COVER: “The Terminator” LVS pulling an 870 trailer with a D7 Bulldozer. A Saudi male with his camels are in the foreground. Two helos with external loads fly above the whole scene. (Painting by CWO-2 Charles G. Grow, USMC.)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

by
Major Steven M. Zimmeck
U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1999
Other Publications in the Series


In Preparation


PCN 190 003146 00
Foreword

This monograph tells the story of the Marines and sailors of the 1st Force Service Support Group, the 2d Force Service Support Group, Marine Wing Support Group 37, and the 3d Naval Construction Regiment whose combined efforts gave the I Marine Expeditionary Force the ability to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. This document is part of a preliminary series of official Marine Corps histories that cover Marine Corps operations in the Gulf War.

During the Persian Gulf crisis, the History and Museums Division sent a team to Saudi Arabia to produce first-hand accounts of unit operations. In November 1990, five Reserve officers from the Mobilization Training Unit (MTU) (History)-DC-7 arrived in Saudi Arabia, deployed to different commands, accompanied their units throughout the battle, and produced powerful narratives on the operations of I Marine Expeditionary Force, the 1st Marine Division, the 2d Marine Division, and Marine Forces Afloat. Unforeseen circumstances prevented a logistics history from being included in the series, so the Secretary of the Navy recalled Major Steven M. Zimmeck, USMC (Ret), to active duty to complete this account of Marine Corps combat service support in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Major Zimmeck is a career Marine Corps logistician who served tours of duty with the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Force Service Support Group, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, and the Royal Saudi Marines. He has accumulated more than seven years of desert logistics experience in the Middle East and the United States. During the Persian Gulf crisis, Major Zimmeck served as a logistics watch officer in the Headquarters Marine Corps Crisis Response Cell and, later, as the first logistics advisor to the Royal Saudi Marines. In the early 1980s he served at Headquarters Marine Corps as the force service support group table of organization sponsor and prior to retirement in 1994, served as the logistics officer’s sponsor. After retirement and as a consultant, he co-authored the final phase of the Marine Corps Logistics Planning Factor Study. In 1995, Major Zimmeck was recalled to active duty for two years to complete this project. Major Zimmeck is a graduate of Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College and holds a bachelor of arts degree in history from Wittenberg University, a master of arts degree in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and a master of business administration degree in finance from George Washington University.

This monograph is predominantly based upon documentation collected during and immediately after Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Unit command chronologies and interviews recorded by the Battlefield Assessment Team served as the basis of a comment edition which was sent out to key participants in the events depicted. These comments were then incorporated into the final narrative. This methodology produced a history that approaches the accuracy and vigor of the MTU’s first-hand accounts.
As in most of the publications of the History and Museums division, the production of this monograph was a team effort. Dr. Jack Shulimson, Mr. Charles Smith, and Ms. Wanda Renfrow of the History Writing Unit together with Mr. Charles Melson, the Chief Historian, provided the final review of the manuscript. Mr. James E. Cypher, an intern from Loyola University in New Orleans, assisted with the appendices, especially “The Glossary and List of Abbreviations” and the “Chronology of Events.”

M. F. Monigan
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Preface

My goal for this volume was an accurate and readable narrative of I Marine Expeditionary Force’s combat service support during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I concentrated on the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups, Marine Wing Service Support Group 37, and the 3d Naval Construction Regiment to relate how their plans, preparations, and activities meshed and supported the Marine force’s scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. The deployment of the force and the reconstitution of Marine Corps capabilities after the crisis were also important stories that required telling. I researched and wrote drafts before contacting knowledgeable participants in the war. This produced a good basis for Desert Storm veterans to fill in gaps, correct mistakes, and provide additional information that improved the quality of the text.

This monograph would not have been published without the professional efforts of the staff of the Marine Corps Historical Center. In that regard, I would like to thank and acknowledge the contributions of Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons (Ret); Colonel Michael F. Monigan; Mr. Benis M. Frank; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Richards (Ret); Lieutenant Colonel Dave Beasley, Jr. (Ret); Lieutenant Colonel Leon Craig, Jr.; Dr. Jack Shulimson; Ms. Catherine A. Kerns; Mr. W. Stephen Hill; and Mr. Charles R. Smith. I would like to extend a special thanks to Mr. George C. MacGillivray. Also, I am grateful for the advice and counsel that I received from the members of the Desert Storm historical MTU. In particular, I would like to thank Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton and, especially, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown (Ret).

Outside of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, I would like to express my thanks to Lieutenant General James A. Brabham, Jr. (Ret); Colonel William D. Bushnell (Ret); Lieutenant Colonel Daniel K. Franklin; Colonel Thomas S. Woodson; Colonel Robert L. Songer; Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Cvrik; Mr. Nicholas M. Linkowitz; Lieutenant Commander David W. Tomlinson; Major Jeffery D. Lee; Mr. Joseph H. Jeu; Ms. Susan A. Meeker; Major Gregory R. Caldwell; Mr. Jan Healey; and Mr. Chuck Hamilton.

Steven M. Zimmeck
Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## The First Shot in the War of Logistics
2 August-2 September 1990

- Gathering the Pieces | 2 |
- BSSG-1 | 7 |
- Drawing the Mameluke | 12 |
- Tools of the Trade | 16 |
- Creating the General Logistics Support System | 20 |
- Extending Direct Support to Regimental Combat Team 7 | 28 |
- Extending Direct Support to Marine Aircraft Group 70 | 30 |
- A Logistics Snapshot One Month After the Iraqi Invasion | 33 |

## Defending Jubayl
3 September-31 October 1990

- The Situation | 34 |
- 1st FSSG Reorganizes | 35 |
- Supporting the 3d MAW | 39 |
- The Seabees Arrive | 40 |
- Jubayl Naval Air Facility | 41 |
- King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station | 43 |
- Ras Al Ghar | 44 |
- Shaikh Isa | 44 |

## Supporting the 1st Marine Division

- September: Supply Point Distribution | 45 |
- October: Mobile Resupply | 49 |
- General Support of the MEF | 53 |
- Motor Transport | 53 |
- Landing Support | 54 |
- Medical and Dental | 55 |
- Supply | 55 |
- Maintenance | 56 |
- Engineer Operations | 58 |
- Headquarters and Support Group | 59 |
- Marine Forces Afloat | 60 |
- Three Months after the Invasion | 61 |
Switching to the Offense  
November and December 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Situation</th>
<th>62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How to Merge the 1st and 2d FSSGs?</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1st FSSG Restructures and Refocuses</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Establishment of GSG-2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG-1, November-December 1990</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seabees Prepare for Reinforcements and the Offensive</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcements</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing the Direct Support Command</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Year Ends</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Desert Shield Ends and Desert Storm Begins  
1-31 January 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Situation</th>
<th>82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaning North: 1-16 January 1991</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Group 37</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting Up Kibrit</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG-1 Reorganizes and Deploys to the Field</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingenuity</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG-2 Deploys to the Field</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm Begins: 17-29 January 1991</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Group 37</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Force Service Support Group</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Direct Support Command</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Attacks Near Qaraah and Khafji 29-31 January 1991</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flexibility and Forward to Attack Positions  
1-23 February 1991

| Moving to the Attack | 112 |
| I MEF Changes Its Plan | 115 |
| The Decision | 115 |
| Khanjar | 117 |
| Lonesome Dove | 118 |
| The Seabees | 119 |
| The Buildup | 120 |
| The 2d Marine Division and DSG-2 Move West | 126 |
| Pushing Forward to the Ground War: Final Plans, Preparations, Problems, and Positions | 129 |
| The Direct Support Command | 129 |
| Direct Support Group 2 | 131 |
Direct Support Group 1 ........................................... 134
Combat Service Support Detachment 91 .......................... 140
MWSG-37 and The Seabees Final Preparations ..................... 140
Conclusion .......................................................... 141

The Ground War
24-28 February 1991

G-Day: 24 February 1991 .............................................. 142
The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 143
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 147
G+1: 25 February 1991 ................................................. 150
The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 150
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 154
G+2: 26 February 1991 ................................................. 159
The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 159
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 162
The Direct Support Command ........................................... 166
The Deluge of Enemy Prisoners of War ............................... 166
G+3: 27 February 1991 ................................................. 168
The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 169
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 170
The Lost Convoy ......................................................... 172
G+4: 28 February 1991 ................................................. 173
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 173
The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action ............................... 173
Brigade Service Support Group 5 .................................... 174
Conclusion .......................................................... 176

Leaving the Gulf with Good Order and Discipline
1 March-10 October 1991

Introduction and BSSG-5 .............................................. 176
First in First Out; Last in Last Out: 1 March-22 April 1991 .......................... 177
Deactivation and Home ................................................. 177
A Marine Corps Shame ................................................. 182
Operation Desert Cleanup .............................................. 182
Marine Forces Southwest Asia: 21 April-10 October 1991 ...................... 184
21 April-24 June 1991 ................................................. 184
24 June-10 October 1991 .............................................. 188
Conclusion .......................................................... 190

Notes .......................................................... 193

Appendix A: CSS Command Relationships .......................... 212
| Appendix B: 1st FSSG/2d FSSG Organizational Chart | 214 |
| Appendix C: Command and Staff | 215 |
| Appendix D: List of Abbreviations and Glossary | 218 |
| Appendix E: Chronology of Significant Events | 225 |
| Index | 230 |
When historians, strategists, and tacticians study the Gulf War—what they will study most carefully will be logistics. This was a war of logistics.1

The Iraqi invasion and takeover of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 threatened the stability of Iraq’s neighbors and the disruption of the world oil supply. Faced with this crisis, U.S. President George Bush drew a “line in the sand” in Saudi Arabia and formed a grand coalition of European and Arab nations to throw back the Iraqi Army and dampen the ambitions, if not bring down the regime, of Iraq’s unpredictable dictator, Saddam Hussein. At the heart of the coalition were the U.S. Armed Forces with the U.S. Marine Corps deploying along the cutting edge. The first challenge of the crisis would be the rapid delivery of troops and materiel to the Persian Gulf.

On 2 August, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered two Navy carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf. Five days later, the United States Central Command (USCentCom), the unified command responsible for the Persian Gulf, ordered to Saudi Arabia a brigade of the lightly armed U.S. Army 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Air Force fighters from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, and two squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) carrying Marine Corps equipment and supplies. Rapidly following this action, USCentCom ordered a second brigade from the 82d Airborne Division, the Army’s mobile 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), additional air and naval forces, and the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Persian Gulf. USCentCom intended to defend Saudi Arabia by bombing Iraqi forces by air and by establishing ground defensive positions around the two major Saudi ports at Dhahran and Jubayl.2

The first month after the Iraqi invasion was a hectic period for Marine units as American forces rapidly moved to the Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia. The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (7th MEB) was the first U.S. combat organization to arrive in the Persian Gulf with the necessary blend of maneuver, fire power, and logistics capability required to defeat Iraqi forces in the open desert.
It was the leading element of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), which served as the Marine Corps command component (MarCent) of USCentCom. Similar to all Marine air-ground task forces, I MEF consisted of headquarters, ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements, able to task-organize into smaller units.* Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, who served as a company commander during the Vietnam War and later as an advisor to a South Vietnamese infantry battalion, commanded I MEF. Major General James M. Myatt, a native Californian who served two combat tours in Vietnam, led the 1st Marine Division. Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr., a Vietnam War veteran who flew both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, directed the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Brigadier General James A. Brabham, Jr., a native Pennsylvanian who served twice in Vietnam and as the Deputy J-4 for logistics at USCentCom, commanded I MEF's combat service support element—the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG).3

Gathering the Pieces

The Marine Corps' deployment to the Persian Gulf, constituting as it did the largest Marine Corps movement since World War II, was dependent on the sealift provided by the Navy and airlift provided by the Air Force. Both sealift and airlift were magnificent.4

On 2 August 1990, the 1st FSSG, headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California, halfway around the world from the Persian Gulf, was organized into eight battalions that provided engineer, motor transportation, supply, maintenance, landing support, medical, dental, and other services, such as postal, disbursing, legal, exchange, and graves registration. Like most Marine Fleet Marine Force units, it had the ability to task organize and deploy into smaller organizations such as Marine expeditionary unit service support and brigade service support groups.

Colonel Alexander W. Powell, a former artilleryman who served two tours in Vietnam, commanded Brigade Service Support Group 7 (BSSG-7), 1st FSSG, which consisted of a small staff of 10 officers and 25 enlisted Marines, located in Building 1141 at Camp Pendleton.5 While Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait, Colonel Powell and his staff planned a deployment to Turkey to participate in Display Determination 90, a routine NATO exercise.6 For this exercise, 1st FSSG transferred operational control of BSSG-7 to the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (7th MEB), located 120 miles east of Camp Pendleton in the Mojave Desert at Marine Corps Combined Arms Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. The 7th MEB consisted of the brigade's command

*Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) doctrine establishes three different-sized units each having command, ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements. The biggest MAGTF is the MEF, followed in size by the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), with the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) being the smallest.
Locations of Combat Service Support Organizations and MPSRONs 2 and 3 on 2 August, 1990
The 1st FSSG, like all FSSGs, was organized into eight functional battalions. Its three combat service support detachments (CSSDs) were established to meet local requirements in California and Arizona.

The 7th MEB was a maritime prepositioning squadron brigade. Maritime prepositioning of equipment and supplies was a concept pioneered by the Marine Corps. According to this doctrine, a Marine brigade's set of equipment and 30 days of supplies were preloaded on ships prepositioned in friendly ports located near potential crises areas. To confront an international emergency, the brigade's personnel would fly to a safe location while the ships would sail to meet them. The brigade along with a Navy support element (NSE) would unload the ships, distribute the equipment, and rapidly create a potent and sustainable combat force in a troubled region.* The Marine Corps maintained three maritime prepositioning ships squadrons (MPSRon) tied to three dedicated Marine expeditionary brigades. MPSRons, the Marine brigades, and the NSEs regularly trained together. The 7th MEB was associated with MPSRon-2, consisting of five civilian-owned ships located 4,600 kilometers from the Port of Al Jubayl, at the British island of Diego Garcia.

Four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Major General John I. Hopkins, a veteran of two tours in Vietnam who once commanded the 2d Force Service Support Group and now the 7th MEB, ordered BSSG-7 to “stand-up” its wartime table of organization, to fly to Saudi Arabia, and to marry up with MPSRon-2 at

* A Maritime Prepositioning Force consists of the MPS squadron, the MEB, a Navy support element (NSE), and a command element. NSEs are task organizations which often consist of cargo handlers and amphibious Seabees from the U.S. Navy’s two amphibious construction battalions. (Author’s telephone intvws, dtd 21Feb91, with Mr. Nicholas M. Linkowitz, Col Alexander W. Powell USMC (Ret), Dr. Robert J. Schneller, and MSChief Alfred H. Jensen).
A Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) would fly in echelon (FIE) to the crisis location, unload the MPS, and rapidly create a logistically sustainable combat force. Marine fixed-wing aircraft would fly to a nearby air facility to provide the MEB its air component.

The 1st FSSG sent departure airfield control groups and logistic movement control center teams to Norton Air Force Base, California, and Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California, to assist 7th MEB’s move to the Gulf. The logistics movement control center coordinated the arrival and departure of aircraft, ground transportation, and transient units. The departure airfield control group helped departing units unload ground transportation and load aircraft.

BSSG-7 began moving by air to the Gulf as part of the 7th MEB’s 148-man Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party, tasked with preparing the Port of Al Jubayl for unloading MPSRon-2 ships. This team reached Saudi Arabia on 11 August. BSSG-7’s advance party landed two days later and Colonel Powell arrived on the 16th. On 21 August, the main body reached Saudi Arabia, increasing the size of BSSG-7 to nearly 3,000 Marines and sailors in-country. In just 15 days, BSSG-7 grew in size from 35 Marines to 2,841 logisticians, moved to the other side of the globe, prepared for combat operations, and laid the ground-
In August 1990, MPSRon-2 docked at Jubayl, 210 kilometers south of the Kuwaiti border, while the 7th MEB landed initially at Dhahran and later at Jubayl Naval Air Facility. Marine fixed-wing squadrons operated from the nearby island nation of Bahrain.

Work for a larger logistical system.\textsuperscript{10}

Thirty miles north of Camp Pendleton at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) 37 provided direct logistics support as well as meteorological and crash and fire rescue services to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW). MWSG-37, commanded by Colonel Robert W. Coop, deployed two squadrons to the Persian Gulf as part of the 7th MEB: Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) 373, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Hanson, located at El Toro, and MWSS-374, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen G. Hornberger, at the neighboring Marine Corps Air Station Tustin.\textsuperscript{11}

On 2 August, MWSS-373 was preparing to deploy to Turkey to participate in the exercise Display Determination in support of MAG-70. MWSS-373 rapidly added 20 personnel to the 7th MEB’s Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party, which was swiftly followed by the squadron’s advance party, which accounted for another 95 persons. The destination of MWSS-373 was Shaikh Isa Air Base on the Gulf island of Bahrain, and not Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. MWSG-37 sent additional people to flesh out MWSS-373, whose main body of 389 Marines and sailors departed California later that month.\textsuperscript{12}

Earlier, on 10 August, MWSS-374, which had one detachment nearing completion of a 1,400,000-square-foot grading project at the expeditionary air field, Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, received orders from MWSG-37 to deploy to the Gulf in support of MAG-70. The group reassigned personnel to bring the squadron up to strength, and on 15 August the advance party departed. Twelve days later, all 21 officers and 426 enlisted
Marines and sailors of the squadron were in Saudi Arabia. As dictated by existing Marine and Navy contingency plans, MPSRon-2 immediately sailed from Diego Garcia Island to join the 7th MEB, already en route, in response to the crisis. The MV Hauge, MV Bonnyman, and MV Anderson reached the Port of Al Jubayl on 15 August. Two of MPSRon-2’s five ships were absent from Diego Garcia when the squadron steamed for Saudi Arabia. The MV Fisher was located off the west coast of Africa, enroute to Blount Island, Florida, to undergo scheduled maintenance. The MV Fisher turned around and sailed for the Persian Gulf, arriving at Al Jubayl on 24 August. The fifth ship of the squadron, the MV Baugh, was docked at Blount Island, Florida, undergoing scheduled maintenance. MV Baugh quickly departed the United States, docking at Jubayl on 5 September. In accordance with doctrine, Navy Captain Carl A. Weegar’s NSE of 523 sailors arrived at the Port of Al Jubayl to assist BSSG-7 in unloading the MPS ships.

BSSG-1

Rapidly responding to the emergency in the Gulf region, on 8 August, the four ships of MPSRon-3, located on Guam, also set sail for the Gulf to marry-up with units from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade located at Marine Corps Air Station Kanehoe Bay, Hawaii. Brigade Service Support Group 1 (BSSG-1) provided general logistics support to the units of the 1st Brigade composed of the command element, Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 3, and Marine Aircraft Group 24, as well as the BSSG.

Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Beinhart III, a former enlisted Marine who served two tours in Vietnam, commanded BSSG-1. Unlike BSSG-7, BSSG-1 was a permanent organization consisting of 1,200 Marines and sailors and not a planning staff to be expanded, when required. The support group was dedicated to maritime prepositioning ship operations, completing Exercise Freedom Banner-90, just prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. During this exercise, ships from MPSRon-3 were unloaded at Indian Head, Washington. On 26 August, BSSG-1’s 51-member advance party reached the Port of Al Jubayl. On the same day, three ships from MPSRon-3, the MV Lummus, MV Williams, and MV Lopez dropped anchor at the Port, followed the next day by the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Beinhart. Four days later, the last MPSRon-3 ship, the MV Button docked at Jubayl.

On the east coast of the United States at Camp Lejuene, North Carolina, the 2d Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG) provided general logistics support to units of the II Marine Expeditionary Force which included the 2d Marine

---

*MPS ships are named after Marine Corps recipients of the Medal of Honor.
**Capt Weegar formed the NSE around the Naval Beach Group which he commanded at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California, and sailors from the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group, Williamsburg, Virginia. (Powell comments)
Division and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, a Naval Academy graduate who had completed two tours in Vietnam and also had served as the deputy director of the White House military office, commanded the 2d FSSG.20

Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) 4, 2d FSSG, commanded by Colonel James J. Doyle, Jr., was also located at Camp Lejeune. BSSG-4 provided general logistics support to the units of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) consisting of the brigade command element, Regimental Landing Team 2, and Marine Aircraft Group 40.* The brigade support group actually consisted of a small planning staff that the 2d FSSG augmented with people and equipment for exercises and operations. It supported a Marine expeditionary brigade that deployed to a crisis on board U.S. Navy amphibious shipping rather than by air.

The 4th MEB staff demonstrated its flexibility during the first week of August 1990. In a period of eight days, the 4th MEB shifted its efforts from planning two exercises in Europe to a contingency operation off Liberia and, finally to its rapid deployment by ship to the Persian Gulf. On 10 August, the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, ordered the MEB to the Persian Gulf. The next day, the 2d FSSG transferred operational control of BSSG-4 to the 4th MEB.

Between 17 and 22 August, the 1,464 Marines and sailors of BSSG-4 quickly departed from Moorehead City, North Carolina, on 13 ships, divided into three transit groups belonging to Amphibious Group 2. Towards the end of August, embarkation teams from the 2d Force Service Support Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, moved to Sunny Point, South Carolina, to load five Military Sealift Command chartered ships with 30 days of supplies and equipment for the 4th MEB.21**

*Regimental Landing Team 2 consisted of two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and detachments of light armored vehicles, TOWs, engineers, and amphibious assault vehicles.

**Col Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2d FSSG, called the 4th MEB’s embarkation on board amphibious ships “a mess, poorly coordinated, it became a stuffex.” The 4th MEB loaded much of its equipment on the MSC char-
On patrol near the Philippine Islands in August, having departed California for its Western Pacific deployment only a few months before, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)), transported by the five ships of Amphibious Ready Group “A,” set a course for the Middle East.*** MEU Service Support Group 13 (MSSG-13), the smallest of the standard Marine air-ground task force combat service support organizations, provided logistic support to the MEU’s command element, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/4, and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 164 (Composite). Lieutenant Colonel Bradley M. Lott commanded MSSG-13’s 16 officers and 273 enlisted Marines and sailors arrayed into eight detachments replicating, in miniature, the eight battalions of the FSSG. 23

As a result of the traditional warm relationship between the Marines and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transit Group 1</th>
<th>Transit Group 2</th>
<th>Transit Group 3</th>
<th>Assault Follow-on MSC Shipping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44)</td>
<td>USS Nassau (LHA-4)</td>
<td>USS Guam (LPH-9)</td>
<td>MV Cape Domingo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Shreveport (LPD-12)</td>
<td>USS Raleigh (LPD-1)</td>
<td>USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)</td>
<td>MV Strong Texan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Spartanburg County (LST-1192)</td>
<td>USS Pensacola (LSD-38)</td>
<td>USS Manitowoc (LST-1180)</td>
<td>MV Bassro Polar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Portland (LSD-37)</td>
<td>USS Saginaw (LST-1188)</td>
<td>USS Lamoure City (LST-1194)</td>
<td>MV Aurora T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Trenton (LPD-14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MV Pheasant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table : 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade shipping**

***The USS Okinawa (LPH-3), USS Ogden (LPD-5), USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43), USS Durham (LKA-114), and USS Cayuga (LST-1186) were the ships of Amphibious Squadron 5.
the Navy's mobile construction battalions, better known as "Seabees," forged during the bloody island-hopping campaigns of World War II. The Commander, Naval Construction Battalions Pacific Fleet (COMCBPAC), located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, ordered in August four naval mobile construction battalions spread over half of the world to join the Marines in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy maintained eight active-duty naval mobile construction battalions that augmented Marines when construction requirements exceeded the capabilities of Marine engineer units. The Seabees performed similar construction tasks to the FSSG and MWSG engineers.

Since there was no active regimental headquarters, a composite headquarters, dubbed COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta (forward deployed), was formed from the staffs of COMCBPAC, the Commander Naval Construction Battalions Atlantic Fleet, and the 31st Construction Regiment (Training). Commander Michael R. Johnson, USN, a member of the Civil Engineer Corps, was quickly frocked to the rank of Captain in deference to his new responsibilities as the commanding officer of the regiment.

As ordered by COMCBPAC, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40 (NMCB-40), stationed in Guam; NMCB-7 posted to Okinawa, NMCB-4 located at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and NMCB-5, based at Port Hueneme, California, prepared to deploy in three echelons to the Gulf. Organized into light air detachments and heavier air echelons, the Seabee units' air movements were due to arrive in the region before 22 August, with the bulk of each battalion's organizational equipment to follow by ship reaching Saudi Arabia a month later. Unfortunately, the lack of aircraft delayed the Seabee air deployment, forcing most of the equipment scheduled to be shipped by air to be moved by ship. The Seabees slightly enlarged their light air movement detachments to compensate for the loss of the heavier air echelon.

Needing to synchronize Seabee and Marine Corps efforts, on 10 August, Captain Johnson sent Lieutenant Kevin R. Slates, USN, as his liaison officer, and Commander William L. Rudich, the regimental operations officer, to Camp Pendleton. Both Navy officers then travelled to Saudi Arabia with Lieutenant Colonel Marshall B. Foore, the I MEF Engineer Officer. This Navy-Marine Corps engineer team formulated a plan for the Seabees to reinforce the MWSS-374 engineers at Jubayl Naval Air Facility and King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and to assist the BSSG-7 engineers at the Port of Jubayl.

*The Seabees of the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions differ in training and mission from the Seabees of the Amphibious Construction Battalions that were assigned to Capt Weegar's NSE. (Author telephone intvw, 21Feb97, with MChief Alfred H. Jensen).

**Frocking allows those selected for the next higher grade to wear their new rank, without the benefits of increased pay and legal authority, prior to their official promotion date. Naval officers who command naval mobile construction organizations are members of the Civil Engineer Corps (CEC).

***Comdr Rudich, LtCol Foore, and Lt Slates played a critical role in the early planning and engineer execution, setting the stage for all follow-on engineer operations, according to Capt Johnson. (Johnson comments).
Seabee group, consisting of the supply officer, Lieutenant Commander Jon Miller, USN; Marine liaison officer Major Martin R. Nolan, USMC; and the operations chief, Master Chief Utilitiesman John Henderson, soon joined the first group. This team began arranging logistics support and evaluating the threat and security situation.

On 28 August, 10 members of the command element of COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta together with the advance party of NMCB-5 reached Saudi Arabia. Two days later, the remaining members of the COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta command element landed, followed on the 31st by the last increment of NMCB-5's air detachment. Lieutenant Daniel T. Ray, USN, commanded the detachment consisting of 91 sailors and 23 pieces of equipment. This group began construction operations with the Marines of MWSS-374 at Jubayl Naval Air Facility. The first 31 members of NMCB-4's air detachment arrived from Puerto Rico on the last day of August, raising the number of deployed Seabees to 181. NMCB-4 was assigned to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station four days after its arrival. On 2 September, the MV Constellation departed Guam carrying NMCB-40's organizational equipment.

The senior Marine logistician in Saudi Arabia by this time was Brigadier General Brabham, who had arrived earlier in the month. Lieutenant General Boomer, the I MEF commander, had assigned Brabham as his personal representative and ordered him to Riyadh, the capital city of Saudi Arabia. Rather than commanding the 1st FSSG, Brabham’s first task was to establish the MarCent headquarters in Saudi Arabia. His recent tour at USCentCom, the overwhelmingly logistical nature of the deployment, and the long-term benefits of positioning I MEF's ranking logistic officer in Saudi Arabia at the earliest opportunity made Brabham the obvious person to fill this position and at a later date to resume control of the 1st FSSG.

Following General Brabham to Saudi Arabia were four members of the Logistics Movement Control Center (Forward), 1st FSSG. This group coordinated the arrival of aircraft with locally available transportation and reported aircraft arrivals to 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton. On 29 August, the Advanced Party of 1st FSSG left Southern California. Their purpose was to establish a forward headquarters and to plan the amalgamation of BSSG-7 and BSSG-1 into the 1st FSSG. By 2 September, 83 personnel belonging to the 1st FSSG were in Saudi Arabia, ready to take control of both BSSGs.

The Navy and the Air Force performed superbly in transporting Marines and Seabees to the Gulf. During the one month following the invasion of Kuwait, eight maritime prepositioning ships reached the Port of Jubayl with a ninth ship closing rapidly. Eighteen U.S. Navy amphibious ships carried the 4th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC) towards the Persian Gulf. Five chartered ships were being loaded to move 4th MEB's supplies and one ship transported Seabee equipment. Two hundred and fifty-nine Military Airlift Command flights moved the 16,469 passengers and 5,985 short tons of cargo belonging to the 7th MEB. Twenty-four flights moved the lead elements of the 1st Marine Brigade and 30 flights transported Seabees. Of the 20,524 Marines and sailors ashore in Saudi Arabia, 4,783
were the logisticians belonging to BSSG-7, BSSG-1, MWSS-373, MWSS-374, the Seabees, and 1st FSSG (Forward). Of the 13,515 personnel afloat with the 4th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC), 1,737 were the logisticians of BSSG-4 and MSSG-13. After arriving in the middle east, the 7th MEB took advantage of the excellent facilities provided by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, unloaded the MPS ships, and spread out in defense of Al Jubayl.

Table: Logistics units deployed to the Persian Gulf in September 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I MEF Logistics Units</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Logistics Units Afloat</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSSG-7</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>BSSG-4</td>
<td>1,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSSG-1</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>MSSG-13</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-373</td>
<td>504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabees</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st FSSG (Forward)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawing the Mameluke

We got three of them at once and did a "dump-ex" on them. We offloaded three ships in about three or four days.36

The 7th MEB entered the oil-rich Persian Gulf area through the heart of its most developed infrastructure. This region contained major airfields and seaports interconnected by an extensive road network optimal for joining Marines, who arrived by air, with their surface-transported equipment. These facilities allowed 7th MEB to build an air-ground defense faster than envisioned by strategic planners.

Al Jubayl was the major port used by Marines during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This port had 16 berths for unloading ships, heavy lift equipment, abundant warehousing, extensive outdoor hardstand, storage, and staging areas; a good surrounding road network; and an existing work force. The port was located near vacant labor camps and the Hulwaylatt Hospital used for the construction of the Industrial City of Jubayl.* The cantonment area at the port was named Camp Shepherd in honor of General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., the 20th Commandant of the Marine Corps.37

Located 27 kilometers due west of the port was Jubayl Naval Air Facility, which gave 7th MEB a local airfield to fly in people and equipment and a heli-

*The Industrial City contained the Saudi petrochemical industry in the Eastern Provinces.
The Port of Jubayl was an expansive modern facility that could unload 16 ships simultaneously.

copter base to support defensive operations. On 16 August, the Military Airlift Command, responding to 7th MEB’s request to open an airhead closer to the Port of Jubayl than Dhahran, began flying missions to Jubayl Naval Air Facility. The next day, Bell Textron Super Cobra attack helicopters from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369 arrived at the air facility. Seven more helicopter squadrons joined them over the next 16 days.*

Already, on 15 August 1990, the 7th MEB’s Surveillance, Liaison and Reconnaissance Party had arrived at the Port of Jubayl to unload the ships of MPSRon-2. Expecting a gunfight upon arrival, the locked-and-loaded Marines of the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Liaison Party brushed past the business-as-usual-attitude prevailing in Saudi Arabia, and rushed to unload the MV Bonnyman, MV Hauge, and MV Anderson. Major items of equipment such as M60 tanks, light amphibious vehicles, amphibious assault vehicles, M198 howitzers, trucks, forklifts, and container handlers came off the ships first. By 17 August, all 1,156 major items of equipment were unloaded and by the 21st, 29,257 short tons of cargo and containers were on dry land. Anxious to move to the field and establish the defense of Jubayl, 7th MEB units rushed to claim their equipment. This caused a distribution problem when some ground units grabbed more equipment than they rated, leaving others without. This gave the 1st Marine Division Logistics Officer, Colonel Jasper C. Lilly, a long-term headache

*7th MEB helicopters were transported by cargo air planes to Saudi Arabia and not by sea.
in sorting out ownership. * Despite this annoyance, the rapid unload of MPSRon-2 allowed the 7th MEB to announce its readiness to defend Jubayl on 25 August, a little more than three weeks after the start of hostilities and nearly a week before strategic planners believed Jubayl could be defended.41**

On 22 August, the MV Bonnyman was reloaded with ammunition and ground equipment to build up the 7th MEB's aviation capability in Bahrain. Located on a small Persian Gulf island, Bahrain was physically connected to Saudi Arabia by 27 kilometers of causeway and diplomatically by membership in the Gulf Cooperative Council.*** The island is 50 kilometers long and 18 kilometers wide. Shaikh Isa Air Base, on the island, is located in the sparsely populated southern part of Bahrain. The command elements of MAG-70 and its fixed wing squadrons set up shop at this airport. Shaikh Isa was located 150 kilometers southeast of the port of Al Jubayl, which was a two-hour journey by ground transportation. Located in the densely populated north of the island, Bahrain International Airport served as the bed-down site for six Lockheed KC-130 Hercules refuelers belonging to Marine Aerial Refueller Transport Squadron (VMGR) 352. MAG-70 used the nearby port of Mina Suliman to unload military prepositioning ships after their initial stop at Jubayl.42

Back in Saudi Arabia, the 7th MEB continued to unload MPSRon-2 ships and use them to support the aviation build-up. On 24 August, MV Hauge moved 10 kilometers southeast of the Port of Jubayl, to pump aviation fuel at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station. On the same day, 20 McDonald Douglas AV-8B Harrier jets of Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 311 arrived at this facility, while the MV Fisher, the fourth ship of MPSRon-2, docked at the Port.43 All 10,000 short tons of cargo from the Fisher were unloaded by 27 August, and similar to the MV Bonnyman, the Fisher was reloaded with aviation ammunition and ground support equipment bound for Bahrain.44

On 26 August three ships from MPSRon-3, the MV Lummus, MV Williams, and MV Lopez docked at the Port of Jubayl. Meeting the ships were the Marines of BSSG-1 who arrived with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade's advance party. Four days later, the last ship belonging to MPSRon3, the MV Button, reached the Port. BSSG-1 spent its brief nine-day existence in Saudi

---

*In addition, 7th MEB unevenly distributed fortification materials (sandbags, barbed wire, and engineer stakes). According to Col Powell, "It (fortification material) pretty much went out on a first come first serve basis because there was no distribution plan and no system to relate bundles of sandbags and rolls of wire with units and areas to be defended. Consequently, units at Jubayl were protected with sandbagged positions while some division units moved to the desert without any fortification materials." (Powell comments).

**7th MEB's efforts to establish a defense quickly were frustrated by a shortage of USAF aerial refuelers which postponed the arrival of MAG-70 fixed-wing aircraft and by a delay in obtaining Saudi permission to move RCT-7 out of the Port of Jubayl.

***The Gulf Cooperative Council was a defense pact established in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to counter both Iranian and Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf.
The Jubayl Naval Air Facility, located 27 miles west of the Port of Jubayl, after 16 August 1990, became the Marines' main airhead for passengers and cargo entering Saudi Arabia and the primary Marine Corps helicopter facility.

Arabia unloading ships. With the 7th MEB consolidating defensive positions, BSSG-1 Marines had time to stage, organize, and account for equipment and materiel. The use of bar-coding scanning procedures greatly assisted identifying and sorting the masses of look-alike containers. By 2 September, all major equipment was unloaded from the MV Lummus, MV Williams, and MV Lopez and nearly all of the containers and cargo. BSSG-1 offloaded 83 percent of Button's equipment, a fifth of its containers, and 47 short tons of cargo. In total, BSSG-1 took off the ships 41,961 short tons of cargo in seven days and began the sorting, organizing, and issuing process.45

The 7th MEB laid claim to superior facilities in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Both countries provided modern seaports and airports within reach of the anticipated field of battle. These facilities served as the foundation for the 7th MEB's defense of Jubayl. I MEF would soon use the same facilities to extend its combat capabilities in the Gulf.

Tools of the Trade

The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) especially proved a life saver.46
—Col Alexander W. Powell, CO, BSSG-7

While the Marines of BSSG-1 unloaded MPSRon-3, the BSSG-7 and MWSS Marines recovered their materials, handling bulk fuel storage, water pro-
The Logistical Vehicle System (LVS) was the premier method of tactical ground transportation belonging to the Marine Corps. LVSs, also known as “Dragon Wagons,” provided logisticians a flexible system for moving cargo, containers, people, water, fuel, and recovered vehicles. The LVS family consisted of the MK48 12.5-ton power unit and four different types of trailers. The MK14 container hauler was a trailer used to move standard 8 by 8 by 20-foot containers, 900-gallon water and fuel modules called Sixcons, and fuel/water pumps. Special trailers carrying heavy equipment, such as tanks and bulldozers, were connected to the M48 power unit by the MK16 fifth-wheel semi-trailer configuration. The MK17 cargo hauler was modified and used to haul troops and evacuate wounded from the battlefield as well as to move cargo. The MK15 wrecker trailer gave the LVS a vehicle recovery capability.

In addition to the LVS, 5-ton trucks were used to carry cargo and people, while the M931 5-ton tractor was hitched to the M970 5,000-gallon tanker to transport fuel. Ancient, but operational, 1,000-gallon M49 fuel and M50 water trucks were also used to transport bulk liquids.

BSSG-7’s Motor Transport Detachment deployed 65 MK48 power units, 46 MK14 container haulers, 17 MK17 cargo trailers, and 3 MK16 fifth-wheel semi-trailer adapters. Augmenting the Dragon Wagon fleet were 26 5-ton trucks and 12 M970 5,000-gallon tankers. MWSS-374 operated 10 Dragon Wagons, 18 5-ton trucks, and 8 M970 5,000-gallon fuel tankers. MWSS-373

*A fifth trailer, the MK18, transported ribbon bridges and was fielded after Desert Storm. (Woodson comments).
deployed 10 Dragon Wagons, 26 5-ton trucks, and 9 M970 5,000-gallon fuel tankers. All three units had a small number of M49A2 refuelers and M50A2 water trucks.48

Material-handling equipment, such as container handlers, cranes, and forklifts, was essential in picking, placing, and moving the numerous containers, pallets, and vans in which supplies and equipment were packed. The rough terrain container hauler (RTCH) was the largest piece of material-handling equipment deployed to the Gulf. It weighed 103,000 pounds and looked like a giant forklift. It could lift and move fully loaded 8-by-8 by 20-foot containers weighing up to 25 tons. Heavy- and medium- capacity cranes along with medium- and light-forklifts, such as the compact RT 4000 forklift, handy in the tight areas around ammunition bunkers and 5-ton trucks, gave the logisticians of the 7th MEB a variety of equipment to use for a multitude of tasks.49 MPSRon-2 carried 10 container handlers, 16 cranes, and 28 forklifts for BSSG-7; 1 container handler, 8 cranes, and 26 forklifts for MWSS-373; and 1 container handler, 8 cranes, and 25 forklifts for MWSS-374.50

Bulk fuel was either stored in amphibious assault fuel systems operated by the BSSG\FSSGs or by tactical airfield fuel dispensing and helicopter expedient refuelling systems belonging to the MWSSs. An amphibious assault fuel system consisted of an interconnected array of pumps, hoses, and 20,000-gallon fuel tanks capable of storing up to 600,000 gallons. BSSG-7 rated eight amphibious assault fuel systems. The tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems stored 120,000 gallons in six 20,000-gallon tanks and dispensed fuel to aircraft from six refuelling points. MWSS-373 possessed eight tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems

*Marines from BSSG-1 prepare to unload ships from MPSRon-3. The ship MV PFC Dwayne T. Williams is seen in the foreground.*

Photo courtesy of LtGen James A. Brabham, Jr.
and MWSS-374 owned seven. The helicopter expedient refueling system stored 9,000 gallons of fuel in an array of 18 500-gallon collapsible fuel drums interconnected by hoses to filter separators and pumps. This system was air transportable and designed to dispense fuel at forward locations. MWSS-373 owned five helicopter expedient refueling systems and MWSS-374 maintained eight.51

The 7th MEB water production capability was provided by reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs). A ROWPU produced up to 600 gallons per hour of purified water from raw water sources such as sea water. In addition, ROWPUs could remove chemical, mineral, and biological contaminants from water. ROWPUs, combined with pumps, tanks, and bladders, were used to establish water points. BSSG-7 owned 13 ROWPUs, MWSS-373 had 8, and MWSS-374 possessed 7.52

Both BSSG and MWSS engineers used heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and graders, to improve and build roads, construct berms surrounding fuel storage and ammunition cells, and stabilize the ground for aircraft parking areas. For the latter purpose, aluminum sheets of AM2 matting were fixed to the ground giving aircraft a place to park and helicopters an area on which to land and from which to take off. BSSG-7’s earth-moving capability was centered around 16 bulldozers and three road graders, while MWSS-373 had five bulldozers and a road grader and MWSS-374 operated five bulldozers and two road graders.53

BSSG-7, MWSS-373, and MWSS-374 claimed their equipment at the Port of Jubayl and began to support 7th MEB’s ground and aviation combat units. MWSS-373 set up shop at Shaikh Isa Air Base to support fixed-wing operations, while MWSS-374, moved to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station to support the Harrier squadron and to Jubayl Naval Air Facility to sustain helicopter operations. BSSG-7 established itself at the Port of Al Jubayl and began building a general logistical support system.
Creating the General Logistics Support System

It was just a matter of shifting gears from a peacetime exercise to a deployment for an actual contingency.\(^5^4\) —Col Alexander W. Powell, CO, BSSG-7

On 18 August 1990, the 7th MEB ordered BSSG-7 to unload MPSRon-2, support the relocation of ground and aviation combat elements, establish remote logistics sites, and sustain units in the field.\(^5^5\) A week later, the MEB assigned BSSG-7 the responsibility for security at the Port of Al Jubayl and the nearby Huwaylatt Hospital.\(^5^6\) Organized on functional lines, BSSG-7 along with help from its Arab hosts, sister Services, and Camp Pendleton, began sustaining the 7th MEB.

Captain Adrian W. Burke, Landing Support Detachment commander, BSSG-7, was responsible for unloading the ships of MPSRon-2. Captain Burke had arrived at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, on 11 August, with the Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party.\(^5^7\) He immediately ordered First Lieutenant Kenneth Olivo to establish a 12-man arrival air control group at Dhahran, responsible for unloading arriving aircraft and facilitating forward movements of people and equipment. Arriving at the Port of Jubayl, the landing support detachment together with the sailors from Captain Weegar’s NSE rapidly offloaded the ships of MPSRon-2.* On 16 August, Captain Burke established a second arrival air control group, led by First Lieutenant Kevin M. McNerney, at Jubayl Naval Air Facility.\(^5^8\)

Major David L. Jankowski commanded the six officers and 234 enlisted Marines of BSSG-7’s motor transport detachment. From 19 August-2 September, the motor transport detachment moved 600 tons of aviation and ground ammunition from the Port of Jubayl to forward deployed units. Major Jankowski used Dragon Wagons hauling 900-gallon Sixcons and M50 1,000-gallon tankers to move water to forward units. Even with the motor transport detachment’s efforts, 7th MEB’s transportation demands exceeded supply. From the beginning of the deployment, the Marines used host nation trucks and creative substitutions for ground transportation. The Saudi government provided 45 8,000-gallon tankers to move fuel to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and Jubayl Naval Air Facility. In anticipation of moving units north by water, the Marines borrowed five utility landing craft (LCUs) from the Saudi Navy and the U.S. Army.\(^5^9\)

Major John L. Sweeney, Jr., commanded the engineer detachment of 20 officers and 700 enlisted Marines and sailors. This detachment furnished 7th MEB with bulk fuel storage, construction, and water production and storage capabilities.\(^6^0\) The 26 Marines of the engineer detachment’s water supply platoon produced water with ROWPUs. On 17 August, the water supply platoon established

*According to Col Powell, “the NSE, especially the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group, played a critical role . . . in unloading MPSRon-2.” (Powell comments).
a water point at the Port of Jubayl. Four ROWPUs produced water stored in three 50,000- and two 20,000-gallon tanks. A second water point, using one ROWPU with 50,000 gallons of storage, was established at the Royal Saudi Naval base at Ras Al Ghar, located 25 kilometers southeast of the Port of Jubayl. The water point was established to support RCT-3 from Hawaii.61 The cantonment area for RCT-3 was named Camp Dan Daly after the legendary Marine recipient of two Medals of Honor.62

During the first weeks of the deployment, the 7th MEB drank water either produced by BSSG-7 or bottled water procured by contracting officers. Water from the local municipal system was used for showers. On 29 August, the Medical Detachment, BSSG-7 began evaluating the potability of municipal water. Two days later, this team reported that the Saudi water supplies at the port, Jubayl Naval Air Facility, Camp 15 in the Industrial City, and King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station were safe for drinking. The next day the team reported that water produced by the desalinization plant north of Jubayl was potable. The 7th MEB began to use the local water for consumption and considered ending the purchase of bottled water.63

The engineer detachment’s bulk fuel personnel could operate up to eight 600,000-gallon assault amphibious fuel systems. On 16 August, BSSG-7 began dispensing some of the 77,183 gallons of fuel offloaded from MPSRon-2 at the Port of Al Jubayl. On 24 August, bulk fuel Marines from the engineer detachment, located at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Facility, received aviation fuel during a ship-to-shore transfer through 18,000 feet of hose from the MV Hauge. In a three-day period, amphibious Seabees from the NSE pumped 504,000 gallons of fuel

*The Navy base at Ras Al Ghar should not be confused with the point of land having the same name north of Al Jubayl.
from the Hauge into one of BSSG-7's amphibious assault fuel systems. While the 7th MEB planned to build an amphibious assault fuel system at Jubayl Naval Air Facility, construction did not start until after 2 September. Helicopters at this facility as well as fixed-wing aircraft at Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and Shaikh Isa Air Base, received fuel contracted from and transported by the host nations.

Engineer detachment construction personnel concentrated on building berms around the assault amphibious fuel systems at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, Shaikh Isa, and the aviation ammunition storage point at Jubayl Naval Air Facility while working on a variety of other projects. In case of an Iraqi assault, MAG-70 needed to store and protect sufficient fuel and ammunition to support three days of maximum flight operations by all of its aircraft. Elsewhere, BSSG-7 engineers assembled heads and shower facilities at Ras Al Ghar Navy Base for

*Col Powell attributed the success of the ship-to-shore fuel transfer at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station to "lessons learned" when BSSG-7 and the NSE had "failed miserably" the previous year to pipe fuel from ship-to-shore during Exercise Talay Thai in Thailand. (Powell comments).
At Jubayl Naval Air Facility, Marines of BSSG-7’s Arrival Airfield Control Group help unload a CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter from a giant USAF C5 transport.

RCT-3. The Saudis added to this camp by erecting 500 tents complete with carpeted floors. BSSG-7 engineers began fabricating wooden tent frames, called “strong backs,” and laid concrete foundations to support the long-term use of tents at the Port of Jubayl.

Major William C. Cox led the 561 Marines of the BSSG-7 maintenance detachment which was organized into engineer, communications-electronics, motor transport, ordnance, and general support maintenance companies. Major Cox focused the engineer maintenance company’s efforts on maintaining equipment needed to unload the MPF ships, such as generators and material handling equipment. As equipment came off the ships, the motor transport maintenance company was inundated with trucks requiring repair, while the ordnance maintenance company performed limited technical inspections on M198 155mm howitzers, crew-served weapons, antitank weapons, and optical equipment prior to the 7th Marines deploying to the field.

Navy Lieutenant Commander Alan L. Nelson commanded the Medical Detachment, BSSG-7 of 52 Navy officers and 338 enlisted sailors and Marines. The medical detachment provided 7th MEB with force-level or second-echelon medical treatment. Second-echelon medicine consisted of resuscitative treatment, surgery, and blood transfusions designed to either cure or stabilize injured, wounded, and sick Marines and sailors. The medical detachment evacuated more serious cases after stabilization to third-echelon theater-level medical organiza-

*Concrete was used for tent foundations instead of wood, because of availability and cost. (Skipper comments). Because the Saudis refused to allow the Marines to drive tent stakes into the asphalt at the Port of Jubayl, the engineers constructed thousands of concrete blocks with metal loops sticking out the top to secure their tents. (Col Paul A. Pankey, comments on draft, 26 Feb 97, Author’s files, MCHC, hereafter Pankey comments).
The Marines took over this fully equipped, abandoned hospital at Al-Huwaylatt in the Jubayl Industrial City and renamed it the Marine Corps Hospital at Al-Huwaylatt. It became operational on 27 August 1990.

Initially, the 7th MEB used the Saudi naval hospital at King Abdul Aziz Naval Base for treatment. On average, eight patients were treated per day. On 26 August, the 7th MEB discovered the fully equipped but abandoned Saudi hospital at Al-Huwaylatt located in the Jubayl Industrial City. This hospital, previously used to care for foreign workers and the local population, was abandoned in 1988. The Al Huwaylatt Hospital could simultaneously perform surgery on 10 patients. The 7th MEB renamed this facility the Marine Corps Hospital at Al-Huwaylatt. BSSG-7 doctors performed two operations on the 27th. Additionally, the top floor of the Marine Corps hospital was used as a women Marines' barracks.

On 21 August, the USNS Noble Star docked at Al Jubayl and offloaded 360 containers carrying the equipment for Navy Fleet Hospital 5. This hospital was staffed by 1,000 Navy medical personnel and had a 500-bed capacity. It required 28 acres of land for installation and was set up near the 7th MEB MEF forward command post at the Port of Jubayl. Fleet hospitals were third-echelon theater-level medical organizations providing specialty and definitive care to the seriously sick and injured. Fleet hospitals belonged to the U.S. Navy, but their primary customers were Marines who took great interest in their deployment, installation, and operation. By 2 September, Fleet Hospital 5 had 200 available beds.

Between 13 August and 2 September, 56 Marines and sailors of 7th MEB were hospitalized. Twenty-one of these cases were medevaced elsewhere from the Gulf for treatment. On 2 September, 26 Marines and sailors were in the hospital.
for a wide variety of causes, such as strains, breaks, hernias, chest pain, back pain, asthma, heat casualty, gastroenteritis, and even a case of pneumonia. The 7th MEB reported one suicide attempt, a stabbing, and two shooting cases.

Captain Gerardo Guerrero commanded BSSG-7’s supply detachment of 13 officers and 293 enlisted Marines and sailors. This detachment stored and issued ammunition, rations, medical supplies, repair parts, and consumable items. In addition, the supply detachment had contracting authority, an important function giving 7th MEB and later 1 MEF, the ability to obtain critically needed resources from the local economy.

The 22 sailors of the medical logistics (MedLog) section, stored and issued blocks of medical supplies called authorized medical allowance lists (AMALs) to all medical units within the MEB. This supply organization carried 36 aid station blocks for first-echelon treatment provided by unit aid stations and corpsmen throughout the MEB. Fifteen operating rooms and 33 shock surgical AMALs were stocked for more serious second-echelon medical treatment administered by the Medical Detachment, BSSG-7.

The supply detachment’s ammunition company, which consisted of three officers and 88 enlisted Marines, was responsible for accounting, storing, and issuing ground ammunition. By 2 September 1990, large amounts of ammunition were available for the 7th MEB. There were 15,000 rounds of tank ammunition, 21,000 artillery rounds, and 2,100 ground TOW missiles. By early September, BSSG-7 had distributed 600 short tons of ammunition to forward locations while the 7th MEB had formulated plans to load ground ammunition on two MPSRon-3 ships as floating dumps. The building of ammunition supply points was at the
top of the list of construction projects awaiting the arrival of the Seabees.74

On 15 August, the 27 enlisted Marines of the ration’s section began issuing “meals ready to eat” (MREs). MREs are the modern version of C-rations, which were individual field rations. MREs consisted of 12 different entree choices, a snack, dessert, powdered beverage, and condiments, giving the diner 1,200 calories of energy per meal. MREs also had a moist towelette for after-meal hygiene. The first three ships of MPSRon-2 gave 7th MEB 689,000 MREs. By 2 September, MRE stocks were increased to 1,800,000 as a result of the influx of rations from MPSRon-3.*

B-Rations were bulk canned and dehydrated foods designed to be heated on messhall stoves and either served in a dining facility or transported to Marines in the field. Due to their perishability, B-rations were not stocked on maritime prepositioning shipping. Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia held B-rations which required requisitioning before they were released. On 15 August, I MEF requested a 30-day supply of B-rations from Albany. Despite the lack of B-rations, on 24 August, the 7th MEB opened its first dining facility at the port of Jubayl, preparing a hot breakfast with food donated by the Saudis. As a result of I MEF’s requisition, B-rations reached a level of 371,742 meals by 2 September, or enough to serve 7th MEB forces one hot meal for 18 days.75

The supply detachment faced shortages of 12-volt batteries, electrolyte for batteries, 30/50 weight oil, and repair parts during the first weeks of the deployment. The battery problem was solved by buying batteries in Saudi Arabia and also flying them in from Camp Pendleton, California. Electrolyte and oil were ordered from the 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton. There was also a shortage in the stock of repair parts called secondary reparable items. These items were reparable components of a piece of equipment, such as engines and transmissions for tanks and trucks. Secondary reparable items were repaired by the FSSG’s maintenance battalion and reused.** The 7th MEB’s maintenance personnel reviewed BSSG-7’s secondary reparable list and identified items not adequately stocked. The arrival of BSSG-1’s parts block on MPSRon-3 increased the volume of needed secondary items, thereby somewhat reducing the concern over the weakness of 7th MEB’s reparable block.76

On 15 August, five enlisted contracting officers arrived at the port of Al Jubayl. Working from their vehicles and limited to purchases of $250,000 or less, the contractors procured fuel, bottled water, lumber, 12-volt batteries, porto-potties, and transportation from the local economy.77 BSSG-7’s contractors took part in negotiations for the use of empty labor camps for billeting in the Industrial City.

---

*Normally, the amount of MREs and other supplies are quantified in terms of “days of supply.” In simple terms, a day of supply is calculated by the amount of something divided by a daily consumption factor for an organization. In this instance, the number of days of supply would be meaningless, since the population changed with every aircraft arrival.

**Secondary reparable items requiring rebuild were shipped to Marine Corp Logistics Bases, in Georgia and California, and to the other Services for repair and return to the field.
The unimproved airstrip at Manifah Bay is where CSSD-73 set up its combat service support area to support the 7th MEB's forward elements.

of Jubayl, such as Camp 15 which the Saudis turned over, on 22 August, to the 7th MEB.78

Captain Thomas D. Carlson, USN, commanded the 12 officers and 24 enlisted sailors of BSSG-7's dental detachment. This amalgamation of sailors from the 1st, 13th, and 23d Dental Companies, 1st FSSG, opened its first dental clinic, on 22 August, in the east end of warehouse number 3 at the Port of Al Jubayl. The next day a second clinic was established at BSSG-7's aid station. A third dental clinic was set up at the Marine Corps hospital and a fourth opened at Shaikh Isa. Services were limited to emergencies.79

The Headquarters and Service Detachment, BSSG-7 provided a number of disparate functions such as postal and legal services. On 21 August, the Postal Section, BSSG-7, manned by one officer and 14 enlisted Marines, received 800 letters. This was the first U.S. mail to reach the area. Three days later, the Postal Section began selling stamps and issuing money orders. On 25 August, the five officers and three enlisted Marines of the Legal Services Section, BSSG-7 opened its doors for business, providing a full range of services to include the ability to hold courts martial. Much of the legal detachment's activities, however, were devoted to issuing wills and powers of attorney.80

While RCT-7 moved north into defensive positions, the 7th MEB transferred responsibility of coordinating and controlling security at the Port of Al-Jubayl and the Marine Corps Hospital at Huwaylatt to BSSG-7. This mission required BSSG-7 to coordinate a wide variety of units devoted to security. The
Saudi Navy conducted outer harbor patrols, a special warfare task group defended inner harbor security, a fleet anti-terrorism and security team handled security on the maritime prepositioning ships. Pier-side security consisted of a stinger team from MAG-70 with its antiair shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles; the BSSG-7's military police; and Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, which on 27 August, arrived from Hawaii.

On the last day of August, a defense team from Naval Inshore Underwater Warfare Group 1 conducted a survey of harbor security. The survey team recommended that a 300-man detachment consisting of boat and underwater sensor sections be flown from the United States to help defend Jubayl’s harbor. This detachment would consist of Reserve Coast Guard and Navy personnel.81

At the Port of Jubayl, BSSG-7 had rapidly established the 7th MEB’s general support capability using the conventional FSSG structure and help from the host nations, the U.S. Navy and Army, and the rear at Camp Pendleton, California. For 7th MEB forces in the field, especially RCT-7, Colonel Powell organized combat service support detachments to provide direct support.

*Extending Direct Support to Regimental Combat Team 7*

*Combat Service Support Detachments continue to adjust to the high operational tempo of supported units.*82 —Commanding General, 7th MEB

*The Cement Factory, as seen from the coastal highway, lent its name to the ridge where the 7th MEB set up its defenses of Jubayl.*
In response to the mission to support combat units in the field, BSSG-7 formed and deployed combat service support detachments to sustain RCT-7’s defense in depth. Combat service support detachments were separate task organizations formed to rearm, refuel, resupply, and/or repair equipment for combat units.83

Combat Service Support Detachment (CSSD) 73 deployed on 21 August 1990. Colonel Powell, the BSSG-7 commanding officer, reassigned his Landing Support Detachment commander, Captain Adrian W. Burke, to command the newly arrived detachment. This organization was tasked with establishing a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) for helicopter operations and to support the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion. On 26 August, CSSD-73 became operational at Manifah Bay, Saudi Arabia, located 120 kilometers south of the Kuwaiti border and 100 kilometers north of Jubayl. The helicopter pilots of HMLA-367 named the new site FARP Foss. CSSD-73 set up at an unimproved air strip located 15 kilometers east of the two lane coastal highway connecting Jubayl to Kuwait and five kilometers from a jetty on the Persian Gulf.84 A security platoon from Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, led by Second Lieutenant David P. Casey, joined CSSD-73 on the 29th, and two days later, the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) with 25 light armored vehicles moved into the vicinity of the junction of the coastal highway and the road leading to Manifah Bay. The 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) was RCT-7’s covering force. BSSG-7 pushed supplies by ground transportation and by helicopters carrying external loads to CSSD-73. A 5,000-gallon load of fuel initially stocked the CSSD’s 12,000-gallon helicopter expedient refuelling system. Near the end of the month, CSSD-73 reached a strength of 90 Marines and sailors and was the northernmost deployed logistics unit in theater, making it the closest fixed target to the Kuwaiti border.85

CSSD-72 supported RCT-7, which occupied defensive positions 50 kilometers south of Manifah Bay in the area called the Cement Factory Ridge where a giant cement plant dominated the region’s skyline. The CSSD formed at Al Jubayl on 24 August 1990, and was commanded by Captain Kerry K. Feldman.86 The 7th MEB tasked CSSD-72 to provide fuel, water, subsistence, limited maintenance, disbursing, postal, and limited legal services to RCT-7. Five days later, CSSD-72 moved 50 kilometers from the port to the Cement Factory Ridge to carry out its assignment.

RCT-7 was in the process of moving to defensive positions, a move that would be completed on 31 August.87 CSSD-72 supported four battalions of infantry, as well as tank, artillery, and combat engineer battalions. Two companies of assault amphibian vehicles, a reconnaissance company, and the command element for RCT-7 rounded-out CSSD-72’s customer list. Major combat items initially deployed to the Cement Factory Ridge were 26 M198 155mm howitzers, 38 M60 A1 tanks, 84 assault amphibious vehicles, and 54 TOW anti-tank missile systems mounted on M1045 HMMWV TOW carriers.88
Table: Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7) on 2 September 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Supported</th>
<th>Personnel Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCT-7 Command Element</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion 7th Marines</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion 7th Marines</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion 5th Marine</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion 9th Marines</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Assault Amphibious Battalion</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Tank Battalion</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion 11th Marines</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Combat Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,501</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regimental positions straddled the coastal road that ran 180 kilometers north to the Kuwaiti border. CSSD-72 was located 22 kilometers by road from the furthest unit supported and four kilometers from the main supply route to the Port of Jubayl.

*Extending Direct Support to Marine Aircraft Group 70*

*Never has this squadron been so completely challenged for such an extended period.* —LtCol Stephen G. Hornberger, CO MWSS-374

After claiming its equipment at the Port of Al-Jubayl, MWSS-374 moved, using its own organic transportation, to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and Jubayl Naval Air Facility.* MWSS-374 was spread thin between the two air fields supporting both helicopter and AV-8B Harrier operations. Accordingly, MWSS-374 was the first organization supported by the Seabees.

At King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, MWSS-374 immediately began supporting AV-8B Harrier operations. The heavy equipment section built berms

---

*The unequal distribution of equipment from MPSRon-2 left MWSS-373 and -374 short on vehicles. (Col Robert W. Coop comments on draft, 9Feb97, Author’s Files, hereafter Coop comments).
surrounding a 120,000-gallon-capacity tactical airfield fuel distribution system operated by the squadron's bulk fuel section. Fuel was provided by BSSG-7's 600,000-gallon capacity amphibious assault fuel system filled by the MV Hauge's ship-to-shore fuel transfer and by Saudi refuellers. The construction section assisted BSSG-7 engineers in establishing an ammunition supply point for aviation ordnance. On 21 August, the medical section established an aid station and tested the local water to determine its potability. MWSS-374 established a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense capability, arranged for rear area security, and set up its crash, fire, and rescue teams.91

At Jubayl Naval Air Facility, the MWSS-374 heavy equipment section built berms surrounding two tactical airfield fuel systems operated by the squadron's bulk fuel section. The Saudis provided the fuel. The heavy equipment Marines helped the expeditionary air field section level the ground in preparation for laying 90 sets of AM2 matting covering 76,032 square feet. Arriving on 31 August, the Seabee air detachment of NMCB-5 immediately assisted in putting down aluminum sheets of AM2 matting. This effort increased helicopter parking by 24 spots and reduced the level of flight-line overcrowding. MWSS-374's construction section, later assisted by the Seabees and using lumber procured by BSSG-7's contractors, began building strongback frames for tents, completing 12 by 2 September. Near the end of the month, the squadron's utilities section opened a 12-man shower unit and wired the strongback tents built by the construction section. The utilities section used 29 generators to supply the camp with power.92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron Name</th>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMLA-367</td>
<td>AH-1W Super Cobra</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1N Huey</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMLA-369</td>
<td>AH-1W Super Cobra</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1N Huey</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-161</td>
<td>CH-46 Sea Knight</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM-165</td>
<td>CH-46 Sea Knight</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-462</td>
<td>CH-53D Sea Stallion</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-463</td>
<td>CH-53D Sea Stallion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-465</td>
<td>CH-53E Super Stallion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH-466</td>
<td>CH-53E Super Stallion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-311</td>
<td>AV-8B Harrier</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MWSS-373 collected its equipment at the Port of Al Jubayl and moved to Shaikh Isa Air Base. The motor transport detachment hauled aviation support equipment and ammunition from Mina Suliman Container Port deposited by the MV Bonnyman and MV Fisher. On 27 August, the wing engineers began base camp construction, building showers, wiring tents, and pouring concrete tent pads. The MWSS engineers built berms for their three tactical airfield refuelling systems operated by the squadron’s bulk fuel section. MWSS-373 began establishing camp services such as food service, billeting, laundry, trash removal, electrical power distribution, and shower facilities to seven fixed-wing squadrons, the command element of MAG-70, and the advance party of the 3d MAW headquarters.

Joining MWSS-373, on 22 August, at Shaikh Isa was Combat Service Support Detachment 71 (CSSD-71) formed at Al Jubayl. Captain Guido G. Aidenbaum commanded CSSD-71, tasked by the 7th MEB to provide fuel, water, subsistence, limited maintenance to ground equipment, disbursing, postal, dental, and limited legal services at Shaikh Isa. On 28 August 1990, CSSD-71 became operational and began setting up assault amphibious fuel systems, completing one and partially finishing another by early September. Major Allen Coulter, BSSG-7’s operations officer, had relieved Captain Aidenbaum as the commander of CSSD-71 on 1 September.

Table: Squadrons supported by MWSS-373 and CSSD-71 at Shaikh Isa, Bahrain on 2 September 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron Name</th>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-235</td>
<td>F-18 Hornet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-314</td>
<td>F-18 Hornet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-333</td>
<td>F-18 Hornet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA-451</td>
<td>F-18 Hornet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA-542</td>
<td>AV-8B Harrier</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA (AW)-224</td>
<td>A6-E Intruder</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMAQ-2</td>
<td>EA6-B Prowler</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marine wing service support squadrons, augmented by CSSD-71 and the leading elements of the Seabees, established a logistics capability in support of MAG-70. Their efforts allowed MAG-70 to conduct three days of maximum flight operations from all bases against the Iraqis and established a logistics system that would be expanded in the coming months.
By 2 September, the 7th MEB had established a potent in-depth defense supported by a logistics system spanning a distance of 240 kilometers from Manifah Bay, Saudi Arabia, to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain. This system was created by the logisticians of BSSG-7, MWSS-373, MWSS-374, and the leading elements of Seabees and BSSG-1, who planted the logistics guidon in the Persian Gulf. During the next three months, I MEF would expand and refine the logistics system needed to defend Saudi Arabia and plan a more extensive arrangement to sustain a massive offensive into Kuwait.

Table: 7th MEB logistics structure on 2 September 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Logistics Unit(s)</th>
<th>Supported Unit(s)</th>
<th>Distance to Saudi-Kuwait Border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manifah Bay (FARP Foss)</td>
<td>-CSSD-73</td>
<td>-3d LAI Battalion</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Factory Ridge</td>
<td>-CSSD-72</td>
<td>-RCT-7</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubayl Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>-MWSS-374</td>
<td>-MAG-70 (104 helicopters)</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Arrival Airfield Control Group, BSSG-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-AirDet, NMCB-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Jubayl</td>
<td>-BSSG-7, BSSG-1, 1st FSSG (fwd) COMCBOPAC (FD)</td>
<td>-MPS Ships 7th MEB CE 1 MEF CE 1st MarDiv CE RCT-3 CE MAG-24 CE</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>-MWSS-374, Bulk Fuel Det, BSSG-7, AirDet, NMCB-4</td>
<td>-MAG-70 (20 Harriers) 2d LAAM Bn</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al-Ghar Naval Base</td>
<td>-Engineer Det, BSSG-7</td>
<td>In Preparation for Regimental Combat Team-3</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhahran Air Base</td>
<td>-Arrival Airfield Control Group BSSG-7</td>
<td>-Aerial Port of Debarkation</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Isa Air Base</td>
<td>MWSS-373 CSSD-71</td>
<td>-MAG-70 (89 Fixed Wing Air Craft)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Defending Jubayl: 3 September-31 October 1990

The Situation

Défend in sector to protect vital facilities vicinity Al Jubayl.—I MEF
Mission for September-October 1990

September began with high expectations of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf believed the primary Iraqi assault route was south along the coastal highway towards the ports of Jubayl and Dammam. Central Command assigned the defense of the coastal avenue of approach to I MEF. Another possible attack route was from the northwest down the Tapline road which intersected the coastal highway in I MEF’s area of responsibility near Abu Hadriyah, 70 kilometers northwest of the Port of Jubayl.* The U.S. Army component of Central Command (ArCent) defended the Tapline route with the 101st Airborne and the 24th Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions.** A lateral road, called the A-B Road, connected the Tapline road and the coastal highway 50 kilometers north of Abu Hadriyah, forming a “Triangle.” Saudi Arabian forces screened the area north of the Triangle while French, Syrian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti forces protected a third suspected attack route, west of the Americans.99 While Central Command planned the defense of Saudi Arabia, I MEF and its major subordinate commands took charge of Marine forces in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.***

On 3 September, I MEF replaced 7th MEB, the 1st FSSG absorbed BSSGs-7 and -1, and the 3d MAW became the MEF’s air combat element. Three days later, the 1st Marine Division took charge of RCTs -7 and -3. I MEF, 1st FSSG, and, initially, the 1st Marine Division, established their headquarters at the Port of Jubayl. The 3d MAW located its headquarters at Shaikh Isa. To protect Jubayl from the Iraqis, I MEF ordered the 3d MAW to defend the area north of the 1st Marine Division’s defense zone around the Triangle. General Boomer ordered the 1st FSSG to support the wing and the division and to plan and supervise rear area security.100

On 13 September, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 6-90, which sailed from Okinawa in the USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS San Bernadino (LST 1189), and USS Schenectady (LST 1185), docked at Jubayl. Colonel Ross A. Brown commanded the MAGTF which consisted of the headquarters for

---

*This road serviced the pipeline that carried oil from eastern Saudi Arabia to Lebanon. It was closed in 1981.

**Further south the 82d Airborne Division guarded oil fields and the 1st Cavalry Division served as a mobile reserve near Dhahran. The XVIII Airborne Corps commanded the Army divisions and served as the tactical headquarters for ArCent.

***The components of CentCom were organized along service lines, with one exception. I MEF served as the Marine component of CentCom, or MarCent, and the Navy, Air Force, and Army components were called NavCent, AFCent, and ArCent, respectively. The Special Operations Command Central Command (SocCent) was the functional command that controlled all special operations in theater.
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 4, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and CSSD-31. Major Thomas J. Nielsen commanded the 19 Officers and 261 members of the CSSD which the 3d FSSG formed on Okinawa earlier in August. Upon its arrival in Saudi Arabia, I MEF broke up MAGTF 6-90 and distributed the pieces within the MEF. the 1st FSSG gained CSSD-31 and the command element of RCT-4.

1st FSSG Reorganizes

The I MEF staff was to be sensitive to the fact that, . . . the FSSG and wing, had very thin staffs. —I MEF Command Chronology, September 1990

On 6 September, General Brabham arrived in Jubayl and inherited an organizational challenge. Facing him were two BSSGs and a CSSD, each of which had similar sets of detachments of varying size and capabilities, but none of which were properly organized to conduct combat service support in the Gulf region. Due to the lack of air transportation, the 1st FSSG’s battalion headquarters remained at Camp Pendleton under the command of Colonel Paul A. Pankey. This situation denied General Brabham the command and control capabilities necessary to lead a large organization easily and to take advantage of
the vast amount of experience resident in the battalion staffs.*

To solve these problems, General Brabham reorganized 1st FSSG into a direct support group, a general support group, and a headquarters and services group. General Brabham assigned Colonel Alexander Powell, the former commander of BSSG-7, as the commander of Direct Support Group (DSG) 1, and gave him the responsibility of sustaining the 1st Marine Division and the 3d MAW. Expecting to be the 1st FSSG’s operations officer upon arrival, Colonel Thomas E. Hampton, a former infantry officer and Vietnam war veteran from southern Illinois, was instead ordered by General Brabham to take charge of General Support Group (GSG) 1.105 The mission of this organization was to provide general support to the MEF. To command the Headquarters and Support Group (H&SG), General Brabham tapped Lieutenant Colonel Henry T. Hayden and ordered him to provide internal support to the 1st FSSG, a variety of services to 1 MEF, and to coordinate port security.106 General Brabham ordered Colonel Brown to use the RCT-4 headquarters to coordinate security in the vital area around Jubayl.

General Brabham believed that the new FSSG structure was well-suited for the fast changing tactical situation facing I MEF, while effectively using

---

*On the positive side, the battalion staffs provided stability to the majority of the 1st FSSG personnel who remained at Camp Pendleton until December 1990.
scarce administrative assets to run the new organization. Additional benefits were the simplified command structure and the improved mission focus of 1st FSSG’s commanders. The costs of the reorganization were the initial confusion and loss of accountability as the people and equipment from both BSSGs and CSSD-31 were distributed throughout the new organizations. The 1st FSSG solved the accountability problem by hard work, time, and the establishment of centralized administration. In addition, the smallness of the 1st FSSG, which was about half its peacetime size, made the reestablishment of responsibility for both people and equipment much easier. The loss of unit identity posed a greater problem for General Brabham as California, Hawaii, and Okinawa Marines left their old units and commanders lost commands. Sensitive to the human dynamics involved in such a comprehensive reorganization, General Brabham spoke at length to all officers and visited the new units after activation. In order to be fair, Brabham used seniority as a basis for determining command and not the geographic origin of the officer.

On 9 September, Colonel Powell took charge of Direct Support Group-1 (DSG-1) which consisted of a small headquarters and BSSG-7’s three CSSDs. He placed his command element of 13 Marines at the port near GSG-1 and worked within the FSSG to advocate the needs of the forward units, which he believed was his primary job. Turning to his CSSDs, Powell redesignated CSSD-73 at Manifah Bay as CSSD-141, but retained Captain Adrian W. Burke as its commander. On 4 September, Colonel Powell stoodup CSSD-111 to support the 1st Marine Division, less units supported by Captain Burke, and assigned Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Kelly, a supply/logistics officer from Pennsylvania.
who served his first years in the Corps as an infantry officer, to command CSSD-111.* On 13 September, CSSD-111 moved to Abu Hadriyah and absorbed CSSD-72 which had previously supported RCT-7 at the Cement Factory Ridge. At Shaikh Isa, CSSD-71 changed its name to CSSD-131 with Major Coulter remaining in charge. On 26 September, Colonel Powell ordered Captain Guido G. Aidenbaum, the first commander of CSSD-71, to activate CSSD-132 at the Jubayl Naval Air Facility. At the end of September, DSG-1 consisted of 956 Marines and sailors organized into four CSSDs and a command element.112

Table: CSSD lineage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Name</th>
<th>New Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-71</td>
<td>CSSD-131</td>
<td>Shaikh Isa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-72</td>
<td>CSSD-111</td>
<td>Abu Hadriyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-73</td>
<td>CSSD-141</td>
<td>Manifah Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
<td>Jubayl Naval Air Facility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 12 September, Colonel Hampton activated his command element and organized the seven detachments of GSG-1. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Beinhart III, the former commander of BSSG-1, took charge of the landing support detachment. The commanding officers of BSSG-7's medical, dental, and engineer detachments retained their commands. Colonel Hampton ordered Lieutenant Colonel Charlie F. Smith to command the motor transport detachment; Lieutenant Colonel Leon S. Lusczynski, the former executive officer of BSSG-7, to lead the maintenance detachment; and Lieutenant Colonel George M. Conroy to take charge of the supply detachment. GSG-1 consisted of 2,815 Marines and sailors located, primarily, at the Port of Al Jubayl.114

Lieutenant Colonel Hayden organized H&SG into four companies. Captain Timothy M. Wilkinson commanded the headquarters company, Captain Ricardo R. Hackney led the communications company, and Second Lieutenant Gino P. Amoroso took charge of the military police company. These companies supported 1st FSSG. The services company, commanded by Captain Joseph M. Dietzler, provided postal, legal assistance, exchange, disbursing, graves registration, and data processing services to I MEF. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Hayden was the officer-in-charge of the Critical Facilities Operations Center which implemented security at the Port of Jubayl.115

*LtCol Richard L. Kelly served a tour at Central Command during the mid-1980s and accompanied Gen Brabham to Riyadh in August. (Col Richard L. Kelly, comments on draft, n.d., Author’s Files, MCHC, hereafter Kelly comments).
Supporting the 3d MAW

The immediate priority for the Marines was to expand aircraft parking areas at three host nation airstrips. Each of these strips had adequate runways, but lacked the ramps and taxiways to accommodate the number of airplanes which would be based there. The Marines’ second priority was to improve berthing areas for their troops.

On 3 September, Major General Moore organized the 3d MAW’s 246 aircraft into three aircraft groups. At Shaikh Isa, MAG-11 took operational control of all fixed-wing squadrons, at Jubayl Naval Air Facility, MAG-16 directed helicopter operations, and at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, MAG-13 (forward) supervised Harrier jet and Rockwell OV-10 Bronco light reconnaissance aircraft operations. The three air groups and airfields formed the main hubs of the 3d MAW’s defensive effort. Eventually the wing also established smaller operating areas at Ras Al Ghar and Manifah Bay which were also sustained by its three support squadrons, the 1st FSSG, and the Seabees.
Table: 3d MAW squadrons and aircraft.118

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
<th>Number/Type of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manifah Bay</td>
<td>HMLA-369 (Det)</td>
<td>8 AH-1W Super Cobras 2 UH-1N Hueys 4 CH-46s Sea Knights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAG-16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubayl NAF</td>
<td>HMLA-367/369</td>
<td>19 AH-1W Super Cobras 16 UH-1N Hueys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAG-16)</td>
<td>HMM-161/165</td>
<td>24 CH-46E Sea Knights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMH-462/463</td>
<td>16-20 CH-53D Sea Stallions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Abdul Aziz</td>
<td>VMA-311</td>
<td>20 AV-8B Harriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAG-16)</td>
<td>VMO-2</td>
<td>8 OV-10 Broncos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Ghar</td>
<td>HMH-465/466</td>
<td>15 CH-53E Sea Stallions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMH-462</td>
<td>4 CH-53D Sea Stallions (9-26 Sep)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhahran (MAG-16)</td>
<td>HMLA-269</td>
<td>12 AH-W Super Cobras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Isa</td>
<td>VMFA-235/314/333/451</td>
<td>48 F/A-18 Hornets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAG-11)</td>
<td>VMA-542</td>
<td>20 AV-8B Harriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VMA (AW)-224</td>
<td>10 A6-E Intruders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VMAQ-2</td>
<td>12 EA-6B Prowlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain Int</td>
<td>VMGR-352</td>
<td>8 KC-130 Refuellers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAG-11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Seabees Arrive

To improve the capabilities of host nation airdromes, I MEF sent most of the arriving Seabees to airfields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. On 13 September, 136 sailors and 46 pieces of equipment belonging to NMCB-7’s air detachment, led by Navy Lieutenant Michael Dolan, landed at Shaikh Isa. On 30 September the advance party arrived and was followed on 2 October by the MV Danah which docked at Mina Suliman with the battalion’s equipment. Nine days later, the main body of NMCB-7, commanded by Commander Gary M. Craft, reached Shaikh Isa which completed the battalion’s deployment from Okinawa.119 On 14 September, the advance party and air detachment of the Guam-based NMCB-40
reached the Port of Jubayl with 189 Seabees and 40 pieces of equipment. Four days later the battalion’s equipment on board the MV *Maersk Constellation* docked at Jubayl and was followed on the 27th by the main body of the battalion, commanded by Commander John R. Doyle. During the last week of September, the advance party of NBCB-5 arrived in Saudi Arabia and joined its air detachment at Jubayl Naval Air Facility. On 7 October the MV *Greenridge* arrived with NBCB-5’s equipment and the next day, Commander David Walsh landed with the remainder of the battalion. On 15 October, the MV *Kubbar*, carrying NMCB-4’s equipment, dropped anchor at Jubayl while the main body, led by Commander James Corbett, landed in Saudi Arabia. NMCBs-4 and -40 took over Camp 13 in the Industrial City and called their new home Camp Rohrbach. On 15 October, Captain Johnson commanded a force of 2,397 sailors and 1,125 pieces of equipment in general support of I MEF which in turn, directed the main Seabee effort to the expansion of aircraft parking at all three major air bases.

**Jubayl Naval Air Facility**

The overcrowded flight line was the main problem facing MAG-16 at Jubayl Naval Air Facility. The additional aircraft parking completed in August failed to relieve the congestion caused by 102 Marine Corps, 12 U.S. Army, and 10 Royal Saudi Navy helicopters crammed into the airport. The risks of flight-line crowding were painfully demonstrated on 13 September when the rotor blade from a taxiing CH-53E hit the rotor of another Sea Stallion parked nearby, and damaged both aircraft as well as a neighboring Saudi chopper. To alleviate overcrowding temporarily, MAG-16 dispatched 19 Sea Stallions 60 kilometers southeast to the Royal Saudi Navy Base at Ras Al Ghar and 14 helicopters to Manifah Bay. The long-term problem, however, still remained.
To solve the congestion problem, the Navy-Marine Corps team of MWSS-374 and NMCB-5 began constructing three parking aprons covering 1.8 million square feet of desert. Site preparation required that loose sand be reinforced with up to three feet of structural fill, compacted, and leveled to a three percent minimum grade to support the strips of aluminum AM2 matting used to lay the parking ramps. NMCB-5, reinforced with equipment from NMCBs-4 and -40 and GSG-1 as well as the Marines of MWSS-374, strengthened the sand with marl, quarried and hauled from a nearby pit by GSG-1 and the newly arrived MWSS-174.* On 10 September, NMCB-5, MWSS-374, and MWSS-174 joined together to lay 120,264 square feet of matting which exhausted the available supply until 14 October, when additional matting arrived on the MV Greenridge. Engineers placed the AM2 matting in a checkerboard pattern with a hole in the middle like a square donut to conserve the amount of material used. By the end of October, the Marines and the Seabees completed 76 percent of Parking Apron 2 and 18 percent of Parking Apron 3.127

Concurrent with the construction of helicopter parking, teams of Marines and Seabees built and operated facilities for MAG-16. The Seabees from NMCB-5 worked two 10-hour shifts to fabricate frames and decks which a second set of Seabees nailed together to create a tent structure with flooring. Following the Navy, the Marines of MWSS-374 hung canvas and wired the tents for electricity. Despite a shortage of construction material, nearly 350 tents were completed by the end of September. To feed the multitude of pilots and support personnel, the NMCB-5 erected a galley which MWSS-374 operated. To repair aircraft, MWSS-374, with the help of MWSS-174, constructed a 10,000-square-foot clam-shell hangar.128

As grateful helicopter pilots moved their sleeping bags from the sand to tents with floors and electricity, MWSS-374 retrieved its detachment from King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and focused efforts on supporting MAG-16’s extended operations.129 On 24 October, MWSS-374 conducted forward arming and refueling (FARP) operations for the CH-53D Sea Stallions of HMH-462. Refueling was conducted from the back of an LVS with fuel stored in sixcon fuel modules. In addition, the squadron sent a detachment to Manifah Bay to lay 14,000 square feet of matting to support helicopter operations at FARP Foss.130 In the meantime, CSSD-132, operating at the air station since late September, provided dental treatment, medical care, and, by the end of October, issued 972,000 gallons of fuel to MWSS-374.131**

---

*Marl is a mixture of clays, carbonates of calcium and magnesium, and remnants of shells used as structural fill to stabilize soil.

**MWSS operations were initially degraded by the shortfall in communications equipment allowed by their tables of equipment. To counter this deficiency, Gen Moore directed Col Coop, the acting 3d MAW logistics officer and commanding officer of MWSG-37, to purchase 200 Motorola wireless radios and a number of low wattage power units. This ad hoc communications system was ideal for MWSS operations. The Motorolas eliminated the need to string and maintain miles of wire around runways and their low power output limited the system’s range and vulnerability to enemy monitoring. (Coop comments).
At King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, General Moore placed MWSS-174 in direct support of MAG-13 (Forward). Lieutenant Colonel James P. Chessum commanded MWSS-174 which came from Hawaii as part of the 1st Marine Brigade. In early August, MWSS-174 sent personnel from Hawaii to Guam with the 1st MEB’s preparation party to make ready equipment for unloading while MPSRon-3 steamed towards Jubayl. Two weeks later, another group from MWSS-174 flew to Saudi Arabia to help unload MPSRon-3. MWSS-174’s advance party and main body followed, bringing the squadron’s personnel strength to 526 Marines and sailors who joined the 137 Seabees of NMCB-4’s air detachment at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station.\footnote{MWSS military police (MP) operations were initially hampered by the lack of equipment. In the United States, the MWSS military police worked for the installation commanders who owned and maintained their equipment. When the MPs deployed for war with their parent squadrons, their equipment remained at the U.S. installations. As a result, the MWSSs had to scrounge radios, vehicles, and crew-served weapons after the MPs arrived in the Gulf. (Coop Comments).}

Going to work on 4 September, the Navy-Marine Corps team of MWSS-174 and NMCB-4’s air detachment expanded taxiways and aircraft parking spaces. Construction started on a 3,600-foot taxiway and 20 dug-in parking spots for the Harriers of VMA-311. To stabilize the sand, which was not as deep as the sand at Jubayl Naval Air Facility, the Seabees used soil cement, while the MWSS-174 Marines compacted and graded the taxiway prior to laying AM-2 matting. Towards the end of September, NMCB-4 began a 22,500-square foot Harrier jet vertical take-off and landing pad, a second taxiway, eight revetments for the OV-10 Broncos of VMO-2, a helicopter refuelling pad, and a Harrier engine test stand.\footnote{MWSS military police (MP) operations were initially hampered by the lack of equipment. In the United States, the MWSS military police worked for the installation commanders who owned and maintained their equipment. When the MPs deployed for war with their parent squadrons, their equipment remained at the U.S. installations. As a result, the MWSSs had to scrounge radios, vehicles, and crew-served weapons after the MPs arrived in the Gulf. (Coop Comments).} The arrival of AM-2 matting on board the Greenridge allowed MWSS-174 and the Seabees to lay 373,790 square feet to complete the taxiway, parking, and landing pad by the end of October. During October, CSSD-132 established a refueling operation and issued 1,281,000 gallons of fuel to MWSS-174.\footnote{MWSS military police (MP) operations were initially hampered by the lack of equipment. In the United States, the MWSS military police worked for the installation commanders who owned and maintained their equipment. When the MPs deployed for war with their parent squadrons, their equipment remained at the U.S. installations. As a result, the MWSSs had to scrounge radios, vehicles, and crew-served weapons after the MPs arrived in the Gulf. (Coop Comments).}

MWSS-174 operated primarily at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, but deployed detachments to Jubayl Naval Air Facility, Manifah Bay, and Ras Al Ghar. MWSS-174, took over refuelling, military police, rear area security, weather reporting, communications, medical, chaplain, crash and fire rescue, and mess hall operations at King Abdul Aziz from MWSS-374.\footnote{MWSS military police (MP) operations were initially hampered by the lack of equipment. In the United States, the MWSS military police worked for the installation commanders who owned and maintained their equipment. When the MPs deployed for war with their parent squadrons, their equipment remained at the U.S. installations. As a result, the MWSSs had to scrounge radios, vehicles, and crew-served weapons after the MPs arrived in the Gulf. (Coop Comments).} To augment other 3d MAW operations, Lieutenant Colonel Chessum sent a crash and fire rescue team and engineers to Jubayl Naval Air Facility. He also ordered a tactical assault fuel distribution system, one ROWPU, and an engineer detachment to forward arming and refueling point (FARP) Foss. During September, the motor transport detachment drove 81,294 miles and hauled 1,740 tons of cargo and 9,367 passengers to support the squadron’s far-flung operations which included operations at Ras Al Ghar.\footnote{MWSS military police (MP) operations were initially hampered by the lack of equipment. In the United States, the MWSS military police worked for the installation commanders who owned and maintained their equipment. When the MPs deployed for war with their parent squadrons, their equipment remained at the U.S. installations. As a result, the MWSSs had to scrounge radios, vehicles, and crew-served weapons after the MPs arrived in the Gulf. (Coop Comments).}
Ras Al Ghar

During September, Ras Al Ghar absorbed both ground and aviation units awaiting deployment to forward locations. On 8 September, MWSS-174 joined the 1st FSSG and RCT-3 at the Saudi naval base. On this day, seven members of the crash and fire rescue team with a fire truck arrived to support MAG-16’s CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters relocated from Jubayl Naval Air Facility. Four days later, six of the squadron’s bulk fuel Marines, equipped with a helicopter expeditious refueling system and a M970 5,000-gallon tanker, established a helicopter refueling point. On the 15th, MWSS-174 set up a communication site while the utilities section wired 80 tents, erected a shower unit, and left three generators to power the tent camp for the helicopter squadrons. During the month, GSG-1 opened a dental clinic and its engineers built strong-back frames for RCT-3.

Shaikh Isa

At Shaikh Isa, MWSS-373 and NMCB-7 built facilities for the 3d MAW’s headquarters and MAG-11’s seven jet squadrons. During the first part of the month, MWSS-373 completed the installation of a shower, wired 3d MAW’s headquarters tents for electricity, and poured concrete foundations for tents. On the 13th, 136 Seabees and 46 pieces of equipment from NMCB-7’s air detachment, led by Lieutenant Michael J. Dolan, USN, arrived from Okinawa. Lieutenant Dolan built a tent camp for the 3d MAW headquarters in which the Seabees laid more than 600 concrete slabs and fabricated and erected 416 frames for both berthing and office spaces. On 15 September, the Seabees leveled a temporary bomb storage and container stacking area and began building an ammunition supply point for MAG-11 which they completed in little more than a month. Reinforced by the battalion’s main body on 11 October, NMCB-7 began the expansion of the runway apron on the 15th. The Seabees leveled, compacted, and reinforced with fill purchased locally Shaikh Isa’s loose soil prior to laying 600,000 square feet of AM2 matting. NMCB-7 completed this project on 19 December.

While the sailors of NMCB-7 expanded facilities at Shaikh Isa, MWSS-373 and the newly redesignated CSSD-131 supported MAG-11’s operations. Though MWSS-373 also assisted the 3d MAW at other locations, at Shaikh Isa, Lieutenant Colonel Hanson focused the squadron’s main activities on providing camp services, conducting crash and fire rescue missions, recovering aircraft, and refueling MAG-11’s jets with fuel provided by CSSD-131. In September, CSSD-131 grew to a strength of 142 Marines and sailors. It erected a second amphibious assault fuel system, and provided MWSS-373’s three tactical fuel dispensing systems with 100,000 gallons of fuel per day throughout October. MWSS-373 extended its operations outside of Shaikh Isa by building a guard tower for the KC-135 Hercules refuellers of VMGR-352 at Bahrain International Airport and by sending expeditionary airfield personnel and crash and fire rescue teams to assist MWSS-374 at the Jubayl Naval Air Facility.
## Supporting the 1st Marine Division

*CSSDs were highly active in support of their forward deployed customers.*

### September: Supply Point Distribution

During September, General Myatt organized the 1st Marine Division into two regimental combat teams, an artillery regiment, a screening force, and a mobile rapid-reaction force. RCT-7, redesignated as Task Force Ripper, moved 40 kilometers northwest of its August position at the Cement Factory Ridge and established defenses inside the Triangle. The headquarters of the 1st Marine Division, 11th Marines, and the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion moved outside of the Triangle above the Abu Hadriyah intersection. South of the Triangle, RCT-3 set-up at the Cement Factory Ridge, prepared for helicopter operations, and guarded the coastal road below the Triangle. In the northeastern part of the Triangle, the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, dubbed Task Force Shepherd, maintained its headquarters near the intersection of the coastal highway and the Manifah Bay road at the “Chicken Ranch” while its LAVs roamed north and west. The mechanized 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, moved just below the north-east corner of the “Triangle” to serve as the division’s mobile rapid reaction force. Pundits called this battalion the “speed bump” in honor of its point position and presumed effect against an Iraqi attack. CSSD-141, located 20 kilometers east of the “speed bump” at Manifah Bay, supported I MEF’s northern forces.

During the month of September CSSD-141, commanded by Captain Adrian W. Burke, grew to 208 Marines and sailors who provided supply point dis-

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/Supported Units</th>
<th>Supporting Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manifah Bay (FARP Foss)/1st MarDiv</td>
<td>CSSD-141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Hadriyah &amp; Cement Ridge/1st MarDiv</td>
<td>CSSD-111, CSSD-142 (FASP-1 &amp; FASP-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubayl Naval Air Facility/MAG-16</td>
<td>MWSS-374, NMCB-5, CSSD-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station/MAG-13 (Fwd)</td>
<td>MWSS-174, NMCB-4 Air Detachment, CSSD-132 (Annex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Ghar/MAG-16 &amp; RCT-3 (Rear)</td>
<td>Det MWSS-174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Jubayl &amp; Industrial city/I MEF and 1st FSSG Headquarters and 1st MarDiv (Rear)</td>
<td>GSG-1, DSG-1, H &amp; SG, COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta CE, NMCB-40, and NMCB-4 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Isa/MAG-11, 3d MAW Headquarters</td>
<td>MWSS-373, CSSD-131, and NMCB-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

tribution to 3,875 Marines of Task Force Shepherd; 3d Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and a detachment of 3d MAW helicopters stationed at Manifah Bay. Additionally, CSSD-141 sustained force reconnaissance Marines and elements of the Naval Special Warfare Group located 70 kilometers north of Manifah Bay at the Port of Mishab. Supply point distribution required that customers travel to the combat service support area to pickup supplies. Delivery to the supported unit, or mobile resupply, was out of the question, since the CSSD lacked a motor transport capability until the last week of September.

Burke’s Marines and sailors provided fuel, repair parts, water, medical supplies, and MREs to its supported units. Eleven ROWPUs purified Persian Gulf water, which was stored in four 50,000-gallon bags for all units north of Jubayl Naval Air Facility, to include most division units supported by CSSD-111. Captain Burke stocked 69 TOW and 32 Hellfire anti-armor missiles and provided security and logistics support for eight AH-1W tank-killing Super Cobras and their crews, four Bell AH-1 Hueys, and two Sikorski CH-46 Sea Knight medevac helicopters. Helicopters parked on matting laid by both CSSD-141 and detachments from MWSS -174 and -374. On 18 September, GSG-1 sent the CSSD a collecting and clearing company which provided resuscitative treatment, surgery, blood transfusions, and hospital recovery to its patients. Navy Lieutenant Michael E. Eby led CSSD-141’s medical detachment while Navy Captain John A. Ungersma supervised the Navy surgeons who ran a field hospital with one operating room and a ward of 40 cots. Still the most northern Marine logistics unit in the Gulf region, CSSD-141 provided combat service support to I MEF’s most forward units, while CSSD-111 sustained the main body of the division south of Manifah Bay.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Kelly began establishing CSSD-111 on 11 September near the Abu Hadiyah intersection of the Triangle. Close at hand were the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division, 11th Marines, and 3d Assault Amphibious Vehicle Battalion. Located north of CSSD-111 were Task Force Ripper, the 1st Tank Battalion, and two battalions of artillery. To shield CSSD-111 from enemy fire from the north, Kelly placed the CSSD behind a ridge line that ran from the southwest to the northeast. To the south of CSSD-111 around the Cement Factory Ridge, RCT-3, the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, and an artillery battalion set up positions. At the Cement Factory Ridge, Second Lieutenant David J. Eskelund commanded a small detachment of 50 Marines, called CSSD-111 (South), which remained at CSSD-72’s old location and supported the division units. By the end of September, CSSD-111 with 419 logistics, supported 5,410 Marines and sailors of the 1st Marine Division.

*The doctrinally correct term for mobile resupply is unit distribution. (FMFM 4-1, p. 7-6).

**CSSD-141 produced 4 million gallons of potable water between mid-September and December 1990. (Burke Comments).

***In mid-October, CSSD-111 (South) deactivated and moved to Abu Hadiyah. (DSG-1, “Incorporation of Ammunition Company, Supply Detachment into Direct Support Group One,” 6Oct90).
CSSD-111 used supply point distribution to provide MREs, repair parts, some construction materials, water, and fuel to the 1st Marine Division, as well as maintenance, helicopter support, vehicle recovery, and dental and medical services. CSSD-111 hauled water with both military and civilian trucks from Captain Burke’s ROWPUs and the nearby Jubayl desalinization plant. By the end of September, the CSSD stored up to 150,000 gallons of water and stocked 720,000 gallons of fuel. On 21 September, GSG-1 delivered a supply block with 4,000 line items and 250 different kinds of secondary repairables. CSSD-111’s new supply detachment, which was the supply detachment from CSSD-31 which arrived from Okinawa, managed the parts blocks. The availability of repair parts helped the 1st Marine Division achieve an average monthly equipment readiness rate of 93 percent. On 29 September, GSG-1 transferred a collecting and clearing company with two operating rooms and 64 cots to CSSD-111. On the last day of the month, Colonel Hampton sent Lieutenant Colonel Kelly a motor transport company giving CSSD-111 the ability to begin mobile resupply training with Task Force Ripper and RCT-3.

Neither CSSD-111 nor CSSD-141 stored ammunition for the 1st Marine Division. GSG-1 supported the division until the Seabees established ammunition dumps and DSG-1 took over their operation. In early September, GSG-1 continued BSSG-7’s push of two days of ammunition to the Cement Factory Ridge. On 5 September, Seabees from NMCB -4, -5, and -40, together with engineers from GSG-1, began constructing Forward Ammunition Storage Point (FASP) 1, two kilometers from the coastal road near the Cement Factory Ridge. Navy and Marine Corps engineers constructed 540 ammunition modules and a system of

1st Marine Division Marines work out with weights and relax at a recreational center in the Industrial City of Jubayl.

Photo courtesy of LtGen James A. Brabham, Jr.
access roads. Each module was 32 feet wide by 70 feet long, surrounded on three sides by berms, and opened on the fourth side to an access road. A 10-foot-high security and blast berm surrounded the FASP. Upon completion of an ammunition module, GSG-1 ammunition specialists filled the cell with munitions from 546 containers brought in by truck convoys protected by MAG-16’s Super Cobra helicopters. One hundred and forty ammunition technicians from GSG-1 operated FASP-1 which was the first of two ammunition supply points constructed near the Cement Factory Ridge.

On 29 September, NMCB-40 and GSG-1 engineers began scraping out FASP-2 from an abandoned quarry near Jabal Al Hadaruk, located 10 kilometers south of the Cement Factory Ridge. The Seabees used 350,000 yards of fill to build the perimeter and the ammunition storage modules and additionally constructed a helicopter pad and guard towers. The Seabees completed FASP-2 in November, but GSG-1 filled each module with ammunition as soon as it was built. The construction of FASPs -1 and -2, together with the deployment of CSSDs -111 and -141, gave the 1st Marine Division the wherewithal to counter any Iraqi forces bold enough to challenge the 3d MAW’s aerial cover.162

Table: The 1st Marine Division’s major weapons163

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Category</th>
<th>Number (Type) Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68 M1 98 155mm Towed Howitzers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 M109A3 155mm Towed Howitzers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 M110A2 8” Self-Propelled Howitzers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Vehicles (LAVs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212 AAVP7A1 (Personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 AAVC7A1 (Communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 AAVR7A1 (Recovery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Assault Vehicles (LAVs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 LAV-AT Antitank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 LAV-25 (25mm Chain Gun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 LAV-L (Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 LAV-M (Mortar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 LAV-CC (Communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 LAV-R (Recovery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank/Antitank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116 M60A1 Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 M60 Tank with M9 Bulldozer Blade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 M88A1 Tank Retriever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>218 TOW Antitank missile launchers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

October: Mobile Resupply

During October, Central Command assigned the British 7th Armoured Brigade, more familiarly known as the “Desert Rats,” to the 1st Marine Division which significantly increased the division’s mobility and firepower. Brigadier General Patrick Cordingly commanded the brigade, which consisted of infantry, artillery, and engineer units, two tank battalions, and a reconnaissance squadron,
which were logistically supported by a brigade maintenance area. General Myatt designated the British unit as the division's reserve and assigned it positions a few kilometers southwest of Jubayl Naval Air Facility along the coastal road. The 1st FSSG helped to move the Desert Rats and gave them fuel, food, and water, until the British established their own supply lines. With a strong ground defense in place and the likelihood of an Iraqi invasion receding, General Myatt rotated personnel from forward areas to camps in the Industrial City to rest, relax, and wash clothing, while DSG-1 remained in the field and expanded its support.*

Table: The British 7th Armoured Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>Type/Size Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queen's Royal Irish Hussars</td>
<td>Tank Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>Tank Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshires</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Field Artillery</td>
<td>Artillery Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Royal Engineers</td>
<td>Engineer Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Maintenance Area</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the month of October, Colonel Powell concentrated his efforts on improving support and consolidating his command. He remained at the port to campaign for the needs of the supported units and the CSSDs. His presence ensured that the 1st FSSG filled 94 percent of the support requests forwarded by DSG-1 during October. The DSG commander worked to gain control of personnel assignments by successfully urging the reinstatement of group special orders to transfer personnel within 1st FSSG commands and by establishing the use of DSG-1 orders to manage assignments within his command. The size of DSG-1 increased with the fleshing-out of CSSD-132 at Jubayl Naval Air Facility and the addition of CSSD-142.

Control of ammunition for the 1st Marine Division became a problem which Colonel Powell worked to improve in early October. Ammunition technicians, who lacked forklifts to move ammunition and radios to talk to supported units, had implemented non-responsive peacetime paper-work-intensive requisition procedures at FASPs -1 and -2. The sole purpose of the FASPs, although under GSG-1’s control, was to support the 1st Marine Division, which was

---

*The division's rotation policy was a sore point with many DSG-1 Marines, who remained in the field for the duration of the deployment. According to Maj Burke, "the CSSD's did not have the personnel to afford this luxury." (Burke comments).
Colonel Powell’s responsibility. To address these problems, Powell recommended and General Brabham approved the creation of CSSD-142 to operate the FASPs. On 17 October, Colonel Powell formed CSSD-142 by combining FASP-1 and FASP-2 under the command of First Lieutenant Nello E. Dachman, who immediately eliminated the onerous bureaucratic procedures while Colonel Powell obtained forklifts and radios for the new CSSD. Additionally, Powell asked the division to work with his CSSD commanders to identify unit munitions requirements. This effort resulted in CSSD-142 constructing helicopter-transportable emergency resupply blocks.* After the creation of CSSD-142, division units could call for ammunition by radio and have their munitions quickly flown to them from FASP-2’s helo-pad.169**

At Jubayl Naval Air Facility, Colonel Powell expanded and extended CSSD-132’s ability to support the 3d MAW and the 1st Marine Division. Captain Aidenbaum, the commanding officer of CSSD-132, received a landing support detachment from GSG-1, which gave DSG-1 the capability of delivering supplies by helicopter to the division. A further method of aerial resupply was added when Colonel Hampton transferred GSG-1’s air delivery platoon to CSSD-132. On 17 October, the air-delivery Marines parachuted supplies to CSSD-141 for the first time. To improve support to the wing, on 19 October, CSSD-132 extended ser-

---

*The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and CSSD-141 collectively urged the creation of helicopter transportable ammunition packages. Both commands were the closest to the enemy and furthest from FASPs -1 and -2. (Burke comments)

**To refine artillery ammunition resupply techniques, CSSD-111 reviewed each delivery with the battalions of the 11th Marines. (Powell comments).
A Marine KC-130 Hercules cargo plane air-delivers supplies to CSSD-141 at Manifah Bay. The Air Delivery Platoon, CSSD-132, packed the parachute, and rigged the cargo for the drop.

services to King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station by opening a satellite detachment. Although DSG-1 supported both the division and the wing, Colonel Powell increasingly focused on division operations, emphasizing responsiveness and tactical mobile resupply to the forward units.170

At Manifah Bay, CSSD-141, under Captain Burke, moved from supply point distribution to mobile resupply. Burke’s landing support Marines conducted helicopter support team (HST) operations.* His “Red Patch” Marines slung 500-gallon fuel pods under helicopters which flew them to refuel the far-ranging LAV’s of Task Force Shepherd; practiced flying emergency resupply ammunition packages with the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines; rigged British vehicles for helo-lift; and trained with the 3d Marines for their helo-borne assault.171** The new truck detachment received from GSG-1 at the end of September, allowed Captain Burke to begin night tactical resupply of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines’ Task Force Shepherd; and elements of RCT-3. Suffering from the lack of Global Prepositioning Systems (GPS) and night vision equipment, convoy leaders used maps, compasses, and intuition to drive their trucks by the dim glow of black-out lights to rendezvous points 30-40 kilometers from the CSSD. From there, a unit guide would lead the convoy to a supply point. Both the CSSD and the supported unit would set up perimeter security, prior to the unit moving through to obtain water, fuel, MREs, ammunition, and repair parts. Noise and light discipline were strictly maintained in order to practice the survival skills needed in combat. The resupply trucks were arranged in a line with fuel on one end and ammunition on the other. Refuelling was a problem because HMMWV’s and 5-ton trucks had gas

---

*HST is a task organization formed and equipped in a landing zone to facilitate the landing and movement of the helicopter-borne troops, equipment, and supplies, and to evacuate selected casualties and prisoners of war. (FMFM 4-1 Combat Service Support).

**Landing support Marines wear a distinctive red patch on the sides of their trousers at knee-level, and on their helmets for easy identification on a beach or in a landing zone. Accordingly, these Marines are commonly referred to as “Red Patchers.” (Kelly comments).
tanks on different sides causing the CSSD either to reverse the flow of vehicles entering the refuelling area or to establish duplicate refuelling stations. In time, the Marines refined their procedures to refuel efficiently the LAVs, AAVs, HMMWVs, tanks, and 5-ton trucks.172

Near the bottom of the Triangle, CSSD-111 continued to support the main body of the 1st Marine Division and aggressively trained during the day and night. CSSD-111 improved its ability to provide maintenance contact teams, conduct tactical security operations, and defend against chemical and biological attacks. Like CSSD-141, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly trained the truck company, transferred from GSG-1 in September, to conduct mobile resupply with division units.173 CSSD-111 obtained more efficiency from its truck fleet when it discovered an artesian well used by the local camel herders, six kilometers from Abu Hadriya. This discovery reduced the amount of water the motor transport detachment hauled from Manifah Bay and Jubayl and increased the availability of trucks to use for mobile resupply. In addition to supplying the 1st Marine Division, CSSD-111 gave water and fuel to U.S. Army units moving inland to defensive locations. The CSSD distributed 760,000 gallons of fuel to both Army and Marine units during October and established a positive long-term relation with the Army.174* During the month, the unit’s maintenance and supply operations helped keep the 1st Marine Division’s equipment readiness rate at 96.3.175 Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly’s 25 landing support Marines conducted helicopter support operations.176**

General Support of the MEF

Logistics support for the MEF continues at a high tempo. Emphasis was placed on providing CSS to units forward at all costs.177

Beginning in September and continuing into October, GSG-1 pushed hard to provide general support to a customer list consisting of I MEF, the U.S Army, the British, the 4th MEB, and especially DSG-1. Colonel Hampton transferred personnel and equipment to DSG-1 and ensured that 77 percent of its requests were filled within 96 hours. GSG-1 shared the port with the U.S Army and British Army and assisted the moves of both organizations to defensive positions. Colonel Hampton consolidated, improved, and extended supply, maintenance, medical, dental, engineer, landing support, and transportation services.178

Motor Transport

From Jubayl, GSG-1’s motor transport detachment hauled cargo, equipment, and passengers to the forward battle area and airfields, supported the British

*Additionally, CSSD-111 called for emergency helicopter services for the Army and allowed an Army military police platoon to operate from its camp. (Kelly comments).

**According to Col Kelly, CSSD-111’s commander, “helicopter resupply was a real disappointment. Rarely did they support us, despite our asking.” (Kelly comments)
Army and the U.S. Army, and transferred trucks and people to DSG-1. In total, Lieutenant Colonel Smith's detachment moved 40,594 passengers and hauled 61,384 tons of cargo in 150 convoys during the two-month period. GSG-1's trucks carried 4,638 pallets and 24 containers of ammunition to FASPs -1 and -2 and AM2 matting to the 3d MAW air bases. In the later part of October, the detachment's trucks hauled 60 pallets of cargo to the British 7th Armoured Brigade, which also used the motor pool to operate 20 heavy transports. In addition, the motor transport detachment carried water for the Army's 3d Armored Calvary Regiment (3d ACR). At the end of September, Smith sent the 3d Platoon, Company A, to CSSD-141 at Manifah Bay and Company B to CSSD-111 at Abu Hadriyah, but partially made up for his losses on 27 October, when 50 LVS trailers and 299 sixcon fuel and water modules arrived from Camp Pendleton.

Landing Support

The landing support detachment unloaded ships and aircraft and conducted HSTs. During September, GSG-1's Red Patchers helped unload the MV *Baugh*, the last ship of MPSRon-3; the maintenance and aviation/support ships (TAVBs) *Wright* and *Curtiss*, which carried the intermediate maintenance capability for the 3d MAW's aircraft; and the MV *Maersk Constellation*, which carried AM2 matting. In October, the landing support detachment shared the port with the U.S. and British Armies and unloaded 38,353 pallets of cargo, 276 containers, and 532 vehicles from seven different ships. The arrival and departure air

* The seven ships were the USS *Dubuque* (RCT-4), MV *Greenridge*, (NMCB-4), MV *Cape Breton* (1 MEF Ammunition), USS *Spartanburg County* (4th MEB), MV's *Alpha Challenger*, Cape *Borda*, and Samsung *Harbor* (1 MEF sustainment).
groups at Jubayl Naval Air Station and Dhahran processed 351 flights carrying 11,481 tons of cargo and 8,553 passengers during September. The following month, Dhahran unloaded 555 vehicles and 184 pallets of cargo from 30 arriving aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Beinhart used HSTs to resupply CSSD-111 and -141, trained with MAG-16’s helicopters, transferred the air delivery platoon, and sent landing support specialists to DSG-1. At the end of September, Captain Peter B. McMurrin replaced Lieutenant Colonel Beinhart as the commanding officer of the detachment.

**Medical and Dental**

The medical detachment worked from the Al Huwaylatt hospital, the port, and forward locations near the Kuwait border. During September and October, doctors and corpsmen treated 1,264 emergencies, snapped 2,586 X-Rays, filled 1,582 prescriptions, admitted 437 patients, and performed 65 surgical procedures. As part of I MEF’s preventative medicine program, specialists tested the MEF’s drinking water 304 times for biological impurities, performed 141 sanitation inspections, and conducted 172 vector control missions.* Medical personnel practiced disaster drills, helicopter medevac procedures, assisted the U.S. Navy to investigate a diarrhea outbreak caused by bad bottled water and contaminated lettuce, and hosted a class on managing chemical casualties presented by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The medical detachment sent Company A to CSSD-111, Company B to CSSD-141, and during October, Company E to the Saudi Naval Base at Ras Al Mishab, located 45 kilometers south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Company E supported RCT-3’s cross-training with the Saudi King Abdul Aziz Brigade and replaced CSSD-141 as the closest logistics unit to the Kuwaiti border. Company E joined forces with a Bangladeshi dressing station that served coalition forces screening the border and made contact with a Moroccan collecting and clearing company located 50 kilometers to the south at Ras Al-Safaniyah. By the end of October, the dental detachment operated 11 clinics and treated 5,213 patients of which 31 percent were emergencies. Patients came from I MEF, the 4th MEB, the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy as well as from Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. To extend service to forward bases without clinics, the dental detachment loaded dental equipment on a 5-ton truck, nicknamed it “Drills on Wheels,” and sent it to forward units. On 30 October, a dentist and a dental technician from GSG-1 joined Company E at Ras Al Mishab and extended service to Marines working in the area.

**Supply**

During September and October, GSG-1’s supply detachment gained control of I MEF’s supplies, issued equipment, and established a myriad of capabilities.

---

*Vectors are organisms, like flies and mosquitoes, that carry and spread disease.

**I MEF’s presence at Mishab began in September with visits by reconnaissance units and gradually increased in scope and size as I MEF expanded.**
ties. The detachment issued equipment from 2,200 containers, warehoused 13,000 different kinds of repair parts, and established a maintenance float to swap functioning repair parts for broken, but repairable, items. The medical logistics section issued supplies to 48 units from its block of 800 line items and from its narcotic and controlled drug issue point. Ammunition company distributed munitions from 1,500 containers and the rations platoon warehoused 40,000 cases of MREs sent from the Marine supply depot at Albany, Georgia. The detachment’s contracting officers purchased services and supplies for both the Marines and the U.S. Army. On 17 October, the Marine Corps’ automated supply support system (SASSY) became operational, which gave I MEF units the ability to account for and manage their equipment and supply requests. Additionally, SASSY gave the supply detachment the ability to requisition directly material from item managers in the United States without going through Camp Pendleton. A day later, the supply detachment released 1,427 parts, which were ordered in August and September, to the supported units. To manage and distribute material arriving in Saudi Arabia, a transportation management office was established in October. For items going in the reverse direction, the packing, preservation, and packaging section built shipping boxes and packed items, such as crashed helicopters, for transport to the United States.

Maintenance

Maintenance Detachment, which provided intermediate maintenance of ground equipment for I MEF, was established on 4 September. Intermediate maintenance consisted of repairing the entire item or component parts and returning it or them to either the owning unit or the supply system. In comparison, the owning unit conducted organizational maintenance which consisted of cleaning, servicing, inspecting, lubricating, adjusting, and completing minor repairs to equip-

One of the huge warehouses located in the Port of Al Jubayl was operated by the Supply Detachment, GSG-1.

Photo courtesy of LtGen James A. Brabham, Jr.
An M60 tank is prepared with applique mounts for the placement of armor panels.

ment. When the repair of an item exceeded the owning unit's capabilities, the item was sent to the maintenance battalion to be either fixed and returned or exchanged for a working item from the Quick Exchange Program. Lieutenant Colonel Leon S. Luszczynski organized the maintenance detachment into motor transportation, engineer, communications, ordnance, and general support maintenance companies.

After activation, the maintenance detachment focused on reducing the backlog of items requiring repair, modifying tanks, and supporting forward units. During September, the detachment completed 50 percent of the 2,879 equipment repair orders opened on 1 MEF equipment and during the following month increased the completion rate to 72 percent when SASSY came on line. Starting on 18 September, GSG-1's maintenance technicians, together with a civilian team from Albany, Georgia and CSSD-111 mechanics, began bolting applique armor panels to the hulls and turrets of M60A1 tanks in the field around Abu Hadriyah. When a high explosive antitank round (HEAT) struck a tank, the applique armor would explode and dissipate the chemical energy from the enemy round to protect the tank and its crew. By the end of October, applique armor protected all the 1st Marine Division tanks. To support forward units, Lieutenant Colonel Luszczynski sent M88A1 tank and R-7 amphibious assault retrievers to CSSD-111 and dispatched contact teams to repair amphibious assault vehicle engines at CSSD-111 and refrigeration units at Manifah Bay and Abu Hadriyah.

During October, Lieutenant Colonel Luszczynski ordered the maintenance detachment to recover all equipment abandoned during the first two months of the deployment and called this effort, "Operational Roundup." The detachment's recovery vehicles scoured the roads and compounds within a 75-mile radius of the
An M60 tank with applique armor panels attached is now ready for battle.

port and recovered equipment that was either broken, lacked operators, not issued, or was unwanted cargo dumped by the unit which wanted the truck rather than the cargo. Lusczynski’s Marines gathered, inventoried, and fixed the equipment at the port and created an operational readiness float (ORF).* The maintenance detachment, which fixed broken items for both the maintenance float and the ORF, managed the ORF which was named the Quick Exchange Program (QEP) by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Keene, the combat service support officer on General Brabham’s staff. The 1st FSSG used the term “QEP” as opposed to the doctrinally prescribed and well-known acronym of “ORF,” because a true ORF was an officially recognized entity by Headquarters Marine Corps and the QEP was an unofficial creation of 1st FSSG. Regardless of the name, the QEP became I MEF’s equipment reserve in the Gulf region.**

Engineer Operations

Major Sweeney’s engineer detachment worked with the Seabees, the division, and the wing engineers to reduce I MEF’s massive construction requirements. Operating from a quarry near Jubayl Naval Air Facility, the GSG-1 engineers dug marl for the apron expansion project at the air facility. Working with the Seabees and MWSS-174 Marines at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, GSG-1

*An ORF is similar to a maintenance float operated by the supply detachment, in that a unit exchanges a broken item for a functional one. The difference is that an ORF exchanges entire items, such as tanks, LAVs, TOWs, radios, and trucks while a maintenance float trades only component parts, like transmissions, circuit cards, and engines.

**One of the criticisms often voiced against the 1st FSSG’s organization in the Gulf was the use of non-doctrinal terms such as QEP, DSG, GSG, DSC, etc.
engineers built an ammunition storage point and dug fighting positions. For the 1st Marine Division, Sweeney’s engineers constructed a mock Iraqi strongpoint for training, prepared a site for the new division’s messhall, dug pits for artillery pieces, and excavated fighting holes for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. The engineer attachment issued more than 5.2 million gallons of fuel, constructed 400 strongback tent frames, 5,500 concrete tent anchors, berms for assault amphibious fuel systems, and produced 7,800 gallons of water daily for the U.S. Army.

**Headquarters and Support Group**

The Headquarters and Support Group (H&SG) provided a variety of services to I MEF as well as coordinating security at the Port of Al Jubayl. Lieutenant Colonel Hayden extended military police patrols with the British to the city of Jubayl and tested the responsiveness of the Critical Facilities Operations Center to multiple threats to the port. On 20 September, the graves registration platoon led by Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cassady, Jr., processed its first fatality, a soldier from the 82d Airborne Division killed in a traffic accident. The graves registration platoon gave I MEF the capability to search, recover, and identify bodies, as well as collecting the victim’s personal property. The processing chain started at the victim’s unit which sent remains to collection and clearing sections where graves registrations personnel processed the body and personal property for shipment to the next-of-kin.

During October, the H&SG established the Interim Forward Automated Services Center (IFASC) which allowed I MEF to operate SASSY, the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS) used by maintenance personnel, and for the MEF’s administrators and disbursers to access
Marine Corps personnel and pay systems. To improve service, Lieutenant Colonel Hayden established a Manpower Management Information Systems Office as the MEF’s focal point for all unit diary transactions with the Marine Corps Finance Center, Kansas City, Missouri, and opened six branch disbursing offices to extend services in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. During October, the post office processed 713 tons of mail which was collected and mailed twice daily; the legal service support section handled a small amount of courts martial, investigations, and payments for foreign claims; and the Marine Corps exchange opened nine outlet stores.

**Marine Forces Afloat**

*First, the short period available for loadout, from alert to sail, without a clearly defined mission, drove a load plan that we knew would have to be adjusted.* . . .

—MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., CG, 4th MEB

As I MEF rushed to establish defensive positions, the 4th MEB and 13th MEU arrived in the region and used September and October to refine their plan and properly load the ships carrying the 4th MEB.* On 7 September, the 13th MEU (SOC) arrived at the northern end of the Arabian Sea near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Ten days later, all three transit groups carrying the 4th MEB reached the coast of Masirah Island in the Arabian Sea. The 4th MEB, commanded by Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., a Californian who served as an infantry company commander during the Vietnam War, lacked a mission from NavCent as well as adequate means to command and control both amphibious entities.198 To offset these problems, Jenkins developed 10 possible missions for 4th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC), which remained as an independent unit, but associated with the 4th MEB. The MEB’s primary logistics problem was that the rapid embarkation of 4th MEB scattered equipment and supplies among the ships of the amphibious task force, especially the five Military Sealift Command (MSC) charters carrying the MEB’s sustaining supplies. Consequently, the 4th MEB needed to repack its equipment and supplies.199

On 9 October, Saudi Arabia granted the 4th MEB diplomatic clearance to dock at the port of Jubayl and reconfigure the MSC ships, which were inadequate for amphibious warfare. The five ships could not unload supplies without a port and were not combat loaded so that different types of supplies could be easily reached and rapidly issued. Finally, three of the ships were under foreign registry which prevented their entry into a war zone. General Jenkins solved these problems by obtaining the MV Baugh and MV Bonynman from MPSRon-2 and by reloading and reconfiguring 4th MEB’s follow on shipping at the Port of Jubayl.200

---

General Jenkins assigned Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Dickerson, Jr., the 4th MEB's assistant logistics officer, to lead the port operations group (POG) consisting of 397 Marines and sailors. The POG had the mission of reloading 4th MEB’s sustaining supplies for combat, repairing equipment, and transferring material to I MEF. The group reached Jubayl on 13 October and began a partial offload of the USS Spartanburg County. Over the next seven weeks, the POG unloaded all five MSC ships; inventoried, repaired, and painted equipment; and reloaded the ships to support amphibious operations. The addition of the MV Baugh and MV Bonnyman gave the 4th MEB the ability to unload supplies and equipment in open water. Also, the POG transferred 6,083 short tons of ammunition, most of the MEB’s construction material, communications gear, and morale and welfare materials to I MEF. The POG unloaded equipment for Battery B, 2d Light Antiair Missile Battalion and the 2d Remote Pilot Vehicle Company, which were units the 4th MEB transferred to I MEF.201

Three Months after the Invasion

In stabilizing and refining the force, the logistics focus remained on building sustainment, filling the throughput pipeline, and preparation for future operations.202

September started with a sense of urgency as I MEF rushed to strengthen defenses and October ended with the Marines and sailors of I MEF contemplating rumors about Central Command’s plan to rotate units in order to maintain a long-term defense.* At the end of October, the size of I MEF increased to 31,391

---

*Central Command, faced with the possibility of a long-term presence in the Persian Gulf, began looking at the possibility of rotating units to-and-from theater in either 8- or 12-month cycles. (I MEF ComdC Oct90, Sec 2).
Marines and sailors of which 8,511 belonged to the 1st FSSG, COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta, and the three MWSSs.  At the end of October, thoughts concerning future operations alternated between the possibility of a long-term presence in the Persian Gulf and the potential of a quick end to the crises by taking the war to Saddam Hussein. In early November, President Bush ended speculation about the future by opting for the latter course of action.

Table: I MEF logistics units and personnel strengths at the end of October 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Unit</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st FSSG</td>
<td>4,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCBPAC Foxtrot Delta</td>
<td>2,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-174</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-373</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Switching to the Offense: November and December 1990

The Situation

On 8 November, President Bush announced that another 200,000 U.S. troops were on their way to the Gulf, and made their mission unmistakable: to ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option.

The President's 8 November decision to reinforce Central Command gave General Schwarzkopf sufficient military strength to begin the preparations for the ejection of Iraq's 435,000 troops from Kuwait. Central Command received the Army's VII Corps and 1st Infantry Division; 400 Air Force aircraft; three Navy carrier battle groups; the 2d Marine Division; 164 Marine Corps aircraft; General Krulak's 2d FSSG from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; MPSRon-1; and the 5th MEB. General Schwarzkopf planned a four-phase offensive of which the first three stages consisted of air campaigns against strategic targets in Iraq, enemy air power in Kuwait, and Iraqi ground forces in both countries. After completing the first three phases, Central Command intended to use ground forces to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait and to destroy the Republican Guard. Two U.S. Army corps would attack west of Kuwait and north into Iraq, wheel east, and destroy Iraqi forces south of the Euphrates River. Schwarzkopf ordered the Marines and coalition forces to launch supporting attacks into Kuwait to fix the Iraqi forces in place. The Coalition forces consisted of the Joint Force's
Command North (JFC-N), which would assault into the western third of Kuwait, and the Joint Force’s Command East (JFC-E), which would attack along the coast towards Kuwait City. I MEF would launch its attack into central Kuwait between the coalition forces.206

The 3d MAW would participate in Central Command’s three air offensive phases and then switch to supporting exclusively I MEF’s ground attack. Reinforced with MAG-26, a helicopter group from Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, and 16 active duty and Reserve squadrons, General Moore, the 3d MAW commander, planned to push as far forward as possible. To provide helicopter support to the ground forces attacking Kuwait, the 3d MAW intended to move MAG-26 to Mishab and MAG-16 from Jubayl Naval Air Facility to Tanajib, which was located 30 kilometers south of Mishab. After the helicopters departed, General Moore aimed to base six KC-130 tankers, two squadrons of F-18 Hornets, and his headquarters at Jubayl Naval Air Facility. The expanded wing required additional combat service support. The general, tried and failed to obtain MWSS-274 from the 4th MEB, but did acquire the services of two MWSSs from II MEF.207 To command and control the wing’s five MWSSs, General Moore brought forward the Marine Wing Support Group 37 (MWSG-37) headquarters from MCAS El Toro, California.208

During Phase Four, General Boomer intended to fix and destroy Iraqi operational reserves in Kuwait, assist with the attack on Kuwait City, and, if ordered, continue the attack to the north.209 To overcome Iraq’s three-to-one superiority of tanks and artillery, General Schwarzkopf initially assigned the British 1st Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Rupert Smith to I MEF. But in early December, he replaced the British division with the U.S. Army’s lighter 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, known as the Tiger Brigade.* General Boomer assigned the Tiger Brigade to the 2d Marine Division, commanded by Major General William M. Keys, a veteran infantry officer with two combat tours in Vietnam.210 The MEF commander planned to penetrate Iraq’s defenses in Kuwait initially with the 1st Marine Division, followed closely by the 2d Marine Division, and then link up with the 4th and 5th MEBs which would conduct amphibious landings further north.211 The 1st FSSG, reinforced with the 2d FSSG, would provide combat service support to the wing and both divisions during the attack.

*According to The Generals’ War, pp. 166-169, British concerns for national prestige and fear of casualties forced Schwarzkopf to reassign the British to VII Corps’ main attack. Schwarzkopf directed the ArCent commander, LtGen John J. Yeosock, to give the Marines an equal substitute, which in Yeosock’s estimation was a U.S. Army brigade.
Brigadier General Krulak at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, had become certain that the 2d FSSG should deploy to Southwest Asia with its headquarters battalion. During October and early November, while preparing to replace the 1st FSSG, the 2d FSSG commander and staff studied General Brabham’s organization in the theater and conducted a series of exercises that simulated the long distances faced in the Gulf region.* The experience obtained in these exercises and telephone discussions with General Brabham convinced General Krulak all the more that he needed his headquarters battalion to control combat service support operations when the 2d FSSG replaced the 1st FSSG in Southwest Asia.

In early November, Lieutenant General Robert J. Winglass, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics at Headquarters Marine Corps, visited General Krulak and relayed specific instructions from General Alfred M. Gray, the Marine Corps Commandant, that the 2d FSSG when it deployed would not take additional command and control assets.213 Winglass explained that General Schwarzkopf had placed a ceiling on the number of personnel in the region and that I MEF could not exceed its limit. Krulak and his chief of staff, Colonel John A. Woodhead III, disagreed with these limitations and argued the need for the headquarters battalion to strengthen command and control capabilities, citing data

---

*The assessment culminated in a command post exercise that located CSSDs at Fort Pickett, Virginia, and the main body of the FSSG at distant Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
from the recently completed exercises.* After departing Camp Lejeune, Winglass forwarded the 2d FSSG’s concerns to General Gray who remained adamant that the 2d FSSG make a one-for-one replacement with 1st FSSG in the Gulf.** According to the 2d FSSG commander, General Gray’s decision “put us in a bind.” Krulak, nevertheless, ordered Colonel Woodhead to plan for the replacement of 1st FSSG without his headquarters battalion and without increasing the number of FSSG personnel in I MEF. On 5 November, the FSSG commander sent General Boomer a letter which stated 2d FSSG’s intent to “mirror-image” the 1st FSSG organization, and detailed the 2d FSSG’s predeployment preparations, and requested a face-to-face meeting of the commanders and staffs of both FSSGs to plan the turnover.214

With the decision to reinforce the forces in the Gulf region, Central Command’s restriction on the number of personnel disappeared. Responding to the change in circumstances, Colonel Woodhead drafted a message that outlined options for integrating the 1st and 2d FSSGs.215 In the first course of action, the two FSSGs would form one giant-sized unit.*** The second option designated zones of action with each FSSG supporting the commands operating in its particular sector. According to the third concept, the Marine command would consolidate the 4th and 5th BSSGs afloat under a single FSSG headquarters. The fourth alternative, which General Krulak recommended, assigned the FSSGs different missions. One FSSG would provide direct support to I MEF’s ground combat element and the other FSSG would furnish general support to the MEF and reinforce the direct support FSSG. After consulting with General Brabham by telephone, Krulak sent Woodhead’s message to Lieutenant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., the commander of both II MEF and the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, and an information copy to General Brabham in Saudi Arabia.216 General Mundy forwarded the message to General Gray for his information and concurrence.217

In Saudi Arabia, General Brabham agreed with General Krulak’s initiative to use the two FSSG headquarters in general and direct support roles. The 1st FSSG was already organized along general and direct support lines, but lacked the command and control capabilities to support the offensive. Moreover, the offensive gave Brabham the additional task of directly supporting two divisions fighting a distant battle as well as providing general support to a reinforced MEF, conducting rear area security, and running the port used by both the U.S. and British armies. General Brabham expressed his views in a phone call to Lieutenant General Winglass and during a telephone conversation with General Krulak suggested that the 2d FSSG, “leap frog right over mine and become a direct support command.”218

---

*Gen Krulak described Colonel Woodhead as “an unsung hero and the finest operational logistician in the Marine Corps at that time.” (Krulak comments)

**Krulak comments.

Col John A. Woodhead III, Chief of Staff, 2d FSSG and the DSC, at left, is shown with BGen Charles C. Krulak, Commanding General of the 2d FSSG and the Direct Support Command.

Around Thanksgiving 1990, General Krulak prepared for a four-day visit to Saudi Arabia to determine, with Generals Boomer and Brabham, the command relationship between the two logistic commands. Krulak, with a small staff and without an answer from the Commandant on his command relationship message, departed Camp Lejeune. While awaiting a connecting flight at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C., General Krulak learned that Generals Gray and Winglass were in the VIP lounge and wanted to see him. On his arrival at the lounge, the Commandant playfully and lightly punched General Krulak a couple of times on the arm and then settled down to business. Krulak told Gray about using the two FSSGs in direct and general support roles and added that he and
General Brabham intended to propose this concept to General Boomer. Thirty minutes later, Krulak departed Washington with the Commandant’s blessing on his recommendation. After arriving in Saudi Arabia, Generals Brabham and Krulak briefed General Boomer, who agreed with the plan, but wanted only one FSSG. Boomer declared that instead of assigning the direct support role to the 2d FSSG, just call the 2d FSSG the direct support command and put it under the umbrella of the 1st FSSG which would execute the general support mission.219

After the I MEF commander had decided upon the command relationship, it was the responsibility of General Brabham, who was senior to General Krulak and in charge of the single FSSG, to decide whether he or General Krulak would lead the Direct Support Command (DSC). General Brabham selected the general support mission which left the DSC in the hands of General Krulak.220 Brabham’s decision maximized the experience of both general officers. Brabham’s previous tour at Central Command and his experiences since August gave him a clear understanding of the logistics situation in the Gulf and strong working relationships with Central Command, the U.S. Army, and the Saudis.221 On the other hand, Krulak was a career infantry officer and the former assistant division commander of the 2d Marine Division, which was one of the two major units that the DSC would sustain.222* He now would be responsible for supporting a movable 40-by-50-mile battle zone. According to the concept drafted by Colonel Woodhead, the 2d FSSG’s chief of staff, the Direct Support Command would receive most of the tactical motor transport, engineers, and landing support assets from both FSSGs, as well as DSG-1. Brabham would get most of the supply, maintenance, and service capabilities, run the port, and push supplies to Krulak’s DSC.223**

The 1st FSSG Restructures and Refocuses

...The key to being able to do what we did in the Gulf is ... flexibility...224

The Establishment of GSG-2

To push supplies forward to the battle area, without the benefit of tactical motor transport assets, required flexibility and creativity. Accordingly, General Brabham ordered his procurement officers to rent trucks and drivers from the

---

*Gen Krulak commented that “In his [General Brabham’s] heart, he wanted to be up front with the divisions,” and that “it was a real smart move by Jim Brabham, who knew what was going to be more fun, but like most Marines, made the right call that put him in the right position with his expertise and me, with my infantry experience, up front with the divisions.” (Krulak comments)

**Col Woodhead laid out the concept for direct and general support FSSGs in a paper called “CSS Command Relationships in SWA,” which is reprinted in Appendix A. This concept paper also served as the basis for Gen Krulak’s November message to the Commandant, which described the command options for integrating the 1st and 2d FSSGs.
Two civilian Mercedes Benz trucks were driven by “Saudi Motors.” Gen Brabham relied on his contracted fleet of trucks to support I MEF’s offensive into Kuwait.

local economy. The FSSG contractors competed with the U.S., British, and Saudi armies to hire a motley assortment of third world drivers and vehicles. To make up for the shortcomings of the available assistance, General Brabham organized the drivers and their vehicles into a “line-haul” battalion and hoped that a Marine Corps-like organization would instill a sense of pride, dignity, and belonging, which were considerations not normally rendered to the drivers by their regular employers. To appeal to the more worldly needs of the vehicle operators, General Brabham authorized one meal per day, Marine Corps exchange privileges, and the opportunity of watching professional wrestling videos during off-hours. Brabham placed the 114 commercial tractor trailers and 56 bus drivers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charlie F. Smith, GSG-1’s motor transport detachment commander. An unidentified wit dubbed the new organization “Brabham’s Bedouins,” but the unit was best known as “Saudi Motors.” On 12 November, Saudi Motors performed its first resupply by running convoys to CSSDs -111, -132, and -141.

Opening a port near the Kuwaiti border was another creative way of pushing supplies to General Krulak’s DSC. Almost from the beginning of Desert Shield, I MEF focused its attention on the port at Ras Al Mishab. During September and October, teams from the Navy support element at Jubayl surveyed the port’s facilities and capabilities and on 7 November, Brigadier Generals Brabham and Thomas V. Draude, the assistant 1st Marine Division commander, visited the port. Following this trip, Brabham ordered Colonel Hampton, the commanding officer of GSG-1, to survey Mishab and to plan for an organization that made best use of the port, its air strip, and location along the coastal road to
Kuwait. On 30 November, Hampton forwarded a rough estimate of the equipment and personnel, and a blueprint of the combat service support area needed to develop Mishab. The next day General Brabham selected Colonel Hampton to command GSG-2 at Ras Al Mishab.

Until 11 December, Colonel Hampton and a small staff waited for I MEF to approve the establishment of GSG-2. Upon this approval, Hampton relocated his staff at Mishab, and absorbed GSG-1’s medical and dental units. GSG-2’s mission was to stock 10 days of water, food, fuel, oils and lubricants, ammunition, and medical supplies for MAG-26 and the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, and eventually to push supplies to General Krulak’s Direct Support Command. On the 19th, Colonel Hampton took charge of the newly arrived 7th Engineer Support Battalion and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The GSG-2 commander used his engineers to establish two amphibious assault fuel systems with a storage capacity of 1,200,000 gallons near the beach and airfield and four additional systems next to the highway. The six systems would eventually give GSG-2 a fuel storage capacity of 3,200,000 gallons. The 7th Motor Transport Battalion using M970 refuellers and the U.S. Army, operating from forward operating base (FOB) Bastogne, hauled fuel. The engineers set up ROWPUs and produced potable water from the Persian Gulf. Captain Johnson, the naval construction task force commander, sent his Seabees to build FASP-3 on 19 December. By the end of the month, Colonel Hampton commanded 1,226 Marines and sailors, who busily prepared to support forward units.
After nearly three months in Saudi Arabia, it was clear to Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, that supporting the division was different than sustaining the wing. CSSDs moved with the division and directly influenced the ground scheme of maneuver. In the defense, CSSD-141 supported combat elements in the division's security zone while CSSD-111 sustained forces in the battle area. In comparison, static CSSDs with the 3d MAW performed housekeeping chores which did not directly influence aviation tactics. The transition to the offense would make DSG-1 mobile and more intimately involved in the planning and execution of the division's tactical plans. Accordingly, Powell transferred CSSD-131 to GSG-1 on 5 November and because of its HST and air delivery capabilities held on to CSSD-132 until the end of the month. The transfer of aviation CSSDs to GSG-1, allowed DSG-1 to concentrate on its only customer—the 1st Marine Division.

On 11 November, Colonel Powell had moved his headquarters from the port to a position near the 1st Marine Division command post at Abu Hadriyah. This move allowed him to interact closely with General Myatt, the division staff, and his own commanders. General Brabham encouraged the relocation since it allowed Powell to voice General Myatt's logistic needs and problems to the 1st FSSG and, in turn, express General Brabham’s capabilities and concerns to the division. The DSG-1 commander attended division meetings and developed working relationships with the commanding general and his staff. Myatt believed that the division’s main offensive limitation was logistics and ordered that a logistical exercise called LOGEX 1-91 be held between 12-17 November. During the exercise, the division, the DSG, and GSG-1 worked through an offensive scenario to determine the amount of supplies needed. As a result of the LOGEX, the 1st Marine Division expressed its supply requirements in daily amounts of ammunition, fuel, food, and water.

After the LOGEX, Colonel Powell convened a reorganization study group to restructure DSG-1 for the offense. The reorganization team studied the division’s scheme of maneuver, converted supply requirements to ton-miles, and used driver-to-vehicle ratios and operating-hours to determine new tables of equipment and organization. The study group recommended the activation of two mobile CSSDs (MCSSDs) to move on the battle field with and sustain RCT-7 (Task Force Ripper) and RCT-1 (later named Task Force Papa Bear), which was scheduled to arrive from Camp Pendleton in December. Because of the lack of trucks, each MCSSD would be small, with the ability to move one day of water, fuel, and ammunition up to 65 kilometers from a fixed support area. The team recommended the activation of a general support CSSD to operate a fixed support area and to push supplies to the MCSSDs and ammunition to the artillerymen of the 11th Marines. The general support CSSD would provide supply point distribution to the remaining units of the division, to include RCT-3 (Task Force Taro), which remained as the division’s helicopter-borne reserve force. Since the MCSSDs lacked maintenance and supply capabilities, the general support CSSD
CSSD-141 Marines learn to wear their gas masks for as long as three hours a day while working and occasionally playing chess on a home-made set.

would repair equipment either by sending contact teams to forward locations or by transporting the broken item to the fixed support area. The DSG commander would control and coordinate the three subordinate CSSDs from a separate headquarters. Colonel Powell forwarded the new structure plan to the 1st FSSG and, when the 2d FSSG arrived in December, to his new boss, General Krulak.

Not waiting until the DSG was reorganized, CSSD-141 and -111 intensified training for offensive operations. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, the CSSD-111 commander, believed that during a rapidly moving assault the CSSD would have to fight its way in to deliver supplies and maintain the momentum of the attack. Accordingly, Captain Dennis P. Muller, the CSSD’s security officer, trained each Marine and sailor to fire the .50-caliber and M60 machine guns, the M-19 grenade launcher, LAAW and AT-4 hand-held anti-tank weapons, and the M16 rifle and 9mm pistol. Everyone learned to drive 5-ton trucks and HMMWVs, and to call for artillery fire and close air support. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly ensured that all of his “Log Dogs” could fight as well as support. The lack of training ammunition, ring mounts for .50-caliber machine guns and M19 grenade launchers, TOW HMMWVs, global prepositioning systems (GPS), position locating and reporting systems (PLRS), and night vision devices, however, frustrated CSSD-111’s training program and remained a primary concern together with the possibility of chemical and biological warfare.

During November, CSSDs-111 and -141 continued to prepare and refine their ability to work in a chemical and biological infected environment. For example, Captain Burke trained his CSSD-141 Marines to work in their gas masks up to three hours per day. After achieving this goal, Burke reduced gas mask time to one hour per day to conserve filters which often clogged from sand...
and sweat. In addition, the CSSD commander set up a chemical “hotline” for decontamination and practiced its execution with division units. A hotline consisted of personnel, equipment, and casualty triage stations that could move to within two kilometers of a chemical weapons impact zone. A contaminated unit would move from a “hot” staging area through the three decontamination stations, and exit, after cleaning, to a “cold” staging zone ready to continue with the battle.238*

The Seabees Prepare for Reinforcements and the Offensive

Priority was to provide living space for the II MEF troops who began arriving in December.239

During early November, Captain Johnson, the Seabee commander, analyzed I MEF’s future construction requirements and planned for the arrival of reinforcements. The Seabees estimated that the level of preparations for the assault equaled the workload expended in setting up I MEF’s defenses. Accordingly, Johnson calculated that four Seabee battalions were sufficient to accomplish his emerging missions, but hedged his bet by requesting a fifth battalion set of equipment and on-call reinforcements from NMCB-1 in Rota, Spain, to cover the unexpected. Captain Johnson planned to rotate two of his battalions and a portion of his staff to maintain the Navy’s overseas deployment schedule. NMCB-24, a Reserve battalion, and NMCB-74, based in Gulfport, Mississippi, would replace NMCB-4 and -7 which would complete their seven-month overseas deployment in December.

With the plan for the ground offensive completed, the Seabees focused the efforts of their four battalions on finishing existing projects and on building camps for reinforcements. On 14 November, the Seabees finished FASP-2 near the Cement Factory Ridge and participated in an exercise called Imminent Thunder. On the 19th, NMCB-40 completed the 1st Marine Division mess hall at Abu Hadriyah just in time to host President Bush for Thanksgiving dinner.** On the 25th, NMCB-5 finished the second parking apron at Jubayl Naval Air Facility, leaving only the third parking area uncompleted. On the same day elements from all four naval construction battalions began building a new tent camp for 15,000 occupants near Camp 15 in the Industrial City. An unidentified humorist nicknamed the camp “Wally’s World,” supposedly in reference to a fictitious amusement park in the comedy film “Summer Vacation,” but in reality, a play on General Boomer’s first name, “Walter.” The six-sectioned camp covered 300 acres, consisted of 1,740 concrete slabs, 108 strongback tent frames, 24 mess hall buildings, 24 shower facilities, a sewer system, and 13 miles of road. Water and electricity came from the local Saudi systems.240

During December, the Seabees rotated units, completed more projects,

* Additionally, CSSD-111 developed a complementary NBC defensive plan with the 11th Marines and extensively trained with the artillery regiment. (Kelly comments)
**The messhall was collocated with CSSD-111 at Abu Hadriyah. (Kelly comments)
and prepared for reinforcements. On 4 December, Commander Patrick Fogarty’s NMCB-74 arrived at Shaikh Isa and replaced NMCB-7 which, before leaving Bahrain, finished MAG-11’s ammunition supply point. Over the next two weeks, Commander James McGarrah’s NMCB-24 replaced NMCB-4 and Captain Johnson received 24 additional staff personnel, which allowed him to redesignate the Seabee task force as the 3d Naval Construction Regiment (3d NCR). To help with I MEF’s construction burdens, Johnson called forward 200 Seabees from NMCB-1 in Rota, Spain, who arrived by mid-month. On the 18th, NMCB-74 moved to Mishab and started building FASP-3, but left behind a detachment at Shaikh Isa to complete the apron expansion program started by NMCB-7. On the

* The additional personnel from NMCB-5, NMCB-24 reaching its wartime strength, the regimental augmentees arriving from the Naval Construction Force Support Unit, and an Underwater Construction Team increased the personnel strength of the 3d NCR to 2,800 by February 1991. (Johnson comments)
23d, NMCB-40 moved to Manifah Bay and assisted the 1st Marine Division engineers build a new support area and, a week later, started building firing ranges for the 2d Marine Division. On Christmas eve, NMCB-24 initiated site preparation for the second fleet hospital in the Jubayl area.\textsuperscript{242}

**Reinforcements**

*Throughout December, the focus of the I MEF effort was planning and preparation for offensive operations as directed by USCINCENT including the reception and training of reinforcements...*\textsuperscript{243}

On the other side of the world in southern California, the 5th MEB, commanded by Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe, a veteran of the Hue City and Khe Sanh campaigns during the Vietnam War, prepared to deploy to the Gulf.\textsuperscript{244} Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lupton commanded the 37 officers and 576 enlisted Marines and sailors of BSSG-5 which supported MAG-50 and Regimental Landing Team 5. Several months earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Lupton had quickly formed a BSSG to deploy with the 5th MEB to the Gulf using MSSG-11 as a nucleus and personnel and equipment from the 1st FSSG. After a few false starts and a reversion to a small planning headquarters, the 5th BSSG received 800 Reservists of whom 300 were engineers and military policemen, once the President made his decision to reinforce U.S. forces in the Gulf. Lupton again redesignated MSSG-11 as BSSG-5, absorbed the Reservists into the organization, and, on 1 December, departed for the Gulf. The 13 ships of Amphibious Group 3 and three MSC ships carried the 5th MEB and its follow-on supplies. After a brief stop in Hawaii to pick up additional personnel and equipment, Amphibious Group 3 steamed to the Philippines where the 5th MEB ended the year by conducting an amphibious exercise.\textsuperscript{245}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USS Tarawa (LHA-1)</th>
<th>USS Denver (LPD-9)</th>
<th>USS German-town (LSD-42)</th>
<th>USS Mobile (LKA-115)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS Tripoli (LPH-10)</td>
<td>USS Juneau (LPD-10)</td>
<td>USS Peoria (LST-1183)</td>
<td>SS Flickertail State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS New Orleans (LPH-10)</td>
<td>USS Anchorage (LSD-36)</td>
<td>USS Barbour County (LST-1195)</td>
<td>MV Neptune Iolite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Vancouver (LPD-2)</td>
<td>USS Mount Vernon (LSD-39)</td>
<td>USS Fredrick (LST-1184)</td>
<td>MV Cape Girardeau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Amphibious Group 3 and follow-on shipping.\textsuperscript{246}
In early December, General Myatt moved the 1st Marine Division north to make room for the arrival of the 2d Marine Division. The 1st Marine Division command post deployed 16 kilometers from its old location at Abu Hadriyah to a point 10 kilometers south of Manifah Bay along a desert road that connected Abu Hadriyah with Manifah Bay. On the 6th, division engineers began construction of a new division support area at Manifah Bay. The engineers disassembled strongback tent frames at Ras Al Ghar and reassembled them at the new location. By mid-December, the 1st Marine Division transferred Camps 3, 5, and 15 to the arriving 2d Marine Division.247

On 8 December, 499 members of II MEF’s Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party arrived by air, moved to the port of Jubayl, and prepared to unload the four ships of MPSRon-1, which were steaming towards Jubayl from the East Coast of the United States. Three days later, the air flow of reinforcements, mostly from the East Coast, but some from the West Coast, began bringing an average 945 Marines and sailors and 222 short tons of cargo every day for the remainder of the month. On the 13th, MPSRon-1 reached Jubayl, where the 6th MEB spent the next 10 days unloading the MVs Kocak, Obregon, Pless, and Bobo. BSSG-6, the combat service support element of the 6th MEB, sent the 2d FSSG’s equipment to Lieutenant Colonel James W. Head, who used his M55022 staff of 15 Marines to account for and sign over every piece of equipment to responsible officers.248 By the end of the month, the size of I MEF increased by 58 percent. The 2d Marine Division added 11,000 Marines and sailors to I MEF, while the 1st FSSG almost doubled in size with the addition of the 2d FSSG. The 3d MAW operated 80 more aircraft.249

Arriving with II MEF’s Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party was a small group of Marines and sailors from MWSS-273 at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, who were the first MWSS reinforcement to arrive in Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant Colonel William L. Riznychok commanded MWSS-273, whose main body reached the Persian Gulf in mid-December, picked-up equipment from MPSRon-1, and started moving to Ras Al Mishab the day before Christmas.250 Completing the move on the 30th, Lieutenant Colonel Riznychok commanded 706 Marines and sailors who prepared Mishab for the arrival of MAG-26.251 Meanwhile, Colonel Robert W. Coop, the former 3d MAW logistic officer, took charge of MWSG-37 which, on 18 December, arrived from California. Coop, therefore, commanded all of the Wing MWSSs and became the camp commandant for King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station.** On the day after Christmas, MWSG-37 moved equipment for a fifth and final MWSS from MPSRon-1 to King Abdul Aziz.252 Near the end of the month, 159 personnel

---

* M55022 was one of three permanent MSSGs in the 2d FSSG.

**Col Coop selected King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station for the MWSG-37 headquarters because of its proximity to the port of Jubayl and to the air bases supported by his squadrons. Because of the location, MWSG-37 retrieved equipment from MPSRon 1 without the problems experienced in August. In addition, MWSG-37 benefitted from the extensive maintenance and supply capabilities resident with GSG-1 at the port. (Coop comments)
Marines from II MEF arrive by air at Jubayl Naval Air Facility as part of the large U.S. buildup in December 1990. These reinforcements gave I MEF the capability of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait.

from MWSS-271 located at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, arrived at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station and claimed the equipment from Colonel Coop’s Marines.253

Arriving with the Marines and sailors of the 2d FSSG were a significant number of Reserve logisticians. From October into December, the Marine Corps had activated Reservists from the 4th FSSG to fill critical shortages in the 2d FSSG caused by BSSG-4’s hasty departure with the 4th MEB. For example, on 6 December, Reserve bulk fuel specialists from Bakersfield, California, and Tucson, Arizona, and electricians and water supply technicians from Gary, Indiana, arrived at Camp Lejeune. During the next two days, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2d FSSG, quickly merged the 215 Reservists from the 6th Engineer Support Battalion, 4th FSSG into its ranks and on 9 December, began sending them to Saudi Arabia. Unlike the active duty Marines, the Reserve engineers departed without any predeployment training.254

GSG-1, under Colonel Paul A. Pankey, a 36-year veteran of the Marine Corps who had assumed command on 7 December, operated a halfway house for

*As described earlier, 2d FSSG sent 1,464 Marines and sailors to BSSG-4, which was the combat service support element of the 4th MEB. The 4th MEB remained on board amphibious ships under the operational control of the Navy and not I MEF during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
reinforcing FSSG units. Newly arrived battalions from the 2d FSSG and the headquarters battalion from the 1st FSSG joined GSG-1, collected equipment, and either stayed in GSG-1 or were assigned to either General Krulak’s DSC or Colonel Hampton’s GSG-2. Colonel Pankey paired old and new units of the same functional variety together to facilitate acclimation to Saudi Arabia. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Charlie F. Smith, the commander of GSG-1’s motor transport detachment, met Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Woodson’s 8th Motor Transport Battalion at the port and transported the new arrivals to the GSG-1 motor pool where they were housed, briefed, and merged into operations. General Krulak brought every battalion from the 2d FSSG, except the dental battalion, while General Brabham brought forward only four of the battalion headquarters from Camp Pendleton. By mid-December, Colonel Pankey was temporarily in charge of nine battalions from the 1st and 2d FSSGs, three detachments, and both the operations and defense of the port of Jubayl.

Establishing the Direct Support Command

Once we got there, we established ourselves as a Direct Support Command.

After General Krulak arrived on 13 December, General Boomer ordered him to find a location in northern Saudi Arabia to support the I MEF forthcoming offensive. Krulak placed Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion and a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Engineer Officer Advance Course with a master’s degree in engineering from the University of South Carolina, in charge of developing the plans for the DSC’s support area. On the 17th, Krulak flew with a group of officers to an area called Qaraah located 100 kilometers west of the port of Mishab and near the Kuwaiti border. Captain Jonathan P. Hull, the commanding officer of Company C, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, and a team of engineers in HMMVWs met Krulak’s helicopter and then surveyed Qaraah. Lieutenant Colonel Skipper described the area as “a totally flat, barren, and desolate place, littered with dead camels.”

Four days later, Krulak, his staff, and Captain Brian J. Heamsberger, the commanding officer of Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, surveyed a number of other locations to include a spot called Kibrit located 50 kilometers

*Col Pankey commanded 1st FSSG (Rear) at Camp Pendleton California, between August and December 1990. After Col Pankey departed for the Persian Gulf, Col John A. Kelly commanded 1st FSSG (Rear). (Pankey comments)

**LtCol Skipper added in his description of Qaraah that “We saw numerous dead camels which someone said had died from a plague. We also saw a four-foot-high vulture sitting on one of the carcasses. For new arrivals in the country, it was a great immediate impression on the challenges ahead of us.” (Skipper comments)
Direct Support Command Marines in eight HMMWVs survey the desolate site at Kibrit where the command would establish CSSA-I to support the I MEF attack into Kuwait.

west of Mishab and 50 kilometers south of the Kuwaiti border. Distinguishing characteristics of this area were a fold in the ground which would hide the silhouette of a camp below the skyline, an old dirt airfield, and a desert road that ran east to GSG-2 at Mishab. Additionally, Kibrit was close enough to the border to support an attack, but far enough away to be out of the range of Iraqi artillery. These advantages convinced General Krulak that Kibrit was the proper place to support I MEF’s attack.

During this time, General Krulak met daily with General Brabham to decide the final distribution of units within the 1st FSSG. Both FSSG staffs and battalion commanders attended a nightly joint meeting co-chaired by the generals. Commanders presented recommendations for the best use of their units. For example, both Lieutenant Colonel Charlie F. Smith, who now commanded the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Woodson, who led the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, wanted the direct support role for their battalions and presented reasons for receiving the mission. By the 20th, Generals Brabham and Krulak decided the final distribution of forces. According to a previous agreement, in addition to responsibility for the Port of Jubayl, Colonel Pankey, who commanded GSG-1, would include in his organization the 2d Supply Battalion, 2d Maintenance Battalion, and 1st Landing Support Battalion, and then spin-off detachments, as needed, to the DSC and to GSG-2. General Krulak would control the 7th Engineer Support Battalion, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, the 2d Medical Battalion, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced with most of the 1st FSSG’s tactical motor transport assets, and landing support, maintenance, and supply detachments. The generals sent the 2d Landing Support Battalion, 7th Motor Transport Battalion, and 1st Medical Battalion to GSG-2, still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hayden. Hayden also took charge of the Headquarters and Services Battalion, 1st FSSG, which remained at Jubayl.

On 22 December, General Krulak activated the DSC, focused its efforts on building Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) 1 at Kibrit, and established a direct support pipeline to the ground combat element. General Krulak used the Headquarters and Service Battalion, 2d FSSG, as his command element and received from GSG-1, the 2d Medical Battalion, 8th Engineer Support Battalion,

*Capt Hearnberger had the mission of starting construction at the new CSSA. LtCol Skipper commented that “his presence at the recon was critical.” (Skipper comments)
and 7th Engineer Support Battalion. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Skipper, who led the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, to build a command post at Mishab and to begin the massive construction effort at Kibrit. Krulak directed Lieutenant Colonel David L. John to bring the 7th Engineer Support Battalion to Kabrit after completing its work at Mishab. Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, who had reported to General Krulak on the 13th, transferred CSSD-142 which operated FASP -1 and -2 to GSG-1 on the 23d, and moved CSSD-111 to the northern part of the Triangle. DSG-1 remained responsible for support of the 1st Marine Division.

On 20 December Krulak activated DSG-2 at Jubayl under Colonel Thomas P. Donnelly, Jr., the former 2d FSSG Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, to sustain the 2d Marine Division. Colonel Donnelly planned a combat support area, similar to the one that DSG-1 established with CSSD-10, but unlike Colonel Powell, he did not plan to create a separate general support organization like CSSD-10. The DSC sent personnel and equipment to DSG-2 and on the day after Christmas, Colonel Donnelly began setting up a support area at CSSD-111’s old position near Abu Hadriyah. To provide direct support to the division’s maneuver regiments, Donnelly intended to establish MCSSD-28 to support the 8th Marines when it arrived in January. To sustain the 6th Marines, which deployed to Saudi Arabia in mid-December, he deployed MCSSD-26, under recently arrived Lieutenant Colonel David L. Wittle.

Lieutenant Colonel Wittle organized his command into headquarters, motor transport, engineer, maintenance, supply, landing support, ammunition, communications, medical, and military police detachments. Wittle, together with his executive officer, Major Charles J. Clarke, had recommended tables of equipment and organization to the DSC based on their extensive experience as CSSD commanders during numerous combined arms exercises (CAX) at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. After a review and adjustment of these requirements, the DSC sent detachments, mostly from the battalions of the 2d FSSG, to MCSSD-26. The highest personnel strength that MCSSD-26 attained was 259 Marines and sailors. On 29 December, MCSSD-26 moved from the Port of Jubayl to the Cement Factory Ridge to join the 6th Marines.

While DSG-2 established itself, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion started the huge construction effort to support the DSC. On 21 December, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper, ordered Captain Hull’s Company C to Mishab to build the DSC’s rear area camp. Six days later, Skipper directed Captain Brian J. Hearnsberger to move Company B to Kibrit and start building

---

*CSSD-142 was redesignated Ammunition Company, 2d Supply Battalion, GSG-1.

**The CAX program consisted of two weeks of training culminating in a three-day mechanized attack across 80 kilometers of desert at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. The Marine Corps conducted 10 CAXs per year which exercised a regimental headquarters in command of a reinforced infantry battalion, an aviation combat element, and a CSSD of about 300 Marines and sailors. Together, Lt Col Wittle and Maj Clarke commanded three different CSSDs in support of eight CAXs in the mid-1980’s. (Wittle comments and BAT Tape 1390A)
the roads, fuel farm, and ammunition supply point that would make up the combat service support area. Skipper ordered Hearnsberger to travel during the day, since he was concerned that local Saudi forces might shoot at them during the night. Skipper visited the commanders of the Saudi 8th and 10th Brigades who guarded the border, to brief them on the 8th Engineer Support Battalion’s presence and operations at Kibrit. Even though intelligence reports showed that the Iraqis were in defensive positions and unlikely to attack, General Krulak obtained infantry support to guard Kibrit. Until the security force arrived, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion would rely on its own machine guns and LAAW hand-held antitank weapons to protect the site. On the afternoon of 27 December, Company B moved into Kibrit, started construction on CSSA-1, and was joined, three days later, by Captain Hull’s Company C. At the end of December, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion was the closest I MEF unit to the enemy.268

The Year Ends

Emphasis on defensive operations was no longer a priority and a shift occurred to the offensive.—3d MAW Command Chronology

By the end of December, I MEF had absorbed reinforcements and leaned

Table: 1st FSSG on 31 December 1990269

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Subordinate Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>H&amp;S Bn, 2d FSSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th Engineer Support Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th Engineer Support Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th Motor Transport Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Medical Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 2d Maintenance Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 2d Supply Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSG-1 CSSD-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSG-2 CSSD-141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSG-1 CSSD-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSG-2 CSSD-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG-1</td>
<td>2d Supply Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Maintenance Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Landing Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, Dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG-2</td>
<td>Det, H&amp;S Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th Motor Transport Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Landing Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Medical Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 2d Maintenance Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 2d Supply Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 8th Engineer Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, Dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Bn</td>
<td>H&amp;S Co, 1st FSSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Postal Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disbursing Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Support Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
forward towards Kuwait with its combat and combat service support units largely in place. General Boomer commanded two divisions, 301 aircraft, a Seabee regiment, and the better part of two FSSGs, spread over 300 kilometers from Bahrain to Kibrit. The 2d FSSG reinforced the 1st FSSG and established the DSC which would provide direct combat service support to the attacking forces from its forward base at Kibrit. GSG-2 stood up with the mission of stockpiling supplies in Northern Saudi Arabia and sending them to the DSC. GSG-1, H&S Battalion, 1st FSSG, and the 3d NCR remained in general support of the MEF while MWSG-37 took charge of the 3d MAW ground combat service support. As I MEF came together as an offensive force, the last peaceful month passed while the United Nations deadline of mid-January rapidly approached without any indication of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Table: Logistics support overview on 31 December 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Logistics Unit (S)</th>
<th>Supported Unit (S)</th>
<th>Distance To Saudi-Kuwaiti Border (Km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kibrit</td>
<td>DSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishab</td>
<td>GSG-2</td>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MWSS-273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, 7th ESB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanajib</td>
<td>DSG-1</td>
<td>1st MarDiv</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CSSD-111</td>
<td>-TF Ripper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CSSD-141</td>
<td>-TF Shepherd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-TF Taro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifah Bay/Abu Hadriyah</td>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>MAG-16</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
<td>MAG-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubayl Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>1 MEF CE</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
<td>-2d MarDiv CE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-5</td>
<td>-6th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-8th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Jubayl/Industrial City</td>
<td>1st FSSG</td>
<td>1 MEF CE</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-DSC CE</td>
<td>-2d MarDiv CE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--DSG-2</td>
<td>-6th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---MCSSD-26</td>
<td>-8th Marines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---MCSSD-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GSG-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-H&amp;S Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d NCR CE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-NMCB-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-NMCB-40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station</td>
<td>MWSG-37 CE</td>
<td>MAG-13 (Fwd)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MWSS-174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MWSS-271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, CSSD-132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, NMCB-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al Ghar</td>
<td>Det, MWSS-174</td>
<td>Det, MAG-16</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Isa</td>
<td>MWSS-373</td>
<td>3d MAW CE</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-131</td>
<td>-MAG-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Det, NMCB-74</td>
<td>-MACG-38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Desert Shield Ends and Desert Storm Begins: 1-31 January 1991

The Situation

*United Nations Resolution 678—Authorized UN Members to use “all means necessary”... if Iraq does not leave Kuwait by 15 January 1991.—DoD, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*

The new year began with the breakout of hostilities imminent. General Schwarzkopf had set 17 January as the date for the start of the air war and the 3d MAW made its preparations for air attacks against targets in Iraq and Kuwait from its fixed-wing bases in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The 1st Marine Division moved north to allow the 2d Marine Division to relocate to the field. As the countdown progressed, I MEF refined its plan against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and decided against an amphibious landing. The revised plan still called for the 1st Division to penetrate the two lines of Iraqi mines and obstacles in Kuwait and seize MEF Objective A, Al Jaber Air Base. As in the original scheme of maneuver, the 2d Marine Division was to follow the 1st Marine Division through the breach, but, now, instead of linking up with an amphibious force, would maneuver to the left of the 1st Marine Division and launch the main attack northwest towards Objective C, the choke point at Al Jahra. The 1st Marine Division would attack on the 2d Marine Division’s right flank and seize MEF Objective B, Kuwait International Airport. General Krulak’s DSC would support both divisions from its base at Kibrit and the 3d MAW would provide helicopter support from Mishab and Tanajib.

Leaning North: 1-16 January 1991

*By 15 January, all units of 1st FSSG were in position and ready to conduct offensive operations to liberate Kuwait.*

*MWSG-37 has provided all ground support requirements necessary for the 3d MAW...*

*Marine Wing Support Group 37*

With the air war about to be launched on the 17th, the southern MWSSs of MWSG-37 completed preparations for operations. To improve support for fixed-wing operations at Shaikh Isa, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Hanson, the commanding officer of MWSS-373, established an air operations division, commanded by Captain Donald A. Thompson. The new organization provided base operations, crash and fire rescue, refuelling, expeditionary airfield services, and weather reporting. At Jubyal Naval Air Facility, MWSS-374 had its hands full...
with MAGs -16 and -26 and the 3d MAW headquarters, but completed there, with the help of the Seabees, the third helicopter parking apron. At King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, MWSS-174 expanded its operations by installing another tactical fuel dispensing system to support Harrier and OV-10 combat missions. Lieutenant Colonel James P. Chessum, the commanding officer of MWSS-174, sent a construction team to help MWSS-273 at Mishab, and provided trucks for the newly arrived MWSS-271.276

Although MWSS support in the south was well established, setting up in the north ran into rain and host nation reluctance. The arrival of the main body of MWSS-271, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Zegar, at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station on 6 January, gave Colonel Coop, the MWSG-37 commander, the ability to expand support for helicopter operations in northern Saudi Arabia. Expecting to support MAG-16 at Tanajib, MWSS-271 joined its advance party, collected its equipment, and then waited. The Saudi national oil company, ARAMCO, which owned the airfield at Tanajib, would neither allow MAG-16 nor MWSS-271 access to its facilities. Instead, on 12 January, Lieutenant Colonel Zegar sent a detachment to Kibrit to operate a FARP for elements of MAG-26,
and seven days later dispatched 30 military policemen to MWSS-273.* Just south of the Kuwaiti border at Ras Al Mishab, MWSS-273 struggled against nature to prepare for the arrival of MAG-26. After repairing the damage caused by torrential rains on the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel William L. Riznychok’s Marines, with the help of a construction team from MWSS-174, rebuilt an access road to the ammunition dump, refueled helicopters, opened a new mess hall, continued construction on the base camp, produced water with its ROWPUs, and, prudently, hardened bunkers.277

Table: Marine Wing Support Group 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marine Wing Support Squadron</th>
<th>Primary Location</th>
<th>Primary Supported Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-174</td>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station</td>
<td>Mag-13 (Forward)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-271</td>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station</td>
<td>Planned to Support MAG-16 at Tanajib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-273</td>
<td>Ras Al Mishab</td>
<td>Planned to Support MAG-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-373</td>
<td>Shaikh Isa</td>
<td>MAG-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>Al Jubayl Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>MAGs-16 and -26 3d MAW HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Setting Up Kibrit

While the 3d MAW prepared for the coming air war, Generals Krulak and Brabham focused their attention on making Kibrit ready to support the ground assault. To supervise the effort, on New Year’s Day, Krulak moved his main command post to Mishab and his forward command element to Kibrit. He sent a planning team, led by Lieutenant Colonel John A. O’Donovan, the DSC’s deputy operations officer, to I MEF headquarters to assist in developing the various logistic schemes to support the different ground attack options under consideration.278** On the 4th, Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, arrived at Kibrit to provide security. Two days later the 7th Engineer Support Battalion reinforced the 8th Engineer Support Battalion to assist in the construction of CSSA-1.279 By

*Col Skipper, who commanded the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, commented that “Due to a shortage of manpower in the MWSS, the FARP was totally constructed by the 8th Engineer Support Battalion and over 50% of the fueling was done by Marines of the bulk fuel company.” (Skipper comments)

**Col O’Donovan noted that Gen Krulak, Col John A. Woodhead, the DSC’s Chief of Staff, and Col Tace, the DSC’s operations officer, attended the I MEF commander’s meetings and planning updates to keep abreast of developments. (O’Donovan comments)
mid-month, the DSC's engineers finished building a sprawling complex spread
over 40 square kilometers as a defensive measure against Iraqi air and artillery
attack. The 8th Engineer Support Battalion and the 7th Engineer Support
Battalion built a 73-cell ammunition support point, improved the 3,000-foot air
strip, established a 1.8-million-gallon fuel dump, stored 500,000 gallons of water,
dug in two field hospitals, and surrounded the entire complex with a blast
berm.280

On 5 January, Saudi Motors began delivering supplies to Mishab. Three
days later, General Brabham returned the 8th Motor Transport Battalion to
General Krulak, which gave the DSC a strength of 352 officers and 6,537 enlist-
ed Marines and sailors.281* At the Port of Jubayl, Colonel Pankey replaced the 8th
Motor Transport Battalion with the newly arrived Reservists from the headquar-
ters of the 6th Motor Transport Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Larry D. Walters. The Reservists took over the management of Saudi Motors just
in time to confront the increasing hesitation of foreign drivers to work as the war
approached.282 To counter this reluctance, Walters assigned Marines as assistant
drivers, which reassured the foreign drivers and gave the newly arrived Reservists
an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the countryside.283

On 6 January, Captain Johnson began moving Seabees north to assist in
the establishment of the DSC at Kibrit. Commander Walsh sent elements of

*The 8th Motor Transport Battalion began moving to Kibrit on 28 December, but was
not officially transferred from GSG-1 to the DSC until 5 January. (Woodson comments)
“Saudi Motors” truck convoy arrives with supplies at Kibrit. This improvised organization filled a gap in the I MEF transportation system.

NMCB-5 to the site to drill for water, but unfortunately, after several attempts, the well collapsed at a depth of 1,000 feet. The Seabees restored an existing 1,200-foot well to operation by replacing its submersible pump. On the 10th, Walsh dispatched a second crew to build a camp for 500 Seabees immediately inhabited by NMCB-40 which arrived to maintain the roads between Kibrit and Mishab. The rapid deterioration caused by extensive truck traffic forced the Seabee commander to assign NMCBs -5 and -40 the responsibility of repairing the 20 kilometers of road east of Kibrit, and NMCBs-24 and -74 the mission of fixing the 30 kilometers of road west of Mishab. The rains on the 13th damaged the marl and sand road and caused the Seabees to work 24 hours a day to repair the destruction. To coordinate northern operations, Johnson moved 10 members of the 3d NCR headquarters with I MEF’s forward headquarters to Safaniyah, located equidistant between Mishab and Tanajib. Even though the bulk of the 3d NCR remained in the south, the focus had shifted north.284

DSG-I Reorganizes and Deploys to the Field

While the generals concentrated on establishing Kibrit, DSG-I reorganized to support offensive operations and moved north with the 1st Marine Division. Executing the plan devised in November, CSSD-111 became CSSD-10

*LtCol Skipper, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion commander, commented that “They (the Seabees) tried mightily, but were unsuccessful at drilling a new well.” (Skipper comments)

**Moderate driving on a desert road turned it into a washboard surface that bounced well-secured cargo off the back of trucks. Drivers, to avoid the painful jarring, drove in virgin strips of sand parallel to the old path. In a matter of days, road systems hundreds of meters wide emerged. The Seabees graded the roads and eliminated the widening effect. (Songer comments and Burke comments)
and refocused its efforts on providing general support to the 1st Marine Division. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly remained in command. At Manifah Bay, Captain Burke renamed CSSD-141, MCSSD-11, and restructured the organization to provide direct support to Task Force Papa Bear (the 1st Marines). Colonel Powell ordered Captain Edward J. Winter, the former CSSD-111 operations officer, to form MCSSD-17 with the mission of supporting Task Force Ripper (the 7th Marines). Later in the month, Colonel Powell tapped Captain William H. Ritchie, III, who was working on the DSC staff, to command CSSD-13 and to support Task Force Taro (the 3d Marines) at Mishab.* As DSG-1's subordinate commands moved to locations near their supported task forces, Colonel Powell moved his headquarters element north of the Triangle and focused his efforts on refining the division's support requirements, obtaining equipment and personnel from the DSC, and looking for more efficient ways to sustain the division.285

Table: Direct Support Group 1 lineage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Name</th>
<th>New Name</th>
<th>Function/Unit Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-111</td>
<td>CSSD-10</td>
<td>General Support/1st Marine Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-141</td>
<td>MCSSD-11</td>
<td>Direct Support/Task Force Pappa Bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CSSD-13</td>
<td>Direct Support/Task Force Taro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>MCSSD-17</td>
<td>Direct Support/Task Force Ripper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Task Force Ripper was one of the two mechanized regiments that gave the 1st Marine Division its primary combat power and mobility. Colonel Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., commanded the task force which consisted of the 7th Marines headquarters element; the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (mechanized); the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (mechanized); the 3d Tank Battalion; and the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion. Exceeding a personnel strength of 4,800 troops, Ripper had concentrated its extensive mobility and fire power in 75 M60A1 tanks, 124

*DSG-1 renumbered CSSDs to conform with the numeric system used by DSG-2. For example, MCSSD-11 supported Task Force Papa Bear whose nucleus was the 1st Marines. The first "1" in MCSSD-11 designated it as supporting the 1st Marine Division and the second 1 designated the regiment as the 1st Marines. MCSSD-17 supported Task Force Ripper (7th Marines), and CSSD-13 supported Taro (3d Marines). The "0" in CSSD-10 indicated that the organization was in general support, while the 1 indicated it was in support of the 1st Marine Division. Accordingly, MCSSD-26 supported the 6th Marines and MCSSD-28 sustained the 8th Marines. Both regiments belonged to the 2d Marine Division. (Powell comments)
Col Alexander W. Powell poses with his DSG-1 detachment commanders in a group picture. From left are Capt Adrian W. Burke (MCSSD-11), Capt Edward J. Winter (MCSSD-17), Col Powell (DSG-1), and LtCol Richard L. Kelly (CSSD-10).

amphibious assault vehicles, and 22 5-ton trucks. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, provided direct artillery support to the task force. On 1 January, Ripper moved 70 kilometers from its Desert Shield position at Abu Hadriyah to a location 30 kilometers northwest of the Triangle. At this location, Colonel Fulford continued to plan, train, and prepare equipment for the attack into Kuwait.286

On 6 January, the newly established MCSSD-17, under Captain Edward J. Winter, formed around the former CSSD-111 motor transport detachment, joined Task Force Ripper in its new position.287 Captain Winter, although a new MCSSD commander, was neither new to the desert nor to Task Force Ripper. Winter entered Saudi Arabia with the 7th MEB’s Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party back in August, and after the bulk of BSSG-7 arrived, commanded Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion.* When the 1st FSSG stood up the following month, he went to work as CSSD-111’s operations officer, where he distinguished himself in perfecting night convoy resupply operations with the division, including Task Force Ripper.288 During the Desert Shield phase, Captain Winter participated in the 1st Marine Division LOGEX and used his knowledge to construct the tables of organization and equipment of the MCSSD that would support Task Force Ripper. When MCSSD-17 formed and moved north of the Triangle, it was led by and manned with experienced Marines and sailors who knew their jobs and the units they supported.289

Captain Winter designed MCSSD-17 to provide one day of supplies and limited services to Ripper. The mobile transported 17,500 gallons of fuel, 12,400 gallons of water, empty bags for ground bulk liquid storage, one day of ammuni-

*During July and early August 1990, Capt Winter prepared Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion, to participate in Display Determination in Turkey with BSSG-7 by conducting extensive mobile resupply training with the 5th Marines. (Maj Edward J. Winter comments on draft, 26Sep96, Author’s Files, hereafter Winter comments)
tion, MREs, batteries, and medical supplies.* To obtain supply support, Ripper’s battalions placed representatives with MCSSD-17’s supply section. After receiving an order for parts, the MCSSD passed the requests to CSSD-10, which in turn, filled the demand and sent the items to MCSSD-17 for delivery to the requested unit. Three RT 4000 forklifts, a TRAM, and the cranes on the MK-17 LVS trailers gave the mobile its material-handling capability. A LVS pulled an 870 trailer which hauled a D7 bulldozer. Winter divided his Mobile into a headquarters element, commanded by First Lieutenant Patrick W. Ford, and two mini-mobiles which delivered supplies. Second Lieutenant David J. Eskelund, former commander of CSSD-111 (South), led Mobile 1, and First Lieutenant Edwin E. Middlebrook, formerly a motor transport officer in CSSD-111, commanded Mobile 2. MCSSD-17 practiced moving into position and setting up in an inverted triangle with each mini-mobile taking a point nearest the enemy and the headquarters element forming the third point away from the threat. Within the security triangle, Captain Winter practiced building a hasty enemy prisoner of war compound and temporary dumps to push supplies to Ripper with its two mobiles.292

Colonel Richard W. Hodory commanded Task Force Papa Bear, which was the 1st Marine Division’s other mechanized fist. This task force consisted of the command element from the 1st Marines, which reached Saudi Arabia two days before Christmas; the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which arrived in January; the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines of “Speed Bump” fame; and the Desert Shield veterans of the 1st Tank Battalion. Company A, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines were in direct support of the task force. On 1 January, Papa Bear established a mobile defense north of the Triangle and then trained, collected equipment, and planned for the assault.294

At Manifah Bay, Captain Burke sent half of his personnel and a good amount of his equipment to other DSG-1 units as he transformed CSSD-141 into MCSSD-11 to support Task Force Papa Bear. Burke lost half of his landing support capabilities, but doubled the size of his motor transport detachment. He organized MCSSD-11 into alpha, bravo, and charlie trains and alpha and bravo command groups. The mission of the Alpha and Bravo Trains was to distribute supplies to Task Force Papa Bear while the Charlie Train contained the mobile’s internal support capabilities. First Lieutenant Delaney C. Williams commanded the Alpha Train, First Lieutenant Juan C. Osorno led the Bravo Train, and First Lieutenant Daniel B. Conley directed Charlie Train’s efforts.297

On 6 January, MCSSD-11 moved 15 kilometers west of Manifah Bay and set up within easy reach of all elements of Task Force Papa Bear. Captain Burke supported the task force, instructed newly arrived units on combat service support methods, and continued training MCSSD-11 in convoy and security procedures. MCSSD-11 practiced establishing the defensive triangle position with the Alpha and Bravo Trains pointed toward the threat and the Charlie Train located furthest from the enemy. Each train was a self-contained security entity that

The term “mobile” is used as a synonym for mobile combat service support detachment (MCSSD).
could defend itself when one or more trains departed the area. An interval of 500 meters was maintained between trains as a protection against Iraqi artillery fire, while the gaps between the mini-mobiles were covered by interlocking fields of fire.  

During this early January period, the general support element of DSG-1 was also active. On New Year’s Day, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly moved the newly-named CSSD-10, 35 kilometers to the northern part of the Triangle, just south of the A-B road along a gravel thoroughfare called Crusher Road. CSSD-10 arrived in the area before the division grew in size, and began executing its mission. Because of the Iraqi air threat, Kelly had his Marines dig in their new positions, which were dispersed within a 10-kilometer perimeter. From Crusher Road, CSSD-10 executed its new general support mission by pushing food, water, fuel, and ammunition to MCSSDs-11 and -17 and artillery ammunition to the 11th Marines. The 1st Marine Division’s smaller task forces and independent units pulled provisions from the CSSD. A second collecting and clearing company, a graves registration section, a Reserve ammunition platoon, and a military police detachment joined CSSD-10, augmenting its capabilities, and increasing its size to 880 Marines and sailors.

CSSD-10’s maintenance detachment helped keep the 1st Marine Division’s equipment readiness level at 96 percent. First Lieutenant Kevin R.

*The Reserve ammunition platoon was from the Ammunition Company, 4th Supply Battalion, 4th FSSG, Greenville, South Carolina. (Powell comments). For a brief period, CSSD-10 had three collecting and clearing companies which increased its size to over 1,000 Marines and sailors. The third company was later transferred to the DSC. (Kelly comments)*
MCSSD-11's defensive fire plan integrates the Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie trains' fields of fire.
Wightman, a limited duty ordnance officer with 10 years of desert experience, two previous tours of duty in the Middle East, and who had deployed to the Cement Factory Ridge during August with CSSD-72, led the 180-man maintenance detachment. Wightman’s team conducted overflow second echelon, full third echelon, and limited fourth echelon maintenance on the 1st Marine Division’s equipment which was either brought back to CSSD-10’s maintenance area or fixed by contact teams dispatched to forward areas. Between October and February, CSSD-10/11 deployed 800 contact teams to front-line locations, often at night and always, commanders worried, without adequate equipment to navigate and to protect themselves. Wightman sent items that exceeded CSSD-10’s capabilities or took too long to fix to the DSC for repair and return. The maintenance detachment was mobile, taking only four hours to pack up and move by using old maintenance vans mounted on Vietnam War-vintage two-and-a-half-ton trucks.303

*Ingenuity*

In every war, a group of usually forgotten Marines, who are normally in harm’s way, develop creative solutions to problems unforeseen by centralized planners and rear echelon tacticians. By January, DSG-1 had spent more than four months in the desert performing combat service support in a high-threat environment. As individuals and as a group, Colonel Powell’s Marines and sailors had experienced and ruminated on the many shortfalls and difficulties that confronted them. By January, DSG-1 had gone a long way in developing innovative and cre-
At Crusher Road, CSSD-10 grappled with methods for handling and evacuating large volumes of wounded from the battlefield. Based on reports that Iranian medical personnel were often contaminated by chemically infected casualties during the Iran-Iraq war, Major William Lucenta, CSSD-10 S-3 Officer and a native of Massachusetts, looked for ways to decontaminate the wounded prior to receiving medical treatment. The maintenance detachment made stretchers by welding bedsprings to poles for carrying chemically dirty casualties to be sprayed at a decontamination site before receiving medical care. In a technique borrowed from the 11th Marines, the detachment would sandwich the contaminated Marine between swaths of chain link fence which allowed him to be sprayed, flipped, and sprayed again before seeing a doctor. Faced with the problem of removing an estimated 3,000 wounded from the battlefield with only two HMMWV ambulances,
Lieutenant Colonel Kelly directed Lieutenant Wightman and a team of medical personnel to devise other ways to get the wounded out. As a result, Master Sergeant James R. Briley in his machine shop designed and prefabricated racks, which were hung by pins on the outside of MK 17 LVS trailers when fully loaded with cargo, then flipped inside the trailer, when emptied, to be fitted with stretchers. Twelve patients could be carried in this manner while medical personnel provided care from the center of the trailer.

Another DSG-1 innovation was the development of the rapid refueling system. The Marine Corps did not possess a mobile system that could quickly refuel a large number of ground vehicles in a tactical situation. Two nozzles distributing fuel from a 55-gallons-per-minute pump was the best solution devised before the war. To refuel rapidly the 1st Marine Division’s fleet of vehicles, Chief Warrant Officer-2 Robert A. Collins, CSSD-10’s engineer officer, blended components from different bulk fuel systems to make from scratch a system that could simultaneously refuel eight vehicles in the field. The heart of the system was a 600-gallon-per-minute pump which was tied to separators and hoses that reduced and distributed enough pressure to fuel the vehicles simultaneously. The system was hauled by either a Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV) pickup truck or a HMMWV and connected to LVSs carrying sixcon fuel pods in order to set up a mobile refueling point. Two systems could refuel an entire tank company at one time while one system could fill up an entire amphibious assault company of 44 vehicles in an hour. MCSSDs -11 and -17 individually deployed two of the rapid refueling systems, which caught the eye of General Krulak who ordered the 8th Engineer Support Battalion to construct 10 systems for DSG-2.

CSSD-10’s maintenance detachment was a hotbed of ideas and initiative that kept the division and the DSC operating. In the dusty and wind-swept desert, Lieutenant Wightman’s Marines modified circuit cards for the TOW II missile

---

*The lack of stretchers was another problem solved by innovation. Capt Burke used sections of piping used to hold camouflage material above the tents and a swath of chain-link fence to make a stretcher. MCSSD-17 found that their field expedient stretchers fit in the LVS ambulances. (Burke comments)

**The rapid refuelling system evolved from a hybrid system developed at Manifah Bay by WO Collins during the fall of 1990. Collins calculated the proper pressure settings and chose components that CSSD-141 put together, tested, and used to fuel both helicopters and ground vehicles. When DSG-1 switched to the offensive, the Manifah Bay system was adapted for mobile operations. (Burke comments)

***The Marine Corps uses commercial pick-up trucks which are officially called commercial utility cargo vehicles (CUCVs). (TM 11240-15/4a, p. 2-22)

****Col Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, added that “the manufacture of ten rapid refueling systems would have cannibalized all eight of our amphibious assault fuel systems. Accordingly, we managed to get several key components built by Zahaid, the Caterpillar Tractor dealer in Jubayl. Ultimately, we were able to equip DSG-2, MCSSD-26, and MCSSD-28 without degrading our bulk storage systems.” (Skipper comments)
A Rapid Refuelling System is seen in operation. Note the 600-gallons-per-minute pump on the left side of the picture.

guidance system and installed clean air modifications on M60 tanks.* Mechanics designed and prefabricated mounts for laser target designators on HMMWVs for forward air controllers, which eliminated the time-consuming and dangerous tasks of unpacking the laser for use and repacking it for transportation. Wightman copied the 11th Marines' design for mounting .50-caliber machine guns on 5-ton trucks when ring mounts were not available. He also participated in the design and conversion of MK 17 LVS trailers into ambulances, and figured out a way to make HMMWV engines from CUCV motors. Much of the work was prefabricated by Master Sergeant Briley's machine shop using metal scavenged from the ARAMCO facility at Safaniyah and from the United States Army.307

Wightman benefitted from his previous contacts with the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne Corps when CSSD-111 had supported the airborne troopers at Abu Hadriyah.** The lieutenant traded tires, cokes, tents and "this and that" with the Army for stock metals, repair parts, and larger items such as 175 6.2-liter engines and 200 injectors to fix or replace engines damaged by the use of avia-

*Gen Krulak commented that Desert Storm was "the first time we went to war when you had optics as a major problem,...if your optics aren't ready you're not going to knock out a tank, so you had people up there, right on the front lines, men and women, who were optics repair people. They were doing things that we never thought would ever be done in such a mobile environment." (Krulak comments)

**LtCol Lucenta related one example of Lt Wightman's ability to create good will. After observing Wightman use a wrecker to lift a downed Apache helicopter onto a truck for the U.S. Army, a local Bedouin tribesman asked the lieutenant through gestures to lift his camel into the bed of a pickup truck. Lt Wightman rigged the unhappy dromedary with a sling and hoisted the animal with his wrecker into the bed of the Saudi's vehicle. (LtCol William Lucenta interview. 10April96)
tion fuel in ground vehicles. All things considered, the 1st Marine Division profited from the creative genius and hard work of CSSD-10's maintenance detachment and its maintenance officer.

**DSG-2 Deploys to the Field**

On 4 January, DSG-2 became operational at CSSD-111's old Abu Hadriyah position and continued to collect people and equipment. More than half of the 868 Marines and sailors reporting to the DSG either fixed equipment or healed people. Colonel Donnelly had under him 218 medical personnel organized into two collecting and clearing companies from the 2d Medical Battalion. Navy Lieutenants Rupert F. Lindo and Henry T. Bierrum commanded Company A and Company C, respectively. Major Dalton J. Langlinais was in charge of the maintenance detachment of 226 Marines. The remaining personnel consisted of engineer, supply, landing support, communications, and motor transportation detachments. Captain Carl D. Matter formed the motor transport detachment with Company A, 8th Motor Transport Battalion, which he also commanded, and furnished trucks and drivers to both MCSSDs. Captain Peter M. Ramey led the engineer detachment which was responsible for fuel and water storage, earth moving, and material handling. Colonel Donnelly arranged his headquarters element into Alpha and Bravo command groups, the latter of which was led by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hering, the DSG-2 executive officer. By mid-month, the DSG helped transport the 2d Marine Division to the field, treated 93 patients, and issued 263,065 gallons of water and 252,678 gallons of fuel to the division and to its mobiles.

**Table: Direct Support Group 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Name</th>
<th>Function/Supported Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSG-2</td>
<td>Direct Support/2d Marine Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSSD-26</td>
<td>Direct Support/6th Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSSD-28</td>
<td>Direct Support/8th Marines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Many participants in Desert Storm believed that it was a myth that aviation fuel caused problems in ground vehicles. Lt Wightman stated, however, that aviation fuel damaged the injectors and engines on the 6.2 liter engines in the HMMWV and CUCV engines. Col Coop, MWSSG-37's commanding officer, added that HMMWV engines ran hotter and only lasted 12,000-14,000 miles before requiring replacement. According to Major Langlinais, DSG-2's maintenance officer, the addition of 10 weight oil and Dextron 2 to the aviation fuel prevented problems. He believed the cause of most fuel pump, engine, and carburetor problems resulted from units not treating their fuel with lubricants. Col Woodson, the commanding officer of DSC's 8th Motor Transport Battalion, experienced minimal mechanical problems caused by aviation fuel, but added that engines ran a little hotter than normal. (BAT Tapes 6 and 1081, Woodson comments, and Coop comments)
By 3 January, MCSSD-26, still in a formative stage, completed its movement to the Cement Factory Ridge where Lieutenant Colonel Wittle established Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Hubert to support the 6th Marines. From RRP Hubert, Second Lieutenant Shaun P. Kelley’s motor transport detachment ran daily trips to the port where his trucks picked up equipment, such as tents and camouflage netting for the MCSSD as well as transporting 6th Marines’ personnel to training at the Thunderbolt Range. In addition, the motor transport detachment hauled a daily average of 7,000 gallons of water, 7 pallets of MREs, 5,000 gallons of fuel, and numerous loads of ammunition to the regiment. MCSSD-26’s maintenance detachment, led by Master Sergeant James E. Rettinghaus, supported the 6th Marines by conducting limited technical inspections on the regiment’s equipment to identify and correct third echelon maintenance problems.

In addition to the daily support given to the 6th Marines, MCSSD-26 prepared for combat. Captain David E. Fournier, the tactical coordination officer, organized crew-served weapons teams to protect the MCSSD and taught all officers and staff non-commissioned officers to request supporting fires and medevac helicopters. Vehicle operators refined day and night tactical driving skills, vehicle recovery procedures, and everyone fired their individual weapons. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle established the Combat Service Support Operations Center (CSSOC) as the mobile’s cerebral cortex to process, task, track, and follow up on requests from the 6th Marines and to DSG-2. The CSSOC rapidly established effective convoy procedures that ensured safety. All convoy leaders and drivers reported to the CSSOC before a resupply mission with their radios and maps, and CSSOC personnel issued compasses and strip maps, and briefed the drivers on their resupply routes and link-up procedures.

In early January, Lieutenant Colonel Head used his staff from MSSG-22 as the nucleus to form MCSSD-28 which the DSC designed to provide direct support to the 8th Marines. In keeping with 2d FSSG procedures for building task organizations, DSC battalion commanders analyzed MCSSD-28’s mission from their functional perspective and sent recommended tables of organization and equipment to the group staff. The DSC staff consolidated, scrubbed, and approved the battalion’s recommendations after obtaining Lieutenant Colonel Head’s views.

*An RRP is a combat service support installation, normally established in forward areas, to support mechanized or other rapidly moving forces (FMFM 4-1, p. 13-3). LtCol Wittle named RRPs after MCCSD-26 personnel who performed well. This was a motivational tool used along the same lines as a meritorious mast. (Warker comments)

**The Thunderbolt range covered 585 square kilometers of desert southwest of the Triangle. The 2d Combat Engineer Battalion built the Division Mechanized Assault Course (DMAC) that simulated obstacles expected in Kuwait such as berms, tank ditches, trenchlines, and minefields. (2dMarDiv ComdC, 1Jan-18Apr91)

***Night Driving Skills were of particular importance. According to Maj Warker, the MCSSD-26 operations officer/logistics officer, “Our drivers did not turn on their normal headlights after we left the port of Jubayl.” (Warker comments)
Col Thomas P. Donnelly, Jr., Commanding Officer, DSG-2, poses with his senior officers. From left are: LtCol John C. Hering, executive officer, DSG-2; Col Donnelly, LtCol David L. Wittie, commander MCSSD-26; and LtCol James W. Head, commander, MCSSD-28.

on the composition of his organization.* As a result of this process, MCSSD-28 formed with the same set of detachments as MCSSD-26, but with a slightly smaller number of people. On 8 January, Head activated MCSSD-28 at the Port of Jubayl and waited for the 8th Marines to collect its equipment and to move to the field.315

The 8th Marines had reached Saudi Arabia in December while most of its equipment arrived by ship between 4 and 22 January. The 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, unloaded its equipment from MPSRon-1 and then logistically supported the regiment while at the port. On 11 January, the 8th Marines moved to the Thunderbolt Range to train on the Division Mechanized Assault Course and to wait for the remainder of its equipment. MCSSD-28 followed the regiment to the field, established a combat service support area near the Cement Factory Ridge, began supporting the 8th Marines, and started an intensive training program to sharpen combat and NBC survival skills.316

Desert Storm Begins: 17-29 January 1991

It was now 2:30 A.M. and...my operations officer, reported that our airplanes and cruise missiles were airborne. “Okay,” I said, “lets go to work.”317

*The 2d FSSG’s method for allowing the battalion commanders to initiate the organization of detachments is called the “Det” system instituted by MajGen Martin L. Brantner when he was the commanding general of the 2d FSSG in 1988. (Woodson Intvw, 19Mar96). This procedure differs from the 1st FSSG whose detachment commanders initiated the process.
On 17 January, Desert Shield ended and Desert Storm began when Central Command ordered the air war to start. The 3d MAW attacked Iraqi targets, while MWSG-37 and GSG-1 “went to work” by pumping large amounts of fuel into General Moore’s attacking aircraft. At Shaikh Isa in January, MWSS-373 dispersed five million gallons of fuel stored by CSSD-131 to the fixed-wing aircraft of MAG-11 which flew the majority of 3d MAW’s missions. At Jubayl Naval Air Facility, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen G. Hornberger, commanding officer of MWSS-374, set up two additional tactical fuel dispersing systems using equipment from FARP Foss, which he closed, and supported 1,613 helicopter missions by pumping 543,300 gallons of fuel. CSSD-132 at Jubayl Naval Air Facility stocked fuel for MWSS-374 and at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station stored fuel for MWSS-174. At GSG-1, Colonel Pankey designated refuelling as the number one priority for CSSDs -131 and -132 and reinforced Shaikh Isa with Reserve engineers from the 6th Engineer Support Battalion. In all, MWSG-37 pumped 6,330,610 gallons of fuel into 3d MAW’s aircraft during the month.

The beginning of hostilities finally convinced ARAMCO to grant permission for MAG-16 to move to Tanajib. On 18 January, Commander Doyle, commanding officer of NMCB-40, sent Seabees from NMCB-40 to Tanajib to expand facilities for MAG-16’s helicopters. The first order of business was to lay a 1,750,000-square-foot AM-2 helicopter parking area on a base of 200,000 cubic yards of soil. Next, the Seabees built a 1,600-foot taxiway, concrete pads for clamshell hangers, a 60,000-square-foot maintenance hardstand, and a 9-module aviation ammunition supply point. On the 25th, MWSS-271 started to arrive at Tanajib and prepared to support air operations there.

The Iraqis responded to 3d MAW’s bombs by shooting free-rockets-over-the-ground (FROG) missiles at Mishab on the 17th and the 19th, while at Jubayl, the drivers of Saudi Motors reacted by quitting their jobs. To lure the civilians back to duty and to keep the supplies moving to Kibrit, General Brabham authorized for each operator a gas mask and poncho for protection against a gas attack, and extra pay. Almost all of the drivers returned, but it was clear that Saudi Motors needed Marines to accomplish the mission fully. Always one step ahead of his fickle foreign drivers, General Brabham had on hand the 600 Reservists from the 6th Motor Transport Battalion, who upon arrival, received the four-hour United Parcel Service training course given to commercial drivers in the United States. As the pool of trained and dependable Marine operators grew,
Lieutenant Colonel Walters, the commanding officer of the 6th Motor Transport Battalion, replaced the least reliable civilian drivers. Despite these problems, Saudi Motors averaged 250 trips a day, moved 50,000 short tons of cargo, and succeeded in stocking Kibrit.324

At Jubayl, GSG-1 modified weapons systems while at Mishab, GSG-2 opened the port. Taking some of the pressure off Saudi Motors, the MV Mallory Lykes, the first ship to venture into Mishab, dropped anchor on 25 January. Dodging FROG missiles, GSG-2 unloaded ammunition, which saved Saudi Motors 500 trips over the distance between Jubayl and Mishab.* From GSG-2, Colonel Hampton pushed ammunition to FASP-3 at Kibrit. On the 27th, an Army ROWPU barge docked at Mishab and three days later began producing water.325 Unfortunately, some of the millions of gallons of oil that the Iraqis dumped into the Persian Gulf fouled the filters of the Army’s ROWPUs, which sucked in raw water from the surface of the Gulf. To counter the problem, the GSG-2 engineers figured a way to draw the raw water from below the surface and kept the Marine Corps ROWPUs operating as the primary source of water in northern Saudi Arabia.326** At Jubayl, GSG-1 worked through Scud alerts and adapted equipment to the situation. Ordnance specialists from the 2d Maintenance Battalion installed applique armor on the 53 M60A1 tanks of the 8th Tank Battalion and helped field new M1A1 Abrams tanks to the 2d Marine Division. Together with a team from the United States, optics technicians modified 476 day trackers and 153 night-sight missile guidance systems on TOW II launchers.327

To manage the predicted 108,000 Iraqi prisoners of war, General Brabham ordered Lieutenant Colonel Linden L. Sparrow to build and operate a camp near Kibrit, which could temporarily hold as many as 40,000 for collection by the U.S. Army.328 Sparrow, who reported to Colonel Hampton at GSG-2, began activating CSSD-91 on the 12th, and sent a Reserve military police detachment from Pittsburgh to Kibrit. Joining the military policemen on the 17th, the Seabees of NMCB-5 used a U.S. Army manual to lay out a camp, divided into three holding pens and a processing area. The Seabees dug in tents, built a mess hall, and erected guard towers around a 3,000-foot by 1,500-foot swath of ground.329

Back at Jubayl, Lieutenant Colonel Sparrow collected people and equipment to operate the camp and sent forward materials to finish building the facility. At Kibrit, working parties of Marines strung concertina wire around the camp to pen in the prisoners. To distribute water in the camp, the CSSD Marines scrounged 500-gallon water tanks from a Saudi company and linked them together with rickety plastic pipes. For prisoner sanitation, the Seabees dug slit trenches and, taking the advice of U.S. Army specialists who were knowledgeable about Arab bathroom behavior, built special wooden heads designed to give the user pri-

*After the Iraqi missile attacks on Mishab, the GSG-2 Marines and sailors referred to the area near the pier as “The FROG Pond.” (Hampton comments)

**According to LtCol Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, “From 14 January to 2 March, the Marine ROWPUs produced 3.75 million gallons of potable water.” (Skipper comments)
vacy. In the processing area, Sparrow established an assembly line system where prisoners were to be searched, interrogated, checked by a doctor, given a blanket, provided a bottle of water, and fed rice and beans before entering the holding areas. During the process, all personal effects were to be screened, inventoried, and immediately returned, except for weapons and items having intelligence value. On 23 January, the DSC sent CSSD-91 its first three Iraqi patrons, whom U.S. Army specialists processed, held, and shipped south.

The Direct Support Command

With the ground war scheduled to start in early February, General Krulak continued preparing the DSC to support the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions. Saudi Motors filled the ammunition supply point with 15,800 tons of munitions and the DSC’s two hospitals, with 470 beds for potential patients between them, opened nine operating rooms. The well repaired by the Seabees produced 80,000 gallons of water per day, while the DSC’s maintenance detachment modified 15 M60 Tanks and 26 bulldozers to perform breaching operations for the divisions. With the construction of Kibrit completed, the burden on the DSC’s engineers, who had been working around the clock, eased and allowed them to continue with their innovative preparations for the ground war.

Knowing that penetrating the Iraqi minefields was the most critical effort in I MEF’s attack, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, modified his battalion’s D-7 bulldozers for the task. Immediately after the battalion’s arrival in December, Skipper ordered his staff to design a way to protect bulldozer drivers from small arms fire and shrapnel, and to devise a wedge to plow through the minefields. The Marines purchased the armor for the protection of the driver from the Saudi economy while Zahaid, the Caterpillar dealer in Jubayl, fashioned a wedge-shaped blade for the front of the bulldozer, similar to the design used by the Israelis and Soviets. In mid-January, the engineers tested the first armored D-7 prototype which proved partially successful. The operator could hold the heavy blade level without digging it into the sand and the bulldozer engine did not overheat from the extra weight, however, the blades of the wedge were too short. As planned, the forward motion of the wedge pushed the mines to the side of the road, but after the blades passed by, the mines would roll back into the lane. A simple extension of the length of the blades solved this problem and Lieutenant Colonel Skipper ordered four wedges from Zahaid. The engineers called the new armored D-7 bulldozers with the wedge-shaped-blades, “Ninja Dozers.”

While the DSC prepared to support the attack, the 2d Marine Division deployed north from its positions at the Triangle to assembly areas south of

*LtCol Skipper commented that the blackout ordered by Gen Krulak at the beginning of the air war was “... one of those great ironies of the war...” and “provided a rest period for the 7th and 8th Engineer Support Battalions.” (Skipper comments).

**In late January, the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, pushed armored kits to Saudi Arabia which protected the D-7 drivers.
Kibrit. After spending only about two weeks at Abu Hadriyah, DSG-2 moved 130 kilometers with the division to a position 70 kilometers south of the Kuwaiti border and 30 kilometers southwest of Kibrit. DSG-2’s new logistics support area became known as Hobo Alley and located DSG-2 within DSC’s logistic network. Starting on the 23d, the DSC routinely transported 30,000 gallons of fuel, 20,000 gallons of water, and 32 pallets of MREs a day to build-up DSG-2 stocks. The daily supply run, performed by the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, consisted of 18 LVSs which made the 60-kilometer roundtrip from Kibrit.

During this period, DSG-2’s operations officer, Major Arthur H. Sass, joined the DSG and established support procedures which were nonexistent when the organization formed. Sass developed a CSS customer’s service guide which published DSG-2’s capabilities. To protect Hobo Alley from enemy air power, Major General Keys, the Commanding General of the 2d Marine Division, sent an anti-air defense team of 13 Marines armed with Stinger shoulder-fired antiair missiles to DSG-2.

In preparation for the coming ground offensive, DSG-2 concentrated on increasing the 2d Marine Division’s equipment readiness, but ran into problems. The DSG was the first source of repair parts for the 2d Marine Division which overwhelmed the supply detachment with requests. For example, the 10th Marines placed 14 computer disks worth of requisitions on DSG-2, which lost 12 of the disks. Moreover, in the face of the deluge of appeals for support, DSG-2 lacked repair parts in its supply block, which had only 440 of the 1,500 line items needed to support the division. To obtain the needed parts, DSG-2, as well as DSG-1, requested items from the DSC at Kibrit, which either filled the request or passed it on to Jubayl. GSG-1 either issued the item or requisitioned the part from the United States. To further aggravate the situation, automated supply and maintenance reports available in garrison were almost non-existent in Saudi Arabia. This caused units which were ignorant of the status of their original requests to reorder parts multiple times and further overload the system.

To combat the problem, the 2d Marine Division sent a liaison team, which carried copies of the lost 10th Marines requisition disks, to DSG-2 on the 25th and Captain Alan B. Will, DSG-2’s supply officer, went to Jubayl to track down the needed repair parts. In addition, Major Dalton J. Langlinais, DSG-2’s main-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

On the 21st, the Tiger Brigade arrived near Kibrit and significantly enhanced the firepower and mobility of the 2d Marine Division, but increased the logistic burdens on DSG-2. The Tiger Brigade added 4,212 soldiers, 354 tracked vehicles, and numerous trucks, generators, and HMMWVs to I MEF, which had agreed, after numerous meetings with ArCent, to provide food, water, personnel support items, general medical support, and common-repair parts to the Tigers. ArCent had agreed to continue distributing clothing, organizational equipment, ammunition, and Army-unique repair parts to the brigade. On the 25th, Colonel Donnelly sent Captain Robert E. Tobin as his liaison officer to the U.S. Army 502d Support Battalion, which provided direct combat service support to the Tiger Brigade. The 502d, commanded by Army Lieutenant Colonel Coy Scoggins, began pulling supplies from the DSG, but lacked the trucks to pull and push supplies to the brigade. To make up for the shortfall, the Tiger Brigade requested trucks from ArCent.348

Between 16 and 23 January, the 6th Marines moved north, accompanied by MCSSD-26, which moved in five increments to a position 40 kilometers south of Kibrit. Lieutenant Colonel Wittle called the new location RRP Laporte and continued to blend the capabilities of MCSSD-26 with the operational requirements of the 6th Marines. In response to a request from his MCSSD commander and in recognition of the need to protect his source of supply, Colonel Lawrence H. Livingston, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Marines, attached a section of TOW missile HMMWVs from the 8th Tank Battalion to MCSSD-26. The TOW detachment gave Wittle the ability to move independently on the battlefield and to respond rapidly to requests for support from the regiment without needing its protection. Besides bolstering the defense, Wittle used the TOWs for reconnaissance and scouting missions.

At RRP Laporte, MCSSD-26 increased and improved its level of combat service support for the 6th Marines which grew in size with the assignment of attachments and direct support units. During the second half of January, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle, believing that the ground war would soon begin, pressed to fix all equipment, especially the weapons systems belonging to the regiment and its assigned units. Items that could not be repaired were swapped for operational equipment held in either the Prepositioned War Reserve or the Quick Exchange Program. The daily amount of supplies delivered to the 6th Marines

---

* According to Col Donnelly, the relations with the Tiger Brigade were reciprocal: “The Tiger Brigade provided a full communications suite to DSG-2 to integrate communications . . . [and] . . . also provided unique M-1 tank maintenance capability. . . . The support provided and received was a tremendous demonstration of interservice cooperation.” (Donnelly comments)

** Major units either attached to or in direct support of the 6th Marines were the 8th Tank Battalion, Task Force Breach A, and the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines.
almost doubled, to an average of 13,000 gallons of water, 9,000 gallons of fuel, and 32 pallets. To expedite the refueling of the growing number of vehicles in 6th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle adopted the rapid refueling system developed by CSSD-10. An eight-man team could set up the system from the back of an LVS in five minutes and refuel 60 assault amphibious vehicles in an hour. MCSSD-26 practiced rapid refueling with the regiment, until it became second nature for both customer and supplier. To ensure good communications with the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle dispatched Captain Scott A. Allen, a supply officer with extensive infantry battalion experience, to act as a roving customer service representative. Allen often returned from a liaison trip with a fist full of support requests.

Between 17 and 23 January, the 8th Marines, commanded by Colonel Larry S. Schmidt, moved to assembly areas south of Kibrit. On the 22d, Lieutenant Colonel Head relocated MCSSD-28 to a position 30 kilometers southeast of the DSC and 14 kilometers east of the regimental command post. At the assembly area, MCSSD-28 continued to focus on refining tactical movement, security, and resupply capabilities. MCSSD-28’s operations officer, Major James M. McNeal, and Captain Tony L. Bumgarner, the tactical security officer, conducted intensive day and night tactical movement and resupply exercises that honed the mobile’s ability to support the 8th Marines. On the 29th, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, received detachments from the 2d Assault Amphibious Vehicle Battalion while the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, obtained 32 5-ton trucks from the 4th Truck Company. The addition of trucks and amphibious assault vehicles made the regiment fairly mobile, but increased the amount of fuel and maintenance support required from MCSSD-28. In addition, the number of trucks allocated to the 8th Marines was not enough to accomplish its mission, a shortfall which hampered rapid movement and caused the regiment to look to MCSSD-28 for help.

During this period, on 25 January, Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, published his plan to move 110 kilometers northwest to Al Qarrahto in support of the 1st Marine Division. This was the location that the DSC had surveyed in December and found littered with dead camels. Colonel Powell intended to stage enough supplies near the division’s assembly areas to sustain the assault deep into Kuwait. To accomplish this goal, Powell ordered CSSD-10 to establish a combat service support area at Qaraah, provide direct support to elements of Task Force Shepherd, the division’s screening force along the border, and to continue its general support mission. In order to execute the plan with the limited amount of available trucks, Powell ordered CSSD-10 and the recently activated CSSD-13 to start immediately shuttling people and equipment to the new location ahead of the division.

*Maj Warker added that resupply procedures were explained and practiced night and day with each of the supported units. This would entail defined security measures for entry into supported units defensive perimeters or designated resupply grid coordinates: “We would attach chemical lights to fuel nozzle points, resupply vehicles with MREs, and water points when in the ‘Jiffy Mart’ mode.” (Warker comments)
Colonel Powell had established CSSD-13 to support Task Force Taro, which was the 1st Marine Division's third maneuver element. General Myatt ordered Taro, commanded by Colonel John H. Admire, to conduct a helicopter assault and capture MEF Object A, the Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait. Colonel Admire moved Task Force Taro, which consisted of the three lightly armed organic battalions of the 3d Marines to Ras Al Mishab where the brigade trained for its heliborne assault. A detachment of Reserve landing support specialists from Company B, 4th Landing Support Battalion, 4th FSSG, Lathrop, California, had joined Taro on 14 January, and began training with the task force. Five days later, Captain Ritchie had activated CSSD-13 at Mishab by combining the Reserve Marines and a group of active duty red-patchers from CSSD-141.

Prior to activation, Captain Ritchie constructed a table of organization for eight officers and 178 enlisted Marines, but was only able to collect four officers and 76 enlisted men, together with a limited amount of equipment. Because of the lack of people, CSSD-13's landing support specialists instructed and supervised Taro's Marines, who performed the labor-intensive chores of hooking external loads to helicopters and providing landing zone security, functions normally performed by fully staffed landing support organizations. Even with the training, Taro's Marines were uneasy with the idea of dangling their equipment and supplies underneath, and preferred to load things inside the aircraft to enhance speed and maneuverability of the helicopters. To counter this concern, Ritchie pointed out that external loads were designed to deliver supplies and equipment to landing zones quickly while minimizing the aircraft exposure to enemy ground fire. For equipment, CSSD-13 gathered nets and slings, an LVS, two 5-ton trucks, and a couple of HMMVWs. The lack of forklifts in the landing zones during the initial phase of the planned heliborne assault, forced Captain Ritchie to create manportable supply packages. For example, CSSD-13 used bottled water in boxes instead of 500-gallon bladders and packed medical supplies in ammunition cans.

Captain Ritchie and First Lieutenant Darryl L. Smith, the CSSD's landing zone support area officer, formed a helicopter support group to coordinate landing support operations during the assault. To control HST operations at each landing zone, CSSD-13 would send receiving teams with each of the two assault battalions and a third group with the reserve battalion to unload helicopters, set up supply dumps, and evacuate the wounded. Ritchie planned to lead the receiving team of the first battalion into Al Jaber, while Smith intended to run the departure landing zone. The lieutenant wanted to place CSSD-13 next to CSSD-10 in order more easily to obtain supplies and to be near an airfield or FARP to maximize helicopter flight time and availability. Smith prepared to package water, fuel, MREs, ammunition, and medical supplies to maximize delivery during the first helicopter wave, since it was doubtful that subsequent waves would reach the objectives. Captain Ritchie sent to Qaraah his engineer officer and elements of

*These Marines belonged to Company C, 1st Landing Support Battalion, 1st FSSG, which was commanded by Capt Burke during Desert Shield. Burke commanded these Marines in CSSD-141 where they had trained extensively with Task Force Taro at the Cement Factory Ridge. (Burke comments)
CSSD-13 to find a suitable place for staging.  

On the 26th, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly led CSSD-10’s security detachment and engineers together with a group from CSSD-13, headed by Captain Sione L. Kava, a Reserve engineer officer from the Pacific island of Tonga, to Qaraah to establish combat service support areas. This movement relocated both CSSDs near the border well in advance of the 1st Marine Division’s main body. Faced with the conflicting tasks of moving CSSD-10, supporting the division from two locations, and assisting the division reposition, Kelly relocated his CSSD in increments which took five days to complete. Major Lucenta, the CSSD’s operations officer, who planned the complex relocation, calculated that CSSD-10 needed 300 LVS-loads to move, but only possessed 70 dragon wagons to accomplish its mission. The gravel plains at Qaraah were located near a dirt air strip, 40 kilometers southwest of the heel of Kuwait, and east of a desert road that ran north to the border and south to the Kibrit road. Only Task Force Shepherd and elements of the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, lay between the border and CSSD-10. Less than a week earlier, DSC’s 7th Engineer Support Battalion built a mock combat service support area at Qaraah as part of I MEF’s deception plan. On arrival, CSSD-10’s engineers worked around the clock to expand the existing berms and bunkers into a real combat service support area that would eventually cover 10 square kilometers. Moving near the airfield and closer to the border, Captain Kava set up a staging area to send supplies by helicopter to Task Force Taro. On the 27th, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion began pushing water, fuel, and MREs to both CSSDs.

Iraq Attacks Near Qaraah and Khafji 29-31 January 1991

Khafji was one of a series of border engagements at the end of January that took Schwarzkopf and his top commanders completely by surprise.

On 27 January, two U.S. Air Force F16 Fighting Falcon multi-role jet aircraft attacked a motorcade near the southern Iraqi city of Basrah and just missed

*MCSSDs -11 and -17 planned to participate in a deception plan that would simulate a logistics buildup north and west of the “elbow.” Neither organization executed the plan. The “elbow” was the point, 70 kilometers inland from the Persian Gulf, where the east-west Saudi-Kuwaiti border turned northwest. (Winter comments); GSG-1’s air delivery platoon conducted air drops along the border as part of the deception operations. (1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 2)

**During this period, the 1st Marine Division conducted the first two combined arms raids of the war. CSSD-10 sent food, fuel, and water to support the raids, while DSG-1 coordinated the heavy equipment hauling capabilities provided by the DSC’s 8th Motor Transport Battalion. (Col Richard Kelly intvw, 10Apr96, (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Thomas S. Woodson intvw 19Mar96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); DSG-1 ComdC, Jan 91; 8th Motor Transport Battalion Dispatch Log, 22Jan91)
killing Saddam Hussein. The infamous dictator of Iraq was returning to Baghdad after reviewing plans for a surprise attack on Saudi Arabia. Saddam intended to inflict casualties on the coalition forces, humiliate the Saudi military, and stir up political opposition to the war in the United States. The Iraqis aimed to launch the 3d Armored Division across the border south of Al Wafra, where it would swing east to capture the Port of Mishab. The 1st Mechanized Division would protect the right flank of the attack by crossing the border above Qaraah, and the 5th Mechanized Division would leap across the border on the left and seize the Saudi town of Khafji, just 35 kilometers north of the attack’s objective, the Port of Mishab. The Iraqi III Corps Headquarters would coordinate the attack, which was scheduled for 29 January.

Just south of Al Wafra on the 29th, Colonel Stephen A. Tace, the DSC operations officer, led a survey team to look for a location to establish a transfer point. General Krulak wanted a spot as close to Kuwait as possible where the DSC could stock two days of supplies to sustain operations in Kuwait. After scouting the area along the border, the DSC team drove to Kibrit, without incident, but planned to return to the border the next day to complete the survey. Arriving at his office, Colonel Tace called the MEF G-4 to discuss some routine business and was told to grab his helmet and flak jacket and to get out of the area because Iraqi armor was bearing down on Kibrit. Tace raced to the combat operations center, thinking along the way about the huge roman candle Kibrit would make if the Iraqis blew up its 15,800 tons of ammunition and 1.8 million gallons of fuel. At the operations center he tuned in to the 2d Marine Division’s command net and pieced together the situation. The Iraqis were indeed attacking along the border and Kibrit was in danger.

General Krulak had always been concerned that the Iraqis would learn about Kibrit, attack the exposed base, destroy the MEF’s ammunition, and dislocate the offensive. After learning about the Iraqi mechanized attack, Krulak feared that the middle prong of the assault was indeed aimed at Kibrit. Krulak ordered a 100 percent alert and focused the DSC’s defense, which consisted mainly of AT-4 hand-held anti-tank launchers and small arms. Every Marine, male and female, rapidly responded to the crisis, grabbed his or her weapon, and took a place on the hastily formed defensive line. The Saudi and Qatari force to the north that supposedly protected the DSC from attack, had departed the area and left the Americans to their own resources. Around midnight, the Marines of CSSD-91,

*Other members of the survey team were Col Donnelly, the DSG-2 commander LtCol Thomas S. Woodson, the commanding officer of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion and LtCol Charles O. Skipper, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion commander.

**Gen Krulak commented that “General Boomer made a tremendous decision, a very brave decision to move his combat service support forward...the one thing that probably should have been done, that wasn’t, was to bring some forces up with him.” (Krulak Comments)

***The Qatari and Saudi forces were responsible for screening the area north of the Kibrit-Mishab road to the Saudi-Kuwait border. (Krulak comments)
Diagram shows Iraqi incursions of 29 January. Saddam Hussein intended to start the ground war with a three-pronged attack into Saudi Arabia. These attacks threaten CSSD-10 at Al Qaraah, the DSC at Kibrit, and GSG-2 at Mishab.

who were closer to the border than the DSC, put all of their shotguns, rifles, and machine guns into a pile, blew them up with C-4 explosives, and then fell back to Kibrit to avoid capture. Krulak sent other troops to the road to guide the CSSD-91 personnel into CSSA-1.*

Having no substantial combat power in front of his position, General Krulak called General Keys and requested help from the 2d Marine Division.** Keys immediately dispatched a company of M1A1 tanks from the Tiger Brigade to protect the base. At the 8th Motor Transport Battalion's motor pool, which lay north of the ammunition dump, the 29th was a pitch-black night made even

---

*Gen Krulak commented that there was a good lesson to be learned from CSSD-91's retreat. He said: "These are the kinds of stories that rarely get out, but its those types of things that, we as Marines, need to think about. When you make the decision to put your forces far forward, with minimal protection, then you need to understand that there are dangers involved with that." (Krulak comments)

**During the night of the 29th, normal communications between the DSC and the 2d Marine Division were down. Gen Krulak's driver, Sgt Slick Olson, used his Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) to establish a link with the division's combat operations center. Krulak then requested support from the 2d Marine Division. (O'Donovan comments); Additionally, the DSC used MCSSD-26 as a communications link with the 6th Marines in order to confirm enemy sightings and friendly unit locations. (Warker Comments)
more jittery for the Marines by the false alarm of an Iraqi gas attack. Not aware of the Iraqi armored attacks, but acutely sensitive to the battalion's closeness to the border and the danger to his troops if the nearby ammunition dump went up, Major Edwin Fielder, Jr., the battalion operations officer, was wide awake at the combat operations center. He became even more concerned when he heard the sound of unidentified tanks clanking by his position in the dead of night. After listening to the tanks for a moment and talking with the DSC, Fielder decided that the tanks were friendly since they were moving north and away from Kibrit. Indeed, the tanks heard by Major Fielder were from the Tiger Brigade moving to protect the DSC.376*

Leaving Qaraah on the 29th, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly drove to CSSD-10's rear location inside the Triangle at Crusher Road. Upon arrival there, he learned from the 1st Marine Division's tactical and intelligence nets that an Iraqi armored column was staging in southern Kuwait for a possible attack on either Kibrit or Qaraah. Kelly immediately ordered all AT-4s, LAAWs, crew-served weapons, and ammunition gathered and loaded for an emergency run to the latter position. The CSSD's chaplain organized a three-truck convoy which sped towards the border. Arriving after dark, Kelly deployed all of his Marines along the berms protecting the CSSD. Captain Dennis Muller's lightly armed, but superbly trained security detachment anchored the defense. Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, the 1st Marine Division assistant commander, joined CSSD-10 to monitor the situation and provided some reassurance to Kelly and his defending Marines that they were not alone. CSSD-10 remained on the berm for the remainder of the night, moved in and out of chemical defense levels 2 and 3 (MOPP-2 and 3), and watched flashes in the sky above the battle raging just a few kilometers north, along the border at Observation Post 4 (OP-4).377** CSSD-10 did not engage the Iraqis, but, the 3d MAW Super Cobra attack helicopters killed two T62 tanks less than two kilometers from CSSD-13.378 The next morning, Kelly dispatched the graves registrations section to recover 11 Marines killed by friendly fires in two separate incidents and ordered Major Lucenta, CSSD-10's operations officer, to continue building Qaraah.379

One hundred kilometers to the east near Mishab, Captain Ritchie, the CSSD-13 commander, received a surprise request from Task Force Taro to push

---

*Before moving into protective positions, the Tiger Brigade drew tank ammunition from the DSC's Ammunition Supply Point. (O'Donovan comments)

**The higher the MOPP Level the greater the threat of chemical attack. There are four levels of MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture—which require the wearing of different protective items of clothing.

1. Level 1: Consists of wearing a protective suit (trousers and jacket and carrying boots, gloves, and mask with hood).
2. Level 2: Adds the overboots to be worn with the gloves and mask, with hood still to be carried.
3. Level 3: Adds the wearing of the mask and hood.
4. Level 4: Requires the wearing of the entire outfit, including the gloves. (Quilter, *With 1 MEF*, p. 96)
immediately enough fuel, water, MREs, and ammunition for an infantry company, and 50 TOW missiles, to the Saudi border town of Ras Al Khafji. On the night of the 29th, a brigade from the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division crossed the border from Kuwait, captured Khafji, trapped two reconnaissance teams from the 1st Marine Division, and threatened Mishab and Kibrit. In response to the Iraqi invasion, Arab forces from the Joint Forces Command East moved towards Khafji to retake the town. Upon hearing of the Iraqi attack, Colonel Admire dispatched two combined anti-armor teams (CAAT), an artillery battery, and two TOW sections to assist coalition forces retake the town and requested combat service support from CSSD-13.

At Mishab, Captain Ritchie had a number of problems to overcome before honoring Colonel Admire’s request. His newly formed CSSD was designed to provide helicopter support and was not equipped to provide ground support. In addition, half of CSSD-13 was at Qaraah. Notwithstanding the drawbacks of the situation, Ritchie immediately requested a refueller from DSG-1 which misinterpreted the request as a permanent equipment transfer to Task Force Taro and refused to send the refueller. The DSG recommended that Taro obtain its refueller from GSG-2. Instead, Captain Ritchie enlisted the help of friends in the 7th Engineer Support Battalion. They gave him a 500-gallon fuel bladder and a pump, and buddies in the 7th Motor Transport Battalion lent him a trailer to haul ammunition. At FASP-3, the ammunition technicians refused to issue munitions to CSSD-13. Frustrated, Captain Ritchie drove home the point that Mishab, to include its ammunition supply point, was now within Iraqi artillery range. Convinced by Captain Ritchie’s irrefutable logic, the technicians finally honored the CSSD-13 request.

After collecting equipment and supplies, Captain Ritchie hustled his two-truck supply convoy towards Khafji. Arriving on the evening of the 30th, CSSD-13 set up a refueling point less than three kilometers south of the Iraqi-held town along the coastal highway and just north of the point where Taro had planted explosives to cut the road, if forced to withdraw. Ritchie’s mini-mobile parked directly behind Taro’s forward CAAT teams, which were dangerously low on fuel and close to the enemy. Ritchie spent the next 14 hours refueling and distributing MREs and bottled water to the CAAT teams which sent vehicles back for fuel and resupply, as the situation allowed. At noon on the 31st, Task Force Taro withdrew its CAAT teams after Saudi and Qatari forces recaptured Khafji and rescued the 12 reconnaissance Marines. CSSD-13, totally depleted of supplies, withdrew with the CAAT teams after successfully accomplishing its unexpected mission.

After the Iraqi attack on 29 January, General Keys ordered the 6th Marines to move to positions 40 kilometers northwest of Kibrit and 26 kilometers south of the border to screen I MEF against further Iraqi probes into Saudi Arabia. On 30 January, Colonel Livingston, the regimental commander, rapidly deployed two mechanized battalions; the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines; a company from the 2d Tank Battalion; and a portion of MCSSD-26 near the Kuwaiti border. When the word came to deploy, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle rapidly gath-
ered together all available fuel, water, and MREs and traveled north with the regiment. When a vehicle broke down, Wittle took the majority of the convoy forward while leaving a small group behind under the command of Captain Peter M. Warker.* After dark and after fixing the broken vehicle, Warker followed the tracks from Wittle’s convoy to find his new location. Along the way, an unidentified mechanized force rapidly approached the little convoy from both sides creating a very dangerous moment. Knowing that both friendly and enemy units were in the area, Captain Warker tensely held fire and was relieved when a Saudi soldier “popped out” of one of the approaching armored vehicles and identified himself. After the encounter with the Saudis, Warker’s group joined Lieutenant Colonel Wittle, who arranged the whole convoy into a circular defensive position. The Marines of MCSSD-26 spent the remainder of the night at MOPP-3, nervously listening to unidentified mechanized sounds passing just outside of visual and thermal sight range.390 Wittle named the new location RRP Brown and was joined by the remainder of the CSSD over the next two days.391

The Iraqi attacks caused General Myatt, the 1st Division commander, to order Task Force Ripper to prepare a counterattack and the 4th Marines to move to Qaraah. At 2000 on the 30th, Colonel Fulford, the task force commander, directed his battalions to prepare to advance and to smash any Iraqi forces moving towards Khafji. Accordingly, Captain Winter ordered MCSSD-17 to be ready to move north in support.392 At noon on the 31st, the crisis at Khafji passed and Ripper and MCSSD-17 relaxed and remained in position. To be ready for a repeat Iraqi performance, Captain Winter conducted a route reconnaissance to Khafji.393

In the meantime, on the 30th, the 4th Marines, since 22 January under Colonel James A. Fulks, the former 1st Division operations officer, had rushed to Qaraah with the mission of defending the border area from further Iraqi aggression.394 The 4th Marines was the division’s newly formed fourth maneuver unit, consisting of the headquarters element detached earlier in the month from the 1st FSSG; the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines; and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The 11th Marines assigned the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, to provide direct artillery support.395 To Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, the 4th Marines was an additional burden that further overloaded his already strained ability to support the division. Until a plan could be devised to support the regiment, CSSD-10 would provide supply point distribution.396

In the final chapter of the Kafji battle, Captain Stephen H. Negahquet, the platoon leader for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Platoon, sent Gunnery Sergeant Mickey Scholfield, Staff Sergeant Rydel, and Sergeant Michael R. Glass to Khafji to help clear unexploded ordnance. On 3 February, Scholfield and his team entered Khafji and linked up with engineers from the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Over the previous days, the Saudis had sustained 18 casualties while attempting to clear the vast amount of booby traps, unexploded ordnance, and arms caches that littered the area. The Marine EOD team ducked sporadic sniper, small arms, and artillery fire and

*Capt Warker was MCSSD-26’s logistics officer until 4 February, when he became the mobile’s operations officer. (MCSSD-26 Historical Collection)
cleared duds, booby traps, a few houses, and some Iraqi armored personnel carriers during the remainder of the day. The next day Chief Warrant Officer 2 Thomas A. Crawford arrived with three NCOs from the 7th Engineer Support Battalion, took charge of the clearing operation, and attached the EOD technicians to squads of Saudi engineers. The U.S./Saudi teams again dodged the intermittent sniper fire and continued with the clearing mission. The following day, Captain Negahnquet and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Thomas E. Bathory arrived at Khafji to supervise the final disposal effort. On the 7th, the Marine EOD team completed its tasks in Kafji, where it destroyed about 4,000 pieces of ordnance, cleared nearly 80 armored vehicles, and gathered many items having a technical intelligence value.\textsuperscript{397}

**Conclusion**

*Set MOPP level two at 2145, downgraded to MOPP level 0 at 0630.*\textsuperscript{398}

January ended with I MEF taking a deep breath after the Iraqi attacks across the border, continuing the air war against Iraq, and preparing for the ground war. On the 31st, General Krulak was close to reaching the goal of stocking seven days of supply at Kibrit to support the MEF and DSG-1 set up positions near the Kuwaiti border to sustain the 1st Marine Division. General Brabham kept Saudi Motors on the road and pushed ammunition to Kibrit from Jubayl and the newly opened port of Mishab. MWSG-37 pumped oceans of fuel to 3d MAW’s attacking aircraft and together with the Seabees, prepared to support the relocations of the 3d MAW helicopters to northern locations. It was apparent to all, that the ground war was about to begin.

### Flexibility and Forward to Attack Positions:
1-23 February 1991

**Moving to the Attack**

Many of the problems experienced during January carried over to February. Transportation issues seemed to overshadow other concerns due to the vast amounts of supplies, equipment, and personnel that needed to be moved. — Col Alexander W. Powell

At the beginning of the month, I MEF continued to prepare for the single-division penetration of Kuwait. General Moore pushed the 3d MAW’s operations north; the 1st Marine Division staged its mechanized units near qaraah and conducted combined arms raids along the Kuwaiti border; and the 6th Marines guarded the border south of Al Wafra. The DSC completed stocking Kibrit for the attack and
### Table: Combat Service Support overview on 31 January 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Logistic Unit(s)</th>
<th>Supported Unit(s)</th>
<th>Distance From Border (Kilometers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPP Brown</td>
<td>MCSSD-26</td>
<td>6th Marines</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaraah</td>
<td>CSSDs-10/13</td>
<td>1st MarDiv</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibrit</td>
<td>-DSC</td>
<td>-Forward Battle Area</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CSSD-91</td>
<td>-I MEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-NMCB-5</td>
<td>-I MEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-40</td>
<td>-I MEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishab</td>
<td>-GSG-2</td>
<td>-I MEF</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MWSS-273</td>
<td>-MAG-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NMCB-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobo Alley</td>
<td>DSG-2</td>
<td>2d MarDIV</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safaniya</td>
<td>3d NCR</td>
<td>I MEF HQ</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Kibrit</td>
<td>MCSSD-28</td>
<td>8th Marines</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanajib</td>
<td>MWSS-271</td>
<td>MAG-16</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubayl Naval Air Facility</td>
<td>MWSS-374</td>
<td>3d MAW HQ</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-132</td>
<td>MAGs 16&amp;26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Jubayl</td>
<td>1st FSSG</td>
<td>I MEF</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GSG-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station</td>
<td>MWSS-37</td>
<td>MAG-13 (Fwd)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MWSS-174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Isa</td>
<td>MWSS-373</td>
<td>MAG-11</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSSD-131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
transported supplies to the DSGs which in turn distributed supplies to the MCSSDs which directly supported the assault forces.

During the first two days of February, Task Force Papa Bear tactically moved 100 kilometers northwest from its positions at the Triangle to an assembly area near qaraah. Captain Burke, the commander of MCSSD-11 in support of Papa Bear, used the road march to train with the 1st Division task force and to validate its daily fuel consumption. On the night before the move, Burke sent his refuelers to top off fuel tanks and then dispatched his eight-point rapid refueling systems to establish a forward refueling point. On the 1st, Papa Bear quickly and smoothly filled up at the enroute refueling point and continued its road march. That evening, while the mechanized force halted, MCSSD-11’s refuelers again topped it off. The next morning, the MCSSD sprinted for qaraah along the road while the Task Force maneuvered cross country to its new location. After Papa Bear reached qaraah and established defensive positions, Captain Burke distributed food, water, and fuel to its battalions. Burke not only wanted to ensure that the task force was logistically ready to fight now that they were close to the border, but, also, to record the fuel data from the last leg of the journey. With the fuel figures from the road march, Captain Burke calculated Papa Bear’s daily consumption rates which he used to plan for the attack.

During the early morning hours of 2 February, U.S. Navy aircraft mistakenly bombed Battery S, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 30 kilometers north of qaraah, killing one Marine and wounding two others. Since helicopter medevac was not available, the wounded Marines were evacuated through qaraah to the DSC at Kibrit. CSSD-10’s Graves Registrations Platoon processed the dead Marine.

The artillery battery was on its way back from one of the combined arms raids that both divisions had conducted along the Kuwaiti border. Following this incident, the 1st Marine Division conducted a number of these raids in which CSSD-10 provided supply support and DSG-1 arranged heavy equipment transportation with the DSC. Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, believed the raids gave his Marines experience in rapidly supporting combat operations and working closely with the division.

On 3 February, Task Force Ripper and MCSSD-17 moved 110 kilometers to positions south of Papa Bear near the intersection of the Kibrit and qaraah roads. The new location was 60 kilometers south of the border and 50 kilometers west of Kibrit. Upon arrival, Ripper sharpened its breaching skills, rehearsed its planned attack on the Al Jaber Air Base, and launched a small operation against the Iraqis. Captain Winter, the MCSSD-17 commander, took advantage of Ripper’s simulated breach lanes by evaluating the trafficability through them and adjusting accordingly his truck loads and equipment.

At the new location, Reservists from Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, commanded by Major Joseph W. Lydon, joined Ripper to manage prisoners of war who might be captured during the assault. Lydon lacked transportation for his Marines and appealed to MCSSD-17 for assistance. Prior to the war, Captain Winter had been the Inspector-Instructor of the Reserve unit in New
Haven, Connecticut, and had trained with Lydon’s company which was from nearby Plainville, Connecticut. Winter agreed to haul some of the Reserve infantry which would give the mobile additional protection against pockets of any hostile Iraqis bypassed by the Task Force during the attack.

In another action following the northward deployment and illustrating the mobile’s close working relationship with the task force, Ripper’s Tactical Air Control Party and the 3d Tank Battalion had moved another 100 kilometers north to Observation Post 6, where they controlled an air strike against Iraqi positions in Kuwait. MCSSD-17 provided a small convoy carrying fuel, water, MREs, and tank ammunition to support the operation.403

Also moving north with the MEF, the 3d MAW deployed units closer to the border to support the coming ground attack. MWSG-37 continued to prepare Mishab and Tanajib for MAGs-16 and -26 and to help relocate both helicopter groups in their new locations. Colonel Coop, the MWSG-37 commander, formed a provisional truck company with assets gleaned from within the support group. First Lieutenant Thomas L. Hankinson led the MWSG truck company which eventually grew to 30 vehicles.404 On 3 February, the MV Ciudad De Manta docked at Mishab with a load of AM2 matting that MWSS-273 began laying at the port and MWSS-271 started placing at Tanajib. The following day, MAG-26 began arriving at Mishab, while at Qaraah, MWSS-273 established a FARP to support helicopter operations during the ground assault. To assist General Myatt, the 1st Division commander, Colonel Coop collected D-7 bulldozers from his squadrons and transferred them to the division. At Tanajib, General Brabham activated CSSD-133, commanded by Captain Eric R. Junger, to support MWSS-271 and MAG-16. On the 9th, elements of MWSS-174 from King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station joined MWSS-271 at Tanajib and set up a support area for AV-8 Harrier Jump Jets. Operating Harriers from Tanajib reduced the distance to the border and allowed the attack jets to rearm, refuel, and return quickly to the battle.405 At the Jubayl Naval Air Facility, the wing headquarters, MWSS-374, continued its support of operations there under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brian E. Dyck, who at the beginning of the month replaced Lieutenant Colonel Stephen G. Hornberger.406

I MEF Changes Its Plan

For the logisticians, the war didn’t begin on G-day-24 Feb—with the start of the ground assault; it really began about three weeks earlier, when General Boomer decided to breach the Iraqi defenses in two places with two Marine divisions, instead of a single breach with one division. —BGen Charles C. Krulak

The Decision

On 4 February, General Krulak visited MCSSD-26 near the border and decided to stop by the 2d Marine Division command post on his way back to
Kibrit. Krulak found General Keys, the division commander, in a meeting with General Boomer; Colonel Ronald G. Richard, the division operations officer; and Colonel Donnelly, the DSG-2 commander. Boomer greeted Krulak and immediately asked him his opinion about a proposal that General Keys had made to conduct a two-division breach of the Iraqi defenses as opposed to a single penetration. Krulak replied that he favored the recommendation for a number of tactical reasons and believed there was enough mine-clearing equipment to support the concept. On the map, General Boomer showed the DSC commander a spot west of Kuwait, located about 150 kilometers from Kibrit and asked him, "the $64,000 question—Can you support a two-division breach on the western flank of Kuwait?" While having some internal doubts, Krulak swallowed hard and answered the MEF commander, "I know I can't support that from Kibrit. I need to find another location for the combat service support area." Boomer replied that he was still undecided, but ordered the DSC commander to find a location and to prepare an estimate of supportability for Keys' plan.

Immediately upon his return to Kibrit, General Krulak gathered his key personnel and planned to find a new location to support a two-division attack. After briefing the group on the situation, Krulak ordered Colonel Gary S. McKissock, who was on loan to the DSC from II MEF where he served as the logistics officer, to scout an area called the gravel plains located 30 kilometers northwest of Qaraah. Krulak then directed Colonel Tace, his operations officer, to call Colonel Billy C. Steed, I MEF’s operations officer, to find out when General Boomer would make his decision. Steed replied that Boomer would decide at the next commanders' meeting scheduled in less than 36 hours for 0830, 6 February. Early the next morning, McKissock led a small party to the gravel plains where they surveyed three locations. At each site, members of the team, which consisted of the DSC staff and a few battalion commanders, spent 30 minutes assessing the suitability of each location from their functional perspective. After returning to Kibrit, the team briefed General Krulak on the strengths and weaknesses of each site. The DSC commander selected a location to the east of the gravel plains, designated it as Combat Service Support Area 2 (CSSA-2), and after holding a quick "contest" among his staff to determine a suitable name, called it Khanjar after the dagger worn by Saudi males.

Of the three sites scouted by Colonel McKissock, Khanjar was the closest to the border, out of Iraqi artillery range, well positioned to support units attacking east into Kuwait, and flat and spacious enough to stage the huge amount of supplies needed to sustain the assault. Unlike Kibrit, the new location could not easily be supported from nearby Mishab, which required that the amount of supplies stored at Khanjar be doubled to 15 days. To make the rapid relocation, General Krulak needed Saudi Motors and all of his own transportation to stock Khanjar and to suspend unit distribution to DSG-1 and -2. In the event Boomer decided upon a two-division attack, Krulak ordered the DSC's earth-moving equipment loaded on trucks for rapid displacement to Khanjar.

Early the next morning, General Krulak drove 80 kilometers from Kibrit to I MEF's forward headquarters at Ras Al Safaniyah on the Persian Gulf. The
BGen Krulak briefs the DSC staff and commanders on 7 February 1991 at Kibrit. In the next two weeks, the DSC would relocate to a point three times the distance from the Port of Mishab and move more than twice the amount of supplies stocked at Kibrit. The relocation permitted I MEF to launch its attack into Kuwait on a two-division front.

The commanders’ conference started on time and addressed many subjects, some of which skirted the issue of the two-division breach. General Boomer encouraged maximum participation at his meeting and many commanders spoke about their portion of the upcoming battle. After three hours of discussion and no decision, General Krulak was concerned that time was wasting and that he needed to get his trucks on the road. Lieutenant General Boomer stopped the conference at 1130 for lunch and Krulak requested a few moments with the commanding general. He then briefed General Boomer that his trucks were ready to move to Khanjar, advised him that “every second counted,” and asked the MEF commander whether a decision had been made. Boomer looked Krulak in the eye and said, “We will make a two-division breach of the Iraqi defenses....”

General Krulak’s aide, First Lieutenant Joseph W. Collins, Jr., called Colonel McKissock at Kibrit who started the DSC trucks moving towards Khanjar and began I MEF’s massive push to the west, less than 48 hours after General Krulak paid his courtesy call on General Keys.

**Khanjar**

At Khanjar, Lieutenant Colonel John’s 7th Engineer Support Battalion took the lead in planning construction and worked as a team with Lieutenant Colonel Skipper’s 8th Engineer Support Battalion. The two organizations raced to

---

*Gen Krulak commented that Gen Boomer’s decision was very brave, since it would move I MEF’s logistics another 100 kilometers in from the sea. Additionally, Gen Boomer made his decision to move to Khanjar over the objections of Col Raymond A. List, I MEF’s logistics officer. (Krulak comments)*
meet General Krulak's deadline of 20 February for establishing CSSA-2. While the two battalions swapped equipment as required, each worked on its own sets of projects which included building ammunition cells, berms, roads, working spaces, billeting areas, and setting up water and bulk fuel storage areas. Manning 12-hour shifts, the engineers operated the equipment 24 hours a day, except for that small amount requiring maintenance.* The Marines dug in a field hospital with 14 operating rooms and started a C-130 air strip, which became operational on the 10th. By the next week, the engineers had completed 24 miles of blastwall, 151 ammunition cells, 800 survivability positions, and huge water and fuel storage areas. The fuel farm dispensed fuel to ground vehicles and to MAG-26's new air facility at neighboring Lonesome Dove by pipeline.\textsuperscript{413} The ammunition storage area, called Forward Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) 5, covered 770 acres while the entire Khanjar complex extended over 11,280 acres.\textsuperscript{414**}

The Seabees of NMCB-40 arrived at Khanjar on the 10th to drill for water. Unfortunately, after working around the clock and after reaching a depth of 1,050 feet, they still had discovered no water.\textsuperscript{415} Four days after the Naval engineers started their drilling, Captain Peter M. Ramey, DSG-2's engineer detachment commander, noticed a metal pipe and a valve sticking out of the ground four kilometers northeast of Khanjar. When the Marines turned on the valve, water gushed out. General Krulak dubbed the discovery the "miracle well." The 8th Engineer Support Battalion sent a purification team which found that the water was of a terrible quality and dissolved the filters of their ROWPUs. Despite that problem, the engineers purified 100,000 gallons per day from the "miracle well," easing the burden for Marine motor transport units which had been hauling fresh water all the way from Mishab. By 19 February, the DSC had pooled a 796,000 gallon water reserve at Khanjar.\textsuperscript{416}

\textit{Lonesome Dove}

At the same time as the DSC deployed to its forward base at Khanjar, the 3d MAW also established its supporting Lonesome Dove helicopter facility. Since 8 February, MAG-26 had stopped its move to Mishab and began its relocation to the new base next to Khanjar.\textsuperscript{***} Colonel Coop, the MWSG commander, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Riznychok's MWSS-273 to deploy with the MAG. The MWSS immediately started shuttling engineer equipment from Mishab to Lonesome Dove on its three 870 trailers. To help with the relocation, Lieutenant

*After the battles of Khafji and OP-4, I MEF believed the Iraqis could not observe I MEF's movements and locations in Saudi Arabia. As a result, trucks drove along the Kibrit road using their headlights and engineer equipment operated at Khanjar with lights on. (Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96)

**In March 1997, Gen Krulak remarked that Khanjar was so big that even six years after the war, you can still see its imprint on satellite pictures. (Krulak comments)

***Lonesome Dove was the name most commonly associated with the MAG-26 base. It was also called Khanjar and the Gravel Plains. Likewise, CSSA-2 at Khanjar was sometimes, if rarely, referred to as Lonesome Dove.
The Marines named the new DSC support area “Khanjar,” meaning “dagger” in Arabic. The 7th and 8th Engineer Support Battalions built this huge support base, whose outlines still can be seen clearly in satellite photographs six years after the war.

Hankinson’s MWSG-37 provisional truck company began moving AM2 matting, reinforcing 50 5-ton trucks already leant to the wing by the 1st Marine Division for the task. Riznychok split his material handling equipment by assigning six forklifts to lay AM2 matting at the new location and kept the remainder of his equipment deployed between Mishab and Lonesome Dove. Having no trucks large enough to transport its giant rough-terrain container hauler (RTCH), MWSS-273 deployed to Lonesome Dove a 30-ton crane, which, while slow and somewhat inefficient, unloaded 140 ISO containers for MAG-26. Seabees from NMCB-24 joined MWSS-273’s engineers and laid 900,000 feet of AM2 matting to park helicopters and surrounded the air field with a four-kilometer berm. DSC engineers set up an assault amphibious fuel system and connected it to MWSS-273’s tactical fuel dispensing system. On the 19th, Colonel Coop sent MWSG-37’s nuclear, biological, and chemical team to MWSS-273 to establish a chemical casualty decontamination site. Three days later, with the help of commercial trucks, MAG-26 completed its move to Lonesome Dove.

The Seabees

To support the buildup and to conduct deception operations, Captain Johnson, the Seabee commander, sent additional elements of the 3d NCR to the border area. At Khanjar, NMCB-24, with the help of personnel from NMCB-5, erected I MEF’s command post and, with the DSC engineers, built two airstrips,
one of which measured 6,600-feet by 150-feet and was completed in 48 hours. After about 20 landings, the Seabees graded and rolled each runway to keep them operational. To the southeast at Qaraah, NMCB-5 constructed a 1,500-foot runway with AM2 matting for remotely piloted vehicles, and maintained the airstrip for C-130 Hercules operations. From Kibrit, NMCB-74 participated in I MEF’s deception effort. The Seabees built prefabricated tank turrets and artillery pieces from wood and moved them to an area along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The purpose of this operation, called Flail, was to trick the enemy into believing that I MEF’s attack would be at a different time and location than planned. The Iraqis rewarded the Seabees’ good work by shooting artillery and mortars at the decoys and maneuvering two brigades into the area.\textsuperscript{419}

The Buildup

The Marine motor transport units also had played an important role in the buildup of the new base areas. Since 9 February, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced with trucks and drivers from the 6th and 7th Motor Transport

\textit{Diagram of CSSA-2 at Al Khanjar.}

Diagram from DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91
A DSC crane unloads an LVS with tandem trailers. The 8th Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced with elements of the 6th and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, drove 1.2 million miles in 14 days to stock Khanjar.

Battalions, suspended unit distribution to the DSGs and began moving supplies and equipment to Khanjar. Working around the clock and driving nights with lights on, the battalion moved containers, engineer equipment, repair parts, MREs, and medical supplies. Also working around the clock were the DSC’s mechanics who kept 98 percent of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion’s trucks on the road. Lieutenant Colonel Woodson, the battalion commander, concentrated the unit’s efforts on emptying Kibrit and, after the 13th, redirected part of the battalion’s assets to relocating the MEF headquarters to Khanjar, moving ammunition from Mishab, and picking up supplies from as far south as Jubayl. During the 14-day push to stock CSSA-2, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion drove more than a million miles.

While the DSC focused on moving from Kibrit to Khanjar, General Brabham relied on the 6th Motor Transport Battalion to push the additional eight days of supplies to CSSA-2. Lieutenant Colonel Walters used his Reserve drivers, the remaining foreign operators, and about 100 volunteers to establish a circuit course between Jubayl and FASP-5 near Khanjar. Walters called the FASP-5-Jubayl loop the Baghdad Express. Brabham contributed his personal driver, who along with the other volunteers, received a four-hour training package prior to making runs. Walter’s plan called for establishing transfer points at Mishab and

*Six years after the war, Gen Krulak still stressed the accomplishments of the drivers from the 8th Motor Transport Battalion and their reinforcements from the 6th and 7th Motor Transport Battalions who drove the 1.2 million miles in 14 days. Additionally, he complimented the DSC’s maintenance Marines who kept 98 percent of the trucks operational during the push to Khanjar. (Krulak comments)
The “Baghdad Express” delivers a 40-foot container to the supply point at Khanjar. BGGen Brabham sent I MEF its supplies on an assortment of civilian vehicles driven by Marine Reservists and third world nationals.

Khanjar where full trailers were exchanged for empty ones. Because of the incompatibility between the myriad types of civilian trucks and trailers and because many trailers were welded to their cabs, Walters ordered that rigs remain together for the entire trip. The 6th Motor Transport Battalion deployed three teams of drivers to work the Jubayl to Mishab, the Mishab to Khanjar, and the Khanjar to FASP-5 loops. At each location, the driver dropped off a full truck, picked up an empty rig, and returned to his point of origin to complete the loop and to start another.423

Almost immediately after the inauguration of the Baghdad Express, it ran into trouble with more than half of its 600 trucks breaking down on the road. General Brabham first concentrated his efforts on trying to fix the vehicles and ordered GSG-1 to repair as many trucks as possible. Major Felix M. Bush, the 2d Maintenance Battalion executive officer, lacked the mechanics, tools, and test equipment to repair major problems, but focused the efforts on ensuring that the hodgepodge of civilian trucks ran safely. Bush set up an assembly line in a warehouse at Jubayl to check, repair, and replace tires, brakes, brake lines, fuel lines, horns, and lights. The maintenance battalion requested bulk orders of parts through the GSG-1 staff, who coordinated purchases from the Saudi economy.*

*In addition to maintaining equipment, Col Marlin D. Hilton’s 2d Maintenance Battalion conducted deception operations by intermittently moving and manning ORF tanks around the Port of Jubayl. On 16 February, a SCUD missile landed in the water 150 meters from Berth 6, which was packed with ammunition, and 300 meters from the USS Tarawa, which was carrying the 5th MEB. (Pankey comments; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 3; GSG-1 ComdC Feb 91, Sec. 3)
Farther north, GSG-2's maintenance detachment recovered and patched up some of the vehicles that broke down between Mishab and Kibrit, while the DSC's maintenance detachment recovered 283 vehicles between Kibrit and Khanjar. 

As the 2d Maintenance Battalion struggled to keep vehicles safely on the road, General Brabham threw more trucks at the problem. Brabham ordered his supply support officer, Major Philip N. Yff (pronounced eyeff), who spoke Arabic and knew the region's customs, to concentrate his efforts on obtaining more trucks from the Saudi economy. * This was not an easy task since competition was fierce among the Marine Corps, the U.S. Army, the British, and the Saudi military

*Maj Yff accompanied Gen Brabham to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. (Kelly comments)
The DSC engineers built 151 ammunition cells at Khanjar FASP-5. These cells held more than 40,000 tons of munitions, enough for 15 days of combat for the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions.

to obtain local transportation. Yff travelled throughout Saudi Arabia and the neighboring country of Qatar hunting for vehicles. Choking down large quantities of tea and coffee, both of which he disliked, and sitting patiently through long meetings with Arab vendors, Yff successfully bargained with local businessmen and procured 500 vehicles to support the buildup.425

At Mishab, GSG-2’s 7th Motor Transport Battalion pressed into service a rickety collection of contracted trucks to push water to Khanjar. Major Yff sent Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the battalion commander, 46 commercial tractors and 40-foot trailers fitted with sixcon water pods. Reserve Marines from the 4th Landing Support Battalion received only one hour of instruction at Jubayl prior to operating the 16-speed, split-shift manual transmissions of the water trucks. Almost immediately, broken-down water trucks littered the road as a result of burned-out clutches, bad road conditions, and the overall poor condition of the vehicles. To compensate, Major Yff scrapped the bottom of the barrel and sent 65 more commercial water trucks. Of the vehicles that limped into Mishab on bald tires and wheezing engines, only 40 percent were sanitary enough to transport potable water. Major Robert W. Ferguson, Jr., the 7th Motor Transport Battalion’s operations officer, was certain that the Saudis had robbed every junk yard in the Persian Gulf, and the battalion’s maintenance detachment succeeded in keeping only a discouraging number of the derelict fleet on the road with spare parts purchased from the local economy.426

To stock Khanjar with 15 days of fuel, GSG-2’s 7th Motor Transport Battalion put its 25 refueling vehicles, which were mostly M970 5,000-gallon
A C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft lands on the dirt strip at Khanjar. Both USMC and USAF aircraft flew cargo on average of 25 missions each day to Khanjar, Qaraah, and Kibrit.

refuellers, on the road. Lieutenant Colonel Smith, however, did not have enough trucks to haul the required amount of fuel. To help, I MEF acquired the services of 60 M967 5,000-gallon bulk hull refuellers from the U.S. Army, which were operated by the Army’s 10th Transportation Battalion, and the 475th Quartermasters Group (240th and 370th Quartermaster Battalions). The Army trucks moved fuel in large convoys that stretched over the horizon. The DSC’s bulk fuel Marines, knowing that they were in for a work surge when the Army rolled into Khanjar, called the convoys the “trucks from hell.” Between the Army and GSG-2, Khanjar’s stocks reached 4,800,000 gallons of fuel by 19 February.

General Brabham also pressed into service 3d MAW helicopters, Army coastal craft, and U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft to push supplies north. Working from the concept that every little bit helps, the 3d MAW flew an average of 25 missions a day moving cargo to Khanjar, Kibrit, and Qaraah. Responding to a request from I MEF’s Military Airlift Command’s liaison officer, the Air Force flew an average 50 C-130 sorties a day to I MEF’s expeditionary airfields at Mishab, Kibrit, Qaraah, and Khanjar. General Brabham obtained the use of logistics support vessels and landing craft from the U.S. Army which made the run from Jubayl to Mishab. At Mishab, GSG-2 unloaded two more ships during the month and sent the contents to Khanjar and Lonesome Dove. On the 17th, Colonel Hampton, the GSG-2 commander, ordered the 2d Landing Support Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel David B. Kirkwood, to redesignate as CSSD-82 and to operate Kibrit after the DSC moved to Khanjar. The same day, General Brabham transferred CSSD-133 at Tanajib to GSG-2.

The roads between Mishab and Khanjar at some points exceeded fourteen

*On one day during the buildup, the 240th Quartermaster Battalion hauled 495,000 gallons of fuel to Khanjar. (Skipper comments)
rutted lanes in width and required extensive maintenance. Captain Johnson, the Seabee commander, ordered NMCB-74 at Kibrit to maintain the 100 kilometers of road between Mishab and the intersection of the Qaraah road. NMCB-5 and elements of NMCB-40 at Qaraah were responsible for the road from Qaraah to the intersection of the Kibrit highway and from there west to the Khanjar road. Johnson gave NMCB-24 the responsibility for the last leg of the main supply route from Khanjar to the intersection with the Kibrit road. He pulled people and equipment from Bahrain and sent them north to augment the road maintenance effort.432

The 2d Marine Division and DSG-2 Move West

DSC’s move to Khanjar allowed the 2d Marine Division to plan a separate breach of the Iraqi defenses northwest of the 1st Marine Division. I MEF’s new scheme of maneuver shortened and modified the direction of the 2d Marine Division’s attack route without changing either division’s objectives. To execute the new plan, the 2d Marine Division would attack from positions between Khanjar and the border with the 6th Marines given the mission to lead the way into Kuwait through the Iraqi minefield, followed by the Tiger Brigade and 8th Marines.433 After crossing both obstacle belts, the Tiger Brigade would swing to the left of the 6th Marines and the 8th Marines would maneuver to the east. The 2d Tank Battalion would remain in reserve.

In preparation for its new mission, the 6th Marines had deployed, on 6 and 7 February, to a breach-training area located 30 kilometers west of Kibrit to practice piercing the Iraqi minefields. Colonel Livingston, the regimental commander, planned to cut six lanes through the two Iraqi obstacle belts with Task Force Breach A and Company C, 2d Combat Engineers.* On the 11th, the DSC sent Captain Brian J. Hearnsberger’s Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, to the 2d Marine Division to reinforce the 6th Marines breaching effort.434 Following the engineers, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines; the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines; and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, all mechanized, would cross the obstacle belts on two lanes each and establish a breachhead on the far side of the minefields. The 8th Tank Battalion; the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (motorized); the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, and MCSSD-26 would move behind the mechanized battalions. After the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, established firing positions on the far side of the minefields, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines would move through the breach and join the regiment.435

Since 8 February when it had arrived at the breach training area and established RRP Moats there, MCSSD-26 supported the 6th Marines, pulled supplies from Kibrit, expanded its medical capability, and rehearsed its role in the

*Company C, 2d CEB, was a remnant of Task Force Breach B which was formed to support the 8th Marines in January 1991. After 5 February, Task Force Breach B ceased to exist and Company C, reinforced with tanks and AAVs, was placed in direct support of the 1st Battalion 8th Marines. (2d CEB ComdC 16Jan-28Feb91, Sec II)
assault. The breach training area was laid out with six lanes on the same azimuth and scale that the 6th Marines would face in Kuwait.* For several days, the mobile, under Lieutenant Colonel Wittle, practiced and simulated different problems that could arise in the minefields, such as blocked lanes and radio jamming. Wittle would move MCSSD-26 in two serials as a component of the 6th Marines team, which reached a size of 7,800 Marines and sailors and 1,098 pieces of rolling stock.436 The large force drilled moving rapidly through the simulated obstacle belts to avoid bunching up and becoming lucrative artillery targets.437** After training during the day, each night MCSSD-26 distributed to the regiment an average 15,000 gallons of water, 36 pallets of MREs, and 16,000 gallons of fuel. Adding to the exhaustive schedule, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle sent convoys to Kibrit to pull supplies for the regiment. Also at RRP Moats, a 20-man collection and clearing team, led by Navy Lieutenant Kenneth P. Collington, joined the

---

*In accordance with doctrine, the engineers marked the lanes with trash cans painted red for lanes 1 and 2, blue for lanes 3 and 4, and green for lanes 5 and 6. (Skipper comments)

**During this period, Hearnberenger’s Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, worked closely with the 6th Marines to identify and practice command and control procedures similar to those used in an amphibious landing. (Skipper comments)
MCSSD, giving it the ability to stabilize, resuscitate, and evacuate casualties.438 The 6th Marines called the arrival of the collection and clearing team a "major milestone" and "the final facet of the regimental ground evacuation plan . . ."439

In the meantime, Colonel Schmidt had moved his 8th Marines into the 6th Marines' old defensive positions south of Al-Wafra, transferred the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, to the latter regiment, and added the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion and the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion to his operational control.* Moving in two echelons, MCSSD-28, under Lieutenant Colonel James W. Head, joined the 8th Marines and established a position 25 kilometers south of the border and 40 kilometers northwest of Kibrit. At this location, the mobile again pushed support to the regiment's battalions while Captain Drew B. Miller, the assistant operations officer, refined the mobile's extensive biological and chemical defensive capabilities and procedures.440 Five days after arriving, a fire broke out on 13 February, destroying a MCSSD-28 refueler during a resupply mission with Company F, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion. While northwest of Kibrit, MCSSD-28 added a collecting and clearing and graves registration team to its roster bringing the personnel strength of the mobile to 241.441

Until the 16th, DSG-2 remained at Hobo Alley where it prepared to move to the northwest in accordance with the DSC's deployment plan. A week earlier, after reviewing stockage levels and lift requirements, the DSC had suspended unit distribution to permit DSG-2 and its mobiles to relocate to the northwest using their own transportation. Upon completion of the relocation, the DSC would reinstate unit distribution and replenish DSG-2's stocks.442 Accordingly, DSG-2 remained south of the Kibrit road, topped off passing 2d Marine Division units who then drew their supplies from the DSC as they moved farther west.443** For example, MCSSD-26, which pulled supplies from Kibrit, supported the two artillery battalions in direct support of the 6th Marines.444 Additionally, the 502d Support Battalion, which supported the Tiger Brigade, pulled supplies from the Marines with 80 fuel and cargo trucks and some commercial water tankers that it had received from ArCent.445 To supply the Tigers with rocket pods for their Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), Captain Tobin, DSG-2's liaison officer to the 502d Support Battalion, coordinated delivery of 60 MLRS pods with the 8th Motor Transport Battalion.446**

Finally, on the 14th, MCSSD-26 led the way west for DSG-2 by establishing RRP Stewart, 20 kilometers northeast of Khanjar and 22 kilometers from

---

*The lack of trucks caused the 8th Marines to take four days to deploy its two remaining battalions to the Kuwaiti border. MCSSD-28 provided truck support to the regiment. (Head comments)

**The units that topped off at Hobo Alley drew down DSG-2's stock of supplies and reduced the burden of its pending move west. (Donnelly comments)

***Because of the size of the MLRS pods, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion dedicated 15 LVSs with tandem trailer to make two round trips from the FASP-4 at Kibrit to the Tigers' location. Col Woodson considered the large but light MLRS pods, which required one LVS bed to haul each pod, inefficient but necessary loads. (Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96)
the border. Two days later, the 6th Marines moved to its final assembly areas northeast of Khanjar and within 10 kilometers of the Kuwaiti border. Colonel Livingston deployed his assault battalions on a 20-kilometer north-south line which protected his reserve battalions, the artillery, Task Force Breach A, and MCSSD-26. The mobile was located 13 kilometers from the most distant element of the regiment. At that time, Colonel Donnelly moved DSG-2 to a position behind the 6th Marines, which was 15 kilometers northeast of Khanjar, 15 kilometers southwest of the border, and 7 kilometers from the 2d Marine Division Command Post. DSG-2’s new combat service support area became known as the Ponderosa. On 19 February, the 8th Marines moved to its final preattack positions, 10-15 kilometers southwest of the Kuwaiti border. Lieutenant Colonel Head moved MCSSD-28 to a new location to support the 8th Marines. The mobile was located 6 kilometers southwest of the regimental headquarters, 7 kilometers south of the Ponderosa, and 10 kilometers east of Khanjar.

*Pushing Forward to the Ground War: Final Plans, Preparations, Problems, and Positions*

At the end of those [last] two weeks we had 15 days of supply at Khanjar, three days with each of the direct support groups, and a day with each of the mobile combat service support detachments—in addition to whatever the divisions were carrying themselves.

The logistics “center of gravity” for I MEF’s imminent ground attack was Khanjar, which reached General Krulak’s stockage goal of 15 days supply on 20 February. From Khanjar, Krulak planned and then pushed supplies and capabilities as far forward as possible to give the divisions every advantage to defeat the enemy. To replenish each of the artillery regiments with the divisions, the DSC and DSG-1 planned to deliver ammunition for the preparatory fires and for the assault at the first obstacle belt. To sustain the attack, every firing battery in I MEF would advance into Kuwait accompanied by ammunition trucks from the DSC and both DSGs. After crossing the first obstacle belt, the DSGs would drop the ammunition between the belts to be used in the artillery bombardment on the second line of obstacles. The DSC’s trucks would move with the artillery to the far side of the second barrier line to support subsequent operations. When the DSC trucks returned, General Krulak planned a transfer point at Al Jaber Air Field, MEF Objective 1, to facilitate the capture of MEF Objectives 2 and 3.

*Col Donnelly commented that pilots named DSG-2’s combat service support area “the Ponderosa.” The Ponderosa was the ranch in the popular 1960s western television show “Bonanza.” According to Col Donnelly, “I was told that during air briefings, because the circular shape of DSG-2’s position resembled an enormous wagon wheel, the DSG-2 position became a recognized vector for pilots. Consequently, pilots began referring to the DSG-2 site as the Ponderosa.” (Donnelly comments)*
emergency situations, the DSC's landing support detachment pre-staged MREs, fuel, and 40 ammunition supply blocks for rapid helicopter resupply.454

Table: The artillery ammunition support plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Mode of Supply</th>
<th>Responsible for Delivery to 10th Marines</th>
<th>Responsible for Delivery to 11th Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory Fires/Assault on 1st Obstacle Belt</td>
<td>Pre-G-Day Lay-Down</td>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>DSC/DSG-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault on 2d Obstacle Belt</td>
<td>Mobile Load</td>
<td>DSG-2</td>
<td>DSG-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets Immediately Beyond the 2d Belt</td>
<td>Mobile Load</td>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>DSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent Targets</td>
<td>Mobile Load</td>
<td>10th Marines</td>
<td>11th Marines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the build up at Khanjar almost finished, the DSC turned to stocking CSSD-10 and DSG-2 with three days of water, MREs, fuel, lubricants, and two days of ammunition.455 From the 18th to the 23d, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion hauled to DSG-2's dumps at the Ponderosa more than 180,000 gallons of fuel, 60,000 gallons of water, 43 LVS beds of ammunition, 74 pallets of MREs, 75 pallets of general cargo, two LVS beds of medical supplies, and two 5-ton truckloads of blankets for enemy prisoners of war.456 At the same time, the transport battalion brought in over 216,000 gallons of fuel, 102 LVS beds of ammunition, 83 pallets of packaged oils and batteries, 78 pallets of medical supplies, and 5 pallets of repair parts to create the necessary supply stocks at CSSDs -10 and -13.457

General Krulak placed both of his engineer support battalions forward with the divisions for the attack. He ordered the 7th Engineer Support Battalion to help the 1st Marine Division while the 8th supported the 2d Division. After completing Khanjar, both engineer support battalions also assisted the two DSGs by building ammunition supply points and blast berms at their new positions. To support the initial attack and to later supply the MEF in Kuwait, Captain William Hatton's Company A, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, manned mostly by Reserves, completed a 35-kilometer, four-lane road, known as the Khanjar

*"Bed" was a measurement term commonly used to denote a trailer load of cargo. The use of LVSs to haul tandem trailers strengthened the use of the word “bed,” as opposed to “truck load,” since one prime mover or truck could haul two trailers or “beds.” (Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96)
Expressway, from Khanjar to the Saudi berm. The three-to-four-meter high berm ran parallel to the border on the Saudi side and served as a point of reference as well as an obstacle to be crossed.* On 21 February, the 7th Engineer Support Battalion began slicing through the Saudi berm and the next day, dug in the 11th Marines’ artillery while under fire.458 Also on the 21st, Captain Hearnsberger led his Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, which had been assigned to the 2d Marine Division since early February, to the Saudi berm in front of the Tiger Brigade. Hearnsberger’s engineers punched nine 50-meter-wide holes in the berm to confuse the enemy about the location of the 6th Marines attack.459**

**Direct Support Group 2**

On 21 February, Colonel Donnelly briefed DSG-2’s concept of support to General Keys, who approved the plan.*** The DSG planned to top off the 2d Marine Division with water and fuel prior to the assault, send artillery ammuni-

*The Saudi berm was “built by the Japanese for the Saudi government...it was made by bulldozing the desert sand into a continuous wall, attaining a height of three to four meters in places. It followed the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from between 1-5 kilometers on the Saudi side and was visible from 10 kilometers away. The berm provided excellent concealment to forces just behind it, and a good vantage point from which to observe Kuwait.” (2dMarDiv ComdC, 1Jan-13Apr91, Sec 2)

**To deceive the Iraqis on the location of the 2d Marine Division attack, engineers cut 18 holes through the berm between 20 and 22 February. Only the six slots in front of the 6th Marines were intended for use. (Cureton, With the 2dMarDiv, p. 38)

***DSG-2’s staff briefed the concept of operations to BGens Krulak and Russell H. Sutton, the Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Marine Division, on 23 February. (Donnelly comments)
Capt Adrian W. Burke and a small reconnaissance party look through high-powered binoculars at Iraqi-held Kuwait from the Saudi berm. Japanese engineers built the three-and four-meter-high berm just inside Saudi Arabia and parallel to the Kuwaiti border. The Marines used the berm for observation, concealment, and as a point of reference.

As did his fellow commanders in the 6th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Donnelly commented that “Casualties were to move to the rear by lifts of opportunity. This guidance came from both the DSC and the division’s assumptions. It seemed prudent to establish a medical collection point as close to the breach as possible . . . .” (Donnelly comments)

**Col Donnelly added that, “No resupply or forward movement from DSG-2 was envisioned for the first 18 hours.” (Donnelly comments)
Wittle used the last days before the attack to prepare his unit for war. MCSSD-26 loaded one day of ammunition; 25,000 gallons of fuel; 20,000 gallons of water, of which 6,000 was non-potable to be used for decontamination purposes; batteries; packaged oils and greases; medical supplies; and 16 pallets of MREs. M870 heavy equipment trailers pulled by LVSs carried the D-7 bulldozer and 10-ton Terex forklift, while smaller forklifts and the 7-1/2 ton crane followed behind the trucks under their own power. To recover vehicles and to medevac people, the mobile had an M936 wrecker, M88A1 tank retriever, assault amphibious vehicle retriever, an LVS 48/15 wrecker, and six HMMWV ambulances. MCSSD-26 also carried collection and clearing, helicopter support, maintenance contact, and the newly joined graves registration teams. The latter capability consisted of 12 personnel led by Sergeant John M. Kananowicz. Lieutenant Colonel Wittle divided MCSSD-26 into two serials consisting of 35 vehicles each, and placed Major Clarke, the executive officer, in charge of the second serial while he stayed with the first.

The 6th Marines, like all Marine Corps ground combat elements, carried a significant array of combat service support capabilities. Prior to the assault, MCSSD-26 pushed two-days' ammunition, water, fuel, and MREs to the battalions of the 6th Marines. Between the 16th and 23d of February, MCSSD-26 pushed 12,000 gallons of water, 44 pallets of MREs, and 12,000 gallons of fuel daily to the regiment.

MCSSD-26 had distributed these commodities to their companies or carried them in the battalion logistic trains. For example, the 1st Battalion, 6th
Marines (mechanized), after distributing general supplies and one-day ammunition supply to its companies, hauled two-days’ worth of MREs, 1,600 gallons of water, 16,232 gallons of fuel, and one-day’s ammunition in its 42-vehicle train. In addition to basic supplies, the battalion took with it a cache of repair parts and an aid station. The infantrymen converted two amphibious assault vehicles into ambulances to evacuate the wounded who would be carried to the ambulances on stretchers by the cooks. The cooks also served in decontamination teams and provided additional security. MCSSD-26 delivered supplies directly to the battalion logistic convoy which moved 500-1000 meters behind the unit’s command element.465

Located 18 kilometers southwest of the border, Lieutenant Colonel Head’s MCSSD-28 loaded trucks to support the 8th Marines who would follow the 6th Marines and the Tiger Brigade into Kuwait on the second day of the war. MCSSD-28 carried 40 pallets of MREs; 10,800 gallons of potable water; 6,000 gallons of non-potable water for decontamination; 19,500 gallons of fuel, packaged lubricants and oils; and one-day’s worth of ammunition. Like MCSSD-26, MCSSD-28 provided on-call helicopter support, collecting and clearing, maintenance, vehicle recovery, and graves registration support. Unlike MCSSD-26, MCSSD-28 did not have a TOW section for protection, but planned to travel with the regimental logistics train and to carry 100 infantrymen from the 8th Marines. This arrangement strengthened MCSSD-28’s defenses, which consisted of machine guns, Mk 19 grenade launchers, and AT-4 anti-tank systems. On the 23d, Lieutenant Colonel Head lined-up MCSSD-28 for the attack into Kuwait.466

Direct Support Group 1

After moving Task Force Taro to Qaraah on 16 February, General Myatt completed his plan of attack.467 Myatt ordered Task Force Ripper, responsible for the division’s main effort, to attack towards Al Jaber Air Base and Task Force Papa Bear to assault on Ripper’s right flank. The 4th Marines, now called Task Force Grizzly, and Task Force Taro were to infiltrate the first line of obstacles on the division’s flanks prior to G-day. The foot-mobile Grizzly and Taro would guard the 11th Marines as it moved into Kuwait to fire in support of the infantry while Grizzly and Taro protected Ripper and Papa Bear’s flanks. The change to Taro’s mission caused Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, to modify CSSD-13’s role from direct support of Taro to general helicopter-resupply support of the division. Powell ordered Captain Ritchie to focus on resupplying Taro, Grizzly, and Shepherd.

Not deterred by the additional burden of supplying two more task forces, Captain Ritchie found that CSSD-13’s experience with Taro prepared his command for its larger mission. The support packages, which CSSD-13 organized for Taro, were usable by Grizzly and Shepherd. CSSD-13 made a list of the resupply packages, assigned brevity codes, and circulated the list within the division and DSG-1. The use of brevity codes allowed units to call quickly for helicopter resupply and minimize radio traffic over the shaky communications system. For
example, if Task Force Grizzly wanted a day’s worth of ammunition for an
infantry company (Brevity Code - “Shark”) it would send the following brief mes-
sage—“CSSD-13, “Shark” at Grid 12345678.” To enhance communication,
Captain Ritchie sent liaison officers to establish radio contact with Task Forces
Grizzly, Taro, and Shepherd. He then analyzed the division’s scheme of maneu-
ver, while Captain Kenneth M. Brown, the CSSD’s operations officer, scheduled
daily resupply missions with the 3d MAW’s helicopter squadrons. Colonel Powell
assisted Captain Ritchie by sending all available landing support equipment to
CSSD-13. To back-up the CSSD in case of limited helicopter support, Colonel
Powell directed MCSSDs -11 and -17 to be prepared for on-order missions to sup-
port the infantry task forces.468

Besides the last-minute adjustment of missions, ammunition planning
remained a lingering problem within DSG-1. The large amount of artillery ammu-
nition required by the 11th Marines and the uncertainty surrounding the daily
allowances of non-artillery munitions were major concerns. Major Lucenta,
CSSD-10’s operations officer, calculated that it took 88 LVS-loads to haul one-
day’s worth of artillery ammunition for the regiment. This caused complications
since CSSD-10 had only 70 LVSSs and seven 5-ton trucks to move ammunition to
the 11th Marines, resupply MCSSDs -11 and -17, and to relocate itself. The CSSD
simply did not have enough vehicles to do the job easily.469 The second hurdle
involved ammunition allowances. Division units requested amounts of ammuni-
tion that exceeded those allowed by a 1985 Marine Corps order, which resulted in
the I MEF ammunition officer disapproving the requests.* Frustrated that a six-
year-old Marine Corps order was viewed as more accurate than their judgment,
the 1st Division logistic officers continued to resubmit their requests which were
duly disapproved. DSG-1’s load planners were caught between the division and
the MEF, since they had to draw and deliver the division’s ammunition, no mat-
ter what amount was approved. Finally, the MEF ammunition officer declared all
division calculations invalid and together with the division’s ammunition officer
computed a new set of allowances which went into effect on 16 February.
Unsatisfied, task force ammunition planners continued to submit requests for
additional allotments.470

The major burden of DSG-1’s pre-G-day preparations and its post-G-day
ability to support extended operations, fell on CSSD-10. To execute his mission,
Lieutenant Colonel Kelly planned to move CSSD-10 near the border to OP-4,
four days prior to the attack. From the new position, he would build up three-
days’ supplies, set up a collecting and clearing company to treat casualties result-
ning from the attack on the first obstacle belt, and establish a decontamination site.
From OP-4, the CSSD would send five ammunition trucks to each battery of the
11th Marines to support the division’s assault on the second belt. Lieutenant
Colonels Kelly and Leonard M. Supko, the 11th Marines’ logistics officer, spent
a good deal of time coordinating the artillery ammunition plan which would tie
up most of CSSD-10’s trucks for the first day of the war.

*Marine Corps Order 8010.1D, Class V (W) Supply Rates for Fleet Marine Force
Combat Operations.
In the field, MCSSD-11 Marines “lived like Grasshoppers.” in an environment providing nothing but sand and air to work with. Everything needed to fight and survive had to be carried by the forces deployed. This reality remained throughout the conflict.

To support subsequent operations, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly planned to move elements of CSSD-10 into Kuwait. Kelly organized a “medical mobile” consisting of six M997 HMMWV, two busses configured by GSG-1 as ambulances, a shock/trauma platoon, a chaplain, and a security element, to evacuate the high number of causalities expected to occur at the second obstacle belt. Ensign William C. Hancock, the executive officer of Collecting and Clearing Company A, led the medical mobile. Because most of its trucks were hauling artillery ammunition, CSSD-10 would not be able to resupply MCSSDs -11 and -17 until the second day of the war. After retrieving the ammunition trucks and resupplying the MCSSDs, Kelly intended to move north of the second obstacle belt. Expecting heavy casualties from the fight at the Al Jaber Air Base, CSSD-10 planned to set up a collecting and clearing company to treat the wounded.471 To sustain the final attack on Kuwait International Airport, Kelly aimed to move to a position 15 kilometers southwest of it. Even with the plan in place, Kelly spent 80 percent of his time wrestling with ammunition resupply and casualty evacuation matters.472

Colonel Powell, the DSG-1 commander, continued to meet and brief General Myatt and his staff to ensure that the division’s logistics priorities were met and that required trade-offs were understood and accepted. In consonance with Myatt’s priorities, Powell designated Task Force Ripper as DSG-1’s main focus for combat service support. The DSG commander used consumption data compiled during the previous months to convince General Myatt and his commanders to reduce the amount of fuel, water, and MREs carried by MCSSDs -11 and -17.* These cuts saved space on trucks which were used to transport more ammunition and to increase DSG-1’s ground medevac capabilities.473 For pur-

*MCSSD -11 and -17 dropped the amount of water carried per man per day to 1.5 gallons from 6 and decreased the number of MREs per man per day to one from three. DSG-1 used a planning factor of 60,000 gallons of fuel per day instead of the division’s estimate of 120,000.
poses of efficiency, CSSD-10 reduced from 35 LVS bed loads to 17 the amount of equipment deployed by a collecting and clearing company. To save space, DSG-1 dispensed with most of its unit equipment, and, according to Captain Jeffrey J. Morsch, DSG-1’s historian, “lived like grasshoppers out there in the sand.” Throughout the planning process, Colonel Powell continued to update and obtain General Myatt’s understanding and concurrence of his plans. On 20 February, during an extensive sand table exercise, Powell, together with the division’s other task force commanders, briefed his final plan of action to Myatt and his staff.

In addition to dealing with his customers, Colonel Powell spent a good portion of his time keeping General Krulak and the DSC staff informed of his intentions. Powell visited the DSC at Kibrit and at Khanjar about five times a week, attended meetings, and kept the DSC current on his plans, activities, and problems. General Krulak enhanced communication by his numerous visits to the DSG headquarters and to the CSSDs and MCSSDs. As early as 7 February, Colonel Powell and his commanders presented their general support plan to General Krulak and received his approval. Throughout the remainder of the month, Powell kept the commanding general aware of such items as the modification to CSSD-13’s mission. An unresolved chronic issue remained — the shortage of equipment, especially trucks, Position Locating and Reporting Systems (PLRS), Global Prepositioning Systems (GPS), night vision goggles, and anti-tank weapons. Powell pressed the issue with Krulak, who guaranteed that he would push additional equipment to DSG-1 after the DSC set up at Khanjar.

During the last days before the ground attack, General Krulak made good on his promise and forwarded equipment and supplies. DSC gave DSG-1 10 LVSs and trailers; 5 M970 5,000-gallon refuellers; 10 Mercedes Benz water tankers, which provided CSSD-10 the ability to carry 66,000 gallons of water at one time; and materials-handling equipment to quadruple CSSD-10’s capabilities. On the 22d, the DSC sent CSSD-10 boxes of new cargo straps and banding material. After six months in the desert, the cargo straps that came with the trailers were worn-out, causing as much as 50 percent of a load to bounce off the backs of trucks and trailers traversing rough desert roads. Just prior to the assault, General Krulak sent CSSD-10 PLRS, GPS, and night vision goggles.

Early on the 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly sent his security force and engineers one kilometer from the border to OP-4, near the site of Task Force Shepherd’s victory over the Iraqis in late January. Using 13 bulldozers, the engineers dug in positions and were joined over the next four days by the remainder of the CSSD and CSSD-13. CSSD-13 set up next to CSSD-10’s ammunition dump, where Captain Kava laid out, dug in, and bermed CSSD-13’s dumps and camps. Two companies from Task Force Grizzly screened OP-4 and Task Force Shepherd bolstered the defenses by collocating its logistics train and eight LAV-25s with CSSD-10. The CSSD’s security platoon, under Captain Dennis

*In addition to providing the DSGs’ equipment, the DSC’s supply detachment exchanged 439 items of working equipment for broken items with the owning units. (DSC ComdC 16Feb-12Mar91, Sec 2)
Muller, prepared to repulse any raid by Iraqi special operations forces and everyone was wary of the Iraqi artillery threat, which was demonstrated by a barrage fired at a Marine reconnaissance team, just 1,000 meters from the CSSD.

The 23d was a busy day for CSSD-10 as capabilities were fine-tuned and supplies were picked up, pushed, and pulled. The CSSD-10 truck detachment completed delivery of 1,700 rounds of artillery ammunition to the 11th Marines, then loaded 12,000 more rounds to move with the regiment into Kuwait.481 Throughout the day, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion supplied water, fuel, MREs, and ammunition to OP-4, while Kelly sent convoys to Khanjar to pull fuel and water, and to Kibrit for water. By the end of the day, CSSD-10 had 97,692 meals, 62,000 gallons of fuel, 24,800 gallons of water, and one-day's worth of ammunition on hand. CSSD-10's ammunition technicians organized munitions into task force packages for easy distribution to the mobiles and the military police completed final preparations at the enemy prisoner of war transfer point. Although not a combat service support function, CSSD-10 prepared a hasty wash-down site to decontaminate any units attacked by chemical weapons at the first obstacle belt.482 Major Lucenta distributed to the convoy commanders five night vision goggles, three Position Locating and Reporting Systems (PLRS), and one Global Prepositioning System (GPS), forwarded by General Krulak. One collecting and clearing company opened another operating room and the second company boxed its equipment in preparation for its move through the breaches in the minefields on the following day.483 At 2200, the medical mobile of HMMWV ambulances and busses departed OP-4 with Colonel Powell in the lead.484

On the 23d, as well, CSSD-13 laid out helicopter deliverable resupply
packages and scheduled helicopters. CSSD-13’s operations officer, Captain Brown, built 4,000-pound packages that could be lifted by a Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. To use the massive lift capability of the Sikorski CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter, Brown planned to sling more than one package under the giant chopper. Captain Ritchie, the CSSD commander, ordered that a block of MOPP equipment be ready to fly to any unit attacked by chemical weapons. Brown scheduled one resupply per day for each of the task forces, knowing that the foot-mobile units would take what they needed and leave what they could not carry. First Lieutenant Darryl L. Smith, the CSSD landing zone support officer, organized the landing zones by laying out resupply packages and netting loads just prior to a mission.

Two days before, MCSSD-17 had followed Task Force Ripper to its attack positions 15 kilometers southwest of the Kuwaiti border. Captain Winter, the mobile commander, still short of trucks and uncertain about the ammunition requirements for the task force, used the last few days to obtain more equipment and to try to improve his security. He informally tried and failed to obtain TOW missile vehicles and he formally requested and received approval for, but never obtained, four amphibious assault vehicles from the Prepositioned War Reserve. Winter wanted to use the amphibious assault vehicles as replacement items and to haul the infantry from Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, which he had agreed to transport. Instead, the CSSD commander used his trucks to transport the infantry whose presence enhanced security, but reduced his ability to haul supplies. Benefiting from the DSC’s pre-G-day equipment reinforcements, MCSSD-17 received one of the 5,000-gallon refuellers, which increased its fuel-hauling capacity to 23,500 gallons and a couple of LVSs which offset the loss of trucks that Winter gave the task force to carry line-charges for the breaching operation. In addition, MCSSD-17 received a crane which helped ease the loss of two, broken down, of its three RT 4000 forklifts.

On the 23d, while Task Force Ripper moved to the berm, MCSSD-17 picked up supplies at OP-4 and then delivered fuel, water, and ammunition to the task force battalion logistics trains. With the exception of the 3d Tank Battalion, Colonel Fulford, the task force commander, consolidated all the battalion logistics trains into a single task force convoy for movement through the obstacle belts. MCSSD-17 delivered 6,000 gallons of water, 4,500 gallons of fuel, and one-day’s worth of ammunition to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and similar amounts to Ripper’s other battalions. The task force carried two days of supply in most commodities, four days of MREs, a basic allowance, and a day’s allowance of ammunition. Late in the evening, Captain Winter sent trucks to OP-4 to pick up the additional amounts of ammunition that Ripper wanted and that I MEF had earlier disapproved. The delayed loading of the ammunition diverted MCSSD-17’s focus on supporting ground operations the following day.

The last day before the ground war started early for MCSSD-11. After adjusting loads and dealing with some maintenance problems, First Lieutenant Juan C. Osorno’s Bravo Train departed for CSSD-10 at 0400 to pick up ammunition for delivery to Task Force Papa Bear. Later in the morning, the Bravo Train
transferred 280,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 30 TOWs, 25 Dragons, 45 AT-4s, and 40 LAAWs to the task force, whose battalion logistic trains remained with their units. At 0800, the Alpha Train, commanded by First Lieutenant Delaney C. Williams, drove to CSSD-10 to pick up fuel, water, and MREs, then distributed the supplies to the task force. After completing the resupply missions, both trains returned to CSSD-10 to load a day's worth of supplies to carry into Kuwait. While MCSSD-11's convoys picked up supplies, Captain Burke, the mobile commander, and his key personnel went to meetings and discussed Papa Bear's final combat plan, ammunition resupply, prisoner of war handling, and casualty evacuation procedures. Late in the evening, Colonel Powell, leading the medical mobile and a communication retransmission team, joined MCSSD-11 which was ready to move into Kuwait. At midnight, Burke dispatched a section of trucks from the Alpha Train to CSSD-10 to pick-up Papa Bear's additional block of ammunition.490

Combat Service Support Detachment 91

I MEF's move to the west took away CSSD-91's advantage of being centrally located to both divisions. Despite the extension of the distance required to transport prisoners from the battle zone, CSSD-91 remained at Kibrit, continued to prepare for war, and received unexpected help from the U.S. Army. Because of Saudi desires to handle Iraqi prisoners, the U.S. Army found itself with a spare military police battalion from the Puerto Rican National Guard. ArCent sent the 350 soldiers of the 34th Military Police Battalion (-) to CSSD-91, where Lieutenant Colonel Sparrow assigned them to guard Iraqis.491 In addition, the Army drivers responsible for bussing prisoners to Army compounds, lived at CSSD-91. By the start of the ground war, the size of CSSD-91 reached 850 officers and enlisted men, of whom two thirds were soldiers. Also during the month, English-speaking Kuwaitis joined the CSSD which increased the number of translators to 25. Sparrow was glad to have the extra help, but took measures to ensure that vengeful Kuwaitis would not harm captured Iraqis. As the ground war drew nearer, small numbers of surrendering and captured Iraqis were smoothly processed through the camp and transported south. GSG-2 at Mishab sent the CSSD fuel and water and the 1st FSSG pushed forward rice, beans, and blankets to prepare for the huge influx of expected prisoners. Right before the start of the ground war, the 1st FSSG assigned CSSD-91 the additional mission of transporting captured Iraqis from the division holding areas in Kuwait to Kibrit. This new responsibility sent Lieutenant Colonel Sparrow unsuccessfully scrambling for trucks and drivers at the last minute.492

MWSG-37 and the Seabees Final Preparations

During the last week before the ground war, the 3d NCR completed projects, unit relocations, and developed plans to move into Kuwait behind the ground forces. When the DSC engineers moved to the berm, NMCB-24 picked up
the responsibility for maintaining the Al Khanjar Highway which connected CSSA-2 with the Saudi berm. After G-day, Captain Johnson planned to move his forward headquarters into Kuwait and collocate with the MEF headquarters at Al Jaber Air Base. NMCBs -5 and -24 would advance with him to Al Jaber, build the MEF headquarters and a Seabee Camp, repair runways and restore services at Al Jaber, Kuwait International Airport, and As Salem Air Base, which was located west of I MEF’s zone of action. NMCB-5 would work from Al Jaber and NMCB-24 would use Kuwait International airport as a base.493

The week prior to G-day, MWSG-37 completed its preparations to support the ground war. MWSS-374 modified the aviation ammunition supply point and refuelling capabilities at Jubayl Naval Air Facility which allowed 3d MAW’s F/A-18 jets to rearm and refuel 170 kilometers closer to Kuwait than Shaikh Isa. On the 20th, Colonel Coop sent MWSS-271 and -273 additional equipment, stripped from the southern MWSSs, and on the 23d, established two FARPs on the border to support helicopter operations. CSSD-10 assisted MWSS-271’s 28-Marine mobile FARP become operational next to CSSD-13.494* After the capture of MEF Objectives A and C, Colonel Coop planned to establish a FARP at Al Jaber Air Base to refuel both helicopter aircraft groups and to send MWSS-374 to Kuwait International Airport.495

**Conclusion**

*Above all else, the division must not unnecessarily lose momentum due to logistics. All of our actions must be driven by this requirement.*—

*Col Alexander W. Powell*

By day’s end on 23d February, the DSC had pushed its assets as far forward as possible to support the coming assault. Trucks from the 8th Motor Transport Battalion and DSG-1 and -2 were forward with the artillery regiments and all MCSSDs were staged with their regiments and task forces, ready to roll into Kuwait. Elements of DSC’s engineer battalions were on the point of the attack with the division engineers, prepared to breach the Iraqi defenses while the bulk of both engineer support battalions were ready to move into the breach. MWSG-37 pushed FARPs forward to refuel 3d MAW’s helicopters and the Seabees were staged to repair Kuwait’s airfields. At midnight on the 23d, I MEF was logistically ready to throw Iraq out of Kuwait.

---

*According to Col Kelly, the FARP arrived unexpectedly and “needed everything.” CSSD-10 brought them under its wing and provided them MREs and dug them in. (Kelly comments)*
The Ground War: 24-28 February 1991

**G-Day: 24 February 1991**

I MEF began the assault at 0400, aimed directly at its ultimate objective, al-Mal'a Pass (aka Al Jahra) and the roads leading from Kuwait City, 35 to 50 miles to the northeast. I MEF faced the strongest concentration of enemy defenses in theater.496

In the early hours of 24 February, I MEF’s assault forces crept towards the border under the cover of darkness and crossed into Kuwait to breach the double lines of Iraqi obstacles. In the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action, combat engineer teams, including Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, from the DSC, cleared the path for Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear, who were to launch the main attack, while Task Forces Taro and Grizzly protected the division flanks. MCSSDs -11 and -17 followed closely behind the two mechanized task forces, while the 11th Marines, with its fleet of DSC and CSSD-10 ammunition

DSC positions at the beginning of G-Day: 24 February 1991
trucks, fired artillery missions and moved forward into Kuwait. To the west, in the 2d Marine Division zone of action, Task Force Breach A, which included Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, from the DSC, advanced in front of the 6th Marines and MCSSD-26, while the 10th Marines fired artillery and drove forward with its fleet of ammunition trucks provided by the DSC and DSG-2. The ground war had begun and the DSC’s forces were far forward and intermingled with the assault elements.

The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action

Throughout the night, the 6th Marines topped off with water and fuel at DSG-2’s RRPs, and moved to penetrate the Iraqi obstacle belts in Kuwait.* At midnight, both serials from MCSSD-26 drove 15 kilometers east from RRP Stewart to tactical assembly areas seven kilometers from the Kuwaiti border. At 0420, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle, the MCSSD commander, leading Serial 1, linked up with Battery D, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, in front of the breach lane marked Blue 3. About the same time, Major Charles J. Clarke, the MCSSD executive officer, leading Serial 2, had joined Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, across from Blue 4. A little more than an hour later, engineer teams attached to each of the three assault battalions began cutting through the first obstacle belt. Captain Hearnsberger’s Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, drove its armored Ninja Bulldozers 16 kilometers from Saudi Arabia straight into the first minefield and, at 0600, began proofing, clearing, widening, and marking the breach lanes.** In order to keep the 6th Marines moving, Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Kur, a breach team leader in Company B’s first platoon, picked up mines with his bare hands and removed them from the lane.***

At 0500, both serials from MCSSD-26 started towards Kuwait, crossed the border at 0630, and entered the breach at 0715. Serial 1 shifted to Red 2, because Blue 3 was closed, while Serial 2 proceeded as planned through Blue 4. At 0905, both serials came under artillery fire which lasted until 0945. While passing over one of the high-pressure gas lines that zigzagged through the area, a CUCV pickup truck belonging to Serial 1 hung up on the pipeline. The LVS in front of the vehicle immediately tried to pull the CUCV across, but snapped its tow line in the effort. Then, a second LVS pushed the stranded vehicle forward,

---

*DSG-2’s RRPs were augmented by 5,000-gallon refuelers from the 8th Motor Transport Battalion. (Woodson intvw, 19Mar96)

**The Company B bulldozers moved “in-stride” directly into the paths blown by the 2d Marine Division’s line charges and plows and proofed, smoothed, and widened to 15 feet the 100-meter-long lane through the breach in two minutes. Company B used two armored Ninja Bulldozers with the wedge shaped blades fabricated by the Zahaid Caterpillar distributor of Jubayl and two straight-blade models to accomplish its mission. (Skipper comments)

***Usually, the bulldozer blades pushed the mines harmlessly to the side of the lanes where engineers destroyed them with TNT charges, after traffic cleared the lane. (Skipper comments)
A line of Iraqi mines in Kuwait greeted I MEF’s attacking elements. The Iraqis laid two series of minefields which elements of the 7th and 8th Engineer Battalions helped to breach.

but bent the hydrogen-sulfide pipeline without freeing the CUCV. Not wanting to rupture the pipeline and cause an explosion, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle halted the operation and ordered an M936 wrecker to lift the CUCV off the obstruction. After freeing the pickup truck, the mobile’s M88A1 tank retriever used its bulldozer blade to push sand over the pipe, which allowed the serial and subsequent traffic to pass. The entire vehicle recovery and route repair operation took 12 minutes.499

After emerging from the minefield at 1140, Serial 1 headed for a preplanned position, but stopped after one kilometer because of a tank battle to its front and right flank.* While halted, Serial 1’s Marines exchanged fire with the enemy and captured 27 prisoners to include the commanding general of the 14th Infantry Division (Commando). MCSSD-26 seized three dozen weapons, a cache of ammunition, maps, overlays, and the division’s communications center including the enemy’s call signs and frequencies.** After Serial 2 arrived, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle established RRP Fournier, named after Captain David E. Fournier, MCSSD’s tactical coordination officer. Wittle ordered his troops to dig in using the Iraqi trenches they had just cleared and begin resupplying individual vehicles and units passing through the area. MCSSD-26 stayed at RPP Fournier until the next morning, ducking incoming Iraqi artillery fire, dispensing water, fuel, and MREs, and treating the injuries of six Marines and four Iraqi wounded.500

After the 6th Marines moved into Kuwait, the 2d Tank Battalion, the

*LtCol Wittle monitored the regimental radio nets and was fully aware of the tactical situation facing the 6th Marines.

**MCSSD-26 captured a ZPU-1 antiaircraft gun which was returned to the United States and is displayed outside of the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the Pentagon. (Warker comments)
division’s reserve, topped off at DSG-2’s RPPs and moved into the first minefield. Following closely behind the tanks, Lieutenant Colmenares, commander of DSG-2’s collecting and clearing station, and his security officer led 15 military policemen and some communicators to a point in front of the entrance to Red 1. At this location, Iraqi soldiers opened fire on the group which returned suppressing fires, captured 45 Iraqis, and then established radio contact with the Ponderosa and a medical treatment area. Meanwhile, the command elements of the 2d Marine Division and the 10th Marines, refreshed at DSG-2’s RPPs, advanced into the breach, and were followed into Kuwait by the Tiger Brigade. While the scheduled waves of the division advanced through the obstacle belts, Lieutenant Colonel Hering, commanding officer of DSG-2’s northern transfer point, waited all day and night with his convoy, seven kilometers west of the Kuwait border. Back at the Ponderosa, Major Sass, DSG-2’s operations officer, obtained two 5-ton trucks from the DSC which evacuated the prisoners captured by Colmenares.

At 0900, Lieutenant Colonel Head relocated his MCSSD-28 eight kilometers northeast of his assembly area, joined the 8th Marines combat train, and waited to move to the breach assembly area. While at the new location, the mobile loaded 100 Marines belonging to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines. In addition to using MCSSD-28, Colonel Schmidt, the 8th Marines commander, hauled infantry on the trucks of the regimental logistics train, but still had to leave 50 Marines in the assembly area when the lead battalions advanced at 1530. Two hours later, MCSSD-28 departed with the regimental logistics train for a 17-kilometer road march to Assembly Area Blue B. After arriving at 2200, MCSSD-28 tried to repair a CUCV pickup truck for the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines; ordered AAV parts from DSG-2 for the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; and waited until morning to move into Kuwait. On the 24th, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper moved his jump command post and Companies A and C, 8th Engineer Support Battalion to the Saudi Berm between Blue Lanes 3 and 4. Skipper ordered Company C to punch a 50-meter

A TOW-mounting HMMWV leads MCSSD-26 through an Iraqi minefield. The low thin cloud that parallels the horizon is the smoke from an exploding line charge used to clear a path through the mines.
hole in the berm and Company A to extend the Khanjar Expressway through the new opening into Kuwait. While the two letter companies completed their tasks, the engineer battalion commander listened to the intelligence and operation nets, used his map and PLRS, pieced together an accurate picture of the tactical situation in Kuwait, and waited impatiently to move to Al Jaber Air Base and establish the DSC’s transfer point.508

Table: DSC commands and commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command/Unit</th>
<th>DSG-1</th>
<th>Command/Unit</th>
<th>DSG-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DSG-1</td>
<td>Col Alexander W. Powell</td>
<td>DSG-2</td>
<td>Col Thomas P. Donnelly, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Element</td>
<td>LtCol Leon S. Luszczynski</td>
<td>MCSSD-26</td>
<td>LtCol David L. Wittle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-10</td>
<td>LtCol Richard L. Kelly</td>
<td>MCSSD-28</td>
<td>LtCol James W. Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-11</td>
<td>Capt Adrian W. Burke</td>
<td>Northern Transfer Point</td>
<td>LtCol John C. Hering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-13</td>
<td>Capt William H. Ritchie, III</td>
<td>RPPs</td>
<td>Capt Carl D. Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD-17</td>
<td>Capt Edward J. Winter</td>
<td>Medical Mobile Retrans Team</td>
<td>1stLt Antonio Colmenares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Mobile Retrans Team</td>
<td>Ensign William C. Hancock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt Jeffery J. Morsch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action

At midnight, Task Force Ripper pushed in a wedge formation into Kuwait, overcame light resistance, and easily breached the first obstacle belt by mid-morning. Delayed by the requirement to pull Ripper's additional ammunition from OP-4, MCSSD-17 departed Saudi Arabia behind schedule at 0615, but rapidly passed through the first obstacle belt abreast of the artillery and ahead of Ripper's logistics trains. While in the breach, the mobile ducked sporadic Iraqi artillery fire directed at Task Force Papa Bear which could be seen conducting breach operations to the east of Ripper. At 1000, MCSSD-17 caught up with Ripper's command element and dropped off the Reserve infantrymen who established a prisoner of war camp between the obstacle belts. At 1125, Task Force Ripper penetrated the second minefield against light resistance and was greeted on the far side by a deluge of surrendering Iraqis. After passing through the second defense line at 1400, MCSSD-17 advanced to a position seven kilometers west of the breach and set up to support the attack on the Al Jaber Air Base. Captain Winter, the mobile commander, chose this position on the western edge of Ripper's zone of action to avoid the danger of ambush from the burning Burqan oil fields to the east. On arrival, Winter's first sergeant led a team that cleared nearby Iraqi positions and captured 35 prisoners of war, a large cache of weapons, and an Iraqi communications plan, which the Marines forwarded to CSSD-10.

Less than three hours after Task Force Ripper departed for the first obstacle belt, Captain Burke ordered his MCSSD-11 to "move out" in two columns "echeloned right," "guns right," and "scouts right." In trace of MCSSD-11, Colonel Powell led CSSD-10's medical mobile and a communications retrans-

MCSSD-11 traverses the breach. The smoke in the distance is from the burning oil wells that barely can be seen as small points of light on the horizon.

Photo courtesy of Maj Adrian W. Burke
mission team. Almost immediately after starting, darkness forced the mobile commander to reform MCSSD-11 into a single and more controllable formation. After moving nine kilometers, the column stopped at 0520 to await its turn to move through the Saudi Berm. At 0800, MCSSD-11 fell in behind the 1st Tank Battalion’s logistics train, crossed the berm, and reached Kuwait at 0936. At the border, Captain Burke left the convoy with two trucks carrying 800 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and looked for Task Force Papa Bear’s logistics operations center. Before departing, he directed MCSSD-11 to move to a location 10 kilometers northeast of the border and wait for his orders. After driving 10 kilometers, Burke found the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines’ field trains and transferred the mortar ammunition. He then drove northeast another five kilometers where he found Major Gary M. Reinhold, Papa Bear’s logistics officer, controlling movement through the first obstacle belt. Told to move through the breach, Burke called forward the mobile, which had been rejoined by the Alpha Train’s ammunition trucks with Papa Bear’s additional ammunition.

Just forward of MCSSD-11’s position, Captain Philip L. Salinas, commanding officer of Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, directed the breaching, proofing, and marking of lanes in the first obstacle belt. Salinas and his engineer company were part of the Engineer Detachment, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, assigned to Task Force Papa Bear. Major Joseph I. Musca commanded the detachment and placed Salinas in command of the Support Breach Team (SBT), which consisted of his company, and elements from the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion and the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion. Half of the SBT rode in amphibious assault vehicles while the other half travelled in trucks. After the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and Company A, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, penetrated the first obstacle belt in two places, the SBT breached and proofed two additional lanes and marked all thoroughfares with colored tape and chemical lights. At 1330, Salinas led the SBT to Papa Bear’s field trains south of the second obstacle belt where it constructed a berm around the regimental aid station, and remained there until the next day.512 Behind the SBT, the 7th Engineer Support Battalion moved into the first obstacle belt and improved and widened breach lanes throughout the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action.513

While Captain Salinas’ engineers marked the lanes, Captain Burke’s MCSSD-11 crossed the first obstacle belt on lane 1, ahead of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Stopping on the north side of the Iraqi minefield to wait for Papa Bears’s logistics’ operations center, MCSSD-11 set up a hasty defense and internally redistributed the ammunition brought forward by the Alpha Train for delivery to the Task Force. After waiting three hours and twice going to MOPP-4 due to erroneous reports of chemical attacks, the mobile fell in behind Ripper’s logistics operation center and moved within 6,500 meters of the second obstacle belt. Still behind MCSSD-11, Colonel Powell ordered Captain Jeffrey J. Morsch, DSG-1’s operations officer, to set up the retransmission site and establish communications between the northern and southern CSSDs. Powell, having one of the few Position Locating and Reporting System (PLRS) sets in the DSG, left Morsch
in charge and led an ambulance to MCSSD-17's location to medevac two wounded Marines from Task Force Grizzly.514*

Fifteen kilometers northwest of MCSSD-11, Captain Winter deployed MCSSD-17 in the inverted triangle formation with his two mini-mobiles oriented north towards the enemy and the command element located to the south. Winter quickly ordered the D-7 bulldozer to scoop out a prisoner-of-war compound in the middle of the position and manned it with the only three Marines he had available. Iraqi soldiers drifting into the area throughout the remainder of the day and night were met by the Marines, disarmed, and guided to the prisoner of war compound.** While MCSSD-17 wrestled with the Iraqi prisoners, Task Force Ripper isolated Al Jaber Air Base and waited for Task Force Grizzly to attack the objective. During the remainder of the day, MCSSD-17 pushed 10,000 gallons of water and 10,300 gallons of fuel to Task Force Ripper; the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; and the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, which supported Task Force Grizzly.515*** In the late afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, CSSD-10’s commanding officer, arrived at MCSSD-17 and decided to establish a combat service support area at the same location. Kelly contacted Major Howard E. Rice, Jr., CSSD-10’s executive officer, and told him to prepare elements of the CSSD to move into Kuwait on the 25th.516 Following Kelly’s visit, Colonel Powell arrived at MCSSD-17 with DSG-1’s ambulances and dispatched two wounded Marines and four injured Iraqis to OP-4. Powell then remained overnight with the mobile.517

After setting up in the triangle defensive formation south of the second obstacle belt, Captain Burke’s MCSSD-11 dispensed combat service support over the entire breadth of the division’s zone of operation. Responding to a request from DSG-1 to supply Task Force Grizzly, which was on the other side of the division’s area of operations, Burke ordered 1st Lieutenant Delaney C. Williams, commander of the Alpha Train, to supply first Papa Bear’s logistics operations center and then resupply Grizzly. Missing the operations center in the fog, the Alpha Train continued west, crossed two regimental boundaries, and was sporadically and ineffectively shot at by the Iraqis. Williams supplied Grizzly with 3,200 gallons of fuel and 2 pallets of MREs. While the Alpha Train traversed the division’s zone, Burke sent the Bravo Train, led by First Lieutenant Juan C. Osorno, to distribute 2,700 gallons of fuel and 1,600 gallons of water to the combat engineers and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.518

*PLRS was an automated navigation aid which operated with Marine Corps radios. A master station using the UHF frequency band, coordinated all signals in a particular area. Besides giving positioning information, PLRS was used as an alternate means of communications.

**According to Capt Winter, “Iraqis drifted out of the fog into MCSSD-17’s position throughout the night. Fire discipline was a concern for the Marines on the perimeter who wanted to protect the mobile from the hostiles without shooting the friendlies.” (Winter comments)

***MCSSD-17’s aggressive support to Task Force Ripper was not always appreciated. 1stLt Edwin E. Middlebrook moved a refueler into one of the jump-off positions for the attack on Al Jaber Air Base, where he was told to leave because of the explosiveness of the fuel. (Winter comments)
Back in Saudi Arabia at OP-4, the 24th was a day of anticipation, preparation, and processing of prisoners of war. Waiting for its trucks to return from the 11th Marines, CSSD-10 loaded its few available vehicles to resupply MCSSDs -11 and -17 the following day. Each resupply convoy would carry 20,000 gallons of fuel, 5,400 gallons of water, ammunition, and one-day’s supply of MREs. After receiving Lieutenant Colonel Kelly’s order to move forward, Major Rice began organizing a detachment to send to MCSSD-17’s location. During the day, Company B, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines dropped off 111 enemy prisoners of war taken during Task Force Grizzly’s infiltration of the first obstacle belt. CSSD-10’s military police detachment processed and transferred these prisoners and 12 others to the DSC holding pen at Khanjar.

During the morning, Captain Ritchie’s CSSD-13 successfully helilifted resupply packages to Task Forces Taro, Grizzly, and Shepherd and enjoyed some good fortune. At OP-4, MWSS-271’s mobile FARP, which set up next to CSSD-13 to support MAG-16, gave Ritchie close access to helicopter operations. Another piece of luck was that CSSD-13 had good communications with the division and could both monitor the tactical situation and talk to the supported units. The CSSD commander attributed this success to the leadership and technical ability of Corporal Andrew S. Jericho, a wireman who tapped into the division’s radio nets.* At noon, Task Force Taro requested an emergency resupply of water. By 1500, CSSD-13 successfully helilifted two pallets of bottled water to Taro on the division’s eastern flank. At the end of the day, Ritchie reviewed the day’s resupply operations and tactical situation, while his operations officer, Captain Brown, scheduled the next day’s resupply missions with the 3d MAW.

\[G+1: 25 February 1991\]

On G+1, I MEF advanced against the fiercest resistance it encountered during the ground offensive.

On 25 February, the 1st Marine Division prepared to seize Al Jaber Air Base and then deploy north towards Kuwait International Airport. To support the division’s extended operations, CSSD-10 planned to move to MCSSD-17’s position near Al Jaber. To the northwest, the 2d Marine Division aimed at bringing the 8th Marines through the obstacle belts and then attacking north towards Al Jahra with all three maneuver units. In support, DSG-2 intended to establish a transfer point to distribute supplies to both mobiles and to provide a maintenance capability near MCSSD-26’s position. On the front lines in Kuwait, the mobile CSSDs prepared for the second day of combat.

The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action

During the morning, MCSSD-26 resupplied the 6th Marines and replen-

*In addition to supporting CSSD-13, Cpl Jericho and his 11 communicators relayed messages for both divisions and the DSGs. (Ritchie comments)
At the far left of this picture is Cpl Andrew S. Jericho of the CSSD-13 Communication Section, who used creativity and persistence to maintain communications during the advance. Capt William Ritchie III, the commander of CSSD-13, is at the far right.

The CSSD delivered its own stock of supplies. The mobile delivered 11,000 gallons of water, 4 pallets of MREs, TOW missiles, 40mm grenades, .50-caliber ammunition, and its remaining 16,500 gallons of fuel. Every unit received fuel, but not as much as it wanted. Accordingly, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle requested resupply of water, fuel, and ammunition from DSG-2. At 0900, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters, which mistook MCSSD-26 for the Tiger Brigade, dropped water, fuel, and MREs. Two hours later, Lieutenant Colonel Hering, DSG-2’s executive officer, arrived with his convoy at RRP Fournier, established the northern transfer point, and gave all his water and fuel to MCSSD-26. Later, helicopters carrying 60 TOW missiles, 3,000 rounds of .50-caliber machine gun ammunition, and about 1,000 rounds of 40mm ammunition arrived from Khanjar. Wittle rapidly distributed the munitions to the 6th Marines.

After the morning’s resupply operations, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle moved MCSSD-26 north to Phase Line Red in preparation for the 6th Marines’ assault to Phase Line Horse. Wittle planned to move Serial 1 north of the

*Phase lines are used to control the movement of units on a battlefield. The 2d Marine Division designated numerous phase lines, including Phase Lines Red and Horse, for common reference.
Abdullea Road and then bring forward the second serial. Wittle left First Lieutenant Walter T. Anderson and his landing support detachment with Serial 2 to receive supplies by helicopter. At 1430, with the enemy still in the area, Serial 1 slowly moved north, hampered by poor visibility from the overcast sky and the burning oil fires. Because of the loss of PLRS and GPS navigational data in the division’s zone of action, Wittle reverted to map and compass, skills learned years before at The Basic School, to guide his convoy to a position 500 meters north of the East-West Abdullea road where they stopped for the night. The visibility was so bad that the Marines walking in front of the convoy periodically stopped and scraped a swath of sand away from the ground until they found the asphalt of the road. Concerned that Serial 2 might get lost in the dark, Wittle ordered Major Clarke to remain at Phase Line Red until the next morning.

Back in Saudi Arabia, MCSSD-28 started the morning by sending a request to DSG-2 for two AAVs from the prepositioned war reserve and then advanced with the 8th Marines logistics train northeast into Kuwait. The mobile and the logistics train moved together in a giant convoy behind the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. When the line of trucks approached the entrance to Blue 4 at 0730, it was stopped by the military police who considered turning the convoy around in favor of approaching combat units, but then allowed the convoy to proceed after gaining an appreciation for its huge size and importance. After exiting the first belt of mines at 0900, Lieutenant Colonel Head, the mobile commander, established a refuelling site for Company C, 4th Tank Battalion, which was rushing forward to join 8th Marines as the regimental reserve. Ordered to relocate without refuelling the tanks, MCSSD-28 packed its equipment and drove 28 kilometers to establish a hasty combat service support area on the far side of the second minefield.

After crossing both obstacle belts and reaching Phase Line Red, the 8th Marines attacked north on the right flank of the 6th Marines to Phase Line Horse. MCSSD-28 remained in position north of the second belt of mines, resupplied the 8th Marines, and awaited replenishment from DSG-2. The first customer served by MCSSD-28 was Company C, 4th Tank Battalion, whose tanks finally emerged from Blue 4 enroute to the line of departure. At 1100, MCSSD-28 sent 15 TOW missiles to the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, which had returned to the 8th Marines operational control after breaching the minefields with the 6th Marines. Two hours later, MCSSD-28 called DSG-2 for an emergency resupply of TOW missiles and tank rounds and prepared a landing zone to receive the munitions. After waiting two hours while Iraqi artillery exploded within 200 meters of the mobile’s command post, resupply helicopters arrived, unloaded unrequested water and unneeded line charges, but no ammunition. At 1600, MCSSD-28 sent refuelers to the logistics trains of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

---

*On the 25th, MCSSD-26’s Red Patch Marines recovered supplies from 13 helicopter support missions. (MCSSD-26 Sitrep 24Feb-1Mar91)

**The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, provides newly commissioned Marine second lieutenants their first schooling as officers in the fundamental tactical skills of their profession.
and the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, while the regimental logistics train transferred wounded Iraqis to the mobile in preparation for the attack.* Lieutenant Colonel Head sent trucks carrying most of his remaining supplies of fuel, water, and ammunition with the logistics train and remained behind to retrieve refuelers, await resupply from DSG-2, and to medevac the wounded Iraqis.

Earlier that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Hering had established DSG-2’s northern transfer point at RRP Fournier and was surprised by MCSSD-26’s need of supplies so soon. After resupplying the mobile, the northern transfer point needed to replenish its stocks of water and fuel, but did not have communication with DSG-2 at the Ponderosa, which was 45 kilometers away and out of range of the VHF radios. Earlier in the day, Colonel Donnelly had ordered Lieutenant Colmenares to move the collecting and clearing and radio relay stations to the northern transfer point which broke the communications link with the rear. After Colmenares moved, Hering was unable to call for replenishment, pass emergency requests for ammunition received from both mobiles, and forward a request from MCSSD-28 to medevac Iraqi wounded. At Khanjar, the DSC heard the requests from the mobiles for resupply. Making separate trips to the Ponderosa, Colonel Woodhead, the DSC’s chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel O’Donovan, the DSC’s assistant operations officer, carried the mobiles requests to DSG-2, ordered that bulk fuel and water trucks be reconfigured, and sent into Kuwait.** Receiving no resupply on the 25th, Hering spent the afternoon watching helicopters deliver ammunition from the DSC and medevacing wounded while regretting that he had brought forward such a large maintenance detachment and had not used the trucks to carry water, fuel, and tank-killing ammunition.529

At 1900, Lieutenant Colonel Head began to prepare MCSSD-28 to follow the 8th Marines and again requested replenishment from DSG-2. The Iraqis underscored the need to move by shooting artillery into the area and damaging one of the mobile’s LVSs. The bad visibility from the oil fires and weather, the coming of night, the loss of GPS and PLRS navigation data, and the need to reload ammunition staged on the ground, nevertheless, delayed the displacement. Head maintained communications with the regimental logistics train and the northern transfer point, but not with the Ponderosa. At 2000, MCSSD-28 again requested replenishment from the transfer point which was located five kilometers northwest of MCSSD-28. Hering informed Head that he could neither push supplies to the mobile nor pass his request to DSG-2 since he did not have communications with the rear. At 2200, Lieutenant Colonel Head lined up his nearly empty mobile and waited all night for the 8th Marines to order him forward.530

Lieutenant Colonel Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer

---

*On the 25th, the Marines from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, were replaced with Marines from the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, keeping the number of infantry Marines carried by MCSSD-28 during the ground war at 100.

**There is no record of these trucks reaching either the mobiles or the transfer point on the 25th. Six years after the fact, LtCol Matter, DSG-2's motor transport officer, remembered the "hot tasker" from Col Woodhead and reacting to the mission, but could not sort out the specifics from other events. (LtCol Carl D. Matter E-Mail, 7Apr97)
Support Battalion, started the 25th still waiting impatiently at the Saudi berm for permission to push his battalion into Kuwait. He finally ordered Captain Hull’s Company C to the first obstacle belt; Captain Hearnberger’s Company B, which had returned to his control, to the second belt; and Captain Hatton’s Company A to extend the Khanjar Expressway to the first minefield. Skipper focused the battalion’s efforts on improving all breach lanes through both obstacle belts. The Ninja Bulldozers pushed sand and mines to the side of the road and engineers removed visible explosives, checked the lanes with metal detectors, and marked the routes. The Ninja Bulldozers performed flawlessly even when they hit mines. The explosions from the antitank mines only dented bulldozer blades while the blasts from all but one antitank mine just peeled back portions of the blade an inch or two. One antitank mine damaged the tread of a Ninja Bulldozer which was evacuated to Khanjar, fixed, and returned to action the next day. On the other hand, a mine destroyed a British flail bulldozer used by the engineers, and blocked a breach lane for a day. Fortunately, exploding mines caused no serious injuries to the Marines, however, a blast from one knocked Company B’s indomitable Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Kur off the bulldozer he was riding. Kur picked himself off the ground, checked the condition of the driver, and continued to clear mines. For the remainder of the day, the battalion graded the breaches, replaced broken engineer stakes, and recovered vehicles either damaged during the assault or by straying outside the marked lanes.

* The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action

The 25th started early for Captain Winter’s MCSSD-17 Marines and for DSG-1. After resupplying Ripper on the 24th, the mobile was low on fuel and

---

*Col Skipper commented that, "A great sight I will always treasure occurred at approximately 0900, as my vehicle approached the first minefield belt. We passed a military police check point which displayed a hastily scrawled sign that said ‘Semper Fi.’ One of the military policeman held up a Playboy magazine foldout. His smile, the sign, and the foldout told me that ‘the Marines had landed, and the situation was well in hand.’” (Skipper comments)

**LtCol Skipper and LtCol John D. Winchester, the commanding officer of the 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, planned the return of Company B to the control of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion “with a handshake.” Skipper and Winchester had known each other since their college days at the Citadel. (Skipper comments)

***The 8th Engineer Support Battalion Ninja Bulldozers hit nine anti-personnel mines and five anti-tank mines during breach clearing operations. (Skipper comments)

****Col Skipper acknowledged the bravery of the Ninja Bulldozer drivers by saying, “They were driving an experimental item, that was not combat tested. It had gone from a concept to fielding in 60 days. Their courage was inspiring.” (Skipper comments)

*****For his acts of gallantry on the 24th and 25th, SSgt Kur was presented the Silver Star Medal.

*******By the end of G+2, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion cleared 50 kilometers of road behind the 2d Marine Division. (DSC, ComdC 16Feb-13Mar91, Sec 3.)
water and needed to replenish its stocks. At 0100, Winter, knowing that Ripper was going to continue the attack at daylight and that CSSD-10 could not resupply until later in the day, sent his executive officer, First Lieutenant Shawn B. Gormish, with empty bulk-liquid trucks to OP-4 to pick-up supplies. A couple of hours later, Colonel Powell departed the area en route to Khanjar to touch base with General Krulak while guides from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, arrived to lead a resupply mission to their position. MCSSD-17 gave the battalion 4,300 gallons of fuel, 4,000 gallons of water, batteries, and 15 TOW II missiles. At 1300, CSSD-10’s scheduled resupply convoy reached MCSSD-17 and transferred 20,000 gallons of fuel, 5,400 gallons of water, and ammunition. An hour later, Lieutenant Gormish returned from OP-4 with 14,400 gallons of fuel. Delayed during the morning by an Iraqi counterattack on Task Force Papa Bear, the main body of Task Force Ripper started north in the afternoon. MCSSD-17, now well provisioned, stayed in position, pushed supplies to Task Force Ripper, and guarded 1,600 prisoners-of-war who crowded its holding area.

Earlier that day, in fact at dawn, MCSSD-11’s Alpha Train returned to the mobile’s position south of the second line of obstacles after resupplying Task Force Grizzly, starting a morning of hectic combat service support operations. Upon its arrival, Captain Burke sent the Alpha Train at 0745 to supply Papa Bear’s command element. Fifteen minutes after completing the mission, an Iraqi tank and two armored personnel carriers carrying a regimental commander emerged from the fog in front of Papa Bear’s command post and surrendered. The Iraqi commander warned the Marines that the combat units following him intended to fight. Almost immediately, a 10-minute battle erupted around the regimental headquarters followed by a three-hour assault on the 1st Tank Battalion. After listening to the battle begin over the regimental tactical net, Burke led a small convoy forward with fuel and ammunition to resupply the tankers and ordered the mobile’s main body to follow him in an hour. Burke moved his convoy to within 200 meters of the second obstacle belt delivering 5,000 gallons of fuel, 1,536 rounds of M60 tank ammunition, and 15 TOW missiles to the tank battalion’s combat train, while the battle raged only 2,000 meters to the north and artillery and mortar rounds burst around his position. A four-round Iraqi salvo impacted 150 meters from his convoy that the 11th Marines immediately answered with an artillery barrage, silencing the enemy fires.

Back at CSSD-13, Captain Ritchie listened to Papa Bear’s engagement on the division’s tactical net and decided to send TOW missiles to MCSSD-11. Thirty minutes later the CSSD-10 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, heard MCSSD-11 unsuccessfully try to request TOWs over the DSG-1 command net and in turn tried and failed to pass the request to OP-4. Disappointed and concerned by the lack of communications, Kelly noticed in the distance an antennae poking into the sky, drove to the location, and discovered an amphibious assault communications vehicle. Kelly asked to use the radio, called CSSD-10, and

*Burke commented that his resupply convoy was close enough to the battle to see turrets flying off exploding Iraqi tanks and that the effect of the Marine artillery on the enemy was an “exhilarating” experience. (Burke comments)
ordered an emergency resupply of TOW missiles for MCSSD-11. Back at OP-4, the CSSD-10 ammunition technicians, responding to both CSSD-13’s request and Kelly’s order, pulled TOW missiles for CSSD-13. Lieutenant Smith, CSSD-13’s landing zone officer, prepared the TOW missiles for helicopter transportation and briefed the pilots on the location of their resupply mission, while Captain Brown in the operations center called over the radio the brevity code “Mackerel” (TOW Missiles), for MCSSD-11. Captain Ritchie calculated that it took only an hour and 15 minutes from when he decided to send TOWs until they reached MCSSD-11, while Lieutenant Colonel Kelly estimated that it took 30 minutes from his call until he saw two CH-53 Sea Stallion Helicopters carrying TOWs, fly over his position towards MCSSD-11.538

Just south of the second obstacle belt, Captain Burke waited with his empty convoy for the arrival of the main body of MCSSD-11 while receiving requests from the 1st Tank Battalion for Dragon missiles and from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, for resupply. The main body with its newly arrived batch of TOW missiles joined Captain Burke at noon and then established a defensive position 1,000 meters south of the second obstacle belt. From this position, the mobile resupplied the 1st Tank Battalion with 39 Dragon and TOW missiles and 2,000 gallons of water; the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, with 42 TOW and Dragon missiles together with small arms ammunition; and the engineers with 3,900 gallons of fuel. Meanwhile, Colonel Powell, after missing General Krulak at Khanjar, returned to the battlefield and ordered Captain Morsch and Ensign Handcock to move the retransmission site and the medical mobile back to the first obstacle belt and to reestablish communications which were lost during the night. Morsch executed Powell’s order and reestablished communication within DSG-1 and with Task Forces Grizzly and Taro.

After dispatching the resupply trains to Papa Bear, Captain Burke sent a request to DSG-1 for fuel, water, ammunition, and a medevac for 12 wounded Marines and Iraqis at Papa Bear’s regimental aid station. Thirty minutes later and
just beating the fog that drifted into the area, two CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters evacuated the casualties. The ammunition resupply was canceled, however, until the weather improved. Burke ordered MCSSD-11 to dig in for the night, and at 2000, dispatched Lieutenant Williams with the Alpha Train to resupply the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Missing the battalion’s logistics train in the fog, Williams found its combat train near the battalion’s forward positions just as a firefight broke out. The infantrymen ordered the Alpha Train out of the area, but recalled it after the battle was over. During the second attempt to resupply the battalion, the Iraqis struck again. The infantrymen circled the Alpha Train with amphibious assault vehicles and tanks and repelled the Iraqis. Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Smith, the battalion commander, concerned with the safety of the Alpha Train Marines, ordered them down from their exposed and elevated ring-mounted machine guns on their trucks. Mortar rounds fell around the position and small arms zinged through the area. The Alpha Train remained encircled in its armored cocoon until the next day.539

CSSD-10 also had an active time on the 25th. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly’s troops at OP-4 retrieved trucks from the 11th Marines, loaded and launched resupply convoys to MCSSDs -11 and -17, and prepared to move into Kuwait. During the previous night, most of the artillery ammunition trucks had returned from the 11th Marines except for those with the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Major Lucenta, CSSD-10’s operations officer, then visited the battalion headquarters to

A CH-53 heavy lift helicopter with an external load, departs CSSD-13 for a resupply mission inside Kuwait.

Photo courtesy of LtCol William H. Ritchie III
A column of CSSD-10 vehicles moves into Kuwait during the ground phase of the campaign. The vehicles are in single file to follow the tracks of the lead vehicle with the intent of avoiding mines or soft spots.

reclaim his vehicles. Between 0900 and 1600 at OP-4, Major Rice, CSSD-10’s executive officer, sent forward three convoys which carried maintenance contact and salvage teams, a collecting and clearing company, graves registration personnel, engineers, ammunition technicians, the landing support detachment, 32 pallets of MREs, 47,000 gallons of water, and 40,800 gallons of fuel. Moving towards MCSSD-17’s position, Colonel Powell met the convoys and led them to a point near the mobile’s position for the night. At OP-4, CSSD-10 received 68,000 gallons of water and 131,000 gallons of fuel during the day.540

With CSSD-10 on the move, Captain Ritchie used CSSD-13’s few trucks to move supplies from CSSD-10’s dumps to his landing zone. Even with this added burden, the CSSD successfully completed its daily helicopter resupply of Task Forces Taro, Shepherd, and Grizzly as well as the emergency TOW resupply to MCSSD-11. In the evening, Captain Ritchie reviewed the situation and scheduled helicopters for the next day. At the top of the list were the 100 TOW missiles ordered during the evening by MCSSD-17.541

While tank battles raged and DSG-1 resupplied itself and the division, the engineers moved forward with the 1st Marine Division. Major Musca, the commanding officer of the combat engineer detachment supporting Task Force Pappa Bear, ordered Captain Salinas’ Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, to build and operate an enemy prisoner of war camp. Salinas directed his bulldozers to erect a berm around an area about the size of a football field to hold 1,250 prisoners. During the afternoon, the DSC engineers quit their jobs as jailers when Musca ordered them to move forward behind the 1st Tank Battalion to an assembly area near the Al Burqan Oil field.542 Behind Task Forces Papa Bear and Ripper, the 7th Engineer Support Battalion completed marking and proofing lanes through both obstacle belts.543
After refueling and replenishing during the night and early morning hours, I MEF continued to attack north on 26 February. Its objectives were Kuwait International Airport and the Al-Mutl'a Pass (Al-Jahrah).544

The second day of the ground war ended with both divisions advancing north after repelling morning counterattacks by the Iraqis. On the morning of the 26th, I MEF’s assault regiments and task forces focused on their final objectives and prepared to attack. To support both divisions’ northerly movement, the DSC planned to establish a transfer point at Al Jaber Airbase, which the 1st Marine Division isolated on the 24th and 25th in preparation for the foot-mobile Task Force Grizzly to clear on the 26th. Both DSG-2 and CSSD-10 aimed to project elements north of Al Jaber to support the attacks on Al Jahrah and Kuwait International Airport, respectively. The first two days of the war had produced few casualties, but had generated hordes of surrendering Iraqis creating control and evacuation problems for both the 1st FSSG and the DSC. On the western flank, General Keys prepared to seize Al Jahrah, advancing with the Tiger Brigade on the left, the 8th Marines on the right, and the 6th Marines in the middle.

The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action

After dawn on the 26th, Major Clarke, MCSSD-26’s executive officer, led Serial 2 north of the Abdullea road where it joined Serial 1 and together prepared to support the 6th Marines’ final attack of the war. Believing there was time before the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle sent refuelers and water trucks to both the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 8th Tank Battalion, ordered that the ammunition received on the previous day be split into battalion packages, and directed that the neighboring Iraqi bunkers be cleared. The security sweep produced three enemy prisoners, weapons, and ammunition while discovering the carcass of a crashed Marine Corps Harrier jet. MCSSD-26 reported these discoveries to DSG-2. Concurrently, the mobile’s doctor, Navy Lieutenant Kenneth R. Collington, began operating on a wounded Marine in the back of an ambulance. In the midst of these activities, the regimental operations officer, Major Jack K. Sparks, Jr., ordered MCSSD-26 to move immediately to support the attack.

Instantly, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle had a number of things to do before moving. Almost simultaneously, he ordered the ammunition reloaded on trucks, requested that the regimental S-4, Captain Lorine E. Bergeron III, designate which units would get the munitions, urged Collington to hurry the surgery, and tried to recall the two resupply convoys. Bergeron replied that the ammunition should go to the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Wittle then sent his munitions trucks to the battalion’s logistics train. Failing to contact the resupply missions and unhappy with the idea of abandoning his Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle sent Second Lieutenant Kelley, the motor transport officer, to find the refuelers.
After several more attempts to contact them by radio and on completion of the medical procedure, Wittle reluctantly ordered MCSSD-26 forward and left Captain Warker, the operations officer, behind to wait for Kelley and the orphaned resupply convoys. Just as the mobile was about to disappear from sight, Lieutenant Kelley appeared from behind a cloud of dust with the lost convoys and rejoined the main body of the MCSSD.545

On the 26th, the situation improved somewhat for Lieutenant Colonel Hering at DSG-2’s northern transfer point. During the early morning hours, Lieutenant Colmenares, with his collecting and clearing station, had arrived at the transfer point and Hering immediately sent him to the Ponderosa with all of the empty bulk-liquid trucks. Colmenares returned later in the morning with fuel and water. Hering informed MCSSD-28 that supplies were available, but that they would have to be picked up at the transfer point.546 He then sent the bulk-liquid trucks back to the Ponderosa for more provisions and ordered that the convoy’s communication vehicle be left at the breach to reestablish contact with the Ponderosa. After restoring communications with the rear, Hering was astonished to learn that the DSG-2 was preparing to relocate into Kuwait. He believed this
was a mistake because scarce trucks would be used to move the unit rather than supplies.547

On the division’s right flank, the 8th Marines logistics train completed an all night road march to Phase Line Horse and sent MCSSD-28’s truck detachment to supply fuel, water, and ammunition to the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines.* After waiting all night to move, MCSSD-28 drove 11 kilometers north, joined the logistics train at 0900, exhausted its remaining supplies, and spent the day replenishing itself. On arrival at Phase Line Horse, Lieutenant Colonel Head, the mobile commander, immediately dispatched the last of his meager stocks of water and fuel to the regiment’s three infantry battalions, headquarters, and the prisoner of war compound, while again requesting resupply from the northern transfer point. At 1030, helicopters carrying ammunition from the DSC delivered munitions requested the day before. Needing more provisions, Head pressed the northern transfer point for replenishment and reiterated his G-day request for two AAVs and sent a new request for an M1A1 Tank. In response, Hering, the transfer point commander, having just received fuel and water as a result of Lieutenant Colmenares’ nocturnal replenishment mission, informed Head that he could now pull supplies. At noon, MCSSD-28 sent all available liquid containers to the northern transfer point, which was now located 10 kilometers south of the mobile.548

To support the afternoon attack while replenishing at Phase Line Horse, Lieutenant Colonel Head attached his landing support detachment to the regimental logistics train which departed at 1300. As trucks returned from the morning resupply runs to the regiment, Head sent them to the northern transfer point for supplies and treated wounded Iraqis.549 At 1630, the MCSSD commander ordered the mobile to prepare to displace north to join the 8th Marines which had run out of fuel after its afternoon attack. Using a GPS borrowed from the 8th Marines, PLRS, maps and compasses, MCSSD-28 crept north in the darkness, sidestepped obstacles and built-up areas, and completed a 23-kilometer road march in the early hours of the fourth day of the war.550

Back at the Ponderosa, requests for support were coming in from the Tiger Brigade. On G-day, the 170 trucks of the brigade’s forward logistics support element followed the assault battalions through the breach and set up a support area on the far side of the minefield.551 On the Saudi side of the border, the 502d Support Battalion remained in place and passed a request to DSG-2 to push 100,000 gallons of fuel and 60 LVS loads of ammunition forward to the brigade.552 DSG-2 forwarded the request to the DSC which dispatched its 970 refuelers and 35 LVSs to supply the needed fuel and ammunition.** Also on the 26th, the 8th Motor Transportation Battalion sent 30 LVSs to DSG-2 to move the organization into Kuwait.553

*The 8th Marines logistics train took eight hours to travel seven kilometers on the night of 25-26 February 91, because of “a route littered with mines, unexploded ordnance, and Iraqi firing holes.” (8thMar ComdC Feb 91, Sec II)

**During the four days of the ground war the Tiger Brigade burned a total of 80,000 gallons of fuel, shot 708 artillery rounds, and launched 276 MLRS rockets. (Tiger ComdC)
At the minefields, in the meantime, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion continued to clear mines in the obstacle belts, then moved forward to prepare Al Jaber Air Base for the establishment of the DSC's transfer point. In the minefields, the engineers continued to discover state-of-the-art plastic mines in lanes that had been previously cleared and extensively travelled on by hundreds of vehicles. Leaving Company B and Company C there, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, ordered Captain Hatton’s Company A and his Bravo command group to Al Jaber to establish the DSC’s transfer point. Arriving at the air base, the engineers found the area littered with unexploded ordnance and wrecked and abandoned Iraqi vehicles. Skipper ordered Captain Stephen H. Negahquet’s explosive ordnance platoon to the air field. Negahquet’s teams immediately began clearing the area immediately to the west of Al Jaber so that the DSC could safely establish a new combat service support area.554

The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action

During this time in the 1st Marine Division area, at midnight on the 25th, the DSG-1 headquarters sent a message to the medical mobile to meet an ambulance carrying two wounded Marines from Task Force Grizzly, four kilometers south of the first obstacle belt between lanes 4 and 5. The medical mobile moved to the rendezvous point and waited for the wounded Marines. After standing by for 45 minutes for the ambulance to arrive, Ensign William C. Hancock, the offi-

A runway at Al Jaber Airbase is marred by two parallel lines of craters which prevented the immediate use of the airfield. Unexploded ordnance in the area delayed the DSC from establishing CSSA-3 until 27 February.

Photo courtesy of LtGen James A. Brabham, Jr.
Demonstrating its versatility, MCSSD-17 refuels Supercobra helicopters near Al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait on 27 February—G plus 2.

cer-in-charge of the medical mobile, unsuccessfully searched the surrounding desert for the lost medevac. Before dawn on the 26th, MCSSD-11, located 20 kilometers north of the rendezvous point, answered a call on the radio for “any station on the net” from the missing ambulance. The corpsmen were frantically looking for the medical mobile and were gravely concerned that the two wounded Marines were about to die after riding for more than six hours in the ambulance. Captain Burke, the MCSSD-11 commander, calmed the corpsmen, ordered them to stop their vehicle, and to verify their position. Burke then changed radio frequency, called for a helicopter medevac, switched his radio back to the corpsmen, and instructed them on the proper method for identifying themselves to and safely receiving the helicopter. Fifteen minutes after MCSSD-11 heard the distress call, a helicopter picked up the wounded Marines. After the medevac, Colonel Powell ordered the retransmission team and the medical mobile to DSG-1’s headquarters, which had moved near Al Jaber Air Base the previous day. After arriving at Jaber, Powell sent a smaller retransmission team to establish communications between DSG-1, CSSD-13, and the DSC at Khanjar.

On the 26th, Task Force Ripper engaged large numbers of dug-in Iraqi infantry and armor, received artillery fire, and captured numerous Iraqis as the Marines neared Kuwait International Airport. Captain Winter intended to move MCSSD-17 forward and to resupply the task force. Before advancing, CSSD-10’s forward element rolled into MCSSD-17’s position and topped off the mobile. At about the same time, the 100 TOW II missiles, requested the night before, arrived by helicopter from CSSD-13. While Winter’s mobile digested its resupply, a Marine Corps UH-1 Huey helicopter circled and landed, with the pilot asking for the mobile to refuel his aircraft and his entire squadron of Super Cobras. Nonplussed, and enjoying the additional security provided by the attack helicopters, Captain Winter, who had served a tour with the wing, proceeded to pump
8,300 gallons of fuel into the 10 aircraft. At 1300, MCSSD-17 moved north 35 kilometers and found Ripper four hours later in an orchard west of Kuwait International Airport. MCSSD-17 immediately pushed water, fuel, MREs, and TOW missiles to the task force. After completing his immediate mission, Winter ordered all remaining water and fuel transferred to storage bags on the ground, called for resupply from CSSD-10, and sent his empty vehicles south to pull fuel and water.

After midnight at MCSSD-11 on the 26th, Captain Burke sent First Sergeant Joseph M. Collins and Gunnery Sergeant Mark W. Fishback to find the emergency resupply convoy requested the day before from CSSD-10. At dawn Captain Burke dispatched the Bravo Train to distribute the last of MCSSD-11's fuel and water to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and to the combat engineers. After the return of the Alpha Train from its second all-night combat resupply mission, Captain Burke prepared MCSSD-11 to move, but awaited for replenishment of his supplies. At 0800 on the 26th, First Sergeant Collins arrived with the CSSD-10 convoy that had departed OP-4 the day before, instead of the emergency resupply convoy. Over the next two hours, CSSD-10 transferred 20,000 gallons of fuel, 5,400 gallons of water, and ammunition to MCSSD-11's trucks. Just as the mobile was about to displace, CSSD-10's other emergency convoy arrived. Captain Burke left the empty trucks of the Bravo Train to trade with CSSD-10's full trucks, and told its commander, Lieutenant Osorno, to follow him by tracking his PLRS signal. MCSSD-11 then passed through the second obstacle belt and was rejoined by the Bravo Train.

At 1300, Captain Burke led MCSSD-11 which carried 41,200 gallons of fuel, 10,800 gallons of water, 32 pallets of MREs, and ammunition, into the Burqan oil field. The mobile rushed north through clouds of smoke from the burning oil wells to catch and resupply Task Force Papa Bear before it attacked toward Kuwait International Airport. At 1600 and after traveling 25 kilometers, MCSSD-11 passes by burning oil wells enroute to its new position near Kuwait International Airport.

Photo courtesy of Maj Adrian W. Burke
11 found the task force staged for its final attack. Burke set up two lines of trucks which in 30 minutes distributed 20 pallets of MREs, 12,300 gallons of fuel, and 5,200 gallons of water to all the major elements of Papa Bear. In addition, MCSSD-11 pushed repair parts received from CSSD-10 forward to the logistics operations center, the 1st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. While Papa Bear attacked, MCSSD-11 consolidated all remaining fuel and water and sent the empty tankers back to CSSD-10 for more loads. At 1730, the mobile moved 13 kilometers north to an abandoned trenchline and bunker complex which was hastily cleared and occupied by the light of the burning oil wells. This position was 11 kilometers southwest of the Kuwait International Airport. Captain Burke ordered his troops to dig in and dispatched patrols to protect the perimeter. The mobile spent the evening at a state of 25 percent alert and listened to the 1st Tank Battalion fight Papa Bear’s final engagement of the war. 558

On the 26th as well, Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion moved with Task Force Papa Bear towards Kuwait International Airport. In the afternoon, Captain Salinas, the company commander, transferred the elements of the company which had been traveling in wheeled vehicles, to the Task Force’s logistics train and continued the advance in tracked vehicles as part of the combat engineer detachment. Major Musca, the detachment commander, set the engineer force in a circular defensive perimeter, three kilometers south of Papa Bear and three kilometers west of the 1st Tank Battalion. At 2230 the wind shifted and blew away clouds of smoke from the oil well fires, which now illuminated the engineers’ position. Almost immediately, the detachment received Iraqi mortar, RPG, and automatic weapons fire from the direction of the airport road. The engineers returned fire and destroyed an Iraqi armored personnel carrier, a jeep, and a truck. Lance Corporal James E. Waldron of Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, was killed when the assault amphibious vehicle he was under pivoted to fire and crushed him in the process. Captain John M. Allison, the detachment’s deputy commander, was shot in the face as he tried to rescue Waldron. No other Marines were injured in this action. 559

Upon arriving at MCSSD-17’s position on the 26th, CSSD-10 immediately set up its security, planned its next move, and provided combat service support. To enhance local security, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, the CSSD’s commander, sent the security detachment to search bunkers in the area thoroughly and to pull machine guns from the abandoned Iraqi tanks that littered the region. 560 In addition to resupplying MCSSD-17, CSSD-10 issued 15,000 gallons of fuel, 32 pallets of MREs, and 10,000 gallons of water to Task Force Shepherd and elements of the 11th Marines. 561 Kelly unloaded the engineer and medical detachments, but kept the remaining portion of the CSSD on trucks to move towards Kuwait International Airport.

In the afternoon, the CSSD commander drove north to scout a new site south of the Kuwait International Airport. While he was on his reconnaissance, the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, requested that CSSD-10 evacuate the 7,000-8,000 enemy prisoners of war it was holding at Camp 4 near Al Jaber Air Base. Major Lucenta, CSSD-10’s operations officer, replied that he only had two 5-ton trucks
available and could not support the request. Shortly afterwards, General Krulak arrived and inquired about the CSSD’s ability to transport prisoners of war. Lucenta briefed the general that the only way he could evacuate prisoners was by shepherding them down the road with a 5-ton truck and its .50-caliber machine gun. After Krulak departed, Kelly returned to CSSD-10 having decided not to move the CSSD to the planned site since the division had advanced farther north than expected and that smoke from multiple oil well fires was poisoning the air in that area. By the end of the day, CSSD-10, near Al Jaber, exhausted its stocks of MREs and had only 25,000 gallons of water and 15,000 gallons of fuel on hand. Accordingly, Kelly requested that the DSC push forward 100 pallets of MREs, 50,000 gallons of water, and 60,000 gallons of fuel from its new transfer point at Al Jaber Air Base.

The Direct Support Command

The return of trucks from the artillery regiments in the previous days permitted General Krulak, on the 26th, to establish a transfer point at Al Jaber Air Base. Krulak intended to store a two-day supply of food, water, fuel, and ammunition for both divisions on the far side of the obstacle belts. In addition, the DSC’s transfer point would perform limited medical, maintenance, and salvage operations. On the morning of the 26th, Colonel Gary S. McKissock, II MEF’s G-4, still on loan to the DSC, led a convoy through the breach to Al Jaber and waited the remainder of the day while Captain Stephen H. Negahnquet’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) platoon cleared unexploded munitions near the air base. Also arriving at Al Jaber were 75 Seabees from NMCBs -5 and -24 together with the advance party from I MEF headquarters. The Seabees intended to build General Boomer’s forward command post and waited while DSC’s EOD Marines labored to make the area safe. The next day, the Seabees returned to Saudi Arabia after I MEF canceled its plan to build a command post at Al Jaber.

The Deluge of Enemy Prisoners of War

On the evening of the 26th, 8,000 Iraqi captives reached the prisoner of war compound at Kibrit by means of an evacuation system jury-rigged by Generals Brabham and Krulak. Three days earlier, Brabham had called Krulak and asked for help in transporting prisoners. Although the 1st FSSG commander was responsible for moving enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) from the minefields to CSSD-91, he lacked the means to carry out this assignment because the relocation to Khanjar had wrecked havoc on the vehicles of Saudi Motors/the Baghdad Express. Krulak agreed that the DSC would help when the trucks carrying artillery rounds returned from Kuwait. Much to General Krulak’s surprise,

*150 Marines and sailors from MWSS-271 arrived on the 28th to establish a FARP to support helicopter operations. (MWSS-271 ComdC Jan-Jun91, Sec 2 and 3; MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 3)
however, the next morning the 1st FSSG ordered the DSC to transport all prisoners north of Mishab to CSSD-91. The DSC commander then called Brabham to clarify the tasking, but knowing the maintenance problems with Saudi Motors, began scouring the DSC for transportation to accomplish the mission.* Krulak scrounged dump trucks from the 8th Engineer Support Battalion and a few 5-ton trucks from the 8th Motor Transport Battalion and sent them through the breach to haul EPWs to Kibrit. At Jubayl, General Brabham scraped together a convoy of buses and commercial Saudi vehicles, driven by clerks, dental technicians, and supply and maintenance personnel, and sent them north under the command of his aide.566

Upon learning earlier from General Keys when the ground war started that the deluge of surrendering Iraqis impeded combat operations, Krulak had ordered the DSC to begin immediately evacuating prisoners from the 2d Marine Division's zone of action. Accordingly, the DSC's assistant chief of staff for operations, Lieutenant Colonel John O'Donovan, ordered the 8th Engineer Support Battalion and the Headquarters and Services Battalion to build a compound rapidly at Khanjar to hold temporarily captured Iraqis until transportation could be arranged to CSSD-91. Within six hours, the DSC Marines: constructed a 10-acre facility surrounded by a berm and barbed wire; posted guards; stockpiled blankets, water, and MREs; and established medical services. While the camp was under construction, O'Donovan gathered volunteers, to include women Marines, as drivers and guards, and pressed into service buses and recovered Saudi Motors trucks. Off-duty staff non-commissioned officers from the DSC's combat operations center, like Gunnery Sergeant Douglas Hedges, led convoys of five to seven vehicles through the breaches and returned to Khanjar with loads of prisoners even before the 8th Marines crossed into Kuwait. By the end of the 26th, the DSC had shuttled 6,000 prisoners to Khanjar from the 2d Marine Division's zone.567**

Elsewhere on the battlefield, the 1st Marine Division evacuated prisoners of war directly to Kibrit and around Jubayl, General Brabham gathered buses and sent them to Kuwait. By the 26th, the arrival of more buses from Jubayl allowed for EPWs to be evacuated directly from the 2d Marine Division zone to Kibrit without going through Khanjar. Also on the 26th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodson, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion's commanding officer, had retrieved enough trucks from supporting the artillery regiments to begin shuttling prisoners from Kuwait. At 1300, Woodson dispatched a 70-bed convoy into Kuwait.568

By the evening of the 26th, the 8,000 Iraqi prisoners who had arrived at Kibrit overwhelmed CSSD-91. The first thing to break down was the system for processing new prisoners. As planned, CSSD-91 gave newly arrived Iraqis a bottle of water, food, and a blanket, and then moved the captives directly into the holding pens. Soldiers and Marines sent the sick and injured to the medical facil-

*Gen Krulak described the capabilities of Gen Brabham's Saudi Motors/Baghdad Express at the beginning of the ground war as "clobbered." (Krulak comments)

**On the establishment of the Khanjar enemy prisoner of war camp Gen Krulak commented that, "We were basically doing the one thing that logisticsians don't like to do and that is double handle anything... it was not smart." (Krulak comments)
The 8th Motor Transport Battalion formed a convoy of LVSs at Khanjar to pick up Iraqi prisoners in Kuwait. The trucks had just returned from hauling ammunition for the artillery.

Because of the large number of prisoners, only Iraqi officers were interrogated. Most of the prisoners were glad to be safely away from the bombing and content with the relative comfort of the camp. Unfortunately on that day, a wind storm blew down the mess hall and interrupted the feeding and the state of contentment of the Iraqis. The lack of food almost caused a riot which Lieutenant Colonel Sparrow, CSSD-91’s commanding officer, narrowly averted by shipping in MREs from GSG-2. In addition to the problems caused by the weather, the Iraqis kept breaking the fragile plastic pipes of the water distribution system and opted to by-pass the culturally-correct wooden heads and conveniently placed slit trenches to relieve themselves by the perimeter fence. As masses of prisoners arrived, Lieutenant Colonel Sparrow discovered that his three holding compounds were too large to manage the Iraqis who could not hear instructions from the camp public address system. Despite these problems, CSSD-91 personnel dumped lime on the fence-lines, continued to fix the water distribution system, and moved Iraqi prisoners south after their brief stay at Kibrit.569

G+3: 27 February 1991

In the I MEF sector on 27 February, the 2d Marine Division began the fourth day of the ground war by holding positions...To the east, the 1st Marine Division consolidated its area, clearing the last pockets of resistance from around Kuwait International Airport...570

The 27th began with the 2d Marine Division on its objective at Al Jahrah which the Tiger Brigade had captured at 2000 the previous day. The 1st Marine Division was in position to capture Kuwait International Airport and General Myatt maneuvered Task Forces Shepherd and Taro into position to seize this final MEF objective. On the 26th, Task Force Grizzly completed clearing operations at
Al Jaber where the DSC established a transfer point to support the attacks on the final objectives and any subsequent actions. Both DSG-1 and DSG-2 planned to set up positions north of Al Jaber and near the MEF's northern objectives. Although the war was almost over, armed enemy remained a threat as the MCSSDs continued to support their assault task forces and regiments, closing in for the kill.

The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action

At 0100, MCSSD-28 passed through the positions of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, and joined the 8th Marines on the outskirts of Kuwait City. A fistful of emergency resupply requests greeted Lieutenant Colonel Head who quickly organized a hasty defense and dispatched supply convoys to replenish the depleted regiment. At 0800, enemy soldiers wandered into MCSSD-28's position and surrendered. Head ordered the military police to investigate a position, to the southeast, where the prisoners had originated. At the enemy position, the MPs discovered three abandoned T-62 tanks with engines running and loaded gun tubes pointing at the mobile. Nearby, a battle then erupted between the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, and the Iraqis. As rounds from the battle impacted within the

DSC positions at the beginning of G+3: 27 February 1991
mobile’s position, Head ordered the M88A1 tank retriever to neutralize the abandoned Iraqi tanks. The retriever moved towards the tanks, received fire from a nearby treeline, suppressed the enemy fires with its machine gun, and disabled the Iraqi armor. At 1030, five Marine casualties from the infantry battalion arrived at the mobile which called for a medevac through the 2d Marine Division headquarters. At 1400, MCSSD-28’s graves registration team processed the remains of a Marine from the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, and later, another from the 4th Tank Battalion. At 1830, a resupply convoy from DSG-2 delivered fuel, water, and MREs and departed with the two dead Marines and documents confiscated from Iraqi prisoners.

On the 27th, Lieutenant Colonel Hering moved DSG-2’s transfer point 20 kilometers north of RPP Fournier to a position called the Ice Cube Tray, which became the focal point for combat service support operations in the 2d Marine Division’s zone of action.* Located 15 kilometers from MCSSD-26 and -28, Hering pushed water, fuel, and MREs to the mobiles and was quickly joined by additional units.** First to arrive was the advance party of Collecting and Clearing Company C after coming under enemy fire on its road march. Later, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion’s LVSs arrived with the first loads of DSG-2 as it relocated into Kuwait.

Spread between the 2d Marine Division’s zone of action and Al Jaber Air Base, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion established Combat Service Support Area 3 (CSSA-3) and continued its work in the minefields. Hulls’ Company C maintained the breach lanes in the first line of mines and Hearn’sberger’s Company B continued to labor in the second minefield. Danger still lurked in the breach as demonstrated when the HMMWV driven by Major Clifton D. Caldwell, the DSC’s breach control officer, hit a mine. Caldwell was not harmed by the explosion, but the deeply planted anti-personnel mine that blew the rear axle off his vehicle was located at a spot in the road where a thousand vehicles had previously passed without incident. On the 27th, Captain Negahnquet’s EOD Marines completed clearing the area near Jaber Air Base of unexploded ordnance which allowed the 8th Engineer Support Battalion’s Bravo command element and Company A to build a 100,000-gallon fuel point, ammunition dump, the DSC’s combat operations center, and a 40,000-gallon water point. Colonel McKissock’s convoy quickly moved in and began stocking the new CSSA. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper led a reconnaissance party that discovered a complex of 45 boobytrapped water wells in the area. ** Captain Negahquet’s EOD Marines rapidly cleared the wells and Hatton’s Company A began pumping water.

The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action

Early on the 27th, Colonel Powell started DSG-1’s morning operations.

---

*The Ice Cube Tray received its name from its grid-like appearance on the map.
**Maj William L. Poggi, Capt William M. Harrison, the battalion’s sergeant major, and the chaplain accompanied LtCol Skipper on the water well reconnaissance. (Skipper comments)
Just after midnight, Powell led a convoy from CSSD-10’s position near Al Jaber with food, fuel, and ammunition to the 1st Marine Division’s forward command post, just south of Kuwait International Airport. After arriving, Powell sent the empty trucks back to CSSD-10 and remained at the division headquarters where he met with General Myatt. At dawn, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly dispatched CSSD-10’s daily resupply convoys to MCSSD-11 and to MCSSD-17, including repair parts for Task Force Ripper. West of Kuwait International Airport, MCSSD-17 pushed 42 pallets of MREs, 21,000 gallons of water, and 37,000 gallons of fuel to Task Force Ripper, while MCSSD-17’s commander, Captain Winter, pulled additional supplies from CSSD-10. In the trench line where MCSSD-11 stopped the night before, Captain Burke of CSSD-11 ordered an extensive search of the area which revealed an Iraqi Army command post, 12 bunkers of tank ammunition, and an armory. Burke ordered the weapons destroyed and drove four kilometers north to Papa Bear’s logistics operation center to attend a meeting. While Burke was at the meeting, MCSSD-11 called for a medevac of 4 Marines, 14 wounded Iraqis, and 1 dead enemy soldier. The Marines would go by air and the Iraqis by ground transportation. After the meeting, Burke distributed ammunition, 24,700 gallons of fuel, 6,400 gallons of water, and 12 pallets of MRE to Papa Bear and the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines.

At noon, CSSD-13 started DSG-1’s afternoon operations by flying 385 rounds of artillery ammunition to the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines. Near Kuwait International Airport, CSSD-10’s resupply convoy departed MCSSD-11’s position with the dead Iraqi after completing its resupply mission. Captain Burke sent the 14 wounded prisoners to the CSSA-3 at Al Jaber by ground transportation where his trucks picked up MREs and returned to his position. At 1616, Colonel Powell, who had moved to Kuwait International Airport with the division forward command element, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Luszynski, DSG-1’s executive officer, to move the command post to join him at the airport. Just about the same time, Task Force Papa Bear passed the word to MCSSD-11 that Kuwait
International Airport was secure. By 1700, CSSD-10’s supplies were becoming dangerously low, which forced Lieutenant Colonel Kelly to pull fuel and MREs from the DSC at Al Jaber and water from OP-4. Three hours later, Colonel Powell ordered CSSD-10 to move to the International Airport the next day and CSSD-13 to be ready to do the same in order to conduct arrival/departure air control operations and to support helicopter activities north and west of Kuwait City. Near midnight, Powell scheduled a meeting for the 28th and ordered his commanders to bring their ammunition inventories.

*The Lost Convoy*

Lieutenant Colonel Woodson’s 70-LVS-bed convoy with the Iraqi prisoners got lost in the dark on the 26th and wisely waited until the morning before picking up 2,000 Iraqis. The prisoners sat on the open beds of the trailers and hung on to cargo straps spread across the bed to keep from falling off. After passing through the obstacle belts on their way back to Khanjar, General Krulak met the convoy and sent them directly to CSSD-91 at Kibrit in order to save time and effort. Back at Khanjar, Lieutenant Colonel Woodson had expected his convoy to return by the morning and drove north to find it. Enroute, he met Lieutenant Colonel O’Donovan, the DSC’s assistant operations officer, who told him that General Krulak had sent the convoy directly to Kibrit. Woodson then dispatched his battalion’s executive officer, Major Robert L. Songer, to find the convoy. As Songer neared Kibrit, he noticed that the road was mysteriously covered with thousands of empty milk containers. At CSSD-91, Songer found the convoy and discovered the answer to the riddle of the empty milk cartons. As the convoy carrying the Iraqis approached Kibrit, it stopped to allow the Iraqis to relieve themselves. A passing truck carrying milk cartons slowed down to look at the Iraqis who leaped onto the milk truck and raided its cargo. The convoy drivers quickly restored order and loaded the Iraqis back on the LVSs, but not before the thirsty prisoners consumed most of the milk on the truck.

*The LVSs of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion near Kibrit with their loads of Iraqi prisoners.*

Quilter, *With 1 MEF*
The final day of the ground offensive found I MEF in defensive positions outside Kuwait City.583

The 1st Marine Division Zone of Action

At 0400, Colonel Powell called General Krulak to brief him on DSG-1's planned activities. Krulak told Powell that the war was over. The DSG-1 commander spent the remainder of the day repositioning CSSDs, supporting the 1st Marine Division, and starting DSG-1's return to Saudi Arabia. At 0830, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly led CSSD-10 from near Al Jaber to a position along the runway at Kuwait International Airport. Kelly set up a collecting and clearing company and a refuelling point.584 To replenish supplies, the DSC pushed 100 pallets of MREs to CSSD-10 which in turn pulled water and fuel from the DSC at Al Jaber. With CSSD-10 at Kuwait International Airport, Colonel Powell ordered Captain Ritchie to keep CSSD-13 at OP-4.585 As Powell positioned his CSSDs, MCSSD-17 pushed supplies to the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines; and Task Force Shepherd, while MCSSD-11 resupplied the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines. Captain Burke delivered his ammunition inventory to Colonel Powell at Kuwait International Airport and sent a convoy with all palletized munitions to GSG-2 at Ras Al Mishab.586

The 2d Marine Division Zone of Action

At 0500 on the 28th, guides from the three infantry battalions of the 8th Marines arrived at MCSSD-28 to lead resupply convoys to their battalion positions. After the morning resupply, the MCSSD spent the remainder of the day pulling supplies from DSG-2 and scheduling resupply missions for 1 March. As the ceasefire took effect, MCSSD-28 improved its positions and fell into a normal resupply routine with the 8th Marines and DSG-2. At the Ice Cube Tray, LVSs from the DSC and DSG-2, which finally trickled back from the 10th Marines and the Tiger Brigade, continued to move the organization into Kuwait. After dropping off its cargo, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion used 13 of its LVSs to move Collecting and Clearing Company C to Al Jaber Air Base.587

At RRP-26, MCSSD-26 coexisted with unexploded ordnance and supported the 6th Marines. The day before, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle ordered his command to dig in and to remove the numerous unexploded artillery projectiles and cluster bomblets that lay about the area. On the 28th, a HMMWV belonging to the engineer officer, First Lieutenant Brian S. Bartholf, hit a cluster bomb which damaged the vehicle without injuring the occupants. Despite the dangers of unexploded ordnance, MCSSD-26 pushed 26,600 gallons of water, 79 pallets of MREs, and 35,900 gallons of fuel to the 6th Marines on the 27th and 28th. In addition, MCSSD-26 dispatched four maintenance contact teams to repair equip-
ment, treated 45 patients including 13 Iraqis, medevaced five Marines, and processed one dead Iraqi soldier.\(^588\) On the 28th, Colonel Livingston visited RRP-26 and expressed his appreciation to a formation of all the Marines and sailors of MCSSD-26, for the superb combat service support they had given the 6th Marines.\(^589\)*

*At Col Livingston's request, the 2d Marine Division included MCSSD-26 in its message requesting the award of the Combat Action Ribbon. (Warker comments)

**Brigade Service Support Group 5**

During the ground war, BSSG-5 supported the far-flung operations of the 5th MEB which landed to reinforce I MEF. On the 24th, the MEB arrived at Mishab and sent a battalion to Al Wafra to conduct a raid. BSSG-5, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lupton, unloaded USS Juneau and Mobile and on the 25th, sent a small mobile carrying fuel, water, and MREs to Al Wafra to resupply the raid force.\(^590\) Reaching Kibrit on the evening of the 25th, the BSSG commander discovered that the 5th MEB had moved to Khanjar.\(^591\) The next morning, Lupton headed for CSSA-2 and directed the BSSG to follow him. At the

---

\(^588\) On the 28th, Colonel Livingston visited RRP-26 and expressed his appreciation to a formation of all the Marines and sailors of MCSSD-26, for the superb combat service support they had given the 6th Marines.\(^589\)*

*At Col Livingston's request, the 2d Marine Division included MCSSD-26 in its message requesting the award of the Combat Action Ribbon. (Warker comments)
DSC, he found Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe, the 5th MEB's commanding general, and together, they decided to deploy the BSSG to the Ponderosa where it could support the MEB's prisoners of war and rear-area security operations. BSSG-5 arrived at Khanjar late on the 26th and early the next morning moved to the Ponderosa where Lupton learned that DSG-2 was moving into Kuwait. Knowing that the 5th Marines, the MEB's ground combat element, was operating near the Ice Cube Tray, Lupton decided to advance into Kuwait with DSG-2. Moving in a 100-truck convoy, the BSSG arrived near the Ice Cube Tray at 2200 on the 27th, established local security, and set up a combat service support area.  

The next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Lupton met with Colonel Randolph A. Gangle, the 5th Marines Commanding Officer, at Al Jaber Air Base. Gangle told Lupton that the 5th Marines had received a new mission to sweep the Al Wafra Forest area in Kuwait. The 5th Marines S-4 then requested resupply and three mobiles to accompany the regiment on a circuitous road march south into Saudi Arabia, east to Kibrit, and north into Kuwait to conduct clearing operations. Lupton rushed back to his camp near the Ice Cube Tray and moved BSSG-5 to Al Jaber where at 1520, he established a replenishment point to top off the regiment's vehicles. BSSG-5's bulk-liquid carriers replenished at DSG-2's Ice Cube Tray location and then departed with the three mobiles to Al Wafra. Afterwards, Lupton led the remaining portion of BSSG-5 back into Saudi Arabia and east towards Mishab to set up a base camp.
Conclusion

The logistics trade is an essential element of the art of war.594

At the end of February, I MEF held all of its objectives, Kuwait was free, and Saddam Hussein was “back in his box.” To ensure that he would not reinvade Kuwait, the 2d Marine Division consolidated its defenses around Al Jahra and the 1st Marine Division strengthened its positions at Kuwait International Airport. The DSC continued to provide combat service support from Khanjar and Al Jaber Air Base to DSG-2 at the Ice Cube Tray and CSSD-10 at Kuwait International Airport, while MCSSDs remained with their regiments and task forces. It was an effective system that could remain indefinitely in Kuwait, extend further to the north, or incrementally downsize while U.S. forces departed the region.

Leaving the Gulf with Good Order and Discipline:
1 March-10 October 1991

Introduction and BSSG-5

I knew my headquarters was about to turn into an administrative meat grinder. We had to start moving forces and equipment home—a happy but gigantic and complicated task—Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf595

While the 5th MEB conducted the last combat mission in Kuwait, I MEF’s planners switched their attentions to leaving the Gulf region. The defeat of Saddam Hussein made the world a safer place, but not a safe place. Crises brewed in Liberia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Iraq, which might require Marine Corps units now in the area. To respond to unknown and emerging situations, I MEF needed to retrieve equipment, supplies, and ammunition spread over three Middle Eastern countries and then clean and fix all items before loading the materials on ships and aircraft. Although I MEF’s priority was to send units home, its main focus was to reconstitute the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). As retrograde operations began, BSSG-5 wrapped up its support of the 5th Marines in Kuwait.

After a night road march from Al Jaber Air Base to Ras al Mishab, BSSG-5 established a camp to support the 5th Marines clearing operations in the Al Wafra Forest of Kuwait. On 1 March, one of BSSG’s three mobiles returned to Mishab from Al Wafra and at 1500 the next day, the 5th Marines requested 13,000 gallons of fuel, 3,000 gallons of water, 16 pallets of MREs, and a variety of repair parts. Using all available transportation, Lieutenant Colonel Lupton, the BSSG commander, dispatched the requested MREs and water, 70 percent of the parts, and 3,000 gallons of fuel. The resupply convoy arrived at Al Wafra on 3 March, just as the regiment ran out of fuel. The next day, the 5th Marines sent the empty
mobiles to Mishab where BSSG-5 began to load the 5th MEB on amphibious shipping. On 12 March, BSSG-5 returned to its ships after 16 days on land, began planning for a possible operation in Ethiopia, which did not occur, and sailed away from the Persian Gulf on board Amphibious Ready Group 3.596*

First in First Out; Last in Last Out: 1 March-22 April 1991

At the beginning of March, the units that had first deployed to the Gulf started to leave. Commands that arrived in August and September 1990, such as the 1st Marine Division, the 1st MEB from Hawaii, the 3d MAW, the 3d NCR, and the 1st FSSG, began departing. Not forgetting about Saddam Hussein, General Boomer ordered the remaining units to maintain the Kuwait defenses and to assist I MEF's departure. Accordingly, the 2d Marine Division stayed in Kuwait and the 2d FSSG took over the support of the MEF as the 1st FSSG returned to Southern California. To reconstitute Marine Corps capabilities, Boomer ordered that the vast amount of equipment and supplies remaining around Khanjar and Kibrit be moved to the ports of Mishab and Jubayl. While the “last-in” units guarded the border and cleaned up the battlefield, I MEF's personnel strength shrank from 84,498 on 28 February to 19,743 on 16 April.597

Deactivation and Home

Very few Marines or sailors in I MEF had more time in the Gulf than those of DSG-1. On 1 March, Colonel Powell turned DSG-1 over to his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lusczynski, and flew to the United States to attend a planning conference for the reconstitution of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. Before Colonel Powell’s plane was in the air, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly returned to the United States on emergency leave.598 Major Lucenta, the operations officer, took command of CSSD-10 at Kuwait International Airport, while Major Rice, the executive officer, sent people and equipment from OP-4 to Manifah Bay. The next day, MCSSD-11 moved to Kuwait International Airport and then relocated to CSSD-141's old Desert Shield location at Manifah Bay. From there, MCSSD-17, together with a detachment of engineers from CSSD-10, supported the 1st Marine Division's preparations to return to the United States.

On the 4th, MCSSD-11's and DSG-1's headquarters moved from Kuwait International Airport to Manifah Bay and started the deactivation process. On the way, Captain Burke refueled Task Force Papa Bear for the last time.599 Two days later, all personnel from the 2d FSSG and a reserve ammunition detachment were added to the roles of CSSD-13 and transferred to the DSC. On the 9th, CSSD-10, MCSSD-11, and MCSSD-17 deactivated and Lieutenant Colonel Lusczynski pooled all personnel and equipment for final processing before returning them to

Convoys carrying supplies and equipment arrive at the port of Jubayl to begin I MEF's retrograde from the Persian Gulf.

their parent units. The remaining personnel and equipment from CSSD-10 moved to Manifah Bay, while a small detachment, commanded by First Lieutenant Clarke D. Henderson, briefly remained at Kuwait International Airport. The DSG-1 headquarters moved to Camp 3 near Jubayl, where it returned all remaining personnel and equipment to their parent commands and deactivated after conducting more than six months of combat service support operations in the desert. Both Colonel Powell and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly returned to Saudi Arabia and developed tables of organization and equipment for a combat service support element that would support the MPF reconstitution.

At Mishab, Colonel Hampton's GSG-2 briefly supported port operations and then deactivated. On 4 March, Hampton sent equipment to Jubayl as the first step in leaving the port of Mishab to the DSC. Port operations consisted of helping load the 5th MEB on amphibious shipping and 1st Marine Division equipment on U.S. Army coastal craft. Equipment and supplies began to arrive from remote locations and CSSD-91 emptied its holding pens, deactivated, and sent its remaining prisoners to Mishab. GSG-2 held the prisoners until the U.S. Army took custody of the Iraqis and transported them to their own facilities. On 10 March, Colonel Hampton relinquished command of Mishab after nearly three months of operations in which GSG-2 supported I MEF's ground attack and 9,000 U.S. military personnel operating in the northeastern part of Saudi Arabia.

During the first half of the month, General Krulak's DSC supported the 2d Marine Division in Kuwait and the 1st Marine Division's retrograde to Saudi Arabia, and began the unenviable task of cleaning-up I MEF's equipment, the staging areas in Saudi Arabia, and the battlefield in Kuwait. Punsters dubbed the clean-up, "Operation Desert Shaft." On 8 March, Colonel Woodhead, the DSC's chief of staff, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Skipper, the commanding officer of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, to Jubayl to set up I MEF's vehicle

*Gen Krulak called Col Powell "A Great, Great Marine." (Krulak comments)
The Marines and sailors of MCSSD-11 pose for a final picture before deactivation. Although hard to see, MCSSD-11’s Marines and sailors are either standing on or displaying an item of equipment that represents their support function.

The next day Hearnsberger’s Company B relocated from Kuwait to Jubayl and established a site with decontamination units, floodlights, and 3,000 gallon water tanks. The 8th Engineer Support Battalion’s rapid action allowed cleaned equipment to depart Saudi Arabia by air. On 10 March the DSC moved to Mishab and a week later, General Krulak redesignated the DSC as the 2d FSSG and reclaimed his battalions as the 1st FSSG returned to the United States. Ten days later, Krulak moved his headquarters to GSG-1’s old location at Jubayl and replaced the 1st FSSG as the only force service support group in the Gulf region.

To support the 2d Marine Division, DSG-2 remained in Kuwait through March until early April and then deactivated. On 2 March, it had closed the transfer point at the Ice Cube Tray, moved to Al Jaber Air Base, took over the DSC’s transfer point there, and had continued to support the 2d Marine Division. The following day, Colonel Donnelly had relinquished command to Lieutenant Colonel Hering and returned to the United States on emergency leave.

Over the following week, the DSG detached the supply, maintenance, and engineer sections and Collecting and Clearing Company A. In early April, the 2d Marine Division returned to Saudi Arabia and left the 8th Marines as the only Marine combat force protecting Kuwait. Accordingly, DSG-2 returned to Saudi Arabia, left MCSSD-28 in Kuwait to support the 8th Marines, and deactivated. During its three-month existence, DSG-2 issued 1,519,350 gallons of water, 1,034,451 gallons of...
Engineers from the 8th Engineer Support Battalion wash a five-ton truck and a 400-gallon water trailer at Jubayl.

lons of fuel, and 2,992,796 MREs. It filled 644 orders for repair parts, and treated 286 medical cases. After the ground war, MCSSD-26 stayed at RPP-26, detached its TOW and graves registration sections, and provided combat service support to the 6th Marines. After the infantry regiment returned to Saudi Arabia, Lieutenant Colonel Wittle, on 1 April, moved his mobile to Ras Al Mishab where it disbanded. In MCSSD-26's short existence it pumped and hauled 620,364 gallons of fuel and 981,050 gallons of water, filled more than 500 orders for repair parts, treated 369 patients, and drove 66,583 miles.

As hostilities ended, from March forward, Navy Captain Johnson focused his Seabees' efforts on construction projects to support I MEF’s departure from the Gulf and on sending his four battalions home. On 1 March, Johnson moved the regimental headquarters and NMCB-40 to the Port of Jubayl. Four days later, NMCB-5 moved to Jubayl, but temporarily left a detachment at Qaraah to maintain the roads. In mid-March NMCB-40's sailors departed Saudi Arabia, while their equipment followed over the next month on the MVs Hauge, Obregon, and Bobo. On 12 April, NMCB-5’s personnel departed Saudi Arabia and were followed two weeks later by their equipment on board the MV Lopez. At Mishab, NMCB-70 built 120 new ammunition cells and two buildings for munitions cleaning and packing and at Shaikh Isa, NMCB-70’s detachment relocated to Jubayl. On the 22d, Captain Johnson relinquished command of the 3d NCR to Captain W.A. Waters, USN, and departed Saudi Arabia. At Khanjar, NMCB-24 left a detachment and moved to the Industrial City of Jubayl where it refurbished the 2d Marine Division camp and loaded ships with equipment from NMCBs 5 and 40.

During March and April, MWSSG-37 temporarily continued operations in Kuwait, shut down its northern locations, fell back on the southern air bases, and began leaving the Persian Gulf. From Jubayl Naval Air Facility, MWSS-374 sent

*On 2 April, the Khanjar detachment rejoined the battalion at Jubayl.*
a detachment to Kuwait International Airport to relieve the Marines of MWSS-271 which arrived with the 1st Marine Division during the war. Between 2 and 13 March, the MWSS-374 detachment refuelled 130 helicopters per day, repaired buildings, and provided morale-boosting hot food and showers to the 3d MAW’s Marines restoring operations at the airport. On 14 March, 98 Marines from MWSS-271 at Tanajib replaced the MWSS-374 detachment, which returned to Jubayl Naval Air Facility where preparations for departure were underway. Three days later, MWSS-273 arrived at Jubayl Naval Air Facility from Lonesome Dove and Ras al Mishab. By 4 April, with MWSS-273 in place, MWSS-374 departed Saudi Arabia. Ten days later MWSS-273 sent its advance party to Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina, while the remainder of the squadron recovered, cleaned, inspected, and loaded equipment and AM2 matting on ships until mid-May.

At the beginning of March, MWSS-271 was spread among Tanajib, Kibrit, OP-4, Al Jaber Air Base, and Kuwait International Airport. During the month, MWSS-271’s Marines helped move MAG-26 from Lonesome Dove and MAG-16 from Tanajib and pulled 800,000 square feet of AM-2 matting off the sand at Tanajib and Kibrit. On the 14th, Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Zegar, the squadron commander, sent Marines to Kuwait International Airport and a week later dispatched seven crash and fire rescue personnel to Mishab to help recover a crashed Saudi C-130 Hercules aircraft. At the end of the month and after recovering detachments from Mishab and Kuwait, MWSS-271 began moving to Shaikh Isa to relieve MWSS-373, which until 17 March had built staging and washdown areas and refueled aircraft, and then prepared for departure. As MWSS-271 arrived, MWSS-373 departed with the last of its Marines leaving on 17 April. Five days later, Lieutenant Colonel Zegar relinquished command of MWSS-271 to Major Roger E. Penrod, who then closed Tanajib. By the end of the month, the squadron was at Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain.

At King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, MWSS-174 prepared the facility to return to the Saudis and departed the Gulf. Prior to handing over the airport, Lieutenant Colonel Chessum, the squadron commander, ordered that all bunkers and strongback tent frames be disassembled, the wood neatly stacked, the soccer stadium cleaned, all firing holes filled, and berms and bunkers leveled. On 1
April, the squadron’s advance party departed Saudi Arabia, while the remainder of its Marines cleaned equipment which was moved to the port, inspected, and accepted by the 2d FSSG, which would later load the equipment on MPS ships. On 24 April, MWSS-174 returned to Hawaii and left MWSS-273 at the Jubayl Naval Air Facility and MWSS-271 at Shaikh Isa, as the two remaining MWSSs in Southwest Asia.

A Marine Corps Shame

At the beginning of March, the DSC was faced with retrieving the huge amount of equipment and ammunition abandoned on the battlefield by rapidly departing units. A large percentage of the deserted equipment came off the ships of the MPS squadrons and was left behind by units that myopically viewed the care and return of their gear as someone else’s responsibility. For example, General Krulak discovered a tank near a minefield and thought that it had been hit by enemy fire. After examining the tank and noting no battle damage, Krulak reasoned that the tank had broken down. When a mechanic tried to start the vehicle, the engine turned over smoothly. The using unit merely left the tank behind in its haste to leave Saudi Arabia. In addition to weapons there were deserted forklifts, bulldozers, and trucks.* Another problem was the huge amount of ammunition that littered Kuwait and Northern Saudi Arabia. As the ground war progressed, rapidly advancing artillery batteries had found it easier to leave ammunition in the sand than to reload it on trucks. General Krulak called the abandonment of equipment and ammunition a “Marine Corps Shame.”616** To clean up after the divisions, the DSC initiated a battlefield hunt for deserted equipment and supplies. Using both helicopters and ground vehicles, the DSC staff searched every known position and route of advance in order to locate, mark, and plan for the recovery of orphaned materials. The DSC’s recovery plans called for a larger version of Operation Roundup which the 1st FSSG’s maintenance detachment conducted the previous October.617

Operation Desert Cleanup

In addition to the material abandoned in Kuwait, most of the 15 days of supply stocked at Khanjar, the Ponderosa, and OP-4 remained at those locations. As the rear elements of both divisions departed, the 3d MAW abandoned Lonesome Dove, and Saudi Motors cleaned out Kibrit. This left the unglamorous,

---

*On one occasion, the DSC Marines found a buried HUMMWV when they saw its antennae poking through the sand. (Krulak comments) Maj Songer, the executive officer of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, twice discovered LVSs that were flipped over by a wrecker so that minor parts could be cut from the vehicles and used as repair parts. (Songer intvw, 19 Mar96)

**Gen Krulak also called the abandonment of the MPS equipment “a tremendous lesson learned.” To prevent this problem from occurring again, the Advanced Logistic Officer Course has implemented a case study that addresses the retrieval of MPS equipment and the methods for instilling a sense of responsibility in its operators. (Krulak comments)
The staff members of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion pose for their picture. LtCol Thomas S. Woodson, the battalion commander, is seated in the center of the first row.

but necessary, burden of reclaiming all things of value to the battalion. As I MEF Marines, flushed with triumph, relaxed, took showers, boarded airplanes, and returned to well-deserved victory parades, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion, which had operated at surge capacity since early February, began another grueling period in which it hauled more tonnage and drove more miles than it had before the war.

During the first half of March, Lieutenant Colonel Woodson focused his battalion on cleaning out sites around Khanjar and supporting the 2d Marine Division in Kuwait. Woodson’s first priority was to move the ammunition left at OP-4, the Ponderosa, and the numerous abandoned artillery sites scattered along the border and in Kuwait. Many of the battalion’s drivers who had hauled ammunition into battle with the artillerymen, helped find the old battery positions. During the war, significant amounts of ammunition and equipment had bounced off the beds of trucks because of frayed cargo straps, strained banding, tired drivers, and washboard roads. The 8th Motor Transport drivers policed up the ammunition and equipment laying along the road and shipped it to Mishab.

By mid-March, trucks and drivers which had transferred to DSGs-1 and -2 for the ground war returned to the 8th Motor Transport Battalion. The return of his vehicles gave Lieutenant Colonel Woodson 400 trucks and the wherewithal to move the huge amount of ammunition and supplies that remained at Khanjar. The battalion dispatched 10 trucks every hour with ammunition and containers to the port of Mishab as well as continuing to carry supplies to the 2d Marine Division in Kuwait. The lack of materials-handling equipment, the Achilles heel of transportation, limited the amount of cargo hauled as truck drivers sat idle, while too few forklifts, cranes, and RTCHs slowly loaded trucks at desert sites and unloaded them at Mishab. By 25 March, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion moved all of the ammunition from Khanjar and then concentrated on hauling the remaining containers and cargo. The U.S. Army helped by picking up excess fuel. On
April, Woodson’s battalion emptied Khanjar and moved into the 7th Motor Transport Battalion’s camp at Mishab. From the port, the battalion continued to support MCSSD-28 and the 8th Marines in Kuwait, supervised the remnants of Saudi Motors, and cleaned supplies and equipment until early May.\textsuperscript{618}

With more and more equipment and supplies arriving from the field, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion’s washdown operations mushroomed. By 4 April, Lieutenant Colonel Skipper’s Marines managed four washdown sites in the Jubayl area that could clean up to a thousand items per day. The sites used 20,000 gallon fuel bags, 600 gallon-per-minute pumps, crimped hand-service nozzles, and chlorinated reclaimed water to wash every item before it left Saudi Arabia. The engineers laid out a total of 24 amphibious assault fuel systems and three water systems at the four sites. After cleaning, U.S. Army customs agents and Department of Agriculture Customs inspectors checked each item before the Marines loaded it on either a ship or an airplane.\textsuperscript{619}

*Marine Force Southwest Asia: 21 April-10 October 1991*

Marine Forces Southwest Asia (MARFORSWA) was established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 21 April 1991. . . . The commander, MARFORSWA, was assigned the mission of control and support of the reconstitution . . . for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). . . . —MARFORSWA Command Chronology

21 April-24 June 1991

On 21 April 1991, Marine Force Southwest Asia (MARFORSWA) activated, replaced I MEF, and began coordinating Marine Corps operations in the Persian Gulf region. Major General Norman E. Ehlert, a naval aviator who served two tours in Vietnam, commanded MARFORSWA. The new organization initially consisted of the 2d FSSG; the 2d Marine Division (Rear), commanded by the division’s logistics officer, Colonel Morris O. Fletcher; the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), led by Colonel Coop; the newly arrived Blount Island Command (Forward), commanded by Colonel William H. Harris; and the 3d NCR (Rear). During May and June, the lead elements of a Special Purposes Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) arrived in Saudi Arabia and replaced the units that fought in Desert Storm. As the desert war veterans departed and new forces arrived, MARFORSWA focused on reconstituting the MPF.

The mission of the Blount Island Command (Forward) was to reconstitute 12 of the 13 ships of the MPF by restoring MPSRon-2 to a status of fully mission capable and MPSRon-1 and -3 to a lesser condition of mission capable.\textsuperscript{*} Colonel Harris led the 88 members of the Blount Island Command, who planned and

\textsuperscript{*}The 13th ship of the fleet, the MV Lummus was refurbished at Blount Island during the autumn of 1991. The MV Fisher was renamed the MV Phillips on 8 April 1991. (Blount Island Command [Forward] ComdC Aug91, Sec 2 and Ms. Marlene Venz, Military Sealift Command, Comment File)
A forklift loads some of the 750 pallets of package petrol and lubricant at Khanjar for transportation to the port.

directed the MPF reconstitution efforts executed by the 2d FSSG; a task-organized Naval Cargo Handling and Port Operations Group (NAVCHAPGRU); contract workers from the Bendix Field Engineering Corporation and DYNCORP, who prepared aviation support and ground material equipment for shipping, and teams of civil servants from Naval Weapons Stations Concord, California, and Charleston, South Carolina, who packed ammunition containers. This eclectic force of Marines, sailors, U.S. Government employees, and civilian contractors worked 24 hours a day to adhere to the loading schedule, competed for resources with residual Desert Storm commands, and successfully loaded three Maritime Prepositioning Ships before the end of June.

An aerial view encompasses one of the four mammoth washdown sites operated by the 8th Engineer Battalion at Jubayl. The engineers used 20,000-gallon water bags to store the water used to clean equipment and supplies prior to leaving Saudi Arabia.
On 18 May, 20 Marines from the 3d FSSG on Okinawa arrived at Jubayl and were immediately joined by 121 Marines and sailors from the 1st FSSG in California and another 404 from the 3d FSSG. Landing with the last group from Okinawa was Colonel Paul M. Lee, Jr., a supply officer with a master’s degree in materiel management from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Lee commanded the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) of the Special Purpose MAGTF, which had the missions of assisting the Blount Island Command to reconstitute the MPF and of replacing the 2d FSSG. As designed earlier by Colonel Powell and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, the CSSE consisted of headquarters and services, engineer, landing support, maintenance, motor transport, and supply detachments. During June, the 2d FSSG (Rear) at Camp Lejeune sent 405 augmentees to the CSSE and the 1st FSSG dispatched an additional 311 logisticians to Saudi Arabia. These reinforcements increased the size of the CSSE to 1,519 Marines and sailors. Colonel Lee dispersed his detachments to similar units in the 2d FSSG to ensure continued smooth operations and turn over when the FSSG departed. In addition, Lee sent a detachment, commanded by Major Michael L. Collier, to Mishab to work under the command of the 2d FSSG.

Between 13-14 May, the Security Detachment, 3d Marines, arrived from Hawaii to guard MARFORSWA, but also helped with the logistics burden. Lieutenant Colonel David A. Debruyne commanded 479 volunteers and individuals from the 1st Marine Brigade who had not served in the Gulf and represented some 75 different military occupational specialties. Debruyne organized his command into two companies, each having two platoons, and deployed the force to sites in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. As camps closed, Lieutenant Colonel Debruyne sent personnel to the CSSE to assist operations. On 14 June, he sent 30 Marines to Mishab to help clean ammunition, later increased the number to 159, and dis-
patched personnel to help load MPF ships and work at FASP-2, near the Cement Factory Ridge.

The Aviation Command Element (ACE), MARFORSWA arrived at the end of May, relieved the last of the MWSS Marines, prepared ammunition for transportation, turned over bases to the Saudis, and loaded ships. On 8 June, Major Robert B. Finney replaced Major Bradley A. Corr, who briefly commanded the 110 Marines and sailors of the ACE. On 15 June, the ACE Marines loaded the SS Cape Carthage, which was the first ammunition ship loaded in Bahrain, at Mina Suliman. In Saudi Arabia, the ACE Marines relieved MWSS-273, whose rear party departed Jubayl Naval Air facility on 27 May. The ACE then proceeded to return Jubayl Naval Air Facility, the ammunition supply point at Ras Al Ghar, and King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station to the Royal Saudi Navy.

In late April and early May, most of the remaining Seabees departed from Saudi Arabia and left a small party to load aircraft and ships at Jubayl until mid-June. On 25 April, NMCB-24 departed and, on 8 May, was followed by most of the personnel from NMCB-74. The latter battalion left a 110-man “delay party” which loaded airplanes and ships with the last of the Navy’s equipment. On 8 May, the Seabees loaded equipment on three U.S. Air Force cargo aircraft destined for Turkey to support Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. Over the next month, NMCB-74’s sailors loaded the MVs American Condor, Cape Horn, and Oslo Polar. On 13 June, the delay party departed Saudi Arabia and thus ended the Seabees tremendous contribution in the Gulf war. From August 1990 until June 1991, naval construction battalions had completed 6 million square feet of aircraft parking, built 9.9 million square yards of ammunition storage, erected camps for 37,500 people, set up mess halls that fed 100,000 people, maintained 400 kilometers of road, laid out two airstrips, and executed a variety of other projects which supported I MEF’s victory in Kuwait.

Between 21 April and 23 June, the 2d FSSG loaded ships and airplanes, and departed the region. In a nine-week period, the 2d FSSG packed 16 Military Sealift Command ships with unit equipment, started filling two ships with ammunition at Mishab, and help the Blount Island Command load the first three MPS ships, the MVs Baugh, Phillips, and Hauge. The 8th Engineer Support Battalion sheathed with wood the walls of three bulk cargo configured ships, so that they could carry palletized ammunition and blocked and braced ammunition on board the ships. In less than two months, the 2d FSSG loaded 126,961 short tons of cargo on ships and 6,143 tons and 14,478 passengers on aircraft. On 6 May, the

---

*MWSS-271 turned over Shaikh Isa to Marine Logistics Squadron 16 on 16 May and departed for the United States. (MWSS-271 ComdC, Jan-Jun91, Sec 3)


***The 8th Engineer Support Battalion handled so much ammunition that its Marines and sailors began referring to themselves as the 8th Ammunition Support Battalion. In addition to loading ships, Capt Hulls’ Company C repacked 232 containers and operated the night shift at FASP-2. (Skipper comments)
8th Marines and MCSSD-28 returned to Saudi Arabia and ended the Marine Corps deployment in Kuwait. The termination of operations in Kuwait allowed Lieutenant Colonel Woodson to move the remaining portion of the 8th Motor Transport Battalion from Mishab to Jubayl and to depart the Gulf. On the 31st, General Krulak replaced General Ehlert and started a 23-day tenure as the commanding general of MARFORSWA. On 1 June, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion washed the last of the 25,000 pieces of equipment that it cleaned since early March, and returned to Camp Lejeune 13 days later. With Colonel Lee’s CSSE in place, the 2d FSSG reduced its strength and on 23 June, General Krulak relinquished command of MARFORSWA to Brigadier General Gary E. Brown, an infantry officer who served two tours in Vietnam. The next day, Krulak departed Saudi Arabia and was immediately followed by the FSSG’s rear party.

24 June-10 October 1991

General Brown took over a logistic-heavy organization of 2,236 Marines and sailors consisting of a command element; the ACE; the Security Detachment, 3d Marines; the CSSE; and the Blount Island Command (Forward). Over the next 108 days, Colonel Lee’s CSSE assisted the Blount Island Command reconstitute the remaining nine ships of the MPF, provided combat service support to MARFORSWA, and ended the Marine Corps participation in Desert Storm. Colonel Lee’s Marines reworked ammunition at Mishab and at FASP-2 as well as loaded ships at Mina Suliman, Jubayl, and Mishab.

On 23 June, Major Collier took charge of the 286 Marines and sailors of the CSSD at Mishab, who identified and disposed of unserviceable ammunition as well as cleaned, palletized, and loaded the munitions on ships. A week later, 24 civilians from the Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California, arrived to help load ammunition. On 8 July, the ground combat element sent teams of Marines to operate a washdown site, which operated 24 hours a day. From the end of June until 4 September, the CSSD loaded 48,502 short tons of ammunition on the SS Cape Bon (30 June), SS Brij (3 August), SS Alten Bells (20 August), SS Gulf Trader (23 August), and MV Jean Lykes (4 September), and its explosive ordnance technicians demolished 5,881 short tons of unserviceable ammunition. After the departure of the Jean Lykes, Major Collier sent personnel and equipment to Jubayl and closed Mishab on 18 September.

Around the Jubayl area, the CSSE cleared the ammunition out of FASP-2, loaded nine Military Sealift Command ships, and assisted the Blount Island Command reconstitute the nine MPF ships. Captain Paul R. Wilson’s landing support detachment loaded ships at Al Jubayl and Mina Suleiman and also passengers and cargo on board aircraft. Captain Daniel W. Elzie’s engineer detachment blocked and braced ammunition on ships, stored fuel and water, operated generators, and destroyed unserviceable ammunition. Between 1 July and 10 October, Capt Negahquet’s EOD platoon destroyed 154,3388 rounds of enemy ordnance, cleared 102 enemy vehicles, and destroyed 975 tons of U.S. unserviceable ammunition. (Skipper comments)

*In its three months of retrograde operations, Capt Negahquet’s EOD platoon destroyed 154,3388 rounds of enemy ordnance, cleared 102 enemy vehicles, and destroyed 975 tons of U.S. unserviceable ammunition. (Skipper comments)*
Vehicles wait to be loaded on ships at the Port of Jubayl.

First Lieutenant Julia A. Smith’s motor transport detachment, using mostly commercial trucks, moved 102,476 short tons of cargo, 981,595 gallons of water, and 385,524 gallons of fuel. Major Michael J. Motes’ supply detachment constructed 367 medical supply blocks, built 667 shipping boxes, loaded 62 40-foot containers with rations, and filled 330 containers with construction materials and spare parts. Major Henry Willis’ maintenance detachment closed 1,626 work orders, deployed 44 contact teams to fix equipment, and then pitched in with working parties and drove vehicles to the pier. Captain Hector L. Melendez’ headquarters and services detachment managed contracts, operated messhalls, ran computer systems, closed down the Marine Corps exchanges, and operated the Military Customs/Agricultural Section. Between July and October, the customs inspectors deployed 152 contact teams to inspect 2,779 vehicles, 2,125 containers, and 55,137 pallets of ammunition. The inspectors took over the washrack at FASP-2 and increased the daily throughput from 200 ammunition pallets to 900.629 Both the ACE and the Security Detachment conducted retrograde logistics operations. On 20 August, the ACE completed packing the MV Hanjin Jedda and SS Aide at Mina Suliman, and returned Shaikh Isa to Bahrainian control. At the Port of Jubayl, ACE personnel prepared ammunition for the SS Aide which loaded munitions in Saudi Arabia until 2 September. Two days later, the ACE departed Saudi Arabia without its commander, Major Finney, who remained with MARFORSWA until 10 October as an aviation planner.630 As installations closed and the security requirement decreased, Lieutenant Colonel Debruyne sent personnel back to Hawaii. On 4 September, 30 Marines departed Saudi Arabia and were followed by 338 more Marines on the 18th. The remaining members of the security detachment guarded the main camps in Jubayl until MARFORSWA departed Saudi Arabia.631

On 10 October, Brigadier General Brown disestablished MARFORSWA, departed Saudi Arabia, and ended the Marine Corps deployment to the Persian
A Marine customs inspector signs off on an item. Between July and October 1991, officials inspected 2,779 vehicles, 2,125 containers, and 55,137 pallets of ammunition prior to loading them on board ships.

Gulf. Departing with General Brown were the 109 Marines of the CSSE who returned to either the 1st, 2d, or 3d FSSG. Between April and October, MARFORSWA loaded 12 MPS ships and 34 Military Sealift Command Ships with 292,411 short tons of equipment and cargo and 112,334 short tons of ammunition. In addition to ships, the command loaded 17,723 personnel and 6,683 short tons of cargo on 173 aircraft.632

Conclusion

"I can only say that I have never worked with or observed a more dedicated group of Marines and Sailors in my Life."633

Between August 1990 and October 1991, The Marine Corps quickly sent forces to the Persian Gulf, freed Kuwait, and rapidly reconstituted its capabilities to respond to other crises. The MPF and Marines afloat gave the Marine Corps the ability to respond rapidly, while the professionalism of its combat service support forces gave the Corps the capability to accomplish its mission. The 1st and
2d FSSGs unloaded ships and aircraft and pushed supplies and services to the ground and aviation combat elements. Generals Brabham and Krulak welded together a general and direct system that extended from Kuwait to Bahrain. To defeat Saddam Hussein, General Krulak’s Marines and sailors moved with the ground attack, while General Brabham used every conceivable means of transportation to push supplies forward. The five squadrons of Colonel Coop’s MWSG-37 provided direct support to the 3d MAW’s helicopters and fixed-wing air groups and the Seabees of Captain Johnson’s 3d NCR built facilities from Bahrain to Kuwait. Not resting on the laurels of victory, the 2d FSSG recovered the Marine Corps’ ammunition capability and, together, with the Blount Island Command, began reconstituting the MPF. Replacing the FSSG, the Combat Service Support Element of Marine Forces Southwest Asia completed the rebuild of the MPF, departed Saudi Arabia, and ended the war of logistics.
Notes

Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: CG 7th MEB/CG I MEF (Fwd) Situation Reports 001-021 for the period 12Aug-3Sep90, hereafter 7th MEB Sitrep(s) 001-021; CG 7th MEB/CG I MEF (Fwd) Logistics Status Reports 002 and 005-016, for the period 19Aug-2Sep90, hereafter, 7th MEB Logstat(s) 002 and 005-016; CG 1st FSSG, Situation Reports 003-007, 009-016, and 018, for the period 16-31Aug90, hereafter 1st FSSG SitRep(s) 003-007, 009-016, and 018; DSG-1 ComdC, 8Aug-3Sep90, hereafter DSG-1 ComdC; MWSS-373 ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, hereafter MWSS-373 ComdC; MWSS-374 ComdC Jul-Dec90, hereafter MWSS-374 ComdC; 7th MEB ComdC 1Jul-3Sep90, hereafter 7th MEB ComdC; 4th MEB ComdC Jul-Oct90, hereafter 4th MEB ComdC; CO Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet, ltr to CNO, Subj: Naval Construction Force Support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, dtd 23 Jan92, hereafter “Naval Construction Force Support”; Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, TM 11240-15/4A, Motor Transport Characteristics Manual, 29Mar91, hereafter TM 11240-15/4A; Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, TM 11275-15/3C, Engineer Equipment Characteristics Manual, 29Mar91, hereafter TM 11275-15/3C; Capt Adrian Burke intvw, 9Dec90 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Burke intvw, 9Dec90; CG MCCDC, FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support Operations, 12Jul93, hereafter, FMFM 4-1. All command chronologies, unless otherwise noted, are located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.


5. Col Alexander W. Powell, comments on draft, Feb97, Author’s Files, MCHC, hereafter Powell comments; Maj Adrian W. Burke, comments on draft, n.d.
[Feb97?], Author’s Files, MCHC, hereafter Burke comments.
6. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 2.
7. Ibid., Sec 3, and Biography of MajGen John I. Hopkins, USMC (Ret), HQMC Public Affairs Division, 2Feb93.
8. 1st FSSG Sitrep 004.
9. Burke comments.
10. 7th MEB Sitreps 001-003, and 010; 7th MEB ComdC, Secs 2 and 3; DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 3.
11. MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 1; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1; MWSG-37 ComdC Feb90, p.5.
13. MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1-3; 7th MEB Sitrep 014.
14. 7th MEB ComdC, Sec 2.
17. BSSG-1 ComdC, Jan-Jun91, Pt IV.
18. 7th MEB Sitreps 014, 015, and 018.
19. Ibid.; 7th MEB ComdC, Secs 2 and 3.
21. 4thMEB ComdC, Secs 1-3.
22. Ibid., Secs 2 and 3; Simmons, “Getting Marines to the Gulf,” p. 19.
26. FMFM 4-1, pp. 10-3 and 10-4.
27. Capt Michael R. Johnson, CEC, USN, comments on draft, 20Mar97, Author’s Files, MCHC, hereafter Johnson comments.
28. COMCPAC Foxtrot Delta ComdC, Aug-Sep90, Sec 1.
29. 7th MEB Sitrep 021.
32. 1st FSSG Sitrep 004.
33. 7th MEB Sitrep 021.
34. 7th MEB ComdC, Sec 2; 7th MEB Sitreps 018-021; “Naval Construction Battalion Support,” pp. 11-12; and 4th MEB ComdC, Sec 3.
35. Ibid.
36. Burke intvw, 9Dec90.
37. 7th MEB Sitrep 006.
38. Author telecon with Dr. John Leland, Historian for the Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, 15Aug95. Dr. Leland researched Military
Airlift Command Situation reports and the Crises Response Team Log book to determine the date of 16 August 1990.

39. Burke intvw, 9Dec90.
40. 7th MEB Sitreps 004, 005, and 008; 7th MEB ComdC, Sec 2.
42. 7th MEB Sitreps 010 and 016.
43. 7th MEB Sitreps 006, 013, and 021.
44. 7th MEB Logstats 007 and 012; 7th MEB Sitrep 016.
45. BSSG-1 ComdC, 1Jan-Jun91, Pt IV.; 7th MEB Logstats 014 and 016; and 7th MEB Sitrep 016.
46. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 2.
47. TM 11240-15/4A, pp. 2-59, 2-60, and 4-21—4-28; TM 11275-15/3C, pp. 2-125 and 2-126; Battlefield Assessment Team Tape # 136 14Mar91 (MCU Archives: Quantico, Va), hereafter these tapes will be designated BAT tape with number. Col Thomas S. Woodson, comments on draft, 24Feb97, Author’s files, hereafter Woodson comments.
48. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1.
49. TM 11275-15/3C, p. 2-36.
50. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1.
51. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1; TM 11275-15/3C, pp. 2-64, 2-66, and 2-77.
52. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1; TM 11275-15/3C, p. 2-166.
53. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1; TM 11275-15/3C, p. 2-82.
54. DSG-1 ComdC, Sec 2.
55. 7th MEB, Order No. 001, 18Aug90, Item No. 14, Supporting Documents, 7th MEB ComdC.
56. 7th MEB Sitrep 013.
57. Burke comments.
58. Burke intvw, 9Dec90; Brabham, “Training,” p. 35.
59. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4; 7th MEB ComdC, Sec 2; 7th MEB Sitreps 018 and 021-023; 7th MEB Logstats 015 and 018.
60. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4.
61. 7th MEB Logstat 015.
62. 7th MEB Sitrep 007.
63. 7th MEB Logstats 012, 014, and 015.
64. 7th MEB Sitreps 010, 011, 014, and 016; 7th MEB Logstat 010.
65. 7th MEB Logstats 012 and 016; 7th MEB Sitrep 019.
66. 7th MEB Logstats 012, 014, and 015; 7th MEB Sitrep 013.
67. LtCol Felix M. Bush, USMC comment file
68. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4; FMFM 4-1, pp. 11-3 and 11-4.
69. 7th MEB Sitreps 014 and 016.
70. 7th MEB Logstats 007 and 008; 7th MEB Sitrep 009 and 15; 7th MEB ComdC, Sec II.
71. 7th MEB Sitreps 007-018; 7th MEB Logstats 014-016.
72. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4.
73. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4.
74. Ibid.; 7th MEB ComdC, Sec 2; 7th MEB Logstat 016.
76. 7th MEB Sitreps 017, 019, and 020.
78. 7th MEB Logstats 006, 011, 013, and 014.
79. GSG-1 ComdC, Sep90, encl 7.
80. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 4; 7th MEB Sitreps 009 and 012.
81. 7th MEB Sitreps 013, 015, 019, and 020.
82. 7th MEB Sitrep 016.
83. FMFM 4-1, p. E-4.
84. Burke intvw, 9Dec90; 7th MEB Sitrep 014.
85. Burke intvw, 9Dec90; 7th MEB Sitreps 017-019; Burke comments.
86. DSG-1 ComdC, Secs 1 and 2.
87. 7th MEB Sitreps 013, 017, and 019.
88. 7th MEB Logstat 009.
89. 7th MEB Sitreps 014 and 021.
90. MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 2.
91. Ibid.; 7th MEB Logstat 014.
92. 7th MEB Logstats 012, 014 and 015; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 1.
93. HMH-462 ComdC, 4Aug-3Sep90; HMH-463 ComdC Sep90; HMM-465 ComdC 3-30Sep90; HMH-466 ComdC 20Aug-2Sep90; 7th MEB Sitreps 011 and 021.
94. MWSG-373 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 3.
95. 7th MEB Logstat 014.
96. DSG-1 ComdC, 8Aug-3Sep90, Secs 1 and 2; 7th MEB Sitrep 013; GSG-1 ComdC, Sep 90, Encl 7; 7th MEB Logstat 016.
97. 7th MEB Sitrep 021.
98. 7th MEB Logstat 014.
100. I MEF ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2; MarCent Sitrep 025.
102. 3d FSSG ComdC July-Dec90, Secs 2 and 3.
104. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2.
105. BAT Tape 880.
106. Ibid.
107. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2.
108. BAT Tapes 416 and 406.
109. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30 Sep90, Secs 2 and 3.
110. BAT Tape 316.
111. LtCol Richard L. Kelly intvw, 9Dec90 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Kelly intvw, 9Dec90; 1st FSSG Sitrep 014.
112. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30 Sep90, Secs 2, 3, and 4.
113. GSG-1 ComdC Sep90, Sec 2.
114. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30Sep90, Secs 1-4; GSG-1 ComdC Sep90, Secs 1 and 2 and Encls 1-8.
115. 1st FSSG ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 1-4.
117. 3d MAW ComdC 3-30Sep90, Secs 1, 2, and 3; VMO-2 ComdC Sep90.
118. Ibid.
120. COMCBPAC FD ComdC 3-30Sep90; “Naval Construction Battalion Support,” pp. 4, 5, and 11.
122. COMCBPac FD ComdC Oct90, Secs 1 and 2; “Naval Construction Force Support,” pp. 4, 5, 11, and 12.
123. 3d MAW ComdC, 3-30Sep90, Sec 2.
124. MarCent Sitrep 022.
125. MarCent Sitrep 031.
126. MAG-16 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3; HMLA-369 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3; HMH-462 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3; HMH-465 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3; HMH-463 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3; HMH-466 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3.
130. MWSS-374 ComdC, Secs 3 and 4; MWSS-174 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3.
131. GSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Encl 6; DSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Secs 2 and 3.
132. MWSS-174 ComdC Sep90, Sec 1, 2, and 3.
135. MWSS-174 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3.
136. Ibid.
137. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encls 6 and 7.
139. MWSS-373 ComdC, Secs 2 and 3.
140. DSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2; 1st FSSG Sitrep 024.
141. MWSS-373 ComdC, Secs 2 and 3.
142. DSG-1 ComdC 03-30Sep90, Sec 2.
143. Burke comments.
144. MarCent SitReps 042 and 056; Cureton, With the 1st MarDiv, p. 13.
145. 1st FSSG SitRep 026; Burke intvw, 9Dec90; Burke comments.
146. FMFM 4-1, p. E-9.
147. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep, Encl 3.
148. DSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2; Burke comments.
149. MarCent SitRep 048.
150. MWSS-374 ComdC, Secs 2 and 3; MWSS-174 ComdC Sep90, Secs 2 and 3.
151. FMFM 4-1, p. 11-3; GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 8.
152. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 8; Burke comments.
153. 1st FSSG Sitrep 0025; DSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2; Burke intvw, 9Dec90.
154. Kelly comments.
155. 1st FSSG Sitrep 024; Author telecon with Col Richard Kelly, 25Jan96, hereafter Kelly telecon; MarCent Sitreps 042 and 056.
156. LtCol Kelly intvw, 9Dec90; Kelly telecon; Kelly comments.
157. 1st FSSG SitReps 010 and 026; Kelly comments.
158. BAT Tape 247.
159. 1st FSSG SitRep 017; 1st MarDiv ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2.
160. 1st FSSG Sitrep 026; GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encls 3 and 8.
161. MarCent Sitrep 023.
163. I MEF ComdC 3-30Sep, Sec 1.
165. Quilter, With I MEF, p. 14; MarCent Sitreps 079 and 090.
166. MarCent Sitreps 055-059.
168. DSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Sec 2.
170. DSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Sec 2.
171. Burke comments.
172. Burke intvw, 9Dec90.
173. Kelly comments.
175. 1st MarDiv ComdC Oct90, Sec 2.
176. Kelly intvw, 9Dec90.
177. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2.
178. GSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Sec 2.
179. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 3.
180. GSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Encl 3.
181. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 5.
182. GSG-1, ComdC Oct90, Encl 5.
184. Ibid., Encls 7 and 8.
185. Ibid.
186. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30 Sep90, Encl 7; GSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Encl 7.
187. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30 Sep90, Encl 4; I MEF ComdC Sep90, Sec 3.
188. GSG-1 ComdC Oct90, Encl 4.
189. FMFM 4-1, p. 8-2.
190. Author telecon with Col William D. Bushnell, 5Jan97.
191. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 2; Kelly comments.
192. LtCol Felix Bush Comments
194. GSG-1 ComdC 3-30Sep90, Encl 6.
195. I MEF ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 2 and 3; LtCol Cassady intvw (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) 25Nov90; FMFM 4-1, p. 12-10.
197. MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, Jr. USMC, letter, Marine Corps Gazette, Feb93, p. 50.
201. Ibid.
203. MarCent Sitrep 079.
204. Ibid; 1st MarDiv ComdC Oct90, Sec 2; MWSS 174 ComdC Oct90, Sec 1; MWSS-373 ComdC, Sec 4; MWSS-374 ComdC, Sec 4.
206. DOD, Final Report to Congress, pp. 65-78.
207. 3d MAW Sitreps 090 and 094.
208. 3d MAW ComdC Dec90, Sec 2.
209. I MEF ComdC Nov90, Sec 2.
211. Quilter, With I MEF, p. 35; I MEF ComdC Dec90, Sec 2.
213. Krulak comments.
214. CG 2d FSSG ltr to CGIMEF, dtd 5Nov90.
215 Ibid.
216. Biography of LtGen Carl E. Mundy, Jr. (HQMC:PAO) 20Jul90.
217. BAT Tape 450; BAT Tape Krulak, Apr91.
218. BAT Tape 416.
219. Krulak comments.
220. NAVMC P-1005, Officers on Active Duty in the Marine Corps, 1Oct90.
221. BAT Tape 1454.
222. BAT Tape Krulak Apr91; BAT Tapes 416 and 450.
223. Ibid.; MarCent Sitrep 108; Krulak comments.
225. BAT Tape 450.
227. 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90, Sec 3; BAT Tape 880.
228. Col Thomas E. Hampton, comments on draft, 2Mar97, Author’s Files, hereafter Hampton comments.
229. BAT Tape 880.
230. 1st FSSG Sitrep 115.
231. DSG-1 ComdC Nov90, Sec 3.
232. BAT Tape 1454.
233. BAT Tape 316.
234. Ibid.; 1st MarDiv ComdC Nov90, Sec 2.
235. Kelly comments.
236. BAT Tape 28.
237. Kelly intvw, 9Dec90; Kelly comments.
238. Burke intvw, 9Dec90.
241. Johnson comments.
242. Ibid., p. 18.
243. I MEF ComdC Dec90, Sec 2.
245. BSSG-5 ComdC 1Jul-31Dec90, Encls 1 and 2.
246. 5th MEB ComdC 1July-31Dec90, Sec 2; Simmons, “Getting Marines to the Gulf,” p. 20.
247. 1st MarDiv ComdC July-Dec90, Secs 1 and 2.
249. MarCent Sitreps 111-141; Simmons, “Getting to the Gulf,” p. 19; I MEF ComdC Dec90, Sec 2.
250. BAT Tape 647.
251. MWSS-273 ComdC Jul-Dec90; 3d MAW Sitreps 118 and 119.
252. 3d MAW Logstat 075.
253. 3d MAW ComdC 3-30Sep90, Sec 1; 3d MAW ComdC Oct90, Sec 1, 3d MAW ComdC Dec90, Secs 1 and 2; 3d MAW Logstats 073 and 075; and 3d MAW Sitrep 118.
254. Skipper comments.
255. GSG-1 ComdC Dec90, Sec 3.
257. 1st FSSG Sitrep 115.
260. Skipper comments.
261. Ibid. pp. 22-23; Woodson and Songer intvw.
262. Pankey comments.
263. 1st FSSG ComdC, Sec 2.
264. DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91, Secs 1 and 2; DSC SitReps 001 and 005; 1st FSSG ComdC, Secs 1 and 2.
266. Col David L. Wittle comments on draft, n.d. [Apr97], Author’s Files, hereafter Wittle comments.
268. Skipper comments.
269. 1st FSSG ComdC Secs 1 and 4; DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91, Sec 4; GSG-1 ComdC, Dec90, Sec 1; GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Sec 1, hereafter, GSG-2 ComdC.
270. MarCent SitRep 140; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90, Secs 2 and 3; DSC ComdC, 22Dec90-15Feb91, Secs 3 and 4; GSG-1 ComdC Dec90, Sec 3; “Naval Construction Force Support,” pp. 2, 6, 17 and 18; GSG-2 ComdC, Secs 1, 2, and 3; MWSS-174 ComdC Dec90, Sec 2.
272. MARCENT OpO, Change 2, 1Jan91, p. 5.
273. 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 2.
274. MWSS-37 ComdC Jan90, Sec 2.
275. MWSS-373 ComdC Jan91, Sec 2.
276. MWSS-174 ComdC Jan91, Secs 2 and 3; 3d MAW ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
277. Ibid.; MWSS-273 ComdC Jan91, Secs 2 and 3.
278. Col John A. O’Donovan comments on draft, n.d. [Mar97], Author’s Files, hereafter O’Donovan comments.
279. Skipper comments.
280. Ibid.
281. DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91, Secs 1, 2, and 3; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb 91, Sec 2.
282. 1st FSSG ComdC 1Dec90-28Feb91, Sec 2 and 3; GSG-1 ComdC Jan91.
283. BAT Tape 81.
285. DSG-1 ComdC Jan91, Secs 1 and 2; BAT Tape 316.
286. 7th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs 2-3.
287. DSG-1 ComdC Jan91, Sec 2.
288. BAT Tapes 371 and 1393.
289. BAT Tape 1393.
290. Winter comments.
291. Kelly comments.
292. BAT Tape 1393.
293. 1st Mar ComdC Jan91, Secs 2 and 3.
294. BAT Tape 022.
295. BAT Tape 022.
296. Powell comments.
297. Burke comments.
298. BAT Tape 022.
299. Burke comments.
300. BAT Tape 371.
302. DSG-1 ComdC 1-23Feb91, Sec 2.
303. BAT Tape 006.
304. BAT Tape 247.
305. BAT Tapes 247 and 371; Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96; Capt Kevin R. Wightman, comments on draft, hereafter Wightman comments.
306. BAT Tapes 1260, 247, 371, and 601; Kelly intvw, 9Dec90; LtCol Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96; Powell comments.
307. BAT Tape 006.
308. Ibid; BAT Tapes 371 and 247; Wightman comments.
309. BAT Tape 626; Kelly comments.
310. LtCol Carl D. Matter, comments on draft, 28Aug96, Author’s Files.
311. DSG-2 Historical Collection; DSG-2 OpO 1-91, 14Jan91 (MCHC:
Washington, D.C.); BAT Tape 628.
312. DSC Sitrep 017.
313. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection; Bat Tape 601; Warker comments.
315. DSG-2 Historical Collection (MCHC: Washington, D.C); BAT Tape 5.
316. BAT Tape 5.
318. MWSS-373 ComdC Jan91, Sec 2.
319. MWSS-374 ComdC Jan91, Secs 2 and 3.
320. 3d MAW ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 1; MWSG-37 ComdC Jan91, Sec 2; GSG-1 ComdC Jan91, Sec 2.
322. MWSS-271 ComdC Jan-Jun91, Secs 2 and 3.
323. Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96.
324. 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Secs 2 and 3; GSG-1 ComdC Jan 91, Secs 2 and 3; BAT Tape 81.
325. GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Secs 2 and 3.
326. Hampton comments; Skipper comments.
327. GSG-1 ComdC Jan91, Secs 2 and 3; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Jan91, Secs 2 and 3.
328. BAT Tape 301.
330. BAT Tape 301.
331. DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91, Sec 3.
333. Skipper comments.
334. Ibid.
335. 2dMarDiv ComdC 1Jan-13Apr91, Secs 2 and 3.
336. DSG-2 Historical Collection; DSC Sitrep 023.
340. DSG-2 Historical Document; Col Thomas P. Donnelly, Jr. comments on draft, n.d. [Feb97], hereafter Donnelly comments.
341. BAT Tape 601.
342. 10thMar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2.
343. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
344. DSG-2 Historical Collection; 10th Marines ComdC Feb91, Sec 2.
345. BAT Tape 1081.
346. I MEF ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2; 2d MarDiv ComdC, Jan-Feb91, Sec 1.
347. DSG-2 Historical Collection; BAT Tape 629.
348. "Action of the 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, during Operation
    Desert Shield and Desert Storm: 10Aug91-1Mar91," hereafter "Tiger ComdC."
349. 6thMar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
350. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
351. BAT Tape 601.
352. Ibid.
353. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
354. BAT Tape 601.
355. Warker comments.
356. Col James Head W. Head, comments on draft, 20Feb97, Author's Files,
    hereafter Head comments.
357. 8th Marines ComdC Jan91, Secs 1, 2, and 3.
358. DSG-1 FragO 01 to OpO 2-90, 25Jan91.
359. BAT Tape 1393.
360. 3dMar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs 2 and 3; Powell comments.
361. DSG-1 ComdC Jan 91.
362. TF Taro FragO 6-91, 4Feb91, Annex D; Maj William H. Ritchie, comments
    on draft, 4Feb97, Author's File, hereafter Rithcie comments.
363. BAT Tape 1393.
364. BAT Tape 371; Ritchie comments.
365. Kelly comments.
366. BAT Tape 371.
367. BAT Tape 247.
368. DSC ComdC 22Dec90-15Feb91, Sec 3.
369. BAT Tape 1393.
370. BAT Tape 1393; 8th Motors dispatch log, 27-30 Jan91.
372. Ibid., pp. 268-271.
373. Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96.
374. BAT Tape 137.
376. Woodson Intvw, 19Mar96; Woodson comments.
377. BAT Tape 371.
378. BAT Tapes 247 and 1393.
379. Kelly telecon, 13Jan96; Kelly comments.
380. BAT Tape 1393.
381. Cureton, With the 1st Marine Division, p. 43.
382. 3d Marines ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
383. BAT Tape 1393.
384. Cureton, With the 1st Marine Division, p. 45, 3d Marines ComdC Jan-Feb91,
    Sec 2.
385. BAT Tape 1393.
386. Cureton, With the 1st Marine Division, p. 45; 3d Marines ComdC Jan-Feb91,
    Sec 2.
387. BAT Tape 1393.
388. 2d MarDiv ComdC 1Jan-18 Apr91, Sec 2.
389. 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs 2 and 3.
390. Warker comments.
391. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
392. 7th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
393. Winter comments.
394. BAT Tape 371; 4th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs 2 and 3.
395. 4th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs 2 and 3.
396. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
397. Skipper comments; Maj Stephen H Negahquet, E-Mail comments on draft, 18Apr97 Author’s Files; WO Michael R. Glass, E-Mail comments on draft, 21Apr97, Author’s Files.
398. DSC ComdC 22Dec-15Feb, Sec 3.
399. 1st Marines ComdC Feb91, Sec 2.
400. BAT Tape 022.
402. BAT Tape 317.
403. Winter comments.
404. Coop comments; MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 3.
405. MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 3; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 3; GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Sec 1.
406. MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 1.
409. Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96.
413. Skipper comments.
414. BAT Tape 642; Krulak, “CSS in the Desert,” pp. 24-25; DSC ComdC 22Dec-15Feb91, Secs 2 and 3; Skipper comments.
416. Quilter, With I MEF, p. 59; DSC ComdC 16Feb-13Mar91, Sec 2; GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Sec 2.
417. Coop comments; 1stMarDiv ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
418. MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 3; BAT Tape 647; “Naval Construction Battalion Support,” p. 20.
420. Krulak comments.
421. 8th Motors Dispatch Log 9-24Feb91; Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar96.
423. BAT Tape 81.
424. O'Donovan, "From Kibrit to Khanjar," p. 31; 1st FSSG ComdC, Secs 2 and 3; LtCol Felix M. Bush comments.
425. BAT Tape 263.
426. GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec-10Mar91, Sec 2; BAT Tape 052.
427. GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Sec 2; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 2.
428. Skipper comments.
429. O'Donovan, "From Kibrit to Kuwait," p. 29; DSC ComdC 16Feb-13Mar91, Sec 2.
430. GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10Mar91, Secs 2 and 3.
431. Ibid., Secs 1 and 3; 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Secs 1 and 3.
433. 2dMarDiv ComdC 1Jan-18Apr91, Sec II.
434. Skipper comments.
435. 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Secs II and III.
436. Wittle comments.
437. BAT Tape 601; 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb90, Sec. II.
438. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
439. 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2; BAT Tape 601.
440. Head comments.
441. MCSSD-28 Historical Collection.
442. BAT Tape 626; Col O'Donovan comments.
443. Donnelly comments.
444. 2d Bn, 10th Marines ComdC Feb91, Sec 2; 2d Bn 12th Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2; Warker comments.
446. 8th Motor Transport Battalion Daily Run Log; Woodson comments.
447. 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec III.
448. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
449. Donnelly comments.
450. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
451. 8th Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2; MCSSD-28 Historical Collection.
455. DSG-2 CSS Users Guide.
456. 8th Motors Daily Run Logs, 18-23 Feb91.
457. 8th Motors Dispatch Logs.
458. DSC ComdC 16Feb-13Mar91, Secs 2 and 3.
459. Cureton, With the 2d MarDiv, p 38; Skipper comments.
460. Capt Antonio Colmenares, comments on draft, n.d. [1996-97], Author's Files, hereafter Colmenares comments; Company C, 2d Med Bn ComdC 1Jan-
7Mar91, Encl 1; DSG-2 FragO 7-91 (Draft) and OpO 2-91, 21Feb91, (MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
461. BAT Tape 628; DSG-2 Frag Order 7-91; LtCol Arthur H. Sass comments on draft.
462. BAT Tape 601; Warker comments.
463. BAT Tape 601; MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
464. MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
465. 6th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2; 1stBn, 6thMar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
466. MCSSD-28 Historical Collection; Head comments.
467. 3d Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2.
468. BAT Tapes 316 and 1393; Ritchie comments.
469. BAT Tape 247.
470. DSG-1 ComdC 1-23Feb91, Sec 2.
471. DSG-1 ComdC 1-23 Feb91, Sec 2.
472. Kelly intvw, 10Apr96; BAT Tape 371,
473. Powell comments.
474. BAT Tape 247.
475. BAT Tape 316.
476. Powell comments.
477. DSG-1 ComdC 1-23Feb91, Sec 2; Bat Tape 371.
478. Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96.
479. Kelly comments.
480. BAT Tape 247.
481. Kelly intvw, 10Apr96.
482. Ibid.
483. Kelly comments.
484. CSSD-10 ComdC 23-28Feb91; BAT Tape 247.
485. BAT Tape 1393.
486. Ritchie comments.
487. BAT Tapes 28 and 050.
488. 1stBn, 7th Mar ComdC, Tabs G and K.
489. Winter comments.
490. CSSD-11 Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91.
491. 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 3.
492. BAT Tape 302.
493. Seabee History.
494. MWSS-271 ComdC Jan-Jun91, Secs 2 and 3; CSSD-10 ComdC 23-28 Feb91; Kelly comments.
495. MWSG-37 ComdC Feb91, Sec 3.
497. 2d CEB ComdC Feb91, Sec 2; Skipper comments.
499. BAT Tape 601; MCSSD-26 Historical Documents.
500. Ibid., MCSSD-26 Sitrep 24Feb-1Mar91, hereafter MCSSD-26 Sitrep.
502. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
503. DSC Sitrep 058.
504. 8th Motors Dispatch Log for 24 Feb91; Colmenares comments.
506. 8th Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2; MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
507. MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
508. Skipper comments.
509. 1st Bn, 7th Marines ComdC, 1Jan-28Feb91, Sec 2; DSG-1 Summary of Action 24-28 Feb.
510. Winter comments.
511. Ibid.
512. Det, 1st CEB, ComdC 24-28 Feb91; 1st CEB ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
513. DSC ComdC 16Feb-13Mar91, Sec 3.
514. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action 24-28 Feb91.
515. CSSD-17, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
516. Kelly intvw, 10Apr96; Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96.
517. Powell comments.
518. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28 Feb91.
519. 1st Bn, 25th Mar ComdC Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
520. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
522. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
524. BAT Tape 601.
525. BAT Tape 1390A.
526. BAT Tape 601.
527. BAT Tape 601; MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
528. 8th Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 2.
529. BAT Tape 628.
530. MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
532. BAT Tape 642.
533. Winter comments.
534. 1st Bn, 7th Mar ComdC, 1Jan-28Feb91, Tab K.
535. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
536. 1st Mar ComdC Feb91, Sec 3.
537. Burke comments.
538. BAT Tapes 1395 and 37; Kelly intvw, 10 Apr96; Kelly comments; Ritchie comments.
539. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91 and DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28 Feb91.
540. CSSD-10 ComdC, 23-28Feb91; Kelly intvw, 10Apr96; Lucenta intvw, 10Apr96.
541. BAT Tape 1393, DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
542. Det, 1st CEB ComdC 24-28Feb91.
543. DSC ComdC, 16Feb-12Mar91, Sec 3.
545. Warker comments
546. MCSSD-28 Historical Collection.
547. BAT Tape 628; Colmenares comments.
548. 8th Mar ComdC, Sec 2; MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
549. MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
550. 8th Mar ComdC, Feb91, Sec 3; MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
551. Tiger Brigade Chronology.
552. 8th Motors Dispatch Log 26Feb91.
553. DSC SitRep 060.
554. Skipper comments.
555. Kelly comments.
556. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91; Burke comments.
557. CSSD-17, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91; Winter comments.
558. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action for 24-28Feb91.
559. EngDet 1st CEB, ComdC, 24-28Feb91; Cureton, With the 1stMarDiv, p. 115; 1st CEB ComdC, Jan-Feb91, Sec 2.
560. BAT Tape 371.
561. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
562. Kelly intvw, 10Apr96; Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96.
563. CSSD-10 ComdC 23-28Feb91.
564. Skipper comments.
566. BAT Tape 1454.
567. O’Donovan comments.
568. 1st FSSG ComdC Dec90-Feb91, Sec 2; Woodson Intvw, 19Mar96; Woodson comments.
569. BAT Tape 302.
571. MCSSD-28 Chronological Narrative.
572. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
574. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
575. O’Donovan comments; Skipper comments.
576. BAT Tape 642; Skipper comments.
577. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91; CSSD-17, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
578. DSG-1, Summary of Action, 24-28Feb91.
579. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action for 24-28Feb91.

580. BAT Tape 1393; CSSD-10 ComdC 23-28Feb91.
581. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action for 24-28 Feb91.
582. Woodson and Songer intvw, 19Mar91; Woodson comments.
584. CSSD-10 ComdC 23-28Feb91; Kelly comments.
585. BAT Tape 1393.
586. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91; DSG-1, Summary of Action 24-28 Feb91.
587. DSC SitRep 062.
588. MCSSD-26 SitRep.
589. Warker comments.
590. Quilter, With I MEF, pp. 90-91.
591. BSSG-5 ComdC Jan-Mar91, Sec 3.
592. BSSG-5 ComdC Jan-Mar91, Sec 3; Quilter, With I MEF, p. 100.
593. BSSG-5 ComdC Jan-Mar91, Sec 3.
595. It Doesn't Take A Hero, p. 490.
596. BSSG-5 ComdC Jan-Mar91, Secs 2 and 3.
598. Kelly intvw, 10Apr96; Lucenta intvw, 19Apr96.
599. CSSD-11, Battle Summary of Action, 13 Mar91.
600. DSG-1 ComdC 1-15Mar91, Secs 2 and 3.
601. Kelly Intvw, 10Apr96.
602. GSG-2 ComdC 12Dec90-10May91, Secs 2 and 3.
603. CWO-5 Thomas M. Sturtevant comments on draft.
604. Skipper comments.
605. BAT Tape 628.
606. DSG-2 Historical Collection.
607. DSG-2 SitRep 066.
608. MCSSD-26 Sitrep 29Mar-2Apr91; MCSSD-26 Historical Collection.
610. MWSS-271 ComdC Jan-Jun91, Sec 2.
612. MWSS-273 ComdC Jan-Jun91 Sec 1,2, and 3.
613. MWSS-373 ComdCs Mar91 and Apr-Jun91, Secs 2 and 3; MSgt David F. Tuche USMC, MWSS-373 Historian, 5 Dec 96.
614. MWSS 271 ComdC Jan-Jun91, Secs 2 and 3.
615. MWSS-174 ComdC 1Apr-30Jun91, Sec 2and 3.
616. Krulak comments.
617. O'Donovan comments.
618. Woodson and Songer Intvw, 19Mar96.
619. Skipper comments.
621. CSSE MARFOR SWA ComdC 18-31May91, Secs 1-3.
622. MWSS-273 ComdC Jan-Jun91 Sec 1,2, and 3.
623. ACE MARFORSWA ComdC 1June-10Oct91.
625. Skipper comments.
626. Ibid.
627. MARFORSWA ComdC Secs 2 and 3; Woodson Intvw, 19Mar96.
628. CSSE Special Purpose MAGTF ComdCs, June, July, Aug, 1Sep-10Oct91, Sec 1, 2, and 3; Author telecon with CWO-3 Jerry L. Mazza USMC(Ret), 7Oct96.
629. CSSE Special Purpose MAGTF ComdCs June, July, Aug, 1Sep-10Oct91, Secs 1, 2, 3.
630. ACE MARFORSWA ComdC 1June-10Oct91.
631. Security Det, 3d Mar ComdC, 23Apr-10Oct91, Sec 1, 2, and 3.
632. MARFORSWA ComdC, 21 Apr-10Oct91, Secs 2 and 3; CSSE MARFORSWA ComdC 1Sep-10Oct91, Sec 3.
Appendix A  
CSS Command Relationships

_Copy of concept paper prepared by Col John A. Woodhead III,  
Chief of Staff, 2d FSSG, in November 1990_

There are several variations to command relationships that could be applied to FSSGs in the Persian Gulf:

1. The Vietnam “solution,” whereby one FSSG would be OPCON to the other, thereby forming a very large command similar to the force logistics command of that time frame. Unfortunately, the result would be the same—a monolith, unresponsive to either the ACE or GCE, and, by necessity, controlled by MARCENT.

2. The assignment of zones of action where each FSSG would support the MSCs in its zone. One of the FSSGs would have control of the IFASC and all automated systems, while both would be competitors in the theater logistics structure.

3. Another option would have an FSSG headquarters afloat with the 4th and 5th MEBs. This option would not be the most effective use of the C3 inherent in the FSSG headquarters. The BSSGs with 4th and 5th MEBs are relatively small and the concept of operations already detailed for use if the MEBs are committed has their support coming from the FSSG in country. If an FSSG headquarters were needed for an amphibious operation, a small staff from either FSSG could move aboard ship prior to the operation and provide the recurring C3 for the two BSSGs. It should be noted that under current ships loading, there is no room for even a “suitcase” FSSG headquarters.

4. The assignment of FSSGs by mission. One FSSG would be assigned the mission of direct support of the ground combat elements while the other would be assigned the general support mission for MARCENT and a reinforcing mission to the other FSSG. (This FSSG could also provide the CSSDs for the ACE and run the port.) In applying this variation, one of the FSSGs could replace the other’s elements either in the current Division’s area or in the port area. (one FSSG become the direct support group and the other become the general support group). This variation might have a negative impact on support for a short period of time but would be the strongest and most responsive over the long run. A variation of this concept that would ease any impact might be to do the following:

Take advantage of the inherent task organization capability of the FSSG. Based upon what (was in the Gulf region) and what 2d FSSG
would deploy with, the available C3 would be as follows—nine Battalion Hqs, three BSSG nucleus headquarters, and an MSSG nucleus headquarters. Each FSSG will have its own Headquarters and Service Battalion to provide C3 for the Group. If the four battalions (Supply, Maintenance, Medical, and Dental) which have general support functions, along with appropriately sized detachments of the other battalions were “chopped” to the general support/reinforcing FSSG, it would have the total C3 required to accomplish its mission. Similarly, the Engineer, Motor Transport, Landing Support Battalions and the CSSE nucleus headquarters, and appropriately sized detachments could be “chopped” to the direct support FSSG supporting the GCEs. This approach would give each FSSG a clear mission with clearly defined responsibilities. The GS/Rein FSSG would accumulate and push forward the supplies and run the port while the DS FSSG would provide the direct support to the two Divisions, through direct support CSSDs that possess the necessary C3 required for offensive operations. This approach is not new! This approach is the method that is used to support back-to-back CAX's where the CSSE is a composite from both 1st and 2d FSSGs.

The bottom line is that the Marine Corps will have approximately two complete MEFs committed to (the Gulf) and any attempt to support that large a force with one FSSG is doomed to failure. In the type of maneuver warfare that we may very well conduct, C3 is as important to the CSSE as it is to the GCE or ACE. Unfortunately, that C3 does not exist in (the Gulf) now and certainly not in the quantity necessary to support two MEF's. By bringing in 2d FSSG and employing them in variation #3, you can form the type of responsive CSS structure that will be effective in both the defense and offense.
Appendix B
1st FSSG/2d FSSG Organizational Chart
Operation Desert Storm, 22 Feb 1991
# Appendix C
## Command and Staff List

### Building Blocks of 1st Force Service Support Group (Aug-Sep 90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Service Support Group 7</th>
<th>Col Alexander W. Powell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 71</td>
<td>Capt Guido G. Aidenbaum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Allen Coulter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 72</td>
<td>Capt Kerry K. Feldman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 73</td>
<td>Capt Adrian W. Burke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Service Support Group 5</td>
<td>LtCol Ernest G. Beinhart III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 31</td>
<td>Maj Thomas J. Nielsen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1st Force Service Support Group (Sep 90-Apr 91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BGen James A. Brabham, Jr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LtCol Henry T. Hayden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen Charles C. Krulak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol James E. Vesely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr William G. Brown, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol David L. John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol Charles O. Skipper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol Thomas S. Woodson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Joseph F. Tracey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt Benjamin R. Braden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt Paul R. Yorio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Alexander W. Powell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol Richard L. Kelly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| LtCol David L. Wittle |
| Col Thomas P. Donnelly, Jr. |
| LtCol David L. Wittle |

*CSSD-142 redesignated as Ammunition Company, 2d Supply Battalion, GSG-1 in Dec 1990.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Support Group 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Maintenance Battalion</td>
<td>Col Thomas E. Hampton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Supply Battalion</td>
<td>Col Paul A. Pankey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Motor Transport Battalion</td>
<td>Col Marlin D. Hilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Landing Support Battalion</td>
<td>LtCol Grant M. Sparks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment, 7th Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>Maj Michael W. LaVigne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion</td>
<td>Maj Jerry W. Datzman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Detachment</td>
<td>LCdr Jackie H. Parks, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 131</td>
<td>Capt Robert A. Brunhofer, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 132</td>
<td>Maj Allen Coulter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support Group 2 (Dec90-Mar91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Service Detachment</td>
<td>Col Thomas E. Hampton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Motor Transport Battalion</td>
<td>Maj James A. V. Hart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Landing Support Battalion</td>
<td>LtCol David B. Kirkwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Medical Battalion</td>
<td>Cdr Gary C. Breeden, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Detachment</td>
<td>Capt John M. Carter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Detachment</td>
<td>CW03 Clement Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Detachment</td>
<td>Capt John G. Hergert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 82</td>
<td>LtCol David B. Kirkwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 91</td>
<td>LtCol Linden L. Sparrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support Detachment 133</td>
<td>Capt Eric R. Junger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Group 37 (Dec90-Apr91)</td>
<td>Col Robert W. Coop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Squadron 174</td>
<td>LtCol James P. Chessum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Squadron 271</td>
<td>LtCol Richard H. Zegar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Squadron 273</td>
<td>LtCol William L. Riznychok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Squadron 373</td>
<td>LtCol Stephen D. Hanson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wing Support Squadron 374</td>
<td>LtCol Stephen G. Hornberger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander Mobil Construction Battalions Forward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Naval Construction Regiment (Aug90-Mar91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt Michael R. Johnson, USN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 4*</td>
<td>Cdr James T. Corbett, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 5</td>
<td>Cdr David F. Walsh, USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NMCB-4 departed Southwest Asia in December 1990 and did not participate in Desert Storm.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 7*</td>
<td>Cdr Gary M. Craft, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 24</td>
<td>Cdr James McGarrah, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 40</td>
<td>Cdr John R. Doyle, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Mobil Construction Battalion 74</td>
<td>Cdr William P. Fogarty, USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NMCB-7 departed Southwest Asia in December 1990 and did not participate in Desert Storm.*
Appendix D
List of Abbreviations and Glossary

A6-E Intruder, Grumman—A two-seat all-weather bomber featuring five-weapon attachments points, each with a 3,600-pound capacity. Typical weapon loads include: 28 500-pound bombs in clusters of six or three 2,000-pound general purpose bombs. The Intruder has a cruising speed of 412 knots.

AAVs—Amphibious Assault Vehicles. AAVP7A1 (Personal), AAVC7A1 (Communications), AAVR7A1 (Recovery)

ACE—Aviation Command Element

ACR—Armored Calvary Regiment

AH-1W Super Cobra, Bell Helicopter Textron—Two-crew attack helicopter with a cruising speed of 147 knots. Armaments include a 20mm turreted cannon, four external wing stations firing TOW/Hellfire (point target/antiarmor) missiles, and Sidewinder (antiair) and Sidearm (antiradar) missiles. During Operation Desert Storm these helicopters destroyed 97 tanks, 104 armored personnel carriers and vehicles, 16 bunkers, and 2 antiaircraft artillery sites without the loss of any aircraft.

AMALs—Authorized Medical Allowance Lists

ARCent—U.S. Army Component of U.S. Central Command

AV-8B Harrier, McDonnell Douglas—Single-seat aircraft providing a capability to attack and destroy surface and air targets, escort helicopters, conduct close and deep air support, and provide combat air patrols. Cruise speed ranges from subsonic to transonic.

BGen—Brigadier General

BSSG—Brigade Service Support Group

C-130 Hercules, Lockheed—Four-turboprop, medium-lift tactical transport airplane. The C-130 provides in-flight refueling, aerial delivery of troops and cargo, emergency resupply, an airborne Direct Air Support Center, and additional support.

CAAT—Combined Anti-Armor Teams
CAX—Combined Area Exercises

CEC—Civil Engineer Corps

CH-46E Sea Knight, Boeing Vertol—Medium-lift, tandem rotor, twin-engine, two-pilot transport helicopter capable of carrying 25 troops or 4.5 tons over a 50-mile radius, known to Marines as a “Frog.”

CH-47 Chinook, Boeing Vertol—A heavy-lift helicopter used by the U.S. Army and allied forces, commonly called a “Hook.”

CH-53D Sea Stallion, Sikorsky—Medium-lift helicopter used in transporting equipment and supplies during the ship-to-shore movement of an amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore. A three-crew member aircraft capable of 130 knots and operations in adverse weather conditions.

CH-53E Super Sea Stallion, Sikorsky—Heavy-lift, single-main-rotor, triple-engine, two-pilot cargo helicopter capable of lifting 55 troops or 16 tons, with aerial refueling capability, also called an “Echo.”

CinC—Commander-in-Chief

ComCBPac—Commander, Naval Construction Battalions Pacific Fleet

CSSA—Combat Service Support Area

CSSD—Combat Service Support Detachment

CSSOC—Combat Service Support Operations Center

CUVC—Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle

DMAC—Division Mechanized Assault Course

DSC—Direct Support Command

DSG—Direct Support Group

EA6B Prowler, Grumman—Airborne Command and Control (C2W) support to Fleet Marine Forces to include electronic attack (EA), tactical electronic support (ES), electronic protection (EP), and high speed antiradiation missiles (HARM). Maximum speed reaches .99 mach, with a cruising speed of .72 mach.

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPWs—Enemy Prisoners of War
FA-18 Hornet, McDonnel Douglas—Single-seat fighter/bomber exceeds speeds of mach 1.8. Armaments include air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground bombs, and a M61 20mm six-barrel gun.

FARP—Forward Arming and Refueling Point

FASP—Forward Ammunition Storage Point

FOB—Forward Operating Base

FROGs—Free-Rockets-Over-the-Ground

FSSG—Force Service Support Group

GPS—Global Positioning System. A satellite navigation system providing highly accurate, continuous three-dimensional positioning for a using unit.

GSG—General Support Group

HEAT—High Explosive Anti-Tank Round

HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

HMLA—Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

HMMWV—High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle. These vehicles carry troops and light cargo, and can be armed with TOW missiles or machine guns.

H&SG—Headquarters and Support Group

HST—Helicopter Support Team

IFASC—Interim Forward Automated Services Center

JFC-E—Joint Forces Command East

KC-130, Lockheed—The aerial refueller version of the Lockheed Hercules C-130.

LAI—Light Armored Infantry

LAAWs—Light Anti-Armor Weapon

LAVs—Light Armored Vehicles. LAV-AT (Anti-Tank), LAV-25 (25mm Chain
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Gun), LAV-L (Logistics), LAV-M (Mortar), LAV-CC (Communications), LAV-R (Recovery)

LCUs—Utility Landing Craft

LtGen—Lieutenant General

LVS—Logistics Vehicle System

M110A2 8" Self-Propelled Howitzers—The crew of five (commander, driver, and three gunners) can normally fire one round every two minutes; includes a 12.7mm M2 HB antiaircraft machine gun.

M109A3 155mm Towed Howitzers—The M126 155mm howitzer can fire one round per minute under normal conditions.

M60A1 Tank—Crew consists of a driver, commander, and gunner. Armaments include a 105mm M68 rifled tank gun firing eight rounds per minute, a M85 12.7mm machine gun, and a 7.62 mm M73 machine gun.

M60 Tank with M9 Bulldozer Blade—"Blade" Tank.

M88A1 Tank Retriever—Recovery vehicle for main battle tanks capable of completely lifting a 155mm M109A1 self-propelled howitzer.

MAG—Marine Aircraft Group

MAGTF—Marine Air Ground Task Force

MajGen—Major General

MarCent—Marine Corps Command Component of the U.S. Central Command

MARFORSWA—Marine Forces Southwest Asia

MCSSDs—Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment

MedLog—Medical Logistics

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU—Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHE—Material-Handling Equipment

MLRS—Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture. Protective equipment for chemical attack consisting of a suit made of charcoal-activated cloth, overboots, gloves, and a gas mask with hood. There are four MOPP levels, depending upon the threat of a chemical attack, and each prescribes which items are to be worn. Level 1 consists of wearing the suit (trousers and jacket) and carrying the boots, gloves, and mask with hood. Level 2 adds the overboots to be worn, with the gloves and mask with hood still carried. At level 3 the mask with hood is worn. Level 4 requires the wearing of the entire outfit, including the gloves.

MP—Military Police

MPF—Maritime Prepositioning Forces

MPS—Maritime Prepositioning Ships. A Marine Corps concept under which ships have been preloaded with combat equipment and supplies and then forward deployed.

MPSRons—Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons

MREs—Meals Ready to Eat

MSC—Military Sealift Command

MSSG—Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group

MV—Motor Vessel

MWSG—Marine Wing Support Group

MWSS—Marine Wing Support Squadron

NAVCHAPGRU—Naval Cargo Handling and Port Operations Group

NBCB—Naval Base Construction Battalion

NCR—Naval Construction Regiment

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)

NSE—Navy Support Element
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

ORF—Operational Readiness Float

OV-10 Broncos, Rockwell—Two-seat, multi-purpose, counterinsurgency and night surveillance aircraft with a maximum speed at sea level of 250 knots.

PLRS—Position Locating and Reporting Systems. This UHF radio network provides precise position locations of subordinate units. The system consists of a master unit with a visual display, and user units which can be manpacked or mounted in vehicles. The master unit continuously updates the location of each user.

POG—Port Operations Group

QEP—Quick Exchange Program

RCT—Regimental Combat Team

RTCH—Rough Terrian Container Hauler

ROWPUs—Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units

SASSY—Marine Corps Automated Supply Support System

SBT—Support Breach Team

SOC—Special Operations Capable

TAVBs—Maintenance and Aviation/Support Ships.

TOWs—Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided antitank missile systems. An antitank missile which can be used by infantrymen, or mounted on vehicles such as the LAV, the BFV, or the HMMWV.

UH-1N Huey, Bell Helicopter/Textron—Twin-turbine engine utility helicopter capable of carrying up to 14 passengers at maximum sea-level cruising speed of 100 knots.

USCentCom—U.S. Central Command

VMA—Marine Attack Squadron

VMAQ—Marine Electronic Warfare Squadron

VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

VMGR—Marine Aerial Refueller Transport Squadron
VMO—Marine Observation Aircraft Squadron
Appendix E
Chronology of Significant Events
2 August 1990 through 10 October 1991

2 Aug—Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait. The United States Government orders two carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf.

6 Aug—The United Nations authorizes economic sanctions against Iraq. MajGen John I. Hopkins, Commanding Officer of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (7th MEB), orders Brigade Service Support Group 7 (BSSG-7) to “stand-up” its wartime table of organization and to marry up with Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 2 (MPSRon-2, Diego Garcia) at the Port of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia.

7 Aug—United States Central Command (CentCom) orders a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, elements of the Air Force’s 1st Tactical Wing, and two squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships to Saudi Arabia.

10 Aug—The Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CincLantFlt) orders the 4th MEB from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to the Persian Gulf.

11 Aug—BSSG-7 arrives in Saudi Arabia to prepare the Port of Al Jubayl for unloading MPSRon-2.

14 Aug—The 7th MEB, from the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, is the first Marine combat organization to arrive in the Persian Gulf.

15 Aug—Three ships of MPSRon-2 reach the port of Al Jubayl. The Marines of the rations section begin issuing MREs (meals ready to eat) to the 7th MEB.

16 Aug—Military Airlift Command (MAC) begins flying missions to Jubayl Naval Air Facility.

17-22 Aug—BSSG-4 departs with 1,464 Marines and sailors from Moorehead City, North Carolina.

21 Aug—BSSG-7 increases to 2,841 Marines and sailors in country.

22 Aug—All 21 officers and 426 enlisted Marines and sailors of Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 (MWSS-374) were in Saudi Arabia.

24 Aug—Twenty McDonald Douglas AV-8B Harrier jets of the Marine Attack
Squadron 311 (VMA-311) arrive at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, approximately 50 kilometers southeast of Jubayl.

25 Aug—The 7th MEB announces its readiness to defend Jubayl, a week prior to expectations.

26 Aug—Combat Service Support Detachment 73 (CSSD-73) reaches a strength of 90 Marines and sailors. The unit is deployed to the junction of the coastal highway and the road leading to Manifah Bay, making them the closest to the Kuwait border.

26-30 Aug—Four ships from MPSRon-3 (Guam) arrive in Al Jubayl.

28-30 Aug—Members of the Commander Naval Construction Battalions Pacific Fleet (ComCBPac) command element reach Saudi Arabia.

3 Sept—BGen James A. Bradham assumes command of the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG).

8 Sept—MWSS-174 joins 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) and Regimental Combat Team 3 (RCT-3) at Ras Al Ghar Naval Base awaiting deployment to forward locations.

13 Sept—Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), from Okinawa, docks at Jubayl.

29 Sept—Naval Mobile Contruction Battalion 40 (NMCB-40), and GSG-1 (General Support Group 1) engineers begin construction of Forward Ammunition Storage Point 2 (FASP-2). Along with FASP-1, CSSD-111 and -141, FASP-2 gave the 1st Marine Division the wherewithal to engage Iraqi forces.

17 Oct—GSG-1's air-delivery platoon parachutes supplies to CSSD-141 for the first time.

30 Oct—The size of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) increases to 31,391 Marines and sailors of whom 8,511 belonged to 1st FSSG, ComCBPac Foxtrot Delta, and the three MWSSs.

8 Nov—President Bush opts for an offensive capability, ordering an additional 150,000 troops to the Persian Gulf.

14 Nov—Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney grants the Marine Corps the authority to call up 15,000 Reservists.

19 Nov—NMCB-40 completes the 1st Marine Division mess hall at Abu Hadriyah, in time to host President Bush for Thanksgiving dinner.
29 Nov—U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of “all necessary means” to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait if these forces do not leave by 15 January 1991.

1 Dec—The 5th MEB commanded by BGen Peter J. Rowe departs southern California for Southwest Asia.

11 Dec—I MEF increases by 58 percent when air flow reinforcements start bringing an average of 945 Marines and sailors and 222 short tons of cargo every day for the remainder of the month.

22 Dec—BGen Charles C. Krulak, Commanding Officer of the 2d FSSG, activates the Direct Support Command (DSC), establishing a direct support pipeline to the ground combat element.

6-15 Jan—DSC’s engineers build a sprawling complex of more than 40 square kilometers at Kibrit, directly west of Al Mishab, as a defensive measure against Iraqi air and artillery attack.

12 Jan—Congress approves the President’s use of military force against Iraq.

15 Jan—The U.N. deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.

17 Jan—Desert Shield ends, and Desert Storm begins when CentCom orders the air war to begin.

17-19 Jan—Iraqis respond to U.S. air bombardment by shooting FROG (free-rockets-over-the-ground) missiles at Mishab.

23 Jan—The DSC sent CSSD-91 (prison camp) its first three occupants who were processed, held, and shipped south by the U.S. Army.

29 Jan—A brigade from the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division captures the Saudi border town of Khafji, trapping two reconnaissance teams from the 1st Marine Division. BGen Krulak orders a 100 percent alert, focusing on the defense of Kibrit. The Marines of CSSD-91 blow up their weapons and fall back on Kibrit to avoid capture.

30 Jan—The 4th Marines, Task Force Grizzly, commanded by Col James A. Fulks, rushes to Qaraah with the mission of defending the border area from further Iraqi aggression.

31 Jan—Saudi and Qatari forces capture Khafji and rescue the 12 reconnaissance Marines from the 1st Marine Division.

2 Feb—U.S. Navy aircraft mistakenly bomb S Battery, 5th Battalion, 11th
Marines, 30 kilometers north of Qaraah, killing one Marine and wounding two others.

3-7 Feb—A Marine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team clears Kafji where it destroys a total of 4,000 pieces of ordnance and removes 80 armored vehicles.

9-20 Feb—DSC moves from Kibrit to Khanjar, approximately 160km northwest of Kibrit, in massive supply buildup.

14 Feb—As of this date, the active-duty end-strength of the Marine Corps was 200,248, including Reservists on active-duty. It was the first time active-duty end-strength exceeded 200,000 since fiscal year 1971.

23 Feb—I MEF logistically ready to begin its advance on Iraqi positions in Kuwait.

24 Feb—I MEF began its assault at 0400, aimed directly at al-Mutl’a Pass, and the roads leading from Kuwait City. I MEF faced the strongest concentration of enemy defenses in theater, penetrating the first obstacle belt. Serial I’s Marines from Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 26 (MCSSD-26) exchanged fire with enemy, and captured the commanding general of the 14th Infantry Division (Commando).

25 Feb—I MEF advances against limited resistance during the ground offensive. Iraqis engage Task Force Papa Bear in a 10-minute battle around the regimental headquarters followed by a three-hour assault on the 1st Tank Battalion.

26 Feb—Task Force Ripper engages large numbers of dug-in Iraqi infantry and armor, receives artillery fire, and captures numerous Iraqis as it reached Kuwait International Airport. Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, moves toward Kuwait International Airport, where the engineers came under Iraqi fire. Eight thousand Iraqi prisoners of war reach the compound at Kibrit.

27 Feb—The 1st Marine Division consolidates its area and clears the last pockets of resistance around Kuwait International Airport.

28 Feb—A cease-fire takes effect. I MEF had a strength of 92,900 at the end of Operation Desert Storm.

4 Mar—MCSSD-11’s and Direct Support Group 1’s (DSG-1) headquarters are moved from Kuwait International Airport to Manifah Bay, initiating the deactivation process.

8 Mar—Khanjar is completely emptied and moved to Mishab.
21 Apr—Marine Forces Southwest Asia (MARFORSWA) is established by the Commandant.

6 May—The 8th Marines and MCSSD-28 return to Saudi Arabia, and end the Marine Corps deployment to Kuwait.

10 Oct—BGen Gary E. Brown disestablishes MARFORSWA, and departs Saudi Arabia, ending the Marine Corps deployment to the Persian Gulf.
Index

A
A-B Road, 34, 90
Abdullea Road, 152, 159
Abu Hadriyah, 34, 38, 45, 47, 53, 54, 57, 70, 72, 75, 79, 88, 95, 96, 102
Admire, Col John H., 105, 110
Aidenbaum, Capt Guido G., 32, 38, 51
Al Burqan Oil Field, 147, 158, 164
Al Huwaylatt, 27, 55
Al Huwaylatt Hospital, 12, 24
Al Jaber, 166, 169, 171-173, 175-176
Al Jaber Air Base, 82, 105, 114, 129, 134, 136, 141, 146-147, 149-150, 159,
   162-163, 165-166, 170, 173, 175-176, 179, 181
Al Jahra, 82, 132, 150, 159, 168
Al Jubayl, 1, 4-7, 10-13, 15-16, 19-21, 23-24, 26-30, 32, 34-36, 38, 41, 43, 48,
   53, 59, 60-61, 68, 72, 74-75, 77-79, 82, 85, 98-102, 112, 122, 124, 167, 177-
   180, 186, 188-189
Al Jubayl Naval Air Facility, 10-13, 19-22, 30-31, 38-39, 41, 43-44, 47, 50-51,
   55, 58, 63, 99, 115, 141, 180-182, 187
Al Khanjar, 116-119, 121-126, 128-130, 137, 141, 146, 150-151, 153-154, 163,
   166-167, 172, 174-177, 180, 182-184
Al Qarrahto, 104
Al Wafra, 107, 112, 128, 176
Al Wafra Forest, 175
Allen, Capt Scott A., 104
Amoroso, 2dLt Gino P., 38
Anderson, 1stLt Walter T., 152
Andrews Air Force Base, 66
As Salem Air Force Base, 141

B
Baghdad, 107
Baghdad Express, 121-122, 166
Bahrain, 6, 12, 15-16, 34, 40, 55, 60, 73, 81-82, 126, 186-187, 191
Bahrain International Airport, 44
Bartholf, 1stLt Brian S., 173
Basrah, 106
Bathory, CW03 Thomas E., 112
Beinhart, LtCol Ernest G. III, 7, 38, 55
Bendix Field Engineering Corporation, 185
Bergeron, Capt Lorine E. III, 159
Bierrum, Lt Henry T., USN, 96
Blount Island Command (Forward), 184, 186-188, 191
Blount Island, Florida, 7
Boomer, LtGen Walter E., 2, 11, 34, 63, 65-67, 72, 77, 81, 116-117, 166, 177
Brabham, BGen James A., Jr., 2, 5, 11, 35-37, 51, 58, 64-70, 77-78, 84-85, 99-100, 112, 115, 121-123, 125, 166-167, 191
Briley, MSgt James R., 94-95
British Army Commands and Units
1st Armoured Division, 63
7th Armoured Brigade, 49, 54
Brown, BGen Gary E., 188-190
Brown, Capt Kenneth M., 135, 139, 150, 156
Brown, Col Ross A., 34, 36
Bumgarner, Capt Tony L., 104
Burke, Capt Adrian W., 20, 29, 37, 45, 47-48, 52, 71, 87, 89, 114, 140, 147-149, 155-157, 163-165, 171, 173, 177
Bush, Maj Felix M., 122
Bush, President George, 1, 62, 72
C
Caldwell, Maj Clifton D., 170
Camp 3, 75, 178
Camp 4, 165
Camp 5, 75
Camp 13, 41
Camp 15, 21, 27, 72, 75
Camp Dan Daly, 21
Camp Lejeune, 7-8, 62, 64-66, 76, 186, 188
Camp Pendleton, 2, 6, 10-11, 20, 26, 28, 35, 54, 56, 70, 77
Camp Rohrbach, 41
Camp Shepherd, 12
Carlson, Capt Thomas D., USN, 27
Casey, 2dLt David P., 29
Cassady, LtCol John M., Jr., 59
Cement Factory Ridge, 29, 38, 45, 47-49, 72, 79, 92, 97-98, 187
Chessum, LtCol James P., 43, 83, 181
Chicken Ranch, 45
Clarke, Maj Charles J., 79, 133, 152, 159
Collier, Maj Michael L., 186, 188
Collington, Lt Kenneth P., USN, 127, 159
Collins, 1stLt Joseph W., Jr., 117
Collins, 1stSgt Joseph M., 164
Collins, CWO2 Robert A., 94
Colmenares, 1stLt Antonio, 132, 145, 153, 160-161
Conley, 1stLt Daniel B., 89
Conroy, LtCol George M., 38
Coop, Col Robert W., 6, 75-76, 83, 115, 118-119, 141, 184, 191
Cordingly, BGen Patrick, 49
Corr, Maj Bradley A., 187
Coulter, Maj Allen, 32, 38
Cox, Maj William C., 23
Craft, Cdr Gary M., USN 40
Crawford, CW02 Thomas A., 112
Critical Facilities Operation Center, 38, 59
Crusher Road, 90, 93, 109

D
Dachman, 1stLt Nello E., 51
Dammam, 34
Debruyne, LtCol David A., 186, 189
Dhahran, 1, 13, 55
Dhahran Air Base, 20
Dickerson, LtCol Robert C., Jr., 61
Diego Garcia, 4, 7
Dietzler, Capt Joseph M., 38
Dolan, Lt Michael J., USN, 40, 44
Donnelly, Col Thomas P., Jr., 79, 96, 103, 116, 129, 131-132, 153, 179
Doyle, Cdr John R., USN, 41, 99
Doyle, Col James J., Jr., 8
Draude, BGen Thomas V., 68, 109
Dubuque, 34
Dyck, LtCol Brian E., 115

E
Eby, Lt Michael E., USN, 47
Ehlert, MajGen Norman E., 184, 188
Elzie, Capt Daniel W., 188
Eskelund, 2dLt David J., 47, 89
Exercise Display Determination 90, 2, 6
Exercise Freedom Banner 90, 7
Exercise Imminent Thunder, 72
Exercise LOGEX 1-91, 70

F
FARP Foss, 29, 42, 99
Feldman, Capt Kerry K., 29
Ferguson, Maj Robert W., Jr., 124
Fielder, Maj Edwin, Jr., 109
Finney, Maj Robert B., 187
Fishback, GySgt Mark W., 164
Fletcher, Col Morris 0., 184
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Fogarty, Cdr Patrick, USN, 73
Foore, LtCol Marshall B., 10
Ford, 1st Patrick W., 89
Fournier, Capt David E., 97, 144
Fulford, Col Carlton W., Jr., 87, 88, 111, 139
Fulks, Col James A., 111

G
Gangle, Col Randolph A., 175
Glass, Sgt Michael R., 111
Gormish, 1stLt Shawn B., 155
Gray, Gen Alfred M., 64-66
Guam, 10, 11, 40
Guerrero, Capt Gerardo, 25
Gulf Cooperative Council, 15

H
Hackney, 2dLt Ricardo R., 38
Hampton, Col Thomas E., 36, 38, 48, 53, 68-69, 77, 100, 125, 178
Hancock, Ens William C., USN, 136, 156, 162
Hankinson, 1stLt Thomas L., 115, 119
Hanson, LtCol Stephen D., 6, 44, 82
Harris, Col William H., 184
Hatton, Capt William, 130, 154, 162, 170
Hayden, LtCol Henry T., 36, 38, 59, 60, 78
Head, LtCol James W., 75, 97-98, 104, 128-129, 134, 145, 152-153, 161, 169-170
Hearnsberger, Capt Brian J., 77, 79-80, 126, 131, 143, 154, 179
Hedges, GySgt Douglas, 167
Henderson, 1stLt Clarke D., 178
Henderson, MCP0 Utilitiesman John, USN, 11
Hering, LtCol John C., 96, 132, 145, 151, 153, 160, 170, 179
Hobo Alley, 102, 128
Hodory, Col Richard W., 89
Hopkins, MajGen John L., 4
Hornberger, LtCol Stephen G., 6, 99, 115
Hull, Capt Jonathan P., 77, 79-80, 154, 170

I
Ice Cube Tray, 170, 173, 175-176, 179
Industrial City, 50, 72
Interim Forward Automated Services Center, 59
Iraq, 1, 4, 34, 82, 107, 112, 141
Iraqi Commands and Units

14th Infantry Division (Commando), 144
1st Mechanized Division, 107
3d Armored Division, 107
5th Mechanized Division, 107, 110
Republican Guard, 2, 62
Jabal Al Hadaruk, 49
Jankowski, Maj David L., 20
Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr., 60-61
Jericho, Cpl Andrew S., 150
John, LtCol David L., 79, 117
Johnson, Capt Michael R., USN, 10, 41, 69, 72-73, 85, 119, 126, 141, 180, 191
Joint Force’s Command East, 63, 110
Joint Force’s Command North, 62-63
Juneau, 174
Junger, Capt Eric R., 115
Jur, SSgt Daniel A., 154

K
Kananowicz, Sgt John M., 133
Kava, Capt Sione L., 106
Keene, LtCol Thomas A., 58
Kelley, 2dLt Shaun P., 97, 159-160
Khafji, 107, 111-112
Khajjar (see Al Khanjar)
King Abdul Aziz Brigade, 55
King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station, 10-11, 15, 19-22, 24, 30, 39, 42-43, 52, 58, 75-76, 83, 99, 115, 181, 187
Kirkwood, LtCol David B., 125
Kur, SSgt Daniel A., 143
Kuwait City, 63, 172
Kuwait International Airport, 82, 136, 141, 150, 159, 163-165, 168, 171, 173, 176-178, 181
L
Langlinais, Maj Dalton J., 96, 102
Lee, Col Paul M., Jr., 186, 188
Lilly, Col Jasper C., Jr., 13
Lindo, Lt Rupert F., USN, 96
Livingston, Col Lawrence H., 103, 110, 126, 129, 174
Lonesome Dove, 118-119, 125, 181-182
Lott, LtCol Bradley M., 9
Lucenta, Maj William, 93, 106, 109, 135, 138, 157, 165-166, 177
Lupton, LtCol Robert E., 74, 174, 176
Lusczynski, LtCol Leon S., 38, 57-58, 171, 177
Lydon, Maj Joseph W., 114-115

M
Manifah Bay, 29, 33, 37, 39, 41-43, 45, 47, 52-54, 57, 74-75, 87, 89, 177
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, 2, 6, 79
Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, 75, 181
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, 63, 76
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, 5, 6, 63
Marine Corps Air Station, Kanehoe Bay, 7
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, 6
Marine Corps Finance Center, 60
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, 26
Marine Corps Commands and Units
  1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 89, 156, 164-165, 173
  1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 87
  1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 35, 126, 133, 159
  1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 139, 155
  1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 98, 104, 126, 128, 145, 152
  1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 89, 148
  1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 106, 165
  1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 47, 87, 148
  1st Dental Company, 27
  1st Force Service Support Group, 2, 5, 11, 26-27, 34-39, 44, 50, 58, 62-65,
    67, 71, 74-75, 77-78, 81, 88, 111, 140, 159, 166-167, 177, 179, 182, 186, 190
  1st Force Service Support Group (Forward), 12
  1st Landing Support Battalion, 78
  1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 45
  1st Marine Brigade, 11, 43, 186
  1st Marine Division, 2, 13, 34, 36-37, 45, 47-50, 53, 57, 59, 63, 68-70, 72,
    74-75, 79, 82, 86-90, 92, 94, 96, 101, 104-106, 109, 111-112, 119, 126,
    130, 135, 142, 148, 150, 158-159, 167-168, 171, 176-178, 181
  1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 7, 15, 177
  1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 40, 178
  1st Marines, 87, 89
1st Medical Battalion, 78
1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 47
1st Tank Battalion, 47, 89, 148, 155, 156, 158, 165
2d Assault Amphibious Vehicle Battalion, 104
2d Battalion, 2d Marines, 126, 159
2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 104, 145, 152-153
2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 111
2d Battalion, 10th Marines, 110, 126
2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 126
2d Force Service Support Group, 4, 7-8, 63-65, 67, 71, 75-77, 79, 81, 97, 
177, 179, 182, 184-187, 190-191
2d Landing Support Battalion, 78, 125
2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 128
2d Maintenance Battalion, 78, 100, 122-123
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 8
2d Marine Division, 7-8, 10, 62-63, 67, 69, 74-75, 79, 82, 96, 100-102, 107- 
108, 126, 128-132, 143, 145, 150, 167, 170, 176, 178-180, 183-184
2d Medical Battalion, 78, 96
2d Reconnaissance Battalion, 128
2d Remote Pilot Vehicle Company, 61
2d Supply Battalion, 78
2d Tank Battalion, 110, 126, 144
3d Amphibious Assault Battalion, 45, 148
3d Assault Amphibious Vehicle Battalion, 47
3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 126
3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 87, 111
3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 45, 47, 52, 59, 89, 148-149, 157
3d Battalion, 10th Marines, 169
3d Battalion, 11th Marines, 88, 149, 157, 173
3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 111, 149, 171, 173
3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 104, 145, 169
3d Force Service Support Group, 35, 186, 190
3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 29
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 2, 6, 34, 36, 39, 44, 47, 51, 54, 63, 70, 75, 81-84, 
99, 109, 112, 115, 118, 125, 135, 141, 150, 177, 181-182, 184, 191
3d Marine Division, 32, 49
3d Marines, 52, 87, 105, 188
3d Tank Battalion, 87, 115, 139
4th Force Service Support Group, 76, 105
4th Landing Support Battalion, 124
4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 8, 11, 12, 53, 55, 60-61, 63
4th Marines, 111, 134
4th Tank Battalion, 170
4th Truck Company, 104
5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 171, 173
5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 62-63, 74, 174-178
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

5th Marines, 144, 175-176
6th Engineer Support Battalion, 99
6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 75
6th Marines, 79, 97, 103-104, 110, 112, 126-129, 131-132, 134, 143, 150-
152, 173-174, 180
6th Motor Transport Battalion, 85, 99-100, 120-122
7th Engineer Support Battalion, 69, 78-79, 84-85, 106, 110, 112, 117, 131,
158
7th Engineer Support Battalion, 130
7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 1-2, 4-7, 11, 13, 15-16, 18-20, 21-29, 32-
34, 88
7th Marines, 23, 87
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 69, 78, 110, 120, 124, 184
8th Engineer Support Battalion, 76-80, 84-85, 94, 101, 117-118, 153-54, 162,
167, 170, 178-179, 187-188
8th Marines, 79, 97-98, 104, 126, 128-129, 134, 145, 150, 152-153, 161, 167,
169, 173, 179, 188
8th Motor Transport Battalion, 77-78, 85, 102, 106, 108, 120-121, 128, 130,
138, 141, 161, 166, 170, 173, 183, 188
8th Tank Battalion, 100, 103, 126, 159
10th Marines, 102, 132, 143, 145, 173
11th Marines, 45, 47, 70, 90, 93, 95, 111, 134-135, 138, 142, 150, 155, 157,
165
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 9, 11, 12, 60
13th Dental Company, 27
23d Dental Company, 27
Alpha Train, 89, 140, 148-149, 155, 157, 164
Battalion Landing Team 1/4, 9
Battery B, 2d Light Antiair Missile Battalion, 61
Battery S, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 114
Bravo Train, 89, 139, 149, 164
Brigade Service Support Group 1, 7, 11-12, 15-16, 26, 33-34, 38
Brigade Service Support Group 4, 8, 12, 65, 76
Brigade Service Support Group 5, 65, 74, 174-176
Brigade Service Support Group 7, 2, 4-5, 7, 10-12, 16-29, 31-34 36-38, 88
Charlie Train, 89
Collecting and Clearing Company A, 136, 179
Collecting and Clearing Company C, 170, 173
Combat Service Support Area 1, 78, 80, 108
Combat Service Support Area 2, 116, 118, 121, 141, 174
Combat Service Support Area 3, 170-171
Combat Service Support Area Ponderosa, 129-130, 132
Combat Service Support Detachment 1, 84, 171
Combat Service Support Detachment 10, 31, 35, 79, 86, 89-90, 92-94, 96,
104-106, 109, 130, 135-142, 147, 149-150, 155, 157-159, 163-166, 172-
173, 176-178
Combat Service Support Detachment 11, 114, 136, 156, 171
Combat Service Support Detachment 13, 87, 104-106, 109-110, 134-135,
137-139, 141, 150, 155-156, 158, 163, 171, 173, 177
Combat Service Support Detachment 17, 136, 155
Combat Service Support Detachment 31, 37, 48
Combat Service Support Detachment 71, 32, 38
Combat Service Support Detachment 72, 29-30, 38, 92
Combat Service Support Detachment 73, 29, 37
Combat Service Support Detachment 82, 125
Combat Service Support Detachment 91, 100-101, 107-108, 140, 166-168,
172, 178
Combat Service Support Detachment 111, 37-38, 47-48, 53-55, 57, 68, 70-71,
79, 86-88, 92, 95-96
Combat Service Support Detachment 111 (South), 89
Combat Service Support Detachment 113, 130
Combat Service Support Detachment 131, 38, 44, 70, 99
Combat Service Support Detachment 132, 38, 42-43, 50-51, 68, 70, 99
Combat Service Support Detachment 133, 115, 125
Combat Service Support Detachment 141, 37, 45, 47-48, 51-55, 68, 70-71,
87, 89, 105, 177
Combat Service Support Detachment 142, 50-51, 79
Combat Service Support Operations Center, 97
Company A, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 89, 148
Company A, 2d Medical Battalion, 96
Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, 142, 148, 158, 165
Company A, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 130, 145-146, 154, 162, 170
Company A, 8th Motor Transport Battalion, 96
Company B, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 150
Company B, 4th Landing Support Battalion, 105
Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 88
Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 77, 79-80, 126, 131, 143, 154,
162, 170, 179
Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 114, 139
Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 84
Company C, 2d Combat Engineers, 126
Company C, 2d Medical Battalion, 96
Company C, 4th Tank Battalion, 152
Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion, 80
Company C, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 77, 79, 145, 154, 162, 170
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, 143
Company F, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 128
Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 29
Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 28
Direct Support Command, 67-69, 77-78, 81-82, 84-85, 87, 92, 97, 101-102,
104, 106-109, 112, 114, 116, 118-119, 121, 123, 125-126, 128, 132,
137, 139, 141-143, 146, 150, 153, 159, 161-163, 166-167, 169, 172-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

173, 175-179, 182

Direct Support Group 1, 36-38, 50-55, 67, 70-71, 79, 86-87, 90, 92, 94, 97,
102-104, 110-112, 114, 116, 121, 129, 131, 134-135, 137, 141, 148-149,
154-156, 158, 162-163, 169-171, 173, 177-179, 183

Direct Support Group 2, 79, 94, 96, 102, 116, 118, 121, 128-130, 132, 141,
143, 145, 152-153, 159, 169-170, 173, 175-176, 183

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 111

Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, 8, 65
Forward Ammunition Storage Point 1, 48-51, 54, 79
Forward Ammunition Storage Point 2, 49-51, 54, 72, 79, 187-188
Forward Ammunition Storage Point 3, 69, 73, 100, 110
Forward Ammunition Supply Point 5, 118, 121-122

General Support Group 1, 36-38, 42, 44, 47-55, 57-58, 68-69, 76, 78-79, 81,
99, 100, 102, 136, 179

General Support Group 2, 69, 77-78, 81, 100, 110, 123-125, 140, 168, 173,
178

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group, 78, 81
Headquarters and Service Battalion, 2d Force Service Support Group, 78

Headquarters and Support Group, 36, 59
Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, 143

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 2, 10-11, 16, 25-26, 35-36, 38, 41, 45, 47, 53,
55-61, 63-65, 68-69, 72-73, 75, 77-78, 80-82, 86, 101, 106, 110 112, 116-1
17, 119-120, 125-126, 129, 135, 139-142, 159, 166, 174, 176-177, 180, 183-
184, 187

II Marine Expeditionary Force, 7-8, 63, 65, 75, 116

Logistics Movement Control Center (Forward), 11

Marine Aerial Refueller Transport Squadron 352, 15

Marine Air Ground Task Force 6-90, 34-35

Marine Aircraft Group 11, 39, 44, 73, 99

Marine Aircraft Group 13, 39, 43

Marine Aircraft Group 16, 39, 41-42, 44, 49, 55, 63, 83, 99, 115, 150, 181

Marine Aircraft Group 24, 7

Marine Aircraft Group 26, 63, 69, 75, 83-84, 115, 118-119, 181

Marine Aircraft Group 40, 8

Marine Aircraft Group 50, 74

Marine Aircraft Group 70, 4, 6, 15, 22, 28, 32

Marine Attack Squadron 311, 15, 43

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 352, 44

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, 13

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, 29

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, 9

Marine Observation Squadron 2, 43

Marine Service Support Group 11, 74

Marine Service Support Group 13, 9, 12

Marine Service Support Group 22, 75, 97
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 174, 42-44, 47, 58, 83-84, 99, 115, 181-182
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 271, 76, 83, 99, 115, 141, 150, 181
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 273, 75, 83-84, 115, 118-119, 141, 181, 187
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 274, 63
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 271, 76, 83, 99, 115, 141, 150, 181
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 373, 6, 11, 17-19, 32-33, 44, 82, 99, 181
Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 374, 10-12, 17-19, 30-31, 33, 42-43, 47, 82, 99, 115, 141, 180-181
Marine Wing Support Group 37, 6, 63, 75, 81-83, 99, 112, 115, 119, 141, 180, 191
Mobile 1, 89
Mobile 2, 89
Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 11, 90, 94, 114, 135, 139-140, 142, 147-150, 155, 157, 163-165, 171, 173, 177
Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 17, 88-90, 94, 111, 114-115, 135, 139, 142, 147, 149-150, 154, 157-158, 163-165, 171, 173, 177
Regimental Combat Team 3, 7, 23, 34, 44-45, 47-48, 52, 55, 70
Regimental Combat Team 4, 35-36
Regimental Combat Team 7, 4, 21, 27-29, 34, 38, 45, 70
Regimental Landing Team 2, 8
Regimental Landing Team 5, 74
Security Detachment, 3d Marines, 186
Task Force Breach A, 126, 129, 143
Task Force Grizzly, 134-135, 137, 142, 149-150, 155-156, 158-159, 162, 168
Task Force Papa Bear, 70, 87, 89, 114, 134, 139-140, 142, 147-149, 155-156, 158, 164-165, 171, 177
Task Force Ripper, 45, 47-48, 70, 87-89, 111, 114-115, 134-136, 139, 142, 147-149, 154-155, 158, 163-164, 171
Task Force Shepherd, 45, 47, 52, 104, 106, 134-135, 137, 150, 158, 165, 168, 173
Task Force Taro, 70, 87, 105-106, 109, 110, 134-135, 142, 150, 156, 158, 168
Marine Forces Southwest Asia, 184, 188-191
Masirah Island, 60
Matter, Capt Carl D., 96, 132
McGarrah, Cdr James, USN, 73
McKissock, Col Gary S., 116-117, 166, 170
McMurran, Capt Peter B., 55
McNeal, Maj James M., 104
McNerney, 1stLt Kevin M., 20
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Melendez, Capt Hector L., 189
Middlebrook, 1stLt Edwin E., 89
Miller, Capt Drew B., 128
Miller, LCdr Jon, USN, 11
Mina Suliman, 15, 40, 187-189
Mina Suliman Container Port, 32
Mishab, 47, 63, 69, 77-79, 82-87, 99-100, 107, 109-110, 112, 115-116, 118-119, 121-126, 140, 167, 175, 177-179, 183-184, 186, 188
Mobile, 174
Moore, MajGen Royal N., Jr., 2, 39, 43, 63, 99, 112
Moorehead City, North Carolina, 8
Morsch, Capt Jeffrey J., 137, 148, 156
Motes, Maj Michael J., 189
Muller, Capt Dennis P., 71, 109, 137-138
Mundy, LtGen Carl E., Jr., 65
Musca, Maj Joseph I., 148, 158, 165
MV American Condor, 187
MV Anderson, 7, 13
MV Baugh, 7, 54, 60-61, 187
MV Bobo, 75, 180
MV Bonnyman, 7, 13, 15, 32, 60-61
MV Button, 7, 15-16
MV Cape Horn, 187
MV Ciudad De Manta, 115
MV Constellation, 11
MV Danah, 40
MV Fisher, 7, 15, 32
MV Greenridge, 41-43
MV Hanjin Jedda, 189
MV Hauge, 7, 13, 15, 21-22, 31, 180, 187
MV Jean Lykes, 188
MV Kocak, 75
MV Kubbar, 41
MV Lopez, 7, 15-6
MV Lummus, 7, 15-16
MV Maersk Constellation, 41, 54
MV Mallory Lykes, 100
MV Obregon, 75, 180
MV Oslo Polar, 187
MV Phillips, 187
MV Pless, 75
MV Williams, 7, 15-16
Myatt, MajGen James M., 2, 45, 50, 70, 75, 105, 111, 115, 134, 136-137, 168, 171
Negahnquet, Capt Stephen H., 111-112, 162, 166, 170
Nelson, LCdr Alan L., USN, 23
Nielsen, Maj Thomas J., 35
Nolan, Maj Martin R., 11
Norton Air Force Base, 5

O
O'Donovan, LtCol John A., 84, 153, 167, 172
Observation Post 4, 109, 147, 149-150, 155-158, 164, 172-173, 177, 181-183
Observation Post 6, 115
Okinawa, 10, 34, 40, 44, 48, 186
Olivo, 1stLt Kenneth, 20
Operation Desert Shaft, 178
Operation Flail, 120
Operation Provide Comfort, 187
Operation Roundup, 182
Osorno, 1stLt Juan C., 89, 139, 149, 164

P
Pankey, Col Paul A., 35, 76-78, 85, 99
Parking Apron 2, 42
Parking Apron 3, 42
Penrod, Maj Roger E., 181
Port Hueneme, 10
Powell, Col Alexander W., 2, 5, 28-29, 36-37, 50-52, 70-71, 79, 87, 92, 104-105, 111-114, 134-138, 140, 147-149, 155-156, 158, 163, 170-173, 177-178, 186

Q
Qaraah, 77, 105-107, 109-111, 114, 116, 120, 125-126, 134, 180

R
Ramey, Capt Peter M., 96, 118
Ras Al Ghar Navy Base, 21-22, 39, 41, 43-44, 75, 187
Ras Al Khafji, 110
Ras Al Mishab, 55, 68-69, 75, 84, 105, 173, 176, 180-181
Ras Al Safaniyah, 55, 86, 95, 116
Ray, Lt Daniel T., 11
Reinhold, Capt Philip L., 148
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) 26, 173-174, 180
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Brown, 111
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Fournier, 144, 151, 153, 170
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Hubert, 97
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Laporte, 103
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Ponderosa, 145, 153, 160-161, 175,
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

182-183
Repair and Replenishment Point (RRP) Stewart, 128, 143
Rettinghaus, MSgt James E., 97
Rice, Maj Howard E., Jr., 149-150, 158, 177
Richard, Col Ronald G., 116
Ritchie, Capt William H. III, 87, 105, 109-111, 134-135, 139, 150, 155-156,
158, 173
Riznychok, LtCol William L., 75, 84, 118-119
Roosevelt Roads, 10
Rowe, BGen Peter J., 74, 175
Rudich, Cdr William L., USN, 10

S
Saddam Hussein, 1, 62, 107, 176-177, 191
Salinas, Capt Philip L., 148, 158, 165
San Bernardino (LST 1189), 34
Sass, Maj Arthur H., 102, 145
Saudi Arabia, 1, 4-5, 7, 10-13, 15-16, 26, 33-35, 40, 43, 55-56, 60, 65-67, 75-
77, 79, 82-83, 88-89, 98, 100, 102, 107, 110, 143, 147, 150, 152, 166, 173,
175, 178-180, 182, 184, 186-189, 191
Saudi 10th Brigade, 80
Saudi 8th Brigade, 80
Schmidt, Col Larry S., 104, 128, 145
Schenectady (LST 1185), 34
Scholfield, GySgt Mickey, 111
Schwarzkopf, Gen H. Norman, USA, 34, 62-64, 82
Scoggins, LtCol Coy, USA, 103
Shaikh Isa, 27, 38-39, 40, 44, 73, 82, 99, 141, 181-180, 182, 189
Shaikh Isa Air Base, 6, 15, 19, 22, 32-33
Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C., Jr., 12
Skipper, LtCol Charles 0., 77, 79-80, 101, 117, 145, 153-154, 162, 170, 178,
184
Slates, Lt Kevin R., USN, 10
Smith, LtCol Charlie F., 38, 54, 68, 77-78, 124-125
Smith, 1stLt Darryl L., 105, 139, 156
Smith, 1stLt Julia A., 189
Smith, LtCol Michael H., 157
Smith, MajGen Rupert, 63
Songer, Maj Robert L., 172
Sparks, Maj Jack K., Jr., 159
Sparrow, LtCol Linden L., 100-101, 140, 168
Spartanburg County, 61
SS Aide, 189
SS Alten Bells, 188
SS Brij, 188
SS Cape Bon, 188
SS Cape Carthage, 187
SS Gulf Trader, 188
Steed, Col Billy C., 116
Sunny Point, California, 8
Supko, Col Leonard M., 135
Sweeney, Maj John L., Jr., 20, 58-59

T
Tace, Col Stephen A., 107, 116
Tanajib, 63, 82-83, 86, 99, 115, 125, 181
Tapline Road, 34
TAVB Curtiss, 54
TAVB Wright, 54
Thompson, Capt Donald A., 82
Thunderbolt Range, 97-98
Tobin, Capt Robert E., 103, 128
Triangle, 34, 109, 114

U
U.S. Air Force Command and Units
   1st Tactical Fighter Wing, 1
   Military Airlift Command, 11, 13, 125
U.S. Army Commands and Units
   101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1, 34
   1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Tiger Brigade), 63, 103, 108-109, 126,
       128, 131-132, 134, 145, 151, 159, 161, 168, 173
   1st Infantry Division, 62
   3d Armored Calvary Regiment, 54
   10th Transportation Battalion, 125
   24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 34
   34th Military Police Battalion, 140
   82d Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1, 59
   240th Quartermaster Battalion, 125
   370th Quartermaster Battalion, 125
   475th Quartermaster Group, 125
   502d Support Battalion, 103, 128, 161
   VII Corps, 62
   XVIII Airborne Corps, 95
U.S. Central Command (USCentCom), 1, 2, 11, 34, 49, 61-63, 65, 67, 99
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1
U.S. Navy Commands and Units
   3d Naval Construction Regiment, 73, 81, 86, 119, 191
   31st Construction Regiment (Training), 10
   Amphibious Group 2, 8
   Amphibious Ready Group 3, 74, 177
   Amphibious Ready Group “A”, 9
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

COMCBPAC Foxrot Delta, 10-11, 62
Maritime Prepositioning Force, 176-178, 187-188, 191
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 1, 62, 75, 98, 103, 182, 184, 190
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, 4-5, 7, 13, 15, 17, 20-21, 26, 60, 182,
184, 190
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3, 7, 15-16, 25-26, 43, 54, 182, 184,
190
Military Sealift Command, 8, 60, 187-188, 190
Naval Cargo Handling and Port Operations Group, 185
Naval Inshore Underwater Warfare Group 1, 28
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1, 72-73
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4, 10-11, 41-43, 48, 72-73
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5, 10-11, 31, 41-42, 48, 72, 86, 100,
119-120, 126, 141, 166, 180
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, 10, 40, 44, 72-73
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, 72-74, 86, 119, 141, 180, 187
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40, 10, 40-42, 48-49, 72, 74, 86, 99,
118, 180
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 70, 180
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74, 72-73, 86, 120, 126, 187
Naval Special Warfare Group, 47
Naval Weapons Station, Concord, 185, 188
Navy Fleet Hospital 5, 24
Ungersma, Capt John A., USN, 47
United Nations, 81
United Parcel Service, 99
USNS Noble Star, 24

W
Waldon, LCpl James E., 165
Walsh, Cdr David, USN, 41, 85, 86
Walters, LtCol Larry D., 85, 100, 121-122
Warker, Capt Peter M., 111, 160
Waters, Capt W.A., USN, 180
Weegar, Capt Carl A., USN, 7, 20
Wightman, 1stLt Kevin R., 90, 92, 94-95
Wilkinson, Capt Timothy M., 38
Will, Capt Alan B., 102
Williams, 1stLt Delaney C., 89, 140, 149, 157
Willis, Maj Henry, 189
Wilson, Capt Paul R., 188
Winglass, LtGen Robert J., 64-66
Winter, Capt Edward J., 87-89, 111, 114-115, 139, 147, 149, 154-155, 163-164,
171
Wittle, LtCol David L., 79, 97, 103-104, 110-111, 127, 133, 143-144, 151-152,
159-160, 173, 180
Woodhead, Col John A. III, 64-65, 67, 153, 178
Woodson, LtCol Thomas S., 77-78, 121, 167, 172, 183-184, 188

Y
Yff, Maj Philip N., 123-124

Z
Zegar, LtCol Richard H., 83, 181
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.