From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACV 343), APO, U. S. Forces 96383
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY

incl: (4) DA, Hq, 101st Airborne Division, APO San Francisco, 96343 comments on Combat After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY and Operation MINCO dated 18 May 68

1. Forwarded.

2. Enclosure (4) is appended here to clarify certain portions of enclosure (3).

3. The following information is submitted relative to the intelligence problems cited in enclosure (1) to the 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, After Action Report:

a. Paragraph 1a(1): Infra-red and SLAR runs were flown on a daily basis under III MAF cognizance. All reports received from these flights were disseminated to the 1st Brigade by radio, phone or teletype as received. One SLAR and two IR requests were submitted for the 1st Brigade but were cancelled by III MAF.

b. Paragraph 1a(2): APD missions were not flown due to unavailability of equipment in country.

c. Paragraph 1a(3): Bad weather during February made air observation difficult to impossible. Only 48 hours of observation were flown for Task Force ARA during the month of February, therefore AD's were allocated strictly on a priority basis.

d. Paragraph 1a(4): Two photo requests were submitted for the 1st brigade. One was cancelled by III MAF and the other, delayed by bad weather, was not flown until after the operation terminated.
From: Commanding General
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Via: MACJ 343, AIO, U. S. Forces 96222)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FFM
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY
Ref: (a) MACJ Dir 335-8 of 1Sep67
(b) 1st MarDiv O 3460.1A
Encl: (1) Task Force XRay After Action Report
(2) 1st Marines After Action Report
(3) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division After Action Report

1. Enclosure (1) contains the subject report of Commanding General, Task Force XRay for Operation HUE CITY. Enclosures (2) and (3) amplify enclosure (1).

2. Operation HUE CITY commenced at 0630H on 31 January 1968 with Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray commanding. The 1st Marines assumed tactical control of committed forces as of 1200H on 1 February 1968. On 22 February 1968 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division came under Operational Control of Task Force X-RAY and on 22 February was employed as tactical unit south of Hue City. Task Force X-Ray assumed tactical control of both 1st Marines and 101st Airborne Division units as of 1200H on 22 February 1968.

3. It should be noted that the task organization for 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division as written in enclosure (3) lists all units under the operational control of the Brigade during Operation HUE CITY. 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry was located at the Phu Bai Combat Base providing a portion of the security for that installation and did not actively participate in the operations to the south of the city. The same is true of the 101st Airborne Division's Long Range Reconnaissance Company, which provided security for engineer upgrading of Landing Zone EL 1A50 during the same period.
4. Paragraph 11 of enclosure (1), reflects only those actions taking place after 22 February 1968 and Task Force X-Ray's assumption of tactical control of the 1st Marines and 101st Airborne Division units. Enclosure (2) reflects those actions taking place prior to 22 February 1968.

Foster C. Lahue
FOSTER C. LAHUE
TASK FORCE X-RAY AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation HUE CITY (Search and Destroy).

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 31O83OH Jan 68 to 022400H Mar 68.

3. LOCATION: City of HUE and surrounding area in THUA THIEN Province.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Task Force X-Ray.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: BGren Foster C. LAHUE.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

   Task Force X-Ray
   TF Hq and HqCo
   Det, HqBn, 1st MarDiv
   1st CIT, FMF
   Sec, 2d SSCT, SI, FMF
   Det, 1st Dental Co
   7th IT, FMF
   13th ITT, FMF
   Det, 3d ITT, FMF
   7th AA Plat, 29th CA Co (USA)
   Co B(-), 3d Sp Bn (22-29 Feb 68)

   Co C (Rein), 1st Med Bn

   Comm Co(-) (Rein), 7th Comm Bn, FMF

   1st Force Recon Co (Rein)
   1st Force Recon Co
   Co C, 1st Recon Bn
   Plat, Co D, 1st Recon Bn

   Btry D, 1st Bn, 44th Arty (USA)

   1st Marines(-) (Rein)
   Det, HqCo
   Det, 3d ITT

   1st Bn(-), 1st Mar
   Det, HqCo, 1st Mar
   Co A
   Co B(-)

   1st Bn, 5th Mar
   Det, H&S Co
   Co A
7. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery. Artillery support for Operation HUE CITY was provided by 1st Field Arty Group with 1st Bn(-) (Rein), 11th Mar in direct support of 1st Marines and 2d Bn (Airborne), 320th Arty in direct support of 1st Marines and 2d Bn (Airborne), 320th Arty in direct support of 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. 1st FAG provided general support to 1st Mar, 1st Bde and ARVN units with 1st 155 Gun Btrv and 2d Plat, 3d
8 inch Howitzer Btry. Additionally Btry C, 3d Bn (8 inch), 18th Arty provided general support to 1st Bde although this battery did not come under the operational control of 1st FAG. See enclosures (2) and (3) for battery locations and displacements during the operation. A total of 18,091 rounds were expended including HE, smoke, WP, illumination and CS gas. Mission surveillance was difficult due to the nature of the built up areas encountered in Hue and low ceilings which severely restricted aerial observation. However supporting fires by artillery were effective and instrumental to the success of the operation. Special FSCC arrangements included direct communications with the Thua Thien Sector TOC which provided a rapid means of obtaining necessary Province clearance and clearance with Province Forces operating in or near Hue. 1st FAG established a liaison section with the 1st ARVN Div and also furnished FO teams in order to provide rapid coordination and clearance of fires with ARVN units participating in the operation.

b. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire was used extensively during Operation HUE CITY, particularly in the seizure of the Hue Citadel. During the operation a total of 5191 rounds of 8"/55, 6"/47, 5"/54 and 5"/38 were fired.

c. Air. Both helicopter and fixed wing air support played an essential role in Operation HUE CITY, however the use of air support was greatly limited by poor weather conditions which prevailed throughout the operation. Medical evacuation by helicopter was carried out in spite of this on a timely basis. One helicopter was shot down during operations in the Hue Citadel and numerous hits were sustained by many helicopters while operating in that area. Although weather precluded the effective use of fixed wing air support during the majority of Operation HUE CITY, on 22 February air strikes were conducted on the southeastern corner of the Citadel with devastating effect utilizing 250 pound snake eye and 500 pound napalm bombs. Advancing directly behind the air strikes, the infantry was able to attack and secure their objectives ending offensive operations in the Citadel. Close air support played a major role in the seizure of Hill 42 south of Hue on 27 February, destroying enemy bunkers and weapons emplacements located on or near the hill. A total of 113 sorties of fixed wing air support were flown during the operation. 293,202 pounds of ordnance were delivered.

d. Engineer. Company A(-) (Rein), 1st Engineer Bn and Co A(-), 326th Engineer Bn supported 1st Marines and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division respectively during Operation HUE CITY. Company A, 1st Engineer Bn established a water point in Hue during the operation which alleviated the requirement for purification of well and river water by the individual Marine. 1st Bridge Company, FMF was employed during the operation to repair a vital bridge on the MSR between Hue and Phu Bai which had been destroyed by the enemy on 4 February at YD 781209.
A floating bridge was completed at the site on 12 February after extensive efforts to secure the bridgehead by infantry units. With the completion of this bridge resupply and reinforcement convoys could once again proceed to Hue. 104 convoys made the round trip from Phu Bai to Hue during the operation.

e. Shore Party. Company E, 1st SF Bn gave HST support to 1st Marines during Operation HUE CITY. (See Par 13, Encl (2))

f. NSA Detachment (Hue LCU Ramp and Col Co/Tan My NSA). With the destruction of the vital bridge on the MSR at YD 781209 on 4 February it became necessary to resupply forces in Hue by LCU from Danang. The U. S. Navy units at the Hue LCU Ramp and the Col Co/Tan My NSA were instrumental in effecting resupply of 1st Marines during the critical period while the bridge was out. During the later phases of the operation the LCU's transported troops, tracked vehicles, and supplies to the Hue Citadel in support of operations to seize that portion of the city from the enemy.

g. Tanks. The built up areas encountered in Hue, both south of the Song Huong and in the Hue Citadel, made tanks an absolute necessity in the clearing of the enemy from the city by 1st Marines. Initially, a provisional platoon from the 3d Tank Bn, 3d Marine Division was employed in support of the 1st Marines. Later two platoons of tanks from Co A, 1st Tank Bn were brought to HUE by LCU from Danang, one platoon on 11 February and one on 17 February, and placed in direct support of the 1st Marines. It should be noted that the successful tactics employed required that the tank be well screened by infantry units in order to protect it from enemy antitank fire. Only one tank was lost to enemy fire.

h. Ontos. AT Co(-), 1st Tank Bn supported 1st Marines in Operation HUE CITY. The Ontos proved to be extremely valuable during the conduct of operations in built up areas. Firing the 106 mm recoilless rifles in salvos of mixed ammunition; BEEHIVE, HEPT, and HEAT; resulted in rapid reduction of enemy positions. The vulnerability of the lightly armored Ontos to enemy antitank weapons was balanced by employing the same type infantry protection for the Ontos that was necessary for the tank, as in the preceding paragraph. The maneuverability of the Ontos allowed it to move into a firing position, fire its salvo, and quickly return to a covered area. Extensive use of B-40 and RPG anti tank weapons during the battle against both tanks and Ontos made the use of an infantry screen mandatory. Additionally the Ontos, being smaller than the tank, could often go places, such as narrow alleyways, that the tanks were too wide to enter. No Ontos were lost to enemy fire.
8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy. The units listed below were confirmed as participating in HUE CITY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CONFIRMED BY</th>
<th>ENTRY DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 6th NVA Regt</td>
<td>POWs from subordinates, usually reliable sources</td>
<td>31Jan68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 800 Bn</td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>30Jan68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 802 Bn</td>
<td>POW</td>
<td>30Jan68 (Est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 806 Bn</td>
<td>2 POWs and usually reliable sources</td>
<td>30Jan68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 4th NVA Regt. No documents or POWs confirm the presence of the 4th Regiment Hqs in Hue City. The 1st ARVN Div reports that elements of the 4th Regt were involved in the attack in the area south of the river. This is true, as will be shown below. It is highly probable that at least a portion of the 4th Regt Hqs was present in order to control subordinates. Because of this, this unit is listed as confirmed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CONFIRMED BY</th>
<th>ENTRY DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 804 Bn</td>
<td>2 POWs</td>
<td>31Jan68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) K-4B</td>
<td>Sec (1) below</td>
<td>31Jan68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The K-4B was reported to have captured the Hue City Jail. POWs from the 804th Regt reported this to ITT. It also was reported that the 160 bodies found in the hospital area after its recapture were from the K-4B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CONFIRMED BY</th>
<th>ENTRY DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 416 Bn (5th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW</td>
<td>20Feb68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 7th Bn (90th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW</td>
<td>21Feb68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 8th Bn (90th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW</td>
<td>21Feb68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 7th Bn (9th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW believed to be 27Feb68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Hl/Hue City Sapper</td>
<td>1st ARVN Div and usually 31Jan68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn/HMV</td>
<td>reliable sources (11Feb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) 810 Bn</td>
<td>1st ARVN Div reports this 31Jan68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unit seized Tu Dam Pagoda and was on the southern wall, later. Also, captured document.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) 7th Bn (29th Regt)</td>
<td>Captured documents and 1 1to10Feb68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chieu Hoi from 9 Bn/29th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) 9th Bn (29th Regt)</td>
<td>Captured documents and 1 1to10Feb68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) K200 Transportation Bn</td>
<td>Captured documents Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Provided support outside City)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following units probably participated in Hue City:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>IDENTIFIED BY</th>
<th>ENTRY DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 12th Sapper Bn</td>
<td>POWs from 6th Regt stated sappers were attached to their units. The 12th Bn normally operates in the same area as the 6th Regt. Consensus among intelligence officers is that this unit participated.</td>
<td>31Jan68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following units possibly participated in Hue City:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>IDENTIFIED BY</th>
<th>ENTRY DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 4th Bn (24th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW</td>
<td>13Feb68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 6th Bn (24th Regt)</td>
<td>1 POW</td>
<td>13Feb68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These battalions are considered possible because the 24th Regiment is considered only as a possible unit. At one time, the 24th Regiment was a training regiment in the 350th Division in NVN. It no longer is carried as a confirmed unit.

b. Weather and Terrain. During the majority of Operation HUE CITY the weather was characterized by low ceilings, poor visibility, light rains and morning fog. Air operations were sharply curtailed by these weather conditions. The city of Hue was characterized by built up areas that consisted mainly of concrete, stone and masonry buildings. The terrain outside the city was mostly low hills with scrub brush growth to the south of the city and native structures interspersed among rice paddies to the north and east of the city. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 69 and 60.2 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 84.7%. Approximately 2.68 inches of rain fell during the operation.

9. MISSION. (22Feb-2Mar) Task Force X-Ray conduct operations in AO to destroy enemy forces in city of Hue, provide security and support to upgrade and ensure continuity of use of National Route #1, protect designated vital installations in AO, clear banks of Song Huong north and east of Hue, and support 1st ARVN Division in Hue as requested and directed.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. (22Feb-2Mar) Task Force X-Ray with assigned forces search out and destroy enemy forces located in the City of Hue and in the area to the north and east of the city; interdict or sever enemy infiltration and resupply routes into the Hue area from the south.
and continue to provide security for LOCS1 and vital installations within the assigned AO.

11. EXECUTION

a. 22 February. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued operations in the Hue area. The southern wall of the citadel and final regimental objective north of the Song Huong was seized at 1500H. Contact south of the city in vicinity of YD 7620 remained moderate to heavy. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division commenced their search operations against negligible resistance. A resupply LCU was damaged on the Song Huong and an escort FR was sunk by B-40 rocket fire near YD 774247.

b. 23 February. 1st Marines(-) (Rein) policed the battlefield within their zone in the Citadel against light resistance. Contact south of the city continued moderate and some modest advances were accomplished. In the area to the south of the 1st Marines, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div encountered very light resistance.

c. 24 February. Advance of both the left (south) flank of the 1st Marines(-) (Rein) and the right (north) flank of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was slowed by strong enemy positions in the vicinity of Hill 42 (YD 751194) and the village complex (grid square YD 7618). Air and artillery fires were employed against well prepared enemy positions. Co B, 1st Bn, 5th Mar was chopped to 1st Bde at 0930H and shortly thereafter discovered a significant enemy weapons cache which included some 59 weapons.

d. 25 February. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) continued to encounter heavy resistance in the vicinity of Hill 42. Other areas were relatively quiet. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div swung units to the south and continued their advance to the south and west.

e. 26 February. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) withdrew its units from the Hue Citadel and located them in the vicinity of the railroad bridge over the Song Huong (YD 750210). Late in the afternoon after heavy air strikes and artillery support, key enemy positions of Hill 42 were captured. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div continued operations to the south and west against light and sporadic fire.

f. 27 February. Mopping up of Hill 42 continued during the day with light to moderate contact. Elsewhere there was only light contact.

g. 28 February. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) attacked north and east of the Song Van Duong (grid square YD 7722). Moderate resistance was encountered in the vicinity of an enemy strong point in the vicinity YD 775240. Contact elsewhere was light to moderate. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div continued to sweep to the west against occasional light resistance.
h. 29 February. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) continued operations north and east of Hue against a series of enemy strong points. Moderate contact continued in their area. At 1435H one company of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div came under heavy enemy attack at YD 746167. The contact was broken by the enemy following fixed wing air strikes.

i. 1 March. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) established heavy contact in the early afternoon in the vicinity of YD 801251 and 805248. Air strikes and artillery were employed and at dark the enemy broke contact and withdrew. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div continued operations in their zone against light resistance.

j. 2 March. 1st Mar(-) (Rein) continued operations north of the city. Contact was light and on two occasions moderate in the vicinity of two enemy strong points (YD 788230, 802246). 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div has light to negligible contact throughout the day.

12. RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA MEDEVAC</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA MINOR</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>DETAINNEES</td>
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<td></td>
<td>INC</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSWC</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA MEDEVAC</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA MINOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>DETAINNEES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSWC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. Supply. At the start of Operation HUE CITY the 1st Marines established a LSA at the Hue City LCU ramp. On 22 February FISG-A established a LSA at the soccer stadium in Hue at YD 778222. The 1st Marines received all classes of supply from this LSA throughout the latter portion of the operation. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was also given external supply support by FISG-A. However no LSA was established for this unit due to the close proximity of the 1st Brigade command post to FISG-A and shortage of HST personnel available to operate another LSA. Resupply of the 1st Marines was conducted by truck convoy and helicopter during the initial phases of the operation, however with the destruction of the bridge on the MSR at YD 781209 on 4 February it became necessary to resupply that unit by LCU from 9ST 410.
Danang. With the marginal weather conditions that existed throughout the operation, which restricted air operations, the primary means of resupply to 1st Marines during the period 5-12Feb was by LCU until the destroyed bridge was replaced, after which shuttle convoys from Phu Bai commenced on a daily basis. LCU resupply continued on a smaller scale after the convoys started to run. Helicopter logistic support was outstanding with 823 sorties flown delivering 1672 personnel and 1,052,459 pounds of cargo. Resupply of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division tactical units was carried out exclusively by helicopter. For a detailed recap of classes of supply see enclosures (2) and (3). 1st Brigade experienced a shortage of Class II supplies, however this did not materially effect the accomplishment of their mission.

b. Maintenance. No significant problems occurred in maintenance during Operation HUE CITY. FLASG-A provided maintenance support for 1st Marines and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Additionally, 1st Brigade received some support from the 27th Maintenance Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) which was located at Phu Bai during the operation.

c. Evacuation and Hospitalization. Casualties were evacuated to Company C (Rein), 3d Medical Battalion and Company A 3d Medical Battalion which were located in Phu Bai. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division experienced no difficulties in evacuation, using standard procedures throughout the operation. 1st Marines experienced minor difficulties initially due to the tactical situation and the marginal weather conditions. Marine helicopter Medevac support was superb with 270 sorties evacuating 977 casualties in spite of marginal weather throughout. No problems were encountered in obtaining necessary medical supplies in the battle area.

d. Transportation. See enclosures (2) and (3).

e. Communications. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division experienced no unusual problems in communications during Operation HUE CITY. See enclosure (2) for details of 1st Marines communications during the operation.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. See enclosure (2).

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS. Early intelligence of enemy activity in Hue did not reveal the number of enemy units that were subsequently discovered as having been committed to the battle. Initial deployment of forces was made with limited information. Clarification of mission came on D+1 when a boundary between ARVN and Marine units was drawn down the middle of the Song Huong. Although Marine units committed to Hue were assigned the mission of clearing that portion of the city south of the Song Huong, requests were received to accomplish a multiplicity of tasks that included locating and rescuing isolated Americans of the
intelligence community, going to the relief of specific ARVN units, re-
capturing the ARVN arsenal and recapturing the provincial prison before
prisoners could be released. As to the latter task, it was discovered
that NVA units had already taken the prison and released the prisoners
during their initial infiltration of the city on the early morning of
31 January.

Essentially there were four phases of the Marine commitment:

Phase I: Initial commitment of reaction forces.

Phase II: The build up of forces south of the Song Huong and
clearing that portion of the city of enemy forces.

Phase III: Operations within the Citadel.

Phase IV: Operations in urban and rural area south of the Phu
Cam canal, north of the Song Van Huong and east of the city.

The dominating factors faced during the operation were poor weather,
all Task Force X-Ray forces committed to other operations at the time
Hue was occupied by the enemy, readjustment of AC's, and the need for
additional forces to relieve Task Force X-Ray units for commitment to
Hue.

During Phase I, Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines was committed in response
to information that the MACV compound in Hue was under attack on 31Jan68
and receipt of an order to go to their assistance. Subsequently a report
was received that the 1st ARVN Division Headquarters was under attack.
This led to the commitment of the 1/1 battalion command group and Co G,
2d Bn, 5th Marines also on 31 January. A/1/1 had to fight its way into
the city. Essentially Co A relieved pressure on the Army Advisor's
compound as it passed, and crossed the Song Huong into the Citadel on the
evening of the first day. It continued its attack for about a block, but
stopped cold, the reason being that, at this early stage, there was still
a prohibition against the use of supporting arms within the Citadel.
G/2/5 and 1/1 command group closed on A/1/1 and during the first evening
they held positions on the north bank of the river which divides the
city until 2000 when the Marine mission was modified to clear that portion
of the city south of the Song Huong. 1/1 pulled back and concentrated
its position in the vicinity of the Army Advisor's Compound.

By D+4, the initial Marine buildup of forces was completed and Phase
II began. Units in south Hue included 1st Marines command group, 1/1 (-)
with companies A and B (-) and 2/5 (-) with companies F, G and H. Start-
ing in the vicinity of the Advisor's compound, on D+1, their perimeter
was slowly expanded to the southwest. As progress was made to the south-
west, effort was also made towards the north and east limits of the city.
By D+10 approximately two square kilometers had been cleared of enemy forces. For five of the critical 11 days, the main Route One bridge into the city was out.

On 10 February Phase III began with Task Force X-Ray receiving the mission of clearing the southeast corner of the Hue Citadel. This area included about 1 square kilometer of heavily built up area. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was relieved in Phu Loc by 1/327, 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div, which was OPCON to Task Force X-Ray, and displaced to the city. On 11 February, reinforced with 5 tanks and 4 ontos, 1/5 entered the northeast portion of the Citadel by LCU. The displacement was completed on the 12th and 1/5 commenced its attack at 0750 on the morning of the 13th. On 22 February the designated area was clear.

From 11 February, the start of Phase IV, to the end of the operation all three battalions of the 1st Marines (1/1 (-), 2/5 (-), and 1/5) operated increasingly in both tempo and area covered out from the southern portion of Hue. Operations were initially conducted to the south, then to the north and east.

Based on this background, the following remarks regard accomplishment, lesson learned, weaknesses and problems encountered. Casualties were moderate with a total of 142 friendly KIA. The strength of units became somewhat of a problem primarily because, with the exception of 1/1, and especially in the case of 1/5, units had been in the field in combat for varying prolonged periods of up to five weeks prior to Hue City. The foxhole strength of some companies was some 10% below normal. Another important factor, was that in some cases, because of prolonged periods of combat both before and during Hue City, small unit leaders had been lost and replacement had not arrived. However, the 1st Division gave priority of replacements to units in Hue City and provided a total of 825 personnel during the operation.

Intelligence prior to Hue City was, on the whole less than adequate. Although it was not surprising that the enemy undertook his TET offensive, it was surprising that so much strength was committed to it. Marine forces in Hue during the initial fighting did not have a clear picture of the number of enemy involved.

Initially there were restrictions which were observed regarding the use of supporting weapons in the city. In the Citadel indirect fire artillery and air strikes were not allowed initially, although this was soon lifted in some regards. In south Hue there were no restrictions regarding organic Division support weapons, but initially bombs and napalm were prohibited. On 14 February the use of napalm, CS and 2.35 rockets was authorized. On the 15th 500 pound bombs were included and later all restrictions were removed. The Tank and Ontos proved to be valuable weapons in the battle for Hue. The firepower and mobility of these vehicles was a necessity in the house to house fighting encountered during the battle.
No malfunction reports of the M-16 rifle were reported at any time during the operation. Although conditions during the fighting were not the best it seemed that Marines had overcome the problems initially encountered with the weapon.

Mechanical mules were invaluable for both the evacuation of casualties and the bringing up of supplies.

Problems were encountered in the Citadel which did not exist in south Hue. In the latter houses were not as closely spaced and the walls were made of softer material than was encountered in the Citadel. Thus the walls in the south were easier to breach. Streets were wider and there were large areas with few buildings which permitted maneuvering in the southern portion of the city. In the Citadel houses were close together and built of masonry and stone. Streets were narrow and stone and masonry walls or hedgerows separated the houses. The hedgerows were interlaced with barbed wire or other obstacles making them extremely difficult to breach. Additionally each residence had its own foxholes and bunkers constructed by the residents for their own protection. Thus each house became a separate defensive position and each block a formidable bastion.

CS was used in all its forms. Fixed wing aircraft delivered CS in crystalline form in napalm tanks and it was sprayed delivered by helicopters. Success of air delivered CS was limited in the Citadel because many enemy troops had gas masks. Initially problems were encountered in adjusting 4.2 inch mortar CS rounds due to inexperience. CS shells were fired into open areas or set at too great a height of burst, minimizing their effect. Errors were quickly discovered and corrected and CS rounds were skillfully employed. CS grenades were used extensively throughout the operation. A large number of grenades had to be used in an area to obtain the desired concentration of gas. The E-8 CS launcher allowed CS to be projected further than the grenades could be thrown and delivered a sufficient concentration of gas to be effective.

Logistics was one of the two biggest problems encountered, the other being a lack of fixed wing air support. Both of these stemmed from continuous inclement weather which was almost constant between 31 January to 2 March. Logistics problems never became a deficiency. Not once during the 32 day battle did Marine units run out of ammunition. The only critical items on several occasion were 90 mm tank and 81 mm mortar ammunition. The logistics effort in support of the operation came from all areas and units including the Division staff, FLG, PISO-A, NSA, Navy LCU's, and 1st MAW, just to name a few. Supplies not only came from Phu Bai, but Danang and Saigon as well. During the critical days, 5-10 February, when the bridge to Hue was out, total reliance for resupply was placed on helicopters and landing craft. The helicopters delivered over one million, fifty thousand pounds of supplies during the operation. The LCU's and LCM's contributed materially to the support of forces in Hue. River convoys from Tan My down the Song Huong battled through...
ambushes and harassing fire. These craft were escorted by PBR's and UH-1E gunships. Artillery prep fire preceded the river convoys and 106mm recoiless rifles were placed on the landing craft. Five LCU's supported Task Force X-Ray with some 400 tons of supplies. The craft received numerous hits from enemy fire while transiting the river. One LCU blew up while carrying ammo and two LCM bladder refueling boats were hit, caught fire and were sunk or stranded. The banks of the Song Huong were cleared later in the operation as forces became available. Priority in LCU loads was for ammo and class II items critically needed. Although there were no specific logistic innovations, there were some practices which were necessary and effective. Most of these involved force feeding and preplanning. The Battalions and Regiment, because of the nature of the fighting, had difficulty in anticipating their needs and in ordering items sufficiently in advance. As a result, requests escalated quickly from routine, to priority, to emergency. To overcome this initial problem, and based on the experience of the first four days, Task Force X-Ray began to prestage a balanced package of usually needed supplies. As soon as higher priority cargo was delivered, these would then be delivered without a request. In this manner after the first few days, supplies were maintained at a good level.

Another problem encountered was ammo resupply. The helicopter pilots on more than one occasion were forced by enemy action to jettison their loads. When a complete sling of one type ammo was lost, the use of that type weapon was critically effected. Mixed ammo loads were instituted to prevent the loss of a certain type weapon caused by the loss of a sling of one specific type of ammunition. Except for the few days when the bridge was out, routine and priority resupply was adequately completed by Rough Rider from Phu Bai to Hue. Over 100 convoys proceeded from Phu Bai to Hue during the 32 days of the operation. Helicopters handled many emergency resupply missions. An IZA was initially located at the Hue LCU Ramp, but was subsequently moved to the Hue stadium where a safer IZ was available. A great deal of hard and sometimes dangerous work went into the logistic support of operation HUE CITY and the success of the operation in large part was dependent on the fine support provided. The ARVN forces participating in the battle for Hue were instrumental to the success of the operation. General Truong, the 1st ARVN Division Commander, had been advised of a possible offensive and had placed his staff and subordinate units on 100% alert. As a result they were not caught unaware during the initial phases of the TET offensive. By 1 February over six ARVN battalions had been brought into the Hue Citadel for its defense and two more arrived in the next two days. By the 10th these battalions had fought hard, had taken many casualties and were at the end of their capabilities. Realizing this, General Truong asked for Marine assistance in the Citadel, as well as help from the Vietnamese Marines from Saigon. Three battalions of Vietnamese Marine were committed by the 16th replacing the airborne battalions, and later two Ranger Battalions were committed to the defense
of Hue. All told the ARVN suffered 357 killed, 1,830 wounded and 42 missing and killed 2,642 enemy, captured 33 POW's, 681 individual weapons, and 129 crew served weapons.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS. None.
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding General, Task Force XRay

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation HUE CITY)

Ref: (a) Div O 3480.1A
(b) First Marines Frag Order 6-68

1. Code Name. Operation HUE CITY (Search and clear operation)


3. Location. City of Hue, Thu Thien Province, RVN.

4. Command Headquarters. 1st Marine Regiment (-) (Rein), FMF

5. Reporting Officer

   1st Marines (-) (Rein)
   1st Battalion (-), 1st Marines
   1st Battalion, 5th Marines
   2d Battalion, 5th Marines
   Col HUGHES S.J.

   LtCol GRAVEL M.J. O58253
   Maj THOMPSON
   LtCol CHEATHAM EC. O58120

6. Task Organization

   1st Marines (-) (Rein)
   Det Hq Co, 1st Marines
   Det 3d IIT
   Lt WILSON
   Capt ROWE

   1st Battalion (-), 1st Marines
   Det Hq Co, 1st Marines
   Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
   Co B (-), 1st Bn, 1st Marines
   LtCol GRAVEL

   1st Battalion, 5th Marines
   Maj THOMPSON

   Det H&S Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines
   Co A, 1st Bn, 5th Marines
   Co G, 1st Bn, 5th Marines
7. Supporting Forces

a. Air

(1) General. Marine air played an essential role in Operation HUE CITY; however, the general effectiveness of air support was greatly reduced by poor weather conditions which plagued the entire operation.

(2) Helicopter Support.

(a) Inclement weather, while not actually causing cancellation of many fragged helo missions, did appreciably increase response times due to weather holds. This situation had the effect of limiting the utilization of the helo as a rapid response resupply vehicle. The rapid seizure of the Hue Ramp LZ (YD 771223) proved extremely useful during the initial phase of the operation; however, the enemy had unobstructed direct fields of fire into this area from across the river necessitating selection of a new site as additional terrain was secured. On 18 February the LZ was moved to the Stadium (YD 777222) and LSA was simultaneously established at the same position. The Stadium proved to be an ideal LZ/LSA for the remainder of the operation. It was easy to spot from the air, a factor which proved invaluable while conducting night medevacs in less than marginal weather, and it afforded more than adequate space from which to operate. In addition, the construction and location of the stadium provided cover and concealment for helos while in the zone. The LZ at the Hue Hospital (YD 752236), the only site available in the Citadel, was not so ideal. The close proximity of the enemy, both in and around the Citadel, made flying through enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire a normal occurrence while approaching and departing the zone. The deterring effect of the enemy fire, coupled with poor weather, greatly diminished helo resupply missions in this LZ. One helo was shot down and many received multiple hits in the vicinity of the Hue Hospital. Medevac response time was generally excellent throughout the Operation except where the weather was so bad that helo operations were impossible with any acceptable risk factor. On three occasions, critical emergency medevacs were extracted at night, with less than a 200 foot ceiling and one half mile visibility.
The following is a recap of helicopter missions by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Trips</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troop</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>584 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>252,845 lbs Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MedEvac</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>980 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57.8 Total Hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed Wing Support

(a) Constant cloud ceilings below 1000 feet seriously limited the employment of close air support aircraft. On 22 February, four flights of aircraft, loaded primarily with 250 pound snakeyes and 500 pound napalm bombs, laid down a devastating screen of destruction in the southeast sector of the Citadel City. Advancing directly behind the bombs, the ground units were able to secure the final portion of their objective with a minimum of casualties. Later, close air support played a decisive role in the seizure of Hill 42, to the southwest of Hue, by destroying bunkers and automatic weapons, mortar and recoilless rifle positions on the hill.

(b) The following is a recap of fixed wing support missions by type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>144,000 lbs ordnance expended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPQ-10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>124 missions requested, 91,750 lbs ordnance expended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>110.7 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>388.5 Hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The following is a breakdown of close air support by battalion and means of control:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BN</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>FAC</th>
<th>AO/TAC (A)</th>
<th>USAF FAC (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) Artillery Organization

(a) 1st Battalion (-), 11th Marines provided direct support with firing batteries initially located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Btry &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>6-105H</td>
<td>YD 883128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry &quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>60105H</td>
<td>YD 740130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Btry, 1/11</td>
<td>4-155(TD)</td>
<td>YD 888127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) 1st Field Artillery Group provided general support with firing batteries located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st 155 Gun Btry</td>
<td>4-155 G(SP)</td>
<td>YD 894128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Plt, 3d 8&quot; How Btry</td>
<td>2-8&quot; H (SP)</td>
<td>YD 829153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Chronology of Movement

6 Feb mortar Btry 1/11 (4-155H) displaced to YD 832148.

11 Feb Det, Mortar Btry, 1/11, displaced to YD 773224. This detachment was equipped with 2-4.2" mortars and was used primarily to provide a CS delivery means.

12 Feb Btry "D", 2/11, under operational control of 1/11, was emplaced at YD 836144.

17 Feb Det, mortar Btry, 1/11 (2-4.2" Mort) displaced to YD 777221.

19 Feb Det, Btry "E", 2/11, (2-155H(TD)) under operational control of 1st Field Artillery Group, was displaced to YD 888127.

21 Feb Det, Btry "E", 2/11, displaced to YD 836321. This detachment was assigned a mission of general support—reinforcing 1st Bn, 11th Marines.

26 Feb Btry "A", 1/11, displaced to position YD 773215.
(3) Missions Fired - Rounds Expended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>SMK</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>ILL</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot;</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105E</td>
<td>5,743</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155E</td>
<td>6,092</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; H</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,327</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* More CS would have been expended had this shell been available earlier in the operation. There was also a period between 18 and 21 February when expenditure of this shell was rigidly controlled while awaiting resupply.

(4) Mission surveillance which included enemy casualties was difficult if not impossible to obtain. Most of the observed missions were fired into heavily built-up areas where the observer could not observe the results of the mission. When the infantry units subsequently swept the area of the target, it was impossible to determine which casualties resulted from artillery fire and which from direct fire weapons (tanks, mortars, etc.). Through the number of enemy KIA's specifically credited to artillery fire was very small (770), the supporting fires provided were effective and instrumental to the success of the operation.

(5) Special FSCC Arrangements

(a) Direct communications were established with Thu Thien Sector TOC which provided a rapid means of obtaining necessary political clearance and clearance with Province forces operating in the Hue vicinity.

(b) 1st Field Artillery Group established a liaison section with the 1st ARVN Division TOC which provided a rapid means of clearance and coordination between 1st Marines units and 1st ARVN Division units operating in the Hue Area.

(c) Hot Saw-A-Plane fans were established for all artillery units firing into the Hue area. All aircraft coming into or passing through the Hue area were passed to the 1st Marines Air Liaison Section for control. This enabled the Fire Support Coordination Center to maintain positive control of air traffic, artillery, and naval gunfire throughout the operation with little or no interruption of supporting fires due to air traffic.
c. Naval Gunfire

(1) During the initial stage of Operation HUE CITY Naval Gunfire Support of the 1st Marines was arranged and controlled by members of 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company based at Hue City. Excellent coordination and cooperation by ANGELICO assisted in Naval Gunfire Support of the 1st Marines for this period. Notable for this period was the use of the 6"/47 guns of USS PROVIDENCE (CLG6) against the Hue City walls. The proximity of friendly ground forces to the target area inhibited the full exploitation of the destructive fire power available.

(2) From 19 February to completion of the operation, 1st Marines Liaison/Spot Teams were utilized in direct and general supporting missions, directing and controlling precision destruction, waterborne convoy support and area and preparation gunfires.

(3) Gunfire Support ships and rounds fired were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Total Rounds</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 And 5 Feb</td>
<td>USS LYND McCORMICK (DDG8)</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>5&quot;/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Thru 12 Feb</td>
<td>USS HAMMER (DD 718)</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Feb</td>
<td>USS LYND McCORMICK (DDG8)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5&quot;/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Thru 18 Feb</td>
<td>USS JOHNSTON (DD821)</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb</td>
<td>USS PROVIDENCE (CLG6)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6&quot;/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Feb</td>
<td>USS HAMLEY (DD940)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5&quot;/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb</td>
<td>USS PROVIDENCE (CLG6)</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>6&quot;/47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Thru 25 Feb</td>
<td>USS CANBERRA (CA92)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>8&quot;/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>USS HULL (DD945)</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Thru 27 Feb</td>
<td>USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA146)</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>8&quot;/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb Thru 2 Mar</td>
<td>USS JOHNSTON (DD821)</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19 Feb</td>
<td>USS HOEL (DDG 13)</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>5&quot;/54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Naval Gunfire Support Rounds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6&quot;/47</th>
<th>5&quot;/54</th>
<th>5&quot;/38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a. Operation Hue City resulted from enemy initiatives connected with the Tet offensive. The 6th and 4th NVA regiments were known to be within a day's march of Hue prior to Tet. The 4th Regiment had been active in the Phu Loc area. The 6th Regiment had been inactive. One of its battalions was reported to be in Base Area 101 in early January, but moved south along the "Street" in mid-January, successfully evading operations by an ARVN airborne task force in Quang Dien and Phong Dien. The 6th Regimental Headquarters displaced somewhat south from the normal location in base area 114 during mid-January as did the 810 battalion. Agent reports indicated the movement of a battalion sized unit to the northeast of Nam Hoa. Precise whereabouts of the Hue City Sapper Battalion and other local and main force units were unknown. Enemy initiated terrorism in the Hue area was slight during this period. Sources of information were primarily 1st ARVN Division and Thua Thien Sector Intsums, and low-level agent reports.

b. Operations in Hue indicated that the 4th NVA regiment, local force companies, and the Hue City Sapper Battalion, and elements of the K-500 (Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Headquarters) were involved in enemy occupation south of the Perfume River. In addition, the K-200 Battalion, K-833, K-21 and several companies whose parent units were not established were identified tentatively, although these units are not listed in current order of battle holdings and may be AKA's for other units. Total enemy strength south of the Perfume River in the Hue area exceeded 3000. An accurate estimate is impossible due to the presence of units not carried in order of battle, and also because of the integration of many of the 1500 "draftees" into the enemy ranks.

c. In the Citadel and other portions of Hue north of the Perfume River, the 6th NVA regiment, augmented later by elements of the 90th NVA, the 5th NVA and possibly elements of the 28th NVA and 29th NVA occupied the city and environs.

d. Enemy preparations were sufficiently complete to insure adequate supplies of all types of ammunition and supply. Large amounts of B-40 rockets and the ample supplies of AK-47 ammunition were notable. Prisoner interrogation indicated no shortages of ammunition during the battle, and indicated that resupply was constant and virtually automatic to front line units. The enemy developed regular and well-organized rear areas south and west of Hue in the nearby villages through which resupply was managed, and to which wounded personnel, prisoners of war, persons freed from the Thua Thien Provincial Prison and numerous persons detained by the VC/NVA were taken. Population control measures inside and around Hue were established by the VC cadre. Political reeducation centers were established. VC PSYOPS were openly established. The general
population outside of Hue was forced by the VC to involve itself by carrying wounded and carrying supplies, by making flags and signs, by volunteering contributions, by attending meetings, and particularly by digging extensive field fortifications.

e. The civilian population was essentially passive. There was little evidence of voluntary assistance to the VC/NVA. On the other hand, civilians volunteered no assistance to the Marines either. There were, however, some instances of individual Americans and other foreign nationals being assisted by Vietnamese civilians in Hue.

f. The VC, commencing about 4 February, evidently proceeded to seek out Americans and other foreign nationals involved in advisory or other roles in Hue. At the same time, a concerted effort to round up ARVN officers and government officials was undertaken by the VC. There were some indications of atrocities and executions, but no confirmation that this was general. Reports that large numbers of police and ARVN were executed persisted, but had not been confirmed as of the completion of the operation.

g. In the south of Hue, the enemy did not appear fully prepared for counter-attack. Having presented a fait accompli, he evidently expected widespread support from the population and acquiescence on the part of the free world forces. Although enemy forces were well-equipped, his defense of the southern portions of Hue was relatively inept. He neither prepared roadblocks nor obstacles. Fields of fire were not cleared nor improved. Demolitions, mines and booby-traps were not employed. Areas containing numerous refugees were not generally defended. Counter-attacks were not staged, and although the enemy was numerically superior and held virtually the entire city, he did not redeploy this forces to meet the Marine attack. He underestimated the effectiveness of supporting arms in a built-up area. He did, however, employ his own B-40’s with excellent results. Little effort was made by the enemy to leave behind or to reinfilitrate snipers into areas the Marines had cleared. Public and quasi-public buildings such as schools, hospitals, temples and churches were used extensively by the enemy and his defense of the city generally was centered in these areas. His use of these buildings was pragmatically based on the fact that these were substantial buildings, and by his belief that in counter-attacking, Marines wither could not or would not destroy these buildings. In addition, major headquarters were inevitably in pagodas and it appears possible that Buddhist Struggle Movement elements were in complicity with the NLF.

h. In the Citadel, the enemy employed better city-fighting tactics, improved the already formidable defenses, dug trenches, built roadblocks and conducted counter-attacks to regain redoubts which were important to
his defensive scheme. His forces within the Citadel mutually supported one another.

i. Weather throughout the operation was extremely disadvantageous. Rain, fog and constant low-ceiling plagued friendly forces. Air observation and support were rarely available because of poor visibility. Helicopter support was generally available only in dire emergencies. Although total precipitation for the operation was less than three inches, cold weather, and crashing conditions predominated.

j. Several miscellaneous items remain:

1. The enemy forces north of the Perfume River did not support those south of the river by fire to any appreciable extent during Operation Hue City.

2. Enemy efforts to interdict lines of communication and resupply did not begin until the southern portion of Hue was under heavy counterattack. The enemy did not make a determined effort to interfere with traffic on the Perfume River until much later. He did make an effort to harass LSA's and CP locations from the outset, however.

3. The enemy apparently reinforced his forces in the Citadel and maintained his own support area outside the western wall until approximately February 24, capitalizing on the failure of friendly forces to isolate the Hue battlefield.

4. Enemy forces in the city had full field gear including jungle hammocks, entrenching tools, etc. They appeared to have come equipped as they would for operations in the countryside, except for the heavy load of ammunition and B-40's. Prisoners seemed generally ignorant of overall plans or of other enemy units, and apparently were not briefed in advance. They evidently moved from jungle bases on the night of 30 January arriving in the city on the morning of 31 January. Some enemy gas masks were captured, and prisoner interrogation indicated that at least officers and small unit leaders were equipped with them.

5. Enemy dead were searched for documents, but virtually none were found. A concerted effort to insure that enemy troops had no letters or other documents identifying units, and had no unit markings on clothing and equipment was evident.

6. The enemy carried very little food, apparently relying on the fact that the civilian population would have plenty of food on hand during Tet from which to provision his forces.
9. Mission. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations in Hue City south of the Song Huc in the area bounded by coordinates YD 775228, YD 780224, YD 781209, YD 777206, YD 770201, YD 750201 and YD 766207, to locate and destroy enemy forces and to restore that portion of the city to U. S. control.


a. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations with one Battalion (-) operating in assigned sector south of Highway 1 in area of operations searching from Highway to Southern boundary of the Regimental Area of Operations. One Battalion (-) maintains security of landing zone in vicinity of the MACV Compound, opens and retains MSR on Highway 1 from MACV Compound to intersection at YD 781210, conducts search and destroy operations in assigned sector of area of operations. (See reference (b)).

b. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-)

(1) At first light, direct suppressive fires against enemy positions vicinity MACV Compound to ensure secure LZ for helo opns.

(2) Prior 0900H, secure MSR on Highway 1 from MACV Compound to intersection at YD 781210.

(3) On order chop Companies F, G, and H 2d Battalion, 5th Marines to 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.

(4) Return OpCon one Section AT's, AT Company, 1st Tank Battalion and one Section M-55 (Dusters) from Co A, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, USA.

(5) Provide security to LZ vicinity MACV Compound.

c. 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

(1) Displace Command Group to Hue City via motor vehicle convoy 030900H.

(2) On order assume OpCon Companies F, G and H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and platoon of tanks, 3d Tank Battalion.

(3) Conduct search and destroy operations in assigned sector of area of operations. (See Annex A to reference (b)).

(4) Siege and eject enemy forces from Province Headquarters and Provincial Jail (YD 770216 and YD 766214).
11. Execution

a. Commencing 31030H January 1968, A/1/1, "Bald Eagle" reaction force for 1st Marines (-) was dispatched by truck convoy to relieve friendly forces in Hue City which were under attack from estimated two NVA Battalions. Almost immediately, A/1/1, while enroute to Hue City via Highway 1, came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The Company deployed and continued to move, but was facing a larger force of unknown number of VC. At 1020H, G/2/5 was chopped to 1/1 (-) as a "Bald Eagle" reaction force and at 1027H, Commanding Officer 1/1 (-) was directed to deploy with G/2/5 and a Command Group, link up with A/1/1 and proceed to Hue City to accomplish assigned mission. At 1445H, 1/1 (-) with A/1/1 and G/2/5 arrived at Hue, vicinity YD 770222. Contact with enemy forces had ceased at this time. At 1515H, Commanding Officer 1/1 (-) met with the Senior ARVN Advisor who stated that the Citadel was in fine shape but requested aid in evacuating US citizens. At 1600H, lead elements of G/2/5 proceeded across the bridge at YD 770222 and were immediately taken under automatic weapons and 57mm Recoilless Rifle fire. Units continued to fire and maneuver and at 1640H, one platoon succeeded in crossing, followed at 1645H by a second platoon of G/2/5. At this time both units were held up by heavy automatic weapons fire, from NVA forces well dug in, and firing from virtually every building in Hue City, north of the Song Huong. In view of mounting casualties and no information available on the nature, size or intent of the enemy forces in Hue, all elements of 1/1 (-) were extracted from the north bank of the Song Huong and by 2000H, 1/1 (-) had established defensive positions on the south bank of the river at YD 770222 and liaison was made with MACV personnel. Friendly losses at this time were ten USMC KIA, 36 USMC WIA MedEvac and 20 USMC WIA Minor.

b. Commencing at first light, 01 February 1968, 1/1 (-) was directed to proceed to the Provincial Prison and Provincial Headquarters and to secure the southern approaches to same. The attack commenced at 0700H, and immediately was met by moderate to heavy contact, resulting in virtually no advance by 1/1 (-). At 1200H, 1st Marines (-) assumed OpCon of F/2/5, chopped to 1/1 (-) at 1201H. Helolifted F/2/5 to the MACV Compound area for link up with 1/1 (-) at 1458H, completing lift at 1705H.

(1) At 011230H, 1st Marines (-) commenced Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) positioned at YD 772219. Area of operations was assigned as that area of Hue City south of the Song Huong bounded by coordinates YD 775228, YD 780224, YD 781209, YD 777206, YD 770201 and YD 746207. 1/1 (-) assigned the mission of conducting sweep and clear operations in assigned area of operations to destroy enemy forces, protect US Nationals and restore that portion of the city to US control.
(2) At 011800H, 1/1 (-) with A/1/1 and Companies G and F, 2/5 prepared to continue the attack to the southwest within its assigned AO, upon arrival of air on station.

(3) At 012300H, TAC (A) reported that ceiling was too low for close air support. 1/1 (-) held night position at YD 773217.

c. 02 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing its assigned mission within the area of operations, attacking toward the Hue City Jail and Province Headquarters to seize and hold same and also maneuvered units to the MACV radio station via YD 772219 to relieve pressure from VC/NVA surrounding the site. Contact continued moderate to heavy.

(1) At 0830H, via YD 776218, 1/1 (-) was attacked by a large number of VC/NVA. Fire was returned immediately with small arms, and 81mm mortars. Attack continued heavy to sporadic, until 1150H, at which time the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Results, five USMC WIA Med-Evac and 55 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(2) At 0950H, via YD 772219, elements of 1/1 (-) attacking in the direction of the MACV Radio Station, via YD 772219, received approximately 3000 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and twelve rounds 60mm mortar fire. Unit returned fire immediately with 4500 rounds small arms and automatic fire, 15 rounds 60mm mortars and continued the attack securing the radio station. Radio station in US hands, all Americans at the station are safe. Results, three USMC WIA Minor and one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 1100H, 1st Marines assumed OpCon of G/2/5, two additional Ontos from AT Company, 1st Tank Battalion and two M-55 (Dusters) from the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery Division USA. Mission of these units is to provide increased security for Rough Rider convoy resupplying 1/1 (-).

(4) At 1200H, 1/1 (-) (Rein) commenced attack on the University YD 769220, as an intermediate objective enroute to the Provincial Jail. Heavy resistance was encountered, with 1/1 (-) (Rein) receiving 3000 rounds small arms fire. Fire was returned, and units continued the attack, expending over 5000 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. The objective was seized at 1445H. Results, 75 NVA KIA Confirmed.
(5) At 1515H, vic YD 775216, Rough Rider resupply convoy enroute to 1/1 (-) received 2000 rounds small arms fire and 500 rounds 50 caliber fire, approximately 300 meters from the NACV Compound in Hue City. Enemy fire was suppressed with six rounds 106mm fire, 260 rounds 40mm from Dusters and 500 rounds small arms fire. One truck was hit, but successfully towed to 1/1 (-) (Rein) CP. Convoy, additionally retrieved two French photographers, one male, one female, who had been VC hostages. Results, one USMC KIA, five USMC WIA MedEvac and seven NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 1400H, permission was requested and received from the Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division to deliver fixed wing strikes on the Royal Tombs in GS 7711. Tombs were verified rocket firing and storage sites.

(7) From 1815H to 2200H, A/1/1 and G/2/5, two assault Companies vic YD 770221 at southern end of bridge, received approximately 5500 rounds small arms fire and 75 E-40 rockets. One tank received heavy volume of fire and was rendered out of action by a 75mm Recoilless Rifle round. Units returned fire immediately with 4300 rounds small arms fire, 2000 rounds 50mm fire, 95 rounds M-79, 85 rounds 81mm mortar rounds. Defensive positions established and consolidated to ensure NACV Compound secure. Results one USMC KIA, eight USMC WIA MedEvac, 13 USMC WIA Minor and 15 NVA KIA Confirmed. Two carbines recovered.

d. 03 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City, with Command Group 1st Marines and Command Group 2/5 (-) moving to Hue. At this time, complex of the operation changed to Regional (-) size. The movement and subsequent deployment of 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) took place in accordance with 1st Marines (-) Frag Order 6-68. 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continued the attack toward assigned objective; contact remained moderate to heavy.

(1) At 0800H, elements of 1/1 (-) at YD 771222 observed NVA moving in and around the church at YD 770220, carrying weapons and wearing helmets and packs. The enemy was taken under fire with 150 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and four LAAW's. Results, six NVA KIA Confirmed and one AK-47 recovered.

(2) At 0900H, gun tank supporting the attack of 1/1 (-) at YD 772221 observed three NVA moving down the street at YD 770220, carrying weapons and wearing uniforms, packs and helmets. Tank opened fire with 30 rounds machine gun fire. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 1056H, 1/1 (-) advised that small scale PayCps loudspeaker broadcasts were having excellent success in getting innocent civilians out of their homes in the battle area. District Headquarters, in ARVN control, was being utilized as a collection point. Estimated 1900 civilians recovered at this time. Efforts continue.
(4) At 1115H, 1/1 (-) advised that a Kit Carson Scout instructor (Sgt Maj RAN (HVN Train)) reported into the 1/1 (-) CP and gave information as to the location of approximately 50 NVA. The Sgt Maj led ARVN Troops to the enemy location.

(5) At 1210H, 1/1 (-) reported that the 811th ARVN Unit and 412th engineer unit remain in ARVN hands at this time.

(6) At 1220H, 1st Marines (-) assumed OpCon of Command Group 2/5 (-) and the 1st Marines (-) and 2/5 (-) Command Groups departed Phu Bai for Hue, arriving at 1256H. At 1300H, Companies F, G and H, 2/5 were chopped to 2/5 (-) and the 1st Marines (-) (Rein) Forward CP was established at the MACV Compound (YD 773219). Plans commenced for the execution of 1st Marines (-) Frag Order 6-68.

(7) At 1630H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) established its forward LSA at YD 774218.

(8) At 1700H, vicinity YD 772218, Scout Snipers attached to 2/5 (-) observed one NVA in open at YD 772216. Sniper fired one round, killing the NVA. While conducting surveillance of the area, sniper observed two additional NVA KIA, result of gun tank fire. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(9) At 1720H, 5-2 1st Marines Forward reported that elements of A/1/1 had recaptured following weapons at abandoned RVN Police station (YD 775216) 30 carbines, two BAR's, ten submachine guns, ten M-1's, 20 60mm mortar rounds, 40 cases of small arms ammunition and an unknown number of weapon magazines. All items turned over to Senior MACV advisor.

(10) At 1730H, vicinity YD 769218, Companies F and H, 2/5 (-) encountered extensive enemy automatic weapons fire while conducting house to house combat with the enemy. Units returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, mortars, utilized an M-48 tank and maneuvered to continue the attack. Results, one USMC KIA, 7 USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor and 13 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1900H, 1/1 (-) reported from its position at Police Headquarters (YD 775216) that NVA in the vicinity of YD 776225 have harassed the Police in that area by fire for the last four days. 1/1 (-) also reported that the ICC Team located in the vicinity of the police station was safe; no USMC personnel violated ICC laws or entered the ICC buildings.
(12) At 1915H, vicinity of YD 772218, gun tank supporting 2/5 (-) was hit by 75mm Recoilless Rifle fire and was rendered inoperable. Tank out of action, ground forces continued the attack. Result, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(13) At 1921H, while advancing toward assigned objective, Companies H and F, 2/5 (-) encountered heavy enemy fire at YD 768218, receiving approximately 600 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 20 rounds 60mm mortar and 20 rounds B-40-rockets. Unit returned fire with 3500 rounds automatic weapons fire, 10 rounds 60mm mortars, maneuvered to positions at YD 769219 and consolidated night defensive positions. No USMC casualties, NVA casualties unknown.

(14) At 1930H, vicinity of YD 777220, G/2/5 received 800-900 rounds small arms fire while proceeding to night time positions. Fire was returned immediately with 2000 rounds small arms fire, 20 rounds 60mm mortar, 15 rounds 81mm mortar. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, five NVA KIA Confirmed and one 3-40 rocket launcher with firing device recovered.

e. 04 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing the attack to the southwest toward the Provincial Prison and Provincial Headquarters. Enemy resistance continues moderate to heavy and forward progress of attacking units is slow. House to house building to building fighting continues.

(1) At 0835H, vicinity of YD 771218, H/2/5 attacking southwest toward assigned objective received approximately 200 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 770218. Unit returned fire immediately with 500 rounds small arms fire, 15 rounds M-79, two LAAW's, two rounds 60mm mortar. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, nine NVA KIA Confirmed.

(2) At 0900H, vicinity, YD 771218, H/2/5 received flanking fire from adjacent buildings, receiving four B-40 rockets and approximately 2500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Unit returned fire immediately with 3000 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 60 rounds M-79 and continued the attack. Results, 19 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 0903H, vicinity YD 771218, while searching and clearing a building, A/1/1 received one B-40 rocket from within the building. Unit opened fire with 300 rounds small arms fire and searched building. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA MedEvac and 15 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 0910H, 1st Marines (-) Rough Rider convoy departed Phu Bai carrying B/1/1 (-) and food, ammunition and medical supplies to the forces in Hue. Convoy arrived at the forward CP at 1005H without incident.
(5) At 1030H, vicinity YD 774219, the MACV Compound in Hue, site of the 1st Marines Forward CP, received five B-40 rocket rounds and 500 rounds small arms fire. Security elements returned fire immediately with 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and 72 rounds 60mm mortars. Results, one US Army WIA MedEvac, two civilians WIA MedEvac and one ARVN WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(6) At 1030H, vicinity YD 770219, F/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from left flank while conducting attack to the southwest. Unit returned fire immediately and deployed one squad to envelop the enemy position. Supported by a base of fire, the squad assaulted through the enemy position. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed and one AK-47 recovered.

(7) At 1115H, 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) conducted coordinated attack against buildings at YD 769216 and YD 769217, both heavily occupied by NVA forces. 2/5 (-) front extends from YD 767219 and to YD 770219. 1/1 (-) front extends from YD 771218 to YD 773217. Both units receiving heavy fire, both units returning fire with all organic weapons, EE-8 gas dispensers and all supporting arms available. No report on casualties at this time.

(8) At 1120H, elements of Headquarters Company (-), 1st Marines (-), accompanied by members of 3d LVT, apprehended one NVA PW vicinity YD 772217 (the Troop Site). PW was wounded and was escorted to the MACV dispensary for treatment and further processing.

(9) At 1141H, vicinity YD 768219, H/2/5 while attacking a building, received 100 rounds small arms fire and six rifle grenades. Unit returned fire with 16 rounds 106mm, 12 rounds 3.5 inch, 500 rounds small arms and machine gun fire. Building was assaulted, seized and secured. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA MedEvac and eleven NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1150H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) Rough Rider convoy returning from the 1st Marines Forward CP to Hue, received heavy automatic weapons fire from unknown number of enemy at YD 790200. Convoy held up, deployed security force and returned fire. Enemy fire was suppressed and convoy continued to Hue Bai. No USMC casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

(11) At 1200H, vic YD 769219, F/2/5 while continuing its attack to the southwest, received several hundred rounds small arms fire and two B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 769218. Unit returned fire with 1000 rounds small arms and machine gun fire, five rounds 3.5 inch rockets and CS gas from EE-8 launcher. Under cover of gas and a concentration of 81mm mortar rounds, the unit assaulted, seized and secured the enemy position. Results, eight USMC WIA MedEvac and 16 NVA KIA Confirmed.
At 1240H, vicinity YD 778222, 3/1/1 (-) returned US personnel who had been pinned down by enemy fire. Commencing its return to the 1st Marine Forward CP, the company came under heavy small arms fire and at the same time, the 1st Marines Forward CP (YD 772219) came under enemy fire (500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons) from enemy located at YD 779222. 3/1/1 (-) returned fire immediately with small arms, 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, artillery, tanks and M-55 (Dusters). Results, one USMC KIA, three USMC WIA MedEvac and 18 ITVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1300H, vicinity YD 778221, Scout Sniper attached to 1/1 (-) observed one NVA with AK-47 in window of building at YD 771219. Sniper fired one round, observed NVA fall, dropping weapon from hand. Results one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1700H, vicinity YD 781209, N-422 (Mitey Mite) leading Rough Rider convoy from Phu Bai to Hue detonated a mine. Convoy also received 12 rounds 82mm mortars. Convoy left the ruined M-422 and continued to Hue without further incident. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

At 1755H, vicinity YD 767210, H/2/5 while continuing the attack to the southwest, received intensive automatic and small arms weapon fire from enemy located in building at same coordinates. Unit returned fire immediately with small arms, automatic weapons and 3.5 rocket fire, gained fire superiority and maneuvered one platoon and secured a building adjacent to the enemy position. G/2/5 deployed and seized building on the right flank of the enemy and commenced firing suppressive fires at the enemy position. Under cover of fire, G/2/5 deployed one platoon that assaulted and secured the enemy position. Upon termination of the firefight, 175 VN civilians came out of adjacent buildings and reported to the Company H CP. The civilians were escorted to the rear and delivered to the Thien Sub-Sector Headquarters. Results, 17 NVA KIA Confirmed and one BAR recovered.

At 1825H, vicinity YD 767218, H/2/5 observed one NVA carrying a weapon across the street at the same coordinate. Unit fired 20 rounds small arms fire. Result, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1830H, vicinity YD 767218, G/2/5 received approximately 200 rounds small arms fire from unknown number of enemy at YD 766218. Unit returned fire immediately with 200 rounds small arms fire, 120 rounds machine gun fire and assaulted the enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and 14 NVA KIA Confirmed. Blood trails and drag marks were also found indicating additional enemy casualties.
(10) At 1030H, vicinity YD 767218, G/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from two enemy snipers located at YD 766218. One sniper was in tree, one was at base of tree. Unit returned fire immediately with 200 rounds small arms fire. One sniper was hit and fell out of tree. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and 1 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(19) At 1830H, vicinity YD 767218, G/2/5 received approximately 300 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 766218. Unit returned fire immediately with 400 rounds small arms fire, 375 rounds K-60 fire, 0 rounds 60mm mortar and 10 rounds 81mm mortar. Searched area, results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and 1 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(20) At 1905H, vicinity YD 770217, F/2/5 received approximately 150 rounds small arms fire from concrete bunker at YD 770218. Unit returned fire immediately with 200 rounds small arms fire and two rounds 3.5 inch rocket. Platoon maneuvered to enemy position and threw two gas grenades into bunker. One enemy came out with his hands up. Unit heard more people in the bunker and tried to talk them out with no success. Unit threw 6 more gas grenades with negative results. Unit fired one IAAW and two 3.5 inch rockets into the bunker causing numerous secondary explosions. Results, 25 NVA KIA Confirmed, one detainee and recovered five AK-47's, two carbines, one SHS rifle, one ChiCom MG and five D-40 rocket launchers.

(21) At 1940H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) (Rvd) reported that the bridge at YD 781209 was destroyed by an explosive charge. Rough Rider convoy unable to return from Hue to Phu Bai.

(22) At 1950H, vicinity of YD 770217, A/1/1 fired an 81mm illumination mission and observed approximately 20 NVA in hedgerow at YD 770217 attempting to break contact. Unit opened fire immediately with small arms. Results, 22 NVA KIA Confirmed and one NVA PW.

f. 05 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Ike City with 1/1 (-) attacking southwest to seize and secure the Provincial Prison and the Provincial Headquarters. Enemy resistance continued moderate to heavy. Adverse weather precludes helo resupply and the blown bridge at YD 781209 precludes Rough Rider resupply of the forces of Ike at this time. However, plans were initiated to obtain needed resupply by LCU from Danang.

(1) At 0530H, vicinity YD 772219, elements of A/1/1 observed approximately four NVA moving from building to building at the same coordinates. Unit opened fire with 150 rounds small arms and machine gun fire. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.
(2) At 0920H, while conducting attack to the south vicinity YD 767218, F/2/5 encountered heavy enemy fire from unknown number of enemy located at YD 766216, receiving approximately 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 20 rounds 60mm mortar and 5 rounds B-40 rockets. Unit returned fire immediately with 800 rounds small arms fire and 15 rounds 60mm mortar fire. At the same time, 1/1 (-) maneuvered elements southwest to cover the left flank of F/2/5. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac, eight USMC WIA Minor and six NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 0920H, vicinity YD 772221, 1st Marines Forward reported that three enemy rockets impacted approximately 75 meters NW of the Forward CP. MACV TCS reported site of blast off at YD 765202, 18 rounds 105mm HE fired at suspected rocket site. Results unknown.

(4) At 1030H, vicinity YD 766218, Companies G and H, 2/5 received intensive enemy small arms, machine gun, M-79 and B-40 rocket fire from enemy located at YD 766216. Unit immediately returned fire with 15 rounds 81mm mortar, and 14 rounds 8 inch artillery. G/2/5 established a base of fire and a platoon from H/2/5 assaulted, seized and secured the enemy position. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac, three WIA Minor and two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 1240H, vicinity YD 766218, G/2/5 received five B-40 rockets and 150 rounds machine gun fire from enemy position at YD 766216. Unit returned immediately with 300 rounds small arms fire and three rounds 3.5 inch rockets. Rifle squad maneuvered across street and secured the enemy position. Results, six NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 1245H, H/2/5 seized and secured a building at YD 766216 and received intensive automatic weapons fire and eight B-40 rockets from enemy bunker on the southwest side of the building. Fire returned immediately with 300 rounds small arms fire and three rounds 3.5 inch rockets were fired into the bunker. Results, ten NVA KIA Confirmed.

(7) At 1250H, vicinity YD 772210, elements of 1/1 (-) received 3 incoming B-40 rockets from enemy position at YD 773212. Unit returned fire with an eight inch Howitzer mission. Results, two USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(8) At 1251H, vicinity YD 760214, F/2/5 received 200 rounds automatic weapons fire and 12 M-79 rounds. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.
(9) At 1300H, vicinity YD 766217, elements of H/2/5 received 30 rounds small arms fire and two M-79 rounds from enemy at the same coordinates. Unit returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire and three K-79 rounds. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1300H, vicinity YD 772219, A/1/1 engaged an unknown number of enemy located at YD 772217. The enemy opened fire with 300 rounds small arms fire and two B-40 rockets. Unit deployed immediately, returning fire with 1000 rounds small arms fire, five LAAW's, 20 rounds 106mm and 15 rounds 90mm. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac and four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1600H, vic YD 766215, H/2/5 received heavy small arms and B-40 rocket fire from enemy located at same coordinates. Unit returned fire immediately with 1500 rounds small arms and machine gun fire, four rounds 106mm Recoilless Rifle rounds and six rounds 3.5 inch rockets, and assaulted and secured the enemy position. Results, seven USMC WIA MedEvac, eight NVA KIA Confirmed, one NVA FW. Also recovered two AK-47's, three carbines, and two B-40 rocket launchers.

(12) At 1632H, vicinity YD 766216, G/2/5 seized the hospital after an approximate 90 minute fire fight. Elements of Company G entered north end of building under heavy fire and cleared out a total of thirty wounded personnel. Transportation was requested from 1st Marines Forward, received and the casualties moved to the rear. G/2/5 expended a total of 20 rounds 90mm, 20 rounds 196mm, 15 rounds 3.5 inch rockets and several thousand rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire in retrieving the wounded personnel. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac, 76 NVA KIA Confirmed and 30 (wounded) detainees. Also, 42 mixed carbines and AK-47's were recovered. Search for additional weapons and enemy casualties will continue at first light.

(13) At 1645H, vicinity YD 766218, elements of H/2/5 received intensive small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from enemy in at the same coordinates. Unit returned fire immediately, maneuvered an M-48 tank into position and fired five 90mm rounds into the enemy position. Under cover of the small arms and tank fire, a platoon maneuvered and assaulted through the enemy position. A search of the area revealed a main defensive position, encircled by bunkers on 3 sides. Units threw gas and frag grenades into the complex and NVA attempted to flee. Unit pursued by fire with 150 rounds small arms fire, two rounds 90mm and 50 rounds 50 caliber fire. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac, 25 NVA KIA Confirmed and the following individual weapons recovered: 8 AK-47's, one M-16, one BAR, nine carbines, two SKS rifles, three B-40 rocket launchers, one M-1, one M-3A1 rifle, four RFG's and two crew served ChiCom LEE.
(14) At 1700E, vicinity YD 771217, A/1/1 was taken under intense automatic weapons fire, receiving 2500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, and eight B-40 rockets from fortified enemy bunkers at YD 771216. Unit returned fire immediately with 3000 rounds small arms and machine gun fire, 22 rounds 90mm, 29 rounds 81mm HE, 71 rounds 8 inch Howitzers and two rounds 105mm. Artillery caused four secondary explosions. Results, one USMC KIA, eight USMC WIA MedEvac and nine NVA KIA Confirmed.

(15) At 1715H, the first of a series of LCU's arrived at the Hue LCU ramp from Danang, loaded with MC1 and was offloaded by 1015H; at 2015H, a second LCU arrived at the Hue RAMP loaded with five days supply of ammo. The LCU was offloaded by 2230H. The LCU resupply runs were commenced in order to offset the effects of bad weather and the blown bridge at YD 781209, and to bring needed resupplies to the forces at Hue.

6. 06 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing the attack to the southwest. 2/5 (-) meeting heavy resistance succeeded in seizing and e<i>cting the Provincial Prison and Provincial Headquarters. Adverse weather precluded close air support and units were too close to enemy forces for much artillery to be employed. As a result, an unreported amount of 90mm, 106mm, 61mm and 3.5 inch rocket ammunition was expended in support of the attacking units.

(1) At 0423H, F/2/5 received nine B-40 rockets at YD 767214. Unit fired six rounds 81mm illumination in the vicinity of suspected enemy position and returned fire with 1000 rounds small arms fire and six rounds 3.5 inch rockets. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 0741H, vicinity YD 765216 (hospital complex) H/2/5 received approximately 60 rounds automatic weapons fire from enemy located 50 meters to their direct front. Unit returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire, six rounds M-79 and two LAAW's. Squads were maneuvered to enemy's right flank and flanking fire delivered. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 0750H, vicinity YD 767216, G/2/5 received approximately 20 rounds sniper fire from building on its left flank. Unit maneuvered and threw four CS grenades into the building. Two NVA attempted to escape and were taken under fire with 20 rounds small arms fire. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, two NVA KIA Confirmed and one HRC-6 radio recovered.

(4) At 0815H, at YD 774214, A/1/1 discovered two boxes of 30 caliber carbine ammunition and one AK-47 rigged as a booby trap with a ChiCom grenade. The grenade was destroyed with C-4. Ammunition and weapon were turned into the 1st Marines Forward S-2.
(5) At 0815H, H/2/5, while conducting prep fires on hospital complex at YD 767216, observed two NVA run out the back door. Opened fire with 20 rounds M-16 fire. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 0820H, H/2/5, while moving to the northwest corner of the hospital complex at YD 765215, received 30 rounds automatic weapons fire. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds small arms fire at two NVA fleeing into street. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed, and the following items recovered: one ChiCom S-79, five B-40 rocket rounds, five ChiCom grenades, six N-26 grenades, 200 rounds AK-47 ammo, 15 satchel charges. Items turned over to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(7) At 0828H, at YD 767216, F/2/5 received approximately 45 rounds small arms fire from the corner of the building. Unit returned fire with 65 rounds small arms fire and two LAAW's. Results, two NVA Confirmed and one SKS rifle recovered.

(8) At 0900H, vicinity YD 772216, A/1/1 received 200 rounds small arms fire from enemy located in building 171, YD 772217. Unit returned fire immediately with 1000 rounds small arms fire, two rounds 106mm, 10 rounds 60mm mortar, and 20 rounds 81mm mortar. Enemy position was assaulted, seized and secured. Results, 30 NVA KIA Confirmed, two detainees (1 male, 1 female) apprehended. Two SKS rifles, two AK-47's, one K-56 rifle and one 53 LG recovered. Detainees turned over to 3d IRT personnel for interrogation and weapons were turned into 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(9) At 0905H, elements of G/2/5 moved into the hospital complex (YD 765215) meeting small unit contacts only. Over 300 residents and patients were liberated from the complex.

(10) At 0915H, A/1/1, at YD 771218 observed one NVA at YD 771216 and fired five rounds small arms, wounding the NVA. While attempting to bring the wounded NVA to the Company CP, an NVA sniper fired two rounds at the Marines with one round hitting and killing the wounded NVA. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 0950H, vicinity YD 772215, H/2/5 while attacking to the southwest was temporarily held up by intense enemy small arms fire. Resistance remained heavy as H/2/5 returned fire with small arms, machine guns, 90mm and 106mm fire and gas from an EE-6 dispenser. Under this suppressive fire, unit was able to continue the attack. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac and 12 NVA KIA Confirmed.
(12) At 1020H, vicinity YD 767214, F/2/5 continued its attack on
the prison complex meeting heavy enemy resistance in the form of intensive
small arms and automatic weapons fire from the front and left flank. Unit
consolidated its position firing small arms, machine guns, 81mm mortars
and artillery on the enemy position. The attack continues. Four USMC
KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac and four NVA KIA Confirmed at this time.

(13) At 1100H, vicinity YD 770218, A/1/1 continued its attack
against building 222. 17 NVA KIA Confirmed were uncovered as units
searched and cleared the area. Attack continues.

(14) At 1145H, vicinity YD 770217, while conducting search of
building 46, A/1/1 recovered one Sks rifle, two carbines, one AK-47, four
ChiCom grenades, one box 30 caliber link ammunition, one TA-312 phone,
one B-40 rocket round and one satchel charge. Items returned to 1st

(15) At 1200H, vicinity YD 767213, A/1/1 while attacking toward
the southwest toward building 205, received a total of 20 rounds 81mm
mortar rounds from unknown enemy position resulting in eight USMC WIA
MedEvac and twelve USMC WIA Minor. Attack continues.

(16) At 1305H, vicinity YD 764213, while attacking building at
the same coordinate, F/2/5 received intensive automatic weapons fire from
enemy within the building. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms
and automatic weapons fire, 50 rounds 81mm, maneuvered and secured the
building. Results, five USMC WIA Minor, and 16 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(17) At 1345H, vicinity YD 767213, A/1/1 received 600 rounds
automatic weapons fire, from enemy position at YD 767212. Unit returned
fire with 1000 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 20 rounds
60mm mortar fire and continued to press the attack. Results, two USMC
WIA Minor.

(18) At 1405H, F/2/5 supported by small arms and automatic
weapons fire, satchel charges, 106mm RR fire and 81mm mortars, assaulted
the Provincial Prison vicinity YD 765214. Walls were breached, the
Prison entered and physically secured. Results, one USMC KIA, nine USMC
WIA MedEvac, sixty-one NVA KIA Confirmed, six unidentified personnel
detained. Additionally, five prisoners and two prison officials were
liberated. Following items were recovered and returned to 1st Marines
Forward S-2 with the detainees: one French rifle, 11 Sks rifles, four
AK-47's, three M-1's, six carbines, three grease guns, two ChiCom LG
one BAR, one RPG, one M-50 SMG, seven cases 7.62 ammunition, eight
ChiCom grenades, four M-26 grenades, one M-2 frag grenade, four cases
CS grenades and twenty demolition charges.
(19) At 1425H, while assaulting building 65 vicinity YD 765215 (Provincial Headquarters) H/2/5 received intensive small arms, B-40 rocket and recoilless rifle fire from within the building. Unit prep fired on objective with 100 rounds 60mm mortars, 50 rounds 106mm, and aggressively assaulted and seized the objective. Results, two USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac and four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(20) At 1521H, vicinity YD 762214, Ontos in direct support of H/2/5, received a direct hit from a B-40 rocket round. All six guns were badly cut up and front armor plate was penetrated by shrapnel. Ontos was towed to rear by a tank, nonrepairable in the field. Results, three USMC WIA Minor.

(21) At 1715H, both 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) reported that there is a great deal of civilian looting taking place in Hue. National Police notified and are taking action.

h. 7 February 1968; 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing the attack to the southwest to search and clear the remainder of the Southern Sector of Hue and return control of the area to GVN. Contact remains moderate to heavy. At 1320H, weather cleared sufficiently to allow helicopters to lift 10,000 pounds of cargo and six personnel into the forces at Hue. Adverse weather continues to curtail air operations in support of the ground attack.

(1) At 0530H, 1st Marines Forward reported that the bridge at YD 768223 was blown by an enemy explosive charge, knocking the center span into the river.

(2) At 0800H, vicinity YD 770217, Marines at the 1/1 (-) CP observed four NVA moving toward building 150, YD 771215. Elements of the CP security force took the NVA under fire with 50 rounds small arms fire and observed one NVA definitely hit and wounded but was able to move to covered position. Area not searched.

(3) At 070928H, vicinity YD 765212, while attacking toward building 205, A/1/1 received sniper fire from an unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Unit continued the attack.

(4) At 0930H, vicinity YD 762212, H/2/5 secured building 179 and 221, finding several freshly dug graves. Six graves were dug up. Three were empty, three contained dead NVA. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed. Search and clear operation continues.
(5) At 0945H, vicinity YD 771215, 1/1 (-) reported that one ontos had been hit by a B-40 rocket. Platoon of B/1/1 was dispatched to the area to obtain information on casualties and extent of damage. As the platoon advanced, it received approximately 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 771215. Unit returned fire with 1000 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and continued movement. As the unit moved, one unidentified VN male turned himself into the platoon and stated through interpreter that 43 civilians were still inside the building at YD 771215. Unit searched the area and found 44 civilians who were detained along with the informant. Unit continued to the site of the disabled ontos and reported that the driver was KIA, ontos commander was WIA MedEvac. Ontos was towed away by tank. Results, two USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac and 45 detainees.

(6) At 1000H, vicinity YD 765211, while advancing on building 205, A/1/1 received 75 rounds small arms fire. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and 10 rounds 40mm from M-55 (Duster). Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed and two individual weapons captured.

(7) At 1157H, vicinity YD 758211, H/2/5 received 25 rounds sniper fire from enemy located at YD 756209. Unit returned fire and checked area. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1230H, vicinity YD 775215, 2d Platoon, B/1/1 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy position 100 meters to their north. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and continued search and clear mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(9) At 1300H, A/1/1 received approximately 50 rounds small arms fire at YD 755211. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and 10 rounds 40mm (Duster). Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1300H, vicinity YD 775215, 2d Platoon, B/1/1 received six incoming 82mm mortar rounds from unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Unit continued mission.

(11) At 1315H, vicinity YD 759211, G/2/5 received four rounds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac. Unit continued mission, attacking building 43.

(12) At 1400H, vicinity YD 771216, B/1/1 (-) received approximately 200 rounds automatic weapons fire from the east side of building 150. Unit held up, fired 105mm artillery mission, 60mm mortars and 90mm. Building destroyed, three secondary explosions observed. Platoon continued mission. Enemy casualties unknown.
(13) At 1400H, vicinity YD 762208, G/2/5 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy position across river at YD 761207. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Enemy fire ceased. Negative search of area due to unit mission and water barriers. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(14) At 1530H, vicinity YD 763208, G/2/5 received 100 rounds small arms fire and one grenade from enemy located at YD 764207. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(15) At 1530H, vicinity YD 763208, Companies G and H, 2/5 received fire from enemy position at YD 766208. Both units deployed to attack and received four rounds 60mm mortar fire. Units fired 30 rounds 60mm mortar fire and a 105mm artillery mission on the enemy position, and on order returned to night defensive positions. Results, six USMC WIA MedEvac.

(16) At 1605H, vicinity YD 765208, G/2/5 was engaged by two enemy machine guns firing from building 102, YD 766208. Unit called an 81mm mortar mission, deployed, set up a base of fire and assaulted the enemy position. Results, eleven NVA KIA Confirmed.

(17) At 1645H, vicinity YD 766212, A/1/1 received 160 rounds small arms fire from a building complex at YD 766209. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms fire and 15 rounds M-79. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(18) At 1730H, vicinity YD 771216, B/1/1 (-) discovered one NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit continued search and clear mission.

(19) At 1745H, vicinity YD 764213, G/2/5 attacked building 221, meeting heavy resistance. Unit fired 10 rounds 90mm, 20 rounds 106mm, 25 rounds 60mm and 3000 rounds small arms and machine gun fire. Building was assaulted, seized and secured. Results, 56 NVA KIA Confirmed and 130 individual and crew served weapons captured as follows: 29 M-1's, 25 Carbines, four AK-47's, five BAR's, seven SKS rifles, three ChiCom LMG, four flare pistols, 45 grease guns, one K-50 SMG, two MA-49 SMG, one British SMG, one 50 caliber MG, one M-60 MG and two 30 caliber MG. All weapons turned into 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(20) At 1745H, vicinity YD 766212, A/1/1 received eight rounds sniper fire from enemy sniper located at YD 766209. Unit returned fire immediately with 50 rounds small arms fire and three rounds M-79. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.
(21) At 1820H, B/1/1 (-) searched a building at YD 771215 and recovered three carbines and one AK-47. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(22) At 1820H, at YD 762210, H/2/5 received four 82mm mortar rounds from enemy position in vicinity YD 755207/YD 756200. Artillery mission fired on the suspected enemy positions and H/2/5 continued mission. Results, ten USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(23) At 1843H, vicinity YD 758212, H/2/5 received five rounds 82mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired 40 rounds 81mm mortar on suspected mortar positions at YD 755207 and YD 756206. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(24) At 2229H, vicinity YD 767218, 2/5 (-) CP received three rounds sniper fire from unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(25) At 2330H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) reported that the battle for Hue City is creating countless refugees located in small pockets throughout the city. Sector Headquarters has been notified immediately in each instance wherein front line units encounter refugees. PsyOps continue to be utilized to establish a feeling of confidence among the civilians and to provide them with instructions on what to do, where to do it, when and how. A refugee center, hospital and administrative consul is operating out of the Hue City area at YD 769220. At present, approximately 5000 refugees are housed in the university. Supply of food creates no problem at this time due to a two year TVN supply maintained in Hue. Housing and medical facilities are adequate at this time.

i. 08 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing the attack to sweep and clear the remainder of the southern sector of Hue of enemy forces and to return control of the area to the GVN. Contact remained light to moderate throughout the day. Adverse weather continued to curtail helo supply and close air support, but LCU's continued to arrive from Danang bringing needed supplies. In excess of 200 replacement troops await helo or vehicle transportation to Hue to reinforce the 1st Marines (-) (Rein).

(1) At 0530H, vicinity YD 772219, 1st Marines Forward CP, building 8 received 10 rounds 122mm rockets from enemy positions at YD 788113, YD 786114 and YD 777120. Battery B, 1/11 took the rocket sites under fire immediately as their OP vicinity YD 744130 and observed the flashes. Negative surveillance on mission. Enemy casualties unknown.
(2) At 0547H, vicinity YD 770215, A/1/1 observed NVA attempting to redeploy troops in and around building 150 at YD 770215. Unit opened fire immediately with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Results, six NVA KIA Confirmed, three carbines, one M-16, ten carbine magazines, three clips carbine ammunition, one M-16 magazine, three ChiCom grenades, two M-26 grenades and one box of 30 caliber ammunition recovered and turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(3) At 0705H, vicinity YD 769209, H/2/5 received incoming machine gun fire from enemy position at YD 765209. Unit returned fire immediately with 800 rounds small arms and machine gun fire and six rounds M-79, suppressing the enemy fire. Unit assaulted the position but found negative sign of NVA casualties. However, one unidentified civilian was apprehended and detained. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac and one detainee.

(4) At 0710H, vicinity YD 765208, F/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 763207. Unit returned fire immediately with 300 rounds small arms and machine gun fire and assaulted through enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 0920H, vicinity YD 765208, F/2/5 discovered one wounded VC male, detained same and returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2 as a VC/NVA suspect.

(6) At 1000H, vicinity YD 775215, B/1/1 (-) received 100 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire in building at same coordinates. Unit returned fire immediately with three LAAW's, three rounds 106mm, 10 rounds 40mm (Duster) and maneuvered into building. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed, and following items recovered: ten carbines, one M-1, one Russian SNG, one AK-47, one automatic weapon of unknown type, one B-40 rocket round, three 60mm mortar rounds, demolition charges and det cord, several documents and a warehouse full of small arms ammunition, estimated 2½ tons. All items returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(7) At 1000H, vicinity YD 773223, B/1/1 (-) observed six NVA attempting to escape from building 36. Unit opened fire with 150 rounds small arms fire and 15 rounds 40mm (Duster) results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1005H, vicinity YD 760209, engineer operating with G/2/5 received 150 rounds small arms fire while attempting to set an explosive charge in bridge at that location. G/2/5 utilized tanks firing six rounds 90mm, 200 rounds 50 caliber and 30 caliber machine gun fire to evacuate wounded. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.
(9) At 1037H, vicinity YD 776214, B/1/1 (-), while searching building 66, recovered 21 carbines, one M-16, two AK-47's, one Russian SMG, one Thompson SMG, one automatic weapon of unknown type. Weapons turned into 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(10) At 1037H, vicinity YD 766208, F/2/5 after securing building 102, discovered the following abandoned ARVN weapons: 1500 mixed carbines and M-1's, 150 MG, four 57 MM, eight tanks, four APC's. Weapons were turned over to the Thua Thien Sector Advisor for recovery.

(11) At 1045H, vicinity YD 762204, F/2/5 received 150 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 762206. Unit returned fire immediately with 300 rounds small arms fire and six M-79 rounds as enemy turned to flee. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1145H, LCU with supplies from Danang arrived at the Hue Ramp without incident and succeeded in offloading necessary ammunition and other supplies for the forces in Hue.

(13) At 1237H, vicinity YD 772219, A/1/1 while conducting search of a building complex recovered four carbines, one AK-47, one Thompson SMG, five Thompson magazines and twelve carbine magazines. Items turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(14) At 1300H, vicinity YD 775216, elements of B/1/1 (-) while searching a building discovered two carbines. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(15) At 1300H, vicinity YD 774218, elements of B/1/1 (-) recovered two carbines while conducting search. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(16) At 1315H, vicinity YD 772214, while conducting search and destroy G/2/5 discovered 20 hastily dug graves, blood soaked rags and medical supplies in the area. Unit dug up graves and found 42 bodies dressed in black. Results, 42 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(17) At 1345H, H/2/5 conducting search and destroy operation vicinity YD 764208, found four graves; graves were dug up and revealed four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(18) At 1610H, A/1/1 conducting search and destroy operation in a building complex at YD 775219 discovered nine NVA KIA Confirmed.
(19) At 1615H, 1st Marines Forward reported that LCU had offloaded at the Hue Ramp and commenced return to Danang. At YD 770245, the LCU was subjected to intensive enemy automatic weapons fire attack, but was able to safely pass the enemy positions and continue enroute.

(20) At 1905H, vicinity YD 768216, 2/5 (-) CP received three rounds 60mm mortar from unknown enemy position. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac.

j. 09 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing search and destroy operations within assigned AO against moderate to heavy enemy contact. Plans were made to move elements of A/1/1 to the north side of the bridge at YD 761209 to secure same and then to move a secure Rough Rider convoy with an engineer bridge company. The site of the damaged bridge, secure the north side, repair the bridge and run a Rough Rider convoy with reinforcements and supplies into Hue. A/1/1 met heavy resistance and was not able to secure the north side. Movement of the Rough Rider convoy and the bridge company delayed.

(1) At 0409H, 1st Marines Forward CP located at YD 773219 received six incoming 60mm mortars. Elements of 1/1 (-) observed muzzle flashes at YD 781213 and fired an 81mm mission of 10 rounds and an artillery mission of eight rounds 155mm on the position. Enemy emplacement silenced, negative casualties. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 0820H, vicinity YD 779222, A/1/1 while proceeding to the bridge site at YD 781209 received 150 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 780221. Unit returned fire with 300 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, three rounds 90mm and three LAAM's and continued to move. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac, enemy casualties unknown.

(3) At 0821H, vicinity of YD 773212, while conducting search and destroy, G/2/5 discovered one grease gun, twelve ChiCom grenades and a small rice cache. Items turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(4) At 0900H, vicinity YD 778221, A/1/1 was continuing to attack the bridge position at YD 781209 supported by a gun tank. The tank received seven rounds 57mm RR fire and commenced burning. Unit returned fire immediately with 400 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and retrieved the tank crew. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac, tank destroyed. Enemy casualties unknown. Attack continues.
(5) At 1005H, vicinity YD 780210, G/2/5 received approximately 200 rounds machine gun fire while on sweep from enemy located at YD 701201. Unit returned fire with small arms, 60mm fire, 81mm mortars and continued attack. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA MedEvac and three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 1010H, vicinity YD 780210, G/2/5 received approximately 200 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 781200. Two M-55 (Dusters) in support of Company G received hits in the gas tank and were rendered inoperable. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and called artillery mission. Results, two USMC KIA, Dusters towed to CP and Company G continued mission.

(7) At 1020H, vicinity YD 778221, A/1/1 while pulling back to regroup received approximately 200 rounds small arms fire and three 84mm rockets from enemy position at YD 779222. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and fired six LAAM's. One LAAM made direct hit on two NVA. Result, three USMC WIA MedEvac and two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1035H, G/2/5 at YD 758210 received five sniper rounds from southwest across the river. Unit returned fire with small arms, 106mm Recoilless Rifle fire, and 81mm mortars and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(9) At 1051H, vicinity YD 766206, H/2/5 received incoming small arms fire from enemy located directly south across the river. Unit returned fire immediately with small arms and automatic weapons, six rounds 106mm RL fire and 12 rounds 81mm HE. Negative surveillance of area due to water barrier and mission of unit. Result, one USMC KIA.

(10) At 1200H, vicinity YD 775210, S-2 scouts from 1/1 (-), while checking out a building, discovered a cache of 23 carbines. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(11) At 1220H, vicinity YD 770215, H/2/5 discovered three VN males with weapons. Results, three detainees apprehended and one carbine and one ChuCom IC recovered and turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(12) At 1305H, vicinity YD 776203, H/2/5 found eight VN civilians with transistor radios, monitoring the artillery CCF net. Unit apprehended the civilians and recovered the radio, turning the detainees and radio over to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.
(13) At 1325H, vicinity YD 779225, while continuing the attack, B/1/1 (-) received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 760225. One B-40 rocket round hit an M-55 (Duster) rendering it inoperable. Unit returned fire immediately with six LAAW's, eight M-79 rounds and 200 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Unit holding present position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(14) At 1330H, vicinity YD 776214, A/1/1 received 10 rounds incoming 60mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 776222. Unit returned fire with 155mm and 81mm fire missions, completely leveling area of enemy position. Enemy casualties unknown.

(15) At 1420H, vicinity of YD 766208, H/2/5 received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy positions at YD 766205, while unit was placing charges to blow bridge. Fire was returned immediately with six rounds 106mm, 700 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and an eight inch artillery mission was called and fired. 1st 8 inch round impacted on target, causing a large secondary explosion. Enemy attempted to flee his position and was cut down by 106mm fire from concrete and small arms fire. Results, eight NVA KIA Confirmed.

(16) At 1515H, vicinity YD 776226, while consolidating night defensive positions, B/1/1 (-) received approximately 60 rounds enemy sniper fire from YD 777226. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire, two LAAW's and 81mm fire mission. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Unit continued to establish night positions. Enemy casualties unknown.

(17) At 1600H, vicinity of YD 779226, B/1/1 (-) received approximately 300 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and six B-40 rockets. Fire was returned immediately with 500 rounds small arms fire, eight M-79 rounds and six LAAW's. Company continued to hold positions. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(18) At 1645H, LCU from Dunny with two onto's and some ammunition resupply landed at the Blue Ramp and offloaded without incident. Adverse weather continues to curtail helo resupply and the blown bridge at YD 761209 continues to preclude vehicle resupply.

(19) At 1730H, at YD 770216, while conducting search of building, elements of F/2/5 discovered two NVA KIA Confirmed.
(20) At 1745H, vicinity YD 779224, B/1/1 (-) received heavy small arms fire from enemy at the same coordinates. Unit returned fire with five LAAW's, 10 81mm rounds and 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Unit pulled back and called 105mm fire mission. Results, two USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(21) At 1800H, vicinity YD 772221, Scout Snipers attached to 1/1 (-) observed six NVA with packs, rifles and full equipment moving east at YD 703222. Sniper fired two rounds from R-700 killing one NVA who was carrying a D-40 rocket launcher.

(22) At 1815H, vicinity YD 779224, B/1/1 (-) received six incoming rounds 60mm mortars from unknown enemy position. Unit prep fired suspected enemy positions with artillery. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(23) At 1820H, engineers attached to G/2/5 detonated a charge on bridge located at YD 772209 but failed to drop the span. Another charge was set, but engineers received intensive small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy positions at YD 772208. G/2/5 returned fire with 500 rounds small arms and MG fire and called an 81mm mortar mission to aid in fire suppression. Fire was suppressed and casualties withdrawn. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(24) At 1940H, vicinity YD 774121, G/2/5 while conducting search of area, received 1500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and six D-40 rockets from enemy at YD 773217. Unit returned fire with small arms, 81mm mortars and assaulted the enemy position. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac and fifteen NVA KIA Confirmed.

(25) At 2310H, B/1/1 (-) reported that their continuous contacts throughout the day had consisted of heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire and that the company had expended over 2000 rounds small arms fire, 150 rounds 81mm, 70 rounds R-79 and 100 rounds 60mm. Search of areas involved completed. Results, 33 NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also recovered two carbines, one French SK. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

k. 10 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Rue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing search and destroy operations in assigned AO against light to moderate enemy resistance. Plans continued to move a secure Rough Rider Convoy, with an engineer bridge company, to the damaged bridge at YD 781209. At 1235H, the convoy departed with the bridge company, reinforcements and resupply for the forces in Rue. However, upon arrival at the bridge it was determined to be extensively damaged and necessary materials were not on hand to repair it. The reinforcements,
in excess of 200 troops debarked and were able to proceed across the bridge on foot into Hue. The convoy, bridge company and resupplies returned to Phu Bai. Plans continue to repair the bridge and to commence Rough Rider resupply of the forces in Hue.

(1) At 0646H, elements of G/2/5 at YD 779211 received four WP mortar rounds from unknown enemy position. However, the unit observed four NVA at YD 783213, opened fire with small arms and called an 81mm mortar mission. Results, five NVA KIA Confirmed.

(2) At 0930H, elements of A/1/1 at YD 779222 received 30 rounds machine gun fire from enemy position at YD 779222, unit fired two CS grenades and small arms into the position. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 1100H, vicinity YD 779221, while continuing the attack to the south, A/1/1 received one B-40 rocket round from enemy located at YD 780222. Fire was returned immediately with three 106mm rounds, six LAAVPs and 10 M-79 rounds. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(4) At 1145H, while continuing the attack to the south vicinity YD 779224, A/1/1 received approximately 250 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 779225. Fire was returned with 400 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, four LAAVPs and 10 M-79 rounds. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(5) At 1155H, vicinity YD 763207, B/2/5 received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 762206. Enemy fire was being directed at engineers attempting to blow bridge. Unit called an 81mm mortar mission on the enemy position to cover the withdrawal of the engineers. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 1200H, while continuing the attack at YD 777225, B/1/1 (-) received approximately 200 rounds automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 777224. Unit returned suppressing fire of 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and continued to move. Negative casualties unknown.

(7) At 1240H, vicinity YD 776225, elements of A/1/1 observed one NVA in the same area. Unit opened fire with 50 rounds small arms, killing one NVA.
(8) At 1245H, vicinity YD 779224, elements of A/1/1 observed one NVA at YD 779225. Unit fired one LAAW and 50 rounds small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(9) At 1330H, vicinity YD 779225H, while continuing the attack to the south, A/1/1 observed one NVA attempting to flee the area. Unit opened fire with 50 rounds small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1337H, vicinity YD 778225, B/1/1 (-) observed one VC with weapon moving along the top of a building in the same area. Unit opened fire with 100 rounds small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1400H, vicinity YD 762206, snipers attached to H/2/5 observed two NVA running down the street at YD 762206. Snipers opened fire with R-700. Results two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1400H, assumed OpCon of A/1/5 in preparation for execution of C3 Task Force Xray Frag Order 101529 Feb 68. At 1430H, A/1/5 departed by truck convoy for Hue, arrived at the bridge at YD 781209 and proceeded into Hue on foot.

(13) At 1440H, vicinity YD 779224, A/1/1 received 15 rounds sniper fire from enemy located at YD 780225. Unit returned fire with three LAAW's, and 100 rounds machine gun fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(14) At 1705H, vicinity YD 779225, A/1/1 while conducting search and destroy, received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire and four B-40 rockets. Unit returned fire immediately with 10 LAAW's, 12 rounds 60mm mortars, 15 M-79 rounds and 500 rounds small arms fire. Results, six USMC WIA MedEvac and eleven NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also received one M-1, one carbine, three AK-47's and one ChiCom LMG. Weapons returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(15) At 1720H, vicinity YD 777229, B/1/1 (-) received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and four B-40 rockets from enemy in the same area. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 10 60mm mortar rounds, six LAAW's and six M-79 rounds. Result, six NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit recovered two M-1's, two carbines and one AK-47 which were returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(16) At 2137H, vicinity YD 775229, B/1/1 (-) observed 30-40 NVA crossing causeway at YD 775229. Unit fired a five round 81mm mortar mission and observed four NVA definitely KIA. Area not searched until first light. Four NVA KIA Confirmed, negative evidence of additional enemy casualties.
1. 11 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing to conduct search and destroy operations within assigned AO to locate and destroy the remnants of the enemy forces in the southern sector of Hue. At 0930H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) assumed OpCon of Command Group 1/5 and B/1/5 in preparation for execution of CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 101529Z Feb 68. At 1100H, elements of B/1/5 were helo-lifted to North Hue; at 1635H, five tanks from 1st Tank Battalion arrived at North Hue by LCU and offloaded in support of 1st Marines (-) (Rein); at 1645H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) assumed OpCon of Companies C and D, 1/5; at 1630H, Command Group 1/5 arrived at 1st Marines Forward CP and at 1730H, A/1/5 moved from the Hue Ramp to North Hue by LCU offloading at YD 756250. These shifts of OpCon, movement of units are a result of preparations for the execution of CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 101529Z Feb 68.

(1) At 0718H, vicinity of YD 781211, G/2/5 received 50 rounds automatic weapons fire and five rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 785210. Fired 200 rounds small arms fire and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Negative casualties. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 0820H, vicinity YD 780223, while conducting sweep, A/1/1 received 25 rounds small arms fire from three NVA fleeing through a rice paddy at YD 783221. Unit returned fire with 250 rounds small arms and machine gun fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 0930H, at YD 772208, snipers attached to H/2/5 observed six NVA moving in southerly direction. Snipers opened fire with R-700, small arms and automatic weapons fire. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 1045H, vicinity YD 772208, lead elements of H/2/5 while conducting attack received 20 rounds sniper fire and four B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 772207. Unit returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire and continued mission. Negative casualties. Enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(5) At 1130H, vicinity YD 786221, elements of A/1/1 observed two NVA behind wall at YD 787220. Unit opened fire with 60 rounds small arms fire resulting in two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 1130H, an Engineer Bridge Company departed Phu Bai by secure Rough Rider Convoy and proceeded to the bridge at YD 781209 to repair same.
(7) At 1410H, vicinity of YD 774226, Scout Sniper attached to B/1/1 observed one NVA sniper at YD 774229. Sniper fired R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1200H, F/2/5 at YD 778207 received one B-40 rocket and eight rounds sniper fire from enemy at YD 775208. Unit returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire and 40 rounds 81mm HE. Results, one USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1330H, vicinity YD 772208, H/2/5 received 50 rounds sniper fire and two B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 772206. Unit returned fire immediately with 100 rounds small arms fire, 200 rounds MG fire and fired 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results, nine NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1745H, vicinity YD 758211, Scout Snipers attached to F/2/5 observed two NVA across river at YD 757208. Snipers opened fire with 15 rounds R-700 and small arms fire. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1835H, vicinity YD 775224, elements of B/1/1 observed two NVA moving at YD 778228. Unit opened fire with 40 rounds small arms fire killing both NVA. Two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1950H, H/2/5 at YD 774207 received 14 B-40 rockets, six rifle grenades and five hand grenades. One B-40 rocket started fire in house adjacent to H/2/5 position, resulting in a large secondary explosion (possible enemy ammo cache). Unit returned fire with 16 rounds 81mm HE and 49 rounds 155mm artillery. Excellent coverage of target resulting in three secondary explosions. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(13) At 2350H, B/2/5 vicinity YD 771208 received three B-40 rockets, six hand grenades from enemy located at YD 770207 and YD 768205. Unit returned fire with small arms and hand grenades. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor and three NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit recovered one AK-47, one B-40 rocket launcher, three AK-47 magazines, five B-40 rockets, seven satchel charges, four ChiCom grenades. All items forwarded to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

m. 12 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) and 2/5 (-) continuing search and destroy operations within assigned AO. Bridge repair operations continued at YD 781209. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued execution of CG Task Force XRay Frags Order 101529Z Feb 68 as follows: At 1500H, 1st Marines chopped OpCon of B/1/5 to 2/5 (-); at 1715H, 1/5 (-) Command Group, remainder of B/1/5 and C/1/5 completed LCU move from the Hue Ramp to YD 756250 in North Hue. 1/5 (-) in conjunction with forces from the 1st ARVN Division will conduct operations in assigned zone of action to clear the northern sector of Hue of enemy forces.
At 2030H, vicinity YD 781210, A/1/1 received small arms fire from rooftop at YD 782208. Unit returned fire with 15 rounds small arms fire resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 0856H, vicinity YD 760209, 1st platoon F/2/5 received one B-40 rocket round. Fire returned with 100 rounds small arms fire. Unit continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor.

At 1005H, vicinity YD 771207, H/2/5 received 10 incoming rounds 82mm mortar. Unit called 81mm fire mission on suspected enemy position and continued the attack. Result, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

At 1045H, vicinity YD 787213, elements of A/1/1 received six rounds sniper fire from unknown direction. Unit continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA Minor.

At 1144H, vicinity YD 756208, F/2/5 received 12 rounds 60mm from enemy located at YD 756207 and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 756206. Unit returned fire immediately, calling 81mm mortar mission on enemy mortar site and returning 300 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

At 1315H, vicinity YD 785211, elements of A/1/1 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy located at YD 788212. Unit returned fire with 30 rounds small arms fire and searched area. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, negative evidence of enemy casualties.

At 1500H, elements of A/1/5 at YD 753240 received two incoming 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Unit continued mission.

At 1540H, vicinity YD 757219, while moving forward to secure beach head on south side of of the canal, F/2/5 received 10 rounds 60mm, 200 rounds small arms fire and two B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 755207. Unit called in an 81mm mortar mission and with tank in support fired and maneuvered to the enemy position. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac and nine NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1725H, vicinity YD 751207, G/2/5 received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from buildings and trees at YD 766206. Unit returned fire immediately with small arms and received supporting fires from UHIE gun ships. Area searched, results, six NVA KIA Confirmed.
(10) At 1800H, vicinity YD 787213, A/1/1 while continuing the attack received 50 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 787212. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire, two LAAW's and 100 rounds MG fire. Results, two USMC WIA Minor, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1800H, vicinity YD 775226, B/1/1 (-) received 75 rounds small arms fire from enemy in the same area. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms and machine gun fire and three LAAW's. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1805H, vicinity YD 758209, elements of F/2/5 received incoming grenades from camouflaged fighting hole at YD 758208. Unit returned fire with small arms, six M-79 rounds and assaulted the position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, two USMC WIA Minor and two NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit recovered one SKS rifle, six ChiCom grenades, and turned items into 1st Marines Forward S-2.

n. 13 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) maintaining security on the vital bridge at YD 780219, and security along the southern approaches to Hue City to prevent NVA counterattack/infiltration; 2/5 (-) continues to conduct operations south of the Phu Cam River in a new expanded area of operations bounded by coordinates YD 735203, YD 740189, YD 761189 and YD 782206. 1/5 (-) in conjunction with forces of the 1st ARVN Division commenced its attack in assigned zone of action in North Hue to clear the city of NVA forces. Contact in the southern sector of the city remains light to moderate; contact in the northern sector of the city is heavy, with 1/5 (-) encountering the same house to house, street to street fighting experienced earlier in the southern sector.

(1) At 0845H, vicinity YD 773209, A/1/1 observed enemy sniper position at YD 773207 and opened fire with small arms. Search of area revealed two NVA KIA Confirmed and one M-1 carbine recovered. Weapon returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(2) At 0845H, vicinity YD 782227, B/2/5 conducting search of area discovered three enemy weapons, one ChiCom IMG, one AK-47, one shotgun. Weapons turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(3) At 0930H, vicinity of YD 776225, B/1/1 (-) received sniper fire from enemy position at YD 777224. Unit returned fire with small arms fire and M-79 rounds. Results, two USMC WIA, enemy casualties unknown.
(4) At 0920H, vicinity YD 798212, A/1/1 discovered and unearthed twelve fresh graves containing twelve enemy bodies. Twelve NVA KIA Confirmed, killed by previous action.

(5) At 0945H, vicinity YD 776224, B/1/1 (-) received one incoming rifle grenade from enemy position at YD 777244. Unit returned fire with small arms and M-79 fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(6) At 0950H, vicinity YD 779219, G/2/5 received small arms fire from enemy position at YD 761207. Unit returned fire with small arms. Results, one USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(7) At 0950H, vicinity YD 786226, B/1/1 received small arms fire from enemy position at YD 785228. Unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, assaulted and secured the enemy position. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1005H, vicinity YD 776227, B/1/1 observed one NVA at YD 776230. Unit opened fire with 50 rounds small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(9) At 1030H, vicinity of YD 776225, B/1/1 received sniper fire from enemy position at YD 777224. Unit returned fire with small arms and M-79 fire. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(10) At 1120H, vicinity YD 747207, D/1/5 received B-40 rocket and small arms fire from enemy position at YD 744206. Unit returned fire with small arms, 3.5 inch rockets and LAAW's. Negative casualties, enemy casualties unknown.

(11) At 1131H, vicinity YD 785206, F/2/5 received five rounds 60mm mortar from enemy position at YD 759205. Unit returned fire with 25 rounds 81mm HE. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1221H, vicinity YD 756203, H/2/5 received sniper fire from enemy positions at YD 757202. Unit returned fire with small arms, assaulted and secured the enemy position. Results two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(13) At 1230H, vicinity YD 762233, B/1/1 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy positions at YD 763232. Unit returned fire with small arms, M-79 fire and artillery. Results, one USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.
(14) At 1250H, vicinity YD 761204, 3/2/5 received 5 incoming 60mm mortars from enemy positions located at YD 759203. Unit called in artillery mission, assaulted and secured the enemy position. Results, ten NVA KIA and fourteen individual weapons recovered. Weapons returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(15) At 1255H, vicinity YD 760229, 0/1/5 received an unknown number of B-40 rockets from enemy located in fortified positions vicinity YD 760228. Unit continued attack and returned fire with 90mm, 81mm and small arms fire. Results, four USMC KIA, 25 USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(16) At 1300H, vicinity of YD 761233, A/1/5 received B-40 and RPG rocket fire with RPG rockets hitting two tanks that were in direct support. Tanks received damage to sights and comm equipment. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(17) At 1315H, vicinity YD 762233, A/1/5 received 150 rounds small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 763232. Unit returned fire with three LAWs, four 90mm rounds and 200 rounds 50 caliber fire. Unit continued attack. Enemy casualties unknown.

(18) At 1315H, vicinity YD 758235, A/1/5 received approximately 12 B-40 rockets, 12-15 grenades and 700-800 rounds small arms fire. Unit returned fire with four 106mm rounds, five rounds 90mm, and 100 rounds small arms fire. Results, two USMC KIA, 30 USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(19) At 1325H, vicinity YD 789226, B/1/1 received small arms fire from enemy bunker at YD 790226. Unit returned fire and maneuvered to destroy bunker. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(20) At 1341H, vicinity YD 755204, H/2/5 received four B-40 rockets and 45 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy positions at YD 762202. Unit returned fire with 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. Results, 15 USMC WIA MedEvac, 8 USMC WIA Minor, and two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(21) At 1351H, vicinity YD 760207, F/2/5 received small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 762206. Unit returned fire with small arms and machine gun fire. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac and three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(22) At 1400H, vicinity YD 786225, B/1/1 received 8 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy positions at YD 783227. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds 81mm mortar fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.
(23) At 1500H, vicinity YD 787226, B/1/1 (-) received approximately 500 rounds automatic weapons fire from enemy positions located at YD 788227. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms fire, one LAAW and three 3.5 inch rockets. Results: five USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(24) At 1600H, vicinity YD 759206, F/2/5 received 50 rounds small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 760205. Unit returned fire with small arms fire and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results: one USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(25) At 1605H, vicinity YD 758229, C/1/5 received one B-40 rocket from enemy position at YD 758226. Unit returned fire with small arms and two 3.5 inch rockets. Results: one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

* 14 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) maintaining its security along the southern approaches to Hue City and at the vital bridge at YD 781209. 2/5 (-) continued its search and destroy operations in the new AO south of the Hu Cam River; 1/5 (-) continued its operations in North Hue in conjunction with forces of the 1st ARVN Division. Contact remained heavy in North Hue. At 0800H, in view of heavy enemy resistance and mounting casualties, D/1/5 was chopped from 2/5 (-) to 1/5 in order to bolster/reinforce USMC units in North Hue.

(1) At 0130H, vicinity YD 772209, a bridge security element from A/1/1 received sniper fire from enemy position at YD 773207. Unit returned fire with small arms and searched area. Results: one NVA KIA Confirmed, one Thompson SMG recovered. Weapon returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(2) At 0735H, vicinity of YD 748207, G/2/5 received small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy positions at YD 744206. Unit returned fire with 12 rounds 81mm HE. Results: one USMC WIA MedEvac, three USMC WIA Minor.

(3) At 0900H, vicinity YD 755205, H/2/5 received small arms and automatic weapons fire and nine rounds 60mm mortars from enemy positions at YD 756204. Unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons fire and 60 rounds 81mm HE. Results: one USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.
(4) At 0915H, vicinity YD 762206, F/2/5 received four B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 762204. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds 81mm HF. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 1000H, vicinity YD 759229, platoon from C/1/5 apprehended an enemy suspect who upon interrogation indicated a knowledge of the enemy situation. Suspect detained and forwarded to the 1/5 S-2.

(6) At 1015H, vicinity YD 771250, two LCM-8's enroute from YD 756250 in North Hue to the southern ramp vicinity YD 772223 received automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire from enemy positions at YD 773251. Unit returned small arms fire and called in an artillery mission. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(7) At 1045H, vicinity YD 792228, B/1/1 (-) received sniper fire from enemy positions at YD 791229. Unit returned fire with M-60, M-79 fire and 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, seven NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1056H, vicinity YD 757203, H/2/5 received 11 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 760200. Unit spotted smoke from mortars and fired an artillery mission of 40 rounds with excellent coverage of target. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1110H, vicinity YD 749210, Scout Sniper Team attached to C/2/5 observed one enemy at YD 743213. Sniper fired one round from R-700. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1200H, vicinity YD 758228, 3d platoon C/1/5 observed three enemy armed with B-40 rocket launchers firing at tanks from YD 759226. Unit opened fire with small arms fire. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1210H, vicinity YD 758202, Command Post, H/2/5 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy positions at YD 748204. Unit called 105mm artillery of 15 rounds HE. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(12) At 1230H, vicinity YD 755207, aerial observer in support of H/2/5 observed three NVA IN the open at YD 755205. AO called an 81mm mortar mission resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(13) At 1315H, vicinity YD 759226, C/1/5 sighted a large concentration of enemy troops. Unit directed tanks to fire 90mm to destroy the enemy position. Unit also called an 81mm mortar mission and observed several secondary explosions. Results, six NVA KIA Confirmed.
At 1320H, vicinity YD 751209, G/2/5 observed approximately 20 NVA moving through an open rice paddy at YD 752202. Unit opened fire with small arms fire and 30 rounds 60mm mortar. Results, ten NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1320H, vicinity YD 758207, F/2/5 received fire on their left flank from enemy positions at YD 759207. Unit returned fire with small arms and called in an 81mm mortar mission. Results, one USMC WIA, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1400H, vicinity YD 761233, B/1/5 received 15 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 761232. Unit returned 25 rounds small arms fire and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

At 1410H, vicinity YD 782210, A/1/1 apprehended one VN male with two M-26 grenades in his possession. Individual detained and forwarded to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

At 1425H, vicinity YD 759209, Command Post of F/2/5 received one 82mm mortar round from unknown enemy position. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac.

At 1515H, vicinity YD 788214, 2d platoon, A/1/1 observed three NVA with weapons at YD 786215. Unit fired small arms and called in an 81mm fire mission. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1600H, vicinity YD 795228, B/1/1 (-) received sniper fire from enemy in tree at YD 795229. Unit returned fire with 257 rounds small arms fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 1630H, while moving vicinity YD 762223, B/1/1 (-) received sniper fire from YD 763232. Unit returned fire with 150 rounds small arms and 300 rounds MG fire, seven rounds 90mm and 250 rounds 30 caliber MG. Results, one USMC KIA, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

15 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security missions along the southern approaches to Hue City. 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in AO south of the Phu Cam River. Continued the attack in assigned zone of action in the northern sector of Hue. Contact remained heavy as 1/5 continued house to house, street to street fighting.

At 0500H, defensive position of G/2/5 at YD 759239 received one incoming enemy grenade. Unit returned fire with small arms. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.
(2) At 0730H, vicinity YD 776227, squad patrol from B/1/1 observed three NVA with weapons moving north along road at YD 776233. Unit fired 60 rounds machine gun fire. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(3) At 0800H, machine gun team in D/1/5 defensive position at YD 758234 observed movement at YD 758234. Unit fired 20 rounds M-60 and threw one frag grenade. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 0800H, MACV advisors at Hue reported that a PF unit at YD 735185 was in heavy contact and requested artillery fire support. 1st Marines fired eight rounds 155mm in support resulting in three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 0815H, vicinity YD 761234, B/1/5 received 75 rounds automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 762235. Unit returned fire with 75 rounds small arms fire and four 3.5 inch rockets. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 0910H, squad security position from A/1/1 at YD 772208 received approximately 400 rounds small arms fire from enemy position at YD 771206. Unit returned fire with 800 rounds small arms fire and swept area. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac and two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(7) At 0915H, platoon of G/2/5 at YD 747205 observed well emplaced enemy positions at YD 745203. Unit directed air strike on targets which resulted in two secondary explosions. Enemy casualties unknown.

(8) At 0915H, platoon patrol from G/2/5 at YD 747201 received small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 749201. Unit returned fire with small arms, 60 rounds 9mm and 32 rounds 105mm HE. Results, one USMC KIA, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1100H, a platoon patrol from B/1/1, vicinity YD 794225 received 40 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 795227. Unit returned fire with small arms, two LAAW's, six M-79 rounds and 12 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac and one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1250H, element of H/2/5 at YD 766209 received 50 rounds small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 766207. Unit returned fire with two rounds 106mm and 150 rounds small arms fire. Results, two USMC WIA Minor, one NVA KIA Confirmed.
(11) At 1418H, vicinity YD 759206, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received 60 rounds small arms fire and one B-40 rocket from enemy position at YD 760205. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms fire. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC WIA MedEvac and six NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1545H, platoon patrol from F/2/5 in vicinity YD 748206 received eight rounds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy positions. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor. Unit continued mission of establishing an ambush position and discovered three NVA KIA Confirmed, killed as a result of previous action.

(13) At 1600H, vicinity YD 786210, Scout Sniper Team attached to A/1/1 received eight rounds sniper fire from enemy positions in building at YD 787209. Sniper team returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire until squad reaction force arrived to land assistance. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(14) At 1630H, while conducting search and destroy vicinity YD 758229, A/1/5 received 20 rounds 82mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 758224. Unit called for counter mortar fire but received negative clearance. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac and one USMC WIA Minor.

(15) At 1820H, vicinity YD 760206, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from three enemy snipers at YD 761206. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(16) At 1835H, platoon from F/2/5 conducting a patrol vicinity YD 760207 discovered one NVA KIA Confirmed, result of previous action.

(17) At 1900H, C/1/5, conducting search and destroy vicinity YD 758227, suppressed enemy force of unknown size with whom the company had maintained contact since 1330H. Unit had sustained constant small arms fire (approximately 3000 rounds) from well fortified and well emplaced enemy forces. Company C/1/5 expended 5000 rounds small arms fire, 40 rounds 90mm and 15 rounds 106mm fire while suppressing the enemy. Results, two USMC KIA, ten USMC WIA MedEvac, six USMC WIA Minor and nine NVA KIA Confirmed.
(18) At 1900H, vicinity YD 763232, D/1/5 terminated contact which had been a constant engagement with enemy forces at close range since 1330H. Unit had received constant B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire and grenades, and had returned fire with small arms, 106mm, 90mm, 3.5 inch rockets, LAAW's, M-79 rounds and 60mm mortars. Results, three USMC KIA, 12 USMC WIA MedEvac, seven USMC WIA Minor and 10 NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also recovered two AK-47's and one SKS rifle which were forwarded to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(19) At 1900H, vicinity YD 761231, B/1/5 engaged unknown number of enemy at close range, meeting heavy resistance from small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Unit returned fire with small arms, grenades, 90mm and 106mm RR fire. Results of action, one USMC KIA, seven USMC WIA MedEvac, four USMC WIA Minor and five NVA KIA Confirmed.

q. 16 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security mission in the southern sector of Hue and conducting search and destroy operations within assigned area of operation; 2/5 (-) continued to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Phu Cam River, and 1/5, in conjunction with ARVN Forces, continued the attack in North Hue to dislodge and destroy enemy forces. Contact in South Hue remained light to moderate; contact remained moderate to heavy in North Hue.

(1) At 0200H, vicinity YD 787225, platoon defensive position of B/1/5 was probed by estimated NVA squad at YD 787227. Unit observed two NVA at close range and opened fire with 75 rounds small arms fire, and fired 300 rounds small arms and 25 rounds M-79 fire at enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(2) At 0655H, D/1/5 conducting search and destroy operation vicinity YD 761231 and YD 763232 received approximately 500 rounds small arms fire and eight B-40 rockets from enemy located at YD 761230 and YD 766233. Unit returned fire with all organic weapons, called in artillery and 81mm mortar missions and continued the attack. Results, two USMC KIA and seven USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(3) At 0732H, platoon patrol from F/2/5 at YD 758206 observed three NVA at YD 760206. Unit opened fire with 30 rounds small arms fire and swept area. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 0735H, platoon from B/1/1 at YD 797222 observed one NVA at YD 798222 and opened fire with 10 rounds small arms fire, hitting and wounding him. Search of area revealed blood trail and an M-16 rifle was recovered. Weapon turned over to 1st Marines Forward S-2.
(5) At 1000H, platoon patrol from B/1/1 vicinity YD 782224 discovered an enemy bunker containing a bed, cooking utensils and several documents. Documents were turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(6) At 1048H, platoon patrol from G/2/5 operating in vicinity YD 754204 received small arms fire from estimated NVA squad located at YD 754201. Unit returned fire with small arms, 81mm mortars and fired 12 rounds 106mm, causing five secondary explosions. Results, three USMC WIA, Minor, five NVA KIA Confirmed.

(7) At 1115H, vicinity YD 763230, 81mm mortar section from H&S Company, 1/5 received seven rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 763242. No fire returned as enemy fire ceased. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac.

(8) At 1130H, vicinity YD 759223, Comm O and radio operator from 1/5, while moving to the Company D CP, received one B-40 rocket round from unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(9) At 1300H, vicinity YD 775227, Scout Sniper team attached to B/1/1 observed three NVA with weapons moving north on road across causeway at YD 775233. Sniper fired six rounds from R-700 resulting in three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1605H, squad from H/2/5 providing bridge security at YD 763198 received one sniper round from enemy located at YD 761206. Unit returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown. Area not searched due to security mission of unit.

(11) At 1635H, two Scout Sniper Teams attached to G/2/5 at YD 749210 observed ten NVA moving across river at YD 744213, YD 749214 and YD 755216. Snipers opened fire with 10 rounds from R-700. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1637H, vicinity YD 752209, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received four 60mm mortar rounds from enemy position located at YD 748202. Unit returned fire with 40 rounds 81mm HE and continued mission. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac and two USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(13) At 1900H, 1/5 summarized the day's activities as follows: Commencing at 0800H, 1/5 with Companies B, C and D attacked to the southeast from positions at YD 758229, YD 763232, YD 764231 and YD 758227. Units immediately made contact with enemy forces, engaging the enemy at extremely close range. 1/5 units received heavy volumes of small arms and automatic weapons fire, grenades and B-40 and RPG rocket fire.
Units returned fire with all organic weapons and supporting arms and continued the attack throughout the day against heavy resistance. Upon consolidation of night defensive positions, results were reported as seven USMC KIA, 47 USMC WIA MedEvac, and 63 NVA KIA Confirmed. Additionally, 1/5 recovered one 60mm mortar, one B-40 rocket launcher, ten RPG rocket launchers, and 21 assorted individual weapons.

1. 17 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing search and destroy and security operations in the southern sector of Hue City. 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in the AO south of the Phu Cam River, and 1/5 continued the attack in North Hue to dislodge and destroy enemy forces in assigned zone of action. Resistance continued to be heavy in North Hue. Between 1517H and 1640H, the weather cleared up sufficiently to allow 62 replacement troops to be helilifted into 1/5 in North Hue.

(1) At 0320H, platoon ambush from A/1/1 located at YD 773209 received incoming rocket, mortar and small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 771206. Unit called 50 rounds 81mm HE on the enemy position and searched area. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor and one NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also recovered one AK-47 and two B-40 rocket rounds. Weapon turned in to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(2) At 0430H, D/1/5 company defensive perimeter vicinity YD 763231 received an underdetermined number of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds from enemy position at YD 769231. Simultaneously, the unit came under small arms, B-40 rocket and grenade attack from enemy positions at YD 764230. Unit fired counter mortar fire with 81mm mortars and artillery to silence the enemy mortars, and fired small arms, LAAW's, M-79 rounds and 81mm mortars at the enemy position at YD 764230. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac and two NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also recovered one AK-47 which was turned in to the 1/5 S-2.

(3) At 0715H, platoon patrol from B/1/1 at YD 794226 received 240 rounds automatic weapons fire from estimated NVA squad located at YD 794228. Unit returned fire with small arms, LAAW's, M-79 fire and called 60mm and 81mm fire missions. Results, seven USMC WIA MedEvac and 17 NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 1000H, vicinity YD 795227, a platoon from B/1/1 received four M-79 rounds and two 60mm mortar rounds from enemy positions at YD 795227. Unit called in five rounds of 155mm artillery to suppress enemy fire. Searched area with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC WIA Minor.
(5) At 1030H, vicinity YD 759206, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received 60 rounds small arms fire from enemy position at YD 762204. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown. Unit continued mission.

(6) At 1125H, vicinity YD 774207, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received 50 rounds small arms fire from enemy position at YD 775206. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and swept area. Negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA MedEvac.

(7) At 1141H, vicinity YD 761205, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received one 82mm mortar round from enemy position at YD 757203. Unit returned fire with small arms and an 81mm mortar mission. Results, one USMC KIA, 11 USMC WIA MedEvac and five USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(8) At 1220H, vicinity YD 759206, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired 20 rounds 81mm HE at probable mortar positions in area. Results, three USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1345H, vicinity YD 774209, Scout Sniper Team attached to B/1/1 observed seven NVA moving across street intersection at YD 775232. Team fired eight rounds from R-700. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(10) At 1544H, platoon patrol from G/2/5 at YD 767217 received 80 rounds small arms fire from estimated NVA squad approximately 300 meters away. Unit returned fire immediately with 500 rounds small arms and 24 rounds M-79 fire, and searched area. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac and ten NVA KIA Confirmed.

(11) At 1600H, vicinity YD 773224, security platoon, Headquarters Company, 1st Marines received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from enemy position at YD 768227. Unit returned fire with 500 rounds small arms fire and enemy fire ceased. Unit searched area. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac and three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1715H, vicinity YD 765209, platoon patrol from H/2/5 received one round sniper fire from enemy sniper located in the vicinity YD 767205. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds small arms fire, searched area with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.
At 1740H, 106mm Recoilless Rifle section from H&S Company 2/5 located at YD 759211 received 15 rounds small arms fire from opposite bank of the Song Huong. Enemy position unknown, no action taken. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

At 1900H, 1/5 reported that its coordinated battalion attack had commenced at 0700H at YD 757229, YD 764230, YD 765229 and YD 759227 and immediately, all units had made heavy contact with the enemy. The attacking companies received heavy automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from the flank, with the heaviest firing coming from the Palace wall. Units maintained constant heavy contact throughout the day until night defensive positions were consolidated. 1/5 utilized all organic weapons, 106mm recoilless rifle, 90mm tank fire and artillery to suppress enemy fire and continue to advance. Results of the day long battle were 12 USMC KIA, 45 USMC WIA MedEvac, 15 USMC WIA Minor and 26 NVA KIA Confirmed. Additionally, 1/5 units recovered 14 assorted individual weapons, one machine gun and one HRC-25. All items turned in to the 1/5 S-2.

At 2030H, while in night defensive perimeter vicinity YD 782208, A/1/1 observed three NVA in defensive wire at YD 782207. Unit fired 20 rounds small arms fire and fired illumination. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

At 2130H, vicinity YD 751208, squad ambush from G/2/5 received six rounds 60mm mortar fire, 50 rounds small arms fire and two frag grenades from an estimated NVA squad at YD 751207. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire, 20 frag grenades and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Area searched. Results, one USMC WIA Minor and three NVA KIA Confirmed.

As of 18 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City; 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Hu Cam River; and 1/5 continued the attack in the northern sector of Hue to dislodge and destroy NVA forces in that portion of the city. Contact in the southern sector remained light to moderate. Contact in the northern sector remained heavy.

At 0430H, vicinity YD 764229, elements of D/1/5 in night defensive perimeter observed several groups of NVA moving across the wall to the Citadel at YD 765228. Unit opened fire with small arms, 30 rounds 60mm and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results, eight NVA KIA Confirmed.
(2) At 0500H, vicinity YD 775217, 1/1 (-) CP group received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds from an unknown enemy position. Unit fired prearranged counter battery fires on suspected enemy positions. Results, one USMC WIA Minor, enemy casualties unknown.

(3) At 0835H, platoon patrol from F/2/5 at YD 762206 observed six NVA moving down stream at YD 761205. Unit opened fire with 150 rounds small arms fire and searched area. Results, two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 0900H, vicinity YD 740210, A/1/5 made contact with enemy sniper and automatic weapons position at YD 758227. Unit returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and 50 rounds 81mm HE. Results, two USMC KIA, six USMC WIA MedEvac, five USMC WIA Minor and three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 0955H, vicinity YD 805191, Rough Rider Convoy security platoon from F/2/5 received 200 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at the same coordinates. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at the same coordinates. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms fire and convoy continued mission. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(6) At 1130H, vicinity YD 762226, C/1/5 received heavy enemy automatic weapons fire from positions at YD 761226. Unit returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and 81mm mortar fire, and the enemy broke contact. Results, two USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(7) At 1145H, vicinity YD 765228 elements of D/1/5 observed one NVA moving across street at YD 765227. Unit opened fire with two rounds small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1146H, vicinity YD 749211, Scout Sniper attached to G/2/5 observed ten NVA crossing river at YD 748214. Sniper opened fire with 10 rounds from R-700. Results, four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(9) At 1207H, vicinity YD 758206, platoon patrol from F/2/5 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired 40 rounds 81mm at suspected enemy mortar positions and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(10) At 1230H, vicinity YD 760229, while moving tanks out of resupply area, one tank from Company A, 1st Tank Battalion was hit by an RPG rocket from enemy position at YD 759228. Unit returned fire with small arms fire and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.
(11) At 1250H, vicinity YD 775227, Scout Sniper Team attached to B/1/1 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 775229. Team returned fire with 16 rounds small arms fire resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(12) At 1305H, vicinity YD 761227, while conducting search and destroy, C/1/5 observed eight NVA at YD 758227. Unit fired 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire killing two NVA as they moved into building. Unit then maneuvered onto firing position and fired 12 rounds 106mm fire, completely destroying the structure. Results, a total of ten NVA KIA Confirmed.

(13) At 1325H, vicinity YD 749210, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received one 57mm recoilless rifle round and one B-40 rocket round from enemy position at YD 748213. Unit returned fire with 14 rounds 155mm artillery and two rounds 106mm recoilless rifle fire and searched area. Results, five NVA KIA Confirmed.

(14) At 1327H, vicinity YD 759208, F/2/5 received one round 60mm from enemy position at YD 756207. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds 61mm HE on suspected enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(15) At 1430H, vicinity YD 760229, elements of the 1/5 Command Group observed one enemy sniper at YD 759226 firing from the top of a palm tree. Ontos maneuvered into position and fired 90 rounds 30 caliber machine gun fire at the enemy position. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(16) At 1450H, vicinity YD 760230, A/1/5 conducting search and destroy received five rounds 60mm mortar fire. Unit returned counter mortar fire of 13 rounds 61mm HE on suspected enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(17) At 1530H, vicinity YD 759229, A/1/5 received two B-40 rocket rounds from enemy located at the northeast corner of the Citadel at YD 758228. Unit returned fire with 250 rounds small arms fire, three rounds 106mm, 15 rounds 60mm and 10 rounds 61mm. Results, two USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(18) At 1650H, vicinity YD 783224, platoon patrol from B/1/1 observed one NVA attempting to flee the area. Unit opened fire with small arms fire killing the NVA.

(19) At 1800H, vicinity YD 762227, while consolidating night defensive position, B/1/5 received two incoming frag grenades. Unit fired 40 rounds small arms at suspected enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA Minor. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.
(20) At 1815H, vicinity YD 783224, platoon patrol from B/1/1 observed ten NVA with weapons at YD 784226. Unit opened fire with small arms and swept area. Results, three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(21) At 1830H, vicinity YD 765229, a squad from D/1/5 made contact at close range with 6-8 NVA armed with rockets and automatic weapons. Unit took the enemy under fire with small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Results, five USMC WIA MedEvac, four NVA KIA Confirmed and one WIA detainee. Unit also recovered two soviet LMG, two AK-47's and one SKS rifle.

(22) At 1900H, vicinity YD 759225, C/1/5 observed an unknown number of enemy along their right flank. Unit exchanged fire at close range utilizing small arms, automatic weapons, M-79's and 60mm mortars. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA Minor and ten NVA KIA Confirmed.

(23) At 2001H, vicinity YD 772209, platoon ambush from H/2/5 received one 60mm mortar round from suspected enemy position at YD 776192. Unit fired 12 rounds 81mm and eight rounds 105mm at suspected position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

t. 19 February 1968: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City. 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City. 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Phu Cam River; and 1/5 continued the attack in the northern sector of Hue city in conjunction with ARVN forces. (contact remained moderate to heavy in all areas).

(1) At 0400H, vicinity YD 786223, platoon ambush position from B/1/1 was probed by an estimated two NVA troops. Unit received B-40 rockets and satchel charges and returned fire with 500 rounds small arms fire, 20 rounds 60mm, 40 rounds 81mm HE and 20 rounds 105mm. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac, two NVA KIA Confirmed and one AK-47 recovered.

(2) At 0830H, vicinity YD 762226, B/1/5 received small arms fire and three B-40 rocket rounds from estimated four NVA at YD 763228. Unit returned fire with three LAAW's, five rounds M-79 and 100 rounds small arms fire. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac; enemy casualties unknown at this time.

(3) At 0900H, vicinity YD 762225, C/1/5 received sniper fire from enemy position at YD 763225. Unit returned fire with small arms and swept area. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.
(4) At 0930H, vicinity YD 776227, B/1/1 received eight rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 787225. Unit returned fire with 80 rounds small arms fire and called a 105mm artillery mission. Results, one USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(5) At 1030H, vicinity YD 766209 elements of G/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 766207. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and continued mission. Results, one USMC KIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

(6) At 1055H, vicinity YD 763208, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received heavy small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 762206. Unit returned fire with small arms and fired an artillery mission. Results, one USMC KIA and one USMC WIA MedEvac. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(7) At 1140H, vicinity YD 774226, Scout Sniper Team attached to B/1/1 observed one NVA near the river edge observing the Hu LCU Ramp. Team fired three rounds from R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(8) At 1145H, vicinity YD 762227, estimated NVA fire team fired small arms and threw grenades at elements of B/1/1. Unit returned fire with small arms and grenades and searched area. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed. one unidentified VN male apprehended and detained and one AK-47 recovered. Detainee forwarded to the 1/5 S-2.

(9) At 1215H, vicinity YD 761232, elements of 1/5 Command Post received three rounds 82mm mortar fire from enemy position at the Imperial Palace. Unit returned fire with an artillery mission. Results, two USMC KIA, enemy casualties unknown.

(10) At 1300H, vicinity YD 760229, while searching area of previous contact, 1/5 discovered six NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit also recovered two SKS rifles and miscellaneous items of individual equipment.

(11) At 1345H, vicinity YD 764228, D/1/5 came under heavy rocket, mortar and automatic weapons attack from enemy located at YD 763228. Unit returned fire and maneuvered to the enemy position. Results, two USMC KIA, three USMC WIA MedEvac, one NVA KIA Confirmed and four detainees apprehended. Detainees forwarded to the 1/5 S-2.

(12) At 1415H, vicinity YD 762228, tanks in support of D/1/5 received three B-40 rocket rounds from enemy position at YD 763229. Tanks were undamaged and returned fire with two rounds 90mm and 50 rounds 50 Caliber machine gun fire. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(13) At 1420H, vicinity YD 762226, G/1/5 received three B-40 rockets from unknown number of enemy located at YD 763227. Unit returned fire with small arms and 81mm mortar fire and searched area. Results, five NVA KIA confirmed and one, Betsy machine gun recovered. Weapons turned in to the 1/5 S-2.
(14) At 1500H, vicinity YD 756211, Scout Sniper Team in support of 2/5 (-) observed one NVA with weapon at YD 753215. Team fired five rounds from R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(15) At 1500H, while conducting search of area at YD 762228, B/1/5 discovered one AK-51, one B-40 rocket launcher and 25 rounds 7.62mm ammunition. Items turned in to the 1/5 S-2.

(16) At 1715H, vicinity YD 784210, A/1/1 received small arms and automatic weapons fire and one B-40 rocket round from enemy located in the same area. Unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons fire and swept area. Results, one USMC KIA, negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(17) At 1737H, vicinity YD 766209, platoon from B/2/5 received sniper fire from unknown enemy position. Unit continued mission. Results, one USN WIA MedEvac.

(18) At 1745H, vicinity YD 766205, 81mm mortar section from 2/5 (-) received small arms fire from one enemy located in the same area. Unit returned fire with small arms and checked area with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac.

(19) At 1900H, vicinity YD 764228, B/1/5 observed six NVA moving in the open in the same area. Unit opened fire with small arms fire, resulting in three NVA KIA Confirmed.

(20) At 1945H, vicinity YD 763228, elements of B/1/5 received four incoming frag grenades. Unit returned fire with 10 frag grenades and searched area with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, three USMC WIA MedEvac.

u. 20 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations within the southern sector of Hue City; 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Phu Cam River; and 1/5 continued the attack in the northern sector of Hue to dislodge and destroy enemy forces in that portion of the city. Contact remained moderate to heavy in all areas.

(1) At 0115H, vicinity YD 787223, while moving to an ambush position, platoon from B/1/1 observed two NVA moving at YD 786222. Unit opened fire with 100 rounds small arms fire, resulting in two NVA KIA Confirmed.

(2) At 0700H, vicinity YD 764228, B/1/5 observed two NVA with packs and weapons at YD 765227. Unit opened fire with small arms, resulting in two NVA KIA Confirmed. Unit unable to recover weapons due to continuing enemy contact in the area.

(3) At 0800H, vicinity YD 776209, platoon patrol from H/2/5 received 150 rounds small arms fire from unknown size enemy unit at YD...
771205. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire and continued movement toward the enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(4) At 0800H, vicinity YD 762227, C/1/5 received sniper fire from enemy bunker at YD 762226. Unit returned fire with small arms and maneuvered troops into the enemy position. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 0820H, vicinity YD 774227, Scout Sniper in support of B/1/1 observed one NVA in the open at YD 772230. Sniper fired two rounds from R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(6) At 0857H, vicinity YD 770206, platoon patrol from H/2/5 received one B-40 rocket round from enemy position at YD 771205. Unit returned fire with small arms and continued mission. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(7) At 1000H, vicinity YD 772206, H/2/5 received three rounds 82mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired 81mm mortars at suspected enemy positions and continued mission. Results, one USMC KIA, three USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(8) At 1000H, vicinity YD 785213, A/1/1 received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from enemy position at YD 786213. Unit, supported by tanks, returned fire with five rounds 90mm, 10 rounds 60mm and 10 rounds 81mm mortar fire and maneuvered through the enemy position. Search of area revealed no evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC KIA. Unit recovered one BAR and forwarded the weapon to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(9) At 1031H, vicinity YD 762207, while conducting search of the area F/2/5 discovered one NVA KIA Confirmed and one AK-47 was recovered. Weapon was forwarded to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(10) At 1110H, vicinity YD 770206, H/2/5 conducting search and destroy operation received 30 rounds 82mm and 60mm mortar fire and a heavy volume of small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 769206 and YD 771206. Unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons and 20 rounds 81mm HE and 16 rounds 105mm artillery on enemy positions and continued mission. Results, four USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(11) At 1330H, vicinity YD 789213, platoon patrol from A/1/1 received small arms and automatic weapons fire and one B-40 rocket from enemy positions at YD 790214. Unit returned fire with small arms, LAAW's, 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire and 20 rounds 90mm. Results, six USMC WIA MedEvac, one NVA KIA confirmed and one M-1 recovered. Weapon returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(12) At 1530H, vicinity YD 761227, C/1/5 received one incoming 82mm mortar round from an unknown enemy position. Unit continued mission. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac.

(13) At 1530H, vicinity YD 763228, while conducting search and destroy of area, B/1/5 discovered four NVA KIA, result of previous action. Unit also recovered two ESS rifles, and miscellaneous 782 gear which were turned in to the 1/5 S-2.
(14) At 1545H, vicinity YD 760228, 106mm Recoilless Rifle team in support of A/1/5 observed four NVA moving at YD 758226. Crew fired one round 106mm resulting in four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(15) At 1700H, vicinity YD 762226, elements of C/1/5 observed one NVA moving behind a truck at YD 765206. Unit fired 10 rounds automatic weapons fire, resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(16) At 2000H, vicinity YD 757207, G/2/5 received small arms fire from enemy force located at YD 763206. Unit fired 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire and searched area. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(17) At 2130H, vicinity YD 763223, the 1/5 Command Post received three rounds 82mm mortar fire from an enemy position at the Imperial Palace, YD 756225. Unit did not call counter battery fire as an adjacent ARVN unit had fire mission on the target. Results, two USMC WIA MedEvac. Enemy casualties from ARVN artillery fire unknown.

(18) At 2150H, vicinity YD 766224, while conducting a platoon patrol from B/1/1 point man was detected by the enemy who threw two ChiCom grenades at the patrol, several NVA were observed in the open and were taken under fire with small arms, automatic weapons and 81mm mortars. Area searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Result, two USMC WIA MedEvac.

(19) At 2359H, vicinity YD 764209, G/2/5 observed three NVA moving northeast at YD 764209. Unit opened fire with heavy volume of small arms fire resulting in three NVA KIA Confirmed.

v. 21 February 68: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued Operation Hue City with 1/1 (-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City. 2/5 (-) continued search and destroy operations south of the Phu Cam River. 1/5 continued the attack in northern sector of the city in conjunction with ARVN forces. At 0930H, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) assumed OpCon of Company L/3/5. At 1415H, L/3/5 was choppered into North Hue commencing 1415H. The lift was terminated due to excessive ground fire being directed at the helicopters. However, all but 45 personnel were lifted. Contact remained moderate to heavy in all sectors.

(1) At 0004H, vicinity YD 771206, squad listening post from H/2/5 received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy at YD 771205. Unit returned fire with small arms and searched area. Negative evidence of enemy casualties. Result, one USMC WIA MedEvac.

(2) At 0750H, vicinity YD 765230, B/1/1 received one 60mm mortar round from unknown enemy position. Unit completed MedEvac and continued mission. Results, seven USMC WIA MedEvac, one USMC WIA Minor.

(3) At 0900H, vicinity YD 774226, Scout Sniper team attached to B/1/1 observed one NVA at YD 774229. Sniper fired one round from R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA Confirmed.

(4) At 0900H vicinity YD 762226, elements of A/1/5 observed enemy movement and sighted four NVA at YD 763237 and YD 762225. Unit engaged the enemy with small arms and automatic weapons fire, resulting in four NVA KIA Confirmed.

(5) At 0945H, vicinity YD 785209, elements of A/1/1 observed sniper fire from the NVA at YD 785207. Unit returned fire with small arms. Results, one NVA KIA Confirmed.
(6) At 1115H vicinity YD 760211, scout sniper attached to A/1/1 observed one NVA running from building at YD 791219. Sniper fired two rounds from R-700. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(7) At 1134H, vicinity YD 751209, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received sniper fire and one 57mm Recoiless rifle round from unknown size enemy force at YD 754205. Unit returned fire with 10 rounds 60mm and 20 rounds 81mm mortar fire. Area searched with no evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC KIA, seven USMC WIA Medevac.

(8) At 1200H vicinity YD 763227 elements of A/1/5 received 12-15 rounds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired preplanned counter mortar fire on suspected mortar sites. Results two USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1540H, vicinity YD 795215 elements of A/1/1 observed four NVA moving northeast at YD 795216. Unit engaged the enemy with small arms and searched the area. Result, three NVA KIA confirmed.

(10) At 1614H, vicinity YD 766208 elements of G/2/5 received one round 82mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac.

(11) At 1800H vicinity YD 757209 elements of F/2/5 observed a sniper at YD 757208. Unit fired two rounds small arms fire resulting in one NVA KIA confirmed.

(12) At 1830H, vicinity YD 772215 Marine from AT Company 1st Tank Battalion received one round sniper fire from unknown enemy location. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac.

(13) At 2145H, 1/5 summarized the days activities in North Hau as follows: 1/5 commenced the attack at 1110H, against well selected and well prepared enemy positions. The NVA forces employed small arms and automatic weapons fire, grenades, B40 rockets and 60mm and 82mm mortars. Movement of 1/5 was very slow due to heavy enemy resistance, and increasing by heavy fire as units neared the east wall of the Citadel. 1/5 employed all organic weapons, tanks, andontos and close air support as enemy positions were destroyed, secured and the attack pressed. Results of the day's battle, three USMC KIA, seventeen USMC WIA Medevac, fourteen USMC WIA Minor and thirty four NVA KIA confirmed. Additionally 1/5 apprehended one detainee and recovered three individual weapons.

(14) At 2152H, vicinity YD 7771206, squad ambush from A/2/5 received automatic weapons fire and one grenade from enemy located at YD 7771206. Unit returned small arms fire, 20 rounds 60mm HE, 20 rounds 105mm HE and 8 rounds 81mm HE. Search of area revealed negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results two USMC WIA Minor.
DECLASSIFIED

22 February 68 - 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City; 2/5(-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Hu Cam River; and 1/5 continued the attack in the northern sector of the city. At 1200H, the remainder of L/3/5 was helolifted into 1/5 at north Hue and B/4/5 was extracted and returned to First Marines forward CP. At 1230H, B/1/5 was chopped to 5th Marines and returned to Phu Bai for rest and recuperation. At 1300H one platoon from A/1/5 secured the northeast corner of the Citadel wall in north Hue; upon doing so, the national ensign was raised over the captured objective. Contact throughout the day remained moderate to heavy.

(1) At 0330H, vicinity YD 764227 and YD 764225, 0/1/5 night perimeter received 20 rounds 82mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit fired preplanned counter mortar fire on suspected enemy mortar sites. Results, four USMC KIA, four USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 1000H, vicinity YD 774245, Tank A-25p company A 1st Tank Battalion in support of ARVN Ranger BN search and destroy operation received one sniper round from unknown enemy position. Round hit tank commander, result one USMC KIA.

(3) At 1000H, vicinity YD 764226, while conducting search and destroy, B/1/1(-) received one 82mm mortar round from unknown enemy position. Round hit tank commander, result one USMC KIA.

(4) At 1100H, vicinity YD 780225, platoon patrol from B/1/1 observed two NVA with weapons moving into tree line at YD 74225. Unit engaged enemy with small arms fire, and searched area. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(5) At 1130H, vicinity YD 773206, Platoon patrol from H/2/5 discovered two NVA KIA confirmed, a result of previous action.

(6) At 1144H, vicinity YD 760205, platoon patrol from B/2/5 received small arms fire from enemy position at YD 760205. Unit returned fire with small arms and 10 rounds 81mm mortars. Search of area revealed no evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac.

(7) At 1351, vicinity YD 761211, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received two rounds 82mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 756204. Unit returned fire with ten rounds 81mm mortar fire. No evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac.

(8) At 1430H, vicinity YD 757209, Platoon patrol from F/2/5 received small arms fire and observed three NVA attempting to flee the area. Unit fired 16 rounds 50cal small arms fire and 30 rounds 81mm mortar HE. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.
(9) At 1525H, vicinity YD 759208, scout sniper team attached to F/2/5 observed four NVA with weapons at YD 759218. Sniper fired five rounds from R-700, resulting in two NVA KIA confirmed.

(10) At 1610H, vicinity YD 780211, scout sniper team attached to A/1/1 observed one NVA at YD 785212. Sniper fired one round from R-700. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(11) At 1805H, vicinity YD 771207, platoon sized ambush from H/2/5 observed fire NVA at YD 771206. Unit engaged enemy with small arms and automatic weapons fire and 20 rounds 81mm mortar fire. Area searched; results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(12) At 1815H, vicinity YD 760221, A/1/1 defensive perimeter received two 840 rockets and small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 761221. Unit returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons fire, 81mm mortar, 90mm fire from gun tanks and flame from flame tanks. Results, four USMC WIA Medevac and one NVA KIA confirmed.

(13) At 1815H, vicinity YD 766207 elements of G/2/5 observed one NVA with weapon in tree at YD 767206. Unit fired 10 rounds 60mm mortars. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(14) At 1845H, vicinity YD 785225, elements of B/1/1 observed one NVA on west bank of river at YD 787224. Unit opened fire with small arms, resulting in one NVA KIA confirmed.

(15) At 1910H, vicinity YD 781209, elements of A/1/1 received one 790 round from enemy position at YD 782211. Unit returned fire with small arms, 90mm and flame tank fire. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(16) At 2000H, 1/5 reported the following summary of the day's activities. Commencing at 0930H, 1/5 continued the attack in the northern half of its assigned zone of action. Enemy contact was lighter than any previous day. The enemy utilized sniping tactics to delay the securing of the southeast wall. However, at 1300H, a platoon from A/1/5 reached the southeast corner of the Citadel wall at YD 766228; upon doing so the National Ensign was raised over the captured objective. At this point, L/3/5 was committed to the foray, encountering several pockets of enemy resistance in its movement, with the enemy contact being largely limited to individual sniping incidents. 1/5 made maximum use of organic weapons and supporting fires in securing the southeast wall, with four flights of fixed wing aircraft being utilized in addition to tanks, mortars and artillery. Results of action, three USMC
WIA Medevacs and two WIA Minor. Enemy losses were twenty one NVA KIA confirmed one NVA PW apprehended, thirty individual weapons and four crew served weapons recovered. Detainee and weapons held by the 1/5 S-2.

(17) At 2244H, vicinity YD 772206, platoon sized ambush position of H/2/5 received one incoming chi com grenade. Unit returned fire with small arms and M79 fire. Area searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC WIA Medevacs.

x. 23 February 68 - First Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southeast sector of Hue City. 2/5(-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Phu Cam River; 1/5 continued its attack in the northern sector of the city in conjunction with ARVN forces. At 1800H, 1/5 consolidated and established night defensive positions within its assigned Zone of Action in North Hue. This action marked the termination of First Marines offensive operations in the old Citadel area. 1/5 assumed the mission of maintaining security against NVA counterattack/infiltration within its assigned area of operation, continuing the attack with supporting arms against the western/south western portions of the zone not previously cleared, in accordance with CG Task Force X-Ray Frag Order 4-68 and 1st Marines Frag Order 30-68.

(1) At 0745H, vicinity YD 785226, a platoon from B/1/1 observed six NVA across the river at YD 785227. The NVA were moving east, carrying two large weapons of unknown type. Unit engaged the enemy with small arms fire resulting in two NVA KIA confirmed.

(2) At 0930H, vicinity YD 759207, a platoon patrol from G/2/5 received 3 rounds 60mm mortar and small arms fire from unknown size enemy force at YD 755207. Unit returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Area searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, four USMC WIA Medevacs and one USMC WIA Minor.

(3) At 0945H, vicinity YD 764223, a tank from company A, 1st Tank Battalion, in support of L/3/5 received direct hit from B40 rocket round from unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC WIA Minor.

(4) At 1015H, vicinity YD 762226, a tank in support of L/3/5 received hits from unknown number of B40 rockets from enemy located at YD 759223 and YD 759229. Results three USMC WIA Medevacs.
(5) At 1016H, vicinity YD 763228, Tank that had been hit at 1015H, received hits from three more B40 rockets. L/3/5 returned fire with small arms and mortars to cover withdrawal of tank. Results, one USMC KIA, six USMC WIA Medevac and five USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.

(6) At 1020H, vicinity YD 762228, A/1/5 received 3 82mm mortar rounds from enemy position inside the palace wall. Unit continued mission. Results, four USMC WIA Medevac, one USMC WIA Minor.

(7) At 1030H, vicinity YD 761208, platoon patrol from G/2/5 received 2 B40 rockets from enemy positions at YD 762205, Unit returned fire with 20 rounds 81mm HE and continued mission. Results, four USMC WIA Medevac; enemy casualties unknown.

(8) At 1445H, vicinity YD 769202 H/2/5 received 4 60mm mortars rounds 3 B40 rockets small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy positions at YD 770209, and YD 767202. Unit deployed, returned fire and continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(9) At 1500H, vicinity YD 787226, B/1/1 received 18 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 785228. Unit returned fire with 18 rounds 60mm mortar and 19 rounds 81mm mortar fire. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

y. 24 February 68 - First Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of Hue City, 2/5(-) continued search and destroy missions in assigned AO north of the Phu Cam River, and 1/5 continued its missions in north Hue. Maintaining security against NVA counterattack/infiltration and continuing the attack with supporting arms against the western/southwestern positions of the zone of action not previously cleared. Contact remained light to moderate throughout the day.

(1) At 0736H, vicinity YD 774183, companies G and H conducting coordinated search and destroy operation, received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 751193. Units returned fire with 12 rounds 105mm HE on enemy position and continued mission. Results, three USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 0800H vicinity at YD 774183, H/2/5 received 6 rounds 60mm mortars and 100 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 751194. Unit returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons and 12 rounds 155mm HE. Results, eight USMC WIA Medevac, and six USMC WIA Minor. Enemy casualties unknown.
(3) At 0846H, vicinity at YD 774227, scout snipers attached to B/1/1 observed one NVA at YD 790232. Sniper fired 2 rounds from R-700, resulting in one NVA KIA confirmed.

(4) At 1000H, vicinity YD 761195, corpsman attached to the 2/5(-) command group detonated an unknown type explosive device. Results, one USN WIA Medevac.

(5) At 1015H, vicinity YD 783221, while conducting search and destroy operation B/1/1 discovered one NVA KIA confirmed, and recovered one B40 rocket launcher, 3 B40 rocket rounds, 3 boosters and 2 chi com grenades. All items were returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(6) At 1030H, vicinity YD 759227, 1/5 command group received one enemy mortar round of unknown size from unknown enemy position. Results, one USMC WIA Minor.

(7) At 1123H, vicinity YD 779204, two PC's being utilized by 2/5(-) for medevac purposes detonated a mine of unknown size. Engineer sweep team was dispatched to sweep road and discovered 5 additional box mines. Results, four USMC WIA Medevacs.

(8) At 1145H, vicinity YD 762226, while conducting search and destroy operation L/3/5 discovered three NVA KIA, determined to be the result of H and I fires during the night of 23 - 24 February, Unit also recovered 15 chi com grenades which were returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(9) At 1154H, vicinity YD 761195 artillery FO with the 2/5(-) command group observed an enemy OP bunker at YD 756194. FO called fire mission of 12 rounds 8 inch and 12 rounds 155mm HE. Six NVA were observed running from the bunker and were engaged with small arms fire. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(10) At 1300H, vicinity YD 759225, L/3/5 conducting search and destroy operation discovered the bodies of fourteen NVA KIA confirmed. Unit continued mission.

(11) At 1330H, vicinity YD 761192, platoon from H/2/5 conducting search and destroy operation, received 250 rounds small arms and automatic weapons, fire from enemy position at YD 759192. Unit returned fire immediately with 500 rounds small arms fire, 6 rounds 90mm and 20 rounds 81mm mortar fire. Search of area revealed negative evidence of enemy casualties.
(12) At 1500H, vicinity YD 760192, platoon from F/2/5 received 100 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 764190. Unit returned fire immediately with 300 rounds small arms fire, 20 rounds 81mm HE and 10 rounds 106mm fire from recoilless rifle. Results, four NVA KIA confirmed and unit recovered one AK 47 which was forwarded to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(13) At 1530H, vicinity YD 764190, F/2/5 observed one enemy sniper at YD 759193. Unit fired 5 rounds small arms fire and continued mission. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(14) At 1622H, vicinity YD 762192, H/2/5 received 10 rounds 82mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Unit could not determine enemy position and no counter mortar fire was conducted. Results, three USMC WIA Medevac.

(15) At 1730H, vicinity YD 764223, elements of D/1/5 observed one NVA attempting to sneak around moat at the same coordinates. Unit fired one burst of automatic weapons fire, killing the NVA. Search of area produced one SKS rifle that the NVA was carrying and also one 50 caliber machine gun that was in the area. Weapons forwarded to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(16) At 1800H, vicinity YD 760227, L/3/5 conducting search and destroy operation discovered eight NVA KIA confirmed, the result of previous action. Unit continued mission.

(17) At 2130H, ARVN forces in North Hue reported to company A/1/5 that while conducting search of Palace Grounds from YD 785220 to YD 762222 they discovered the graves of 140 NVA KIA and indicated the NVA had been killed by air strikes and artillery. Location of Graves verified and 140 NVA KIA confirmed added to First Marines cumulative totals.

(18) At 2210H, vicinity YD 774226, B/1/1 received 4 B40 rockets from enemy located at YD 777228. Unit returned fire with 200 rounds small arms fire, 6 rounds M79 10 rounds 60mm mortar and 12 rounds 81mm mortar fire, area searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac and one USMC WIA Minor.

25 February 68 - First Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-) continuing security missions and search and destroy operations in the southern sector of operations in the southern sector of the city; 2/5(-) continued search and destroy operations in assigned AO south of the Phu Cam River; 1/5 continued its mission in North Hue maintaining security against NVA counterattack/infiltration within its assigned zone of action. Reports received from the 1st ARVN Division.
indicated that the northern sector of Hue City was returned to GVN control with the arrival of VN Marines at the southwestern wall of the citadel at 0500H.

(1) At 0532H, vicinity YD 768193 a squad sized listening post from F/2/5 received one 60mm rocket round from an unknown enemy position. No fire returned as unit could not determine the enemy position. Results, one USMC KIA and three USMC WIA Medevac.

(2) At 0600H, an ontos from AT Company 1st Tank Battalion, in support of ARVN/USMC operations in northern Hue, prepped an enemy bunker complex with 2 rounds 106mm fire at YD 752216. While reloading the ontos crew received 2 sniper rounds from enemy in the same area. Fire was returned immediately and the area searched. Negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, two USMC KIA.

(3) At 1111H, vicinity YD 762204, elements of H/2/5 discovered one NVA KIA confirmed in a camouflaged fighting hole and recovered one AK 47. Weapon returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(4) At 1212H, vicinity YD 761192, elements of H/2/5 discovered seven NVA KIA confirmed and recovered two AK 47's. Weapons forwarded to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(5) At 1307H, vicinity YD 754188 G/2/5 received 18 81mm mortar rounds from enemy position at YD 751187. Unit fired counter mortar mission of 20 rounds 81mm HE and searched area. Results, eight USMC WIA Medevac and three NVA KIA confirmed.

(6) At 1430H, vicinity YD 764185, H/2/5 received a heavy volume of small arms fire from enemy located at YD 764103. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms fire, and 6 rounds 90mm. Results, four NVA KIA confirmed and one AK 47 recovered. Weapon returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(7) At 1443H, vicinity YD 754194, F/2/5 received approximately 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 754195. Unit returned fire with 1000 rounds small arms fire, 40 rounds 60mm mortar fire and continued search and destroy mission. Results, ten USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(8) At 1845H, vicinity YD 758194, elements of G/2/5 discovered one NVA and apprehended same. Detainee delivered to 1st Marine Forward S-2.
26 February 68 - First Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-), continuing security missions and search and destroy operations within the southern sector of the Hue City; additionally commencing 0930H, 69 troops from company B/1/1(-) were helilifted to the Col Co/Tan Ky complex to relieve elements of 3d Shore Party Battalion of security responsibilities of the area; lift was completed at 1115H, 2/5(-) continued search and destroy operation in assigned AO south of the Huong Cam River, commencing at 1225H, 1/5 was shuttled from North Hue YD 767224 to South Hue YD 773223 by LCN-8 in preparation for further operations south of the Song Hoang River. Move was completed at 1515H, commencing at 2045H, elements of 1/5 provided security for MEB units repairing the railroad bridge at YD 749213 in accordance with CG Task Force X-Ray Frag Order 8-68.

(1) At 0833H, while conducting attack on objective at YD 755195, companies F and G 2/5 received 13 rounds 82mm mortar fire from enemy position at YD 758198. Units returned fire with 1000 rounds small arms fire, 60mm and 81mm mortars, and continued the attack. Results, two USMC KIA, and three USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) At 1013H, while conducting search and destroy operation at YD 754192, F/2/5 received approximately 250 rounds small arm fire and 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy located at YD 754194. Unit returned fire with 750 rounds small arms fire, 40 rounds naval gun fire and 20 rounds 155HE. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac and twelve NVA KIA confirmed. Unit recovered one B40 rocket launcher, one AK 47, one M1 and 2 B40 rocket rounds. Items were returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(3) At 1035H, vicinity YD 758195, G/2/5 received 100 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 757194. Unit returned fire with 250 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac and one NVA KIA confirmed.

(4) At 1215H, while conducting search and destroy operation vicinity YD 765229, H/1/5 was informed by ARVN units of NVA in the same area. A reinforced squad patrol was dispatched to the suspected enemy position and succeeded in locating NVA elements in a hole next to the Citadel wall. Unit engaged the enemy with small arms and M79 fire and hand grenades. Results, seven NVA KIA confirmed. Unit also recovered one LAW, and miscellaneous pieces of individual equipment. Items returned to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

(5) At 1535H, vicinity YD 758206, H/2/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 757198. Unit returned fire with 150 rounds small arms and 20 rounds M79. Results, two NVA KIA confirmed.
(6) At 1553H, while conducting search and destroy vicinity YD 753191, F/2/5 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire and 150 rounds small arms fire. Unit returned fire with 400 rounds small arms fire and 30 rounds 81mm HE. Results, four USMC WIA Medevac and four NVA KIA confirmed. Unit recovered one carbine and one 45 cal pistol which were returned to the 1st Marines forward S-2.

(7) At 1620H, while conducting attack on objective at YD 759197, H/2/5 received 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire and heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy located at YD 756197. Unit returned enemy fire immediately and requested an aerial observer and close air support. AO responded and controlled four flights of fixed wing in which on total of 26 250 lb GP bombs and 8 500 lb napalm bombs were dropped. Results of action, five USMC KIA, five USMC WIA Medevac and twenty one NVA KIA confirmed. Unit also found two machine guns, two 60mm mortars, and two 57mm Recoilless rifles. These items had been destroyed and were not added to 1st Marines cumulative totals.

bb. 27 February 68 - 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City. Commencing at 0700H 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducted a 2 battalion search and destroy operation south of the Phu Cam River with 1/5 and 2/5(-) searching for and destroying enemy forces, weapons and logistic caches within assigned AO. 1st Marines Frag Order 34-68 refers. Additionally, commencing at 0700H, 1/1(-) having been relieved in place at key positions by VN Marines, maintained security of the vital bridge at YD 781209, LSA/LZ at YD 774226, the LCU Ramp at YD 774226 and maintained a company blocking position in assigned AO in accordance with 1st Marines Frag Order 34-68.

(1) At 0200H, while in night defensive position at YD 768210, A/1/1 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy at YD 779210. Unit returned fire with 50 rounds small arms fire. Area searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC WIA minor.

(2) At 0240H, while in a night defensive perimeter at YD 751194, F/2/5 received one 82mm mortar round from unknown enemy location. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac.

(3) Between 0815H and 0945H while conducting a coordinated battalion search and destroy operation in the vicinity YD 756195, 2/5(-) requested close air support to neutralize suspected enemy position containing mortars, automatic weapons and recoilless rifles at YD 755199 and YD 744196. Aerial observer (Benchmark 22) controlled two sorties of F-4's (Rainneck 104) dropping 6 500 pound napalm bombs, 10 250 pound GP bombs and one sortie of F-8's (Hellborn 323) dropping 5 500 pound napalm
bombs, 10 250 pound GP bombs and strafing with 20mm cannon. 2/5(-) units searched area and found two NVA KIA confirmed and fifteen structures totally destroyed. Condition of area indicated that the enemy had withdrawn rapidly prior to the air strike.

(4) At 1000H, vicinity YD 755196, elements of F/2/5 discovered two NVA KIA confirmed, results of artillery fire.

(5) At 1015H, vicinity YD 764202, elements of D/1/5 discovered one 50 caliber machine gun, two 30 caliber machine guns, one BAR and one M1. Weapons were turned in to the 1st Marines Forward, S-2.

(6) At 1020H, vicinity YD 756197, H/2/5 discovered six additional NVA KIA confirmed.

(7) At 1030H, vicinity YD 753197 elements of G/2/5 discovered graves containing twelve NVA KIA, confirmed.

(8) At 1050H, while conducting search and destroy operation vicinity YD 767205, elements of L/5 discovered two NVA KIA confirmed.

(9) At 1130H, vicinity YD 773204 while conducting search and destroy, B/1/1 discovered one SKS rifle, one cartridge belt, one bayonet, four carbine magazines. Items were turned in to 1st Marines S-2.

(10) At 1300H, while conducting search and destroy at YD 745187 H/2/5 engaged an unknown size enemy force at close range. Unit fired small arms, automatic weapons, 81mm mortars and artillery in attempt to prevent enemy withdrawal to the south. Results, two USMC KIA, seven USMC WIA Medevac, and two NVA KIA confirmed.

(11) At 1500H, vicinity YD 780211, scout sniper attached to A/1/1 observed one NVA moving across rice paddy at YD 780211. Sniper fired 1 round from R-700 resulting in one NVA KIA confirmed. Thirty minutes later, two additional NVA were observed by the sniper attempting to retrieve the body. Sniper fired 1 round from R-700 killing another NVA.

(12) At 1500H, aerial observer in support of First Marines (-) (Rein) observed fifteen NVA running north at YD 744187. Elements of H/2/5 conducting search and destroy at YD 744206 attacked south and engaged the enemy with small arms and automatic weapon fire. Results, four USMC WIA Medevac. Negative evidence of enemy casualties.

(13) At 1555H, while conducting search and destroy at YD 761199 L/3/5 discovered three NVA KIA confirmed and recovered two carbines, two
(1) At 0900, while conducting search and destroy at YD 787214, A/1/1 received 100 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy position at YD 789208. Unit returned fire with 300 rounds small arms fire, 4 rounds 90mm, 6 rounds 60mm and 10 rounds 81mm HE. Results, three USMC Medevac and three NVA KIA confirmed.

(2) At 1000H, vicinity YD 776235, L/3/5 received 12 rounds 60mm and 15 rounds sniper fire from unknown enemy position. No fire returned, unit continued mission. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac.
(3) At 1020H, vicinity YD 786222, B/1/1 observed approximately twenty NVA moving at YD 787224. Unit opened fire with 300 rounds small arms fire and 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire. One 60mm mortar round caused a secondary explosion. Search of area revealed four NVA KIA confirmed.

(4) At 1100H, while conducting road clearing operation vicinity YD 776239, L/3/5 received two B40 rocket rounds, four 60mm mortar rounds and 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 775240. Unit returned fire with 3 rounds 90mm and searched area. Results, three NVA KIA confirmed.

(5) At 1300H, C/1/5 was setting in a defensive position at YD 786230. As two mule mounted 106 recoiless rifles were moving into position RPG rockets hit both and the company received 200 rounds small arms fire from enemy located at YD 788224. Unit returned fire with 20 rounds 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. Enemy broke contact. Search of area revealed negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, one USMC KIA and two USMC WIA Medevac.

(6) At 1500H, vicinity YD 779239, L/3/5 observed three NVA at YD 780241, and took the enemy under fire with 3 laaws, 50 rounds small arms fire, 10 rounds M79 and 150 rounds machine gun fire. Results, two NVA KIA confirmed.

(7) At 1715H, while conducting search and destroy at YD 796223, A/1/1 observed two NVA in the open at YD 798223. Unit opened fire with 200 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, killing both. Two NVA KIA confirmed.

(8) At 1900H, vicinity YD 777241, L/3/5 received one B40 rocket round from enemy position at YD 777243. Unit adjusted artillery mission on the suspected enemy position. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.

dd. 29 February 68 = 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-), 2/5(-) and 1/5 continuing search and destroy operations in assigned AO north of the Song Van huong to locate and destroy enemy forces, logistic and weapons caches and return control of the area to GVN in accordance with CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 9-68 (with change one) contact remained light in all areas.

(1) At 0600H, while conducting search and destroy operation vicinity YD 787228, C/1/5 received 20 rounds sniper fire from enemy across river at YD 788228. Unit returned fire with 300 rounds small arms fire, 15 rounds 60mm and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Results, three USMC WIA Medevac. Enemy casualties unknown.
(2) At 0630, vicinity YD 777242, L/3/5 observed four NVA digging fighting holes in close proximity to each other at YD 777243. Unit opened fire with 20 rounds small arms fire, killing the four NVA. Unit also recovered.

(3) At 1000H, vicinity YD 777241, scout sniper attached to L/3/5 observed three NVA with weapons running toward tree line at YD 778224. Sniper fired 5 rounds from R-700 killing one NVA. Surveillance of body maintained for possible movement of additional enemy in area. No further contact.

(4) At 1530H, vicinity YD 786248, F/2/5 received 25 rounds small arms fire from enemy position at YD 787239. Unit returned fire immediately with 150 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and swept area. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac and one NVA KIA confirmed.

(5) At 1850H, vicinity YD 800244, F/2/5 received 10 rounds sniper fire from enemy position at YD 803246. Unit returned fire immediately with 40 rounds small arms and searched area. Results, one NVA KIA confirmed.

(6) At 1945H, 1/5 completed day long battalion search and destroy operation in the vicinity of YD 777242. The battalion had encountered 20-25 NVA operating as a delaying unit in an area containing intensive trench lines and concealed fighting positions. Results of action, ten NVA KIA confirmed, and blood trails found indicating additional enemy casualties. Units recovered one AK 47, one M3 machine gun and two mile loads of assorted ammunition. Items returned to 1st Marines Forward S-2.

End Report.

(1) At 1700H, while conducting search and destroy operation at YD 796246, L/3/5 requested air strikes to neutralize enemy bunkers, emplacements, structures and trench lines at YD 805248. TAC (A) (TRAIL 31) controlled one flight of 2 A-4's delivering 4 500 GP bombs. Ordnance was 100% on target, 100% target coverage. Results, twenty NVA KIA confirmed.
At 2000H, 1/5 completed search and destroy operation in area bounded by YD 773250, YD 803250, YD 804246, and YD 774240. The battalion made initial contact at 1230H, encountering 25-30 NVA with automatic weapons at YD 801251. Units deployed and returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons mortar and artillery fire and air strikes. Results, action, five five USMC KIA, eighteen USMC WIA Medevac, three USMC WIA Minor, eight NVA KIA confirmed and seven individual weapons were recovered. Weapons were turned in to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.

ff. 02 March 68 - 1st Marines (-) (Rein) continued operation Hue City with 1/1(-), 2/5(-) and 1/5 continuing search and destroy operations in assigned AO north of the Song Van Dung to locate and destroy enemy forces, logistic and weapons caches and restore control of the area to the GVN in accordance with CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 9-68 and 1st Marines Operation Order 3-68 (with change one). Throughout the day plans were developed for the execution of CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 11-68 and at 2400H, Operation Hue City was officially terminated in accordance with CG Task Force XRay Frag Order 11-68.

(1) At 0135H, vicinity YD 759209, elements of H and S company 2/5 in night defensive position received one incoming mortar round of unknown type from unknown enemy position. No action taken. Results, two USMC WIA Medevac.

(2) At 1030H, while conducting search and destroy at YD 786228 F/2/5 received 10 M79 rounds, 2 B40 rockets, and 150 rounds small arms fire from enemy positions at YD 788230. Unit returned fire immediately with 300 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 15 rounds 60mm mortar fire, and swept the area. Resulting one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA Medevac, 5 USMC WIA Minor and three NVA KIA confirmed.

(3) At 1530H, while conducting search and destroy vicinity YD 801246, F/2/5 received 200 small arms and automatic weapons fire and 4 B40 rocket rounds from enemy positions at YD 802246. Unit returned fire immediately with 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire, 10 rounds 60mm mortar fire and 20 rounds 81mm HE. Area was searched with negative evidence of enemy casualties. Results, 2 USMC WIA Medevac, 1 USMC WIA Minor.

(4) At 1530H, vicinity YD 801246, F/2/5 received 150 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire and 4 B40 rockets from enemy positions in the same area. Unit returned fire with 300 rounds small arms 10 rounds, 60mm HE, 10 rounds 81mm HE and 20 rounds 81mm WP. Results, 1 USMC WIA Medevac, 6 NVA KIA.

(5) At 1600H, vicinity YD 805247, L/3/5 observed eight NVA moving east at YD 804246. Unit fired approximately 2500 rounds small arms fire, 20 rounds 60mm and 20 rounds 81mm HE, and searched area. Results, one USMC WIA Medevac and seven NVA KIA confirmed. Unit also recovered four individual weapons which were turned in to the 1st Marines Forward S-2.
12. Results:
   a. USMC KIA 137
   b. USMC WIA MEDEVAC 659
   c. USMC WIA MINOR 220
   d. NVA KIA (C) 1889
   e. Prisoners of War 9
   f. Detainees 42
   g. Individual Weapons Captured 536
   h. Crew Served Weapons Captured 54

13. Administrative Matters:
   a. Casualty Reporting. One significant problem encountered was the separation of service records from the administrative headquarters. Service records were located at Quang Tri, while casualty reporting section was at Phu Bai. Difficulty involved getting KIA's evacuated due to fact that service records must be present. There was a 5 to 7 day delay on outset of operation. The use of personnel on a temporary duty basis at major points of hospitalisation to report casualties to parent units was again very successful. System is sound and no insurmountable problems arose.

   b. Replacements. Due to reduced availability of aircraft, delay in personnel arriving from DaNang was experienced. This, however, was overcome by special helicopter flights to bring replacements to Phu Bai for both 1st Marines and other units located in the Phu Bai area. The use of helicopters proved to be very valuable.

   c. Awards. A contact team from Division awards section was present to assist units in preparation of award recommendations. This service was of great assistance and is recommended for any such future operations.

   d. Communications. Communications for Operation HUE CITY were initially quite austere, providing only for essential tactical radio, wire, and radio relay communications to senior and supporting headquarters at Phu Bai. Shortly after the arrival of the Regimental Command Group in Hue, the supporting arms sections displaced from Phu Bai to Hue, and communications were greatly expanded to include a complete radio, wire, radio relay, and teletypewriter capability.

   (i) Radio. The full spectrum of radio communications was employed, including FM, AM Single Side Band, and AM Ultra High Frequency. Further, the KL-8 secure speech capability was extensively utilised.
between Regiment and Battalion headquarters to pass classified orders, reports, and commanders estimates.

(2) Wire and Radio Relay. Wire communications were used rather extensively within Hue City by the Regimental Headquarters, linking the battalions, support areas, and attached units to the Regimental switchboard. During the earlier phases of the operation, maintaining wire lines outside the Regimental CP proved difficult due to wire line damage from hostile fire, and both friendly and enemy cutting of wirelengths. Radio relay provided the means of telephone and teletype communication to Phu Bai for the duration of the operation, and also was utilized to battalions until wirelines could be maintained on a positive basis. In addition to organic communications, a telephone line from the Defense Communication System (DCS) Hue Switchboard was installed to the Regimental COC.

(3) Teletype. As the operation progressed and grew in scope, a teletype cryptographically secured capability was required and installed from the regiment's tactical headquarters in Hue to Task Force XRay in Phu Bai. This circuit was utilized only for operational, intelligence, and logistics type traffic having to do with the operation, and proved invaluable as the orders and reports increased in scope and number.

(4) Communication Equipment Maintenance. The Regimental Headquarters established a limited maintenance facility at Hue to provide essential support for the entire Regiment. Over thirty AN/PRC-25 Radio Sets were repaired and returned to the field, primarily by a selective interchange of parts from those radios that had become combat casualties. During the time when the regiment was isolated except for occasional emergency resupply, this facility proved invaluable. Limitations were imposed by the non availability of tape antennas, antenna bases, and certain modules for the AN/PRC-25.

(5) Problem Areas. Extreme difficulties were experienced at times in maintaining radio communications due to frequency interference. For the most part, this condition was noted upon a change of operating frequency directed by higher headquarters, which in turn was due to frequency allocation to accommodate additional U. S. Forces entering the area of operations. However, as a lesson learned, it is recommended that no radio frequency changes be implemented during the conduct of a major operation, except when specifically requested by the operating unit.

e. Supply.

(1) Resupply. Resupply during Operation Hue City was accomplished
by the use of nearly all types of transportation. During the period 31 January and 3 February 1968, the majority of resupply was by helicopter. Commencing with the convoy which carried 1st Marines and 2/5 Command Groups to Hue, supplies were carried by truck convoy until Highway 1 was closed on 4 February by the destruction of the An Tu bridge that afternoon. For the period 5 - 12 February, the bulk of the resupply was carried by LCU's and LCM-8's from DaNang and Col Co. With the reopening of Highway 1 on 12 February, truck convoys from Phu Bai again became the main resupply method though some items which were NIS in Phu Bai were still sent by barge from DaNang. Helicopters were used throughout this period to transport critical items. Initially a logistical support area was established in the Thua Thien District Headquarters compound which is adjacent to the MACV Compound. All classes of supply were staged in this compound. With the arrival of Shore Party personnel on 17 February, the LSA was moved to the Tu Do Soccer Stadium. The running of this LSA was taken over by FLSG "A" on 22 February.

(a) Class I

1 MCI - Sufficient MCI were brought into the LSA with the convoy on 3 Feb to sustain the forces involved for two days. On 5 February an LCU arrived at the Hue LCU ramp with enough MCI to last until 16 February. With the reopening of Highway 1 on 13 February, rations were brought in either by road convoys or boat, depending upon which was the easiest.

2 Water - Two full water trailers were brought in by motor convoy on 4 February. After the potable water in the trailers was consumed, it was necessary to rely on river or well water purified by helizone. On 16 February, a water purification unit was established on the Perfume river next to the LZ. This was moved to the stadium on the 20th and remained there for the duration of the operation.

(b) Class II

1 Sufficient quantities of Class II items were usually on hand to support the operation. Gas masks were the only critical item and remained in short supply throughout the operation.

(c) Class III

1 Diesel - Diesel fuel was required for the tanks and multifuel trucks we had in support of us. It was initially brought from
I hu Bai in 55 gal drums by barge and truck. About 6 February the Navy brought in a LCM-8 with a 10,000 gal bladder of diesel and beached it at the LCB ramp for our use.

2 Argus - Argus was obtained from the Navy. Empty 55 gal drums were put aboard LCM-8's at the ramp and would be filled at Col Co and returned to the Hue ramp.

(d) Class IV

Initially what little fortification materials (sand bags) that were required were borrowed from MACV supply. When the LSA was established by FLSG A”, Class IV was ordered through them.

(e) Class V

Due to the type of fighting involved in the built up area, certain items of Class V were expended at about 10 times the normal rate of expenditure. Selected examples of ammunition expended during the operation include: 20,500 rounds 81mm HE, 2500 rounds 60mm Illumination, 19,457 rounds 60mm HE, 4284 rounds of 90mm, 4104 rounds of 106mm HEAT and HEP, 549,000 rounds of 7.62mm link and 1,054,000 rounds of 5.56mm ball.

2 Two LCU's with assorted quantities of Class V items arrived from DaNang on 5 and 8 February, exclusively for the 1st Marines. Subsequent to 8 February, regular resupply boats began arriving for FLSG A. Needed items of Class V were siphoned off at Hue LCU ramp. Those items not available from these boats were requested from the ADP at Phu Bai. Some items of Class V such as 60mm W.P., 81mm HE, and certain types of 90mm were at times in short supply but normally items which were NIS in Phu Bai could be brought in from DaNang within 48 hours. An exception to this was M-26 frag grenades which were in extremely short supply until the last week of the operation.

(2) Evacuation and Hospitalization

(a) An LZ was established on the south bank of the Perfume River just west of the LCU ramp. Medevacs from 1st Marines, 1st Bn 1st Marines and 2nd Bn, 5th Marines were lifted out from this zone. Wounded were trucked from the front lines to the aid station at the MACV compound, treated and then delivered to the LZ for evacuation to Phu Bai. This same procedure was followed when the LZ was moved to the stadium.

(b) Medevacs from 1st Bn, 5th Marines were processed through
their RAS and then evacuated from an LZ located near the 1st ARVN Div Headquarters. Later, when 1st Bn 5th Marines had cleared the north bank of the Perfume River across from the LCU ramp, some casualties were brought across the river by LCM-6 and processed through the RAS and evacuated via the stadium LZ.

(3) Transportation,

(a) After the afternoon convoy on 4 February arrived in Hue and the bridge was blown, it was necessary to leave the trucks in Hue until the bridge was repaired. These trucks were a real asset as they were used in delivering ammo to forward positions, displacing CP's and 81mm firing positions, returning medevac from front lines to the aid station and hauling supplies from the HUE ramp to the ARVN compound.

(b) After 1/5 went across the river and their resupply was largely dependent on LCM-6's, the trucks were more valuable as the most practicable means of supplying 1/5 was to load trucks with gear, drive them on boats at the LCU ramp and drive them off at the Old Hue City ramp.

(c) 1/4 and 3/4 ton vehicles were at a premium as not enough of these smaller vehicles were brought into the city initially. The MACV advisory team and CORDS were helpful in allowing us to utilize their 1/4 ton vehicles until more of our organic transportation arrived in the city.

(4) Services,

(a) NSA Detachment (LCU ramp and Col Co beach) - The Navy was extremely helpful in many aspects. They provided forklifts upon request, made all their assets at the LCU ramp available to us and, of course, provided the necessary boat transportation between their ramp and the Old Hue City ramp in order to resupply 1/5.

(b) Engineer - On 16 February the engineers established a water point which alleviated the need to purify river or well water.

(c) Shore Party - On or about 7 February a request was made to Task Force XRay for a SP platoon to assist in operating the LSA. We received an HAT consisting of 5 men which was not sufficient to handle the job. The lack of sufficient personnel to operate the LSA properly was one of the biggest deficiencies of the entire operation. The T/O of the regimental S-4 woefully lacks the personnel to handle the tasks required in an operation of this nature. When sufficient shore party personnel did take over the running of the LSA under the directions of the great improvement in both service and accountability.
(1) Evacuation and Care of the Wounded System.

(a) The medical support for operation Hue City was entirely dependent upon the routine medical evacuation procedure initially, but within a few days the need for a forward medical facility became grossly apparent. This was necessitated by (1) inclement weather and thus markedly poor flying conditions, and (2) the nature of the tactical situation with primarily street and house to house fighting and consequently few available and suitable landing zones.

(b) The following system was then established. Each battalion with the exception of 1/1, established well stacked forward aid stations attended by the battalion surgeon. These served the purpose of immediate emergency care for all casualties, and each aid station established a holding ward for those patients who would be able to return to duty 24-48 hours after treatment, thus conserving critically needed man power.

(c) A forward Regimental aid station was then established at the MAU team III Dispensary by the Regimental surgeon and a team of 8 medical officer and his medics. The function of the Forward Regimental aid station was to (1) provide definitive emergency care and resuscitation of casualties, (2) Provide control and coordination of all casualty evacuation (3) provide a clearing house for the KIA's in order to establish definite identification as soon as possible so that difficulty with the same would not arise later, and to (4) serve as the Battalion aid station forward for 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. A holding ward for patients who would return to duty within 24-48 hours was established at the regimental aid station forward. The capability of the Regimental aid station forward consisted of definitive shock and resuscitation (use of IV fluids, administration of blood and emergency drugs) and a limited major surgery capability (closed tube thoracostomies, tracheostomies, in one instance a limited craniotomy in order to relieve intracranial pressure, amputations when deemed necessary, fasciotomies, removal of foreign bodies and projectiles, in one instance removal of a B40 rocket fuse, and etc., in addition to wound care, administration of antibiotics and routine sick call.

(d) A holding ward for routine and low priority casualties ready for evacuation and who were stable was established at the Hue University in close proximity to the designated LZ and later at the Hue stadium in the immediate area of the designated LZ. This ward was under the constant care and supervision of experienced corpsmen and was frequently visited and attended by the Regimental surgeon. The casualties held at this holding ward consisted of those that could be held for 12-24 hours.
hour prior to evacuation if this was necessary because of inclement weather.

(e) The forward battalion aid stations were relatively mobile and always within 2-3 minutes transit time via vehicle from the site of battle. All high priority and emergency medevac's, in addition to other difficult problems, were sent directly from the forward battalion aid stations to the forward Regimental aid station for definitive emergency care. All of the latter casualties were maintained at the forward regimental aid station under the constant care and vigilance of the regimental surgeon, until the required medevac helicopter was airborne and on the way. It was only then that they were moved to the designated LZ. The transit time from the forward Battalion aid stations to the forward Regimental aid station was 3-5 minutes via vehicle and the transit time from the regimental forward aid station to the designated LZ was 2-3 minutes via vehicle. Emergency medevacs were classified into 2 groups, the classification being necessitated by extremely bad weather conditions and helicopter availability:

1 Emergency Medevac (Class I) - Those casualties having wounds putting them into the emergency group, who, after definitive emergency care at the forward Regimental aid station, become stable and could be held at that position under care for 12-24 hours without danger to life, limb, or further complication. This was referred to as a emergency Medevac, weather permitting.

2 Emergency Medevac (Class II) - Those casualties having wounds putting them into the emergency groups who had such wounds (such as ruptured opleen, etc) that, after definitive emergency care and maintenance at the forward Regimental Aid Station, required immediate medevac and definitive surgery in order to prevent loss of life, limb, and undue complications. Constant liaison was maintained with the Regimental Air Officer, and the specific details and needs made known to him and relayed by him to the Marine helicopter squadron. Army helicopters did assist in the evacuation of the wounded of the routine, priority, and emergency Class I medevac types, and for this we are truly thankful and appreciative. Marine Helicopters were responsible for the evacuation of casualties of the emergency Class II type, which they accomplished under severe weather conditions, and with great risk to the helicopter crews, often times flying with a 100' ceiling and 0 visibility. When a medevac of the emergency Class II type was made known to the Marine Helicopter squadron they in no instance failed to respond within a matter of minutes regardless of the weather and tactical situation, and are to be complimented for their magnificent support in this matter.

(2) Medical Supply: Routine medical supply was obtained by
the needs being made to the respective S4's and battalion aid stations in the rear. Emergency and high priority medical supplies were provided immediately by the forward regimental aid station as soon as the request was submitted. An adequate stock of emergency and priority combat essential medical supplies was maintained by the forward Regimental aid station.

(3) Results.

(a) On the south side of the Perfume river the results are as follows: Of all the casualties not being killed out right by the nature of their initial wound and arriving alive at the forward battalion aid stations, only 2 died after arrival. These two deaths occurred at the 2/5 forward BAS within several minutes after their arrival there. One of these had a severe GSW of the head and the other had a GSW of the neck with severance of both carotid arteries. Of all the casualties arriving at the forward regimental aid station alive, none died, and all were evacuated in a stable condition. Of all the casualties at the forward aid station there have been only two deaths, both of these occurring 1-2 weeks after hospitalization of unpreventable complication.

(b) There was a short period of time when there was no route by land or water from 1/5's position on the North side of the Perfume River to the South Side of the river and they were solely dependent during this time on Task Force XRay for re-supply and medical. During this time 6 casualties died after emergency care while awaiting helicopter evacuation during severely inimical weather. Of the 6 who died, the 1/5 battalion surgeon states that 4 of these would have died regardless of evacuation because of the nature of their wounds, and of the remaining 2 it is equivocal whether they could have been saved if evacuated rapidly. On the south side of the perfume river none died awaiting evacuation. At no time were essential medical supplies lacking at any position.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. Although the type of combat waged in operation Hue City was not unknown to the Marine Corps, it was certainly different from any type of action conducted previously in Viet Nam. The majority of the officers and staff Non Commissioned officers engaged in the operation had no prior experience in the type of close in, built-up area fighting that prevailed. Necessarily, numerous techniques and tactics to determine the most successful methods, particularly in the area of supporting arms and special equipment, were tried. The following comments are based on the results of employment of various supporting arms available or the utilization of special equipment and/or munitions.

a. E-8 Gas Dispenser. The defensive positions utilized by the occupying NVA forces were well prepared and over-headed for protection from air and artillery; this was particularly evident in the area of the Citadel of Hue. Additionally, due to the closeness of the buildings and the obvious desire to save as many structures from destruction as possible, the advancing forces were very often fighting the NVA from positions too close for air or heavy artillery support. The E-8 Gas
Dispenser was employed in these areas as a means to break strong points or soften enemy positions prior to an assault. Utilizing four to six dispensers on buildings with approximately 100-150 square feet of deck space, generally 2 stories, it was found that the effect of the CS was satisfactory. Although not strong enough to cause a break down of the defenses or rout of the enemy force, the effects were sufficient to disorganize the enemy and allow the assaulting forces to seize the objective with reduced or negative casualties. Buildings which contained few openings to the exterior or which had high solid walls surrounding them were not infiltrated by the CS sufficiently to achieve the desired results when the E-8 was utilized.

b. 4.2 inch mortar CS munition. The effects of the 4.2 CS round were highly successful, more so than the E-8 dispenser. The capability of this round to penetrate the roofs of buildings (the majority were tile) concentrated the full power of the round in the building rather than relying on the infiltration of the CS gas from outside the buildings. Initial use of this munition required a trial and error method in order to determine the number of rounds required to provide a favorable effect on the enemy force occupying the objective building. It was found that a building with a floor plan of approximately 150 square feet was covered adequately by 3 to 4 of the CS rounds. When used in open terrain, in areas with few buildings, but heavy to moderate brush and tree growth, the 4.2 CS round produced excellent results and generally required fewer rounds for adequate target coverage. Interrogation of POW's who had been subjected to the CS round substantiated the evaluation of the effects of the round and indicated that it had a demoralizing effect on the units as a whole.

c. 90mm CP fuzes. Utilization of M48A1 90mm tanks against the concrete block buildings proved relatively ineffective without CP (concrete piercing) fuzes. The CP fuse resulted in excellent penetration and walls were breached with two to four rounds. When fuzes other than CP were used against these buildings penetration was less significant and ricochets were not uncommon.

d. Ontos/106. Although not considered special equipment, the uncertainty of the M50 Ontos in Vietnam is justification for comment here. If any single supporting arm is to be considered more effective than all others, it must be the 106 Recoilless Rifle, especially the M50 Ontos with its mobility and relative degree of security it provides the crew. The Ontos was found to be significantly more effective against the concrete and steel structures in Hue, then most supporting arms were. Firing from ranges of 300-500 meters and utilizing a combination arrived at, by the trial and error method, it was found in most cases, that one HEAT and two HEP-T rounds were sufficient to open 4 square meter holes.
or completely knock out an exterior wall. In many cases the 106 Recoilless Rifle was used on targets in excess of 800–1000 meters with the results as effective as at shorter ranges.

15. Commanders Analysis.

a. Operation Hue City was an unplanned operation evolving from a contact made by a reaction company on entering Hue City 31 January 1968. As the situation in the city continued to develop, it was determined that an extremely large force of NVA, at least two regiments, had occupied the city, and the operation expanded to that of a regiment (minus) with two battalions of two and three companies each. The nature of the terrain and the stubborn "hold at all cost" tactics of the enemy forces introduced a new concept of warfare to the Marines in Vietnam. It took each of the battalions a period of about 24 hours to adjust to these new enemy tactics and determine the most effective method of attack in order to seise their objectives rapidly and with a minimum of friendly casualties. This regiment "Re-discovered" the capability of the 3.5 rocket launcher, realizing the difference in bursting radius and penetrating power when compared with the Law. The M50 Octos and M274 mounted 106 Recoilless Rifle was quickly found to be an effective direct fire weapon against strong building housing a determined enemy unit. Artillery was almost always employed in a "danger close" due to the nature of the fighting, and a distances from front lines to target were often a hundred yards or less. The Marine of the rifle squad soon learned to appreciate the accuracy of artillery and developed confidence in its ability to be utilized close to friendly troops. A similar situation existed with close air support as the Marine also developed confidence in the Marine pilots' capability to hit targets with a minimum of dispersion.

b. The M16 rifle certainly proved its worth in Operation Hue City. There were little or no reports of Malfunctions of this weapon although the weather conditions during the operation were such that rain was frequent and the presence of mud was constant. The M16 functioned almost perfectly under these conditions. It was also found that with the extremely high volume of fire required in this type of operation, the weapons performance improved as the number of rounds expended grew more numerous. At the end of operation Hue City, Marines, almost to the man, were praising their weapon and experiencing no difficulty at all with its functioning.

c. Refugees, although numerous, presented no large problem to this Regiment. Initially refugees were not present in the city, but returned to Hue from the surrounding villages and hamlets only after main areas were secured. Initially there was considerable looking by the refugees (15,000 in south side sector 15 New 40,000 in the entire city), but with
the establishment of controlled refugee centers by the Thua Thien Province Headquarters, refugees were quickly removed from the streets and cared for through GVN channels. Refugees had little or no effect on the development of the tactical situation during this operation. An intensive Paywar effort was made in conjunction with this operation but had little apparent effect on the enemy force. The tenacious fighting and "hold til death" attitude of the occupying NVA forces was not one that was receptive to pay ops, despite the deteriorating situation that worsened every day. Pay Ops directed towards the civilian population was successful and played an important role in the rapid response of the civilians to assist the GVN with information and rebuilding or clean up efforts.

S. S. HUGHES
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)

THRU: Commanding General
101st Airborne Division
APO US Forces 96383

Commanding General
TASK FORCE XRAY
APO US FORCES 96383

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCS-MH
APO US Forces 96222

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation HUE CITY (Search and Destroy Operation)

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 22 February 1968 to 2 March 1968

3. (U) LOCATION: THU THIEN Province

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel John W. Collins III, Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
   a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation HUE CITY was as shown below:

   
   | 2nd Bn 327th Inf | Brigade Control |
   | 2/A/326 Armag |
   | A/326 Armag (-) |
   | Scout Platoon (-) |
   | Avn Sec (-) |
   | MP Platoon (-) |
   | 181 MI Det (-) |
   | 406 RRD |
   | TACP (-) |
   | 20th Cal Det |

   b. Attachments and Detachments:

   (1) Second Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry, OPCON 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division effective 231200H February 1968; released from OPCON 022400H March 1968.

   (2) Second Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry

   (a) Effective 2400H 15 February 1968 assumed OPCON of Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (A), 021200H February 1968.
A VoD-C
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (REG MAC J3-32) (K-1)

(b) Effective 271000H February 1968 assumed OPCON of Long Range Recon Company 101st Airborne Division until 0000H March 1968.

7. (c) SUPPORTING FORCES:
   a. Artillery: See Enclosure 40, Artillery
   b. Aviation: See Enclosure 6, Aviation
   c. Tactical Air Support: US Air Force and US Marine Corps pilots flew 10 tactical fighter missions totaling 19 sorties. All sorties were immediate requests in support of troops in combat. These requests were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request met with an average reaction time of one hour and 17 minutes. This reaction time was considered unsatisfactory. The major reason for the delay was attributed to obtaining GVN political clearance. No preplanned missions were flown. Forward Air Controllers flew 40 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See Enclosure 1, Intelligence

9. (c) MISSION: Conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to establish blocking positions on infiltration/egress routes to the city of Hue to prevent enemy withdrawal of reinforcement of elements in Hue; secure engineer work parties upgrading LZ EL PASO (renamed CAMP EAGLE) and opening road system in AO KOWSKI.

10. (c) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The brigade established a tactical command post and firebase at GIA LE Base Camp. The 2-327 moved by foot from GIA LE Base into the southern portion of AO KOWSKI and commenced S&D operations generally oriented north-northwest. The Long Range Recon Company 101st Abn Div was placed OPCON to the 2-327 Inf on 271000H February 1968 to secure engineer work parties upgrading CAMP EAGLE and opening the road system in AO KOWSKI. The Second Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry was placed under OPCON of the brigade effective 231200H February 1968. The battalion was given the mission to conduct search and destroy operations in AO GRANT to provide tactical security for PHU BAI Base and to continue in-country familiarization. All engineer work was accomplished by 1/326 Engineer Battalion with elements positioned at GIA LE Base Camp and CAMP EAGLE.

11. (c) EXECUTION:
   a. Methods of Operation. The tactics employed by the brigade during operation HUE CITY consisted primarily of saturation patrolling and ambushes.

   (1) Saturation patrolling tactics were employed to offset the inability to develop specific intelligence on the enemy's disposition, strength and methods of operations. It was accomplished by having companies patrol on three or four axes with a platoon size force on each axis. All platoons remained within supporting or reinforcing distance of each other (normally thirty minutes marching time). This allowed large areas to be searched and reduced the enemy's capability to determine the size and direction of the unit operating in his area.

   (2) Ambushes were established to deny the enemy freedom of movement at night. Trails were frequently ambushed when areas were found, lines of drift, such as stream beds and ridgelines, were ambushed.

   b. The Brigade commenced Operation HUE CITY on 22 February as planned. The Second Battalion, 327th Infantry deployed into the southern portion of AO KOWSKI by foot and commenced search and destroy operations. Company A moved northwst, Companies B and C were initially oriented southwest then re-oriented north-northwest. On 22-23 February operations were characterized by engagements with groups of enemy forces ranging in size from three to five personnel.
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (RG5: MAC 0-32) (k-1)

Results during the period were 2 VC KIA (C), 1 WHA (medevac) and 7 detainees.

On 24 February 1968 at O625H Company A vic YD762159 came under enemy mortar attack. Company A maneuvered on suspected enemy locations and made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Elements remained in contact until 1200H at which time the enemy withdrew northwest. Results 1 WHA (medevac), 3 NVA KIA (C), 1 AK-47 captured. During the same period vic YD775185 Company C engaged four NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA (C).

At 241255H vic YD768183 Company B became involved in the operation in most significant contact in terms of enemy losses. It commenced with Company B being subjected to mortar fire, calling artillery on the enemy positions and assaulting. Contact was broken at 1821H. Results 2 US KHA, 14 US WHA and 27 NVA KIA (C).

Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was placed OCPON to Second Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to assist in road clearing operations and place fires Tq CF 2-327 and mini-firebase. This element at 241420H vic YD772176 found a weapons cache consisting of 36 M-1 rifles, 14 BARs five M1919 A6 machine-guns and one .50 Cal machine gun. Weapons were extracted to higher headquarters.

Contact with small enemy groups continued with the brigade employing tactical air, artillery and gunships to support maneuver elements. Weather during the later stages of the operation hampered all types of air support. The enemy frequently employed mortars which accounted for the larger part of friendly casualties.

The Second Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry deployed into AO GRANT on 240800H February 1968, reporting no significant contact with enemy forces and no friendly or enemy losses.

The Long Range Recon Company, 101st Abn Div secured LZ EL PASO (CAMPEAGLE) and engineer work parties. This element made no significant contact with enemy forces. Operation terminated effective 022400H March 1968.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its assigned mission by blocking enemy routes of withdrawal/reinforcement south of the city of HUE.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRIGADE</th>
<th>1-5 Mar</th>
<th>HUE CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed VC/NVA</td>
<td>24/32</td>
<td>0/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners-VC/NVA</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual (Cache)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served (Cache)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The following losses were suffered by the brigade,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA (medevac)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHA (minor)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVBD-C
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)

d. Elements of the USMC OPCON to the Brigade suffered the following casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIA (medevac)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA (minor)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (U) **ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:**

14. (C) **SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:** None

15. (C) **COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:**
   a. Lessons Learned: None
   b. Commanders Notes:

   (1) The brigade experienced numerous difficulties in logistical, aviation and tactical air support. This resulted primarily from differences between US Army and US Marine Corps procedures.

   (2) Weather was at best marginal during Operation HUE CITY, hampering air support.

16. (U) **RECOMMENDATION:**

Differences between service operational and support procedures should be resolved before the start of joint operations.

Inclosures:
1-Intelligence
2-Operation Schematic
3-Personnel and Administration
4-Logistics
5-Civil Affairs
6-Aviation
7-Artillery

JOHN W. COLLINS III
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (C) Operational Intelligence Activities.

   a. Aerial Activities:

   (1) Infra-Red and SIAR: Requests for Infra-Red and Side Looking Airborne Radar coverage were submitted daily by liaison and landline to Task Force X-Ray. Follow up requests were forwarded to III MAF when no readings were obtained. Several Infra-Red missions were flown during the period 22 Feb 68 to 29 Feb 68, but the results were not provided through normal channels. When obtained, they were not timely, and mission number, target numbers, and percentage of coverage data were not provided with the results. This makes the determination of action taken on requests nearly impossible.

   (2) Airborne Personnel Detector: Requests for aircraft to support and AFD mission were submitted daily through aviation and O2 Air channels, however, due to lack of helicopters in the area, this type mission was never flown.

   (3) Visual Reconnaissance: Requests for aircraft to fly Visual Reconnaissance missions were submitted daily, but without any results, therefore it was necessary to rely upon the attached FAC's to support the missions. Visual Recon missions were flown once or twice daily, depending on the weather. However, this arrangement was not completely satisfactory as the FAC's primary mission is to direct air strikes, resulting in frequent diversion from running Visual Reconnaissance.

   (4) Imagery Interpretation: Photo requests were submitted concurrently with other 52 Air requests, but it was difficult to determine what action was being taken. Photo readouts were supplied by TP X-Ray. Results and photography were also provided by 101st MI Det, but coverage was inadequate.

   b. Interrogation of POW's:

   Operation HUE CITY was conducted in a built up area, resulting in many indigenous personnel being detained. Interrogation of these detainees left us with no alternative but to classify them as Innocent Civilians. However, they were all turned over to the National Police for further interrogation and screening.

2. (C) Enemy Losses: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during Operation HUE CITY.

   a. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>1-5 Mar</th>
<th>HUE CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (C) VC/NVA</td>
<td>24/32</td>
<td>0/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA (F) VC/NVA</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW VC/NVA</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body/Wpns Ratio</td>
<td>8.7:1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En/Frd Kill Ratio</td>
<td>10:1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>1-5 Mar</th>
<th>HUE CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual (Cache)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served (Cache)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Weapons by Type

   | BAR | 14 |
   | m-1 Carbine | 4 |
Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (U)

- M-1: 35
- AK 47: 7
- 30 CAL MG: 15
- 50 Cal MG: 1

C. Ammunition:

- Small Arms: 2250
- 57mm RR rounds: 17
- B-40 Rocket rounds: 34
- 82mm rounds: 11

D. Food Stuff:

- Rice: 2 Tons

3. (C) Order of Battle:

a. Operation HUE CITY was conducted with light to moderate contact with squad to platoon size enemy forces. The operation was characterized by frequent mortaring of friendly units in AO KOWSKI.

b. Enemy contacts during the operation primarily consisted of small resistance forces. Although some hastily prepared caches were found, there was no indication that the enemy utilized the area for storage. There were indications that the enemy had utilized the area both as an infiltration and exfiltration route during the conflict in HUE CITY. The only positive unit identification came from a POW who stated he belonged to the C-2 Company, subordinate to the Cong Troumjg 9 Headquarters. Although it is believed that the 9th NVA Regiment participated in the HUE CITY battle, no further contacts in the area justified the prisoner's statement. It is most likely that he had become separated from his unit and was attempting to rejoin it when he was captured.
Inclusion 2 (Operation Schematic) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (U)
Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (U) UNIT STRENGTHS:

   a. Personnel strength reflected below includes HHC, 1st Bde, 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf, and Co A, 326 Engineers.

   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>22 FEB</th>
<th>2 MAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>1092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Area</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDY/SD</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confinement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In transit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. A total of 103 replacements were received by brigade units participating in Operation HUE CITY.

   c. On the final day of Operation HUE CITY the 2/327 had an assigned strength of 609 which is 77% of the authorized strength. When unit strengths reach this level, the operational capability of the unit is seriously affected.

2. (C) CASUALTIES. The following casualties were sustained during Operation HUE CITY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KHA</th>
<th>WHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/2/320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326 Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (U) Concept of Support:

a. General: External logistical support for the brigade was provided by Fleet Logistics Supply Group A, USMC, while operating in the HUE/HU BA1 area. No Forward Support Area (FSA) was provided. Internal logistical support was provided by the Division Support Command Forward Support Element (FSE).

b. Field Trains:

(1) General: All classes of supply and services were provided to the headquarters and maneuver elements by the field trains consisting generally of a FSE from Support Command and the battalion trains employees. The FSE usually provided unit distribution of all classes of supply to the battalion trains who in turn supplied the rifle companies exclusively by air LOC direct from the field trains location.

(2) HHC, 1st Brigade was supplied by FLSG-A thru the FSE. Transportation by road was furnished from PHU BA1 to GIA LE by FLSG-A and Task Force X-Ray. The FSE did not close into PHU BA1 in time to furnish its own transportation.

c. Combat Trains: the 2d Bn (Abn) 327th Inf established a Forward Supply Point (FSP) at its Tactical Command Post. A three day basic load was maintained there.

2. (U) Material and Services:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: Meal, Combat, Individual (MCI) formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. 'A' rations were fed when conditions permitted and "A" rations supplements for "C" rations were issued when available. The primary problem was a lack of transportation from DA NAG to resupply the FLSG-A.

(2) Class II & IV. No class II was issued by FLSG-A to the brigade. Class IV barrier material was issued on an emergency basis only. Class II & IV items became critical. No resupply could be affected by the 101st Airborne Division from either BIEN HOA or PHAN RANG.

(3) Class III: FLSG-A furnished all Class III during the operation. Shortages of MOAS and diesel fuel were experienced due to the lack of transportation to move bulk into the PHU BA1 area.

(4) Class V: The brigade was supplied all Class V items by an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) from NAI QUANG Area Command. This ASP was located one mile north-west of PHU BA1. Critical items at zero balance throughout the operation were Mine, M18A1 (Claymore) and pyrotechnics. Hand grenades were never stocked in sufficient quantities to meet the demand. Other items such as 105mm and 4.2 had such erratic balance that planning became extremely difficult.

(5) Water: The potable water source was the well site at PHU BA1 operated by the FLSG-A. Some water shortages were experienced due to the sudden increase in troop strength in the area.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance support was furnished by the FLSG-A and the 27th Maintenance Battalion, 1st Air Cav Div. The FSE did not close at PHU BA1 in sufficient time to support the operation.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat After Action Report Operation HUE CITY (U)

c. Transportation

(1) Vehicular: Vehicle and convoy support was furnished through Task Force X-Ray. Requirements were submitted to TF X-Ray G-4 and USMC assets were furnished on a mission basis.

(2) Air:

No scheduled USAF airlift was used during the operation. No resupply was accomplished from the base camp at PHAN RANG of the division base at BIEN HOA.
Inclosure 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (U) MISSION: The civil affairs mission was to control and coordinate:
   a. Refugee Movement.
   b. Food Extraction.
   c. Medical Assistance.
   d. Return of Innocent Civilians.
   e. Civic Action Projects.
   f. Distribution of Supplies and Commodities.
   g. Hiring of Indigenous Workers.

2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
   a. No mass population moves were planned during this operation, and only a small number of refugees was generated by the tactical operations in THUA THIEN Province. These were evacuated to the PHU LONG Refugee Hamlet, HUONG THUY District.
   b. The rice cache (2½ tons) was uncovered but was destroyed due to the tactical situation.
   c. Due to the tactical dispersion of the brigade's maneuver elements and the short duration of this operation no MEDCAPS were implemented. Some persons were medically treated in the brigade's area of operation.
   d. Civilians apprehended in the area of operation as suspected Viet Cong/NVA sympathizers were extracted for questioning. Those classified as Innocent Civilians were turned over to GVN authorities at district headquarters for disposition.
   e. Supplies were donated on two occasions in support of the PHU LONG Refugee Hamlet.

3. (U) EXECUTION: The Civil Affairs mission was executed in six areas.

a. Refugee Movement:
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>EXTRACTED TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar 68</td>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2 UH-1D</td>
<td>PHU LONG (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Medical Assistance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar 68</td>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>HUONG THUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar 68</td>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>HUONG THUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Return of Innocent Civilians:

   40 civilians classified innocent were transported to District Headquarters, HUONG THUY District.

d. Distribution of Supplies:

   Following supplies were donated in support of PHU LONG Refuge Hamlet.

ENCLOSURE (3)
Inclosure 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUE CITY (U)

e. Hiring of Indigenous Workers:

As Daily Laborers were not allowed on base, funds were made available to units so that they could utilize workers off base.

f. Other Activities:

Two hundred seventy-six refugees were escorted through the brigade's area of operation to the safety of an ARVN compound.

4. (U) TOTAL OPERATION HUE CITY STATISTICS:

a. Refugees Relocated: 17 persons
b. Persons Medically Treated: 7 persons
c. Innocent Civilians Returned: 40 persons
d. Distribution of Supplies: as indicated
e. Hiring of Indigenous Workers: as indicated
f. Other Activities: 2 actions

5. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS ANALYSIS: Although this area is in great need of help due to the recent aggressiveness of the enemy, the short duration of the operation and the absence of the majority of the brigade's tactical elements did not allow any major Civic Action projects to commence.
Inclosure 6 (Army Aviation) to Combat After Action Report Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (U) GENERAL: During operation HUE CITY aviation support was provided by both 101st Airborne Division and the III Marine Amphibious Force through Task Force \( X \)-Ray. One UH-1 aircraft was provided daily to the infantry battalion by the 101st Airborne Division. All other aviation requirements for lift and resupply were provided by USMC assets. Aviation support from the Marines was prompt and efficient. They accomplished all assigned missions in a professional manner.

2. (U) WEATHER: Weather was a limiting factor during the first week of the operation. Difference in weather minimums between the two services did not permit Marine ships to fly missions due to the low ceiling. Weather was habitually 200–300 feet and ½ mile visibility. Emergency minimums are 500 feet and 1 mile visibility for Marine aircraft. As a result an Army medevac ship was obtained to evacuate wounded. These dust-off aircraft picked up both Army and Marine wounded.

3. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: The frequency bands on Marine aircraft were not compatible with many of the unit's assigned frequency in the higher FM range, and required operations to be conducted on frequencies other than the intended frequency.
Inclosure 7 (Artillery) to Combat After Action Report Operation HUE CITY (U)

1. (U) The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (-), supported Operation HUE CITY with Battery B supporting the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry from a firing position in GIA LE Base Camp (ID 827152).

2. (U) Battery C, 3d Battalion (8th), 18th Artillery provided General Support - Direct fires from GIA LE during the entire operation.

3. (U) The 1st Field Artillery Group provided General Support Marine Artillery consisting of 105mm, 155mm, and 8" support from numerous positions in the GIA LE and HUE/PHU BAI area.

4. (U) During the operation Battery B fired a total of 326 missions, expending 5,746 rounds of ammunition with the following results:

   11 Killed by artillery.
   24 Secondary explosions.
   22 Structures destroyed.
Subject: Combat After-Action Report, Operation HUE CITY and Operation MINO

DA, HQ, 101st Airborne Division, APO, San Francisco 96383, 18 May 1968

Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray, 1st Marine Division, FPO San Francisco 96602

1. A detailed review of the basic report has been conducted, with particular emphasis on para 2, Enclosure 4 (Logistics) "Material and Services". The following comments are furnished:

   a. Supply:

   (1) CLASS I - The statement contained in the report that "A" rations were fed when conditions permitted, and the "A" rations supplements for "C" rations were issued when available, is correct. "A" rations were issued on 3 of the 14 days. The primary problem was closure of Route QL 1 and the Perfume River due to enemy action, thus necessitating reliance on air transport. Air was critically short, with first priority to CLASS V.

   (2) CLASS II & IV - The statements that no CLASS II was issued to the brigade, and that CLASS II & IV items became critical is not correct. FLSG-A had not agreed to provide CLASS II items. CLASS II items were issued to Divisional Units, OPCON TF X-Ray. On or about 29 Feb., the Division requested sufficient barrier material to establish the Division TOC at Camp Eagle. FLSG-A on 2 March 1968 dispatched a TWX to DA NANG Sub Area Command on an O2 priority for critically needed barrier material, which was received.

   (3) CLASS III - The statement that shortage of NOGAS and Diesel fuel were experienced due to lack of transportation to move POL into the IHU area is not correct. Fuel was not plentiful due to controlled movement of CLASS III but no operational impact resulted from the controlled issue. At one time the river was closed for 4 days. The POL point at GIA L limited issue of bulk fuel, and only 100 gallons a day were authorized by FLSG-A.

   (4) CLASS V - The statement that Claymore Mines and Pyrotechnics were zero balance throughout the operation is correct. It is noted that CLASS V was not a FLSG-A responsibility. FLSG-A has issued CLASS V on a cooperative basis consistently. Overall there was no critical shortage of ammunition. This was due to excellent cooperation by FLSG-A.

   (5) WATER - The statement that potable water source was operated by FLSG-A is incorrect; however, the statement that water was limited due
to the increase in troop strength is correct. The water point at MAGV forward was pumped dry by 1700 hours daily. The well at GAI II also lacked sufficient output to support the brigade. Water supply in the PHU BAL area is still limited but adequate.

b. Transportation: The statement in this paragraph of the reports that the "lack of transportation did not cause a shortage of supplies" is inconsistent with statements in preceding paragraphs that transportation from Da Nang was primary cause of shortages. It is believed the comment on transportation applies to local haul, as opposed to line haul from Da Nang, in which case the statement is correct. There was adequate transportation in the local area to distribute available supplies.

2. In summary, the statements made by 1st Brigade intended to identify logistics problems that, although they were not critical, did require emphasis, control, and close management. This headquarters, has only the highest praise for the support rendered by PLSG-A during the period. The success of 1st Bde and the 101st Abn Div in Operation HUL CITY and Operation MINCO is attributable to a marked degree to the operation of PLSG-A of the III MAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ W. I. THOMAN, Jr.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

ENCLOSURE( 1)