Securing the Surrender: Marines in the Occupation of Japan

Marines in World War II Commemorative Series

By Charles R. Smith
ERRATUM

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SECURING THE SURRENDER
MARINES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (SFT)

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At noon on 15 August 1945, people gathered near radios and hastily setup loudspeakers in homes, offices, factories, and on city streets throughout Japan. Even though many felt that defeat was not far off, the vast majority expected to hear new exhortations to fight to the death or the official announcement of a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

The muted strains of the national anthem immediately followed the noon time-signal. Listeners then heard State Minister Hiroshi Shimomura announce that the next voice they would hear would be that of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. In a solemn voice, Emperor Hirohito read the first fateful words of the Imperial Rescript:

After pondering deeply the general trend of the world situation and the actual state of Our Empire, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present crisis by resort to an extraordinary measure. To Our good and loyal subjects, we hereby convey Our will. We have commanded Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the terms of their Joint Declaration.

Although the word “surrender” was not mentioned and few knew of the Joint Declaration of the Allied Powers calling for unconditional surrender of Japan, they quickly understood that the Emperor was announcing the termination of hostilities on terms laid down by the enemy. After more than three and a half years of fighting and sacrifice, Japan was accepting defeat.

On Guam, 1,363 nautical miles to the south, the men of the 6th Marine Division had turned in early the night before after a long day of combat training. At 2200, lights on the island suddenly came on. Radio reports had confirmed rumors circulating for days throughout the division’s camp on the high ground overlooking Pago Bay: the Japanese had surrendered and there would be an immediate ceasefire. As some Marines clad only in towels or skivvies danced in the streets and members of the 22d Marines band conducted an impromptu parade, most of the 4th Marine Regimental Combat Team was on board ship, ready to leave for “occupational and possible light combat duty in Japanese-held territory.” No less happy than their fellow Marines ashore, they remained cynical. The Japanese had used subterfuge before. Who could say they were not being deceptive now?

In May 1945, months before the fighting ended, preliminary plans for the occupation of Japan were prepared at the headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in Manila and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on Guam. Staff studies, based on the possibility of the sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command, were prepared and distributed at army and fleet level for planning purposes. In early summer, as fighting still raged on Okinawa and in the Philippines, dual-planning went forward for both the subjugation of Japan by force in Operations Olympic and Coronet, and its peaceful occupation in Operations Blacklist and Campus.

Many essential elements of MacArthur’s Olympic and Blacklist plans were similar. The Sixth Army, which was slated to make the attack on the southern island of Kyushu under Olympic, was given the contingent task of occupying southern Japan under Operation Blacklist. Likewise, the Eighth Army, using the wealth of information it had accumulated regarding the island of Honshu in planning for Coronet, was designated the occupying force for northern Japan. The Tenth Army, a component of the Honshu invasion force, was given the mission of occupying Korea. Admiral Nimitz’s plan envisioned the initial occupation of Tokyo Bay and other strategic areas by the Third Fleet and Marine forces, pending the arrival of formal occupation forces under General MacArthur’s command.

When the Japanese government made its momentous decision to surrender in the wake of atomic bombings and the Soviet Union’s

(Continued on page 3)
By May 1945, as bitter fighting continued on Okinawa and Americans celebrated Germany’s surrender, Pacific strategists had developed detailed plans for Operation Downfall, the two-phased invasion of the Japanese home islands to begin on 1 November. More than 5 million Allied troops would conduct the two largest planned amphibious assaults in history. As planned, all six Marine divisions and three Marine aircraft wings would play major combat roles.

Operation Olympic, the first phase of Operation Downfall, would involve the seizure of southern Kyushu by 14 divisions of the U.S. Sixth Army. Their objectives were to seize airfields, harbors, and staging areas for the subsequent buildup and launching of Operation Coronet, the amphibious assault by 23 divisions of the U.S. First and Eighth Armies on 1 March 1946 against the industrial and political heart of Japan, the Kanto Plain on Honshu. The Marine ground component for Olympic was V Amphibious Corps, composed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions, under the command of Major General Harry Schmidt. For Coronet it was III Amphibious Corps (1st, 4th, and 6th Marine Divisions) under Major General Keller E. Rockey.

On 1 November, three corps of three divisions each would conduct simultaneous amphibious assaults against three separate locations on southern Kyushu. General Schmidt’s V Amphibious Corps would seize a beachhead near Kushikino and then clear the Satsuma Peninsula, bordering the west side of Kagoshima Bay. The Army’s XI Corps would land at Ariake Bay and take the eastern peninsula. I Corps would land further up the island’s east coast. The three corps would move north and establish a defensive line, stretching from Sendai in the west to Tsuno in the east, effectively blocking Japanese reinforcements from moving south through the central mountains. If needed, a fourth corps and two additional divisions would reinforce the three assault corps.

The Japanese defensive plan for Kyushu encompassed three phases. First, thousands of suicide aircraft and boats would attack the American fleet, targeting troop transports in an effort to disrupt the landings. Second, newly organized defense divisions occupying heavy fortifications overlooking the beaches, would attempt to prevent the landing force from gaining a foothold. Finally, mobile divisions based inland would counterattack toward threatened positions. In August 1945, Japanese ground forces on Kyushu consisted of 14 divisions and several independent brigades, about 600,000 die-hard troops, most of whom were deployed near the invasion area.

Ideally, an attacking force should have at least a three-to-one superiority in numbers over the defenders. On Kyushu, American and Japanese ground forces would be of almost equal strength. In addition to regular military units, Allied forces would also face a large citizen militia, armed with whatever was at hand. The battle was expected to be bloody and costly. Lieutenant General Thomas A. Wornham, who commanded the
27th Marines and would have taken part in the assault, later noted that when he commanded the 3d Marine Division he would often commute between Japan and Okinawa and “we’d fly right over Kagoshima, and you could see the beaches where Operation Olympic was to be . . . . Every time I flew over I’d say: ‘Thank God that the Japanese decided to call the war off when they did, because I don’t think any of us would have made it.’ It was pretty wild country down there.”

With Kyushu-based fighters furnishing air support, Operation Coronet would be launched in March 1946. First Army would land two corps abreast at Katakai and Choshi on the Pacific Coast east of Tokyo. The XXIV Corps (three divisions) and General Rockey’s III Amphibious Corps would seize the peninsula flanking Tokyo Bay. The Eighth Army’s two corps would land at Sagami Bay and seize the vital Yokohama-Yokosuka port complex. In subsequent operations, the First Army would advance on Tokyo from the east while the Eighth Army would attack the capital from the southwest. Facing Allied troops would be nine divisions totalling some 300,000 men, with an additional 27 to 35 divisions available as reinforcement.

The dropping of the atomic bombs ended the war and the need for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. If the invasion had proceeded, it would have been costly. While there is no way to accurately predict casualties, there is no doubt that the Japanese would have suffered immense losses, both military and civilian, dwarfing those inflicted by the atomic bombs. And American casualties certainly would have been in the hundreds of thousands.

(Continued from page 1)

entry into the war, MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s staffs quickly shifted their focus from Operation Olympic to Blacklist and Campus, their respective plans for the occupation. In the process of coordinating the two plans, MacArthur’s staff notified Nimitz’s representatives that “any landing whatsoever by naval or marine elements prior to CINCPAC’s [MacArthur’s] personal landing is emphatically unacceptable to him.” MacArthur’s objections to an initial landing by naval and accompanying Marine forces was based upon his belief that they would be unable to cope with any Japanese military opposition and, more importantly, because “it would be psychologically offensive to ground and air forces of the Pacific Theater to be relegated from their proper missions at the hour of victory.”

Despite apparent disagreements, MacArthur’s plan for the occupation, Blacklist, was accepted. But with at least a two-week lag predicted between the surrender and a landing in force, both MacArthur and Nimitz agreed that the immediate occupation of Japan was paramount and should be given the highest priority. The only military unit available with sufficient power “to take Japan into custody at short notice and enforce the Allies’ will until occupation troops arrived” was Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet, then at sea 250 miles southeast of Tokyo, conducting carrier air strikes against Hokkaido and northern Honshu. On 8 August, advance copies of Halsey’s Operation Plan 10-45 for the occupation of Japan setting up Task Force 31 (TF 31), the Yokosuka Occupation Force, were distributed. The task force’s mission, based on Nimitz’s basic concept, was to clear the entrance to Tokyo Bay and anchorages, occupy and secure the Yokosuka Naval Base, and operate Yokosuka Airfield, support the release of Allied prisoners, demilitarize all enemy ships and defenses, and assist U.S. Army troops in preparing for the landing of additional forces.

Three days later, Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander, Battleship Division 7, was designated by Halsey to be commander, TF 31. The carriers, battleships, and cruisers of Vice Admiral John S. McCain’s Task Force 38 also were alerted to organize and equip naval and Marine landing forces. At the same time, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, directed the 6th Marine Division to furnish a regimental combat team to the Third Fleet for possible occupation duty. Major General Keller E. Rockey, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, on the recommendation of Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., nominated Brigadier General William T. Clement, the division’s assistant commander, to head the combined Fleet landing force.

The decision of which of the division’s three regiments would participate was an easy one for General Shepherd. “Without hesitation [he] selected the 4th Marines,” Brigadier General Louis Metzger, Clement’s former chief of staff, later wrote. “This was a symbolic gesture on his part, as the old 4th Marine Regiment had participated in the Philippine Campaign in 1942 and had been captured along with other U.S. forces in the Philippines. Now the new 4th Marines would be the main combat formation taking part in the initial landing and occupation of Japan.”

Preliminary plans for the activation of Task Force Able were prepared by III Amphibious Corps. The task force was to consist of a skeletal headquarters of 19 officers and 44 enlisted men, which was later augmented, and the 4th
Marines, Reinforced, with a strength of 5,156. An amphibian tractor company and a medical company were added bringing the total task force strength up to 5,400. Officers designated to form General Clement’s staff were alerted and immediately began planning to load out the task force. III Amphibious Corps issued warning orders to the division’s transport quartermaster section directing that the regimental combat team, with attached units, be ready to embark 48 hours prior to the expected time of the ships’ arrival. This required the complete re-outfitting of all elements of the task force which were undergoing rehabilitation following the Okinawa campaign.

Requirements for clothing, ordnance, and equipment and supplies had to be determined and arranged for from the 5th Field Service Depot. Initially, this proved to be difficult due to the

Brigadier General William T. Clement

Leading the 4th Marines ashore at Yokosuka on 30 August was a memorable event in Brigadier General William T. Clement’s life and career. Clement was 48 and had been a Marine Corps officer for 27 years at the time he was given command of the Fleet Landing Force that would make the first landing on the Japanese home islands following the nation’s unconditional surrender. He was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, and graduated from Virginia Military Institute. Less than a month after reporting for active duty in 1917, Clement sailed for Haiti where he joined the 2d Marine Regiment and its operations against rebel bandits.

Upon his return to the United States in 1919, he reported for duty at Marine Barracks, Quantico, where he remained until 1923, when he became post adjutant of the Marine Detachment at the American Legation in Peking, China. In 1926, he was assigned to the 4th Marine Regiment at San Diego as adjutant and in October of the same year was given command of a company of Marines on mail guard duty in Denver, Colorado, where he remained for three months until rejoining the 4th Marines. Clement sailed with the regiment for duty in China in 1927 and was successively a company commander and regimental operations and training officer. Following his return to the United States in 1929, he became the executive officer of the Marine Recruit Depot, San Diego, and then commanding officer of the Marine Detachment on board the West Virginia. Clement spent most of the 1930s at Quantico, first as a student, then as an instructor, and finally as a battalion commander with the 5th Marines.

The outbreak of World War II found Clement serving on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. Although quartered at Corregidor, he served as a liaison among the Commandant, 16th Naval District; the Commanding General, U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East; and particularly with the forces engaged on Bataan until ordered to leave on board the U.S. submarine Snapper for Australia in April 1942. For his handling of the diversified units engaged at Cavite Navy Yard and on Bataan, he was awarded the Navy Cross.

Following tours in Europe and at Quantico, Clement joined the 6th Marine Division in November 1944 as assistant division commander and took part in the Okinawa campaign. Less than two months after the Yokosuka landing, he rejoined the division in Northern China. When the division was redesignated the 3d Marine Brigade, Clement became commanding general and in June 1946 was named Commanding General, Marine Forces, Tsingtao Area.

Returning to the United States in September, he was appointed President, Naval Retiring Board, and then Director, Marine Corps Reserve. In September 1949, he assumed command of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, holding that post until his retirement in 1952. Lieutenant General Clement died in 1955.
secret nature of the operation and that all requisitions for support from supply agencies and the Island Command on Guam had to be processed through III Amphibious Corps. At 0900 on 12 August, the veil of secrecy surrounding the proposed operation was lifted so that task force units could deal directly with all necessary service and supply agencies. All elements of the task force and the 5th Field Service Depot then went on a 24-hour work day to complete the resupply task.

The regiment not only lacked supplies, but it also was understrength. Six hundred enlisted replacements were obtained from the FMFPac Transient Center, Marianas, to fill gaps in its ranks left by combat attrition and rotation to the United States.

Dump areas and dock space were allotted by the Island Command to accommodate the five transports, a cargo ship, and a dock landing ship of Transport Division 60 assigned to carry Task Force Able. The mounting-out process was considerably aided by the announcement that all ships would arrive in port on 14 August, 24 hours later than originally scheduled. On the evening of the 13th, however, “all loading plans for supplies were thrown into chaos” by information that the large transport, *Harris* (APA 2), had been deleted from the group of ships assigned and that the *Grimes* (APA 172), a smaller transport with 50 percent less capacity, would be substituted. The resultant reduction of shipping space was partially made up by the assignment of a landing ship, tank (LST) to the transport group. III Amphibious Corps informed the task force that no additional ship would be allocated.

Later, after the task force departed Guam, a second LST was allotted to lift a portion of the remaining supplies and equipment, including the amphibian tractors of Company A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

On the afternoon of 14 August, loading began and continued throughout the night. The troops boarded between 1000 and 1200 the following day, and by 1600 all transports were loaded. By 1900 that evening, the transport division was ready to sail for its rendezvous at sea with the Third Fleet. Within approximately 96 hours, the regimental combat team, it was reported, “had been completely re-outfitted, all equipment deficiencies corrected, all elements provided with an initial allowance to bring them up to T/O and T/A levels, and a thirty day re-supply procured for shipment.”

Two days prior to the departure of the main body of Task Force Able, General Clement and the nucleus of his headquarters staff left Guam on the landing ship, vehicle *Ozark* (LSV 2), accompanied by the *Shadwell* (LSV 15) and two destroyers, to join the Third Fleet. As no definite mission had been assigned to the force, little preliminary planning had taken place so time enroute was spent studying intelligence summaries of the Tokyo area. Few maps were available and those that were proved to be inadequate. The trip to the rendezvous point was uneventful except for a reported torpedo wake across the *Ozark*’s bow. Several depth charges were dropped by the destroyer escorts with unknown results.

Halsey’s ships were sighted on 18 August, and next morning, Clement and key members of his staff transferred to the battleship *Missouri* (BB 63) for the first of several rounds of conferences on the upcoming operation. At the conference, Task Force 31 was tentatively established and Clement learned, for the first time, that the Third Fleet Landing Force would play an active part in the occupation of Japan by landing on Miura Peninsula, 30 miles southwest of Tokyo. The primary task assigned by Admiral Halsey to Clement’s forces was seizure and occupation of Yokosuka airfield and naval base in preparation for initial
landings by air of the 11th Airborne Division. Located south of Yokohama, 22 miles from Tokyo, the sprawling base contained two airfields, a seaplane base, aeronautical research center, optical laboratory, gun factory and ordnance depot, torpedo factory, munitions and aircraft storage, tank farms, supply depot, shipyard, and training schools and hospitals. During the war approximately 70,000 civilians and 50,000 naval ratings worked or trained at the base.

Collateral missions included the demilitarization of the entire Miura Peninsula, which formed the western arm of the headlands enclosing Tokyo Bay, and the seizure of the Zushi area, including Hayama Imperial Palace, General MacArthur’s tentative headquarters, on the southwest coast of the peninsula. Two alternative schemes of maneuver were proposed to accomplish these missions. The first contemplated a landing by assault troops on the beaches near Zushi, followed by a five-mile drive east across the peninsula in two columns over the two good roads to secure the naval base for the landing of supplies and reinforcements. The second plan involved simultaneous landings from within Tokyo Bay on the beaches and docks of Yokosuka naval base and air station, to be followed by the occupation of the Zushi area, thus sealing off and then demilitarizing the entire peninsula. The Zushi landing plan was preferred since it did not involve bringing ships into the restricted waters south of Tokyo Bay until assault troops had dealt with “the possibility of Japanese treachery.” Following the conference, Admiral Halsey recommended to Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army, whom MacArthur had appointed to command forces ashore in the occupation of northern Japan, that the Zushi plan be adopted.

At 1400 on 19 August, Task Force 31 was officially organized and Admiral Badger formed the ships assigned to the force into a separate tactical group, the transports and large amphibious ships in column, with circular screens composed of destroyers and high speed transports. In addition, three subordinate task units were formed: Third Fleet Marine Landing Force; Third Fleet Naval Landing Force; and a landing force of sailors and Royal Marines from Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawling’s British Carrier Task Force. To facilitate organization and establish control over the three provisional commands, the transfer of American and British sailors and Marines and their equipment to designated transports by means of breeches buoys and cargo slings began immediately. Carriers, battleships, and cruisers were brought along both sides of a transport to expedite the operation. In addition to the landing battalions of sailors and Marines, fleet units formed base maintenance companies, a naval air activities organization to operate Yokosuka airfield, and nucleus crews to seize and secure Japanese vessels. In less than three days, the task of transferring at sea some 3,500 men and hundreds of tons of weapons, equipment, and ammunition was accomplished without accident. As soon as they reported on board their transports, the newly organized units began an intensive program of training for ground combat operations and occupation duties.

On 20 August, the ships carrying the 4th Marine Regimental Combat Team joined the burgeoning task force and General Clement and his staff transferred from the Ozark to the Grimes. Clement’s command now included the 5,400 men of the reinforced 4th Marines; a three-battalion regiment of approximately 2,000
Marines from the ships of Task Force 38; 1,000 sailors from Task Force 38 organized into two landing battalions; a battalion of nucleus crews for captured shipping; and a British battalion of 200 seamen and 250 Royal Marines. To act as a floating reserve, five additional battalions of partially equipped sailors were organized from within Admiral McCain’s carrier battle group.

The next day, General Eichelberger, who had been informed of the alternative plans formulated by Admirals Halsey and Badger, directed that the landing be made at the naval base rather than in the Zushi area. Although there was mounting evidence that the enemy would cooperate fully with the occupying forces, the Zushi area, Eichelberger pointed out, had been selected by MacArthur as his headquarters area and was therefore restricted. His primary reason, however, for selecting Yokosuka rather than Zushi as the landing site involved the overland movement of the landing force. "This overland movement [from Zushi to Yokosuka]," Brigadier General Metzger later noted, "would have exposed the landing force to possible enemy attack while its movement was restricted over narrow roads and through a series of tunnels which were easily susceptible to sabotage. Further, it would have delayed the early seizure of the major Japanese naval base."

Eichelberger’s dispatch also included information that the 11th Airborne Division would make its initial landing at Atsugi airfield, a few miles northwest of the northern end of the Miura Peninsula, instead of at Yokosuka. The original plans, which were prepared on the assumption that General Clement’s men would seize Yokosuka airfield for the airborne operation, had to be changed to provide for a simultaneous Army-Navy landing. A tentative area of responsibility, including the cities of Uraga, Kubiri, Yokosuka, and Funakoshi, was assigned to Clement’s force. The remainder of the peninsula was assigned to Major General Joseph M. Swing’s 11th Airborne Division. While Eichelberger’s directive affected the employment of the Fleet Landing Force it did not place the force under Eighth Army control.

To insure the safety of allied warships entering Tokyo Bay, Clement’s operation plan detailed the British Landing Force to occupy and demilitarize three small island forts in the Uraga Strait at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. To erase the threat of shore batteries and coastal forts, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, supported by an underwater demolition team and a team of 10 Navy gunner’s mates to demilitarize the heavy coastal defense guns, was given the mission of landing on Futtsu Saki, a long, narrow peninsula which jutted from the eastern shore into Uraga Strait at the mouth of Tokyo Bay. After completing its mission,
the battalion was to reembark in its landing craft to take part in the main landing as the regiment’s reserve battalion. Nucleus crews from the Fleet Naval Landing Force were to enter Yokosuka’s inner harbor prior to H-Hour and take possession of the damaged battleship Nagato, whose guns commanded the landing beaches.

The 4th Marines, with the 1st and 3d Battalions in assault, was scheduled to make the initial landing at Yokosuka on L-Day. The battalions of the Fleet Marine and Naval Landing Forces were to land in reserve and take control of specific areas of the naval base and airfield, while the 4th Marines pushed inland to link up with elements of the 11th Airborne Division landing at Atsugi airfield.

The cruiser San Diego (CL 53), Admiral Badger’s flagship; 4 destroyers; and 12 assault craft were to be prepared to furnish naval gunfire support on call. Four observation planes were assigned to observe the landing, and although there were to be no combat planes in direct support, more than 1,000 carrier-based planes would be armed and available if needed. Though it was hoped that the Yokosuka landing would be uneventful, Task Force 31 was prepared to deal with either organized resistance or individual fanaticism on the part of the Japanese.

L-Day was originally scheduled for 26 August, but on the 20th, storm warnings indicating that a typhoon was developing 300 miles to the southeast forced Admiral Halsey to postpone the landing date to the 28th. Ships were to enter Sagami Wan, the vast outer bay which led to Tokyo Bay, on L minus 2 day. To avoid the typhoon, all task forces were ordered to proceed southwest toward a “temporary point” off Sofu-gan, where they were replenished and refueled. On 25 August, word was received from General MacArthur that the typhoon danger would delay Army air operations for 48 hours, and L-Day was consequently set for 30 August.

At 0900 on 28 August, the first American task force, consisting of the combat elements of Task Force 31, entered Tokyo Bay and dropped anchor off Yokosuka at 1300. During the movement, Naval Task Forces 35 and 37 stood by to provide fire support if needed. Carrier planes of Task Force 38 conducted an air demonstration in

Marines of the Fleet Landing Force on board the Ozark receive a final brief from LtCol Fred D. Beans, the 4th Marines’ commanding officer, prior to landing at Yokosuka.

National Archives Photo 127-N-133054
such force “as to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy.” In addition, combat air patrols, direct support aircraft, and planes patrolling outlying airfields flew low over populated areas to reinforce the allied presence.

Shortly after anchoring, Vice Admiral Michitore Totsuka, Commandant of the First Naval District and Yokosuka Naval Base, and his staff reported to Admiral Badger in the San Diego for further instructions regarding the surrender of his command. They were informed that the naval base area was to be cleared of all personnel except for skeletal maintenance and guard crews; guns of the forts, ships, and coastal batteries commanding the bay were to be rendered inoperative; the breechblocks were to be removed from all antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns and their positions marked with white flags visible four miles to seaward; and, Japanese guides and interpreters were to be on the beach to meet the landing force. Additionally, guards were to be stationed at each warehouse and building with a complete inventory on its contents and appropriate keys.

As the naval commanders made arrangements for the Yokosuka landing, a reconnaissance party of Army Air Force technicians with emergency communications and airfield engineer equipment landed at Atsugi airfield to prepare the way for the airborne operation on L-Day. Radio contact was established with Okinawa where the 11th Division was waiting to execute its part in Blacklist. The attitude of the Japanese officials, both at Yokosuka and Atsugi, was uniformly one of outward subservience and docility. But years of bitter experiences caused many allied commanders and troops to view the emerging picture of the Japanese as meek and harmless with a jaundiced eye. As Admiral Carney noted at the time: “It must be remembered that these are the same Japanese whose treachery, cruelty, and subtlety brought about this war; we must be continually vigilant for overt treachery. . . . They are always dangerous.”

During the Third Fleet’s first night at anchor, there was a fresh reminder of Japanese brutality. Two British prisoners of war hailed one of the fleet’s picket boats in Sagami Wan and were taken on board the San Juan (CL 54), command ship of the specially constituted Allied Prisoner of War Rescue Group. Their description of life in the prison camps and of the extremely poor physical condition of many of the prisoners, later confirmed by an International Red Cross representative, prompted Halsey to order the rescue group into Tokyo Bay and to stand by for action on short notice. At 1420 on the 29th, Admiral Nimitz arrived by seaplane from Guam and authorized Halsey to begin rescue operations immediately, although MacArthur had directed the Navy not begin recovery operations until the Army was ready. Special teams, guided by carrier planes overhead, quickly began the task of bringing in allied prisoners from the Omori and Ofuna camps and the Shanagama hospital. By 1910 that evening, the first prisoners of war arrived on board the hospital ship Benevolence (AH 13),
and at midnight 739 men had been brought out. After evacuating camps in the Tokyo area, the San Juan moved south to the Nagoya-Hamamatsu area and then north to the Sendai-Kamaishi area. During the next 14 days, more than 19,000 allied prisoners were liberated.

Also that evening, for the first time since Pearl Harbor, the ships of the Third Fleet were illuminated. As General Metzger later remembered: “Word was passed to illuminate ship, but owing to the long wartime habit of always darkening ship at night, no ship would take the initiative in turning their lights on. Finally, after the order had been repeated a couple of times lights went on. It was a wonderful picture with all the ships flying large battle flags both at the foretruck and the stern. In the background was snowcapped Mount Fuji.” Movies were shown on the weather decks. While the apprehension of some lessened, lookouts were still posted, radars continued to search, and the ships remained on alert.

Long before dawn on L-Day, three groups of Task Force 31 transports, with escorts, moved from Sagami Wan into Tokyo Bay.

The first group of transports carried the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; the second the bulk of the landing force, consisting of the rest of the 4th Marines and the Fleet Marine and Naval Landing Forces; and the third, the British Landing Force. All plans of the Yokosuka Occupation Force had been based on an H-Hour for the main landing of 1000, but last-minute word was received from General MacArthur on the 29th that the first transport planes carrying the 11th Airborne Division would be landing at Atsugi airfield at 0600. To preserve the value and impact of simultaneous Army-Navy operations, Task Force 31’s plans were changed to allow for the earlier landing time.

As their landing craft approached the beaches of Futtusaki, the Marines of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines spotted a sign left on shore by their support team: “US NAVY UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS WELCOME MARINES TO JAPAN.” At 0558, the ramps dropped and Company G, under First Lieutenant George B. Lamberson, moved ashore. While Lamberson’s company and another seized the main fort and armory, a third landed on the tip of the peninsula and occupied the second fort. The Japanese, they found, had followed their instructions to the letter. The German-made coastal and antiaircraft guns had been rendered useless and only a 22-man garrison remained to oversee the peaceful turnover. As the Japanese soldiers marched away, the Marines, as Staff Sergeant Edward Meagher later reported, “began smashing up the rifles, machine guns, bayonets and antiaircraft guns. They made a fearful noise doing it. Quite obviously, they hadn’t enjoyed doing anything so much in a long, long time.” By 0845, after raising the American flag over both forts, the battalion, its mission accomplished, reembarked for the Yokosuka landing, scheduled for 0930. With the taking of the Futtusaki forts and the landing of the first transports at Atsugi, the occupation of Japan was underway.

With first light came dramatic evidence that the Japanese would comply with the surrender terms. Lookouts on board Task Force 31 ships could see white flags flying over abandoned and inoperative gun positions. A 98-man nucleus crew from the battleship South Dakota (BB 57) boarded the battleship Nagato at 0805 and received the surrender from a skeleton force of officers and technicians; the firing locks of the ship’s main battery had been removed and all secondary and antiaircraft guns relocated to the Navy Yard. “At no time was any antagonism, resentment, arrogance or passive resistance encountered; both officers (including the captain) and men displaying a very meek and subservient attitude,” noted Navy Captain Thomas J. Flynn in his official report. “It seemed almost incredible that these bowing, scraping, and scared men were the same brutal, sadistic enemies who had tortured our prisoners,
reports of whose plight were being received the same day."

The morning was warm and bright. There was hardly a ripple on the water as the 4th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, scrambled into landing craft. Once on board, they adjusted their heavy packs and joked and laughed as the coxswains powered the craft toward the rendezvous point a few miles off shore. Officers and senior enlisted men reminded their marines of orders given days before: weapons would be locked and not used unless fired upon; insulting epithets in connection with the Japanese as a race or individuals would not be condoned; and all personnel were to present a smart military bearing and proper deportment. "When you hit the beach, Navy cameramen who will land earlier will be there," Lieutenant Colonel George B. Bell said to the men of the 1st Battalion. "They will be taking pictures. Pictures of you men landing. I don't want any of you mugging the lenses. Simply get ashore as quickly as possible and do your job."

As the Marines of 1st Battalion and 3d Battalion gave their gear a last minute check, the coxswain in the lead craft signaled with both hands aloft and the boats, now abreast, moved toward the shore exactly on schedule. Out of habit, the Marines crouched low in the boat. "No one knew what would happen on the beach. You couldn't be absolutely certain. You were dealing with the Nip." Accompanying the Marines were "enough correspondents, photographers and radio men," one Marine observed, "to make up a full infantry company."

At 0930, Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Bell's 1st Battalion landed on Red Beach southeast of Yokosuka airfield and those of the 3d Battalion, led by Major Wilson B. Hunt, on Green Beach in the heart of the Navy Yard. There was no resistance. The few unarmed Japanese present wore white arm-bands, as instructed, to signify that they were essential maintenance troops, officials, or interpreters. Hot-heads and others considered unable to abide by the Emperor's decree had been removed. Oriented by the few remaining personnel, the two Marine battalions rapidly moved forward, fanning out around hangers and buildings. Leaving guards at warehouses and other primary installations, the Marines moved across the airfield and through the Navy Yard, checking all buildings and each gun position to insure that the breechblock had been removed and "driving all non-essential Japanese before them." With the seizure of Yokosuka, the three island forts in Surago Channel, and the landing on Azuma Peninsula by British forces, the initial phase of the occupation was completed.

General Clement and his staff landed at 1000 on Green Beach where they were met by Japanese Navy Captain Kiyoshi Masuda and his staff who formally surrendered the naval base. "They were informed that non-cooperation or opposition of any kind would be severely dealt with." Clement then proceeded to the Japanese headquarters building where an American flag was raised with appropriate ceremony at 1015. The flag used was the same raised by the First Provisional Brigade on Guam's Orote Peninsula and by the 6th Marine Division on Okinawa.

Vice Admiral Michitore Totsuka had been ordered to be present on the docks of the naval base to surrender the First Naval District to Admiral Carney, acting for Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Badger. At 1030, the San Diego, with Carney and Badger on board, tied up at the dock at Yokosuka. With appropriate ceremony, the
formal surrender took place at 1045, after which Badger, accompanied by Clement, departed for the former naval base headquarters building, the designated site for Task Force 31 and Fleet Landing Force headquarters.

At noon, with operations proceeding satisfactorily at Yokosuka and in the occupation zone of the 11th Airborne Division, General Eichelberger assumed operational control of the Fleet Landing Force from Halsey. Both of the top American commanders in the Allied drive across the Pacific set foot on Japanese soil on L-Day. General MacArthur landed at Atsugi airfield and subsequently set up temporary headquarters in Yokohama’s Grand Hotel, one of the few buildings in the city to escape serious damage. Admiral Nimitz, accompanied by Halsey, came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330 to make an inspection of the naval base.

Reserves and reinforcements landed at Yokosuka during the morning and early afternoon according to schedule. The Fleet Naval Landing Force took over the Navy Yard area secured by 3d Battalion, and the Fleet Marine Landing Force occupied the airfield installations seized by 1st Battalion. The British Landing Force, after evacuating all Japanese personnel from the island forts, landed at the navigation school in the naval base and took over the area between the sectors occupied by the Fleet Naval and Marine Landing Forces. Azuma Peninsula, a large hill mass extensively tunneled as a small boat supply base, which was part of the British occupation area, was investigated by a force of Royal Marines and found abandoned.

Relieved by the other elements of the landing force, the 4th Marines moved out to the Initial Occupation Line and set up a perimeter defense for the naval base and airfield. There they met groups of uniformed police brought down from Tokyo ostensibly to separate the occupational forces from the local Japanese population. Later, patrol contact was made with the 11th Airborne Division, which had landed 4,200 men during the day.

The first night ashore was quiet. Guards were posted at major installations while small roving
Among the few Marines present at the surrender ceremony on board the Missouri, other than the ship's Marine detachment, were LtGen Roy S. Geiger, his aide Maj John Q. Owsley, BGen Joseph H. Fellows, BGen William T. Clement, and 1stLt William F. Harris, the son of BGen Field Harris. Captured on Corregidor, 1stLt Harris was one of four Americans rescued from Japanese prison camps and brought on board the Missouri to witness the surrender. The other three, all naval personnel, were Cdr Arthur L. Mosher, of the Houston, Lt James W. Condit, of the Yorktown, and MM2cL. C. Shaw of the Grenadier.

Patrols covered the larger areas on which no guards were posted. A beer ration was issued to those not on duty. “We got a couple of trucks and went up to Yokohama,” Lieutenant Colonel Beans noted later, “and brought two truckloads of beer back at night, which we paid for in cash. We had no trouble whatever... because the entire Navy Yard had been cleared.” The 4th Marines had carried out General MacArthur’s orders to disarm and demobilize with amazing speed. There was no evidence that the Japanese would do anything but cooperate. It was clear, for the moment, that the occupation would succeed.

On 31 August, Clement’s forces continued to consolidate their hold on the naval base and the surrounding defense area. On orders from General Eichelberger, Company L, 3d Battalion, sailed in two destroyer transports to Tateyama Naval Air Station on the northeastern shore of Sagami Wan to accept its surrender and to reconnoiter the beach approaches and cover the 3 September landing of the Army’s 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team. With the complete cooperation of the
Col John C. Munn brought MAG-31 into Yokosuka to support the occupation of northern Japan. The group had participated in the Marshall Island and Okinawa Campaigns before moving into Japan.

Japanese Army, Navy, and Foreign Office, the company quickly reconnoitered the beaches and then set up its headquarters at the air station. Likewise, elements of 1st Battalion, 15th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Walter S. Osipoff, moved south to accept the surrender and demilitarize Japanese garrisons in the Uraga-Kurihama area. Less than 500 yards from where Commodore Matthew Perry and his Marine detachment landed 92 years earlier, Osipoff, in a simple ceremony, took control of the Kurihama Naval Base. Japanese officials turned over complete inventories of all equipment and detailed maps of defensive installations, including guns so carefully camouflaged that it would have taken Marine patrols weeks to find them. Here, as at Tateyama, the Japanese carried out the surrender instructions without resistance. As Lieutenant Colonel Osipoff noted:

When the Japanese captain presented his sword to me, it was evident that he and his officers were taking the surrender inwardly quite hard. Here was a man passing over to a foreign power everything that he stood for. Yet he looked me straight in the eye. He wasn’t haughty. He didn’t turn away. But he was obviously deeply moved. I felt sure he must be thinking that his surrender was something that went along with the military profession. You fight and lose and you must face the consequences.

Occupation operations continued to run smoothly as preparations were made to accept the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire on board the Missouri, where leading Allied commanders had gathered from every corner of the Pacific. At 0930 on 2 September, under the flag that Commodore Perry had flown in Tokyo Bay, the Japanese representative of the Emperor, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, and of the Imperial General Staff, General Yoshijiro Umezu, signed the surrender documents. General MacArthur then signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Admiral Nimitz for the United States. They were followed in turn by other senior allied representatives. The war that began at Pearl Harbor now officially was ended and the occupation begun. When later asked how many troops would be needed to occupy Japan, MacArthur said that 200,000 would be adequate. Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, FMFPac, agreed. “Sure,” he said, “that’ll be enough. There’s no fight left in the Japs.” Then he added: “Why, a squad of Marines could handle the whole affair.”

As the surrender ceremony took place on the main deck of the Missouri, advance elements of the Eighth Army’s occupation force entered Tokyo Bay. Ships carrying the Headquarters of the XI Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division docked at Yokohama. Transports with the 112th Cavalry on board moved to Tateyama, and on 3 September the troopers landed.
and relieved Company L, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, which then returned to Yokosuka.

With the occupation proceeding smoothly, plans were made to dissolve the Fleet Landing Force and Task Force 31. The 4th Marines was selected to assumed responsibility for the entire naval base area and airfield. The first unit to return to the fleet was the British Landing Force, which was relieved by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, of the area between the Navy Yard and the airfield on 4 September. The Fleet Marine Landing Force was then relieved of its control in the Torpedo School, followed by the relief of the Fleet Naval Landing Force in the eastern end of the Navy Yard by the 3d Battalion. By 6 September, the 1st Battalion had relieved the remaining elements of the Fleet Marine Landing Force of the airfield and all ships' detachments of sailors and Marines had returned to their parent vessels and the provisional landing units deactivated.

While a large part of the strength of the Fleet Landing Force was returning to normal duties, a considerable augmentation to Marine strength in northwestern Honshu was being made. On 23 August, AirFMFPac had designated Marine Aircraft Group 31 (MAG-31), then at Chimu airfield on Okinawa, to move to Japan as a supporting air group for the northern occupation. Colonel John C. Munn, the group's commanding officer, reconnoitered Yokosuka airfield and its facilities soon after the initial landing and directed necessary repairs to runways and taxiways in addition to assigning areas to each unit of the group. On 7 September, the group headquarters, operations, intelligence, and the 24 F4U Corsairs and men of Marine Fighter Squadron 441 flew in from Okinawa. The group was joined by Marine Fighter Squadron 224 on the 8th; Marine Fighter Squadron 311 on the 9th; Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542 on the 10th; and Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 131 on the 12th. "The entire base," the group reported, "was found [to be in] extremely poor police and all structures and living quarters in a bad state of repair. All living quarters were policed . . . under the supervision of the medical department, prior to occupation."

As additional squadrons arrived, the air base was transformed. Complete recreational facilities were established, consisting of a post exchange, theater, basketball courts, and enlisted recreation rooms in each of the squadron's barracks.

When not engaged in renovating the air base or on air missions, liberty parties were organized and sent by boat to Tokyo. Preference was given to personnel who were expected to return to the United States for discharge. Fraternalization, although originally forbidden by the American high command, was allowed after the first week. "The Japanese Geisha girls have taken a large share of the attention of the many curious sight-seers of the squadron," reported Major Michael R. Yunck, commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 311. "The Oriental way of life is something very hard for an American to comprehend. The opinions on how the occupation job 'should be done' range from the most generous to the most drastic—all agreeing on one thing, though, that it is a very interesting experience."

Prostitution and the resultant widespread incidence of venereal diseases were ages old in Japan. "The world's oldest profession" was legal and controlled by the Japanese government; licensed prostitutes were confined to restricted sections. Placing these sections out of bounds to American forces did not solve the problem of venereal exposure, for, as in all ports such as Yokosuka, clandestine prostitution continued to flourish. In an attempt to prevent uncontrolled exposure, all waterfront and backstreet houses of prostitution were placed out of bounds. A prophylaxis station was established at the entrance to a Japanese police-controlled "Yashuura House" (a house of prostitution exclusively for the use of
On 6 September 1945, more than 120 4th Marine survivors of Bataan and Corregidor, who were freed from Japanese prison camps and were physically able, were invited to a regimental guard mount at Yokosuka Naval Base, the fallen bastion of Japanese naval might. Their hosts were the officers and men of the new 4th Marines. Reactivated in February 1944, the new regiment was composed of men from the four Marine raider battalions; men who could carry on the name of the old 4th—the legendary China Regiment which protected American interests in the Far East from 1927 to 1941 and caught the first full impact of the Japanese in the Philippines.

Alighting from trucks they were met by a huge sign which read: "Welcome, Old 4th!" Overwhelmed, the older men immediately threw their arms around the new in their first display of emotion since being rescued. A number said that the Japanese had marked them for death in the event another atomic bomb was dropped.

Looking thin but fit in newly issued dungarees and canvas sneakers or fabric split-toed shoes purchased from Japanese civilians, they quickly lined up three deep in parade formation in front of the base's wooden naval barracks where each was given a small Marine Corps emblem. "We're damned glad to have you here," said Brigadier General William T. Clement. "Some of you have changed a bit since I last saw you, but this is the happiest moment of my life just to be able to bring you back to the Fourth Marines."

In a mess hall where Japanese suicide pilots ate less than a month before, members of the new regiment treated members of the old to an American-style steak dinner with tomatoes, mashed potatoes, gravy, oranges, and coffee while a strolling Marine band played the latest jazz tunes. Horror tales of Japanese imprisonment were exchanged for stories of Pacific victories. Two half-brothers, one in the old regiment and one in the new, were reunited after never expecting to see each other again. Following the dinner, they reviewed a guard mount in their honor and drank their first American canned beer in more than three years. As the band struck up the Marine Corps Hymn, "one returned prisoner, a tough-looking leatherneck with a face like a bulldog's, began to sob. Tears streamed down the checks of half a dozen more, and those who weren't weeping were swallowing hard."

As the truck convoy pulled away to carry them to the ships waiting to take them back to the United States, one veteran remarked: "Hell, I don't want to go back home. I want to stay with the Marines and just as soon as I get to the United States I'm going to ask for a transfer back to the Fourth Regiment. I've been in the Marines since I was 17 and it's the easiest life I know."

Members of the new 4th pass in review for members of the old 4th Marines.
of occupation forces), another in the center of the Yokosuka liberty zone, and a third at the fleet landing. These stations were manned by hospital corpsmen under the supervision of a full-time venereal disease-prevention medical officer. In addition, a continuous educational campaign was carried out urging continence and warning of the dangerous diseased condition of prostitutes. These procedures resulted in a drastic decline in reported cases of diseases originating in the Yokosuka area.

On 8 September, the group's Corsairs and Hellcats, stripped of about two and a half tons of combat weight, began surveillance flights over the Tokyo Bay area and the Kanto Plain north of the capital. The purpose of the missions was to observe and report any unusual activity by Japanese military forces and to survey all airfields in the area. Initially, Munn's planes served under Third Fleet command, but on the 16th, operational control of MAG-31 was transferred to the Fifth Air Force. A month later, the group was returned to Navy control and reconnaissance flights in the Tokyo area and Kanto Plain discontinued. Operations of the air group were confined largely to mail, courier, transport, and training flights to include navigation, tactics, dummy gunnery, and ground control approach practice. By mid-October, the physical condition of the base had been improved to such an extent that the facilities were adequate to accommodate the remainder of the group's personnel. On 7 December, the group's four tactical squadrons were placed under the operational control of the Far Eastern Air Force and surveillance and reconnaissance flights again resumed.

On 8 September, Admiral Badger's Task Force 31 was dissolved and the Commander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, assumed responsibility for the naval occupation area. General Clement's command, again designated Task Force Able, continued to function for a short time thereafter while most of the reinforcing units of the 4th Marines loaded out for return to Guam. On the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Beans relieved General Clement of his responsibilities at Yokosuka, and the general and his staff flew back to Guam to rejoin the 6th Division. Before he left, Clement was able to take part in a ceremony honoring more than 120 officers and men of the "Old" 4th Marines, captured on Bataan and Corregidor.

After the initial major contribution of naval land forces to the occupation of northern Japan, the operation became more and more an Army task. As additional troops arrived, the Eighth Army's area of effective control grew to encompass all of northern Japan. In October, the occupation zone of the 4th Marines was reduced to include only the naval base, airfield, and town of Yokosuka. In effect, the regiment became a naval base guard detachment, and on 1 November, control of the 4th Marines passed from Eighth Army to the Commander, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka.

While the Marine presence gradually diminished, activity in the surrounding area began to return to normal. Japanese civilians started returning to the city of Yokosuka in large numbers. "The almost universal attitude was at first one of timidity and fear, then curiosity," it was reported. "Banks opened and started to operate... Post offices and telegraph offices started to function smoothly, and movie houses began to fill with civilian crowds."

Unlike Tokyo and Yokohama, the Yokosuka area had escaped much destruction and was remarkably intact. On base, evacuated Japanese barracks were quickly cleaned up and made reasonably liveable. The Japanese furnished cooks, mess boys, and housekeeping help, allowing Marines more time to explore the

Hundreds of neatly stacked torpedoes are inspected by Marines. They are a small part of the tons of war materiel Marines found at the naval base.
Their behavior was remarkable considering only a few months before they had fought a hard and bloody battle on Okinawa. Crimes against the local Japanese population were few and, for the most part, petty. It was the replacement, not the combat veteran, who, after a few beers, would "slug a Jap" or curse them to their faces.

Of the few problems, two stood out—rape and the black market. Japanese women, so subdued, if propositioned would comply and later charge "rape." "Our courts gave severe sentences, which I approved," noted one senior commander. "This satisfied the Japanese honor. I expected the sentences to be greatly reduced, as they were, in the United States. The sooner these men were returned home, the better for all hands, including the Japanese." In addition, the utter lack and concomitant demand for consumer goods caused some Marines to smuggle items, such as cigarettes, out to the civilian market where they brought a high price.

### Marine Corps' Demobilization Plan

Following the surrender of Japan, the Secretary of the Navy announced details of the Marine Corps' plan for demobilization of personnel. Intended to supplement existing policies and directives concerning discharges and releases, the plan provided the most equitable means of establishing the priority for the release of Marines by computing their service credits.

The Point System, as the plan was commonly known, applied to both officers and enlisted men. Each Marine received one point each month of service from 16 September 1940; one point for each month served overseas or afloat from 16 September 1940; five points for the first and each additional award of the Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Cross (Army), Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Navy and Marine Corps Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart, and Bronze Service Star; and 12 points for each child under the age of 18, up to a limit of three children. With 12 May 1945 as the original cutoff date for computations, the critical score to be used when the plan went into effect on 1 September 1945 was 85 points for male Marines and 25 points for Women Reservists. Subsequent reductions in critical scores would reflect changes in the missions, and therefore personnel requirements, of the Marine Corps.

The plan also provided that enlisted personnel with sufficient points for discharge could remain on active duty so long as there was a need for their services. Conversely, key personnel or those with specialized skills who had amassed the required score would be retained on active duty until their re- lief s could be procured and trained. Since the number of officers to be released would be relatively smaller than the number of enlisted men involved, the immediate needs of the service and the necessity of keeping male officers who applied for transfer to the regular Marine Corps would be of primary concern.

Barely a month after the program began, the critical score was lowered to 60 points and all enlisted personnel with three or more children under 18 years of age could request discharge. The point score was further reduced to 50 on 1 November and to 45 on 1 February 1946. To some this was not fast enough. A few Marines in Hawaii were, as Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger noted, "infected... by the insidious bug that has bitten the Army and caused Army personnel to stage mass meetings protesting their demobilization program." A few hours before Marines were scheduled to meet at Camp Catlin, Pearl Harbor, Geiger issued orders against any demonstration meetings. Other Marines at Ewa Marine Air Station circulated a demobilization protest petition and were confined for disobeying a lawful order. "It isn't necessary for the men to hold a meeting to make their grievances known," his chief of staff, Brigadier General Mervin H. Silverthorn, said. "The Marines have had a standard method as long as I can remember whereby any man at any time can see his company or unit commander to discuss his troubles and receive an answer." By 1 July 1946, as the number of Marine Corps commitments in the Pacific fell and more replacements were trained and sent out, inductees or reservists with 30 months of active duty, regardless of points acquired, became eligible for discharge.

The increased flow of discharges required to bring the Corps to the planned postwar limit of 108,200, reduced the strength of the Marine Corps from a peak of 483,977 on V-J Day, the day that the surrender was signed, to 155,592 by the end of June 1946. Because of public pressure to release veterans from the Armed Services, the flow was accelerated in October 1946 and all reservists and selectees, regardless of length of service, became eligible for discharge. With fewer replacements and additional discharges, the Marine Corps’ strength continued to fall until just prior to the Korean War when it stood at 74,279.
Although attempts were made to curb the practice, many unnecessary and expensive courts-martial where held "which branded our men with bad conduct discharges."

In addition to routine duties and security and military police patrols, the Marines also carried out Eighth Army demilitarization directives, collecting and disposing of Japanese military and naval materiel. In addition, they searched their area of responsibility for caches of gold, silver, and platinum. During the search, no official naval records, other than inventories and a few maps and charts, were found. It was later learned that the Japanese had been ordered to burn or destroy all documents of military value to the Allies.

The surrender of all garrisons having been taken, motorized patrols with truck convoys were sent out to collect as many small arms, weapons, and as much ammunition as possible. The large amount of such supplies in the Yokosuka area made the task an extensive one. In addition, weekly patrols from the regiment supervised the unloading at Uraga of Japanese troops and civilians returning from such bypassed Pacific outposts as Wake, Yap, and Truk. Although there was concern that some Japanese soldiers might cause trouble, none did.

On 20 November, the 4th Marines was removed from the administrative control of the 6th Division and placed directly under FMFPac. Orders were received directing that preparations be made for 3d Battalion to relieve the regiment of its duties in Japan, effective 31 December. In common with the rest of the Armed Forces, the Marine Corps faced great public and Congressional pressure to send its men home for discharge as rapidly as possible. The Corps’ world-wide commitments had to be examined with this in mind. The Japanese attitude of cooperation with occupation authorities fortunately permitted considerable reduction of troop strength. In Yokosuka, Marines who did not meet the age,
Relief Map of Kyushu
service, or dependency point totals necessary for discharge in December or January were transferred to the 3d Battalion, while men with the requisite number of points were concentrated in the 1st and 2d Battalions.

On 1 December, the 1st Battalion completed embarkation on board the carrier Lexington (CV 16) and sailed for the West Coast to be disbanded. On the 24th, the 3d Battalion, reinforced by regimental units and a casual company formed to provide replacements for Fifth Fleet Marine detachments, relieved 2d Battalion of all guard responsibilities. The 2d Battalion, with Regimental Weapons and Headquarters and Service Companies, began loading out operations on the 27th and sailed for the United States on board the attack cargo ship Lumen (AKA 30) on New Year’s Day. Like the 1st, the 2d Battalion and the accompanying two units would be disbanded. All received war trophies: Japanese rifles and bayonets were issued to enlisted men; officers received swords less than 100 years old; pistols were not issued and field glasses were restricted to general officers.

At midnight on 31 December, Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A. Hochmuth, the regiment’s executive officer, took command of the 3d Battalion, as the battalion assumed responsibility for the security of the Naval Station, Marine Air Base, and the city of Yokosuka. A token regimental headquarters remained behind to carry on the name of the 4th Marines. Six days later, the headquarters detachment left Japan to rejoin the 6th Marine Division then in Tsingtao, China.

On 15 February, the 3d Battalion was redesignated the 2d Separate Guard Battalion (Provisional), Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. An internal reorganization was carried out and the battalion was broken down into guard companies. Its military police and security duties in the naval base area and city of Yokosuka remained the same. The major task of demilitarization in the naval base having been completed, the battalion settled into a routine of guard duty, ceremonies, and training, little different from that of any Navy yard barracks detachment in the United States.

In January, the Submarine Base was returned to Japanese control. With the return of the Torpedo School-Supply Base Area, the relief of all gate posts by naval guards, and the detachment of more than 300 officers and men in March, the 2d and 4th Guard Companies were disbanded and the security detail drawn from a consolidated 1st Guard Company. On 1 April, MAG-31 relieved the 3d Guard Company of security responsibility for the Air Base and the company was disbanded. With additional drafts of personnel for discharge or reassignment and an order to reduce the Marine strength to 100, the Commander, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, responded. "I reacted," Captain Benton W. Decker later wrote, "reporting that the security of the base would be jeopardized and that 400 Marines were necessary, whereupon the order was canceled, and a colonel was ordered to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Bruno Hochmuth. Again, I insisted that Lieutenant Colonel Hochmuth was capable of commanding my Marine unit to my complete satisfaction, so again, Washington canceled an order." On 15 June, the battalion, reduced in strength to 24 officers and 400 men, was redesignated Marine Detachment, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Lieutenant Colonel Hochmuth commanding.

The continued cooperation of the Japanese with occupation directives and the lack of any overt signs of resistance also lessened the need for the fighter squadrons of MAG-31. Personnel and unit reductions similar to those experienced by the 4th Marines also affected the Marine air group. By the spring of 1946, reduced in strength and relieved of all routine surveillance missions by the Fifth Bomber Command, MAG-31, in early May, received orders to return as a unit to the United States.

Prior to being released of all flight duties, the group performed one final task. Largely due to an extended period of inclement weather and poor sanitary conditions, the Yokosuka area had become infested with large black flies, mosquitoes, and fleas, causing the outbreak and spread of communicable diseases. Alarmed that service personnel might be affected, accessible areas were dusted with DDT by jeeps equipped with dusting attachments. The spraying effort was effective except in the city’s alleys and surrounding narrow valleys, occupied by small houses and innumerable cesspools. "Fortunately we had a solution," wrote Captain Decker. MAG-31 was asked to tackle the job. "Daily, these young, daring flyers would zoom up the hills following the pathways, dusting with DDT. The children loved to run out in the open, throw wide their jackets, and become hidden momentarily in the clouds of DDT. It was fun for them and it helped us in delousing the city."

On 18 June, with the final destruction of all but two of the seven wind tunnels at the Japanese First Technical Air Depot and the preparation of equipment for shipment, loading began. Earlier, the group’s serviceable aircraft were either flown to
The Senior Marine Commanders

The three senior Marine commanders on Kyushu were seasoned combat veterans and well versed in combined operations—qualities that enhanced Marine Corps contributions to the complex occupation duties and relations with the U.S. Sixth Army.

Major General Harry Schmidt commanded V Amphibious Corps. Schmidt was 59, a native of Holdrege, Nebraska, and a graduate of Nebraska State Normal College. He was commissioned in 1909 and in 1911 reported to Marine Barracks, Guam. Following a series of short tours in the Philippines and at state-side posts, he spent most of World War I on board ship. Interwar assignments included Quantico, Nicaragua, Headquarters Marine Corps, and China, where he served as Chief of Staff of the 2d Marine Brigade.

Returning to Headquarters in 1938, Schmidt first served with the Paymaster’s Department and then as assistant to the Commandant. In 1943, he assumed command of the 4th Marine Division which he led during the Roi-Namur and Saipan Campaigns. Given the command of the V Amphibious Corps a year later, he led the unit during the assault and capture of Tinian and Iwo Jima. For his accomplishment during the campaigns, Schmidt received three Distinguished Service Medals. Ordered back to the United States following occupational duties in Japan, he assumed command of the Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego. General Schmidt died in 1968.

Major General LeRoy P. Hunt commanded the 2d Marine Division. Hunt was 53, a native of Newark, New Jersey, and a graduate of the University of California. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1917 and served with great distinction with the 5th Marines during World War I, receiving the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Cross for repeated acts of heroism.

Postwar assignments were varied, ranging from sea duty to commanding officer of the Western Mail Guard Detachment and work with the Work Projects Administration’s Matanuska Colonization venture in Alaska. Following a short tour in Iceland, he
was given command of the 5th Marines which he led in the seizure and defense of Guadalcanal. As the 2d Marine Division’s assistant division commander he participated in mopping-up operations on Saipan and Tinian and in the Okinawa Campaign. Appointed division commander, he led the division in the occupation of Japan and for a period was Commanding General, I Army Corps. Returning to the United States, Hunt assumed duties as Commanding General, Department of Pacific and then Commanding General, FMFLant. General Hunt died in 1968.

Major General Thomas E. Bourke commanded the 5th Marine Division. Bourke was 49, a native of Robinson, Maryland, and a graduate of St. Johns College. He was commissioned in 1917 after service in the Maryland National Guard along the Mexican border. While enroute to Santo Domingo for his first tour, he and 50 recruits were diverted to St. Croix, becoming the first U. S. troops to land on what had just become the American Virgin Islands. Post-World War I tours included service at Quantico, Parris Island, San Diego, and Headquarters Marine Corps. He also served at Pearl Harbo; was commanding officer of the Legation Guard in Managua, Nicaragua; saw sea duty on board the battleship West Virginia (BB 48); and commanded the 10th Marines. Following the Guadalcanal and Tarawa campaigns, General Bourke was assigned as the V Amphibious Corps artillery officer for the invasion of Saipan. He next trained combined Army-Marine artillery units for the XXIV Army Corps, then preparing for the Leyte operation. With Leyte secured, he assumed command of the 5th Marine Division which was planning for the invasion of Japan. After the war’s sudden end, the division landed at Sasebo, Kyushu, and assumed occupation duties. With disbandment of the 5th Marine Division, General Bourke became Deputy Commander and Inspector General of FMFPac. General Bourke died in 1978.

Okinawa, distributed to various Navy and Marine Corps activities in Japan, or shipped to Guam on the carrier Point Cruz (CVE 119). Prior to being hoisted on board, the planes made the shore to ship movement by Japanese barge equipped with a crane and operated by a Japanese crew. It was reported with amazement that "not a single plane was scratched." A small number of obsolete planes were stricken and their parts salvaged. On 20 June, the 737 remaining officers and men of MAG-31, led by Lieutenant Colonel John P. Condon, boarded the attack transport San Saba (APA-232) and sailed for San Diego. The departure of MAG-31 marked the end of Marine occupation activities in northern Japan.

Sasebo-Nagasaki Landings

In the period immediately following the conclusion of the Luzon Campaign, the U.S. Sixth Army, under the command of General Walter Krueger, was engaged in planning and preparing for the invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost Japanese home island. The operation envisioned an assault by three Army corps and one Marine amphibious corps, totaling 11 Army and three Marine divisions, under the command of General Krueger. After more than three years, the major land, sea, and air components of the Central and Southwest Pacific forces were to merge in the initial ground assault against Japan itself.

In early August, with the destruction of Hiroshima and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, the possibility of an early surrender increased. Although planning for the invasion continued, General MacArthur directed Krueger to also plan and prepare for the occupation of Kyushu and western Honshu should the Japanese Government capitulate. General Krueger’s initial plan for the occupation called for V Amphibious Corps, commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt, to land the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions in the Sasebo-Nagasaki area on 4 September. These landings were to be reinforced later by a 3d Marine Division seaborne or overland movement to the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area. Major General Innis P. Swift’s I Corps, consisting of the 25th, 33d, 98th, and 6th Infantry Divisions, was to land three days later in the Wakayama area of western Honshu and establish control over the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe area. The X Corps, composed of the 41st and 24th Infantry Divisions and commanded by Major General Franklin C. Sibert, was scheduled to land in the Kure-Hiroshima area of western Honshu and on the island of Shikoku on 3 October.

On 14 August, the Sixth Army assumed operational control of V Amphibious Corps. After receiving official word of Japanese acceptance of the surrender demands the following day, the Corps’ three divisions were informed that they should be prepared for an occupational landing in early September, and that “all units were to be combat loaded and alerted to the possibility of appreciable resistance to the occupation.” The Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, would be responsible for collecting, transporting, and landing V Corps and other scattered elements of Krueger’s army. Because of the wide dispersion of assault shipping and the magnitude of the minesweeping problem, the fleet could not move major units to
their targets simultaneously and landing dates would therefore have to be postponed.

At the time of surrender there were an estimated 20,000 allied prisoners of war in Kyushu and western Honshu. Sixth Army planners contemplated that recovery teams composed of American, Australian, and Dutch representatives would accompany the occupational forces and immediately evacuate prisoners in their respective zones. Following the surrender, the Japanese virtually freed all Allied prisoners by turning the prison camps over to them and allowing them freedom of movement. Taking full advantage of the situation, many former prisoners roamed the countryside at will, creating a situation that called for an immediate change in plans.

With the landing of the first American forces in Japan at the end of August, it became apparent that the evacuation of all Allied prisoners of war "must receive first priority as many of them were in poor physical condition." The revised Sixth Army plan allowed the Eighth Army to extend its evacuation program to the west and to evacuate prisoners through Osaka to Tokyo until relieved by Fifth Fleet and Sixth Army units. Prisoners on Shikoku were to be ferried across the Inland Sea to the mainland and then transported by rail through Osaka to Tokyo. The Fifth Fleet and Sixth Army immediately organized two evacuation forces consisting of suitable landing craft, hospital ships, transports, Army contact teams, truck companies, and Navy medical personnel. One force, under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph S. Riggs, landed at Wakayama on 11 September and by the 15th had completed the processing of all prisoners in western Honshu, a total of 2,575 men. The other force, commanded by Rear Admiral Frank G. Fahrion, landed at atom-bombed Nagasaki, after Fifth Fleet mine sweepers had cleared the way, and by 22 September had evacuated all 9,000 remaining prisoners on Kyushu.

Preliminary examination revealed that there were no serious epidemics in the camps except for a few cases of typhoid and dysentery. Malnutrition was common and the most serious cases of beriberi and tuberculosis required immediate hospitalization. The initial processing revealed many instances of brutality. However, as it was reported at the time, "close questioning often disclosed that the prisoners had been guilty of breaking some petty but strict prison rule. A considerable number of the older men stated that the camp treatment, although extremely rugged, was on the whole not too bad. They expected quick punishment when caught for infractions of rules and got it. All complained of the food, clothing, housing, and lack of heating facilities." Except for a few stragglers, the release, medical examination, delousing, processing, and screening of Allied prisoners of war in southern Japan was completed on 23 September.

While the Eighth Army extended its hold over northern Japan, and the two evacuation forces rounded up and processed Allied prisoners, preparations for the Sixth Army's occupation of western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu continued. The occupation area contained 55 percent of the total Japanese population, including half of the Japanese Army garrisoning the homeland, three of Japan's four major naval bases, all but two of its principal ports, two-thirds of all Japanese cities with a population in excess of 100,000, and three of its four main transportation centers. The island of Kyushu, which was to be largely a Marine occupation responsibility, supported a population of 10,000,000 spread amongst its 15,000 square miles of

In a conference held on board the Mt. McKinley prior to the landing, BGen William W. Rogers, V Amphibious Corps Chief of Staff, left, stresses a point to his interpreter, Maj F. D. Wolf, as RAdm Keichi Ishii, Chief of Staff of Sasebo Naval Station and his vice chief locate a point under discussion.
mountainous terrain. The southern and eastern parts of the island were chiefly agricultural areas, producing large quantities of exportable rice and sweet potatoes. The northwestern half of the island contained almost all of southwestern Japan’s coal fields, the nation’s greatest pig iron and steel district, and many important shipyards, in addition to a host of other smaller industries.

On 1 September, Major General Harry Schmidt opened his command post on board the Mt. McKinley (AGC 7), flagship of Amphibious Group 4, off Maui in the Hawaiian Islands and sailed to join the 5th Division convoy, already enroute to Saipan. The remainder of V Corps’ troops, including several Army engineer augmentation units, with the exception of rear echelons, continued loading and, on 3 September, departed Hawaii for Saipan on board 17 LSTs. Schmidt’s forces also carried more than 300 tons of “Military Government” or relief supplies consisting of rice, soy beans, fats and oils, salt, canned fish, and medical equipment.

During the voyage to Saipan planning for the occupation continued in light of changes to the original concept of operations allowed by favorable reports of Japanese compliance with surrender terms in northern Japan and alterations in the troop list. However, every effort was made to salvage as much as possible of the content of the Olympic plans for the assault landing. On 5 September, the 3d Marine Division was deleted from the Corps’ occupation force and the 32d Infantry Division substituted. To guard against possible treachery on the part of thousands of Japanese troops on bypassed islands in the Central Pacific, the Navy tasked the 3d Division, then on Guam, with preparing for any such eventuality. Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division and additional Corps units began loading in the Marianas. “Someone at higher headquarters apparently made a gross error,” noted Lieutenant Colonel Jacob G. Goldberg, the division’s logistics officer. “For the first time since the war began we were assigned enough shipping to lift the entire division, and by entire division I mean 100% personnel and equipment. VAC was very much surprised that we were able to do this, and I freely admit it was a hell of a nervous strain on me up until the last ship was loaded.”

Early on the morning of 13 September, the various transport groups rendezvoused at Saipan. The 2d Marine Division almost was loaded and the 32d Infantry Division on Luzon was preparing to move to staging areas at Lingayen for loading on turn-around shipping of the 5th Marine Division. Because of continuing indications that the landings would be unopposed, the number of air and fire support ships assigned to accompany the transport groups was reduced.

The following day, General Schmidt held a conference of his subordinate commanders on board the Mt. McKinley to clarify plans for the operation. He stressed “the importance of maintaining firm, just, and dignified relations with the Japanese . . . [and] responsibilities of commanders of all echelons in following the rules of land warfare and the directives of higher authority.”

In view of the cooperative attitude of the Japanese thus far, permission was requested and granted to send advance parties to Nagasaki and Sasebo. Their missions were “to facilitate smooth and orderly entry of U. S. forces into the Corps zone of responsibility by making contact with key Japanese civil and military authorities; to execute advance spot checks on compliance with demilitarization orders; and to ascertain such facilities for reception of our forces as condition and suitability of docks and harbors; adequacy of sites selected by map-reconnaissance for Corps installations; condition of airfields, roads, and communications.”

The first party, led by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, VAC operations officer, and consisting of key Corps and 2d Division staff officers flew via Okinawa to Nagasaki, arriving on 16 September. A second party of similar composition, but with underwater demolition teams and 5th Division personnel attached, left for Sasebo by high speed transport on 15th. After meeting with local officials, spot checking coastal defenses, and arranging for suitable bar-
racks, warehouse, and command post sites, Colonel Wensinger and his staff proceeded by destroyer to Sasebo where they made preliminary arrangements for the 5th Division’s arrival. On 20 September, the second reconnaissance party arrived at Sasebo where it was met by Wensinger’s party, and completed preparations for the landing.

At dusk on 16 September, Transport Squadron 22 bearing the Corps headquarters and 5th Marine Division slipped out of Tanapag Harbor bound for Sasebo. The landing ships carrying elements of the 2d Marine Division left Saipan for Nagasaki the next day. During the eventful voyages, Marines received refresher training in military discipline and courtesy and got their initial briefs on the Japanese people, customs, and geography.

Early on 22 September, the transport squadron carrying Major General Thomas E. Bourke’s 5th Marine Division and corps headquarters troops arrived off Sasebo Harbor. They were met by Colonel Wensinger and members of the advance party together with Japanese pilots who were to guide the ships into their assigned berthing and docking areas. The advance party representatives were transferred to their respective unit command ships where they made their reports which required changes in billeting plans, making it necessary that 3d Battalion, 26th Marines remain afloat. At 0859, after Japanese pilots had directed the transports to safe berths in Sasebo’s inner harbor, the 26th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, landed on beaches at the naval air station. Advancing rapidly inland, the Marines moved to areas tentatively selected at Saipan from aerial photographs and verified by the advance party. Unarmed Japanese naval guards on base installations, arms, and stores were relieved and Japanese guides arranged for by the advance party directed the Marines to pre-selected billeting areas. Ships carrying other elements of the division then moved to the Sasebo docks to begin general unloading. The shore party, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, was ashore by 1500 and began cargo unloading operations which continued throughout the night.

The remainder of the 28th Marines, in division reserve, remained on board ship. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines landed on the docks in late afternoon and moved out to occupy the regiment’s assigned zone of responsibility. During the afternoon, Generals Bourke, Schmidt, and Krueger inspected the occupation’s progress with tours of the naval station, city of Sasebo, and naval air station. Before troop unloading was suspended at dusk, 1st and 2d Battalions, 13th Marines had landed on beaches in the aircraft factory area; 5th Tank Battalion had come ashore at the air station; and the assistant division commander and his staff had established an advanced division command post at the Sasebo Fortress. The main division command post remained afloat to control unloading better. All units ashore established guard posts and security patrols, but the division’s first night in Japan was uneventful.

Sasebo, the home of the third largest naval base in Japan, was a city of more than 300,000 prior to 29 June 1945. That day, the city suffered its only B-29 raid of the war which destroyed a large portion of the city’s shopping and business districts. The naval area was largely undamaged. More than 60,000 were made homeless and approximately 1,000 people were killed. The Marines saw very few of the remaining 166,000 inhabitants. “There wasn’t a damn soul in town except those black coated policemen,” General Ray A. Robinson later noted, “and there was one of those on every intersection. There wasn’t another person in sight and it was very eerie.” The few policemen and naval guards were described as being “acquiescent and docile.
with little expression of emotion or show of interest."

The city was described as unbearable due to the stench rising from refuse piled high throughout. But as Bourke's Marines began the arduous task of cleaning up, Sasebo and the attitude of its inhabitants changed, as Marine Lieutenant Edwin L. Neville, Jr., later recalled:

Gradually young children would appear as scouts to see what the American were up to. Tremendous propaganda by the Japanese government about the treacherous Americans who would kill, mutilate, torture and rape the Japanese population if they ever won the war had instilled fear in the Japanese, who were petrified. What happened blew away these fears. The Marines gave the kids candy, chewing gum, food, whatever they had instantly at hand. They showered them with love and attention. The kids went back and told their folks that these were the good guys. Gradually, the citizens of Sasebo returned from the countryside or from behind the shutters of their houses that still stood. . . . Moreover, many Japanese were starving, and the Marines fed them and gave them food to prepare at home. The change in attitude in a short period of time was startling.

On 23 September, as most of the remaining elements of the 5th Division landed and General Bourke set up his command post ashore, sanitary squads prepared billeting areas and patrols started probing the immediate countryside. Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, was sent by amphibian trucks to Omura, about 22 miles southeast of Sasebo, to establish a security guard over the aircraft assembly facilities and repair 2 training base “to prevent further looting by Japs.” Omura's 5,000 by 4,000 foot, “cow-pasture variety” airfield had been selected as the base of Marine air operations in southern Japan.

A reconnaissance party, led by Colonel Daniel W. Torrey, commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Group 22 (MAG-22), had landed and inspected the field on 12 September, and the 600-man advance echelon had flown in from Chimu on Okinawa six days later. The echelon found a considerable number of enemy planes ranging from beaten up “Willows,” the Japanese version of the Boeing-Stearman Kaydet trainer, to combat aircraft consist-
ing of "Jacks," "Georges," and "Zekes," all lacking just enough parts to be inoperable. Twenty-one Corsairs of Marine Fighter Squadron 113 reached Omura on the 23d, after a two-day stop-over at Kanoya airfield on Kyushu due to bad weather. The rest of the group's flight echelon, composed of Marine Fighter Squadrons 314 and 422 and Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, arrived before the month was over. Each squadron was assigned two hangars, one for storing and servicing its planes and the other for quartering enlisted men and messing facilities. MAG-22's primary mission was similar to that of MAG-31 at Yokosuka—surveillance flights in support of occupation operations.

As MAG-22 began flight operations from Omura and the 5th Division consolidated its hold on Sasebo, the second major element of Schmidt's amphibious corps landed in Japan. The early arrival of the ships of Transport Squadron 12 at Saipan, coupled with efficient staging and loading, had enabled planners to move the 2d Marine Division's landing date forward three days. When reports were received that the approaches to the originally selected landing beaches were mined but that Nagasaki's harbor was clear, the decision was made to land directly into the harbor area. At 1300 on 23 September, the 2d and 6th Marines, in full combat kit with fixed bayonets and full magazines, landed simultaneously on the east and west sides of the harbor.

Nagasaski, as one Marine observed, "can be described very easily: It is a filthy, stinking, wrecked hole, and the sooner we get out the better we'll all like it."

Fields of rubble greeted Marines as they made their way into central Nagasaki, site of the second atomic bomb dropped on Japan. The Nagasaki Medical Center was the only building left standing near ground zero.

Marines of the 2d Division watch as a bulldozer clears an area for an LST to pull into shore at Nagasaki on the second morning after the division arrived.
Relieving the Marine detachments from the cruisers *Biloxi* (CL 80) and *Wichita* (CA 45), which had been serving as security guards for the prisoner of war evacuation operations, the two regiments moved out swiftly to occupy the city. Their second objective was to cordon off the area devastated by the atomic bomb. As Lieutenant Colonel George L. Cooper later recalled: "Ground zero appeared to have been a rather large sports stadium, and all of us were categorically ordered to stay out of any place within pistol shot of this area. The result of this order was that everybody and his brother headed directly for ground zero as soon as they could, and in no time at all had picked the area clean of all moveable objects." Later, ships were brought alongside wharfs and docks to facilitate cargo handling, and unloading operations were well under way by nightfall. A quiet calm ruled the city, auguring a peaceful occupation.

On 24 September, the rest of Major General LeRoy P. Hunt's 2d Division landed. The 8th and 10th Marines, the last of the division's regiments to land, and Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2, passed through Nagasaki, moved northeast to Isahaya, and seized control of the area. Once it had completed its movement into Nagasaki and Isahaya, the 2d Marine Division dispatched reconnaissance patrols to check the road conditions from Isahaya through Omuta to Kumamoto. The same day, the corps commander arrived from Sasebo by destroyer to inspect the Nagasaki area. General Schmidt had established his command post ashore at Sasebo the previous day and taken command of the two Marine divisions. The only other major allied unit ashore on Kyushu, a reinforced Army task force that was occupying Kanoya airfield in the southernmost part of the island, was transferred to General Schmidt's command from the Far Eastern Air Force on 1 October. This force, built around the 32d Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, had flown into Kanoya on 3 September to secure an intermediate airstrip for staging and refueling aircraft enroute from the Philippines and Okinawa to Tokyo.

General Krueger, satisfied with the progress of the occupation on Kyushu, assumed command of all forces ashore at 1000 on 24 September. The following day, Headquarters I Corps and the 33d Infantry Division, the first major elements of Sixth Army's other corps, arrived and began landing operations at Wakayama. Headquarters Sixth Army landed with Major General Swift's troops and on the 27th opened at Kyoto. At Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Wakayama, there was ample evidence that the occupation of southern Japan would be bloodless.

Like the Marines and sailors of General Clement's command at Yokosuka, those under the command of General Schmidt expected the worse. The only experience most had was in battle, during which the Japanese often refused to surrender and were annihilated. But like Clement's, Schmidt's forces were amazed at what they encountered. "We couldn't believe the Japanese could previously
Occupation duties included countryside surveillance patrols, supervising the inventory and destruction of ammunition, weapons, and other war materiel, and keeping order, all to insure strict adherence to surrender terms.
When not on duty, Marines on Kyushu either "sacked out" in make-shift barracks, visited one of the many tea houses while on liberty in bombed-out Sasebo or Nagasaki, organized basketball games, or attended a local Japanese wrestling match.
fight so ferociously and then be so completely subservient, without a murmur,” Brigadier General Joseph L. Stewart later recalled. “Not once did I see any Japanese who acted or looked with disrespect toward occupation forces . . . . We were overwhelmingly surprised by the cooperative reception we had from the Japanese.”

**Kyushu Occupation**

The V Amphibious Corps zone of occupation comprised the entire island of Kyushu and Yamaguchi Prefecture on the western tip of Honshu. After the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions had landed, General Schmidt’s general plan was for Major General Hunt’s 2d Marine Division to expand south of the city of Nagasaki and assume control of Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures. In the meantime, Major General Bourke’s 5th Marine Division was to expand east to the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi. Bourke’s troops were to be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi areas with the arrival of sufficient elements of Major General William H. Gill’s veteran 32d Infantry Division.

Preliminary plans for the occupation of Japan had contemplated the establishment of a formal allied military government, similar to that in operation in Germany, coupled with the direct supervision of the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces. However, during the course of discussions with enemy emissaries in Manila, radical modifications of these plans were made “based on the full cooperation of the Japanese and [including] measures designed to avoid incidents which might result in renewed conflict.” Instead of instituting direct military rule, occupation force commanders were to supervise the execution of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ directives to the Japanese government, keeping in mind MacArthur’s policy of using, but not supporting, the government. Enemy military forces were to be disarmed and demobilized under their own supervision, and the progressive occupation of assigned areas by Allied troops was to be accomplished as Japanese demobilization was completed. The Japanese government and its armed forces were to shoulder the chief administrative and operational burden of disarmament and demobilization.

The infantry regiment, and division artillery operating as infantry, was to be “the chief instrument of demilitarization and control. The entire plan for the imposition of the terms of surrender was based upon the presence of infantry regiments in all the prefectures within the Japanese homeland.” Within the Sixth Army zone, occupational duties were fairly standardized. The division of responsibilities was based upon the boundaries of the prefectures so that the existing Japanese governmental structure could be used. The Sixth Army assigned a number of prefectures to each corps proportionate to the number of troops available. The corps, in turn, assigned a specific number of prefectures to a division. Regiments, usually, were given responsibility for a single prefecture. In the 5th Marine Division zone of responsibility, however, the size of certain prefectures, the large civilian population, and the tactical necessities of troop deployment combined to force modifications of the general scheme of regimental responsibility for a single prefecture.

The regiment’s method of carrying out its occupational mission varied little between zones and units whether Army or Marine. As a corps extended its zone of responsibility, advance parties, composed of specialized staff officers from higher headquarters and the unit involved, were sent into areas to be occupied. Liaison was established with local Japanese civil and military authorities who provided the parties with information on transportation and harbor facilities, inventories of arms and supplies, and the location of dumps and installations. With this information in hand, the regiment then moved into a bivouac area in or near its zone of responsibility. Reconnaissance patrols consisting of an officer and a rifle squad were sent out to verify the location of reported military installations and check inventories of war materiel and also to search for any unreported facilities and materiel caches. The regimental commander then divided his zone into battalion areas, and battalion commanders could, in turn, assign their companies specific sectors of responsibility. Sanitation details preceded the troops into the areas to oversee the preparation of barracks and messing facilities, since many of the installations to be occupied were in a deplorable condition and insect-ridden.

The infantry company or artillery battery thus became the working unit which actually accomplished the destruction or transfer of war materiel and the demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces. Company commanders were empowered to seize military installations within the company zone and, using Japanese military personnel not yet demobilized and laborers obtained through the local Japanese Home Ministry representative, either destroy or turn over to the Home Ministry all materiel within the installation.
All war materiel was divided into five categories and was to be disposed of according to SCAP Ordnance and Technical Division directives. The categories were: that to be destroyed or scrapped, such as explosives and armaments not needed for souvenirs or training purposes; that to be used for allied operations, such as telephones, radios, and vehicles; that to be returned to the Japanese Home Ministry, which encompassed food, fuel, clothing, lumber, and medical supplies; that to be issued as trophies; and that to be shipped to the United States as trophies or training gear.

The hazardous job of disposing of explosive ordnance was to be handled by the Japanese with a minimum of American supervision. Explosives were either burned in approved areas, sealed in place if stored in tunnels, or dumped at sea—the latter being the preferred method. Because of the large quantity of ammunition to be disposed of on Kyushu, both divisions would experience difficulties. Japanese shipping was not available in sufficient strength for dumping the ammunition at sea and the large ammunition could not be blown up as there were no suitable areas in which to detonate it safely. Metal items declared surplus were to be rendered ineffective, by Japanese labor, and turned over to the Japanese as scrap for peacetime civilian uses. Food items and other nonmilitary stocks were to be returned to the Japanese for the relief of the local civilian population.

While local police were given the responsibility of maintaining law and order and enforcing SCAP democratization decrees, Allied forces were to maintain a constant surveillance over Japanese methods of government. Intelligence and military government personnel, working with the occupying troops, were tasked with stamping out any hint of a return to militarism, looking for evidence of evasion or avoidance of the surrender terms, and detecting and suppressing movements considered detrimental to the interests of allied forces. Known or suspected war criminals were to be apprehended and sent to Tokyo for processing and possible arraignment before an allied tribunal.

In addition, occupation forces were responsible for insuring the smooth processing of hundreds of thousands of military personnel and civilians returning from Japan's now defunct Empire. Repatriation centers would be established at Kagoshima, Hario near Sasebo, and Hakata near Fukuoka. Each incoming soldier or sailor would be sprayed with DDT, examined and inoculated for typhus and smallpox, provided with food, and transported to his final destination in Japan. Both line and medical personnel were assigned to supervise the Japanese-run centers. At the same time thousands of Korean and Chinese prisoners and conscript laborers had to be collected and returned to their homelands. In the repatriation operations, Japanese vessels and crews would be used to the fullest extent possible to conserve Allied manpower and allow for an accelerated program of postwar demobilization.

This pattern of progressive
The strangest story to come out of the division's occupation of Northern Kyushu concerned a Marine, but not a member of the 5th Division. He was 82-year-old Edward Zillig, who served as a Marine at the turn of the century.

Born in Switzerland, Zillig immigrated to the United States when he was three years old. Having something of a wonderlust, he joined the Marine Corps in 1888 at Philadelphia. As a member of the Marine detachment on board Commodore George Dewey's flagship, the USFS Olympia, he headed the 12-man reconnaissance patrol which landed in Manila bearing the surrender terms. The group was fired upon, seven were killed, and Zillig with four others returned to the ship. For bravery in battle in the Philippines, he was awarded the Manila Bay Medal, also known as the “Dewey Medal.”

Out of the Marine Corps, he served briefly with the American Company of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and then as a clerk with the Chinese revenue department. He moved to Japan in 1927, eventually settling in Nagasaki where he worked as a watchmaker. “For my own protection, or so they told me,” he said, the Japanese moved him to a concentration camp near the city at the outbreak of the war.

In the camp when the atomic bomb was dropped, he later gave this description of the city's ruin: "Greater destruction was never wrought by man. The example of human defeat by human initiative was never so forcibly expressed as at Nagasaki. It was horrible, it was bloody. Yet at the same time, it was good, it was magnificent. It was the magnificence of a nation, determined to remain free, no matter what the cost.” With the city destroyed, Zillig was sent to the village of Ogi, near Saga, where a three-man intelligence patrol from the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, found him in early October 1945.

Edward Zillig had two requests—that his $60-a-month pension be restored and that he might again see a formal flag-raising and a full-dress Marine Corps parade. His wish for a parade was fulfilled when he stood beside Lieutenant Colonel John W. A. Antonelli, 2d Battalion's commanding officer, at a late morning flag-raising in Saga.

The former Marine's pension was restored as soon as the Veterans Administration received evidence of Zillig's existence, which Colonel Thomas A. Wornham, the commanding officer of the 27th Marines, personally delivered to Washington. Unfortunately, Zillig did not live long enough to see more than a few checks, for on 9 March 1946 he committed suicide.

occupation was quickly established in V Amphibious Corps' zone of responsibility. During the last days of September, both of the Corps' divisions concentrated on unloading at Sasebo and Nagasaki, moving supplies into dumps, organizing billeting areas, securing local military installations, and preparing elements for the expansion eastward. In addition to normal occupation duties, both divisions became saddled with the job of unloading "a terrific amount of shipping." As Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Goldberg wrote at the time: "we are building up a mountain of supplies consisting of items we will never be able to use and I can foresee the day when we just leave it all for the Japs..... Everyone in the Pacific is apparently getting rid of their excess materiel by shipping it to Japan, regardless of whether anyone in Japan needs it. One word describes the situation: SNAFU." Confirming Goldberg's assessment, Major Norman Hatch later noted that the Marines, after days on C- and K-rations were getting "fed up with this, and occasionally a big refrigerator ship would come in and everybody would say, ... 'Now we'll get some fresh food,' but we'd find that the cold lockers were loaded with barbed wire, ping pong balls, things of that nature.... What we would do with barbed wire in Japan nobody had the slightest idea."

On 25 September, two days after landing at Sasebo, General Bourke's division began expand-
Maximum Deployment of VAC on Kyushu as of 14 October 1945
ing its assigned zone of occupation and patrols were sent into outlying areas. The Marines found Japanese civilian and military personnel to be cooperative, but as they initially found in the city, most women and children in rural areas appeared frightened. As the Japanese grew accustomed to the Marine presence and more assured that they would not be harmed, their initial shyness and fear soon disappeared.

During the next few days, all main routes within the division’s zone were covered even though most were in poor repair, “some not negotiable by anything but jeeps.” As the expansion continued, Japanese guards were relieved at military installations and storage areas; the inventorying of Japanese equipment was begun; liaison was established with local civil and military officials. Brigadier General Ray A. Robinson, the division’s assistant commander, was given command of the Fukuoka region occupation force which consisted of the 28th Marines reinforced with artillery and engineers and augmented by Army detachments. Lead elements of Robinson’s force began arriving on the 30th, and by 5 October the force had completed the move from Sasebo. “All the way up [to Fukuoka],” as General Robinson recalled later, “when we stopped at a station, the equivalent of our Red Cross girls, these Japanese women, would come down with tea and cakes. They’d been our enemies . . . so we thought they were going to poison us, so nobody took ‘em!”

The Fukuoka Occupation Force, which was placed directly under General Schmidt’s command, immediately began sending reconnaissance parties followed by company and battalion-sized forces into the major cities of northern Kyushu. But because of the limited number of troops available and the large area to be covered, Japanese guards were left in charge of most military installations, and effective control of the zone was maintained by motorized patrols.

To prevent possible outbreaks of mob violence, Marine guard detachments were set up to administer Chinese labor camps found in the area, and Japanese Army supplies were requisitioned to feed and clothe the former prisoners of war and laborers. Some of the supplies also were given to the thousands of Koreans who had gathered in temporary camps near the principal repatriation ports of Fukuoka and Senzaki in Yama-guchi Prefecture, where they waited for ships to carry them back to their homeland. The Marines, in addition to supervising the loading out of the Koreans, checked on the processing and discharge procedures used to handle Japanese troops returning with each incoming vessel. In addition, the branches of the Bank of Chosen were seized and closed in an effort to crush suspected illegal foreign exchange operations. Like their counterparts in other areas of Kyushu, Robinson’s occupation force located and inventoried vast quantities of Japanese war materiel for later disposition by the 32d Infantry Division.

On 4 October, Robinson dispatched Company K, 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, across the Shim-
On 11th, a detachment was sent from Shimonoseki to Yamaguchi; advance parties reached the city of Oita on the 12th; and on the 19th occupation forces were set up at Senzaki.

As General Robinson's force took control of Fukuoka and Yamaguchi Prefectures and penetrated Oita Prefecture, the 5th Marine Division expanded its hold on areas east and west of Sasebo. On 2 October, the division's reconnaissance company was dispatched to Hirado Island. Moving overland to Hainoura by DUKWs, the amphibian trucks were used to "swim" the narrow channel to Hirado. As elsewhere, they found the Japanese on the island in full "compliance with surrender terms." Other elements of the 5th Division followed, destroying defenses, collecting materiel, and reconnoitering the small islands of Gotto Retto, Kuro Shima, Taka Shima, Tokoi Shima, and A Shima, west of Sasebo. On 5 October, the division's zone of responsibility was extended to include Saga Prefecture and the city of Kurume in the center of the island. On the 9th, the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, operating as an independent occupation group, moved to Saga city. Two weeks later, the regiment, less the 1st Battalion, established its headquarters in Kurume and assumed responsibility for the central portion of the division zone, which now extended to the east to Oita Prefecture. For each of the division's movements, advance billeting and reconnaissance parties were sent to the areas to contact local authorities and arrange for the occupation. Since one of the greatest problems was sanitation, sanitation squads accompanied each party in order to prepare billeting areas. Wherever possible, Japanese labor was used to improve living conditions for the troops. In addition, the maintenance of roads and bridges was a constant problem since the island's inadequate road network quickly disintegrated under military traffic. The situation was further aggravated by heavy rainfall and the lack of suitable repair materials. Although roads were passable only for jeeps, no attempt was made to use motor transport between major cities except for special patrols. Therefore, the major burden of supplying and transporting the scattered elements of the Marine amphibious corps fell to the Japanese rail system.

When it was decided to occupy Oita Prefecture, the entire 180-mile trip from Sasebo to Oita city was made by rail. The occupation group, Company A, 5th Tank Battalion, operating as infantry since tanks could not be used on the island's roads, set up in the city on 13 October and conducted a reconnaissance of the surrounding military installations using motorized patrols. The group's size severely limited its activities and therefore most inventory work had to be carried out by the Japanese under Marine supervision. From Oita, elements of the company moved northwest along the coast to Beppu, noted for its hot springs, beaches, and shore resorts. The tankers of Company A remained in the coastal prefecture until relieved by 32d Division troops in early November.

By mid-October, elements of the 5th Marine Division were dispersed so as to permit almost complete control of the key areas in the northern portion of the V Amphibious Corps zone. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 27th Marines controlled the cities of Saga and Kurume, the 26th Marines occupied Sasebo and the surrounding region, and the 28th Marines controlled the eastern prefectures of Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi. The 13th Marines, occupying the area to the south and east of Sasebo in Nagasaki and Saga
Prefectures, supervised the processing of Japanese repatriates returning from China and Korea, and handled the disposition of the weapons, equipment, and ammunition stored in naval depots near Sasebo and Kawatana. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, detached from its regiment, was stationed in Sasebo under division control and furnished a portion of the city's garrison as well as detachments which searched the islands offshore. In addition to routine occupation duties, elements of the division conducted a number of coordinated surprise searches of schools, temples, and shrines. Only a small number of unreported swords, rifles, technical instruments, documents were seized in the raids.

On 13 October, the 26th Marines was alerted for transfer to the Palau Islands. While the regiment made preparations to move to Peleliu to supervise the repatriation of Japanese troops from the Western Carolines, the first elements of the 32d Infantry Division began landing at Sasebo. The 128th Infantry, followed by the 126th Infantry and division troops, moved through the port and boarded trains for Fukuoka, Kokura, and Shimonoseki, where Robinson's occupation force assumed temporary command of the two Army units. The 127th Infantry, less the 1st Battalion at Kanoya airfield, landed on 18 October, passed to the control of the 5th Marine Division, and on the 19th relieved the 26th Marines of its occupation duties in Sasebo.

On 24 October, Major General Schmidt dissolved the Fukuoka Occupation Force and 32d Infantry Division, now commanded by Brigadier General Robert B. McBride, Jr., opened its command post in Fukuoka. A base command, composed of the service elements that had been assigned to General Robinson's force, was set up to support operations in Northern Kyushu and continued to function until 25 November when it was disbanded and the 32d Division assumed its duties. The division's three regimental combat teams, comprising infantry, artillery, and attached service troops, relieved the 28th Marines and 5th Tank Battalion: the 128th Infantry with the 1st Battalion at Shimonoseki, the 2d Battalion at Bofu, and the remainder of the regiment at Yamaguchi, controlled Yamaguchi Prefecture; the 126th at Kokura patrolled east and south through Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures; and the 127th, after being relieved by the 28th Marines in the zone formerly occupied by the 26th Marines, occupied Fukuoka and the zone to the north.

The 26th Marines began boarding ship on 18 October and the following day was detached from the division and returned to FMFPac control. Before the transports departed on 21st, orders were
received from FMFPac designating the 2d Battalion for disbandment and the battalion returned to Ainoura, the 5th Division Headquarters' camp just outside of Sasebo. On 30 October, the 2d Battalion ended its Pacific service and passed out of existence, its men being transferred to other units.

As the Army's 32d Infantry Division entered Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures, Major General Hunt's 2d Marine Division gradually expanded its hold on southern Kyushu following an intensive reconnaissance effort. The 2d and 6th Marines had moved into billets in the vicinity of Nagasaki immediately after landing with the mission of surveillance and disposition of enemy military materiel in the immediate countryside and the many small nearby islands. The 8th and 10th Marines had gone directly from their transpots to barracks at Isahaya and passed out of existence, its men being transferred to other units.

The corps expanded the 2d Division zone of occupation on 5 October to include the highly industrialized prefecture of Kumamoto in central Kyushu. An advance billeting, sanitation, and reconnaissance party travelled to Kumamoto city to contact Japanese authorities and pave the way for the 8th Marines' assumption of control. By 18 October, all units of the regiment were established in and around Kumamoto and began the process of inventoring and disposing of Japanese war material. Carrying out SCAP directives outlining measures to restore the civilian economy, the Marines, and accompanying military government teams, contacted local officials and assisted wherever possible in speeding the conversion of war industries to essential peacetime production.

The 2d Division gradually took control of the unoccupied portion of southern Kyushu during the next month. Advance parties headed by senior field commanders contacted civil and military officials in Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefectures to insure compliance with surrender terms and adequate preparations for the reception of division troops. Miyazaki Prefecture and the remaining portion of Kagoshima east of Kagoshima Wan were assigned to the 2d Marines. The remaining half of Kagoshima Prefecture was added to the 8th Marines' zone; later, the regiment was also given responsibility for the Osumi and Koshiki Island groups, which lay to the south and southwest of Kyushu.

On 29 October, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, the first major element of the division to move to southernmost Kyushu, departed Kumamoto for Kagoshima city by truck convoy. The 3d Battalion followed several days later, occupying the inland city of Hitoyoshi. Once in place, the battalions began the now all-too-familiar routine of reconnaissance, inspection, inventory, and disposition. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, assigned to the eastern half of Kagoshima, found much of the preliminary occupation work completed. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had maintained a refueling and resupply point at Kanoya, had been actively patrolling the area since its arrival in early September. When 2d Battalion, loaded in four landing ships, arrived from Nagasaki on 27 October, it was relatively easy to effect the relief. The Marines landed at Takasu, port for Kanoya, and moved by rail and road to the airfield. Three days later, the Marine battalion assumed operational control of the Army Air Force detachment manning the emergency field, and the Army detachment returned to Sasebo to rejoin its parent command.

In early November, the 2d Marines' remaining two battalions also moved by sea from Sasebo to Takasu and thence by rail to Miyazaki Prefecture. The regimental headquarters and the 3d Battalion arrived at Kanoya on the
5th and moved to Miyakonojo, where they established the command post and base of operations. The 1st Battalion sailed from Nagasaki on the 9th, arrived at Kanoya the following day, and then boarded trains for Miyazaki city on the east coast of Kyushu. By mid-November, with the occupation of Miyazaki, General Schmidt’s command had established effective control over its assigned zone of responsibility. By the end of November, V Amphibious Corps reported substantial progress in its major occupation tasks. More than 700,000 Japanese military and civilians returning from Korea and the South Pacific had been processed through the Corps’ authorized ports and separation centers at Sasebo, Kagoshima-Kajiki, Fukuoka, Shimonoseki, and Senzaki. Local commanders had shouldered the main burden of setting up the organization and machinery necessary to supervise the orderly, rapid, and sanitary processing for further movement by ship and rail of the incoming Japanese repatriates. In addition, more than 273,000 Koreans, Chinese, Okinawans, and other displaced persons had been sent back to their homelands. While the incoming Japanese presented little problem, the outgoing Chinese, Koreans, and Formosans did. Eager for freedom and naturally resentful of their virtual enslavement under the Japanese, they caused frequent disturbances and riots which had to be quelled by corps troops. In addition, their previous “animal-like living conditions made them a sanitary menace wherever assembled.” Only about 20,000 Japanese Army and Navy personnel remained on duty, all employed in demobilization, repatriation, minesweeping, and similar supervised occupational activities. While initial feelings were mixed, a good rapport soon developed between the Marines and their Japanese counterparts. “We were operating off LSTs [in the Tsushima Islands] during the day and blowing up guns and destroying ammunition, and I particularly remember the Japanese who did
the job,” Lieutenant Edwin Neville later recalled. “After one spectacular blow-up, they pulled out bottles of potato whiskey. That is all the booze they had, but they shared them with the Americans. They did not have much to look forward to except mustering out, but that was okay, and we were okay.” On 1 December, in accordance with SCAP directives, the remaining Japanese military forces were transferred to civilian status under newly created government ministries and bureaus.

The need for large numbers of combat troops in Japan steadily lessened as the occupation wore on, and it became increasingly obvious that the Japanese intended to offer no resistance. The first major Marine unit to fulfill its mission in southern Japan and return to the United States was MAG-22.

On 14 October, Admiral Spruance, acting for CinCPac, queried the Fifth Fighter Command as to whether the Marine aircraft group was still needed to support the Sasebo area occupation forces. On the 26th, the Army replied that MAG-22 was no longer needed, and it was returned to operational control of the Navy. The group’s service squadron and heavy equipment which had just arrived from Okinawa were kept on board ship, and on 2 November, Air-FMFPac directed that the unit return to the United States. The group’s 72 Corsairs were flown to the naval aircraft replacement pool on Okinawa, the pilots returning to Kyushu by transport plane. On 10 November, a majority of the group’s personnel boarded the SS Sea Sturgeon at anchor in Sasebo Harbor. Included were 485 low-point officers and enlisted men being transferred to MAG-31 at Yokosuka as replacements for those eligible for rotation or discharge. The transport weighed anchor on the 12th and sailed for Yokosuka, skirting the southern tip of the island instead of heading through Shimonoseki Straits which was still heavily mined. Upon arrival, the group spent the next several days at anchor in Tokyo Bay taking on fuel and provisions. “The one bright spot was a liberty party to the Tokyo area on 17 November,” reported Colonel Elliott E. Bard, the group’s new commanding officer. “At 0800 approximately 450 of the Group’s personnel went over the side and down the ladder into a waiting LSM for the two-hour trip to Tokyo. Time there was passed sightseeing, buying souvenirs, lunching at the Imperial Hotel, and visiting the non-restricted section of the Imperial grounds surrounding Hirohito’s palace. All agreed that the day was well spent.” On 20 November, after picking up MAG-31’s 598 returnees at Yokosuka and more than 800 Army troops at Yokohama, MAG-22 sailed for the United States. The Marine Air Base at Omura remained in operation, but its aircraft strength consisted mainly of Marine Observation Squadron 2’s light liaison and observation planes which flew courier, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and, more importantly, daily mail flights. Although a third Marine air base was planned at Iwakuni to support operations in the Iwakuni-Hiroshima-Kure area, it was not established and the transport squadrons of MAG-21 slated to occupy the base were reassigned to Guam and Yokosuka.

The redeployment of MAG-22 began the gradual drawdown of excess occupation forces on Kyushu. On 12 November, Sixth Army was informed by V Amphibious Corps that the 5th Marine Division would be released from its duties and returned to the United States in December. By early 1946, the 2d Marine Division would be the only major Marine unit remaining on occupation duty in southern Japan.

**Marine Withdrawal**

By late November, only about 10 percent of the Marines in General Schmidt’s command had been returned to the United States, although more than 15,000 men were eligible for discharge or rotation. The divisions were under orders to maintain their strength at 90 percent of personnel allowances, which severely curtailed the number of men who could be released. Replacements were almost nonexistent. The 2d Division, for example, had received only 45 officers and 130 men during the first two months of the occupation as replacements for the approximately 8,000 officers and men who were entitled to be released from active duty. To solve this problem, V Amphibious Corps ordered an interchange of personnel between the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions. The exchange
was to be carried out by battalions, beginning with the separate battalions, followed by battalions within regiments, and concluding with clerical personnel in the division headquarters.

Those men of the 2d Division eligible for discharge under current directives and those having 24 or more months overseas would be transferred to units of the 5th Division, while men not yet eligible for discharge or rotation would move from the 5th to the 2d Division and Corps troops. Almost half of the 2d Division and 80 percent of the 5th Division, in all about 18,000 Marines and corpsmen, were slated for transfer. At the same time the personnel exchanges were taking place, elements of the 2d and 32d Divisions would occupy the 5th Division zone of responsibility so that the occupation missions of surveillance, disposition of materiel, and repatriation could continue without interruption.

On 24 November, control of Saga and Fukuoka Prefectures passed to the 2d and 32d Divisions, respectively. In the first of a series of troop movements, the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines boarded trains for Saga to take over the duties and exchange personnel with the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines. The 6th and 10th Marines occupied other areas of the 5th Division zone, relieving units of the 13th, 27th, and 28th Marines and effecting the necessary personnel transfers. The 2d and 8th Marines sent their returnees to Sasebo, the 5th Division’s port of embarkation, and joined new men from the 5th’s infantry regiments, as did the separate battalions and division troops.

The 5th Division began loading out as soon as ships became available at Sasebo, and on 5 December, the first transports, carrying men of the 27th Marines, departed for the United States. The division gradually reduced its zone of responsibility and on 8 December, the 2d Division relieved the 5th of all its remaining occupation duties. Eleven days later, seven landing ships with the last elements of the 5th Division on board departed Sasebo.

The Marines of the 5th Division had accomplished much during their few months of occupation duty. Within the division’s zone, the remaining Japanese armed forces were almost completely demobilized; a majority of the military facilities razed; a large percentage of ordnance, aircraft, and weapons destroyed; and war materiel and equipment in useable condition turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for conversion to peacetime use. In addition, the Marines had begun the task of reconstruction by clearing debris, reinforcing roads and bridges, and establishing rudimentary clean water, sewage, and communications systems. Although most enjoyed their stay and left with a greater appreciation of Japanese customs and culture, all looked forward to their return home.

Beginning on 20 December, with the arrival at San Diego of the first troopships carrying the 27th Marines, a steady stream of division officers and men passed through reassignment and discharge centers at Camp Pendleton. Those men to be shipped elsewhere for discharge were put on their way as rapidly as possible, and those to be reassigned quickly moved out to their new jobs or to furloughs. Those to be discharged were assigned to the separation battalion—which had a highly streamlined discharge process:

He hears lectures on the favorable aspects and the pitfalls of civilian life, has his uniform pressed and all decorations and insignia added. A physical examination is taken and he has an opportunity to file a disability claim with the Veterans Administration with the help of Red Cross field assistants. The U.S. Employment Service also informs him of the prospects of a job. In the meantime, his records are being examined, completed and closed out. At the end of five days, he and his records meet for the final pay-off and he receives his discharge.

The process returned more than 200 Marines per day to civilian life. During January, most of the component elements of the division were skeletonized and then disbanded. On 5 February 1946, the Headquarters Battalion followed suit, and the 5th Marine Division, after two years of service, passed into history.

On the same date that the 2d Marine Division took over the duties of the 5th, V Amphibious Corps received a dispatch directive from Sixth Army stating that the corps would be relieved of all occupation duties and missions when the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth on 31 December. With reorganization of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and subsequent plans to reduce American military strength to only those units considered essential to a peacetime establishment, Eighth Army was designated to assume command of all allied occupation troops in Japan. I Corps, headquartered initially at Osaka and then at Kyoto, would take over V Amphibious Corps’ area and troops.

Major General Schmidt’s command spent most of its remaining time in Japan conducting routine reconnaissance and surveillance patrols, disposing of an increasing amount of war materiel, supervis-
Commanding General, I Corps, returned to the United States on temporary assignment, Major General Hunt, as the region's senior division commander, assumed command of the Corps, a position he held until General Woodruff's return on 5 April. The corps zone of responsibility underwent one more change during this period. On 4 February, advance elements of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force began moving into Hiroshima Prefecture and formally took control from the 24th Infantry Division on 7 March. Later in March, the British force relieved the 6th Marines in Yamaguchi Prefecture, therefore reducing the 2d Marine Division zone to the island of Kyushu.

Except for the movement of the 2d Marines' command post from Miyazaki to Oita, the constant shifting of units was largely over and the division could concentrate on routine occupation missions and on reinstating regular training schedules. In late February, in order to reduce the division to peacetime strength, infantry regiments were instructed to relieve respective third battalions, and the artillery regiment the last lettered battery of each battalion, of occupation duties. The battalions and batteries were assembled at Ainoura, moved to Sasebo and boarded transports for the United States where the units would be disbanded. The remaining units were assembled in battalion-sized camps which served as centers for the daily reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence patrols. As occupational duties permitted, training in basic military subjects, firing of individual and crew-served weapons, and exercises in combat tactics filled increasing amounts of the Marines' time. An extensive air courier service, operating from Omura, linked the scattered battalions and enabled the division and regimental commanders to maintain effective control of their units. Other than fielding special unarmed election patrols during national elections in April, most of the disposition work had been completed and the flow of Japanese repatriates had slowed, and the Marines settled into a weekly routine of patrols, training, and liberty.

Soon after General Hunt returned from Kyoto, word was received from Eighth Army that the 2d Division would be returned to the United States and the 24th Infantry Division would move to Kyushu and take over the Marine zone. Preparations for the movement got underway before the end of April, as reconnaissance parties of the relieving Army regiments arrived to check their future billeting areas. General Hunt planned to relieve the outlying units first and then gradually draw them into Sasebo until the last unit had departed. On 24 May, the 19th Infantry Regiment, under operational control of the 2d Division, relieved the 2d Marines and assumed responsibility for Oita and Miyazaki Prefectures. The regiment left Sasebo on 13 June bound for Norfolk; the 8th Marines was relieved by the 21st Infantry and followed two days later; and the 10th Marines departed on the 23d. On 15 June, as all scheduled courier flights ended and Marine Air Base, Omura, was secured, Major General Hunt turned over responsibility for the island of Kyushu to the 24th Division and the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments reverted to control of 24th Division. General Hunt and the Division headquarters boarded the Rutland (APA 192) and departed Sasebo on the 24th. Before leaving, however, the division transferred more than 2,300 men to the "China Draft" as
replacements for the 1st Marine Division. The 6th Marines, slated to sail for the West Coast, and service troops and unit rear echelons needed to load out heavy equipment, remained behind. By mid-August, the 2d Marine Division had completed its move from Japan and settled in at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. How well the division had done its job was attested to by I Corps' commanding general, Major General Woodruff: “Today the 2d Marine Division comes to the end of its long trail from Guadalcanal to Japan. Its achievement in battle and in occupation: ‘Well done.’ The cooperation and assistance of your splendid Division will be greatly missed.”

The first Marines to set foot in Japan after the war landed at Yokosuka expecting to meet the same implacable foe they had encountered in years of bitter fighting across the Pacific. Instead they were confronted by a docile people anxious to cooperate. As a result of their acceptance of defeat, General MacArthur found it unnecessary to institute complete military rule. His program of demilitarization and democratization was implemented through the Emperor and the machinery of the Japanese Government, which disarmed and demobilized the country’s military forces and reformed and modernized the political and economic structure without incident.

While the Marines on Kyushu stood by as observers and policemen during many phases of the occupation, they were direct participants in others. They supervised the repatriation of thousands of foreign civilians and prisoners of war and handled the flood of returning Japanese. Using local labor, they collected, inventoried, and disposed of the vast amounts of munitions and other war materiel that had been stockpiled on Kyushu in anticipation of the Allied invasion. In addition, they used their own men and equipment to repair war damage and to assist in reestablishment the Japanese economy.

Within three months after landing on Kyushu, V Amphibious Corps had established effective control over the entire island and its ten million people. By the beginning of 1946, the tasks of repatriation and disposition had progressed to such an extent that responsibility for the whole island could be assumed by one division. The occupation not only exposed the Marines to a different culture and its customs, but also provided them experience not gained from their normal peacetime routine of training and guard duty. Faced by heavy responsibilities, Marines at all levels quickly learned to be kind but firm in handling the extremely delicate political, cultural, and economic problems which confronted them daily. “Their general conduct,” as General MacArthur recalled, “was beyond criticism...They were truly ambassadors of good will.”
Sources


Primary documents on the Marine participation in the occupation of Japan are held by the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. Although division, regiment, aircraft group, battalion, and squadron War Diaries provide monthly summaries and day-by-day accounts, the best overviews are to be found in the After Action or Operational Reports of Task Group 31.3 (Task Group Able and Fleet Landing Force); V Amphibious Corps; U.S. Eighth Army; U.S. Sixth Army; U.S. Fifth Fleet; 2d Marine Division; and 5th Marine Division. The Marine Corps Oral History Collection contains numerous interviews with occupation veterans, among them Samuel G. Taxis; Fred D. Beans; James P. Berkeley; Norman T. Hatch; Ray A. Robinson; Joseph L. Stewart; Thomas A. Wornham; and John C. Munn. The Historical Center also holds a number of important personal papers collections, the most helpful of which were those of James P. Berkeley; Joseph A. Bruder; Thomas E. Watson; Norman T. Hatch; and Raymond L. Doyle.


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Charles R. Smith has been with the History and Museums Division since July 1971. A California native, he is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara; received his master’s degree in history from San Diego State University; and has done additional graduate work at Georgetown University. He served in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in 1968 and 1969, first as an artilleryman and then as a historian. He has written and edited several works on the early history of the Marine Corps, among them Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1878. He is also the author of U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969; co-author of U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 in the official chronologies of the Marine Corps in the Vietnam War; and the author of Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991, the first volume in the division’s series on Marine Corps humanitarian relief operations.

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