ANNEX B
TO
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASES I & II OKINAWA OPERATION

22ND MARINES
HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY SECOND MARINES, 
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION
PHASES I AND II

CHAPTER I: GENERAL

The purpose of this report is to record the operations of RCT-22 during the landing on and subsequent seizure of Northern OKINAWA.

RCT-22 was ordered to land on Beaches Green-1 and Green-2, and to seize the O-1 line. Thence, on Div order to seize such successive objectives as were designated. This entire plan was, of course, predicated on the assumption that our advance would be opposed. There was no opposition to the landing and little or no opposition to the advance North. Therefore, this report will of necessity be limited, operationally, to the description of the occupation of a lightly defended area. Most of the operations were patrol and guerilla warfare actions. For this reason it is believed that the most important and useful part of this report will be those sections dealing with logistics.

CHAPTER II: THE TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) BLT 3/22

LtCol Donohoo

3d Bn, 22d Mar
3d 37mm Plat, Wons Co
3d & 4th Sec, 105mm Plat, Wons Co
Det 3d Plat, B Co, 6th Engr Bn
Det Coll Sec, B Co, 6th Med Bn
2d Sec, Fifth Prov Rocket Det
1 Sec, 3d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
SFC Pty, 6th JASCO
AGL Pty, 6th JASCO
3 FO Teams, 2d Bn, 15th Mar
1 Tk Ln O teams, 6th Tk Bn
Det 814th DUKW Co (2 DUKWs)

Shore Party

Det 3d Plat, B Co, 6th Pion Bn
3d Plat, B Co, 6th MT Bn
Det 3d Plat, B Co, 6th Engr Bn
Det 26th & 37th Repl Draft
Det 2d Plat, 6th MP Co
Det 2d Plat, 6th SPS Co
SP Com Team, 6th JASCO
Det 2d Plat, 6th Ord Co
Det 55th NCB
Det 11 Sp NCB
Special Action Report, (cont'd).

(b) BLT 2/22

LtCol Woodhouse

2d En, 22d Mar
2d 37mm Plat, Wons Co
1st & 2d Sec, 105mm Plat, Wons Co
Det 2d Plat, B Co, 6th Engr BN
Det Coll Sec, B Co, 6th Med BN
1st Sec Fifth Prov Rocket Det
1st, 3d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
SFC Pty, 6th JASCO
AGL Pty, 6th JASCO
3 FO Teams, 2d BN, 15th Mar
1 Tk Ln Team, 6th Tk BN
Det 814th DUKW Co (2 DUKWs)

Shore Party

Det 2d Plat, B Co, 6th Pion BN
2d Plt, B Co, 6th MP BN
Det 2d Plat, B Co, 6th MT BN
Det 2d Plat, 6th Prov BN
Det 26th & 33d Prov BN
Det 2d Plat, 6th MP BN
Det 2d Plat, 6th S&S BN
SP Com Team, 6th JASCO
Det 2d Plat, 6th Ordn BN
Det 58th NCB
Det 11 Sp NCB

(c) RCT Trs

Col Schneider

Fwd Command Echelon
Rear Command Echelon
H&S Co, less Dets
Wons Co, less Dets
2d Band Sec
B Co, 6th Med BN, less Coll Sec
2d Plat, 6th Ordn BN, less Dets
Fifth Prov Rocket Det, less 2 Secs
SFC Pty, 6th JASCO
AGL Pty, 6th JASCO
Tk Ln O Team, 6th Tk BN
Ln O Pty, 2d BN, 15th Mar
Ren Pty, 2d BN, 15th Mar
FO Pty, 4th BN, 15th Mar

Hq, RCT-22 Shore Party

Hq Sec, B Co, 6th Pion BN
Hq, 2d Plat, 6th S&S BN (less PX Sec)
Co Hq, B Co, 6th Engr BN
Co Hq, B Co, 6th MT BN
2d Plat, 6th MP Co, less Dets
CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

A - S-1 Section

The S-1 section procured all available replacements and assigned them as near as possible in accordance with the SSN's. All units were thoroughly instructed in the use of the S-1 periodic reports and was practiced many times on Division and Regimental exercises.

B - S-2 Section

Security initiated the preliminary planning for this operation. A series of lectures, supplemented by films and literature, were prepared methodically to promote security-consciousness. Censorship methods and procedure were instituted to greatly increase the rigidity of normal practice.

The intelligence personnel of all units was augmented by the addition of specialist necessary to complete sections for early coordination.

A thorough study of the theatre of operations was made from all available sources of information. Data was compiled in detail and disseminated to staff members of all units assigned.
Special Action Report, (cont'd).

C - S-3 Section

The preliminary planning done by the 3-section included no features of special interest. Continuous and close contact with S-2 paid dividends, as did close liaison with C-3. S-3 had frequent conferences with the C0's of all units attached to the RCT and kept such units informed as to all operational decisions. Information and orders from Division were usually received in fragmentary form, and annexes to the Div Opn Plan were received at different times. Thus, the RCT annexes were issued one at a time. By the time the formal Div Opn Plan was distributed the RCT had it's own plan completed. This was due solely to the policy established by both Div and the RCT of issuing information in fragmentary form as fast as it came in. It is recommended that this policy be continued.

Some difficulty was experienced in preliminary planning due to difficulty in obtaining information on ship-to-shore movements and boat requirements. If early information from the Navy can be obtained, and if this information remains valid, the amphibious planning phase will be much simpler. In this connection it is strongly recommended that in planning Landing Diagrams, etc, the planning begin on LT level. This was not done in this operation and several weeks were required to clear up the difficulties caused thereby.

The recommended procedure for this phase is:

(a) All available information and instructions from the Navy be secured as early as possible and fully disseminated. This to include LVT information and assignments.

(b) LT's, using the above information and with the RCT landing plan in mind compile their own Landing Diagrams and boat requirements. Each LT Beach should be shown on a different diagram. This procedure will give LT's a chance to state exactly how they want to land.

(c) RCT collects the above information from LT's and, in conference with C-3, LT CO's, LT S-3's, the LVT CO, and, if possible, a representative of the Transport Division Commander, works out the details together.

It is earnestly believed that this three-phase method is a fool-proof solution of this difficult problem. When higher echelons try to plan ship-to-shore movements for LT's, trouble results. The LT CO must originate his own Landing Diagram and must be the most interested party in any subsequent changes imposed by higher authority. In this connection it is interesting to note that the RCT can do little during this particular phase except limited co-ordination. The real ship-to-shore planning must be done primarily by the LT CO, C-3 and the Transdiv.
D - 9-4 Section

The planning phase of the 9-4 section was primarily the writing of the Adm order, TQM work and conferences with units to determine the type and amount of equipment to be brought on the operation.

The DivAdm Order was received in parts so that a complete Regt Adm order could not be issued at one time. Also several Warning Adm orders were received together with memorandums from the Div QM and the Div TQM. This led to quite a bit of confusion because some of these orders contradicted each other and some time was spent in straightening it out.

As found from the operation itself the supply of all classes of supplies was adequate. Supply was accomplished through Div and would have been adequate except for some excess losses in galleys and individual equipment.

The planning phase did not take into consideration a fast moving operation due to the G-2 information previously received. It was planned to hand carry supplies for the first day or two and by that time sufficient transportation would be landed to handle the situation. As experienced, the movement was fast and other means of transportation had to be utilized. This was done by LVT's which are not good cargo carriers over narrow mountainous roads.

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The loading plan allowed 20 out of 25 trucks, AF6, 28-T, to be carried for each Motor Transport Co. Since a Infantry Div does not have sufficient transportation originally, this created some hardships. Due to the lack of shipping space, only 19 of these trucks were loaded.

The plan called for 2 LCVP's per Bn loaded with essential supplies to be used as floating dumps. Also to load all LVT's with a basic load of not over 1000 lbs. With the loading of LVT's in such a manner it was not necessary to have the LCVP's.

Our previous plans called for keeping the Regt QM dumps as close as possible with safety. This could have been done in a slow moving operation with the transportation available. With a fast moving operation as experienced this was almost an impossible task. Regt dumps were moved 9 times in the first 11 days. This required the overworking of personnel and trucks and resulted in the "leap frogging" of dumps and the necessity of leaving some equipment and the subsequent loss of same.

Plans were not made to set up immediately a Regt dump of all heavy equipment of all our units near the landing beaches. It was expected that this could be done in three or four days and all equipment not needed forward could be collected and a new dump could be established then. This proved to be disastrous as much equipment was lost as a result because by the time trucks did become available the troops were so far forward that they were all needed to transport rations, water and ammo. In the future it should be planned to set up a rear dump, 2000 or 3000 yards off the beach and all equipment not immediately needed be stored and guarded in this area.
Loading plans called for only this Regt to land on beaches Green I and Green II. Two Infantry Regts, 2 Bn's of Div Artillery, several Bn's of Corps artillery and some service troops landed on these beaches. This resulted in much confusion and loss of equipment, while if previously planned for these losses could have been greatly reduced.

Planning for handling supplies in dumps did not include the labor troops. It was planned to use Shore Party personnel for this purpose. These were requested but due to the rapid advance of the troops, these men never arrived until L3/5. They should therefore be assigned beforehand and report to their organization upon landing.

About 60% of all vehicles were waterproofed. No more sets were available.

E - COMMUNICATION SUB SECTION

Communication plans were received by lower echelons in adequate time to prepare for operation.

In loading ships, it is suggested that when two organizations go aboard the same ship i.e., one LT plus CT Hq., a portion of the loading space be designated for the CT, or closer liaison be maintained between CT loading officer and LT loading officer. In this case, LT loading officer took care of his unit with little regard to CT Hq plans.

Approximately 15% of communication personnel reported to this organization within 30 days prior to embarkation. Consequently, training and absorption of men into a well-knit unit was impossible.

Men and equipment suitable for maintaining open wire construction (used 90% of the time in operation) were lacking.

Seventy percent of essential equipment arrived within the 30 days prior to embarkation. As a result, training and prior planning were impeded.

Waterproofing was done on all radio equipment. Most of the telephone equipment was not waterproofed. It is suggested that in the future telephone equipment be waterproofed.

CHAPTER IV:
TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

The first training undertaken by RCT-22 that was specifically directed towards the operation was a succession of CP displacement rehearsals. Boat Assignment tables were prepared for the entire RCT Hq group and several "landings" were made. All personnel participated and as much equipment was used as possible.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd)

The next training done was a one-day RCT problem on Corps Arty Ranges A, B and E. "Reaches" were measured off and placed exactly as they would be at the objective. LT's were formed up according to their boat assignment tables and "landing" and advance to the 0-1 line was made. This rehearsal was invaluable and such a procedure is recommended for all future landing operations.

The RCT boarded its Trans Div on 1 March and rehearsed the ship-to-shore movement until 8 March. During this period details of the ship-to-shore plan was ironed out and much practice in staff work was obtained thereby. As this RCT was well experienced in assault landings no problems of especial difficulty arose and nothing of particular interest and value to other units occurred. This rehearsal was chiefly valuable to the Navy end to those officers concerned with Landing Diagrams, Boat Assignment Tables, etc.

CHAPTER V:

A. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

3-1 Section (Embarckation of Personnel)

Embarkation of troops at GUADALCANAL was carried out in a quick and satisfactory manner. Transhipment of troops at the staging area was held to an absolute minimum and, although because of the lack of LST's troops were crowded from the staging area to the target area, all troops reached the target area in excellent condition, both morale and physical.

B - 3-4 Section (Embarckation of Material)

Fuel and rations for the APA's required a twenty-four hour period to load and about thirty to thirty-four hours to load the AKA. Both organizational equipment and vehicles were loaded in both APAs and AKA within forty-eight hours. Troops were embarked on all transports in half a day. LSTs were loaded with fuel and rations within half a day. Those LSTs which carried vehicles on the top deck had to have the vehicles rearranged in final loading to make room for more equipment than was anticipated. All equipment was loaded from the beach to the transports on LCVPs, LCMs, LCTs, and LSM.

CHAPTER VI:

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

A - 3-2 Section

Operational data, aids, and literature were made available to troops enroute to the combat zone. Briefing continued daily in small units under the direct supervision of an officer. Operational information received enroute was disseminated by guard mail to all ships transporting troops belonging to RCT 22.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd)

Enroute to the target this section made minor changes in boat assignment plans and landing diagrams. Ample time was had by all hands to study in detail the multitude of material concerning the target.

Upon reaching the staging area, En staffs had the opportunity to discuss with the Regtl Staff any last minutes changes in the plan. Such discussions proved to be invaluable, for they cleared up any doubt of just what we were to do, and where.

Training enroute to the target consisted of daily exercises and inspections as well as a thorough briefing of all hands to the plans for the operation. All available material was used in this briefing.

While at the staging area, all hands were able to go ashore. Since exercise while aboard ship must be of a limited nature, athletics ashore gave the men ample opportunity to obtain proper physical conditioning.

CHAPTER VII:
ASSAULT PHASE

L Day, 1 April 1945

2/22, landed on Green-1 and, meeting no opposition, pushed rapidly inland with left assault company peeling off troops to establish defense of left (exposed) flank. 2/22, reached the initial phase line O-1 at 1200, three and one half hours after their landing, and continued their advance toward the O-2 line reaching this phase line at 1700, L Day. They occupied, organized, and defended this line for the night.

3/22, landed on Green-2 against no opposition and advanced rapidly, maintaining contact with 2/22 and 3/4. At 1700, L Day 3/22 had reached the O-2 line on left and contact with 1/22, while on the right they had passed the O-2 and were 500 yards beyond it, maintaining contact with 3/4 which had crossed and advanced 100 yards beyond L/3 phase line. 3/22, occupied, organized and defended this line for the night.

1/22, in regimental reserve, landed two assault companies on Green-1 and one on Green-2. A and B Companies pushed rapidly forward in the right sector of 2/22, and closed the advancing front line as necessary due to 2/22 peeling off troops on left flank thereby reducing the number of troops advancing toward O-2. 1/22, reached the O-2 line and advanced beyond O-2 line in zone of action. They occupied, organized and defended that line for the night, C company in Regtl reserve.
Special Action Report. (Cont'd).

1/39 landed on Green-1 and at 1500 assumed defensive position on our left flank from Green-1 to the left flank of 2/22, occupied, organized and defended that portion of the 0-2 line for the night.
2/15 in direct support and 4/15 in general support landed early on L Day and was in position to fire concentrations that night. B Company, 6th Tank Bn in direct support CT-22.

Love / 1

2/22, 1/22, and 3/22 abreast, 2/22 on the left, jumped off at 0730 and advanced rapidly against light, unorganized resistance to reach the L / 5 line. At 1000, the assault battalions had reached a line running generally between the towns of MAFUDA (west coast) and OYASHI on the right well beyond the L / 5 line. Occupied, organized, and defended this line for the night. No night activity. 2/15 in direct support. B Company, 6th Tk Bn in direct support.

Love / 2

2/22, 1/22, 3/22 on line, 2/22 on the left, continued the advance at 0730. 2/22 advanced up the west coast road supported by tanks and maintaining contact with 1/22 the interior unit. 1/22 advanced more slowly due to extremely rough terrain. 3/22 advanced in their zone maintaining contact with 3/4. Only scattered pockets of enemy resistance were met and eliminated. Many caves were located in regimental zone of action. The days objective was passed, and the advance continued on order to a tentative O-B line. 2/22 reached MAFADI MARURI town south of the O-B line at 1700. 1/22 and 3/22 reached and established a defensive line 400 yards south of this line. C Company in regimental reserve. Assault battalions occupied organized and defended this line for the night. 2/15, B Company, 6th Tk Bn in direct support of 22nd Marines. 1/15 fired harassing fire during the night. No enemy activity.

Love / 4

2/22, 1/22, 3/22 on line, jumped off at 0730 to reach the objective L / 16 line, gradually pinching out the 4th Marines on the right as this line was reached. 2/22, employing a fast tank-infantry column advanced with great speed up the west coastal road, sending patrols inland along the route of advance, maintaining contact with patrol columns of 1/22 in the interior.
Upon reaching the L 1/15 line at ISCHICA town, 3/22, advanced by fast tank-infantry column up the east coastal road and conducted patrolling inland maintaining contact with 1/22. At this time the 22d Marines had taken over the entire front from east to west coast. The entire advance was rapid against light resistance and small enemy pockets. At 1700, the assault units had reached a line 2000 yards north of YAKA (see overlay) and occupied, organized and defended this line for the night. 2/15, B Company, 6th Tk Pln in direct support. No night activity. At the end of this day the assault was sixteen days ahead of the tentative schedule and the 22d Marines had advanced eleven miles over rough, mountainous terrain since H-hour, L day. 1/22, less C Company to regimental reserve at 1600. 1/29 assumed the sector of 1/22 and organized the defense. C Company, attached to 3/22 for night defense.

Love / 5

2/22, 3/22, 1/29 Atchd, 1/22 in regimental reserve, defended present positions while 6th Mar Div conducted reconnaissance in force by Div Rcn Co and 4th Marines. Front line units of 22d Marines conducted aggressive patrols 500 Yds to the front and certain rear areas for possible by-passed enemy. 22d Mar continued the advance, 2/22 up the east coastal road, patrolling inland. 3/22 advanced up east coastal road, patrolling inland to contact 2/22 patrols. 1/22 advanced in march column behind 2/22 on west coast road. 2/22 reached ANFUSU town at 1600, then turned inland to SOBARU town where they occupied a defensive position for the night. 1/22 occupied, organized, and defended the line for ANFUSU to SOBARU. 3/22, advanced to CHIMU town and occupied, organized, and defended a line just north of the town. 1/22, conducted active patrolling of rear area for possible by-passed enemy.

Love / 6

22d Marines in Division reserve, regrouped behind line of departure and thoroughly patrolled area between line ATSUT-ABARU-KIN and line YAKADA-YAKA. 2/22 and 3/22 in defensive positions. 1/22 moved to new assembly area after patrolling assigned area. (See overlay)

Love / 7

2/22 and 1/22 moved by march column, 1/22 in advance guard followed by 2/22, and 3/22 moving from MADERIA on cross island road to CHUDA, advancing up west coast road to MABO, thence to MAUYA. 1/22, 2/22, 3/22 occupied, organized, and defended positions on the 0-9'. Night defenses set up. 1/15 in direct support. No night activity. (See overlay)
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

Love / 9

Active security patrolling by all battalions along and to rear of O-G'. One platoon ambushed by 25 Japs. Several wounded in action. Enemy stores and ammunition dump located and destroyed. No night activity.

Love / 10

1/22, advanced to SHAN-WAN town and set up an all around defense. A Co advanced from SHAN-WAN east on a good road to TAIRA town, and set up an all around defense for the night. 2/22, continued patrolling area near O-G' and defense of that position. 3/22, remained at MAJIYA and continued active patrolling with effort to contact patrols of 4th Marines. No night activity. 1/15 in direct support B Btry Spt 1/22.

Love / 11

1/22, two companies sent on patrols from OBU town 2000 Yds North, East, and South. No enemy contact. 2/22, three platoon patrols, one from each company, sent out to Northeast, East, and South. No contact with 4th Marines. Killed 17 Japs and captured considerable amount of enemy supplies. Remaining units of 2/22 defended O-G' line. 3/22, one company worked tactically with patrols of 2/22. Excellent coordination. Other companies defended O-G'.

Love / 12

1/22, less A & B Companies occupied, organized and defended position at SHAN-WAN. B Btry in direct support. 2/22 reinforced, C Company and A Company, 6th Tk Bn advances to MOMOBARU and occupied, organized and defended that position. 3/22, actively patrolled O-G' line. At 1400, I and K companies ordered to AMA to support 3/29. Entrucked at 1450 and completed unloading at 1700. L company remained on O-G'.

Love / 13

1/22, C Co returned to area 1000 Yds south of HADENA. 2/22, advanced up west coast road to HEDO-MISAKI patrolling inland. No enemy resistance. Occupied, organized and defended northern tip of island HEDO-MISAKI. 3/22, in Div Res at AMA. Contact with the enemy resulted in 8 casualties. Number of enemy killed undetermined. Later committed to help 2/15 which had been under heavy mortar fire necessitating a withdrawal. A Co, 6th Tk Bn in direct support 2/22.
Love 14

1/22, B Company patrol sent to KANADA town on east coast, patrolling 3000 Yds inland. Three Japs killed. 2/22, G company patrolled north on east coast to OKU. Strafed four times by friendly planes. No casualties. One Jap killed. Active patrolling in northern area. 3/22, reverted to 22d Marines at 1400.

Love 15

1/22, C company returned to SHAN-WAN. Active patrolling by A and B companies. No enemy contacts. 2/22, sent one patrol to DANA on east coast, and other patrols inland. Reported planes bombing targets 6 miles NE. 3/22, moved to new assembly area east of HAMA.

1/22, at 1800 ordered to move to AWA in Div Res and attack O-M line. Two companies alerted to patrol east coast for three days. No night activity.

Love 16

1/22, moved to AWA by truck.
2/22, at HEDO-MISAKI, continued local patrolling.
3/22, at HICHI, continued patrolling of assigned area.
3/1, Atchd to 22d Mar and assigned patrol area A.
3/1, I Co sent to 15th Mar as security patrolling.
No night activity.

Love 17

At 0000, 20 Japs attacked Regtl quartermaster at MAJIYA. No stores damaged. Killed 2 Japs. Our casualties were one KIA and 1 WIA. At 0900 a bridge at 1623U was partially destroyed by Japs. Engineers pursued the Japs. 1/22, on MOTOBU peninsula destroyed pillboxes and killed several Japs.
2/22, East coastal patrol reached IE. No enemy contacts. Located a good road from OKU inland. Supplied by LVT.
3/22, continued patrolling. Negative reports. One platoon was sent to SHAN-WAN to guard bridge and switching central. K Co on three day patrol east coast.
3/1 sent I company to assistance of QM dump. Killed 2 Japs.

Love 18

1/22 reverted to parent control and moved to assembly area at 1422 S, prepared for all around defense and further patrolling. Movement to area completed by truck at 1400.
2/22, continued defense of HEDO-MISAKI. One patrol to OKU and return. G Co continues patrol down east coast supplied by LVTs reached ADA at 1600, no enemy contacts.
3/22, sent out two patrols; one platoon up west coast road to KAMA then inland over trail; one platoon went to OGIMI then inland. No enemy contacts. K company continued patrol up east coast to meet G Company. No report on position. Supplied by LVTs. 3/1, at KAMADA sent out two patrols. Negative results. I Company security patrolling in 15th Mar area. 1/15 direct support 22d Marines.

Love / 19

1/22, patrolled area as directed by 6th Mar Div near division rear. A Company in vicinity of NAGO, B Co security patrolling in 15th Mar area, C Company at MAJIYA. Several light enemy contacts.

2/22, G Company reached AHA on east coast and joined with K Company of 3/22 Bivouac for the night. Negative results of patrol – no enemy contact and no road on east coast. 2/22 and 3/22 continued local patrolling. 3/1, K Company attempted cross inland passage. Returned to bivouac at dark, mission not completed.

Love / 20

1/22 regrouped near MAJIYA and began active patrolling of Patrol area A. A Company, killed 16 Japs in division rear area. B Company rounded up 700 civilians in the hills and sent them to government camp.

2/22, 3/22 G and K Co returned from AHA by LCI to respective battalion areas. Other units patrolled local area. 3/1 continued security patrolling of assigned area.

Love / 21

At 0500, B Co killed 2 and probably 15 more Japs in local night infiltration. 1/22 patrolled area A. No contacts. 2/22 continued local patrolling. No enemy contacts. 3/22, local patrolling of assigned area. One platoon, I Co returned to 3/22 defensive position from KAWADA. 3/1 continued patrolling. K Co crossed island to GENYA. All battalions preparing defensive positions and submitted plans of defense to regiment.

Love / 22

1/22 patrolling Div rear area near NAKAGISHI killed 35 Japs in fire fight.

2/22 improved defensive position and G Co proceeded to 3942K to bivouac and continue inland patrolling. 3/22, continued patrolling.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd)

3/1, reverted to parent control and proceeded from KAWADA to regiment.

Love 23

1/22 patrolled area 1118 to 1318. Contested strong Jap position. A and E Co engaged the enemy and killed 50 Japs. Our casualties were 20 men. It was necessary to withdraw due to lack of ammunition. Returned to bivouac area at 2230.

2/22 patrolling, negative reports.
3/22 patrolled area to 100 civilians in the hills and turned them over to civil affairs.
3/4 occupied area at KAWADA vacated by 3/1.

H&S Co rounded up 200 civilians.

Love 24

1/22 advanced to hill where engagement of previous day had been made and estimated 3 rifle squads, 5 LMG squads, 1 mortar squad. 4/15 in direct support. Enemy pocket wiped out.

2/22 patrol activity in north sector.
3/22 patrolled area and north of HENTONA.

1/15 in direct support of 22d Mar. B Co, 1st Sep Engr En joined 22d Mar in direct support.

Love 25

1/22 completed mission of eliminating enemy pocket, then returned to our control.

2/22 continued local patrolling and killed 5 Japs, captured 1 truck.

3/22 local patrolling.

Smaller area of responsibility assigned this date by Div. Up to this 22d Mar were responsible for 140 square miles and 45 miles of coast line.

Love 26

1/22 reforming at MANTIYA preparing to move to vicinity of HENTONA.

2/22 and 3/22 continued patrolling of assigned areas. No enemy contacts. I Co was sent to provide a security guard for bridge and switching control.

Love 27

1/22 moved to HENTONA and was alerted to move to HAMA at 1700 then proceed inland on trail to intercept a Jap troop column report by 3/4 in TA 3034. Estimated 200 nips, well armed.
1/22 continued to move until 2300 over mountainous terrain, then
bivouacked for night prepared to continue advance at dawn.
3/22 was alerted to move inland from present position
parallel to advance of 1/22 and 1000 Yds north to intercept Jap
troop column. Bivouac at 1830 prepared to advance at dawn.
I Co continued security guard of bridge and switching central
3/4 prepared to move in pursuit of Jap column thus completing a
triple pincers movement to trap Japs.
2/22 continued local patrolling.
1/15 in direct support, 4/15 at TAIIRA in direct support of
3/4.
At 2230, an enemy bomber dropped a 250 kilogram incendiary
bomb 500 Yds from regimental CP starting a fire in native house.
No casualties.

Love 28

1/22 jumped off at 0715 to close with the enemy in TA 3042.
Small scattered groups were encountered on the way and six Japs
were killed. Due to rugged terrain 1/22 did not reach scene of
action and bivouaced at 1800. Casualties 1 KIA, 2 WIA.
3/22 continued their advance at 0530 to intercept Jap
troops reported by 3/4. Arrived too late to engage in the fire
fight. I Co continued security mission.
3/4 engaged the enemy at 1145 in a fire fight which contin­
ued until 1423. The Japs used small arms, LMG, and mortars.
The enemy pocket was annihilated and 125 Japs were killed. Our
losses 1 KIA and 9 WIA. Returned to bivouac area 1800 and re­
verted to parent control at 2100.
2/22 continued patrolling the northern sector. No enemy
contacts. Air raids during the night.

Love 29

1/22 reached east coast and returned to bivouac near MOMO­
BARU via truck.
2/22 continued patrol missions. No contacts.
3/22 patrolled area in vicinity of yesterdays action to
locate any possible Japs that may have escaped trap. I Co re­
joined 3/22 at 1730.

Love 30

1/22 in bivouac at MOMOBARU at rest.
2/22 and 3/22 continued patrolling assigned areas. No
enemy contact.
(1) **SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT:**

The ship-to-shore movement was executed according to plan. Because of no resistance from the enemy men and supplies were landed faster than originally anticipated. During this phase the RCT Hq was divided into 3 groups: CO and advance Ech on the beach; Asst S-3, LVT CO and TQM on Green Beaches Control Vessel; R-X and rear Comd Ech on the MONROVIA. This arrangement worked smoothly and well. By 1300 on L day the entire Comd groups was on the beach at RCT CP and normal functioning was again possible.

(2) **SHORE PARTY**

Organization of the combat team shore party was in accordance with CO-28 6th Marine Division Shore Party SOP and it functioned smoothly and efficiently.

After reconnaissance of the beaches by the reconnaissance section of the BLT SP, the command section was called ashore by the regimental commander and organization of the various dump sites was initiated. From that time the Shore Party performed their normal functions and deserve great credit for their efficient performance of duty.

(3) **NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT**

a. **Effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Party Personnel:**

The number of men in the forward Observers team was too small in this operation, during the early phases. This was due to the rapid rate of advance and the large amount of communication equipment which he must carry.

The number of men in the Liaison Officers team was sufficient. Upon arrival of the 1 ton vehicle, the Liaison Officer was able to lease two men to assist the Forward Observer.

The Officers and enlisted men were well trained and understood their respective jobs thoroughly.

b. **Effectiveness of Shore Fire Control equipment:**

The communication equipment furnished was entirely satisfactory. The jeeps and trailers were extremely useful.

c. **Effectiveness of Gunfire:**

The fire delivered against beach defenses seemed adequate. Illumination was good. We had very little need for night harassing or interdiction fires.

Due to the small amount of opposition we had very few needs for call fires. Five (5) targets were fired upon, using 100 rounds of A.A.C.
d. Effectiveness of Coordination:

Coordination with Artillery and Air was very good. The chain of command between various echelons of Naval Gunfire control worked very well.

e. Outstanding or unusual features of employment of Naval Gun Fire No specific outstanding features of Naval Gunfire were noted.


1. The use of telephone communications between echelons of the division and corps should be stressed in order to minimize traffic or the radio control net.

2. More information regarding the tactical situation ashore should be furnished the fire support ship, especially the nature of the target. It will create greater enthusiasm and better cooperation from these fire support ships.

3. The Regimental Liaison Officer should have a TCS radio in addition to the SCR 694. This would enable him to be in contact with the Battalion NLO's and, at the same time, maintain a watch on the Naval Gunfire Common net.

(4) AIR SUPPORT

1. Air strikes which had been arranged for prior to L day were thoroughly effective in the combat teams zone of action. Neutralization of towns and villages afforded rapid progress and few casualties. Prior to landing it is questionable as to the advisability of destroying bridges and roads. During actual combat operations and contact with the enemy, such destruction will at times be necessary, however in the north, such destruction of bridges and roads impeded rather than helped the operation.

2. Air attacks and air cover on L day was adequate.

3. Air Liaison parties in this regiment functioned to the complete satisfaction of the regimental commander.

4. Communication between the AGL teams and the support aircraft when on station should be changed. At no time was the AGL team in direct communication with support aircraft. This situation causes delay and confusion.

5. Panels proved satisfactory in marking front lines. Coordination between artillery and support aircraft for the use of smoke at times was unsatisfactory. On one occasion an artillery piece was immobilized for one hour because of the inability of the AGL team to coordinate with the support aircraft.
6. The number of aircraft desired for air support missions were usually available. However the interval between the organization of the request for air support missions and the execution were generally unduly long. 15 minutes was the minimum time but generally the average time was between 45 and 60 minutes.

7. Dummy attacks afford opportunity for the infantry and air to iron out any difficulties and are recommended for future operations.

8. The effectiveness of control of aircraft from the ground may be satisfactory in higher echelons but direct communication between AGL parties and support aircraft is essential for full effectiveness.

(5) ARTILLERY SUPPORT

1. Artillery support during this phase of the operation was excellent. Liaison parties and forward observers showed the results of thorough training and were at all times more than anxious to do everything in their power to assist the infantry.

2. Because of the rapid advance of this regiment to the north, there were occasions when the supporting artillery was out of supporting range. However this condition was rare and corrected as soon as possible.

(6) TANKS

1. During the advance of this regiment to the North, limited use was made of tanks. When on L day it became apparent that only light resistance was to be encountered, the employment of Tank Infantry teams was discarded and the tanks began to operate under Divisional control. When road conditions permitted, a few tanks usually accompanied the advance elements of the regiment. Troops rode on the tanks (one platoon per four tanks) and on several occasions a motorized column of tanks and infantry in trucks made rapid thrusts up the coastal roads. Their use with patrols inland was impractical because of the mountainous and wooded terrain.

(7) AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS

1. The LVT's were loaded aboard the LST's in reverse order of waves and were pre loaded with approximately 1000 pounds of ammunition, water, and gasoline. This initial supply is invaluable upon landing and such procedure is recommended for future operations.
2. When the battalions of the regiment became widely separated in the north and roads were inadequate for supply or non-existent, the LVT bridges the gap in the supply system by taking to the water. Its use over narrow roads in impractical and un-advisable.

(8) ARMORED AMPHIBIONS

1. As planned, the armored amphibious landed one minute ahead of the assault waves and quickly moved to the flanks of the beaches to afford protection thereof. Later, they set up ashore prepared to function as artillery in direct or indirect support missions. The commanding officer of this Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion deserves great praise for the thorough training in artillery technique installed in his personnel.

2. When sectors to be defended were greater than could normally be expected of depleted battalions, the armored amphibians filled in along beach areas to afford adequate protection.

(9) INFANTRY COMBAT

1. Combat during the phase of the operation was generally characterized by rapid marches and extended patrols. Resistance was of the guerilla type and the groups of the enemy encountered were small and poorly organized.

2. On the few occasions when larger numbers of the enemy were encountered, the infantry showed the results of thorough training and the ability of small unit commanders to successfully control their wits in action.

3. Continuous training in the operation of flame thrower demolition teams in varied situations, is essential and recommended. Such tactics is the answer to our enemy who will burrow himself into the earth and remain there until exterminated.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

(10) Communications

Embarkation and Voyage

Equipment was not loaded according to plan.

No equipment was damaged in loading.

Items such as storage batteries were checked during voyage.

Training aboard ship was: Msg Cen function; athletics; extensive study of SOI, SOP and tactical situation.

Personnel assisted the ships communication officer by establishing a Marine message center, maintaining a 24 hour watch on one of the ship's vox circuits, three communication officers were on continuous coding watch.

Personnel.

Need 33 additional radio men for the Regiment broken down in the following way: 4 men for two new SCR 608, 20 men for ten new SCR 610, 9 men for nine new SCR 300. These sets have just been authorized by the T/A without a corresponding increase in personnel to man the sets. Also need 1 non CP clerk and 1 QM clerk in Reg'tl Com Plt.

Recommend the training of officers and men in the basic principles of open wire construction. With the advance into civilized area great dependence will be put in this form of wire communication.

No losses of personnel aboard ship or in effecting the landing.

No losses in personnel after landing.

Besides standing security watches in a few instances, communication personnel were not used for other duties.

Equipment.

There were no overages in major items of equipment. The only shortage was alignment equipment for the SCR 600 series, a great handicap; however, over 70% of the equipment arrived within the 30 days prior to embarkation thus seriously hampering training and planning.

No equipment was lost aboard ship, in effecting the landing and after the landing was completed.

The equipment was not suitable in design or quantity for the particular task to be performed. Tactically speaking this Regiment covered an area suitable for Corps activity. The road distance in length was over 40 miles and the width was over 8 miles. Operating under such conditions all types of equipment and the number of personnel was inadequate. While this is not typical, it shows a possibility of what may be expected on occasion when operating in vast areas. For such an eventuality equipment for maintaining open wire, a pool of light weight long range radios of the SCR 694 type is recommended. Patrols
and outposts of company size were often operating for several days and in many cases it was difficult or impossible to maintain communication.

New equipment recommended.

The SCR 694 is recommended to replace all Telex radios.

The SCR 694 was found superior to the Telex in all respects and on every occasion.

At least one 1 ton 4x4 truck is recommended in addition to the two wire laying jeeps. Movement of gear is impossible without such a vehicle. In fast moving situations a one tone is needed for moving essential personnel and equipment instantaneously to the new CP location.

Two weasels were allowed the 1st Comm Plt on the operation. They were excellent for wire laying in areas denied jeeps. As a consequence wire was laid and maintained well off the road network. It is recommended weasels be specifically allowed to Communication Platoons of all units.

Extension cords for remote control are needed by all units for every radio except the SCR 536.

A supply of carbon tetrachloride is recommended to be a part of each Supply. Contact points on relays, switchboards and telephones become corroded and must be sent to the rear for repair. Time can be saved by giving lower echelons a supply of carbon tetrachloride.

New equipment used and results:

SCR 608 excellent set no improvement necessary.

SCR 510 very good set. Suggest it be made easier to change frequency. Set gets out of alignment very easily. Repair is time consuming. A system of changing frequency such as used by SCR 300 is superior.

SCR 624 is the best set of the operation.

SCR 300 HANDSET - wires break very easily in cord due to circular twisting of wire as it enters handset. This defect was prevalent, averaging four failures per day.

TYPE CLG - 20207 VIBRATOR CONVERTOR UNIT (Part of complete RBO) Very useful for immediate repairs using soldering iron and other maintenance equipment requiring 110 volt current.

All radio equipment was waterproofed. Results were good.

Suggest telephones and switchboards be waterproofed.

No non T/A items were used.

All T/A items were used.

All equipment was unloaded from the ship during the operation.

Equipment was not in all cases landed on the proper beach. Reason unknown.

No essential equipment was left in rear echelon.
Wire and batteries placed the greatest strain on supply. No change in replenishment rates is recommended.

Method of resupply used by organization was as follows:

An arbitrary list was made of inventory level to be on hand at all times in each outfit of the CT. Also, made an arbitrary inventory level to be carried as pool supply for entire CT. Each unit made report daily on major expendable items. Daily the lower units were resupplied, approximately twice per week. the CT pool level was resupplied by request to Div Sig GM. Very limited repair facilities were made available to the CT. Operating 30 miles from Div Hq this worked a handicap on keeping gear operational. All major equipment was repaired at this Hq.

Equipment spares were adequate.
Equipment spares were carried.
Sufficient spares other than equipment spares were available except SCR 300 Handsets.

The most outstanding handicap of the operation was the lack of transportation for CT communication platoon.

Recommended transportation:
2 - 1 Ton 4x4 trucks; 2 - ½ Ton 4x4 trucks; 2 - Vehicles.

Operation.

No agencies were established that were not normal.
Overloaded agencies were radio and scheduled messenger.
Little could be done to relieve the overloaded agencies.
In the first case RCT command post moved 10 times in 9 days for a total of over 80 road miles. Telephone for the most part was impossible to maintain so that radios were depended upon in all but a few instances. Later battalions were as much as 25 miles from the Command Post and Div Hq was approximately 30 miles from the RCT Hq.

Under such circumstances there was an inadequacy of vehicles for scheduled messenger runs.

There were no unnecessary duplications of agencies.
There were no unused frequencies.

Difficulties encountered were:
Radio - Considerable enemy interference.
Wire - Length of wire to maintain - over 50 miles for RCT.
Also enlisted men continually shot insulators from pole lines.
Naval - Distance in travel in contrast to lack of vehicles. Also, officers are not acquainted with proper precedence.

To high a precedence was invariably used.
Communication difficulties were encountered here that were not encountered on previous operations. All of this, as explained above, was due to the overextended area assigned to RCT.

Improvement was noted in this operation over previous operations. The new FM radio sets are excellent.

No communication failures were noted in the ship-to-shore phase.

No officers were required to operate any agency because of enlisted casualties.

No enemy installations were captured but a considerable amount of test and repair equipment was captured and used to advantage.
Infantry-Tank communications was accomplished by the infantry using SCR 536 radios to contact GF/RU sets in the tanks. Liaison teams from LVT equipped with SCR 510 were in the CT CP end on the beach. Liaison between LVT and infantry was good.

Security

Cryptographic aids used were:
CCBP 0130-23
CSP 1500
Shackle
No criticism of present codes.
Shackle was used for authentication with undetermined results.

Enemy did not try to use our authentication system.
Communication personnel were trained sufficiently in security but officers were not.
With the entrance of the FM radio sets it is advisable for officers to have extensive security training.
Enemy used countermeasures in the form of radio jamming by key, voice and spark coil.
Measures used to overcome enemy interference were to continue communication on jammed circuit and deliver message by other means.

More RCM instruction by competent personnel is suggested to overcome enemy interference.

Summary

The 10th Army Order stated and each subordinate order repeated a paragraph to this effect, "All telephone lines leading into enemy territory will be destroyed." The result was disastrous. Lines were indiscriminately cut. Poles were destroyed. Thousands of insulators were shot off by friendly troops. It is suggested that in the future paragraph 3x of the Operation Order will contain a paragraph reading to this effect: "No enemy telephone installations will be destroyed. All existing installations will be considered as used by friendly troops. Any radio station and/or switching central will be taken over intact and a guard will be thrown around the installation until qualified communication personnel can be summoned to the spot." Then in the signal annex, give detailed instructions to Communication personnel as to what action should be taken toward existing installations. Communicators can, with or without orders, deny existing facilities to the enemy and yet preserve the essential elements of communication for future use.

The greatest single waste of time resulted from the shooting of insulators by friendly troops. The entire wire section and all vehicles of this platoon were used 24 hours a day to repair short circuits resulting from damaged insulators.

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Special Action Report, (Cont'd)

Recommendations in order of importance.

Additional transportation for RCT Communication platoon.
More communication instruction, voice procedure and security, for officers.
Basic essentials in personnel and equipment for maintaining open wire lines by lower echelons.
More repair equipment and personnel in RCT.
Sufficient amount of equipment on hand during training phase.

(11) ENGINEERS

1. The use of engineers during this phase of the operation was primarily the repair and maintenance of roads and bridges and the establishment of water points.

2. In a rapidly moving situation it would be advantageous to have at least one platoon of engineers with at least three bulldozers attached permanently to the Regiment. This would allow each battalion the use of a bulldozer and in many cases hasten the advance of columns over the road. Too often the bulldozer was far to the rear when its need at the front was urgent.

(12) MEDICAL

Medical installations:

Location - due to the fast movements of the troops and to a minimum number of casualties it was only possible during the first week of combat to set up temporary Aid Stations under the best coverage available wherever the Battalion and Regimental CPs came to a halt. Trail and roads were used in most of the movements of the Battalion and Regimental CPs, and would be the natural line of drift of the walking wounded. Other medical installations were located at various sites on the beach and patients were evacuated to the most convenient one.

Protective Measures Taken:

Local Security was provided by the Battalion or Regimental CP. Fox-holes were dug for night bivouac. Shelters and dug-outs were available. There were no black-out tents available black-out precautions were always observed.

Hospitalization:

Adequate as to functioning, equipment, supplies and personnel

Number of patients for the regiment - 376.
Evacuation:

Litter Bearers carried patients over rugged terrain to points where Jeep Ambulances could evacuate them to a Medical Company. Due to excellent cooperation from "B" Medical Company, Jeep Ambulances were available upon call and were frequently used.

Casualties treated:

Number of casualties - 397
Retained 3
Evacuated 371
Killed in Action 21
Sanitation:

All hands were supplied with one (1) set of Typhus-dipped dungarees prior to coming ashore. Skat and insecticide powder were issued to all hands. Instructions were given to treat all fresh water with Halazone tablets. Instructions were given not to consume any native foods. DDT spray and powder was used when available. Food consisted of "C" and 10 in 1 rations.

Disposal of Dead:

Our dead were evacuated to Division Grave Registration. Enemy dead were buried by our troops when possible.

Epidemics or unusual diseases in Troops:

None present.

Dental Services:

Supplied in emergencies by Regimental Dentist working with "B" Medical Company.

Number of cases - 56
Extractions - 26
Temporary Cements - 33
Pyorrhea - 1
Angina, Vincent's - 6
Additional duties - Mess officer.

Care of civilians:

Fifty civilians were treated throughout the Regiment and were then evacuated to Civil Affairs. Types of service rendered was for the most part minor injuries and a few gunshot wounds. Facilities for treating natives was adequate and no diseases were noted.

Prisoners of War - Care of:

Number - 3
Treated - BAS
Location - Shan-s-wan
First Aid
Evacuated - Civil affairs.

Medical Organization:

Adequate as it is at present. Suggested changes - For increase in transportation this Regiment should have two (2) Ambulance Jeeps and two (2) trailers for each Battalion Aid Station and two (2) Ambulance Jeeps and two (2) trailers and a one ton truck for Regimental Aid Station. This is needed to move essential Medical Gear and to prevent its loss and pilferage.
Medical Personnel:

Adequate.

Bn-3 evacuated five (5) Hospital Corpsmen with gunshot
wounds and they were immediately replaced.
Employment - First Aid, Evacuation and Record work.
Adequately trained.
No Specialties needed.

Field Medical Equipment:

Medical Units one (1), three (3) and five (5) to (10)
inclusive were carried ashore by each Battalion and Regimental Aid Station.
No pilferage and no losses except in evacuation.
Supplies were adequate.
Present type suitable.
Improvements - Allowances be made for additional transporation.

Fuel Supply - Poor. More attention should be paid to Sanitary and Malaria Control equipment.

Medical Supplies:

Five (5) days supply was carried ashore by Medical Personnel.
Twenty-five days supply was retained in Battalion and Regimental Dump and guarded.
One (1) Unit lost in Regimental Dump.
No block shipments received.
Adequate.

Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock:

One (1) Ambulance Jeep and one (1) trailer to First and Second Battalions, two (2) Ambulance Jeeps and no trailers to Regimental R&S and one (1) Ambulance Jeep and no trailer to Third Battalion.
Losses - None.
Utilized to carry Medical Supplies and evacuate patients.
Maintained by Bn-4 and Bn-4.
Inadequate.
Improvements - Two Ambulance Jeeps and trailers for each R&S and Two Ambulance Jeeps with trailers and one (1) one ton truck for R&S.

Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies:

Sanitation and Malaria Control - None.
Not Available - DDT Powder, Mosquito Repellant, Insecticide Powder and Grenade bombs.
Re-clothing of patients — See Medical Company VAR.

Inadequate.
Supply by CM suitable if supplies had been boated and were available.

Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment and Supplies:

None initially. L-Day plus 17 received two (2) five gallon cans DDT Solution and four (4) Spray cans for Regiment. Used as local spray when in CP.

Not available for two weeks. Practically all DDT Powder Freon bombs, mosquito repellant, insecticide powder were not loaded and shipped due to lack of shipping space.

Present type suitable.

(13) Supply and Logistics.

All transports were unloaded by D/6 with the exception of the AKA. The AKA finished unloading on D/7. This extra time for unloading the AKA was due to the fact that a greater load was carried and because it moved to another anchorage for final unloading. Some delays were caused by a large number of small boats being tied up at the control vessel waiting for space on the beach to unload.

Unloading was made difficult at the target area by high winds on D/3. Many ships not assigned to our beaches were unloading over them. This slowed up the over all unloading time. More use of barges at the reefs edge would facilitate the unloading time of all ships.

All ships used by this Regiment were adequately supplied with cargo nets and various types of slings for the unloading of vehicles and heavy equipment. Whenever possible ships should switch to yard and stay where the weight of cargo will permit.

Supply for battalions was done directly from the beach to the troops for the first three (3) days. This was done by LVTs as the trucks were not available during this time. Unit distribution from Division went into effect at 0800, L+4. Six trucks were assigned this regiment, at that time. Three (3) additional trucks were assigned L+7. These were to be used primarily for the movement of ammunition. The number of trucks is not sufficient to keep going in a fast-moving situation. The regimental dumps were moved (9) times in the first 11 days, an average distance of about 7 miles over rough narrow roads. As found by actual movement it required 17 trucks, 2½-ton, to load one (1) days ration and 1 U/F for the regiment.

This does not include the movement of organic equipment in the battalions such as heavy machine guns and spare flamethrowers and the movement of Regt and BN CPs. This resulted in the over-working of motor transport, the leapfrogging of Regt dumps and the necessity to work until the early morning hours.
Dump distribution remained in effect during the first phase. This was found necessary because of the fast movement of En dumps which were often established at their new location late in the afternoons and to effect unit distribution would have required movement of supplies to battalions after dark.

Division Salvage section arrived L 4 5 with a PPC in charge. They had no transportation and none was available for salvage so these troops were used mainly for handling supplies. Very little salvage was done until L 4 13 when the forward movement slowed down and trucks were available.

One officer and 25 men from the SP arrived on L 4 5. These men were used for labor troops and were retained until L 4 20. During the whole of the first phase supply was adequate and the only trouble encountered was the lack of transportation to move these supplies forward.

Water was mainly supplied by using 5 gal expeditionary cans. The 2½ gal/man/day was not furnished to the troops. An average of one gal/man/day was supplied to the troops. Water trailers were also used, but due to the lack of transportation only a limited number could be used. One 2½-ton truck can load 200 5 gal water cans giving a battalion 1000 gallons of water per load. Water resupply was to be effected by the trading of empty cans for full cans on the beach. Again due to the fast movement water had to be drawn from forward water points after L 4 3 where no full cans were available. This required much waste of time filling these water cans.

The 2½-ton amphibious trailers were assigned two (2) per battalion and two (2) to regimental. They were loaded with initial supplies which were determined by unit commanders. They were landed in LCT's, due to the problem of pulling ashore and of their tendency to sink if not loaded properly. Only one of these was moved forward of the beach. They are too clumsy to handle behind truck and are too large to traverse narrow winding roads. They proved very unsuccessful for this operation.

This regiment used six (6) M29C cargo carriers. They were used for laying communication wire, carrying supplies and many odd jobs. They proved invaluable over rice paddies such as encountered and fording streams where bridges had been destroyed. They are weak in construction, especially the tracks, but if handled properly and used with discretion will last a long time. All six were kept in operation until L 4 25 at which time one was salvaged to repair others. The main breakdown was caused by the breaking of the steel cable which holds the track together. This could be remedied by the strengthening of this steel cable or by each M29C cargo carrier being equipped with two spare tracks strapped to their sides.

Water proofing did not prove a great value. The reef was so rough that small vehicles could not cross it at low tide and at high tide the landing boats could be run up to the beach. Heavy vehicles and tracked vehicles were run over the reef at low tide, but only after the reef was bare of water.
Ammunition expended for a 30 day period:

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Shell, shotgun, 12 ga.  1325
Flare, Trip para M48  153
Flare, trip, M49  93
Block, demo, chain, M1 (Tet)  22
Caps, Blast, Non-Elec  420
Primacord, 100 ft, sp.  7

(14) Public Relations, S-2 Section.

Public relations correspondents and photographers were assigned to all units prior to embarkation. They landed with their units, blending into the activities of the respective unit for fuller coverage and tactical coordination.

Correspondents and photographers functioned very affectively covering battle and troops in every phase of activity. It is believed that best results are obtained by public relations personnel when assigned to units for the duration of an operation as well as prior to the operation. To know the men by constant contact is to promote more intimate relationship and therefore news and photo accounts of greater human interest imbued with a personal touch. The work of public relations is of such importance and benefit to the troops, their families, and intelligence, that many more could be desirably assigned to units.

The use of the radio recording device employed by public relations to record events of troop activities and action in battle is a novel idea. It is of great interest to the troops, of greater interest to their families, and an excellent expedient for the animation of new reports. One recording machine was employed in this operation but more would be advisable for it is almost impossible for one machine to adequately cover an entire regiment in combat.

(15) Military Government, S-1 Section.

Military Government on the whole was unsatisfactory in that insufficient personnel was made available to the assault regiments to quickly and efficiently handle the number of civilians encountered.

(16) Special Reconnaissance Missions

1. Reconnaissance of landing beaches which was conducted by three men of this regiment prior to L Day, proved of inestimable value to the BLT commanders in perfecting their plans for landing. Continued use of these teams is strongly recommended.
CHAPTER VIII:

The enemy employed guerrilla tactics, constantly, under cover of darkness. In small bands, he raided our installations, dumps, and CPs. Road blocks were prepared by him; bridges were destroyed; and fires started in villages. Weapons employed by him were generally small arms and demolition charges. Few were his attempts at organized resistance which were destroyed in short order for the enemy was on the move in our regimental zone of action.

CHAPTER IX

(1) S-3 Section

During the period 1 April to 13 April inclusive RCT-22 advanced all the way from Green Beaches to the norther tip of the island. RCT-22 alone secured approximately 200 square miles counting areas that were covered by patrolling alone) and at one time defended 95 miles of coastline.

(2) S-1 Section

Enemy killed - 712, Enemy POW - 106

(3) S-3 Section

There was little operational material damage done to the enemy because his fortifications were either non-existent or lightly garrisoned. No enemy emplacements or fortifications of consequence were encountered.

(4) S-1 Section

Own casualties. KIA 25, WIA 71, Missing - none.

CHAPTER X:

(1) S-1 Section

It is urgently recommended that more Civil affairs personnel be made available to the assault regiments for future operations of this type in order to quickly and efficiently handle civilians. Also, it is recommended that plans be made available to handle wounded, crippled, and aged civilians encountered.

(2) S-2 Section

The Japanese language personnel provided was over-burdened by the civilian problem. Three enlisted men and two officers were assigned to interrogate prisoners, translate documents, and handle civilians.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

The problem presented by civilians required the assistance of more than the language personnel available. It is recommended that a greater number of language personnel is made available if civilians are to be handled by combat troops. It is further recommended that each battalion be provided with three enlisted men and regiment with three officers, Japanese language personnel, for combat intelligence only.

(3) S-3 Section.

Viewed from the purely technical aspect of staff functioning the most interesting and significant feature of the OKINAWA landing and subsequent occupation was the sudden change from the expected to the unexpected. The S-3 section was both mentally and physically prepared for an opposed landing followed by a slow advance against a well-entrenched enemy. Map boards were set up with the 1:10,000 map, heavy gear such as black-out tents, drafting material and typewriters had been assigned a low unloading priority and the 3-section landed with more thought being given to the entrenching tool than to equipment normally associated with operations. However, full communications gear was taken and a full complement of radiomen and wiremen landed with the forward command echelon. Picture then the Operations Section arriving on an undefended beach and being confronted with the necessity for a complete turn-about in planning. Orders for a blitz-krieg type of advance had to be prepared and disseminated with minimum equipment and personnel, and all hands had to re-adjust their thinking to an unexpected type of warfare. This was somehow done, although it took 2 hours before necessary adjustments were made.

Other than as related above, the Operations Section functioned in accordance with doctrine insofar as possible. CPXs and rehearsals on Guadalcanal had resulted in a comprehensive and smooth-working S-2, S-3 functional SOP. Changes in this SOP are unnecessary and resulted in confusion and malfunctioning.

It is strongly recommended that the tried and tested system be adhered to with only those minor deviations made necessary by the situation. This is especially applicable to CP displacement. Many hours of work and practice have borne fruit in a fool-proof displacement SOP. Unless it is carefully followed by all hands confusion will be the inevitable result. It is further recommended that there be at least two full-dress CP displacement rehearsals prior to the next operation.

Far too many officers still have a strong tendency to take their troubles to the S-3 instead of to the proper staff section concerned. This is a sign of a lack of knowledge of staff doctrine and is an excellent contribution towards confusion. The S-3 has his hands full with his own job and has no time for attention to details that are not his proper function.
It is recommended that prior to the next operation a series of informal schools and round-table discussions be held by the Regtl staff in order to acquaint all concerned with the proper duties and responsibilities of the Executive staff sections, plus those of the Special staff, and that the Staff Manual, USMC, be adhered to in practice as well as in theory. The most useful practice of staff conferences to plan the next day's operation is invaluable to S-3.

It is recommended that a staff conference be held daily during the next operation. Minimum attendance will undoubtedly be the rule but at least the following should be present: R-X, S-2, S-3, S-4 Com O, Ln O's. A 15 minute conference of these officers will be the most important factor in the speedy preparation and dissemination of an operation order. However, it should be emphasized that the preparation of the order itself is of minor importance compared to the supervision of its execution. It is the duty of every staff officer to supervise the execution of that part of an operation that pertains to his section.

The tendency to refer all operational matters no matter how trivial to the S-3 personally still exists. This practice was publicly and officially condemned by the ADC during the critique of the CPX phase of the Division problem on GUADALCANAL. It is a time-waster of the first order and serves no purpose whatsoever except to divert the S-3 from his normal duties. On occasions too numerous to mention the S-3 has been called to the phone, or otherwise interrupted, to answer a question or make a minor decision that the S-3 Watch Officer could adequately handle. This is the function of the Watch Officer, the assistant S-3 on duty. His sole duty is to handle the routine business of the section so as to free the S-3 for planning and general supervision. The watch officer receives information, disseminates such information to proper authority and makes many of the minor decisions that are properly a part of a staff-officers function. It is recommended that all hands make it a rule to contact the S-3 Watch Officer FIRST. Nine times out of ten he will have the answer. If he does not — then it is only necessary for him to refer the matter to S-3 personally. This reference will normally only take a few seconds for S-3 is always on duty and is normally in the immediate vicinity of the watch telephone.

Nothing in the above recommendation is intended to imply that the S-3 is not immediately and continuously available at all times to handle all matters pertaining to his section. S-3 operational gear was not always available when needed. This applied to the landing and to subsequent CP displacements. Unless there are practical reasons that cannot be reasonably surmounted it is recommended that the 3-section look after its own gear. There is sufficient enlisted personnel available to to this and transportation can usually be arranged.
(4) S-4 Section.

Table of Organization be changed to include two (2) trucks, 1-ton, 4x4 under each battalion and three (3) under H-H Company, with one (1) assigned to Headquarters, one (1) assigned to Ordnance and Ammunition section, and one (1) assigned to the Communication section. The 1-ton truck is the handiest vehicle available for small units. For short quick hauls it can carry almost as much as a 2½-ton truck in the same length of time. It would also be used for hauling water trailers which is not easy to handle behind a 2½-ton truck.

Table of Organization to include twenty five (25) Pvt's in Service section act as labor troops. The present Table of Organization does not allow enough personnel to handle all classes of supplies in either combat or at a rehabilitation area.

Table of Organization be changed to include two (2) extra trucks, 4-ton, 4x4, cargo, to Headquarters section and one extra to each battalion. The present allowance does not allow sufficient transportation for the various staffs to properly carry out their missions.

Table of Organization to provide one (1) 1-Ton trailer for every truck, 1-Ton, 4x4, cargo. These would not be used all the time, but for moving of C.P.'s and for small amounts of supply they are invaluable.

Table of Organization to provide two (2) trailers, 1-Ton for service section and one (1) to Headquarters section. No organic transportation is INCLUDED for moving and supplying Regimental C.P.'s. With the addition of a 1-ton truck and trailer for this purpose only a small number of extra trucks will be required. Since two trucks, 1-ton are assigned the Service section, the two (2) trailers would greatly assist them.

Table of Organization be changed to include the trailer, grease, under Motor Transport and Maintenance sections instead of Weapons Company. This section is responsible for the maintenance of all vehicles in the Regiment so it is therefore logical that this trailer be assigned to this section.

Table of Organization to provide the additional increase of 7-trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo to the Motor Transport and Maintenance section of the Regiment. Transportation assigned the Regiment is insufficient to handle supplies in either combat or rehabilitation areas. With this increase and other recommended increases in organic transportation, a Regiment will only have to rely on Division transport for only a limited amount. As experienced from this operation the Division transportation was inadequate and very hard to obtain. In a fast moving operation it requires at least twenty-five (25) 2½-ton trucks to keep all supplies and organic equipment moving forward. Even if unit distribution is provided to the Regiment it will require this number of trucks to keep Ammunition, water, rations and other equipment to the troops.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd)

Table of Organization and regulations be increased and modified to permit Regiments to perform 3rd echelon work on vehicles. As found from this operation the Motor Transport Battalion of the Division was too far behind the front line units to effectively perform the required work in the shortest time possible. Motor Transport was often 25 or 30 miles behind the Regiment and there was too much time lost in the running of these vehicles to the rear area for repairs.

Table of Organization be changed to include four (4) trucks, 2½-ton to be assigned the 105mm, M7 Platoon of Weapons Co., instead of the present two (2) 1-ton trucks now assigned. These are needed to carry the added ammunition now required since the change over from the old 75mm Half track.

Table of Organization to be changed to include the fourteen (14) water trailers now under Motor Transport, to be assigned to the Regiment directly. This would give better control to the Regiment since they are mainly used by them now.

The M29C cargo carrier be added to the Table of Organization allowance. These were used on this operation and proved invaluable. It is recommended that eight (8) be assigned per Regiment.

That 2½-ton Amphibian trailers not be used. They are of very little use and too hard to handle.

That Colman one burner stoves be provided on ratio of Two (2) per Rifle squad. This would greatly aid in the cooking of hot food on the front lines and aid in the comfort of the men.

An additional allowance of one can of fruit juice per man, per day be issued with type C, K and 10-1 rations. There is no juice provided in these rations at this time.

That each Engineer water point be provided with at least 200 5 gal expeditionary cans for water. These could be kept filled and units could trade empty cans for full cans and much time would be saved in drawing water.

That M42 pack stoves be carried on all operations instead of M37 ranges. The pack stove is more compact and is as useful in the field as the M37 range.

That Regiments be allowed to carry 30 days replenishment of all class II supplies. This was not done on this operation and it was some time before resupply was affected.

That all organic equipment not immediately needed by units, be turned over to the Regimental QM for loading, landing guarding. This would greatly decrease the losses of this equipment as experienced in this operation and also lighten the load of the units.
That plans be made prior to landing to assign LVT's and Motor Transport units to the using units to report to them upon landing. This would save confusion and many messages between organizations.

The unit of fire be changed to:

81 mm Mortar:
- 70% Light
- 20% Medium & Heavy
- 10% Smoke

60 mm Mortar:
- 50 rounds, Illuminating.

The 81 mm Mortar light shell is preferred by all units. Twenty-five (25) rounds of 60 mm Illuminating does not provide sufficient illuminating. If Naval illumination is not provided even 50 rounds of 60 mm Illuminating is none too much.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL M.F. SCHNEIDER

KARL K. LOUTHER,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
R-X.

OFFICIAL:

W. W. BROWN,
1st Lt., USMC,
S-1
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FIRST BATTALION, TWENTY SECOND MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION.

FIRST AND SECOND PHASE

OKINAWA, RYUKYU RETTO.

1 APRIL TO 4 MAY 1945
BASIC REPORT

CHAPTER #1: GENERAL

The purpose of this report is to review the training prior to the operation, and the tactical aspect of the operation as undergone by this battalion during the period ending 4 May 1945.

The mission assigned this battalion was to land as regimental reserve on either Green Beach 1 or 2; and assist operation in Twenty Second Marines Zone of Action as ordered.

CHAPTER #2 TASK ORGANIZATION

The task organization of the BLT for the operation was as follows:

BLT 1/22
1st Battalion, 22d Marines
1st Plat. 37mm R/W Co.
1st Plat. BNco 6th Engr BN.
1st Plat. B Co. 6th IT BN.
1st Plat. B Co. 6th Pion BN.
Det Call Sec B Co. 6th Med BN.
Det B Co. Replacement Draft.
Det 2d Plat. 6th MP Co.
Det 2d Plat. 6th ORD Co.
Det 1st Plat. 6th S&S Co.
SFCP-6th JASCO.
AGL-6th JASCO.
SP Comm Team - 6th JASCO.
3 FO Teams 4th BN 15th Marines.
CHAPTER # III

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Preliminary planning consisted of writing the open plan, overlay, boat assignment tables and landing diagrams. The drawing up of Unit Personnel and Tonnage tables for the BLT.

CHAPTER # IV

TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

Due to the classified nature of the operation plan, no dissemination or briefing was conducted ashore. Information was made available to company commanders and the staff only, prior to embarkation for Okinawa.

Prior to rehearsals simulated landings consisting of boat teams and waves moving toward a simulated beach and subsequent debarkation and deployment were conducted. This allowed the coordination of the boat teams in waves and familiarization of the men in the individual boat teams with the composition of the teams and location of small units within a wave.

After this, the battalion landing team was embarked on the APA Monrovia for the rehearsal phase of the operation. While aboard the APA, numerous drills were conducted to indoctrinate the men in debarkation procedure. These drills included cargo net and rail-loading. Practical debarkation exercises were held in which the troops left the ship, the boats formed in waves, after which the troops were reembarked. As the actual landing was to be made in LVT'S, further exercises were conducted in transferring from LCVP'S into LVT'S. This was affected in the following manner: troops debarked into LCVP'S from the APA, proceeded to the LST'S in the proper LVT'S. During rehearsals and the actual operation, each boat team transferred to the same LVT each time, so no confusion resulted in the transfer.

During the final phase of the rehearsal the waves proceed into the beach and made actual landings, the unit advanced inland, reorganizing, and establishing all means of communication.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Gas masks protective covers, protective ointment, BAL ointment, waterproofing kits and shoe impregnate were issued to all men approximately three weeks prior to leaving for the operation. Extensive training was given all men in gas mask drill, detection of gases, first aid treatment of gas casualties, and checking of all masks in a gas chamber, using both tear gas and chlorine. Protective clothing was carried by the battalion quartermaster and was to be distributed to all men if required.
All gas equipment issued to individuals was carried in the landing, but on the morning of the second day of the landing, was turned in to the quartermaster as it had become apparent that there was no immediate need for this equipment to be kept by the individual troops.

CHAPTER IV
LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The loading of the USS MONROVIA (APA-31) required 34.5 hours. The loading was accomplished in four phases:

1. The first phase, prior to maneuvers, required eight hours. Rations and fuel were loaded at Kukum Beach, Guadalcanal.

2. The second phase, also accomplished prior to maneuvers, required 9.5 hours. This loading included general cargo, such as water, emergency rations, and organizational equipment. Loading was done at Tassafaronga beaches 20 and 21, Guadalcanal.

3. The third phase, subsequent to maneuvers, required 9.5 hours. This included the loading of vehicles and the remainder of organizational equipment not loaded in the second phase. These items were loaded at Tassafaronga beaches 20 and 21.

4. The fourth phase, subsequent to maneuvers, required 7.5 hours. This included the loading of the troops and baggage, which was accomplished at Tassafaronga beaches 20 and 21.

No particular difficulties were encountered in loading either troops or equipment. It is recommended, however, that more canvas-bottom nets be made available to expedite the loading of 61mm mortar medium ammunition, which is packed one round per container. These containers cannot be loaded with the standard cargo net.

The total time required to unload the ship was 80.5 hours. Only emergency cargo was unloaded on L-day, the unloading of the ship was accomplished only during the daylight hours. Because of this situation, 42 hours were lost during the night. This figure included time lost in the late afternoons due to reef and tidal conditions.

During the unloading, the following difficulties were encountered:

Only specified priority loads of water, rations, and ammunition were permitted to be sent ashore on L-day. Even though time permitted and boats were available to send other needed equipment ashore, such as trucks, ½-ton, cargo and trailers, 2-ton, cargo.

On L plus 1 day and LSM was sent along side the APA with orders to unload only large type vehicles, which included 2½-ton and 1-ton trucks. This resulted in the setting aside and disregard of priority numbers of smaller vehicles which were located on platforms above the larger vehicles. It is strongly recommended that the priorities established by the BLT commander be strictly adhered to.

The slings, nets, and rigging of the USS MONROVIA were adequate for the unloading.
CHAPTER # VI

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

When the troops embarked for the movement to the target area, the details of the operation were disseminated. The officers of the battalion landing team were indoctrinated in all phases of the operation and were issued the necessary orders, plans, maps and other material pertaining to the operation. The troops were then briefed in the operation, issued familiarization data, maps, etc. During the briefing, all men studied aerial photographs, maps, a rubber relief map of the target area, and a plaster model. During the voyage a continued discussion and briefing of the operation was conducted, from the general aspect down to the minute details as they applied to the lower tactical units. As additional information was received at the staging area, this too was made available to the officers and men. For purposes of briefing, groups were usually composed of one platoon.

CHAPTER # VII

ASSAULT PHASE

Operations

1 April - The first battalion was initially in reserve. It was ordered to land on Beach Green # 2 at 0018. "C" company was ordered to land on Green 2 at 1200. The first battalion advanced with the second battalion on the left and the third battalion on the right. When the regiment reached the L plus 3 line the attack was halted and the battalion dug in for the night. During the day the battalion ran into negligible opposition, killing 2 Japs and gathering 59 civilians.

2 April - This unit commenced attacking at 0730. Upon reaching the L plus 5 the battalion was ordered to seize the road just to the front of L plus 5 line. During the day's advance light enemy Japanese resistance was met, though many caves, pillboxes and bivouac areas were encountered.

3 April - At 0815 the battalion jumped off continuing this attack. The battalion seized the C-A line and was ordered to continue its advance on to the O-B line. The battalion met little in the way of opposition capturing one POW and 21 civilians. Casualties resulting from a shell fragment ceased the attack at 1700 and dug in.

4 April - The first battalion jumped off at 0730 for the L plus 15 line. Upon reaching the L plus 15 the battalion sent patrol north for a distance of 1000 yards. At 1300 the battalion moved out to new objective approximately 1000 yards north of L plus 15. At 1420 A & B Company moved into bivouac area as regimental reserve. "C" company continued towards junction with first battalion 29th who assumed first battalion Z of A. E opposition during the day was negligible.
5 April - The battalion conducted combat patrols north of present positions. They encountered many E-caves and killed 8 Japs. The battalion was ordered to set up and defend along the Isthmus road from YAKA to 990-3 K-B. The battalion set up strong points along this road and dug in for the night.

6 April - During the night Japs attempted to infiltrate our positions, killed 8 Japs, no casualties. The battalion was ordered to patrol the area north of present positions for a distance of 3000 yards. Upon completing the patrols, the companies reported killing 7 Nips and encountering many evidences of recent Jap activity in this area. The battalion moved to an assembly position at 0007 L-3.

7 April - At 1230 the battalion moved out of bivouac area to CHUDA. Here the battalion set up a perimeter defense. No enemy contact was made during the day.

8 April - The battalion was assigned the advance guard for the right move northward. One section of 105mm SP were attached. The battalion reached the town of NAKOSHI and set up a defensive position 1500 yards further north along the coast road. No enemy encountered during the day.

9 April - The battalion conducted combat patrols to the north and east. The patrols ran into scattered groups of Japs and many civilians. A total of eleven Nips were killed and two POW's taken.

10 April - The battalion was ordered to move to an area around SHINAWAN. Upon reaching the assigned objective combat patrols were sent to the front. These patrols reported light enemy resistance. At 1730 the battalion established a defensive position. A total of eight Japs were killed during the day - no casualties were suffered by this unit.

11 April - The battalion conducted vigorous patrolling, north and east to the coast. A company reached the town of TIRARA on the east coast and set up a defensive position. B & C companies conducted patrols and encountered light enemy groups. A total of 6 Nips were killed during the day.

12 April - "C" company was ordered to set up a defensive position at AKAMAR'NO-MISAKA, during the move north active patrolling was conducted inland. A company patrols contacted the 4th Marines along the East coast as ordered. During the day a large Jap ammunition dump was captured and destroyed. A total of 8 Japs were killed during the day.

13 April - The battalion was ordered to assemble at 2225-R and establish an all around defensive position. "C" company to remain in area of MOMABARU. Patrols sent out by the battalion reported negative results.

-5-
14-April The action consisted of strong patrols. B company was ordered to KA'ADA, set up a defensive position and patrol north along the east coast road to GINIAWSAKI. Their report recommended strongly that any further patrolling in this area be done by amphibious movement as the road is little more than a trail. A & C patrols report signs of Jap activity, killed 5 Nips during the period. No casualties.

15-April The battalion again conducted combat patrolling to the NE-E-SE from present positions. All reports were negative only a few natives seen. The Battalion was alerted to be ready to move at 0630 by truck to AMA as division reserve.

16-April The battalion moved by truck to AMA, on Motobu Peninsula and conducted strong patrols. The terrain was very rugged. The objective assigned was the C-N line, determine type of terrain and E installations along that line. C company ran into a well organized position of approximately one squad. Both companies knocked out the enemy resistance encountered in their Z of A. Could not reach the C-N line due to rugged terrain and lack of trails. A & C companies went into all around defensive positions in their present areas. The battalion killed 6 Japs and suffered 2 KIA and 6 WIA.

17-April The battalion was assigned the mission of patrolling in its Z of A and establish contact with the 4th & 29th Marines on either flank. The battalion reduced the enemy positions encountered, capturing large quantities of stores ammunition and clothing. The battalion established contact with the 4th Marines on the left and 29th Marines on the right and reached the C-N line. The battalion was then ordered to withdraw to an area around AMA and set up a night defense.

18-April The battalion moved by truck to a bivouac area north of MAJIYA. No enemy contact.

19-April The battalion was assigned patrol and security missions. One company in area around 15th Marines CP and another in the area around the III Corps Evac Station No. 2. The remaining company would maintain the defense of MAJIYA. A & B set up all around defensive positions with ambushes and booby traps. A total of 3 Nips were killed, other reports were negative.

20-April During the night the Japs attempted to infiltrate the various positions. A total of eight Japs were killed in these attempts. All companies conducted long range vigorous patrols in their areas. Upon the completion of patrols a total of 700 civilians were turned over to civil affairs, 80 Nips KIA and one POW.
21 April - During the night an estimated force of 75 Nips attacked B company position, the attack was repulsed with 2 E KIA. Daylight patrols were conducted from all positions. A total of seven Nips were killed and 60 civilians turned over to civilian compound. All patrols returned at 1730. At 2230 Division called and reported an enemy concentration of approximately 150 Nips. The battalion was assigned the mission of destroying this force.

22 April - During the night 10 Nips were KIA. A & C advanced inland to assigned objective, encountering scattered pockets of E resistance, killed 11 Japs and suffered one KIA. The companies encircled the pocket of Japs and receiving LMG and mortar fire. Ordered to remain in position for night. Enemy resistance was over run, a total of 37 Japs were KIA.

23 April - All companies report negative night activity. While cleaning out the encircled Japs A company ran into another well prepared position in their Z of A. The rugged terrain, lack of maneuver ground and ammo supply running low the company was forced to withdraw. A total of 46 Japs were killed while the battalion suffered 9 KIA and 9 WIA.

24 April - The battalion moved out for Tahiyo-Take, where the Japs were apparently well entrenched. After an arty preparation the right half of the hill was assaulted and taken. The supply problem was a difficult one, only carrying parties could be utilized. The companies were ordered to organize and defend the high ground where they were. The battalion suffered 4 WIA. Number of Japs KIA estimated as 30.

25 April - The report of night activity was negative. The battalion jumped off at 0730 and soon over-run the high ground meeting no opposition. The Japs apparently evacuated the area. Beyond Hill 3957 the battalion captured a large bivouac area containing large quantities of clothes, ammo, food and such. Battalion accomplished the mission assigned of cleaning out the Japs and was ordered to return to its bivouac area at Mejlya and await orders.

26 April - The battalion remained in bivouac, and consolidated its equipment preparatory to moving north.

27 April - The battalion moved to MOMABARU by truck and set up a bivouac area. At 1700 the battalion was ordered to march to HAMA and cut across the island to assist in wiping out a reported group of 500 Japs. At 2300 the battalion set up an all around defense.
28 April - The battalion continued the march at 0730 toward the east coast. Enroute the battalion ran into scattered groups of Japs, killing 5 Japs and taking one POW. The battalion suffered 1 KIA and 2 WIA. No further contact with the enemy made. The battalion set up a defensive position for the night. The battalion was informed that it would return from CAWADA to its bivouac area by truck.

29 April - The battalion returned to its MOMABARU bivouac area and occupied its previous positions.

30 April to 4 May

(1) SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

The ship to shore movement was made in two stages, The first by LCVP’s from the APA to LST’s. The second by LVT’s from the LST’s to the beach. This was done the morning of LOVE-day.

One LCVP transferred completely into one LVT, there was no confusion as the same boat team number was retained for the LCVP and LVT.

(2) SHORE PARTY.

As the battalion landed in reserve the BLT Shore Party upon landing consolidated with units already ashore. Considerable galley gear and miscellaneous equipment was lost on the beach due to improper guarding of supplies on the beaches. Otherwise it was satisfactory.

(3) NAVAL GUNFIRE.

Personnel for this operation included one officer and five enlisted in the liaison team and one officer and six enlisted in the spotter team. This allowance of personnel is inadequate due to the large quantity of communication equipment carried. It is recommended that a minimum of eight enlisted men be furnished for each team.

The training of the personnel was satisfactory.

The SCR-694 furnished a satisfactory means of communication with regiment and with the firing ship. The operation of the SCR-694 mounted in the Jeep was satisfactory. Due to rough terrain and great distances involved in this operation, the SCR-300 did not always perform satisfactorily. It is recommended that the use of this set be discontinued, as the SCR-694 is more dependable and furnishes adequate communication.
The east groups battalion with the sition it would rea and 4 the ort.

The s from day. The was the Party considerable such due it was and five ted in the due to the recommend-ach team.

Only one call fire mission was used during the operation, except night illumination. Both call fire and radar were used for spotting the indirect fire. 60 rounds of ammunition were expended for call fire. The firing ship's gunnery was satisfactory, but the ship was slow in opening fire. 35 minutes elapsed between the time the request was given and the time of the opening salvo.

Night illumination was used on several occasions and was satisfactory.

Coordination with adjacent units was satisfactory for both HE and illumination firing.

The chain of command was satisfactory.

The naval gunfire common and firing circuits were frequently used to augment communication between battalion and regiment when all battalion means of communication were out.

It is recommended that one firing ship and frequency be assigned to each battalion landing team and that this assignment be maintained as long as possible in order to facilitate communications and to insure that supporting fires will always be available when needed.

Requests for night illumination cannot always be turned in prior 1700, as front lines are frequently not established for night defense before this time in a rapid-moving situation.

It is recommended that a firing ship be kept available until the operation is secured. This unit requested illumination on three occasions after naval gunfire was secured.

(4) AIR GROUND LIAISON

The air liaison party performed its duties satisfactorily. Liaison with NGF and artillery was good. Radio communication with air support control was excellent throughout the operation. Due to the opposition encountered, only one close air support mission was requested. This was called for 17 April 1945 near AMA, on MOTUBU Peninsula. The request was negated by the Twenty-Ninth Marines, as that unit considered the target too near its troops.

The communication equipment and nets between ACL teams and ASC was adequate. Net control was excellent.

The front lines of infantry units were marked by using panels or colored whenever friendly planes passed overhead. Timing of air support missions, and effectiveness of dummy attacks prior to actual live runs was not observed, due to the fact that no missions were completed.

The AGL was used several times to assist the battalion communications with regiment when the battalion's means of communications with higher echelon was unsatisfactory.
(5) **ARTILLERY SUPPORT**

The occasions for using artillery support were very few. When it was used, artillery was satisfactory. Due to inaccurate and incomplete maps it was slow in registering and delivering fires.

(6) **TANKS**

The only use made of tanks by this unit was when the battalion acted as an advance guard for the regiment's move northward along the west coast road from NAFAQ to MAJiya. A platoon of tanks was assigned to support the battalion in this move. Coordination between infantry and tanks was easily accomplished, and no opposition was encountered.

(7) **AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS.**

The cooperation and performance of the LVT's was very satisfactory, both during the assault phase and for supply purposes after initial landing.

(8) **ARMORED AMPHIBIANS.**

The few occasions that armored amphibians were assigned the battalion, they were used for beach defense purposes. Their performance was good.

(9) **INFANTRY COMBAT.**

Due to the lack of a strongly organized enemy positions, the infantry units were primarily concerned with small skirmishes and patrols, both reconnaissance and combat. The majority of the patrols consisted of a reinforced platoon. Small unit maneuvering was excellent.

(10) **COMMUNICATIONS.**

(a) **BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS.**

The communication plan (SCI) was adequate. Sufficient frequencies and call signs were assigned. No duplication of systems was noted. The battalion did not contribute to the formulation of plans of communication. The plan was received in time for study and indoctrination of personnel in the plans. The plans included measures for avoidance of destruction of means of communication by vehicles. The only violation of these measures noted was the avoidable knocking down of telephone poles by amphibian tractors operated by "C" company, First Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

During the rehearsals, no changes were made in the communication plan. No deficiencies were noted in equipment. The rehearsal provided a check on the different means of communication, but distances involved were slight so that long range communication difficulties did not exist.
Communication equipment was loaded according to plan without damage. Storage batteries were checked frequently during the voyage. Training aboard ship consisted principally of familiarization of all men with the operation, the SCI, the SOP, and added review in radio procedure. Two radio men stood regular watches with the ship's communication personnel. The flag and SCT communications operated jointly. The ship's communication officer and the communication officer of this unit operated jointly during the voyage.

Personnel allowances for authorized equipment are adequate. However, two additional radio teams (6 enlisted) should be added to the tables of organization if the use of SCR-610's is continued. Training of personnel was adequate. On embarkation, the section was short 3 message center personnel, one wireman, and 1 maintenance (radio) personnel. No losses were sustained during the operation. No extra duties were given communication personnel.

Upornsock, no shortages or overages of authorized equipment existed. Two SCR-610 radios were carried in addition to authorized equipment. Eight SCR-536 radios became inoperative aboard ship and no replacements or repair facilities were available. No losses of equipment resulted in the landing.

In this operation, the distances involved were so great that present allowances of equipment was not adequate. The range of the radios was not sufficient to provide communication at all times between companies and battalion and between battalion and regiment. Wire-laying and trouble-shooting facilities were strained due to long distances involved so that wire communication could not be satisfactorily maintained at all times. Portable radios with longer range are needed. Loading coils should be installed on long wire lines. It is recommended that installation of these be accomplished by regiment or division where required.

No new equipment was employed. The TCS vehicle and radios and switchboards were waterproofed but conditions did not allow a reliable test of the effectiveness of this protection. No extra equipment was used.

All naval helmets, all except 20 rubber bags, and all RL16's could be deleted from the T/A. Battalion communications do not require the wearing of naval helmets as headsets are not used during combat, the allotted bags are in excess of requirements, and the RL-16's are a duplication of other wire-laying equipment which is superior. All equipment was unloaded from the ship.

Desks, training equipment, naval helmets, and excessive rubber bags were left behind. This did not affect communications during the operation. Maintaining a supply of wire and batteries was the only difficulty involved in supplies. No changes in allowances of these items are recommended. Additional supplies were furnished by the next higher echelon. Both regimental and division repair facilities were utilized for radios. No spare parts for radios were carried, as none are allotted to battalions.
Only normal communication agencies were established. No agency was unnecessarily overloaded and no duplication of agencies was noted. Present agencies were adequate for land operations. Over extended distances, such as this unit has encountered in this operation, present radio and wire facilities will not always provide continuous communication with higher echelons. All radio frequencies assigned were used.

Difficulties noted in communication are:

Radio - Excessive range. Unreliable repair.

Wire - Difficult re-supply of combat wire on DR-9's. Too much resistance over extended distances. Need loading coils installed or a wire of less resistance.

No visual or messenger difficulties were noted.

No improvement of communications over that of previous operations was noted. No failures of communication resulted during the ship-to-shore movement. No officers were required to operate any communication agency because of enlisted casualties. No enemy installations were captured and put to use, except the use of approximately 25 miles of existing commercial wire lines. No infantry-tank communications were utilized as tanks were not employed extensively.

Amphibian tractors utilized their own communication facilities and this unit maintained normal nets during the ship-to-shore movement.

Assault code, Hassel device, shackle code, and pre-arranged message code were used. These were adequate for the operation. The shackle authenticator was used effectively for message authentication. This was used chiefly between battalion and regiment. No enemy counter-use of codes was noted.

Personnel were sufficiently trained in the use of security measures. Station authenticators should be provided for added security. The plan for signal security in this unit was strict compliance with Chapter 4, Communication Instructions, U.S. Navy, 1944.

No communication counter-measures by the enemy were noted.

(b) AIR LIAISON COMMUNICATION.

At one time the air request circuit was over-crowded, but normally it was good. The net was tied up for 24 hours in transmitting regimental orders of the 29th to all battalions. This unit could not check into the net until this transmission was ended.

The availability of aircraft, time between request and reporting of aircraft was not observed due to no missions being called.
Lateral wire communications between air liaison parties was not maintained in many instances, due to the rapid movement of the battalion and regimental CP's.

There were no losses in men and material and the present equipment was adequate for the operation.

(c) **SHORE BASED AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.**

Communication was established within 30 minutes after landing. During the operation control was jointly operated. Air support missions were originated by the unit commander and relayed to the Air Support Commander. The original planning of personnel and material was adequate.

(d) **SHORE FIRE CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS.**

Communication was established within 30 minutes after landing, between the SFC parties and the assigned firing ship. The frequencies and firing ships were changed throughout the operation.

The net discipline was excellent. Communication with all firing ships was satisfactory.

There were no losses in men or material during the operation.

The present naval gunfire comm plan is adequate with the following suggestions:

(1) Due to the equipment carried prior to the landing of the "Jeep", an eight man team would be more suitable for operations.
(2) One firing ship and frequency be assigned each battalion and this assignment kept as long as possible.
(3) If a firing ship is not assigned each unit, a ship be made available for emergency night illumination on call; as all requests for night illumination cannot always be turned in by 1700 as required.

(11) **ENGINEERS.**

Though engineers were attached to the BLT for the landing no use of them was made during the operation from 1 April to 4 May 1945.

(12) **MEDICAL.**

A. **EMBARKATION.**

1. On 14 March 1945, thirty-nine (39) Hospital Corpsmen, one (1) Marine driver, and two (2) Doctors boarded the U.S. S. MONROVIA (APA-31). Supplies were carried aboard in accordance with basic allowances.
B. ABOARD SHIP.

1. Sickness:
   (a) The usual Upper Respiratory Diseases and Gastric upsets were present. Otherwise sickness aboard ship was at a minimum.

2. Sanitary Conditions:
   (a) Heads - Satisfactory as to number and condition.
   (b) Living Quarters - Overcrowded and too warm due to inadequate ventilation.
   (c) Messes - Adequate as to quality and quantity.
   (d) Galley - Inspected regularly and found to be in good sanitary condition.
   (e) Cooks and Messmen - Satisfactory.

3. Special Precautions:
   (a) Messgear was rinsed in hot soapy water before sterilizing.
   (b) Two (2) Atabrine tablets were given daily except Sunday to all hands.

C. DEBARKATION

1. Six (6) Company Aid Men per company were boated with each of the respective companies in the first, second and third waves of this Battalion which was in Regimental Reserve. One company Aid Man was boated with the 81 mm Mortar Section in the third wave. The Assistant Battalion Surgeon and three (3) Hospital Corpsmen were boated with Baker Company in the second wave. The remaining personnel were so divided that in the third wave with Headquarters Company, the Battalion Surgeon and nine (9) Hospital Corpsmen were in one boat and eight (8) Hospital Corpsmen were in an adjoining boat.

2. Five (5) day supply was divided into units and carried by Medical Personnel. Twenty-five (25) day supply was landed with Bn-4 on L-Day plus three (3). There were no losses of personnel or material.

D. ASHORE-ASSAULT PHASE.

1. Medical Installations:
   (a) Location - Due to the fast movements of the troops and to a minimum number of casualties it was only possible during the first week of combat to set up temporary Aid Stations under the best coverage available where ever the Battalion CP came to a halt. Trails and roads were used in most of the movements of the Battalion CP and would be the natural line of drift of walking wounded. Other Medical Installations were located at various sites on the beach and patients were evacuated to the most convenient one.
2. Protective Measures Taken:
   (a) Local security was provided by the Battalion CP. Foxholes were dug for night bivouac and blackout conditions prevailed after dark.

3. Hospitalization:
   (a) Adequate as to functioning, equipment, supplies, and personnel.
   (b) Number of patients - 112.

4. Evacuation:
   (a) Litter bearers carried patients over rugged terrain to points where Jeep Ambulances could evacuate them to a Medical Company. Due to excellent cooperation from "E" Medical Company, Jeep Ambulances were available upon call and were frequently used.

5. Casualties treated:
   (a) Number of casualties - 56.
      Retained - 5.
      Evacuated - 51.
      Killed in action - 15.

6. Sanitation:
   (a) All hands were supplied with one (1) set of Typhus-dipped utility clothes prior to coming ashore.
   (b) Skat and insecticide powder were issued to all hands.
   (c) Instructions were given to treat all fresh water with Halazone tablets.
   (d) Instructions were given not to consume any native foods.

7. Disposal of Dead:
   (a) Our dead were evacuated to Division Grave Registration.
   (b) Enemy dead were buried by our troops when possible.

8. Epidemics or Unusual Diseases in Troops:
   (a) None present.

9. Dental Services:
   (a) Emergencies were all taken care of by Medical Companies.

10. Care of Civilians:
    (a) First-Aid was rendered for twenty (20) civilians with Gunshot wounds. These were then evacuated to Civil Affairs.
11. Prisoners of War - Care of:
   (a) Number - 1.
   (b) Cared for by Battalion Surgeon.
   (c) Boric Acid dressing to first degree burn, face.
   (d) Returned to Battalion CP.

12. Medical Organization:
   (a) Adequate as is at present.

13. Medical Personnel:
   (a) Adequate.
   (b) No losses and no replacements.
   (c) Adequately trained.
   (d) No specialities needed.

14. Field Medical Equipment:
   (a) Medical Units one (1) and three (3) and five (5) to ten (10) were carried ashore.
   (b) No pilferage. No losses except in evacuation.
   (c) Supplies were adequate.
   (d) Present type suitable.
   (e) Re-supply was difficult due to poor contact because of distance between medical installations.

15. Medical Supplies:
   (a) Five (5) days supply was carried ashore by medical personnel. Twenty-five (25) days supply was retained in Battalion Dump and guarded.
   (b) No pilferage or losses.
   (c) Adequate.
   (d) No block shipments have been received.

16. Motor Vehicles and Rolling-Stock:
   (a) One (1) Ambulance Jeep and Trailer.
   (b) No losses.
   (c) Utilized to carry Medical Supplies and evacuate patients.
   (d) Maintained by Bn-4.
   (e) Due to the fine cooperation of "E" Medical Company, one (1) Ambulance Jeep proved to be adequate.

17. Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies:
   (a) Skat and Insecticide powder were issued to the Medical Department by Bn-4 before the operation. There has been no re-supply of these items.
   (b) Inadequate.
18. Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment and Supplies:

(a) All Regimental Malarial Control Supplies were lost on the beach.

E. ASHORE – AFTER COMPLETION OF ASSAULT PHASE.

(1) Hospitalization:
   (a) All patients needing hospitalization are sent to one of the Medical Companies.

(2) Medical & Quartermaster Supplies & Equipment:
   (a) Medical supplies are to be furnished by the regiment
   (b) Quartermaster supplies are not available at this time.

(3) Sanitation:
   (a) Bivouac area are policed daily and all refuse burned or buried.
   (b) Straddle trenches are used as Heads.

(4) Food and Water:
   (a) Personnel are issued Ten & One Rations and "C" Ration daily in sufficient quantity.
   (b) Water is issued one (1) five (5) gallon can per five (5) men daily.
   (c) Sea Water is available nearby for bathing and laundry.

(5) Sickness - Epidemic or Unusual Diseases in Troops or Native Population.
   (a) No Epidemic or Unusual Diseases have been noted in troops or native population.

F. Recommendation:

1. T.O. allowance to include one 1/4 ton Jeep trailer.
2. Combat blankets - 20 to be furnished each battalion.

13. SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS.

A. Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies.

Class I
Rations adequate throughout operation.

Class II
Vehicles insufficient for this type of operation.

Class III
Adequate throughout operation.

Class IV
Adequate throughout operation.
Class V
Adequate throughout operations.
B. Resupply sufficient in all classes.
C. Shore based supply facilities were efficient throughout operation.
D. Salvage - The companies returned all salvaged material (chiefly equipment of casualties) to a point where En-4 transportation picked it up.
E. Transportation - Very adequate. It is recommended that four (4) 21/2 ton trucks be assigned, each BLT while in combat. It is further recommended that T.O. allowance for 1/4 ton, trailer cargo, be increased to eight (8); the T.O. allowances for 81 mm mortar platoon be increased to include two (2) trucks; 1-Ton, w/trailers for transporting ammo and equipment.
F. Vessels are not built for this kind of terrain.
G. Amphibian trailers are too heavy and bulky for any practical purposes for a BLT.

H. Ordnance -
(1) The following was brought ashore by the BLT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, U.S. Cal. 30. M1</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, U.S. Cal. 30. Carbine</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Browning Automatic Cal. 30.</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, U.S. Cal. .45</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.G., M 1917 A 1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.G. M 1919 A 4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket, A.T. Launchers</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame throwers</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars, 60 mm</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars, 81 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, Shoulder fire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun, Riot, 12 gauge</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four (4) 60 mm mortars were lost on the beach during unloading of the APA.

(2) There was a thirty (30) day battle employment of all weapons.
(3) The number of spare parts and accessories made available for MG's and BAR's was inadequate. A complete set was not available to units prior to embarkation for the target area.

**I- VEHICLES:**

- 8 Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4, Cargo
- 1 Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, Radio Equip.
- 1 Truck 1/4 ton, 4x4, Ambulance
- 6 Trailers, 1/4 ton, 4x4, Cargo
- 1 Weasel, cargo
- 2 3½ ton, Amph.trailers.

No vehicles were lost or damaged beyond repair.

**J- Ammunition expended during present operation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.G. Belted Cal. .30</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 60 mm Ill.</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, Cal. .30</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Frag.</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 81 medium</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 81 Light</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 81 Smoke</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Smoke (Yellow)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Smoke, Violet</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Smoke, Red</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, Smoke, Green</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, A.T. Mine</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell, 12 Guage, 00</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade, Ill.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal. .30, 8rd clips M</td>
<td>44,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal. .30, 5rd clip</td>
<td>37,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 60 HE</td>
<td>1790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
K - Recommendations:

1. Demolitions.

An increase in the allowance of demolitions carried, present supply inadequate. A suggested unit of fire:

270 lbs tetrol
540 Caps # 8
540 Feet primacord
270 Feet safety fuse
1 Box fuse lighters
5 Pull type igniters
10 Rolls friction tape
10 Rolls twine
20 "Jumping Jack" - anti-personnel mines.
19 Trip flares.
9 Spare crimpers

2. 81mm Mortar.

The present method of packaging one round of medium shell to a case is too clumsy and heavy to carry any appreciable amount on the person. A packaging similiar to the light shell of four (4) to a package would be better.

The light shell is excellent in packaging and makeup. The present waterproofing method is good.

14. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

During initial phase the coverage of this unit by combat photographers and correspondents was poor. About LOVE plus 13 the combat photographers and correspondents were assigned and did excellent work.

15. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

The handling and tagging of civilians by the Civil Affairs was poor. Often these civilians would pass through the lines with
CHAPTER VIII

No new enemy tactics were encountered during the operation. The enemy employed "hide-and-seek" tactics throughout and appeared to set up automatic weapons with rapid withdrawal as the prime requisite, rather than fields of fire.

CHAPTER IX

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

1. Enemy Casualties.
   a. 227 KIA
   b. 27 POW

2. Operational material damage to enemy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>SALVAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LMG.Kodan 99, Cal. 7.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars Model 86, 60mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrage Type 70mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistoles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolitions all types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 mm Mortar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuzes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a tag or notice informing the reader that the individual was permitted to do so. In many cases it was proved that these civilians carried food and information to the Jap soldiers hiding in the hills.
SALVAGED

Bomb Fuses

200

DESTROYED

(One long delay type found, adjustable to about 120 hours delay.)

3. OWN LOSSES.

a. Killed in Action - two (2) officers and sixteen (16) enlisted.


c. Missing in Action - NONE.

CHAPTER X

S-1

(a) The current methods used for reporting casualties are excellent, particularly the individual report card system, however, it is felt that the abbreviated G-1 periodic report form used for the Guam operation were much easier to prepare in that it did not require the weekly reports which take considerable time to prepare and further increases the load of paper that is carried on person. It is believed that the preparation of the weekly reports could be made by the more rear administrative units as the reports are merely weekly summaries.

(b) The morale of troops was excellent, however, the combat efficiency during the latter part of this period was lowered due to terrific physical exertion. The ample supply of cigarettes and especially the new style of "C" rations with the occasional 10-in-1 ration contributed materially to a long period of high morale.

S-2

The maps furnished before the operation for general distribution were: Special Air and Gunner Target Topographic Maps of scale 1:10,000 and 1:25,000. All maps had the aerial photo from which they were compiled reproduced on the reverse side. Several large scale maps were furnished for staff reference and planning.

In general, the standard issue maps were sufficiently accurate for infantry purposes, although discrepancies up to 200 yards were occasionally found in the location of key terrain features. From the Ishikawa Isthmus area northward there was virtually no inland topographic data shown. This forced us to reply entirely upon captured maps and our own patrol sketches. Just a few salient terrain features, e.g., peaks, valleys, and streams, which could be plotted fairly accurately from aerial photos, would have been of great assistance.
Vertical and oblique aerial photos, individual and stereo-pairs, of the beach, reef, and areas as far as 4,000 yards inland were furnished showing our zone of action. Special emphasis was given to the regimental landing area. Photo coverage was adequate but a few smaller scale photos, i.e. 1/5,000, would have been helpful.

Two terrain models were furnished. One of sponge rubber and of scale 1:7,000; was very inaccurate and virtually worthless. The other of plastic composition, scale 1:5,000, was quite detailed, accurate, and of great value, especially for briefing troops.

During the operation aerial photos were furnished this unit twice. Both issues were stereo-pairs, hence awkward to handle and redundant in coverage. The second issue did not cover the area with which this unit was concerned. Assault units need small-scale verticals more than stereo-pairs or obliques.

Two Japanese map reproductions were furnished in quantity during the assault phase and were of especial value, although not exceptionally accurate and of very large scale.

Hydrographic information was adequate.

The intelligence information disseminated by higher headquarters before the operation was erroneous in regard to numbers and disposition of enemy troops and of installations; but during the operation the information was sufficient, although not always timely due to rapid rate of advance and the over-extended lines of communication, transportation, and extremely rough terrain.

The system of handling civilians and prisoners by higher echelons was not satisfactory. Many of the male civilians which this unit sent back were released by higher authority within a few hours, fed, and sent back through our lines. It is believed that many of these were aiding the enemy by carrying food and military information to soldiers hiding in the hills. There also seemed to be no set procedure or policy among higher echelons or military government for handling civilians - especially during the first two weeks of the operation. All likely-looking POW's and civilians were interrogated briefly before being sent to the next higher echelon.

The S.O.P. for handling captured enemy documents and material was as follows: All men sent back captured materiel to the battalion command post as soon as practicable. The interpreter and battalion intelligence officer screened the material, returning everything of no intelligence value to the finder who had been instructed to put his name and unit on any article he might want returned. All relevant matter was checked and signed by the intelligence officer before being forwarded to the next higher unit.

The Japanese language officer who was intermittently attached to this unit and the Japanese language enlisted man who was permanently attached were of very great value. They were needed for interrogation and translation many times daily and were especially useful in handling civilians. The enlisted language specialist did excellent work.
The effects of our written propaganda were not discerned, although dissemination must have been fairly wide since many of the enemy and civilians were found to have the leaflets in their possession.

Intelligence liaison with regiment was as good as could be expected, in view of the unusual transporation and communication problem which existed.

Counter-intelligence measures — camouflage, light and sound discipline at night, were initially good, but due to the sporadic and infrequent contact with the enemy counterintelligence measures became increasingly lax as the assault progressed.

There was little deviation from the standard Jap tactics noted. There was the usual night activity and suicidal measures. In his delaying actions the enemy placed his automatic weapons with regard to good escape routes rather than to cover long, unobstructed fields of fire. Most of the enemy's tactics were of a hit-and-run nature and he never tried to make a stand when heavy weapons were brought against him, or when he was hit from a flank.

Japanese intelligence seemed to be fairly active. In one instance especially, it was found that the enemy had rather complete knowledge of our unit identifications and this, coupled with the fact that the enemy almost invariably had excellent observation indicates that the Japanese were well informed as to our strength and disposition at all times. A packet of approximately two dozen Japanese propaganda sheets was found by this unit on Motobu Peninsula the afternoon of April 17 and upon these the Fifteenth and Twenty-Ninth Marines, the Sixth Marine Division, and the Third Amphibious Corps were specifically mentioned.

There was much evidence that the Japanese were being informed of our strength, movements, and disposition by civilians, and were themselves impersonating civilians and getting through our lines. In every enemy bivouac area were numerous bundles of civilian clothing.

The majority of the civilian-male population of military age seemed to be connected in some way with the military. Most of them have been conscripted into labor units although there were many actual soldiers among the natives. Almost all of these native men were loyal to a certain degree to the Japanese army; however, in most cases they were very poorly equipped with munitions and were chiefly a nuisance factor. The remainder of the civilian population were not belligerent and, except for their spying, offered no resistance to our troops.
discerned, many of the heir possession could be allocation.

ight and sound sporadic measures up tactics measures, weapons ongoing, unaware of a when heavy on a flank. In one her complete with the ration strength two dozen on the Third being in- vilians, and through our military. Most of re were these native however, ones and were a population and no

None, except as noted throughout the report.

BY ORDER OF MAJOR THOMAS J. MYERS:

E. J. COOK, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, En-X

OFFICIAL:

EDWARD G. KURDZIEL
Major, U.S. Marine Corps, En-3
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
1 APRIL, 45 - 5 MAY, 45

SECOND BATTALION
TWENTY SECOND MARINES
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND BATTALION, TWENTY-SECOND MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

Subject: Special Action Report.

1. Administration

a. Casualty reports were received and made in accordance with division regulations. It might be called a "roster and casualty card" system. Its merits might be stated as insuring within the division a method of uniform reporting sufficiently simple to demand promptness and accuracy. In application, printed casualty cards were supplied for issue to the platoon leader and three noncommissioned officers of each platoon. Complete company rosters were supplied each company commander and first sergeant. A casualty occurring was reported by filling in a casualty card indicating full military name, rank, serial number, type of wound, disposition, and other pertinent information and checked for accuracy by both the company first sergeant and the company commander. At regular periods, such casualty cards were dispatched by all units to the 3-1 section where they were again checked for accuracy and then compiled for reporting to the battalion commander and subsequently to regiment. Because of the few casualties occurring within this battalion, this system was not put to full test. However, within our limited use, it has worked well.

b. The morale of the men of this battalion has been excellent through the current operation. No special or extraordinary means have been used to maintain high morale. The causes of its sustained high level originated in the training phase, and might be summed up as follows: Avoiding unnecessary and irritating regulations; sound, and scrupulously progressive training of individuals, squads, and platoons; including all noncommissioned officers in critiques of company and battalion problems; maintaining thorough orientation down to the individual rifleman; and in the progress of the current operation, keeping up an excellent line of supply in food and water.

2. Intelligence

a. The maps and photos furnished the battalion prior to the operation were adequate for the training and subsequent planning phase.
b. For the Guam operation and for the small infantry units there were provided 1:20,000 scaled maps. Subsequent criticism favored provision for a larger scaled map. Thus we were given a 1:10,000 map for the crucial and initial stages of the OKINAWA JIMA operation, and, in addition, a 1:25,000 coverage of the same area. These two maps were not unlike each other, the 1:10,000 being merely a blown up version of the 1:25,000. However, it was decided that the 1:10,000 map would be used as the preferred map within the regiment with an eye toward facilitating map-reading and planning for the small infantry commander. At this time, after having used both and weighing the relative merits of both, it is felt that henceforth the 1:20,000 map will be preferred. The advantage of a larger scaled map are overshadowed by the disadvantage of being oversized and difficult to handle in the field, necessitating frequent changing of sheets or refolding of the map. The platoon leader was forced to carry a bulky bundle of map sheets in reserve or if cut and glued together, he was forced to fold it many times, soon damaging its surface. Considering that both maps in question possessed identical data, the 1:25,000 was superior. However, this decision is admittedly tempered by the fast moving situation encountered here and the resulting distance covered in one day. If the operation had been one of a more stable nature or over a more limited area, the 1:10,000 map would apt to be preferred.

The target area designator continues to prove the most effective method of giving locations and is quite satisfactory. The printing of known military installations and defenses was a fine innovation. This greatly facilitates the reading of the map since, heretofore, such installations were transposed from overlays to the map by hand using a red pencil.

Road net, coast line, and towns and villages continued to be the best means of orientation. The road net depicted on the map in the landing area proved accurate, but to the north, many inaccuracies were noted. Secondary roads were shown which were nothing more than footpaths and vice versa. There were many instances of good trails, and in some cases of roads, existing which were not represented on the map at all and vice versa.

Contouring was faulty in that there was simply not enough of it. The terrain in the northern end was far too cut up and dissected for the existing contours on the map.
Obviously, there was a crying need for detail on the map in those spots that were completely lacking in terrain study.

Aerial photographs as stated in (a) above were adequate for the planning phase of the operation. However, from that point on, aerial photographs were totally "in absentia". Upon embarkation it was felt that surely we would receive recent photographs at some time prior to Love-day, but such was not the case. After landing, photos were requested time and again by this headquarters with no results whatsoever. In fact, it was approximately 17 days after landing before we received our first photographs. Photographs would have been extremely useful at many points along our route of advance. The photos finally received were good and have proven quite useful to the patrol leader in the northern end of the island. There is much room for improvement in this department.

c. Hydrographic information was accurate and complete. However, our knowledge was greatly enhanced by the information derived from our representative with the U.D.I. This man has personally observed all that could be seen and had recorded this data in graphical form. When returned to his assault battalion, he was enabled to contradict or to corroborate previous information and, more important, was able to enlarge and vividly describe the hazards that might be encountered and the location of same. This liaison between the assault battalion and the Navy U.D.I. proved highly successful and it is recommended that it be continued in the future.

d. Intelligence disseminated by higher headquarters was, in general, sufficient and in time to be of value. Lack of active enemy defenses in our zone of action prevented the thorough testing of our combat intelligence.

e. Prisoners were necessarily hastily and informally handled. Military personnel prisoners were few and far between. Civilian prisoners were frequently encountered. They were both handled in the same manner. A hasty interrogation and subsequent evacuation to a rear area. While in the attack, the handling of prisoners was quite difficult and awkward due to the fast-moving situation. Evacuation was important but transportation was usually lacking. Any vehicle which was headed to the rear was commandeered and utilized, also, the nights were particularly a problem.
Special Action Report (Cont'd)

Civilians were invariably located within or immediately in front of our chosen positions for the night. At the time of their seizures there was usually only another half-hour or hour of daylight and all organic transportation would usually be engaged in other duties. It would be a great aid to the battalion if a higher echelon could provide "stand-by" transportation for prisoners in order to expedite their removal from forward areas.

f. Thanks to a thorough indoctrination of all members of the battalion in the value of intelligence derived from enemy documents and material, there has been no problem in this matter. Enlisted and officer personnel have cooperated.

g. The only permanently attached language personnel has been one enlisted man. This man is particularly well qualified for his job and his willingness to work has left little that could be desired of any one man. But the language problem has been far too large for one man to handle. Frequently, and interpreter was needed in several places at once — e.g. in the battalion bivouac area and also on a company patrol. For future operations in populated Japanese speaking areas, there will be a dire need for increased language personnel with assault battalions. Their services are mandatory and indispensable.

h. Interrogation of prisoners, thus far, indicates that the propaganda leaflets dropped prior to Love-day were not read. In the area immediately inland from our landing beach, many propaganda leaflets were found by our own troops. In the same area were found civilians, none of whom, would admit having read them. By their actions before capture and immediately afterwards it was evident they were telling the truth. A portable public address system would be a desirable asset in dealing with Japanese holed-up in caves. These sets should be within the regiment and readily accessible to the battalion.

i. No JICPA teams operated with this battalion.

j. Excellent liaison existed between intelligence sections in this regiment. Communications were usually very good facilitating ready exchange of intelligence between higher and lower echelons.

k. Counterintelligence measures prior to Love-day were sufficient when enforced. This battalion, along with the regiment, observed strict censorship regulations and kept the target area a secret to all but the battalion staff and company commanders until embarked. The results were excellent within the battalion. The whole operation was a complete secret until embarkation.
Special Action Report (Cont'd)

However, it was rather discouraging to realize that higher echelons were not being as strict as the lower echelons were in the enforcement of the adopted precautions.

The effects of counterintelligence precautions taken during the operation are not easily judged because of the lack of enemy activity.

l. No comment.

m. No comment.

n. No great effort was evidently put forth by the Japanese to organize the mass of the Okinawans. There have been reports of attacks by civilians in other areas by none have occurred in this battalion's zone of action. However, the enemy has been thorough in removing the Okinawan's male of military age and physique from a civilian status. They are almost totally absent and interrogation of their elders points that they are serving in the Japanese Army. Male members who were not taken into the Japanese Army seem to have been affiliated to a Home Defense Unit, the organization, equipment, and spirit of which little is known because of our limited contact with the enemy. The civilians confronted by this battalion have demonstrated fear, indifference, and friendliness, but none have shown signs of offering organized resistance.

3. Operations and Training

No novel methods were used in the rehearsal to indoctrinate the troops in the details of the operation. Maps, aerial photos and relief maps were used. Every man in the HLI was given all the intelligence and operational information available.

The normal procedure of preboat and landing exercises could have been more effective, if an adequate number of ships had been available. If ships are not available and the amtracks are present, the troops should be preboat from the shore and carried out to the rendezvous area, and then landing exercise carried out from there. This being impossible the troops should be secured as the exercise is of no value to them. If possible, on the landing exercise the beach and terrain inland should approximate those of the operation.

The LVT(A) (4)'s were used as supporting artillery. Though we met meager resistance, they moved into position rapidly and were ready for supporting fire. As we rapidly moved up the inland the LVT(A) (4)'s were able to test their ability as mobile artillery. On one occasion they ran out...
Special Action Report (Cont'd)

of gas and were unable to support the assault troops. Which may show an inherent weakness in their supply during a rapidly moving situation.

The infantry and tank coordination was excellent and made the rapid advance north possible. Though there were no enemy strong points to test accurately their proficiency, it is felt that the training in this phase had been adequate.

4. Supply

Mounting out supplies of all classes for this operation were adequate. Resupply of classes I, III, & IV was adequate. A marked shortage in classes II & IV occurred due to improper handling during the landing phase and inadequate transportation to move unit dumps in later phases of the operation. To cite an example: On L 4 the beaches were taken over by higher echelons (III Phlip Corps). The equipment was then issued out without regard to organizational markings. Prior to this time no transportation was available which made it impossible for this BLT to move their equipment off the beaches into lower echelon dumps. When the trucks were allotted to us the distances were so great, the trucks so few, and the time allotted so short that the dumps could not be completely moved forward, which caused additional losses. As our stoves and galley equipment were part of the losses this battalion could not serve hot meals until L 30. In addition our amphib trailers were of no use after we landed due to lack of transportation. If the supply section is to run efficiently a minimum of two 2½ ton trucks should be added to the Bn transportation.

Lower halves of packs, squad bags and officers clothing rolls were placed under guard of six cooks on each of 3 LST's. These guards were ordered to go in with the gear and remain with it until it arrived in the Bn dumps on the beach. However due to the following reasons this plan was not satisfactory:
1. Gear was landed all over Green 1 and Green 2.
2. Green 1 and 2 were 850 yards apart.
3. This battalion's shore party operated on only Green 2.
4. Other units and higher echelons gear came over the same beaches and the battalion's equipment had no priority.
5. The battalion had no transportation to move the equipment.
6. By the time our gear was placed inside the battalion dump some had been misplaced and some had been pilfered.

It is felt that the battalions are too small an unit to cope with this situation. And it is recommended that the Regt'l 3-4 set up a plan to supervise the Bn 3-4 section in Regt'l team. Consolidating and sorting the equipment in a
Reg'tl dump, and then when the battalions are ready for the gear, having it brought forward. However it must be carried in mind the Bn's S-4 section should not be the man power as they have to keep the Bn's supplied with combat gear and that at present it is the limit of their capacity.

The weasel (M29C) proved of great value throughout the operation. A small amount of time was lost by necessary repairs on the tracks. It is believed that this trouble would be eliminated by substitution of a stronger cable on the track of the vehicle. One weasel w/trailer should be added to the T.O. (Rifle Co.)

Spare parts and maintenance facilities were for the most part adequate for vehicles and time lost for these reasons was negligible.

Communications was adequate.

6. Air

a. Defensive Air cover of the assault phase adequate. Advances were not held up by enemy aircraft.

b. Preliminary air strikes were effective. Enemy strong points were knocked out or made impractical to defend.

c. Criticism of air attacks on D-day, from H-60 to H-hour is favorable. However, it is recommended that more extensive use of Napalm be made, and that the pilots cease the practice of dropping auxiliary gas tanks on the leading boat waves.

d. The air-liason officer performed his duties in an excellent manner. The Bn C.O. was kept well informed of adjacent air strikes and the team maintained excellent contact with the ASC and other AGL teams.

e. Communications between AGL team and ASC were adequate and net control was excellent. It was necessary at times to relay messages through other AGL teams when unable to contact ASC and it was favorable. We were in contact with ASC at all times either directly or by relaying messages.

f. The methods of marking front lines by use of panels and colored smoke was carried out. However, on one occasion they proved entirely insufficient. (See j).

g. Number of aircraft for missions was adequate. Interval between origination of request and their execution was a matter of a few minutes. When request was granted they were executed in an excellent manner. However, on occasions planes were not available.
Special Action Report (Cont'd).

h. No comments.

i. No Comments.

j. ASC should have adequate communications with other air units so they would be able to cancel or call off strikes if so desired by AGL teams. On one occasion "G" Co while on patrol was strafed and bombed twice. This strafing lasted for over a half hour in one case. Panels and smoke as prescribed in the SOP were displayed, but had no apparent effect. The BN AGL notified the ASC but ASC was unable to call it off. The NLO notified the support ship which relayed to the carriers, again to no avail. All air units claimed no ownership of the six F6F's which were doing the bombing and strafing and could not call them off. Such situations can not be tolerated and must be remedied.

Recommend that ASC have adequate aircraft for spotting and air cover after the initial phase of the operation has been completed.

7. Naval Gunfire

1. Shore Fire Control personnel were well trained but up to the time of the arrival of vehicular transportation were numerically inadequate for the task of carrying so much equipment.

2. All equipment functioned well with the exception of the SCR 300 which functioned so poorly and was of so little service that it was returned to JASCO at the first opportunity. The SCR 694 gave excellent service although some transmission difficulty was encountered due probably to the absorption of the radio waves by the mountains. The only other equipment used aside from personal and radio equipment was a 4x4 1/2 ton truck and trailer. These proved of inestimable value: 1st because the radio has greater range and is easier to operate from the vehicular battery; 2nd because with the truck and trailer less personnel is needed; 3rd the forward observer's team can leave their excess personal and communication equipment behind to be transported in the trailer thus easing their burden on long marches.

3. Resistance was so light and the fighting so fluid that there was little actual need for Naval Gunfire Support after the first day when only three targets of opportunity were fired upon. All subsequent fires were for illumination for which there was also little need. What fires were required were effectively delivered.
4. The plan for using one ship for illumination of the whole Regimental front worked satisfactorily. On one occasion an adjacent unit called illumination which lighted up our lines. It was quickly corrected by our NCL(0) in an excellent fashion. Coordination between Naval Gunfire, Artillery and Air Support worked smoothly. The problem was of course simplified by the lack of targets for any of us. The Naval Gunfire chain of command was quite effective, our requests and questions being speedily handled.

5. One of the most outstanding features of the employment of Naval Gunfire was its use in Battalion communications. There were times when NGF spotting net was the only contact between forward patrols and the CP. Support ships did valuable work in relaying information between the Charlie and Oboe teams, when communications were difficult. On one occasion the forward observers team saved the day for a patrol which was being strafed by friendly planes. They flashed back the news which was passed to AG and the planes were called off.

6. Many of the ships do not like to stand by all day if there are no targets; however, we feel that their aid in communications with advance echelons which would otherwise be cut off, more than repays the tedium of standing by.

7. After reaching the beach the forward observer established communications with the firing ship within 20 minutes. The liaison team took 45 minutes to establish communications. These times can be bettered but were due to the rapid advance inland and also the fact that the liaison team became separated on the beach from the CP.

8. The Shore Fire Control Party’s various frequencies and frequent changes of ships, sometimes two in one day, caused some confusion, considerable inconvenience, and repetitious briefing of newly assigned ships. Most important of all was the situation arising when one ship would shove off before the relieving ship arrived on station. On several occasions we were without a supporting ship for as long as four hours. On one occasion valuable intelligence information could have been relayed to the Bn CP if the support ship had been present. An intolerable situation could arise by a ship leaving before it is properly relieved, and it should be mandatory that they stand by until properly relieved. A suggested remedy is one ship and one frequency for an entire operation, unless ammunition supply and other reasons makes a change necessary.

9. Net discipline was good but clarification is necessary as to who is net control.
Special Action Report (Cont'd).

10. One remote control unit was lost on the beach and one SCR 500 was in such poor condition that it was returned to AASC. Neither was replaced since replacement was not considered necessary.

11. The Communication plan was adequate but it is recommended that frequency changes be eliminated.

9. Transport Quartermaster

a. Time required to load.
   Hold #1, 8 hrs; Hold #2, 14 hrs; Hold #3, 13 hrs; Hold #5, 13 hrs.

b. Time required to unload.
   Hold #1, 6 hrs; Hold #2, 11 hrs; Hold #3, 11 hrs; Hold #5, 12 hrs.

c. The difficulties encountered during unloading at the transport area were reduced to a minimum by pre-planning enroute in joint sessions with ship and Marine officers. Actually there were no important difficulties encountered in the transport area during unloading.

A procedure followed by this battalion, which is suggested for future operations to assure that essential bulk cargo gets ashore in the event of limited unloading the first day, is a "special vehicle and bulk priority list" which is made-up listing only those vehicles and that bulk which is absolutely essential for the first night defense. This is submitted to the ship's debarkation officer, and in the event that a full measure unloading is impossible the first day — either due to enemy activity or time and space elements in ship to shore movement, then at least full essential cargo will reach the beach.

d. Usual transport riggings were used, vehicle slings and cargo nets as commonly used, water in five gallon cans and flame thrower fuel was palletized loosely and then lifted within a cargo net. This safeguarded cans and prevented smashing and leaking which is especially dangerous with flame thrower fuel.

All equipment used for unloading was adequate. The transfer system was not effective on Beach Green 1. The crane was brought too far in and when the tide went out it was high and dry and the small boats could not get to it; therefore, losing its value as a transfer point.

Salvage was non-existent in this Bn Z of action. The salvage collection unit did not report to this organization. Captured material and dumps were reported and guards.
were provided in some cases. The amount of time used by higher echelons to relieve these guards was excessive.

10. Ordnance

Weapons brought on the operation:

- Shotgun, 12 gage
- Carbine, .30 Cal.
- Rifle, .30 Cal. M1
- BAR, .30 Cal.
- MG, .30 Cal. M1919A4
- MG, .30 Cal. M1917A1
- Pistol, .45 Cal.
- Launcher, Rocket
- Launcher, Grenade M7
- Flame Thrower, M2-2

Spare parts and repair facilities are adequate and all weapons are in serviceable condition. Ammunition expended was approximately 3 u/f. It is recommended that the u/f of Bazooka and A.I. Grenades be increased to at least six per launcher.

Flame throwers were not used enough to allow a thorough study of their capabilities, and maintenance requirements.

Sniperscopes and Snoperascopes were not used to any great extent, thus not allowing a thorough study of maintenance and repair requirements; however, it is believed that some type of water proof cases or trunks or a mobile unit to handle all necessary battery charging equipment and other equipment which requires protection from the weather should be furnished.

12. Medical

a. Embarkation, Personnel: 40 Hospital Corpsmen and 2 En Surgeons. Personnel distributed in following manner:

| Corpsman | 21 |
| Co. | Hq Co. |
| 1 | Monter Plt. |
| 6 | Bray Co. |
| 6 | Fox Co. |
| 6 | George Co. |
| 1 | Division Adm. |
| 1 | Grave Reg. |
| 1 | En C.P. |
| 1 | En Liaison to Aid Station |

7 enlisted Marines acting in capacity of malaria control-men.

2. Collecting section corpsmen form B Medical Company attached to 2d En Medical Section.
Material: Embarked with 30-day Medical Supply. 5 Days supply carried ashore in assault. 25 days supply came ashore under supervision of En Q.M. 5 day supply included 36 units of Plasma, 3 unit #7, 2 unit #5. Each Corpsman carried one unit #3. 2 En Surgeons carried one unit #1 each.

b. Aboard Ship: APA 54 (WAYE) one appendectomy performed 3/18/45, one appendectomy performed 3/19/45, routine sick call held twice daily. Troops quarters and troop officers quarters inadequate for number of troops aboard. Heads unsatisfactory. Messes inferior in quality. Galley satisfactory, cooks and messmen satisfactory. Atabrine given daily during mess as Malarial prophylactic. At Staging Area En transferred to LST'S 791, 483, 627, routine sick call held aboard LST, and atabrine given daily. 3 enlisted men retained aboard ship due to sickness.

c. Debarkation: Personnel:

4 Corpsmen in 2d wave.
9 " in 3rd wave.
1 " in 4th wave.
1 " in 5th wave.
1 En Surgeon and 10 corpsman in 6th wave.
4 Malaria controlmen came in the 6th wave.
3 Malaria controlmen came in the 7th wave.
1 En Surgeon and 5 corpsmen came in the 7th wave.
2 collecting section corpsmen came in the 7th wave. All personnel were botted in LVT'S: time of landing approx. 0830 to 0900, 4/1/45. Material transported in packs and carried ashore in assault waves.

d. Ashore, Assault phase:

1. Aid station set up within protected limits of En C.P. Advantage taken of all cover and concealment with adequate dispersion of medical personnel. All casualties were evacuated immediately to shore party at beach.

2. All protective measures taken at site of Aid Station. Malaria Control personnel acting as security for Aid Station. Advantage taken of terrain and tombs, thus affording adequate protection.

3. 3 patients were evacuated to B Medical Co. due to enemy action, no operations were performed in this En Aid Station.

4. Evacuation adequate for the number of casualties sustained during enemy action.
5. Casualties treated (Battle) numbered 3; 3 were evacuated. No deaths.


7. Disposal of dead: No deaths to Marine personnel. Enemy dead were buried by troops if time permitted. All sanitary precautions taken in regard to enemy dead.

8. No epidemics of unusual diseases among troops.

9. All dental services referred to Battalion Medical Company for treatment.

10. Care of civilians: Wounded civilians transferred to rear area; wounded civilians received first aid and were evacuated to nearest hospital.

11. All prisoners of war were under the supervision of Battalion Intelligence officer. No medical treatment instituted.

12. Medical Organization: Satisfactory collecting section personnel were referred back to Battalion Medical Company due to inactivity. Suggested changes: All collecting section personnel assigned to the Battalion should make an assault landing with Battalion medical section.

13. Medical personnel: Adequate no losses due to enemy action. All medical personnel received adequate medical instructions before operation. One Pediatrician among corpsmen.

14. Field Medical Equipment: No pilferage or losses in medical equipment. Supplies adequate and not overage. Resupply satisfactory.

15. Medical supplies: 30 days supplies carried ashore. Medical supplies: 30 days supplies carried ashore. No losses or pilferage. Resupply adequate.

16. Motor vehicles and rolling stock: On 25-26 January, 14 trucks were received from Battalion Motor Transport Section and 9 trucks from Battalion medical section. No improvements in motor vehicles at present date.

17. Quartermaster supplies and clothing: Clothing issued suitable for climate encountered on operation.
18. Malaria and Epidemic control: Sufficient atabrine for Malaria. Prophylaxes carried ashore and adequate resupply was available from 25 days supply at Bn Q.M. D.D.I. spray and aerosol bombs for insects. Repellent was insufficient and resupply inadequate. There was no resupply of insect powder available. Atabrine issued by respective company corporals daily.

e. Ashore:

1. Hospitalization: All medical evacuees transferred to nearest Hospital. Transportation adequate.

2. Medical and Q.M. supplies and equipment satisfactory as to quantity and quality.

3. Sanitation: Satisfactory; Each Bn section is maintaining closed heads; cat holes used while on march.

4. Food and Water: adequate and satisfactory.

5. Sickness: No epidemics or unusual diseases among troops, native population has symptoms.

6. Mal-nutrition, and living facilities of natives population unsatisfactory and inadequate.

13. Signal

a. Communication Plan (SOI)

1. The plan was adequate.

2. Sufficient frequencies were not made available to tactical organizations. The alternate frequencies assigned this Bn was so high that only our ICS could reach it. This left us with no frequencies for long range patrols. Such patrols used the Regt'1 frequencies which proved unsatisfactory due to the numerous stations involved in the net.

3. Call signs assigned were not sufficient. Various attached units equipped with radios were not assigned call signs. The rocket platoon and tank destroyers (m-7) are examples.

4. There were no duplications of communication systems.

5. Liaison was not effected during the planning stages.

6. Does not pertain to us.
7. Communication plans were not received by lower echelons in sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and make necessary changes.

8. Plan did include preventative measures for avoidance of destruction of wire lines by our own vehicles. This part of the plan was not successful in the operation.

b. Rehearsal

1. There were no changes in the communication plan as a result of the rehearsal.

2. Deficiencies were found in the equipment.

3. Deficiencies were corrected by the equipment being reissued.

4. The rehearsal did provide an adequate check on all communication facilities.

5. The rehearsal definitely indicated that additional MOW equipment for both Bn and Co use was needed.

c. Embarkation and voyage.

1. Equipment was not loaded according to plan. Equipment was moved to different holds after underway resulting in damage and making it impossible in some cases, to be unloaded in accordance with priority needed.

2. Equipment was damaged in loading, such as the destruction of cases.

3. Such items as storage batteries and etc; were checked during the voyage.

4. Such types of training as familiarization of 301 were carried out aboard ship.

5. Personnel were helpful to ships communication officer in the form of visual watches.

6. Does not pertain to us.

d. Personnel

1. Not satisfied with present allowances of personnel.

2. Less message center personnel and more radio and wire personnel who are experienced with equipment is recommended.
3. The training of personnel was adequate.

4. Recommendations are made for special training. Most radio personnel experienced difficulty in receiving signals through interference.

5. No overages or shortages of communication personnel.

6. No losses of personnel afloat in ships.

7. No losses of personnel in effecting the landing.

8. No losses due to operation.

9. Communication personnel were not employed for other duties.

10. No battle casualties experienced.

a. Equipment.

1. No overage or shortage of equipment.

2. No losses of equipment aboard ship before landing.

3. No losses of equipment during landing.

4. Various types of batteries, wire and radio equipment were lost on the beach due to pilfering and lack of transportation to bring such gear up to forward dumps.

5. Patrons covered such distances on this particular operation that company SCR 300's and 610's did not have sufficient distance range. Patrols moved so rapidly it was impossible to equip them with a set as heavy as the TBX. No replacements for 536 to provide inter company communication when initial issue became inoperative.

6. Replace TBX with 694, provide Bn's with 610's, 12 additional SCR 536's and 3 additional SCR 300's.

7. A set comparable to the SCR 300 but with a greater range in distance. Additional personnel would not be needed to operate this equipment.

8. The 694 was used but did not prove satisfactory due to personnel not familiar with set.

9. All equipment was water proofed as much as possible. The water proofing was effective.

10. Yes 610 & 694 recommended. 4 610's and 3 694's be included in Rifle Bn T?A.

11. All eq

(16)
Special Action Report (Cont'd)

11. All equipment was used that was authorized by T/A.
12. All equipment was unloaded from the ship.
13. All equipment was landed at the proper beach.

f. Supply.

1. Nothing was left behind except rear echelon gear.
2. This did not affect the operation in any way.
3. Wire and Batteries placed the greatest strain on supplies.
4. No changes in replenishment rates.
5. Regiment to Battalion was the method employed by our organization for resupplying.
6. No repair facilities were available.
7. The Regimental repair shop and supply dump was used for repair and supplies.
8. Repair facilities could be improved by increase of material personnel.
9. Equipment spares were not carried with equipment.
10. Equipment spares were not adequate.
11. Spare parts other than equipment spares were not sufficient.
12. Transportation was not sufficient.
13. 2½ ton trailers be included in the T/A.
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, does not pertain to BN's.

G. Operation

1. There were no agencies established that were not normal.
2. The most overloaded agency was the radio.
3. To overcome above statements more radio equipment and frequencies are needed.
4. There was no unnecessary duplication of agencies used.
5. Present normal operating agencies would not be adequate in operations on larger land masses.
6. Agencies would probably break down on Extended patrols and movement over large area in the Bn Z.

7. Some frequencies assigned to this unit were not used because they were too high for standard equipment.

8. Difficulties encountered.
   Radio -- Insufficient allowance of frequencies; interference from higher power stations attached to unit during latter part of the operation; personnel inexperienced with new types of equipment issued during the operation; insufficient means of transportation; present equipment not of sufficient ranges (Milage for this type of operation) Officers and personnel not familiar with limits of various sets; Radio communications overlaid by unnecessary transmissions by officers.
   Wire -- Insufficient means of transportation; Units moved to rapidly to maintain wire lines; vehicles disregarded wire lines, causing excessive trouble by breakage; towns and villages were destroyed by fire after troops had moved through there by preventing satisfactory use of commercial lines; wire lines during latter part of phase was such length that loading coils were necessary but not available.

c. Visual communication -- not used.

d. Messenger communication -- Some type of transportation necessary for messengers when units are separated by great distances.

9. More rapid movement of troops over greater distances, and personnel were less experienced than on previous operations.

10. Noted improvement between this operation and previous operations.

11. There were no communication failures during the ship-to-shore movement.

12. Officers were not required to operate and maintain any agency of communication because of enlisted casualties.

13. There were no enemy communication installations captured.

14. Infantry-tank communications were: Tank liaison men equipped with SCR 300 with all companies; All tanks equipped with phones on rear.
15. Infantry-amphibious tractor communications was not used.

h. Does not pertain to Battalion.

i. Security.

1. CSP-1500 prearranged message code and combined assault code were the only cryptographic used.

2. No criticism made of present aids.

3. The shackles authentication system was used and found satisfactory.

4. The enemy did not attempt to use our authenticator.

5. Personnel were not sufficiently trained in signal security.

6. Recommend that officers be made to realize the full importance of radio security.

7. This organization did have a Signal Security Plan.

j. Countermeasures by enemy.

1. The enemy used radio countermeasures such as jamming

2. Stronger signals and alternate frequencies were used to overcome enemy interference.

3. Recommend that in training more schooling on copying through interference be stressed.

H. C. WOODHOUSE, Jr.
Lt. Col., USMC,
Commanding.
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OKINAWA

BLT 3/22

APRIL 1-30, 1945.

Submitted May 4, 1945.
CHAPTER I. GENERAL.

(a) This report is prepared to provide a complete and accurate record of the part which BLT 3/22, 6th Armdiv, took in the invasion, occupation and defense of OKINAWA SHIMA.

The primary mission of BLT 3/22 was to land in assault on beach GREEN-2 at 0830 on April 1, 1945 and seize the 0-1. Then to seize successive objectives on order.

CHAPTER II. THE TASK ORGANIZATION.

The following was the task organization of BLT 3/22:

BLT 3/22

Lt. Col. M.O. Donohoo

"I" Co. 1st Lieut. G.G. Conoj

FO Team, 2/15.

Tk Ln Team, "B" Co., 6th TkBn.

NGF Team, 6th JASCO.

"L" Co. Capt. J.P. Lanigan

FO Team, 2/15.

Tk Ln Team, "B"Co., 6th TkBn.

"K" Co. (En. Reserve.) Capt. J.P. Lockery
Bn. Troops

Lt. Col. M.C. Donohoo

3/22 (Less Dets.)

NGF Team, 6th JASCO

Tk Ln Team, "B" Co., 6th Tk Bn.

Arty Ln Team, 2/15

AGL, 6th JASCO

Det., 5th Prov. Rocket Det.

3rd 37mm Plt., WpnCo.

3rd and 4th Sec., 105mm, WpnCo.

Det., Bomb Disposal Team


FLT 3/22, Shore Party 1st Lieut. R.C. Harms


Det., 6th MP Co.

Det., 3rd S & S Plt.

Det., 26th and 33rd Repl. Draft.

Det., 61st NCBn

SP Com Team, 6th JASCO.
CHAPTER III. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

The preliminary planning was carried out by the combined efforts of the executive and special staffs. A training Operation Order was prepared for the rehearsal. Later a final Operation Order, with all annexes, was carefully prepared in accordance with orders of higher echelon and in coordination and collaboration with attached and adjacent units.

CHAPTER IV. TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS.

All training was carried out in accordance to a plan which contained all types of tactics that would be used against opposition encountered on the operation. The battalion and attached units were well trained in all techniques and tactics. The only type of training that was considered unsatisfactory was village fighting.

During the period February 28 - March 7 while the Battalion was on dress rehearsal much was gained in landing procedure and in staff functioning and operation. The time was well spent as the rehearsal was set up as near as possible to the actual landing.

CHAPTER V. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

On the dress rehearsal the troops were embarked on LST's as they became available. No difficulties were encounter-
ed in the embarkation for rehearsal.

The loading of the transport was well planned and directed by the TQM and assistants. The loading was accomplished with minimum difficulties in the minimum of time. The troops were embarked on a schedule without confusion. At the staging area the troops were debarked and embarked on the assault landing ships in the minimum time of 4 hours.

CHAPTER VI. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

During the movement to the objective all the time was devoted to briefing the officers and men so that each man knew the big picture as well as exactly what he was supposed to do. A period was set aside each day for physical conditioning. Although the ships were greatly overcrowded, the troops arrived at the target in good physical condition and excellent morale.

CHAPTER VII. ASSAULT PHASE.

(1) Ship-to-shore movement.

The assault elements of the BLT 3/22 left the LST's in 23 LVT's as scheduled. The first and each succeeding wave was on, and crossed, the Line of Departure on time. The movement from the Line of Departure to the beach was successful but the landing schedule was disrupted a little because of the condition
of the reef, but the last scheduled assault wave landed only 15 minutes late. The APA was unloaded according to unloading schedule and orders received from the Shore Party Commander. Supplies were slow getting ashore on LOVE Day. No enemy gunfire or resistance was encountered in the ship to shore movement. The LVT (A)'s and LVT's ran into an obstacle on the beach in form of a cliff which they could not climb, and the troops in most cases had to debark on the beach. Three exits from the beach were soon cleared and the LVT (A)'s and Tanks were able to get inland to support the infantry.

(2) Shore Party.

The BLT's Shore Party's main function was to organize beach GREEN-2 to receive supplies from transports. The organization was well handled by the Shore Party Commander in coordination with the Beach Master. BLT Shore Party was taken over very early by the RCT Shore Party.

(3) Naval Gunfire Support.

Naval Gunfire preparation was carried out as scheduled and many enemy positions destroyed. After the initial landing it was not necessary to call Naval Gunfire in the BLT's Zone of Action, but in all cases the Naval Gunfire support was on constant call by the NGF Officer. There were several instances where Naval Gunfire provided night illumination.
(4) Air Support.

The pre-landing Air Bombardment was carried out as scheduled and many enemy positions destroyed. After the initial landing it was not necessary to call for any close support air strikes in our Zone of Action. In many instances when the Battalion was moving very rapidly and contact was hard to maintain, it is believed that if it were possible for the AGL Officer to talk directly with an Air Spotting plane, much could be gained in the way of reconnaissance of routes of approach and getting contact with adjacent units late in the afternoon for night defense positions.

(5) Artillery Support.

The LVT (A)'s proved to be an excellent means of getting early artillery support. In all cases where artillery support was called, very efficient fire was provided by the supporting units. The F.O.'s did a good job in registering barrages for night defenses.

(6) Tanks.

Sixteen Tanks of "B" Company, 6th Tank Battalion, landed on Beach GREEN-2 at 0900. In one hour and fifteen minutes, 15 of the tanks were operating with the assault troops, one having had trouble when landing. Tanks supported the battalion until they reached HANZA, but could not find streets wide enough for passage through the town. From then on, the tanks were handicapped by the hilly and rough terrain that they were restricted
to motorized patrols on the coast roads. On April 4th, one
platoon of tanks was attached, but due to marshy ground could
not operate until afternoon when they were sent on a motorized
patrol from ISHIKAWA to YAKA. The terrain in the Battalion
Zone of Action prohibited the use of Tank-Infantry tactics.

(7) Amphibian Tractors.

Twenty-three LVT's were assigned to BLT 3/22 to
land the assault elements. This was sufficient to embark the
necessary troops of the battalion for the scheduled assault
waves. The LVT's were successful in landing all the troops
on the beach over the reef without casualty to any LVT or
troops. After the initial landing several LVT's were used
to haul supplies to the front line troops until organic
transportation was landed. LVT's were used to transport
troops and supplies over the reef.

(8) Armored Amphibians.

Twenty-three LVT(A)'s landed at 0828 and pre-
ceeded the first troop wave by one minute. The LVT(A)'s
covered the beaches with assault fire after the Naval Gun-
fire had been lifted until their fire was masked by the
troops. The LVT(A)'s were unable to precede the troops in-
land as they were held up by the cliffs and narrow exits.
After the exits were cleared the LVT(A)'s moved into position
to fire called supporting fire.
April 1st. LOVE DAY.

At 0829 the assault waves landed on Beach GREEN-2 against no opposition. Item and Love companies moved out in assault with King company in reserve. Contact was made immediately with BLT 3/4 as they landed on Beach GREEN-2. Both companies pushed rapidly inland to seize RL-1, RL-2, RL-3, and 0-1 against no opposition. After reorganization and contact had been made with adjacent units, the battalion was ordered to seize Hill 400 and 0-2 line. Love and King companies were assigned the mission of capturing Hill 400 and then King and Item companies were to push on to the 0-2. Hill 400 was taken at 1620 against no opposition except enemy artillery fire. The only fire fight of the first day developed at 1715 in Target Area 8195-V. Item Company had extended into BLT 3/4 Zone of Action and encountered a group of Nips in a ravine. Lt. G.G. Conoley was injured in this fight. The net result was not ascertained as the area was then taken over by BLT 3/4 for night defense. BLT 3/4 reported the next morning that a large number of Japs had been killed. They also confirmed the report that 19 Nips had been killed in one area by one of our Machine Guns. The man operating the MG was killed in action but was credited with having knocked out the strong point. 0-2 was seized at 1730 and night defense set up. See Operation Overlay.

-3-
April 2nd.

Due to the logistical situation the battalion was unable to move out on time. King and Item Companies moved out at 0930 and seized L plus 3 at 1027. Seized L plus 5 at 1615 against no opposition over very difficult terrain. At 1830 set up night defense. See Operation Overlay.

April 3rd.

Later receiving Attack Order from Regiment and moved out at 0815 with King and Love Companies in assault. The first assigned objective was the O-a line and Hill 215. Due to very difficult terrain and no trails, this battalion was unable to reach the O-a line until after it had received orders to proceed to the O-b line. Hill 215 and O-a were taken at 1250 against no opposition. At 1300 the battalion moved out with Battalion in column of Companies. Reached O-b line at 1730, but had to readjust another 700 yards to set up night defense at 1900 with an open right flank. Eight thousand yards on the map were covered during the day's operation over almost impassable terrain. See Operation Overlay.

April 4th.

Moved out at 0745 with King and Item Companies in assault to seize L plus 15. One platoon of tanks was attached as the ground looked favorable for tanks. This proved false as
the ground was too marshy for tank operation. Around noon all companies got into a fire fight around the L plus 15 and ISHIKAWA. Love Company was preparing to proceed up the East Coast road on motorized patrol as ordered when it received fire from the enemy. The enemy was soon destroyed and Love moved up the coast. Item and King Companies patrolled to the front and took Hill 238. Love Company met no opposition and the Battalion moved up to YAKA. When a patrol was sent inland to contact 1/29, they were engaged by a group of Japs just outside YAKA. Most of the Nips were killed and the remainder fled into the hills. No contact could be made with 1/29 so an all around defense was set up for the night at YAKA. Charlie Company, 1/22, was unable to contact their battalion and reported into our CP. It was ordered to remain there for the night. See Operation Overlay.

April 5th.

Received orders to hold present lines and patrol to the front and try to contact 1/29 while the 4th regiment sent a motorized patrol up the East Coast road. At 1100 the Battalion was alerted to move at 1200 to a new bivouac area 2½ miles North. The battalion moved out at 1200 in March Column of Companies with all around protection. After reaching IJI, regiment ordered the battalion to continue to high
ground short of CHINU. At 1400 arrived on high ground and awaited orders. At 1445 received orders to move out to CHINU, take cross-island road, and contact 2/22 for night defense. Not having any good maps of area, missed the cross-island road and took another road in advance of correct position. Went into night defense position at 1900 without any contact with adjacent units. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 6th.

Regiment reverts to Division Reserve. Battalion sent out patrols to the front to contact 2/22. Contact was made at 1015 with 2/22. At 1400 moved to night defensive position near CHINU. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 7th.

Moved out at 0900 and reached the O- e line at 1400. At 1600 set up night defensive position. (See Operation Overlay)

April 8th.

Received orders to move to new bivouac position near KOKAOSKI. Moved out at 0800 and arrived at new position at KAJIYA at 1625. Set up an all around defensive position. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 9th - 11th.

Remained in present position and did extensive patrolling. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 12th.

Remained in present position awaiting orders. At 1130 received orders to remain in present position. Enlarge and defend Regimental rear. At 1415 received orders from Regiment to be prepared to move out to the MOTOSU Peninsula.
to support 29th Regiment. Moved out by truck at 1500 and reported in at AWA at 1815, set up in defensive position and became the Division reserve. King Company remained in present position. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 13th.

King Company reported in at AWA at 0830. Received Division Order to remain in present position and patrol vigorously to the front. At 1015 patrols were fired upon by enemy. A fire fight lasted for an hour when units withdrew under cover of 81mm mortar fire. At 1100 received orders to return to 22nd Regiment. The order was countermanded by verbal orders of the Commanding General. The Battalion remained in position and maintained contact with the enemy. At 1400 sent out Company patrols after an Artillery preparation. No enemy contacts were made. At 1500 enemy shells begin falling on Battalion position. Shells later identified to be eight inch. 2/15 ammo dumps were hit and fires started so that CP had to move 200 yards to the rear. At 1700 took up same position as night before except for CP. 1/4 moved through our position at 1730. Received orders placing 3/22 under control of the 4th Regiment for the night. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 14th.

Remained in present position and sent out patrols. At 1300 relieved by 3/4 and returned to position at MAJIYA. (See Operation Overlay.)
April 15th.

Moved from MAJIYA to new defensive position at HICHI. (See Operation Overlay.)

April 16th - 26th.

Remained in present position and did extensive patrolling in assigned area. (See Patrol Overlay.)

April 17th - 20th.

King Company was sent on patrol on the East Coast to contact George Company. (See Patrol Overlay.)

April 21st - 22nd.

Lt. Cook's platoon of Item Company sent out to find cross-island road. (See Patrol Overlay.)

April 24th - 28th.

Item Company less one platoon sent out to patrol inland and contact Fox Company. (See Patrol Overlay.)

April 27th.

At 1915 received orders to move out immediately on cross-island trail. Battalion less Item Company moved out over cross-island trail. At 2000 arrived in night defensive position. (See Patrol Overlay.)
April 28th.

Battalion moved across the island via cross-island trail. Made contact with 1/22 and 3/4 at 1200 by radio. No enemy contact. At 1500, 3/4 reported that the enemy had been destroyed. At 1630, Regiment ordered 3/22 to continue to East Coast and set up night defense. Established night defense at 1915 after a tiresome march over very rough terrain. (See Patrol Overlay.)

April 29th.

Moved to new bivouac position at MIYAGUSUKU arriving at 1145. Patrols were sent out to search all the area in vicinity of previous days engagement. (See Patrol Overlay.) Item Company joined Battalion at 1700.

April 30th.

Remained in present position and patrolled the area to the North. No enemy contacts were made. (See Patrol Overlay.)
(10) Communications.

During the entire period communication in general was excellent. At no time was the battalion entirely out of communication with the next higher echelon by radio. Due to the distance covered each day, wire communication could not be maintained because of the amount of wire required. Whenever it was possible to lay wire, wire communication was maintained with Regiment, and every night the battalion position was wired in. Signal supply was excellent as well as radio repair. SCR 610 radio communication with Regiment was very satisfactory whenever the terrain and distance permitted. TBX and TCS was relied upon whenever SCR 610 communication failed. SCR 300 proved a satisfactory means of communication with the companies on a fast moving situation when wire was not used. The only time when communication was unsatisfactory was when the CP had to move on foot and could not move by displacement due to rapidity of movement. JASCO communication was always reliable and provided an auxiliary means of communication within the Regiment.

(11) Engineers.

The battalion did not require the services of Engineers.

(12) Medical

The following report was made by the Battalion Surgeon.

OFFICE OF THE BATTALION SURGEON,
THIRD BATTALION, TWENTY SECOND MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD.

-15-
From: The Battalion Surgeon.

To: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Special Action Report, Medical Section.

1. Embarkation.

Embarkation satisfactory.

2. Aboard Ship.

Sickness - No serious illness or epidemic encountered aboard ship.

Sanitary conditions - Sanitary Conditions aboard APA-52 in general poor. Troop heads were dirty and men were seldom able to get salt water soap or fresh water. Messmen were required to work without washing and all requests for fresh water were refused. Troop compartments were dirty and crowded. Galleys and messes fairly satisfactory.

3. Debarkation.

Personnel - Medical Department personnel landed in seventh and ninth waves. Medical personnel were divided in three sections according to plan, one section on an LCM and two sections on LVT's. The first and second sections landed at about H plus 35 and the third section at about H plus one hour.

Material - The five day supply was carried ashore by personnel and our thirty day supply was landed the first night accompanied by our supply man who remained with equipment until called for which was L plus two.
Losses of personnel and material - A large amount of our thirty day supply was stolen from our battalion dump. No loss of personnel.

4. Ashore - Assault Phase.

Medical Installations - Emergency aid stations were set up at all bivouac areas.

Location - Aid Station set up in proximity to CP, but on several occasions evacuation of casualties to Medical Companies was very difficult and sometimes impossible because of difficult terrain and inadequate transportation. Aid station situated as far as possible at point most accessible to walking wounded, and on natural line of drift to the rear.

Protective Measures Taken - The Aid Station was set up on quite a few occasions on the perimeter of defense of the CP. Cover, concealment, shelters and dugouts adequate according to the situation presenting itself at the time. Blackout precautions carried out by all hands.

No special features or comments.

Hospitalization - Provided by Medical Companies and in most cases adequate. On occasions men were returned for duty from Medical Companies when in our opinion they were not fit for same. This apparently was done by Medical Companies to lower their census before moving and therefore placed an unnecessary load on the battalion. An epidemic of Cat.Fever was encountered and
handled mostly without hospitalization.

Operations performed - Only minor surgical procedures performed.

Evacuation - Evacuation effected by jeep ambulance and any available trucks. Facilities would have been grossly inadequate had casualties been higher. On rough roads the jeep ambulance proved to be very poor means of transportation for the wounded.

Casualties treated:

Number - One hundred and ten.

Detained - Three.

Evacuated - One hundred three.

Died - Four.

Sanitation - Measures carried out according to sanitation SOP.

Food - Due to rapidity of troop movement, food supplies occasionally inadequate. The rations in general have been of good quality, and galleys were never installed which undoubtedly kept the incidence of gastro-intestinal disturbances very low. Water was adequate at all times.

Disposal of dead - Our bodies were always disposed of properly through the usual channels to Division Cemetery. Enemy dead were disposed of properly.

Epidemics or unusual diseases in troops - A minor epidemic of Cat.Fever was encountered as mentioned above.
Dental Service - Furnished by Medical Company.

Approximately fifteen patients required dental care. Cases varied from dental caries to abscesses (2). The latter were returned to us unfit for duty.

Care of Civilians - About one hundred civilians were given emergency treatment and were evacuated. Civilians were treated and evacuated through proper channels.

Prisoners of War - One cared for; given first aid treatment.

Medical Organization - Medical organization suitable

Medical Personnel - Adequate. Four Hospital Corpsmen wounded (two company and two aid station corpsmen), evacuated and replaced.

Field Medical Equipment - Our five day supply was carried by personnel and thirty day supply was landed intact and accompanied by our supply man. A large portion of our thirty day supply was stolen from dump. Supplies were adequate for number of casualties treated, he-supply has been difficult and essential drugs could not be obtained through proper channels. On 13 April considerable equipment was destroyed by fire including unit of combat blankets, brandy, stretchers, splint unit, and number of unit 3's.

Motor Vehicles and rolling stock - One quarter ton jeep ambulance without trailer which was very inadequate for transporting supplies and wounded. No losses encountered. In our
opinion, the jeep is not a suitable ambulance.

Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies - The prescribed allowance was not carried. Supplies of freon-pyrethrum bombs, insect repellent, insecticide powder, and malaria control supplies and equipment were grossly inadequate. This might have led to an epidemic of crippling proportions. Re-supply of clothing fairly adequate.

5. Ashore - After completion of assault phase, As above.

(13) Supply and Logistics.

No supplies reached the front line on LOVE Day due to transportation difficulties. Only when LVT's were assigned to battalion were supplies delivered to the position. First supplies reached the troops at 0730 on April 2nd. In general, supply was fair until April 8th when the supply finally caught up with the battalion. Due to distance covered and the distance from dumps, transportation was a difficult problem. This strain could have been solved by assigning two 6x6 2½ T Cargo trucks to a battalion when it is operating so far from regiment. Sealsels proved a valuable means of transportation. When the battalion reached its final bivouac area, much of the organizational, camp, and mess equipment was missing. Insufficient galley equipment made it impossible to set up galley within the battalion. Whenever the battalion made a motor movement, there was never enough transportation, causing over loading of trucks and numerous trips,
thus lengthening the time and space factor. In general, Supply and Logistics were fair, but a shortage of transportation still exists.

(14) Public Relations.

Two combat correspondents and one combat photographer were attached to the Battalion. They made immediate coverage of all likely stories of interest. The photographer also took intelligence photographs for the Two-Section.

(15) Military Government.

All civilians encountered and all POW's taken were immediately turned over to Regiment.

(16) Special Reconnaissance Missions.

No requests were made for Special Reconnaissance missions.
CHAPTER VIII. ENEMY TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION.

The enemy showed little organization. Resistance was generally scattered and small arms alone were employed. The enemy personnel were clean, well kept, in good physical condition and demonstrated traits of well disciplined troops. However, when in groups of 20 or more, they gave little indication of tactical organization.

The use of terrain for ambushes was cleverly employed. However lacking units with which to capitalize upon these surprise tactics they were able to inflict only light damage. On each occasion the ambushing party permitted the point to pass unharmed and opened fire on the main body with well sited and concealed automatic weapons.

Light artillery was encountered on MCTOBU Peninsula. The fire though accurate was sporadic and not in salvos.

CHAPTER IX. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

(1) Area secured.

All objectives were seized as assigned by Regiment to this Battalion. See Operation Overlay for successive objectives and area taken.

(2) Enemy Casualties.
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(3) Operational Material Damage to Enemy.

53 rifles captured, numerous destroyed.
1 Light Machine Gun captured.
2 Light Machine Guns destroyed.
1 Heavy Machine Gun destroyed.
1 Truck, Cargo, captured.
1 Suicide Craft, captured.
Miscellaneous Radio and Radar Equipment, reported, some destroyed. Numerous enemy munition dumps, barracks and stores were reported, some destroyed.

(4) Own Losses.
CHAPTER X.

Comments and recommendations of the commander, classified according to activities of the following staff sections:

S-1 Procedures prescribed in Division and subordinate unit SOP's were followed by the Personnel Section throughout this operation, and results were in every way satisfactory. It was found advisable to have two journal clerks, one with the 2-3 group at the CP and one with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer at the OP. This was made necessary by the large volume of orders and instructions transmitted verbally, by telephone, and by radio rather than by written messages.

S-2. In this operation, I could have used at least three Japanese Language men. The one furnished was of great value,
but where companies were employed simultaneously on extended patrols, it was of course impossible to send an interpreter with every patrol—a procedure I consider essential to the most effective accomplishment of patrol missions.

S-3 The value of warning and fragmentary orders was demonstrated in this operation. I feel that separate 2 and 3 reports from battalions to regiment are unnecessary and cause a great deal of duplication of work. A blackout tent of some sort is essential at all times as so much operations work must of necessity be done at night.

S-4 Supply during the first week of this operation was made difficult due to the extremely rough terrain in the Zone of Action and the absence of an adequate road net. In any operation where units move as fast as they did here, I consider two Weasels and two 6x6 2½-ton cargo trucks a minimum of non-organic transportation essential to the movement of a battalion. I feel that the loss of all types of equipment would be eliminated if this extra transportation were under Battalion control throughout the operation.
Submitted:
ROY D. MILLER,
Major, USMC.
S-3.

Approved:

M. "O" DONOHOO,
Lt. Col., USMC.
Comdg.

ANNEXES:

A. Operation Overlay.

OFFICIAL

Buenos A. W. Young,
Lt., USMCR.
S-1.