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COMMANDER GROUP TWO, AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

(CTG 52.2)

REPORT OF

SAIPAN OPERATION
COMMANDER GROUP TWO
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

23 August 1944

From: Commander Task Group 52.2 (Commander Group TWO, Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet).
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CTF 51).
(2) Commander FIFTH Fleet (CTF 50).
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.


Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-44 dated 1 January 1944.
(b) Cominch Restricted Letter FF1/Al2-1/Al6-3, serial 7152 dated 29 October 1943.

Enclosure: (A) CTG 52.2 Report of SAIPAN Operation.
(B) Force Beachmaster Report SAIPAN.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

H. W. HILL.

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H. L. TALLMAN,
Commander,
Flag Secretary.
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## PART II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

None

## PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

None

## PART IV - OPERATIONS

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PART VIII - AIR SUPPORT
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COMMANDER WESTERN LANDING GROUP (CTG 52.2)

REPORT OF SAIPAN OPERATION

LIST OF DIRECTIVES

1. ComFIFTHFleet (CTF 50) — Operation Plan ComFIFTHFleet No. CEN 10-44, serial 00010, 12 May 1944.


5. ComPhibsPac (CTF 52) — Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO Training Movement Order No. A13-44, serial 00540, 7 May 1944.


7. ComGrpTWO, PhibsPac (CTG 52.16) — Movement Order ComGrp 2, 5thPhibFor No. A108-44, serial 0002, 26 May 1944.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
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PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

1. PLANNING

For the SATPAN assault, the plan called for the simultaneous landing of two divisions of troops abreast. This presented a new problem in coordination and control of a far greater number of ships and small craft in the assault area than had heretofore been attempted in the Pacific Theater.

Basic planning for this primary task included a careful study of all available intelligence on the landing beaches and the fringing reef which extended 500 to 1000 yards off shore with an intervening coral studded lagoon. Particular emphasis was placed upon the means of landing over this reef the large quantities of supplies which the assault troops would require. Plans for the actual landing of the troops required provisions for a closely coordinated control of the scheduled waves. The reef and lagoon were such that they could be negotiated readily by LVT's and LVT(A)'s.

Plans as finally formulated included landing supplies by the following means:

(a) By LVT
(b) By DUKW's
(c) By beaching LST's and LCT's on the fringing reef after preparation of a beaching area by underwater demolition.
(d) By boats direct to beaches, after entry through the existing boat channel.
(e) By construction of a pier from the beach after the only existing boat channel through the reef had been rendered reasonably safe from enemy gunfire.
(f) By blasting a second boat channel through the reef to the northward of the existing channel.

After basic decisions had been made regarding the assault, the two Transport Group Commanders involved, with their staffs, transferred to ROCKY MOUNT in order to provide for closer liaison with the Western Landing Group Commander during the detailed planning and writing of the orders. This procedure greatly facilitated the holding of numerous conferences and permitted the concurrent preparation of orders by the Landing Group Commander and the Transport Group Commanders with each intimately cognizant of the work of the other.

During the planning phase headquarters of the SECOND and FOURTH Marine Divisions were located on HAWAII and MAUI respectively. Two trips to these headquarters were made by the Transport Group Commanders and one by the Landing Group Commander for the purpose of holding conferences with Assault Troop Commanders.

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PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

1. PLANNING (Cont'd)

Extensive and detailed experiments were conducted with an LCT mounting eight 4.2 inch chemical mortars. These experiments included installation of the mortars, stowage space for the ammunition, and launchings from an LST with the LCT carrying a partial load of fuel and ammunition. The purpose was to provide a means of covering the landing beaches with a blanket of heavy mortar fire from the LCT's steaming parallel to the beach while the assault waves were being formed. Launchings and test firings were successful and the results highly encouraging. Accordingly, three such LCT's were equipped and loaded on LST's. During movement to the rehearsal area, however, three LCT's were carried away from the decks of the LST's by heavy seas. Two of these carried away were the "gunboat" LCT's so that the project for their use at SAIPAN had to be abandoned.

Investigation was made as to the feasibility of loading and laying a pre-assembled light weight anti-torpedo net from an AKN. Experiment proved successful and the plans provided for transporting and laying 10000 feet of this net off the SAIPAN Anchorage. These plans were executed, the net being laid by the KEOKUK, assisted by two AN's, in three and one half hours.
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52)

TASK ORGANIZATION

Northern Attack Force (52), Vice Admiral TURNER (Rear Admiral HILL, Second in Command).

(a) Force Flagship, Captain PATTEN.

ROCKY MOUNT

1 AGC

(b) Northern Support Aircraft (52.1), Captain WHITEHEAD.

Assigned Aircraft.

(c) Western Landing Group (52.2), Rear Admiral HILL.

(1) Northern Landing Force (56), Lieut-General H.M. SMITH, USMC.

Corps Troops
SECOND Marine Division, plus attached units.
FOURTH Marine Division, plus attached units.

(2) Transport Group ABLE (52.3), Captain KNOWLES.

Transdiv TEN (52.3.1), Captain MORRISON (See TG 52.9)

CLAY (F), NEVILLE, MIDDLETON, FELAND, ALHENA,
JUPITER, HERCULES 4 APA, 1 AKA, 2 AK

Transdiv EIGHTEEN (52.3.2), Captain KNOWLES.

MONROVIA (F), FUNSTON, CAMBRIA (Landing Group Flagship)
WARHAWK, ALCYONE, LINDENWALD 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 1 LSD

Transdiv TWENTY-EIGHT (52.3.3), Captain FLANAGAN.

BOLIVAR (F), DOYEN, SHERIDAN, COMET, ELECTRA, OAK HILL
3 APA, 1 AP, AKA, 1 LSD

SECOND Marine Division Landing Force (52.3.4), Major
General WATSON, USMC.

SECOND Marine Division, plus attached units.

(3) Transport Group BAKER (52.4), Captain LOOMIS.

Transdiv TWENTY (52.4.1), Captain LOOMIS.

LEONARD WOOD (F), PIERCE, O'HARA, LA SALLE,
THUBAN, ASHLAND 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 1 LSD

ENCLOSURE (A) to

CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

Transdiv TWENTY-SIX (52.4.2), Captain HANSON

CALLAWAY (F), SUMTER, LEON, STORM KING, ALMAACK,
WHITE MARSH, BELLE GROVE 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 2 LSD

Transdiv THIRTY (52.4.3), Captain MISSON. (See TG 52.9)

KNOX (F), CALVERT, FULLER, JOHN LAND, BELLATRIX,
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT 3 APA, 2 AP, 1 AKA.

FOURTH Marine Division Landing Force (52.4.4), Major
General SCHMIDT, USMC.

FOURTH Marine Division, plus attached units.

(4) Tractor Flotilla (52.5), Captain ROBERTSON.

PC(S) 1402 (Flotilla Flag) 1 PC(S)

Tractor Group ABLE (52.5.1), Captain LILLARD.

PC(S) 1403 (Tractor Group ABLE Flagship) 1 PC(S)

LST Unit ONE (52.5.2), Lt-Cdr HARLAN.

LST 242, 130, 271, 218, 451 (F), 31, 213,
268 8 LST

LST Unit TWO (52.5.3), Lt-Cdr LIEF.

LST 341, 278, 34, 484 (F), 390, 450, 461,
485 8 LST

LST Reserve ABLE (52.5.4), Lt. SHEA.

LST 166, 486 (F), 127, 246, 131, 120 6 LST

Tractor Group BAKER (52.5.5), Capt. ROBERTSON.

LST Unit THREE (52.5.6), Comdr. WHITESIDE.

LST 226 (F), 126, 223, 42, 273, 19, 84, 45 8 LST

LST Unit FOUR (52.5.7), Lt-Cdr HOYT.

LST 129, 222, 275, 267, 224, 128, 487, 225 (F)
8 LST

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ENCLOSURE (a) to

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PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

LST Reserve BAKER (52.5.8), Comdr. LAJEUNESSE.

LST 121, 340, 354 (F), 23 4 LST

Support Artillery Group (52.5.9),

LST 272, 169, 483 (F), 277, 240, 40, 124, (27th Division and Corps Artillery)

7 LST

(5) Control Group (52.6), Commodore THEISS.

Central Control Unit (52.6.1), Commodore THEISS.

PC(S) 1452 (F), 1421 2 PC(S)
SC 1049, 1052, 1320 3 SC
LCI 371, 82 2 LCI
LCC 25491 1 LCC

Control Group ABLE (52.6.2), Lieut. KOSHLIEK.

PC 1079, 1080 2 PC
PC(S) 1461 1 PC(S)
LCC 21433, 21437, 25472, 39054 4 LCC

Control Group BAKER (52.6.3), Lieut. (jg) BAXTER.

PC 581, 582 2 PC
PC(S) 1455 1 PC(S)
LCC 21432, 25471, 25473, 39046 4 LCC

Demonstration Control Unit (52.6.4), Lieut. LOONEY

SC 999, 1066 2 SC
LCC 25485, 25486 2 LCC

(6) Gunboat Support Group (52.6.5), Comdr. MALANAPHY

Gunboat Support Unit ABLE (52.6.6), Lt.Comdr. EIKEL

LCI 456 (GF), 458, 459, 461, 463, 451 (F),
452, 462, 453, 455, 460, 470 12 LCI

Gunboat Support Unit BAKER (52.6.7), Lt.Comdr. McFADDEN

LCI 347, 372, 373 (FF), 454, 725, 726,
77 (GF), 78, 79, 80, 81 11 LCI

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
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PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

(7) Beach Demolition Group (52.6.9), Commander HORNER

    CLEMSON, BROOKS, GILMER (F) 3 APD

Underwater Demolition Teams - Lt. Commander KAUFFMAN

Underwater Demolition Team No. 5 - Lt. Comdr. KAUFFMAN
(Embarked in GILMER)
Underwater Demolition Team No. 6 - Lt. LOGSDON
(Embarked in CLEMSON)
Underwater Demolition Team No. 7 - Lt. BURKE
(Embarked in BROOKS)

(8) Beachmaster Group (52.6.10), Commander ANDERSON

    SC 1012 1 SC

Central Beachmaster Unit (52.6.11), Comdr. ANDERSON
Beachmaster Unit ABLE (52.6.12), Lt. Comdr. ADAMS
Beachmaster Unit BAKER (52.6.13), Lt. BOARDMAN

(9) LCT Flotilla THIRTEEN (52.6.14) - Lt. Comdr. TOWER

(1) LCT Group THIRTY SEVEN (52.6.15) - Lieut. CROSS

LCT Div. SEVENTY THREE (Initially embarked)

LCT 160 (LST 213), 356 (LST 451), 967 (LST 31),
993 (LST 166), 994 (LST 84), 996 (LST 486)

LCT Div SEVENTY FOUR (Initially embarked)

LCT 258 (LST 218), 357 (LST 19), 985 (LST 271),
986 (LST 242), 987 (LST 461), 1060 (LST 340) 12 LCT

(2) LCT Group THIRTY EIGHT (52.6.16) - Lieut. CROSS

LCT Div. SEVENTY FIVE (Initially embarked)

LCT 348 (LST 222), 349 (LST 121), 962 (LST 226),
966 (LST 273), 989 (LST 42), 1061 (LST 169),
1062 (LST 205)

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

LCT Div. SEVENTY SIX (Initially embarked)

LCT 964 (LST 224), 965 (LST 45), 968 (LST 126), 982 (LST 274), 995 (LST 127), 1059 (LST 130) 13 LCT

(3) LCT Group THIRTY NINE (52.6.17) - Lieut. KASER

LCT Div. SEVENTY SEVEN (Initially embarked)

LCT 355 (LST 225), 394 (LST 341), 997 (LST 275), 998 (LST 129), 1057 (LST 131), 1058 (LST 278)

LCT Div. SEVENTY EIGHT (Initially embarked)

LCT 354 (LST 354), 358 (LST 484), 991 (LST 272), 1001 (LST 485), 1000 (LST 71) 11 LCT

(10) Pontoon Barge Unit (52.6.18) - Comdr. ANDERSON

Pontoon Barges when debarked from following LST's:

LST 450, 128, 34, 267, 120, 119 24 PONTOON BARGES

(d) Service and Salvage Group (52.7), Comdr. CURTISS

TANASA, TEKESTA, MOLALA 3 AT
PRESERVER 1 ARS
CINCHONA 1 AN
PHAON 1 ARB
MIMOSA 1 AN
KEOKUK (F) 1 AKR
BALLARD 1 AVD

(e) Eastern Landing Group (52.8), Commander McWHINNIE

(1) Transdiv TWELVE (temp) (52.8.1), Comdr. McWHINNIE

WATERS (F), STRINGHAM, GOLDSBOROUGH, MANLEY, OVERTON, NOA 6 APD

(2) Eastern Landing Force (52.8.2), Colonel KYLE

FIRST Battalion, SECOND Marines, plus attached units

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPAREDNESS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

(f) Demonstration Group (52.9), Captain MORRISON

Transdiv TEN (52.9.1), Captain MORRISON
(from Transport Group ABLE)

CLAY (F), MIDDLETON, NEVILLE, FELAND, ALHENA
JUPITER, HERCULES 4 APA, 1 AKA, 2 AK

Transdiv THIRTY (52.9.2), Captain MISSON
(from Transport Group BAKER)

KNOX (F), CALVERT, FULLER, JOHN LAND, BELLATRIX,
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT 3 APA, 2 AP, 1 AKA

(g) Fire Support Group ONE (52.17), Rear Admiral OLDENDORF

(1) Fire Support Unit ONE (52.17.1), Rear Admiral KINGMAN

TENNESSEE (F), CALIFORNIA 2 OBB
INDIANAPOLIS (Fleet Flag) 1 CA
BIRMINGHAM 1 CL
REMEY, WADLEIGH, NORMAN SCOTT, MERTZ 4 DD

(2) Fire Support Unit TWO (52.17.2), Comdr. FITZGERALD

ROBINSON (F), BAILEY, A.W. GRANT 3 DD

(3) Fire Support Unit THREE (52.17.3), Capt. JARRETT

COGHLAN, MONSSEN, HALSEY POWELL (SF) 3 DD

(4) Fire Support Unit FOUR (52.17.4), Rear Admiral OLDENDORF

LOUISVILLE (GF) 1 CA
MARYLAND (F), COLORADO 2 OBB
MC DERMUT, MC GOWAN, MELVIN, MC NAIR 4 DD

(5) Fire Support Unit FIVE (52.17.5), Rear Admiral HAYLER

MONTPELIER (F), CLEVELAND 2 CL
YARNELL, TWINING, STOCKHAM 3 DD

(h) Fire Support Group TWO (52.10), Rear Admiral AJINSWORTH
(from TF 53)

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

(1) **Fire Support Unit SIX** (52.10.6), Rear Admiral AINSWORTH

- Pennsylvania, Idaho
- Honolulu (F)
- Anthony, Wadsworth, Hudson
- Dickerson
- Hogan

2 OBB 1 CL 3 DD 1 APD 1 DMS

(2) **Fire Support Unit SEVEN** (52.10.7), Rear Admiral WEYLER

- New Mexico (F)
- Minneapolis, San Francisco
- Terry, Halford, Braine
- Talbot
- Stanbury

1 OBB 2 CA 3 DD 1 APD 1 DMS

(3) **Fire Support Unit EIGHT** (52.10.8), Rear Admiral JOY

- Wichita (F), New Orleans
- St. Louis
- Guest, Bennett, Fullam (SF)

2 CA 1 CL 3 DD

(i) **Carrier Support Group ONE** (52.14), Rear Admiral BOGAN

(1) **Carrier Unit ONE** (52.14.1), Rear Admiral BOGAN

- Fanshaw Bay (GF), Midway
- Cassin Young, Irwin, Ross

2 CVE 3 DD

(2) **Carrier Unit TWO** (52.14.2), Captain WELLER

- White Plains (F), Kalinin Bay
- Porterfield (SF), Callaghan, Longshaw

2 CVE 3 DD

(j) **Carrier Support Group TWO** (52.11), Rear Admiral SALLADA

(1) **Carrier Unit THREE** (52.11.1), Rear Admiral SALLADA

- Kitkun Bay (F), Gambier Bay
- Laws (FD), Morrison, Benham

2 CVE 3 DD

(2) **Carrier Unit FOUR** (52.11.2), Rear Admiral STUMP

(from TF 53)

- Corregidor (F), Coral Sea
- Bullard (F), Kidd, Chauncey

2 CVE 3 DD

- 9 - ENCLOSEMENT (A) to CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

2. COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE (TF 52) (cont'd)

(k) Transport Screen (52.12), Captain LIBBY

NEWCOMB (SF), BENNION (FD), HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, BRYANT (FD), Pritchett (FD), PHILIP, CONY, MCGUFF, SELFRIDGE, CONYNGHAM, PATTERSON, BAGLEY, PHELPS, SHAW, RENSHAW

15 DD

PC(S) 1396, 1444, 1457, 1460

4 PC(S)

KANE (V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company embarked)

1 APD

Other assigned vessels

(1) Minesweeping and Hydrographic Survey Group (52.13), Commander LOUD (Cominron 2)

(1) Minesweeping Unit TWO (52.13.2), Comdr. LOUD (Cominron 2)

(from TF 53)

HOPKINS (SF), FERRY, LONG, HAMILTON

4 DMS

(2) Minesweeping Unit ONE (52.13.1), Lt.Cdr. THOMPSON (Comindiv 5)

CHANDLER (F), ZANE, PALMER, HOWARD

4 DMS

(3) Minesweeping Unit THREE (52.13.3), Comdr MOORE

CHIEF (SF), CHAMPION, HERALD

3 AM

(4) Minesweeping Unit FOUR (52.13.4), Lt-Cdr. FELS (Comindiv 12)

ORACLE (F), MOTIVE, HEED

3 AM

(5) Minesweeping Unit FIVE (52.13.5), Lt-Cdr. LAMBERT

YMS 385 (F), 295, 396

3 YMS

(6) Minesweeping Unit SIX (52.13.6), Lieutenant BOWES

YMS 302 (F), 291, 292

3 YMS

(7) Minesweeping Unit SEVEN (52.13.7), Lt.(jg) BRADFORD

One LCVP loaded on each of following

LST 340, 121, 486, 71, 23, 166

6 LCVP

(8) Mobile Hydrographic Unit (52.13.8) Comdr. SANDERS

YMS 296, 323

2 YMS

LCC 25485, 25486

2 LCC

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

3. REHEARSALS

Rehearsals were carried out by ships of the Western Landing Group in the MAALAEA BAY dash KAHOOLawe Area between 15 May and 19 May in conjunction with ships of Task Force 52 available at that time. Emphasis was placed upon proper formation of boat waves and their simultaneous dispatch.

The first days rehearsals were marred by the non-arrival of one group of LST's due to adverse weather. A partial schedule was carried out, with the group of LST's present exercising at launching LVT's and forming up of boat waves.

The second days rehearsals were conducted as planned, with an actual landing of all assault troops carried in LST's on four separate beaches in MAALAEA BAY. No supplies and equipment were landed and all troops reembarked on the same day.

The third day's exercise closely approximated the second except that fire support ships and aircraft simulated support of the landings, and troops conducted tactical exercises ashore, reembarking on the fourth day. Shore and beach parties were landed, communication circuits tested, and landing of supplies simulated.

The fourth day of rehearsal was spent in reembarkation of personnel, conferences covering exercises already held, and preparation for the full scale rehearsal on the fifth day. All ships put to sea in the afternoon in order to make an approach as closely approximating that actually expected as practicable.

On the fifth day units arrived in the assault area off KAHOOLawe in accordance with a time schedule similar to that expected to be used at SAIPAN. Fire support and air support plans were executed insofar as practicable, using live ammunition, and all assault waves were dispatched from line of departure for the beach. Waves proceeded as far toward the beach as safety permitted and then turned back. Dispatch of waves from line of departure was repeated as soon as waves could be reformed, in order to gain maximum experience in the complicated control procedure necessary to dispatch assault waves of two divisions simultaneously.

On completion of exercises on fifth day, ships returned to port for rehabilitation.

Relatively high winds, up to 35 knots, were experienced consistently in MAALAEA BAY. This made conditions generally unsatisfactory for operations of LCM's carrying tanks and DUKW's carrying artillery, and also created some delay in debarking and reembarking LVT's. The experience gained in rough water operations of amphibious craft was, however, of great value.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART I - PREPARATIONS FOR THE OPERATION

3. REHEARSALS (Cont'd)

The rehearsals as a whole were very ragged and poorly conducted, due in a large measure to the late issue of rehearsal plans, the wide separation of all participating units, and the inability to brief personnel in advance. They served a most useful purpose, however, as was proven by the smooth performance on DOG Day.
PART II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

1. COMPOSITION OF ATTACK GROUP TWO (TG 52.16)

TASK ORGANIZATION of TG 52.16 and Attack Group TWO (Commander TG 52.16 and Attack Group TWO - Rear Admiral H. W. Hill in CAMBRIA, APA-36).

(a) 52.3 Transport Group ABLE

(1) 52.3.1 Transport Division TEN
   CLAY (F), NEVILLE, MIDDLETON, FELAND
   ALHENA
   HERCULES, JUPITER
   
   Captain KNOWLES
   Captain MORRISON
   4 APA
   1 AKA
   2 AK

(2) 52.3.2 Transport Division EIGHTEEN
   MONROVIA (F), FUNSTON, CAMBRIA (GF)
   WARHAWK
   ALCYONE
   LINDENWALD
   
   Captain KNOWLES
   3 APA
   1 AP
   1 AKA
   1 LSD

(3) 52.3.3 Transport Division TWENTY EIGHT
   BOLIVAR (F), DOYEN, SHERIDAN
   COMET
   ELECTRA
   OAK HILL
   
   Captain FLANAGAN
   3 APA
   1 AP
   1 AKA
   1 LSD

(b) 52.12.2 Screen
   HALSEY POWELL (SF), PRITCHETT (FD),
   MONSSEN, PHILIP, CONY, SHAW
   CHAMPION (F), HEED, HERALD
   STRINGHAM, GOLDSBOROUGH, NOA

   Captain JARRETT
   6 DD
   3 AM
   3 AFD

(c) 52.7.19 Salvage Vessels
   MOLALA
   PRESERVER
   
   Lieutenant WARD
   1 AT
   1 ARS

(d) 52.14.2 Carrier Escort Unit
   WHITE PLAINS (F), KALININ BAY
   PORTERFIELD (SF), CALLAGHAN, LONGSHAW
   
   Captain WELLER
   2 CVE
   3 DD

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

2. COMPOSITION OF ADVANCE GROUP (TG 52.15)

TASK ORGANIZATION

Advance Group (52.15), Vice Admiral TURNER

(1) Force Flagship, Captain PATTEN

ROCKY MOUNT 1 ACC

(2) Advance Transports (52.2), Rear Admiral HILL

Transport Group ABLE (52.3), Captain KNOWLES

TransDiv EIGHTEEN (52.3.2), Captain KNOWLES

MONROVIA (F), FUNSTON, CAMBRIA (Landing Group Flagship), WARHAWK, ALCYONE, LINDENWALD

3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 1 LSD

TransDiv TWENTY-EIGHT (52.3.3), Captain FLANAGAN

BOLIVAR (F), DOYEN, SHERIDAN, COMET, ELECTRA

OAK HILL 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 1 LSD

Transport Group BAKER (52.4), Captain LOOMIS

TransDiv TWENTY (52.4.1), Captain LOOMIS

LEONARD WOOD (F), PIERCE, O'HARA, LA SALLE,

THUBAN, ASHLAND 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 1 LSD

TransDiv TWENTY-SIX (52.4.2), Captain HANSON

CALLAWAY (F), SUMTER, LEON, STORM KING, ALMAACK,

WHITE MARSH, BELLE GROVE 3 APA, 1 AP, 1 AKA, 2 LSD

Transport Screen (52.12), Captain LIBBY

NEWCOMB (SF), BENNION, EDWARDS, ROBINSON,

GRANT, FRITCHETT, MONSSEN, HALSEY POWELL 8 DD

CHIEF, CHAMPION, HERALD 3 AM

WATERS, GOLDSBOROUGH, STRINGHAM, NOA,

MANLEY, OVERTON 6 APD

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 serial 0226
PART II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

3. NARRATIVE

PEARL TO SAIPAN

Task Group 52.16, composed of Transport Group ABLE, Escort Carrier Unit TWO and HALSEY POWELL, MONSSEN, PRITCHETT, PHILIP, CONY, HEED, HERALD, CHAMPION, GOLDSBOROUGH, STRINGHAM, and NOA, under the command of Rear Admiral H. W. HILL departed PEARL HARBOR at 1130WV May 30, 1944. Cruising disposition was formed at 1530WV and the disposition proceeded along track specified in Commander FIFTH Fleet Movement Plan, Annex "B" to Commander FIFTH Fleet Operation Plan Number GEN 10-44. Tactical, gunnery, and radar tracking exercises were conducted daily until west of longitude 175° E., at which point all gunnery exercises requiring active firing were discontinued. Exercises were necessarily curtailed because of the need for making nearly maximum formation speed in order to counteract an unexpected adverse current.

ENIWETOK, designated the staging point for Task Group 52.16, was reached on the early morning of June 9, 1944, East longitude date. CAMBRIA led into the lagoon anchorage, passing through the entrance at 0645 LOVE. Entry was accomplished without difficulty, all ships entering by 0800 LOVE.

Control personnel, communication teams, and certain assault troops were transferred immediately on arrival to LSTs of Tractor Group TWO, which departed the same afternoon for the objective. The remaining time at anchor was taken up with fueling, watering, and provisioning which was rapidly accomplished under the efficient direction of CTF 51.

On June 11, 1944 Escort Carrier Unit TWO was detached to join and proceed with Escort Carrier Unit ONE. SHAW, PRESERVER and MOLALA reported to CTG 52.16 for assignment to his screen.

Sortie from ENIWETOK took place immediately after that of the last ship of Task Group 52.15, first heavy ship passing through the entrance at 0915 LOVE, June 11, 1944. Cruising disposition was formed at 1015 LOVE and Task Group 52.16 proceeded along the track of Task Group 52.15 remaining generally fifteen miles astern, until June 14. Distance was then gradually closed until, at 1300 KING, Task Group 52.16 was on the port beam of 52.15, with only two thousand yards between screening vessels of the two screens. A combined approach disposition was then formed with two divisions of transports taking station as a demonstration group; and Task Group 52.16 was dissolved. Further movement is covered in the approach narrative.

The movement from PEARL HARBOR to the point at which the approach disposition was formed was uneventful. No submarine contacts were made by the ships of Task Group 52.16, although several were reported by 52.15. An unidentified air contact was made the night before arrival at ENIWETOK and the formation was maneuvered to avoid. The plane was later identified as

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART II - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

3. NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

friendly. APD's were fueled enroute to ENIWETOK, and all screening vessels, less diesel burning ships were fueled on June 13, enroute ENIWETOK to SAIPAN. Fueling in the first case was accomplished by the off duty carrier which pulled ahead of the formation sufficiently during the night to permit fueling of ships during the next day without dropping behind the remainder of the formation. In the second case fueling was done by designated transports, half of the destroyers and APD's fueling at a time. All these operations were without incident.

Entry to and sortie from ENIWETOK was accomplished using an area screen around sortieing ships rather than a screening or patrol lane. This is recommended as the method providing the best protection for the sortie of a large number of slow ships when relatively few screening vessels are present.
THIS SECTION CONTAINS MAPS REFER TO ORIGINAL FOLDER
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE

(All times local, zone - 10)

Introduction.

1. The amphibious attack on SAIPAN was the first directed against a relatively large and heavily defended land mass in the Central Pacific area. The size of the island was such that possible landing places could be and were defended heavily, leaving the attacker little choice as to landing beaches. At the same time the coast line was sufficiently extensive to make adequate coverage of a landing by naval gunfire and air bombardment difficult.

2. During the training period, considerable thought was given to command relationships and it was finally decided that CTG 52.2 (Rear Admiral Hill) would control all matters related to the landing and supply of the troops ashore and in addition would control the gunfire support during the critical period immediately preceding and following the landing of the assault waves. CTF 51 (Vice Admiral Turner) controlled gunfire support except for the above, air support, screen, and exercised the normal SOPA functions.

3. This command relationship functioned satisfactorily and resulted in relieving my staff of many burdensome details, particularly those of logistics. However, gunfire and close support air are as intimately related to the operations of the ground troops that it is considered advisable in future operations to vest in the naval commander responsible for the landing, the complete control of naval gunfire and close air support.

4. In view of the magnitude of the assault wave control problem, CTF 51 made available his Chief of Staff, Commodore P. S. Thoiss, USN, as senior control officer. His great experience in landing operations aided materially in the preparation of plans and in the conduct of the assault. The Senior Beachmaster, Commander C. E. Anderson, was also appointed at an early date. He took charge of organizing and training the beach parties with the result that the functioning of the beach parties on this operation, it is believed, was better than on any operation to date.

The Approach.

5. The Approach Plan became effective at 1307 14 June. At this time Transport Groups ABLE and BAKER, with screen, joined in one disposition under tactical command of Vice Admiral Turner. Control personnel were transferred that afternoon from transports to APD's, to ensure their prompt arrival at the line of departure the next morning. Transport Divisions TEN and THIRTY, with screen, formed a separate Demonstration Group.

6. The approach to SAIPAN was enlivened by two underwater sound contacts. ROBINSON, picket destroyer, dropped depth charges at 2058 and reported a resultant oil slick. At 2255 an excellent and encouraging report on the DOG
PART III—GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

minus ONE Day reconnaissance of the landing beaches was received. No obstacles or anti-boat mines had been observed on the reef. The reef edge was reported suitable for crossing of DUKW's and landing of tanks from LCM's. Heavy mortar fire had been received. Depths of water in the lagoon were reported. Ten feet of water was reported in the beat channel at CHARA KANO. After midnight MONSEEN located twelve enemy survivors on a raft who refused rescue, and later picked up one enemy enlisted pilot whose plane had been shot down. MOLALA recovered nine enemy survivors from the water. Light from fires burning on SAIPAN was visible during the latter part of the night.

7. At 0452 15 June, Commander Task Force 52 signalled "execute Attack Order All-44". Transports arrived in the transport area off SAIPAN at 0524. At 0533 Vice Admiral Turner signalled to and the Transport Group Commanders "take charge; good luck". Fire support ships had started the preliminary bombardment at 0530 on schedule. LST groups were in sight approaching their assigned areas, transports had begun lowering boats, and it was apparent that HOW Hour of 0830 for the assault would be met within narrow limits. The weather was favorable, flying conditions good, wind east 13 knots, moderate swell.

8. Underwater demolition team representatives reported on board CAMBRIA at 0543 with information amplifying the despatch report made the previous night.

The DOG Day Assault.

9. The assault plan called for the landing of two divisions abreast on eight landing beaches, contiguous except for a 900 yard section opposite SUSUFE Point. Approximately 8,000 men, all boated in LVT's, were to land in the first hour of the assault. A detailed ship-to-shore movement plan was included in the attack order. Diagrams showing the control and wave formation plan, and the supply control plan, are reproduced as part of this report, and are appended to this narrative. All of the initial assault troops were carried from ENIWEETOK to SAIPAN in 32 LST's. These ships also carried forward elements of the beach parties, and wave guide and other control officers.

10. Transports and LST's arrived on schedule in assigned areas off the island and commenced launching boats and LVT's. The four LSD's carrying medium tanks in LCM's launched promptly. It was necessary to embark key naval and marine personnel in LCC's after the transports arrived and launched these boats. Although this operation was carried out smartly, there was a delay in getting all control craft to their assigned stations, and HOW Hour had to be delayed ten minutes, from 0830 to 0840.
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

11. Assault and Unloading Phase (Cont'd)

All air support units arrived on station promptly. Naval gunfire ceased at 0700 for the scheduled air strike, which included 60 VF, 46 VB, and 40 VTB planes. The air strike, timed to finish at 0730, was completed at 0727. CTG 52.2 assumed control of close gunfire support at 0730. Details of close gunfire support by CTG 52.2, who controlled until 0911, are included in the Gunfire Support Section of this report.

12. The following table shows the times assault waves were dispatched from the line of departure to each beach, and the intended time relative to departure of the first wave:

<table>
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<th>Wave</th>
<th>RED</th>
<th>GREEN</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>BLUE</th>
<th>YELLOW</th>
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<td>0832</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All waves left the line of departure on schedule except the fourth and fifth to Fourth MarDiv beaches, which were each one minute late.

13. While the assault waves were proceeding toward the beaches a heavy strafing rocket and dive bombing attack on the beach area was carried out by VF planes. This strike was planned to keep down the defenders after naval gunfire had to be lifted because of danger to the assault waves. It was commenced on schedule and completed prior to the arrival of troops at the beaches.

14. The landing was made with precision and with only a slight difference in time of landing of first waves on all beaches. Casualties in troops and vehicles enroute to the beach were extremely light, but shortly after landing the beach area was brought under fire by mortars and light artillery defiladed on the high ground in rear of the beaches. These guns were well camouflaged and difficult to locate and during the first three days continued to inflict serious casualties upon our troops and beach parties.

15. Transport Divisions TEN and THIRTY conducted a diversionary feint at landing off TANAPAG Harbor, lowering boats and forming waves which proceeded toward the beach. It was learned later that this feint immobilized one regiment of Jap troops all of DOG Day. The Jap news broadcast that night reported the repulse of this attack. No gunfire was received by these transports or the boats. These two transport divisions moved down to the transport area off CHABAN KANO'A at 0939 and commenced embarking reserve troops in boats.

16. At 0911, the Air Coordinator reported that all organized LVT waves
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

had landed, LVT's began returning to the transfer area. Here reserve troops were transferred from LCVP's to LVT's and proceeded to the beaches on call.

17. The transports did not receive fire from the island, and at 0927 they were moved in to Transport Area THREE. LST's back of the line of departure received occasional enemy fire, but it was not heavy enough to force their retirement.

18. At 1032, the launching of eight LCT's from LST's was ordered. These LCT's had been designated in advance to load high priority vehicles from certain transports. At 1055, the channel control vessel was ordered to take station off CHARAN KANOA Channel. Artillery in DUKW's began landing on YELLOW Beaches at 1140. At 1242, medium tanks in LCM's began landing through the boat channel on Beach BLUE TWO, and on the reef opposite Beach YELLOW ONE. At 1519, boats began using the channel at CHARAN KANOA, although it was still under enemy fire.

19. Only emergency supplies were landed on DOG Day. By evening a narrow beachhead had been won, with a gap between Second and Fourth MarDivs in CHARAN KANOA Town. Heavy swells had built up on the reef. Two loaded LVT's were overturned and several men drowned. It was necessary to suspend unloading by LVT across the reef DOG night. The swell decreased gradually, and conditions were normal by DOG plus TWO Day. At 1700, Commander Task Force 52 ordered night retirement of the transports less CAMBRIA. While ships were forming for retirement at 1800 an enemy air attack developed. This attack by a small number of planes was not pressed home, and was completed at 1952. There was a great deal of wild shooting by our ships. No enemy planes were shot down, and no ship was hit.

20. At 2035, LST's less hospital ships and those designated to remain for delivery of emergency supplies were ordered to retire. They remained in the vicinity of SAIPAN that night. CAMBRIA anchored at 2058 inside a protective screen of anti-submarine vessels and LCT's. Two small air attacks were made during the night. Smoke was used to cover ships off SAIPAN and no damage was received.

Subsequent Assault Operations.

21. DOG plus ONE Day, June 16, began auspiciously with the sinking by GILMER and SHAW of a five ship Japanese convoy north of SAIPAN. GILMER sank four of the small AK, SHAW the fifth. Enemy counter-attacks were made during the night against both Marine Divisions. These were beaten off. Numerous tanks were destroyed by the Second Division.

22. By 0730, all transports and LST's had returned and commenced unloading operations of priority cargo. There was no enemy gunfire in the transport area offshore, and ships in anchorage water were directed to anchor to facilitate unloading. Supplies were landed by LVT's across the reefs, and by boats through the CHARAN KANOA Channel. Efforts continued throughout the day to locate and destroy enemy batteries firing on the beaches.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

23. At 1530, Reserve Group ONE, Transport Divisions 7 and 32, arrived with RCT of the 27th Division embarked. One RCT of the 27th Division was ordered to land on BLUE ONE Beach. The troops were not beached and at the line of departure until dark, and most of the night was required to land them through CHARAN KANOA Channel. This process delayed unloading of assault supplies from boats.

24. At 1800, all transports less CAMERIA, MIDDLETON, LASALLE, five AK and OAK HILL retired for the night. Construction of a causeway pier at BLUE ONE Beach was started. There was no enemy air attack this night. A submarine alarm at 0340 was abortive.

25. Dog plus TWO Day, June 17, all transports returned at 0600 and resumed unloading of priority supplies. A second RCT of the 27th Division was landed in boats. Reserve Group TWO, (Transport Division 34), arrived with the remainder of 27th Division embarked. Defense Group ONE, four LST's carrying anti-aircraft batteries, personnel, and other equipment arrived. Two LST's of this group were beached successfully on the roof opposite YELLOW ONE, and anti-aircraft guns, personnel, and ammunition landed on this day.

The situation ashore improved, with our troops reported to be on the initial objective line except in the vicinity of Lake SUSUPE. Contact between the two Divisions was still not good, and some artillery and mortar fire was being received on the beaches. Five PBM with BALLARD arrived in the afternoon, and the first air searches out of SAIPAN began that night.

26. Because of threat of enemy air and surface attack all large ships except CAMERIA, ELLIOTT, JUPITER, HERCULES, and twelve LST's were retired to the eastward of SAIPAN. During retirement an enemy air attack in small force developed. CAMERIA with heavy ships and LST's got underway at 1308, returning to the anchorage at 1936 on completion of the air attack. LST 84 was hit by a small bomb or anti-aircraft projectile and set on fire aft. The fire was extinguished in five minutes with no serious damage resulting.

27. Dog plus THREE Day, June 18, began with an air attack, ineffective, at 0422. All ships were directed to get underway and lie to, and smoke cover was used. About 0430 an amphibious counter-attack from GUNBAY developed. This was opposed and broken up by LVT-A's, LCT's, and PHELPS. LCI 371, PHELPS and YMS 323 were hit by enemy shore battery fire. General unloading began after daylight with ships again at anchor. SOLACE and BOUNTIFUL arrived and started embarking casualties. The approaches to beaches WHITE ONE and WHITE TWO, SAIPAN, were swept for mines with negative results. The causeway pier at BLUE ONE, with three sections installed, was placed in operation. Ashore the

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situation continued to improve. ASLITO Airfield was captured. One BETTY was shot down during the day south of TINIAN. OY observation planes were operating from CHARAN KANOA airstrip.

28. In the late afternoon an air attack developed. At 1636, ships present got underway and lay to. About 1800, the combat air patrol reported destruction of nine enemy planes, without damage to themselves. The attack was broken up before it could reach our ships. All ships anchored at 1729 and resumed unloading.

29. During DOG plus FOUR Day, June 19, the following additional ships were brought in and unloading started: ALHEMA, BELLATRIX, ALCYONE, WINGED ARROW, HARRIS, HEYWOOD, OAK HILL, ASHLAND, and five LST's. Five additional LCT's were launched to assist in unloading. ASHLAND was assigned duty as small boat repair ship. BOUNTIFUL departed loaded with casualties. Beaches were secure and unloading conditions improved.

30. During DOG plus FIVE Day, June 20, the following additional ships were brought in for unloading: FREMONT, CUSTER, SHERIDAN, KNOX, CONET, STORM KING, FOMALHAUT, PRINCE GEORGE, KENMORE, DE GRASS, LIVINGSTON, LEONIS, LA SALLE, RCT 106, the remaining RCT of the 27th Division, was embarked in LST's from transports. The LST's were beached on the reef opposite YELLOW THREE, and the troops waded ashore. Field hospitals were in operation ashore. Most of corps artillery had been landed. Six LST's arrived to unload, and four unloaded LST's departed under escort for ENIWETOK. LONG and WAILEIGH each rescued pilots from planes shot down, the latter approaching very close to TINIAN to effect the rescue. Commander Task Group 56.1 assumed command ashore. SOLACE was loaded with casualties and departed. Additional PB4Y planes arrived. Progress of the troops ashore continued. At 2200, serious fires and explosions began in a Second Division ammunition dump near CHARAN KANOA airstrip. Attempts to get fire fighting equipment ashore to assist were unsuccessful. Two additional LCT's were launched from LST's.

31. Shortly after midnight of June 21, DOG plus SIX, PHELPS and NORMAN SCOTT received machinegun fire from enemy small boats mooring in the vicinity of GARAPAN. Some minor casualties and material damage resulted. Five boats in all were seen. One was sunk and the remainder retired.

32. On this day MAZAMA arrived with replenishment ammunition for fire support ships. Fourteen LST's arrived to complete unloading and launch LCT's, pontoon barges, and pontoon causeway strings. ROCKY MOUNT arrived with remaining ships of Transport Group ABLE. Unloading commenced at once. Seven LST's were unloaded and departed. CUSTER, FREMONT, STORM KING, LA SALLE, BELLATRIX, ELLIOTT, all partially or completely unloaded, departed for retirement areas.

33. DOG plus SEVEN Day, June 22, started with a series of small air raids commencing at 0113. Several ships fired anti-aircraft batteries ineffectively. Bombs fell near PRINCE GEORGE, and ashore near the beach line. The following ships of Transport Group ABLE completed unloading and departed: OAK HILL,
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

COMET, BOLIVAR, DOYEN, ALCYONE, MONROVIA, FUNSTON, WARHAWK, LINDENWALD, WHITE MARSH, FELAND, ALHENA. There were small air raids throughout the night of 22-23 June. MARYLAND anchored on the outer shelf was torpedoed forward at 1953. JOHN LAND with machinery casualty stood in at 2300. LIVINGSTON reported at 0500 that a torpedo dropped from a plane had passed under the ship causing no damage. Some fire from TINIAN was received during the night. Beach WHITE ONE was used for the first time to unload vehicles from beached LCT's. The first P-47 planes arrived at ISLEY Field.

34. The remaining ships of Transport Group BAKER stood in DOG plus EIGHT Day, June 23, and resumed unloading. All remaining LST's, ten in number, returned to complete unloading and to launch pontoon barges and causeway sections. CLAY, MIDDLETON, NEVILLE, LA SALLE, and POMALHAUT completed unloading and departed. Fifteen LST's completed unloading and departed. The work of building up the causeway pier at BLUE ONE Beach proceeded rapidly. At 1830, ROCKY MOUNT with ships of Transport Group BAKER retired for the night.

35. DOG plus NINE Day, June 24, started with an air raid at 0025. PHAON was hit by bomb fragments at 0105, which caused some damage and casualties. There was a total of 10 killed and 22 wounded in PHAON, LCT 998, and PCS 1452 and 1461. Commander Task Force 51 in ROCKY MOUNT returned at 0730 with ships of Transport Group BAKER, and unloading was resumed. SAMARITAN and RELIEF arrived. AGENOR arrived and commenced work at once repairing LCT's and boats. Seven P-61 night fighters and two transport planes landed at ISLEY Field.

36. DOG plus TEN Day, June 25, SAMARITAN and RELIEF departed with capacity loads of casualties. Six ships of Garrison Group ONE arrived and commenced unloading operations. CAVALIER, J. F. BELL, CUSTER, HERALD OF THE MORNING, and AURIGA returned to resume unloading. In the evening Transport Division THIRTY FOUR departed to retirement area. Commander Group ONE retired for the night with eleven transports and cargo ships. There were no air raids; MOUNT TAPOTCHAU was captured.

37. About 0300, DOG plus ELEVEN Day, June 26, LCI's engaged Jap barges reported to be coming out of TaNApAC Harbor. The attack was repelled. LCI 438 had one man killed and four wounded. LCI 456 had two men wounded. Damage to both ships was repaired locally. Retiring transports returned at daylight to resume unloading. Garrison Group TWO consisting of ten ships arrived and commenced unloading operations. ELECTRA, HERALD OF THE MORNING,
PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

J. F. BELL, CAVALIER, HERCULES, JUPITER, JOHN LAND, PREMONT, and CUSTER completed unloading and departed. LST 130 began functioning as Fleet Post Office ship. Air raids occurred between 2050 and 2316. Bombs dropped on ISLEY Field at 2147. MERCURY was hit by a dud torpedo in flight dropped from a Jap plane. One man was killed and some topside damage done. The plane struck one of the ship's king posts and crashed in the water alongside.

38. DOG plus TWELVE Day, June 27, was devoted to unloading. In the evening five ships of the garrison groups were sent out to join ships in the retirement area. Air raids occurred between 1915 and 0037. Bombs were dropped in the water at 1958 and again at 2232, doing no damage. The use of smoke to cover ships in the anchorage was consistently effective in preventing air raid damage.

39. DOG plus THIRTEEN Day, June 28, THURAN and AURIGA were unloaded and departed. KEOKUK laid 10,000 feet of anti-torpedo net south of TANAPAG Harbor entrance in three and one half hours. Small air raids occurred between 2039 and 2136, shore anti-aircraft batteries shooting down two planes. Capture of NA FUTAN Point was completed.

40. DOG plus FOURTEEN Day, June 29, was remarkable for the complete absence of air raids. In the evening the Island Commander took over all shore party functions.

41. DOG plus FIFTEEN Day, June 30, three garrison ships were recalled from the retirement area and commenced unloading. Air raids occurred between 1953 and 0125. Night fighters shot down two planes. Bombs fell in the anchorage area without damage.

42. DOG plus SIXTEEN Day, July 1, BOUNTIFUL arrived to take casualties on board. The consistent good weather continued.

43. DOG plus SEVENTEEN Day, July 2, started with an air raid at 0058. Raids continued until 0215. BENNION, radar picket in the outer screen, shot down one plane. The raids caused no damage. Two garrison ships plus Transport Division 34 arrived to continue unloading. SOLACE arrived to take casualties on board. ISLAND MAIL, ROBIN WENTLEY, CAPE GEORGIA, CAPE SAN MARTIN, CAPE STEVENS, and MERCURY completed unloading and departed. BOUNTIFUL departed at 1800.

44. No air raids occurred on DOG plus EIGHTEEN Day, July 3. Transport Division 34 plus DASHING WAVE, CAPE FEAR, CAPE ISABEL completed unloading and departed. At 1830, the Second MarDiv announced the capture of G AraPAN Town.

45. At 0000 July 4, DOG plus NINETEEN Day, YMS 396 reported a contact

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PART III - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. ASSAULT AND UNLOADING PHASE (Cont'd)

with two enemy barges off MARPI Point. With the assistance of SIGOURNEY and CHIEF one barge was sunk and one driven ashore. No air raids occurred. Mine- sweepers commenced work in TANAPAG Harbor.

46. Troops reported making good progress north of east-west line through FLORES Point on DOG plus TWENTY Day, July 5. SOLACE departed with a capacity load of casualties. TANAPAG Harbor was reported clear of mines. One mine was swept in the entrance channel. In an air raid between 2002 and 2056 no bombs were dropped.

47. July 6th, DOG plus TWENTY ONE Day, started with an air raid between 0018 and 0047. No damage was reported. Merchant ships CAPE VICTORY, LESUTH, CLAREBORNE, JOSIAH EARL, SEA C.A.T, J. BOSEMAN, ENOS MILLS, and NATHANIEL CURRIER arrived and commenced unloading. At 0800, CTG 52.2 was relieved of responsibility for unloading operations by the Commanding Officer, Gropec RIGHT. Small air raids occurred between 1939 and 2326. One plane was shot down by our night fighter. Troops continued to make rapid progress toward the northern tip of SAIPAN.

48. July 7, DOG plus TWENTY TWO Day, began and ended with air raids, with damage negligible. ISLEY Field was shelled at 0045 from TINIAN, with three men injured and some material damage. Just prior to dawn the Japs made a "Banzai" attack against the western end of our line, held by the 27th Division. The attack penetrated about 1500 yards, and over-ran a battery of 105MM howitzers before it was stopped by reserves. Some of our survivors from the attack were picked up by destroyer boats from the fringing reef north of TANAPAG Harbor. By night fall the situation was largely restored. CAPE NEWENHAM arrived and commenced unloading. MORMACPORT, CAPE TRINITY, and MAZAMA were unloaded and departed. Small air raids started at 1947 and continued until midnight, with damage negligible. One Jap plane was shot down. These were the last Jap air raids up to the time of my departure from the MARIANAS August 12.

49. July 8, DOG plus TWENTY THREE Day, the attack ashore progressed rapidly and it was apparent that the end was near. SAMARITAN arrived to take on casualties. U.S. VICTORY, unloaded, departed in company with ASHLAND.

50. Rapid progress of the attack was reported July 9, DOG plus TWENTY FOUR Day. SAMARITAN departed, filled with casualties. DOMINICAN VICTORY, W. WYMAN, and ARGONAUT arrived and commenced unloading. At 1613, the Commanding General announced that SAIPAN Island was secured.
THIS SECTION CONTAINS MAPS REFER TO ORIGINAL FOLDER
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY

(All times KING, Dates East Longitude)

14 June 1944 - DOG minus ONE

Weather Summary - Showers in vicinity; sky cloudy with low middle and high clouds; average visibility good; winds predominantly southeast, course about 13 knots.

Task Group 52.16 steaming about nine miles on the port beam of Task Group 52.15, base course 289°.

1307 - CTF 52 signalled, "Execute approach plan". TG 52.16 commenced closing TG 52.15 contact position in special cruising disposition 3AL3 in accordance with Approach Plan, Annex (B) to CTF 52 Attack Order 41-44.

1332 - Completed forming cruising disposition 3AL3. Fleet course and axis 289° True, speed 10 knots.

1417 - Formation stopped for transfer of control personnel from MONROVIA, BOLIVAR, LEONARD WOOD, CALLAWAY and ROCKY MOUNT to NOA, MANLEY and OVERTON.

1435 - Transfer completed, changed speed to 13.5 knots.

1459 - Commenced zigzagging in accordance with Plan 6.

1723 - Formation executed emergency ships right 60°.

1726 - Executed ships left to true course 289°.

1732 - Commenced zigzagging in accordance with Plan 6.

1925 - Ceased zigzagging and resumed base course.

1931 - Changed speed to 12.5 knots.

2054 - ROBINSON in picket station ahead reported underwater sound contact.

2055 - Formation executed emergency ships right 45°.

2058 - ROBINSON dropped depth charges on contact and reported a resultant oil slick.

2135 - Formation executed ships left 45°.

2200 - WATERS in the inner screen on station 4060 reported underwater sound contact bearing 335°.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

14 June 1944 - DOG minus ONE (Cont'd)

2202 - Formation executed emergency ships left 50°.
2222 - Formation executed emergency ships right 50°.
2339 - Changed fleet course and axis to 270° True.
2353 - Increased speed to 13.5 knots.

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY


0045 - MONROVIA lost man overboard.
0112 - MONSSEN sent to investigate reports of men in water and recover them if possible.
0121 - MONSSEN located 12 enemy survivors on a raft but they refused rescue.
0150 - Changed fleet course and axis to the left to 225°.
0324 - Changed fleet course and axis to the left to 180°.
0338 - MONSSEN recovered one enemy enlisted pilot whose plane had been shot down.
0350 - Changed fleet course and axis to the left to 140°.
0357 - Changed fleet course and axis to 110°.
0452 - CTF 52 executed CTF 52 Attack Order No. All-44.
0505 - Changed to 2/3 speed.
0507 - Formation executed ships left to 090°.
0513 - Formation executed ships right to 110°.
0515 - Changed to standard speed.
0523 - Changed to 2/3 speed.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

0523 - MOLALA recovered 9 enemy survivors from water; the tenth refused rescue.

0524 - Executed speed ZERO.

0524 - Transports arrived in Transport Areas 1 and 2.

0530 - Fire support ships started bombardment on schedule.

0533 - From CTF 52 to CTG 52.2 and Transport Commanders, "Take charge, good luck".

0536 - CAMBRIA and other transports lowering all boats.

0540 - CTF 52 announced H-Hour 0830 for assault on SAIPAN Island.

0543 - Beach reconnaissance units reported no obstacles in reef or lagoon. Water depth over reef and lagoon 2-3 feet, reef flat top and sandy bottom. DUKW's can cross all beaches. Underwater Demolition Team reported they had lost four killed five wounded in reconnaissance.

0550 - CTG 52.17 reported guns on MANIAGASSA Island obliterated.

0550 - Air coordinator reported on station.

0600 - Air coordinator reports 12 VF on station for CAP.

0602 - Air coordinator reported 8 TBF on station for ASP.

0610 - Air coordinator reported machine gun and mortar fire from beaches at CHARAN KANDA.

0617 - From CTG 52.2 to CTF 52 - "UDT reports bad mortar fire appears about 600 yards behind all beaches".

0619 - Fire Support Unit #4 reported receiving fire from shore installations.

0624 - LSD's commenced launching LCM's carrying tanks.

0630 - HOW minus NINETY air strike reported on station.

0641 - CTG 52.2 to CTF 52 - "No change in estimate of HOW Hour".

0647 - Air coordinator reported 6 smoker planes on station.

0700 - Gunfire ceased for the air strike.

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PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

0700 - H-90 air strike commenced - 60 fighters, 46 dive bombers, 40 TBF participating.

0700 - CTF 52 ordered "Cease firing for air strike".

0700 - LST Group BAKER arrived on station in LST Area BAKER and commenced launching LVT's with assault troops of 4th MarDiv.

0703 - CAMBRIA moved up near LST Area ABLE.

0705 - 4th MarDiv air observer reported on station.

0710 - LST Group ABLE arrived on station in LST Area ABLE and commenced launching LVT's with assault troops of 2nd MarDiv.

0724 - CTF 52 announced HOW Hour 0830.

0727 - Air strike completed. Scheduled gunfire resumed.

0729 - LCI's are formed up for beach bombardment in close support of the assault.

0730 - Assumed gunfire control for fire support sections ONE, TWO and THREE.

0735 - CALIFORNIA ordered, during period HOW minus 30 to HOW Hour to deliver 400 rounds A/A common on beaches RED 2 and RED 1 in that order in addition to scheduled fire.

0740 - BELLE GROVE launched LVT's for reserve waves.

0741 - BIRMINGHAM ordered to add Beaches BLUE 1 and GREEN 3 to her HOW minus 20 through HOW Hour scheduled 5" fire and to fire on BLUE 1 initially and work northward.

0746 - TENNESSEE ordered to deliver fire on identified targets in Area 127Q prior to HOW minus 30.

0750 - CTF 52 announced change in HOW Hour to 0840 on recommendation Central Control Officer. This change necessitated by failure of rapid transfer of control personnel.

0751 - CALIFORNIA ordered to deliver 100 rounds W/P in 182A, B, C and D from HOW minus 10 to HOW Hour.

0805 - The 2nd MarDiv air observer reported on station.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont’d)

15 June 1944 - D-Day (Cont’d)

0810 - Destroyers commenced close supporting fire.

0810 - Commander Control Group reported "Everything set and ready".

0813 - First wave left line of departure for all beaches.

0815 - Second wave left line of departure for BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.

0816 - LCI’s commenced firing.

0818 - Second wave left line of departure for RED and GREEN Beaches.

0819 - Large formation of VF on station for strafing and rocket attack on beaches. Heavy naval gunfire from destroyers and LCI’s to cover landing waves in progress.

0819 - Third wave left line of departure for BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.

0823 - Planes formed up over the beach. Commander Minesweeping Unit FOUR (52.13.4) reported to Commander Minesweeping Group (52.13) that he had completed his initial assignment, i.e., of sweeping Areas 1A and 1B, the areas in which the assault ships were operating.

0826 - Third wave left line of departure for RED and GREEN Beaches. Fourth wave left line of departure for BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.

0832 - Fifth wave left line of departure for BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.

0832 - Fire support ships directed to get W/P down on the ground.

0832 - Heavy machine gun fire reported on Beach RED 2.

0833 - CALIFORNIA ordered to discontinue use of W/P.

0834 - Fourth wave left line of departure for RED and GREEN Beaches.

0836 - Leading wave reported 2500 yards off BLUE and YELLOW Beaches. Leading waves for RED and GREEN are ahead of leading waves for BLUE and YELLOW.

0839 - Strafing and rocket attack by VF commenced.

0840 - To all ships - "Estimate leading waves will be late on all beaches".

0843 - First waves landed BLUE and YELLOW (reported by control but not by air observer).

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS
1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

0843 - Splashes observed near destroyer on CAMBRIA's starboard bow.
0844 - Waves for BLUE and YELLOW Beaches estimated to be ten minutes late.
0846 - Air coordinator asked if he could locate origin of fire landing in the boat lanes.
0846 - Dive bombers attacked BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.
0847 - Leading waves reported 1000 yards off BLUE and YELLOW.
0848 - First wave landed RED and GREEN Beaches. (From air observer)
0848 - LCI's ordered to retire when duties completed.
0848 - LVT's crossed the air strip on GREEN Beach.
0850 - Leading wave crossed the reef on BLUE and YELLOW.
0854 - Waves for Beach YELLOW 2 received fire from AGINGAN POINT. Enemy gun in 137K and 137A fired on boats. Air observer reported leading wave landed on BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.
0855 - Landing troops received heavy fire from BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.
0901 - CAMBRIA directed to move to position off YELLOW ONE.
0905 - Mortar fire from inland began landing inside the reef.
0907 - Some of our LVT(2) reported to be in Area 127C.
0911 - CTF 52 assumed control of all fire support.
0911 - Air coordinator reported all organized waves had landed.
0912 - LVT's began returning from RED and GREEN Beaches to line of departure.
0917 - TENNESSEE reported receiving fire from northeast point of TINIAN.
0927 - Transport Group ABLE began moving into Transport Area #3.
0939 - Transport Divisions 10 and 30 moved down from Transport Area 6 and 7.
0958 - INDIANAPOLIS stood out.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

1024 - CAMBRIA moved up closer to the line of departure.

1032 - CTG 52.5 ordered 8 LCT to be launched as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCT 143 from LST 242</th>
<th>LCT 962 from LST 226</th>
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<td>985</td>
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1055 - Channel control vessel was ordered to take station.

1057 - ComTrans Group BAKER ordered ComTransDiv 30 to debark troops.

1104 - Enemy 40mm fire reported as coming from Beaches GREEN 1 and 2.

1105 - Enemy artillery located beyond 0-1 line firing on our troops. CTG 52.2 requested intensified air search and destruction of these batteries.

1126 - CTG 52.2 reported to CTF 52 that enemy gunfire was creating a serious situation in the 2nd MarDiv and requested that every effort be made to locate and destroy.

1135 - CTF 52 reported to CTG 52.2 that planes were making every effort to locate enemy fire in 2nd MarDiv Zone.

1140 - YELLOW Beach was secured. Began landing artillery.

1209 - Air coordinator announced our troops are on 0-1 line.

1242 - Medium tanks commenced coming ashore on BLUE 2 and YELLOW 1 Beach.

1300 - Enemy reported as massing troops in Area 143.

1322 - Two enemy tanks hit and left burning and out of action in Area 160.

1352 - Air strike went into Area 130 on emplacement of heavy artillery reported by air observer.

1435 - Enemy artillery reported in Area 161A and 161V.

1510 - Jap net tender attempted to escape from TANAPAG Harbor and was put out of action by naval gunfire.

1519 - Boats began using GHARAN KANOA boat channel.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

1542 - Senior Beachmaster reported to CTG 52.2 that YELLOW Beaches were still under fire and not ready for unloading craft.

1700 - CTF 52 ordered TF 52 form cruising disposition 3AL2, course 272°, speed 8 knots and to pass through a point 2½ miles east of Point CRAB at 1830 for night retirement. CAMBRIA to remain near anchorage.

1819 - Commander Carrier Support Group ONE reports he did not know how many planes were in the enemy attack group. One had been shot down.

1824 - Unidentified plane reported at 105°, distance 26 miles.

1825 - Commander Carrier Support Group ONE reported 5 or 6 enemy planes bearing 250°, distance 12 miles.

1830 - CAMBRIA reported unidentified plane bearing 208°, distance 64 miles.

1836 - CAMBRIA got underway.

1836 - CTF 52 to TF 52 - "Prepare for air attack",

1839 - CAMBRIA radar picked up unidentified plane bearing 161°, distance 14 miles.

1839 - CAMBRIA ordered by CTG 52.2 to act independently during attack.

1840 - Enemy plane in sight bearing 155°.

1845 - Enemy planes reported bearing 320°, distance 15 miles.

1846 - TENNESSEE reported air attack ahead of the formation.

1847 - Enemy planes sighted off CAMBRIA's starboard beam.

1849 - Pritchett reported bogies in sight.

1849 - CTF 52 ordered open fire on enemy planes.

1852 - ROCKY MOUNT reported she was under air attack.

1900 - Bogie reported closing the BENNION, very low.

1903 - Bogies west of TINIAN seen by BENNION.

1904 - CAMBRIA reported unidentified plane bearing 118°, distance 19 miles.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

15 June 1944 - DOG DAY (Cont'd)

1920 - CAMBRIA ordered to slow to about five knots.
1922 - CAMBRIA reported bogie bearing 302°, distance 16 miles.
1952 - Enemy air attack completed.
2035 - LST's got underway for night retirement.
2058 - CAMBRIA anchored in Berth BAKER 12. CTG 52.2 formed anti-submarine screen around anchorage area and stationed LCI's around area to provide protection against enemy small craft. ORACLE stationed as listening watch in Berth BAKER One.
2107 - CTG 52.2 to all ships present - "Prepare to repel air attack, Flash RED".
2112 - CTG 52.2 to all ships "Execute smoke plan".
2127 - FLASH WHITE.

16 June 1944 - DOG plus 1

Weather Summary - Showers early morning with scattered lower clouds and three to six tenths cirrostratus throughout period. Southeasterly surface winds averaging 11 knots, maximum velocity 17 knots. Visibility 15 miles or better.

0245 - FLASH RED by CTG 52.2.
0250 - Executed smoke plan.
0316 - Ceased smoking, FLASH WHITE by CTG 52.2.
0405 - FLASH RED by CTG 52.2.
0406 - Executed smoke plan.
0425 - GILMER reported 5 small Japanese merchant vessels bearing 005°, distance 18 miles from the anchorage. CTG 52.2 ordered GILMER to take appropriate action and ordered SHAW to assist. GILMER sank 4 of the vessels - SHAW sank the fifth when enroute to assist GILMER.
0432 - Ceased smoking.
0538 - FLASH WHITE by CTG 52.2.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

16 June 1944 - DOG plus 1 (cont'd)

0610 - Air support requested to assist repelling enemy counter-attack on SAIPAN. The counter-attack has been going on since 0430. The enemy is apparently trying to get back down to YELLOW Beach.

0616 - Strafing attack made on northeast section of SAIPAN.

0630 - Bombing and strafing attack made on guns in Area 161X.

0715 - Received report that the 2nd MarDiv had been under attack since midnight.

0730 - Ships that retired during night returned to assigned area west of SAIPAN. Commenced unloading operations.

1330 - CHANDLER reported 3 burning ships 25 miles north of SAIPAN. CHANDLER had 11 prisoners of war aboard from ships. (These were probably those destroyed by GILMER and SHAW.)

1530 - TG 51.18 - Reserve Group ONE under Admiral BLANDY which included TransDiv 7 and TransDiv 32 and escorts stood in SAIPAN anchorage with two RCT of 27th Inf. Div. troops.

1545 - The following report secured from a Marine Officer who had returned to CAMBRIA from ashore: "The Japs are shelling the pier. A lot of LCM's are on the beaches. The channel will be deep enough by 1600 or 1800 to run in LCT's. The salvage boats are trying to pull some of the obstacles out of the way. The Shore Party team is around GREEN 2 and 3 getting it set up. No trouble in coming right up to GREEN 3. There is still a gap between the two marine divisions. Believe we can get in to GREEN 2. There are LVT's coming in to GREEN 2 and 3. There are gun emplacements in a ravine inland from GREEN Beaches. In the channel the supplies are going well; that is until some artillery registered on the beaches."

1700 - Fire support units continue to deliver call fires.

1800 - All transports with exception of CAMBRIA, BELLATRIX, THUBAN, MIDDLETON, LA SALLE, ALMAACK, ALCYONE, ELECTRA and OAK HILL under command of CTF 52 departed transport area for night on retirement. One RCT of 27th Division boated and landing by battalions through boat channel to BLUE ONE Beach.

Weather Summary - Moderate mid-morning showers with showers in vicinity throughout day. Waterspout observed in evening. Sky overcast with middle and low clouds predominating. Average visibility 12 miles reduced to 2 miles in showers. Winds mostly easterly averaging 5 knots with highest velocity 14 knots from the northeast.

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
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PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

17 June 1944 - DOG plus 2 (Cont'd)

0340 - PRESERVER reported an LCM from OAK HILL came alongside and reported while drifting about 0200/17 she had sighted a surface submarine approximately 298°, distance 8 miles from AGINCAN Point.

0346 - ORACLE directed to make anti-submarine sweep 3 miles to seaward of transports.

0349 - CTG 52.2 ordered all screening vessels to make a sweep immediately towards point of origin of screen to within 2 miles of point of origin, then reverse course and make sweep to regular positions.

0559 - Air coordinator advised front line panels were in place along entire O-1 line.

0600 - Transports of Task Force 52 returned and resumed unloading operations. CTG 51.18 with one RCT of the 27th Inf. Div. embarked stood in. Commenced unloading and disembarking RCT.

0644 - BatDiv 4 relieved BatDiv 2 in Fire Support Area 2 and 3 for fueling.

1000 - TG 51.2 - Defense Group ONE composed of LST 119, 274, 205, 277, RENSHAW, FC(S) 1404, 1396 and 1460 arrived.

1503 - Five (5) PBM's planes landed, BALLARD acting as tender.

1515 - A TBF made a forced landing on CHARAN KANOA air strip.

1525 - Air coordinator reported 4 or 5 enemy aircraft on TINIAN Island with crews working around them.


1531 - Destroyers ordered not to shoot starshells until 1 hour after sunset and to cease 1/2 hour before sunrise.

1532 - MC GOWAN reported one PBM landed near MANIACASIA Island, resting on reef (damaged).

1606 - The air observer reported an advance of the front lines to north of the airfield.

1700 - All transports less CAMBRIA, ELLIOTT, JUPITER, and HERCULES and all LST's less LST 127, 246, 121, 340, 23, 124, 40, 341, 218, 450, 126 and 130 with ENCLOSEMENT (A) to

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CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

17 June 1944 - DOG plus 2 (Cont'd)

screening vessels commenced retirement to eastward of SAIPAN under command of CTF 52. Upon their departure CTG 52.2 became SOPA SAIPAN and assumed command of all naval elements supporting the assault on SAIPAN. Ships remaining SAIPAN in addition to above after departure of main body are: LCI 80, 81, 79, 451, 460, 458, 452, 371; PC(S) - SC 1452, 1461, 1421, 1455, 1049, 1012, 1052, 582, 1082; YMS 302, 295, 296, 291, 292, 323, 385, 396, AM's ORACLE and CHIEF, APD's BROOKS, GILMER, CLEMSON, HAMILTON; AT's CHICKASAW, MOLALA; ARB PHAON; ARS PRESERVER; DD's SHAW, BRYANT, PHELPS, BALLARD; DMS'S LONG, HOPKINS and PERRY.

1706 - MARYLAND reported unidentified plane bearing 352°, distance 15 miles from Point SUZY.

1801 - FLASH RED by CTF 52 - ASP ordered to get underway.

1808 - CTG 52.2 ordered ELLIOTT, JUPITER and HERCULES to get underway, forming column on CAMBRIA with screen ORACLE, SHAW, MOTIVE, YMS 323, CHICKASAW, and GILMER. Departing course was 250° True. Changed course to 000° departing transport area due to air attack. Formation maneuvered to northward returning to anchorage SAIPAN after air attack.

1815 - CTG 52.2 ordered all LST'S to get underway and maneuver in vicinity of anchorage returning to anchorage to continue unloading operation after air attack.

1827 - CTG 52.14 reported 1 BETTY shot down.

1847 - Ships fired on single plane.

1922 - LST 84 in LST formation on port beam of CAMBRIA was set on fire by enemy air attack. PRESERVER dispatched by CTG 52.2 to assist. Fire reported under control before PRESERVER arrived. Was hit by small bomb. LST 84 proceeded with formation.

1936 - FLASH WHITE - CAMBRIA, ELLIOTT, JUPITER and HERCULES returned to anchorage west of SAIPAN.

2108 - Screen informed that covering Groups 1 and 2 would operate in Area PATHE and ACME during night.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

18 June 1944 - DOG plus 3

Weather Summary - Cloudy with low, middle and high clouds present throughout period. Visibility averaging 15 miles. Good flying weather. Winds easterly averaging 12 knots, with highest velocity 16 knots from the east.

0018 - PHELPS and BALLARD turned on search lights for take off of 4 PHM's on search mission.

0039 - Patrol planes completed take offs - departing for patrol duties.

0422 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

0430 - CTG 52.2 directed ASP to get underway and lie to.

0433 - Japanese apparently attempted an amphibious counter-attack from GARAPAN (using barges and sampans). LCI's stationed off GARAPAN to prevent such an attack intercepted and effectively repulsed the attempt.

0540 - PHELPS was fired on by shore battery and received two hits.

0542 - CTG 52.2 directed LCI's to cease firing GARAPAN Lagoon. LCI 371 received hits from 4-five inch shells - counter-attack repelled. PRESERVER dispatched to assist LCI 371.

0544 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

0830 - Air coordinator advised our planes were strafing enemy planes on TINIAN Island.

0850 - ORACLE conducted sweeping operations off Beach WHITE 1 and 2. No mines encountered.

1045 - Air coordinator announced BETTY shot down 5 miles south of TINIAN Island by our fighters.

1358 - SOLACE and BOUNTIFUL stood in and anchored.

1415 - POLOMOKE (AV 9), ONSLOW (AVP 48) with escort RENSHAW stood in. RENSHAW directed to report to Commander Transport Screen. POLOMOKE and ONSLOW anchored in area near moored seaplanes.

1438 - Transfer of seriously wounded from transports and LST's to hospital ships commenced.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

18 June 1944 - DOG plus 3 (Cont'd)

1625 - CAMBRIA reported unidentified aircraft (three groups) bearing 185°,
distance 80 miles.

1636 - Ships present were ordered by SOPA to get underway and lie to in assigned
berths.

1645 - Air coordinator reported carrier unit 30 miles east of SAIPAN was under
air attack.

1652 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

1721 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

1728 - PRINCE dispatched to vicinity MAGICIENNE BAY to assist in repelling enemy
tank attack in Target Area 140.

1729 - Transports and LST's present anchored and continued unloading. Naval
gunfire and air missions on call.

1756 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

1801 - Friendly planes engaged enemy aircraft over TINIAN, seven enemy planes
shot down.

1847 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2215 - POCOMOKE advised 4 FBM's (search planes) were taking off. Take-off aided
by starshells from BALLARD and SHAW.

19 June 1944 - DOG plus 4

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy to cloudy entire day with high and low clouds
present. Visibility unlimited. Surface winds easterly averaging 15 knots with
highest velocity 18 knots.

0524 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

0534 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

0600 - ALHENA (AKA 9) stood in, anchored, and commenced unloading.

0800 - BELLATRIX (AKA 3), ACLYONE (AKA 7), WINGED ARROW (AP 170), and HARRIS
(AP 2) escorted by CHANDLER, A. W. GRANT, CHAMPION, TALBOT and HERALD
stood in. Transports anchored and commenced unloading.

ENCLOSURE (A) to

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CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

19 June 1944 - DOG plus 4 (Cont'd)

0800 - CHANDLER, BRYANT and HAMILTON departed to join CTF 52.

0830 - A. W. GRANT dispatched to join CTF 52.

0927 - CAP shot down 1 enemy plane over TINIAN.

0930 - CHAMPION and HERALD dispatched to join CTF 52.

0940 - LST 169 stood in.

1025 - LST 486, 166, 272, 483 stood in.

1200 - Following LCT's launched - LCT 1059, 995, 349, 1060 and 968.

1401 - BOUNTIFUL dispatched for ENIWETOK.

1745 - ASHLAND, OAK HILL and HEYWOOD escorted by OVERTON and MC NAIR stood in. OVERTON and MC NAIR dispatched immediately to CTF 52. Commenced unloading HEYWOOD and OAK HILL. ASHLAND assigned duties as boat repair vessel.

20 June 1944 - DOG plus 5

Weather Summary - Cloudy entire day with thick cirrus predominating. Lower swelling cumulus present. Surface winds east-northeast averaging 14 knots with highest velocity of 20 knots. Visibility unlimited.

0048 - Enemy troops reported on PURPLE Beaches MAGICIENNE BAY. Fire support requested by marines on beaches north of illuminated Area 330 to break up concentration of enemy troops.

0600 - FREMONT, CUSTER, SHERIDAN, KNOX, FOMALHAUT, STORM KING and COMET with escorts GOLDSBOROUGH, NOA, MANLEY, CONWAY and EATON and MC COWAN stood in. Transports anchored in assigned berths and commenced unloading operations.

0600 - Task Group 51.19 composed of PRINCE GEORGE, KENMORE, DE GRASSE, LIVINGSTON, LEONES, LCI's 457, 345, 346, 348, 436, 441, 449, KEOKUK, and MIMOSA with escort SEDERSTROM, TISDALE, BARON and ACREE stood in. Transports anchored in assigned berths and commenced unloading operations. ELECTRA with DIONNE as escort stood in, anchored and commenced unloading.

0600 - LST's 277, 205, 274, 240, and 119 stood in and anchored off assigned beaches for unloading operations.

0910 - LONG rescued pilot of own VF plane shot down west of TINIAN.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

20 June 1944 - DOG plus 5 (Cont'd)

0950 - WADLEIGH rescued one member of TBF crew shot down east of SAIPAN.

1000 - CTF 56.1 assumed command ashore in accordance with CTF 51 OpPlan A10-44.

1200 - LST 121, 246, 340 and 126 completed unloading and departed SAIPAN with escort YMS 291 and 296.
Landed RCT 106 in LST's loaded from Transport Division 34.

1310 - SOLACE departed SAIPAN.

1400 - The RENSHAW, CONWAY and EATON joined fire support units being replaced by PRINGLE and SAUFLEY.

1420 - 4 additional PBM's search planes landed SAIPAN.

1430 - LCT 996 and 993 launched.

1730 - LST 275 stood in SAIPAN anchorage for minor damage repairs.

1747 - MC GOWAN joined fire support unit.

2000 - LA SALLE with SIGOURNEY as escort stood in.

2030 - DICKERSON (APD 21) stood in.

2100 - SIGOURNEY departed SAIPAN in accordance with CTF 52 orders.

2200 - Explosions and fires observed in ammunition dumps back of Beach GREEN ONE.
Tugs and LCI's with fire fighting apparatus dispatched to beaches to assist in fighting the fires.

2223 - SEDERSTROM and TISDALE departed SAIPAN to join TG 52.5 in compliance with CTF 51 dispatch 19/0828.

2300 - PRINCE GEORGE, WINGED ARROW, HEYWOOD and ASHLAND dispatched additional fire fighting equipment to beaches.

21 June 1944 - DOG plus 6

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy to cloudy during day with upper type clouds pre-
dominating. Fair weather cumulus present. Surface winds easterly 13 knots
highest hourly wind 15 knots. Visibility 20 miles.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

21 June 1944 - DOG plus 6 (Cont'd)

0025 - PHELPS anchored in Berth B-25 received 2 hits from 40mm fired from enemy small craft. PHELPS and NORMAN SCOTT returned fire sinking one craft, damaging another. (5 boats observed in all) NORMAN SCOTT received damaged starboard torpedo director. 7 casualties, none serious.

0600 - HARRIS, KNOX, SHERIDAN, WINGED ARROW, HEYWOOD completed unloading and escorted by GOLDSBOROUGH, NOA and MANLEY departed SAIPAN area to report to CTF 51 operating to the eastward of SAIPAN.

0630 - LST 225, 273, 19, 224, 45, 84, 354, 451, 213, 461, 278, 131, 129 and 31 escorted by PRINGLE stood in.

0730 - MAZAMA (AE 9) escorted by H. L. EDWARDS and DENT stood in and anchored.

1352 - CHIEF reported one of our planes had been shot down over MARPI POINT.

1700 - ROCKY MOUNT, MONROVIA, FUNSTON, WARHAWK, LINDENWALD, CLAY, NEVILLE, MIDDLETON, FELAND, EOLIVER, DOYEN, ALMAACK, THUBAN, WHITE MARSH escorted by BRYANT, HALSEY POWELL, IRWIN, KANE, MC DERMUT, CASS IN YOUNG and STRINGHAM stood in SAIPAN anchorage. CTF 52 in ROCKY MOUNT assumed duties as SOPA.

1800 - CUSTER, FREMONT, STORM KING, LA SALLE, BELLAATRIX, ELLIOTT escorted by PERRY, SAUFLEY, ACREE and BAHN stood out for eastern retirement area.

1900 - TU 52.2.11 - LST's 354, 213, 278, 483, 131, 19, 272 finished unloading and stood out escorted by YMS 302, 295 and 385.

22 June 1944 - DOG plus 7


0113 - CAMBRIA reported unidentified plane bearing 320° True, distance 37 miles.

0117 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

0148 - Some ships at anchor fired AA batteries.

0150 - CTF 52 ordered cease firing.

0215 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

22 June 1944 - DOG plus 7 (Cont'd)

0238 - CTD 34 reported to CTF 52 that 4 bombs fell in vicinity Berth BAKER 71 off port quarter of PRINCE GEORGE during RED ALERT.

0315 - Beachmaster advised Japanese bomber during RED ALERT came from southeast headed northwest dropped 7 bombs 1/4 mile inland.

1100 - Underwater Demolition Team working on Beach WHITE ONE received fire from TINIAN.

1800 - TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, CONWAY, MC GOWAN, DIONNE departed for ENIWETOK for ammunition.

1850 - ELLIOTT and BELLATRIX stood in SAIPAN to join with TU 51.18.18 for departure from SAIPAN area. Escorts ROBINSON, MC NAIR, HERALD and CHAMPION.

1850 - TU 51.18.18 consisting of OAK HILL, COMET, BOLIVAR, DOYEN, ALCYONE, MONROVIA, FUNSTON, WARHAWK, LINDENWALD, WHITE MARSH, FELAND, ALHENA, ELLIOTT and BELLATRIX finished unloading and with escorts ROBINSON, PHELPS, CHAMPION, HERALD, TALBOT and BROOKS departed SAIPAN area.

1953 - MARYLAND reported she had received torpedo hit from low flying plane.

2300 - JOHN LAND escorted by PERRY and HOWARD stood in. Commander THEISS was this date relieved as Commander Central Control Group by Commander KING.

2307 - THUBAN advised "We are under fire".

2339 - CTF 51 to ASP - "FLASH RED - planes approaching".

2352 - CTF 51 to ASP - "Execute smoke plan".

2355 - GREEN Beach advised shells are definitely coming from TINIAN and falling about 50 yards from GREEN Beach Headquarters.

23 June 1944 - DOG plus 8

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy entire day with cumulus, swelling cumulus and traces of cirrus present. Showers in vicinity, visibility 15 miles or better. Surface wind easterly averaging fourteen knots, highest velocity 17 knots.

0008 - CTF 51 to ASP - "All ships cease smoking and standby to start again".

0011 - CTF 51 to ASP - "Execute smoke plan".
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

23 June 1944 - DOG plus 8 (Cont'd)

0026 - Shore anti-aircraft batteries opened fire.

0039 - CTF 51 to ASP - "Cease smoking".

0049 - CTF 51 to ASP - "Execute smoke plan".

0145 - CTF 51 to ASP - "Cease smoking".

0309 - CTF 51 to ASP - "FLASH WHITE".

0339 - CTF 51 to ASP - "FLASH BLUE".

0500 - LIVINGSTON reported low flying planes dropped torpedo which passed under ship, no damage.

0546 - FLASH WHITE.

0600 - CALVERT, FULLER, CALLAWAY, SUMTER, LEON, BELLE GROVE, LEONARD WOOD, O'HARA, STORM KING, PIERCE, LA SALLE escorted by NEWCOMB, WATERS, OVERTON, NOA, MANLEY, GOLDSBOROUGH and TEKESTA stood in to unload, included LCI's 455, 453, 470, 373, 78, 454, 726, 347, 456, and 725 as escorts.

0700 - LST 267, 222, 242, 271, 226, 223, 128, 34, 42, 487 escorted by BAILEY, COGLIANO, PC 1403, 581, 1079, YMS 291, 296, SC 1066, PC(S) 1402, 1404, 1396, TISDALE, and CINCHONA stood in to continue unloading operations.

1000 - INDIANAPOLIS stood in and anchored.

1200 - Commander GroPac EIGHT assumed control of RED and GREEN Beaches.

1650 - CHIEF dispatched to MAGICIENNE BAY to destroy floating mines.

1800 - TU 51.18.16 consisting of CLAY, MIDDLETON, NEVILLE, LA SALLE, POMALHAUT, completed unloading and departed SAIPAN area escorted by MANLEY, NOA, MC NAIR, VICINNES, CONY, WALLER and PHELPS.

1800 - LST 31, 40, 42, 45, 84, 128, 129, 166, 224, 225, 271, 273, 277, 461 completed unloading and departed for ENIWEITOK with escorts PC 1080, PC(S) 1403, SC 1066, LCI 347, 451, 452, 458, 460, 470 and COGLIAN.

1830 - ROCKY MOUNT, FULLER, CALVERT, JOHN LAND, JUPITER, HERCULES, LEONARD WOOD, THUBAN, PIERCE, O'HARA, ELECTRA, CALLAWAY, LEON, SUMTER and ALMAACK with escort NEWCOMB, PRINGLE, BRYANT, DICKERSON, DENT, STRINGHAM, GOLDSBOROUGH, MOTIVE, HEED, HOWARD, PERRY, OVERTON, TEKESTA, retired from SAIPAN

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

23 June 1944 - DOG plus 8 (Cont'd)

anchorage for night to return daylight 24 June 1944. CTG 52.2 assumed
duties as SOPA.

2219 - LST 127 with PC(S) 1421 got underway to join TU 52.5.1.

24 June 1944 - DOG plus 9

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy in morning becoming broken by noon with thick
cirrus and low swelling cumulus. Occasional showers throughout period. Winds
easterly averaging 12 knots. Visibility 12 miles.

0025 - CTG 52.2 to ASP - "FLASH RED".

0035 - CTG 52.2 to ASP - "Make smoke".

0104 - CTG 52.2 to ASP - "Cease smoking".

0105 - PHAON was hit by shrapnel from falling bombs.

0107 - FLASH WHITE.

0716 - PBm with fighter escort dispatched to point 10 miles south of MAGICIENNE
BAY to pick up men on raft (men from crashed TBF).

0730 - CTF 52 with retirement ships and escorts returned to SAIPAN anchorage.
CTF 52 assumed duties as SOPA.

0830 - PC 549, SC 504, LCI's 469, 471, 472 and AGEDOR (ARL 3) stood in.

1015 - Hospital ships SAMARITAN and RELIEF stood in and anchored.

1200 - Commander GroPac EIGHT assumed control of BLUE and YELLOW Beaches.

1420 - Seven P-61's (night fighters) and two transport planes landed on ASLITO
Airfield.

1650 - MARYLAND departed for PEARL HARBOR via ENIWETOK for repairs to torpedo
damage.

1800 - TU 51.18.14 - OTC in BAILEY with LST's 23, 34, 124, 222, 223, 226, 242,
267, 486, 487 completed unloading and departed for ENIWETOK with LCI's
469, 471, 472, PC 582, 581, 1079, 549, PC(S) 1402, SC 1052, 504, 1320, 503,
as escorts.

ENCLOSURE (A) to

CTG 52.2 Serial O226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

24 June 1944 - DOG plus 9 (Cont'd)

1830 - TU 51.18.15 - CALLAWAY, SUMTER, LEON, STORM KING, LEONARD WOOD, O'HARA, PIERCE, CALVERT, FULLER, ALMAACK, completed unloading and escorted by MC DERMUT, CASSIN YOUNG, OVERTON, DEWEY, MELVIN, HULL, MACDONOUGH, HOWARD, HEED and MOTIVE departed for ENIWETOK.

1912 - CTF 52 to all ships - "FLASH BLUE".

1917 - CTF 52 to all ships - "FLASH RED".

1923 - Air command on beach launched 4 VF.

1925 - Bombs fell off YELLOW Beach.

1943 - FLASH WHITE.

1952 - CTF 52 ordered STRINGHAM and TISDALE to keep SUNHARON Harbor under observation to keep Japanese troops from TINIAN from landing behind our troops on SAIPAN.

2043 - FLASH BLUE.

2049 - FLASH RED.

2053 - CTF 52 to ASP - "Make smoke".

2107 - Enemy plane dropped flares over southwest part of SAIPAN.

2134 - Enemy planes appear to be using south TINIAN airfield.

2146 - FLASH BLUE.

2209 - CTF 52 to ASP - "FLASH WHITE".

25 June 1944 - DOG plus 10

Weather Summary - Overcast throughout day with low middle and high clouds, cirrostratus predominating. Scattered showers during period. Visibility good. Winds east 13 knots.

0230 - Hospital ships SAMARITAN and RELIEF departed for KWAJALEIN.


ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

25 June 1944 - DOG plus 10 (Cont'd)

1230 - TG 51.4 - Garrison Group #1 composed of ISLAND MAIL, ROBIN WENTLEY, CAPE FEAR, SAN MARTIN, CAPE GEORGIA, EL SALVADOR VICTORY, escorted by DEEDE, PHILIP, and ELDEN stood in and anchored.

1530 - NEW MEXICO, IDAHO, PENNSYLVANIA, CruDiv 9, DesDiv 2 plus STANBURY and LONG ordered to proceed ENIWETOK for ammunition and supplies.

1700 - TG 51.19 composed of PRINCE GEORGE, KENMORE, DE GRASSE, LEONES, PRITCHETT, LIVINGSTON, H. L. EDWARDS, BARON, TISDALE, TAWASA retired to Area CALIFORNIA.

1700 - TG 51.18 compose of FREMONT, CAVALIER, J. F. BELL, HERALD OF THE MORNING, AURIGA, CUSTER, JUPITER, HERCULES, THUBAN, ELECTRA, JOHN LAND, with escorts HALSEY POWELL, MONSSEN, WADLEY, RENSHAW, TWINING, DEWEY, HULL, MAC DONOUGH, STRINGHAM, and DENT retired for the night to return daybreak 26 June to complete unloading.

26 June 1944 - DOG plus 11

Weather Summary - Broken to overcast with upper clouds predominating and swelling cumulus present. Surface winds easterly averaging fifteen knots, maximum hourly velocity 17 knots. Visibility unrestricted.

0303 - LCI 373, 453 and 30 proceeded to vicinity of anchorage C-9 to assist LCI's there repelling Japanese barges reported coming out from TANAPAG Harbor.

0600 - CHANDELEUR (AV 10) and STEELE (DE 10) stood in SAIPAN anchorage.

0600 - TG 51.18 stood in from night retirement to complete unloading.

0830 - Bombing and strafing mission of range station in Area 558 and barges on TINIAN.

1130 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

1139 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

1600 - TG 51.5 - Garrison Group #2 - DASHING WAVE, MORMACFORT (F), CAPE STEVENS, CAPE ISABEL, CAPE TRINITY, CAPE FRIENDSHIP, JOSEPH LYKES, MERCURY, CAPE SANDE, U. S. VICTORY, escorted by W. C. MILLER, CABALI, GRIENER, CASSIN YOUNG and MELVIN stood in and anchored.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

26 June 1944 - DOG plus 11 (Cont'd)

1900 - TG 51.18 - ELECTRA, HERALD OF THE MORNING, J. F. BELL, CAVALIER, HERCULES, JUPITER, JOHN LAND, FREMONT, CUSTER, escorted by DEWEY, HULL, MACDONOUGH, BANCROFT, WILEMAN, ELDEM, HOPKING, DENT, STEELE, PERRY departed SAIPAN for ENIWETOK.

2032 - LST 130 began functioning as Fleet Post Office.

2050 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2057 - CTF 52 to ASP - "Execute smoke plan".

2104 - Enemy plane dropped bombs on airfield (ASLITO) from about 5000 feet altitude.

2118 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

2124 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2147 - MERCURY reported having been hit by dud torpedo from low flying plane. One man was killed, damage was slight. Enemy plane hit aft boom and was destroyed.

2205 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2209 - CTF 52 to ASP - "Execute smoke plan".

2306 - CAMBRIA lookout reported 1 plane overhead.

2309 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

2316 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

27 June 1944 - DOG plus 12

Weather Summary - Overcast during day with few breaks. Cirrostratus predominating, with scattered lower cumulus clouds. Showers in morning. Winds east averaging 13 knots.

0227 - BALLARD detached to report to CTG 59.3.

1254 - CominRon 4 advised CTF 52 of 5 mines on surface across approach to PURPLE Beaches ONE and TWO; small boat sent to destroy them.

1440 - CominRon 4 reported 8 more mines on surface off PURPLE Beach.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

27 June 1944 - DOG plus 12 (Cont'd)

1600 - MACKINAC (AVP 13) stood in and anchored.

1800 - TU 51.18.13 composed of JOSEPH LKLS, CAPE TRINITY, CAPE FRIENDSHIP, CAPE SANDY, DASHING WAVE, escorted by PRINGLE, SELFRIIDGE, CABANA and GOLDSBORO, GI departed to retirement area CALIFORNIA to await further orders.

1915 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

1917 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to make smoke.

1953 - En my bombs dropped between beach and transport area, no damage.

2013 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2057 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2100 - SP in anchorage area ordered to make smoke.

2153 - CAMBRIA lookout reported sighting plane 1500 feet altitude, 1000 yards dead ahead, plane on southerly course.

2201 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2220 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2224 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to make smoke.

2232 - 5 bombs dropped close aboard CAMBRIA - 1 man slightly wounded, no material damage.

28 June 1944 - DOG plus 13

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy entire day with cumulus and swelling cumulus and traces of high cirrus. Visibility unlimited. Winds averaging 14 knots, with maximum hourly velocity of 21 knots.

0037 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

0910 - SUWANEE stood in to receive ammunition from MAZAMA.

0930 - THUBAN, AURIGA, escorted by PATTERSON and GRIENER, departed SAIPAN area. THUBAN and GRIENER to ENIWETOK; AURIGA to rendezvous with TG 53.2; PATTERSON to return to SAIPAN after rendezvous.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

28 June 1944 - DOG plus 13 (Cont'd)

1037 - KEOKUK completed installing anti-submarine net (10,000 yards) in 3 hours and 30 minutes time.

1600 - SUWANEE with CLEMSON stood out to Area NEBRASKA.

1712 - PORTERFIELD reported torpedo track heading on course 350° toward CTG 52.14.

2036 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

2039 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2040 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to make smoke.

2053 - Bombs fell on SAIPAN.

2058 - Friendly PBM patrol plane took off.

2105 - Our shore batteries shot down one enemy plane. Enemy pilot bailed out behind our lines. Parachutes later reported in water off AGINGAN POINT.

2119 - ASP ordered to stop smoking.

2124 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to start smoking.

2136 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2340 - ASLITO airfield reported 2 enemy planes out of four that came over were shot down.

29 June 1944 - DOG plus 14


0050 - BENNION in Screen Station #4 reported dropping depth charges on sound contact.

0135 - WADLEIGH reported her lookout sighted torpedo passing ahead.

0539 - STRINGHAM returning from mission reported 10 small caliber guns on southeast coast TINIAN fired on her but were not able to reach ship at 5000 yards range.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG '52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

29 June 1944 - DOG plus 14 (Cont'd)

0600 - SANGAMON with CLEMSON stood in to receive ammunition from MAZAMA.

0600 - SELFRIDGE, GOLDSBOROUGH and PATTERSON stood in.

0800 - SUAMICO (AO 49) with CAPPS (DD 550) stood in. CAPPS departed immediately to join TG 50.17 at Point WALNUT.

1600 - SANGAMON departed.

1800 - PORTERFIELD stood in.

1830 - KEOKUK escorted by KANE departed for ENIWETOK.

1830 - PORTERFIELD departed for ENIWETOK.

2000 - Island Commander SAIPAN took over shore party functions, including local defense of beaches.

30 June 1944 - DOG plus 15

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy with cirrus and cumulus clouds predominating. Visibility averaged 25 miles with surface winds 13 knots from the east. Lowest cloud base estimated at 2200 feet. Light showers in vicinity in evening.

0552 - CONYNGHAM in Station 15A dropped four charges on good sound contact.

0700 - WHITE PLAINS (CVE 66) with escort ROSS arrived to replenish ammunition from MAZAMA.

0832 - INDIANAPOLIS reported one TBF shot down, pilot bailed out and landed in Area 200R. ASLITO airfield name changed to "ISLEY Field".

1000 - DASHING WAVE, CAPE TRINITY, CAPE SANDE with escorts EDWARDS and CABANA stood in from retirement area, anchored, and commenced unloading operations.

1600 - WHITE PLAINS with escort ROSS departed for Area PRUDENCE and DEPOT.

1950 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

1953 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

1958 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to make smoke.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

30 June 1944 - DOG plus 15 (Cont'd)

2000 - PHILIP departed for scheduled rendezvous with CAVALLA to return late 1 July to SAIPAN.

2016 - ASP cease smoking.

2018 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2040 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

2049 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

2051 - P-61, night fighter, reported contact with enemy planes.

2128 - Night fighter shot down one of two enemy planes.

2152 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2259 - FLASH RED. ASP in anchorage area ordered to commence smoking.

2312 - LCI 441 reported bombs landed 100 yards astern.

2316 - ASP cease smoking.

2327 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

2348 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

1 July 1944 - DOG plus 16

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy in morning becoming overcast in afternoon with low middle and high clouds present. Distant lighting observed about noon. Visibility reduced by smoke in P.M. Winds southeast 10 knots.

0030 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

0031 - ASP in anchorage area are ordered to commence smoking.

0111 - ASP cease smoking.

0125 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

0700 - MIDWAY stood in to receive ammunition from MAZANA.

1000 - BOUNTIFUL stood in and anchored.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

1 July 1944 - DOG plus 16 (Cont'd)

1600 - MIDWAY departed SAIPAN for operating area PRUDENCE and DEPOT, escorted by CASS IN YOUNG.

1600 - PRESERVER reported that fire fighting equipment from LCI's 81, 82, 458, and 455 had been placed in 4 LVT's. These LVT's stationed at RED THREE, GREEN TWO, BLUE ONE and YELLOW TWO Beaches. Each LVT manned by 1 SP(F), 2 hands from an AT or ARS and 3 hands from shore station as crew. Communications established and word was passed ashore and these LVT's will cover any beach now in use in case of fires.

2 July 1944 - DOG plus 17

Weather Summary - Broken to overcast entire period with light showers in morning. Cirrostratus and swelling cumulus clouds predominating. Visibility good. Winds southeast averaging 12 knots.

0056 - FLASH BLUE by SOPA.

0058 - FLASH RED by SOPA.

0059 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to execute smoke plan.

0115 - BENNION reported she shot down one plan on outer screen station.

0155 - ASP ordered to cease smoking.

0201 - ASP in anchorage area ordered to commence smoking.

0210 - ASP ordered to cease smoking.

0215 - FLASH WHITE by SOPA.

0349 - RENSHAW in Screening Station picked up two prisoners of war from plane shot down.

0555 - PHILIP and CAVALLA stood in.

0600 - KALININ BAY stood in to receive ammunition from NAZAMA.

0730 - CAPE FRIENDSHIP, JOSEPH LYKES, KENMORE, LEONES, DE GRASSE, LIVINGSTON, PRINCE GEORGE escorted by SHAW, PRINGLE, PRITCHETT, BARON, TISDALE, and TAMASA stood in and anchored to complete unloading.

0900 - KENMABAGO (AO 81) escorted by CAPPS stood in and anchored.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

2 July 1944 - DOG plus 17 (Cont'd)

1030 - SOLACE stood in for casualties.

1200 - CAVALLA escorted by PHILIP departed.

1300 - KALININ BAY finished loading ammunition and returned to Area PRUDENCE and DEPOT. TG 51.10 - ISLAND MAIL, ROBIN WENTLEY, CAPE GEORGIA, CAPE SAN MARTIN, CAPE STEVENS, MERCURY, MONSSEN escorted by CONYNCHAM, WATERS and DICKERSON departed for ENIWETOK.

1400 - SUAMICO and CAPPS departed.

1800 - BOUNTIFUL completed loading casualties and departed.

3 July 1944 - DOG plus 18

Weather Summary - Light showers in morning and afternoon. Good visibility and flying weather. Sky overcast with high cloud forms. Not more than 4 tenths low clouds present at anytime. Winds predominately easterly averaging 13 knots with highest velocity 21 knots from the south.

0600 - FLASH BLUE by SORA.

0606 - FLASH WHITE by SORA.

1000 - KENMORE, LEONES, LIVINGSTON, DE GRASSE, PRINCE GEORGE, DASHING WAVE, CAPE FEAR, CAPE ISABEL, MORMACPORT, MAZAMA, KENNABAGO, escorted by NORMAN SCOTT, MC NAIR, HALSEY POWELL, ACREE, PATTERSON, CLEMSON, BALLARD, BENHAM and CHANDLER departed for ENIWETOK.

1253 - Crew of REMY caught carrier pigeon with leg band carrying Japanese characters. Pigeon delivered to ROCKY MOUNT.

1700 - PHILIP stood in.

1730 - LST 119, 169, 205, 240, 274 escorted by YMS 323, LCI 371 and GOLDSBOROUGH departed for ENIWETOK.

1800 - CONYNCHAM stood in.

1830 - 2nd Marines announced town of GARAPAN captured.

2355 - YMS 396 had contact with two enemy barges on Station #53, lost contact. SIGOURNEY and CHIEF went to help destroy barges.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

4 July 1944 - DOG plus 19

Weather Summary - Showers and moderate thunderstorms in morning and in evening. Visibility averaged 12 miles, reduced to 1 mile in heavier showers. Sky overcast with flying weather generally average, becoming undesirable in showers. Winds easterly averaging 9 knots.

0105 - SICOURNEY reported she got one of the barges and chased the other up on the beach at MARPI POINT.

0600 - MORMACPORT, MAZAMA, KENNABAGO escorted by CHANDLER, HALSEY POWELL, BENHAM, returned to SAIPAN anchorage to complete unloading.

1200 - CLAMP (ARS 33) with NOA arrived SAIPAN anchorage.

1526 - CHIEF with use of LCVP began investigating TANAPAG Channel and Harbor for mines and obstruction prior to our use of harbor for unloading.

5 July 1944 - DOG plus 20

Weather Summary - Cloudy to overcast entire period with low, middle and high cloud forms present. Light showers in early morning with showers in vicinity in afternoon. Flying weather good with four tenths or less cloudiness present at any one time. Winds easterly averaging 11 knots with highest velocity 15 knots.

0600 - LST 485, GEMSBOK, MANLEY and RALPH TALBOT stood in SAIPAN anchorage.

0700 - NEW ORLEANS with HUDSON, BENNETT, HALFORD, GUEST, WADSWORTH, FULLAM, TERRY, ANTHONY stood in SAIPAN anchorage from Area NEBRASKA.

1300 - Marines and 27th Division launched attack on north end SAIPAN Island making good progress. Moderate resistance encountered.

Minesweeping Unit advises first sweep of TANAPAG entrance channel, harbor and dock area free of mines and obstacles.

1600 - SOLACE departed SAIPAN for RUSSELL ISLANDS.

1959 - FLASH BLUE.

2002 - FLASH RED, commence smoking from CTF 52.

2007 - Two P-61 night fighters airborne.

2056 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52 (no bombs reported dropped during raid.).
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

6 July 1944 - DOG plus 21

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy entire period with swelling cumulus predominating; few cirrus present. Light, scattered showers in afternoon. Visibility good. Winds easterly averaging 12 knots, gusts to 22 knots.

0017 - FLASH BLUE by CTF 52.
0016 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.
0023 - Commence smoking by CTF 52.
0047 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52.

0700 - TU 57.18.5 - Merchant ships - CAPE VICTORY, LESUTH, CLAIBORNE, JOSIAH EARLY, SEA CAT, J. DOZEMAN, ENOS MILLS with escorts ROBINSON, A. W. GRANT, DEEDEE, AGREE and PATTERSON stood in SAIPAN, commenced unloading operations.

0800 - PC 582, 1080 and PC(S) 1421 stood in SAIPAN anchorage from ENIWETOK.

0800 - Responsibility for unloading of merchant ships at SAIPAN turned over to GroPac EIGHT by CTF 52.2.

1450 - CTF 52 to all ships - "At 1440 submarine was sighted breaking water at 1209. Submerged and headed north. HALSEY POWELL and BENHAK sent to investigate. Negative results".

1500 - NATHANIEL CURRIER (XAK) with escort HEED (AM 100) stood in to SAIPAN anchorage.

1939 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.
1940 - ASP make smoke by CTF 52.
2009 - ASP cease smoking by CTF 52.
2013 - Execute smoke plan by CTF 52.
2036 - ASP cease smoking by CTF 52.
2058 - Execute smoke plan by CTF 52.
2110 - ASP cease smoking by CTF 52.
2142 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

6 July 1944 - DOG plus 21 (Cont'd)

2144 - CIC reports night fighter shot down 1 enemy plane.

2220 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.

2222 - Execute smoke plan by CTF 52.

2247 - CABANA reported a BETTY flying over TINIAN headed for SAIPAN very low.

2304 - CTF 52 to ASP - "Apparently enemy planes are attempting to land on SAIPAN and TINIAN".

2326 - ASP cease smoking by CTF 52.

7 July 1944 - DOG plus 22

Weather Summary - Partly cloudy sky with light showers in early morning. Lightning observed in evening. Flying weather good with good to excellent visibility. Winds easterly with velocity averaging 9 knots. Highest velocity 13 knots from east-southeast.

0014 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52.

0026 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.

0033 - BENHAM advised have taken Areas 575, 594, 605, 606 under fire, gun flashes were observed within these areas.

0034 - SHAW fired at low flying BETTY in Station 13A.

0045 - ISLEY Field received 51 Japanese shells - 3 men injured.

0101 - ASP cease smoking from CTF 52.

0111 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52.

0600 - IOWA, NEW JERSEY, WASHINGTON, INDIANA with escorts LONG, ELLET, STERETT, WILSON, LANDON, CASE, LARDNER and MC CALLA stood in SAIPAN anchorage for logistics and departed same evening.

0830 - COPAHEE (CVE 12) with escort ZANE (DM 14) and PALMER (DM 5) stood in SAIPAN anchorage to load captured ZERO's for return to PEARL.

0900 - Commanding Marine General SAIPAN announced Japanese made break-through during night along eastern part of our lines, 27th Inf. Div.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

7 July 1944 - DOG plus 22 (Cont'd)

1130 - CAPE NEWENHAM (XAK) with escort CONY (DD 508) stood in SAIPAN anchorage and commenced unloading.

1325 - Observation plane advised 60 of our soldiers stranded on reef north of TANAPAG Harbor. Enemy activity in northwestern part SAIPAN has pushed them in water. Boats dispatched to pick them up.

1800 - COPAHEE retired from transport area for night.

1830 - TU 51.5.1 - MORRACPORT, CAPE TRINITY, MAZAMA with escorts MOLALA, TAWASA, NOA, MELVIN, SIGOURNEY, R. TALBOT departed SAIPAN for ENIWETOK.

1830 - KENNEBAGO (AO 81) and BAGLEY (DD 386) departed SAIPAN anchorage.

1935 - FLASH BLUE by CTF 52.

1945 - ASP execute smoke plan by CTF 52.

1947 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.

2013 - BARON and ACREE have TINIAN airfield under slow harassing fire and occasional illumination during RED Alerts.

2028 - P-46 airborne from ISLEY Field.

2034 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.

2036 - ASP execute smoke plan by CTF 52.

2044 - Cease smoking by CTF 52.

2050 - CONY delivered harassing fire at MARPI POINT during RED Alerts.

2102 - PHILIP reported burning plane fell in water 25 miles, 130° True from Point SUZY.

2105 - FLASH WHITE from CTF 52.

2141 - FLASH RED by CTF 52.

2143 - ASP make smoke by CTF 52.

2202 - Cease smoking by CTF 52.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

7 July 1944 - DOG plus 22 (Cont'd)

2208 - Commence smoking by CTF 52.
2231 - Cease smoking by CTF 52.
2238 - Commence smoking by CTF 52.
2306 - Cease smoking by CTF 52.
2318 - Commence smoking by CTF 52.

8 July 1944 - DOG plus 23

Weather Summary - Light showers in early morning and late afternoon. Flying weather good with good to excellent visibility throughout period. High, middle and low cloud forms observed with heavy cumulus predominating. Winds easterly averaging 10 knots with highest gust 15 knots.

0004 - Cease smoking by CTF 52.
0009 - FLASH WHITE by CTF 52.
0600 - COPAHEE (CVE 12) stood in SAIPAN transport area from night retirement.
0700 - SAMARITAN (AH 10) stood in SAIPAN anchorage.
0743 - WUGFORD sent boat after 2 men on raft outside TANAPAG Harbor. Men were Japanese who fired on our rescue boat. Boat crew returned fire, Japanese now dead.
0800 - BAGLEY (DD 386) stood in SAIPAN anchorage.
1800 - COPAHEE, ASHLAND, U. S. VICTORY with escorts YARNALL, ZANE, PALMER, departed SAIPAN for ENIWETOK as part of TU 51.18.11.
1800 - TU 53.18.1 composed of WICHITA, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, MINNEAPOLIS, HUDSON, BENNETT, HALFORD, FULHAM, GUST, WADSWORTH, TERRY and ANTHONY departed SAIPAN to operate in vicinity of GUAM.

9 July 1944 - DOG plus 24

Weather Summary - Sky ranged from partly cloudy to cloudy with showers in afternoon. Thunderstorms in vicinity at night. Visibility good to excellent with good flying weather. Heavy cumulus clouds predominated. Shifting winds averaging seven knots with highest gust seventeen knots from the east-southeast.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

1. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

2 July 1944 - DOG plus 24 (Cont'd)

1422 - Commander Mine Squad 4 advised of mines on surface off BROWN Beach. Mines being destroyed.

1430 - TU 57.18.12 composed of LST 272 with MOTIVE (AM 102) stood in SAIPAN anchorage from ENIWETOK.

1500 - TU 57.18.13 composed of DOMINICAN VICTORY, W. WYMAN, ARGONAUT with escorts WALLER, EATON and SIGOURNEY stood in SAIPAN anchorage and commenced unloading.

1530 - SAMARITAN (AH 10) departed SAIPAN.

1613 - Commanding General ashore SAIPAN announced "SAIPAN Island secured".
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(a) NARRATIVE

1. General. The unloading of assault and garrison supplies and equipment is second in importance only to the landing of assault troops, and must be given corresponding consideration by the responsible commanders concerned. The almost daily air attacks during the first three weeks at SAIPAN were samples of what must be anticipated in future operations, and it is essential that these valuable ships and cargoes be exposed in the assault area for a minimum time. A proper balance must be provided in assault shipping between assault equipment and the unloading equipment required to move it rapidly across the beaches.

2. Assault Unloading. Unloading of assault shipping for SAIPAN commenced on DOG Day with the discharging of LVT's and DUKW's from LSD's and LST's. These were all water borne in the forenoon and comprised all of the first day's unloading with the exception of a few boat loads of balanced cargo kept at the line of departure by each transport to meet normal calls. The aggregate weight of the LVT's and DUKW's with their organic loads exclusive of personnel amounted to 14,610 short tons or 18 percent of the total assault cargo.

Unloading of all the transports, LSD's and LST's present progressed in varying degrees throughout DOG plus ONE and TWO during which approximately 19,356 short tons of cargo were moved to the beaches or a daily average of 9,678 short tons, making 43 percent of assault unloading completed by nightfall DOG plus TWO.

From DOG plus THREE to DOG plus SEVENTEEN when assault unloading was completed, transports were called in from the retirement area for unloading as needed and at no time were all present after DOG plus TWO. During this period unloading had progressed by DOG plus FIVE to 53,237 short tons or 67 percent and by DOG plus TEN to 73,509 short tons or 93 percent, with a daily average over the beaches of 6,682 short tons. The few transports with cargo remaining aboard after DOG plus TEN were called in during the first echelon garrison unloading phase as needed.

3. Unloading of garrison ships. The first echelon of garrison ships arrived 25 June, DOG plus TEN Day. A conference was held with the convoy commander, masters of the ships, representatives of the Island Commander and the Commanding General. General plans were made regarding priority of unloading, unloading points for various types of cargo, and methods to be followed to expedite unloading. The masters of ships were requested to cooperate by feeding crews of boats alongside during meal hours. Loading plans of the ships were examined.

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(a) NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

A daily conference was held thereafter with representatives of the Island Commander, the troops, the Commanding Officer of Cropac EIGHT, and the officers in charge of LST's and LCT's. At this conference the difficulties of the past 24 hours were discussed and priorities for unloading the following day were established.

Unloading of the garrison shipping commenced on DOG plus ELEVEN. During this phase unloading progressed at a daily rate of 4,035 short tons up until 0800, 6 July, (DOG plus TWENTY-ONE), when all unloading was turned over to the Island Commander.

4. Unloading Details. Appended are unloading details showing the daily amounts discharged by the various assault and garrison units, based upon signalled unloading reports. These are subject to considerable error, but present an excellent overall picture of the unloading problem.
## PART IV - OPERATIONS - 2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS - (a) NARRATIVE

**SAIPAN - ASSAULT AND 1ST ECHELON GARRISON - UNLOADING RECORD D-DAY TO D+21**


### 2nd MARDIV
- **2nd MARDIV:** 496: 916: 918: 342: 596: 784: 1111:
- **22 LST's:** 7366: 5196: 1085: 1085:

### 4th MARDIV
- **4th MARDIV:** 5817: 616: 1315: 1315: 250: 1462: 429: 460:
- **TRANSDIV 26:** 6099: 980: 884: 884: 262: 183: 1772: 1736:
- **TRANSDIV 30:** 5369: 616: 1070: 1074: 688: 536: 326: 1051: 8:
- **20 LST's:** 7064: 1656: 1202: 1202:

### 27th INF. DIV.
- **TRANSDIV 7:** 5416: 793: 212: 1617: 494: 198: 32: 278: 994:
- **TRANSDIV 32:** 4553: 589: 590: 256: 345: 314: 1507: 865: 87:
- **TRANSDIV 34:** 5672: 1427: 469: 226: 321:
- **3 LST's:** 2229: 837: 1392:

### CORPS ARTILLERY
- **TOTAL CORPS ARTILLERY:** 20,333: 533: 1710: 1505: 780: 240: 450: 750: 120: 150:
- **5 LST's OF CORPS ARTILLERY:** 1393:

### 105MM ARTILLERY
- **5 LST's OF 105MM ARTILLERY:** 1393:

### NO. GARR. FOR.
- **TOTAL NO. GARR. FOR:** 3303:
- **NO. GARR. FOR.:** 3303:

### TOTAL ASSAULT
- **1st ECH. GARR. SHIP:** 34: 545:
- **GRAND TOTAL:** 31,385:

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*UNLOADING FUNCTIONS TURNED OVER TO GROPC 8 0800 6 JULY 1944*

#PART 1st. ECHELON ONLY - BALANCE AMOUNTING TO 13574 SHORT TONS UNLOADED BY GROPC 8 FROM D/1 TO D+27 INCLUSIVE.

**ENCLOSURE (A) to OTG 52.2 Serial 0226**
THIS SECTION CONTAINS MAPS REFER TO ORIGINAL FOLDER
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(B) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Loading of garrison vessels. The loading of garrison vessels evidenced a great deal more care and foresight at the loading points than heretofore has been experienced. There is still considerable room for improvement, however, and the following comments and recommendations are submitted with a view to speeding up the unloading in the combat area:

(a) In general ships which have been loaded on the west coast had no stevedores or winchmen and insufficient food to feed these men when they were placed on board. These ships were loaded poorly, did not have cargo officers on board, and were not sufficiently well equipped with cargo nets (only 25), slings, straps, and barrel chimes (wherever they can be employed eight-drum chime hooks should be provided).

(b) Top-load the first echelon garrison ships to the maximum practicable extent with unloading equipment required on the beach such as cranes, trucks, and bulldozers.

(c) In the ships of the first echelon, provide stevedore or other unloading personnel sufficient for working five ships on a 24-hour basis and five others on a 12-hour basis. This total will normally meet the maximum capacity of available boats and beach unloading facilities.

(d) Most ships had one slow unloading hold consisting mainly of lumber, marston matting, and jewelry for pontoons. Slow unloading material, so far as practicable, should be divided between all holds so that they may all finish at approximately the same time.

(e) Heavy lifts and bulky material should not be loaded in number one and five holds due to the difficulty of landing it in boats alongside.

(f) Many trucks arrived completely empty, which is a waste of space.

(g) Ship all trucks and LVT's sufficiently serviced, so that after batteries are connected they can be run ashore under own power. Many hours were lost in this operation due to the difficulty in handling 'dead' vehicles.

(h) Provide wooden skids for distillation units and reefer boxes, and permanent wire towing bridles.

(i) Loading plans of all garrison ships were not available. Positive steps should be taken to insure that these are forwarded by airmail to the island commander, with a copy to the Task Force Commander of the
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

assault operation, in order that advance unloading plans can be made.

2. Unloading facilities on shore. Although it was a well known fact that at least two divisions were to be landed for the assault on SAIPAN, and also that a tremendous amount of garrison shipping had to be unloaded at the earliest practicable time, the unloading equipment provided by the troop shore parties and the first echelons of the garrison force was completely inadequate. This had been discussed with the shore party commander prior to departure, and as a result considerable extra equipment had been obtained, but shipping space could not be found for it on assault vessels. Fortunately some cranes and dozers for Gropac and for the pontoon barge personnel had been landed early, which together with several small cranes landed from LST's, provided a minimum amount of beach unloading equipment. It is a matter of record that on DOG plus TWELVE Day, when the unloading of the first garrison echelon was at its height, there were 13 cranes working on the beaches of which 9 had been provided by the Navy.

Positive measures must be taken in future operations to provide adequate unloading equipment on the beaches at an early date so that assault and garrison shipping may be unloaded at a maximum rate. This should include beach lighting equipment to facilitate night unloading.

3. Unloading craft. Numerous problems arose in the selection and operation of the vessels available for unloading. These problems are generally inherent to the type and are discussed under each class of vessel.

(a) LST's. As in previous operations the LST proved to be indispensable. Forty-nine of these ships were included in the assault force. Thirty-four carried assault troops, LVT's, and priority cargoes of food, water, ammunition, and medical supplies. Eight carried artillery of the Second and Fourth MarDivs, in DUKW's, with some LVT for ammunition carrying. Each of the eight carried ammunition for the embarked artillery. Three carried 105 MM guns, prime movers, and ammunition of Corps Artillery. Two carried 40 MM and 90 MM anti-aircraft guns.

In addition to the loads already listed, thirty-five LST's carried one LCT each, six carried four pontoon barges each, and six side carried two 2x30 causeway sections each. Eight LST's were retained at SAIPAN after completion of assault unloading.

Because of the fact that LST's could not be beached except on the barrier reef with lagoonal water intervening between the beaching point and shore, the use of LST's in this operation to assist in unloading was
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

very limited and was restricted to three main services.

(1) Unloading of troops. One RCT of the TWENTY-SEVENTH Division and practically all of the garrison troops were landed via LST's which beached at low tide and the troops waded ashore at not more than knee depth. This avoided unloading delays which would have resulted if available landing craft had been diverted from their cargo unloading duties for this purpose.

(2) Petroleum products. LST's made a very efficient carrier for oil and gasoline drums. Loads of approximately 3,000 drums were taken, which after beaching, would be either loaded into LVT's or rolled ashore through the water by Jap prisoners.

(3) Handling palletized cargo. LST's were very effective in unloading ships of the TWENTY-SEVENTH Division which were 100 percent palletized. After beaching, the pallets were hauled ashore by LVT's or DUKW's.

Recommendations:

(1) Provide evaporators for LST's.

(2) Provide a side cargo port to assist in cargo unloading or in handling of casualties.

(3) Provide all LST's with one finger lift truck and one crane, and with 200 feet of roller conveyors.

(b) LCT's. These are excellent all around vessels, particularly when sand beaches or docks are available for their use. It is recommended that side doors be provided for use in hand unloading while alongside dock or when unloading into DUKW's or LVT's as was done at TINIAN.

Although the LCT is an extremely useful vessel, care must be taken to provide a proper balance between all types of unloading craft. The rate of unloading is determined by the ability to keep the whips of a ship working continuously. Given adequate unloading facilities on the beach and a run of 1-2 miles from ship to beach, it will take about 10 LCT's, 12 pontoon barges, or 18 LCM's (or 15 LCVP's and 5 LCM's) to keep one cargo vessel unloading at its maximum rate. One LST can carry either one LCT or four 3x7 pontoon barges. Unless long runs in the open sea are required, the most efficient unloading facilities would be pro-
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

vided by top-loading approximately one third of LST's with LCT's and two thirds with pontoon barges.

(c) Pontoon barges. Pontoon barges supplied for the SAIPAN operation were not provided with ramps nor with any spare engines. One spare engine should be provided for every two pontoon barges. The lack of a ramp was keenly felt as it prevented their effective use in the early assault phases before piers were available. Ramps should be provided with all of the pontoon barges lifted with the assault units.

The 24 pontoon barges at SAIPAN were all provided with double crews and therefore effective on a twenty-four basis. An LCI was detailed as parent ship, which worked very well.

The effective capacity of these barges would be nearly doubled if they were provided with portable bulwarks. It is recommended that all pontoon barges be provided with sockets for 4x4 stanchions and that one set of stanchions, 4x4x4x0 be provided. Dunnage is always available for the sides.

(d) Boat pool boats. The problem of adequately caring for the boats and boat crews, either of the boat pools or those left by parent vessels during night retirement, is a difficult one which has not yet been satisfactorily solved. It was unusually difficult here because of the large number of boats - 60 LCM's and 100 LCVP's - comprising the SAIPAN and TINIAN Boat Pools. Initially, commencing on DOG plus FIVE, two LSD's were designated as parent vessels for these boats. In addition the Commanding Officer, ASHLAND, was established as the boat repair officer and directed to coordinate the repair facilities on the two LSD's, the AGENOR and the CALMORIA. All transports were directed to transfer their spare parts for boat pools to the ASHLAND and BELLE GROVE. This worked reasonably well so far as boat repair was concerned and approximately 80% of the boats were kept in operating conditions at all times until the departure of the two LSD's, 28 July. After that the combined efforts of the AGENOR, EGERIA, and CALMORIA were inadequate and the condition of boat pool boats gradually deteriorated. Whenever possible the repair load was eased by exchanging boats requiring repair for boats in good condition on departing vessels.

In future operations the boat pool organization must be established before departure from the loading port. The boat pool officer and his senior assistant must be competent officers. Plans should be issued in sufficient time for the officers in charge of boat pools to hold confer-
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

ences with their boat pool officers, who in turn should have time to contact and to brief the boat coxswains for whom they will be responsible. A boat pool organization should be prepared and included as an annex to the attack order.

Based upon past experience the following is recommended as a basis for organization:

(1) That unloading groups, each of 5 LCM and 10 LCVP, be organized under the command of designated boat pool officers. Such a group, plus one or two LCT or barges, is capable of unloading an average garrison ship at maximum speed.

(2) Assign one LCI as parent vessel for every two groups as above constituted and require all boats of these groups to nest alongside or astern of that vessel.

(3) Prior to joining the boat pool, appropriate boat pool numbers should be assigned and legibly painted on the bows of all boats.

(4) Each transport provide replacement crews for the boats they provide for the pool. These relief crews should be new crews from the training schools. Utilize these crews as relief crews in order to permit twenty-four hour a day operation of all boats in the boat pool. Upon completion of the occupation phase, return the original boat crews to their parent ships, thereby retaining combat trained crews for future assault operations.

4. Night unloading. In view of the urgency of completing the unloading of assault and garrison shipping at the earliest practicable time, night unloading should be undertaken wherever practicable. During the SAIPAN operation double crews were available for most of the cranes on shore so that their continuous operation was possible. LCT's, because of their long loading and unloading times, which gives the crews an opportunity for rest, can be worked on a twenty-four hour basis. Pontoon barges were provided with double crews which permitted their continuous operation.

During critical periods of the assault phase, an effort was made to operate LCM's and LCVP's continuously on a twenty-four hour basis, but this proved extremely unsatisfactory as the crews cannot be expected to work continuously and the opportunity for rest on those craft is negligible while engaged in unloading operations.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

It is believed that means should be provided for continuous operation of the maximum number of landing craft, particularly those assigned to boat pool duty. A recommendation concerning this will be found in the discussion of boat pools just preceding.

5. Use of pallets. The use of pallets has been a controversial question, which should be considered in conjunction with a study of the beaches and unloading facilities anticipated at the objective. The effect of the increased cargo space required must also be taken into account, although in hold spaces with high overhead it is believed that higher pallet loading will compensate for most of the apparent loss. At Saipan, cargo of the SECOND and FOURTH Marine Divisions was 10-15 percent palletized, with water and some ammunition pallet loaded. Cargo of the TWENTY-SEVENTH Division was 100% palletized, with permanent wire slings attached to each pallet. At both Saipan and Tinian 100\% palletizing could have been successfully handled at the beaches, with considerable reduction in handling time. Palletized loading of LST and LSD cargo would have been particularly beneficial.

Pallets were unloaded in various ways at Saipan:

(a) By hand, after breaking, from boats to LVT's and then across the reef to the beaches.

(b) By crane from boats at Angin Point directly into trucks and thence to the beach dumps.

(c) Into LST's alongside transports. The pallet-loaded LST was then beached at YELLOW Three, and pallets dragged across the reef through the water by DUKW's, LVT's or tractors.

(d) Into LCT's which were unloaded at the reef edge as in (c).

(e) Into LCT's and boats which were unloaded by crane into trucks at the BLUE One causeway pier, or hauled from boats at the beaches.

Recommendations:

(a) Pallet load all LST's. Also pallet load all barbed wire.

(b) After consideration of prospective beach conditions and cargo loading plans, determine the percentage of assault cargo to be palletized. At least 50\% is recommended as standard.

(c) Whenever practicable, provide permanent slings to each pallet as was done by the TWENTY-SEVENTH Division.

ENCLOSURE (a) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

6. Operation of the shore party. In previous amphibious operations in the Central Pacific area, the assault on any contiguous group of beaches has been made by a single division. Each division has an organized shore party and therefore the handling of supplies has been strictly a divisional affair.

Future operations will probably involve the use of two or more divisions on contiguous beaches similar to the landing made at SAIPAN. This landing accentuated the limitations of the divisional system, particularly for the following reasons:

(a) The beaches assigned the SECOND Division were not available to boats until the afternoon of DOG plus ONE, necessitating the diversion of certain organizational equipment across FOURTH Division beaches.

(b) A heavy swell, which existed from the night of DOG Day until DOG plus ONE morning, prevented delivery of supplies across the barrier reef facing RED, GREEN, and YELLOW Beaches and forced all supplies for both divisions to be handled across BLUE Beaches.

(c) Commencing on DOG plus ONE Day, the TWENTY-SEVENTH Division was landed and its supplies and equipment all had to go across FOURTH Division beaches.

As a result the divisional supply dump organization became confused, and the Corps issued orders that commencing at daylight on DOG plus TWO, the Corps would assume control of shore parties on shore. By DOG plus THREE there were nearly 50,000 troops ashore and a large amount of artillery. The pontoon causeway at BLUE One was not yet in commission and delivery at all beaches was subject somewhat to tidal conditions. It was essential, therefore, that food, water, and ammunition be pushed ashore as fast as the beach could take it regardless of whether it landed on a SECOND Division or FOURTH Division beach. Numerous calls were received from the divisions for supplies of various kinds, particularly water and ammunition. In one instance a representative of one division sent word out to his control vessel to stop sending in 105 MM ammunition very shortly after a directive had been issued by central control vessel to all ships to send in the maximum amount of this type of ammunition because the remaining two divisions were running short. It is believed that at no time in these early stages was there any shortage of supplies on the beach, but due to conditions enumerated above, the organization was not adequate for a proper distribution.

In addition to the distribution difficulty, the movement of the divisional troops inland created demands for trucks and personnel initially
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

assigned to shore parties so that there was a gradual dwindling of shore party and equipment at the beaches. One division found it necessary to utilize their shore party commander to replace a regimental officer killed in action. On two occasions bulk of the shore parties were hurried into the front lines to meet an emergency attack situation.

The above is not intended as a criticism, but merely an outline of circumstances which can always be expected to arise within the organization of a combat division.

In order better to meet the conditions of future operations, the following recommendations are made:

(a) That a Corps Shore Party be organized and trained. The task of the Corps Shore Party should be to control the movement of supply from the beach to the beach dumps, and to issue from the beach dumps to the divisions.

(b) That the Corps Shore Party be provided with adequate unloading equipment, such as cranes, trucks, bulldozers, and beach lighting equipment, with personnel to operate them on a 24 hour basis. During the early stages of the assault phase, it is probable that the Corps Shore Party would have to be augmented by shore party details from each division to assist in manhandling stores and equipment across the beaches prior to the arrival of power equipment.

7. Beachmaster operations. In general beach parties operated in a highly efficient manner despite the fact that the beaches were under intense mortar and artillery fire for the first three days. They were quick to adapt themselves to changing conditions and maintained excellent communications throughout most of the period. It is considered that a great deal of credit for this excellent performance is due to the personal efforts and ability of the Senior Beachmaster, Commander C. E. Anderson.

The beachmaster organization at SAIPAN was made up as follows:
(a) Force Beachmaster.
(b) Two Transport Group Beachmasters.
(c) Four Transport Division Beachmasters.
(d) Eight Ship Beachmasters, one for each of the assault landing beaches used.

The Force Beachmaster was in charge of all beaches, and directly responsible to me. Each Transport Group Beachmaster was responsible for the
PART IV - OPERATIONS

2. UNLOADING OPERATIONS

(b) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

four beaches used by each assault Marine Division. Each Transport Division
Beachmaster was responsible for the two beaches used by one assault regiment.
Each Ship Beachmaster was responsible for his own beach.

This organization for assault was generally effective. There were
eighteen ship beach parties in the two assault transport groups. Since only
eight beaches were worked, this made it possible to relieve beach party
personnel. Because of retirement of transports, no set schedule of reliefs
could be maintained.

The cargo ticket system as developed at KWAJALEIN was designed to
keep track of cargo from ship to dump. It did not work well here due, pri-
marily, to the constant necessity for diverting boats to any beach which
could take them, and also to the lack of acquaintance of all personnel with
this system. Basically the idea is considered sound, except that it must pro-
vide for the final routing of all cargo and equipment to be made by the
central control vessel, and control and shore party personnel trained in its
use.

Gropac personnel should be worked into the beach party organization
as soon as the assault phase is completed and thus prepare themselves for
taking over beach party duties upon withdrawal of ship beach parties.

Due to both immersion and enemy gunfire, considerable damage was
suffered by the beach party equipment, particularly radio. It is recommended
that one spare set of all beach party equipment be supplied each TransDiv
flagship for issue to beach parties as replacement.

The importance of trained beach parties cannot be over emphasized.
In addition to training in their normal functions they should receive elementar
training in individual combat protection and the use of weapons at their dis-
posal. Permanence of this detail should be maintained to the maximum extent.
A trained beachmaster and communication assistant should be assigned to the
staffs of each Group Commander, TransGroup Commander and TransDiv Commander.

A small number of seadrome buoys were obtained for use in this
operation. They proved extremely successful and it is recommended that twelve
of these buoys with lighting apparatus and spare parts be issued to each
TransDiv flagship for use as required. It is recommended that half of the
lights be amber and the other half green.

The report of the Force Beachmaster is included as enclosure (B)
and is in general concurred in subject to the above comments.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Boat Control Assault Phase:

At SAIPAN it was necessary to control the landing of troops and supplies on eight contiguous beaches covering a front of 6000 yards, and the boat traffic through one boat channel through which five of the eight beaches could be reached.

(a) The control organization consisted of the Central Control Officer, embarked in a PC(S); two Transport Group Control Officers, each embarked in a PC(S); four Transport Division Control Officers, each embarked in a PC; and a Channel Control Officer embarked in an SG. On each of the first three vessels was a G-4 representative of the troops involved. This basic organization worked well, and is considered sound.

Recommendation:

Attach an officer qualified by experience in control duties to the staff of each Transport Division and Transport Group Commander, and of each Amphibious Force Group Commander.

(b) At SAIPAN there were insufficient control officers. The Transport Group Control Officers, in the absence of Transport Group Commander, handled a heavy responsibility with outstanding success, and without relief. They had insufficient rest, and were exhausted after a couple of days of continuous effort.

Recommendation:

Two experienced control officers should be assigned to each control vessel. Relief control officers will probably have to be drawn from boat group commanders of ships of reserve divisions, and from the staffs of reserve and assault transport divisions as availability and qualifications dictate. Use of boat group commanders should be avoided if possible, since they are needed by individual transports during the critical assault phase. After about DOG plus THREE Day, GroPac officers should be utilized as Assistant Control Officers, and should take over when conditions permit.

(c) Eleven LCC's were used in control of assault waves and subsequent control of assault and garrison unloading. These boats are heavy, displace LCM's on transports, and are not self supporting. They are useful, although neither at SAIPAN nor TINIAN was there need for the elaborate radar and sound gear on board. A subchaser, though larger and more conspicuous, can better perform the duty to which LCC's were assigned in this operation.

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PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

Recommendation:

Reduce the number of LCC's to the minimum for which their special characteristics are required.

(d) The PC(S) as flagship for central control and transport group control officers is too small.

Recommendation:

Equip a larger vessel with the necessary communication facilities. LCI(L)'s may prove the most satisfactory type.

(e) PC, PC(S) and SC assigned to control duties should retain this assignment for successive operations. In this way the experience of their commanding officers can be used to the best advantage in assisting control officers and troop officers on board. Alterations should provide berthing space for a minimum of six officers.

(f) LCT flotilla and group commanders with their staffs were embarked in transports of the assault force, and took over the operation of LCT's as soon as they were launched.

Recommendations:

1. Embark the LCT flotilla commander and his staff in the flagship of the Attack Force Commander.

2. Embark LCT group commanders at the objective in transport group control vessels.

3. Make specific assignment of LCT groups to transport groups.

4. Assign tenders to LCT flotilla and group commanders.

(g) The assignment of PC(S) to LST flotilla commanders for use in controlling LST's was successful, and should be continued.

(h) The special markings and flags on control craft, and the large numbers and identification flags on LST's were useful. This practice should be continued.

1. A standard plan of boat flag marking should be developed, to indicate the contents of loaded boats.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

(j) Boats left behind by retiring transports should have instructions to report to the control vessel off the beaches to which these boats have been carrying supplies. Specific parent ships should be designated, in advance if practicable, for such boats.

(k) Pontoon barges were controlled by the officer in charge, embarked in the central control vessel, and by assistants embarked in the transport group control vessels. They were provided with relief crews, and an LCI assigned as parent vessel. This system was effective. A tender should be assigned to the officer in charge of pontoon barges.

(l) Control communications were generally excellent despite the tremendous volume of traffic handled. The control communication plan is considered to be a sound guide for future operations.

Recommendation:

Continue intensive training of communication teams and increase the number from 24 to 40.

2. Fire Fighting Facilities for Fires Ashore:

During the early phase of the assault on SAIPAN, before the beachhead had been greatly expanded and while supplies were greatly concentrated, a fire of rather large proportions occurred in a SECOND MarDiv dump. Portable 500 gal/min salvage pumps each with 1,000 ft. of fire fighting hose were placed in four LCV's and sent in to the beach, but failed to arrive in time. The following day this gear was transferred to four LVT's to permit greater freedom of movement. These LVT's, with trained personnel, were retained on this duty throughout the remainder of the operation.

Recommendation:

That fire fighting units, such as those described, be made a part of shore party equipment, and be landed when general unloading commences.

3. Amphibious Attacks:

From various sources there were indications that the Japanese might undertake amphibious counter-attacks, and special precautions were taken against operations of this nature. On two occasions, described elsewhere in this report, specially stationed LCI's encountered enemy barge movement close inshore and sank several of these barges.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

During one of these attacks, a report of sighting a torpedo was received from one of the vessels present. Little weight was paid to this report at the time but recent information from a POW discloses that two torpedoes apparently with positive buoyancy, were towed out and fired from alongside the Japanese barges.

After the capture of SAIPAN, two amphibious tanks were discovered in the vicinity of the seaplane base. These had been separately stored in insignificant looking buildings, but had apparently been put out of action by naval gunfire.

Documents captured on SAIPAN indicated that a portion of the TINIAN Garrison Force had been directed to embark in small boats and proceed to SAIPAN during the assault on that place. This was not confirmed by documents captured on TINIAN. On the night of 19 June, however, the SAUFLEY patrolling off TINIAN TOWN took under gunfire a large number of small craft attempting to leave that place and forced them to return to the harbor with the loss of some vessels.

4. Handling of Casualties:

(a) The Medical Plan provided for three hospital LST's to receive casualties direct from the beach and then to transfer them to transports. Initially one hospital LST was stationed off SECOND MarDiv beaches, one off FOURTH MarDiv beaches, with the third standing by. The Central Control Officer was to direct a hospital LST to transfer casualties to a designated transport, after 100 were on board, and to maintain a hospital LST off SECOND and FOURTH MarDiv beaches at all times to receive casualties. Each hospital LST left PEARL HARBOR with one doctor and eight hospital corpsmen attached. This medical force was augmented after arrival at SAIPAN by the transfer of two doctors and sixteen corpsmen to each hospital LST from designated transports. The use of hospital LST's was to be discontinued when transports could safely approach the beaches closely enough to receive casualties direct.

The above procedure developed numerous disadvantages:

(1) Two should have been provided for each division. It was exceedingly difficult for the Central Control Officer to coordinate the movements of hospital LST's with the two Transport Group Commanders.

(2) Transports which provided doctors and corpsmen to hospital LST's were seriously short handed when required to handle casualties on board.

(3) It was exceedingly difficult to remove casualties in LVT's, DUKW's, or boats and get them on board hospital LST's. Transfer via the LST ramp was usually not feasible.

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CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

(4) In a normal ocean swell hospital LST's found it difficult to get alongside transports, and difficult after securing alongside to transfer the patients.

(5) Emergency withdrawal of transports left hospital LST's filled with casualties for periods as long as eighteen hours. They were not equipped to handle this emergency.

(6) No one on the control boats at night knew where the hospital LST's were, since no lights were shown.

(7) The Victor flags flown to distinguish the hospital LST's were not large enough. It was difficult to find them in the large group of LST's in the unloading area.

Recommendation:

If it is necessary in future operations to employ LST's as casualty collecting stations, set aside an area for them so that they can be found readily by boats coming from the beach. Bring in medical personnel with them, so that transfer of doctors and corpsmen from attack transports at the objective will not be necessary. Employ two casualty handling LST's per division. Side cargo ports to facilitate handling casualties are recommended elsewhere in this report.

(b) No hospital ships were brought in with the attack force. Two arrived DOG plus THREE Day, one sailing DOG plus FOUR and one DOG plus FIVE. A total of seven hospital ships was loaded with casualties and dispatched through 9 July, when SAIPAN was reported secure. All were filled to capacity. These ships do not have proper means of transferring casualties from boats. It is necessary on all of them to transfer litters from boats at the gangway.

Recommendation:

Equip hospital ships with WELIN davits so that LCVP's with casualties can be hoisted and unloaded at the rail.

(c) In the early days of the assault all ships except a small number of AK and AKA, with CAMBRIA, retired because of threat of Jap surface and air attack. This threw a heavy load on the medical personnel on board the ships remaining, which they handled efficiently and well. CAMBRIA cared for a total of 717 casualties including 44 wounded POW's during the period of the assault.

All transports of the attack force were unloaded and departed by DOG plus ELEVEN, 26 June. Casualty handling facilities afloat after this date were extremely limited. CAMBRIA and ROCKY MOUNT worked to capacity when

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PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

hospital ships were not present. Unloaded XAP were used to evacuate casualties in order to ease the situation in field hospitals ashore.

Recommendation:

Commission sufficient hospital ships so that one can always be present during a large assault operation.

(d) A serious shortage of litters developed early in the operation.

Recommendation:

Increase the APA and AP allowance of litters.

5. Fueling LVT's From LCVP's

The problem of fueling LVT's during the early stages of the assault, before service and repair facilities could be set up ashore, was the subject of considerable discussion.

Each LST which carried LVT's to the SAIPAN area carried also a load of gasoline and lubricating oil for LVT's. Similarly LST's which carried DUKW's had gasoline and lubricating oil on board for them. The two vehicles require gasoline of different octane rating.

The general plan was for LVT's to fuel from parent LST's, or from an LST from which the LVT was loading cargo for the beach. In order to insure that LVT's would have an ample gasoline supply afloat, and to avoid delays, two LCVP bowser boats for each battalion beach were supplied by designated transports, and stationed in the LVT-LCVP transfer area. These boats carried gasoline in drums, with a hand operated bowser pump, and were marked with a large red painted "GAS" on the bow. This method of gassing LVT's was satisfactory.

6. Smoke Protection Against Enemy Aircraft Attacks

From the beginning of the assault until the Island of SAIPAN was secured on 9 July enemy aircraft were in the area practically every night. Their appearance usually occurred near dusk or during periods of moonlight. Despite this large number of air attacks only minor damage was suffered. This fact is attributed in part to the excellence of land based anti-aircraft batteries and night fighters, but at least equal credit should be given to the protection provided the ships by heavy smoke cover.
PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

Unloading ships were anchored at night in as small an area as practicable in order to provide maximum coverage from small craft and from each other.

Prior to dark each night available LCI's and LST's were stationed on the windward semicircle of the transport area. In addition each heavy ship was provided with two boats equipped with smoke pots, for individual coverage. Isolated ships, such as ammunition ships were assigned an individual LCI.

Merchant ships without BESSLER generators were provided with smoke pots and floats for use on the fan tail.

During Condition RED at night all ships prepared to make smoke when ordered. Smoke boats were put into position to windward of their respective ships. When air attack became imminent SOPA would order "Execute smoke plan", and all vessels with smoke making equipment would begin making smoke. Approximately five minutes is required for the smoke to spread sufficiently to provide proper coverage.

In order to provide commands concerned with a basis upon which to calculate future needs, the following analysis is submitted. Data for the appended curves, which show the hours of smoke coverage provided in relation to moonlight hours of darkness, apply to the ships of Task Force 52 during the capture of SAIPAN.

The following table shows the types of smoke equipment now in use, together with present and recommended allowance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Approx. Burning</th>
<th>Present Allowance</th>
<th>Recommended Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wt.</td>
<td>APA</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besler Generators</td>
<td>100 gal.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fog oil/hour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(approx)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fog oil for Besler Generators</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sufficient for 10 hours operation per generator on hand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-4 smoke floats</td>
<td>35 lbs. min.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mk 3 smoke pots</td>
<td>35 lbs. min.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 smoke pots</td>
<td>13 lbs. min.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A) to
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PART IV - OPERATIONS

3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

Recommendations:

1. Two portable type BESLER generators should be furnished each LSD and transport type ship which carries landing craft. These generators to replace the smoke pots in boats assigned smoking duties at night.

2. Equip merchant ships entering combat areas with at least one BESLER generator each.

3. Equip AM's participating in amphibious operations with one BESLER generator each.

4. Where installation is practicable shift one BESLER generator to the bow of APA's, AP's, AKA's, AK's and LSD's. Ships usually swing into the wind and at present must depend upon boats or other ships for their own coverage.

5. Calculation of the quantity of fog oil required should be based upon the assumption that one BESLER generator per ship, and each generator in boats, will run 25 percent of the time during the moonlight hours of darkness while the ships or boats concerned are at the objective. During the capture of Salerno an average of approximately 18 transport type ships, 22 LCI's, and 14 LST's were at the anchorage each night during the period of night air attacks.

6. When BESLER generators are not provided for boats, sufficient Mk III pots should be provided so that one boat per transport type and merchant ship at the objective can smoke 25 percent of the time during the moonlight hours of darkness. In addition, sufficient M-4 smoke floats should be available so that each of the above mentioned boats can keep three floats burning continuously during the same period. To accomplish this would require 10 Mk III pots and 18 M-4 floats per boat per hour.

7. A central stowage and issue vessel for fog oil and another for smoke pots and floats should be available at the objective. It is recommended that fog oil be carried by all tankers. A reserve of smoke pots and floats should be brought in on the weather decks of one or more LST's, arriving with the assault forces.

8. At the nearest staging point maintain an adequate reserve supply of fog oil, smoke pots and smoke floats for prompt movement forward. One month's supply for the assault forces is recommended.
PART IV - OPERATIONS - 3. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Percentage of hours of moonlight during darkness when smoke was being made equals 14.1%.

Number of hours of moonlight between sunset and sunrise. Total 135 hours.

Number of hours nightly ships were making protective smoke. Total 19 hours.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

(All times KING, Dates East Longitude)

1. The Naval Gunfire Support for the capture of SAIPAN was controlled by Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO, except during the landing phase and during periods when that officer left the immediate vicinity for retirement. At these times control of Naval Gunfire Support was given to Commander Task Group 52.2, who remained in the anchorage area off CHARAN KANOA throughout the operation for control and supervision of the unloading. This narrative covers only the periods during which Naval Gunfire Support was controlled by Commander Task Group 52.2.

DOG Day (June 15, 1944)

2. On completion of the HOW minus NINETY to HOW minus SIXTY minutes air strike, scheduled to be completed by 0730, CTG 52.2 was given temporary control of the close supporting gunfire of Fire Support Units ONE, TWO and THREE, and LCI(G)'s. The purpose of this change of control was to permit CTG 52.2 to control and coordinate the actions of all craft in the landing area. The Task Force Commander retained control of naval gunfire of all other Fire Support Units. HOW Hour was set for 0830. At the request of CTG 52.2 the MERTZ took position north of the RED Beaches as directed by CTF 52, in order to protect close fire support ships on the north flank with counter-battery fire on this flank.

3. Scheduled fires were resumed at HOW minus SIXTY minutes(0730) on completion of the scheduled air strike. Fire Support Units ONE, TWO, and THREE gradually decreased the range, proceeding toward assigned final positions for the boat approach phase (HOW minus THIRTY minutes to HOW Hour). Their approach to these positions was covered by enfilade fire from Fire Support Unit EIGHT (WICHITA, NEW ORLEANS, and ST. LOUIS) delivering fire on the landing beaches from a position south of AGINGAN Point. As required by plan, Fire Support Ships were in their final support positions by HOW minus THIRTY minutes, in order to prevent interference with the assault boat waves. Ships of Fire Support Units ONE, TWO, and THREE were positioned for final support generally as follows: INDIANAPOLIS and BIRMINGHAM between the SECOND and FOURTH Marine Division boat lines (2000 yards west of AFETNA Point); MONSSEN between RED and GREEN Beach boat lanes (between 6th and 8th Regiments, SECOND MarDiv); NORMAN SCOTT between BLUE and YELLOW Beach boat lanes (between 23rd and 25th Regiments, FOURTH MarDiv); HALSEY POWELL, CALIFORNIA, and COGHLAN in order from north to south, were stationed on the northern flank of the landing area (opposite RED Beach ONE); A. W. GRANT, ROBINSON, BAILEY, and TENNESSEE, in order from north to south, were stationed on the southern flank of the landing area (opposite YELLOW Beach THREE). REMEY and WADLEIGH were given the general duties of screening south of the landing area, prepared to lay smoke screen and deliver counter-battery fire as necessary. Close fire support ships were required to remain dead in the
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

Water in accurate positions prescribed, from HOW minus THIRTY until the passage of the last assault boat wave. The final support positions were established to place heavy ships at the stipulated minimum distance of 2000 yards from the nearest shoal or reef, and destroyers 1500 yards.

4. At 0735 scheduled fires were modified by CTG 52.2 to provide additional fire as follows: CALIFORNIA to deliver 400 rounds AA common on RED Beaches TWO and ONE from HOW minus THIRTY minutes to HOW minus TEN minutes; BIRMINGHAM to include BLUE Beach ONE and GREEN Beach THREE with previously authorized 300 rounds AA common additional fire, from HOW minus THIRTY to HOW Hour; CALIFORNIA to deliver 100 rounds white phosphorous for smoke screen on north flank of landing beaches from HOW minus TEN minutes to HOW Hour.

5. Leading assault waves left the line of departure at 0813, for their 4250 yard run to the beach. HOW Hour was changed to 0840. At 0831 tracers were observed being fired at the boat waves from positions inland of YELLOW Beaches ONE and TWO, and TENNESSEE was directed to take this strong point under fire. At 0833 CALIFORNIA's white phosphorous fire was observed to be too high above the ground, and ineffective, and was ordered ceased. At 0836 CALIFORNIA was ordered to silence heavy machine gun fire observed to be directed on leading boat wave from positions on RED Beach TWO. At 0838 a report was received that the leading waves of FOURTH Division were 2500 yards from BLUE and YELLOW Beaches and that the SECOND Division leading waves were about 10 minutes in advance of those of the FOURTH Division. The SECOND Division leading waves landed on RED and GREEN Beaches at 0843 under moderate mortar, artillery and machine gun fire from the beach flanks and high ground behind the beaches. Close fire support ships lifted their fire to selected areas just beyond the O-1 line for THIRTY minutes of deep supporting fire, as scheduled. At 0845, the FOURTH Division leading waves were reported to be still 1000 yards from BLUE and YELLOW Beaches and were receiving heavy fire from AGINGAN Point and from positions inland of the YELLOW Beaches. TENNESSEE was again directed to take these guns under fire. Various other enemy guns were reported firing on the boat waves and landing beaches during this critical period, and ships in best position for counter-battery fire were assigned to silence these.

6. At 0850 NORMAN SCOTT reported the first wave had landed on BLUE Beach TWO, verifying the report that the FOURTH Division waves were approximately 10 minutes behind those of the SECOND Division.

7. On completion of the close fire support phase at HOW Hour, the ships assigned to deliver supporting fire on request of battalion naval gunfire spotters and naval liaison officers took position for best support of units assigned, other ships clearing the boat lanes and taking positions on the flanks for counter-battery and deep-supporting fires. Initially assigned direct support ships and units to which assigned were as follows:

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ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

| MONSSEN          | 1st BN, 6th RCT (In reserve) |
| CALIFORNIA      | 2nd BN, 6th RCT               |
| HALSEY POWELL   | 3rd BN, 6th RCT               |
| A. W. GRANT     | 1st BN, 8th RCT (In reserve)  |
| BIRMINGHAM      | 2nd BN, 8th RCT               |
| COCHLAN         | 3rd BN, 8th RCT               |
| REMEY           | 1st BN, 23rd RCT (In reserve) |
| ROBINSON        | 2nd BN, 23rd RCT              |
| NORMAN SCOTT    | 3rd BN, 23rd RCT              |
| TENNESSEE       | 1st BN, 25th RCT              |
| BAILEY          | 2nd BN, 25th RCT              |
| WADLEIGH        | 3rd BN, 25th RCT (In reserve) |

The 2nd RCT, SECOND MarDiv and 24th RCT, FOURTH Marines were in division reserve.

8. At 0910, control of Naval gunfire of Fire Support Units ONE, TWO, and THREE was returned to Commander Task Force 52 according to plan, and the landing phase terminated.

9. At 1830, designated heavy combatant ships and transport types retired for the night according to plan. Control of naval gunfire support was given to CTF 52.2 until the return of the Task Force Commander the following morning. Fire support ships remaining during the night were organized into three harassing units in accordance with CTF 52's mailgram 131500/June, as follows:
   Unit ONE consisting of BIRMINGHAM, ROBINSON, A. W. GRANT and SELFRIIGE to operate generally south of the anchorage area and west of SAIPAN Channel;
   Unit TWO consisting of LOUISVILLE, MC DERMUT, MC GOWAN, PHELPS, HALSEY POWELL, and MONSSEN to operate generally north of the anchorage area; and Unit THREE consisting of MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND, TWINTING, and STOCKHAM to operate generally in SAIPAN Channel.

10. Prior to relinquishing control of gunfire support, CTF 52 made partial initial night assignments of supporting ships as follows, based on request from SECOND Division Headquarters: LOUISVILLE to 3rd BN, RCT 8, MC DERMUT to 3rd BN, RCT 6, MC GOWAN to 2nd BN, RCT 6, MONTPELIER to 2nd BN, RCT 25, CLEVELAND to 1st BN, RCT 23, YARNELL to 2nd BN, RCT 23, and TWINTING to 3rd BN, RCT 23. CTF 52.2 was directed to complete assignments when requests were received from the FOURTH Division Headquarters.

11. Frequent changes in assignments of supporting ships were made during the night. The principal reasons for these changes were the failure to establish communications with assigned shore fire control party, and the substitutions required for ships providing illumination at rates which soon expended their supply of illuminating projectiles.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

12. Special missions were given to ships not assigned or not in communication with assigned shore fire control parties, as follows: At 1931 YARNELL and STOCKHAM commenced all night harassing fire on selected areas in vicinity of ASLITO Airfield and areas known to be enemy strong points, as requested by FOURTH Division Headquarters. At 2145, LOUISVILLE, MC DERMUT and MONSSEN commenced harassing fire in areas on the north flank of the SECOND Division with principal purpose to interdict approaches from GARAPAN Town, the PHELPS relieving LOUISVILLE in support of 3rd Bn, RCT 8 for this mission. At 2230 MONTFELIER commenced all night harassing fire mission on the narrow pass of the vital road approach from northern SAIPAN along the northern shore of MARGICANNIE BAY.

13. Demands for starshell illumination were particularly heavy this first night in an endeavor to prevent counter attacks and keep the enemy from improving his positions.

14. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued heavy throughout the night. Delivered from the east slope of the ridge behind CHARAN KANOA, the positions were difficult to locate accurately for counter-battery fire. Due to lack of communication and good observation, it became necessary on one or two occasions for shore fire control parties to call for fire on dangerous targets located outside their own zone of action.

15. The two enemy artillery strong points which gave the heaviest opposition during the night were located on the high ground east of CHARAN KANOA. One of these batteries was located on the hill 3200 yards due east of AFETNA Point and was taken under fire initially by MC GOWAN at 0200 and later by PHELPS and MONTFELIER at 0450 when opposition from this point increased. The second was located along a 1500 yard NE-SW line on the high ground immediately west of ASLITO Airfield. This second strong point appeared to be the backbone of the enemy artillery defense. BIRMINGHAM, supporting 1st Bn, RCT 25, delivered fire on this area intermittently throughout the night. When at 0630, a counter attack from this sector appeared imminent and artillery fire became intensified, CLEVELAND was assigned this area as a special mission.

16. At 0437 assignments of supporting ships were made to be effective at 0500 as follows: MC GOWAN to 3rd Bn, RCT 6, MC DERMUT and HALSEY POWELL to 2nd Bn, RCT 6, PHELPS to 3rd Bn, RCT 8, BIRMINGHAM to 1st Bn, RCT 25, ROBINSON to 1st Bn, RCT 23, and A. W. GRANT to 3rd Bn, RCT 25.

17. At about 0615 an additional strong enemy concentration and counter attack developed on the north flank of SECOND Division at a point 500 yards north of RED Beach ONE. MONSSEN, supporting 1st Bn, RCT 6, called for immediate additional assistance to thwart this attack. LOUISVILLE was assigned to augment MONSSEN's fire.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

18. At 0715, CTF 52 arrived in the anchorage area and took over control of naval gunfire support, and made assignments for direct support and for KING Hour preparation fires to ships returning from night retirement.

19. At 1738, CTG 52.2 made night assignments for direct support effective at 1830, as follows:

   MC GOWAN                      3rd Bn, RCT 2
   HALSEY POWELL             3rd Bn, RCT 6
   MONSSEN                     3rd Bn, RCT 8
   A. W. GRANT                2nd Bn, RCT 23
   CLEVELAND                  3rd Bn, RCT 24
   YARNELL                    2nd Bn, RCT 25
   STOCKHOLM                  3rd Bn, RCT 25

20. Upon departure of the Task Force Commander for night retirement at 1826, control of naval gunfire support was given to CTG 52.2 and the night harassing unit organization (CTF 52 mailgram 131500) was placed in effect.

21. Special night harassing fire missions in areas requested by SECOND and FOURTH Divisions were given to TWINING and LOUISVILLE. All ships were directed to be alert for delivery of counter-battery fire on enemy artillery positions along the ridge east of CHARON KANOA.

22. At 2000, PHEILPS was given special illumination mission to silhouette the north-south ridge line at a point 1000 yards west of MAGICIENNE BAY.

23. Due to communication difficulties and numerous special requests for illumination, counter-battery and harassing fires, many changes in assignment were made during the night in order to carry out these special missions requested.

24. Heavy enemy artillery, estimated to be located on the eastern slope of the north-south ridge, 3500 yards east of GREEN Beach ONE, began heavy fire on SECOND Division positions and on GREEN Beaches about 2200. At the request of Headquarters, SECOND Division, MONTPELIER screened by YARNELL were ordered at 2213 to proceed to a position southeast of NAFUTAN Point to observe for gun flashes from this battery and establish its location.

   DOG plus TWO Day (June 17, 1944)

25. At the request of 3rd Bn, RCT 24 spotter, PHEILPS was ordered at 0105 to close CAPE OBIAM to 3000 yards and deliver 40mm fire on strong enemy gun positions on the promontory of this cape.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

26. After locating heavy artillery guns firing from eastern slope of ridge, MONTPELIER and YARNELL returned to SAIPAN Channel at about 0220. At 0224, MONTPELIER commenced main battery counter-battery fire on these heavy guns. Without the aid of spots and during the darkness, the accuracy of this fire was not determined, but it succeeded in neutralizing this strong enemy battery for the remainder of the night.

27. Many urgent requests for counter-battery fire and illumination against impending enemy counter attacks were received during the night. Ships in best position were given missions to fulfill these requests. Communications had improved considerably on this second night of the assault and resulted in better coordination of naval gunfire support, although frequent changes in assignment were necessary to provide for situations arising.

28. At 0600, the Task Force Commander returned from night retirement and resumed control of naval gunfire support. At this time ships were supporting battalions as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC DERMUT</td>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALSEY POWELL</td>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONSSEN</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBINSON</td>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>RCT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILLIP</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. W. GRANT</td>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>RCT 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEVELAND</td>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>RCT 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTPELIER</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARNELL</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further assignments using incoming supporting ships were made by CTF 52 upon taking control of naval gunfire.

29. At 1715, in anticipation of enemy fleet air and surface action, a general retirement and reorganization was made leaving CTG 52.2 in charge of all operations at SAIPAN. Fire Support Ships remaining to continue support of troops ashore were organized into two harassing units: Unit ONE, LOUISVILLE, WALLER, SAUFLEY and PRINGLE; Unit TWO, PHELPS, CONY and PHILLIP. Covering Group ONE, operating approximately 15 to 25 miles west of SAIPAN consisted of TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, MARYLAND, REMEY, WADLEY, NORMAN SCOTT, MERTZ, MELVIN and PRITCHETT.

30. Assignments of supporting ships for the night were made as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHELPS</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONY</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILLIP</td>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>RCT 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

LOUISVILLE 1st Bn, RCT 23
WALLER 2nd Bn, RCT 24
SAUFLEY 2nd Bn, RCT 25

31. During the general retirement, enemy planes made bombing attacks on various retirement groups. Planes were believed to have taken off from local airfields and to prevent recurrence, CTG 52.2 directed that dawn and dusk harassing naval gunfire be placed on SAIPAN and TINIAN Airfields. PRINGLE was accordingly assigned to harass USHI Point field, TINIAN, to prevent enemy planes from taking off. CONY was given the mission of harassing MARPI Point field, SAIPAN, which seriously conflicted with her primary mission of direct support of 3rd Bn, RCT 2, but was unavoidable due to lack of sufficient ships to perform all requirements. This harassing gunfire was maintained for several days, during which time air attacks ceased.

32. At 1800, LOUISVILLE was reassigned to support 1st Bn, RCT 165 (Army) to thwart enemy counter attack against that Battalion. At 1900, PRINGLE was assigned to support 2nd Bn, RCT 23, in addition to her harassing fire mission.

33. With no immediate replacement of ammunition available, it became necessary to restrict the rate of starshell expenditure to 6 per hour per ship except for emergencies, and to limit the amount of AA common available for support of troops to all in excess of 60 rounds per gun, per ship, which was to be held in reserve for surface and air action.

34. At about 2345, PHLEPS furnished special illumination requested by USS BALLAND to enable PBM's to take off for search mission.

DOG plus THREE Day (June 18, 1944)

35. At 0209, Headquarters SECOND Division reported enemy small craft leaving the shore in vicinity of FLORES Point apparently in preparation for an amphibious counter attack. CONY was directed to discontinue harassing mission on MARPI Point field and to proceed south to investigate this report. Results of investigation by CONY, completed about 0300 were negative.

36. Because of the limited number of available supporting ships, Headquarters SECOND and FOURTH Divisions were informed that hereafter it would normally be necessary to assign one ship to support more than one battalion.

37. At 0436, PRINGLE's harassing fire mission on USHI Point Airfield, TINIAN, was terminated.

38. At 0450, an enemy amphibious counter attack by several small craft developed north of RED Beach ONE. These may possibly have been the same craft
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

reported by SECOND Division as moving from FLORES Point at 0209. PHELPS was ordered to commence immediate emergency starshell illumination of the area 2000 yards south of MUTCHO Point in order to silhouette enemy craft. With the help of this illumination, LCI(G)'s on patrol in this area stopped this attack with 40 MM fire, destroying several of the enemy craft and driving off the remainder. LCI(G)'s received considerable return fire from enemy craft, with several hits, but no serious damage.

39. At 0539, just after the amphibious counter attack was driven off, PHELPS, still close inshore for support of LCI(G)'s and illumination, received two hits from coast defense batteries located on the hillside southeast of GARAPAN Town, and withdrew delivering heavy counter-battery fire with good effect.

40. At 0615, assignment of supporting ships was made as follows:

PHELPS
PHILLIP
CONY
WALLER
SAUFLEY
FRINGLE
LOUISVILLE

2nd Bn, RCT 2 and 1st Bn, RCT 6
2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 8
3rd Bn, RCT 2
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 23
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24
2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 25
1st Bn, RCT 165 for fire on enemy strong points along southern coast and NAFUTAN Point using airspot.

41. At 0700, Commander Covering Group ONE was directed to detach MARYLAND or COLORADO for special heavy caliber fire mission on the coast defense battery which fired on PHELPS. SECOND Division reported their forward artillery observer had definitely established this battery to be located at the foot of the GARAPAN Municipal Pier and was neutralizing it with light artillery until heavy caliber fire could destroy it. MARYLAND was assigned the mission and commenced destructive 16-inch fire at about 0900, spotted by shore spotter of 3rd Bn, RCT 2, and MARYLAND air spotter.

42. At 0850, SHAW was detached from screen and relieved PHELPS at 0930 in support of 1st Bn, RCT 6, and 2nd Bn, RCT 2. PHELPS went alongside PFAON (ARB 3) for repairs and moored in such a manner that gunfire could be continued uninterrupted during repair work.

43. At 1000, MARYLAND completed special mission, having delivered 36 rounds 16-inch high capacity projectiles on specified coast defense battery and on a blockhouse observed on hillside southwest of GARAPAN Town. Results of this fire were not determined. MARYLAND rejoined Covering Group ONE on completion of this mission.
PART V – GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

44. At 1230, Commander Harassing Unit ONE reported LOUISVILLE had destroyed two enemy batteries located on NAPELANT Point and was continuing fire on special strong points as directed by spotter of 3rd Bn, RCT 165.

45. Upon commitment and landing of RCT's 165 and 105 of the 27th Army Division, there were 24 battalions in the field to which only seven supporting ships could be assigned. By assigning one ship to each regiment, one of the eight regiments had to be left without naval gunfire support. Except in special cases, three ships were assigned to the SECOND Division and the remaining four ships to the FOURTH and 27th Division.

46. At 1345, LOUISVILLE and SAUFLEVY were released by Headquarters FOURTH Division; LOUISVILLE was reassigned to support 1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 105.

47. At 1602, Headquarters SECOND Division requested heavy caliber fire on concrete 5-inch gun emplacement and bivouac area located 1000 yards east of the GARAPAN Municipal Pier. Enemy air attack in progress prevented releasing LOUISVILLE for this mission until the "all clear" signal was given at 1701, at which time LOUISVILLE was ordered to leave SAIPAN Channel and carry out this mission.

48. At 1700, the regimental liaison officer, RCT 24, requested urgent support against violent enemy tank attack developing on the north coast of MAGICIENNE BAY. PRINGLE was ordered to proceed at high speed to position southeast of MAGICIENNE BAY and support 1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24, against this attack.

49. At 1732, LOUISVILLE was directed to cancel carrying out mission on SECOND Division target and to return to SAIPAN Channel for urgent fire on NAPELANT Point as requested by Headquarters FOURTH Division.

50. At 1738, WALLER was ordered to join PRINGLE in repelling the MAGICIENNE BAY tank attack and to support 1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 25 against this attack.

51. At 1745, Headquarters FOURTH Division reported tank attack in MAGICIENNE BAY had been repulsed by artillery, that our own tanks now in the same area engaging enemy tanks prevented naval gunfire support. Accordingly, WALLER was directed to remain in MAGICIENNE BAY area for possible call, PRINGLE took over fire mission on NAPELANT Point assigned to LOUISVILLE and LOUISVILLE was directed at 1800 to proceed to area west of GARAPAN and deliver main battery fire previously requested at 1602 by Headquarters SECOND Division. At 1803, while standing by in MAGICIENNE BAY, WALLER received heavy enemy fire simultaneously from batteries on NAPELANT Point and KAGMAN Penninsula, but cleared area before being hit.

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

52. At 1901, assignments of supporting ships for the night were made as follows:

In area west of GARAPAN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHAW</td>
<td>3rd Bn, RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONY</td>
<td>1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILLIP</td>
<td>2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In SAIPAN Channel area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WALLER</td>
<td>2nd Bn, RCT 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUFLEY</td>
<td>1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRINGLE</td>
<td>1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISVILLE</td>
<td>unassigned initially</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. At 1919, LOUISVILLE completed main battery mission for 3rd Bn, RCT 2, on the concrete 5-inch gun emplacement with satisfactory results and was released by Headquarters SECOND Division to return to SAIPAN Channel.

54. At 1955, PHELF, now moored alongside PHAON west of GARAPAN, requested a fire support mission and was assigned to support 3rd Bn, RCT 6, with illumination. At 2020 LOUISVILLE was assigned to support 1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 165.

55. Initially, communications with assigned shore fire control parties were bad, but by 2200, ships had contacted their spotters and were providing support missions requested.

**DOG plus FOUR Day (June 19, 1944)**

56. Between 0600 and 0800 supporting ships were reassigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHELF</td>
<td>3rd Bn, RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONY</td>
<td>1st Bn, RCT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILLIP</td>
<td>1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALLER</td>
<td>2nd Bn, RCT 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRINGLE</td>
<td>1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISVILLE</td>
<td>3rd Bn, RCT 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAW</td>
<td>1st Bn, RCT 105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. At 1020, Headquarters Northern Troops and Landing Force (NT&LF) was established ashore.

58. At 1025, LOUISVILLE was assigned counter-battery mission on NAFUTAN.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

Point batteries using own airspot, on request from Headquarters NT & LF. At 1045, WALLER was assigned to 2nd Bn, RCT 25, for special mission on large gun battery, and troop concentration located in this battalion's zone of action.

59. At 1127, SAUFLEY was assigned special harassing fire mission on GURGUAN Point Airfield, TINIAN, to be conducted in two two-hour periods commencing prior to sunset and prior to first light of dawn next morning. The purpose of this mission was to deny enemy air operations at these likely periods.

60. At 1217, Headquarters SECOND Division requested heavy caliber fire on a blockhouse, a probable command post, located on the high ground 1000 yards east of GARAPAN Municipal Pier. At 1230, COLORADO was detached from Covering Group ONE and directed to take position and deliver this fire as spotted by the shore fire control party of 3rd Bn, RCT 6, and own air spotter.

61. At 1310, SAUFLEY relieved SHAW in support of 1st Bn, RCT 105; SHAW proceeded to anchorage area for fuel, ammunition and gun repairs.

62. At 1335, PHILLIP was directed to relieve MERTZ on station in screen of Covering Group ONE; MERTZ to report to CTG 52.2 for fire support duties when relieved. At 1415, MERTZ was assigned to support all three battalions of RCT 8. NORMAN SCOTT, relieved in the screen of Covering Group ONE by CONY, reported for fire support duty and was assigned to the Regimental Liaison Officer, RCT 6 for support of battalions as directed by him.

63. At 1430, Headquarters NT & LF requested an LCI(G) to enter MAGICIENNE BAY to clear enemy from caves in that area. This request and a similar one made at 0700 for destroyer fire, were refused on the basis that enemy batteries which had fired on WALLER the previous afternoon, were still active.

64. COLORADO completed main battery mission on enemy blockhouse at 1450 and was directed to rejoin Covering Group ONE.

65. At 1530, WALLER was directed to relieve WADLEY on station in Covering Group Screen; WADLEY when relieved reported to CTG 52.2 for fire support duties and at 1630 was assigned to support 1st Bn, RCT 105. SAUFLEY left Saitap Channel to carry out harassing fire mission on GURGUAN Point Field, TINIAN. SAUFLEY was also directed to deliver fire on numerous small craft reported assembling off SUNHARON Town, TINIAN, apparently in preparation for night amphibious troop transfer to Saitap.

66. At 1700, night assignments for supporting ships were made as follows:

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHLEPS (Alongside PHAON)</th>
<th>3rd Bn, RCT 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MERTZ</td>
<td>all three Bns, RCT 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORMAN SCOTT</td>
<td>1st and 3rd Bn, RCT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISVILLE</td>
<td>1st Bns, RCT's 23 and 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINGLE</td>
<td>2nd Bns, RCT's 25 and 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WADLEIGH</td>
<td>1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUFLEY</td>
<td>on special harassing mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67. At the request of CTG 52.2, Commander Harassing Unit ONE in SAIPAN Channel area coordinated the illumination provided by ships of his unit to prevent more than one star in the air at any one time.

68. At 2238, report was received from 2nd Bn, RCT 25, that spent illuminating projectiles were falling on own troops.

After considerable investigation it was determined that these were WADLEIGH's projectiles fired from the south. WADLEIGH was directed at 0212 to shift position to the west to allow spent projectiles to fall clear of own troops.

69. At 2251, SAUFLEY was directed to discontinue patrol off SUNHARON Town, and return to SAIPAN Channel. At 2355, SAUFLEY relieved LOUISVILLE in support of 1st Bns, RCT's 23 and 24. At 2358, LOUISVILLE left SAIPAN Channel to join Covering Group ONE and proceed to rendezvous with tanker for fueling.

70. At 0037, Headquarters NT & LF requested a destroyer to proceed to a point southeast of MAGICIENNE BAY and deliver fire on enemy troops reported active on PURPLE Beaches (north shore of MAGICIENNE BAY). At 0045, PRINGLE was given this mission. At this time, NORMAN SCOTT, in a standby status with assigned SECOND Division shore fire control parties, was secured from her assignment and detached from Harassing Unit TWO with orders to proceed to SAIPAN Channel and join Harassing Unit ONE as relief for SAUFLEY.

71. At 0152, Headquarters NT & LF reported enemy troop activity on PURPLE Beaches had ceased; PRINGLE was ordered to resume illumination support for assigned battalions.

72. NORMAN SCOTT relieved SAUFLEY at 0215 in support of 1st Bns, RCT's 23 and 24. SAUFLEY left SAIPAN Channel and proceeded to carry out dawn harassing fire mission on GURGUAN Point Airfield, TINIAN.

73. At 0416, NORMAN SCOTT investigated a reported concentration of enemy landing craft on western and southwestern beaches of MAGICIENNE BAY; results negative.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

74. At 0622, SAUFLEY completed special harassing mission and reported having delivered additional fires on enemy small craft observed off SUNNARON Town. SAUFLEY was directed to return to SAIPAN Channel for fire support assignment.

75. Assignments of supporting ships for the morning were made at 0645 as follows:

Off GARAPAN:

PHELPS 3rd Bn, RCT 2
MERTZ 2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 8

Off South and Southeast coast of SAIPAN:

SAUFLEY 1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24
WADLEY 1st Bn, RCT 105
PRINGLE 3rd Bn, RCT 105

76. At 0700, NORMAN SCOTT was relieved by SAUFLEY and was reassigned to Harassing Unit TWO to support all three Bns, RCT 6.

77. At 0915, at the suggestion of the FOURTH Division Air Observer, artillery was requested to fire smoke shells on a heavy gun on NAPUTAN Point in order to provide PRINGLE a good point of aim. PRINGLE had been firing indirect fire on this gun and air observer's suggestion was carried out, but was unsuccessful.

78. At 1036, WADLEY was assigned to support 2nd Bn, RCT 165, in addition to initially assigned 1st Bn, RCT 105.

79. At 1100, reassignments of supporting ships were made as follows:

PHELPS to all three Bns, RCT 8
MERTZ 3rd Bn, RCT 2 and 1st Bn, RCT 6

80. At 1130, Headquarters NT & LF reported a strong enemy troop concentration on the northwest coast of MAGICIENNE BAY and requested coordination between destroyer gunfire and air strike on this target. SAUFLEY was released from support of 2nd Bn, RCT 24 at 1147, and proceeded to a point southeast of MAGICIENNE BAY for a safe line of fire of 330 degrees on target. SAUFLEY opened fire on enemy concentration at 1235 and Headquarters FOURTH Division reported trucks and tanks were heavily hit by this fire and were retreating northward. SAUFLEY was ordered to cease firing at 1310 to allow scheduled air strike to bomb and strafe targets.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

81. At 1300, WADLEY was assigned to support 3rd Bn, RCT 165, for urgent mission. This put WADLEY in support of three battalions.

82. At 1410, at request of Headquarters NT & LF, SAUFLEY commenced destructive fire mission on enemy coast defense guns and installations located on the north and northeast coast of MAGICIENNE BAY. At 1419, SAUFLEY reported destroying one of these enemy guns and shifted fire to other batteries. Air spot by TF 52 air liaison officer was provided SAUFLEY at this time. SAUFLEY completed special fire mission at 1540 and resumed direct support mission for 1st and 2nd Bn, RCT 24.

83. At 1555, WADLEY was given orders for GURGUAN Point Airfield, TINIAN, dusk and dawn harassing fire mission, similar to that given SAUFLEY on 19 June, whose purpose was to deny enemy air operations at these likely periods for aircraft take-off. At this time CONWAY (ComDesDiv 44) reported for fire support assignment having been detached from transport screen. When ordered at 1630, CONWAY relieved WADLEY in support of 1st Bn, RCT 105, 2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 165, and ComDesDiv 44 relieved Commanding Officer WADLEY as Commander Harassing Unit ONE in SAIPAN Channel area. At 1705 WADLEY proceeded on airfield harassing mission.

84. At 1640, SAUFLEY was directed to relieve EATON in transport screen and EATON, when relieved, to support 1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24.

85. At 1810, night assignments of supporting ships for SECOND Division were made as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHELPS</td>
<td>3rd Bn, RCT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORMAN SCOTT</td>
<td>1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERTZ</td>
<td>2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. At 1828, RENSHAW was detached from transport screen and assigned to support 1st Bn, RCT 105, and 2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 165. PRINGLE's fire support mission was terminated at this time and she was directed to take RENSHAW's position in transport screen.

87. Lack of coordination of requests for support and the many urgent requests for illumination again resulted in considerable confusion in making assignments for support of FOURTH and 27th Division Battalions for the night. Finally at 2000, these assignments were completed and were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONWAY</td>
<td>3rd Bn, RCT 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EATON</td>
<td>1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENSHAW</td>
<td>1st Bn, RCT 105, and 2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (A) to
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PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

88. At 2030, WADLEY was directed to return to SAIPAN Channel area for fire support assignment on completion of harassing fire mission of TINIAN Airfield. On return, WADLEY was assigned to support 1st Bn, RCT 165 for illumination of northern shore of MAGIC TRENNE BAY.

89. In accordance with CTF 52's dispatch 200230Z authorizing expenditure of 320 rounds 14-inch HC projectiles in TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA on 21 June and 22 June in order to further the SAIPAN Campaign, Headquarters SECOND, FOURTH and 27th Division were directed to submit their list of suitable targets for this fire. These requests were received from SECOND and FOURTH Divisions prior to midnight. No request was received from 27th Division.

90. At 2240, Commander Harassing Unit TWO was directed to alert his unit for possible enemy amphibious counter attack coming from TANAPAG Harbor. Fires and explosions set off in one of our large ammunition dumps by an enemy sniper provided a confusion on shore of which the enemy would be likely to take advantage. 20 and 40 MM fire was observed inside the lagoon opposite RED Beaches at 2230. Starshells fired over the water areas west of GARAPAN failed to reveal any sign of this expected attack prior to midnight.

DOG plus SIX Day (June 21, 1944)

91. At 0029, PHELPS reported receiving 50 caliber machine gun fire from small craft and was firing 20 MM in return. Other ships of Harassing Unit ONE and patrolling LCI(G)'s opened fire at about this time on what appeared to be a minor enemy amphibious counter attack headed south from GARAPAN for RED Beaches. Illumination was provided by NORMAN SCOTT. By 0200 the attack had been repulsed although precautionary starshell illumination of the area north of GREEN Beaches was continued at a slow rate for remainder of the night.

92. At 0315, WADLEY left SAIPAN Channel area to carry out dawn harassing fire mission on west TINIAN Airfield. Assignment for support of 1st Bn, RCT 165, was terminated on WADLEY's departure. WADLEY completed special mission at 0455 and was directed to return to SAIPAN Channel area.

93. At 0530, assignments for special fire mission in support of the 27th Division were made as follows:

RENSHAW and SAUFLEY
SHAW and MC GOWAN

2nd Bn, RCT 105
3rd Bn, RCT 105

94. At 0545, assignments of supporting ships for SECOND and FOURTH Divisions were made as follows:

CONWAY
EATON
MERTZ

2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 25
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24
2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 8

- 100 -

ENCLOSURE (A) to
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 PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

PHELPS and NORMAN SCOTT 3rd Bn, RCT's 2 and 6 for special counter-battery mission using air spotter; mission to commence at 0700.

95. At 0745, TENNESSEE reported in position for main battery fire on selected targets in GARA'PAN Town, as requested by SECOND Division, and was assigned to 3rd Bn, RCT 6, shore spotter for this mission. At 0830, TENNESSEE requested deenforcement of fire mission until afternoon because of poor light conditions on targets during the morning. This request was granted but on request of 3rd Bn, RCT 6 spotter, TENNESSEE delivered main battery fire on MANLAGASSA Island coast defense batteries and installations until 1015, at which time she rejoined Cover Group ONE.

96. At 0926, CONWAY was ordered to discontinue support of 2nd and 3rd Bns, RCT 25, with whom he was not in contact, and to relieve SAUFLEY in support of 2nd Bn, RCT 105. Upon being relieved, SAUFLEY reported having destroyed heavy gun on NAFUTAN Point.

97. At 1040, CALIFORNIA was directed to proceed with three DE's as screen to eastern side of SAIPAN and deliver 90 rounds main battery fire on selected targets requested by FOURTH Division. No shore fire control party spotter was assigned due to widely separated target locations.

98. At 1100, WADLEY relieved MC GOWAN in support of 3rd Bn, RCT 105.

99. At 1245, PHELPS and NORMAN SCOTT completed special destructive fire missions in support of 3rd Bns, RCT's 2 and 6. PHELPS reported several ships in TANAPAG Harbor destroyed or set afire, blockhouse on MUTCHO Point penetrated by common projectiles and supply buildings north of FLORES Point set afire.

100. At 1400, TENNESSEE commenced main battery fire mission on targets requested by Headquarters SECOND Division, located in the GARA'PAN-FLORES Point area. Several additional targets in this area had been added by Headquarters NT & LF to the original SECOND Division list and were taken under fire by TENNESSEE. The 1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 6, shore spotter spotted fire on targets which they could observe.

101. At 1619, CALIFORNIA completed main battery fire mission of targets requested by FOURTH Division and was directed to rejoin Covering Group ONE.

102. Assignments of supporting ships effective at sunset were made at 1712 as follows:

CONWAY
3rd Bn, RCT 25
EATON
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24

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PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

RENSHAW
1st Bn, RCT 105

SHAW
3rd Bn, RCT 105

PRITCHETT
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 165

103. At 1725, TENNESSEE completed destructive 14-inch fire mission and at 1730 was directed to rejoin Covering Group ONE.

104. PHILLIP was detached from Screen of Covering Group ONE and relieved NORMAN SCOTT at 1750 in support of 1st and 3rd Bns, RCT 6, and 2nd Bn, RCT 2. NORMAN SCOTT when relieved took PHILLIP's position in screen of Covering Group ONE.

105. At about 1700, Commander Task Force 52 returned to the CHARAN KANOA anchorage from protracted retirement of 17 June. Information on night assignments of supporting ships was given to CTF 52 and control of naval gunfire support was taken over by him at 1845.

DOG plus EIGHT Day (June 23, 1944)

106. Control of naval gunfire support was given to CTG 52.2 at 1813 when heavy ships and transport types made night retirement with the Task Force Commander. At that time night assignments of supporting ships were as follows:

MELVIN
all three Bns, RCT 23 and 2nd and 3rd
Bns, RCT 106

EATON
1st and 2nd Bns, RCT 24

HALSEY POWELL
3rd Bn, RCT 2

CASSIN YOUNG
1st and 3rd Bn, RCT 6 and 1st and 3rd
Bn, RCT 8

BAILEY
2nd Bn, RCT 105

MC DERMUT
1st and 2nd Bn, RCT 165

LOUISVILLE was directed to look for fire from enemy artillery located in areas 500 yards east of GARAPAN and FLORES Point and deliver counter-battery fire as necessary. RENSHAW and IRWIN in screening stations in SAIPAN Channel were directed to deliver counter-battery fire on northern TINIAN if enemy guns were observed firing from this island. CLEMSON and GILMER were assigned special all night harassing mission of SUNHARON Town.

107. At 2037, Regimental Liaison Officer RCT 165 requested urgent illumination in the hills 3500 yards east of RED Beach ONE, in which area a strong enemy counter attack was in progress. MELVIN, already assigned to FIVE Battalions for support, was given this mission.

108. At 0112, BAILEY and MC DERMUT were assigned the special mission to

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PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. NARRATIVE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (Cont'd)

harass USHI Point Airfield TINIAN from 0430 to 0530 to deny enemy dawn air operations.

109. At 0620, LOUISVILLE was assigned main battery destructive fire mission on selected targets requested by Headquarters NT & LF, certain ones of which were to be taken under fire prior to 0800 and remainder prior to 0900. 100 rounds 8"/55 HC and 150 5"/25 AA common were authorized for expenditure on these targets. No shore spotter was assigned for this mission.

110. At 0630, IRWIN was assigned to support 2nd Bn, RCT 165.

111. At 0810, CTF 52 resumed control of Naval gunfire support upon his return from night retirement.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(The comments and recommendations below are based on the phases of the SAIPAN naval gunfire support which were controlled by Commander Task Group 52.2)

With larger land masses now being encountered in amphibious landings in the Central Pacific, our procedures and methods of naval gunfire support are requiring modification to meet the new problems imposed.


(a) Heretofore, amphibious landings in the Pacific had to be made on a relatively narrow front, on one or more well separated beaches whose width rarely exceeded 300 yards. It had been a simple matter to provide excellent close supporting fire from the flanks of those beaches and to continue supporting fire until the assault waves were 300 yards from shore. At SAIPAN, with a simultaneous landing of two divisions abreast (eight battalions), the provision for sufficient and continued close supporting fire on the 6000 yard beach presented a new problem and one which is not believed satisfactorily solved. Due to the configuration of the land, enfilade fire on the landing beaches of SAIPAN was not possible from the north flank. From the southern flank, enfilade fire could not be observed by supporting ships. Maximum fire on the beaches could only be accomplished by stationing ships on each flank of the 6000 yard boat lane area and by positioning additional ships between division and regimental boat lanes. Close supporting ships were approximately half way between the line of departure and the beach, and from their final supporting positions could deliver excellent supporting fire until the boat waves reached positions inshore of the supporting ships. Upon passing the line of close supporting ships, safety to the boat waves required that ships' lines of fire be moved toward the flanks in the case of the flanking ships, or in a direction parallel to the boat lanes and directly down the narrow gap between them, in the case of ships stationed in interior positions. This, of course, resulted in a cessation of fire on the beach areas directly ahead of the boat waves during the most critical time of their approach to the beach. Ships on the flanks which were furthest from the lanes were able to maintain supporting fire the longest but could not adequately cover the entire beach. A better solution for positioning close supporting ships for similar future situations is not apparent, and the advantages gained by a landing on a wide front must be weighed against the inherent reduction in the density and duration of supporting fire.

(b) In the close support fire plan for the SAIPAN landing, provision was made for assigning ships on each flank to the primary mission of observing for and delivering counter-battery fire on enemy guns located on the flanks and areas behind the beach, which opened fire. A ship delivering scheduled close supporting fire on the beach must not divert

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

its attention or fire to emergency targets, since in so doing, scheduled support becomes lost and the landing support becomes a target-of-opportunity program. If there are insufficient ships to provide for definitely designated counter-battery ships, the secondary batteries of heavy ships must be made available for this specific duty. In previous assaults, the stationing of ships for counter-battery was not necessary, but large land masses now make this a necessary precaution.

(c) Full use could not be made of the LCI(G) beach barrage rocket support in the SAIPAN landing. The reef off CHARAN KANOA on all northern beaches and some southern beaches extended farther out from the shore than the maximum range of the rockets, so that only a part of the LCI(G)'s could close the beach sufficiently to fire these. 40 MM fire from the LCI(G)'s provided, to some extent, the final supporting fire which could not be delivered by destroyers, cruisers and battleships.

Recommendations:

(1) LCI(G)'s in leading the assault waves to the beach must remain as close ahead of the leading boat wave as possible so that naval gunfire in support of the LVT's will not be blanked off unnecessarily early by LCI(G)'s crossing the line of ships' fire.

(2) It is recommended that 40 MM guns on LCI(G)'s be provided with telescopic sights and more accurate control for fire on shore and surface targets. This recommendation and a suggestion for a make-shift improved sight has been made in separate correspondence by Commander LCI(G) Flotilla THREE. 40 MM guns now installed in LCI(G)'s have open ring sights designed for anti-aircraft fire, which when used against shore and surface targets, result in erratic, inaccurate fire and considerable waste of ammunition.

(3) The installation of a small rangefinder in LCI(G)'s has been recommended previously.

(d) With larger land masses now being encountered in amphibious landings, naval gunfire will not be able to destroy as much of the enemy resistance as was possible on atoll landings. In future operations, as in the SAIPAN attack, a reasonable amount of mobile artillery and mortar fire must be accepted. Naval bombardment, even over a long period of time and by large expenditures of ammunition, cannot be expected to destroy each of these small, portable, yet dangerous weapons concealed over a large land area.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

(c) Deep support fire from the time the assault waves leave the line of departure until they are well established on the beach, is a new problem not satisfactorily solved as yet. At Saipan, deep supporting fires commenced at HON Hour when a light neutralizing fire was placed on road junctions just beyond the first objective line, and continued for thirty minutes. The value of this fire as delivered is questionable. The large area which must be neutralized to prevent enemy mortar and artillery fire from camouflaged and defiladed positions, requires a prohibitive expenditure of ammunition, a large percentage of which is wasted by falling in areas where no results are produced. For two days after the landing on Saipan, the main resistance to the landing came from the high ground behind the beaches where the enemy had prepared his artillery and mortar positions for use against a landing. These had to be silenced by counter-battery and direct supporting fires after the landing. To destroy or neutralize these weapons during the critical landing period is the problem now confronting amphibious assault commanders. At Saipan, the deep supporting fire scheduled was neither intense enough or prolonged sufficiently to accomplish the desired neutralization. Its delivery prevented aircraft from searching out and methodically destroying the sources of enemy fire. The value of naval gunfire deep supporting fires to cover the large areas to be encountered in the future, is doubtful. The solutions recommended are:

(1) Prowler aircraft to orbit over the entire area to deliver strafing, bombing and rocket attacks on any indication of enemy activity or fire. This avoids the necessity of accurately locating a target for counter-battery fire for naval gunfire, since the pilot attacks what he sees without reference to target maps.

(2) Counter-battery fire from designated ships, as previously recommended, to search thoroughly and continuously for enemy gun flashes. Naval gunfire by these ships would necessarily have to be coordinated with the deep support of aircraft (para 1 above) and should be fired from ranges to insure a maximum ordnance which would not interfere with aircraft strikes.

(3) Earliest priority to landing of artillery, and employment of 4.2" rifled mortars landed simultaneously with assault troops.

2. CALL FIRES in direct support of assigned Shore Fire Control Parties.

(a) With few exceptions, the usual problems with which direct support ships have been confronted in past operations had been largely eliminated by the thorough and excellent training provided in the KAHOLAWE

ENVELOPE (A) to
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PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

shore bombardment practices and by the increasing combat experience of the supporting ships.

(b) One serious handicap in the control of supporting gunfire continues to be the inability of most destroyers to make voice transmission on two different frequencies simultaneously. Orders must be given "blind" on the gunfire common frequency to destroyers whose one transmitter is on the spotting frequency of the assigned Shore Fire Control Party, and if receipts for messages to them are necessary, these must be given over TBS. Innumerable cases occur where destroyers supporting battalions fail to receive important general orders issued on gunfire common circuit, in spite of the requirement that a continuous listening watch on this circuit be maintained. This again makes resort to TBS necessary. If naval gunfire is to be controlled efficiently, ships must be able to transmit on both the assigned spotting frequency and gunfire common frequency at any time. This would also permit periodic reports by direct support ships on the status of their mission without the inconvenience of shifting frequencies. These reports, required by CTG 52.2, are a valuable check on the location, employment and ammunition status of call fire ships, but a serious inconvenience to destroyers. Recommendations for providing for two voice transmitters in destroyers are made in the communications section of this report.

(e) With the increasing size of the landing forces there arises another problem in providing naval gunfire support. The assignment of a supporting ship to each battalion becomes obviously impossible when two or more divisions are used in assault. Obvious also is the fact that it will rarely be possible for all battalions of two or more divisions to utilize naval gunfire support simultaneously. Hence the problem becomes one of assigning available supporting ships to only those battalions which can utilize the support. Any number of combinations of battalions, even of different regiments, may find it desirable to use the same ship, depending on the situation ashore, but not more than three battalions should normally be assigned to one ship.

Recommendations:

(1) All fire support ships must keep up-to-date information on the location of the front lines of all units ashore, preferably on a situation map in CIC and on the bridge. With larger land areas and larger landing forces, it may occur that a ship, supporting an assigned battalion, will fire over or into own troops in other units, unless the front line situation of all units is known and the ship intelligently positioned for delivery of fire requested.
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

(2) The continued regular visits of all battalion spotters and naval gunfire liaison officers to each type of ship likely to be assigned, will prevent many of the common misunderstandings between these officers and ships assigned direct support duties. Each must know the other's problems in order to achieve the maximum support.

(d) After the time of landing, it has been found impractical to attempt to continue any unit organization for ships delivering fire support, or to establish any new unit organization. Ships delivering direct support for assigned battalions must operate independently because necessary frequent shifts in assignment often require a ship to change its location by several miles to support the newly assigned battalion. Any attempt to keep direct support ships together as a unit seriously reduces availability of ships for assignment and restricts quick and flexible maximum support.

3. Illumination.

(a) Starshell illumination at night has proven to be so successful in preventing enemy movement and counter attack that demands for it have far exceeded the available supply of projectiles. In the Saipan operation, due to the very limited number of available starshells, it became necessary to enforce a maximum expenditure rate of six illuminating projectiles per hour, except during emergencies. Requests for illumination at night in future operations will continue to be heavy and must hereafter be adequately provided for as follows:

(1) Increased loading of illuminating projectiles in destroyers.

(2) Increase in the proportion of illuminating projectiles over HE in the 60 mm mortar unit of fire.

(3) Development of artillery and larger caliber mortar illuminating projectiles.

Recommendations:

(1) It is recommended that destroyers assigned for fire support be loaded to 60 rounds per gun of this type ammunition, reducing the amount of 5 inch common to 10 per gun to allow for this. Expenditures of common projectiles by destroyers at Saipan were negligible, and will be hereafter now that heavy fortifications are not found on the landing beaches.

(2) Recommended as a result of the Eniwetok operation and again
PART V - GUNFIRE SUPPORT

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

recommended here as an urgent need, is the development of an artillery illuminating projectile and a larger caliber mortar starshell. It is conceivably possible to manufacture a 105 or 155 howitzer and a 4.2" mortar illuminating projectile equal to or superior to the naval illuminating projectile. Ground forces are now supplied only with the 60 MM mortar M33 illuminating projectile whose flare burns for 25 seconds with a light of 110,000 candle power. In emergency, due to shortages of the 60 MM illuminating projectiles, the white parachute flare ground signal was also used. Both of these are inferior in brilliance and burning time to the 5 inch naval projectile. The advantage of turning over the illumination problem to ground forces in this way rests in their ability to have light where, when and in amount they desire it.

(3) Ships providing illumination for ground troops must take positions which prevent the spent illuminating projectile from falling on or near own troops. Spent starshells caused a few casualties and one known death among own troops in the SAIPAN operation.

4. Miscellaneous Recommendations:

(a) After the landing has been accomplished, it will be found advisable to keep a ship standing by in likely locations for the delivery of counterbattery, harassing, or special mission firing. These standby ships must not be assigned to support any shore fire control party. Failure to provide ships for this specific duty makes it necessary to interrupt a ship delivering direct support on call, to provide emergency fire, and results in confusion.

(b) As the size of landing forces in amphibious operations increases, the problem of naval gunfire control becomes increasingly difficult. If the initial landings are made on one beach, it will continue to be essential that one officer control the close supporting gunfire regardless of the strength of the assault force or width of beach. If simultaneous or nearly simultaneous landings are to be made at widely separated points, a separate officer will be required for control of the supporting fire for each. A single common frequency cannot efficiently handle the load for control of supporting gunfire of more than three divisions. An operation involving more than three divisions will therefore require additional gunfire common frequencies. If the supporting fires of more than three divisions must be coordinated because of divisions operating in the same general area, this must be done by one officer whose flagship and staff are equipped to handle two or more common frequencies simultaneously and coordinate the entire
support at one station within the coordinating and controlling officer's flagship. This, of course, will require additional communication channels and a larger naval gunfire control staff, but is believed to be the only efficient solution for rapid and efficient coordination of support for a large landing force.

(c) The SAIPAN operation required a continuous watch, day and night, on the naval gunfire control (common) circuit for a period of 24 days. Future operations may also require this. Present amphibious group staffs do not have sufficient officers with gunnery experience to conduct an operation of the magnitude of SAIPAN. At least four officers are considered necessary for proper control of naval gunfire of such an operation. Inasmuch as this number of gunfire officers is required only during the control of gunfire in an assault operation, it is recommended that one or more groups of two or three experienced amphibious gunfire officers be established and made available for temporary assignment to the staff of the amphibious group commander assigned to control naval gunfire support.

5. There can remain little doubt that naval gunfire is the most feared and most effective of all weapons with which the Japanese are confronted in resisting a landing and assault. Without exception, prisoners of war have stated that naval gunfire prevented their movement by day or night and was the most deciding factor in accomplishing their defeat.
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS

A. General.

1. Communications throughout the SAIPAN operation were generally excellent. In view of the short time actually allowed most participating units to study, plan, and instruct personnel it is considered that the flow of communication traffic was always fast enough to satisfy the dictates of command.

2. Basically CENTCOM TWO is considered sound and satisfactory for present type of operations. The Northern Attack Force Communication Plan with Diagram proved adequate for both the attack and unloading phase communications. This was primarily due to the fact that channels provided were functional and allowed a flexibility which was necessary to fit the command set up.

B. Planning.

1. Constant and close liaison was maintained between Commander Task Group 52.2 Communication Officer and Commander Task Group 56.1 Signal Officer from the earliest stages of planning and formulating CENTCOM TWO and other communication and signal directives. This personal liaison began in the latter part of February and continued even after Commander Task Group 56.1 shifted his CP from the U.S.S. CAMBRIA to SAIPAN on DOG plus FIVE Day. The resultant common understanding of own and joint particular problems is believed to have greatly aided the Northern Troops and Landing Force in obtaining their desired communication set up on board the CAMBRIA, Flagship of Commander Task Group 52.2.

2. The radio installation on the CAMBRIA was accomplished under pressure of time. Communication equipments are stacked in radio rooms which are not designed to accomodate them. Radio operator's positions are too few and some are located in relatively isolated spaces where the supervisors cannot actually supervise them. The Northern Troops and Landing Force signal personnel were required to set up improvised stations at many places, to use operators in standing positions at receivers, copying dispatches, and to use as many as 30 messengers to distribute their traffic.

3. For the rehearsal and actual operation a joint communication center was established in the CAMBRIA consisting of Commander Task Group 52.2 personnel and Commander Task Group 56.1 personnel. This JCC furnished communication service to all commands embarked in the CAMBRIA and was not actually dissolved until about DOG plus FIVE Day, after which time dispatch traffic was obtained by Commander Task Group 56.1 via Officer Messenger to Commander Task Group 52.2.

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PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

4. The services furnished the CP of the Northern Troops and Landing Force could not have been accomplished without the complete cooperation of the signal section of the Northern Troops and Landing Force, and it is felt that their knowledge and understanding of joint problems and constant application to the job at hand was one of the primary reasons effective joint communications were obtained. It is further felt that this joint cooperation could not have been obtained on short notice without the understanding which resulted from long and continued liaison between the Marine and Navy personnel involved.

C. Cruising Enroute to the Objective and During the Approach.

1. Communications enroute to the objective were primarily by visual means, supported by TBS and SCR 608-610 during an emergency. Several vessels were equipped with TBY and attempts made to use this equipment on the TBS channel were unsatisfactory most of the time. SCR 608-610 equipment was not used during daylight from one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset as a security precaution.

2. When about 900 miles from the Hawaiian area considerable voice radio communications were heard on the task force commanders frequency, 4420 kilocycles. Signals were loud and clear. No attempt as yet has been made to identify the transmitting stations but it is believed they were units in the Hawaiian area conducting amphibious training exercises involved in landing and bombardment.

D. Assault Phase.

1. Communications during the Assault Phase ran according to plan. Circuits were well disciplined and traffic cleared with reasonable speed on all channels observed by Commander Task Group 52.2.

2. In Commander Task Group 52.2's flagship the following equipment was actually in service on channels during the assault until DOG plus FOUR Day.

| 11 TCS | 4 RBB | 2 - 4 BC 630 |
| 3 TBK | 5 REC | 2 - 4 BC 640 |
| 2 TBL | 1 RBH | Note: No spare equipment was available. In event of a breakdown in material radio channels would have been dropped until repairs effected. |
| 1 TAJ | 1 RBB | |
| 5 TDE | 16 RAO | |
| 1 TCP | 2 RBL | |
| 1 TBS | 1 RAK | |
| 2 SCR 808 | 1 RAL | |
| | 4 SCR 608 | |

3. After CP of Northern Troops and Landing Force shifted completely to SAIPAN some of this equipment was not in use.

- 11.2 -

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

4. The greatest volume of traffic flowed on the SCR 603-610 channels, and the great flexibility afforded by instantaneous frequency shifting made this equipment so valuable that communications could not have functioned well without it.

5. Communications for Naval Gunfire Support, Support Air Command, and Fighter Director were satisfactory. It is believed that the frequencies assigned these support operations are adequate and fundamentally well chosen. However, more separation should be given between channels assigned 3845 kcs. and 3925 kcs.

6. Interference was experienced from off tuning to bring in stations slightly off frequency, stray audio pickup on unshielded leads, spillover due to proximity of antennas, and blocking receivers. This condition was greatly remedied by judicious control of power output and frequency measurement. However the inherent limitation imposed on the radio engineering installation on the CAMBRIA by lack of ample space applies equally as well both to equipment and antennas. When transmitting and receiving antennas are close it is a physical impossibility to have absolutely no adverse effects from coupling.

7. It is pointed out, however, that Naval Gunfire Support, Support Air Command, and Fighter Direction communications were used effectively for control of these missions during each night of DOG, DOG plus ONE, DOG plus TWO, DOG plus EIGHT, and both day and night of DOG plus TWO to DOG plus SEVEN Days. All the channels worked and provided effective communications to produce the desired operational results.

8. It was fortunate that ample technical skill was available in the various transports and flagships together with spare parts and spare equipment. Considerable assistance was provided in this respect to small craft and activities requesting services.

9. Graphs at the end of this section show the radio and visual traffic load from DOG to DOG plus TWENTY Days on channels other than Naval Gunfire, Support Air Channels, and Landing Force Nets.

E. Unloading Phase.

1. Communications being functional, as distinguished from echelon communications, were effective and worked well during the unloading and consolidation phase. Vessels of various echelons returned to the unloading area and communications were provided without requiring shifts of frequencies except in a few cases.

2. One particular exception to this existed, however, and that concerned the LCT communications. Channels were provided for the LCT's on the LST circuits and CENPAC Common. Transport Group Commanders set
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

up their own LCT's as they specifically desired and some confusion resulted. This was a direct result of the change in the Command set-up for unloading and was slow in being rectified. The time involved to shift frequencies in 33 LCT SOR 610 radios delayed their use considerably. These crafts were eventually all set up on the Landing Boat Common where they should have been originally. Lack of ample technical skill within LCT's was a contributing factor to slow frequency shifting.

F. CW Communications.

1. The Task Force Common and the Task Group Commanders channels were very effectively employed for the clearing of CW traffic. Except for errors by radiomen in procedure and errors evidently caused through lack of complete understanding of the operation in progress, these channels worked to great advantage and facilitated the flow of necessary CW traffic. These errors can be corrected by better indoctrination and training.

G. Interference and Jamming.

1. One instance of outright interference and attempts by the enemy to disrupt our communications was noticed on DOG and DOG plus ONE Days on 31.6 megacycles on SOR 608-610 channel. The enemy used voice on this channel and repeated the word "OVER" many times at various instances. His efforts were in vain, however, because that channel continued to function in spite of him.

H. Radar.

1. No enemy radar jamming was observed throughout the entire operation. Several times jamming was reported, but upon further investigation it was found to be pickup from nearby voice modulated transmitters. Thereafter, no trouble was encountered once the operators had observed the indications. The BL equipment was particularly susceptible to this type of interference. Since the BL is the only part of the radar equipment without its separate A.C. generator, it is believed that the interference originated in pickup from the ships A.C. line.

2. Window was frequently used by the enemy. Window could almost be considered "standard equipment" for every raid and should be expected rather than be considered a possibility. Little difficulty was encountered with window as the operators have had considerable experience with this form of radar deception. The most effective use of window proved to be when it was dropped at or near a point of interception. No attempt was made to saturate any sizable portion of the screen with window.

3. During night raids several times the enemy showed unusual ability to join two raids into one from a considerable distance when returning to their base. Each time the planes converged on each other without the least
apparent hesitation as to the course to be followed for joining during darkness with little moon. Whereas this might be purely accidental, it might also indicate the enemy carries radar or radio equipment for such a purpose.

4. During this operation particularly interesting tactics were used by enemy planes in an attempt to evade radar tracking. Enemy planes were first detected on a steady course designed to carry them directly over TINIAN and up the east coast of SAIPAN. Upon reaching TINIAN their echo would merge with the land echo of TINIAN, emerge from this land echo and continue on the course. However, while over TINIAN one or more of these planes would leave their formation, orbit over TINIAN and remain undetected in the mass of land echo and lose altitude rapidly. Meanwhile the remainder of the raid continued up the east coast of SAIPAN attracting most of the attention in their direction. When the planes over TINIAN were very low, too low for search radars, they made a high speed attack on the transports to the west of SAIPAN undetected and were over the anchorage area before the word could be passed by the few ships that might have picked them up on surface search radars.

The following are possible remedies to the situation:

(1) Be aware that such an attack might be launched and be prepared for it.
(2) Alert surface search watches.
(3) Careful observation by the operators on composition of raid so it will be known when the raid splits.

I. Recommendations.

1. Radio.

   (a) Speed up the production of UHF multi-channel radio equipment for amphibious operations, both ship-borne and portable types. This is necessary in order to increase the number of channels available for large scale operations. Communication planning is now limited to the frequency spectrum covered by existing equipments. To aid future operations more channels must be provided and these can only be supplied by new equipment on the so-far unused portions of the frequency spectrum.

   (b) Continue to procure and install SCR 608 and 808 equipment and issue SCR 610's to amphibious force vessels until other more suitable navy equipment is available.

   (c) Procure motor generator sets for use with SCR equipment installed in all craft and provide sufficient spares to remedy breakdowns.
PART VI – COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

(d) Provide TBS or other common limited range VHF radio equipment to vessels performing screening duties and to AP's and AK's used in amphibious operations.

(e) Install TCS radio as part of permanent equipment allowed destroyers. This will provide destroyers with a low powered transmitter on medium and high frequencies which will prove valuable for naval gunfire support communications. It is not considered advisable to modify the TBK for voice communications because of the unnecessarily high power output of that transmitter. Too many vessels use too much power output on all transmitters now and two high powered voice transmitters available to each fire support destroyer would probably result in more trouble from interference than would be justified.

(f) Continue to train and drill communication teams for the various functional parties and control vessels as was done for this operation. Choose key personnel of each team with great care. The success of all communications is directly proportional to the skill of the personnel doing the communicating - even with perfect equipment and a perfect plan.

(g) Conduct more frequent drills in the type of communications actually used during an operation simulating operating conditions. This includes CW drills on tactical circuits coordinated with coding board drills. Communication personnel do not get enough practice on CW circuits. Radiomen are not thoroughly conversant with operating procedure because they have not actually used enough CW on both plain language and encrypted messages. Commanding Officers and Communication Officers, probably misguided by the ready availability and ease of operation of voice channels, do not insist on using CW when such use may be practicable.

(h) Eliminate unnecessary reports such as daily, noon fuel reports, and continuous unloading reports. Where reports are absolutely necessary and where reports cannot be made by visual means or by means of dispatch boat use CW radio transmissions using enciphered signals where quick security is considered necessary; otherwise use plain language.

Responsible officers must be made to realize that voice communications enable command to function smoothly, to help iron out the kinks resulting from current exigencies, inadequate or faulty planning, and incomplete or untried doctrine. All communications are an aid to command and should serve as such, and voice communications should be used only
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

when other means will not serve the same or desired purpose. This fact cannot too often be brought to the attention of responsible officers. It is basic. It is logical. It is necessary and vital to the success of all communications.

(i) Provide ten SCR 300 sets to each underwater Demolition Team.

(j) Provide XAP's and XAK's, AP's and AK's with SCR 808 or SCR 610 equipment in rear areas before sailing to the operating area.

(k) Provide AC power packs for shipboard TCS radios and separate the transmitter from the receiver. It is preferable to use the transmitter with a separate receiver.

Increase effectiveness of waterproofing portable equipment which must be carried or used in boats and subjected to spray and rain.

2. Radar.

(a) Prior to an operation Task Force Commander should issue special letter to Task Force vessels listing special spares carried by key vessels and showing location by ships of technicians qualified to repair the many types of radar, indicating these types.

(b) Issue instructions stating explicitly that only qualified and trained personnel should be allowed to trouble shoot radar equipment. Much harm is done and time is wasted by trained technicians in repairing mistakes made by the untrained.

(c) Install SM or SP radar on Headquarters Ships. The responsibility of the OTC embarked in a Headquarters Ship, especially during the early phases of an amphibious operation against a hostile shore where many enemy aircraft are encountered, is such as to require the best known means available to aid fighter direction.

(d) Provide separate AC power source for BL equipment in cases where none is already provided, or provide means for filtering unwanted signals from ships AC line to BL.

(e) Provide greater ventilation in radar spaces, particularly in motor generator rooms.

ENCLOSURE (A) to

CTG 52.2 Serial 0226

(a) It is recommended that the radio call sign system be reviewed with a view toward increasing the security thereof. Indiscriminate use of combat calls together with enciphered calls is positively a breach of all security principles. Yet this situation occurred and was at times apparently unavoidable when addressing especially rapid radio dispatches to multiple addressees some of whom were assigned combat calls only or had no means of enciphering calls and to others outside immediate area, retiring for the night, or otherwise employed when actual combat operations had ceased.

It is believed that a rapid cipher machine could be developed for enciphering combat calls or scrambling combat calls so that periodic or irregular changes in the system could be effected when desired.

(b) In the operation plan covering both assault and consolidation small vessels and boats should be assigned for dispatch service only. These craft should be made available for quick delivery of mail, dispatches, and other vital communications. Landing force commanders should have boats assigned to them for this same and necessary purpose.
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS

TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED IN FLAG HEADQUARTERS ON TBS AND SCR CHANNELS, NOT INCLUDING NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND SUPPORT AIR CHANNELS AND LANDING FORCE NETS.

APPROXIMATE TOTAL = 27,800 MESSAGES

TOTAL VISUAL TRAFFIC HANDLED

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5

JUNE

DOG DAY

JULY
PART VI - COMMUNICATIONS

CTG 52.2
TBS & SCR CIRCUITS
OUTGOING

MESSAGES
300
250
200
150
100
50

JUNE

DOG

JULY

DAY

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART VII - BATTLE DAMAGE

1. At 1922 on 17 June while LST Group was forming up off SAIPAN for retirement, several Japanese planes attacked. A bomb fell near LST 84. Anti-aircraft fire was opened by nearby ships. LST 84 was hit either by fragments from the bomb or by friendly anti-aircraft fire. Ten men received shrapnel wounds, three serious. A fire was started in her gasoline storage forward on the main deck. The fire was extinguished in about five minutes. Damage was superficial.

2. At 0503 on 18 June LCI 371 was hit by four shells, estimated to be 5-inch, fired by shore batteries on SAIPAN. The following damage was incurred:

(1) 36" hole in port side at frame 18, three feet above waterline.
(2) Port ramp sponson destroyed.
(3) Numerous small holes in the port ramp.
(4) Frame 17 and 18 on port side broken and twisted.
(5) 12" hole in starboard side between frames 13 and 14, about four feet above the waterline.
(6) 12" hole on the port side at frame 61, three feet below the top of the deckhouse.
(7) Numerous shell fragment holes in inner bulkheads in the captain's cabin and wardroom.
(8) Four foot diameter hole in the deck over wardroom.
(9) 12" hole at frame 60, five feet above the waterline.
(10) Three foot sections of two longitudinal frames overhead in the crew's berthing space torn out.
(11) All electrical wiring and piping in the crews berthing space severed.
(12) Two foot hole in the starboard side five feet above waterline at frame 59.
(13) 1/4" hole at junction of door and water-tight frame leading into companionway at frame 77 above the main deck.
(14) Several large holes in the refrigeration bulkheads and doors between frames 72 and 77.
(15) Refrigeration coils destroyed in chill room.

LCI 371 was assisted by salvage tug. Temporary repairs were effected by PHAON.

3. On 18 June while engaged in survey work at the entrance to the ship channel TANAPAG Harbor, YMS 323 was hit six times by 4.7-inch shells from shore batteries on MUTCHIO POINT. Water-tight integrity was destroyed by three hits below the water line. Auxiliaries were damaged by submersion. The acoustic mine sweep air tanks and lines were carried away by one hit. The magnetic sweep gear was rendered inoperative due to submersion. The master gyro was destroyed by hit, fire, and submersion. The cold storage plant was rendered inoperative. The electrical circuits were damaged by
PART VII - BATTLE DAMAGE (Cont'd)

fire and submersion. The living quarters were damaged by fire and water. One man was killed and one wounded. Temporary repairs were effected locally and the ship returned for overhaul.

4. At 0540 on 18 June Phelps (DD360) was hit by two shells from shore batteries located in vicinity of Tanapag Harbor. Number two fire room and both stacks were damaged by fragments. The blower casing of number four boiler was damaged, and number three boiler was damaged by fragments. Superficial structural damage was incurred. Phelps tied up bow to stern to Phaon and continued her fire support mission from Phaon's berth off Charan Kanoa. Temporary repairs were completed on 21 June and Phelps resumed her duties.

5. At 0238 on 22 June the Prince George received superficial damage from a near miss by a bomb during a Japanese air raid on the anchorage off Charan Kanoa. One or two enemy planes took part in the raid.

6. At 2330 on 22 June LST 119 sustained the following damage caused by shell fire from shore battery on the north end of Tinian Island while she was beached and unloading cargo near Agingan Point Saipan:

   (1) One hole six feet by three feet in hull of steering engine room and void space C-419-V extending two feet above water line.
   (2) One horsepower electric motor destroyed.
   (3) Steering engine tolemotor system and electric cables damaged by shell fragments.
   (4) Drains in void space C-419-V pierced and broken.

The seaworthiness of the ship was restored within twelve hours through temporary repairs made by salvage crew and ships force.

7. At about 0045 on 23 June several bombs were dropped in the unloading area resulting in damage as follows:

   LCT 998 nine casualties, minor damage, ship operable.
   PCS 1461 twelve casualties, radio damaged temporarily.
   PCS 1402 two minor casualties.
   Phaon several casualties from bomb fragments, no serious damage to ship.
   A total of ten men were killed and twenty-two wounded on LST 222, LCT 998, PCS 1402, PCS 1461. No loss of stores or equipment.

8. At about 0220 on 26 June LCI(G)'s 438 and 456 sustained the following damage as a result of engagement with several Japanese barges near the entrance to the channel to Tanapag Harbor:

   LCI(G) 438 -
   A. (1) One gunner's mate killed almost instantly by 37 MM shell hit.

ENCLOSURE (A) to

- 122 - CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART VII - BATTLE DAMAGE (Cont'd)

(2) Four other enlisted men wounded by shrapnel shells.

B. (1) Shell hole in transverse bulkhead between number two and
number three compartment.
(2) Broken fire main in number three compartment.
(3) Shell hole in port side of number three compartment.
(4) Two shell holes in door on port side of pilot house.
(5) Shell hole in hull outside officer's toilet.
(6) Two holes in starboard bay tank.
(7) Two holes in hull outside of engine room.
(8) Large CO2 extinguisher hose and reel ruined.
(9) Batteries on port side of engine room ruined.
(10) Radar unit damaged.
(11) Shell hole in water-tight door aft.
(12) Froen pipe in refrigerator unit broken.
(13) Shell hole in bulkhead on starboard side aft of galley.
(14) Shell hole in transverse bulkhead between 20 MM magazine
and steering gear room.
(15) 750 pound bow anchor and 80 fathoms of 3/4-inch cable lost.
(16) Shell hole in hull, port side in number four compartment.
(17) Shell hole in transverse bulkhead between number four com-
partment and engine room.
(18) Shell hole in hull outside transverse bulkhead between
steering engine room and 20 MM magazine.

LCI(G) 456 -

A. (1) Two enlisted men were slightly wounded.

B. (1) The refrigerator bulkhead and insulation was pierced and
damaged.
(2) The twelve foot wherry was pierced and splintered.
(3) The brake drum on the after anchor winch was pierced and
bent.
(4) 40 MM shell holders were struck and torn loose.
(5) Splinter protection for number one 40 MM gun was dented
but not pierced.

Both ships were repaired with local facilities and remained in
service.

9. At 2147 on 26 June MERCURY was hit by a torpedo while in air flight,
which had been dropped from a Japanese plane. The torpedo did not explode,
and caused superficial topside damage. The Japanese plane struck and dam-
aged a MERCURY kingpost, crushing in the water alongside. One man missing.
During the same raid one man on CAMBRIA, APA 36, was struck by a spent bomb
fragment; no material damage to the ship occurred.
PART VIII - AIR SUPPORT

Air support operations during the SAIPAN campaign were directed by Commander Support Air in ROCKY MOUNT. During the absence of Commander Task Force FIFTY ONE from SAIPAN air support operations were controlled from CAMBRIA. The report of these operations is included in the report of Commander Task Force FIFTY ONE.

Appended hereto is the report of CIC operations controlled by the excellent fighter director team in CAMBRIA:

FIGHTER DIRECTOR OPERATIONS - SAIPAN

1. Enroute - Fighter Direction Control enroute from PEARL to ENIWETOK was alternated odd and even days between the U.S.S. CAMBRIA and the U.S.S. PRITCHETT. The first C.A.P. was launched on the 6th of June. No enemy contacts developed. Enroute to SAIPAN from ENIWETOK a BETTY was reported by the anti-sub patrol in the sector ahead of the leading Task Group. No interception was made. The contact was sighted only momentarily by the A.S.P. and was lost. It was never picked up on the SK radar.

2. D-Day - The report of the first day attack was received at 1811K on the 15th of June. The GAMBIER BAY reported the CVE's were under attack. By 1832K several enemy raids were also closing the SAIPAN area. The combat air patrol had been released earlier. No interceptions were attempted. Destroyers in the screen reported taking low flying enemy aircraft under fire. It is estimated 5 to 10 VALS were in this first raid. The second raid at 2100K was small and retired quickly. The third raid from 0240K/16 until 0425K/16 closed from the southwest and consisted of 3 to 5 enemy aircraft.

3. On the 18th of June control of the C.A.P. (GAMBIER BAY VF's) was assumed by the CAMBRIA. At 1016K the C.A.P. was vectored to intercept single bogey closing from south. Tally-ho, one BETTY shot down south of TINIAN. The BETTY had crossed to the east climbing rapidly to twenty-four thousand feet. In the chase he was destroyed at 2000 feet after attempting to escape in a steep dive.

4. At 1740K on the 18th many bogeys were picked up 210-80 miles on a course closing the SAIPAN area. The earlier afternoon raid had crossed to the northeast and attacked the CVE's. The C.A.P. was vectored to intercept. Tally-ho, five VALS, altitude eight thousand, position of interception west of south TINIAN 10 miles. All five were shot down by the C.A.P. (KITKUN BAY VF's). At 1805K another raid closed from the south and east. It appeared that some were returning from a strike on the CVE's. From the MAGICIENNE bay area the C.A.P. was vectored south east to intercept by the CAMBRIA. Tally-ho, many ZEKES reported, believed to have bagged nine of them. The stragglers retired to the south. No fighters were lost, although one pilot was picked up after a water landing near the CVE. Score for the day - 1 BETTY, 5 VALS and 9 ZEKES.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART VIII - AIR SUPPORT

FIGHTER DIRECTOR OPERATIONS - SAIPAN (Cont'd)

5. On the 19th again the C.A.P. (CORREGIDOR VF's) was controlled by the CAMELIA. At 0610K a small raid closed from 180° - 50 miles. The C.A.P. stationed near AGUIJAN Island was vectored out. Tally-ho two BETTY's, both shot down with no damage to C.A.P. At 0900K single bogey picked up closing from 200° - 68 miles. In this interception the C.A.P. shot down the enemy bogey reported as a KATE at one thousand feet attempting to land on the west TINIAN air field. Time - 0925K. Score for the day - 2 BETTY's, 1 KATE.

6. The first P-61 night fighter was launched at 1945K on the 24th of June. On their first hop they were controlled by the CAMELIA and the ROCKY MOUNT, later by the destroyer F.D. ships. The F.D. Units ashore eventually became the principal controllers. After the 24th the VF(N)'s were used every night. The Japs continued their night attacks. Night radar contacts were made on enemy aircraft on the 25th and 26th. Two aircraft were taken under fire by the night fighter on the 27th with one possibly downed. On the 30th numerous contacts were investigated with one BETTY definitely destroyed. Again on the 6th of July at 2140K one bogey was shot down by the night fighter, bearing 220° - 55 miles. At 0045K after a chase which lasted over twenty-five minutes the P-61 shot down one BETTY 150° - 95 miles from SAIPAN. Night fighter score to date - four enemy aircraft destroyed. Altitude determination in every case was the important factor which the night fighter director had to consider. The F.D. destroyers and their fire control radar in many cases were the only source of altitude information. Their success in securing prompt altitude estimates contributed materially to the interceptions accomplished.

7. After the 7th of July there were no further night attacks on the SAIPAN area.

(a) There were seventy-six designated raids during the period prior to the 7th of July. Each raid averaged one to three planes for an estimated total of one hundred and fifty aircraft in all raids.

(b) These raids continued for fifteen out of the first twenty-three nights in the MARIANAS, time at General Quarters - approximately forty-eight hours.

(c) The longest period of coordinated attacks was on the 7th of July - Time under attack 1945K/7 until 0200K/8.

(d) The largest single night raid, estimated twelve planes hit SAIPAN on the 21st of June.

(e) It is believed that some of the early raids originated on GUAM, ROTA, or TINIAN. Later they appeared to come from PAGAN, TRUK, or WOLEAI, with reservicing at GUAM or ROTA before return.

ENCLOSURE (A) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226
PART VIII - AIR SUPPORT

FIGHTER DIRECTOR OPERATIONS - SAIPAN (Cont'd)

(f) The type of attack tended to bombing runs although on many nights they undertook only harassing tactics, with no definite plan. Low level runs were also recorded. One torpedo plane flew so low it was destroyed by crashing into the boom of a transport.

(g) Few raids closed on their initial course. Usually it was from the east to take advantage of land protection.

(h) The evasive tactics employed indicated the Japs have an adequate knowledge of the limitations of radar.

(i) The amount of window dropped further indicated the use of counter measures by the Jap may be expected.
FORCE BEACHMASTER REPORT SAIPAN

I. NARRATIVE

A. Assault Phase.

1. The advance echelons of the various beachmaster parties made the landing with the FOURTH Assault Wave. In this landing several of the beach parties lost radio gear and sustained some casualties, but communication was established by beach parties immediately after landing. The entire beachmaster components including the Transport Division and Transport Group Beachmasters, were landed and functioning on the morning of DOG plus ONE.

2. On DOG Day the concrete pier at CHITAN KANOA was captured by our forces and used for unloading critical supplies. However, early on the morning of DOG plus ONE a Japanese counter-strike succeeded in driving beach and shore parties from the pier and BLUE ONE down to Beach BLUE TWO. In the afternoon of DOG plus ONE the pier and Beach BLUE ONE were recaptured and normal operation was resumed by beach and shore parties. While the pier was in Japanese possession it was partially destroyed and before it could be utilized 100% for unloading, a construction battalion had to repair it.

3. The Force Beachmaster on the afternoon of DOG Day made a personal inspection of the beaches and found all beach parties with communication and medical units, to be functioning in a well organized and military manner, with beach markings placed. At all times during the stages of the assault phase, the work of the Naval beach parties was considered well done, in spite of serious handicaps encountered as a result of enemy fire. In this regard the Naval Beach Parties on the RED and GREEN Beaches were under considerable mortar and sniper fire during the hours of darkness and yet performed their duties in an orderly and capable manner. During this stage of the operation all functions were coordinated well with the control vessels.

4. All during the assault phase cooperation was experienced between the Naval Beach Parties and the Shore Parties, and later, when the Garrison Group took over, full cooperation was experienced.

5. The beach organization plan in the Force Beachmaster's opinion was excellent. An increasing amount of responsibility and authority fell on both the Transport Group ABLE and Transport Group BAKER Beachmasters. This responsibility was well assumed as shown by the excellent and capable performance of these individuals.
B. Secondary Phase:

1. The landing of assault supplies continued from D-DAY until D-DAY plus THIRTEEN. During this period of unloading, the Transport and Transport Group Beachmasters were constantly alert and prepared to receive from time to time certain assault supplies on a priority basis when the condition so demanded. On 24 June the assault beach parties turned their duties over to the Garrison Beach Parties.

2. Control over the landing and beaching of garrison supplies and equipment was vested in Commander Task Group 52.2 until 0800, 6 July at which time this responsibility passed to the Island Commander at SAIPAN.
FORCES BEACHMASTER REPORT SAIPAN

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

A. Supervision and Coordination of Assault Unloading.

1. At the Saipan operation the landing and unloading phase of the assault was directly under the command of the various Trans Group Commanders. This command in addition to having control of unloading his ships had complete jurisdiction over the beachmaster organization and control units in his Trans Group. By reason of the strategic situation, often times orders were issued for certain ships to retire. This retirement plan would take away from the unloading area the Trans Group Commander, but it would not necessarily withdraw all the ships under his command. Quite often this Trans Group Commander would not return to the unloading area for several days even though certain of the ships under his command had returned and resumed unloading.

In the absence of the Trans Group Commander the components of his command, especially the small boats and beach parties from the various ships were left without direct orders and supervision. This absence of the Trans Group Commander was particularly felt when time came to make important decisions regarding the utilization of small boats and changes to be made on the beaches as well as the unloading of ships in his Trans Group.

Had it not been for the direct supervision and coordination of these affairs by the Commander Western Landing Group, who was always present in the unloading area, this phase of the operation could have easily been a complete failure.

2. If this unloading responsibility is to remain with the Trans Group Commander, steps should be taken to insure his presence in the unloading area at all times. When it becomes necessary to retire the flagship, arrangements should be made to transfer the Commander and his staff to another ship, preferably a PC(3) which would remain in the unloading area at all times and much closer to the beaches, where his presence is required while his ships are being unloaded.

If it is impossible for the Trans Group Commander to remain in the unloading area, then it should be necessary to designate someone with comparable rank to assume full responsibility for unloading of the ships in his Trans Group.

3. The system of cargo tickets as used in this operation was not effective. Quite often with no knowledge of beach conditions transport quarter-masters would issue cargo tickets designating certain beaches for unloading. This would necessitate the coxswain lying to until space was available while he could have been beached elsewhere and unloaded.

- 3 -

ENCLOSURE (B) to CTG 52.2 Serial 0226.
Another cause for confusion was that the control vessel without altering or collecting the cargo tickets, would verbally instruct the coxswains to land at beaches other than those designated on the cargo ticket issued by the transport. As a result the coxswains had written instructions from one source and verbal instructions from another, and didn't know where to go. If cargo tickets are to be used, the control vessel, and not the ship where cargo was loaded, should designate the beach where boat is to discharge its load. Actually the ship need only designate the type cargo on the ticket and the control vessel would have the knowledge as to where it should be discharged.

4. The control organization plan as written was excellent but the plan as executed was ineffective. In many instances loaded boats anchored off shore for a period of 24 hours or more and when rounded up the coxswains maintained they had received no orders. This was likewise true of empty boats. Another instance citing ineffective control is the case where boats were left behind when the parent ship departed, and they wandered around without orders until finally rounded up. As a remedy for these practices, the Force Beachmaster recommends that a Central Control Station for loaded boats and a Central Control Station for unloaded boats be organized and this together with a control boat off each beach would eliminate confusion and keep a more vigilant check on the whereabouts of the boats.

5. The prearranged plans for the execution of a well organized and effective method of transferring cargo from the beach to the dispersal dump fell short of promises and expectations during the assault phase of this operation.

Obviously any plan that earmarks certain dumps for some particular division will fail in the general purpose of unloading in that necessarily no full consideration can be given to the beach conditions. This fact is clearly demonstrated in those instances where it became necessary to close certain beaches to traffic and the cargo consigned to the closed beach could not be unloaded elsewhere since the open beaches were only servicing dumps belonging to other divisions.

As a solution to this problem all dumps established should be general dumps from which all divisions could draw supplies. These dumps would be under the general supervision of the Corps Shore Party which organization would have not only the responsibility of supervising but that of selecting the site for these dumps.

The Shore Party as such should be a permanent organization commanded and manned by experienced personnel and amply supplied with the necessary unloading equipment. This would eliminate the problems encountered in this operation such as the unavailability of lights for night unloading, lack of unloading gear such as various types of slings,
the lack of trucks and cranes and the constant drain on shore party personnel occasioned when they were requested to send men to the front lines with supplies or for combat duties. The shore party should designate a cargo gear control officer to keep a complete log of unloading gear coming ashore over the various beaches and this officer would be responsible for the whereabouts of this gear at all times. To facilitate the unloading of cargo on the beaches and at the dumps the shore party in this operation emphasized the need that all cargo possible should come ashore loaded in net slings. After the ships had complied with this request little or no effort was made to return these net slings to the beaches for delivery to the various ships. This fact is made more obvious when you consider that nowhere on the entire island of SAIPAN would it have been impossible to find some of these slings. All the more would this emphasize the need for the cargo gear control officer herein recommended.

In future operations if we wish to insure a steady and orderly flow of cargo from ship to shore and thence to the dumps a closer and more complete working arrangement must be experienced between shore party and Beach Party Officers and men.

B. Force Beachmaster's Organization.

1. In the SAIPAN-TINIAN operation the beachmaster organization consisted of a Force Beachmaster with a staff of junior officers and a communication team; two Trans Group beachmasters with their communication teams and equipment.

With the exception of the Force Beachmaster who was under the direct control of the Commander Western Landing Group; all other beachmaster organizations functioned under the direct control of their Trans Group or Trans Division Commanders. When the different units were unloaded and departed they took their own beachmaster organizations with them. Therefore, the beachmaster organization as set up in this operation was not effective.

2. As the Amphibious Operations will become more extensive, it is apparent and necessary that a better organized beachmaster organization be established to insure maximum efficiency between forces afloat and ashore.

3. The Force Beachmaster organization should be supplemented by one assault division beachmaster for each assault division to be landed. This officer should be of the rank of Commander or Lieutenant Commander with experience in beach work and should have his own beach organization complete with communication personnel and equipment.
2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS (Cont'd)

The various APA beachmasters handling his assault division will operate directly under his supervision while on the beaches.

The addition of the assault division beachmasters to the Force Beachmasters Staff will insure a continual and uninterrupted flow of cargo when the Garrison Beach Parties replace the APA beach parties.

4. The Force Beachmaster should have an officer of his staff acquainted with beach conditions, aboard each Central Control vessel and an officer representing the Senior Control Officer and acquainted with Control Organization should be on the staff of the Force Beachmaster during the assault landing phase of the operation.

5. In several reports written by Trans Division Beachmasters to their Trans Division Commanders, it has been stated that the advance echelons of beach parties have gone in too soon. This contention is based on the fact that several advance elements of beach parties lost some radio gear and sustained some casualties. The fact remains that these advance elements established communication immediately with the control officer and ships afloat. If for this reason alone, the advance elements of beach parties should continue to go in with initial assault waves.

6. As soon as possible after the beaches have been secured, a prefabricated observation tower should be set up for the use of the beach party. Their loudspeaker system and signal light is to be installed on this tower. This would enable the beachmaster to command a full view of his beach and exercise a direct control over all traffic coming in to it. It would be necessary only on beaches that are 400 or more yards wide and should be at least 16 feet high. The responsibility for construction, erection, and maintenance of these towers should rest with the Construction Battalions that have charge of the Pontoon Causeways.

C. Pontoon Causeway Unit.

1. In the future as amphibious operations become larger the pontoon causeways will play a more important role in the unloading phase. Therefore, it will be necessary to employ more standardized and heavier equipment. On the SAIPAN operation it was found that the couplings on all 2 X 30 sections were faulty and were the first part to break in heavy weather. These couplings, therefore, should be made heavier and stronger.

2. The base section as used in this operation was 2 X 30 while the smaller sections used for strengthening were 2 X 12. This situation resulted in lack of uniformity and prevented the proper alignment when it became necessary to enlarge or strengthen the causeway. To remedy this situation it is recommended that if the base section is to remain 2 X 30 then the smaller sections should be 2 X 15 thus standardizing these units.
3. The sloping end piece as now used on the causeways is 7 feet long making it impossible to unload small craft because of the steep angle. It is recommended, therefore, that this sloping end piece be lengthened to 9 - 10 feet reducing the sloping angle, simplifying the problem of unloading.

4. The standard size anchors for mooring causeways are 200 lbs. The use of the causeways on this operation would have been impossible if it were not for the fact that heavier anchors had been obtained from the fleet salvage officer. For future operations, it is recommended that each causeway unit carry four 3,000 lb. anchors with two shots of chain 30 fathoms long. Two of these anchors are to be used as deadmen for attaching inshore end of the causeway.

5. Since difficulty was experienced during this operation in holding the inshore end of the causeways secure it is a definite fact that the wires and turnbuckles now used for this purpose are entirely too light. For future operations, therefore, it is recommended that 1\(\frac{1}{2}\)" turnbuckles and 1\(\frac{3}{8}\)" wire be used and made a part of each causeway unit.

6. In this operation neither the shore party commander nor the officer in charge of causeway made any provision for illumination of causeways or beaches for night unloading. As a remedy for this it is recommended that one power generator with clusters be made a standard part of each causeway.

7. The barrel corral is an excellent medium for hauling fuel drums from ship to shore. The effective use of the barrel corral was hampered by lack of constant supervision over its operation. Because of this the corral was damaged on nearly every trip to the beach and the oil drums were scattered and later had to be rounded up by small boats.

It is recommended that the Construction Battalions in charge of causeways, build these corrals and be made responsible for their effective use and availability during the unloading phase.

8. It is recommended that the officer-in-charge of the causeways be a member of the Force Beachmaster’s staff and directly under his command.

D. Communications.

1. On D-Day the Force Beachmaster’s communication center was set up aboard the SC 1012, a message center was also established on D-Day plus TWO at the Shore Party Commander’s Command Post, in CHARIN KANOA. Its facilities were made available to all commands at this post. Channels A2, A3, B1, and the Control Vessel Listening were guarded continuously. All communications established by the Force Beachmaster were secured on 8 July 1944.
2. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) The communication plan and doctrine for this operation was, with few exceptions, well executed and carried out.

(b) More rigid net control could have been enforced. Channel A2 was an example of a well-policed channel.

(c) TBY channels were not necessary for Beachmaster use. The equipment is not reliable enough.

(d) All operators should be instructed to be on their toes as to giving assistance in relaying, rather than stand by and listen to a much repeated call up.

(e) At least three communication officers should be available to the Force Beachmaster's Staff.

(f) Too much time is lost in repeating of messages. Cutting in before listening causes most of the repetition. Radio discipline must be enforced.

(g) Radio operators should attend material school on the SCR series radios. They should know the basic construction and how to make minor repairs to the voice sets.

(h) In order to eliminate "break over" location of radio equipment aboard SC's should be altered.

(i) Intermediate frequencies on voice nets were not used as planned and not used often enough. Much more traffic should have been cleared on these nets.