We Can Do What’s Easy or We Can Do What’s Right: A Preliminary Report on Leaders’ Perspectives on Ethical Failures in the United States Marine Corps

A Joint Research Project between the USMC Lejeune Leadership Institute (LLI) and the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning’s Translational Research Group (CAOCL-TRG)

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Research Project Origins

In December 2013, LLI and CAOCL-TRG initiated a joint research project, entitled “Ethics and Marines,”¹ to gain insight into Marine-relevant ethical issues, topics, and problems. The project grew out of the 2012 Ethics Stand Down initiated by then-Commandant General James Amos, which was designed to address “a lack of discipline and accountability by Marines and leadership,” as evidenced by highly publicized, embarrassing events in Afghanistan.² Dr. Wendy Chambers, a contracted researcher at CAOCL-TRG, and Dr. Tripodi were members of the teams delivering ethics training during the stand down. In gathering feedback from training participants, several leaders expressed the need for the following:

1) More guidance on how to teach Marines to be ethical given their diversity of backgrounds;

2) A better understanding of the role of the individual in reacting to an ethical situation, rather than just the situation’s impact on the individual (heavily emphasized in the training); and

3) More scenarios with an ethics theme relevant to younger Marines in order to more effectively communicate ethics training to them.

As an initial step toward meeting these leaders’ requests, Dr. Chambers partnered with Dr. Tripodi to develop a two-phased research plan. The first phase (now complete) focused on...
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identifying the most pressing ethical issues among Marines. The second phase, as conceptualized, is to study Marine decision-making in relation to the issues identified in phase one. Dr. Tripodi was the Principal Investigator for the project, and Dr. Chambers conducted the interviews for phase one in the spring and summer of 2014 as the primary researcher.

Current Status of the Research Project

Recent staffing re-alignments at CAOCL-TRG required Dr. Chambers to step away from the project at the end of data collection for phase one. Consequently, CAOCL-TRG asked Dr. Tortorello to author this preliminary report using data from the joint LLI/CAOCL-TRG project in order to capture insights from phase one. As of this writing, it is not clear if phase two of the research project will be executed. This report will offer some introductory remarks to provide the scientific basis of the research and some insights into the nature of social scientific data. The bulk of the report is devoted to analyzing some of the themes voiced by the Marine participants that can be used to scope the problem and define further efforts for research and consequently improved education and training on ethics.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Special Note: Use of direct quotes from Marines involved in this research is limited due to the exploratory nature of the initial research and the preliminary nature of this report.

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Section 1: Introduction

During the spring and summer of 2014, Dr. Chambers interviewed a total of 31 Marines on the most pressing ethical topics, issues, or problems in the Marine Corps today. About three quarters of this number were majors and lieutenant colonels, a third had a combat arms military occupational specialty (MOS), and a quarter were women. Dr. Chambers requested volunteers for this study through in-person requests during classes at Marine Corps University, through a request posted to Marine Corps University’s Blackboard system, and through personal contacts. Volunteers were informed of the possible risks of participating in the study. Potentially identifying information like name and unit was deleted from interview notes to maintain confidentiality.

Dr. Chambers used a flexible set of questions to conduct semi-structured interviews lasting from forty-five minutes to two hours. “Semi-structured” means that, while the initial question, “What are the most pressing ethical issues, topics, or problems the Marine Corps needs to address and why?” was set, it led to a wide range of topics. Consequently, at times, one or more of the subsequent questions were not asked, as Dr. Chambers pursued a deeper understanding of the content being offered by a participant. Dr. Chambers took extensive notes during the interviews (interviews were not audio- or video-recorded), and Dr. Tortorello used these notes to produce this report.

The framework used to analyze the interview data assumes that the best way to understand ethics and ethical action in the Marine Corps is through examining what Marines say and do. This is in contrast to certain psychological, neuroscientific, and psychiatric approaches claiming that genes, brains, and hormones provide the real explanation of human decision-making. There are fundamental problems with these approaches. A more scientifically defensible approach to understanding what people say and do and why is to understand the concepts and values in use by them—in this case by Marines in their daily lives. This is the approach taken in this research.

Similarly, another popular view that can be captured in this question: “What can the Marine Corps learn from a study based on a sample of only 31 Marines?” A two-part answer exists: whether the content conveys meaningful issues faced by Marine readers and whether the content says something about how and why Marines do what they do.” Labeling a statistically-
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defined number of Marines as “representative” and then using it as a basis for claiming that a study is relevant can be a form of deception in which a method replaces reality. If Marine leaders accept statistics in place of reality they may miss the complexity of the issues at hand and so develop a false sense of how to address ethics in the Corps.

While some of what follows may be readily apparent to experienced Marine leaders, what may be of interest is the consistent theme among participants in the study that identifies a real need for the Marine Corps to critically examine and perhaps change certain cultural practices. Examples of such practices are “maintaining unscientific views of how and why Marines act” and “ineffective training approaches.” Given the way participants commented on these practices, they can be understood as obstacles both to Marines acting ethically and to the Corps making real progress in addressing unethical action.

Section 2: Top Level Themes

The participants in the study were in broad agreement that the need to choose between doing what is ethically right and ethically wrong is endemic to being a Marine. That choice can be understood in terms of two basic oppositions:

1) Doing or saying what advances self-interest instead of what advances other-interest.
   “Other-interest” means doing or saying what is in the interest of the Marine Corps, the mission, or fellow Marines. Generally, this means putting Corps values above individual values. Marines who decide to commit adultery rather than to uphold legal and ethical principles are an example of acting in self-interest.

2) Doing or saying what is in line with Corps values instead of what the average American would do or say. For some Americans, it is ethically right to smoke marijuana, and this view is supported by law in some places. For Marines, however, it is neither ethically nor legally right to smoke marijuana in any context.

From these two basic oppositions, a host of complex consequences are immediately appreciable.

For #1, identifying whether one course of action or another is actually self-interest or other-interest can be a problem. If a senior Marine leader is in trouble for adultery, it can appear to junior Marines that “punishment” is delayed, and often the outcome is not public. Compare this to the junior Marine who is reduced in rank, forfeits pay, and is required to perform extra
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duty the day after an infraction and an outcome readily observable by other Marines. This can create an impression that a kind of self-interest is operating at senior levels that is not operating at junior levels of the organization.

This can be buttressed by practices even at the unit level where wrong-doers are quickly transferred out of a unit while leaders tell Marines “we got this,” meaning that it is not a subject for discussion or understanding and so does not concern junior Marines. “Protecting Marines” from the unethical actions of others can, according to some of the participants, squander an opportunity to educate and train Marines on ethics. On the other hand, one participant wondered whether a Marine transferred out of a unit after committing an unethical action might be harmed in some way should his or her action become the topic of unit discussion. The issue, then, is how leaders can best address ethical issues while being ethical in that activity.

A variation on this theme is the employment of total force required training programs that can appear to burden all Marines for the unethical actions of a few. An example cited by some of the participants in this study is that of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) training. Participants noted that some Marines perceive the total force nature of this training requirement as a general lack of trust: the vast majority of Marines do not sexually assault anyone—and will not—yet all Marines are obligated to attend the training. Whether this position is realistic or logical is a different question.

For #2, posting images to social media sites or posting opinions about military or political leadership are excellent examples. The pervasiveness of civilian practices with social media can make posting activities seem like they are ethically and legally unproblematic to young Marines. This becomes especially tricky since civilians (and some military members) choose to justify their actions by referencing a “God-given right” with the implication that even the military is not permitted to abridge the actions. Similarly, in a state where marijuana is legal, Marines must struggle with the idea that doing what is legal (at the state level) is not doing what is right according to the Corps and to the United States military in general. A version of the reverse of this issue has been discussed by, for example, David Wood, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for the Huffington Post: In the civilian world, killing a child is both legally and ethically wrong, but in combat, it can be both legal and right. Wood quotes a former Marine, “You know [shooting a child] is wrong. But…you have no choice.” None of the participants in this study
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referred to any systematic or consistent engagement with these issues by the Corps as an organization. Instead, addressing such complexities appears to be left to the judgment of individual Marine leaders.

Examples like those presented above were offered by participants to illustrate three interrelated themes facing Marine leaders. The first theme is the ambiguity and malleability of the ethical status of some actions on the part of either a Marine or his or her leader. Critical here is the idea that changes in context can sometimes suggest, if not demand, changes in either value prioritization or the ways values are expressed. For example, the “rigid” standards of dress in garrison for some units might give way to “relaxed” standards of dress in a combat zone. On a more concrete level, a Marine who takes off his flak jacket in a combat zone might normally be understood as violating the value of force protection; however, if he is about to attend a meeting with local leaders, he would not necessarily be held accountable. Though this practice might now be an accepted “exception” to a force protection rule, that there are exceptions to such an important principle means that a leader cannot simply exhort his or her Marines to “do the right thing.” That exceptions to important principles may not be identified or even identifiable ahead of time further supports the study participants’ idea that the Marine Corps needs to institute more and better education as well as to create expectations for leaders to practice and discuss ethical decision-making with their Marines.

The second theme is the variation in how Marines perceive both what counts as an unethical action and the severity of an unethical action. Participants made it clear that one leader can judge a sexual assault case to be a case of he-said/she-said and find the supposed perpetrator not responsible while another leader hearing the same facts may judge the case very differently and find the supposed perpetrator responsible for the action. This is one of the reasons leaders called for common education and training on ethics at the organizational level.

The third theme is the potential for lack of competence, lack of confidence, and lack of understanding in how, when, and why to address unethical actions. Marines and Marine leaders face the reality of the first and second themes daily and, thus, are likely to encounter this third theme in one form or another. A host of 2nd and 3rd order consequences can follow, such as Marines in the unit losing confidence in the ability of the leader to make fair or just decisions.
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Participants emphasized two areas that are important, but missing, from current education and training: *how* a good Marine leader can make a fair and just decision about supposedly unethical action and *how* good Marines actually “do the right thing.” These two areas emphasize positive examples of what *to do* instead of negative ones of what *not to do* that are typical in current education and training. These themes could provide a starting point for developing the kind of scenario-based training called for by leaders during the Ethics Stand Down presentations.

Section 3: Marines and Self-Control

In providing context for these themes, participants pointed to the question of what level of control Marines and their leaders have over their own actions. For example, many were skeptical that 13 weeks of boot camp could materially change 17 years of socialization into a set of values and practices with which a typical recruit or candidate enters into the Corps. Participants were divided on the extent to which young Marines could exercise judgment and self-control. While no participant excused or justified unethical actions among younger Marines, most noted that both judgment and self-control could be improved with more consistent and better constructed ethics education and training. A common notion among participants was that the Marine Corps and Marines seem to assume that all Marines share a common value heritage and so will somehow know exactly how to “do the right thing.” However, the reality is that, even in some common cases, what the right thing to do is may not be exactly clear or may entail 2\(^{nd}\) or 3\(^{rd}\) order consequences that bring about new ethical challenges.

One participant noted a contextual challenge to Marine leaders and to Marines who do try to exemplify ethical behavior and educate and train Marines in acting ethically. The participant asked how the Corps can expect a 19 year old Marine to “do the right thing” when a much older, senior leader does not? Though there are answers to this question, constructing those answers and deciding whether and how to deliver them, to which Marines, and over what period of time, are all open questions facing any Marine leader after an incident. Given such incidents, and given a Marine Corps set both within and (in certain significant ways) against American civilian culture with its strong valorization of self-interest, Marines can readily construct both excuses and justifications for *not* “doing the right thing.” This adds to the difficulty of ethics education.
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and training. This coupled with a perceived lack of substantive and effective engagement on ethics by the Corps as an organization can challenge individual leaders’ efforts to create and manage their own ethics education and training.

A further complexity emerges when a common, everyday issue is acknowledged: not doing the right thing can appear to be doing the right thing, especially if concepts and beliefs among Marines remain untested and unexamined. Consider this illustrative commentary from one of the study participants:

Marines believe sexual assault is…1) it’s not really a problem – it’s an exception rather than the rule and most people who report it are lying, 2) even if it is a problem there’s nothing you can do to stop it. People aren’t going to say, “Sir, I don’t think we can stop this” and you’ll just do the minimum to check the block. They think “it’s what happens when men and women work together.” If you can’t convince people there is something you can do about it, that you can change the dynamics, AND if you haven’t given them the tools to make that change, it’s a waste of time. … People think that their characters are set and that is not the case.”

The leader clearly thinks that character—defined as the typical ways a Marine talks and acts—can be changed. But that is not the case for all Marines, and this gives rise to conflicts about what actions are the right thing to do: some Marines think that there is no changing the natural fact of what happens when opposite sexes are together. They believe the outcome is automatic and, by definition, uncontrollable. Marines with this view will not say what they are thinking since it conflicts with the leader’s belief (itself an ethical problem). They will “check the box” in order to meet what they view as an impossibly idealistic demand from the leader. This is quite practical and, in a sense, can be understood as exactly the right thing to do when one is tasked with fulfilling an impossible task.

From a social scientific perspective, the idea that any human action is automated and, thus, uncontrollable means equating all human action with a reflex, like when the doctor hits your relaxed knee with a rubber hammer. This is a scientific mistake, and it creates a very serious ethical problem. In the example above, notice how #2—the idea that sex is automatic—provides the underlying explanation for #1—that assault is both the exception and a fabrication. In other words, #2 tells us why Marines can think #1: males and females will have sex, period.

This means all sex is consensual, no matter what. For Marines who think and reason like this, the real problem is when the automated process is misrepresented by a complainant. The idea is that
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there is no such thing as sexual assault, only misguided complainants. In this light, it is no surprise that victims of sexual assault can be and, at times, are blamed for being assaulted. Moreover, this line of reasoning is a conceptual set-up for both further sexual assaults and for Marines to simply stand by during a sexual assault.

The Marine Corps challenges this kind of thinking every day. That is, the culture of the Corps is built on the idea that humans are capable of controlling most if not all their actions. The activity of training for combat depends on the idea that Marines control what many civilians think are automatic responses to, for example, frightening situations. The Corps demands that recruits replace self-interest and self-doubt with other-interest and self-confidence, and then it makes them practice ways of acting that constitute other-interest and self-confidence. “Automatic behavior”—like males and females having sex—is nowhere to be found in Corps training. The idea that males and females engage in sex automatically is rejected by the Corps in the same way that it rejects the idea that a bullet wound automatically results in a Marine’s being incapacitated.

Marines are invited to adopt a set of values that then guide their talk and actions accordingly. Those values often result in Marines acting in ways that are opposite to what is considered natural or automatic. Marines pride themselves on running toward instead of away from the sounds of gunfire. The Marine Corps honors Marines who throw themselves onto, not away from, the live grenade. Marine Corps training does not mean that a recruit’s “wiring” is changed. If the latter were the case, there would be no reason to think that a Marine would ever do anything but throw him- or herself onto the live grenade. Past history—like growing up in a social setting that prizes theft or assault—would have no impact at all on a Marine’s decision-making. All recruits and candidates would simply be re-wired, or reprogrammed, to talk and act as the Corps wishes.

If “what and how a Marine thinks” is a set-up for how they act, then the Marine Corps has a golden opportunity to make a difference in ethical action among Marines. Through education and training, Marines can learn how the ways they think can lead them into a situation in which what appears right may actually be wrong and what appears wrong may actually be right. In the example just cited, Marines who believe that sex between males and females is
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automatic may judge it wrong to seek to educate and train Marines to not have sex. But that effort is exactly right given the ethics of the Corps and its approach to combat training.

A way to advance former Commandant James Amos’ ethics overhaul would be to engage in presentations and discussions of ethics at the level of the social science of human action. As the example above indicates, Marines already have beliefs on this topic, some scientifically defensible and others not. Ethics education and training could provoke Marines to question their thinking and beliefs about human action and, thus, encourage them to adopt a more critical approach to what they choose to think and believe. Following Marine Corps operational and combat training, changing what Marines think and believe leads to changes in their actions.

Against this background, it is easy to understand the concern of participants that current training efforts are far from relevant and effective. Participants reported that Marines can easily think that senior leaders do not trust them and do not think they are worth time or effort, insofar as what is delivered to them are dry, legalistic presentations, emphasizing what not to do, with hundreds of their fellow Marines. As mentioned previously, the impression can be that such training is self-interested on the part of leaders who want to keep themselves out of trouble with higher authorities, and that it simply blames all Marines for the misdeeds of a few. From a social scientific perspective, this impression, accurate or not, can help invite junior Marines to stray further from the ethical mark intended for them by senior leaders: after all, in the eyes of those junior Marines who think this way, the example being set is self-interest, not other-interest.

Section 4: Leader Talk and Action as Ethical Issues

Participants called for better education and training on ethical issues not only for junior Marines but for themselves as leaders. Consider this value conflict faced by one of the participants as a commanding officer of an infantry battalion. In preparing for a large field exercise, the executive officer (XO) of the infantry battalion was responsible for procuring certain equipment. It became clear to this commanding officer (CO) that the equipment had not been procured. The CO had been discussing ethics, focusing on maintaining integrity. He was initially going to threaten the career of the XO for failing to accomplish the mission, but one of his subordinates reminded him that that XO had not compromised his integrity by either falsifying paperwork or stealing the equipment to accomplish the mission. The CO decided to
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e nsure that he did not prompt the officer to falsify records or steal equipment before future exercises by not reprimanding him for his failure. This CO saw the situation as a fundamental contradiction between achieving the mission and doing the right thing for his executive officer. Utility and effectiveness were rendered secondary, and so, by implication, we can say that the CO chose to demote mission success in order to promote honesty and integrity. Of course, the central importance of mission success in the Marine Corps means that an outcome like this could be highly problematic even as it delivers a good message about honesty and integrity. Because of its ambiguity, this kind of example would seem to provide a good scenario of the kind called for by leaders during the 2012 Ethics Stand Down.

This example also illustrates the idea that all COs face such value conflicts and often do so without necessarily having had guided practice identifying such conflicts, deciding whether to pay attention to them (instead of simply reacting according to common practice), deciding whether and how to handle them, and determining what sorts of consequences might ensue. Participants indicated, moreover, that conflicts like this are embedded in a complex social environment. Given comments and discussions from other participants, it is easy to imagine this CO being advised by a superior officer that the CO has better things to think about, that the CO is going to be held responsible for failing to procure the equipment regardless, and that if it were to happen again, the CO’s career would be finished, and so on. Ethics education and training would do well to include the fact that when a leader makes a judgment or a decision about another Marine’s actions, that judgment or decision is fundamentally a social activity. In other words, the viewpoints of others in the community are always involved in such ethical decision-making, especially since a leader’s understanding of “integrity,” “honesty,” and “mission success” has to come from someone, whether a high school sports coach or a drill instructor.

Section 5: Conclusion and Options

Participants in this study presented both ethical and unethical action as something an individual decides to engage in using his or her judgment and beliefs, but only in light of and in reference to others. Participants noted that context is critical for Marines in deciding what to say and do, as are Marines’ concepts and beliefs. Participants used example after example to demonstrate the complexity of ethical action and, thus, the need for better education and training.
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that enable small groups of Marines to discuss ethics. Some of the issues that stand in the way of Marines consistently engaging Marines on ethical topics include cultural assumptions, like the ideas that it is better not to talk about ethics violations within a unit but rather to remove the offender, that “doing the right thing” is mostly obvious, or that ethics education and training are really up to leaders (because, apparently, it is assumed that all Marine leaders know and agree what ethics are and how they apply in most situations). In this light, “doing the right thing” almost always requires hard thinking and time. Leaders in this study almost universally panned “easy” reactions to ethical issues—such as simply exhorting Marines to “do the right thing” or simply imposing a punishment on a Marine and moving on to the next issue without taking the time to educate the Marine—as impotent at best and promoting more unethical action at worst.

But these assumptions can and should be investigated. For example, in legislating against “sammich jokes,” senior leaders presented the right thing to do as to not tell such jokes. But is it always right? It is a social scientific truism that, depending on the person, context, voice tone, and so forth, a joke can be a means of expressing acceptance or even affection. Humor, meanwhile, has been associated with building cohesive communities. In some cases, for some male and female Marines, a sammich joke is a way of acknowledging the social closeness and so acceptance of a female, while in other cases it can be used by a female against a male during the kind of verbal sparring match often used by Marines in their daily interactions. Junior Marines may ask whether leaders considered the full range of uses of sammich jokes and whether the value of “positive” uses of the joke justifies allowing the derogatory uses of the joke. This is not a defense of sammich jokes, but rather a rendition of the kind of complexity attending to ethics in the Marine Corps. As has been suggested in this report, a more sophisticated social scientific understanding of social practices would help Marine leaders develop a firm foundation on which to identify when, how, and why, for example, some joking practices are offensive, and so provide resources and opportunities for leaders to formulate education and training on the topic. This creates the possibility of creating nuanced and on-target reactions to the novel ways of interacting in constant development by Marines.

At least three options are available given the content of this preliminary report. Supporting further study would enhance these options, but for now, we can suggest that, first, the Marine Corps could build a typology of exemplary actions in reference to the kinds of
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ambiguous, contradictory, and difficult ethical challenges faced by Marine leaders and their subordinates. At the very least, such a typology would alert Marines to unsuspected or unimagined possibilities for both ethical and unethical talk and actions. Second, the Corps could revamp its fundamental approach to ethics education and training by constructing scenarios based on real-life issues faced by Marines. These could be made rank and MOS appropriate and designed for use by small groups of Marines in discussion with leaders. While promoting unit cohesion, these scenarios would also give Marines critical time practicing ethical decision-making and trying out different ways of talking and acting when faced with ethical issues in front of their peers, superiors, and subordinates.

Finally, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps should conduct a thorough examination of the deep assumptions built into the Corps’ culture about the capability of self-control among Marines and about the sources of the Corps’ values. We have already seen how the supposed automaticity of male-female sex, a belief held by some Marines, contradicts the Corps’ philosophy of training Marines for combat. Central to the Corps’ philosophy is the idea that Marines can act in spite of their biology, for example, despite suffering the loss of limbs and blood on the battlefield.

As social scientists, one of the areas for critical review we want to suggest is what appears to be the central role that the concepts and values associated with middle-class, white, Christian, father-son relationships play in underpinning assumptions about what “the right thing” is and how “the right thing” is done. This model is now complemented—and contradicted—by a number of other models. We can readily imagine that at least some of the Corps’ ethical problems have to do with dynamics arising from conflicts in these models. For example, a male Marine who was raised by a mother without a father might do very well in relating to women but might be insensible to the use of a father-son relationship model by an officer trying to educate him about ethics. Without shared concepts, lessons can fall flat.

For us, what appears to be at stake in these issues is the ability of Marines to know what doing the right thing is and how to educate or train one another in that knowledge preparatory to actually making decisions and taking action. To attain this knowledge appears to require a critical review of some of the basic assumptions in the Corps about the nature of ethics, training, and the capabilities of Marines. This requires the involvement of more sophisticated social
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discernable expertise than is currently circulating in the Corps to evolve the types of questions being asked from, for example, “How can we improve individual cognitive skills?” to “What do Marines mean when they tell sammich jokes and what effect does that have on other Marines?”

This is a shift away from treating the Marine Corps as a collection of individuals toward considering it a vision for a way of life that is worked out dynamically, every day, by Marines. In this change lies the promise of effective engagement with ethics on the part of the Corps.

1 The research project, “Marines and Ethics,” was approved by the Marine Corps Institutional Review Board on December 20, 2013. Its protocol identification number is USMC.2014.0004. This protocol covers only phase one of the project as conceptualized. A separate protocol is needed for phase two research.
3 For reviews of biologically reductive arguments see, for example, the USMC CAOCL-TECOM Resilience Research Project Final Report, available here
5 A ‘sammich joke’ is a variation on the phrase “Make me a sammich (sandwich)!” This misspelling is deliberate. The phrase calls forth the idea that the true and right place of a woman is in the service of a man. As it is used, the phrase is usually, but not always, a way for men to mock women or to demote their worth. See this website: http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/make-me-a-sandwich