SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
ON
OKINAWA OPERATION
PHASES I AND II
VOLUME TWO

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TO

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I & II OKINAWA OPERATION

29TH MARINES
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

TWENTY-NINTH MARINES (REINFORCED)
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

OKINAWA, RYUKYU ISLAND
This report covers the action of the 29th Marines Regiment in the fighting on OKINAWA from LOVE DAY, 1 April, 1945, through LOVE Plus 20 days. On this date, 21 April, 1945, MOTOBU PENINSULA was declared secured and Phase I of the operation completed.

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Colonel, USMC,
Commanding, 29th Marines.
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - 29th MARINES

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CHAPTER I - GENERAL

This report embraces the activities of the 29th Marines, Reinforced, in respect to organization, planning, training, embarkation, and combat of the Okinawa operation.

29th Marines, Reinforced, as III Phib Corps Reserve, had the following prospective missions:

1. To execute assault landing on any designated beaches, either as a Combat Team or as Combat Team less 1 BLT.
2. To execute assault landing on beaches not shown in Corps Plan.
3. To land over captured beaches, assemble as Corps Reserve; prepare to reinforce or relieve assault units in any part of Corps Zone.
4. To replace any RCT or component thereof in III Phib Corps which becomes a casualty.
5. To land and revert 1 BLT to 6th Mar Div.
6. To make such diversionary feints or landings as may be directed.
### CHAPTER II - The Task Organization

#### a. **LT 1/29**

- 1st Plat, Co C, 6th Engr Bn
- 1st Plat, Co C, 6th Pion Bn
- 1st Plat, Co C, 6th MT Bn
- 1st Plat, Wpns/29
- Det AGL Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SP Com Team, 6th JASCO
- Det 3rd Sec, Band Det
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th MP Co
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th S&SCo (less PX Sec)
- Det H&ES/29
- Repl Co 1/29
- Det 11th Spl NCB
- Det 814th Amph Trk Co

#### b. **LT 2/29**

- 2d Plat, Co C, 6th Engr Bn
- 2d Plat, Co C, 6th Pion Bn
- 2d Plat, Co C, 6th MT Bn
- 2d Plat, Wpns/29
- Det AGL Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SP Com Team, 6th JASCO
- Det 3rd Sec, Band Det
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th MP Co
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th S&SCo (less PX Sec)
- Det H&ES/29
- Repl Co 2/29
- Det 11th Spl NCB
- Det 6th Amph Trk Co

#### c. **LT 3/29**

- 3rd Plat, Co C, 6th Engr Bn
- 3rd Plat, Co C, 6th Pion Bn
- 3rd Plat, Co C, 6th MT Bn
- 3rd Plat, Wpns/29
- Det AGL Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SP Com Team, 6th JASCO
- Det 3rd Sec, Band Det
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th MP Co
Chapter II - Task Organization (Cont'd)

c. LT 3/29 (Cont'd)
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th S&S Co (less PX Sec)
- Det H&S/29
- Repl Co 3/29
- Det 11th Sp1 NCS
- Det 6th Amph Trk Co

d. Regtl Trs/29
- H&S/29 (less Dets)
- Wpns/29 (less 1st, 2d, and 3rd Plts)
- Det 3rd Sec, Band Det
- Det AGI Team, 6th JASCO
- Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO

Lt Col PRESSLEY

e. Co A, 6th Tk Bn

Capt MORELL

f. SP Gp/29
- Co C, 6th Engr Bn (less Dets)
- Co C, 6th Pion Bn (less Dets)
- Co C, 6th MT Bn (less Dets)
- 3rd Plat, 6th MP Co (less Dets)
- 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co (less Dets)
- 3rd Plat, 6th S&S Co (less Dets) (less PX Sec)

Capt LUTZ

g. Co C, 6th Med Bn

Lt Comdr TOPCIK

h. 1st MWD Plat

Lt KILLORAN
CHAPTER III — PRELIMINARY PLANNING

S-1 Section:

During the preliminary planning for the Okinawa Operation, three (3) groups of administrative personnel were selected and trained in the specific duties which each would perform during that operation. The composition of each of these groups were:

1. Assault Group
   a. S-1
   b. AS-1, Graves Registration Officer.
   c. Sergeant Major
   d. Journal Keeper
   e. Personnel Clerk
   f. General Clerk

2. Rear Administrative Group
   a. AS-1, Classification O.
   b. Regimental Classification NCO
   c. Personnel Clerk
   d. Personnel Classification NO from each Inf BN
   e. Personnel Clerk from each Inf BN

3. Rear Echelon Group
   a. Adjutant
   b. Chief Personnel Clerk and one (1) assistant.
   c. Company clerks of H&S Co and Wpn Co
   d. Correspondence clerk

Instruction of the personnel listed above was based on Sixth Marine Division General Order Number Twelve and the principles outlined therein were followed throughout. Certain changes in the manner of reporting total casualties were made during the staging period, as outlined in Sixth Marine Division Special Order No. 56-45, but these changes in no way affected the efficiency of the method of reporting individual casualties and following those reported through evacuation and/or burial. The use of individual casualty report cards and file cards again proved to be the best method yet devised for such reports.

S-2 Section:

Collation of available intelligence regarding enemy strength and dispositions on Okinawa Jima, Ryukyu Retto, was carried out upon the receipt of information from G-2, 6th Marine Division.

Prior to departure for target area; maps, overlays, photographic studies, terrain information, Japanese combat phrases, and enemy order of battle were prepared for distribution to all hands upon departure from rendezvous area. The intelligence annex to the operations order as well as appendices were prepared; Paragraph 1-a, of the order was written.
Chapter III - Preliminary Planning (Cont'd)

S-2 Section (Cont'd):

As this organization was in III Phib Corps Reserve before and during the landing phase of the operation, additional photographic intelligence and terrain studies were made of the 1st Marine Division area as well as of ZAMPA MISAII.

Prior to departure from base, all discussion of the forthcoming operation was carried out "in camera." Information was disseminated only upon written order of the Commanding Officer.

All relief maps were so painted as to show enemy positions given by photographic intelligence reports, thus increasing their value to the troops being briefed.

S-3 Section:

Upon receipt of III Phib Corps Operation Plan L-45, the S-3 section studied the theater of operations in its entirety with particular emphasis on III Phib Corps zone of action. In addition, the operations plans of the First and Sixth Marine Divisions, down to battalions, were studied and disseminated with a view of possible assignment in either zone. Landing plans were drawn up including two landing diagrams in view of the possibility of being required to make either an opposed or unopposed landing. Upon receipt of III Phib Corps Operation Plan L-45 (Alternate), 29th Marines, Reinforced, prepared and issued 29th Marines, Reinforced, Operations Plan No. L-45 (Alternate).

S-4 Section:

Division SOP as to organization was followed. Regiment named ship loading officers and troops transport quartermasters as specified. All personnel attended a Division Transport Quartermaster School and were thoroughly indoctrinated in their line of work. As information was furnished the Combat Team by Division Transport Quartermaster, meetings were held within the regiment and final details were ironed out concerning priorities, stowage, and availability of materials to be utilized enroute.

Chemical Warfare

Chemical Warfare Officers and NCOs attended a three (3) day Division school in chemical warfare. A fourteen (14) hour course in Defense Against Chemical Warfare under regimental control was given to all members of the 29th Marines. The course included: Orientation, General Description of Chemical Agents, Field Identification, First Aid, Detection of Gases, Decontamination Gas Mask Drill, and Gas Chamber Exercise. The new Army Assault Masks were issued to the three infantry battalions and weapons company for testing. Masks proved satisfactory and preferred to Army Lightweight Service Gas Mask. A 1/2 quart decontaminating apparatus per vehicle was filled with Decontaminating Agent Non-corrosive. Gas Masks were issued to all men and tested, Protective Goggles, Protective Ointment S-451, and BAL Ointment were issued to all men. A 30-day supply of Protective Equipment, including a suit of Protective Clothing per man, was issued to each Battalion Landing Team.
Demolitions and Flame Throwers:

Extensive training of personnel in the employment of their weapons was carried on throughout the training period. With an eye to the limitations of the weapon imposed by the problem of transport and resupply, carts were improvised to accommodate two flamethrowers and a load of demolitions. Each platoon was issued such a cart, battalion filling stations were organized for proper maintenance and resupply of the flamethrowers and demolition equipment to be used by front line companies.
CHAPTER IV—TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

1. During the training period at Kokumbona, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., emphasis was given to fighting in rugged terrain, villages, and to special demolitions and flamethrower work in compliance with 6th Marine Division training directives. It is felt that the Division Schools conducted for staff officers and transport quartermasters contributed materially to better staff functioning in the early phases of planning.

2. During the planning phase, this regiment as III Phib Corps Reserve, was confronted with the possibility of employment at any place in the Corps zone either as an assault or reserve unit. To this end, flexible administrative and operation plans permitting such employment were made. Liaison was established with all III Phib Corps units and studies of their respective plans and areas were made.

3. During the rehearsal phase, 29th Marines, Reinforced, as Corps Reserve, made practice landings in anticipation of landing either in the assault or as a reserve unit. Specifically, two landing formations were planned and rehearsed extensively, i.e., BLTs in column of companies and BLTs with two companies abreast. 29th Marines, Reinforced, made one landing in anticipation of being used as an assault regiment in the 6th Marine Division zone.
CHAPTER V - LOADING AND EMBARKATION

S-1 Section:

1. The employment of embarkation warning orders as a preliminary basis upon which final unit and personnel commitments were made to each ship was effective and desirable. These preliminary adjustments resulted in embarkation orders being accurate to within ten percent for each APA after all corrections were made.

2. The numbers of embarkation rosters required by each of the several ships varied considerably. While the number of copies to be submitted to each ship was designated in orders, it is suggested that this number be made applicable for the embarkation of personnel in all ships in order to eliminate the labor involved in the preparation of additional copies required by certain ships.

S-3 Section:

1. Working in conjunction with S-1, this section completed the task organization governed principally by characteristics of ships available to transport us to Okinawa.

2. S-3 working in conjunction with unit commanders assigned priorities to loading and stowage of equipment. Constant liaison was maintained during this phase with staff of ComTransDiv 35. The skill, experience, and cooperation of the Naval Officers contributed materially to a smooth and uneventful loading and embarkation.

3. S-3 promulgated the embarkation order based on division and corps orders. This was issued to BLT commanders early to expedite the embarkation of their commands.

4. Due to characteristics of ships assigned 29th Marines, it was not possible to embark all elements of each tactical unit aboard its ship. However, as a result of conferences and cooperation of Trans Div 35 Naval Officers, plans were made for boating of these separated elements and dispatching them to their assigned unit at the transport area.

5. In rehearsals this plan worked very satisfactorily. In the operation, as the landing was non-tactical, it was not necessary to put the plan into operation upon debarking and landing on Okinawa.

S-4 Section:

1. Upon arrival of the ships that were assigned 29th Marines, all ship TQMs reported to the embarkation officer of the regiment. With the assistance of ship TQMs and upon issuance by Division of ship characteristics data, all loading plans were completed. Beaches were assigned to respective unit within regiment and all gear placed in stock piles on their beaches in combat unit loads under the supervision of Ship Loading Officers and Troop TQMs. The Pioneer Company furnished Shore Party working details for the loading of all APAs. Provisions however were not made for Shore Party working details to load the AKAs. Also while APAs had ships platoons furnished by the 71st NCB,

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Chapter V - Loading and Embarkation (Cont'd)

The AKAs had to be loaded by regimental working parties and the ships platoon also had to be furnished by regiment. All APAs were loaded in two days. Loading of the AKAs took four days. Due to fine weather conditions, all loading was accomplished smoothly and without interruption. Embarkation of troops was accomplished in about four (4) hours by loading from the beach on to landing craft and from landing craft to the ship by cargo nets. All supplies and troops were loaded with a minimum of delay and confusion and on schedule.

2. It is recommended that the Shore Party working details also be furnished to load AKAs. Furthermore, it is suggested that ship's platoons for AKAs be furnished by other agencies than regiment.
CHAPTER VI - MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

S-2 Section:

On departure from rendezvous area, extensive briefing of all officers and men was carried out throughout the regiment. Previously prepared material was disseminated in adequate quantity. Indoctrination of personnel was carried out by the Intelligence Sections and by company officers. Detailed study of relief maps was afforded all units down to and including the squad.

S-3 Section:

The 29th Marines, Reinforced, embarked on 14 March, 1945, aboard assigned ships in TransDiv 35. Training schedules covering the following subjects were prepared and carried out enroute to target area:

- Calisthenics
- Inspections
- School on Weapons
- First Aid
- Field Sanitation
- Looting and Pilfering

Troops debarked at Ulithi Atoll on 24 March, 1945, for a day's recreation at Mog Mog Island.

Debarkation drills and abandon ship drills were conducted enroute to target area including two night debarkation drills.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE

Narrative account:

LOVE DAY - 29th Mar (Reinf) (less 1/29) landed on Green Beach #2 at 1535 and proceeded inland approximately 1,000 yards where perimeter defense was set up in general area of town of HANZA and Northwest of YONTAN AIRFIELD. 1/29 as 6th Mar Div Res landed at 1445 on Green Beach #2. For activities 1/29 as Div Res, see 1/29 Special Action Report (Appendix I Atchd).

LOVE Plus 1 - Remained in Posn.

LOVE Plus 2 - Moved to vicinity of IRIMIYA, area assigned by III Phib Corps. Remained there in 1st Mar Div area as III Corps Res. While in this assembly area 3/29 encountered 3 Nips and Nambu MG hidden in cave which they subsequently destroyed. A total of approximately 15 Nips were killed by Regt while in this area.

LOVE Plus 3 - 2/29 assigned mission of defense of YONTAN AIRFIELD.

LOVE Plus 4 - 29th Mar (Reinf) reverted to 6th Mar Div control and moved by marching to new assembly area in vicinity of ONNA. 2/29 was relieved a 3n of 1st Regt. 29th Mar (Reinf) reverted to 29th Mar (Reinf).

LOVE Plus 5 - 29th Mar (Reinf) attacked to seize O-E line in a column of battalions. The following towns were captured as they proceeded up the West Coast toward the MOTOBU PENINSULA: ATSUTABARU, NAKAMA, IMBU, KISE, KOC KOBESOKO, and CHUDA. Patrols were sent to interior as Regt proceeded up the ros and seized the O-E line at 1129. Regt CP moved to KOBESOKO. Nip employed very effectively on town of NAKAMA during this Adv.

LOVE Plus 6 - Continued Atk to seize the O-F line, captured and secured the town of NAGO which previously had been effectively levelled by Naval Gun Firo, Air Strikes and arty; moved CP to NAGO.

LOVE Plus 7 - Continued Atk to seize O-H line. 1/29 encountered Nip Plat reinforced with MGs enroute to O-H line; failed to reach O-H line in this sector and compelled to dig in and set up all round defense at this point approximately 500 Yds from objective. 2/29 moved laterally across MOTOBU PENINSULA to NE Coast, proceeded up NE Coast to seize GUSHIKU, O-H line secured at 1/25. 2/29 jumped off for O-J line assigned by CG, 6th Mar Div at RCT-29 CP. Small groups of Nip snipers killed enroute.

LOVE Plus 8 - O-J line secured at 0330 on SW sector by 3/29. 1/29 in center of Z met heavy resistance in its push toward NARASHIDO and ITOMI. 2/29 was ordered to organize and hold Z on right Flk of Regt Z leading into ITOMI. It became apparent at this time that Regt was developing strong enemy Posns in general area from ITOMI W to TOGUCHI. EDs in 3/29 Z of action were found to be effectively demolished and rendered impassable by Nip employment of road blocks, mines and demolitions. Patrons set out in all directions from 1/29 in attempt to fix the enemy in this area. 1/29 was ordered to push forward to occupy and defend ITOMI for the night. 1/29 engaged a strong enemy force 600 Y
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE - Narrative Account (Cont'd)

S of ITOMI and was compelled to dig in for the night. The Island of YASHIMA was patrolled by 2/29 to search for suspected radio station. Report on enemy there negative. That night Mort and Arty fire registered in on 3/29 CP causing a number of casualties.

LOV3 Plus 9 - O-K line in right flank of Regtl Z of action was seized by 2/29 on the left flank, 3/29 seized O-K line and town of TOGUCHI and patrolled to interior. 1/29 pushed forward, but as a result of heavy enemy activity was forced to withdraw to ITOMI for the night.

LOV3 Plus 10 - Patrols from 2/29 moved SW through interior of HOTOBU PENINSULA to make contact with 1/29 in vicinity of ITOMI, encountered little opposition and this tended to substantiate previous estimate of the enemy located in the area between ITOMI and TOGUCHI. 3/29 moved inland to contact 1/29, hit by heavy resistance at town of YASHIMA and was compelled to withdraw in order to consolidate Posn.

LOV3 Plus 11 - In center of Regtl Z strong combat patrols of two Cos moved out and seized high ground on O-K line; engaged enemy and killed approximately 25 Nips, returned to ITOMI in order to aid in defense that area where strong enemy opposition was now centered. One Co 2/29 was moved on around Peninsula by Rd to town of KISE and joined Div Rcn Co.

LOV3 Plus 12 - 4/29 in attempting move toward town of HAMMA Ran into ambush and was hit heavily by fire from 20mm Dual-Purpose as Guns being used here as anti-personnel Wpons. Due to nature of terrain, evacuation and re-supply became a serious problem in this area. Normal patrols were carried out by all units. Approximately 35 Nips were killed during day's activity.

LOV3 Plus 13 - 4th Mar (Reinf) on 0 of 0, 6th Mar Div moved in on the W and 3/29 was Atch'd. 3/29 at this time was Atch'd to Div Rcn Co. 29th Mar jumped off from ITOMI in column of En's to the W to clear the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Rd and isolate enemy pocket of resistance between these points. En's moved S to take advantage of high ground and employed ambushes in clearing this area. Prior to commitment of 2/29, 1/29 was hit and pinned down by heavy fire from the high ground to their front. Trs were ordered to dig in and hold this ground for the night. 2/29 swung in on left flank to strengthen defense. Enemy resistance at this time was heavy. No information of number killed. (Notes - For activity of 3/29 while Atch'd to 4th Mar, see 3/29 Special action Report - appendix X Atch'd)

LOV3 Plus 14 - Col W. J. Whaling assumed command of 29th Mar (Reinf)

Heavy 20mm fire hit En CP's at 1600. This became a daily occurrence. Heavy Arty and Mort fire and NEP from the USS TENNESSEE's main batteries were placed on the area from which the 20mm's were firing. Wpons were silenced, but not put out of action. Vigorous patrolling was conducted and defense organized on commanding high ground. That night enemy infiltration began and 2/29 was brought under heavy Knee Mort fire and grenade and small arms attack inflicting approximately 35 casualties on the Enn.
LOVE Plus 15 - Regt front lines had advanced about 300 Yds covering mountainous and difficult terrain. Supply and evacuation problems were most acute at this time. This was in the drive E to effect a juncture with the 4th Mar.

LOVE Plus 16 - Atk jumped off at 0800. F/29 had reverted to 29th Mar control and, on the left Flk of Regt Z, contacted elements of 22nd Mar, destroyed series of concrete emplacements and at end of period were within 600 Yds of 4th Mar who were moving in from the N. Contact between units was good. Elements of 1/29 captured the highest ground in its area; killed 32 Nips, captured 2 - 20mm Guns. 29th Mar now occupied O-P line. The Regt CP was now located at ITOMI. Heavy Arty concentrations succeeded in knocking out 20mm Guns which has been harassing En GS. These were the Wns captured on LOVE Pl 17.

LOVE Plus 17 - Regt continued push toward W to seize and occupy O-K line; patrolled as far as town of MAKIA; made no contact with 4th Mar; captured 5 - 20mm Guns and a number of MGs; killed approximately 16 Nips. 3/29 reverted to 29th Mar control at this time and moved to ITOMI by Trk. 3/29 moved out N on trail toward assigned objective which was the high ground in Ta 0227 and 0327. 3/29 reached its objective late on the night of LOVE Plus 17.

LOVE Plus 18 - In N of Regt Z 3/29, from high ground, sent patrols 500 Yds N and both Flks, effectively securing area. An elaborate system of unoccupied trenches and caves was noted. Contact was made with 4th Mar along the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Rd. Enemy resistance SW of ITOMI-TOGUCHI Rd had ceased. 29th Mar, with 3 Ens abreast and in contact with 4th Mar on left, now pushed N to coast in order to complete seizure and occupation of MOTUBU PENINSULA. At ITOMI nightly infiltrations were experienced at Regt CP resulting in a number of NIPS being killed. No casualties to our own TRS.

LOVE Plus 19 - At 1515 all 3 Ens reported that they had reached N Coast and encountered no enemy activity enroute; were organizing ground along N Coast of Peninsula. Patrol activity continued. One Co was detached to protect 4/15. Ambush patrols were set up for night of LOVE Plus 19 to protect avenues of withdrawal to the S open to the enemy.

LOVE Plus 20 - All units of 29th Mar engaged in patrols to the interior for the purpose of mopping up enemy in that area. Regt CP moved at 0945 to 0529 Xray and was operational at 1040. Ens were each assigned zones of responsibility and conducted daily vigorous patrols to mop up in their areas. During this time a few Nips were routed and killed.
CHAPTER VII - Assault Phase (Cont'd)

1. Intelligence - see Appendix Able.

2. Ship to Shore
   The ship to shore movement of the 29th Mar occurred on the afternoon of LOVE DAY. LCVP's carried the Trs toward shore. Due to tide conditions in the afternoon, it was necessary to effect a transfer to LVTs. We proceeded from ship to transfer line in a column of Cos. No formation was employed from transfer line to the beach. This greatly retarded the ship to shore movement. LVTs were at a premium and this necessitated ferrying the Trs piecemeal as the LVTs became available at the transfer line. Inasmuch as this was a non-tactical landing, the lack of control of the LVTs at the transfer line did not offer a serious problem. It was discovered shortly thereafter that the waterline above the reef was negligible and a majority of the Trs waded ashore after debarking from the LCVPs. This resulted in disorganization of units upon arrival at the beach. Control and reorganization of Trs on the beach offered a major problem, but it was overcome and reorganization and march to assigned assembly area was effected in a minimum of time. At no time was any information given us that the reef was virtually dry for any period throughout the day.


4. Naval Gunfire - see Appendix Baker.

5. Air Support - see Appendix Charlie.

6. Artillery Support - see Appendix Dog.

7. Tanks
   The terrain in the 29th Mar sector of MOTOBU PENINSULA was not favorable for the employment of Tks. In the action around ITOMI a Plt of Tks was sent to the assistance of 1/29, but due to the conditions of roads could not be employed effectively. A Tk Ln was maintained with Regt during the time Tks were attached to 29th Mar. Two Plts of Co C, 6th Tk Bn carried a Co of 3/29 to NAGO greatly expediting seizure of that town. Our Tk Destroyers were hampered by the same limitations as were the Tks. It was impossible as a result to determine their effectiveness as Regtl Wns.

8. Amphibian Tractors
   In the movement of the 29th Mar (Reinf) from NAGO across the Peninsula and up to TS 0725 Xray, 3 LVTs were used to aid in moving rations, water and fuel.
   At GAGUSUKU where the bridge was out these 3 LVTs aided greatly in ferrying Trs across the water. Once again narrow Rds and impassable adjacent terrain limited their use and in the presence of heavy rains, the tracked vehicles damaged the roads to an extent which hindered Tk and jeep travel. These same 3 LVTs were used to supply F/29 when they were sent on Recon mission to NAGAHOMARI and thence to BISE to join the Div Recon Co. Upon completion of this mission they reverted to parent control.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE (CONT'D)

9. Armored Amphibian Tractors

One Plat of Armored Amphibian Tractors operated with 2/29 from LOVE Plus 9 to LOVE Plus 11 as they proceeded up the NE coast of MOTOBU PENINSULA. They were of inestimable value in supporting the Bn as they patrolled the entire sector up to the N end of MOTOBU PENINSULA. Conditions of Rds and adjacent terrain imposed definite limitations. They were not employed at any time as close fire support Wpns. While attached to the Regt they supplemented the CF defense during the period LOVE Plus 11 to LOVE Plus 18, at which time they were detached and reverted to parent control.

One Plat of Armored Amphibian Tractors was attached to 3/29 on 10 April, 1945. They functioned as Arty exclusively and provided excellent close fire support. It cannot be calculated how many enemy guns they knocked out, but they definitely succeeded in silencing many that were firing at our Trs. By virtue of their mobility the LVTAs were capable of firing many missions out of reach of Arty because of existing hill masks. In the absence of their own Fos it was necessary to use NGE and Arty Ln to spot their fire. On April 18, 1945 this Plat reverted to parent control.

During the initial Atk received by 1/29 at ITOKI, their only Arty support was furnished by the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Bn. Their fire support was excellent and the Bn proved unquestionably its ability to function as an Arty unit and fire as batteries to lend direct close fire support to front line infantry units.

10. Infantry Combat

There were no new or particularly notable features in the Inf combat of this campaign. As soon as the Nip Fosns in the Z of action of this Regt had been fixed, their reduction followed a standard pattern. The Nip Fosns took excellent advantage of high ground and the inaccessibility of these Fosns made Atk through heavy cover and over high ground imperative.

The Jap coverage of roads and normal avenues of approach was excellent and every effort to move in over the easier routes was met with sturdy and effective resistance. The enemy showed his usual ability to exploit terrain to maximum advantage to employ caves, pits and natural cover, and to secure maximum benefit from his Wpns. Particularly noteworthy was his use of 20mm AA guns as anti-personnel Wpns.

Our reduction of enemy Fosns followed a pattern of "ridge-hopping" preceded by heavy fires from all Spt Wpns. When this method was employed, it was possible to take Nip Fosns from the flank and reduce them in detail. Usually the enemy when placed in this Fosn showed little inclination to stand by his guns. Rather numerous Wpns and Fosns were abandoned. No true coordinated Atks, with all units in contact across a wide front, were made. The Atks, even when delivered simultaneously, were a series of local patrol actions to seize dominating Fosns followed by mopping up actions within the Z.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE (CONT'D)

Infantry combat from our point of view showed the continued necessity for careful training of all individuals in basic subjects and for rigid control of units by Tr leaders.

11. Communications - see Annex G.

12. Engineers - see Annex H (OVERLAY)

13. Medical - see Annex I

14. Supply & Logistics
   a. All types of mounting out supplies were sufficient. Units were supplied with equipment and supplies as per Div Adm Os prior to Opn.

Class I: Extra components of the "B" ration with the 10-in-1 ration were eagerly accepted. Trs prefer this rather than the "B" ration in its entirety. Fruit and fruit juices were in great demand and were eaten and drunk so to speak on the run. Coffee was in great demand. New type "C" rations were the hit of the operation. Trs like them better than the 10-in-1 because they were easier to handle.

Class II: All vehicles functioned well. Jeeps and jeep trailers with weasels were the main source of transportation from regiment to battalion. 2-1/2 ton 6x6 trucks were in great demand and regiments should have their own trains. It should be remembered that 1-ton trucks often could pass over bridges with supplies that could not hold 2-1/2 ton trucks. Although the particular type 1-ton trucks now in use were not ideal because of mechanical failure or because the body was not ideal for bulky cargo, one-ton trucks however, did serve us well in many cases.

Class III: Fuel was never lacking. It was available and drawn by us whenever needed. However, fuel hand pumps should be more plentiful down to include rifle companies. When our companies operated independently, their vehicles have to travel great distances for refueling. Even though drums of fuel were issued to them, much waste was noticed when vehicles were refueled by backyard methods. Radio jeeps and ambulance jeeps served 100% mechanically and otherwise.

Class IV: Clothing was in sufficient quantity. In this type of terrain foxholes are always muddy or damp in the night and during heavy rains the poncho is unsatisfactory and unwieldy. It becomes easily mud-soaked and heavy and troops throw them away. The new type combat jacket is in demand and it is very good for bivouac areas in this climate.

782 Equipment: Shelter Halves like the poncho are outmoded. A light oblong rubberized material with holes along the edges with small ropes would be ideal. Almost every shelter half discarded was mud-soaked and was not satisfactory cover for one individual. At present a tour of this regimental area will show men living under everything but shelter halves. All other 782 equipment was satisfactory.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE (CONT'D)

Class V: All types of ammunition was available and used. Trip flares were used in conjunction with booby traps and in almost every case infiltration was completely stamped out immediately.

b. Resupply - excellent.

c. Palletized Cargo: No palletized cargo was used. Barbed wire and pickets were initially loaded during embarkation, but were never used.

d. Distillers: Distillers used by Engineers adequate and in demand.

e. Water Purification: Water purification adequate and in demand. At this time it should be recommended that each infantry company have one or more small water pumps. Many wells and small streams can supply water for bathing and washing of clothes. To fulfill medical requirements it is impossible with transportation available to supply regimental units with water for bathing and washing of clothes.

15. Public Relations

The three combat correspondents of this organization together with the regimental photographers performed the following duties during the period 8124pp - 3124pp:

130 news stories forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps.
4 magazine stories forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps.
8 news stories picked up by civilian press for radio relay to U.S.
3 canned radio broadcasts arranged and recorded.
15 film packs forwarded to CINCPAC.

16. Military Government

(a) Military Government Personnel maintained constant liaison during the operation and rendered assistance in the evacuation of civilians from combat areas. Further, requests for native labor were met promptly and cheerfully.

(b) It is recommended that the following changes be made in the method now employed in handling civilians:

That all civilians be handled by the S-1 Section:

That one of the two (2) Japanese language officers assigned to each regiment be employed by the S-1 Section to interrogate all civilians and to isolate those of doubtful character and those who possess valuable information.

That POWs and those civilians isolated by the S-1 Section be turned over to S-2 for further interrogation by a Japanese language officer assigned to that section and that disposition of such persons be made by S-2.
17. Special Reconnaissance Missions.

Special Reconnaissance Missions assigned the 29th Mar (Reinf) included the following islands:

- YAGAMA SHIMA, where a radio jamming station was suspected,
- SESOKO SHIMA,
- KOURI SHIMA,
- YAGACHI SHIMA.

Physical occupation of YAGAMA SHIMA was accomplished by 2/29 but not enemy reported; no radio activity uncovered. The other three island reconnaissances were cancelled as a result of earlier reconnaissance by the Division Reconnaissance Company which showed no enemy activity there. These islands were later patrolled as part of the 29th Mar phase of the 6th Mar Div defense plan of MOTOBU PENINSULA.

2/29 was assigned a reconnaissance mission of USETEN CO and OBSERVATORY HILL where they uncovered 2 Naval Torpedoes, 50 floating mines, 10 tape-measure mines and 5" aerial hand smoke bombs. The radio station was discovered and destroyed in this area and the observatory proved to be non-operational.

One Company prior to physical occupation of entire MOTOBU PENINSULA made reconnaissance of road from NARASHIDO to BISE at which point they were attached to Division Reconnaissance Company and engaged in active patrols for two days with them.

18. War Dogs - see Appendix How.
CHAPTER VIII - Enemy Tactics

Enemy tactics, as practiced on the northern part of Okinawa, consisted mainly of delaying action in the form of small patrols, ambushes, and systematic destruction of routes of communication and supply. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was outstanding in its effectiveness throughout the operation. 20mm and 25mm AA and dual-purpose guns were used frequently and effectively as infantry defensive weapons.

Enemy continued to prove that their unit commanders had an excellent mastery of terrain appreciation and use of cover and concealment. Their movement at night was of the standard pattern. On two specific occasions they moved through wooded areas to within several hundred yards of our lines and lobbed in knee mortars. Their position was readily apparent due to the noise and shouting practiced by them once in position.

Nambus and knee mortars continued to prove themselves the most effective short-range weapons of the enemy as they figured largely in their ambushes and attempted night attacks.

On one occasion a company, moving after dark, was followed by a number of Nips who entered the battalion bivouac area, set up light machine guns, and placed grenades under jeeps, effectively disabling the jeep and wounding several men. In the ensuing gunfire they escaped.
CHAPTER IX - RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Area Secured

1. 1/29 in Div Res secured ZAITA-MITSUKI PENINSULA, an area of approximately 2.9 Square miles. After securing this peninsula, 1/29 was attached to the 22d Mar. For area secured by 1/29 while attached to 22d Mar see 1/29 and 22d Mar Special Action Reports.

On LOVE Plus 5, 1/29 reverted to 29th Mar control and 29th Mar (Reinf) moved into front lines at town of Omin and continued the attack from that point. In securing its assigned zones on the Isthmus from Omin to Wab, this regiment secured an area of approximately 17 square miles.

Area secured on KOTOBI PENINSULA by 29th Mar (Reinf) was approximately 33 Square miles. Total area secured by 29th Mar (Reinf) was approximately 52.5 miles.

2. Enemy Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1/29</th>
<th>2/29</th>
<th>3/29</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1/29 - includes Hips KIA while attached to 22d Mar.
* 3/29 - includes 180 Hips KIA while attached to 44th Mar plus 300 credited to 3/29 by 44th Mar.

3. Operational Material Damage to Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>25mm Dual Purpose Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13mm Machine Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.2mm Machine Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>LMGs Rhambu 96 &amp; 99, .256 &amp; .303 cal (Credited to 3/29, by 44th Mar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LMGs Model 1932 Hotchkiss, .303 cal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lewis Guns, .30 cal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grenade Dischargers (Knee Mortars) Model 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DP 40mm Double Mount AA Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>75mm Artillery Pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mines, floating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mines, tape-measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bombs, aerial smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dump containing 150 Eds 40mm AA, AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>QL Dps (Clothing, food, Med Supplies, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Large Storage Dps (food, clothing, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Caves containing small arms, am and grenades.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own Losses

(a) KIA - 3 Os - 65 Enl.
(b) WIA - 15 Os - 200 Enl.
(c) MIA - 100 Enl.
S.1 Section:

1. It is recommended that replacements be transported from higher echelons to lower echelons in vehicles provided by the former. Collecting replacements from beaches places a strain on the limited transportation available to a regiment.

2. It is recommended that casualties be re-equipped upon discharge from field hospitals in the same manner in which they were equipped upon arrival. In many instances men evacuated for minor wounds and sickness requiring short convalescent periods have returned to duty with little more than the clothing they were wearing. In no case have they been equipped with the weapon and ammunition they were carrying upon admission.

3. It is recommended that a casualty reporting system be changed so that no effort is made to distinguish between men injured in action and those injured in any other status. It is so difficult to determine the actual cause of injury that any attempt to do so should be disregarded just so long as injury results in line of duty and not from misconduct.

S.2 Section:

1. Insufficient language personnel was available and since interpreters are not organic to regiment, they were moved about by higher echelon at times without regard to wishes of regiment.

2. It is recommended that the Table of Organization for the Regimental S.2 Section be altered to include language personnel as organic to regiment.

S.3 Section:

1. All support weapons functioned efficiently. Arty and MGF were employed frequently and with telling effect. Liaison personnel cooperated enthusiastically throughout. On several occasions these liaison parties maintained tactical communication for the regiment through their facilities, greatly alleviating a serious communication situation.

2. Communication, due to distance, terrain, and interference, and spillover from more powerful stations in radio nets, was often difficult. It is believed that this condition was inherent in the situation and no remedial measures were neglected.

3. Support fires and air strikes called by higher echelons should be handled through liaison personnel of the regiments and battalions on the line. Failure to do this results in confusion, duplication of effort, and occasional damage to own troops.

4. On two separate days, requests for aerial reconnaissance of the area immediately in front of this regiment were made. Although OYs were observed over the area in question, no reports of reconnaissance were received.
Chapter X - Comments and Recommendations

S-3 Section (Cont'd)

5. It is felt that the M29C could be of much greater value as a tactical and communication vehicle. However, to be worthwhile, the vehicle should be issued on a basis of 2 per battalion and 3 per regimental headquarters, and a much larger store of repair parts should be carried. As the matter stands, the M29C while potentially of great value, cannot be counted on for sustained activity.

S-4 Section:

Class II: More weasels should be issued to infantry regiments. 2½ ton 6x6 trucks are in great demand and regiments should have their own trains.

Class III: Fuel hand pumps should be more plentiful down to include rifle companies. Each infantry regiment should have a medium bull dozer with blade in its Motor Transport Section. Many times during the past operation in the regimental area vehicles and terrain needed the assistance of dozers and engineers were either too busy or too far away for immediate assistance.

Class IV: Provisions should be made for a complete issue of utility suits and underclothing every 15 days to units directly in contact with the enemy. A power-driven decontaminating apparatus for delousing salvaged clothes, thus making them available for re-issue, should be an organic piece of regimental equipment.

Shore Party: Control of shore party labor was shocking. Shore Party personnel rifled clothing rolls, bedding rolls, and sea bags. Organizational equipment was mishandled and lost. Field ranges were stripped of burners and ranges were uncrated and used on the beaches. Lack of supervision was apparent.

Engineers: The past operation has shown the need for a change in the use of engineers during combat as now conceived. The present engineer battalion setup may be ideal for rear areas or for permanent camp sites, but in combat and in fast-moving situations, it does not suit our needs. In fast-moving situations they must be flexible and should be directly under the S-4 if attached to regiment. Subject units should be divided into two groups - heavy equipment group and light equipment group. The light group should be equipped with shovels, picks, crowbars, buck saws, hand water pumps, demolitions, etc. In addition the light equipment group should be motorized and broken into three teams, each team consisting of two or three 2½ ton 6x6 trucks (two cargo, one dump) and fifteen men; but heavy equipment with its dozers, scrapers, graders, shovels, etc., is unnecessary in the immediate assault echelon. It should follow, making permanent the read and bridge or by-pass repairs initiated by the light equipment group.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE - APPENDIX ALE - Intelligence.

I. General:

The difficulties encountered on this operation by intelligence personnel were caused principally by the rapid movement and the wide zone of action assigned to this organization, which precluded the most effective use of regimental observation posts and S-2 patrols. Language personnel, although too few in number, did an excellent job of producing military information and handling civilians.

A. Intelligence:

1. Reconnaissance:
   a. Patrols: Throughout movement of the RCT up the island from YONTAN to NAGO, patrols were detached from the leading battalion and sent into the interior up to the center of the isthmus. In the early stages of the MOTOBU campaign, extensive patrolling was carried out by all units. Combat patrols of platoon and even company strength were employed to seek confirmation of reports as to the strength and dispositions of the enemy forces in the interior of the MOTOBU PENINSULA. Reconnaissance of the coastal areas was carried out by elements of 2/29 and 3/29 as well as by the Division Reconnaissance Company. All patrols sent out were accompanied by members of both battalion and regimental intelligence sections. In addition, regimental scout observers were made available to battalion intelligence officers when their proper resources were overtaxed.

   b. Aerial photographs and interpretation reports as well as reports from NGF, Air Liaison and Artillery spot planes were used in close conjunction with ground intelligence.

2. Observation Posts:
   a. Organization and conduct of observation posts was in accordance with the SOP for this organization. However, due to the fast-moving situation and the large zone of action covered by this organization, on only one occasion was a regimental observation post effectively set up. That OP was located on BESUSA MISAKI, and was used to afford observation of the southern shore of MOTOBU PENINSULA during movement of the RCT to NAGO.

3. Prisoners of War:
   a. Interrogation of both civilian and military POWs was carried out briefly at battalion level, and more extensively at RCT headquarters before sending prisoners back to higher echelon.

   b. The information gained from both civilian and military prisoners proved of considerable value. The composition, strength, and, in some case, dispositions of enemy
troops in the NCDBU area were made known before actual contact with the enemy had been reached. Subsequent operations confirmed the intelligence thus obtained in all respects.

4. Captured Documents:
   a. Documents were gathered by collection teams at both battalion and regimental levels. When judged of immediate value by the language personnel attached, these documents were forwarded to higher echelon immediately. Otherwise, documents were forwarded in bulk by first available transportation.
   b. Some maps proved to be of immediate value to the capturing unit, but in most cases, a hasty study of documents showed them to be of purely strategic or long range value and they were accordingly forwarded to higher echelon for further evaluation and translation.

5. Personnel:
   a. Organization of intelligence personnel in this organization was in conformity with SOP.
   b. Training of personnel proved to have been excellent. Intelligence personnel in all echelons of this command were at all times able to deal competently with the situation that confronted them.

B. Counter Intelligence:
   1. Counter Intelligence Plan:
      a. In accordance with Annex "a", Opn Ord 1-45; 29th RCT.
   2. Secrecy Discipline:
      a. Prior to embarkation, this organization maintained a Black Chamber to which admittance was obtained only with signed approval of the Commanding Officer. Prior to departure from the rendezvous area, no information was given the troops in accordance with orders from higher echelon.
   3. Concealment:
      a. Camouflage discipline was observed throughout this organization under the supervision of the Regimental and battalion camouflage officers.
      b. Use of cover and concealment was not adequately taken advantage of by individuals and small groups such as the crews of weapons.
4. Feints, Demonstrations and Raids:
   a. None employed by this organization save trail ambushes.

5. Signal Communications Security:
   a. Security measures were observed by all communications personnel in this organization. In several instances, however, staff section members risked compromising the shackles code through inability of the party they were calling to decode.

6. Counterpropaganda:
   a. Use of counterpropaganda was largely limited to indoctrination of civilians in occupied areas who still believed wholeheartedly the enemy claims that our troops would engage in wholesale murder and rape. Through language personnel, the fallacy of this belief was finally explained to them. Very soon after moving into an area, the majority of the civilians were persuaded to leave their caves without fear for their personal safety. No natives were encountered after the first few days who did not respond to kind treatment, and who were not persuaded to return to normal living conditions within the limitations necessitated by military operations.

C. Staff Work:
   1. Utilization of intelligence personnel was in accordance with the SOP for this organization.

   2. Maps and photographs were distributed as received from higher echelon. Photographs of desired scale of specific areas proved difficult to obtain in time, and frequently did not afford very complete coverage as per photo requests.

D. Propaganda:
   1. See subparagraph 6 above.

   2. No enemy propaganda save that reported by higher echelon was noted.

E. Enemy:
   1. Enemy morale ranged from good, in the case of regular troops, to poor, in the case of Home Guards (302Tai). Members of the Home Guard showed little or no enthusiasm for the military profession. They readily threw away their weapons, when they had any, and often deserted or surrendered.

   2. Order of Battle:
      UDO Force (Colonel Takehiko UDO, Commanding)
      2d 32, 2d Inf Unit; 44th IRA (Major SAITO, Commanding)
      Headquarters
4th Company
6th Company
2d MG Company
AT Unit .......................... 500 Os & Enl

1st Btry, 100th Ind Artillery
9th Naval Gun Unit ................. 100 Os & Enl
3d Midget Sub Unit
27th Torpedo Boat Unit
IMOTO TAI (Naval Labor Unit)
YAMAME TAI (Naval Labor Unit) .... 300 Os & Enl
1st Flat 1st Co, 26th Ship. Engr ..... 55 Os & Enl
1st GOKYOTAI (Veterans Unit)
2d GOKYOTAI (Veterans Unit)
3d YUGEN TAI Commando Unit
4th YUGÉ KITAI Commando Unit ...... 200 Os & Enl
225 Special Guard Company
Misc. Special Service Troops ......... 66 Os & Enl
Regt. Gun Unit (2 - 75mm Guns) ...... 60 Os & Enl

TOTAL 1281 Os & Enl

3. Organization (New Developments):
a. None except use of impressed Okinawan civilians as Home Guards.

4. Equipment (New Developments):
a. The following items of new equipment were found and turned in to higher echelon for ordnance analysis:
   (1) Frangible pottery grenade.
   (2) Bangalore Rocket
   (3) Wood Box Type AT Mine with Picric Acid Filler.
   (4) AT - "Throw Mine"; similar to "Lunge Mine" reported by Army in Philippines.

5. Tactics:
The enemy set up defenses in depth of strong hill positions. These were manned with the usual Japanese efficiency at this type of fighting. The enemy made effective use of road blocks, mines, booby traps and other demolitions to retard our advance and to render the road net unserviceable to us. The enemy carried out guerilla and patrol warfare with a view to forcing our frequent deployment, retarding our advance and gaining knowledge of our dispositions and strength. This type of fighting was ineffective because of the low caliber of troops employed.

6. Emplacements:
Almost all enemy emplacements were in the form of caves dug into the sides of hills, cliffs and embankments. Many of these were revetted with log supports. Caves
were connected and self-supporting. Few concrete positions were found save submarine pens. No positions differed from types previously encountered.

7. Logistics:
Our control of the major roads early in the campaign paralysed the enemy's transport, caused him to abandon his dumps, and to use his motor transport as road blocks. The enemy was thus forced to rely on those stores that were accumulated in the areas he chose to defend as strongpoints.

II Recommendations:
See Chapter X of Special Action Report under S-2.

III Appendices:
See attached enclosures.

L. G. RICHARDSON,
Major, U.S.N.,
S-2.
29th Marines,
HOTOBU PENINSULA,
OKINAWA JIMA,
1824 pp

S-2 Summary:

POW reports and reconnaissance patrol information indicate resistance on
the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road, will consist of small numbers of Naval Garrison
troops, remnants of the UBO Force, and KOTAI elements.

It is probable that the total strength of enemy effective is 300 to 500
officers and enlisted, with only a few supporting weapons. KOTAI troops are
frequently armed only with grenades, and often attempt to desert, but will
fight when cornered.

OKINAWA males of military age taken by our troops should be searched and
escorted to this headquarters. All other civilians should be started toward
the rear, under guard when possible.

L. G. RICHARDSON,
Major, USMC,
S-2.
APPENDIX II

29th Marines,
MOTOBU PENINSULA,
OKINAWA JIMA,
1405pp

S-2 Estimate as of this date and time.

Total enemy forces in interior of MOTOBU PENINSULA is estimated at between 1,000 and 2,000. Of this total, 500 or more are probably Naval Personnel from UNTEN, and Okinawan conscripts (BOETAI) and are located N of the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road. A more compact force, which may be the UDO Unit is located S of MANNI on high ground.

Enemy capabilities:

1. To conduct delaying action with use of deep supporting fires from 20 and 25mm cannon and mortars.
2. To defend astride the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road with one or two company strength, making use of flanking fires from N.
3. To attack on one or both of our flanks at any time, and with a strength of two companies (plus).

L. G. RICHARDSON,
Major, USMCR,
S-2.
Extracts from 2/3 Journal:

**THE DATED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incidents, Notes, Orders, Etc.</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/32a</td>
<td>Rad Fr: Item Co on Coast Rd nearly on Obj. George Co just behind preparing to send out patrols as assigned; How Co patrolled to Q618 Charlie (1), civilian speaking English captured.</td>
<td>X, S, I 0-2, 0-3, 3/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/82a</td>
<td>Rad To: Civilian reports Nip unit commanded by a Col at 0324 How &amp; Item believed still there.</td>
<td>X, S, M 0-2, 0-3, 3/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22a</td>
<td>Rad Fr G-2: 6th Engr report Jap aerial bomb on bridge at 0918 How (2)</td>
<td>X, S, I, Dem0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/33a</td>
<td>Magstr to Div: Rd beyond 0019 George to 9720. Sugar reported impassable due to mine fields. Reported by 6th Rex Co who is sending Rex party out. Our Trs are at G119 George.</td>
<td>X, S, I, Dem0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval Gunfire was employed daily by the 29th Marines subsequent to date of commitment. A total of 52 missions were called for. The greater number of these missions were in deep support of the infantry. Numerous missions were called for by the Division Commander, but were fired and controlled by regiment when the targets were near the regimental zone of action. On three of the latter missions, shore fire control was employed. Because rugged terrain masked observation, the remainder of the deep supporting missions were fired with plane spot. On such missions type of target, target location, and limits of line of fire were designated by the regimental Naval Liaison Officer.

Extensive close supporting fire was called for by the 3rd Battalion, 29th Marines, during the strong enemy resistance encountered by them on 9, 10, 11, and 12 April, 1945. Moreover, one mission called by division and two missions called for by regiment were actually in close support of the infantry, and were fired with Shore Fire control.

Ships' fire was accurate. In every instance the initial adjusting salvo was very close to the target designated. On 11 April, 1945, the U.S.S. PORTLAND fired her initial salvo with a time of flight. This salvo was only 300 yards over in range and 50 yards right in deflection. Night harassing fire was employed on 10 and 11 April, 1945, by indirect fire with no shore fire control. No casualties or embarrassment to friendly troops resulted from these missions.

The effectiveness of Naval Gunfire was lessened by three factors beyond the control of Naval Liaison teams:

1. Relief of ships at non-scheduled times.
2. Ships frequently secured station prior to the arrival of their relief.
3. WOB frequently secured station prior to the arrival of their relief. This necessitated needless delay in briefing the relieving plane and enabling it to locate the target.

Ships fired with more effectiveness with their own planes spotting. In my opinion the reasons for this are fourfold:

1. Because of its slower speed, a ship's plane can more accurately observe and fire the target.
2. Ship's planes can remain on station for longer periods of time.
3. The relieving plane can remain informed of the tactical situation while aboard ship and enroute to the target; this enables the relieving plane to be completely briefed prior to arrival on station.
4. Ship's pilots are excellently trained in spotting and can work in close harmony with their own ship.
Communications:

In the latter stages of the campaign, communications were frequently hampered by long range, terrain, and CW interference. Due to the rapid advance of the troops and the resultant expanded distance between echelons, wire could not always be employed.

Net control on Green River was excellent. On spotting frequencies, limitations were imposed by the shortage of frequencies. This meant that several battalion liaison teams were compelled to employ the same net.

This operation again demonstrated its necessity for two radios for the regimental naval liaison team. One radio to monitor the Naval Gunfire Support Net, and one radio to monitor the spotting frequencies of the battalion teams.

Regimental communications can adequately be maintained simultaneously on two nets by a team consisting of three radiomen and a driver.

The SCR 694 is the finest radio available for Shore Fire Control Communications. The only limitations on the performance of this set were imposed by terrain, CW interference, and enemy jamming. The SCR 694 was invariably the last radio to mask out. On 9 and 10 April, 1945, and again on the night of 12 April, 1945, the Naval Gunfire net became the regimental tactical net and served as the only means of communication between several echelons of the regiment.

Radar Beacons:

At no time did a ship call for radar beacon. I can see no use for the beacon in shore fire control. The only time target designation becomes difficult is in rugged terrain where topography is poorly described on charts. In such instances, radar is non-operational because the terrain masks the beacon. Consequently, the only time radar might be required is when it is non-operational.

Regimental Control:

Extreme cooperation was accorded the Naval Gunfire Liaison team by the Commanding Officer, 29th Marines. The Commanding Officer and his staff utilized ships fire on every feasible occasion. This is evidenced by the fact that the 29th Marines fired more than twice as many missions as the other two regiments of the division.

Rapidly fluctuating front lines necessitated closer regimental control than has been required on previous operations. The lack of experience of battalion Naval liaison officers was another factor warranting close regimental control. In future operations, I suggest that the 29th Marines place more confidence upon their battalion liaison teams; and if the front line situation is more orthodox, that they exert less regimental control. All battalion Naval liaison officers are now experienced and capable of conducting their missions without suggestions from the regimental Naval Liaison Officer.
Division Controls:
Division control was more excellent and cooperative than in any of the six campaigns I have witnessed. Fire support requests were promptly fulfilled. The Division Naval Gunfire Officer frequently assisted in relaying messages. Without his cooperation, communications would have been much less effective.

Individual Ships:

U.S.S. TENNESSEE

The U.S.S. TENNESSEE again lived up to its reputation as the favorite OBE of shore fire control parties. In my opinion her firing at OKINAWA was even more excellent than at SAIPAN or TARAWA. I have fired the U.S.S. TENNESSEE on four previous occasions and my confidence in her firing is such that I would never hesitate to fire her in the very closest support of the infantry.

On the night of 16-17 April, 1945, the TENNESSEE performed a remarkable accomplishment in illumination. Only two spots were required to adjust her to the target. When adjustment was completed she maintained the illumination in the same spot throughout the night. No further adjustment was required.

On the morning and afternoon of 17 April, 1945, the main and secondary batteries of the TENNESSEE were brought to bear on enemy gun positions and personnel. These positions were on the crest and face of a slope and the line of fire was almost parallel to the slope. Despite this difficult situation, effective fire was brought to bear on the positions. Two factors made possible adjustment on these targets:

1. Accurate application of spots.
2. Very tight close pattern, especially with secondary batteries.

The intense fire of the U.S.S. TENNESSEE was of great importance in the capture of the hill without casualty to the 29th Marines. A report from the Naval Liaison Officer of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, stated that eight enemy were killed by Marines on the way up the slope, 32 were killed on the top. In huge craters created by the TENNESSEE, over 100 dead enemy personnel were counted.

Cooperation between the TENNESSEE and shore fire control parties was as close as in previous operations. The TENNESSEE obviously enjoys firing with shore fire control and is prompt and enthusiastic in her support of the infantry.

U.S.S. BILoxI

Fire delivered from the U.S.S. BILoxI was very effective. On the night of 17-18 April, 1945, she maintained illumination without adjustment throughout the night just as the U.S.S. TENNESSEE had done on the preceding night. On the afternoon of 18 April, 1945, she delivered effective fire on the crest of a slope, always a difficult target. One enemy dual-purpose gun and two automatic weapons were found to have been destroyed by her fire. The hill was taken the following day without casualty.

On this mission the BILoxI employed her own plane spot. The coordination between plane and ship was excellent. The plane thoroughly walked...
CHAPTER VII - APPENDIX BAKER - Naval Sunfire (Cont'd.)

the fire along the entire area with effective results.

The U.S.S. BILOXI has a tight close pattern with her main battery. This factor makes her a very desirable ship for call fires in close support of the infantry.

Throughout the entire operation, the U.S.S. BILOXI was more than usually cooperative with the shore fire control parties of the 29th Marines.

U.S.S. PRESTON

The U.S.S. PRESTON is reported by the Naval Liaison Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Marines, to have been largely influential in deterring a strong enemy counterattack on the afternoon of 12 April, 1945. Her fire was distinguished by the promptness with which it was delivered on call missions. Accordingly to N.L.O. 293, her fire released two companies for duty urgently required elsewhere.

Recommendations:

(1) That no ship secure station until its relief has arrived on station, is briefed, and is ready to deliver call fires.
(2) That V.O.F. spotting planes remain on station until their relief has arrived and is briefed and ready to assume control of the fire.
(3) That ships employ their own spotting planes in preference to a V.O.F.
(4) That one ship and one frequency be assigned to each shore fire control team, and that this ship remain on station until its ammunition is exhausted. This recommendation was made by the U.S.S. PORTLAND in her report on the operation against PELELIU. This procedure enables the ship to keep completely briefed on the tactical situation and to be available for call fires at all times.
(5) That radio relay stations be established where radio range is great. This could be accomplished either on the beach or at sea by having a small craft take station close to the beach in the vicinity of the shore fire control team.
(6) That Radar Beacons not be used by Shore Fire Control parties.
(7) That the SCR 300 be made an optional radio for Shore Fire Control Teams.
(8) That the Regimental Naval Liaison Team be equipped with one SCR 694, and one TCS mounted in a 12-volt jeep.
(9) That personnel of the Regimental Naval Liaison Team be decreased to three radiomen and one driver.
(10) That personnel of Battalion Naval and Spotter Teams be increased to three radio operators, one wire man, one driver, and three general duty men.

Submitted by Lieutenant (jg) John T. Ryan, USNR.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE - APPENDIX CHARLIE - Air Support.

Our regiment being in Corps Reserve on LOVE' DAY, I had but little
case to observe the efficiency of defensive air cover. However, the
effectiveness of preliminary heavy air strikes against enemy installations
proved adequate and attained the desired degree of neutralization.

The Battalion ALP performed their duties favorably and kept their
unit commanders informed of the air situation at all times.

The radio communications between ALP and AOC were excellent during
the day, but there was too much CW interference between 1600 and 1800 to
use voice transmissions. Contrary to popular opinion, communication be­
tween regimental ALP and higher echelon was very seldom possible due to
rapid advances and the lack of personnel to maintain tactical wire.

There was no communication between ALP and support aircraft. It is
felt that more accurate and timely strikes could be called by communication
between these parties.

Marking front lines with panels or colored smoke and targets with
white phosphorous appeared satisfactory to support aircraft.

Number of aircraft was adequate for all missions.

Except in one incident, dummy-runs to adjust air attacks on targets
proved effective.

It is felt that in the future, Regimental ALP should have control of
all aircraft and strikes in their zone of action, allowing the battalion
ALP to direct the strikes. In many cases HSF spotting aircraft and uncontro­
trolled aircraft picked targets of their own. This not only caused casual­
ties to friendly troops, but lowered the morale of ground personnel and
jeopardized the reputation of future close support missions.

Submitted by Second Lieutenant Lorrimer D. Elliott,
USMC.
The 4th Battalion, 15th Marines, was assigned the mission of direct support of the 29th Marines on 11 April, 1945, and took over at 0300 the same day. Forward Observers and Liaison Officers were sent to the First and Second Battalions and to the Regimental CP where they made themselves known to the unit commanders and were acquainted with the situation. When the Third Battalion reverted to 29th Marines controls on 20 April, two Forward Observers were assigned them, remaining with them for the remainder of the operation.

The 4th Battalion, 15th Marines, remained in direct support of the 29th Marines from 11 April to 24 April, 1945, during which time there were many missions fired and according to the general consensus, the support was good and the effect excellent.

Some of the more outstanding missions were:

1. The concentrations fired in support of "A" and "B" companies when their positions were threatened by a greater force. The attack was broken up by artillery fire and "A" and "B" companies had the opportunity to better their position.

2. Artillery fire brought to bear on a 20mm Gun Emplacement effectively silenced same and allowed the foot troops to overrun and secure the position.

3. Credit was given to the artillery for materially aiding in practically unopposed taking of a high hill on which was found approximately one mile of enemy trenches and pillboxes. Found in these fortified positions were numerous enemy who had met a descent and violent end.

Artillery communications were commended highly inasmuch as at times they were utilized by the supported units when all other means of contact had failed.

Cooperation between infantry commanding officers and artillery officers was at the maximum which is, in part, the reason for the excellent work done by both.

Approximately 40 missions were requested and fired for the 29th Marines.

Submitted by Daniel H. Linebaugh, 1st Lt., USMC.
CHAPTER VII - APPENDIX ESM - Communications

Signal

a. Communication Plan (SOI)
   (1) The plan was adequate.
   (2) Frequencies were adequate.
   (3) Call signs sufficient.
   (4) No duplications of communication systems.
   (5) No liaison effected.
   (6) Plans were received in ample time to permit study and to make alterations as necessary.

b. Rehearsal
   (1) No change in plans.
   (2) No deficiencies in equipment.
   (3) Rehearsal provided an adequate check on communication facilities.
   (4) No improvement could be accomplished.

c. Embarkation and Voyage
   (1) Equipment was loaded according to plan.
   (2) No equipment damaged in loading.
   (3) All items checked during voyage.
   (4) Actual operating ships circuits, both visual and radio - general instructions in communication plans and security.
   (5) Landing Force MC and Ship Communications Officer operated together by handling traffic between troops and ship.

d. Personnel
   (1) Allowance of personnel is not adequate. The increase of FM radio equipment and no operators requires double duty for personnel assigned. Recommend an additional operator to be assigned for each additional FM radio.
   (2) Training adequate.
   (3) The RCT was short 2 CP personnel which was made up of line personnel who had little technical training. This RCT had its authorized quota of trained CP until about two months before the operation, wherein the higher echelon transferred them to other units.
   (4) No losses during landing.
      4 KIA - 12 WIA - 0 MIA
   (5) No battle casualties replaced.

e. Equipment
   (1) No overage or shortages.
   (2) No losses of equipment aboard ship.
   (3) Losses consisted in the 30-day replenishments. This equipment was landed over the proper beach, but was never to this date received except small amounts which had been pilfered and handled most carelessly.
(4) Equipment design and quantity was excellent with the following exception:
The TBY generator is too noisy.

(5) SCR 694 generator should replace the TBY generator.

(6) No new equipment employed.

(7) Waterproofing was accomplished, but was not necessary.

(8) No additional T/A equipment.

(9) All equipment authorized by T/A was employed.

(10) All equipment was unloaded from the ship over the proper beach.

f. Supply:
(1) Supply by Sixth Division Division Signal Quartermaster and radio repair was outstanding. There could not be any improvement.

(2) Transportation was not adequate. The authorized wire jeeps were continually shoting trouble and wire laying, thereby equipment amounting to approximately 200 pounds per man was left without transportation.

(3) RCT Communication Section should have three wire jeeps with 1/4 trailers and one 6x6 truck. This would be ample for displacement and supply would reach the unit when needed.

g. Operation:
(1) No new agencies established.

(2) Radio.

(3) Impossible to eliminate because of fast-moving situation.

(4) Difficulties:
(a) Radio - none.
(b) Wire - fast moving and great distances of units from RCT was impossible at times to lay wire.
(c) Visual - none.
(d) Messenger - none.

h. None.

i. Security:
(1) Shackle, Hug were used with excellent security.

(2) Personnel sufficiently trained.

j. Countermeasure by enemy:
(1) Radio jamming was not effective.

k. None.

l. None.
CHAPTER VII - Appendix F - Engineer

ENGINEER

During the time the Twenty-Ninth Marines were in the attack, Company "C", 6th Engineer Battalion was almost constantly in direct support. A liaison officer checked in daily with the S-3 and S-4 Sections in order to anticipate equipment to be needed and nature of work to be done on following day. With in support the Engineers accomplished the following tasks:

1. Cleared approximately 23 Road Blocks.

2. Established water points in vicinity of all command posts and battalions areas.

3. Improved, repaired and widened all roads in use by 29th Marines on MOTOBU PENINSULA.

4. Constructed Bailey Bridge in vicinity of AWA and repaired approximately 8 other bridges that had been destroyed or damaged by the enemy.

5. In the vicinity of GAGUSUKU, where the Nips had done their most effective bridge demolition job yet seen, the Engineers constructed a by-pass and a ford useable at low tide. This enabled all types of vehicles to continue rolling supplies to the advancing units and lightened the problem of evacuation.

6. Mine Removal Detachment cleared all major roads of the MOTOBU PENINSULA, working for the most part while areas were still under fire.

Close liaison must be maintained between a supporting unit such as engineers in order for the regiment to get the maximum amount of necessary work accomplished and for the engineers to use their equipment and time most expeditiously.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE - APPENDIX GEORGE & MEDICAL

MEDICAL

A. Embarkation:

1. Personnel.
   Eight (8) Medical Officers and one (1) Dental Officer. These officers
   divided into three (3) groups of one Battalion Surgeon and one Assistant Battalion
   Surgeon for each of the three (3) battalions comprising this regiment, one (1)
   Regimental Surgeon, one (1) Assistant Regimental Surgeon, and one (1) Regimental
   Dentist.
   
   Forty (40) corpsmen were assigned to each of the three (3) battalions
   and fourteen (14) to Headquarters & Service Company, five (5) of which were at­
   tached to Weapons Company. The Battalion Surgeons and corpsmen and the Regimental
   Surgeon and corpsmen were boated with their respective landing teams.

   Class IV combat supplies loaded aboard jeep ambulances and in 155mm
   powder bag cylinders attached to jeep ambulances were carried in addition to canv­
   as carrying bags, weighing approximately 35 pounds. These consisted primarily of
   plasma, serum albumin, morphine, battle dressings, wire and plastic splints, sul­
   fanilamide powder, sulfanilamide packets for oral consumption, paregoric, opium
   tablets, and such other gear as was considered applicable to combat situation.
   Thirty day back-up supply of essentially the same character, but in bulk, was trans­
   ported by the Regimental Quartermaster.

B. Aboard Ship:

   Sick call aboard ship was more or less limited to skin diseases, fungus in­
   fection of the feet, and other minor complaints.

   Sanitary conditions. Heads were adequate for care of personnel. Bunk space
   available. Living quarters were grossly overcrowded, inadequately ventilated, not
   enough bunk space available necessitating that half the men in a compartment had to
   sleep top-side on the weather deck regardless of weather conditions.

   Messes; Adequate and well run.
   Cooks and messmen; Well trained and inspected daily.
   Special Precautions; None.

C. Debarkation:

1. Personnel.
   The forty battalion corpsmen were divided as follows: eight were assigned
   to each rifle company, giving two corpsmen to each rifle platoon, and one corps­
   men to each 60mm platoon, and one corpsman to each headquarters section. From
   thirteen to fifteen corpsmen were assigned to battalion headquarters company to
   run the aid station. These personnel were boated and landed with the organization
   to which attached. In H&S Company five corpsmen were attached to Weapons Company
   to give 1 corpsman per weapons platoon and 1 corpsman for headquarters. The nine
   remaining corpsmen attached to H&S Company were boated individually, one in each
   of the regimental landing craft and they landed with the regiment. On the second
   wave of regiment, twenty-two corpsmen comprising the Forward Collecting Section
from "C" Medical Company were boated in three boats containing nine, nine and four corpsmen each.

2. Material:
Combat supplies and material, generally averaging ten canvas bags of 35 pounds weight, were landed with each battalion and regiment and were carried. Combat loaded jeeps, as already indicated, came ashore on lower priority.

3. Losses of Personnel and Material:
NONE.

Other line four back up combat material packed and banded in crates were carried by each Battalion Quartermaster and by the Regimental Quartermaster.

D. Ashore - assault Phase.

Because of lack of enemy resistance, this regiment was extremely mobile and a minimum of medical installations were set up until enemy opposition was encountered. When in combat, Battalion Aid Stations and a Regimental Aid Station were set up in the battalion and regimental CPs close to natural lines of drift. Camouflage and cover were utilized on every occasion. Evacuation was carried out by jeep ambulances from the Battalion Aid Stations to the Regimental Aid Station, and by litter and litter bearers from the front lines to the Battalion Aid Station.

Casualties taken direct from Regiment to "C" Medical Company. Third Battalion, 29th Marines, on one side of HITOKUBI PENINSULA was for a short time, attached to the 4th Marine Regiment and they evacuated in a similar manner to "A" Medical Company.

Protective measures taken. Battalion Aid Stations were located within the perimeter defense of the Battalion CPs and the corpsmen attached to the Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations were also used as perimeter defense immediately around the Aid Stations. Whenever possible, concrete tents, defiladed positions and natural foliage were utilized for concealment and cover. Blackout precautions were practiced during combat, however, no blackout tents were furnished Battalion Aid Stations and Regimental Aid Station. It is strongly urged that such tents be made standard equipment for these organizations.

Hospitalization: All casualties were removed to the rear as soon as they were in a condition to be moved and hospitalized in medical companies supporting the regiment. This hospitalization seemed adequate. Evacuation was effected as referred to above. Because of the rugged mountainous terrain, nylon jungle litters were of inestimable value because of their lightness, durability, and compactness. This regiment was furnished 75 jungle litters, which was not an adequate supply.

Casualties treated: Casualties per battalion:
1st Bn - 140 wounded, 32 killed.
2d Bn - 64 wounded, 7 killed.
3d Bn - 118 wounded, 29 killed.
H&S Co - 1 wounded, 1 killed.

Sanitation: Sanitation was adequate and for the most part under battle conditions, well executed. Food was adequate. Water constituted, at times, a problem.
as an adequate site for a waterpoint was hard to find. Once water points were established, however, the water supply was adequate.

Disposal of Dead: (Our) turned over to the S-1, who turned them over to Division Graves Registration. Enemy dead were buried on the spot.

Sanitary precautions taken—bodies were removed as soon as possible.

Epidemic or unusual diseases in troops—none.

Dental services performed by the Regimental Dentist consisted of temporary fillings and extractions. Number of cases treated—97. Type of cases—fillings and extractions, 41 adequate, 56 inadequate. Additional duties of Regimental Dentist—Evacuation, Liaison and Assistant to Regimental Surgeon. His services were found invaluable.

Care of Civilians: Number of cases treated—250. Temporary first aid measures were given to civilians that passed through regimental and battalion aid stations. They were transported by jeep-ambulance from battalion to regiment and from regiment to nearest Civil Government Hospital. Diseases among civilians noted—Filaria, Scabies, Impetigo, and one case of Trachoma.

Prisoners of War—Care of—None.

Medical Personnel: They were considered adequate and were extremely well trained, and functioned in a very commendable way.

Losses and Replacement: Corpsman losses in the regiment were 15. Replacement of corpsman was rather slow. Specialties needed—None.

Field Medical Equipment: Only that portion of field medical equipment was carried that could be handled with ease. Heavier articles such as, autoclave, sterilizer, field desk, chemical warfare, etc., were left in the rear echelon.

Pilferage and losses—None.

The equipment carried was found adequate and suitable to the present field duty.

Medical Supplies: Carried as previously mentioned. The initial supplies carried by personnel were considered adequate for five days. Thirty-day back-up supplies allocated to the Regimental Quartermaster caught up to us only after combat was over. Re-supply to the Third Battalion, 29th Marines, who were on the South coast of MOTOKU PENINSULA, while the Regimental CP and the other two battalions were on the North coast, proved a major problem at one time and re-supply was requested from and received from the Division Surgeon. It was impossible for regiment to supply the Third Battalion because of the long route round the Peninsula. Because the road was under fire and bridges were blown up, amphibious DUKWS and boats were finally resorted to by division to supply and evacuate the Third Battalion on this particular occasion. When the Third Battalion was attached to the 4th Marine Regiment, they were re-supplied from that organization.
Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock: Each battalion was allowed one jeep ambulance and during combat, three ambulances were drawn from "C" Medical Company, pooled at Regimental Aid Station and sent to each battalion upon request to evacuate casualties. One jeep ambulance was immobilized by enemy action, but later reconditioned and put back in use. These ambulances during rest periods were maintained and serviced by assigned Marine Corps drivers. Jeep ambulances came ashore combat loaded and whenever a battalion moved forward, the combat load upon them made them useless for evacuation during the move. It is impossible to carry all the accumulated battle supplies of a battalion and regimental aid station and it is strongly urged that each battalion aid station be furnished one jeep trailer. This would enable each battalion and regimental aid station to move in its entirety with little effort. It was found by all the battalions and regiment that the combat gear handled by the battalion and regimental quartermasters were never accessible when needed. Other supplies were moved forward before the medical supplies were brought up.

Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment and Supplies: These are Quartermaster equipment and except for the small amount of DDT and insect repellent, louse powder carried by each battalion and regimental aid station and a few Freon bombs carried by the same organizations, no more were available at the quartermaster and at the present writing none are yet available. DDT powder and DDT in kerosene are considered a major item of importance as are Freon bombs in the control of insect pests, such as flies, fleas, and mosquitoes, which are found in great numbers on this island.
CHAPTER VII - ASSAULT PHASE - APPENDIX How - War Dogs

First Marine War Dog Platoon Report:

1. The following is a partial report of the 1st Marine War Dog Platoon in the ICEBERG Operation on the south coast of IWO JIMA against forces of the Japanese Enemy.

2. This report consists of the actions of approximately one-half of the platoon's strength of dogs (13 dogs) and their action with the 29th Marines.

3. In the 19 days that the 1st Marine War Dog Platoon saw action with the 29th Marines, the men and dogs were on patrol 192 times; the dogs alerted to the presence of the enemy (not including the hundreds of civilians seen), 16 times; and were directly or indirectly responsible for the killing of 60 enemy troops and the taking of 3 prisoners.

4. All dogs were used as night security about company and battalion CPs when on the front lines.

5. The following report does not include any patrols that were not over 1,000 yards unless the presence of the enemy was discovered and this will be included in this report.

6. Landed on Green Beach #2 on LOVE plus 1 and reported to the regimental CP; ordered to send the 1st Section to the 1st Battalion:

2 Apr 45 - Purucker (Baron), Lippold (Bobby), Devault (Jack) - 1st Bn; each man 2 patrols - found nothing.

5 Apr 45 - Battista (Father) - 2d Bn; found 2 natives in caves.

4 Apr 45 - Battista (Father) - 2d Bn; patrol, 1 Jap prisoner.

Walker (Zingo), Marchesi (Carlo) - 1st Bn; patrol, 2 patrols, nothing.

7 Apr 45 - McDermott (King) - 2d Bn; found 2 natives in caves.

Smith (Gunner) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.

8 Apr 45 - Stevenson (Jeep), Battista (Father) - 2d Bn; patrols at point, found approx 50 natives in caves.

Eason (Donny) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.

Smith (Gunner) - 2d Bn; point to Peninsula, nothing.

Lippold (Sobby) - 1st Bn; patrol, 3 Japs killed.

Marchesi (Carlo), Walker (Zingo), Purucker (Bacon) - 1st Bn; patrols, nothing.

9 Apr 45 - Stevenson (Jeep), Battista (Father) - 2d Bn; patrols at point, 3 Japs killed.

Eason (Donny) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.

Smith (Gunner) - 2d Bn; point to Peninsula, nothing.

Lippold (Bobby) - 1st Bn; patrol, 1 Jap killed.

Purucker (Bacon), Shepperd (Sparks) - patrols, 1 Jap killed.

Lippold (Bobby) - 1st Bn; patrol, dog alerted 3 times presence of enemy; warning given to officers on point at each alert; dog & handler however were ordered to proceed along Ed; ran into ambush of at least 2 MGs; handler wounded and dog killed plus other casualties on point; man was evacuated.
CHAPTER VII - APPENDIX HOW - War Dogs (Cont'd).

9 apr 45 - Coates (Baron) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
McDermott (King) - 2d Bn; patrol, dog did not alert, but 3 Nips killed.
Batkowski (Baron) - 1st Bn; patrol, nothing.
Burns (Blitz) - 1st Bn; patrol, nothing.
Purucker (Baron) - 1st Bn; point, nothing.
Marchesi (Carlo) - 1st Bn; patrol, 3 Nips killed.

10 apr 45 - Battista (Bother) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Coates (Baron) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Smith (Gunner) - 2d Bn; point, nothing.
Sheppard (Sparks), Walker (Zingo) - 3d Bn; point, nothing.

11 apr 45 - Fowler (Rollo) - 2d Bn; 1 Hip killed.
Batkowski (Baron) - 1st Bn; patrol, dog alerted, enemy fled.
Burns (Blitz) - 1st Bn; patrol, nothing.
Sheppard (Sparks) - 3d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Devault (Jack) - 3d Bn; point, two Nips killed.

12 apr 45 - Stevenson (Jeep) - Patrol, three Nips killed.
Battista (Bother) - 2d Bn; alerted, nothing.
McDermott (King) - 2d Bn; point, nothing.
Coates (Baron) - 2d Bn; alerted to 50 Nips, approx 25 killed.
Sasson (Donnay) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Sasson (Donnary) - 2d Bn; failed to alert ambush, too far away.
Fowler (Rollo) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.

13 apr 45 - Stevenson (Jeep) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Fowler (Rollo) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Devault (Jack), Marchesi (Carlo) - 3d Bn; patrol, nothing.

15 apr 45 - Fowler (Rollo) - 2d Bn; patrol, nothing.
Sharpe (King) - 1st Bn; patrol, nothing.
Batkowski (Baron), Hogh (Duke) - 1st Bn; patrols, nothing.

17 apr 45 - Batkowski (Baron), Hogh (Duke) - 1st Bn; patrols, nothing.
Sharpe (King) - 1st Bn; point, nothing.

18 apr 45 - Smith (Gunner) - 2d Bn; patrol, 1 Hip killed, 2 taken prisoner.

19 apr 45 - Walker (Zingo), Devault (Jack) - 3d Bn; patrol, two Nips killed.

20 apr 45 - Sasson (Donnay) - 2d Bn; Nip killed attempting to infiltrate.

Submitted by:
First Lieutenant Robert W. Killoran, USMC, Condg.
Chapter I - General

The purpose of this report as supplemented by references made herein, is to present a concise and accurate narrative of missions and operations of this battalion in the Okinawa operation, from its inception in the planning phase to the occupation and defense phase. Initially this battalion functioned as Division reserve, and later was attached to the Twenty-second Marine Regiment, finally reverting to the Twenty-ninth Marine Regiment on L plus 5 day. Both assault and security missions were assigned to this battalion during this operation.
Appendix I to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 1/29 (Cont'd)

Chapter II - The Task Organization.

Landing Team 1/29 consisted of fifty-three (53) officers, one (1) warrant officer, and one thousand four hundred and ninety-three (1493) enlisted personnel, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jean W. MOREAU. Included in the landing team were detachments from the following units, commanded by officers and non-commissioned officers as shown:

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<th>DETACHMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LT 1/29</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Plat, C/6th Engr Bn</td>
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<td>1st Plat, C/6th Pion Bn</td>
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<td>1st Plat, C/6th MT Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det SP Com Team, 6th JASCO</td>
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<td>Det 3rd Plat, 6th MP Co</td>
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<td>Det 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det 3rd Plat, 6th S&amp;S Co (less PX Sec)</td>
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<th>COMMANDER</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lt Col Jean W. Moreau</strong></td>
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<td>1st Lt Raymond S. Poppe</td>
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<td>1st Lt Charles K. Mitchell</td>
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<td>2d Lt John H. French</td>
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<td>1st Lt Raymond C. Rudden</td>
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<td>Sgt Clarence O Ingram</td>
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<td>1st Lt Wayne B. Dayberry</td>
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<td>2d Lt Leonard J. Olsen</td>
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<td>2d Lt Frederick R. Kennedy</td>
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<td>Lt (jg) Edgar P. Howard</td>
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<td>1st Lt Charles F. Mc Kiever</td>
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<td>2d Lt Edward H. Donelan</td>
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<td>Lt (jg) Robert W. MONTZ</td>
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<td>S/Sgt Thomas R. May</td>
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<td>Sgt. Alexander Stewart</td>
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* - 26th and 33rd Repl Drafts used as shore party under Lt. Mitchell.
Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

The planning for the Administrative Section in the formative stage of the operation consisted of Battalion, Regimental, and Division CPXs. These CPXs served to indoctrinate both forward and rear echelon personnel of the section in their duties for the forthcoming operation.

The specific training of the Intelligence Section for the operation was devoted mainly to a thorough study of all available intelligence data. Overlays and panoramic sketches of beaches and installations were prepared for study by the troops and the section. This work occupied all available training time until departure.

Preliminary planning of the operation included the drafting of BIT 1/29 Opn Plan 1-45 and Alternate Plan 1-45, boat assignment tables, landing diagrams, debarkation and approach schedules, and briefing schedules for troops enroute to target.

In the period of preparation for the Okinawa operation, most types of supplies and equipment were not too difficult to obtain. There were some items of individual equipment unobtainable, such as carbine slings, BAR belts and assistant BAR belts. Some items of equipment arrived nearly too late to be used. Paint for marking and stenciling was very inadequate in amount. Weapons, ammunition, barbed wire, clothing and all Class I supplies were plentiful and easy to obtain. Motor transport repair and maintenance facilities were adequate. Taken as a whole, the supply of the above items and Class II equipment were not adequate in the preparatory phase of this operation.

The Medical Department of the First Battalion, 25th Marines, began its preparation for the invasion of Okinawa early in September, 1944. Initially the program was of field exercises and biweekly lectures to the corpsmen on current medical subjects of importance to them. The field exercises consisted of functioning as a medical unit with the battalion on its maneuvers. Preparation of medical material and gathering of all quotas of supply and equipment began September 15, 1944, and was completed March 1, 1945. In January, 1945, a training program was instituted for Marine personnel in first aid, field sanitation, and general information regarding disease in the area of the coming operation. Lectures were given by a corpsman and doctors to all hands in the battalion. In January and February, shots were given for cholera, typhus, plague and tetanus to the battalion and attached shore party units.
Chapter IV - Training Phase and Rehearsals

An extensive training program for troops was carried out for a period of six (6) months prior to embarking on the operation, in accordance with directives of the Sixth Marine Division and the Twenty-ninth Regiment. Amphibious training was held from 28 February, 1945, to 8 March, 1945, during which all phases of ship to shore movement, and coordination with Naval personnel on the transport phase of the amphibious operations were covered.

After the completion of amphibious training and prior to embarkation to the target area, a review of the training phase was held for all troops. All weapons and equipment were checked, and the camp site was cleared.

The rehearsal period did not give a good check of communication equipment. Signal equipment could have been checked to a better degree in a bivouac area. Communication personnel were given valuable instruction and practice in debarkation drills during this period.

The early training of intelligence personnel presented a special problem for the battalion, as men with previous training were not available. The first phase of the training was devoted to selection, procurement, and assignment of personnel to specific jobs in the section. When this was finally accomplished with occasional changes, a period of intensive training in all phases of intelligence work was begun. Following are some of the topics emphasized: Map reading, map making, API (at regiment), beach studies, keeping of intelligence section documents, sound recognition (night and day), compass marches (night and day), mechanical drawing, time, rate, and distance problems, establishing and maintaining observation posts, camouflage, ditto and mimeograph work, reproduction, sketching, aircraft, vehicles, and naval craft recognition; tactics, weapons, identification, and organization of Japanese forces; handling of POWs, collection of documents and material, instructions in common Japanese military phraseology, reconnaissance work in preparing company and battalion field exercises, general operation and function of the intelligence section in connection with the Battalion CP.

In addition to the above, the intelligence section was given individual training on all phases of field work, to include mechanical training in all infantry battalion weapons; chemical warfare, field sanitation, message writing, shackles code, authentication, physical conditioning, semaphore, radio and telephone procedure, tables of organization for the battalion, regiment, and division.

During this training period the entire section was taken to regiment, division, and corps to observe the intelligence section setup in higher echelons. Arrangements were made to have one man spend several days at a photo laboratory of a Naval Aviation unit to study photography, developing, and printing.
The two men who were to be attached to each rifle company spent considerable time with them in the field to familiarize themselves with the personnel and their work.

The newer members of the section were instructed by the older men, and each man was rotated through all the jobs in the section for obvious reasons during combat.

Each man was assigned a subject on the history of the war in the Pacific, prospective target areas, and overall Japanese strategy in the Pacific, to prepare and present to the section. A continuous situation map of the European Theatre was kept up for dissemination to troops. A two-day course of instruction was given to all rifle platoon guides on the function and operation of the intelligence section, and on general intelligence work. Highlights of the training were extensive examinations covering all previous training, which usually took a full day to complete.
Chapter V - Loading and Embarkation

The Administrative Section prepared and distributed loading rosters of personnel, prepared and supervised the embarkation and billeting of BLT 1/29 personnel aboard the transport, set up and maintained a troop office aboard ship, established a ship's guard detachment, and assigned personnel for nets and general duty aboard ship.

Provision was made for adequate space and time for the briefing and training of troops aboard ship en route to the target. Arrangements were completed for the movement of troops from the beach to the ship.

The loading of the ship presented very few difficulties and went very well. The TQM and ships loading officer, in conjunction with the ships TQM loaded the ship according to priorities and in adequate time. There was no supply problem aboard ship. Rations and ammunition for embarkation were issued on Love minus one (1) day.

The total time required to load the USS Lep covered five (5) days; actual loading hours totaled forty (40). The loading continued smoothly, with sufficient numbers of LCVPs and LCMs, until there appeared to be a shortage of cargo nets which caused several hours delay each day. During the first days loading of ammunition in number two hatch, one half hour was lost because of a broken cable on the yard and stay rig. This was the only break down and delay due to equipment during the entire operation.

Troops required four hours to embark. This length of time could have been reduced to about two hours with the number of landing craft at our disposal and method employed. The time consumed was due to extra details ashore and release by higher command.

Troops embarked by scaling landing nets which were lowered adjacent to their compartments. This method relieved much congestion on the main deck while last minute cargo was coming aboard.
Chapter VI - Movement to and Arrival at Objective Area

Upon embarkation at Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands, all personnel carried out a training schedule, which included among other subjects, instruction in Japanese language phrases, sniper and snoper scope, land mines, booby traps, handling of civilians, personal hygiene as it affected troops at target area, air and naval gunfire support phases of amphibious operations, communication procedure, shore party, Regimental Weapons support, and physical drill. This schedule was in effect for six (6) days from Guadalcanal to Ulithi, and for four (4) days at the latter port.

After leaving the Naval staging area at Ulithi, all personnel of the landing team received detailed instruction and briefing on the Okinawa operation. Enlarged sketches and charts were prepared which facilitated this briefing. Review of past work and its possible use in the forthcoming operation was also carried out. Training of communication personnel aboard ship consisted of a minute review of what each individual’s duty would be while in combat. Extracts from the SOI were studied carefully. All information that the Intelligence Section had concerning the target was passed on to the regimental communication personnel did not assist the Ship’s Communication Officer because of an overage of ship’s communication men. The troop message center worked with the ship’s Messenger Service.

There was a brief outbreak of diarrhea aboard ship. The organism was isolated from contaminated food and identified as belonging to the salmonella group. Most other illnesses consisted of skin diseases and mycotic ear infections, a carry-over from Guadalcanal. These, for the most part, improved rapidly under treatment as the ship sailed toward a cooler area. The usual amount of seasickness was encountered. Two men fell from ladders, sustaining fractures of a 5th metacarpal in one and a Colles fracture in the other.

Heads, living quarters, messes and galleys were inspected daily for cleanliness. Heads were conspicuous for their foul odor, but this could not be remedied since the ship had no supplies of creosote or other antiseptic deodorants. Sanitation was generally good.

There were no unusual events enroute to the target area.

Splendid cooperation on the part of the personnel of the USS Leon transporting the landing team to the target permitted regular periods for training and briefing troops.
Appendix I to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 1/29 (Cont'd)

Chapter VII - Assault Phase

At 1300 on Love Day, BLT 1/29 debarked from the USS LEXON in accordance with BLT 1/29 debarkation and approach schedule, moved to the transfer line and boarded LVTs. The first wave of the landing team arrived at Green Beach 2 at 1445, Love Day. Some delay in landing occurred at the reef due to LVT difficulties in negotiating the reef and niggerheads at low water.

Upon reporting to the Sixth Marine Division C.P., in the vicinity of Green Beach 2, this landing team was ordered to protect the left flank of the division and tie in with the Twenty-Second Marine Regiment on that flank. The securing of this flank was completed at 1700, Love Day, with the landing team covering a thousand yard flank, tying in with "H" Company, 22d Marines. This defense line extended from TS 7995 L to TS 8095 F. Patrols were sent 500 yards to the front on Zampa Misaki Peninsula, and reported some enemy sniper fire. Harassing artillery fire and naval gunfire illumination was called for and delivered during the night of Love Day, and the early morning of Love plus 1 Day. All artillery and illumination was coordinated with RCT 22. Enemy attempts at infiltration during the night were repulsed.

On Love plus 1 Day, BLT 1/29 was ordered to seize and secure Zampa Misaki Peninsula, and the attack jumped off at 0730. The advance up the peninsula progressed rapidly against light resistance, and the peninsula was secured at 1125. The battalion awaited orders from Sixth Marine Division to leave the peninsula, and at 1430 orders were received to proceed to a division reserve position in the vicinity of Green Beach 2.

At 1600, Love plus 1 Day, BLT 1/29 took up a position as division reserve in the vicinity of Green Beach 2, with the mission of protecting the division left flank and repulsing any counter-landings on the Black Beaches and at the Nagahama area, the defense line extending from TS 7995 S to TS 8095 T.

At 0800, Love plus 2 Day, patrols were sent to Zampa Misaki Peninsula and reported no additional enemy activity. At 1330, BLT 1/29 was ordered to occupy a new division reserve position to the east of Yontan Airfield at TS 8095 S, and to be prepared to support either assault regiment of the division on order. The battalion reached this position without encountering any resistance. BLT 1/29 was ordered to move to Yontan Airfield at 2000, Love plus 2 Day to defend the air strip against possible enemy airborne attack. The air strip was organized for defense, supported by "C" Company, 6th Tank Battalion, by 2300. No attempted enemy landing on the air strip occurred during the night.

On Love plus 3 Day, at 0835, the battalion was ordered to move immediately by truck to TS 8798 I, in the vicinity of the town of Nakadomari, and there assemble and await further orders. This movement was completed at 1000. At 1155 BLT 1/29 was attached by division to RCT 22.
and ordered to advance up Ishikawa Isthmus. The zone of the interior of the isthmus was assigned to this battalion and was thoroughly patrolled at the conclusion of the day's operation, this battalion was tied in with 2/22 on the right and 3/22 on the left, in a line extending across the isthmus from TS 9202 B to TS 9202 Y. Light enemy resistance was encountered in this advance. During the night, strong enemy attempts at infiltration were repulsed. Artillery and illumination were adequate.

The next morning, Love plus 4 Day, at 0730, patrols were sent 500 yards to the front by all companies on the line and slight enemy resistance was encountered. At 1200, the battalion was ordered to continue the advance to the north and to occupy a new bivouac and defense area approximately three and one-half miles north of lines occupied on the night of Love plus 3 Day.

This unit in conjunction with 2/22, patrolled the western half of the isthmus in this advance and encountered only light resistance at the conclusion of the day's operation. 1/29 reverted to 29th Marine Regiment at 0600 the following morning.

At 0730 Love plus 5 Day, 1/29 resumed the attack up the western half of the isthmus with "C" Company clearing the town of Atsutabaru, hill 171, and assembling at Nakawa, and "B" Company clearing the town of Nakawa, patrolling inland and assembling at Imbul. Successively these companies cleared Kise, Kochi, and Kobesoko. "A" Company proceeded directly to Chuda on tanks and M-7 tank destroyers. Light resistance was encountered by all companies. At Chuda, two platoons of "A" Company seized and cleared the town against light resistance and seized the high ground. One platoon proceeded on tanks half way across the Chuda-Kushi road, making visual contact with HCT along the eastern coast. The battalion occupied the western coastal sector of the regimental defense line. For the night of Love plus 5 Day, tying in with 2/29 on the right. No enemy activity of any kind occurred during the night of Love plus 5 Day.

Love plus 6 Day, 1/29 advanced further up the west coast of Ishikawa Isthmus at 0800, occupied and secured the town of Yofuke and awaited orders to pass through 3/29. A perimeter defense was set up on the high ground surrounding the town, tying in with 2/29 on the left and 3/29 on the right. Strong patrols were sent by all companies to the interior for 1,000 yards. Light enemy resistance was encountered on these patrols. A coastal defense was set up supported by 1st 37mm Platoon, Wpns/29. No enemy activity occurred during the night.

On Love plus 7 Day, 1/29 initially in reserve, was ordered to send one company to Nago and advance inland across the Motobu Peninsula for approximately 2,000 yards to the town of Yamadobaru, secure that area and await orders to advance further. "B" Company was assigned this mission and arrived at the designated area at 0900. At 1000 the order of the day was changed, and the battalion was directed to push rapidly northwest to Marishido to assist "H" Company, 3/29, which unit was meeting strong resistance in ES 0422. The rear CP, with "A" and "B" Companies, moved out to this area from Yofuke. "C" Company proceeded northwest from Yamadobaru.
at 1100. All companies converged in the vicinity of Narishido at 1500, and a perimeter defense was set up for the night at TS 0522 A.B.G. Heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire was encountered in the vicinity of Narishido, and two enemy strong points were knocked out. No enemy activity was evident during the night. Heavy artillery concentrations were laid down on enemy strong points located to the front at regular intervals during the night.

This battalion consolidated its position on Love plus 8 Day, as ordered, and patrols were sent 500 yards to the front and flanks. At 1300 this unit moved to Itomi, patrolling laterally as the advance progressed against light resistance. The high ground south of Itomi was reached at 1600, and a night defense was set up at TS 0325. No enemy activity was evident during the night.

On Love plus 9 Day patrolling of the high ground above and flanking Itomi was begun, and strong enemy resistance was located, consisting of well-prepared positions employing 25mm guns, mortars, machine guns and rifles.

The same procedure was followed on Love plus 10 Day, to obtain additional information of the enemy strong points, and patrols were sent to TS 0325 and TS 0425. Light resistance was encountered.

On Love plus 11 Day, a strong patrol was moved westward along the high ground bordering the Itomi-Toguchi Rd, while two patrols moved north and east of Itomi. From the extremely high ground south of the Itomii-Toguchi road, west of Itomi, well-placed enemy positions were encountered which offered the patrol strong resistance. Further information of this locality was obtained when reinforcing patrols were sent to the same area.

The final phase of patrolling in all directions from the general area of Itomi was completed on Love plus 12 Day, resulting in definitely locating the enemy strong points in the western sector of Southern Motobu Peninsula.

On Love plus 13 Day two companies of this organization, followed by two companies of 2/29, pushed to the west to eliminate the strong positions located by the patrols of the previous four days. An advance of 500 yards was made up steep slopes against strong resistance. The battalion stopped for the night and set up a perimeter defense at TS 0323 F.

During the morning of Love plus 14 Day the battalion was consolidated and the attack continued. In the afternoon the line advanced to the C-H line at TS 0223 I by "G" Company. This position was reinforced on Love plus 15 day and vigorous patrols kept the battalion in constant contact with the enemy. Artillery and Naval Gunfire support were employed throughout the assault up these steep ridges and heavier preparation was laid down prior to the final assault phase. The final assault on the enemy strong point was completed at 1300 on Love plus 16 Day. Patrols mopped up remaining sporadic resistance in this area on Love plus 17 Day, and contact was maintained with 2/29 on the left. Light resistance was encountered by one patrol in the vicinity of Manna.
Appendix I to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 1/29

Chapter VII, Cont'd

Patrols pushed further north on Love plus 18 Day. No resistance was encountered, and contact was made by two companies with 3/1 on the left, and 3/29 on the right at TS 0125 E.4.

The attack to the north coast of Motobu Peninsula was continued on Love plus 19 Day. The advance was coordinated with 3/4 on the left and 3/29 on the right. No resistance was encountered by patrols combing mountainous terrain to the east. Patrols clearing out the towns of Keneshi and Shushi encountered very light resistance. A defense was set up for the night outside Shushi and a road block and ambush were placed on the road net leading to the south and east.

Patrols were sent out 1500 yards in all directions on Love plus 20 Day, and no enemy activity was reported. The following day, 1/29 was ordered to proceed to Toguchi and prepare to embark from that point to land on Sesoko Shima. The order of the day was changed at 0900, and the battalion returned to its area at Shushi and continued patrolling in all directions.

From Love plus 21 day to Love plus 23 Day local patrolling was continued in all directions. Contact was maintained with patrols from adjacent units.

This battalion was ordered to move to a new defense area in the vicinity of Toguchi on Love plus 24 Day. The movement was completed and a camp area was set up at TS 9625 S. One platoon, reinforced by machine guns and detachment from "C" Company, 6th Engineer Battalion, patrolled the Itomi-Toguchi road and encountered no enemy activity or land mines. The road was open to vehicle traffic.

From Love plus 25 Day to date, actual operations have been underway for the organizing, patrolling, and defending of the defensive sector of Motobu Peninsula assigned to 1/29. This area of responsibility was divided into three subsectors, each subsector being assigned to a rifle company for a period of nine days, with the mission of seeking out and destroying or capturing any remaining enemy resistance. Companies have been assigned different sectors at the termination of each nine-day period. Each company schedule requires constant three-day patrols by each platoon assigned this mission. Provision has been made for defense against airborne attack by units not immediately engaged in patrol work. Units not engaged in patrolling are responsible for defense against counter-landings on any of five possible landing beaches in the subsector of defense assigned to this battalion, as well as the internal security of the battalion bivouac area. Defensive installations are underway along each landing beach, and a final defense position is located on the high ground southeast of Toguchi.
Special additional patrol and security missions have been assigned this battalion and include security patrols for service units operating in the area.

Throughout the operation, infantry combat was limited previously to patrolling in strength, varying from company to battalion patrols. Advances through strong points encountered were made by fire and movement. A large percentage of the time it was necessary to fight the terrain in order to seek out and destroy the enemy, who was at no time visible in large numbers to the attacking force.

Supply

By the nature of the operation several supply difficulties were encountered upon landing on the beach and moving inland. This battalion landing team landed on Green Beach Two Love Day and on Love plus One began to move on an average of several miles per day. Confusion and congestion on the beach combined with a decided lack of transportation made movement of supplies inland very difficult. Arranging for supplies and transportation to move them and actually getting the supplies underway invariably required an excessive amount of time.

During the movement over the island the availability of Class I, II, III, & V supplies was adequate but transporting these supplies to the unit was very difficult. During the first week the source of supply did not move close enough behind the assault units necessitating long hauls over very congested roads with inadequate transportation. When this Battalion Landing Team joined CT 29, this situation was alleviated to a great extent.

Water points were always quickly established close to the unit and the capacity was always sufficient which made water supply relatively easy during the whole operation.

Class II supplies have been particularly lacking. Ponchos, packs, and web equipment lost and destroyed have not been replaced by issue. Salvage has taken care of part of the need.

Motor maintenance has been quite good. All minor repairs, replacement of tires and most parts, have been made very quickly.

The Engineers have kept roads passable at nearly all times. Seldom was forward movement of vehicles held up for more than a few hours in the forward areas.
The First Battalion began to disembark at 1300, 1 April, 1945. The two battalion surgeons and six corpsmen went ashore in the 6th wave, one doctor and three corpsmen in each of two boats. The remaining headquarters corpsmen landed in the 8th wave. Company corpsmen accompanied their units in the first 4 waves. Ten combat packs went ashore with the corpsmen. The remaining heavy gear was landed with the quartermaster supplies. The jeep ambulance came ashore on Love plus 2 day with the sick call box, extra plasma, splints, and litters. No losses of material or personnel were sustained in the landing.

Throughout the campaign the First Battalion was a mobile unit continually on the move either as a battalion or in company patrols. The terrain was largely mountainous and a good part of the time in territory where vehicles could not operate in close support. These conditions many times precluded any type of medical setup other than facilities for first aid and evacuation by hand. The battalion moved by day usually stopping to dig in in the afternoon or early evening. Rough roads and native trails were numerous providing adequate routes of evacuation. The hills were thickly foliaged and camouflage was a minor problem.

Local security was obtained by setting up a perimeter defense of 3-man fox-holes about the aid station every night. Two hours watches were stood in each hole. An attempt was always made to find natural protection for the wounded, and used when possible. At no time was the battalion stationary long enough that shelters or dugouts could be erected. Blackouts were strictly enforced. No blackout tent was available and night work was done beneath blankets and ponchos.

Evacuation was extremely difficult over mountainous terrain. When the battalion operated away from roads reliance was placed on nylon jungle litters. Regular Navy folding litters were too heavy and unwieldy for use over mountain trails. Casualties were evacuated on jungle litters after cutting pine carrying poles to slip through the handles. Bandmen and company corpsmen carried jungle litters and a unit of plasma. By that means facilities were always available for the treatment of shock and prompt removal of the patient. Because of road blocks, blown bridges, and mines, it was necessary several times to evacuate patients a distance of up to 3000 yards by hand. Radio messages would bring ambulances to the nearest point to meet casualties. On the whole, evacuation was prompt and adequate.

Casualties for the operation were 32 dead, 105 wounded, and evacuated, and 35 wounded and not evacuated.
The battalion did not reach a bivouac area until the 26th day. Prior to that time field sanitation consisted of slit trenches and burning and burying garbage and trash. On the 26th day the battalion was placed in bivouac near a native village. Houses were designated for use by the staff, sick bay, and command post, and company offices. All houses, grass and shacks, and mosquito breeding areas were sprayed with 5% DDT in kerosene. Local wells and cisterns were heavily chlorinated with sodium hyperchlorite for use in washing and bathing only. At no time did the battalion drink any water other than that which was supplied from a water point in expeditionary cans. Food supplies consisted of K, C, and M-1 rations. Eating of local fruits and vegetables was forbidden unless they were thoroughly cooked.

All bodies of first battalion dead were reclaimed and evacuated by the quartermaster department. Enemy dead, including civilians, were buried when time and movements permitted.

No epidemics or unusual diseases were encountered.

No dental service is available in the battalion. Urgent cases were returned to the regimental dentist where they were promptly treated and returned to duty. Eight dental cases were sent back during the campaign, only one of which was a battle injury.

Civilian casualties were numerous from artillery and night firing. All those who presented themselves at the aid station or were found by troops were given first aid treatment. Forty seven were treated. Seriously wounded civilians were evacuated through regimental aid station or through Civil Government if available. Definite care for civilians was inadequate. A prevalence of crusting eczema of the scalp was noted in many children. An occasional adult with elephantiasis was seen.

No prisoner of war was treated by the medical department.
Chapter VIII - Enemy Tactics, Organization, and Equipment.

The first distinctive enemy tactic noted was in the advance north on Motobu Peninsula, when huge craters were blown out of the roads, bridges were wrecked and large trees were cut to fall across roads. In almost every instance, these road blocks were covered by heavy or light machine gun fire, with snipers in groups and as individuals located in strategic positions. On the Itomi-Toguchi road, and roads leading north, these road blocks and open places were well-covered by 25mm cannon and heavy machine guns out of small arms range. Several times the enemy allowed portions of a unit to pass, then fired on the rear, or on another unit in column. With this heavy fire, and by the use of mortars and snipers, a relatively small enemy force was used to attempt to cut units in two and reduce the personnel of the attacking force.

The usual cleverly camouflaged and strategically located machine guns, mortars and heavy weapons were encountered. The strategic use of high explosive ammunition from 25mm automatic cannon had a greater demoralizing effect than mortars or machine guns. Night infiltration by small groups and individuals was noted on several occasions. No strong banzai charges occurred.

On Love plus fifteen Day, a captured enemy notebook revealed the fact that an observer had located the rear CP and bivouac area of LT 1/29 at Ts 0324 X. From his location (Ts 0124 Q), with the aid of glasses, he had observed our patrols going out, and recommended to his unit commander that he send a squad to visit our bivouac area. It is evident, from the location of this document when found, that heavy weapons fire had all routes from the bivouac area covered, and all the enemy observer had to do was call down fire on any movement in the area.

In most instances, the enemy held his emplaced machine gun and cannon fire until middle or late afternoon. It is believed that this tactic was employed to prevent disclosure of strong points in time for any attack in force on any such target as a specific objective.

The military organization of civilians was discovered on Motobu Peninsula through the questioning of civilians who had been organized into home guard or home defense units. Their training was evidently limited and they seemed to be capable only of guerrilla work or individual sniping. Quite a few surrendered readily when cut off or caught. One man, who was armed with a grenade, said that he would use it to protect his family against either Japs or Americans.
Chapter IX - Estimated Results of Operation.

The area secured by this battalion included the Zampa Misaki Peninsula and sections of Ishikawa Isthmus and Motobu Peninsula.

Enemy casualties:

- Killed: 328
- Prisoners of War: 8
- Captured: 328

Our losses:

- Killed in Action: 32
- Wounded in Action and Evacuated: 105
- Wounded in Action (not evacuated): 35
- Missing: 0

The operations of this battalion on Motobu Peninsula contributed to the breaking of enemy resistance on the south side of that peninsula. Three hundred and twenty-eight (328) enemy soldiers were killed, and considerable military equipment, weapons and supplies were destroyed. Among other items of enemy equipment destroyed were five (5) heavy machine guns, eleven (11) light machine guns, six (6) mortars and nine (9) 25mm dual purpose guns.
Chapter X - Comments and Recommendations

A contributing factor to morale throughout the operation was a plentiful supply of new type rations, i.e.: 10 in 1 and the new type C; another factor in maintaining morale was the distribution of mail after leave plus 10 days. It is suggested that the daily reports of the S-1 Section be submitted at the same time as the other sections reports. If possible company commanders should make rough outlines of citations for future awards for meritorious service while in action, this will save time in acquiring the facts for the submission of the recommendations. One fact that tended to lessen morale was the looting of seabags of personal belongings while they were being transported from the ship to the bivouac area.

Maps furnished before the operation consisted of target square maps of 1:10,000 and 1:25,000 and small scale general maps of 1:50,000, and 1:100,000. All maps were adequate in numbers for briefing of troops and for initial distribution on landing. Details of beaches and inland for the first 1,000 yards were fairly adequate. Aerial photos furnished before the operation were not sufficient in number for detailed briefing of troops on assigned beaches. It is believed certain photos of largest scale possible should be furnished in sufficient numbers to permit study of landing beaches by squad leaders; these to be captioned if practical by trained API personnel, to clearly show routes inland and small installations that may not appear on a smaller scale map. Photos that were furnished did not show details clearly, this was probably due to cloudiness or poor visibility.

The target square maps 1:10,000 used by troops in initial phase proved to be very adequate for the first ten days, but had to be discarded after moving inland due to the bulk of so many sheets and insufficient numbers, after moving on to and up the Ishikawa Isthmus the target square 1:25,000 map was used. Here and on the Motobu Peninsula many discrepancies were noted in the terrain as shown on the map and as it actually was; also on the trails and roads. This was true both in areas covered and clouded areas. The photos received by BLT 1/29 were not furnished as soon as needed, and not being captioned were of little use to small unit commanders, as detailed study was not possible under existing conditions.

Intelligence information furnished for initial phases by higher echelons proved sufficient for the BLT. However, on reaching the Motobu Peninsula lack of accurate information on the terrain, installations, number and composition of enemy forces became evident.

For the first two days POWs, natives and civilians were sent to proper collecting points under armed guard. Later natives and civilians were questioned briefly by enlisted language men attached and if they did not appear suspicious were sent to concentration under guard if practical, and given safe conduct slips and verbally directed where to go when not practical to send escorts.
POWs or suspicious civilians were given preliminary interrogation on the spot by language men to obtain any pertinent information and then sent under guard to collection point by most expeditious means.

The additional personnel allowed Battalion Intelligence Collection Teams by Division proved very valuable in recovery of enemy documents and material. A much better coverage was permitted of previously occupied areas which could not have been possible with T/0 personnel only. Two men were assigned to each rifle company with recovery of documents and material a primary mission. This proved very effective as long as the situation permitted the personnel to remain.

The one enlisted language man assigned to this BLT answered a "must" lacking in past operations. From D-Day to L plus 9 one man remained with the BLT, when he was relieved another language man was assigned. These two men were very efficient, did their work thoroughly and offered every cooperation at all times. Their attitude to work with other personnel was also noteworthy.

Only an occasional case was noted of civilians having been affected by propaganda. In general, they seemed to be less hostile than in the past, and some of this could have been the result of the written propaganda.

Liaison between Battalion S-2 and Regimental S-2, adequate.

Usual counterintelligence measures for small units were carried out such as night noise discipline, use of concealment and defilade for movement when possible, burning of envelopes of mail received, destruction of documents no longer of use, shackles and withholding of firing at night when practical.

The M-29-C (weasel) proved very effective and is highly recommended for further use. The track is not sturdy enough for continued use on hard surfaces, but with replacement tracks available it will be an excellent vehicle. On several occasions the weasel was the only vehicle able to pass where bridges had been blown. It is recommended more of them be put to use in each unit.

The amphibious cargo trailer is too heavy and unwieldy to be practical. It is so close to the ground it will hardly traverse on level ground. Also it requires a heavy vehicle to move it, too many times a truck is not available when it is time to move the trailer forward.

Trucks, 2 ton, 4x4, and 1 ton 4x4, and 2 ½ ton 6x6 prove very efficient and more of these are needed for fast movement over long distances.
Organizational equipment and baggage arrived at the organizational dump in very poor shape. Virtually all the clothing rolls and knapsacks had been pilfered and looted. Many of the seabags did not arrive at all. Approximately seventy-five (75) percent of the organizational equipment either did not arrive or had been broken open and partially lost or destroyed. Complete replacement is required on ranges, field, M-1937, to mention one item.

To sum up the supply problem, the class II supplies are for the most part the least adequate, and transportation is inadequate. More care should be exercised by the service units in guarding and handling supplies and equipment put in their hands on the beaches.

Only in one or two unusual instances was it impossible to get supplies to the assault units regularly. While units were up in the hills much of the supply of ammunition, food, and water was by hand-carry, from the roads up the mountain sides, at no time was supply cut off long enough to impair the efficiency of the men.

One aerial delivery drop of food, ammunition and water was made on 18 April. In this instance the drop was none too successful. Part of the ammunition was not the type requested, much of the water was lost, and the amount of food was inadequate. The necessity of salvaging parachutes and containers requires about as much work as it would take to deliver the supplies by hand carry from the unit dump.

The communications plan (SOI) was adequate. Because of the initial reserve status of this battalion sufficient time was not allowed to draw up a communications plan. Sufficient call signs and frequencies were allotted. Friendly interference was encountered one day on the Battalion Command Net.

Because of added radio equipment (SCR-610) four additional voice radio operators should be added to the T/0. Training of communication personnel was adequate. More time should be spent on voice procedure. During this campaign only one message was received in code by the Commanding Officer of this battalion. C.P. losses while in combat were:

1 Radio Operator.
1 Lineman.
1 Message Center Clerk.

Three trained wiremen attached to the communication platoon were used to guard a quartermaster dump. These men reported back to the platoon eight (8) days later. During action on two (2) occasions C.P. were used as stretcher bearers. Battle casualties have not been replaced to this date.

Signal equipment lost or badly damaged during the period 1 April to 25 April included one (1) SCR-300, one (1) radio set, Model EB, three (3) EE-3 telephones, and two (2) sound powered headsets. All signal equipment with the exception of the switchboard RE-71 was suitable. This switchboard does not contain enough drops and is cumbersome in carrying over rough mountainous terrain. A silent generator is needed for the radio set, TBX. One (1) trailer, 1/4 ton, should be added to the T/0 or T/A for a battalion communication platoon. All radio sets were to a certain degree water-proofed.

During the embarkation and voyage period no satisfactory storage area was available for signal equipment. Sensitive radio equipment and all other articles of signal equipment was stored in overcrowded holds with the troops. Fortunately only slight damage was caused to any of this equipment.
All of the signal equipment belonging to this battalion was loaded from the ship and landed at the proper beach. Fifty (50) miles of wire, 41-30, five miles of wire, 41-110 and four (4) boxes of assorted batteries have not reached this battalion at this date.

No major items of signal equipment was left behind. Extra batteries, heavy repair equipment, and a small amount of wire was left in the rear echelon. This did not have any effect on the operation. A resupply of signal equipment was obtained from the Regimental Communications Platoon and the Division Signal Company, during the operation. We had minor repair facilities and did minor repairs on radio sets SCR-300, switchboards RL-71, telephones B-6 and radio sets SCR-610. Regiment and division made major repairs. A very small amount of equipment spares were carried because they were not obtainable prior to embarkation. Equipment spares were adequate, as already stated in this report, a trailer should be permanently assigned to this battalion communications platoon. A messenger vehicle should be available at all times. On several occasions messengers walked two or three miles to a superior unit early in the morning and late in the afternoon.

Because of the great distance between units and the rapid movements of the units, wire could not keep up, thereby causing radio communications to be overworked. This situation was relieved when it was possible to get wire communications in.

In possible large land mass battles it is believed that the existing agencies except transportation should be adequate. It is believed that the only possible breakdowns would be supply.

Difficulties encountered:

Radio — Terrain, slight jamming, new batteries being dead.

Wire — Terrain, long distance from parent organization, friendly and enemy cutting of wires.

Visual — Terrain.

Messenger — Long distances from parent C.P., road blocks, insufficient information on location of other C.P.'s other than your own.

The shackles code authentication system was used. The enemy did not try to use it. Personnel were well trained in security measures. This organization had a security plan.

On several occasions slight jamming by the enemy was encountered. Due to previous training personnel readily recognized this and had little difficulty in receiving transmissions.

Remarks:
1. Less voice transmissions at night.
2. More luminous controls on equipment.

Appendix I to 29th Mar SAR, Sar 1/29
3. Nothing but urgent messages at night by radio.
4. Less personal conversation on radio nets.
5. Give communications officer information on any movement that would affect communications so he can have time to make plans for it.

All the battalion medical equipment was carried on the operation. Two combat packs and one case of atabrine were lost from the quartermaster dumps. Pilfering was negligible. Supply and resupply of essential items for combat casualties was adequate. Plasma units frequently gave difficulty in the field; failure to retain the vacuum in the plasma bottle, broken glass elements in the tubing, failure to run, etc. Plasma at times had to be mixed by hand, by pouring from bottle to bottle. Air filter had to be removed or blown through to start a flow. Human serum albumin is compact, easy to carry, and easy to start running. No failures were encountered with it. It is of extreme value to a line outfit and should be provided in greater quantities for their use.

The battalion aid station had one hospital jeep. One vehicle is inadequate for carrying necessary first aid and common sick call supplies. The First Battalion was fortunate in procuring a surveyed trailer before leaving for the operation. It proved invaluable in keeping supplies at hand. One jeep ambulance is inadequate when a number of casualties must be evacuated a long distance. Frequently the battalion had to radio Regimental Headquarters for additional ambulances. It is suggested that a battalion be allowed two jeeps.

Adequate initial supplies of atabrine, mosquito repellent, insecticide powder and DDT were carried. Resupply of insecticide powder did not fill existing needs. One case of atabrine was lost from the quartermaster dump. All men were supplied with atabrine, mosquito repellent, halazone tablets and insecticide powder in a jungle kit before embarking. Thereafter company corpsmen were supplied with these items from the Battalion Aid Station to replace items needed. Atabrine is given in the chow line any time a galley is erected.

After completion of the assault phase, the battalion went into bivouac near an OKINAWA village. Houses were designated for the staff, sick bay, command post and company offices. These houses were sprayed with DDT and all loose trash was gathered and burned. Covered heads were started the second day and completed shortly. All unoccupied houses were declared out of bounds. Wells and cisterns were heavily chlorinated for washing and bathing purposes. All drinking water was procured in expeditionary cans from a water-point where it had been chlorinated and filtered by the engineers.

Ten-In-One and Charlie rations were dispensed to personnel. The refuse from these rations was burned in company garbage pits and then buried. All medical supplies carried by the quartermaster caught up at this point. The aid station was able to then set up a sick bay with regular sick call hours and with facilities for ordinary therapeutics. All patients requiring bed rest were sent to the medical company from this point. No epidemics were encountered in troops or natives.

Appendix I to 29th Mar S. A. R., SAR 1/29
The number of shore fire control personnel was inadequate for efficient movement of equipment over the difficult terrain encountered on this operation. It is recommended that two (2) men be added to the Forward Observer Team.

The SCR 694 radio proved to be the most satisfactory set that has ever been used by naval gunfire teams. The atmospheric conditions in this locale were such that at times communications were impossible. It is believed that this could be corrected by further improvement of the radio set.

The SCR 300 was practically useless. Its poor durability and short range made it very impractical in situations where the distance between forward and rear echelons was excessive.

All of the other equipment used by the teams proved to be very satisfactory.

The opportunity for counter-battery fire was slight, but there was one target, and the results were very satisfactory. The terrain was such that a direct hit upon the target was practically impossible, but the fire was effective enough against the personnel to render the enemy position ineffective.

There were no opportunities for night harassing fire, and there were no calls for interdiction fire or for firing against coastal targets, caves, etc.

Air spot was very effective; probably the most effective of the operation because of the difficulty encountered by the forward observers in finding suitable O.P.'s. It is believed that the planes from firing ships were much more efficient and capable than those from the V.O.F. squadrons.

We were at all times able to effectively coordinate our fire between units, but the fact that we never had a normal front line set-up made all close supporting fire rather hazardous.

The cooperation between naval gunfire, artillery and air support units was exceedingly helpful, especially that between artillery and naval gunfire. Targets were always considered as possibilities for each unit before taking it under fire.

The close cooperation between Battalion, Regiment and Division was largely responsible for the success of naval gunfire. Communications at night were extremely difficult and the close cooperation between echelons made it possible for us to carry on.

There were no outstanding or unusual features of the employment of naval gunfire.

It is recommended that the practice of relieving a ship early in the morning be discontinued. Pre King Hour preparation fires were often thwarted by the use of this practice. Naval gunfire is irreplaceable in regards to illumination, but it is of little use for close support over terrain such as was encountered on this operation. Frequencies were shifted too often, usually at most inopportune times, causing poor results.
Communications were established with our firing ships at approximately 1500 on LOVE DAY. The frequency was changed from time to time throughout the operation. Net discipline was not practiced, with the exception of the command frequency. There were no losses in men or material.

The present communication plan is adequate for the primary circuit. It is recommended that the SCR 300 A be discontinued and the Regimental N.L.O.'s be equipped with either two (2) SCR 694 radios, or one (1) SCR 694 and one (1) T.C.S. radio.
APPENDIX J  ~ SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - BLT 2/29

a. CHAPTER II: General

The below report covers the activities of BLT 2/29 from February, 1945, through April, 1945, embracing organization, planning, training, embarkation, and combat action relative to this unit in the Okinawa campaign. BLT 2/29 as part of CT 29, Corps Reserve, had the following primary missions:

1. To execute assault landing on any designated beaches, independently or as part of CT 29.
2. To execute assault landing on beaches not now shown in Corps plan, independently or as part of CT 29.
3. To land over captured beaches as part of CT 29; assemble as part of CT 29, prepared to reinforce or relieve any EKT in III Phib Corps.
4. To replace as part of CT 29, any RQT or component thereof in III Phib Corps, which becomes a casualty.

b. CHAPTER II: The Task Organization

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c. CHAPTER III: Preliminary Planning

S-1 Section

Prior to embarkation, meetings with S-1 and G-1 were held. A comparatively new system of reporting casualties, the casualty report card system, was introduced. The S-1 section and all first sergeants were thoroughly briefed in the method of making reports and submission thereof. Shortly before sailing, the Army announced that marine units under control of the Army must submit reports in accordance with 10th Army SOP, First Sergeants and the S-1 Section were thoroughly briefed on the necessary forms aboard ship.

Appendix J to 29th Mar S.3, S.3 2/29 -1-
APPENDIX J to 29th Mar S&R, SAR 2/29

S-2 Section

In the planning stage of the OKINAWA Operation, the intelligence section of this battalion prepared for briefing the troops on the geography and enemy situation of OKINAWA. Maps, photographs and other intelligence were obtained from higher echelon and overlays showing known enemy positions were drawn up.

The plaster of paris relief maps furnished by III Phib Corps for briefing proved to be of more value after painting on them all known positions taken from aerial photographic reconnaissances.

The intelligence section planned on attaching two scouts and observers to each rifle company, keeping a draftsman, clerk and a five man Collection Team at the Battalion CP. The Collection Team, under the charge of a corporal, was to be sent where needed, for gathering documents and making sketches of installations, a three man OP team operated out of the CP. This system worked satisfactorily. One member of the Collection Team was equipped with a 35mm camera for pictures of emplacements and other intelligence.

S-3 Section

Supplied with general material by S-2, the S-3 section studied the theater of operations in full detail with particular attention to topography. Upon receipt of CT 29 Opn Plan 1-45, the S-3 section made out LT 2/29 Opn Plan 1-45 including extracts from all CT 29 annexes. Boat assignment tables were drawn up in conformity with CT 29 Boat Allocation Tables. Troops were trained in practice landings from LVT 3’s and LVT 4’s with particular emphasis on deployment from ramp astern.

S-4 Section

Early planning of the S-4 section was based on division and regimental memorandums which gave helpful suggestions as to both the amount and kind of equipment which to carry, and how to administer it during the assault. Consultations with the commanding officer, the executive officer and the S-3 section were held to obtain their suggestions.

Finally, recommendations from each company commander were taken as to the kind and amount of equipment each wished to take along for his company. These were then compiled and compared and submitted to the commanding officer for consideration.

From these various sources, the S-4 section built up data to facilitate the movement into combat. Every effort was then made to equip the battalion and certain items were held to a date very near embarkation to insure that they would not be lost. The battalion left GUAM well equipped.

c. CHAPTER IV: Training Phase and Rehearsals

Ground training at base camp, KOKUSHOA, GUAM, 3, S.I., was brought to a fine peak during February, 1945. Special attention was given to fighting...
in rugged hilly terrain and additional emphasis given to the flamethrower and demolitions training in the "Charley Fire Team". Attention was also given to stream-crossing expedients and company and platoon patrols. As a result, patrols on Okinawa were eminently satisfactory. Ship to shore rehearsals were held during the period 28 February, 1945, to 7 March, 1945. Inasmuch as CT 29 was in reserve, only one actual complete movement from ship to shore was undertaken. Troops were put through intensive drill in movement to net debarkation stations and movement down nets and into LCVPs in accordance with the two landing plans issued by CT 29.

Chapter V: Loading and Embarkation

The loading plans were drawn up by the Battalion Transport Quartermaster, and the Battalion Loading Officer. Both of these above-mentioned officers attended the Sixth Marine Division Transport Quartermaster School on Guadalcanal together with selected non-commissioned officers.

Unit personnel and tonnage tables were compiled by the company executive officers who had the list of prescribed equipment approved by the battalion commander. The Table of Basic Allowances was used as a standard of weight and cubic measurement. The attached units of the battalion submitted their unit personnel and tonnage tables to complete the loading picture. Then the Battalion Transport Quartermaster and the Battalion Loading Officer and the Transport Quartermaster from APA 27 drew up the final loading plans.

Equipment was placed on the second battalion beach by division, regiment, and battalion, in accordance with the profile loading plan. This was done to facilitate movement of the impediments from beach to ship.

Embarkation was handled by the S-1, who compiled the embarkation rosters the attached units and went aboard APA 27 to arrange billeting. Lack of berthing space made it necessary to use cots for sleeping topside, but billeting and messing arrangements aboard ship were satisfactory.

The troops embarked on the USS George Clymer, APA 27, on the afternoon of March 14, 1945, in accordance with Embarkation Order 1-45. We set sail on the morning of the 15th. Loading was effected through the medium of LCVPs. The troops embarked by using port and starboard gangways. No nets were used in embarkation of troops.

Chapter VI: Movement to and arrival at Objective Area

S-3 Section

29/2/29 embarked aboard the USS George Clymer on 14 March, 1945. The training schedule of organized athletics, inspections, school on weapons, first aid and field sanitation commenced 15 March, 1945. Numerous abandon ship drills and walk-through debarkation drills were held including one night debarkation drill.

On 24 March, 1945, troops went ashore for athletics and recreation on Mog Mog at staging area.

The intelligence section assisted in briefing troops, distributing maps and surveys of the target area. Officers and staff NCOs were thoroughly

Appendix J to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 2/29
briefed on 26 March, 1945. Troop briefing by platoons commenced the next day. Saturday, 31 March, troops were inspected with full combat equipment. 1LT 2/29 commenced debarking on 1 April, 1945 at 1235 at Okinawa.

Little enemy action affected this battalion on the way to the target. There were several air alerts enroute.

6. Chapter VII Assault Phase

1LT 2/29, a unit of RCT 29, III Phib Corps Reserve, at ROW minus four hours on Love day set up radios aboard ship, on the command nets of the two assault regiments, RCT-4 and RCT-22. All operational messages were intercepted and the situation plotted on the S-3 situation map. Whenever possible, frequencies were changed to the channels of the assault regiments, RCT-5 and RCT-7 of the First Marine Division, their operational messages intercepted and their situation plotted on the S-3 map. In this manner, the battalion staff kept abreast of the situation and were prepared to land on any beach in the III Phib Corps Zone.

At or about 1230 on Love day, the Commanding General, III Phib Corps ordered "Land RCT 29 as soon as possible." The transports moved in closer to the beach, lowered their boats, and commenced debarking troops. Due to low tide and reef conditions, it was about 1630 on Love day before the final elements of this BTL assembled on the beach.

The battalion, reinforced, moved inland about 300 yards and in conjunction with BTL 3/29 set up a defense against possible sea or airborne attack. From L plus 1 to L plus 4 days, this battalion spent the days cleaning out the Japa in the caves behind Yontan airfield and the nights protecting the airfield against possible airborne attack.

On L plus 4 days, RCT-29 reverted to Division control, and BTL 2/29 and BTL 3/29 proceeded to the town of ONNA (T-4905) on the west coast of northern Okinawa. At 0730 on Love plus 5 days, BTL 2/29 moved out in column behind BTL 1/29; during the forenoon BTL 2/29 passed through BTL 1/29 and proceed up the west coast securing in succession the towns of Kise, Ohuda, and Shikikuda within the next two days.

On Love plus 7 days, BTL 2/29 passed through NAFO, cut across the base of Kotobu Peninsula and occupied the town of Gagasu.

On Love plus 8 and Love plus 9 days, BTL 2/29 patrolled the east coast of Kotobu Peninsula to the town of Nakasumi. On this patrol, the battalion met small disjointed groups of the enemy who were killed or scattered; destroyed several enemy supply dumps and vehicles; and seized the important midget sub and naval torpedo base at Unten.

On Love plus 10 days BTL 2/29 (less Fox Co.) was recalled and ordered to set up defensive installations in conjunction with BTL 1/29 on the high ground in the vicinity of Itomi. Contact was made and the battalion dug in. Fox Company continued on patrol.
For the next two days, BLT 2/29 sent out strong reconnaissance patrols into the hills north of the Itomi-Toguchi Road in an effort to determine the strength, armament, and dispositions of the enemy. All patrols met resistance from strong forces of the enemy in prepared defensive positions.

On love plus 13 days, BLT 2/29 (less Fox Co) moved west from Itomi in column behind BLT 1/29 to clear the enemy from the high ground south of the Itomi-Toguchi Road and thereby open the road between Itomi and Nanna.

Within the next three days, BLT 2/29 (Fox Co reverted to Battalion control on Love plus 14 days), with BLT 1/29 on the right, secured the high ground flanking the Itomi-Toguchi Road and established contact with elements of RCT-4 which cleared out the pocket at Yae-Take.

During this phase of the operation on Motobu Peninsula, BLT 2/29 met fierce and fanatical resistance from elements of the Udo Force, reinforced by units of the Okinawan Home Guard. Several of the enemy were killed, a number of knee mortars, and ammunition and supply dumps were destroyed.

After juncture with RCT-4 was made, BLT 2/29 was withdrawn from the line to clear out of the Regimental zone any enemy pockets that might have been bypassed during the previous attack. More enemy ammunition dumps were uncovered and destroyed.

Upon completion of the mopping up operations, BLT 2/29 set up a battalion strong point on the high ground north of Itomi.

On the afternoon of Love plus 15 days, BLT 2/29 (less Easy Co) moved north from the Itomi-Toguchi Road to establish contact with BLT 3/29 on the high ground in the vicinity of Ta 0327. Contact was made and both battalions dug in for the night. Easy Company remained to protect the Regiment CP.

The next morning, BLT 2/29 (less Easy Co) moved northeast and covered by patrols the high ground to Nakasoni and Goechi. No enemy contact was made and the battalion occupied the town of Nakasoni.

On Love plus 21 days, the reconnaissance in force that was to be made by BLT 2/29 on the island of Sesoko Shima was determined unnecessary, and the battalion was ordered into bivouac in Ta 0725.

The ensuing days were spent in improving the battalion defensive installations and patrolling the area bounded by Gagusuku-Itomi-Nakasoni.

Patrols are encountering stragglers from the enemy force that defended Motobu Peninsula.
(1) Ship to shore movement

BLT 2/29 received orders to land troops at 1315 on Green Beach 2. BLT 2/29 was boated entirely in the transport area by 1330. Inasmuch as the order of landing had been changed from 2/29-1/25-3/29 to 1/25-2/29-3/29, 2/29 was ashore on Green Beach 2 by 1545. A total of 34 LCVPs were used to transport 2/29 to the reef. One platoon of 37mm guns, 1/29, were brought in the following day. Considerable difficulty was encountered at the reef, because there seemed to be no controlling element to bring the troops ashore. Some troops landed directly from LCVPs and waded ashore; others were transferred to LVTs. Only herculean efforts as ashore kept down confusion.

(2) Shore Party

The Shore Party Reconnaissance Group from LTSP 2/29 landed on Green Beach 2 on the afternoon of Love day. They were ordered to reinforce LTSP 2/22 on Green Beach 1. On Love plus 1 day, SP 2/29 landed on Green Beach 1, and unloading operations began.

On Love plus 6 days, LTSP 2/29 was moved to Green Beach 2 to augment LTSPs 1/22, 3/22, 1/29 and 3/29.

On Love plus 12 days, LTSP 2/29 displaced to the beach at Nago and commenced SP functions there.

LTSP 2/29 functioned in accordance with Sixth Marine Division SOP and experienced no difficulty in accomplishing the task assigned.

(3) Naval Gunfire Support

The T/O strength of the SFC team is considered inadequate, and it is recommended that the team be increased to fourteen (14) men. The state of training in this team was excellent; a few of the men had made previous operations and thus formed a good nucleus on which to build a well-integrated team.

With the exception of the SCR 300, all SFC communications equipment was considered effective. Due to excellent results obtained from use of the SCR 694, it is recommended that this radio replace the SCR 300.

The estimated number of call fires for this BLT was approximately ten, all naval gunfire proved most effective, especially the preparation fires and the night harassing and night illumination fires.

The coordination between adjacent units, between other supporting arms, and between the various echelons of Naval Gunfire Control was above average.

SFC communications were, as mentioned above, most effective. Ninety-six (96) hours after landing, this SFC Team established communications with its assigned firing ship. This abnormal delay is explained by the fact that this BLT was in Corps Reserve. Yet discipline was practiced and it worked well.

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It is felt that a common frequency for Battalion and Regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers would greatly facilitate function of the chain of command.

(4) Air Support

Air support for BLT 2/29 was requested from the Air Support Commander by the Air Ground Liaison Officer through the Air Support Net. Communications functioned well. The strikes called for were effective, and the planes were well controlled from the ground, but it is felt that better timing of air support missions could be effected if the AGL Officer had more control of the aircraft. Dummy runs proved most effective in bringing the planes in over the target. Targets were marked by white phosphorous smoke, while friendly front lines were marked by colored smoke and/or panels. The air ground liaison personnel performed their jobs creditably.

(5) Artillery Support

In that this unit was in Corps Reserve, no artillery personnel were assigned to BLT 2/29 in the initial stages. When the battalion reverted to Division control, FO teams from 2/15 and 4/15 were assigned to this unit.

Except for the encounter with the enemy astride the ITOKI/TOGUCHI ROAD, little use was made of artillery, due to the lack of lucrative targets.

When artillery was used, it proved most successful.

On one critical occasion, due to the failure of radio equipment in the hands of the FO, it was necessary to relay fire orders over wire. Had this wire not been laid, artillery fire would not have been available when most needed.

(6) Tanks

BLT 2/29 used tanks on only one occasion and, then, not in contact with the enemy. In advancing from NAGO towards USUZUKU, on 8 April, 1945, BLT 2/29 mounted two platoons of infantry on six tanks, and used this element as a motorized spearhead. Inasmuch as no action developed, only conjectures can be made as to the efficiency of this maneuver. For units attempting to feel out and contact the enemy, this method is deemed highly satisfactory.

(7) Amphibian Tractors

BLT 2/29's use of amphibian tractors was small. On LCT Day, some tractors were used to convey part of 2/29 across the reef at Green Beach 2. The commanding officer and command group were stranded on the reef for half an hour when the tractor fell into a hole in the coral. Other tractors showed notorious disregard of signals for assistance. Tractors were used again on 9 April, 1945, to ferry 2/29 across the river west of Usuzuku. Tractors were used at this time to haul supplies - with favorable results.

Appendix J to 29th Mar S&R, S&R 2/29
(8) Armored amphibians

BLT 2/29 used armored amtracs advancing on UNTM and KONSOHI on 10 April, 1945. Four LVT's took to the water and reconnoitered the coastline for 1,000 Yds in each direction. Fox Company, on detached patrol to the west end of KOTOJU PENINSULA used armored amtracs for reconnaissance with some success until broken tracks and blown bridges stopped their further use.

(9) Infantry Combat:

Inasmuch as 2/29's action in combat was largely patrol action with the exception of 15, 16, 17, and 18 April, the only chances for close observation of infantry came at this time. During period mentioned, 2/29 and 1/29 attacked a sizeable enemy force entrenched on the high ground south-west of ITOJI. Individual units performed with creditable skill in extremely rugged mountain country. Little maneuvering was possible in this mountain area; most enemy positions being taken frontally assisted by heavy mortar and artillery fire.

The 81mm mortars of 2/29 proved indispensable at this time, both in assisting the attack, and in placing defensive concentrations for the night.

Previous training demolitions proved of good value, inasmuch as 2/29 had to destroy numerous enemy pillboxes, caves, dugouts, and supply dumps.

2/29's patrol action showed the results of good training, although it is believed that not enough stress was placed on "automatic tactics". This situation is being remedied in present training and patrolling.

(10) Communications: (See Annex "C").

(11) Engineers:

An engineer platoon was assigned to this BLT, but it reverted to parent control before employed by this unit. Engineers were called upon to construct a ford across the river at OBUSUKU, but it was too big a project and LVT's were used to ferry troops and supplies across.

(12) Medical: (See Annex "B")

(13) Supply and Logistics:

Supply during the assault phase was made difficult by the extremely rapid advance of our troops, and the congested conditions of the narrow roads. Knocked out bridges also contributed their share of difficulty. Transportation was, and is, our greatest impedance to supplying the battalion. We are limited to jeeps and trailers for transportation, and during our rapid advance we turned much of our equipment over to regiment. Carrying our minimum essentials was a great problem at times, we had two dumps behind our latest supply point. In stiff combat, it would be extremely hard to supply the battalion even with food, water, and ammunition on time. The Marine Infantry Battalion badly needs trucks for its supply. Even unit distribution by regiment cannot fully alleviate the situation because of its own truck shortage. The L-29 Weasel is of no great value in hauling.
April, 1945

Most of our remaining equipment unloaded on the beach after our departure was looted indiscriminately somewhere between the beach and the battalion dump. Company boxes were opened and choice articles, such as tools were taken. The boxes were returned to us opened. It was with considerable disgust that we saw much of our hard work nullified.

(14) Special Reconnaissance Missions:

F/29 conducted a company reconnaissance mission of the west end of Kotosu Peninsula during the period 11 April to 14 April, 1945. Patrolling from HOK 4301 to BISS, F/29 made contact with messenger at BISS. F/29 reported little enemy activity and encountered no difficulty. Initially supplied by airstage, F/29 was later supplied by air-drop. This last was not too satisfactory in that the air-drops were not accurate, and in that ammunition as well as food was dropped and F/29 was forced to bury the ammunition, since they were unable to carry it.

h. CHAPTER VIII: Enemy Tactics, organization and equipment:

F/29 encountered only small bands of disorganized Japs and Okinawan Home Guard in the early phases of the operation. These elements were generally equipped with aikake rifles and grenades. Occasionally MGs were encountered and captured. On 4 April, 1945, 2/29 killed approximately 10 Japs southeast of Yontan Airfield. These Japs were apparently ground personnel from the air-drome. Moving up the west coast of Okinawa from Yontan to NSA, 2/29 encountered small isolated groups of deserters and stragglers, poorly equipped and easily killed.

On 12 April, 1945, 2/29 ran into approximately 50 to 60 Japs at 0327 S-1. Enemy had entrenched on topmost peak of high ridgeline. Japs had apparently withdrawn from HOKI area. MGs and grenade dischargers were evidenced. 2/29 killed 32 Japs before being recalled by HOK 29.

On 14 April, 1945 2/29 operating with 1/29 ran into severe 90mm mortar fire, but suffered no casualties. Enemy use of mortars, searching and traversing, is excellent.

On 15 April, 1945 2/29 attacking west towards Ts 0123 and 0023 on the left flank of 1/29, ran into considerable opposition from Japs in dugouts and pillboxes. Light and heavy mortar fire was both intense and accurate. 2/29 suffered approximately 30 casualties, mostly from mortar fire. 20mm automatic fire also raked out advance elements. Two knee mortars were captured and 30 Japs killed. Remainder of operation consisted of large and small patrol operations meeting scattered groups of Japs from the force defending Kotosu Peninsula. These units were generally ill-equipped.

No Jap artillery was met with on this operation, nor was there any protracted operations in which to fully determine enemy tactics. Generally, Jap defense lines consisted of caves, dugouts, and rock pillboxes, all generally with limited fields of fire. All Jap positions utilized high ground.
commanding roads and trails. Jap supplies of small arms ammunition, mortar ammunition and food were of considerable quantity. All were destroyed.

1. Chapter IX: Estimated results of operation

(1) Area secured (See CT-29 Special action Report).

(2) Enemy casualties
   (a) Killed - 166
   (b) Captured - 1

(3) Operational material damage to enemy:

April 3rd - Five cases small arms ammunition turned in to regiment.

April 9th - Easy Company patrol near ITOKI destroyed five (5) 13.2mm machine guns, four (4) trucks, and quantities of 13.2mm ammunition plus stores of uniforms and rations.

April 10th - Near UTEZ, the battalion found and reported to division two (2) naval torpedoes, fifty (50) floating mines, ten (10) tape measure mines, five (5) aerial hand smoke bombs.

April 14th - Seventy (70) per cent of an ammunition dump at TS 0124 was destroyed,

April 16th - Two (2) grenade dischargers, three (3) Rohambu 109 Type plus magazines, and twenty-six (26) grenades destroyed.

April 17th - Five (5) caves with gas masks, steel jacketed small arms ammunition, four (4) rifles, demolition equipment, grenades, and rations blown in. One (1) grenade discharger and six (6) rifles captured.

April 19th - Three (3) Japanese trucks, one (1) Ford Command Car discovered, reported to regiment.

April 21st - Easy Company captured two (2) .303 rifles, several grenades and one (1) Arisaka rifle.

These are all reported weapons and supplies captured or destroyed.

(4) Own losses:
   (a) Killed in action - 7 enl.
   (b) Wounded in action - 5 officers, 60 enl.
   (c) Missing - None
   (d) Injured in action - 1 officer, 6 enl.
APPENDIX J to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 2/29

CHAPTER X: Comments and Recommendations

S-1. The S-1 Section carried out its duties in a highly satisfactory manner and all reports were submitted in accordance with existing orders. There are no recommendations for this section.

S-2. The S-2 section had indoctrinated all personnel as to the value of turning in captured documents prior to the operation. This indoctrination proved highly satisfactory, in that a large amount of valuable material was turned in and forwarded to higher echelon for evaluation and dissemination.

S-3. The S-3 section functioned to a high degree both during the training and operational phases. At all times, the operation maps were up to date with complete and comprehensive information.

Training in automatic tactics and use of concealment should have been stressed to a greater extent. This deficiency is being remedied during the period set aside for patrols and mopping up in the assigned area.

S-4. The S-4 section functioned to a highly satisfactory degree. It is again stressed that the vehicles allotted to an infantry battalion are not adequate. It was evident many times during the operation that the battalion dumps would not be available to the command, due to this lack of transportation. On three occasions, it was necessary for the S-4 section to overload all jeeps and trailers, in order to supply the organization with ammunition, water, and food.

It is recommended that each infantry battalion be issued two (2) 2-1/2 ton trucks to be used for supplies only.

W. G. MOE,
Lt. Col., USMC,
Cond., 2/29.
Communications:

(a) The communication plan (SOI) was adequate.

- Frequencies and call signs assigned sufficed.
- Duplication of communication systems proved entirely worthwhile.

- There were crucial moments, for instance, when infantry nets handled traffic for artillery, and naval gunfire sections. Due to failures of equipment, duplication of radio nets was essential.

- Liaison was not effected during the planning stages, due to the fact that this organization was Corps Reserve.

- The communication plan was received in sufficient time to permit study and instruction of personnel.

(b) Rehearsal.

- The rehearsal stage for this unit was not very comprehensive, due again, to the fact that this unit was in Corps Reserve.

- The only deficiencies found in equipment during this stage were due to "sweating" of radio sets and batteries in the rubber bags.

(c) Embarkation and Voyage.

- Equipment was loaded according to plan and no equipment was damaged during this phase.

- Storage batteries were checked during the voyage and recharged three days prior to debarkation.

- The training carried out aboard ship included instruction in the SOI and SOP, maintenance of equipment and physical exercises.

- Four radio operators of this unit stood regular watches in the ship's radio room. They manned Fox and ship to ship circuits.

- The scarcity of traffic made joint operation of the landing force message center and the ship communication office unnecessary.

(d) Personnel.

- Present allowances of personnel proved adequate during this operation.

- The training of personnel was entirely adequate with the exception of the five non-communication personnel men, assigned to this unit a few weeks before debarkation.

Appendix J to 29th Mar SAR, SAR 2/29
At embarkation, this unit had six non-communication personnel men and was short one man. No personnel were lost aboard ship or during the landing. Two radio operators were lost during the operation, and one jeep driver. They have not been replaced to date.

(s) Equipment,

At the present time, this unit is short only two major items of equipment. A TOS jeep knocked out by enemy action and an SCR 610, which is in the process of being repaired.

The design and quantity of equipment proved adequate for the tasks performed.

It is recommended that an additional SCR 610 be assigned to EMT's in order that communication can be maintained between the Command Post and Supply Dump. An additional operator would be needed to man the set.

Water-proofing of equipment by the Division Signal Repair Section proved to be very successful, but unfortunately all equipment was not water-proofed. Several failures resulted, especially in SCR 300's and SCR 536's.

Rubber bags proved unsatisfactory due to the bulk of the bag and the sweating of equipment in the bag.

Improvised covers for the equipment were made from gas caps and waterproof rifle covers. They were not put to a rigid test, but stood up very well under the conditions in which they were used.

All signal equipment authorized by the T/A was used.

Equipment not carried when debarked did not reach the unit until the operation was concluded. Supply and replacement was considerably hampered by this failure.

(f) Supply,

Batteries for radio sets placed the greatest strain on the supply. This was partially due to the fact that equipment left on the beach was not available to us during the operation.

Replenishment rates are considered adequate. Resupply was effected through the HCT.

Major repairs of equipment were made by the HCT and the Division Signal Repair Section. Both repair and replacement facilities functioned exceedingly well.

Major items of equipment repaired were TOS Jeep, TIX, SCR 610, SCR 300, and SCR 536.

It is strongly recommended that a trailer be authorized for use by the Communication Platoon. Transportation would have proven wholly inadequate if a trailer had not been borrowed from another section.
(c) Operation.

When supply lines became extended due to the fast moving situation it was necessary to give an SOE 610 to the unit Supply Dump.

The overloading of agencies varied with the situation and the agencies available.

Difficulties encountered in radio communication were due, mainly, to failure and poor battery supply. Excellence of repair and replacement facilities greatly minimized these difficulties.

Wire communication suffered due to the fast moving situation and the reluctance of the RCT to lay wire over any distance.

Visual communication was not used.

Messenger communication in the B.L.T. was satisfactory. Between the B.L.T. and R.C.T., messenger communication was often impossible due to the distance involved.

Enemy communication installations captured were reported to higher echelon. The inaccessibility of one radio installation, and the prevailing tactical situation, necessitated the destruction of the sets.

No occasion arose to test infantry to tank, and infantry to amphibious tractor communication systems.

(h) Security.

No cryptographic aids were used by this unit in this operation. The use of such aids by a B.L.T. in any operation is inconceivable; a fact which should be recognized. Assignment of such aids to a B.L.T. only increases the chance of compromise to the equipment and the system.

The authenticator system prescribed in the SOE was used and proved to be satisfactory.

Communication personnel were sufficiently trained in security, but members of the staff, in both the B.L.T. and the R.C.T., despite frequent warnings and imploring, flagrantly violated signal security time and time again. Against a better organized enemy, such violations would have resulted in catastrophe. In order to reduce such violations, it is recommended that unit commanders be more forcefully charged with this responsibility.

(1) Countermeasures by enemy.

Enemy jamming was experienced a few times on infantry nets, but did not prove successful. Jamming of naval gunfire nets was more persistent and more effective.
Personnel embarked as follows:
5 Hospital Corpsmen with Dog Co.
5 Hospital Corpsmen with Easy Co.
3 Hospital Corpsmen with Fox Co.
13 Hospital Corpsmen with Hq Co.
2 Medical Officers with Hq Co.
9 Redi. Bandmen (litter bearers) with Hq Co.

Material—All class 4 aid station supplies and equipment were put in the 2/29 quartermaster dump and embarked by the quartermaster.

All class 1 aid station supplies and equipment were carried by the hospital corpsmen on embarkation.

(a) Abroad Ship.

Sickness aboard ship was for the most part Fungal Infections and Catarrhal Fever. Fungal Infections comprised approximately 60% of the daily sick call. There were no epidemics of food borne and communicable disease.

Heads were adequate, one per state room for officers and one (12 holes) for each troop compartment. They were kept in excellent police.

Living quarters were inadequate for troops aboard ship. An average of 25 men from each compartment had to sleep on the weather decks, because there was no available bunk space for them.

Hoses were adequate except for the poor heating facilities for water used for washing mess gear of the troops. Galley's were adequate and kept clean and in good police. Cooks and messmen were inspected weekly by the Medical Department for evidence of communicable disease.

(d) Debarkation.

Medical personnel were assigned to three boats of the 8th wave.

Class 1 material and supplies were carried ashore by the hospital corpsmen. The minimum of necessary class 4 aid station supplies were carried ashore in the ambulance jeep.

There were no losses of personnel or material.

(d) Ashore:

Civilians were given emergency first aid treatment at Battalion aid stations, and were evacuated to civilian stockades under control of the military government. The evacuation was performed by the Battalion and Regt disposable ambulances.

Prisoners of war: None treated.
Medical personnel was adequate. Two hospital corpsmen were assigned to each platoon of each rifle company. Two hospital corpsmen were assigned to 81mm Mortar Platoon and one to the Communications Platoon. The remaining corpsmen and two Medical Officers were assigned to the Battalion Aid Station.

Four hospital corpsmen were combat casualties and were evacuated. Three replacements were received within 48 hours.

The state of training was far advanced.

Assault Phase:

Field Medical Equipment: All units from 1-20 were carried by this organization with the exception of units 2, 4, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 20. In addition, 2 units 101 and 6 units 102 were carried. These supplies were adequate. Units 14 and 17 are considered in excess for emergency combat supplies and are of use only in rear areas.

Eight folding litters were lost in combat.

Re-supply was prompt and efficient throughout the operation.

Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock:

One 1/4-ton ambulance was carried in Battalion Aid Station. This vehicle was used to carry aid station supplies and to evacuate casualties from Battalion Aid Station to Regt Aid Station. Only in a few instances was it possible to evacuate from the front lines to the Battalion aid station by vehicle, due to impossible terrain.

One 1/4-ton ambulance was available at Regt Aid Station, which could be obtained on request by Battalion Surgeon.

The motor vehicles and rolling stock allotted the Battalion Aid Station is inadequate for its needs in combat. The Battalion Quartermaster is given the responsibility of moving the aid station supplies in excess of class 1 gear which is carried by hospital corpsmen. These supplies are necessary for the proper care of the wounded, and should be with the aid station at all times. The time required for transportation of these supplies makes the aid station practically non-functioning at times when it is vital to the organization. It is believed that this can be eliminated only by providing all Battalion Aid Stations with at least one jeep and trailer, for the exclusive purpose of transporting supplies. If any of these supplies are carried on the ambulance, the ambulance is out of action for use in evacuation of casualties.

The majority of the medical supplies carried by the quartermaster in this operation were not seen until the operation was over.
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ALEX "O" INTELLIGENCE

I. GENERAL

A. INTELLIGENCE

(c) Patrols - Prior to LOVE DAY, this battalion sent two intelligence
men to a week's school on amphibious reconnaissance under Lt. Witty,
6th Mar Div. These men were to accompany the Underwater Demolition
Team in preliminary reconnaissance of the target beaches. Plans were
changed as to the number of men to go on this reconnaissance, and this
battalion had no one participating.

A great amount of vigorous patrolling was done after the landing.
Intelligence scouts and observers were sent with all patrols, and proved
great value in reporting enemy troops and material discovered.
This patrolling activity occurred between IOMAN AIRFIELD and KOSOBU
ENIMUSA, and is still being carried out by this battalion in their
zone around WATSON VILLAGE.

(b) Air - It was learned that valuable information of the enemy can
be obtained by maintaining close contact with the Air Ground Liaison
Officer attached to the battalion. "Flash Red" air alerts are gotten
much quicker this way, as a rule, than through regular channels. Also
planes' spotings of enemy concentrations and installations may be picked
up over the AG radio.

(c) Artillery - The artillery liaison officer can be of great assis­
tance to the intelligence officer in giving accurate coordinates of
enemy positions which have been spotted.

II. OP's

(a) Organization and Conduct - This Battalion used a three-man OP team,
consisting of the Corp Chief Observer and two privates. They were
 equipped with two pairs of field glasses and a telescope. At night,
they used Sniperscopes on one occasion. The telescope was found to
be of little value, 6 x 30 field glasses were much better for observing.

(b) Communications - An EEG telephone with a line laid directly to the
battalion switchboard was the most satisfactory method of communication
from the OP. An SCR 300 radio was used in fast moving situations.
Intelligence personnel should be trained in radio voice procedure.

III. PRISONERS OF WAR

(a) Interrogation and Value of Information - Only one POW was taken by
this battalion during the operation. However, numerous civilians were
brought in and gave valuable information on the enemy of which they knew.
Civilians were cooperative, but as a rule, seemed to know little about
the location and strength of the enemy. This was due largely to the
fact that they had been restricted from enemy corps, and had been living
in caves for several weeks. An enlisted interpreter attached to the
battalion gave all prisoners and detained civilians a preliminary ques­
tioning, and if their information was of value, they were sent to the
Repti OP for further interrogation. Information obtained from civilians
was found to be reliable.
IV. Captured Documents.

(a) Evaluation Procedure — All documents brought to the CP by the Collection Team, which was the main source of collection, or any other personnel, was checked immediately by the interpreter and the intelligence officer for information of value to the battalion in their immediate situation. All documents, except when obviously of no value, were then forwarded through message center to regiment. All intelligence personnel should be taught to recognize classified matter and to read dog tags.

(b) Value of Documents — Dog tags are important, especially in the initial stages of an operation, for C&O. All maps should be checked thoroughly. In one instance this battalion found a Japanese map which gave excellent terrain information of an area not covered by our own maps. Many documents were found which give indications of the strength of units.

V. Personnel.

(a) Organization — Most of the troops hit by this battalion were members of the 7th/1.

(b) Training — These troops showed evidence of thorough training in the use of the grenade discharger and LMG. Many of the Home Guard Units showed that they were very poor in the use of their weapons.

VI. Counterintelligence.

Enemy secrecy discipline, camouflage and the use of cover was superb. They also engaged in radio jamming which proved effective in some instances in disrupting our radio communication.

Many civilians were found in possession of the propaganda leaflets dropped on the island before LO53 D.A. telling them how to pass through our lines and that they would be well treated.

Some Japanese soldiers were killed wearing civilian kimono.
Chapter I - General

The purpose of this report is to furnish an account of the planning and training activities and movement of the Third Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marines prior to the operation on Okinawa, Ryukyu Retto and the missions assigned and accomplished by that battalion in the course of the operation.

During this period there were units (listed in next chapter) attached to the battalion for training and rehearsal and the battalion plus its attached units was designated BLT 3/29, a part of RCT 29.

The original mission of this BLT was that of Corps Reserve. For additional information, see Chapters IV and VII.

Chapter II - Task Organization

The following units were attached to the Third Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marines to form BLT 3/29:

- 3rd Plat Co "C", 6th Engr En.
- 3rd Plat Co "C", 6th Pion En.
- Det Co "C", 6th Pion En (26th & 33rd Repl Draft)
- 3rd Plat Co "C", 6th HT En.
- 3rd Plat Waps Co, 29th Mar.
- SP Group, 6th JACCO.
- NCT, 6th JACCO.
- AGL, 6th JACCO.
- Det 3rd Band Sec (HqCo, HqEn)
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th NF Co.
- Det H&ES Co, 29th Mar.
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th Ord Co.
- Det 3rd Plat, 6th SES Co.
- Det 6th Amph Tk Co.
- Det 11th Spl NOS.

Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

In planning for this operation Division and Regimental training directives and memoranda were followed. In the rehearsal, plans were affected so that the BLT practiced various types of landings including assault on a virgin beach and reserve landings on beaches already occupied. Various formations for landing craft were used so that the officers and men were well indoctrinated and trained.

Special Section Reports

1. Administration.
Division and Regimental SOP for casualty reports on WIA and KIA were used with great success. The planning and schooling in this case were excellent.

2. Intelligence information as regarded this operation was not disseminated until enroute to objective for security reasons. See Chapter VI.

3. Medical Section. See Chapter VII for complete coverage.

Chapter IV - Training Phase and Rehearsals

During the training phase and rehearsals emphasis was placed on the perfection of training for amphibious and land operations, the development of coordination and teamwork for officers and men, the perfection of tactical employment and coordination of supporting weapons, and the development of individual initiative, resourcefulness, discipline, physical endurance, leadership, technical and tactical proficiency, offensive spirit and esprit de corps.

Training facilities and aids were adequate. For rehearsal training, see Chapter III.

Chapter V - Loading and embarkation

In view of the fact that troop transports were able to lay off good sandy beaches closely adjacent to the battalion bivouac area, the loading of troops and cargo was greatly facilitated and worked smoothly at all times with a minimum of time and effort involved. This work was supervised by the En TqM, the En loading officer and the En Adjutant. Working parties on the beach and in the holds aboard ship were furnished by the battalion.

Chapter VI - Movement to and arrival at objective

Training of officers and men of BnT 3/29 was continued aboard ship enroute to the objective. All information furnished by higher echelons was rapidly disseminated. Briefing with the use of maps, aerial photos, plans and intelligence material was carried out extensively. (See special intelligence report below). Physical exercise, inspections of weapons and equipment was carried out daily. A careful study of all landing beaches in III Phib Corps area and plans and maneuvers of units to land on these beaches were studied diligently.

Special intelligence report

a. Maps furnished before operation:

1. Ryukyu-Netto, scale 1/25,000 covering III Phib Corps area of the preferred and alternate plans. Adequate and complete coverage.

2. Ryukyu-Netto, scale 1/10,000 covering III Phib Corps area of the preferred and alternate plans only. Adequate and complete coverage for area covered.

3. Ryukyu-Netto, scale 1/100,000, covering entire Okinawa Shima, plus small neighboring islands. Adequate and complete.

b. Photos furnished before operation:

1. Stereo photos of 6th Marine Division beaches of the preferred plan, in various scales ranging from 1/7000 to 1/17,500. Adequate and complete for area covered.

2. Aerial mosaics of 6th Marine Division beaches of the preferred plan in scale 1/5000.
Chapter VI, Cont'd.

3. Miscellaneous maps and photos showing road systems, beaches, and terrain inland etc., were furnished.

Chapter VII - Assault Phase

BLT 3/29 landed on Green Beach 2 at 1559 on 1 April 1945 and proceeded inland approximately 1000 yards where a perimeter defense was set up at TS 7993 D5. On 3 April BLT moved to TS 8791 AD and set up perimeter defense. Patrols were sent out meeting resistance from two Japs in a cave who destroyed themselves after killing one of our men.

On 5 April Battalion commenced route march north toward Motobu Peninsula arriving at TS 9306 L3 at 1710. Night bivouac defense was set up.

March was continued 6 April to TS 0510. Patrols were sent out in that area. One Jap was killed and two captured after they had fired on George company patrol. On 7 April march was continued toward Nago which was reached and occupied without resistance. From Nago on to Nara small arms fire was encountered by patrols. Roads leading inland were found mined and contained road blocks.

Heavy fire from enemy artillery hit Battalion CP on 9 April from 1400 to 1915. Sixteen casualties were evacuated during night. Position of battalion at this time was at TS 9621 T1.

March was resumed on 10 April to Toguchi passing through villages of Sakinotobu and Hamasaki. From Toguchi I Company patrol pushed toward village of Manna and met sniper and mortar fire. Battalion perimeter defense was set up in TS 9725 for the night.

On 11 April battalion was ordered to send a patrol of two companies to contact 1st BN, 29th Marines at TS 0628 Y. This patrol met determined resistance from sniper fire, LMG and mortars. Resistance estimated to be about company strength. Flank patrols were unable to locate enemy definitely. Fire was received the whole length of both company columns. Because of casualties and positions continuation of advance was impossible. The patrol was withdrawn to Toguchi.

On 12 April George Company was sent north to contact Division Reconnaissance Company and to meet the 2nd Battalion, 29th Marines at Imadenari. H Company was ordered to proceed to Manna to effect meeting with 1st BN, 29th Marines. I Company was ordered to patrol south and east to high ground and remain overnight. At T. A. 9824 W5 I Company received intense mortar, light machinegun and sniper fire from all directions in spite of the fact that patrols were covering flanks of main body. At the same time H Company was pinned down by the same type of fire on their march toward Manna and could not continue without risking heavy casualties. I Company was forced to withdraw and reorganize. Evacuation of casualties was begun. H Company was ordered to cover withdrawal of I Company and aid in evacuation of casualties. LVT fire was adjusted on...
Appendix K to 29th Mar S.A.R., S.A. 3/29

Chapter VII, Cont'd

area from which heavy firing was believed coming. 81mm Mortar platoon laid
down barrage covering I Company's withdrawal. Casualties from I Company for the
day: 8 killed, 33 wounded. H Company, 1 killed 1 wounded.

George Company reached Inadomari at 1415 and was ordered back to
Taguchi immediately. No casualties. Killed two Nips.

On the following day, 13 April, 3/29 was ordered to organize and
hold present position and to continue patrolling around perimeter which was
done. Negative report.

Orders were received on 13 April for a coordinated attack toward hills
and mountains southeast of Taguchi. 3/29 was attached to 4th Marines and
tied in with their left flank, two companies G and H abreast with I Company
in reserve. Jumped off at 0800, 14 April as per plan and moved against
light resistance.

Both G and H reached their objectives which was the high ridge east
of the line of departure before noon and further orders were issued to
proceed on the same azimuth of 113 degrees to the next high ground. Before
and during these movements heavy barrages were laid down by NCF, Arty, and
LVTas plus two air strikes. The second objective was reached early in the
afternoon and the companies dug in for the night. Before dusk both companies
received mortars and artillery fire.

The attack was continued on 15 April and the line was pushed forward
toward nine hundred yards east and south. During this advance there were
numerous firefights and much mortar, artillery, and machinegun fire was received.
I Company was tied in on the left flank of H Company.

Continuing the attack on 16 April, H Company moved around the rear of G
and took position on the center of the line between George Company on the
right and I Company on the left. At 0600 George Company commenced the
attack pushing up a steep and well-defended hill which was secured by 1005.
The defense of this hill was fanatical and was cleared by hand to hand
fighting near the summit. Grenades were used in large numbers by both
the enemy and ourselves inflicting many casualties. Front line positions
were from 9925 Y1 to 9923 O3. Casualties for the day: G Company 5 killed
27 wounded; H Company, 5 wounded; I Company 4 killed and 3 wounded.
Nip casualties 157.

On the 17th of April orders were for our battalion to hold in its present
position while the 4th Marines pushed across our front. During the day this
crossing was accomplished and the 1st Bn, 4th Marines reported that in front
of George Company position they found two eight inch naval guns, five artillery
pieces, eight caves of ammunition and over three hundred dead Japs. On this
night George Company remained in their position in perimeter defense while H
Company and I Company tied in on 1st Bn, 4th Marines left flank and extended
around Taguchi.
Chapter VII, Cont'd

From Toguchi we moved to Itomi by trucks, on the 15th of April and 1400 yards east of Itomi on the east west road we commenced the attack toward the hills west of us at 1600. We dug in that night at 0526 B. Our casualties for the day: 1 killed, 2 wounded. We killed 20 Japs.

Resuming the attack on the 19th of April we moved two companies abreast and one in reserve toward our objective 0327 P after preparatory air strikes and artillery preparations. No contact was made with the enemy on this date but on our objective found a good observation tower and trenches and fortifications.

Proceeded 20 April north toward beach meeting no resistance. Reached the beach about 1500 and set up defense at 0430 Uncle. From that time on we have been patrolling the northern peninsula.

Our support on this operation from LVTAS was excellent as were air strikes. Our artillery support was good but because many of our targets were masked due to the fact that we were attacking toward our own artillery up high ground, the artillery was not as successful as it could have been otherwise. Support from our 37mm platoon was very good. They were able upon occasion to fire directly into caves and fortified positions. 1TGP gave good support and was efficiently coordinated with other fire.

During the operation a War Dog Platoon was attached to the battalion and was used effectively. Company Commanders were unanimous in their praise of the dogs and handlers, particularly for patrol work. It is recommended that on long route marches lasting over a period of days that the dogs be transported rather than walked. The dogs become tired, listless, and lame, after continuous forced marches.

Chapter VII. Enemy Tactics, Organization, and Equipment, Etc.

Insofar as this battalion is concerned there were no radical departures on the part of the enemy from his previous tactics already encountered and reported in preceding operations. As usual the enemy took excellent advantage of terrain and natural concealment, both of which were admirable suited for defense of the sector chosen. Artillery pieces in large camouflaged caves were placed so that they could be rolled out and fired and pulled back again into safe hiding. The same fanaticism encountered before was found in this operation. Nearly all roads and trails leading into the enemy’s defensive position were mined and/or blocked. His entire perimeter was manned by outposts and because of their high ground positions they were able to watch our every move and to forestall our patrols by moving in strength to strike against them. Not until a coordinated attack by battalion was commenced did we achieve any noticeable success. In approaching and attacking the enemy’s position, we were never out of contact with him. While the enemy strength consisted of heterogeneous units, they were well enough trained and coordinated to attack patrols of one and two company strength with some success and force them to withdraw.
Appendix K to 29th Mar S.A.R., S.A.R 3/29
Chapter IX - Estimated results of operation

For area secured see accompanying overlay. It is estimated that this B.E.F. killed 606 of the enemy, and captured 14.

Our own losses for this operation were two officers, and twenty-eight enlisted men killed, and two officers and one hundred and fifteen men wounded in action.

Chapter X - Comments and Recommendations

A. No comment on 1, 2, and 3 section functions.

B. Supply

1. In this operation, insofar as this battalion was concerned, all types of supply were available and the distribution was satisfactorily conducted.

2. It is recommended that the transportation allowance for an Infantry Battalion be increased to include a heavier type of vehicle for the rifle companies, eg: 1 truck, 1 ton, 4x4 with trailer; 1/2 ton 2 wheel cargo; per each rifle company; that the En QM be allowed 1 truck 2 1/2 ton 6x6 cargo with trailer water 2 wheel, 300 gallon (this in addition to the water trailer carried by the M1 Plat); that the Medical Section be permanently assigned 2 ambulances and 1 trailer 1/2 ton, 2 wheel, cargo; that Headquarters Company be allowed 4 trucks, 1/2 ton, 4x4, and 3 1/2 ton 2 wheel cargo, one truck, 1 ton 4x4 with trailer, 1/2 ton, 2 wheel cargo - 1 truck, 1/2 ton, TCS.

3. In the particular type of terrain covered in this operation, the cargo carrier, M29C (weasel) proved very unsatisfactory and was constantly in need of maintenance and repair. Unless the terrain in future operations is more suitable for their operation, it is recommended that their use in this En be discontinued.

4. The new C rations and the 10-in-1 rations proved highly satisfactory and their continued use is highly recommended.

5. Class 5. It is recommended that a greater supply of 81mm mortar ammunition Shell HE light, 105mm AP, 60mm Illuminating M83 and grenades, hand, illuminating, be made available.

6. Due either to the lack of immediate supervision or inadequate protection of the beach, a great deal of supplies have not been received at the En QM Dp. These include galley equipment, medical supplies and camp equipment. In addition, there was an alarming amount of looting of officers and enlisted men's baggage. It is recommended that determined steps be taken to assure greater protection of Dps, both on the beach and as the Dps move inland.
appendix K to 20th Mar S&R, S&R 3/29
Red Dept

A. Embarkation

1. Personnel
   - Two medical officers
   - Forty corpsmen

2. Material
   - Infantry battalion medical supplies and equipment.

B. Aboard Ship

1. sickness
   - While aboard the USS CLAY the Sick Call for this battalion averaged sixty men per day. The vast majority of these cases were tropical skin diseases which had been acquired on Guadalcanal and all but two of them responded very well to treatment as we approached the more temperate zone. The latter two were transferred to a hospital ship on disembarkation.

2. Sanitary Conditions.
   - Heads, living quarters, galleys and mess halls were kept in an excellent state of police at all times. Daily inspections were made by the Ship’s Executive Officer, Battalion Executive Officer and a Medical Officer and it was a rare occasion when corrective measures had to be pointed out. Cooks and mess men were inspected daily.

C. Disembarkation

1. Personnel
   - Forty Corpsmen were divided into two distant groups; Battalion Aid men, fifteen; Company Aid men, twenty-five. The latter group was divided down further into eight corpsmen permanently assigned to each rifle company and one corpsman with the 60mm Mortar Platoon. The eight men with each rifle company were allotted as follows - two corpsmen with each rifle platoon, one corpsman with each 60mm Mortar platoon and one corpsman in each headquarters section.
     - (a) The Company Aid men landed with their respective platoons. There was one corpsman in each of the Company’s LCWs. The Battalion Aid men were divided into four sections two of which came ashore with the third wave and two with the fourth wave. The Battalion Surgeon was in a free boat which came ashore with the second wave while the Assistant Battalion Surgeon came ashore with the fourth wave.

2. Material
   - As a Battalion Aid Station is a mobile unit it is necessary for them to carry all of their combat Medical supplies in on their backs and to depend upon the Regiment for resupply. This organization deviated markedly from the Division SOP and found that their system met with great success. Instead of utilizing the large cumbersome canvas carrying case of “Jackass packs” all material was divided up equally into thirty water tood knapsacks. Each of the fifteen Battalion Aid Men was then given two of these knapsacks to carry into combat. One of these was attached to the haversack containing the man’s personal gear making a transport pack while the other was carried in the hand like a small weekend bag. By this method we were able to lighten the individual load and at the same time carry with us at all times more of the material necessary for front lines emergency Medical Treatment. In addition
to this, crates of Battalion Medical Supplies were placed in the hands of our Quartermaster. However, this organization never received the latter group of supplies until L plus 26.

3. No personnel or material were lost during the landing.

D. Ashore-Assault Phase

1. Up to and including L plus seven this Battalion met no organized enemy resistance. We were constantly on the move and thus no definite Aid Station was established. From L plus eight to L plus twenty-one, we encountered enemy resistance. During this phase the Battalion Aid Station was set up as close to the Battalion CP as the lines of drift would permit. We were fortunate in that all times during the assault there were well defined lines of drift from the assault platoons to the aid station. We were also fortunate in that on all but two occasions Jeep Ambulances could be used for evacuation from the front lines.

2. Our Aid Station was set up in a series of caves or tombs whenever possible. Because of the fact that this Battalion was always two hours traveling time from the nearest Medical company it frequently became necessary to split the Aid Station into two sections, one section following right behind the assault troops and one section three thousand yards behind the lines. In this way one of the two Battalion Surgeons was able to see casualties within five to fifteen minutes after they had been injured and render lifesaving measures while the other Battalion Surgeon could undertake the more definitive measures. Because we were able to use our ambulances to such great advantage the return of walking wounded was discouraged and attempts were made to evacuate as many casualties as possible by stretcher. This worked out to great advantage as we found in numerous instances that so called walking wounded actually had serious wounds which would have given rise to complications had they been forced to walk to the rear.

3. Local security cover, concealment, blackout precautions and dugouts were carried out according to the Division SOP on such matters. On several instances it was found necessary to treat casualties after dark. This gave rise to a serious problem as at no time did we have a blackout tent and we were so close to the scene of action that not even lights in caves could be used. However, we were able to utilize the now time honored flashlight poncho method.

4. Because of the nature of this organization all casualties were removed to the rear as soon as they were in good enough condition to travel and no facilities for hospitalization were necessary.

Operations - It was our policy to perform no definitive surgery. Instead it was our aim to administer life saving emergency treatment and evacuate casualties to the various field hospitals which were better equipped for such measures. In only three instances was it found necessary to perform any surgery; twice to close sucking wounds of the chest and once to control hemorrhage from beneath the deltoid muscle.
E. Evacuation.

For purposes of evacuation this organization trained nine bandsmen and nine infantrymen as litter captains. Six of these litter captains were assigned to each rifle company and each was equipped with a nylon jungle litter and extra plasma. In addition to this, one squad minus 3d platoon from the reserve platoon of each company were assigned to the task of evacuating casualties. This gave us a total of sixteen men with each rifle company to be used for evacuation purposes only.

The litter bearers were further divided and assigned thusly; two and in some instances three two-man litter teams were assigned to the corps in each assault platoon. When a man was hit on the front lines a corpsman went forward applied emergency medical treatment and then waved one of the two-man litter teams forward. The casualty was placed on a jungle litter and transported by these two men to the company CP. If the terrain was such that the ambulance could reach the company CP, the casualty was brought to the aid station via vehicle. If not the litter was taken over by four new men and the casualty brought back to the aid station by hand. The nylon litters proved to be of unlimited value as they are light, durable, and can be easily attached to the litter captains back when not in use.

It was found in using this system that casualties could be evacuated faster, that the distance any one group of men had to haul a patient was greatly reduced and that no combat troops were taken out of action to evacuate casualties.

F. Casualties treated by this aid station.

1. Number - 116
   (a) Retained - 0
   (b) Evac. - 117
   (c) Died - 1

2. Killed in action - 20

3. Non battle Casualties - 24

G. Sanitation

1. Sanitary measures as practiced by the companies were excellent at all times.

H. Disposal of Dead

All dead bodies were recovered and turned over to the S&L for removal to the Division Cemetery.

I. There were no epidemics or unusual diseases amongst the troops of this organization during the period in question.

No dental services were rendered by this organization. All injured civilians and prisoners were given emergency treatment and evacuated to the nearest regiment.

J. Medical Organization

1. It was found in this operation that two battalion surgeons and forty corpsmen with a division of the latter into company aid and battalion aid men as mentioned above were sufficient to handle the casualties we encountered.
However, it is suggested that some definite arrangement be made for the replacement of those corpsmen injured in action for even as of to date we have received no response to our request for the replacement of four corpsmen.

K. - Field Medical Equipment.

1. Field Medical Equipment and supplies allotted to this Marine Infantry Battalion by the Medical Corps of the United States Navy were found to be adequate in all categories. However, it was impossible to carry some of the heavier articles such as blankets, splints, combat covers and folding litters in on our backs, it is suggested that a trailer be allotted to the Medical Section of each Infantry Battalion into which these heavier articles can be placed and hauled when the tactical situation is a fast moving one. All equipment was found to be adequate and suitable for this type of operation.

2. Resupply.

(a) As mentioned above this organization went into combat carrying its supplies on their backs. Initially we had a five-day supply and were dependent upon the Regiment for resupply when this was used up. Anticipating some difficulty along these lines this organization created enough supplies to resupply itself for thirty days. No supplies were lost through pilferage.

L. - Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock.

1. At all time during combat this organization had at its disposal three Jeep ambulances; one of its own and two additional ones from “C” Medical Company. These proved to be of untold value in many instances to evacuate directly from the front lines to the Battalion Aid Station.

M. - Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment.

1. Spray cans, DDT powder, kerosene, freon bombs, and insect repellent were all carried by the Battalion Quartermaster.

N. - Recommendations

1. That a blackout tent be allotted to the medical section of each infantry battalion for use at night.
2. That more nylon jungle litters be issued to each infantry battalion.
3. Faster replacement of injured corpsmen.
4. It is recommended that a 1/4-ton trailer for each 1/4-ton Ambulance Jeep be furnished.
5. That medical supplies be given a higher priority in combat and placed in such a position in the quartermaster dump that they are easily accessible.
6. That DDT spray be kept available at all times.

INTELLIGENCE

A. - Covered in Chapter VI.

B. - Maps and Photos Furnished During Operation.

Ryukyu-Isoto, scale 1/25,000 furnished in adequate quantity; not complete in some areas of KOTOBU PENINSULA. Captured Jap map, showing contours and road and trail network, was used.

C. - Hydrographic Information furnished proved accurate and complete.

D. - Generally, intelligence disseminated by higher headquarters was timely, effective and sufficient.

Appendix K to 29th Mar SAR.
E. - The system for handling prisoners, natives, civilians, etc., was for the most part unsatisfactory, from the viewpoint of this unit. During much of the action, this unit operated in areas a considerable distance from higher headquarters, making it impractical to route each captured civilian and possible POW; whenever possible, such routing was accomplished. Enlisted interrogator attached to this unit proved valuable throughout the action, in dealing with the many civilians and possible POWs encountered.

F. - The procedure for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material was effective.

G. - One Japanese language man, enlisted, was attached to this unit throughout the action; effective and qualified for preliminary handling of captured material and personnel.

H. - The attitude of most natives would seem to indicate that our propaganda was effective.

I. - JICPOA teams not observed.

J. - Intelligence liaison with S-2 of next higher and other echelons accomplished through wire and radio communications, and our liaison officer. This proved not too satisfactory during periods when higher echelons were located at such distances that wire and radio communications were out, and more than one run daily by the liaison officer was impractical. Suggest that in such instances a liaison team be sent to the lower echelon, to be sent back to the higher echelon when deemed necessary by the Intelligence Officer of the lower unit.

K. - Counterintelligence measures were successfully practiced. Suggest that shackles codes and passwords be issued covering an extended period of perhaps a week or a month. This would tend to eliminate the difficulty and at times impossibly of disseminating them, resulting from the problems of daily issuance.

L. - Jap machine-guns and mortars were laid in on vacated trenches in which our troops took cover when the enemy opened fire. The speed and accuracy with which the enemy brought fire to bear on the trenches indicates rearrangement.

Several of our elements on different occasions were successfully ambushed by the enemy, who withheld fire until our elements were well advanced, then opened fire from all sides.

M. - The enemy, occupying the high ground, usually was afforded good observation of much of our movement, hence was probably capable of anticipating some of our action. Nothing specific in regards to enemy intelligence noted.

N. - The absence of adult males among the civilians population, and information gained through interrogation of captured civilians and POWs, indicates the enemy's complete organization of the male civilian population.
COMMUNICATION

A. - The SOI was adequate and had sufficient frequencies and call signs available. There were no duplications noticed and no liaison affected during the planning stage. Plenty of time was available for plans, changes and criticism. Plans included prevention of destruction of wire lines by our own vehicles. This was successfully carried out during the operation.

B. - No changes were made in the communication plan. There were no deficiencies noted in equipment. The rehearsals provided an adequate check on all communication facilities.

C. - Equipment was loaded aboard ship according to plan. No equipment was damaged. Storage batteries were checked every three days during the voyage. It is recommended that batteries and wire be deck loaded for easier access. During the voyage training was carried out by briefing, lectures, care of equipment and physical exercise. Three men assisted the ships company on Radar Watch. Higher echelon handled all message center duties.

D. - Radio personnel was inadequate due to change in T/O when the two 610 radios were added taking four operators from assigned duties. It is recommended that four wiremen be added due to the maintenance of long trunk lines. Countermeasures on jamming were taught.

Five men were lost during the operation. The Communications Chief was wounded and evacuated. Message center code clerk was wounded and evacuated as was one wire team corporal. Two radio operators were killed in action.

E. - Three radios, SCR 300 were lost due to shelling and/or inevitable capture. Latter destroyed. Five short SCR 300 antennas and four long type were put out of action, also three band sets and one lip mike.

Five HS-5 telephones were knocked out by shelling, one HS-17. Ten sound power phones and ten HS-11s were lost during the campaign.

Would recommend T1X be replaced by SCR 604 due to better efficiency, silent generator, water proofed set, longer range, conservation of batteries, also would recommend two HS-72 and one BL-71 instead of three BL-71s in order to conserve manpower. Also one 4 x 4 half ton truck to replace one 4 x 4 1/4 ton truck.

F. - Supply of equipment was effective. Spares were carried.

G. - No agencies were established that were not normal. No agencies were overloaded. No emergencies used.

It is believed that present operating agencies would be adequate on large land operations.

Difficulties encountered in:

1. Radio: Jamming.
2. Wire: Trouble shooting long trunks, enemy cutting lines.
3. Visual: None.
4. Messenger: None.

The communication set up for this battalion was as efficient as circumstances permitted as narrated before.
APPENDIX K to 29th Mar S.A.R., S.A.R 3/20

ORDNANCE

A. - Weapons used in twenty one days of battle employment:

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<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>472</td>
<td>M11 Rifles</td>
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<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Pistols</td>
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<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>B4s</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MGs</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
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</table>

B. - Weapons Lost.

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<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>M11 Rifles</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mortar, 60mm (tube)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. - Malfunctions.

The following malfunctions were noted:

1. One BAR failed to fire because of broken recoil spring. Failure to feed was noted on 6 M1s and one .45 Pistol; while another M1 failed to eject. The elevating and traversing mechanism broke on a Light Machine Gun.

D. - Adequacy of Spare Parts and Accessories.

A definite shortage of spare parts and accessories was noted, particularly for M1s and B4s.

E. - Recommendations as to Modifications of Existing Types and New Types.

1. Many casualties have been caused by the careless handling and carrying of hand grenades due to safety pins working loose. It is recommended that a new method of carrying these grenades be adopted such as a bandolier similar to a .30 Cal bandolier.
2. Have handles for all B4s.
3. Replace carbines with M1s.
4. Test all bazooka ammunition. One company had three duds on one pill-box.