HEADQUARTERS
NORTHERN TROOPS AND LANDING FORCE

Report Of

MARIANAS OPERATION PHASE I (SAIPAN)

Enclosures:

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J  (1) TQM REPORT
    (2) ENGINEER AND SHORE PARTY REPORT
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    (2) LIAISON OFFICERS REPORT
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L  (1) AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION REPORT
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    (3) AIR WARNING SQUADRON 5 (AT) REPORT
Headquarters,
NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force
In the Field.

12 August 1944.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Via:
(1) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops Pacific (CTF 56).
(2) The Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific (CTF 51).
(3) The Commander, Central Pacific Forces.


Enclosures:
(A) NT&LF Operation and Administrative Orders.
(B) NT&LF Daily Dispatch Summaries.
(C) G-1 Report.
(D) G-2 Report.
(E) G-3 Report.
(F) G-4 Report.
(G) Signal Report.
(H) LVT Report.
(I) (1) XXIV Corps Artillery Report.
(2) Air Report.
(3) Naval Gunfire Report.
(J) (1) TQM Report.
(2) Engineer and Shore Party Report.
(3) Medical Report.
(K) (1) Civil Affairs Report.
(2) Liaison Officers Reports.
(3) Public Relations Report.
(L) (1) Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion Report.
(2) Headquarters Commandant Report.
(3) Air Warning Squadron 5 (AT) Report.

1. In compliance with current directives the following operations report is submitted. This report includes a general narrative account of the NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force operations during Phase I (SAIPAN) operation and preliminary recommendations for future operations. The Enclosures accompanying the report are included in order to furnish details which will be of value to any headquarters planning for a similar operation. Subordinate unit reports will be forwarded upon receipt.

DOWNGRADING AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY CLASSIFIED.
2295-5-25
O125/256 NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Operations
Ser. 0024A Report Phase I (SAIPAN).

2. Planning Phase:
   (a) Introduction.

   (1) After the capture of KWAJALEIN Atoll in early February, a Task Force for the execution of the CARRILON Operation was immediately mounted at KWAJALEIN. This Force executed its assigned mission and by 22 February had captured ENIWETOK Atoll. The early completion of this operation resulted in advancing plans as laid down in CinCPoa concepts for Central Pacific operations by about 90 days. The advantage gained was aggressively pursued and by late February plans for the execution of another operation were underway. In early April it was decided not to execute the latter operation and plans for the former operation were adopted.

   (2) To capture the MARIANAS in order to deny their use to the enemy and put them to our own use, it was decided to land on the Islands of GUAM, SAIPAN and TINIAN. To accomplish this mission in the most expeditious manner, information indicated that a landing force larger than heretofore used in the Central Pacific would be required and that it would have to be divided into two separate and distinct landing forces. Each landing force would have to correspond to what amounts to a Corps to accomplish its mission. As a consequence it was decided to employ the III Amphibious Corps located on GUADALCANAL as the Southern Landing Force to capture GUAM in the Southern MARIANAS and to employ the V Amphibious Corps located in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as the Northern Landing Force to capture SAIPAN and TINIAN to the north. At this point, however, came the need for a higher landing force headquarters to command both landing forces. There was not another landing force headquarters adequately experienced or available at the time. Therefore, it was decided that the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps should have a dual command and control all landing forces for KWAJALEIN as Commanding General Expeditionary Troops and also perform the duties of Commanding General, NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force.

   (b) Preliminary Planning.

   (1) The staff of the V Amphibious Corps was reorganized to form two staffs to provide the Commanding General a separate staff for each echelon of his dual command. Actually, the preliminary planning was accomplished prior to the division of the staff of the V Amphibious Corps. However, on 12 April,
the staff was divided into the Red Staff and the Blue Staff. The Red Staff later became the staff for NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force and the Blue Staff became the staff for Expeditionary Troops.

(2) The Red and the Blue Staffs operated in separate office spaces but had identical information sources from which to draw as the detailed plans were being designed. Official designation of Task Groups and assignment of forces were withheld pending directives from higher authority. While awaiting that directive, however, both the Red and Blue Staffs drew up tentative plans and issued them to the subordinate units to expedite planning.

(3) On April 26 Expeditionary Troops Operation & Plan Number 3-44 was received by this Headquarters. This plan assigned the following mission to NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force: "To land on, seize, occupy and defend SAIPAN; then be prepared to seize TINIAN on order." To accomplish this mission the following Task Organization was designated:

"a. NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force (TG 56.1) - LtGen H.M. Smith.

Corps Troops
   H&S Bn, VPhibCorps (less dets)
   Sig Bn, VPhibCorps (less dets)
   Corps Arty
      XXIV Army Corps Arty
   PhibReconBn, VPhibCorps (less Co "A")
   Hq Prov Engr Gp, VPhibCorps
   MT Co VPhibCorps (less dets)
   7th Field Depot (less dets)
   Med Bn, VPhibCorps
   31st Field Hosp (Army)
   2dProvPortSurgHosp (Army)
   3dProvPortSurgHosp (Army)
   2dMarDiv (Reinf) (less 1st Bn 2d Marines)
   4thMarDiv (Reinf)
   1st Bn 2d Mar, Co A PhibRecon Bn, VPhibCorps attached
   SAIPAN Garrison Force (TG 10.13)
   TINIAN Garrison Force (TG 10.12)

(4) On the basis of this directive, NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force was officially activated and on 27 April issued NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Operation Plan Number 2-44 (Tentative) to subordinate units. The divisions submitted tentative plans for approval without delay. At this time latest information indicated that the proposed landing of the 1st Bn,
2dMarines (Reinf) on MAGICIENNE BAY on the night of Dog minus 
one - Dog-day was not advisable and was thus abandoned. On 1 May NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Operation Plan 3-44 was issued with only a few changes made in the tentative plan. On 3 May the Alternate Plan, NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Operation Plan Number 4-44, was issued.

(5) In spite of the fact that the divisions were located on other Islands and that attachments were made dangerously late for desired planning, close liaison was realized between all echelons and frequent personal visits resulted in excellent coordination during the planning phase.

3. Training and Rehearsal.

(a) Training.

(1) All major training with the exception of the rehearsal had been accomplished under the directives of the V Amphibious Corps. The Marine Camps for the divisions at MAUI and HAWAII were new and considerable difficulty arose initially in providing sufficient and adequate training areas. This matter was later partially corrected. Both divisions had had previous combat experience involving amphibious operations. Both divisions conducted amphibious exercises from transports during the month of April at MAUI.

(2) The XXIV Corps Artillery was newly organized and the 155mm Gun Battalions were formerly Coast Artillery. Intensive training was commenced to provide additional training time for this unit and only the headquarters took part in the rehearsal.

(3) Of the eight Amphibian Tractor Battalions assigned, four were Marine and four Army. Of the Army units all were well trained and one had been in combat. Of the Marine units two were well trained and had been in combat but the other two were new and had just arrived from the States. All training possible was arranged and these units performed satisfactorily at the rehearsal.
(4) Corps Troops and NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Headquarters had not functioned as a unit in training or in combat. Consequently, on May 3 to May 5 a Command Post Exercise was held on OAHU with tactical Corps Troops participating and considerable value was derived therefrom.

(5) The 1st Bn, 2d Marines with Co.A, VPhibCorps Recon Bn attached conducted special training exercises from APD's with the use of rubber boats for night landing and air drop of supplies ashore. This training was to prepare them for a special landing mission. The mission for this unit was changed but the training was pursued until completed and the unit was prepared to make landings from APD's on call.

(6) Concurrently with the final training and preparation for the rehearsal and final embarkation of the assault forces, the Garrison Forces were assembled. Major General Jarman, USA was assigned as Commanding General, SAIPAN Garrison Forces and Major General Underhill, USMC was assigned as Commanding General, TINIAN Garrison Forces. The Garrison Forces were assembled and prepared for their missions in close harmony with the plans of the assault and naval forces. An AA Artillery unit from the SAIPAN Garrison Forces was assigned to take part in the assault landing on SAIPAN and later performed its mission in an excellent manner.

(b) Rehearsal.

(1) In accordance with a directive from higher authority a rehearsal was conducted on the Islands of MAUI and KAHOOLawe from 15 May to 19 May in conjunction with Expeditionary Troops and parallel naval echelons. The rehearsal was so designed that the plans for the attack on SAIPAN would be rehearsed in every detail insofar as the nature of the terrain and the condition of the beaches would permit.

(2) The landing phases of the rehearsal were held on the Island of MAUI. Due to habitations on MAUI, naval gunfire, air and other fires were restricted to simulated firing during the landings. The bombardment phase was subsequently conducted on the nearby uninhabited Island of KAHOOLawe. During the bombardment phase the assault waves were formed and proceeded to within 300 yards of the beach without landing to coordinate actual firing with the ship to shore movement.

(3) The rehearsal proved particularly valuable in the training derived from the ship to shore movement exercises involving over 700 LVT's and in the test of the overall communication plan, although many of the troop units had had adequate
previous training. Critiques were held following the rehearsal and minor defects that had been discovered were pointed out and corrected insofar as practicable. It is considered that rehearsals are of great value and should be conducted prior to the initial assault landing of any operation, particularly if conditions approaching those of the actual landing can be approximated.

(4) On 19 May the bombardment phase completed the rehearsal for NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force and this force was returned to port for completion of loading and rehabilitation.


(a) The task organization for NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force has been previously shown. The major task organizations included in the NORTHERN Attack Force were as follows:

NORTHERN Attack Force, Task Force 52, ViceAdm Turner, USN. (RearAdm Hill, second in command)
WESTERN Landing Group, Task Group 52.2, RearAdm Hill, USN.
NORTHERN Landing Force, Task Group 52.1, LtGen H. H. Smith, USMC.
Transport Group Able, Task Group 52.3, Capt Knowles, USN.
2dMarDiv Landing Force, Task Group 52.3.4, MajGen Watson, USMC.
Transport Group Baker, Task Group 52.4, Capt Loomis, USN.
4thMarDiv Landing Force, Task Group 52.4.4, MajGen Schmidt, USMC.
Tractor Flotilla, Task Group 52.5, Capt Robertson, USN.
Control Group, Task Group 52.6, Commodore Theiss, USN.
Gunboat Support Group, Task Group 52.6.5, Comdr Malanaph, USN.
Beach Demolition Group, Task Group 52.6.7, Comdr Harner, USN.
Beachmaster Group, Task Group 52.6.10, Comdr Anderson, USN.
LCT Flotilla Thirteen, Task Group 57.6.14, LtComdr Tower, USN.
Pontoon Barge Unit (52.6.18) Comdr Anderson, USN.
EASTERN Landing Group, Task Group 52.8, Comdr McManus, USN.
Demonstration Group, Task Group 52.9, Capt Morrison, USN.
Fire Support Group One, Task Group 52.17, RearAdm Oldendorf, USN.
Fire Support Group Two, Task Group 52.10, RearAdm Ainsworth, USN.
Carrier Support Group One, Task Group 52.14, RearAdm Bogan, USN.
Carrier Support Group Two, Task Group 52.11, RearAdm Stump, USN.
Transport Screen, Task Group 52.11.2, Captain Libby, USN.
Minesweeping and Hydrographic Survey Group, Task Group 52.13, Comdr Moore, USN.

(b) In every appropriate instance there was a Landing Force parallel to the naval command echelon. During the planning phase and rehearsal the closest possible understanding of the attack plans was realized between parallel commanders.
5. Embarkation.

(a) Requirements for shipping in which to embark the NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force were submitted to Commander, Task Force 52. When the shipping available was provided, this Headquarters prepared general loading plans and allocated shipping to subordinate units. A schedule for loading was prepared in conjunction with the Navy to fit as closely as possible the time of availability of the ships to the time desired by the troops. This was a considerable problem in view of limited harbor facilities in various islands from which to mount such a large force. However, with a carefully made plan the entire force was loaded out on time and in the manner necessary to fit the tactical plans.

(b) This Headquarters in conjunction with V Amphibious Corps screened all equipment lists of subordinate units in order to insure that only essential equipment was taken and that unloading would be accomplished in an orderly manner. This included defense and Garrison units as well as assault forces. Shipping was at a premium and most careful allocation of space was essential. Some last minute changes forced revision of loading plans for individual ships and in some cases caused certain essential equipment to be left behind.

(c) The following units of NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force were loaded as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2dMarDiv</td>
<td>HILO, HAWAII</td>
<td>2 - 13 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4thMarDiv</td>
<td>KAHULUI, MAUI</td>
<td>2 - 13 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT&amp;LF Troops</td>
<td>P.H. &amp; HONOLULU</td>
<td>9 - 12 May (on Div Ships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached and</td>
<td>P.H. &amp; HONOLULU</td>
<td>19 - 28 May (NT&amp;LF Ships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 - 12 May (on Div Ships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 - 28 May (on other Ships)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) The following personnel and cargo were carried by units as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Cargo (short tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2dMarDiv</td>
<td>23,651</td>
<td>23,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4thMarDiv</td>
<td>24,866</td>
<td>24,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT&amp;LF Troops</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>9,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def Group I (AA &amp; Const)</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>77,413</td>
<td>79,014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(e) About a week prior to the commencement of loading the Transport Group Commanders, and either the Captain or cargo officer of each ship visited the unit whose troops their ships were embarking. This early liaison settled many questions regarding loading and loading arrangements in a most satisfactory manner and is highly recommended for the future.

(f) The LST's of the Tractor Flotilla were preloaded in PEARL HARBOR with emergency supplies for use during the early phase of the landing. After reloading, the LST's proceeded to assigned islands for embarking assault troops, LVT's and DUKW's. The preloading of LST's with emergency supplies to be near the beach for resupply prior to the time transports can come close in is highly recommended for future operations.

(g) One AP and two AK's assigned to lift Corps Troops and cargo was inadequate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space available</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (off &amp; enl)</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (sq ft)</td>
<td>93,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cu ft)</td>
<td>1,159,487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consequently space originally allotted to divisions had to be used which resulted in the divisions having to leave some of their combat equipment behind.

6. Rehabilitation Following Rehearsal.

(a) When the rehearsal was completed on 19 May, the force returned to PEARL HARBOR for rehabilitation. One half of the LST's with embarked assault troops and LVT's remained at MAAEA BAY, MAUI. With such a large force at PEARL HARBOR, facilities and space for exercising the troops ashore were not available. It was possible, however, to bring small units ashore each day and this was done. At the same time, the remainder of loading to be accomplished was in progress.

(b) On 21 May an LST loading ammunition caught fire and exploded in WEST LOCK, PEARL HARBOR. The explosion spread to other LST's and by dark 6 LST's were lost, (200 casualties to assault troops resulted) and considerable equipment was lost. Those LST's were to have sailed on 24 May. By 25 May all personnel, equipment and supplies had been replaced and the LST Tractor Groups sailed only 24 hours late with the lost time to be made up enroute. An advance CP had been set up ashore by this Headquarters prior to the
explosion and its location ashore assisted greatly in the rapid action necessary to replace the damage caused by the explosion.

(c) The rehabilitation period was valuable in that final conferences were held, which included all major task organizations, for the purpose of clearing up details of the attack plans. The troops, however, gained little from the rehabilitation period and in the future prior arrangements should include means for the adequate rehabilitation of troops.

7. Movement to the Objective.

(a) The NORTHERN Attack Force departed from PEARL HARBOR in echelon. The Tractor Groups with assault troops, LVT's and artillery embarked departed on 25 May. Attack Group One with the remainder of the 4thMarDiv, ExtrOpac Headquarters and other units embarked departed PEARL HARBOR 29 May. Attack Group Two with the 2dMarDiv, NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Headquarters and other units embarked departed PEARL HARBOR on 30 May. Other echelons of Garrison and Defense Forces and resupply shipping were scheduled to depart at later dates.

(b) Enroute to the objective every individual was thoroughly indoctrinated in the plans for the attack on SAIPAN. Schools were conducted, lectures were given, photographs, relief maps, terrain maps and charts had been prepared and furnished all units. It is believed that every individual was more completely informed of the detailed plans for the attack than had ever before been realized.

(c) The force arrived at ENIWETOK LAGOON for final staging 6 - 11 June. Additional assault troops were placed aboard LST's for the final five day trip to the objective in order that all personnel landing in the assault from each LST would be present.

(d) The details of staging at ENIWETOK LAGOON were completed on time and the force departed in echelon 8 - 10 June. The force arrived at the objective on schedule. The entire movement from PEARL HARBOR to the objective had been uneventful and capably directed. So far as is known, no portion of NORTHERN Attack Force was detected in its movement to the objective. It is understood that the carrier force covering the movement was possibly detected just prior to making its strikes on D minus three and consequently made its strikes earlier than planned.
8. Narrative of Assault on SAIPAN.

(a) There will be no attempt made here to narrate the full details of the operation. For further details, reference is made to Enclosure (B) for Daily Dispatch Summaries of the operation, Enclosure (D), G-2 Report, for detailed information of the enemy, Enclosure (E), G-3 Report, for detailed information of own troops and to other appropriate Enclosures for other information desired.

(b) Narrative.

(1) On the morning of 15 June the NORTHERN Attack Force arrived off the west coast of SAIPAN. The objective was an Island about 12 miles in length extending generally SW to NE and consisting of about 75 square miles of land area. To the Southwest about 5000 yards lay the Island of TINIAN. On SAIPAN a mountainous rugged stretch of terrain extended from the Northern end of the island rising to the highest peak, MT. TAPOTCHAU, which is about 1500 feet high and about two thirds of the way down the island. The Southern third of the island is less rugged and rises from low level ground on the Southwest coast to the high ground at MT. TAPOTCHAU. On the Southern third of the island was located the main Japanese airfield. The main harbor, TANAPAG HARBOR, is located about half way up the west coast and near the harbor was the main city of the island, GARAPAN. The island was the main Japanese staging point for their other islands in the central Pacific and their main stronghold in the MARIANAS about 1500 miles from JAPAN. On the morning of D-day it was estimated the island was defended by about 23,000 enemy military.

(2) The landing area selected was on the Southwest coast of SAIPAN near the sugar mill village of CHARAN KANO. In this area a reef extends off shore about 800 to 1200 yards. There is a small break in the reef about 50 feet wide leading to a piper at CHARAN KANO. At the shore line is a sandy beach in rear of which is comparatively level ground rising to a ridge about 200 feet high about 1500 yards inland which overlooks the beach.

(3) The plan of landing was to land two divisions abreast across the reef in LVT’s and to secure rapidly the 0-1 line which included the high ground overlooking the beaches. The troops were to remain in the LVT’s and go as far inland to the 0-1 line, as enemy opposition and terrain would permit. At dawn the demonstration force was off the Northwest coast of SAIPAN. On the Southwest
coast the transports were 18,000 yards off shore. The LST's were stationed in rear of the line of departure and commenced debarking LVT's. The fire support ships were in position firing according to schedule.

(4) H-hour was set at 0830. It was later changed to 0840 to complete the formation of waves. Following a heavy naval gunfire and air preparation and preceded by LCI gunboats and armored LVT's firing, the first wave was reported on the beach at 0845 with the 2dMarDiv on the left and the 4thMarDiv on the right. The landing was made on a broad front and over 70% LVT's were used to land approximately 8,000 assault troops in about 20 minutes. Enemy opposition was initially light on the front of the 2dMarDiv and heavy on the front of the 4thMarDiv. After advancing 500 yards inland the 2dMarDiv met heavier resistance. Enemy resistance to the landing consisted of artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. By 1800, D-day, a 10,000 yard front was secured to an average depth of 1500 yards. AETNA POINT, in the zone of the 2d MarDiv between the divisions remained in the hands of the enemy. The right flank was lightly held. Reserves, tanks and artillery had been landed in support. Japanese artillery registered on the beaches and on the channel of CHARAN KANOA prevented full use of landing beaches and full shore parties were not ashore. Landing and evacuation were seriously impeded. The landing was, however, successful and units reported their ability to meet any counter-attack. Both division Command Posts were ashore by dark.

(5) D + 1, June 16. After a predawn counter-attack was repulsed in the zone of the 4thMarDiv the attack on SAIPAN continued. A request was made to the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops Pacific for the employment of the 27thInfDiv, which commenced arriving in the area on this date. The request was approved and a warning order was issued to the 27thInfDiv to be prepared to land one RCT on the right (Southern portion) of the front. The day's operations resulted in the consolidation and expansion of the beachhead lines, mopping up of isolated resistance, cleaning of beaches, securing of the pier and channel, setting up shore party operations and commencing the landing of RCT 165 of the 27thInfDiv. Enemy resistance consisting mainly of heavy artillery and mortar fire from unlocated positions had resulted in about 3500 reported casualties to our troops in the first two days. This was about 20% of the total casualties received on SAIPAN.
(5) D + 2, June 17. The attack on SAIPAN continued. At 0430 the 2dMarDiv repulsed a counterattack on its center destroying 31 enemy tanks with bazooka, half track and medium tank fire. RCT 165 was attached to the 4thMarDiv and both divisions jumped off to the attack at 0730. Corps Artillery commenced landing during the day and NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Command Post opened ashore at CHARAN KANOA at 1530. During the day the beachhead was extended 200 to 1200 yards and a sufficient advance was made to allow room for the landing of the 27thInfDiv on the right.

(7) D + 3, June 18. The attack on SAIPAN continued. At 1000 the 2dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv and 27thInfDiv launched a coordinated attack. Advance was made against light opposition in the zone of the 27thInfDiv and on the right of the 4thMarDiv. Shortly after 1000 the 27thInfDiv reported the capture of ASLITO Airfield and construction work commenced immediately. Elements of the 4thMarDiv right reached the East coast during the afternoon but a pocket of enemy resistance on the boundary between the 2d MarDiv and the 4thMarDiv existed. By darkness all lines had improved and Corps Artillery was established ashore effectively neutralizing enemy artillery fire.

(8) D + 4, June 19. The attack on SAIPAN continued. The 27thInfDiv launched an attack at 0730. The 4th MarDiv launched a local attack to reduce a stubborn enemy pocket existing in the boundary between the 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv. The day's operations resulted in light action by the 2dMarDiv and 4th MarDiv giving those divisions some rest. The enemy pocket between divisions was reduced. The 27thInfDiv advanced its front lines from 1000 to 2000 yards against light resistance and by dark left flank elements were on the East coast. One battery of Corps Artillery commenced fires on TINIAN.

(9) D + 5, June 20. The attack on SAIPAN continued. The 2d and 4th MarDivs jumped off to the attack at 1030 and the 27thInfDiv at 1200. All divisions were ordered to jump off at 0900 but king-hours was delayed until 1030 for the 2d MarDiv and 4thMarDiv. The 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv secured their objectives at 1001 and 1616 respectively. The day's operations resulted in securing most of the southern end of SAIPAN except for NAUTAN POINT. BLT 2/105 in HTLF reserve was released to the 27thInfDiv. RCT 106 completed landing and was placed in HTLF reserve. Supply situation progressed satisfactorily.
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(10) D + 6, June 21. The attack on SAIPAN continued. The 27thInfDiv attacked at 0730 with four battalions abreast to capture NAUTAN POINT. Little advance was made. The 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv prepared to continue the attack and patrolled 800 to 1500 yards to their front with no opposition encountered. Enemy weapons captured were being extensively employed.

(11) D + 7, June 22. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Night patrolling 600 to 1000 yards to front of 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv during the night encountered only Japanese patrols and isolated outposts. Small enemy air raid during past night resulted in 1 KIA and 4 WIA from 13-500 pound bombs in the 14th Marines area. Following artillery preparation by 18 Battalions of artillery of ten minutes duration 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv jumped off to the attack at 0600. 27thInfDiv less one RCT and one BLT in NTLF Reserve. RCT 105 contained enemy at NAUTAN POINT. BLT 1/106 in NTLF Reserve engaged in rear area mopping up mission. The operations for the day resulted in capture of important approaches to MT. TAPOTCHAU and improving positions. The first squadron of P47s landed at ASLITO field.

(12) D + 8, June 23. The attack on SAIPAN continued. The enemy was active along entire front during night. The attack jumped off at 1000 with the three divisions abreast with the 27thInfDiv in the center, 2dMarDiv on the left and the 4thMarDiv on the right. The 27thInfDiv was delayed and did not jump off with all units until 1315 and consequently the other divisions anchored their flanks and moved slowly. It made 500 yards advance on the right of the right flank regiment and 200 yards advance in the center of the left flank regiment during day. BLT 2/105 was placed under NTLF control with the mission of cleaning up NAUTAN POINT. The battalion delayed in jumping off until 1300 and made little or no advance. The day's operation resulted in placing three divisions in the line against the enemy. Little advance was made.

(13) D + 9, June 24. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Enemy artillery concentrations were received by the 2dMarDiv during the night. Three divisions abreast jumped off to a coordinated attack at 0800. In about one hour the 2dMarDiv left advanced about 1000 yards. The 27thInfDiv left moved about 800 yards in three hours but at 1155 their right flank was driven back by an enemy attack. Its lines were restored by committing a reserve battalion and the advance continued. The 4thMarDiv advanced about 4000 yards during the day against light opposition.
BLT 2/105 attacking at NAFUTAN POINT was to jump off at daylight but delayed until 0800 and made no appreciable gains during the day. The operations for the day resulted in appreciable gains along the main front. About 30 tanks were destroyed. Additional commanding terrain was gained for continuing the attack. At 1800, 24 June, Major General Sanfor Jarman, USA assumed command of the 27thInfDiv, vice Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, relieved.

(14) D + 10, June 26. The attack continued on SAIPAN. Enemy activity during the night consisted of some artillery fire and an air raid of about 14 planes. No damage inflicted. At 0730 the three divisions jumped off to the attack. The 4thMarDiv advanced 2000 yards in the first two hours against light opposition. The 27thInfDiv maneuvered in its zone of action to flank enemy defenses by attacking perpendicular to the general direction of advance. During the day an advance of 600 to 1000 yards was made. The 2dMarDiv advanced about 400 to 800 yards during the day and captured MT. TA OTCHAI, the commanding ground of the island. Some elements of the division entered GARAPAN. Garrison Forces SAIPAN were assigned an area of responsibility and BLT 2/105 assigned to them to continue the attack on NAFUTAN POINT. Little advance was made there during the day. The day's operations resulted in gains on all fronts. The 4thMarDiv cleaned up the KAGAHAN PENINSULA Area resulting in a considerable reduction of the NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force front.

(15) D + 11, June 26. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Patrols during the night traced the location of enemy front lines. The attack was in echelon. 2dMarDiv jumped off at 0730 and the 27thInfDiv at 1305. The 4thMarDiv was well ahead in its zone and held its gains awaiting the straightening out of lines. During the day the 2dMarDiv advanced about 800 yards. The 27th InfDiv gained about 2000 yards on its right and came abreast of the 4thMarDiv but was held up on its left. The operations for the day resulted in improving positions along the lines with appreciable gains on the right of the 27thInfDiv and the center of the 2dMarDiv. About half of SAIPAN was now in our possession and our forces hold the best positions they had held since the initial landing.

(16) D + 12, June 27. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Enemy planes were over SAIPAN three times during the night. Several casualties reported from bombing at ASLITO Airfield but no other damage. During the night an estimated 500 enemy slipped out of NAFUTAN POINT area being held by BLT 2/105. The airfield was attacked but the enemy was repulsed by engineers
and seaboos with loss of one plane. Other installations reported being attacked. The main force of the enemy proceeded towards hill 500 near MAGICIENNE BAY on which the 25th Marines in NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force reserve had been strategically placed. By 1000 the 25th Marines had killed over 200, the 2d Bn 14th Marines over 100 and other artillery and infantry units reported Japanese killed resulting in a total of over 500 destroyed. At King-hour, 0630, the 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack. The 4thMarDiv was delayed by the above infiltration into its artillery positions until 0730 when, with the 165th Inf attacked, it jumped off and gained about 2000 yards during the day. The 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv meeting heavier resistance advanced only about 400 yards. The 4thMarDiv lines were far ahead of the 27thInfDiv lines and necessitated three Battalions to cover the 4thMarDiv's open left flank. NAFUTAN POINT was cleared, with scattered enemy remaining.

(17) D + 13, June 28. The attack continued on SAIPAN. Enemy planes were over SAIPAN three times during the night. At 0630 the 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack. The 4thMarDiv held its positions awaiting the advance of the 27thInfDiv on its left. The day's operations resulted in a 600 yard advance in the center of the 27thInfDiv and a 300 yard advance by the 2d MarDiv right flank. The rough terrain impeded advance more than did the enemy resistance. Major General George W. Griner, USA, assumed command of the 27thInfDiv vice Major General Sanford Jarman, reassigned as Commanding General, SAIPAN Garrison Force.

(18) D + 14, June 29. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Enemy planes were over SAIPAN during the night and two enemy aircraft were shot down. The 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack at 0700. The 27thInfDiv was delayed until 0730 when it jumped off with two Battalions. The third battalion, scheduled to jump off at 0730, did not arrive on the line in time to do so and a coordinated attack of three Battalions jumped off at 1400. The 4thMarDiv held its positions and the 25th Marines continued in NT&LF Reserve. The day's operations resulted in a 1000 yard advance in the 27thInfDiv zone. The 2dMarDiv right flank advanced 500 to 1000 yards with the left flank holding.

(19) D + 15, June 30. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Naval gunfire and ground and carrier based planes continued to support the attack. Corps Artillery continued fires on SAIPAN and TINIAN. The 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack at 0700. The 27thInfDiv was delayed fifteen minutes...
to straighten out lines. The 4thMarDiv held its positions. The
day's operations resulted in an advance of 500 yards in the 27th
InfDiv area and about 200 yards on the right flank of the 2dMarDiv.
At the end of the month, after 18 days of fighting, slightly
more than one half of SAIPAN was in our hands.

(20) D + 16, July 1. The attack on SAIPAN
continued. During the night all divisions had out patrols to the
front to find and trace the front lines of the enemy. The night
was generally quiet. Enemy planes were over SAIPAN at 0658, 2045
and 2150 and dropped bombs but no casualties or damage. Our night
fighter downed one. Following an artillery preparation the 2dMarDiv
and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack at 0730. The 4thMarDiv
held its gains and supported the attack by fire. The 25th Marines
remained in NTLF reserve. The operations for the period resulted
in the advance of 2dMarDiv center and right flank 500 to 600 yards
with the left flank holding fast on favorable high ground. The
27thInfDiv advanced about 500 yards during the day. Tactical air
observers and artillery air observers have been invaluable through-
out the operation.

(21) D + 17, July 2. The attack on SAIPAN
continued. Generally quiet during night. A Red alert was sounded
at 0638 but no bombs were dropped. Our night fighter shot down one
enemy plane. Following a heavy artillery preparation the three
divisions abreast jumped off at 0830. The 4thMarDiv advanced rapidly
1600 by 1345 and was ordered to halt, organize its positions, and
protect the gap on its left flank caused by the rapid advance. The
27thInfDiv made little advance by 1130 but enemy opposition was by-
passed or mopped up and by dark had advanced 1400 to 1800 yards and
gained contact with the 4thMarDiv on the right. The 2dMarDiv on
the left advanced 800 yards into GARAPAN by 1200 and simultaneously
advanced and pushed out its center to take the high ground over-
looking GARAPAN. The 25th Marines and the 2Bn 165th Inf were en-
gaged in anti-sniper patrols in NTLF reserve. The day's operations
resulted in an advance of about 600 to 1200 yards in the 2dMarDiv
zone of action, 1400 to 1800 yards in the 27thInfDiv zone and 1600
yards in the 4thMarDiv zone. A gap of 400 to 500 yards existed be-
tween the left of the 27thInfDiv and the right of the 2dMarDiv
which was this distance in rear. NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force
Memorandum Number 9-44, subject, Occupation of Positions for the
Night and Preparation for Night Counterattack was published this
date.
(22) **D + 18, July 3.** The attack on SAIPAN continued. Minor enemy activity during the night. Our patrols were out all along the front. Following an artillery preparation the 2dMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack at 0800. The 4thMarDiv on the right was delayed until 1100 in jumping off due to moving another regiment into the line for the attack. The 25th Marines reverted to the 4thMarDiv from NTLF reserve. The 2d Bn 165th Inf in NTLF Reserve continued anti-sniper patrols. 2d Bn 105th Inf attached to Garrison Force reverted to 27thInfDiv and Company B VPhibCorps Reconnaissance Bn was released to SAIPAN Garrison Forces. Garrison Forces were prepared to assemble on two hours notice all available personnel of the troop port command and of the Engineer Group. The day's operations resulted in advances as follows: 2dMarDiv 600 to 1200 yards, 27thInfDiv 600 to 800 yards and 4thMarDiv 1200 to 1600 yards. High commanding terrain was held all along the center of the lines. Nine infantry regiments were in the line on an 11,000 yard front.

(23) **D + 19, July 4.** The attack on SAIPAN continued. Enemy activity and infiltration reported along entire front during the night. At 0700 following an artillery preparation the 2dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv and 27thInfDiv jumped off to the attack. The 2d Marines secured NUTCHI POINT by 0900. By 1000 the 6th Marines were on the beach at TANAPAG HARBOR and by 1320 the 8th Marines reached TANAPAG HARBOR. GARAPAN was announced secured at 1830. The 27thInfDiv advanced against retreating Japanese about 1600 yards on the left to reach the beach near TANAPAG. On the right the 105th Inf and the 165th Inf advanced about 1200 yards. The 4thMarDiv advanced 800 to 1500 yards to gain high ground overlooking TANAPAG on the left and gaining high ground to the North to protect the Corps right flank. The day's operations resulted in capturing GARAPAN and most of the TANAPAG HARBOR area and advances were made to cut off any enemy attempting to escape from the TANAPAG area and to extend the lines 1500 to 1600 yards to the Northeast. At 1400 2d Bn 165th Inf reverted to the 27thInfDiv. The 3d Bn 8th Marines had passed to NTLF reserve at 0915. The 2d Marines lost the 2d Bn passed to NTLF Reserve at 1452 and the 3d Bn 8th Marines was attached to the 2d Marines.

(24) **D + 20, July 5.** The attack on SAIPAN continued. The enemy was active along the entire front during the night. The order for the attack this date changed the boundaries and pinched out the 27thInfDiv and gave the entire Northern portion of SAIPAN to the zone of the 4thMarDiv. The 27thInfDiv was to continue to the West coast in its zone of action.
The 2dMarDiv less detachments passed to NTLF reserve to continue anti-sniper patrols and mopping up. During the morning the 4th MarDiv and the 27thInfDiv executed preliminary local operations to adjust the front lines within their zones prior to launching a coordinated attack to the NE at 1200. King-hour was changed to 1300 due to the delay incident to the relief of the 4thMarDiv units in the 27thInfDiv zone which was completed by 1025. At 1300 following an artillery preparation, units of the 27thInfDiv and the left regiment of the 4thMarDiv jumped off to the attack. The right regiment was delayed in jumping off due to the road congestion in movement from the 27thInfDiv zone of action to the 4thMarDiv zone of action subsequent to their relief. By 1400 this regiment had jumped off and by 1525 the 4thMarDiv had advanced about 1000 to 1200 yards with their right regiment slightly in advance. On this day the 2dMarDiv (Reinf) less 6th Marines, 2d Marines (less 2d Bn), 3d Bn 8th Marines and the 10th Marines (less 1st and 2d Bns) was engaged in anti-sniper patrols in NTLF Reserve. The 6th Marines in NTLF reserve was engaged in anti-sniper patrols. The 2d Marines (less 2d Bn) with 5d Bn 8th Marines attached remained in NTLF reserve in 4thMarDiv zone of action. The 10th Marines (less 1st and 2d Bns) passed to 4thMarDiv control. The day's operations resulted in an advance of 400 to 1000 yards in the zone of the 27thInfDiv and 1500 yards in the 4thMarDiv zone. Approximately three fourths of the island of SAIPAN was secured.

(25) D + 21, July 6. The attack on SAIPAN continued. There was considerable enemy activity all along the front during the night. Our patrols were out to the front where units were not in contact with the enemy. At 0700 following an artillery preparation the attack jumped off in echelon. The 27th InfDiv on the left jumped off at 0700 and the 4thMarDiv jumped off at 0900. At 0915 RCT 2 was released from NTLF Reserve to the control of the 4thMarDiv. By 1400 the 4thMarDiv had relieved all elements of the 27thInfDiv in its new zone and their two right regiments had advanced about 1200 yards against light opposition. The 27thInfDiv advanced against stronger opposition and lost eight tanks as a result of encountering enemy short bangalore torpedoes and C type mines. The 4thMarDiv left also advanced against stubborn opposition. The 2dMarDiv (Reinf) less 2d Marines, 6th Marines, 10th Marines (less 1st and 2d Bns), 1st Bn 29th Marines and Co A 2d Tank Bn were engaged in anti-sniper patrols in their assigned zone in NTLF Reserve. The 6th Marines in NTLF Reserve near TA 213 was engaged in anti-sniper patrols. The day's operations resulted in the following advances: In the 4thMarDiv zone, 25th Marines on the right 2000 yards, 24th Marines in the center 1700 yards, 23d Marines on the left 200 to 500 yards; the 27thInfDiv advanced 200 to 300 yards in its zone. Good progress was being made on the new KAGMAN POINT airfield construction. 1st Bn
29th Marines at 1000 passed from control of 2dMarDiv to control SAIPAN Garrison Forces, relieving Co B VPhibCorps Recon Bn, which reverted to control NTLF. Based on intelligence information, the Commanding General visited the Division CP's this date and warned Division Commanders to prepare for and be particularly alert for a hostile counterattack.

(26) D + 22, July 7. The attack on SAIPAN continued. Enemy activity was considerable throughout the night. Enemy attacks in groups of about 100 were reported on the front of the 4thMarDiv and the 27thInfDiv and active fire fights reported throughout the night. The most intense activity was on the front of the 105th Inf on the left in the 27thInfDiv zone. Enemy planes over SAIPAN during the night at 1944, 2226, 0025. No casualties reported. At 0510 the 27thInfDiv reported a "Banzai" attack on their left flank in the 105th Inf zone of action. Two platoons of tanks were ordered to their support; the strength of the enemy attack was undetermined. The 27thInfDiv alerted their reserve, the 106th Inf, to move to meet the counterattack. By 0635 the Japanese attack had overrun the 1st and 2d Bns of the 105th Inf.

The Japanese attack continued down the coast two to three thousand yards toward GARAPAN and overrun two batteries of the 3d Bn 10th Marines. The two artillery batteries fired all their ammunition at their position using air bursts and superquick bursts to their immediate front. When all artillery and MG ammunition was expended the firing locks of the guns were removed and the artillerymen manned the lines as infantrymen. By 0755 the 106th Inf was committed to recover the field artillery positions and restore the lines of the 105th Inf. By dark the divisions had recovered about half of the ground lost and most of the artillery positions which had only two guns damaged (one by enemy tank fire and one by the artillerymen). The CP of RCT 105 was surrounded by enemy but held out in a pocket beyond our lines employing regiments' headquarters troops.

Remnants of the 1st and 2d Bns 105th Inf which had been overrun drifted back into our lines throughout the day; other remnants waded out on the reef and were rescued by out destroyers that came to their aid. Losses were reported undetermined but heavy. Enemy dead later counted on the ground indicated a strength of 2000 to 3000 enemy participated in the counterattack. In the meantime the 4thMarDiv had jumped off to the attack at 0930 and made the following advances during the day: 2d Marines on the left 400 yards, 23d Marines on the left center 100 yards, 24th Marines on the right center 1000 - 1200 yards and 25th Marines on the right 600 to 1000 yards. The 2dMarDiv (less detachments) was in position to back up the counterattack on the 27thInfDiv left.
flank. The following moves were ordered during the day: At 0900
3d Bn 6th Marines was released to the 27thInfDiv, at 1010 the 2d
MarDiv less RCT 2 and RCT 6 was ordered to extend their North
boundary and occupy hill 209 HOW and be alert for further moves,
at 1200 the 6th Marines (less 3d Bn) reverted to the 2d MarDiv
and the 2dMarDiv ordered to occupy and hold the high ground along
the line 225 FOX 230 DOG prepared to pass through or relieve the
27thInfDiv, which was accomplished by 1800. The operations for
the day resulted in repulsing a determined enemy counterattack and
restoring all but about 500 yards of the ground lost in the zone
of the 27thInfDiv, shifting Corps Reserves to back up the 27thInf
Div and making appreciable gains as previously stated in the zone
of the 4thMarDiv.

(27) D + 23, July 8. The attack on SAIPAN
continued. Considerable enemy activity continued in the area of
the counterattack during the past night. Small enemy units would
blow whistles and attack the 106th Inf lines throughout the night
but all attacks were broken up. LVT's evacuated about 300
casualties from the pocket held by the CP group from the 105th Inf
Regt. At 0525 the 27thInfDiv reported the 106th Inf Regt was re-
ceiving a fairly heavy counterattack but no Japanese had broken
through. Enemy planes were over SAIPAN during the night at 1940,
2145 and 0124. No casualties were incurred and 2 enemy planes shot
down. At 0630 the 4thMarDiv following an artillery preparation
jumped off to the attack. With one battalion each of the 24th
Marines and the 25th Marines protecting the right flank of the 4th
MarDiv changed its direction of attack to the West. By 1530 the
2d, 23d and 24th Marines (less one Bn) had reached the West coast
and were mopping up cave areas. At 0630 the 2dMarDiv started for-
ward from their night positions and by noon had relieved the 27th
InfDiv. The 165th Inf Regt and 3d Bn 6th on the right passed to
the 2dMarDiv upon the passage of lines. The enemy resisted the
advance of the 2dMarDiv with machine guns, hand grenades, small
arms fire, bayonets on the end of long sticks and swords. By the
end of the day only two small pockets of enemy resistance remained
in the zone of the 2dMarDiv, one on the right of the 6th Marines
and the other between the 8th Marines and the 165th Inf. The 27th
InfDiv continued to repulse fanatic enemy charges until relieved
by the 2dMarDiv. Upon being relieved the 27thInfDiv assembled
one regiment in NTLF reserve in the area overlooking GARAPAN. The
remainder of the division assembled in the zone of the 4thMarDiv
prepared to hold high ground in their rear or on NTLF order to
reinforce the 4thMarDiv. The operations for the day resulted in
the 2dMarDiv capturing all but two small pockets in its zone of
- 20 -
action after effecting a passage of lines, and the 4thMarDiv making advances that left only three square miles of SAIPAN to be taken.

(28) D + 24, July 9. The attack on SAIPAN continued. All organized resistance ceased at 1615. Following a night of only minor enemy activity and infiltration, the 4thMarDiv and the 2dMarDiv jumped off to the attack at 0630. By 1440 the 2dMarDiv reported enemy pockets reduced and units on the beach all along the line. By 1540 the 25th Marines on the right of the 4th MarDiv was at the end of the island in their zone. By 1615 the 24th Marines and the 2d Marines had reached the end of the island at which time all organized resistance had ceased and the Island of SAIPAN officially announced secured. Intensive mopping up of enemy in caves and in ravines continued. At 0700 this date D Company 2d Armored AmphTank Bn passed to the 4thMarDiv to assist the 23d Marines by firing into caves along the coast from the seaward. The results were reported as excellent. The day's operations resulted in the completion of capture of the Island of SAIPAN with mopping up continuing and three battalions of XXIV Corps Artillery completing registration on TINIAN.


(a) Ship to Shore Movement.

(1) LVT's and DUKW's.

a. The amphibian tractor is the only assault landing craft or vehicle in which assault troops can be landed on a beach bordered by a fringing or barrier reef at any stage of the tide. For the landing on SAIPAN six amphibian tractor battalions (3 Marine and 3 Army) were employed to land assault troops and supplies. Two armored amphibian battalions (1 Marine and 1 Army) were employed with or in front of the first wave of troop carrying LVT's to furnish gunfire on the beach after naval gunfire had lifted. A total of over 700 LVT's were employed during the ship to shore movement.

b. Assault LVT's were transported to the objective in LST's and LSD's exclusively. Assault troops were embarked in the LST's carrying LVT's in which they were to land. This proved highly satisfactory in that the troops and the LVT officers were able to cover thoroughly their landing plans en route and also avoid the usual transfer of troops from APA's to LST's on the morning of D-day. The LST's were somewhat overcrowded by the large number of troops embarked but the morale of
troops remained high and this method of embarkation is recommended for future similar operations. Troops had to be transferred to LSD's carrying LVT's in the Transport Area.

c. The assault cargo LVT's landed a normal load of 18 assault troops. A standard load of supplies was also carried by each LVT which consisted of ten cases of small arms ammunition, two boxes of grenades, one clover leaf of mortar ammunition and four cans of water. These supplies did not overcrowd the troops or interfere with the LVT machine gunners. This is considered an excellent means of landing an initial resupply.

d. The majority of cargo LVT's were equipped with improvised pin-on armor as prescribed by Bu-ships and this armor proved highly effective against small arms fire at mid ranges. The added weight caused by the armor did not materially affect operation or endanger the free board. Most of the LVT forward machine guns were equipped with a semi-circular splinter shield which saved lives and gave added confidence to the gunners. This shield should be adopted as standard equipment.

e. The AmTanks with the 75mm How mounted proved far superior to the AmTanks with the 37mm mounted. The fire of the 75mm How is more effective against beach emplacements and in several instances Japanese tanks were engaged and destroyed. The 37mm does not provide the fire power needed in the initial phase of the landing. It is recommended the 75mm How AmTank be continued in production and that experiments be conducted to determine if the 105mm How can be mounted in the AmTank. The AmTanks are not adequately armored and recommendations for increased armor protection has been forwarded by separate communication.

f. The cargo LVT with the stern ramp is far superior to the cargo LVT without a ramp. The LVT(4) with the ramp has an emergency capacity of 35 boat spaces in addition to the crew. It is capable of transporting vehicles, certain types of 105mm Howitzers, ammunition, demolition and machine gun carts, radio and ambulance jeeps and other such equipment which makes it extremely valuable in landing operations.

g. The control of LVT's during the landing was excellent. LVT control personnel paralleled the navy control system. The Corps LVT officer was aboard the Central Control Vessel, the LVT Battalion Commanders were on the PC Control Vessels...
off each regimental beach, an LVT officer was on each LCC Control
Boat off each battalion beach, an LVT officer landed with each
shore party commander and all LVT control and unit commanders were
in communication with the respective LVT Battalion Commanders.
The control system is recommended for future operations.

h. There were not sufficient LVT's available
to land all regimental reserves initially. Consequently a LVT
troop transfer area was established for the transfer of troops em-
barked in LCVP's to the LVT's upon return from landing assault
waves. The LVT's returned to the transfer area on the flank of
the landing beach. When the transfer was ready to be effected,
the control officer at the transfer area called for the LVT's and
stationed them in wave formations in rear of the line of departure
and effected the transfer by bringing the LCVP's alongside. The
wave of LVT's was then dispatched to the beach. This or a similar
system properly controlled is effective for the orderly transfer
of troops from landing craft to LVT's. This is, however, a slow
process and LST's with LVT's embarked should be provided for
regimental reserves of assault regiments.

1. The maintenance of LVT's was accomplished
by designating one LST for each battalion as a repair LST and pre-
loading the necessary repair equipment aboard. One LST per bata-
illon proved inadequate. At least one per beach is required. The
LSD is more desirable as an LVT repair ship due to its added facili-
ties for repair and it is recommended they be used for this pur-
pose if available after launching their initial loads. The
maintenance ashore was greatly hampered by lack of spare parts
and heavy maintenance equipment. Provisions must be made to pre-
vent this need arising in the future. LVT's were refueled during
the operation by LCVP's loaded with fuel at the troop transfer
area. The hand pumps that were used slowed up the process
considerably. Larger craft and more efficient pumps should be
provided for future operations.

j. A number of LVT(4)'s were attached to
artillery regiments to land artillery and ammunition and produced
excellent results. These LVT's are very useful for towing in the
event DUKW's are unable to negotiate the reef. Evacuation of
casualties was initially exclusively handled by LVT's to landing
craft off the reef. After the assault was over, LVT's were used
as a supply medium and continued unloading supplies over the roof
to inland dumps until D+25. This was required due to limited
dock and beach facilities. The S.O.P. for the operation of LVT's
in the ship to shore movement prepared by this Corps will be re-
vised to incorporate lessons learned from the Operation.
k. LVT losses at SAIPAN were low in considering the enemy opposition and surf conditions. Of 719 LVT's employed, 184 were lost operationally, however, 74 of that number have been returned to OAHU for base maintenance.

1. During the operation the 2½ ton Amphibious Truck (DUKW) proved invaluable in landing artillery, ammunition and supplies. It is a dependable, sea worthy vehicle and surpasses the LVT for durability on long hauls and lasting qualities. A total of three companies were used initially. It is recommended that no less than two companies per division be assigned for any amphibious operation in the future.

(2) Control of the ship to shore movement.

The control of the ship to shore movement in the attack on SAIPAN was the most effective realized to date. In addition to the LVT control as previously mentioned, there was a tactical and logistical control which provided for parallel Navy and Marine representatives for every control point from the ship to the beach.

There was a central control vessel for the control of all beaches. There was a control vessel for each division beach, a control vessel for each regimental beach and a control craft for each battalion beach. Aboard each control vessel was found a naval officer acting as control officer. He was assisted in his duties by a tactical officer, a supply officer and an LVT officer from each parallel landing force echelon. The troop commander or his executive was usually embarked initially in the regimental or battalion control craft. Each control vessel was plainly marked by flying a flag that represented the beach or beaches over which it maintained jurisdiction. The LVT’s were plainly marked with vertical stripes painted on their sides corresponding to the beach on which they were to land. Landing craft guide boats were assigned to each wave to form and to guide each wave to the proper beach. After reaching the beach a parallel beachmaster set up was in effect to correspond to each shore party echelon. With this control arrangement it was possible to have a flexibility never before realized and the system is recommended for future operations.

(3) Scheme of landing.

For the scheme of landing on SAIPAN reference is made to Annex KING to NORTHERN Troops and Landing
For Operation Order Number 3-44 found in enclosure "A". By the
general scheme of LVT and LST allocation and the timing of waves
8000 troops were landed ashore in twenty minutes with the loss
of nine LVT's operationally. Subsequent enemy artillery fire
on the beach area resulted in many casualties and the advantage
of clearing the beach areas as rapidly as possible was clearly
demonstrated.

(4) Shore Party.

For the organization and operations of the
shore party see Enclosure (J)(2). From D-day to D + 10 an average
of 7,183 tons per day of supplies were unloaded across the beaches.
The organization of the shore party was improvised but produced
excellent results. However, due consideration should be given to
providing a permanent shore party organization for amphibious
operations.

(b) Naval Gunfire Support.

(1) The fire support ships were aggressive,
enthusiastic and cooperative in the support of the troops on
SAIPAN. Night star shell illumination was capably and repeatedly
furnished nightly throughout the operation.

(2) Preliminary bombardment commencing on D
minus two by fast heavy battleships was continued by other fire
support ships until the time of landing. Undoubtedly naval gun-
fire destruction played a large part in the success of the landing
on and capture of SAIPAN. The destruction of sugar cane fields
by burning with white phosphorous was invaluable to the advance
of the infantry.

(3) For the landing, naval gunfire was continued
by battleships and cruisers until the waves were 1200 yards off
shore and the destroyers until the waves were 300 yards from the
beach. The fires were then lifted to the flanks and inland until
the shore fire control parties were set up ashore for the control
of fires. The fires were well controlled. Most of the ships had
previously supported landings in the Central Pacific and had
trained in close support which shore fire control parties from
this Corps on KAHOOLAWE Island, T. H. The doctrine established
is basically sound and effective support improves with every
operation and continued training. Provision should, however, be
made to ensure continuous fire on areas inland from beaches from
which light artillery and mortars can harass troops after landing.
(4) The Corps Naval Gunfire Officer was set up ashore at the CP near the Air Officer and Artillery Officer. For proper coordination it is essential that these agencies be together.

(5) Enemy artillery located inland was not effectively destroyed prior to the landing. Intensive training must be given to naval gunfire air spotters in the location of enemy artillery inland for future operations.

(6) LCI(G)'s were effectively used late in the operation to fire into caves along the coast in addition to their original mission of supporting the landing. For firing close to troops after the landing a liaison officer was habitually placed aboard for coordination. The troops are enthusiastic in praise of the close support furnished by LCI(G)'s in landings. Their fire was continued until the waves were almost on the beach and the close support furnished by LCI(G)'s in landings. Their fire was continued until the waves were almost on the beach and then close fires were shifted to the flanks. LCI's were also used with loud-speakers and interpreters aboard later to persuade the surrender of hundreds of civilians and Japanese military in caves along the coast.

(7) For large scale operations more emphasis must be placed on corps and division control of naval gunfire for proper coordination. It is also necessary that adequately trained personnel be provided to handle naval gunfire. It is a powerful weapon that at times is handled by inexperienced officers. The naval officers particularly should have more prestige given their arduous and responsible assignments and should be provided more adequate training prior to representing the Navy ashore.

(c) Air Support.

(1) The air strikes prior to the landings completely cleared the air of enemy planes. The excellent coverage provided by our air throughout the operation resulted in almost complete disregard of camouflage discipline. Units were aware of and secure in the superiority our air maintained. The preliminary strikes on major Japanese installations and the burning of cane fields played an important part in the capture of SAIPAN.

(2) Close support by air, however, must be improved upon. There was often a shortage of aircraft for such missions; also there is a growing lack of confidence in close support air flying missions close to front lines in spite of the success of the majority of such missions. This attitude is
attributed mainly to a number of casualties resulting from mis-
placed strikes, and the slow results obtained on calls for close
support missions. To improve this condition it is believed
necessary that pilots to execute close support must have more
training with ground troops. It is believed special squadrons
should be assigned for this special mission and that carriers
be designated and trained for the particular task of close
support. It is further believed that Marine squadrons would be
best fitted for this type of employment.

(3) Tactical air observers and artillery ob-
servers flying from carriers and from land bases were highly
successful. For the future it is recommended that four SBD type
planes be permanently assigned to each VMO squadron for tactical
air and high speed observation missions once the landing is
successful and a landing field is established ashore. On some
occasions carrier planes assigned this mission were called away
for other tasks resulting in inadequate air observation for the
ground troops.

(d) Field Artillery.

(1) In addition to the divisional artillery,
the XXIV Corps Artillery employed two battalions each of 155mm
How's and 155mm Guns in this operation. A total of eighteen
battalions of artillery were available for support. Artillery
played a major role in the capture of SAIPAN and once ashore
constantly kept enemy batteries on SAIPAN and TINIAN neutralized.
The artillery was throughout the operation closely coordinated
with air and naval gunfire at the NORTHERN Troops and Landing
Force OP. The need for Corps Artillery for landing operations
in which more than one division is employed at a single objective
was definitely established.

(2) The 75mm Pack How Battalions again demon-
strated their versatility in landing under enemy fire and occupying
positions practically undetected by the enemy. In spite of
the many advantages of versatility of this weapon, however, it
provides inadequate fire power for normal operations over a
period of time. With the advent of the DUKV and LVT(4) for land-
ing artillery, it is recommended that the 75mm Pack Howitzer be
replaced in Marine divisions by the 105mm Howitzer. Some 75mm
Pack Howitzer material should be maintained in Corps Artillery
for assignment to divisions for special landings or special
mountainous terrain missions. It is recommended that the artil-
lery regiment of the Marine division consist of four battalions of
105mm Howitzers. When the division is on a separate mission one
battalion of 155mm Howitzers should be attached.
(3) Japanese infiltration tactics definitely demonstrated the need for automatic weapons in field artillery battalions. The Tables of Organization for all artillery battalions should include at least 36 Browning Automatic Rifles and 3 light machine guns.

(e) Tanks.

(1) In the attack on SAIPAN tanks were habitually used to precede the infantry advance where the terrain permitted. The infantry followed the tanks closely to cover them with fire while the tanks searched out enemy opposition. Normally, one company of tanks was assigned to each infantry battalion in the attack or kept the company under regimental control depending on the terrain. This employment of tanks is considered highly desirable in operations similar to the attack on SAIPAN. When larger land masses are taken, the need for a stronger mobile reserve will demand additional tanks battalions to be attached to the Corps as appropriate to the terrain and mechanized opposition. It was found desirable to keep tanks well forward at night.

(2) The light tank is found to be of little value in operations in the Central Pacific because of its light armor. The 37mm cannon was, however, effective on occasion to protect medium tanks from enemy infantry. It is recommended that the medium tank replace the light tank completely and that at least one medium tank per platoon be equipped with a flamethrower of long range as the primary weapon.

(3) Infantry-tank communication is not adequate. Telephones placed on the rear of the tank to enable infantry to communicate with the occupants of tanks are of value but cannot be used in many situations. A suitable light, durable radio set is needed to facilitate good infantry-tank communication.

(f) Infantry.

(1) Preliminary reports indicate that the new Marine infantry organization is satisfactory. There appears to be a great need for a machine gun officer on the staff of each Battalion Commander to coordinate a battalion base of fire when needed and also to coordinate the training of machine gunners between operations.

(2) Training for operations against the Japanese should continue to stress small unit leadership and small unit training. The need for thorough individual training and discipline is becoming more apparent each day. Individuals became very careless in use of cover and contemptuous of enemy
marksman, as the attack progressed resulting in unnecessary casualties.

(3) In future operations provisions should be made for at least one hot meal per day for the troops. The "C" and "K" rations are highly favored for operations of short duration but will not keep the troops in fighting trim over long periods of time. Fruit juices should be served frequently and hot coffee should be available daily.

(4) The desirability of the 4.2mm mortar for use by the infantry in the early stage of a landing is apparent. This weapon is meeting with high favor in all theaters of war and was very effectively used by the 27thInfDiv in this operation. Consideration should be given to its employment in Marine divisions.

(5) Reports indicate the carbine is of limited value but that the other infantry small arms weapons are generally satisfactory. The half track mounting the 75mm gun is a very valuable weapon and it is believed the number should be increased to 6 per regiment.

(g) **Japanese Tactics and Defense.**

When the landing on SAIPAN was made, Japanese initial active resistance consisted largely of artillery and mortar fire. Once the bulk of his artillery and mortars were destroyed, by D plus two, there was little semblance of effective control or organization to the overall Japanese defense that remained. For details reference is made to Enclosure (D).

(h) **Intelligence.**

(1) During the first weeks of March little information was available relative to the enemy situation on SAIPAN. Only one photo mission had been flown during the February strike and incomplete coverage had resulted. It was then estimated there were approximately 5500 - 6500 troops garrisoning the SAIPAN-TINIAN area but no breakdown of strength by islands was attempted. By the end of March, however, it was evident that the enemy was taking definite steps to strengthen his holdings in the Southern MARIANAS. Between that date and D-day three additional sorties were flown by our aircraft and a great increase in defensive installations was noted. Also, there were strong indications that major troop reinforcement of SAIPAN was in progress and it was estimated there were 12,000 - 14,000 combat troops located there on D-day. This estimate was later changed by analysis of captured documents and interrogation of POW's taken during the first two days of the battle. Those sources indicated there was probably a total of 22,000 - 24,000 enemy troops present on 15 June. At
this time it was determined that the bulk of the SAIPAN defense force consisted of the 43d Infantry Division, reinforced by one tank regiment (100 tanks) and one artillery regiment, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 58th KEBITAI and other naval and supporting units, including independent artillery battalions.

(2) Selection of landing beaches was made largely from aerial photographs taken during the initial February coverage and from charts and other hydrographic data captured during the Operation. From this material two major landing areas appeared feasible, one on the beaches in the GARAFAN-TANAPAG area and another on the beaches off CHARAN-KANOAA. A third minor landing area was selected as possible on small beaches in MAGICIENNE BAY. Selection of the CHARAN-KANOAA beaches was determined upon in part because of their suitability for a two division landing, because the terrain inland allowed tank operation and an easy extension into a larger beachhead once a successful landing had been made, and because heavy equipment and supplies could be landed through the break in the reef off BLUE Beaches in support of our troops ashore.

(3) At the time of our landings very little was known of the enemy's plan for defense but it was soon developed from captured documents and actual experience that it was to withdraw initially from the beaches in the face of our landings and to shell these beaches with all available weapons to prevent our landing supplies and then to launch a coordinated attack against our positions before we were able to consolidate them. This plan proved partially successful in holding up our advance for several days.

(4) After failing to repulse our forces on the beaches and after losing the Southern end of the island the enemy shifted his line to run East and West through GARAFAN, MT. TAPOT-CHAU, MAGICIENNE BAY. This line was held for several days with the 156th, 156th and 118th Infantry Regiments, plus the Special Naval Landing Force in the line. This line was effectively penetrated on its left flank where captured documents indicate a misunderstanding of orders and disrupted communications caused the 118th Infantry to withdraw to prepared positions to the North. This error caused the whole line to be outflanked and the enemy was forced to withdraw to prevent being cut off in the rear. After this defensive position was broken the enemy rapidly lost faith in his chances to stop our advance and finally on 5 July when he received word from the Empire that he could expect no
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further assistance, General SAITO decided to make a final all out
"Banzai" charge with all the forces he could muster. This attack
was carried out before dawn on 7 July against the 27thInfDiv North
of GARAPAN with an estimated 2000 to 3000 troops participating.
These forces were able to penetrate our lines and drive 1000 to
1500 yards to the rear before they were finally stopped and
annihilated.

(5) After this counter-attack all organized
resistance appeared to crumble and our forces were able to advance
rapidly to the North and secure the remainder of the island on
9 July.

(6) Photo reconnaissance was carried on through-
out the operation and proved to be of great assistance in locating
enemy installations and activities.

(7) Much valuable information was also obtained
from the unprecedented number of POW's taken and the large amounts
of captured documents which were turned into this Headquarters.
For future operations a Radio Intelligence Platoon should
accompany the senior Landing Force Commander in order to take
advantage of radio transmissions made by the enemy also Jamming
facilities should be provided.

(i) Communications.

(1) Communications during the attack on SAIPAN
were excellent. The communication agencies from the battalions
through to the Corps performed commendably. Front line informa-
tion was passed to the rear rapidly, accurately and continuously.
There can be improvement made in beach communication consolidation
and steps will be taken to accomplish this in future operations.

(2) The codes allotted to this Headquarters
were the same as those authorized a battalion commander. To be
able to pass rapid information to higher command echelons afloat
the Landing Force Headquarters must be provided with electric
coding machines. With the devices available, dispatches were
frequently 24 to 48 hours delayed.

(3) During the planning phase the Signal
Officer assisted in all of the Landing Force Communication Planning
for except communication supply. This officer, therefore,
placed into execution the orders as issued (May44) from the con-
cept (abou 15Feb44) of the Operation. This is mentioned
since one plan (CentComTwo) was used by all organizations (with slight modifications) down to and including battalions. NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force communication annex consisted solely of placing CentComTwo into effect. No signal operation instructions were issued. The failure to have the Signal Officer assist in supply planning led to requests for air shipments of critical items needed by company and battalion landing team commanders. The Signal Officer should be allocated block spaces on LST's or small cargo ships in order to establish loading priorities of signal equipment.

(j) Liaison.

This Corps emphasized close personal liaison in planning through all echelons of command. During the operation, in addition to frequent personal visits to front line units by the Commanding General and his staff, liaison teams were sent to each division. The teams were equipped with adequate communication facilities and were a constant source of information. Subordinate units passing to NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Reserve were always required to furnish a liaison officer to this Headquarters.

(k) Supply.

(1) This operation for the first time in the Central Pacific involved questions of resupply for the assault forces, and questions of logistic coordination of forces exceeding one reinforced division at a single objective. The Corps organization available to achieve this control was in some instances improvised and provisional and inadequately staffed. However, it functioned and there was never any serious question as to the ability to provide adequate logistic support to meet the tactical plan.

(2) Supply and evacuation fell into two general phases - the period of division control and the period of corps control. The transition was effected smoothly and logically, and without disruption of the tactical effort.

(3) The operation demonstrated the necessity for providing a corps, operating under an independent mission, with service and supply units capable of handling corps supply and evacuation functions for corps troops, and capable of reinforcing similar services of the subordinate divisions as required. Amphibious divisions have normally been reinforced to provide self-sufficiency of logistic support throughout the operations of short duration, and throughout the period in any larger operation prior to the establishment of a corps service zone. Similar cognizance must be taken of the supply functions of a corps operating alone,
which must perform the supply and service functions normal to a field army.

(4) During this operation, faults of organization were met and remedied by a commendable eagerness on the part of all hands to improvise and to function in multiple capacities, and by a very noticeable and widespread general understanding of the tactical and supply plan. Units understood what they were trying to do. This proved to be the principal reason the plan worked.

(1) Shore Party and Engineer Functions.

(1) Previous operations in this theater involved small land areas, and the shore party organization contained units and personnel with additional and supplemental inland engineer functions. In this operation, a similar organization prevailed in that the principal components of the shore parties were C.B., engineer and pioneer troops. The divisions retained for combat use only their organic engineer combat battalions, and the corps had no engineer troops for corps engineer missions. This proved to be an unsound organization for this operation. The shore parties functioned well and were adequately equipped for their purely shore party functions. They were not properly equipped or even available for inland engineer functions. As shore parties, their interest was naturally confined to the prompt and efficient handling of supplies across the beaches, and to the minor engineer functions incident thereto.

(2) An early need was manifest for troops and equipment for road maintenance and construction, and for engineer staff planning to support the inland tactical and supply plans. This need was met by improvisation, by use and conversion of captured equipment, and by diversion of troops from shore party missions. On the whole it worked very well. The roads held up, circulation was maintained, the beaches were developed and supplies came ashore in quantities and volume exceeding planned expectancies. As previously mentioned, from D-day to D plus 10 an average of 7,18 tons per day crossed SAIPAN beaches.

(3) Medical.

(1) Assault force medical units were called upon to expand their hospital facilities far beyond normal capacity. They provided hospitalization exceeding all expectations, with expansion of hospital bed facilities as high as six times that of the rated capacities. Such over-expansion of bed facilities without increase in medical personal must, by necessity, be accomplished at some sacrifice of the
standard of care afforded each casualty, and also results in marked overtaxing of the existing medical personnel. This situation can be greatly improved by the use of semi-mobile evacuation hospitals in place of field hospitals in the support of divisions engaged in future operations.

(2) Tetanus and gas bacillus infections in the civilian and enemy military personnel and gas bacillus infections in our own troops will continue to be a real menace in future operations over the "night soil" contaminated terrain of this theater.

(3) Future prior planning must include adequate provision for civilian medical care. In this operation, this burden fell to assault force medical units, already overtaxed with their own heavy casualties. This burden on assault force medical units for early hospitalization of civilians can be eased by the inclusion of an advance echelon of garrison hospitalization, equipped with field medical units, in the assault shipping, for unloading during the first week of the assault.

(4) Civil Affairs.

(1) For the Operation, the seven Civil Affairs Officers of the NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force were attached as follows: Three to the 2d Marine Division, three to the 4th Marine Division and one to the NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force Staff. Those attached to the divisions functioned as a part of the unit during the period of attachment. Initially, civilians were placed in stockades established by the three divisions, but by D + 8 a main camp was established and designated as Internment Camp No. 1, and orders were issued that civilians taken by the divisions be delivered to the camp within twenty-four hours. Civilians were screened and separated within the camp as Japanese, Koreans, Chamorros and Carolinians, the latter two groups being kept together. On 15 July the population of this camp totaled 13,289, composed of 8,061 Japanese, 1,158 Koreans, 2,258 Chamorros and 722 Carolinians, and of this number about 1,600 able bodied males were used as laborers. Food and clothing were supplied as far as possible from stocks found on the island, and medical care, for which there was a great demand, was supplied by Unit "B" of the 31st Field Hospital, which used captured medical supplies and volunteer civilian nurses to augment its own supplies and personnel. On 23 July control of Civil Affairs passed to the Island Commander.
(2) The personnel, transportation, supplies, and medical assistance available was not adequate for the civil affairs agency to properly perform its functions. Corrective measures must be arranged for in future operations.

(c) Public Relations.

(1) The Public Relations Section of this Corps coordinated all agencies engaged in the collection of information for dissemination to the public during the attack on Saipan. The information media consisted of news stories, still pictures, color and news reel motion picture films, paintings and sketches and battle recordings. Combat correspondents and combat photographers were assigned to all divisions and the coverage of separate units such as hospitals, Seabees, etc, was handled by Corps representatives. A pool of photographic personnel was held at Corps for general campaign coverage and for special assignments as requested.

(2) Civilian war correspondents were assigned to the operation by CinCPac and were given all practical cooperation including information and physical facilities consistent with security and operations. Press copy and news pictures were collected on the beach and delivered to the flagship. Photographs and motion picture film with the captions enclosed were forwarded unprocessed to CinCPac in accordance with a Fleet Memorandum. One story from one of the four major wire services, in rotation, was sent by Navy radio to Pearl Harbor each day from the flagship. Copy from other correspondents was censored on the flagship and flown to Kwajalein where it was radioed to Pearl Harbor. Civilian correspondents' "Mailen" copy and military correspondents' (Army, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard) were sent to CinCPac for censorship and disposition.

10. Tactics and Training.

(a) The training directives and SOP's issued by the V Amphibious Corps have proved basically sound. Minor adjustments as necessary will be included in future training. Training for the attack of larger land masses and against the type of defense encountered will receive adequate attention. Logistical functions will receive additional emphasis.


(a) That adequate shipping be made available to embark assault troops and all necessary combat equipment including organic transportation; and further that adequate headquarters ships be provided to enable landing force headquarters to function properly while afloat.
(b) That U. S. Marine Corps Aviation squadrons flying from specially designated carriers be assigned and trained with assault troops.

(c) That naval gunfire doctrine for support of landing operations be modified to provide for successive concentrations in front of the troops until artillery can be landed.

(d) That a permanent Corps shore party control organization be established for amphibious operations.

(e) That adequate provisions for personnel and equipment be made to insure that Civil Affairs can properly perform its functions in future operations.

(f) That the 105mm Howitzer replace the 75mm Pack Howitzer in the Marine division as organic field artillery, and that a limited amount of 75mm equipment be available in Corps Artillery for allocation to divisions if required.

(g) That, for future planning, provision be made to supply not less than two amphibian truck (DUKW) companies per division for amphibious operations.

(h) That the medium tank replace the light tank completely for amphibious operations and that one medium tank per medium tank platoon be equipped with a long range flame thrower as the primary weapon.

(i) That the number of 75mm Half Tracks per infantry regiment be increased from four to six and that the most effective type of weapon be procured that can be landed in an LCM.

(j) That truck mounted multiple rocket launchers be assigned on the basis of 18 per division.

(k) That Corps headquarters be provided with electric coding machines for use ashore in future operations.

(l) That JASCOs and VMO Squadrons be permanently attached to Marine Corps Divisions. These units require the same order of joint training as other divisional units and require the same period for reorganization, rehabilitation, reequipping and retraining as other units participating in an operation.

(m) That the policy of assigning only experienced and qualified officers as observers be strictly adhered to.

(n) Other recommendations embodied in the contents of this report and the reports contained in the Enclosures are recommended for appropriate consideration. Action will be taken by this corps on matters within its cognizance.
Further recommendations will be submitted in separate correspondence after subordinate reports have been received.

Summary and conclusion.

(a) That following a preparatory bombardment of SAIPAN which covered a period from 12 June until the morning of 15 June, NORTHERN Troops and Landing Force supported by naval forces with the 2dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv in the assault landing and the 27thInfDiv landing in reserve, landed on, seized and occupied the Island of SAIPAN in twenty five days. The operation resulted in the capture of one of the most vital enemy strongholds remaining in his outer defenses and it can now be used by our forces for future operations against the enemy. Our casualties for the operation were 3,143 killed, 13,208 wounded and 335 missing for a total of 16,386 casualties. Enemy casualties were 23,811 killed and 1,810 captured. Civilians interned totaled 14,735.

(b) The overwhelming success of this large scale joint amphibious operation reflects the close cooperation realized between all services and indicates that landings against the enemy can be made whenever and wherever we are ready to make a landing.

(c) Subordinates deserving of commendation will be recognized in separate communication.

H. SCHMIDT.

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