FORTITUDINE

Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 era.

Volume XII  Spring 1983  No. 4

This quarterly newsletter of the Marine Corps historical program is published for the Corps and for friends of Marine Corps history in accordance with Department of the Navy Publications and Printing Regulations NAVEXOS P-35. Individuals and institutions desiring Fortitudine on a complimentary regular basis are invited to apply to: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code HDS-1), Washington, D.C. 20380.

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THE COVER

The cover by Combat Artist John Groth, was the basis for his 1967 painting, "Marble Mountain Patrol," above left. In this watercolor wash over brown and black ink work, Combined Action Platoon (CAP) Marines check Vietnamese identification cards, with Marble Mountain, near Danang, in the background. Groth, above right, produced 155 drawings for the Marine Corps Combat Art Collection. As the Marine Corps Combat Art Program's first civilian artist, he covered Marine action in Vietnam in 1967, having previously covered World War II in Europe, and other action in Korea, French Indochina, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic.

Fortitudine is produced in the Publications Production Section of the History and Museums Division. The text for Fortitudine is set in 10 point and 8 point Garamond typeface. Headlines are in 18 point or 24 point Garamond. The newsletter is printed on 70-pound, matte-coated paper. Printing, by offset lithography, is by the Defense Printing Service.
Vietnam Histories: Where We Are

Gen William C. Westmoreland came to see us at the Marine Corps Historical Center the afternoon of 4 April. What prompted his visit was the draft of *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-71* we had sent to him for comment. There isn't much in this draft about Gen Westmoreland who by 1970 was out of Vietnam and Chief of Staff of the Army. However, in the introductory paragraphs there is a summary on strategy which amongst other things says:

Many, including General William C. Westmoreland, General Abrams' predecessor as ComUSMACV, favored giving priority to the big-unit war and were willing to divert troops from pacification to mount multibattalion sweeps into remote enemy base areas. . . . General Abrams, who took over as ComUSMACV after the Tet offensive in 1968, at once began moving toward a more balanced strategy. Late in 1968 he promulgated what he called the "One War" concept as the guiding principle for Allied operations.

Gen Westmoreland took exception to our statement that he and Gen Abrams viewed the prosecution of the war differently. He had started to write me a letter, but, being in Washington for reasons connected with his $130 million suit against Columbia Broadcasting System over the 1982 CBS broadcast "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," he decided to visit us instead.

I assembled our three civilian and three Marine writers who are working on the Vietnam histories and we had what amounted to a seminar. With Gen Westmoreland's permission, we taped the proceedings. The first hour was given over to a detailed exposition by Gen Westmoreland on his conduct of the war. He objected strenuously to our assertion that Gen Abrams had made a major change in the way the war was fought. Said Gen Westmoreland:

The change was the situation. It was not the personality because General Abrams was my deputy for over a year. He and I consulted about almost every tactical action. . . . I do not remember a single instance where our views and the courses of action we thought were proper differed in any way, to include the situation in the I Corps area.

The "changed situation," in Westmoreland's view, was the result of the smashing of the enemy's 1968 Tet offensive. With the enemy main force defeated, Westmoreland, and, after Westmoreland left in June, Abrams were able to concentrate "a lot more on the guerrillas and the local forces as opposed to the main forces."

Gen Westmoreland is just one of 257 persons, mostly Marine Corps officers, to whom we sent the Vietnam 1970-71 working draft for comment. As I write this we have heard from 170 respondents. Some of the replies are simple "attaboys," but more often and more usefully they are substantial. As for example: a number of reviewers have pointed out that the 1970-71 draft has a great gaping hole as to the role played by communicators and communications. Responses from reviewers come in the form of letters, documents, photographs, tapes, and quite often, as in the case of Gen Westmoreland, visits and follow-on interviews.

Three volumes of our sequential *U.S. Marines in Vietnam* series have now been published. First to appear was *The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964*, by Capt Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR,

When Gen Westmoreland visited, he very generously gave each of our six writers the opportunity to question him on issues fundamental to their particular volumes. Seven books remain to be done in the sequential series. Three of these are fairly close to completion and we hope to have the whole series published by 1987.

Next in line for publication is *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967* (It doesn't yet have an approved sub-title.) The author, Mr. V. Keith Fleming, is in the last stages of reconciling reviewers' comments. Keith, who has behind him 13 years enlisted and commissioned service in the Marine Corps, was a company commander in the 7th Marines in Vietnam in 1966-67. He pointed out to Gen Westmoreland that the last Special Landing Force operation conducted outside I Corps tactical zone was Deckhouse V in the Delta region early in 1967. Keith asked why there were no more SLF operations outside I Corps after Deckhouse V—was it because of "a doctrinal dispute over who would control air in amphibious operations?"

Gen Westmoreland admitted there was a dispute over doctrine but said that the major reason for discontinuing SLF operations south of I Corps was simply because the potential productivity was not worth the cost in effort.

Next to question Gen Westmoreland was Jack Shulimson, our senior Vietnam writer. Jack has been at it since 1964; after brief enlisted service in the U.S. Army he took his bachelor's degree at the University of Buffalo and his master's at the University of Michigan; then in rapid succession taught high school English, worked for National Archives, and was with the Army's Center of Military History before coming to us. He is now researching what may be the toughest volume in the series, the first five months of 1968, a period that includes Tet and Khe Sanh.

Jack's first question had to do with the barrier along the DMZ, the so-called "McNamara Line." Westmoreland, in his book, *A Soldier Reports*, says that he was about to institute his own strong point obstacle system along the DMZ when the order came from Secretary of Defense McNamara, and that he took the Washington directive and transformed it into his own plan.

"Our records and interviews indicate that all Marine commands connected with the barrier were adamantly opposed to the concept," said Shulimson. "Would not any strong point obstacle system have frozen the 3d Division in the north to the defense of static positions along the DMZ?"

Westmoreland answered that what he had in mind was a series of strong points that would canalize the enemy into using routes covered by sensors which would in turn give full warning so that air and artillery strikes could stop the North Vietnamese, inflicting heavy casualties. The Marines would establish the strong points but would be replaced by South Vietnamese battalions over a period of time, or even more desirably, by what he called his "KANZUS" plan, an international force along the DMZ involving Korean, Australian, South Vietnamese, and New Zealand forces. The whole matter was compromised by Mr. McNamara, said Gen Westmoreland. "... he had a press conference
where he described on a map the whole thing, the world knew it, and the next thing we knew the enemy had reacted."

Shulimson then asked Westmoreland about allegations that he had deliberately placed a Marine regiment at Khe Sanh "in a vulnerable position so as to bait the NVA to give open battle."

Westmoreland took understandable exception to the word "bait." He and LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then commanding III Marine Amphibious Force, had met, he said, and agreed to fortify Khe Sanh so as to try to entice the enemy to battle in a non-populated area rather than fight him in the lowlands among the people. In Westmoreland's opinion, this strategy worked; further, Khe Sanh "was an unusual battle by virtue of the fact that the enemy was defeated basically by fire power."

Shulimson then said that Westmoreland in A Soldier Reports implies that his unhappiness with Marine Corps generalship at the time of Tet led him to consider taking away from the Marines operational command north of Hai Van pass. Was establishment of MACV Forward a compromise solution?

"... all totally out of context," answered Gen Westmoreland, going on to say:

That particular action had not a damned thing to do with my confidence in General Cushman or the Marines, not a damned thing. General Cushman had an impossible span of control. Look at the real estate he had. Not only had to advise the Vietnamese, he not only had to direct the Korean Marines, he had his own Marines, he had the Americal Division, and the lines of communication from Da Nang over the Hai Van pass were tenuous at best. So, I toyed with several ideas. One was to set up a corps headquarters as was subsequently done. And then, as an interim, we set up MACV Forward because this put us in the posture we needed. I wanted Gen Abrams there with authority to give orders to not only Marines in my name, but [also] to the Navy and to the Air Force. There were an awful lot of decisions that had to be made to put us into posture in order to control operations in that area and reaction to the enemy.

Gen Westmoreland then hit on one of the most sensitive doctrinal issues of the war: control of tactical air.

A collision between the Marine Corps with its integrated air-ground doctrine, and the Air Force, with its doctrine of centralized control of tactical air, had been avoided in August 1965 by an agreement worked out between LtGen Joseph H. Moore, USAF, then commanding Seventh Air Force, and BGen Keith B. McCutcheon, then Deputy Commander of III MAF for Air, under which overall air defense authority was passed to the Air Force but operational control of Marine tactical air was retained by III MAF. This compromise worked until late in 1967.

Gen Westmoreland's account in A Soldier Reports differs in slight detail from what he told us at our meeting, but the essentials are the same. The three Army divisions he had committed to I Corps were beyond effective supporting range of Seventh Air Force. He talked to LtGen Cushman and MajGen Norman J. Anderson, then commanding 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, saying, "I expect you people to take
care of these Army units until something can be worked out."

A day or so later he visited the 101st Airborne Division (or, according to A Soldier Reports, the 1st Air Cavalry Division) and was "aghast" to learn that no provision had been made for its air support. That, he said, was the moment he decided to support the Seventh Air Force in its insistence that it be given "single manager" responsibility for tactical air. The Marine Corps lost the ensuing doctrinal debate that went all the way to the Secretary of Defense for decision. On 10 March 1968 Gen Westmoreland was able to give the commander of Seventh Air Force "mission direction" of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's fixed strike aircraft.

In bringing up the "single manager for air" issue, Gen Westmoreland had anticipated the questions prepared for him by Maj Frank M. Batha, Jr. Frank is our resident aviator. During his Vietnam tour, 1968-69, he flew helicopter "gunships" with VMO-6 and VMO-2. He assists in the aviation content of all the Vietnam histories, is at work on his own volume, Marine Aviation in Southeast Asia, 1962-73, and edits our burgeoning series of squadron histories.

Mr. Charles R. ("Rich") Smith, who is in the last throes of completing his initial draft of The Year of Quiet Valor, 1969, had no questions to ask of Gen Westmoreland. Rich, who is the author of our Marines in the Revolution and who also is at work on Marines in the Frigate Navy, was the assistant historian of the 101st Airborne Division in 1969-70.

Maj William R. Melton, who is doing the final writing and editing of the 1970-71 volume, had a two-pronged question growing out of the failure of Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in the spring of 1971. Didn't Lam Son 719 kind of prove that Vietnamization wasn't working, and was Vietnamization ever anything more than a political term used by the United States for backing out of Vietnam? Westmoreland answered that he had seen Vietnamization as a long-term process but that under the Nixon administration it became a withdrawal strategy.

Bill Melton had two Vietnam tours, as a sergeant with the 9th Marines in 1965 and as a lieutenant with the 5th Marines in 1968-69. In 1974-75 he was out in the Western Pacific again and as a captain company commander participated in the evacuation of Phnom Penh and Saigon. All three of the majors currently assigned to the Histories Section are well-decorated Vietnam veterans. I have already mention-
in 1976; the draft is waiting, either for his completion or for someone else to pick up where he left off.

Even after the sequential histories are published the whole story won't be told as there is an open-ended requirement for a number of functional or topical volumes. One of these, *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam*, by Cdr Herbert L. Bergsma, USN (ChC), is already written and almost ready for the printers. As mentioned, Maj Batha is at work on *Marine Aviation in Southeast Asia*. Other possible Vietnam topics to which we had given thought are military law, logistics, and Special Landing Force operations.

Researching and writing Vietnam operational history is a tedious, laborious, sometimes frustrating process. It also can be satisfying and rewarding. A writer, civilian or officer, on being assigned a segment of the history, starts by getting "read into the problem" as exhaustively as time will permit. He then works up an outline and a time-phased plan for the writing of his draft. These are reviewed by the Chief Historian, the Deputy Director for Marine Corps History, and myself, and after approval become a kind of contract between the writer and the division. As the writing progresses there is a great deal of internal review and interaction including what Bud Shaw likes to call "intramural editing." More formally, there is a Vietnam Committee that meets monthly. In addition to all members of the Histories Section, the committee includes the Deputy Director for Marine Corps History, the heads of the Oral History and Publications Production sections, and myself.

The really basic primary sources are the command chronologies, after-action reports, journal files, message files, debriefs, and field interviews. All these bits and pieces have to be fitted together, rather like making a mosaic. After the writer's draft passes the muster of a chapter-by-chapter internal review, it goes to our Publications Production Section where Mr. Robert E. Struder and his assistants set it in type and prepare the comment edition. Comments received from readers of this edition—and we try to send it to as many informed, involved individuals as possible—can cause up to a 30 or 40 percent revision of the draft. Collection of photographs, preparation of maps, and compilation of supporting appendices goes on concurrently. After everything is reconciled and put together, the Publications Production Section does the paste-up of the camera-ready pages and these go off to the Government Printing Office for printing.

We are currently printing 8,000 copies of our Vietnam histories. Three thousand of these are bound in green cloth; these are intended for libraries and other permanent repositories. Five thousand are bound in heavy paper; about half of these are distributed internally to the Marine Corps. About half the total print order is distributed immediately after publication; the remainder is doled out over the years. We keep a "protected" reserve stock; we don't want to be in the position in which we found ourselves with respect to the World War II and Korean War histories. The early volumes in these histories were "out of stock" before the final volumes were printed.

*Current authors and editors of the ten-volume "U.S. Marines in Vietnam" series are, seated from left, Maj Edward F. Wells; senior Vietnam historian Mr. Jack Shulimson; Chief Historian Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; and Maj Frank M. Batha. Standing from left are Mr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr.; Maj William R. Melton; and Mr. Charles R. Smith.*
Readers
Always
Write

FOUR MONTHS TOO SOON

... In your (World War II Chronology for April-June 1943)... you have shown an entry for 21 June (presumably 1943), “the 3rd Defense Bn was withdrawn from Cape Torokina, Bougainville.”

Either you have some faulty Chronology, or the 3rd Defense Bn made history by singlehandedly invading Bougainville more than four months before the 3rd Marine Division, which landed at Torokina and beaches to the north 1 November 1943!

LtGen Alpha L. Bowser, USMC (Ret)
San Diego, California

AN ACHIEVEMENT WORTH MENTION

... The chronology (Fortitudine, Winter 1983) mentions a meeting between Halsey and MacArthur 18 April 1943. I'm sure this was an important meeting but another very important 18 April 1943 event was not mentioned at all and should be included. It was the demise of the Chief Flag Officer of the IJN, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, shot down over southern Bougainville by ComAirSoPac P-38s of the 13th Fighter Command, based at Guadalcanal. Yamamoto was one of the types whose “files” and plans were largely kept in his own head, a factor which made his death a special plus for the confusion and bewilderment it brought to the IJN fleet forces. It might also be included in the chronology because it was undoubtedly the longest planned intercept successfully achieved in all of WW II, about 325 nautical miles from base.

... the withdrawal of the 3d Defense Battalion from Bougainville ... the Empress Augusta Bay operation did not occur until 1 November 1943. ... Re VMF-124: as indicated in the footnote to Mr. Olynyk’s letter, p. 17, the correct arrival date of the first Corsairs was in fact 12 February 1943. What is omitted is the fact that upon landing at Fighter Two, Guadalcanal, Major Gise and his pilots who had flown up from Espiritu with him, were immediately briefed and launched on a mission to escort a heavy bomber attack on Kahili airfield at southern Bougainville. This they did successfully even though they had never been in the area before. It made a long day of about eight hours of flight time, over half of which was in the combat zone and in contact with the Japanese. At the time of their arrival at Guadalcanal, the average Corsair flight time of the VMF-124 pilots was less than 20 hours total, including the three hours flight to Guadalcanal from Espiritu! I think it was a super achievement and one which should not go unmentioned.

MajGen John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)
Washington, D.C.

REMEMBERING GEN SHoup

... The 21 June item in the “World War II Chronology” of Fortitudine (Winter 1983) concerning the 3rd Defense Battalion may be correct as to the event and date but it is very premature as to the year. D-Day for the Bougainville operation was December 1, 1943, and I know that the 3rd Defense Battalion had not already been there when we landed.

In Gen Shoup’s obituary it states that “... he was assigned as Asst D-3 of the 2nd Marine Division ...” This may be true. When I reported to the 2nd MarDiv from sea duty in May of 1942 I was assigned to the D-3 Section and Dave was the D-3. He still was when I left the Division in April of 1943 to go to the IMAC D-3 Section for planning the further Solomon Islands campaigns—which is how I got to Bougainville, among other places.

BGen Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret)
Mooresstown, New Jersey

According to Reference Section, which regrets the error, the correct date for the withdrawal of the 3d Defense Battalion from Bougainville is 21 June 1944.

According to Gen Shoup’s official biography, he was assigned as Assistant D-3 from July to September 1942 and as D-3 from September 1942 to November 1943 when he took command of the 2d Marines. — Editor
Regular readers of *Fortitudine* will recall that a section of the Fall 1978 issue was devoted to the Marine Corps Commemorative Naming Program. Since that time, a significant number of commemorative namings have been approved for use at Marine Corps facilities throughout the United States.

The purpose of the Commemorative Naming Program is to honor members of the Marine Corps or other military services who have made an outstanding contribution of lasting nature to the Marine Corps or to the welfare of Marine Corps personnel. From the outset, priority has been given to those Marines who died in the line of duty. Names of living persons can rarely be approved for naming actions.

The program is administered by the Reference Section. To date, more than 500 separate facilities have been named in honor of over 380 Marines.

Ships—especially combatants—have traditionally received the names of Navy and Marine Corps heroes. Some that recently have been assigned names of Marines are the USS *O'Bannon* (DD-987), commissioned on 15 December 1979; the USS *Vandegrift* (FFG-48), christened on 15 October 1982; and the USS *Lewis B. Puller* (FFG-23), commissioned on 17 April 1982. The principal speaker at the *Puller* commissioning ceremonies was the then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow. He noted that Chesty Puller had served as an inspiration to many Marines—even those who had never laid eyes on him. Several weeks later, on 28 April, General Barrow spoke at the dedication of Lejeune Hall, the U.S. Naval Academy's new physical education center.

In recent years, the History and Museums Division has noticed an increasing interest among Marine Corps commands in Marine candidate names from the Vietnam War era. In recent naming actions, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has approved requests to honor four Medal of Honor recipients from the Vietnam War:

- (From Col George N. Robillard, Jr., then CO of Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps): To name a Bachelor Enlisted Quarters at Henderson Hall in honor of LCpl Miguel Keith, a Marine Medal of Honor recipient killed in action on 8 May 1970 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- (From LtGen Richard E. Carey): To name a building (OCS Dining Facility) in honor of 2dLt John P. Bobo, a Marine Medal of Honor recipient killed in action on 30 March 1967 in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- (From Col Jon R. Robson, CO of Marine Corps Air Station [Helicopter] Futema): To name a building (Station Chapel) in honor of Lt Vincent R. Capodanno, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve, a Medal of Honor recipient killed in action 4 September 1967 in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam. At the time of his death, Lt Capodanno was serving as Chaplain with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division.
- In addition to these naming actions, the History and Museums Division was pleased to learn that the name of a highly decorated Vietnam-era Marine aviator was recently selected for the new Federal Aviation Agency Building in New York City. Maj Robert M. Fitzgerald was serving with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262, Marine Aircraft Group 16, when he was killed in action on 1 June 1970 in Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam while on an emergency extract of a Marine reconnaissance team. The new FAA Building was dedicated in honor of Maj Fitzgerald on 3 December 1982.

*Mr. Aquilina is a historian with Reference Section. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history from the State University of New York at Buffalo. He joined the division in May 1981.*
Lebanon Oral Histories Added to Collection

On 24 June 1982, following the Israeli attack into Lebanon, the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) (Battalion Landing Team [BLT] 2/8, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron [HMM] 261, and MAU Service Support Group [MSSG] 32), conducted the evacuation of American citizens and other foreign nationals from the port of Juniyah, Lebanon. Since then, front-page news stories have appeared nearly every day in major papers across the country, telling of Marine activities in Lebanon.

With the evacuation completed, the MAU continued its schedule of landing exercises and port visits in the Mediterranean area. On 29 September, it landed again in Lebanon to become part of the Multinational Force (MNF), with French and Italian troops, to assist the Lebanese armed forces in bringing peace and order to Beirut. An additional mission was to support the diplomatic efforts of U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib. After landing in the port of Beirut, and occupying positions in the port area, the MAU established close relations with the other members of the MNF, and assisted in evacuating forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut.

Their stay on shore was extended and the Marines received a further mission of maintaining a presence in Lebanon, to stabilize the situation for the Lebanese government. This tasking required the 32d MAU (later redesignated the 22d) to occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport and to continue their close relationships with French, Italian, Lebanese, and (later) British forces. The 22d MAU was relieved in position on 1 November by the 24th MAU (BLT 3/8, HMM-263, and MSSG 24), which in turn was relieved on 15 February 1983 by the returning 22d MAU.

These are just the bare bones of the story. Much more information can be found in the command chronologies each MAU has submitted since June 1982. To flesh out the story as fully as possible, Maj Ronald H. Spector, USMCR, and Benis M. Frank, head of the Oral History Section, went to Camp Lejeune in January 1983, to interview key officers and

Maj (LtCol selectee) David N. Buckner, CO, MAU Service Support Group 24, and former member of the History and Museums Division, provides Mr. Frank with information on the logistics support of the 24th MAU during its service in Lebanon.
enlisted Marines of the 22d MAU. In four days, Spector and Frank obtained 20 oral history inter-
views. The subjects ranged from Col (BGen selectee) James M. Mead, CO of the MAU, to platoon and
squad leaders from BLT 2/8. For the platoon and
squad leaders, a discussion format was employed.
Unit leaders at this level often provided details and
facts not raised by more senior officers. Perhaps the
most interesting was Col Mead’s interview, as he
commented on the unusual aspects of his most
unusual mission. The pilots of HMM-261 had much
to relate about their numerous diplomatic flights,
with Ambassador Habib and his staff, as well.

Mr. Frank also conducted interviews with the key
Marines of the 24th MAU at Camp Geiger in mid-
March. The MAU landed in early November, to find
that its mission would differ from that of its predecessor. The MAU was also part of the MNF and
took up the same positions held by the 22d MAU.
But after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from subur-
ban Beirut in December, the 24th MAU began a
series of motorized and foot patrols in the Baabda
area of the city. In December, the MAU also began a
program of cross-training with Lebanese ground
forces and air crews. Simultaneous cross-training oc-
curred with French and Italian troops. Some of these
had participated in earlier landing exercises with
Marines in the Mediterranean.

The 24th MAU Marines had a number of well-
publicized encounters with Israeli Defense Force
troops. The most spectacular of these was Capt
Charles B. Johnson’s confrontation with a patrol of
three Israeli tanks. His story was recorded during this
interview trip. Also of interest are the comments of
LtCol George T. Schmidt, MAU Executive Officer,
who attended meetings in Beirut of the Interna-
tional Military Committee, a consultative group of
U.S., French, Italian, and Lebanese officers.

The oral history interviews, in conjunction with
command chronologies and press reports, give a
reasonably comprehensive picture of Marine activity
in Lebanon. After the 22d MAU is relieved once
again and returns to Camp Geiger, its Marines will
again be interviewed to determine contrasts between
their first and second tours. When a history of
Marines in Lebanon is finally written, these inter-
views will undoubtedly provide a major portion of
the primary source material used in the research
phase. They are a living contemporary history of a
unique mission for Marines.—BMF

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ROYAL MARINES’ MAGAZINE HONORED

Gen Robert H. Barrow, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, presented the Marine Corps
Historical Foundation’s Special Award to
Globe and Laurel, The Journal of the Royal
Marines, “in recognition of its prompt and
comprehensive publication of historical
materials relating to the employment of the
Royal Marines in the Falklands War.” Accept-
ing the award, on 9 May 1983, was LtGen Sir
Stewart Pringle, Bt, KCB, Commandant
General, Royal Marines. A second Special
Award was presented to Leatherneck,
Magazine of the Marines, “in recognition of its
consistent use of Marine Corps historical
materials and its support of the Marine Corps
Historical Program.” BGen George L. Bartlett,
USMC (Ret), Executive Director of the Marine
Corps Association, accepted the award on 6
April 1983.
Aerial Photographs an Overlooked Resource

by Dino A. Brugioni

Each day, thousands of aerial photographs are taken for a variety of purposes by private organizations and by local, state, and federal agencies. The aerial platforms used to acquire these photos range from low flying helicopters to sophisticated overhead reconnaissance systems. Each aerial platform was designed to achieve specific objectives, but their common result is the creation of a historical record. Each photographic exposure creates an irreplaceable record of a moment in time, a chronicle of what was happening at a specific place. Each photo also establishes a baseline reference point that has critical importance in recognizing the inevitable changes that the future will bring. The compendium of this photography constitutes an invaluable historical record—one that few are aware of, and fewer still know how to interpret; even fewer still know where these priceless records are stored, or their availability for research.

Aerial photography as a medium for historical research has been overlooked by history departments.

Mr. Brugioni recently retired as a senior official and reconnaissance and photo-interpretation expert with the Central Intelligence Agency. His first experience came from aerial reconnaissance missions with the Army Air Force in World War II. He was one of the founders of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, which interprets photography derived from a variety of overhead reconnaissance systems.

This aerial photograph taken on D-Day at Tarawa shows a Marine amphibian tractor (arrow) knocked out by Japanese anti-boat fire just as it began climbing over the seawall.
throughout the academic community. There is not a single college or university in the United States that teaches photo interpretation as part of the historical process. Photo interpretation, for the most part, is taught in the geography or earth resources departments. The national professional historical associations appear to be oblivious to its potential, or prefer to sustain traditional approaches to recording and researching history.

But if one looks at any modern strategic or tactical military plan, he will find that aerial reconnaissance is an essential ingredient in the planning of any campaign. Commanders also insist that aerial reconnaissance be conducted before, during, and after the campaign. Crucial decisions are often based on the results of the interpretation of the reconnaissance photography. Yet, in writing the histories of these campaigns, the aerial photography so important to the decision making process is seldom reviewed or used as source material. Those familiar with the interpretation of aerial photography and its potential as a resource for historical research and analysis are consistently amazed at the volume of information that could be extracted and added to existing historical records.

There are difficulties in researching and reviewing older aerial photography. In most instances, the documentation of reasons why a particular mission was flown, and the results of the interpretation, have long been separated from the photography. There is at present no standard methodology for cataloging or controlling aerial photography. Each agency has developed its own methods. No standard criteria exist for delineating the classics, no Library of Congress index card for recording the results accomplished by each mission, and no Dewey decimal system for codifying the principal subject covered.

The prime purpose of aerial photography for many years was military reconnaissance. During the Civil War, Union forces used tethered balloons to obtain information about Confederate terrain, and to pinpoint enemy forces and movements. The invention of the airplane, however, made aerial photography a practical tool and totally changed the nature of aerial reconnaissance. In World War I, the airplane became the eyes of the army, discovering enemy positions that could later be struck by field artillery or bombers. At first, the interpretation of aerial photos depended upon deductive reasoning, as well much guesswork. With increased experience,
These two aerial photographs provide a bird's-eye view of the fighting on the first afternoon at Tarawa from the Japanese side (left) and from the American perspective (right).

Interpreters could appreciate the significance of details seen on the photographs, and could spot the positions of trenching, troop movement, headquarters areas, and ammunition dumps. Interpreters organized their deductions, until they formed a reliable code or key, through which they could teach the art of interpretation to others. A great revolution had taken place in the field of military intelligence. Today, military photo interpretation is a highly developed skill, a demanding art, and a well-developed science.

During World War II, little was known about the geography of the European, Asian, and African land-masses on which we were about to fight. Aerial photography provided vital geographical intelligence and was the basis for production of maps and charts. In addition to photographs of the battlefronts, a number of aerial surveys were made of the worldwide logistical networks extending from Latin America to the Arctic, and from the Himalayas to the Pacific Islands. Many of these areas were being photographed from the air for the first time.

At the end of the war, thousands of cans of aerial photography were destroyed, assumed to be no longer of any practical use. Fortunately, thousands of other cans of aerial photography found their way to Washington repositories, along with hundreds of boxes of photographic prints.

One of the most remarkable groups of World War II aerial photos that made its way to Washington was recently discovered by the Marine Corps Historical Center. I was asked to look at them, and later to perform a detailed interpretation of the actions depicted. In a photo-interpretation career spanning some 40 years, I've looked at thousands of aerial photos. These are some of the most remarkable battle photos I have ever seen. They were taken over Betio Island, during the Battle of Tarawa, on D-Day, 20 November 1943. These photos were taken at an altitude of 1,000 to 1,500 feet, between 1229 and 1410, by a U.S. Navy OS2U Kingfisher from the battleship Maryland. The coverage is unique in that the mission was flown both north and south of the island and gives both a frontal and rear view of the Japanese defenses, as well as a frontal and rear view of the attack by U.S. Marines. These aerial photos comprise a priceless historical record. Viewed in stereo, they present a remarkable panorama of the entire island. The battle scene is captured in 89 prints. A clock in the corner records the hour, minute, and second each exposure was taken. Each exposure, therefore, becomes an irreplaceable and
Aerial photographs can clarify spatial relationships and aid in the location of specific, but ephemeral events. The top photograph, taken during the battle for Tarawa, shows a landing craft tied by its stern to the long pier at Betio. It also serves as a reference point for determining where Marines unloaded another landing craft later in the fighting.
unchangeable record of a moment in time and the events that were happening at that very moment.

I set about the task of interpreting the photos and correlating them with written accounts of the battle. The classic eyewitness report on the battle has been written by Robert Sherrod, a *Time-Life* correspondent. It is aptly titled, *Tarawa, the Story of a Battle*. Mr. Sherrod now lives in Washington, D.C. I sought him out and we met at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

Sherrod has written many eyewitness accounts of Marine bravery and heroism in a number of Pacific battles, but the Battle of Tarawa has remained the most vivid in his memory. He developed a particularly close association with the Marine Corps veterans of Tarawa and has followed their careers and maintained close contact with many of them.

On D-Day, Sherrod went ashore with the first wave. When his LVT was brought under fire by the Japanese, Sherrod and others disembarked and waded toward land. Approaching under cover of a long pier, they eventually reached the coconut-log seawall on Red Beach 3. Sherrod, along with many of the Marines who landed that day, sheltered from the heavy Japanese fire by crouching down behind the seawall most of the morning and afternoon. Beside a damaged LVT that rode high on the seawall, and which also served as Maj Henry P. "Jim" Crowe's command post, Sherrod jotted notes on the progress of the battle.

In his book Sherrod describes the three days of battle and a tour of the island afterwards which provides graphic descriptions of the aftermath of battle. Following the war, he visited a number of widows of Marines killed in action, giving them accounts of the bravery and heroism of their husbands. In 1968, he returned to Tarawa and his impression of Betio Island 25 years later appeared in a new edition of his book. *Tarawa, the Story of a Battle* will be reissued again this fall.

At our meeting, I placed various aerial photos in stereo so Sherrod might more vividly recall the battle. First, I showed him what was happening on Red Beach 3. He asked to see the LVT where he spent the greater part of D-Day. I then showed him the activities on Red Beach 2 and Red Beach 1 which he had not been able to observe personally because of the fierce Japanese opposition. Later, as he read passages about battle events from his book, I pointed them out on the aerial photography. It was a relatively easy task to confirm his excellent descriptions. At this meeting, we also compared the aerial photos with ground photos taken that day by combat photographers.

At the time the aerial photos were being taken, there were many communication problems, not only among the command elements but also among the Marines on the beaches. The glass vacuum tube transmitters of the command ship, the battleship *Maryland*, had been damaged during that morning's heavy bombardment of the island. The radios carried by the Marines as they waded ashore became inoperable when they were soaked with seawater. It was probably for this reason that the Kingfisher aircraft, with a Marine observer on board was sent out to reconnoiter the battle area and report back to command authorities. The aerial photos I examined with Mr. Sherrod were taken on one of the many Kingfisher missions that day. They eventually made their way to the Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard where they were discovered by Keith Fleming, of the Histories Section. There is no record that these photos were ever interpreted. Undoubtedly, the ever changing battle scene during those fateful three days precluded interpretation at that time.
I have conducted a detailed interpretation of the aerial photos and a number of them, along with my interpretations, are scheduled to appear in the November 1983 issue of Leatherneck magazine—in time to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Tarawa.

Aerial and ground-level photographs complement each other. In the photograph a damaged truck (A) rests in an aircraft revetment, while others (B) sit on the runway.

This ground-level photograph identifies the truck in the revetment (above) as a water truck, rather than a gasoline tanker. It also clarifies construction details of the coconut-log-and-coral aircraft revetment.

The aerial photograph (above) aids in pinpointing the location of these flatbed trucks on Tarawa. The ground-level photograph has a flat, featureless background which makes the actual location obscure.
A project now underway is the transfer of the Military Music Collection from the Marine Corps Historical Center to the Marine Band Library. For the first time, the two historical collections will be joined, creating a single center for research into military music and the U.S. Marine Band.

From its modest beginnings as “thirty-two fifers and drummers” in 1798, the Marine Band has played a central and highly visible role in America’s musical history.

Most significant official occasions in our nation’s capital have been accompanied by the music of the Marine Band. Since Thomas Jefferson’s time, the band has played for every Presidential inauguration. It was Mr. Jefferson who first called the band, “The President’s Own.” The Marine Band played for Lafayette, when he visited the White House in 1824, and they were hand for the laying of the cornerstone of the Washington monument and Lincoln’s Gettysburg address. From White House weddings to social teas, and from arrivals of foreign dignitaries to funerals for fallen heroes, no other musical group has witnessed more of America’s public history or made more history of its own.

Since the 1960s, the mission of the Military Music Collection has paralleled that of the Marine Band Library: to collect and preserve music-related items of historical interest (musical scores, books, photographs, uniforms, papers, and instruments) and to make them available to scholars and researchers. For some time, the Museums Branch and Marine Band personnel have considered the advantages of combining the two collections. When the personal papers collection at the Historical Center needed growing room, and corresponding space was available at “Eighth and Eye,” the time was right for a merger into an expanded Marine Band Library.

At the time of the first historical donations, space was scarce at the Washington Marine Barracks, home of the band. The expanding music collection sought storage space in a series of moves: to a building in the Washington Navy Yard; to the Pension Building in downtown Washington; back to another building in the Navy Yard; and finally to Building 58 there. After long service as a barracks for the “Eighth and Eye” Ceremonial Guard Company, Building 58 had become the Historical Center of the Marine Corps.

After a new Bachelor Enlisted Quarters building was constructed across the street, most of the Barracks’ south wing was assigned to the Band. Improvements included expanded dressing spaces and a second rehearsal area. The library moved into more spacious facilities and its staff grew to seven full-time music librarians, including a trained archivist.

The library’s inventory of historical musical material will be significantly augmented by the addition of the Military Music Collection. The Marine Band plans to establish a research center for wind and military music, and having both collections in one location will enable researchers to use them simultaneously.

The Marine Band has one of the largest performing music libraries in the country today, with over 40,000 listings in the areas of: band and orchestra music; brass, woodwind, string and percussion ensemble music; dance band music; and reference books and scores. In addition, the library maintains extensive historical files on the Marine Band and military music including: program files; cor-
respondence; engagement sheets (listing the musicians who actually performed); logs of the daily activities of the band; historical records and documents of all types; photographs; scrapbooks; and memorabilia of former Marine Bandsmen. With the expansion in staff and facilities, old photograph files are being re-activated, program files are being checked and sorted, cataloging procedures are being refined (to include evaluation of automated cataloging systems), and music of historical interest is being removed from active files to receive archival treatment. The library contains a variety of music dating from the 1860s, including many original compositions and transcriptions by former Marine Band members and directors, including John Philip Sousa.

The Military Music Collection contains approximately 12,000 musical compositions, photographs, a large collection of Sousa memorabilia and personal papers; and uniforms and collections of music and memorabilia of several former members of the Sousa Band. Also included are other personal items of John Philip Sousa, including medals, batons, trophies, and books from his collection. There are also 85 press and program books, covering the entire period of the Sousa Band. The Sousa music portion of the collection has been donated from several sources: the Victor Grabel/Sousa Collection given by Stetson University, which contains most of the library of Sousa's first band (just after he left the Marine Band); donations from the Sousa family; and the famous Sousa Band encore books donated by Charles Hyde Walker of New York. These highly prized encore books were lost for many years, then discovered in two unclaimed trunks, stored in a New York City warehouse. They were purchased for storage costs by Mr. Walker's father. Also found in the trunks was Sousa's holograph score of "The Liberty Bell" march.

The transfer of the Military Music Collection to the Marine Band Library is more than half completed. Upon receipt, each shipment is carefully recorded, then inspected. Notes are made on items requiring immediate attention. The next step involves a comprehensive inventory of the collection, major cataloging and cross-filing of all music materials, and evaluation for restoration where needed.

Future plans include expansion in two areas of the current library: a special storage area for rare items and a permanent research/reference area with listening facilities. The library will be further enhanced with the addition of other collections in the future, and should eventually become one of the finest research centers of its kind. In the meantime, the Marine Band remains committed to assisting researchers and historians whenever possible. Inquiries regarding the collections may be addressed to: MSgt Frank Byrne, Chief Librarian, U.S. Marine Band, 8th and I Streets, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20390.
1 July. The Navy’s V-12 program, designed to recruit and train college students for future service as line officers, was launched; 11,500 students were to be included for training.

1 July. The Administrative Division was organized at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to control the civilian personnel program and the assignment of enlisted Marines.

1 July. Adm Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, submitted a tentative plan for operations against the Marshalls.

1 July. Two platoons from Company P, 4th Raider Battalion, overran the Japanese detachment at the village of Tombe overlooking Viru Harbor, New Georgia, while the remainder of Company P and Company Q seized Tetemara, a village on the west side of the harbor where the bulk of the defenders were located.

1 July. Additional troops and supplies including 90mm and 155mm batteries from the 9th Defense Battalion arrived on Rendova.

1-4 July. The 4th Raider Battalion and the U.S. Army’s Company F, 103d Infantry Regiment withdrew to Vura, Vangunu where a defensive perimeter was established and a coordinated attack was launched against the main group of Japanese survivors, at Cheke Point. Kaeuru was retaken and Cheke Point overrun with little opposition.

2 July. MajGen Noboiu Sesaki assumed sole command of all Japanese garrisons on New Georgia.

2-3 July. Troops of the 43d Army Division began a shore-to-shore movement to New Georgia, while guns of the 9th Defense Battalion and the Army’s 192d Field Artillery fired on Munda Airfield. Japanese bombers hit supply dumps on Rendova on 2 July causing heavy casualties, but failed in a similar attempt on the 3d.

3 July. The Southern Landing Group of the Munda-Bairoko Occupation Force landed troops of the Army’s 172d Infantry, 43d Division on Zanana beach New Georgia, without opposition.

4 July. A 52-man detail from the 9th Defense Battalion’s special weapons group arrived on New Georgia and emplaced four 40mm guns for antiaircraft protection.

4 July. The Japanese attempted the last size able daylight assault on Rendova; antiaircraft batteries of the 9th Defense Battalion downed 12 of 16 bombers that broke through the ring of Allied interceptor planes. As a result the focus of the air war shifted to New Georgia.

5 July. The Northern Landing Group, commanded by Col Harry B. Liversedge, made a secondary landing on New Georgia and established a beachhead at Rice Anchorage on the north coast.

5-6 July. The Battle of Kula Gulf, Solomon Islands. The Japanese succeeded in landing reinforcements on Kolombangara despite intervention by naval forces.

7 July. The Northern Landing Group seized Maranusa I and Triri villages on Dragons Peninsula.

8 July. Eight Army B-24s from Midway made the first land-based air strike against Wake Island.

8-10 July. Companies N and Q of the 4th Raider Battalion patrolled Gatukai Island, east of Vangunu, New Georgia, where 50-100 Japanese troops had been reported but returned to Vangunu after making no contact.


9-10 July. The 1st Raider Battalion (rein) of the Northern Landing Group, attacking from Triri, seized Enogai, New Georgia.

9-12 July. The 13th Japanese Regiment moved about 3,700 troops from Kolombangara Island to Bairoko, New Georgia.

10 July. The airstrip at Segi was ready for limited operations as a fighter base.

10 July. Companies O and P, 4th Raider Battalion were relieved at Viru and returned to Guadalcanal.
10 July. The main invasion forces of the U.S. Seventh and the British Eighth Armies landed at St. Agata, Sicily.

11 July. Adm Halsey, Commander, South Pacific, issued a directive to attack an unannounced position in the Bougainville area. LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps, was selected to head the invasion force.

11 July. The 1st Marine War Dog Platoon arrived in the South Pacific to serve on Bougainville as scouts, messengers, and night security guards with the 2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional).

11 July. The Segi Point landing strip on New Georgia became operational.


12 July. Companies N and Q, 4th Raider Battalion, departed New Georgia to rejoin the remainder of the battalion at Guadalcanal.

12-13 July. An Allied surface force engaged a Japanese convoy carrying reinforcements to the central Solomons. The Japanese succeeded in landing 1,200 men on Kolombangara, but it was their last attempt to reinforce and resupply the New Georgia garrison by destroyer.

14 July. The Marine Corps Glider Base at Edenton, North Carolina, commanded by LtCol Zebulon C. Hopkins, was designated a Marine Corps air station.


14 July. Marine tanks and a special weapons detail from the 9th Defense Battalion and the Army’s 103d Infantry Regiment landed on Laiana Beach to support the New Georgia Occupation Force.

14 July. Woodlark airfield in the Trobriands was declared operational.

15 July. Allied general headquarters circulated a plan for the occupation of western New Britain, to include the general line Gasmata-Talasea; D-Day was programmed for 15 November.

15-17 July. Coordinated tank-infantry thrusts which included tanks of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion drove a wedge in the Japanese defenses on New Georgia stretching from Laiana beach northwest for more than 400 yards.

17 July. The U.S. Army’s 161st Infantry, 25th Division, landed at Laiana beach, New Georgia and went into position at the center of the XIV Corps front.

17 July. Aircraft, Solomons executed a 192-plane strike on a large concentration of shipping in the Kahili-Buin area in the Solomons, resulting in heavy destruction of Japanese air and surface forces.

17-18 July. An unsynchronized counterattack by the 13th and 229th Japanese Regiments against the Laiana beachhead, New Georgia, and positions of the U.S. Army’s 169th Infantry, failed. This ended Japanese attempts to regain the initiative on the island.

17-18 July. The 4th Raider Battalion arrived at Enogai Point, Dragons Peninsula, where it rejoined its parent regiment after a short rest on Guadalcanal.

18-24 July. The New Georgia Occupation Force was reinforced by U.S. Army troops during a lull in combat.

20 July. The JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, to plan and prepare for operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.

20 July. Marine land-based aircraft attacked Japanese shipping south of Choiseul Island in the Solomons; two Japanese destroyers were sunk.

20-21 July. The Northern Landing Group (including the 1st Marine Raider Regiment and the U.S. Army’s 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry) on New Georgia unsuccessfully attacked Bairoko Harbor then withdrew to Enogai, covered by one of the heaviest air strikes of the central Solomons campaign.

21-22 July. A six man patrol of Army, Navy, and Marine officers landed near Barakoma, Vella Lavella, to scout the area for a proposed landing on the island.

23 July. Marine Corps Air Station, El Centro, California, was commissioned under command of LtCol Thomas J. McQuade.

25 July. MajGen Nathan F. Twining, USA, replaced RAdm Marc A. Mitscher, USN, as Commander, Aircraft, Solomons.
25 July. King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy announced the resignation of Premier Mussolini and his cabinet. Marshal Pietro Badoglio became head of the Italian government.

25 July-25 August. The final attack by the New Georgia Occupation Force opened with destroyer and torpedo and dive bomber support. Marine tanks from the 9th Defense Battalion, joined (on 5 August) by those of the 10th and 11th Defense Battalions, supported the infantry advance. Munda airfield fell on 1 August and Bairoko Harbor was reached on 25 August.

31 July. The amphibious reconnaissance patrol composed of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers from Vella Lavella reported that a landing in the Barakoma area was feasible.

5 August. Adm Spruance, formerly Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area became Commander, Central Pacific Force and Commander, Fifth Fleet.

6-7 August. The Battle of Vella Gulf. U.S. naval forces defeated a Japanese attempt to reinforce the Central Solomons area.

6-7 August. Munda airfield, New Georgia became operational for emergency use.

8 August. Battery B, 9th Defense Battalion, emplaced on Kindu Point to undertake the seacoast defense of Munda Point, New Georgia.

8-9 August. The main body of the Japanese Southeast Detached Force move to Kolombangara.

9 August. The Northern and Southern Landing Groups of the New Georgia Occupation Force made a linkup when a patrol from the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry appeared at a roadblock southwest of Triri held by the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry.

9 August. A light antiaircraft battery from the 11th Defense Battalion arrived at Enogai.

10 August. Operational control of the Northern Landing Group passed to the Army's 25th Infantry Division, and the 1st Marine Raider Regiment returned to Enogai.

11 August. Adm Halsey, Commander, South Pacific, received orders for the seizure of Vella Lavella by Task Force 31, to neutralize Japanese troops concentrations on Kolombangara. The forces on New Georgia were directed to continue their cleanup operations in the Munda area and to interdict Vila airfield on Kolombangara by artillery fire.

13 August. Troops from the Army's 43d Infantry Division landed on Vela Cela Island, between New Georgia and Baanga Islands, and reconnoitered without incident.

13 August. Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued Navy Staff Directive No. 267, authorizing the abandonment of the Central Solomons after delaying actions.

13-19 August. Elements of the 169th and 172 Infantry Regiments, 43d Infantry Division landed on Baanga Island north of Munda Point, New Georgia and attacked Japanese troops fleeing from Munda. They were supported by artillery units at Munda and on offshore islands, including the 155mm gun batteries of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion.

14 August. BGen Francis P. Mulcahy moved his Aircraft, New Georgia command post from Rendova to Munda Point. Marine aircraft began operations from Munda airfield.

14-24 August. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that the advance through the Southwest-South Pacific by Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific and Commander, South Pacific be continued while Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area aimed a new offensive along the Central Pacific axis. Action in the Central Pacific would begin with the invasion of the Gilberts and Marshalls; Rabaul would be neutralized but not captured.

15 August. The Northern Landing Force assaulted Vella Lavella near Barakoma. The 4th Defense Battalion was responsible for the installation and operation of antiaircraft and seacoast defenses and for the organization and occupation of a sector of the beach defenses.


16 August. The 4th Marine Division, commanded by MajGen Harry Schmidt, was activated at Camp Pendleton, California. It was the only Marine division during World War II to be formed and staged into combat directly from the continental United States.

18 August. The Division of Aviation was transferred from the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

18 August. Axis resistance in Sicily collapsed with the fall of Messina.

20 August. Adm Nimitz, Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Area, submitted an outline plan for the Marshalls operation which assumed the success or continued progress of operations in the Gilberts and in the New Guinea-New Britain area.

20 August. Baanga Island was secured by the Army's 43d Division supported by artillery units at Munda, New Georgia, including the 155mm gun batteries of the 9th Defense Battalion.

21 August. Planners for the New Britain operation circulated an outline naming the units to furnish the assault elements. These included the 1st Marine Division, the U.S. Army's 32d Infantry Division, and its 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment.

22 August. An advance party of the 2d Marine Airdrome Battalion landed at Nukufetau, Ellice Islands where an air base was to be established.

24 August. Col William O. Brice, heading Fighter Command, moved his command post to Munda airfield and relieved Commander, Aircraft, New Georgia, of responsibility for control of fighter aircraft operating there.

25 August. Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, at Camp Elliott, California, was redesignated V Marine Amphibious Corps with MajGen Holland M. Smith retaining command. It was to be an administrative command with control over Marine elements in the Central Pacific area and a tactical organization to direct amphibious assaults comprising both Marine and Army troops. Responsibility for the training of amphibious troops on the west coast passed to the Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, which activated simultaneously with the V Amphibious Corps.

25 August. VAdm Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

26 August. Allied General Headquarters directed the New Britain assault force to "seize the Cape Gloucester area and neutralize Gasmata ... and establish control over Western New Britain to include the general line Talasea-Gasmata, the Vitu Islands and Long Island" as well as to participate "in over-seas landing operations to capture Rabaul."

27 August. The 2d Marine Airdrome Battalion and Seabee units occupied Nukufetau Atoll, Ellice Islands, preparatory to the installation of an airfield and suitable defenses.

27 August. The U.S. Army's 172d Infantry crossed Hathorn Sound from New Georgia to Arundel Island and seized artillery positions that had been harassing Munda Point.

28 August. A detachment of the 7th Marine Defense Battalion with troops from the 16th Naval Construction Battalion went ashore at Nanomea, Ellice Islands, in preparation for a move into the Gilbert Islands.

28-29 August. The 1st Marine Raider Regiment and the 4th Raider Battalion departed Enogai to return to Guadalcanal.

29-30 August. Battery A of the 9th Defense Battalion at Viru Plantation, about 7,000 yards northwest of Munda Point, began firing its 155mm batteries at the Japanese garrison at Kolombangara, New Georgia.

31 August. The 1st Marine Division was alerted for movement from Melbourne to an advanced staging area.

1 September. Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, was established at Ewa to administer all Marine aviation units in the Hawaiian area except Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific.

1 September. A JCS directive was dispatched to Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, allocating troops and naval forces for the Marshalls operation. These included the 4th Marine Division, the 7th U.S. Infantry Division, and the 22d Marines augmented by base defense and development units. In addition, Adm Nimitz was ordered to "seize or control Wake, Eniwetok and Kusaie" upon completion of the Marshalls task.

1 September. An Allied task force arrived on Baker Island to develop it as a base from which future operations in the Central Pacific could be supported.

1 September. Aircraft, Northern Solomons was formed at Espiritu Santo, under BGen Field Harris, in preparation for the northern Solomons offensive.

2 September. Marine Corps Air Depot, Miramar, California, commanded by Col Caleb Bailey, was established.

3 September. The British Eighth Army invaded Italy.

4 September. The VII Amphibious Force landed Allied troops on the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea preparatory to the eventual passage of General MacArthur's forces through the Vitiaz-Dampier Straits.
Did You Bury Ammunition in New Zealand?

During World War II the 2d Marine Division was headquartered in Wellington, New Zealand. Some of its units were stationed at McKay's Crossing, just north of Paekakariki, on the west coast of North Island. Since the war the area of the Marine camp at McKay's Crossing has been developed as a recreational area called Queen Elizabeth Park. In recent years various quantities of ammunition, some of it in dangerous condition, have been found in the park, among the sand hills which make up much of the area.

The head of the Defence Staff at the New Zealand Embassy has asked the Navy and, in turn, the Marine Corps History and Museums Division if there are any records extant which might show where Marine units dumped or buried ammunition in the McKay's Crossing-Paekakariki-Wellington area. A thorough search of the archives has turned up nothing of value. Requests of Washington-area Marine veterans who served in New Zealand have been equally unrewarding.

Since some veterans might recall information that would help the ordnance disposal teams of the New Zealand Army, the History and Museums Division has sent this announcement to journals whose readership would include veterans who served with the 2d Marine Division in New Zealand.

Anyone having pertinent information should forward it to the following address:

New Zealand Inquiry
c/o Marine Corps Historical Center
Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C. 20374