ANNEX D

TO

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I & II OKINAWA OPERATION

15TH MARINES

(Art. 76 Navy Regs.)
HEADQUARTERS,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

24 Nov, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Sixth Marine Division.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GC-35.

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Special Action report for this Regiment is forwarded herewith.

R. E. LUCKEY
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I AND II, OKINAWA OPERATION
Chapter I: General

1. This Special Action Report is submitted by the Fifteenth Marines on the activities during the Planning, Training, Rehearsal, and Assault Phases of the OKINAWA Operation. The mission assigned the Fifteenth Marines was that of an Artillery Regiment in direct support of the Sixth Marine Division. Planning, training, and rehearsal were directed toward this end, and this mission was carried out throughout all phases of the OKINAWA Operation.

2. The Second Provisional Field Artillery Group (consisting of the First Battalion 155mm Howitzer, Third Battalion 155mm Howitzer, and Seventh Battalion 155mm Guns of the III Phib Corps Artillery) was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of this Regiment, and this mission was carried out throughout, except that the First Battalion and the Third Battalion were detached from the Second Provisional Field Artillery Group. The First Battalion was detached on the fifth of April and the Third Battalion on the seventh of April and each assigned another mission. VMO-6 was assigned the mission of furnishing spot planes for the Air Observers of the Fifteenth Marines. The First Armored Amphibious Battalion was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the Fifteenth Marines after the ship-to-shore movement of assault troops was completed.
Chapter II: Organization.

1. The Fifteenth Marines, commanded by Colonel R. F. Luckey, USMC, consists of Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery, First Battalion, Second Battalion, Third Battalion, and Fourth Battalion. The authorized strength of the Regiment is as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
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<td>Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>56</td>
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</table>


3. The Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, 105mm Howitzer Battalion, commanded by Major Hat H. Pace, USMC, consists of Headquarters and Service Battery, "D", "E", and "F" Batteries.

4. The Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, 105mm Howitzer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joe C. McHaney, USMC, consists of Headquarters and Service Battery, "G", "H", and "I" Batteries.

5. The Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, 105mm Howitzer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill, USMC, consists of Headquarters and Service Battery, "K", "L", and "M" Batteries.

6. The authorized strength of each Battalion is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Marines</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>610</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter III: Preliminary Planning

1. All planning for the OKINAWA Operation conformed with the Training, Operation, and Administrative Orders of the Sixth Marine Division and of the III Phib Corps Arty.

2. 1:25,000 plotting equipment was ordered both from the United States and New Zealand.

3. All guns were calibrated and were regrouped according to their V.E.

4. All aiming circles and transits were redeclinated for the OKINAWA area under the supervision of the Regimental Survey Officer to conform with the declination of the instruments of the III Phib Corps Arty.

5. All camouflage nets were garlanded with colored cloth strips to correspond to the OKINAWA terrain.

6. In the preliminary planning for the landing of this Regiment on OKINAWA, several sources of information were used concerning the amount of equipment and supplies to be carried. These were:

   a. Sixth Marine Division Warning Order.
   b. Directives issued by:
      2. Division Quartermaster.
   c. Tables of allowances.
   d. Recommendations within the Regiment for items to be carried.

7. Conference was held by the Regimental Staff with the Special Staff and Battalion Commanders to determine, in accordance with directives, what items of equipment and supply were necessary for the efficient accomplishment of this Regiment's mission.

8. Compilation of data on the items selected was made. This was given to the Regimental Transport Quartermaster and he consulted with the Division Transport Quartermaster as to shipping space available for this Regiment and recommendations therefore. The recommendations made by the Regimental Transport Quartermaster were almost completely carried into effect by the Division Transport Quartermaster.

9. Supply:

   A. Class I.

   a. Rations and water to be carried were specified
Chapter III: Preliminary Planning. (Cont'd).

by Division. Post Exchange supplies were to be allotted to LSTs carrying troops, based on the number aboard.

B. Class II.

a. Clothing, individual equipment, and baggage. These items and their method of being carried (i.e., in squad bags or packs) were specified by Division.

b. Office Equipment and supplies. Division specified that one typewriter per Battalion or similar unit be carried. Other equipment such as field desks, stands, filing chests, stationary chests, etc., were determined by consultation within the Regiment. All stationary supplies were to be taken.

c. Motor Transport.

1. This Regiment conferred with G-4 and made recommendation that all organic transportation be carried. This recommendation was not accepted. A second recommendation complying with G-4's plans was made. This recommendation was followed. The second recommendation eliminated considerable necessary vehicles. A deficiency in the authorized allowance of 2½-Ton 6x6 SWB Cargo trucks was not remedied prior to embarkation. This called for a re-apportionment of this type vehicle among the Battalions.

d. Ordnance.

1. All ordnance equipment and supplies were deemed necessary to keep the Regimental weapons up to combat standards.

e. Mess Equipment.

1. Only the items authorized by the Division were taken.

f. Camp Equipment.

1. Items necessary for operation such as pyramidal tents, command post tents, communication tents, paulins, camp stools etc. were cut to a minimum. Pyramidal tents were to be used for the FDC. These were altered to be suitable for blackout conditions. Only paulins were to be used to cover supplies, galley, aid stations, and ammunition storage.

g. Chemical Supplies.

1. The allowance was based on Division directives and the Tables of Allowances.
h. Medical Supplies.

1. Medical supplies to be taken were based on directives of Division and the Tables of Allowances.

i. Signal Supplies.

1. Based on Division directives and Tables of Allowances.

C. Class III.

a. All Class III items were based on the Division directives. Their stowage was in accordance with Division plans.

D. Class IV.

a. The only Class IV items deemed necessary were Dannert wire, helium gas, dynamite, and demolition kits. The Dannert wire was to be carried by Division due to bulk and weight. The demolitions were to blast gun positions prior to the landing of bulldozers. The helium was for use by the Meteorological Section.

E. Class V.

a. All items of this class were specified by Division. Plans to understow all Artillery ammunition were carried out through coordination of Division Ordnance, Division TQM, and the Regimental Ordnance Officer.

F. Method of Supply.

a. In planning the method of supply in combat, it was determined the most efficient method would be for Battalions to carry their own organic equipment and supplies as Battalions were carrying the majority of vehicles in the Regiment.

10. Resupply:

A. In resupplying the Regiment, it was decided that units would resupply themselves from the Division dumps (Supply Point Distribution) due to the transportation distribution within the Regiment. It was planned to initially supply ammunition to the Battalions from the LSTs by use of DUKWs.

11. Preliminary planning of Communications began almost with the commencement of training. Frequent conferences of Communication Officers were held throughout the period and various communication plans were discussed and tried in field training.
Chapter III: Preliminary Planning. (Cont'd).

12. The signal appendix to the Artillery annex was prepared at an early date. Several changes were required, however, due to the late issuance of the final SOI.

13. Constant liaison and planning with the First Armored Amphibious Battalion was carried out to perfect the communication problems arising from their employment as direct support Artillery during the assault phase. This presented an entirely new communication problem which required very detailed planning from the beginning. In its final form the plan worked very well, and communication between the tractors and Artillery forward observers was quickly established and firing conducted before the Artillery landed.

14. As a final step following the last conferences, detailed procedure plans for the orderly establishment of communications were distributed to all units for study enroute to the objective.
Chapter IV: Training Phase and Rehearsal

1. The Training Phase for the OKINAWA Operation was divided into four periods:

   a. Battery Training Period.
   b. Battalion Training Period.
   c. Regimental Training Period.
   d. Division Training Period.

2. These periods were for a duration of approximately six weeks each.

3. Intensive service practices were conducted by each Battalion in observed fires. OP methods using small-T and large-T were stressed. FO's and Air Observers were used extensively.

4. Fire Direction Procedure was carried out according to the methods set forth in FM 6-40. Massing of fires was stressed. Time on Target (TOT) was frequently employed and was well perfected. Observed and unobserved fire charts were used.

5. During the training phase this Regiment was scheduled to conduct experimental shoots with BE smoke shell. Unfortunately the allotment of ammunition for this experimental test firing never arrived; therefore no data were obtained.

6. The lack of position areas and limited impact areas greatly effected training from a tactical standpoint. It was practically impossible to conduct an RSOP problem involving a displacement. Therefore the only tactical training conducted during this period was the occupying and improving of position areas, which nearly amounted to digging in and camouflaging the same positions week after week. This same scarcity of position areas limited the effectiveness of training of Survey Sections.

7. A two day Regimental CPX was held during the first week in January.

8. A two day Regimental shoot was held during the second week in January. The massing of the four Battalions was stressed both by observed and unobserved fires. Several TOT problems were fired with excellent results by the entire Regiment.

9. Following the Regimental Shoot, the Fifteenth Marines participated in a three day Corps Shoot involving 13 Battalions of Artillery. Four from the Fifteenth Marines, Three from the Eleventh Marines, and Six from the III Phib Corps Arty. Fires were massed by observed and unobserved methods. The technique of massing fires under the central control of one fire direction center was stressed. The massing of fires based on the adjustment of one battery and bringing in the entire 13 Battalions was employed with excellent results. The massing of fires using transfer and metro data was also employed.

10. The Fifteenth Marines participated in the Sixth Marine Divi-
sion problem lasting for six days during the third week in January. The tactical aspect was stressed during this period to the utmost. The first three days were non-firing and the last three days the Regiment fired continuously in direct support of the assault infantry Regiments. Harassing and preparation fires were stressed and during the assault phases of the problem, close-in support fire missions were conducted by the Forward Observers and Air Observers. The importance of immediate forwarding of information by FOs and LoOs and of real coordination and cooperation between infantry and Artillery were stressed during this phase.

11. During January and February ship-to-shore problems were conducted both by Battalions and Regiment, using DUKWs and LCVPs. These problems were conducted with the assault phase of the OKINAWA Operation in mind.

12. Rigorous training was conducted for all personnel of the communication section beginning with individual and working up through team and unit phases. The late arrival of personnel hampered training as did the lack of trained CP personnel. New types of equipment used on the operation were late in arrival and training on this equipment was not as long as it should have been.

13. An extremely difficult problem was encountered in training basic personnel for communication duties, especially in radio. The greater percentage of these men had no communication training or experience prior to assignment to this organization for communication duty. Field conditions do not provide time or facilities for training competent communication men from general duty men.
Chapter V: Loading and Embarkation.

1. The Fifteenth Marines were loaded for this Operation at Doma Cove, Guadalcanal. The four Battalions were each allotted one (1) LST. In addition, space was allowed on an AKA, the U.S.S. CASSELL, for the Battalion vehicles which the LSTs were unable to carry. The number of vehicles in excess of the capacity of the LSTs varied from 10 to 17 per Battalion depending on the type and size. The personnel of the Battalions was divided between the LSTs and the U.S.S. NOBLE, an APA, until the staging area was reached, where those on the APA were trans-shipped to their respective LSTs. Each of these LSTs then had aboard over 500 men and Officers. The Liaison, Command and Forward observation parties of the Battalions were loaded with the infantry unit which they were to support during the initial phase of the Operation.

2. The artillery ammunition was under-stowed on the tank decks of the LSTs. In addition to the four (4) LSTs allotted completely to the Fifteenth Marines, this Regiment was allowed to under-stow three (3) other LSTs. This was ample for the five (5) units of fire for the howitzers.

3. Each of the Battalion's LSTs carried 20 DUKWs on its tank deck loaded with the howitzers and a few high priority vehicles. Approximately 450 rounds of ammunition per battalion was also loaded in the DUKWs to be put ashore with the howitzers.

4. The time element in loading varied. The under-stowing of ammunition took on the average 12 hours. It took about 20 hours more to complete the loading. LSTs arrived with gear on board and installations not shown on ship's characteristic diagrams, which caused delays and changes.

5. The unloading of the four LSTs consumed between 48 and 72 hours. Initial trip of the DUKWs was for the most part highly successful. Markers are necessary for loaded DUKWs in crossing coral reefs. One DUKW capsized due to the absence of markers and put a howitzer out of action for three (3) days. In one instance the Beachmaster caused 5 hours delay by ordering the DUKWs to return to the wrong ships.

6. Difficulties in unloading LSTs were caused chiefly by the nature of the beaches. An LSM would have been of great assistance in unloading high priority vehicles such as tractors which could be on the beach early even if the LST cannot be beached immediately. After the LSTs were beached, incomplete examination of the reefs caused some vehicles to be flooded in landing.

7. Vehicles on the AKA were unloaded promptly and without any difficulty. Ship's crew were well trained in embarking and debarking vehicles.

8. Headquarters and Service Battery, Fifteenth Marines, was loaded aboard the U.S.S. HYDRA (APA-202). All personal and gear of this Battery was loaded aboard this ship. Loading was accomplished without undue incidence in cooperation with the ship's TQI and the Troop TQI. Special arrangements were made for the deck loading of a radio equipped 2-lton 4x.
truck in order to maintain communication with the Battalions of this Regiment and Division prior to debarkation on D-Day. Bulk cargo was loaded before the practice landing and was not put ashore during the maneuvers. Vehicles were loaded on 1Mar45, the day before the troops embarked. All gear and vehicles were combat loaded in accordance with the tactical plan.

9. Unloading of Headquarters and Service Battery gear started at 1300, 4Apr45, and was not completed until 1700, 5Apr45. However, between 1300 and 1800, 4Apr45, enough of Headquarters and Service Batteries personnel, vehicles, and gear was put ashore to operate tactically. Landing craft were only able to make two (2) trips a day. The use of an LCT for one day did much to speed up the debarkation of bulk cargo. The gear was distributed over several beaches which caused some loss, particularly of medical gear.

10. Loading and embarkation of communication equipment was accomplished with a minimum of difficulty. The only problem encountered arose from the late arrival of equipment which hampered the advance preparation of loading tables and created a shortage of shipping space. This was overcome, however, by shifting equipment and making maximum use of all available shipping space.
Chapter VI: Movement to and arrival at Objective Area.

1. Historical.
   

b. On 21 March, 1945, the U.S.S. MINEFEE arrived at Ulithi Anchorage. During the stay at Ulithi, full advantage was taken of the recreational facilities offered ashore. All hands were given at least one day ashore on the recreation area at Mog-Mog Island.

2. Activity on shipboard.
   
a. Life on shipboard followed the normal routine of police details, ship's guard, and messing details. All troops were given one-half hour of exercise daily under the supervision of an Officer. Recreation consisted of boxing and shows arranged by the Regimental Chaplain.

3. Training.
   
a. An abandon ship drill was made up and all hands participated in abandon ship drills. Boat assignment tables were made up and debarkation drills were carried out until all hands became thoroughly acquainted with their troop assembly areas, debarkation stations and the routes thereto.

4. Briefing.
   
a. A thorough briefing of all troops on the impending operation was carried out with two purposes in view:

   1. To acquaint all troops with the overall picture of the operation, the mission and plan of attack of the Sixth Marine Division, and the mission and plan of attack of the Fifteenth Marines.

   2. To thoroughly acquaint each individual with his own particular mission and duties.

b. To accomplish this it was decided to divide the troops into groups of 6 to 8 men. In this manner briefings were kept on an informal basis and each individual was given an opportunity to clear up any matters that were not clear to him. Discussions were conducted by Officers of the 2 and 3 sections. In addition to scheduled briefings, at certain specified hours during the day, personnel of the 2 and 3 sections were available to answer any questions that any of the troops might ask.
Chapter VI: Movement to and arrival at Objective Area. (Cont'd).

After this method of briefing was completed, the section chiefs met with the members of their sections to further clarify and work out the details of their particular mission. This method of orientation proved highly successful and will be employed by this unit on future operations. Relief maps, vertical and oblique photos, and standard maps were used in briefing.

c. During movement to the theater of operations, all personnel of the communication section were briefed on the operation and special classes were held on its communication phases. Frequent drills on call signs, authentication, use of codes and ciphers, etc., were held.

5. Enemy Activity.

a. No direct contact was made with any enemy units surface, air, or submarine during the entire trip.


ea. Discipline with a very few exceptions was excellent. Quarters, though crowded, were comfortable. Some minor complaints concerning the food were encountered but on the whole it was judged to be adequate. The morale of the command on arrival at the target area was excellent.
Chapter VII: Assault Phases.

Part I: Landing Phase.

1. On L-Day (1 Apr 45), the Battalions of the Fifteenth Marines landed in the following order:

- 3-15 on Red-1, Recon. Party at 1030, Guns at 1330.
- 4-15 on Green-1, Recon. Party at 1130, Guns at 1535.
- 2-15 on Green-2, Recon. Party at 1300, Guns at 1540.

Reg'tl H&G Battery on Green-2 at 1500.

2. 1-15 was in direct support of the 4th Marines.
   2-15 was in direct support of the 22nd Marines.
   3-15 was in general support reinforcing the fires of 1-15.
   4-15 was in general support reinforcing the fires of 2-15.

3. The Regimental FDO was established and operating with communications to all Battalions at 1700. At that time all Battalions reverted to Regimental control.

4. All Battalions had registered on defensive fires for the night by 1830.

5. The only hindrance to the combat efficiency of the Regiment in the initial assault phase was the rapid movement of the Infantry which strained communications and allowed the forward observers little opportunity for registering their respective Battalions.

6. All combat equipment and howitzers were landed successfully on L-Day with the exception of one howitzer from 4-15. The DUKW carrying this howitzer floundered on the reef off Green Beach 1 and sank.

7. Communications were established on L-Day with the First Armored Amphibious Battalion but due to the rapid movement of the Infantry the front lines had extended beyond the effective range of the LVT(A), therefore they were not called upon for reinforcing fire missions.

8. After delivering the howitzers ashore to their position areas, DUKWs returned to LSTs to unload understowed ammunition. Each Battalion brought ashore in their initial wave approximately 450 Rds of ammunition. By the night of L plus 1 each Battalion had a level of two units of fire in their Battalion dumps.

9. Corps Artillery was in position and assigned fire missions of L plus 3.

10. On L plus 4, all Battalions and Reg'tl H&G made their 1st displacement. This displacement involved the use of DUKWs as all of the organic transportation belonging to the Battalions had not been landed.

Ship-to-shore movement:
Chapter VII: Assault Phases. Part I: Landing Phase. (Cont'd)

a. Battalions and Regimental H&S Battery were responsible for the unloading of their respective organic equipment and supplies from the vessels on which they were embarked.

b. A large portion of the equipment carried was loaded in trucks prior to embarkation and was brought ashore without further handling.

c. Battalions were embarked, with all equipment and supplies aboard LSTs with the exception of the overflow of vehicles which were loaded aboard the U.S.S. CASWELL.

d. Regt'l H&S Battery was loaded aboard the U.S.S. MEHEMEE (APA-202).

e. The LSTs were brought into the transport area where DUKWs, loaded with howitzers, ammunition, necessary fire control equipment, and personnel, were disembarked and made their way to initial positions. Two DUKWs were submerged but successfully recovered later.

f. The DUKWs were turned over to the Division Shore Party Commander, who allotted 70 of the 80 DUKWs initially used to return to the LSTs and unload ammunition. This ammunition was carried directly to the gun positions until two U/F were on hand and the remainder was then sent to the Division dump.

g. The LSTs were then brought into the reef for completion of the unloading. However, the unloading was delayed considerably due to tide conditions and to a slight extent by lack of coordination in bringing them to the reef.

h. Trucks, with trailers were generally driven over the reef to the beach although a few were transported by LVTs. The few vehicles which were drowned out or stuck on the reef were retrieved by LVTs. The only waterproofing was the use of waterproofing compound on spark plugs and distributors and the loosening of fan bolts.

i. The remaining equipment and supplies not loaded on trucks were brought in by LVTs to the beach.

j. Regt'l H&S Btry was unloaded, as was the overflow of vehicles on the U.S.S. CASWELL, by use of slings and cargo nets. Vehicles and supplies were brought into the reef and beach by LC1's and LCVPs. Regt'

Brig was held up considerably by the lack of coordination and carrying out of plans by the U.S.S. Ernest P. Fullmer's Transport Quartermaster.

k. On the beach vehicles were stopped by the heavy, loose, sand which was impassable. Tractors and LVTs were used to pull the vehicles to solid ground.


a. General — Materials taken and used were organic, with the exception of demolitions and demolition kits to blast initial gun positions.

b. Class I — The supply of rations (including coffee, fruit juices, milk, sugar, and accessory rations) was at all times sufficient. Water was supplied from water points and supplemented in three battalions by portable distillation units and was sufficient at all times.

Part II: Ishikawa Isthmus Phase.

1. This phase lasted from L plus 5 to L plus 10. A tactical situation developed in which two assault infantry Regiments pressed the attack, driving north up the Ishikawa Isthmus; one Regiment going up the west side and the other going up the east side. The Fifteenth Marines were employed so that each assault infantry Regiment had one Battalion of Artillery in direct support and one Battalion in general support.

2. During this phase all Battalions and Regt'l H&S Btry were displacing on an average of one displacement per day. Due to these rapid displacements it was necessary to establish rear echelons in the vicinity of CHINA and combat equipment was cut to a minimum. At no time during this phase was an assault infantry Regiment without at least one Battalion of Artillery furnishing direct support fires. This was accomplished by the leap-frog method.

3. Communications were taxed to the utmost during this phase and due to the rapid displacements, radios were used in place of wire. All radio sets functioned well, and at no time was the Regiment out of contact with the Battalions.

4. On L plus 7 the First Armored Amphibious Battalion was displaced up the Ishikawa Isthmus by I ST, and after taking up their new position, came under control of the Fifteenth Marines.

Part III: Motobu Peninsula Phase.

1. During this phase elements of three infantry Regiments were employed and each assigned a Battalion of Artillery for direct support. The Battalions were so employed that fires of two Battalions of the Fifteenth Marines, a company of the First Armored Amphibious Battalion and a Battery of 155mm guns of the 7th Battalion, III Phib Corps Arty could be placed in any Zone of Action of the three infantry Regiments.
2. Complete communication set-up of both wire and radio was employed during this phase.

3. At least two planes from VHO-6 were employed daily from sunrise to sunset to conduct registrations and surveillance.

4. Excellent results were obtained in the early part of this phase with harassing and preparation fires. At no time was this Regiment unable to give maximum fire support to the infantry. In the latter part of this phase, artillery fire was limited to close-in fire support, conducted by Forward Observers. These limitations were caused by the numerous patrols that were active throughout the Koto Peninsula.

5. Two Battalions, at all times, were capable of bringing fire on Sosoko-Shima and Yagachi-Shima.
Chapter VIII: Enemy Tactics.

1. Enemy Tactics during this Operation consisted entirely of scattered resistance and an unorganized withdrawal to the North end of the Island.

2. There was no counter-battery encountered during this Operation. Several individual field pieces and mountain guns were encountered, which were destroyed or captured before they had accomplished much damage. These weapons were usually located in caves and it was difficult to adjust artillery fire on them.

3. Several attempts at infiltration of Battery positions were made by the enemy, but proved unsuccessful.

4. There was one report of enemy use of land mines in the vicinity of ITOJI. There were no reports of booby-traps.

5. On several occasions enemy attempts to jam our radio nets were noted. These efforts were very weak and they had little success.
Chapter IX: Estimated Results of Operation

1. The results of the OKINAWA Operation were highly successful in every respect. The Sixth Marine Division landed on LOVE-Day at HOW-Hour and continued to seize successive lines until the entire northern end of OKINAWA was secured.

2. The Fifteenth Marines carried out their mission of supporting the Sixth Marine Division with the maximum amount of artillery fire at all times.

3. Liaison with reinforced artillery Battalions and assault infantry Regiments and Battalions, was effectively maintained throughout the Operation.

4. During Part II and Part III, the mountainous nature of the terrain considerably hampered the effectiveness of artillery. The maps proved inaccurate and Forward Observers could only estimate their general location. The air observers were extremely valuable in conducting observation.
Chapter X: Comments and Recommendations.

1. This Regiment left Guadalcanal with an effective strength of one hundred and sixty-nine (169) Officers, including eight (8) U.S. Navy, and two thousand three hundred and sixty-eight (2368) enlisted, including fifty-four (54) U.S. Navy. Eleven (11) Officers and two hundred and two (202) enlisted men remained in the Rear Echelon. During the transportation stage, five (5) enlisted were transferred to Ulithi, Caroline Islands, for medical treatment. One (1) enlisted returned to duty 6 April, 1945, two (2) enlisted returned to duty 24 April, 1945, one (1) enlisted was transferred by staff returns to Headquarters Battalion, Sixth Marine Division, one (1) enlisted, no word received as yet as to disposition. One (1) enlisted USN died prior to debarkation on L-Day. The effective strength on L-Day was one hundred and sixty-nine (169) Officers and two thousand one hundred and ninety-two (2192) enlisted, and all debarked on L-Day during the assault phase, with the exception of three (3) Officers and one hundred and seventy-three (173) enlisted who remained aboard LSTs as ammunition and supply working parties, and elements not able to get ashore on the first day.

2. Casualties sustained during the operation to and including 30 April, 1945, were two (2) Officers and ten (10) enlisted killed in action, three (3) Officers and twenty-six (26) enlisted wounded in action and evacuated, one (1) Officer missing in action while on detached duty with the Third Amphibious Corps. Eight (8) enlisted (USMC) and (1) enlisted USN wounded not evacuated. Two (2) Officers, seventeen (17) enlisted sick and evacuated, seventeen (17) enlisted returned to duty during the period from sick or wounded.

3. Six (6) Aerial Observers were ordered to temporary detached duty with the Third Amphibious Corps prior to departure from Guadalcanal. Two (2) of these have become casualties since operation started. One (1) is missing in action, one (1) was killed in action and body recovered. One (1) enlisted was ordered to detached duty with Division Post Office, returned to duty on 17 April 1945.

4. The effective strength on May 1945 was one hundred and fifty-two (152) Officers, two thousand two hundred and fifty enlisted USMC plus eight (8) Officers and fifty-three enlisted U.S. Navy. Aggregate two thousand four hundred and sixty-three.

5. Morale throughout the campaign continues excellent with no visible laxity in the Regiment.

6. Mail, although irregular in delivery, was delivered in quantity comparable to that received in a Base status and is believed satisfactory. The effort expended to place mail in the hands of the troops gives excellent returns in morale.

The method of reporting personnel during the transportation
Chapter X: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd).

stage proved inadequate to meet the situation when the troops of the Regiment were spread over ten (10) different ships. It is unknown whether the breakdown in the plan was due to the failure of the Commanding Officers of troops on the various vessels to make the necessary reports to higher echelon or if higher echelons failed to pass such information down the chain of command to the Regiment. In any case, the responsibility for the various detachments of this unit with the exception of Regt'l H&S Battery, was out of the hands of this Headquarters, and it is apparent that only a positive report by those responsible will allow this Headquarters to complete the required Unit Report in a satisfactory manner. The only correction to the problem seems to be a complete understanding of the system used by all concerned, or an effort in the future to keep units together on one ship, or by having each of the units as spread, maintain their own record of events for submission to Regiment at the first opportunity as a check against Troop Commanders' reports, in-so-far as concerns one section matters.

8. The use of Field Administrative Forms and Casualty cards proved an excellent method of personnel administration in the field.

9. Recommend better communication setup to enable rear echelon of the One Section to submit reports to higher echelon in time to be of some use. When administrative group of forward echelon is broken up by rapid displacement, no transportation is certain and wire or radio is rarely operative due to wide separation of Battalions. Suggest 1-Ton Jeep for sole use of group in rear responsible for submission of reports, as none is provided for under present T/A allowance for artillery Regiment.

S-2: INTELLIGENCE.

Maps and Photographs

1. The principle maps used for this Operation were the 1:25,000 and 1:10,000 maps as issued. The two principle faults of these maps proved to be the complete absence of detail in some areas and the inaccuracy of vertical control. The latter made the delivery of accurate unobserved fire difficult.

2. Vertical and oblique photographs of the initial plans of the operation were excellent. Photo coverage of the subsequent Operation were almost non-existent. Forward Observers and air observers must be furnished with good clear mosaics or single verticals of the area of Operations.

3. The transmissions of enemy information within the Regiment, on the whole, was adequate. Difficulties of communication, due to rapid displacements, proved to be the principle stumbling block to the rapid transmission of information. Exchange of information between this Regiment and higher headquarters was satisfactory.

4. There were very few instances of enemy artillery fire here.
Chapter X: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd).

were no instances to prove that the enemy has changed his tactical use of artillery from previous campaigns or that any attempts were made to mass artillery fire. The Division Artillery is greatly handicapped in the execution of its counterbattery fire by the lack of sound or flash ranging equipment. It is strongly recommended that such equipment be carried in subsequent operations.

5. In conclusion it is suggested that the following be included in the plans for future operations:

a. Adequate and clear mosaics with an approximate scale of 1:20,000 to 1:25,000 be furnished all forward observers and air observers.

b. The addition of sound and flash ranging personnel for counterbattery work.

c. The addition of API personnel within the Division Artillery S-2 section.

THIRD SECTION

1. From the experience gained in the OKINAWA Operation, the following recommendations are offered for future operations involving an Artillery Regiment:

a. It is recommended that all .50 cal. machine guns allowed by the TBA be replaced by .30 cal. machine guns. All machine guns are used for local defense. .30 cal. machine guns being lighter, more ammunition can be carried. These guns may be employed and placed in action more rapidly during a fast moving situation. .30 cal. machine guns are adequate for the purpose of local defense.

b. It is recommended that one (1) Thompson Sub-Machine Gun be issued to each wire and survey team.

c. It is recommended that when an operation is planned on as large a scale as the OKINAWA Operation, the Artillery Regiment be allowed to take all of its transportation allowed by the TBA, instead of the 33 1/3% allowed on this operation.

d. It is recommended that Battalion Recon. parties be assigned free boats, (LVTs if possible) instead of placing them in a scheduled wave.

e. It is recommended that all 1-T 4x4's allowed Regt'l H&S Battery, with the exception of wire-laying trucks, be replaced by 2-1/2 Ton 6x6's.
f. It is recommended that one (1) 60mm mortar be furnished each battery for the purpose of firing illuminating shells to aid in the local defense of their position.

g. It is recommended that illuminating shells be included in the unit of fire for Division Artillery. On several occasions such requests were made by infantry commanders.

h. It is recommended that four (4) additional trained enlisted personnel be furnished each chemical warfare section. This will enable more thorough training in smaller groups.

i. It is recommended that a generator power unit FE-75 or equivalent 110 volt AC generating equipment be furnished each Battalion and Regimental H&S Battery for the purpose of illuminating the Fire Direction Centers.

j. It is recommended that a 2 Ton trailer be given to each 1/2-Ton 4x4 ambulance truck to carry the aid station gear. There are no provisions made in the TBA for this. It is further recommended that a 21/2-Ton 6x6 be added to the TBA for the purpose of carrying medical supplies.

FOUR SECTION

1. General.

a. In the activation period and training period of this Regiment, supplies were extremely slow in reaching the Regiment. This caused impairment of training.

2. Class I.

a. Rations, fruit juices, milk, coffee etc., were sufficient at all times. Water was also sufficient. Water supply was supplemented by the attachment of a water distillation unit to each of three Battalions. This is an excellent idea but each Battalion should be given one.

3. Class II.

a. Clothing and Equipment.

1. This item was sufficient at all times with the exception of blankets for one Battalion which lost theirs due to enemy action. Impregnation against typhus was an excellent idea.

b. Office Equipment and Supplies - No comment.

c. Ordnance.
Chapter X: Comments and recommendations. (Cont’d).

1. Weapons.

a. Weapons carried by this Regiment into the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Lost or Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, cal. .30</td>
<td></td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, M1 cal. .30</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR, cal. .30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, cal. .30 M1919A4</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, cal. .45</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG, cal. .45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, cal. .50 HB</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, rocket</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, grenade M3</td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 75mm Pack</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 105mm</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. No malfunction of weapons was experienced during the operation.

c. The T/A’s allowance of spare parts is sufficient if complete. Such was not the case on this operation although no hardship was experienced. Cleaning materials were not sufficient.

d. It is recommended that the .50 cal. machine gun, M2, be substituted by the .30 cal. M19 19A4 Machine Gun. It is also recommended that 60mm mortars and the illuminating shell be issued on the basis of one mortar per Battery, or seventeen in the Regiment. The normal unit of fire being used in supplying the illuminating shell.

2. Ammunition.

1. Ammunition problems were minor. Packaging of some 105mm ammunition showed evidence of having been subjected to moisture for some time; although this proved to have little effect on the firing.

2. Illumination ammunition, as authorized, should be included. During this operation none was available.

3. Ammunition expended:

105mm Howitzer:

- 22,263 Shell, semifixed, HE M1, w/fuse, FD, M47A1.
- 5,269 Shell, semifixed, HE M1, w/fuse, TSq, M54.
- 55 Shell, semifixed, AT, M67, w/fuse, BD M62.
105mm Howitzer:
1,596 Shell, semifixed, smoke phosphorous, HE H60, w/fuse, PD, T57.
13 Shell, H.C., E.H., N24, w/fuse H54.

75mm Howitzer:
333 Shell, semifixed, HE, H46, w/fuse PD H46A.
60 Shell, semifixed, smoke phosphorous, HE H64 w/fuse, PD, T57.

Small Arms:
57,315 Cartridge, carbine, ca.30, M1.
16,354 Cartridge, AP, cal..30.
3,600 Cartridge, tracer.
2,015 Cartridge, ball, cal..50, H19H.
20,015 Cartridge, AP-I, 50, & tracer, cal..50.

Grenades, Hand:
168 Fragmentation.
Smoke, Phosphorous
Smoke, H.C.
Incendiary, Thermit

Grenades, Rifle, M9AL.

Ground Signals.
Rocket, AT, 2.36", M6AL.

c. Motor Transport.
1. Vehicles carried by this Regiment into the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/2-T 4x4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor, TD-14, W/AD</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor, TD-9, W/AD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1-T, cargo</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1-T, cargo</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1-T, grease</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1-T, water</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/2-T, 4x4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/2-T TGS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/2-T 4x4 SCR605</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/2-T, cargo</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/2-T 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 21/2-T 6x6 dump</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 21/2-T 6x6 cargo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Destroyed or lost 0
Chapter X: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd)

2. Battle employment was approximately 24 days.

3. Maintenance problems were normal, replacing clutches, springs, greasing, tire repair, general overhauling etc. Those vehicles destroyed by enemy action or damaged beyond repair were sent to the 5th Motor Transport Battalion for salvage. One TD-14 was entirely demolished by enemy action.

4. Spare parts and accessories were few upon embarkation and difficult to get during the operation. A more complete stock should be furnished by Division and held in stock by Division for resupply.

5. It is recommended that all organic transportation be taken in future operations. The lack of transportation has a decided effect on the movement of the Regiment in that it placed an abnormal strain on available transportation and under unfavorable conditions could have seriously impaired the displacement of the Regiment.

6. In one instance the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, had all its prime movers and ammunition trucks hauling ammunition from a distant point when the Battalion was under heavy enemy mortar fire. As a result, the 105mm howitzers were not able to be moved from the area and two were destroyed, along with other equipment and ammunition.

7. It is recommended that in the future prime movers of weapons be used for no other purpose than that intended.

8. Supply of ammunition in this case should have been made by Corps or Division, especially since the impetus of supply is from the rear.

9. The use of DTJKWs is mandatory to expedite the movement of Artillery and ammunition from ship to the initial gun positions and their use as prime movers until such time as prime movers are beached.

10. The use of matting on the beach would have prevented the stalling of vehicles and avoid unnecessary delays.

f. Camp Equipment.

1. Thirty pyramidal tents should be taken instead of fifteen. Additional replacements for CP and communication tents should be taken on the basis of 25%

G. Mess Equipment.

1. Sufficient mess equipment was taken to operate efficiently.
Chapter X: Recommendations and comments. (Cont’d)

h. Chemical supplies.

1. The collection of chemical warfare equipment by Division when it was apparent the enemy would not use gas, was an excellent idea. This saved a great deal of equipment normally thrown away, lost or destroyed. It also reduced the transporting of excess equipment.

4. Class III.

1. No problems concerning Class III items were met.

5. Class IV.

1. Barbed Wire, sand bags, and demolitions were obtained from the Sixth Engineer Battalion when necessary. Division should have carried more helium gas for resupply.

6. Class V.

1. Initial supply was adequate to meet existing conditions. Resupply was once delayed for a period of three days which, under existing conditions was not detrimental to the accomplishment of the Regiment's mission. However, under normal or unfavorable conditions, it would have impaired the firing of this Regiment.

7. Logistics.

1. Roads of the Division area were generally in good condition with medium traffic and good circulation.

2. As stated previously, the hauling of ammunition from points far to the rear placed a great strain on the Regiment. It is again emphasized that this should have been done by higher echelons.

3. Evacuation of personnel and equipment was done efficiently in all respects.

4. Salvage collection was small due to the care of equipment and supplies. The greatest loss occurred in the Second Battalion by enemy action.

5. Supply Point Distribution was found to be the best method of supply in this Regiment during the Operation.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX DCG

SIGNAL

a. Communication Plan.

1. The SCI was adequate, but late in distribution, which limited the opportunity for study and criticism.

2. Sufficient frequencies were allotted this organization, but interference from units outside the Division was found on many circuits.

3. Call signs were ample.

4. Sufficient time was available for planning.

5. More time could have been used for study of higher echelon communication plans than was available.

6. Plans were made for preventing destruction of our wire lines but were not effective. Something more concrete is definitely needed.

b. Rehearsal.

1. No changes in the communication plan were made as a result of the rehearsal.

2. No deficiencies in equipment were found.

3. The rehearsal did not provide an adequate check of communication for this organization. It was too short for a complete test of communications.

c. Loading.

1. Equipment was loaded according to plan.

2. Minor damage to one radio vehicle was incurred in loading. This resulted from the ship's personnel dropping a cargo net on the hood which smashed the windshield and bent the hood itself.

3. Storage batteries were frequently checked throughout the voyage.

4. Communication personnel assisted the ship's Command by acting as messengers during the voyage.

d. Personnel.

1. This organization is not satisfied with the present personnel.
allowances. At least one additional wire team is needed in Regimental H&S Battery. A message center section is needed in each Battalion and the six man message center allowed Regimental H&S Battery is not sufficient. Additional radio operators (776) are needed in place of the large numbers of voice operators (757) now authorized whose abilities are very limited. Training among radio operators was definitely not sufficient. These men were basics when received and time was not sufficient to make efficient radio operators of them when they had no basic communication training to start with.

2. Facilities in the field are not adequate for training communication personnel from line duty men. It is recommended that communication personnel with at least a basic training in communication be furnished in the future.

3. At time of embarkation, this organization was at T/O strength in number of men, but they were not of the SN's prescribed by T/O.

4. No personnel were lost either on board ship or in effecting the landing.

5. Communication personnel not on duty were used in the CP defense.

c. Equipment.

1. There were no shortages of major equipment at time of embarkation. The Regiment was in excess of T/A by 5 radio sets, TCS, mounted in 1/2-Ton trucks and one radio set SCR-605 mounted in 2-T truck.

2. Losses in major equipment during the operation were:
   (a) 6 Radio sets SCR-610.
   (b) 2 Switchboards ED-71.
   (c) 1 Switchboard ED-72.
   (d) 15 telephones, EE-8.
   (e) 7 Bales RL-27.
   (f) 2 radio sets, TEY.

   Note: All radios and switchboards were destroyed by fire.

3. Equipment provided was suitable in design but in some cases not in quantity.

4. It is recommended that one additional radio set, TCS, mounted in 1/2-Ton truck, be allotted each Battalion and Regiment.
H&S Battery. In a rapid advance over long distances, as was encountered during this operation, the TBX is not satisfactory for mobile work and high frequency equipment is limited in range. Therefore, additional medium frequency equipment is needed for dependable communication. In long distance operations, such as this, a set of higher power than the TCS was needed. An SCR-193 borrowed from Division Signal Company was invaluable. Both terrain and distances involved during this operation made radio communication on Regimental nets with any other than medium frequency equipment difficult.

5. A great deal of trouble has been experienced with the Head and Chest Set, Sound Power, used in the firing Batteries. This equipment will not stand up under field conditions and repair is difficult. More dependable equipment for use in this connection is needed.

6. The SCR-608 and 610 radios were new to this organization. Both items gave satisfactory performance within the limitations of high frequency equipment. For simplicity of operations the 600 series radios are ideal, but the limitations of distance and susceptibility of this equipment to terrain conditions requires frequent establishment of relay stations. The SCR-610's get out of alignment very easily under the hard use they get with forward observer teams and require frequent realignment. On the whole, however, the 600 series has proven satisfactory for Artillery radio communication in most situations.

7. Waterproof bags were used for all suitable equipment and were very effective.

8. An SCR-193 radio not authorized by T/A was used for long range communication with Battalions and the airfield with excellent results. It is recommended that this radio be added to T/A for Regimental H&S Battery.

9. All equipment was unloaded from the ship. Some equipment was not landed at the proper beach, due to the roof, which limited landing space and created congestion.

i. Supply.

1. Equipment left behind in rear echelon included:

   (a) 1 Telephone Central Office Set TC–4,
   (b) 1 Telephone System, Alert MCT–1,
   (c) 1 Radio set, RSO,
   (d) Miscellaneous items of small equipment not used under combat conditions. Leaving this equipment did not effect the operation in any way.
Appendix 1 to Annex Dog - Signal. (Cont'd)

2. Batteries BA-39 and 40, wire W-130 on EM-3's, and replacement parts for damaged equipment placed the greatest strain on supply.

3. It is recommended that the replenishment rate for Batteries BA-39 and 40 be increased.

4. For resupply a signal dump containing thirty days replenishment was established at the Regt'l CP. This dump was kept up to level by drawing from the Division Signal Dump as supplies were expended. All Battalions drew from this dump or directly from the Division dump in emergencies.

5. A Regimental repair shop was set up at the Regt'l CP for second echelon repair and handled all repairs within its scope. All types of radio equipment used in the Regt plus switchboards, telephones, and head and chest sets, sound powered, were repaired.

6. Repair facilities could be greatly improved by increasing the present meager supply of parts and replacements allowed in echelons below Division. Many repairs which could have been affected by this Headquarters had to be sent to higher echelon because of the lack of spare parts. This takes up much valuable time before the using organization can obtain the equipment. With the large numbers of 600 series radio sets in this Regiment, complete alignment equipment and spare parts for these sets are definitely needed.

7. Equipment spares were carried whenever available, but many sets were issued to this organization either partially or completely lacking in equipment spares.

8. Transportation for equipment was extremely cramped. An additional 1-Ton truck w/trailer for carrying equipment and a ½-Ton truck w/trailer for message center use are needed.

6. Operation.

1. No abnormal agencies were installed.

2. Radio was the most overloaded agency during the rapid movement in the early stages of the Operation. This was overcome by making use of all available channels and equipment.

3. Present operating agencies are adequate. In operations on large land masses, combined with rapid movement, wire communication would probably be the first to break down.

4. All frequencies assigned to this organization were used during the course of the campaign.

5. The difficulties encountered in all agencies of communication were not unusual and have been covered by comments throughout this re-
port. The major difficulties were as follows:

a. Radio: (1) Interference from friendly stations on 600 series frequencies.
   (2) Long distances involved which necessitated constant establishment of relay stations.
   (3) Inability to effect rapid repair of equipment due to lack of spare parts.

b. Wire: (1) Rapid movement of all units which wire laying parties could not keep up with.
   (2) Breaking of wire lines by tanks, tractors, and construction units.
   (3) Unusually long lines for good transmission on W-110 wire without loading or repeaters.

c. Visual: (1) No visual communications was used.

d. Messenger: (1) Varying times for submission of scheduled reports by staff sections made scheduled messenger runs difficult to establish.

6. This was the first operation for this organization.

7. Extensive use was made of enemy wire lines and poles. Much of the enemy's pole line construction was left intact and with minor repairs aided immeasurably in establishing wire communication over long distances.

i. Security:

1. Cryptographic aids used were CSP 1500, Joint Assault Code, Shacklock Numeral Cipher and Prearranged Message Code.

2. The shacklock authenticator system was used and proved very effective. The enemy made feeble attempts to use our authentication system by using random letters. This was totally ineffective.

3. Communication personnel were well trained in signal security.

j. Countermeasures by enemy:

1. The enemy is believed to have used the following countermeasures at various times: (a) Static. (b) Keying. (c) Appropriating call signs. (d) Voice jamming.

2. In most cases it was possible to work thru the noise jamming and use of authenticators eliminated use of call signs.

3. The radio countermeasures school conducted by E&F during training was very helpful and should be continued.
APPENDIX 2 TO A2FEX DOG

MEDICAL

Embarkation

1. All Battalions embarked on LSTs along with each Medical detachment. Material was packed in ambulance jeeps and trailers. Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery embarked on an APA.

2. During the voyage no outstanding illnesses were suffered. All ships were reported to be in good sanitary condition. Heads were adequate as to number and condition. Living quarters for enlisted personnel were of the usual type, well-lit and ventilated. Galley and messes were clean and well-policed; the messes were overcrowded as is usual aboard troop ships. Troop cooks and messmen cooperated in the preparation and serving of meals. Salt and atorbrin tablets were dispensed daily to all hands by roster.

Debarkation

1. Material unloaded in several landing craft to obviate entire loss in case of shelling. No losses of personnel or matériel suffered initially.

Ashore - Assault Phase

1. Due to unopposed landing, no difficulties were encountered in establishing installations. All Battalions had prefabricated aid stations. Blackout facilities were available.

2. Hospitalization of casualties, both battle and non-battle, were effected easily and without delay due to excellent road-nets and the proximity of collecting stations, medical companies and the Division Field Hospital, during entire campaign.

3. During the first 20 days of action, the Regiment as a whole suffered the following casualties:
   b. Non-battle - 32.
   c. Dead - 12 (including two Army personnel).
   d. Wounded and returned to duty - 14 (one Army).
   e. Transferred to Medical companies - 57.

4. Due to the daily and rapid displacement of all Battalions and Regimental H&S Battery sanitary control in general was hasty but apparently adequate as no diarrheas, dysenterics or other epidemics were suffered. Food was mostly of "C" ration type while on the "move". When possible, screened-in galley cars were erected and "B" rations served. One Battalion (1st) carried self-made prefabricated galleys which could be rapidly assembled and which were flyproof. No water was used for any purpose except originating from a Divisional water point.

5. The dead were disposed of by the Grave Registration Detail in the Division Cemetery.
6. There were no epidemics suffered in the Regiment. It is interesting to note however that all Battalions and Regimental H&S Battery had several cases of unexplained "fever", the nature of which was investigated by the Division Epidemiologist and his staff, the consensus being that they were probably "sand-fly" fever. In no case did the fever last more than three days and none of those affected were acutely ill. All cases responded well to symptomatic measures.

7. It is also interesting to note that in all cases, areas used by the Regiment for bivouac sites, especially when using native houses, thorough spraying with 5% DDT and kerosene was necessary to eradicate human fleas. Studies of fleas by the Division Epidemiological Section established the fact and informed Regiment that they were not vectors of disease.

8. Dental service was adequate, afforded by the Regimental Dental Officer who was initially handicapped by mislocation of Dental equipment which was later located except for supplies. Replacements were available but not adequate. There were a total of twenty-five dental cases treated. The Dental Officer states that the facilities were adequate. The type of cases ranged from temporary fillings to extractions and Vincent's treatment (2 cases); no serious complications or sequelae resulted. The Dental Officer had additional duties of being Officer in Charge of Rear Echelon aid station during displacements. He also was of help in daily sanitary inspections of areas and installations.

9. The handling of civilians was no problem, this being effected by Army Military Government.

10. Prisoners of war were immediately delivered to the Division P.O.W. stockade.

11. Medical organization of the Regiments is considered adequate. Medical personnel were well trained. One Corpman was lost on L-Day, Death due to strangulation Respiratory.

12. Field medical equipment was adequate and the total amount allowed according to TBA was carried. The following equipment was lost between landing beach and the first bivouac area:

   Unit #11-A (Chest)  #15 (Pack blankets)
   #9 (2 packs) litters   #17 (chest-tent-furniture).

13. The following Dental equipment was lost:

   Unit #35 (Cases 3 & 5)

14. Medical and Dental supplies carried were up to TBA strength. Alcohol pilfered amounted to 10,000cc. Narcotics pilfered as follows:
Appendix II to Annex D - Medical. (Cont'd).

Atropine Sulphate - 20 tablets (.0006 grams).
Morphine Sulphate gr 1/4 & Atropine Sulphate gr 1/150 - 100 tab.
Codeine Sulphate gr 1/4 800 tablets.
Codeine Sulphate 1/3 oz. (powder) - 2 bottles.
Morphine tartrate gr 1/2 (syrup) - 75 syrups.
Pantopon tablets gr 1/3 - 20 tablets.

15. Restock of all gear was adequate, efficient, and rapid.

16. It is felt that motor vehicles used for transporting medical gear are inadequate. One (1) jeep ambulance and one (1) 1/2-ton trailer hardly being sufficient for Regimental H&S Battery let alone the larger Battalions.

17. Malaria and epidemic control equipment and supplies were adequate; this department being a Divisional function. DDT powder, kerosene, diesel fuel, knapsack sprays, hand sprays being adequate.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that one 1-Ton truck and 1-Ton trailer be supplied to all Bns and Regt'l H&S Battery in addition to their 1/2-ton ambulance.

2. It is recommended that medical personnel be stationed aboard ships to guard medical supplies in the ship-to-shore movement.

3. It is recommended that prefabricated galleys be supplied.

R. E. LUCKEY,
Colonel, USMC;
Commanding.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GO-76.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.

R. H. Leutstrom
R. H. Leutstrom
FIRST BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINES DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I AND II, OKINAWA OPERATION
CHAPTER I

GENERAL

The purpose of this Special Action Report is to relate the activities of the First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, in the planning and training for, and in the execution of its mission in the ICEBAG operation. The battalion landed on LOVE day on Okinawa in direct support of the 4th Marines. The Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, and "A" and "B" Companies, First Armored Amphibian Battalion, were in general support.
CHAPTER II
THE TASK ORGANIZATION

1. 1. The First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, commanded by Robert H. Armstrong, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, consists of three firing batteries and Headquarters and Service battery.

2. Batteries are commanded as follows:

  "A" Battery.....John J. O'Connor, 1stLt, USMC.
  "B" Battery.....James H. Boyd, 1stLt, USMC.
  "C" Battery.....Herbert T. Pitch, Capt., USMC.
  M.S Battery.....Paul K. Lynde, 1stLt, USMC.
CHAPTER III
PRELIMINARY PLANNING

S-1 Embarkation and debarkation rosters, and new personnel cards were prepared.

S-3 1:25,000 plotting gear was obtained.

Aiming circles were declinated.

Howitzers were calibrated and regrouped according to their VIST's.

S-4 Preliminary planning began several weeks before receipt of the warning order.

The first concern was transportation; from past combat experience it was felt that transportation was inadequate, so it was requested that the battalion be furnished a truck larger than the one-ton for the operation. Regiment assigned the battalion 15 trucks, 21/2 ton, cargo, 6x6. The Battalion Motor Transport section overhauled and painted all vehicles and put them in first line combat readiness.

The need was felt for greater firepower in ordnance small arms. The Tables of Organization calls for 100 .45 cal. pistols with the exception of 16 .45 cal. pistols, .45 cal. and 22 L.1's, .30 cal. A request was made to regiment for 150 L.1 rifles and the request was granted.

From the comparison of the warning order with loading tables it was found that combat equipment and organizational equipment could be loaded on the embarked vehicles, thus doing away with the necessity of hold and deck stowage of crated equipment. A surplus of stowage space aboard vehicles allowed lee-way to take in extra equipment not called for in the warning order and plans were made accordingly.

Equipment carried in the extra stowage space consisted of portable screened-in galley frames, "Baker" rations that could be needed before the time called for in the warning order, spare parts for vehicles and ordnance, sandbags, Entert Wire, and excess 702 equipment and clothing. Anticipating the need for a tight perimeter defense on LCV day, the battalion secured extra quantities of Entert Wire and sandbags to carry along, so as not to have to depend initially on the installation of a Division or Regimental dump. The ship and UK's were loaded with this in mind.

The priority loading of the ship was planned at conferences of the Battalion commander, staff, Battery Commanders, and T-1 for the purpose of loading the ship so that it could be unloaded with the greatest possible speed and so that all equipment would be available as needed after the landing.
Training for the Okinawa campaign began on 1 October, 1944 and ended on 7 March, 1945. This five-month period was divided into four phases:

A. The first phase (1 October - 15 November). Stress was placed by battery commanders on gun drill, survey, the battery fire chart, and communications emphasizing wire-laying under adverse conditions and radio procedure. During the latter half of the phase, the batteries went on two field problems weekly, one of which was a firing problem. Rapid displacement of individual gun sections was stressed. During this phase, Headquarters and Service Battery trained by sections exclusively.

B. The second phase (16 November - 31 December). During this phase the battalion trained as a unit, firing a minimum of twice a week. One field problem weekly was held at night. The firing batteries and Headquarters sections continued their individual training.

C. The third phase (1 January - 26 February) consisted in (1) participation in regimental, division and Corps Artillery problems, and (2) concluding battery and battalion training not completed in their proper phases. The battalion participated in two Regimental CEP's, a Regimental shoot, a Corps Artillery shoot, a 7-day Division field exercise, and three battery and two battalion problems with infantry units of the Division. Rapid battalion displacement, wire and radio communication methods using forward switching centers and M. 29's, fire direction under regimental control, local security, infantry-artillery liaison, and operation of battery galleys all received emphasis during these exercises.

D. The fourth phase (1 Mar - 7 March) consisted in Division maneuvers. The battalion took part in the dress rehearsal only.
LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Loading and embarkation went according to schedule; no difficulties were encountered. All transportation was loaded on the top deck of the LST and all combat equipment was loaded in vehicles. The DUKWs were combat loaded before being embarked. Personnel were embarked while the LST was beached. Following is the battalion schedule for loading and embarkation:

(1) 26 February — Started loading ammunition, rations and vehicles aboard LST 708.
(2) 10 March — Loaded DUKWs and embarked personnel aboard LST 708 for movement to transfer area.
(3) 12 March — Loaded vehicles aboard APA Caswell.
(4) 14 March — Embarked reconnaissance party and one P.O. group aboard APA McIntyre. Embarked remainder of battalion aboard APA Noble.
(5) 22–27 March — Transhipped personnel at Ulithi. P.O. groups went aboard LST's with their infantry units; all personnel on Noble transhipped to LST 708.
CHAPTER VI

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

during the voyage, a training schedule was observed which provided for \( \frac{1}{2} \) hour daily of calisthenics, \( \frac{1}{2} \) hour daily of inspection, and two hours daily of instruction and briefing.

Instructional material was so divided as to provide each ship with an adequate supply. Staff briefings and conferences were held daily.
CHAPTER VII
ASSAULT PHASE

Following is the record of the battalion's part in Phases I and II of the IWO JIMA operation.

1 April
1045  Reconnaissance party landed on Beach Red 3.
1140  Battalion ordered in by radio.
1310  No. 2 piece, "B" Battery, which landed with the
      reconnaissance party, commenced to register but did
      not finish due to displacement of the F.O.
1345  Battalion landed and occupied position in TS 2008 P.
1350  Completed registration on battalion base point.
2215-2400  Fired harassing mission in front of 1/4, where enemy
      activity had been noted.

2 April
0545-0705  Registered on new battalion base point.
1355-1715  Fired four missions in support of the 4th Marines.
      All were area targets and were covered.
1715-1840  Using all battalions of the 15th Marines, shot in
      defensive fires in front of 4th Marines.
1940-2400  Fired harassing missions.

3 April
0710-0722  Fired preparation for 1/4.
0820  Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for new
      position area.
1205  Reconnaissance party returned.
1300  CSI'
1430  Battalion arrived at new position in TS 3395 P.
1445-1505  Registered on battalion base point.
1500-2115  Fired in defensive fires in front of 4th Marines.

4 April
0707-0715  Fired preparation for 4th Marines.
0750-0817  Fired two missions for 4th Marines. One was a reported
      location of 150 Jap troops. Effect unobserved. The
      other was an unsuccessful attempt to burn a ridge.
1300  Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for a new
      position area.

5 April
0001  Battalion went into direct support of 22nd Marines.
0700  Battalion CO's party left for new position.
0600  CSI'
1010  Battalion arrived at, occupied but did not develop
      new position in TS 8008 J.
1600  Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for new
      position.
1610  CSI'
1600  Battalion arrived in new position from which it could
      directly support 22nd Marines. Position area in TS
      3008 P.
1700  Registered on battalion base point.

6 April
1010  Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for new position.
1310  CSI'
1600  Battalion occupied new position in TS 0309 / from which
      it could support 26th Marines.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>0630</td>
<td>Registered on battalion base point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>0640-0700</td>
<td>Registered on new battalion base point from battalion OP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for new position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>CSIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Battalion occupied new position in 0714 from which it was able to support 29th Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Began registration on battalion base point, after having been assured by R-3, 29th Marines, that all patrols were in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Ceased firing on order from 15th Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Received clearance to fire from 15th Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Registered on battalion base point. Observation difficult due to darkness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April</td>
<td>2100-2400</td>
<td>Fired harassing missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>0000-0500</td>
<td>Continued harassing missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Battalion CO's party left to reconnoiter for new position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>CSIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>Battalion occupied new position in TS 1120 P, from which it was able to support the 29th Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>1845-2125</td>
<td>Shot in defensive fires in front of 2/29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>2145-2400</td>
<td>Fired above targets as harassing missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>CSIC &quot;F&quot; Battery. Battery moved out in direct support of 1/22 and occupied position in TS 1025 V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>0730-0745</td>
<td>Fired preparation for 29th Marines in same area as harassing fires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>Began firing urgent mission for 1/22. Target was a concentration of enemy troops. Ceased firing when communications were disrupted. Effect unobserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>Shot in defensive fires in front of 1/22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>0000-0540</td>
<td>Continued harassing fires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Battalion went into direct support of 22nd Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>0905-0930</td>
<td>Registered on battalion base point in zone of 22nd Marines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Battery displaced to TS 2333 U to remain in support of 1/22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April</td>
<td>0800</td>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Battery displaced to 2333 U to go in direct support of 2/22.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VIII

NARRATIVE ON ENEMY TACTICS

1. Contact in the battalion area with the enemy was made only at one position, near Taira, in Northern Okinawa, which the battalion occupied for eight days. During the entire period, enemy in small numbers were active around the position, necessitating an alert perimeter defense.

2. Nearly every night explosives were thrown into installations near the perimeter. Potato-masher grenades, anti-personnel land mines, demolition charges and hand grenades were employed by the enemy. Sporadic sniping occurred and knee mortars were used on one occasion.

3. No attempt was made to attack the position with a view of occupying it; all enemy activity was of a guerrilla nature.

4. Charges were thrown near the Fire Direction Center and one battery exec pit; the battalion tractor was hit by rifle fire and an enemy soldier, armed with demolition charges, was killed near an ammunition dump after having infiltrated into the battalion position. This, coupled with the fact that the enemy had excellent observation from the hills to the rear of the position indicated that the enemy activity was coordinated.

5. The enemy occupied the surrounding area in force. On one occasion an ingeniously devised ambush resulted in the deaths of three Marines on patrol and two Japanese.
14 April
No activity. "B" Battery in direct support of 2/22.
Battalion less "B" Battery in direct support of 22nd Marines less 2/22.

15 April 0730
"A" Battery displaced to TS 2634 B to go in direct support of 1/22. "C" Battery displaced to 2634 C to go in direct support of 3/22.

16 April 0630
Headquarters and Service Battery displaced to join battalion less "B" Battery in TS 2635 V. "B" Battery supporting 2/22 from same position in TS 2142 F.

1625
Battalion less "B" Battery completed registration on battalion base point.

17 April
Battalion in direct support 22nd Marines, less 1/22 which moved south out of range.

20 April
Northern section of Okinawa declared secure.

21 April 0600
"B" Battery displaced to TS 2635 V to join remainder of battalion.
CHAPTER IX

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

A. The First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines was in direct support of the 4th Marines from 1 April to 4 April as they drove from the Red beaches to the vicinity of Ishikawa on the east coast. The battalion went into direct support of the 22nd Marines on 5 April and supported their drive up the west coast of Okinawa. On 6 April when the advance reached the vicinity of Nago, the battalion switched to direct support of the 24th Marines in order to cover their drive up Motobu Peninsula. On 11 April, when the 25th Marines had advanced out of range, the battalion reverted to direct support of the 22nd Marines as they proceeded up to Nedo-Lisaki along the west coast. The battalion remained in direct support of the 22nd Marines until the end of Phase II of the Operation.

B. Enemy casualties
(1) By small arms
   (a) KIA 15
   (b) Captured 19
(2) By artillery — no estimate made.
(3) Own losses
   (a) KIA 4
   (b) WIA 1
   (c) Missing 0
CHAPTER X
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Administration

a. Difficulties were encountered in submitting unit reports. First, the fact that some reports were due at 0700 often required that messengers travel during the hours of darkness. Secondly, all reports were not due at the same time; this burdened the message center and did not make the maximum efficient use of transportation. It is suggested that all unit reports be submitted together by 0600 as of 2400.

b. The morale of the battalion was very high at all times. At the earliest practicable time recreational facilities were installed. Football fields and volleyball courts were set up. Football and volleyball teams were organized by each battery and an intra-battalion league was activated with prizes for the winners. Native boats that were in the vicinity of the battalion area were used for recreation. Boat races were held and small prizes awarded to the winners. A battalion newsheet was published daily which included items of battalion interest.

2. Intelligence

a. Maps furnished before and during the operation were both adequate in number and complete in area covered. Photographs, however, did not adequately cover the area in which this battalion was to work during the operation. It is suggested that photographs be distributed to battalions according to area covered rather than that an equal distribution be made, if the supply is limited. Also, with personnel scattered among several ships it is recommended that photographs be distributed earlier, so that officers and key men may be briefed prior to boarding ship.

b. On the whole 6-2 kept the battalion well supplied with timely and effective intelligence. However, it is believed that insufficient information was disseminated about friendly and enemy activities which involved other divisions and corps in the operation. Receipt of such information would make for better coordination and control—especially for flank units, and would aid both the S-2 and S-3 sections in keeping their F.O.'s informed of activities close to or in their zone of action and observation. Lack of information about a friendly patrol operation in the zone of action of the 4th Marines on one occasion nearly caused the battalion to bring fire on the patrol.

c. Initially the handling of natives and civilians in the zone of action of this battalion was unsatisfactory. When the battalion was located at Taira (TS 1120 and 1121) many natives were rounded up both in the battalion area and by patrols operating in the vicinity. They were all sent to the MG compound at Taira, but few were detained; the majority being permitted to return to the hills carrying baskets of food, presumably for the sustenance of Japanese soldiers in the vicinity.
During the period 8-16 April, 10 Japanese soldiers were killed, 19 captured, and two wounded at or near the position. A great deal of enemy activity took place at night; specifically, demolition charges and hand grenades were thrown into the position on several occasions, and some sniping occurred. This activity indicated that there were a considerable number of armed enemy in the vicinity of the battalion area. Consequently the free passage of natives through the position, aside from being hazardous to themselves, since several were killed while approaching the area at night, was very possibly a means of supply for scattered Japanese troops in the vicinity. It is suggested that more stringent control be exercised over natives, especially in areas where Japanese troops have been located.

d. Most of the intelligence about the enemy and information about the location of various units was furnished by the infantry regiment currently being supported by the battalion, or by division. However information was requested from the 15th Marines, it was given, but was rarely furnished voluntarily, and never in report form. Regiment could remedy this situation by sending the battalion copies of its S-2 report with overlays when necessary. Such information would give the battalion a much better picture of the activities in all sectors of the division area with emphasis on artillery and would make liaison with infantry easier when the battalion relieved another in support of an infantry regiment.

e. Generally this battalion was well indoctrinated in counter-intelligence measures. All material of any intelligence value was turned in promptly, and security as to our movements in this operation was strictly maintained. However, several cases were noted where unit designations, times for jumping off, troop locations by names of towns, and casualties were sent in the clear over the radio. It is suggested that all radio operators and other personnel sending such messages by radio be thoroughly instructed in this important counter-intelligence measure.


e. "A" and "B" Companies of the First Armored Amphibian Battalion fired in general support of the 4th Marines from 1 April to 4 April. Initially, the two companies were netted by radio with this battalion's F.O.'s, who were able to register one company on a base point before 1/15 had landed. Subsequently both companies were connected to the battalion by wire and radio. Despite the fact that their reinforcing fires were not needed during Phase I, the LVTA's proved that they were capable of operation as field artillery.

It is recommended that the companies of Armored Amphibian Battalions be provided with sufficient personnel and equipment to do their share of wire-laying and wire maintenance. During Phase I, the burden of initiating and maintaining all communications with the LVTA's was placed on this battalion which was at that time in direct support and short-handed as it was.
Both companies' position area surveys were run by this battalion's survey team.

3. The battalion encountered two novel Japanese weapons. Five antipersonnel mines and one potato mashor were thrown into the battalion area by infiltrating Japanese soldiers. The anti-personnel mines, thin shelled and filled with picric acid, had considerable blast effect but little fragmentation. Of the five thrown only one exploded and it did no damage.

4. Supply

Class I. An adequate supply of "Charlie" and "King" rations, water, hospital rations, was understocked and brought into the battalion area during the unloading period. After this supply was used the battalion drew adequate amounts of 10-in-1, "Charlie", hospital, and extra components of "Baker" rations from the beach dumps. A distillation unit was assigned to the battalion and moved with it in all displacements, furnishing an adequate supply of water for drinking, cooking and sanitation. IX supplies were issued in ample quantities.

Class II. Mounting out supplies in this class were adequate. However, shortages were serious in Ordnance and Transportation spare parts. It is recommended that all organic transportation be brought as all of it could have been used to good advantage during the first moving situation that arose.

Class III. The amount of fuel carried in vehicles and expeditionary cans was sufficient to operate all vehicles until fuel could be drawn at the beach. A distillation unit was attached to the battalion for the operation; the capacity of the unit was 1500 gallons per day, an adequate amount for drinking, cooking and sanitation. This unit was a great asset to the battalion.

Class IV. All mounting out supplies in this class were adequate.

Class V. The ammunition resupply was adequate and well handled.
5. Artillery

a. LOADING

The howitzers were loaded in the DUKW's ashore and embarked in that manner. The three extra pieces were loaded on the top deck of the LST. All ammunition was understood to be loaded with the exception of 30 rounds per howitzer, which were loaded in the DUKW's. Transportation and combat equipment were loaded on the top deck.

The howitzers were broken down in the DUKW's and were unloaded by hand. This system was found satisfactory because (1) it was faster than unloading by A-frame, and (2) it permitted the DUKW's to be dispersed at all times.

b. UNLOADING

1. Several important modifications to the battalion's OP on landing proved successful,

   (1) A large (10'x10') unit identification marker was placed on the beach at the precise spot where the DUKW's were to land.

   (2) Six route markers (4'x3') were employed to guide the DUKW's over the right route to the battalion position. In addition to this battery agents met the DUKW's at the beach.

   (3) In order to save time and prevent confusion, the battalion was called in by radio using a prearranged code by which the BN-X could be informed of the correct beach on which to land and the order in which the batteries were to land.

2. The howitzers were landed with the first wave of the DUKW's. As soon as the DUKW's returned to the ship the unloading of ammunition, water and combat equipment began. The unloading continued with few difficulties encountered. The greatest difficulty was the T9-14's could be unloaded ashore and returned faster than they could be loaded from the ship. This was brought about by the fact that the T9-14 was not loaded according to schedule and its presence in the tank deck hampered maneuvering of the DUKW's. An LCI was scheduled to arrive at the LST at 0030 plus 2 to unload the T9-14 and the trucks; it did not arrive until 1200 on L030 plus 1, made one trip with the tractor and never returned to unload the trucks.

3. It is recommended that the beach party indicate by guides and by flags, the exact routes to be followed by DUKW's and by tracked vehicles from the edge of the reef to the beach. Units landing should not have to survey their own routes.

c. COMBAT

1. This battalion and 3/15, operating in group attack in Phase I, used a common OP for their position area survey on LOVE day. 1/19's survey officer, after completing the battalion's position area survey, traversed to "A" and "B" Companies, First Armored Amphibian Battalion, and surveyed their position areas.

2. Initial survey presented no problem because of the large number of road and trail junctions near the beach.
C. FIRE DIRECTION

1. The use of a 1:25,000 firing chart was not found satisfactory, because of its relative inaccuracy as compared to a chart of 1:20,000 scale. The battalion preferred to fire from a grid sheet rather than from a map and could have used a 1:20,000 grid sheet just as easily.

2. Using a home-made L-square template was found more efficient than superimposing the L-square on the entire grid sheet. Concentrations and their number, minimum range lines, fire possibilities together with a superimposed L-square, so clutter up a grid sheet that confusion and error are likely to ensue.

F. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND TACTICAL EQUIPMENT

It is recommended that one battalion of Pack Howitzers be retained as an organic part of each division or corps to be used as a direct support battalion on special missions, for the following reasons:

1. During a fast-moving situation a pack howitzer battery using four 6x6 trucks, two one-ton trucks, two one-ton trailers and one 1-ton truck can be prepared to displace in approximately one hour after receiving its orders; it can move intact carrying one unit of artillery ammunition, two units of small arms ammunition, two days' water, rations and fuel, concertinas, sandbags and all essential personnel, and can be prepared to give artillery support on short notice.

2. Characteristics of the pack howitzer enable it to be employed as mountain artillery when difficult terrain is encountered. One battery was so used during Phase II.

3. Some roads and some position areas encountered were able to support pack howitzers but would have proved extremely difficult for heavier artillery.

G. LIAISON

1. During Phases I and II, the battalion's F.O.'s worked closely with the infantry company commanders, the battery liaison officer with the infantry company commander and the battalion liaison officer with the infantry regiment S-3.

2. It is recommended that a direct support battalion be permitted to deal directly with the supported infantry battalion as regards fire missions in that battalion's zone of action, with the infantry regiment as the only monitor. The artillery regiment's chief source of late information is its direct support battalions; hence the ratification of missions by the artillery regiment serves no purpose but to constitute an additional delay to the efficient cooperation between the infantry and its direct support artillery.

3. Higher echelon liaison during Phase I was not always efficient; on several occasions there was considerable doubt as to the activities of the division on the right flank of the 6th Marine Division.

(a) On the night of 2 April, 1/2, the right flank battalion of the 6th Marine Division extended beyond the boundary between divisions as indicated on the operations overlay. Hence artillery support that night was denied 1/2, although the F.O.'s with the battalion had good observation to the front and knew it was safe to fire.
(1) During the afternoon of 3 April, a battalion commander of the 4th Marines requested that fire be brought on troops to his front which he supposed to be enemy since he had been informed of no patrols in his zone of action. 1/15 requested its airstrip to check on the activity to make sure, and it was found that what the infantry battalion commander had seen was a patrol from another unit, operating in the 4th Marines zone of action. Neither the 4th Marines nor the 15th Marines had been notified of this patrol.

h. COMMUNICATIONS

1. General. Due to very rapid advance, it was necessary to rely largely on radio communication. Normal wire nets were operated satisfactorily during the first four days. The wire net as provided by S.O.P. proved very satisfactory. The regimental policy of assigning wire personnel from the general support battalion to a direct support battalion was of great assistance in maintaining communications.

2. Radio. Radio communication was in general improved over previous operations, due primarily to the use of the 606 and of Remote Control units at the FDC.

(a) 606. In general excellent results were obtained with the 606, despite mountainous terrain. Ranges up to 30 miles were obtained, failures were few, and the two receivers greatly facilitated handling of nets. The only difficulties were:

(1) Several cases of sticking of transmitter relays.
(2) Defective radio storage batteries. These batteries were defective when the jeeps were issued. To date only four have been replaced and the remainder are in poor condition.

(b) 610. The operation was in general satisfactory, results being obtained roughly comparable to those of the 606 on the previous operation. Several failures occurred:

(1) Fast failures were due to loss of calibration. This occurred in about 20 instances during the operation. Lack of a vacuum tube voltmeter or adapter in the battalion reduced efficiency of the 610's perhaps 25%; if the battalion had had such equipment, several days of loss of use of the set losing calibration would have been avoided.
(2) Several failures of power cables occurred. Considerable difficulty was encountered with the mechanical connection.
(3) The coupling between the antenna mounting bushing and the antenna did not function satisfactorily on several sets.
(4) Some means of carrying the 610 on F.O. teams is necessary. The army pack boards have proven to be the only satisfactory method, and should be issued.
(c) TCS-TBX. TCS operation was very satisfactory. Contact with air spot was excellent. TEK's were not used. It is suggested that these be replaced by TCS's.

(d) Allocation of channels.

(1) Too many 610's were set on channels (infantry, artillery regiment) that could better have been put on 608's, and which interfered with flexible use of all sets in making replacements for defective sets.

(2) The 608 channels should not be considered as fixed, but should be changed as required, to work infantry, amphibious tanks, etc., as required. All operators should be trained to make these changes.

(3) Total channel allocation was sufficient.

(4) Considerable interference from other nets was experienced on 608's and 607's, especially in the beach area. There was no JAP interference.

(e) A.O. It is recommended that A.O.'s be supplied with SCI 300's to work with infantry patrols which are often cut off from communication with their own CP. An A.O. can be of great assistance to a patrol.

3. Personnel

(a) The failure to provide promotions for Communication Personnel lessened morale substantially, and made control more difficult because of the lack of CC's. This battalion received its last temporary CP warrant in February 1943, 27 months ago. During this operation a sergeant served as communication chief, a corporal as battalion wire chief, and privates first class as battalion radio chief and wire chiefs of two batteries.

(b) There was an insufficient number of school trained radio operators. Eighteen radio operators had had radio training, accordingly there was a shortage of 25 operators below T/O strength. The Line personnel used to fill up the section did not receive sufficient training in the time available. If it is necessary to use large numbers of non-CP operators, a rigid training schedule must be set up and adhered to, regardless of working parties and other interferences. This was not possible prior to this operation. Total T/O allowance of radio operators is insufficient if the most highly trained personnel are available.

(c) The T/O allowance of wiremen is inadequate for a direct support battalion. At least 25 additional wiremen are necessary for the battalion to maintain efficient wire communication.

(d) Since a message center has an important function in the battalion, it is felt that personnel should be allotted to operate it. A corporal rate for the message center chief is essential.

4. Equipment

(a) Failures. Other than radio failures mentioned above, equipment failures were few, although much of the equipment is three years old and has seen three campaigns. An exception was soundpower head and cheek sets, a large number of which failed and could not be repaired.
(b) TB allowance shortages.

1. Vacuum tube voltmeter, for tuning 610's.
2. Army pack boards, for carrying 610's.
3. Two additional 8672's, for switching control and PDC switchboard.
4. One or two TCS's, to replace TBU's. When batteries are detached and sent some distance away, a TCS is necessary for communication. This occurred on several occasions.
5. Lance poles, for initial installations in beach areas without trees.

(c) Unnecessary items provided by TB.

1. Buzzer, 1522.
2. Earmuffs, rubber.
3. Steel helmet, navy.
4. Wire pits.
5. TKX (to be replaced by TCS).

(d) Items of which TB allowance is excessive.

1. Gloves (cut allowance to 1/30).
2. Lamp, EE 25. (cut allowance to 1/10).
3. Lead, black. (cut allowance to 1/10 present).
4. Tape, rubber. (cut allowance to 1/5 present).

(e) Suggested changes in items.

1. Only a small amount of 150 was used; it proved superior to 130.
2. R45's are inconvenient; all TS's should be issued on DR4's.

6. Use of personnel aboard ship. Radio operators stood regular ship radio watches on LST 708, which was short of radio personnel.

6. Equipment losses. No losses were due to enemy activity, or in the landing. Minor losses of small items occurred during the operation.

7. Checking equipment in staging area. Inability to check radio equipment at Ulithi, due to division order, denied a final check of radio landing nets. Several failures had occurred aboard ship, and could have been discovered and corrected if checking had been allowed.

8. Supply. The only near shortage occurred in BS 39's the initial allowance of which was inadequate. Replacements of expendables were obtained without difficulty.

8. Tactical aspects. Two aspects of the tactical employment of artillery rendered communication more difficult and less efficient.
(a) The use of F.O.'s from other battalions as F.O.'s for this battalion. Wire-laying practices vary among battalions; the F.O.'s of other battalions are not acquainted with our wire-laying practices, and some confusion resulted. Close cooperation between the F.O.'s and the battalion communications officer was more difficult to obtain. Likewise, handling of radio nets was more difficult, and the 610 channel and 608 channels of the battalions are different. Communications would be improved if F.O.'s of each battalion were used only with their own battalion, except in emergency.

(b) The assignment of the battalion in direct support of different infantry regiments. Efficient operation of the wire nets, especially the forward lines, depends on close cooperation with the infantry, which is most satisfactory when the direct support battalion works continuously with one infantry regiment.

J. PERSONNEL

1. It is recommended that the strength of forward observer teams be regulated by the specific missions to be accomplished. An officer and 10 men is a good average, but the average situation was seldom encountered on Okinawa. For a fast-moving situation, when it is impractical to lay 110 wire, an officer and six men is ample; for a slower advance, an officer and 10 men is not sufficient, unless the road net is good enough to permit resupply of wire and radio batteries by vehicle. It is believed that at least 16 men are normally needed when the team lays 110 wire. When the two assault companies are advancing parallel and along a narrow front, it is efficient to pool all wiremen with the Liaison Officer and lay one well-protected line.

The composition of forward teams cannot be predetermined for an entire operation; it should be varied as the situation varies from phase to phase.

2. At all times, and particularly over poorly-mapped terrain, such as the northern portion of Okinawa, it is important that the F.O. be able to locate himself. The degree of close support that the battalion can safely furnish depends entirely on his ability to do so. It is therefore recommended that a member of the battalion survey team be trained specifically in road-sketching and in all other means for locating his position; that he be supplied with adequate equipment (compass, pace tally, plotting board, etc.), and be attached to each F.O. and Liaison team with the designation and if possible with the rank of Survey Corporal. It is essential that this man be given no other duties by the officer in charge of the team.

K. AMMUNITION SUPPLY. Ammunition supply was adequate and well handled. At no time was the battalion short of any type of ammunition.

L. TRANSPORTATION. For comment on landing transportation see 5 b 2.
I. TRAINING DEFICIENCIES

1. It is believed that in place of a detailed training program, higher echelon should assign objectives of training for each phase, and allow each battalion to work out the means for attaining these objectives. Assignment of training hours per subject by higher echelon does not allow for the fact that no two battalions are ever at the same level of proficiency in the same subject.

2. It is recommended that the training week be cut down from 39½ hours because:
   (a) training an organized unit is 90% repetition for 75% of the personnel.
   (b) working parties so interfere with training that it is impossible to maintain such a schedule. The result is that all the training planned for a week will seldom be accomplished, and must be carried over into the following week. The battalion was usually unable to complete its training in the period assigned.

3. It is further recommended that all training be done in the morning, with the afternoon devoted to maintenance and rigidly supervised athletics.

4. Overnight problems, such as were held in December, '44 and January '45, should be continued. They constitute practical, realistic training.

II. SUPPLY

Supply in all classes was excellent with the exception of spare parts for Ordnance and Motor Transportation.

A. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF MISSION

1. Registrations 460 rounds
2. Harassing and defensive fires 2853 rounds
3. Targets of opportunity 400 rounds

B. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY ITEM

1. Shell, H. E., 148 w/1 43/1 3153 rounds
2. Shell, Smok, TP w/1 140 620 rounds

C. Transport Quartermaster

1. Loading time: 20 hours.
   No difficulties encountered; a good beach was used and the LST was easily accessible by truck at both high and low tides. Ammunition, rations, and water were at the beach when the LST arrived; loading began immediately and continued without interruption.

2. Unloading time: 72 hours.
   Difficulties encountered: Unloading began with the return trip of the DUKW's and continued for about eight hours without interruption; then the LST changed position and DUKW's that had been assigned began unloading another LST. The ship's radio contacted the Beachmaster and the DUKW's were returned after a time lapse of five hours. The greatest difficulty encountered was the securing of an LCA to unload the high priority TD-14. The tractor was needed
on the beach and it was also very much in the way since only one DUKW could
enter the tank deck to load ammunition while the tractor was there. The LCM
was not obtained until 1400. Due to the conditions ashore, the
battalion's basic transportation was needed earlier than planned, but it was
impossible to get it ashore until the LST could beach on the reef. If the
LCM had been made available to the LST for the entire unloading the unloading
time would have been decreased by 24 to 30 hours.

It is suggested that in future operations an LCM be assigned to each
LST for unloading heavy vehicles in the event the LST cannot beach initially.

10. Observations

A. Weapons

(1) The following weapons were employed by this battalion during the
period 1 April, 20 April, 1945:

- 15 Howitzer, 75mm Pack, 11.1
- 368 Carbine, cal., .30, 11
- 22 En.G., cal., .30, 1918
- 8 Machine-guns, cal., .30, 1919, Flexible
- 16 Machine-guns, cal., .50, B. E. 12.
- 8 Launcher, Rocket, 2.36 inches (Bazooka)
- 17 Pistol, cal., .45, 1911
- 6 Sub-Thompson, cal., .45

(2) Due to rough roads and terraced terrain, two howitzers sustained
bent axles and axle sleeves while being towed into position. These pieces were
out of action for six days, but were replaced with the fifth piece in both
cases. Both howitzers were subsequently repaired and replaced in service.

(3) Broken drawbars were sustained while the howitzers were being
towed 6x6's. It is recommended that either the drawbar or the coupling device
on the truck be modified to permit the howitzer to travel in a more horizontal
position.

B. Combat vehicles:

(1) Number and types used:

- 1 Ambulance, 1/2 ton, 4x4
- 1 Tractor, medium, TP-14, w/ angle dozer.
- 6 Trailers, 1 ton cargo, 2 wh.
- 4 Trailers, 1 ton cargo, 2 wh.
- 1 Trailer, 1 ton, gunning.
- 3 Trailers, 1 ton, water.
- 9 Trucks, 1 ton, 4x4 cargo.
- 2 Trucks, 1 ton, radio TCS.
- 8 Trucks, 1/2 ton, 4x4 radio SCR-608.
- 9 Trucks, 1 ton, 4x4 cargo.
- 11 Trucks, 2/3 ton, 6x6, cargo, S'V. B.
- 4 Trucks, 2/3 ton, 6x6, dump.
(2) Employment -- all vehicles had 20 days battle employment except the trailer, 1 ton, greasing, 2 wh. which was destroyed by enemy action.

(3) Types lost -- 1 trailer, 1 ton, greasing, 2 wh. Destroyed by enemy action.

(4) Malfuctions -- no serious malfuctions.

(5) Maintenance difficulty -- Batteries and tires could not be replaced. Batteries seemed exceptionally short-lived on this operation.

(6) It is recommended that the Truck, 1 ton, 4x4, cargo be withdrawn and the Truck 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo be substituted.

(7) It is recommended that for operations the battalion be furnished the four TD-14's which it rates in the T/0.

C. The following amounts of ammunition were expended:

(1) Shell, H. E., 148 w/F M48A1. 3153 rounds
(2) Shell, Smoke, w/F 160. 620 rounds
(3) Carbine, cal., .30 M1. 640 rounds
(4) Rifle, cal., .30 A.P. 5 rd clips 1300 rounds
(5) Cal., .30, Belted (all ratios) 6300 rounds
(6) Cal., .50, Belted (all ratios) 300 rounds

Five units of fire were landed by the battalion. Subsequently, two units were kept in the battalion area and the remaining three units were left in the Division dump. There was no great problem of supply, as in each forward displacement one unit of fire was carried with the batteries and the remaining unit of fire hauled by truck immediately thereafter. Resupply was made from the Division dump by truck convoy.

12. Medical

A. Supply

The battalion carried initially a two-weeks' supply of insecticides and repellants. After this period, the battalion was unable to obtain a resupply. Specific items were DDT powder, 5% DDT in kerosene, Peron-acrosol bombs, insecticide powder, and screen wire.

B. Disinfection

(1) It would be of some value if a survey could be made of various fresh water streams to determine if any delotorous effects would result from their use for bathing and for washing clothes.
(2) DDT mixtures did an excellent job of controlling insects--more frequent spraying by planes would be desirable.
(3) In each camp area of a semi-permanent nature occupied by the battalion, the batteries set up fly-proofed galley, pre-fabricated heads, urinals...
and garbage pits. Heads were burned, lined and sprayed daily. The area was sprayed with DDT in kerosene for a radius of 300 yards, and fresh water ponds even at a greater distance. Enteric diseases have been minimal.

(4) Prompt serving of hot meals, made possible by the quick erection of sanitary galley's, contributed immeasurably to the morale of the unit.

R. H. Armstrong
Major, USAF
Commanding.
SECOND BATTALION,
FIFTEETH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

24 May, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.

Subject: Special Action Report.

Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division 60-36.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.
SECOND BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I AND II
OKINAWA OPERATION
Chapter I

GENERAL

1. Mission.

The mission assigned this battalion was that of supporting either directly or generally the attack of one or more infantry regiments.
Chapter II

THE TANK ORGANIZATION

1. Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, Commanding Officer
   Nat H. PACE, Major, USMC.
   a. Dog Battery, Commanding Officer
      Henry C. SCHLOSSER, First Lieutenant, USMCR.
   b. Easy Battery, Commanding Officer
      McCuthen C. ATKINSON, Captain, USMCR.
   c. Fox Battery, Commanding Officer
      John L. MOONAN, Captain, USMCR.
   d. Headquarters & Service Battery, Commanding Officer
      Henry H. LAWLER, First Lieutenant, USMCR.
Chapter III
PRELIMINARY PLANNING

1. S-3.

(a) Howitzers were calibrated and grouped accordingly.
(b) Aiming Circles were declinated under regimental supervision.
(c) Camouflage nets were garnished so as to conform with the natural colors anticipated.

2. S-4.

In planning for this operation the four-section of the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines complied with all General Orders and Special Orders issued by division. Rolling stock and its maintenance equipment were thoroughly checked as to serviceability and as to whether or not it would stand operational use. Organizational equipment was brought up to T&A strength and equipment in hands of the troops was inspected to insure that it was in serviceable condition. Planning along the line of general supplies was based on Division Administrative Plan L-45. Personnel in the section were trained in what was to be expected of them. In the event of casualties each member could take over any post in the section, including the S-4 job.
Chapter IV

TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

1. Training Phase.

The training phase was divided into four (4) periods:

(a) Individual and section training.
(b) Battery RSOPs and the battery in support of an infantry battalion.
(c) The battalion functioning as a unit in RSOPs and in support of the infantry regiment.
(d) The battalion as an integral part of the artillery regiment in support of the infantry division.

2. Rehearsals.

The Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines participated in the III Corps Artillery service practice, the Division CPX, the troop phase of the division rehearsal, the final division landing, and three (3) battalion landings, one as part of a regimental landing.
Chapter V

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

1. Loading.

The loading of the equipment, ammunition, and supplies of the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines on LST 568 was divided into two (2) parts. The first cargo loaded consisted of ammunition, gas, rations, vehicles, and other equipment not needed in camp during division maneuvers. The second part of the cargo was loaded after division maneuvers and on the same day the troops were finally embarked. Approximately thirty-three (33) hours were necessary for the entire loading. Vehicles were loaded in about six (6) hours.

Some difficulties arose causing delays which extended the period of time necessary for loading. When the ship was only partially loaded, it was necessary to move the LST to another place on the beach. A considerable period of time elapsed (4 - 5 hours) before loading could be resumed. Other delays were caused by the distance of the battalion's camp from the loading beach. Proper dunnage was not available when needed, and considerable delay was caused by the necessity for moving and placing the heavy timbers and steel matting used as substitute dunnage materials.
Chapter VI

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

1. Disposition and Personnel Afloat.

Personnel of the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines were embarked on nine (9) ships: two (2) APAm, one (1) AKA, and (6) LSTs.

2. Briefing.

Briefing and training aboard ship were of necessity delegated to the officer or NCO in charge of each detachment.

3. Arrival.

Upon arrival at the objective area battalion headquarters contacted regimental headquarters by radio at H-5 hours.

4. LST 568.

Four hundred eighty-six (486) officers and men were carried on LST 568 from the staging area forward. The space available on the ship was not ample enough to accommodate properly that number of men over a period of seven (7) days. Sanitary conditions were poor and adequate cleanliness for any length of time. Many men did not receive sufficient rest prior to the landing.
Chapter VII

ASSAULT PHASE

1. Historical.
   a. S-3.

   The battalion reconnaissance party landed on Beach Green 2 at 1700 on L-Day. Upon finding there was no enemy resistance near the battalion position area, the howitzers were called in to Beach Green 2. They arrived off the beach at 1900, but because of the low-tide roof conditions were forced to move to Beach Green 1 where they landed at 1940. The battalion was ready to fire at 1930 but was not able to register until approximately 2000 because of the rapid advance of the Twenty-Second Marines of which the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines was in direct support.

   The battalion remained in this position from 1 April to the morning of 4 April. Beginning 4 April five (5) displacements in as many days were necessary to keep pace with the rapid advance of the infantry. Positions occupied were at T.s. 8393G, 8396X, 0001B, 1409M, and 0616R. During this period little more than registration was accomplished in each position before it was necessary again to displace. The Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines was in support of the Fourth Marines during this period.

   The battalion remained at 0618R from 8 April to the morning of 11 April in general support of division. On 11 April a displacement to 0121R near Ura was made and the battalion assumed direct support of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Ninth Marines which was then advancing west along the southern coast of Motobu Peninsula. The heaviest fire delivered by the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines during the campaign occurred on 12 April. Heavy mortar fire fell in the battalion position on the afternoon of 13 April and forced the battalion to displace to 0422R near Ura where the battalion resumed direct support of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Ninth Marines the next morning. It remained in this position the rest of the campaign.

   b. S-4.

   The first wave of the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines disembarked from LST 568 at 1530, 1 April, and landed on Beach Green 1 at 1540. The battalion was scheduled to land on Beach Green 2, but the rough and low tide prevented the landing of the DUWMs. The leading DUWM was informed that Green 1 was open and DUWMs could land safely.

   Prior to debarkation, 1 day's "King" and 1 day's "Dog" rations were in the hands of all personnel. All personnel had two (2) canteens filled with water. The four-section, having landed, water and ration dumps were established. On 2 April expeditious canteens and rations began to arrive from the LST. The afternoon of the same day regiment delivered approximately 2000 "Charlies" and "King" rations to the battalion dump. The rations in the hands of personnel lasted until that afternoon. At this time one (1) day's ration, either "King" or "Charlie" was issued to the batteries. At no time during the first three (3) days did water present a problem. The battalion
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

had four hundred twenty-five (425) cans and three (3) three hundred (300) gallon water trailers. The trailers were slow in arriving since the sea and tides were unfavorable. If water was needed, B Company, Sixth Pioneer Battalion furnished the needed amount from their supply in fifty-five (55) gallon drums.

All vehicles landed from LST 588 and the AKs, safely with the exception of one (1) ½ ton cargo trailer which disappeared on Beach Green 1. The vehicles were brought to the battalion area where they were serviced and checked for any damage incurred during the landing. All vehicles were made serviceable. Ammunition arrived slowly from LST 588, but through regimental directing ammunition from LST 947 the battalion was able to build up one (1) u/f in the battalion dump and one (1) u/f at the battery positions.

All organizational equipment arrived from the LST intact. The morning of 4 April the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines deployed to the vicinity of China. The displacement required round trips for each truck. If the battalion had been able to bring the transportation allowed by the T.A., the displacement could have been made in one (1) trip. The firing batteries did well in transporting their one (1) u/f from the beach position in a short time. Two (2) men were left at the battalion ammunition dump as guards. At China ammunition was drawn from this battalion dump to maintain the one (1) u/f at the battery positions. This dump reverted to regimental control when the battalion deployed from China. At China rations, fuel, and water were drawn from Beach Green 2. Road conditions were favorable for movement of supplies from this beach.

On the morning of 5 April the battalion displaced to T.S. 8996X. The four-section did not displace forward with the remainder of the battalion. Two (2) day’s rations and two (2) filled water trailers were carried on the displacement. The battalion displaced to T.S. 0000B on 7 April. Fifteenth Marines delivered rations to the battalion at this location. The four-section displaced from China to rejoin the battalion at T.S. 0618R near Hego on 9 April. Ration and fuel dumps were established, and three (3) days “10 in 1” rations and twenty-four (24) drums of fuel were drawn from division near China. The large amount of fuel drawn was to replenish the supply depleted by the long displacements and to establish a reserve since trucks were frequently making ammunition runs. On 10 April the rear echelon displaced forward to rejoin the battalion.

On 11 April the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines displaced to Avo. All administrative installations were set up in a school building. The supply line was extended five (5) miles, but road conditions and traffic allowed fast movement of supplies. On 12 April the Third Battalion, Twenty-Second Marines moved to Avo for security purposes. Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines patrols in the vicinity had discovered the presence of the enemy in some numbers. Twelve hundred (1200) rations were issued to meet their requirements for two (2) meals. On the morning of 13 April trucks were dispatched to the division dump to secure more rations. After the same morning the majority of the battalion’s transportation was sent to draw ammunition. Prior to 1200 enemy mortar shells began to fall in the battalion position. Urgent requests from the batteries prompted immediate resupply of ammunition.
Division issued two thousand (2000) with the approval of the Division Quartermaster. The sandbags were rushed to the battalion area only to find it had been under mortar barrage which had set fire to the 105mm ammunition which was beginning to explode. The section attempted to enter the position to evacuate equipment, but the ferocity of the explosions altered the effort. The Third Battalion, Fiftieth Marines sent their available transportation to help retrieve what could be evacuated. The battalion displaced to T.S. O416Q near Unna with the equipment which could be evacuated. On being informed that the school building in which two (2) batteries had been billeted had burned down, the section concluded there would be a shortage of warm clothing, blankets, toilet articles, and Class II equipment. Communications with regiment were slow. For that reason the usual channel of requisitioning was avoided and division, closer at hand, was contacted. The Division Quartermaster approved an immediate issue of clothing. Such items as ponchos, shelter-halves, and blankets were not available. Regiment, informed of the emergency, immediately dispatched trucks to furnish the battalion with fuel and rations.

The following day, 14 April, preliminary estimates were made and submitted to the Regimental Quartermaster. The number of items requisitioned was high as salvage operations in the abandoned area were not complete. Most of the requisitions were filled and distribution was made. The batteries turned a number of items back to the section, which items were turned over to the Regimental Quartermaster on 16 April.

2. Unloading.

Fifty-one (51) hours were required to unload. The vehicles were unloaded in the space of a few hours. Unloading began on 1 April at 1300 and was completed on 3 April at 1600. Most of the time was consumed unloading 105mm ammunition and the heavy and bulky substitutes for dunnage. The DUKWs assigned to unload the ship before beaching were withdrawn without warning before the ship was completely unloaded. Five (5) or six (6) hours elapsed before the amphibious truck company could be contacted and the DUKWs returned. Other delays were caused by the handling of the LST. On one occasion the LST was beached at a place not previously inspected and most unsuitable for the unloading of vehicles stored on the main deck.


Survey in this battalion consisted wholly of position area surveys. With one exception the surveys proved accurate. In the vicinity of China the map was in error by several hundred yards. For the most part the map proved to be sufficiently accurate for artillery purposes, though contours especially in the Motobu Peninsula area, were frequently incorrect.
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

b. Displacement.

The survey section was displaced, whenever possible, as part of the battalion reconnaissance party, and in most instances had completed the position area survey by the time the batteries arrived at the new position.

4. Fire Adjustment.

No comment.

5. Fire Direction.

c. General.

Fire direction was conducted according to Marine Corps Schools and Fort Sill doctrine as outlined in P.M. 6-40 with minor modifications dictated by regiment.

b. High Angle Fire.

Low trajectory fire was employed except during the Hotobu Peninsula phase when considerable high angle fire was delivered from the position occupied near Iwa. This was necessary because of the high neck and proved advantageous in the light of the extremely rough terrain in the target area.

c. Metro Messages.

Metro corrections were applied whenever possible.


No comment.

7. Liaison.

e. With Twenty-Second Marines.

Artillery liaison with Twenty-Second Marines proved to be smooth and efficient. The artillery officer was continually consulted on to the capability and limitations of artillery. While the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines was in direct support of the Twenty-Second Marines there was little need for artillery, though that called for was quickly delivered.

Liaison between supporting arms: i.e., artillery, naval gunfire, air, tanks, and rockets, was well coordinated in the Twenty-Second Marines headquarters by assigning one portion of the CP to the various liaison officers and putting the artillery liaison officer in charge. He was given authority to coordinate the supporting arms, subject to the approval of the Commanding Officer. This enabled the Commanding Officer or S-3 to locate his liaison officers and keep in constant touch with them with little effort. Also, this grouping of all liaison officers enabled them to eliminate informally much duplication of effort and simplified coordination between the supporting arms. For example, the artillery forward observer sometimes adjusted naval gunfire by relaying his commands through the artillery liaison.
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

officer to the naval gunfire liaison officer who passed them on to the firing ship.

The artillery liaison officer was able to furnish incidental service such as communications and information received from the artillery air spot. Another service rendered was as follows: When the Twenty-Second Marines advanced so rapidly it ran out of 1/2500 maps and radio between battalions in the line failed, darkness set in before the battalions were able to contact each other. The artillery fired on the flanks of one of the battalions. This enabled the other battalion to estimate the distance from the burst to their own position, thus revealing the size of the gap between battalions.

6. Communications.

Wire and radio communications in this battalion proved to be satisfactory throughout the campaign, the latter replacing the former when conditions warranted. During the rapid advance up the island to Rotobu Peninsula when frequent daily displacements were made, radio was the sole means of contact with regiment. In the Rotobu Phase, a relay station strategically located between the position area and the front lines rendered great service both in wire and radio nets. SCR 610s and 608s functioned well and there were few breakdowns.

9. Observation.

Observation was generally good in the terrain encountered by the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines observers. The rolling, undulating nature of the terrain provided adequate observation. In some areas one forward observer would remain on an OP overlooking the entire battlefield and the other observer remained with his battalion for close direct call fires.

The advantage of direct communication between the artillery air spot and the direct support battalion was considerable. Targets could be checked by both ground and air observers and any area desired surveyed by the infantry commander was immediately brought under observation by the air spot.


a. Are you satisfied with present allowance of personnel? Yes.
b. What changes, if any, are specifically recommended? None.
c. Was training of personnel adequate? Yes.
d. What recommendations, if any, were made for special training? None.
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

c. List averages or shortages of communication personnel in your unit embarked aboard ship for the operations: This battalion was short sixty-seven (67) enlisted personnel in the Communication Section. (The Battalion rates one hundred seventeen (117).)

d. List losses of personnel aboard ship before landing. None.

e. List losses of personnel in effecting the landing. None.

f. List losses of personnel in period from after landing until operation was completed. Four (4) officers. Thirty-two (32) enlisted men.

i. Were communication personnel employed for duties other than communications: Yes. What were their duties: Headquarters & Service Battalion Commander.

j. How were battle casualties replaced? They were not replaced.

11. Ammunition Supply.

c. Number of rounds expended or lost due to enemy action.

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<td><strong>10467</strong></td>
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d. Methods and Problems of Supply.

1. Regiment was the supplying agency. Trucks were dispatched to regimental dumps on order of regimental ammunition officer.
2. No problems encountered.

c. Methods and Problems of Storage.

1. Ammunition, when time permitted, was placed in pits deep enough to prevent detonation by any hit except a direct one.
2. No problems were encountered.

d. Adequacy and Types and Packaging.

1. Types and packaging were found to be adequate.

c. Recommended Changes in u/f.

1. None.

f. New types desired.

1. None.
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.


a. Number and type of combat vehicles used.

- **12 Trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, dump.**
- **3 Trucks, 2½ ton, 6x6, S.W.B., cargo.**
- **9 Trucks, 1 ton, 4x4, cargo.**
- **9 Trucks, ½ ton, 4x4, cargo.**
- **3 Trucks, 4½ ton, 4x4, 606 Radio-Equipped.**
- **2 Trucks, 6½ ton, 4x4, TOS Radio-Equipped.**
- **1 Tractor, TD 14, w/angledozer.**
- **3 Trailers, water, 2 wheel, 300 gal. cap.**
- **4 Trailers, 1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo.**
- **6 Trailers, ½ ton, 2 wheel, cargo.**

b. Number of days battle employment. Twenty-one (21).

c. Number and type damaged beyond repair.

- **1 Tractor, TD 14, w/angledozer.**
- **1 Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo.**
- **3 Trailers, ½ ton, 2 wheel, cargo.**
- **1 Trailer, water, 2 wheel, 300 gal. cap.**

d. Malfunctions, explain in detail.

1. The Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines had twenty-six (26) flat tires on 2½ ton, 6x6 trucks. The tires on this type of truck do not seem to withstand cuts by nails, shell fragments, etc. as well as those on other vehicles. No trouble was encountered with 1 ton or ½ ton tires.

c. Principal items of maintenance difficulty.

1. Carburetion and ignition systems.

f. Adequacy of spare parts and accessories.

1. Spare parts and accessories were not adequate. A complete stock of spare parts should have been carried but was not available.

c. Recommendations as to modifications of existing types and for new types. None.

13. Material used.

c. Number, type and caliber of weapons used.

1. 558 Carbines, Cal. 30.
2. 18 Machine Guns, HE, Cal. 50.
4. 22 Rifles, Browning Automatic, Cal. 30.
5. 8 Launchers, Rocket.
Chapter VII, ASSAUL1 PHASE, continued.

6. 30 Dischargers, grenade, MG.
7. 13 Howitzers, 105mm, M2.
8. 11 Pistols, Cal. 45.

b. Number of days battle employment.
1. Twenty-one (21).

c. Number, type and caliber of weapons lost.
1. 35 Carbines, Cal. 30.
2. 3 Machine Guns, HE, Cal. 50.
3. 1 Machine Gun, 1919A4, Cal. 30.
4. 6 Rifles, Browning Automatic, Cal. 30.
5. 4 Launchers, Rocket.
6. 2 Howitzers, 105mm, M2.
7. 3 Pistols, Cal. 45.

d. Malfunctions, explain in detail.
1. There were no malfunctions in this battalion.

e. Adequacy of spare parts and accessories.
1. Spare parts and accessories for the 105mm howitzers were not only inadequate, they were non-existent in this battalion. Actual loading of ammunition before leaving Guadalcanal was delayed one (1) day by reason of indecision as to whether the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines would use 75mm howitzers or 105mm howitzers. The explanation for this indecision was the lack, until practically the last day, of sight mounts for the 105mm howitzers.

f. Recommendations as to modifications of existing type and for new types.
1. None.

a. Displacements.
1. Training in displacing was inadequate. One (1) displacement was made during the training period. It was made in the troop phase of the division maneuver. Range limitations on Guadalcanal were largely responsible for this deficiency.
2. Inadequate emphasis on certain aspects of the forward observers mission.
1. Not enough training was given in identification of targets by means of target squares. This proved to be the only method used by forward observers of the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines with perhaps one exception.

2. It is believed that a stationary CP is not good preparation for combat. Forward observers should have been made to move their CPs frequently
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

in order to simulate the moving situation encountered in combat. This would necessitate identification of targets from different angles which is essential.

15. Maps and Photos.
   a. Maps.
      Maps were not available at one time during the rapid advance toward Motobu Peninsula.
   b. Photos.
      No photographs were received after the landing.

16. Enemy Action Against our Artillery.
   a. The Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines encountered accurate mortar fire on 13 April in the vicinity of Awa from an unobserved position.

17. Supply.
   a. Adequacy of all types of mounting supplies.
      All classes sufficient except for Class II ordnance items.
      Class II: Spare parts and accessories for 105mm howitzers.
   b. Adequacy of resupply.
      Sufficient in all classes with the exception of ordnance items in Class II mentioned above.

   a. M 48 - 7413
      M 54 - 1590
      MP - 438
      TOTAL 9441
   b. Cal. 30. AP & Tracer 6940
      Cal. 30. Carbine 5825
      Cal. 50. AP & Tracer 1200
      Cal. 45. 350
      Fragmentation Hand Grenade 40

19. Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Type of Fire Mission.
   a. Registration.
      M 48 - 1491
      M 54 - 41
      MP - 76
      TOTAL 1568
   b. Call Fires.
      M 48 - 3608
      M 54 - 1249
      MP - 107
      TOTAL 4964
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

c. Harrasing Fires.
   M 42 - 1779
   M 54 - 270
   WF - 135
   TOTAL 2184

d. Preparation Fires.
   M 42 - 1585
   M 54 - 20
   WF - 120
   TOTAL 1735

20. Effectiveness of Artillery.

a. Motobu Peninsula.

1. Placing fire on observed gun positions while not knocking them out in most instances silenced them effectively. Some fortified positions were destroyed and others were kept under constant harrassing fire, and the usefulness of these positions to the enemy was materially reduced. Artillery fire destroyed the camouflage of concealed enemy positions revealing their location and caliber.

2. Fire on suspected enemy positions was successful on the peninsula beyond expectations. Over three hundred (300) bodies fell victim to fire of supporting arms. The continual use of artillery did considerable work in disorganizing enemy communications and denied him the use of roads during daylight hours.

3. Harrassing fire not only acted as a determent to the enemy but also as a morale-booster to the infantry. It was a constant reminder that the artillery was in support.

4. The First Armored Amphibian Battalion was well trained in basic field artillery technique of fire and was employed as field artillery as a secondary mission. The fire of the First Armored Amphibian Battalion in support of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Ninth Marines was very effective. On Motobu Peninsula the armored amphibs were able to get into their positions only by reason of their tracked nature. It is recommended that all armored amphibious battalions learn field artillery methods.


22. Types of Material used by Enemy Artillery. No comment.

23. Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery.

   Enemy mortar fire was highly effective against this battalion.
Chapter VII, ASSAULT PHASE, continued.

24. Methods used to locate artillery targets.
   a. Ground observation.
   b. Air Spot.
   c. Information from higher echelon.

25. Effectiveness of coordination of target information center.
   a. No comment.
Chapter VIII

NARRATIVE ON ENEMY TACTICS

1. No Comment.
Chapter IX

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. Enemy Casualties.
   1. KIA  6
   2. Captured. Estimated 7 Soldiers. These were included in a group of approximately 150 persons taken from caves.

2. Own Losses.
   1. KIA  5
   2. WIA  35
   3. Missing 1
Chapter X

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDER

1. S-1. None.


It is recommended that aerial photos of critical areas be furnished artillery battalions throughout the campaign.


Maps contoured in yards rather than meters would simplify and speed up fire direction.


a. It is recommended that the following items of equipment be included in the T.A. for an artillery battalion:

1. Water distillation unit.
   (a) Distant water points caused considerable divergence of transport from primary functions.

2. One (1) T.D. 14 per battalion.
   (a) The T.D. 9 now rated is inadequate for building gun pits, CP fortifications, and the roads frequently required in improving a battalion position.

3. Two (2) .30 Caliber B.M.G. air-cooled, in lieu of two (2) .50 Caliber H.S., H.E., w/ground mounts.
   (a) This substitution is recommended for two (2) reasons as follows:
      (1) Increased mobility and more rapid emplacement.
      (2) Less danger to surrounding friendly units.

b. It is recommended that two (2) LST's be assigned to an artillery battalion. This would allow all organic transportation to be taken on the operation and would provide ample living space for the men.

Hat H. Pace,
Major, USMC,
Commanding.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GO-36.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this Battalion is forwarded herewith.

J. C. McHANEY
THIRD BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASES I AND II, OCNINAVA OPERATION
Chapter I

GENERAL

This special action report is submitted to give a complete account of plans and events leading to the assault and occupation phase.

The Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, was assigned the mission of General Support, reinforcing the fires of First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, in the assault phase of the operation. Subsequently in the occupation phase this battalion was employed as a Direct Support Battalion.
Chapter II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

The Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joe C. McHaney, consists of three (3) 105mm Howitzer firing batteries and one (1) Headquarters and Service battery.

Subordinate Commanders were:

- Headquarters and Service: Capt. Edward C. O'Donnell
- George: Capt. Harris H. Barnes, Jr.
- Item: Capt. Louis D. Abney, Jr.
Chapter III

Preliminary Planning

1. One Section planning:

The preliminary planning of the S-1 consisted of meeting with troop adjutants of the various transports on which the battalion personnel was to be embarked and plans were made for the submission of embarkation rosters and the embarkation of the troops.

2. Two Section planning:

The S-2 held classes for the entire Battalion on the handling of enemy documents, censorship and security measures, collection of enemy material, handling of POWs, identification and operation of enemy weapons, enemy tactics and organization.

3. Three Section planning:

Preliminary planning for the operation was begun upon receipt of maps, aerial photos, and information bulletins of the target area. Officer classes were conducted by the Battalion Commander and S-3. Every detail of the operation was discussed until all officers were familiar with the enemy situation, the terrain, and scheme of maneuver. Each officer then held classes with the men in his section and they were thoroughly briefed on the following points: the beaches, the initial position area, the scheme of maneuver, adjacent troops, the enemy, diseases, the terrain, and the native inhabitants. It is felt that each man knew the task ahead and how best to accomplish it.

Since the scheme of maneuver dictated the use of short-range artillery fires, all firing batteries were instructed in the firing of (1/2) charge. One service practice was held firing this charge. The operation section made up GFT slides for super-high angle fire, and slides for charges one (1) and (1/2) for ranges below 1400 yards. Probable targets, base point, and check points were plotted on the firing chart and copies distributed to forward observers, Liaison Officer, FDC, and BFCs.

4. Four Section planning:

Supplies for a thirty day period were accumulated and distributed to the batteries as far as possible. The batteries were better equipped to handle gear because of their 2 1/2 ton, 6x6 trucks, whereas the H&E Battery had only three 1 ton trucks and was unable to allot a great deal of truck space to the Quartermaster.
Chapter III

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

4. Four section: (Cont’d)

The supplies were furnished with a view toward operating for thirty days before any more supplies were to be available. Leading rehearsals were held, each one proving valuable in that a better method of arranging the battalion gear was discovered and more essential equipment loaded without reaching the limits of the vehicles used.

Leading of the 105mm Howitzers into M16’s along with ammunition, sand bags, and all high priority local security equipment was also carried out prior to embarkation. Combinations of ammunition, personnel and sand bags were tried until finally, with all factors taken into consideration, it was decided that each firing battery would carry 39 rounds of ammunition, 2500 sand bags and approximately 35 men ashore initially. This load, distributed over five M16’s would prevent any capsizing in the event a high rough surf was encountered on L day. The load in each M16 came to within 500 pounds of the load limit.

The quartermaster was granted the use of a 1 ton trailer and carried, in addition to quartermaster supplies, a few medical supplies which the medical department was unable to find space to transport. Throughout the battalion an effort was made to put all forward echelon equipment on rolling stock to facilitate speedy unloading and to make recovery on the beaches an easy task. The quartermaster carried a small amount of expendable supplies to supplement or replace any lost and also materials to erect and outfit an Operations Center.

Motor transport coordinated their repair section plans with regiment and planned to take only essential spare parts and tools in the battalion while regiment attended to the transportation of the heavier and cumbersome battery charging set and the welding unit, and also assigned the transporting of a grease trailer to another battalion in the regiment. Spare parts were at a premium and requisitions were not filled completely prior to embarkation. As a result, this battalion embarked without the full complement of spare parts it desired.

Ordnance checked all equipment and packed only a few spare parts and tools. A traveling repair and maintenance unit was planned with major repairs to be evacuated to a higher echelon, if they occurred.

Small supplies of fruit juices were obtained by personnel in the battalion and sections were permitted a small box of this commodity to supplement emergency rations the first day ashore.
Landing rations, DOG, KING and CHARLIE were supplied without trouble and were adequate. Ammunition supplies were also adequate and available in time to prepare them for under-stowage aboard the LST's. One item which was not available and was desired for use as booby trap equipment was trip flares. Fuel supplies were adequate and Class IV supplies were available for the most part but it is suggested that prefabricated heads and prefabricated galleys, at least four of each, be furnished each battalion for an operation. Sand bags were furnished after a slight delay but in plenty of time for loading.
Chapter IV
TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

All troops were trained thoroughly on the performance of their specific job, and in addition were given brief indoctrination in other duties so they would be capable of taking over in an emergency. They were indoctrinated as to the function of an artillery battalion from its smallest component part to the battalion as a unit. Infantry tactics, the employment of scout-sniper teams, demolitions and chemical warfare were also stressed.

Six (6) hours were devoted to loading and unloading DUKWs in the Battalion camp area. In addition to two practice landings required by Regiment, two RSOPs were held in which DUKWs landed the Battalion.
Chapter V

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

1. The embarkation of troops was made difficult because of the numerous changes in the plans. In the final week before embarkation a number of changes were made, and often considerable time elapsed before the information was passed on to all the units concerned. At times information concerning the embarkation of troops was given to the Battalion transport quartermaster, but was not given to S-1, and at times the information obtained by the transport quartermaster and the S-1 did not coincide.

The actual embarkation and billeting of troops aboard ship was hampered by the fact that the ship had submitted a schedule showing the available space for billeting the troops, but when the troops were embarked it was found that there was not as much space as had been anticipated and some members of the ship's crew had moved from their assigned compartments, necessitating a reshuffling of the troops at the last minute.

2. Loading required approximately 30 hours after the LST beached. Primary difficulties in loading were (1), the excess gear the ship had on both the top deck and the tank deck which had not been counted upon by the ship loading detail, (2), the lack of preparation on the part of the ship's crew to receive new cargo, (3), the difficult berths allotted to the rations which were not easily accessible. The rations were placed forward on the top deck beneath the gun platforms and valuable loading time was lost in this tedious process. To overcome the obstacles, the loading detail had to clean the ship thoroughly and then wait for the ship's crew to get the crane and other bulky gear moved to the least troublesome spot on the deck as far as the plans of the loading officer were concerned.

It was discovered in loading 55 gallon drums of fuel that instead of using the ship's ramp to roll the drums to the top deck, that much time and labor could be saved by rolling the drums aft on the tank deck and using the ship's crane to hoist them to the top deck, after which they were rolled forward to the space allotted them in the loading plans. Also noted was the fact that properly loaded trailers may be telescoped to save space on the deck, and that time may be saved by putting four (4) men on a corner of a jeep and bouncing it into place instead of driving it in wherever a tight squeeze is involved.
Chapter VII

ASSAULT PHASE

1. The battalion reconnaissance party disembarked from APA 129 into two (2) LCVPs, and transferred to three (3) LVTs at the transfer point. At 1030, the reconnaissance party landed on Red Beach 1 and quickly reconnoitered the assigned area in the vicinity of TOYA. The battalion was called in and landed at 1330. Guns and personnel were carried in DUKWs of the 814th Army DUKW Company, and experienced no difficulty in crossing the reef. Survey for the initial position was initiated from one of two battalion IPs, predetermined by the first and third battalion. Survey was completed prior to occupation of battalion position and batteries were laid by base angle on Hill 400. Surveys were run thereafter for all new positions, using either regimental control or map data.

Adjustment of fires was entirely by forward observers and aerial observers. The rugged terrain on Motobu Peninsula dictated the extensive use of shell smoke during adjustment.

Fire direction used Fort Sill and Marine Corps Schools principles and proved entirely satisfactory. Registrations were made each morning and evening whenever possible. Application of registration and metro data was used because of varying weather conditions which changed Range F's 60 yards per thousand and deflection corrections 30 miles within a period of six hours. Metro service, as furnished by Regiment, was excellent.

Wire and radio were the only means of communication employed. Maintenance of wire communication during the Motobu Peninsula campaign proved difficult because of the speed of the advance, and the great distances separating the supporting and supported units. Consequently, reliance was on radio communication. Both the 610 and 608 proved to be excellent pieces of equipment.

Ammunition was both ample and excellent. Many of the inherent difficulties in fire adjustment experienced during the training phase can be attributed to faulty ammunition.

Unloading of the LST took 69 1/2 hours, including the removal of all dunnage from the ship. The biggest delay was caused by the coral reef which prevented the LST from beaching after the enemy resistance was found to be light. The rolling stock on the top deck had to be towed through salt water, which measured at least three feet at low tide. Low tide lasted but thirty minutes, and unloading had to cease at high tide because of the depth of the water at this time. Unloading was carried out, however, with damage to only one truck being serious enough to stall it for over a period of twenty four (24) hours. This truck was towed into a coral hole and tipped to one side, dropping some of the load into the water and assuming such a precarious position that further attempts to extricate it was postponed for hours.
Chapter VII

ASSAULT PHASE

1. (Cont'd)

It was removed later and repaired on the beach in a few days. Damage to other vehicles was slight, except that all were immersed in salt water and performances were not perfect until repair units had the opportunity to overhaul them. In view of this experience, it is suggested that all vehicles be water-proofed before an amphibious operation to protect the motor and vital parts. An attempt was made to do this prior to embarkation, but materials were not available.

Also hampering the unloading was the fact that DUKW's were slow in returning to the ship for ammunition and dunnage and this, it is estimated, caused at least 30 hours delay. The DUKW's were not at fault as the LST remained a great distance from shore and the number of DUKW's available was not sufficient large to make it possible to load continuously. At times, more than an hour passed without any ammunition going ashore.

Under ideal conditions, where the DUKW's would be launched and the LST would beach shortly thereafter; a conservative estimate of the time required to completely unload would be 6 hours. If the LST were unable to beach, as in this operation, but if loading were to proceed continuously, the unloading time should be approximately 24 hours, making the estimated delay on this operation about 15 1/2 hours.

For a short while, water appeared to be a problem, but the unloading of 55 gallon drums and conservative use gave the battalion enough water until a water point was established. This battalion had a distillation unit attached, but this unit was unable to function efficiently until 13 because of numerous and almost daily displacements made by this battalion. Once established the unit was able to produce upwards of 700 gallons a day, until relieved to return to its parent organization. Fifty five gallon water drums were used extensively in the battery which had no water trailer and are the best substitute found by this battalion for water trailers. This water is not noticeably flavored and is more suited to drinking and cooking purposes than the water which is obtained from the 5 gallon expeditionary cans. The drums are easy to handle when empty and a rack built about three and one-half feet high serves as an excellent support for full drums. An ordinary water faucet fits the drum and makes economical use possible.

No trouble was encountered in the resupply of Class I, II, III, IV, and Class V materials. All were adequate and easily obtainable. Ammunition for the 105mm Howitzers seldom fell below 1 unit of fire at all guns and, except for a few hours during displacements, was near 2 units at all times.
Chapter VII
ASSAULT PHASE

1. (Cont'd)

Ammunition expenditures are listed below by type of ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-48</td>
<td>5,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-54</td>
<td>1,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-57</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,457</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal.</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 cal., belted</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 cal., clips</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 cal., ball</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30 cal., Carbine</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.36 Rocket</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Hand, Frg.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Hand, WP.</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flares, trip</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ammunition expenditures listed by mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation fires</td>
<td>3,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassing</td>
<td>1,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire missions</td>
<td>3,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,457</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No serious problems arose in the procurement or stowage of ammunition. The new metal containers protecting the inner carton around the 105mm ammunition are a great aid in keeping the ammunition in excellent condition. This is indicated by the favorable appearance of the tubes after the operation as compared to the condition of the tubes after the RSOFs in the training area, using old ammunition.
Chapter VII

ASSAULT PHASE

1. (Cont'd)

This battalion used the following weapons on this operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>DAYS BATTLE EMPLOY</th>
<th>LOST</th>
<th>MALFUNCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, cal. .50, hb.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, cal. .30, M1919</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, rocket</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR, cal. .30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, cal. .30, M1</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, cal. 30, M1</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, cal. .45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordnance spare parts for this operation were adequate. No malfunctions were recorded and few of the small arms were fired.

The following vehicles were employed and performed satisfactorily although roughly treated in the salt water landing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>BATTLE EMPLOY: DAYS</th>
<th>LOST OR DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 1/4, 4x4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor, w/angle dozer, med.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1/4 ton, cargo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1 ton cargo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, water</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, cargo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, w/TCS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, SCR 608</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1 ton, cargo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last column on lost or damaged trucks or vehicles is intended to list those vehicles which were damaged beyond repair. Prior to embarkation this battalion requisitioned many spare parts for vehicles which not received and the spare parts with which this battalion operated were not adequate. Many starters, throw-out bearings, spark plugs, wheel cylinders, clutches, and batteries were ruined, and much brake fluid was needed to replace that which was rendered useless when the vehicles were immersed in salt water during the landing.
Chapter VIII

ENEMY TACTICS

1. This battalion received no counter battery fire. In no instance did the enemy attempt to mass his artillery fires. His fires were harassing. One enemy piece was located by "flash bang" methods conducted at the battery positions.

The battalion had little opportunity to observe enemy ground tactics. No infiltration of the battalion area was encountered. Enemy killed and captured in the areas around the battalion positions appeared to be trying to hide rather than fight.
Chapter IX

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. Enemy casualties:

   (a) 16 killed by patrols and local security; 5 captured in the battalion area.

   (b) Results of many artillery missions could not be ascertained, but fires delivered in the area around the town of Ishi Kawa and on the Motobu Peninsula were very effective. One local counter-attack against the First Battalion, Fourth Marines, on Mt. Yaetsuke was stopped by artillery fire. Two high angle fire missions delivered against this counter-attack proved very successful in reaching enemy troops on reverse slopes. An estimated 120 dead were counted.

2. Own losses:

   (a) One (1) killed in action.

   (b) Three (3) injured in action, including one (1) officer.
Chapter X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. One Section:

(a) Better coordination and dissemination of information relative to embarkation of troops prior to actual embarkation.

(b) That steps be taken to alleviate the overcrowded conditions aboard the transports insofar as the available ships allow. It appears that it was unnecessary to have all personnel of an artillery battalion aboard the LST. The gun crews would be sufficient for the initial landing and the remainder could be on call at any time from an APA.

(c) The setting up of a standard operating procedure for submitting sailing rosters to troop commanders. Some of them required one hundred and fifty copies and others required only one copy.

2. Two Section:

(a) The 1/25,000 terrain map furnished during the operation could have been better. Sections did not readily fit together. Aerial observers and forward observers found many terrain features inaccurately located and in many cases not mapped.

(b) The battalion was in position many miles from division or regimental headquarters and limited transportation made the bringing of prisoners, civilians, documents and material to higher headquarters quite difficult. In a similar situation periodic collection runs by higher echelon would be very helpful.

(c) Intelligence summaries and operation orders generally arrived too late to be of much use.

3. Three Section:

(a) Displacements were made difficult by the lack of adequate transportation. More transportation is definitely needed.

(b) A closer coordination between the infantry regiments and division as to who will have priority on preparation fires, night harassing fires, and the amount of fires desired.

(c) The need of radio channels far enough apart to prevent interference is recommended.
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3. Three Section: (Cont'd)

   (d) Aerial photos are needed both for survey and identification of targets.

4. Four Section:

   (a) It is recommended that all vehicles be waterproofed, and

   (b) That all transportation be taken by the battalion. The TBA allowances would be adequate in combat if it were possible to take the vehicles in the forward echelon. Many displacements on this operation were retarded somewhat because of the problem of moving all equipment and ammunition. At one phase of the operation, because of the lack of vehicles, the battalion had three camps with men and equipment at each establishment. This put a strain on communication equipment and supplies.

   (c) That 1 ton, 4x4 trucks be replaced by 2 1/2 ton, 6x6 trucks throughout the battalion.

   (d) That more canvas be allotted to forward echelon units. Also that a new sufficiently large blackout tent be issued to accommodate the FDC, which operated with a pyramidal tent during this operation. Cramped quarters and long hours in this air tight tent might detract from the efficiency of this highly technical detachment. Ammunition tarpaulins are also a necessity and were not available prior to embarkation.

   (e) That more troop space be furnished for the transporting of troops to the target area. Because of carrying more than twice the normal number of troops aboard an LST on this operation, this battalion lost or had irreparably damaged a great amount of individual equipment. Many troops who had no billeting and who lived topside, lost equipment over the side and had gear water-soaked by rain and heavy seas. Many rations were wastefully consumed and littered about the decks because the overload made it impossible to guard them properly. If troops must be transported in this manner, it is suggested that a suitable frame and enough canvas be furnished to provide cover for troops not provided with bunks. Canvas and lumber to be struck on D minus and turned into Division dump on beach.

   (f) That new CHARLIE and new KING rations be furnished entirely until BAKER rations and 10 in 1 rations can be made available.
Chapter X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Four Section: (Cont'd)

(g) That distillation plants be assigned to battalion and be used until enough water points are in operation so as to make the distillation units with each battalion unnecessary. This distillation plant near the battalion reduced the traffic on the narrow roads, saved wear on the vehicles, and greatly simplified the water problem.

(h) That prefabricated heads and galleys be furnished each battalion under Class IV supplies. Four of each would suffice and aid greatly in the maintenance of strict sanitary measures.

(i) That slots be cut in left armor plates on the 105mm, M3A3 mount to provide better vision toward aiming stakes. This slot should be deepened, it is believed, at least 3 inches.

(j) That more motor parts be made available to artillery battalions, who maintain a sizeable fleet of prime movers and ammunition carrying vehicles.
FOURTH BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

5 May, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GO - 36.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.

BRUCE T. HEMPHILL
FOURTH BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASE I & II, OKINAWA OPERATION
Chapter I

GENERAL

This report is submitted to give a complete and accurate narrative of the preparation for and execution of the mission assigned, from its inception in the planning phase, through the training and logistical preparations, to the completion of the assault and occupation phase.

The Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines was assigned the mission of General Support of the Sixth Marine Division for the initial landing of the OKINAWA operation. Prior training was conducted so that the battalion would be capable of either Direct or General Support. Both missions were assigned to this battalion at different times during the operation.
Chapter II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

The Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill is composed of three (3) firing batteries of 105mm Howitzers and one Headquarters and Service battery.

Battery Commanders are as follows:

- Headquarters and Service — Capt. Robert D. Lackland
- King — 1stLt. Robert T. Patterson
- Love — Capt. John T. Haynes
- Mike — Major Robert F. Irving
Chapter III
PRELIMINARY PLANNING

1. One Section planning:
   A. Embarkation rosters compiled.
   B. Additional personnel cards and rosters compiled.
   C. Equipment reconditioned.
   D. Combat report forms and instructions for use of same, given to batteries.
   E. Rear Echelon personnel of One Section instructed in rear administrative duties.
   F. Early attempt (with cooperation of En. Surgeon) to regulate admission of En. personnel to Division and Fleet Hospitals.

2. Two Section planning:
   Prior to operation the Battalion had classes on how to handle prisoners, what to do with various types of enemy material and how souvenirs would be handled. One of the classes was conducted by a Division Language Officer and the balance by S-2 of the battalion.

3. Three Section planning:
   Detailed planning for the OKINAWAN operation was begun early in March of 1945 when topographic and relief maps and general information about the operation was made available to the battalion. Classes were held for officers to give them information on beaches and type of terrain that would be encountered in our first position area. The relief map which was available for about two weeks was very valuable in giving officers a clear picture of the immediate landing area.

   Since our training program and SOP had emphasized this type of landing, a written operations order was not issued. Office and key NCOs were thoroughly instructed as to what they were to do upon landing, and four rehearsals were held prior to departure from the training area.

   Boat assignment tables were made out for the first trip of landing boats (20 DUKWS). Shuttle trips were planned with first priority on ammunition, and second priority on local security sections. Since the initial position area of this battalion was about 200 yards from the left flank of the division (also the left flank of the Tenth Army), local security was assumed to be quite serious. Fourteen BNG Cal. 30 MG1944 were given the battalion, and plans were made and coordinated with the infantry battalion for a tight
3. Three Section planning (continued):

defense on the left flank. Scout sniper sections were organized and instructed in the job of cleaning out the immediate vicinity of the battalion area.

One hundred and thirty nine (139) probable targets were received from Regiment, which we plotted on maps for use by the Forward Observer, FDC, and Battery Fire Charts.

The same type grid system that appeared on the terrain maps was superimposed on FDC Grid boards. All available information was plotted on these boards (targets, phase lines, and boundary lines) which was to be used as the firing chart.

Aiming circles were declinated.

The survey plan was set up to get batteries located on the map from a short traverse from a control point used by the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines (The direct support battalion in our area). Later the survey was to be adjusted by Regimental control. The use of photographs for restitution was contemplated for location of batteries on the firing chart.

4. Four Section planning:

Early planning was based upon recommendations set forth by Regimental S-4 section. These recommendations stated the number of vehicles, weapons, and quartermaster supplies to be taken. Requisitions were then submitted for the necessary supplies to bring the Battalion up to combat strength and, in addition, supplies for fifteen (15) days shipboard use and thirty (30) days operational use. At the same time the motor transport and ordnance sections made every effort to put their equipment in the best possible condition with available spare parts and accessories.

Supplies were loaded aboard trucks where they remained until unloaded at the beach. A cargo list was made up for each truck with copies for the driver and the Quartermaster. These proved to be of value in the efficient unloading of trucks at the beach and in aiding the driver to keep his cargo intact aboard ship.

5. Communications planning:

Before embarkation all radios were realigned and serviced. Radio Jeeps were waterproofed. All communication gear was serviced and put in excellent condition.
Chapter III
PRELIMINARY PLANNING

6. Ordnance planning:

Plans were made for under-stowing ammunition aboard the LST. Rows of ammunition were stowed from stern to bow so that different types of ammunition could be taken off at the same time.

Howitzers and small arms were inspected and serviced.

7. Motor Transport planning:

All vehicles were painted and serviced. An extra wheel was added to each front wheel of each 2½ ton 6 x 6, making duals all the way around. Chains were placed on all vehicles. Windshields were crated.
Chapter IV

TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS.

Specific training with a view toward accomplishment of the assigned mission included (1) the use of DUKWS in practice landings, (2) test firing ½ charge (bag 6 only), (3) training scout sniper sections, and (4) standard basic training for all sections.

The initial training with DUKWS was in the Battalion camp area. A total of four (4) hours was given to each firing battery for practice loading and unloading of Howitzers from DUKWS. These dry runs were valuable in getting gun sections and DUKW personnel coordinated in the unloading at the beach.

Three (3) practice landings were made with the twenty (20) DUKWS which were assigned to land us for the operation. A maximum weight of 6500 lbs was decided upon for the maximum load to put on each DUKW. Six DUKWS were assigned to each firing battery and two to Headquarters and Service Battery. The three practice landings were made with the above allotment to batteries.

Since "short range" firing was anticipated for the initial phases of the operation, charge ½ was used on two service practices. The charge was very satisfactory, and the gun crews were soon efficient in its handling.

Scout sniper sections were composed of eight (8) men (2 MA 4 M-1 rifles, 2 carbines) were organized and trained to clean out the Battalion area before occupation of the position. Each battery had one of these sections which came from local security personnel.

One rehearsal was made before the actual landing on L-Day. Here the reconnaissance party, and the first trip of DUKWS were landed.

The basic training of the Battalion was based on standard Field Artillery tactics and technique as set forth by Field Artillery School at Quantico and Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.
Chapter V

LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

The battalion was embarked aboard the following ships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LST 704</td>
<td>March 11th</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA NOBLE</td>
<td>March 14th</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA MONROVIA</td>
<td>March 14th</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA WAYNE</td>
<td>March 14th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA CASSELL</td>
<td>March 14th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2½ u/f 105mm ammunition, plus small arms ammunition, were understowed in approximately twenty (20) hours.

Understowage can be accomplished anywhere from ten (10) to twenty (20) hours depending on size of working party and trucks available.

It took five (5) hours to load LST of everything else.

Difficulties encountered were ship's equipment (crane on weather deck, 2 finger lifts on tank deck, boarded up area around winch, tank deck aft) which reduced loading space. All equipment was loaded with adjustments to loading plan. It is recommended that some space (about 5%) be provided in loading plan to account for such contingencies.
Chapter VI
MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

The Battalion less eighty seven (87) men and fourteen (14) officers were embarked aboard the LST from the transhipping area to the objective.

Due to an overcrowded LST drills and classes of more than ten (10) men were impossible. However, each section leader briefed his section on latest Intelligence Summaries, and available literature on the island in general. A relief map would have been very valuable in getting the information to the men.

Gun crews serviced the howitzers daily, and the FDC had daily drills of one hour duration.

The Reconnaissance party and three (3) Forward Observer teams received adequate briefing since they were aboard the MONROVIA with Headquarters, 22ND MARINES where plenty of information was available. They attended three meetings of the Headquarters on the scheme of maneuver of the Regiment and latest intelligence information.

UDT reports came in about three days before L-Day. The battalion was kept up to date on all these reports.

No unusual events happened enroute.
Chapter VII

ASSAULT PHASE

1. Ship to Shore Movement:

The Battalion Reconnaissance Party landed on GREEN BEACH I at 1130 on L-Day. Reconnaissance was completed at 1200 and the first load of DUKWS were ordered in by the Battalion Commander. Unloading commenced at 1230 but due to difficulty in finding a route for the DUKWS over the reef it was 1415 before they arrived at the position area. One DUKW with howitzer overturned on the coral the first trip. The howitzer was recovered with a water logged sight as the only damage. The sight was repaired in three days by Division Ordnance.

Very little time was lost in the transport area for the ship came in as close as safety permitted to the reef.

All Jeeps were unloaded with LVTs by the second day. The LVTs were not assigned the battalion but were borrowed from the Shore Party when one was available.

The LST was beached the morning of the third day and all vehicles were driven over the reef under their own power. All gear was off the ship at 1530 3 April, 1945.

No riggings or slings were used in debarking from the ship. All unloading was done with DUKWS, except for the vehicles that came off the third day and the Jeeps in LVTs.

2. Communication:

Communication from beach to ship was excellent. This was not a good test for the radios, however, because the greatest distance for the operation was about (3) miles, over water. Difficulties with 610 radio was encountered later when the range approached five (5) miles or greater over rugged terrain. The SOI contained sufficient frequencies and call signs for all units involved.

3. Medical:

Came ashore at H plus 8 hours. The sick bay was located about 400 yards from the beach. Roads were available for evacuation work. Local security was taken care of by H&S Battery. A tarpaulin was set up and a camouflage net was used for concealment. Fox holes were dug for the medical personnel and the sick bay was dug for possible casualties.
Assault Phase

Medical (continued):

Evacuation, if necessary, would have been accomplished by use of a Jeep ambulance to the next higher echelon or the Division Hospital. There were no casualties.

Water was brought in from ships until an NBC unit set up a water distillation unit.

Food consisted of "K" rations with hot coffee from the galley.

Slit trenches were dug. They were sprayed three times daily with DDT. There was no dysentery.

Enemy dead were buried with the use of a bulldozer.

Flea bites, which were prevalent at first, were treated with DDT powder and soon controlled.

Dental treatment was available at the Regimental Headquarters. Four men were treated. Dental facilities were adequate.

Two civilian casualties were treated and evacuated to the Civil Affairs Hospital.

Medical personnel was adequate. At present the Medical unit is under its complement by two men. One corpsman died aboard ship.

No specialties are needed.

Supplies that were expended have been drawn from the Regimental sick bay.

The Quartermaster department carried excess cans of DDT powder and a thirty-day combat replenishment supplies.

Warm clothing was applied for and received.

Supply and Logistics:

At 0600 of the fourth day the battalion began its first displacement which was not completed till late that night. It was therefore decided that all batteries would strip down to the bare essentials and a rear echelon would be left to facilitate subsequent displacements. In the afternoon a suitable site was found for the
4. Supply and Logistics (continued):

water distillation unit attached to this battalion and it supplied us at the approximate rate of 75 gallons per hour, over a twenty-four (24) hour period.

On the fifth day the battalion again displaced with the rear echelon being left as planned. It was found impossible to move all our ammunition forward, however, however by nightfall Regiment had eight DUKW loads of ammunition at our new position which gave us an ample supply.

On the morning of the sixth day the battalion displaced forward to a new position, and again Regiment brought forward several DUKW loads of ammunition. Shortly before dusk the Battalion once more moved forward and the Bn-4 was left in charge of the men and equipment that could not be moved up that night. At this time all contact with the Regimental "Four" was lost and it was not until the following noon that contact could be reestablished. Shortly after the forward echelon movement a convoy of DUKWS arrived transporting ammunition. Upon their arrival they were immediately dispatched to the new position. This was very fortunate as it made it unnecessary for the battalion to haul during the night.

There were no events of interest the seventh day. On the eighth day the Battalion made its last displacement before the north end of OKINAWA was secured. The majority of the battalion's firing was accomplished from this position. Ammunition left in the old positions was brought forward under the direction of Regiment and when the old dumps were exhausted ammunition was obtained at HAG Beach. During this period Regiment issued clothing and equipment, however, all fuel and rations were drawn directly from the Division Quartermaster.
Chapter VIII

ENEMY TACTICS

Enemy tactics as observed by this battalion did not include any tricks that have not been practiced before in previous operations.

Infiltration of a single soldier to the battalion area happened several times, but it was not known whether he was on a mission or whether he was a straggler. All that were killed were armed with at least one grenade.

20mm cannons and mortars were very hard to attack with artillery because they were fired from caves and immediately after firing were drawn in.

Every afternoon about dusk when the infantry was digging in for the night, the enemy harassed our lines. This delayed registration of defensive fires for the night and was a constant hinderance.

No counterbattery was encountered by this battalion during this phase of the operation.
Chapter IX

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

1. Enemy casualties:

(a) 11 killed (by patrols and local security)
3 captured around the battalion area.

(b) It is not known how many were killed by our artillery since Navy Gun fire and Air strikes were also on many of the targets fired on by this battalion.

2. Own losses:

2 Killed in Action.
Chapter X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. One Section: None.

2. Two Section:
   Maps and photographs furnished prior to the operation were adequate. Early photo coverage of the blank spots on the topographic map and wide distribution of these photos would have been of considerable assistance in later stages of the operation.

3. Three Section:
   (a) Preparation fires should where possible be in to the battalion which is to fire them at least two hours before they are to be fired.
   
   (b) It is believed that better results could be derived from artillery preparations if these preparations were detail planned and requested by the Infantry Regiment. It is realized that the important function of coordination of the various supporting arms which assist the advance of the infantry is primarily a task of higher echelons of command, but the close support fires immediately in front of the assault battalions must be checked and double checked to avoid mishap. It is believed that the infantry regimental commander with his direct support artillery liaison group, his KGF and AGL groups, and his close contact with his assault battalion commanders, can best plan and request those close support fires which are to fall in his zone of action for the attack. These remarks apply particularly to situations where the attack is to be made in rough terrain where maps are poor, such as occurred in the final phases of the operation to secure MOTOBU PENINSULA. On this operation I believe some confusion resulted from preparations planned to be fired in the 29TH MARINES zone of action of MOTOBU PENINSULA by higher echelons.
   
   (c) The single narrow road available to this division in its advance made artillery displacements difficult on this operation. We found that displacements in the early morning (starting at daylight) proved most satisfactory to us on this operation. In situations such as this where enemy air action and counterbattery is of no great concern night displacements using lights would have probably been most satisfactory.
   
   (d) Better communications between Forward Observer and FDC is desired. Since the 610 radio is a "line of sight" radio, communication was cut at times due to the lack of suitable terrain. It is recommended that the SCR 610 radio in artillery organizations be replaced by the SCR 694 radio used by the AGL and KGF liaison sections.
Chapter X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. Three Section (continued):

(e) When Aerial Observers are assigned to a Battalion, communication would be better if the Battalion Air Spot net were used due to a crowded Regimental net interference was encountered during fire missions.

4. Four Section:

(a) The LST was incapable of handling the number of troops embarked (almost 600). Three hundred (300) men were exposed to weather at all times on weather decks, as living compartments (capacity 100) and tank deck were crowded. All could not even find a place to lie down. Some tried to sleep in a sitting and standing position. All were undernourished due to poor feeding facilities of LST and lack of cooperation on part of Navy. Only unusual hardiness and ingenuity on part of troops enabled them to maintain a reasonably health condition for the landing. It is recommended that this number of troops never be assigned an LST for more than a two or three day voyage. On this occasion almost 600 officers and men lived aboard the LST for eight days.

(b) Landing craft should have been used to establish ammunition dumps on available beaches along the route of advance. This would have greatly facilitated ammunition supply and have eased overload on vehicle maintenance and drivers; as it was necessary to make some ammunition hauls of over thirty (30) miles on congested roads.

(c) LVTs should be assigned from Shore Party to LST for unloading purposes. They could stand by to speedily haul out DUKWs when stuck on coral or vehicles when drowned out. They are also excellent for unloading Jeeps, obviating the necessity for any waterproofing and easing vehicle maintenance problems initially, as wheels need not be pulled, etc. All our Jeeps were landed in this fashion in borrowed LVTs without even getting tires wet.

(d) DUKW officer should reconnoiter landing area in advance of DUKWs. This could be accomplished by DUKW officer going in with wave boat guides from LST. He could reconnoiter reef and route to beach, mark it and return to LST with wave boat guide. Failure to take this precaution cost us one DUKW in this instance, although the howitzer was later recovered.