ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT

General
OLIVER P. SMITH
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

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Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.

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FOREWORD

This typescript, the transcribed memoir of General Oliver P. Smith, USMC (Retired) results from a series of tape-recorded interviews conducted with him at his home in Los Altos Hills, California during 9 and 11-12 June 1969 for the Marine Corps Oral History Program. As one facet of the Marine Corps historical collection effort, this program obtains, by means of tape-recorded interviews, primary source material to augment documentary evidence.

Oral History is essentially spoken history, the oral recall of eyewitness impressions and observations recorded accurately on tape in the course of an interview conducted by an historian or an individual employing historical methodology and possibly the techniques of a journalist. The final product is a verbatim transcript containing historically valuable personal narratives relating to noteworthy professional experiences and observations from active duty, reserve, and retired distinguished Marines.

General Smith has read the transcript and made only minor corrections and emendations. The reader is asked to bear in mind, therefore, that he is reading a transcript of the spoken rather than the written word. General Smith has placed a restriction of OPEN on the use of both his interview tapes and transcript. This means that a potential user may read the transcript or audit the recording upon presentation of appropriate credentials.

Copies of this memoir are deposited in the Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.; Special Collections, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.; Oral History Collection, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland; the Manuscript Collection, University of California at Berkeley; and the Manuscript Collection, Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia.

E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Signed:
17 September 1973
GENERAL OLIVER P. SMITH, USMC (RETIRED)

General Oliver P. Smith, highly decorated combat veteran of World War II and the Korean Conflict, was advanced to four-star rank on retirement, 1 September 1955, by reason of having been specially commended for heroism in combat.

General Smith was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in Korea during November and December 1950, when he led the 21st Marine Division in its epic breakout from the Chosin Reservoir area. In the face of sub-zero temperatures and the onslaught of eight Chinese Communist Divisions, his division broke the enemy stranglehold and completed a fighting 70-mile march to the seaport of Hungnam in thirteen days. The general took command of the 1st Marine Division in June 1950, and after assembling it in the Far East, led it in the Inchon assault, the Inchon-Seoul fighting, the Chosin Reservoir operation, the first UN Counter-Offensive, and the fight against the Communist China Spring Offensive of 1951. For his service in Korea, he was also awarded the Army and Navy Distinguished Services Medals, the Silver Star Medal, and the Air Medal.

During World War II, General Smith commanded the 5th Regiment, 1st Marine Division, for the Talasea phase of the Cape Gloucester operation in March 1944. In the fall of that year, he participated in the Peleliu campaign as Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division. For the joint Army-Marine Corps Okinawa operation in 1945, he served as Deputy Chief of Staff with the Tenth Army.

General Smith was born 26 October 1893, in Menard, Texas. He attended the University of California, Berkeley, California, where he graduated in 1916. He reported for active duty as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps on 14 May 1917.

The following month he was assigned his first overseas tour at Guam, Mariana Islands, where he served with the Marine Barracks, Naval Station. In May 1919, he returned to the United States for duty with the Marine Barracks at Mare Island, California.

Ordered to sea duty in October 1921, General Smith served as Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment aboard the USS Texas until May 1924. At that time he was ordered to Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D. C., for duty with the personnel section.

Returning overseas in June 1928, he joined the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, as Assistant Chief of Staff. Following his return from foreign shore duty in June 1931, he became a student at the Field Officer's Course, Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Graduating in June 1932, he was ordered to duty at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, as an instructor in the Company Officers' Course. In September 1933, he was named Assistant Operations Officer of the 7th Marine Regiment at Quantico.

General Smith sailed for France in January 1934, where he joined the staff of the American Embassy at Paris for duty with the Office of the U. S. Naval Attache. From November 1934, to July 1936, while in Paris he studied at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre.

He returned to the United States in August 1936, and joined the staff of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, as an instructor in the Three Section, (Operations and Training). General Smith was transferred to the West Coast in July 1939, where he joined the Fleet Marine Force as Operations Officer at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California.

In June of the following year he became Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and in May 1941, sailed with the Regiment for Iceland where he remained until returning to the United States in March 1942.

In May of the same year the general was ordered to Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., where he became Executive Officer of the Division of Plans and Policies. He remained in this capacity until January 1944, when he joined the 1st Marine Division on New Britain. There he took command of the 5th Marines and subsequently led the regiment in the Talasea phase of the Cape Gloucester operation.

In April 1944, he was named Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division and participated in operations against the Japanese in the Peleliu operation during September and October 1944.

General Smith became Marine Deputy Chief of Staff of the Tenth Army in November 1944, and participated in the Okinawa operation from April through June 1945.

In July 1945, the general returned to the United States and became Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, and in January 1948, was named Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, in addition to his duties at the school. Three months later he became Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.

Named Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in June 1950, General Smith led his division through the bitter campaigns of the Korean conflict -- from the late summer
assault at Inchon, to the sub-zero winter drive north to the Chosin Reservoir.

In November 1950, with the 1st Marine Division surrounded and vastly outnumbered at Chosin, he directed the breakout and subsequent 70-mile march to the seaport of Hungnam.

General Smith returned to the United States in May 1951 and was assigned duties as Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California.

In July 1953, he assumed his final duties as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and served in this capacity until his retirement, 1 September 1955.

His medals and decorations include: the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal (Navy), the Distinguished Service Medal (Army), the Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and Oak Leaf Cluster, Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", the Air Medal, the Presidential Unit Citation with three stars, the Navy Unit Commendation, World War I Victory Medal, the Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal, Haiti, 1929-31, American Defense Service Medal with base clasp; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal, American Campaign Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with three stars; World War II Victory Medal, National Defense Medal, Korean Service Medal with five stars, U. N. Korean Service Medal, Haitian Distinguished Service Medal with diploma, the Order of the Orange Nassau, Rank of Commander, Korean Order of Military Merit with Silver Star, and Korean Presidential Unit Citation with Oak Leaf Cluster.
I would like to say, General, that it's a very rare privilege for us to be here talking to you, and to have you participate in this program.

If I may, sir, I'd like to go back to before April 1917, and talk about your family and childhood. I see that you were born in Texas.

Gen. Smith: Yes, I was born in Menard, Texas, on October 26th 1893. My father was a lawyer, and he died when I was about seven years old. My mother then moved to Austin, and then in 1903 we came to California and settled in Santa Cruz. It was a rather hard struggle for my mother. I had an older brother, and he didn't get a chance to go to college -- he went to work when he got out of high school to help out, but I went on to college. I had exactly five dollars
in my pocket when I landed in Berkeley. Of course I had paid my fees. I got a job and I joined the fraternity, and made most of my money after the first year at gardening.

I was in what was called the College of Commerce. I majored in economics. My idea at first was to go into the consular service, and then I got the idea of going in the foreign service of the Standard Oil Company, and I put in an application for that type of duty. What they did was, they sent you to New York and you spent a year in training, I think, with the Vacuum Oil Company, and then you were sent out under contract; you had to be unmarried, you stayed out three years, and then you came back and they didn't care what you did after that. The pay was very good.

World War I came along, and I landed in the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps offered ten commissions to graduates of the University of California at Berkeley. This was the outbreak of World War I. All that was necessary for commissioning was to have the recommendation of the professor of military science and tactics, and two or three letters of recommendation. I took advantage of that program, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the reserve on April 17th 1917. I was sworn in by Lt. Col. H.C. Haines of the A & I, (I guess he's long since dead) in his office in San Francisco at 36 East Street, which is right near the Palace Hotel. There were about 30 of these college men from West Coast colleges that came in on this program, and we were all ordered to report for active duty on Mare Island on May 15th 1917, which we did. Quantico was not yet established at that time. It didn't come along until July. The Mare Island people didn't know just what to do with these college boys coming in there, and what training we got was very rudimentary.
We did close order drill; we stood up and recited paragraphs from the *Infantry Drill Regulations*, and we had white painted stones that we put in line out there to represent grenade practice; and that was about it.

I didn't know until later that the Marine Corps at that time was looking to the future and wanted to have an expeditionary force to send to France, and they needed some qualified officers. So they began pulling in qualified company officers from foreign stations for eventual use in this expeditionary force. Suddenly they picked out ten of us among this group of about 30 young officers at Mare Island, and ordered us to the Far East; six of us to Guam, four of us to other stations in the Far East. We were sent out in the ratio of two lieutenants for one captain pulled out, and we sailed from San Francisco on the USS *Sheridan* on June 5th 1917. You can see there was not much chance for training there.

There was an interesting thing on that ship. On the *Sheridan*, traveling as a casual, was Captain Davis, a Negro officer, who had been commissioned by President Theodore Roosevelt. The quartermaster of the ship, who ran these Army transports, asked Capt. Davis if he'd mind eating in his stateroom. Well, Davis said he preferred to eat in the wardroom. So the quartermaster came around us young lieutenants and he said, "Would you mind having Capt. Davis at your table?" And we said, "Certainly not, we'd be glad to have him." And he sat at the head of our table; he was a fine gentleman and he gave us a lot of good information. He had been in the service for a long time.

Q: Benjamin Davis?
Smith: Yes. He's the fellow who became a brigadier general and was a troubleshooter in the Pentagon in World War II, and his son is now a lieutenant general in the Air Force.

Q: May I ask you one thing, General? Had you heard of the Marine Corps before you applied?

Smith: No.

Q: You had no idea of what it was?

Smith: I had no idea except there was this opportunity, we wanted all to get into something, you see, (and I was was surprised) that Lt. Col. Haines was a very fine gentleman, and he talked to us and he told us about the beauties of a regular commission and all that -- he saw that these college boys had possibilities. But we weren't interested in that; we told him we just came in for the war, and when the war was over we wanted to get out. But he put us down for a regular commission. I found out later that it was a probationary thing, and I didn't know it at the time. I started out as a reserve. Is that enough on that?

Q: Yes. But who else was there at Mare? Was Silverthorn there with you?

Smith: No. He was at Mare Island, but he belonged to that crowd -- they had to hide us from these people because they weren't very
proud of this bunch of college students wearing these uniforms —

And the recruiters had been around the University of Minnesota, and had practically enlisted the entire junior or senior class, and Silverthorn was one of those. They were brought to Mare Island, and they were in the boot camp when we were in a stockade. And a great many of those fellows got commissions later on. Johnny Beckett and Elmer Hall — all those, they got commissioned later on.

I forget who, but there were a lot of very fine people there.

We got to Guam on July 1. Lt. Col. Berkeley was in command. He is the father of Lt. Gen. Phil Berkeley.

Q: Randolph Berkeley, the medal of honor winner.

Smith: Yes. And later Maj. Manwaring took over. He did the best he could for us. He established schools. We didn't know anything, and he gave us lectures, and we were immediately assigned to various posts of duty.

There is no need to go into what Guam consisted of. There were only about 12,000 people on Guam when we got there, and most of those lived in the capital city of Agana, and they all had farms out in the country. They'd start out at varying times during the early morning on their bull carts to go to their farms and put in an hour or two of work and come home at night. We had few roads. We only had 18 miles of roads, that's all there was; that connected Sumay and Agana, and little bit else.

The garrison that was on Guam consisted of the Headquarters Company and three rifle companies: the 40th, 41st and 42nd Companies.
The Headquarters Company and 40th Company were in Agana, and the 41st and 42nd in Sumay. I wound up in Agana and I had very good jobs at different times; I was editor of the Guam "Newsletter", mess officer, adjutant, company officer, and wound up as company commander. Just before we young officers arrived out there, Guam had gone through a couple of crises. First, the commanding officer of the station ship, Capt. Cronin had relieved and placed under arrest the governor of the island, Capt. Maxwell, as being mentally incompetent. The Navy rushed over a replacement and ordered Capt. Maxwell home. Unfortunately for Capt. Cronin, who was a very fine officer, the board of medical examiners in the United States said Maxwell was sane. That finished Cronin's career.

The other crisis built up on the eve of the outbreak of World War I. In 1915 a German raider, the Cormorant, had been chased into the harbor at Guam by Japanese destroyers and was interned by us. The German officers were very cooperative with the colony, and for a couple of years relations were wonderful. But there were about 400 men on that ship -- more than in the garrison of Guam -- and Cronin (that was one of the reasons he relieved Maxwell) felt he hadn't taken steps as war was approaching to do something about the Cormorant. They took away the flying mechanism and the Germans immediately in the machine shop manufactured new ones.

Well, the new governor, who was a very fine officer, Capt. Roy C. Smith, realized that if they put the pressure on the captain of the Cormorant, when war broke he probably would scuttle the ship, and they wanted to have it in shallow water so they could get the stuff off it. And they tried to persuade him to move into
shallow water, but they didn’t move.

Then later on they decided that on April 6th 1917, the day war was declared, the aide of the Governor would go out and demand surrender of the Cormoran. We had artillery out there, placed at Point Pit, and at Cabras Island, all the way around. And Lt. Bartlett, the aide, was aboard. The captain refused to surrender, as he came off, was given a signal to Cabras Island that was close to a board, and Cabras would open up with its guns, and then the others would open up.

Bartlett went aboard, and the young skipper said they would surrender men, but not the ship. Bartlett started coming off the ship and there were all those young men jumping over the side, yelling CORMORANT!, which was the password.

Shortly after he cleared The ship, the ship went up in smoke. And they never determined — they had taken all the powder off the ship; they figured it must have been compressed coal dust; that’s the only thing it could be blown up with.

Q: It was injected into the boilers?

Smith: I don’t know how they did it. But there were five people drowned; that didn’t get off. All the rest got off. The skipper was a German. He came in this little gig to the dock at Pit, he wouldn’t go near the sentry at the dock, and the sentry started to tell him, “Come here,” and he wouldn’t, so the sentry fired a shot over his bow, which was the first shot fired in World War I; and he came
to the dock, but then he took a sledge hammer and he 
destroyed the engine. Typically German.

Well, Guam went about its business. It was a very peaceful 
life out there, except for a flu epidemic in 1918, which killed 
800 of the natives, but only one white man. And a typhoon. Of course, 
we young officers were promoted very rapidly. My goodness, we were all 
promoted to Captain by 1 July 1918.

But I remained a Captain for 17 years, after that.

Q: You weren't reduced during the Russell or Neville Boards?

Smith: No, I was lucky. I'll cover that a little later.

Q: I recall reading Gen. Smedley Butler's memoirs once -- I think 
it was his memoirs -- going out to China before the Boxer Rebellion, 
and how there was some young officer assigned to Guam; that Guam 
was such a hellhole -- something like that -- that the men 
jumped over the side. It was in the war report for 
the period.

Smith: Guam was not too bad. It's not a bad place to live except 
we'd come in for the war, and we didn't realize until after we got 
to Guam and we began talking to these older officers that we were 
there for a tour of duty and we weren't going any place.

Q: Was there much bitterness, much letter writing going on?
Smith: I don't know about that in those days. We just took it, and that was it. If that was what the Marine Corps wanted, we took it. I missed out on France, of course, in World War I, but I got a lot of valuable administrative experience. I noted that when I came back to Mare Island; these boys who had been to France didn't know anything about how a post was run. I missed out on France, of course, in World War I, but I got a lot of valuable administrative experience. I noted that when I came back to Mare Island; these boys who had been to France didn't know anything about how a post was run.

Q: What about the problems that the young lieutenants -- these company grade officers, who had been in the Corps for some time, when they got to France; they had to learn tactical maneuvers and everything else that the Marine Corps never had before.

Smith: That's right, we didn't have much in the way of schooling. There was one famous book by Wagner, I think, on tactics or something, that Gen. Berkeley had us read, but... (Pause) No, no, the marines didn't have much training there.

Q: Were the veterans of France better schooled in tactics?

Smith: Not the young officers, no.

Q: Even after coming back?

Smith: No, because they went over there first and had trench warfare. Then they had a modified open warfare after that, but not tactics in the sense of the Civil War kind of tactics at all.
Q: So you were one up on them as far as administration went.

Smith: Administration. But of course they had combat experience that I did not have, and that’s very, very important. And they got promotions that I did not get because of that combat experience.

Well, we came back to Mare Island in April 1919, and that was a mess. The place was just swarming with officers who had come back from France and foreign stations and were waiting to be demobilized, they were making up their minds whether to put in to be retained, or what have you. There was very little duty except officer-of-the-day duty, and, with all the officers there, that became about once in 30 days. Of course, the day you had it it was pretty tough because there were 30 sentry posts, and you went around on a bicycle with a sword, and it was quite a chore to get around. But the number of officers there at Mare Island was progressively reduced by the Russell and Neville Boards. Now the Russell Board was a simple situation. Gen. Russell simply squeezed up the list, and squeezed out men from the ranks; they were reverted to enlisted ranks; and people with bad records were kicked out, and everybody came back a bit. But, unfortunately, there were people who had very fine records in France who were fairly junior, like Gen. Cates, for instance. Gen. Cates went back to first lieutenant, and I remained a captain, because he came in later than I did. The people who had been to France decided they’d fix up. And they should have done something for these people with combat records. So the Neville Board was convened, and that threw us all in the hat.
Naturally, they took out the ones with records and put them at the top, like Gen. Cates, Gen. Hermle, and so forth.

Q: And LeRoy Hunt.

Smith: Oh, LeRoy Hunt.

Q: He was number one, and Cates was number two.

Smith: That's right. And that was fair enough. The only thing that made people bitter was when they got down at the bottom of the list here they found this long alphabetical list, and at the bottom of the list was Walter Wensinger. Wensinger became a lieutenant general, so somebody -- we felt, "What kind of a board is this if they get so tired that they just throw a bunch of people in alphabetically?" As a matter of fact, I guess technically it was illegal, what they did, because we permanent officers had a position on the lineal list, and only a court martial can deprive you of your position on the lineal list. And that's what the Neville Board did. They just moved us around. But it wasn't protested.

Q: I have been told, rightly or wrongly, that the Russell Board was composed of officers who had not had duty in France for the most part.

Smith: It might have been. I don't know who was on the board, other than Gen. Russell.
Q: And that they were -- I said bitter -- the unhappy ones, who had never gotten over to France, and as a result the people whom they called out were many reserves, like Jerry Thomas.

Smith: I don't think Jerry was called out.

Q: I think he was way at the bottom on the list.

Smith: He was a first lieutenant, but that was because of this squeezing of the list.

Q: But when the Neville Board came in they brought back on active duty a lot of people, a lot of reservists, who'd been out a year or so.

Smith: Who had records, I guess. One of the rules the Neville Board had was that you could not be put in a rank higher than anything you'd held during the war, and Jerry Thomas had not held a rank higher than first lieutenant during the war, so they put him at the top of the first lieutenants' list, like Silverthorn. Silverthorn was right at the top of the first lieutenants' list, because by the rules of the game he couldn't be made captain. They had a good enough record to be captain.

Q: But they served as first lieutenants for 13 years.
Smith: That's right. Well, I don't know whether Silverthorn did. But they were on the top, and they got promoted. We were only making ten numbers a year as captains. That's how we made it.

Q: They made it in the 20s. But some of the people who were fixed in grade remained on active duty until the selection boards came in effect.

Smith: Well, yes, it was in 1934 that the selection board process came in, and that really cleaned things out, boy! It was terrific. Of course, at Mare Island we didn't know what this was all about. We were just sitting there. I didn't know there was a Russell Board or a Neville Board. I wasn't aware of it. I decided that I liked the Marine Corps and I'd like to stay if they'd keep me. I put in to stay and they said I was acceptable, so I stayed for a total of 38 years. And that was that. But at Mare Island everybody was looking for a job. I finally got the command of the Machine Gun School, which was a blessing; it gave me something to do, and later on I became assistant adjutant under Maj. D.E. Randolph. Col. Karmany was commanding the post.

Q: Oh, Lincoln Karmany.

Smith: Yes, he was a very fine old gentleman.

Q: He had a lot of time in by then.
Smith: He almost became Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Q: Oh, really?

Smith: He had marital troubles. That kind of crossed him off.

Q: He must have been considered for selection at the time Barnett was, I guess.

Smith: That's right.

Q: And Waller?

Smith: Yes. Waller lost out because, I suppose, of Samar or something like that. I don't know.

He was right up there with Waller and Barnett. He was an old timer.

I was given good quarters there at Mare Island. I had a nice little bungalow on the base, and we were very happy there. Then Col. Karmeny took a three months' leave and went to China, and they brought Col. Gamborg-Andresen as his temporary relief. Col. Gamborg-Andresen couldn't move into Col. Karmeny's quarters, so he came around to me and he said, "After all I have to take you out of quarters in order to save money for the Government." So he rated me out of quarters and moved into my bungalow.

Q: Were you married by then?
Smith: Oh, yes. It didn't make me very happy. And the people on the post were mad too -- he shouldn't have done it. He didn't want to live in Vallejo. Well, after the three months he left Col. Karmany came back and they offered the quarters to me again, and I said, "You can keep the quarters. I have had one experience and I don't want to go through it again."

Q: What kind of a man was Col. Gamborg-Andresen?

Smith: Oh, very conscientious. He was honest. But after I went aboard ship, I came into Bremerton, and at that time he was commanding the Marine Barracks at Bremerton, and I went to call on him. It was around 5-5.30 and he wasn't home yet. Mrs. Andresen said he was over at the office. So I went over to the office to see him, and there he was, working on the muster roll of the headquarters company of his outfit, and he said, "You know, I can't trust these young officers and sergeant major; I have to check this muster roll." He was checking off the muster roll.

Q: He still had a very heavy Scandinavian accent.

Smith: Oh yes. He was a full colonel. (Pause) Well, that finishes up Mare Island. In October 1921 I went aboard ship. I received the orders on Oct. 8th and I had to be aboard the Texas in San Pedro on October 13th. I had to move. I had to get my family relocated.

I reported aboard. At that time, in 1921, the entire fleet was based at San Pedro -- everything was there -- and the Texas was
one of the battleships of Battleship Division -- the Texas, New York and Oklahoma -- and that division was commanded by Rear Adm. R.H. Jackson, who is still alive at Coronado at the age of 103.

Q: REALLY? I'll be darned.

Smith: Yes. He later became commander in chief of the fleet. He retired a four star admiral. But he was commanding in 1921 that division as rear admiral. And he is still alive.

We lived in San Pedro. The more socially minded people aboard ship lived in Long Beach, but we got quite a boost when Adm. Jackson decided to live in San Pedro. I lived in the same apartment -- the Sunset Court Apartments -- with Lt. Cdr. Nimitz, who later became commander in chief of the fleet.

We had a fairly good routine in those days. You went aboard ship early in time for breakfast, and set out for quarters at 8.30. Then you might take off up the coast for gunnery drills or even firing practices. You always tried to get back by 4.30, and then we'd go ashore.

Q: The whole battleship? They'd get the whole thing mustered to take out just for that?

Smith: Yes. And it was a fairly decent routine. Of course later on they got a little more serious, and they'd go out for a week at a time. Of course in those days gunnery was king; everything revolved around gunnery. And we in the Marine Detachment manned
Groups 3 and 4, which was a total of eight 5-inch 51 guns. I was control officer for those guns.

Q: Were you the senior marine officer?

Smith: Oh yes.

Q: Who was your junior officer?

Smith: Gilman. He is dead now. Fred Gilman.

Q: He'd be up behind the smoke stack.

Smith: That's where my control station was.

Q: That's where you were.

Smith: I was up above the galley. And Gilman ran up and down the deck. He supervised what was going on down at the guns, and I was in the control station up on the stacks.

Q: Kind of a smoky place.

Smith: Yes, a smoky place.

Q: What was Nimitz like at that time, General, do you recall?
Smith: No, I don't recall. I didn't get to know him very well until World War II. He was a very fine gentleman; I admired him greatly. He was on the California, you see. He was on the big staff, and we were on a very junior ship. The Texas was a very junior ship.

When I was aboard we only had two antiaircraft guns. Antiaircraft practice was very rudimentary. We had a couple of cranes, one on either side of the ship, with a sort of circular platform on top of the crane, and we had a 3-inch gun up there: when you fired it the whole crane would shake. We manned those two guns; and then they decided to put more 3-inch guns there, and they put them on top of the turrets. My goodness, when the turret fires you just can't stay on the top, it just blows you. So you couldn't fire the guns when the turrets were firing, and even to practice, the turrets would be turning one way and you'd be trying to turn another way. It was a mess. And of course the targets we had -- we didn't have sleeve targets or anything like that. All you had in the way of targets was a tug way out there towing a kite. That's all we had.

Each year we had to go up to Bremerton for overhaul for six weeks, and, of course, being a junior ship, we always drew January or February or some ungodly month like that. But we spent two months in the summer in the Puget Sound, just going from port to port. I usually got a chance to take my outfit to a rifle range or something, while I was there.

I was stuck for 31 months on this ship, and while I was aboard they changed policy, and they decided that only one Marine officer a year would be relieved, and that relief would be made
in the summer. My junior officer had preceded me aboard by three or four months, so, of course, he went off in the summer of '23, and I stayed on until May 1924, for 31 months.

In the spring of 1924 the whole fleet went for maneuvers, and after the maneuvers we went on through the Canal and went on up to New York for leave and liberty; and the Texas never returned west. It put into Norfolk to be modernized, to take the cage masts off and replace them by tripod masts, and to make a bigger aperture for the turret guns to increase their ability to elevate and give them greater range. At that time I was detached. I didn't know anything about the Detail Office. I got orders to report to Maj. Torrey up at headquarters for an interview. He was the Detail Officer at that time. The result was that I was ordered to the Detail Office as the relief of Capt. Best in the enlisted section. Then a little later on I took over the officers' section relieving Maj. Pickett.

Q: Harry Pickett.

Smith: Yes.

Q: May I ask you about your experience with a seagoing detachment? During World War II, of course, as the amphibious warfare doctrine became developed, we appreciated the employment of naval gunfire in support of landing forces. Did you get any feeling of this? Was there any inkling of this during the time that you served?
Smith: No. We had an organized landing force on the ship, under command of a lieutenant commander, which consisted of a naval contingent and a marine contingent. For a while, we went ashore for drills, and I ducked drilling with the blue jackets because they were drilling by bugle signals; can you imagine that? And I didn't know the bugle signals. But they drilled with the bugle signals; it was pretty ragged. But we went ashore and did our work drill. But as far as amphibious operations were concerned, no, it was just gunnery. We were thinking in terms of these 5-inch guns that I had -- they were anti-torpedo guns. In other words, in those days the destroyers fired torpedoes, and it was up to us to knock off the enemy destroyers that were carrying torpedoes. Of course, in World War II the concept changed. They did it from a carrier.

Q: Of course, they say -- I've been told that all the naval officers had in mind at that time was crossing the "T" and engaging the enemy in a large scale surface engagement.

Smith: That's right. When I was aboard ship (voice trails off)

But they had taken from the British the director system of controls which was very modern. And I think our people could shoot pretty well. During World War II they didn't get much chance to shoot the guns of the battleships except in the Philippines.

Q: Surigao.
Smith: Yes.

Q: Surigao is in Indonesia.

Smith: No, it was the straits there where they cross the Surigao Straits.

Q: That's right.

Smith: They really did shoot their guns there. And, of course, those battleships did a remarkable job for us in World War II in bombarding the beaches. The old Texas was over in Normandy.

Q: It was used as a flagship there?

Smith: I don't know. (Pause) Well, at Headquarters Marine Corps Gen. Lejeune was the Commandant, and maybe Gen. Collins was the Assistant Commandant. And of course I was there in '24, and by '27 we had considerable expeditionary activity. We had to send an outfit to China, an outfit to Nicaragua. We had a brigade in Haiti; we had gotten out the brigade out of Santo Domingo in 1924, but we still had the brigade in Haiti and expeditionary troops in Nicaragua and in China. Now all we had -- we had an authorized strength of 27,400 to base our officers on. We had, I think, 1,092 officers. But the enlisted strength was only 18,000, that's all we had. At one point, when we had all this going, of these 18,000 men we had 13,000 on sea duty, foreign duty, or expeditionary duty. That left only 5,000 people for all other purposes.
I remember when we assembled the first battalion to go to Nicaragua. It was done according to the old Marine Corps style: we simply pulled the officers and men from all the posts and stations up and down the East Coast and assembled at Norfolk, went aboard ship, and the battalion commander organized his battalion after he got aboard ship, and they landed at Bluefield, Nicaragua.

A lot of people thought Maj. Torrey was vindictive, but he was very loyal to his subordinates, I'll say that, and I was very fond of him to the end. He was there two years, and then he was relieved by Maj. Calvin Matthews, and in order to provide continuity they held me over -- the old racket -- and I stayed two more years. That was a total of four years that I was in that office. And living in Washington then was very high priced. My goodness, I had an awful time making ends meet.

Q: Were you expected to be very social?

Smith: No, no social life at all. My budget for recreation was three dollars a month, and you can't do much social life on three dollars a month; you can go to one movie, period. As an example, I paid $90 a month for the privilege of living in a house -- the woman who owned it had one room and kitchenette, and I had a bedroom, a sleeping porch and the use of the dining room and the kitchen, and I paid $90 a month for that.

Q: Where was it located?
Smith: In Petworth: that's now a Negro district. When I was in Washington in 1924 to 1928 Petworth was a middle class neighborhood. I couldn't afford to live in Chevy Chase -- that was out -- but Petworth was a district of solid people, you know, contractors, people like that. A few years ago I went through the area, and it's all Negro now. Petworth is way out 8th Street, it's out by the Old Soldiers' Home.

Q: Oh yes. But I had never heard of it.

Smith: You'd never heard of it called Petworth?

Q: No.

Smith: It was a whole district there, between 8th Street and the Old Soldiers' Home, and extending north of it.

Q: What was it like to serve on the headquarters staff during Gen. Lejeune's incumbency as commandant?

Smith: Well, of course, he was a very efficient gentleman. But we didn't have any staff organization. The A & I was still rather powerful, and the Detail Office had nothing to do with the A & I.

Q: Who was A & I at the time -- Lauchheimer?

Smith: No, Gen. Lane.
Q: Rufus Lane.

Smith: He was a very fine gentleman. And we were more or less directly under the Commandant. The quartermaster was Gen. Richards, who'd been there for 17 or 18 years.

Q: George Richards?

Smith: George Richards. The quartermaster was Gen. McCawley, who had been there for I don't know how many years. Gen. Lejeune was the only new face.

Q: That's right. McCawley ... Lauchheimer was A & I under Barnett, I believe.

Smith: Yes. He was gone then.

Q: Rufus Lane, Richards, and McCawley.

Smith: Yes. I used to watch Gen. McCawley arrive in the morning. He had one of those landaubs, where you had an enclosed part in back of the chauffeur; he sits in front; and ... he would swing up to the MUNITIONS Building where we were, and get out, and hand the morning paper to the chauffeur, and then he -- he had a bowler, I think, and a cane -- would come on up, and the driver would follow him with the paper to deliver it to him when he got to his office.

Q: He was quite social, I understand.
Q: Very socially prominent.

Smith: Yes, very. His father had been Commandant of the Marine Corps. World War I caught him short; he thought we were going to fight the war in blues. He had quite a time getting uniforms together.

Q: It was he who originated the dress blue uniform for the Marine Corps, I believe.

Smith: Probably was. I wrote an article for the Gazette. I was ordered to write the article, and I wrote about this pride of uniform and what not, and old McCawley thought that was wonderful stuff. He called me in to tell me. Poor Gazette -- to get articles they had the detail officers around headquarters write articles just to keep the thing going. It was a quarterly then. I got $5 an article, that's all. I finally wrote an article for the Naval Institute Proceedings and I got $85, which I thought was, gee whiz, wonderful!

Q: The promotion and rate of payment for the two publications remains the same, General?

Smith: It does? (laughs) Well, in the Naval Institute Proceedings I wrote up John Twiggs Meyers. Dion Williams was trying to get --
I think he was then a brigadier, promoted to major general. And Myers had a very fine record for the defense of the legations.

The other captain who was with him was put up before a court of inquiry on the charges of cowardice, charges made by the Secretary of the Legation; and the Secretary of the Legation never would come to testify. Well, Gen. Dion Williams turned over to me the report of the court of inquiry; and there was testimony from all the Marines as to what went on; and I wrote a story on the defense of the wall, and the message that John Twiggs Meyers had sent to the Ambassador that we will do our best, and so on. I got $85 for that.

Q: John Twiggs Meyers was still on active duty then, was he not?

Smith: Oh yes. I don't know on what duty, but he was still on active duty. And he thanked me for the article, and he told me of the wound that he got: it was kind of accidental, he drove into a spear that was leaning up against the wall!

Q: Do you have any old issues of the Gazette around?

Smith: Yes. I've been intending to ask the barracks down here or somebody if I can turn them over -- not too many.

Q: Don't think them over to the barracks!

Smith: Whom can I give them to?

Q: We'll take them.
Smith: Will Headquarters Marine Corps take them?

Q: Yes, sir! We'll take them.

Smith: I'll probably bundle them up some time.

Q: The Historical Branch?

Q: Yes, sir. (Brief interruption)

Smith: We got to the point where Maj. Calvin Matthews came up to headquarters to relieve Maj. Torrey and I stayed on for two additional years. Then I guess as a reward for keeping me there four years, they sent me to the Gendarmerie, which was a very good duty.

Q: Financially it was all better off than . . .

Smith: Then Washington? Oh yes, as a Gendarmerie officer I got $150 a month from the Haitian Government, which helped out quite a bit. I went down on the old USS Kittery, which was a broken down transport, and I reported to the American High Commissioner, who was Gen. Russell then. Then I reported to the Gendarmerie, and the Commandant of the Gendarmerie at that time was Col. F.E. Evans, who had the rank of major general in the Gendarmerie. This destroyer which was just cut in half was the Evans. I didn't realize but that he must have had a pretty good decoration, because it said this destroyer was named for Brig. Gen. F.E. Evans. And I think he must
have gotten a decoration in World War I. He had been retired in 1908 for heart, and became a newspaper reporter and drank like a fish; and when World War I came along he talked the Marine Corps into taking him back and he went to France, and did a very fine job over there in France, and still continued to drink like a fish! He was down there in Haiti, and he went on to retirement for age. So the decoration he got must have been for World War I, and they named the ship for him.

Q: You bring up an interesting point. I'd like to go ahead in time a number of years to Korea. You talked about Gen. Evans, and the fact that despite all his faults he went ahead and did a good job. Did the Marine Corps face the same situation in 1950, when there were a bunch of people who'd been passed over twice and who would have been selected and were forced into retirement because of two pass-overs, except for the fact that the Korean crisis had arisen, and then they went on realizing they had one more chance to make, and they went ahead and made good records.

Smith: Oh yes.

Q: ... where the Marine Corps was embarrassed with a situation where they couldn't

Smith: As a matter of fact, I had not much control over whom they sent me to be the officers of the First Division for Korea. One of the officers they sent me was Col. Gregon Williams. I'd never
served with Gregon. He was a senior colonel, he came in and I made him chief of staff. And he'd been passed over for brigadier.

Q: A very difficult man?

Smith: He did a fine job for me, and, of course, I gave him excellent fitness reports, and he made brigadier. Of course the man I had picked to be chief of staff was Col. Snedeker, and Eddie Craig had grabbed Snedeker and taken him out with the Brigade to be his chief of staff; so I made Gregon Williams chief of staff of the Division. And then when we joined hands, Gen. Shepherd wanted me to relieve Gregon. I said, "Look, Gregon has done a very fine job for me, and I am not about to relieve him and to replace him by Snedeker."

Then Gen. Shepherd took Snedeker away from me and took him over to Tokyo to write up the contribution of the Marines in Korea on the board they had over there. And I got him back after the Chosin Reservoir. Then Gregon was promoted to brigadier general and had to go home. So was Puller promoted to brigadier general, and they wanted to know which one I wanted for Assistant Division Commander to relieve Eddie Craig who was promoted to major general. And I said I'd like to have Gregon Williams, because I felt Puller was getting tired. But they gave me Puller, and took Gregon back, and he became the commanding general for the troops at Camp Lejeune.

Q: Of course Gregon Williams, before he went to Korea, had been the chief of staff of FMFPac under Tommy Watson.
He is dead now.

a decoration and when he retired we went up to Major General any
they wouldn't make him a Major General, but he had
promoted Brigadier General. He was very loyal to me and that
at all. So General came back to me, and I kept him until he was
brought out Brute Kenneth, and Bruce and General didn't get along
but he was a very effective person. Of course Gen. Shepherd

4: Tertlittle Tommy. Maybe he added a little. (laughed)

4: Tertlittle Tommy?

Smith: Yes, well, William carried out the orders of Tommy Wate...
inefficient. Well, Litzenberg was sent to me as one of the colonels and I gave him the 7th Regiment. He was a little difficult to handle, but he did a good job with the 7th; I had no complaint; I gave him good fitness reports, and he made brigadier general. And he made major general, but he couldn't get along. They tried him out at Lejeune and pulled him out, tried him out at Parris Island, and pulled him out -- he was just too tough on his subordinates.

Q: He was a rough man.

Smith: Finally, Gen. Shepherd eased him off me. By that time I was commanding general of FMFLant, and he said I could have him for planning. Well, I couldn't refuse; he had a little bit too much rank for the planning section, because all the naval officers and all the other commands were four stripers, and here was a Marine who was a brigadier general. But I took him, and he did a good job. Then he was promoted to major general, and I told Gen. Shepherd, "It's just too much, I can't have a planning officer who's a major general go around with the captains of the Navy." And Gen. Shepherd got mad at me and all that, but eventually he pulled him out and made him Inspector General of the Marine Corps.

Q: But he was up at Quantico in '51 to '52, I believe.

Smith: He was? I don't remember. He was pretty rough, and his relief -- I never did quite understand that. He joined me on the 21st of September. We had already landed at Inchon. He had formed up the 7th, and they came out as fast as they could, and we used
his regiment to good purpose in going around north of Seoul and capturing Uijongbu and that not. And of course, he did a very fine job at Chosin Reservoir. He did a fine job when we were chasing the guerrillas in January of '51.

Q: In Pohang.

Smith: Yes, Pohang. And then we went up in central Korea and jumped off from Wonju and he had the 7th there; Murray had the 5th. Then Murray was relieved by a parachute colonel -- Hayward.

Q: Dick Hayward.

Smith: Yes. Well, we got up toward the Pohang Dam, and we were getting toward April '51; and I got these warning orders, one stating that Litzenberg would be detached upon reporting of his relief; and they sent me a list of colonels that were coming out. I tentatively selected one of those colonels who would relieve Litzenberg. While Litzenberg was up there he sent me a dispatch, and he said, "When am I to be relieved in accordance with my orders?" I went up to see him and I said, "This says, sure, that you'll be detached upon reporting of your relief. I have tentatively selected an officer but he won't be out here for a month, and when he comes he'll relieve you." He wanted to be relieved then. He had watched his classmates; many of them had gone out of the picture with heart attacks, and he'd been under strain and all that. I said, "Look, there are a lot of people in the Division who've been under strain."
He said, "You can send Bowser up to relieve me." I said, "Bowser is my G-3 and I am not about to do that." Well, I went back and talked to Lewie Puller, who was then my ADC, and Lewie wanted to go up and relieve me. (laughter)

Q: The two of them were very much alike.

Smith: I said, "No, Lewie, let's get him out of here with a good taste in his mouth. The fellow is going to bust up unless we get him out." It happened that at that time Nickerson -- who now is a lieutenant general -- was a colonel and was FMF representative in Tokyo and had come over to Korea to observe; and during the Inchon-Seoul Operation he had practically been executive officer to Lewie Puller in the 1st Regiment. He had experience; he was junior.

I immediately shot off a wire to Gen. Shepherd and requested that he release Nickerson to me to relieve Litzenberg because of Litzenberg's concern over the condition of his health. Well, Litzenberg finally told me he wanted to put in a dispatch to retire and I said, "Look, you've got a future in the Marine Corps, and I won't send any dispatch like that. When you get to Pearl Harbor you talk to Gen. Shepherd; if you still want to send your dispatch you can do it from there." He never did.

Q: You felt that he was under strain when he did all this?

Smith: There was something wrong with him. He was self-centered; I guess this is what you'd call it. Everything revolved around his (person). Gza, Murray had been under as much strain, Bowser
had been under as much strain. He hadn’t gone through the Inchon landing.

Q: My God, here you were a major general, and here was a little colonel giving you a hard time.

Smith: That’s right. But I got him out of there. We got him out within a day, and we brought him down to division headquarters, gave him the best meal we could, we gave him an additional silver star.

Q: I admire your forbearance. Of course, Litzenberg had a reputation for being very hardnosed and very difficult.

Smith: He was hardnosed. And he always requested everything -- he wanted somebody else to always be giving him more artillery support, more of this and more of that.

Q: It was almost a demand?

Smith: We had a very fine Reconnaissance Company. He ran into the Chinese up there before the big bust -- he ran into the 124th Division and he requested that the Reconnaissance Company be assigned to his regiment. We had the Reconnaissance Company working off on the flanks. So we assigned it, and what did he do? He put it right in the front lines with his rifle companies instead of using it as a reconnaissance company; and got a lot of these high-priced people killed. So we bawled him out and took it away from him.
And we put it back to operating on the flank.

Have I gone enough into that?

Q: Yes. I am glad you dealt with these personalities, but I was thinking of my question in the overall concept of a number of officers who were on their last legs and here was the opportunity for combat came, and they ...

Smith: Oh, undoubtedly there were other people that I may not have known who were passed over. I had no complaints about the way they performed their duties out there, and I suppose that since most of them got good fitness reports, they did set them on their feet again.

Q: Bill Barber of course is out in Vietnam now.

Smith: He is?

Q: Yes.

Smith: He is a cocky individual.

Q: Yes. I like him.

Smith: (laughs) He told his company when he took them over just what he was going to do, and these Marines looked him over and said, "We'll see," And he went up and did a fine job up there.

Q: We'd better get back to ...
Smith: As I say, they probably gave me the Gendarmerie because they kept me so long. Col. Evans -- or Maj. Gen. Evans -- was Commandant of the Guard. Col. South was the first chief of staff.

Q: Hamilton.

Smith: Hamilton South, yes. He got sick and Col. Ramsey relieved him -- Trooper Ramsey.

Q: Fred Ramsey's father.

Smith: Yes. And I was what they called Assistant Chief of Staff. I was a glorified adjutant, that's what it amounted to. The Gendarmerie was administered by departments. We had the departments of the North, Center, West, Port-au-Prince, and South. And there was a colonel of the Gendarmerie in command of each. That colonel of the Gendarmerie was probably a captain or a major in the Marine Corps. And in each department were districts, and they were commanded by captains of the Gendarmerie that were usually sergeants of the Marine Corps, or what have you. We of course had quite a few Haitian officers, and we were adding to the number each year because eventually we wanted to have 100% Haitian officers and turn the Gendarmerie back to the Haitians. The Gendarmes were very loyal. The enlisted men were extremely loyal, because there was a lot of prestige involved in being a member of the Gendarmerie. My telephone orderly at headquarters was a Haitian corporal, and we had to put our correspondence in both English and French, which was a nuisance. In dealing with the departments of government there,
you had to send a letter in French. These Commandants of the Garde, like Gen. R.P. Williams who came in; they couldn't even read French. So we always had to have the English along with the French letters so we could see what he was signing.

Q: Who did the French translations?

Smith: I had a couple of interpreters who put it in French. I had one sergeant who was a French Canadian -- Lèveque -- I don't know whether you ever ran into him or not, he probably became a warrant officer. He didn't have much formal education and I don't know how good a letter he could have written, but he did know French.

Q: Did you know French at all?

Smith: I had had four years of college French, but when you want to talk that's not enough. I found that out.

End of Side 1, Tape 1, Session 1.
Smith: We were operating in the framework of the Haitian Government. There were the Haitian President, Borno, the House, the Senate, the Department of the Interior and all the other things that make up a government. Shortly after I arrived there they changed the name of the Gendarmerie to Garde D'Haiti, and that was at the instance of President Borno, who felt that Gendarmerie sounded too much like police, and the word "Garde" was comparable to "Garde Republicaine" in France; and it was a better name, so we changed it.

On April 30th 1930, Col. R.P. Williams -- Terrible Terry -- relieved Col. Evans as Commandant of the Marine- Corps-gendarmerie. He had quite a temper; I never served under him. And I felt that he'd probably clean house and I'd be fired or something, but I wasn't The first thing he told me was, "Smith, I want you to give me a memorandum of all the annoyances to which the Commandant of the Garde is subjected." So I sent down a memorandum. One was Haitian politicians and editors of Haitian papers and correspondents from the United States who were looking for dirt, and he got the list and looked it over, and said, "I won't do this, I won't do that." I didn't say anything although I realized that his hand would be forced.

The next thing that happened was that a reporter from the Chicago Tribune came down, and came in to me: he wanted to talk to Gen. Williams. I stalled him, and we talked about the Treaty, about the troubles with Haitian opposition, and I said that he really
should go over and talk to Gen. Russell, that Gen. Russell could
give him the answers. He went over and talked to Gen. Russell and
then came right back. Gen. Russell called up and said, "Colonel
Williams should talk to this guy." So that's when he was struck
off the list.

Jolibois, who was the leading rebel against the occupation,
came in one day, and he wanted to see the Commandant of the Garde.
I asked him what he wanted, and said I'd try to take care of his
wants. He wanted to hold a demonstration. I told him I knew that
the Commandant of the Garde would never approve of that, whether
they wanted to fire firecrackers -- that's just an excuse to start
things off. Then he started to make a speech in French to the
assembled people -- I was in a big office -- to the Haitian enlisted
men, to the Marine officers: he made a vitriolic attack on the
Occupation, and I said, "Look, Mr. Jolibois, there's the door and
you can take that door and go out again." And he turned to me and
waved and said, "You say to me 'there's the door', and I say
to you there's the sea, and that's where we are going to drive you --
into the sea." And he shoved off. That's the type of thing you
ran into down there.

It was a very poor country. My goodness, the average income
was only $85 a year, which is not an awful lot, you know. There
were all these agitators. In 1929 we had some rather serious
trouble. It's interesting -- it started with a strike of students!
(laughs) which is still going on. Our own Agriculture Department
had come down to help out the Haitians, and they had started an
agricultural school at Damien, near Port-au-Prince, and they wanted
to train these young Haitians on how to cultivate the land in Haiti, and how to grow crops, and what to grow. But these young Haitians wanted white collar jobs; they wanted to go to the school, and they thought that would give them white collar jobs; and when they found out it wouldn't they struck. That was an issue, you see, and it spread all over the island. Finally we had to call for assistance from the Brigade which sat in its barracks there, and they were not even allowed to parade down the streets, you know. The Marine Brigade there were kept out of sight. We had to ask them for help to go down to the South where things had gotten out of control. They sent a detachment down there -- I forget who commanded that -- and they were attacked by a drunken mob of Haitians, and they fired on the mob and killed several of them. And thereafter that day became a holiday in Haiti. But the riot was stopped.

The Occupation down there did a tremendous amount of good. They sent down a Financial Adviser, an American, with a couple of assistants, and they demanded vouchers for all expenditures, which was something new in Haiti! The Haitian gourde was just as sound as the dollar: they paid all the debts of Haiti. Haiti didn't owe a nickel, and their money was as sound as the dollar by the time I was there. The Gendarmerie provided law and order; we had roads all over the place; we had an excellent hospital and medical service; we had an operating telephone network. Today it's all gone; you can't make a telephone call in the city of Port-au-Prince. And of those 2,000 miles of roads probably there's a couple of hundred miles left. And they are head over heels in debt. They are back where they were when the Marines came in there in 1916.
At first there was a good deal of pressure in the United States for us to get out, and in 1930 President Hoover sent down a commission to determine on steps that were necessary for an orderly liquidation of the occupation, and this liquidation was accomplished in 1934. I was detached in June 1931 -- I'd spent three years in the Garde. I was ordered to the Field Officers' Course at the Infantry School at Fort Benning -- which I was very glad to go to.

Q: This was the first school that the Marine Corps sent you to?

Smith: Yes, the Infantry School at Benning.

Q: You hadn't even been through the basic course, or the junior officers' course at Quantico.

Smith: We did have . . .

(cross conversation)

Those schools were organized in the 20s. No, I never went to Marine Corps Schools, but instructed in the Marine Corps Schools three times.

Q: Did you feel at a disadvantage when you went to Fort Benning?

Smith: No, no. It was a very practical course. They had 97,000 acres down there at Fort Benning. It's interesting, going into who was down there.
The Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School who ran the school, was Lt. Col. Marshall, who became Commander in Chief of the US Army. Lt. Col. Stilwell was an instructor in tactics: he became a four star. Major Bradley was an instructor in machine guns, and he became a five star. Maj. Bull was an instructor in logistics, and he became a four star. Capt. Bedell Smith, who was a classmate of mine, became chief of staff to Eisenhower. Capt. Porter, another classmate of mine, became G-3 in the Army. Maj. Terry Allen, a student and classmate, became commanding general of the First Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily.

This was 1931, and the Army, like the Marine Corps, stagnated in the grade of captain, and most of these students in this senior course -- the Field Officers' Course -- were captains, except Terry Allen.

Q: Bradley was in that famous class . . . the stars fell on him.

Smith: Fifteen class, from West Point. It was a very practical course and I was glad to get it, because you know, we'd heard about trains and all that, but in Benning we put them on the road. I mean, they took you around and said, "This is a field train." And everything was done that was supposed to be done in the book. Then we had an awful lot of terrain exercises, most of them mounted. We made these reconnaissances on horseback, and you couldn't tie a horse up by the rules of the game: you had to hang on to your horse with one hand while you were looking at the map, and then he'd jerk his head and spoil your map work. I remember one day we were
making a rapid reconnaissance at a trot. We went two or three miles around in this position, and the horse I drew that day was a kicking horse. We were going in column, and he'd lift up and try to kick the horse in column, and I was busy keeping his head up so he couldn't kick. When we got to the other end, this instructor called on me to give an estimate of the terrain that we passed over. I said, "Look, frankly I've been trying to handle a kicking horse all the way, and I haven't the least idea of what the terrain looked like." And he laughed and let me off the hook.

Q: You talked about field trains and rolling kitchens and so on. This smacks so much of World War I.

Smith: It did, sure. Naturally.

Q: Still dealing with the same things that went on in World War I.

Smith: That's right. Also, on the tactical problems I would have liked to have been the opposing commanding general, because I could go about exactly what a Fort Benning graduate would do in a given tactical situation, you see. But we did learn so that you could look at a mass of terrain and you could see a battalion in defense, or you could see a place where you could attack, or you could set up machine guns; you got a feel of the terrain, and that's where it was very valuable. Although in France I got a much better feel of the terrain.
Q: Well, of course, was telling me about

( the French)

Smith: They were very, very thorough on the study of the ground.

Q: But the old saw that you can't throw away the book until you know the book was certainly proved by the training you had down here.

Smith: Oh yes. Those phrases in the book had meant nothing to me before. Field trains? I couldn't visualize what they were talking about. But at Benning I saw it, and I suppose they were very efficient for that period, 1931. But World War II was only 10 years away.

In the Field Officers' Course there were two marines -- Capt. Gilder Jackson and myself -- and in the company officers' course there were three marines -- Capt. Dudley S. Brown, 1st Lt. G.C. Thomas, and 1st Lt. L.B. Puller. I got a kick out of Lewis. Once a year -- at the end of the school year -- they had a tremendous maneuver. They had at Benning a very highly trained infantry regiment; I think it was the 29th Infantry. And they turned that regiment over to the students. We commanded battalions, regiments on a rotation basis. They and what not, and then rotated, and had a maneuver that involved everything -- attack, defense, daylight withdrawal, night withdrawal, everything. I was given a battalion when it was in the midst of a daylight withdrawal, and Lewis Puller was with that battalion. We got back to a defensive position and then received an order to make a night withdrawal to a new position two or three miles back.
Well, the Army officer, who was my operations officer, and myself got together, and knew that we had to use a school solution -- we knew what the instructors expected us to do under that situation, which was to put out a covering screen and assemble your battalion, and draw back along the wire lines. I put Puller out with the machine gun detachment of the covering screen, while an Army lieutenant had the infantry detachment. The Army was represented by a regiment of cavalry. Actually they had red flags, and they were riding all over the place. The battalion on my left pulled out ahead of time. The cavalry began easing around there, and they also tried to get this Army lieutenant and Puller to surrender. They were supposed to hold there until 9 PM.

Well, Lewis had these machine guns which were drawn on carts by mules -- that was the kind of machine guns you had; they were Brownings -- and he went on and on. This lieutenant told me about it. He quoted Lewis as saying, 'Is this the way you fight the war in the goddamn Army? I am getting out of here!'

So Lewis took off cross country with his machine guns, and he came to one of these streams. At Benning there are streams that overflow the banks, and there was swampy ground, and he found a slashing that went across where a telephone line or something had gone across, and the trees had been cut down, and somehow or other he got his machine guns carts across that, and he reported in to me at 2 o'clock in the morning, (laughs) with his machine guns intact.

Q: The infantry element surrendered?
Smith: I suppose they did; yes, they probably surrendered.

Well, of course, later on in the course Nicaragua was in full flower, and the Army instructors came to me, and Gilder Jackson and I had not been to Nicaragua. I said to them, "We haven't been there, but go over to Nicaragua. We'd like to get some Marine to talk to us about Nicaragua." Both Gilder and I had not been in Nicaragua.

I said to them, "We haven't been there, but go over to the Company Course; and you've got 1st Lt Puller, who had 27 contacts in Nicaragua, and he could give you a very good talk." So they agreed to have Puller. They assembled both the Company Course and the Senior Course together plus the instructors -- about 200 people, I guess -- and got up there on the platform; he had no notes, and unfortunately they had told him not to talk about his contacts, but to talk about the country, the customs and manners of the people and so forth. So he got up and talked out of the side of his mouth -- that's the way he talks, out of the side of his mouth -- and he went into the private life of President Moncada, which was rather spicy. He went along for a while on that, and then shifted to the "yellow peril," and half his lecture was delivered about the threat from Japan -- and he had very definite ideas on what to do about that. Col. Marshall was not there, but these instructors afterwards came to me and said, "My God! How many people like that have you got in the Marine Corps?" I said, "We've only got one!" (laughter) "That's all!" But he was very popular with those people down there.

Q: They liked him.

Smith: Oh yes.
Q: Gen. Thomas was telling me about one of those sessions where he got up and argued vehemently with Col. Marshall.

Smith: Something-or-other, I don't know. Well, Col. Marshall was pretty definite in his ideas. He was a pretty tough hombre. He had a habit of coming in and giving short five-minute pep talks at the end of a period, and he came in one day, and we had these maps; they were tremendous, and at the end of a session you usually folded up your maps and put them away. There was a major tank officer, who was a student, and he must have been a dumb dumbbell, because after Col. Marshall began to talk, he was folding the map and making a lot of crinkling noises. Gosh, Col. Marshall turned on that fellow and he really told him off. He was mad!

Q: Of course you had to fold the maps according to the Fort Benning solution.

Smith: I've forgotten now how we folded them. (Pause) That about finishes Benning. In June 1932 I was detached to the Marine Corps Schools, and I knew that I'd have to pay for going to Benning -- I had to instruct for a while. I got up there on the 30th of June 1932, and assigned as an instructor in the then Company Officers' Course. It wasn't a junior course, it was a Company Officers' Course.

The school at that time was in one of the -- I don't know whether it was H Barracks or what it was -- one of those two-story barracks. They had put some proofing material in the lecture room, pasted it on the ceiling, but in the corridors and in the base where the
instructors worked there was no soundproofing, and we could not talk from here to there in that room; your voice would just roll around the room -- it was terrible. But the lecture room was sound-proofed, or sound-deadened, I guess you'd call it.

Gen. Breckénridge was the Commandant of the Schools at the time I went there, and, rightly, he wanted to give an amphibious flavor to the schools. Heretofore, they simply took Benning problems and gave them at the Marine Corps Schools, because our tables of organization -- the Marine tables of organization -- were based not on the tactical use of a rifle company, but on making the total equal the figure that the appropriations would provide. So you got rifle companies that weren't really rifle companies. That's where they had to balance the books, they'd take a few out of the rifle company, you see. And the Army's tables of organization were based on tactical purposes in effect at that time.

Gen. Breckénridge wanted to quit using those tables and shift to Marine Corps tables, which we did -- which had much smaller rifle companies than the Army company. We had at the last minute to rewrite every problem we had, and in order to find an area that had an amphibious flavor -- we didn't have decent maps of islands -- we had to take the Gettysburg map -- where we had excellent maps -- and our reproduction department made a big island out of a part of that map, and then we drew in on that island -- I forget what we called it -- Quantico Island or what have you -- and the towns remained the same; I think they did. And we'd go through the motions of making an amphibious landing and fighting a battle on this island which was part of the Gettysburg map.
Q: Wasn't this about the time that these schools were involved in writing the...

Smith: Yes. At that time the Company Officers' Course kept on going, but in the Field Officers' Course at Marine Corps Schools they quit instructing and all of them turned to writing, and the Tentative Landing Operations Manual came out in 1934. I was there in '32-'33, and they were working on it at that time. Some colonel had written a tremendous amount of material on amphibious operations that we had to work with, and it was very good. I forget who he was now. Eventually the Tentative Landing Operations Manual came out, and that was used as a guide.

There'd been a board.
Q: /Peck had been on it, and DelValle, and I think Waller. Barrett of course.

Smith: Houston Noble was on it. You are probably thinking of the revision of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1934, which became the 1938 Navy document.

Q: FTP 167.

Smith: Yes, FTP 167. Noble was on that board, I know.

Q: I think DelValle, Waller and Barrett maybe . . .

Smith: Barrett was undoubtedly involved.
Q: Earlier -- what they decided upon, (I think Gen. Russell probably... ) later to the committee which governed the writing of the Tentative Landing Manual.

Smith: Gen. Russell deserves a lot of credit; he is the man who established the FMF, and he is the man who put in selection, and he only had three years to do it in. He didn't have four years to do when he became commandant.

Q: Oh, he deserves a lot of credit.

Smith: He deserves a lot of credit.

Q: Walter Ansel, a naval officer, was there.

Smith: Yes, Ansel, I remember that name. Well, we got this thing going. The only thing we didn't agree definitely with what Gen. Breckinridge wanted was that he thought the schools should be placed where you learn and where you are not taught. So we pointed out to him that in this Company Officers' Course you got prospective company commanders who've got to know their weapons, and we had highly qualified weapons instructors, and we felt that it was essential that these highly qualified people instruct potential company commanders in the use of their weapons. And we got away with that. But he thought they would be just studying on their own, you see. That would work for a Senior Course or for the Naval War College, but it wouldn't work for a Company Course.
In the summer of 1933 -- that was the next year -- I went for a six-weeks course at the Chemical Warfare School, and came back.

Then in September 1933 I worked very religiously on a lecture on the tactical employment of the bayonet. I'd gone back into history -- all the way back. Of course, the idea was that it had no tactical value except to give a man confidence. That was the second period of the course in 1933, September 1933. I was well started on the lecture, when the adjutant interrupted me and gave me a list of names of officers to report immediately to Barracks B for duty with the 7th Regiment. Well, I read off the list of the officers and went on with the lecture. A few minutes later he came in again and he gave me another list to report to Barracks B. I read them off and dismissed them, and went on with the lecture. Then he came in with a third list, and my name was on that list. And I thought, well, it's only 10 minutes from finishing the lecture; I'll finish this lecture and then go over to Barracks B, which I did. And I was assigned as assistant operations officer of the regiment under the then Major J.C. Smith.

Q: What was the urgency for the 7th Regiment?

Smith: As far as I can figure it now, they thought for a while that they might send that regiment down to Cuba when Batista was in the process of taking over. But they thought better of it and the regiment was never sent, and eventually it disappeared. But as far as I know, that was what it was organized for, and it was organized hastily. It was the first FMF unit. In 1934 Gen. Russell organized the FMF; this was September '33, and in '34 this 7th
Regiment was still existing and it became the first troop...

Q: ... of the East Coast expeditionary force.

Smith: Well, eventually it became that. Gen. Almond was at Quantico with a small staff, and he was the CC of FMF, of everything. But all he had was two or three officers with him, that's all, and this 7th Regiment.

Q: You say the bayonet has no tactical value. I was thinking of it as a shock value.

Smith: Well, I went into the Russo-Jap War, and went into the Boer War, and went into the use of the bayonet in the Civil War, and in World War I, and I found it greatly exaggerated. The bayonet man-to-man very seldom happened, except in the Russo-Jap War. And there were a lot of bayonet casualties there.

Q: We have a famous painting of Bannock Woods, showing...

Smith: But when you run down the history... Where I got the dope was from the medical officers, how many bayonet wounds they treated, and there weren't many.

Q: Same thing for the Civil War?

Smith: Yes.
Q: How about the Franco-Prussian war?

Smith: Same thing. The place where they really used it was the Russo-Jap war, and they really used the bayonet, both of them, and used it very seriously.

Q: And of course Stony Point and the Battle of the Revolution.

Smith: Well, you see, you hear these reports of Appomattox -- oh not Appomattox, but the Courthouse, am after the battle of the Wilderness, where they had the Bloody Angle, and the Confederates were in this angle and you see the pictures of the Union troops charging in and driving them out with the bayonet. So what happened was that the Confederates got a out before anybody had a chance to stick them with a bayonet.

Q: When I think of shock value, when you see someone attacking you or you hear the clicking of bayonets being fastened...

Smith: It does give the man with the bayonet some confidence. He has more confidence with that bayonet attached there than without it. But why use a bayonet to kill a man if you can pull a trigger and kill him that way?

Q: Of course this one attack in the Revolution right near the Hudson -- I am pretty sure it's Stony Point -- were the order was given to the American forces to attack; that was a night attack with bayonets; not a shot was to be fired.
Smith: Well, yes, I suppose they were valuable there. (Pause)

Col. R.P. Williams was in command of this regiment and Lt. Col.
John R. Henry was executive officer. And that finishes up the 7th
Regiment.

On September 28th 1933, I got a personal letter from Gen.
Russell -- who was then Commandant -- ordering me to the Ecole de
Guerre unless I had some personal reason for not going. Well, I
was reluctant to leave the 7th Regiment at that time when it was on
the verge on going on expeditionary duty, but it was up to them.
And the regiment never went anywhere anyway. I sailed from Baltimore
on January 17th 1934 on the City of Havre. Incidentally, those
ships came back and were converted to APAs in World War II, and
I stayed sailed to Iceland on one of them; the USS Fuller, which
was one of the Baltimore Line ships; I forget which one it was --
the City of Baltimore, the Havre, something like that.

I went over in January and the Ecole de Guerre didn't open
till November, and they gave me that time to get command of the
French ship. Capt. McCormick was the naval attaché, and later Capt.
Beauregard, and I was attached to the naval attaché's office for
administrative purposes. Of course, my sole duty was to perfect
myself in the French language. I had had four years of college
French and had some practice with the language in Haiti, but I
needed a lot more than that, as there was no English spoken in
the Ecole de Guerre. The first thing I did was to go for a
course refresher at the Alliance Française, which was a school in Paris
that taught French to foreigners. There was no English spoken
there, no Polish spoken, or anything else -- they taught you French.
How they managed with somebody that knew no French at all, I don't
know, but they did it. Then after that we went down in the Loire Valley and lived with a French family at a Château there. The owner was the widow of a major of the French Army and she owned this old château: the towers had been destroyed by Richelieu -- it dated back to Richelieu.

Q: Oh really?

Smith: It was Cinq Mars. There is a book, The Conspiracy of Cinq Mars, a novel. He tried to get the king to drive out Richelieu and he lost his head instead. They then destroyed his castle which was this place we lived in. We lived in the guard house, which was not destroyed. The towers were destroyed.

Q: What was the Cinq for?

Smith: I don't know, that was his name. The little village where it was located was called Cinq Mars La Pile. La Pile means tower. There was near there a tower made of brick that was built by the Romans as an observation tower. It's still there.

Of course, there you had to talk French because nobody there talked English. It's interesting that this château where we lived in the guard house was only about 300 yards from the spot where Gen. Dunlap was killed -- Gen. Dunlap of the Marine Corps. Now Gen. Dunlap had gone over -- he was not going to be a student in the Ecole de Guerre, but an observer, and he had done the same thing I did; he was down, living in a château and getting his language straightened away.
Q: Why the Loire Valley region?

Smith: Good French. They talked the best French. In the Loire Valley we had the flat of the valley, and then there were short cliffs that come up sharply. Their houses are built in those cliffs: they dig in. An at this château where he lived the cow barn was dug in \textcolor{red}{\text{the cliff}} and he was just walking around the yard when the hired woman was milking the cows; there had been a lot of rain and the stuff cracked down. Gen. Dunlap rushed in and threw himself over this woman to protect her, and then the rest came down on him and killed him. They sent a whole engineer battalion there to dig him out. The woman survived, but they had to amputate her legs.

Q: I guess he was a brigadier general at that time.

Smith: He probably was.

Q: I understand he was . . .

Smith: He was a very fine officer.

Q: He was certainly in line to be Commandant. Commandant designate.

Smith: Yes. He was a very, very fine officer. \textcolor{red}{\text{They had a beautiful little château in France. It had a drawbridge and a moat and a river running by. We went out and spent a weekend with him, at the Château de Coulennes, or something like that. After he died Mrs. Dunlap kept it, and each summer she'd get people to go over with}}
her, and they'd go together and live there. I don't know whether Mrs. Dunlap is alive today or not. She was living in Georgetown the last I heard of her.

Q: This happened before, didn't it? Wasn't he killed in '29?

W Smith: Oh no.

Q: It was later?

Smith: I went to France in 1934, ...

Q: And he was still alive then.

Smith: Oh no, no, he was dead. Down near there the Veterans of Foreign Wars had put up a something to mark that Gen. Dunlap was killed there. I don't know just when he was.

Q: I think it was '29.

Smith: You think it was '29? He'd been in Nicaragua in '27-'28, somewhere in there. Well ...

After two months with this family, then I had to start what the French call "stages", which are periods in the French regiments when you observe the training. The French officers who were going to the Ecole de Guerre were required to do that, and they were required to keep notebooks on everything they saw and heard, and those notebooks were turned in after the stage. But, of course, with me, they didn't bother me about any notebooks.
I started the first series of stages on July 1st 1934, and I went on duty with the 57th Regiment of Infantry at Bordeaux. The first part of the month was spent in barracks, and then we moved out to their big camp at Cama de Sauz. I think it was, for field training, field firing and what not.

Q: D-E-S-S-O-U-G-E-S, could that be it?

Smith: Oh no. I can look it up. Americans had been there in World War I. It's 5-O-U-E-S, I think. I'll check on it.

Q: The only reason I'm trying to get these words is for when I prepare the glossary for the transcriber. It's easier if they know how to spell them, and if I don't -- well!

Smith: Don't let me forget that, I'll look it up. Anyway, the training there was very thorough, except for the rifle. The French didn't believe the rifle had the part in battle -- machine guns, automatic rifles, they really worked on that. But the rifle... I went to see a rifle practice one day. They didn't have any targets up there, and the lieutenant told these people, "Range, umpty ump, fire 10 rounds." And they fired the 10 rounds, some of them from the left shoulder, some from the right shoulder, and after the 10 rounds they examined the targets, and a couple of targets had no hits on them at all. There was no correction, and that was it. That was rifle shooting. Machine guns were different, mortars were different.
While I was there, Col. Chapoulilly -- a very fine gentleman -- insisted that I accompany him on a parade in Bordeaux on Bastille Day. I said, "Now look, Colonel, I don't want to get involved trying to handle a sword on a horse." He said, "Oh, if you want a pistol, and I'll give you my horse which is very "sage" (which means not temperamental -- he rode the temperamental horse)." So I agreed to ride the darn thing. It was a tremendous parade; it was reviewed by the Comte de Chambrun, he's that fellow that married an American; a descendant of Lafayette.

Chambrun

Q: René de Chambrun was ambassador to the United States.

Smith: He was a major general, and he reviewed the thing. I think the division went by. I didn't realize there was an American Consul there in Bordeaux; I should have told him about it. I saw this American officer in uniform riding in this French parade and he did not know just what was going on. But he got in touch with me and I told him. He was a very fine fellow, no complications.

The other preparations for that parade at the barracks -- they simply broke out all the horses that were to participate, and the men fell out in their dungarees -- what we call dungarees -- with rifles; and the band there; and they just marched round and round and round in the quadrangle, and the horses were there to get used to the music. And that's all the preparation there was. But it looked good. Of course, they were ahead of us on drill regulations. They are the ones that invented this simplified drill where you just do right face or left face. There's no such thing as squads right and squads left, and right in the line and left in the line. They had ranks of three -- what we had later on.
Q: Did you wear your blues?

Smith: No, I wore greens for that. I wore blues for other occasions like cocktail parties and what not. (Pause) There was no paper work in the regiment. I've saved a morning report; it's on a little piece of scratch paper, about so big, and it's got what company it was and the date, "none absent," and the initials. That was the morning report. They only had one typewriter per regiment. One typewriter per regiment, that's all, so there couldn't be an awful lot of paper work.

There were no disciplinary problems because the conscription in France was very fair; everybody was conscripted, able-bodied and not. They would find something for you to do if you weren't able-bodied. So these enlisted men knew that everybody else was doing the same thing; that they weren't being picked upon; and anyway they all had what they called a little "carnet," which was the information on their name, thumb prints and what outfit they belonged to; and they had to have that in their possession at all times, and they could not move from one department to another without permission. So if they deserted there was no place they could go; they couldn't get a job; there was nothing they could do unless they showed that "carnet."

Q: Every citizen had an identification card in France.

Smith: Sure, everybody who'd been in the military. Not the women, of course. I talked to these French officers about it later. I remember I was in one big camp and the sanitary facilities were not too wonderful. They didn't have flush toilets; they had a sort of cylindrical hole in a concrete place that sloped down toward this hole and there were heel places where you put your heels down, and the place was filled up with feces. The colonel apologized to me.
He said to me, "We just don't have enough people on extra duty in order to clean this up." They didn't have any working parties like we have; and I talked to these French officers, and they said, "Once in a while some enlisted men get fresh with an officer and we give them some extra duties, but that's all." And then they said, "I understand that your people who guard prisoners carry guns. Do you mean that if a prisoner starts to run you shoot?" I said, "We'd try to halt him and if he doesn't you shoot for his feet." "That's brutal" they said; they couldn't see that at all.

That tour of duty ended the 4th of July, and then on August 1st I had to report to the 301st Regiment of Artillery at Lafère in Northeast France, not too far from Soissons. Of course, we were in barracks and saw the barracks training. Then we went to Camp Girose, which was a big camp where artillery had actually fired, and they put on some demonstrations of artillery fire. I saw a barrage that was very, very convincing. We never had enough ammunition over here to put on a rolling barrage. But this was very convincing.

I saw the 3rd Cavalry Division make an attack across the Aisne River, and they had a regiment of Spahis. The Spahis are those North African cavalrymen who have those red-lined capes. It was beautiful but not practical. This regiment charged across.

One machine gun finished the whole works.

Q: With baggy pants ...

Smith: Yes. My classmate in the Ecole de Guerre was Maj. Renner. He is now dead. He was a cavalryman. The colonel of this Spahi regiment loaned Renner his horse to see how it rode.
been used to trotting horses, but an Arabian horse does not compare. And he could not make that horse trot. You either set to walk, or what the French call a 'trot' (a very fast walk), or then you go into a gallop, and then into the run. These Spahis went off their charge with their sabres at a full run, not a gallop.

That tour I finished on August 28th. I ate in the French mess there, and my comrade wanted to withdraw from the darn place because of the filthy language they used. I worked in a logging camp there, and there was nothing in our logging camp comparable to what those fellows put on -- the songs and stuff.

Q: The officers' mess?

Smith: Yes, the officers' mess. And I noticed the colonel came there one night and he enjoyed it thoroughly. Yet I went to that colonel's quarters for dinner, he invited me up there, and he just exuded refinement: his whole setup, his wife, his children, his sister-in-law. But that same fellow himself in the mess.

Q: Why do you think this is so?

Smith: I don't know; the French are that way.

Q: Well, the British had the filthiest, dirtiest/songs I've ever heard. Some are very charming.

Smith: We learned that in Iceland from the British. (laughter) But that's not . . .
Q: But they had other songs. In Korea, when I was with the 5th Marines, we were near a REME outfit, the post of the cockneys. When Puller came up, he was on an inspection trip, and they had him doubled over with laughter. The filthiest . . .

Smith: Yes. Well, the French were that way. And then of course every time I went out to dinner with them they were always trying to make the waitresses and what not. They were a very predatory outfit.

Q: Your French was very good now.

Smith: Oh yes, I got French training regulations, and I went through the damn thing. I picked out phrases that were typically military. I had a French-English dictionary, but it was inadequate. But if I couldn't get the definitions from that, I wrote the definitions in French. And then I would talk to these French officers and get the meaning of these phrases, which I wrote down in French. After six months I had a military vocabulary. I never used the dictionary again in these talks. But I had no cocktail vocabulary or any chitter-chatter. I had a military vocabulary, pure and simple.

But we, on those exercises -- well, I'll get into that later.

The next thing I went to was on August 31st when I reported to the 502nd Tank Regiment at Angoulême, which is down in the South of France. When I got there I found that the one conscript class was on the way out, and the new conscript class was coming in. There was no training. I talked to the poor bandleader: he had an excellent band; he had just two people left in the band, that's all.
The French at that time had a tank that the Germans took over later, a good tank, it was a D tank, but they kept it under wraps. We couldn't even see the thing, and the only thing they talked to us about was the World War I tank which the French never intended to use and which was just a little bust, you know.

Q: Tankette.

Smith: I looked the situation over and I decided I'd just shove off. I cut my tour short. The French were a little annoyed, but I wasn't going to waste my time down there on that stuff. I came back to Paris and we got an apartment, and then I went to every lecture that I could find just to get my ear trained. And it's quite a thrill when you finally get to the point where you listen to this fellow, you understand what he is saying, and you don't realize he is talking in French. Then you know that you've arrived.

The first year in this course -- we started the first week in November -- was the division with the supporting arms, and a lot of other things thrown in. They learned English, German, Russian, had equitation, political science, and lots of other things. But basically it was division and supporting arms in the first year.

The French students that I was with were very, very carefully selected, and if they graduated from the Ecole de Guerre they were practically sure of being general officers. The class was divided into six groups of about 18 officers each, with two or three foreign officers with each group, and the instruction was the conference method of instruction, which was excellent: you don't have any approved solutions, you come in and discuss a problem, and the
instructor interrogates you and he leads you along, and you eventually come up with a solution. You never know whether it's a school solution or not, unless he knocks down your arguments. I remember one time my French was not adequate to argue with an instructor, and there was a question of how many battalions of artillery to assign to this operation. I had the right answer, and I gave that answer to the instructor; but then he began to cross-examine me, and I couldn't justify it, you see, and I thought maybe I had the wrong answer. He came back to it, and that was the answer; maybe he got some French officer who could defend it. They wanted to make you reason, and they worked and worked and worked over the development of a process of reasoning, and they carried it to such extremes that they couldn't make a decision. They would say, "on the one hand, on the other hand," and they'd go back and forth, and no decision; whereas the Anglo-Saxons would blunder into a decision that might be wrong, but at least they'd make a decision.

Q: Where did the foreign officers come from? All over the world?

Smith: Yes. We had one Italian. We had no Germans, of course. We had them from -- Russia has those three countries now.

Q: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Smith: Yes, we had them from up there and we had them from Czechoslovakia. We had some British, but the British were too proud to be students. They came over and talked English to the Ecole de Guerre people, and listened in. We had Spanish, we had a Brazilian, we had
a Mexican. The Mexican was pretty clever; he liked to live in Paris, so he would never complete the year's course, and he'd come back the second year and start over again. He did that for about five years! I don't know whether they ever caught up on him or not.

We had a lot of terrain exercises and historical rides. We went over the battlefields, and the Frenchmen really knew terrain. My goodness! Every little swale and hollow meant something to them.

Before you started a problem they'd get somebody wise to give us a tour d'horizon -- a tour of the horizon -- which would take in everything you saw in connection with the problem, a detailed description of it, and what you could do with it.

Q: Now the Japanese in World War II and later the Koreans, and now the Vietnamese have a feeling for terrain, to organize the ground, which the Americans never had. They could the French have done that? They may have known terrain, but could they have organized it? Could they have done things with it?

Smith: Oh yes. As a matter of fact I found this instruction that I got in the Ecole de Guerre was very valuable to me when I came back to the schools to teach landing on islands, because the French were always working out of some place. They couldn't do any Stonewall Jackson thing. All they could do was assemble everything in one spot and try to make a breakthrough, and then exploit the breakthrough. That's exactly what we do in landing operations. You see, we land right on the nose. It's only MacArthur who landed where "they ain't." They therefore have to carefully study the terrain to see what they can do with it. They are very conscious of the terrain.
Q: You said the French officers who graduated could be assured of generalcy. Did many people drop out?

Smith: No, because the preparation was so tough. If they made the school they were in. My goodness, they had to go through -- first they had to take written examinations; then they had to appear before a board of general officers for evaluation as to their character; then they went on the "stages" for three months and put in a report. And by that time they were ready to go to school. None of them dropped out, no. All the preparation was before.

Q: How did the foreign officers do?

Smith: Not too well. /I felt sorry for those guys. They had to take notes in their own script; that meant that the lecturer was lecturing in French, and that they had to make a translation into Iranian and put it in Iranian script. You just lose an awful lot. I made up my mind early in the game that I would take no notes in English. My notes might be fragmentary, but I'd take notes in French and that paid dividends, because you began to think in French.

Well, starting in May of '35 -- that's the second year -- we started what they called the voyages. They were mounted terrain exercises. There was a remarkable piece of staff organization to organize that. We went by groups, and we . . . .

End of side 2 of Tape I, Session I.
Smith: As I was saying, these voyages were a remarkable example of staff planning. They had to have a series of terrain exercises, starting down by Tours that ended up west of Paris, and you'd join a voyage near Tours that would be an infantry voyage for a few days. Then another group would come down and take cavalry. Then another group would come down and take artillery, where the emphasis was on that. Then we would come back again and pick up artillery. That went on for most of the summer. You were billeted on the population. According to French law people were required to have a room for officers with a wash basin and towel, and they were supposed to have it available, and you could occupy it for three days with no charge. After three days you had to get out. So we had to change our area every three days. We'd move to another area and be billeted again. These Goums from North Africa went ahead with the horses, and when we arrived by train at the depot, there they were with your horse, and they showed you to the house where you were going to live. You /introduced yourself, and there you were. We rounded up at 6 o'clock in the morning. You put your foot in the stirrup at 6 AM sharp, and there was never any argument about that. And we worked all morning, mounted, and they had arranged for the noon meal at some restaurant in some village somewhere; and we always managed to get there at 12 noon sharp. Then in the afternoon you marked up your maps for the succeeding day, and there was a critique held around 5 o'clock. Then the next morning up at 6 o'clock.
I stayed with a varied assortment of people — retired farmers, doctors etc. — and I was rather hesitant to go into these places without paying, but the French officers said, "That's the law. If they don't want to put you up they are supposed to put you up in a hotel at their expense." That happened to us at St. Quentin. They wouldn't put up these people, so we were put up in a hotel at their expense, and there again the French officers wouldn't let me pay my hotel bill to teach these people a lesson.

But if anybody has ever written up problems for terrain exercises, he would appreciate this performance as tremendous; to do it for a whole summer, and . . .

Q: Through the whole country, too.

Smith: Well, starting at Tours and ending up west of Paris meant covering a whole range of river crossings, everything. Of course, there were no troops involved; this was all terrain exercise, maps.

Q: Nothing to do with amphibious operations at all? Strictly land-water warfare.

Smith: No, I was excluded from that. They had one period they took the French officers down somewhere and gave them instruction in amphibious operations. It was confidential, and I don't know what they got, and I never asked them. I don't imagine it amounted to much. One professor told us frankly when he started out, "We are talking about one war, and that is the war against Germany." And that's what it was. It was all oriented to stopping the Germans and then doing something about it.
Q: What was the reaction to the Nazis and to Hitler at this time? Was there any feeling -- or --

Smith: Well, I got out of France in '36, and Hitler really didn't come into power until '36 or after. I did, in driving the family along the Rhine Valley -- the Rhineland -- see one of Hitler's battalions armed with shovels. That was before he armed them with rifles. I did get a letter from one of my comrades later on, when they mobilized to drive Hitler out of the Rhineland; and if they had moved he would have gotten out. But the French mobilized and said, "Well, at least one thing, we proved that in eight days we could mobilize." The others didn't. They mobilized, but the decision was not to do anything about it, and Hitler took over the Rhineland. (Pause) Somewhere along the line I remember a case of a French cavalry officer who was a comrade of mine who went out somewhere in Northeast France and was billeted with a widow woman. Now the rule there was that a widow must be over 50 years of age. He -- I forget his name -- was billeted with a French family, both father and mother living, who had a daughter of almost marriageable age in the family. The next morning this French officer joined us for the noon meal, and he was fit to be tied. This father had made him come in by 9 o'clock in the evening and go into his room, and he'd lock the door from the outside; and then in the morning he'd unlock the door and let him out. Boy, this French officer was just fit to be tied! (laughs) I met him when I went over with Adm. Wright in 1954 or '55 to Paris, with the NATO headquarters, and he was a colonel then on duty on the staff of NATO. I tried to remind him of that, but he wouldn't remember it. I took him to lunch.
Let's see. At least as far as I was concerned we began these voyages on May 9th, and ended on July 26th -- which was quite a lengthy time, of course. There were periods when we were in Paris, while another group was doing a voyage, but then we were taken out on historical rides or something like that, in that period -- or for a demonstration of equipment, something like that.

The second year of the school was devoted to the army corps and army, with supporting arms and miscellaneous subjects. In that year all the foreign officers were required to give a talk to their comrades, 50 minutes worth, in French, on a subject of their choosing. And I struggled with this thing. I knew the French officers were just crazy about Indians and frontiers. All of them had read the Leatherstocking Tales, you know -- all these French officers had read those.

So I looked up a talk on the frontier in American history -- the progress of the frontier from colonial times on across. I thought it went all right. President Theodore Roosevelt wrote a similar type of book, I forget what he called it, but it was a study of the advance of the frontiers.

Q: Of course that's the famous concept in American history...

Smith: Sure. But it was a pain in the neck. In that second year we did more historical rides, and then finally from June 2nd to the 14th we had the finale of the course, which was a big more or less command post exercise up near Mézières, which is in Northeast France. It's the northern limit of the Maginot Line; it's where the Maginot Line ended; between Mézières and the coast there was nothing but field fortifications. There again we had various different commands. I was successively the commanding general of the 8th Army Corps...
and commanding general of the 8th Infantry Division (friendly) and commanding general of the 10th Army Corps (enemy). You operated, and the French orders were written out in great detail: we had to write out the orders for attacks and defenses and what not. They were written in longhand on a reproduction sort of paper that would reproduce 25 copies, no typewriter. Those were Army orders.

Q: No five-paragraph order for them.

Smith: They had more than five paragraphs. They had a lot of details. I've still got the little aide-mémoire—the French aide-mémoire, the book that had all the notes on organization, weapons, everything else. These young officers carried that around; if they didn't remember everything, it was in there.

Q: Just like the staff manual.

Smith: Yes, but this was more detailed. It had all the tables of organization. It had everything in there; the range weapons could fire etc. It was very thorough.

In one of these messes, somewhere along the line, there would be these tremendous discussions that would take place in the mess on various subjects. The French officers would argue back and forth. Now most of these French officers had been in World War I, but there was one young officer there who had come after World War I, and he was quite talkative, and he was putting up an argument that France had won World War I on her own; that it wasn't the allies that had helped France to win. France's fighting ability had won the war.
The other officers argued that after all the Americans and the British had something to do with it. I listened to this, and he got vehement and he said, "After all, what was the American Army? It was just a cloud on the horizon." They argued with him again, and he came out with it stronger, so in the best French I could muster I told this young fellow, "Now look, did you ever hear of the Argonne operation? After all, there were 800,000 Americans that participated in that operation, and that was a little more than a cloud on the horizon." Then he apologized, and all these French officers began telling what a wonderful army the American Army was. I never thought anything more about it. But on graduation day this young fellow came around to me to say good-bye, and he said, "I trust there is no bitterness." I said, "Heck, no, I'd forgotten all about that!" But I still think he believed it.

Q: It was pretty typical of some of them, this attitude.

Smith: Yes.

Q: The supremacy of the French Army over any other.

Smith: Well, they were at one time considered the best army in Europe, and they lived on that reputation, and the German army built up. They were very good on staff work. I never saw anything like it in America. I watched one operation there of staff work -- it was remarkable. At Benning we touched on that kind of thing -- how when you get columns proceeding and crossing each other, going at different speeds, how do you figure
when to start and stop them in order not to cause a traffic jam.

Q: The march serials?

Smith: Yes. We did that for the brigade. I was in one of these exercises and it was a question of moving a couple of Army corps across the country by road and rail and everything else. And these French staff officers -- of course there again we were assigned jobs -- organized what they called the Bureau of Movement, an office in movement, with three or four of them and they'd step down and within an hour they'd have the whole thing cleared out.

My goodness, I thought it would take a week to figure that one out, because you had all these different speeds, and all the different roads. You had artillery, tanks, you had the infantry, all going at different speeds. And they couldn't cross each other unless you figured it out in advance.

Q: Isn't this the nature of continental warfare? It was the Germans that organized the railroads. I think the French . . .

Smith: The French did too. They did a remarkable thing. When you think that . . . for instance Soissons was fought on July 18th 1918, and they'd gotten in there by truck and rail and what not, and then they moved the whole outfit including the First and Second Infantry Divisions by road and rail around St Mihiel, which was tough, and my Gosh, they all got there, and that was a tremendous movement.

The trucks were driven by these little animals which were these North Vietnamese people.
An interesting thing: the 5th Marines in going into Soissons had to come up through a big wood -- I forget the name of it -- to the jump off line, and their trucks or something had been delayed, so they had the double time to get to the line of departure on time. The same thing happened to the 5th Marines where the jump off for Operation Killer in Korea. We were to jump off on February 21st 1951, and I was jumping off with the 1st and 5th Marines in assault. The 7th Marines was still coming by a road around from Pohang. We moved in there. And General MacArthur at that time decided to visit the area where we'd jump off to give some decorations to the people who were leaving, and they stopped all traffic in and out of the place while MacArthur was in the area, and our 5th Marines were moving in by truck and couldn't move in. I sent Lewie Puller up ahead to Wondju, and I intended to come up before the jump off, and Lewie called me up all excited and he said if this wasn't going to make it, how many people did we have to have up there in order to jump off? The First Marines had gotten up there before this closing off of the traffic. I said, "I'll be up there in time, but if one battalion of the 5th Marines gets there in time to jump off we will jump off with the 1st, and one battalion of the 5th." And that battalion had the double time to get in there for the jump off. I forget whether it was the 2nd or 1st battalion. But it's interesting that history repeated itself.

Q: At that Soissons attack was when the 5th double time at night, was it not?
Smith: It must have been, because it must have been a daylight attack. Well, it was not at night, that the jump off for Operation Killer was made.

Q: I wonder if the reason why the emphasis on organization of march serials and movements such as they had in France, and why this country didn't emphasize it was because our concept of fighting was to fight overseas, and we are not concerned on movements within this country.

Smith: No, no we are not. The thing I could never understand about the Army is why they could never figure that in World War II we had to have an amphibious operation to get ashore in Europe. They just figured that it'd be like World War I, that the French would be holding all the ports, and all we'd have to do is go in and go into the lines. It never occurred to them that they'd have to land an assault. So at the last minute they dashed down and got our FTP 167 information and copied it into a field manual to give their people on what to do about amphibious operations.

Q: The Amphibious Force of the Atlantic fleet -- Holland Smith's outfit . . .

Smith: He trained the lst Division, and that was for North Africa.

Q: And then on the West Coast . . .

Smith: But before that they got out this training manual.

Q: And they had an amphibious engineer outfit that supposedly was to -- which ran its own boats and so on . . .
Smith: You'll find when we get to Talasea that that's what I went ashore with -- 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The Navy didn't support that operation. The Army. That was Army.

Q: Had you learned a lesson by then? Were they good?

Smith: They were pretty good, except that the Navy just was shocked at the way they handled boats with abandon. I went out in one of their boats to transport that was anchored there, and all there was was a coxswain, and it was an LCM or something like that, and we went alongside this transport, and he left his tiller and got the boat ready to get hold of the line, you should have two men in a boat like that.

That lieutenant colonel who commanded that engineering outfit with me was a very fine officer; he eventually became Deputy CIA. Amory was his name. He was a very fine man. He went on with that outfit to the Philippines. My gosh, they went in small boats from New Guinea to the Philippines. They just took off. Of course there were islands not too far apart. That's the way they operated. Well, I got into that a little later. Well, graduation was in July of 1936 -- I guess it must have been -- and we were given a certificate and given the tabs of French staff officer. I've got a certificate that appoints me as a staff officer of the French Army.

Q: Did you wear the tabs?

Smith: I've got them somewhere, stowed away. They are red and they have lightning flashes; little red lightning flashes. The red tabs you put on your sleeve.
Q: Did the French have the same concept of a staff officer as the Germans have? In other words, the commanding general has as his principal adviser a member of the general staff.

Smith: Well, the French started the general staff system, and the Germans developed it to a high degree, and the staff became all powerful in Germany. As far as I know, in Germany as in France there was a G-1,2,3,4 and a chief of staff. It was the same type of organization. Apparently, the general staff officers in Germany made the tactical decisions; it was a staff officer who told the German commander to withdraw after the Battle of the Marne. That was a lieutenant colonel of the general staff, and that general withdrew. That wouldn't happen in France; they didn't have that kind of an organization. (Pause)

I came home in August 1936 on the SS City of Baltimore. As expected, I was ordered to the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico as an instructor, and reported there in August of '36. Gen. Holcomb was then commandant of the Marine Corps Schools. From the time I had been there before there had been tremendous strides made in the instruction. They really were studying this problem of the march across the Pacific in depth. We had problems worked up for Palau, Guam; we captured Guam; we had Saipan.

Q: Truk, I imagine.

Smith: Oh, Truk -- we worked hard on Truk.

But by the time I got there in '36 the Tentative Landing Operations Manual had been published, and they were working on smoothing it for FTP 167. The only thing I objected to -- and I think maybe did get
some revision of their thinking on that -- was that the man who planned the naval gunfire for a landing wanted the attack to go in by phase lines, reaching phase lines at a given hour, and then he'd sit down and figure out naval gunfire for all those objectives because he had the time. I said, "My gosh, how do you know you're going to get there? You've got to have it on call. You can do it for the beach: you can plan all that ahead, but anything beyond the beach has got to be on call." And of course that upset his whole apple cart. That was Col. Shannon. (laughs) But we finally put that across, and got it more realistic.

Of course, Gen. Holcomb didn't stay with us too long. On January 1st 1937 he became Commandant of the Marine Corps, and he was relieved by Col. Clapp first, and then Gen. Buttrick came down. The interesting thing on his being appointed Commandant was -- I happened to go to the big Birthday Ball in Area 17 there at Quantico: Gen. Holcomb was present, Gen. Lyman was there, Gen. Russell was there, there were people from headquarters. And Gen. Lyman thought he was going to be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. Gen. Holcomb had been confidentially advised that he was to be the Commandant; he didn't say anything about it. Gen. Russell never said anything about it at the dinner. Finally some woman turned to Gen. Lyman and said, "I'm sorry about what happened." He said, "What happened?" Then she told him, and boy, that kind of broke up the party down there.

Q: It got around fast!

Smith: It got around fast, yes. But Gen. Holcomb was a very fine Commandant.
Q: Was that some senior officer's wife who said it?

Smith: Yes. She was sitting next to him; it must have been a senior officer's wife. His aide knew about it, but the aide was afraid to tell him.

Q: Everybody knew about it except . . .

Smith: Except him. He was a kind of a tough hombre, you know. I just saw his son Andrew, and he's a dead ringer for his father. He was on the FMF staff when I was in command.

Q: He was Big Foot Brown's artillery exec in the Marines.

Smith: I don't remember.

Q: I am pretty sure he was.

Smith: He was with me in FMF; I forget what job he had there.

Q: He must have been a lieutenant colonel then.

Smith: I think he was colonel. That was in '55. He's retired and living in Marin County now. (Pause) Well, I simply instructed in amphibious operations there. Of course, I always wanted to go to the FMF and had never been able to make it, but I did finally get detached on June 1st 1939 to the FMF in San Diego. In those days the FMF headquarters of all the FMF
was in San Diego, and Gen. Louis McCarty Little was in command of the FMF. Later he was relieved by Gen. Upshur. They assigned me there to staff duties as usual. I was made what they called in those days F-3. I was the operations officer of the Force. The Fleet Marine Force in those days consisted of the 1st Brigade at Quantico, the 2nd Brigade at San Diego, and aviation units at San Diego, Quantico and Virgin Islands -- that was it. Now the Brigade itself was a stripped down brigade, consisting of one regiment, and the regiment having only two battalions, a minimum of supporting troops and artillery. That was what we had. We did some field training on a make-shift basis. They managed to lease some land 10 miles east of San Diego -- what became Camp Elliott -- and they'd go out there and wander around the brush and do a little shooting. And of course, we began to agitate for the purchase of a decent training area, and we were pinned down. Headquarters Marine Corps was not interested in a training area for anything more than a brigade, and that brigade had to be supported from the Marine Corps Base at San Diego, which limited what you could do. But we went around and we recommended an area, 19,000 acres, near the old Escondido Road, about 10 miles east of San Diego. We got nowhere with our recommendation until the reserves were mobilized in November 1940, and then the Marine Corps purchased the 19,000 acres just like that.

Q: The quartermaster general at that time was Seth Williams, who was a very tight fisted individual.

Smith: Yes. When we were dickering about this area, as a matter of curiosity I went up with Col. Creasy to Santa Margarita Ranch, which became Camp Pendleton. We went in and talked to Mr. O'Neill
who owned the place along with Mr. Flood, and talked to the manager, and talked about leasing land. The manager said, "We'll lease you the top of those mountains, but that's all we are interested in leasing."

Old Mr. O'Neill said, "I am not making any money out of this land anyway; I wish the Government would take it over." That was '42, they did take it over for $2,000,000.

Q: Is that the Flood who had the Flood Estate around here?

Smith: Yes. He was a silent partner in this deal. O'Neill was the front man; he lived in the Ranch House and he ran the ranch. But most of the money as far as I know came from Mr. Flood. We had a Flood Building in San Francisco, and a Flood Estate. He was a millionaire.

Q: Down in Monterey too?

Smith: I don't know whether he was in Monterey, but certainly around the peninsula he had big holdings. We thought it was a good idea to name the new camp Camp Holcomb. We ran into difficulties there, because you are not supposed to name a camp for anybody who's alive, except Camp H.M. Smith in Honolulu which we named for a living general. Gen. Holcomb said, "You got to change the name" so we changed it to Camp Elliott, the name of a previous Commandant of the Marine Corps. And we laid out firing ranges there; we did a tremendous amount of live firing, but we had a great deal of difficulty with fires: every time a tracer bullet or a mortar round would go out into this grease wood you'd have a beautiful fire.
We had beautiful fire lanes all around the place, but the rule was that the fellow who started the fire had to stay there until it was out; and the poor mortar people, they never got home, because they were the people that always started the fires. The place was alive with rattlesnakes, but I always carried a stick, and I'd hit the brush with the stick just to give the rattlesnake warning so he could warn me. But we never had anybody bitten. We had one lieutenant who was struck in the heel of his shoe, and a private who had a rattlesnake grab on to his trouser's leg, but didn't get through to his skin. That's all the trouble we had.

Q: Scared the devil out of 'em.

Smith: Oh sure! We killed about one a day, and, of course, the men used them to scare people to death; they'd lay out the darn snake some place where somebody would run on to it and would be scared to death.

In 1940 we talked to the Navy and decided to put on a real amphibious operation around San Clemente Island. The Navy agreed to send in battleships, cruisers, destroyers, transports, everything and we'd really have a go round. And then the Japanese situation worsened, and the Navy had to pull out all these ships. But we held the exercises. There was an awful lot of artificiality at San Clemente Island because they've got only 100-yard beaches.

We put the Defense Battalions ashore there. By that time we had Defense Battalions; they had 50 machine guns. And Col. Bone had these things laid out so there wasn't anybody in the world could ever have gotten ashore. So we had to rule out about 75% of those
guns from naval gunfire in order to get ashore at all, and we had a maneuver. Then we couldn't stop Col. Thomason; he had the 2nd Battalion of the 6th, and he'd been raised on the legend of Stonewall Jackson, and this business of being stopped he just couldn't see, and he'd just keep on going. I was chief umpire, and I had to get Gen. Upshur to get hold of Col. Thomason and say, "This is it, you are not going in further." And they finally stopped John.

Q: He had 2-6 at this time?

Smith: Yes. I took over 1-6. Ashurst had 1-6, and Thomason had 2-6. At the end of the first year I still wanted to get a battalion, so I talked to Bill Ashurst and told him about all the beauties of staff duty, and how about trading with me. I talked him into it. We went around to Gen. Keating who commanded the brigade and he approved, and Bill came up and took over F-3. Shortly after, he was ordered to Peking and locked up as prisoner of war in 1941.

Q: Just think, if he hadn't given up his battalion . . .

Smith: My conscience hurts a little bit on that.

Q: Did you think about it?

Smith: Oh yes, I thought about it.

Q: You were promoted into the job anyway. He might have been slated for it regardless.
Smith: He was commanding the barracks out there, which was a better job than commanding a battalion at Camp Elliott.

Q: But he was a full colonel.

Smith: Yes, he was a full colonel.

Smith Q: So the point is that with promotion he would have been slated for it regardless of whether he gave up the battalion or not.

Smith: Yes. Well, this was a pretty busy time. After mobilization of these Reserve units, we did it a little differently at San Diego from the East Coast. Each battalion took an intact reserve battalion. I took the Seattle battalion intact, and absorbed it, and the commanding officer of the battalion became my executive officer. We had a few extra captains but eventually it all shook down. They had so few troops, it would have been impractical to bring them up to strength. It was much better to set them into an organized battalion and, anyway, their enlisted personnel wasn't so hot. There were some good officers. The executive officer, the commanding officer of the battalion, was a nice fellow, a bold one, but he didn't have enough background to supervise the training of a battalion in the field. He'd done a summer training, but that had not meant much. So I had to do all the work alone. I did a lot of work, I'll tell you. I tried to have one field exercise a week in the field, and they had to be written up. I had some very fine junior officers, like Bill Jones who was a 2nd lieutenant in my outfit, a very fine officer; Haffner;
but they didn't have the background to write up problems like that. I had to do it alone, and Baldwin couldn't help me. My commanders -- I had Jaime Sabatier and I don't know who else, but they were pretty busy and I couldn't call on them.

The first thing we had to do was to make our 3rd Battalion. We only had two battalions in the 6th after I went over to the 6th. Then we made the 8th Marines, and then we made the 2nd Marines, and I don't know how many Defense Battalions: they just kept coming and getting cadres and sending in recruits. You'd train up these recruits and then they'd be pulled as cadres for some unit.

Q: The 17th defense battalion was organized down there.

Smith: Yes. I finally came to the conclusion that the best kind of a recruit to get in my battalion was a farmer boy who didn't know anything about machines or anything else, and then the tanks and the motor transports and all these people wouldn't get his name, and I could hang on to him for a while. After I took over the battalion they turned over the M-1 rifle to us. They armed us with the M-1 rifle to try it out and report the bugs. And we found plenty of bugs; gee whiz, we had to have a cart with spare parts follow us around. But the Army was doing the same thing, and eventually they worked out all the bugs and it became a good rifle.

Q: Why didn't they take the Johnson rifle?

Smith: I don't know. The Army?
Q: Or the Marine Corps. I understand that Johnson was supposed to be a very fine one.

Smith: I didn't hear any talk about that.

Q: That's the one that a marine colonel invented, Melvin Johnson.

Smith: Oh. We moved into a tent camp at Camp Elliott in August 1940, and had field training, and in the fall of 1940 we absorbed the 1st battalion. Then the 1st Battalion was designated as the Air Infantry. Then we had to go down -- and the Navy cooperated very well -- to the air station. All we had in the way of planes to transport infantry was PBY planes. We went down there and figured out all the loads for machine company, rifle company, headquarters company -- what you could put in a given plane, what was the standard load, and we simulated the weight. We filled up bandoleers with sand and what not, because these aviators down there wanted to weigh out the plane. Once you got it loaded it had to have equilibrium.

We never got more than eight PBYs at a time. We flew around the ocean out there. The trouble was that the Marine Corps had not yet developed a good rubber boat that we could use. We wanted a boat that could be folded up inside the PBY and then pushed out the door and automatically inflated; and they just didn't have that kind of a thing.

Q: Wasn't that the one that Great Farrell was working on?

Smith: Yes, they eventually developed it. As matter of fact, in World War II there was one place where you could have used that kind
of infantry. That was the capture of Ulithi. There were only 100 Japs at Ulithi, and they sent a whole regiment, an RCT of the Army there to capture the place, and they landed that RCT on the beaches with all its gear, and only 100 Japs. Now you could have taken a battalion in these PBY planes and gone in there and done the business with no strain. But we didn't have that.

We were in Camp Elliott permanently in early 1940; we never got out of that tent camp before we went to Iceland. We continued furnishing cadres for new units. Then in February 1st 1941 the 2nd Mar Div was organized officially, and in late May we had a division review: the most impressive thing I've ever seen. Gen. Voge organized it for some South and Central American officers who were up observing, and by that time we had three regiments in the division plus the artillery, tanks, motor transport. The troops fell out in khaki and leggings and they marched at sling arms with fixed bayonets; out to Miramar Field, which was a big field near Camp Elliott. Dust clouds rising -- it was very impressive. In World War II, I never saw that many Marines in one place together. I had more Marines than that, but not together. One of these South Americans said to me, "My gosh, that outfit even come down and lick any army we've got in South and Central America!" And they could have.

Q: Are you skipping over Iceland?

Smith: Just coming to it.

Q: Oh, you went ahead on this.
Smith: Yes. In late May 1941, the First Battalion was engaged in loading out on the USS Fuller. We'd load out with simulated ammunition and what not, go over to San Clemente and make a landing and come back. Then another battalion would go over. As we were loading out, orders came to throw away the practice ammunition and what not and load 10 % units of real ammunition and 30-days rations; and to embark for an unknown destination. We didn't know where we were going. The units involved were the 6th Marines, now with its 3rd Battalion and supporting units, even a Parachute Platoon attached to me. We got rid of that on the East Coast. I was the troop commander on the USS Fuller. Capt. was commanding. I ran into him again; he was then a commodore and Chief of Staff to Kelly Turner on the Eldorado in Okinawa.

I suppose what I had would have been called a landing team. I had about a thousand men in the force. We sailed from San Diego May 31st, destination unknown. We didn't know what to do about uniforms. No word came from higher headquarters whether to take winter uniforms or not, and I told my crowd, "I am taking everything I've got including an overcoat. We haven't got any orders, but that is what I would suggest." Jaime Sabatier said, "I am not going to take any overcoat." He didn't, but when he got to Iceland he had to buy an enlisted man's overcoat.

We went down to the Canal and we passed through the Canal at night -- no one ashore. It was pretty tough on the men; they wanted to see the Canal, but nobody was allowed on deck. My guess was that we'd go to Guantanamo and then to Martinique. We kept in the wardrooms; the officers kept a chart, they'd plot it on the chart, trying to figure where on earth we were going.
I talked to the Captain. He was making checkpoint X or whatever it was. He didn't know his eventual destination, and I think he told me the truth. When he got to checkpoint Y, he was told to go to Z or something like that.

Well, by the time we rounded Cuba and passed through the Florida Straits all bets were off; we weren't going to Martinique then. We put in at Charleston, South Carolina, where we were joined by the 5th Defense Battalion, which had been hastily organized, and the machine guns had been shipped by express from all over the United States by the Army, because we were going to Iceland instead of the Army, you see? And they agreed to equip us. There was a $400,000 express bill, as a result of expressing that stuff in. Gen. Marston showed up as Brigade Commander with his staff, and we found we were in the 1st Brigade, and he told me we were going to Iceland. Everybody talked freely about it down at Charleston. What he said had happened was that the British had asked the Americans to come over to Iceland to relieve the 25,000 British troops that were there.

Gen. Marston said he was in the process of organizing an expeditious force and he could use draftees in the United States, but he couldn't use them in Iceland, and if he had to send those troops over there at that time he'd have to break up organizations in order to get together troops, and he asked Gen. Holcomb if he had anything he could send. Gen. Holcomb said, "I've got this reinforced regiment on the high seas." So they agreed to soup it up to brigade and send it on out. Our quartermaster had been around to Sears & Roebuck and bought all the cold weather clothing we could find. All we had in Marine clothing was our overcoats and those old fur caps. Remember they used them? And we took off for Argentia,
Newfoundland, and hesitated there while President Roosevelt made up
his mind whether to take a chance on sending this bunch of Marines
across the submarine-infested North Atlantic. He had taken the
precaution to extend the neutral zone to Iceland, so that we could
have destroyers operate between the United States and Iceland, and
they'd be in the neutral zone. But the Germans didn't pay any
attention to that neutral zone. After three days at Argentia we
took off for Iceland on July 1st 1941, and arrived in Iceland July 8th.
Of course, we arrived there in the Arctic summer; there was no
night, and we worked all night long. Iceland is a bleak and rugged
island -- mountains, cliffs, no trees; not a tree. There were about
25,000 British troops there under command of Gen. Curtis, a very fine
gentleman. I took over from the British camp near Hofn, which
is about 10 miles east of Reykjavik, the capital. It was Nissen Hut
camp, with huts placed so the wind couldn't get a bite on the huts.
It was near the Var'ma River, which was a hot stream. It was
practically boiling at the source; then some of the tributaries that
came into it were cold and it cooled off a bit. But my men went
swimming behind the dam there until November; the water was still
warm. We were in an anomalous situation; here there were 25,000
British troops on Iceland, at war with the Germans, and here we were, 5,000 Marines at peace with the Germans. If the Germans
attacked Iceland we'd have to do something about it, we'd have to
defend. So we drew up a defense plan and did a lot of talking with
Gen. Curtis, and more or less agreed on the part that we would
defend. We drew up these plans and then showed them to Gen. Curtis
and he just put his initials on them. He couldn't give an order to
the American troops, you see. That would not have been cricket.
Gen. Marston asked me senior member of the board to draw up an estimate of the situation on how to defend Iceland. Some of these jokers in Washington felt that we could defend the whole of Iceland - 200 miles around -- with that one brigade, which of course was foolishness. The first thing I had to do was decide that we would defend. We were not at war with Germany, and what would we do in case they attacked? The idea was to defend. I don't know how many divisions we came up with as a solution; and planes. By that time the Army had come out, and the estimate was turned over to Gen. Bonesteel, and, of course, he was aghast at the number of people we thought it would take to defend. And he figured the number of men we could use would be dependent upon the ability to supply them through different ports such as Reykjavik.

He then convened an Army board and another Marine board to make another set of estimates, and they came up with the same answer I had (laughs) They didn't get anywhere. The Germans periodically sent planes over, mostly Heinkels; they were on photographic missions. The 5th Defense Battalion would go into Condition One.

On one occasion earlier the German planes had strafed the airfield near Reykjavik, and I don't know whether they wounded or killed anybody.

On August 16th 1941 Winston Churchill was on his way home from Argentina where he had conferred with President Roosevelt, and they had drawn up the Atlantic Chart. He was on a battleship and he decided to stop in Iceland and pay a visit to the British troops and to the American troops there. We put on a review for him on the main road near Reykjavik. Fortunately we had a good day. It was a balmy day. In Iceland the weather can change radically in
four hours. In the summer it can be balmy and within four hours you may have sleet. It's all occasioned by the Gulf Stream which flows around it and makes the weather uncertain. The Arctic Circle comes down and almost touches the north side of Iceland, but because of the Gulf Stream going around it doesn't quite touch, the ice doesn't quite touch. The ice comes within 50 miles of the north coast of Iceland.

The Congress eventually passed — well, eventually they permitted the Army to send draftees out of the country, and by September the Army was ready to send out troops to Iceland, and theoretically they were to relieve the Marine Brigade and we would go home. They came out in September, but we didn't go home until next March, and they decided that they'd put us to work on building hut camps for the Army when they came. So on the basis of the 17-hour day — there was still a good bit of daylight — we started building huts for the Army. We built a total of 206 Nissen huts for the Army, and got very little thanks for it. As a matter of fact we built a camp for one regiment, and this regimental commander got the Legion of Merit for overcoming difficulties in Iceland. I read later that he occupied the camp we had built.

On November 24th 1941 the Marines were detached for service with the Army, and we became an administrative part of the Army. We had to throw our court martial manual out the window; use the Army court martial manual. The battalion commander lost any disciplinary authority; the regiment convened courts, and the company commander had a certain amount of disciplinary power authority. We felt rather let down. It was Gen. Marshall who put this over because that's the way it was in France in World War I, and he figured it
should be the same in Iceland, instead of attaching us tactically to the Army, which was done in World War II. And we felt kind of let down; we felt the Marine Corps had let us down. We found later that Gen. Holcomb had intended to go and argue about this but he didn't have time. Gen. Marshall put it into effect before he could put up an argument.

Q: I guess any World War I officers had that experience of the 14th Brigade under such conditions didn't want it anymore. They didn't want it under any condition again.

Smith: Is that so?

Q: I mean the Marines didn't want it.

Smith: Oh no, of course they didn't, because they had to wear Army uniforms and everything else.

Q: I think Gen. Worton still talks about it.

Smith: Yes, sure. We felt let down, but we managed to live with it. Then along came the problem of the long nights. In the summer I'd have an awful time chasing those boys off to bed at 10 o'clock. After working all day they'd go out and play softball -- it was daylight -- and we had to get them into bed because reveille was at 5 in the morning. When winter came, I began making reveilles later and later as time went on, and I finally got reveille at 7 in the morning; and they couldn't sleep anymore than that, and had
to quit there. It got light about 9 in the morning and dark at 3 in the afternoon. We built a tremendous recreation building there and did a certain amount of training in there, and we established a recreation program. We had each company draw up a little show, and then they put on the show. Then the idea was to select the best talents from all the shows and have a battalion show that would go on the road. Then they got one movie projector for the Brigade, and that was rotated between the battalions, and we had a week movies once or twice. When weather permitted we went out and fired. We fired mortars and machine guns, and whatnot. The 3rd Battalion for some reason or other got out of Iceland early; they got out before March, and came on home, and the troops that were to relieve the rest of the Brigade arrived on March 3rd 1942, and the Army had one of their systems; when new troops come in the Army you have what you call a host unit. And I was to be the host unit for the battalion that was to move in my camp. I had to get all my gear out of the huts; I had to lay out the linen in the huts; have 10 days' rations for them and feed them for three days. At the same time I was the commanding officer of troops on the outgoing transport, and they had to get my gear assembled and down at the docks and load it on the ship. That's the way they operated, I was assigned to the USS Minnoro and we sailed on the morning of the 9th. We were in the mud, you see. There was a 21-foot tide in Reykjavik and the ship came in at high tide and then rested on the mud while we loaded her; then at 8 o'clock the tide rose and we got out. We had to be loaded by 8 o'clock in order to get out on that tide. The skipper told me, "If we aren't loaded, we'll go out with what you've got." I had a very good gunnery sergeant and put him on the job during the night, and he got it aboard. We
were limited to one hatch, and that's what slowed us down. And
during the night there was an air alert. I didn't intend to pay
any attention to it; I didn't know whether it was a real one.
An
Army officer came down to the dock and said, "With an air
alert you are supposed to take to the hills." I said, "Now look,
this is the middle of the night, the skipper of the ship has turned
in, all his crew has turned in, what about them? And most of my
men except the working parties have turned in. If you want us to
abandon . . .

End of Side 1, Tape 2, Session I.
Smith: The Army officer had authority to tell me to do that, but he didn't go any further. I told him that if he wanted me to abandon ship to go and wake up the skipper of the ship. I said, "I have reported to the commanding officer of the ship and I figure it's up to him." And, of course, he didn't wake up the captain of the ship.

After loading out, we went up to Val Fjordur -- Valfjord, we called it -- which is a deep fjord north of Reykjavik, that was more or less a naval anchorage, and we joined the other ships of the convoy there. Then we waited there for two or three days for a convoy that was coming from Ireland, and then we put out in the middle of the night and joined that Irish convoy for the trip across the Atlantic. We first went due South, and we had air cover for that part of the trip. There were British anti-submarine planes on Iceland and they covered us for that southern leg. Then we turned West at about the latitude of New York, then the seaplanes on the cruisers took up the anti-submarine watch. It was very tricky to watch those people. They were cut off. That was easy enough, but the North Atlantic is quite a rough ocean, and to come back and get back aboard, what they'd do would be this: the cruiser would make rapid circles, and that would flatten the water and the plane would come in and hit that flat water and pick it up quickly before the sea could build up again.

Q: Was the cruiser still under way when it picked up the ...

Smith: Oh yes. They had a crane, and the plane would slide over under the crane and they'd hook on and be hauled aboard.
They gave us cover in mid-Atlantic. We had some submarines, at one time, before we got through, they were heading back towards Europe. They make a 90 degree turn and the destroyers go out and drop the charges. The place was alive with submarines.

Then when we got near New York the blimps picked us up and gave us cover until we got into New York. We put into Brooklyn and unloaded at the docks, and I ran into labor trouble there. We got in March 25th. The stevedores insisted that they would unload the ship and didn't want any Marines mixed up in it; and they had rules that they quit an hour for lunch and so forth.

I talked to the chief and told him that we wanted to get out of the darn place; we had plenty of Marines there we could turn to and help them. They finally agreed that they would let us go down in the hold and fill up the slings, but they had to have a stevedore down there to signal for the slings to be lifted.

We eventually got our gear off.

Then the Brigade on another ship held a conference.

I wanted to get my people out of there as quickly as possible, so they could get some leave, but the Brigade thought there was no transportation available in that part of Brooklyn in the night, and we finished unloading at night, and they'd wait until the next day. I said, "You give me authority. I am not worried about those men finding transportation, they'll find it." "Will you let me go ahead and let them go?" They agreed to do that. The men had seen me go off the ship and they knew I was going over to this conference about getting off, and I heard when I came back up the gangway, "Here comes the old man." We had immediately pass the word that..."
all those who were going on leave -- we let half go on leave with permission to report in to San Diego, and the other half we took by train to San Diego.

Q: How did you make the choice?

Smith: It was where they lived. If they lived east of the Mississippi they got leave in New York; if they lived west of the Mississippi they got it at the other end. It worked out more or less.

They got off within half an hour, and a half hour later you couldn't see a sign of Marines anywhere on the horizon. I don't know how they got to where they were going, but they did. And they had a seabag on their shoulder.

Q: What about the outbreak of war at Pearl Harbor?

Smith: Oh yes, that was very interesting. Of course it didn't make much difference to us in Iceland because we were more or less in a war status, and we got that message AIR ATTACK PEARL HARBOR THIS IS NO DRILL -- we got that.

Q: That was in the clear, so that anyone who could pick it up could pick it up?

Smith: I don't know whether our people picked it up in code or not, but we got the message. There was nothing we could do about it; we were at war. Of course, then when we went to war ourselves we became allies of the British. That made a little difference. I got a kick out of those British: they were very cagey; they wanted to give the
impression that they had a lot more troops in Iceland than they had. The battalion commander I relieved talked to me, and he more or less said it -- they had 85,000 troops there. I knew there were only 25,000. He was trying maybe to mislead the Germans. And they periodically sent a whole battalion at a time; and they had to be very careful because of the submarine threat. They couldn't tell anybody about it. Nobody knew about it except the commanding general and maybe the commander of the battalion, and these fellows were simply marched down the dock and put on a ship and left. They never knew where they were going until they got on the ship. When we left Iceland we couldn't do it that way because we had to close up the Post Exchanges; we had to tell the Marines to stop selling cigarettes; we had to turn over to the Army. My BM-2 was a pretty clever fellow. He asked permission to make an estimate of the situation on when we would leave Iceland. He didn't know; I didn't tell him. I'd been told verbally by Gen. Bonesteel. I told him to go ahead. So Haffner went down to the dock and he interviewed girlfriends of the Marines, he interviewed everybody; and he wrote up an estimate and he hit the day on the nose.

Q: I was his order of Battle officer during Korea when he was G-2.

As that so?

Smith: I was very fond of Haffner. He didn't make general.

Q: How much longer did Bonesteel actually remain in Iceland?
Smith: I really don't know. He was to take over from Gen. Curtis --
to take over command of the whole place the minute that the total of
Americans exceeded the total of British, and that's why we were held
over until the next spring, so we could help Gen. Bonesteel get more
troops than the British had there. Eventually, before we left
Iceland, he did take over from Gen. Curtis.

Q: You don't know how much longer the Army remained there?

Smith: No, I don't. Of course the importance of Iceland diminished
very rapidly because we overcame the German submarine threat, and
then the Germans weren't in any position to launch any expedition
against Iceland. It would have been a wonderful place as a submarine
base, with all these fjords, but they lost their fleet; one of the
big ships had been sunk off Norway, another one was sunk out in the
Atlantic.

Q: The Bismarck. The Graf Spee was down there. You still have
your polar bear patch?

Smith: Somewhere, yes, and that kind of annoyed me because Gen.
Bonesteel Curtis was very courteous about that. They wore that,
you see, and he decided that he 'd furnish the Brigade with polar
bear patches. We were very glad to get them, and then the people
back in Washington looked down their noses at us and told us to
take them off. Then when the First Division went to Guadalcanal
the first thing they did was to get a shoulder patch. But we had
to take off our polar bear patches.
I took this outfit by train out to San Diego, and of course, all these marines were on their best behavior; I had absolutely no difficulty -- they wanted that furlough when they got at the other end. The conductor told me it was remarkable. He said some of those outfits they carried would just tear the train apart. When you go aboard a train with troops you have to sign a receipt for the cars and everything else, and then when you get at destination they check to see what condition it's in. But we had no trouble; as a matter of fact we were in a special train and they didn't set foot on the ground until we got to Los Angeles, and there we had to shift to the Santa Fe line and we did go out in the depot. The marines went around to get coffee and cigarettes and what not, and they couldn't pay. At that time these people wouldn't take any money from these marines. Just big hearted, I guess.

Q: Was there any publicity attendant?

Smith: Oh yes no, no.

Q: Or the fact that you'd been in Iceland?

Smith: No, unless the men told them. We debarked down at Linda Vista which is near Camp Elliott. The regiment was supposed to get in first. Everybody was out there with a band to welcome the regimental commander, and he didn't get in till the next day. I was the guy who arrived.

Q: That was Hermle.
Smith: Yes, Col. Hermes. We were moved into the barracks there — the first time we'd ever been in barracks at Camp Elliott, and, of course, immediately the first thing they did, they took a third of our troops as cadres because we had some wonderful people there.

When we left for Iceland, The people who brought us up to peace strength were directed to send these people with clear records, and then we had them in Iceland for nine months or so; trained them and we had no disciplinary troubles, and we realized that we had people that rated promotions beyond the people the table of a battalion, and Finally Headquarters Marine Corps allowed to make noncoms without reference to our table of allowances, so we began making corporals, sergeants like nobody's business. Finally, on working parties I had to have corporals' working parties; I didn't have enough privates, I had to use the corporals as working parties. When we landed in Elliott they grabbed a third of those people just like that. It was reasonable. I had hoped that I could stay out there, but my orders were waiting for me to go to Headquarters Marine Corps. I had talked to Gen. Marston into leaving me in the battalion as a full colonel. I had made a colonel on January 1st 1942, and Gen. Marston wanted to bring me up to be chief of staff of the Brigade. Col. Murray had gone a little off the deep end on drinking and he was sent home.

Q: That's Charlie Murray.

Smith: Yes, a very good friend of mine, incidentally.

Q: Wasn't he found on an Army court martial?
Smith: I don't know -- no.

Q: Wasn't there a court martial out there?

Smith: No, no. But Murray wasn't the only one. Maurice Holmes was drinking too much. I am not a drinker. Gen. Marston got us all together one time, and the British were rather cagey about their drinking; they realized they were on the alert all the time, and they would never allow anything except a small percentage of the battalion to go on a bender at one time; they always had enough people so they could operate. But we'd had a party. Maurice Holmes had given a party, and I went and all these other people went, and we did too much drinking, and if an emergency had come I am afraid we wouldn't have been able to do too much. So Gen. Marston got us all together and he said, "I am taking off my stars. My chief of staff was drunk. Arthur, you were tight (that was Arthur Worton)." Arthur mumbled that he wasn't tight, he was in full possession of his faculties; he told Dutch Hermia that he'd had too much. Then Dutch got up and made a speech which didn't help me, and they admitted they had all drunk too much except me, who was a non-drinker. That didn't make Arthur Worton very happy! I had quite a time talking him out of being mad at me.

Q: It was his liquor supply in the first place, was it not?

Smith: Well, he was the fellow who arranged for bringing it in. He got it from Britain. We would buy it from him for our officers' messes. Maurice did stretch it too much.
Well, they nicked me for duty at Headquarters Marine Corps. I was sorry to leave that place out there. Most of the people that had been with me went into the 2nd Division. There was only one I ran into later in the 1st Division, and that was Joe Hankins, who had been my executive officer in Iceland. He was a battalion commander at Cape Gloucester and won the Navy Cross.

Arthur Worton was more social than I was, and he had Joe Hankins as his exec. Joe doesn't handle a teacup too well, and Arthur wanted a more acceptable social life so he got -- I forget whom he got; he was a character; he knew how to handle a teacup; but he didn't last long in the Marine Corps and they sent Joe Hankins over to me to relieve Baldwin who had been promoted and gone up to the executive officer regiment. Joe Hankins did a good job for me, but I could not persuade him that the reserve had any chance in the Marine Corps. We lived together in a hut all winter long, and I talked and talked and talked to him; I don't think I ever made any impression, he just felt that the reserve didn't have a chance.

Then later on I came to Cape Gloucester and here he was commanding a battalion and had won the Navy Cross, and I talked to him and said, "Hankins, what is this?" He had to admit he'd done pretty well. But then he went back again, and when we went to Peleliu he was promoted to full colonel, and he was made provost marshal, and Bucky Harris was given the 5th Regiment because Bucky had been promised the 5th Regiment and he was senior to Hankins. Well, Hankins came to me again and he said, "You see, I don't have a chance." And I tried to explain to him that Harris was senior to him, but I don't know that I ever convinced him. He was killed out there.
Q: He was doing something he shouldn't have been doing.

Smith: He was going out as an individual to get this sniper, and he was killed. He was a good shot, but he was killed before he could get in a position to watch. I was very fond of Hankins. That's one loss during the war that affected me. I never quite got over it -- losing Hankins. I was very fond of him. When he was provost marshal there he picked up a little young Jap -- just a boy -- who had been one of those people who had been sent down to swim into the beach with stuff strapped around his waist to blow up the airfield or something, and he was captured. Hankins made him his orderly, and Hankins would come around to my place with this Jap three paces behind, and the Jap would watch everything Hankins did; if he sat down the Jap would sit down. He only knew one word in English -- Okay. (laughs) Finally Hankins got tired of the Okay and put him back in the stockade. Nice little Jap.

Q: I don't know if you have the same feeling, but as I've done more work on the Pacific campaigns and more material has come out of Japan, I have a tremendous respect and sympathy for the average Japanese soldier.

Smith: He really fought.

Q: And for the commanders too.

Smith: When you think of Okinawa, that General who was in the cave at the tip of the island, who bumped himself off. He wasn't going to give up.
Q: Did you ever read the letters that they wrote -- the Admiral on Oroku Peninsula, the letter he sent back ...

Smith: No.

Q: And then the letter that Ushijima sent to the Emperor. It's quite moving, quite touching. A tremendous compassion for the men.

Smith: We captured very few Japanese. The people we captured were mostly Koreans -- labor troops -- and they were kind of willing to surrender.

But the Japanese soldiers, no.

Q: The funny thing about the Koreans willing to surrender -- the mean meanest, the toughest, the nastiest guards in those Japanese POW camps were Koreans.

Smith: They were a peculiar crowd. (Pause)

Q: Shall we end it here now, General?

Smith: Okay.

Q: We'll stop right now then.

End of Side 2 of Tape 2, Session I.
Smith: I made a quick trip across the continent by automobile, and reported at Headquarters Marine Corps on May 2nd 1942. I was assigned as chief of the M-4 Section, that is logistics. As I remember, Gen. Rockey was the head of the Division of Plans & Policies at the time. At this time, the Marine Corps was in the throes of expansion. Every month the strength of the Marine Corps seemed to change; it was quite expansive. Of course, we eventually wound up with 486,000 troops. With the increase in size of the Marine Corps we needed additional training areas, and in 1942 Camp Pendleton was purchased for $2,000,000, 125,000 acres, and about the same time Camp Lejeune was acquired -- 100,000 acres. When I was at Headquarters, the question at issue was what to call the camp. While we were deliberating, Gen. Lejeune passed away, and that solved the problem, and the camp was named Camp Lejeune for him, because you can only name a camp for some deceased general.

I went to Norfolk on May 19th, where the 1st Marine Division was loading out for the South Pacific. Specifically, I was sent down there to be sure that Gen. Vandegrift got aboard the ship, his Beechcraft airplane was a division plane, and it was a little difficult; there was an admiral that wanted to put a barge aboard instead of the plane. I stayed until I saw the plane loaded aboard and talked to Gen. Vandegrift and people like Col. Roy Hunt who were loading out.

In the summer of 1942 I became executive officer of the Division of Plans & Policies under Gen. Rockey. Then I think Gen. Rockey
went up to Assistant Commandant, and then went on to take the 5th Division, and Gen. Peck relieved him as chief of the Division of Plans & Policies. For our information, Gen. Vandegrift came home in January, I think, of 1943, to brief Headquarters Marine Corps on what was going on. It was a very valuable briefing. And then he returned to the South Pacific in command of the Corps out there.

On January 1st 1944 he came to Washington as Commandant of the Marine Corps. When he came he wanted to bring Jerry Thomas with him, who was then a colonel, to be Director of Plans & Policies. It so happened we had a lot of colonels in the Division of Plans & Policies who were senior to Jerry, so Gen. Vandegrift had to clean house. There were people like myself and Gilman, "Torchie" Robinson. There were several colonels who were senior to Jerry. Of course, we were glad to get out of the place and get to the Pacific.

Gen. Vandegrift told me personally that they were going to send me to the 1st Marine Division to be chief of staff; I was too old to be a regimental commander. He also said that if I did all right out there I would probably make a star. At the same time he told me that Gen. Shepherd would be given his chance. Gen. Shepherd was then a brigadier and ADC of the 1st Marine Division, and Gen. Vandegrift said he would be given his chance for, I assumed, command of the Division. It was Gen. Shepherd that I relieved as ADC of the 1st Division.

Well, all these colonels were detached in January 1944. I was detached on January 15th 1944 to the 1st Marine Division. "Torchie" Robinson and I traveled together; he was going to the 3rd Division, I think to be chief of staff to Hal Turnage -- I think that was it. So we decided to travel together. We went by air to San Francisco,
and then picked up a clipper ship there to Honolulu; then we picked up a PBM flying boat to Espiritu Santo. We went by Canton Island, and then we picked up a Pern flying boat to Espiritu Santo. We went by Canton Island. The only trouble with this flying boat was that it had a load of penicillin that had to be kept cool, so they flew at the maximum height they could without forcing us to wear oxygen masks. We had to wear overcoats, it was as cold as all get out. We spent a good bit of time in a little galley that they had on that PBM. They had a cook, and that place was warm. They had a little stove and a few places to sit down, and he'd fry us bacon and eggs and what not. We spent a lot of time down there.

At Espiritu Santo we picked up a SCAT plane and went on to Guadalcanal. Normally, I should have gone to Australia and beaten my way up to New Guinea and over to Finschhafen, and then by boat to Cape Gloucester. Cape Gloucester didn't yet have a field that would take air transport planes. But I went into Guadalcanal and thought that maybe I could catch a plane going up and get off that way. Fortunately, when I got there I found that Gen. Geiger was on the eve of going to New Britain Island to visit the 1st Marine Division. So he took me along with him in his Blue Goose, or whatever he called that darn plane he had; it was a converted PBY. We flew to Finschhafen in that, and then got two PT boats for the 90 mile trip to New Britain Island -- that's 90 miles across the straits there to New Britain. That was quite a ride. They cut down the speed of the PT boats to 25 knots, but still we hit those waves, and we couldn't sit down; the jar was so terrific that you had to stand up all the way. Gen. Geiger and I went to the little wardroom or whatever they called it, to get a cup of coffee, and to drink that coffee was just practically impossible.
We got off at Yellow Beach about dusk. I think it was the 28th of January 1944. The PT boat commander was blinking ashore to get somebody to come out and take us off. We saw some big splashes in the water about a quarter of a mile off the bow, and we thought the Japs were dropping some bombs there. Then a couple more splashes came, none right near us, and then we heard the boom of the artillery piece; the sound was delayed, and it was the 90 mm guns that were shooting at us. Well, the PT boat man blinked a lot and got them to stop and we went on ashore. Willy Harrison was in command there. He got a lot of kidding about shooting at his Corps commander.

Q: Had Gen. Vandegrift consulted with Gen. Rupertus at all as far as your assignment with the Division was concerned?

Smith: That's what I was just going to cover. It was very embarrassing to me, because Gen. Vandegrift said he was sending me out there to be chief of staff of the 1st Division. When I arrived at the 1st Division I said nothing about that at all, but I found that Gen. Vandegrift's crowd in writing the orders detaching the man I relieved as chief of staff -- what was his name? he commanded the 7th Marines at Guadalcanal and became Chief of Police of Norfolk after he retired.

Q: Semmes.

Smith: Yes, Semmes. His orders read, "Upon my reporting as his relief as chief of staff he'd be detached." I didn't know that. I think my orders only read "to the 1st Marine Division." Gen. Rupertus was pretty upset and I didn't blame him. A division
commander has a right to select his own chief of staff, and I told him frankly that that's the way I felt about it. He then decided that he'd send me down to be the assistant to Gen. Shepherd who was ADC. Gen. Shepherd had had a full colonel there; Hanneken had been operating with him and I was to go down to relieve Hanneken. When I had told Gen. Rupertus about what Gen. Vandegrift had said about Gen. Shepherd, and he like I assumed that Gen. Shepherd would take over the 1st Division when Gen. Rupertus went home. Later Gen. Rupertus got a letter from Gen. Vandegrift in which he apologized for having us hold him over for another operation. It's then that I think Gen. Rupertus found that Gen. Shepherd was going to take the Brigade, which eventually became the 6th Division. Gen. Rupertus called up Gen. Shepherd who didn't live at headquarters, and asked him if he got the 1st Division would he want me as chief of staff. Gen. Shepherd said yes. Then Gen. Rupertus decided to hang on to me as chief of staff until Shepherd took over the Division. I guess he hadn't yet found out that Gen. Shepherd was going to the Brigade. Then it turned out that he was going to have to stay for another operation and he wanted Johnny Selden as his chief of staff, so he then sent me to the 5th Marines, to command the 5th Marines, which was under Johnny Selden and had moved up the coast as far as Iboki, which was about 60 miles toward Rabaul from Division Headquarters. I went up there, and as I remember I reported on the 1st of March, and Gen. Rupertus had planned this operation to land on the Willaumez Peninsula and clean out the place. That was to be the 6th of March. So I had it just from the 1st of March to the 6th of March to get going. This thing was dreamed up without
a great deal of detailed planning. The Army was to furnish 40 LCMs
and 17 LCVPs for the operation, and they were under command of Lt Col
Amory of the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. They were Army
boats, and the Navy furnished four PT boats that would act as scouts and
five LCTs. Now up to that time nobody had ever put Amtracs and
LCTs, but we decided to do it for this operation because there was
a reef at Plantation where we had to land, and only a
boat channel that came in around close to shore to get in.
So we had to get across that reef in Amtracs and get a small beach-
head to protect the boat channel. Well, there was delay in getting
the LCTs up to us, delay in getting the Amtracs up to us. There was
other than the PT boats
going to be no Navy support whatsoever, no Navy gunfire. The Army
Air Corps was to furnish air support which didn't show up.

Gen. Rupertus sent Gen. Shepherd up to Iboki to observe -- that
is what he loved to do with ADCs, to observe -- and he told Gen.
Shepherd that he was not in the chain of command, that he was not
to give me any orders; that he would just sit there and observe.
Well, then he came up and he set up a tent near where I was, and
I said, "Now look, Major, I've known you a good many years, and I'm
not going to bypass you about anything. I'll tell you everything
I planned to do, and I'll be glad to get your advice and counsel."
So that's the way it went, although there was nothing in writing
about that.

Q: Were you always close to Gen. Shepherd?

Smith: Pretty close, yes.

Q: Later on in Korea, was there ever any conflict between you?
Smith: Oh no, very cordial relations. I'd known him for years. He asked me about that; he thought it would be a pain in the neck to have Gen. Shepherd hanging around looking over my shoulder, but it wasn't at all. We got along very well.

Q: And he must have been awfully sensitive about this Inchon thing later on. Some thoughts, some reactions I had during an interview with him make me wish to get this clarified.

Smith: Yes, well, we planned to load on these LCTs a stripped down battalion. We had to strip it down because when we had five LCTs they could carry each five Amtracs; and that's what we had. That was the first battalion that we took on under Barbados. The second battalion, under Cayle, was to follow in in boats, and they would use the boat channel to get in. We had 57 miles to cover in the approach from Ibaki to Volejai Plantation; it was 57 miles; and we had to do it at night to make an 8.30 AM hour. What we did was, we loaded these boats with the gear at Ibaki by boat waves, and then had them lay off; and then the last thing after the gear was loaded, they came in and picked up the troops. I forget, but we had a tremendous number of waves, something like 12 or 15, and because of the darkness it was black like the inside of your hat -- and the thundershowers threatening, we decided we'd have to go in column of waves, and each wave in column of boats, so we wouldn't get lost. At the head of the whole column was Col. Amory with his picket boat, which had pretty good navigational gear... I was in an LCVP under command of an Army captain, and Buse who was a lieutenant colonel and my exec, we put him in a different boat, because we didn't want both him and me in the same boat.
I waited at Ibuki to be sure this thing got under way before I started out. Then I was going to move up the column and take a position halfway up, or something. After the last boats took off, Gen. Curtis came up to say goodbye to us. I took off. We didn't see any boats. As the night progressed, I could see the Army captain was getting a little jittery -- he was looking for boats out there, but no boats. I asked him if he was on course and he said yes, he was on course. I said, "All we can do is just keep our own course. We'll keep on going during the night and maybe when daylight comes we can see where the rest of the people are."

So we kept going until daylight, and then way off to the right we could see this chain of mountains, some peaks, and my G-2 and G-3 got their heads together on the maps and we identified the peaks. And that was Milliaumez Peninsula. Hank Adams was my G-2. Then we turned right and hightailed the convoy, and we got there before H hour. On the route we ran into some straggling LCMS; and two of them were going in the right direction and two in the wrong direction, and we herded them along with us. One of them said, "I am getting the hell outta here." I said, "You come along with us." So we got them in. Gayle's boat broke down and he was a little late getting in, but his exec got in. Well, we got in there off the beach, and the next thing to come was the air support -- they would bombard the beach, and nothing happened. There was no air except a little plane -- what do you call them? It was an L-4.

Q: Oh, the Grasshopper.

Smith: The Grasshopper came over with the General's pilot.
Q: Ted Petras.

Smith: Yes, Petras. And he came over and dropped five hand grenades along the beach, and that was naval gunfire and air support. After half an hour I gave the word to go on in. And there were Japanese there. We had taken the precaution of sending in a reconnaissance under Rodney Marsland, who was a flight lieutenant of the Australian Air Force, and who was part owner of a plantation on the Willaumez Peninsula, and he went in a day or two before with a couple of black men he knew, and he made contact with village chiefs and that sort of thing, and found out where the Japs were. The only trouble was that the New Guinea man could only count on their fingers, and if there were more than they could count on their fingers then they merely said, "Many many." So we knew where the Japanese were, but weren't quite sure of how many there were. We landed on this beach at Vegetable Plantation, and we had only 100 yards of usable beach. There was a clearing for about 50 yards in depth. Our artillery had to come ashore and set up in that clearing, and our Amtracs had Sherman tanks; we had a little bit of everything. And about that time the Japanese opened up with 90 mm mortar; we could see them; they went down on the beach and then they began to tip. The casualties began to occur. By evening we had 50 seriously wounded men and some killed. The boats that had brought in this first outfit had returned to Ikoki to pick up the 3rd Battalion, and I had a minimum of boats left. So I radioed to Division Headquarters and asked that they send in PBYs to pick up these wounded, and asked them to send the PBYs before 4 PM because it had to be before dark. I got no reply at all.
Pause) The casualties were beginning to mount, and I had asked for PBYs and got no reply, so I decided to send out the wounded on what boats I had. The PT boats were still within radio communication, and they came in and picked up these boats and took off some of the more seriously wounded. They had to go 57 miles to Iboki. Two men died en route.

Q: Pardon me, on the trip up there, the waves, what means of control did they have?

Smith: Sight.

Q: Just sight.

Smith: What had happened on my boat was that the compass went out. We were just heading out into the Bismarck Sea on a tangent to where the main convoy was going, and we didn't have any communications. Of course, Amory up ahead had communications; the LCTs had communications.

Well, we got a small beachhead, and the idea was for him to get this small beachhead and to cover the beach, and then Gayle was going through, which happened -- Gayle passed through, and then we eventually got into the Vegetable Plantation and overran these 90 mm mortars and cut down on the casualties.

Then we continued on across the Peninsula and overran the Talasea area, the Talasea Harbor -- not a bad harbor on the other side. There were three villages called Wairu. Villages up on high ground, inland from Talasea, and we put on a joint attack between the First and Second Battalion, and overran those villages.
Then the 3rd battalion came in, and came across the Peninsula and joined us, and we sent them down the Peninsula towards the base of the Peninsula to try to cut off those Japanese that were retreating from the Cape Gloucester campaign. They were all drifting toward Cape Hokkaido, which was the garrison just below us, and eventually they wanted to wind up in Rabaul.

Q: This was the purpose of the Talasea operation— to cut off the retreat.

Smith: Yes. And we captured quite a few prisoners that were in pretty bad shape; they had come a long way and had had nothing to eat but coconuts. When we got to Talasea, two squadrons of PT boats joined us, and that was rather fatal to them; they were bombed twice by their own planes and lost some men, some killed and some wounded, because at 5,000 feet, these planes would come over and they couldn't tell a Japanese torpedo boat from an American torpedo boat.

Q: These were Army Air Force planes.

Smith: The first case was Australian planes, the second case, Marine planes. I talked to Thompson, he was a University of California man, a lieutenant, who commanded these PT boats, and he was pretty upset over this first bombing. An Australian major came up to apologize. I got the two of them together; I didn't know whether they were going to start a fight or not. I had no command over the PT boats; they were under somebody else. But the Australian
were truly sorry. But they just said that at that height they didn't know they were Americans.

In the other case, the PT boats were going up toward Rabaul looking for barges, and the Marine planes from Emirau came over. A Marine fighter plane came down and strafed the PT boats, and

Thompson told me, "The next time I'll not wait, I'm going to start shooting if anybody makes a pass at me." So he started shooting and he knocked down the Marine plane. Then Emirau sent over a Dumbo plane to rescue the pilots, you see, and when the Dumbo came down they found that these poor devils were not Japs but Americans, and that a good many were wounded and some killed. And that was the end of that. Eventually we sent Gayle with his battalion down toward the base of the Peninsula to set up a battalion position there to continue to intercept these prisoners, and the 3rd Battalion was pulled back to Talasea. An interesting sidelight: I went down there to visit Gayle, and I took along Lt. MacIlhenny, who is now a brigadier general in the reserve and runs the Tabasco plant down in Louisiana.

Q: Tabasco Mac.

Smith: Yes. Gayle put on dance for us; he got all the natives from all around. Going back he asked me if I'd take a couple of prisoners back with me that he had. I said yes. I had one of these crash boats that they used around PBY planes -- a good boat. One of the prisoners was wounded and the other two were not. There were also a couple of black scouts that we took back. We put the prisoners aft. There was a canopy up forward and we got under that. The sentry was sitting under it and watching these prisoners.
Then a terrific thundershower came up, and we put a poncho over the wounded. We were all under this canopy, and one of the Japs crawled up and scratched on the canvas and motioned if he could come inside. We let him come in; then the other fellows came up and scratched on the canvas and we let him come in. It was kind of crowded: the two black men, myself, MacIlhenny, the sentry, and the two Japs. Then I noticed these black men were talking in pidgin Japanese to these prisoners. They talk pidgin Japanese, you know, and told them they were going to get their throat cut and what not. But we got in without any trouble. Of course, our supply problem was out of this world there. All we had was an engineer company, and it was way beyond their capability to build a road across the Peninsula from the Volunteer Plantation into Talasea: there were 8 feet of topsoil and no rock any place. We then had to bring our supplies by LCM all the way from Cape Gloucester to Iwo Jima, and Iwo Jima and around the Wlaueme Peninsula, and around to Talasea. It was about a 100 mile trip from Iwo Jima. That was our supply. The Navy would not send transports out there because of the Jap bombers. They did eventually send one of these little 65-foot ships that had some fresh beef on it. Of course, we had no refrigeration, and had to bury the beef immediately and eat it up within a day.

We received word that the 40th Infantry Division was coming in to relieve the Marines on Cape Gloucester. That's the California National Guard Division. On April 11th I was directed to return to division headquarters to relieve Gen. Shepherd as ADC. I still was a Colonel. On April 28th I was promoted to brigadier general.

Then as soon as the commanding general of the division arrived -- I forget his name, he's dead now -- Gen. Rupertus left by air. By
that time we had a strip that would take his plane. I was left
behind to bring out the troops. And the Navy did send in transports
to send out those troops -- the old standard transports, they were
converted boats that had made the trips across the Pacific; the
"President" boats.

Q: Oh, Hoover, Jackson . . .

Smith: Yes, but they had different names as Navy transports.

Q: The Wakefield was the old Manhattan.

Smith: I could find out.

Q: President Jackson -- that was the one you were on.

Smith: Yes, I was on that, but there were three of them as I recall,
all President boats. Anyway, they came in and took the division out
by echelons. Gen. Rupertus had flown on to the new camp on Pavuvu.
I brought out the troops. The last transport sailed from New Britain
for the Russells on May 4th 1944. Then I took off and joined the
division in the Russells. The day after my arrival at Pavuvu, Gen.
Rupertus and Johnny Selden took off for the United States for six
weeks, part business, part leave. I was left as division commander.

As you very well know, this Pavuvu was not very well loved by
Marines. Our camp was 600 acres of cocoanut palms, and the ground
was littered with the rotting cocoanuts which we tried to get rid
of. Training facilities were limited to certain inlets there that
you could go across. It had a couple of advantages. There was no malaria whatsoever, and we were so isolated that they couldn't call on us for working parties to handle stores. Now the 3rd Division over on Guadalcanal had to furnish a thousand men a day for working parties. We were never confronted with that difficulty. The big supply depot was at Buna on Buna Island, but we were so isolated that we couldn't get there. Our only connection with Buna was by Grasshopper plane.

Q: Or by boat, by landing craft.

Smith: Oh, but gee-ee-hee, you went around through the channel and it'd take you forever to get there.

Q: You were awarded a letter of commendation for the Talasea operation, I notice.

Smith: I found that in my letter box. It was never awarded to me. Later on Gen. Shepherd came to me. Gen. Rupertus had an idea that any letter of commendation from him was worth more than a bronze star or a silver star, I don't know why. But at any rate, in those days we didn't have a bronze star, we didn't have a silver star. Then the bronze star was authorized and we appointed a board, of which Lewis Puller was a member, to examine all these letters of commendation and see which ones should be converted into bronze stars. And Lewis, of course, unless a citation was written to show that a Marine was advancing in the face of the enemy, he had no part in giving him a bronze star! The Marine had to be advancing
in the face of enemy fire. Then Gen. Shepherd came to me and he said, "What about this letter of commendation you've got? Do you want the Legion of Merit or what else . . . " By that time -- this was some time later -- I had gotten a Legion of Merit for Peleliu and I didn't have a bronze star, so I said, "How about a bronze star?" So he recommended me for the bronze star, and I got the bronze star for Talasea. The letter of commendation was washed up because it was for the same thing.

Q: I think by the time you went in on Pavuvu the forward echelon of the division was there, and also a sizeable group of replacements and I was one. We'd been working a long time to clean it up. It was a mess, the water was terrible, there were rotting palm leaves...

Smith: We had one good thing which was this waterfront road that we used as an air strip. The siren would blow and they'd block the road, and then the plane would come in. It was quite tricky getting in there because you had to make a left turn over the baseball field back of the docks, and then come in and line up with the road, and come down and hit the middle of the road because it was a high crowned road, and if you didn't hit the middle of it you'd go into the ditch.

Q: In other words you had to bank around the baseball field and go over the pioneer and engineer outfit, and come down...

Smith: I suppose so. Then we'd line up and . . . Well, when Bob Hope came over with his show he got quite a thrill out of that because we brought him over in, I think, six of these little planes.
The troops were already assembled there on the baseball field -- probably 10, 12, 15,000 of them -- and Bob Hope flew in over them, right over their heads and came down. He was quite thrilled by that; he'd never approached a performance quite like that before!

Q: But there was aggravation on the part of many of these people. As a matter of fact I think it has a division of Rupertus and Geiger -- Silverthorn and Geiger, rather.

Smith: Geiger. His object was to help us out, to get us away from the working parties. What they didn't do there was the training area. We did escape the working parties, but we had no training area.

Q: It turned out to be a rather nice place.

Smith: It wasn't too bad. Thousands of rats, from coconut things like that. Gen. Rupertus, he shoved off no sooner than I got there. Then while he was gone I went over to Genaca to a farewell party -- (interruption, bell ringing)

Adm. Halsey came through the area saying goodbye to all the command, and I went over to Genaca to say goodbye to him on May 26th. He was accompanied by Gen. Ralph Mitchell.

On June 2nd, while Gen. Rupertus was still absent, we received the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept for the Palau Operation. There were many changes in this operation. At first it was quite an operation, that included not only Peleliu, Anguar, Babelthaup; and
at one time Yap was in it; and there was to be a complete Army Corps taking part, plus the 1st Marine Division. It was about then that the aviators from Adm. Halsey's fleet found that Leyte was not too strongly held, and they made a quick decision to cancel everything except Peleliu and Anguar and take this Army Corps of the 7th, 77th and 96th and lend them to Gen. MacArthur for the Leyte operation which was done. And then we got those divisions back for Okinawa.

Q: Do you think we could have cut out Peleliu also?

Smith: Well, as a matter of hindsight . . . We captured Peleliu and Anguar in order to set up air bases to support a landing in Mindanao which was only 500 miles away. But when Leyte was put on there was no need for that. We did need the islands if the Army hadn't gone in as early as it did in Leyte, and unfortunately for us the Japanese had given high priority to the fortifications of Peleliu. They had a priority above that of Saipan. So when we hit Peleliu its fortifications were complete. When the Marines hit Saipan, many of the guns had not yet been placed. So it was pretty rough at Peleliu for that reason.

Before going into

Q: About the Pelaiu operation, in talking to Gen. Rogers -- Tex Rogers -- he became Island Commander relieving Harold Campbell, and he took the surrender of the Pelau unit. He was chief of staff to Charlie at Babelthaup, and he offered also talked to the Japanese there; Babelthaup would have been much more difficult.

Smith: Oh, much more difficult. Babelthaup is the island on which we based our school's problem. I helped write up part of that
problem -- the capture of Babelthaup. Peleliu didn't come into our thinking in the Marine Corps Schools in Babelthaup. But I am glad we didn't have to go there. It was a very rugged island and it would have been difficult to build decent airfields there, whereas on Peleliu you had a ready-made airfield that just needed resurfacing. But Peleliu as an air base never became more important than just a staging area. If you were on route to some place you could stop off there. (Pause) Well, this Joint Chiefs of Staff directive came in, and in all the directives, all the changes, always the lst Marine Division was responsible for the capture of Peleliu. That meant we could go ahead and plan without reference to directives from higher headquarters, because our mission never changed -- capture Peleliu.

We started to work.

Q: Had Rupertus returned?

Smith: No. By the time Gen. Rupertus returned on June 21st, we had already worked out a plan for the landing on Peleliu. There was not much we could do except to land on the west coast beaches. That was about all that could be done; the east coast beaches, the weather was no good.

Q: There were big cliffs there.

Smith: On the east coast there were some beaches, but the west coast beaches were the best beaches. We gave him (Rupertus) a briefing on the plan and he approved it. I was detailed to select a site for the rehearsal for this landing and to try to find some place that was similar to Peleliu, something that was comparable. I got some young
aviator, a pilot, who took me to -- I guess we took the General's plane, but I'm not sure --; we had made a map study before and decided that up by Florida or Malaita it looked like there was some little off-lying islands that might be all right. We got to this big island; there was a lot of cloud cover and the pilot went mile after mile along the beach; he thought he was going along Florida Island. I said, "Look, Florida Island isn't this big." He said, "I'll go over and take a look." And he went over about 4,000 feet of mountains there, and we looked at the other side and there was the headquarters of the Australian Government colonial administration; we were on the island of Malaita. Then we followed along the coast of Malaita. Florida had been obscured by clouds and we'd missed it. We found an island just off the coast of Malaita that was about the size of Peleliu and looked good. So I came back and recommended that we rehearse on that. The Australian Government objected strenuously because they had to move the natives out and they didn't want to do that. So we wound up at Cape Esperance and had the rehearsal there.

On August 9th Gen. Rupertus sent me to Pearl Harbor to get approval from Adm. Wilkinson for our plan. Adm. Wilkinson was one step over Adm. Fort. Adm. Fort was responsible for Peleliu and Anguar, but Adm. Wilkinson was under Adm. Halsey and would have been responsible for the whole Palau operation.

Q: He was the Amphibious Force Commander?

Smith: Yes, he was the Amphibious Force Commander for Adm. Halsey; and I went up and he approved the plan. Then in mid-August Gen.
Vandegrift, and Jerry Thomas, and Elmer Hall, and *would* came out and visited the division. I had to take them around because when Gen. Rupertus got back from Washington I took him around to see what was going on and observe the training, and we were out at one of the beaches there, and he'd come into the beach in an amphibian tractor, and when he was leaving he started to climb up into the amphibian tractor and the hand hold gave way and he fell backward onto the rough coral rocks, and he badly fractured his ankle; it was a bad fracture, and he was in bed for quite a while. He was still unable to get out of his headquarters when Gen. Vandegrift visited us, and I took him around.

Q: I understand that Gen. Vandegrift was quite upset and said, had he known he would have relieved him.

Smith: That was Gen. Geiger. Geiger told me that. I'll get to that in a minute.

Q: What were your relations with Rupertus when he got back? Were they cordial?

Smith: *Assistant* Gen. Rupertus had a fixation about division commanders; he didn't want them under foot, and he told me when we got to Pavuvu, "Now I am setting up this new command post on the hill here. I've got 16 mess attendants that have been sent out for duty with the division; you can take your choice, and I suggest you set up a separate mess over in the plantation house." So I went over there, and I told him, "General, I should keep abreast of what's
going on in the division, so you should let me take some of the junior members out of the staff section to live with me so I can keep abreast." And he agreed to that, and I got some people like Hank Adams, and we set up a mess and we were very comfortable. But I was only a guest at Division Headquarters. I was never consulted about anything tactical or anything like that. I went around, inspected the training, and periodically I'd come in and tell the General what I saw. Our relations weren't buddy-buddy, but there was no bitterness or anything like that. He treated Gen. Shepherd exactly the same way on Cape Gloucester; he didn't allow Gen. Shepherd to eat in the division mess. Gen. Shepherd would eat at Yellow Beach; he and his aide had a tent down there. The only time I ever went over to his mess was when some VIP was there and he thought he ought to have me over, I guess. I don't know.

Q: He'd been out too long, you think?

Smith: It may have been the way Gen. Vandegrift treated him. I don't know. (laughs) I haven't the least idea!

Q: I think he was treated that way. Vandegrift had his own staff with Thomas and Twining . . .

Smith: It may be that, I don't know.

Q: What is the proper function of an ADC?

Smith: To observe the training and to stand by in case the division commander breaks his leg. The humorous thing was that it did happen!
On Pavuvu. I said nothing to anybody about this accident, but I began to worry as D Day approached. I went to Dr. -- whatever his name was -- and I said, "Look, doctor, frankly, is the General going to be able to make it for Peleliu?" He told me he thought he would, but he'd have to use a cane. I said okay. And I never said anything.

Then on August 27-29th we had our rehearsals at Cape Esperance and we had a part of the rehearsal down at Terry Beach. I took the troops ashore; Gen. Rupertus was unable to get into a boat. He stayed aboard ship and I took the troops ashore and set up a command post. Gen. Geiger came up the beach and talked to me and said, "Where is Rupertus?" And I told him, and that's when he said, "If I had known I'd have relieved him."

Q: Was he unhappy that you didn't tell him?

Smith: He didn't say so, but I felt out of loyalty to Gen. Rupertus that it was up to him to tell those people over there if he wanted them to know.

Q: What was his relationship with Geiger?

Smith: Not good.

Q: Was this of long standing?

Smith: It must have been some length of time. But I gathered that their relations weren't too friendly.
Now in getting ready for this operation I was ADC and I felt that I should have a minimum staff to go in with me, because when you go in first you are the senior officer present ashore, and some emergency may come up and you can't get the advice or orders from the division to handle it, and you should have enough staff so you can evaluate the situation and make a decision. I had to argue quite strenuously with the General to get any minimum staff go in with me.

Q: What was his argument against it?

Smith: That he was coming right in. He wanted me to go ashore and set up the CP, and he'd be in within an hour or so, and there was no need of my having to make any decisions whatsoever. Of course, he didn't get in for a day. But I finally told him about this and I said, "After all, if something happens and the division is unable to intervene, who holds the sack?" I told him that as senior officer present ashore I was responsible and I should have the facility to make the proper decisions. So he gave me Hankins, and he gave me Lt. Col. Smith as communications officer. I had Day as operations officer...

Q: What Day was that, Merle Day?

Smith: No, he is out now, he was a reserve, a nice young fellow, a major. I had Hank Adams as my 2, and Gover as my 4. That's whom I went ashore with.

Q: Deakon remained with the division.
Smith: Yes. I had Benedict who was my One representative. He now works for Bert over here.

Q: He was relieved unfortunately in Okinawa, at the end, at the last operation, the last hills that the division faced.

Smith: Is that so? I didn’t know about that.

Q: No prejudice to him. It was unfortunate. No fault.

Smith: After the rehearsal the LSTs took off for the Palauas on September 4th and the transports followed on September 8th for this landing on the 15th. The landing was to be made at 8.30 in the morning on the western beaches, three regiments abreast with one battalion, the 2nd battalion of the 7th, held out in division reserve.

In accordance with the plan I was to land at H plus 1½ hours and set up the advance CP, and Gen. Rupertus would follow in as fast as he could and not later than H plus four hours. He assumed that by that time we would have all of the south end of the island and the airfield, and he could make a decision about what to do about the terrain north of the airfield.

Q: Now again in retrospect about the operation -- his pre-invasion speech and comments to the newspapermen and so on . . .

Smith: He was very, very optimistic. I didn’t get one of the letters, but he apparently wrote letters that he gave to his regimental commanders -- they were pep talks -- and to newspaper
correspondents, in which he pointed out that this was going to be a quickie, probably faster than Tarawa. I didn't go along with that kind of optimism. I'll admit that it never occurred to me that one month after the landing we'd still be fighting within sight of the airfield, but I didn't figure any two-day job. But that's what he felt, and that's what he told the newspaper correspondents, and it didn't go over very big because then some of them shoved off, they said, "What's the use of sticking around?" He got some bad press out of that. I suppose at Iwo Jima there were no Marines that figured they'd be fighting there a month after they'd landed either. It's just hard to imagine on those small islands where you pile ashore 25,000 men and they've got 10,000 how on earth there's room for 'em all. But there is.

Q: As a result, Peleliu never received the attention it deserved.

Smith: No. The first five days at Peleliu were just as tough as Iwo Jima, but then it tapered off, and Iwo Jima kept on going. And of course, Peleliu was a smaller operation because we only had one division in assault and they had two and two thirds divisions on Iwo Jima. We had made a map study trying to select a site for the CP from the aerial photographs of these maps, and inland from the boundary between the 5th and 7th Marines (which was south), it looked like there was a small knoll, and we figured we'd set up behind that. Well, when we eventually found that knoll it was a small one swamp, but we didn't find that for a long time. There was a lot of fighting going on around it.
Q: How was the intelligence, and the aerial photographic information that we got?

Smith: Pretty good. We knew exactly the number of people on the island. We didn't realize the extent to which they were dug in, because the aerial photographs could not show up all these caves. Lewis Puller, with his 1st Marines, destroyed 140 defended caves. How he did it, I don't know. But those things were invisible before we went in.

later

Q: We'll talk about Puller and his operation.

Smith: Yes. I was on the Elmore with this group, and we started out in time to make the beach by 8:30. We first checked in at the Hazelwood which was the control destroyer, and from the Hazelwood we got directions to the control vessel right behind the beach we wanted to go in on. I had planned to go ashore in a duck, and I got on this control vessel and saw all those burning amphibian tractors and all the mortar fire coming down inside the reef, and I decided I'd rather go in in a LVT that wouldn't waste any time going across the reef. Eventually they were able to hail an LVT and it came alongside the control vessel and picked me up. I asked the boy who was driving it if he knew the way into the beach and he said, yes, he had been in two times, so I said, "Okay, we want to go in..." I think I told him Orange-2, which was the middle beach. He started toward shore, and there was mortar fire falling in the water. When he got halfway from the reef to the beach, there was a barbed wire fence that went along parallel to the beach, and he turned north -- he
could have gone right through that fence but he didn't -- and paralleled the wire. Finally, I told him, "Look, you are going to run out of beach here pretty quick, and we've got to move in."
So he then turned in, and we landed on the north end of Orange . . . well, it was the north Orange beach, the north beach of the 5th Marines. Beyond us to the north was a gap of 800 yards and then came Lewis Puller's outfit on the White Beaches. So I went ashore there and we holed up under a bank, and then I sent Hankins and Benedict and Smith down the beach to find a CP location around about the middle, and they discovered . . .

End of Side 1, Tape 1, Session II.
Tape 1, Side 2 - Session II

Q: You said they went down and found out that they couldn't...

Smith: They went down the beach and Benedict had a narrow squeak. A Japanese popped up from out of the sand and took a shot at him. Benedict took a shot at him with his pistol; both of them missed. Then a submarine bumped off the Jap. They found this anti-tank ditch just inland from the beach that the Japanese had dug to stop our tanks, and decided that was a good place for the CP. The 2nd battalion of the 5th went in. They came back and I moved down there, and we set up in this tank ditch, and established telephone communications with the shore party, with the 5th and 7th Marines.

But we only had fragmentary information from the 1st Marines. Their communications outfit had been hit when they went in, and a lot of their radios had been destroyed and the only some information I had from them up there -- there was no telephone communication -- was a liaison officer had come down the beach earlier, and I asked him about casualties, and he said, "Oh, 40 or 50," Well, as a matter of fact Lewis had 2,3,400 casualties or more. We did get a dispatch finally asking for hospital corpsmen, and finally, late in the day I did get through to Lewis on the telephone, and I asked him how he was coming and he said, "All right. I said, "Do you need any help?" He said no, he didn't need any help. He'd been taking a beating all day, but that's Lewis; he wouldn't ask for help. While we were sitting in this ditch, some time toward one o'clock in the afternoon, I looked up and here came Gen. Geiger up over the bank, with mortar shells falling into the place. He came to me, and I said, "Look, General, according to the book you're not supposed to be here at this time." He said, "Well, I wanted to
see why those Amtracs were burning." And he found out. There were 38 of them that were burned. Then he said, "I'd like to see the airfield." I said, "That's simple, all you have to do is just climb up this bank and there it is." One leg of the airfield came right above where I was.

Q: Right above the CP.

Smith: Yes. While we were up there the telephone rang. It was for me and I slid down the bank to talk. About that time the Japs put over in rapid succession; there must have been, not mortars, but rockets; they made a horrible screech and it sounded like they were just clearing your head. Well, they put three of those over, and he slid down the bank and I asked him if he'd seen the airfield and he said yes, he'd seen it. Then he went down to visit the 5th and 7th CPs, and he wanted to see Lewis, and I said, "Now look, General, there is a gap of 800 yards here and we don't know who's in there, and you just shouldn't go up there." I had to do quite a bit of talking to talk him out of that. So we sat down then and tried to figure out the casualties. We had communication with the 5th and 7th and they gave us their report, but fragmentary information from the 1st. We came up with 250 casualties. That was before the afternoon counterattack. Then Gen. Geiger shoved off. This big counterattack came in at about 5 in the afternoon, I think. There were 15 Japanese tanks and infantry.

Q: Right across the airfield.
Smith: Yes. One tank got about 2 or 300 feet from my CP, and the artillery which was all in their there, they destroyed with point blank fire. Part of the tanks were destroyed by our own tanks, part by bazookas. We never did know who was given the credit for it. All of them were destroyed. It was rather upsetting. Some fellow who had been sent down from the 1st Marines came down just about the time this thing was hitting, and he came into the CP all out of breath and said, "There is a Japanese tank on the beach shooting up the Shore Party." I guess maybe one of them did get that far, but it was destroyed.

Gen. Rupertus' idea the first day would be that we would have all the southern end of the island and the airfield up to include the Administration Building, and Puller's beach head a little to the northwest. Actually, the 5th Marines had pushed across the lower part of the airfield, and the 7th Marines on the south had pushed in pretty well, and they'd turned south. But they still had to clean out that southern end. Puller had a minimum beach-head of 300 yards or so, and the northern part of the 5th Marines had about 300 yards of beach head, and then there was this bulge that went across the airfield. Then during the night there were two counterattacks, one against the 7th, and I think one came directed toward the CP.

Q: Where the tanks were?

Smith: Yes. It is rather eerie to hear -- on this 7th Marines one I heard the banzai. Everything was quiet, and suddenly I heard this banzai, the Japanese shouting, and then everything in God's green earth opened up.
Then, gradually, as the counterattack was beaten back the fire died down, and the machine gun bursts were shorter. Then everything stops and you know it's finished. Gen. Rupertus, of course, was very anxious to get ashore, and he tried to get me to tell him to come ashore. I knew he shouldn't be ashore there; he had a tremendous headquarters, and to move that ashore would have taken a lot of amphibian tractors and we just didn't have them.

Finally, along in the afternoon I told him that if he wanted to do it it looked like he could get ashore, but then they began looking for amphibian tractors and they couldn't find them; they had used up the available ones to send in the reserve, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th. So the General had to spend the night on the ship, and he was not very happy about that. He came ashore at 9:50 the next morning, and I turned over to him. He initially set up his CP in the ditch where I'd been. Then after that we cleaned up the southern end of the island; then they got the airfield and got some of the noses of the high ground north of the airfield; and then he moved into the old Administration Building -- he moved his CP in there -- and I remained down in the ditch. I was still there on November 1st when I came back to Pavuvu. I did a lot of traveling around the division, and I went in periodically to tell the General what I'd seen. I never sat in on any conferences on planning or anything like that. I just went around and talked to the battalion commanders.

Q: Were you there when Geiger ordered Rupertus to accept the 81st?

Smith: Oh yes.

Q: What was their confrontation like?
Smith: The first of the 24th to come in was one regiment under Col. Dark, who relieved Lt. Col. Puller. Gen. Rupertus felt that Puller had had all he could take. He had 1,700 casualties in the regiment, and he decided to send the whole regiment back to Pavuvu. He still was optimistic he could finish up the operation in a couple of days. Not only did he send the 1st Marines back, but he sent our tanks back with them, and that was a bad mistake because the Army tanks that came in didn't do as well with our infantry as our own tanks had done. But Dark came in and relieved Puller up the west road there, and then the 7th Marines relieved the 1st Marines around the pocket, and they beat themselves down. In the meantime the 5th Marines had dashed up the west road and captured Peleliu Island and the north end of the island, and then swung back toward the pocket. Then Dark came ashore with his regiment and went in there and relieved the 5th in the north end of the island and swung around the northern end. Then the 5th came and took its turn at the pocket, and they did pretty well; they reduced the size of the pocket. As a matter of fact, when I left the island I guess the pocket wasn't over 600 yards in its biggest dimension, and there weren't over 600 Japanese in the pocket. But about that point Gen. Geiger decided that the First Division should be relieved, and we came over and talked to Gen. Rupertus, and at that time Gen. Rupertus was very, very anxious to be relieved. I had hoped personally that with Dark relieving Lt. Col. Puller, maybe with his help we could finish the job, but our troops were too badly beaten down to do it.

Q: Do you think Puller fought his regiment properly?
Smith: Well, he banged his head against the opposition. I went over the ground he captured, and I didn't see how a human being had captured it, but he did. He believed in momentum; he believed in coming ashore and hitting and just keep on hitting and trying to keep up the momentum until he'd overrun the whole thing.

Q: No finesse.

Smith: No, no finesse. When he destroyed 140 defended caves that's quite an operation, plus a blockhouse or two. No, there was no finesse about it, but there was gallantry and there was determination.

They tell a story about Honsowetz -- remember that? -- telling him to attack, and he said he only had 13 men or something like that. And Lewis said, "You got yourself, haven't you?" (laughs)

Q: Honsowetz or Hunt?

Smith: Honsowetz.

Q: Honsowetz had a battalion?

Smith: He had a battalion there, yes.

Q: I thought Honsowetz was the 3.

Smith: Oh, later on. On Okinawa he was a 3. But he had a battalion of the 1st Marines, and the General said, "You got yourself, haven't you?" Lewis was a card. I'm very fond of him. I've served with him a lot.
On Peleliu, a couple of days after we landed, I decided to go and visit Lewis. My aide and I went down to the beach and followed up the wire -- that was the only way you could find where he was -- and we crawled through a swamp and finally I found him up there in an abandoned quarry at the south end of this high ground, with his pipe in his mouth, stripped down to the waist and shouting orders. And the Japs were just 150 yards out ahead, that's all. I kidded Lewis about his position, but that's the way he operates. The next time I visited his CP he'd shifted his zone of operation up to the west road and he'd gone quite a ways up the road. I found him in his CP as usual, the Japs weren't very far out. While I was at the CP the Japs opened up on the CP, so he organized a patrol out of cooks, bakers, whatever he had around there, and sent the patrol out to get those Japs. I heard a little shooting, and they came back and reported they'd gotten the snipers.

Then Col. Dark came ashore and relieved him, and the first thing Col. Dark did was to move his CP one thousand yards back! He wasn't going up there and relieve Puller where he'd been.

We are getting along toward the end. (Pause)

Then finally on October 12th Adm. Fart announced that assault operations had been concluded, and Gen. Geiger moved ashore at that time. He was correct in that. On October 12th we had everything on Peleliu that was ever used by anybody: we had the beaches, we had the airfield, we were using everything that we ever wanted to use. All we didn't have was this darn pocket, and why the Japanese from the high ground around the pocket never fired on the airfield I don't know, but they didn't. They never fired on that airfield. They could have. They fired at the troops that were close aboard, but not at the airfield.
Then on October 20th the 91st Division relieved the 1st Marines and Gen. Geiger and Gen. Rupertus departed by air the same day; and I again was left to bring out the troops. I talked to Gen. Mueller, who later became chief of staff to Gen. MacArthur, and, of course, he insisted that he was just beginning a new campaign, that we hadn't done much with the Japs. I didn't argue with him. The first thing he wanted from me was an overlay showing the position of all our machine guns on the island. I said, "Look, General, we have been attacking, and we don't make overlays for machine guns when we are attacking, we keep them moving." So he let me off the hook on that, and then he began to question the combat efficiency of the outfit, and I said there was nothing wrong with the combat efficiency of the 1st Marine Division. I said, "The only thing is that it's time for them to be relieved." Then in turn the first thing he did was to encase the whole Administration Building around he built up sand bags, and he then called it the OP of the 81st Division, and he moved his CP over on the east coast of Peleliu — I forget the name of the beach; there was a nice beach there where the trees hadn't yet been knocked down. He moved in there and left his OP where our division CP had been. As a matter of poetic justice took two barges later on in the game and converted them and put torpedoes in these barges, and sneaked down from Babelthaup down to Peleliu, off the east coast of Peleliu — where there was a tremendous amount of shipping, they were unloading the and what have you.

Q: That's where the division left from the east coast.
Smith: Yes. And they let fly with a torpedo at the beach, it missed all those ships, and piled up on the beach, and, of course, everybody in creation began shooting at those boats; and they put holes through the general's tent and everything else, so he didn't escape the war by going down to this beach! There was no other place he could have gone.

Incidentally, when I finally went up to Pearl Harbor, Adm. Nimitz questioned me about this Peleliu operation. He wanted to know just how many people were left in the pocket, and I told him my best estimate was 600. Now the 81st; they methodically went about reducing this pocket. What they did was, they took over six positions, they were entrenched there, and they'd get poles and sand bags ahead, and then crawl up behind the first sand bag, and people behind would push more sand bags, and they'd pile them up, and they'd have a new line of a few yards out here and they kept that up until the 27th of November. They relieved us on the 20th of October, and on the 27th of November they finally overran the pocket. They gradually moved these sand bags forward down the ridges until there was nothing left, and the poor Jap down there sent word out that this was the end and he killed himself and burned the colors. Now the casualties for the first part of that operation were 6,525, and the 81st Division lost 1,393, because even with this methodical thing a lot of people are hurt.

On Anguar -- to show you what can happen -- there were only 1,500 Japanese, and the 81st Division landed two regiments there. One regiment went all the way down the island and met not all but the other regiment turned and found the 1,500 Japs up in the northwest corner of the island. Then they started to methodically
reduce the place) and it cost them 1,500 casualties to get 1,500 Japanese. So this methodical business doesn't always pay off.

Well, Nuts Moore fixed me up with a plane on November 1st. I'd gotten the last of the 5th Marines off. He gave me a plane and I flew out to Emirau and then on down. It's funny, when I took off from the field they were still shooting at the pocket up there; there were star shells and everything else. A sad thing -- I was watching the last of the 5th go; they were going out on the east coast beach there, and of course as they came down to the beach they unloaded their weapons to go aboard ship, and somebody didn't get the word. And some boy armed with a Thompson sub machine gun$ snagged the trigger and hit a sergeant in the stomach, just as he was . . . fortunately he lived, it was not fatal.

Now is that enough about Peleliu?

Q: I think we have pretty well covered it. Of course the operation is a matter of record.

Smith: Oh, it's a matter of record. I didn't go into the capture of Nicosia, that was quite a show.

Q: Certainly the record of the division was outstanding.

Smith: Oh yes, geeheeze, we had good people. I think our people did everything that was humanly possible to end up this operation. I think the 5th Pulle$ was the most aggressive of the regiment, and the 5th next, and the 7th was at the bottom of the heap as far as aggressiveness was concerned. Hanneken was not about to beat his
head against those rocks up there. But the 5th when it came in, they really did close in.

Q: I remember they took the division headquarters personnel and put them up on the lines and facing Horseshoe Ridge at night there, every night.

Smith: That's right, they had a provisional battalion. But that had its disadvantages because they had no fire discipline. (laughs)

Q: Those were those who were pulling the 50 caliber machine gun every once in a while.

Smith: Yeah! I got a kick out of Spencer Berger who was up on that ridge there for quite a while. He told me about this Jap that annoyed him no end. There was a steep cliff on one side; I think what we call Death Valley went up there. And there was a cave down at the bottom, and the Japs periodically would haul a little cannon out of the cave, and shoot at the Marines further down the line, then haul the cannon back. Here was Spencer Berger sitting up on a cliff, and they couldn't get at these people. Finally they got a charge of TNT and put it on a line; I don't know how they set it off, but they hung the line down and then swung it, and swung the charge into the cave, and somehow exploded it. That blew up these Japanese. But Berger said he could smell this boiling rice down there, and it just made him mad that they were cooking meals right under his nose and he couldn't do anything about it.
Q: I recall they had a --- of mortar that was wheeled out from the caves during that first day.

Smith: That --- this thing that went over our heads. It made a horrible screech; it may have been this mortar. It could have been a rocket, I don't know.

Q: I remember seeing it on the beach when Gen. Rupertus had come ashore and he was looking at it; it was pretty massive, it was the biggest thing that we'd ever seen.

Smith: Of course, the Japanese had mined the beaches. They had these mines all over the place, but fortunately they hadn't armed a great many of them. Right near where I set up there were three of them in the sand, right near my tent, and they put white tape around them showing they were disarmed. Poor old Willie Harrison at that time was commanding the artillery, and his CP was at the south end of the airfield, and when the 155 guns fired they fired right over his head, and the blast was terrific. He couldn't sleep or write or do anything else; he wanted to move in with me and I said, "Now look, if . . ." He was the engineer, uh?

Q: Harrison had the artillery.

Smith: No, this was the colonel engineer -- who was he? (Pause) Oh, Fenton! I said, "Look, Frank, I'll be glad to have you if the first thing you'll do is take those darn mines and take them out in the ocean somewhere and dump them." He agreed and he moved in,
and we were very glad to have him. We were down in a ditch, you see, and we could hear the shooting, but we didn't get the terrific blast that he had got. He'd got it full scale.

Q: Was the direction of the operation conducted from the division CP by Rupertus and his staff for the most part, or were the regiments pretty much on their own?

Smith: From the division staff, as far as I know. As I say, I had very little to do with the planning. My function was to bring the troops out after the operation was over and to go around visiting the troops in between times, and if I saw anything of interest I'd go and tell the General about it.

Q: You never saw him after that.

Smith: After Peleliu? No. I'll get to that. When I returned to Pavuvu on November 2nd (I took off from Peleliu on the 1st and went to Emirau) I didn't know there'd been a change in command. I came into Beqa and the quartermaster there gave me a boat to go around through the channel and get a chance to shave. It takes about two hours to get from Beqa to Pavuvu by the channel. When I got to the dock Gen. Del Valle was there in command of the division. He took me up to the CP and I found that the quarters I'd lived in in the plantation house, the Red Cross girls were there, and Louis Jones was living with Del Valle at division headquarters. There I found out first about the 10th Army: I never knew anything about that until I returned to Pavuvu. There were orders for me there to go
to the 10th Army, and I left Guadalcanal on November 7th and crossed the dateline to arrive at Pearl Harbor the same date. I reported to Adm. Nimitz and then to Gen. Buckner. Up to the last, Edson would never admit that the 10th Army was going to have the Okinawa campaign. I talked to Edson a good bit. He maintained that Holland Smith would get the operation, and as a matter of fact Adm. Spruance recommended that. Adm. Nimitz felt that the Army should command because the bulk of the troops were Army. When you wound up, there were 90,000 Marines, but there were 280,000 Army, and there were 80,000 Navy in that campaign. The thing Adm. Nimitz wanted me to watch over there was the supporting troops. You know, the Army, when they moved in, they've got to have thousands and thousands of supporting troops, and the Navy just doesn't have amphibious shipping to haul everything in the world across the ocean. I told him I'd do the best I could.

Q: How did you view this assignment?

Smith: I wasn't too happy about it. I would rather have stayed with the division. As a matter of fact Jerry Thomas wanted to clear me out before Peleliu to come back and command the Marine Corps Schools. And I wrote Jerry and I said, "Look, Jerry, it took me a long time to get out to the Pacific and I want to stay out here for a while. I realize that probably I've got the qualifications to command the schools, I've taught there several times, and maybe eventually it'll be a nice job, but not now." Then Gen. Rupertus got hold of me before we sailed to Peleliu, and he wanted the job of Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, and he wanted me to say that I didn't want it. I told him that I'd written Jerry Thomas
that I wasn't interested in going back now. Then he told Gen. Vandegrift that I absolutely didn't want the job -- which was not quite it, I didn't want it at that time. So he was ordered back to the Marine Corps Schools.

Q: He was very close to Vandegrift, wasn't he?

Smith: I don't know what their relations were.

Q: When you reported up to Pearl, did Nimitz say anything further to you about your assignment, and did Holland Smith say anything to you?

Smith: No. Holland I think must have been assistant at Iwo Jima at that time. That was November when I reported there.

Q: No, Iwo Jima wasn't until February.

Smith: I did talk to him, yes. I remember he had me over to dinner and he wanted me to go to the baseball game with him. The Marines were playing the Army and I said, "Look, General, General Buckner has a box over there and I'll have to go over and sit with Gen. Buckner, I guess." He understood. Then later on he was much upset about an article that had been written in Newsweek or World Report or something, about him trying to undercut the Army. He was much upset about that; he claimed he'd never done anything like that.

Q: He had a hard fight all the time he was there, didn't he?
Smith: I think he argued pretty strenuously with Adm. Nimitz.

Q: Well, Richardson was always . . .

Smith: Oh, Richardson, yes. He was a pain in the neck. That's why Adm. Nimitz moved to Guam -- to get away from Richardson. And that's why he had to leave Holland Smith back in Pearl, because if he took Holland Smith with him to Guam he would have had to bring Richardson to Guam.

Q: Couldn't Nimitz have been more forceful with the Army?

Smith: Well, he was trying to play ball.

Q: Because the comment has been made that a fellow was out on a liaison visit from headquarters and he said, "Well, now I've got to talk to Richardson, I have a rough hour ahead of me." Richardson was always trying to undercut the Marines.

Smith: Oh yes, Richardson was the man who said no Marine officer was qualified to command a division. He made that statement.

Q: What was his claim to fame?

Smith: I don't know. He was the fellow that after the war furnished the trucks to the demonstrators who came down to his headquarters and demonstrated against him: the want-to-go-home crowd. And he furnished the trucks. That's the kind of a man he was.
Gen. Geiger at that time was in command of the Marines at Pearl Harbor, and he had a sergeant and a corporal that were bad, and boy, he got them up and convened a board, and they reduced those noncoms to privates just like that for inefficiency, and that was the end of any trouble in the Marine Corps. But Richardson had quite a demonstration, and he furnished the trucks.

Q: He was wearing those breeches and those boots all the time.

Smith: I never had any contact with him.

Q: What was your reception on arrival at 10th Army Headquarters?

Smith: Very friendly. Gen. Buckner was a fine gentleman. I don't know if he was brilliant mentally, but he had character, he was solid. The only trouble in that 10th Army setup was that the 10th Army was made up of two veteran corps -- 3rd Amphibious Corps and the 24th Corps -- that had had plenty of combat experience, and Gen. Geiger had a staff that, as far as Leavenworth staff work went, they were highly qualified, but they had no combat experience. And of course, these two veteran corps weren't too happy about getting orders from a staff that had no combat experience, but it worked out fairly well.

Q: You mention in your personal narrative that because of the joint nature of the operation Buckner bent over backwards to try to get a joint staff.
Smith: Oh yes. It was padded too much; I found that. There were 30 marine officers and 30 naval officers. I was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. Commodore Talbot was Deputy Chief of Staff for the Navy, and Brig. Gen. Shick was Deputy Chief of Staff Army, and Brig. Gen. Post was Chief of Staff to Buckner. The relation between Post and Buckner was very close; he was practically a son to Gen. Buckner; they’d served together five, six or seven years; had been up to Alaska together. Post was a very fine person and I lived in the same tent with Shick; he had been an instructor at West Point and had been a cavalryman earlier and he came out with Gen. Buckner to Alaska and then down to the Army. I used to argue with him quite a bit, but we were very friendly. The relations were very friendly, except that, my goodness, sometimes you were aghast at what people without combat experience could do. First thing, the general’s aide came around to me and wanted my helmet to get a star painted on it. I said, "Look, I don’t want to paint any star on any helmet where there are Japs around. That’s just an invitation for somebody to shoot at you." They had never thought of that. The Marines hid their rank during the war. And finally, the solution was not a bad one; they painted the stars on the liner; you wore the liner when you were around your tent or what not, but you wore the steel helmet when you were out with the troops and somebody could shoot at you. Then when they began figuring out the rations for landing, they were going to take three days of sea rations. I said, "Now look, all the fellows have got to go ashore is these combat pack on their back, and how is he going to get all those cans in there?" And I told them what we normally did; we took one can of sea rations and maybe a K ration and a half a bar of chocolate.
That was it, and that could go in there with your other gear. So that's more or less what they did. Then the poor Army -- they didn't have complete combat packs like we had; they had a bag; they had this little sack here, but then they had this bag that they had to tote around.

Q: The B bag.

Smith: Yes. They had two bags; the A and the B bag. I think the A bag held the blue uniforms and the B bag the khaki. I've forgotten. But that's a mess when they land, they have to land all those things in a pile; then somehow or other the troops have to get them. The Marines -- they have their complete pack. You drop the transport pack and leave somebody there to guard these packs and you go about your business with your little combat pack.

I talked about the experience of these people. They knew the book, but ... For instance when they laid out the Army headquarters area, it was really a place -- you needed a car to get around from the G-3 to the G-2; they'd laid it out according to the book for the Army, and it really was scattered over the countryside. And there weren't any roads in there. Eventually it stripped down.

Of course there was a tremendous amount of planning in this Okinawa operation. They got off their first planning schedule on October 25th -- that's before I reported -- and on December 3rd CincPA -- that's Adm. Nimitz -- issued orders to initiate planning. That's December 3rd. Gen. Geiger and his staff came up in November, and they put on some sort of presentation for Gen. Buckner.

Q: Plan Fox I think it was. Plan Fox was the landing across the
August

Okinawa beaches, and Plan Baker was the alternate plan.

Smith: Well, they impressed Gen. Buckner rather thoroughly. They knew their business, that 3rd Corps. Gen. Buckner then told me that he felt that going into this operation he should designate in advance a second in command. Now the senior Army officer in the 10th Army -- I've forgotten his name.

Q: Fred C. Wallace.

Smith: Yes. He was a major general, and he was to be the Island commander once we got some territory. But Gen. Buckner didn't feel that he was qualified to command an army in the field, and he did feel that Gen. Geiger was so qualified. At the time we were at Pearl Harbor, and he wanted to write this letter to Adm. Nimitz, but he felt he ought to send it via Gen. Richardson, because Richardson was the senior Army officer present.

Q: But Nimitz was in overall command of this operation.

Smith: Oh yes. Gen. Buckner did that, and he got his letter back from Gen. Richardson with a pencil note on it that "this is a matter for the War Department to decide." That made Gen. Buckner kind of mad, but he realized that once he got aboard ship, and once we started the Okinawa operation, Gen. Richardson was out of the picture, you see, and Adm. Nimitz could make whomever he wanted commander of this task force. It was not really an Army, it was a task force -- 56, whatever it was.
Q: Yes, Joint Expeditionary Forces.

Smith: Yes. Well, Post was well aware of how Gen. Buckner felt about this matter, and, of course, when Gen. Buckner was killed there was no doubt, Gen. Geiger took over. Gen. Wallace came to me and he was very bitter. He said, "I am the senior Army officer, and by Army regulations I should take command." What he failed to realize was that what we called the 10th Army was a tactical command, not an administrative command. It's true that Gen. Geiger couldn't be administratively commanding general of the 10th Army, but he could tactically be commanding general of that task force, which was called 10th Army. Of course, what the Army did -- they didn't want any Marine in command of an Army. Gen. Stilwell had been through Okinawa shortly before. He was the chief of all the infantry of the Army, at that time, and he'd inspected the troops, and he'd just left and was en route to Pearl Harbor, so they grabbed him and brought him back. I am getting a little ahead of my story.

Gen. Buckner was killed on the 15th of June. Gen. Geiger took over on that date; the campaign ended on the 21st of June, and Gen. Stilwell arrived on the 22nd of June, and I took his plane to go home. I am a little ahead of my story, though.

The complete 10th Army operations plan was issued on January 6th 1945, with a target date of April 1st 1945. It was March 1st and then they changed it to April 1st. When this plan was gotten out it was April 1st.

Q: March 1st, then March 15th and then April 1st.
Smith: I forget. I know it wound up April 1st. Well, Gen. Buckner after he got out this order had a potential command of 375,000 men, (175,000 in assault, 25,000 additional assault troops that came in later shipping), and he felt that he should get around and see the troops that were to participate in the operation, because he had none of them there at Pearl Harbor, just his headquarters. So he took off on January 18th, and he took me with him, and took Col. Kelly, his G-2, Brig. Gen. Dumas, his G-3, Brig. Gen. Blakelock, his G-4, and his aide. And we took off in a big plane on the 18th of January, flew to Espiritu Santo, and on January 25th inspected the 27th Infantry Division under Gen. Saigeon, and it didn't look good. And Gen. Buckner realized that it didn't look good. The A we went to New Caledonia.

Q: Pardon me, had they recovered from Saipan, or were they so dispirited?

Smith: I lived with the brigadier general who commanded the artillery. I forget his name now. And he said, "These damn people don't want to fight." That was an Army officer talking. Gen. Buckner thought he could stir them up a bit by talking to the enlisted men and to find out what was the thing they most would like to do. He'd hoped they'd say "to go and kill Japs." All of them wanted a 30 day furlough at home. And they didn't pan out on Okinawa.

On the 21st we were over on New Caledonia to see the 81st Division. In retrospect, that was a very good division. They didn't go in with us to Okinawa.
Q: They were area reserve.

Smith: Yes. Then we went over to Guadalcanal from January 23rd to 26th, and visited the 1st Mar Div; then the 6th Mar Div. The 1st had come over from Pavuvu for training, and they were in the midst of a live ammunition exercise, and the 6th was in the midst of live ammunition exercise. They were really impressive, and that convinced the Army that they didn't have to worry about Marines. I had had to go to Biak. The Army had a form that they sent out to divisions -- a progress report, where you had to put down had they fired the rifles, had they done this, had they done all these things. I told the G-3, I said, "Look, these Marine divisions have just come out of combat. You don't have to worry about whether they know how to shoot their rifles or mortars." But they had to have these forms, and after Guadalcanal the G-3 came to me and said, "Forget about it."

Then we flew from Guadalcanal to Biak Island off New Guinea. We were there January 26th-27th, and we saw the 41st Division which didn't belong to us; it was at the time loading out for the Philippines. Then we went on to Leyte, where the 7th, 77th and 96th Divisions were just winding up the Leyte campaign. They were the XIV Corps that went into Okinawa. When we got there on February 1st the campaign was practically over; they were living in the mud.

The Army had not quite played ball with Adm. Nimitz. The agreement was -- they signed an agreement -- that after Leyte these three divisions would be returned to the Central Pacific in the same condition in which they'd been furnished to Gen. MacArthur. Well, they didn't have their rations, they didn't have their ammunition,
and they'd hit each division for 800 men to form up quartermaster transport companies for the Army. Gen. Hodge had come back to Pearl Harbor and pointed this out, and Adm. Nimitz had gone after Gen. MacArthur and said, "If you don't carry out this agreement I'll take it up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff." So they made an attempt to do something about it. But the rations for the 24th Corps had to be brought in from other sources, and I think each division was 2-3,000 men short when it came in to Okinawa.

Q: I think you mention in your personal narrative about some tank officer who was almost in tears telling you how they'd been re-organized -- the quartermaster truck . . .

Smith: Yes. (Pause) Well . . .

Q: [MacArthur] dragged his feet all the way through.

Smith: He dragged his feet on that one. But we finally got the 24th Corps and they did a good job on Okinawa. They were all right. Except the 27th -- it was not really 24th Corps.

We went from Leyte over to Guam. Gen. Buckner was doing a little sightseeing and he wanted to see Peleliu, so we flew over Peleliu, circled it. Then he wanted to see Ulithi. The dumb Army pilot when we approached Ulithi, flew right over the middle of this tremendous anchorage with aircraft carriers all around there. A couple of fighter planes came up under our wings and told us to get out of there. And we got out. They never permitted any planes
that they didn't know about to fly over their fleet. The Japs had
sent down a transport plane and dropped a bomb or two there some
time earlier.

Well, we got into Guam and we were late, and Gen. Buckner was
worried about the reception he'd get, because when he came into
Leyte the communications were terrible and Gen. Hodge didn't know
he was coming. He talked to me and he wondered whether that might
happen on Guam. I said, "I know Gen. Larsen is in command of the
transient camp there, and I am sure that he'll take care of it."

We were an hour or two late, and we came into Guam in the
depot field, and there was Gen. Larsen's aide -- Gen. Larsen had
stayed around for an hour or so, and there was no message to say
we were going to be late -- and he took us over to his camp; he
had a very fine dinner for us, so Gen. Buckner was satisfied that
the Marine Corps had taken care of him. Gen. Erskine at that time
was on Guam with the 3rd Mar Div, and he came around to Gen. Buckner.
The 3rd Mar Div was not in the 10th Army, but he was having some
live ammunition exercises out near Talafofo, which he wanted the
General to see, so we drove out there. It was very impressive.

Then after that, on February 2nd to 4th, we were at Saipan
visiting the 2nd Mar Div, which did belong to the 10th Army, and
Gen. Buckner was thoroughly impressed with that 2nd Division! He
told them in advance, "I don't want any parades or anything. I want
to see just what you would be doing on a Saturday (that was when we
arrived) -- you just go ahead and do whatever you were going to do."
And he got there and all these vans were working -- the shoemaker's
van, the machine shop, one regiment was having an inspection on the
field, and I don't know what the others were doing. But he was
thoroughly impressed. And they were a good outfit. He talked to
the battalion commanders, and there were battalion commanders like
Bill Jones that knew their way around. He told me afterwards he had
never seen such an alert bunch of battalion commanders. They were
good. Unfortunately we didn't get much use out of the 2nd Division
on Okinawa.

Q: We'll talk about that. I've written that in this history that
I've done for Ballantine Books which I just got in the mail -- the
fact that his interest and attraction to the 8th Marines proved fatal

Smith: It did. The 8th Marines impressed him more than ... Wallacewas in command of it at the time when he was on Saipan, and
they were having inspection on the field. And Gen. Buckner went
around and was thoroughly impressed with Wallace and his outfit.
When he was killed -- it's true -- he was up on the hill there,
watching, I think, a rifle company, as one battalion of the 8th
moved forward, and they were really moving. They were fresh.

Q: It was the first day of action, I think.

Smith: Yes. They were fresh and they were good, and they looked
good, and Gen. Buckner was very happy. We are getting ahead of the
story, but he had gone up there and taken position behind two big
coral boulders -- there was a crack between them and he was looking
out through the crack. He was just over the topographical crest,
and his aide was with him. At that time the 1st Mar Div, to which
the 8th Marines was attached, was about 4,000 yards ahead of the
96th Division on the left which was up on the plateau, on the Yuzadake escarpment. The Japs had 47 mm guns up there. Suddenly, in rapid succession, three rounds of 47 mm hit the base of these rocks, and a big piece of coral went right through his heart. There happened to be a doctor there, and within three minutes the doctor was treating him. Apparently it was too late to give him a transfusion in the wrist, so he gave him a transfusion in the ankle I think -- I don't know what . . .

Q: The big toe, there is an artery that goes . . .

Smith: But it was too late, he was gone. The poor aide -- I talked to him later -- was pretty shaken. All he got out of it was broken ear drums, Hubbard.

I talked to Post about it. I said, "After all, the General goes off here every morning with his aide and his driver, and he goes up with these rifle companies, and he's just going to get bumped off some time." Eddie Post said, "I know it, but there's nothing I can do about it." Gen. Geiger did the same, but somehow he didn't take as many chances as Gen. Buckner did.

Q: They were very much the same in many ways, weren't they?

Smith: Quite similar, yes.

Q: As a matter of fact there was almost a similarity in appearance, was there not?
Smith: Gen. Buckner was more handsome and a little taller.

Q: Grey hair, blue eyes.

Smith: Yes. He was in wonderful physical shape. The man was 62 at that time. I guess I'll go into that later when we get to Pearl Harbor -- about his physical condition.

We finished up on Saipan and then returned to Pearl Harbor on February 4th. On March 11th, April 1st was confirmed as Love Day. The D Day was when the 77th Division landed in Kerama Retto. That's why we didn't have a D Day on Okinawa. The headquarters of the 10th Army was a tremendous thing. It was divided into forward echelon, rear echelon, and a liaison detachment which was to be left at Pearl Harbor, at Schofield Barracks. That forward echelon was again divided in two parts -- one called the command detachment, which was on the SS Eldorado (and I accompanied that), and the remainder of the forward echelon (the rest of the staff, the working members of the staff) were on two or three ships. Where Gen. Buckner made a mistake was in dividing this forward echelon according to rank. He took the senior officers on the Eldorado with him. For instance, he took Wallace with him. Now Wallace could be of no help in the landing; he was going to be the Island Commander. Once we got off the island and got landed, then they made some shifts; they shifted Gen. Wallace to one of these other ships and pulled some working members of the staff on to the Eldorado.

We in the command detachment flew back to Guam and on the 7th of March, and on the 12th boarded the Eldorado with Adm. Turner who had just come back from Iwo Jima.

End of Side 2 of Tape 1
Smith: We boarded the Eldorado on March 12th. I ate at Adm. Turner's mess, with Gen. Buckner and Gen. Harris of the command detachment. I noted that Adm. Turner and Gen. Buckner were sizing each other up at first. Kelly Turner didn't think too much of Gen. MacArthur, and he wanted to sound out Gen. Buckner on what he thought about Gen. MacArthur, but he didn't get any answer. They sparred a while. Their relations became friendly.

Q: What do you think Buckner's attitude was?

Smith: He never told me, I haven't the least idea. Not the least.

The 7th Division landed on Kerama Retto on March 26th -- DDay -- and did a nice job there.

Q: That was Gen. Bruce's outfit.

Smith: Yes. He wanted to be alone. He was never happy when he had to be part of the Army or the Corps. He managed to escape it for the Kerama Retto and for the capture of Ie Shima. Then Gen. Buckner brought him over to the 24th Corps, and he was put right down in the middle, and he was not happy at all!

As we went in for the landing on April 1st, of course we expected the Japanese to make some show of defending the beaches, and after looking at those beaches, it would have been very, very tough. I was asked to go up on the searchlight platform with
a telephone, and report blow by blow what went on. Well, I went up there and nothing happened. In no time at all the Marines had gone in standing up, and in no time at all they had Yontan and Kadena fields, so there was nothing to report. The 1st Division made pretty good progress, the 6th Division the same. The 1st Division had a road that went across the island, and they loaned that road, I think, to the 7th Division for the first day or so, and the 7th Division made beautiful progress, but poor old 1st Mar Div was out its road, and the best they could do the first day was 3,000 yards. Eventually they got their road back.

Q: How would you compare the 1st and 6th Divisions at this time?

Smith: The 1st Division was a different type of division. It was more of a plugging division than the 6th Division.

Q: You said the 6th Division was trying to make up for lost time, since the 1st had been there at Guadalcanal first and that as a unit it had established a reputation, whereas the 6th tended toward being more flashy.

Smith: Well, it was more flashy. Of course the 6th Division had some veteran regiments: it had the 22nd Marines and the 4th Marines, and they had a lot of combat experience. Of course, the 29th Marines hadn't had much combat experience. I guess the 6th was a little more flashy, but there was nothing wrong with the 1st Mar Div -- it was a good, hard charging division.
U: You said divisions reflected the staff and their commanders. For instance Krulak was a driver.

Smith: Yes, they may have. And then of course they were a little more cocky than the 1st Marine Division. When we got down the island there a ways, the 1st Marine Division set up a CP somewhere inland from Naha, and there was a little ravine not over 10 feet wide that they had to build a bridge across, and the 6th Division had built a bridge across the Naha estuary and had a sign on it -- THE LONGEST BRIDGE EVER BUILT BY AN ENGINEER BATTALION OF THE MARINE CORPS. So Pedro Del Valle put a sign on his bridge, THE SHORTEST BRIDGE EVER BUILT BY AN ENGINEER BATTALION OF THE MARINE CORPS.

Q: That burned Shepherd up, I understand.

Smith: Yes, (laughs) The 6th Division was more pushy. (Pause) Nothing much happened in the first few days except for the 1st Mar Div to cut across the island, the 6th Mar Div to cut across the island and move north, and the 24th Corps to turn south and gradually slowed down by more and more opposition coming up down south there.

On April 6th the Japanese sent down 500 planes; only 22 of them got through, but some of those 22 did a lot of damage.

The 6th Division moved north, and, my goodness, they really made knots. Finally the Army turned them loose and they went all the way up to the base of the Motobu Peninsula, and then cleaned up the Motobu Peninsula. They did a very fine job. I went up there; my aide and I drove up and after they'd gotten to Motobu we drove all
the way around. We went up and went all the way around that Motobu Peninsula. We didn’t move ashore with the Army headquarters until the 18th of April. They had to build this tremendous setup there.

Anyway we had good communications aboard ship. There was no question of issuing Army orders because you had one corps attacking north and one corps south; they were individual corps operations.

The Navy wanted to get Ie Shima because there were some good airfields there. Ie Shima is just off the west coast of Okinawa. The 77th Division landed there on April 16th, and after a five day campaign they captured the island.

As I said, the 24th Corps met more and more resistance as it moved to the south, and finally slowed to a halt. Gen. Hodge figured that he’d have to get a lot of artillery preparation before they could proceed any further. A full scale attack was planned for April 19th with naval gunfire, artillery and everything else behind it. And, of course, the Army thought they’d break on through and keep going, but they got nowhere. The results of that attack of April 19th were negative.

Q: It was at this time that Gen. Vandegrift and Gen. Thomas...

Smith: I’ll come to that. (Pause) The progress was slow, you were making progress by yards. I went down to the front a good bit; I spent more time at the front with the 3rd Corps than with the 24th, although Gen. Hodge is a very friendly person. We spent a lot of time in the evening listening to the air raids. Gen. Buckner had an armored car that had a radio, loudspeaker and what not. My goodness, one evening we counted 32 raids. A raid can be one
plane or two, and they'd follow the progress, either splashed or went down on the land if disappeared.

I don't think Gen. Buckner really wanted to commit the 1st Marine Division. At first he was prevented by orders from higher headquarters. The 3rd Corps, after it had done its job on Okinawa, was supposed to go over and capture Miyako, which was some island over toward Formosa some place.

Q: The island of Sakashima Gunto, west of . . .

Smith: Southwest of Okinawa.

Q: And off of Formosa. It completed the Ryukyu chain.

Smith: Yes. Well, finally CincPoa released the Army from the responsibility of doing anything about that. The 1st Mar Div was sent down to relieve the 27th Division which had been brought in because of the opposition. They were a mess. The 1st Division went down and found that they hadn't buried the dead -- the dead were lying around and they complained to the Army. The Army made the 27th Division send back working parties to bury their own dead. The 27th was to move north and relieve the 6th Division, so the 6th could come down and join the 1st Division in the south.

Gen. Buckner, about the time of the relief of the 27th Division, held a press conference. Of course, these correspondents were all on him about the 27th Division, which had been relieved in Saipan, and they wanted to know why he was relieving the 27th Division. Well, Gen. Buckner told them the truth, but it wasn't exactly what he
believed. He said that, after all, in the initial planning the 27th Division had been designated as the island command division -- that's correct -- and that now there was an opportunity to put them on that job, and he was taking them out to take over the territory from the 6th Marine Division. I don't think he ever convinced the correspondents, but that's what he told them, anyway.

Q: How were his special agents -- pretty good.

Smith: I think they were pretty good, I don't remember anything out of line.

Q: There was criticism later on this appearing in the paper -- the southeastern landing, the alternate landing.

Smith: Yes, I know. There have been a lot of arguments for and against that. Of course, what Gen. Bruce wanted to do was, after Ie Shima he wanted to go down and land on the southeastern beaches. But what Gen. Buckner and his staff were concerned about was that the Japanese had sitting back there either a brigade or a division that had never been committed, that was back in that general area, and he was afraid that if you took this one division and landed it down there, it might be pinned down, and they were already pinned down up north, and you'd just have a stalemate. Now if you had taken the whole 3rd Corps and sent it around they could have made progress, but then the Army would have been pretty weak on the original front.

Q: What about the 2nd Division?
Smith: They got one regiment over, and the trouble was that they had left the 2nd Division go; it was loaded out; and it had unloaded all its gear in Saipan, and it would have been quite something to load them up again and bring them out.

Q: They could have done it.

Smith: I suppose they could have. Possibly Gen. Buckner thought that with what he had -- with the 3rd Corps down there -- he had enough people to finish the job. As a matter of fact, when he got the two corps down there attacking together, he decided to put on an Army attack on May 11th -- the first time he had an opportunity to issue an Army attack order. It was to be a coordinated attack involving the double envelopment of the Shuri position. I kidded Shick quite a bit about that. He thought -- like the other Army officers -- that because Gen. Buckner had issued this order everything would just start rolling starting May 11th. I said, "What's the difference between what happens on May 11th and what happened on May 10th, May 9th, May 2nd, May 3rd. We've been day by day getting yard by yard, and on May 11th it's going to be the same thing." But he thought that just because the Army issued the order there'd be a breakthrough. The breakthrough didn't come till the 31st of May -- 20 days later. That attack jumped off and we made real progress. In the meantime the 8th Marines had been brought over from Saipan to capture Ie Shima and Aguni Shima that the Navy wanted for an air warning station, and then they came over and joined the 1st Division.
On May 24th we had a little excitement. Five Japanese planes attempted to land on Yontan Field. My goodness, we witnessed it all from the Army headquarters; there was a tremendous amount of anti-aircraft fire. They knocked down four of these five planes, but one of them landed, and 30 Japs came out of that plane with thermite grenades and threw them into planes parked around the airfield. Of course, the antiaircraft people came down with their fire till it was level, and they put holes in all the planes around the airfield. The airfield was out of action for two days, and Nuts Moore's plane was burned up. Of course, they killed the 30 Japs.

Q: There also was a counterattack at the beginning of May.

Smith: Yes, that was supposed to be a double envelopment by the Japanese; they were going to send barges up the coast, and what the 1st Mar Div did was -- at that time the 1st Mar Div was over on the coast; the 6th hadn't yet come in. They had Amtracs on the beach, and when these barges came in they really shot them up. Some of the Japanese did get ashore, but they didn't do any damage. More or less the same thing happened on the east coast. I thought that was much earlier.

Q: That was March 4th.

Smith: I guess I must have missed it going through my notes.

Q: They came up the coast and the ones up the coast were supposed to go behind at DNNA -- I forget where it was, on the east coast. Of course they were just cleaned.
Then the frontal attacks against the lines of the 77th and the 96th really took it, but they held.

Smith: Yes.

Q: Wasn't it about the middle of April that Vandegrift came?

Smith: Yes, didn't I have that? (Pause) Yes, he came out . . .

Q: About the time of the April 19th attack.

Smith: (Pauses, looks at papers) It was some time there, and it was agreed that Adm. Nimitz, who came too to visit the Army, and Gen. Vandegrift, would visit the Marine Corps. It was early in the game because at that time the III Corps CP was up the peninsula, and I had gone up to the peninsula, up to that CP, when Gen. Vandegrift was there, and while I was there the III Corps got an order from the Army to take the first tank battalion and attach it to the 27th Infantry Division, which had ineptly lost all its tanks. Gen. Geiger wanted me to do something about it, and I said, "Those people know that our tank-infantry outfits are something we don't separate, and I'll go right back and talk to Gen. Buckner. They are well aware of this." So I went back to the Army CP and put it up to Gen. Buckner, and of course he couldn't let his G-3 down entirely -- he didn't know anything about this order -- and he finally agreed that he'd think it over. I told him that these tank crews of the 27th Division had escaped; that all they needed were tanks; they didn't need tank crews. It was agreed that they'd take the spare tanks
that the 3rd Corps had and the spare tanks from some other source, and turn them over to the 27th Division. Gen. Geiger pointed out that if you were going to take people down south, why not take the whole division. And that's what they did. That was before the 1st Mar Div was ordered south.

Q: It was probably the attitude of Geiger and his staff that carried over from World War I, when the Marine Corps were sent piecemeal to Army outfit. I think there was a reluctance.

Smith: Yes.

Q: But when Vandegrift came, were there any conferences?

Smith: I never sat in on any that he had with Gen. Buckner. He visited Gen. Geiger, but I think it was Adm. Nimitz more or less who had the contacts with Gen. Buckner. Of course, Gen. Vandegrift must have talked to him somewhere along the line. (Pause)

The break in all this thing came on May 29th. Company A of the 5th Marines broke through Shuri Castle, and Pedro Del Valle threw in two battalions of the 1st following right in behind them. The whole 77th Division had been planning an attack to capture Shuri Castle for some time, and they were all set to go, and here the 1st Marine Division cut in and took all the glory. And of course, they probably did take some chances of being shot up by somebody's artillery, but they weren't. That double envelopment of Shuri was finally accomplished on June 1st, and it cost 10,500 casualties. The Japanese pulled out and went down to the Yuza-dake escarpment.
And the Marines and Army followed up. Then the 6th Marines was sent across the Naha estuary to land on the Oroku Peninsula; they did a nice job there; they landed and cleaned up the Oroku Peninsula and then rejoined and took the zone of action along the coast; and the 1st Mar Div was inland with the 96th Division on the left.

Q: I understand the company commander of A-1-5 raised the Confederate flag on Shuri Castle and created quite a stink.

Smith: Yeah, shouldn't do that. There was one of those company commanders from South Carolina that . . .

Q: Dusenberry.

Smith: Is he the one who was paralyzed from the waist down?

Q: Yes, Julian Dusenberry. It was he who raised the Confederate flag.

Smith: Paul Douglas took me around when I came to Washington -- he took me around to the hospital to visit Dusenberry. Paul Douglas at the time was in the hospital; he had some nerves that were severed and never did regain full use of one hand.

Q: I was with him when he got shot.

Smith: You were?

Q: Yes, he was taking a shot clutch out of a when the 5th Marines had gotten ambushed and beaten back pretty hard at Wana Draw.
Smith: Yeah, that was pretty tough. No, I didn't know he raised the Confederate flag. Well, you know the operations from there on.

The Army came down on the east and the 96th Division on top, and eventually the 7th and 1st Marines met down at the south end. It was on the 10th of June that Gen. Buckner was watching the 8th Marines, which at that time had been inserted in the lines of the 1st. He was watching one of their units go forward and he was killed. Gen. Geiger took over and the first thing he did when he took over was to send for Gen. Dumas to come down and talk to him. I had complained to Gen. Buckner. I'd watched these reports that went from the Army to Adm. Nimitz, and I may have been overly sensitive, but it looked to me like the thing was being shaded to downplay the Marine Corps. Finally on one day when the 6th Division had suffered the highest casualties of any division on the whole front, the report that went to Adm. Nimitz said that they had advanced 100 yards against scattered resistance. That made me mad. I went to Gen. Buckner and I said, "After all, if they had all these casualties (I don't know how many were killed and wounded that day, but it was a big number) those bullets must have come from somebody, there must have been some Japanese out there; it wasn't any scattered resistance." So thereafter Gen. Buckner okayed these things -- he'd never seen them before -- and he checked them over, and Post checked them over to see that they were objective. Of course, the 3rd Corps down there knew what was going on, they'd been watching these things. Gen. Geiger was pretty mad about it, and the first thing he did was send for Gen. Dumas. Dumas put on his pistol and belt and all his gear and went way down
the south end of the island to see Gen. Geiger, expecting to get shot, I guess, and Gen. Geiger read him off a little bit. Then Gen. Geiger was relieved on the 22nd. It was Gen. Geiger who came up and took part in the surrender ceremony on the 21st.

Now, exclusive of the Fleet, there were 450,000 men employed on Okinawa -- 450,000; 280,000 Army, 90,000 marines, 80,000 Navy. There were 18 CB battalions, and a lot of air base personnel of the Navy. The Army reported 107,000 Japanese dead and 7,000 prisoners.

When we first landed there our Intelligence indicated there were 85,000 Japanese on the island. The G-1 had some nice charts there. He had that one column that had the 85,000 and then as the killed in action occurred this other column began to creep up. I went to him and said, "Now if you don't look out, this column is going to get ahead of these 85,000." He said, "These reports come from the regiments, they are correct." Yes, they reported 107,000, and then to justify that they said that the Japanese had impressed the Okinawans.

I don't know how many actually were killed. I took the trouble to figure out the high explosive ammunition that had been fired against these Japanese on the basis of 85,000 of them, and it required 1.26 tons of high explosive ammunition to kill one Jap. That included the air bombardment, the naval gunfire, mortars, artillery. And in addition to that there were thousands and thousands of small arms ammunition.

I received orders on the 15th of June to go to Quantico to take command of the Marine Corps Schools. Brig. Gen. Blake was coming out to relieve me. I had quite a time getting my orders because
at that time point, when it was time to write up my orders, Gen. Geiger was in command of the 10th Army, and the adjutant general, the travel orders, he didn't want to say, "By command of Gen. Geiger" because he couldn't command an administrative army. I didn't know whether I was going to get any orders or not, but finally they got a solution and they said, "By command of the commanding general." And the adjutant general signed his name. Those were the travel orders I had.

Q: Not picking, little matter.

Smith: Yes.

I remember Gen. Richardson came out to Okinawa when Gen. Geiger had just taken over, and of course, Gen. Richardson was much annoyed that a Marine should be taking over command of the Army. I overheard him tell these Army staff officers, "I'll stick with you." As though Gen. Geiger was going to cut their heads off.

I went back on the plane that brought in Gen. Stilwell. I left on the 23rd and got to Washington on the 27th of July, and went down to the Marine Corps Schools on August 2nd. At the Marine Corps Schools at that time there were quite a few schools going. The Command & Staff School, 17 weeks, which was later changed to the Senior Course (a nine-months course); the Air Infantry School, 16 weeks; the Basic School, six months; Field Artillery School, 21 weeks -- they later did away with that for economy reasons; Communications Officers School, 25 weeks; and the Officers' Candidate Class. Of course, what we mainly were doing at that point was to put in writing in pamphlet form the result of our experience in World War II in amphibious operations. We got out some very good
returned to duty and no treatment recommended. They would give
I did not know there was anything wrong with me. On March 12th
I was ordered to be treated for observation and treatment.

My surprise, I was ordered to get the medical board and examine
and sometime in that they could retire them, and that they
could retire all the convalescent and generales. To examine
they convened a special medical board at Bethesda to carefully
then. In February -- shortly after I took over the bridge
the bridge had everything it needed to move out.

In front of the March Corps Schools Headquarters and put everywhere
the troops that wanted to get most of the officers. It was
was out on the horses. Quantico was a very poor place for it.

There was they wanted to get back to the Army. Quantico
the March Corps Schools you see. And by detaching me to command the bridge they put the bridge on
bridge to have something in hand. In case there was an emergency,
our led and secondly there were stripped. So they organized the
were absolutely nothing available in case of an emergency area.
Marine Corps, the Army and everything else after World War II, it
figured out to be that because of the preprotectoration of the
bridge at Quantico. It came out of the blue sky. Why there is

Then suddenly on January 26th 1946 I was ordered to return

Then try to clean that up.

treated a bunch of Dutch marines that were getting out to Indochina
appallingly on the various aspects of amphibious operations. We al
everything up there. Genl Underhill told me that they worked on him for being psychotic or something like that. They asked him a lot of foolish questions.

Q: What an embarrassment for a general officer!

Smith: Yeah. Well, by March 12th the 48 hours had passed. They had to relieve me of command of the Brigade because it was on 48 hours notice, and they brought Brig. Gen. Nimmel to command the Brigade, and on March 4th they moved it down to Lejeune anyway. Then Gen. Vandegrift told me after it was all over that he'd never had any intention to leave me with the Brigade permanently. They just put me in there to get these officers out of the Marine Corps Schools, because if headquarters had picked them or told us to send so many, there would have been a protest from the Schools that they couldn't spare them. But I was more or less sent over there to command the Brigade, but still more or less commanding the Schools. Col. Twining was doing the paper work — he was all that was left over in the Schools.

Then I resumed my duty as Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools and that continued on until July 15th 1946, when there was a long overdue reorganization at Quantico. The organization before that was not entirely logical. I as Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools reported directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Gen. Torrey, who commanded the barracks, supported me logistically, but I was not under his command, and that was not right. So on July 16th they then made the overall commanding general the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, and I became the Assistant...
Commandant, with no change in duties -- I still did everything I did before. Gen. Cates was brought down to relieve Gen. Torrey, and his title became Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, and Commandant, Marine Corps Schools. And I became the Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps Schools. Then late in 1947 Gen. Cates was advised that he was going to be brought up as Commandant of the Marine Corps on January 1st 1948, and he told me confidentially that he intended to bring me up there as Assistant Commandant. I was then still a brigadier general. I made my number on January 1st 1948 and was actually commissioned major general on April 2nd 1948, and was ordered up at Headquarters Marine Corps on April 5th.

Now when Gen. Cates went up on January 1st, then I took over as Commanding General Marine Barracks, Quantico and Commandant, Marine Corps Schools. On April 5th I came up to Headquarters Marine Corps. Gen. Shepherd had been the Assistant Commandant, but he had gone over to England to visit the Royal Marines and was Kicking around there for a month or so, and it took a little while for him to get out of the quarters down at the Marine Barracks; and finally I became Assistant Commandant in fact on April 15th, 1948. Before that I'd been just at Headquarters Marine Corps.

Q: During this time after the war -- actually before the war ended -- the Marine Corps was facing its fight for life.

Smith: That's right.

Q: This unification fight.

Smith: That's right.
Q: I think Twining had this special study group down there. He had the Marine Corps Board.

Smith: Yes, that happened after I took over as Assistant Commandant.

Q: You were involved with this.

Smith: I went over with Gen. Cates to one congressional hearing. Twining and his crowd wrote the letter, and I objected to the content of the letter because it impugned the motives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It just said they were trying to do away with us. I pointed out to Twining that if you mention Joint Chiefs of Staff these people will say, "Who do you mean?" And then you just say Collins or something like that and you get involved -- you should avoid impugning motives.

Q: Well, the thing is that the whole unification fight was dirty.

Smith: It was.

Q: And behind the scenes, and the Marine Corps has always had a chip on its shoulder and so we felt that people were trying to -- people known and unknown, and certainly Louis Johnson . . .

Smith: Oh, Louis Johnson, yes.

Q: . . . were trying to do away with us. So the Marine Corps had to fight fire with fire. Hutchins, I think, was involved, and of course the group of Sam Shaw and so on.
But someone has told me that you weren't happy with this, that you didn't particularly like this. He used the term "wheels within the wheels."

Smith: I didn't like the letter they wrote. As a matter of fact, Gen. Cates changed the letter. These bitter things were taken out of the letter. You could fight for your life without impugning the motives of these people. We do know that Gen. Eisenhower wrote this memorandum recommending that we be in regimental strength and man the landing boats. That's what you were up against. What he'd done -- been over in Europe and seen the Royal Marines and that's what they were doing. They had nothing and they did man the landing boats, so he thought that would be a good idea for the US Marines, who happened to have six divisions in the Pacific war.

We just laid our case on the line -- why there should be a Marine Corps. I remember this fellow Rivers; somehow or other he brought in Okinawa, and he was trying to be friendly and he wanted me to admit that the Army was no good, or something to that effect. But I wouldn't get involved in that.

Q: Do you think there was a place for what they were doing down at Quantico -- for all these preparations, and the studies, and the background?

Smith: Oh yes, but you have to be very careful how you use that information. Some of these young officers can write these sharp letters, but they don't have to take the responsibility of following through with them. The Commandant of the Marine Corps had to
follow through. If he accepted wholeheartedly what these young fellows wrote he'd have to follow through with it, and that would have been a little difficult.

Q: It was a fight for life.

Smith: Yes, but how would Gen. Cates prove that Gen. Collins was out to destroy the Marine Corps? How would he go about proving it?

Q: I thought that there had been enough background material provided.

Smith: Gen. Collins merely had a plan for an overall chief of staff who would run the whole works. I don't remember anything he ever put in writing about that. The only man who put in writing anything on it was Gen. MacArthur who told Mr. Hoover that if Mr. Hoover would give him a brigade he'd take over the functions of the Marine Corps, and that's when Congressman Maas went to bat for us and saved our lives. Congress saved our lives.

Q: By this time the lines in Congress must have been pretty well drawn up, just before the National Defense Act (I guess) of '47 went into effect. There was a lot of backstairs politicking. For instance I understand Clair Hoffman through Hittle's father's associations with the Republican Party -- they were able to walk up to Congressman Hoffman and tell him what was going on. That's when the JCS, the 1476 Series -- the JCS papers, whatever it was that they were working on . . .
Smith: Well, when I went over with Gen. Cates it was 1949.

Q: This was much later. This was after.

Smith: Yes, and that was the B-36 investigation that we went over. Our aviators had put on a very fine presentation on what Marine Aviation could do, and Gen. Cates more or less told them what the rest of us could do, but he didn't accuse anybody of deliberately trying to destroy us. The furthest Gen. Vandegrift went was to say that the Marine Corps is a continual affront to the Army. He said that, and that made them mad. But it more or less is true -- like on the helicopter; we developed it and the Army has taken it over, and they would object strenuously if we said that the Marine Corps developed the helicopter.

Q: Of course Gen. Vandegrift also which I think probably is part of the same thing.

Smith: Yes, (Pause) That was 1949, and of course the upshot of it was that Adm. was relieved. I think the Navy was right in what it said in that investigation. Gen. Bradley didn't help things by talking about the Navy officers who were -- what did he call them?

Q: Grandstand . . .

Smith: No, it was some demeaning term . . .

Q: Fancy Dans.
Smith: Fancy Dana, yes. He called the Navy Fancy Dana.

Q: Also, wasn't it at this time that Louis Johnson was trying to demean Gen. Cates -- took away his limousine?

Smith: I don't remember about the limousine, but they kept cutting us down on strength until we were down to nine battalions -- peace strength -- and I don't know how many groups the air had, but very few. Finally Mr. Vinson went over and bore down on Johnson. Mr. Vinson knew what Johnson was trying to do -- he was trying to destroy the Marine Corps, but destroy it by cutting down on appropriations.

Johnson was a National Guard officer. Apparently he was sold on the Army running everything, and he was not sold on Naval Aviation. And if he wasn't sold on Naval Aviation he wasn't sold on Marine Aviation. He was no friend of the Marine Corps. Of course he got his comeuppance when Korea came along. He told the world that if the North Koreans attacked Monday at 5 o'clock the next morning we would counterattack. Well, you know what happened. He was eventually relieved. Even Mr. Truman couldn't take all this.

Q: Were you Assistant Commandant at the time that the exchange of letters came out, when Truman called the Marine Corps a glorified police force?

Smith: Yes. Mr. Truman apologized to Gen. Cates.

Q: His letter of apology was written by the Marine Corps, wasn't it?
Smith: It may have been, I don't know. But he did apologize. He had a habit of shooting from the hip once in a while, like he criticized his daughter's voice.

Q: And called Paul Hume a no good SOB.

Smith: Yes. But I don't know what he was thinking about. Of course, this fellow, Gen. Lowe, who came out, was a very close friend of Mr. Truman, and when he was in Korea he wrote a letter every day to Mr. Truman in longhand, giving him the background on Korea. Gen. Lowe was a very good friend of the Marine Corps.

Q: I was going to interview Gen. Lowe. Then he was sick last fall and died. Have you ever seen any copies of the correspondence?

Smith: Only the letters he wrote to me. Oh no, I never saw anything he wrote to the President, no. But he told me that he had written to the President and recommended that never again after Chosin Reservoir should the Marines ever be put under command of the Army. He told me that, because he knew what happened.

Q: What was going on at headquarters during this time? What were you faced with as Assistant Commandant?

Smith: I went up there on April 15th, and of course, an Assistant Commandant -- like an Assistant Division Commander -- acts in the absence of the Commandant. Although in my case I was also Chief of
Staff. My title was Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. Now of course, you have a lieutenant general in each function. You've got a four star general in one function and a three star in the other. I attended the functions that Gen. Cates couldn't attend or didn't want to attend. Of course, there was a barrage of paperwork because I was Chief of Staff.

Q: What were your relations with Gen. Cates -- very close?

Smith: Fine. He was no personal buddy, but our relations were fine. After all, he had no reason to bring me up there. I told him afterwards, "I thought you'd bring Frank Hart up here." The only time I'd ever served with him was down at the Marine Corps Schools. All he knew about me was what he learned down there. If he didn't like me he wouldn't have brought me up there.

Q: He had most of his 4th Division crowd there.

Smith: He had Al Pollock. I had Al Pollock as my Chief of Staff at the Schools. When Gen. Cates came down and took the overall command I knew I was going to lose Pollock and I didn't put up any battle. Pollock went over to be Chief of Staff to Cates and Col. Good came over as my chief of staff.

Q: Is that Frank Good?

Smith: Yes. Then when Gen. Cates went to Headquarters Marine Corps he brought Pollock up there. Another favorite of his was Gen.
Jerome; he brought him up to be his aviation deputy, and he brought me up. Of course some of the people he inherited, like P.T. Hill.

Q: Do you think it possible that he ever thought that Jerome was going to make Commandant?

Smith: He thought so.

Q: He thought so.

Smith: Yes. It's an interesting thing. He was my deputy at Norfolk up until a month or two before I retired -- Deputy Commander FMO FLANT -- and then Maggie McGee came and relieved him the last month or two, and he went on out to command the wing. And all these admirals down around Norfolk came to talk to me about who was going to be the next Commandant. How about Jerry Jerome? And I said, "You've got a lot of good generals, I'm not guessing." I never thought he would make it, but I think he felt it.

Q: Do you think there will ever be an aviation commandant?

Smith: There could be. No reason why there shouldn't be. If Geiger had lived he might have made it.

Q: Geiger -- the ground experience . . .

Smith: He might have made it if he'd lived. I don't know. I don't see why there shouldn't be. And now we've got so many aviation
generals, they send them around to do ground jobs. We've had a commanding general at Pendleton who was an aviator.

Q: Weede?

Smith: Leek.

Q: He is FMFLant now.

Smith: Yes. Oh, that's Weede?

Q: He was supposed to go to FMFLant.

Smith: I am talking about L.E.E.K.

Q: I know. Weede is going to retire and Leek is going to become FMFLant.

Smith: Is that so?

Q: Yes, sir.

Smith: He's an aviator?

Q: Of course Frank Tharin is up at.

Smith: Yes, Frank Tharin is an aviator.

Q: McCutcheon too.
Smith: Yes. I don't know any reason why there shouldn't be. (Pause)

Well, in September '48 I had to go out to talk to the Command & General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth on amphibious operations. It was the first time a Marine ever talked at Leavenworth -- they were very high hat. And how I got in on it ... They had asked Adm. Sherman to come out and talk to them about this, and he couldn't come out and he recommended that I go out. And these jokers at Leavenworth wanted me to talk on the duties of CNO (Navy) and I said, "Look, I can talk to you about the Marine Corps, but you've got to get some naval officer to talk about the Navy." We had a liaison officer there. Finally they broke down and consented to let me talk on the Marine Corps. I went out there three times! And gave the same talk three times, in three different years.

I went down in February of '49. Gen. Buckner had been interred in the 7th Division's cemetery in Okinawa. He was disinterred and brought down to Frankfort, Kentucky, for reburial, and I was one of the honorary pallbearers down there. I flew down with Gen. Bradley who took me down in his plane. Gen. Buckner was very very close to Daniel Boone. Daniel Boone is not very far away.

Gen. Cates finally let me go in 1949 on a jump to the West Coast for indoctrination. I went to Pendleton, San Diego, San Francisco. In 1949 Gen. Eisenhower, who was then President of Columbia, came to Washington to survey how the new Defense Department was operating. He had to be briefed by everybody, and Gen. Cates detailed me to brief him. I prepared a one hour briefing on the Marine Corps, and Gen. Cates went over with me to be there in case Gen. Eisenhower asked any questions. He asked a couple of questions, but he didn't
question what we told him.

In 1949 Secretary of Defense Johnson encouraged efforts to reduce the Marine Corps in effectiveness. At that time the B-36 investigation was going on, and I accompanied Gen. Cates to the congressional hearings where he made his statement, which had been drawn up by Twining and Company.

On November 14th to 19th 1949, I went out to Sandia Base in New Mexico for an indoctrination course on nuclear weapons. They brought generals out there and told them all about nuclear weapons. Those instructors were wonderful, my goodness! The man explained the Einstein theory, and after he got through I thought I could go out and tell the whole world what it was all about, and within two or three days it was all gone! But they were good. The man on chemistry -- my goodness!

Q: Were these Army officers or civilians?

Smith: They might have been civilians, I don't know. Either Army officers or civilians. Or Navy.

Q: You mentioned Adm. Sherman before. Had you known him well?

Smith: By reputation, that's all.

Q: He was reputedly no friend of the Marine Corps.

Smith: Not particularly, no, although he did consent to the 1st Marine Division going to Korea.
Q: His hand was forced, though.

Smith: Yes. He pretty nearly crossed me up. I'll tell you that in a minute. In early 1950 I talked Gen. Cates into giving me the 1st Division, because it'd been agreed that I'd stay up there two years, and Silverthorn was to relieve me, and Gen. Erskine was due for relief from the 1st Division. He'd been out there.

Q: He was unhappy about that!

Smith: Yes, he was unhappy. So on April 14th Gen. Cates issued orders detaching me from headquarters on July 31st 1950, and ordering me to Pendleton to command the 1st Marine Division and the Base. That was before Korea broke. About this time, Adm. Sherman, who was CNO, wanted to send me to Southeast Asia to determine what the French needed in the way of weapons, equipment, and what not to finish off their war down there. The trouble was, I had gone to the Ecole de Guerre and Adm. Sherman thought I had a background of French and that I was the one to do this. Well, I talked him into sending Gen. Erskine out there with an interpreter. And that was done, and I went out. He had no cause for complaint; he had two years with the 1st Division. He would have liked to have stayed, but . . .

Q: Well, as a matter of hindsight he would probably have liked to have taken it to . . .

Smith: To Korea. Of course, he didn't know anything about Korea when . . .
Well, on the 25th of June, North Korea invaded South Korea, and Gen. Shepherd did some good ground work out in Tokyo in getting the Marines mixed up in Korea. First, we got the Brigade out, which was around 6,800 men including air and ground, and they sailed from San Diego July 14th. Of course, that took practically all of what was then called the 1st Marine Division. It left only about 3,500 men at Pendleton, who were all short timers - that's all that was left. And of course, the Brigade went out there and did a line-up job under Eddie Craig. Eddie Craig took the fellow I was going to have as Chief of Staff -- I was going to have Snedeker as Chief of Staff, and Eddie grabbed him, and I took Gregon Williams who was ordered in -- I didn't know him but he was a senior colonel.

Then, they had to modify my orders a bit. On July 19th I was to be detached and go out because Korea had occurred. At that time the reserves hadn't been mobilized and it looked to me like if I went out to command the 1st Division I'd just have to slowly build it up with recruits or whatever they sent in there. There was nothing there. I made a quick trip across the continent -- I drove across for seven days (I wanted to get the car across). While I was en route Gen. Cates went to Mr. Truman and got authority to mobilize the reserves.

End of Side 1, Tape 2, Session II.
Smith: I arrived at the Carlsbad Hotel in the late afternoon of July 25th and I called up Harry Liversedge -- he was in temporary command at Pendleton. Gen. Erskine had come to Washington to be briefed before he went to Southeast Asia, and Harry told me, "My gosh, I've just gotten a directive here to bring the 1st Marine Division up to war strength and embark it by the 10th of August."

I said, "Harry, I'll come up right away and we'll look at the directive, but manifestly we can't do much about bringing the 1st Division to war strength unless somebody gives us some people. We've only got 3,500 short-timers."

Q: Were you going to move into the Ranch House?

Smith: No, not then. The following day another directive came, which elaborated on the first directive. It said that I was to assemble troops to bring the Brigade in Korea to war strength, (It was peace strength, you see) and that I would organize the division less a regiment, or near strength with Force Troops, and that they would send in troops from the 2nd Division from posting stations, and the reserves, to accomplish this. Then Congress extended the enlistments of all men for one year. So we had the materials to do what we had to do.

Then on August 4th we received a directive on the 7th Marines, which was the 3rd regiment of the division. Our initial problem was to assemble, equip, and load out in 15 to 20 days 15,300 men of the main body of the division, which consisted of the 1st Marine
Division units, reinforcing units -- by that they meant troops -- and 1135 men to bring the Brigade up to war strength. Then the 7th Marines, which was to go out a week later, with 4600 men. It was an RCT, one battalion of which was coming from the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. The equipment all came from Barstow -- there is where the Marine Corps used a little prevision that was very wonderful. After World War II they got all these broken down jeeps, amtracs and everything from the war zone and took them to Barstow and reconditioned them. Barstow has a very dry climate, so they could put them out in the fields without their deteriorating further. And all our amtracs, tanks and everything else was there; it was just a question of shipping them down to Pendleton.

Q: How did they come -- by train?

Smith: Train. As regards the amtracs we had no time to test them out in the water, and the only rehearsal we ever had for the amtracs was when they got to Kobe; they were gassed up, lifted out of the hold, dropped into the water, and swam ashore -- that was it. There was no rehearsal for Inchon. The next time those amtracs were run was when they were launched from LSTs in the water to make the run to the beach.

Q: Did you have any breakdowns at all?

Smith: No. The colonel of that battalion came to me at Kobe and said, "I can't make it." I said, "Now look, we've got to leave here (I knew the date we had to leave), so you've got to be ready.
If we are not ready by that day we'll stay behind, and we've got to have your amtracs." He got aboard all right.

There was no training except test firing weapons, that's all. I remember going out to visit Rear Admiral Puller who was ordered to me. He used to command the 1st Marines. The first time I came out to see him he and a sergeant were in a Quonset hut, period; that was the 1st Marines, period.

Q: He broke his neck out there, didn't he?

Smith: Yes. I didn't do anything to help him; he spent a lot of money on telegrams and what not.

Q: He had commanded the barracks at Pearl Harbor.

Smith: Yes. I was glad to get him in the 1st Marines. (laughs) The Navy did the best they could. They grabbed ships from all up and down the coast; merchant ships, anything they could find. All the amphibious shipping was in the Far East. There wasn't any amphibious shipping on the West Coast. We took all this stuff down to the docks and loaded it on the ships as they came in, loaded it commercially, and as a ship was loaded it took off for Kobe. Out there we had to unload all this stuff and load it into amphibious shipping.

Q: You must have had good TQMs.

Smith: Yes,
Smith: Yes, I had good people. On August 7th -- the Commander in Chief of Far East Forces, which was MacArthur, requested that the planning staff of the 1st Mar Div be airlifted to Japan, which was a good prevision. Of course, I didn't want to go until I knew that I was going to get this outfit in date. After all, it was pretty tight squeezing. The directive came the 25th of July and we were supposed to start sailing by the 10th of August. So I sent out a first echelon of my staff on August 15th; that included Bowser, the G-3, and key men. Then on August 18th -- three days later, when I was assured that everything was going all right down at the docks -- I took off with the rest of the staff.

Q: Who remained in charge? Whom did you leave in the rear echelon?

Smith: We only had a small detachment there. We closed the CP at Camp Pendleton the day I left on August 18th, and the communication guard was assumed by the Commander Naval Forces Far East until I got out there. We left a small liaison detachment at Pendleton. It wasn't under any high ranking officer.

Q: Did you fly out from El Toro?

Smith: No, I flew from the field at Pendleton. They sent down the plane to Pendleton and I flew out from there. We took everything out. Of course I left Litzenberg there. Litzenberg with the 7th Marines was there for a week or so after we left, and then he sailed, and when he sailed there was simply a small liaison detachment, that's all.
Then Harry Liversedge had to sweat with the reserves and everything else. Of course, we had to process the reserves because we couldn't take a chance on sending somebody into combat who didn't have sufficient training to warrant it, and we had certain criteria which we followed. It took a little time to process the reserves.

I think we had 18% reserves in the first go-round. Even we used all of the camp reserve people—they were REMF troops with training, and the posting station people were very good, except they were rusty. There were an awful lot of these noncoms that had World War II service, and they were good people; they just needed shaking down.

Then gradually the reserves were put into shape and my replacements were mostly these reserves and some recruits. When I left the division in April 1951, over 50% of the division was reserves, and I thought it was a better division when I left it than when I took it over. They worked out very well.

Q: Did Twining have the barracks at this time?

Smith: No, I think that was after I came home, that he was there.

Q: Oh, after you came home.

Smith: Yes, he was there; and Bare was there for a while. No, Twining wasn't there. Liversedge was still at Pendleton when I left and I didn't worry much about what a mess I was leaving to him. I had enough mess ahead of me! They assumed the communication guard till I got out there. I went out and reported to Gen. MacArthur on the 22nd of August. Bowser had briefed me on what was up. I didn't
know anything about Inchon. It's funny that somebody didn't tell me, but I had no idea we were going to land on Inchon. Stan fellers came back from out there; he'd been in charge of training the Army in amphibious operations -- and he said they were doing a lot of talking out there about landing on a place called Inchon. And he said that would be a mess if we had to land there -- there were a bunch of mud flats and tides and everything else. That's all I knew. And the first I knew definitely was when Bowser briefed me when I reported aboard the Mt. McKinley on the 22nd of August; that we were going to land on the 15th of September.

Q: What was your reaction?

Smith: Well... (laughs softly) I talked to Adm. Doyle, and his reaction was that it was a terrible place to land, but he couldn't say it couldn't be done. And I wouldn't say it couldn't be done. I wasn't very happy with it. But we went to work. I don't know if there is any point in my going into the Inchon operation because I can't improve on what had to say about it.

Q: Is there anything about your personal reaction and personal involvement that perhaps might be...

Smith: Even my disillusionment with Gen. Almond -- has covered that. I'll admit that I very shortly lost confidence in the higher command out there. I went around and reported to Gen. MacArthur and he was very friendly, and it was very apparent that Gen. Almond had briefed him before he got there, because I'd gotten there early to report and had talked to Gen. Almond and he'd told me
all this stuff about -- after all this amphibious stuff is just a mechanical operation. I tried to tell him a few of the facts of life, and he was rather supercilious, and he called me "son" -- which kind of annoyed me. And when I went in to Gen. MacArthur he was very friendly. I had met him on Cape Gloucester, he'd come there. He told me how much he thought of the Marines and he said, "I know that this operation will be sort of helter-skelter, but the 1st Marine Division is going to win this war by landing at Inchon."

I told him I didn't have much to say. The only thing that worried me was how to get out of there at the proper time. Finally he solved that by standing up and putting out his hand, and that ended the interview.

The other thing that caused me to lose confidence -- well, a couple of other things --: there had never been any question about the release of the Brigade to the Division before the landing at Inchon. It had gone down and done a very fine job down with Gen. Walker. And I talked to Gen. Almond about it and he passed it off. He said, "Gen. Walker will let them go at the proper time."

I said, "There is a lot of work to be done in mounting out, and the Brigade has got to have some time to get ready to mount out."

We still stalled, so finally I sat down and wrote a dispatch on September 1st 1950, and requested -- or maybe I sent it on the 29th of August -- that the First Brigade be released to the 1st Marine Division on September 1st 1950 in order to prepare and mount out for the Inchon operation. That kind of put him on the spot.

Q: Whom did you send that to?
Smith: I sent it to the Corps. Well, I sent it to GHQ, I guess. I guess the Corps existed at that time. I forget just what date the Corps was organized -- that's in the book.

Gen. Walker down there said, "If I lose the 1st Brigade I can't guarantee the integrity of the Pusan perimeter." And they stalled. Finally, they wanted to substitute a regiment of the 7th Division for the 5th Marines, and I protested bitterly over that because this regiment of the 7th Division was made up 40% of South Koreans who couldn't talk English; they'd had only a minimum of amphibious training; actually logistically they couldn't have made it because they were up at Yokohama, so one place. I didn't say that they were no good, but -- I went around with Adm. Joy, and he sympathized with me. Of course, Adm. Doyle was with me 100%.

Q: He was a good Marine.

Smith: Yes, he was a good Marine. Adm. Joy arranged a conference with Gen. Almond and GHQ staff to determine what to do about this substitution of a regiment. Adm. Joy really read off Gen. Almond! Adm. Doyle had his say. I didn't say anything. Finally, Adm. Joy asked what I thought of it, and I told him frankly that if they did make that substitution I would call off the Blue Beach landing and land only with the 1st Marines on Red Beach. If I did that, that was going beyond the point of a considered risk, and Almond said, "We will take the risk." Then the argument went back and forth. Adm. Struble was there, and he finally suggested something which proved to be the solution. He said, "After all, why can't you
embark this regiment of the 7th Division and send it down to lie off Pusan, and if Gen. Walker needs a reserve, they can land it, and release the 1st Brigade." That was done. Then they issued the orders for the release of the Brigade. The North Koreans attacked again, and the poor Brigade had to fight No-Name Ridge before they could be released. I sent down a liaison officer to talk to Murray about the landing and what he was to do, and they discussed that under fire. I think I finally got them detached on the 5th of September, and we had to land on the 15th of September, and there was the travel time to get there.

Well, that kind of shook my confidence -- that anybody would think that you could take an untrained regiment like that, and at the last minute substitute it for a veteran regiment.

Q: According to your book a lot of the conferences that were held you weren't even involved in.

Smith: No, there was high planning; what it was I don't know. Adm. Doyle and I did everything that was necessary to make the landing at Inchon. I don't know what those jokers did! That's what Walt Sheldon tried to bring out in his book -- all this high planning that was going on. What it was all about I don't know. It must have been something long after we landed -- how they would maneuver the divisions and the 8th Army. And, of course, the next thing that shook my confidence was this ordering us to counterattack on two or three hours' notice in Seoul to make a night attack and move forward to the limit of our objectives. We got the order
at 8 o'clock at night, and when you make a night attack you normally make a reconnaissance, and we had no chance for a reconnaissance.

Q: Any Basic School student knows that.

Smith: Yes. So Bowser, of course, the first thing he did was to call up his office number and protest. Col. Childs said, "After all, Gen. Almond ordered it." Then I called up the Chief of Staff, who was Maj. Gen. . . . er . . . I forget, but anyway he was a major general, and he said, "After all, Gen. Almond dictated that order, and he wants it carried out." So we did the best we could. I called up Murray and Puller and told them what we were up against, and to move forward but keep to the main streets and not to try anything precipitate. Of course Puller asked for 15-minute artillery preparation; he got it, but he wasn't satisfied with it, and he asked for 15 minutes more, and while I was coming down the North Koreans attacked with a battalion, and they fought the rest of the night, and destroyed several tanks, and. Finally it got started again the next morning. What Gen. Almond tried to get me to agree to was that we would capture Seoul by the 25th of September. And he explained frankly -- that was exactly three months after the date that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. They wanted to be able to get out a communiqué saying that on September 25th, three months later, they'd been thrown out. And I told him I couldn't guarantee anything, that was up to the enemy. We'd do the best we could and go as fast as we could. And that's why he sent this regiment and this 7th Division across. And Sheldon gives the impression that that was decisive.
Q: Was that the Wolfhounds?

Smith: No, the Wolfhounds is a good regiment. It was in another division.

Q: Michaelis' division -- er, regiment.

Smith: Yes. That was a good regiment. No, this was the 32nd or 31st, I forget which. And they got South Mountain all right, but they didn't do anything about it. And we continued on up through the city, roadblock after roadblock. And as I pointed out to Sheldon, in three days it took to clean out the city, from the 25th to the 28th, the 1st Marine Division suffered 711 battle casualties, and the total battle casualties of the 7th Infantry Division for the entire operation had only been 552. So manifestly the North Koreans weren't precipitously retreating from the city. That didn't help the confidence, and then, of course, Chosin Reservoir didn't help our confidence any. I finally told Gen. Ridgway later on in the game, "After all, there has been a loss of confidence in this Division and it goes down to Pfc's." And he said, "Well, that's a question of leadership." I said, "Look, General, these boys read Newsweek and these things; that's where all this stuff is appearing." He didn't put me back in the 1st Corps again.

Q: Almond.

Smith: Yes, Almond and the 10th Corps. Then he had what he called a special action company. He had a company that was organized for
command purposes, and they wanted 100 carefully selected Marines to add to this company. Well, I wanted no part of that, because I needed all the Marines I had. I had just gotten the order from the Secretary of the Navy to send 500 17-year-olds ashore at Kobe. There were 500 people deducted right there, and I stalled, and Gregon Williams stalled on this thing, because it was a wild idea. They were going to embark in a British frigate and go around Inchon and transfer to a smaller boat, go in and row ashore in rubber boats and capture the Kimpo Airfield. Well, I told these people in the Army. These people had a radio that would only reach four miles, so they couldn't reach me by radio, and I'd have this outfit in there and I wouldn't know where I could put down naval gunfire. Anyway, according to the intelligence reports there were more people at the Kimpo Airfield than these people could handle, and if they'd just leave us alone we'd go in and capture the Kimpo Airfield for them, and in a very short period of time. Finally, Gen. Shepherd came in and helped me out on that. We had stalled, and finally they were going to issue an order to send 100 men, and I told Gen. Shepherd, "After all, some of these men that we would send are already aboard ship, loaded out." (We were then loading out for Inchon). And I told him what I thought of the operation, so he put in his word and it was cancelled. But, apparently, Col. Ely didn't get the word, and he went around with his own Army company, and they got into rubber boats, and it never occurred to these jokers to figure out when the tide was going out, and they tried to row ashore against the tide. It was just foolishness. And they had to come back.
Q: Did you feel at any time that the Inchon landing was not going to succeed?

Smith: No, there was never any point where I lost confidence. I guess I am just overly optimistic, I don't know.

Q: So despite all of these things you felt . . .

Smith: Oh yes, we had good people, and I don't think it occurred to the 5th and 1st Marines that they wouldn't make it. And Adm. Doyle, he was a good . . .

Q: In the 1st and 5th Marines the men were not aware of all this....

Smith: They were aware of the things I was aware of, that's all. All they knew was they'd get in these boats and go ashore and . . .

Q: Of course optimism is a supreme Marine trait.

Smith: You've got to have it.

Q: You had to have it under those circumstances.

Smith: We needed it at Chosin Reservoir more than we needed it at Inchon.

Q: Did Gen. Shepherd show his preoccupation about this whole situation?
Smith: About the . . .

Q: The Army, your reaction . . .

Smith: I told him about it, and he knew that . . . And I told Gen. Cates about it too. The only remark he ever made to me was, "You can catch more flies with sugar than with vinegar." He was trying to tell me not to be so bitter. According to Heinl, he confirmed a great many of the things I said in my notes there. Gen. Shepherd, I find, kept a journal. He helped me out on this special operation. As far as the landing was concerned, Bowser and Company worked up a plan in conjunction with Adm. Doyle's staff. Adm. Struble came aboard, and Gen. Shepherd came aboard, and we gave them a presentation on how we intended to make the landing, and they approved of it. The only suggestion Gen. Shepherd made was that he thought the first night the 1st and 5th Marines ought to make contact, but that was just physically impossible because we didn't land until 5.30 in the afternoon, and it got dark around 7.30, and for the 1st and 5th Marines to make all that distance -- We did make contact the next day.

Q: "Had your staff been happy with the Army?"

Smith: They didn't think too much of the Army staff, but there again you had people who knew staff procedure but hadn't had experience. Bowser had had plenty of experience. Fuller had had plenty of experience. My Chief of Staff had had plenty of experience. They all were experienced, and we talked the same
language as Doyle's crowd. He had a very good crowd there.

Of course, Adm. Doyle had done a lot of studying -- his staff had done a lot of studying on this Inchon situation, and I never could figure just how they planned to make the landing, because you could not bring these big transports and LSTs in at night because of the mud channels. They had to make an approach in daylight, and if they had to make an approach in daylight, you couldn't land on the morning tide; you could only land on the evening tide; and it was manifest that you had to get Wolmi-do island before you landed in Inchon. And how they were going to do that I don't know. I don't know how they were going to get Wolmi-do. We did a lot of talking, and the Navy staff agreed with Bowser and Company that they could get together a task force of ships that could do navigation at night, like the APDs (they had radar navigation), the LSDogs had radar navigation, and that we would embark the 3rd Battalion of the 5th in that task force and bring it around at night, up through the mud channels and land the first thing in the morning on Wolmi-do. They would capture Wolmi-do, and then the artillery would come in to Wolmi-do on the evening tide, and set up and sight in and be prepared to support the landing of the 5th marines on the evening tide. And that was done. It didn't take but 45 minutes to overrun Wolmi-do. They were more or less stripped down battalion there, but they were pretty well battered.

Q: Why couldn't they have landed paratroops on Wolmi-do, for instance? Had that been considered?

Smith: No, it was never considered because it was just a spit. I don't know that anything could hit the darn island. There weren't
Q: Did the Army staff reflect Almond's thinking?

Smith: Oh yes, and Gen. MacArthur's thinking.

Q: There was no indication that any of the Army people sympathized with the Marine predicament?

Smith: In landing at Inchon?

Q: Yes, sir.

Smith: I don't know. I think this fellow Wright was pretty reasonable.

Q: Courtney Wright?

Smith: Oh, no, it's Courtney Whitney you are thinking of.

Q: Courtney Whitney.

Smith: He didn't do much. But Wright, who was a brigadier general, was the G-3 of GHQ. Our relations with most of the Army were friendly. In fact my relations with Almond were friendly. I always tried to carry out his orders and hoped that reason would prevail.
Q: Who was the intelligence officer? A German name.

Smith: Oh, he was GHQ. That was Willoughby. He was intelligence officer of GHQ, and he's the man that insisted that only volunteers had been sent to Korea by the Chinese, and it was very difficult to disabuse him of that idea.

Q: Later on, even up to the time that you encountered the Chinese at the Reservoir he wasn't willing to accept the Chinese were in the fight.

Smith: I think at the Reservoir he accepted them. But when we met the 124th CCF Division near Chinhung-ni and polished off that division and captured 50 prisoners, he still thought they were volunteers. But we knew differently because we'd interrogated these prisoners and they were in an organized unit, organized regiments, and they were not volunteers. They'd been ordered there.

Q: That's part of the 43rd Army, I guess.

Smith: It was the 3rd Field Army, I think. There were three of these CCF divisions that came down early in Northeast Korea; the 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions. And their orders were to go as far south as they could to cover the later arrival of the main body. There were 80,000 following up behind these three divisions on our side, and on the 8th army side, the same deal. And we polished off the 124th, and we captured a prisoner or two from the 125th, but
After we polished off on the 124th, what was left moved back to the north. Then we didn't begin to capture prisoners from new divisions until just about three days before the roof fell in. About the 24th of November we began to capture prisoners from new divisions, and we knew that there was a lot of stuff coming in there. But it was too late to do much about it then.

Q: There was a lot of political hanky panky and nonsense on the capture of Seoul and subsequent pronouncement of handing it over to Syngman Rhee by MacArthur.

Smith: Well, of course, as far as Gen. Almond's communiqués were concerned, Seoul was captured on the 25th of September, and they never admitted that the fighting went on after that. It was Gen. MacArthur's idea to turn over the city to Syngman Rhee. The only prescription he had was that he wanted to drive into Seoul on the bridge. We, of course, had crossed the Han River -- we'd crossed with amtracs and rafts and everything else, and had gotten the whole division across the Han River, but there was no bridge. The bridging material we took out was enough to make these rafts. So the Corps -- it was their job to get the bridge across. They did some sweating. They were flying over the countryside. We broke up a couple of our rafts and sent those pontoons down to help them out. I think at midnight the day before Gen. MacArthur was to come in for the liberation ceremony they patched a bridge, and he was able to drive across in a jeep. He would not ride in a helicopter.

Q: He didn't like it.
Smith: No. And there was no field in Seoul on which he could land in his Bat[an], or whatever the plane was. He landed at Kimpo, and then took the jeep.

Q: I understand you and Gen. Puller (or Col. Puller) were the only people there in dungarees.

Smith: Well, we went in our combat gear. The order was that two officers from the division and one officer from each regiment could attend. I went with Eddie Craig, who was my Assistant Division Commander, and I think I took my aide along. And Lewie Puller came along. Litzenberg was busy going up towards Uijonbu, and he couldn't come. I don't think Murray was there. Murray was establishing a blocking position up the line; so that's all there was. There were all this high level stuff from Tokyo there. There were plenty of officers there. I've got pictures of them. But that's correct -- there were very few Marines. As far as the troops were concerned, we were directed to keep them out of sight. They were not to be visible.

Q: Why?

Smith: They put South Korean troops, South Korean Marines and South Korean infantry along the route of approach, and the Marine battalions were really looking out for security; they were inland from the approach for some distance, out of sight. None visible.

Q: Was any comment ever made about that?
Smith: Well, the Marines were a little caustic about it. But that was politics, I guess. I tried to play a little bit of politics. I thought it would be a good idea if Korean Marines could be among the first troops entering the city of Seoul. They were good people. We put one battalion in, and it took terrible casualties; it was pretty badly beaten up, and we had to relieve it with a second Battalion of the 5th. But they did come in and guard the route of approach. (Pause) I could have gone through this thing, but there is so much information on it on file at headquarters, and my notes, which are very, very complete; and Heinl's books.

Q: One of the aspects of the program is to get your voice on tape talking about this.

Smith: Well, I've done a lot of talking! (laughs)

Q: Would you like to take a break now? Shall we go to supper?

Smith: It's 20 minutes to 6, I guess we should.

(interruption)

Smith: With the capture of Uijonbu and the establishment of a blocking position on the road to Pyongyang, the Inchon operation was completed. The 1st Cavalry Division passed through the 5th Marines, which had this blocking position on the Pyongyang road, almost up to Panmunjom that way. It passed through the 5th, and the 2nd Corps came up the Uijonbu road and relieved the 7th Marines. That occurred on October 4th.
There was a lot of planning going on. The 10th Corps did not want to become a part of the 8th Army; they wanted to continue their independence, and they apparently talked to Gen. MacArthur into sending them around to the East Coast. The unrealistic planning was that we mounted out from Inchon while the 8th Army was coming up and trying to use the ports by themselves -- logistically it was pretty rough.

The 7th Division -- they didn't have the shipping to mount it out, so it marched and moved by truck from Inchon down to Pusan, going counter to all of the 8th Army coming north, and they mounted out in ships at Pusan and went on up to Northeast Korea. And with us, the idea was to make a landing at Wonsan, assault, and then cut across the island, 60 miles across, over the central mountain chain, and meet the 8th Army before Pyongyang and assist them in capturing Pyongyang. That was really unrealistic because the central mountain chain was swarming with these North Koreans who were making their way north to reorganize, and they had their weapons with them. Anyway, the 8th Army had no trouble getting to Pyongyang; they went up there very rapidly; they didn't need our help. And we didn't have to land an assault at Wonsan because the South Korean troops were coming up the coast, and, my goodness, they got to Wonsan before we could land; we were blocked by these mines; the place was absolutely blocked with mines. And Adm. Doyle refused to send troops ashore until the mine fields were cleared. There again Gen. Almond wanted to land us through the mine fields. He never would accept October 26th as the D Day for the landing. October 20th was the date he'd fixed, and he always called this October 26th date as "Doyle date," because Adm. Doyle refused to -- and I went along
with Adm. Doyle. It's very probable that small boats going in wouldn't have triggered the mines, but LSTs you couldn't have sent in; and the mines were tricky, they were these magnetic mines, part of them. Part of them were just mines that you could blow up, but a magnetic mine if you passed over it, I think, three times, it went up. And we lost a couple of mine sweepers. But we finally did get ashore on October 26th, and by that time there was no point cutting across the island, so they had to figure something else for us to do, so they gave us these tremendous zones of action to clear of North Koreans. The North Koreans weren't along the coast -- they had gone up the central mountains chain.

Q: What was the matter with Almond? Was he mad?

Smith: I don't know. He was a very energetic man. He was egotistical. He was a MacArthur man, and anything MacArthur said, nothing could change it. MacArthur was God.

When we got to Wonsan everything was going so well that it was almost an end-of-the-war atmosphere, and I got a directive from Adm. Joy stating that when the war was over we would leave one regiment, I think, in Japan, and the rest could go on home. The Army got a directive from higher headquarters stating that Gen. Almond would be the occupation force commander, and they'd leave one division in Korea as occupation force. That didn't last long, that end-of-the-war atmosphere. We were directed to send a battalion down to Kojo, which was about 25 miles south of Wonsan, where there was supposed to be a dump of supplies, and they wanted
globally, and they were glad to get the heck out of there.

and they were glad to get the heck out of there because they'd made contact with the 12
saw the 12 which had already gone up. The 12 went up the road up to the Yellow, and we directed me to have the 12 go up and

He wanted to get us started going up to the Chosun Reservoir

Corps commander, but the idea was there was nobody out there.

that was the way we were spread. I communicated to the

the southernmost battalion I had was 20 miles from the northern

separation of the battalion over this period -- the

thunder. At one point -- I've got in my notes a study of the

the way to the Yalu River. We got spread thunder and thunder and

Hamburg and Chosun Reservoir. The direction we got was to go all

over that road down there to them, and we started up the road toward

we finally got our Korean Marines back again, and we turned

In action and it was too much for one battalion.

people killed 250 of those people, but there were still 22 killed

down just in case. But that was the end of that. Of course, the

at Korean So let's work on down, and we sent another battalion

of Komer and said, "You go down and see what's going on down there.

atmosphere. It was a battalion off the last group, and I got hot

we had 22 killed in action there, and that ended the end-of-the-1

jumped by a considerable force of North Koreans who were armed.

position around Korean. It was rather thin they had, and they were

ween't any dump down there. They make or less look up a defenenta

the battalion on down there and they couldn't find the dump -- I

so they could go on north towards Hungnam and go forth. We sent

us to relieve the South Korean troops that were guarding there.
Litzenberg went on up the road and met these people just below Chinhung-ni and they had quite a fight. Litzenberg had 43 killed and a couple of hundred wounded, but they absolutely decimated this 124th CCF Division. Then we took it kind of slow from there on out. I was hoping that we wouldn't have to get up on that plateau, which was 4,000 feet up with winter descending and only one road going up there. And the Army had become somewhat sobered by the experience of the 1st Cavalry Division in the West. The Chinese had sent in an advance force over there just like they had sent in an advance force over on our side, and the 1st Cavalry Division lost practically an entire regiment. It was surrounded and chopped up.

Q: They withdrew fast too, didn't they?

Smith: Not at that time. They tried to attack and relieve that regiment, but it never broke through. So everybody was sobered a bit by that, and for about ten days there was no talk about rushing to the Yalu; and then out came the directives again by the 10th of November to go to the Yalu. Instead of letting the 5th Marines follow up the 7th going up the road -- you could only put one RCT on the road at a time, it was part one-way, sometimes two way -- there was another road that went out to the Northeast, and they directed me to go out there and seize the Fusan Reservoir.

Q: Split your forces.

Smith: Yes. The Fusan Reservoir was about opposite the Chosin
Reservoir, and we went out that way and had reconnaissance patrols go out, and there was no road from our side going into the Reservoir. The road came in from Gen. Braw's side, where the 7th Division was. I finally talked Gen. Almond into letting us off the hook on that, so the 5th could go and follow up the 7th. Then the 1st Marines gradually was released down below and came on up, and I was given an order to move out to the Northwest, out another road from Hamhung and establish a blocking position out there. I went to Almond and said, "After all, we can't make a main effort in two directions. We've got one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu, and here you are telling us to be prepared for a major attack out to the Northwest." By that time the 3rd Infantry Division had landed, and I said, "Why can't they take over that job?" And they did eventually.

What I was trying to do was to slow down the advance and stall until I could pull up the 1st Marines behind us and get our outfit together. I was unable to complete that until the 27th of November. By that time the 1st Marines had been broken loose from all its commitments down below, and I was able to put a battalion of the 1st at Hagu-ri, and a battalion at Koto-ri, and a battalion at Chinhungni. They were to guard our main supply route.

I was told to occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni with the 7th, and to have 5th - there again another division, the 7th was to go out to Yudam-ni, to the Northwest, occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni, the 5th was to go by the east side of the reservoir and continue on to Yalu. I told Murray and the 5th to take it easy; that we'd fix an objective every day. The only objective the Corps gave me was the Yalu River, and we would tell
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They moved down toward the Reservoir which was frozen to a depth of 18 inches -- it would take a jeep -- and they started coming down the Reservoir toward Hagu-ri. For some reason or other the Chinese didn't shoot the troops on the ice; I don't know why, but they didn't.

Q: Was that the group that Beal saved?

Smith: Yes. And Beal -- he took a jeep and drove up on the ice to see what was going on. He said it was pitiful. Some of these men were dragging themselves on the ice, some had gone crazy and were walking in circles. He began rescuing them; he devised sleds and up there, and in one day he rescued 250 of them. The Army was very grateful; they gave Beal the Navy Cross Distinguished Service Cross for that. Some of them just wandered down the road. The young Marine who was up there with the air liaison party got out -- how he got out I don't know. He was a captain.

Q: Was that Fred Fees?

Smith: I've forgotten. He was a captain, and he joined us. Of course with Litzenberg and Murray. We got Murray over there all right. I flew up on the 26th, the day before the Chinese hit. I flew by helicopter up to Yudam-ni and visited Litzenberg. I couldn't catch Murray; he was en route at the time. Litzenberg at that time had his CP about 4,000 yards short of Yudam-ni. I didn't know just where he was. I flew on to Yudam-ni and saw a group of tents and dropped down. That was Ray Davis with the headquarters of his
battalion which was occupying Yudam-ni, and he directed me how to get to Litzenberg. I then went back by helicopter to Litzenberg's CP which was on a gentle slope, and we tried to land. The ground was covered with ice, and every time we put the wheels of the helicopter down we'd skid. Then in order to get down we went down into the flat of the valley -- maybe 200 yards further down -- and came down straight. We were up over 4,000 feet, and the ceiling of the helicopter at that time was only 5,000 feet. And in that thin air we dropped the last 15 feet. We came down with quite a bang, but we didn't break anything. I talked to Litzenberg, and then came on back.

The next night, the 27th, after Murray had jumped off on the attack at 8 AM on the 27th -- we jumped him off, you could only attack with one regiment at a time. There was just this one road and steep hills. He jumped off and made about 2,000 yards, while Litzenberg continued to hold the high ground on either side of the road. He ran into considerable opposition out there. The only order I got from the Corps was to displace a regiment to come back to Hagu-ri to rescue this Army outfit. My God, at that time we were being attacked by three CCF divisions ourselves. Our road was cut by the Chinese; the Chinese were across the road between Yudam-ni and Toktong Pass and across the road between Toktong Pass and Hagu-ri. They didn't give me any orders other than to redeploy a regiment to rescue the 31st and 32nd Infantry. I had already told Litzenberg, who had the rear regiment, to clear the road if he could.

End of Side 2, Tape 2, Session II.
Smith: Murray made, as I say, about 2000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there. But we got no orders from the Corps for two days to actually withdraw, so we couldn't do anything but defend, as I couldn't withdraw without permission from higher authorities. On this redeployment I'd already told Litzenberg to try to use as much of his regiment as he could to clear the road back to Hagu-ri. We didn't know just how much was across it.

Q: Was there any knowledge on the part of the Corps Commander of your predicament?

Smith: Every four hours we sent in a report of what was going on, but apparently they were stunned; they just couldn't make up their minds that the Chinese had attacked in force, you see. They just had to re-orient their thinking. It took them two days before we actually were told to withdraw to Hagu-ri and advance to the coast — that took them two days to figure out.

Litzenberg got nowhere in clearing the road. Then I sent a dispatch to stop the attack, and then when I gave Litzenberg the order to try to clear the road I had Murray come back to Yudam-ri -- to come back the 2000 yards -- to relieve the 7th Marines on the hills they were defending in the vicinity of Yudam-ri. Then they defended there. As a matter of fact, after the first night they didn't have such a terrible time. The first night was the worst, they really were attacked that first night.
Q: Did you have the Royal Marines attached to you at this time?

Smith: Yes.

Q: Drysdale's force.

Drysdale. I'll go into that on the Drysdale Column.

Smith: Yes. I was going to discussing with Drysdale's column. We had had a plan to use Drysdale with our Reconnaissance Company to make a wide sweep around and see what was there, but the Chinese closed in and we had to use them just as infantry, and he went to Haag-ri with us. He had fought his way up from Koto-ri, and that's where he joined us; he was in command of the so-called Drysdale Column that Lee Puller sent north to clear the road. The Drysdale Column consisted of his Commandos, the missing company of the 3rd Battalion 40th, which was at Haag-ri, and a company of the Army which was trying to get up to the people on the east side of the reservoir. He got about half way and landed into a lot of opposition; he had tanks with him. He sent me a message and he told me about his condition and wanted to know whether I really wanted him to come on through, and I told him if it was at all possible to fight his way on through, because we had been attacked in division strength, and all we had was a battalion of the rifle company at Haag-ri.

So he came on with the Marine rifle company and the tanks. They had a lot of casualties, but they got into Haag-ri, and we were very glad to get them. The Army company disappeared; I don't know what happened to it — prisoners of war? Part of the tanks had to go back. The trouble had been that the enemy had burned some stuff and trucks on the road, and our convoy was blocked. The troops and
the tanks came on through, but the trucks were stopped. The Marine truck convoy was in command of the marine trucks, and the Chinese surrounded him and he eventually surrendered on the promise that they would take care of the wounded -- he had a lot of wounded. My stenographer was one of those; he was wounded in the hip, and he dragged himself into a hut; the Chinese didn't bother him; a little North Korean boy took care of him, gave him water and what not. This was on the 29th of November, and we didn't come back down that road until the 6th of December, and when Litzenberg came back down the road he heard this faint call, "American! American!" or his patrol. They thought it might be a trap, and they cautiously surrounded this hut, and found Erwin in there. He had on his parka and his shoe-pacs and everything, but he'd been wounded and had lost blood, and had lost circulation, and his legs were frozen. We got him to Kato-ri and flew him out to Japan. They had to amputate both legs. I corresponded with him later. I didn't see him again; I wrote him a letter in the hospital in Japan and he wrote back; he had good spirit. He said, "After all, I am a stenographer and I don't need my legs to be a stenographer." Then he went on to Oak Knoll in Oakland. When I came out of Korea I went around to Oak Knoll to see him, but the nurses said they couldn't keep him under control -- he'd taken his furlough and shoved off before his artificial limbs had arrived. They said he was a ball of fire, and his spirit must have impressed people because he was made the marshal of the football parade of the University of California while he was there. He had fine spirit. Then I lost track of him. The last thing he sent me a picture of himself, and I assumed it was his wife and child; I don't know.
They were standing by an automobile and he looked perfectly natural; he had artificial limbs by that time.

Well, we couldn't begin the breakout from Yudam-ni until December 1st. By that time we had orders. The 7th was to lead out, it was the regiment that first got the road (?).

The 5th had to break away and make a daylight withdrawal from the hills around Yudam-ni, and that was rather tricky, but they got out in good shape. They fell back and took up a position astride the road further toward Haguri while Litzenberg continued on. As a matter of fact, the 5th did an excellent job.

Of course, Barber had been up on Toktong Pass -- he belonged to Litzenberg. Litzenberg had dropped him off there as a precaution, to have somebody guard the Pass. And then Litzenberg wanted Barber to rejoin him at Yudam-ni. Barber looked the situation over, and that was impossible -- the Chinese were all around the place and he couldn't withdraw; he'd have to fight and he didn't have enough people to fight. So he sat tight and defended the place. About a regiment was what attacked him, and he beat them all. He himself was wounded through the leg, and he strapped a board to his leg, had people carry him around, and remained in command. And Davis with his battalion was sent across the country to relieve him. Davis crossed the country through the night, and eventually got around and identified himself. Barber wanted to send out some people to bring Davis in, and Davis said, "I'll come in myself, you don't have to send anybody out here to bring me in." Davis joined Barber, and then they cleaned the Chinese off the ridge on which Toktong Pass was located, and a battalion of the 5th by that time was coming up the valley under
the fellow who landed at Wolmi-do, Lt. Col Taplett, the one who had the 3rd battalion of the 5th. He attacked up from up the road toward Toktong Pass, and Davis' outfit got behind the Chinese, and between the two of them they got rid of those people. Then the road was opened.

Q: It wasn't Myers -- er.

Smith: Oh no. Col. was with the 1st. This fellow had the 3rd battalion of the 5th. I'll think of his name in a minute. He landed at Wolmi-do and captured Wolmi-do. (Lt. Col. Taplett)

Then they fought down the mountain; there were Chinese between and Hauri, so there was more fighting to do. There was not much we could do at Hauri; we'd been attacked twice there in division strength and had had a lot of casualties, and had to use all our service personnel in the lines -- everybody fought. We did send the Commandos out the road. On the 3rd of December they began coming in to Hauri.

Q: Was a strip there for landing?

Smith: Oh yes. Field Harris and I had gone up early in the game and selected the site of that field. The Corps at that time wasn't interested in any field up there. I told Almond that we ought to have a field that would take transport planes to bring in supplies and take out casualties. "What casualties??" That's the kind of thing you were up against. He wouldn't admit there ever would be any casualties. We took 4500 casualties out of that field.
So Field Harris went up and selected a site. There was nothing but a bean field, but being mid-winter it was frozen to a depth of 18 inches, so you had to scrape it smooth and make an airfield. As I remember, we finished that on the 1st of December -- enough so that a transport plane could get in -- and we sent out wounded. But the trouble is, a plane to come in was loaded with ammunition, and it collapsed its landing gear; and that finished the strip for that day, because the plane was too heavy you couldn't move it. But it was late in the day anyway. The next day we got operating at full speed, and I think we got out over 900 casualties.

What we were working on first were these Army casualties from this overrun Task Force Faith, you see.

Q: They were in bad shape.

Smith: I am afraid something got out -- didn't work too well. Some of them might have frostbitten fingers, something like that. They would go down to the strip and get a blanket and a stretcher and then green a b.t.; the corpsman would come along then and put him on a plane. The doctor came to me and he was fit to be tied, because he knew how many seriously wounded he had that should be evacuated, and he knew how many had gone out by air, and it just didn't make sense. Somebody was getting out of there that wasn't seriously hurt.

It was our fault probably, because the Air Force had sent up what they called an Evacuation Officer, and the doctor assumed that the Evacuation Officer would see that the proper people got aboard the planes, but that was not his function at all; he was just thinking
in terms of planes, not on what was flown on the planes. After that, I couldn't have gotten aboard a plane without a ticket. Nobody after that got on any plane without a ticket that showed that he was due to get out.

Q: Were any of the Marines trying to pull that stuff?

Smith: I don't think so, because they were certified by the doctors, and they had spirit. I am sure there were no Marines I had quite a time with those people -- they had no spirit. We tried to help them out as best we could. We had to fly in weapons to re-arm them; they'd thrown away all their weapons. I put Lt. Col. Anderson in command of them. They didn't want to put up tents -- they felt it was up to us to take care of them, feed them and put up tents for them.

Q: Just like Iceland.

Smith: Yes, and we disabused them of that idea. We eventually salvaged 385 of them. As near as I can make out, that Task Force had 2800 men when they went up there. There were a few Army troops that were left in Ha-gu-ri, but as near as I can make out, 2800 were in Task Force Faith or in Task Force McClellan, the first colonel, and we evacuated 900 of them. We salvaged 385, so there must have been over 1200 killed, captured, or what have you.

Those 385 we joined to what Army we had left on Ha-gu-ri and made a provisional battalion. They marched out with us. I attached them to Litzenberg, and they were pitiful. Litzenberg gave them the
job of guarding the left flank, to march along the column, and the Chinese opened up, and they simply went through the column to the other side and took off. Well, Anderson was a pretty good fellow; he tried to get them under control and get them back. Litzenberg had to take one of the regular battalions to send up there to take over. He brought charges against some of the officers. According to the word I got, then he was put in a psychiatric hospital in Tokyo, eventually.

Q: Anderson was?

Smith: Yes, and they never did anything about his sergeant. That's the story I got; I forget who told it to me -- maybe Litzenberg. But they came on out with us. I am afraid that some of those 900 Army troops which were evacuated shouldn't have gone out, because over in Tokyo the GHQ looked over some of these cases that were coming into the hospital that had only minor frostbite. And they sent over a directive which Adm. Joy had never sent to me -- sent it to Adm. Joy for the Marine Corps and to the Army for the Army troops -- stating that there was a lack of leadership, because there shouldn't have been this frostbite if there was good leadership. That made me mad as a hatter. Of course, Adm. Joy swept it under the rug, he didn't send the thing on, but I heard about it and I wrote Gen. Cates. I said, gee, this just doesn't make sense at all. "What are you going to do? Here I have just given a silver star to a sergeant who pulled off his mittens in order to heave a grenade and he got frostbitten fingers. Are you going to court-martial that man for not taking proper precautions against frostbite? Are you going to
court-martial his battalion commander, his regiment commander, his division commander?" Silverthorn wrote me a letter and said, "Don't worry about it." By that time my senior medical officer had been detached and come on back to Washington, and he'd gone around talking to a few people and saying, "We know the score." The Army was much upset about it, he said, but as far as the Marine Corps was concerned they took things in their stride.

Q: What did Almond say to you after this was all over? Did you ever have a confrontation with him?

Smith: Oh, no. He came up to Hagu-ri a couple of times. He had enough field there so he could come in a light plane. The first time he came up he was all full of beans, and he wanted by 6 o'clock that evening our time schedule for rescuing the 31st Infantry on the other side of the reservoir. Gen. Barr who commanded the 7th Division -- he was a pretty good egg -- had come up at the same time and we talked it over after Almond left and said, "We can't do anything about going up there for these people until the 5th and 7th Marines fight their way into us; then maybe we can do something about it." But with one battalion of infantry, to send them to Hagu-ri, we haven't got anybody to rescue." And Barr agreed with me. But so we didn't have to do anything about that.

Q: That, David Barr?

Smith: Yes, David Barr, he was a pretty good egg, I liked him. The next time Almond came up, by that time Litzenberger and
Murray had fought their way out, and he came up and gave us all the Distinguished Service Cross, and he was weeping. I don't know what he was weeping about, whether from the cold or from emotion or what it was. I didn't know anything about this in advance; he came up to me and asked me if I'd line up Murray and Litzenberg and myself and Bealé. He had one Distinguished Service Cross with him. We suggested that he give the Cross to Bealé, who was a junior -- let him have the Cross and we'd get ours some time later. I never did get a citation for that because I suppose I would have had to write my own. That's the way they operate in those things. It came out in Army General Orders, you see, but it was just for the Chosin Reservoir. But he was weeping that time.

Q: You had great forbearance. A lesser man would have ...

Smith: (laughs) That's what says! It is true. I ...

Q: Weren't you ever tempted to ...?

Smith: Very often, but I held it in. I told Gen. Shepherd some of the troubles; I told Gen. Cates, but I never had any confrontation with Almond. He was trying to get me back in the 10th Corps after we got out of there. He came to me one day and he said, "I am going to get you back." I didn't say anything, but I made up my mind that if I could avoid it I wasn't going back. Relations were more or less friendly, but I'd lost confidence in him, that's all.

Q: Had he ever had a combat command before this?
Smith: I talked to one of the newspaper correspondents, and he couldn't understand why on earth they'd ever given him the Corps. He's a newspaper correspondent who had been with him in Italy. And in Italy Gen. Almond had commanded the 92nd Division which was Negro, and apparently they didn't do too well. Gen. Almond with that Negro outfit didn't work very tactically. He did all this maneuvering like he tried to do in Korea. This correspondent told me that he maneuvered this outfit so much that he finally was defeated by one German battalion. Now I don't know what the score was. But, apparently, he was imbued with Stonewall Jackson's idea; he got clobbered three times. He got clobbered at Chosin Reservoir, and when we went up and attacked on the 21st of February from Wonju, that was his outfit that had been clobbered there; he'd taken a couple of South Korean divisions under his command and tried to effect a double envelopment of the Chinese, and both South Korean divisions were clobbered. That's why we went in and went forward from Wonju. He was clobbered a third time -- that was just after I left Korea, and I talked to his artillery officer who was a brigadier general, and he said, "Why everybody told him that he was out on a limb." He had a front that was open or something, and he said I heard the last I want to hear about that. The Chinese came around and they had an awful time getting squared away. They did finally get all their pieces together, and the Marines helped out a little bit.

She sounds like The World's Worst Tactician, or at least in Korea.
Smith: He was just optimistic. I felt a little sympathetic to him after the débacle. When you went around Army Headquarters, all you could hear about was the evacuation from Pusan. It was absolutely a defeated army, and I got the map of how we were to fall back, with all these phase lines coming back to a phase line around Pusan. That's all they talked about. When Gen. Ridgway came out he made them throw those maps away, and he said, "Give me a plan for attack."

But they were a defeated army except for Almond. Almond was never defeated, he was ready to go again, and I have to give him credit for that -- he had a plan of attack. But I avoided getting mixed up in that one.

Q: More than optimism, it sounds like blithe ignorance.

Smith: Well, er -- he was pretty sharp. But he was overly optimistic. Overly optimistic. He came back to the States and he was a three star general. I was senior to him at Inchon. My major general commission outdated his, but actually he should have been senior to me because he was class of '16, and I was class of '17. But somehow or other my date of commission went back a little further and I was senior to him. But that makes no difference. He was Corps Commander, and it makes no difference whether I was junior or senior; he still was Corps Commander. But he came back and he went and took command of the Army War College. Then they had the big MacArthur investigation and he came around and testified. Of course, to him MacArthur was a hero and could do no wrong, and he told this bunch of senators -- and they were aghast -- that Gen. MacArthur would be remembered when Gen. Bradley was forgotten. These senators
made him repeat that. Loyalty is one thing -- he was certainly loyal to Gen. MacArthur. You have to hand that to him for that.

Q: It's smart to know when to quit.

Smith: I tried to be loyal to Gen. MacArthur, but I confess that it was a little difficult at times. Later on I had a five-hour jeep trip with him. I might go into that later. I met him a couple of times afterwards. I guess I am getting back to World War II now!

When we were in the midst of Operation Ripper, I had gone over and taken command of the Corps; during Operation Killer, and then Gen. Hodge had come out and relieved me, and I went back to the Division. I got this order right in the midst of the jump off in Operation Ripper to meet Gen. MacArthur over in the zone of action of the 1st Cavalry Division. I told Gen. MacArthur, "After all, I've got a division that's just jumping off in attack, and I don't want to be leaving the division." The other division commanders felt the same way, except the first cavalryman who was being held in his zone, so that was no strain on him. Well, Hodge said, "You've got to come." And I was the only one outside of the cavalryman who came. Hodge told me afterwards. I went up and chatted with the generals -- Gen. Redway -- and that was that, and then I got my helicopter and went on back to the Division. Hodge said, "That conference was not very productive." I think what Hodge had in mind -- he had gotten me to come over there and he thought that Gen. MacArthur would give me the DSC! So he said it was not very productive. I eventually got it, but I didn't know that until Gen. Hodge gave me that impression.
Q: What was this five-hour jeep ride?

Smith: That was after we had jumped off and made about 50 miles, across the line. We got this word from Gen. MacArthur that he wanted to visit the Division; he was coming over by plane (in his Bataan plane) to Wonju, and wanted to be met there by a jeep, and he wanted to make a tour of the Division without getting out of the jeep. So we went down; I took my driver down and we met the plane. Gen. Ridgway rode in the jeep with Gen. MacArthur and myself. We started out the road and I said, "Now General, we are scattered -- I don't know how many miles we were scattered, 60 miles or so on the road -- and you said you had three hours that you could spend here; and we can't make the rounds in 3 hours." He said, "I've got the time." I said, "All right, if you've got the time." So we went up and picked up the reserve regiment of the Division, which was the first thing we ran into -- I think was in command of it at the time -- and he didn't get out of the jeep; he talked to Haywood. We went on up by my CP, and he didn't get out of the jeep; he shook hands with some of the staff officers. Then I said to him, "The 7th Marines is up the road here, up by the Hongchon River; that's quite a ways up there." He said, "I've got the time." So we took off for the Hongchon River, and I was hoping that Litzenberg hadn't crossed the darn thing yet, because it was a deep and fast flowing river, that we would have to ford in a jeep. But we got to the south bank of the Hongchon and Litzenberg had gone on, so we forded the Hongchon River, and we actually floated at times, and we had to stop for a while and dry out the engine on the other side. We never got out of the car. We got it going again, and then we found Litzenberg
and talked to him. Then he said, "I want to see an assault battalion." My Gosh! We kept on going up the road and found Webb Sawyer and his battalion, and all the Marines crowded around . . .

Q: Did you have a guard with you, or an MP escort?

Smith: Oh, there were MPs all along the road. I forget who my MP officer was, but he did a good job on that. At every bridge, at every sharp turn, he had an MP to make sure that nothing happened.

Nobody told these Marines it was Gen. MacArthur who was coming up the road, but all of them had cameras. My God, there were more cameras . . .

After we talked to Webb Sawyer we went back, and then we made it straight back to Wonju. I don't know how many miles that was, but if you've ever ridden for four or five hours in a rough-riding jeep you've got to go to the head. Well, nobody ever suggested stopping, and we got to Wonju, and the General marched majestically off to his plane, and all the rest of us just disappeared!

Gen. Ridgway came to me and he said, "Smith, why in hell didn't you suggest that we stop to take a leak?" I said, "Well, you were the senior, and I think it was up to you to suggest that!" Maybe the old man had a rubber bag or something, I don't know.

Q: It would just like him to take out everyone else.

Smith: But he walked majestically to his plane. (Pause) We got a little off Korea there, didn't we?
Q: You were still at Hau-ri.

Smith: Yes. I had moved my CP up there on the 28th of November. I had my CP at Hungnam, and with all this dispersion of troops that was about as central as I could get. I had sent Eddie Craig up to make a reconnaissance at Hau-ri; we figured that was where we should set up the next move, and Eddie Craig went up to reconnoiter the place and found a house. We were planning to go up when the roof fell in. So on the 28th I flew up by helicopter because the road was blocked; I had to fly over the Chinese to get into Hau-ri. And we set up the CP there on the 28th. Eddie Craig on the 27th had gone home; his father was on his deathbed; he was very close to his father and I didn't feel that well, when he left the thing hadn't broken yet. I sent a dispatch to Gen. Shepherd at Pearl Harbor and said unless I received an answer within 12 hours I was going to grant Craig leave to go home. I got no reply, so I let him go, and he went on back to San Antonio, Texas. He had 10 days' leave, I think. And apparently, without my knowledge, Almond or somebody in the Army chain of command had wired to that the Commandant of the Marine Corps wanted to get Craig back. I was not administratively under the Army.

Q: After his leave?

Smith: While he was on leave. Eddie told me that he got orders from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to come back. When he got to Pearl Harbor, he talked to Gen. Shepherd, and he asked Gen. Shepherd's advice. He said, "Shall I go on back, or shall I go on
and see my father." Gen. Shepherd told him to go on to San Antonio. Then apparently somebody complained. Well, I guess it's not too good an idea to have only one Marine general in a division, but . . . He came on back and he joined me at Hungnam as we came out.

Q: His father died?

Smith: Yes. He was very close to his father. Eddie Craig was a very fine person. I was very fond of him. (Pause)

The 5th and 7th fought their way into Hagu-ri. Our plan for getting out of there was to have the 5th completely capture all this high ground just east of Hagu-ri -- we called it the East Ridge. The Chinese were looking right down at us, and we had never had enough troops to chase them off there. We held on to one end of the ridge, that's all. So the plan was to have the 5th go up and capture that ridge, because until it was captured the people on the ridge could fire down on the road going to Koto-ri, and we had the whole ridge before we could move a large outfit down the road to Koto-ri, and once Murray captured the ridge, then Litzenberg was to start moving down the road. We had divided up the column into two components -- one under Litzenberg and one under Murray -- and the vehicles and everything else. We had Train No. 1, Train No. 2; we had a very complete operation order; there was no word of withdrawal in there at all. That was an attack order because we were attacking, and we gave them objectives to capture en route to Koto-ri, and had an appendix on what to do about destruction. And we destroyed very little; we had to destroy a few rations, and we stripped a few trucks of their spare parts. The rest of the stuff came out all right.
Q: You brought out all your wounded and dead?

Smith: Yes. We flew out 138 bodies from Hagu-ri. We didn't want to bury them in that God-forsaken place. We had a good cemetery in Hungnam. Litzenberg had had to bury 85 in Mudam-ni because he only had helicopters to get them out of there, and there was a field burial there. But at Hagu-ri, when we caught on to the wounded, we just slipped the bodies in and it was very simple -- they were frozen stiff, there was no putrefaction or anything like that. Then the Corps wanted us to quit, and Gregon Williams handled the phone on that. (laughs) We just stalled them. We sent them all out. We didn't pay any attention. Then when we got to Koto-ri, we had a very limited strip there; we couldn't fly out the dead, so we buried 113 there. And 96% of those people were identified and their remains brought back and turned over to their next of kin. Of all that outfit, 96% were identified, and I've got to hand it to the North Koreans -- they did an excellent job of digging up those bodies and put them in bags and send them to Panmunjon. They wouldn't let us send up graves registration people to do it. They did it themselves.

Q: As part of the truce terms?

Smith: Yes. And I've got the maps. They sent maps of just where they had found the bodies, with the red cross to mark where they had found the scattered area burials. I've got the maps, in here.

Bare at that time was in the personnel department and he copied the maps and he sent me the maps: 96% were unidentified was in this well organized cemetery at Hungnam. We had
two or three unidentified there, because these 13 bodies we sent in there were buried by the Army, you see, and they were kind of careless in identifying these people. We had a cemetery at Wonsan, a cemetery at Hungnam, a field burial at Koto-ri and a field burial at Koto-ri, and a few scattered people that they couldn't get out that were buried where they fell, but were reported, identified and reported. I've got to hand it to them.

Q: Didn't you have a problem when Maggie Higgins came up to Hagurri?

Smith: Yes, that was interesting. Maggie had visited us a good bit in the Inchon Campaign. She was quite popular with the men, and she particularly liked the 5th Marines, and she spent a lot of time with front line companies. She had plenty of fortitude. I met her there once. We were in a CP near Kimpo Airfield -- it was an old housing development.

(interruption)

Maggie Higgins came around to my quarters. She was accompanied by Keyes Beeche, who followed her around all over Korea.

Q: Keyes was an old Marine combat correspondent,

Smith: That's right. She'd been invited to dinner. I didn't know anything about it. She disappeared in another room to comb her hair -- it needed combing. She was in khakis and her hair was pretty well mussed up.

Q: Were you taken aback with this self invitation?
Smith: Well, we then said we'd give her a cup of coffee or something. I found that what had happened was that she had run into Eddie Craig and his aide out in the field somewhere, and they had invited her to dinner, but they hadn't gotten the word to me, and we gave her whatever we had -- it wasn't much.

The next time I ran into her was at Koto-ri. She had talked the Air Force into flying her in there. It was not right, because we were pressed to get planes to get our wounded out. It meant that she could come in all right, but to get her out would mean we would have to displace a wounded man. Well, Lewis Puller was in command at Koto-ri, and of course I came down from Haguri, and the division was assembling there to fight on the rest of the way. Lewis wanted to know why she was there and told her it was no place for a woman. He had detailed a first lieutenant to follow her around, and he was going to put her on the last plane going out. I then got in the picture. I guess I arrived from Haguri, and Maggie came to me for support. She said she was just like any other correspondent, man or woman, and she wanted to march down the hill with the troops. I said, "There are a lot of good Marines that are getting frostbite, and if you march down with these Marines you probably will get frostbitten, and then somebody is going to have to take care of you. I am sure these Marines will see that you are taken care of, and we haven't got men to afford for that kind of business." She thought it was discrimination. But I said, "Nevertheless, that's it. You have to get out on the last plane." What she did then was she was flown out, and she came back up to Chinhun-ni and came up the road to meet the Marines when they came out from Koto-ri to Chinhun-ni. She was going to fool me
that she was going to meet them anyway. Then she wrote an article for the Saturday Evening Post, and she took me apart. Then Hibbs wouldn't publish it as she wrote it; he was the editor of the Post at that time and he made her temper it. But she did put something in; she said I had ideas of chivalry that didn't agree with her ideas and so forth. She wrote Gen. Cates that I was given to discrimination. Gen. Cates wrote her a letter and kidded her along, and he sent me a copy of the letter he wrote her, and that's the last I heard of her.

Q: Didn't she go out with Gen. Shepherd? Wasn't he there at the time? The two of them flew out together?

Smith: I don't know whether she flew out with him. I remember Gen. Shepherd going out.

Q: He told me the two of them had a very rough takeoff because the enemy had the end of the airfield under fire.

Smith: Oh, we had an awful time getting Gen. Shepherd out of there because they were firing from the high ground up to the north, and we had to bring in fighter planes and work over those hills in order to get Gen. Shepherd out. I didn't know Maggie was with him.

Q: He said to her, "God, Maggie, won't it be an awful scandal if the two of us crash together in the plane?"
Smith: Gen. Shepherd wanted to stay overnight with me and I said, "Look, you can do me more good down at Corps Headquarters than you can here, because planes keep coming up." And I didn't have any accommodations for him. Keyes Beech realized that it was an imposition to try to get on a plane to get out of there. He came up to Koto-ri and he agreed to stay with us. And he didn't have a sleeping bag. He went to the troops. We had these mountain sleeping bags, but only on the basis of one per man. Finally I got him a sleeping bag. Then Keyes Beech made the mistake of asking where he got the sleeping bag, and Keyes said, "Off a corpse." And Keyes Beech didn't sleep very well that night! But that's the only way you could get an extra sleeping bag. These wounded men were brought in in sleeping bags to keep them warm.

Q: David Duncan . . .

Smith: He joined us at Koto-ri. He walked out with the troops.

Q: He got some fantastic pictures.

Smith: He and one other Marine -- I think his name was Smith, a correspondent -- an ex marine; they walked out with the troops. They were the only ones.

Q: Keyes didn't go out with you?

Smith: He didn't go out with the troops. He hung around and I guess maybe he went out on a truck, I don't know how he got out of there, but he didn't go out by plane as far as I know.
Q: How did you feel all this time? Were you optimistic, or were you highly concerned all through this?

Smith: I was pretty optimistic. I talked to Lew Walt about that, and I said, "After all, Lew, it never occurred to me at any time that we wouldn't get out, and I don't think it ever occurred to any man in the division." I don't think it did. It just didn't occur to us that we wouldn't be able to fight our way out. The only time I had cause for great concern was when Litzenberg and Murray were fighting out from Yudam-ni, and I got a dispatch from Litzenberg along midnight somewhere, and he said, SITUATION GRAVE. I didn't like that at all. But it was followed within an hour or two by a message stating that they had come on through and everything was all right.

Q: At any time during this period were you unhappy with the situation of the division was put in by your corps?

Smith: We didn't have much time to think about it. We didn't grouche about it. We were intent on getting out of there, and intent on getting supplies and replacements in. The head of the air transport command became a lieutenant general -- I forget his name. (Lt. Gen. Turner?)

Q: Who flew up to see me?

Smith: No. He flew up to see me. They had done a very fine job -- Marine planes, Air Force planes -- getting our people out. Even
Greek planes. He said, "Now Smith, when you get these wounded out
I got all kinds of planes, and I'll send them up here just as fast
as you want them, and get out all the people that you want to get
out." I said, "Look, nobody's going to get out of here who's able-
obody's bodied. Do you realize we've just flown in 600 replacements?" His
jaw dropped. Down at Hungnam we had these people who had been
hospitalized, and what not, who had been discharged from the hospital
and were assembled at Hungnam; and there were 600 of them.
We could use them very profitably up our way, so we flew them in, and by that time -- well, we flew them in just before the 5th
and 7th got into Hau-ri, and they were distributed to the outfits
they'd come from when the 5th and 7th got in, and the 3rd Battalion
of the 1st was at Hau-ri, and they got their share. The 2nd
Battalion came up to us at Hau-ri and we took them down the road,
and they joined when we got to Koto-ri. The replacements for the
1st battalion at Chinhun-ni simply went up the road to Chinhun-ni.

I remember -- to show how loyal Marines are to their unit -- I
was going around Hau-ri one day and I saw a Marine sitting next to a tent, and he was the most dejected person I'd ever seen
in my life, and I went to him and said, "What's the matter with
you, lad?" He said, "I belong to the 1st Marines." I said, "You
are in the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines." He said, "But I
belong to the 2nd Bat." I said, "The 2nd Bat is 10 miles down the road, and there are a lot of Chinese between
them and us, but we'll get you back there eventually." And he
cheered up a bit. But he didn't realize that he'd come into this
maelstrom at Hau-ri; all he wanted to do was get back to 2nd Bat One.

And I hope he got there, but I don't know.
Q: Knowing of you, your reputation and your career and what you've done during the war, this business of writing an attack order was the logical, tactical move at this time.

Smith: Sure, you couldn't withdraw when you're surrounded. I've tried to explain that retreat helps business to people; you can't retreat or withdraw when you are surrounded. The only thing you can do is break out, and when you break out, that's an attack. And the only fellow who understood that was S. L. A. Marshall -- he understood it thoroughly. He wrote up a top secret report on the 1st Division breakout. A very fine document.

Q: I've never seen that.

Smith: Headquarters Marine Corps had got copies. You might dig it out. It was classed as either secret or top secret. I had difficulty getting a copy, but I told Gen. Ridgway I wrote him a letter saying I understood that Col. S. L. A. Marshall had made this study; he'd made a study of the 2nd Infantry Division and of the 1st Division on the Chinese and the attack, and I said that we would be very glad to get the benefit of his observations on how we conducted the operation. He sent over a copy to me, and of course I sent that over to FMF and they made more copies, and I've got it around some place. He was very complimentary.

I've forgotten just where we were.

Q: We were still tracing our way back to the 6th. You hadn't taken off from Hagu-ri yet.
Smith: No, we took off from Hagu-ri on the morning of the 6th with the 7th division in the lead. By that time the 5th Marines had captured the ridge, the East Ridge. They began coming in the 3rd of December and we had to give them a rest. We just let the outfits rest. Two more Chinese divisions came in. Then the 5th cleaned out the ridge on the 5th, and then on the 6th we started down the road. Litzenberg got down two or three miles and it took him until 2 o'clock in the afternoon to clean that up. We were waiting around at Hagu-ri to get the word when he was really on his way so that we could get into the helicopters and drop into Koto-ri. You had to do a lot of advance planning in this withdrawal; there was no point in going down the road because you would have been out of communication.

When I got the message from Litzenberg that he'd finally broken through and was on his way, we all got in the helicopters and went down to Koto-ri. The only thing that concerned me on that trip was that our planes were really working over that road and those ridges, and the poor old helicopter only had a 5000 foot ceiling and the road was 4000 feet up, so we were pretty low, and what concerned me was not the Chinese -- I never saw any Chinese, they were there some place -- but I was afraid one of those planes might run into us. I was hoping they'd see us. And we got down to Koto-ri. Litzenberg and Murray came on down the road; they had some knockdown drag out fights on that road; the Chinese closed in pretty close; they had to use the artillery at point blank with incendiary cut down to practically nothing. But we didn't lose many vehicles. They came by the place where the Drysdale column had been ambushed and tried to get some of those vehicles but couldn't.
...and capture that. Then... KOTO-RT, we had twenty men to send a battalion to two to the high ground on the right and left of the road just south of the high ground. There was a hill there that needed to be captured. Lieutenant was to capture the 7th and 8th Marines coming down the mountain. There was a hill there, and we could attack up the mountain, come up the mountain and meet them out and attack them on the right, for the 7th was from KOTO-RT, and we could take them out. But we picked up 500 on the trip to KOTO-RT, and we had no wounded. But we picked up 500 on the trip to KOTO-RT, and we had about 14,000 people in there. We had evacuated some and we had about 14,000 people in there. We had evacuated some and the night of the 7th and the 8th all the artillia came in to KOTO-RT, and we then on the 8th... we got in during the day of the 7th... until the snow stopped. It was an all fixed plane -- he came in and read how it ever found it. I don't know. No more planes came out of the snow. Came a transport plane that landed on that little extension in, and then the next day there was a heavy snowstorm.

Remember then, if we could get the wounded out in a hurry we had 500 casualties.

Then we decided not to hesitate too long at all KOTO-RT. We had...
Smith: We knew that the bridge over the penstocks just below Koto-ri had been blown, when we were still at Hagu-ri, and Partridge was planning on what to do about it. He flew in a light plane down opposite the bridge -- he flew back and forth and he darn near froze to death trying to take some notes, trying to make an estimate of what we needed to replace the blown bridge. The bridge had been blown a couple of times, and the final blowing of it left a gap of about 30 feet, but there was absolutely no way to bypass that bridge, there was this steep slope and these four tremendous pipes -- penstocks -- that came down the mountainside, and they had this one way concrete bridge across the penstocks. There was no place you could build a bypass, it was just like that. So we knew we had to replace the bridge. He went down and he talked to me about it.

Q: Was that Gen. Partridge of the Air Force?

Smith: Oh no, this was Lt. Col. Partridge of the Marine Corps. He commanded the Engineer Battalion. He was kind of a grouchy guy. He came up to me and told me about this plan; he'd talked to the Air Force; we had communication with Hungnam by two-way radio links. He said what he wanted to do was to examine all the possibilities - drop Treadway bridges from the air at Koto-ri and put in a Treadway bridge over this gap. He admitted that the Air Force had never dropped Treadway bridges; each section weighed
2500 pounds. But the Air Force was willing to make some test drops and see what they could do. I asked him a few questions. I said, "Now look, do you know it'll work? Have you tried it out?" He said he'd made arrangements for a test drop. I said, "Suppose some of the sections are damaged in dropping? Have you got any provisions for that?" Yes, he said he'd ordered double the number required. I said, "If all the Treadway bridge stuff fails, are you prepared to put in a trestle bridge?" (We had lost our tanks of course.) He said yes, he knew where he could get the timber. I could see that he was mad by that time by my questioning. He told me, "I got you across the Han River, I got you the airfield, and I'll get you a bridge." (laughs) I said, "Okay, we'll take that." It took one flying box car to fly one section, and we needed four sections to make the bridge, so we dropped eight sections, and in order not to kill a lot of people we tried to drop them on the perimeter of Koto-ri, not in the middle. One section was dropped into Chinese hands, but we still had seven sections, and we didn't kill anybody. Fortunately for us, Gen. Almond had had an idea that at Hagu-ri he wanted to set up an advance CP in his optimistic mood, and he had sent a young lieutenant up with some Treadway trucks with tents and stuff for his advance CP. The Treadway trucks had a winch to handle these sections. We could have done it with a bulldozer, but these trucks were good and this lieutenant had had some experience with the construction of Treadway bridges, so he came in very handy. The next thing was to get the bridge site which was held by the Chinese. Murray had no difficulty getting to the high ground up above it, but in the snow Litzenberg had pretty slow going trying to get the high ground on either side of the road just south. He finally got moving going to his second objective
down the road. And we started out this bridge train behind him, because we wanted to get that stuff to the bridge site as soon as possible. There were two trucks, I think. They followed close behind Litzenberg's CP, and then mortar fire began to come down, and Litzenberg got worried that the mortar fire would hit these darn trucks, so he told Partridge to go on back up the road out of range of the mortar fire, and he send for him later. So Partridge went back up the hill; it was getting dark, and he saw what looked like a flat field off to the side of the road. He started moving, and there were some Marine tanks around there, and he figured that was a good place to stop. It wasn't Koto-ri, but those tanks would give him protection. He backed on to this flat place -- it was ice, and his trucks crashed. He got one truck out with no difficulty; the other truck was damaged. They stayed there until Litzenberg captured the bridge site. Then they went on down, and it only took Partridge 3 ½ hours to install that bridge.

A Treadway bridge is nothing but two metal treads, but you have to have abutments to hook it on, and he had some difficulty building up some abutments there. This bridge would take 50-ton tanks -- we had 50 ton tanks, and we needed that bridge to get our tanks out.

But he got the bridge completed. Before he got it completed, we started the convoy; by that time we had 1400 vehicles in that convoy -- artillery, tanks, everything -- and we'd started out from Hagu-ri with 1000 vehicles; we picked up 400 vehicles at Koto-ri. So by the time he got the bridge completed the head of the convoy was at the bridge. Night had come by then, and Partridge's station engineers with flashlights guided these people across the bridge. It went along fine for a little while, until
I had a sense of well being, after all, had gone across and up; I had a sense of well being, after all, had gone across and up. I had a sense of well being, after all, had gone across and up.

Particularly near the bridge. He said in the interview after the fire, you can't turn two more, except at one or two times an hour, to bring in people across the tanks, an exceptionally slow fire, and have more than one at a time. You can't turn two more, except at one or two times an hour, to bring in people across the tanks, an exceptionally slow fire, and have more than one at a time.

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There is where Lewis looked up on the loss of the tanks. The plan was that the 1st Marines was left in Koto-ri to defend and come out as rear guard, and by that time Lee had his two battalions; the 3rd had come down from Nam-ri, and he had the 1st there with him, and he had an Army battalion that had come up the road.

The 7th and the 5th -- the 7th first, I think it was the 7th first, and then the 5th -- were to come down to the road and go on out, and then Lewis was to relieve the 7th and the 5th on their objectives. As they pulled out, the 1st Marine battalion went up on these objectives. Well, it was quite a climb up to where Murray had been, up over the bridge site. The battalion of the 5th -- I think it was Sutter -- had been up there, and he hadn't been attacked. Lewis looked over the situation, and decided there was no use sending one of his battalions up there; it was a battalion of the 5th; Sutter was supposed to go up and relieve the 5th behind the bridge site, and he decided that he'd just let Sutter come down the road. Then after Murray got out, the Chinese came up on the hill, and Lewis had orders to guard the rear of the column. We had taken the precaution of putting the tanks at the rear of the column, because we were afraid if something happened to a tank it would block the road and it'd be so heavy you couldn't move it. So the tanks were the last elements in the column, and Lewis just assumed the tanks would take care of the rear, and he let Sutter go on down the road. Then the Chinese came down the slopes over the road and they began intermingling with the refugees -- there were about 3000 refugees that were following us out -- and the refugees came forward. We kept them back; we didn't allow them to mix in with our column. The Chinese were coming down
and there was nothing the tanks could do, because when you are on a road that goes like that and tanks can either shoot ahead or shoot back, but they can't shoot up. And they began throwing some grenades and stuff at the tanks, and one of the tanks had a brake-lock. When you use your brakes a lot they are liable to lock on you. One or two tanks were able to get by this tank with the brake-lock, and then I think another one had a brake-lock. And they were beginning to heave thermite grenades on the tanks, and they abandoned two or three of the tanks. We had 50 tanks all told, and those tanks did not get out and we lost quite a few.

Finally, the elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion were the last out. They shouldn't have been. The infantry should have been the last out. When they came across the bridge, Partridge verified that they were the last people and he blew the bridge. I guess the refugees just went around over the mountainside, that's how they came on out. We took 100,000 of them out of Hungnam.

Q: Did Partridge get an award for this?

Smith: He got the Legion of Merit. I had quite a difficulty getting a decent citation for him. Headquarters Marine Corps at that time said we'd get out a temporary citation. I got out a temporary citation for the Legion of Merit which explained exactly what he'd done — which was a rather remarkable job. It got back to Headquarters; they rewrote it, and about all they said was that he commanded the Engineer Battalion. At that time I was in Norfolk and I started writing letters. I finally got them to accept my citation for Partridge. He never got promoted, though.
But he did a good job for us. He did make that airfield, and he did it under fire, and he had problems there that were terrific; he had to use jackhammers to knock the ice off these pans; everything froze, you see. He had to weld claws on the blades of his bulldozers in order to bite into this stuff. Then we had these attacks come in while he was building, and they had a part of the perimeter. They had to drop their bulldozers and take their rifles and go and defend. Then when they drove off the Chinese, they went back to building this thing. I never told him to take this bridge material to Korea, but he did -- it was very fortunate that he did, because we would never have gotten our tanks across the Han River if he hadn't brought out those floating sections of 50-ton bridge. We made rafts out of that and put the tanks and trucks on the rafts, and sent down the dock and talked to Adm. Doyle into giving us an LCVP as a power boat, and brought it up on a flat bed and used it to push these rafts back and forth across the Han River. He did that. So he was all right, except he was kind of grouchy.

Puller was the fellow who was always saying, "Goddamn it, it was his line. We didn't pay any attention to him. Then he came to Division Headquarters, and the shoe was on the other foot. He belonged to this dumb headquarters outfit. He was the Assistant Division Commander. His attitude changed a little bit. Not an awful lot.

Q: Wasn't it unusual for a lieutenant colonel like Ray Murray to have a regiment?

Smith: Yes, but I didn't change it. He'd done a good job for Erskine. Erskine had made him the commander, and I saw no reason
He got his number there. I never regretted it. He did a very fine job. (Pause) Well, by the time our people got to Chinhung-ni, Gen. Shepherd released Col. Snedeker back to me. He'd taken him away from me because I wouldn't get rid of Gregon Williams and put Eddie in as chief of staff. Eddie would have been a fine chief of staff, but I just couldn't use him. So Eddie came back to me and we put him at Chinhung-ni to supervise the routing of these people as they came off the mountain in trucks. There was a railhead down a few miles further south.

Q: At what point did the enemy stop trying to get you?

Smith: Below Koto-ri.

Q: Once you got past the bridge.

Smith: Once we got past the bridge -- er, well, Schmuck had had a tremendous fight getting that high ground below the bridge, but he was up there and the road was open, so once they passed the bridge there was nothing to bother them. There were Chinese not too far from the road. The 3rd Division had sent the battalion up to Chinhung-ni to relieve Schmuck so he could attack up the mountain, and they were responsible for the road south of Chinhung-ni, back to -- I've forgotten the names, but Sudong and so forth. And when Lewis Puller, who was the last fellow out, came down the road to Chinhung-ni they told him the road was open, and he was ambushed down by Sudong and lost some people, and he was pretty hot under
the collar for that because the Army was supposed to keep the road clear. But he came on out. We picked up some Army trucks that had been abandoned, so he came out with more equipment than before he was ambushed. They came out partly by train, partly by truck. At first, the idea of the 10th Corps was that the 1st Division because of its amphibious background would be the last outfit out of Hungnam; that we would defend the final beachheads. Well, somebody saw the light of day down there. We had taken all the casualties of the 10th Corps. The 7th Division outside of the two battalions that got messed up at the reservoir had had no casualties. We had had 4-5000 casualties. And somebody got the word and we were sent out first. Our first mission was to go into those assembly areas around Hungnam and defend. Then we got the orders to go aboard ship, and it didn't take us long to get out. The 7th Marines came in, and I think we went out the same day; and the next outfit in was the 5th Marines; then the 1st Marines.

Finally, by December 13th the entire division had sailed from Hungnam, less the amtracs and miscellaneous service units that were left behind. The idea was that the 7th Division would take over where we pulled out, and then the 7th Division would go out, and the perimeter would be drawn back closer and closer to Hungnam; the 7th Division would pull out; the 3rd Division would take over the beachhead; and then the 3rd Division would pull out by regiments, and then they finally got down to a final battalion. They finally got out of there about Christmas, I think, the last of them.

The withdrawal was pretty orderly. At first the 10th Corps was kind of stampeded and they began to burn and destroy, and when they found that we were holding up there and coming out slowly,
then they quit the burning and went out in an orderly manner. They got 17,000 vehicles and 100,000 refugees plus 100,000 troops that came out from Hungnam. They were never molested by the Chinese; everything went smoothly. On the first go round, when they were destroying and burning, the dumps were just open to anybody, and they could get what they wanted, and we left our amtrac battalion down at Hungnam because we couldn't use it up at Chosin Reservoir, and the amtrac battalion then took these empty amtracs over and loaded them with field desks, blankets, everything. We had 30,000 blankets and we never turned back to the 10th Corps. I eventually gave most of them to the Korean Marines.

Adm. Radford sent Gen. Shepherd in to Hungnam. He was not in command of the evacuation. Adm. Doyle was in command of the evacuation. But Adm. Radford sent Gen. Shepherd out to kind of look over the situation and see if everything was going all right.

Q: Didn't a man by the name of Dick Schutt, a major -- wasn't he helping? He was an engineer from FMFPac. Were there any FMFPac personnel there?

Smith: I don't remember. I don't remember anybody by the name of Scott.

Q: That's S-C-H-U-T-T.

Smith: Well, er, -- I had two engineers. I remember Moses was the second in command of the engineer battalion, and Partridge was commanding the battalion. I don't remember Schutt. (Pause)
Eddie Craig joined me at Hungnam. When he had the 259th Brigade they had gone into bivouac at Masan -- he was very fond of that place, and he suggested if possible that we recommend to the 10th Corps that we be allowed to go there to rehabilitate, to get our replacements, and apparently there were no objections. I sent Eddie on down to Masan to get ready for us. We came into Pusan, and went by road from Pusan over to Masan. I tried to get Adm. Doyle to take us around into Masan Harbor, but he wouldn't do it because it would have increased the turnaround time, you see. He couldn't afford to lose that time on getting his LSTs back to evacuate more people. So we got off at Pusan and went over by truck, and we moved into a Japanese barracks. There were a few little bungalows. I had a bungalow with Eddie Craig and I forget who else. Maybe Williams was in there, but I've forgotten. The whole division was bivouacked in the Masan area. And of course we started active patrolling, because at that stage of the game the Army was coming backward, and they had these phase lines. You'd read these Army orders that they were to fall back to phase line D, prepared to fall back to phase line umpty-ump, and you didn't know when that was going to stop. While we were at Masan, people from divisions that were up front came down looking for rear CP locations, way down at the south. Then they came down there and laid out defensive setups in the vicinity of Masan. It was a defeated outfit.

At Masan we hoped to get some fresh meat and stuff to rehabilitate these men who had been living on C rations and what not up north there. And the Army of course promised they'd give us some fresh meat, and I, in order to stir them up, sent a message to
Adm. Joy's message to the Army, information of Adm. Joy's command, pointing out that these men had come out of a grueling experience and required some fresh meat and what not to get them back in shape. And gosh, Adm. Joy loaded up a ship with turkeys and sent it around to Masan, and at the same time the Army made good on its promise and we had turkey coming out of our ears for a while there. We didn't get much fresh beef, but it was around Christmas and we got all this turkey. So sending that information of Adm. Joy, worked. He also sent a bunch of Christmas trees along with the food. That was on December 16th that I landed at Pusan. The transport ship that I came down on was the same one that Gen. Cates went into Iwo Jima on. I'll think of it in a minute.

Of course, the Lt. Colonel that I went around to Wonsan on stayed for the rest of the evacuation.

On December 26th, Gen. Ridgway assumed command of the 8th Army, replacing Gen. Walker who'd been killed on the 23rd in a jeep accident. On January 8th he had me come over to Taegu; he was holding a conference of corps commanders and he wanted to talk to me about the employment of divisions. He asked for my comment on a plan that Almond had proposed -- sending one regiment of the division to Andong, which was up north of Pohang; to send this one regiment up to Andong to be attached to the 10th Corps, and the remainder of the division to go to Pohang. I told Gen. Ridgway I didn't think much of that, that it was just a start of the breaking up of the division, and I was very much concerned as to whether that one regiment I sent up to the 10th Corps would be put out on a limb. I told him that frankly we had been put out on a limb and we'd gotten ourselves off that limb, but we'd lost some confidence in the higher command.
The upshot was that he thought it over and he kept us in Army reserve, and sent us up to Pohang to run down this 10th North Korean Division that had infiltrated through the lines and was in that whole area north and northwest of Pohang. We did send Lewis Puller's outfit to Pohang, but we sent it out as a part of the 1st Division. By that time Almond's crowd had moved on north a bit. And, of course, we chased that poor North Korean 10th Division all over the place. We divided the area up into sectors. It was an area about the size of Rhode Island. We had a sector for each of the infantry regiments. The Korean Marines had rejoined us; we gave them a sector. The artillery without its guns had a sector; the tanks without their tanks had a sector. And everybody patrolled. We left it up to the regiments how they patrolled. Litzenberg more or less worked by battalions. Murray sent out a flock of small patrols all over the place, and they really patrolled. He lost one patrol; he lost the whole ten of them.

Eventually of course, the Army began to want to know when we were going to get through chasing this division around so they could use us for something else. Gen. Ridgway used to come around to the airfield there at Pohang and we'd talk. I'd go out to talk to him. One February 1st he wanted my ideas on the future employment of the division. I wrote a memorandum. I got the staff to work on it. I felt we should try to preserve our amphibious capabilities, so I recommended that we remain on the East Coast and attack up the East Coast, so we could come in in various places there and supply ourselves. I turned that in to him. Then on February 11th he had a conference. He told me then he appreciated the logic of my statement, but the 1st Marine Division was the most powerful division.
in the 8th Army, and he wanted to use the division where the threat was greatest, and at that time the threat appeared greatest in the Han River corridor, the Han River came in and then bent down, and they were going to send us in there. That's what we were planning on -- that was a good many miles from Pohang. We moved the division up to Pohang on the 18th of January. Then suddenly, out of a blue sky, on the 12th of February, we got warning orders to get to Chungju.

Chungju was in Central Korea, south of Wonju. I then sent Lewie Puller up. By that time he was ADC, and I sent him to make a survey of Chungju; what we'd do when we got there. We were attached to the 9th Corps when we got to Chungju. We were told we were to participate in Operation Killer, which was the jump-off on the 21st of February.

Q: Lewie Puller was ADC by this time. Had he had a star yet?

Smith: Oh yes.

Q: Had you gone back on a special selection board?

Smith: No. I don't know what board selected him.

Q: I thought you were on his selection board.

Smith: No. I was on Brown's, but that was much later. Oh no, wait. Brown's was when I was at Headquarters Marine Corps, or at Norfolk, I guess. I came up . . .

Q: FMFLant.
Smith: Yes, when I was in FMFLant, I came up . . .

Q: That was after Korea.

Smith: That's right, that was after Korea.

(cross talk)

Yes, Brown was coming out to join me in the spring of '51 as a colonel, and by that time Lewis was my ADC and a brigadier general.

Well, we were to pass through elements of the 20th Corps at Wonju and attack north. Initially, the 7th Division was on our right, and the 1st Cavalry Division was on our left. Later on, the 1st Cavalry Division was replaced by the 6th Rock Division, and it was on my left.

We had some difficulty, and I talked to Gen. Moore about it. We were delayed; we were dependent upon trucks to get into Wonju for the jumpoff. The 1st Marines got in all right. Then Gen. MacArthur decided to visit the troops at Wonju and give out a few decorations to -- I guess -- the Dutch Battalion that was with the 20th Corps there, and Gen. Almond just closed off all traffic coming in or going out of Wonju while Gen. MacArthur was present, and Murray was trying to get in there to jump off, but he couldn't. I had sent Lewis up to Wonju to check these outfits coming in for the attack, and I told him I'd be up there before the jumpoff. He began calling me on the phone wanting to know what about the 5th Marines? What should we do about it? Should we refuse to jump off? And I said, "Well, if one battalion of the 5th gets in on time we'll jump off, we'll have one battalion of the 5th. Anyway I'll be up there before you jump off and I'll make that decision." And that's what we did.
This battalion had to double time to get to the jumpoff line on time. The 7th Marines was way back, coming in by road; it didn't get in for a day or so. We didn't run into a great deal of resistance immediately. The rest of the 5th joined up.

We found some evidence of this clobbering up just north of Massacre Valley. There had been an American outfit chopped up there, and we found a lot of bodies, trucks; and the poor battalion commander of the Dutch Battalion was bumped off; we found his body and brought it back.

Q: Was this the place where bodies were hands tied behind their backs and so on?

Smith: I don't know; it was called Massacre Valley. We lost quite a few people. I don't know what regiment it was that lost them.

Q: Some of the Army's had been ambushed and then were killed in their sleeping bags and others were found with their hands bound.

Smith: We got going up the road. I got out of Wonju. That was a terrible mudhole. My God, the mud that was in there! The next move our CP was moved up the road alongside the river and we had a little better drainage in this camp. While I was there Gen. Moore died suddenly of a heart attack, and I got a message from Gen. Ridgway directing me to take command of the 5th Corps, and then he came up to see me; and as I told you before he said that so far as he was concerned the Corps was mine, but he didn't know what the War Department would do, and I told him I was pretty sure of that,
I would consider the assignment as temporary. And of course the
War Department dashed around and poor old Gen. With me in Trieste.
He told me he had just 24 hours to get out of there; he had to leave
his wife to do the packing, and he dashed from Trieste all the way
over to Korea to take over that 21st Corps.

Q: They wouldn't let a marine general . . .

Smith: Well, you see, Gen. With me was a major general and if he kept
that command six months he became three star. That's the way Almond
got his third star, when he had commanded the 10th Corps for six
months he became a three star. And to me it made no difference -- I
would go up to three star when somebody back in Washington decided
it was time to go up, which was two or three years later.

I went over. A very nice staff over there, although they had
this defeatist attitude. They'd sit in the mess and talk about when
they or some other place bugged out of Pyongyang, and when we bugged out of here. The
Marines would never have talked about it, but they talked freely
about it. They had -- we were way back of the front lines -- a Negro
company that was used for ceremonial purposes and that's all, and
they had a rifle company from the 25th Division guarding a bridge
across the river near the headquarters. And I said, My gosh, why
can't this Negro company here guard that bridge? That was the
ceremonial company. The man who brought it up was the commanding
general of the 25th Division. The minute I came over there he came
to me and wanted his company back, and I sympathized with him. I
don't think they should have. It was miles back of the front lines.
But they were afraid the Chinese would get in that deep. Of course,
I was gone before too long.
I turned over the command to and he commanded the Division until I returned. It was March 5th. I took over on the 24th of February, and Gen. got out there on the 5th of March. Then he took over, and I went back to the Division. This Operation Killer had jumped off on the 21st of February, and then they had to stop it on the 25th of February because they ran out of rations and ammunition. Logistically they had to stop and had to catch up on logistics. Then they jumped off Operation Ripper on the 6th of March; that was the day after I went back to the Division. In that corps that I commanded they had the 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th Division, the 1st Mar Div, the 27th British Brigade, and the 6th Division -- that was the 5th corps. Gen. relieved me on March 5th, and I returned to the division. On March 17th, Gen. MacArthur came over for this five hour jeep trip that I told you about. We continued up the road, successfully capturing Hongchong, then Chunchon, and then continued north up to the Warin Reservoir.

I guess we'd gone about 60 miles against resistance of varying degrees of toughness. About this time -- I think it was when we were at Hongchong -- the chaplain (Chaplain Sporr ) incident broke. He was a chaplain who'd been with us during the Chosin Reservoir and he'd gotten not only the Bronze star but the silver star; he'd been decorated twice. He was a crusader, and he had seen the units of the 7th Division coming out of there, and they were in pretty pitiful shape, and their spirits were pretty well broken. And he was disgusted, and he said in an article that was published in a Fort-nightly magazine, which was almost like Time Magazine and was published in Los Angeles, (he had gone home, and this was published in this paper) that he was ashamed to be an American after seeing
these troops suffer like that. And he talked about the luxury of the commanding post. That got back to Washington and Lyndon Johnson, who was then on I forget what committee . . .

Q: Senate Preparedness Committee.

Smith: Yes, and he wanted an investigation, and the Public Information Officer of the Army -- Gen. Parks or somebody like that -- wanted me to disavow the chaplain. The chaplain had long since gone home, and I wasn't going to disavow this chaplain. Gen. Ridgway came up to see me and I said, "General, I read that article and I got down near the bottom and it said, 'I am not a marine officer.' And I breathed a sigh of relief when I read that thing was unsigned."

He said, "Not a chaplain of the Marines?" I said, "No, sir, Chaplain Smith, this chaplain, was a Navy chaplain, and he violated an order of the Navy by criticizing a sister service." Gen. Ridgway said, "Well, don't you give any press conferences. I think the way to handle this is to follow out Lyndon Johnson's request for an investigation and just ignore Parks." Then it was agreed that that would be done. They sent over the Inspector General to look over my mess and how I lived and how Gen. Almond lived. Almond did live in luxury. The point was that this fellow's article was 60% correct.

He should never have written the letter, but he was about 60% correct. In the Corps mess, they had chinaware, napkins, napkin rings, fresh fruit, and meat being flown in every day from Japan, the goods. Well, they came around and took pictures of my outfit, and said "Our mess consisted of a pyramidal tent with a division down the middle. The stove was on this side, and the table..."
where we sat on the other side, and it was a wooden table. And we lived in a van. So there was nothing they could get on us. This Inspector General came around to talk to me and to Lewie Puller and I said, "Now look, there are certain questions you may ask me and I'll give you answers you don't want to get, so you'd better be careful of what you ask me."

Q: Army Inspector General?

Smith: Yes, from Tokyo. And he only asked me three questions, because I said frankly, "I'll tell you the truth as I know it." He asked me three questions, as I remember. Spor had reported that Col. Murray had protested being sent to Yudam-ni or something like that. And I said that frankly I'd never heard of anything like that. I myself had talked to Gen. Almond and had pointed out the implications of moving way out there. As I said, any good staff officer should point out implications; if you feel that it's dangerous or unwarranted you should point it out. But he said he got the order and that was it. Then he wanted to know about the statement that the Army troops were untrained, and I told him I knew nothing about the training of the occupation troops that had come over from Japan; how they'd trained in Japan. I said I felt from observation that the basic training of Marines was more thorough than the basic training of the Army. There was one other question -- I forget -- but that's all. With Lewie Puller it was the same. It was a whitewash. There was nothing ever done about it. I found out later the rest of the story. I came back after Korea, and I was on leave in Berkeley, and Mr. Matthews, the Secretary of the Navy, had come out
to San Francisco to address a gathering of chaplains, and he found I was over in Berkeley -- he was rather fond of me -- and he asked me to come over to the St Francis Hotel and see him. I went over there and all he wanted to do was to pass the time of day, and I asked him, "Mr. Matthews, what did you ever do about the Spor case?" (laughs) He said, "Adm. Radford had the thing handled and he was going to do something disciplining Spor, and Cardinal Spellman (who was supposed to be the Vicar of Catholic chaplains in the service) said that man spoke in accordance with his conscience and his God and you'd better not do anything about disciplining him. Sp Adm. Radford said, "I'm not going to get mixed up in this!" And he passed it on to Mr. Matthews who was a very high ranking lay Catholic; he had a medal from the Pope and a few other things. Mr. Matthews said he finally gave Spor a letter of caution, not for the letter he wrote, but after he'd been warned to lay off he gave a radio broadcast and said the same things, and they gave him the letter of caution for the radio broadcast he'd made. (laughs)

Q: Was he out or was still in?

Smith: He was still in the service, but he'd gone home, he'd completed his tour of duty; he'd been rotated. I had nothing to do with anything he wrote.

Well, we'd been sort of sidetracked before we got to Shoshon Dam. We'd eased out to the right, and the Cavalry Division had gone up the road we were following and had more or less captured the Shoshon Dam which was in the reservoir -- it was about 25 miles long across the front. They decided to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division
by the 6th ROK Division, and have us go up and relieve the
Cavalry Division at the Hwachon Dam, with the 6th ROKs out to our left.

The Cavalry Division had a little time capturing the Hwachon Dam, and the Cavalry Division Commander, Gen. Palmer, wouldn't let them get out of there until they fully captured that dam. Then when it was fully captured he'd turned over the area to us.

We relieved him on the 10th of April, and by that time the 6th ROK Division was on our left. The 6th ROK Division had looked pretty good, not in the face of the enemy, and Gen. Keen had made some remarks to me, and his staff had more or less harassed Bower about the progress we were making. When he talked to me I said, "Look, General, I'll be convinced when the chips are down; let's see what the 6th ROK Division does when the chips are down. They look pretty good now and as they may be going a little faster than we are, but we are thoroughly looking over the ground, and as we go forward." After the 6th ROK Division collapsed he saw me later and he said, "The next time I am going to keep my big mouth shut!" (laughs) He realized he'd been off base on that.

On the 11th of April Gen. MacArthur was relieved. I had been ordered that day to go to a location north of Chinchon to meet the Secretary of the Army; he was in our zone of action. And of course, the relief of MacArthur occurred and he had to dash around to try to find MacArthur, I think, and tell him about it, and he went back to Japan; so I never met the Secretary of the Army.

On April 15th we were moving pretty well up. We had captured the Hwachon Dam, and then we were supposed to continue the attack to the north, and we had objectives like Objective Pendleton,
Objective Quantico and what not, that we were capturing up the line. I got information from Headquarters Marine Corps about four or five colonels that were coming out to the Division, and also got orders detaching Litzenberg upon the reporting of his relief. I had looked over this list of colonels coming out and picked out one whom I thought would make a good relief for Litzenberg, and I suddenly got this dispatch from Litzenberg wanting to know when he was going to be detached in accordance with his orders. I went up to see Litzenberg and I said, "The colonel I selected to relieve you won't be out here for two, three or four weeks or a month." He said, "You could send Bowser up to relieve me." I said, "I am not about to do that." He told me he'd been under strain; that some of his classmates had died of heart attacks and that he ought to get out. I said, "The trouble with you is you've been sitting in your tent here too much, thinking." I went back and talked to Lewie about it, and Lewie wanted to go up and read him off, but I said, "No, we won't do that; but I am afraid if we don't get him out of here he'll crack up." Because then he talked about sending a dispatch requesting retirement for physical disability. And I told him on that, "I am not sending this dispatch for you because you've got a career ahead of you in the Marine Corps, and after you get out of here when you go back to Pearl Harbor you talk to Gen. Shepherd; if you still want to send your dispatch, you go ahead then." He never did.

It so happened that Nickerson, who was a colonel, was over there at that time; he was the FMF representative in Tokyo, but he had come over as an observer, and he'd been with Louis Puller through the Inchon Operation, practically operating as executive officer to
Lewis, and he knew what the score was, and he happened to be over there at this time, observing. So I dashed off a dispatch to Gen. Shepherd who at that time was back at Pearl Harbor, and requested that he release Nickerson to me as the relief of Litzenberg who was concerned about his physical condition. I sent Nickerson up and we got Litzenberg down; we brought him down to Division Headquarters, gave him the silver star and gave him a good dinner, and sent him on his way. We got him out within 24 hours. I was really afraid he'd crack up. But it didn't leave a very good taste in my mouth.

Q: You could have done other things. He was insubordinate.

Smith: Oh, well, when a man is under strain you don't hold that against him.

Q: But it left a bad taste in your mouth.

Smith: In my mouth, yes. Litzenberg, I don't know. We had a perfectly friendly visit when he left. I didn't bawl him out; I just told him he sat around his tent thinking too much about his condition, about his physical condition. As a matter of fact he didn't die of a heart attack, he died of cancer.

Well, we continued the attack on the 21st. By this time Nickerson was in command of the 7th. Our outfit at that time had the 7th on the left, next was the 5th, then the Korean Marines, and the Corps had taken the 1st Marines as corps reserve. We continued this attack on the 21st, and we captured the objectives for the 21st.
On the 22nd we got warning of the CCF attack that was building up, and that the 9th Corps was to be the target of the breakthrough. So we cancelled the attack -- Well, as a matter of fact we attacked the 21st and attacked the 22nd and got our objectives by the evening of April 22nd. It was then that we got this word about the Chinese attack, and we called off the attack for the 23rd, and told people to be on the alert. At that point, that evening, the 6th ROK Division was under heavy attack, and the left of the 7th Marines was getting hit. Then the 6th ROK Division collapsed, and within a matter of hours there was a gap 10 miles wide and 10 miles deep on my left. Gen. Hex called me up and he said, "Do you know what's going on on your left?" I said, "Yes, I know, we are doing what we can about it." In the meantime he'd released the 1st Marines back to me. So we immediately dashed one battalion of the 1st up to the left of the 7th and tried to plug part of the gap, and then a little later the same day we sent the rest of the 1st Marines up on that flank. Then the Corps had us fall back to another line that was about 2000 yards back, I guess, and that shortened our line, so that I could pull out one entire regiment out of the front lines. I pulled the 7th Marines out, and had remaining the 1st, 5th, and Korean Marines, and then took the 7th and one battalion was sent around to help out on that left flank. The Corps wanted one battalion sent back to Chunchon as a safety measure, and we put one battalion of the 7th on a ridge between us and Chunchon, just in case we had to get out -- to have something of a cover.

End of Side 2, Tape 3, Session II.
Smith: Where should we start?

Q: We could go back to the reservoir. You said you were going to make some comments on the Marine Air.

Well, I'll go through it all.

Smith: Gen. MacArthur was so pleased to get the Brigade when it came out that he agreed to take it with the air, and give the Brigade control of its own air. And Air did a very fine job with the Brigade down there. Then, when Inchon came along, Gen. MacArthur was still very happy to get any Marines that he could get, and he agreed with the Navy to make a Navy-Marine Corps-Air show. A big arc was drawn around back of Seoul -- I don't know how many miles it was -- and inside that arc was only to be Navy-Marine Corps-Air with their own control system, and that worked very nicely. They had wonderful air support at Inchon from both the carriers and the ground-based air. Of course, Field Harris came over as fast as he could as soon as we got the Kimpo airfield -- he began flying people in there, and it was no time at all until he had his air operating from there. Then he got into Wonsan. We were steaming back and forth up the coast waiting for the mines to be cleared. The South Koreans had come up the east coast and captured Wonsan, and it was a pretty fair field there. So Field Harris flew in his outfit -- they flew in by transport plane -- and by the time we got ashore he was set up ashore there.

Gen. Partridge commanded the 5th Air Force, and he'd been raised on the Joint Operations Center business where everything had to be cleared through the Joint Operations Center at Taegu.
The new carrier that we're working with, we would take these with the Contra System, so it was agreed that Field Herzig and the
our control system was, so it was agreed that Field Herzig and the
in that, we don't want to get involved with them, because we don't have
we get involved with them. That's how the Air Force must
can agree on. The only thing we don't want (the) Air Force must
"We'll do what you want," I said, "but I just want all the info.
and I could talk to Field Herzig called me up on that and he said,
when I get up at Eau Claire I had the radio link on telephone

...everything down on the ground, and we got everything support and communication with the ground and with the liaison people
and communicated with the headquarters and the control center. Of radio gear, and it flies continuously and flies up with a tremendous
mountain, got a transport plane and flies up with a tremendous
in order to handle the control of the area up there with that there
in the show, and tell him what he did afterwards, and Field Herzig
and down the hill, you know, Partidge agreed to let Field Herzig
and the mountain, just north west at all. Your radio is fairly go in

The, I've been the Air Force saw that when we got up to Chicago

before we ever got the approval from Tegnul.

Of course, he'd already flown the mission and given us the picture
of course, he'd already flown the mission and given us the picture
and red tape of asking permission to fly the mission and all that. As
red tape of asking permission to fly the mission and all that. At
Field Herzig would say, he'd fly the mission and go through it
then information right away because we were moving up the road. So we
taken a couple of days to get the thing checked, and we wanted to
and go through it. We wanted him to get some pictures of the road going up north.

Field Herzig had to bend the regulations quite a bit. For instance
Field Herzig had to bend the regulations quite a bit. For instance
of which they put that in effect, and it worked for a while. But
At Incheon we hadn't had to worry about that kind of business, but
on either side of the road and work on that, and then the Air Force could drop anything they wanted any place else, as long as they left this corridor five miles on either side of the road. We put out in that period of 13 days the First Air Wing, and the carriers put out 3,500 sorties of close air support — in 13 days, which is quite a bit of air support. Of course, we realized that it would have been pretty rough getting out of there if we hadn't had that air support.

You'll see, I've got the letter I wrote to Field Harris here, thanking him.

They did a lot of napalm work too, as the North Koreans -- the refugees -- told us that these Chinese were holing up in the huts in the daytime and moving at night; they attacked at night, you see. They had no tents, and the only way they could keep warm was to hole up in these huts, and by body heat keep themselves warm. These North Koreans suggested we burn the huts. So we put Field Harris to work on burning huts five miles on either side of the road.

The Chinese ran out of some of them -- they were in there all right. The poor devils had no shelter; they were just out in the open. Then.

And we had captured documents of their bitter complaints about the cold, and we found that in one of the corps we had 30,000 men, and 10,000 were disabled by cold. We had nothing like that in the Division.

Q: You captured some CCFs on the way down, didn't you?

Smith: 400 of them.

Q: How did you get them out?
Smith: What we did was, we captured most of them around Hagu-ri. When Murray captured that east ridge he got 200 in one fell swoop there, and we had others that we'd captured, and we captured some more down below Koto-ri. There were some that were wounded, and when we left Hagu-ri, we took one of the buildings that were still standing and put in wood, rations and medical supplies, and put 30 of these people who were unable to walk in there, and left them. Then all that could walk we organized into a marching column under a warrant officer. They marched down the road, and when the Chinese closed in on the road they got close enough to discover that they were Chinese in the column, and there was some Chinese shouted back and forth between the two. Some of the Chinese prisoners made a break, and of course the Marines didn't have any second thoughts about what to do -- they started shooting. So when that was over, out of the 400 there were only about 200 left, and those 200 came on down to Koto-ri, and then we picked up some more just below Koto-ri, and we brought them in to Hungnam and turned them over to the Army. Some of them were in critical shape. The ones we captured near Koto-ri had taken refuge in caves and the weather had dropped in temperature terrifically there when we were at Koto-ri -- to 20 or 30 degrees below zero -- and they were hunched up in these caves; and they just froze in that position. When we got them we had to lift them out and then thaw them out; their limbs were just stiff; in a foetal position.

Q: That frostbite business -- I was out at FMFPac. As a matter of fact Brute Krulak preceded me from headquarters by a number of hours on 1 December. He was back here and then he got the word.
Then I came out. That was at FMFPac headquarters, and I remember Gen. Shepherd going out -- plane load after plane load of frostbite cases.

Smith: I suppose we evacuated about 1200 with frostbite. It was mostly feet, because we had shoe-pacs which was used in Alaska, and Canada. It was an impermeable boot, and the trouble with it was that men would climb hills and what not and their feet would sweat, and then they'd have to lie down, start shooting or something, and a film of ice would form over their ankles and feet, and they got frostbite. We had very little frostbite other than that; we had only two cases of amputation. One of them was my stenographer. Well, no, there were a few more than that. There were, I think, 60 amputations.

Q: Of all the frostbite evacuated.

Smith: Yes, of all of them there were only 60 amputations, and there were two that died partly from exposure, and partly from wounds. That was with Ray Davis. When he made that trip across the country to leave Toktong Pass, two of his men just couldn't take it, they went out of their head and they had to put them in straightjackets -- improvised straightjackets -- and they brought them on in. But they died. That's the only two where the question of exposure was involved. The amputations -- there were 60 of them as I remember. It's in there in the book. Mostly it was feet. A great many men hid their frostbite, and when we got down to Masan my head doctor (I'll think of his name) decided he wanted to look these people
over carefully, and carefully examined all the men who'd come out, and he picked up a lot more cases of frostbite -- not serious, but had to be treated.

Q: So they were able to cure these others.

Smith: Oh yes. Sometimes there never was a complete cure. I had a cook at Pendleton who'd been frostbitten there, and his fingers never were right again. He was a cook, and his fingers gave him trouble.

Q: I think some studies were made after the first Korean winter, showing the lessening of combat efficiency, the proportional lessening of combat efficiency as the temperature went down.

Smith: Litzenberg had a thumb rule on it -- I forget, giving the number of percentage points of drop in combat efficiency for a given number of degrees in the temperature. Definitely your combat efficiency went down because you slowed down. To regas a tank or a truck just took a lot longer because fingers were stiff, everything was stiff. Even to get your guns back in battery, they came leisurely back, they didn't come back quickly enough. Everything was frozen down.

Q: Was that because you didn't have the proper lubrication, in the case of guns?

Smith: Didn't make any difference what we had.
Q: Is it feasible to fight a war under cold weather conditions?

Smith: Oh yes, we fought it, we fought it at 20 and 30 degrees below zero. Napoleon never had anything worse than that getting out of Moscow. The only other cold weather campaign I know is the Yugoslavs during World War I or World War II. It was pretty cold there. But there was definitely a drop in efficiency. I noted it in talking; it was difficult to talk, your jaws were stiff.

Q: A lot of lessons were learned out of this.

Smith: Oh yes. The hospital staff had to carry the morphine in their mouths, and the plasma just froze; we had no plasma.

Q: The shock was that much greater then.

Smith: Oh yes. Until you could get these people back to some central place -- at Haguri we had a pretty good hospital setup there . . .

Q: You had warming tents.

Smith: Oh yes, we had those everywhere. Wherever you hesitated you had warming tents, and it was very simple to put them up; they were just pyramidal tents, and this diesel stove in the middle, with a pipe that went up; and you could rig up that pyramidal tent in no time flat. Then you started the fire going; the diesel was carried in these expoditionary cans, and you usually had a pot of coffee
and a pot of soup on top of the stove, and people who had been out on patrol or who were in the front lines and were relieved, would come back through the warming tent and get loosened up again. And, of course, the wounded were brought into the warming tents.

Q: But it wasn't constant -- 24 hours a day.

Smith: Oh no. We were exposed to that cold weather for close to 13 days, but not 24 hours a day. I don't know what was the longest time that anybody was exposed. Of course, all the men carried their mountain sleeping bags right on their backs, and if you stopped you just got inside the sleeping bag unless you were in the front lines, you never did it then, because we lost a few men bagged in their sleeping bags -- couldn't unzip it quick enough and get out.

Q: Of course, by the time I got over there they had the new quick release sleeping bag.

Smith: I don't remember. All we had . . .

Q: It had quick release from the inside. And also they had the new boots.

Smith: Yes, the thermal boots. They didn't come out while I was there, but I heard about them. I still am to be convinced, whether they are 100% effective. They say all you have to do is wiggle your toes and you won't get any frostbite.
Q: They were good.

Smith: They were good, uh?

Q: Yes, sir. Experiments proved that a man could get water inside the boot and the water would remain at body temperature while it was 30 or 40 degrees below.

Smith: With the shoe-pac, the men carried an extra pair of socks in their shirt, and if your feet did some sweating you'd take off the shoe-pac and change your socks. Schmuck described the difficulties with that when he was fighting on the way up there; the whole boot was ice-encrusted, and to try to unlace that boot was something! This company commander did it, but he had to stand over the men and almost beat them on the head to get them to change their socks.

Q: You see, in the thermal boots they have these hooks.

Smith: I've never seen them.

Q: You know, on the mountain-type boot like the present combat boots, in the top holes you put a lace through the lace and crisscrossed the lace.

Smith: We had a laced boot. I wore them, they were heavy, and boy, how these men climbed hills in them I don't know, but they did. My chief of staff, Gregon Williams, got frostbite. (laughs)
We were at Koto-ri and we had a radio telephone outside the door, and calls came in that he had to take. He didn't put on his gloves or anything; he just went outside the tent, put his hand in his pocket and talked. That night his fingers turned blue and he had to take codeine to kill the pain. And he was not out there more than three or four minutes. My G-2, Holcomb -- one of his ears got frostbitten.

Q: Was that Banks Holcomb?

Smith: Yes, he was the G-2. I never got frostbitten. We had pretty good rules about who could be evacuated for frostbite. At Hagu-ri, where we had to do the sorting of these people, the doctor used the medical officer of the 5th Marines as a guide as to whether a man should be evacuated or not. Now this medical officer was pretty badly frostbitten but he hobbled around and did his duty, and the doctor said, "If a man is worse than this doctor of the 5th Marines, he goes; if he is better, he stays." And there were a lot of people that had frostbite but were not evacuated. (Voice trails off) That doctor was a very fine man, I forget his name.

Q: It wasn't Don Pebedian?

Smith: No, no. He finally got out of the Navy because he couldn't convince anybody in Bu Med that they needed field medicine. All Bu Med was interested in was hospitals. This doctor was interested in developing the techniques of field medicine -- what you do in
the field, and he was good at it. Gee whiz, what was his name? I'll get his name. (Pause) Hmm.

Q: George Herring was the helicopter pilot.

Smith: Yes. This doctor spelled his name H-E-R-I-N-G. He was a four star, and a very, very fine man. This goes into how they screen them. As a working criterion, those with large blisters or large discolored areas were considered candidates for evacuation. After the breakout at Hungnam had been completed, another screening was conducted, it was found that many men with toes or parts of toes absolutely black had never reported to medical installations during the course of the breakout, and had somehow made the march to the coast. They just didn't want to leave their buddies.

Q: When the toes turned black, wasn't that the first stage of gangrene?

Smith: It could, I suppose, turn into gangrene, but if it's treated ... (pause) I think maybe we'd better finish up on this air in Central Korea, where they had a big go round with Gen. Partridge.

Q: I guess that was when Gen. Shepherd sent his representative Hewitt out.

Smith: I've forgotten whether Hewitt was there. But when we went into Operation Killer, the 5th Air Force system went into effect --
the JOC -- and what I was trying to do was... our Marine Air was support for everybody. We brought the Marine Air Wing out there, and we figured that we should get some priority out of our own Air Wing.

I went to Gen. Ridgway about it, and I said, "I realize, of course, that I can't ask for all the Marine Air Wing support for the Marines; as a matter of fact we don't need all this all the time. But I would like to have one squadron that we could have on station at all times, that we could call, and we'd have a squadron that would come in." He said, "Smith, I am sorry, but I don't command the Air Force!" The 5th Air Force didn't recognize the 8th Army Commander as their chief. They went back direct to MacArthur. Well, then we argued back and forth, and I talked a lot to Field Harris -- he was sympathetic with us, but we had to play ball with the Air Force. Finally we got Gen. Partridge to come up to our CP, when we were somewhere up near Hongchon, up there, to discuss this close air support. And he came up and he told me, "Smith, close air support frankly doesn't pay dividends." I said, "We don't agree with that; we figure it pays a lot of dividends." He wanted to use most of our air to go up the line and bomb the railroad tracks and all that kind of thing -- this Operation Strangle, which never worked.

While we were talking there, somebody had requested an air strike, and they were trying to call Taegu to go through the JOC. It took 45 minutes to get the call through, and I told Gen. Partridge, "You see what this involves?" He said, "Well, maybe you've got something!" But it wasn't changed, and what it meant was that our people up in the front lines, finding that it took so long to get any air, just called in the artillery
and tried to get the artillery to do the job, whereas the air as we had used it at Inchon and Chosin Reservoir we could get it within 15 minutes, you see? It was right in there.

Q: Do you think Field Harris could have fought harder?

Smith: No, he was fighting the whole Air Force. It was their concept that close air support did not pay. Their main objection was philosophical: they didn't want anybody on the ground telling a plane what to do. We got around that in the Marine Corps by having an air liaison party where one of those officers was a pilot. There were two officers with this group, and the other officer might have been an artilleryman. And when a request went up to the Air for support, those people up there knew that some aviator down on the ground had checked that over and they were not going to have to do something impossible. We never had any complaints from our aviators. These poor aviators in these frontline battalions, they really took a beating; they were right up there.

Q: This goes back to the old concept of tactical air. Is it a separate arm or is it a supporting arm?

Smith: Well, we maintain it's a supporting arm. As for the Air Force, it took until Vietnam for them to get away from the idea that there should be close air support. They gave it over in Vietnam. They gave it pretty nearly as close as the Marines used to give it. They've been converted.

Well, is that enough on air?
Q: I think that covers it very well, sir.

Smith: It's all here. One dispatch I got... Well, when it was all over I wrote Field Harris a letter. He was not there when I sent the letter -- his boy had been lost, you know, up there, and he'd gone on home, I suppose to comfort Mrs. Harris. When he got back he discovered that these people hadn't properly answered my letter. He realized that what I'd written required some sort of answer. I told him -- this was 20 December, after I'd gotten down to Masan -- "Now that the successful withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area is a matter of history, I want to repeat on behalf of the officers and men of this Division, my verbal expression of gratitude for the magnificent support rendered by your Wing. Without your support our task would have been infinitely more difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and in the snowstorms, many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or clearing weather, when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the presence of a night heckler was reassuring. Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of understanding has been established that will never be broken."

Well, when Field got back he realized he had to say something, and he replied on 15 January, "Your thoughtful letter of 20 December on behalf of your officers and men is deeply appreciated and highly prized by the 1st Marine Air Wing. The indomitable courage and the determination of the 1st Marine Division in its march from
Yudam-ni to Hamhung, and its sacrifices under extreme hardship, were our unfailing inspiration." It was in the same vein, you see.

Q: The same turn of phrase. This was the second time his son had been lost, I guess. He had been lost in World War II...

Smith: He was? Anyway, it was pretty sad. (Pause) Now MacArt he made periodic reports to the United Nations Organization. He was the UN Commander. Then on 31 January 1951 he made his 11th report and said, regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation, "In epic action the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice covered road, against opposition from six to eight Chinese Communist Force Division, which suffered staggering losses. The success was due in no small part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units, who maintained their integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior forces, consistently held their position until their wounded had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supp and equipment to the enemy. United Nations Air Forces through bulk of their efforts in the close support of ground forces cut their way through overwhelming numbers of Chinese Communists, the bulk of the enemy taken by the United Nations aircraft contribut in large measure to the successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the Hamhung area, despite the tremendous odd against them. Air support provided by the United States Marine A
Force and naval aircraft in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical air operations in history."
It's a pretty good report. Nothing wrong with that.

Q: He summed it up also.

Smith: Yes. He was not about to throw compliments around, you know. He didn't do it very often. We even get congratulations from the Admiralty in London.

Q: Oh really?

Smith: Yes, because we had the Commandos with us.

Q: What did they say?

Smith: Let's see. (looks through some papers) Senator Pepper, ...
Yes, this is from the British Admiralty to the 41st Independent Commando. It says, "Personal from CGRM (Commanding General Royal Marines) to Lt. Col. Drysdale. The country and Corps have watched with pride the great fight of the 41 Commandos alongside our United States Marine Corps Allies. Up the Marines!" (laughs)

Q: (laughs) Very good! Very good.

Smith: Adm. Ewing was the one I liked. Even Gen. Collins wrote a message. It's a very nice message. [Eth Corp] dispatch from
Austin, Texas, from 100 mothers down there. We got all kinds. (Gen. Smith is thumbing through papers here.) Oh yes, this is a dispatch from CTF 77 to 1st Mar Div. 77 was the carriers out there. "We have watched you all the way, and have only the highest admiration for your gallant and heroic return to Hamhung. The Marines are tops with us. We are ready and eager to assist you in any way possible. God bless you and God keep you. Ewing Smith."

That's Adm. Ewing who commanded the Carriers.

Q: Very, very nice. When did you get all these, while you were on your way back from Korea?

Smith: I must have watched and when there was something significant like that I had a copy made for myself, and I brought them back with me, because these things would normally go in the division files. I must have extracted copies. I had time after the Chosin Reservoir, I was there for seven months.

Q: Have you ever heard from Drysdale?

Smith: Oh yes, I saw him personally.

Q: I know he taught down at the Schools afterward.

Smith: He came to San Francisco -- that was after I was retired -- and they had a reception. We then had a Commanding General Department of the City (?). I went over to the reception and this -- I don't know whether he was a general or what -- of the Royal Marines
was there, and Drysdale had come over to this country with him.

He was of course very happy to see me and very proud to show me the ribbon of the Presidential Unit Citation that we got for him. We had quite a go round on that. We felt that since the Division got the Presidential Unit Citation for the Chosin Reservoir, Drysdale was part of that outfit and he should get it. Then the British Admiralty raised a point -- they said he hadn't been recommended by any British officer. Of course he hadn't; I was the only guy who could recommend him. Then Gen. Shepherd backed me up, and we went round and round, and eventually they agreed to let him have the ribbon, and they wear it right here on the shoulder -- a little tab. The Presidential Unit Citation ribbon. I think it's the left shoulder. He was very proud of it and he was wearing it when he came to San Francisco.

Q: I wonder why they wore it there instead of with their other ribbons.

Smith: I don't know. And this, of course, is the secret document.


Smith: Oh, that's the C.L.A. Marshall. CCF Part II -- Part II is the 1st Mar Div and Part I ... I don't know whether I ever got Part I or not; that was the 2nd Infantry Division. It was a pretty sad story; they were pretty badly chopped up, you know.

Q: What was the difference?
Smith: He wrote a book, The River and the Gauntlet. If you read it you'll see what they did. The thing is, we had to go 35 miles with Chinese all the way. They only had to go 9000 yards, that's all, and as near as Marshall could determine, the total number of machine guns against them was 30, that's all. They were up on the ridges. They made no attempt to drive these people off the ridges. They loaded up everybody on tanks and trucks and whatever they had and started barging down the road. Of course, a truck or two were hit and burned; the tanks were fired at, and the infantry unloaded off the tanks and went into the ditches, and all cohesion was lost. They finally tried to get their wounded out by dashing in trucks, and they were all clobbered. When they came out of there they had 3500 men missing in action -- 3500 -- and most of their wounded had been killed. The division commander was down at the end of the gauntlet, and he was trying to organize a platoon to do something about it.

Q: That wasn't Dean, was it?

Smith: No, Dean had the 24th. This was Kyser. He was relieved of the command, and the division was pulled out as unfit for combat and it took them a couple of months to get replacements to get it back in shape. One regiment of the division went on another road and got out all right. But this was two regiments, plus -- they lost all their equipment, they lost everything -- they lost all their artillery, trucks, tanks, everything was lost.

Q: Of course, it's simple enough to say that it's a matter of command, a matter of unity. There has to be more than that.
Smith: I think he made a fatal decision, trying to load up in trucks and make a run for it.

Q: But I mean, before they started pulling out, when there was no offensive spirit, the will to fight --

Smith: And that's lacking.

Q: And of course the commanding general is only one man, it as far as the officers go. I don't know whether this was a unique situation amongst Army units or not, but it's certainly foreign not only to the Marine Corps but foreign to anything the Marine Corps has ever done.

Smith: Well, the 2nd Division was not too fine a division. The poor Brigade down there had some tough luck trying to attack next to them. They weren't very effective. The 2nd Division in World War I was a very, very fine division, and in World War II as far as I know it was an excellent division. It's the personnel that make up a division. This 3rd Division that came out to join us and came into Wonsan, was The 'Rock of the Marine Division', but my goodness, what a bunch of tramps. They had one regiment of Puerto Ricans, they had black battalions -- oh, it was a mess!

I talked to Gen. Soule about it. He said he wasn't worried about casualties among his Negroes; he said they never stayed around long enough to get wounded.

Q: Had the 1st Division been integrated?
Smith: Oh yes. I had a thousand Negroes, and we had no racial troubles. The men did whatever they were qualified to do. There were communicators, there were cooks, there were truck drivers, there were plain infantry -- they did everything, and they did a good job because they were integrated, and they were with good people; and if Negroes are with good people they'll be good Negroes. It's the example. Poor old Gen. [name] had the 25th Division at the start there, and he had one regiment of Negroes, and he found, they just took off at the drop of a hat. He told me that he just never could count on them to stay in any place. If the enemy took a couple of shots at them they'd all come off the hill. And he recommended that the whole regiment be disbanded and integrated. Of course, they stalled on it for a while, but that's what they eventually did, and that solved the problem.

Q: Well, we got out of the chronological order, but it's a good point to be made. You had Negroes coming down the hill . . .

Smith: Sure. And I gave the Navy Cross to two of them. Two of these Negroes got the Navy Cross. There was no fooling; it was a real citation. And there were plenty of silver stars and bronze stars, and what have you. And I had no complaint on their performance of duty. Some of the Marines said that well, they had no objection to having Negroes with them, but if they were on patrol duty they would prefer to have an all-white patrol because the white Marines were a little more alert than the Negroes. That was the only reaction I got.
Q: Was that a valid assertion, do you think?

Smith: Based on IQ it was. The IQ of the Negro in the service was about 10 points below the IQ of the white soldier or Marine. And probably that meant they were less alert. There is a big argument as to whether you can improve that IQ. University of California has caused a storm!

Q: Oh yes, he has! (laughter) He might as well have been writing for the University of Mississippi.

Smith: Yes. (Pause)

Q: Maybe we ought to go back to Central Korea again. About air support -- you left before it was ever settled, I guess.

Smith: Jerry Thomas carried on the fight, and got nowhere. I don't think it ever was solved.

Q: I think it was lessened somewhat by the time I got there, because Operation Strangle proved to be such a fiasco. Absolutely incorrect employment of close air support.

Smith: I'll admit that even in Central Korea with these restrictions we used air more than any other division in the Army, because we knew how to use it. We had the air liaison parties, we had the facilities to use it. But we didn't have it on station. Once we got it we would use it.
Q: It was the same old problem during World War II in the Pacific, where we had Navy planes, where we could have Marine planes for interception. It took so long to get a plane through the combat air support control unit on board ship.

Smith: (Pause) When we stopped on Central Korea, I had committed the 1st Marines to that open flank, and they had quite a fight there and had quite a few casualties. McAllister who commanded the regiment, got wounded himself. The Corps ordered us to fall back to a phase line -- I've forgotten the name of it.

Q: Jamestown Line? Kansas Line?

Smith: I don't know. We fell back about 2000 yards and it shortened our line, so that I was able to pull the entire 7th Marines out of the line and close up with the 1st, 5th and Korean Marines. I had told Gen. Howe that in coming back I'd like to come back with both my flanks refused, but he wanted me to hang on to one corner at the Wochen Reservoir to protect the 10th Corps on the right. You see, the Wochen Reservoir was 25 miles across, and the Chinese didn't have any boats or any way of getting across the Reservoir, and our right flank tied in to a leg of this Reservoir that came down, and as long as we tied in there, the Chinese would have to come through us or go 25 miles over to the East and come around. So I hung on there. My staff protested vigorously. But that's what the Corps wanted us to do. But we did economize this one regiment. Then the British Brigade was sent in to help plug the gap, and I think one regiment of the...
Cavalry Division was eased up there; that way. The 6th ROK Division threw away their weapons, and they were assembled about 15 miles back and issued new weapons. I guess they came into action again. They were considered a good South Korean division. Didn't do too well next to me.

Of course, pulling back 2000 yards put our CP in the rear lines, or even with the front lines over in the West, because our western flank was refused, and the division CP had to be moved back. It was at that point -- it was exactly on the 38th parallel -- that I happened to get an old copy of the National Geographic that had a series of pictures on that part of Korea, and there was a picture of the river where our CP was. We were on the -- er, uh, I'll think of the name of the river. The doggone Chinese tried to flood us out -- we were warned about that. They opened up the flood gates of the dam and let all the water come charging down the valley, and we were on the low ground. It raised the level of the river about four feet, but of course, they ran out of water pretty quickly, and it didn't do any damage.

We moved back to Masan-ni, which was north of Chinshon. We were still out on a limb -- we were way up there all by ourselves.

Gen. Van Fleet at this time had come to command the 8th Army, and he came up to visit us, and he was briefed. By this time -- this was April 25th when Jerry Thomas arrived -- the fighting had tapered off. We had about 500 casualties from the 23rd to the 25th, most of them in the 1st Marines and in the 7th. The casualties had tapered off. I think the day that Jerry arrived we had three or four casualties, that's all. The thing was stopped. He got there during the afternoon of April 25th.
Q: He was earlier than expected, wasn't he?

Smith: No, I don't think so. I didn't know when he was coming, they didn't advise me. But we decided we'd make the turnover at 9.30 AM the following day, the 26th. I didn't hold any ceremony because of the tactical situation; I didn't feel it was appropriate to have our band or anything like that. So all we did was to line up the division staff and introduce them to Jerry and he took over. And he immediately took off for the front lines to find out what was going on. And I took off in a plane that Field Harris had furnished me. It was at Chunchon, and I went down there. I flew to K-1 field, which is west of Pusan. President Rhee came up to give me a medal, and Field Harris had to scout around and drag out a few Marines to have a little bit of ceremony involved. President Syngman Rhee awarded me the Korean Order of Merit with silver star. That's the highest decoration they had in Korea at that time. The silver star indicated "division." If it was a gold star it was a corps commander. I don't know what a regimental commander's star would have been.

During my tenure as division commander, the division was awarded three Presidential Unit Citations -- at Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, and eventually this blocking of the Chinese counter-offensive in April of '51; that in connection with another piece of action under Jerry Thomas was given the Presidential Unit Citation, so there were three of them.

Field Harris and I took off the same day from K-1 for Itami Air Base, which was the headquarters of his wing. I had to get my trunks together; they were at Kobe. I went around with Field
Harris and inspected his wing installations, and got to Tokyo on the 28th of April. I went around and called on Adm. Joy and Gen. Ridgway, who was then in Gen. MacArthur's spot. Gen. Ridgway was not very happy over what had happened in Korea. Fortunately for me I didn't have to do any drastic withdrawals. The day after I left, poor old Jerry had to withdraw 25 miles, because, you know...

The Army had fallen back. The I Corps out west had fallen back, and in order to straighten out the line they made Jerry withdraw. Jerry wanted to counterattack, which was logical. The Chinese were pooped, you see, and we were on their flank. So it was a logical time to counterattack. No, he had to come back -- 25 miles.

Q: Big-foot Brown was telling me he was driving back in his jeep and he heard yells of "Son of a bitch."

Smith: And he said, "I didn't tell him to withdraw!" (laughs)

Q: I think the 1st Marines had a pretty hard fight.

Smith: Oh, they had a hard fight. It was a pretty tough fight, and a confused fight.

Q: And he had the KM's, I guess, on the left flank there.

Smith: No, the 24th Division was left over there. The Korean Marines were over on the right.
Q: On the right. They were right on the lip of a...

Smith: On the refused flank, the left flank. The nearest thing to them was this British Brigade that came up and hit the Chinese on the nose. They came in down at the base of the penetration. But apparently there was also a penetration out in I Corps, and they decided to hold out the attack, and then no sooner were they back there than they started going back again, and finding no opposition. And they went back 10 or 15 miles with no opposition.

Q: Did you have a long conversation with Ridgway?

Smith: No, just a friendly chat, that's all. There was no information I could give him that he didn't have. He was a little disappointed in this falling back. He'd hoped that that wouldn't have to happen.

I took off from Haneda Airfield in Tokyo on the 29th for the US Midway, and got to Pearl Harbor the same day because of crossing the Date Line. I called on Gen. Shepherd and Adm. Radford. I attended a luncheon at the Golf Club where Adm. Radford presented me with the DSM Navy; somebody had sent that out from Washington. Then I took off for San Francisco on the evening of the 29th and arrived at the Naval Air Station Alameda on the 30th.

Bobby Erskine was there. At that time he was commanding the Department of the Pacific, and he had a guard of honor out.

Q: He had finished up with that DOD study?
Smith: Oh yes, he'd come on home. And I thought I was going on leave, but I had to go on the fried chicken circuit, talking about my experiences in Korea. While I was on leave I talked to the Press Club in San Francisco, the Chamber of Commerce at Berkeley, Commercial Club, San Francisco, and the Alumni Commencement Luncheon at the University of California. And I had to write these talks.

Q: Did you do all your own writing?

Smith: Yes.

Q: You didn't get any help from MAR PAC?

Smith: No, this was my experience. Who could help me out on that? I had an old typewriter at home. Regarding the Press Club Luncheon and talk, they give you -- when you go there, there is no notice in the paper that you were there, everything you say is off the record, and they put that black cat in front of you, to indicate that you are free to talk about anything without fear of being quoted. Well, they asked some very embarrassing questions and I gave straight answers. A couple of the answers weren't very complimentary to the 4th Corps. Then I read in the paper, after I'd talked to the Commercial Club, I had a talk that didn't assail anybody, didn't criticize anybody, and there were two Marine officers there listening -- Robillard and I think Mason -- and the Chronicle came out in the morning saying that I'd talked there and I had assailed the Corps Commander. Paul Smith at that time was editor of the Chronicle and I knew him and I called him up and
said, "Look, you put me on the spot. I didn't criticize anybody. I had a manuscript, and although I didn't read it I didn't vary from it." He said, "You must have ad libbed." I said, "No, I did no ad libbing." Then Gen. Cates (apparently it got back to Washington) wrote to the Department of the Pacific to see if anybody had attended this talk, and to see what went on. And Robillard and Mason were mad as hatters; they wrote a memorandum to Gen. Cates and told him that the Chronicle was just way out of line.

What had happened -- when you read the article there was nothing about assailing the Corps Commander, that was the headline, you see. The headline writer is a different man from the man who wrote the article, and he must have been somebody who attended that Press Club luncheon, where I wasn't complimentary about the Corps.

Q: Let's turn the tape now, General.

End of Side 1, Tape 1, Session III.
Tape 1, Side 2, Session III.

Q: The people who asked you the questions at the Press Club conference, were they combat correspondents?

Smith: I don't know who they were.

Q: But they had knowledgeable questions?

Smith: Yes, and they knew I'd been put on the spot there, and they wanted me to confirm that I felt I was put on the spot, you see.

Q: What were some of the questions?

Smith: They wanted to know what I thought about the orders I got to attack to the Northwest, and I told them frankly that the first objective was 40 miles distant, through what proved to be 80,000 Chinese, and that the mission was absolutely impossible. It was. That's the only objective I had -- to attack and capture this town 40 miles away, and that was through the whole darn Chinese 3rd Field Army corps.

Q: Was that the way the Army generally issued orders?

Smith: That's the way they issued them at Chosin Reservoir. The Yalu River was the objective, and then I'd break that down and give
an objective 2-3000 yards out, and then give another one.

I relieved Gen. Noble down at Camp Pendleton on the 19th of June. At that time I was Commanding General of Camp Pendleton and FMF troops that were there. Later, with the formation of the 3rd Mar Div, the command structure was changed, and I continued to command the Base, but the 3rd Mar Div Commander commanded the FMF troops and reported directly to FMFPac -- which was a logical step.

The principal mission of Camp Pendleton when I came there was to train replacements for Korea, and we worked on that pretty hard.

Q: The first commander of the 3rd Division was Puller, was it not?

Smith: No, Pepper. Puller was his ADC. Puller had organized the 3rd Marine Brigade before the 3rd Marine Division was organized. Puller commanded that, and then it was absorbed.

I moved into the Ranch House shortly after arrival and continued making speeches all over the countryside. I had to go to selection board duty in Washington in July of '51. Then we had a little go around making this picture Retreat, Hell.

Q: What was that about?

Smith: Somebody, somewhere along the line objected to the word "hell", so Warner Brothers came up with some pusillanimous title for the show, and I wrote to Gen. Cates and told him I'd never said that but it was a much better title than the one they proposed and I didn't see anything particularly wrong with the "hell" there. They eventually allowed it to go through. I told these Warner
people that I wanted no mention of my name; I wanted no part of the thing, and they played ball on that. I gave them a first lieutenant who had been in Korea with me to go over the production to see that there wasn't too much blood and thunder in it. They did a remarkable job, a realistic job of reproducing the road. They took a canyon between 101 and headquarters, off to the right there, and they bulldozed a road out of the side of the canyon, and then sprinkled gypsum all over the whole area, and then they came down this road, you see.

Q: It looked like snow.

Smith: It looked like snow. The only difficulty was that the actors had to be in parkas and it was summer, and they took quite a beating in the heat. For the Hany-ri airstrip they just took out a little airstrip at Pendleton and scattered gypsum all over the place; they had a wind machine that blew the snow around, and that was very realistic. They came down and showed me the picture, and, as war pictures go, it was pretty good. But all the war pictures are about the same -- they can't give you the overall picture, they have to take about four or five characters and build up a show around them. They usually have the hero, the fat boy, the Jewish boy, the Negro boy. Then you have the dumbbell and you have the smart aleck.

Q: The guy from Brooklyn.

Smith: Yes. It's always the same. And Retreat, Hell, was like that. In that it was the battalion commander who was the hero.
Q: Frank Lovejoy.

Smith: Yes. Now Frank Lovejoy had never been in uniform. That's kind of a handicap to work on.

Q: He'd never been in the service.

Smith: No. But they did a fair job.

Q: Was Cotton Gilliland the Marine adviser on that?

Smith: No, it was a first lieutenant.

Q: Oh. Cotton was a colonel.

Smith: This was a first lieutenant. He darn near had a nervous breakdown trying to keep the thing under control. He wept on my shoulder many times. I later saw a movie, Hold Back The Night, that was better than Retreat, Hell. The man who wrote the book sent me the book, and I read it. Of course, it had nothing to do with history. I wrote to the author and I said "I appreciate, of course, that this is literature. But it certainly is not history, because you have us coming out on two roads and we only had one road." And there were a lot of other things. Well, he wrote back and he said, "After all, I never was in Korea; I went to Headquarters Marine Corps and got a good look at a map. I just studied the map and dreamed this up," he said.
Q: This was about the reservist, or something or other, with his bottle of whiskey?

Smith: That's right.

Q: Pat Frank was . . .

Smith: As literature it was pretty well done.

Q: It was exciting.

Smith: Yes, pretty well done. And in the movie it was very well done, it looked almost documentary, but it just wasn't.

Q: You see some fantastic things in the movies.

Smith: Well, Gen. Cates came out to visit me in October 1951. You saw some of the pictures in the album. Then in February 1952 I presented Lewis Puller with his fifth Navy Cross. At that time he was commanding the 3rd Marine Brigade, and we had a little review for him. I told Lewis at the time -- I didn't think he would take it seriously -- I said, "Lewis, this is your fifth Navy Cross, and they ought to do with this like they do with the Air Medal." (In those days if you got five Air Medals you got the Distinguished Flying Cross.) So I said, "You got five Navy Crosses, and they ought to give you the Medal of Honor." Well, I didn't think he'd take it seriously. But doggone it, he got people working on the Congress to try to give him the Medal of Honor. And they wrote
me, and I said, "This medal of honor has to be given for individual acts -- it can't be cumulative. The only thing they can do is to take one of those Navy Cross citations and change it to a Medal of Honor citation. And frankly, the one I gave him in Korea could not be changed, I wasn't worth more than the Navy Cross," I said. "Maybe one of those Guadalcanal citations might be capable of change," I said.

Q: I understand that the one thing he regretted most was the fact that he'd never been awarded the Medal of Honor.

Smith: He did a good job, but I guess they didn't figure he was worth the Medal of Honor.

Q: Of course, five Navy Crosses is nothing to be sneezed at either.

Smith: No. There was only one other man in the naval service who got five. I forget who it was, some lieutenant commander who was in submarines.

Q: Ray Murray had how many?

Smith: He had the Navy Cross and DSC, period.

Q: I think when he was on active duty he was probably the most decorated Marine officer.

Smith: Murray was?
Q: That's right except for Lew Walt.

Smith: Lew Walt might have run him a pretty good race.

I had a little trouble with the citations for Murray and Litzenberg. I told you about Gen. Almond coming up there with one DSC, and lining us up and awarding us the DSC, and that was at Ha-ri. And I had intended all along to recommend Murray and Litzenberg, and I wrote up a citation, but I made it for the whole Chosin Reservoir operation, and Adm. Burke -- who was then a four-striper, I think -- was over at Guam and picked it up and said it was illegal to give a man the Navy Cross for what he'd already gotten the DSC for. So I said we'd change the citation to give it to him for the fight from Ha-ri to Koto-ri in the South. And that went on through.

Q: Of course during World War I ... 

Smith: Oh, yes, well, that's what made them prevent it. Sure, all those boys who were in France got the DSC, and then the Navy automatically gave them the Navy Cross with the same citation. So most of those people -- like Roy Hunt, Bob Blake and all of those -- had the two of them with the identical citation. And that was stopped.

Q: Same way with a man like Cukela, with two Medals of Honor.

Smith: Yes, he got one Army and one Navy. (Pause) On February 15th, 1952, Gen. Pepper arrived to command the newly organized 3rd Mar Div, and of course we had a change in command structure then. He was
not under my command. In May 1952 I flew to Kingston, Ontario, to address the Canadian Army's Staff College. The subject they gave me I couldn't talk on -- mobilization training, something like that -- so I simply gave them a talk on how we trained Marines, and let it go at that.

While I was at Pendleton we established a cold weather camp up at Pickle Meadows near Bridgeport, and started sending people up there for cold weather training. Also we acquired Twenty-Nine Palms. I forget how many acres -- 400,000 or whatever that is -- it's a tremendous reservation. At that time it was simply a satellite installation of Pendleton and we sent out antiaircraft and artillery out there to shoot. They began building the camp that's out there now. They began building that concrete camp while I was there at Pendleton.

Q: I understand the Commandant didn't even know they had Twenty-Nine for a while.

Smith: Oh, is that right? I didn't know that. Of course, it wasn't used very much at the start. There were no facilities; if you went there to shoot you had to take everything with you. There were no barracks, nothing. But I didn't know that.

Q: Do you know why Camp Pendleton ran something like a poor relation to Camp Lejeune as far as ...

Smith: Yes. One thing was P.T. Hill, whose pet was Camp Lejeune. He was the fellow who started the construction of it, and he fought
hard for it. The other reason was that there was a lot of controversy over the water rights at Camp Pendleton, and Congress refused to authorize new construction of a permanent nature at Pendleton until the water rights controversy was settled — which would assure an adequate supply of water to Camp Pendleton. That battle was going on the whole time I was at Pendleton. The judge who was ruling on it ruled in favor of us, but of course it was appealed, and from the standpoint of Congressmen this was a very emotional issue, like this People's Park in Berkeley; they claimed we were stealing the water from the town of Fallbrook. What had happened was this: there is a tremendous ranch east of Camp Pendleton — the Vail Ranch, 90,000 acres — and then came the Santa Margarita Ranch, which became Camp Pendleton, with 120,000 acres. There was a little gap between Vail and Pendleton that belonged to nobody in particular, and the Santa Margarita River, which was dry in summer and a raging torrent in winter, came through the Vail Ranch and on down into Pendleton. And for many years O'Neill, who owned Santa Margarita, and Vail, had fought in the Courts over water rights. Vail had built a damn up there, and O'Neill didn't like that. Finally, after they spent an awful lot of money, they decided there was no percentage in that and they might as well go to Court and agree to a stipulation and divide up the water resources. The agreement was, under this stipulation, that Vail would let a given amount of water per day pass a given point, and it still is; you can go up there on US 395 where the Santa Margarita crosses there, and you'll see a trickle of water coming down. And that's measured. Vail stores it in his big dam up there, you see, and he can let it out during the summer to guarantee so much water going by that given point.
Then the little town of Fallbrook -- which could have hooked in to the Colorado River water, the viaduct goes right through the town of Fallbrook down to San Diego -- went down and leased a section of this river bed between the Vail Ranch and Pendleton, and dug a big sump there and set up a pump and began pumping the water out up to Fallbrook, which stopped the flow of underground water down to Pendleton -- we were depending on that. Now according to California law, if they had gotten away with that for three years, it would have been what you call an appropriated right; they would have had a right to it because of stealing it for three years running. We immediately went to Court, and got out an injunction, and then they started battling. And, of course, these people said we were stealing the water from Fallbrook. How could we steal the water when we were downstream from there?

Q: Senator Nelem?

Smith: Yes, Senator Nelem. It was a political issue. The Los Angeles Times had a bitter series of articles on how unjust it all was, and I realized later why the Los Angeles Times was so bitter. Because the City of Los Angeles, with respect to the Colorado River, was in the same boat as Fallbrook. California went in and took water out of the Colorado River in excess of what their riparian rights would have entitled them to. And Arizona, of course, protested. The City of Los Angeles didn't like this riparian business at all; they wanted to base what they got in the way of water on the population you had, and your going around appropriating it, not necessarily being somebody who lived on the banks of the
river. Los Angeles was not on the banks of the Colorado, you see. I think the matter was settled not too long ago, but over the years Congress relaxed, and they built some camps and new construction. But that was the basic reason for not doing anything way back.

Q: I heard about P.T. Hill, and Lejeune.

Smith: Oh, that was his pet. He got brick barracks down there.

Q: I understand also that by the time you got a directive to conduct training Pickle Meadows was a reality, and it came as somewhat of a shock to Gen. Shepherd.

Smith: It did?

Q: He didn't tell me, someone else did. And here you were way ahead of the game. Iwining told me that.

Smith: I thought we had authority to establish it. It was established while I was there. We may have leased some land first, and then eventually built the camp. Even when I was there we started the construction -- this type construction -- we began building camps all over the place. It's a very simple type of construction: you pour the slabs on the ground; they are about 30 feet by 20 feet; and you tilt them up and hook them together and you've got barracks. Very quick.
In July of '52 I went back to Washington again on selection board duty, and in that summer some high ranking people from Washington came out in connection with the water rights controversy. Secretary Kimball -- he was at that time Secretary of the Navy -- came out, and I took him in a helicopter and flew up the river with him and showed him this sump. And Kimball, who can use rather salty language, boy he was mad! He began cursing at what they were doing. It was so evident what they were doing!

Then Secretary of Defense Lovett came out, and I gave him a briefing on the water and he went around too.

While I was there they built this Korean Village. I suppose now they have a Vietnam Village too. The engineers built it, and it's a very realistic village, and we had some very realistic demonstrations on capturing the village.

Then on the 27th of May 1953 I was detached from Pendleton to Norfolk to command FMFLant with Gen. Erskine relieving Gen. Erskine. Gen. Shepherd had talked to me before, and he wanted to know if I had any bees in my bonnet. I said, "Well, the only thing is I'd like to make three stars when my turn comes." I guess he figured my turn would come in the year 1953. I'd gone to Korea. Silverthorn was very apologetic, he wrote me a letter; he was the first one to be made a three star, you see, because they stepped up the rank for Assistant Commandant to three stars, and Silverthorn who relieved me was sitting there and he was made three stars. And they stepped up the Marine Corps Schools, and Frank Hart was three star for that. I was still two star, and Silverthorn thought I should have been ordered home and made three star. Then Bobby Erskine -- he was senior to me, it was his turn. He was given
FMFLANT when I—guess Gen. Hunt retired. Then I guess it was my
turn. I don't know if I passed over anybody, except possibly Gen.
Noble, and he relieved me at FMFLANT when I left, and got three stars.

Q: Had it ever occurred to you at any time during this period that you might
be Commandant?

Smith: That I might be commandant? No. Bob Bare came around to me
when word came out that Gen. Shepherd had been made Commandant, and
said, "Sorry you didn't make it." I said, "Bob, I don't think I was
even considered, it's" He said, "You were." I knew the history of
that. Gen. Cates told me. When Gen. Cates was made Commandant they
narrowed the list down to Gen. Cates and Gen. Shepherd. Mr. Truman
was President at the time, and he looked over these records -- he
had both of them over there, both Gen. Cates and Gen. Shepherd --
and he said, "I've looked over your records and they are comparable;
there is not much difference between them. But you, Gen. Cates, are
senior, so I am going to make you Commandant, and then Gen. Shepherd
can have his turn", which was an implied promise that he would
relieve Gen. Cates, and I always assumed that to be the case.

Well, Mr. Truman was still President when Gen. Cates finished
his tour, and he made Gen. Shepherd. That's that, as far as I know.
I never figured I was considered.

Q: Was there much politicking?

Smith: Yes, some. Gen. Cates got a little annoyed. He had a good
record and he knew he had a good record, and there was a good bit of
politicking for Gen. Shepherd.
Q: They had a case?

Smith: Yes, to make Gen. Shepherd Commandant at the time that Gen. Cates was made Commandant. So Cates said, "After all, I'll get in this thing too." And he got hold of Keravver, and did a little politicking, and he made Commandant. I suppose Gen. Shepherd was using the Senator from Tennessee.

Q: It's pretty much like you have the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Army Chief of Staff both from South Carolina.

The selection board system is about the only thing we have. Like they say, It's not much of a war but it's the only war we have.

(Voice trails off, mentions Vietnam)

Do you feel that under the circumstances this is the best way?

Smith: Selection? If it's fair, I think it is, because I spent the first part of my career under the old system of making 10 numbers a year, as people died or retired. As a captain I was making 10 numbers a year, and there were 329 captains. I remember when I went to the 7th Regiment at Quantico in 1933 as assistant to Julian Smith (he was a major, I a captain), we had a lot of time on our hands and he figured that the best he could do in 30 years was to make lieutenant colonel, and I figured I'd be a captain for 25 years. I was a captain for 17 years, but not 25. Selection made the difference.

Q: You say if it's fair.

Smith: And I think it is. I think the selection boards by and large are pretty fair. Sometimes I haven't understood the findings, but I
figured that they saw more of the record than I knew about.

Q: Now getting up to selection for general officers, are considerations, desiderata I guess you'd call it, different than for.

Smith: It's pretty rough. Going up from colonel to brigadier you've got to have 85% attrition, to make the system work. Only 15% of the colonels can go to brigadier. I was on the board one time to select the brigadiers, and we were given a list of 40 names from which we were to select three brigadier generals -- 40 names. Well, we sweated over that and we tried every way to winnow down the number. In that group of 40 people there were 10 who had commanded regiments during World War II, with distinction. Finally we hit on a scheme. We said, All right, what are the jobs that a brigadier general might have? He can command a brigade, he can take command of the Marine Corps Schools, he can be a very high level staff officer. What else could he do? I don't know. (Pause) Then we took each one of these names, to see how many of these jobs each individual officer could do, and it's remarkable that we could cut out a lot of them who could do one thing only. There were some of them that could command a regiment or a brigade, period; and would have been lost on staff duty or school duty. Maybe we made a mistake. We wound up with Johnny Selden and Harry Liversedge. The third one was an aviator, who was Jerome, and he was selected separately. He had no competition. But that's the best we could do.

Q: Liversedge fitted those categories over and above the others?
Smith: Well, he fitted them better than some of the other people. Johnny Selden could have taken the Schools. He had commanded troops and he could do staff duty, he'd been a chief of staff. Harry was undoubtedly a very fine troop commander -- there's no doubt about that. He had a good education and he'd been in command of the Reserve Section -- he'd done that kind of staff duty. Well, we did the best we could. That's what you are up against.

Q: Do other things, such as personal habits, the wives, count?

Smith: Well, you take an oath that you will recommend on the basis of the record, and you are not supposed to take anything into account except what's in that record. I remember a case came up when Gen. Torrey was the senior member of the selection board. I forget what the selection was for -- it wasn't for generals -- and they came down to the name of an officer who was on duty on Guadalcanal, and somebody down in Guadalcanal had written a letter to somebody in Headquarters Marine Corps saying this fellow had cracked up. Yet his last fitness report that we had was perfectly okay. So we passed him. Gen. Torrey said, "Forget this personal letter; we cannot even think about what is said in a personal letter." Well what happened was, it was correct, and he never went any further.

Q: The fallacy of the fitness report.

Smith: It's not current enough.

Q: That may be so. But it's not only that.
Smith: You see, the last fitness report we got on him was written up before he cracked up, before he went bad.

Q: But there also were cases where fitness reports -- guys bounced up or transferred, instead of being relieved . . .

Smith: Yes, oh yes, I suppose that happened. It's awfully hard, particularly when you show the man his fitness report, to put down an honest opinion of what he is worth.

Q: As you know, during the time that you were on active duty, the system changed. A man never saw the fitness report. If the man was not doing his job the commander would talk to him. They'd indicate how many of the same grade you marked, and how you were liable to mark so as to give an idea of the fitness, to give the selection board an idea of how you marked. Of course in the old days I guess the selection board would know that So-and-so was a hard marker, or . . .

Smith: I was on one board where we graded the reporting seniors. I think that was in connection with reorganizing the rank structure after World War II -- getting all the reserves and the regulars all in one piece. Somebody at Headquarters had worked up this system of evaluating reporting seniors -- who was tough and who was easy -- because some people, if you keep your nose clean give you a straight A, and other people, like Gamborg-Andresen, and people like that, if you got three five you were as lucky as all get out. Gen. Butterick used to tell us, "Nobody ever gave me any four o's and I am not going to hand out any."
So it does make a difference who the reporting senior is.

Q: Were you able to give an evaluation of the reporting seniors?

Smith: That was given to us, and we had it as a guide.

Q: Somebody had already worked it out.

Smith: Yes, at Headquarters. I don't know who worked it out -- in the Personnel Department. It's quite a job to do it. (Pause) Maybe we'd better go on to Norfolk, hadn't we?

On June 22nd 1953 I reported to CINCLANT as the prospective FMFLant, because Bobby Erskine was still there.

Q: It had to be approved by Congress, also.

Smith: Well, I had been nominated for three stars. Bobby Erskine was going round and round with the people there -- he wanted some job in the Pentagon and he wanted to get his promotion to four stars and somehow hold on to his military rank, and he went round and round. He was to get a salary up there. I lost out on that deal because they didn't get around to giving me my three stars until the 23rd of July, and Erskine was detached on the 1st of July. That kind of annoyed me a little bit; it seemed to me they could have been more speedy than that. In fact the Navy saw it -- Vice Adm. Farron who was my opposite number and commanded the Amphibious Forces, said, "What goes on with these people? From the standpoint of prestige you should have had the three stars the day you relieved Erskine." But I didn't and I lost the money.
Q: Oh really?

Smith: Sure. The vacancy occurred on July 1st, and at that time there wasn't much difference between two star and three star -- it was just an entertainment allowance -- but I lost whatever the income was for the period 1-23 July. We held a relieving ceremony on July 1, 1953. I relieved Bobby. I forget where he went. Oh, he went to the Pentagon. At that time Adm. Lynde D. McCormick was CINCLANT and SACLANT; he had the dual title -- Commander in Chief of the Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander LANT. He was a very fine person, and our relations were very cordial. FMFLant was what they called a Type Command in the Fleet, like submarines, like cruisers, like battleships. The components of FMFLant at that time were 2nd Marine Air Wing at Cherry Point, 2nd MarDiv at Camp Lejeune, FMF troops at Camp Lejeune, and headquarters FMFLant at Norfolk. Of course, we had a floating battalion in the Mediterranean. I moved into the Michigan House, which was one of those houses along what they call the Gold Coast. The best looking house of the bunch is the Virginia House whereas the Commandant of the Station lives.

On July 30th 1953, Gen. Good held a division review at Camp Lejeune for Undersecretary of the Navy Thomas and I went down and attended that review. From August 16th to the 22nd I went up to one of those general officers conferences at Headquarters Marine Corps.

Then in August '53 we furnished a commanding general and staff for a NATO exercise in Greece, called Keystone or something like that. We did that periodically. The Med Battalion would join up with the Greeks or with the Turks or somebody else, and we would furnish a brigadier general as commanding general of the outfit and a staff, and they'd hold a landing exercise.

Then, in view of the connection of FMFLant with NATO -- that is, we were a Type Command in the Fleet and therefore we would be used
So I flew over from September 19th to 30th, and went to London and talked to Adm. Wright and his staff, he at that time was in London. I went to Paris and talked to Gen. Guenther and had lunch with him. At the same time I gave a lecture to the NATO Defense College on amphibious operations. The lecture hall was in the same building where I'd gone to the Ecole de Guerre, on the other end, but very much more modern. They had earphones, and I gave the lecture in English and it was translated into French. Then we had a question-and-answer period afterwards. NATO Defense College students were from all over Europe, all of the NATO nations.

Then I went to Frankfurt, Germany and talked to Gen. Handy who commanded the Army forces in Europe, and his Navy staff officer -- some four striper, I've forgotten his name.

Q: Didn't Handy get in trouble with a misplaced diary or something?

Smith: I don't know. (Pause) I came on home after that, and in late October Lt. Gen. Westall of the Royal Marines paid us a visit -- they were always doing that, they loved to go around and visit FMF units. From October 31st to November 7th 1953 I went down to Vieques. We periodically sent Marines of the 2nd Division down there for training. We tried to do the training at Lejeune in the summer months, and at Vieques in the winter months. While I was there I went over to Puerto Rico and called on Gov. Muñoz-Marin -- he had a bunch of bodyguards around him. He was a very fine gentleman; he talked excellent English; of course, he graduated from an American college. Then I went over to the Virgin Islands and called
on the Governor there, because we were in the middle there, right close to those two places. At that time the Governor of the Virgin Islands was a man who had come up through the ranks of the Civil Service, and at that time he was much concerned. He told me he was appointed by a Democratic administration, and Eisenhower was the President, and he didn't know when the ax would fall. He said that after all he had spent a great many years in the Civil Service in the Virgin Islands and he wanted his retirement rights. I don't know what they did about it. They probably took care of him.

On December 4th of '53 I went out to the Command General Staff College again at Leavenworth and gave them a lecture on amphibious operations. On February 1st, 1954, Gen. Good held a division review commemorating the birthday of the 2nd MarDiv. It was organized at Camp Elliott on February 1st 1941. In that case I was the reviewing officer. From March 3rd to 10th 1954 I went down to the Caribbean again. Adm. Forrest was always asking me to come and take trips with him on his ship -- he loved to get out of Norfolk, and what he'd do was, in the winter months he'd wander around the West Indies; he was a great tennis player, and he'd put in to ports where they had good tennis courts! and get in some good tennis during the winter. I agreed to join him. On March 3rd I flew to Kingston, Jamaica, where he was with the USS Adirondack. I joined him on the ship, and I went out and called on Gov. Fox, who was at that time the British Governor of Jamaica. He eventually became the Governor of Cyprus; he was quite a British politician.

Then I accompanied Adm. Forrest on the Adirondack to Roosevelt Roads, and went ashore there and went on over to Vieques, and I was there watching training from March 7th to 10th and returned to Norfolk on the 10th date.
On March 13th of 1954, I went down to Quantico and addressed the graduation of the 26th special staff class. I worked hard on that talk. Eventually, I furnished it to Gen. Hurst who was at Pendleton conducting some sort of leadership course. He had been there and had listened to it, and wanted to know if I could get it for him, and I did -- I sent him a copy.

Between April 19th and May 4th, 1954, I was periodically at Camp Lejeune in connection with the 2nd MarDiv amphibious exercises -- observing, going to critiques and what not. On May 18th-19th 1954 I went up to a type Commanders' Conference at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. By this time Adm. Wright had come over and relieved Adm. McCormick at CINCANT, and Adm. McCormick was up at Newport commanding the Naval War College. From June 4th to 12th, 1954, at the Naval War College they had what they called global strategy discussions. I went up there and I went along with Adm. Faller who was on the Pocono then. We went from Norfolk to the Naval War College on the Pocono, and I lived aboard the Pocono while I attended the conference. But I told him I didn't have time to ride home with him, and I flew back. He was a very fine fellow.

From June 17th to 20th, 1954, I attended the Secretary of Defense Conference at Quantico. That used to be an annual affair; they invited all these high level people from all over the countryside, civilians and military, to attend for a bunch of briefings. I lived in the FBI Hall there, and my roommate was Gen. Gavin, and the Counsel for the Navy Department had a German name, but I've forgotten it. He was counsel, a civilian.

In September '54 was operation Keystone which was held in Turkey, and I furnished Litzenberg who had come down and joined me as the planning officer; he was a brigadier at the time. We sent
over to command a task force with a staff, and the 2nd Battalion participated together with the Turks.

Q: Was there a Greek one, Golden Fleece?

Smith: I don't know, I've got it in the book some place.

Q: The name just stuck in my mind.

Smith: No, it wasn't Golden Fleece, but I can't think of it now.

Q: It would have been appropriate for a Greek one.

Smith: Yes! In September '54, Puller was commanding the 2nd MarDiv by now, and he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. I talked to Snedeker afterwards on how it hit him; they were in the mess and he started to walk out and he simply ran into the wall, he couldn't see. That's what the doctor said it was. Well, he protested it was not a cerebral hemorrhage, it was heat exhaustion; he had spent the day inspecting 600 rifles and that was it. However, he got the doctors to change the diagnosis a bit over a period of time. He first got them to change it to vascular thrombosis, which was not quite so serious as cerebral thrombosis. And then after a while they changed it again to hypertension, benign, which was quite a drop! But Bu Med didn't go along with all this, and they ordered him up to Bethesda for observation. In the meantime, Lewis had gone to the examining board at Lejeune for his annual physical and he twisted their arms, and they pronounced him fit for all duties at sea and in the field! But he went up to Bethesda and they...
Then he felt -- I think we talked about it before -- that he had to go around; that the doctors would tell him that if Gen. Shepherd would provide limited duties they would recommend it. And Gen. Shepherd would say, "If the doctors will recommend limited duties, I'll find a job for you." He didn't get anywhere, and he eventually was retired and was very bitter. When he got his three stars he wouldn't have any officer give it to him; he had a sergeant major pin the three stars on his shoulder. I wrote him a letter. He was very bitter against Gen. Shepherd. I don't think he was bitter against me because I had nothing to do with this at all. The only thing I told him was, when he got out of the hospital, to take it easy. In November, we were going to have a big FMF exercise landing on the beach, and he shouldn't go aboard ship and attempt to come in on the beach; what he should do was to stay ashore and meet the division when it came ashore, and let Snedeker -- who was Assistant Division Commander -- bring the division ashore. That's what he did. Of course, he didn't last long after that. This exercise was held in November of '54; it was an FMF F exercise, not a division exercise, that included constructive units plus the 2nd MarDiv. I went down there on the USS Northampton with Adm. Ferron. We shifted to the Northampton which had a tremendous amount of radio and radar gear. It was just a normal exercise.

In January and February of 1955, I was the senior member of a board to recommend the future composition of air and ground components for the Marine Corps.

Q: Was that a carryover from the Hogaboom report? Hogaboom wrote something, I guess in the 50s, about the composition of the FMF divisions, the reorganization of the FMF.
Smith: No, this was just a balance between air and ground -- how do you divide up the strength of the Marine Corps. And we had a mixed board. Maggie Megee was the aviation member. I don't know anything about the Hogaboom report.

On February 2nd of '55 I went out to the Command and General Staff College again and gave them a third lecture on the FMF. March 1 to 5 of '55, I was down in the Caribbean again, at Vieques, and that time Adm. Wright came down and paid us a visit and watched the landing operations. On March 5th I flew back to Norfolk via Haiti. I had served in Haiti and I thought I'd just drop in there and take a look at the place. As we approached Haiti we had to lie off and circle because Mr. Nixon at that time was making a goodwill visit to Haiti and everybody was assembled at the airfield to say goodbye to him; he was taking off. So we circled until Mr. Nixon took off and then landed, and it was very simple to make my call on the minister -- he was right there at the airfield. I called on him there. A young naval officer took me in his car. I'd said I'd like to see where I'd lived up on Tahiti. We went up there, and I found that was where he was living. I didn't recognize the house, it had been much improved; it had a carport and a few other little things. I stopped in and paid a visit to him and his wife and then went back and took the plane to Norfolk.

On April 19th to 30th 1955, I made quite a junket with Adm. Wright in a special plane. We went to Paris to attend the NATO Command Post Exercise, conducted by Marshal Montgomery. He at that time was Deputy Commander of SAC-EUR. I was put up with some other admiral. Well, Adm. Wright was put up in the same hotel. I didn't pay for the hotel bill; I don't know who paid for it; $44 a day! It was the George V, one of the best hotels in Paris. Adm. Wright
really got around. I tried to keep up with him for a few days and I quit. I said, "Look, Admiral, I can't keep up with you people." At 7 o'clock he'd call me up and say, "O.P., come over and have a cocktail." So I'd go; I didn't drink; I stayed around. And then after drinking cocktails for a while they decided to go out to dinner and then they'd go out on the town and get back at 2 o'clock in the morning; and we had to be en route to NATO headquarters at 7 in the morning. Adm. Wright took it in his stride. I said, "I can't take it," and he understood. I lived in peace after that.

It was a tremendous exercise involving all the NATO forces, and what I got a kick out of was Adm. Fechteler taking off on Marshal Montgomery. Marshal Montgomery was very contemptuous of carriers. He didn't think carriers could stay in European waters in the face of Russian air. Adm. Fechteler told him a few of the facts of life; about what had happened in the Pacific in the face of land based air of the Japanese, and he kind of talked the Marshal down. But I was very glad to hear it.

On May 9th of '55 we had ceremonies at SACLANT. The West Germans were admitted to NATO and their flag was raised at NATO Headquarters. We had the flags of all the NATO nations there.

From the 15th to the 16th of May '55, the permanent representatives of the NATO Council visited SACLANT, and Adm. Wright thought it would be a nice gesture if individually the different officers living on the base would take one of two of them and put them up in spare rooms. At the time I had my granddaughter with me, but we did have one room, and I took Sir Christopher Steele of the United Kingdom; he was the permanent representative from the UK. I put him up in my house.
On May 19th and 20th I went down to Dallas for Armed Forces Day and talked to the Lions Club. In July of '55 I went up to Headquarters again for this General Officers Conference. I was due for retirement for age on November 1st, 1955 -- my birthday was October 26th, and I would have been retired, therefore, on November 1st of '55. Well, Gen. Shepherd had asked me sometime in the spring what my plans were, and I said, "I'd like to finish out my time on this job." I realized that they had this two year limit, but I didn't figure it was stretching the regulations too much to hold on to me until November. After all, I held on to Brute Krulak for four years out here at CGFMPac. But he didn't say much about it. But suddenly I got a letter from him and orders detaching me from FMFLant on September 1st and ordering me to Headquarters Marine Corps for board duty. The letter that accompanied this -- somebody had given him some very bad dope -- said that Gen. Noble was to relieve me and he wanted to give Gen. Noble as much time on the job as he could before he was to retire in 1956, and he wanted to make the change on September 1st 1955. He thought that September 1 was a better date than November or July. I didn't say anything, I simply put in a letter and requested retirement effective September 1st 1955. In his letter he said I'd been there 31 months, so that was that. That was really cockeyed: I'd come there in July of '53 and in November of '55 it would have been 27 months. I don't know who gave him that figure, 31 months -- and that would have been a little long. But he had had a tough time getting Gen. Hart back. It's a safe thing to have a two year rule, you see. You say, "I am sorry, but ..." Poor Gen. Rockey didn't want to retire, so he took a reduction to major general and went out to San Francisco as commanding general, Department of
the Pacific. But I wanted no part of being relieved and going up to Washington for two months and then to California. It didn't make sense. I would have been reduced in rank. People like Snedeker -- they didn't understand it. They couldn't figure it out.

I knew that later on Gen. Shepherd was a little apologetic about it. The Navy didn't quite understand what was going on. Adm. Wright never sent the orders on -- he held them to see what the score was. He sent one of his admirals to find out:

End of side 2, Tape 1, Session III.
Smith: Adm. Wright apparently sent this admiral on his staff over to find out what the score was, and he came over and said, "O.P., what's the dope?" And I told him frankly that Gen. Shepherd wanted to make the change on September 1st, so I was simply putting in for retirement effective September 1st. And all I said in my letter was that having completed more than 38 years of service in the Marine Corps I requested that I be retired effective September 1, 1955. Apparently it was approved. Then my Chief of Staff got the people at headquarters to withdraw that set of orders, you see. They were never delivered to me, and I retired on the 1st of September. The staff gave me a farewell dinner on the night of August 29th -- a very nice ceremony. Then we had our relieving ceremony on September 1st 1955, and I was promoted to four star rank effective on my retirement. Adm. Wright came out to pin the stars on one shoulder and Mrs. Smith on the other. She is kind of short and she had quite a time with that four star business. Adm. Wright got his on and had to come around and give her a hand on getting hers on.

Then we took off for California, thereby ending my career.

Now to sum it up -- I had never planned a military career. It was the accident of World War I that brought me into the Marine Corps, and after World War I, I decided I'd like to stay in the Marine Corps if I was acceptable, and I was, and so I continued on active duty for a total of 38 years.

I was very fortunate in my career. I had varying and interesting duties. I missed out on France, of course, in World
War I, but I made up for that in World War II in Korea. If you stay long enough you make up for it.

Promotion was very rapid in the first year of my career, but then I stagnated in the grade of captain for 17 years. However, in this long period of 17 years as captain I never repeated the same type of duty. I wasn't a company commander, a company commander, a company commander. It was always a different kind of duty: instructor, student -- various different types of duty.

As far as my overall career is concerned, I'd say my most enjoyable tour of duty was the command at Camp Pendleton. That was the most enjoyable. But my most rewarding duty was of course the command of the 1st Marine Division.

In the 14 years of my retirement I've had various contacts with the Marine Corps, but I do continue to follow with interest the progress of the then young officers that were under my command, what they are doing and how they are getting along. And they have done pretty well, I think.

Q: Which tour of duty did you least like?

Smith: I suppose the hardest struggle I had was that four years in Washington from '24 to '28. Two years would have been enough. And when you are on a job for four years, the same job, and struggling to make ends meet, it's no fun. About the other duties I have no complaints -- Ecole de Guerre, Haiti, Guam, Mare Island, instructor in the Schools, duties at Headquarters. Well, outside of those four years in the detail office . . .
The next tour at Headquarters was much shorter, and when Jerry Thomas came back we were very glad to get out. That was only 18 months. And of course, the last tour at Headquarters as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I had nice quarters, was fairly busy, and had congenial people to work with.

Q: I notice that in the course of your career the thread of your association with the Marine Corps is strong. I get the impression that you both liked and enjoyed him.

Smith: I did. I knew his limitations.

Q: Do you think he liked you?

Smith: Oh I am sure of that.

Q: This quite an incongruity, in a sense ...

Smith: It is.

Q: ... with your bent for scholarliness and ...

Smith: Oh, he's more scholarly than you think. Before we went to Korea he read five books on Korea, and he read a great many military books. He'll fool you. He gave the impression of being a little bit illiterate, but he wasn't. And as a family man he was wonderful. He had a wonderful family and a wonderful family life. But his reputation was as hard as nails, tough
fighting man -- which isn't the whole picture. I remember Mrs. Puller was much upset when a man came out from the *Saturday Evening Post* to Pendleton to write a story on Lewie, and **he emphasized he hoped up the hard-as-nails story, and Mrs. Puller was all upset about, because, she said, Lewie is not like that. Well, he wasn't at home. He was a perfectly fine family man.

Q: Some character out here on the West Coast, a former Marine, who made some money in wholesale grocery, decided to get into the movies and commissioned a script on the book *Marines*, and we got it for review. Pretty corny. Probably the corniest was a tender love scene at Pearl Harbor, prior to his departure for Korea. It had kind of bedroom overtones. It was criticized. It was never made. The Department of Defense would never give its support for it, as far as I know.

Smith: He was on duty at Pearl Harbor and I suppose Mrs. Puller was out there with him.

Q: But it was a family leave-taking type of thing.

Smith: I was very fond of Lewie. I knew his limitations. I told you about the experience at Benning. The experience at Pavuvu, when he was holding a command post exercise -- I think Burr Davis wrote that up, I gave it to Davis -- and I went over to see what was going on. He'd gone across an arm of the sea and landed two
battalions in assault, and all it was was a command post setup. And I went over there and I found the two battalions' command post, and I talked to the battalion commanders and I said, "Where is Col. Puller?" "He's up ahead there." Well, I went one up ahead a piece and here was Lewie with his regimental CP, ahead of these two battalion CPs. I said, "Look, Lewie, you know according to the book that the regimental CP is supposed to be behind the battalion CPs." He said, "Yes, I know, but that's the way I operate. And if I am not up here they'll say, 'Where the hell is Puller?'"

Q: You had mentioned the fact when your niece was typing your 

personal narrative there was very little controversy.

Smith: Itinerary?

Q: That there was very little controversy.

Smith: That's right. But I had a professional stenographer who typed it up, and she couldn't understand why there was nothing, no controversy, and she said, "You've lived a good life. You mean to tell me you didn't have any arguments with anybody?" And I told her this was written for the grandchildren.

Q: But the Marine Corps life being what it was, the competition being what it was, I am sure there must have been people that had their knives out and that the path wasn't, couldn't have been strewn with roses.
Smith: I don't know . . . I knew of course at the start that I was behind the eight ball because I hadn't been to France -- that was very manifest. Gen. Bob Blake, who is one of my very fine friends, when he came back from France we met us at Mare Island and he sneered at me and said, "I suppose you were out in the Pacific counting the casualties among us that were over in France." You were behind the eight ball because you hadn't been to France. And I realized that I just had to do the best I could, and do as good a job as I could to make up for that lack of duty in France. And in World War II, I finally caught up a bit and in Korea I caught up some more.

Q: Do you think many of the young officers in the post World War I period got out because they felt that . . .

Smith: No chance?

Q: Because of this France thing?

Smith: I don't know whether they did or not. I really am not prepared to answer that. We were picked over pretty carefully and cut down pretty drastically after World War I. Even the alphabetical list -- those fellows didn't resign, and they might very well have been bitter. Wensinger went on to become a lieutenant general on the retired list, and he was a W on the alphabetical list. I think the A was Atkinson. I forget, really. The list must have had 30 or 40 names.
Q: Well, General, I want to thank you very much. It has been a great honor and privilege to sit down here and talk with you.

Smith: Well, I hope it hasn't been too wandering. It's all there in my notes in a logical order, but when you talk you often don't document your remarks so well.

Q: Well, we feel very fortunate to be able to have this down on tape -- the story of your own career. I think this is the important thing, and we've gone into certain aspects of your career which the diaries that we have don't cover. This I think is important.

Smith: Yes. Of course what you have on file in the Historical Division doesn't go back prior to Ireland.

Q: No.

Smith: There's nothing prior to that in there.

Q: General, I want to thank you again. I really enjoyed it.

Smith: I am very glad to have given you a hand. I assume that this will be typed out now.

Q: Yes, sir. But I can't guarantee it'll be right away!

Smith: Is there any way they can slow it down so they can type it?

Q: Oh yes. Well, thank you again. 

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