“We can only know who we are by being certain of who we have been.”

Gen Leonard F Chapman Jr.
24th Commandant of the Marine Corps

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About the Cover: Donald E. Dickson, former editor and publisher of Leatherneck Magazine, painted this picture about 1929. The picture depicts two Marines with a captured insurgent during the Caco Insurrection in the Republic of Haiti. The Marines were involved in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 with two Caco Insurrections taking place in 1915 and 1918 to 1920.

This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical program is published for Marines, at the rate of one copy for every nine on active duty, to provide education and training in the uses of military and Marine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue subscriptions from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The appropriate order form appears in this issue.
From the Director

A New Year 2010

This past October, the History Division made the transition from its modular facility to a new location at 3078 Upshur Avenue, the previous site of the Staff NCO Academy. Along with the move, the History Division has increased the number of historians in the Histories and Reference Branches by three. The Editing and Design Branch has increased its personnel with the hiring of three editors and a graphic designer; three new Editing and Design hires this year will allow the Division to accommodate the increased demands from the MCU Journal, MCU Press, and the official histories of the Marines Corps.

One of the most difficult challenges that the History Division faces in the upcoming year is covering the increased operational tempo in Afghanistan and also the important contributions that Marines are still making in Iraq. During the past year, under the able leadership of branch head, Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey, Field History Branch has reorganized itself to meet this operational challenge. The goal is to keep Marine historians deployed on a regular basis, visiting both theaters of operation each year. Dr. Lowrey has reinvigorated the Division’s Individual Mobilization Augmentee section and enrolled a group of dynamic reserve Marines who are able to deploy for short periods of time throughout the year. Thanks to these efforts, the History Division is now able to have historians visit various Marine Corps commands worldwide on a regular basis. For example, this year a team plans to visit the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) area of operations on Okinawa and collect the history of III MEF on that island since the 1950s. The decision to move components of III MEF to Guam will be a historic moment for the Marines, and the History Division plans to capture this information.

The new emphasis of the Field History Branch is on historical collection and preservation of the Corps’ history as it is happening. I cannot overemphasize just how important this activity is for future generations of Marines. While people and events move on in time, Marine Corps values and its organizational ethos remains constant. Future Marines, facing their own unique challenges, will look back on what their predecessors accomplished and draw valuable lessons from these past deeds. And if this past is not accurately preserved, it will be lost forever. The Field History Branch’s efforts will ensure that the experiences of today’s Marines are accurately preserved for generations to come.

The Histories Branch, led by Chief Historian Chuck Melson, continues to produce engaging stories about Marine Corps history. In addition to their own branch assignments, the historians also manage a number of outside writing projects from authors who have received research grants from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. For example, the Heritage Foundation helped sponsor a forthcoming academic monograph, written by the eminent Dr. Richard Shultz of Tufts University, on the role played by key Marines and Iraqis during the al-Anbar “Awakening,” 2004–2008. This book will complement the already published Al-Anbar Awakening oral history anthology, creating a definitive set of primary and secondary sources for future historical research. The Histories Branch is also preparing stories about Afghanistan, including a battle study on Operation Kharian (strike of the sword) and the activities of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, led by Brigadier General Larry D. Nicholson, and an oral history anthology to complement this battle study. Other branch historians continue to work on traditional histories such as Marines in the Frigate Navy and the U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991.

Finally, the Editing and Design Branch continues to do a tremendous amount of work for the Marine Corps. For example, Senior Editor, Mr. Ken H. Williams, will launch the inaugural edition of the Marine Corps University Journal this year. The production of a journal will be the fulfillment of a long-desired, strategic goal of the University and will provide future opportunities for both University faculty and outside scholars to showcase their work on national security affairs. Meanwhile the branch continues to produce historical publications on a regular basis (12 in the last year). Their new “battle studies” series of monographs and MCU Press products are popular throughout the Marine Corps, and their traditional history products also remain in high demand.

In sum, the coming year portends to be a busy one for the History Division. Our primary focus remains, as always, on the collection, preservation, and publication of the history of the Marine Corps. Our ability to work at such a high level would not be possible without the consistent and generous support of the Marine Corps Heritage and University Foundations. It is only through their strong advocacy of Marine Corps history that we are able to publish historical publications at the rate that we currently do.
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The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*: An Old Solution to a New Challenge?

by Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser
Historian

In the spring of 2004, as the 1st Marine Division prepared to return to Iraq, its commander, Major General James N. Mattis, suggested that his officers reread the *Small Wars Manual*. The doctrine, first published in 1936 and revised in 1940, was written following the Marine Corps’ interventions in Central America. Though it predated World War II, Marine Corps’ leaders saw the manual as an appropriate guideline for conducting operations in Iraq. As Major General Mattis declared, referring to Iraq that “this is the right place for Marines in this fight, where we can carry on the legacy of Chesty Puller in the Banana Wars in the same sort of complex environment.” General Mattis was not alone among Marines who looked to the old manual and legacies of the era of interventions for guidance in Iraq.

The *Small Wars Manual* is a comprehensive guide for conducting counterinsurgency operations. It features chapters on strategy, tactics, logistics, aviation, building local security forces, building civil institutions, and organizing and monitoring elections. The manual represents the sum total of knowledge and expertise acquired from nearly four decades of fighting irregular wars in areas such as the Philippines, China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. To modern readers, the manual is anachronistic in many ways. Its paternalistic, patronizing approach to non-white populations, language linking “racial psychology” and revolutionary activity, and extensive sections describing how to feed and use pack mules mark it as a document of the pre-World War II era.

Yet, in many ways the mixture of combat tactics with political strategies anticipates the approach to fighting insurgencies undertaken by Marines in al-Anbar Province, Iraq. The manual lays out many of the principles about counterinsurgency that are incorporated into counterinsurgency publications such as the Army and Marine Corps manual *Counterinsurgency*. For example, it argues that battlefield victories alone are not sufficient to defeating an insurrection and that building local security forces and creating stable governance is just as necessary to achieve ultimate victory over an insurgency. The manual states that the overwhelming use of force could often have counterproductive consequences because of impacts to the civilian population, making it hostile to U.S. forces. Furthermore, the manual stresses that it is imperative for U.S. forces to be respectful and sensitive to local cultures in order to achieve success.

For all of these reasons, it is easy to understand why so many Marines turned to the manual as they prepared to return to Iraq. The manual represents an important summary of the Corps’ experience conducting counterinsurgency operations. While it is certainly a product of its time, many of its sections are strikingly prescient.

The Era of Intervention

The *Small Wars Manual* was a product of over a quarter century of Marine Corps interventions between 1899 and 1934. The expeditions in Central America and the Caribbean proved to be the most influential upon the doctrine found in the *Small Wars Manual* and the Marine Corps as a whole. In states such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, Marines were tasked with a range of duties which went beyond conducting purely military operations, such as monitoring elections and establishing civil government. In many...
cases, such as in Nicaragua and Haiti, their presence lasted decades, and throughout this period, two-thirds of the Corps’ entire strength was often deployed overseas. Many of the Marines who served in Central America, such as Merritt A. Edson, Harold H. Utley, and Samuel M. Harrington, would go on to shape Corps’ doctrine during the 1930s.

The longest of the interventions was in Nicaragua. The small Central American republic was of strategic importance because of its proximity to the Panama Canal. Between 1912 and 1933, the U.S. Department of State attempted to establish a stable government favorable to the United States by deploying Marines to restore order, monitor elections, build local police forces, and effectively manage the Central American republic’s politics and military. During the 1920s, the Marines were pulled into Nicaragua’s civil war between supporters of the Liberal Party and the U.S.-backed Conservative president. In May of 1927, the Liberals, Conservatives, and Americans brokered the peace of Tipitapa. The treaty called for a coalition government between the two factions, new presidential elections in 1928, and the creation of a new Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional, to be officered by Marines. Marines would remain in the country to defend the new political settlement, monitor elections, and train the new Guardia Nacional.

All but one Nicaraguan leader accepted the new settlement. The lone holdout was Augusto Cesar Sandino, who led a band of fighters into the country’s northern highlands. Between 1927 and 1933, Sandino waged a guerrilla war against the “Yankee Imperialists” and the Guardia Nacional. Marines adapted to the new circumstances and conducted a range of operations which would come to be associated with counterinsurgency warfare: they occupied Nicaragua’s major cities and towns, strengthened local security forces, deployed infantry columns to seek out and defeat Sandino’s forces, and used aircraft to provide close air and logistical support.

During the Nicaraguan intervention, Marines served as officers in locally raised constabularies. In this photo of members of the Guardia Nacional taken in 1931, 1stSgt Hernandez (far left) and Sgt Torres (far right) stand alongside 1stLt Puller (center left) and GySgt William A. Lee (center right). The Small Wars Manual devoted an entire chapter to raising local constabularies.

The Great Depression and lack of popular support for the American presence in Central America led to the withdrawal of the Marines from Nicaragua in early 1933. The Nicaraguan government negotiated a truce with Sandino that year. However, the settlement was short lived, and in 1934 members of the Guardia Nacional assassinated Sandino and staged a coup d’état, ending democratic government in Nicaragua for over 50 years.

In general, the legacy of the so-called “Banana Wars” was mixed. In 1935, Marine Corps Major General Smedley Butler protested that during his service in Central America and China he had “spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers.” For most Marines, however, the principal drawback of the interventions was that they distracted from the Corps’ primary mission as an Advanced Base Force. Instead of fighting bandits and insurgents, and helping the Department of State prop up often corrupt governments, many Marine leaders wanted the Corps to focus on large-scale amphibious landings. The idea of serving overseas as soldiers of occupation lacked appeal, and Marine Corps’ leaders struggled to overturn the impression that they were the military arm of the U.S. Department of State.

During the years immediately following the Nicaraguan intervention, many Marines felt it was necessary to codify their experiences into a doc-
trine for conducting similar types of missions. While Marines were turning their focus to advance base operations, the possibility of future interventions remained a real one. Consequently, many Marines believed that the development of a small wars doctrine was necessary in order to train for future interventions. Although leaders such as the Commandant, Major General John H. Russell, wanted to focus more on developing a doctrine for an amphibious landing force, Marines, such as Major Harold H. Utley and Captain Merritt A. Edson, pushed for the creation of a small wars doctrine.

**Defining “Small Wars”**

The *Small Wars Manual* belongs to a long tradition of works on the subject of irregular warfare. While the Corps’ experience in Central America heavily influenced the doctrine found in the manual, the authors drew heavily from the ideas and theories of earlier works about the nature of small wars. The earliest of these works was written in 1896 (revised in 1906) by British Colonel C. E. Callwell, a veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan and South Africa. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* would have an important influence upon Marines formulating their own small wars doctrine decades later. Callwell was one of the first individuals to establish that small wars were distinct from conventional wars. He wrote that “the expression ‘small war’ has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking, irregular forces.” Among Callwell’s other observations were the importance of understanding the enemy and tailoring tactics and strategy to that enemy. Consequently, Callwell noted that generals and their subordinate officers needed to be familiar with the distinctive cultures, customs, and tactics of their enemy.

Callwell’s references about “savages,” “uncivilized,” and “semi-civilized” races and to “those lowest in the human scale,” are stark reminders of the author’s 19th Century attitudes and sensibilities. Considering Callwell’s “cultural superiority” mental schema, it is no surprise then that he believed offensive operations in a small war must lead to the annihilation of the enemy. Callwell recommended that “the mere expulsion of the opponent from ground where he has thought fit to accept battle is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the hostile ranks—they have been brought up to the scratch of accepting battle, they must feel what battle against a disciplined army means.” Callwell recommended swift, punitive expeditions that would decisively defeat the enemy.

Marines began to publish their own examinations of small wars during the 1920s, following nearly two decades of fighting small wars. One of the most influential of these was a serialized treatise, “An Introduction to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars,” published by Major Harold H. Utley in *The Marine Corps Gazette* in 1931. Utley’s examination reflected recent experiences in the second Nicaraguan intervention and drew extensively from the combat experiences of his subordinate, Captain Merritt A. Edson. After nearly three decades of interventions, Marines had quickly discovered that the brutal, punitive expeditions recommended by Callwell were counterproductive and hindered the ultimate goal of forging a stable and peaceful settlement. After considering these tactics, Utley wrote that “their application will probably exasperate the people as a whole against us, and tend to forfeit their friendship permanently, as well as stir up more or less trouble for us among neighboring nations and at home.”

Utley emphasized this point throughout the text, stressing that certain operations, even if they are the best tactical approach, will nevertheless...
lead to strategic failure in the long run. He wrote that “measures justifiable in a regular war, tactically sound, and probably the most efficient available, must frequently be eliminated from the plan of campaign as not being in accord with public policy in the existing situation.” Consequently, small wars were characterized by the need to limit firepower and focus on protecting the civilian population. This approach strongly influenced the writers of the Small Wars Manual when writing began in 1935.

Creating the Small Wars Doctrine, 1935–1940

The creation of a formal doctrine for conducting small wars began on the initiative of Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, head of Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia, from 1930–1931. Berkeley sought to produce a new guideline that would bring together all that the Marine Corps had learned during its experiences in Central America and Asia. The influence of these experiences was further pronounced by the fact that the chief architects of the small wars doctrine were all veterans of the interventions in Central America and Asia.

The manual was first published in 1936 and then republished after considerable revision in 1940. From the outset, it sought to reconcile the broad diplomatic goals of interventions with the tactical imperatives of effective counterinsurgency. Both Callwell and Utley had defined small wars as being simply wars between regular and irregular forces. While the new manual acknowledged this principle, the Small Wars Manual gave a new emphasis to the political dimension of the conflicts. The manual declared at the outset that “as applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.”

BGen Berkeley began the process that would ultimately lead to the creation of a Marine Corps’ doctrine for small wars.

Here, the specific political characteristics of the Central American interventions clearly influenced the doctrine. The interventions were conducted at the behest of the State Department, and the writers of the Small Wars Manual anticipated future interventions when they stated that “this feature has been so marked in past operations, that Marines have been referred to as State Department Troops in small wars.”

Small wars could not be detached from the political realities of the country in which they were being fought. The manual stated that “the military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations.” The manual also noted that purely military means were not enough to restore peace and order due to the long-term role played by political, economic, and social forces. Marines, according to the Small Wars Manual, were expected to be more than just fighting men. They were expected to be diplomats sensitive to the cultural and social norms of the environment in which they were conducting operations. Whereas regular warfare was conducted when all diplomatic means had been exhaust-

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Small Wars Manual echoed this principle when they wrote the following:

So long as there is armed opposition to the occupation, the intervening force must maintain the principle of the offensive. If it adopts a defensive attitude by garrisoning only the more important cities and towns without accompanying combat patrols throughout the theater of operations, minor opposition to the force will soon increase to alarming proportions. A guerrilla leader, if unmolested in his activities, creates the impression among the native population that the intervening forces are inferior to him; recruits flock to his standard, and the rapid pacification of the country will be jeopardized. (Italics author)

It is clear from this passage that the writers of the Small Wars Manual were familiar with Callwell to the point of (either consciously or unconsciously) quoting his precise language, notably when invoking the threat that hostile forces may “flock” to the enemy’s “standards.”

Another parallel was Callwell’s discussion about small infantry tactics. Both documents stress the importance of small, mobile forces. However, here experience certainly played a greater influence upon the Marines. Callwell noted that, in general, small wars were conducted by company sized units. The Small Wars Manual recommended even smaller forces, and its writers tended to favor the rifle platoon as the best type of unit for conducting counterinsurgency operations. Throughout the manual, the authors focus on platoon and squad tactics, and there is comparatively little on tactics using battalion and regimental sized units.

The sections on infantry tactics also feature sections in which the writers’ experiences in Nicaragua had direct influence. Perhaps most influential was Merritt A. Edson’s contribution. Best known for his actions as the commanding officer of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion during World War II, Edson was also a veteran of the interventional in Nicaragua. He fought 12 engagements against the Sandino rebels and won a Navy Cross and the Nicaraguan Medal of Merit with Silver Star. Upon returning to the United States, Edson served as a tactics instructor at the Basic School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and enrolled in the Senior Officers’ Courses at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia, in 1936.

Edson’s experiences in Nicaragua had a direct impact upon the Small Wars Manual, and reflected his often unorthodox approach to counterinsurgency. His biographer, Major Jon T. Hoffman, attributes the bulk of the 1940 revision to Edson, crediting him for chapters on tactics and aviation. Of the manual’s writers, Edson was the only one with experience on the ground in a small war. Between July 1928 and March 1929, Captain Edson conducted a patrol through the dense jungles of Nicaragua in an attempt to put down Sandino’s rebellion once and for all. During the operation, Edson devised the concept of small, roving patrols that would work like a guerrilla unit. He limited the use of reconnaissance by fire and made sure that the point men on patrols were not armed with automatic rifles.

Both of these practices were recommended in the manual. Writing about reconnaissance by fire, the manual’s writers declared that “this method should never be used by patrols assigned to aggressive or offensive missions.” The method revealed the patrol’s location to the enemy, prevented the capture of solitary guerrillas, and expended ammunition. At the same time, it was also not a given that a well-disciplined insurgent force would return fire. Regarding the point of patrols, the manual noted that “if a patrol leader assigns too large a proportion of his force to the point, he sacrifices his freedom to maneuver in combat. The leading man of the point should never be armed with an automatic rifle.” The point’s primary duty, the manual emphasized, was reconnaissance. Mobility was consequently a critical element of their task.

In most of the countries where the State Department requested Marine interventions, local civil authority was either corrupt or nonexistent. Consequently, Marine leaders often had to establish ad hoc military administrations to help restore order; there was little doctrinal guidance when it came to the creation of local civil and security institutions. While the Marines in Nicaragua built upon informal practices devised in Haiti and Nicaragua, there was no formal instruction regarding how to create orderly governance in countries where the local authority was usually unable to exert authority without Marine support. The writers of the Small Wars Manual sought to solve this deficiency by devoting a chapter each to military government, local security forces, and elections. These chapters provided detailed guidelines for establishing effective military administrations, forming a civil affairs staff, and arming and equipping a local constabulary. Marines initially
led constabularies that were built to be nonpartisan security forces. The chapter on elections stresses the stabilizing contributions of orderly electoral politics. However, the writers also acknowledge the dangers to American image caused by such interventions in the local political process. “Whenever the Government of the United States assumes the responsibility of supervising the elections of another sovereign state, it compromises its foreign and political prestige as effectively as by any other act of intervention or interposition.”

The Small Wars Manual lived on briefly after the Banana Wars and the era of interventions. World War II forced the Marine Corps to focus on a different kind of war and develop the Fleet Marine Force with the techniques and tactics needed to conduct amphibious landings. Both World War II and the Korean War would be wars marked by large-scale landings and maneuver warfare. The manual did not even have much influence during the Vietnam War even though that conflict more closely mirrored the experiences of Marines in Central America. However, U.S. military doctrine, during that period, tended to favor overwhelming force when dealing with insurgents and neglected the political and cultural elements of the insurgency that the manual was so careful to stress.

Following Vietnam, however, many planners began to show a renewed interest in counterinsurgency. Beginning in the 1980s, Marine Corps’ instructors began to draw on the manual for their lessons and assign it in their classes. Thus, when the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan began in 2003 and 2004, many Marines were familiar with the ideas and principles of the Small Wars Manual and its recommendation that understanding and appreciating political and cultural factors were critical to effectively conducting counterinsurgency warfare.

One can see the manual’s impact on how the Marines approached operations in Iraq. Upon returning to Iraq in 2004, Marines focused on engaging the population, stressed the need to respect the local culture, and undertook concerted efforts to build local police forces similar to the constabularies described in the Small Wars Manual. Most counterinsurgency operations in Iraq have focused on company- and platoon-sized patrols designed to both destroy the insurgency and protect Iraq’s civilian population. The axiom that political and cultural understanding is just as important as success on the battlefield has also been a hallmark of Marine Corps operations in Iraq, especially during the Second Battle of Fallujah. As Marines prepared for battle in November 2004, they used information operations to encourage civilians to vacate the city before the impending battle and conducted the operation in cooperation with the Iraqi National Army and interim government. This approach can be seen throughout the Small Wars Manual, drafted almost 70 years before Operation Phantom Fury. We can also see antecedents to the efforts to create local police forces in al-Anbar Province in the manual’s chapters on constabularies.

Thus, what seemed in the 1940s as an aberration and distraction from the Marine Corps’ primary duty as an amphibious landing force has gained a new status as an important part of the Corps’ legacy as it faces the new challenges of warfare in the 21st Century. Yet, it is important not to look at the Small Wars Manual as a prophetic document fully applicable to current circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. An examination of the manual’s history shows that, as insightful as the manual is, it is also a product of the era of interventions in Central America, a period with a mixed and controversial legacy for the Marines. Nevertheless, undergirding the Small Wars Manual are broad principles that state that irregular war success in the political and cultural arena is just as important as success on the battlefield; these broad principles have come to define effective counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq today.
On 26 June, Colonel Pendleton’s force, numbering 34 officers and 803 enlisted men, began its 75-mile march from Monte Cristi to Santiago. While Colonel Pendleton had emphasized in his instructions to his troops the peaceable nature of their mission, he organized his column in anticipation of ambush and battle. An advance guard of Marines mounted on locally procured horses led the column along the Santiago road. They preceded the main body, which consisted of most of the infantry and artillery, at a distance of about 800 yards. The hospital and supply train—a motley collection of 24 mule carts, 7 motor trucks with trailers, 2 motorized water carts, a water wagon, a Holt tractor pulling four trailers, and 11 Ford touring cars—followed the main body escorted by the 6th Company of infantry. During the last part of the march, the troops would have to live and fight entirely on the supplies carried by this train. Until the column broke all contact with Monte Cristi, a signal detachment maintained a telephone line between Colonel Pendleton’s headquarters and the coastal base. During the first day of the march, the Marines

Navarette, from which they would proceed jointly to Santiago for the final attack. During its road march, the Monte Cristi column, the larger of the two and the one which had the longer distance to cover to reach the Navarette rendezvous, would cease to draw supplies from its base about halfway along its route and operate as what Colonel Pendleton called a “flying column.” The smaller column from Puerto Plata would secure and reopen the railroad connecting Santiago with the seacoast, thus establishing a line of supply for the combined force during the attack upon and occupation of the city.

On 24 June, before the operation got under way, Colonel Pendleton issued to his troops an order defining the Marines’ mission in the Dominican Republic and laying down the principles which should govern their conduct in this campaign and throughout their stay in the country. He pointed out to his officers and men that “our work in this country is not one of invasion”; instead, they were there to “restore and preserve peace and order, and to protect life and property” and to “support the Constituted Government.” He continued: “Members of this command will therefore realize that we are not in an enemy’s country, though many of the inhabitants may be inimical to us, and they will be careful so to conduct themselves as to inspire confidence among the people in the honesty of our intentions and the sincerity of our purpose. Officers will act toward the people with courtesy, dignity and firmness, and will see that their men do nothing to arouse or foster the antagonism toward us that can naturally be expected toward an armed force that many interested malcontents will endeavor to persuade the citizens to look upon as invaders.”

He went on to stress that “minimum force” should be used at all times “but armed opposition or attack will be sharply and firmly met and supported with force of arms.” Enemy wounded and prisoners were to receive humane and liberal treatment, and Marines were to give rigid respect to the inhabitants’ property rights, taking nothing “however apparently valueless” from a native except with his consent and in return for payment. Pendleton prohibited the firing of weapons “unless by command of an officer, or in pursuance of orders given by an officer,” or “in actual defense of one’s life or the life of another.” With this order, Pendleton gave expression to the principles that would guide the entire Marine presence in the Dominican Republic, principles to which the Marines, with a few individual exceptions, in the main faithfully adhered.

The March on Santiago

The plan which Pendleton and his staff devised for capturing Santiago and pacifying the great interior valley, or Cibao, provided for two columns of Marines to converge simultaneously on the rebel stronghold. One column, consisting of the 4th Regiment with some artillery attached, would march by road from Monte Cristi. The second, composed of the 4th and 9th Companies and the Marine detachments from the battleships Rhode Island and New Jersey, would follow a railroad inland from Puerto Plata.*

The two forces would meet at

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*The campaign had to be based on the northern coast because there was no road passable for a large force with a supply train from Santo Domingo City north across the central mountain range.
covered 16 miles without meeting rebel resistance, but that night one of the trucks, dispatched for water, came under fire with the result that Corporal Leo P. Cartier of the 13th Company suffered a serious wound and became the first Marine casualty of the march.

The next day, 27 June, the first major engagement of the advance occurred at Las Trencheras. Here the Dominican rebels had dug trenches on two hills, one behind the other, blocking the road to Santiago. Their position, while strong, had the disadvantage that the ground between it and the Americans was flat and covered with brush thick enough to hide advancing Marines from enemy riflemen, yet not so thick as to hamper seriously American movement. At about 0800 on the 27th, the field guns of Captain Chandler Campbell’s 13th Company, along with a machine gun platoon, took position on a hill commanding the enemy trenches and opened fire. Under the cover of this fire, the Marine infantry attacked. About 1,000 yards from the trenches, the Marines came under heavy yet high and inaccurate rifle fire which caused a few casualties, but they pressed forward until they could bring their own weapons to bear. Then with a final rush and fixed bayonets, the infantry charged the defenders’ first line, covered until the last possible moment by the artillery barrage. The insurgents, unwilling to engage the Marines at close quarters, fled to their trenches on the second hill. They rallied there briefly, then broke and ran again as the American field guns resumed shelling. Within 45 minutes from the opening artillery shots, the Marines, at a cost to themselves of one killed and four wounded, had overrun the enemy positions. They found no dead or weapons in the trenches but later discovered five rebel bodies in nearby woods.

This engagement set the pattern for most Marine contacts with hostile forces in the Dominican Republic. Against Marine superiority in artillery, machine guns, small-unit maneuver, and individual training and marksmanship, no Dominican force could hold its ground. However, with too few men to cover too much terrain, inadequate mounted or motorized forces, and often poor communications, the Marines usually could not force the elusive enemy to stand for a decisive battle. Time after time, the enemy broke and ran, only to return to harass the Marines another day.

For the next several days from 28 June to 2 July, Pendleton’s column pushed on toward Santiago, severing its supply line to Monte Cristi on 30 June as originally planned. Aside from sniper fire and a couple of ineffective night attacks on Marine outposts, the enemy offered no resistance. The rough and overgrown countryside, the poor roads, and the need to stop and rebuild destroyed bridges did as much or more than the insurgents to slow Pendleton’s advance. Toiling and straining, the vehicles of the indispensable supply train managed to keep up with the column, although the heavier trucks burned fuel at an estimated rate of one gallon per mile. Animal fodder and water both were scarce, and Pendleton often had to send parties away from the main column to search for them.

On 3 July at Guayacanas the insurgents made their second major stand against Colonel Pendleton’s Marines. In this, the decisive engagement of the advance to Santiago, the Americans again faced an entrenched foe and an approach through thick undergrowth. This time the artillery, unable to find a position from which to observe or fire upon the enemy, could not support the attack; and the infantry and machine gunners had to carry the burden of the engagement. The machine gunners displayed particular gallantry. They dragged their Colts and Benet-Merciers through the brush to within 200 yards of the opposing line and fired burst after burst in an effort to silence the enemy’s rifles. Corporal Joseph Glowin set up his gun behind a fallen log and fired until twice wounded, when other Marines forcibly dragged him to the rear and a second Marine whose gun had jammed replaced him. First Sergeant Roswell Winans, working a jam-prone Colt gun from an exposed position, stood up under fire to clear a stoppage and keep his weapon in action. For this exploit, he became the first man in the 4th Regiment to be awarded the Medal of Honor.

While the infantry and machine-gunners pressed the attack in front, the 6th Company, under Captain Julian C. Smith, a future lieutenant-general, fought off a rebel force which had slipped around the Marines flank to attack the supply train. Finally, the
enemy broke and fled, leaving the Marines, who had lost one man killed and 10 wounded, in possession of the trenches. Attesting to the superiority of Marine rifle marksmanship and machine gun fire, the rebels lost at least 27 dead and left five prisoners in the Marines’ hands. The next day, without meeting further resistance, Colonel Pendleton’s column reached its interim destination of Navarette.

While Pendleton’s troops advanced from Monte Cristi, the column from Puerto Plata, initially commanded by Captain Fortson, marched along the railroad repairing bridges, track, and roadbed. Many of the men rode on an improvised military train consisting of four boxcars and a locomotive which seemed to be held together with baling wire. On a flatcar pushed along in front of the locomotive, they had mounted a 3-inch gun. After a skirmish at Lianos Perez, where shells from the gun dispersed the insurgents, the column halted on 28 June at Lajas, just south of Puerto Plata. Here, Fortson was replaced in command by Major Hiram Bearss, known to his comrades as “Hike ’em” Hiram because of his preference for extended marches.

Resuming their march, Bearss’ Marines on 29 June encountered a force of about 200 rebels entrenched across the railroad line at Alta Mira. Bearss sent the 4th Company over a mountain trail to turn the defenders’ right flank while the rest of his force supported by the train advanced along the railroad. By a combination of frontal and flank attack, the Marines forced the insurgents back to a second position covering a tunnel. Again, frontal and flank attacks dislodged the enemy while Bearss with 60 men charged through the 300-yard long tunnel to prevent the rebels from damaging or destroying this crucial link in the railroad line. When Bearss and his party emerged from the tunnel, they saw the rebels running in full retreat toward Santiago. In this engagement, which lasted about half an hour, the Marines suffered two men wounded, including Second Lieutenant Douglas B. Roben, who was cited for his exemplary actions during 4th Company’s flanking maneuvers. The insurgents lost an estimated 50 casualties. After making further extensive repairs to the roadbed and constructing a bridge, the railroad column, which encountered no more serious enemy resistance, joined the main force at Navarette on 4 July.

The commanders of the two columns represented a study in contrasting and yet complementary personalities and styles of leadership. Soft-spoken, retiring, and aloof, Pendleton was noted for his seemingly unlimited patience, but he could assume a stern demeanor. His Marines had faith in his justice and fairness and responded enthusiastically to his leadership. In contrast, Bearss of the railroad column, a noted extrovert, had a reputation among contemporaries as one of the best storytellers in the Marine Corps. At nightly camps along the road to Santiago, he would entertain junior officers and troops with tales of his past exploits and adventures. His rush through the tunnel at Alta Mira illustrated his spectacular style of personal command.

The march on Santiago came to a peaceful if anticlimactic conclusion. On 5 July, Pendleton received a peace commission sent out from Santiago. The members of the commission informed him that the insurgent General Arias had made an agreement with Admiral Caperton to cease resistance. The commissioners declared that Arias was trying to disband his armed following and asked the Americans to delay their entry into Santiago, which would be unopposed, to give Arias time for this. Pendleton agreed to this request, but he at once pushed troops forward to seize the remaining defensible positions between his camp and the city, just in case Arias should go back on his word. The rebel capitulation, however, went off as planned. On 6 July, Pendleton’s column marched into Santiago, signaling the end of large-scale organized resistance to American forces. Colonel Pendleton at once established the 4th Regiment’s headquarters in Santiago and opened communications with the Marines to the south in Santo Domingo City.
Colonel Gregory “Pappy” Boyington remains a fascinating and quixotic historical figure. His fame stems from his skills as a combat pilot and as the commander of Marine Fighting Squadron 214 (VMF-214), the Black Sheep squadron, in late 1943 during the Solomons Campaign. He received the Medal of Honor for his success in air combat, and VMF-214 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its action in the Solomons Campaign. He is also the Marine Corps’ top ace, having been credited with 28 enemy aircraft shot down. However, Boyington’s personal problems—his excessive drinking, indebtedness, marital difficulties, and reputation as a trouble maker—precluded any hopes of a career in the Marine Corps after World War II. Historians, researchers, and writers have raised serious questions about his claims of enemy aircraft shot down. Some have suggested that the Marine Corps reevaluate Boyington’s claims and remove him from leading ace status. The reevaluation of Boyington’s claims would cast the record of the Black Sheep in question and imply that the Black Sheep’ reputation is more public relations than authentic combat success.

There is no doubt that Boyington and the Black Sheep garnered tremendous media attention, then and on down to the present day. His run for leading ace status in late 1943, previously held by Marine Joseph J. “Joe” Foss, who, in shooting down his 26th enemy aircraft over Guadalcanal in January 1943, had broken Edward V. Rickenbacker’s World War I record of 25, made Boyington of tremendous media interest. Boyington’s personality—blunt, no-nonsense, irreverent, aggressive, made good copy, suggesting he was the quintessential Marine fighter pilot. Stories on the Black Sheep and Boyington appeared in the major magazines, newspapers, and radio programs of the day. When Boyington was shot down on 3 January 1944 and presumed dead, his fame continued unabated. Found alive in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp at war’s end, his star shown even brighter; he was a national hero. After the war he remained a media figure, and in 1958 his own book, Baa, Baa Black Sheep, which detailed his war experiences, was published. It sold well then and has remained in print.

Almost 20 years later the Black Sheep became a household name because of a 1976 NBC television show. Latching onto the “bad boy” image the squadron name implied, this weekly series—which continued for a number of years, even into the 1990s on the History Channel—fictionalized virtually everything about the Black Sheep pilots and air combat in the Solomons in World War II, except for the beauty and grace of the magnificent Corsair in flight. The squadron’s intelligence officer, Frank E. Walton, attempted to repair the squadron’s image in his book, Once They Were Eagles, published in 1986. Bruce Gamble’s two works, The Black Sheep and Black Sheep One, published in 1998 and 2000 respectively, provide the most comprehensive and accurate assessment of the squadron and Boyington to date. Gamble covers all episodes of the squadron’s World War II activities including the previously ignored periods when Boyington was not in command. Even today, a feature documentary about Couer D’ Alene, Boyington’s hometown and Idaho’s airport, Boyington Field, is making the rounds.

Although there is considerable “mythology” about Boyington and the Black Sheep, and there is little doubt that Boyington had serious personal problems and moral failings, there is little doubt that the World War II Black Sheep were an exceptionally effective and successful squadron. A large part of this success can be laid at the feet of Boyington, who employed effective leadership techniques.

Leadership is not easily defined. It can be measured by how well a unit accomplishes its mission. In the case of a fighter squadron, this can be both objectively and subjectively measured. Statistical information, the number of
planes shot down or destroyed, missions successfully completed, etc., are objective measurements. Subjective measures of leadership, such as motivational or inspirational impact, exist only in the hearts and minds of those influenced by the individual in question. Fortunately, in the case of Boyington, he is often mentioned in oral histories, which allows an assessment of how he was viewed by subordinates and peers.

Gregory Boyington gained command of VMF-214 in an unusual, indeed controversial manner. Before Boyington took command, VMF-214 had been in combat in the Solomons for two combat tours. The pilots of VMF-214 called themselves the Swashbucklers. Squadrons normally flew three combat tours while in the war theater, each four to six weeks long, with periods of R&R between them (usually at this time in Australia) to complete a World War II overseas tour. When the three combat tours were complete, the squadron returned to the U.S. With two combat tours completed, the Swashbucklers in August 1943 were headed for R&R. They looked forward to one more combat tour, then home.

While the Swashbucklers relaxed from their fatiguing combat tour, a group of unassigned replacement pilots, with Boyington as their leader, was designated VMF-214. They promptly gave themselves another name, the Black Sheep, and a month later staged into the combat zone. When the Swashbucklers returned from R&R, they were dumbfounded to learn that they were no longer VMF-214. The pilots were forthwith piece-mealed out to other squadrons where they completed their third combat tours. This was a decidedly unusual decision by the leaders of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), VMF-214’s parent organization, especially when one considers Boyington’s past.

He had earned an “over the edge” reputation even before the war. His excessive drinking, wild partying, outrageous antics, and fighting were quite well-known throughout the small pre-war Marine aviation force. Charles Hayes, a future three-star general, characterized Boyington as a “playboy, a real wild man” and General William O. Brice recalled he was a “trouble-maker.” Future Major General Norman J. Anderson recalled he was “one of the biggest party boys that you could ever find.” Although he held a regular commission, he had little chance of making captain when he heard in 1941 about an opportunity to fly in China against the Japanese. This was Claire Chennault’s Flying Tiger organization. Boyington resigned his regular Marine Corps commission in July 1941 and signed on with Chennault. After an unsatisfying and a not-so-profitable stint with the Flying Tigers, Boyington and the Tigers parted company, each disenchanted with the other. Joe Rosbert, a fellow Flying Tiger, recalled that when drunk, which was frequent, “He (Boyington) was always obstreperous in some way, always pulling some sort of crazy stunt—wrestling, or shooting, or whatever.”

Arriving in the war zone, Boyington continued his off-duty partying. While serving as the commanding officer of VMF-122, he broke an ankle during a drunken wrestling match with another Marine flyer. In July, with his ankle nearly healed, he was sent to the replacement pilots’ pool at Espiritu Santo to await reassignment.

Boyington wanted to get into combat and sought command of a fighter squadron. He lobbied 1st MAW officers in the course of social activities to this end. These officers included Brigadier General James T. “Nuts” Moore, the Assistant Wing commander and Colonel H. M. H. “Sandy” Sanderson, a Marine aviation pioneer and the senior Marine at the Turtle Bay fighter strip. Pappy Boyington visiting a Marine at Da Nang, South Vietnam during Boyington’s visit to Marine aviation units. Marine Corps Photo
They knew Boyington from before the war and liked him. They no doubt were instrumental in getting Boyington command of VMF-214. Although having all the outward signs of a deal between drinking buddies, they had solid reasons in their decision to give Boyington command of VMF-214, a squadron that actually belonged to someone else. 

The Central Solomons battle was winding down at this time and the invasion of Bougainville, on tap for November 1943, guaranteed increased enemy air action. Squadrons were needed immediately to subdue the powerful Japanese aviation forces that would surely contest a Bougainville landing. Transferring the flag of VMF-214 to Boyington’s pilots gave the 1st MAW another combat squadron ready for immediate deployment. A morale issue within the Swashbucklers made this decision all that much easier for the 1st MAW leaders.

Based on Munda, New Georgia during their previous combat tour, the Swashbucklers had been involved in intense aerial combat during the Central Solomons campaign. They had acquitted themselves well—they had destroyed 20 enemy aircraft in air combat, almost half of the total claimed by all of Marine Air Group 21 (MAG-21), which contained at least two other squadrons (it varied during this period as squadrons rotated in and out of theater). The pilots, however, were fatigued and demoralized. Miserable living conditions and stressful combat operations were partly the cause. A more important factor though was the death, midway through their tour, of their commanding officer, Major William Pace, a well-liked and respected leader. His replacement was the squadron executive officer, Captain John R. “Smiley” Burnett. Burnett had lost the trust of some of the junior squadron pilots earlier because of his airmanship, characterized as “erratic,” “irrational,” and at times “dangerous.” Major George Britt, who was the MAG-21 operations officer (and had been VMF-214’s commander prior to Pace), observed that when Pace died “that was the end of the squadron.”

Another factor that induced the 1st MAW leaders to give Boyington a squadron was the relative high level of experience among Boyington’s group of replacement pilots, the future Black Sheep. This contravenes the television show’s characterization of the Black Sheep as a bunch of inexperienced troublemakers and misfits. Nine of them had already served combat tours in other squadrons, and six among them had seen enough combat to claim fourteen and one-half enemy kills. Another seven had been flight instructors or been trained in the Royal Canadian Air Force prior to going through the U.S. Navy’s flight training program. Even the less experienced pilots, those who had entered the pilot replacement pool direct from stateside pilot training, were beneficiaries of a more robust and comprehensive training regimen than pilots who had been rushed to war earlier. That there were only two fresh-out-of-flight school second lieutenants in the squadron, Bruce Matheson and Bob McClurg, bears witness to the squadron’s experience level. None of Boyington’s pilots had been in trouble in the military.

The decision to give Boyington a squadron indicated the high regard for Boyington’s flying and leadership skills held by his peers and superiors, despite his personal issues. Carson A. Roberts, who became a three-star general, knew him when he joined VF-9M in 1937, at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. Boyington was fresh out of flight school. Roberts remembered that Boyington “turned out to be a real top flyer.” Future Major General John Condon similarly noted shoot down a Japanese aircraft for every baseball cap they received from one of the World Series teams. The Black Sheep offered to...
that he was a “hell of a good pilot, a terrific pilot.” Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy believed that the ideal solution for Boyington would have been to give “him an MP escort from the local cage down to the airplane, strap him in and send him off on a mission; and then have MPs meet him when he got back, and put him back in the cage.” Despite his shortcomings, 1st MAW leaders and supporters of Boyington understood that he was uniquely suited for combat, and they wanted just his sort of aggressive airmanship to turn loose on the Japanese.

With these factors in his favor, Boyington’s assignment to piece together a combat-ready fighter squadron in a few weeks, instead of the standard months, was nevertheless a considerable challenge. The character of the fighting in the Solomons had changed to make aerial combat more daunting for fighter pilots. The upcoming Bougainville campaign meant regular raids would have to be flown into enemy controlled territory to attack airbases on Bougainville and at Rabaul, instead of waiting for the enemy to attack over your home field. This meant flying long distances, 125 miles and 250 miles respectively. Squadrons were staged from forward air bases to minimize flight distances and give pilots as much fuel as possible in the target area, but it also meant that they were in enemy controlled skies almost immediately after takeoff. Such flights were daunting, layered with hazard. The Corsair, as good a fighter as it was, in its early service life had lots of kinks to work out and thus had regular mechanical difficulties. On top of this was the primitive (by modern standards) navigational gear, which combined with volatile tropical weather, made for a challenging mission. Finally, Japanese pilots, who were not to be sneezed at, would fight with an increased ferocity and determination in defense of their home bases while enemy antiaircraft gunners would fire at raiders with equal élan.

In the short time Boyington had to prepare his pilots for combat before deploying to the combat zone, he used two principal techniques. First was intense flight training to increase his pilots’ flying skills in aerial combat as well as increase their familiarization with the F4U. John Begert, one of his pilots, recalled that “we trained more in that squadron than we did in the previous two.” Boyington was willing to give pilots extra attention when required. Robert McClurg who “arrived in theater with only 21 hours of fighter time in his logbook” struggled with landing the intimidating Corsair. After watching him fly, Boyington was unimpressed. “Mac, you fly like a bag of ****” Boyington declared. “You’ll never get anywhere till somebody teaches you something.” McClurg, who had been rejected as a replacement for the original VMF-214 before it commenced its second combat tour, was grateful for Boyington’s tutelage: “I’d begun to feel like another bump on a log, and thought I’d never get home.” McClurg eventually completed two combat tours with Boyington’s squadron and became an ace, downing seven Japanese aircraft.

The second tact that Boyington employed was to prepare his pilots psychologically for combat. He realized that fear could be debilitating if not downright deadly in combat. Success was dependent on confidence. Thus, his job, as he saw it “was to get rid of unnecessary fear.” He set to work to do this. He talked flying with his men. He coached his men, imploring them to think “of all the possible problems or situations they might get into, and then think what they’d do” to establish reflexes that would kick in when in combat. Begert remembered that the “bull ses-
sions” on flying often lasted well into the evenings. Ed Harper attested that Boyington “helped me lose any fear I had in the air.” Bruce Matheson similarly remarked that “when Boyington introduced himself with a bit about his Flying Tiger tour, I was impressed. He had seen combat and could tell us that the Japanese were not ten feet tall.”

Boyington also focused his charges on the main thing, their mission, impressing upon them that their sole purpose was to fly and fight. He transmitted this, probably unintentionally, by his own disregard for anything that happened on the ground. Thus the respect he gained from his subordinates came purely from his skills as a fighter pilot. There is little doubt that Boyington convinced his pilots that he intended to lead from the front and that air combat was the reason they were there. Other facets of military life were secondary. Bruce Matheson commented: “We felt we were there purely to fly . . . when we weren’t flying, we had nothing else to do.” His aggressiveness and singular focus on flying approximated the leadership style of Eddie Rickenbacker who in command of the Army’s 94th Pursuit Squadron in World War I exhorted his men to fly as “often and aggressively as possible . . . that the only reason for their being there was to shoot down Germans.” Boyington earned his subordinates’ respect with this tact; men looking at close and deadly combat are acutely focused on combat success and survival.

Boyington drew subordinate loyalty by his recurrent clashes with superior officers, especially the one Boyington called in his book (and also represented on TV as such) “Colonel Lard” who was actually Colonel Joe Smoak. Begert recalled the poor morale in the pilot replacement pool because of Smoak or someone like him: “We sat around doing nothing . . . some idiot colonel in charge of the base made us go out and pick up cigarette butts, and he was hot on using mosquito nets, poking his flashlight into every tent.” Boyington’s willingness to take on Colonel Lard, the pilots’ former nemesis, further enhanced his appeal to the young fighter pilots. Sandy Sims made a direct connection to this: “We had more sense of unity than I found in any other squadron, more esprit de corps. I’m sure that was partly due to Pappy and partly due to the vile treatment from Colonel Lard.”

This rivalry could also have been at least partly responsible for their choosing a nickname emblematic of their unorthodox genesis, and the central role Boyington played in the squadron’s persona: “Boyington’s Bastards.” The squadron pilots changed the name to the Black Sheep, however, when a combat correspondent assured them that their first choice would guarantee they never got any press coverage.

The group of pilots gelled immediately into a close-knit group. Indeed the camaraderie, esprit, and teamwork that imbued the squadron during the two combat tours in which Boyington commanded (7 August 1943 through 3 January 1944) was a common theme expressed among the Black Sheep veterans years later.

“We had a team, and we all tried to live up to it,” remarked Fred Losch. John Bolt, the only Marine ace in both World War II and the Korean War, surmised that it was “the pressure and the accomplishments along with Boyington’s leadership [that] made it a great team.” Bob McClung: “There was camaraderie other squadrons didn’t have.” Ed Olander attested that he could recall “no group I served with that had such esprit.” Harry Johnson asserted that the Black Sheep were unique and that he had “never been in a group like the Black Sheep since then that would approach it. It was a feeling that we were the best and we’d take any job. I don’t believe I knew a one who wouldn’t risk his life to save another.” Bruce Matheson, who stayed in the Marine Corps and became a brigadier general, asserted that the time with the Black Sheep was the highlight of his 30 year career: “Never before or since have I been in a situation that was a literal life and death effort, where you would knowingly place yourself repeatedly and routinely in these remote air battles hundreds of miles from your base and really think nothing of it. I don’t believe it was a matter of stupidity; we had reliance on each other and the airplane.” Glenn Bowers, another career Marine officer, remarked that “looking back on my military career, the only regret I have is that the squadrons I was in following the Black Sheep could not have been the same kind of outfit. They just didn’t have the same leadership or teamwork.”

It is evident that Boyington’s reputation, tutelage, and charisma won
over his men. In combat he proved to be the genuine article, aggressively seeking out and closing with the enemy. His record of enemy planes shot down lends credence to that. Subordinates noted his aerial leadership, all-important in a fighter squadron. John Begert recalled that "Boyington was very strict on air discipline." John Bolt got a serious chewing out by Boyington when he flew without permission to Vella Lavella to shoot up a harbor full of Japanese barges. In another instance, on a mission over Rabaul in December 1943, Boyington, leading a formation of Black Sheep, orbited overhead waiting for Japanese fighters to come up and fight. The only enemy plane spotted was a "Rufe" floatplane several thousand feet below the Corsairs. Bob McClurg stealthily slipped out of formation, dropped down, and dispatched the easy target. When he got back in formation, there was Boyington glaring at him. He "shook his fist and wagged his finger at me," McClurg recalled, "as if to say, 'Don't pull that!'

While being an exacting flight leader, Boyington impressed his pilots by his willingness to forego the privileges of rank, ostensibly on their behalf. Rollie Rinabarger noted the tendency of some squadron commanders to surround themselves with the best pilots in the squadron: "I didn't like the way some of the other squadrons were handled . . . the CO put the best people on his wing instead of having them lead divisions where they'd do the most good." Boyington's division (a four-plane tactical formation) was made up of Don Fisher, as his wingman, Virgil Ray as the other section leader (a two-plane subdivision of the division) with Walter Harris as Ray's wingman. Fisher and Harris were both first tour lieutenants with no combat experience. Ray was probably the weakest veteran pilot in the squadron. Later in the tour he admitted to not being able to handle combat and was eased out of flying combat sorties.

Boyington also forewent the commanding officer's prerogative of having the squadron's best aircraft as his own. Instead, Boyington deferred to the less experienced pilots which made a significant impression on the young pilots who were just learning to handle the intimidating Corsair and were quite aware of its propensity for mechanical difficulties. Al Johnson recalled the day the squadron got a rare commodity, a brand new Corsair. It was Boyington's to fly. Boyington, however, assigned the plane to Johnson, a new lieutenant short on experience. Ned Corman corroborated this characteristic, remembering that "the Black Sheep had the same number of planes and pilots as other squadrons, but the CO had his plane, and the Exec had his, and nobody touched those planes. What a difference! I remember going to our ready room and it was a recital. The officer of the day would assign a new plane to Boyington, and he would go and erase the number, giving it to one of the new guys, saying: 'Give me one of those old klunkers. I'll fly circles around them anyway.'" Perry Lane admitted that this characteristic increased the trust he had in Boyington. "He was one of the boys on the ground, but he knew what he was doing in the air, and we knew he was on the level with us. If you got a lousy aircraft, you figured, he's got one too."

The statistics indicate that Boyington fulfilled the expectations placed on him when assigned a squadron. During their first combat tour the Black Sheep maintained an impressive operational tempo. During VMF-214's previous combat tour, from 22 July to 31 August, the Swashbucklers flew 69 missions. Boyington's squadron flew 129 missions in a shorter span, 14 September to 21 October. Boyington's VMF-214 killed more of the enemy and at a greater rate, shooting down 57 enemy planes in this first combat tour compared to the Swashbucklers' 20 in the tour that preceded. The Black Sheep were only one-tenth of the total fighter force of 300 participating in the assault on Bougainville's air power. They made a larger contribution proportionately to the fight. Out of the 158 missions flown against targets on Bougainville or neighboring Choiseul during October, the Black Sheep flew 18, slightly more than 10 percent. Of the claimed 139 enemy planes shot down by Allied fliers in the same arena in the same period, the Black Sheep scored 42, almost one-third of the total. During the Black Sheep's second combat tour, 27 November 1943–6 January 1944, the squadron's operational tempo matched that of the first combat tour. The Black Sheep flew 151 total missions and claimed 40 enemy aircraft kills, bringing their two combat tour total kill count to 94. Boyington claimed 22 of these. These are notable statistics. The kill ratio for the Black Sheep was remarkably high compared to other squadrons. In the period 17 December 1943 until the end of the year, at the height of the air battle for Rabaul, 147 Japanese aircraft were shot down. The Black Sheep claimed 28 of these, or about one-fifth, while contributing about one-tenth of the fighter force.

His pilots in years later gave Boyington credit for the squadron's kill rate. Bill Case credited Boyington's aggressive leadership as a factor: "He was an aggressive person and a lot of that rubbed off." The fact that nine of Boyington's subordinates became aces lends credence to Case's statement. Henry Miller, the only pilot that served in both the Swashbucklers and the Black Sheep, agreed that "one of the mistakes I think was made by Marine leaders in aviation at that time was that there was very little general instruction given to pilots about getting into a fight and sluging it out, dominating the enemy by your own aggressiveness. The attitude was more or less do your own thing. Boyington's main characteristic was the desire and willingness to get right in there, ride as close as he could, do a lot of shooting without regard to himself."

Fearlessness in the face of the enemy, knowledge, competence, and tactical skills are all important leadership traits, and they were displayed by Boyington. His squadron's combat success, and the trust and loyalty of his subordinates are important characteristics of quality leadership, and they were characteristic of Pappy Boyington while leading the Black Sheep squadron.
This month Fortitudine features the last of four artists who had their art work shown at the Navy Art Gallery from September 2008 to February 2009. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael D. Fay was interviewed about his favorite art piece, "Lance Corporal Nicholas G. Ciccone."

Fay arrived at Kandahar International Airport with the rest of the Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit out of Camp Lejuene. He was waiting in the terminal building for a patrol from K Company to come back; this patrol, called a "Gilligans Patrol," had been out for nine days on what was supposed to be a 12-hour patrol. Fay stated that it was a bitterly cold January 2002 as he and the journalists waited for K Company.

Finally, the helicopters showed up and K Company walked into the terminal building. Fay snapped away with his 35 mm SR camera. He stated that the Marines had "the look . . . the 1000 yard stare." Looking at the Marines as they walked into the hangar, Fay stated that everyone dropped their packs, dropped they weight; however, looking at Ciccone, Fay saw that "even though the pack was off, the helmet is off, the weight was still there . . . there was a burden there." The Marines of K Company had fought the elements with multiple layers of clothing, hadn’t shaved, had matted hair inside their helmets—“there was a real primitiveness to how they looked.”

Fay didn’t get a chance to look at the pictures until he got back to the U.S. When he started looking at one of Ciccone’s photos, he thought it had a “Renaissance feel . . . like an Italian painting.” He stated that “between the poise, his stance, the look on his face, that as an artist, there it is, there is the image of what it was like to be a Marine in Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.” He stated that the Ciccone photo had something “ineffable” about it and “felt compelled to do something with it.”

Fay “spent two months on it . . . the drawing took on a life of its own.” After doing a charcoal sketch on newsprint, he then drew another rendition on 18 x 24 inch paper, using a soft graphite pencil. He used a technique called “cross-hatching” and then used a soft sable brush to give a “delicate tone” and avoid smearing.

Fay eventually put a picture of Ciccone in his Internet blog and “got an email from Lance Corporal Ciccone’s step-brother, Matthew” who told him that Ciccone had committed suicide after he got discharged from the Marine Corps. Fay, in explaining the interplay of art and death, stated that the picture captured something about the burden of Ciccone that prefigured his suicide; his family said that when he came back that “he had been changed.” The family also stated that they “loved the image” and thought the picture was “absolutely him.”

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In Memoriam

Passing of Colonel John G. Miller, Former Deputy Director of History and Museums Division

by Robert V. Aquilina
Reference Historian

The Marine Corps History Division, along with all friends of Marine Corps history, lost a respected former colleague and friend with the 31 August 2009 death in Annapolis, Maryland, of Colonel John G. Miller, at the age of 74. The Annapolis native was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in June 1957, following graduation from Yale University, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in English. He completed The Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, in February 1958. His early duties and assignments included service with all three infantry regiments of the 1st Marine Division, as Registrar with the Marine Corps Institute, and as Assistant S-3 officer of the Marine Barracks at 8th and I, Washington, D.C. He completed the U.S. Army Infantry School/Airborne School, Fort Benning, Georgia, in June 1965. In January 1970, he completed the Armed Forces Staff College and then attended the Marine Advisor Course at Quantico. During the Vietnam War, Colonel Miller served two tours of combat duty in the Far East. From June 1965 to May 1966, he served in the Republic of Vietnam as a rifle company commander and battalion S-3 with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and participated in Operations Harvest Moon, Virginia, Chero-kee, and Wayne, earning the Bronze Star Medal with Combat “V.” His second tour, from June 1970 to May 1971, was, consecutively, as battalion, brigade, and division advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in Cambodia and in the Republic of South Vietnam. He took part in Operations Song Than XVI, Vu Ninh XII, and Lam Son 719. For his service during this tour of duty, he earned the Legion of Merit with Combat “V,” the Vietnamese Honor Medal, 1st Class, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Bronze Star. Upon returning from his second combat tour in June 1971, he reported for duty at Headquarters, Marine Corps in the Policy Analysis Division (later Special Projects Directorate) as principal speechwriter for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. After serving vice with the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit. He then returned to Headquarters, Marine Corps where he was promoted to colonel on 1 April 1979. He served consecutively as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, and Head of the Amphibious Requirements Branch, Operations Division, until June 1982. Colonel Miller’s next duty was as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the III Marine Amphibious Force on Okinawa. In June 1983, he began his final duty assignment, as Deputy Director for History at the Marine Corps History and Museums Division. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1985 and subsequently served for 15 years as Managing Editor of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine. His best known work, The Bridge at Dong Ha, received rave reviews and is considered a classic of Vietnam War literature. Ironically, Colonel Miller was to have received the 2009 Brigadier General Robert L. Denig Memorial Distinguished Performance Award at the United States Marine Corps Combat Correspondents Association Annual Merit Awards Banquet. At the time of his death, he was working on a history of the Marine Barracks at 8th and I, Washington, D.C. Colonel Miller ranks among the most highly respected Deputy Directors ever to have served at the Marine Corps History and Museums Division. He left behind an enduring legacy of professional excellence that was coupled with a quiet, compassionate demeanor. He certainly will be missed by his many friends, associates, and anyone who has an interest in the history of the Marine Corps.
The “Annual Chronology of the Marine Corps” serves as a valuable source of information on significant events and dates in contemporary Marine Corps history. Since 1982, the Historical Reference Branch of the Marine Corps History Division has compiled the yearly chronology by researching numerous primary and secondary sources each week. The following excerpts highlight key entries from the 2008 Chronology including the ongoing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

To see past annual chronologies as well as the complete 2008 Chronology, please visit the Frequently Requested section of the History Division’s website at <www.history.usmc.mil>.

1 January. The strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,409,897 of whom 186,342 were U.S. Marines.

15 January. Marine Corps officials announced that approximately 3,200 Marines and sailors with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would be deployed in the spring of 2008 to Afghanistan in response to a request for additional forces from the NATO-International Security Assistance Force commander.

22 February. Marine Corps Special Operations Command commemorated its second anniversary by breaking ground for its new headquarters building at Camp Lejeune.

25 February. China finally agreed to the long-standing request from the U.S. to permit access to sensitive military records that might hold information regarding the fate of numerous U.S. service members still unaccounted for from the Korean War. The agreement did not give U.S. researchers direct access to the records but was viewed as a positive step.

3 March. It was announced that the Toys for Tots charity was expanding to include a new year-round literacy program. The charity, one of the largest and most well-known in the U.S., began raising money to purchase books for needy kids as well as help fund literacy programs at libraries.

7 March. The special court of inquiry commissioned to hear testimony regarding Marines killing 19 Afghani civilians in March 2007 delivered its report to LtGen Samuel T. Helland, commander of Marine Corps Forces, Central Command. Due to the inclusion of classified material, the report was not made public.

19 March. This date marked the fifth anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

11 April. The keel was laid for the USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) at the Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine. Named in honor of Medal of Honor recipient Cpl Jason Dunham, the ship will be an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, 511 feet long with berths for 380 service members when completed.

16 April. The Department of Defense (DOD) approved the wearing of campaign stars on the Afghanistan and Iraq Campaign Medals for service members who have been on multiple deployments to those areas. One campaign star may be worn for participation in each of the campaign phases designated by DOD. Marine Administrative Message 299/08 (MARADMIN 299/08) was released on 20 May 2008 with the inclusive dates.

19 April. The historic deployment of the Marine Corps’ first operational Osprey squadron came to an end as the main body of Marine Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (VMM-263) returned home to MCAS New River, North Carolina. The squadron spent seven months operating out of the al-Asad Air Base and was replaced by VMM-162.

25 April. Marine Corps Security Forces Battalion was redesignated Marine Corps Security Forces Regiment in a ceremony at Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia. Commandant of the

26 April. All Marine Message 015/08 (ALMAR 015/08) announced that Capt Jonathan R. Smith from Battalion Landing Team 2/4, 31st MEU, was selected as the 2007 recipient of the Leftwich Trophy for Outstanding Leadership.

20 May. The Marine Corps officially reactivated the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, during a ceremony at Camp Lejeune. The battalion had been deactivated since 1994.

23 May. LtGen Samuel T. Helland, the commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command, made the decision not to bring criminal charges against two officers whose special operations unit was accused of killing as many as 19 Afghan civilians in March 2007. The general made the decision after reviewing the findings of a special tribunal that had spent three weeks hearing testimony in the case in January.

5 June. Jacklyn “Jack” H. Lucas, the youngest Marine to receive the Medal of Honor, died at the age of 80 in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. In February 1945, Lucas was just days past his 17th birthday when he hurled himself onto two enemy grenades and saved the lives of other Marines during the battle for Iwo Jima. He spent the next several months undergoing dozens of surgeries to remove shrapnel. He was laid to rest at Highland Cemetery in Hattiesburg.

11 June. The Marine variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft made its first test flight near Fort Worth, Texas. The JSF is a short take-off vertical landing fighter jet being developed by Lockheed Martin.

1 July. The Department of Defense marked the 35th anniversary of the nation’s all-volunteer armed forces. Until July 1973, the military operated under an involuntary draft policy to produce manpower to fight the United States’ wars. Draftees served during both world wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

2 July. LtGen James F. Amos was advanced to the rank of general and assumed duties as the 31st Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Gen Amos replaced Gen Robert Magnus who officially retired from active service on 1 September 2008.

26 July. This date marked the 60th Anniversary of President Harry S. Truman signing the executive order to integrate the armed forces, allowing African-American troops to serve in a desegregated military.

26 August. Iraqi leaders signed the Command and Control Memorandum of Understanding in a ceremony at the Anbar Governance Center in the al-Anbar Province, a step toward taking full control and responsibility for security from Coalition forces.

1 September. Iraqi security forces assumed responsibility for security of al-Anbar Province. The Marine Corps main area of operation, al-Anbar Province was the 11th of Iraq’s 18 provinces to come under provincial Iraqi control. Marines remained deployed to the area to provide support and training to the Iraqi security forces.

8 September. U.S. Marines from the 24th MEU turned over responsibility for Garmser in the southern province of Helmand to the British and Afghans. Marines retook the key town from Taliban militants in an operation earlier in the year.

1 October. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command, transferred operational control of Marine Corps forces in the Horn of Africa region to the newly established Marine Corps Forces, Africa, under the fledgling U.S. Africa Command.

6 October. The Pentagon announced a revision to the Purple Heart eligibility criteria for prisoners of war (POWs) who died in captivity. The revised policy allows for the retroactive awarding of the medal to qualifying POWs from 7 December 1941 forward and has the potential to affect 17,000 former service members.

23 October. Today marked the 25th Anniversary of the devastating bombing of the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1983, 241 American servicemen, 220 who were Marines, were killed when a suicide bomber drove a truck laden with explosives into the four-story barracks building while the men slept. The attack was the deadliest single day in Marine Corps history since the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II.

26 October. Nearly 20,000 runners gathered in the Washington D.C. area to participate in the 33rd Annual Marine Corps Marathon. The male and female first-place finishers were first time competitors in the 26.2 mile run: Andrew Dumm finished in a little over 2 hours 22 minutes; Cate Fenster finished in 2 hours 48 minutes.


Official Marine Corps Photo by Sgt John J. Parry
28 October. Navy Cross recipient and former director of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Col John W. Ripley, passed away at his home in Annapolis, Maryland, at the age of 69. His death came mere months after becoming the only Marine to be inducted into the U.S. Army Rangers Hall of Fame. He was laid to rest at his alma mater, the U.S. Naval Academy, on 7 November.

30 October. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Robert H. Barrow, died in St. Francisville, Louisiana, at the age of 86. A veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, he served as Commandant from 1979 to 1983. Gen Barrow was instrumental in drafting reforms for both Marine recruiting and training during his time as Commandant. He was laid to rest with full military honors on 3 November in St. Francisville.

4 November. Barack Obama was elected as the 44th President of the United States of America.

10 November. Marines around the world celebrated the Marine Corps’ 233rd Birthday. Ceremonies were held across the U.S. and elsewhere, including Iraq and Afghanistan, as Marines came together to celebrate the Corps’ history and to look to the future.

14 November. The last of the 3,000 Marines stationed in Fallujah, Iraq, were pulled out of the city center as part of the U.S. plan to hand security operations for the city over to Iraqi security forces.


29 December. Three-war veteran and author, LtGen Victor H. Krulak, passed away at Scripps Memorial Hospital in La Jolla, California, at the age of 95. He was laid to rest at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery, San Diego, California.

31 December. The strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,444,553 of whom 198,902 were U.S. Marines.

Historians Tour the White House

Historians from the Marine Corps History Division and Naval History and Heritage Command take a tour of the White House, 19 August 2009. The participants contribute historical vignettes to the Director of the Navy Staff’s “End of Day” speeches. Contributors from the History Division include: (1) Nicholas J. Schlosser, (2) Annette D. Amerman; (3) Thomas M. Baughn, (4) Kara R. Newcomer, (5) Robert V. Aquilina, (6) Lena M. Kaljor, and (7) Paul W. Westermeyer.
History Division is soliciting input from the readers of Fortitudine regarding the current format and future articles—feature topics, types of articles (history making news versus history stories)—and value to your understanding of Marine Corps history.

If you have comments about Fortitudine or about the number of magazines you receive, please contact me.

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