Overall CAOCL Survey II Findings: The Value and Use of Culture by Type of Deployment

Over a thousand Marines participated in an online survey about their value and use of foreign engagement, interpreters, cultural skills, and cultural resources on various deployments, to include several open-ended questions. For the majority of the survey, Marines responded to questions based on their deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or a deployment other than those operations. Overall, independent of type of deployment, Marines strongly endorsed the value of culture for their deployments across a variety of skills, knowledge, and engagements but also offered suggestions for improving the use of cultural knowledge, skills, and training in their narrative responses.
Executive Summary

In 2012 CAOCL deployed a large-scale survey through Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to 20% of all Marines listed in the Global Address List (GAL) by proportions of rank as reflected in the USMC population. In this survey, CAOCL intentionally designed the questions to focus on deployments in addition to or other than OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) in order to answer the following overarching question: Would Marines who had deployments in addition to or other than OIF/OEF value and use culture as much as those who deployed solely to OIF/OEF?

A total of 1,654 Marine participants represent the weighted sample size. All ranks participated in the survey save for General Officers, but Privates (E-1s) and Privates First Class (E-2s) were excluded in the final analyses due to their small numbers. As reflected in the USMC population, the bulk of the weighted data ranks fell in the Lance Corporal (E-3) and Corporal (E-4) categories (~30% and ~22%, respectively, or ~52% total). All Military Occupational Specialties (MOS’s) were represented except for “Navigation Officer and Enlisted Flight Crews”.

Quantitative Findings

Overall, regardless of deployment type, Marines tend to rate the value or importance of culture for operational readiness, understanding the organizational culture of a foreign security force, cultural skills, and cultural knowledge as important or very important for mission success. Differences that emerged were statistically significant albeit small. For example, those Marines who only had deployments other than OIF/OEF rate culture training as statistically significantly more important relative to other pre-deployment training program (PTP) requirements in comparison to Marines who deployed only to OIF or OEF. While this is a statistically significant difference, it was also a small one in that both groups actually had similar, positive evaluations of culture training -- the bulk of both groups rate such training to be “as important” as other PTP requirements. In terms of foreign engagement, though both groups spent similar amounts of time with their respective groups (~30% per week), Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF engaged a statistically significantly greater variety of foreign groups in comparison to Marines who responded based on deployments to locations other than OIF/OEF. Not surprisingly, therefore, Marines referring to an OIF/OEF deployment were also more likely to use an interpreter, though a large number of both groups appeared to engage foreign individuals or groups without the use of an

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1 See full survey in Appendix A – please note that this is a paper version of the online survey which had significant branching based on a particular Marine’s response to various questions.

2 In order to increase the confidence that our sample accurately reflects today’s Marine Corps, we weighted the data we received in terms of the USMC population values for rank and gender. Weighting is a statistical process that balances each case (participant) relative to the proportions of the population you’re trying to represent (in this case, the current proportions of rank and gender in the USMC). We also manually compared our sample to the population estimates of age and deployed status (ever deployed vs. never deployed) and found these sufficiently comparable – i.e., typically within a few percentage points. We therefore did not weight those variables. In addition, we excluded the solitary E-1 and 12 E-2s that participated because the weights for those few cases would have been disproportionately large to compensate for their lack of representation in our sample. Hereafter the data is referred to as the weighted data.

3 The ranks of E-1 and E-2 are particularly underrepresented in the GAL and therefore our survey could not reach many of them.

4 Population based on Task Force Data Warehouse estimates for May 2012 except for gender estimates, which are based on U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2011.

5 Raw numbers for E-3: 490, E-4: 368.
interpreter. In comparison to Marines addressing a deployment other than OIF/OEF, Marines who only deployed to OIF/OEF were statistically significantly more likely to choose “foreign military personnel – coalition ops” as the foreign group they interacted with most and regarded as most important for their mission. In contrast, Marines addressing a deployment other than OIF/OEF were more likely to identify foreign military personnel – host country as the foreign group they interacted with the most and deemed most important in comparison to Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF. While some small differences between the groups emerged with respect to rating the importance of various cultural skills, overall, both groups tended to perceive the skills as important or very important. While the two groups did not statistically significantly differ in their evaluation of the importance of cultural knowledge – most perceived such knowledge as important or very important - Marines who addressed an OIF/OEF deployment reported using statistically significantly more cultural resources before and during their deployment than those Marines addressing a deployment other than OIF/OEF. Furthermore, while Marines focusing on a deployment other than OIF/OEF were statistically significantly more likely to choose in-country local relationships as their most useful resource, Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF were statistically significantly more likely to highlight immersion exercises as their most useful resource before or during their deployment compared to Marines focusing on deployments other than OIF/OEF.

Qualitative Findings

Because deployment type did not appear to differentiate the narrative responses in addition to the fact that half or less of the entire survey even completed the narrative responses, the narrative analysis involved a general identification of trends across the entire sample. With respect to the most important type of cultural knowledge or skill Marines had on any previous deployment, Marines tended to highlight culture-specific types of knowledge, often focusing on norms, while preferred skills were of an interpersonal nature, such as building rapport. Regarding the type of knowledge or skill Marines wanted but didn’t have on any deployment, the majority of responders identified language skills. Finally, Marines offered both praise and suggestions for improvement regarding culture and language training, as well as suggesting that the former should involve more hands-on approaches as well as the incorporation of culture general and military culture concepts.
OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF Deployments: 
Is there a Difference in How Marines Value and Use Culture?

Introduction
The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) provides culture and language training and education to ensure the Marine Corps can effectively navigate culturally complex operating environments and meet mission requirements. In 2010 CAOCL supported the deployment of its first large-scale survey through the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) in order to better understand attitudes toward Marine Corps-wide culture and language training as well as preferred resources and methods of instruction. Over two thousand Marines participated in this voluntary survey and expressed that culture and language are important for military operations. In addition, those who had received culture or language training in the four years since CAOCL’s inception indicated that they regard culture training as more important than language training for operational effectiveness. The bulk of the participants in this first survey participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

As the Marine Corps transitions away from OIF and OEF and re-engage steady state activities, CAOCL leadership decided to take a closer look at the value and use of culture in non-counterinsurgency (COIN) USMC missions and operations. To this end, in 2012 CAOCL deployed a second large-scale survey through MCCLL to 20% of all Marines listed in the Global Address List (GAL) by proportions of rank as reflected in the USMC population. In this survey, CAOCL intentionally designed the questions to focus on deployments in addition to or other than OIF and OEF in order to answer the following overarching question: Would Marines who had deployments in addition to or other than OIF/OEF value and use culture as much as those who deployed only to OIF/OEF?

Quantitative survey content addressed how Marines value understanding culture in general and with respect to a specific deployment, the importance they assigned to cultural skills, engaging in foreign interactions, using interpreters, applying cultural knowledge, and using cultural resources before or during their deployments. Qualitative survey content included three narrative questions about the most valuable cultural knowledge and skills used on any deployment, what cultural knowledge or skills Marines wanted but lacked prior to any deployment, and anything else they might have to add. Because only 50% of all participating Marines responded to any of the narrative questions and a light review did not reveal any differences in the trends by deployment type, these questions were analyzed across all responses and not divided by deployment type.

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8 See full survey in Appendix A – please note that this is a paper version of the online survey which had significant branching based on a particular Marine’s response to various questions.
9 Additional analyses solely focused on deployments in addition to or other than OIF/OEF can be found in Appendix C. Specifically, since slightly over half of those deployments were to Japan, analyses were performed on the quantitative survey questions comparing Japan deployments vs. deployments other than Japan.

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The Survey Sample

The sample was weighted to better reflect the USMC population. A total of 1,654 Marine participants represent the weighted sample size. All ranks participated in the survey save for General Officers, but Privates (E-1s) and Privates First Class (E-2s) were excluded in the final analyses due to their small numbers. As reflected in the USMC population, the bulk of the weighted data ranks fell in the Lance Corporal (E-3) and Corporal (E-4) categories (~30% and ~22%, respectively, or ~52% total). All Military Occupational Specialties (MOS’s) were represented except for “Navigation Officer and Enlisted Flight Crews”. See Table 1 for further demographic details.

### Table 1: Survey Sample Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Demographic</th>
<th>Rounded Proportions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total weighted valid</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>19-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(74% under 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve, Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Deployed</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently Deployed</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 In order to increase the confidence that our sample accurately reflects today’s Marine Corps, we weighted the data we received in terms of the USMC population values for rank and gender. Weighting is a statistical process that balances each case (participant) relative to the proportions of the population you’re trying to represent (in this case, the current proportions of rank and gender in the USMC). We also manually compared our sample to the population estimates of age and deployed status (ever deployed vs. never deployed) and found these sufficiently comparable – i.e., typically within a few percentage points. We therefore did not weight those variables. In addition, we excluded the solitary E-1 and 12 E-2s that participated because the weights for those few cases would have been disproportionately large to compensate for their lack of representation in our sample. Hereafter the data is referred to as the weighted data.

11 The ranks of E-1 and E-2 are particularly underrepresented in the GAL and therefore our survey could not reach many of them.

12 Population based on Task Force Data Warehouse estimates for May 2012 except for gender estimates, which are based on U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2011.

13 Raw numbers for E-3: 490, E-4: 368.
Demographics according to deployment type based on the overarching question for the survey are in Table 2 below – “Non-OIF/OEF” refers to Marines who deployed in addition to or other than an OIF/OEF location.

**Table 2: Survey OIF/OEF and Non-OIF/OEF Samples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Demographic</th>
<th>Weighted Proportions: OIF/OEF</th>
<th>Weighted Proportions: Non-OIF/OEF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>20-57</td>
<td>19-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently Deployed</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Method**

For the quantitative portion of the survey, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used and nonparametric statistics (e.g., Mann-Whitney test)\(^\text{14}\) were applied due to the lack of normality of the data and the use of Likert scales (non-continuous types of variables). Please see Appendix B for a brief explanation of the statistics used in this report. For the qualitative portion of the report, thematic analysis was applied per narrative question.

\(^{14}\) See for example [http://academic.udayton.edu/gregelvers/psy216/spss/ordinaldata.htm](http://academic.udayton.edu/gregelvers/psy216/spss/ordinaldata.htm)
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

Overall Conclusions about the Value and Use of Culture

Regardless of whether participating Marines deployed only to OIF/OEF or had deployments in addition to or other than OIF/OEF, survey results illustrate that Marines in 2012 strongly value understanding the impact of culture on an operation, regional knowledge, the organizational culture of a foreign security force, and culture training. They also regard the use of cultural skills and knowledge as important or very important while deployed. Any differences highlighted below are statistically significant and therefore unlikely to be due to chance, but overall the differences are small.

The Value of Culture

Marines responded to four different questions about the value of culture, such as the importance of cultural or regional knowledge to operational readiness, the value of culture training, and how they value understanding the organizational culture of a foreign security force (relations among the ranks, traditions, motivations to join/serve, etc.) when engaging such forces.

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF or Non-OIF/OEF Only

In general, Marines rate the value of culture, culture training, or organizational culture as important or very important regardless of deployment type based on frequency data (e.g., see Figures 1 and 2). As illustrated in Figures 1, “OIF/OEF” refers to Marines who solely deployed to either OIF or OEF and no place else and “Non-OIF/OEF” refers to those Marines who deployed to locations in addition to or other than OIF/OEF. In Figure 2, “Non-OIF/OEF Only” refers to Marines who solely deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF, allowing for a more pure comparison of whether OIF/OEF deployments actually influenced perceptions of the value of culture.

Figure 1: When dealing with security forces – military, police, etc., -- how important is understanding their organizational culture (e.g., relations among the ranks, traditions, motivations to serve)?

Note: Smaller sample sizes due to the fact that this question only pertained to those who had worked with foreign security forces
Figure 2: Based on your experience in the Marine Corps, how important is culture training compared to other PTP requirements?

![Bar chart showing importance ratings of culture training]

**Differences between OIF/OEF and In Addition to or Other Than OIF/OEF**

- When applying a statistical test to assess any significant differences, Marines who have deployed to solely OIF/OEF or a location in addition to or other than OIF/OEF did not statistically significantly differ in their ratings of the value of culture – Marines expressed positive ratings about the value of culture regardless of deployment type.

**Differences between OIF/OEF and Non-OIF/OEF Only**

- “Non-OIF/OEF Only” refers to Marines who solely deployed to someplace other than OIF or OEF. Marines who only had deployments other than OIF/OEF assign statistically significantly greater importance to culture training relative to other PTP training requirements in comparison to Marines who only deployed to OIF/OEF. All other comparisons regarding the value of culture were not statistically significant.

**The Use of Culture**

Marines focused on a single deployment in responding to the importance of types of foreign engagement, use of interpreter, various cultural skills, or cultural knowledge. Specifically, a Marine solely responded based on either an OIF or OEF deployment if those were the only deployments he/she had experienced to date. If, however, he or she had other types of deployments in addition to or other than OIF or OEF, the Marine solely discussed a “Non-OIF/OEF” deployment. This means that those Marines who fell under what hereafter is referred to as a “Non-OIF/OEF” deployment could have

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15 Please note that this is the only time Marines who solely deployed to someplace other than OIF or OEF were included in any analysis. For the rest of the report, only those Marines who deployed “in addition to or other than” OIF or OEF (“Non-OIF/OEF”) were compared to Marines who went to OIF or OEF.

16 U = 62936.5, p = .016

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historically deployed to an OIF or OEF location (“in addition to” OIF or OEF) or solely deployed somewhere else (“other than” OIF or OEF).

Foreign Engagement

Marines responded to questions about the number of foreign individuals or groups they engaged, the types of people they engaged, how much time they spent with them, who they interacted with the most, and who was the most important to interact with for mission accomplishment. The Marines could select who they engaged with among the following choices:

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)
- Others

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

- Both groups spent ~30% of their time with their foreign groups in a typical week. Figure 3 displays the percentage of Marines who engaged different types of foreign groups based on deployment type (OIF/OEF or a location other than OIF/OEF). The majority of Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF and Marines who answered based on a deployment to a location other than OIF/OEF (“Non-OIF/OEF”) engaged with four or fewer types of foreign groups (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Percentage of Marines Engaging Different Types of Foreign Groups

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Figure 4: Percentage of Marines Engaging Different Numbers of Foreign Group Types

Differences Based on Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

• Based on a statistical test to assess any significant differences, Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF tended to interact with statistically significantly more types of foreign groups or individuals than Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF.  

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• A statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF were more likely to
  
  – …interact with “enemies” (32.8%) 18 in general and “foreign military personnel – coalition ops” (14.7%) 19 and “third country nationals” (39.5%) 20 the most in comparison to Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF.

  – …identify “foreign military personnel – coalition ops” (15.8%) 21 as the most important group to interact with for their mission than Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF.

• A statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF were more likely to:

17 U = 74901.00 p = .000
18 Chi-square (1, N = 1060), 143.270, p = .000
19 Chi square (1, N = 710), 13.250, p = .000
20 Chi-square (1, N = 710), 94.112, p = .000
21 Chi square (1, N = 844), 16.324, p = .000

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...interact with “local nationals/civilians” (45.8%)\textsuperscript{22} as well as “foreign military personnel – host country” (30.6%)\textsuperscript{23} the most in comparison to Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF.

...identify “foreign military personnel – host country” (33.8%)\textsuperscript{24} as the most important group to interact with for their mission than Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF.

Use of Interpreter

Questions posed to Marines to identify their use of interpreters included whether they interacted with any groups that did not speak English, whether they used a formal interpreter or mediator (and if not, if they needed one), and what percentage of time they interacted with said interpreter or mediator in a typical week, including on and off duty time.

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

• Nearly 80% of Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF and Marines who answered based on a deployment other than OIF/OEF indicated that they interacted with foreign groups or individuals who did not speak English.

• Yet, only 53% of Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF and 40% of Marines who addressed a deployment location other than OIF/OEF used an interpreter.

• Of those who lacked an interpreter, only 10% of Marines who solely deployed to OIF/OEF and 11% of Marines who focused on a deployment other than OIF/OEF said they needed one.

• ~29% of Marines who only deployed to OIF/OEF and ~39% of Marines who addressed a deployment to a location other than OIF/OEF used other means than an interpreter to engage foreign individuals or groups.

Differences Based on Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

• Based on a statistical test to assess any significant differences, a statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF used an interpreter/mediator in comparison to Marines who deployed to a location other than OIF/OEF.\textsuperscript{25} See Figure 5. No statistically significant differences emerged between OIF/OEF and Non-OIF/OEF regarding typical weekly time spent with an interpreter, or the number of Marines who needed but lacked an interpreter.

\textsuperscript{22} Chi-square (1, N = 710), 38.888, p = .000
\textsuperscript{23} Chi-square (1, N = 710), 23.424, p = .000
\textsuperscript{24} Chi-square (1, N = 842), 20.784, p = .000
\textsuperscript{25} Chi square (1, N= 934), 13.291, p = .000
Cultural Skills

While focusing on an OIF/OEF deployment or a deployment to a location other than OIF/OEF, Marines rated the importance of applying the following cultural skills to engaging the aforementioned foreign individuals or groups:

- Influencing or persuading
- Behaving according to cultural norms as needed
- Building rapport
- Using or interpreting culturally-relevant body language
- Negotiating
- Using basic words or phrases in a foreign language

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

- Regardless of deployment type, the majority of Marines rate the cultural skills addressed in the survey as important or very important according to frequency data as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.
Differences Based on Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

- Based on a statistical test to assess any significant differences, Marines addressing a deployment other than OIF/OEF rate behaving according to local cultural norms as needed and using basic words or phrases in a foreign language as statistically significantly more important than Marines who only deployed to OIF/OEF.²⁶

²⁶ U = 61180, p = .000; U = 64548.5, p = .006, respectively

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- Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF rate influencing or persuading as statistically significantly more important than Marines who focused on a deployment other than OIF/OEF.  
- Deployment type did not differentiate with respect to the importance Marines assigned to the use/interpretation of body language, building rapport, or negotiating – the majority of Marines on either type of deployment regarded those skills as important or very important.

**Cultural Knowledge**

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

- Regarding the importance of using cultural knowledge for planning or decision making, understanding situations or events, anticipating second and third order effects, or interacting with foreign groups, Marines do not statistically significantly differ in their opinions based on their type of deployment – the majority of both groups regard using cultural knowledge for these efforts as important or very important.

**Cultural Resources**

Marines received a list of cultural resources and checked all those that they used before or during their deployment/station/assignment (see list below). Of the cultural resources that Marines selected, they then identified their most useful cultural resource for their deployment/station/assignment.

- PTP – live training
- PTP – online training or computer-based
- Subject Matter Expert(s)
- Other Marines
- Reading material
- Video
- Immersion exercise, such as Mojave Viper
- Intelligence
- In-country local relationships
- Interpreter
- Other. Please specify
- None

Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF

- Based on frequency data, regardless of type of deployment, a majority of Marines indicated that they used multiple cultural resources – typically 2 or 3 – before or during their deployment.

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27 $U = 44970.500$, $p = .006$
28 $U = 89100$, $p = .982$; $U = 82517.500$, $p = .460$; and $U = 87648.500$, $p = .059$, respectively.
• Both groups endorsed “Other Marines” as the most popular cultural resource to use prior or during deployment based on frequency data (see Figure 8), but only ~30% of either group endorsed this as their “most useful” resource (see Figure 9).

**Figure 8: Choice of Cultural Resources**

**Figure 9: Most Useful Cultural Resource**

Differences Based on Type of Deployment: OIF/OEF vs. Non-OIF/OEF
Based on a statistical test to assess any significant differences, Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF used statistically significantly more cultural resources than Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF. \(^{29}\)

Statistically significantly more Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF used PTP-live training, PTP-online training, reading material, videos, immersion exercises, and interpreters in comparison to Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF. \(^{30}\) Statistically significantly more Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF also endorsed immersion exercises as their most useful cultural resource in comparison to Marines addressing a deployment other than OIF/OEF. \(^{31}\)

Statistically significantly more Marines who deployed to locations other than OIF/OEF indicated that they used in-country local relationships more than Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF\(^{32}\) and also were more likely to identify them as their most useful cultural resource\(^{33}\) than Marines who deployed to OIF/OEF.

\(^{29}\) U = 134875, p = .000
\(^{30}\) PTP-live training – Chi square (1, N = 1030), 23.345, p = .000; PTP – online training – Chi square (1, N = 1031), 46.855, p = .000; Reading material – Chi square (1, N =1031), 4.608, p = .038; Video: Chi square (1, N = 1030), 10.396, p = .002; Immersion exercises: Chi square (1, N = 1031), 55.785, p = .000; Interpreter: Chi square (1, N =1029), 34.784, p = .000
\(^{31}\) Chi square (1, N = 770), 23.282, p = .000
\(^{32}\) Chi square (1, N = 1031), 10.313, p = .001
\(^{33}\) Chi square (1, N = 771), 14.330, p = .000
QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

Overall Narrative Conclusions for Total Sample

The following analysis of narrative responses across the total CACOL Survey II sample characterizes a general overview of the narrative trends in response to three questions. In addition, Appendix D contains a wide variety of selected quotes to provide additional insight into Marine culture and language needs as experienced in a variety of deployments and across MOS and rank. This contrasts with the report, The Value and Use of Culture: Marines with Ground Combat Arms MOSs and Marines with Other MOSs, for example, which represents a more detailed analysis of a specific survey sample.

Although some comments specifically mention CAOCL, it is not possible to determine if they are actually commenting on CACOL or another organization's products, services, or training. It is also not possible to know the associated year the Marine references for these products, services, or training, all of which are regularly revised and updated at CAOCL.

With respect to the most important type of cultural knowledge or skill Marines identified on any previous deployment, they tend to highlight culture-specific types of knowledge, often focusing on norms, while their preferred skills emphasized those of an interpersonal nature, such as building rapport. Regarding the type of knowledge or skill Marines wanted but didn’t have on any deployment, the majority of responders identify language skills. Finally, Marines offer both praise and suggestions for improvement regarding culture and language training, preferring more hands-on approaches as well as the incorporation of culture general and military culture concepts.

When thinking about any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments, what cultural knowledge or skill was the most important to your mission success and why?

Over 50% of Marine survey participants answered this question. Based on a preliminary review of responses, there appear to be no significant differences in the trends among Marines who have only deployed to OIF/OEF and those who have additionally or exclusively deployed elsewhere. Marines seem to place roughly equal importance on both cultural knowledge and skills. Types of knowledge tend to be culture-specific, while preferred skills focus on the interpersonal. Although some Marines only mention one knowledge or skill item, many report on multiple important skills and types of knowledge.

In the knowledge category, culture specific norms appear most frequently and most responses relate to one of the Five Dimensions of Operational Culture. The following quote illustrates the typical “customs and courtesies” and “rapport building” response but also expands into a training recommendation:

“Customs and courtesies. Mannerisms accepted in the United States are sometimes not looked at favorably in foreign cultures. Showing the soles of your feet for instance, certain hand gestures, touching the top of someone’s head, volume, posture etc. Basic cultural awareness to such things helped me build rapport with the local nationals and earn and maintain a good working relationship. I read “The Ugly American” prior to my overseas assignments and found that was a very telling book and helped make me aware of how Americans can be perceived abroad. That book put much of my subsequent training in context and helped me understand why I had to attend and participate in some training. I would make it mandatory for all Marines, at a minimum any Marine that may come into contact with foreign civilian populace. The reading should be testable via a short written report to ensure that Marines understand the material and have actually read it.”
In the skills category, interpersonal skills are mentioned most frequently, in particular developing rapport using communication skills such as language and non-verbal communication. While less popular than interpersonal skills, Marines also highlight intrapersonal skills such as perspective-taking. The following quote is illustrative and combines both language and perspective-taking:

“Understanding the basic way they thought or looked at things from their cultural perspective, and being able to understand or speak some of the "basics" of their language...and knowing what motivated them...”

A quick look at infantry responses (58) indicates that they emphasize skills over cultural knowledge but that within the skills category, trends remain similar: Responses focus on communication (verbal and nonverbal) and relationship development followed by perspective-taking. For example:

“People of different cultures are basically people- the most important knowledge or skill was understanding how to relate to others on the basis of our common humanity. The ability to demonstrate an empathy of that which makes us human allowed the development of the relationships that were crucial to mission accomplishment. Across the globe I have found that successfully relating to people of "other cultures" begins with this.”

What cultural knowledge or skills do you wish you’d had under your belt prior to any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments?

While the data have not been analyzed in depth, the overwhelming response (70-80%) is language skills. The remaining responses pertain mostly to other types of cultural knowledge and skills.

Any additional thoughts or comments?

Marines responded on a variety of topics ranging from how best to provide culture and language training, the quality of the training they received, use of cultural resources and assets within the Marine Corps, and the perceived value – or lack thereof – of culture and even of CAOCL.

Comments on how to provide culture training indicate an awareness of its complexity and suggest a need for a career long program that includes live face-to-face training, role players, a focus on attitudes (respect, humility, desire to learn), culture general concepts (perspective-taking) and interaction, as well as some instruction in military culture rather than just country-specific culture. Marines also demonstrate an awareness of time pressures and show some desire for testing. A minority believe too much time is already spent on culture training.

The most common thoughts about language refer positively to Rosetta Stone and ask, “Where has it gone?” Other comments discuss flexibility of delivery and suggest that it would help with practicing language skills if “language courses were easier to download to I-phones[sic], I-pods[sic] and I-pads [sic].”

A few Marines commented directly on the value of CAOCL training. For example:

“Before deploying to Afghanistan with the Female Engagement Team I had the opportunity to be trained by instructors at CAOCL and was pleased to learn about their culture and basic phrases. This
helped out a lot when interacting with the local population. During one conversation, without a linguist, I was speaking fluently enough in Pashto that the gentleman asked me what tribe I was from. I would not have been able to interact with him like that had I not had the language training before hand.”

- E-5, Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix A: CAOCL SURVEY II

You have been randomly selected for this survey about how you value and use culture. WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO: The survey has multiple-choice questions and a few short-answer questions. It will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. Please review the following before completing the survey.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: The United States Marine Corps may collect the information requested in this survey under the authority of 10 United States Code, Section 2358, “Research and Development Projects.” In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), this notice informs you of the purpose, use, and confidentiality of this study.

PURPOSE:

- The purpose of this survey is to understand how Marines VALUE and USE culture.
- The goal is to use the results to improve training and education about culture in order to help you conduct your missions more effectively.

ROUTINE USES: The information provided in this survey will be analyzed by the Training and Education Command (TECOM), the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). The data files will be maintained by TECOM/CAOCL where they will be used to improve culture training and education efforts as well as at MCCLL to inform MCCLL-CAOCL lessons learned collection plans.

DISCLOSURE/PARTICIPATION: Participating in this survey is voluntary and you may choose at any time not to participate. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate. Failure to respond to any of the questions will only result in a possible lack of representation of your views in the survey’s final results and outcomes. You will not receive any compensation for your participation.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

- Survey responses are anonymous - even if you choose to identify yourself, your name will be deleted from your survey answers. Demographic data combined with details from a narrative answer could, however, reveal your identity. We cannot provide “confidentiality” or “non-attribution” to you regarding information provided that involves criminal activity/behavior, or statements that pose a threat to yourself or others. Do NOT discuss or comment on

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Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)
1019 Elliot Road (Bldg 711, 6th Street), Quantico, VA 22134 703.432.1504

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July 09, 2013
criminal, classified, operationally sensitive, or FOUO information during this survey. If any information is determined to be FOUO, it will be deleted from the dataset. If information is criminal or classified, it will be handled in accordance with TECOM Security Office guidelines.

- All responses will be held in confidence by TECOM/CAOCL and your data will be password protected. Data collected from the survey will be stored on the MCCLL Battleboard and is only accessible by MCCLL employees and contracted support personnel.

- If you choose to take this survey on a personal computer, keep in mind you are responsible for the security of that computer with respect to protecting your answers.

- Information you provide will be statistically summarized with the responses of others and will not be attributable to any single individual. Identifying themes, topics, or quotes will either be not for attribution or only identifiable with respect to rank/gender/MOS or rank/gender/MOS and associated mission type.

- Data from this research project will be retained and may be used in future research. Listed data protections will be maintained during storage and any future use of data sets

**RISKS:** The risks to taking this survey include potential loss of anonymity if you choose to identify yourself and possible career implications if you reveal classified or criminal data in the survey. See “Confidentiality” for how these risks are addressed.

**BENEFITS:** The results will help us help you and your unit to be more operationally effective.

**CONTACT INFORMATION:**
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact the principal investigator. You may request that data/information you have provided be removed from the study at any point up until data analysis begins.

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Kerry Fosher, CIV, Director of Translational Research Group; USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning; 1019 Elliot Road (Bldg. 711, 6th Street), Quantico, VA 22134; Office: 703-432-1504; DSN: 378-1504; Fax: 703-432-1463; kerry.fosher@usmc.mil.

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant, contact the MCCDC Human Research Protection Program.

**MCCDC Human Research Protection Program Office:** Ms. Leah B. Watson, Human Research Protection Official Chair, Institutional Review Board; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; 2079 Barnett Avenue, Quantico, VA 22134; Office: 703-432-2566; Fax: 703-784-0089; leah.watson@usmc.mil.

**DO YOU VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY?**

- Yes

- No  >>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted
Please answer all questions as an individual Marine and not on behalf of your unit. DO NOT use the back arrow to change your answers.

Please select your service branch.

☐ USMC

☐ Navy >>>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted

☐ Other >>>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted
Please select your current rank.

- E-1
- E-2
- E-3
- E-4
- E-5
- E-6
- E-7
- E-8
- E-9
- W-1
- W-2
- W-3
- W-4
- W-5
- O-1
- O-2
- O-3
- O-4
- O-5
- O-6
What is your current status?

- Active
- Reserve
- Active Reserve
- Mobilized Reserve
- Other, please specify: ____________________

Please select your current age.

- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28
- 29
- 30
Please select your gender.

- Male
- Female

(End of Page 3)
USMC-OccFld-MOS. Please select your primary Occupational Field and MOS.

OccFld ____________________

MOS ____________________

(End of Page 4)
Please rate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following statements:

Having the skills to understand the impact of culture on any given operation is a key component of your unit’s operational readiness.

- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Having Marines in your unit knowledgeable of different regions of the world is an important component to unit operational readiness.

- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Neutral
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Please rate the importance of culture training:

Based on your experience in the Marine Corps, how important is culture training compared to all the other pre-deployment training requirements?

- Less Important
- Somewhat Less Important
- As Important
Somewhat More Important

More Important

(End of Page 5)
Deployment History:

While in the Marines, have you ever been stationed, deployed, or on assignment outside the United States of America?

☐ Yes

☐ No >>>> Skip to Page 8: Have you ever worked with a foreign security force (military, police, etc.)?

(End of Page 6)
Have you ever worked overseas with a foreign security force (military, police, etc.)?

☐ Yes

☐ No >>>> Skip to Page 10: Are you deployed, stationed, or on assignment outside the United States now?

(End of Page 7)
Have you ever worked with a foreign security force (military, police, etc.)?

☑ Yes

☑ No  >>>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted

(End of Page 8)
When dealing with foreign security forces -- military, police, etc. -- how important is understanding their organizational culture (e.g., relations among the ranks, traditions, motivations to join/serve, etc.)?

- Unimportant
- Of Little Importance
- Moderately Important
- Important
- Very Important

Advanced Branch: 12b. Foreign Security Force? Have you ever worked with a foreign security force (military, police, etc.)? = Yes; >>>> Skip to End Page: Survey Submitted

(End of Page 9)
Are you deployed, stationed, or on assignment outside the United States now?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Please indicate the number of overseas deployments/stations/assignments you’ve had in your military career.

For example, a MEU would be one deployment, PCS another deployment. Include any current deployments/stations/assignments. Be sure to include operations and exercises but not liberty, port calls or airports.

Number of Overseas Deployments _______________________

(End of Page 10)
Please indicate where you have been, and if applicable, are currently deployed, stationed, or assigned outside of the United States. Include all overseas operations, exercises, and/or assignment locations.

If you are UNSURE of the region, please just write down the country under “Other”.

- OIF - Iraq
- OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan
- Middle East (including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan but Pre- OEF or OIF)
- Balkans and Caucasus (including Turkey)
- Bosnia and Kosovo
- Europe (including the U.K. and Russia; excluding above)
- Japan (including Okinawa)
- Asia (including Korea and Philippines but not Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Japan)
- Africa (including Egypt and North Africa)
- Central America (including Mexico)
- Caribbean
- South America
- Canada, Australia, New Zealand
- Pacific Islands
- Other. Please specify: ____________________

OCONUS (Europe (including the U.K. and Russia; excluding above)) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Japan (including Okinawa)) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Asia (including Korea and Philippines but not Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Japan)) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Africa (including Egypt and North Africa)) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Central America (including Mexico)) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Caribbean) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (South America) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Pacific Islands) = Not Selected AND 16. Deployed Location OCONUS (Other. Please specify:) = Not Selected; >>>> Skip to Page 15: How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to OIF - Iraq?


(End of Page 11)
For the remainder of the survey, we are focusing on deployments/stations/assignments OTHER THAN OIF - Iraq and OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Of the selections below, please choose your most RECENT station/deployment/assignment outside of the United States.

(Note: If your most recent deployment was on a MEU or you were stationed at III MEF OKINAWA, choose the most recent region or country you visited.)

- Middle East (including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan but Pre-OEF or OIF)
- Balkans and Caucasus (including Turkey)
- Bosnia and Kosovo
- Europe (including the U.K. and Russia; excluding above)
- Japan (including Okinawa)
- Asia (including Korea and Philippines but not Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Japan)
- Africa (including Egypt and North Africa)
- Central America (including Mexico)
- Caribbean
- South America
- Canada, Australia, New Zealand
- Pacific Islands
- Other. Please re-type "%[16. Deployed Location OCONUS]Q16LBL15%": ____________________
Of the selections below, please choose your most RECENT station/ deployment/ assignment outside of
the United States. (Note: If your most recent deployment was on a MEU or you were stationed at III
MEF OKINAWA, choose the most recent region or country you visited.) ≥ Middle East (including Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan but Pre-OEF or OIF)); >>>> Skip to Page 17: How many
deployments/stations/assignments have you had to %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%?

(End of Page 12)
How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to OIF - Iraq?

**Number of Deployments to OIF - Iraq __________________**

Please indicate the total duration of your **most recent deployment/ station/ assignment to OIF - Iraq**:

Months __________________

Weeks __________________

**For the remainder of the survey, please focus on your most recent tour in OIF - Iraq.**

(End of Page 13)
How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan?

**Number of Deployments to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan** ______________________

Please indicate the total duration of your **most** recent deployment/ station/ assignment to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan:

- Months ______________________
- Weeks ______________________

**For the remainder of the survey, please focus on your most recent tour in OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan.**

(End of Page 14)
How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to OIF - Iraq?

**Number of Deployments to OIF - Iraq ____________________**

Please indicate the total duration of your *most* recent deployment/ station/ assignment to OIF - Iraq:

Months ____________________

Weeks ____________________

*For the remainder of the survey, please focus on your most recent tour in OIF - Iraq.*

(End of Page 15)
How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan?

**Number of Deployments to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan __________________________**

Please indicate the total duration of your **most** recent deployment/station/assignment to OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan:

Months ____________________

Weeks ____________________

**For the remainder of the survey, please focus on your most recent tour in OEF – Afghanistan/Pakistan.**

(End of Page 16)
How many deployments/stations/assignments have you had to %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%?

**Number of Deployments to %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%**

(End of Page 17)
Please list the countries you went to on your most recent deployment/station/assignment to %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%. Check all that apply. Be sure to include operations and exercises but not liberty, port calls or airports.

- Iraq pre OIF
- Afghanistan pre OEF
- Pakistan pre OEF
- Bahrain
- Iran
- Israel
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Oman
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- United Arab Emirates
- Yemen
- Albania
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Georgia
- Greece
- Macedonia
- Montenegro
- Romania
- Serbia
- Turkey
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- Kosovo
- Andorra
- Austria
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Russia
- San Marino
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Ukraine

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- Cambodia
- China
- India
- Indonesia
- Kazakhstan
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Kyrgyzstan
- Laos
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Mongolia
- Philippines
- Nepal
- Singapore
- Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina-Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Kinshasa)
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas, The
Barbados
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Grenada
Haiti
Jamaica
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
Trinidad & Tobago
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
- Guyana
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Suriname
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
- Canada
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Fiji
- Kiribati
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia, Federated States of
- Nauru
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

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Other. Please specify: ____________________

Please indicate the total duration of this deployment/station/assignment to %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%:

Months ____________________

Weeks ____________________

For the remainder of the survey, please focus on your most recent tour in %[17. Recent OCONUS Location]Q20LBL%.

(End of Page 18)
Was this your home station assignment or an overseas deployment?

- Home Station Assignment  >>>> Skip to Page 20: Please indicate what duty you were assigned to during this assignment.

- Overseas Deployment

(End of Page 19)
Please indicate what duty you were assigned to during this assignment.

- Security guard
- Attaché
- Operating forces
- Joint HQ
- MARFOR HQ
- Individual augmentee
- Security cooperation/assistance
- Other. Please specify: ____________________
Please choose the mission types you participated in during this deployment or while stationed overseas. Definitions appear when cursor hovers over the terms. Select all that apply.

- Civil Affairs
- Civil Military operations
- Combat operations/arms
- Combat support operations
- Combat service support operations
- Force Protection
- Foreign military training exercises (such as UNITAS, Cobra Gold, Bright Start, etc.)
- Forward Presence Operations (such as Medfloat, Westpac, etc.)
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
- Information Operations
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Peacekeeping operations
- Public Affairs
- Security cooperation (including foreign military training/advising)
- Special operations
- Stability operations
- Other. Please specify: ____________________

(End of Page 21)
What level of command did you serve under for this particular deployment/ station/ assignment?

- Team-size
- Squad-size
- Platoon-size
- Company–size
- Battalion–size
- Brigade/Regiment-size
- Division-size

(End of Page 22)
Please identify your billet on this deployment/station/assignment.

Deployed Billet ____________________

Briefly describe your primary duties on this deployment/station/assignment.

Deployed Primary Duties
__________________________________________________________________________________

Briefly describe your collateral duties (official and unofficial) on this deployment/station/assignment or type “N/A” if this does not apply.

Deployed Collateral Duties
__________________________________________________________________________________

(End of Page 23)
Status when on deployment/station/assignment?

- Active Duty
- Mobilized Reservist
- Activated Reservist (ADOS)
- Other, please specify: ____________________

Rank during deployment/station/assignment?

- E-1
- E-2
- E-3
- E-4
- E-5
- E-6
- E-7
- E-8
- E-9
- W-1
- W-2
- W-3
- W-4
- W-5
Recent Deployment or Assignment/Interactions with Foreign Groups and Individuals:

Please select all of the foreign groups or individuals (excluding interpreters) you interacted with on this deployment/station/assignment. Check all that apply.

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)
- Others. Please specify: ____________________

- Did not interact with foreign groups/individuals

>>>> Skip to Page 33: What cultural resources did you use before or during your deployment/station/assignment? Check all that apply.

(End of Page 24)
What was the average percentage of time you spent interacting with those foreign groups and individuals in a typical week, including on and off duty time?

Percentage of time interacting with foreigners ____________________

Advanced Branch: 29. Foreign Interactions (Count) ≤ 1; >>>> Skip to Page 29: Did any of the individuals/groups you interacted with NOT speak English?

Advanced Branch: 22. Mission Types (Count) > 1 AND 29. Foreign Interactions (Count) > 1; >>>> Skip to Page 27: Who did you interact with the most, regardless of the number and type of missions you performed?

(End of Page 25)
Who did you interact with the **most**?

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)
- %[29. Foreign Interactions]Q30LBL_8%

Who was the most **important** to interact with for **accomplishing your mission**?

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)
- %[29. Foreign Interactions]Q30LBL_8%

(End of Page 26)
Who did you interact with the most, regardless of the number and type of missions you performed?

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/c Civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)

On which mission did you interact with that foreign individual or group you selected above?

- Civil Affairs
- Civil Military operations
- Combat operations/arms
- Combat support operations
- Combat service support operations
- Force Protection
- Foreign military training exercises (such as UNITAS, Cobra Gold, Bright Start, etc.)
- Forward Presence Operations (such as Medfloat, Westpac, etc.)
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
- Information Operations
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
○ Peacekeeping operations

○ Public Affairs

○ Security cooperation (including foreign military training/advising)

○ Special operations

○ Stability operations

○ [%22. Mission Types]Q22LBL_17%

(End of Page 27)
ACROSS ALL MISSIONS, who was the most **important** to interact with for **accomplishing a mission**?

- Foreign military personnel – host country
- Foreign military personnel – coalition operations (not host country)
- Host country paramilitary personnel (e.g., police)
- Host country government personnel (non-military)
- Local nationals/civilians (“green” population)
- Third country nationals (foreign support personnel who might guard a base, serve food, etc.)
- Enemies (including detainees)
- %[29. Foreign Interactions]Q30LBL_8%

On which mission did you interact with that foreign individual or group you selected above?

- Civil Affairs
- Civil Military operations
- Combat operations/arms
- Combat support operations
- Combat service support operations
- Force Protection
- Foreign military training exercises (such as UNITAS, Cobra Gold, Bright Start, etc.)
- Forward Presence Operations (such as Medfloat, Westpac, etc.)
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
- Information Operations
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Peacekeeping operations
- Public Affairs
- Security cooperation (including foreign military training/advising)
- Special operations
- Stability operations
- [%22. Mission Types]Q22LBL_17%

(End of Page 28)
Did any of the individuals/groups you interacted with **NOT speak English**?

- Yes
- No

Did you **use** a formal or informal interpreter/mediator?

- Yes  >>>> Skip to Page 31: What percentage of time did you spend interacting with your formal or informal interpreter/mediator in a typical week, including on and off duty time?
- No

(End of Page 29)
Did you need a formal or informal interpreter/mediator?

- Yes
- No

Advanced Branch: 34. Use Interpreter? Did you use a formal or informal interpreter/mediator? = No; >>>> Skip to Page 32: Regarding your interaction with the foreign individuals and groups you previously indicated, please rate the IMPORTANCE of the following actions for facilitating the accomplishment of your mission(s) while on this deployment/station/assignment.

*Not Applicable* = your duties never involved these actions.

(End of Page 30)
What percentage of time did you spend interacting with your formal or informal interpreter/mediator in a typical week, including on and off duty time?

Percentage of time with formal or informal interpreter/mediator ____________________

(End of Page 31)
**Recent Deployment/Cultural Skills:**

Regarding your interaction with the foreign individuals and groups you previously indicated, please rate the IMPORTANCE of the following actions for **facilitating** the accomplishment of your mission(s) while on this deployment/station/assignment.

"Not Applicable" = your duties never involved these actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Of Little Importance</th>
<th>Moderately Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influencing or persuading.</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behaving according to local cultural norms as needed.</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building rapport.</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using or interpreting culturally-relevant body language.</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiating.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using basic words or phrases in a foreign</td>
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language.
Recent Deployment/Cultural Knowledge:

What cultural resources did you use before or during your deployment/station/assignment? Check all that apply.

- PTP – live training
- PTP – online training or computer-based
- Subject Matter Expert(s)
- Other Marines
- Reading material
- Video
- Immersion exercise, such as Mojave Viper
- Intelligence
- In-country local relationships
- Interpreter
- Others. Please specify: ____________________
- NONE  >>>> Skip to Page 35: For this deployment/station/assignment, please indicate the importance of using any type of cultural knowledge or information to do the following:

"Not Applicable" = your duties never involved these actions.

Advanced Branch: 39. Cultural Knowledge Items (Count) < 2;  >>>> Skip to Page 35: For this deployment/station/assignment, please indicate the importance of using any type of cultural knowledge or information to do the following:

"Not Applicable" = your duties never involved these actions.

(End of Page 33)
The cultural resources you selected in the previous question are listed below. What was the most useful for your deployment/station/assignment?

- PTP – live training
- PTP – online training or computer-based
- Subject Matter Expert(s)
- Other Marines
- Reading material
- Video
- Immersion exercise, such as Mojave Viper
- Intelligence
- In-country local relationships
- Interpreter
- [%39. Cultural Knowledge Items]Q59LBL_11%

(End of Page 34)
For this deployment/station/assignment, please indicate the importance of using any type of cultural knowledge or information to do the following:

*Not Applicable* = your duties never involved these actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Of Little Importance</th>
<th>Moderately Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
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<td>Planning or decision making</td>
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<td>Understanding situations or events</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anticipating second and third-order effects</td>
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<td>Interacting with foreign individuals or groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(End of Page 35)
When thinking about any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments, what cultural knowledge or skill was the most important to your mission success and why?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

What cultural knowledge or skills do you wish you’d had under your belt prior to any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

(End of Page 36)
Any additional thoughts or comments?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

(End of Page 37)
Appendix B: How to Understand the Statistics in this Report

- **Differences** (U = xx, p = xx or Chi Square): Both the Mann-Whitney test (“U”) and the Chi Square test are used to assess whether there are any statistical differences between two factors such as whether being enlisted or an officer makes a difference in how much time you spend with foreign groups.

- **Whether the differences are robust enough that they are unlikely to be due to chance is indicated by the “p = xxx”**: “p” is used to denote “probability”. Therefore, p = < .05 means the odds of these results being due to chance are less than 5 out of 100. Anything above .05 is considered not statistically significant and due to chance.

  - **Significance**: The term “significance” always refers to statistical significance in this report, which is independent of the magnitude of the effect in question (e.g., U = xx or Chi Square = xx). Typically, the larger the sample size, the easier it is for a small effect to be statistically significant. In this sample size of over one thousand Marines, most statistically significant effects are small.
Appendix C: Japan vs. Non-Japan Deployments

The survey instructed Marines to focus on their most recent deployment if they deployed someplace in addition to or other than OIF/OEF. Many Marines focused on a Japan deployment. If Marines who deployed to Japan statistically significantly differed in their responses from those Marines who deployed to locations other than Japan (but not to OIF or OEF) strongly and consistently, it could justify excluding the Japan deployers in performing any analyses based on deployment type, specifically, the Non-OIF/OEF sample. Otherwise, the sample would be skewed. In order to assess whether Marines who focused on a Japan deployment (496) statistically significantly differed in their responses from Marines who focused on a Non-OIF/OEF deployment other than Japan (424), statistical analyses were performed across the range of survey questions for this select sample of deployers. The analytic focus for this appendix exclusively focuses on Marines who addressed a Japan deployment or a deployment other than Japan with respect to “Non-OIF/OEF” deployments only. Differences ranged from statistically small to moderate in magnitude – moderate differences are of greater importance and therefore will be the focus here unless the percentage of Marines responding was extremely small.  

Overall, any differences that emerged were in an expected direction; keeping in the Japan deployers did not “taint” or skew the “Non-OIF/OEF” results.  

Modest differences largely emerged on questions of foreign engagement and use of cultural resources. A statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who deployed to locations other than Japan were likely to engage with foreign military personnel - host country the most (~41%) and identify them as most important for their missions (~45%) than Marines on Japan deployments (~20% and ~23%, respectively). In contrast, a statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who deployed to Japan were likely to engage with local nationals the most (~59%) in comparison to Marines addressing deployments other than Japan (~34%).  

Regarding cultural knowledge, Marines on deployments other than Japan were statistically significantly more likely to rate using cultural knowledge for “anticipating second and third-order effects” as more important than Japan deployers.  

Pertaining to the use of cultural resources, a statistically significantly greater percentage of Marines who addressed a deployment other than Japan indicated that they had used PTP-online training (41% vs. 25%), intelligence (32% vs. 13%), and an interpreter (23% vs. 10%) before or during their deployment in comparison to Marines on Japan deployments.  

With respect to their most useful cultural resource, statistically significantly more Marines focusing on Japan deployments identified “other Marines” (38%) as their most useful resource in comparison to Marines addressing deployments other than Japan (~25%).  

With respect to questions on the value of culture, cultural skills, use of interpreter, and remaining questions on foreign engagement, cultural knowledge, and cultural resources, differences between Marines who addressed a deployment other than Japan versus those Marines who addressed a Japan deployment were typically not statistically significant and any statistically significant differences were few and small in nature.

34 E.g., A moderate statistically significant difference emerged for Marines on Non-Japan deployments who engaged enemies (~8%) vs. those on Japan deployments (~2%). This is a very small number of Marines and therefore not likely to skew the overall Non-OIF/OEF sample.

35 Chi square (1, N = 109), 25.958, p = .000; Chi square (1, N = 140), 35.690, p = .000;

36 Chi square (1, N = 147), 32.605, p = .000

37 U = 52428.50, p = 000

38 Chi square (1, N = 151), 23.105, p = 000; Chi square (1, N = 115), 38.738, p = .000; Chi square (1, N =83), 22.338, p = .000

39 Chi square (1, N =106), 11.416, p = .001
Appendix D: Notable Quotes from CAOCL Survey II

The below quotes from the three narrative questions in the 2012 CAOCL Marine Corps survey were selected to provide insight into Marine culture and language needs as experienced in a variety of deployments and across MOS and rank. With respect to a variety of deployments, this reflects that Marines were free to address any previous deployment in these narrative answers, not necessarily the deployment they were guided to address in the survey.

Although some comments specifically mention CAOCL, it is not possible to determine if they are actually commenting on CACOL or another organization’s products, services, or training. It is also not possible to know the associated year the Marine references for these products, services, or training, all of which are regularly revised and updated at CAOCL.

All quotes have been directly lifted from Marine responses (therefore misspellings and blunt language remain unchanged), though occasionally data were deleted to protect identity and noted as “[deleted from dataset]” and any profanity was substituted with “[expletive deleted]”. To organize the quotes under each narrative question, themes or categories have been identified in italics preceding a block of quotes and were peer-reviewed for their appropriateness in capturing the meaning of the quotes.

Q1: When thinking about any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments, what cultural knowledge or skill was the most important to your mission success and why?

- The Value of Culture General Skills or Knowledge
  o People of different cultures are basically people- the most important knowledge or skill was understanding how to relate to others on the basis of our common humanity. The ability to demonstrate an empathy of that which makes us human allowed the development of the relationships that were crucial to mission accomplishment. Across the globe I have found that successfully relating to people of "other cultures" begins with this.
    ▪ E-7, Infantry
  o Knowing that the local people know we are Americans and we don't know all of the customs. So by being humble and courteous and anxious to learn about them it created an opportunity for both sides to learn about the other and communicate.
    ▪ E-5, Infantry
  o The understanding that the application of American values is not appropriate when applied to other countries. Leaders must understand how a culture works and why things happen in the culture the way they do. Therefore, the importance of understanding the cultural nuances (language, body language, social rituals ect...) and how they apply to mission accomplishment is critical.
    ▪ 0-4, Logistics
- Don't be a [expletive deleted]. Different cultures do things differently; get over it and go with the flow. When in Rome, do as the Romans do. Amazingly, a great number of Marines don't seem to get this.
  - 0-4, Logistics

- The Value of Culture-Specific Skills or Knowledge
  o My training in how Afghans negotiated and made decisions. Afghans have a drastically different means of coming to a decision than do Americans and if my training had not prepared me for that I would have been extremely frustrated and useless.
    - 0-2, Infantry
  o Understanding that Iraqi or Afghan Culture is extremely foreign to Marines, and not getting frustrated when foreign nationals react very differently from American military personnel. Just that basic understanding will allow Marines to work through problems instead of just assuming that the LN's don't want to cooperate.
    - 0-3, Infantry
  o Understanding the Afghan culture assisted in understanding and predicting of insurgent operations.
    - E-4, Intelligence
  o Particularly in Yemen, it was essential to understand the situation and different dynamics of the civil unrest. Not only did religion come into play, but also understanding the tribal differences, the political situation, and the history of the country. Following closely to that would be building rapport with the local nationals we worked along side [deleted from dataset]. Understanding their culture and making an effort to speak their language was essential in building rapport.
    - 0-3, Infantry
  o Understanding cultural sensitivities, customs and courtesies, body language, religion, and language were all important in some manner or another. I witnessed many interactions not go smoothly between host nation members and U.S. members due to a lack of most of the areas noted above. Additionally, whenever attempts were made to speak to locals and host nation military members in their native language, the relationships that ensued tended to be much more civil and advantageous.
    - 0-4, Communications
  o Understanding the customs of the host nation. The reason that this was most the most important is because being a Marine OCONUS you are an ambassador of the United States and anything that you do outside of the parameters of good order and discipline not only affects you it also affects the relationship of the United States and the host nation as well as the perception of the Marine Corps.
    - E-7, Organizational Avionics Maintenance
  o Learning the customs of the people, understanding their moral values and abiding by the laws and customs of their nation. To be successful in any nation other than your own you have to understand the people and live to a higher standard than what they hold.
themselves to; we must understand their values and what they see as important to their nation.

- **E-6, Intermediate Avionics Maintenance**

  **Culture Training Gaps and Challenges**

  - The most important skill was the ability to convey US principals, policies and objectives to foreign audiences so that a common understanding of mission could be derived. While an understanding of foreign cultures was necessary, it was the ability to translate US cultural (Civilian, popular, media and military) so that US actions could be understood in their cultural vernacular. The gap in Cultural training is that we teach about foreign culture but we do not appear to teach how US culture is either similar, different or complimentary to a foreign culture.

  - **0-4, Financial Management**

    - The golden rule: treat other as you would want to be treated (have a basic level of respect for your fellow human beings). However, cultural relativism is wrong and Marines should not in any way show tolerance or support for cultural behavior that is against the values we claim to have as Americans and Marines. The US has put up with despicable behavior by our "partners” in Afghanistan and has allowed them to continue child sexual abuse (chi or bachi boys) by ANA ⁴⁰ and ANP ⁴¹ leaders, treating women as livestock (or worse), and the official persecution of individuals who try to practice any religion other than Islam (even the Afghan Gov has tried to sentence converted Muslims to death), and many more abuses of basic human rights. I have witnessed many of these repugnant cultural norms during my year long deployment as a mentor in an embedded training team with the ANA. My team was not one of the many part time advisor teams that meet for a couple of hours with their Afghan and then go back to their deluxe accommodations on the Collation camp, we lived, ate, and fought 24/7 with our Afghans. Do to this fact I feel that I have a good understanding of their culture. In our cultural training we are beaten over the head that we should go to extreme lengths to respect Islam. Islam is not compatible with basic human rights or liberty (read the Koran for goodness sake and not just the cherry-picked feel good verses) and I am tired of being preached to about how the majority of Muslims just want peace. That's simply not true and the evidence and history proves it. But reality does not line up with political correctness and so we continue to ignore reality. To accept cultural practices that betray our principles to try to "get along" is wrong and shame on us if we continue to turn a blind eye to human suffering. Most importantly, I am tired of tip toeing around ignorant cultural norms and practices at the cost of Marines lives to no effect. COIN in Islamic areas does not work or comes at too large a price, both in lives and treasure, and we need to accept that.

  - **0-6, Communications**

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⁴⁰ Afghan National Army
⁴¹ Afghan National Police

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July 09, 2013

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The Value of Language Skills

- Language skills are paramount without a capability to communicate, we were dead in the water for 90% of the missions we conducted.
  - O-3, Infantry
- Language and understanding of cultural norms. These two factors kept me alive numerous times in tense events where misunderstandings commonly became international incidents.
  - E-2, Intel

Q2: What cultural knowledge or skills do you wish you’d had under your belt prior to any of your overseas deployments/stations/assignments?

Culture and/or Language Training Gaps

- Not CAOCL products! Country books are wrong, customs, courtesies misidentified. 32 interpreters in AFG found 36 errors in first half of the book! I need basic language, "want to", history, famous people of my region, the social science make-up that will affect the will to act. BLUF- I need to have the tools to Co-Opt or manipulate my counterpart to my aims by winning him over.
  - O-4, Infantry
- Language, Language, Language!!! Or religous and cultural training conducted by Ph.D. level instructors with first hand knowledge of what they speak. Sometimes the briefs we receive sound like something out of a third-rate Tom Clancy book. People come out of that training already soured on the locals before our boots have touched the ground. All bad stuff.
  - E-9, Communications, In addition to and other than OIF/OEF
- I took CAOCL tactical pashto and it was ok, but largely a waste of time and little was retained. I wish they would train at least one marine per platoon to be a formal translator for their small-units. CAOCL was just memorizing phonetically spelled phrases for use on a patrol card, etc...
  - E-5, Infantry

The Value of Language Skills

- Language skill is vital, but instruction must be concentrated on those with the propensity and desire to learn. Speaking a few words of a language opens so many doors that would otherwise remain closed. Being able to listen to conversations and understand the what the topic of discussion is can also prove to be extremely valuable.
  - 0-3, Air Control/Air Support/Anti-air Warfare/Air Traffic Control
- The ability to communicate effectively with the host country's "green" and "white" individuals in their native tongue and with thorough knowledge of thier people and government may further provide the population with the perception ISAF is attempting to
further understand the ins and outs of their culture rather than attempting to push our beliefs on them.

- E-4, Intelligence
  o More language training, however with the reduced turnaround time there is not enough time to focus on our basic skills let alone worry about language training. As a leader I am forced to make decisions about sending people to language training or sending them to become more proficient at their job as an infantryman, therefore the language training takes a back seat, and always will only a year turn around.

- E-7, Infantry

Q3: Any additional thought or comments?

- The Value of Culture-General Resources, Skills, or Knowledge
  o I read “The Ugly American” prior to my overseas assignments and found that was a very telling book and helped make me aware of how Americans can be perceived abroad. That book put much of my subsequent training in context and helped me understand why I had to attend and participate in some training. I would make it mandatory for all Marines, at a minimum any Marine that may come into contact with foreign civilian populace. The reading should be testable via a short written report to ensure that Marines understand the material and have actually read it.

- E-7, Ground Ordnance Maintenance
  o We keep advertising the Marine Corps' ability to conduct missions with other foreign militaries. My observation is that Marines tend to have zero tolerance for other cultures. We have a hard enough time dealing with civilians and other services much less interacting with foreign nations. Forgot trying to master cultures and language. We need to address the ability to empathize with a different culture before we can sell Marines on operational culture. That starts at entry level training and continues throughout their career. Either that or we realize how badly we suck at FID.  

- O-4, Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
  o Our training tends to focus on cultural differences vice identifying similarities. We often diminish foreign behaviors and display arrogant if not self righteous attitudes. For example - we pay commissions on all transactions in our country, but we characterize this as "bribery" elsewhere. We call out "enshalah" as an example of cultural laziness - even though there are plenty of examples of this kind of behavior in our own country. The most important aspect of cultural training (and war) is to understand the fundamental basics of human behavior. When we seek differences - we will find them. When we seek common ground we can find that too. Although we may have strong convictions as to "American Exceptionalism," this does not promote productive cultural interaction or awareness. Empathy, understanding and respect for others as people - all of whom are

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created equal in accordance with the Constitution that we are sworn to defend is the recommended approach. The "empathy" approach to cultural awareness is advanced through all major philosophies and religions. One overriding concept in this is the challenge of knowing oneself and one's own culture because without self awareness, it is impossible to perceive the state of others. If CAOCL is concerned with inadequate cultural awareness and ineptitude in dealing with foreign entities - it may be advisable to engage in some training on United States cultural and behavioral tendencies, and promote a level of moral empathy that can transcend differences.

- O-3, Communications
  - Due to the nature of our deployments ([deleted from dataset] we deployed to Okinawa, Thailand, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia in one deployment) we need to concentrate training on the overall importance of treating foreigners with respect, use of tone/body language, and simple negotiating. If we get too caught up in one specific culture/region, then we probably will deploy somewhere else. Opportunities for language training are phenomenal for Marines, however there is very little time in a work-up to make it worthwhile.

- 0-3, Infantry
  - Maximizing Culture-Specific Skills or Knowledge
    - As Marines forward deployed having teams who speak the language and understand the culture is very important. We must continue to seek out people of culture within our ranks to use and leverage as a tool when dealing with foreign nations. Hispincs and Asians who have a strong culture should be trained to assist the commanders in dealing with host nation individuals.
      - E-9, Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
    - Cultural and language study should not be a PTP event or checklist. It needs to be a career long endeavor which builds upon various aspects of a particular culture and is tracked as an additional sub-MOS for use in assignment, selection (rank, duty & PME) and deployment.
      - O-4, Pilots/Naval Flight Officers
    - Cultural awareness is very barely stressed both before and during deployments. Some information is supplied only after someone asked for it. I believe it should be a requirement for all marines to have at least 8 hours of classes on the culture, customs & courtesies of the country THAT Marine is being deployed to.
      - E-4, Aircraft Maintenance (Rotary-Wing)
    - I think the Marine Corps is pushing in the right direction with language/cultural training, however, it is difficult in a PTP to not only develop a training plan for this, but to allot time to it as well. The cultural development plan started at TBS for officers is a great start and should be implemented through enlisted ranks. As leaders we need to support language development more seriously and provide greater incentives for Marines to
become proficient in a language. While the extra pay is good, Marines still don't feel it's worth their time and effort--so maybe the extra pay is not the right approach. Educational opportunities outside the Marine Corps or exciting Marines to study language and history is a better technique. Language training should be identified by commanders in the beginning of the PTP with a solid plan for development and action.

- O-3, Infantry
  - I can only speak on experience from two PTPs leading up to two OEF deployment. However, in each of these cultural training took a backseat to all other training. I believe a possible solution to this dilemma is to make cultural training an annual training requirement, in which every Marines is required to learn critical language skills and cultural norms that will be evaluated through a formal exam.

- O-2, Infantry
  - Future deployments are likely to involve varied locations. Responsibility for this training needs to fall on the individual unit to prepare their Marines for a precise and relevant cultural orientation for their area of interest. Give units the authority to incentivize studying the culture and countries of their deployment. Book reports completed (on unit approved and identified relevant books) on a country's culture should contribute in a similar fashion as The Commandant's Reading list. At the very least; increasing a junior Marine’s pros/cons and consideration of a Marine’s knowledge on their FitRep. The Marine Corps could further create and maintain a standard for country orientations which would suit the resource for individual study.

- E-4, Intelligence
  - Homestead regional cultural experts in duty areas related to their expertise. We have Korean linguists in Camp Lejeune and units in Okinawa deploying to Korea with out linguists. During OIF, we had arabic speakers in Okinawa who could not seem to buy a trip to Iraq. I realize that not every MOS can afford to regionalize, but Intelligence can and should. Cultural understanding is not obtained in a day, a class or from afar. It takes years of concentrated study, often emersion (sp) to understand a culture to the degree needed to successfully advise a commander. 0231 intelligence specialists need to have a regional focus, required language training and cultural emersion as a part of their professional development. Further, they then need to be positioned in a place to use what training and expertise they have gained.

- E-8, Intelligence
  - The Value of Culture Training
    - Cultural factors are huge and understanding them is critical to mission success in any operation.
      - O-5, Infantry
    - CAOCL (and its core mission) is the instrument needed to keep alive the notion that cultural understanding is key to our success.
- O-5, Intelligence
  o CAOCL has really improved over the years. It is critical for every Marine, Sailor and civilians working with Marines to be very aware of cultural implications with regard to our actions. It can't be stressed enough. A little bit of cultural awareness and sensitivity in the battlespace can save lives. To quote MCUFd\textsuperscript{43} - "...we ensure that Marines in uniform are 'Armed with Insight' when they deploy in harms way".

- W-5, Military Police and Corrections
  o CAOCL, should be mandatory for all Marines conducting operations in areas other than CONUS. Regardless of rank, billet, or MOS, every Marine should know the same as Marines operating outside the wire IOT to support each other and maintain a good relationships and understanding with our foreign allies and enemies.

- E-6, Motor Transport
  o …the cultural awareness given to use by the education CAOCL classes it allowed my missions to run smooth as can be for the enviroment.

- E-9, Engineer, Construction, Facilities, & Equipment
  o Understanding culture is paramount to the future success of the Marine Corps. I am a huge advocate of FAO/RAO programs, CAOCL, and MCIA. While most people aren't thinking about it, it is incumbent on the intel shop to make folks think about it. Culture helps us understand our enemy and build strong relationships with our allies. I have personally seen the impact of a unit that has deployed with and separately without culture training, and the difference was huge. It is the small interactions with have with host nations that echo up to the strategic level, when our policy makers are meeting with their policy makers.

- O-2, Intelligence
  - The Value of Language Training
    o Before deploying to Afghanistan with the Female Engagement Team I had the opportunity to be trained by instructors at CAOCL and was pleased to learn about their culture and basic phrases. This helped out a lot when interacting with the local population. During one conversation, without a linguist, I was speaking fluently enough in Pashto that the gentleman asked me what tribe I was from. I would not have been able to interact with him like that had I not had the language training before hand.

- E-5, Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
  - Culture or Language Training Gaps and Challenges
    o Develop CAOCL courses and make them available on-line first. Once units complete the basics of that a one week course from linguists would be beneficial and then just brief customs review. Courses should be specific to foreign military customs and not just the rote customs of foreign countries ... foreign militaries usually have a distinct culture from their country of origin. Also, I think one week is about all a unit can affort to spend for

\textsuperscript{43} Marine Corps University Foundation

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most training due to operational/training commitments (especially in III MEF) this is why a pre-requisite on line course is necessary.

- O-4, Artillery
  - Having both host country citizens and Marines that have experience the culture of said country can provide both sides to the training
  - E-6, Intelligence
  - I do not think it is valuable to learn a few phrases and know whether or not to put one's feet on the rug. Rather, it is important (if implementing a FMTU\textsuperscript{44} -type mission) to know HOW another culture learns; what techniques does the host-country use to instruct its military, what is the prospective students' motivation, do they expect to be scolded or punished corporally for failure, is the military of the host - or training/target country effective as it stands or is the intent to try to make a mirror of US techniques? A dedicated - minimum of six months - school should be created for ETT/PRT/etc to allow those team leads to truly understand the culture. My past experience [deleted from dataset] has only provided 8-40 hours of instruction prior to deployment where interaction with a foreign military is THE purpose of the trip. I don't feel that I knew enough about HOW to train a foreign military; short of becoming fluent in the language, insight into the past methods of the target audience would be useful.

- O-3, Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
  - If the language courses were easier to download to i-pods, i-phones and i-pads it would help greatly. It seams that almost everyone has one of the three on them and could practice the language skills more frequently if they were able to successfully download the language programs.

- W-3, Motor Transport
  - Online training is being overused, and creating more online classes does not convey the importance of issues like having an instructor.

- E-5, Aircraft Maintenance (Fixed-Wing)
  - We get too wrapped around not offending them by showing them the bottom of our feet or using the left hand. They know we are Americans, they know we don't understand their ways as they don't understand us. So by being sincere and acting as you would as a child at a new persons house many of the things that may be considered offensive can be overlooked. Many times they would tell us if we did something offensive we would be apologetic and move on making sure we didn't do it again. The only way many of these things can be leaned is from immersion, the closest thing is the role players. Many times the roles players highered only know the language and not the body language and gestures a "true" local would know because they have been in the United States so long. A better screening process for that could be beneficial. As for the whole Americans not being around their women, we used a common sense approach and were respectful.

\textsuperscript{44} Foreign Military Training Unit
When necessary we used our corpsman, it was never a problem and had positive results resulting in numerous captures.

- **E-5, Infantry**
  - We teach culture all wrong. Generally classes consist of a list of things not to do so that the Marines won't offend anyone in the host country. This was of limited value as the majority of local nationals appreciate we are different and as long as Marines are polite and respectful issues don't arise. What is important about culture is understanding it to make your unit more effective operating inside it. Understanding the environment to include the people is a critical element of the planning process and what's needed is models to do this more effectively. Language is also critical and challenging, some Marines have a natural aptitude but it's difficult to identify the right guy during the work up and get him to school. Interpreters are extremely limited and often times are the single point of failure. Unless I'm doing a security patrol, I'm pretty much worthless in the current operating environment without a language capability.

- **O-3, Infantry**
  - I am currently serving as the CoCdr of a CI/HUMINT company. The current push for FAO/FAS Marines seems to be reinventing the wheel. I have a company mission (by T/O) to provide language and cultural intelligence support to the MEF among other things. However, there is no money or school seats to develop this capability. On one hand, I currently have in my company a few Marines with native fluency in various languages (not necessarily important for this AO). On the other, I can't get DLI seats for any Marines, let alone the numbers required by my T/O. In short, I have a few Marines with deep cultural experience, but most do not. There are little to no resources to maintain/enhance their capabilities or recognition by the Marine Corps that puts them in relevant billets once they have the experience.

- **0-4, Intelligence**
  - *Less Culture, More Warfighting Skills*
    - Over the past 3-5 years, cultural understanding, not unlike Force Protection following 9/11, has taken over and become the primary mission in combat operations (instead of supporting them), to the detriment of combat operations (at any spectrum). Our combat forces spend inordinate amounts of already too limited PTP time attempting to learn the language and culture of Afghans instead of learning basic soldiering. This is occurring not only in OEF (and occurred in OIF) but occurs in almost all US military operations/exercises world-wide. While it is vitally important to have a basic cultural understanding of your enemy and the environment, it must never become the only of consideration for your military actions or reactions to him. The US military has fooled

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45 Foreign Area Officer/Foreign Area Staff NCO
46 Task Order?
47 Defense Language Institute
itself into believing that if we can just better understand the cultures in which we operate, we are guaranteed to win over the population (friendly, neutral, and enemy) and therefore win the conflict. It is a fallacy that has turned true COIN on its head and led to the current stalemate in OEF. The future conflicts of East Asia will develop extremely rapidly and will be much more violent than our current conflicts in West Asia. The luxury of culturally deciphering the Asians (a vastly more complex culture and modern environment) or developing cultural specialists at the tactical level to engage them is not where we as a Corps should be exhausting our limited and shrinking resources.

- 0-3, Infantry

  o While cultural awareness is vital to mission accomplishment there is far too much importance placed on it. As a Marine, U.S. servicemember, we are expected to embody the ethos and highest values of the American people. Our culture is distinctly American and as such is a treasure that we hold in high regard. The onus is not on the United States or the Marine Corps to embody, respect, or give value to a foreign culture, it is the HN population’s responsibility to adapt to our will and culture. American exceptionalism should be the message, giving recognition and respect to cultures that devalue women, animals, the environment and don’t have mutual respect for others persons religious practices is not what we should be about. It is also not how we should approach a culture (any culture) when conducting military operations. It devalues our ethos, our nation, and justifies their hateful and discriminatory practices towards other people lessening our credibility on the world stage.

- E-7, Infantry

  o For an Infantry Battalion, basic skills training is more important than cultural training. If we cannot execute our basic mission of locate, close with, and destroy the enemy then we are no good to anyone even if we are very culturally savy. But culture training cannot be ignored or just used as a PTP "check in the box." It has to be done at the sacrifice of some infantry training, but to me the relationship should be about 80% infantry specific and 20% culture specific. Of course that depends on the specific mission of the unit as well.

- O-3, Infantry

  - Leadership Barriers to Cultural Success

    o The most important tools for cultural success are maturity and leadership. Regardless of the customs, courtesies, and traditions of any culture, there are some basic principles that are universal. Don't steal or destroy other people's property, and don't be mean without justification. Many times in Iraq I witnessed Marines steal or unnecessarily destroy the property of civilians, often under the supervision of SNCOs or Officers and free of consequence. The implications of such actions were never even a topic of discussion or training. The leadership shortfalls in such situations are a direct result of a flawed promotion system, which places very little weight on maturity and decision making.
abilities, coupled with very vague descriptions of the responsibilities and expectations for each rank. Marines of all ranks face a severe lack of training and mentoring from the top ranks all the way down, and an unwillingness to "ruin careers" by identifying deficiencies in the individual Marine and either correcting the problem or removing incompetent Marines from positions they cannot properly execute.

- **E-5, Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle**
  - The, "why," is the most important in my opinion. At this day and age of, "new" military being a leader with little or no answers puts that leader in a bad position, because it can make us look incompetent. Why don't we shake their hands? Why are we here? Why do the farmers hate us? With these questions answered we are best not to repeat mistakes and can learn from them. Too many times I hear, "SSgt that doesn't concern you, or that doesn't affect what you do here." This may be true but as a leader i would like to know more than what I get from media. I want to hear it from my, "brass." If this offends I apologize.
  - **E-6, Aviation Ordnance**

- **O-2, Infantry**
  - Unfortunately, it is impossible to cram cultural information/knowledge down Marine's throats between PTP events. Marines will not care. The best we can do is to develop the "culture" within the Marine Corps that we have a global mission to promote security through Security Coorperation Exercises and that we belong side by side with our partners. For the French Foreign Legion and the British Army, operating side by side with foreign armies and living with foreign armies is in their blood. This has not been absorbed into our collective psyche' yet. We still have a "we are Americans...be like us" mentality. This must change before a Marine will sit down and truly care about culture.
  - **O-4, Logistics**

- **E-5, Aircraft Maintenance**
  - Why are we still there? Like for real this time. I don't want to hear "to win the hearts and minds..". That will never happen the more we keep doing wrong on these people because we've been there too long. All the "good" things we have done for them is erased by the few bad ones. Like it's been said before, these people are going to be our life long enemies because of what we have done to them. Sometimes I feel we're no different..