 275.9268.7 (Tahure map). Relief completed at 3.30
A.M., October 2nd.
The 81st Company joined the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and relieved the French units
west of Somme-Py, in vicinity of 268.0–277.4
(Tahure map). Relief completed at about 4.00
A. M., October 2nd.
The French were confused and uncertain
about their own positions and those of the enemy. Roads were badly congested.
On October 2nd, the 15th Company remained in place all day. The attack scheduled
for 11.00 A.M. was postponed for 24 hours.
The 23rd Company remained in place, being
subjected to harassing fire from enemy machine
guns all day. The 77th Company remained in
place, guns set up for and fired at enemy avions,
and was shelled intermittently by enemy artillery. The 81st Company remained in place, establishing two new gun positions 266.8–277.6
(Tahure map). Personnel office took position in
Suippes.
On October 3rd, the 15th Company attacked
at 5.00 A.M.; 1st platoon with the 82nd Com53


pany on the right flank, 2nd platoon supporting the rear centre of the battalion, and the 3rd platoon supporting the left flank. Company Commander Captain Kingman was the battalion commander. The Company reached its objective without incident, taking up line 279.8–266.8–280.3–267.6 (Tahure map). The company remained in this position until October 4th.

The 23rd Company formed for attack with the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, along the railway embankment west of Somme-Py. Machine guns followed in the 2nd wave in squad columns. The advance began at 7.45 A.M., the company being subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire from left flank. The 6th Marines, along old improved road from point 266.0–280.0 (Tahure map), in Trench de Étienne, toward the south, two platoons of machine guns in line and one platoon held in support, at 10.00 P.M., drew back, acting on orders, to point 267.0–280.0 (Tahure map). Remained here until 5.00 A.M., October 4th. The 77th Company took up positions in Trench Dusseldorf 275.7–267.8 (Tahure map), at 5.00 A.M., 1st platoon with the 3rd platoon with the 45th Company, attacked in general direction of 343 degrees compass bearing, battalion in support of the 5th Regiment. Attack started at 5.50 A.M. Advance made to Bois de Somme-Py, arriving there at 2.00 P.M., remained in this position until 6.30 P.M., then moved forward to road 281.0–266.7 (Tahure map); the right flank at crossroads 281.07–267.2 (Tahure map), left flank about 900 metres west of crossroads. Gas and shellfire on the crossroads at night. The Company remained in this position until 6.00 A.M., October 4th.

The 81st Company received orders to advance at 5.50 A.M.—orders received at 5.40 A.M. The 1st platoon advanced with the right support company, the 2nd platoon being held at Battalion Headquarters as a reserve. All platoons were slow; in moving out, duel to lateness of receipt of the orders. The objective was gained at 8.30 A.M., and consolidated, 4 guns on the right flank, one gun with each centre company, and 3 guns on the left flank. One gun with the 5th Marines, having become lost from the company, joined the 5th Marines on its advance.

At 5.00 P.M., October 4th, the 15th Company, 1st and 3rd platoons, supported the 82nd and 84th Companies in the advance on machine gun nests on Blanc Mont. At 6.00 P.M., withdrew and remained in place until next day. The 23rd Company attacked with the 6th Marines, acting with support battalion. Two crews were knocked out while forming for attack. Great quantities of gas and shells were used. Two platoons supporting and one in reserve. Direction of the attack was toward St. Étienne and parallel to St. Étienne-Somme-Py road. Were shelled from arc of 300 degrees, but met with no resistance. The company reached a point 265.0–283.0 (Tahure map), about noon. Infantry fell back to a point 265.0–282.0 (Tahure map), and consolidated, two platoons remaining in advanced positions three hours to cover consolidation. Right of line in woods on right of St. Étienne-Somme-Py road at 266.0–282.0 (Tahure map). Line extended along the road a short way and then toward the west. Company Commander and second in command were casualties.

The 77th Company at 6.00 A.M., leapfrogged the 6th Marines, and advanced in general direction 343 degrees compass bearing, advance made without artillery preparation, and met with considerable artillery and machine gun fire. Platoons assigned as follows: 1st with 20th Company as left flank protection; 2nd with 16th Company, left flank of leading wave; and 3rd with 45th Company, right flank of leading wave. Advance was made to a point about 3 kilometres north of crossroads. Encountered opposition on right of line. On left, units met heavy machine gun and one-pounder fire from front and left flank and suffered heavy casualties. The 47th and 45th Companies advanced through woods toward St. Étienne the 3rd platoon using direct overhead fire to assist the advance. The infantry and machine guns were suddenly subjected to heavy machine gun fire from the front flanks—apparently the woods had not been cleared out during the advance.
The infantry retired harassed by machine gun fire, and on flanks notably the left flank (French). All guns were organized on line 265.5–282.4, 266.3–282.3 (Tahure map). This company now had only 9 guns, others being destroyed by shellfire or crews’ casualties in the advance. About 7.00 A.M., the 2nd platoon with the 16th Company encountered the enemy at close quarters, who attacked with hand grenades and tried to put the gun crews out of action before the guns could be set up. The attack was held up by pistol fire until the guns could be put in action. The 81st Company remained in place.

On October 5th, the 15th Company moved into support position behind the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and held front line for the remainder of the day. This line was from 284.2–265.4 to 284.2–266.1 (Tahure map). The objective was 287.1–263.0 to 287.6–260.0 (Tahure map), but was not reached. The 23rd, 77th, and 81st Companies remained in place.

On October 6th, the 15th Company at daylight moved forward to attack the enemy positions on the ridge due east of St. Ètienne, passing through the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Artillery preparation from 5.30 A.M. to 6.30 A.M. The attack succeeded. Formation of guns the same as for previous attacks. All platoons on the line for consolidation. The 23rd Company remained in place. The 77th Company at about 7.30 P.M., dropped back to Trench de St. Ètienne, on the slope of Blanc Mont. The 81st Company remained in place, becoming reserve on advance of the 5th Marines. At 4.30 P.M., moved forward, taking up positions along the ridge south of St. Ètienne.

On October 7th, the 15th Company remained in place. During the night the 142d Infantry arrived and occupied the same positions.

The 23rd Company at about 10.00 P.M. withdrew and took up reserve positions along Trench de St. Ètienne, from 266.8–281.2 to 267.5–281.1 (Tahure map). The 77th Company remained in place.

The 81st Company withdrew and took up reserve positions on Blanc Mont ridge.

On October 8th, the 15th Company remained in place, the 141st Infantry advanced at 5.20 A.M. The 23rd, 77th and 81st Companies remained in place.

On October 9th, the 15th Company remained in place. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, was relieved. The 23rd Company remained in place during the day. Relief was started at 3.00 A.M., October 10th, marching back along the Route Nationale, arriving at Camp Marchand at 4.00 P.M., October 10th. The 77th Company remained in place during the day, being relieved at 2.30 A.M., October 10th, and marched to Camp Marchand, arriving at 3.00 P.M., October 10th. The 81st Company remained in place during the day, being relieved at night by machine guns from the 36th Division, relief was completed at 1.30 A.M. Marched to Camp Marchand, arriving during the afternoon of October 10th.

On October 10th the 15th Company was relieved about dark, marched to Camp Marchand, arriving there about 4.00 A.M., October 11th. The personnel office and Supply Train joined the battalion at Camp Marchand.

From this account of the participation of the machine guns in the Champagne operations may be gleaned many formations, but interesting side lights are not shown. For example, the casualties in this fight, while not the greatest sustained, were heavy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell shocked</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gassed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of wounds</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>153</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These casualties were practically all from the gun crews, although some may have come from the train in bringing up rations, etc. A safe estimate of men engaged in the advance echelon would be about 7 men to a gun and 12 guns to a company; including officers, noncommissioned officers, and runners the companies may have averaged as high as 100 men to a company.
It may be well to note here how casualty reports are handled. The personnel office took its position in the town of Suippes near the train; this office consisted of the battalion adjutant and the necessary clerks, at least one being left from each company in charge of the company records, descriptive books, etc. The battalion medical staff was divided among the dressing stations where most needed; the guns being so scattered it was not practicable to establish a machine gun battalion dressing station. As far as possible, a hospital apprentice was kept in each of the different stations. As casualties would occur at the guns, they were reported by the next runner to battalion PC; each night as rations came up a copy was sent to the personnel office containing all casualties that had occurred since the previous report. These reports were on field message blanks, pieces of paper, or anything else available, and showed the nature of the wound or death. The regulation reports of casualties were made out by the personnel office after a careful check and sent on to the division personnel adjutant. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion's hospital apprentices kept a list of all machine gunners evacuated from stations at which they were serving; these lists were made from the carbons of the evacuation tags, and were checked by the personnel adjutant as soon as received after coming out of the line. This method with a careful muster made on the relief would usually show most casualties and keep the missing list small. The history of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion shows only eight missing men for the entire period of the war, and some of these have since doubtless been located.

Infantry protection for machine guns on the march is necessary, though seldom needed. The experience of the 77th Company in the advance in being attacked with hand grenades and in holding off this attack until the guns could be set up is interesting and the only time this occurred in the brigade. At least, it can be said the Boche were willing to take a sporting chance. Had they been able to get in on the guns before they were set up, they could easily have annihilated the gun crews. On the other hand, if the gun crews were able to get the guns up their own chances of escape were small and, on this particular occasion, the guns won.

Difficulty was again encountered in rationing companies owing to rapid and repeated change of position and congestion of roads. This difficulty is normal and must be overcome by excellent work on the part of the train. The best method of handling rations was discovered to be by almost personal work between the companies and the train, a man from each company train preceding the ration carts to the battalion PC with a map, if one is available. Here he can ascertain the position of the guns, which may have been changed since the preceding night, and arrangements can be made as to where the ration carts would deliver rations to each part of his company. This information is then sent by company runner to the company commanders with instructions as to where the ration parties were to meet the carts. Even this method has its disadvantages, as conditions may change to such an extent as to make it inadvisable to have the carts at the places selected by the battalion commander or to get the ration parties up to that point, owing to heavy shelling, gas, or some similar reason. However, like many other arrangements, this was the best that could be done, and while not as good as it might have been, was satisfactory.

It is to be noted that, during this fighting, information was lacking on many important points, causing some confusion. Orders were clear and concise, but unit commanders had but little information concerning the intention of the high commanders and were unable, therefore, to take correct action at all times. It is probable that the French staff work on these occasions was very good, but owing to the fact that most of the times during which the Marines fought with the French they were placed in line at the last minute they were therefore unable to receive full information as to plans.

In the capture of Blanc Mont ridge, 78 Boche machine guns were taken out of one nest. The Boche by this time had come to depend largely on machine guns for defense, but their lack of trained machine gunners was noticeable at times. In front of Saint-Étienne-à-Arnes, however, our line was held up for some time due to a very cleverly concealed nest of guns that was so placed in the open and without cover except from view that its fire appeared to be coming from an entirely different locality, and our inability to locate its exact position caused a delay in putting it out of action. During all of our fight-
ing from July to the Armistice, [we realized that] had the Boche had machine gunners as clever as the man who made this position, our losses would have been infinitely greater.

The period from the relief in the Champagne to 1 November was spent largely on the road. On reaching the billeting area upon relief, machine guns remained in camp for six days, when orders were received to march to Leffincourt and relieve the 73d French Division. A march of 109 kilometers was made. On arrival, these orders were revoked and the march back was started, which carried the brigade around the Argonne Forest up into positions to start the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne drive on 1 November. On this march, all six machine gun companies of the brigade were together and, while the infantry battalions were picked up by camions and given a ride after a rest of a few days in billets, the machine guns marched the entire distance, so again they reached the jump-off in a tired condition, although we had a short period of time between our arrival and the attack. This time was spent in constructing machine gun emplacements at night and preparing for the attack on 1 November.

The assault was made by the 5th and 6th Regiments passing through the 42d Division (American); all machine guns of the 42d Division remained in place assisting in the barrage until the advance had progressed to their limit of fire, when they withdrew. The entire machine gun personnel of the 2d Division less the two companies assigned to the assaulting battalions took part in the barrage, which lasted for [more than] two hours. It was feared that the assault battalions might lose their machine gun companies if the advance was as rapid as planned, had they taken part in the barrage; therefore, these guns were held ready for the assault in the jumping-off trenches. It is interesting to note that, in this barrage fire, the division had 255 machine guns working on about a three-kilometer front, which is, I believe, the largest number of guns ever employed on a front of similar length during the entire time of the war on the part of the Allies.

All preparations for this attack were made ahead of time and followed the general lines laid down in the Saint-Mihiel attack. Again emplacements were dug, fire data and barrage charts made out ahead of time; many guns had wet sand bags at hand to cool the barrels; ammunition was brought up and every contingency possible was provided for in advance. Again the disadvantage of air cooled guns was demonstrated. The 89th Division on our right, using Vickers water cooled guns, fired during the same length of time in preparation for their own attack over five times the amount of ammunition fired by the 2d Division.

In the plan of attack, a halt was to be made on the first objective, and here it was planned to put down a second barrage, positions being selected from the map and instructions issued as to what points were to be covered. On arrival at these positions, it was found inadvisable in some instances to attempt a barrage, owing to features of the ground and to the fact that while it is a very simple matter to draw an objective on a map it is a very difficult matter for all infantry units to stop exactly on that objective. Therefore, in some instances, we found our infantry had advanced a little beyond the objective in such a way as to make it extremely dangerous to our own troops to open fire. There were, however, several instances in which the guns were able to assist in the advance both to the first objective and beyond by direct overhead fire. This work was done in the reduction of machine gun nests and in the capture of artillery positions in which whole batteries were taken, the machine guns preventing the bringing up of the battery horses so that the field pieces could not be moved. In reducing machine gun nests they were able to obtain a preponderance of fire, and in that way to permit the infantry to encircle and take these nests with small loss. This is in itself an answer to many who contend that a machine gun is a good defensive weapon but useless on the offensive. The machine gun is as good an offensive weapon as defensive, but it must have well-trained personnel and must be handled in a tactically correct manner by infantry commanders. Lack of understanding of the powers and limitations of the machine guns caused a lack of efficiency in the work of the guns themselves. This the British were quick in discovering and in their machine gun training centre at Grantham, England, they had many courses which were attended by infantry officers alone. All general officers, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors were sent to these schools, as well as machine gun officers themselves, who not only learned machine
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gunnery here, but also were sent back from time to time on short refresher courses in order that they might keep up with the latest developments.

During the advance commencing 1 November, the machine gun platoons were on the flanks and center of the infantry using their same old dispositions, which were changed from time to time to meet the conditions of the advance, always, however, consolidating on the front line with the infantry whenever it halted.

Great difficulty was experienced in getting up rations and ammunition, owing to the rapidity of the advance and the conditions of the roads. About 5 November, the roads were only kept clear with tractors, and in supplying the companies with rations the machine guns fared better than the infantry as rations could be brought up by the light machine gun carts. Here also the machine gun trucks of the motorized battalion proved their worth—they carried ammunition to the front and wounded to the rear after all other forms of motor transportation except tractors had failed.

This fighting was some of the hardest the machine gunners had during the war, owing to the rapid movement during which they had their heavy guns and ammunition to carry. The weather was cold and rainy and the exhausted men, sleeping in the mud, when they had a chance to sleep, and getting little if any hot food, were rapidly being evacuated for sickness. This condition was getting to be serious, as around 10 November few of the companies had more than 50 percent of their total strength available for duty.

On 10 November, orders came to force the crossing of the Meuse, and on that night three companies—the 8th, 23d, and 81st—were ready for the crossing. The 81st did not make the attempt, owing to the fact that the bridges were shot away as fast as the engineers could throw them. The 23d, which by this time had only five active guns, put one gun over the river to protect the approaches on the successful laying of a bridge by the engineers, the other four guns being held in the near bank to cover the crossing which was made at the foot of the hill, on which the Boche had three tiers of machine guns rising one over the other. Due to casualties, these four guns had to be salvaged, so that that company managed to get only one gun over the river. The 8th Machine Gun Company went over and consolidated the positions gained. In spite of terrific opposition, this attacking force gained their objectives and, on the morning of 11 November, held the bridgehead that they had been ordered to take.

One of the interesting features of this crossing was a machine gun duel between a Boche gun and one of the 8th Company guns. The Boche gun was discovered after the 8th Company had gotten over the river, and it appeared to be not far away, firing at about right angles to the position of the 8th Company gun, which immediately set up and opened fire. The range was unknown and the location only visible by an occasional flash. As this gun of the 8th Company was one of the leading guns in the attack, it was safely assumed that the flash seen was that of a German gun. After several bursts of fire at varying ranges, the Boche gun became silent, and the following day the gunners were discovered dead at their guns not 100 yards away.

On the declaring of the Armistice, the 2d Division remained in position for about a week preparing for a march into Germany. During this time, the Hotchkiss machine guns of the 4th Brigade were replaced by the new Browning. New equipment was drawn and everything prepared to meet resistance on the march. The spirit of the men was excellent, as it had been all during the war. The 23d Company, which on the morning of 11 November had only one active gun in commission, turned in a few days later when drawing the Brownings, 16 Hotchkiss guns, almost complete, their total allowance. The spirit had been instilled into all machine gunners that where possible they must bring out all their guns. As an example, one gun was brought out in the Champagne [that] had been hit with a piece of high explosive shell on top of the handle block, the fragment penetrating into the mechanism and jamming there. No part of the gun could be moved nor could any part of it be taken down, and yet tired men brought that gun out by hand about 15 or 20 kilometers, just so they could say that they had not lost it—the gun itself being about as worthless as its equal weight in stone.

In the foregoing, probably more stress has been laid on the work of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion than on that of the two regimental companies of the 5th and 6th Regiments. The reason for this is
not that the companies of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion did any better work than the regimental companies, but solely because more data is available from the 6th Machine Gun battalion history on the work of those machine guns than there is on that work performed by the 8th and 73d Companies.

There are very many other features of the work of the machine guns in France, which are interesting and instructive, but in order to make a resume of the whole operation it is manifestly necessary to skim lightly over the subject and not spend too much time on any one phase.

The equipment used by the machine gunners of the 4th Brigade was the standard French Hotchkiss equipment; mule carts, Hotchkiss fire control equipment, etc. In addition, the 6th Machine Gun Battalion carried eight caissons, two to each company, which were the standard American infantry caissons; the regimental companies also carried two each. Escort wagons, rolling kitchens, ration carts, water carts, and medical carts, in accordance with the AEF tables of organization, were carried.

While the equipment was French in so far as the machine guns themselves were concerned, the organization of these companies followed more nearly the line of the British. On the adoption of the Browning, the Browning equipment was the same as that used by the French with the necessary changes in the carts to fit the difference in guns. This form of transportation proved very satisfactory, and I believe is more practical than that used by the British.

The training of machine gun units in France was originally along French lines; however, it was soon changed under orders from General Headquarters, AEF, so that the training then closely followed the British line. The British use of machine guns was in general better than that of the French. Their organization was different and the tactical handling of guns by the French changed little during the whole war. This may have been due to the fact that the French Hotchkiss gun was really not a machine gun in all respects, whereas the British Vickers was, and was therefore capable of being used according to correct tactical principles. The French machine guns were very frequently, even in the last stages of the war, used purely as automatic rifles. It was the British Machine Gun Corps [that] originated and perfected the barrage and battery system of firing, and while, according to our ideas, they carried this to extremes, yet the use of batteries was a decided step forward and at times of an estimable value. The lack of correct handling of machine guns on the part of the French was probably largely also due to the fact that each machine gun company was an independent unit in itself, by which I mean that it was independent of all other machine guns and formed part of an infantry battalion. It was found in all divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces that the regimental machine gun companies, no matter how well officered, were probably a little behind the organized machine gun battalions in efficiency, due without doubt to the fact that small units of specialist troops find it harder to train individually than a collected organization of such troops. This the British discovered early in the war, with a result that all machine guns were formed into a machine gun corps [that were] specially officered and specially trained. Battalions from the machine gun corps were assigned to brigades and operated with those brigades in the same manner that our machine gun battalions operated with our brigades.
**Division 9 Organized for Overseas Service**

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet was organized for overseas service, under command of Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, on 13 November 1917. The [USS] *New York* [BB 34] was designated as the flagship with the *Wyoming* [BB 32], *Florida* [BB 30] and *Delaware* [BB 28] completing the division. At this time, Division 9 was at Yorktown, Virginia, officially and publicly known as Base Two.

The vessels of Division 9 left Yorktown, Virginia, on 13 November 1917 for their respective Navy yards for overhaul and provisioning in anticipation of proceeding overseas. The division rendezvoused at Lynnhaven Roads, Virginia, on 24 November 1917.

**Marines in the Division**

At this time, the Marine officers serving onboard the vessels of Division 9 were as follows: *New York*, Major Nelson P. Vulte (division Marine officer and aide on staff of commander, Division 9), Major Julian P. Willcox, and First Lieutenant Richard H. Jeschke; *Wyoming*, Major Randolph Coyle and First Lieutenant Benjamin W. Gally; *Delaware*, Major Paul A. Capron and Second Lieutenant Donald U. Bathrick; *Florida*, Captains William H. Rupertus and Charles M. Jones.

**They Sail for Scapa Flow**

The division, escorted by the destroyer [USS] *Manley* [DD 74], sailed from the Virginia Capes on the afternoon of 25 November 1917. Rough weather was encountered almost at once, and increased in severity until on the thirtieth the wind was blowing considerably over 100 miles an hour. Due to the heavy weather, Thanksgiving Day festivities were featured by their absence. An enjoyable Thanksgiving dinner at sea requires an even keel and an appetite. Neither existed to any normal degree. Those who did eat can testify that it was like eating dinner on a seesaw or an express elevator with added minor distractions in the form of an inch or so of water sloshing around under foot and the air growing more stale and smelly beneath the battened-down hatches. By this time, everybody onboard the American vessels had learned of their destination—Scapa Flow, that mystery base in the Orkneys.

**Thanksgiving Day at Sea**

This day of thanksgiving fell on the twenty-ninth and the *Manley* celebrated it by becoming separated from the division. The *Delaware* dropped out of formation with a crippled port engine. The *Florida* also decided to go it alone and ran before the storm. The storm moderated on 2 December. On this date, the division was a very much scattered one, the *New York* and *Wyoming* being in company, while the *Delaware* and *Florida* were each in single blessedness somewhere. The storm had raised havoc with materiel. The *Wyoming* lost both lifeboats and had a steamer stove-in. The *Florida* rejoined on the fourth, but the *Delaware* did not show up until three days later.

At 0230 on the sixth, the *Delaware* spoke to HMS *Constance* [1915], and two hours later that vessel took position astern of the *Delaware*. These two vessels joined the division at the rendezvous off Cape Wrath at 0645 [on] the seventh.

**Arrive at Scapa Flow**

The American vessels were picked up by a British light cruiser, HMS *Blanche* [1909], and 10 destroyers early on the morning of the seventh and escorted into Scapa Flow, where the crews of the British vessels turned-to and gave the Americans a “hearty three cheers” and a royal welcome. It was “cold as the deuce” but, as one Marine expressed it in his diary, “Gun watches off. Hurrah!”

The first conscious act of the Marines after arrival was to coal—one of those heartbreaking coalings starting in empty bunkers. At this time, the Marines first became acquainted with the small
regulation bags of the British Navy holding about 200 pounds. The colliers looked sort of unfriendly and the coal itself was a fiendish mixture of fine, lung-filling dust [and] smothering lumps that defied the shovels and maddened the shovelers. A bitter wind added to the misery, while cutting snow-squalls were unwelcome visitors. It was an all-night sort of horrible nightmare and the stuff seemed to go aboard the ships with pitiful slowness. As one Marine remarked: “It was a new game, strange coal and stranger colliers, and we did not handle it well at first, but before long we had that darned Welsh coal trained so it would roll over and play dead.”

Official and personal matters were assisted greatly by the British assigning a vessel of their fleet to each of the four American battleships.

The Division 9 was designated as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

Proceed to Rosyth

Ten days at Scapa, and the American vessels moved to Rosyth with the Fifth Battle Squadron—25 knot oil-burning battleships, all veterans of Jutland, the commander-in-chief himself leading the way onboard the [HMS] Queen Elizabeth [1913]. The 300 miles were covered at 18 knots, which is not remarkable, but the fact that a flotilla of submarines—so-called tin-fish—held the same pace did make the Americans take notice. Of course, a screen of British destroyers was also present. The vessels anchored off the Rosyth Dock Yard near Edinburgh at about 0900 [on] the eighteenth.

Christmas and New Year’s Day were celebrated and many liberty parties were shoved off to Edinburgh while the ships were at this location.

The Labor Party, House of Commons, visited the New York on 20 December.

Admiral [John R.] Jellicoe went aboard the New York on the twenty-second and Admiral [David] Beatty the following day.

The division left Rosyth the day after Christmas and indulged in tactical maneuvers in the Firth of Forth, anchored off Burnt Island the same day, returning to Rosyth on the twenty-seventh.

Return to Scapa Flow

The American vessels returned to the storm and gloom of Scapa about the middle of January 1918. Accompanied by HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Iron Duke [1912], and a destroyer screen, they sailed from Rosyth on 14 January and arrived at Scapa Flow the next day.

The waters of Scapa swarmed with ducks of all kinds, while an occasional seal was observed.

There was a bright display of aurora borealis on the night of 30 January.

German Submarines Interrupt Maneuvers

The American vessels, as a squadron of the Grand Fleet, left Scapa Flow on 31 January for maneuvers in the North Sea. About 1000 [on] 1 February, the vice admiral, commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron, signaled the New York that there were two German submarines dead ahead of her, distant about 1,000 yards. Firing was heard from the direction of the British vessels, as the New York veered out of column to starboard, followed by the other vessels of the division. The destroyers attacked the submarines with depth charges and drove them down.

About 1140 of this same date, according to the log of the Delaware, that vessel “apparently passed over some sunken object as several distinct shocks were felt under torpedo room, first on starboard bow, then on port, then under fire room.”

The steering gear of the Florida jammed, and she avoided ramming a destroyer by a narrow margin on the above date.

A fire broke out and was extinguished on 4 February in the moulding shop of the Florida.

The crown prince of Denmark and our ambassador were guests of honor onboard the New York on 5 February.

The Mystery

On 6 February, the Florida vigilantes sighted a light on the horizon. It grew bigger and bigger. A steady red light. Even sleepy eyes kept vigil as they watched the phenomenon increase in size. They marveled. It assumed shapes of various objects and possessed an
uncanny appearance—as the visions of a drug fiend. It presented its own peculiar portent of evil to each observer. The suspense grew to a breathless terror, then—“the Moon!”

**Attacked by Submarines Near Norway**

The division, accompanied by the Third Light Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, sailed from Scapa Flow on 7 February for the purpose of escorting a convoy of small freighters to a point near Bergen, Norway. The *Florida* and *Wyoming* almost collided on the seventh.

Submarines were encountered on the eighth, about 20 miles off Selbiorns Fiord near Bergen. Since this location was in the path of the German submarines as they passed from Kiel to their northern base, the fleet was ready for them.

The speed and cleverness of the camouflaged battleship monsters were very suggestive of polo ponies as they wheeled and darted in their successful maneuvers in avoiding the submarines, torpedoes, and floating mines. During the attack, the *Delaware* became separated for a short time from the division. Her log best describes what happened, and reads in part as follows:

At 12:45 p.m., sighted British cruisers on starboard bow and starboard quarter. At 12:50 sighted coast of Norway, Bommelo Island, ahead and on starboard bow. At 1:17 sighted a fleet of merchant vessels on starboard bow. At 1:22 trained battery in direction of submarine as reported by U.S.S. *Wyoming*. At 1:36 U.S.S. *Florida* reported torpedo passed from starboard to portboard. At 1:41 destroyer dropped depth bomb two points abaft *Delaware’s* port beam. At 1:53 sighted wake of torpedo from primary on starboard bow. Put rudder hard right and torpedo passed port bow and along port beam. *Delaware* left formation. At 1:54 saw from primary and flying bridge the wake of a torpedo or more probably a periscope as it moved very slowly, so fired one shot from port anti-aircraft gun after which saw no more of torpedo or periscope. At 2:08 lookouts aloft sighted and reported wake of torpedo dead ahead. Put rudder hard left and passed just inside of wake which was not again seen after passing abaft the beam. Steamed at full speed away from locality and then maneuvered to rejoin squadron which was continuing on a southerly course. At 2:35 sighted four suspicious objects about 700 yards on starboard beam, by order, destroyer investigated and found same to be fish floats. At 3:25 caught up with and rejoined Division. Sounded the general alarm, general quarters on the bugle, and manned all battle stations to repel submarines and torpedoes where the wake of the torpedo was sighted.

The log of the *Florida* for this date shows that that vessel sighted the “wake of submarine” ahead; that the ship was headed for ramming but passed through wake after submarine had passed from port to starboard; that shortly afterward the ship was maneuvered “to avoid torpedo”; that at 1158 the ship was maneuvered to avoid another torpedo; that at 1408 two periscopes of submerged submarines were sighted and shortly afterward the wake of a torpedo passed close aboard from astern between the *Wyoming* and the *Florida*; that at 1406 a torpedo missed the *Florida* by about 100 feet.

The official story of the experiences of the *Florida* in this engagement is recorded in her log as follows:

At 1:35 p.m., U.S.S. *New York* hoisted “Submarine to Starboard,” and at 1:43 annulled it. At 1:40 changed course to 175 degrees. At 1:45 a submarine periscope was sighted from the conning tower bearing 30 degrees (relative) but was lost sight of U.S.S. *Florida* and U.S.S. *Delaware* fell out to port and starboard respectively to avoid torpedoes, and U.S.S. *Delaware* fired five-inch battery at periscope. Destroyer astern dropped two depth charges. In all, two submarines and five torpedoes were sighted by squadron.

In describing the experience of the *Wyoming* in the North Sea, one Marine expressed himself as follows:

These trips gave us new ideas in endurance and discomfort, watch and watch, zigzagging
steadily at 18 knots, fog, storm, and the North Sea, plus a big coaling the instant we got back to the base. The North Sea has attained a certain prominence during this war, but it is not yet sufficiently infamous. It is the darnedest, most miserable body of water ever, especially in winter, a rotten place to sail, fish, or fight. Once or twice a month it gets fairly clear, about as clear as Pittsburgh, but usually the visibility is unmentionable. Storms work up to a remarkable intensity in a few short hours, and then everything and everybody is wet and cold and inclined to think favorably of life on the old farm.

Our first trip we flushed a sub, which let fly a “tin-fish” across our bows and ducked. That was the memorable occasion when the Delaware broke loose and flew over the horizon like a hen in front of an automobile, her speed being estimated at 30 knots. * * * And, we did not stand Torpedo Defence watches in port in the Grand Fleet.

Another writer has described the North Sea as “a seething cauldron in a drenching mist.”

On the night of 9 February, another flurry hit the squadron. Searchlights were observed north of the ships lighting up the whole horizon. All were on the qui vive, but soon quieted down when the searchlights turned out to be nothing but the antics of old aurora borealis.

[The] Texas Arrives

The [USS] Texas [BB 35] joined the division at Scapa Flow on 11 February, having sailed from the United States on 30 January. Her Marine officers were Captain Pedro A. del Valle and First Lieutenant Frank P. Snow.

The Marines of the American vessels had their first experiences in the building of roads on British territory when they landed on 12 February, [Abraham] Lincoln’s birthday, to assist the natives in that work. This was but the first of several visits ashore for a similar purpose.

Submarines a Nuisance during Maneuvers

The division sailed from Scapa Flow on 16 February, participated in the maneuvers with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and returned to Scapa Flow on the 17th. During this cruise, German submarines were cause for worry to the Florida, Texas, and Delaware. The log of the Delaware for the sixteenth reads as follows:

At 9:25 a.m., sounded the general alarm and stationed all hands at action stations. At 9:45 the U.S.S. New York reported a submarine on her port hand. Changed course to starboard and went ahead full speed to avoid submarine as reported by the U.S.S. New York. Steadied on course 50 degrees true and sighted what appeared to be a submarine periscope, dead astern, distant about 700 yards. At 10:00 changed course to regain position in formation and resumed standard speed.

The log of the Texas states that at 0920 the crew of that vessel “went to General Quarters” and later No. 20 gun fired once at “what appeared to be a submarine periscope,” 600 yards off.

The only reference in the log of the Florida of the sixteenth to submarines was: “At 9:40 a.m., sighted submarine on port beam. Sheared out,” etc.

The weather experienced during this cruise was rather tempestuous, one who was present stating that “it raised Cain with the top and bottom of the Old North Sea.” The heavy seas damaged the boats of the American vessels, particularly those of the Delaware.

The New York shifted the flag to the Wyoming on 18 February, on which date she sailed from Scapa Flow for New Castle-on-Tyne, to have her paravanes* installed. She rejoined the fleet on 3 March.

[George] Washington’s birthday was celebrated at Scapa Flow.

* An underwater defensive device against mines, consisting of a pair of torpedo-shaped vanes towed at the bow of a ship, usually a minesweeper, by cables that can cut the cable of a moored mine, causing the mine to rise to the surface, where it can be destroyed or removed from the water.
Submarines Engaged while on Escort Duty

[On] 8 March the division, with the Second Light Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, sailed from Scapa Flow on convoy duty for Silbourns Fiord. The squadron, on 11 March, ran into a fog bank and the New York and Delaware tried for the port gangway of the Florida. At 1135 [on] the twelfth, the Delaware sighted a torpedo on her starboard beam. The sun glare interfered in locating the submarine. The Florida’s log of the twelfth reported the fact that “at 11:40 a.m., Delaware hoisted submarine port warning.” The Wyoming’s log of the twelfth states that “at 11:43 Delaware reported a submarine going from port to starboard.” Floating mines were also encountered on this cruise and were sunk by the gunfire of the destroyers.

At 0800 [on] 13 March, the vessels half-masted their colors in honor of the late former Secretary of the Navy G[eorge] von L. Meyer.

St. Patrick’s Day, the seventeenth, was not forgotten, although little opportunity was given for celebrating.

Three admirals and one commodore of the Royal Navy visited the New York on 31 March.

On 2 April, the Delaware left Scapa Flow for New Castle for docking and paravanes installation, sailed from New Castle on 16 April, and rejoined the fleet at Rosyth on the 17th.

Second Visit to Rosyth

Leaving Scapa Flow on 11 April, the division, with the Grand Fleet, arrived at Rosyth on the 13th.

Engagement with German Submarines

The division, less the Delaware, left Rosyth on 17 April on escort duty to Norway and returned to Rosyth on the 20th. On the seventeenth, the Texas fired at a submarine forward of the Florida. The destroyers dropped four depth charges. The Florida’s log for the seventeenth shows that “at 3:40 p.m. Texas hoisted submarine sighted to port signal.”

The Wyoming left Rosyth for New Castle for docking and paravanes installation on 23 April and rejoined the division at Rosyth on 9 May.

The New York was visited on 23 April by a French admiral.

Searching for the German Fleet

On 24 April, the division, less the Wyoming, sailed from Rosyth with the Grand Fleet for the vicinity of Heligoland, on another “baiting” cruise for the Germans. News had been received that the German High Seas Fleet was out, but the Grand Fleet returned to Rosyth on the twenty-sixth without meeting the enemy’s fleet. During this cruise, at about 0730 on the twenty-fifth, the Americans heard firing, and at 0745 the destroyers opened fire, signaling that they had sighted mines.

On 8 May, a division of British destroyers fired torpedoes at the vessels of the Sixth Battle Squadron for practice.

On 9 May, the Florida sailed for New Castle for docking and paravanes installation and rejoined the division at Rosyth on 25 May.

The Marine detachment of the New York, under Major Willcox, went ashore at Rosyth and drilled for a detachment of British Marines under Major Wainwright of HMS Barham [1914].

The New York was inspected on 28 May by the Duke of Atholl, King George’s personal representative.


On 7 June, the Deputy First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, visited the New York. He followed his inspection of the ship with an optimistic speech offering a rousing welcome to the Americans.

Admiral Sir David Beatty visited the New York on 12 June.

Back to Scapa Flow

On 19 June, the division left Rosyth for Scapa Flow, where they arrived the next day. A new game was tried there—covering the U.S. mine layers as they placed the great mine barrage across the North Sea.

At Scapa in June, the midnight sun could almost be seen; it was light enough to read all night and sunset and sunrise were practically all in one.
Escort American Mine Layers and Drive Off Submarines

The division, with the Sixth Light Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, left Scapa Flow on 30 June to act as escort for the American Mine-laying Squadron that put down the North Sea mine barrage from a point off the Orkneys to the Norwegian Coast. They soon picked up the [USS] San Francisco [C 5] and three other American mine layers.

At 1625, the Wyoming sighted what appeared to be the periscope of a submarine and opened fire with the starboard after-group of 5-inch guns. The Wyoming went full speed ahead on both engines and turned to port, which brought the submarine astern. The Wyoming ceased firing shortly after and resumed her position in formation.

The log of the Florida showed that she fired one shot at 1625 from her No. 9 gun at a periscope wake on her starboard quarter; and at 1630, destroyers dropped depth charges.

The log of the Texas discloses that the Wyoming reported a submarine at 1626. The log of the Delaware shows that what appeared to be the wake of a submarine was sighted at 1630 dead astern.

About an hour later, the submarines appeared again. At 1725, the port sky gun of the Florida fired one shot at a periscope wake on the starboard quarter and five minutes later the destroyers dropped depth charges. The log of the Wyoming states that “at 5:22 p.m. Delaware and Texas opened fire on submarine on starboard quarter.” The antiaircraft guns of the Texas fired two shots at the periscope. The log of the Delaware shows that a submarine wake was sighted at 1724, and that [the] No. 1 antiaircraft gun fired three shots and [the] No. 13 5-inch gun fired three shots. A submarine wake, or what appeared to be such, was observed between the Florida and Wyoming. No shots were fired as it was concluded to be a “hallucination created by wakes meeting.”

On 1 July, the Delaware sighted a mine, which was sunk by the destroyers.

Fourth of July Celebrated at Scapa Flow

The division returned to Scapa Flow on 2 July, and the Fourth of July was celebrated “in the dreary North.” The division, with the Grand Fleet, sailed from Scapa Flow on 6 July for maneuvers off Jutland Bank and arrived at Rosyth on the 8th.

At Rosyth Again

The Texas returned to Scapa Flow on the seventh and rejoined the division at Rosyth on the morning of the twelfth.

King Albert I and Queen Elizabeth of Belgium visited the New York on 9 July. As their majesties approached the ship, the American kite balloon fell from its height in a flaming spiral into the firth.

The Arkansas Joins the Division

The [USS] Arkansas [BB 33] sailed from the United States on 14 July. At 1425 on 22 July, [the] No. 2 sky gun of the Arkansas fired two shots at an object on the port beam. Later the submarine oscillator indicated a sound to the starboard. She picked up Cape Wrath light on the twenty-fifth and anchored at the Northern Base on the same date. While cruising from the Northern Base to rejoin the division at Rosyth, the Arkansas experienced some thrills. At 2102 [on] 28 July, a submarine periscope was sighted and [the] No. 2 sky gun fired 35 shots, while the destroyers dropped depth charges. She joined the division at Rosyth on the twenty-ninth. The Arkansas brought over the House Naval Committee. Her marine officers were Captains Roy D. Lowell and Charles I. Emery.

The battalion of Marines from the division was ashore on 15 July at Rosyth for drill.

King and Queen of England Visit the New York

The King and Queen of England visited the New York on 22 July. Prior to this visit HMS Oak [1912], carrying the royal guests, passed down the line and the usual honors were rendered, including the three cheers from the men manning the rails. Details from each of the American ships went onboard the flagship New York to welcome the royal party.

On the 27th of July, the House Naval Committee visited the flagship New York.
The Delaware Returns to United States

The Delaware, flying her “homeward bound” pennant, sailed for the United States on 31 July and arrived at Yorktown, Virginia, [on] 12 August.


With the American Mine Layers

Early on 8 August, the division with the Fifth Battle Squadron and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth as escort for the American Mine-laying Squadron.

The log of the Wyoming, under date of 8 August, states that “at 12:53 p.m., sighted a buoy with red flag on port bow distant about 1,000 yards. Passed buoy abeam distant 75 yards.” Later: “At 10:06 p.m. sighted object resembling a periscope one point abaft port beam distant 250 yards. Blew one blast on siren and headed away from object at full speed.”

The log of the Arkansas for 8 August records the fact that the Wyoming had sighted an upright stick in the water and that the Florida had reported a torpedo crossing the bow. The log of the Florida for the eighth reads that “at 10:05 p.m. torpedo passed ahead from port to starboard.”

The log of the Texas for 9 August states that the Arkansas sighted a submarine at 0652, and fired with her five-inch guns. The Texas fired twice at the submarine and the destroyers dropped depth charges. The log of the Arkansas for 9 August states that “at 6:54 a.m. a periscope was sighted and that fire was opened on it with port sky guns. Also that Wyoming and Texas also opened fire and that destroyer dropped a depth charge.”

The division arrived back at Rosyth on 10 August. On 19 August, the battalion of Marines was ashore for a hike of about eight and a half miles.

On 20 August, a congressional committee visited the New York.

On 22 August, the division sailed from Rosyth and participated in maneuvers with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea as part of the Red Fleet. It was a storm cruise and everybody was glad to get back to Rosyth on the twenty-fourth.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt visited the division on 29 August.

A battalion of American Marines from the division, under command of Major Vulte and the British Marines from the Fifth Battle Squadron, drilled together ashore at Rosyth on 5 September. Moving pictures were taken of the drills, parades, etc.

Samuel Gompers* visited the New York on 11 September.

Admiral Mayo and [his] staff visited the New York on 21 September.

Playing Tag Between Scapa Flow and Rosyth

The division left Rosyth on 23 September and arrived at Scapa Flow two days later during a nasty gale. Five days later, the thirtieth, the division, in company with the Grand Fleet, sailed from Scapa Flow and arrived at Rosyth on 1 October.

On 9 October, a fire occurred in the storeroom near No. 4 handling room of the Texas at 2030.

Several officers were detached and several joined on 10 October. Captain William H. Rupertus was detached from the Florida and Second Lieutenant James B. Darby joined. First Lieutenant Richard H. Jeschke was detached from the New York and Second Lieutenant William C. Hall joined.

First Lieutenant Benjamin W. Gaily was detached from the Wyoming on 12 October. Second Lieutenant Edward Earle joined on the 10th.

Second Lieutenant Stanley E. Wilson joined the Texas on 10 October, and First Lieutenant Frank P. Snow was detached 14 October.

The division sailed from Rosyth on 12 October and arrived at Scapa Flow the next day.

Out to Head Off German Raiders

The greatest thrill of all came in the middle of October. “Enemy ships, heading for Pentland Firth at high speed,” trying to escape into Atlantic to

* Samuel Gompers was a cigar maker who emigrated to New York in 1863. He helped organize Cigarmaker’s International Union and made it a model for other unions. In 1881, he helped establish the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, which was reorganized into the American Federation of Labor. Gompers was the organization’s first president and held the post for more than 40 years.
raid shipping. It was black as ink and blowing up a bit. Out through Pentland Firth which, with its skerries* and tide rips, is considered a murderous piece of water even in broad daylight, the vessels dashed. Battle stations at 0200; no sleep for anyone all night. Daylight found the American vessels in company with some old British battle cruisers and light cruisers in the Atlantic, searching, hoping and praying for a chance to justify their existence as fighters; but, as expressed by one of the disappointed, they “never did hear another word about those damn raiders.” This was on 14 October, and the vessels arrived back at Scapa Flow the same day.

**The New York Bags a German Submarine**

At 1645 [on] the fourteenth, while returning to Scapa Flow from heading off this reported German battle cruiser raid, the New York struck a submerged object in Pentland Firth near the entrance to Scapa Flow. This was later pronounced to be an enemy submarine, and so the New York was officially accredited with [downing] a German submarine. The starboard propeller of the New York was so severely damaged that she had to go to New Castle for repairs. On her way down, she was attacked by enemy submarines, but drove them off. On 15 October, the flag was shifted to the Wyoming when the New York left for Rosyth for repairs.

**At Rosyth**

The division, less the New York (Wyoming flying the flag), left Scapa Flow on 18 October and arrived at Rosyth the next day. The Wyoming sighted a floating mine on the morning of the nineteenth and destroyer sank it with gunfire. The Texas sailed for New Castle for docking and paravanes installation on 20 October and rejoined the division on 5 November.

Prince Yorihito of Japan, accompanied by Prince Arthur of Connaught, visited the New York on 3 November.

The king, queen, and crown prince of England on 20 November visited the New York.

* Ledges, rocks, cliffs, shelves, or ridges.

**Celebrating the Armistice**

“Armistice Day” was celebrated in a most elaborate manner. The entire Grand Fleet was assembled in the Firth of Forth on the afternoon of 11 November. That afternoon, Queen Elisabeth signaled, “Splice the main-brace. Negative 6th B.S.,” which in plain English meant: “Everybody get an edge on except the American Squadron.” Another report of the general signal broadcasted from [the] commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet, was: “The Armistice commenced at 11:00 to-day, Monday, and the customary method in His Majesty’s service of celebrating an occasion is to be carried out by ships’ companies splicing the main brace at 9:00 p.m. to-day. Hands are to make and mend clothes.” Needless to say the signal was obeyed. By sundown, all was set for the grand celebration. It was like a good old-fashioned football celebration or election night in New York. King George reviewed the fleet, and everybody manned the rail with eager willingness.

Every searchlight was turned on from 2100 until 2230. Every whistle and siren in the fleet—and there must have been at least 300—broke loose. Every hand was on deck with all the noise they could muster. Commanding officers made speeches at the urgings of the crews.

The firth was teeming with small craft carrying jubilant and noisy throngs—officers and men—up and down the line. Many of these stopped long enough at the gangways of the dry American battleships to embark a load of Americans to the ships where General Order No. 99 did not apply. Motor sailors from the American ship, manned by large crews, carrying bands and flying American, British, and French colors, passed around the fleet. The celebration lasted well into the night, and it is quite probable that no other Armistice Day celebration in the world equaled it in brilliance or in noise.

**Surrender of the German High Seas Fleet**

On the 21st of November, Admiral Beatty wired the following message to the admiralty: “The Grand Fleet met this morning at 9:20, five battle cruisers, nine battleships, seven light cruisers, and forty-nine destroyers of the High Seas Fleet, which
surrendered for internment and are being brought to Firth of Forth.”

And this was “The Day.”

The American battleships occupied a prominent position in the north column of the Grand Fleet on the occasion of the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918, off the mouth of the Firth of Forth. They assisted in escorting the German vessels into port, but did not accompany them to Scapa Flow, where they were interned.

The division, in company with the Grand Fleet, got under way at about 0330 on the twenty-first. At 0846, HMS Cardiff [D 58], leading the German High Seas Fleet, was sighted. The American squadron countermarched and steamed on parallel course to German fleet for the Firth of Forth. May Island was sighted about 1200; Fidra Gap was passed shortly before 1300; Inchkeith was passed about 1345; Black Rock Gate was passed through about 1350 and Oxcars Gate about 20 minutes later; and the Americans came to anchor about 1420. The Queen Elizabeth stood-in about half-past three and the usual honors, including three cheers for Admiral Beatty, were accorded. One of those who was present wrote: “Then at last we did meet the German High Seas Fleet, on Surrender Day, and escorted it into the Firth of Forth. It was a wonderful, almost terrible, sight; and it gave one a feeling of embarrassment in looking on at another’s shame.”

Admiral Beatty said: “It was a pitiful day to see those great ships coming in like sheep being herded by dogs to their fold, without an effort on anybody’s part; but it was a day that everybody could be proud of.”

The Nevada Joins

The day after the surrender of the German Fleet, the [USS] Nevada [BB 36], that had been serving with Division 6 of the Atlantic Fleet stationed at Bantry Bay, Ireland, joined Division 9 (Sixth Battle Squadron), at Rosyth, and proceeded with it to Portland. The Marine officers serving on the Nevada were Major Rolland E. Brumbaugh and Captain Sidney W. Wentworth.

American Vessels Leave British Grand Fleet

On the forenoon of 1 December, the Sixth Battle Squadron of American battleship prepared for sea, being under orders to weigh anchor at 1145.

Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman paid his respects to Admiral Beatty on the Queen Elizabeth and returned to the New York. Quite a number of the flag and commanding officers of the Grand Fleet went onboard the New York unofficially to pay their respects. Admiral Sir David Beatty went onboard the New York about 1100. He was piped over the side, and received by eight officer sideboys,* Rear Admiral Rodman and [his] staff, the commanding officers of the American vessels, and the officers of the New York.

All hands were mustered on the forecastle, and Sir David Beatty, commander-in-chief of the British Grand Fleet, made a cracking good speech in his usual, straightforward, sailorman’s style.

Rear Admiral Rodman replied in a few words to Admiral Beatty’s speech, saying that the sentiments expressed by him were most heartily reciprocated; that this feeling could not be put in words; and that they would give a demonstration of their feeling toward the commander-in-chief by giving him three rousing cheers.

Admiral Beatty left the New York, the American vessels got under way, broke out “Homeward Bound” pennants, and proceeded out of the harbor, exchanging cheers and messages of friendship and good luck with everybody.

The New York, followed by the Texas, Nevada, Arkansas, Wyoming, and Florida, in column, were escorted to May Island by the Fifth Battle Squadron and the Eleventh Destroyer Flotilla. The Barbam, Vice Admiral Arthur C. Levenson’s flagship, and the [HMS] Malaya were on the starboard, and the [HMS] Valiant [1914] and [HMS] Warspite [03] on the port. The Eleventh Flotilla took up a screening formation ahead and on either beam. Upon approaching May Island, the British units turned outboard and exchanged farewell cheers and fe-

* A sideboy is a member of an even-numbered group of seamen posted in two rows at the quarterdeck when a visiting dignitary boards or leaves the ship.
licitous messages with the Americans, the Barham displaying the plain English hoist “Good Bye-e-e-e-e-e-e.”

Admiral Beatty radioed the following message to the departing Americans:

Your comrades in the Grand Fleet regret your departure. We trust it is only temporary and that the interchange of squadrons from the two great Fleets of the Anglo-Saxon race may be repeated. We wish you good-bye, good luck, have a good time and come back soon.

The reply message read as follows:

Your friendly and brotherly signal of God speed deeply appreciated by the officers and men of the Sixth Battle Squadron. We will never forget the hospitality which has made us feel as a part of one big family and we intend to maintain that relation for all time. We all hope to serve again under your command.

Fleet Honors President Wilson

Sailing from Rosyth on 1 December, the American vessels arrived at Portland on the 4th, finding the [USS] Utah [BB 31], Oklahoma [BB 37], and the Arizona [BB 39] in the harbor. The Marine officers on these vessels were: Utah, Major Leon W. Hoyt (division), Captain Keith E. Kinyon and First Lieutenant James J. Bettes; Arizona, Captain David H. Owen and Second Lieutenant Joseph L. Nolan; and Oklahoma, Captain William H. Davis and First Lieutenant Clifford C. Cowin.

Admiral Sims went aboard the Wyoming just before the two divisions (6th and 9th) sailed from Portland for Brest on 12 December. On the morning of the next day, the [USS] George Washington [ID 3018] (flying the president’s flag) and the [USS] Pennsylvania [BB 38] (flying Admiral Mayo’s flag) were sighted. The president was rendered full honors. Anchoring off Brest, France, on the thirteenth, the rails were manned and other honors rendered as the George Washington and Pennsylvania passed in. The Marine officers of the Pennsylvania were Colonel Frederic L. Bradman (fleet), Major George C. De Neale, and Second Lieutenant Alien R. Sherman. Those of the George Washington were Major David H. Miller and Second Lieutenant Louis F. Peiper.

The Wyoming, carrying as passengers Admiral Sims and Mr. Davis, the newly appointed American ambassador to Great Britain, sailed from Brest on the afternoon of the thirteenth and arrived at Plymouth, England, the next day. Admiral Sims and Mr. Davis left the ship. The ship was coaled and sailed to join Divisions 6 and 9 en route from Brest for the United States.

Sail from Brest for Home

The Divisions 6 and 9 (less the Pennsylvania, that rejoined shortly after sailing, and the Wyoming) sailed on 14 December for the United States. The Utah dropped out on the seventeenth and rejoined the next day. The Wyoming rejoined on the twenty-first. Land was sighted about 1200 of Christmas Day. The vessels came to anchor off Ambrose Lightship early on the twenty-sixth and later proceeded into the harbor.

Home

The return of the overseas battleships was signaled by a notable naval review on the morning of the twenty-sixth, for which all available vessels of the fleet in home waters were assembled. The returning ships were accorded a great demonstration as they steamed into New York Harbor. The secretary of the Navy onboard the [USS] Mayflower [PY 1] and the assistant secretary of the Navy on the [USS] Aztec [SP 590] reviewed the homecoming of the battleships. Onboard these vessels were also the secretary of war and other cabinet members, senators and members of Congress, representatives of the diplomatic corps, Navy, Marine Corps and Army officers, and distinguished civilians who had rendered conspicuous service during the war. The naval review was followed by a land parade of all the returning officers, bluejackets, and Marines.
In common with every new weapon introduced to the military Service, Marine Corps aviation has travelled a rocky and uphill road. Its small size has tended to make the jolts more frequent and severe. Nothing short of the firm conviction that it would ultimately become of great service to the Corps sustained the enthusiasm of the small number of officers who have worked to make it a success. The past year has seen the completion of the first of the stages through which our aviation must pass. Prior to this, we had practically no official status or recognition. While we sent 182 officers and 1,030 men to the front in France, and they made a splendid record under severe conditions, we had no aerodromes at home, no shops or other facilities; in fact, nothing permanent [belongs to aviation], and could very readily have been disbanded entirely. When it was realized that the Marine Corps’ permanent strength of 17,000 was entirely inadequate and that a larger permanent strength must be requested, the figure decided upon was approximately one-fifth the authorized strength of the Navy, or about 26,380. It was desired to utilize this number for ground duties; therefore, Congress was asked to authorize an additional 1,020 men for aviation duty, making the total 27,400. This gave us permanently our aviation personnel. The next task was to secure well-equipped home stations for our personnel, and it required the surmounting of many discouraging obstacles before the Navy Department, which handles the expenditure of all aviation funds, approved the construction of flying fields at Quantico, Parris Island, and San Diego. With this much accomplished and our men and pilots well trained, we feel that the time has about arrived when we can demonstrate our usefulness to the Corps, which I am confident will be great.

One of the greatest handicaps [that] Marine Corps aviation must now overcome is a combination of doubt as to usefulness, lack of sympathy, and a feeling on the part of some line officers that aviators and aviation enlisted men are not real Marines. We look upon the first two criticisms complacently, knowing that we can abundantly prove our usefulness even to the most skeptical, and that when we have done so, we will receive the sympathy and hearty support of all Marine officers. The last criticism we resent vehemently as an injustice, so far as it applies to loyalty, supreme pride in the Corps, and a desire to do what is assigned to us as quickly and as well as it can be done. Conditions arising from the necessity of organizing and training in a short time an aviation section, with practically nothing to start with and the nature of the duty, which does not allow the older officers to keep their juniors continually under their observation and guidance as is allowed in ground work, may have prevented the instillation in the younger pilots of all the qualities necessary in a Marine officer to the same degree as is done in infantry work. We have realized this difficulty and have made an earnest effort to overcome it and believe, with some few exceptions, that we have been successful. Now since the rush of organizing for war service is over, this difficulty will be easily and simply overcome and the task of aviation officers made much more simple by taking into aviation only those young officers who have had enough service with infantry troops to be thoroughly indoctrinated with Marine Corps discipline and spirit.

It is fully realized that the only excuse for aviation in any Service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations. Having in mind their experience with aviation activities in France, a great many Marine officers have expressed themselves as being unfriendly to aviation and as doubting its full value. I am confident that this must have been caused by some local condition, as the French, British, and Belgian troops in the sector over which the 1st Marine Aviation Force and the British squadrons operated were enthusiastically “full out” for aviation. In our own aviation section we intend, before asking a vote of confidence from the remainder of the Corps, to demonstrate to their complete satisfaction that we can contribute in a surprising degree to the success of all their operations, save many
hours of weary, fruitless “hiking” and materially shorten each campaign. Previous to now, we have had no opportunity to do this. During the war, we were unfortunately not allowed to serve with the 4th Brigade, but were placed in a sector containing only British, French, and Belgian troops. Since the war, all our effort has been required to secure flying fields and the construction of buildings and hangars on them. We would have been hopelessly handicapped without these facilities. Now since they are nearing completion, we are looking forward with enthusiasm to our real work of cooperating helpfully with the remainder of the Corps. All we ask is a spirit of cooperation and encouragement, and that judgment be reserved until the proper time.

Judging from the unfamiliarity of the average Marine officer with what has been accomplished by Marine aviation, we have failed woefully to advertise. A short resume of what has been accomplished will perhaps be of interest.

In May 1912, when the writer was detailed for aviation, the Marine Corps took very little interest in the subject. In those days, it was looked upon more as a crazy sport than as anything useful, and when I look back on the old original Wright 35-horsepower planes I flew, where one sat on a board projecting out into atmosphere, I am inclined to agree with that view. About eight months later, another Marine officer was assigned to aviation and, during the next year, we accumulated six Marine enlisted men. There was very little increase in personnel until the [First] World War began. On 6 April 1917, Marine aviation amounted to 4 officers and 30 men, all part of the complement of the Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. From this time, we began to work energetically for expansion. Our ambition was to organize a first-class aviation force to operate with the Marine forces we hoped would be sent to the front. During the next few months, we secured a flying field at Philadelphia, organized a full squadron of land planes, and began intensive training, so that we would be ready to go to France with the other Marine Corps forces. In order to have the latest aviation information, the commanding officer of this squadron was sent to France to serve with the French aviation forces for three months. This officer made every possible effort, both with the War Department in Washington and American Expeditionary Forces in France, to secure authority for our Marine aviation squadron to serve with the Marine brigade in France. No success whatever attended these efforts. Army aviation authorities stated candidly that if the squadron ever got to France it would be used to furnish personnel to run one of their training fields, but that this was as near the front as it would ever get. Confronted with this discouraging outlook, the squadron commander set about to find some other way of getting his squadron into the fight. The only aviation operations abroad planned by the Navy at that time were antisubmarine patrols in flying boats. After visiting the Navy flying station at Dunkirk, France, and talking with officers of the British destroyer patrol, it was realized that Marine aviation’s opportunity to get into the fight lay right here. The situation was as follows: submarines were causing enormous losses to shipping; their main operating bases and repair shops were [in Belgium] at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges, all within easy reach by plane from Dunkirk; and the water for 10–15 miles off these bases is so shallow that a submarine cannot safely negotiate it submerged. If these waters could be patrolled continuously during daylight with planes carrying heavy bombs, submarines attempting to enter these bases could be destroyed. Destroyers were prevented from patrolling these shallows efficiently in daylight by the heavy shore batteries, but could under the cover of darkness and with mines close the channels at night. This was evidently such an effective plan that inquiries were made as to why it was not put into effect. These inquiries developed [to a point] that the Germans realized the danger of such a plan and energetically suppressed any attempts of the British Navy to patrol these waters with seaplanes, sending out their best land pursuit planes to shoot them down. An inquiry as to why the British did not patrol this area with bombing planes protected by fighting land planes developed the fact that they were so hard pressed on the front in Flanders and northern France that they could not spare the planes for this work.

Why could not the Marine Corps man the necessary number of planes to allow this operation to be carried out? Jubilant at having discovered a prospective field of usefulness for Marine Corps aviation, our squadron commander hurried home and
placed the whole scheme before the Major General Commandant, had a hearing before the General Board and the secretary [of the Navy], and as a result orders were issued soon afterward to organize four Marine land squadrons as quickly as possible and secure from the Army the necessary planes to carry out the operation. It may well be imagined that, with the prospect of getting into some real thick fighting, all hands turned to with a rush, and by May 1918, we had our planes and four of the best-trained fighting squadrons that ever went to war. A short time before going overseas, a British ace and all-round aviation expert was ordered to spend a week with these squadrons to give them their finishing touches. After three days, he stated that they were the most thoroughly trained squadrons he had seen away from the front, and that he could offer no suggestions for improvement—that they were then ready to go over the front lines.

Before the Marine squadron arrived in France, the Navy decided to make the main objective the destruction of the bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges, and to increase the number of land squadrons, manning the additional squadrons with Navy personnel and assigning a naval officer to command the whole operation. It was somewhat of a disappointment that the status of this operation, which was originated and organized by the Marine Corps as a Marine operation, should have been changed. But with the prospect of getting into the fight, nothing could discourage the squadrons.

The Northern Bombing Group, which was the title given the combined Navy and Marine Corps land plane bombing operation in Belgium and northern France, although supposedly operating under the British, was in reality almost an independent body. It was composed of four Marine squadrons of 18 DH4 planes* each, known as the Day Wing, and was to have had four Navy squadrons of six Caproni [Ca. 1] night bombing planes each, known as the Night Wing. Only one Navy squadron was organized and it got into difficulties and sent, prior to the Armistice, only one plane over the front on one raid. Although handicapped on account of the inability of the naval bases at Paullac, France, and Eastleigh, England, to furnish us our planes, spare parts, and tools, the four Marine squadrons accomplished a great deal. The results of one of our raids, verified after the enemy had evacuated Belgium, showed that we totally destroyed a troop train, killing about 60 officers and 300 men. The Marine aviators also introduced an innovation at the front. A French regiment was isolated during an offensive near Stadenburg, and it was decided to feed them by plane. Sacks of food were bundled into planes and they flew low over the isolated regiment and made good deliveries of much-needed subsistence. This necessarily had to be done at a low altitude and under a heavy fire from every weapon the enemy could bring to bear. It is believed to have been the first instance of its kind. This organization participated in the Ypres-Lys offensive and the first and second Belgian offensives.

The following is a table of what was accomplished over the front lines. The objectives of some of these raids were 75 miles from our aerodromes, nearly all of the distance over German territory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of raids with the</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French and British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of independent raids</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds of bombs dropped</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of food-dropping raids</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds of food dropped</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of enemy planes shot down</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots and observers cited for</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decorations (two for the Medal of Honor)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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In the meantime, other activities were being worked out by Marine aviation. An organization of 12 officers and 133 men was organized and sent to the naval base at Ponta Delgada, Azores, where they carried on an antisubmarine patrol with seaplanes and flying boats until the Armistice. A temporary flying field was secured at Miami, Florida, where approximately 282 pilots and 2,180 aviation mechanics were completely trained, including advanced and acrobatic flying, gunnery, bombing, photography, and radio. A Marine aviation unit of 6 officers and 46 men was organized and attached

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* Airco British two-seat biplane day bomber.
to the Naval Air Station Miami, Florida, and performed practically all the long overseas patrols for that station.

In March 1919, a squadron of six land planes and six flying boats was organized and attached for duty to the 1st Brigade in Haiti, and in February 1919, a flight of six land planes was organized and attached to the 2d Brigade in Santo Domingo. These organizations have been seriously but unavoidably handicapped by a lack of suitable planes and not enough personnel to properly carry on the work. These handicaps will be removed in the near future. However, both brigade commanders have requested that the number of planes be increased, and very complimentary reports as to the value of the aviators’ work have been received. They patrol regularly the whole island and have saved many long, hot, and fruitless “hikes.” They have located bands of cacos, dispersed them with machine-gun fire and performed many useful services, which will be explained later.

Naturally our first and most important peacetime duty was to secure permanent well-equipped flying fields as close as possible to large Marine Corps posts, so that we could by actual demonstration prove our usefulness. The difficulty of accomplishing this was greater than all our previous endeavors. We received abundant proof that, whether the government wastes money or not—as is claimed by the public—it certainly does not waste it on the Marine Corps. It was finally accomplished, however, and we now have nearing completion well-equipped stations at Quantico and Parris Island, and the establishment of a similar station at San Diego is approved and work on it will begin when the ground at the Marine base is in condition.

The following paragraphs give some of the duties we believe we can perform satisfactorily, provided always that suitable equipment is furnished. They require no equipment impossible to secure with the present state of development.

Every officer who served at the front in the [First] World War was given a rather impressive demonstration of the damage and demoralizing effect of bombs dropped from the air, and was perhaps extremely annoyed by being shot up by a machine gun in an airplane, which it seemed impossible to hit from the ground. It will be remembered that troops in this war were, for the most part, well protected in trenches and dugouts from aerial attack as well as from attacks on the ground, and that both bombing and gunnery from airplanes will be much more effective against guerrillas and troops with less permanent protection. During the late war, proper advantage was not taken of the possibilities of radio and radio-telephonic communication between planes and between ground troops and planes.

Let us assume that the commanding general of a Marine expeditionary or advanced base force with his troops onboard transports is approaching a port at which he is supposed to land in the face of enemy opposition. Would it be of value to him if one or more of his Marine aviators left his ship a hundred or more miles off shore, flew over the port, photographed the harbor, and returned in time to have the finished photographs in the hands of all subordinate commanders before land was sighted?
This would allow the commander to plan his operation, not with inaccurate maps, but with actual photographs showing every detail of any effective plan of resistance. Pilots would hardly be available at an enemy port. The photographs of the harbor in practically all tropical waters show clearly the channels, buoys, reefs, sandbars, and minefields, if any exist, allowing the ship to be navigated into the harbor without a local pilot.

If the commanding general desired to prevent the removal from any locality of enemy stores, railway equipment, and locomotives, would it not be of service to him if the aviator left the ship before the enemy was aware of its presence and destroyed the railway tracks or bridges and made the highways impassable by bombing? During the actual landing, the planes could with machine-gun fire and small fragmentation bombs so demoralize resistance as to make the task of landing much easier and safer.

After having landed, the following are a few of the ways the planes can be useful to the troops:

They can locate quickly bodies of the enemy and communicate instantly their approximate strength, location, disposition, and actions. The enemy can be watched and any movement instantly reported. In this connection, there has been developed a portable radio and radio-telephony ground set, which is so small and easily set up that one can be carried by two or three men or on the back of a mule, horse, or donkey. In future operations, every unit [that] has one of these—and every unit should have one—will be in instant communication with the planes and through them with any other station.

Photographs of enemy defenses, proposed battle terrain, or any other object or area of reasonable size within a radius of 50 miles can be taken, developed, and the desired number of prints delivered to the troops in time to use them in the plan of attack or defense. I have personally seen photographs distributed to the various organizations 45 minutes after the plane [that] took them had landed.

Planes continuously in communication with headquarters can patrol wide areas daily or hourly, which duty would require large bodies of troops and much fatigue to accomplish otherwise.

By bombing and machine gunnery, the enemy can be harassed and prevented from making orderly dispositions.

Enemy troops and population well in rear of the line of resistance can be kept in a demoralized condition, and enemy ammunition and supply depots and other military objects destroyed.

Any railways, bridges, and roads within a radius of 100 miles can be quickly made impassable.

Rapid communication can be furnished between detached bodies of our troops in difficult country, and officers can be quickly transported anywhere on urgent missions.

In thick and rough country, the planes can keep headquarters informed at all times of the disposition, progress, and needs of our troops.

In the event the enemy has planes, we can protect our troops from observation and annoyance and prevent the enemy from securing benefit from his planes.

For the field artillery, the following are some of the ways in which we can be helpful:

Difficult and temporary targets can be located quickly, accurately described and changes in targets promptly reported.

The bursts of our shell can be accurately spotted and corrections for the next shot instantly reported.

Targets invisible from the ground can be kept under accurate fire by corrections given by the planes.

Photographs of targets can be furnished showing progressively the results of artillery fire.

The location of hidden artillery batteries causing damage can be discovered and reported.

At night, designated areas can be kept lighted by parachute flares, etc.

Through its speed and remarkable visibility, and by the use of its radio and radio-telephone, together with visual signals which must be developed, the airplane will cooperate with
the signal and communication troops so as to greatly increase their effectiveness.

For advanced base work:

In addition to the duties mentioned above, which aviation will perform—and nearly all these will enter into advanced base work as well—the planes will cooperate in the following ways:

- Offshore patrols to prevent surprise raids by enemy light forces.
- Antisubmarine patrols.
- Spotting for shore batteries in attacks by enemy ships.
- Communication between the base and our vessels offshore.
- Photographing, bombing, and torpedoing enemy craft and bases within reach.

On account of the aviator’s ability in most localities to pick up and chart enemy mine fields, airplanes should furnish valuable assistance in countermining and mine sweeping.

A large part of the work performed by the Marine Corps is to combat guerrilla and bandit warfare, usually in tropical countries where roads are few and ground communications almost nil. We must not overlook the valuable assistance aviation can render in this kind of fighting or fail to realize its many helpful possibilities in the occupation of such territories whether fighting is in progress or not. The enemy encountered under these conditions are usually unstable and can not withstand punishment. They are nearly always superstitious and easily stampeded or cowed by methods of warfare with which they are unfamiliar. They base their hope for success on their ability to make raids and get away before the necessary number of our troops arrive. When an attempt to round them up is made, their knowledge of the country and their ability to travel light and fast allow them to lead our troops an exhausting chase for some time before they are dispersed, if that is accomplished. The work of the Marine Corps aviators in Haiti and Santo Domingo has abundantly shown the possibilities in this class of operations. Difficult country can be patrolled so completely and frequently that it is impossible for bands to form without being discovered. To cover an area as thoroughly and frequently as can be done by airplanes would require a prohibitive number of troops and a weary amount of “hiking.” The planes in Haiti have already proved that they can, without assistance from the ground, disperse and almost destroy bands of cacos with gunnery and small bombs. When these insurrectos realize that they cannot congregate without being attacked within a very short time thereafter by our planes, their enthusiasm quickly disappears and the unfamiliar form of attack from the air greatly assists in their discouragement. If the planes could perform no other service for our expeditionary troops than to make unnecessary the long marches formerly required in searching for cacos they would be worth their keep, but a little imagination will suggest to any experienced Marine officer numerous duties the planes, on account of their special abilities, can perform for them.

It is believed that enough has been said to show those who are students of Marine Corps operations that an intelligent development of aviation and an encouraging spirit of cooperation between it and our troops can only result in enabling the Corps to perform its function much more quickly and efficiently. Marine officers very properly “like to be shown,” and nothing is more desired by Marine Corps aviation than a chance to work out with our troops the problems suggested above, as they feel assured that such an opportunity can result only in mutual respect and confidence.

Before closing this article, I would like to mention something that might interest prospective pilots. Above all, aviation is a young man’s game. It requires a young heart, nerves, lungs, eyes, and reflexes. It has been said that after a man reaches a certain age, he has too much sense to do what an aviator is required to do. There are exceptions, of course, and older men have been good fliers, but I believe they are exceptions, and my eight years’ experience and observation has shown me that, provided they have the necessary amount of judgment, the younger the pilots are the better. I believe it is good policy to set the maximum age for applicants for pilot’s duties at around 25 years. I am also led to believe that the average term of usefulness for a pilot flying regularly is not over five years. At the
end of that time, they know the work thoroughly, but those who are still alive have lost the “pep” and enthusiasm [that] is essential.

The established policy regarding pilots is that they will not be ordered to aviation duty until they have had enough experience with troops to have become thoroughly qualified Marine officers. The ordinary length of the detail will be five years, after which they will return to duty with troops.

Aviation is probably the most highly technical branch of the military Service. It differs from other arms in the unusually fast development of its equipment, planes, motors, etc. The administrative and technical part of it is really a profession [that] requires long experience and constant study to fit one to properly make decisions, which decisions must necessarily be correct, as the life of the pilot, even in peace times, depends upon their soundness. For self-evident reasons, it is necessary for any aviation organization to have enough old experienced aviation officers to run the technical part of it on sound principles proved by experience, and to prevent the enthusiasm and inexperience of younger pilots from causing harm. This necessity for officers of long experience is recognized and unquestioned, and for this reason a very small number of pilots who show special aptitude will be continued in aviation duty indefinitely to furnish the number of expert and experienced officers required.

The men in aviation are enlisted especially for aviation duty, and are sent through the regular recruit course at Parris Island or Mare Island, after which they are given a thorough education in gasoline motors, as shop machinists, and in practical and theoretical airplane repair and upkeep. Our main trouble with enlisted men has been that, after giving them an excellent education, they discover that men performing identically the same duties in the Army and Navy draw much more pay than they. As a result, they become dissatisfied and do not reenlist. It is hoped and believed that this will be remedied shortly and their pay put on a par with men doing similar work in the Army and Navy.

For fear that, by mentioning in this article the skeptical feeling regarding aviation [that] is supposed to exist among some officers, I have given an erroneous impression, I would like to state that I believe the number of officers who hold this attitude constitutes a small minority of the officers of the Corps. The subject is only mentioned here because the whole article is an effort to show Marine Corps officers that, with encouragement and cooperation, we can be of real service to them, and to show commanding officers what parts of their problems they can use aviation to perform. Naturally, the ones we wish most to convert are those who at present do not fully believe in us.
The American 1st Division had taken up its position in a relatively quiet sector. The 3d Division had not yet been tested as a whole, although one of its units, the 7th Motorized Machine Gun Battalion, had taken a successful part in the Battle of Château-Thierry during the night of 31 May–1 June [1918]. It was reserved for the 2d Division, therefore, to give the answer to the then all-important question: how will the American troops behave in a pitched battle? Therein lay the significance of the battles for the possession of Belleau Woods.

The stirring impression produced on the hard-pressed Frenchmen by the appearance of the Americans on the western front is pictured in vivid language by [Jean de] Pierrefeu in his book, Sector I: Three Years at Great General Headquarters [1922]:

Striking was the contrast in appearance between the Americans and the French regiments, whose men, in torn uniforms, hungry and hollow-eyed, were scarcely able to hold themselves erect. New life had come to bring a fresh, surging vigor to the body of France, bled almost to death. Thus it came to pass that in those crucial days when the enemy stood for a second time on the Marne, thinking us disheartened, then, contrary to all expectation, an ineffable confidence filled the hearts of all Frenchmen. . . . General Pétain, who clearly discerned what a vital force they were radiating, thereafter repeatedly pronounced the word “Americans” with the satisfaction of the builder of imperishable monuments who perceives an inexhaustible source of labor in the midst of the threat of a general strike. . . . General Foch, too, included the Americans as an essential factor in all his plans for the coming offensive.

The drama of the situation is enhanced when one remembers that this intervention came at a time when, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the premiers of France, England, and Italy issued the following desperate appeal for help to President Wilson:

There is danger that the war will be lost, unless the speedy arrival of additional American troops serves to restore the weakened Allied reserves. Thus only can defeat be averted, because of the exhausting of the Allied reserves long before those of the Germans.

How did the allies come to be in such a desperate situation? The German attack between Soissons and Reims had begun on 27 May, with the storming of the supposedly impregnable Chemin des Dames Hill Range, and the French and English positions nearby. By 30 May, they had reached the Marne. The French divisions thrown into this battle had been completely crushed; they evaporated, as a French officer aptly expressed it, like rain drops on white-hot iron. Not until 1 June could the French High Command interpose an organized resistance. The German High Command now added to the 7th Army, led by Colonel General von Boehn, four divisions [that] had been in the second line, namely, the 197th, 237th, 10th, and 231st Infantry Divisions. These troops were now grouped on the right wing of the 4th Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Infantry [Richard] von Conta, who had then reached the Marne. The mission of this corps was a fan-shaped advance to the southwest, while the advancing corps under [General Arnold von] Winckler, [General Georg] Wichura, [General Alfred von] Larisch, and [General Hermann Karl Bruno von] Francois, took up their positions to the right, facing west. In advancing toward the west, the German High Command hoped to reach Compiègne, and then, by an attack at Noyon, to close the pocket that had been formed there.

There was no intention, however, that the four divisions pushing southwest should make a thrust for Paris. Even if successful, this would have created a front in the shape of a spearhead, unfavorable both strategically and tactically. Their mission was therefore limited to protecting the flanks of the corps advancing to the west. The four divisions were followed by two more—the 5th Guard Infantry and the 28th Infantry Divisions—detached from
the forces [that] had reached the Marne. Château-Thierry was taken on 1 June, after intense house-to-house fighting, by the 231st Infantry Division, advancing on the left wing. Owing to the timely arrival of American troops, however, they did not succeed in establishing a bridgehead to the railroad on the southern bank of the Marne as they had been ordered to do. The other three divisions kept up a powerful advance to the southwest and, during the night of 1–2 June, pushed back the opposing troops everywhere, breaking the French line sharply in the neighborhood of Gandelu, over a front of four kilometers. Again American troops had to be moved to the front to cover this break.

The German divisions were still attacking on 3 June. The 197th Infantry, which had advanced farthest on the right flank, succeeded that day in occupying Veuilly, Eloup, Bussières, and Hill 164, close to Les Mares farm. On the other hand, every effort made by the 28th Reserve Regiment to penetrate Veuilly forest failed; intense machine-gun fire stopped the German troops at the edge of the woods. Under cover of approaching darkness, the 2d and 4th Companies, supported by a mine thrower, again attempted to penetrate the woods but were once more repulsed by the fierce enemy fire. This extraordinarily strong resistance was entirely unexpected by the Germans, who thought that they were pursuing a beaten foe. They had no means of knowing that on 2 June, the American 23d Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 5th [Regiment], the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 2d Engineer Company, had established strong defenses here, with the 2d Battalion of the 5th [Regiment] adjoining them on the right.

The 237th Infantry Division, with the 462d Infantry Regiment, was to occupy Hill 142 and Champillon that day, and then proceed to Marigny, while the 461st Infantry Regiment was to attempt the capture of Lucy-le-Bocage. As the artillery was not ready to open fire until 1215, the attack could not be launched until 1230. The 462d Regiment then found such formidable resistance in the strongly defended woods on its front that it could advance only as far as one kilometer south of Torey, north of the woods. During the night, the 462d Infantry was relieved by the 460th. The 461st Regiment now completed the occupation of Belleau Woods, pressing forward as far as the western edge. After repulsing an enemy counterattack at 1500, they cleared the southwest corner of the woods of enemy machine-gun nests, and pushed their advance posts far to the southwest and to the southern edge of the woods. The whole woods now came under severe artillery fire of every caliber, which continued throughout the day and the following night. The attack on Lucy-le-Bocage was abandoned because this place was under enfilading fire from the heights near Triangle.

The 10th Infantry Division, which had taken Bouresches on 2 June, was now working up its defenses, as ordered.

At midnight [on] 3 June, General von Conta issued the following order to his corps:

1. The right wing of the 7th Army will continue the attack, the Conta Group assuming the protection of the flanks during the attack. The group will fight for a suitable defense position. This position is located in the following line: Veuilly—Marigny—La Voie du Châtel—Hill 201 about one kilometer southeast of Montgivrault—Le Thiolet—Hill 204 west of Château-Thierry.

2. The exact hour of the attack will be ordered later. The attack will not take place prior to June 7. Get necessary information and prepare at once.

In this attack, the 5th Guard Infantry Division was to be placed on the right, next to the 197th Infantry Division.

This, then, was the situation on the night of 3 June. The American troops, fresh and in full strength, had absorbed the remnants of the crushed French troops. Facing them were the Germans, with morale heightened by the habit of victory, but with ranks considerably worn and thinned by the campaign. The Americans formed such a formidable wall that the commanding general, von Conta, found it necessary to spend several days in preparation, and to add another division preliminary to an attack which had for its objective merely the capture of a defensive position.
On 4 June at 0900,* the exhausted French 45th Infantry Division was relieved by the American 2d Division on the Champillon–Monneaux front, where the Americans had actually established themselves on 3 June. On their left was the newly arrived French 167th Infantry Division, which had relieved the shattered 43d; parts of the American 2d Division stationed here had to be withdrawn from the remnants of the French 43d Division. On their right was the French 10th Colonial Division, among whom were isolated units of the American 3d Division. This led the Germans to believe that they were facing the American 3d Division. It was by design that the French, who had no confidence yet in the American leadership, thus avoided having here the American 2d and 3d Divisions united under their own commanding general, as would have been natural. It was not until 2 September that the Americans were allowed an independent sector of their own.

Facing the 6th Marines was the 461st Infantry Regiment of the same division.

Facing the 9th Infantry Regiment was the 398th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division; and facing the 23d Infantry was the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division.

This alignment is only approximate. The front of the American units of the 4th Brigade extended farther east than the German regiments opposite them, so that the right wing of the 5th [Regiment] was opposite the right wing of the 461st Regiment and, similarly, the right wing of the 6th Marines overlapped the right of the 398th Regiment at Bouresches.

The German divisions spent that day, 4 June, solely in strengthening the positions they had reached, with the 10th Infantry Division established on the hills north and east of Bouresches. This place had originally been occupied by the 3d Battalion of the 398th Regiment but, owing to the lowness of the ground, it did not appear advisable to leave a whole battalion here, and to persist in holding it at any cost. Accordingly, the commander of the 398th Infantry ordered two companies withdrawn on the night of 3–4 June, and ordered further that the railway be made part of the main defense line. Bouresches was to serve only as an outpost. On the main front, the battalions entrenched themselves by companies, with machine gun companies distribut-
ed in separate nests to the rear. Small outposts were extended as far as the heights of Triangle and the Bouresches-La Roche-Vaux road.

In the morning, the 461st Infantry Regiment ascertained through prisoners and dead that they were facing the American 5th and 6th [Regiments]. Major [Hans Otto] Bischoff, the commander, reported in the afternoon that an American attack was being made in the direction of Belleau and the northwestern corner of Belleau Woods. It was natural that a unit attacking for the first time would not have the skill of seasoned troops, and it was equally natural that the Germans should count on that lack of experience. The Americans were caught front and flank by the machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion, 461st Regiment, and, after heavy losses, retired to Hill 169. However, the defenders of the woods suffered greatly from the effects of the continuous heavy artillery fire in which the American 2d Field Artillery Brigade, posted along La Voie du Châtel-Coupru, took a very prominent part.

[For] 5 June was rather quiet, except for a French attack in the direction of Gandelu and Veuilly, which pushed back the German outposts to the edge of the village; the village itself being retained. There were also sporadic attacks by the Americans along the front of the 461st Infantry, which were repulsed, with many dead in front of the German positions; prisoners confirmed that the American losses were heavy. These daringly conducted raids served to convince General von Conta that he had before him a strong and enterprising foe. Accordingly, on 5 June, he issued the following order:

The attack ordered on June 3 is for the present deferred. However, the attack is to be so thoroughly prepared that it could be made within forty-eight hours after receipt of the order.

With the German battalions thus standing on the defensive on 6 June, the French 167th Division and the American 2d Division launched a combined attack. The French succeeded in entering Veuilly, but were ejected in a vigorous counterattack made by two companies of the 28th Replacement Infantry Regiment. The left wing of the 197th Division was pushed back to a line including the crossroads one kilometer west of Torey, the road leading south of Bussiares, and the northern end of the square patch of woods west of Bussiares. Owing to the fact that a new attack was expected early the next morning, and that his position projected too far from the line, the division commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelmi, voluntarily evacuated Veuilly during the night.

According to the German conception of the conduct of battle on 6 June, the two fresh divisions in full force, after a brief artillery preparation and gassing of the enemy artillery, should have rushed simultaneously in thin lines of skirmishers along the entire front. However, General [Joseph] Degoutte, commander of the French XXI Army Corps, to which the American 2d Division was attached, had a different idea. He had the attack made in echelon, developing gradually from the left to the right in assigned periods of time, so that the different regiments followed one another into battle like the ribs of an opening fan. The right wing of the 4th Infantry Brigade did not advance until evening. This ingenious method of attack, well suited in view of possible flanking movements, had the great disadvantage of enabling the Germans to concentrate their artillery fire every time exactly on the attacking troops.

If the Americans, notwithstanding their extraordinary bravery, did not meet with greater material success on 6 June, the fault lies mainly in this arrangement of the French corps commander.* Precious American blood, and much of it, was shed, without any necessity.

The difference between the German and the French methods is very clearly shown in the map.

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* Note by MajGen J. G. Harbord, U.S. Army (Ret), division commander of the American 2d Division: “I am obliged to acquit General Degoutte of any responsibility as to the tactical methods employed on that date, nor was there any concerted action, of which I am aware, between the American 2d Division and the 167th French. With the information we had had that the woods were unoccupied by the Germans, we gave it no artillery preparation, thinking thereby to take it by surprise or to find it unoccupied. Occupied as it was by machine gun nests well placed, the tactical formation of the time, which was the advance in successive waves as we were then being taught, did entail considerable losses. My recollection is that the attack took place late in the afternoon. Colonel Otto starts it at 4:45 a.m. He is probably confusing our attack on the woods with the French attack on Bussiares.”
of 7 June. This map also shows in what manner the Germans expected the attack of the American 2d Division to be carried out.

In accordance with orders from General Degoutte, at 0445, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the Marine’s 5th Regiment joined the French 167th Division in the attack, the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2d on the right. This attack struck the 1st Battalion of the 460th Regiment, and the 9th Company of the 462d Regiment, echeloned to the right. As the French had succeeded in making a temporary entry into Bussiares (they were ejected at 0945 by a Saxon Jäger battalion*), the 9th Company of the 462d Regiment, and the 9th Company of the 460th Regiment, were surrounded by superior forces and cut off in the early morning hours and, after a particularly brave defense, were practically annihilated. Only a small number of the 9th Company, 460th Regiment, succeeded in fighting their way back to their battalion with their bayonets. The 10th and 11th Companies, 460th, dug themselves in, in their patch of woods southwest of Torey, in the face of the enemy attacking on all sides. They repulsed the attack with severe losses, but were continually harassed by low fliers who almost touched the treetops. The few available reserves were rushed in turn to the places where the enemy was approaching the closest, sometimes within a few paces. A vigorous counterattack by the 12th Company, 460th, whose company commander fell in this comradely endeavor, cleared the way to the north. The enemy now covered the woods with heavy artillery fire, including gas shells. To have sent further support would have entailed severe losses; the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, therefore decided to withdraw both companies. Of course, this could only be done after dark. Accordingly, these two hard-pressed companies withstood the enemy attacks most creditably during the whole day. In order to support the front of the 460th Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 462d, was now wedged in between the 3d Battalion, 460th, on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 460th, on the left; the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 460th, was secured by the 10th Company, 462d, and by establishing flanking machine-gun nests.

* A German military term adopted around 1630 to refer to elite light infantry or, as the term implies, hunters.
Following the orders of the Conta Group, the 237th Division was now required to take over a strip heretofore covered by the 197th Division. The 2d Battalion, 460th, therefore took position to the right, next to the 3d Battalion, 460th. At nightfall, the regimental alignment was to be reestablished as follows: the 2d Battalion, 460th, to the right; the 1st Battalion, 460th, to the left; the 2d and 3d Battalions, 462d, and the 10th and 11th Companies, 460th Regiment, to be established to the rear. To facilitate this, at 1930, a heavy artillery barrage was directed along the front of the entire position. In the meantime, a raid by the enemy at 1800 was easily repulsed. Despite the heavy artillery fire, enemy raids were made at 2000 at different points as far as the line of the 1st Battalion, 460th. They were beaten off by a powerful counterattack of the 1st Company, 460th, and the flanking machine-gun fire of the 461st Regiment. Three Americans were taken prisoners.

By 2300, the 460th Regiment had completed the change of position. The two companies surrounded in the grove slipped away from the enemy in good order, without the loss of a single machine gun.

The 461st Regiment, holding Belleau Woods, reported that at 0630 the Americans had made a surprise attack on the 2d Battalion, holding the eastern half of the woods, but that the attack broke down on the front line. The southeastern tip of the woods had been left out of the defensive line on 5 June, presumably because of the danger of a surrounding movement.

The enemy’s intentions were obvious, as his artillery fire became more intense, particularly in the region east and north of Bouresches, while the activities of his flyers became more pronounced. The division commander, Major General von Diepenbrock-Grüter, at 1850, issued the following order: “We must expect continuous attacks on the front of the 10th Division.”

The attack of the [Corps’] 3d Battalion, 5th [Regiment], and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 6th [Regiment], late that evening, was therefore not at all unexpected by the Germans. It was directed chiefly against the left wing of the 398th Regiment, particularly the 1st Battalion, and the right wing of the 47th Regiment, 1st Battalion. The Americans were obliged to come down from the heights they were occupying before the eyes of the Germans. They did this in thick lines of skirmishers, supported by columns following immediately behind. The Germans could not have desired better targets; such a spectacle was entirely unfamiliar to them. Under similar conditions, German troops would have advanced in thin lines of skirmishers following one another like waves, or in small, separate units of shock troops, moving forward in rows with their light machine guns, utilizing whatever shelter was offered by the terrain until they were in a position to open fire. It was thus that the French had advanced the same day, through the grain fields, until they had crept close to the German defenders. However, when one considers that this was their first real fight, this procedure of the Americans is by no means surprising. Troops coming under fire for the first time often proceed in just that way. The German soldiers of 1914, generally conceded to have constituted the best army ever known, often advanced in almost the same way as the Americans did on this occasion, despite orders to the contrary. This is evident from the French and English descriptions of the early battles. And yet in those days, they defeated all the French and English armies, driving them back of the Marne, although they suffered great losses, particularly in officers. It is, therefore, perfectly clear why the vigorous American battalions adopted that method of advancing to the attack. And it was only natural that the entire artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire of the defenders should have been concentrated on these advancing masses. It was thus that the first attack broke down with severe losses.

This failure by no means disheartened the Americans. They kept on attacking with tenacity. Gradually the German artillery fire to the westward became weaker, as they themselves were under heavy fire from the enemy, and suffered great losses. The artillery battery of the 21st Infantry, for example, had three men left at the guns at 0255, and it was, of course, impossible to keep up an effective barrage. All officers, noncommissioned officers, and other personnel were either dead or wounded. It thus became easier to run the barrage. Making good use of the bed of a brook, the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, at 0300 succeeded in entering Bouresch. As has been seen, there was here only an outpost consisting of the 7th and 8th Companies of the 398th Regiment. After a furious house-to-house
battle, they were ordered to withdraw to the main defense line to avoid being cut off.

Now began a struggle of unexampled obstinacy. The American battalions set about their mission of capturing Belleau Woods, the Bouresches railway station, and Hills 126 and 133, unconditionally resolved to the last man to do so, cost what it might. But the German battalions defended this, their main defense line, with equal determination. After bitter fighting, the Americans finally had to give up the struggle, but with the village of Bouresches in their possession. The heroic spirit with which these brave troops attacked will be realized from the fact that, in front of the 4th Company, 398th Regiment, alone, 100 American dead were counted the following morning. On the German side, too, occurred something generally considered very rare in the war; the infantry, particularly the 1st Battalion, 398th, had almost completely exhausted their ammunition. An emergency supply had to be brought up during the night by the 3d Battalion, 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had been stationed to the rear. The division commander now sent the 2d and 3d Battalions, 6th Grenadiers, to support the 398th Regiment. The rifle strength of each of the battalions, however, did not exceed 200. The 3d Battalion, 6th Grenadiers, was posted in the northwestern corner of the woods, near Rochette farm; the 2d Battalion was echeloned behind the right wing of the 398th Regiment.

After the 398th Regiment was thus protected against a further expected attack from Bouresches, Lieutenant Colonel Rotenbucher, commander of the 47th Infantry Regiment, ordered the 1st Battalion, on whose right wing the 4th Company had given way before the American attack at 1930, to eject the enemy that had penetrated the wood patch east of Hill 192. Captain Rickert, the battalion commander, conducted this counterattack with unusual skill. He waited until dusk and until after the enemy captive balloon had been hauled down. From 2110 to 2114, the enemy were showered with machine-gun fire from a northerly direction. Here, too, he left the 2d and 3d Companies. In the meantime, the 1st and 4th Companies advanced, unobserved, through a ravine southeast of the wood patch in the vicinity of Point 175. At 2114, the two companies threw themselves on the enemy, whose whole attention had been turned to the north. In the ensuing fight in the woods, Lieutenant Gluckert fell, wounded, into the hands of the enemy, but the surprise attack was a complete success. The enemy sought to save themselves by a hasty retreat in a northerly direction, but thus came under the hot fire of the 398th Infantry. Here, too, numerous dead and wounded Americans covered the field, some of the wounded begging for water in German.

The total losses of the 10th Infantry Division on 6 June were as follows: killed, 24; wounded, 101; missing, 2 officers and 24 men. The losses of the 237th Division were considerably greater: killed, 6 officers and 72 men; wounded, 10 officers and 218 men; missing, 5 officers and 90 men. The 237th Division took 40 American prisoners; the 10th [took] 7 Americans.

Thus ended the battles of 6 June. Both sides have reason to be proud of the deeds of their young men there.

[For] 7 June was comparatively quiet. The right wing of the 197th Division withstood an attack by the French from the direction of Gandelu, losing a little ground. During the night, this division was relieved by the 5th Guard Division.

At noon, the 237th Division received reports of a concentration of enemy infantry in the woods between Torey and Lucy-le-Bocage. This pointed to an attack on the 461st Regiment. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion, 462d Regiment, was assigned to the 461st as a reserve. In the afternoon, after a strong artillery preparation, the Americans actually did try an attack along the entire front of the regiment. On the right wing, the attack broke down in the German advanced positions owing to a hot machine-gun fire; on the left wing, the Americans advanced on the line from Hill 181 to the left, but they were finally driven off. Whether a major attack had been planned or whether it was simply a local demonstration has not been determined.

The total losses of the 237th Division on that day were: killed, 9; wounded, 68; missing, 8.

The 10th Division also believed that it nipped in the bud an enemy attack in the early morning hours of 7 June by a combined artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire. A patrol from the 10th Company, 398th, found Bouresches strongly occupied by American forces. Some of their trucks on the way
to the rear came under vigorous German machine-gun fire. During the night of 7–8 June, the 47th Regiment was relieved by the 444th Regiment of the 231st Division. The division now extended its quiet front to the west by the width of a regiment.

The losses of the 10th Division amounted to 2 officers and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 50 men wounded, and 13 men missing; there were also 3 officers and 20 men gassed, having inhaled German gas.

An incident very characteristic of the bold behavior of the Americans took place that day near the 231st Division. During the relief of the 1st Battalion, 442d Regiment, by the 2d Battalion on Hill 204, some men of the 8th Company suddenly came upon Americans and Frenchmen on top of the hill in a clearing that divides the southern part of the woods. Two startled Americans were captured, and were led behind the lines by some food carriers of a machine gun company. But despite all their efforts, the Germans could not get a clear statement from them. However, it was believed that a strong enemy patrol had pushed in between the 6th and 8th Companies during the relief operations. Due to the impenetrable underbrush and the heavy machine-gun fire, the 8th Company failed to dislodge them, as did a counterattack by the 3d and 4th Companies along the edge of the woods, ordered by Major von Görne, the regimental commander. Another attack made by the 3d Battalion, 442d Regiment, also ended in failure.

The division commander, Major General von Hülsen, then issued an energetic order to clean out that “American nest.” The efforts were repeated on 8 June and again on 10 June, but the intruders, no doubt considerably reinforced by the French, held their own, notwithstanding the fact that they were hemmed in by a semicircle of the 442d Regiment. Their tenacity was so great that, finally, all efforts to dislodge them were given up. The German position on Hill 204 was strongly fortified to form a ring around the “American nest.”

On 8 June at 0100, the 460th Division asked the 237th Division for a barrage, but the threatened enemy attack did not materialize. At 0130, however, the 461st Regiment, stationed on their immediate left, repulsed an attack made in strong force after a drum fire of 15 minutes.

At 0500 came an attack against Belleau Woods by the 3d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], reinforced by one company of the 2d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], and two companies of the 2d Engineers. The 461st Regiment made the following report concerning this attack:

At 5:00 A.M. the enemy renewed his attack along the entire front of this regiment. Beaten back everywhere else, he succeeded in penetrating on the left wing, favored as he was by the possession of Bouveresches. A counterattack by the 6th and 8th Companies, 461st, and the 365th Engineers Company, threw the Americans back to their original position in the woods. The mass of dead lying in front of the point where they temporarily broke our line indicates that the enemy suffered great losses. Forty prisoners were taken by the 461st Regiment.

The losses of the 237th Division were: 2 officers and 49 men killed; 8 officers and 128 men wounded; and 2 men missing.

At 0200, an attack was made against the 398th Regiment, 10th Division, by the American 34th Infantry Regiment, but was beaten back with great losses. Attempts by our own men during the early morning hours to bring in the American wounded lying along the front failed because the enemy evidently misunderstood the attempt, and fired on the hospital unit. During the night of 9 June, the 398th Regiment was relieved by the 109th Grenadier Regiment of the 28th Division.

The losses of the 10th Division on 8, 9, and 10 June were: 5 men killed; 1 officer and 29 men wounded; and 18 men sick.

With the relief of the 197th Division by the 5th Guard Infantry Division, and of the 10th Division by the 28th, the division fronts were shifted to the right by the width of one battalion. The front of the 5th Guard Division was narrowed; the 197th Infantry Division was required to take over Bussieres during the night of 8–9 June; and the 40th Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division was shifted to take over the eastern half of Belleau Woods. This last, as we will see later, proved fateful.

Lieutenant General [Albano] von Jacobi, commander of the 237th Division, which has held our interest so much, had among his officers some out-
standing regimental commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, commander of the 460th Regiment, to which had been assigned the 3d Battalion, 462d, and a company of shock troops, to take over Bussiases, anticipated the events of the coming day in the following order, issued at 2325:

If the enemy attacks tonight at Bussiares or Torrey and breaks through anywhere, a counterattack should be made immediately, if possible, in order to gain ground that can be used later as an advanced position if it offers favorable facilities for defense.

The 3d Battalion, 462d Regiment, and the company of shock troops were to enter Bussiares; the 3d Battalion, 460th, and the 1st Battalion, 462d, were to hold themselves in readiness in the hollow near Licy-Clignon.

Such was the situation when the enemy, at 0440 on 9 June, after a vigorous artillery preparation, attacked the front of the 5th Guard Infantry Division and Bussiares. They succeeded in pushing back the 20th Regiment of the 5th Guards, which was unacquainted with the ground, and in surrounding several of its companies in the triangular wood patch southwest of Bussiares, but they were unable to force their way into the village. At 0800, they increased their artillery fire with considerable use of gas shells. At 0930, they made a furious attack and, after a violent house-to-house fight, penetrated into Bussiares. Thereupon followed a terrific counterattack of the 2d and 3d Companies of the 460th Regiment. In full force, they threw the enemy out of the village and followed him to the heights southeast of Bussiares. They established positions here, but were compelled to return to the southern edge of Bussiares because they were suffering from the short-range fire of their own artillery. The enemy held out in some of the houses on the western edge until 1630, when they were ejected. During the night, the 3d Battalion, 460th Regiment, occupied Bussiares, relieving the 3d, 462d.

The 461st Regiment repulsed an attack during the night, and again at 0500, another American attack directed along the entire front of the regiment. It was learned from statements of prisoners that the attack had been made by the 5th and 6th [Regiments] and the 23d Infantry, but that it had been repulsed with heavy losses.

THE BATTLES OF BELLEAU WOODS:
PART II
by Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Otto, German Army (Ret)

The losses sustained during these daily battles had reduced the companies of the 461st Regiment to such an extent that it became necessary to put almost the entire regiment on the front line in order to attain the required strength in our main defensive line. There remained in reserve only the 3d Company, directly behind the 1st Battalion; the 9th Company, behind the 2d Battalion; the 365th Engineer Company, directly behind the left wing; and the 366th Engineer Company, near the center. Major Bischoff, the regimental commander, a veteran in African bush and forest fighting, had thus far been able to repel all American attacks by those methods. During the night of 10 June, he was to turn over the left half of his regiment’s front in Belleau Woods to a battalion of the 4th Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. From the officer sent in advance, he learned that this battalion was to relieve six weakened companies of his regiment by stationing only two companies on the main defense line, while the other two companies were to be echeloned east of the woods. Major Bischoff protested at once. He insisted that the customary procedure must be avoided; that the woods were so thick that a counterattack coming from a deep position would be ineffective. His arguments did not prevail, however, as the plans of the 28th Division had already been approved. Major Bischoff had a presentment of what was to be enacted on that scene in the next few days. To provide against the worst, he left six heavy machine guns in the relinquished position, but unfortunately only for 24 hours.

The losses of the 237th Division on 9 June amounted to 40 men killed, 6 officers and 163 men wounded, and 3 officers and 57 men missing. Those of the 28th Division, which had taken over the new front at 1000, were 9 men killed [and] 1 officer and 44 men wounded.

The commander of the 28th Division, in his order of the day dated 8 June, addressed his tired troops as follows:
Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

An American success along our front, even if only temporary, may have the most unfavorable influence on the attitude of the Entente and the duration of the war. In the coming battles, therefore, it is not a question of the possession or non-possession of this or that village or woods, insignificant in itself; it is a question whether the Anglo-American claim that the American Army is the equal or even the superior of the German Army is to be made good.

Nowhere is the thought more clearly expressed than in this order of Major General Bohm.

On 10 June, the main defense line along the front of the 5th Guard Division was shifted back to the north of Clignon Brook. The main defense line of the 460th Regiment was also drawn back. The village of Bussièrues, now but an outpost, was occupied only by the 3d and 4th Companies of the 460th. This shift was accomplished without interference by the enemy.

The 461st Regiment had now taken over a battalion front from the line of the 460th. Only the 1st Battalion of the 461st was now left in Belleau Woods. An attack on this battalion at 0500, preceded by the heaviest artillery preparations, was repulsed by machine-gun and artillery fire. At the same time, the Americans made an attack against the 2d Battalion of the 40th Regiment in the eastern half of the woods. This attack and a further one from the direction of Bouresches were both repulsed.

The losses of that day amounted to 1 officer and 36 men killed, 5 officers and 132 men wounded, and 4 men missing in the 237th Division; 137 men killed, 247 wounded, and 50 missing in the 28th Division.

We now come to the decisive American attack of 11 June, executed mainly by the 2d Battalion, 5th [Regiment], and the 1st Battalion, 6th [Regiment].

At 0330, the enemy artillery fire had reached its maximum effectiveness. At 0530, the 1st Battalion, 461st, was attacked in the western half of the woods. Our demand for an artillery barrage received no answer, as our signal lights could not be seen through the heavy fog. Nevertheless, this attack was beaten off. Fifty American dead lay along the front of the battalion. Immediately after, however, the enemy broke through the right wing of the 2d Battalion, 40th Regiment, and appeared on the flank and rear of the 1st and 4th Companies of the 461st Regiment. Favored by the fog, he immediately renewed his attack on the front of the two companies. After a bitter night battle, the German companies lost 3 officers and 80 men as prisoners; the rest fought their way through by bayonet to the north, where they were incorporated into the 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th Companies of the 461st Regiment, under Major Hartlieb, the battalion commander. Major Hartlieb, after building a strong barricade in the woods, marched at the head of his companies to the counterattack, sweeping along, by his own example, those units exhausted by the struggles of the day. This spirited procedure had its [intended] effect; by noon, the 1st Battalion, 461st, had regained its position.

Upon being informed of the enemy incursion, the commander of the 237th Division advanced the 1st Battalion, 462d Regiment, into the wood patch near Les Brusses farm, and the 2d Battalion, 462d, to Point 182. The hard-pressed 1st Battalion, 461st, was reinforced by the 1st and 3d Companies of the 462d, and two machine gun platoons. It should be noted here that, in the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 460th Regiment, the number of influenza cases began to increase about this time to an alarming degree.

On the front of the 2d Battalion, 40th, in the eastern part of the woods, the first American attack had been repulsed by the 7th and 8th Companies. However, owing to the thinness of the lines—against which Major Bischoff had protested in vain—the Americans succeeded in a second attack in breaking through the right wing of the 2d Battalion, 40th Regiment. In this operation, the Americans made good use of the bed of a brook, which ran through the middle of the woods in a northeasterly direction. The captain of the 5th Company, 40th, standing here in reserve, immediately threw himself upon them. But his company was soon scattered in the thick forest. There remained under his control but few of his men, or of the mine throwing company stationed in the woods, and he was overwhelmed by numbers. His company, thrown into confusion, together with the 7th and 8th Companies of the 40th Regiment, was attacked flank and rear. In the ensuing bayonet battle fought
on both sides with the utmost bravery, both sides suffered great losses. The general confusion among
defenders was increased by German-speaking Americans who, in the thick woods, called out, “Wo ist das Regiment 40?” and the like, apparently
for assistance. This confusion resulted in the loss of
practically the entire personnel of the three com-
panies; but a few succeeded in fighting their way
through. Those who did not fall in battle were taken
prisoners.

The 1st Battalion of the 40th was now thrown
into the counterattack. They were received by the
Americans, however, with a heavy machine-gun
fire, and advanced only 200 meters. Their losses
were so heavy and their ranks so thinned that any
further effort at counterattack seemed hopeless. The
commander of the 28th Division now ordered the
2d Battalion of the 110th Regiment, which had ad-
vanced to the region southwest of Étrépilly, to the
support of the 40th Regiment. The new troops were
stationed to the right of the 1st Battalion, 40th, and
Captain Mencke was given command of the two
battalions in the attack. He pushed forward another
200 meters, and then came to a standstill; his ma-
chine guns and mine throwers were powerless in the
thick forest. His men were so exhausted by about
2000 that all attempts to advance were stopped. The
front line was even moved back a little to get a bet-
ter situation.

The brigade commander issued orders to retake
the old line the next day at any cost.

The losses of the 237th Division on this day
amounted to 2 officers and 28 men killed, 2 offi-
cers and 114 men wounded, and 3 officers and 82
men missing. Those of the 28th Division have not
been fully established, but they amounted to about
3 officers and 151 men killed, 6 officers and 355
men wounded, and 1 officer and 53 men missing.
The number of prisoners was probably somewhat
greater than this.

Quiet reigned along the front of the 460th and
the 461st Regiments during the forenoon of 12 June.
The Americans contented themselves with feeling
out the positions with strong patrols.

At 1701, however, a surprise attack was made
on Belleau Woods without artillery preparations,
and executed mainly by the 2d Battalion, 5th
Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 461st, repulsed the
advancing in part in columns, were subjected to a murderous fire; nevertheless they continued to throw in new forces. They succeeded in breaking through at various points. Now they appeared in the rear of the 2d Battalion, 110th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 40th. After an obstinate resistance, both battalions were forced back. Those remaining behind fought their way to the eastern edge of the woods, and then returned to the Bouresches-Belleau road, where they were incorporated into the 1st Battalion of the 110th.

Thus the bold 2d [Battalion], 5th [Regiment], succeeded in driving completely out of the woods the forces of the 28th Division that had established themselves there.

The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 8 men killed, 5 officers and 48 men wounded, and 1 officer and 63 men missing. Those of the 28th Division were 2 officers and 43 men killed, 1 officer and 274 men wounded, and 1 officer and 35 men missing.

The question here might suggest itself: how can it be explained that the Germans, after fighting off with unheard of bravery continuous American attacks for seven days, should have been overwhelmed in hand-to-hand fighting in the comparatively short time of two days, as soon as the Americans had forced their way into the forest? The question is the more pertinent and the success of the Americans the more creditable because it had been common knowledge that it was precisely in hand-to-hand fighting that the German was an exceptionally redoubtable foe. It had been repeatedly demonstrated during the long course of the World War that, due to the Furor Teutonicus* once dreaded by the Romans, the Germans were so superior to the French and the Russians in this form of combat—and what is more important, felt themselves so superior—that it was only when the French and Russians outnumbered them that they dared meet the Germans at close quarters. The marked superiority of the German race over the Roman and Slavic races in hand-to-hand fighting impressed itself throughout the hardest battles of the World War. If the sport-loving English, and the powerful Canadians and Australians, proved to be the equals of the Germans in hand-to-hand combat, it must be remembered that, like ourselves, they are of Germanic blood.

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* Latin for Teutonic Fury and refers to the ferocity of the Germanic tribes during the Roman Empire.
To give a complete answer to this question, we must also examine the organization and equipment of a German infantry regiment at this time. In each, there was a mine thrower company of six light mine throwers; each of the three battalions had one machine gun company with eight heavy machine guns; each of the four companies of a battalion had six light machine guns. With such an organization, which was quite similar to that of the French, the German infantry possessed a great firing force that enabled them to beat off the American attacks. But the small number of men armed with the rifle—men with bayonets—constituted a great disadvantage once the fighting started inside the forest itself. Moreover, their shock troops had been considerably thinned out. It was quite the contrary with the Americans.

Even as it was, the equipment of the attacking division had been reduced before beginning the offensive in order to give them greater shock force. During trench warfare, each infantry regiment had as many as 12 light mine throwers, 24 grenade throwers, and 36 heavy and 96 light machine guns.

There is another point. Even before the opening of the Chemin des Dames offensive, a German commanding general had seriously recommended to the High Command that each two divisions be merged into one, because he believed that the fighting strength of our infantry had been too much reduced. In the first place, the infantry regiments were weak in numbers; secondly, the number of specialists not participating in actual combat amounted to 2,000 in each division. As the specialists have smaller losses than the fighting men, the result was that after the first heavy engagements they were actually numerically grater than the infantry troops.

Now, what was the actual situation with regard to strength? The German battalions stationed opposite the American 2d Division had suffered heavy losses since 27 May. It is difficult to determine the actual losses during and after each of the daily battles. However, a good grasp of the situation may be gained from the report of the 237th Division that, on 13 June, its rifle strength, exclusive of machine-gun and mine-thrower troops, was:

- 460th Regiment—21 officers—575 men
- 461st Regiment—12 officers—429 men
- 462d Regiment—14 officers—478 men

In accordance with a brigade order, all available men from the transport service had been concen-
trated and brought to the front line. This added on the front of the 462d Regiment a total of 1 officer, 58 noncommissioned officers, including a sergeant major, and 150 men, all of whom were urgently needed, as the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 460th Regiment had had [more than] 100 new cases of influenza in the last two days.

It may be assumed without doubt that the rifle strength of an American company at this time was about equal to that of a German battalion. When the German companies reported that they were attacked by superior numbers in the woods, that must actually have been the case.

On 13 June, a concerted attack was planned to be made under the commander of the 28th Division, with the object of regaining the woods and the village of Bouresches. The artillery preparations began at 0400, and 15 minutes later the united battalions of the 109th, 110th, and 128th Regiments began the advance; but they were soon driven back to their positions by heavy machine-gun fire from the woods and from Bouresches. Parts of the 109th Grenadier Regiment did succeed in establishing a foothold in Bouresches, where they left an outpost. As the attack failed to progress, the 461st Regiment did not join in.

Toward five o’clock in the afternoon, the positions still held by the right wing of the 28th Division and the 2d Battalion of the 461st Regiment were attacked by the Americans, but they did not succeed in forcing the Germans completely out of the woods. The 461st Regiment, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 462d, managed to reestablish its communications and to organize the main defense line for further resistance.

The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 4 officers and 32 men killed, 3 officers and 106 men wounded, and 9 men missing. Those of the 28th Division amounted to 65 men killed, 317 wounded, and 35 missing. The total losses of the 28th Division from 27 May to 15 June amounted to 70 officers and 2,100 men.

The conditions existing in the 40th Regiment on 13 June were described as follows: “Due to exhaustion, malnutrition, and above all to lack of junior officers, the fighting value of these troops is practically nil.”

On 15 June, a gathering of American troops in the northwestern part of the woods in front of the 237th Division was scattered by a withering fire. The 237th lost 1 officer and 13 men killed, and 1 officer and 60 men wounded. Major Mors, commander of the 462d Regiment, died as a result of severe wounds received on 6 June. On 16 June, the gallant 237th Division was relieved by the 87th Division.

The conditions existing in the 237th Division are best described in the following extract from the diary of Lieutenant Breil, commanding the 12th Company, 461st Regiment, and in private life a head schoolmaster:

He who escaped being wounded during the days around here may surely boast of exceptionally good fortune. But there was no time to worry about that; we were too exhausted. What our men did here can only be judged by one who was on the scene himself. How feeble and sick we were, with fever (the influenza), and diarrhea, all of us without exception, and yet we held out! Here we had a good example of the influence of a leader. Major Bischoff, the veteran African fighter, said to his men: “I know you are all sick. Any physician would have you put on the sick list. But will you allow the successes won with our blood to be jeopardized or even lost? A man can endure anything so long as he has the will to do so. Clench your teeth, then! Put yourselves together! When we get out of this place we will have time to recuperate.” Not a man reported himself sick.

The other divisions—the 10th and 28th—were among the finest in the German Army. As the most successful German division, the 28th (Baden) Infantry had led the attack from Chemin des Dames to the Marne, defeating and hurling back all the French who opposed its bold dash. Like the 5th Guard, this division had been relieved on the Marne in order to undertake a new task. The troops of both divisions naturally had been used up by the long drawn-out fighting, without any intervening periods, and were sorely in need of rest.

The question might therefore be raised: why did the German Supreme Command place these badly worn troops in the battle line, well know-
ing that they could not live up to their standards or their reputations? As a matter of fact, general headquarters still had at its disposal at that time, in the army group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, alone, 37 fully manned and fresh divisions. But it desired to use them in a decisive offensive against the English in the region of Ypres, the plan being to push their northern wing back against the sea and to roll up their southern wing. As stated before, there was no intention of making an attack on Paris. The great offensive launched between Soissons and Reims, as well as the later attack on both sides of Reims, [for] 15–17 July was intended as a diversion to cover this mighty so-called “Hagen” (hedging) operation. It was only as a result of the successful attack of the Allies on 18 July that the German Supreme Command was compelled to abandon that vast plan, and to use the “Hagen Divisions” for defense in other quarters.

On 14 June, the Supreme Command issued orders to the army groups of the German crown prince to suspend the offensive and to organize for the defensive. This put an end not only to the battles raging since 9 June on the front of the 18th Army in the region of Noyon on the Avre and the Matz and to the great offensive conducted by the right wing of the 7th Army west and southwest of Soissons, but also to the local attacks in the Belleau Woods region. The latter offensive could have been brought to a successful conclusion only by the use of fresh troops. The 28th Division was no longer equal to the occasion.

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The newly arrived 87th Division now took over the right sector of the front of the 28th Division; the latter, in turn, the right sector of the front of the 231st Division. This front, on which there had been so much fighting, now became a so-called “quiet front.” However, as will be seen, there was no lack of fighting here, even if it was a “quiet front.”

The transfer of the positions to the 87th Division gave rise to the suggestion that the northern corner of the woods be evacuated, and that the main defense line be withdrawn to the slopes behind the villages of Belleau and Torey, to gain a stronger advanced position. In the forest itself, an advanced position could have been created only by clearing the very thick underbrush with mines. However, General von Conta did not approve this plan.

The division commander stationed the 345th Regiment on the right, and the 347th on the left. Within the woods was the 1st Battalion, 347th, less one company, which was withdrawn to Belleau village as a reserve.

We shall now take only a brief further glance at the events concerning Belleau. On the night of 17–18 June, our positions in that region were attacked by infantry patrols, which were repulsed by light machine-gun fire and hand grenades. During the night of 18–19 June, the enemy made a surprise attack along the entire line of the division with infantry and machine guns. At 0450 [on] 20 June, without special artillery preparations, they attacked the front of the 347th Infantry in strong lines of skirmishers, but without success. Patrols from the 3d Battalion, 347th, found between 60 and 70 American dead in one small area. They appeared to belong to the 7th Infantry Regiment.

On 21 June at 0630, the enemy attacked the 11th Company, 347th Regiment, then stationed in the woods. This attack broke down close to our lines, with heavy losses to the enemy. We captured three wounded Americans of the 7th [Infantry].

On 23 June between 2400 and 0500, four patrol raids in considerable force took place, the last one after artillery preparation. All were beaten off with rifle and machine-gun fire.

On 24 June, they attacked at 2000 and, after being beaten off, again at 2215; once more, they were repulsed with heavy losses after we had resorted to barrage fire. Commencing at about 1230, there were sporadic raids by grenade throwers against the 1st Battalion, 347th. Simultaneously, patrols advancing on the right wing of the battalion were driven off. At 0300, a rush against the center of the battalion was repulsed. At 0400, the enemy again made unsuccessful attacks on the right and left wings of this battalion. In this attack, the enemy crept in cautiously with their helmets covered with green brush. French troops were now found with the Americans. Along the left wing of the battalion, the enemy was only 50 or 75 meters from the German lines.

The conclusive American attack took place on 25 June. The divisional report was as follows:

At 5:00 p. m., a very heavy artillery fire suddenly began from Belleau and the high ground.
between the woods and the village. Simultaneous-ness, medium and heavy mine throwers directed a fire on the part of the woods held by us. At 6:00 p.m., the adjoining battalions and the artillery positions also came under fire. The companies on the left, the 3rd and 4th of the 347th Regiment, stationed nearer the edge of the woods, suffered severe losses, since the mines burst for the most part in the trees.

The infantry attack began about 6:30 p.m. The battalion at first evaded the force of the blow. Captain (Cavalry) Kaulbars, commander of the battalion, was informed of the heavy losses suffered by the companies and, at 7:00 p.m., he sent an emergency call, by radio, for the assistance of the 3rd Battalion, in reserve. He now distributed the 1st Company of shock troops among the 3rd and 4th Companies. At 7:12 p.m., division headquarters was informed by the artillery observers that the battalion was again advancing on the woods. At 7:45 p.m., observers noticed white light signals from the depth of the woods (“Here we are.”) At 8:09 p.m., an artillery observer reported that the northern tip of the woods was again in our possession, and that the enemy fire had quieted down.

An infantry flier sent by the division reported that the infantry had again reached the old line. After a short pause, a new attack was opened at 8:30 p.m. The enemy broke into our positions between the 3rd Company and what remained of the 4th. Both were rolled up against the 2nd and 5th Companies of the 2nd Battalion, adjoining them on the north. A regrouping of the massed shock troops for defense could not be effected for lack of time, particularly since at the very opening of the attack the captain of the 4th Company had been killed, and the captain of the 3rd Company mortally wounded. Those prisoners captured in our counterattack fell again into the hands of the enemy.

At 10:15 p.m., there were only remnants of the five companies participating in the fighting. They succeeded in establishing themselves anew in positions now held along the Torey-Belleau road.

The division had dispatched two companies of the reserve battalion of the 3rd Replacement Regiment to Belleau from the region north of Bouresches. These companies were detailed to the 347th Regiment for use on the thinned portion of its front. The 6th Company occupied the southern edge of Belleau as a measure of precaution.

The total losses of the five participating companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 347th Regiment, amounted to 7 officers and 433 non-commissioned officers and men. Of these, 2 officers and 64 non-commissioned officers and men returned wounded. Therefore, there remained 5 officers and 369 non-commissioned officers and men to be classed as dead or missing. Assuming that the report from Eiffel Tower of 5 officers and 259 men prisoners is correct, 110 men must be counted dead. The 66 mentioned above as wounded were light cases, and returned to duty before the second attack. At the ratio of 1 dead to 2% wounded, there would be a total of 275 wounded, with 209 of them either seriously wounded or lightly wounded but not recovered. On this basis we should count 264 less 209, or 55 unwounded prisoners, who must belong mainly to the five companies stationed in the western corner of the woods, and attacked in the rear.

So much for the report of Major General Feldkeller, commander of the 87th Infantry Division. Reports to the effect that part of the Americans wore German uniforms with insignia of the 109th Grenadier Regiment are no doubt mere stories. On the other hand, it is true that they sought to create confusion amidst their foe by calling out in the German language.

Belleau Woods was now entirely in the hands of the American 2d Division.

To get an accurate conception of the effect produced by the first appearance of the young American troops in a pitched battle in the western theater of war, we must keep in mind both the material results attained and the moral impression produced. The two combined will give a correct picture. It is much like the effect of a well-directed artillery fire; every experienced soldier knows that often the moral effect is decidedly greater than the material.
The enormous moral impression created by the appearance of the Americans on the side of the Allied powers was dwelt upon at the beginning. In the course of my narrative, I have pointed out that the death-defying boldness of the Americans, their impetuous onslaughts, and their tenacious endurance were well recognized by the opposing troops and produced a great impression on them.

The opinion of the commanding general of the 4th Reserve Corps, von Conta, concerning the Americans after these battles is evidenced from the following report, dated 17 August 1918:

Fighting Value: The 2nd American may be described as a very good division, and might even be considered as fit for use as shock troops. The numerous attacks by the two Marine regiments in Belleau Woods were executed vigorously and without regard for the consequences. Our fire did not affect their morale sufficiently to interfere appreciably with their advance; their nerves had not yet been used up.

The replacement troops must be pronounced excellent. They are healthy, strong, physically well-developed men from eighteen to twenty-eight years of age, who only need the proper training to be turned into opponents worthy of respect.

In spirit the troops are lively and full of a grim, but good-natured, confidence. Indicative is the expression of a prisoner “We kill or get killed.”

General Ludendorff had recognized from the first reports how considerable was this new foe and how great the danger when many such fine American divisions appeared on the front. On 8 June, he therefore issued the following order to all army groups on the western front:

American units appearing on the front should be hit particularly hard in order to render difficult the formation of an American army.

The order is significant in that it shows what a high value even the German Supreme Command set on the aid of American arms.

So it was the 2d Division that brilliantly and deeply engraved in a glorious chapter of the history of the war the answer to the question as to how the Americans would behave in a pitched battle.

On the edge of the blood-drenched woods, however, we might well erect a monument draped with the French, German, and American colors, and bearing the inscription:

These are the Woods of Belleau; in June 1918, wrested from the French after a brave defense by the Germans, storming on in a bold two-day offensive; heroically defended by them for nine days; then taken by storm in two days with incomparable bravery by the Americans, who remained victoriously in possession of the woods. Honor to the unexcelled heroes of the three nations who, true to their fatherland, here fought and died.
“A critical analysis of flank protection” in the action of the 2d Division in France 3–9 October 1918.

In presenting this monograph, I hope to show that without flank protection how the advance of a division stopped—stopped as though the leading elements had come to a red traffic signal.

About the first of October, the 2d Division entered the sector of Somme-Py—French Fourth Army. The enemy was holding stubbornly in positions that he had occupied since 1914. The French had conquered the difficult system of trenches south of Somme-Py after several days of terrible fighting and, on 1 October, were holding on a line one kilometer northwest of Somme-Py. These gains had been made over an area of complete desolation where the Germans had constructed a most amazing mass of deep trenches and concrete fortifications. The wide stretches of chalky ground, torn and scarred by years of artillery bombardment, the thickly scattered bodies of French and Germans, the vast mine craters, gave the men of the 2d Division a very vivid conception of their new task. Never had they seen such grim, horrible evidence of war’s destruction. One saw nothing but tangled masses of wire, torn bodies, great ugly duds, dead horses, smashed guns scattered over the chalkish waste.

General [John A.] Lejeune’s plan called for a converging attack by the 3d and 4th Brigades, the 4th jumping off just north of Somme-Py [and] making the main effort on Blanc Mont (key point of German lines between Rheims and the Argonne), the 3d Brigade to jump off three kilometers northeast of Somme-Py and attack in a west by north direction, principal objective being the well organized strong point [at] Mede ah Ferme. Both brigades to attack on a front of one and one-half kilometers. The artillery preparation was to consist of a five-minute intense bombardment by all guns of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade firing at the maximum rate. The lines of advance of the two brigades were to converge at a point three kilometers from the jump-off, closing at this point the large angle of difficult terrain that was to be neutralized. This angle included the Bois de la Vipère and a fortified wooded hill, which were to be heavily bombarded with gas shells.

The attack started at 0550; the 6th [Regiment] leading and the 5th [Regiment] supporting in the 4th Brigade; the 9th Infantry leading and the 23d Infantry supporting in the 3d Brigade. Two companies of 12 French tanks each, one company to each of the two leading battalions of the 4th Brigade and the same to the 3d Brigade. System after system of trenches, all heavily manned, were swept over. Heavy flanking fire caused many casualties on the Marine left, but the advance continued and at 0830 the 9th [Infantry] and 6th [Regiment] were on the division’s first objective.

The hostile forces holding this narrow sector in which the 2d Division advanced were the 51st Reserve, 200th, and 203d Divisions. Elements of the 213th Division had been brought from reserve position in anticipation of the attack. This force was distributed in depth, occupying positions in great force with orders to hold at all cost.

At this point, let me give you a general picture of the strength of opposing forces and also the adjacent French troops.

In the American organization, we have approximately 50 men per platoon (six squads), two sections of three squads each, then the four Platoons per company; total 200 men [in] four companies per battalion or 800 men. The normal strength of the infantry company was 250 on the rolls, the 50 men left behind or the well-known 20 percent made up the company headquarters rear echelon, cooks, messmen, ration carriers, ammunition carriers, etc. We have then a total of six infantry battalions per brigade, or about 4,800 men in the fighting line per brigade.

At the beginning of the war, the French companies were similar to the American; 250-man companies but, during 1917–18, they went into action with 100 per company—four companies per battalion—three battalions per regiment—three regiments per division (No. brigades); a total of 3,600
men in the three infantry regiments of the division as against 4,800 infantry men in the American brigade.

The German strength and organization were similar to the French.

The success achieved in less than three hours was greater than anticipated. The angle between the two brigades was cut off so swiftly that the several hundred Germans isolated there offered but little resistance and were easily captured.

General Lejeune's plan was as brilliantly executed as it was daringly conceived.

Early in the afternoon, elements of the 4th Brigade assisted the French in driving the Germans from their very strong position in the Essen Hook.

The two brigades were ordered to continue the advance at 1600 [on] 3 October, seizing the wooded heights south and southwest of Saint-Étienne. The 23d Infantry passed through the 9th [Infantry] and moved up to the new objective, sustaining severe losses from machine-gun fire [that] appeared to come from every direction. The 5th [Regiment] on the left were so heavily engaged protecting the left flank where the French had not yet come up that they were unable to leave the position and pass through the 6th Marines until the following morning.

The situation at the end of the first day was generally satisfactory, although decidedly precarious. Both flanks were exposed to the German machine guns and artillery. The morning of 4 October promised to be a critical one and, during the night [of] 3–4 October, all possible preparations were made to defeat possible counterattacks. The 4th Machine Gun Battalion took position on the left flank nearly two kilometers in rear of the advance positions.

They were faced directly west at right angles to the division line of advance, holding positions from which they could powerfully resist deep flank attacks from the left.

DESPATCH EXTRACTS  4 October [1918]

From 4th Brigade to 2d Division

Have you seen anything of any French on our left in the other Corps; try to reestablish liaison and let us know if possible so we won't shoot them.

The 170th Division (French Chasseurs) on the right was relieved by the 167th Division and were in support position. They were ordered by the XXI Corps commander to move westward across the rear area of the 2d Division and take position facing west.

At daybreak, the Germans launched two powerful counterattacks striking at both flanks nearly two kilometers back of the divisions’ advance positions. The German plan was to drive their two flank forces through, rolling up the 2d Division’s flanks.

On the right, at one point, they succeeded in breaking through but a brilliant counterattack by the 9th [Infantry] recovered all ground and captured many prisoners.

On the left, the German counterattack started just as the 5th [Regiment] were moving up to pass through the 6th and the assaulting waves of the 5th cut off the bewildered Germans and took many prisoners.

On the 5 October, the two brigades advanced to line.

From 5 to 9 October, very little advance could be made. The French were coming up very slowly; the losses were increasing. During this period, the Germans contented themselves by laying down terrific harassing fire from artillery and machine guns. This fire was of unprecedented volume and intensity, so accurately placed on all lines of approach from the rear that carrying parties bringing up food and ammunition were rarely able to get through.

An attempt was made to carry the long wooded ridge east from Saint-Étienne. The woods were crossed and crisscrossed with open lanes where the trees had been cut down and the borders of the lanes strongly wired. Machine guns on these lanes caused very heavy casualties in the 3d Brigade. The nights were very cold, and the men had no blankets, no hot food, no water. The shallow “foxholes” were their only protection against the crashing shells that showered down. I have here extracts of a Despatch.

[2145 on 4] October Phone

From 4th Brigade to 2d Division

Have repelled two counterattacks possibly three. We need all the artillery protection we can get. Can the Division have an aviator lo-
cate enemy batteries so that counter battery can be done? Our men are digging in and doing all that man can do to hold out, but something must be done to keep down enemy's fire. Our losses are about fifty percent—more among officers and sergeants.

Pressure on the left flank was considerably relieved by an attack at 0615 [on] 5 October. A battalion of the 6th [Regiment] stormed a large redoubt west of Blanc Mont, capturing 213 prisoners and 75 light and heavy machine guns.

On the night of 5–6 October, plans were perfected for the final reduction of the Saint-Étienne ridge and the occupation of the high ground beyond. The French were to advance on Saint-Étienne, the 6th [Regiment] and 23d [Infantry] were to carry the ridge.

The attack was launched at 0630 after an hour's artillery preparation. Heavy flanking fire from the right slowed up the advance somewhat, but at 0930 the attacking troops had all gained their objectives. The French forced an entrance into Saint-Étienne but were driven out. Fighting in the town continued throughout the day and the town changed hands several times.

The tactical situation was somewhat improved the evening of 6 October. French units on the left flank of the division were well up and making continuous progress in spite of most desperate resistance by the enemy. On the right flank, however, the French had not yet succeeded in capturing Bemont Château. This condition necessitated a refusal of the division's right flank.

Starting on the night [of] 6–7 October, the division was gradually relieved by the 36th Division. The troops of the 36th had never been under fire, and it was necessary to feed them into the lines by degrees.

The difficulties of exchanging forces in so active a sector can only be appreciated by those in command. Everything possible was done to give the newcomers an opportunity to harden to it. They were supported by battalions from the 2d Division, the 2d Engineers, and the entire 2d Artillery Brigade. As a result, the men of the 36th [Division] soon became oriented and fought with splendid valor. Their attack on 8 October with the 9th Infantry and 6th [Regiment] in close support was delivered with great force and resulted in a substantial gain. Relief of the 3d and 4th Brigades was completed on the night [of] 9–10 October. The 2d Division Artillery Regiments and Engineers stayed in line to support the infantry of the 36th Division in the advance to the Aisne River.

The most costly to the Germans was the holding of these strong German divisions on this front when they were so sorely needed elsewhere.

Losses to 2d Division during the period from 2–10 October were 41 officers and 685 men killed, 162 officers and 3,500 men wounded, 6 officers and 579 men missing—total 209 officers and 4,764 men. Its captures included 48 officers and 1,915 men, 25 guns, 332 machine guns.

**Conclusion**

I hope there has been some analysis of this action that may help others as it has helped me, and the high spots that I shall always remember are: first, that had the forces on the left and right of the 2d Division been able to advance as planned the losses to the division would have been comparatively slight; second, that the rapid advance of the 2d Division left the hostile flanks in the air and permitted a later advance of friendly forces on the flanks; third, that a commanding general in all respects (General Lejeune) and a staff hard to equal visualized before this action, what flank protection would be required when they employed those eight battalions in column; and last, that the mission was carried out as planned, but the division could not move forward and exploit the advantage gained because of the unprotected flanks.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 4TH BRIGADE

by Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC
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The Historical Division has been asked to describe the [First] World War operations and other activities of the 4th Brigade in a series of articles to appear in the Marine Corps Gazette. It is yet too early for any Historical Division to place its stamp of approval on a composition purporting to be a close analysis of an event occurring during the war, a criticism from a professional viewpoint of any particular major or local operation, or one that asserts opinions or draws conclusions of an important nature.

It is quite proper and also desirable that books and articles be written that will give the public information about what its military representatives have accomplished, but the expression of opinions, the drawing of conclusions, and the assertion of criticisms, should be left to the individual writers until all available information upon the subjects have not only been gathered together by the Historical Division, but carefully studied without prejudice in favor of one's own organization or any particular individual.

These proposed articles by the Historical Division will be limited to the statement of facts secured in a mechanical fashion from official operation reports, field orders, general orders, orders, war diaries, etc., and will be a mere recital of the movements and positions of troops, and the occurrence of events, while in none of the published articles under its name will opinions, conclusions, or criticisms be expressed, except in a very few instances, where it would appear beyond cavil that such are warranted. It is obvious that even this is but the presenting of an ex parte statement, which is inconclusive if there exists a conflicting report of another organization.

This first article will give a general outline of the activities of the 4th Brigade, with some statistics, and while it may be dry reading, it is believed that it is necessary in order that the articles following, which will describe the operations in detail, will be more readily appreciated.

In order to save repetition it should be understood that the Marine brigade, except where otherwise stated, operated as a unit of the 2d Division, and while it may not always be expressed, the other elements of that division were present in every operation doing their share of fighting and the work.

The 4th Brigade was composed of the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. From 27 June 1917 to the middle of September 1917, the 5th Regiment was a unit of the 1st Division of Regulars. Although the 5th Regiment was the only organization of Marines in France at the time, the 4th Brigade was formed on 23 October 1917, when Colonel Charles A. Doyen cabled acceptance of his appointment as brigadier general. From 26 October 1917 to 8 August 1919, the 4th Brigade was a part of the 2d Division of Regulars, except for 20–23 October 1918, when the brigade was provisionally at the disposal of the IX French Army Corps, in the vicinity of Leffincourt. On 8 August 1919, the brigade was transferred back to the naval service.

On 29 May 1917, in accordance with directions issued by the president, the secretary of the Navy directed the Major General Commandant “to organize a force of Marines to be known as the Fifth Regiment of Marines for service with the Army as a part of the first expedition to proceed to France in the near future.” The 5th Regiment was accordingly organized at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 7 June 1917, with Colonel Charles A. Doyen in command and Major Harry R. Lay as adjutant.

General [John J.] Pershing and his staff, accompanied by two Marine officers, preceded the first expedition to France, sailing late in May 1917 from the United States.

On 14 June 1917, the first expedition of American troops left the United States for France and the 5th Regiment embarked on the naval transports [USS] Henderson and Hancock, and the auxiliary cruiser De Kalb ([formerly the] Prinz Eitel Friedrich), formed approximately one-fifth of it. The fourth group, including the Hancock, did not sail until 17 June 1917.
The orders received by the convoy commander on the day prior to sailing read, in part:

A military expedition is to be embarked on the above-named transports, augmented by a Regiment of Marines embarked in naval vessels, for transportation to a destination already communicated.

The **De Kalb** was in group one, the **Henderson** in group two, and the **Hancock** in group four; all were part of the escort and not the convoy.

Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, the convoy commander, flying his flag on the *Seattle*, personally commanded the first group, while Major General W. L. Sibert on the [USS] *Tenadores* [1913] was the senior Army officer embarked.

The passage of the four groups across the Atlantic was successfully accomplished without a single disaster or the loss of a life due to enemy causes.

At 2215 [on] 22 June 1917, the first group, including the **De Kalb** was attacked by enemy submarines. The wake of a submarine was sighted crossing 50 yards ahead of the *Seattle’s* bow from starboard to port. A few seconds later, the **De Kalb** and **Havana** sighted torpedoes and opened fire. Two torpedoes passed close to the **Havana**, and one passed ahead and one astern of the **De Kalb**. The second group encountered two submarines, the first at 1150 [on] 26 June 1918, about 100 miles off the French coast, and the second two hours later.

The **De Kalb** arrived at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 26 June 1917; the **Henderson** [arrived] on 27 June 1917; and the **Hancock** [arrived] on 2 July 1917. On 27 June 1917, the commanding officer of the 5th Regiment reported to the commanding general, 1st Division, American Expeditionary Forces, and from that date the 5th Regiment was considered as being detached for service with the Army by direction of the president.

Five hundred negro stevedores had been brought from the United States by the Army to discharge ships, but they were found inadequate for the large number of ships concerned. The Marines relieved the situation somewhat by turning to and discharging their own vessels.

On 27 June 1917, the 1st Battalion, less the 15th Company, which joined the battalion the following day, disembarked from the *De Kalb* and occupied quarters ashore. On this date, Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland joined the 5th Regiment. On 28 June 1917, the 2d and 3d Battalions went ashore from the *Henderson* for a practice march, and the following day the 1st Battalion erected tents on a campsite a short distance outside of Saint-Nazaire. By 2000 [on] 3 July 1917, the entire 5th Regiment was ashore under canvas.

On 15 July 1917, the 5th Regiment, less the 3d Battalion, which remained behind to perform guard duty, and other detached units and officers proceeded to the Gondrecourt Training Area and was stationed in Menaucourt and Naix.

On 1 August 1917, General Pershing inspected the battalions at the two towns where they were billeted.

On 15 August 1917, the 1st Division, including the 5th Regiment, was reviewed by its commanding general on a plateau 12 miles distant from the training area.

On 19 August 1917, General Pershing and General Pétain, commander-in-chief of all the French forces, inspected the Marines, as a unit of the 1st Division. General Pétain congratulated the colonel of the regiment on the splendid appearance of its officers and men, as well as the cleanliness of the towns.

Every opportunity was taken advantage of to perfect the regiment for combat duty, but this work was handicapped by the fact that many units of the regiment were scattered along the line of communications, performing duty of a necessary but of a nontraining nature. One company and one battalion commander left the regiment on 22 September 1917 for duty in England, and did not rejoin the regiment until 11 March 1918. Many other officers and men were placed on detached duty.

On 24–25 September 1917, that part of the 5th Regiment available for training arrived in the Bourmont Training Area and was stationed at Damblain and Breuvannes.

The following letter dated 10 November 1917, addressed by General Pershing to the Major General Commandant, is both complimentary and explains why the Marines were used along the line of communications:
Your Marines having been under my command for nearly six months, I feel that I can give you a discriminating report as to their excellent standing with their brothers of the Army and their general good conduct. I take this opportunity, also, of giving you the reasons for distributing them along our Line of Communications which, besides being a compliment to their high state of discipline and excellent soldierly appearance, was the natural thing to do as the Marine Regiment was an additional one in the Division and not provided for in the way of transportation and fighting equipment in case the Division should be pushed to the front. When, therefore, service of the rear troops and military and provost guards were needed at our base ports and in Paris it was the Marine Regiment that had to be scattered, in an endeavor to keep the rest of the organized division intact.

I have been obliged to detach a number of your officers as Assistant Provost Marshals in France and in England, all of which I take it you will agree with me was highly complimentary to both officers and men, and was so intended. I can assure you that as soon as our service of the rear troops arrive, including a large number of officers and men for the specific duties now being performed by your men, the Marines will be brought back once more under your brigade commander and assigned to the duties which they so much desire in the Second Regular Division, under General Bundy.

It is a great pleasure to report on your fine representatives here in France.

Colonel Charles A. Doyen was in command of the 5th Regiment from the date of its organization on 7 June 1917 to 29 October 1917; and Lieutenant Colonel Hiram I. Bearss [was in command] from 30 October 1917 to 31 December 1917. Colonel Wendell C. Neville having arrived onboard the De Kalb at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 28 December 1917, reported to the 4th Brigade for duty on 1 January 1918, and on that date assumed command of the 5th Regiment, continuing in command until July 1918.

The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was organized at the Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, by order of the Major General Commandant on 17 August 1917. The battalion was designated the 1st Machine Gun Battalion, but on 20 January 1918, after arrival in France, was renamed the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. On 14 December 1917, the battalion sailed from New York on the De Kalb, arriving at Saint-Nazaire, France, [on] 28 December 1917. On 3 January 1918, the battalion arrived at Damblain in the Bourmont Training Area and began training with headquarters at Germainvilliers.

Major Edward B. Cole was in command of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion from the date of its organization until 10 June 1918, when he received a mortal wound.

On 4 August 1917, in accordance with directions issued by the president, the secretary of the Navy directed the Major General Commandant “to organize a force of Marines, to be known as the Sixth Regiment of Marines, for service with the Army in France,” and the regiment was organized as directed.

On 23 September 1917, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment sailed on the Henderson from New York and landed at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 5 October 1917. On 17 October 1917, the 73d Machine Gun Company, Headquarters and Supply Companies, and Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, commanding officer of the 6th Regiment, with his staff, sailed from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the De Kalb and [then] from New York on 18 October 1917, arriving at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 1 November 1917. On 31 October 1917, the 3d Battalion of the 6th Regiment sailed from New York onboard the Von Steuben and anchored at Brest, France, on 12 November 1917. On 20 January 1918, the 2d Battalion of the 6th Regiment sailed on the Henderson from New York and arrived at Saint-Nazaire, France, [on] 5 February 1918, and with the arrival of this last battalion, the entire 6th Regiment was in France.

On 23 October 1917, the 4th Brigade was organized with Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen in command. Brigade headquarters was at Damblain. Brigadier General Doyen continued in command until 7 May 1918, when he published in General Orders No. 5 that he had relinquished command.
Major Harry R. Lay was the first brigade adjutant, and performed the duties of that office from 24 October 1917 to 9 August 1918, except during the period 7 February to 8 May 1918, when Major Holland M. Smith was brigade adjutant.

On 26 October 1917, Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps, assumed command of the 2d Division as its first commanding general, and announced his staff in General Orders No. 1, with station at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, serving as such until relieved by Major General Omar Bundy, U.S. Army, who announced that he assumed command in General Orders No. 4, [on] 8 November 1917.

Like the 5th Regiment, the 6th Regiment spent several months performing the necessary but undesired duties along the line of communications. On 12 January 1918, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin established headquarters for the 6th Regiment at Blevaincourt in the Bourmont Training Area. The 3d Battalion arrived in this area on 12 January 1918, the headquarters units the same date, the 1st Battalion during January 1918, and the 2d Battalion on 10 February 1918.

Therefore, on 10 February 1918, the 4th Brigade was in the Bourmont Training Area intact, with the exception of one company on duty in England, training industriously as an infantry brigade of the 2d Division. While the brigade had been organized on 23 October 1917, and had actually functioned as a brigade with elements of all three of its units present from 12 January 1918, it was not until 10 February 1918 that the brigade was perfected.

Neither the Marine brigade nor any other elements of the 2d Division was the first American unit to enter the front lines since the 1st Division enjoyed that honor on 21 October 1917, when it entered the line in the quiet Toul sector.

The 4th Brigade remained in the Bourmont Training Area with headquarters at Damblain until 14 March 1918, when it commenced movement into subsectors of the Verdun front; the first units of the brigade entering the front line during the night of 16–17 March 1918, with headquarters at Toulon. On 1 April 1918, brigade headquarters was changed to Moscou. The brigade remained on the Verdun front until 14 May 1918, when it proceeded to an area around Vitry-le-François for open warfare training, with headquarters at Vanault-les-Dames. In the meantime, on 6 May 1918, Brigadier General James G. Harbord assumed command of the brigade, relieving Brigadier General Doyen who had been ordered to the United States on account of his physical condition. Brigadier General Doyen relinquished command of the brigade most unwillingly, and the reasons for his relief are best set forth in the citation of a Navy Distinguished Service Medal, which will be posthumously awarded to him, reading as follows:

By reason of his abilities and personal efforts, he brought this brigade to the very high state of efficiency, which enabled it to successfully resist the German Army in the Château-Thierry Sector and Belleau Woods. The strong efforts on his part for nearly a year, undermined his health, and necessitated his being invalided to the United States before having the opportunity to command the brigade in action, but his work was shown by the excellent service rendered by the brigade, not only at Belleau Woods, but during the entire campaign when they fought many battles.

General Pershing, in a letter to Brigadier General Doyen, stated in part:

Your service has been satisfactory and your command is considered as one of the best in France. I have nothing but praise for the service which you have rendered in this command.

On 14 May 1918, the brigade left the area around Vitry-le-François, as it was unsuitable, and proceeded to an area around Gisors-Chaumont-en-Vexin, with headquarters at Bou-des-Bois. The brigade was in this area when sudden orders came to move to the Château-Thierry sector.

On 27 May 1918, Brigadier General John A. Lejeune and Major Earl H. Ellis sailed from New York onboard the Henderson and arrived at Brest, France, on 8 June 1918.

In order to understandably appreciate the importance of the early operations participated in by the Marine brigade as a unit of the 2d Division, it is necessary to remember that in 1918, prior to the
middle of July, the offensive was in the hands of the Imperial German Staff, and that between 21 March 1918 and 15 July 1918, the Germans directed no less than five major offensives against the Allied lines in efforts to bring the war to a successful conclusion for the central powers. American troops assisted in breaking up every one of these drives, but the 2d Division, including the Marines, participated in only one that in the Château-Thierry sector.

The first offensive (Somme) of the Germans was stopped within a few miles of Amiens, and the second (Lys) overran Armentières. In this second German offensive, which lasted from 9 to 27 April 1918 and which has been designated by the Americans as a major operation, there were approximately 500 American troops engaged.

Then late in May 1918, with startling success, which brought a corresponding depression to the morale of the Allies, the Germans launched their third offensive west of Rheims, crossed the Chemin des Dames, captured Soissons, and the last day of May found them marching in the direction of Paris down the Marne Valley. It was at this critical time that the 2d Division, including the Marine brigade, together with elements of the 3d and 28th Divisions were thrown into the line and in blocking the German advance in the Château-Thierry sector rendered great assistance in stopping the most dangerous of the German drives.

Without minimizing in any way the splendid actions of the 26th Division at Seicheprey and Xivray in April 1918, or the brilliant exploit of the 1st Division at Cantigny in May 1918, the fact remains that the 2d Division, including the Marine brigade, was the first American division to get a chance to play an important part on the western front, and how well it repelled this dangerous thrust of the Germans along the Paris-Metz highway is too well known to be dwelt upon at length in this preliminary article.

The fighting of the 2d Division in the Château-Thierry sector was divided into two parts, one a magnificently stubborn defensive lasting a week, and the other a vicious offensive. The defensive fighting of the 2d Division between 31 May and 5 June 1918 was part of the major operation called by the Americans the Aisne defensive. Without discussing at this time the tactical or strategic significance of the work of the 2d Division in the Aisne defensive, suffice to say that its psychological effect upon the morale of the Allies was tremendous and has been recognized in practically every writing worthy of consideration up to the present date.

The close of the Aisne defensive on 5 June 1918 found the line of the 2d Division well established but not including Hill 142, Bois de Belleau, Bouresch, or Vaux, and the Germans were in possession of Château-Thierry on the right of the 2d Division, and continued to hold that town until about 17 July 1918.

On 6 June 1918, the 2d Division snatched the initiative from the Germans and started an offensive on its front [that] did not end until 1 July 1918. The Marine brigade captured Hill 142 and Bouresch on 6 June 1918, and completely cleared Bois de Belleau of the enemy on 26 June 1918, a major of Marines sending in his famous message: "Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely." On 1 July 1918, the 3d Brigade captured Vaux. The artillery, engineers, and the other elements of the 2d Division assisted materially in these successes, while a regiment of the 3d Division was in Belleau Wood for a few days about the middle of June.

During these 26 days of constant fighting, which has been defined by general headquarters of the AEF as a "local engagement," the 2d Division suffered 1,811 battle deaths (of which approximately 1,062 were Marines), and suffered additional casualties amounting to 7,252 (of which approximately 3,615 were Marines). It was that fighting and those 9,063 casualties that made the name Château-Thierry famous.

The achievements of the 4th Brigade in the Château-Thierry sector were twice recognized by the French. The first, which changed the name of the Bois de Belleau, was a beautiful tribute, spontaneously made, to the successes and to the losses of the 4th Brigade, and shows the tremendous effect that the retaking of Belleau Woods and other nearby positions from the Germans had on the feelings of the French and the morale of the Allies. Official maps were immediately modified to conform with the provisions of the order, the plan director used in later operations bearing the name Bois de la Brigade de Marine. The French also used this new name in their orders as illustrated by an "Ordre General"
dated 9 August 1918 signed by the commanding general of the VI French Army, reading in part as follows:

*Avant la grande offensive du 18 Juillet, les troupes américaines faisant partie de la Vle Armee française se sont distinguées en enlevant l’ennemi le Bois de la BRIGADE DE MARINE et le village de VAUX, en arrêtant son offensive sur la MARNE et à FOSSOY.*

The order changing the name of Bois de Belleau reads as follows:

*VIe ARMÉE au Q. G. A., le 30 Juin 1918.*

*Etat-Major*

6930/2

*ORDRE*

*En raison de la brillante conduite de la 4éme Brigade de la 2éme D. U. S. qui a enlevé de haute lutte BOURESCHES et le point d’appui important du BOIS de BELLEAU, défendu avec acharnement par un adversaire nombreux, le Général Commandant la VIe ARMÉE décide que dorénavant, dans toutes les pièces officielles, le BOIS de BELLEAU portera le nom de “Bois de la Brigade de Marine.”*

*Le Général de Division DEGOUTTE Commandant la VIe ARMÉE (Signed) DEGOUTTE.*

à M. le Général Cdt la 4me Brigade de Marine.

v/c. de M. le Général Cdt la 2me D. U. S.

The second recognition by the French of the Marines’ work in the Château-Thierry sector were citations of the 4th Brigade, 5th and 6th Regiments, and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, in French Army orders, that of the brigade, the others being identical, reading as follows:

*Après approbation du Général Commandant en Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en France, le Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Françaises du Nord et du Nord-Est, cite à l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:*

*4e BRIGADE AMÉRICAINE*

*sous les Ordres du Général de Brigade James G. HARBORD, comprenant: le 5e régiment de marine, sous les Ordres du Colonel Wendell C. NEV-ILLE, le 6e régiment de marine, sous les ordres du Colonel Albertus W. CATLIN, le 6e bataillon de mitrailleuses, sous les ordres du Commandant Edward B. COLE:*

*A été jetée en pleine bataille, sur un front violemment attaqué par l’ennemi. C’est affirmée aussitôt comme une unite de tout premier ordre. Dès son entrée en ligne, a brisé, en liaison avec les troupes françaises, une violente attaque ennemie sur un point important de la position et entrepris ensuite à son compte une série d’opérations offensives. Au cours de ces opérations, grace au courage brillant, à la vigueur, à l’allant, à la ténacité de ses hommes qui ne se sont laissés rebuter ni par les fatigues, ni par les pertes; grace à l’activité et à l’énergie de ses Officiers; grace enfin à l’action personnelle de son Chef, le Général J. HARBORD, la 4e brigade a vu ses efforts couronnés de succès. En intime liaison l’un avec l’autre, ses deux régiments et son bataillon de mitrailleuses ont réalisé, après douze jours de lutte incessante (du 2 au 13 Juin 1918) dans un terrain très difficile, une progression variant entre 1500 à 2000 mètres, sur un front de 4 kilomètres, capturant un nombreux matériel, faisant plus de 500 prisonniers, infligeant à l’ennemi des pertes considérables et lui enlevant deux points d’appui de première importance: le village de BOURESCHES et le bois organisé de BELLEAU.*

*Au Grand Quartier Général, le 22 Octobre 1918, Le Général Commandant en Chef, Signé: PÉTAIN.*

During the first attack on Belleau Wood on 6 June 1918, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin was severely wounded and was relieved in command of the 6th Regiment by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, who continued in command until the regiment was demobilized in August 1919.

When Major Edward B. Cole was mortally wounded on 10 June 1918, he was relieved in command of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion by Captain H. E. Major, who on 11 June was relieved by Captain George H. Osterhout, who retained command until relieved by Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr. on 20 June 1918.
During the fighting in the Château-Thierry sector, the headquarters of the 4th Brigade was successively at Montreuil-aux-Lions (in an automobile for half an hour on the way to the front lines), Issonge farmhouse, and La Loge farmhouse. After being relieved by elements of the 26th Division during the night of 5–6 July 1918, the brigade moved to an area in rear of the lines and occupied what was known as the “line of defense” or “Army line,” with headquarters at Nanteuil-sur-Marne. The brigade remained there until 16 July 1918.

During the time the above described fighting was going on, the Germans were frustrated in their fourth 1918 drive (Noyon-Montdidier defensive) between 9–15 June 1918 and, of course, being busy in the vicinity of Bois de Belleau, the Marines had no opportunity of engaging in it.

On 15 July 1918, the Germans attacked for the fifth time in 1918 and, as events turned out, it was the last, for from the time of its failure they were on the defensive. The Allied troops, including many Americans, held this attack, called by the Americans the Champagne-Marne defensive, which was on a large scale and the grand initiative passed from the Germans to the Allies on 18 July 1918, when Marshal Foch launched what is termed by the Americans the Aisne-Marne offensive. In this magnificent and gigantic offensive, the Marine brigade and other elements of the 2d Division played leading parts in the vicinity of Soissons.

General headquarters, AEF, on 28 May 1919, credited the 2d Division units with participation in the major operation of Champagne-Marne defensive, but on 2 June 1919 rescinded this credit.

On 11 July 1918, Brigadier General James G. Harbord, commanding general of the Marine brigade, received notification of his appointment as a major general, and two days later left on a five-days leave of absence. As Colonel Neville had been evacuated to a base hospital after leaving the Château-Thierry sector, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee assumed temporary command of the brigade. Major General Harbord and Colonel Neville both returned in time to enter the Aisne-Marne offensive, the former in command of the 2d Division and the latter in command of the 4th Brigade.

Of the six Allied offensives taking place in 1918 dignified by the Americans as major operations, the brigade of Marines, with the other units of the 2d Division participated in three; the first being the Aisne-Marne in which the Marine brigade entered the line near Soissons.

On 17 July 1918, the 1st Moroccan Division, and the 1st and 2d Divisions of American Regulars were hurriedly and secretly concentrated by forced night marches through rain and mud in the Bois de Retz, near Soissons, the headquarters of the 4th Brigade being established at Vivières.

The getting to the “jump-off” on time for this operation will always share in Marine Corps history with the glorious victory that followed.

Early on the morning of 18 July 1918, Marshal Foch threw these three picked divisions at the unsuspecting Germans with overwhelming success, and again on the following day. Major General James G. Harbord, commanding the 2d Division in this operation, describes the two days’ fighting of his division in these words:

It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings of General Pershing, who visited the Division Headquarters last night. His praise of the gallant work of the Division on the 18th and 19th is echoed by the French High Command, the III Corps Commander, American Expeditionary Forces, and in a telegram from the former Division Commander. In spite of two sleepless nights, long marches through rain and mud, and the discomforts of hunger and thirst, the Division attacked side by side with the gallant 1st Moroccan Division and maintained itself with credit. You advanced over six miles, captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven batteries of artillery, over a hundred machine guns, minenwerfers,* and supplies. The Second Division has sustained the best traditions of the Regular Army and the Marine Corps. The story of your achievements will be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands to-night.

This was one of the greatest strategic successes of Marshal Foch and that the part played by the

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* German mine throwers.
Marines was appreciated by the French is illustrated by the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion being cited in French Army orders. The citations of the 6th Regiment (that of the 5th Regiment being similar) and that of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion are quoted below:

Après approbation du Général Commandant en Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en France, le Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Française du Nord et du Nord-Est, cite à l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

**LE 6e REGIMENT de MARINE AMÉRICAINE,**
sous les ordres du Lt.-Colonel LEE,

> “Engagés á l’improviste dans l’offensive du 18 Juillet 1918, en pleine nuit, dans un terrain inconnu et tres difficile, ont déployé pendant deux jours, sans se laisser arréter par les fatigues et les difficultés du ravitaillement en vivres et en eau, une ardeur et une ténacité remarquables, refoulant l’ennemi sur 11 kilométres de profondeur, capturant 2700 prisonniers, 12 canons et plusieurs centaines de mitrailleuses.”

*Au Grand Quartier Général, le 25 OCTOBRE, 1918.*

Le Général Commandant en Chef, Signe: Pétain.

Après approbation du Général Commandant en Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en France, le Maréchal de France, Commandant en Chef les Armées Française de l’Est, cite à l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

**Le 6e Bataillon de Mitrailleuses U. S. Marine,**
sous les ordres du Commandant L. W. T. WALLER.

> “Quoique très fatigué par un long trajet en camion et une marche de nuit sur des routes difficiles, ce bataillon c’est précipité á l’attaque le 18 Juillet 1918, prés de VIERZY et a puissamment contribué á consolider et á maintenir la position atteinte ce jour-là.

> “Dans le matinée du 19 Juillet, il c’est vaillamment porté en avant, en terrain découvert, sous un violent feu d’artillerie et de mitrailleuses, souten-

ant résolument l’attaque lancée contre les positions renforcées de l’ennemi.

> “Ayant á faire face á une forte résistance ennemie et á des contre-attaques continuelles, a fait preuve du plus beau courage en consolidant rapidement et en tenant résolument l’importante position con- quise par l’infanterie ce jour-là.”

*Au Grand Quartier Général, le 4 Mars 1919.*

Le Maréchal,

Commandant en Chef les Armées Française de l’Est.

PÉTAIN.

During the action, brigade headquarters was moved to a cave in Vierzy.

Colonel Logan Feland was in command of the 5th Regiment during the Aisne-Marne offensive, near Soissons, and continued in command of it with the exception of two days in July 1918 (when Brigadier General Lejeune commanded the 4th Brigade and Colonel Neville the 5th Regiment), until 21 March 1919, when he was relieved by Colonel Harold C. Snyder, who retained command until the date of demobilization.

The 4th Brigade was relieved about midnight 19 July 1918 and, after remaining in a reserve position until 22 July 1918, marched to an area farther in the rear, but still in a reserve position, brigade headquarters being established at Taillefontaine. After final relief from this active sector, the brigade was billeted 24–25 July 1918 in an area around Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, brigade headquarters being established at Nanteuil. The brigade remained in this area, cleaning and resting up until 31 July 1918.

On 25 July 1918, Brigadier General John A. Lejeune arrived and assumed command of the 4th Brigade on 26 July 1918, [with] General Orders No. 16 reading as follows:

I have this day assumed command of the Fourth Brigade, U.S. Marines.

To command this Brigade is the highest honor that could come to any man. Its renown is imperishable and the skill, endurance and valor of the officers and men have immortalized its name and that of the Marine Corps.
Over There

Brigadier General Lejeune retained command until 29 July 1918, when he became commanding general of the 2d Division, relieving Major General Harbord who left to assume command of the Services of Supplies. Colonel Neville, on this latter date, resumed command of the 4th Brigade.

On the last two days of July 1918, the units of the brigade entrained for a 24-hour railroad journey, which took them to an area around Nancy, with headquarters at Villers-lès-Nancy, where they remained resting and refitting until 9 August 1918.

On 7 August 1918, information was received of the promotion of Brigadier General Lejeune to the grade of major general, and of Colonel Neville to the grade of brigadier general, both to date from 1 July 1918.

On 5 August 1918, movement of units of the brigade was started for the occupation of the Marbache subsector, near Pont-à-Mousson, on the Moselle River. By 8 August 1918, the movement was completed, with headquarters established at Scarponne just across the Moselle River from Dieulouard. The sector was quiet and occupation uneventful except for an enemy raid, which was successfully repulsed and prisoners captured.

On 8 August 1918, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis was appointed adjutant of the 4th Brigade, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Lay who had been detailed as inspector general of the 2d Division.

The relief from the Marbache sector was completed on 18 August 1918, and the brigade moved to an area about 20 kilometers southeast of Toul, headquarters being established at Favières. Intensive training for the impending Saint-Mihiel offensive was indulged in here.

The brigade started to move from this area on the night of 2 September 1918, and after a series of night marches, during which time headquarters were established at Pont-SAint-Vincent, Velaine-en-Haye, and Bouvron, the brigade arrived just outside of Manonville, headquarters being established in Manonville. From 12 to 16 September 1918, the brigade was engaged in the Saint-Mihiel offensive in the vicinity of Thiaucourt, Xammes, and Jaulny. Headquarters during these operations were successively at one kilometer north of Lironville, Thiaucourt, and finally at Manonville, on 16 September 1918.

On 20 September 1918, the brigade moved to an area south of Toul, with headquarters at Chaude-nay. The brigade remained in this area until 25 September 1918, when it moved by rail to an area south of Châlons-sur-Marne, with headquarters at Sarry.

From 1 to 10 October 1918, the 2d Division was placed temporarily at the disposal of the IV French Army under General [Henri] Gouraud.

On 28 September 1918, the brigade moved by bus and marching to the Souain-Suippes area, with headquarters at Suippes. On 1 October 1918, the brigade, with the rest of the 2d Division, marched to the front line near Somme-Py on the night of 1–2 October 1918 and relieved elements of a French division. The brigade headquarters was located in the trenches about two-and-a-half kilometers south of Somme-Py. The relief was effected before daylight without incident.

The Battle of Blanc Mont, fought by the 2d Division as a unit of the IV French Army between 3 and 9 October 1918, was one of the most powerful and effective blows struck under the direction of Marshal Foch against the retreating Germans, and its brilliantly successful conclusion was due in a great degree to the military genius of Major General John A. Lejeune of the Marines.

On 27 September 1918, Major General Lejeune was summoned to the headquarters of the IV French Army where General Gouraud, placing his hand upon the range of hills on the map representing Blanc Mont Ridge and turning to General Lejeune said, “General, this position is the key of all the German defenses of this sector, including the whole Rheims Massif. If this ridge can be taken the Germans will be obliged to retreat along the whole front thirty kilometres to the river Aisne. Do you think your Division could effect its capture?” General Lejeune responded that he felt certain the 2d Division could take the stronghold pointed out, whereupon he was informed that he would be ordered to make the attack within a few days and was directed to prepare a plan for the assault.

The results of this operation are described in an order of the 2d Division dated 11 November 1918, reading in part as follows:
In the Champagne District, October 2nd to 10th, it fought beside the Fourth French Army. On October 3rd, it seized BLANC MONT RIDGE, the keystone of the arch of the main German position, advanced beyond the Ridge and, although both flanks were unsupported, it held all its gains with the utmost tenacity, inflicting tremendous losses on the enemy. This victory freed RHEIMS and forced the entire German Army between that city and the ARGONNE Forest to retreat to the AISNE, a distance of 30 kilometres.

The amazing success of the attack and the vital effect of the capture of Blanc Mont Ridge and Saint-Étienne is described in the words of General Gouraud himself in a letter to Marshal Foch, reading in part as follows:

Because of the brilliant part played by this “Grand Unit” in the offensive of the IV Army, during the autumn of 1918, I propose the 2nd American Division for a citation in “The Order of the Army,” upon the following specific grounds:

The 2nd Infantry Division, U.S., brilliantly commanded by General Lejeune, * * * * played a glorious part in the operations of the IV Army in the Champagne in October 1918. On the 3rd of October, this division drove forward and seized, in a single assault, the strongly entrenched German positions between BLANC MONT and MEDEAH FERME, and again pressing forward to the outskirts of SAINT ÉTIENNE-a-ARNES, it made, in the course of the day, an advance of about six kilometres. It captured several thousand prisoners, many cannon and machine guns, and a large quantity of other military material. This attack, combined with that of the French divisions on its left and right, resulted in the evacuation by the enemy of his positions on both sides of the River Suippe, and his withdrawal from the Massif de Notre-Dame-des-Champs.

The further opinion of the French as to the results and effect of the 2d Division’s operations in Champagne is set forth in the following quoted extract from Information Bulletin No. 12 of the IV French Army dated 7 October 1918:

Up to October 4th, at which date the present bulletin is written, the IV Army has pushed its advance up to objectives of the very highest importance. A splendid American Division, full of dash and ardent, the 2nd Division, U.S., placed at the disposition of the 21st Corps on October 3rd made itself master of MASSIF DU BLANC MONT, which dominates the valley of the ARNES and gives us excellent outlook on the valley of the SUIPPE, in rear of the region of MONTS; this conquest rapidly brought about the downfall of NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS and the GRAND BOIS de SAINTSOUPLET.

During this operation, the headquarters of the brigade was advanced from the trenches two-and-a-half kilometers south of Somme-Py to a point half a kilometer south of that town.

The 5th and 6th Regiments were cited in French Army orders for their splendid accomplishments in the Champagne [sector]. The citation of the 5th Regiment, that of the 6th Regiment being similar, reads as follows:

After approval of the General Commandant en Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en France, le Maréchal de France, Commandant en Chef les Armées Françaises de l’Est, cite à l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

Le 5ème Regiment de Marine Américain, sous les Ordres du Colonel Logan FELAND:

On 10 October 1918, having been relieved from the line in the Blanc Mont sector, the brigade took station in the Suippes-Somme Suippes-Nantivet area and the adjacent camps with headquarters at Suippes, being assigned as IV French Army reserve. The brigade remained in this area resting and refitting until 14 October 1918 when, in accordance with orders, it marched to the Vadenay-Bouy-la-Veuve-Dampierre area, north of Châlons-sur-Marne, with headquarters at Bouy. While here, orders were received placing the 4th Brigade provisionally at the disposal of the IX French Army Corps to hold a sector in the region Attigny-Vancq-Aisne River.

Accordingly, on 20 October 1918, the brigade was temporarily detached from the 2d Division and marched to the area Suippes-Nantivet-Somme-Suippes, with headquarters at Suippes. On 21 October 1918, in obedience to orders, the Marines hiked to the vicinity of Leffincourt, where brigade headquarters was established. While about to take over the assigned sector, the 4th Brigade received orders to rejoin the 2d Division, which was preparing to enter the Meuse-Argonne offensive. After a hard march, these orders were obeyed and brigade headquarters established at Montpellier on 23 October 1918.

On 24 October 1918, Major Matthew H. Kingman relieved Major Littleton W. T. Waller, in command of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, Major Waller joining the 2d Division staff as division machine gun officer.

On 25 October 1918, the brigade moved to the Les Islettes area with brigade headquarters at Camp Cabaud. On the evening of 26 October 1918, the brigade moved to the area south of Exermont and bivouaced in the woods that night with brigade headquarters at Exermont. The brigade remained in bivouac in this area until the night of 30–31 October 1918, when it moved forward into line to participate in the immense Meuse-Argonne offensive, which had started on 26 September 1918.

Relieving elements of the 42d Division just south of Landres-et-Saint-Georges, the Marine brigade, early on the morning of 1 November 1918, jumped off, following a terrific barrage, for its final operation of the war, the conclusion of which at 1100 on the morning of 11 November 1918 found the Marines firmly established on the heights of the far bank of the Meuse River after an advance of 30 kilometers.

The operations of the 2d Division, including the Marines, are described in the following official reports.

In recommending that the 2d Division be cited in G. H. Q. Orders for its excellent work in the attack of 1–11 November 1918, the commanding general, First Army, states on 16 January 1919, in part as follows:

4. In the 1st Army attack on November 1, 1918, the 2nd Division was selected and so placed in the battle line that its known ability might be used to overcome the critical part of the enemy’s defense. The salient feature of the plan of attack was to drive a wedge through Landres-et-St. Georges to the vicinity of Fosse. It was realized that if the foregoing could be accomplished the backbone of the hostile resistance west of the Meuse would be broken and the enemy would have to retreat to the east of the Meuse. Success in this plan would immediately loosen the flanks of the 1st Army. The 2nd Division was selected to carry out this main blow.

5. The 2nd Division accomplished the results desired in every particular on the first day of the attack, not only clearing the hostile defenses of Landres-et-St. Georges and the Bois de Hazois but continuing its advance to the vicinity of Fosse, i.e., about 9 kilometres. This decisive blow broke the enemy’s defense and opened the way for the rapid advance of the Army.

With reference to the first day’s attack, the commanding general, Fifth Army Corps, wrote officially on 2 November 1918, in part as follows:

The Division's brilliant advance of more than nine kilometres, destroying the last stronghold on the Hindenburg Line, capturing the Freya
Stellung, and going more than nine kilometres against not only the permanent, but the relieving forces in their front, may justly be regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements made by any troops in this war. For the first time, perhaps, in our experience the losses inflicted by your Division upon the enemy in the offensive greatly exceeded the casualties of the Division. The reports indicate, moreover, that in a single day the Division has captured more artillery and machine guns than usually falls to the lot of a command during several days of hard fighting. These results must be attributed to the great dash and speed of the troops, and to the irresistible force with which they struck and overcame the enemy.

The following citation in Fifth Army Corps General Orders No. 26, dated 20 November 1918, gives a further description of these operations:

The 2nd Division, in line at the launching of the attack, broke through the strong enemy resistance, and leading the advance, drove forward in a fast and determined pursuit of the enemy, who, despite new divisions hastily thrown in, was driven back everywhere on its front. This division drove the enemy across the MEUSE, and under heavy fire and against stubborn resistance, built bridges and established itself on the heights. The cessation of hostilities found this Division holding strong positions across the MEUSE and ready for a continuation of the advance.

An order of the 2d Division dated 5 November 1918, reading in part as follows, tells what occurred subsequent to the first day's attack:

During the night of November 2–3, the 2nd Division moved forward overcoming the resistance of the enemy's advanced elements, and at 6.00 A.M., it attacked and seized the enemy's line of defense on the ridge southeast of VAUX-en-DIEULET.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy, having reorganized his line on the border of BELVAL FOREST, was again attacked and defeated. After nightfall and in a heavy rain, the advanced elements of the Division pressed forward through the Forest, and occupied a position on the heights south of BEAUMONT, eight kilometres in advance of the divisions on our right and left.

During the night of November 4–5, the Division again pressed forward, occupied BEAUMONT and LETANNE and threw the enemy on its front across the MEUSE.

An order of the 2d Division dated 12 November 1918, describing the historic crossing of the Meuse River on the night before the Armistice became operative, reads as follows:

1. On the night of November 10th, heroic deeds were done by heroic men. In the face of a heavy artillery and withering machine gun fire, the 2nd Engineers threw two foot bridges across the Meuse, and the first and second battalions of the 5th Marines crossed resolutely and unflinchingly to the east bank and carried out their mission.

2. In the last battle of the war, as in all others in which this division has participated, it enforced its will on the enemy.

The commanding general of the Fifth Army Corps has this to say about the crossing of the Meuse by the Marines, who were assisted by the artillery, engineers, and other troops of the 2d Division:

Especially I desire to commend the Division for the crowning feat of its advance in crossing the Meuse River in face of heavy concentrated enemy machine gun fire, and in driving the enemy’s troops before it, and in firmly establishing itself upon the heights covering the desired bridgehead. This feat will stand among the most memorable of the campaign.

The general success achieved by the 2d Division in the Argonne-Meuse offensive is well described by the words of the order citing Major General John A. Lejeune of the Marines for a Distinguished Service Medal reading in part as follows:
In the Argonne-Meuse offensive his division was directed with such sound military judgment and ability that it broke and held, by the vigor and rapidity of execution of its attack, enemy lines which had hitherto been considered impregnable.

During this fighting, the headquarters of the 4th Brigade was successively established at: Exermont, half a kilometer north of Exermont, Sommerance, Bayonville-et-Chennery, Fosse, Bellevaux-des-Dames, and Beaumont.

On “the eleventh hour, the eleventh day, of the eleventh month, of the year 1918,” Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, commanding general of the 4th Brigade, published the following tribute to the officers and men of the 4th Brigade:

Upon this, the most momentous hour in the history of the world war, the undersigned wishes to express to his command his sincere appreciation of their unfailing devotion to duty and their heroic and courageous action during the recent operations.

The time, when the results of our efforts during the past year are shown, is here. The hour has arrived when the convulsion which has shaken the foundations of the civilized world has ceased. The enemy is defeated and the principles of freedom and democracy have triumphed over barbarism and autocracy. We may all feel justly proud of the extent of our participation, which has forced the enemy to a cessation of hostilities. It is fitting, at this time, to think of those of our comrades who have fallen on the field of honor and rejoice in the fact that they did not give their lives in vain.

Your display of fortitude, determination, courage and your ability to fight has upon more than one occasion been a determining factor in making history, and your work has had a direct bearing upon the remarkable chain of events, which have this day culminated in such a satisfactory manner. Along the fronts of Verdun, the Marne, the Aisne, Lorraine, Champagne, and the Argonne, the units of the Fourth Brigade Marines have fought valiantly, bravely and decisively. They have nobly sustained the sacred traditions and have added glorious pages to the already illustrious history of the United States Marine Corps. It is a record of which you may all be proud.

On 17 November 1918, the 2d Division commenced its march to the Rhine, passing through Belgium and Luxembourg. The German frontier was reached 25 November 1918, crossed on 1 December 1918, the Rhine reached 10 December 1918, and crossed on 13 December 1918. During this march and up to the time the 4th Brigade settled down to its occupation duty in Germany, brigade headquarters were successively established at Margut, Bellefontaine, Arlon, Useldange, Berg, Eppendorf, Neuerburg, Waxweiler, Prüm, Budesheim, Wiesbaun, Ahrweiler, Neuenahr, Burghbrohl, Rheinbrothal (2 kilometers northeast of), and Henningen (1 kilometer northeast of).

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army of Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the outstanding features being the establishment of a Rhine River patrol, manned and commanded by Marines; an extended visit, inspection, and review by the secretary of the Navy; and the operation of the 2d Division, including the Marines, made about the middle of June 1919, in which an advanced position was taken as a part of the concentration of the Third Army immediately preceding the signing of the treaty of peace by the Germans.

Headquarters of the 4th Brigade during the greater part of the occupation of Germany was at Nieder Bieber, while during the last operation when the advanced position was taken, just prior to Germany signing the peace treaty, it was at Herschbach. On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hartenfels, occupied the most advanced position ever occupied by Marines.

Just before departing from Germany, headquarters was at Nieder Bieber, and with the exception of Brest, France, this was the last headquarters the brigade had in Europe.

Major Charles D. Barrett relieved Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis as brigade adjutant in April 1919, and held that position until the brigade was demobilized. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis was assigned to duty as second in command of the 5th Regiment. On 12 March 1919, Colonel Logan Fe-
land was temporarily appointed brigadier general to rank from 9 March 1919 and accepted appointment and executed oath on 17 March 1919. On 21 March 1919, Colonel Harold C. Snyder assumed command of the 5th Regiment, relieving Brigadier General Logan Feland, who after acting as aide for the secretary of the Navy arrived in the United States on the Von Steuben on 13 May 1919.

A great many Marines were returned from Europe gradually and in small detachments from the date the Armistice became operative.

The commanding general of the 2d Division and his staff, headquarters of the 4th Brigade, the 5th Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 6th Regiment, arrived in the United States onboard the George Washington on 3 August 1919; the remainder of the 6th Regiment arrived in the United States early in August 1919 onboard the Rijndam and the Wilhelmina; the 6th Machine Gun Battalion arrived in the United States onboard the Santa Paula on 5 August 1919.

The company of Marines and battalion commander (major) and staff, forming a part of the Composite Regiment, Third Army, returned to the United States onboard the Leviathan on 8 September 1919, and were returned to the naval service in September 1919.

The colonel commanding the Composite Regiment, in a letter dated 21 September 1919, commended the battalion commander and staff, the commanding officer of the company, and the lieutenants for their loyalty and attention to details and the Noncommissioned officers and men for their soldierly appearance, high standards of morale and discipline. The Composite Regiment paraded as escort to the General of the Army in London, Paris, New York, and Washington, DC. The Regiment has been favorably commended. This is entirely due to the loyalty, energy, and attention to duty of the officers and individual soldiers in the Regiment; and in this the Marine Corps representatives deserve a large share.

On 8 August 1919, the 4th Brigade, as a part of the 2d Division, paraded in New York City. Major General John A. Lejeune, with many Marine officers on his staff, was in command.

On 8 August 1919, the 4th Brigade was transferred to the naval service upon its arrival at Quantico, Virginia.

On 12 August 1919, the 4th Brigade under Brigadier General Neville, then a part of the naval service, was reviewed by the president of the United States in a parade at Washington, DC.

A company of Marines and a battalion commander, as a part of the Third Army Composite Regiment, paraded in New York and in Washington, DC, as escort to General Pershing. The 1st Division also formed a part of these parades.

The demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades was effected at Quantico, Virginia, and the Naval Operating Base, Hampton Roads, Virginia, respectively. This undertaking was by far the largest and most important of its kind that had ever confronted the Marine Corps, but due to the coordination of the various departments interested, and the far-reaching and clearly denned instructions issued in advance, the demobilization of these units was effected in a remarkably short time, being completed on 13 August 1919 and in a manner bringing satisfaction to the men discharged and reflecting to the credit of the Corps. The success of these efforts is evidenced by the following statement of demobilization:

Discharged or transferred to inactive status:

4th Brigade 6,677 enlisted men.

5th Brigade 6,671 enlisted men.

In addition to the enlisted men released, there were also about 200 officers of the two brigades who were either discharged or transferred to an inactive status.

To summarize the operations and certain statistics of the 4th Brigade, the following are set forth:

The 4th Brigade as a unit of the 2d Division participated in actual battle in France in the following sectors between the inclusive dates set down:
Toulon sector, Verdun: from 15 March to 13 May 1918.
Aisne defensive, Château-Thierry sector: from 31 May to 5 June 1918.
Château-Thierry sector (capture of Hill 142, Bouresches, Belleau Wood): from 6 June to 9 July 1918.
Aisne-Marne (Soissons) offensive: from 18 July to 19 July 1918.
Marbache sector, near Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle River: from 9 to 16 August 1918.
Saint-Mihiel offensive, in the vicinity of Thiécourt, Xammes, and Jaulny: from 12 to 16 September 1918.
Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) (capture of Blanc Mont Ridge and Saint-Étienne): from 1 to 10 October 1918.
Meuse-Argonne (including crossing of the Meuse River): from 1 to 11 November 1918.

Under the rulings of General Headquarters, AEF, the Marine Corps units serving with the 2d Division are entitled to silver bands on the staffs of their colors for battle participation in the above-mentioned engagements.

General Headquarters, AEF, ruled that the 2d Division, including the 4th Brigade, participated in only four major operations: the Aisne defensive (31 May to 5 June 1918); the Aisne-Marne offensive (18–19 July 1918); the Saint-Mihiel offensive (12–16 September 1918); and the Meuse-Argonne offensive (1–10 October 1918 and 1–11 November 1918). The operations [that] resulted in the capture of Blanc Mont and Saint-Étienne were construed to be included in the Meuse-Argonne offensive despite the fact that the operations were a part of the operations of the IV French Army, far to the west of the western limit of the American Argonne-Meuse sector, and further that the work of the 2d Division was continued by another American division. The operation [that] resulted in the capture of Bouresches, Bois de la Brigade de Marine by the Marine brigade, assisted by artillery, engineers, etc., of the 2d Division, and the capture of Vaux by the 3d Brigade, engineers and artillery of the 2d Division, were held to be local engagements rather than a major operation. The 2d Division suffered about 9,000 casualties in this operation.

Marine Corps deaths in France, as obtained from Marine Corps records on 10 December 1919, are divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of wounds received in action</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died from accident</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died from disease</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other causes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>2,785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The records of the 2d Division show that 252 officers and 8,277 enlisted men were wounded, and 24 officers and 962 enlisted men were gassed between 15 March and 11 November 1918.

The French Army recognized the splendid work of the 5th and 6th Regiments by citing them no less than three times in army orders for achievements in the Château-Thierry sector, in the Aisne-Marne (Soissons) offensive, and in the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne). The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was similarly cited for its work in the Château-Thierry sector and Aisne-Marne (Soissons) offensive. The 4th Brigade received a similar citation for its work in the Château-Thierry sector. Since only two French Army citations are sufficient to make an organization eligible for the award of the French fourragère, the high standard of the Marine units is evident. The only American organizations [that] have received permission to accept or wear the French fourragère are three sections of the ambulance service and one aero squadron, all of which were temporary organizations and have been now demobilized.
A Marine Corps unit arrived in France with the first expedition of American troops. Between 26 June 1917 and 11 November 1918, Marines were in Europe with the AEF a total of 504 days, of which 66 days were in active sectors and 71 in quiet sectors.

The following number of decorations were awarded Marines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decoration</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medals of Honor (American)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medals (American)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Crosses (American)</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order (British)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decoration</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croix-de-Guerre (French)</td>
<td>1,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Honor (French)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médaille Militaire (French)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian decorations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian decorations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrin decorations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1,648

The 2d Division captured 343 pieces of heavy and light artillery, 58 trench mortars, 1,350 machine guns, and 8 antitank guns; it captured 12,026 prisoners; and advanced 61 kilometers against the enemy.
The Lafayette high-power radio station at the village of Croix d’Hins, France, about 15 miles from Bordeaux, the construction of which was undertaken during the war by the United States Navy in conjunction with the French authorities for the purpose of ensuring adequate and reliable communication facilities between the United States government and the American Expeditionary Forces in France, was formally turned over by representatives of the Navy to the French government on 18 December 1920, and the station was then formally inaugurated in the international wireless service of the world.

The construction of a super high-power radio station in France was deemed necessary after the entrance of the United States into the World War, in view of the extremely heavy and constantly increasing volume of trans-Atlantic traffic being handled by the ocean cables, and the not remote possibility that this means of communicating with our forces abroad might be interrupted.

It was decided, therefore, to establish a super high-power radio station in France [that] would be capable of communicating with the American stations during all periods of the day and night and all seasons of the year regardless of possible interference from the powerful station at Nauen [Germany], or from atmospheric disturbances prevailing during the summer months. Accordingly, the Navy Department was entrusted with the task of establishing a station in France [that] would be not less than twice as powerful as any radio station then in existence.

The construction of the station was far advanced when the Armistice was signed, at which time, however, all work was stopped, as the very urgent need of the station as no longer apparent. Later, however, the French government requested that the station be completed as an after-war measure, and work was again resumed and carried to completion.

The principal engineering features of the Lafayette radio station are eight self-supporting steel towers each 820 feet in height, resting on immense concrete foundations [that] rise 12 feet above the ground level; the antenna system, and the transmitting equipment consisting of 1,000-kw [kilowatt] arcs complete in duplicate.

The eight towers, resting on their foundations, thus providing a height of 832 feet from the ground level to the tops of the towers, are arranged in two rows of four each, the rows being spaced 1,320 feet, and the towers in each row likewise being spaced 1,320 feet apart; giving a total antenna area of 5,227,200 square feet, this antenna area far exceeds that of any other existing radio station.

The antenna is of the inverted “L” type, [with] the longitudinal antenna wires, consisting of number three silicon-bronze cable, being supported by triatics stretching across the aisle formed by the two rows of towers.

The arc equipment is of the Federal Poulsen type and is capable of withstand ing a 25 percent overload, thereby making 1,250 kw available intermittently for short periods of time. The contract for the arc transmitting equipment called for the delivery of a high frequency current of 500 amperes continuously on a wave length approximately three times the natural period of an antenna having a true capacity of 0.047 microfarad and a total continuous undamped wave radio frequency resistance, exclusive of radio apparatus and connections, not to exceed 1.3 ohms under operating conditions.

The characteristics of the antenna system and oscillatory circuit, as permanently installed, are outlined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>0.05 microfarad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenna resistance</td>
<td>0.45 ohm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground resistance</td>
<td>0.90 ohm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading inductor aid connections</td>
<td>0.30 ohm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total oscillatory circuit resistor</td>
<td>1.65 ohms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenna natural period</td>
<td>8,130 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective antenna height</td>
<td>172 meters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The average height of the antenna horizontal wires is 650 feet, which shows the average sag of the wires to be 182 feet, since the tops of the towers are 832 feet above ground level.

The equipment was adjusted to five wave lengths, namely 13,900, 16,300, 18,700, 21,200, and 23,500 meters, the latter being considered as the contract wave length for the purpose of acceptance tests. A maximum antenna current of 610 amperes was obtained without damage to the installation. The antenna current used during the 30-day tests, which were conducted from 21 August to 19 September 1920, averaged about 450 amperes on the various wave lengths.

The signals from the Lafayette station as received at Cavite, Philippine Islands; San Francisco, California; Balboa, Canal Zone; Bar Harbor, Maine; and Washington, DC, during the 30-day tests were of from three to eight times greater intensity than those of other high-power radio stations of the world of approximately equal distances.

Work on the station began on 28 May 1918 and was completed on 21 August 1920. The total cost of the station, which the French government has agreed to assume, was approximately $4 [million].

A commemorative tablet has been placed on the radio power building near the main entrance, bearing the following inscription in both English and French:

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LAFAYETTE RADIO STATION
Croix d'Hins, Gironde, France

In Honor of General Lafayette

Conceived for the purpose of ensuring adequate and uninterrupted trans-Atlantic communication facilities between the American Expeditionary Forces engaged in the World War and the Government of the United States of America.

Erected by the United States Navy in conjunction with and for the Government of France.
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It is understood the Lafayette station will exchange trans-Atlantic radio traffic with stations in the United States and across the continents of Europe and Asia with the French station at Saigon, Indo-China, and also with other high power radio stations in various parts of the world.
Although the [USS] *Brooklyn* (CA 3), flagship of the United States Asiatic Fleet, was in Vladivostok Harbor, Siberia, in November 1917 when the [Aleksandr F.] Kerensky government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks; no part of her crew was landed, as the Kerensky adherents remained in power in Vladivostok for several months after their chief had been deposed. But upon the return of that vessel in March 1918, conditions made it imperative for Admiral Austin M. Knight, the commander-in-chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, to send a force of Marines and Bluejackets ashore.

**“Brooklyn” Arrives at Vladivostok**

The *Brooklyn*, with the regular Marine detachment, consisting of Captain Archie F. Howard, Second Lieutenant Conrad S. Grove III, and about 75 enlisted men, augmented by an additional 50 enlisted men, organized at Cavite, Philippine Islands, arrived at Vladivostok, Siberia, on 1 March 1918. While en route from Manila to Vladivostok, six machine gun crews were organized, equipped, and trained. These crews carried out firing exercises at sea on the way north.

Weather conditions were adverse for training as the *Brooklyn* neared Vladivostok. The weather being extremely cold, the exercises, of necessity, were limited to drills in the overcrowded quarters of the Marine detachment. The Marines, however, as usual turned to with a willing spirit and accomplished all that could be desired in the way of training.

After breaking from two to four feet of ice on entering the harbor of Vladivostok, the *Brooklyn* went alongside the dock on 1 March 1918. Then disappointments followed in rapid succession. Everybody had fondly expected to land immediately upon arrival, but as events turned out the Marines languished onboard ship until late in June.

**Lieutenant Colonel Little Performs Important Duties**

Lieutenant Colonel Louis McC. Little was the fleet Marine and intelligence officer on the staff of Admiral Knight, and he had prepared complete plans in anticipation of an immediate landing upon arrival at Vladivostok. Lieutenant Colonel Little was performing this duty at the most interesting time when the Republic of China was finally induced to declare war against Germany; when the effect of the Bolshevikic demoralization made it appear that Russia and her dependencies were to become the tool of Germany; and when the possibility of reestablishing an eastern front was being seriously considered.

Lieutenant Colonel Little was sent out on a special mission into China and Siberia by Admiral Knight who, upon its successful completion, expressed himself as most highly satisfied with the results attained. Prior to his being relieved by Major Paul E. Chamberlin on 29 April 1918, Lieutenant Colonel Little was in charge of the Bureau of Military Information [that was] made up of the American, British, and Japanese forces on the spot, and obtained valuable information, including a large number of important maps.

**Japanese Land**

The following proclamation was issued by Rear Admiral Kato [Tomosaburo] when the Japanese sailors landed at Vladivostok:

CITIZENS:

I, the Commander of the Japanese Squadron, appreciating the present conditions in Russia and wishing an immediate suppression of civil dissention and the realization of the aims of the Revolution, until now have avoided any action that would interfere with the internal politics of Russia, or would assist or hamper any party. Such would tend to delay the establishment of a stable government according to the desires of the people. It is deplorable that conditions have failed to improve and disorder grows daily. It is evident that the authorities are unable to suppress disorder. I do not feel that the lives and
property of the citizens of the Japanese and Allied Governments are safe. The killing and wounding of three Japanese citizens in broadest daylight is a regrettable and a surprising incident. In view of this incident I have no other alternative for the protection of lives and property of the Japanese citizens but to land a detachment from the forces under my command, and take such measures as may be deemed adequate to insure the safety of life and property. Instructions have been requested from the Imperial Japanese Government governing further action.

As the measures taken are only for the protection of life and property, I again declare my deep friendship and sympathy for the Russian Government and people. It is my intention and desire that the people be not alarmed, and as heretofore, will pursue their daily business.

Commander of the Japanese Squadron,
REAR ADMIRAL HIROHARU KATO.
5 April, 7th Year of Taisho [1918].

The log of the Brooklyn for 5 April 1918 contains the following notation in the morning watch:

5:15. Japanese landing force consisting of about 160 men and three steam launches and four pulling boats left H. I. M. S. Asahi, and at 5:25 whole force had landed near railway station and marched UP towards Japanese Consulate in close formation, column of fours.

7:00. Three boat loads of supplies from H. I. M. S. Iwami landed astern, and loaded into carts.

8:00. Four boat loads of supplies from H. I. M. S. Iwami landed astern.

Bolsheviki Overthrown

From their arrival on 1 March 1918 until 29 June 1918, the Marines onboard the Brooklyn lived on rumors regarding happenings that “were to be” ashore, and the detachment was at all times prepared to leave the ship at a minute’s notice for any duty it might be called upon to perform.

In June 1918, Vladivostok, and practically all of Siberia, was ruled by Soviets [with] the Bolsheviki being in control. About a week prior to 29 June 1918, the Soviets, seeing that its days of power were about to expire, made attempts to ship away from Vladivostok the enormous quantities of war material in their possession to the interior of Russia, but these efforts proved unsuccessful as the Allied Military Council proclaimed that not a single shell or any other kind of ammunition in Vladivostok and neighborhood should be moved without its consent, which, of course, was never accorded. Military guards from the several war vessels in the harbor were placed over the depots and other buildings in which the war materials were stored.

The Bolsheviki, assisted by German and Austrian prisoners of war, were resisting the advance of the Czecho-Slovaks, who were trying to reach Vladivostok. In that city on 29 June 1918, there were approximately 12,000 well-organized Czecho-Slovaks but only about 2,500 of them, however, were armed or equipped.

At 0600 [on] 29 June 1918, several detachments of Czecho-Slovaks, Japanese sailors from their two warships, British Bluejackets from the [HMS] Suffolk [55], and Chinese sailors from a gunboat, all armed with machine guns, hand grenades, rifles and other arms, completely disarmed and imprisoned the Bolsheviki leaders of the Soviets, and assumed control of the city of Vladivostok and surrounding region.

The struggle centered around the building occupied by the staff of the Soviet military forces situated near the railway station and just opposite the harbor. It had been planned to blow up this building, as a great number of the Bolsheviki and former prisoners of war were resisting the Allies with machine guns and one-pounders. However, this operation was not necessary, as the Czecho-Slovaks gained entrance into the building under cover of

Major Fryer Relieves Major Chamberlin

Major Chamberlin was relieved by Major Eli T. Fryer on 4 May 1918, Major Fryer continuing as fleet Marine and intelligence officer until after the Armistice of 11 November 1918 became operative.
the British and Japanese machine guns set up on the roof of the British consulate just opposite the military staff building. A white flag soon appeared at the window and, a few minutes later, bodies of Bolsheviki soldiers were carried out on the bayonets of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The log of the *Brooklyn* for 29 June 1918 describes the overthrow of the Bolsheviki in the following words:

During the day the Czecho-Slovak troops which were encamped in and around the city, about 16,000 in number under the command of General Deitrich, occupied the city of Vladivostok and its suburbs, disarmed the Red Guard, prisoner the former Bolsheviki rulers, and many Germans and Austrians, and assumed control of the city pending the formation of a responsible government.

It had been known for several days that the Bolsheviki authorities along the Trans-Siberian Railroad had received instructions from Moscow to disarm and send to prison camps all Czecho-Slovak troops. On June 28, 1918, the local Bolsheviki authorities commenced to ship arms and munitions on land to be used against the Czech troops en route for Vladivostok. To prevent this the Czechs delivered an ultimatum at 9.30 A.M., that date, demanding the disarmament of the Red Guards,* and at 10.00 A.M., not having received a favorable reply, they proceeded to occupy the city.

In most parts of the city the occupation was quietly done, no resistance being offered by the Bolsheviki. The Czech forces began their occupation at the eastern end of the city, and worked westward, making prisoners of the Bolsheviki under arms, and any Germans and Austrians found. During the forenoon they took possession of the City Hall and Post Office, the Telegraph Office, and the Police Headquarters. In this they were assisted by a hastily organized company of former Russian officers and soldiers who had served at the front, called Frontoviki. The English and Japanese patrols assisted in patrolling a restricted area containing their Consulates, but took no actual part in the occupation and subsequent fighting. At 9.50 A.M. the English guard was increased by 153 men from the *Suffolk*.

At 10.20 four Russian torpedo boats left their docks and stood out into stream. The crews of all Allied warships in the harbor immediately went to general quarters. The torpedo boats anchored to the eastward of the Allied Squadron, without attempting to leave the harbor.

At 1.30 P.M. an armed force of sixty men was landed from the Chinese cruiser *Hai-Yung* for protection of the Consulate, and at 5.30 P.M. a Consulate Guard of thirty Marines landed from the *Brooklyn*.

By 3.00 P.M. the Czech forces had occupied the city as far as the railroad station. At 2.45 P.M. intermittent rifle and machine gun fire commenced in the vicinity of the Staff Headquarters Building, opposite the railroad station. In this building the Red Guards and Hungarians were making their stand. At 4.00 P.M. the firing became more violent and continued until 6.00 P.M., when the building was taken by a bomb attack, and the occupants made prisoners. For the remainder of the evening the city was quiet, with the Czech forces in control, continuing their search for Germans and Austrians, and their confiscation of firearms.

On 30 June 1918, and on many subsequent days, large numbers of Germans and Magyars, former prisoners of war who had served with the Bolsheviki, were executed by the Czecho-Slovaks.

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* Volunteer paramilitary group made up primarily of factory workers, peasants, Cossacks, and some former military.
Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Marines, controlled by the Soviet forces. As soon as the defeat of the Bolsheviki became evident, these vessels attempted to put to sea. The British and Japanese war vessels, however, had kept them under surveillance and, with all guns trained on the Bolsheviki vessels, demanded by signal their surrender. The Bolsheviki at first demurred, but surrendered the next morning without any firing being necessary.

Marines Land

On the afternoon of 29 June 1918, Admiral Knight ordered the Marines of the Brooklyn ashore with instructions to protect the American consul. These orders were carried out by posting sentinels at the American consulate and patrolling the streets for one block in all directions from the consulate. Everything was quiet and the duty eventually became ordinary guard duty. This guard was maintained until a few days before the Brooklyn sailed from Vladivostok on 10 October 1918.

Marines Form Part of Allied Patrol

Shortly after 29 June 1918, an Allied patrol was organized and marched through the main street of Vladivostok night and day, with the idea of impressing the Bolsheviki. This patrol consisted of American Marines, British Bluejackets, Japanese sailors, Czecho-Slovak soldiers, and Chinese sailors.

About 1 July 1918, the majority of the Czecho-Slovaks left Vladivostok to open up the line along the Trans-Siberian Railway in eastern Siberia, with the idea of facilitating the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks eastward.

Marines Stationed on Russian Island

After their first battle, about 3 July 1918, many seriously wounded soldiers were practically put in the hands of the Navy medical officers of the Brooklyn. An abandoned Russian military hospital on Russian Island, about five miles from Vladivostok, was selected, and about 100 German and Austrian prisoners of war were put to work cleaning and repairing it. About 10 American Marines from the Brooklyn, in [the] charge of Sergeant Allen H. Lange, acted as guard over these prisoners. This work was done in connection with the Red Cross. Sergeant Lange had almost complete control of the administration and security of these prisoners doing this construction work, and he carried out his duties in a most commendable manner. The Russian naval hospital in Vladivostok was also used and the Brooklyn surgeons assisted in the work there.

Fourth of July Celebration Puzzles Bolsheviki

An incident of considerable interest, tinged with a bit of sadness yet amusing to some, occurred on the Fourth of July. The Allied military authorities in control of Vladivostok, not desirous of creating any feeling against the Allies, permitted the Bolsheviki to hold funeral exercises and the customary elaborate Russian parade in honor of those Bolsheviki who had been killed during the fighting on 29 June 1918. Thousands of sympathizers and mourners followed the nine coffins.

The Brooklyn, as called for by Navy regulations, was in “full dress” and fairly smothered with flags in honor of the day.

Without any more knowledge of the significance of the importance of this day to Americans than the average American would have as to a national holiday in Russia, the Bolsheviki immediately leaped to the erroneous conclusion that the display of flags on the Brooklyn was in honor of their dead and due to American sympathy for their cause. This was but a natural inference, for America had maintained her usual strict neutrality, had not interfered in any way with the Soviet government, and had not joined in with the other forces on 29 June 1918 to overthrow the Bolsheviki government.

At any rate, when the funeral procession and parade passed the American consulate guarded by Marines, its decorated appearance made the presumption conclusive in the Bolsheviki mind that America was their friend. A command was given to stop the procession and America was the recipient of undeserved eulogies. Literally, thousands of cheers, were given for the United States of America by the Bolsheviki, numerous speeches were delivered in which the highest esteem and appreciation was expressed to the American republic and her
people for their supposed condolence concerning the fall of the Bolsheviki government and the dead. The Bolsheviki gave the Marines a grand welcome into their organization, and it was with some difficulty that the Bolsheviki were kept outside the fence surrounding the American consulate.

In further explanation of this unusual incident, it seems that the Bolsheviki had anticipated a revolution onboard the Brooklyn, and a subsequent joining with them, because three times a day the red pennant (meal pennant) had been hoisted, which the Bolsheviki looked upon as the “Red Flag.”

**Patrolling the Navy Yard**

About 10 July 1918, the Marines were ordered to patrol the navy yard at Vladivostok. The Bolsheviki had threatened to destroy the machinery, and the maintenance of this machinery was necessary for the Allies and loyal Russians. This patrol duty was performed by the American Marines in conjunction with British Marines, Japanese sailors, and Chinese sailors; each of the foregoing taking a day’s duty in turn. About eight posts were established and the patrols had control of the navy yard as far as concerned the safety of the workmen and the yard. Only one incident of a troublesome nature occurred. One night while the British Marines had the duty, a drunken Russian sailor tried to rush a member of their guard, and the Russian was killed.

**Marines Prepared at All Times to Land**

During this long period, the Marines of the Brooklyn stood by ready at all times to land. A good example of their readiness was afforded about 1 September 1918, when at about 0200 the admiral received a field message from United States Army authorities ashore, requesting that the Marines be sent to the railroad station to assist the Army in an anticipated attack by the Bolsheviki. The log of the Brooklyn shows that, five minutes after the call was sounded, the Marines left that ship, fully equipped, for the scene of the expected action, only to find that the contemplated attack was one of their old friends—“a rumor.”

**Marines Withdrawn**

The Marines of the Brooklyn maintained the guard at the American consulate until a few days before that vessel sailed from Vladivostok on 10 October 1918. In connection with the landing of the Marines at Vladivostok, it is interesting to note that such landing occurred approximately one month before that of the American Expeditionary Forces.

**Allied Troops Arrive**

Early in July 1918, the Russians set up a provisional government in Vladivostok. While this government was recognized provisionally, but not as a permanent government by the representatives of the Allies, the military council of Allies was supreme.

As soon as the official declaration by the [Supreme War] Council of the occupation of the city was announced, a large number of Japanese transports carrying troops arrived, while regiments of Czecho-Slovak soldiers were immediately dispatched to free the whole of Siberia and to secure communication with those Czecho-Slovaks who were held on the other side of the front by the Bolsheviki. These Czecho-Slovaks were former Austrian soldiers and there were in all about 60,000 of them in Siberia.

On every arrival of foreign military forces in Vladivostok, the Japanese from the nearby islands, the British from Hong Kong and other places, the French colonials from Saigon, and the Chinese, they were given a hearty welcome and the Russians seemed to be glad to see them. Of them all, however, the American troops from the Philippine Islands received the warmest welcome.

Meanwhile, fierce battles between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Bolsheviki were in progress, and the casualties were large on both sides. The British, French, and Japanese troops were sent to reinforce the Czecho-Slovaks, but no American troops were used for this purpose, America again carefully guarding her neutrality. The guns were removed from the British cruiser Suffolk and sent forward to the front lines on special open cars manned and officered by the British under command of British officers.
PEACE AND OCCUPATION
The most optimistic could not believe that there was any significance to the order. How could a war that had been going on four years stop that way—when 1100 came on the morning of 11 November?

“Cease firing at eleven.” Impossible!

What did time and dates mean to soldiers at the front? Nothing; nothing. The past was hazy memories and all of us knew that there would be one “tomorrow” too many. Time was just something mechanical. Even the days of the week, when we knew them, were mere reminders of another life. Whenever Fritz strafed us a little harder than usual, it was Cognac Smith who said, “Guess it must be Sunday, the way the squareheads are tossing ’em over today.”

That morning at daybreak, Fritz began in earnest. We knew it was 11 November because the logbook showed the day before was the 10th.

Sitting comfortably on some damp straw, we talked and laughed cynically. The very idea, we agreed, was preposterous. The war ending at any set time! The German stronghold of Metz was our objective, and Berlin on the Rhine, our ultimate destination. Bah! “Cease firing at eleven.” That was no way to end a war. Whoever heard of stopping a war that way—by the hands of a clock? Absurd! Impossible!

At about 0900, our batteries began to open up. “Give ’em hell, boys, but stop at eleven.” That was the order everywhere, reminding us of rookie camp stuff.

At least five shells were going out to every one that came in. It was like prolonged thunder; the kind that sounds when lightning blinds and cracks. But we were restless and even the dog-like rats scampering around the pots and pans didn’t stop to fight over the scraps that Cootie, the cook, invariably left on the floor. There was something besides shells in the air.

Cognac Smith swore between incoming shells, though every time I looked at him he was staring at his watch as though hypnotized.

It seemed that watches had stopped running. It was just 1037.

The strain of waiting until 1100 was worse than the shelling. We were used to that; it wasn’t so bad. Being in it constantly since the middle of August had taught us many things.

“What was Death, anyhow?” I recalled Cognac’s philosophy of the night before. “Others meet it every day. Then, after dark, the cursing, ghoulish grave-diggers shovel out a shallow hole—and that’s the end.” I couldn’t get his words out of my mind.

But for the thousandth time, I learned that the front was the place to forget—not to think. There came another whining, mournful shriek and a death-dealing, three-ten banged into the earth and showered tons of dirt and scrap iron.

When I could see, Smith was still clutching his old silver watch in his twitching hand. That watch must have been his grandfather’s. He took pride in the fact that he set it only every 60 days. It was one minute fast by mine.

Only 1046. Each minute was an hour.

The thought kept going through my mind, wouldn’t it be hell to get bumped off now, and the war did stop when eleven o’clock came?

Our eyes smarted from the gas, but we couldn’t help from staring at the face of Smith’s huge watch. The hand crawled to 1059—then the second hand seemed to go backward. What a sensation it would be if everything could become still—just for an hour, I remember thinking.

Breathing stopped when the second hand said only 25 seconds—then 20. Every gun was barking like a horde of enraged, prehistoric monsters. Smith’s hand quivered so that I could not see the time; or perhaps it was I who quivered too much.

I remember looking at Cootie, the cook. He was breathing like a creaky bellows; his eyes were nearly popping out and his jaw was held up by his helmet strap. (There were varying accounts of how I looked.)

Then a typhoon of oaths that would have made a veteran deep-sea sailor hide his head in shame:
“eleven o’clock and the are going stronger than ever. I told you so—liars—damn the war and the—that started this armistice stuff!”

Cognac Smith was turning into an insane demon. “Gone cuckoo,” I remember saying to Cootie. Poor Smith, he had been up too long.

Cootie fumbled for a cigarette; then another HE [high explosive] shell—and graveyard stillness. Disconnected pictures flashed through my mind: white bath tubs, coffins, soggy hob-nailed shoes, rocking chairs, underwear alive with cooties, flower gardens, women who smiled and spoke English. It was impossible to speak and torturous to think. It was all too sudden and unbelievable. There were vague thoughts of the day of judgment and being transposed from hell to heaven; of a tottering old man being rejuvenated into a lusty infant.

We heard a feeble shout from somewhere, but it wasn’t enough to awaken us. The silence became uncanny, as enveloping and deathly as mustard gas. My mind could not grasp it all. It must be death, I thought, but I was not conscious of pain except in my ears.

Trying to think was maddening. From hell to heaven; from death to life; the weight of years being snatched off my shoulders. Was it another miracle or just a nightmare? No, there was Cootie and Smith, and the odor from the damp filthy straw. A dying, gasping groan—unmistakable—came from a pile of stone and timber.

The silence became more oppressive than the roar of the guns—the whining, screeching incoming shells—the deathly slugs of iron after the burst. It seemed that we stood there for hours before we realized that it was the end. I became partly conscious when some doughboys outside began to shout.

Poor old Cognac Smith; he would have been a wreck if it had lasted another week. His eyes were still gazing at his big, silver watch.

Finally, it seemed days later, he broke the silence. He swore more eloquently than I have ever heard, before or since. He cursed the Army’s inefficiency, General Pershing, canned willie, the Kaiser, cooks that let flies get in the slum, “the damn careless fools,” his contorted face showed grinding teeth, “that’s the way they run this war,” and tapping an unsteady, nicotine-stained finger on the dial of his old watch, he gasped for breath and growled, “their time was a whole minute slow!”
I am confronted with the task of analyzing and criticizing the events just prior to, during, and just subsequent to the crossing of the Meuse on the night of 10–11 November 1918.

There was much caustic criticism and there still lingers in the minds of some not a little resentment for the commander who ordered the actual crossing when an armistice was expected at any moment and for the apparently needless sacrifices of lives.

For either side of this argument, records, reports, and history furnish us with arguing points, but I would prefer to attempt to disabuse your minds of any thought that this operation was conceived with the idea of adding glory to any individual.

I believe that the basic principles of any battle can be likened in most respects to a school-yard fight between two boys. They have a grievance and decide to fight. After a long tussle, A gets the better of B, and B feeling his strength waning says to A, “Let’s stop and talk this over and see if we can come to an understanding,” and to himself he says, “When I get my breath and a little reserve strength, I’ll be able to lick this fellow.” Should A be a sap, or should he continue to drive home the attack until he has thoroughly beaten B? The answer is simple.

Let us get down to basic facts, and in doing so it is necessary to go back to 4–5 October 1918, when the news of the so-called false armistice was broadcast and there was rejoicing in every quarter.

To many Germans in authority, a peace based on President Wilson’s famous 14 demands was entirely acceptable, but Marshal [Paul von] Hindenburg had other ideas. It was at this time that he accompanied the Kaiser back to Berlin and persuaded the supreme headquarters that a levee in mass should be proclaimed in order to secure one last reserve for the defense of the frontier at the Grenz position. The attempt was a failure and Hindenburg’s scheme was merely to secure a peace by diplomacy while he held the Allies at bay and made their further advance so costly that they also would be inclined toward peace.

Whether the ruse behind these incidents was known at the time by the Allies, I do not know, but I cite it here to show that at that time the Allies placed no faith in the announced desires of the Germans and their every move was treated with suspicion. They were sparring for time and the Allies could not be fooled.

As early as 28 October, there was a meeting of the Allied commanders to settle upon the terms which would be offered the Germans when the time came and these terms were so exacting that it was not expected that they would be accepted.

From this time until the news of the Armistice reached the combat troops, there was constant talk of peace, much of which percolated into the ranks of the fighting men and none of which did any good for morale.

It remained that hostilities were continued unabated; the Germans suffering from the hammer blows of the combined Belgian, French, British, and American forces gradually fell back at the same time continuing their suit for peace.

On the evening of 9 November, Marshal Foch was in conference with the representatives of the German forces. Affairs in Germany were fast reaching a chaotic state and it was not known exactly who was in authority to conclude terms. Foch, still wary of the outcome of any negotiations and wishing to let the enemy know that there could be no further delay, dispatched the following telegram to Allied headquarters:

The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attack, retreats along the entire front. It is important to coordinate and expedite our movements. I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief and of their armies to make decisive the results obtained.

In response to this appeal from the supreme commander, orders were immediately issued by General Pershing to give the enemy no respite and, as plans had already been drawn which provided for
the crossing of the Meuse, it does not seem to me that it was unusual for General [Charles P.] Summerall, commanding the V Corps, to order the carrying out of the plans. Their execution only awaited a favorable opportunity when the bridge material could be placed in position for the crossing.

It is quite true that, in some instances, attack orders were not carried out and half-hearted attacks bogged down for want of the necessary aggressiveness which latter spirit was only caused by the dissemination of false rumors. Still, other leaders were jubilant because, as it later developed, they had spared further bloodshed.

As the momentous events developed, this was all very well, but what would have happened if the entire battle line from the Swiss border to the North Sea and laid down on the job for want of offensive spirit? The question answers itself, for it was all that the German commanders in the field wanted, to demand a stouter resistance by their troops and even offensive operations, and the bloodshed would have been a hundred fold greater.

In the forest between Compiegne and Soissons, the representatives of the central powers and the Allies again met on 7 November. The German delegates had no authority to definitely conclude the terms of an armistice and it was necessary for them to refer the matters to Berlin for approval. Upon learning the demands of the Allies, a German delegate was sent to Berlin with the terms.

At 2300 on the 10th of November, a wireless message was received in code from Berlin, authorizing the German delegates to accept the terms and sign the Armistice. The decoding of the message took a considerable time and it was not until 0500 on the eleventh when it was finished, and the discussions were completed sufficiently to draw up the terms in rough. Even at that, the final page was completed first in order that word could be disseminated to the fighting troops to cease hostilities in order that lives might not be needlessly sacrificed.

Remember this, that in spite of the fact that the American First and Second Armies occupied a front of some 80 miles, most of the units were notified before 1100 on the morning of that memorable day. Compare that with our present day claim for efficiency in communications when we determine that it will take some three hours for a mere brigade to get orders down to their companies, and here had been a fast moving situation where even the supply facilities could not keep up with advancing infantry. Let us now get down to the matter in hand: that of an analysis of the operation of 10–11 November.

The 2d Division, consisting of the 9th and 23d Infantry and the 5th and 6th Regiments were fresh from their victories at Blanc Mont. On 1 November, they had been moved by truck and marching to become a part of the V Corps under General Summerall. The Hagen and the Grenz positions had been carried and part of the Kremsbilde or, better known Hindenburg line had fallen into our hands and the Germans on the night of 4–5 November had fallen back to the north bank of the Meuse.

German resistance to the impetuous attacks of the Americans was weakening and their only hope lay in getting the remnants of their forces to the rear where a new defensive line could be formed. The crossings of the Meuse therefore were left in the hands of a composite force consisting of trainmen, signalmen, and even clerks from division headquarters, who manned the machine gun defenses. The German artillery, however, was farther to the rear and, since it was falling back on its supply line, there was no dearth of ammunition.

On the sixth, the 2d Engineers under Colonel [William A.] Mitchell continued their reconnaissance of the river in the zone of the V Corps and started plans for bridging operations.

On the eighth, orders were received for the 2d Division to affect a crossing at Mouzon and Latanne.

The Germans had destroyed all bridges in this area except one just south of Mouzon and just north of Latanne. The former was under machine-gun and artillery fire and the latter had been partially wrecked.

The division plan contemplated a crossing at two points on the night of 9–10 November by the 4th Brigade, with all artillery supporting the crossing, but the project had to be abandoned when the engineers failed to have the bridges ready, and it was not until the night of 10–11 November that the plans were crystallized and then only in part.

The 6th [Regiment] were in position at the appointed hour, having moved up under cover of darkness from the Bois de Limon on the ninth, but
the Germans had discovered the attempt and forced the engineers to abandon work on the bridge. There was nothing for the regiment to do but return to the partial security of the woods. The movement was called off for that night and plans immediately set on foot to accomplish the crossing the following night.

The night of 10–11 November witnessed a more determined effort and though the 6th [Regiment] were again foiled in their attempt, the 5th [Regiment] fared a little better downstream where two bridges were successfully thrown across. One of these was blown out by a direct artillery shell, but the other one held and in one hour the 1st Battalion was across. By 2330, the 2d Battalion got across and by the following daybreak the 89th Division was across.

Briefly, that is what transpired and, while it is useless to be harshly critical and unfair regarding these events and decisions made during the heat of battle, we must, in order to avoid like mistakes, study them with a critical mind in the quietness of our study.

European battlegrounds furnish us with a fertile field for a study of river crossings and from Napoleon’s time forward, history is replete with fine examples. True in those days there was no aircraft to detect a contemplated crossing and bridge material could be moved up during daylight to the points selected with little chance of discovery by the enemy.

French tactics, then as always, relied upon secrecy and deception with great attention to details and long and careful planning. If there was a possibility of the enemy detecting the movement, then plans were laid for crossings at numerous points and, at the final moment, patrols were thrown across the river to determine the weak spots and it was at these points that they pushed their main effort.

For the crossing of the Limmat [river in Switzerland] in 1799 by Massena, a total of three weeks was consumed in preparations and the gathering of materiel and boats. It required 1,000 men to carry 37 boats from their hiding place to the bank of the river on the night selected for the crossing, the wagons with the bridge equipment having been kept under cover until the final moment when they were pushed rapidly to the river. Troops began to cross at 0445 and, by 0730, 8,000 men were on the other side of the river.

The crossing of the Rhine by [Field Marshal Gebhard] Blücher in 1813 was only successful because the point chosen was undefended, for their preparations were incomplete and lacking in many details. Likewise, the crossing at Beresina in 1812 by Napoleon when pursued by the Russians would have resulted in a rout and annihilation had not the wary Napoleon dispatched a large force of unarmed stragglers toward the logical point of crossing while he himself took another route with the remnants of his army.

History is also replete with glaring examples of a total disregard for present day intelligence tactics. In other words, commanders of great repute decided what the enemy was going to do rather than what the enemy was capable of doing. This very point is exemplified in the crossing of the Yalu [River] by the Japanese in 1904. In spite of ominous warnings, nothing could shake the faith of the Russians that the crossing would take place at a certain point, and their dispositions were made accordingly. When the actual crossing took place at another point, it was then too late to make other dispositions, and the crossing was completely successful.

There are several outstanding requirements in crossing a stream and, in general, each depends upon the others.

Technical skill is important and in some cases may even govern. This, however, would be in the case where the crossing was entirely unopposed or very lightly defended and where speed is essential in getting the troops across. Boldness and a consummate skill in erecting the bridge are therefore requisites under these circumstances. Under practically all other conditions the factors of secrecy and surprise are essential, with a moderate amount of luck on the attacker’s side. These factors would avail little however if the technical skill were lacking and you could not “beat the enemy to the draw.”

Now let us summarize for a moment and then determine how the crossing of the Meuse on the night of 10–11 November compares with those few examples which I have cited, together with numerous others of which I have read in the preparation of this paper.
To make an apple pie, it is first necessary to get some apples, and so, it is necessary that we collect the materiel and lay most careful plans both from the technical and tactical point of view.

Having accumulated the necessary materiel, it must be gotten to the point of crossing and kept from the prying eyes of enemy aviators. This done, we must see that the element of surprise is not lacking for without it we sacrifice much of our chance of success. Still further, we must arrange for adequate artillery support and lastly, there must be a coordinating head for the operation, that is, someone on the spot.

As Colonel Robinson has told you, there was no bridge train present with the 4th Brigade at this time. Three or four bridges had been constructed on land preparatory to launching in previous operations, but these had been left in places miles from the rivers and the division found itself confronted with a crossing and nothing to accomplish it with. This, in spite of the fact that everyone in the American Expeditionary Forces knew full well that the Germans would destroy the bridges behind them and that if a final defeat was to be administered to the Germans, bridges were a vital necessity.

The roads in rear of the Mouzon-Latanne zone were for the most part second-class and rendered almost impassable by recent rains and continuous traffic. The 2d Engineers were kept constantly busy keeping them in repair.

Orders providing for the actual construction of the bridges were not issued until the 8th of November. It was only possible to detail two companies of the 2d Engineers for this duty and it was necessary to assign two companies of the 9th Infantry to assist in the work. In previous operations, the French equipment had proved useless and it was necessary for the engineers to improvise bridges.

It is true that heavy bridge material was delivered at Yoncq [Ardennes], but it could not be gotten into usable shape in time for the crossing. It was therefore necessary for the engineers to wreck old German barracks in Beaumont and Latanne and from this source they managed to contrive a set of footbridges unlike any theretofore used.

On the night of 9–10 November, when the first crossing was ordained, the Germans discovered the attempt and forthwith stopped it, and the element of surprise was forfeited.

The crossing was postponed until the following night and the 6th Marines, back in the Bois de Li- mon, awaited the signal to start for the bridge site. They were due there at 2130 and, at this time, the artillery [that] was to fire a preparation would just be raising their fire to objectives further in rear. Just at dusk when the Marines were about to leave the woods and with some four miles to march, they saw their artillery firing on the opposite bank of the river. Only shortly after this, they witnessed the fire lift to targets in rear. There was just a slight mistake of about one hour in the barrage and had their bridging operations been successful they would have force made crossing without artillery support. Thus we see that another of the essential elements to a successful crossing was lost. As events transpired, it is fortunate that they failed to execute a crossing in this area.

Four hundred yards to the south, the so-called Latanne crossing met with greater success and, while the element of surprise was lacking, yet the artillery covering this point did not fail, that is, the firing on schedule.

It did not subdue the hostile machine gunners, nor did it have any appreciable effect on the amount or accuracy of the German artillery fire. It must be remembered, however, that the Germans were falling back on their line of supply and ammunition was plentiful. Certainly it was far more economical to expend than leave it for the Allies to capture.

One other point that may be overlooked is the fact that the German artillery had orders not to retire from their positions until their supported infantry had actually passed through them.

In all fairness to the artillery supporting the 2d Division in this operation, it was the first time they had all operated together as a team and it was a fast moving situation for the advance of the 2d Division had covered some 13 miles in eight days.

In short, the Americans were deprived of the element of surprise; for the most part, their artillery support was inadequate and finally, the makeshift bridges left much to be desired yet in spite of these sad deficiencies the élan of the division drove forward to ultimate success.
The demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades, with their attached machine gun battalions, involving approximately 14,000 men, with an aggregate payroll of $3,250,000, was accomplished on their return from overseas with a celerity and thoroughness that was all the more creditable to those organizations, and to the staff organizations concerned, by reason of the fact that heretofore all processes of demobilization in the Marine Corps had been confined to gradual and limited demobilization of individuals. Through the precedent established in August, it seems worthwhile that a summary of this demobilization be presented to the Corps to supplement the official reports that were filed at Headquarters of the Corps. Only the most optimistic idealist can discount the probability of future wars that may call for the employment of the Marine Corps as a whole in another conflict of immensity and, in addition to the professional interest that the processes of the demobilization of organizations have for every officer of the Corps, the mustering out of the two brigades will not only serve as a model for future action, but it affords a basis for improvement and simplification. The officers directly concerned, both those of the line and of the staff, faced new conditions that intimately affect all that bulk of officers who had no part in the demobilization, but are curious to learn how the work was done.

* The editor has received a letter from LtCol F. E. Evans, USMC, author of the article entitled “Demobilizing the Brigades,” in our December issue, requesting that an error in that article be corrected. The statement was made that “the only hitch in the day’s work was due to the failure in one organization, namely, the 11th Regiment, to circulate to all company commanders of the organization the details arranged for the entraining at the naval base. Due to this error a number of discharged men were sent into Norfolk with their transportation, and upon arrival of the trains at the base it was necessary to locate the men and effect their return to the base.” Col Evans has since been informed by the late commander of the 11th Regiment that this statement was incorrect, and at Col Evans’ request this information is made public to the readers of Marine Corps Gazette.

The Initial Work

Immediately following the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918, demobilization was begun on a very limited scale in accordance with the orders then in effect. This gradual and limited operation was applied to individual Marines as they made application for release from the Service, and continued as such until the beginning of the fiscal year on 1 July 1919. From that date, the process became accelerated through the fact that Congress, in the Naval Appropriation Act approved on 11 July 1919, made provision for only sufficient funds to maintain the Corps at an average strength of 27,400, with the corresponding ratio of officers, for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1920. In anticipation of this limitation, plans for the rapid demobilization of the overseas forces were begun early in June. These plans contemplated the complete demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades upon their return from France. The actual demobilization of the brigades, a combined force equal to that of the Corps before our entry into the Great War, was completed on 13 August. Its speed and efficiency came up to the most sanguine hopes, for it had as its basis the rigid discipline and varied experience that the work overseas had fashioned, and the minor administrative faults failed to hamper the work of demobilization to any real extent.

The Preliminary Staff Work

Before the overseas troops came within effective range of the paperwork barrage that seems inseparable from the other horrors of war, the staff departments in Washington had much to do before the approach of zero hour. So soon as it was decided
that Quantico, the training ground of the brigades, would receive the veterans of the 4th Brigade for their demobilization, the post quartermaster at that station proceeded with the assignment of barracks for the men, and quarters for the officers. This involved nothing less than a complete reassignment of the organizations then at Quantico. As fast as barracks were emptied, they were policed and overhauled. Bunks, mattresses, and bedding were placed in the barracks assigned; ranges and latrines were overhauled and fuel provided. Rolling kitchens, one for each two companies, were stationed conveniently, and when the troops detrained hot coffee was ready for issue.

The general procedure of the Paymaster's Department was based on the demobilization of an organization as an organization. Final settlements were therefore made on payrolls in place of on individual vouchers, as had been the invariable custom in the Corps. The payroll procedure was, of course, not practicable in peacetime with the necessity imposed by individual dates of discharge. It was therefore necessary for this staff department to begin its paperwork well in advance of the return of the brigades. Several difficulties were encountered along this line. The recent law authorizing a travel allowance of five cents per mile either to the point of original muster-in, or to the bona fide home of the man, as he might elect, proved the most troublesome factor. Without exception, the individual elected that point which involved the greater mileage, a natural method of self-determination. Of the bona fide homes, which were selected in one-third of the total cases, many were found to be at considerable distances from railroad lines. Few were within a close radius of railroad centers. The computation of the distances to the bona fide homes proved vexatious and soul-trying. In every instance, it was necessary to verify the bona fide home as given by the individual from the official records, no mean task in itself.

The loss or absence of many staff record books in the 4th Brigade also made payment by affidavits necessary. This factor was pointed out early in the war when Sergeant Major John Quick, of the 6th Regiment, advocated that, on arrival in France, all service record books be forwarded by the organizations to some central office well in rear of the lines, where, on receipt of memoranda from the companies, they could be kept up to date and not subjected to loss by sudden moves, shell fire, and other accidents of war.

The loss or absence of deposit record books also made it necessary to make the required abstracts of deposits from the paymaster's office.

**The Paymaster's Instructions**

Upon the recommendation of the paymaster, the orders for the demobilization of the 5th Brigade, which also governed that of the 4th Brigade, gave detailed instructions to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all pay and service record data. Eight of the paymasters then overseas were made available for return with the oversea organizations, making one available for each 1,500 men. They were ordered to handle the final statements of all men to be discharged. The pay accounts of those men came under the separate classification of either four-year men, duration-of-the-war men wishing to extend their enlistments, and the reservists, were assigned to the post paymaster at Quantico.

These general instructions were further amplified by separate orders from the paymaster to the chief paymaster in France. They covered such details as to ensure, so far as practicable, that the accounts of the men to be discharged be extended to include the date of arrival in the United States; that accounts be ready and audited for settlement on arrival at the demobilization centers; and that payments in all cases be made by cash unless an individual specified his desire to be paid by check. The paymasters were further instructed that, should they lack sufficient funds or did not have them to their credit with the Treasury Department, they should cable before departure, or radio after sailing, the amount necessary to be placed to their credit. The chief paymaster was also directed to assign pay officers equably to returning organizations and, where practicable, that the duplicate payrolls of organizations for the preceding month be made equally available for purposes of audit and comparison. The paymaster designated for the casual troops was directed to pay all returning casuals promptly on arrival for the preceding month, and that all casuals who extended enlistments and applied for furlough,
should be paid in full before leaving on furlough.

It is worthy of note that the only obstacle encountered in the prompt final payment of troops was the difficulty of getting money for the payment of the 5th Brigade at the Naval Base Hampton Roads [Virginia]. No bank in Norfolk could advance the sum necessary, and $1,300,000 in cash was sent down to that point in two installments under heavy guard from the Treasury Department in Washington.

**The Adjutant and Inspector**

Instructions relative to those matters of records, discharges, and other administrative work under the jurisdiction of the Adjutant and Inspector’s Department, were prepared by that department after consultation with the Paymaster’s Department, and embodied in orders to the brigades issued by the Major General Commandant. This order directed that the organizations be divided, for administrative purposes, into two groups:

(a) Those duration-of-the-war men desiring immediate discharge upon return.

(b) Those duration-of-the-war men desiring to extend enlistment. Four-year men. Members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

The first group retained their organization designation, and the second were tentatively organized into casual companies, one in each regiment or machine gun battalion, capable of immediate detachment from their organizations upon arrival at the demobilization center of Quantico, and assignment to duty at that post. Authority was granted to give 60-day furloughs to all men extending their enlistment, and commanding officers were delegated authority to effect the discharge of men without reference to Headquarters in all cases of oversea men who had enlisted between the historic dates of 6 April 1917 and 11 November 1918.

Because of the many technicalities involved, the matter of placing reservists on an inactive status was reserved to the jurisdiction of Washington. Lists of all such men were, however, ordered to be cabled prior to sailing in order that these cases could be handled with dispatch. A supply of discharge certificates and extension certificates was forwarded through the medium of the chief paymaster. The instructions also covered such points as the required physical examination and record of health at time of discharge to protect both the government and the individual and prescribed that discharges should read to have been directed for “the convenience of the government.”

At least one officer of the staff department involved has since stated that the instructions could have been improved upon if the second group, or casual companies, had been allowed to remain unseparated from the first group. This would have obviated the necessity of their transfer to casual companies which in itself entailed their being paid off on new payrolls [that] required not only the starting of new payrolls, but the creation of a new clerical force to effect the transfer of reservists to an inactive status. The number affected was held to be too small to warrant the method that was followed.

**The Work of the Line**

The units of the 4th Brigade were somewhat handicapped at the start by reason of their failure to receive direct orders as in the case of the 5th Brigade, but early decided not to await them but to govern their activities with copies of the 5th Brigade orders as their guide. The 4th Brigade at once faced two troublesome factors. The supply of blank discharge certificates was very inadequate. One regiment surmounted this by abstracting, while at sea, the necessary data on slips of paper for transfer to discharge certificates when the latter would become available in the United States. The other difficulty was the lack of the official tables of distances and the fact that the one available to a regiment was incomplete in many cases. The 5th Regiment solved this obstacle by dispatching an officer ahead to work up the missing data at Washington.

All organizations completed as much preparatory work as was within their power while en route at sea. Books were completed to date with the exception of the date of discharge. Discharges were not made out, as a rule, in the 4th Brigade because of lack of official data, and payrolls in many companies were not started for the same reason. These factors, however, did not interfere with or delay the actual demobilization.
Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

The 4th Brigade Arrives

When the [USS] George Washington [ID 3018], carrying the headquarters of both the 2d Division, under Major General John A. Lejeune, and the 4th Brigade, under Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, arrived in New York Harbor, Lieutenant Colonel H. R. Roosevelt, the post quartermaster at Quantico, boarded her at quarantine and delivered to the brigade adjutant blueprints showing the troop assignments and lists showing the billeting capacities of the various buildings.

Following the parade of the 2d Division in New York, the 4th Brigade entrained for Quantico. Instead of the familiar “40 Hommes-8 Chevaux” box cars in which the brigade had been wont to entrain in France, the troops were furnished with 16 trains for the movement, 1 of 9 baggage cars and the others of 1 Pullman and 14 coaches each. The first train left at 1845 on 8 August and the last at 2401 [on] 9 August, arriving at Quantico at 1300 of that date. The railroad facilities at Quantico were taxed to the limit by this movement, as each train had to be turned around and sent back to its home road immediately after the troops detrained. There were no delays as all trains were emptied within six minutes after their arrival.

Handling Troops at Quantico

To facilitate the work of detraining, 36 trucks, five Fords, and four ambulances were available at Quantico, and the supply detachment averaged 17 hours daily work from that date until the end of the thirteenth. Between the morning of 9 August and midnight of 11 August, complete outfits of overcoats, winter field uniforms, hats, shoes, leggings, underwear, and chevrons were issued to the brigade. The reclamation department sorted and classified approximately 52,000 articles, among which may be noted 10,000 olive drab uniforms, 6,000 overseas caps, 8,000 suits of underwear, 7,000 pairs of wrap puttees, 4,000 belts, and 7,000 pairs of shoes. This was in addition to the salvaged mess gear and equipment. The post tailor shop was also taxed to its capacity in altering, pressing, and sewing chevrons and overseas devices on the new uniforms, while amateur tailors were equally busy transferring campaign ribbons and decorations from olive drab to a winter field background. The post laundry and all other branches of post activities also went over the top for new records and the post commissary and bakery handled the feeding of 33 separate messes in order to do their bit.

Requisitions for clothing had already been received from all companies in the brigade, and the clothing was ready for issue on the arrival of the first trainload. It is interesting to note that, following the demobilization, 25 civilian laborers found employment until 25 August in assembling, segregating, and loading for shipment to the Depot of Supplies brigade stores to a total of 33 carloads. The figures reported from the 5th Brigade are almost identical with those of the 4th [Brigade] in this and in other respects. The troop movement to Washington for the parade of the 4th Brigade, however, added to the activities of the post quartermaster at Quantico.

Regimental Activities

When the 4th Brigade passed the reviewing stand in New York and the troops marched on to the point of entraining, the regimental billeting officers turned out of the column and proceeded direct to Quantico. The billeting parties, as was the procedure in France, went out by the first troop train leaving for Quantico.

Immediately on the arrival of troops, they were marched to their assigned billets and arrangements made for the issue of clothing. Pay accounts were closed out and final settlements made by the attached paymasters. In both regiments, the method followed for railroad ticket requisitions practically coincided. Individual cards were prepared in each company showing the name, rank, unit, destination, and the routing requested. These cards were arranged alphabetically in payroll fashion and then delivered to the regimental demobilization entraining officer. In the meantime, company commanders, first sergeants, company clerks, and the pay personnel were engulfed in the details of closing out service record books, preparing or finishing payrolls, checkages, final discharges, etc.

The medical examination of all men to be discharged was thorough and conscientious. Before any man was allowed to “sign clear,” all his rights
and the need for protection of government rights were explained. All doubtful cases were transferred to hospital for further diagnosis and final action. In many cases, men who had been wounded were inclined to make light of their disabilities, and especial care was had in such cases to ensure that no summary action or decision was taken that meant their signing away rights to future relief or benefits.

The method by which the men, on their arrival, disposed of their equipment that was to be turned in for shipment to the Depot of Supplies was admirable in its simplicity, and could not have been improved upon. They were marched by companies to empty buildings reserved for the purpose and there deposited in separate piles the articles of equipment down to ammunition clips. Placards showing the articles to be deposited had been already affixed. The first article called for was piled up at the entrance and succeeding articles were likewise deposited along the length of the building, the last one at the door of exit. Combat packs and mess gear were turned in on the following day.

**The Brigade Passes**

It had been arranged that the 4th Brigade should be paid off and entrained in the following order: 5th Regiment, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, 6th Regiment. On 11 August, the railroad officials decided that it was beyond the range of possibility to have tickets ready for the entire brigade so that it could move on the 13th. As the result of a conference, however, inaugurated by the 6th Regiment, 10 extra ticket sellers were provided from Richmond, a new office was opened up in the regimental headquarters, and work was kept up throughout the night of the eleventh. Upon the return of the brigade from the parade in Washington, the railroad officials had despaired of being able, even with their augmented force, of handling the 6th Regiment on the thirteenth. The determination of the regiment to move out with the rest of the brigade, coupled with the resourcefulness and courtesy of the railroad officials, finally surmounted what appeared to be a hopeless obstacle. The plan agreed upon was to entrain the 6th Regiment on four trains on the thirteenth, not more than 800 men on any but the last train, and to sell tickets from Washington to the various destinations of the men by reserving for them 10 ticket windows at the Union Station.

As the conditions differed, therefore, a short summary of the procedure followed by the organizations is given. In the 5th Regiment and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, as soon as the men were paid off they were marched to improvised ticket offices. They were then regrouped according to their destinations to facilitate the work of the railroads. On the morning of departure, battalion commanders formed train groups according to destination and train assignment. These groups were again divided into carload lots, marched to the “spotted” cars, halted abreast of them, and at the scheduled time one-half of each carload lot entered by the forward, and the other by the rear car doors. By 1030, the 5th Regiment had been demobilized and entrained. The four-year men and reservists, approximately 350, had been transferred to the 5th Casual Reserve Company, bereft of their old “top” sergeants, and at the doubtful mercy of a newly made “top” with freely expressed aversions to the handling of, and scornful of the sensibilities of, veteran fighting men.

The first unit paid off and entrained in the 6th Regiment was the 1st Battalion, payment beginning at 0830 on the thirteenth. Each man, as he entered the pay office, was handed his pay in an envelope, insurance literature, discharge, and discharge button. As they left the office, two officers directed them to two improvised ticket offices, where they purchased tickets to Washington. The men who were routed to the south via Richmond were handled as casuals and were sold their tickets at a separate window. Their average per company was 10. As soon as the tickets were purchased, the men returned to barracks and packed up, all movements being made regular formations attended by all officers. The first train was scheduled to leave at 1100, but was sent away 20 minutes ahead of schedule as the work proceeded with gratifying celerity. The post adjutant provided a military policeman at the end of each car, with orders to pass no one aboard without a railroad ticket. Battalions followed in regular order, and the time taken by a battalion for payment, packing up, and entraining averaged about 50 minutes.

There was a noticeable feeling of restraint among both officers and men in the famous brigade that increased as the last act of demobilization ap-
Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

approached. Even when the men ceased, by virtue of their discharge, to be members of a military unit, the forms of discipline were as scrupulously observed as at any time in the varied and brilliant history of the brigade. They marched to their trains several thousand civilians, but their march discipline was as correct as though they were marching into the line or moving from one billeting area to another. Discipline had become too ingrained a virtue to be shaken in the least by the sudden transition from Private John Smith, 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, to John Smith, civilian, and master of his own fortune. By their subdued demeanor, the men showed the deep and lasting impression that the passing of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, had made on them, and it is needless to state that Major General Lejeune, Brigadier General Neville, and the regimental and battalion officers were as deeply affected by the closing scenes.

With the 5th Brigade

The assignment of the naval base at Hampton Roads, Virginia, for the demobilization of the 5th Brigade simplified the earlier stages of the process for that organization, since no rail travel was involved. Preparatory to the arrival of the brigade Major H. N. Manney, as the representative of the Quartermaster's Department, left the Depot of Supplies for that base. A shipment of 30,000 tons of supplies and stores, including camp equipage, clothing, cots, mosquito nets, and frames was made by the USS Hancock [AP 3]. The greater part of this shipment proved to be unnecessary for the following reasons: the brigade had already been outfitted with winter field clothing before leaving France; such articles of camp equipage as field ranges were not needed, as the naval base was thoroughly equipped, down to mess gear, for a strength well exceeding that of the brigade. As a result, when the needed articles of clothing were issued, a great many cases were untouched and these, with the camp equipage, had to be reshipped to the depot.

As fast as the troops disembarked, they were met by guides and marched to their assigned barracks, which had an average capacity of two platoons each. Messes were already in operation, transport was available, and the transfer from ship to base was greatly facilitated not only by reason of available accommodations for messing and billeting, but through the active and efficient cooperation made possible by the zeal and courtesy of Rear Admiral A. F. Fechteler, U.S. Navy, and his staff. Such minor difficulties as were incurred through the issue of clothing on the pier, the reshipment of unbroken cases, and the transfer of unissued articles in broken packages from the pier to the brigade storehouse, and the unsatisfactory work of civilian laborers were trying but unimportant.

Since the 5th Brigade had secured enough blank discharge certificates before sailing to carry out its paper work more satisfactorily than its sister brigade, the only difficulty experienced along this line was due to lack of facilities aboard ship for clerical work. To illustrate, however, how a seemingly trivial miscarriage of administration blocks the best-laid plans, it might be well to mention one that fell to the lot of the 5th Brigade. In order that men might receive their full mileage allowance from the point of demobilization to final destination, information was requested by cable as to the actual mileage from the naval base to Norfolk. This information was not supplied and could not be made available until the brigade actually arrived in the United States.

The process of demobilization on the thirteenth, a date that is indelibly interwoven into the history and vicissitudes of the 5th Brigade, was completed for both the 11th and 13th Regiments and the Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. The only hitch in the day's work was due to the failure in one organization, namely the 11th Regiment, to circulate to all company commanders of the organization the details arranged for the entraining at the naval base. Due to this error, a number of discharged men were sent into Norfolk with their transportation, and upon arrival of the trains at the base it was necessary to locate the men and effect their return to the base. This, however, did not mar the successful demobilization and entraining according to the one-day schedule.

The excellent messing arrangements and quarters contributed much toward the comfort of the troops. Adequate motor transport, recreation provisions, and the hearty cooperation of the naval authorities proved a great aid to the efforts of the brigade, regimental and battalion officers, and the
happy combination crowned the demobilization of the 5th Brigade with complete success. And, of course, the 5th passed out of existence to the familiar strains of “Sweet Adeline,” the battle hymn of Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler and his splendid organization, which, denied the fortune of combat, tackled with characteristic spirit the many and exciting duties that were allotted to it in France.
PART II
POSTWAR ANALYSIS
“Last Night of War.”
Courtesy of F. C. Yohn, Marine Corps Archives
OVER THERE, OVER HERE
Private Raymond H. Stenback from Independence, Oregon, wrote his family that he had finally received orders for the war in France. “It is with deep regret that I write and tell you that I will not be home on that furlough for I am on my way across.” Like many Marines of today, Private Stenback’s 22 June 1918 letter resounded with anxiety and moxie; he was ready to “get into the fight” overseas and willing to trade more pay for the chance. “I might have backed out and could have been a sergeant in a short time here. I would rather be a buck private in the rear rank over there than a sergeant here. It is what I enlisted for.” Private Stenback’s letters were not written from a traditional Marine base such as Quantico or Mare Island; he was with the 112th Company, 8th Regiment, at Fort Crockett, near the city of Galveston, Texas.

Major Edwin N. McClellan said it best in The United States Marine Corps in the World War that, “while the battle operations of the 4th Brigade as an infantry brigade of the 2d Division of Regulars overshadowed all others taken part in by Marine Corps personnel, those operations were by no means the only ones participated in by officers and men of the Marine Corps.” The Marines in Texas trained for war in France—or closer to home, if necessary. Germany clearly had made attempts to cause discontent between Mexico and the United States, particularly when German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann sent his infamous telegram to the Mexican government in January 1917, encouraging the Mexican government to invade the United States and reclaim Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Germany had also resumed its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. The threat to the United States from the south was very real; the Mexican government was unstable and disjointed after years of revolution, but remained a major oil producer for the Allied powers. Fort Crockett’s position on the Gulf of Mexico made it an ideal location for Marines to launch an amphibious operation into Mexico’s Tampico oil fields—one of the most crucial sources for the Allied war machine in Europe. Had the need arisen, Fort Crockett would have provided the definitive solution—United States Marines.

The 8th Regiment was activated at Quantico, Virginia, on 9 October 1917 and, just more than a month later, it arrived in Galveston onboard the USS Hancock [AP 3], after spending a week at sea where rumors ran wild as to its final destination. None of the Marines, including Private Stenback, believed they were staying in Texas. “We arrived here at Galveston, Texas, yesterday evening and have been busy unloading our necessary equipment for a short stay.” The next day, the Marines were told to unload the entire ship—an all-day job for nearly 1,000 pairs of hands. Despite the exhaustive task, they finished the day with a four-mile march to their camp, where they found level ground to pitch their tents, eat dinner, and bed down in the chilly November night.

The day-to-day life of the Marines in Galveston was consumed with learning to operate machine guns, qualifying with different weapons on the rifle range, learning flag semaphore, playing baseball games, and swimming in the Gulf of Mexico. Private Stenback kept his family well informed of the daily grind: “Signal practice has kept us pretty busy with flags, sun glasses, and then one night a week we have to go out with lamps. With this system, we can talk two or three miles.”

The Marines shared Fort Crockett with two regiments of U.S. Army coast artillery that were headquartered at the fort. “Talk about mossbacks—there are ever so many of these coast artillery men who have never been out of this state. They ask us what kind of a place we come from that we should have such rosy cheeks and smooth complexions.” Locals were not their only source of companionship; Stenback’s company adopted a dog that they dubbed “Rags,” which apparently slept around. “Every bunk is his home when he wants to treat it as such.” Dogs were not the only mascots kept at the fort as “the company next to ours has a monkey for a mascot and it is sure a smart fellow and de-
lights in climbing around on the fellows shoulders and hunt for something in the hair or digs down into the pockets for something to eat.”

Like their counterparts at Quantico, the Marines in Galveston kept active with sports—most notably baseball. In April 1918, the world champion Chicago White Sox soundly beat the Marines and coast artillery team. While the Marines and coast artillery played “a whale of a game, for amateurs,” they still lost 11 to 3. The Chicago Daily Tribune was more accepting than Private Stenback, who stated that it was “not anymore than could be expected.”

Gossip continued to spread that the Marines would leave any day for the war in France, or Cuba (where the 9th Regiment and 3d Provisional Brigade would depart from in 1918 to join the 8th in Texas). Private Stenback even heard the speculation of “an early move to Argentina in South America to take care of threatening German uprisings and to protect American interests.” Obviously, the minds of the Marines were on the battles across the ocean and not the duty they were performing in Texas. “Things are looking pretty serious over there [France] the last few days it seems and so now it is mighty hard to tell when they will need us. I really believe we are an emergency regiment.”

With the calming of troubles in Cuba, the 3d Provisional Brigade headquarters and the 9th Regiment boarded the USS Hancock and were sent to unite with the 8th Regiment in Texas in August 1918, where they joined in the training activities and guard duty.

Private Stenback finally shipped over to France in the summer of 1918 and returned to the United States unscathed in 1919 after occupation duty in Germany. In 1971, he transcribed his letters written during World War I and turned them into a personal memoir titled, *Raymond Howard Stenback as a United States Marine.*

A more prominent Marine stationed at Fort Crockett during World War I had already made his mark on Mexico. Medal of Honor recipient Lieutenant Colonel George C. Reid joined the 8th Regiment in late November 1917, after a short stint at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Lieutenant Colonel Reid was aptly suited to command Marines should the need arise to land at Tampico; he earned his Medal of Honor in Mexico just three short years before during the capture of Veracruz. After the arrival of the 9th Regiment, he was promoted to colonel and made commanding officer of the regiment. Colonel Reid continued to serve in the Marine Corps after his duty in Texas and, upon retirement in 1930, was advanced to brigadier general for having been specially commended in combat.

Another noteworthy officer arrived in Texas onboard the USS Hancock with Private Stenback and the regiment in 1917. First Lieutenant Edward A. Craig of the 105th Company, 8th Regiment, lamented that he missed the “action” in France; however, his time would come and fame would be his. Lieutenant General “Eddie” Craig retired in 1951 after commanding the “fire brigade” that was launched into the Pusan perimeter in the opening days of the Korean War.

On 10 April 1919, both regiments boarded the same vessel that carried them to Texas—the USS Hancock—this time bound for the Philadelphia Navy Yard. No sooner had the regiments disembarked men and equipment, than they were deactivated. Although the anticipated trouble in Mexico did not materialize, one might say that the presence of the 8th Regiment and later the 9th, with the 3d Brigade headquarters, deterred any possible actions on the part of the Mexican government. Oil continued to flow to the Allied powers and, in November 1918, the war in Europe was over without an intervention into Mexico.
Wednesday, 9 October 1918

Tonight I had a flight with Ziegler at down in old 328, which was on its last legs. They are broken now, caved in. You see we had power enough to get in the air and at twenty-five feet she died and let me down. I saw a twelve-foot steel can buoy just ahead of me and as I wasn’t keen about hitting that at sixty-five miles an hour I slued the machine violently to one side, missing the buoy (landed right beside it) and as I was skidding when I lit, wiped off the pontoons, broke wings, propeller, oh! a swell mess, but it couldn’t be helped. We only got a swim.

What you have just read is an excerpt from Walter Smith Poague’s diary. He was a 27-year old Marine Corps aviator in October 1918, stationed with the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company in the city of Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands.

Poague was born in Chicago on 21 August 1891, into the city’s “high society.” After graduating from the University of Chicago in 1914, Poague worked as a sales manager at the Real Estate Mortgage Department of the Woodlawn Trust and Savings Bank, where his father was the director. In June 1917, he decided to enlist in the Marine Corps (the United States was officially at war on 6 April 1917).

Monday, 22 April 1918

Nowhere in this account have I detailed how I came to be a Marine. It is interesting and typical. When War became inevitable, I looked for some branch of the service, navy preferred, as I have always loved the sea, army least desired, for I feared the inefficiency of such a rapidly aging body. By chance, I heard of commissions in Marines. Somewhere I’d heard the name, but I had not the slightest idea what Marines were or their duties. Buell Patterson was going after the Marines, however, so I telephoned him. The conversation follows:

“Hello, Pat, what are Marines?”
“I don’t know. They do something on ships and are first to fight.”
“Sounds good to me.”
“Same here.”
“I’m going to try it.”
“So am I. Goodbye.”

And here I am. I had never seen a Marine and had no idea of their duties, but here I am.

As of 6 April 1917, Marine aviation was an experimental unit, with only 7 officer aviators and 43 enlisted men. It was just a section of naval aviation, operating with four Curtiss AH hydroaeroplanes. After his enlistment, Poague trained at Quantico, Virginia, where, when his training was completed, he was commissioned a second lieutenant. His basic flying training lasted 10 weeks.

Lieutenant Poague was sent to Cape May, New Jersey, in October 1917 and stationed at the Aviation Department Flying Field. At this time on 12 October, the aviation unit of the Marine Corps—the Marine Aeronautic Company—was split into the 1st Aviation Squadron (with 24 officers and 237 enlisted men) and the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company (with 10 officers and 93 enlisted men). On 14 October, the Marine Aeronautic Company was transferred to Cape May where it was equipped with two Curtiss R-6 floatplanes with the mission...
to carry out patrol duty along the coast. Lieutenant Poague was assigned to this unit.

Poague’s commander was Captain Francis T. Evans, a skilled pilot who was the first pilot to successfully execute a loop with an N-9 seaplane in 1917. The spin-recovery maneuver of the loop became a basic element of aviation safety and earned Evans (retroactively) a Distinguished Flying Cross in 1936. Second in command was Captain David L. S. Brewster, and the other officers were First Lieutenant Harvey B. Mims and seven second lieutenants including Poague.

In December 1917, the Marine Aeronautic Company received orders to go to the U.S. Naval Base 13 at Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands, Portugal. Their mission was antisubmarine patrols, using two Curtiss N-9s and 10 R-6 seaplanes. The aircraft were very similar in design being both biplanes with two seats; the main difference was that the R-6 had a more powerful engine at 200 horsepower and had two main pontoons, while the N-9 had a 100-horsepower engine with only one main pontoon.

Why were the Marines sent to the Azores Islands? The Azores Islands are an archipelago of nine islands and, at that time, had two excellent harbors: Horta at Faial Island and Ponta Delgada at São Miguel Island. While Horta is considered—even today—a better harbor in terms of winds, sea, and orientation, Ponta Delgada is larger and more populated. When the “Great War” started in Europe in 1914, Portugal remained neutral. But in 1914, clashes broke out in the Portuguese colonies [that] bordered German colonies, namely in southern Angola and northern Mozambique. Though there was a mobilization effort by Portugal, there still remained no formal state of war between the two countries. In 1916, due to the damaging losses of merchant ships, England asked Portugal to seize all German merchant ships in Portuguese harbors. After some negotiations, the request was approved, and somewhere between 66 and 72 ships were seized on 23 February 1916. Germany responded with a formal state of war on 9 March 1916.

Due to the incidents in Africa, an agreement was made with England, by which the Royal Navy would assume the defense of Madeira and Azores Islands. The Portuguese Navy remained responsible for the defense of the mainland coast, especially the harbors, and for escorting merchant vessels to the islands of Madeira and Azores and [to] Africa. At the beginning of 1917, Germany declared zones of “unrestricted” submarine warfare, which meant that all civilian ships could be sunk without warning. As a result, the submarine campaign arrived in the Portuguese islands; at Madeira, the harbor of Funchal was shelled on 3 December 1916 by Germany’s U-83.

The defenses on all the islands were weak or nonexistent. On 4 July 1917, [a] U-155 shelled the harbor of Ponta Delgada, apparently attempting to destroy a coal depot mainly used by U.S. ships. The coal depot was not destroyed; however, this raid raised fears of a possible German submarine base in the Azores Islands. The Royal Navy felt that it could not release units due to huge submarine activity on the coast of England and the fighting in Europe. Therefore, the United States, after an agreement with England, assumed the defense of the Azores Islands. The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company was the first domestically equipped and trained aviation unit to deploy to the war. At the end of July 1917, destroyers arrived at Ponta Delgada with the USS Panther [1889] defending the harbor. However, due to the lack of ships in Europe, this defense force was sent to Europe a few months later and replaced by the USS Tonopah [previously the USS Nevada (BM 8)] and some older destroyers and K-class submarines. The new mission of this defense force was no longer to hunt submarines but to deny the area near the islands to German incursions and help ships on their way to Europe.

On 12 December 1917, Funchal was again shelled by a German submarine. The United States knew that it was only a question of time until the American Expeditionary Forces arrived in Europe and that the Azores Islands would have a role as a supporting harbor. Two harbors (Feteiras and Ponta Delgada) had artillery to protect British radio antennas, but the airplanes of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company were suited for this task.

Poague was transported to the Azores Islands by the USS Hancock, an 8,500 ton transport ship. The following excerpts record his thoughts during this transition.
Tuesday, 1 January 1918

On board the Transport Hancock. We came on here on Friday, the 29th and I found my quarters. Now I know why they call them quarters—eighths would be better. I almost have to go out in the passage to clean my teeth. But they are very conveniently located, fresh air (at six degrees below zero), have a door just above, and the engine room just below. We’ve had bitter weather, and expect to sail in the morning at seven.

Last night, New Year’s Eve, I volunteered to load ship, which pleasant pastime continued until the small hours. What a contrast to last New Year’s Eve, with Bill Buckley and a tall girl in black at the South Shore Country Club. When the whistles and sirens cut loose at midnight, one of the men, staggering under a load of tin roofs (the Admiral loves tin roofs) remarked, “Well, this may be New Year’s to home folks but it’s just plain first of January to me.” The rest of the day was uneventful except for the turkey dinner.

Wednesday, 2 January 1918

By some queer courage, I turned out at seven to see us sail. Found the tugs alongside and all ready and at the last minute the word was passed that we do not go for twenty-four hours or longer, as the ice is to heavy to the destroyers which convoy us. So again we wait. I’m fretful to go and can’t bear to any more goodbyes.

Saturday, 5 January 1918

We no longer mention sailing. It is a sore subject. But it continues cold. Mornings we smoke, play poker, and read and yawn. After two P.M., we go ashore and return any time before eight A.M. I find these mornings rapidly become the perfect blanks that so much of the time I have been in the Service becomes, due to its inactivity and dullness. I can truthfully say we will not sail tomorrow.

Wednesday, 9 January 1918

Well, “we’ve done it.” We sailed at 7:20 this morning, in spite of ice and misgivings, and as I write we’re pounding southeast across the night Atlantic. All day we spent coming down the Delaware, passing Cape May, of aerial activities, at 4:30 in the afternoon. How decidedly different it all was from my imagination of a sailing—no crowds, no cheers, no fuss.

Thursday, 10 January 1918

All day we have rolled through a black blue sea, the wind to stern. Although she has considerable motion, it is not violent, her load is too heavy. On going on deck this morning, I found a destroyer about half a mile on each side of us, wallowing along in the sea. We’d picked up our convoy in the night. The wind still follows us, a northwest wind from home.

Thursday, 17 January 1918

We entered the official barred zone today and our attendant destroyers closed in as night fell. We’re running to a submarine base and I think a submarine fighting outfit of great value. There can’t be any doubt they will try to get us.

Friday, 18 January 1918

At midnight we ran into a gale, a truly new experience. I found it impossible to stay in bed, we rolled so. At intervals of five minutes, great seas broke over the deck above me washing and tearing, and combining with the howl of the wind and the shivering of the ship to produce an awesome effect. The waves even came down the ventilating funnels so badly that the kitchen floor was a foot deep in water. Everyone was awake; sleep was impossible. At midnight I went on watch and in the dark found seas piling up like mountains. They seem to rush down on our stern and pick up the ship like a chip, breaking over her and twisting her about. We have posted sentries to keep everyone off the decks. They would be washed away. All day the storm has continued with regular squalls and
driving rain. All during my watch the wind was entered on the log as No. 11; that is better than 80 miles an hour.

Saturday, 19 January 1918

The very funniest thing I ever saw was this morning's breakfast. A huge roll to starboard and the long table, fifteen chairs, men, syrup, scrambled eggs, everything sailed down on Captain Evans, who was pinned back of the table, his hands in his lap, his eyes staring, his mouth open. I laughed until my sides ached at his looks as he received all these things.

When Poague arrived at U.S. Naval Base 13, it was commanded by Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, who reported directly to Admiral William S. Sims, chief of U.S. Navy Operations in Europe. Naval Base 13 and the Azores Islands were strategically important to the United States because they served as a support location at Ponta Delgada, São Miguel Island, Azores Islands, which are in the north Atlantic about 1,446 kilometers west of Portugal. At the time of World War I, Ponta Delgada was the only city on São Miguel Island, and its harbor was considered small for the number of ships that arrived to refuel or to make repairs on their way to or from Europe. The nearest island was Santa Maria, 50 nautical miles to the south, but had no harbor or bay to support seaplane operations; 90 nautical miles to the west was the island of Terceira; Faial Island, approximately 65 nautical miles from Terceira, had the best geography for seaplanes operations. Lieutenant Poague reveals his first impressions of the Azores Islands on 23 January 1918.

Wednesday, 23 January 1918

The harbor is full of shipping and varied, hence interesting. All morning I have loafed about the ship, but this afternoon I went ashore with Dr. Thompson and we rambled. I am entranced. I feel in these narrow streets, among these houses of every color, quaint, tiny, under a blue sky from "Never Never Land" that I've stepped into a dream. The cleanliness, the age of the place, the courtesy of the people—oh! It's all out of another world from the breathless rush of America. I can't describe the beauties of Del Gada; I can't tell the loveliness of the street I've just passed anymore than I can describe the beauties which lie around the corner I have not yet turned. There is an atmosphere here which I never encountered, and how I love it. Surely I can work here. Surely among all this beauty I can "dream true." And this is War. Why, it's a picnic. I feel almost a slacker but that I have dangerous work to do and that I volunteered for anything. Surely I'm lucky-lucky.

Thursday, 24 January 1918

Today I've tried to work but failed, so I've loafed. The unloading of the ship is going to be a serious problem, as we are too big to get to the doc. We're going to have to lighter out our entire cargo, which will take quite a while. The lighter and all the harbor boats are colorful. There is a little steam tug, about thirty feet, a trim little craft painted pink, in charge of a gray-bearded old pirate named Caesar. He is the rooster of the flock of hen lighters, brown boats, double decked, holding thirty tons, and what a fuss of crowing he does with his puffy little boat and his peanut steam whistle. We hope to begin unloading tomorrow in earnest. I stood around most of the day as useless and anxious to help as a dog at a bullfight.

Friday, 25 January 1918

A hard day's work is done. We've got a pretty decent system and the unloading proceeds faster than I'd thought. I have a title. I am "Admiral of the Mosquito Fleet" because I had the brilliant idea of using the ship's boats as lighters [landing craft]. The executive officer gave me four big boats and a steam launch and I am unloading two hundred tons a day, which helps a lot.

Saturday, 26 January 1918

And again today we worked like [——] and looked like them from smut and cement dust. It did seem odd to be in charge of the gang where Rollie Harger was working—good old
Over There, Over Here

Rollie—he's [a] corporal. I'm [a] lieutenant. We've lifted sacks together and had a smoke during rest. Later, he, Burke (a former instructor in Cornell University) and I were heaving a load together, for I worked as hard as any of my men, all and remarked on the oddity, three college men, all pulling on a rope, 2,400 miles from home. A week should see us unloaded and another should see us flying. I hope so.

Sunday, 27 January 1918

By some luck we didn't work, and this morning we went ashore to see our new campsite. It is on a level meadow in a curious old park up in the hills, facing off south towards the sunny warm sea. The soil is volcanic ash, red and porous, in which the heaviest rain is quickly absorbed. I find it a lovely place, with the hillsides overgrown with pine, cactus, and bushes which will flower in a few months. On the return, we watched Portuguese officers drilling recruits in civilian clothes, for all the world as we drilled on the campus at home last spring, except that although these men were very well dressed, collars, cravats, etc., every man in two companies with one exception was barefooted. And again I thought what a hideous thing War is, to take these simple folk from their sunny homes and put them into the tearing, torturing occupation of the trenches.

Wednesday, 30 January 1918

We're still unloading the ship, but it is getting down. A whale of wind came up last night—a grand little place to fly in.

Friday, 15 February 1918

We've had a couple of machines running and the crowd increases. The natives seem to think we're supermen. Odd, if they really knew.

Saturday, 16 February 1918

A big day in the history of this little town, for this morning we made the first aeroplane flight in the Azores. Crowds lined the streets, docks, water front and housetops. A municipal holiday was declared, quite a grand occasion. One ragged old peasant, delightful in his multicolored patches, on his little noisy donkey, said he got there at five in the morning. Word had been passed that the first flight would be at 10:30, but he wanted to be on time. An old lady in the national costume of huge blue hood and cape knelt in the middle of the street by the flying beach when the first plane went up and prayed continuously for the safety of its aviators until they returned, nearly half an hour. We sent out three machines and made ten flights. Everything combined to make it a success—fair blue weather and the ever-present element of luck.

One interesting note is the setup of operations to the beginning of flights compared with that of Curtiss HS-1s at Pauillac, France. At Ponta Delgada, the Marines installed their facilities (from tents to machinery shops) in 25 days; in France, with facilities already in place, it took 20 days.

After these initial flights, and according to Poague's diary, an intense instruction period started for the seven young lieutenants (from flight practice in their new environment to operational aspects of their flying). They were the backbone of the unit's operation. The weather was the main obstacle for the Marine aviators, learning how to operate in the seas and winds around the Azores Islands.

Tuesday, 19 February 1918

Today I had my first flight in the Azores, an hour hop. The most distinct reaction is the surprise at finding how instinctive flying has become. It is now two and a half months since I have flown, and yet the former control came to me as easily as ever. Flying is like swimming, I am sure, or skating, or riding a bicycle, in that once it is learned and the muscles become adapted, it is never forgotten. From the air this rolling, fertile country looks, even better than from the sea. We had expected bad air currents, due to the mountains, but to date haven't found any.
Wednesday, 20 February 1918

First experience at bomb dropping came this morning when Lieutenant Mims and I went up. At a certain predetermined point on the ground was a marker, and I flew the plane while he dropped a dummy (practice bomb). I regret to record in this storehouse of truth-and-fiction—that he missed the mark by more than enough.

Wednesday, 27 February 1918

Death came close today. I could see the hollow of the skull through the empty eyes. It’s such things that make this flying the greatest thing in the world. Mims and I had been up for half an hour and on returning, making a landing in a stiff breeze, were forced to keep on by a cutter getting in the way. A ten-foot buoy, a monitor and three subs loomed up before us, a hundred feet away, and we were going a hundred miles an hour. We rose and cleared the buoy by two feet, then facing the rock cliff had to turn so sharply that she side slipped on one wing to within eight feet of a heavy dock; after that we had to clear the mass of big shipping 700 feet away, which we cleared by perhaps five feet; and just a touch of any one of them would have finished us. But it was well worth it, for if we’d not had to turn off we would have landed at 100 miles an hour and been tripped by a seven-inch cable suddenly stretched across the opening, and at that speed we would have broken our necks. A close shave—exciting and a lot of fun.

The initial excitement ends when the weather turned sour and flying was halted. As the days dragged on, Poague lamented his choice, pouring out his dismay at being posted in such a remote location.

Tuesday, 5 March 1918

A windy day as prevent us from flying and for nearly a week now I have done nothing. I am fed up. I’d give ten years for some action, something to do. I never felt such utter self-contempt as in this company. I am useless and I know it, and yet I was placed here. We all were. If I could make it, I’d resign and enter the British Naval Air Service. I’d see action there, at least, but there is no chance, and the Marines have no place where I could be transferred. I’ve got to stick it out. Something’s wrong, all wrong in this company, and I think it is idleness. Is my “big adventure” to be a fizzle, just a day dream?

Wednesday, 6 March 1918

The thought of and longing for action continues. With my training, I would be eagerly accepted in any naval flying service in the world. I’ve been looking up the British service. Action there, for sure, but I don’t see how I could get a resignation accepted to enter it. Always I encounter that stone wall. Good God! The big things of the world are being done by other men no better trained, no more eager I than I am. In these same hours they are fighting gloriously, which I put in pitching quoits or lying on my cot reading. Haven’t I a right to my share? Am I not fit to enter into that high camaraderie? Patience, patience, always that. And all the while I am idling. Someone who knew said, “Idleness is the rust which first destroys the finest metals.” I’ve even gone to such fool lengths as to look up court martial laws to find how I could be kicked out. But I won’t go that way, even for action.

Saturday, 30 March 1918

Our flying is almost forgotten. Inclement weather has prevent[ed] any work for two weeks. You see the wind hops over these mountains in swirls, which make air work suicidal.

[Wednesday], 10 April 1918

Sharp comment from the Admiral has driven Capt Evans to real flying and, from 4:30 A.M. to dark, machines have been up. A fine blue day has aided tremendously.

While Poague was anxious to fly and fight, his love and skill of writing was evident from his diary entries, which was quickly discovered by Admiral Dunn.
The admiral wants to give a vaudeville show for the Portuguese Red Cross and I’m asked to run the thing. It will be great fun to get among the drops again and with the odor of grease paint. The raucous nature of vaudeville shows added a certain level of levity to Poague’s days.

We’ve got rehearsals in a high-ceilinged, barren dining room in a restaurant, from 9 in the morning to 11 at night. Great guns! If my friends in the show business at home could only see me trying to teach a cook, third class, on a submarine to be a French doll, or a mess attendant on the *Tonopah* to dance, they’d laugh themselves sick.

The vaudeville show consumed the majority of Poague’s time and offered him the ability to hob-knob with the admiral, who was “very enthusiastic over our idea of the play.” On 5 April, the crew and cast had their final dress rehearsal. Poague’s talents were further certainly put to the test.

I am property man, assist in making up, scene shifter, and most important of all a combination of stage manager and electrician. With a blue drop with a gold eagle on it, which I had painted, and certain lights, I have a really beautiful effect. After two showings, the play was deemed a “glorious success” and received “a thousand sincere compliments.”

After the resounding success of the vaudeville show, Poague received “a most unusual proposition and which was very flattering” on 10 April 1918. He was offered the opportunity to be attached directly to the admiral’s staff and take responsibility for entertainment at the base, to which he “turned it down,” after all, as the lieutenant states in his diary, “I came in to fight, not to dodge.” However, just two days later, after much compromise, Poague accepted the responsibility for much of the entertainment. For his role, he was allowed to move into town and yet retain his piloting duties. “This releases me from officer of the day work and leaves me free except from flying. So now, perhaps, I’ll have time to write; it depends on the weather.”

Despite his newly acquired additional duties, Poague’s skill as a pilot was always tested. He recounted his own close encounter with death on 21 April.

**Sunday, 21 April 1918**

Another close escape today for which I am glad, both in the closeness and in the escape to live more. A bad landing in the harbor gave me the alternative of trying another landing or trying to clear the fort at the end and circle to sea. In the second, I chose the fort and headed for it, knowing I had a bare chance with a missing motor to clear it. If I didn’t, it would mean crashing into it at ninety miles an hour. When I realized I was started, all nervousness left me and it seemed as if I (another person) said to myself “Well, Walt, enjoy it. It’s a good sensation,” and I know I smiled, for the cold air blast hurt my teeth. I record this for it is an odd experience. It did not look that I could clear the stone fort and when I approached it I am told that men on the flying beach turned away their heads. I missed it by between six and eight feet. So I’m lucky in having had one more glorious moment of living—and that’s what life is for. I am glad.

The joy of flying never left Poague—his diary is full of the thrills and beauty of the act, and finally, he is tested for his qualification as a naval aviator.

**Monday, 20 May 1918**

Being officer of the day now has the advantage of a hop at sundown and sunrise. Oh, glorious-beauty, freedom. My observer and I made a hundred-mile flight tonight, going forty miles at sea. The unspeakable beauty of it! We flew halfway between the clouds charging up out of sunset and the sea. Up they came from the orange on the western horizon, the “cavalry of the sky,” and orange and rose in a haze of pink, the sea blue below us, far to the north the upstanding peaks this island, with clouds of white and purple and black level strata around the mountain tops. Up there, washed clear of all the earth and free from all pettiness of man, we seemed gods resting in our chariot with beauty, beauty, beauty filling our souls.
Tuesday, 21 May 1918

Another wonderful flight this morning at sunrise; I said goodnight to the sun and welcomed it this morning. Oh, surely God is good to have created all of this and the fates of chance kindly to have let me see and revel in it. This afternoon I went out for altitude and climbed so high into the sky that below me this Island, 50 by 8 miles, was spread out a map of green and blue and brown, blue sea all about it. From there it seemed a ridiculous little thing for man to live upon and fortify—an impudent little thing to stick its head up above all this expanse of water. I got a little dizzy on my turns from height, the motor roared the wind tugged at me, and then the long velvet silences of my spirals down from that cold air to the warm surface breezes until my pontoons lit and I was home!

Saturday, 25 May 1918

A cloud is a beautiful thing to watch on a Summer day when you’re flat on your back on a lawn, but it’s no matter of jubilation when it gets friendly and descends to the sea in a twenty-five mile square mass of dark and wet and impenetrableness. Ask me; I know. On a sunset flight tonight I got about as beautifully lost as a man could—twenty five miles to sea, no compass getting dark—oh, it was a novel sensation. Everywhere was mist, heavy and baffling. Even at a very low altitude, the water was all but invisible and the damp, heavy darkness seemed to sap your courage. I do hasten to add that while I wasn’t cheerful, still I wasn’t scared. At last a friendly peak came above the low clouds and showed me I was forty miles wrong. When I did get it was quite dark and I sang as I took off my flying clothes.

Thursday, 30 May 1918

The flight was an interesting one, my longest up for two hours and went a very long way to sea. Far below the big ship looked like a rowboat, almost impossible to believe it was a large steamer. So I circled and patrolled until my gasoline got dangerously low, then I spiraled down to them, waved them good-by and came home-ward. And they plowed westward—toward all that I love.

Tuesday, 4 June 1918

After a great many promises Capt Evan has at last decided to qualify us as “Naval Aviators.” It’s rather funny that after making for months flights alone of one hundred miles or more to sea in all sorts of weather and having to do circus stunts and land in this tiny harbor, we were not qualified for our N. A.’s. It’s not his fault, however, but just red tape. So today we made our last test, 3,000 feet altitude, spiral down and land within 150 feet of a target. It’s a whole lot harder to do than one would think. The judgment of distance is necessarily a fine one. Why, at 3,000 feet a target 10 feet square is hardly visible. I had and have had all along a good deal of confidence in my ability to fly a machine and I thought I could make it. I did on the first trial, being the only one of the lot to do so, hence the boyish bragging. Some, Hill for instance, have missed it by half a mile on several trials.

Despite their distance from the trenches and battlefields of Europe, and initially, his lack of knowledge about the Corps, Poague added his own commentary about the Marines fighting at Belleau Wood.

Tuesday, 11 June 1918

The huge battle rages on in France. At a fearful cost, the Huns are pouring out men in a vain attempt to force a decisive battle and are failing. They cannot win and this is their last attempt, the last powerful clutch of a drowning man as the waters close over his head. If, as we are told, the Allies have used no reserves, then the Hun is indeed doomed. The two regiments of Marines have lived up to the best of our traditions. Six thousand Marines officially are credited with taking 6 miles by 2 and a half of trenches from thirty thousand Germans and another thirty thousand Huns were called to stop them. It is as I expected. We have the finest body of fighting men in the world. The casualties were
heavy. Every officer in one company was killed and the men were led on to further victories by a corporal. Brave men. I think of all my friends, brown, white teeth flashing through the dust at Quantico. They died well.

In 1918, the influenza pandemic broke out around the world. The pandemic of 1918–19 killed more people than World War I (between 20 and 40 million people) and is cited as the most devastating epidemic in recorded world history. Known as “Spanish Flu” or “La Grippe,” the influenza arrived in the Azores Islands at the end of the summer, where Poague and his comrades were not immune to its effects.

Sunday, 7 July 1918

Boynton has become very ill and has gone to the hospital; Brewster is sick in bed and all of us feel badly in greater or less degree, I included. Spanish influenza they call it. I think and it appears to be very painful.

Tuesday, 9 July 1918

This epidemic of Spanish influenza or grippe, rather, has hit Brewster, Sellon and Hill. I have been feeling a bit under the weather too, but not enough to keep me from at the play, which I have been typing all day.

Tuesday, 16 July 1918

I decided to stick out my time of duty as officer of the day today, in spite of feeling pretty fairly rotten, and did so until this afternoon. I went out to the hospital to get some medicine and the surgeon in charge looked me over, pronounced a high fever, and insisted on my going to bed. So I turned into a cot and they began throwing druggists staples into me. And then at ten in the evening, with the wind and rain playing fiercely, came mail! The first in nine weeks, and what a mail! Why it didn't seem anything could be such a tonic as those letters from home. Mother, Dad, dear Sis, with her clever tender letters. I lay until after midnight reading them and then had hard work to calm down enough to sleep.

Wednesday, 17 July 1918

They have diagnosed my complaint as “something similar to gripe, probably Spanish influenza.” At all events, I feel a lot better today and am honestly enjoying the rest and change. This hospital under canvas, rows of tents, with the operating rooms in portable houses, would be a revelation to our doctors at home. But it is well and quietly run, the attendants are kind and thoughtful, and the food is good. All told, it is a credit, and I have the highest confidence in Surgeon Hepler a Newark doctor, who is in command. There is a corksing tame rabbit too, who hops into your tent and sits up solemnly watching you eat and nibles bread from your hand.

Thursday, 18 July 1918

A little weak, but otherwise “big and strong.” I left the hospital this morning and arrived at my alleged home in time to receive more mail. The old adage of raining and pouring holds good now and it is just flooding us with letters praise be! The little details of home life and thought fill my heart.

By the end of July, the submarine menace was considered under control by the chief of naval operations and at this time the 1st Marine Aviation Force arrived in France (Brest). Only one squadron remained in the United States (“D” squadron) at Miami. With almost the entire Marine aviation deployed overseas, the call for pilots to continue the effort of building and sustaining the major unit was a natural decision; several of the skilled pilots were transferred back to the United States. Those departing the Azores Islands were Captain Evans (with a total of 4.3 scouting flight hours); First Lieutenant Mims (3.8 hours); Second Lieutenants Hill (22.1 hours), Sellon (29.5 hours), and Boyton (1.0 hour); and Gunnery Sergeant Carl Ehlers who also logged only one scout flight. At the officers school, the admittance terms where changed, giving now priority to the personnel who were in the ranks. Also returning home to become a future officer was a private—Christian Schilt—who became famous in the near future of Marine Corps aviation.
The reduction of the number of pilots did not affect the number of scouting flights. In July, the total of flights was 104, from which 82 are scouting (78.9 hours). The small decrease of flights, comparing to the previous month, could be justified by four days of bad weather. It is now clear that, on a month with good weather, the total scouting hours were around 80 hours—the maximum that they could sustain. However, keeping up with this operational tempo resulted in an increase of accidents due to material fatigue, which the six remaining aviators contended with.

Summer drew to a close as Poague and his fellow aviators continued their routine—flying and complaining about not flying when the weather was uncooperative. The war news continued to pour in and added further misery to their lack of usefulness in the far reaches of the Atlantic. On 5 November 1918, Poague and Gunnery Sergeant Walton B. Zeigler made their way to the beach at 0600 to conduct a sunrise scout patrol. It is best to use Zeigler’s own words for the events that followed:

The motor and plane seemed and tested all O.K. But the wind was against us, as there is only one way to take off in that harbor. We had what we call a down wind of about twenty-five miles per hour and the sea just outside the harbor was very rough.

When we left the beach we both expected to take off before we passed the sea buoy, which is at the mouth of the harbor, but when we passed the buoy we were still planning.

After leaving the buoy I expected to feel it take off any moment, but the pontoons just seemed to be touching the top of the waves. We traveled for quite a distance when the plane rose several feet and then settled, and the pontoons struck the top of a wave and gave way. I saw one come through the right lower wing and I loosened my belt to jump, but we bounded and turned over too fast to jump.

We turned over twice and stopped with us hanging head down under water. I fought my way out between the tangled wires and wreckage and was about exhausted when I reached the surface, but was not hurt badly, teeth knocked loose and stiff neck.

I called for Mr. Poague, but received no answer, so I climbed around the wreckage and found him still hanging in his seat with the top engine panel—that is the top wing—just over the front seat against his chest and blocking all of the rear cockpit . . . He appeared dead then, for he did not move all the while I worked to get him out.

Walter Smith Poague was 27 years old at the time of his death—the war nearly over. His fellow Marines fondly remembered Poague in letters of condolence to the young man’s family, as did the Portuguese with letters of appreciation for his services to the Red Cross. Poague’s diary is nearly a daily record of the unit’s actions, weather, flying, boredom, and frustration covering nearly nine months. It was published by his devoted father in an attempt to ensure that his son lived on in words if not in body.

* 1stLt Walter S. Poague was sealed in a copper-lined casket and transported back to the United States by the cruiser USS Chicago [1885] on 21 November 1918. He was buried in Oak Woods Cemetery in Chicago on 21 December 1918. Poague died on 5 November 1918, six days before the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, officially ending World War I.
On 1 July 1911, the United States Navy purchased its first airplane from Glenn Curtiss, who designed and built it at his Hammondsport, New York, factory. Less than a year later, two men wearing the uniform of the United States Marine Corps began flight training: Alfred Austell Cunningham and Bernard Lewis Smith. Today when flying around the world is safer than driving to a nearby grocery store, it is hard to keep in mind how dangerous flying was in those early days. In a few brief years, the frail doves called aeroplanes and the first aviators united by a common bond suddenly found themselves enemies and birds of prey shooting at each other in the skies over France. World War I saw the formation of two types of aviation: flying for peace and flying for war.

When the United States entered the war against Germany in 1917, there was no phase of her forthcoming industrial effort from which so much was expected as from the building of airplanes and equipment for aerial warfare. Here in America, mechanical flight was born; but other nations would develop the invention into an industry and a science that were a closed book to our people.

In August 1914, when Germany, France, and England went to war, Germany had about 1,000 airplanes, France 300, and England 250. America’s 224 planes in 1917 were nearly all obsolete in type, compared with the machines then in service in France. The U.S. Army Air Service had 65 officers and 1,330 enlisted personnel and civilians, two flying fields and a few serviceable planes, mostly trainers. U.S. naval aviation was as unprepared for war as was the Army. The strength of naval aviation with a Marine Corps section stood at 48 officers and 330 enlisted men with some aviation experience. They had 54 aircraft of training types (mostly obsolete), one free balloon, one kite balloon, and one air station at Pensacola, Florida. The Marine Corps section consisted of 7 qualified pilots and 43 enlisted men.

Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, USN, traveling incognito as a civilian aboard the merchant vessel New York, arrived in England on 9 April, three days after the United States had declared war. He was astounded to learn that the total loss of British and Allied tonnage during February had been 536,000 tons, in March 603,000 tons, and that the April rate of sinking would bring the total from that month alone to nearly 900,000 tons. At that rate, Germany would win the war within six months by reducing shipping to the point where necessary supplies of the Allies could not be maintained, much less sending American troops to France. Unrestricted submarine warfare played an important part in the declaration of war by the United States.

The primary role of naval aviation in WWI was antisubmarine warfare. Submarines could be spotted from the air. The seaplane on patrol could spot a submarine and then summon destroyers and sub chasers to the scene. Thus the aircraft would indirectly bring about the destruction of the submarine.

Three weeks after the declaration of war, the Marine Aeronautic Company was formed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. A site was selected on the shore of the Delaware River, and a hangar was built, open at both ends, one end with ramps on the water and the other facing the airfield. Two Curtiss R-6 seaplanes and one obsolete Farman landplane was the available inventory of aircraft. Marine Captain Alfred A. Cunningham was in command. Captain Cunningham, who was Naval Aviator No. 5, had soloed after two hours and 40 minutes of instruction on 5 March 1913. Over the next six months, the company expanded and trained 34 officers and 330 enlisted men.

At a halfway point between America and Europe lay the Portuguese-owned islands called the Azores. Soon after war was declared, the United States began negotiations with Portugal to establish a naval base at this strategic point. Had the Germans succeeded in establishing a base there or in utilizing the islands for supplying or refueling
submarines, they could have seriously menaced our troop and cargo transportation and trans-Atlantic lines of communication. U-boats were known to be operating in the area.

The Fourth of July 1917 was ushered in by the booming of American guns, not in the United States, but in the far-away Azores. A German submarine, the U-155, poured a rain of shells into Ponta Delgada, the principal city in the islands. People were panic-stricken; the antiquated forts were no defense. Their guns were not of sufficient caliber to cope with the enemy.

Relief came to the people of Ponta Delgada from an unexpected source. The U.S. naval collier [USS] Orion [AC 11] was in port and, three minutes after the enemy began operations, her guns were in action. This was a surprise for the submarine. When the shells began to fall around her, the Germans could not imagine where they came from. Orion was at a dock 2,000 yards away on the other side of a point of land that juts out into the harbor. She could not sail out immediately, as her stern had been hoisted to make repairs, but she promptly turned her guns on the intruder. In a few moments, the enemy found he was faced by a formidable foe. It was not long before the submarine, baffled, disappeared as the shells were getting too close. When American servicemen arrived in the Azores, they found Orion cigarettes, an Orion restaurant and theater, and even cigar boxes with a picture on them of the commanding officer of USS Orion, Lieutenant Commander J. H. Boesch—evidence of how popular the Americans had become.

Back in the states, on 14 October 1917, the Marine Aeronautic Company was divided into the 1st Aviation Squadron under Captain W. M. McIlvain, USMC, and the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company under Captain F. T. “Cocky” Evans, USMC. Later that same day, the 1st Aeronautic Company was transferred to the newly established naval air station at Cape May, New Jersey, for training in seaplanes and flying boats. Three days later, the 1st Marine Squadron transferred to the Army field at Mineola, Long Island, for training in landplanes. In December 1917, the Marine Aeronautical Detachment was organized at the Marine Barracks Philadelphia Navy Yard, under command of Captain Roy S. Geiger, USMC. On 31 December 1917, Captain McIlvain’s 1st Aviation Squadron was transferred to Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, for advanced training in landplanes.

On 9 January 1918, the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, 12 officers and 133 enlisted men, embarked on USS Hancock [AP 3] with 10 Curtiss R-6 seaplanes and 2 N-9 seaplanes for Ponta Delgada in the Azores. This was the first flying unit of any U.S. Service to go overseas fully equipped and trained. A detachment of Marines was formed in Philadelphia under Captain Maurice G. Holmes to mount and operate two seven-inch guns to protect Ponta Delgada.

The Aeronautic Company developed an air station and, about a month after its arrival, began making antisubmarine patrols. The Marine company later received six Curtiss HS-2L flying boats. Each of these patrol boats carried a crew of two and had a cruising range of about 400 miles. A corporal who had enlisted in the Marines on 23 June 1917 had this to say about serving with the 1st Marine Aeronautical Company in the Azores.

The assignment had its pleasant aspects. There was wonderful flying weather, people were very friendly, they took us right into their homes and did everything they could for us, so it was good to be there. We saw a few enemy submarines out there. In fact, we dropped a few bombs, but as far as we know we didn’t damage anything . . . but we kept them submerged, I think.

On 5 November 1918, in the Azores, Second Lieutenant Walter S. Poague, USMC, was killed in a crash. He was the only casualty of the 1st Aeronautical Company. After the war ended on 11 November 1918, the 1st Aeronautical Company under Major David L. S. Brewster, who on 18 July 1918 had succeeded Major Francis T. Evans, was ordered home. On 20 January 1919, the two seven-inch guns were turned over to the Portuguese.

But for the base in the Azores and Portugal’s cooperation, we would have lacked a place to refuel destroyers as they went across escorting convoys. The corporal who told about serving in the Azores, after returning to the states, entered flight training at the Marine Flying Field, Miami. On 10 June 1919, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and
designated a naval aviator. Christian Frank Schilt went on to become a legend for his Medal of Honor exploits on 6–8 January 1928 at Quilali, Nicaragua. Lieutenant Schilt risked his life to make 10 flights into a besieged town to evacuate 18 wounded Marines and carry in a replacement commander and badly needed medical supplies. He retired from the Marines as a general on 1 April 1957.

The Marine land-based aviation force began to organize and train after combining the 1st Aeronautical Detachment under Captain Roy S. Geiger and McIlvain’s 1st Aviation Squadron on 15 April 1918 into what would become known as the 1st Marine Aviation Force. This unit was to be stationed at the first-ever Marine flying school, which was donated by Glenn Curtiss near Miami at the site of his old Curtiss Flying School.

Captain Cunningham became commanding officer while he also served as the de facto director of Marine aviation. In November 1917, he would go to France to find a mission for Marine Corps aviation. Captain Cunningham sailed for France on 3 November 1917 and visited both British and French flying fields. His trip was marked by bad weather and sickness. When he returned home in January 1918, he reported to Lieutenant Commander John [H.] Towers, USN, in Washington, DC, in charge of naval aviation.

Cunningham felt that Marine Corps fighters should be assigned to defend Dunkirk: “No matter how many bombing machines we put out” to strike the U-boat bases in Belgium, “if there are no fighting machines there to protect them it is a useless sacrifice.” While in France, Cunningham had tried to persuade the Army to attach the Marine landplane squadron to the Marine brigade, then training in France as part of the famed Army 2d Infantry Division. The Army said that if the Marine squadron ever got to France, it would be used to furnish personnel to run one of their training fields, but that was as near the front as it would ever get.

On his trip, Cunningham had also conferred with the U.S. Navy officers and British naval officers who told him of a need to bomb German submarine bases located on the Belgian coast at Zeebrugge, Bruges, and Ostend. With support from the General Board of the Navy, he presented a plan from which came the formation of the Northern Bombing Group. The Marines would conduct daylight raids and the Navy wing would conduct night raids using Italian-built Caproni bombers.

The 1st Marine Aviation Force, which had reorganized on 16 June 1918 at the Marine Flying Field outside Miami, needed personnel. Cunningham, in command, recruited officers from the Quantico Marine Officers Training School, and 80 Navy-trained pilots transferred to the Marine Corps, wanting to get overseas sooner. The aviation force was divided into four squadrons—A (7), B (8), C (9), and D (10)—and began to train in earnest on Curtiss JN-4s (the famed Jenny), some Thomas-Morse Scouts, and Hall-Standards. With their mission established, the Marines would be equipped with the American-built De Havilland DH-4 with the 12-cylinder Liberty engine, also known as the “flaming coffin.” Most pilots and observers who flew the Liberty swore by the plane; a few swore at it.

On 14 August 1917, the Dayton-Wright Company in Dayton, Ohio, was awarded a contract to build the British-designed DH-4. The most objectionable feature [of the aircraft] was the unprotected gas tank in combination with a pressure-feed gas system since, in most cases when the gas tank was punctured, the DH-4 went down in flames. When the gas tank was punctured, not only did the hole remain unsealed, but the pressure on the gas line finally tended to force the fuel out, spraying the fuselage and making it highly flammable to the enemy’s incendiary bullets. Further danger lurked in every impending crash since the unprotected fuel tank located behind the pilot and engine might easily be crushed.

On 29 May 1917, in a suite at the Willard Hotel in Washington, DC, two successful engineers from the auto industry—Elbert J. Hall and Jesse G. Vincent—developed a design of what became America’s greatest contribution to aviation in WWI, the 12-cylinder, 400-horsepower Liberty engine. By October 1918, 46,000 engines a year were being produced and, when production ended, the following were actually built by Packard, 6,500; Lincoln, 6,500; Ford, 3,950; General Motors, 2,328; and Nordyke and Marmon, 1,000. The Liberty en-
gines were still being used [until] up to 1942 mainly due to their availability. They were used as aircraft engines and tank engines in Russia and England.

The DH-4 was the only American-built aircraft to see combat in WWI, and the first combat sortie took place by the 135th Aeronautic Squadron on 9 August 1918. Finally on 18 July 1918, the 1st Marine Aviation Force embarked on USS DeKalb, the former German liner Prinz Eitel Friedrich, at Newport News, Virginia. She carried Marines of the 5th Regiment to France as part of the first convoy in June 1917. Squadrons A, B, and C, 107 officers and 654 enlisted men, disembarked from DeKalb when she moored in Brest, France, on 30 July 1918. Squadron D had remained in Miami to complete its training and fill its complement of personnel. When they arrived in France, the 1st Marine Aviation Force became the Marine Day Wing of the U.S. Navy Northern Bombing Group under the command of Captain David [C.] Hanrahan, USN, headquartered in Antingues, France. Major Roy S. Geiger commanded Squadron 7(A); Major William M. McIlvain, Squadron 8 (B); Major Douglas B. Roben, Squadron 9 (C); and Captain Russell A. Presley would bring over Squadron 10 (D). These squadron commanders had been in France to establish airfields prior to the arrival of the three squadrons.

At a location between Calais and Dunkirk was Oye. This would be home to Squadrons A and B. Squadrons C and D would be established at LaFresne, some 12 kilometers southwest of Calais. Major Cunningham set up his headquarters at nearby LaFresne. Calais is 400 miles from the port of Brest. As with one of the many foul-ups of wartime endeavors, no transportation awaited the newly arrived Marines. Major Cunningham had to commandeer a French freight train to take his squadrons north to Calais. When they arrived at Oye and LaFresne, no airfields awaited them, much less aircraft.

Tents were pitched in the orchards surrounding the proposed sites of airfields, and the Marines were under canvas. Turning to with picks and shovels, the sugar beet fields were transformed with the help of a “borrowed” Navy steamroller into the first two Marine combat airfields.

The 72 DH-4 bombers promised by the Army were slow in coming. The first of these arrived on 7 September. The planes with the wings in one crate, the fuselage in another, and the engine in still another (the old expression about “flying crates” was derived from the crates the planes were shipped in). The naval air station at Pauillic, France, was where the planes were to be assembled and then flown to the Marine flying fields.

Cunningham found that the American-built planes would not arrive with the administrative foul-ups, so he turned to the British for help. The British, having been at war for three years prior to America’s entry into the conflict, had a surplus of airframes for the DH-9A. This plane was basically a modified DH-4 with the gas tank being relocated. However, the British were short of engines, and casualties had created a lack of trained pilots. With approval of U.S. Navy authorities and the Royal Air Force, a swap was arranged. The American Liberty engines had arrived with no planes to put them in, so for every three Liberty engines delivered to the British, they would return one to the Marines mounted in a completely equipped DH-9A.

On-the-job training began for Marine pilots and observers with Royal Air Force Squadrons 217, equipped with DH-4s, and 218, flying DH-9s. Marine pilots who had flown the JN-4 with its 90-horsepower engine found the Liberty engine of 400 horsepower made the ground shake. The Marine pilots were temporarily assigned to the British squadrons to fly three or more combat missions over the German lines. At the British pilots’ pool located at Audembert, France, Marine pilots began practice flights to qualify for flying bombing missions and then return to their own units.

One of these Marine pilots, Second Lieutenant Chapin Barr, died on 29 September 1918 from wounds received the day before on a combat raid over enemy territory. He was the first Marine aviator to lose his life as a result of enemy action. It was on 25 September 1918, flying with RAF Squadron 218 over Belgium, that First Lieutenant Everett R. Brewer, pilot, and observer Gunnery Sergeant Harry B. Wershiner brought down a Fokker, the first enemy plane ever recorded for the Marine Corps. Captain F. Patrick Mulcahy, pilot, with Gunnery
Sergeant Thomas L. McCullough, observer, brought down a German plane also over Belgium.

On 1 and 2 October 1918, some of the earliest food-drop missions were flown by three Marine Corps pilots: Captain Francis P. Mulcahy, Captain Robert S. Lytle, and Lieutenant Frank Nelms. They had to fly repeated low-level runs in the face of enemy fire to deliver 2,600 pounds of food and supplies to a French regiment surrounded by German troops near Stadenburg.

On 5 October 1918, Squadron D arrived at LaFresne with 42 officers and 183 enlisted men. Also arriving on 5 October was the 88th Company from the 1st Marine Regiment, which was equipped with searchlights.

On 8 October, over Ardoye, Belgium, Second Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, pilot, with Gunnery Sergeant Robert G. Robinson, observer, encountered a flight of nine enemy planes. Refusing to flee, Lieutenant Talbot engaged them, and in a terrific battle the Marines shot down one of the enemy and eluded the rest.

In mid-October 1918, with the war going badly for the Germans, they evacuated their submarine bases in the North Sea, and thereby the U.S. Navy Northern Bombing Group found its mission changed. They offered their services to General John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces. General Pershing felt that where they were located they would be better able to support British operations in Belgium.

On 14 October 1918, Captain Robert S. Lytle led five DH-4s and three DH-A9s of Marine Squadron 9, based at LaFresne, on the first all-Marine air combat operation to bomb the German-held railway junction and yards at Thielte, Belgium. Without fighter escort to and from Thielte, the Marines dropped 2,210 pounds of bombs. On the way back, they were jumped by 12 German fighters, eight Fokker D-V11s, and four Pfalz D-111s.

While flying over Pittham, Belgium, Lieutenant Talbot and his observer, Gunnery Sergeant Robinson, suffered engine trouble and became detached from their flight. Using their frequent tactic, the Germans zeroed in on Talbot's DH-4. Talbot elected to fight against the odds. Robinson brought down one of the attacking fighters before his machine gun jammed. As he struggled to get it back in action, a burst of fire practically carried his arm away. Talbot attacked the enemy with his front guns, shooting one down. Robinson received another bullet through the stomach and collapsed in the cockpit. Talbot scattered the nearest formation, and with his engine failing, Talbot glided over the enemy trenches at an altitude of 50 feet, landing at the nearest Allied hospital.

Captain Lytle tried to help Talbot, but his engine failed after Lytle and his observer, Gunnery Sergeant Amil Wiman, brought down a German plane. Lytle glided his plane to a landing in the Belgian front-line trenches and beat it to safety. Later that night, Marine ground crews went up and dismantled the plane and took it back to base.

Lieutenant Talbot and Gunnery Sergeant Robinson each were awarded the Navy Medal of Honor. The gallant Talbot received his posthumously for he died in a plane crash nine days later, crashing into a bomb pit. Second Lieutenant Colgate W. Darden, who was in the observer's seat, was thrown clear of the plane, survived, and went on to become governor of Virginia and president of the University of Virginia. In 1936, a U.S. Navy destroyer was named in Talbot's honor. Robinson, incapacitated by his wounds, was retained as a first lieutenant on the inactive list.

The worldwide influenza epidemic struck the Marines and paralyzed operations; 21 enlisted men and 4 officers died, including Major Douglas B. Roben, commander of Squadron C. The first Marine aircraft lost to enemy action occurred on 22 October when seven German fighters attacked Second Lieutenant Harvey C. Norman's plane. Norman and his observer, Second Lieutenant Caleb W. Taylor, were killed in the crash near Bruges Canal, Belgium.

Marine squadrons continued to carry out raids on railway centers, supply dumps, enemy airfields, and canals in 14 independent raids. Second Lieutenants Frank Nelms Jr. and John F. Gibbs were on a mission when German antiaircraft fire hit the DH-4 they were flying and forced them to land in neutral Holland. They were interned from 27 October 1918 until after the Armistice. Squadron 8 (B) under Major McIlvain began operations from an
abandoned airfield at Knesselaere, Belgium, on 11 November 1918 when the Armistice was signed.

A total of 57 bombing raids were participated in by the Marine Day Wing, dropping an estimated 62,000 pounds of bombs, 15,140 pounds while flying with the British.

Major Cunningham remembered how cold the winter was in northern France and Belgium and that his Marines were ill-housed. Being under command of the U.S. Navy, Cunningham secured [the] USS *Mercury* in December to transport the Marines back to the States. Although overshadowed by the larger combat elements during the First World War, a handful of U.S. Marines in France made flying history. Not until 25 years later and another war was “The Marines’ Hymn” changed to read:

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From the halls of Montezuma
To the shores of Tripoli
We fight our country’s battles
In the air, on land, and sea.
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Headnote

Taking the offensive, the 4th Brigade helped turn the tide of World War I during two days of hard fighting in July 1918.

Belleau Wood, the 4th Brigade’s first big fight, had occupied most of June 1918. At the legendary battle, the Marines earned international recognition that they could stand and fight on a European battlefield. Less than three weeks later, however, the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and its Marine brigade were facing a new challenge: reversing Germany’s fifth major drive of 1918 by spearheading an Allied offensive near Soissons, France, that would prove a turning point in the war.

During the first week of July, the 2d Division had gone into reserve, holding the support line behind Belleau Wood and Vaux, the latter about three miles to the southeast.** Replacements were arriving, and the less-serious casualties had begun to return to the brigade. On 13 July, the brigade commander, Army Brigadier General James G. Harbord, was promoted to major general. Colonel Wendell C. “Buck” Neville, commander of the 5th Marines, was in the hospital, and Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland was acting commander. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee led the 6th Regiment. The two regimental commanders pinned on Harbord’s second stars, and Harbord went off to Paris for five days’ leave.

The next day was a Sunday and, war or no war, also Bastille Day. Army General John J. Pershing’s chief of staff informed Harbord by telephone that he was to take command of the 2d Division, and the sooner the better. The sleep of the division’s doughboys was disturbed that night of 14–15 July by the sound of distant artillery fire from the east. From Reims to Château-Thierry and across Champagne to the Argonne, the armies of German Crown Prince Wilhelm were attacking. For the Germans, it was the fifth and final offensive of 1918—the last throw of the dice. Hurried along by these events, Harbord, early on Monday morning, drove back from Paris to the 2d Division headquarters, comfortably situated in the Château de Chamigny on the Marne.

At 1855, General Marie Emile Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Army Group to which the 2d Division was assigned, issued an order placing the division at the disposal of General Charles “the Butcher” Mangin, commander of the French Tenth Army. At about 2030, a French staff officer arrived at Chamigny and vaguely informed the division that it would soon be moving somewhere. Later that evening, more specific orders arrived. Troops were to “embus” at 1600 the following day and proceed to an unnamed area subject to further orders. Harbord complained in his diary, “In truck movements of troops, the French never tell any one where they are going.”

Allied Commander in Chief General Ferdinand Foch had begun concentrating troops north of Paris to counterattack the flanks of the huge German salient reaching toward Paris. General Pershing, the overall U.S. commander, would write dryly in his final report, “The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching of the counterattack already planned.” According to Pershing, French Army Commander in Chief Philippe Pétain’s “initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire western

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** The big 2d Division included two infantry brigades: the 3d Infantry Brigade, with the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 4th Marine Brigade, with the 5th Regiment and the 6th Regiment and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Division troops included a headquarters troop, the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, the 2d Engineer Regiment, and the 1st Field Signal Battalion. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade consisted of the 12th (75mm) and 15th (155mm) Field Artillery Regiments and the 2d Trench Mortar Battery.
face of the Marne salient. The 1st and 2d American Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons.” The operation came to be known as the Aisne-Marne offensive and lasted from 18 July until 6 August. Some 270,000 American troops were involved.

About 1500 on Tuesday, 16 July, Harbord was informed that his new division headquarters would be in the Forêt (Forest) de Retz, and that the French Tenth Army, to which his own division was now assigned, was contemplating an attack. General Mangin had initially received no information on Mangin’s intentions for the 2d Division except that it would be assigned to the French XX Corps. Now, Harbord learned that the 2d Division, as part of XX Corps, was to attack on a wide front extending south from the vicinity of Soissons. A French operations officer offered to write the 2d Division attack order; however, Harbord declined with a bit of ice in his voice.

Preparing for Battle

The 2d Division commander spent the night drafting the order. The front would be approached through the Forêt de Retz, also known as the Forêt de Villers-Cotterêts. Beyond the woods, most of the land was planted in wheat, which then stood waist high. The area was dotted with villages and farmhouses built of stone from local quarries, offering the Germans strong defensive positions. Emerging from the woods, the division would advance almost due east on a frontage of about two miles. The first objective would be a mile-long line running through Beaurepaire farm. There, the axis of the attack would change from east to southeast. It would be an awkward maneuver. The next objective, another advance of a mile, would be to Vauxcastille. Still another mile would bring the division to the village of Vierzy.

Harbord expected that the principal resistance would be on his right. He gave this zone to the 2d Division’s 3d Brigade, which would attack with both its regiments—the 9th and 23d Infantry—abreast. He assigned the narrower left front to the 5th Regiment. The 6th [Regiment] would be in reserve. The wheat fields promised good tank country. Four battalions of French tanks, 54 tanks in all, were allocated to support the division.

While the mimeograph machine at headquarters churned out copies of the attack order, the Marines marched from their billeting areas near Nanteuil-sur-Marne to the main highway, where they embussed in French trucks. The convoys moved forward in total darkness.

In the morning, the Marines tumbled out of the trucks northwest of Villers-Cotterêts, near spots on the map marked Pierrefonds, Retheuil, and Taillefontaine. Mangin’s Tenth Army was to break the German front between the Aisne and Ourcq rivers. The XX Corps was expected to penetrate deeply at the critical point on the western flank of the salient. The corps was to attack with the 1st U.S. Division on the left, the French 1st Moroccan Division in the center, and the 2d U.S. Division on the right. The 3d Brigade would advance with its two regiments side by side, the 9th Infantry on the left, the 23d Infantry on the right. The 5th [Regiment] would attack on the left of the 3d Brigade. A group of about 30 French tanks was assigned to support the 5th Regiment. The 6th [Regiment], along with the 2d Engineers and 4th Machine Gun Battalion, would be in division reserve. A French squadron of 10 aircraft would support the division in the attack—or so XX Corps promised. To ensure surprise, there would be no preliminary artillery fire. The attack would begin with a barrage that would roll forward at the rate of 100 meters every two minutes.

The weather—cloudy, rainy, and totally miserable—favored a surprise attack. The Forêt de Retz, a magnificent blanket of beech to the north and east of Villers-Cotterêts, concealed the approach. One principal highway, with a paved center and dirt shoulders, ran through the forest, which was crisscrossed by dirt roads. During the night on 17 July, after a terrible forced march through mud and rain, the 1st Moroccan Division and the U.S. 2d Division ended up huddled in the Retz forest.

Neville was back from the hospital in time to command the Marine brigade. The 5th and 6th [Regiments] were to reach the woods during the afternoon and evening. The brigade’s 6th Machine Gun Battalion was to arrive about 0300 on 18 July.
Traffic moving to the front, however, packed the main roads through the forest, and the congestion delayed the delivery of the attack orders. There was little or no time for reconnaissance or the study of maps. For miles, the infantry was forced to march in single file along a ditch dug into the clay on the right of the road, each man holding onto the belt or coattail of the man in front of him.

Colonel Feland reported to Harbord at his headquarters late in the afternoon and received his orders for the 5th [Regiment]. Not until 2200 did he find his regiment on the road, two miles west of division headquarters. More tanks, large and small, than the Marines had ever seen had been assembled in the forest along with troop after troop of French cavalry. There were also the Moroccans; according to a Marine battalion history, the North Africans’ “cold-blooded manner of fighting had, from early days of the war, struck terror in the hearts of the Germans.”

The weather cleared and, from midnight until the dawn of 18 July, the troops marched from the rear through the woods to their attack positions. Major Julius Turrill’s 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, had been billeted in Crouttes, about eight miles southwest of Château-Thierry, from 9 to 15 July, “worn out, but well satisfied” from their work in Belleau Wood. At 2140 on 17 July, Turrill started his march through the Forêt de Retz in an effort to reach the jump-off point before H-hour. Each rifleman was carrying two extra bandoliers of ammunition. The expected French guides did not arrive to show Turrill the way.

The 1st Battalion was followed by the 2d and 3d. The 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, commanded by Major Ralph Keyser, would also be in the assault. After traveling all night, it had debussed at Brassieres at 1100 on 17 July. From there, it marched into the western part of the Forêt de Retz, following the 1st Battalion.

“. . . [A] 4 o’clock only one Regiment—the Ninth Infantry—was in position on the jump-off line,” says the wartime history of the 2d Division. “The attacking Battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry arrived in position at exactly 4-30, after double-timing for over a mile. The First and second Battalions of the Fifth Marines came up on the run just as the attack started, going from column into attack formation without a halt.”

Attack orders were sketchy. None of the company commanders had maps, nor were they given much more to go on than compass bearings of their direction of attack. The jump-off line for the 5th Regiment was about three kilometers from the eastern edge of the forest. At the jump-off time, neither the 8th Machine Gun Company nor the 6th Machine Gun Battalion had arrived. “Very well,” said some unknown optimist, “we will take the Boche machine guns.”

Immediately opposite the 2d Division were the German consolidated 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions, six infantry regiments each with an average effective strength of 30 officers and 1,000 men, and with 140 light and 200 heavy machine guns. They had the support of a mixed bag of light and medium artillery, about six battalions in all. The Germans were tired, their rations short, and their morale none too good, but they had the trench-wise cunning born of four years of survival.

**The 2d Division’s Assault**

As the attack began, the 2d Division faced the 14th Reserve Division on its right and the 47th Reserve Division on its left. Initially, resistance was not strong. Two German battalions, one each from the 218th and 219th Infantry Regiments, lightly held an outpost line. The main line of resistance was a few hundred yards behind, thinly manned by two battalions, one from the 138th Infantry and one from the 17th Infantry. The German direct support artillery was about a mile to the rear. A second, stronger defensive line, called the “Chaudun Position,” ran along the ridge east of Chaudun and through Vierzy.

Coming through the forest, Turrill reached a roadblock marking the proximity of the front line, and turned his battalion to the northeast. He deployed the 66th Company on the right and the 17th Company on the left, and held the 67th Company in support. The 49th Company came up about 10 minutes later.

The Allied artillery fire began as Turrill’s Marines were deploying, and the Germans answered with their own barrage. The battalion endured the
shelling for about 30 minutes, and then went forward. Without machine guns, the attack was made with rifles, bayonets, and automatic rifles. Keyser went in on the right of Turrill. His companies, from right to left, included the 51st Company, 18th Company, 43d Company, and 55th Company.

To the right, the 3d Brigade attacked over open ground against little resistance. By 0645, the first waves of the Army doughboys had advanced four kilometers and were crossing open fields behind a screen of tanks toward Beaurepaire farm. The Marine battalions, still hampered by the woods, moved more slowly. It had been close to 0600 before the assault battalions of the 5th Regiment went over the top. The barrage continued to roll inexorably forward. The first waves, going against heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, burst through the barbed wire interlaced amid the trees, and took the first German trench line, reaching the forward edge of the woods. The companies became scattered to the north and south.

Keyser's right flank company, the 51st, attempting to maintain contact with the 9th Infantry, met heavy resistance. In Keyser's center, La Verte-Feuille farm was taken with the help of the French tanks. These, to the Marines' satisfaction, crushed most of the German machine-gun positions.

By sunup, Turrill had also reached the edge of the forest. There had been snipers in trees, and machine guns to contend with, but no serious resistance. Most of Turrill's casualties had come from shells bursting in the trees. With daylight, as the Marines moved out into the open, German aircraft flew overhead, and then dove to strafe and bomb. More beneficially, Turrill's line of skirmishers received the support of seven or eight light French tanks.

The 9th Infantry, meanwhile, overran Beaurepaire farm, defended by a second battalion of the 219th. An entire German dressing station was captured intact and put to immediate use. With Beaurepaire farm taken, the direction of advance changed nearly 45 degrees—a difficult maneuver under the best of circumstances. The change exposed the left flank of the 3d Brigade to heavy fire from German machine guns and artillery at Maison Neuve farm. Nevertheless, the advance was rapid from Beaurepaire farm to Vauxcastille. Not even direct fire from German 77mm and 150mm artillery could stop the doughboys, but losses were heavy and units became badly intermingled.

As the advance continued, a gap opened between the 2d Division and the 1st Moroccan Division on the left, and the left of the Turrill's line was enflamed by machine-gun fire from the woods north of Translon farm, which the Moroccans had not yet taken. Turrill pushed ahead against stiffening resistance, veering into the Moroccan zone of action. Maison Neuve farm was on his right and the village of Chaudun on his left. At about 0930, the 16th and 20th Companies came up from the 5th [Regiment’s] 3d Battalion, and Turrill was able to form a support with the two fresh companies and a part of the 49th Company. In the meantime, his own 66th and 67th Companies had reached the ravine extending from Chaudun to Vauxcastille.

By then, Keyser's 2d Battalion had gained its objectives, having fought its way to the Chaudun-Vauxcastille ravine through heavy machine-gun fire with the aid of the French tanks. By midafternoon, the division was on its final objective, except for the village of Vierzy itself, which was still strongly held by the Germans. In and about Vierzy were fragments of all six regiments of the 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions with miscellaneous additions. Until now in reserve, the German 28th Division, which the Marines had fought in Belleau Wood, was moving all three of its regiments into the line.

Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely had established his 3d Brigade headquarters at Beaurepaire farm, and at 1330 Harbord ordered him to resume the attack, with the 5th [Regiment] as an attached reinforcement. About a half-hour later, Harbord moved his own division headquarters forward to La Verte-Feuille farm. At that time, elements of the 5th [Regiment] and the 9th and 23d Infantry Battalions held the eastern edge of the Vauxcastille ravine, the western edge of Vierzy, and the high ground north of the town. The assault battalions had halted there to reorganize. Regimental commanders were sent for, and the attack order was issued at 1630, setting the launching time for “as soon as possible, but not later than six p.m.”

Major Maurice Shearer's 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, moving in regimental reserve, had first occupied old French trenches to the rear of the
jump-off line. Later, Shearer’s 16th and 20th Companies went forward to reinforce Turrill. His remaining company, the 47th, was used as a provost guard to escort prisoners to the rear and bring ammunition forward. With all his companies parceled out, Shearer was left with a headquarters and no battalion.

Until now, Marine machine guns had been of little help. Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr.’s 6th Machine Gun Battalion caught up with the 5th [Regiment] at La Verte-Feuille farm at about 1500. His companies were then paired off with the assault battalions and the machine guns spread along the line.

The 3d Brigade, with a battalion of Marines attached to each of its regiments, had the mission of taking Vierzy, where the Germans were forming their new line. The 9th Infantry, on the left, was to pass north of the town, and the 23d Infantry was to take the town itself.

Major Keyser received verbal orders to join his 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, to the 9th Infantry. His was to be the left assault battalion in the renewed attack. With neither tank nor artillery support, Keyser went forward at about 1900 with his three depleted companies in two waves on a 500-meter front. He had advanced about a kilometer and a half when his left flank company encountered heavy machine-gun fire. The Moroccans, who were supposed to be on his left, had not come up. By dusk, the battalion had reached an old French trench line. German fire from machine guns hidden in the wheat was growing heavier, and Keyser, having neither grenades nor tank support, decided to stop for the night. The battalion halted in the old trench system and stayed there until it was withdrawn two days later. The 9th Infantry, on Keyser’s right, was able to advance a mile east of Vierzy before halting for the night.

Major Turrill, with the 1st Battalion, was to have joined the 23d Infantry’s attack, but he did not receive the order until 15 minutes before the scheduled jump-off. Knowing that he could not possibly meet the jump-off time with his entire battalion, Turrill hurriedly gathered those Marines closest to him, about 150 of them, from both the 1st and 3d Battalions, and marched with this improvised company by way of La Verte-Feuille farm to Vauxcastille. With this pick-up force and the three companies from Shearer’s 3d Battalion, Turrill went forward. By early evening, he had taken four-fifths of Vierzy, after which the 23d Infantry entered from the northwest and took the remainder. The 1st Battalion and the 8th Machine Gun Company then went into a position to the rear of the 23d Infantry southeast of the town.

By nightfall of 18 July, the 5th Regiment held good positions along the ridge between Chaudun and Vierzy. That evening, Feland moved his “post of command [PC]” to Vauxcastille and in the morning to a large tunnel in Vierzy. The 2d Division’s line for the night ran nearly north-south a little more than a kilometer east of Vierzy, with the left bent back to face Lechelle. The Moroccan division was on the left and the French 38th Division on the right. The Germans failed to counterattack during the night. Not until late in the afternoon had the ambulances arrived to clear the Beaurepaire dressing station of all its wounded. The aid station then moved forward to Vierzy. According to the short history of the 2d Division, during the unit’s eight-kilometer advance that day, “Several thousand prisoners, hundreds of machine guns and practically all of the artillery, light and heavy, of two German divisions had fallen into our hands.”

The 6th [Regiment’s] Battle

Within the Marine brigade, the 5th Regiment had done almost all of the fighting on 18 July; the 6th Regiment, as division reserve, followed behind, moving up to Beaurepaire farm early that afternoon. According to Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Battalion, 6th [Regiment]:

We had a very scenic day. I’ll never forget it. . . . That day lancers and cuirassiers, the beautiful French cavalry, would go loping by. The artillery was displacing forward, at the gallop. On the side of the road the walking wounded were coming back. . . . About three o’clock in the afternoon, our regiment moved forward and deployed on the side of a hill. Down in front of us and off to the left was a line of artillery pieces as far as you could see standing hub to hub. I never saw anything like it, before or since. The word
was, “We’re going to attack.” We deployed. . . . Then the word came, “Stand fast.” They told us that we were deployed too far to the rear, and that the 23d Infantry was on the road in column right behind us. They passed through us. As they went by you can imagine what they said to us. They . . . went on toward the village of Vierzy.

The 6th [Regiment] would soon enough have its chance to fight. The ground taken south of Soissons on the eighteenth far exceeded French expectations. Delighted with the success of his foreign troops, General Mangin ordered a resumption of the attack at 0400 on the nineteenth. For the 2d Division, the objective would be the Soissons-Château-Thierry road.

At 2200 on the eighteenth, Harbord had again advanced his headquarters, this time to Beaurepaire farm, but now he had outrun his communications and had no telephone wire to the rear. At about 0200, a French staff officer brought him the XX Corps attack order for that morning, and Harbord summoned the 6th Regiment’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, to his headquarters. The night was fairly well over before Lee reached Harbord. At about 0300 on the nineteenth, Harbord learned that the 6th [Regiment], reinforced with the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, would take over the entire division front. The artillery preparation was to begin at 0600. Passage of lines would be at 0700. The 6th [Regiment] would advance on a frontage of about 2,300 meters. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major John A. Hughes, was to go in on the right; Thomas Holcomb’s 2d Battalion on the left; and the 3d, led by Major Berton W. Sibley, to follow in support. Holcomb, with a promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, was to move up to regimental second in command.* He had orders to turn his battalion over to Major Robert L. Denig, but chose to stay with the 2d for the attack. Denig went along as an observer.

The 6th Regiment moved out at 0600. Working its way up through the Vauxcastille ravine, the column reached Vierzy without loss. Lee, at the railroad station, sequentially issued orders to his battalion commanders as they arrived with their units. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major John A. Hughes, was to go in on the right; Thomas Holcomb’s 2d Battalion on the left; and the 3d, led by Major Berton W. Sibley, to follow in support. Holcomb, with a promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, was to move up to regimental second in command.* He had orders to turn his battalion over to Major Robert L. Denig, but chose to stay with the 2d for the attack. Denig went along as an observer.

The 6th [Regiment] began the passage of lines at 0825. The terrain was much like that around Belleau Wood. The German positions were about a kilometer away, across open fields. The ground was practically level, with no cover, except for the waist-high wheat. It was now more golden than green, and the poppies seemed less red, as if they had faded, than they had on the fields approaching Belleau Wood.

As then-Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas in the 1st Battalion, a future four-star general, remembered the approach march:

We moved down into the Vierzy Ravine, and then went forward, past Vierzy. My battalion came up out of the Vierzy Ravine and deployed on the edge of a wheat field. The Germans, who were over on the right on a hill, spotted us. They were about 1,800 yards away, but they started

* In 1936, Holcomb was named the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps. He would serve through 1943 when, upon his retirement, he became the Marine Corps’ first four-star general.
throwing machine gun bullets at us. . . . I could see Holcomb’s battalion come out of the orchard way off to our left and deploy and move out. . . . We lay there, and after a while we heard rumbling. It was the tanks. . . . When the tanks passed through, the command came, “Forward.” We got up and started going with them.

Major Sibley reached Vierzy with the 3d Battalion at about 0815, and Lee ordered him to follow the 1st and 2d Battalions at a distance of about 1,000 yards. The 3d Battalion was to be followed by the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers (Army), in reserve. Sibley understood that he was to be supported by both the 15th and 77th Machine Gun Companies. Sibley put all four of his companies, each in a column of platoons, on line: the 97th on the right, the 84th at right center, the 83d at left center, and the 82d on the left.

Standard tactics for the “square” infantry battalions of World War I called for two companies in the assault and two companies immediately behind in support. In Holcomb’s 2d Battalion, the 80th Company was the left-flank assault unit, with the 96th Company following close behind in support. To their right, similarly disposed, were the 78th and 79th Companies.

The 96th Company’s First Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates, a future Marine Corps Commandant,* recalled:

So we formed for the attack and we were supposed to have had, I think it was, eight little old French tanks. So there we stayed for an hour or an hour and a half waiting for the tanks to arrive. By that time, we were getting not only artillery fire but indirect machine gun fire. . . . In fact, one hit the back of my shoulder. I finally pulled it out and it was a red-hot bullet. I went over to Major Holcomb and yelled to him, “Well, I got the first bless. Here’s the first wound,” and I handed him this bullet and he dropped it, it was still hot.

Well, anyway we finally got under way and started the attack with these little old tanks. . . . It was the most beautiful attack that I have ever seen. As far as you could see, up to the right, there were just waves and waves of men extending up two miles. . . .

The attack moved out in full view of the Germans. By then the commander of the opposing XIII Corps, Major General Baron Oskar von Walter, responding to orders from the crown prince, had firmed up his new line along the Château-Thierry road with the relatively fresh 46th Division. West of Tigny was the 49th Division.

The American artillery preparation was inadequate, and the battle was a hopscotch sort of affair, with the Marines crossing the wheat fields to reach the dubious shelter of woodlots. Because of the necessity of following the French tanks, the pace was slow. Of the 54 tanks that had begun the battle the day before, only 28 were still operational. During the morning, 11 more would be knocked out. With its observers overhead in “sausage” balloons, German artillery laid down a devastating fire. The slaughter was taken up by the waiting Maxims.

After a gain of about one kilometer, the Marine line halted. The right of the line was stopped in front of Tigny, the left at La Raperie, and a gap had opened between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At 0855, Sibley received a message by runner from Lee telling him to reinforce the line in the center using two companies in waves and two in local support. Sibley sent the 84th Company in to the left of the 1st Battalion and moved the 83d Company to the right of the 2d Battalion to fill the reported gap. The 97th and 82d Companies remained in support.

At 0950, Sibley reported to Lee that his attacking line was moving forward, and by 1030 his two assault companies had pushed forward almost to the Bois de Tigny north of the village, but had taken heavy casualties. At about 1100, Sibley put in the 82d Company to connect the 83d Company with the 2d Battalion, and the 97th Company to bolster the 84th Company, which was then in the Bois de Tigny. One of Sibley’s officers reached Hughes, who said that he had only about 100 men left and that nothing less than a regiment would drive the Germans out of Tigny.

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* Cates became the 19th Commandant, serving as such from 1948 to 1951.
At 1215, Lee sent a runner to Sibley. “Has the town of Tigny been taken by our troops?” his message asked. “If you don’t know, find out. If you are stopped, dig in.” A half-hour later, Sibley sent runners to his companies telling them: “Hold the line you have now—dig in—get in touch with Cos on your right and left. Reinforcements coming.” But reinforcements were not coming and, at 1315, Sibley reported to Lee that Tigny had not been taken.

Sergeant Thomas remembered: “The Germans had massed their artillery on a hill about three or four miles off in front of us. It was all direct fire. . . . Our attack collapsed. The attack was over.”

By 1000, the 96th Company had reached a position about three kilometers east of Vierzy near Villemontoire and was digging in. The French colonials on their left flank had failed to keep up, and the company suffered accordingly. In the space of about two hours, the 96th suffered 26 killed and 56 wounded. All the company’s officers were wounded early in the attack. According to Cates:

The Moroccans that were supposed to have attacked on our left didn’t appear at all. We broke the first German line without too much trouble. By that time though we were catching billy-hell. . . . I had just remarked to this sergeant of mine close to me, “Look at Captains [Wethered] Woodworth and [James F.] Robertson getting right together there. That’s bad business.” And I hadn’t any more than said it when a shell hit close to them and they both went down. By that time, the other lieutenants had all been wounded and I was the only one left out of the company. I tried to take charge, but just about that time a whole bunch of Germans jumped out of the trench and started running and our men went after them like a bunch of coyotes. With that it was bedlam. I was never able to organize them again. I kept the attack going for about a kilometer, I guess. By that time, though, we were getting terrific fire from our left flank . . . the attack just petered out. We were up near an old sugar mill. And that’s where I wrote that message . . . to Major Holcomb. I think I said, “I have twenty men out of my company or out of my battalion and a few stragglers,” and I wound up by saying, “I will hold.” By that time though, I had a pretty bad wound across my knee.

In Hughes’ 1st Battalion, Sergeant Thomas and another Marine took cover behind a heavy iron roller the French had left in the wheat field, which had created a small depression in the ground. “About an hour and a half later, I looked up and there was still a lot going on,” Thomas recalled. “They were dropping hand grenades out of airplanes on us . . . . What had caused us to be slaughtered was the fact that the [French] division, which was supposed to have come up on our right, was delayed . . . . There was nobody on our right except German machine guns. . . . Maybe at noon or a little after, I was able to get up and peek around. That’s after the [French] came forward.”

The Marines had outrun their artillery support, and evacuating the wounded was almost impossible. At 1145, from his PC in the Vierzy railroad station, Lee sent the following message to Harbord:

Reports indicate growing casualties, amounting heavy, say about 30 percent. Seventy-eighth Company by runners say have only one platoon left. All are requesting reinforcements and M. G. and Chauchat ammunition. First Battalion reports no French troops on right, and are held up 300 yards in front of Tigny. Have in line from right, First, Third and second Battalions; Reserves, Battalion Engineers, Headquarters Company and two companies Sixth Machine Gun Battalion. Have ordered line to dig in.

The 6th Regiment’s commander was told to “entrench your position and hold it at all costs.”

German artillery fire was heavy for the rest of the day. At 1545, Lee alerted his battalion commanders that “The Division Commander directs us to dig in and hold our present line at all costs. No further advance will be made for the present. He congratulates the command on its gallant conduct in the face of severe casualties. Let me have a sketch of your position and disposition. Ammunition at crossroads 112 southeast of Vierzy. Lee”

Throughout the day, the 5th Regiment had held the ground it had taken the previous day, harassed by enemy shelling and intermittent bombing and
strafing from German aircraft lazily circling overhead. The Marines fired their rifles and machine guns at the planes with no noticeable effect. At 1400, Major Keyser received an order to report with his battalion once again to the 9th Infantry. But before he could execute it, the command was canceled and his battalion was put into the line to the right of the 6th Regiment.

The 1st Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was luckier. At 1600, Turrill was ordered to take the battalion into a large tunnel at Vierzy, which gave them relief from the German shelling and bombing. An hour later, Harbord received word that the 2d Division would be relieved by the French 58th Colonial Division. At 1840, Lee sent Buck Neville, who, as brigade commander, had been given no tactical role by Harbord to play in the attack, a message reading:

Am enclosing two sketches of positions of First and Third Battalions and a statement of the C. O. Second. It is impossible to move from one position to another without drawing all sorts of fire. Losses are placed by Battalion Commanders at from 40 to 50 percent. Their appeals for doctors, ambulances, and stretcher bearers are pathetic. Cannot the ammunition trucks, and any other transportation that may appear tonight, be used to evacuate the 200 or more cases now in the Regimental O. S. [Dressing Station] under Doctor Boone? Some may be saved by prompt removal.

Lee was not exaggerating his losses. Of the 2,450 men of his regiment who had made the attack, 1,300 were dead or wounded. Hughes’ 1st Battalion had lost 11 officers. In Holcomb’s 2d Battalion, only three officers remained. Sibley’s 3d Battalion had started off that morning with 36 officers and 850 men. At the end of the day, Sibley’s effective strength was 16 officers and 385 men.

At 2005, Sibley summed up the day in a message to Lee, part of which read:

Will continue holding line until we can be reinforced or relieved. . . . In front lines canteens are practically all empty and very few remaining rations. Can water and rations be sent to us or a relief sent? We have no flares—pyrotechnics or flare pistols. Have no hand grenades. Considerable amount of rifle ammunition remaining. Also some Chauchat. Many of their Chauchats out of action because of loss of men.

By then, the shelling had died down, and the ambulances and trucks started reaching Vierzy. At 2030, Sibley received a message dispatched an hour earlier by the 6th Regiment headquarters that he was to send back guides to bring forward a French battalion. The regimental staff officer who drafted the message ended it with an unnecessary request: “Bring in all wounded when relieved.”

A Hard-Earned Rest

In Hughes’ 1st Battalion sector, the French came in at midnight, Sergeant Thomas recalled. By then he was the apparent commander of the 75th Company. “I got my 33 men. I went back to battalion headquarters,” he wrote. “We made stretchers out of blankets wrapped around rifles, and we carried the wounded out. Later we may have found another 35 or 40 men at different places, but my company lost over 50 percent. . . . We really took a shellacking.”

In Holcomb’s 2d Battalion, it was much the same. “So we stayed there that night and a bunch of Frenchmen, I think Moroccans, I’m not sure, came in and relieved us,” said Gates. “We lost approximately, I would say, two-thirds of the battalion in that attack.”

The 58th Colonial Division completed the relief by 0400 on 20 July. The 2d Division was to move back to its starting position in the Forêt de Retz, where it would go into bivouac. Before moving their headquarters back to Vivières, Harbord and his chief of staff stood by the side of the road and watched the division’s two depleted brigades pass. “Battalions of only a couple of hundred men, companies of twenty-five or thirty, swinging by in the gray dawn, only a remnant, but a victorious remnant, thank God,” wrote Harbord in his diary.

After the march past, Harbord moved his HQ to Vivières. Here Harbord located a nice French house with clean beds. His orderly found him hot water for a shave and a good soaking in his rubber bathtub.
By late afternoon, practically all the division except the artillery had gone into bivouac in the woods near La Verte-Feuille farm. The 6th Regiment went into bivouac near Translon farm. The intense shelling had weakened the trees; there was a high wind; and one Marine was killed and two seriously injured by falling branches. The Germans further treated the regiment to a shelling with long-range Austrian 130mm guns. Lee sent a motorcycle courier to brigade headquarters asking for a more favorable resting place a little farther to the rear.

In the early morning hours, the 5th Regiment had marched back into the Forêt de Retz, about one kilometer behind the jump-off point that it had crossed two days before. The rolling kitchens—mule-drawn four-wheeled carts with wood-burning stoves—were waiting. On the morning of the twentieth, the 45th Company reached its kitchens and had hot cakes, syrup, and coffee—its first hot food since the sixteenth. At first count, the 5th Regiment had 44 men dead, 360 wounded, and 34 missing. The numbers increased as returns came in.

Colonel Neville* left Vierzy on the morning of 20 July and moved the brigade headquarters to the campsite of his old regiment, the 5th [Regiment]. A day later, Harbord ordered him to displace his brigade to the woods south of Taillefontaine. For those Marines who still had shelter halves, two of them buttoned together made an acceptable pup tent. Neville set up his considerably more comfortable headquarters in the village itself.

During the evening on 21 July, General Pershing came by the 2d Division headquarters and told Harbord, “It appears I have to congratulate you every time I see you.” With these praises singing in his head, Harbord issued an effusive general order:

> It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings of General Pershing, who visited the Division Headquarters last night. . . . You advanced over six miles, captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven batteries of artillery, over a hundred machine guns, minnenwerfers [sic], and supplies. . . . The story of your achievements will be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands tonight.

The Germans bombed both the brigade and division headquarters during the night of 21 July—probably to the secret satisfaction of the Marines sleeping in the woods—but they caused no casualties. By the twenty-second, the count of prisoners taken in the two days of fighting reached 66 officers and 2,810 enlisted Germans. Those were the able-bodied ones. The number of wounded prisoners evacuated through the medical chain was unknown. Pershing, Pétain, and French Sixth Army commander General Jean Degoutte all hastened to send compliments to the division.

In its two-day battle, the Marine brigade had lost at least 2,000 killed and wounded, with two-thirds of the loss in the 6th Regiment.* But the result was historic: many believe the attack of XX Corps south of Soissons began the general retreat of the Germans and moved the war toward its end. Said Pershing in his final report: “Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed in the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2d Division, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.”

On 23 July, Harbord received orders to move his division to the vicinity of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, virtually the same location it had left one long week earlier. By the twenty-sixth, the entire 2d had reassembled. About 2,000 replacements were absorbed into the brigade.

* Neville, who had earned the Medal of Honor for Veracruz, became the 14th Marine Corps Commandant in March 1929, succeeding MajGen Lejeune. In failing health, he died after only 16 months in office.

* Despite apparently precise numbers, casualty figures are seldom, if ever, completely accurate. Casualties for Soissons, as officially compiled by the Marine Corps, indicated 341 KIA, DOW, or MIA; 1,709 WIA; and 41 gassed, for a total of 2,091.
75 YEARS AGO...

WITH THE MARINES AT BLANC MONT

by Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)*

From 2 to 10 October 1918, the U.S. 2d Division “hurled the Boche from Blanc Mont.” It was a confusing and costly struggle, but one that serves well to illustrate and commemorate Marine service in the war that ended 75 years ago this month.

Blanc Mont, not Mont Blanc, as too many present-day writers try to make it. Mont Blanc is a very tall mountain in southeastern France and the name of an expensive French fountain pen. Blanc Mont is a ridgeline of no great elevation in the Champagne region of northern France. By the time the Marines arrived there in October 1918, the Germans had been in residence for four years. In their industrious and efficient way, successive German garrisons had burrowed into the chalk-white limestone that gives the ridge its name, until the complex of trenches, dugouts, and pillboxes was as formidable as any position on the western front.

Quite probably, Major General John A. Lejeune, commanding the U.S. 2d Division, had never heard of Blanc Mont when he paid his exit call on the I Corps commander, Major General Hunter Liggett, USA, in mid-September 1918 as his division came out of the line at Saint-Mihiel.

Liggett told Lejeune, most confidentially, that a great offensive was planned for the latter part of the month. The American First Army was to attack on a front lying between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. This, in concert with an attack by the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne, was aimed at driving the Germans back from the rail lines that converged near the town of Mézières. If successful, this operation would put in peril all German armies between the Argonne and the North Sea. Liggett said that the 2d Division would be badly missed on D-day of the big attack.

On 16 September, General Henri Pétain had asked General John J. Pershing for three divisions for use in the Fourth Army attack. Pershing promised him two: the newly arrived and incomplete 36th Division, a Texas and Oklahoma National Guard outfit, and the veteran 2d Division. But this was not known to Lejeune.

The 2d Division, as most Gazette readers will know, included the 4th Brigade as a counterpart to the 3d Brigade of Infantry. Both brigades prided themselves on being “Regulars.” After the successful affair at Thiacourt in the Saint-Mihiel salient, the 4th Brigade had marched on 20 September to a rest area south of Toul. On 23 September, Lejeune received orders directing the movement of his division by rail to an unnamed destination about 10 hours distant, the move to begin on 25 September and to be completed by the 28th.

Lejeune had it revealed to him that his new division headquarters would be at Mairy-sur-Marne near Châlons-sur-Marne. He found it in an imposing stone château that once had been occupied by King James II during his exile from England (and whose face looked out sternly from a portrait). But the château, historically significant though it might be, had no bathroom and few creature comforts. On arriving on 25 September, Lejeune was directed to report to General Henri Gouraud, commanding the French Fourth Army, at his Châlons headquarters. Lejeune found Gouraud, the legendary hero of Gallipoli and other battles, to be a tall, erect man with a heavy dark-brown beard and a face bronzed from years of African sun. One sleeve of his uniform was empty and he walked with a pronounced limp from another wound. He won Lejeune’s immediate affection by pointing out that he too was

* BGen Simmons, the long-time director of Marine Corps History and Museums, is presently at work on Through the Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I, a book-length history of Marines (2008).
Postwar Analysis

a “Marine” as indicated by his khaki uniform and anchor insignia of the colonial forces rather than the sky-blue uniform of the regular French Army. Gouraud talked at considerable length of the great battle that was to begin on the following morning. Hanging on the wall of Gouraud’s office was a relief map of the front occupied by the Fourth Army. Gouraud told Lejeune that the French had learned from sad experience that the high hills east of Rheims were impregnable. The plan was to outflank these positions. The Fifth Army would cooperate on the west; the Fourth Army would have to take the high ground north of Somme-Py.

Lejeune visited Gouraud’s headquarters twice on the twenty-sixth. Gouraud was not there nor did Lejeune expect to see him. All reports coming in from the front were favorable. A French staff officer said to Lejeune, “Ca vu bien. It is always so at the beginning. We will wait and see.”

First elements of the Marine brigade arrived at Châlons that same day. As usual, the move was a combination of troop train, motor transport, and marching.

On the next afternoon, a disquieting rumor reached Lejeune: it was planned that the parts of the 2d Division would be piecemealed out to reinforce French divisions, leaving the 2d Division headquarters with no tactical mission. An alarmed Lejeune asked for and got an immediate interview with Gouraud. The French general stood before his map and described the progress of the attack. The French had been stopped by a strong German line in the vicinity of Somme-Py. North of Somme-Py was a curved ridge line marked on the map as Le Massif du Blanc Mont. Gouraud explained that the enemy’s main line of resistance ran along this ridge. He placed his hand on that part of the ridge between Medeah farm and Blanc Mont itself. If this ridge were taken and an advance made beyond it to Saint-Étienne-à-Arnes, the Germans would be forced to fall back to the line of the Aisne River, a distance of nearly 30 kilometers. He doubted, however, if his worn-out divisions, unless heavily reinforced, could take this position.

“General,” responded Lejeune, rising to the bait, “if the 2d Division is kept together as a unit and is allowed to attack on a narrow front, I am confident that it can take Blanc Mont Ridge in a single assault.”

Gouraud replied that, in fact, the 2d Division was not as yet attached to his army, but was being held in the reserve of the group of Armies of the Centre at the disposition of Marshal Ferdinand Foch and General Pétain. He would, he said, bring to Pétain’s attention what Lejeune had offered and ask him to assign the 2d Division to his command.

Next morning, Lejeune was summoned by telephone to Gouraud’s headquarters.

“Mon général,” said Gouraud on Lejeune’s arrival. “I regret so much that you are too late to meet General Pétain, as he left here only a short time ago. . . . He was greatly pleased and has issued instructions for the assignment of the 2d Division to the Fourth Army. You will receive orders this afternoon to begin the movement of the division toward the front.”

The 2d Division was to proceed to the Souain-Suippes area, 10 kilometers south of Somme-Py. The move, partly by truck and partly on foot, was to begin on the twenty-ninth and to be completed by the next day. Twenty percent of each regiment was left behind on division orders, twice the cadre that had been left behind previously and a grim portent of casualties to come. Brigadier General Wendell C. (Buck) Neville set up his 4th Brigade headquarters at Suippes. This put the brigade in position to reach the frontlines in a single day’s march.

Lejeune opened his headquarters at Suippes on the morning of the thirtieth. He found it a desolate place, behind the German lines for four years and “shelled frequently and bombed often.”

The approaches to Blanc Mont were held by the French XXI Corps, the same corps under which the division had fought at Belleau Wood. The countryside was rolling, with some fairly steep slopes. Scrub pine was about all that grew here. The 2d Division was assigned officially to XXI Corps on 1 October. The XXI Corps was the left center corps of the French Fourth Army. The XI Corps was to its left and the II Corps to its right. The corps commander, a Major General Naulin, directed Lejeune to relieve the French 61st Division and part of the 21st [Division]. All of the front would be taken over by the 4th Brigade; the 3d Brigade would be in sup-
An order issued at 1700 that evening directed the 2d Division to attack in the morning. Lejeune asked that the attack be postponed a day to allow the 4th Brigade a chance to do a daylight reconnaissance of its front and also to bring up all of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade. The delay was granted.

The night of 1–2 October was clear and cold. Lejeune's headquarters at Suippes was both bombed and shelled. Lejeune took shelter in the caves of the village. He did not stay long, but went back to the doorway of his house and spent the balance of the night watching the stream of traffic—his division moving to the front.

The line occupied by the division, which was about three kilometers long, began about one kilometer northeast of Somme-Py, and ran to the southwest to its juncture with the boundary with the French XI Corps about two kilometers west by south of Somme-Py. The 5th Regiment occupied the right of the sector and the 6th Regiment the left. The 3d Brigade was four miles to the rear in the vicinity of Navarin farm.

At 0800 on 2 October, Lejeune opened his forward headquarters in what had been the post of command (PC) of the [French] 61st Division, a collection of dugouts known as Wagram about one kilometer north of Souain on the Souain-Somme-Py Road. The staff car drive forward to Wagram was through "a hideously battle-scared country." The debris of battle was everywhere. As Lejeune described the scene in his Reminiscences:

The town of Souain was completely destroyed, and the whole area north of it gave full evidence of the fact that it had been continuously a battlefield for more than four years. It was the white chalk country, and not only was it a perfect maze of trenches and covered with a tangle of barbed wire, but the very soil was desiccated and pulverized. It had been shelled, and bombed and mined so frequently that it had lost all semblance of its former self. Not a tree was standing anywhere near Navarin Ferme, or elsewhere in its vicinity, nor was there even a brick on the site of the farm to show that buildings had once stood there. The debris of battle was still lying about—broken cannon and machineguns, rifles, bayonets, helmets, parts of uniforms, articles of military equipment, and partly buried horses; most gruesome of all, fragments of human bodies were often found. Arms and legs thrust out of the torn soil, and unrecognizable, long-buried human faces, thrown up to the surface of the ground by exploding shell, were frequently visible. The fearsome odors of the battlefield, too, were always present. P. C. Wagram was in the midst of the devastated area. It was not a home, but a horror.

The telephone system inherited from the 61st Division was virtually useless. Until the division could get in its own lines, communications forward of division were by motorcycle and forward of regiment dependent upon the age-old system of runners.

The front taken over by the 2d Division, only partially secured by the French, consisted of four lines, known as the Krefeld, Prussian, Elbe, and Essen trenches. The right of the 2d Division line was in the Essen trench. West of Somme-Py the Germans still held the Essen trench where it bent around a strongly fortified hill. The Marines soon named the bend in the trench line the "Essen Hook."

The task for the 2d Division and, on its left, the French 21st Division, on 2 October was the cleaning up of the Essen and Elbe trenches. The French 170th Division on the right was already well forward, but the 21st Division was dug in 150 yards south of Elbe trench.

"We spent another quiet day," remembered Don V. Paradis of the 80th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, of 2 October. When the war began in April 1917, Paradis was an inspector with the Detroit Gas Company. Now he was an acting gunnery sergeant and a veteran of Belleau Wood, Soissons, and Saint-Mihiel.

Even had hot chow brought in to us after dark the night of October 2d. There was quite an odor of dead bodies blowing across No-Man's-Land, but I don't remember that it affected anyone's appetite.

Colonel Harry (Light Horse Harry) Lee, commanding the 6th Regiment, found the Essen trench in front of his regiment abandoned by the Germans but controlled by fire coming from
strongpoints to the west. He also learned that the 21st Division was undecided as to whether it would attack or not. “If they should attack, the 6th Regiment will act in conjunction with them and occupy the trenches as previously planned,” reported Lee. Otherwise, he recommended that, for the afternoon of 2 October, the trench be patrolled but not occupied.

Lejeune, accompanied by his brigade commanders, was called to the headquarters of the XXI Corps and met its commander, General Naulin, face to face for the first time. Gouraud arrived and joined the discussion. As decided, there would be a frontal attack by the 4th Brigade and an oblique attack by the 3d Brigade from the advanced position held by the 170th Division. Lejeune returned to PC Wagram and called a conference of his brigade and regimental commanders at which the details for the attack were worked out.

It was well that he did, because the XXI Corps attack order did not reach his headquarters until 2200 that night. It was in French and had to be translated. The objective for the 2d Division was the line extending along the road from Medeah farm west to Blanc Mont Ridge inclusive. The division order had to be written and then committed to the mimeograph machine. Finally, at about 0300 the motorcycle dispatch riders took the order off to the brigades.

Neville’s staff had not waited for the division order. The brigade order, based upon the conference held that afternoon, was signed at 2145. The tone was almost laconic:

This Brigade will attack in column of Regiments, the 6th Regiment in 1st line and the 5th Regiment forming the 2d line of support. . . . The Regiments will take the usual formation—column of battalions—each regiment with one battalion in 1st line, one in support, and one in reserve.

The 6th [Regiment] went “over the top” that night in a local attack and took its share of the Essen trench with a loss of 15 Marines. This put the division into its attack position for the next day. There remained the Essen Hook about 300 yards to the left of the boundary separating the XXI and XI Corps, a very strong position of machinegun nests.

The German High Command had decided on a general retirement, but it was going to be a fighting withdrawal designed to inflict maximum casualties on the Allies. Ground was not to be given up unless ordered, and any lost ground considered essential to the retreat would be retaken by counterattack.

The 6th [Regiment] were to advance directly to the front from the positions it held. The 5th [Regiment] were to stand fast and then fall in behind in support of the 6th Regiment. The 3d Brigade was to move through the zone of the 170th Division and then pass through the lines of that division.

Jump-off for the general attack was at 0550 on 3 October. Lee, busy occupying the Essen trench, did not receive the brigade order until 0440. Major Ernest C. Williams, commanding the 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, which would lead the attack, would later say that he did not have a chance to read it until after he had taken his objective.

The division objective was a line two-and-a-half miles long connecting Medeah farm with the Blanc Mont Road. Each brigade deployed in a column of battalions, a formation Napoleon would have found familiar.

The 2d Field Artillery Brigade had been reinforced with French batteries and other additions to a total of 30 light and 18 heavy batteries. The artillery preparation was to be a short but violent five minutes. The attack was then to follow a rolling barrage fired by the close-in 75mm guns, the rate of progress to be 100 meters every four minutes. The 155mm howitzers would continue to fire on Blanc Mont Ridge and the heavy longer-barreled guns would search out German positions to the rear.

The attack plan was deceptively simple. The two brigades were separated by about a mile and were to converge on Blanc Mont Ridge. This left a triangular wedge of no-man’s land uncovered. The Marine brigade would attack through the section of the line held by the 6th [Regiment]. The 6th [Regiment] would lead off on a front of about a mile. The 5th [Regiment] would follow in support with the tasks of clearing out the triangle and protecting the flanks of the 6th [Regiment]. The Marines had confidence in the 3d Brigade on their right, but were doubtful that the French 21st Division on their left would advance at all.
About 2200 on the night of 2 October, Sergeant Paradis received orders that he and his section would lead the 80th Company up a communication trench to the next line of trenches, which was supposed to be empty of Germans. He was then to turn left and proceed down the trench until he contacted the French. The 96th Company would be on the 80th's right. The 80th Company moved out at about midnight and Paradis soon found out where the stench of dead bodies was coming from.

"There was one body in the communication trench, two in the main trench, one I did not see and stumbled over," wrote Paradis.

He heard someone coming down the trench toward him and for a frightful moment was not sure whether the voices he heard were speaking French or German. He and the French lieutenant fumbled with the passwords and finally made each other understand. It was 0300 by this time.

Neville's brigade moved out in the main attack in the morning on schedule. In Harry Lee's 6th Regiment, Major Williams' 2d Battalion led off, followed in turn by the 1st Battalion (Major Frederick A. Barker) and the 3d Battalion (Major George K. Shuler). The 5th [Regiment], under Colonel Logan Feland, had in column the 2d Battalion (Major Robert E. Messersmith), 3d Battalion (Major Henry L. Larsen), and 1st Battalion (Major George W. Hamilton). The two regimental machine gun companies and the four companies of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr.) were parceled out, as had become usual, one to each infantry battalion.

Opposite the XXI Corps was the German XII Corps under General der Kavallerie Krug von Nidda. The zone of action assigned to the Marine brigade was defended by the German 51st Reserve Division. Behind the 51st Division was the 200th Division. The German outpost line was held by a battalion of the 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment, down in strength to about 200 officers and men. The main line of resistance filled the trenches on Blanc Mont itself, about three kilometers to the rear of the outpost line.

The Germans, in response to the barrage, were firing phosphorus shells. Paradis remembered:

They burst like giant Fourth of July sparklers in the air, showering down what looked like red-hot iron, I led a section column of about 20 men; we were the extreme right of our company. When we reached our objective, which was the very center and top of Mont Blanc [sic], I was to connect with the 96th Company, Capt [Clifton B.] Cates, on our right. Blanc Mont was covered with scrub pines, which reminded me very much of the jack pine country around Kalkaska, Michigan, where I grew up as a child.

Major Williams' 2d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], with all four companies on line and with the 81st Machine Gun Company attached, advanced rapidly at first, against nothing but occasional machine-gun fire. This increased to heavier fire coming in from the left flank. The Marines swept aside the right flank battalion of the 235th Regiment and got into the rear of the 200th Division, the frontline units of which were heavily engaged by the French 21st Division.

Principal resistance came initially from machine-gun fires from the front, from the right flank where the ground between the two brigades was not completely covered and, most particularly, from the left flank, where the French had been stopped in front of the Essen Hook. Marine losses were light in the advance and several hundred prisoners were taken. The 6th [Regiment] met more resistance as they reached Somme-Py Woods. The support battalion came up on the lead battalion's right. The objective was taken by 0830 and the reserve battalion was given the task of mopping up. The 5th [Regiment] now turned its full attention to the exposed left flank.

The infantry and artillery commands of the 200th Division were in dugouts on Blanc Mont. Also on Blanc Mont was a division observation post manned by a Lieutenant Richert. At 0815, he reported to his division commander, somewhere to the rear in a presumably safer position, that the Jager regiments on the frontlines were holding against the Americans. The Jagers had twice the ordinary complement of machine guns, two companies of them in each infantry battalion.

Partly because of the flanking fire and also because of the lay of the land, the 2d Battalion, 6th
[Regiment], slid to the right as it went up the slope. The *Jagers* on its left were putting up a stubborn defense. The gap separating the right of the 2d Battalion from the 3d Brigade also widened. Major Barker’s 1st Battalion, with the 6th Regiment’s machine gun company attached, went into the gap. Major Shuler’s 3d Battalion, with the 15th Machine Gun Company attached, moved up behind the 2d Battalion.

The *Jager* regiments were still holding off the French 21st Division and each of the Marine battalions, in turn, as it went up the slope was enfiladed by machine-gun fire coming from the Essen Hook.

By 0830, Williams’ battalion had reached the main line of resistance and had taken a section of the Medehah farm road, which ran along the ridge. The 3d Brigade took Medehah farm itself by 0840 without serious loss.

The headquarters of the 2d *Jager* Brigade left the Blanc Mont position; Lieutenant Richert remained. The German division commander put his reserves into motion, ordering a counterattack by the 149th Regiment, 213th Division. At that same time he called on *XII Corps* for reinforcements. He was sent a battalion of the 74th Regiment. By 0920, the Americans were in the headquarters dugouts and the telephone lines to the rear went out. Sergeant Paradis remembered:

We arrived at the top just as a bunch of German prisoners came out of a large dugout. There were about 25, some looked to be not over 16 years old. They were so scared that their knees actually knocked together. I can still hear them leather boots that they wore as they knocked together, flapped together. . . . Later in the day I found a Luger and a Mauser pistol under a bunk, in this dugout. . . . I sold them for 250 francs when we came out of the lines.

Two of the eight Medals of Honor given to Marines in World War I were earned that day, both by members of the 78th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment. At about 0620, Private James Kelly, with the advance impeded by a German machine gun that had escaped the barrage, charged forward, killed the gunner with a grenade, killed another crewmember with his pistol, and marched the remaining eight members back through a curtain of bursting shells. Shortly thereafter, Corporal John H. Pruitt single-handedly went against two German machine guns, killed two Germans, and captured the rest of the crews. A little later he pulled 40 Germans out of a dugout and made them prisoners. Continuing at the front edge of the action, he was sniping at the retreating enemy when mortally wounded by shellfire.

As soon as it was broad daylight, Lejeune had gone to the high ground of Navarin farm to watch the battle. It was a hazy morning and visibility was poor. He could see little until Very pistol flares at between 0800 and 0900 signaled that the day’s objectives had been taken. General Naulin, from having been rather pessimistic, was now jubilant. Lejeune pointed out to him that XI Corps on the left flank had not crossed its jump-off line. Naulin nevertheless ordered Lejeune to press on. Lejeune demurred, [for] to press on would create a narrow salient that would be an invitation to disaster. He said that if necessary he would appeal Naulin’s order to Gouraud. A short while later, a message from Naulin said to consider the order as never having been given. Lejeune replied that he was preparing to advance to a point about a kilometer southeast of Saint-Étienne.

With the entire left flank of the brigade open, Major Messersmith’s 2d Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was brought up to extend the line to the southwest. The Germans were preparing (or so it seemed) to attack that flank, so Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was echeloned in to the left and rear of Messersmith’s battalion.

The one still unemployed battalion, Major Hamilton’s 1st Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was bringing up the rear of the brigade. It was given the task of reducing the remaining machine guns in the Essen Hook. The 17th Company, under Captain LeRoy P. Hunt, was sent to take out the guns. This involved entering the French 21st Division’s zone of action. A covered trench line got the company to within about 800 yards of the hook. A 37mm gun and several heavy machine guns were brought to bear on the offending German guns, knocking out several. Hunt then maneuvered to within 300 yards of the position, covering it with machine-gun fire while two of his platoons came in from the north.
and south. The 17th Company captured the position along with 100 German prisoners. Hunt then handed over the position to the French and moved his company to the north to extend farther the left flank of the 5th [Regiment]. The French promptly lost the position to a German counterattack. Gunfire against the Marine flank resumed and would continue to annoy the Marines.

The Marines now had a foothold on Blanc Mont, but the western portion, in the zone of the 21st Division, was still held by the Germans. General Naulin, commanding the XXI Corps, annoyed at the neighboring XI Corps’ inability to take the Essen Hook, ordered his weary 170th Division, which had been relieved by the 167th Division, to move to the west, behind the 2d Division, to cover the left flank. But he also cautioned that the 2d Division must not wait for the arrival of the 170th Division “before resuming the march.”

Other than that, Naulin thought the American performance splendid and asked the 2d Division to renew the attack that afternoon.

By 1400 on 3 October, the 2d Division was able to publish an order pronouncing the morning’s attack “a complete success,” that the 21st Division had passed the Essen trench, and that another French division [the 170th] was moving up in support of the 2d Division’s left. Lejeune ordered his brigades to continue their advance to the northwest.

Later that afternoon, XXI Corps received a message:

Marshal Foch has just learned of the success of the XXI Corps, and of the American 2d Division, attached to it. He directs that this success be exploited to the limit. All must press forward at once, without hesitation. The breach is made; the enemy must not be given time to repair it.

Once again, the French thought there might be an opportunity for a cavalry charge and breakthrough in the grand Napoleonic manner. The French 3d Cavalry Division was moved into position and a liaison officer arrived at 2d Division headquarters. No occasion for its use would be found.

In the 3d Brigade’s zone, the 23d Infantry passed through the 9th Infantry and pushed forward with the 9th following in support. The doughboys of the 23d Infantry veered a little to the left of their designated axis of attack and advanced about two kilometers in the direction of Saint-Étienne.

In the 4th Brigade, Neville ordered the 5th Regiment to pass through the 6th and continue the advance in concert with the 3d Brigade to the right and the French on the left. The 5th made its passage of lines at 1930 and almost immediately was met by machine-gun fire coming from the front and flanks. The regiment pushed forward about one-and-a-half kilometers and dug in for the night under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. At nightfall, the division held a salient one mile wide at the base, one-and-a-half miles deep, and only 500 yards wide at its rather porous apex. The 5th [Regiment] repelled two local counterattacks during the night. Two companies from the 6th Regiment were sent forward to cover the 5th’s left flank and, by morning, connections had been made with the 3d Brigade on the right and the 6th Regiment to the rear.

The 2d Division prepared to advance beyond Saint-Étienne but, until the French came up on both flanks, it was out of the question to deepen the salient further. Late in the evening, the French 22d Division, which had been designated to relieve the stationary 21st Division, marched into the 2d Division’s zone of action with plans to attack to the west in the morning.

Lee, commander of the 6th [Regiment], had understood that only the eastern half of Blanc Mont was his responsibility. During the night, a patched-together German reserve, consisting of a dismounted cavalry regiment and several Bavarian units, reoccupied the western portion of Blanc Mont and reinforced the lines in front of the 2d Division. To the left front, the town and cemetery of Saint-Étienne had been turned into a fortress.

This is what faced the 5th [Regiment] when it advanced early on the morning of 4 October. The regiment passed through the 6th [Regiment] in a column of battalions, Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion leading the way. Larsen went about two kilometers without encountering any significant resistance (the German line was farther to the west) and reached the dangling flank of the 3d Brigade. His battalion was able to extend the 3d Brigade line about a mile to the west. After a brief rest and reorganization, Larsen went forward again and, within a few hun-
dred yards, found his battalion enfiladed from both flanks. He pulled back to a woods reforming on a line with the 3d Brigade.

The other two battalions of the 5th had been following in support. All three battalions were now in rather exposed positions, taking heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Essentially, the regiment was now holding a ridge-line position a mile southeast of Saint-Étienne. This relieved some of the pressure on the 23d Infantry, but placed the Marines in an even more precarious position.

The Germans chose to counterattack. Hamilton's battalion had reached a point about half a kilometer southeast of Saint-Étienne when he was hit heavily on his left flank. He faced about and stopped the counterattack, but took heavy losses. At this point, XXI Corps ordered that the advance be continued to Machault. Lejeune dutifully issued a division order to continue the attack, but artfully inserted a condition that H-hour would be designated later.

Larsen fought off a counterattack from the west during the afternoon, but that evening, at about 1930, several hundred Germans came at him from the southwest and rear, forcing him to face about to beat off their attack.

The blame for such flaws would be argued, but overall, viewed from a higher level, the attack should have been regarded as a great success. The deep penetration made by the 2d Division caused the German High Command to hasten the withdrawal of troops from the hills east of Rheims to the line of the Arnes and the Suippes. The German withdrawal was orderly and the Germans reacted violently to efforts to hasten them along.

The 200th Division, opposing the 2d Division, reported on 4 October that the total rifle strength of its three regiments was only 500, the artillery had lost nearly all its gunners and from 60 to 70 percent of its horses, the few remaining horses were worn out, a third of the guns were unserviceable, the division signals detachments had losses of 25 percent, only 2 officers and 40 men were left of the division engineers, and the cavalry squadron was totally dismounted.

Lejeune consulted with Neville that afternoon [on] 4 October, and it was decided that the most pressing problem was to capture the rest of Blanc Mont Ridge. Lee was told to launch his attack at daybreak, coordinating his advance with the adjacent French units.

These arrangements had scarcely been made when Feland telephoned that his 5th [Regiment] were not only under heavy artillery fire but also virtually ringed by machine guns, especially from its left rear. Naulin was in Lejeune's PC and Lejeune heatedly informed him that this fire was coming from a position reportedly taken by the French. Gouraud then arrived at PC Wagram. He ordered Naulin to keep his 22d Division in place until released by Lejeune. He then commended the 2d Division, expressing regrets for its heavy casualties.

On the afternoon of the forth, Major Shuler's 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, reconnoitered in force and determined the extent of the enemy's defenses, mostly machine-gun nests, on the western end of the ridge. Artillery was brought down on these defenses. Again, the French did not come up, and after considerable loss, Shuler's attack was broken off with further action postponed until the next day.

Even so, Shuler's attack had shaken the Germans. This part of the German line was held by the remnant of the 149th Infantry of the 213th Division, serving under the orders of the 2d Jager Brigade.

Foch wrote to Pétain on 4 October, saying that the Fourth Army had done fairly well, but not as well as he expected. He characterized 3 October as “a battle which was not commanded, not pressed, not held together.”

Naulin's XXI Corps received this chiding in the form of an injunction: “Marshal Foch orders strong pressure in the direction already assigned; everyone forward, without halt.”

Lejeune received his copy of this message at 2225 on 4 October along with the attack order for the next day. The 2d Division would retain its place in line as the left flank division of the corps.

During the night of 4–5 October, the German XII Corps regrouped as best it could. The remnant of the 200th Division stayed in the line on the right. The 51st Reserve Division was on the left, but was to withdraw its headquarters and turn over its regiments to the 213th and 17th Divisions.

For 5 October, Lejeune planned an advance in line of brigades with regiments in column. In the 4th Brigade, the 5th Regiment was ordered to stand
fast. The 6th Regiment was to reorganize and then pass through the frontline, conforming in its advance to the movement of the French 22d Division, which was attacking across the front of the laggard 21st Division from its position in the 2d Division's sector.

The 6th [Regiment], in conjunction with the 22d Division, was to clear the remainder of Blanc Mont itself. The morning of 5 October came and the attack jumped off at 0615 behind a curtain of powerful artillery support.

In the 6th [Regiment] zone of action, Colonel Lee had ordered his 3d Battalion to lead the attack. Shuler's 3d Battalion, with the help of a battalion from the French 22d Division and some informal volunteers from the 170th Division, took by assault the remaining hard core of the defenses of Blanc Mont, taking at least 65 machine guns and 205 prisoners. The attack against Blanc Mont was completed by 0900, the linkup with the 22d Division was solid, and the 2d Division was ready to take up the general advance.

To the Marines' right, the 3d Brigade was held up all day in its assault of the Medeha Ferme-Orfeuil position by the failure of the 167th Division to advance. The 6th Regiment resumed the attack at 1500, pushing forward its left and holding back on its right to maintain contact with the 3d Brigade. The 2d Battalion (Williams) led off, followed by the 3d (Shuler) and 1st (Barker).

With the situation on the left under control, the 6th [Regiment] swung to the right and passed through the lines of the 5th [Regiment] outside Saint-Étienne. Fighting was severe all day. The lead battalion, under Williams, down to 300 men, was attempting to cover a front of a mile. At 1800, the advance stopped for the night, about a mile southeast of Saint-Étienne.

The Germans to the immediate front were the remnants of the 149th and 368th Infantry Regiments, both of the 213th Division. The German Third Army summary of operations for 5 October reads in part:

On October 5th the enemy again attacked the Py and Perthes Groups, west of the Aisne, after powerful artillery preparation. His attacks, made in great force, were broken up by the stubborn resistance of our infantry, well supported by the artillery. The enemy's losses were heavy. . . . Captured papers describe the American 2d Division as an exceptionally fine assault division; they indicate that it was chosen for employment here for the reason that this is considered the decisive point in the enemy's offensive.

Late in the day, Lejeune was informed that the 71st Brigade, U.S. 36th Division, would be assigned temporarily to the 2d Division. The brigade climbed down from its trucks at Suippes on the afternoon of 5 October. General Naulin, however, decreed that the 71st be given a day of rest before going into the line.

Lejeune now gave his attention to continuing the attack toward Machault. He moved his headquarters forward from PC Wagram to a new position in Somme-Py. On the morning of 6 October, the whole of the narrow 4th Marine Brigade front was given over to Major Shuler's 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment. The bombardment, by the entire 2d Field Artillery Brigade, began at 0530 and, after an hour of pounding, Shuler's Marines went forward behind a rolling barrage. They were supported on the right by the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry. Hard fighting, which ultimately brought in nearly all of the 23d Infantry and parts of the 9th, carried the advance to the Saint-Étienne-Orfeuil road.

By now the 2d Division was about fought out. On the night of 6–7 October, the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division took over the entire division front, functioning temporarily as a brigade of the 2d Division. The 142d Infantry took over the 4th Brigade's front while the 141st moved into the front of the 3d Brigade. The 5th [Regiment] and 23d Infantry went back to Blanc Mont Ridge; the 6th [Regiment] and 9th Infantry stayed with the relieving units to give them a bit of practical instruction.

Lejeune met with Naulin the morning of 7 October. Naulin informed him that a general attack would take place at daybreak the next day. Lejeune told him that he was expecting too much of untried troops and urged that the 71st Brigade not go into the attack until it had a few days' seasoning. Naulin was insistent. Final orders for the attack came at 2045 on 7 October.
Lejeune gave the entire division front to the 71st Brigade with the objective of taking the high ground two miles north of Saint-Étienne. The flanks of the 71st would be protected on the left by a battalion of the 4th Brigade and on the right by a battalion of the 3d Brigade. The 71st moved out with the 141st Infantry on the right, the 142d on the left, the regiments in column of battalions.

The Marine battalion on the 142d's left flank was Major Barker's 1st Battalion, 6th [Regiment], charged with maintaining contact with the French to the west and also with the taking of Saint-Étienne itself. The 76th Company, under Captain Macon C. Overton, accompanied by a few French soldiers, plunged into the shell-wrecked town. The 75th Company came up on Overton's right.

Optimistic reports received from the 71st Brigade early in the day became less so as the day wore on. Late in the afternoon, the fresh German 159th Infantry of the 14th Reserve Division counterattacked. The green 142d Infantry was in no condition to stand against the veteran Germans. The regiment fell back. Barker held at Saint-Étienne and was joined by the 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers. The withdrawal of the 71st Brigade had left the 75th Company, on Overton's right, in a desperate situation. All the officers of the 75th Company were killed or wounded, but Sergeant Aralzaman C. Marsh and a handful of men held on to the position.

Lejeune, hearing that the 142d was falling back, went forward to the headquarters of the 71st Brigade and ordered its commander to reorganize his scrambled units and prepare for a German counterattack. He also canceled the relief of the 3d and 4th Brigades and ordered these weary Marines and soldiers back into the lines.

There was no general attack on 9 October, simply small attacks to straighten the line and strengthen the connections between units. The French 7th Division was understood to be in a trench line a half mile north of Saint-Étienne and General Naulin was very anxious for the Americans to connect with it. The 71st Brigade was ordered to do this, making a formal attack with artillery support, if necessary, but the green brigade was so disorganized that no serious effort to do so was made.

On their side of the line, the Germans were withdrawing, leaving just one regiment from each division as rear guards. As Gouraud had predicted, they were retreating to the Aisne where they formed a new line on 13 October.

The rest of the 36th Division was now coming up. Because the 36th was incomplete, the 2d was to turn over its transport and much other equipment and leave its artillery and engineers in place. Command was to pass from Lejeune to Major General William R. Smith, USA, at 2200 on 10 October. The 72d Brigade moved into support and reserve positions, the 144th Infantry relieving the 4th Brigade and the 153d Infantry relieving the 3d Brigade. The relieved 2d Division units assembled near Navarin farm and marched to the vicinity of Suippes. Lejeune stayed on with the commander of the 36th Division for another day and then moved to his new headquarters, Camp Montpelier, near Châlons.

Major Shuler's 3d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], was the last Marine battalion to hold a position in the Champagne sector. He was down to fewer than 300 men, but had been reinforced with two companies of the always-willing 2d Engineers. The 3d Battalion was not relieved until the night of 10 October. On coming out of the lines, Major Shuler laconically reported: "We shot the tar out of the Boche." Sergeant Martin Gulberg, who had been wounded earlier, rejoined the 75th Company as it came out of the line. He wrote:

I fell in line and marched with them to some French barracks a few miles from Suippes, where we billeted for 4 days. It wasn't the same old gang that I had left. There were many new faces, and only six of the old timers of the 2d Platoon were left.

From 2 to 10 October, the 2d Division had lost 41 officers and 685 men killed, 162 officers and about 3,500 wounded, and 6 officers and 579 missing, for a total of 209 officers and 4,764 men. The division had taken prisoner 48 officers and 1,915 men and captured 25 guns and 332 machine guns. The week of almost continuous fighting had cost the Marine brigade, at best count, 494 killed or died of wounds and 1,864 wounded. Officer casualties were particularly high. The 5th and 6th [Regiments]
were again cited by the French Army, the third citation for each. Two such citations entitled the receiving unit to wear the fourragère (or shoulder cord) in the red-and-green colors of the Croix de Guerre. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion had also met this requirement. About 2,000 Croix de Guerre were passed out to members of the 2d Division for Blanc Mont, and Lejeune himself was named a commander of the French Legion of Honor.

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**Fourragère**

Marines, with wartime service in the 4th Brigade, could continue to wear their *four-ragers*, regardless of their future assignments. As late as the Korean War, officers, such as Generals Lemuel C. Shepherd and Gerald C. Thomas, could be seen wearing their “pogey ropes,” as other envious Marines called them. Present-day members of the 5th and 6th [Regiments] wear the cords, but must doff them when they leave the regiments.
In an article by Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Evans, USMC, appearing in the December 1919 number of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, relating to the demobilization of certain Marine organizations following the close of World War I, including the 13th Regiment, appears the following:

Only the most optimistic idealist can discount the probability of future wars that may call for the employment of the Marine Corps as a whole in another conflict of immensity.

In view of the present state of world affairs it would appear that the statement above-quoted was a portentous one—more noteworthy in that it was made at a time when the policy of demobilization, reduction, and retrenchment was the order of the day.

The immensity of the conflict that now envelops the world within the brief space of 22 years following the previous worldwide struggle, probably was not visualized at the time the above observation was made. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the size and scope of the Marine Corps, required for the gigantic conflict now raging, was even dreamed of 20 years ago.

Much is being written and published nowadays concerning the war and current affairs generally. So many different opinions, ideas, and theories are being advanced for the conduct of the war—often by amateurs with little or no military experience—that in the maze of it all we are apt to lose sight of some of the successful achievements of the Marine Corps in World War I—truly a war from which the Marine Corps still draws inspiration, and one which still serves to yield exemplary information, based on actual experience which, in some instances at least, might serve as a model and incentive for future action.

A lot has been written lauding the brilliant battle participation of the 4th Brigade in France, which included the 5th and 6th Regiments, in 1918, and deservedly so. The purpose of this essay is to present a brief but concise account of the organization and activities of the 13th Regiment—an elite military organization which, having had its inception rather late in the previous war, was denied by circumstances the high privilege of coming to grips with the enemy on the field of battle—but which, through the tireless efforts of its officers and men, rendered an invaluable contribution toward winning the war by performing essential wartime duties other than actual battle participation.

**Critical Situation in Europe**

With the coming of May 1918, and the ever-increasing fury of the war, it was becoming apparent that more and more American infantry must be dispatched to France with all possible speed. The 4th Brigade, which had proceeded to France soon after the entry of America into the war, had undergone intensive training in France, had already been engaged in combat with the enemy in the Verdun sector, and had repeatedly proven its worth in those early encounters.

The last big enemy offensive in France had been launched in the spring of 1918 and, as the Germans pushed ever nearer to Paris, sweeping away all opposition in their advance, the cry went up from both sides of the Atlantic for more Marines for service in France. The situation was considered to be no less than critical, and something had to be done without undue delay. The Marine Corps, still a comparatively small organization was hard-pressed to meet the demands for increased forces for duty abroad, after supplying detachments for all the larger vessels of the Navy, personnel for duty in Haiti and Santo Domingo, garrisoning of numerous posts in the United States and elsewhere, and other duty of special nature. Increases in Marine Corps strength, however, in the spring of 1918 permitted the raising of additional units eventually to be combined in a new brigade for service with the Army overseas. A full division was at first considered but, for want of time and the immediate availability of sufficient personnel, a brigade was decided upon.
On 2 May 1918, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a letter to the major general [Commandant] of the Marine Corps, directed that an additional brigade of Marines, equipped as infantry [and] with necessary replacements, required from time to time to keep the units up to their authorized strength, be organized for use with the American Expeditionary Forces in France. The order further stated that “when organized, the necessary arrangements will be made with the Navy Department for the transportation to France of this force, and the commanding officer thereof will be duly directed to report, upon his arrival in France, to the senior United States Army officer for duty.” And that “upon his so reporting, the force will be considered as detached for service with the Army, by direction of the President.” The record of the Marines in France during the weeks immediately following as well as the record of the brigade, thus ordered, during the balance of the war testify to the wisdom and propriety of the order, above quoted.

Organization of 5th Brigade Commenced

In compliance with the above order, plans were immediately drawn for the organization of a brigade of Marines (later designated as 5th Brigade, made up of the 11th Regiment, 13th Regiment, and 5th Machine Gun Battalion), tables of organization were prepared [with] Quantico, Virginia, designated as the place of mobilization, officers and units selected, necessary orders issued, and the organization commenced. The 11th Regiment, originally composed of artillery companies that had seen service as early as the year 1914 at Veracruz, Mexico, and later in the Haitian campaign, was primarily organized at Quantico in January 1918. Much, of course, had to be done by way of making available the necessary personnel, their equipment, and requirements for the formation of a brigade, which was to include the reorganization of the 11th Regiment, and the organization of an entirely new regiment—the 13th—as well as a complete machine gun battalion. The proceedings at Quantico were described by one of the members present as “sort of gathering together of the clans, for the men came from far and near, from Parris Island, Mare Island, the tropics, and the various navy yards in the states. Many were old-timers, but the bulk of them poured in from the boot training camps, all hard of muscle and anxious to be on their way to that country, France, the very mention of which thrilled us.”

13th Regiment Organized

The 13th Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps, was organized at Quantico, Virginia, on 3 July 1918 with Headquarters Company and Supply Company attached. Lieutenant Colonel Smedley D. Butler was placed in command of this regiment with Captain C. D. Meginness as regimental adjutant.

Headquarters, field, and staff of the 13th Regiment were organized on 31 July 1918, and Companies A, B, C, and D on 13 August 1918. Company B was organized on 14 August 1918; Companies E, F, G, and H on 19 August 1918; Companies K, L, and M on 22 August 1918; Company I on 23 August 1918; and the Machine Gun Company on 1 September 1918.

Major W. P. Upshur was in command of the 1st Battalion; Major W. C. Powers was in command of the 2d Battalion; and Major John Potts commanded the 3d Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. McDougal, promoted to that rank on 2 August 1918, became second in command to Colonel Butler who was promoted to the rank of colonel on the same date. Major F. S. McConnell joined on 4 September 1918 and relieved Captain Meginness as regimental adjutant. Captain Meginness was detached on the same date.

Upon the formation of the regiment and while things were taking shape, the men performed various and sundry duties, which included details at work cleaning up and improving the camp in addition to the regular routine. The men had a good deal of experience in carpentering, etc. A record of efficiency was attained in marksmanship by the 13th Regiment on the range at Quantico shortly before leaving for duty overseas, when 95 percent of the personnel won their medals, a splendid showing out of 3,850 officers and enlisted men.

From Quantico to France

On 13 September 1918, the 13th Regiment began to move from the Overseas Depot at Quantico to
the port of embarkation [at] Hoboken, New Jersey, in high hopes of soon having its chance at the enemy. “Never did a happier aggregation of Marines leave Quantico,” it was stated at the time.

Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC, was ordered [on] 5 September 1918 to take command of the brigade. General Cole and the 5th Brigade staff sailed from the United States in the latter part of September and arrived in France a few days later. General Cole commanded the 5th Brigade until 9 April 1919, when relieved by Brigadier General Butler.

On 15 September 1918, Headquarters, field and staff, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 13th Regiment embarked onboard USS Von Steuben [ID 3017] at Hoboken and arrived at Brest, France, [on] 25 September 1918. The 3d Battalion arrived three days later onboard USS Henderson [AP 1]. Soon after arriving in France, the regiment was detached for duty with the Army.

While at Quantico, the quarters of the 13th Regiment were located in the town of Quantico proper. The 11th Regiment, which had been quartered on the “Hill” on the reservation just out from the town of Quantico, moved into the buildings upon their being vacated by the 13th Regiment.

Soon after arriving in France, the regiment was placed under quarantine for spinal meningitis [on] 3 October 1918 but, because of the arrival of large contingents of Army troops at Brest, the quarantine was lifted to enable the regiment to perform urgent duties in connection with the landing and care of the incoming troops. After a few weeks at Brest, units of the 13th Regiment were assigned to duty in the SOS (Services of Supply).

Field and staff, 1st and 2d Battalions were organized [on] 22 and 23 October, respectively. Lieutenant Commander William Chambers, USN, joined as regimental surgeon [on] 5 October 1918.

After a few weeks at Brest, various units of the 13th Regiment, as well as other components of the brigade, were assigned to duty in the SOS.

The 2d Battalion left Camp Pontanezen [on] 23 October 1918 and arrived at Embarkation Camp No. 1, Base Section No. 1, AEF, at Saint-Nazaire, France, the following day. The Machine Gun Company left Camp Pontanezen [on] 29 October and arrived at La Pallice Barracks, La Rochelle, France, [on] 17 November. Headquarters Company left Camp Pontanezen [on] 9 November and arrived at Embarkation Camp No. 1, Saint-Nazaire, on 10 November while the Supply Company left Pontanezen the same date, arrived at Saint-Nazaire on the 11th, and proceeded to Camp Montoir, Base Section No. 1, where the company arrived on 15 November 1918. Field and Staff, 13th Regiment, left Camp Pontanezen [on] 7 December and arrived at Casino de Lillas, Bordeaux, France, two days later.

General Butler, promoted to his rank of brigadier general on 19 November 1918, soon after his arrival in France, assumed command of Camp Pontanezen. He devoted much energy to the development and administration of that great camp, in which he was highly successful, and “for exceptionally meritorious service” was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, and the Order of the Black Star with grade of commander by the French government. Upon being appointed brigadier general, Butler was relieved of command of the 13th Regiment, and Colonel McDougal took over command of the regiment.

Widespread Duties in France

Like the 11th Regiment with which it was brigaded throughout the war, the 13th Regiment performed duty at various posts and stations over an extensive area of western and southern France in the SOS. Among such places were Brest, Bordeaux, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, La Pallice, Rochefort, Montoir, Bassens (Gironde), Sursol (Gironde), Casino de Lillas (Bordeaux), La Teste (Gironde), Savenay, Saint-Loubes (Gironde), Lormont, Carbon Blanc, Grange Neuve, Genicart, Croix d’Hins, La Baule, Isle of Saint-Anne (Nantes), Penhouet, and Usine Brulée.

The officers and men of the 13th performed a wide range and variety of duties, among such being provost guard, hospital center guard, camp guard, railroad transportation officers, commanding dock guard, dock guard, unloading ships, erecting tents at Camp Pontanezen barracks, military police, warehouse guards, convoying railroad trains, special
guards for shipments of commissary supplies, assistants to camp commanders at Pontanezen Camp, prison guards, assisting thousands of convalescent and sick soldiers who disembarked from the USS Leviathan [SP 1326] to reach Camp Pontanezen, Inspector General’s Department, Base Section No. 1, stock guard, traffic police, motor transportation convoy guard, secret service, segregation camp, and railway patrol. During the great influenza epidemic of 1918, the 13th Regiment performed extraordinary services. Among other things, the personnel carried sick men and their packs up [the] long hill from docks to camps they had built, cooked food, and nursed the sick.

The 13th Regiment continued to perform the general duties above-noted until July 1919, when all units of the regiment and 5th Brigade were assembled at Camp Pontanezen. Prior to the departure of the Marine brigades from France in the summer of 1919, a battalion of Marines, first known as “Provisional Battalion, U.S. Marines,” but whose designation later was changed to “15th Separate Battalion,” was organized at Camp Pontanezen for duty in connection with the Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite. The battalion, made up of selected personnel from the 13th Regiment (Company E and 47 enlisted men of the Machine Gun Company), units of the 4th Brigade, and personnel from the 12th Separate Battalion, was under the command of Major (now Major General) Charles F. B. Price, USMC.

The battalion, also known as the “Schleswig-Holstein Battalion,” rendered honors to General Pershing on 1 September 1919 upon his departure from France and, on the same day, was inspected by Marshal Foch, who commended the battalion on its splendid appearance. A few days later, the battalion proceeded to Bordeaux, France, via USS Mercury [ID 3012] and took part in the ceremonies incident to the laying of a foundation for the monument at Pointe de Grave, commemorating the entrance of the United States into the world war.

13th Regiment Returns to the United States

The regimental headquarters was moved from Bassens, near Bordeaux, France, on 13 July 1919 and returned to Camp Pontanezen. Former locations of the regimental headquarters included Bordeaux, Base Section No. 2, where the headquarters had been established as early as 6 December 1918, and where they remained until 3 July 1919 when moved to the American guard camp at Bassens.

Field and Staff of the 1st and 3d Battalions were disbanded in France [on] 16 July 1919, while that of the 2d Battalion was disbanded on 20 July—the personnel being transferred to the Regimental Field and Staff and Headquarters Company.

Company E rejoined the regiment on 22 July at Brest.

On 31 July 1919, all of the 13th Regiment, with the exception of Company B which was on duty at the “American Dock,” at Bassens, embarked onboard USS Siboney [ID 2999] at Brest and disembarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 8 August. The final parade and review of the regiment occurred at Hampton Roads on 9 August 1919.

Company B, having at last been relieved from the duty at Bassens, arrived back at Brest on 31 July 1919, embarked two days later onboard USS Mercury [ID 3012], and disembarked two weeks later at Hampton Roads, where the entire regiment was disbanded on 15 August 1919.

The Schleswig-Holstein Battalion, made up largely of personnel from the 13th Regiment as above stated, having returned to Camp Pontanezen, boarded the USS Henderson early in December, and arrived at Philadelphia [on] 23 December 1919, where the “duration-of-war” men were discharged. A week later, the remainder of the battalion proceeded to Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, and there disbanded—the last Marine Corps unit of the American Expeditionary Forces to return from Europe.

In conclusion, may it be stated that the 13th Regiment, rated as one of the crack units of the Marine Corps, throughout its existence had the reputation of being a highly efficient and steady organization, ever-ready and prompt in the performance of its numerous duties—at times extremely arduous. To the great disappointment of the personnel, the turn of events precluded the participation of the 13th, as also its sister regiment the 11th, in the big fighting in France, and the regiment was
Postwar Analysis

denied the glory that attaches to actual battle participation against the enemy. A number of its members, however, did succeed in getting into the heavy fighting during the summer and fall of 1918 as replacements.

Even prior to its arrival in France, months of intensive training had imparted to the 13th Regiment a high esprit de corps and put the personnel on a mettle seldom found in the world’s best soldiery.

Commendations

American Expeditionary Forces Headquarters Services of Supply
22 November 1918.

From: Commanding General, SOS
To: Commanding Officer, 13th Regiment, USMC, Base Section No. 1.

Subject: Letter of Commendation.

I wish to express my extreme satisfaction at the splendid work of your Regiment as reported to me by Brig. General Harries. The spirit of zeal, co-operation and self-sacrifice shown by you and your men is worthy of the best traditions of the Marine Corps and the American Army.

At a time when your thoughts must have been with the fighting units of our Armies, as were those of all of us in the SOS, you helped to accomplish the work behind the lines without which the success of our combatant troops would have been impossible. You have exemplified the spirit with which I have endeavored to animate the entire SOS.

Please express to the officers and men of your command the very great pleasure their fine achievement has given me.

(Signed) J. G. HARBORD,
Major General, USA.

Headquarters, Base Section No. 5
Services of Supply
U.S. Army Post Office No. 716
16 November 1918.

From: Commanding General, Base Section No. 5.
To: Commanding General, Services of Supply.

Subject: Acknowledging service rendered by 13th Regiment, USMC.

1. The departure from this Base Section of the final element (3d Battalion) of the 13th Regiment, USMC, suggests that suitable acknowledgment be made of the uncommon services rendered by that Regiment while stationed here.
2. Arriving at the beginning of the Influenza and Pneumonia epidemic which was brought by troops from the United States, the Regiment (Colonel—now Brigadier General—Smedley D. Butler, Commanding) devoted itself to insistent labor with zeal that knew no faltering. A well trained and thoroughly disciplined organization, it gave forth cheerful energy in amazing quantity. It made and prepared camps for incoming organizations, providing every needed facility which was at hand or could be created; guided the new troops from the docks to their respective camp areas, carried the packs of the unfit; put new spirit into the weary; hauled water and rations by hand for the incoming units, and then cooked the rations; nursed the sick; in short, did every practicable thing to improve the morale and minister to the physical needs. Whenever music had value, there was the Regimental Band—day or night and much of the time without hours. Colonel Butler and his officers were everywhere welcoming each opportunity to lend a hand and their example was eagerly followed by their men. A concrete instance of performance was the pitching and trenching of five thousand pyramidal wall tents, the pitching and equipping and manning of kitchens, store tents, first aid stations, etc.

3. The object lesson was, and always will be, inspiring. Aside from the life-saving results achieved, there was an unforgettable exhibit of supreme soldierly qualities—the voluntary assumption of a great burden, an immeasurable spirit of self-sacrificing helpfulness and an individual smartness which was unaffected by boil, rain, mud or any other variety of obstacle. The 13th Regiment, USMC, is a living synonym for “the highest efficiency.”

(Signed) GEO. H. HARRIES,
Brigadier General, USA, Commanding.

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**Final Press Comment in France**

The following extract from an editorial of the *Pontanezen Duckboard*, service publication at Camp Pontanezen, France, during the years 1918–19, commenting on the 5th Brigade at [the] time of its departure from France for the United States, is also submitted:

The Fifth Brigade of Marines (11th & 13th Regiments and Fifth Machine Gun Battalion), one of the oldest permanent organizations which came to the camp when there were not even tents to shelter them and duckboards were unheard of, are leaving us. * * * These men are pioneers of Camp Pontanezen and they were of the first to start the alleged impossible task of bringing the big camp up out of the mud. They have been an important factor in conducting camp activities and did their share in keeping up the morale and spirit of both permanent and transient troops. We are sorry to see them go. * * *
The French government awarded decorations for especially meritorious conduct in action during World War I to 156 American units varying in size from a section to a brigade. These decorations were the fourragère and the Croix de Guerre with various combinations of palms, gilt, [and] silver and bronze stars. The various classes of the Croix de Guerre were as follows:

- Bronze palm: for citation in orders of the army
- Gold (or gilt) star: for citation in orders of the corps
- Silver star: for citation in orders of the division
- Bronze star: for citation in orders of the brigade, regiment, or equivalent unit

The fifth citation in orders of the [French] army calls for the award of a silver palm, which replaces the four bronze palms.

Just as individuals are decorated for services rendered, so are the colors of an organization decorated to commemorate the deeds of the unit as a whole. The American unit to which such an award has been made is authorized by our government to place on its flag a streamer—one streamer for each award—and on each streamer, in the colors of the decoration, are embroidered the name or names commemorating the battle for which the unit was cited. The unit twice decorated with a Croix de Guerre with palm is entitled to a braided and knotted cord, called a fourragère, in the green and red colors of the Croix de Guerre. The fourragère becomes a part of the uniform of the unit so cited and all members of the organization are authorized to wear the decoration on the left shoulder of the uniform as long as they remain members of the organization. Individuals attached to the organization on at least two occasions in which it was cited in orders of the [French] army, are entitled to wear the fourragère at all times, regardless of whether or not they are serving with the unit so decorated.

A person entitled to wear the fourragère as an individual decoration is authorized to wear on the knot thereof, above the metal point, the device of the division to which he was attached when he received his last citation, with the Marine Corps emblem below same, both in bronze metal and in miniature. Although the single cord or plain cotton is the regulation issue, officers generally wear the silk cord with the double loop.

According to Larousse’s Grand Dictionary of the XIX Century, the fourragère was originated by the Duke of Alva, a Spanish general. After a unit of his Flemish troops had made a rather hasty withdrawal from the battlefield, the duke ordered “that any further misconduct, on the part of these troops, should be punished by hanging, without regard for rank or grade.” The Flemish warriors, determined to reestablish themselves in the good graces of their commander, wore—as a reminder of their disgrace—coiled around one shoulder, a rope in the shape of a hangman’s noose, at the end of which dangled a long spike. In their next battle, the Flemish fought so gallantly and well that the noose and spike became a mark of distinction and honor.

The French fourragère is a decoration instituted by Napoleon I for units [that] had distinguished themselves in battle. It was revived during World War I and was awarded by the French Ministry of War to organizations [that] were cited more than once in the French Orders of the Army. The three classes of the fourragère are as follows:

- First: Legion d’Honneur (scarlet)
- Second: Médaille Militaire (yellow and red)
- Third: Croix de Guerre (with palm, green and red)

In 1918, Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments by their heroic deeds of valor inscribed the names of momentous and brilliant battles on the pages of Marine Corps history as well as on their own regimental flags. They have the signal honor of being the only two regiments in the AEF to receive three citations—two in the orders of the army and one in the orders of the corps—the fourragère and Croix de Guerre with two palms and one gilt star.
It has been said that the warrior’s fame sometimes is based on luck and the chance of war as much as on valor and skill. Although the 5th and 6th Regiments had the good fortune to come upon the western front at critical times and in critical places they had the esprit de corps, the stamina and the ability to make the most of these opportunities.

Following initial combat experiences in the Toulon sector, a stricken region along the heights of the Meuse on the edge of the old Verdun battlefield, the 5th and 6th, together with other units of the Marine 4th Brigade, 2d Division, were re-assembling in Normandy preparatory to entering the line northwest of Paris. Meantime, the enemy had broken through the Allied lines west of Rheims, making a deep salient [that] pointed like a menacing spearhead towards Paris. The exhausted French Army was overwhelmed and retired, fighting desperately, toward the Marne and the vital region of Paris.

The 2d Division was hurried toward this new point of danger, and by 1 June the forest-green columns of the Marine battalions were marching through the wheat fields of the Marne toward the advancing Germans. From 6 to 25 June, the fighting was of the most desperate character. In a series of bitter battles, the Marines forced the enemy back through the Bois de Belleau, that bloody tangle of brush and rocks made horrible by the reek of dead bodies, the unceasing crash of shells, and the whine and snap of machine-gun bullets. Despite heavy losses and almost complete physical exhaustion, the Marines in a final brilliant dash on 25 June killed or captured the last German in Belleau Wood. In recognition of the “brilliant courage, the vigor, spirit and tenacity” of the Marines of the 4th Brigade who “overcame all hardships and losses and captured the village of Buresches and Belleau Wood” in June 1918, the French renamed the wood the “Bois de la Brigade de Marine” and the 5th and 6th [Regiments] received their second honor when cited in French Army Corps Order No. 10.886 “D” and awarded the gilt star.

Withdrawn from Soissons [and] much depleted by casualties, the Marines rested through August in the Marbache sector near Nancy. In September, they were a part of the American First Army under the personal command of General John J. Pershing, which, on 12 and 13 September [and] pinched off the Saint-Mihiel salient, thereby releasing the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination and establishing the Allied lines in a position to threaten Metz.

During the latter part of September, the Marines moved to the Champagne region, where General Gouraud’s French Fourth Army was making laborious progress against German strongholds [that] had stood invincible since 1914. At dawn on 3 October, the Marines and other units of the American 2d Division swept forward toward the Massif du Blanc Mont, the long ridge [that] dominated the valley of the Arnes and the entire country east of Rheims. Despite determined resistance and desperate counterattacks on both flanks as well as on the front, the 2d Division captured the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont and the heights near Saint-Étienne, breaking the enemy hold on
the martyred city of Rheims and freeing the western approaches to the Argonne region. For their “glorious part” in the operations in the Champagne [sector] in October 1918, the two Marine regiments were awarded their third honor—a citation in French Army Order No. 14.712 “D” and the second palm.

The Marines had only a few days of rest before they were ordered to the Argonne to participate in the final phase of the great Meuse-Argonne battle. Attacking on 1 November, they battered down the strong Kriemhilde Stellung (position) and drove the enemy beyond the Meuse River. During the night of 10–11 November, 2d Division Engineers threw a pontoon bridge across the Meuse and the Marines fought their way across the river—the dramatic last fight of World War I.

The Marines of World War II who are privileged to wear the fourragère have excellent reason to be proud of their service with these two famous regiments.
COMMANDERS
“I can give you no better command in France than to let you succeed General Doyen with the Marines.”

~General John J. Pershing

This was General Pershing’s way of introducing his chief of staff, Brigadier General James G. Harbord, to his new command assignment, that of the 4th Brigade, one May day in 1918. Pershing might have added that he could give the Marines no better leader in view of the confidence he placed in General Harbord; a confidence born of close association since May [19]17. And it was this period of association that had seen the AEF in France grow from less than 100 men to a half million.

This first year in France had been a difficult period, not only because of the many problems involved in shifting a large army across the seas into a foreign land, but also the necessity of proving the worth of that army. All the French really wanted by way of an army from America was infantry and machine guns to be integrated into their own divisions. To convince them that America could provide something besides warm bodies was one of Pershing’s most trying jobs. And, by the same token, the general was not about to settle for a role in the war that permitted the French to rule his ranks and dispose of his troops without the intervention of American command and staff organization. France was justly proud of her Napoleon and de Villars and l’École Militaire, but so was America proud of her [Generals] Grant and Lee and fast-developing military tradition. Facts spoke loudly at the conference table.

Naturally, Pershing was proud of his 4th Brigade, which comprised the 5th and 6th Regiments with attached 6th Machine Gun Battalion, and formed a component of the Army’s 2d Division. They comprised an elite group, officered by future leaders of the Corps—Shepherd, Holcomb, Cates, Lejeune, Neville, Catlin, Hunt, Rockey, and Smith, to name but a few. There were luminaries of the sport world also: [Bert] Baston and [Earl] Martineau of Minnesota, [Harry] Lagore of Yale, [and] many more. Indeed, one regiment included 60 percent college men within its ranks. Little wonder that they made such a fine showing in early training with the Alpine Chasseurs (“Blue Devils”) in their brigade and regimental inspections, and in their initial deployment near Verdun before going on to later achievements that won them lasting fame.

Picture, if you will, the feelings that went through General Harbord’s mind as he journeyed to the command post of the 4th Brigade. The incumbent, Brigadier General Doyen, had been relieved for reasons of ill health (he died three months later), and the Marines had no brigadier for replacement. Harbord, as he relates in his memoirs, had misgivings as to how well he would be received by his new command. Here he was wearing the “Mex” rank of brigadier with little field experience about to take charge of two regimental commanders, both regulars, and each wearing a Medal of Honor. However, he was buoyed by Pershing’s confidence in him and the natural eagerness with which a staff officer reacts to a command assignment.

The warmth of the welcome from Colonel Wendell Neville of the 5th [Regiment] and Colonel Albertus Catlin of the 6th dispelled any doubts General Harbord might have had about his new assignment. His brigade staff included an administrative officer, Major Holland M. Smith, who was to make his mark on Pacific coral in later years.

Harbord found little time for shaking down, as movement orders arrived on 30 May [that] took the brigade into the valley of the Marne.

French refugees blocked the roads in their flight ahead of a steadily advancing German Army. These were dark days in France. Almost a million people had deserted Paris; the British had suffered a severe loss; the defeatists were crying for an honorable peace. Into the breach went the Marine brigade as part of the 2d Army Division. The French Army was in retreat but a typical reaction of the Marines was Captain Lloyd Williams’ countermand to a French order to withdraw, which history has recorded as, “Retreat Hell—we just got here.” And they stood fast.
The Germans were stopped cold by accurate rifle and machine-gun fire since division artillery had not yet arrived. Then the brigade assumed the offensive and used up four German divisions in the process while capturing 1,000 prisoners. The brigade’s objectives were Belleau Wood and Bourgeois. These were seized on the 6th of June, now recorded as the date Paris was saved. The cost of Marine casualties was severe with some 670 killed and 3,721 wounded. The 2d Battalion of the 5th [Regiment] came out of the fight with 7 officers and 350 men; [they were] all that remained of 30 officers and 1,000 men two weeks previously. War correspondent Floyd Gibbons, grievously wounded in the same action, was permitted by a sympathetic censor to file his story and thus identified the Marines’ victory to an electrified America.

The thanks of a grateful French people was some recompense for American losses. They declared the Marine’s defensive stand of the Aisne-Marne one of the greatest in history. Citizens kissed the Marines on the streets, but official recognition came in yet another way—the order issued on 30 June 1918 by General [Jean Marie] Degoutte, commanding France’s Sixth Army:

In view of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth Brigade of the Second United States Division, which in a spirited fight took Bourgeois and the important stronghold of Belleau Wood, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General commanding the Sixth Army orders that henceforth, in all official papers, the Bois de Belleau shall be named “Bois de la Brigade de Marine.”

The 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were decorated with the Croix de Guerre with palm to denote a citation in [French] Army Orders. Subsequent decorations of the Croix de Guerre with gilt star and palm earned these organizations the coveted French fourragère to be worn as a part of the uniform by all members.

With this success, General Pershing had received a powerful boost at the conference table with his French and British colleagues. No longer would there be doubt as to whether American troops could operate successfully with their own staffs and with sector responsibility. The man from overseas was no longer untried; he had fought and won.

It was indeed a proud Harbord who stepped up to receive his second star on the 4th of July, albeit saddened by the thought of leaving his gallant brigade. No doubt the memories of Sergeant Major John Quick, First Sergeant Dan Daly, Major Berton Sibley, and other heroes of the brigade were echoing through his mind as he bade farewell to his comrades-in-arms. He had come to love the emblem of the globe and anchor on his collar as dearly as his crossed sabers of the cavalry. The surprise farewell from several hundred Marines to the strains of the “Marine Hymn” played by the 6th [Regiment’s] band was indeed a moving tribute.

General Harbord had found the brigade’s esprit de corps unexcelled by that of any other organization: its proof of valor unsurpassed by any other outfit of comparable size in history. His relationship, though brief, led him to remark, “I look back upon my service with the Marine brigade with more pride and satisfaction than on any other equal period of my long army career.”

This feeling of affection and respect was reciprocated by the brigade. It set the stage for Marine Major General John A. Lejeune to take command of the 2d Division on 28 July 1918 and lead that organization to victory over the battlefields of Saint-Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and Meuse-Argonne. However, before the succession in command, General Harbord was to win his spurs as commander of the 2d Division at Soissons and thereby enhance his already fine reputation.

It was on the night of 16 July that the division moved into position for an attack the next morning at dawn, with no previous opportunity for reconnaissance. The French reckoned speed and surprise to be of the essence in view of the Germans strongly entrenched positions and great strength. The payoff was a brilliant victory. All three division objectives were captured by evening of D-day, culminating a five-mile advance. The attack the next day did not have benefit of the element of surprise but was nonetheless effective against determined resistance. A dangerous salient at Soissons was eliminated and another proof established for the quality of American arms, this time on a corps level.
The next step up the ladder was the creation of an American field army. This Pershing accomplished in August; a final recognition of America as a fighting power capable of holding her own on any foreign battlefield.

The rotation of General Harbord from field command to the Services of Supply paved the way for the Marine's General Lejeune to step up from the 4th Brigade to command the 2d Division; an historic precedent of interservice command. The Marine Corps had indicated a desire to form its own division, but Pershing would not permit his 2d Division team to be changed.

As a proving ground for his new First American Field Army, General Pershing chose the Saint-Mihiel salient, considered by the French to be impregnable.

The Germans had come to know the 2d Division by this time and referred to them in captured documents as “shock troops.” Yet another captured document further honored the Marines with the appellation, *Teufel Hunden* (Devil Dogs). Both organizations lived up to their advance billing as they swept through the German defense lines on the first day to seize objectives [that] had been selected for the second day, and in the doing to capture [more than] 3,200 prisoners.

After two weeks’ rest the division again went into action on 28 September in the Champagne offensive. It was in seizing the Blanc Mont ridge and breaching the Hindenburg Line that the Marines and doughboys of the 2d had some of the toughest fighting of the entire war. It took five days of battle to clear the Germans out of Rheims, and the division suffered nearly 5,000 casualties in the process of using up nine enemy divisions. This victory was one of the most decisive of the war. It was a proud General Lejeune who, on 11 October, addressed his command: “To be able to say when this war is finished, ‘I belonged to the 2d Division, I fought with it at the battle of Blanc Mont ridge,’ will be the highest honor that can come to any man.” As if to lend emphasis to his words, General Lejeune established the star and Indian-head insignia for his organization so that its members might always be identified. This symbol has been perpetuated to the present time.

Official recognition for their achievement at Blanc Mont came for the entire division in a citation in French Army Orders.

Unfortunately, an organization cannot rest long on its laurels when there is still a war in progress. [For] 1 November became yet another dog day for the weary 2d Division, and the battle of Meuse-Argonne was effectively joined. This action destroyed the last stronghold of the Hindenberg Line in a six-mile advance that sent the enemy in full retreat and contributed in no small measure to the final collapse that resulted in an armistice on the 11th [of November].

Praise came from many quarters for the work done by the 2d Division. General Lejeune’s brilliant leadership won for him the DSM [Distinguished Service Medal] and the French Legion of Honor. The inevitable statistical comparisons—most casualties suffered, most prisoners captured, most artillery captured—all revealed the star and Indian head at the top of the list of American divisions.

A period of occupation duty followed before General Lejeune was to take the division home. His relinquishment of the command on 3 August 1919 ended this unique but happy association of Marine command over an essentially Army organization and established a precedent of interservice cooperation so successfully launched by his comrade-in-arms, General Harbord.
When war was declared on Germany in April 1917, the U.S. Army was tasked to form a division to be the first American troops sent to France. It was a decision that put the Marine Corps’ most recent recruiting slogan, “First to Fight,” in immediate jeopardy. After much lobbying, the Corps was finally authorized in late May to send a regiment with this division. With all four of its existing regiments committed to expeditionary duty in Haiti and Santo Domingo, the Corps quickly organized the 5th [Regiment] at the Philadelphia Navy Yard by calling together permanently organized, numbered companies that were the building blocks of the Corps expeditionary forces. But with fewer than 20 of the Corps’ 59 majors available in the states, finding the best men to command the three battalions was an immediate problem, as the regiment was formed on 7 June and had to sail on the 14th.

The three who got the jobs were “old hands”—officers commissioned around the turn of the century [table 1]. All had served on sea duty, expeditionary duty, and at stateside and overseas barracks. [Major Frederic M.] Wise had seen action against the Boxers around Tientsin in 1900 and later in Haiti; [Major Julius S.] Turrill was in Cuba in 1906; and [Major Charles T.] Westcott served in Santo Domingo. Of the three, only Turrill had received formal schooling and was a graduate of both

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**Table 1. World War I battalion commanders, 5th Regiment**

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<tr>
<th>Deployment to France</th>
<th>1st Battalion</th>
<th>2d Battalion</th>
<th>3d Battalion</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Maj Julius S. Turrill</td>
<td>Maj Frederic M. Wise</td>
<td>Maj Charles T. Westcott</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Maj Edward A. Greene</td>
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<td>Maj Edward W. Sturdevant</td>
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<td>Verdun</td>
<td>Maj Julius S. Turrill</td>
<td>Maj Frederic M. Wise</td>
<td>Maj Benjamin S. Berry</td>
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<td>(16 March–14 May)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belleau Wood</td>
<td>Maj Julius S. Turrill</td>
<td>Maj Frederic M. Wise</td>
<td>Maj Benjamin S. Berry</td>
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<td>(1–26 June)</td>
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<td>Maj Stover Keyser</td>
<td>Capt Henry L. Larsen</td>
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<td>Maj Maurice E. Shearer</td>
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<td>Soissons</td>
<td>Maj Julius S. Turrill</td>
<td>Maj Stover Keyser</td>
<td>Maj Maurice E. Shearer</td>
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<td>(18–19 July)</td>
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<td>Saint-Mihiel</td>
<td>LtCol Arthur J. O’Leary</td>
<td>Maj Robert E. Messersmith</td>
<td>Maj Maurice E. Shearer</td>
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<td>(12–16 September)</td>
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<td>Blanc Mont</td>
<td>Maj George W. Hamilton</td>
<td>Maj Robert E. Messersmith</td>
<td>Maj Henry L. Larsen</td>
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<td>(3–10 October)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meuse-Argonne</td>
<td>Maj George W. Hamilton</td>
<td>Capt Charley Dunbeck</td>
<td>Maj Henry L. Larsen</td>
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<td>(31 October–11 November)</td>
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the Army’s School of the Line and the Staff College (unusual for one so junior). After nearly nine months in France, Turrill and Wise retained their commands, but Westcott was reassigned to take command of an Army battalion. Major Benjamin S. Berry replaced him shortly before the regiment received its first combat assignment under French command in a quiet sector near Verdun.

These were the men in command of the battalions when the 5th [Regiment] deployed before Belleau Wood on 1 June for five days of desperate defensive action in which each of them rendered distinctive service. The regiment went into the attack on 6 June, and the battle that followed marked the end of relative stable command in the battalions of the 5th [Regiment]. Berry was severely wounded leading an assault in his sector. His second in command, Captain [Henry] Larsen, led the battalion until relieved by Major [Maurice] Shearer, the author of the famous report that concluded the battle on 26 June, “Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely.”

The colorful “Fritz” Wise was the next to be replaced. On 23 June, after an altercation with the brigade commander, he was evacuated and treated for combat fatigue. Major [Ralph S.] Keyser, a recent aide to Major General Commandant [George] Barnett, took over until Wise returned and was in command along with Turrill and Shearer for the next offensive, the action at Soissons on 18–19 July.

Following Soissons, the Marine brigade was assigned to rest areas and quiet sectors for nearly two months. Wise returned from hospitalization to reclaim his battalion, but he and Turrill were soon promoted to lieutenant colonels and transferred. Shearer remained with the 3d Battalion. On the eve of Saint-Mihiel, the first “all-American” battle of the war, the 1st and 2d Battalions were commanded by newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel [Arthur J.] O’Leary and Major [Robert E.] Messersmith. O’Leary was commissioned in 1900 and Messersmith in 1909—a notable difference in experience. Both, however, had records of good assignments. Messersmith had taken part in the 1912 campaign in Nicaragua and then been retained with the Legation Guard in Managua.

For its next operation, the 5th [Regiment’s] parent division was back under French command to take the “impregnable” German position at Blanc Mont. It proved to be one of the hardest battles of the war. Two newly promoted veterans of all the fighting since Verdun were now in command of the 1st and 3d Battalions: Major [George] Hamilton, who had distinguished himself at Belleau Wood, and Major [Henry] Larsen, who had briefly taken charge during Belleau Wood.

The Marine brigade remained under French command for two more weeks and then camions arrived to take them back to the American First Army, which had been fighting for a month in the Meuse-Argonne. By the evening of 31 October, the 5th [Regiment] was in attack positions for what proved to be the final phase of the campaign and of the war. Hamilton and Larsen remained in command of the 1st and 3d Battalions, but in the 2d Battalion there was a new commanding officer, Captain Charley Dunbeck. As commander of the battalion’s “lucky” 43d Company, Dunbeck had been in every battle, but he was not the typical young officer. Enlisting at age 18 in 1903, he was one of the first promoted to Marine gunner when that rank was first established in March 1917. Three months later, he received his temporary promotion to captain.

The regiment jumped-off in a column of battalions at 0530 on 1 November to lead the attack against the German Kriemhilde Stellung, another “impregnable” defense. They breached this and the reserve fortifications, advancing an unprecedented nine kilometers. On 6 November, the Marines reverted to reserve, enduring only the freezing rains until moving into positions to force a crossing of the Meuse on the night of 10 November. Here they experienced both an unusually heavy German bombardment and increasing rumors of an imminent armistice. With Major Hamilton coordinating the two assault battalions, and Captain [Leroy] Hunt in temporary command of the 1st Battalion, the 1st and 2d made their crossings and continued the attack until 1100 the next morning when the Armistice took effect. While battalions in other regiments had held back from the crossing that night in expectation of the Armistice, the 2d Battalion followed Dunbeck’s simple order, “Men, I am going across that river, and I expect you to go with me.”

Eight months of combat, including five major battles against Europe’s finest, had given the Marine Corps its most severe test. Had its officers
measured up in battalion command? We have seen their success under the most difficult conditions and have noted that Wise, Turrill, and O’Leary were from groups commissioned in 1899 and 1900; Berry, Shearer, and Keyser in 1904 and 1905; and Messersmith in 1909. For the last six weeks of the war, battalion commanders Hamilton and Larsen were classmates commissioned in August 1913, while Dunbeck had even briefer commissioned service but long enlisted experience. Had their prior service prepared them for this command? Years of sea duty and expeditionary service, where iron discipline, personal leadership, and periodic leaps into the unknown were the norm, had given these officers a sound foundation based on the cool, self-confident ability to lead men in the face of danger. In many ways, this was all they really required since battalion command was largely a matter of personal example and personal leadership. Communication was by runner; an adjutant and a second in command made up the battalion’s operational staff; and supporting artillery was under higher level control. A battalion commander had to control 1,000 men in his four rifle companies—with perhaps a 180-man machine gun company thrown in. He had to get them to unknown locations with inadequate maps and information, deploy them properly with incomplete instructions and insufficient time, and attack Europe’s best troops, suffering 50 percent or higher casualties but persevering until victorious. Those the Marine Corps picked met the challenge, and many of them went on to very successful careers.
As the men of the just-arrived 5th Regiment (see *MCG* [Marine Corps Gazette], September 1997, p. 112) celebrated Independence Day of 1917 in France, the Marine Corps made final plans for another regiment to join them there. One week later, on 11 July 1917, the 6th Regiment was formed for the first time at Quantico, Virginia. With far fewer experienced officers, NCOs, or prior service Marines than the 5th [Regiment] had received the month before, the new regiment took more than two months to ship out its first battalion for France [table 1].

A good man was chosen to lead it. Major John Arthur “Johnny the Hard” Hughes had led Marines in action in the Philippines, at Veracruz where he received the Medal of Honor, and in the Dominican Republic where he suffered a painful leg wound in 1916 that was not completely healed. Intensive training readied the 1st Battalion, which embarked on 23 September and landed in France on 4 October.

Next overseas was the 3d Battalion, commanded by Major Berton W. Sibley, who also had served in the Philippines and twice with expeditions to Cuba. He joined the 6th [Regiment] on 14 August and sailed for France with his battalion on 24 October. The final battalion took longer. Major Thomas Holcomb took command of the 2d Battalion in August but they did not sail until January 1918, arriving at Saint-Nazaire on 6 February. An “old China hand”

**Table 1. World War I battalion commanders, 6th Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment to France</th>
<th>1st Battalion</th>
<th>2d Battalion</th>
<th>3d Battalion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj John A. Hughes</td>
<td>Maj Thomas Holcomb</td>
<td>Maj Berton W. Sibley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verdun (16 March–14 May)</td>
<td>Maj John A. Hughes</td>
<td>Maj Thomas Holcomb</td>
<td>Maj Berton W. Sibley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belleau Wood (1–26 June)</td>
<td>Maj Maurice Shearer, Maj John A. Hughes, Maj Franklin B. Garrett</td>
<td>Maj Thomas Holcomb</td>
<td>Maj Berton W. Sibley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soissons (18–19 July)</td>
<td>Maj John A. Hughes</td>
<td>Maj Thomas Holcomb</td>
<td>Maj Berton W. Sibley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Mihiel (12–16 September)</td>
<td>Maj Frederick A. Barker</td>
<td>Maj Ernest C. Williams</td>
<td>Maj Berton W. Sibley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanc Mont (3–10 October)</td>
<td>Maj Frederick A. Barker</td>
<td>Maj Ernest C. Williams</td>
<td>Maj George K. Shuler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meuse-Argonne (31 October–11 November)</td>
<td>Maj Frederick A. Barker, Maj George A. Stowell</td>
<td>Maj Ernest C. Williams</td>
<td>Maj George K. Shuler</td>
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and distinguished rifle shot, Holcomb had been director of marksmanship and before that aide to the Commandant. (See *MCG*, August 1997, p. 88.)

These three commanders trained their men at Quantico, then in France, and led them through their first defensive combat in a quiet sector of the front near Verdun during March and April 1918. In May, Major Hughes was briefly hospitalized and the 1st Battalion was led by a newly promoted company commander, Major Maurice E. Shearer, when the regiment was committed to action at Belleau Wood on 2 June. Hughes returned to claim his command on 5 June, and Shearer replaced a wounded battalion commander in the 5th [Regiment] two days later.

Hughes lasted eight days in Belleau Wood and then was replaced by Major Franklin B. Garrett, a recent graduate of the American Expeditionary Forces General Staff College who had commanded a company in Haiti for 20 months. Garrett retained command for a month until Hughes once more returned from the hospital to lead the battalion in the great counteroffensive action at Soissons on 18–19 July. On 30 July, Hughes was relieved by Major Frederick A. Barker, another seasoned officer who had three years Army enlisted service before his commissioning in the Marine Corps in 1904. Barker, who had seen action as a company commander in Haiti in 1915 and in the Dominican Republic in 1916, would continue with the battalion for another three months.

Holcomb retained command of the 2d Battalion through Belleau Wood and Soissons, but in August he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and reassigned as second in command of the regiment. His replacement was another veteran of the 1916 fighting in the Dominican Republic, Major Ernest C. Williams. Although Williams had less than 10 years commissioned service, he was a proven leader who had won the Medal of Honor leading an assault that captured a key fortress in the Dominican campaign.

Sibley lasted the longest of the three original battalion commanders, but fragmentation wounds and temporary blinding by mustard gas during the action at Saint-Mihiel brought his command tour to an end in mid-September. His relief was just-promoted Major George K. Shuler, commissioned in 1910 and a veteran of the Veracruz landing. Shuler proved to be a skillful combat leader. During the next offensive at Blanc Mont, his French citation for the Croix de Guerre read, in part, “After a minute reconnaissance of Blanc Mont he attacked, took the position, capturing 85 machine guns, 234 men, and 4 officers.” His American citation concluded, “Fearless, aggressive and able, he twice accomplished moves of vital importance with brilliant success.”

Although the 6th [Regiment] had borne the brunt of the Marine brigade’s heavy fighting at Saint-Mihiel, it was a situation where the Germans were conducting a fighting withdrawal. At Blanc Mont, it was a different story. The Germans occupied heavily fortified positions that they had held against all French attacks since September 1914. They had every intention of continuing to hold but, at 0550 [on] 3 October 1918, the 6th [Regiment] led the assault and within two hours had occupied the position. There were fierce counterattacks and continued fighting until 6 October, but the Marines had set a new standard of tactical skill. Later in the month, the regiment shifted to the Meuse-Argonne sector and prepared for the final offensive.

Here the 6th [Regiment] endured cold rains, artillery, and air bombardment as they prepared for the attack on the last German defensive line south of the Meuse River. Barker, Williams, and Shuler still led the battalions as they jumped-off with Army light tank support at 0530 [on] 1 November. With adequate time for reconnaissance, planning, and detailed dissemination of orders, their success was complete, and they advanced an unprecedented nine kilometers the first day. Skillful tank-infantry work resulted in the outflanking and capture of a number of enemy positions. Sickness, however, was beginning to cause as many losses as enemy action and, by the night of 2 November, Barker, suffering from both [exposure to mustard] gas and influenza, was unable to function and was evacuated.

His relief was Major George A. Stowell, another recently promoted company commander who had been commissioned in 1913 and then taken part in the Veracruz landing in 1914 and combat in both Haiti in 1915 and the Dominican Republic
in 1916. The new major had been employed during the attack as commander of the “liaison battalion,” a composite of one Marine and one Army infantry company whose mission was to maintain contact between the Marines and the Army division on their flank.

The regiment completed offensive operations on 4 November and prepared for a crossing of the Meuse, first on the 8th, then the 9th, and finally at 2130 [on] 10 November, but this too was delayed by events; midnight of the 10th found them still in assembly areas near the river. Despite a detachment of 40 Marines sent to assist them, Army engineers were unable to complete the bridges in this sector. As dawn approached on the eleventh, Shuler, now the senior battalion commander, conferred with the other two battalion commanders and led the move away from the river out of observed German fire. Here the men dropped into an exhausted sleep and the Armistice took effect a few hours later.

The 6th [Regiment] had been organized exactly 16 months before and had seen five officers command its 1st Battalion and two each [command] its 2d and 3d Battalions. In spite of very heavy losses in both officers and men, the last eight months of combat had led to greatly increased tactical skill at all levels of command.

The trench raids of the Verdun sector had given way to the confused and violent fighting within Belleau Wood, followed by the forced marches and lack of information during the multidivision counterattack at Soissons. The next three large offensives saw increasingly competent performance at brigade and higher levels and consequently more opportunity for proper tactical planning. The men the Marine Corps chose to lead its battalions proved equal to their tasks in all respects, both the young majors who led their men into Belleau Wood in June and the seasoned captains of 1917 who later succeeded to command.
The 5th [Regiment] was initially organized and sent to France with one machine gun company of Lewis guns for each infantry battalion, but later policy required one machine gun company with each infantry regiment and a four-company machine gun battalion for each brigade. Consequently, a two-company machine gun battalion was formed in August 1917 at Quantico and, on arrival in France in January 1918, absorbed two now-excess companies from the 5th [Regiment] and was designated the 6th Machine Gun Battalion.

There cannot have been much question as to who would command this battalion. For some years, newly promoted Major Edward B. Cole had been unchallenged as the Corps most prominent machine gun expert. Commissioned in 1904, he had frequent expeditionary deployments, including the Veracruz operation. For the last year, he had been working with Headquarters Marine Corps perfecting tables of organization and equipment for machine gun units. It was during this time that the “Cole cart” was put in service based on his modification of a design used by German naval infantry. His most important contribution was service on the War Department Machine Gun Board in 1916, after which he led the Marine Corps’ large-scale procurement of the Lewis machine gun.

The Lewis was an excellent, highly portable, air-cooled gun then in production in the United States for the Allies, but for some reason shunned by the Army. By March 1918, a complex of logistical factors caused the American Expeditionary Forces to transfer the Marine brigade’s Lewis guns to the Air Service (that desperately needed them) and to substitute old French Hotchkiss guns.

The battalion’s first combat employment in the Verdun sector in France provided good individual training but little in the way of tactical choice, as the gun crews simply manned the same positions the French had been occupying for years. But the experience it provided of enemy artillery bombardments, trench raids, and tactical movement at night was good preparation for the challenges ahead.

Belleau Wood was the first great test as the four companies of the battalion employed for “battery fire” against the German advance. This was a technique of long-range fire perfected by the British and was highly effective in the initial defensive phase of the battle. With the shift to the offensive on 6 June, companies were attached to the infantry battalions, and Major Cole’s job became much more difficult. With the confused fighting inside the woods, machine gun units became intermingled and lost contact with supported troops. Cole’s answer was personal leadership at the line of contact, and 10 June found him leading a small party of Marines in the assault of a German machine-gun nest. Severely wounded by a German grenade, Cole died of [his] wounds eight days later.

His replacement was the battalion’s senior company commander, recently promoted Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr. Commissioned in 1907, Waller was the son of the Corps’ most famous expeditionary Marine and a veteran of the Veracruz landing. As the fighting in the woods continued, the battalion was continually engaged with all companies committed. Only on 5 July were these exhausted men relieved by Army gun crews. They enjoyed 11 days of comparative rest preparing a new defensive line in the rear before orders came for a 16-kilometer night march to meet trucks that would take them to the front.

This next operation, the great counterattack at Soissons, gave the battalion its most demanding physical ordeal. After nine hours on trucks, the battalion marched to its bivouac area where it received orders to countermarch to join the 5th [Regiment] for an attack at 0435 [on] 18 July. Carrying guns and the extra ammunition ordered for this operation, the troops marched in rain through the night, catching up with the supported troops only after H-hour. They continued on until consolidation on the first objective at 1500. They moved out again at 1700, this time in support of Army troops of the 3d Brigade. Spending the night with a reserve mission, they jumped-off with the 6th [Regiment] at
0800 the following morning, two companies in support and two companies moving with the infantry. Extremely heavy casualties continued through the day, but they consolidated a position for the night and were relieved by French troops at 0200 on 20 July. Hopes for a hot meal were in vain, German planes having bombed and strafed the battalion’s field kitchens the day before. Major Waller later noted that this led the battalion to fabricate special mounts on their caissons for antiaircraft fire, stating: “Had we had this disposition during the Soissons drive, we might have accounted for several Boche planes, provided, of course, that the four mules hitched to the caissons felt so disposed.”

The battalion spent two weeks in a rear area, two weeks in fortifications on a quiet sector of the front, and two weeks at a division machine gun school. This latter was badly needed because most of the replacements had no machine gun training, and many junior men had been promoted to more responsible jobs for which they lacked adequate knowledge.

The training was particularly important since these Marines were about to engage in their first well-planned and well-prepared operation—the attack to eliminate the Saint-Mihiel salient. Major Waller later stated: “The intelligence maps of the Boche lines were wonderful; we knew the location of every PC [CP], dressing station, dump, machine gun position, artillery position. . . . All these points we had studied for days ahead, and the machine-guns were placed where we could best harass these points.” The entire battalion was in position for overhead, indirect battery fire beginning at 0500 [on] 12 September, which continued for nearly an hour until masked by advancing friendly troops. Moving by bounds to follow the advance, the guns were on the final objective by the end of the day. There they remained for three days, experiencing only harassing fire and ineffective counterattacks.

In the next operation, Blanc Mont, there was less preparation time and far less advance information, despite the fact that the French had been trying to take the position since 1914. Marines relieved French troops under fire there before dawn 2 October and attacked at 0500 the next day. As machine gun companies moved with their supported infantry battalions, there was not much the battalion commander could do to influence the action other than to ensure that his units were well supplied with ammunition. Although a six-kilometer advance was achieved the first day, for the machine gunners, Blanc Mont was a series of dogged, bitter encounters fought mainly by Platoons. Six more days of artillery shelling and heavy counterattacks followed until the Marines were finally relieved on 10 October.

On 24 October, Major Waller was transferred to be the 2d Division’s machine gun officer. The senior company commander, Major Matthew H. Kingman, took command of the battalion. Kingman was commissioned in 1913 and had just completed his first tour of sea duty when war was declared in April 1917. He sailed to France with the 5th [Regiment] in June in command of one of the machine gun companies and was promoted to captain in October 1917. Wounded during the 6 June attack at Belleau Wood, Kingman returned in time to lead his company at Soissons; he was promoted to major in September.

Returning to the U.S. First Army in the Meuse-Argonne, the Marines were involved in another well-planned, deliberate attack. On the attack frontage of three kilometers, the 2d Division massed all three of its machine gun battalions for a total of 255 guns firing overhead fire when the troops jumped-off at 0530 [on] 1 November. This continued for two hours before the guns moved out by company to follow their supported battalions. They continued in the attack for five more days, reverted to reserve, and made the final attack—an opposed crossing of the Meuse—the night of 10 November. Two companies made it across, but one of these which had only five guns remaining serviceable had four of them knocked out by German fire in the crossing. The war was over and the long march into Germany was soon to begin. Ironically, this march was made with the excellent Browning water-cooled machine gun, which would be one of the Corps’ prime infantry weapons for the next 40 years, but was just days late to see action in France.

All three of the men who commanded the battalion had performed with distinction and were heard from in subsequent years. In Major Cole’s case, this consisted of having a destroyer named
for him in 1919 and earning eternal praise from all Marines for his wonderful cart, which hauled every thing from weapons and ammunition in combat to wall lockers in garrison. Waller left the Marine Corps after the war but retained reserve status. Recalled in 1941, he ultimately commanded Marine bases in the Pacific as a brigadier general, the first Reserve officer to attain that rank. Kingman had extensive duty in Haiti and Nicaragua, was promoted to brigadier general in 1942, commanded the San Diego training center, and served with the OSS prior to retirement in 1944.
When war was declared in 1917 the senior line officers of the Corps were—with a single exception—a block of [U.S.] Naval Academy graduates commissioned from 1883 to 1897, after which the Navy had decided it could no longer provide officers to the Corps. Below them was another large block of officers commissioned from civil life during the Spanish-American War; the initial commanders of the first two regiments to go to France came from the first group while their successors came from the second. Three of the most promising colonels—Joseph H. Pendleton, John A. Lejeune, and Eli K. Cole—had just been promoted to the new rank of brigadier general, but 11 others were in the United States available to command the 5th [Regiment] when it was formed in June 1917.

The job went to the second senior of these, Colonel Charles A. Doyen, a classmate of the Commandant, Major General George Barnett, conveniently on duty at Washington, DC. The 57-year-old Doyen, who over the years had commanded three expeditionary regiments and two brigades in the Philippines and Caribbean, was an obvious choice based on both seniority and field experience.

Three months after arrival in France, Doyen was promoted to brigadier general, and soon took command of the 4th Brigade. He was relieved by a member of the Spanish-American War generation, Lieutenant Colonel I. Hiram Bearss. Bearss, one of the Corps' notable warriors, was too junior to retain such a plum and, on 1 January 1918, was relieved by future Commandant Colonel Wendell C. Neville. Ten years younger than Doyen, but still from the Naval Academy block (commissioned 1892), Neville had a brilliant record. He had been breveted for heroism at Guantanamo in 1898, commended for bravery under fire against Boxers in China in 1900, and awarded the Medal of Honor [for] leading the assault regiment at Veracruz in 1914. His skill and example would be sorely needed in the months ahead.

By January 1918, two battalions and the regimental headquarters of the 6th [Regiment] were in France with the third battalion due to arrive the next month. Formed at Quantico in July 1917, the 6th [Regiment] was commanded by the Corps' most recent graduate of the Army War College, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin. The 49-year-old Catlin was a classmate of Neville, had considerable expeditionary duty and he too had been awarded the Medal of Honor at Veracruz.

Both Neville and Catlin faced similar challenges as the Marine brigade intensified training, experienced defensive combat under French command near Verdun, and in May had a new brigade commander. Doyen was sent home in bad health, took command of the training base at Quantico, and died there of influenza five months later. His relief was Brigadier General James G. Harbord, USA, who had been Pershing's chief of staff and, coincidentally, Catlin's classmate at the War College the year before. Harbord was a good brigade commander, but he had little time to get ready. Belleau Wood was at hand, waiting to provide as severe a test of both formal command methods and personal leadership as man could devise. Catlin escaped most of it. As the defenders shifted to the attack on 6 June, Catlin was forward observing and was shot through the lung. His war was over, but he survived to be promoted to brigadier general and served until he retired in December 1919, publishing a picturesque personal memoir, With the Help of God and a Few Marines.

His relief was the regiment's second-in-command, Harry Lee. At age 46, Lee was an athletic, commanding presence, and a direct descendant of the dashing Light Horse Harry Lee of Revolutionary War fame. He acted the part. From 1892 to 1898, he served in the National Guard where he made a name as a boxer and wrestler, receiving a wartime Marine commission in August 1898. With much sea and expeditionary duty, he had seen action in the 1912 Nicaraguan Campaign and in Haiti. On his first day in command, he needed all his resources. Faced with a confused situation, Lee soon was operating in his usual manner,
winning the loyal devotion of subordinates and the warm approval of his seniors.

Astute and observant, an example of his style was seen in the next great battle at Soissons where his 3d Battalion led the attack against suddenly heavy resistance approaching Tigny. This was a key point at which to consolidate our gains or from which the Germans could counterattack. With 55 percent casualties in four hours, the battalion could not advance, and Lee’s runner-delivered, scribbled message was characteristic: “Has Tigny been taken? If you don’t know, find out. If stopped, dig in.” Thus he anticipated precisely the division’s order of four hours later.

Soissons also brought a new commander to the 5th [Regiment] as Neville took command of the Marine brigade. Unlike the 6th [Regiment] where the second-in-command had been kept in the rear to maintain communications and to supervise logistical support, the second-in-command of the 5th [Regiment], Logan Feland, had been active throughout the fighting at Belleau Wood coordinating the battalions in contact. For these actions, he had already been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and Harbord later wrote:

He was the principal reliance of Gen Neville . . . and of myself . . . when an officer of Field Rank . . . was needed in any critical place or moment . . .

He never failed me in any instance, and I attribute a very substantial portion of the fame so worthily won by the Marine Brigade to the efficiency of Logan Feland.

A company commander with the 3d Kentucky Infantry during the Spanish-American War, Feland was commissioned a Marine Corps first lieutenant the following year and had the usual expeditionary assignments, including Veracruz. Chosen to be one of the two Marine officers with General John J. Pershing’s advance party, he managed to spend the last six months of 1917 observing French infantry operations and then, a 48-year-old lieutenant colonel, joined the 5th [Regiment] under Neville in January 1918.

Lee and Feland found war was changing; for the first time, the Marines came under complete American command for the next operation. Preparations for the Saint-Mihiel attack were thorough. On 3–5 September, the regimental commanders had the opportunity to walk their formations through “division terrain and maneuver exercises.” They also were given the unprecedented opportunity for both map and physical reconnaissance of the objective and precious time for complete briefings of leaders at all levels. The following week’s attack went well with the 5th [Regiment’s] casualties limited to 136 enlisted while the 6th [Regiment’s] losses were 16 officers and 483 enlisted men. Problems still came from other causes as Army tanks on their first operation suffered control and mechanical problems and failed to keep up with the infantry, and the 6th [Regiment] suffered from the “friendly fire” of the adjacent division’s artillery.

The Blanc Mont battle was another challenge for Lee and Feland as the Marines encountered the famous French language barrier while conducting a night relief of troops in contact on 2 October. Daylight was spent in planning how to occupy attack positions still outposted by German troops and under fire of German strong points. Attacking at first light on 3 October, all obstacles were overcome, and Blanc Mont was another notable victory for the Marines.

By the final operation in the Meuse-Argonne, the American First Army was functioning well and the Marine regiments received orders for their next attack a full week in advance! Formal “aerial” support was added to normal engineer and artillery, and the two Marine regiments had the direct support of the 1st Provisional Tank Company—by now all that was left of Patton’s light tank brigade that had supported them at Saint-Mihiel less than two months before. Their success was complete, and the war was over.

Eight months of combat against Europe’s finest had validated the Marine Corps as fully capable on the modern battlefield, and command of the Corps’ two most famous regiments made Lee and Feland marked men. In 1920, they were both promoted to brigadier general over several colonels who had been wartime brigadiers but reverted to permanent rank after the war.

Feland became the first director of General Lejeune’s new Operations and Training Division at Headquarters Marine Corps, a significant reform
of that somewhat moribund headquarters and its first major structural change since 1798. Lee went on to become military governor of the Dominican Republic, the only Marine to hold a job previously reserved for Navy flag officers. Both enjoyed continued success during the 1920s and, in April 1927, Feland was chosen to lead the Marine occupation of Nicaragua where he remained, except for a four-month stateside tour, until March 1929. Feland was looked on by many as the logical successor to General Lejeune, but it was not to be as the next three commandants came from the group of Naval Academy graduates commissioned before the Spanish-American War. He retired in 1933 and Lee, who was highly regarded as a trainer, died while in command at Quantico in 1935.
PART III
ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE
“5th Marines at Champagne.”
Courtesy of Capt John W. Thomason Jr., Marine Corps Archives
At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the German cruiser SMS *Cormoran* (1909) sought refuge in the harbor of Guam from two Japanese men-of-war. Once inside the harbor, the ship and its crew were interned and under the control of the U.S. naval commander, who was also the governor of Guam. The crew and ship were partially disarmed and the crew was allowed to continue living on the ship. The failure to fully disarm the vessel caused considerable anxiety for many months preceding America’s entry into the war, until it was finally completely disarmed in March 1917.

In the early morning of 7 April 1917, a cutter from the *Cormoran* was ashore for provisions when the German officer-in-charge heard that the United States had declared war on Germany. The officer immediately attempted to carry the news back to his commanding officer on the cruiser. At the same time, a small American boat was already headed toward the *Cormoran* in a steam launch, noted a small party of Germans departing the ship in a small boat. Bartlett ordered Corporal Micael B. Chockie to fire a warning shot.*

However, the *Washington Post* and the *Marines’ Bulletin*, which were published within months of the actual incident, indicated that it was “Major Ethelbert Talbot,” from one of the shore batteries, who commanded a small boat of Marines and thus ordered “Corporal Cordrey” to fire the warning shot. A review of the muster rolls reveals that “Major Talbot” was in fact First Lieutenant Ethelbert Talbot—a company officer with 40th Company, Marine Barracks, Naval Base Guam. Interestingly, Corporal Chockie was also assigned to the 40th Company. Further confusing the situation is the identification of Corporal Thomas Cordrey as a member of 41st Company, Marine Barracks, Naval Base Guam. The only answer to the question, “Who fired the first shot?”—a U.S. Marine. Therefore, including the Marines in Guam in this order of battle is only fitting.

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Combat Forces

4th Brigade

The 4th Brigade was activated on 24 October 1917 at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France, as part of the U.S. Army’s 2d Division. It consisted of the 5th and 6th Regiments as well as the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. The companies forming the battalions were as follows:

5th Regiment

1st Battalion
17th (A) Company
49th (B) Company
66th (C) Company
67th (D) Company

2d Battalion
18th (E) Company
43d (F) Company
51st (G) Company
55th (H) Company

3d Battalion
16th (I) Company
20th (K) Company
45th (L) Company
47th (M) Company

8th Machine Gun Company
Supply Company
Headquarters Company

6th Regiment

1st Battalion
74th (A) Company
75th (B) Company
76th (C) Company
95th (D) Company

2d Battalion
78th (E) Company
79th (F) Company
83d (K) Company
84th (L) Company

3d Battalion
82d (I) Company
80th (G) Company
84th (L) Company
97th (M) Company

73d Machine Gun Company
Supply Company
Headquarters Company

6th Machine Gun Battalion

15th (A) Company
23d (B) Company

77th (C) Company
81st (D) Company

*See p. 235 for full detail of this organization
The brigade participated in the following campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, Château Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. On 17 November 1918, the brigade (as part of the 2d Division) commenced its march to the Rhine, passing through Belgium and Luxembourg. The German frontier was reached on 26 November 1918 and crossed on 1 December; the Rhine was reached on 10 December and crossed on the 13th. The brigade settled down to its occupation duty in Germany with headquarters successively established at Margut, Bellefontaine, Arlon, Useldange, Berg, Eppeldorf, Neuerburgh, Waxweiler, Prüm, Budesheim, Wiesbaum, Antweiler, Neuenahr, Burgbrohl, Rheinbrohl, and Hönningen.

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army of Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the outstanding features being the establishment of a Rhine River patrol, manned and commanded by Marines; an extended visit, inspection, and review by the secretary of the Navy; and the operation of the 2d Division, including the Marines, made about the middle of June 1919 in which an advanced position was taken as a part of the concentration of the Third Army immediately preceding the signing of the treaty of peace by the Germans.

Headquarters of the 4th Brigade during the greater part of the occupation of Germany was at Niederbieber while, during the last operation when the advanced position was taken just prior to Germany signing the peace treaty, it was at Herschbach. On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hatenfels, occupied the most advanced position ever occupied by Marines in Germany. Just before departing from Germany, the headquarters was at Niederbieber and, with the exception of Brest, France, this was the last headquarters the brigade had in Europe. Upon arriving at Quantico, the brigade was deactivated on 13 August 1919.

5th Regiment

Late in May 1917, President Wilson directed the secretary of the Navy to issue the necessary orders detaching for service with the Army a force of Marines to be known as the 5th Regiment and, within 16 days, the regiment, completely organized and ready for active service, was sailing for France.

The rapid organization, equipping, and embarkation of the regiment was the product of considerable forethought. Major General Commandant George Barnett had strongly contended that Marines should be sent to Europe's western front. Accordingly, he conducted liaison with various War Department agencies to collect the information necessary to organize and equip a Marine expeditionary force. General Barnett's efforts began to bear fruit when, on 16 May, the secretary of war asked President Wilson for a Marine regiment equipped as infantry for duty in France. Anticipating approval, General Barnett recalled overseas troops and organized them into the 5th Regiment.

President Wilson had directed that the 5th Regiment was to serve as part of an Army force, so the regiment was assigned to the 1st Division upon its arrival in France. Service as part of the 1st Division consisted of training for most of the regiment, but included providing units for lines of communication (Services of Supply) duty. In September 1917, the regiment was reassigned to the 2d Division and later to the 4th Brigade, which was activated on 24 October.

The 5th Regiment participated in the following campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, Château Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. After 11 November 1918, the regiment remained in Europe.
to occupy the German Rhineland. The regiment returned to the United States in August 1919 and was deactivated on the 13th of the month.

6th Regiment

A little more than a month after the United States declared war, on 14 May, the Marine Corps leased 6,000 acres at Quantico, Virginia. On 14 June 1917, the 5th Regiment sailed for France and full attention could be focused on forming and training the 6th Regiment.

Recruiting new enlisted men proved to be no problem after war was declared. An unusually high quality of men presented themselves for enlistment, and many successful business and professional men were among their number. The recruiting of new officers proceeded more slowly. Many outstanding men from the enlisted ranks were promoted to officers, both at the beginning and during the war. Many made careers of the Corps after the war and became distinguished officers, some of whom even reached the rank of four-star general. Consequently, when the 6th Regiment was organized on 11 July 1917 at Quantico, more than half the Marines were college men with a large number of athletes among them. Two-thirds of one company came straight from the University of Minnesota—300 students enlisted together, for example. Trained and ready, the 6th Regiment together with the 6th Machine Gun Battalion arrived in France on 31 October 1917. It was assigned to the 4th Brigade upon arrival.

The 6th Regiment participated in the following campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, Château Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. After 11 November 1918, the regiment remained in Europe to occupy the German Rhineland. The regiment returned to the United States in August 1919 and was deactivated on the 13th of the month with the 5th Regiment.

6th Machine Gun Battalion

The 5th Regiment was initially organized and sent to France with one machine gun company of Lewis guns for each infantry battalion, but later policy required one machine gun company with each infantry regiment and a four-company machine gun battalion for each brigade. Consequently, a two-company machine gun battalion was formed on 17 August 1917 at Quantico, and was designated as 1st Machine Gun Battalion, but on 20 January 1918, after arrival in France, it was redesignated as the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. The newly redesignated battalion absorbed two now-excess companies from the 5th Regiment.

The Lewis automatic rifle (fitted with a tripod and carried on a “Cole” cart) was an excellent, highly portable, air-cooled gun then in production in the United States for the Allies, but the Marines were required to turn them over to the Army; they were replaced by the old French Chauchat guns. Other equipment used by the battalion included eight caissons (two to each company; standard American infantry caissons), escort wagons, rolling kitchens, ration carts, water carts, and medical carts.

The battalion participated in the same battles alongside the Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments and, after the Armistice was signed, the battalion was tasked to occupy the Rhineland. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion embarked onboard the USS Santa Paula (ID 1590) and arrived in New York on 5 August 1919. Three days later, the battalion took part in the parade in New York City before being moved south to Quantico. Along with the other Marines, they participated in the Washington, DC, parade on 2 August 1919 and subsequently deactivated the next day.
3d Provisional Brigade, Fort Crockett, Texas

While the battle operations of the 4th Brigade overshadow all others that took part in the First World War, those operations were by no means the only ones participated in by Marines around the globe and yet still engaged in the fight against German aggression. The 3d Provisional Brigade was headquartered in Cuba for the majority of its activation. But as things settled there, the brigade along with the 9th Regiment was relocated to Galveston, Texas, where the 8th Regiment was already stationed in August 1918.

Due to Germany’s attempt to draw Mexico into the affairs of the United States and its declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, the threat from the south was very real. The Mexican government was unstable and disjointed after years of revolution, but remained a major oil producer for the Allied powers. Galveston’s Fort Crockett was positioned on the Gulf of Mexico, which made it an ideal location for Marines to launch an amphibious operation into Mexico’s Tampico oil fields had the need arisen.

While at Fort Crockett, Marines were occupied with learning to operate machine guns, qualifying with various types of weapons, learning flag semaphore, playing baseball and swimming in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as guard duty. The brigade was deactivated in April 1919.

8th Regiment

The outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Germany in 1917 resulted in the original activation of the 8th Regiment. American entry into World War I in April of that year led to an immediate expansion of the Marine Corps. A number of regiments were brought into existence for use not only in Europe but also in areas outside the war zone. A total of 14 Marine regiments were on active duty by late 1918. Most never served in Europe but were deployed either in the Caribbean or remained stationed in the United States. One such organization that did not see combat, bearing the designation 8th Regiment, was activated as an infantry unit at Quantico on 9 October 1917.

The new regiment initially consisted of four units: Headquarters, 105th, 106th, and 107th Companies. The last three companies had come from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a few days earlier. On 13 October 1917, the 103d, 104th, 108th, 109th, and 110th Companies joined the regiment after arriving from Mare Island, California. The last two companies of the regiment—the 111th and 112th Companies—were organized at Quantico on 22 October. When completely manned, the regiment consisted of approximately 1,000 officers and enlisted men.

The first orders that the 8th Regiment received after its creation in 1917 indicated that it would not
be deployed to France but would be sent instead to Texas for a possible thrust into Mexico. Relations between the United States and Mexico had deteriorated to a low state. In the years preceding America's entry in World War I, open hostilities had erupted between the two countries. German intrigues in Mexico, actual or imagined, only heightened American anxiety over Mexico once the United States became a belligerent. Allied dependence on Mexican oil fields exaggerated fears that the Germans might take advantage of chaotic conditions in Mexico to disrupt the flow of oil from Tampico, the principal area of production. Thus, the 8th Regiment was ordered to Fort Crockett near Galveston, Texas. Had it been necessary, the regiment was to move swiftly, make an amphibious landing on the Mexican Gulf Coast, and seize the Tampico oil fields.

The regiment's duties in Texas were primarily those of a typical garrison force. In addition, it embarked on a training program designed to ensure its readiness to intervene in Mexico should the order be given. Orders for the 8th Regiment's redeployment from Texas eventually arrived from Washington in early spring 1919. On 10 April, personnel and equipment were embarked onboard the USS Hancock (AP 3), the same vessel that had brought the regiment to Fort Crockett a year and a half before. The ship immediately sailed and, within two weeks, reached Philadelphia where the regiment and its supplies were unloaded. The following day, 25 April, the 8th Regiment went out of existence.

9th Regiment

The 9th Regiment originated during the great expansion of the Marine Corps during World War I. Created as one of the two infantry regiments of the Advanced Base Force, it was assigned to duty in the Caribbean as a mobile force in readiness. It was activated on 20 November 1917 at Quantico and in December was bound for Cuba.

Cuba entered World War I on the Allied side soon after the entry of the United States, but insurgent bands left over from a recent rebellion still roamed the countryside, threatening the sugar crop vitally needed by the Allies for the war effort. The 9th Regiment remained in Cuba to quell the dissidents until matters cooled enough to leave.

After the situation in Cuba improved, on 31 July 1918, the 9th Regiment was withdrawn and sent to Texas to aid the 8th Regiment in forstalling the possible disruption by German agents of vital Mexican oil. Through the end of the war, the regiment remained at Fort Crockett, spending their time training and guard duty. With the end of the war, the need for the regiment evaporated, so the regiment embarked on 10 April 1919 aboard the Hancock for Philadelphia. It was deactivated on 25 April.

Aviation Forces

On 6 April 1917, the Marine section of naval aviation consisting of 5 officers and 30 enlisted men was stationed at the Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida, as part of the complement of that station. During April, May, and June 1917, the Marine aviation section was transferred to a combination land and water station for Marine fliers at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, and the training of personnel for land flying began. The official designation of this organization was the Marine Aeronautic Company. Training in observation balloons was done in addition to the heavier-than-air work.

On 12 October 1917, this Marine Aeronautic Company, then consisting of 34 officers and 330 enlisted men, was divided into the First Aviation Squadron, consisting of 24 officers and 237 enlisted men, and the First Marine Aeronautic Company, consisting of 10 officers and 93 enlisted men. On 14 October 1917, the First Marine Aeronautic Company was transferred to Cape May, New Jersey, and took over the naval air station there.

On 17 October 1917, the First Aviation Squadron was transferred from the Marine Flying Field, Philadelphia Navy Yard, to the Army training field at Mineola, Long Island, where instruction and training were carried out in land flying. On 31 December 1917, this organization was transferred to Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, for advanced training.

In March 1918, the Marine Flying Field in Miami, Florida, was established and, on 21 March 1918, the First Aviation Squadron was transferred to that field from Lake Charles. Four Marine squadrons of land-fighting planes and a headquar-
ters company were organized to operate under the Navy as the Day Wing of the Northern Bombing Group.

1st Marine Aviation Force and Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group, France

On 13 July 1918, the 1st Marine Aviation Force, consisting of Squadrons A, B, C, and Headquarters Company, left Miami. The units were embarked onboard the USS De Kalb (ID 3010) at New York City for France on 18 July. This organization consisted of 107 officers and 654 enlisted men and, when Squadron D joined in October 1918, it consisted of 149 officers and 842 enlisted men. On 30 July 1918, the Day Wing disembarked at Brest, France, and proceeded to its aerodromes between Calais and Dunkirk, where they established camp and prepared the aerodromes for use. The personnel of the Day Wing were completely organized and ready for service two weeks after their arrival in France. Some of the planes and equipment of this organization arrived at Pauillac, France, before the organization did. Squadron D, consisting of 42 officers and 188 enlisted men, arrived at the Le Franc aerodrome on 5 October, completing the four squadrons of the Day Wing.

During the month of October, additional planes were delivered to the Day Wing. To prevent the personnel who were completely trained and ready for action when they reached the front on 2 August 1918 from getting badly out of practice, the commanding officer requested permission from the British aviation forces in the vicinity for Marine aviators to operate with their squadrons until the Marine’s planes were delivered. As many Marine pilots as could be accommodated were operating with British squadrons until the end of the war, and were highly complimented by the British officers. The Day Wing carried out 14 independent raids far behind the enemy lines, did considerable damage, and brought back valuable information. The organization participated actively and creditably in both offensives on the Flanders front.

While in Europe, the Marine fliers served with the 217 and 218 (bombing squadrons), Royal Air Force (Great Britain); and with pursuit, observation, and bombing squadrons of the French Flying Corps.

Early in December 1918, the Day Wing received orders to return to the United States and embarked on 6 December 1918 onboard the USS Mercury (ID 3012) at Saint-Nazaire, France, arriving at Newport News, Virginia, on 21 December 1918.

1st Marine Aeronautic Company, Ponta Delgada, Azores

On 7 December 1917, the First Marine Aeronautic Company, then consisting of 12 officers and 133 enlisted men, was ordered to Naval Base 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores, arriving there on 21 January 1918. This company was the first completely equipped American aviation unit to leave the United States for service in the war.

This organization operated an antisubmarine patrol station of 10 R-6 seaplanes, 2 Curtiss N-9 seaplanes, and later 6 Curtiss HS-L flying boats until the station was ordered abandoned on 24 January 1919; the company was ordered to return to the United States, arriving at the Marine flying field in Miami, Florida, on 15 March 1919.

Marine airplane mechanics working on a Curtiss HS-2L in Ponta Delgada, Azores. Hugh Squires Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives
Ships Detachments, Naval Base
Detachments and Miscellanea

Foreign Expeditionary Detachment, Naval Base Number 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores

Early in November 1917, Rear Admiral Herbert O. Dunn was ordered to the Department of the Navy for temporary duty prior to assuming command of the U.S. naval base in Ponta Delgada, Azores. During this time, he focused his energies in obtaining permission from the Portuguese government to establish a headquarters on shore, to land a detachment of Marines and a Marine aviation unit, to establish a supply department with storehouses on shore, and to allow the transfer of Navy supplies to and from ships to be carried on without assessing customs duties. A request was also made to land and mount six- or seven-inch guns for the protection of the base; however, the Portuguese government refused to grant the landing of the large weapons unless they were manned and controlled completely by the local military.

On 9 January 1918, the Hancock sailed from Philadelphia with Admiral Dunn and staff, as well as one company of Marines with equipment, one Marine aviation unit with aircraft and accessories, two seven-inch guns, and miscellaneous cargo for the base. While the concessions for the variety of requests made in late 1917 were approved, the remaining issue was the placement of the seven-inch guns for the defense of the base.

Permission to land the guns was finally verbally given; the Marines would mount and man the guns initially, but would train the local military in their maintenance and operation and eventually turn over the responsibility as soon as practical. The guns were landed and two locations were chosen—one gun pointed toward western Ponta Delgada for the protection of the city and the other was mounted about eight miles west of Ponta Delgada to protect the British wireless station that was being built at the time.

As soon as the guns were ready, instruction and drills began for Portuguese officers and enlisted men; however, it soon was decided that the local military was not proficient enough, nor would it ever be, to man the weapons alone. Nevertheless, repeated requests were received from the local military authorities to turn the weapons over to them, and the situation became tenuous.

On 15 April, General José Augusto de Simas Machado arrived from Lisbon; recently appointed high commissioner of the Azores, his authority extended over all islands. The issue of the guns was promptly settled; General Machado, after consultation with the Marine detachment commander, decided that the Marines would retain complete
control of the weapons and responsibility for manning the batteries.*

The company was disbanded on 14 September 1919; the final commanding officer, First Lieutenant John D. Lockburner, remained in Ponta Delgada as ordnance and communications officer until mid-December 1920.

136th Company, Naval Base Number 29, Cardiff, Wales

A small, but vital base was built at the Welsh port of Cardiff. A few weeks after the American Expeditionary Forces began to arrive in France, General Pershing’s staff discovered a shortage of coal. The British had none to spare, and a severe coal shortage existed in France. Admiral William S. Sims recommended the establishment of a base at Cardiff to handle the shipments of coal to France and requested a flag officer to command the base and the coal carriers. Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, designated Cardiff as Naval Base Number 29.**

The Marine Detachment, Lafayette Radio Station, France

Originally named the Liberty Radio Station,* the Lafayette high-power radio station was situated in the village of Croix d’Hins, about 15 miles from Bordeaux. The construction of the station was the responsibility of the U.S. Navy in conjunction with the French. The construction of this station was deemed necessary after the United States entered the war, particularly due to the extremely heavy and increasing volume of trans-Atlantic traffic being handled by the ocean cables.

Work on the station began on 28 May 1918 and was far advanced when the Armistice was signed, at which time all worked stopped as it appeared that the facility was no longer needed. Later, however, the French government requested that the station be completed as an after-war measure. The station was completed on 21 August 1920.**

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* “Historical Sketch of U.S. Naval Base, Ponta Delgada, Island of St. Michaels, Azores,” 15 February 1919, Azores Geographic File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
** William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2007), 97.
Office of the Chief Paymaster, U.S. Marines, France

In obedience to orders dated 2 October 1917 and in compliance with provisions of GHQ General Orders no. 38(2), 17 September 1917, the “Office of the Chief Paymaster, U.S. Marines, France,” was established in Paris, France, on 5 October 1917. Major Davis B. Wills was chief paymaster from the establishment of the office until it was abolished on 30 August 1919.

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet, with British Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow and Firth of Forth

Division 9 of the Atlantic Fleet, composed of the USS *New York* (BB 34) (flagship), *Wyoming* (BB 32), *Florida* (BB 30), and *Delaware* (BB 28), was detailed for service with the British Grand Fleet, rendezvoused on 24 November 1917 in Lynnhaven Roads, Chesapeake Bay, and sailed for its destination the following day. The division took the northern passage and was 13 days en route, 4 days of which were spent in holding its own against a 90-miles/hour gale off the Newfoundland coast. On 7 December 1917, the American battleships anchored with the British Grand Fleet in Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands, after a rousing reception, and on 26 December were designated the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

The arrival of the U.S. division reduced the deficiencies in the Grand Fleet in several ways. Having a shortage of trained personnel, the Royal Navy, with the arrival of the U.S. ships, was able to pay off older battleships to release those crews for duty on destroyers. In addition, the arrival of the U.S. battleships gave the British enough capital ship strength to protect the Scandinavian convoys with a heavy covering force. The Admiralty probably would not have done so without the added measure of battleship superiority.*

From the time of its arrival to 29 November 1918, this squadron—with the addition of the USS *Texas* (BB 35) in February 1918, and the substitution of the USS *Arkansas* (BB 33) for the *Delaware* in July 1918—operated with the British Grand Fleet, basing most of the time in Scapa Flow and the remainder of the time in the Firth of Forth (Ro-

The squadron took its regular turn at convoy duty, patrol duty, target practice, and fleet exercises with all the other squadrons of the British Grand Fleet. The squadron was at sea an average of 8–10 days each month and followed the procedure of the Grand Fleet in all respects, even going so far as to shift to the British method of signaling.

Division 6, Atlantic Fleet, Castletown Berehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland

Division 6, composed of the USS *Utah* (BB 31) (flagship), *Nevada* (BB 36), and *Oklahoma* (BB 37), was based on Berehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland. During the summer of 1918, the German Navy was severely criticized by the German press and taunted by the Allied press. It had become evident that the enemy submarines were powerless to prevent the transport of large numbers of troops and a great amount of material. It was learned from intelligence sources that, for these reasons if no other, the enemy contemplated an effort to send out battle cruisers to attack convoys, particularly troop convoys.

Because of the possibility that one or more German battle cruisers might slip out to sea and assail Allied convoys in the Atlantic, the Navy Department decided to send Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet to Berehaven, Ireland. Berehaven, on Bantry Bay, was situated close to the shipping lanes between the United States and ports in France and southern Britain. It was also close to Queenstown, Ireland, where most of America’s destroyers were stationed, making it an ideal location for a base from which the battleships could guard the convoys.*

In anticipation of such possible action by the enemy, and to further strengthen the protection of the convoys, the battleships *Utah*, *Nevada*, and *Oklahoma* were based at Berehaven, arriving on 23 August. They were kept in readiness to put to sea on four-hours’ notice.** This division made two trips into the channel, escorting convoys when enemy submarines were reported in the vicinity. The *Nevada* joined the American battleships of Division 9 the day after the surrender of the German Fleet off Rosyth, near Edinburgh.

**Asiatic Fleet, Vladivostok, Siberia**

The Marines of the USS *Brooklyn* (CA 3), flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, participated in the activities around Vladivostok, Siberia, in 1918. In June 1918, Vladivostok and practically all of Siberia was under the control of the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, assisted by German and Austrian prisoners of war, were resisting the advance of the Czecho-Slovaks, who were trying to reach Vladivostok. In that city, on 29 June 1918, there were approximately 12,000 well-organized Czecho-Slovaks, only about 2,500 of whom were armed or equipped. On the foregoing date, the Czecho-Slovaks in the city took it over from the Bolsheviks after a three-hour battle near the city center and, on the afternoon of that day, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, ordered a detachment of American Marines ashore to guard the American consulate and to act as part of an Allied force composed of British, Japanese, Chinese, and Czecho-Slovaks to patrol the city.

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*R Adm William L. Rogers and his staff onboard the USS Albany in Vladivostok, Russia. From left to right: LtCdr T. J. Bright, Cdr J. E. Gill, Capt Alvin Althouse, Adm Rogers, LtCol Eli T. Fryer, LtCdr Earl F. Smith, Lt (Junior Grade) F. V. Martinez, and Lt H. C. Davis.*

In July 1918, Marines from the *Brooklyn* acted as guards over German and Austrian prisoners of war on Russian Island, about five miles from Vladivostok, while Marines from the same vessel constituted part of an Allied military force of American and British Marines, Japanese and Chinese bluejackets, and Czecho-Slovak soldiers, which was organized to prevent a threatened strike and disorder among the workmen in the Russian navy yard at Vladivostok.

The USS *Albany* (CL 23) was at Vladivostok on 2 April 1919 until relieved by the USS *New Orleans* (CL 22) on 25 July 1919. Each of these ships, while they were anchored off Vladivostok, kept a small guard of Marines at the U.S. Naval Radio Station on Russian Island.

**Marine Detachment, U.S. Naval Radio Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, Siberia**

The *Albany* was anchored off Vladivostok on 2 April 1919 and provided a small guard of Marines at the United States Naval Radio Station on Russian Island. The *Albany* was relieved by the *New Orleans* on 25 July 1919. The detachment transferred to Marine Barracks at Naval Station Cavite, Philippines, when the radio station was turned over to the Russian government on 19 November 1922.

**American Naval Planning Section, London**

The section was created in accordance with telegraphic instructions on 19 November 1917 by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Benson. Benson stated that he believed that "plans satisfactory to both countries can not [sic] be developed until we virtually establish a strict planning section for joint operations here (in London), in order that the personnel therein may be in a position to obtain latest British and allied information and to urge as joint plans such plans as our estimates and policy may indicate." The section was officially formed in London on 26 December 1917 at the headquarters of the force commander for U.S. naval forces operating in European waters as part of his staff.

*American Rest Camp, Southampton, England*

Numerous “rest camps” were established in England and France during the war. The camp located in Southampton, England, was primarily used as a “lay-over” for those troops just arriving from the United States. These troops were, after a short stay, then forwarded to the fighting forces in France.

**Virgin Islands, Marine Barracks St. Thomas and All Marines Ashore in Virgin Islands**

A few days prior to our actual declaration of war, the transfer of the Virgin Islands from the possession of Denmark to the United States was completed, and a battalion of Marines, acting as an occupying force, helped to take them over. One company (21st Company) established a garrison at Christiansted on St. Croix (29 Mar 1917) and two companies (14th and 56th Companies) went to St. Thomas (21 April 1917). The islands had been purchased largely to prevent their falling into the hands of the Germans, who it was feared might use them as submarine bases for operations in the western Atlantic. The Navy Department was constantly in fear of such a possibility even after the United States had taken possession of the islands.


"Without this 45-horsepower tractor, I do believe our casualties would have been greater than what the people at the front are suffering," a Marine stated in reference to the dangerous work of moving the massive guns into place in rugged and remote locations throughout the Virgin Islands.
About one year later a small base defense force, equipped with searchlights and fixed naval guns, was organized and sent to the islands, where they established defenses which they maintained throughout the remainder of the war.*

**Services of Supply**

5th Brigade

The 5th Brigade was activated to cope with emergencies in World War I and was organized during the summer of 1918 at Quantico, Virginia. It consisted of the 11th and 13th Regiments and the 5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. The companies of the brigade were designated by letters instead of numbers to conform to Army standards.

The Fifth Brigade of Marines was sent to France without previously being assigned as part of an infantry division by the War Department. Practically all combat troops sent overseas were organized and received some training as units of divisions before leaving the United States. When Pershing was notified of the departure of the Fifth Brigade for France, it was not quite clear to him just how it should be used. He cabled the War Department, who advised him that the Brigade was not assigned to any regular division or other organization and was to be used as he saw fit. At the time of its arrival in France the commanding general of the S.O.S. (Service[s] of Supply) was much in need of dependable troops for guard duty and upon his request the Fifth Brigade was assigned to the S.O.S. (September 23, 1918) with the restriction that it should not be used for replacements nor for labor purposes. When the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, arrived in France he was transferred to St. Aignon with his headquarters and assigned to the 41st Division—a depot division for the advanced training of replacements. Cole was

Annotated Order of Battle

given command of the division late in October which position he held until January 1919.*

One of the most prominent accomplishments of the Marines of the 5th Brigade was the administration of Pontanezen Camp at Brest, France, which turned out to be one of the largest embarkation camps in the world to that date. The camp was responsible for the reception, entertainment, and departure of large numbers of officers and enlisted men on their way back to the United States. The brigade returned to the United States in the summer of 1919 and was demobilized at Hampton Roads, Virginia, in August 1919.

The 5th Brigade was constructed as follows:

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<th>11th Regiment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
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<td>Company B</td>
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<td>Company C</td>
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<td>Company D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Gun Company</td>
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<td>Supply Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters Company</td>
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<tr>
<th>13th Regiment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
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<td>Company C</td>
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<td>Company D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Gun Company</td>
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<td>Supply Company</td>
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<td>Medical Detachment</td>
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<td>Headquarters Company</td>
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<tr>
<th>5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Company A, Company B, Company C, Company D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11th Regiment

Activated at Quantico on 3 January 1918, Colonel George Van Orden commanded the 11th Regiment during its entire existence. The regiment was an outgrowth of the Mobile Artillery Force and was meant to be an artillery regiment. More infantry were needed in France and, with the 5th Brigade formed, Van Orden requested the regiment be converted to infantry. His plea coincided with the request from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt for more infantry in France. In anticipation of the eventual conversion to infantry, the 11th Regiment underwent intensive infantry training at Quantico throughout the summer of 1918. On 5 September 1918, the regiment was officially designated an infantry regiment and joined the 5th Brigade; it set sail for France on 28 September.

Upon arrival in France, the 11th Regiment was split up, with several units spread all over the country. Units of this regiment performed duty at various times at the following places: Brest, Tours, Montierchaume (Indre), Havre, Gièvres (Loir-et-Cher), Marseilles, Toulon (Bouches-du-Rhône), Miramas (Bouches-du-Rhône), Issoudun (Indre), La Pallice, La Rochelle (Charente Inférieur), Mehun (Cher), Saint-Aignan-Noyers, Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher), Marans, Nevers, Aigrefeuille, Barmant, Somme, Châteauroux (Indre), and Camp Covington (Camp Carret) near Marseilles, Paris (Headquarters Detachment, American Peace Commission).

*A Ibid., 466.
The officers and enlisted performed duties of various kinds, among such being: post commanders, post and assistant post adjutants, personnel adjutants, regulating officers, assistant to the depot engineer, receiving officers, entertainment officers, assistant post chaplain, police officers, prison officers, camp guards, dock guards, commanding officers of troops, police sergeants, inspectors of the guard, district fire marshals, post welfare officers, district athletic officers, assistant provost marshals, fire patrol officers, fire marshals, transportation guard service, guard duty over prisoners, quartermaster property guard, interpreters, etc.

In early July 1919, the 11th Regiment returned to Brest and, on 29 July, it embarked aboard the USS Orizaba (ID 1536) for home. It disembarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 6 August and was deactivated there just five days later.

13th Regiment

The 13th Regiment was organized at Quantico, Virginia, 3 July 1918, with Headquarters Company and Supply Company attached. Colonel Smedley D. Butler commanded the 13th Regiment from the date of its organization until 19 November 1918, on which date Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. McDougal assumed command and remained its commanding officer until it was demobilized.

Like the 11th Regiment, the units of this regiment performed duty in the various posts in the Services of Supply, among such places being Brest, Bordeaux, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, La Pallice, Rochefort, Montoir, Bassens (Gironde), Sursol (Gironde), Casino-de-Lilas (Bordeaux), La Teste (Gironde), Beau Desert (Gironde), Nantes, Saint-Sulpice (Gironde), Savenay, Saint-Loubes (Gironde), Lormont, Carbon Blanc, Grange Neuve, Genicart, Croix d’Illins, La Baule, Isle of Saint-Anne (Nantes), Penhouet, and Usine Brulée.

The officers and men performed duties of various kinds, among such being provost guard, hospital center guard, camp guard, railroad transportation officers, commanding dock guard, dock guard, unloading ships, erecting tents at Pontanezen Barracks, military police, warehouse guards, convoying of railroad trains, special guards for shipments of commissary supplies, assistants to camp commander at Pontanezen Camp, prison guards, inspector general’s department, Base Section No. 1, Base Section No. 2, Saint-Nazaire, and Base Section No. 3, Bassens (Gironde).
stockade guard, traffic police, motor transportation convoy guard, dock guard secret service, segregation camp, and railway patrol.

When the regiment arrived, Camp Pontanezen was in the midst of the influenza epidemic. Transport ships began to arrive with great numbers of dead and dying onboard. The regiment was used to assist the troops in debarking from the transports. The Marines carried the men’s packs up the long hill and even carried the men themselves. They built camps, cooked food, and nursed the sick. For their efforts and great accomplishments, the regiment received a letter of commendation from Major General Harbord, the Services of Supply commanding general.

The regimental headquarters was moved from Bassens, near Bordeaux, France, on 13 July 1919 and returned to Camp Pontanezen. Former locations of the regimental headquarters included Bordeaux, Base Section No. 2, where the headquarters had been established as early as 6 December 1918, and where they remained until 3 July 1919, when moved to the American Guard Camp at Bassens. Field and Staff of the 1st and 3d Battalions were disbanded in France on 16 July 1919, while that of the 2d Battalion was disbanded on 20 July, with the personnel being transferred to the Regimental Field and Staff and Headquarters Company.

5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion

This battalion performed duty at Camp Pontanezen during its entire stay in France.

Camp Pontanezen, Base Section No. 5, Services of Supply

Base Section No. 5 was built around the port of Brest, which was the most important port of debarkation for personnel in France as it was the only deep-water port available to American forces.* Camp Pontanezen was one of the camps within Base Section No. 5 and was commanded by now Brigadier General Butler from 19 November 1918 to 8 April 1919.

Camp Pontanezen was first opened in December 1917 by 95th Company, 6th Regiment; half the company was used as guards upon arrival. Camp Pontanezen was located about three miles from Brest and occupied the area surrounding the Pontanezen Barracks—a stone barracks built in the time of Napoleon—and covered an area of about 650 acres. At peak, the camp was capable of holding 80,000 men, consisting of 15,000 permanent and 65,000 transient troops.

Consisting of about 1,100 buildings and broken down by use, they were as follows:

- 450 barracks, capacity 112 men each
- 62 officers quarters, capacity 2,200 officers
- 31 bathhouses
- 30 washrooms
- 39 mess halls and kitchens
- 15 troop mess halls
- 122 latrines
- 9 infirmaries
- 44 office buildings
- 283 buildings for shops, recreation, warehouses, stables, etc.

Tented areas consisted of about 6,000 tents that were well floored, strongbacked, and well-secured. Each tent held six men.

Guard Companies, Services of Supply

The use of the entire 5th Brigade by the SOS did not satisfy the wants of that tremendous organization for dependable guard units. Only part of the Marines who were evacuated for illness or wounds from the 4th Brigade recovered sufficiently to return to their organizations. Upon being discharged from hospitals, other men who were able to perform guard duty were organized into guard companies—some permanently assigned, others temporarily pending further classification. The first of these companies was organized on 23 July 1918, and became a prisoner of war escort company.

Twelve guard companies of 2 officers and approximately 100 Marines were formed from Marine Corps personnel discharged from hospitals at various times during October and November 1918, and were sent to guard SOS establishments in various parts of France. Eleven other companies, designated Guard Companies Nos. 62 to 72, inclusive, were formed during the first three months of 1919 and performed various guard duties until July 1919, when they were disbanded and their personnel returned to the United States with the 5th Brigade.

Training and Replacement Units

Overseas Depot, Quantico, Virginia

In addition to giving the enlisted men general training at Quantico in preparation for overseas and other duty, the Overseas Depot was established on 19 May 1918 for the double purpose of organizing and training units of the Marine Corps for service with the American Expeditionary Forces. The Overseas Depot consisted of an administrative staff and the various sections:

- The specialists’ schools for the technical training of the infantry and machine gun, and the coordination of these specialists’ arms;
- The tactical department for the instruction and training of overseas units in new tactical principles; and
- The enlisted staff school for the training of first sergeants, mess sergeants, cooks, company clerks, armorer, etc.

Two French and four Canadian officers, who had abundant experience fighting in Europe, were assigned as advisors of the commanding officer.

The basic independent unit of organization was the platoon, and the platoon therefore became the principal training unit. In the organization of this unit, the scheme followed was to assure to each a certain nucleus of enlisted instructors trained in the various specialties, in addition to the platoon commanders, who were qualified to carry on the instruction along approved lines within the unit. This nucleus was taken from the graduates of the specialists’ schools of the depot. When four such platoons had been formed, they were assembled into a company. The company headquarters, trained in the enlisted staff school, was added to the four platoons and the company organization was turned over to the company commander complete in all details. Battalions were likewise formed by the consolidation of companies. In every instance, the platoon,
company, and the battalion carried out a regular schedule of drills and instructions under the supervision of the depot, but all administrative details were left in the hands of the company and the battalion commanders. These training schedules were made up in the tactical department, were approved by the commanding officer, and were based on the most approved methods in effect at the time. In the cases of the formation of regimental organizations, of which there were two formed during the existence of the Overseas Depot, the battalions were turned over to the regimental commander upon being formed and, in this case, direct supervision by the depot ceased, but all facilities on hand, such as material, officers acting in an advisory capacity, training areas, etc., directly attached to the depot, were placed at the disposal of the regimental commanders who were at all times in active liaison with the depot.

About 85 percent of the troops forming the detachments arriving at the Overseas Depot for service in France had undergone not less than 8, or more than 12 weeks’ training at the regular recruit depots of the Marine Corps. The preliminary training received at these recruit depots was such as to prepare the men for general service throughout the Marine Corps, and resulted in the men being well disciplined, considering the short time they had been in the Service. This facilitated the more advanced and specialized training they were to receive at the Overseas Depot. These detachments were composed entirely of qualified riflemen, having undergone during the recruit period a most thorough and comprehensive course in the use of the rifle. Upon the arrival of these detachments, they were organized as outlined above, and the commissioned personnel were assigned to the units from the officers’ school. The schedule and drills and instructions were provided them and were carried out under the supervision of specially selected officers of the tactical department of the Overseas Depot, including the foreign officers. This training continued until the units departed for France. The Overseas Depot was redesignated as Field Training Depot by reason of altered functions on 11 March 1919.

The following units were organized by the Overseas Depot: 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Separate Battalions; 2d and 3d Machine Gun Battalions; 5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion; 2d and 3d Separate Machine Gun Battalions; and the 11th and 13th Regiments. They amounted to approximately 16,000 officers and enlisted men. The 7th and 8th Separate Battalions were organized and sent to France from Marine Barracks Parris Island, South Carolina.

The following table shows the names of the replacement organizations sent to the American Expeditionary Forces, dates of sailing and arrival, and names of vessels (table 1).
Marine Barracks Parris Island, South Carolina

The barracks, at what is known today as Parris Island, was activated on 25 October 1915 as Marine Barracks Port Royal, South Carolina. Two months after the declaration of war on Germany on 22 June 1917, the post was redesignated as Marine Barracks Parris Island. The post was named after Colonel Alexander Parris, who was one of the most conspicuous citizens of South Carolina in the 1700s. Through the early years of the post, the second “r” was often dropped believing it in error. The name was corrected with the redesignation of the post on 3 May 1919.

With the entry of the United States into World War I, an enormous expansion of the installation at Port Royal became necessary. In the course of the war, this expansion took place not only in the number of men trained, but also the variety of instruction given, and the physical plant in which these operations were conducted was likely enlarged.

On 6 April 1917, there were 835 men in training at the post; this rose to a peak of 13,286 during the war but had receded to 4,104 on the day of the Armistice. The course of instruction lasted eight weeks; the first three weeks were devoted to instruction and practice of close-order drills, physical exercise, swimming, bayonet fighting, personal combat, wall-scaling, rope climbing, etc. Weeks four and five were where recruits perfected drills, trained in boxing and wrestling, and were taught interior guard duties and exercised. The last three weeks were spent on the rifle range.

On 21 April 1917, the Bureau of Yards and Docks awarded a contract for the construction of approximately 233 temporary buildings that were completed in March 1918. These structures provided accommodations for 5,000 men, but much of the accommodations were tents. During the latter half of 1918, an additional 288 buildings were constructed, affording quarters for 4,100 enlisted, officers’ quarters, piers, and other necessary structures.*

Occupation Forces

Company E, Composite Regiment, Third Army

In April 1919, the 4th Brigade was directed to select a special company. Officers and enlisted were to be chosen for their war records and soldierly qualities. Each of the 11 infantry brigades received a similar directive. The companies were assembled at Coblenz, where they were formed into the three battalions of the Third Army’s Composite Regiment.

Captain Clifton B. Cates commanded Company E with First Lieutenant Merwin H. Silverthorn as his second-in-command. It became Company E of the 2d Battalion, also commanded by a Marine officer, Major Frederick A. Barker, commander of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, after Soissons. Cates recalled in an oral history interview the conditions of choosing the men of the unit, “We had I think about twelve or fourteen lieutenants and about 400 enlisted men that were already hand-picked. The first requirement was they had to be five feet ten inches tall and they had to have been in combat operations and they had to be in good shape physically.”

In June 1919, after working up to near perfection in drill and ceremonial routine, “Pershing’s Own,” as the Composite Regiment was nicknamed, left Coblenz for Paris and an interesting summer. The Summer Olympic Games missed a quadrennial during the war. The Allied Armies, with the U.S. Army acting as the moving spirit, made up for it in part by staging the Inter-Allied Games. Pershing Stadium was formally opened on 22 June by General Pershing and Premier Georges Clemenceau, who reviewed the regiment that subsequently performed guard and ceremonial duties during the games.

Then Independence Day ceremonies commenced and, 10 days later on Bastille Day, marked proud moments for Cates and 100 of his Marines as they marched in the great victory parade. Although the regiment was at reduced strength on that occasion, the order of march was the same. The Marines were just behind the massed colors and standards

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* Gen Clifton B. Cates intvw with Benis Frank, 1967 (Oral History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA), 38.
of the 36 regiments of the Third Army as they passed through the Arc de Triomphe and down the Champs-Élysées to the Place de la Concorde.

After the victory parade in Paris, Cates’ Company E accompanied General Pershing to London. Guard officers acted as personal hosts to the American officers. After a splendid few days that included an inspection by the Prince of Wales in Hyde Park and marching in another victory parade on Empire Day,* the regiment crossed the English Channel again to embark on the USS Leviathan (SP 1326) and return home with Pershing. On 19 September 1919, Company E was detached and transferred to Marine Barracks Washington, where, on the 20th, Cates paid and discharged his men.

Provisional Battalion
(Schleswig-Holstein Battalion)

Prior to the departure of the Marine brigades from France in the summer of 1919, a battalion of Marines, first known as Provisional Battalion, U.S. Marines, but whose designation later was changed to the 15th Separate Battalion, was organized at Camp Pontanezen for duty in connection with the Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite; a mission for which the battalion was never used. The battalion, made up of selected personnel from the 13th Regiment (Company E, and 47 enlisted men of the Machine Gun Company), units of the 4th Brigade and personnel from the 12th Separate Battalion, was under the command of Major Charles F. B. Price.

The battalion, also known as the Schleswig-Holstein Battalion, rendered honors to General Pershing on 1 September 1919 upon his departure from France and, on the same day, was inspected by Marshal Foch, who commended the battalion on its splendid appearance. A few days later, the battalion proceeded to Bordeaux, France, via the USS Mercury (ID 3012) and took part in the ceremonies laying the foundation for the monument at Pointe de Grave, commemorating the entrance of the United States into the World War.*

Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol,
Third Army Water Transportation Service

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army of Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the outstanding features being the establishment of a Rhine River Patrol, manned and commanded by Marines.**

Since one of the conditions of the Armistice did not allow German police in the occupied zones to carry weapons, the Third Army took responsibility for policing the river with patrol boats. Under the direction of the Inter-Allied Waterways Commission, the Allied armies controlled the commercial traffic and navigation on the rivers in their zones.

They were also therefore required to patrol the rivers. The British and French brought their own boats on the Rhine for this purpose, but the American's used confiscated German patrol boats. Because of the potential for running into armed criminals and smugglers, Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments were assigned as boat crew and to man the deck cannons and machine guns. The American river patrol fleet consisted of 14 vessels and was manned by 8 officers and 190 enlisted Marines. The largest of these riverboats was the *Preussen* (1903), which was also used by Major General Joseph T. Dickman, commanding general, Third Army, on his inspection tours of the bridgehead. *Preussen* had a working crew of 29 Marines and 6 Germans and was heavily armed with two 37mm cannons and six machine guns.

The *Mosel* was the second largest of the vessels and was used as a supply boat, carrying provisions for the patrol stations and troops stationed along the river. It was poised, had the need come to fruition, to provide humanitarian aid to Cochem, Germany, in 1919 when it was nearly cut off by rising river waters. In addition to the *Preussen* and *Mosel*, Marines commanded the following other ships as well: SS *Rhein*, SS *Borussia* (1912), SS *Elsa*, SS *Albertus Magnus*, SS *Frauenlob*, and SS *Rheingold*, as well as three stations and at least six or seven smaller vessels manned by Marines.

**France Map Detachment, Saint-Étienne-à-Ardennes, France**

Initially the idea of Major Charles D. Barrett, the France Map Detachment was created to survey the battlefield of Belleau Wood and then create a large-scale relief map. Since First Lieutenant Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. had studied civil engineering at college and was well versed in topography, Barrett asked him to return to France and assist. Shepherd recalled, “Barrett obtained authority to carry out his proposal to make a relief map of Belleau Woods. Upon the disbandment of the Brigade at Quantico we organized a mapping detachment consisting of four officers who were familiar with map making and six enlisted men to be rodmen and automobile drivers. We obtained transits, drawing boards and other engineering equipment from the Marine Corps Schools and within two weeks we sailed back to France.”

During an oral history interview in 1967, Shepherd further explained the detachment’s mission:

Since Major Barrett was an accomplished Cartographer he envisioned making a topographical map from which a relief map could be reproduced in plaster-of-paris. The scale of the map was 1 to 100 or one inch on the map represented one hundred feet on the ground. Such a large scale map would show every terrain feature in detail—woods, fields, farms and individual houses in the villages included in the area. Since the only relief map of any size in existence at the time was the one of the Gettys-

* Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd intvw with Benis Frank, 1967 (Oral History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA).
burg battlefield made many years previously, we became pioneers in the field of relief maps before the project was completed and originated several unique techniques in their construction. The France Map Detachment, as our unit was officially named, consisted of Major Barrett in command, Captain [Samuel C.] Cumming operated the transit and I did the sketching. The two enlisted men were used as rodmen. Barrett, with a draftsman, transferred the topographical sketches the two parties made in the field to a master map in his office. In addition to the sketching parties, Barrett took along an enlisted artist who made colored drawings of the houses platted on the map and a warrant officer by the name of Gustav [A.] Brodstrom modeled the houses in clay and painted them to correspond to the original dwellings. The terrain Major Barrett assigned to be mapped included all of Belleau Wood and an area of equal size to the west which included Hill 142 and Le Mares Farm where the Fifth Marines had stopped the German attack prior to the Fourth Brigade assault on Belleau Wood. The mapping of the area took about three months. Following our return to Quantico it took six months to complete the relief map which was about sixteen feet square.*

* Ibid.

**Army Units Commanded by Marines (battalion or larger)**

As the U.S. forces rapidly mobilized and deployed to France, the need for officers was readily apparent. General Pershing and the AEF Headquarters filled those vacancies with capable officers, regardless of Service. Believing Marines were wholly capable as soldiers and officers, several were used to fill the gaps.

**Women Marines**

By July 1918, the demands of the war hit an all-time high; the heavy fighting and mounting casualties abroad were increasing an already acute shortage of trained personnel. As fast as men could be spared, they were sent to join Marine units at the front in France. When it was discovered that there was a sizable number of battle-ready Marines in the United States still doing clerical work who were urgently needed overseas, the Corps turned in desperation to the female business world.

Major General Commandant George Barnett, in an effort to determine how many men could be released, dispatched memorandums to the offices of the Quartermaster, Paymaster, and Adjutant and Inspector asking for an analysis by the directors of each as to the feasibility of using women as replacements for male troops. In every case, it was agreed that there were areas in which women with clerical skills could be used on an immediate basis. Interestingly enough, although it was estimated that about 40 percent of the work at headquarters could be performed equally well by women, it was believed that a larger number of women than men would be needed to do the same amount of work.
General Barnett wrote a letter to the secretary of the Navy on 2 August 1918 requesting authority to enroll women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty at Headquarters Marine Corps and at other Marine Corps offices in the United States where their services might be used to replace men who may be qualified for active field service. In a letter dated 8 August 1918, Secretary Josephus Daniels gave his official approval to the request and authority was granted to enroll women as Marines.

Overnight the word was spread via newspapers and enthusiastic Marines and, on 13 August 1918, women by the thousands flooded into recruiting offices across the country. The Marine Corps had very definite ideas as to the type of women it wanted as members of the Corps. Recruiting officers were instructed to enroll only women of excellent character, neat appearance, and with business or office experience. While the greatest need was for stenographers, bookkeepers, accountants, and typists, applicants who had considerable experience handling correspondence and general office work and could show evidence of exceptional ability in this line were given consideration.

Recruiting orders stipulated that women reservists were to be between 18 and 40 years of age, but that an applicant slightly younger than 18 years of age, who is in every respect very desirable, may be enrolled with the consent of her parents. In addition, each applicant was required to submit to a thorough physical examination before her final acceptance. While this seemed a simple task, it presented unusual problems as the enlistment requirements established by naval medical regulations were designed for men only. Medical officers, it seems, were as uneasy with the situation as were the women applicants when it came time for the examination. In an effort to establish a policy guiding medical officers, Headquarters Marine Corps released a “circular” on 14 August 1918 giving detailed instructions as to the enlistment requirements expected.

The women selected for duty with the Marine Corps were enrolled as privates in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4, for a period of four years. Each applicant was required to furnish three letters of recommendation and, if possible, was given an interview with the head of the office in which she was to be assigned.

The muster roll for Headquarters Marine Corps dated January 1919 shows the distribution of women reservists to the various departments as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Sergeant</th>
<th>Corporal</th>
<th>Private First Class</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjudant and Inspector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BGen Charles H. Lauchheimer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BGen Charles L. McCawley)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paymaster</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BGen George Richards)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to doing the clerical and routine office work at the recruiting stations the women were also used as recruiter’s aides. They were reported to be very impressive with their "trim and snappy appearance and their business-like attention to their work." The women were effectively used for publicity in bond drives and rallies, photographs, and as members of recruiting teams touring the country with Marine Corps exhibits.

In most cases, the male Marines were very protective of the women and helped them as much as they could in the performance of their jobs. Although some of the women came up against negative attitudes harbored by Marines who felt that the Corps “stepped down” when it enrolled women, most of the female reservists, regardless of where they were stationed, felt that they were treated as equals.

With the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the urgent need for the support of female labor gradually decreased and, finally on 15 July 1919, orders were issued by the Major General

Commandant for the transfer of “all reservists on clerical duty at Headquarters . . . to inactive status prior to 11 August 1919.” With traditional Marine Corps pomp and circumstance, a great ceremony was arranged on the occasion of their departure from the Corps back into civilian life. Major General Barnett accompanied by his complete staff and the Marine Corps band reviewed the women for the last time on the White House lawn. As the women completed their final pass-in-review, Josephus Daniels stepped up to give the farewell address. Disenrollment from the Marine Corps Reserve (inactive status) took place at a steady but gradual rate, and eventually all women were discharged, although this was as late as 1922 in some cases.*

**Marine Corps Reserve**

On 29 August 1916, Congress passed the Naval Appropriations Act, which gave statutory authority to establish the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve was patterned after the Naval Reserve Force and consisted of five classes of personnel:

- Fleet Marine Corps Reserve
- Marine Corps Reserve A
- Marine Corps Reserve B
- Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps
- Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve

In addition to the five classes of Reserves, the act also contained provisions for the Naval Militia and the National Naval Volunteers.

The extent to which individual Marine Corps Reserves were involved in World War I is not clearly documented. The role of the Reserves in France is obscure, partly because official records often combined Regulars, “For the Duration” Regulars, and Reserves.

The Reserve members of the Corps who fought in France did so with distinction and sacrifice. Of the 8,248 enrolled, the casualty statistics record the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of other causes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three officers and 18 enlisted men were cited for gallantry.*

**Naval Medical Personnel**

To discuss the Marines in World War I and not mention those brave men who served, lived, and died with the Marines would be a blatant oversight. The medical personnel, surgeons, corpsmen, and others served a vital and indispensable role of preserving life wherever necessary and possible.

Throughout the Corps, naval medical officers and hospital corpsmen were attached to recruiting stations as physical examiners. They “entered into the general Marine Corps spirit” and were kept busy examining the thousands of recruits.

On 15 May 1917, Lieutenant William L. Mann Jr. (Medical Corps), USN, was ordered to Quantico as the post surgeon; he was the medical pioneer in the huge construction and training program that grew up out of nothing in a matter of weeks. Training for active field service and the actual distribution of medical personnel to the new war strength organizations (companies, battalions, and regiments) were conceived and worked out by the post administrative staff under Lieutenant Mann.

Battalion dispensaries and post sick quarters were built, equipped, and occupied. Large numbers of troops were inspected for communicable diseases upon arrival in trains from all over the United States. Sick call, physical inspections, problems of quarantine, mass vaccination, and training of new medical personnel, sanitary inspections, and mosquito control—all were accomplished while organizing a huge war camp with full war strength regiments during a period of significant transition. In addition to caring for the induction health inspections and the regular medical care of the Marines, Lieutenant Mann was also responsible for

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Annotated Order of Battle

2,000 civilian workmen employed in the construction of the camp.

Once overseas, the general duties of the medical personnel were those incident to the health and comfort of the Marines—billet hygiene and sanitation. Wherever the Marines were assigned, at least one representative (typically a hospital corpsman) was to be found. This person’s responsibility was the care of the health of his Marines. He not only gave treatment to the sick, but he took all necessary precautions to prevent illness.

The attached medical personnel for each regiment consisted of 7 medical officers, 3 dental surgeons, and 48 hospital corpsmen. Generally, the medical detachments of regiments were distributed as follows:

Regimental Headquarters—Regimental Aid Station

- Surgeon (senior medical officer)
- Assistant
- Dental surgeon (senior dental officer)
- Chief pharmacist’s mate (senior)
- Hospital corpsmen (six to eight)

Battalion Headquarters—Battalion Aid Station

- Surgeon
- Assistant
- Dental surgeon (if available)
- Chief pharmacist’s mate
- Hospital corpsmen (five to seven)

Each Company

- Hospital corpsmen (two to four)

Where the Marines bled and died, so did the medical personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy Medical Personnel</th>
<th>Total Hospital Corps Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Regiment</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Regiment</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Machine Gun Battalion</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 4th Brigade</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 331 officers and men of the Medical Department serving in the actual combat in France received 648 decorations and awards—a stunning 207 percent. Six Medals of Honor were awarded to naval medical personnel for their actions while serving with the Marines; two were dental surgeons.*

APPENDIX A
COMMAND LIST

Combat Forces

4th Brigade, France

23 October–9 November 1917  BGen Charles A. Doyen
9 November–8 December 1917  LtCol Hiram I. Bearss (Acting)
8 December 1917–9 April 1918  BGen Charles A. Doyen
9–11 April 1918  Col Wendell C. Neville (Acting)
11 April–7 May 1918  BGen Charles A. Doyen
7 May–15 July 1918  BGen/MajGen James G. Harbord,*
U.S. Army
15–17 July 1918  LtCol Harry Lee (Acting)
17–26 July 1918  Col Wendell C. Neville (Acting)
26–29 July 1918  BGen John A. Lejeune
29 July 1918–2 March 1919  Col/BGen Wendell C. Neville*
2–14 March 1919  Col Logan Feland (Acting)
14 March–11 May 1919  BGen Wendell C. Neville
11 May–16 June 1919  Col Harry Lee (Acting)
16–17 June 1919  BGen Wendell C. Neville
17–22 June 1919  Col Harold C. Snyder (Acting)
22 June–12 July 1919  BGen Wendell C. Neville
12–23 July 1919  Col Harry Lee (Acting)
23 July–3 August 1919  BGen Wendell C. Neville

5th Regiment

7 June–10 July 1917  Col Charles A. Doyen
11–16 July 1917  Maj Logan Feland
17 July–1 August 1917  Col Charles A. Doyen

* Indicates promotion to the next higher grade while serving in the billet.
Appendix A

2 August 1917 LtCol Logan Feland (Acting)
3 August–23 October 1917 Col Charles A. Doyen
24–29 October 1917 Maj Frederick M. Wise
30 October–31 December 1917 LtCol Hiram I. Bearss
1 January–7 July 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville
8–25 July 1918 LtCol Logan Feland
26–27 July 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville
28 July 1918–20 March 1919 Col Logan Feland
21 March–13 August 1919 Col Harold C. Snyder

5th Regiment Base Detachment
20–30 June 1917 Capt Tracy G. Hunter Jr.

Commanding Headquarters Company
(no detachment commander listed)
1 July–7 September 1917 LtCol Hiram I. Bearss
8 September–24 November 1917 Maj Edward A. Greene
25–30 November 1917 Capt Bailey M. Coffenberg
1 December 1917–23 January 1918 Capt Tracy G. Hunter Jr.

6th Regiment

11 July–15 November 1917 Col Albertus W. Catlin
16 November 1917–15 January 1918 Maj Frank E. Evans
16 January–6 June 1918 Col Albertus W. Catlin
7 June–12 July 1918 LtCol Harry Lee
13–15 July 1918 Maj Thomas Holcomb
16 July 1918–12 August 1919 LtCol Harry Lee

6th Machine Gun Battalion

17 August 1917–10 June 1918 Maj Edward B. Cole
10–21 June 1918 Capt George H. Osterhout
21 June–24 October 1918 Maj Littleton W. T. Waller Jr.
24 October 1918–31 July 1919 Maj Matthew H. Kingman

3d Provisional Brigade (Fort Crockett, Texas)

29 August 1918–8 March 1919 BGens James E. Mahoney
Command List

8th Regiment

1 February 1918–25 April 1919  Col Laurence H. Moses

9th Regiment

18 August 1918–25 April 1919  Col George C. Reid

Aviation Forces

1st Marine Aviation Force and Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group

1 September 1918–7 December 1918  Maj Alfred A. Cunningham

1st Marine Aeronautic Company, Ponta Delgada, Azores

1 October 1917–18 July 1918  Maj Francis T. Evans
19 July 1918–1 April 1919  Maj David L. S. Brewster

Ships Detachments, Naval Base Detachments, and Miscellaneous

Marine Barracks, Naval Station Guam

6 April–28 September 1917  LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley
29 September 1917–27 July 1918  Maj Edward B. Manwaring
28 July–12 November 1918  Capt/Maj Ralph J. Mitchell*

7th Company, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces

1–12 February 1918  Capt John C. Foster
13 February–25 March 1918  1stLt Edward L. Burwell Jr.
26 March–2 April 1918  Capt John C. Foster
3 April–10 October 1918  1stLt/Capt Edward L. Burwell Jr.

Foreign Expeditionary Detachment, Naval Base Number 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores

6 December 1917–21 November 1918  Capt Maurice G. Holmes
22 November–14 December 1918  Capt William H. Haggerty
15 December 1918–14 September 1919  1stLt John D. Lockburner**

136th Company, Naval Base Number 29, Cardiff, Wales

30 September 1918–2 May 1919  Capt/Maj John M. Tildsley*
3 May–24 July 1919  Capt Judson H. Fitz-Gerald

** Company disbanded on 14 September 1919. Lockburner remained in Ponta Delgada as ordnance and communications officer until mid-December 1920.
Appendix A

Marine Detachment, Lafayette Radio Station

2 April 1919–28 February 1920 Capt Edward B. Hope

Marine Detachment, Naval Headquarters, London, England

6 September 1917–22 June 1918 1stSgt Otto N. Roos
23 June–14 October 1918 1stLt/Capt Vincent E. Healy*

Marine Detachment, Headquarters Naval Aviation Forces/Naval Forces in France

2 January 1918–9 October 1918 Capt Charles P. Gilchrist
10 October 1918–5 February 1919 1stLt/Capt Joseph P. Gargan*
6 February 1919–19 April 1919 1stLt Albert B. Sage
20 April 1919–15 January 1920 1stLt James W. Flett
16 January 1920–31 July 1920 1stSgt Walter A. Rawnsley

Marine Detachment, U.S. Embarkation Office, Liverpool, England

1 December 1917–24 May 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

Marine Detachment, U.S. Debarkation Office, Liverpool, England

25 May–22 September 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

Marine Detachment, Camp Rochambeau, Tours, France

1 February–31 March 1919 LtCol Charles T. Westcott

Office of the Chief Paymaster, U.S. Marines, France

4 October 1917–30 August 1919 Capt/Maj Davis B. Wills*

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet, with British Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow and Firth of Forth

Division Senior Marine: Maj Nelson P. Vulte

Division 6, Atlantic Fleet, Castletown Brehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland

Division Senior Marine: Maj Leon W. Hoyt

Asiatic Fleet, Vladivostok, Siberia

25 August 1915–17 July 1917 Col Carl Gamborg-Andersen
18 July 1917–24 April 1918 LtCol Louis McC. Little
25 April–2 May 1918 Maj Paul E. Chamberlin
2 May–24 June 1918 Capt Archie F. Howard
24 June 1918–13 November 1919 Maj/LtCol Eli T. Fryer*
**Command List**

*Marine Detachment, U.S. Naval Radio Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, Siberia*

- 24 February 1920–22 September 1920  
  1stLt Judson H. Fitz-Gerald
- 23 September 1920–6 March 1921  
  1stSgt Richard H. Harnett
- 7 March 1921–29 April 1921  
  Sgt Oscar Laemmert
- 30 April 1921–15 August 1922  
  1stSgt James M. Davis
- 16 August 1922–19 November 1922  
  1stSgt Earl C. Harrah**

*American Naval Planning Section, London*

- 26 February–24 November 1918  
  LtCol/Col Robert H. Dunlap*
- 14 September 1918–March 1919  
  Col Louis McC. Little

*American Rest Camp, Southampton, England*

- 1 October 1917–28 February 1918  
  Maj Julius S. Turrill

*Marine Detachment, 2d Supply Train, 2d Division, U.S. Army*

- 6–20 August 1919  
  1stLt Carl J. Norstrand

*Virgin Islands*

*Marine Barracks St. Thomas and all Marines ashore in the Virgin Islands*

- 21 April 1917–3 May 1919  
  Maj/LtCol Jay M. Salladay*
- 4 May 1919–1 June 1921  
  Maj/LtCol Raymond B. Sullivan*

*Services of Supply Forces*

*5th Brigade*

- 5 September 1918–31 March 1919  
  BGen Eli K. Cole
- 1–9 April 1919  
  Maj Charles D. Barrett (Acting)
- 9 April–12 August 1919  
  BGen Smedley D. Butler

*11th Regiment*

- 20 August 1917–11 August 1919  
  LtCol/Col George Van Orden*

*13th Regiment*

- 3 July–19 November 1918  
  Col Smedley D. Butler
- 19 November 1918–12 August 1919  
  LtCol Douglas C. McDougal

** On 19 November 1922, the detachment transferred to Marine Barracks Naval Station Cavite, Philippine Islands, upon the turning over of the U.S. Naval Radio Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, to the government of Russia.
Appendix A

5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion
28 September–7 November 1918 Maj Ernest A. Perkins
8–11 November 1918 Capt Franklin A. Hart
11 November 1918–12 August 1919 Maj Allen H. Turnage*

Camp Pontanezen, Base Section Number 5, Services of Supply
19 November 1918–8 April 1919 BGen Smedley D. Butler

Marine Guard Battalion #1
6 February–24 July 1919 Maj L. H. Miller

Training and Replacement Units**

Overseas Depot, Quantico, Virginia
19 May 1918–11 March 1919 Maj Philip H. Torrey

Marine Barracks Parris Island, South Carolina
25 October 1915–11 February 1917 Capt Elias R. Beadle
12 February–18 December 1917 Col Thomas C. Treadwell
19 December 1917–25 January 1918 Maj Elias R. Beadle (Acting)
26 January–1 September 1918 BGen Eli K. Cole
2 September–12 November 1918 BGen John T. Myers

Marine Training Battalion
20 June 1918–25 August 1918 1stLt David R. Kilduff

1st Training Regiment
7 September–December 1918 Col Louis M. Gulick

1st Training Battalion, 1st Training Regiment
8 September–6 October 1918 Capt Arnold W. Jacobsen
7–12 October 1918 Vacant
13 October–18 November 1918 Maj Harold L. Parsons

Training Battalion, 1st Training Regiment***
9 September–10 November 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse
11–18 November 1918 Maj Adolph B. Miller
19–30 November 1918 Maj Harold L. Parsons

** Locations in France unless otherwise noted.
*** On 9 September 1918, the battalion was redesignated from 6th Separate Battalion.
### Command List

**1st Training Machine Gun Battalion, 1st Training Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11–26 September 1918</td>
<td>Capt Thomas M. Luby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September–16 October 1918</td>
<td>Capt Pink H. Stone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 January–10 June 1918</td>
<td>Maj Ralph S. Keyser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2d Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 February–13 September 1918</td>
<td>Maj Harold C. Snyder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3d Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 April–31 May 1918</td>
<td>Maj Richard P. Williams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**12th Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 May–28 July 1919</td>
<td>Maj Ross E. Rowell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1st Machine Gun Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 May–27 August 1918</td>
<td>Maj Arthur J. O’Leary</td>
</tr>
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**1st Casual Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 May–30 June 1918</td>
<td>No battalion commanders listed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2d Casual Replacement Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–28 June 1918</td>
<td>2dLt Augustine Healy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June–31 July 1918</td>
<td>Capt Reginald R. Hogan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3d Separate Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 July–31 August 1918</td>
<td>Capt Rupert M. Purstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4th Separate Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 July–6 August 1918</td>
<td>Capt Edward M. Reno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August–7 September 1918</td>
<td>Capt Arnold W. Jacobsen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5th Separate Battalion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 July–1 August 1918</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–3 August 1918</td>
<td>Capt Paul C. Marmion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–6 August 1918</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August–6 September 1918</td>
<td>Capt Clarence N. McClure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**On 8 January 1918, the battalion was redesignated from Training Battalion, 6th Regiment.**
Appendix A

6th Separate Battalion**

- 6–30 August 1918 Capt Kirt Green
- 1–8 September 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

7th Separate Battalion

- 19 October 1918–Unknown Maj Epaminondas L. Bigler
- Maj Miles R. Thacher

8th Separate Battalion

- 19 October 1918–Unknown Maj Epaminondas L. Bigler
- Maj James L. Underhill

9th Separate Battalion

- 22 October–19 November 1918 Maj Edwin N. McClellan

1st Separate Machine Gun Battalion

- 1 August–10 September 1918 Capt/Maj Thomas Luby*

Diplomatic Couriers and Marine Detachment,
Naval Headquarters Couriers

Diplomatic Couriers

- Gunner Edward Driscoll
- GySgt Charles W. Harwood
- SgtMaj/Gunner Edward*
- GySgt Paul Henninger
- Rowland (Ret)
- GySgt George J. Kelley
- 1stSgt/Gunner Joseph J. Franklin*
- GySgt William O’Grady
- Gunner Otto N. Roos
- GySgt Donald G. Oglesby
- SgtMaj Frank Frazier
- GySgt William R. Sands
- 1stSgt Michael Fitzgerald
- GySgt John P. Steele
- 1stSgt Michael Maloney
- GySgt George H. Barrett
- 1stSgt Willard W. Sibert
- GySgt Daniel W. Brosman
- GySgt Thomas C. Baisden
- Sgt Edward Conwill
- GySgt Earl M. Christy

Naval Headquarters Couriers

- Sgt Christopher Thedorf
- Sgt Marcellin Hoeveler
- Sgt Jack W. Evans
- Sgt Ray Trulock

** On 9 September 1918, the battalion was redesignated as 2d Training Battalion.
Sgt Edward Conwill  Cpl Lester H. Auerbach
Sgt Lester E. Duval  Cpl Jim Wheeler
Sgt Louis N. Flatten

Occupation Forces

Company E, Composite Regiment, Third Army

23 July–20 September 1919  Capt Clifton B. Cates

Provisional Battalion (Schleswig-Holstein Battalion)

23 June 1919–13 March 1920  Maj Charles F. B. Price

Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, Third Army Water Transportation Service

18 December 1918–13 March 1919  Capt Robert H. Shiel
14 March–8 July 1919  1stLt/Capt Lloyd A. Houchin*

Ships and Stations of the Rhine River Patrol

SS Mosel (1872)  Capt Gaines Moseley
SS Preussen (1903)  1stLt William L. Harding Jr.
SS Rhein (1899)  1stLt Harold W. Whitney
SS Borussia (1912)  2dLt Guy D. Atmore
SS Elsa (1906)  2dLt Morris C. Richardson
SS Rheingold
SS Albertus Magnus  2dLt George R. Rowan
SS Frauenlob  2dLt James E. Stanners
Stadt Dusseldorf Station  2dLt Elmer L. Sutherland
Andernach Station  2dLt John T. Thornton
Remagen Station  2dLt Vernon Bourdette

France Map Detachment, Saint-Étienne-à-Ardennes, France

17 May 1920–13 January 1921  Capt Samuel C. Cumming
1st Group  Capt Lemuel C. Shepherd
2d Group  1stLt Lother R. Long
Army Units Commanded by Marines
(battalion or larger)**

2d Division

26 October–8 November 1917  BGen Charles A. Doyen
28 July 1918–15 July 1919  MajGen John A. Lejeune

41st Division (1st Depot Division)

29 October–26 December 1918  BGen Eli K. Cole

2d Brigade, 1st Division

22 July–8 August 1917  Col Charles A. Doyen
14–18 August 1917
26–28 August 1917

8th Brigade, 4th Division

15–24 January 1919  Col Frederick M. Wise

51st Brigade, 26th Division

15–24 October 1918  Col Hiram I. Bearss
9–23 November 1918

64th Brigade, 32d Division

9–25 July 1918  BGen John A. Lejeune

82d Brigade, 41st Division

21–26 December 1918  LtCol Pagsley M. Rixey

59th Infantry, 4th Division

5 September–31 December 1918  Col Frederick M. Wise

17th Field Artillery, 2d Division

30 October 1918–8 February 1919  Col Robert H. Dunlap

102d Infantry, 26th Division

26 August–14 October 1918  Col Hiram I. Bearss
25 October–8 November 1918
24 November–7 December 1918

** Dates listed are only those during which a Marine was in command of the Army unit.
1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2d Division
24 August 1918–21 January 1919 Maj Edward H. Brainard

1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Division
1 May–7 July 1918 Maj Robert L. Denig

3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, 2d Division
26 February–30 April 1918 Colonel Hiram I. Bearss
30 July–3 October 1918 Maj Robert L. Denig

3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Division
May 1918–June 1918 Maj Edward W. Sturdevant

3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Division
April 1918 Maj Harry G. Barlett

3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 3d Division
April 1918–7 July 1918 Maj Robert E. Adams

1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, 26th Division
Summer 1918 Maj Charles T. Westcott

1st Battalion, 365th Infantry, 92d Division
July–September 1918 Maj Edward W. Sturdevant
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AND ABBREVIATIONS

This appendix can be found on the supplementary microfilm reel for the World War Casualties within the Muster Rolls of the Marine Corps. It is reproduced in its entirety.

(*) indicates further description at end.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft or Army Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Service or Army Ambulance Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AASC</td>
<td>Army Air Service Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Army Corps or Air Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>American Civil Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Army Candidates School or Aero Construction Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC of S</td>
<td>Acting (Assistant) Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj</td>
<td>Adjutant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admitted (to hospital, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>American Embarkation Center(^1) or American Education Center (AEF University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Forces(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEFU</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Forces University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF in F</td>
<td>American Forces in France(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF in G</td>
<td>American Forces in Germany(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGD</td>
<td>Adjutant General's Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Adjutant General's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Army Infantry Specialists (School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb</td>
<td>Ambulance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>American Military Cemetery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A of O</td>
<td>Army of Occupation (in Germany)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Established 3 January 1919 at Le Mans; disestablished on 16 July 1919.

\(^2\) In some instances, AEF was made singular. For our purposes, it will be made plural.

\(^3\) Created 22 August 1919 to function beginning 1 September 1919 in place of general headquarters (GHQ).

\(^4\) On 2 July 1919, Third Army was deactivated and staff and troops remaining in Germany on and after 3 July 1919 were designated as AF in G.
### Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Air Production Center[^5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Assistant Provost Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>American Post Office[^6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>American Post Office Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCMH</td>
<td>American Red Cross Military Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arr</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Advanced Section[^6] or Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Army Service Corps[^7] or Air Service Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asgd</td>
<td>Assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASS, Fr. H</td>
<td>American Statistical Section, French Hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Acting Town Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Antitetanic Serum (administered) or Army Transportation Service[^8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Articles of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWL</td>
<td>Absent with (official) Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>Absent without Official Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>Battalion Aid Station or Brigade Ambulance Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Base Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORU</td>
<td>Bordeaux Overseas Replacement Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Bedridden (naval classification of patients received on naval transports for the United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Base Section (a geographical division of the Services of Supply)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BX</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Coast Artillery Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal</td>
<td>Caliber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Aviation Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASC</td>
<td>Corps Air Service Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief, Air Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Cerebro [Cerebral] Spinal Meningitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Casual Camp or Casual Company or Convalescent Center or Convalescent Camp or Company</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[^5]: Opened winter of 1917–18 at Romorantin, France.
[^6]: Established 4 July 1917 with headquarters (HQ) at Nevers; on 17 September 1917 in Is-sur-Tille; on 1 November 1917 in Neufléchâteau, Belgium; on 20 January 1918 in Langres, France; on 15 June 1918 in Nogent-en-Bassigny; on 23 October 1918 in Neufléchâteau; and on 12 June 1919 in Is-sur-Tille.
[^7]: Established 22 August 1918 and furnished detachments for various special services in the AEF.
[^8]: Established 18 October 1917 and combined with Transportation Service on 18 December 1917.
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;C</td>
<td>Casualties and Changes (a record form of AGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>Casual Camp, Orleans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDH</td>
<td>Contagious Disease Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Engineer Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Casual from Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C fr C</td>
<td>Casual from Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief, Gas Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Camp Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl.</td>
<td>Colonial (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class. Cp.</td>
<td>Classification Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clf. Cp.</td>
<td>Classification Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cm</td>
<td>Centimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMT</td>
<td>Chief, Motor Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Casual Officers' Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COD</td>
<td>Casual Officers' Depot&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORD</td>
<td>Casual Officers' Replacement Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conc. HC</td>
<td>Convalescent Hospital Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C of S</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Central Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPWE</td>
<td>Central Prisoner of War Enclosure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQM</td>
<td>Chief Quartermaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Central Records Office&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>Chemical Warfare Service&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAH</td>
<td>Disordered Action of Heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Dental Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>Dismounted Cavalry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>District Criminal Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>Division of Casualty Replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Detached Duty or Depot Division&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del.</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHQ</td>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Infantry Division (French)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>9</sup> Opened at Blois, France, on 18 January 1918 as a depot for classification and distribution of casual officers arriving from the United States and from organizations in the AEF. Another COD was established at Gondrecourt on 22 February 1919.

<sup>10</sup> Organized on 20–21 May 1918 at Saint-Pierre-des-Corps, but was moved to Tours on 15 September 1918.

<sup>11</sup> Created on 28 June 1918 from the Gas Service.
Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dis.Bks.</td>
<td>Disciplinary Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D of P</td>
<td>District of Paris[^12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D of ST</td>
<td>Director of Storage and Traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dental Reserve Corps or Daily Report of Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D of W</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWC</td>
<td>Duty with Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Engineer Corps or Embarkation Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Extra Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Enlisted Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ent.</td>
<td>Entered (hospital or on record)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Embarkation Order or Embarkation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPD</td>
<td>Extra Police Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Expert Rifleman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>First Aid Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Fracture, compound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Fracture, compound, comminuted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fme.</td>
<td>Farm (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fne.</td>
<td>Fountain or spring (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Field Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>From</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Fracture, simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>Field Service Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUO</td>
<td>Fever of unknown origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Group of Armées of Center (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAE</td>
<td>Group of Armées of the East (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Group of Armées of Flanders (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAN</td>
<td>Group of Armées of the North (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>Group of Armées of Reserve (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Group de Combat or combat group, fighting unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCM</td>
<td>General Court Martial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gd. Co.</td>
<td>Guard Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gd. Div.</td>
<td>Grand Division, a railway operating unit of the Transportation Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^12]: On 6 May 1918, geographical boundaries defined as comprising Departments of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GH</td>
<td>Gas Hospital or General Hospital (in United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Gassed in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GISD</td>
<td>General Intermediate Storage Depot (at Gièvres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Purchasing Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPC</td>
<td>German Prison Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GQG</td>
<td>Grand Quartier General (French GHQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRS</td>
<td>Graves Registration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff or Gas Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Administrative Section, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Section, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>Operations Section, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Supply Section, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>Training Section, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSW</td>
<td>Gunshot wound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Hospital Ambulance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Hospital Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HES</td>
<td>High Explosive Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFA</td>
<td>Heavy Field Artillery (in orders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOE</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HT</td>
<td>Hospital Train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Tr.</td>
<td>Hospital Train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>In action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Infected Connective Tissue (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIB</td>
<td>Initial Information Blank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILOD</td>
<td>In Line of Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>Infantry or Infirmary or Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Intermediate Section\textsuperscript{13} or Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISD</td>
<td>Intermediate Salvage (or Storage) Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWS</td>
<td>Infantry Weapons School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHG</td>
<td>Justice Hospital Group (hospitals located in or near Justice Barracks, near Toul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>Kilometer = 1,000 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>In line of duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Bn</td>
<td>Labor Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{13} Created on 13 August 1917 by territorial organization of the Line of Communication with HQ at Nevers.
### Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. of C</td>
<td>Line of Communication(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>Liaison Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Meter or Morphine (administered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Medical Corps or Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.Tr.Bn.</td>
<td>Marine Training Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.Tr.Rgt.</td>
<td>Marine Training Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.</td>
<td>Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.Seg.Cp.</td>
<td>Medical Segregation Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ment.</td>
<td>Mental (naval classification of patients received on naval transports for the United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Machine Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGB</td>
<td>Machine Gun Bullet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Bn</td>
<td>Machine Gun Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>Mobile Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil.</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil.Sp.Co.</td>
<td>Military Specialists Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Motor Mechanics or Marksman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm</td>
<td>Millimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORS</td>
<td>Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Military Police Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPES</td>
<td>Military Postal Express Service(^{15})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Monthly roster or muster roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR Bn</td>
<td>Marine Replacement Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Medical Reserve Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR Park</td>
<td>Motor Reception Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS Co.</td>
<td>Military Specialists Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Motor Supply Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTU</td>
<td>Machine Shop Truck Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Motor Transport Corps(^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Motor Transport Service(^{17})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASN</td>
<td>No Army Serial Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{14}\) Established on 5 July 1917 (see Services of Rear).

\(^{15}\) Created on 9 May 1918 for handling official and personal mail for the AEF, eventually operating 169 field and mobile post offices and railway mail service.

\(^{16}\) Established on 11 July 1918 as a separate service of Services of Supply (see MTS).

\(^{17}\) Established on 8 December 1917 as a separate service under QMC and included Service of Utilities on 16 February 1918 and Service of Utilities, which dissolved on 11 July 1918.
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

NBH  Navy Base Hospital
NDR  No Disability Rating or Notifiable Disease Reported
NG   National Guard
NSN  No Serial Number
NSR  No Service Record
NYD  Not Yet Diagnosed

O    Slight
O in C Officer in Charge
OCE  Office of Chief Engineer
OLA  Over Leave, Absent
OR   Operations Report
Ord. Ordnance
O&T  Observation and Training or Observation and Treatment

PA   Personal Adjutant (statistical officers were so designated in GHQ GO #187, dated 25 October 1918)
PAL  Prisoner at Large
PC   Post of Command
PBH  Provisional Base Hospital
PBHU Provisional Base Hospital Unit
PH   Post Hospital
PLM  Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée (Railway)
PMG  Provost Marshal General
POD  Post Office Department
Pont.Bks. Pontanezen Barracks (near Brest)
PORR Paris-Orleans Railroad
POW  Prisoner of War
Prov. Provisional
PUO  Pyrexis Unknown Origin (Trench fever)
PW   Penetrating Wound (British) or Prisoner of War
PWIB Prisoners of War Information Bureau18

QGA  Quartier Général d’Armée (Army Headquarters)

R    Roster
RA   Regular Army
RC   Reserve Corps
RD   Replacement Depot19
Rel. Released
Repl. Replacement

18 Established on 1 July 1918.
19 The 1st RD was organized at Saint-Aignan on 30 December 1918 to take the place of the 1st DD, which was abolished on 9 July 1919.
Appendix B

Reptd.  Reported
Rheu.  Rheumatism or rheumatic
RIO  Regimental Intelligence Officer
RMS  Railway Mail Service
RO  Regulating Officer/Office
Ros.  Roster
Rptd.  Reported
RR&C  Renting, Requisition, and Claims (Service)\(^{20}\)
RRD  Regional Replacement Depot\(^{21}\)
RSO  Regimental Special Order
RTO  Railway Transportation Officer/Office
S  Severe or South
SAA  Small Arms Ammunition
San. Tr.  Sanitary Train
SC  Signal Corps
SCD  Surgeon's Certificate of Disability
SD  Special Duty
Seg.  Segregation
SIW  Self-inflicted Wound
SO  Special Orders
SOP  Senior officer present
SOR  Services of Rear\(^{22}\)
SOS  Services of Supply\(^{23}\)
Sp. Tr. Bn.  Special Training Battalion
“S&S”  *Stars and Stripes*, official AEF newspaper\(^{24}\)
Stat. Sect.  Statistical Section
St.  Saint (French)
Ste.  Steinte (French)
S of U  Service of Utilities\(^{25}\)
SW  Shell Wound

TB  Tuberculosis
TC  Transportation Corps or Tank Corps
TD  Transportation Department\(^{26}\)

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\(^{20}\) Established on 22 April 1918 under Services of Supply.

\(^{21}\) Established on 15 January 1919 at Chelles, Toul, and Revigny.

\(^{22}\) On 16 February 1918, L of C is reorganized as Services of Rear (see SOS).

\(^{23}\) SOR is redesignated Services of Supply on 13 March 1918 and abolished on 1 September 1919.

\(^{24}\) Authorized on 8 February 1918.

\(^{25}\) Established on 16 February 1918 to include Transportation Department, Motor Transport Service, and Forestry Service; disbanded on 11 July 1918.

\(^{26}\) Established on 14 September 1917.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>Temporary Foreign Warrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM Bty</td>
<td>Trench Mortar Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tr., Trs.</td>
<td>Transferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans.</td>
<td>Transferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Transportation Service&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSST</td>
<td>Training School for Sanitary Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTW</td>
<td>Through and through wound (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW</td>
<td>Temporary Warrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TY</td>
<td>Target Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Utilities Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unasgd.</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USR</td>
<td>United States (Army) Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTP</td>
<td>United States Troops, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Veterinary Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDG</td>
<td>Venereal disease, gonorrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDH</td>
<td>Valvular Disease of the Heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDS</td>
<td>Venereal disease, syphilis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLC</td>
<td>Venereal Labor Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VO</td>
<td>Verbal Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOCOH</td>
<td>Verbal Orders, Commanding Officer, Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRC</td>
<td>Veterinary Reserve Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Walking, Dressing (naval classification for patients received on naval transports for United States) or War Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDB</td>
<td>War Damage Board&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WND</td>
<td>Walking, No Dressing (naval classification for patients received on naval transports for United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>War Risk Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRS</td>
<td>War Risk Section&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>27</sup> Created on 14 September 1917 as a separate service and was included in Service of Utilities on 16 February 1918.

<sup>28</sup> Established on 19 January 1919 to evaluate damages caused by AEF in France. On 1 February 1919, jurisdiction extended to Serbia, Romania, Greece, Italy, Great Britain, and Belgium.

<sup>29</sup> Created on 7 January 1918 and charged with War Risk Insurance administration in AEF.
### American Post Offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>City 1</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>City 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>Saint-Nazaire</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>32d Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>734-A</td>
<td>Champlitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703</td>
<td>Gondrecourt</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>La Rochelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704</td>
<td>La Valdahon</td>
<td>735-A</td>
<td>Rochefort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705</td>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>Aix-les-Bains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705-A</td>
<td>Genicart</td>
<td>736-A</td>
<td>Annecy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705-B</td>
<td>Pauillac</td>
<td>736-B</td>
<td>Chamonix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>706</td>
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</table>

**Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations**

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Appendix B

Base Sections

BS #1: Organized as Base Port #1 on 21 June 1917 and designated BS #1 on 13 August 1917 with headquarters at Saint-Nazaire.

BS #2: Organized on 8 September 1917 with headquarters at Bordeaux.

BS #3: Organized on 13 August 1917 with headquarters at Le Havre. BS #3 was redesignated on 27 November 1917 as BS #4.

BS #4: See above

BS #5: Organized on 10 November 1917 with headquarters at Brest.

BS #6: Organized on 30 May 1918 with headquarters at Marseille.

BS #7: Organized on 28 June 1918 from part of BS #2 with headquarters at La Pallice.

BS #8: Organized on 11 October 1918 with headquarters at Padua, Italy.

BS #9: Organized on 8 April 1919 with headquarters at Antwerp, Belgium.

Depot Divisions

1st DD: The 41st Division was Replacement Division, I Corps, from 20 December 1917 to 14 January 1918 at La Courtine; Base and Training Division, 1st Corps, from 15 January to 4 March 1918; Depot Division, 1st Corps, from 5 March to 12 July 1918, and also served as the replacement division for the entire AEF from 11 April to early August 1918; 1st Depot Division, AEF, from 13 July to 26 December 1918. On 15 January 1918, activities were transferred from La Courtine to the Saint-Aignan-Noyers area (see 1st RD).

2d DD: The 83d Division was so designated and concentrated in the Le Mans area on 30 July 1918; it was relieved by the American Embarkation Center 15–31 December 1918.

3d DD: The 76th Division was 3d DD from 3 August to 7 November 1918, and was located in the Saint-Amand-Montrond area.

4th DD: The 85th Division was so designated on 28 July 1918 and moved to the area of Pouilly-sur-Loire, Sancerre, and Cosne; from 14 August to 29 October 1918, it served as Depot Division, Intermediate Section; and from 30 October 1918 to 12 January 1919, it was the Regional Replacement Depot, Second Army, in the Toul area.

5th DD: The 35th Division was so designated on 14 August 1918 and moved to the Chârost and Mehun-sur-Yèvre area southwest of Bourges; it was relieved on 19 October 1918.

6th DD: The 40th Division was so designated on 16 August 1918 and moved to the La Guerche-sur-l’Aubois area; on 4 November 1918, it moved to the Revigny area, only to be relieved on 4 December 1918.
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APPENDIX D
PERSONAL AND UNIT AWARDS
AND DECORATIONS

The European custom of decorating heroes of another nation was a new experience for the military Services involved in World War I. The United States, with the Medal of Honor as its sole decoration at the time, was unprepared, but also had no appropriate award to recognize a level heroism of less than that merited by the Medal of Honor and no decoration to reward the myriad acts of meritorious noncombat service that the war spurred.

The U.S. Army shared this dilemma and, with the aid of President Woodrow Wilson and Congress, instituted its Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Distinguished Service Medal (DSM) in 1918 with clear guidelines for the award of the DSC for combat heroism and the DSM award for distinguished noncombat duty in a position of great responsibility. Both awards were made available in time for activities taking place during World War I. Parallel awards were created a year later for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, months after the Armistice and amid the massive demobilization of our forces.

Medal of Honor

Eight Medals of Honor were awarded to U.S. Marines for actions in the Great War; five recipients received both Navy and Army versions. Another six were awarded to naval medical personnel for service with the Marines.

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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Louis Cukela*</td>
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<td>Ernest A. Janson*</td>
<td>Gunnery Sergeant</td>
<td>6 June 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. Kelly*</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3 October 1918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matej Kocak*†</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>18 July 1918</td>
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<td>John H. Pruitt*</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>3 October 1918</td>
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<td>Robert G. Robinson</td>
<td>Gunnery Sergeant</td>
<td>8 and 14 October 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred W. Stockham†</td>
<td>Gunnery Sergeant</td>
<td>13–14 June 1918</td>
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*Double recipient; one U.S. Navy and one U.S. Army.
†Killed in action.
Appendix D

Navy Cross

The creation of the Navy Cross and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal was fraught with controversy, ambiguity, and confusion. As enacted on 4 February 1919, the Navy Cross was the Navy’s third-highest award and could be awarded for both combat heroism and for other distinguished noncombat service. Many, for instance, were earned for extraordinary diving and salvage feats. Originally third in precedence behind the Medal of Honor and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, more than one Navy Cross recipient regarded the award as a “snub” in lieu of the Distinguished Service Medal. Twenty-three years later, on 7 August 1942, Congress placed the Navy Cross just beneath the Medal of Honor, and limited its award to combat-only recognition.

At least 392 Navy Cross medals were awarded to Marines; many of these men also received the Distinguished Service Cross. Captain Percy D. Cornell and Corporal Robert Slover received two separate awards of the Navy Cross for their actions in the war.

Distinguished Service Cross

The Distinguished Service Cross was established by President Wilson on 2 January 1918. General Pershing, commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Forces in France, had recommended that recognition other than the Medal of Honor be authorized for the U.S. armed forces for service rendered in a similar fashion to that awarded by the European armies. The request for establishment of the medal was forwarded from the secretary of war to the president in a letter dated 28 December 1917. The act of Congress establishing this award (Public Law 193, 65th Congress) dated 9 July 1918 is contained in Title 10 United States Code (USC) 3742. Establishment of the Distinguished Service Cross was promulgated in War Department General Order No. 6, dated 12 January 1918.

The first design of the Distinguished Service Cross was cast and manufactured by the U.S. Mint at Philadelphia. The die was cast from the approved design prepared by Lieutenant Aymar E. Embry, Engineer Officer Reserve Corps. Upon examination of the first medals struck at the mint, minor changes were recommended to add to the beauty and attractiveness of the medal. Due to the importance of the time element involved in furnishing the decorations to General Pershing, 100 of the medals were struck from the original design and numbered 1–100. These medals were furnished with the provision that the crosses be replaced when the second design was complete, which would also be numbered 1–100.

At least 357 Distinguished Service Cross medals were awarded to Marines for this period. Many of these men also received the Navy Cross medal for the same actions.

Distinguished Service Medal

The Distinguished Service Medal was authorized by presidential order on 2 January 1918 and confirmed by Congress on 9 July 1918. It was announced by War Department General Order No. 6, dated 12 January 1918, with the following information concerning the medal:

A bronze medal of appropriate design and a ribbon to be worn in lieu thereof, to be awarded by the President to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army shall hereafter distinguish himself or herself, or who, since 6 April 1917, has distinguished himself or herself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility in time of war or in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United States.

An act of Congress on 9 July 1918 recognized the need for different types and degrees of heroism and meritorious service and included such provisions for award criteria. The current statutory authorization for the Distinguished Service Medal is Title 10, United States Code, Section 3743.
Among the first Distinguished Service Medals awarded for World War I were those to the commanding officers of the Allied armies:

France: Marshals Ferdinand Foch and Joseph Joffre
General Henri Pétain

Great Britain: Field Marshal Douglas Haig

Italy: General Armando Diaz

Belgium: General Cyriaque Gillain

United States: General John Pershing

The Navy Distinguished Service Medal was established by an act of Congress (Public Law 253, 65th Congress) approved on 4 February 1919. The medal was designed by Paul H. Manship (1885–1966). The first person to receive the Navy Distinguished Service Medal was Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, USMC, who received the medal posthumously on 13 March 1919.

Between the Army and Navy versions of the medal, 32 were awarded to Marines.

Silver Star Citation/Medal

The Citation Star was established as a result of an act of Congress on 9 July 1918 (65th Congress, Sess II, Chapter 143, page 873) and was promulgated in War Department Bulletin No. 43 dated 1918. A letter from General [Henry] Jervey, Office of the Chief of Staff, dated 26 February 1926, states that: The Secretary of War directs as follows—The following is the amended version of paragraph 187 of Army Regulation:

No more than one Medal of Honor or one Distinguished Service Cross or one Distinguished Service Medal shall be issued to any one person, but for each succeeding or act sufficient to justify the award of a Medal of Honor or Distinguished Service Cross or Distinguished Service Medal, respectively, a bronze oak leaf cluster, shall be issued in lieu thereof; and for each citation of an officer or enlisted man for gallantry in action, published in orders from headquarters of a force commanded by a general officer, not warranting the issue of a Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross or Distinguished Service Medal, he shall wear a silver star, 3/16 inch in diameter, as prescribed in Uniform Regulations.

Army Regulation 600-40, paragraph 48, 27 September 1921, specified that the Citation Star would be worn above the clasp on the ribbon of the service medal for the campaign for service in which the citations were given.

On 19 July 1932, the secretary of war approved the Silver Star medal to replace the Citation Star. This design placed the Citation Star on a bronze pendant suspended from the ribbon design. The star was no longer attached to a service or campaign ribbon.

At least 3,076 Marines received the Silver Star medal or Silver Star citation for actions in World War I. Many were recipients of multiple medals or citations.

World War I Victory Medal

The Victory Medal was awarded to Marine Corps units that were on active duty between 6 April 1917 and 11 November 1918 or that served on shore in northern Russia or Siberia between 13 November 1918 and 30 March 1920. Campaign periods for which campaign stars are awarded are as follows:
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The Maltese Cross was awarded to officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Medical Corps who served in France during World War I but did not participate in any engagements; this included those Marines assigned to the 5th Brigade.

**Army of Occupation of Germany Medal**

The Army of Occupation of Germany medal was awarded to units and men of the Armed Services of the United States who served ashore in Germany or Austria-Hungary during the period of occupation at any time between 12 November 1918 and 11 July 1923. From 12 November 1918 to 25 December 1919, Marines formed part of the Allied Forces stationed in Germany or territory formerly held by Germany to enforce the terms of the Armistice.

**Croix de Guerre and French Fourragère**

The French government awarded decorations for especially meritorious conduct in action during World War I to 156 American units varying in size from a section to a brigade. These decorations were the four-
ragère and the Croix de Guerre with various combinations of palms and gilt, silver, and bronze stars. The various classes of the Croix de Guerre were as follows:

- **Bronze palm:** for citation in orders of the army
- **Gold (or gilt) star:** for citation in orders of the corps
- **Silver star:** for citation in orders of the division
- **Bronze star:** for citation in orders of the brigade, regiment, or equivalent unit

A fifth citation in orders of the army calls for the award of a silver palm, which replaces the four bronze palms.

Just as individuals are decorated for services rendered, so are the colors of an organization decorated to commemorate the deeds of the unit as a whole. The American unit to which such an award has been made is authorized by the U.S. government to place on its flag a streamer—one streamer for each award—and on each streamer, in the colors of the decoration, are embroidered the name or names commemorating the battle for which the unit was cited. A unit twice decorated with a Croix de Guerre with palm is entitled to a braided and knotted cord, called a fourragère, in the green and red colors of the Croix de Guerre. The fourragère becomes a part of the uniform of the unit and all members of the organization are authorized to wear the decoration on the left shoulder of their uniform as long as they remain members of the organization. Individuals attached to the organization on at least two occasions in which it was cited in orders of the army are entitled to wear the fourragère at all times, regardless of whether or not they are serving with the unit so decorated. A person entitled to wear the fourragère as an individual decoration is authorized to wear on the knot thereof, above the metal point, the device of the division to which he was attached when he received his last citation, with the Marine Corps emblem below same, both in bronze metal and in miniature. Although the single cord of plain cotton is the regulation issue, officers generally wear the silk cord with the double loop.

The French fourragère is a decoration instituted by Napoleon I for units that had distinguished themselves in battle. It was revived during World War I and was awarded by the French Ministry of War to organizations cited more than once in the French Orders of the Army. The three classes of the fourragère are as follows:

- **First:** Légion d’Honneur (scarlet)
- **Second:** Médaille Militaire (yellow and red)
- **Third:** Croix de Guerre (with palm; green and red)

In 1918, the heroic deeds of Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments inscribed the names of momentous battles on the pages of Marine Corps history as well as on their own regimental flags. They have the honor of being the only two regiments in the AEF to receive three citations—two in the orders of the army and one in the orders of the corps—the fourragère and Croix de Guerre with two palms and one gilt star.
APPENDIX E
RESERVE DECORATIONS
MARINES AWARDED VALOR AWARDS
IN WORLD WAR I

by Colonel Walter Ford, USMC (Ret)*

The following list includes those Marines who were in the Marine Corps Reserve at the time of the action, or who entered the Corps via a Marine unit of the Naval Militia or the National Naval Volunteers.** The awards are listed alphabetically by type of award given, beginning with the awards of highest precedence. This content was sourced with the assistance of Mr. Doug Sterner, Home of Heroes.com.

Ancestry.com's online database advanced the research into the U.S. Marine Corps muster rolls for 1893–1958 to confirm the source of entry of these heroic leathernecks. Another cross-checking reference came from Jane Blakeney's Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955 (1957). Blakeney, who after service in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) during World War I and immediately thereafter, continued her contributions at Headquarters Marine Corps until retirement as the head of the Marine Corps' Decorations and Medals Branch.

Talbot, Ralph

Medal of Honor

Citation:
The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, United States Marine Corps, for exceptionally meritorious service and extraordinary heroism while attached to Squadron C, First Marine Aviation Force, in France. Second Lieutenant Talbot participated in numerous air raids into enemy territory. On 8 October 1918, while on such a raid, he was attacked by nine enemy scouts, and in the fight that followed shot down an enemy plane. Also, on 14 October 1918, while on a raid over Pittham, Belgium, Second Lieutenant Talbot and another plane became detached from the formation on account of motor trouble and were attacked by 12 enemy scouts. During the severe fight that followed, his plane shot down one of the enemy scouts. His observer was shot through the elbow and his gun jammed. Second Lieutenant Talbot maneuvered to gain time for his observer to clear the jam with one hand, and then returned to the fight. The observer fought until shot twice, once in the stomach and once in the hip and then collapsed, Second Lieutenant Talbot attacked the nearest enemy scout with his front guns and shot him down. With his observer unconscious and his motor failing, he dived to escape the balance of the enemy

* This list was compiled by Col Ford in the course of his research on a forthcoming article on the Marine Corps Reserve.
** Note that, in some instances, the individuals listed were in Reserve status due to Selective Service Classifications. For our purposes, they include Class 1, which identified them as “Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or the Public Health Service”; Class 4, which identified them as “Conscientious Objectors Available for Noncombatant Military Service Only”; or Class 5, which identified them as “Conscientious Objectors to All Military Service.”
and crossed the German trenches at an altitude of 50 feet, landing at the nearest hospital to leave his observer, and then returning to his aerodrome.

Death:
Killed in aircraft accident on 25 October 1918

Source of Entry:
Former U.S. Navy Reserve Flying Corps (ensign); disenrolled to be commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps, Class 5

Barr, Chapin C.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Chapin C. Barr (MCSN: 0-1916), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a Pilot in the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), at the front in France. On 26 September 1918, while on an air raid over enemy territory, Lieutenant Barr was attacked by a superior number of enemy scouts. In the fight which ensued he behaved with conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity, and despite having been mortally wounded, he drove off the enemy and brought his plane safely back to the aerodrome.

Source of Entry:
Ensign in the Navy Reserve Flying Corps

Bower, George

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant George Bower (MCSN: 0-98), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 81st Company, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Thiaucourt, France, 15 September 1918. Aiding an infantry platoon, which had been forced to withdraw because of heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, Lieutenant Bower, while suffering from severe wounds, kept his guns in position, consolidating his location, and preventing the danger of an enemy counterattack.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
Cornell, Percy Duryea

**Navy Cross (First Award)**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain Percy Duryea Cornell (MCSN: 0-187), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. Captain Cornell courageously led his company through heavy artillery and machine-gun fire in the attack on a strongly defended enemy position. His company held the exposed flank and later, when the battalion withdrew, he skillfully covered the other shifting units while exposed to heavy enemy fire.

**Navy Cross (Second Award)**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting a Gold Star in lieu of a Second Award of the Navy Cross to Captain Percy Duryea Cornell (MCSN: 0-187), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action on 18 July 1918, shortly after his company had jumped off in an attack against the enemy’s strongly organized position in the Bois de Ritz, southwest of Soissons. Seeing the advanced wave of the adjoining company being annihilated, and hearing the sudden outburst of machine gun fire coming directly from his front, Major Cornell, without thought of self, or the consequences, shouted to the men of his platoon to follow, and dashed toward the sound of the deadly fire followed by those few of his men who heard him, and, with their assistance silenced the machine gun. By this heroic act and rare presence of mind he saved the lives of many who would otherwise have been cut down.

**Personal Awards:**

- Two Navy Crosses (WWI)
- Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)
- Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)
- Two Purple Hearts

**Source of Entry:**

Company B, Texas National Naval Volunteers

Dietrich, Carl R.

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Carl R. Dietrich (MCSN: 0-1378), United States Marine Corps, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service while serving with the 4th Brigade (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Soissons, St. Mihiel, Champagne and the
Appendix E

Argonne, France. Throughout the operations of the 4th Brigade Marines First Lieutenant Dietrich was indefatigable in his attention to duty. He was frequently sent on important missions in the transmission of orders, establishing liaison and location of elements of the command, under extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. Days and nights without sleep, Lieutenant Dietrich has always proved himself reliable, efficient and of great value and assistance.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Feigle, William M.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Sergeant William M. Feigle (MCSN: 93428), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Headquarters Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Beaumont, France, 10 November 1918. When an ammunition train was passing through a town, one of the trucks was struck by a shell and set on fire. The blazing truck was abandoned and, knowing that it soon would explode and kill all those in the vicinity, Sergeant Feigle jumped on the truck and drove it to the outskirts of the town, thereby saving the lives of at least thirty-five people.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Company B, Texas National Naval Volunteers

Glendinning, Henry P.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant Henry P. Glendinning (MCSN: 0-2431), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving with the Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, on 3 and 4 October 1918, in the Blanc Mont region of France. Lieutenant Glendinning showed fine qualities of command as well
as remarkable valor and an absolute disregard of danger. He directed the advance of his men and personally saw to it that the wounded were promptly evacuated.

**Personal Awards:**
- Navy Cross (WWI)
- Silver Star Citation (WWI)

**Source of Entry:**
- Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

**Haws, Edward H.**

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Edward H. Haws (MCSN: 105079), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 96th Company, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 2–9, 1918. Throughout eight days of fighting, Private Haws fearlessly and tirelessly carried messages between his company and battalion headquarters, through heavy machine-gun and artillery fire.

**Personal Awards:**
- Navy Cross (WWI)
- Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
- Silver Star Citation (WWI)

**Source of Entry:**
- Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

**Hewitt Jr., Charles Wilmer**

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Corporal Charles Wilmer Hewitt, Jr. (MCSN: 81440), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 45th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Chateau-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918, Killed in action, Corporal Hewitt gave the supreme proof of the extraordinary heroism which will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

**Death:**
- Killed in action

**Personal Awards:**
- Navy Cross (WWI)
- Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
- Silver Star Citation (WWI)
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Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Humphreys Jr., Albert E.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Albert E. Humphreys, Jr. (MCSN: 0-2593), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Husted, Chester Seth

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Private Chester Seth Husted (MCSN: 106854), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 6th Machine-Gun Battalion, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, 5 October 1918. Displaying great courage and disregard for his own safety, Private Husted volunteered to carry an important message through a heavy machine-gun barrage, losing his life in attempting to carry out this mission.

Death:
Killed in action

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
Israel, Frederick

*Navy Cross*

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant Frederick Israel (MCSN: 0-468), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. Second Lieutenant Israel twice volunteered and carried messages to the front line along a road swept by machine-gun and shell fire.

*Personal Awards:*

Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

*Source of Entry:*

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Jones, Harold A.

*Navy Cross*

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant Harold A. Jones (MCSN: 0-1494), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

*Personal Awards:*

Navy Cross (WWI)

*Source of Entry:*

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Justesen, William A.

*Navy Cross*

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private William A. Justesen (MCSN: 108059), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d
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Division, A. E. F. in action near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918. Private Justesen displayed exceptional bravery in charging three machineguns with the aid of a small detachment of his comrades, killing the crews and capturing the guns, which were immediately turned on the Germans, thereby opening the line for the advance of his company, which had been held up by the enemy's fire.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Laughlin, George McC.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant George McC. Laughlin (MCSN: 0-1524), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Legendre, James Hennen

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant James Hennen Legendre (MCSN: 0-1531), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action on the Lucy-Torcy Road, France, 6 June 1918. Second Lieutenant Legendre displayed exceptional bravery in organizing and leading a party of volunteers through heavy machine-gun fire for the purpose of securing two wounded men on the Lucy-Torcy, Road.
Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Lindgren, Everette (Edward) E.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant Everette (Edward) E. Lindgren (MCSN: 0-2779), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A.E.F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. During an attack on a strong enemy position, under terrific machine-gun and artillery fire, Second Lieutenant Lindgren led his platoon to the support of the platoon operating on his left, rallying men from another company, who had become separated from their organizations, to his support. Although severely wounded, he remained in action until the position was consolidated.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

McGraw, John K.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Sergeant John K. McGraw (MCSN: 171704), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession. On 28 October 1918, there had been received at the aerodrome of Squadron C, First Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in France, 1500 live bombs in individual wooden crates. An aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Ralph Talbot crashed into this pile of live bombs, caught fire and was completely burned. The fire spread to the crates of bombs and an explosion was imminent. Sergeant McGraw impressed the nearest men into service and dragged the burning crates of bombs off the pile while other men rolled them in the mud until the fire was extinguished. Sergeant McGraw’s presence of mind and courage undoubtedly prevented a serious explosion, which would unquestionable have resulted in the destruction of the entire aerodrome and probable loss of life as well, and it is believed that this action should be appropriately recognized.
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Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, Class 1

Messinger, Elias J.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Elias J. Messinger (MCSN: 108067), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918, Private Messinger with three other soldiers captured a machine gun which was holding up the 55th Company of Marines, killing the entire crew. To accomplish this hazardous and daring work it was necessary for them to expose themselves to the fire of this gun.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Norman, Harvey C.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Harvey C. Norman (MCSN: 0-3040), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a Pilot in the First Marine Aviation force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), at the front in France. While on a bombing raid into enemy territory, 22 October 1918, Lieutenant Norman became separated from the other planes of his formation, owing to heavy fog and while so cut off was attacked by seven enemy scout planes. In the engagement which ensued he behaved with conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity, continuing the fight against overwhelming odds until he himself was killed and his plane shot down.

Death:
Killed in action

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Reserve Decorations

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Olsen, Eynar F.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Eynar F. Olsen (MCSN: 0-1608), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Peterson, Herman A.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Herman A. Peterson (MCSN: 0-3115), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5
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Platt, Jonas Henry

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Jonas Henry Platt (MCSN: 0-770), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near the Bois-de-Belleau, Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Seriously wounded in the leg early in the engagement, First Lieutenant Platt continued to direct, the operations not only of his platoon but of another. He charged and drove off the crew of an enemy machine-gun, supervised the disposition and digging in of a large part of his company, and yielded command only when exhausted from pain and loss of blood.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Company, 2d Battalion, Ohio Naval Militia, Cleveland

Reath, Thomas R.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Sergeant Thomas R. Reath (MCSN: 83996), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action on 12 June 1918, in Belleau Woods, France. Sergeant Reath's Company was under a heavy and devastating fire of artillery and machine guns. The Company Commander was endeavoring to send an important message to his Battalion Commander. Several messengers had been sent; none had returned all having been killed or wounded in the endeavor to pass the intervening open ground. Knowing all this, Sergeant Reath volunteered to try to get the message through. In the performance of his duty he was killed.

Death:
Killed in action

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)
Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

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Richmond, Clarence L.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Clarence L. Richmond (MCSN: 108937), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 3–5, 1918. Private Richmond unhesitatingly went through the heaviest machine-gun and artillery fire dressing and carrying wounded. Disregarding his own safety, he refused to take rest or food while there were wounded needing attention.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Robillard, Fred S.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Fred S. Robillard (MCSN: 0-3225), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Sieg, Robert E.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Robert E. Sieg (MCSN: 109056), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E.
F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 3–5, 1918. Private Sieg unhesitatingly went through the heaviest machine-gun and artillery fire dressing and carrying wounded. Disregarding his own safety, he refused to take rest or food while there were wounded needing attention.

**Personal Awards:**
- Navy Cross
- Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

**Source of Entry:**
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

**Simpson, Roy Hobson***

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Private Roy Hobson Simpson (MCSN: 81727), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Forty-Seventh Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action during the attack on the Bois-de-Belleau, France, 12 June 1918. Private Simpson carried a message from Battalion to Company headquarters directly across the face of enemy fire. Shot through the chest he continued running and called out, “I must deliver this message,” struggling forward for 50 feet more in his heroic effort to carry out his mission before falling dead.

**Personal Awards:**
- Navy Cross (WWI)
- Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
- Silver Star Citation (WWI)

**Source of Entry:**
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

**Somers, Vernon L.**

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Vernon L. Somers (MCSN: 0-3370), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Killed in action,

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*Erroneously reported as killed in action, Simpson was captured by the Germans and held at Rastatt, Baden, Germany. He was released on 6 December 1918 and returned to his unit via Switzerland and Vichy, France, on 16 January 1919. This information is based on the Revised Muster Roll, 47th Company, 5th Marine Regiment, June 1918.*
Second Lieutenant Somers gave the supreme proof of that extraordinary heroism which will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

Death:
Killed in action

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Synnott, Joseph A.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Joseph A. Synnott (MCSN: 0-3434), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Killed in action, Second Lieutenant Synnott gave the supreme proof of that extraordinary heroism which will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

Death:
Killed in action

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Former enlisted Marine (gunnery sergeant); he was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Taylor, Caleb W.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Caleb W. Taylor (MCSN: 0-3443), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as an Observer in the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN) at the Front in France. While on a bombing raid into enemy territory on 22 October 1918, Lieutenant Taylor became separated from the other planes of the formation on account of fog, and was attacked by
seven enemy scout planes. Despite the overwhelming odds he fought with great gallantry and intrepidity until he was killed and his plane shot down.

Death:
Killed in action

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (chief quartermaster); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Thayer Jr., Sidney

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Sidney Thayer Jr. (MCSN: 0-3451), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Beaumont, France, 11 November 1918. After being wounded, Lieutenant Thayer remained with his company until its objective had been reached, refusing evacuation until rendered unconscious by loss of blood.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Thomason Jr., John W.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Major [then Second Lieutenant] John W. Thomason Jr. (MCSN: 0-985), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 49th Company, First Battalion, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in the Battle of Soissons. When a German machine gun nest held up a Marine advance on 18 July 1918, Major Thomason and one of his men fearlessly advanced on the position and killed thirteen of the enemy.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)
Source of Entry:
Company C, Texas National Naval Volunteers, Marine Corps Branch, Houston

Weaver, John H.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant John H. Weaver (MCSN: 0-3546), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Whiteside, John R.

Navy Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to First Lieutenant John R. Whiteside (MCSN: 0-3585), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation cooperating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Death:
Killed in flying accident on 23 January 1919

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (chief quartermaster); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5
Appendix E

Whiting, Donald N.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Donald N. Whiting (MCSN: 0-1771), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (ensign); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Wilmer, Pere

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Major Pere Wilmer (MCSN: 0-3620), United States Marine Corps, for meritorious and distinguished service near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918. As Battalion Commander, Second Battalion, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., Major Wilmer showed great courage and an utter disregard of danger in crossing with his battalion an exposed terrain of a distance of three kilometers under intense artillery and machine-gun fire. Major Wilmer led his men on by his example.

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Originally commissioned in January 1906; resigned in January 1913; and then reappointed in the Marine Corps Reserve on 1 August 1917

Wilson, Claggett

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Claggett Wilson (MCSN: 0-3622), United States Marine Corps, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service during the campaigns of St. Mihiel, Champagne, and the Argonne, France. First Lieutenant Wilson was in charge of the Head-
quarters Detachment of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, A. E. F., and was responsible for its efficient functioning under extremely difficult, and at times, dangerous circumstances. Days and nights without sleep, particularly during the campaigns of the Argonne, when the roads were at times impassible, First Lieutenant Wilson displayed unusual foresight and energy in getting rations and transportation through on scheduled time. In the duties of Aide-de-Camp to the Brigade Commander he proved himself of great value and assistance.

**Personal Awards:**
Navy Cross (WWI)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

**Source of Entry:**
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

**Wright, Arthur H.**

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Arthur H. Wright (MCSN: 0-3667), United States Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

**Personal Awards:**
Navy Cross (WWI)

**Source of Entry:**
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

**Zinner, Fred Joseph**

**Navy Cross**

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Second Lieutenant Fred Joseph Zinner (MCSN: 0-1096), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 17th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, October 4, 1918. While attacking a strongly held enemy position, under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, Second Lieutenant Zinner rallied men of another company, who had become separated from their organization, to his support. With these reinforcements, his platoon was able to relieve a very critical situation.
Appendix E

Personal Awards:
Navy Cross (WWI)
Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Nelms Jr., Frank

Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Distinguished Service Medal to Second Lieutenant Frank Nelms Jr., United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a pilot in the First Marine Aviation Force, at the front in France, where he participated in numerous air raids into enemy territory. On 28 September 1918 while on such a raid, he was attacked by a superior number of enemy scouts, and is believed to have destroyed an enemy plane. On 2 October 1918, when word was received that a body of French troops had been cut off from supplies for two days by the enemy, and it was decided to feed them by aeroplane, food was loaded in planes and Lieutenant Nelms flew over the besieged troops at an altitude of only one hundred feet and dropped the food where these troops could get it. This performance was repeated three times, each time under intense fire from rifles, machine guns and artillery on the ground.

Personal Awards:
Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Source of Entry:
Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (ensign); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Gest, Sydney G.

Distinguished Service Cross

Citation:
The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Private Sydney G. Gest (MCSN: 843331), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Forty-Third Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action in the Bois-de-Belleau, France, 11 June 1918. The attacking line of the Forty-Third Company being held up at one point by the fire of an enemy heavy Maxim machine gun, Private Gest, in the face of the machine-gun fire, crawled around the flank and, undaunted by grenade and rifle fire, rushed the gun crew's nest, killing the enemy gunner and four others as they attempted to escape.
Personal Awards:
Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)
Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Thomas, Fred

Distinguished Service Cross (First Award)

Citation:
The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant Fred Thomas (MCSN: 0-1833), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Sixteenth Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action near Chateau-Thierry, France, 25 June 1918. Second Lieutenant Thomas commanded the left flank platoon of his company, which was subjected to heavy fire from enemy machine-guns and trench mortars. When further advance in the face of the fire became impossible, he went forward alone, located the machine-gun positions, and then organized a flank attack on the emplacements, putting out of action four guns, one of which he himself captured. In this exploit his command suffered 40 per cent casualties and captured twenty-one prisoners. Reforming the remnants of his platoon, he moved forward through the enemy's barrage and to his objective, which he consolidated and held in the face of three counterattacks in five hours.

Distinguished Service Cross (Second Award)

Citation:
The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a Second Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant Fred Thomas (MCSN: 0-1833), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Sixteenth Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. While endeavoring to re-establish a large company front, which had become disconnected, Second Lieutenant Thomas encountered a large number of the enemy filtering through our lines. By strategic maneuvers he formed a strong resistance, causing heavy casualties on the enemy and forcing their retreat, after he himself had been seriously wounded.

Personal Awards:
Two Distinguished Service Crosses (WWI),
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (same action as the Distinguished Service Cross) (WWI)
Four Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:
Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
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