Cover Photograph: Marine rifleman and tanks of the 4th Marine Division advance across the cane fields on Tinian in July 1944. (USMC Photo 88108)
THE 4th MARINE DIVISION
IN WORLD WAR II

by

First Lieutenant John C. Chapin, USMCR

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

1974 Reprint of 1945 Edition
Republished 1976
FOREWORD

The major ground component of the active Marine Corps Reserve is the 4th Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force. The combat record of this division in World War II was exemplary; in the short space of one year it participated in four major amphibious assaults and won two presidential citations. The interest in its battle record among the reservists who now serve in its ranks has prompted the republication of this brief history, originally published in August 1945 and reprinted in 1974. This new reprint contains a brief history of the reserve 4th Division, written by Colonel Joseph B. Ruth, USMCR, a former member of the 25th Marines. Also included are copies of the division's lineage and honors, a list of its commanders, and a list of its units and their locations.

The author of the 1945 history, then First Lieutenant John C. Chapin, served in the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines of the 4th Division. Assigned to the Historical Division when he recovered from wounds received in combat in Saipan, he completed this history and a similar one of the 5th Marine Division before his release from active duty.

E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Reviewed and Approved:
1 September 1976
Reactivation of the

Early in 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicated to the Congress that he wanted the Marine Corps to have a fourth division/wing team, to be formed of Ready Reserves. In April of that year, the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced a major reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve to be effective 1 July 1962. In this reorganization, 53 reserve units were redesignated as 4th Marine Division units.

While 1 July 1962 is regarded as the date of reactivation of the division, it was not until 14 February 1966 that the 4th Marine Division headquarters nucleus was actually activated at Camp Pendleton. The division was given the primary mission "to establish an effective staff nucleus capable of directing, controlling and integrating, as directed, the mobilization planning and logistics functions preceding the activation of the 4th Marine Division and of ensuring an orderly and efficient mobilization of the division." Major General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., commanding general of Camp Pendleton was given the additional responsibility as the commanding general of the division.

The small division staff immediately set about its many demanding tasks including the development of mobilization plans, standing operating procedures, and post-mobilization training programs. Another major task was the conduct of annual training for reserve units assigned to Camp Pendleton. This latter function included the preparation of operation and control plans for air/ground exercises held during the summer training periods. Both regular and reserve forces took part in these exercises.

On 23 June 1966, the World War II division colors were presented to General Cushman, significantly at a 4th Marine Division Association meeting at Camp Pendleton, California. Reminiscent of a passed torch, a new generation of Marines was eager to prove itself worthy of the trust attendant in the acceptance of the proud colors.

Even before the headquarters nucleus had been formed, still other changes were on the drawing board. In late 1965, the Commandant approved a plan to further reorganize the Organized Marine Corps Reserve so that the division/wing team would become a "mirror image" of its regular counterparts. The first step toward achieving this goal was to reorganize the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing so that it would reflect an active wing. Other steps that were required to accomplish the Commandant's directive were: establish division combat and combat support units together with certain force troops units; form the 4th Force Service Regiment (completed in June 1968); and form FMF augmentation units. To complete the reorganization, active-duty colonels were assigned as commanders of the reserve regiments, reserve brigadier generals were assigned as assistant division commanders, and an active duty general officer was assigned as a fulltime division commander. All of these changes were made by 15 July 1970 when Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki arrived to take command of the division. One month later, General Dulacki was promoted to major general. The "nucleus" designation was dropped with the command unit now being designated as Headquarters, 4th Marine Division.

With the division's new structure came a new mission. The division was now responsible for training all Organized Marine Corps Reserve ground units. The Commandant's intent of 1965 had been accomplished and the Marine Corps had one more division/wing team. The new change antedated by three years the "Total Force Concept," the Department of Defense policy of integrating reserve component units into the wartime planning and programming process.

The 4th Marine Division was now a fully structured force in its own right, able to muster and move out to a combat assignment within a relatively short period of time. In still another change, effective 17 May 1976, the 4th Division Support Group was formed, providing the division with selective combat service support which includes combat engineers, tactical motor transport, and an assault shore party. In a move external to the division, certain battalions were added to the 4th Force Service Regiment, now redesignated as the 4th Force Service Support Group.
4th Marine Division

The ultimate goal of any Marine division is readiness, but the 4th Marine Division has one peculiar problem not shared with the regular divisions. An unusual span of control situation is brought about by the geographic dispersion of some 200 division units throughout the United States. This challenge has been met by the strong resolve and abundant energies of the commanding generals and their staffs together with the cooperation, long hours, and sheer doggedness of the regimental commanders, their officers and NCOs.

The training accomplishments of the 4th Marine Division have been both imaginative in content and impressive in operation. During 1975, 15,543 Marine reservists received training at 25 Marine Corps and other installations including some locations outside the continental United States. The training year also saw two Marine amphibious unit exercises, one at Camp Lejeune, and the other at Camp Pendleton, and a desert exercise at the Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, California.

The 4th Marine Division has one purpose and that was clearly expressed by Major General Edward J. Miller in his 1976 Armed Forces Day message, “The 4th Marine Division stands ready to carry out any mission assigned as the Marine Corps’ Force in Readiness.” Created for battle in 1943, the division’s ultimate purpose remains the same.

Commanders, 4th Marine Division

BGen James L. Underhill 16 Aug 1943 — 17 Aug 1943
MajGen Harry Schmidt 18 Aug 1943 — 11 Jul 1944
MajGen Clifton B. Cates 12 Jul 1944 — 18 Nov 1945
MajGen Lewis J. Fields 1 Mar 1967 — 14 Jun 1968
BGen (MajGen) Leo J. Dulacki 15 Jul 1970 — 4 Mar 1973
BGen Paul X. Kelley 23 Aug 1974 — 30 Jun 1975
MajGen Edward J. Miller 1 Jul 1975 —

(*) Although 1 July 1962 is regarded as the date for the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division, no headquarters element was activated at that time.
4th Marine Division
Unit Locations
1 July 1976

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (MINUS)
Headquarters Company (Minus), Camp Pendleton, Calif.
Division Headquarters (Minus), Camp Pendleton, Calif.
Photo Imagery Unit, Denver, Colo.
30th Interrogator-Translator Team, Alameda, Calif.
31st Interrogator-Translator Team, Los Angeles, Calif.
32d Interrogator-Translator Team, Fort Schuyler, N.Y.
33d Interrogator-Translator Team, Miami, Fla.
34th Interrogator-Translator Team, Garden City, N.Y.
35th Interrogator-Translator Team, Washington, D.C.
Service Company, unmanned.
Communications Company, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Military Police Company, Minneapolis, Minn.

23D MARINES
Headquarters Company, Alameda, Calif.

First Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company, Houston, Texas.
Company A, Lafayette, La.
Company B, Austin, Texas.
Company C, Corpus Christi, Texas.
Company D, Orange, Texas.

Second Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company, Houston, Texas.
   Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company, Port Huenme, Calif.
Company E (Minus), Stockton, Calif.
   Detachment, Company E, Concord, Calif.
Company F (Minus), Salt Lake City, Utah.
   Detachment, Company F, Las Vegas, Nev.
Company G (Minus), Los Alamitos, Calif.
   Detachment, Company G, San Bernardino, Calif.
Company H (Minus), San Bruno, Calif.
   Detachment, Company H, San Rafael, Calif.

Third Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company (Minus), New Orleans, La.
   Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company, Baton Rouge, La.
Company I, Shreveport, La.
Company K, Memphis, Tenn.
Company L (Minus), Rome, Ga.
   Detachment, Company L, Johnson City, Tenn.
Company M, Little Rock, Ark.
24TH MARINES

Headquarters Company, Kansas City, Mo.

First Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company, Detroit, Mich.
Company B, Dayton, Ohio.
Company C (Minus), Lansing, Mich.
    Detachment, Company C, Toledo, Ohio.
Company D, Flint, Mich.

Second Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company, Chicago, Ill.
Company E, Chicago, Ill.
Company F, Milwaukee, Wis.
Company G (Minus), Madison, Wis.
    Detachment, Company G, Des Moines, Iowa.
Company H, Waukegan, Ill.

Third Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company, St. Louis, Mo.
Company I, Nashville, Tenn.
Company K (Minus), Danville, Ill.
    Detachment, Company K, Evansville, Ind.
Company L (Minus), Topeka, Kans.
    Detachment, Company L, Wichita, Kans.
Company M (Minus), Springfield, Mo.
    Detachment, Company M, St. Louis, Mo.

25TH MARINES


First Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company (Minus), Boston, Mass.
    Detachment, Headquarters and Service Company, Topsham, Me.
Company A, Albany, N.Y.
Company B, Hartford, Conn.
Company C (Minus), Springfield, Mass.
    Detachment, Company C, Manchester, N.H.
Company D, Buffalo, N.Y.

Second Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company, Garden City, N.Y.
Company E (Minus), Folsom, Pa.
    Detachment, Company E, Wilmington, Del.
Company F, New Rochelle, N.Y.
Company G, Dover, N.J.
Company H, Harrisburg, Pa.

Third Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
Company I (Minus), Wheeling, W. Va.
Company K, Akron, Ohio.
Company L (Reinforced), Pittsburgh, Pa.
Company M, Columbus, Ohio.
14TH MARINES
Headquarters Battery, Fort Worth, Texas
First Battalion
Headquarters Battery, Los Angeles, Calif.
Battery A, Spokane, Wash.
Battery B, Pico Rivera, Calif.
Battery C, Waterloo, Iowa.
Battery X, Los Angeles, Calif.
Second Battalion
Headquarters Battery, Dallas, Texas.
Battery D, Dallas, Texas.
Battery E, Texarkana, Texas.
Battery F, Jackson, Texas.
Third Battalion
Headquarters Battery, Philadelphia, Pa.
Battery G, Trenton, N.J.
Battery H, Richmond, Va.
Battery I, Reading, Pa.
Fourth Battalion
Headquarters Battery, Birmingham, Ala.
Battery K, Joliet, Ill.
Battery L, Birmingham, Ala.
Battery M, Chattanooga, Tenn.

4TH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
Headquarters and Service Company, San Antonio, Texas.
Company A, San Antonio, Texas.
Company B, Billings, Mont.
Company C, Reno, Nev.
Company D, Albuquerque, N.M.

4TH DIVISION SUPPORT GROUP
Headquarters and Service Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company, Freemansburg, Pa.
Truck Company (Minus), Erie, Pa.
  Detachment, Truck Company, Connellsville, Pa.
Service Company (Minus), Charleston, S.C.
  Detachment, Service Company, Augusta, Ga.
Logistics and Support Company (Minus), Seattle, Wash.
  Detachment, Logistics and Support Company, Tacoma, Wash.
4th Combat Engineer Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company, Baltimore, Md.
Support Company, Baltimore, Md.
Company A, South Charleston, W. Va.
Company B, Roanoke, Va.
Company C, Lynchburg, Va.
Company D, Knoxville, Tenn.
4TH MARINE DIVISION

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STAR
WORLD WAR II
SAIPAN AND TINIAN, 1944
IWO JIMA, 1945

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER
WORLD WAR II
IWO JIMA, 1945

ASIATIC-PACIFIC CAMPAIGN STREAMER WITH FOUR BRONZE STARS

WORLD WAR II VICTORY STREAMER
LINEAGE

4TH MARINE DIVISION

1943

ACTIVATED 16 AUGUST 1943 AT CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA AS THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION

DEPARTED CONUS 13 JANUARY 1944 FOR COMBAT AT ROI-NAMUR, MARSHALL ISLANDS

1944 - 1945

PARTICIPATED IN THE FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II CAMPAIGNS

MARSHALL ISLANDS
SAIPAN
TINIAN
IWO JIMA

RELOCATED DURING APRIL 1945 TO MAUI, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, THE DIVISION TRAINING BASE FOR THREE OPERATIONS

RELOCATED DURING NOVEMBER 1945 TO CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

DEACTIVATED 28 NOVEMBER 1945 AT CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

1966 - 1974

REACTIVATED 14 FEBRUARY 1966 AT CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA AS THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, USMCR
the

FOURTH MARINE

DIVISION

Historical Division
U.S. Marine Corps
THE FOURTH MARINE DIVISION
in
WORLD WAR II

Prepared by
Lieutenant John C. Chapin
HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
August, 1945
# INDEX

## CHAPTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Formation and Training in the United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Kwajalein</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Tinian</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Maui Again</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Ocean Areas</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roi-Namur</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saipan (Showing Daily Progress)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinian (Showing Daily Progress)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima (Showing Fourth Marine Division Zone of Action)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima (Showing Daily Progress)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

A: Command and Staff Personnel (1) Commanding Generals (2) Assistant Division Commanders (3) The Division Staff (4) Regimental Commanders

B: Composition of the Division (1) Organization (2) Designation (3) Composition (as of August 1945)

C: Task Organization of the Division (1) Kwajalein (2) Saipan (3) Tinian (4) Iwo Jima

D: Movements and Battles of the Division

E: Casualties of the Division

F: Strength of the Division

G: Medals and Decorations (Won by Members of the Division)

H: Maui Petition and Hawaiian Senate Resolution

I: Bibliography
CHAPTER I

Formation and Training in the United States

The overwhelming successes of the Japanese in their early campaigns in the Pacific made it obvious that the number of combat divisions of the Marine Corps would have to be greatly increased. The First Marine Division and elements of the Second were engaged in the grim struggle for Guadalcanal when the Third Division was organized on September 8, 1942. By mid-February, 1943, the Third was enroute to the Southwest Pacific, and steps were taken to organize and train another division for the fast growing Fleet Marine Force.

Accordingly, the formation of the Fourth Marine Division was begun. The 23rd Marines, under Colonel Louis R. Jones, USMC, became the nucleus for the Division's rifle units. This regiment had originally been activated on July 20, 1942, and it had served as part of the Third Division. However, it was detached from the Third on February 15, 1943, and five days later it was designated part of the Fourth Division. On March 26, the 24th Marines was organized with Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell H. Mizell, USMC, as Acting Regimen
tal Commander. In order to form the last rifle regiment, the 23rd Marines was split into two. This subdivision supplied the personnel for the 25th Marines when it was activated on May 1, 1943. Colonel Richard H. Schubert, USMC, was its first commander. The formation of the Division's artillery regiment was begun as early as February 20, when a battalion of the 12th Marines was redesignated as part of the 14th Marines. On June 1, 1943, the 14th was organized as a complete unit under Lieutenant Colonel Randall M. Victory, USMC. The engineer regiment of the Division also had its start on February 20, when elements of the 19th Marines were redesignated part of the 20th Marines. This regiment was formally activated on June 15, 1943, with Lieutenant Colonel Nelson K. Brown, USMC, in command.

All these units, except the 24th Marines, were grouped into the East Coast Echelon of the Fourth Marine Division. This echelon received its training at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina, during the summer of 1943. At the same time, the 24th underwent its training at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California. It was reinforced there by detachments of engineer, artillery, medical, motor transport, and special weapons personnel. The 4th Tank Battalion was likewise a member of the West Coast Echelon at this time.

In all the Division's units, long hours of practice were spent on the things that were to prove so essential later: scouting and patrolling, firing of weapons, landings from

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* In World War I a 14th Regiment had existed at Quantico from November 26, 1918, until it was disbanded on June 19, 1919.
** For a list of the Division's command and staff personnel, and its component elements, see Appendixes "A" and "B".
LCVP's, night attacks and defenses, the use of cover, concealment, and camouflage, map work, close combat with bayonet, knife, and Judo, and all the thousand and one other skills that go into the makeup of a good Marine.

The 23rd Marines was the oldest regiment in the Division, and, as such, it had completed the most training. It was the unit chosen to initiate the East Coast Echelon's movement to Camp Pendleton. From July 3, 1943, to the 12th it was engaged in this transfer. August found the remaining units' period of training at New River nearly over. Veterans of broiling summer heat at Tent Camp, landings at Onslo Beach, artillery problems at Verona, and close combat school at Courthouse Bay packed up their gear in anticipation. By the 9th of the month, the movement to California had begun. At this time, the strength of the East Coast Echelon stood at 6220 officers and men. The 25th Marines embarked at Norfolk and sailed through the Panama Canal to San Diego, while the rest of the units traveled overland by train.*

On August 16, 1943, the Fourth Division was formally activated at Camp Pendleton with Brigadier General James L. Underhill, USMC, acting as Commanding General. Two days later, Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC, took over command, and General Underhill became Assistant Division Commander.

At the end of August, the Divisional strength had climbed to 12,678, and the staff and regimental commanders had been assigned as follows:**

- Chief of Staff: Colonel William W. Rogers, USMC
- D-1: Colonel Merton J. Batchelder, USMC
- D-2: Major Gooderham L. McCormick, USMC
- D-3: Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, USMC
- D-4: Colonel William F. Brown, USMC
- Fourteenth Regiment: Colonel Louis G. DeHaven, USMC
- Twentieth Regiment: Colonel Lucian W. Burnham, USMC
- Twenty-third Regiment: Colonel Louis R. Jones, USMC
- Twenty-fourth Regiment: Colonel Franklin A. Hart, USMC
- Twenty-fifth Regiment: Colonel Samuel C. Cumming, USMC

This was the team that was to lead the Fourth Division through its final intensive training and overseas onto its first beachhead.

By the 10th of September, the last of the East Coast Echelon (the Twenty-fifth Marines) had arrived at Camp Pendleton, and the Division was together as an organic unit for the first time. Ten days later, it had been brought to full strength for all its authorized units. It carried 17,831 officers and men on its rolls on September 30.

The following months were devoted to the final polishing-up of the Division's personnel preparatory to "shoving off." December 1, 1943, had been set as the original target date for readiness. A shortage of transports, among other factors, forced a delay until January, 1944. Meanwhile, all hands participated in innumerable landing exercises at Aliso Beach near Highway No. 101, field problems at Las Pulgas Canyon and the Tent Camps, Command Post Exercises, pillbox assaults in Windmill Canyon, night attacks near the Santa Margarita River, and similar field work.

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* For movements of the Division, see Appendix "D."
** For a chronological list, see Appendix "B."
At the turn of the year, the Division was 19,446 strong,* and its training culminated in maneuvers at San Clemente Island from January 1 to January 6, 1944. The Division was now reinforced by several amphibian tractor battalions and by the First Joint Assault Signal Company. Its naval complement was furnished by Task Force 53, under Rear Admiral R. L. Connolly, USN. Live ammunition was employed in the naval bombardment and aerial strafing, and in all respects, the planning and execution of the maneuvers were designed to simulate as closely as possible the forthcoming operation.

That was the Division's farewell to the United States. On the 6th and 7th of January, the Fourteenth Marines and the amphibian tractor battalions embarked on LSD's and sailed from San Diego. By the 13th, the remainder of the Division had been combat loaded aboard its ships, and on that day it departed, bound for its first assault landing!

* For a tabulation of the Division's strength from month to month, see Appendix "F."
CHAPTER II

Kwajalein

LIFE at sea soon settled down into a regular routine. During the Division's maneuvers before its departure, most of its units had been aboard the same ships on which they were now embarked. This facilitated matters greatly, most noticeably in the cooperation between the Navy crews and Marine passengers. Furthermore, the men of Division had gained a familiarity with APA's that hastened the process of adjustment to shipboard life. All hands soon became acquainted with the rituals of GQ in the blackness of pre-dawn, mess lines stretching along the passageways, inspections and calisthenics on the cluttered decks, the loudspeaker with its shrill "boson's" whistle and its "Now hear this!", fresh water hours, and classes and weapon-cleaning every day. Off duty, the men took advantage of the opportunity to sleep, play cards, stand in line for ice cream, write letters, and, of course, engage in endless speculation about the Division's objective, (Which was now known only by the intriguing title of "Burlesque and Camouflage.")

The Division arrived in the Hawaiian area on the 21st of January. Some of the command ships proceeded to Pearl Harbor for consultation with higher echelons. (Since September 20, 1943, the Fourth Division had been a part of the Fifth Amphibious Corps.) The majority of the convoy remained in anchorage off Maui, while everyone waited eagerly for some word about liberty ashore. When it came, it was in a phrase that was to become painfully familiar to all the men of the Division: "There will be no ---.

The following day (January 22) the convoy departed. Now the great secret was finally revealed to everyone: the Division was headed for the Marshalls, and its main objective there was the assault and capture of Roi and Namur Islands. (See map) It constituted (with the 18th Defense Battalion) the Northern Landing Force.* The Seventh Infantry Division of the Army (plus two defense battalions) formed the Southern Landing Force, which had the mission of seizing Kwajalein Island. Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, USN, was in overall charge of the "Joint Expeditionary Forces," while Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, was in command of all expeditionary troops.

From locked safes, a series of maps, models, photographs, and operation plans emerged. All hands poured over them daily until every aspect of the terrain and every detail of the assault plan was familiar. Signs and counter-signs were memorized. Tank identification was studied. Weapons were cleaned with an added zest.

The days rolled by. The International Date Line was crossed. January thirty-first dawned; it was D-Day! Land was sighted and soon the Fourth Division lay off its objective. All around the transports hovered the stunning power of the United States Navy, and

* The strength of the Division (with its attached units) for the Kwajalein operation was 18,912 (V Amph Corps, G-1 Report, P. 3).
throughout the day its guns fired salvo after salvo onto Roi and Namur and their neighboring islets. Aerial strafing and bombing was continuous. The naval shelling had been going on since D-2, and the air strikes much longer than that.

The plan of attack called for landings on D-Day on the islets adjoining Roi and Namur. Control of these was vital to the success of the assault, for they commanded the passageways through the reef into the lagoon. Accordingly, the three battalion landing teams of the Twenty-fifth Marines were boated in LVT's and went in to make the first landings. H-Hour had been set for 0900, but due to confusion amongst the control boats and tractors, it was 0952 before they "hit the beach." There was a minimum of opposition, and by 2000 the islets of Ennuebing, Mellu, Ennumennet, Ennubirr, and Ennugarret had all been secured. The Fourteenth Marines then emplaced its 3rd (75mm pack howitzer) and 4th (105mm howitzer) Battalions on the western pair of these islets. The 1st and 2nd Battalions (75mm pack howitzers) were set up on the eastern ones. With this disposition, they would be able to provide close-support artillery fire for the main attack on Roi and Namur the next day (D plus 1).

That same afternoon of January 31, the assault troops of RCT 23 and RCT 24 (each reinforced by a composite engineer battalion of the Twentieth Marines) transferred from their APA's to LST's and then proceeded into the lagoon.

The night was spent in a feverish refurbishing of LVT's to try to ready them for the coming day. Ashore, the Fourteenth Marines' howitzers and the Twenty-fifth's machine guns prepared to lay down their support fires.

As dawn broke on D plus 1 (February 1), the LVT's waddled out of the jaws of the LST's and took up their circling, while the air strikes and naval bombardment mounted in fury. Originally, 1000 had been designated as H-hour, but, due to unforeseen difficulties (such as the lack of usable LVT's), it was changed to 1100. As it was, the first waves did not land till nearly 1200. RCT 23, with the First and Second Battalions in assault, was on the left. The regimental objective was Roi with its strategic airfield. On the right, RCT 24, led by its Second and Third Battalions, assaulted Namur, where the preponderance of warehouses, barracks—and pillboxes—was situated. (See map)

After the earth-shaking barrage of naval shells and aerial bombs, climaxed by a deluge of rockets fired from LCI's, opposition on Roi was comparatively light, and the O-1 line was reached at 1217. After pulling back some over-extended units and reorganizing, RCT 23 continued the attack about 1530. The twisted steel skeletons of the hangars and the shattered remnants of the Jap planes were overrun, and the northern edge of the island was reached by 1800. All that remained was mopping up the enemy snipers who were still hiding in the drainage ditches. This was completed by the next morning, February 2 (D plus 2), and at 0800 Roi was declared secure.

Namur proved to be a different story. There had been some delay at the Line of Departure, and then when the LVT(A)'s neared the beach, they halted instead of going ashore. The first wave of troops was forced to work its way around them, and when the men disembarked on the beaches, they were met by a rather brisk fire from the enemy, especially on the left in the zone of BLT 3/24. The pre-H hour bombardment had smashed many of the enemy's installations (notably the huge reinforced concrete building near the center of Namur), and the flat, sandy surface of the island was covered with debris:

A total of 14345 tons were fired on Roi and 1230.6 tons on Namur (4MarDiv. Oper. Rep.).

**For a complete list of the Fourth Division's task organization, with all reinforcing units, see Appendix "O(1)."**
broken palm tree branches, ruined enemy equipment, concrete rubble, and dead bodies. The Japs were everywhere: hidden in this debris, as well as in their trenches, foxholes, machine gun emplacements, and concrete blockhouses. As the enemy recovered from his shell shock, strong opposition developed. However, the men of the Fourth Division fought their way inland, dealing with each center of resistance as they came to it. Whenever an enemy pillbox opened fire, it was assaulted by flame thrower-demolition teams. After it had been silenced, the Marines moved on. In the course of this advance, an enormous explosion occurred in the zone of BLT 2/24, causing heavy casualties. The O-1 line, about half way across the island, was reached by mid-afternoon and some units pushed slightly past it. Here the attack was halted to permit reorganization, and it was decided not to try to seize the remainder of Namur that day (D plus 1). At 1800 General Schmidt landed on Namur, set up his CP, and assumed command ashore.

During the night of D plus 1, several Jap counterattacks were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. At 0915 the following morning, RCT 24, reinforced by tanks, resumed its attack. Gradually the remainder of the island was taken, and organized resistance was crushed by 1215. Thus Namur had been conquered by the afternoon of February 2, in approximately 24 hours.

The cessation of fighting brought no rest to the weary men of the Fourth Division, for the sanitation problem had become acute. Japanese dead in various stages of putrefaction littered the two islands, and every available man was immediately put to work on the burial parties. Concurrently, the Twentieth Marines was laboring mightily as the Shore Party, unloading supplies from ships, while its Seabee Battalion rushed reconstruction of the airfield.

After seizure of the Division's two main objectives, the multitudinous smaller islets in the Northern Landing Force zone of responsibility remained to be dealt with. RCT 25 was assigned to seize the first of these on February 2. When it became apparent that opposition was extremely light, BLT 3/25 alone proceeded to secure them. Some fifty-five islands in all were occupied, and the last one (Burle) had been taken by February 7. The next day at 0730, the Commander, Central Pacific Forces, declared that the capture and occupation phase had been completed.

Reembarkation and departure of the units of the Division began as early as the 6th of February and continued steadily. RCT 25 was detached to the control of the Atoll Commander on February 8 for temporary duty as a garrison force. Command ashore was turned over to the Island Commander at 1300 on February 11. The following day (February 12), the Japs struck back at their erst-while possessions by sending bombers to attack Roi. Several well-placed bombs caused considerable loss amongst the personnel and equipment of the Twentieth Marines.

The Twenty-fifth Marines was relieved as Atoll Garrison Force by the Twenty-second Marines on February 29th, and it sailed the same day for Maui—the last of the Fourth Division to leave Kwajalein.

A recapitulation of the Division's losses showed 190 killed in action and 547 wounded in action, or a total of 737 casualties. (See Appendix "E".) The Japanese lost 3,472 men killed, and 264 prisoners; total: 3,736.

In its first battle, the Fourth Division had done an excellent job.* The commander of the expeditionary troops, Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, reported to the

* For some of the medals won by members of the Division, see Appendix "G."
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet: "The dispatch and efficiency with which the Fourth Marine Division overcame enemy opposition and captured its objectives reflects great credit upon its Commanding General, officers, and men."

The capture of Kwajalein was of vital importance. With this atoll in American hands, the United States was now in strategic control of all the Marshall Islands. The by-passed Japanese garrisons at Mille, Wotje, Maloelap, and Jaluit were put in a position of helpless isolation. Moreover, the Japanese line of communication south from Wake Island had been effectively severed.

The United States, on the other hand, had acquired a stepping-stone for further advances westward in the Pacific. Here was a base 2,375 miles beyond Pearl Harbor with a sixty-mile long lagoon that would furnish a magnificent staging area for American shipping.* (See map of "Pacific Ocean Areas"). Its airfields would extend the striking range of our planes enormously; now they could attack any of the Japanese bases in the area at will—not only those remaining in the Marshalls, but also Ponape, Kusale, and even Nauru. Finally, seizure of Kwajalein Atoll eliminated once and for all the possibility of another sudden surprise attack by the Japanese upon the Hawaiian Area.

* This was demonstrated almost immediately, for the task force that was to assault Eniwetok assembled at Kwajalein and departed from there on February 15, 1944.
CHAPTER III

Maui

DEPARTING from Kwajalein at various times as they did, the units of the Fourth Division arrived at their advance base on Maui at irregular intervals. The Rear Echelon had reached there on February 12, 1944, from San Diego. By February 26 the majority of the Division was reassembled there, and on that day General Schmidt assumed command of Camp Maui. However, RCT 25, having acted as the garrison force at Kwajalein, and Company "D", 4th Tank Battalion, having participated in the Eniwetok assault, did not arrive until March 8-10. Coming to Maui just out of combat and cramped from shipboard life, the men were faced with a base that was not very highly developed or equipped for reorganization and rehabilitation. As one regimental commander put it, "there were no lights in the new camp and the whole area was ankle deep in mud from recent rains. General aspects of this 'rest camp' seemed discouraging. All hands were quarantined for one week."* Thus, after the disembarkation at Kahului and the truck ride up to camp, all hands were busy for a while making their areas liveable.

Simultaneously with this activity came the recommencement of training. There was much to be done to ready the Division for its next operation, and the planning and coordination of this training placed heavy burdens on all the Commanding Officers and their staffs.

The D-1 Section and its subordinates were faced with the problem of the acquisition and disposition of the Division's personnel. The casualties at Kwajalein had to be taken into account: how many were permanently lost to the Division, how many would eventually be coming back to duty, when, etc.? The replacements that had been received had to be apportioned to the various units to fill their gaps and bring them up to full strength. Extensive adjustments were necessary to achieve conformity with the revised Tables of Organization.

The D-2 Section and its subordinates had the task of collecting, organizing, and analyzing what had been learned about the Japanese on Kwajalein. In addition, a start had to be made in the compilation of documents, maps, and other information for future use.

Planning and putting into execution a satisfactory training schedule posed a serious problem for the D-3 Section and its subordinates. As a Divisional report stated: "Upon return from the Roi-Namur operation, the Division was confronted with the problem of initiating a training program with practically no aids nor facilities available. It was immediately apparent that the continuation of camp construction and maintenance, the anticipated delay in replacing essential equipment, the acquisition of ranges and maneuver

*War Diary, 26th Marines, February, 1944.

13
areas, the adverse weather conditions, and the requirements of reorganization and rehabilitation would all contribute to the difficulty of executing a co-ordinated and progressive schedule of training.”

The D-4 Section and its subordinates had to solve the question of replacing all of the equipment that had been lost or damaged at Kwajalein. This was difficult, for the flow of supplies to the Division at this time was not satisfactory. It was reported officially that “the replacement of equipment following the Roi-Namur operation was extremely slow, although timely requisitions had been submitted.”

Gradually, the various handicaps were overcome. “By the institution of emergency measures for the acquisition of suitable land areas, the full co-operation of Army and Navy authorities, and a careful co-ordination of the use of all means available, a fairly satisfactory schedule of individual, unit, and combined training was embarked upon.”

The first thing accomplished was the reorganization on March 1 of the three rifle regiments to increase their complement of BAR’s and to create organic flame thrower-demolition teams.

There were many other things to be taken care of too. The errors that had been made at Kwajalein were discussed, and steps were taken to prevent any recurrence. Control of LVT’s had been poor at Roi-Namur, so there was considerable practice in handling them. Fire discipline had been weak in the battle, so junior officers and non-coms worked with their men to improve control. Tank-infantry co-ordination had been faulty, so exercises were held to rectify this. Pillbox assault technique had been rather haphazard, so all rifle units intensified their training in this. The new replacements, some of them fresh from boot camp, were taken in hand by the older men who had the Division’s exhaustive training in the “States” and a campaign under their belts. As the weeks passed, the new men in each unit became better and better assimilated, the key positions were satisfactorily filled up, and the Division’s “condition of readiness” began to improve.

The familiar life of marches, problems, field exercises, schools, landings, etc., was well under way. The surrounding terrain with its towns of Haiku, Makawao, and Paia became well known to the men. Above all, they made the acquaintance of the Jungle Training Area, where bamboo forests, mosquitoes, and rain awaited all visitors. There were also encounters to a lesser degree with the Ranger Obstacle Course and the Moving Target and Street Fighting Ranges where live ammunition was used. Special schools were held for air observers, flame throwers, linguists, and others. The arrival of VMO-4 enabled the Division to work with aircraft on the problems of artillery spotting, infantry reconnaissance, and photography. Mid-April found the 23rd and 25th Marines embarked on short amphibious maneuvers. Toward the end of the month a Division Command Post Exercise was held.

On April 26 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, presented several awards and decorations to members of the Division for individual achievements at Kwajalein. During the stay on Maui a total of 211 officers and men were given Purple Hearts.

Camp life on Maui had become a familiar routine to everyone by now. Who in the Fourth Division will ever forget the close order drill on the makeshift baseball diamonds;

*Fourth Marine Division Operations Report on Saipan, Section III.
**Division report on Saipan, Annex “D.” It should also be noted that the unloading, distributing, and warehouse facilities of Kahului Port were found to be inadequate.
***Division report on Saipan, Section III.
****For a list of the higher medals won by members of the Fourth Division, see Appendix “G.”
the constant effort to police each unit's area; the flashlights, lanterns, and candles that were finally replaced by electric lights; the tents with their cots, flaps, and uneven plywood floors; the icy-cold water for showers and shaving; the guard and O.D. and staff duties; the huge over-grown Quonset huts that served as mess halls; the open-air movies that were faithfully attended through rain, mechanical breakdown and grade "Z" films; the U.S.O. shows with the Hawaiian hula girls; the PX beer issues and the wine messes; the long hours of letter writing and censoring; the "athletic and morale" hours in the training schedule; the liberties that were made in Wailuku with its Grand Hotel, in Kahului, and even across the island in Lahaina; the rigors of weapon cleaning, clothes cleaning, and tent cleaning; and all the many other episodes that went into life at Camp Maui.

As the beginning of May approached, it became obvious that the Division was getting ready to "shove off" soon again. The well-known flurry of crating, packing, and final reviews of equipment and personnel showed what was in the offing. It was only now, at the eleventh hour, that much of the equipment the Division had been needing began to arrive in quantity. These shipments included such vital items as BAR's, which had been lacking during the Division's training.

On May 2 the combat loading of the ships was started (by the 23rd Marines). By the 13th the loading had been finished, the men were aboard their ships, and the Fourth Division left Maui for its final maneuvers. In conjunction with the Second Marine Division, a joint landing was made at Maalaea Bay. Then came a similar landing on Kahoolawe Island in which the approach was supported by scheduled naval gunfire and aircraft using live ammunition. The entire maneuvers were designed to parallel as closely as possible the forthcoming operation.

After the long hours of wetness (and seasickness) in the landing craft, the men were happy when the Division moved up to Pearl Harbor and moored there on May 20. The days there were pleasant ones. All hands got ashore for liberty, athletics, and recreation. After the small villages of Maui, the blandishments of Honolulu were all the more beguiling. At a ceremony on the parade ground of the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz awarded more decorations for actions at Kwajalein.

The Division's stay was marred by a very unfortunate occurrence. Five of its LST's were destroyed by fire on May 21, causing 112 casualties. The ships, personnel, and equipment were replaced, however, in time for the tractor groups (LST's) to get under way on May 25. Four days later the main part of the convoy sailed. The Fourth Marine Division was on its way to combat again!
CHAPTER IV

Saipan

As SOON as the convoy got under way, everyone (except those few who had been handling the "Top Secret" operation plans) eagerly awaited the news of the Division's objective. As usual, it had been the subject of months of conjecture. The word was soon passed around: Saipan! Briefing was begun almost immediately, and all hands were given more details. The Fourth Division was part of a huge expedition that was bound for the Marianas Islands, with the objective of seizing the Japanese bases of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. This was an enormous task. These islands were deep within the enemy's defenses and very far from any American base. Saipan, for example, lay 1,344 miles beyond Kwajalein, and a full 3,226 miles from Pearl Harbor, but only 1,270 miles from Tokyo. (See map of "Pacific Ocean Areas.") The entire route of approach was flanked by the series of Japanese strongholds in the Carolines. Furthermore, a sortie by the Japanese fleet—still a powerful force at this time—was a probability that had to be prepared for.

Thus the use and co-ordination of many far-flung units was vital if the safety of the Marianas operation was to be insured. This was done. Far to the south, ComSoPac and CincSowesPac's planes were lashing the Caroline and Palau Islands to prevent any interference from those regions. To the west, the submarines of Task Force 17 formed a screen for defense and observation. Above all, the protection of the landing lay with the giant Fifth Fleet under Admiral R. A. Spruance, USN. This Fleet, with control over more than eight hundred ships, was "the largest ever assembled in the Pacific."* It furnished the naval forces to transport, land, and support the assault troops. Another portion of it, Admiral M. A. Mitscher's fast carriers, made the air strikes against the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the northwest.

The ground forces had been drawn from the west coast of the United States, Guadalcanal, and the Hawaiian Area. The number of expeditionary troops employed for the Marianas operation (attack forces plus garrison forces) totaled 165,672.** They were organized as follows:

- Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56
- Northern Troops and Landing Force, Task Group 56.1
- Corps Troops (Detachments V Amphibious Corps Headquarters Troops).
- XXIV Corps Artillery, Brig. Gen. A. M. Harper, USA.
- 2d Marine Division (Reinforced), Maj. Gen. T. E. Watson, USMC.

**CominCh Report, Invasion of Marianas, Page 1-1. The strength of the Fourth Division was 16,729 officers and men at this time (May 31, 1944). With reinforcing units, it had 21,618 for the Saipan battle.
Maj. Gen. C. B. Cates, USMC (12July-).

Task Group 10.13 (Island Commander and Garrison Force Saipan),  
Maj. Gen. S. F. Jarman, USA.

Task Group 10.12 (Island Commander and Garrison Force Tinian),  
Maj. Gen. J. L. Underhill, USMC.

Southern Troops and Landing Force, Task Group 56.2  
Maj. Gen. R. S. Geiger, USMC.

Corps Troops (Detachments III Amphibious Corps Headquarters Troops).  
III Amphibious Corps Artillery, Brig. Gen. P. A. Del Valle, USMC.

3d Marine Division (Reinforced), Maj. Gen. A. H. Turnage, USMC.

1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced), Brig. Gen. L. C. Shepherd, USMC.

Task Group 10.11 (Island Commander and Garrison Force Guam),  
Maj. Gen. H. L. Larsen, USMC.

Expeditionary Troops Reserve  
Task Group 56.3 (afloat) 27th Infantry Division.


Maj. Gen. G. W. Griner, Jr., USA (28June-).

Task Group 56.4 (General Reserve) 77th Infantry Division alerted in Oahu.

After D plus 20, Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce, USA.

It will be seen that the V Amphibious Corps formed the major portion of the Northern  
Troops and Landing Force, while the III Amphibious Corps was the nucleus of the Southern  
Troops and Landing Force.

The plan of attack for the Northern Troops and Landing Force called for the Fourth  
Division and the Second Division to land abreast on D-day on Saipan with the Twenty-  
Seventh Army Division in reserve. The town of Charan-Kanoa on the lower western side  
of the island was to constitute the center of the landing zone. North of it were the Second  
Division's beaches, and south of it were the Fourth Division's (Blue 1, Blue 2, Yellow 1,  
Yellow 2, and Yellow 3). The initial objective assigned to the Second Division was the  
capture of Mt. Tapotchau, which rose to a height of 1,554 feet and dominated the entire  
island. The Fourth was given the primary mission of seizing Aslito Airfield, Saipan's  
main airbase.

This was the broad outline of the situation that was described to all hands. The days  
aboard ship were spent in studying the details, and in the routine of ship-board life that  
the men had come to know so well by now. Even the waters they were in were the same  
one they had traversed three months earlier.

The transports reached Eniwetok on June 8, a day after the tractor groups had  
adarrived. Last minute changes in plans and personnel were effected here. It was interesting  
to look at the surrounding islets and realize that they had been Japanese possessions so  
very recently. Now the vast lagoon was jammed with American ships. As far as the eye  
could see were moored the APA's, AKA's, LST's, APD's, LSD's, and, of course, the  
countless guardian warships of the convoy. It was an impressive spectacle.

On June 9 the tractor groups departed for the combat area, and two days later the  
transports followed them. The last lap of the trip had begun. "During the final approach,  
control exercises were conducted by the Division to include all units present. Visual Com-  
munications were utilized and execution of the plan for the ship-to-shore movement
was simulated in the form of a command post exercise. Conferences and briefing on the details of the plan were continued during the final approach.*** Every officer was held responsible for passing on to his men all the information available, and many hours were spent over maps, photographs, operation plans, and relief models. Japanese phrases were studied, and it was a common sight to see a Pfc. murmuring over and over “TAY-OH-AH-GEH-TAY-DEH-TAY-KOL.”*** Three alternate plans of maneuver ashore were memorized. These were varied according to the success the Division might achieve on D-day, and they were all designed to insure the seizure of Aslito Airfield at the earliest possible moment. The final days were taken up with issuing ammunition, last minute boat drills, and the packing and repacking by each man of the gear he planned to take ashore.

The pre-Invasion bombing, shelling, and strafing of the Marlanas was begun by Task Force 58 on the afternoon of June 11 (D-4). At the same time, late photographic coverage of the assault beaches was secured. The minesweepers and underwater demolition teams began their work on D-2. D-day had been set for June 15, and the night of June 14 was one of sober thoughts. This was going to be a much bloodier struggle than the Division’s last operation. "The preparatory bombardment for Saipan was limited to carrier and surface strikes beginning on D-4... There was no land-based air support prior to the landing operation. There was no artillery support prior to the landing operation from lesser islands within supporting range, as had been possible at Kwajalein and Roi-Namur. There was no continued preparation of any sort over an extended period of time, which proved to be so effective in the preparation for the subsequent Guam and Tinian phases. Saipan, the most bitterly defended of the three islands, contained the greatest number of enemy troops, and the most developed system of defensive positions. Mt. Tapotchau, the key terrain feature of Saipan, provided observation of the landing beaches and the entire beachhead area. Finally, a factor, which cannot be underestimated, was the confidence of that island's defenders in their ability to withstand any landing attempt and eventually to defeat it.**** And that was the situation facing the Fourth Division and the other assault units on Saipan.

Finally—and yet almost suddenly—it was D-day! Everyone was up long before dawn, personal gear was rearranged for the final time, a hasty meal was bolted, and the formation of the various boat and tractor groups was started. Then began the waiting. Some units aboard APA’s were standing by for the call to go up from the stifling troop quarters to the weather decks to load aboard their LCVP’s. Others on LST’s were alerted for the word that would send their LVT’s rumbling out of the cavernous hold into the water. Tension mounted.

Off the beaches of Tanapag Harbor, RCT 24, as Division Reserve, was conducting a demonstration, in conjunction with the reserve regiment of the Second Division, that lasted from pre-dawn to H-hour plus 60. (Subsequent intelligence indicated that this diversionary maneuver succeeded in containing at least one enemy regiment in the northern area).

The Division plan placed RCT 23 and RCT 25 (each reinforced by a battalion of engineers from the 20th Marines) in assault, and RCT 24 in reserve.**** From left to right the leading BLT’s were: 3/23, 2/23, 2/25, and 1/25. H-hour had been delayed until 0840, but it was fast approaching as they began debarking in their LVT’s and forming into waves

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* Fourth Division Report on Saipan, Section V.
** "Put your hands up."
**** For a complete list of the Fourth Division’s task organization, with all reinforcing units, see Appendix "C" (2).
off Charan-Kanoa. At 0812 the assault battalions crossed the Line of Departure and started in, preceded by the LVT(A)'s with their ugly 75mm snouts. The supporting naval gunfire and aerial strikes reached their peak intensity. The LCI(G)'s were showering the beaches with their rocket and 40mm fire. A final massive air strike occurred. Despite all the preparation, the Japanese were ready and waiting. "The landing was vigorously opposed. The opposition consisted, primarily, of artillery and mortar fire from weapons placed in well defiladed positions and previously registered to cover the beach areas, as well as fire from small arms, automatic weapons, and anti-boat guns sited to cover the approaches to and the immediate landing beaches."** The first wave hit the beach at 0843 and was met with this intensive fire. Continued movement to the O-1 line had been planned, and some units, especially in the center of the beachhead, drove on inland—largely due to on-the-spot initiative of the officers and non-coms in individual LVT's. On the left flank, however, the LVT(A)'s hesitated at the beachline, and, in some cases, did not advance inland. Units of the 25th Marines on the right flank were receiving such heavy enfilade fire that they were pinned down and forced to disembark at the beach. The Division was ashore, but the going was very tough and casualties were mounting. The supporting waves were pounded on their way in by heavy Japanese artillery and mortar fire. No words can convey the fury of the battle, but the men of the Division who were there that day will remember the smoking wrecks of LVT's, the blasted pillboxes, the dead Japanese and Marine bodies, the reek of high explosives in the air, the searing flash of a flame thrower in action, the high-pitched "wheeng" of Jap bullets, and the freight-train roar of Jap shells "zeroed in."

Amidst this hell of confusion, sweat, and death, the men fought ahead. Extremely heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to rain down throughout the Division's zone, but by 1040 small elements in the center had reached the O-1 line. At the same time the first tanks began to land safely. (They had been unable to come through the channel, as originally planned, and had been forced to come over the reef and then ashore under their own power.) Later, after word had been received that the Division had a sufficient beachhead, units of the 14th Marines were landed. By 1630 all its artillery battalions were ashore, and within half an hour after that, in spite of almost constant Japanese counter-battery fire, two of them were firing in support of the attack. They were sorely needed. On the Division's left flank, BLT 3/23 was suffering heavy casualties from point-blank enemy fire, and was unable to make contact with the Second Division. On the Fourth Division's right flank, BLT 1/25 had been able to claw out a total of twelve yards of beach depth in its first hour of fighting.

As nightfall approached, the situation was still precarious. The Commanding Officer of RCT 23, estimating his regimental position as untenable, withdrew his advance units to a better defensive line approximately 800 yards short of O-1. RCT 25 had been unable to reach the part of O-1 on its extreme right by the end of the day. (See map.) Since RCT 24 had been on call as the Division Reserve, it did not come ashore until afternoon and its landing was not completed until 1800 (on Beaches Blue 1 and Yellow 1). Then it proceeded inland to its assembly area. The Division CP with the Divisional Commander ashore opened about 1930. By this time, all hands were digging in and preparing for any and all eventualities as best they could, for no one knew what the night might bring.

All hands were rather tense that night of D-day. By-passed groups of Japs, as well as the enemy's shelling and attempts at infiltration, did not contribute much towards a peaceful sleep. About 0530, the Division's left flank was hit by an enemy counterattack, which was repelled after an initial penetration. In addition, after the heavy casualties


20
SAIPAN
PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK

Scale in yards

PREPARED BY HISTORICAL DIVISION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
of the day, nearly every unit of the Division was occupied with the vital tasks of evacuating its wounded, replenishing its ammunition and water supply, and reorganizing for a continuation of the attack the next morning. Thus passed the night of D-day.

On the following morning (June 16, D plus 1), BLT 3/24 was assigned to reinforce RCT 25, while 2/24 was detached to RCT 23's zone to guard the open left flank. The rest of RCT 24, as Division Reserve, was committed in assault between the other two regiments. At 1230 the attack began. By this time, elements of all Divisional artillery, although subjected to considerable enemy counter-battery fire, were firing in support, and the medium and light tanks were operating with their assigned regiments. The Division was also helped by air strikes and naval gunfire. Under intense fire from heavy Japanese weapons the attack moved forward, and by 1730 the Division was dug in generally along the O-1 line (except on the left flank).*

It had become apparent by now that the capture of Saipan would necessitate the use of another division, and it was decided to commit the 27th Army Division from Expeditionary Troops Reserve. During the night of June 16-17, elements of this Division began landing, and RCT 165 was moved up on the right flank of the Fourth Division to assist in the final drive for Aslito Airfield. The entire Fourth Division was ashore by June 17, and its attack that day was launched with four regimental combat teams abreast in the assault. (From left to right, 23rd, 24th (minus detachments), 25th, and 165th.) Late in the afternoon, elements of RCT 25 had penetrated to the barracks area of the airfield, but a withdrawal was necessary to maintain contact on the right with RCT 165, which had advanced more slowly. Thus, as night fell, the Fourth Division stood at the edge of its assigned objective; O-2 had been reached in the middle of the Divisional zone, and the flanks were now beyond O-1. However, the gap on the left between RCT 23 and the Second Division still existed, and from it the 23rd had been receiving very heavy enfilade fire.

On the morning of June 18 the Fourth Division prepared to resume its attack with the objective of seizing the O-3 line. Success in this would mean a drive clear through to the east coast of Saipan, and the splitting in two of the enemy forces on the island. Capture of the airfield was left to the 27th Army Division (to whose control RCT 165 had now reverted). At 0730 preliminary operations were begun by RCT 23, reinforced by BLT 3/24, to secure the portion of the O-2 line in its zone as a Line of Departure for the main attack to O-3. The whole Division, with its three rifle regiments abreast, jumped off at 1040. Three hours later the 25th Marines had reached O-3. The 24th was subjected to a tank-led Japanese counterattack on both its flanks, but it too reached the O-3 line before dark. The 23rd, however, was held up by the intense mortar and machine gun fire that was still coming from the Jap pocket on its left flank. This enemy position was holding out southeast of Lake Susupe in an area that lay right on the boundary line between the Second and Fourth Divisions. As a result, it was never quite clear who was responsible for it. Furthermore, it was impossible to bring artillery fire to bear on it without hitting friendly troops. Because of this unreduced strongpoint, RCT 23 suffered heavy casualties and was not able to push more than 400 yards beyond Lake Susupe that day (June 18). Thus by the end of the day, the Division held a line with all its regimental combat teams in contact (although this had necessitated the use of the entire Division Reserve), but it was without physical contact with the Second Division on its left or the 27th Army Division on its right. Nevertheless, the shores of Magicienne Bay had been reached; the

* It will not be possible in an account of this size to mention all the units that contributed to each day's success. On D plus 1, for example, the Division Air Observers were active on many missions, and back on the beaches, which were still being shelled, the Shore Parties were established and beginning to organize the flow of supplies to the assault units.

23
Division had completed its initial drive eastward, and it was now ready to wheel and drive north. (See map of Saipan.)

In the following days the Division advanced northeast up the island, fighting its way through the endless cane fields, ravines, hills, and caves.* June 19 saw the wiping out of the troublesome pocket on the left flank of RCT 23. Contact was made with the Second Division for the first time. The next day (June 20) RCT 23 went into Division Reserve, and RCT 25 was shifted inland to become the left assault regiment. Hill 500, which commanded all the surrounding terrain, was taken by 1200. Physical contact with the Second Division was strengthened. RCT 24 on the right, despite heavy resistance from caves along Magicienne Bay, reached the O-4 line also.

These advances were made under extremely adverse conditions. One of the chief difficulties was the increasing physical exhaustion. Fighting had been almost continuous, sleep had been very scanty, and heavy casualties placed extra burdens on the remaining men of the assault units.** Another problem at this time was the diminishing amount of supplies. During the period June 17-24, nearly all the Division's transports were withdrawn from Saipan due to the approach of the Japanese fleet. As a result, the Division was dependent on such stock piles as had already been established ashore, and these were not overly-abundant. Artillery ammunition, for example, was soon down to a "bare minimum."*** All fleet units had been forced to leave also. Thus the Division was stripped of its naval gunfire and air support.

Even more important, of course, was the fact that the fate of the whole campaign hung on the outcome of the Fifth Fleet's battle with the Japanese task force. If, by some mischance, the Jap fleet broke through to Saipan—but it did not. On June 19-20 the U. S. Fifth Fleet completely shattered the sortie, destroying five enemy ships and 402 planes.****

In spite of the uncertainties and problems of the moment, morale remained high, for there were many favorable factors in the situation. The Division had successfully established itself on Saipan, despite the fiercest opposition the Japanese could offer. Aslito Airfield had been taken and would soon be in operation. All units were reorganized, and contact with the 2nd and 27 Divisions was well established now. Corps artillery with its 155's was ashore and in action. Supplies, although sometimes limited, were coming forward regularly. Medical facilities were operating to care for casualties quickly and effectively. By June 20, the situation was sufficiently stabilized so that Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, as Commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force, assumed command ashore.

After an intensive artillery preparation on June 22,***** the Division continued its attack with a drive northeast to the base of the Kagman Peninsula. It gained 2500 yards towards the O-4 line. The following day (June 23) the 27th Army Division passed through the left flank of the Fourth Division, and continued the attack northward abreast of the Second Division. Meanwhile, the Fourth Division swung to the right to clean out Kagman Peninsula. Progress was held up by a pocket of Japanese that was in the 27th Division's zone, had been by-passed by that unit, and was firing on the Fourth Division's left flank regiment (the 23rd Marines).

* A day-to-day account with all the details of the Division's operations does not lie within the scope of this work. It can be found in the Division's Report on Saipan.
** In the first eight days of fighting the Division suffered 3,755 casualties. (G-1 Report, NT&LF).
*** Division Report on Saipan, Page 22.
**** The landing on Guam had been scheduled originally for June 18. It was delayed due to this fleet action, and also because of the unexpected difficulties on Saipan which necessitated the use of the 27th Division, thus depleting the Expeditionary Troops Reserve.
***** The first squadron of P-47 planes landed this day on Aslito Airfield.
This introduced a factor that was to influence the Fourth Division's progress many times in the weeks to come. In the words of the official report: "The 27th Infantry Division failed to attack on time and thus deterred the advance of the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions on its flanks. One battalion jumped off 55 minutes late and the other elements of the division jumped off variously at later times in anything but a co-ordinated manner. The 165th Infantry finally jumped off 3 hours and 15 minutes late. Little semblance of contact was maintained on the division flanks, and in spite of light opposition little advance was made during the day. For the rest of the week the 27th Infantry Division, which fought through difficult terrain, advancing frequently across the front of the enemy defensive positions in sides of cliffs, maintained such a slow rate of progress that the entire course of the attack was delayed. The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions were compelled to anchor their interior flanks and advance slowly, in order to prevent extensive gaps from developing."** On June 24 Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, was relieved of command of the 27th Division.

The bypassed strongpoint that had been holding up the Fourth Division's left flank was wiped out on June 24; Chatcha Village was seized, and the O-5(A) line was secured. A further advance would have been possible except for a reoccurrence of the gap on the left flank. Major successes were achieved on June 25. The Division reached the O-6 line, thereby completing the seizure of Kagman Peninsula. (See map of Saipan.) On the other side of Saipan, the Second Division captured Mount Tapotchau, and some of its elements entered Garapan. A day of rest for the Fourth Division, as Northern Troops and Landing Force Reserve, was followed by a return to the assault. The Division, with RCT 165 again attached, went into line on the 27th Army Division's right flank. The start of the attack was delayed while RCT 25, in reserve, eliminated approximately 300 Japanese who had broken through the lines of BLT 2/105 on Nafutan Point and fought their way up to the rear of the Division in the vicinity of Hill 500. By the end of the day (June 27), the Division had gained 3000 yards and secured the major portion of the O-6 line in its zone. However, it was so far advanced that the Divisional front line covered 2500 yards, while its left flank extended for the same distance! Three battalions were needed to fill the gap.

For the next four days, the Division held its ground, waiting for the 27th Army Division to come abreast of it. The time was spent in mopping up, assisting the advance of the 27th by fire, patrolling to the front, and consolidating the O-6 line preparatory to continuing the attack when so ordered. During this period, RCT 165 and RCT 23 were generally on the front lines, while RCT 24 was in Division Reserve (guarding the open left flank), and RCT 25 was in Northern Troops and Landing Force Reserve. Flanking fire was received from the 27th Division's zone each day. The return to action at this time of some previously wounded men, and the chance for rest and reorganization was very helpful to the Division's morale and combat efficiency.**

By July 2, all three divisions were nearly abreast and ready to launch a drive to seize the northern part of Saipan. Their main objectives were Garapan, Mutcho Point, Tanapag Harbor, and finally Marpi Point at the northeast tip of the island. The Fourth Division jumped off at 0830, after a heavy artillery preparation, with RCT 23 and RCT 24 in assault and BLT 3/25 as Division Reserve. Helped by the intensive patrolling of the previous days and light enemy resistance, the advance was rapid across the rough terrain, and the intermediate objective of O-6(A) was reached at 1345. Here the Division was ordered to halt until the main part of the 27th Army Division on the left had caught up. The attack was continued the next day (July 3) with all three regiments in the assault. Strong resistance

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** The Division had suffered 4,347 casualties by the end of June. (G-1 Report, NT&LF)
developed at Hill 721 in the afternoon and prevented any further gains. RCT 23 on the right flank was stretched to cover 2500 yards along the O-7 line. On the west coast of the island, Mutcho Point was reached by the Second Division. July 4 was celebrated by the capture of Garapan and most of Tanapag Harbor by the Second Division. Hill 721 and Hill 767, another strongpoint, were stormed by the Fourth Division, and the axis of its attack swung to the northeast as a result of a change in the boundary line between the 4th and 27th Divisions. (See map of Saipan.)

Because of the narrowing width of Saipan, the Second Division was now pinched out (July 5), and it reverted to Northern Troops and Landing Force Reserve. The 27th Division continued its drive to the west coast above Tanapag Harbor, while the Fourth Division (on the 27th's right) was assigned the entire northern part of the island. Approximately three-fourths of Saipan had now been secured, but the Division's combat efficiency was down to "75%, with troops approaching physical exhaustion."* However, strong new support in the form of additional men, artillery, tanks, and planes was becoming available to the Fourth Division through the redispersion of other units. The O-8(A) line was taken on July 5, and most of O-8 was reached the next day. With four regiments abreast (left to right, RCT 23, RCT 2, RCT 24, and RCT 25), the attack was continued on July 7. On the left of the Division zone, the 23rd Marines and the 2nd Marines were soon blocking each other's progress, and an extensive shuffling of their various components was necessary. "This maneuvering all resulted from the lack of exit from the cliff heights to the coastal plain. RCT 23 struggled to clean out the cliff line at Karaherra Pass to establish a suitable line of departure from the base of the sheer cliff onto the coastal plain. (The coast was approximately one-half mile in distance from the cliff.) This unique and difficult condition was a major obstacle. The pass was mined at the base. At 1730, cave fighting and mopping up was still in progress. The assault BLT's were ordered to the high ground for the night. Throughout the day effective long range heavy weapon fire from the cliff was placed by RCT 23 on enemy troops retiring north along the coast. More than 500 enemy casualties resulted."*

This same day of July 7, the Japanese launched a last, desperate, banzai attack down the west coast of the island. The left flank of the 27th Army Division was penetrated, and the enemy drove 2000-3000 yards towards Garapan, until they were finally checked by elements of the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines.

The Fourth Division, with four regiments still abreast, broke through the enemy cliff line and reached the western coast of Saipan during July 8. Then it drove north in order to gain observation of the Marpi Point area, its last objective. Despite the difficult terrain, road blocks, and enemy fire from caves, the end was now in sight. Only three square miles of the island remained unconquered.

The final assault came on July 9, (D plus 24). Commencing at 0630, three regimental combat teams (from left to right, 2, 24, and 25) jumped off to finish the long struggle by seizing Marpi Point and the O-9 line. All organized resistance ended that afternoon, and Saipan was officially declared secured at 1615, July 9, 1944.

For the next week, the Division was engaged in mopping up hidden pockets of Japanese. The intermingling of enemy soldiers and civilians in remote caves, and their fanatical stubbornness when called on to surrender, rendered this a laborious and often dangerous job. In view of the forthcoming operation, the whole Division was assembled on July 18, and all further mopping up was left to the garrison forces.

*Division Report on Saipan, Pages 33-34.
A period of rehabilitation, reorganization, and rest was sorely needed. The Division’s casualties for the Saipan campaign totaled 5,981, and the men who were left were bone-weary.* The vital part that these men (and those of the Second Division) played in the long grueling battle is described in the Expeditionary Troops Report: “The decisive factor, without which all support and amphibious technique would have been futile, was the character of the troops employed. Leadership and aggressiveness of the highest order were called for, coupled with experienced teamwork in the employment of organic infantry weapons: tanks, artillery, rockets, regimental weapons, demolitions, and flame throwers to reduce the heavily fortified centers of enemy resistance. The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions fought through most difficult terrain and vegetation against determined resistance suffering severe casualties and never failed to exploit the support of air and gunfire to maintain constant pressure on the enemy. The attack of the Marine Divisions was conducted throughout with more vigor and relentlessness than could be reasonably expected from any but the finest troops.”** The result was the complete destruction, through death or capture, of the 28,000 Japanese military personnel on the island.

The sacrifices and efforts that these divisions had made were of the utmost value.*** With the help of the supporting bombardments, the “relentless pressure by assault troops won Saipan and assured subsequent success at Tinian and Guam. The Saipan phase was decisive in the Mariana Operation.”**** More specifically, “Saipan played a vital role in the Tinian assault. The shore-to-shore movement for that phase was based on the southern beaches of Saipan and in Tanapag Harbor. The artillery, land-based air, and logistical support for both the Tinian and Guam operations were provided from Saipan.”*****

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* There are various and conflicting figures as to the Fourth Division’s Saipan casualties. The total of 5,981 is drawn from the Division Report on Saipan (Annex “A”, Page 1). The G-1 Report of NT&LF gives the total as 6,612. See Appendix “E” of this report.
*** For a list of some of the medals won at Saipan by members of the Fourth Division, see Appendix “G”.
CHAPTER V

Tinian

WITH the conclusion of the Saipan operation, several command changes occurred. On July 12 Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC, left the Fourth Division to become commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force, and also Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps. Command of the Fourth Division went to Major General Clifton B. Cates, USMC. Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, continued as Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, and assumed command of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Preparing the Division for its coming assault on Tinian was a race against time. Jig-day was set for July 24, and the Division was not assembled as a whole until after it had finished its share of the mopping-up on Saipan on July 16. This left only a week in which to repair the ravages of the Saipan battle and get all equipment and personnel ready for the landing on Tinian. After its heavy losses on Saipan, the Division, reinforced, could muster only 16,843 officers and men for the Tinian battle.

On the other hand, the staff work for the forthcoming operation was well-advanced. "During the attack on Saipan the Island of Tinian was being closely observed and studied. One battalion of Corps Artillery had the mission of neutralizing Tinian airfields and destroying located targets. Daily plane strikes and naval gunfire bombardments were executed on Tinian; frequent photo coverage flights were flown; valuable intelligence data of Tinian was captured on Saipan. When the capture of Saipan neared its final stage, there was considerable information available pertaining to Tinian and enemy units thereon."* The number of Japanese defenders was estimated at 9,000, with the 50th Infantry Regiment—veterans of Manchuria—as the main component.

To investigate the situation ashore, the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Battalion conducted highly successful rubber boat landings, which were undetected by the enemy, on the nights of July 10 and July 11. Beaches White 1 and White 2 were reconnoitered. Information brought back showed that the sandy portion extended only 60 yards on White 1 and 65 yards on White 2. However, it was ascertained that the rough coral ledges on either side of the beach proper could be surmounted by foot troops, and this insured a landing area for personnel of 200 yards on White 1 and 400 yards on White 2. It was decided to make the landing over these two beaches.

Plans for the operation had been initiated in Pearl Harbor as far back as April. They called for a prolonged softening-up of Tinian, followed by a shore-to-shore movement

*NTMLP Special Action Report on Tinian, Page 3. One of the most important facts discovered in captured documents was that the Japanese had organized only a very scanty defense against a landing on beaches White 1 and White 2 on the northwestern shores of Tinian.
from Saipan to the landing beaches. (The two islands were separated by a gap of only 3½ miles of water.) The Northern Troops and Landing Force had been assigned to the Tinian operation, while the Southern Troops and Landing Force had been given the mission of seizing Guam. Now that Saipan was finally secured, these plans were put into effect. The Southern Troops and Landing Force, built around the Third Marine Division and the First Provisional Marine Brigade, landed on Guam July 21, just three days before Jig-day on Tinian. As the details for the Tinian operation were worked out, the Fourth Division was designated the assault force, with the Second Division to land on order behind the Fourth. The 27th Army Division was held in readiness on Saipan. The Fourth Division’s mission was stated as follows: “4th MarDiv (Reinf) land at How-hour, Jig-day on beaches White 1 and 2, seize objective O-1; then, on division order, make the main effort in the direction of Mt. Lasso and seize the FBL. Reorganize and prepare for further operations.”

The way was paved by a series of air strikes, shelling from Saipan-based artillery, and naval bombardments. Starting with Task Force 58’s blow on June 11, the destruction rained on Tinian increased steadily. With the finish of the Saipan phase, the island was subjected to the massed fire of as many as thirteen battalions of 105 and 155mm guns and howitzers. Simultaneously, the planes and guns of Task Force 52 and Task Force 58 joined the planes flying from Saipan’s fields in pounding Tinian. Napalm-gasoline belly-tank incendiary bombs were used for the first time with great effect. “The preparatory bombardment delivered on Tinian prior to the landings exceeded in duration and deliberate destructiveness any previous preparation of the Pacific War.”

Last minute planning was facilitated by the nearness of all interested Commanding Officers. In addition, a new aspect of briefing was introduced by having all the key officers make an aerial reconnaissance of Tinian. By July 17, the Division Operation Order had been completed. All combat elements of the Division were to be pre-loaded in LVT’s or DUKW’s. RCT 24 would land in column of battalions on White 1, while RCT 25, with two battalions abreast, went ashore simultaneously on White 2. RCT 23 would form the nucleus of the Division Reserve.*** LVT(A)’s would lead the way in but would not land. Tanks and half-tracks were to go ashore as soon as possible behind the assault BLT’s. Four battalions of 75mm howitzers were to be pre-loaded in DUKW’s in order to be readily available. To facilitate the landing of vehicles and supplies, pontoon causeways and special ramps were to be brought over from Saipan.

Loading of the artillery (1st and 2nd Bns, 14th Marines, plus 1st and 2nd Bns, 10th Marines), and the three battalions of the 23rd Marines aboard the LST’s took place on July 22. The next day the remainder of the Division went aboard the LST’s, using all the beaches from Red 1 to Yellow 3, as well as Tanapag Pier. All elements of the Division were embarked by 1800, and two hours later all ships and landing craft had moved to the anchorage area. That night Jig-1, Naval Underwater Demolition Teams reconnoitered the reef and beach areas off White 1, White 2, and Tinian Town. All during these last days before the landing, the sight and sound of the Corps Artillery firing steadily on Tinian targets was a very reassuring factor to the men of the Division.

As Jig-day (July 24) dawned, the supporting bombardment mounted in fury. Eleven battalions of shore-based artillery were joined by the fire of two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and two destroyers. Off Tinian Town, where the best landing beaches were, the Second Division conducted a diversionary demonstration. Meanwhile, the LVT’s of the

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* N.T.L.P. SAR on Tinian, Page 4.
*** For a complete list of the Division Task Organization, with all the reinforcing units, see Appendix “O(3).”
TINIAN
PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK

PREPARED BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Fourth Division formed into their waves behind the Line of Departure, about 3,000 yards off the beaches. H-hour had been delayed until 0740, and at 0718 the first wave of LVT's, led by the LVT(A)'s, crossed the Line of Departure. Guide planes overhead showed the way in, since the beaches were completely obscured by smoke from the bombardment. Thirty LCI gunboats provided close-in support with their rocket and automatic cannon fire. At 0750 both assault RCT's hit the beach, the 24th Marines on the left at White 1, and the 25th Marines on the right at White 2.* After the wall of fire that had greeted the Division's landing on Saipan, it was a relief to encounter only moderate small arms and mortar fire this time. The overwhelming preparatory fires, the surprise choice of the narrow, rough, northern beaches, and the demonstration off Tinian Town had all combined to weaken and delude the Japanese so effectively that they were unable to offer strong resistance initially. Tactical surprise had been achieved.

Once the first waves had landed and advanced inland, the remainder of the Division and its reinforcing elements poured ashore in a torrent. Mines on White 2 were an obstacle that forced most of the tanks to use White 1. However, by 1850 all tanks were ashore. On the heels of the reserve battalions of the leading RCT's came the artillery. Four battalions of 75's were ashore and firing by 1635. RCT 23, the Division Reserve, after some confusion in orders and control, completed its landing by 1830. Then it proceeded inland, took over the right sector of RCT 25's zone of action, and continued the attack to O-1.

As night fell, it was apparent that the Division's landing was a success. In spite of the difficulties engendered by the bottleneck beaches, the whole Division had been landed in nine hours. Although the O-1 line had not been reached by RCT 23 or RCT 25, a beachhead 4,000 yards wide and 2,000 yards deep had been seized. (See map.) A Division Reserve, consisting of BLT 1/8 (from the Second Division) and BLT 3/23 had been set up. The Division's casualties totaled only 240.** Supplies were coming directly to the inland dumps via DUKW's and LVT's. Firm contact had been established between units, and "extensive preparations made for an enemy counterattack expected during the night."***

The attack came on schedule. From 0200 on the enemy's forces, supported by artillery fire, surged against the Fourth Division's perimeter in wild Banzai charges that piled his dead up in tiers. One attack hit the Division's left flank and fierce fighting ensued. It was not until 0700 that the combined weight of Marine infantry, artillery, and tank fire smashed the enemy assault completely. Another thrust struck the boundary between RCT 24 and RCT 25, but it too was thrown back with heavy losses to the Japanese. The right flank was subjected to a tank-led attack at 0330. Bazookas knocked out five of the six tanks, and 37mm canister slaughtered the supporting infantry. Meanwhile, a sizeable force of Japs had infiltrated through the Division's lines and attacked the artillery positions. They were repulsed by point-blank fire. The following morning 1,241 enemy dead were found in the immediate vicinity of the Division's defense perimeter. Victory in the night battle had been complete. "It was there and then that the Fourth Marine Division broke the Jap's back in the battle for Tinian."****

Efforts to resupply and reorganize the Division began immediately. The remainder of RCT 8 was brought ashore and went into the line. A heavy preparatory artillery bombardment was laid down. At 1000, July 25 (J plus 1), the Division went over to the

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* The hour given in the Division Report on Tinian (page 23) is 0750. As an illustration of the variance between different accounts, it may be noted that the NT&LP BAR on Tinian (page 11) puts RCT 24 ashore at 0746 and RCT at 0755.
** NT&LP BAR (Page 12) gives them as 165.
attack with four regimental combat teams abreast (from left to right: the 8th Marines, the 24th Marines, the 25th Marines, and the 23rd Marines). Rapid progress was made until RCT 25 was held up by a sheer cliff in its zone. This was eventually taken by a well-executed double envelopment. By dark, the O-2 line had been secured on the left and O-1 in the center, while on the right, after considerable resistance along the coast line, a position beyond O-1 had been reached. The Division CP, with General Cates ashore, had opened at 1115 that morning between beaches White 1 and White 2.

After minor enemy activity and attempts at infiltration during the night, the Division resumed its attack the next morning (July 26) at 0800 after a 10 minute artillery preparation. By now, all attached units of the Second Division had reverted to their parent organization, and that Division was in assault on the left flank of the Fourth. Against disorganized enemy resistance the Fourth Division, with RCT 24 now in reserve, pushed rapidly ahead. Mt. Lasso, the commanding elevation on Tinian, was seized at 1530, and the Division advanced slightly beyond before digging in for the night on the 0-4(A) line. (See map of Tinian.)

It was clear now that the Tinian operation would be far different from the long, exhausting, bloody struggle for Saipan. Casualties had been light, and gains had been large. The terrain of Tinian was more favorable than Saipan's; it was flatter and had a better developed road net. Thus the Marine tanks were able to operate much more effectively. Moreover, close tactical support was furnished from the start by Army P-47's operating from Aslito (Isley) Field on Saipan.

Further substantial gains (up to 1800 yards) were scored on July 27, J plus 3. Japanese resistance continued light, and patrols sent out after the 0-4 line had been reached reported no contact with the enemy. RCT 25 and RCT 23 were spear-heading the Division's attack, with the 23rd Marines on the right (along the coast). RCT 24 remained in Division Reserve. The objective set for the Division on July 28 (J plus 4) was the 0-5 line. After an adjustment of zones of responsibility so that they were distributed more equitably between the assault regiments, the attack jumped off at 0700 with tanks leading the way. In less than six hours, the 0-5 line had been passed, and the Division received authorization to continue its advance that afternoon. By 1730, the 0-6(A) line was reached. In one day, the Division had gained 6000 yards on a 5000 yard front and had seized the "New Airfield" at Gurguan Point! Approximately half of Tinian had now been secured. The indentation of the west coast of the island at this point resulted in a narrowing of the width of the Division zone. (See map of Tinian.) Accordingly, the right flank regiment (RCT 23) was pinched out, and it replaced RCT 24 in reserve.

The next day, July 29, the 0-6 line was taken. This placed the Division in a commanding position overlooking Tinian Town and the valley that extended across the entire width of the island. Opposition continued light. By the end of this day (J plus 5) the total casualties of the Division were only 731.*

Tinian Town (O-7) was captured in ruins on July 30. Japs that had "holed up" in cliff caves, defending the approaches to the town, were destroyed with demolitions and flame throwers. The beaches were found to be heavily mined, and it was judged that "a landing there would have been disastrous."** Twice during the day, a very heavy barrage of naval gunfire was laid down on targets at the southern end of the island in order to smother all enemy attempts at a well-organized, last ditch stand.

* NT&LP SAR, G-1 Report.
** 4th Division War Diary, July 30, 1944.
The Japanese defenses stiffened on the next day, July 31. The fact that the enemy had no further room for retreat, and the terrain with its dense growth and precipitous escarpment both contributed to this increased resistance. A tank-led counterattack in company strength hit the 24th Marines at 0200, but it was repulsed. Mortar fire was received all along the front. The Marine reaction was quick and strong. "Commencing at dawn there was an air, naval gunfire, and artillery preparation that lasted until 0830, that probably was the most intense for the area and time assigned, and the most effectively controlled, of any bombardment of amphibious operations thus far in the Pacific. The bombardment was placed on enemy positions on the high ridge on Southern Tinian, about 1000 yards forward of our front line positions. 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 14 destroyers, 112 planes and 11 battalions of artillery were assigned."**

At 0830 the attack began. With the Second Division on its left, the Fourth Division jumped off led by RCT 24 (on the right) and RCT 23. Japanese resistance grew progressively stronger. Caves, anti-tank guns, mine fields and the cliff line itself reinforced the enemy defenses. A gap between the divisions opened up, and BLT 1/23 on the exposed left flank was pinned down for a while by fire coming from the Second Division's zone. In spite of this, the battalion was able to secure the portion of the escarpment in its zone by 1745. BLT 2/23 in the center received fire from heavy calibre guns, and was held up by mine fields protected by machine guns. However, one company of this battalion managed to work its way up to the top of the cliff-line by an enveloping movement. There a perimeter defense was formed for the night.

Over on the right side of the Division front, the 24th Marines was also being delayed by the terrain. Tank support was hindered by the thick undergrowth. The ground grew more and more rugged. Flame throwers tanks were brought into action to burn the vegetation away, and LVT(A)'s afloat provided additional support along the shoreline. A small Japanese counterattack near the beach was thrown back at 1000. Later in the afternoon, however, heavy resistance developed from the ridge, and the tanks and half-tracks were stopped by mined roads, so the troops dug in for the night. In spite of the formidable terrain and strong enemy resistance, "the Division had penetrated the last ditch island defenses along the southern high plateau."*** (See map of Tinian.) The end was in sight.

On the first of August, the Division attacked to try to finish off the campaign by reaching the O-8 line on the southern end of the island. RCT 23, on the left, reduced the road blocks that had held it up the day before, and maneuvered to obtain a better position for the start of the main attack. By 1330 the advance to O-8 had begun. On the right of the Division, RCT 24 was forced to adjust its units to the three different cliff levels that it had to cross on its descent from the plateau to the sea. Overcoming resistance that varied from light to heavy, the Division reached the final sheer cliff that overlooked the small southern coastal plain. The Second Division also drove through to the end of the island that afternoon. At 1855 on August 1, 1944, Tinian was declared secured. The entire island had been captured in 9 days!

For the next five days, the Division spent its time in mopping-up, salvaging equipment, and burying the dead. Here, as on Saipan, it was found that the Japanese, both military and civilian, often preferred to commit mass suicide rather than give themselves up. August 4 was set as the final limit for all surrenders, and after that dead line had passed (with limited results), a thorough mop-up of the southern cliff area was made.

* NT&LF BAR, Page 15.
** Division Report on Tinian, Page 31.

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On August 7, the Division turned over its zone to RCT 8, and then it assembled north of Tinian Town for reembarkation.

The capture of Tinian had cost the Fourth Division 1906 casualties. But nearly 9000 Japanese had been wiped out through death of capture by the two Marine Divisions. This campaign was unique in that it was the first large scale shore-to-shore operation conducted in the Central Pacific area. Another outstanding feature of the battle was the daily artillery preparation that aided the assault troops immeasurably. After the capture of Ushi Airfield, the air evacuation of casualties was instituted and developed to a high degree of efficiency. No account of this operation would be complete without some mention of the feats performed by supply personnel. Heavy seas after J plus 4 day upset the preconceived methods of supply. So DUKW's were utilized to meet the emergency. "The DUKW personnel and their vehicles performed a remarkable feat of endurance, in that for five (5) days the entire system of supply of a corps in battle was solely dependent on their continuous performance."

The capture of Saipan and Tinian (and Guam which was secured on August 10, 1944) was of the utmost strategic importance. Possession of these three islands gave the United States control of all the Marianas Islands, and nearly isolated the Jap bases in the Carolines. Furthermore, the Jap mainland was now within striking distance. Soon the fleets of B-29's would take off, Tokyo-bound, from the fields of Tinian through which the Fourth Division had fought. Control of the Marianas gave the United States advanced bases from which future operations could be launched. (For example, Saipan was the staging area for the Iwo Jima invasion.)

The Fourth Division had played a leading part in the capture of these vital islands. The way in which it had overcome all opposition won it the Presidential Unit Citation:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

consisting of: Division Headquarters; Division Special Troops; Division Service Troops; 23rd, 24th, 25th Marines; 20th Marines (Engineers); 1st JASCo; 534th and 773rd Amphibian Tractor Battalions (Army); 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Company "C" 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army); VMO-4; 2nd Amphibian Truck Company; 14th Marines (Artillery); 311th and 539th Port Companies (Army); Detachment 7th Field Depot; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, V Amphibious Corps; Detachment, Air Warning Squadron No. 5; 4th 105mm (Howitzer) Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps; 14th Marines (Artillery), (less 3rd and 4th Battalions); Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Amphibious Corps; 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion; 2nd and 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalions; 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army); 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army); 1st Amphibian Truck Company; 2nd Tank Battalion; 1st and 2nd Battalions, 10th Marines (Artillery) and the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment for service as set forth in the following

* Division Report on Tinian, Annex "A". The figure is set at 1046 by the G-1 Report, NT&LF SAR. See Appendix "E" of this report. For some of the medals awarded for this campaign, see Appendix "G".
** NT&LF SAR, Page 21.
"For outstanding performance in combat during the seizure of the Japanese-held islands of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas from June 15 to August 1, 1944. Valiantly storming the mighty fortifications of Saipan on June 15, the Fourth Division, Reinforced, blasted the stubborn defenses of the enemy in an undeviating advance over the perilously rugged terrain. Unflinching despite heavy casualties, this gallant group pursued the Japanese relentlessly across the entire length of the island, pressing on against bitter opposition for twenty-five days to crush all resistance in their zone of action. With but a brief rest period in which to reorganize and re-equip, the Division hurled its full fighting power against the dangerously narrow beaches of Tinian on July 24 and rapidly expanded the beachheads for the continued landing of troops, supplies and artillery. Unchecked by either natural obstacles or hostile fire, these indomitable men spearheaded a merciless attack which swept Japanese forces before it and ravaged all opposition within eight days to add Tinian to our record of conquests in these strategically vital islands."
CHAPTER VI

Maui Again

Embarkation

of the Fourth Division began immediately after it had assembled near Tinian Town on August 7, 1944. For the next week, its various component elements were engaged in loading aboard the transports and sailing from the Marianas—with a sigh of relief—bound for Camp Maui. By the end of August, the whole Division (except for some Headquarters, Medical, and Service personnel) had arrived back at Maui and disembarked at Kahului. On August 31, several units were disbanded: Division Special Troops, Co "D" of the 4th Tank Battalion, and the 20th Marines. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 20th Marines were redesignated the 4th Pioneer Battalion and the 4th Engineer Battalion. (The 3rd Battalion, 20th, (Seabees) had been detached on August 27 and left on Tinian.)

Back on Maui, the Division faced the familiar problem of reorganization, resupply, and retraining. Only this time it was a larger and longer task. Losses in men and equipment had been severe. Combined battle casualties for Saipan and Tinian had amounted to 6,658.* The arrival of replacements for the Division was delayed. The next objective of the Division was unknown, and the exact type of training required was therefore uncertain. In making plans for its next movement, the Division was handicapped by having to work with a new Naval Transport Group which was unfamiliar to the Division, and which was not in the Maui area at that time. The DUKW's that were needed for the training of the newly-activated 4th Amphibian Truck Company were late in arriving. The new M4A3 tanks were also received by the Division at a late date.

These were the obstacles in the path of the Division as it set about preparing itself for its next readiness date: December 15, 1944. The well-known schedule of field problems and training men to fill key positions was begun again. The months of September and October passed in this way. Numerous ceremonies were held for the presentation of medals to members of the Division.** On September 8, all the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers were detached to become the Fourth Marine Division's contribution to the Army's landing on Leyte in the Philippines.

The V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan for the Marines' forthcoming campaign was received by the Division on October 24th. For security reasons, only certain key officers were allowed access to the document. Subordinate units were briefed on most of the details of the plan, but the objective was cloaked under the title of "Island X." From this time on, training was intensified. Attack of fortified positions, neutralization of minefields, and the coordination and use of supporting arms were all stressed. As a rehearsal for the "X"

* Division Report on Iwo Jima, Section 1, Page 5.
** The number of Gold Stars awarded in lieu of a second Purple Heart was steadily increasing now. For a list of the higher decorations won by members of the Fourth Division, see Appendix "G".
landing, ship-to-shore maneuvers, based on the Division Operation Plan, were carried out in the Maalaea Bay area during November 14-30 by the three regimental combat teams. For the last two days of the exercise, all units participated in a Divisional CPX.

Camp Maui and the life of the troops there are well described in the Division War Diary:

"During the month of December the 4th Marine Division was still on the island of Maui, two miles above the village of Haiku. Camp Maui is located about six miles from the shore, on a ridge running from Haleakala Mountain to the sea. Behind the camp the mountain towers 10,000 feet; below it extend miles of visible shore-line and Kahului Harbor; to the east stretch miles of upland plantation land, serrated by deep valleys and gulches.

"One such gulch runs through the camp, separating it into two parts connected by two roads down through the gulch. On the west side of Malik Gulch runs the Makawao-Haiko highway; on the east side is Kokomo Road, leading to Makawao through the settlement of Kokomo. Located on the eastern side of this gulch are the three infantry regiments, Third Provisional Maintenance Detachment, Malaria Control and the Division Airstrip, which is used for the landing of observation planes and for parades.

"On the west side of the gulch, east of the highway, is Division Headquarters, and below it are the areas of Headquarters Battalion, 1st JASC0, and the 4th Tank Battalion. Across the highway are the Service Troops, 4th Pioneer Battalion, 4th Engineer Battalion, 14th Marines (artillery) and the attached Naval Construction Battalion. Located just off the highway above Division Headquarters, are the Quartermaster Warehouses and the 4th Motor Transport Battalion Motor Pool. The Division Quartermaster's office and camp is in Haiku, at the railroad.

"Officers and men of the 4th Division live in pyramidal tents in Camp Maui. Wash racks and showers are open, without roofs, and the water is cold mountain spring water. The men mess in long storage tents, going in line through galleys to be served and using their mess gear. Each infantry regiment has two galleys, there being nineteen galleys in the whole camp. Long lines of pit-type head buildings stretch along the roads at opposite ends of the tent rows from the wash-racks. Office buildings are constructed of Canex, without windows; units down to and including battalions have these structures for offices; companies use pyramidal tents.

"Recreation facilities are good. Each regiment or correspondingly sized units has an out-door theatre at which movies are played nightly and in which various stage shows appear frequently. Unit post-exchanges sell beer, and most units have bamboo beer-gardens for parties. There are numerous ball diamonds and boxing rings about the camp, and gymnasiums in the nearby towns of Makawao and Paia are available for basketball games. A football field at Haiku has been used quite consistently by the Division personnel for its football teams. The Army recreation center of "Tradewinds," on the beach below Paia, is open to 4th Division personnel for swimming, dancing, and movies. USO's in Makawao, Haiku, Kahului, and Wailuku are used extensively by personnel of this Division. Liberty trucks and busses are dispatched from camp daily, returning at 1730 and 1830, to help lighten the heavy burden that the Division has placed on the island's transportation system. . . .*

"During the month of December, 47 training areas were available to this Division. Many of these areas were of necessity located in and around Camp Maui, while others

*For an interesting sidelight on the relations of the Fourth Division and the people of Maui, see Appendix "H".
were as far away as twenty-five miles from camp. Around camp and easily accessible to all units were six areas consisting of gulches and rough terrain, used chiefly for squad and platoon non-tactical maneuvering. On the outskirts of camp were a demolitions area, a live grenade course, and the 1,000" machine gun range. In Maliko Gulch was an obstacle course. The Division Airstrip and two regimental parade grounds were used for close order drill and parades.

"Located about five miles east of the camp in a gulch opening into the sea was the Division's bazooka area, in which it was possible to maneuver fire teams and fire with bazookas at simulated caves on the faces of three cliffs.

"Along the coast east of camp for about ten miles were various training areas available to the Division, some leased by the Division and some leased by the Army. A combat firing range permitted the maneuvering and the firing of tanks and half-tracks in coordination with infantry activities. A number of maneuver areas in which there were no installations were used by the Division for platoon, battalion, and regimental tactical and non-tactical problems.

"One area in this vicinity was used to train motor transport drivers in the movement of troops and supplies under both day and night conditions of combat.

"Army facilities east of Camp Maui, available to the Division consisted of a jungle training center, a village fighting course, a cave fighting course, and an infiltration course. In this area all organic weapons of the infantry battalions were fired during the training. The fortified jungle position consisted of twenty-two pillboxes and emplacements well concealed in bamboo groves, under the roots of banyan trees, and in thick undergrowth.

"A mortar and artillery impact area, a Sea Coast Artillery range and an anti-aircraft firing area in this vicinity were made available to the Division. In November, the Opana Point Rifle Range had been completed by the Division, and was used in December. This range, facing seaward, is probably the only 100 point target range in the Pacific.

"Located in the Maalaea Bay Area and around the Division's Amphibian Tractor Base were a number of other Army training areas which the Division used, such as anti-tank moving target range, a combat village course, an infiltration course, a close combat course, and a known distance, 15 point range. In the period between the Saipan and Iwo operations 16,000 men of the 4th Division had fired the Navy 20 Point Rifle Range on Maalaea Bay.

"In the Amphibious Maneuver Area on Maalaea Bay, where the Division held its practice landings, was a fortified beach area with pillboxes and emplacements modeled from the Tarawa Beach. Inland were two artillery position and maneuver areas, one being used chiefly for the maneuvering and the firing of artillery and the other being used as an impact area. The range was 3 to 6 miles long and up to 3 miles wide.

"Near Puunene Air Station were two large tank maneuver areas used by the 4th Tank Battalion for instruction in driving. . . .

"Using these available facilities the 4th Division, in addition to making its final preparations and plans for the Iwo Jima Operation, carried out routine preparations and training of small and large units. Infantry units received instructions and training in the digging of foxholes and individual protection, squad problems, mortar and machine guns, company training with tanks, control of platoons, and the use of all basic weapons. Jap weapons were studied and fired, and personnel were instructed on booby traps and mines. Communication school was held in the classroom and in the field, and radio problems, code practice, and message writing were studied. Other schools throughout the
Division gave instruction in aircraft identification, gunfire characteristics, intelligence and counter-intelligence work, counter-intelligence data, map reading, camouflage, and chemical warfare. Battalion and Regimental field problems were held and included instruction and firing of bazookas, instruction and practice on the new flame-thrower and the use of all infantry weapons in tactical situations. Training for the infantry had been concentrated on jungle warfare but the emphasis was now changed and concentrated on the assault of fortified positions. Coordinated with infantry training was the training of attached units such as amphibian tractors, tanks, rockets, artillery, JASC0, and war dogs.

“The Medical Battalion during the month of December supervised the giving of courses of inoculation to the officers and men of the Division for plague, typhus, cholera, and smallpox, in preparation for the coming operation.”

Two exercises were conducted in camp during December to give a last polish to the Division’s use and coordination of supporting arms and to its staff work. All hands were working under heavy pressure now. The readiness date after being postponed was nearly at hand. The last of the replacements had just been received, and it was necessary to rush their training with all possible speed. (One regiment and one battalion of another regiment were to have only twenty-nine days in which to integrate and train their last draft of personnel.)

On December 27, the Division was split up into its combat task organization of 3 RCT’s, the Division Artillery, and the Support Group. That reorganization marked the end of the Division’s stay on Maui, for on the following day the troops began loading aboard the transports at Kahului. By January 3, 1945, the last of the Division (except the 14th Marines) was embarked. This time the ships were comparatively new, the food was good, and the ships’ crews were most cooperative. As a result, all hands were quite comfortable—in contrast to some of the Division’s previous trips.

Once embarked, all units moved to Pearl Harbor or Honolulu. Some liberty was granted there, but on January 6 all the elements of the Division at Oahu sailed for Maalaea Bay to participate in amphibious maneuvers. These lasted for three days, but they were handicapped somewhat by the absence of some units and the simulation of the use of LVT’s. At this same time, the 14th Marines was embarking aboard its LST’s at Kahului. Near the end of the maneuvers, assault units of RCT 23 and RCT 25 also loaded aboard LST’s. On January 9, all units returned to Oahu for more liberty and recreation.

A full dress rehearsal for the coming operation was held at Maalaea Bay during the period of January 13 to 18. Ship-to-shore movements, a landing on Maui and continuation of the problem overnight there, and the use of live ammunition by support planes and ships climaxed the end of the Division’s training.

All units returned to Oahu on January 18, and for the next week, one fourth of the command was granted liberty each day. Medals for heroism in the Marianas campaign were presented to members of the Division during this period. Final staff conferences were held and intelligence data and operation plans were distributed.

The days at Pearl Harbor and Honolulu went by quickly, and all too soon they were over. On January 22 the Tractor Group of LSM’s and LST’s sailed, and on January 27 the transports with the main body of the Division also departed. Officers and men were in top physical condition and well trained. Morale was at a peak. The Fourth Marine Division was ready!

* For a complete list of the Division Task Organization, with all reinforcing units, see Appendix “C(4).”
CHAPTER VII

Iwo Jima

ONCE the Division was underway, the word was passed to all hands; the objective was Iwo Jima! All the details of the operation—so closely guarded in the past—were now revealed to everyone. Iwo Jima was located in the Volcano Islands, 660 miles from Toyko. It was only 625 miles from Saipan, but 3,330 from Pearl Harbor.* In addition to its strategic location in the innermost ring of the defenses of the Japanese homeland, it was the enemy’s main base for the interception of American B-29’s.

To capture this vital island, the United States had set in motion a vast series of co-ordinated blows. Shore-based aircraft from as far away as China and India, and the Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, had laid the groundwork of reconnaissance and patrol. The 20th Air Force and the Fast Carrier Force had struck at the home islands of Japan. Iwo itself had been under attack for several months by the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas. Starting on D-3, Task Force 52 and Task Force 54 arrived off Iwo to cover the work of the Underwater Demolition Teams, to conduct mine-sweeping, and to deliver preinvasion bombardments and air strikes. At the same time, Task Force 58 was making its strikes on the Tokyo-Nagoya-Kobe area to forestall any Japanese effort to attack the American forces at Iwo.

The Fourth Division formed but a small part of this array of striking power, but it was an important part, for the efforts of the fleet and air units were all made with the purpose of getting the Marine assault troops ashore on Iwo and helping them after they had landed there. Once again, the Fourth Division (under Major General C. B. Cates, USMC) was part of the V Amphibious Corps (Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC), which, in turn, was part of the Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56) under the command of Lieutenant General H. M. Smith, USMC.** The Fifth Marine Division (Major General K. E. Rockey, USMC) was also part of the V Amphibious Corps, while the Third Marine Division (Major General O. B. Erskine, USMC) formed the Expeditionary Troops Reserve. Overall command of the whole amphibious operation lay with Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, as head of the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51), and ultimately with Admiral R. A. Spruance (Fifth Fleet).

Briefing was carried on steadily during the voyage. Eniwetok was the first stop (February 5-7). From there, the Division sailed to the Saipan-Tinian area, arriving on February 11. How the two islands had changed since the men of the Fourth Division had last seen them! Endless white runways for B-29’s now stretched where dead Japs had

* See map of the “Pacific Ocean Areas.”
** The strength of the Fourth Division (reinforced) for the Iwo Jima operation was 22,488, while the strength of the Expeditionary Troops (TF56) was 83,573. (G-1 reports of VAC & TF56.)

43
lain amidst the burnt cane fields in July, 1944. One last rehearsal for Iwo was conducted off the western shore of Tinian on February 13, but it was impeded by rough seas. Two days later, the final staff conferences were held, and on February 16 the Division left for Iwo Jima.

The last lap of the trip was spent in a final summary of intelligence, terrain, passwords, objectives, and tactics. The operation plan called for the Fourth and Fifth Divisions to land in assault on D-day (with the Fourth on the right). The landing beaches were on the southeast side of Iwo, and Yellow 1, Yellow 2, Blue 1, and Blue 2 were assigned to the Fourth. The Division's mission was, as usual, to seize the O-1 line. On Iwo this would entail the capture of most of Airfield No. 1, the high ground between Airfield No. 1 and No. 2, and the rugged cliffline on the right flank. (See map.)

Early on the morning of February 19, the Division arrived off Iwo. It was D-day! Lying off the island was the now familiar spectacle of the vast armada of an invasion force. From every side the guns of warships were laying down their bombardment, and overhead wave after wave of planes hit the island: torpedo bombers firing rockets, fighters strafing, and dive bombers coming straight down to drop their load.

The assault BLT's were boated at an early hour in their LVT's. The reserve battalions and the reserve regiment (RCT 24) were to use LCVP's. The Division landing plan provided for RCT 23 to land on the left (Yellow) beaches, while RCT 25 would use the right (Blue) beaches. From left to right, the assault BLT's were 1/23, 2/23, 1/25, and 3/25. Because of the damage to the LCI(G)'s caused by the Jap fire on D-1, close-in fire support for the assault waves was to be furnished by LCS(L)'s. In addition, the leading LVT's were to be preceded by LVT(A)'s. Hour hour was set for 0900.

By 0815, the first three waves of assault troops were formed and waiting behind the Line of Departure. At 0830, they were on their way in. The weather was good and the surf moderate. The naval gunfire, air strikes, and rocket and mortar barrages from the gunboats were saturating the beaches now, and only moderate enemy fire fell on the leading waves. As they neared the shore, the support fire moved inland in a "rolling barrage." At 0902 they hit the beach.

And then came trouble—in large quantities. As the naval gunfire lifted, the Japanese "opened up" with every weapon they had, and soon a solid sheet of fire was pouring down on the beaches and incoming waves. It was "the heaviest enemy mortar and artillery fire yet seen in any operation." Boats were hit; they broached and clogged the beaches. Personnel casualties mounted rapidly. Vehicles ashore found the sandy volcanic ash and the first terrace (with its 40% grade) nearly impassable. Even tanks bogged down. Every move was under direct observation of the Japanese on top of the cliffline on the right flank and on Mt. Suribachi on the left.

Nevertheless, supporting arms and personnel kept coming ashore as rapidly as conditions on the beaches would permit. Tanks were on the Yellow beaches by 0940. The reserve BLT's of the assault regiments were coming ashore by 1233. The Shore and Beach Parties began landing. Around 1500, two battalions of artillery were going ashore to furnish direct support for the assault troops, and 1/14 was firing missions by 1740. BLT's 1/24 and 2/24 of the Division Reserve were sent in at 1615 to be attached to the assault regiments. The command posts of RCT 23 and RCT 25 were set up by 1700. RCT 24 (minus detached elements) was completely ashore at 1945, and then it moved to its assembly area.

*Division Report on Iwo, Section III, Pages 8-9.
IWO JIMA
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION ZONE OF ACTION

SCALE IN YARDS

PREPARED BY HISTORICAL DIVISION, U. S. MARINE CORPS
Thus by the night of D-day, the Division had all three of its rifle regiments (less some Support Group elements), two battalions of artillery, and some heavy Shore Party equipment ashore. Despite the withering enemy fire and extremely heavy casualties, the assault units had driven ahead and established a line that included the eastern edge of Airfield No. 1 and was "of sufficient depth inland from Blue Beaches to guarantee the successful holding of the beachhead." Full contact with the Fifth Division had been established, and adequate supplies were ashore for a continuation of the attack the next day.

The night of D-day was spent in trying to get ready for the next day's operations. Some units had suffered terrible casualties: BLT 3/25, for example, had lost 50% of its men. Accordingly, reserve companies and battalions were sent in to be attached to or to relieve the most battered units. On the beach that night, in spite of all efforts, "no appreciable progress was made in clearing the beaches of wrecked landing craft." Enemy harassing fire continued to fall all night long throughout the Division Zone.

As dawn came on February 20 (D plus 1), the men of the Fourth Division prepared for King hour. Naval gunfire and local preparation by two battalions of the 14th Marines paved the way for the attack. At 0830 the assault began with RCT 23 on the left and RCT 25 on the right. Through bitter enemy opposition, the 23rd Marines, reinforced with tanks, fought its way across Airfield No. 1 to complete its capture by 1600. (See map of "Progress of the Attack"). On the other flank, RCT 25 made little progress. Minefields prevented the use of tanks; terrain was very unfavorable; enemy resistance was fanatical, and the 25th's left flank was necessarily anchored to the adjoining unit of the 23rd Marines. During the day, the remainder of the 14th Marines came ashore and went into position. RCT 24 (minus its two detached battalions) remained in Division Reserve.

These first two days ashore left no doubt in anyone's mind that this would be the Division's toughest battle. Losses already totaled 2,011.*** The need for additional manpower was plain. RCT 21 (from the Third Division) had been boated that day (February 20), but due to congestion on the beaches and the surf conditions, it had not been landed. This latter factor was to play a large part in the operation. Rough weather and high seas, beginning on D plus 1, were to hamper very seriously the landing of vitally needed supplies. Ashore, the sand proved a nightmare. Foxholes caved in, wheeled vehicles could not move, and there was no cover from enemy fire. Japs deep in reinforced concrete pillboxes laid down interlocking bands of fire that cut whole companies to ribbons. Camouflage hid all the enemy installations. The high ground on every side was honeycombed with layer after layer of Jap emplacements, blockhouses, dugouts, and observation posts. Their observation was perfect; whenever the Marines made a move, the Japs watched every step, and when the moment came, their mortars, rockets, machine guns, and artillery —long ago zeroed in—would smother the area in a murderous blanket of fire. The counter-battery fire and preparatory barrages of Marine artillery and naval gunfire were often ineffective, for the Japs would merely retire to a lower level or inner cave and wait until the storm had passed. Then they would emerge and blast the advancing Marines.

In spite of all this, Fourth and Fifth Divisions moved ahead. After splitting the island on D-day, the main part of the Fifth Division wheeled and drove up the west side of Iwo Jima. (RCT 28 was detached to capture Mt. Suribachi in the south.) Side-by-side with the Fourth Division also wheeled and advanced to the northeast. LVT's, DUKW's, and a few "Weasels" worked their way through the heavy surf, the clutching sand, and the wall of wreckage to maintain the flow of high-priority supplies.

*Division Report on Iwo, Section III, Page 11. See map of "Progress of the Attack."
**Division Report on Iwo, Section III, Page 12.
***This figure and all succeeding casualty totals are from the Division Report on Iwo, Annex "A".
On February 21 (D plus 2), after repulsing a night counter-attack by the Japs, the Fourth Division attacked again. RCT 25 moved forward along the right flank by the East Boat Basin. However, RCT 23 on the left gained little. Its “advance against numerous pillboxes and extensive minefields was extremely costly and very slow.” The Division combat efficiency was already down to 68%. Although the day's advances averaged only 100-250 yards, the enemy had been driven from the cliff heights and Quarry area on the Division right flank, while the left flank was approaching Airfield No. 2. Furthermore, reinforcements were becoming available. At 1630, RCT 21 was released to the Fourth Division, and soon thereafter the whole regiment was ashore. During the night the usual enemy attack was repulsed by the Division.

Early in the morning of February 22 (D plus 3), RCT 21 began a passage of the lines to relieve RCT 23. This was a long, slow process, as every move had to be made under observed fire from the high ground in front of Airfield No. 2. By 1130 the relief had been effected and RCT 21 attacked northward. At the end of the day, the southern edge of Airfield No. 2 had been reached. On the other flank of the Division, the 25th Marines had made gains along the coastline. (See map of “Progress of the Attack.”) The Advance Division Command Post was set up ashore this day.

The American flag was raised on top of Mt. Suribachi (by the 28th Marines) at 1037 on February 23 (D plus 4). At 0930 that morning the Fourth Division Command Post had opened ashore. After the usual preparatory barrage, the assault troops jumped off for the day's attack. RCT 24 had regained its detached battalions, and it relieved the 25th Marines on the right flank. RCT 25 reverted to Division Reserve, while the 23rd Marines continued as Corps Reserve. Due to the unusually rough terrain, tanks were able to furnish little assistance during the day. RCT 24 on the right averaged gains of 300 yards. However, RCT 21 on the left was “unable to make any advance except on the extreme right because of difficult terrain and extremely stubborn enemy resistance from pillboxes, emplaced tanks, 47mm guns sighted so as to cover both airstrips of Airfield No. 2, high velocity flat trajectory weapons, heavy artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. Continuous artillery, naval gunfire and air support failed to break the determined and fanatical resistance in this critical area.” By now, the Division's casualties had mounted to 3,163.

It was decided to make the maximum effort of the Division on the left flank the next day (February 24, D plus 5) in order to eliminate the enemy salient and seize Airfield No. 2. Strong tank support was given to RCT 21. An intensive naval and artillery barrage was laid down. Although the 21st was delayed in beginning its attack by the late arrival of its tanks, it managed to penetrate to the southeastern edge of both strips of the airfield by 1130. After another artillery preparation at mid-day, the 21st continued its tank-infantry attack. Considerable gains were made on the right, but its left BLT (2/21) was unable to advance. Meanwhile RCT 24, on the Division's right flank, was fighting a slow and bloody battle for “Charlie-Dog Ridge.” The ridge was finally taken at 1520. (See map of the “4th MarDiv Zone.”) The Division's combat efficiency had been reduced by now to 60%. More troops had been pouring ashore all day, however, and the Third Division was now ready to take over a section of the lines.

At 0700 on February 25 (D plus 6), the 21st Marines reverted to control of the Third Division, and that Division went into position in the Airfield No. 2 area on the left of the Fourth. At the same time, RCT 23 moved up to the front and returned to action on the left of RCT 24. Little progress was made until tanks were sent through the Third Division

* Division Report on Iwo, Section IV, Page 6 and Page 9. All figures on combat efficiency are drawn from Section IV of the Division Report.
** Division Report on Iwo, Section IV, Page 14.
zone to outflank and attack the pillboxes and anti-tank guns holding up the 23rd. On the right, RCT 24 gained very little.

Thus it went, day after day. The Japs would attempt small counter-attacks or infiltrations each night. Every morning after an artillery preparation, the Division would jump off in the attack against an endless series of concealed pillboxes and mutually supporting positions. The three rifle regiments and their battalions were shuffled in and out of the line in an effort to equalize the burden of assault work. Casualties continued to be heavy.

Starting about February 26 (D plus 7), the Division began working its way into the enemy's main defense line of prepared positions. For the next week it ground slowly forward, suffering bloody losses, and engaged in the most savage type of close combat. The Jap line was based on a series of strongpoints known as Hill 382, the Amphitheatre, Turkey Knob, and the village of Minami. (See map of the "4th MarDiv Zone.")

RCT 23 reached the southwest slopes of the vital Hill 382 on February 26, and was met by a murderous wall of fire there. This hill was the key point in the whole Jap defense line, and for days it was the scene of the bitterest kind of fighting, with RCT 23 and then RCT 24 attempting to capture it and keep it. Dug-in tanks, deep crevices with long tunnels, and a multitude of camouflaged emplacements took a heavy toll of the attacking units. Often it seemed that the radar station on top would never be taken. "It appeared that there were underground passageways leading into the defenses on Hill 382, and when one occupant of a pillbox was killed, another one came up to take his place."

Finally, late on March 3, the hill was secured. The anchor of the enemy defense line had been taken by storm, and the success of the Division was now assured, but some of the companies which had fought for Hill 382 were nearly wiped out. Over the dead bodies and equipment that littered the battlefield hung the ever-present sulphur fumes.

RCT 25 on the right of the Division had been engaged in equally fierce fighting during this same period. Its left flank elements (mainly BLT 1/25) had run into a cliff-line and the Turkey Knob defenses. No amount of shelling, demolitions, flamethrowers, or riflemen seemed to dent the enemy's fanatical resistance here. Time and again advances would be made at the cost of very heavy casualties, only to find that the position reached was untenable at the end of the day, and that a withdrawal was necessary. Every possible solution was tried. A surprise attack was launched without any artillery preparation. Outflankings and envelopments were attempted. To silence one concrete blockhouse in a commanding position on top of the cliff-line, a 75mm howitzer was packed up to the front lines, assembled, and put into action. Nothing seemed to succeed.

After days of bloody battering, advances finally were made so that the Jap pocket at Turkey Knob was nearly isolated. RCT 25, however, was worn out, and on March 3 it was relieved by the 23rd Marines. The blockhouse on the cliff-top was partially reduced that afternoon. In spite of mines covered by Jap fire, it was attacked by demolition teams and flame-thrower tanks. RCT 23 finally succeeded in cutting off Turkey Knob completely, and then mopping up began in the Minami area. (See map of "4th MarDiv Zone.")

The Division had broken the back of the Jap line, but at a terrible cost. As of March 3, it had lost 6,591 men. In spite of receiving a draft of replacements, the Division's combat efficiency had fallen to 50%.

The direction of the Division's attack now shifted to the southeast in order to move parallel to the terrain corridors. With the fall of Hill 382, the Amphitheatre was outflanked.

*Division Report on Iwo, Section IV, Page 31.
and by-passed. March 5 was a day of general reorganization which allowed the troops a momentary breathing spell. The next day, the Division went over to the attack again. All three rifle regiments were now in the line, with RCT 25 on the right anchored on the coastline and the other regiments pivoting about it. Very little progress was made through the rugged terrain. Die-hard Jap defenders continued to hold out in the Minami pocket.

This slow advance continued for days. The terrain was extraordinarily rough. Crevices, draws, ravines, cross-compartment, and hills were all filled with cave and tunnel systems. Half-tracks and tanks were unable to move into the area. Advancing troops would be met with fire from one quarter and when they attacked there, they would be hit from a different side by Japs using underground passages. The enemy had to be rooted out by assault squads and their weapons. Supporting arms usually could not be brought to bear. It was slow, exhausting, grim work. Anti-personnel mines were sown in cave mouths, approaches, tunnels, paths; deadly accurate snipers were everywhere. But the Marine lines kept moving forward, compressing the enemy into an ever-smaller zone. The Japs could not retreat much further: the sea lay behind them and on their left flank.

Finally, the pressure on the enemy grew so great that he was forced to come out of his camouflaged, fortified holes and counterattack in force. On the night of March 8-9, the intensity of the Jap fire began to increase around 1800. Rocket, mortar, grenade, rifle and machine gun fire rained down on the Division's lines, reaching its peak about 2000. Enemy infiltration began along the front of all three regiments with the main effort being made against RCT 23. At 2330, the Japs attacked BLT 2/23 in force, attempting to break through to Airfield No. 1. Although this was not an all-out Banzai charge, "the attack was apparently well-planned, preceded by probing of our lines to find weak spots, and the enemy made good use of terrain to infiltrate our lines, and some enemy, well armed and carrying demolition charges, reached Command Post areas." The Japs were finally thrown back by the Marine rifle units, aided by intense artillery fire. A count of the enemy bodies that were found after this attack reached 784.* By now the Fourth Division's total casualties had risen to 8,094, while its combat efficiency had fallen to 45%.

As daybreak came on March 9 (D plus 18), the Division resumed its attack. In one sector (on the right of BLT 1/24) resistance was so heavy that no progress could be made. As a result, the Japs retained a salient or re-entrant in the Marine lines. (See map of "Progress of the Attack.")

RCT 25 closed off this enemy wedge the next day (March 10), and annihilated the Jap strongpoints within it. The whole Division front made substantial gains. Commanding ground 400-600 yards from the beaches was seized by RCT 23. Around 1500 patrols from the 23rd reached the ocean; there was no opposition, but they were withdrawn. By now, "it was quite apparent that the main enemy resistance had been broken, but that the Japanese were continuing their passive defense from an intricate system of well-concealed caves. These caves were hard to locate and were generally disclosed only when the enemy opened fire."**

On March 11, the twentieth day after the landing, the Division reached the ocean. RCT 23 overcame weak enemy resistance and by 1055 its patrols were on the beach. At the end of the day, combat patrols were mopping up in the 23rd's zone. Over on the Division's right flank, however, RCT 25 was meeting heavy opposition and considerable fire. Here, in a pocket of indescribably wild terrain, the Japs chose to make their last stand so as to exact as heavy a toll of the Marines as they possibly could. (See map "Progress

** Division Report on Iwo. Section IV, Pages 49-50.
of the Attack.""

Except for this one small pocket, the Fourth Division had crushed the enemy in its zone of action on Iwo in twenty days!

Mopping up and the elimination of the final Jap pocket (by RCT 25) occupied the troops for several days. The area of resistance was studded with caves and emplacements, and was absolutely impenetrable to tanks or other support weapons. The Jap defenders, as usual, fought until they were individually routed out and killed by riflemen, demolition and grenade teams, and flame-throwers.

During the night of March 15-16, a party of nearly 60 Japs tried to break out of the hopeless corner into which they had been driven. The attempt failed, for they were forced back into their caves. This was the last gasp of the enemy. By 1030 on the morning of March 16, the final pocket was wiped out, and at 1100 the entire zone of the Fourth Division was reported secured. The Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, announced at 1800 that all organized resistance on Iwo had ended. The "impregnable fortress" of Iwo Jima had been taken by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine Divisions in 26 days!

On the following day RCT 24 took over the 25th Marines' zone. The 23rd had been relieved on March 16. The day was spent in burying the dead, policing the area, and final mopping up by patrolling and blowing caves shut. The 23rd and 25th Marines spent March 16-17 in assembling and embarking aboard ship. The Third Division relieved RCT 24 at 0808 on March 18, and that regiment immediately assembled in preparation for its embarkation. It began going aboard ship that afternoon.

All elements of the Division were embarked by March 19, and the Division Command Post was closed ashore. The following morning at 0800, the Fourth Marine Division left Iwo Jima.

The battle was over, and the island taken, but the Fourth Division had paid a heavy price. It had suffered a total of 9,090 casualties, of which 1,731 were killed in action. (See Appendix "E".) However, Iwo had been defended by an estimated 22,000 Japanese who had been completely wiped out by the three Marine Divisions. An actual count of the number of enemy dead in the Fourth Division zone came to 8,982. Probably another thousand were sealed in caves or buried by the enemy. The ferocity and tenacity with which the Japs had fought was well illustrated by the fact that the Fourth Division captured only 44 prisoners in the whole operation.

In summarizing the campaign for Iwo Jima, Admiral Nimitz said: *"The battle of Iwo Island has been won. The United States Marines by their individual and collective courage have conquered a base which is as necessary to us in our continuing forward movement toward final victory as it was vital to the enemy in staving off ultimate defeat. The enemy was fully aware of the crushing attacks on his homeland which would be made possible by our capture of this island, only 660 nautical miles distant, so he prepared what he thought was an impregnable defense. With certain knowledge of the cost of an objective which had to be taken, the Fleet Marine Force, supported by the ships of the Pacific Fleet and by Army and Navy aircraft, fought the battle and won. By their victory the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island uncommon valor was a common virtue."

Admiral Nimitz's statement on the vital importance of Iwo had already been illustrated, for the first crippled B-29 had landed on Airfield No. 1 on March 4. In addition,
before the Fourth Division left the island, Army P-51 Mustangs were based there. American air power was now on Japan's doorstep, and Tokyo-bound B-29's could have a fighter escort henceforth. In these planes the men of the Fourth Marine Division could see the reason for the bloody struggle into which they had been thrown. Iwo Jima was only 8 square miles of black volcanic ash and sulfur vapors, but it was essential to the United States air offensive. To help win this island, the Fourth Division had fought its greatest battle. On Iwo Jima it had put to use all the skills that it had acquired in two years of training and in its three previous assault landings at Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian. The Fourth Marine Division had met the Japanese where they were strongest, and it had beaten them.

FINIS
APPENDICES
## APPENDIX "A"

### Command and Staff Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Assumed Command</th>
<th>Relinquished Command</th>
<th>Engagements</th>
<th>New Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Commanding Generals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates</td>
<td>12Jul44 (Saipan)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Tinian Iwo Jima</td>
<td>— —</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2. Asst. Division Commanders** |                 |                      |             |                              |
| Brig. Gen. Franklin A. Hart | 30Aug44 (Maul) | — — | Iwo Jima | — — |

| **3. The Division Staff** |                 |                      |             |                              |
| **a. Chief of Staff**     |                 |                      |             |                              |
| Col. Matthew C. Horner    | 21Aug44 (Maul) | 29Aug44 (Maul) | — — | Assistant D-3 |
| Col. Merton J. Batchelder | 1Nov44 (Maul) | 9Apr45 (Maul) | Iwo Jima | HQ, FMF, Pacific |
| Col. Walter W. Wensinger  | 10Apr45 (Maul) | 16Apr45 (Maul) | — — | HQ, V Phib Corps |
| Col. Edwin A. Pollock     | 17Apr45 (Maul) | — — | — — | — — |

| **b. Staff D-1** |                 |                      |             |                              |
| Col. Merton J. Batchelder | 16Aug43 (Pendle.) | 10Apr44 (Maul) | Kwajalein | 25th Marines |
| Col. Walter I. Jordan     | 11Apr44 (Maul) | 29Aug44 (Maul) | Saipan Tinian | 24th Marines |
| Col. John R. Lanigan      | 30Aug44 (Maul) | 27Oct44 (Maul) | — — | 25th Marines |
| Col. Orin H. Wheeler      | 28Oct44 (Maul) | 9Apr45 (Maul) | Iwo Jima | Division Inspector |
| Lt. Col. Joseph H. Berry  | 10Apr45 (Maul) | — — | — — | — — |
## APPENDIX “A” (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Assumed Command</th>
<th>Relinquished Command</th>
<th>Engagements</th>
<th>New Assignment</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>c. Staff D-2</strong></td>
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<td><strong>d. Staff D-3</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Walter W. Wensinger</td>
<td>16Aug43 (Pendle.)</td>
<td>16Oct43 (Maul)</td>
<td>Kwajalein Salapan Tinian</td>
<td>23rd Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. William W. Buchanan</td>
<td>17Oct44 (Maul)</td>
<td>31Oct44 (Maul)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Assistant D-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Merton J. Batchelder</td>
<td>1Nov44 (Maul)</td>
<td>8Dec44 (Maul)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Edwin A. Pollock</td>
<td>9Dec44 (Maul)</td>
<td>17Apr45 (Maul)</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. William W. Buchanan</td>
<td>16Aug43 (Maul)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e. Staff D-4</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. William F. Brown</td>
<td>16Aug43 (Pendle.)</td>
<td>7Nov44 (Maul)</td>
<td>Kwajalein Salapan Tinian</td>
<td>HQ, V Phib Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Matthew C. Horner</td>
<td>25Nov44 (Maul)</td>
<td>27May45 (Maul)</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>HQ, V Phib Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Charles T. Hagan</td>
<td>28May45 (Maul)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
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<td><strong>4. Regimental Commanders</strong></td>
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<td><strong>a. 14th Marines</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Randall M. Victory</td>
<td>1Jun43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>7Jun43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Louis G. DeHaven</td>
<td>3Jun43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>27May45 (Maul)</td>
<td>Kwajalein Salapan Tinian Iwo Jima</td>
<td>HQ, FMF, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Randall M. Victory</td>
<td>28May45 (Maul)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>— —</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>b. 20th Marines</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Nelson K. Brown</td>
<td>15Jun43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>22Aug43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>c. 23rd Marines</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. William B. Onley</td>
<td>20Jul42 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>2Sep42 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>— —</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX "A" (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Col. Louis R. Jones</td>
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<td>15Oct44 (Maul)</td>
<td>Kwajalein</td>
<td>HQ, FMF,</td>
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<td>Saipan</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Walter W. Wensinger</td>
<td>15Oct44 (Maul)</td>
<td>9Apr45 (Maul)</td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Edward J. Dillon</td>
<td>10Apr45 (Maul)</td>
<td>2May45 (Maul)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Lenard B. Cresswell</td>
<td>3May45 (Maul)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. 24th Marines</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Orin H. Wheeler</td>
<td>10Apr43 (Pendle.)</td>
<td>11Jun43 (Pendle.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Austin R. Brunelli</td>
<td>31Aug44 (Maul)</td>
<td>6Sep44 (Maul)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Walter L. Jordan</td>
<td>7Sep44 (Maul)</td>
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<td>Iwo Jima</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. 25th Marines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Richard H. Schubert</td>
<td>1May43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td>27Jul43 (Lejeune)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4th Serv. Bn., E.C.E., 4th MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Merton J. Batchelder</td>
<td>11Apr44 (Maul)</td>
<td>31Oct44 (Maul)</td>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. John R. Lanigan</td>
<td>1Nov44 (Maul)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: On 5Apr45, the letter designating divisional staff officers was changed from “D” to “G,” and in the lower echelons it became “8.”

Sources: 1. War Diary, 4th Marine Division
2. Tri-monthly Reports of Headquarters Co., 4th Marine Division
3. Headquarters Memorandums

59A
**APPENDIX "B"**

Composition of the Division
(Organization and Designation of its units)

I Organization:

a. East Coast Echelon
   - 14th Marines
   - 20th Marines
   - 23rd Marines
   - 25th Marines
   - 4th Service Battalion
   - 4th Signal Company
   - 4th Medical Battalion
   - Hq Co, ECE, 4MarDiv

b. West Coast Echelon
   - 4th Tank Battalion (minus Company "C")
   - 24th Marines, reinforced with:
     - Battery "D", 4th Special Weapons Battalion
     - Company "B", 4th Motor Transport Battalion
     - Company "B", 4th Medical Battalion
     - Company "B", 20th Marines
     - 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines

c. Headquarters Company, East Coast Echelon, Fourth Marine Division, organized on 1 June 1943, at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina.8

d. Fourth Marine Division activated on 16 August 1943, at Camp J. H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California.1

e. Fourth Division became a part of the V Amphibious Corps on 20 September 1943.4

f. Division brought to full strength for all authorized units on 20 September 1943.1

II Designation:

1. a. Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac:
   - 16 August 1943, organized as: Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   - 5 February 1944, in the field.
   - 1 September 1944, present designation.

b. First Provisional Rocket Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac:
   - 13 April 1944, organized as: First Provisional Rocket Detachment, V Amphibious Corps, Transient Center, FMF, Pacific.
   - 1 May 1944, present designation.

c. Signal Company, Headquarters Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac:
   - 16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton; joined Headquarters Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF.
   - 5 February 1944, in the field.
   - 1 September 1944, present designation.

d. Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac:
   - 15 June 1943, organized as: Company "D", (Scout), 4th Tank Battalion, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   - 23 August 1943, to Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, at Camp Pendleton.
   - 15 September 1943, to Headquarters Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   - 5 February 1944, in the field.
   - 12 March 1944, present designation.

e. Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac:
   - 24 August 1943, organized as: Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   - 5 February 1944, in the field.
   - 1 September 1944, present designation.

f. Headquarters Company, East Coast Echelon, 4MarDiv, Camp Lejeune:
   - 1 June 1943, organized.
   - 17 August 1943, disbanded.

2. a. Headquarters and Service Battery, Special Weapons Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv:
   - 19 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   - 5 February 1944, in the field.
   - 22 March 1944, disbanded.

---

1 War Diary, Fourth Marine Division.
2 Change Sheets.
3 Headquarters Memorandums.
4 Division Report on Kwajalein.
APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

b. Battery "A", Special Weapons Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv.
   19 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   8 March 1944, disbanded.

c. Battery "B", Special Weapons Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv.
   1 May 1943, organized as: Battery "B", Fourth Special Weapons Battalion, attached
   to the 25th Marines (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton; joined Special Weapons Battalion.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   11 March 1944, disbanded.

d. Battery "C", Special Weapons Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4 MarDiv.
   19 February 1943, organized as: Battery "E", Fourth Special Weapons Battalion, attached
   to the 23rd Marines (Reinforced), Camp Lejeune.
   1 July 1943, redesignated: Battery "C", Fourth Special Weapons Battalion, 23rd
   Marines.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton with 23rd Marines.
   19 August 1943, joined Special Weapons Battalion.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   4 March 1944, disbanded.

e. Battery "D", Special Weapons Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv.
   26 March 1943, organized as: Battery "D", Fourth Special Weapons Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF.
   Attached to the 24th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton.
   19 August 1943, joined Special Weapons Battalion.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   4 March 1944, disbanded.

3. a. Headquarters Company, Service Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   10 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

b. Service and Supply Company, Fourth Service Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

c. 3rd Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv,
   FMF, Pac.
   3 October 1942, organized as: 3rd Platoon, Service and Supply Company, Third
   Service Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines (Reinforced), New River Training
   Center.
   20 February 1943, designation changed to: 3rd Platoon, Service and Supply Company,
   4th Service Battalion, Camp Lejeune.
   11 May 1943, to 4th Service Battalion.
   1 July 1943, to 23rd Marines.
   19 August 1943, rejoined Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion, 4MarDiv,
   at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

d. Ordnance Company, Fourth Service Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   6 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

e. Second Separate Laundry Platoon, Transient Center, FMF, Pac, attached to Service
   Troops, Service Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1944, organized as: Second Separate Laundry Platoon, Headquarters Company, San
   Diego Area, Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.
   25 February 1944, redesignated: 1st Platoon, 2nd Laundry Company, Corps Head-
   quarters Troops, Fifth Amphibious Corps, FMF, Pac.
   17 February 1945, to present designation.

61B
APPENDIX “B” (Cont’d)

f. 1st Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized as: 1st Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion, attached to the 25th Marines (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   11 May 1943, to 4th Service Battalion.
   1 July 1943, to 25th Marines.
   13 September 1943, to Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

   19 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

   1 May 1943, organized as: Company “A”, Fourth Service Battalion, attached to the 25th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Lejeune.
   4 May 1943, detached to the 4th Service Battalion.
   13 September 1943, to 4th Motor Transport Battalion, at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

   26 March 1943, organized as: Company “B”, (Transport), 4th Service Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF. Attached to 24th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

   22 July 1942, organized as: Company “C”, Third Service Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines (Reinforced), New River Training Center, FMF, New River.
   20 February 1943, redesignated: Company “C”, 4th Service Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines.
   3 May 1943, assigned to 4th Service Battalion.
   19 August 1943, to 4th Motor Transport Battalion, Service Troops, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

5. a. Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   8 July 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   19 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

b. Company “A”, 4th Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized as: Company “A”, 4th Medical Battalion, attached to the 25th Marines, (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   1 July 1943, attached to 4th Service Battalion, 4MarDiv, Camp Lejeune.
   19 August 1943, joined 4th Medical Battalion, 4th Division, at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

c. Company “B”, Fourth Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   26 April 1943, organized as: Company “B”, 4th Medical Battalion, attached to the 24th Marines, (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton.
   19 August 1943, joined 4th Medical Battalion, at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

d. Company “C”, 4th Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   22 July 1942, organized as: Company “C”, 3rd Medical Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines, (Reinforced), New River Training Center, FMF, New River.
   20 February 1943, redesignated: Company “C”, 4th Medical Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines at Camp Lejeune.
   1 July 1943, attached to 4th Service Battalion, at Camp Lejeune.
   8 July 1943, to 4th Medical Battalion, 4th Service Troops, Camp Lejeune.
   19 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

62B
APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

e. Company "D", 4th Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   8 July 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   15 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

f. Company "E", 4th Medical Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   19 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

6. a. Fourth Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF, Pac.
   19 August 1943, organized as: Fourth Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Division Service
   Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, detached to Corps Troops, First Amphibious Corps, in the field.
   15 April 1944, to Third Amphibious Corps.
   11 November 1944, present designation. Includes Headquarters and Service Company
   and Companies "A", "B", "C".

b. Headquarters and Service Company, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Provisional
   Amphibian Tractor Group, FMF, Pac.
   5 December 1943, organized as: Headquarters and Service Company, 10th Amphibian
   Tractor Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   5 March 1944, to V Amphibious Corps.
   11 April 1944, to Service Troops, 4MarDiv.
   11 April 1945, to present designation.

c. Company "A", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Provisional Amphibian Tractor
   Group, FMF, Pac.
   15 October 1943, organized as: Amphibian Tractor Company, 22nd Marines, Camp
   Pendleton.
   27 November 1943, in the field with Transient Center, V Amphibious Corps.
   12 December 1943, joined 22nd Marines, V Amphibious Corps.
   28 February 1944, redesignated: Company "C", 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
   V Amphibious Corps.
   22 August 1944, redesignated: Company "C", 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
   attached to the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF, Pac.
   26 October 1944, redesignated: Company "A", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
   4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   11 April 1945, present designation.

d. Company "B", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Provisional Amphibian Tractor
   Group, FMF, Pac.
   5 December 1943, organized as: Company "B", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
   Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   5 March 1944, to V Amphibious Corps.
   11 April 1944, to Service Troops, 4MarDiv.
   11 April 1945, to present designation.

e. Company "C", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, First Provisional Amphibian Tractor
   Group, FMF, Pac.
   5 December 1943, organized as: Company "C", 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
   Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   5 March 1944, to V Amphibious Corps.
   11 April 1944, to Service Troops, 4MarDiv.
   11 April 1945, to present designation.

7. a. First Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF, Pac. (Temporarily attached to 4MarDiv.)
   24 October 1943, organized as: First Joint Assault Signal Company, Amphibious
   Training Command, Pacific Fleet, Camp Pendleton.
   2 December 1943, joined the 4MarDiv.
   29 January 1944, in the field.
   1 March 1944, joined the Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, in field.
   8 March 1944, to V Amphibious Corps.
   21 August 1944, present designation.

b. Fourth Marine Amphibian Truck Company, FMF, Pac.
   21 October 1944, organized in the field and attached to Fourth Motor Transport
   Battalion, Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
APPENDIX "B" (Cont’d)

c. Company “A”, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, First Amphibian Tractor Group (Pro-
visional), FMF, Pac.

5 December 1943, organized as: Company “A”, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
Service Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
3 March 1944, to V Amphibious Corps.

d. First Armored Amphibian Battalion, FMF, Pac.

20 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton. Includes Headquarters and Service
17 November 1943, joined 4MarDiv.
5 February 1944, in the field.
18 February 1944, attached to Corps Troops, First Amphibious Corps.

8. a. Headquarters and Service Company, Fourth Tank Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

13 May 1943, organized as: Headquarters and Service Company, Fourth Tank Bat-
tallon, Camp Pendleton.
16 August 1943, to Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, Camp Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field.
1 September 1944, present designation.


8 June 1943, organized as: Company “A”, Fourth Tank Battalion, FMF, Camp
Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field.
1 September 1944, present designation.


26 March 1943, organized as: Company “B”, 4th Tank Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF.
Attached to the 24th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton.
12 May 1943, detached to: 4th Tank Battalion, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
4 February 1944, in the field.
1 September 1944, present designation.

d. Company “C”, Fourth Tank Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

22 July 1942, organized as: Company “C”, Third Tank Battalion, attached to the 23rd
Marines (Reinforced), New River Training Center, FMF, New River, North Carolina.
20 February 1943, designation changed to: Company “C”, 4th Tank Battalion,
attached to the 23rd Marines (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
20 July 1943, to 4th Tank Battalion, Camp Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field.
1 September 1944, present designation.

e. Company “D”, Fourth Tank Battalion, Division Special Troops, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

August 1943, organized as: Company “B”, First Corps Tank Battalion (Medium),
Corps Troops, First Marine Amphibious Corps, FMF, Pac.
27 February 1944, to 3rd Tank Battalion, Division Special Troops, Third Division.
12 May 1944, to Fourth Tank Battalion, 4MarDiv.
31 August 1944, disbanded.

f. Company “D” (Scout), 4th Tank Battalion.

History given under Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion. (See No. 1.d).

9. a. Headquarters and Service Battery, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

1 June 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
9 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field.

b. First Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

1 May 1943, organized as: First Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 25th Marines
(Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
1 June 1943, joined 14th Marines at Camp Lejeune.
9 August 1943, at Camp Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field.
Includes: Headquarters and Service Battery
   Battery “A”
   Battery “B”
   Battery “C”
APPENDIX “B” (Cont’d)

c. Second Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

26 March 1943, organized as: Second Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 24th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton.
19 August 1943, reverted to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.
Includes: Headquarters and Service Battery
Battery “D”
Battery “E” History shown separately below.
Battery “F”

26 March 1943, reverted to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.


3 December 1942, organized as: Pack Howitzer Battery, 1st Separate Battalion (Reinforced), Camp Lejeune.
9 March 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
26 March 1943, redesignated: Battery “D”, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines (Reinforced), Camp Pendleton; attached to the 24th Marines.
19 August 1943, to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.

26 March 1943, redesignated: Battery “E”, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 24th Marines.
19 August 1943, to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.

f. Battery “F”, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDIV, FMF, Pac.

1 February 1943, organized as: Battery “A”, 3rd Separate Battalion (Reinforced), Training Center, Camp Lejeune.
17 March 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
28 March 1943, redesignated: Battery “E”, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 24th Marines.
19 August 1943, to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.

28 March 1943, redesignated: Battery “E”, Second Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 24th Marines.
19 August 1943, to 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.

g. Third Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

22 July 1942, organized as: Third Battalion, 12th Marines, New River Training Center, FMF, New River, attached to the 23rd Marines, (Reinforced).
20 February 1943, redesignated: Third Battalion, 14th Marines, attached to the 23rd Marines.
1 June 1943, joined 14th Marines at Camp Lejeune.
9 August 1943, at Camp Pendleton.
5 February 1944, in the field, present designation.
Includes: Headquarters and Service Battery.
Battery “G”
Battery “H”
Battery “I”

2. Fourth Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

29 July 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
19 August 1943, joined 14th Marines.
5 February 1944, in the field.
Includes: Headquarters and Service Battery.
4 August 1944, Battery “K”
19 August 1944, Battery “L”
25 August 1944, Battery “M”

3. Fourth 155mm Howitzer Battalion, First Provisional Field Artillery Group, FMF, Pac.

1 March 1944, organized as: Fifth Battalion, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
16 April 1944, redesignated: Fourth 105mm Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps, temporarily attached to 14th Marines.
29 August 1944, detached to V Amphibious Corps.
23 November 1944, present designation.

4. Fourth Sound Ranging Unit, 14th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.

9 October 1944, organized.
1 November 1944, disbanded.
APPENDIX “B” (Cont’d)

   15 June 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   17 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, disbanded.

b. Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   History given under Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Engineer Battalion, 4MarDiv.

   (See No. 11.a).

c. Company “A”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   History given under Company “A”, 4th Engineer Battalion, 4MarDiv.
   (See No. 11.b).

d. Company “B”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   History given under Company “B”, 4th Engineer Battalion, 4MarDiv.
   (See No. 11.c).

e. Company “C”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   History given under Company “C”, 4th Engineer Battalion, 4MarDiv.
   (See No. 11.d).

   25 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, redesignated Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Pioneer Battalion, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   (See No. 12.a).

g. Company “D”, 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   (See No. 12.b).

h. Company “E”, 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized as: Company “A”, 20th Marines, attached to the 25th Marines, (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   25 August 1943, designation changed to: Company “B”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineers), 4MarDiv, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

i. Company “F”, 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   (See No. 12.c).

j. Third Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   Includes: Company “G”
      Company “H”
      Company “I”
   25 August 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   1 April 1944, redesignated: 121st Naval Construction Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.
   27 August 1944, detached.

   25 August 1943, organized as: Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer), 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   1 May 1943, organized as: Company “A”, 20th Marines, attached to the 25th Marines, (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   25 August 1943, designation changed to: Company “A”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineers), 4MarDiv, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   26 March 1943, organized as: Company “B”, 20th Marines (Engineer), attached to the 24th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   25 August 1943, designation changed to: Company “B”, 1st Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineers), 4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   22 July 1942, organized as: Company “C”, 3rd Engineer Battalion, attached to the 23rd Marines, (Reinforced), New River Training Center, New River.
   14 October 1942, redesignated: Company “C”, 19th Marines (Engineer), attached to the 23rd Marines, (Reinforced), New River.
   20 February 1943, redesignated: Company “C”, 20th Marines (Engineer), Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.
APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

   25 August 1943, organized as: Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines,
   4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   1 May 1943, organized as: Company "D", 20th Marines, attached to the 25th Marines
   (Reinforced), FMF, Camp Lejeune.
   15 June 1943, to 20th Marines, Camp Lejeune.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   25 August 1943, organized as: Company “B”, 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer),
   4MarDiv, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   30 February 1943, organized as: Company “F”, 20th Marines (Engineer), attached
   to the 22nd Marines (Reinforced), at Camp Lejeune.
   1 July 1943, attached to 20th Marines.
   16 August 1943, to Camp Pendleton, to 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   31 August 1944, present designation.

   20 July 1942, organized as part of the 3MarDiv at New River Training Center, New
   River, North Carolina.
   20 February 1943, attached to the 4MarDiv.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   8 February 1944, in the field.

b. Regimental Weapons Company, 23rd Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   20 July 1942, organized as part of the 3MarDiv at New River Training Center, New
   River.
   20 February 1943, attached to the 4MarDiv.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   8 February 1944, in the field.

c. First Battalion, 23rd Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   20 July 1942, organized as part of the 3MarDiv at New River Training Center, New
   River.
   20 February 1943, attached to the 4MarDiv.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   8 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   Company “A”
   Company “B”
   Company “C”
   Company “D” (3 March 1944, disbanded).

d. Second Battalion, 23rd Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   20 July 1942, organized as part of the 3MarDiv at New River Training Center, New
   River.
   20 February 1943, attached to the 4MarDiv.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   8 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   Company “E”
   Company “F”
   Company “G”
   Company “H” (3 March 1944, disbanded).

67B
APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

f. Third Battalion, 23rd Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   20 July 1942, organized as part of the 3MarDiv at New River Training Center, New
   River.
   20 February 1943, attached to the 4MarDiv.
   3 July 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   8 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   Company "A"
   Company "K"
   Company "L"
   Company "M" (3 March 1944, disbanded).

   26 March 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton (included 2nd Band Section).
   18 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

   14 July 1943, organized at Camp Pendleton.
   18 February 1944, in the field, present designation.

c. First Battalion, 24th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   19 October 1942, organized as: First Separate Battalion (Reinforced), Camp Lejeune.
   9 March 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   26 March 1943, redesignated: 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, FMF, Camp Pendleton.
   Special Troops and Service Troops disbanded.
   18 February 1944, in the field, present designation.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   Company "A"
   Company "B"
   Company "C"
   Company "D" (Disbanded 1 March 1944).

d. Second Battalion, 24th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   20 January 1943, organized as: Second Separate Battalion, Camp Lejeune.
   15 March 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   26 March 1943, redesignated: 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, Camp Pendleton.
   18 February 1944, in the field, present designation.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "B"—redesignated Company "F", 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines.
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "C"—redesignated Company "G", 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines.
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "D"—redesignated Company "H", 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines.
   (26 March 1943). Disbanded on 1 March 1944.

e. Third Battalion, 24th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 February 1943, organized as: Third Separate Battalion (Reinforced), Training
   Center, Camp Lejeune.
   17 March 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   26 March 1943, redesignated: 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, Camp Pendleton.
   18 February 1944, in the field, present designation.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
   Company "A"—redesignated Company "T", 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "B"—redesignated Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "C"—redesignated Company "L", 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines
   (26 March 1943).
   Company "D"—redesignated Company "M", 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines
   (26 March 1943). Disbanded on 1 March 1944.
APPENDIX "B" (Cont'd)

   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.

c. First Battalion, 25th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
            Company "A"
            Company "B"
            Company "C"
            Company "D" (10 March 1944, disbanded).

d. Second Battalion, 25th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
            Company "E"
            Company "F"
            Company "G"
            Company "H" (12 March 1944, disbanded).

e. Third Battalion, 25th Marines, 4MarDiv, FMF, Pac.
   1 May 1943, organized at Camp Lejeune.
   13 September 1943, to Camp Pendleton.
   5 February 1944, in the field.
   Includes: Headquarters Company
            Company "I"
            Company "J"
            Company "K"
            Company "M" (1 March 1944, disbanded).

III Composition (as of August 1945):

1. Headquarters Battalion, consisting of:
   a. Headquarters Company
   b. Fourth Signal Company
   c. Reconnaissance Company
   d. Military Police Company
   e. Fourth Assault Signal Company
   f. First Provisional Rocket Detachment
2. Fourth Service Battalion
3. Fourth Motor Transport Battalion
4. Fourth Medical Battalion
5. Fourth Tank Battalion
6. Fourth Pioneer Battalion
7. Fourth Engineer Battalion
8. Fourteenth Marines
9. Twenty-Third Marines
10. Twenty-Fourth Marines
11. Twenty-Fifth Marines

Source: Muster Rolls and Change Sheets.
APPENDIX "C" (1)

Task Organization
of the
Fourth Marine Division on Kwajalein

PHASE I: D-day landings by the Mellu (Ivan) Landing Group:

RCT 25 (Reinforced)—Brig. Gen. J. L. Underhill
Det Hq Co, Hq Bn, 4th Mar Div.
Det Sig Co, Hq Bn, 4th Mar Div.
25th Marines (plus Band Section)
14th Marines
1st Composite Engr Bn (plus Cam Det, H&S Co, 20th Mar).
Co "A", 4th Tk Bn (less 1st Platoon)
Btry "B", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
10th Amph Trac Bn.
1st Plat, Btry "A", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
Co "A", 11th Amph Trac Bn (plus Prov LVT(2) plat, 1st Armd Amph Bn).
Cos "B" and "D", 1st Armd Amph Bn.
Co "A", 4th MT Bn.
1st Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
1st Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCo.
Co "D", 4th Tk Bn (Scout).

PHASE II: Capture of Roi and Namur on D plus 1 and D plus 2:

(1) RCT 23—Col. L. R. Jones
23rd Marines (plus Band Section)
3d Composite Engr Bn (plus Cam Det, Com Plat, H&S Co, 20th Mar).
Co "C", 4th Tk Bn (Medium).
1st Plat, Co. "A", 4th Tk Bn.
Btry "C", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
3d Plat, Btry "A", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
4th Amph Trac Bn.
Cos "A" and "C", 1st Armd Amph Bn.
Co "C", 4th MT Bn.
3d Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
3d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Dets 1st JASCo.

(2) RCT 24—Col. F. A. Hart
24th Marines (plus Band Section).
2d Composite Engr Bn (plus Cam Det, H&S Co, 20th Mar).
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.
Btry "D", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
2d Plat, Btry "A", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
10th Amph Trac Bn.
Cos "B" and "D", 1st Armd Amph Bn.
2d Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
2d Plat, Serv and Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
2d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Dets 1st JASCo.

(3) DIVISION RESERVE—Col S. C. Cumming
25th Marines (plus Band Section)
1st Composite Engr Bn (plus Cam Det, H&S Co, 20th Mar).
Co "A", 4th Tk Bn (less 1st Platoon)
Co "D", 4th Tk Bn (Scout).
Btry "B", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
1st Plat, Btry "A", 4th Spl Wpns Bn.
Co "A", 11th Amph Trac Bn (plus Prov Plat, 1st Armd Amph Bn).
APPENDIX "C" (1) (Cont'd)

Co "A", 4th MT Bn.
1st Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
1st Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCo.

(4) DIVISION ARTILLERY—Col. L. G. DeHaven
14th Marines

(5) SUPPORT GROUP—Col. E. W. Skinner
Hq Bn, 4th Mar Div (less Dets).
20th Mar (less 1st, 2d & 3rd Bns, & less Com Plat & Cam Sec., H&S Co, 20th Mar).
4th Tk Bn (less Dets).
1st Armd Amph Bn (less Dets).
4th Med Bn (less Cos "A", "B", and "C").
4th Serv Bn (less Dets).
4th MT Bn (less Dets).
1st JASCo (less Dets).
4th Spl Wpns Bn (less Dets).

(6) GARRISON FORCE
15th Mar Defense Bn.

Note: a. All units less Rear Echelon.
b. The Mellu Landing Group for PHASE I was dissolved at 0700 on Dog Day plus one, and its units reverted as indicated in the Task Organization for PHASE II.
c. PHASES III, IV, and V (the capture of the smaller islets of the atoll) were executed by Combat Team 25, reinforced by elements of the 14th Marines and elements of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

Staff Organization at Kwajalein
Fourth Marine Division

Major General Harry Schmidt
Brigadier General James L. Underhill
Colonel William W. Rogers
Colonel Merton J. Batchelder
Major Gooderham L. McCormick
Colonel Walter W. Wensinger
Colonel William F. Brown

23d Marine Regiment

Colonel Louis R. Jones
Lieutenant Colonel John R. Lanigan
Captain Frank E. Phillips, Jr.  
Captain Charlie J. Talbert
Captain Richard W. Mirick
Major Edward W. Wells
Captain Henry S. Campbell

1st Battalion, 23d Marines

Lieutenant Colonel Hewin O. Hammond
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Haas
Major Hollis U. Mustain
1st Lieutenant Maurice Gross
1st Lieutenant Claude B. Duval
Captain James R. Miller
Captain Kenion E. Edwards, Jr.

2d Battalion, 23d Marines

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Dillon
Major Lawrence V. Patterson
Major Albert H. Polmar
1st Lieutenant Charlie J. Talbert
1st Lieutenant Charles J. Ahern
1st Lieutenant Marvin J. Raskin
Captain James W. Sperry
Captain Donald P. Libera

Battalion Commanders

Battalion Executive Officer

Bn-1
Bn-2
Bn-3
Bn-4

Battalion Commanders

Battalion Executive Officer

Bn-1
Bn-2
Bn-3
Bn-4

71C
APPENDIX "C" (1) (Cont’d)

3d Battalion, 23d Marines
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Cosgrove, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Haas
Major Paul S. Treitel
1st Lieutenant Robert B. Steele
1st Lieutenant Mortimer B. Doyle
2d Lieutenant Clarence J. Stines
Major Robert J. J. Picardi
Captain Harold Post

24th Marine Regiment
Colonel Franklin A. Hart
Lieutenant Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.
Captain Kenneth N. Hilton
Captain Arthur B. Hanson
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Roberts
Major Clyde T. Smith

1st Battalion, 24th Marines
Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. Dyess
Major Maynard C. Schultz
Major Robert N. Fricke
2d Lieutenant Herbert I. Hines
1st Lieutenant Robert S. Belinger
1st Lieutenant Gene G. Mundy
2d Lieutenant George P. Wheeland

2d Battalion, 24th Marines
Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Brink
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rothwell
1st Lieutenant James A. Granier
1st Lieutenant John J. Ward, Jr.
Captain Claude M. Cappelman
2d Lieutenant Kingsley G. Torgesen

3d Battalion, 24th Marines
Lieutenant Colonel Austin R. Brunelli
Major John V. Veeder
1st Lieutenant George M. Gallion
1st Lieutenant James B. Lamm
Captain Webb D. Sawyer
1st Lieutenant Oscar Harte, Jr.

25th Marine Regiment
Colonel Samuel C. Cumming
Lieutenant Colonel Walter I. Jordan
Captain Francis A. Norton
Captain Charles D. Gray
Lieutenant Colonel William F. Thyson, Jr.
Captain Edward Sherman

1st Battalion, 25th Marines
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. O’Donnell
Major Michael J. Davidowitch
1st Lieutenant Monroe R. Davis
Captain William C. Eisenhardt
Captain Fenton Mee, Jr.
1st Lieutenant John E. Masterson

2d Battalion, 25th Marines
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.
Major William P. Kaempfer
2d Lieutenant Johnston Robinson, Jr.
2d Lieutenant John S. Bellan
Captain Victor J. Barringer
1st Lieutenant William M. Masterson
### APPENDIX “C” (1) (Cont’d)

#### 3d Battalion, 25th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers**
- Major James Taul
- **2d Lieutenant Norman C. Smyth**
- **1st Lieutenant Samuel R. Pitetti**
- Major John H. Jones
- **1st Lieutenant John M. Fogarty**

#### 14th Marine Regiment
- Colonel Louis G. DeHaven
- **Lieutenant Colonel Randall M. Victory**
- 1st Lieutenant Cecil D. Snyder
- Captain Harrison L. Rogers
- Major Frederick J. Karch
- Major Richard J. Winsborough

#### 1st Battalion, 14th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Zimmer**
- Major Clifford B. Drake
- W.O. William H. Woerner, Jr.
- Captain John C. Stonestreet
- Major Thomas McE. Fry
- 1st Lieutenant David Applebaum
- 1st Lieutenant James R. Fury

#### 2d Battalion, 14th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel George B. Wilson, Jr.**
- Major William McReynolds
- W.O. Charles J. Rose
- W.O. Carl P. Haynes
- 1st Lieutenant Lawrence L. Graham
- 1st Lieutenant Charles F. McKeen
- Captain Ralph W. Boyer, Jr.
- 2d Lieutenant Thomas S. Burrowes

#### 3d Battalion, 14th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. MacFarlane**
- Major Harvey A. Feehan
- 1st Lieutenant David F. Lawless, Jr.
- Captain Theodore Y. Davis
- Major Donald M. Love, Jr.
- 1st Lieutenant Cecil E. Hinkel

#### 4th Battalion, 14th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Youngdale**
- Major John B. Edgar, Jr.
- W.O. Lawrence C. Handzlik
- Captain Benjamin W. Muntz
- 1st Lieutenant Paul C. Harper, Jr.
- Major Roland J. Spritzen
- Captain George J. Brookes, Jr.

#### 20th Marine Regiment
- **Colonel Lucian W. Burnham**
- **Lieutenant Colonel Nelson K. Brown**
- Captain Martin M. Calcaterra
- Captain Carl A. Sachs
- Major Melvin D. Henderson
- Captain Samuel G. Thompson
- **Major Richard G. Ruby**
- Captain George F. Williamson
- Captain Hapgood Kipp
- Captain Martin H. Glover
- Captain Donald C. Warner

#### 1st Battalion, 20th Marines
- **Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lessing**
- Major John H. Fartridge
APPENDIX “C” (1) (Cont’d)

1st Lieutenant Eben C. Mann, Jr.
1st Lieutenant James J. Curry
Captain George A. Smith
Captain Thomas D. Irvine

4th Special Weapons Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.
Major Alvin S. Sanders
2d Lieutenant Robert M. Krementz
Captain Ernest G. Atkin, Jr.
Major Edward H. Gartside
1st Lieutenant Harris M. Hardy

4th Tank Battalion

Major Richard K. Schmidt
Captain Francis L. Orgain
1st Lieutenant Eugene M. Hill
1st Lieutenant Richard F. Harding, Jr.
Captain Leo B. Case
Major Arthur “J” Berk

Company “D” (Scout)

Captain Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.
1st Lieutenant James R. Barbour

4th Motor Transport Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Schiesswohl
Captain Michael J. Danneker
Captain Michael J. Danneker
Major Vaughn H. Huse
1st Lieutenant Walter W. Alford
1st Lieutenant Robert P. Logue

1st Joint Assault Signal Company

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Bishop, Jr.
Captain Murray L. Thompson
W.O. William T. Farrar, Jr.

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

Major Louis Metzger
Captain Richard G. Warga
1st Lieutenant Robert V. Denney
1st Lieutenant Thomas M. Crosby
2nd Lieutenant Robert C. Hoffman

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Major Victor J. Crozat
Major Warren H. Edwards
1st Lieutenant Clifton T. Runtoon
1st Lieutenant Donald E. Kramer

Battalion Commander
Battalion Executive Officer
Bn-1
Bn-2
Bn-3
Bn-4

Battalion Commander
Battalion Executive Officer
Bn-1
Bn-2
Bn-3
Bn-4

Company Commander
Executive Officer

Battalion Commander
Battalion Executive Officer
Bn-1 & Bn-3
Bn-4

Company Commander
Company Executive Officer
Adjutant

Battalion Commander
Battalion Executive Officer
Bn-1
Bn-2
Bn-3
Bn-4
APPENDIX "C" (2)

Task Organization of the
Fourth Marine Division on Saipan

(1) RCT 23—Col. L. R. Jones, USMC
23d Mar.
3d Band Sec.
Cos "B" & "C", 4th Tk Bn.
Co "D", 4th Tk Bn (less 1st Plat).
Co "C", 20th Mar.
Co "C", 4th MT Bn.
121st N C Bn (plus Det Com Plat, H&S Co, 20th Mar).
3d Plat, 4th MP Co.
3d Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
3d Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
10th Amph Trac Bn (less Co "A" & plus Co "C", 11th Amph Trac Bn).
Co "B", 534th Amph Trac Bn (plus Dets Co "C").
708th Amph Tk Bn (less Cos "C" & "D").
Det 7th Field Depot.
311th Port Co.

(2) RCT 25—Col. M. J. Batchelder, USMC
25th Mar.
1st Band Sec.
Co "A", 4th Tk Bn.
1st Plat, Co "D", 4th Tk Bn.
Co "A", 20th Mar.
Co "A", 4th MT Bn.
2d Bn, 20th Mar.
1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
1st Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
1st Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
773d Amph Trac Bn
Co "C", 534th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets).
Cos "C" & "D", 708th Amph Tk Bn.
Det, 7th Field Depot
539th Port Co.

(3) RCT 24—Col. F. A. Hart, USMC
24th Mar.
2d Band Sec.
Co "B", 20th Mar.
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.
2d Plat, 4th MP Co.
2d Plat, Ord Co, 4th Serv Bn.
2d Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
APPENDIX "C" (2) (Cont'd)

(4) DIVISION ARTY—Col. L. O. DeHaven, USMC
14th Mar.
4th 105mm Arty Bn (How) (V Phib Corps)
2d Amph Trk Co.
1st Plat, Co "A", 534th Amph Trac Bn.

(5) DIV ENGRS—Lt. Col. N. K. Brown, USMC
20th Mar (less Cos "A", "B", "C" & less 2d Bn).
Hq, 7th Field Depot Det.

(6) SUPPORT GP—Col. O. H. Wheeler, USMC
Hq Bn (less Dets).
4th Tk Bn (less Cos "A", "B", "C" & "D").
4th MT Bn (less Cos "A", "B" & "C").
4th Med Bn (less Cos "A", "B" & "C").
4th Serv Bn (less Dets).
Div Rcn Co.
VMO-4
1st JASCO (less Dets).
1st Prov Rocket Det.
Det Air Warning Sq #5.
534th Amph Trac Bn (less Cos "A", "B" & "C").
APPENDIX “C” (3)

Task Organisation
of the
Fourth Marine Division on Tinian

(1) RCT 25—Col. M. J. Batchelder, USMC

25th Mar.
1st Band Sec.
Co “A”, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M. Tks, 1 Retriever) plus Det Co “D” (3 flame thrower tks).
Coll Sec, Co “A”, 4th Med Bn.
2d Bn, 20th Mar (SP).
1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCo.
708th Amph Tk Bn. (34 amph tks).
773d Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (92 LVT(2)’s and 44 LVT(4)’s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2½ ton trks).
1 Sec, Prov Rocket Det (4 1-ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

(2) RCT 24—Col. F. A. Hart, USMC

24th Mar.
2d Band Sec.
Co “B”, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M Tks, 1 Retriever) plus Det Co “D” (3 flame thrower tks).
1341st Engr Bn. (Army) (SP).
Det H&S, 20th Mar (CP).
2d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCo.
2d Armd Amph Bn (34 LVT(A)’s).
2d Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (96 LVT(2)’s and 40 LVT(4)’s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2½ ton trks).
1 Sec, Prov Rocket Det (4 1-ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

(3) RCT 23 (DIV RES)—Col. L. R. Jones, USMC

23d Mar.
3d Band Sec.
Co “C”, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M Tks) plus Det Co “D” (3 flame thrower tks).
Co “C”, 20th Mar.
Coll Sec, Co “C”, 4th Med Bn.
3d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCo.
10th Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (104 LVT(2)’s and 32 LVT(4)’s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2½ ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

77C
APPENDIX "C" (3) (Cont'd)

(4) DIV ARTY—Col. L. G. DeHaven, USMC

14th Mar. (less 3d and 4th Bns).
1st and 2d Bns, 10th Mar.
1st and 2d Amph Trk Co.
4th Bn (105mm) Corps Arty.

(5) DIV ENGRS—Lt. Col. N. K. Brown, USMC


(6) SUPPORT GP—Col. O. H. Wheeler, USMC

Hq Bn. (less Dets).
4th MT Bn. (less Dets).
4th Tk Bn. (less Cos "A", "B" and "C", and Dets Co "D").
4th Med Bn. (less Dets).
4th Serv Bn.
VMO-4.
1st JASCo (less Dets).
2d Tk Bn.
Prov LVT Gp, V Phib Corps (less Dets).
5th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).
715th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).
534th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).

NOTE: 2d Tank Bn was released to 2d Marine Division on Jig-plus-one. 1st and 2d Bn, 10th Mar were released to 2d Marine Division on Jig-plus-two.
APPENDIX "C" (4)

Task Organisation
of the
Fourth Marine Division on Iwo Jima

(1) RCT 23—Col. W. W. Wensinger

23d Mar.
3d Band Sec.
Co "C", 4th Tk Bn.
Co "C", 4th MT Bn.
133d Nav Const Bn (less Co "D"; plus Co "A", 4th Plon Bn).
3d Plat, 4th MP Co.
3d Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
10th Amph Trac Bn.
Co "B", 2d Armd Amph Bn.
3d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Plat.
Det 8th Fld Dep (SP).
3d Plat, 442d Port Co.
2d Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det.
Liaison & FO Parties, 2/14

(2) RCT 25—Col. J. R. Lanigan

25th Mar.
1st Band Sec.
Co "A", 4th Tk Bn.
Co "A", 4th MT Bn.
4th Plon Bn (less Co "A"; plus Co "D", 133d Nav Const Bn and Hq Det, 8th Fld Dep).
1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
1st Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
5th Amph Trac Bn.
Co "A", 2d Armd Amph Bn.
7th War Dog Plat (less 2d & 3d Secs).
Det 8th Fld Dep (SP).
30th Repl Draft (less Det) (SP).
1st Plat, 442d Port Co.
1st Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det.
Liaison & FO Parties, 1/14

(3) RCT 24 (DIV RES)—Col. W. L. Jordan

24th Mar.
2d Band Sec.
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.
2d Plat, 4th MP Co.
2nd Plat, Serv & Sup Co, 4th Serv Bn.
Det 1st JASCo.
2d Sec, 7th War Dog Plat.
Det 24 & 30th Repl Drafts.
442d Port Co (less 1st & 3rd Plat).
Liaison & FO Parties, 3/14
APPENDIX "C" (4) (Cont'd)

(4) DIV ARTY—Col. L. O. DeHaven
   14th Mar.
   4th Amph Trk Co.
   476th Amph Trk Co.
   VMO-4.

(5) SUPPORT GROUP—Lt. Col. M. L. Krulewitz

   HQ Bn (less Det).
   4th Tk Bn (less Cos "A", "B", "C"; plus Tk Main Plt, Ord Co, 4th Ser Bn).
   4th Engr Bn (less Cos "A", "B", & "C").
   4th Ser Bn (less Dets).
   Div Recon Co.
   1st JASCo (less Dets).
   1st Prov Rocket Det (less 1st & 2d Secs).
   Det 728th SAW Co.
   JICPOA Int Team.
   Det Sig Bn, VAC.
   Corps Liaison Grp.
APPENDIX "D"

Movements and Battles of the Division

3-12 July 1943: 23rd Marines moved by train from Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina to Camp J. H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California.

5-14 August 1943: 14th Marines 4th Service Battalion and 4th Medical Battalion

11-16 August 1943: Company "A" and Company "C" 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

13-20 August 1943: 20th Marines

13-21 August 1943: 25th Marines moved by sea through the Panama Canal from Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina to Camp J. H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California.

14-15 December 1943: Amphibious exercises off the California coast.

1-6 January 1944: Amphibious exercises at San Clemente Island.

13 January 1944: Main part of the Division embarked at San Diego for Marshalls Operation.

31 January-8 February 1944: Battle of Kwajalein (1-2 February: Roi-Namur).

8-18 February 1944: Main part of the Division reembarked and proceeded to Maui, T. H.

13 May 1944: Last of the Division left Kahului Harbor, Maui, T. H.

20 May 1944: Division completed maneuvers in Maalaea Bay area, Maui, T. H. and moved to Pearl Harbor.

29 May 1944: Division sailed from Pearl Harbor for Salpan.

8-11 June 1944: Division at Eniwetok enroute to Salpan.

15 June-9 July 1944: Battle of Salpan.

23 July 1944: Reembarkation at Salpan for Tinian.

24 July-1 August 1944: Battle of Tinian.

7-14 August 1944: Division embarked and left Marianas for Maui, T. H.

18 August-1 September 1944: Division arrived at Maui, T. H.

14-30 November 1944: Maneuvers in Maalaea Bay area.

3-17 January 1945: Maneuvers in Maalaea Bay area and landing on Maui and Kahoolawe.

18-27 January 1945: Division at Pearl Harbor.

27 January 1945: Division sailed for Saipan (via Eniwetok).

13 February 1945: Rehearsal off Tinian.

16 February 1945: Division left Tinian for Iwo Jima.

19 February-16 March 1945: Battle of Iwo Jima.

20 March 1945: Division left Iwo Jima for Maui.

Source: War Diary, Fourth Marine Division.

81D
APPENDIX "T"

Casualties of the Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Total Casualties</th>
<th>Percentage of Division</th>
<th>Days of Battle</th>
<th>Average per Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kwajalein</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td>6981</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinian</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>9090</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. There are numerous discrepancies between the casualty figures of different echelons (e.g. Corps and Division). In this table, the casualty totals are taken from the Division Reports.

2. Based on the strength of the whole Division (Reinforced). Naturally the percentage of loss was far higher in the rifle regiments (over 100% for some at Iwo Jima).

3. Taken as the period from D-day until the Island was secured, except in the case of Kwajalein, where there were only 3 days of real combat.

Sources: (A) Fourth Marine Division Operation Reports for casualties.  
(B) G-1 Reports of V Amphibious Corp for strength of Fourth Division (Reinforced).
APPENDIX "F"

Strength of the Division
(Officer, Warrant, and Enlisted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1943</td>
<td>7,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1943</td>
<td>7,527</td>
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<td>9 August 1943</td>
<td>6,220</td>
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<td>31 August 1943</td>
<td>12,687</td>
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<td>30 September 1943</td>
<td>10,831</td>
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<td>31 October 1943</td>
<td>18,144</td>
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<td>30 November 1943</td>
<td>18,758</td>
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<td>18,729</td>
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<td>30 June 1944</td>
<td>16,391</td>
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<td>31 July 1944</td>
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<td>31 August 1944</td>
<td>14,591</td>
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<td>30 September 1944</td>
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<td>19,451</td>
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<td>31 December 1944</td>
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<td>31 January 1945</td>
<td>19,709</td>
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<td>28 February 1945</td>
<td>19,672</td>
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<td>31 March 1945</td>
<td>16,412</td>
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<td>16,280</td>
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<td>31 May 1945</td>
<td>17,784</td>
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<td>30 June 1945</td>
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<td>31 July 1945</td>
<td>17,029</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 August 1945</td>
<td>17,838</td>
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(East Coast Echelon Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1943</td>
<td>16,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1943</td>
<td>17,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 November 1943</td>
<td>17,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1943</td>
<td>17,838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Division as a Whole)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1943</td>
<td>16,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1943</td>
<td>17,800</td>
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<td>31 November 1943</td>
<td>17,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1943</td>
<td>17,838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: These figures are for the Fourth Division alone. Any attached units that reinforced the Division are not included in these totals.

Sources: (1) Tri-monthly Reports of Headquarters Co., 4MarDiv.
(2) Strength Report of Headquarters, 4MarDiv.
APPENDIX “G”

Medals and Decorations

1. A. CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR: Marshalls Operation:

Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. DYESS

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of the First Battalion, Twenty-Fourth Marines, Reinforced, Fourth Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces during the assault on Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, February 1 and 2, 1944. Undaunted by severe fire from automatic weapons, Lieutenant Colonel Dyess launched a powerful final attack on the second day of the assault, unhesitatingly posting himself between the opposing lines to point out objectives and avenues of approach and personally leading the advancing troops. Alert, and determined to quicken the pace of the offensive against increased enemy fire, he was constantly at the head of advance units, inspiring his men to push forward until the Japanese had been driven back to a small center of resistance and victory assured. While standing on the parapet of an antitank trench directing a group of infantry in a flanking attack against the last enemy position, Lieutenant Colonel Dyess was killed by a burst of enemy machine gun fire. His daring and forceful leadership and his valiant fighting spirit in the face of terrific opposition were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

1st Lieutenant John V. POWER

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as platoon leader attached to the Fourth Marine Division during the landing and the battle of Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, February 1, 1944. Severely wounded in the stomach while setting a demolition charge on a Japanese pillbox, First Lieutenant Power was steadfast in his determination to remain in action. Protecting his wound with his left hand and firing with his right, he courageously advanced as another hostile position was taken under attack, fiercely charging the opening made by the explosion and emptying his carbine into the pillbox. While attempting to reload and continue the attack, First Lieutenant Power was shot again in the stomach and head and collapsed in the doorway. His exceptional valor, fortitude and indomitable fighting spirit in the face of withering enemy fire were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

Pfc. Richard B. ANDERSON

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the Fourth Marine Division during action against enemy Japanese forces on Roi Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, February 1, 1944. Entering a shell crater occupied by three other Marines, Private First Class Anderson was preparing to throw a grenade at an enemy position when it slipped from his hands and rolled toward the men at the bottom of the hole. With insufficient time to retrieve the armed weapon and throw it, Private First Class Anderson fearlessly chose to sacrifice himself and save his companions by hurling his body upon the grenade and taking the full impact of the explosion. His personal valor and exceptional spirit of loyalty in the face of almost certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

Pvt. Richard K. SORENSON

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with an assault battalion attached to the Fourth Marine Division during action against enemy Japanese forces during the battle of Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, on February 1-2, 1944. Putting up a brave defense against a particularly violent counterattack by the enemy during invasion operations, Private Sorenson and five other Marines occupying a shellhole were endangered by a Japanese grenade thrown into their midst. Unhesitatingly, and with complete disregard for his own safety, Private Sorenson hurled himself upon the deadly weapon, heroically taking the full impact of the explosion. As a result of his gallant action he was severely wounded but the lives of his comrades were saved. His great personal valor and exceptional spirit of self-sacrifice in the face of almost certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”
APPENDIX "G" (Cont'd)

1. B. CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR: Marianas Operation:

GySgt. Robert H. McCARD

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Sergeant of Company "A", 4th Tank Battalion, Fourth Marine Division, during the battle for enemy Japanese-held Salpan, Marianas Islands, on 15 June 1944. Cut off from the other units of his platoon when his tank was put out of action by a battery of enemy 77-mm. guns, Gunnery Sergeant McCard carried on resolutely, bringing all the tank's weapons to bear on the enemy, until the severity of hostile fire caused him to order his crew out the escape hatch while he courageously exposed himself to enemy guns by hurling hand grenades, in order to cover the evacuation of his men. Seriously wounded during this action and with his supply of grenades exhausted, Gunnery Sergeant McCard then dismantled one of the tank's machine guns and faced the Japanese for the second time to deliver vigorous fire into their positions, destroying sixteen of the enemy. His valiant fighting spirit and supreme loyalty in the face of almost certain death reflect the highest credit upon Gunnery Sergeant McCard and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

Pvt. Joseph W. OZBOURN

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Browning Automatic Rifleman serving with the First Battalion, Twenty-Third Marines, Fourth Marine Division, during the battle for enemy Japanese-held Tinian Island, Marianas Islands, 30 July 1944. As a member of a platoon assigned the mission of clearing the remaining Japanese troops from dugouts and pillboxes along a tree line, Private Ozbourn, flanked by two men on either side, was moving forward to throw an armed hand grenade into a dugout when a terrific blast from the entrance severely wounded the four men and himself. Unable to throw the grenade into the dugout and with no place to hurl it without endangering the other men, Private Ozbourn unhesitatingly grasped it close to his body and fell upon it, sacrificing his own life to absorb the full impact of the explosion but saving his comrades. His great personal valor and unwavering loyalty reflect the highest credit on Private Ozbourn and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

2. A. NAVY CROSS: Marshalls Operation:

Colonel Franklin A. Hart
Captain Frank E. Garretson
1st Lieutenant Benj. S. Preston, Jr.
1st Lieutenant William R. West
1stSgt. Augustus H. Winchester
Sgt. Theodore E. Gilliland
Sgt. Fred B. Penninger
Sgt. Frank A. Tucker
Corp. Arthur "B" Ervin
Corp. Alex Haluchak
Pfc. Frank W. Celentano
Pfc. Howard E. Smith
Pfc. Bronislaw A. Snieckus
Pfc. James R. Zarillo
Pvt. Chester Pauley, Jr.

2. B. NAVY CROSS: Marianas Operation:

Colonel Merton J. Batchelder
Colonel Louis R. Jones
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Cosgrove
Major Robert M. Neiman
Captain Thomas E. Clarke
Captain James G. Headley
Captain Fenton J. Mee
Captain Irving Schechter
1st Lieutenant Arnold C. Hofstetter
1st Lieutenant Thomas M. Horne
1st Lieutenant Robert E. Stevenson
APPENDIX “C” (Cont’d)

1st Lieutenant Frederick A. Stott
1st Lieutenant James A. Stranahan, Jr.
Sgt. Maj. Gilbert L. Morton
GySgt. Ralph R. Bowling
PlSgt. William O. Koontz
Sgt. Onel W. Dickins
Sgt. Wayne R. Fish
Sgt. Benjamin R. Liversey
Sgt. James T. Mitchell
Sgt. Stanley A. Strantz
Corp. Joseph Huszarik, Jr.
Pfc. Harold P. Forsythe
Pfc. Emmett F. Kirby
Pfc. Louis W. Trafton
Pfc. Ralph K. Wood
Pfc. James C. Yeaple
Pvt. Cecil R. Tolley

2. C. NAVY CROSS: Iwo Jima Operation:
Colonel John R. Lanigan
Colonel Walter W. Wensinger
Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers
Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Dillon
Major Edward L. Asbill
Captain Walter J. Ridlon, Jr.
Captain William A. Eddy, Jr.
Captain Stanley C. McDaniel
2nd Lieutenant William L. Shannon
GySgt. Samuel D. Johnston
GySgt. Addies S. McGlinn
Sgt. Camille J. Dolron
Sgt. Daniel J. Marin
Corp Joseph T. Sganga
Corp. Robert G. Sheipe
Corp. Wallace W. Johnson
Pfc. Clinton M. Adcock
Pfc. Darluis W. Latch
Pfc. Lionel A. Canejo
Pfc. Eugene J. Frederick, Jr.
Pfc. Orville V. Hahn
Pvt. Charles M. Sheehan

Gold Star in lieu of second award:
Major Fenton J. Mee
Captain James G. Headley

3. A. DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL: Marshalls Operation:
Major General Harry Schmidt

3. B. DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL: Marianas Operation:
Major General Clifton B. Cates

Gold Star in lieu of second award:
Major General Harry Schmidt

4. A. LEGION OF MERIT: Marshalls Operation:
Brigadier General James L. Underhill
Colonel William F. Brown
Colonel Samuel C. Cumming
Colonel Louis R. Jones
Colonel William W. Rogers
Colonel Walter W. Wensinger
Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Brink
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson K. Brown
Lieutenant Colonel Austin R. Brunelli
Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Granger
Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Zimmer
Captain Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.
APPENDIX "G" (Cont'd)

4. B. LEGION OF MERIT: Mariana Operation:
Brigadier General Franklin A. Hart
Colonel Merton J. Batchelder
Colonel Louis G. DeHaven
Colonel Matthew C. Horner
Colonel Walter I. Jordan
Colonel John R. Lanigan
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson K. Brown
Lieutenant Colonel Justice M. Chambers
Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Dillon
Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Duchein
Lieutenant Colonel Reed M. Fawell, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Granger
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. MacFarlane
Lieutenant Colonel Hollis U. Mustain
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas E. Reeve
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rothwell
Lieutenant Colonel Maynard F. Schults
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel Randall M. Victory
Lieutenant Colonel George B. Wilson
Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Youngdale
Major Clifford B. Drake
Major Frank E. Garretson
Major Frederick J. Karch
Major John H. Partridge
Major James Taul

Gold Star in lieu of second award:
Colonel William F. Brown
Colonel Walter W. Wensinger

4. C. LEGION OF MERIT: Iwo Jima Operation:
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. O'Donnell
Lieutenant Colonel William R. Wendt
Major James S. Scales
Major Doyle A. Stout

NOTE: Due to the limitation of space, only men winning the fourth highest awards are listed here. This compilation is undoubtedly incomplete (as of August, 1946).

Sources: (1) 4th Division Decoration Order 41-45.
(2) Headquarters Bulletins.
APPENDIX "H"

The feeling of the people of Maui about the Division was illustrated in the petition which they drew up February 13, 1945. It was signed by 1,191 people, and read as follows:

"To: Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,
U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,
In care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

In the event that it is going to be the policy of the Navy Department to use Camp Maui or other facilities on the Island of Maui, Territory of Hawaii, for rest, rehabilitation or training of Marine units, it is the request of the undersigned, residents of the Island, that the Fourth Marine Division, if and when necessary, to use these facilities, be assigned to the Island.

We would consider it a distinct honor to have this Division make Maui its war-time home or base for future operations. Our wholehearted, personal cooperation in their rehabilitation would be considered a duty, a privilege and a pleasure to each and every one of us and we are sure that by our efforts, we could assist the officers and men of the Division to continue to maintain the high degree of morale which they possess and which is such a necessary element for the proper continued prosecution of the war."

After the Division's victory at Iwo Jima, the Senate of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii adopted a special resolution on April 3, 1945, which read:

"RESOLUTION

BE IT RESOLVED by the Senate of the Twenty-Third Session of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii that the heartfelt welcome of the Senate be and it is hereby extended to the officers and men of the Fourth Division of the United States Marine Corps upon its return to its base after extraordinary gallantry in combat, and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that copies of this Resolution be sent to the Commanding Officer of said Fourth Division, to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy and to Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, U.S.N., Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas."

88H
APPENDIX "I"

Bibliography

1. Operation and Special Action Reports:
   A. Fourth Marine Division Operation Reports on:
      a. Kwajalein
      b. Saipan
      c. Tinian
      d. Iwo Jima
   B. V Amphibious Corps Operation Reports on:
      a. Kwajalein
      b. Iwo Jima
   C. Northern Troops and Landing Force Special Action Reports on:
      a. Saipan
      b. Tinian
   D. Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56) Special Action Reports on:
      a. Saipan
      b. Tinian
      c. Iwo Jima
   E. COMINCH Report, Invasion of Marianas.

2. War Diaries:
   a. 24th Marines
   b. Fourth Marine Division
   c. V Amphibious Corps

3. Strength Reports:

4. Miscellaneous:
   a. Headquarters Memorandums
   b. Change Sheets
   c. Muster Rolls
   d. Headquarters Bulletins
   e. Pacific Fleet communique No. 300, 17 March 1945.

5. Note: For additional copies of this report, contact the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps: Republic 7400, Extension 7460.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

consisting of: Division Headquarters; Division Special Troops; Division Service Troops; 23rd, 24th, 25th Marines; 20th Marines (Engineers); 1st JASCO; 534th and 773rd Amphibian Tractor Battalions (Army); 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Company "C" 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army); VMO-4; 2nd Amphibian Truck Company; 14th Marines (Artillery); 311th and 539th Port Companies (Army); Detachment 7th Field Depot; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, V Amphibious Corps; Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5; 4th 105mm (Howitzer) Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps; 14th Marines (Artillery), (less 3rd and 4th Battalions); Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Amphibious Corps; 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion; 2nd and 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalions; 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army); 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army); 1st Amphibian Truck Company; 2nd Tank Battalion; 1st and 2nd Battalions, 10th Marines (Artillery) and the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, for service as set forth in the following:

CITATION:

"For outstanding performance in combat during the seizure of the Japanese-held islands of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas from June 15 to August 1, 1944. Valiantly storming the mighty fortifications of Saipan on June 15, the Fourth Division, Reinforced, blasted the stubborn defenses of the enemy in an unceasing advance over the perilously rugged terrain. Unflinching despite heavy casualties, this gallant group pursued the Japanese relentlessly across the entire length of the island, pressing on against bitter opposition for twenty-five days to crush all resistance in their zone of action. With but a brief rest period in which to reorganize and re-equip, the Division hurled its full fighting power against the dangerously narrow beaches of Tinian on July 24 and rapidly expanded the beachheads for the continued landing of troops, supplies and artillery. Unchecked by either natural obstacles or hostile fire, these indomitable men spearheaded a merciless attack which swept Japanese forces before it and ravaged all opposition within eight days to add Tinian to our record of conquests in these strategically vital islands."

For the President,

[Signature]

Secretary of the Navy