Cover Art: Rice Harvest in then-South Vietnam by Maj John T. Dyer Jr. in pen and ink on paper, 1969. (Control No. 1-6-175, Marine Corps Combat Art Collection)

Inside Cover Art: Recon Retrieval by Maj John T. Dyer Jr. in acrylic on canvas. A CH-46 helicopter from HMH-362 picks up a Marine reconnaissance team during the 1977 NATO exercise in Turkey. (Control No. 1-4-417, Marine Corps Combat Art Collection)

Back Cover Art: Turkey Bound by Maj John T. Dyer Jr. in acrylic on canvas, 1978. USAF C-141 transport aircraft loads troops and equipment at Cherry Point, North Carolina, and flies to Charleston, South Carolina, Torrejon, Spain, and finally lands in Cigli, Turkey, for the NATO exercise Display Determination 1976 during Sept-Oct 1977. (Control No. 1-4-419, Marine Corps Combat Art Collection)

Inside Back Cover Art: On Watch during Christmas 1983 by Maj John T. Dyer Jr. in watercolor. (Control No. 1-4-492, Marine Corps Combat Art Collection)

Errata: On the contents page (Volume 38, Number 2), the description of the cover art stated that Marine Attack Squadron 331 was called the "Doodlebugs" in 1985. The squadron was called the "Doodlebugs" until 1961 at which time the moniker was changed to the "Bumblebees." Thanks go to Col Kevin Hermann (Ret) for pointing out this discrepancy.
This edition of Fortitudine will be the last one under this particular title. However, a new publication will take its place and will be called the Marine Corps History magazine. It is our fervent hope that the name change will be relatively seamless to our readers and those who have subscribed to Fortitudine should not be concerned about getting Marine Corps History in the future. The magazine continues, just in another form and with a new title. During the spring of 2014 the division received approval from then-President, Marine Corps University, Brigadier General Thomas D. Weidley to change the title beginning in 2015. Since that time, we have been moving full speed ahead.

The change of titles has been a long time in coming. For the past several years, we here in the Marine Corps History Division have thought the time was right to transform the newsletter from its “bulletin” like format into one that truly explores the rich historical legacy of the United States Marine Corps. Many Marines both past and present may not be aware that the Latin term “fortitudine” [meaning with fortitude] was the original motto of the Marine Corps. During the War of 1812, the word was even embossed upon the cap shields of all U.S. Marines at sea or ashore. Following the war, the motto briefly changed to “By Sea and by Land.” This was an obvious translation from the long established Royal Marines motto “Per Mare, Per Terram” and seemed to suit the land/sea orientation of the still evolving U.S. Marine Corps. Some objected to this literal plagiarism and the motto soon transitioned “to the Shores of Tripoli” in recognition of the role the Corps played in the 1805 capture of the fortress of Derna. In 1848, following the conclusion of the Mexican War, the motto was expanded and became the now familiar phrase “From the Halls of the Montezumas to the Shores of Tripoli.” This remained the motto until it was officially replaced by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1883 with “Semper Fidelis.” Interestingly, the Marine Corps shares its motto with England’s Devonshire Regiment, the 11th Foot, one of the senior infantry regiments of the British Army, whose sobriquet is “the Bloody Eleventh” and whose motto is also Semper Fidelis.

Fortitudine had a longer run as a magazine than it did as an official Marine Corps motto. Started by Marine Corps History and Museums Division Director, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), in the summer of 1972, the publication replaced various other newsletters that had been published by the USMC History Division over the years since its founding in 1919. It was clear that General Simmons’s vision was to keep the Corps informed as to what was going on with the various components of the History and Museums.
Division then attached as a “special staff” element at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). He used the covers of numerous editions of Fortitudine to feature work generated by the still quite unique Marine Corps combat artist program. The work of talented artists such as Charles Waterhouse, John Clymer, Jack Dyer, Jerry Jakes, Donald Dickson, Donna Neary, Mike Gish, and even occasional sketches originally drawn by World War I-era Marine, Captain John Thomason, were used as cover art for the magazine. In more recent years and in homage to the combat art program, the covers of Fortitudine featured the work of more recent artists such as Mike Fay, Kris Battles, and Charles Grow (who is currently the deputy director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps).

In an era before the proliferation of computers and the internet, General Simmons tried to publish at least one copy of Fortitudine for every nine Marines on active duty. Often a reminder would be placed on the cover to “pass this issue along to another Marine.” It was not long before Fortitudine became fairly ubiquitous around various Marine Corps bases, posts, and stations. It had a wide and faithful readership and, while it was not primarily focused upon what was happening inside the division, the magazine also featured occasional articles on Marine Corps history and even included rare oral history selections such as one culled from Iwo Jima flag raising photographer Joe Rosenthal who explains how and why he was able to get one of the world’s most famous war photos. Earlier editions of Fortitudine included very informative historical essays on the legendary Marine Corps Raider battalions from World War II, the Navajo Code Talkers, and numerous vignettes related to the history of the Corps from its founding in 1775 down to the present day. Over time, other categories were added to include commentary on artifact discoveries or donations, book reviews, and even obituaries of famous Marines or friends of the Corps. Because Brigadier General Simmons was also the president of the Permanent Marine Corps Uniform Board, many earlier stories were related to aspects of various service uniforms worn by Marines since 1775. Nonetheless, all the stories included in past editions of Fortitudine were short and pithy but always interesting.

In 2005, the Marine Corps History and Museums Division changed substantially. Having earlier separated from its Museums Branch in preparation for the opening of the National Museum of the Marine Corps in 2006, the History Division, which had been ensconced for years in Building 58 at the Washington Navy Yard, was ordered to pack up and move to Quantico and place itself under the auspices of the president of Marine Corps University. The division made this transition in September 2005 and, due to issues related to the move, Fortitudine went into a two-year hiatus.

I was appointed the director of the History Division in December 2006. The position had remained vacant since the 2005 retirement of legendary Marine Colonel John W. Ripley. At the time of my appointment, then-President, Marine Corps University, Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret), always a strong supporter of the Marine Corps history program asked that I think about resurrecting Fortitudine to which I indicated that I thought it was possible. Subsequently, and thanks to the innovative ideas generated by then Major Valerie Jackson, a Marine Corps reservist who had been appointed by me to be the acting editor of Fortitudine, the magazine reemerged in the winter of 2007. Since
that time, the division has been publishing approximately three to four issues a year. However, it was noticed that the U.S. Army and Navy had recently reinvigorated their own historical journals. Their magazines, however, were not news bulletins written along the lines of Fortitudine. Rather, they focused upon more in-depth historical scholarship. It was also clear that we in the Marine Corps historical program produced nothing like them. So at about that time I made the decision to transition Fortitudine from being primarily a news bulletin to a historical publication that would be comparable to what was being produced by the other armed services.

Beginning in 2011 and under the watchful eye of Mr. Greg Macheak, the managing editor of Fortitudine, recent volumes of the magazine have featured articles that are much longer and more scholarly than we had ever attempted before. For example, in 2012, several volumes of Fortitudine were replete with more in-depth histories and articles related to the 100th anniversary of Marine Corps aviation. For the past two years, Fortitudine has begun to emphasize scholarly work written by in-house Marine Corps historians such as Doug Nash, Major David Kummer, Paul Westermeyer, and Dr. Nick Schlosser (to name just a few). New senior editor, Angela J. Anderson has only added to the improved quality and professionalism of all recent History Division publications. For more than 30 years, Mr. William S. Hill has been the sole designer of Fortitudine and has worked diligently to create the exciting new look for HD’s Marine Corps History.

With the planned summer 2015 move of the History Division to the new Brigadier General Edwin Simmons Center located inside the Senator John L. Warner wing of the Marine Corps University, we believe that the time is now right to fully transition our former news bulletin into a full-fledged historical magazine. Not only will the change signal that the division has finally arrived at its new and hopefully permanent location but also indicate that we have entered into a new era of scholarly publication. We hope you enjoy the new magazine.
The Mexican Revolution, a period of armed conflict and political upheaval that began in 1910, achieved international fame when the port city of Veracruz, Mexico, was occupied by the United States in 1914. What transpired in Veracruz is often remembered less as a battle and more for the quick deployment of U.S. Marines and the noteworthy number of Medal of Honor recipients recognized from the campaign—56 in total, 9 of whom were U.S. Marines. At the beginning of the crisis in 1914, both Mexico and the United States had seen recent changes in leadership. Thomas Woodrow Wilson took office as the 28th president of the United States in 1913, during which time Mexico had already endured three years of civil unrest. On the other side of the border, Mexican General Victoriano Huerta gained power on 9 February 1913 after staging a coup d’état against Mexican President Francisco I. Madero, who had only won the office in 1911 after decades of rule by Porfirio Díaz.

Wilson never formally recognized the Huerta regime as the legitimate government of Mexico, because as one of his first forays into international relations, Wilson was leery of becoming too involved in Mexican politics. Huerta’s followers, called the Huertistas, became the Federalists that supported him while he was president. Huerta ran a harsh dictatorship in Mexico, which prompted Wilson to call for a democratic election, but Huerta refused. Tensions grew between the U.S. president and Huerta, so much so that Wilson withdrew Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson from the country. President Wilson adopted a “watchful waiting” attitude on the situation, essentially looking for any excuse to challenge the Huerta regime. Soon enough, Wilson had a reason to intervene.

Map of Veracruz, Mexico, 13 August 1914. Photo courtesy of the Norman C. Bates Collection, 10562
On 9 April 1914, Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo of the U.S. Navy sent nine sailors in a small whaleboat to procure gasoline at Tampico, Mexico. Although Mexican federal gunboats had been ordered to blockade the city, nonetheless, the port was still open, and the sailors arrived unarmed with the American flag flying high. The sailors were nearly done loading the whaleboat with gasoline when 10 federal soldiers appeared with weapons drawn. After explaining their intentions and situation to the Mexican officers who spoke English, the U.S. sailors were released and Huerta’s military general in Tampico, Ignacio M. Zaragoza, offered his regrets. The affair was rather tame, lasting only a few hours, and was essentially a misunderstanding. For Admiral Mayo, however, holding American sailors at gunpoint was not a situation to be taken lightly or without remediation. Mayo gave General Zaragoza an ultimatum: (1) a public hoisting of the American flag with a proper 21-gun salute and (2) a formal written apology in 24 hours, or suffer American intervention. Zaragoza asked for an extension to the demand while the news travelled to Huerta in Mexico City.

Huerta issued a formal apology but refused the 21-gun salute, knowing that doing so would be political suicide. Wilson would refer to the Tampico incident as “the psychological moment” in which he believed there would be grounds for intervening in Mexico.

Huerta was given a new deadline—19 April—to offer the salute, while at the same time President Wilson ordered most of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet to concentrate in the waters off the coast of Mexico. The U.S. State Department then informed Wilson that the German steamship Ypiranga was scheduled to arrive in Veracruz, carrying 200 machine guns and 15 million rounds of ammunition. Wilson was shocked, but he moved quickly. With support from Congress, Wilson sent a telegraph with orders to Navy Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher: “Seize Customs House. Do not permit war supplies to be delivered to Huerta government or to any other party.” Based upon the ammunition ship and the disrespect to the U.S. military, Wilson believed that there was no other alternative.

The Brigade Commander and Staff at Vera Cruz. Front row from left to right, LtCol W.C. Neville, Col J.A. Lejeune, Col L.W.T. Waller, Maj S.D. Butler, Maj R.C. Berkeley.

Marine Corps Photo Collection
Although the telegram gave a very short and simple command, Fletcher’s situation was rather complex. The mission was actually to occupy the customs house, prevent the Ypiranga from delivering her cargo, provide all possible assistance to distressed Americans, and treat the Mexican population with consideration and respect. The Mexican public represented a mixed bag of innocent bystanders and armed hostiles. Fletcher learned on 20 April that prisoners from the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa were being freed and given arms to augment the federal militia. The military commandant of Veracruz, General Gustavo A. Maass, had as many as 600 soldiers, along with familiar surroundings and the support of the local police, convicts, and general populace.

Plans for landing began on 13 April with two regiments. The 1st Marine Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Wendell C. Neville, was composed of the battalion on board the USS Prairie (AD 5) and the fleet Marines from two battleships—a total of 22 officers and 578 men. A landing party went ashore at 0900 on 21 April to inform the American consulate of the impending landing. U.S. Consul William W. Canada was to inform General Maass that “overwhelming” American forces were landing to take control of the customs house, in hopes that the Mexican general would avert his men from the shore to avoid conflict. However, after Canada spoke with him, Maass did the exact opposite. He ordered his men to engage and defend the city. At the same time, further orders were requested from Mexico City. By the time word came from the capital to fall back to nearby Tejería, it was too late. The Mexican soldiers were mobilized and expected to defend their city—there would be a battle that day.

The landing happened calmly and without incident. Beginning on the morning of 21 April at 1140, 787 men landed—502 of whom were Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Neville’s Marines were to head northward to occupy the terminal station, the railway yard, the cable office, and the power plant. The Marines took the terminal house unopposed in spite of expecting heavy fire and trains, neither of which were present. After taking the cable office peacefully, a battalion from the USS Florida (BB 30) headed toward the customs house, the main objective of the landing. “The city was quiet—a calmness prevailed,” said Navy Ensign George M. Lowry, who played an important role in the capture of the customs house.

A block away from the customs house, the first shot rang out, which began a firestorm of bullets on pier 4.
Fire came from four main points: a pink stucco building, a machine gun on the yard of the Mexican Naval Academy, a warehouse across from the customs house, and a machine-gun nest in the Hotel Oriente. Lowry’s men, under heavy crossfire from the warehouse, ran through a small alley and took out a machine gun and several snipers. They scaled the customs house wall and secured the objective.

After the first volley of fire and the capture of most major city buildings, the Marines retired to the railroad warehouses. When they were fired upon, Captain Jesse F. Dyer and Captain John A. Hughes directed a counterstrike that put Marine snipers on top of the Hotel Alimón and American consulate. The snipers protected the ground troops and silenced the guns on Avenida Independencia (Independence Avenue). Both men were awarded the Medal of Honor after the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Neville then took the offensive; his troops advanced into an area occupied by the largest detachment of Mexican soldiers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Albino R. Cerillo. When Marine gunfire hit Cerillo in the arm, the organization of the Mexican defenses fell apart, and the troops scattered. The Marines, wearing conspicuous white uniforms, quickly soaked their clothing in beer barrels on the side of the road so as to disguise their identity more effectively.

Smoke was seen on the horizon at about 1230; it was the German cargo ship Ypiranga. When the ship anchored in the outer harbor, Navy Lieutenant Lamar R. Leahy of the USS Utah (BB 31) was sent to inform the cargo ship captain about what had transpired. The captain promised to stay in the outer harbor and within gunshot of the Utah unless a storm broke. At 1345, the Marines from the Utah landed and reported to Lieutenant Colonel Neville. The Utah added 17 officers and 367 Marines to the fight. During the afternoon, fighting essentially ceased, and the men were assigned to their night positions. With more Marines arriving soon, Lieutenant Colonel Neville put Major George C. Reid in charge of the detachments from the Florida and the Utah. Consul Canada attempted to contact an authority from the Mexican military about a cease-fire. When his efforts proved fruitless, it was clear that intermittent shooting in the streets came from sources not under the control of any authority.

Most of the casualties during the battle at Veracruz occurred during the skirmish over the Mexican Naval Academy, shown here after being shelled by the USS Prairie.
At 0335 on 22 April, the USS Chester (CL 1) arrived with the 10th Company of Marines, under the command of Major Smedley D. Butler. About an hour later, a squadron of five battleships arrived, and the combined 300 Marines from the ships were placed under the control of Major Albertus W. Catlin. The newly arrived Marines took their positions and at daybreak entered the city. The Marines, better trained for ground combat, stayed off of the dangerous main roads. However, the sailors, less skilled in ground warfare in an urban setting, traversed the main roads and became easy targets for hidden Mexican snipers. This was a major reason for the heavier losses of the sailors. As a result of the disproportionate sailor casualties during the street fighting, Veracruz was marked as the beginning of the end for large naval landing parties.

Early in the morning, an attack from the Mexican Naval Academy started. Heavy gunfire rained down on sailors and Marines. Most of the casualties suffered at Veracruz occurred during the skirmish over the naval academy. Gunners on the Chester and the USS San Francisco (C 5) opened fire, pounding the naval academy for five minutes with 3- and 5-inch guns. When the naval gunners ceased firing, the Mexican gunners in the academy also quit. The battalion from the Utah was sent to clean up the Plaza de la Constitución (main square of the city), neutralizing the Mexican troops in a church and the Hotel Diligencias. Consequently, the Marines quickly gained control of both buildings and secured their positions.

Fighting spread into the heart of the city, with women and youths picking up arms. United States troops were shocked when they found that some of the gunfire coming from the windows was from women. The Marine regiments began to push south as the naval regiments moved into the waterfront. “We fought like hell,” said Major Butler. “Since the Mexicans were using the houses as fortresses, the Marines rushed from house to house, knocking in the doors and searching for snipers.” The Marines were not fighting the same as the sailors in an urban setting, but they still could not avoid ambushes and were constantly under fire as they made their way south. Major Catlin reflected on the fight: “It was a hot fight while it lasted. The enemy was well supplied with machine guns, and the housetops were alive with snipers. It looked like a dive into a hail-storm of bullets, but we took a reef in our belts and started in.”

The Marines’ main weapon through this ordeal was a pickax. The houses of Veracruz were generally adjoined adobe houses with flat roofs. They used the pickaxes to break through the thick walls of the houses and make their way through each row of houses—without having to go out into the street—clearing each house as they got to it. Securing the houses, especially their rooftops, was key to the operation as it helped to clear the streets by removing snipers and hidden machine guns.

At 1120, Colonel John A. Lejeune landed from the USS Hancock (AP 3), having been put in charge of all Marines in Veracruz by Admiral Fletcher. The “Cajun Colonel” ordered Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long to take the 1st Advanced Base Regiment and advance west. The city was almost completely in U.S. hands and, aside from some isolated snipers and occasional shots fired, it was safe to walk the streets. The city was relatively quiet, but the Mexicans killed on the first day were still lying where they had fallen. The heat had not improved the situation, and many of the bodies were in various stages of decomposition. The U.S. Armed Forces allowed the Mexicans to gather their dead and helped with the transportation of the corpses. The exact number of Mexican casualties is not known, but an estimate made by the local hospital was 126 killed and 195 wounded. The losses sustained by the Marines were
Four future Commandants—John A. Lejeune, Wendell C. Neville, John H. Russell, Jr., and Alexander A. Vandegrift—and a handful of other legendary Marines, including Smedley D. Butler, John H. Quick, and Randolph C. Berkeley, were all present at the Battle of Veracruz. The short and effective battle and occupation of Veracruz is a success story rarely told but has the narrative of a thrilling novel. The Atlantic Fleet was quickly thrown into combat with little preparation, organization, or planning. Despite these conditions, the Marines led the successful occupation of a hostile city in an un receptive country. The public attention from Veracruz did not last long. On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated, and World War I soon began. The short public interest in Veracruz, however, does not take away from the honorable and swift actions taken by the Marines in the spring of 1914.

The monotony of clearing houses, street by street, was neither new nor illuminating to the Marines, yet the U.S. occupation was truly an affair of honor for the Marine Corps. In the two-day battle, nine Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor: Major Randolph C. Berkeley, Major Butler, Major Catlin, Captain Dyer, Captain Eli T. Fryer, Captain Walter N. Hill, Captain Hughes, Lieutenant Colonel Neville, and Major Reid. The 56 Medals of Honor awarded to the men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army is the most awarded for any single action before or since. Almost half that number would be awarded for the entirety of World War I.

The end of fighting did not mean that the Marines could go home. One of their main tasks was protecting U.S. citizens and property in Veracruz. Thousands of U.S. refugees had to evacuate, so President Wilson authorized $500,000 in relief. The city was split into three districts, and the Marines took control of the western section. On 26 April, a group of Marines from the USS North Dakota (BB 29) occupied the prison, San Juan de Ulúa, and immediately released many of its prisoners, most of whom were being held for trying to escape conscription. The next day, 27 April, all of the troops who landed on 21 April gathered in front of the Terminal Hotel. At 1400, Captain Frederick H. Delano, First Sergeant John H. Quick, and Navy Ensign Edward O. McDonnell raised the American flag over Veracruz. With the “Star Spangled Banner” playing, the USS Minnesota (BB 22) rang out with a salute of 21 guns.

The United States finally received the gesture it had requested almost three weeks earlier, and the Huerta regime never recovered. Ironically, the Ypiranga was almost completely forgotten in the aftermath of the landing. The captain was given permission to discharge the cargo on 23 April, but he decided to return the weapons and ammo to Germany instead. The Army arrived on 29 April and took over jurisdiction of Veracruz.

After weeks of mediation with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Huerta—whose military had slowly dissolved—stepped down as president of Mexico on 15 July 1914. Wilson was jubilant and believed that his first encounter with foreign affairs had been a success.
In 2001, a U.S.-led Coalition invaded Afghanistan and assisted in the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Although the overthrow came swiftly, the Taliban threat remained in Afghanistan especially in the southern provinces where the Taliban and other hostile forces led an insurgency against the Coalition and the Afghanistan government.

In the summer of 2004, Afghanistan was slated to hold its first democratic presidential elections. Before elections could be conducted, voters needed to register and security needed to be ensured. In response to these needs, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed nearly 3,000 U.S. Marines to Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province to secure the area and allow for safe voting. The Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (22d MEU [SOC]) completed Operation Mountain Storm during the spring and summer of 2004. Operation Mountain Storm was the designation for the MEU’s overall mission in the Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces. Just as Operation Mountain Storm was part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Mountain Storm consisted of a number of smaller operations, including Operations Ulysses I–V, El Dorado, Rio Bravo, Pegasus I, Thunderball, Asbury Park I–II, and Thunder Road. The aviation combat element (ACE) of the 22d MEU proved itself to be a valuable asset during the operation by providing close air support (CAS), preemptive strikes, and reconnaissance for Marines on the ground.

On 11 April 2004, the Fighting Griffins of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced) (HMM-266), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joel R. Powers, took off from the USS Wasp (LHD 1) near Pasni, Pakistan, headed for Kandahar, Afghanistan—about 425 nautical miles inland. HMM-266 served as the ACE of the 22d MEU during Operation Mountain Storm. The squadron included 11 Boeing CH-46E Sea Knights, 4 Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallions, 4 Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, and 3 Bell UH-1N Iroquois (nicknamed “Huey”) helicopters. As a composite squadron, HMM-266 also included six McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II aircraft from Marine Attack Squadron 542 (VMA-542) that were based in Kandahar.

The MEU operated primarily in Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces in southeastern Afghanistan. The area was a Taliban stronghold, plagued by violent insurgency. The MEU’s mission was to preempt an anticipated spring offensive and secure the area for voter registration and presidential elections in the fall of 2004. HMM-266 flew out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ripley near Tarin Kot and successfully supported Marines on the ground throughout the unit’s deployment, which lasted for three months, ceasing combat operations on 10 July 2004.

The heat, dust, and terrain in southeastern Afghanistan created operational challenges for the squadron. The heat and terrain produced dangerous landing conditions that caused tires on some of the helicopters to blow out and made landings difficult. High temperatures also meant that aircraft could not remain in the air for long periods of time. Dust and small debris infiltrated the aircraft and clogged parts; however, this problem was easily mended with tape for most aircraft. Large debris was especially dangerous to the Harriers. Marines were able to keep the runways and landing zones relatively clear of debris, and the six jets suffered no foreign object damage. Additionally, the mountains caused problems with radio communications between the air and ground forces. Aircraft were forced to communicate from almost directly above the ground troops as a result.

Although the squadron used all aircraft at its disposal and worked with both U.S. Army and Air Force aircraft, the aviation unit found that the most effective combina-
tion was the “skid duo,” (named for the skids on both aircraft) or a combination of two Super Cobras and two Hueys. The Super Cobras had a limited field of vision but offered superior firepower; the Hueys had a much better field of vision but lacked the offensive capabilities of the Super Cobras. The Super Cobras and Hueys proved to be a powerful combination in the skies. Helicopters, in general, were highly effective because they stayed closer to the battle. Rotary-wing aircraft could remain within range of radio communications longer than the fixed-wing aircraft, because mountains would interrupt long-distance communications to the fixed-wing aircraft.

The squadron’s first missions were to provide support and forward reconnaissance for Marines during Operations Ulysses I–V. The Ulysses missions performed route reconnaissance from Kandahar to Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan Province, and determined a location for the establishment of an FOB. The Ulysses operations were followed by Operation El Dorado. HMM-266 flew numerous helicopter sorties during the operation, which resulted in FOB Ripley being established in the Tarin Kot bowl. FOB Ripley became the base of HMM-266’s helicopter operations.

As Operation El Dorado was concluding, a Marine was killed in a firefight during the night of 7 May. The MEU responded by organizing an attack and a cordon of the area. The HMM-266 assisted by providing immediate assault support, helicopter escort, and CAS. The squadron also lifted two companies of Marines during the engagement. This counteraction showed how the squadron was able to quickly and forcefully respond to enemy threats and the needs of troops on the ground.

Operation Pegasus I began on 9 May. The mission was centered on Khas Uruzgan, a town in the northwest corner of Uruzgan Province, and was intended to restore security to a town that had been a hotbed of Taliban and insurgent activity. The helicopters were vital to the success of the mission as they regularly flew in reinforcements and supplies for the Marines on the ground. HMM-266 also transported Afghan National Army (ANA) forces and Provincial Governor Jan Mohammad Khan to the operation.

On 12 May, the MEU began Operation Rio Bravo in the Shah Wali Kot District in northern Kandahar Province. While ground forces engaged in cordon-and-search missions and vehicle checkpoints, the squadron flew in

An AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter from HMM-266 provides overhead cover during Operation Thunder Road in Afghanistan in June 2004. The Super Cobras were a common sight in the sky during all of the MEU’s operations.

Photo by GySgt Keith A. Milks.
Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040628-M-UW532-006
food, water, and ammunition for troops throughout the nine-day operation. As in Operation Pegasus I, HMM-266 provided supplies that enabled ground forces to remain away from the FOB for extended periods and to successfully complete their missions.

Two weeks later, HMM-266 transported troops into a valley near Tarin Kot to conduct a 24-hour cordon-and-search operation. After the operation, several Afghan soldiers were injured in an accident when their vehicle fell off the road. The troops had to be evacuated by HMM-266 Sea Knight helicopters. The pilots flew in almost complete darkness and relied on night-vision goggles to fly and land. Despite the difficult conditions, the Sea Knights completed the casualty evacuation and no lives were lost. One pilot described the evacuation as “one of the most difficult landings” he had ever made, and Lieutenant Colonel Powers described the incident as “true varsity flying.”

Operation Thunderball began in late May and involved the squadron flying numerous flights in the Area of Operations Tennessee to get the enemy accustomed to seeing them. Once the enemy had been desensitized to the flights, the MEU launched a heliborne assault into the area. Because of the previous flights, the MEU was able to infiltrate an area that both the former Soviet Union and earlier OEF forces had been unable to enter.

In June, HMM-266, acting as the ACE, began providing more CAS as opposed to its previous roles in reconnaissance and supply. On 2 June, the MEU began Operation Asbury Park I in the Deh Chopan District of Zabul Province. During the mission, Marine attack helicopters and Harriers provided CAS while Marine antiarmor vehicles pursued the enemy. The squadron was called on to provide CAS as the ground forces encountered small arms, machine guns, and rocket fire throughout the two-week operation. HMM-266 also conducted preemptive air strikes to weaken enemy positions. HMM-266 received additional support from U.S. Air Force Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt and Rockwell B1-B Lancer aircraft and Army Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters that were also operating in the area.

Operation Asbury Park I–II highlighted the role and capability of the MEU’s ACE. HMM-266 employed both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and worked as a composite squadron with both Army and Air Force aircraft from across the region for both CAS and preemptive air strikes. Asbury Park operations showed that the troops on the ground relied on air support and also that CAS was vital to mission success. During the operations, the squadron employed a variety of techniques and used a full assortment of assault aircraft. Marine ground troops would have been exposed to higher rates of enemy fire from combatants well entrenched in defensive positions if not for the CAS and preemptive air strikes from the ACE. Furthermore, the enemy would have had an easier time escaping had aircraft not pursued them. Overall, Asbury Park resulted in 85 enemy combatants confirmed killed, many by the ACE, and no Marines were killed.

Although Asbury Park was the primary offensive operation for the ACE, HMM-266 did continue to provide CAS, transport, and reconnaissance throughout its deployment. Operation Thunder Road would not have been possible without the heliborne insertion provided by HMM-266. HMM-266 also assisted in humanitarian Operations Nightingale I–IV, which provided medical and dental care to more than 2,000 Afghans.

Overall, the Marines of HMM-266 accumulated more than 4,313 hours of flight time during 3,074 sorties. Of those, approximately 3,600 hours and 2,800 sorties were in combat situations. The Harriers alone flew more than 1,000 hours. The Harriers were used primarily for aerial reconnaissance and as helicopter convoy escorts, but they did see significant action, providing CAS during Operation Asbury Park I–II. Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., commander of the 22d MEU, lauded the Harriers saying, “Their speed, lethality, and intelligence gathering capabilities have made them invaluable to our operations.” The ACE of the 22d MEU was vital to the success of Operation Mountain Storm. According to Major Matthew Ducar and Captains James B. Hunt and James K. McBride, there was “not a single engagement . . . that the [battalion landing team] did not have multiple sections of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft overhead. In addition, these aircraft were rarely sent home with any ordnance remaining.” The reconnaissance, CAS, and deployment and extraction of troops provided by the HMM-266 made an immeasurable difference in Operation Mountain Storm. For their service, 52 Marines and U.S. Navy sailors were awarded the Combat Aircrew Insignia.
In March 2002, the United States was engaged in an asymmetrical, unconventional war (dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]) with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. OEF was launched in retaliation for al-Qaeda’s terrorist strikes on American soil at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. Throughout the fall of 2001, the war had been fought, on the American side, with special operations forces, air strikes, and close cooperation with the Northern Alliance—Afghans who had been fighting against the Taliban since its creation in 1994. Despite the fury of Americans at the 9/11 attacks, however, conventional American military units had yet to engage the enemy.

This changed in March 2002 when Operation Anaconda was launched against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces occupying the Shahi Kot Valley in southeastern Paktia Province, near the Pakistani border. Over the course of two weeks, elements of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division and 101st Air Assault Division and assorted American and allied special operations and light infantry forces fought to cut off and destroy the enemy forces in the valley. This was the first conventional unit fight of OEF. The plan was for American airborne units to seize various exits from the valley while friendly Afghan forces struck the valley itself—a traditional “hammer and anvil” attack.

Operation Anaconda opened on a somber note with an air strike from a Lockheed AC-130 gunship striking allied Afghan fighters. The air strike killed 1 of the group’s U.S. Special Forces advisors and 2 Afghans, and wounded 2 Americans and 13 Afghans. This ended the Afghan advance and left the American light infantry and various special forces units to clear the valley of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Despite the setback sustained by the friendly Afghan force, the American infantry landed and took up positions under long-range fire from enemy combatants positioned along the ridges of the valley and on the western ridge known as the “Whale.”

Two days after the attack began, a U.S. Navy SEAL team inserting into an observation post on Takur Ghar—the mountain at the southern end of the valley—landed directly in front of an enemy defensive position, resulting in several casualties under heavy fire. A quick reaction force of Army Rangers reached the area only to be hit by the entrenched enemy. For roughly 24 hours “Robert’s Ridge,” as the mountaintop came to be known—named for one of the SEAL members lost in the fight there—dominated available American air support. Eventually, the dead and wounded were evacuated from the ridge, and air support was able to concentrate on supporting the attacks in the valley, destroying the Taliban and al-Qaeda positions one by one.

Lester W. Grau is the research director for the Foreign Military Studies Office at the U.S. Army’s Combined and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is also one of the few scholars to write on modern Afghan military history prior to the 9/11 attacks, including The Bear Went Over the Mountain, The Other Side of the Mountain, and The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Dodge Billingsley is a noted military documentary filmmaker who accompanied U.S. troops into the Shahi Kot Valley during Operation Anaconda. Both men were uniquely well placed to gather, collate, and analyze the vast amounts of data produced by a modern military operation.

In Operation Anaconda, the authors begin with two succinct chapters describing the Afghan-Soviet War and the rise of the Taliban, followed by two chapters detailing the
initial response to the 9/11 attacks and the collapse of the Taliban regime in November and December 2001, including the taking of Kabul and the battle at Tora Bora. The next four chapters provide an operational narrative of the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda through January and into March 2002. The final chapter provides a synopsis of the aftermath of the battle and an analysis of various aspects of the battle, such as close air support, mountain warfare, and media relations.

This is a well-organized story, the chronological organization suits the topic well, and numerous section headings detailing the date and time as well as which units are discussed in that section make for an easy read. The endnotes are numerous, very clear, and informative, with bits of additional commentary as well as source citations. The sources include all of the relevant secondary literature, extensive interviews with participants, and after-action reports, combat logs, and other documentation. While the maps are based on military presentations, the quality of the reproduction could have rendered them much clearer and easier to read. A non-military specialist will find some of the maps confusing.

This well-written account by two specialists with extensive personal knowledge of the battle provides the straightforward, chronological operational narrative that should be the foundational account of Operation Anaconda for historians moving forward, particularly as previous accounts of the battle were incomplete or focused on small slices of the action. Grau and Billingsley have provided the broad context and solid chronology one needs to understand the first conventional battle of the Afghan War. •1775•

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History
“First to Write” highlights History Division’s past work through excerpts from earlier publications.

In August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait; the large Iraqi army quickly overwhelmed the small Kuwaiti armed forces. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States assembled a global Coalition of concerned nations, first to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression, then to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait.

For the U.S. Marine Corps, the Gulf War was a test of its ability to perform quickly and under pressure, as advertised. A Marine expeditionary force (MEF) was rapidly deployed and then reinforced, while two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) were also deployed as the Marine Corps continued to support its peacetime commitments. Despite long months of tedium in the desert as the crisis played out, the Marines performed their duties with skill and élan, achieving a remarkable victory against the Iraqi Army in Kuwait and proving the Corps’ strategic concepts, most especially the value of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).

This excerpt is from Paul W. Wustermeyer’s, U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait (Quantico, VA: History Division, 2014), 154–58. This book can be downloaded as a PDF from the History Division’s collection of publications at http://www.history.usmc.mil.

The Battles of 19–23 February

On 21 February, teams of Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Rapp’s 1st Reconnaissance Battalion could not find a route through the minefields for Task Force Grizzly’s infiltration. Artillery fired in support of the reconnaissance effort drew return fire from Iraqi artillery, which landed short of the Marines’ positions. For most Marines, this Iraqi shelling of the assembly areas was their first time under fire. Years afterward Lance Corporal Anthony Swofford of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, published a florid, impressionistic account of the experience:

The first few rounds land within fifteen feet of the fighting hole Johnny Rotten and I are digging. Johnny is the first to yell Incoming, and we crouch in our half-dug hole. The rounds explode beautifully, and the desert opens like a flower, a flower of sand. As the rounds impact, they make a sound of exhalation, as though air is being forced out of the earth. Sand from the explosion rains into our hole. Because we’d been deep in the labor of digging our fighting hole, and the chance of an enemy attack seemed remote and even impossible, our flak jackets, helmets, weapons, and gas masks are stacked in an orderly fashion a few feet behind our position. . . . Then I crawl on my belly to our gear, and as delicately as possible, I throw it all to Johnny and I crawl backward to the safety of our halfhole, and we don and clear our gas masks. More rounds impact, and these explosions too look quite beautiful and make it sound as though the earth is being beaten, as though air is being forced out of the earth’s lungs, and I begin to weep inside my gas mask, not because of fear, though certainly I’m afraid of one of those rounds landing closer or even on top of me, but because I’m finally in combat, my combat action has commenced.

At the more northerly breach, 2d Marine Division sent teams from Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. McKenzie’s 2d Reconnaissance Battalion across the berm to scout its breaches as well. For four days, the teams reported on Iraqi movements and scouted minefields without incident, but early in the morning on 20 February, one of the teams was apparently spotted by the Iraqis and threatened by a mechanized infantry platoon. Company B, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, extracted the reconnaissance team while Harriers and Marine artillery struck the Iraqis. The rest of Lieutenant Colonel McKenzie’s teams completed their missions, under trying conditions, and all had returned safely by 22 February.

On 21 February, Lieutenant Colonel Keith T. Holcomb’s 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion crossed the berm and began attacking Iraqi positions to the north of 2d Marine Division’s intended breach site.
Within an hour, the battalion began taking Iraqi artillery and mortar fire. Two Marines from a 3d Marine Aircraft Wing low-altitude air-defense team attached to the battalion proved to be some of the luckiest Marines in the Persian Gulf when their humvee [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle or HMMWV] was destroyed by a direct hit from an Iraqi mortar. The official monograph on the 2d Marine Division in the Gulf War documented this incident: “The round impacted in the rear of the vehicle, the force of the explosion pushing the occupants, Lance Corporal Robert M. Grady and Lance Corporal William B. Noland, across the hood, from which they rolled onto the sand. Although the vehicle was destroyed, both Marines were unhurt, emerging from the wreck literally without a scratch. Apparently their personal gear and other equipment, piled behind them, absorbed the effects of the blast. After returning to the division CP [command post] and briefing [Major] General [William] Keys, their only request was for another vehicle so they could return to the fight.”

This Q-36 counterbattery radar was mistakenly hit by an AGM-88 HARM missile fired by a Marine EA-6B Prowler on 23 February 1991. Cpl Aaron A. Pack lost his life, and Cpl Timothy W. Collins was wounded in the incident.
For two days, the battalion aggressively moved in front of the Iraqi positions. Their success in convincing the Iraqis they were about to undergo a major attack can be seen in comments made after the war by Iraqi commanders:

On the 21st a group of enemy tanks . . . an estimated size of one battalion moved toward our covering troops in front of the battalion at the al-Manaqish region [center of Kuwait border] and attacked the covering troops using their [Coalition] artillery supported by missiles [and] armored vehicles . . . clashing with our troops . . . leading to heavy maneuvering and concluding [with] some of the enemy tanks and [armored vehicles] withdrawing. [At] 1500 [hours] the vehicles returned for the second time and tried to attack two different locations. . . . [The] enemy was unable to remove the covering troops because of our missiles [free rocket over ground and multiple rocket launcher] and our reserve armor retaliation. . . . The enemy was unable to defeat the covering troops and the [7th Infantry Division]. . . . The army commander called to present his appreciation to the soldiers for their resistance, and he gave a [commemorative] gun to each soldier.

Captain Kenneth W. Amidon, commander of Company C, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, was awarded the Silver Star for his conduct and leadership during these actions. As described in his award citation, Captain Amidon “aggressively and skillfully maneuvered his Company through heavy artillery, mortar, rocket, and tank fire to seize an enemy battalion position and secure a lodgment in face of an enemy brigade. Over the next two days, his calm, fearless leadership, and expert employment of forces and supporting arms enabled the Marines of his company to hold their critical flank position despite sustained, heavy indirect fire and repeated attempts by numerically superior tank and infantry G-1, Task Force “Ripper” CP Group by Col H. Avery Chenoweth. On 23 February 1991, the day before the Coalition offensive, the command element of Task Force Ripper makes final preparations for the assault.
forces to dislodge them. On G-1 [23 February], concerned that the deception was losing its effect, Captain Amidon launched a determined and well-coordinated assault to gain a commanding view of the enemy’s defenses. Despite incoming artillery, mortar, tank, and antitank fires, he moved to and occupied a highly exposed position for over four hours to coordinate combined arms attacks on the targets he uncovered.

The success of Captain Amidon and his fellow light armored infantry company commanders was in large part due to the support they received from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, despite the poor visibility and hazardous flying conditions created by the smoke from the many oil fires Iraq had set in Kuwait. The Iraqi antiaircraft defenses were far from supine as well, as Captain Troy A. Ward and First Lieutenant Kevin G. Mechler of Marine Observation Squadron 2 discovered during the eight hours they flew in support of the battalion in an [North American] OV-10 Bronco. Both Captain Troy and Lieutenant Mechler received the Distinguished Flying Cross because they conducted two flights totaling 8.1 hours. . . . During the first flight, [they] simultaneously supported two companies from 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion by engaging revetted enemy tanks and troops in trenches with close air support and adjusting artillery fire. During the process of controlling a section of Marine [McDonnell Douglas] AV-8B Harriers, [they] successfully avoided two SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. [They] remained in the battle and despite the constant threat of antiaircraft artillery and surface to air missiles, controlled a section of [McDonnell Douglas] F/A-18 Hornets on an enemy trench line which resulted in the destruction of an Iraqi tank. On another flight later that evening, using the forward looking infrared radar, [they] located twelve vehicles despite severe smoke from fire trenches and burning oil wells.

Shortly after midnight on 22 February, Task Force Grizzly advanced to the first minefield and moved into hidden positions in front of the Iraqi lines. Throughout the day they engaged the Iraqis with 81mm mortars, MK19 grenade launchers, machine guns, antitank missiles, artillery, and air strikes. The Iraqi return fire was ineffectual, and Colonel Fulks, the task force commander, withdrew his Marines to less-exposed positions in the afternoon. Unfortunately, a poorly coordinated friendly air strike prevented another attempt to discover a lane for the task force through the minefields.

Iraqi commanders continued to believe that the light armored infantry attacks, reconnaissance excursions, and infantry probes along the berm were major Marine assaults that they were fending off. On 22 February, for instance, the Iraqis believed that the enemy managed to move forward toward the 26th Infantry Division using heavy forces. The enemy tried to [defeat the division], but the enemy was forced to withdraw behind the border [with Saudi Arabia]. . . . Then the enemy returned with heavy armor toward the 14th [Infantry] Division. . . . At 1300 the enemy was forced to stop one kilometer in front of the [Iraqi] covering troops. On the same day, the enemy troops, using armor, managed to go forward toward the covering troops for the 29th [Infantry] Division. The enemy was forced to step backward after we launched twelve missiles. These missiles were successful in forcing half the enemy unit to withdraw and the other half to stop. The enemy’s attacks and air raids became rapid on this day.

Concerning Iraqi reports that the Coalition offensive had already begun, General [Walter E.] Boomer told [Army] General [H. Norman] Schwarzkopf [Jr.] “that was our 2d LAI Bn [2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion]. If they think that’s the war, they better pray it never starts. We will see.” The intensity and success of the light armored infantry is vividly illustrated in the report General Boomer was given on 22 February at the daily briefing:

highlight of the day was in the 2d Div [2d Marine Division] sector, where besides scaring the s---t out of Saddam Hussein, 2d LAI [2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion] aggressively engaged, all morning, a series of enemy positions along this general line here. Aggressive prosecution of tanks throughout the morning led to engaging tanks at 0910 with direct fire weapons, engaging tanks with arty [artillery] and air at 0930. The bottom line—and this engagement petered out right around noon, but the bottom line on the engagement is over the course of the 24 hours of operations, some 87 confirmed EPWs [enemy prisoners of war], with more inbound that the Div[ision] did not wish to take credit for until they finished counting, but they are confident the total will be over 100. Seven T-62s [main battle tanks] destroyed by fire with [901A1] TOWs [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided] [antitank missiles], 11 T-62s destroyed with air, 15 vehicles destroyed by direct and indirect fire, and 80 to 90 dead Iraqis counted in the trench lines that were cleared by 2d LAI.
John T. “Jack” Dyer (16 February 1938–31 July 2014) was a career Marine, accomplished artist, and art curator. He grew up reading John W. Thomason’s books and admiring his battlefield sketches. Thomason was an infantry officer who earned the Navy Cross during World War I and became famous for writing and illustrating articles and books that documented the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) life in Europe and the Caribbean. Jack credited Thomason with inspiring him to become both an artist and a Marine.

Dyer’s first professional job was working as an artist at The Boston Globe from 1955 to 1960; he drew cartoons and illustrations, covered news events, and participated in marketing campaigns. During his time working at The Globe, he pursued his artistic vein with art instruction. In 1960, he graduated from the Massachusetts College of Art, Brookline, Massachusetts, with a bachelor of fine arts; in that same year, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. From 1960 to 1963, Lieutenant Dyer served as a student naval aviator (nondesignated), communications officer, and with an air-naval gunfire liaison company. After completing his tour, he pursued education courses at Boston University and worked as an art teacher for a private school in Stoneham, Massachusetts. He taught design, theory, color, art appreciation, and how to use different media to grammar and high school students. In 1963, he resumed his artistic work with The Globe until he returned to active duty three years later. During this period, he became an accomplished fine artist, showing his work in exhibitions throughout southern New England. He also served as the vice president for the Wakefield Art Association (1964–65) and the Copley Society of Art in Boston (1966).

Shortly after America became involved in Vietnam, Marine Corps Commandant General Wallace M. Greene Jr. directed Colonel Raymond “Ray” Henri to reconstitute the Marine Corps’ combat art program. The Corps had great success with combat art during World War II under the leadership of Brigadier General Robert L. Denig; the original artists were part of “Denig’s Demons,” which included writers and photographers. The mission remained the same; artists were to go to war and do artwork. The purpose of the artwork was to keep the American public informed of the Marines’ service and sacrifice. Jack quickly responded to the call for artists and became the first Marine Corps combat artist in Vietnam during 1966. Captain Dyer returned to Vietnam in 1968 to continue documenting the activities of the Corps.

During his time in uniform, Jack participated in multiple military operations: joint NATO Operation Olympic Express (May 1969); winter training at Camp Drum, New York (January–February 1971); joint NATO Oper-

“Tragic Monument,” In rubble marks the spot where an explosives laden truck demolished a building that housed U.S. Marines in Beirut, Lebanon.
This acrylic painting portrays a Marine at the moment he is hit by North Vietnamese sniper fire. The painting was inspired by action witnessed along the then-South Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone in 1966.
ation Strong Express with Norway and the United Kingdom (October 1972); Marine aviation at Nam Phong, Thailand (July 1973); jungle training in Panama and an amphibious landing at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (April 1974); NATO Operation Teamwork ’76 with Norway (September 1976); NATO Operation Display Determination (September 1977); and NATO Operation Bold Guard with Germany (1978).

After the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, Jack was recalled from retirement into active service to meet with the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU); he was tasked to capture the scenes of devastation and the creative adaptations the Marines used to deal with the aftermath, provide security, and work with their international partners. As an example of one of his most iconic works, Tragic Monument shows the stark, twisted metal where the battalion landing team headquarters building at the Beirut International Airport once stood. His art was exhibited at museums and Marine Corps bases throughout the United States, inspiring and informing the public and other Marines about the sacrifices made through the experience of war. Through the medium of art, this painful story became more accessible for people from all walks of life and political inclinations.

Jack’s formal art training and combat art experience made him the ideal candidate to curate the growing USMC art collection and help recruit other artists. He contributed to the legacy of combat art through direct experience for 17 years and 32 years as a curator. He grew the collection to more than 8,000 works, including significant drawings and paintings from such artists as John F. Clymer, Tom Lovell, James Montgomery Flagg, Howard Chandler Christy, Henry Casselli, Mike Fay, and hundreds of others.

Jack Dyer’s work is direct, immediate, and honest. He exemplified the role of a combat artist in war by following the Marine Corps’ admonition to all of its artists before and since, “Go to War, Do Art.” The Corps relies on the eyes of the artist to capture the story, to honestly and truthfully draw, sketch, and paint what they see and experience. During his time as both a Marine and civilian curator, Jack created more than 600 works, which are part of the collections of the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

While serving as curator of art for the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, he wrote numerous articles about Marine Corps art and artists; not only did his work appear in countless publications, but he also preserved the art collection for generations to come. After his retirement in 2003, Jack continued to play an important role within the Marine Corps combat art community by sharing his experience and expertise with those who followed. He also continued to paint almost every day for the rest of his life. Jack followed the advice he had given to hundreds of other artists—he followed his bliss. In his art, as in his life, he was simple, bold, and true.

Jack left behind his beloved wife, Rita, daughter Erin, her husband and children, four sisters, and scores of friends.

Mr. John T. Dyer being presented an award by then director Col John W. Ripley during his retirement ceremony.

For whatever reason, this reconnaissance Marine carries all of his gear including M-16 rifle while in transit from Beirut. He was spotted at Rhein Main Air Force Base, Frankfort, Germany.
Liberating Kuwait
Paul W. Westermeyer
In August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait; the large Iraqi army quickly overwhelmed the small Kuwaiti armed forces. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States assembled a global Coalition of concerned nations, first to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression, then to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait. This definitive history describes the role of the U.S. Marine Corps in that conflict.

U.S. Marines in Battle: Fallujah
November–December 2004
Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser
During Spring 2003, a U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime. Over the course of eight years, the United States faced a persistent insurgency dedicated to expelling American forces. In its attempt to stabilize the Iraqi government, the Coalition fought two battles to secure Fallujah. The first battle was fought in April. Several months later, U.S. forces launched a second offensive in November—known under several monikers, Second Battle of Fallujah, Operation Phantom Fury, and Operation al-Fajr—to clear the city. This battle study documents the events between November and December that eventually cleared Fallujah.

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography
Major David W. Kummer
This anthology and bibliography presents a collection of 37 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This History Division publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign can be completed. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available.

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare
Training and Education, 2000–2010
Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser
U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine Corps. The initial fighting during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how it trained and educated Marines in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This book recounts the work of Marines and educators in the field and at home at Marine Corps Base
History Division Commemoratives

Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

The Path to War
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961 to 1965

Colonel George R. Hoffmann Jr. (Ret)

Book one of this commemorative series documents the activities of the U.S. Marine Corps in Southeast Asia from January 1961 to March 1965, during which time Marines saw increased involvement in the region as they served to protect American interests. While individual Marines saw duty as early as 1954 with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, the first operational unit of 300 Marines from Marine Air Base Squadron 16 was deployed to Udorn, Thailand, in March 1961 to provide aircraft maintenance and flight-line support for Air America.

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

The United States Marine Corps in the World War
Major Edwin N. McClellan

This commemorative reprint of McClellan’s seminal work, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, acknowledges and honors McClellan for his contributions to the historical field and the Corps. During his time as a Marine Corps historian, McClellan established a high standard of detailed research and extensive writing, laying the groundwork for how the current Marine Corps History Division collects and writes the history of the Corps. This brief history has been prepared to acquaint both the personnel of the service and the public with the general facts concerning the United States Marine Corps in the First World War.

Advent of Marine Corps History Magazine

With the production of History Division’s new magazine upon the horizon, thanks go out to all past contributors, both internally and externally, for their efforts in making Fortitudine the magazine for all readers—Marines, sailors, family members, researchers, and citizens of all ages—thirsting for a great story about the Corps. As Dr. Neimeyer has explained in his comments, Fortitudine is retiring only to be reborn as Marine Corps History.

As such, History Division welcomes submissions of stories and book reviews for the new magazine. Stories submitted for consideration should be engaging, high-quality, and well-researched; the central focus of the stories can be on the history of the Marine Corps, military operations, or even stories about the history and contributions of a well-known Marine or of an ordinary Marine who did extraordinary deeds. Any author submitting a story or book review should provide, at a minimum, her or his full name, email address, and telephone number(s). Story guidelines will be posted on the History Division’s web site on the Marine Corps History/Fortitudine web page under Publications. Finally, if funding is available, authors may be compensated for their work.