SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASES I AND II, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The special action reports of the various organizations of the 6th Marine Division appended hereto as Annexes A thru K contain comments and recommendations of subordinate unit commanders. In addition to those listed in the various annexes the following comments and recommendations are considered to be of such import as to merit special consideration:

1. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Personnel):

a. PERSONNEL:

   (1) Requisitioning of personnel:

      (a) COMMENT:

      Present system of requisitioning replacements does not permit requisitioning unit to anticipate normal losses by attrition.

      RECOMMENDATION:

      That the division be allowed to requisition upon the basis of T/O plus 5%.

   (2) Rotation:

      (a) COMMENT:

      The lack of any announced policy for rotation of officers handicapped planning for this operation.

      RECOMMENDATION:

      That higher authority enunciate a definite rotation policy for officers. Rotation should be effected immediately following a unit's return from combat, with replacements being furnished at that time.
(3) Replacements:

(a) COMMENT:

Replacements for the present operation reached the Division at a later date than is considered desirable from a training standpoint.

RECOMMENDATION:

That immediately following the return of the Division from combat, sufficient replacements be furnished to cover battle losses, losses by rotation, and anticipated losses by attrition prior to the next operation.

(b) COMMENT:

Two replacement drafts were assigned for use as shore party labor and for later release to replace battle casualties. These drafts proved invaluable, both as shore party labor and on the spot replacements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the present system of supplying two replacement drafts for each operation be continued. That these drafts total approximately 125 officers and 2500 enlisted.

(4) Promotions:

(a) COMMENT:

No authority was ever received by the First Provisional Marine Brigade and none has been received by this Division for promotion of communication personnel or engineer personnel. There are many men in this Division of these classifications who have served overseas for more than two years without promotion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this Division be given authority immediately to effect promotions in communication personnel and engineer personnel ranks.

(b) COMMENT:

There is a definite need for authority to effect field promotions of those enlisted who take over and effectively discharge the responsibilities of a senior NCO during combat.
RECOMMENDATION:

That division be allowed to effect field promotions of men who, because of battle losses, assume and satisfactorily discharge in combat, the greater responsibilities of a higher ranking non-commissioned officer.

b. EMBARKATION:

(a) COMMENT:

Use of an APA as command ship for a transport squadron and a Marine Division is undesirable due to lack of adequate space for staff billeting and serious restrictions on office space for division headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION:

Whenever possible an AGO should be made available for embarking the headquarters of a Marine Division.

c. MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

(a) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments assigned this Division had no experienced personnel in their complements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That personnel with practical field experience be used as cadres for newly forming Military Government Detachments.

(b) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments were restricted seriously by lack of adequate transportation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That each Military Government Detachment (A or B) be assigned three additional \( \frac{2}{3} \) ton 6x6 trucks and two additional \( \frac{1}{2} \) ton 4x4 trucks, with a driver for each.

(c) COMMENT:

During this operation, A and B detachments were required to perform functions beyond their capacity and which the plan called for to be performed by C and D teams and 96 hospitals.
RECOMMENDATION:

Plans should be sufficiently flexible to permit landing of the larger Military Government detachments when needed, thereby obviating the necessity for augmenting the small detachments with combat troops and organic medical personnel.

(d) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments assigned for this operation were made up of a mixture of Army and Navy personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That detachments be made up of personnel from only one branch of service, preferably the branch under whose command they are going to serve.

d. CASUALTY REPORTS:

(1) Periodic Reports:

(a) COMMENT:

A revised form for submission of periodic reports was received by this Division subsequent to embarkation of assault wave troops. This last minute change from a relatively simple form to a much more detailed form created confusion during the first few days of reporting.

RECOMMENDATION:

Any change to be made in procedure should be made sufficiently prior to embarkation to permit dissemination to all units and indoctrination in the new procedure.

(b) COMMENT:

The weekly periodic report form required by Tenth Army took between 6 and 8 hours for preparation at the Division level, and proportionately as long in lower echelons.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the periodic report form be simplified. Reversion to the form used by III Phib Corps in previous operations is recommended.
(2) Daily Report:

(a) COMMENT:

The dispatch partial daily report form used by Tenth Army proved extremely valuable, allowing the Division additional time in which to compile an accurate, complete report.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Marine units retain this form and use it for daily reports.

(3) Reports of death and Missing in Action:

(a) COMMENT:

Subsequent to embarkation the established method of reporting dead and missing was altered by APOA 164. This Division had embarked without Airmailgram forms and communication personnel had not been indoctrinated as to the proper method of handling these reports.

RECOMMENDATION:

That divisions in combat be permitted to report dead and missing by airmailbrief to CG, FMF, Pac, who can then forward the information to SECNAV by dispatch.

(4) Classification of Casualties:

(a) COMMENT:

Much difficulty was experienced in determining the line of demarcation between killed in action and died of wounds received in action, also between wounded in action and injured in action, and between injured in action and injured.

RECOMMENDATION:

That to attain uniformity in the use of these designations a directive be published giving exact definitions of the designations, illustrating such definitions by examples of the proper classification of border line cases.

(5) Evacuation Reports:

(a) COMMENT:

The use of NCO's remaining aboard each transport report evacuations to that ship proved exceedingly valuable.
however, it did constitute a drain on trained administrative personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Marine Transport Quartermaster aboard each APA be required to record and report to the landing force commander with copy to the division whose troops were embarked, on evacuees received aboard that ship. These reports should be daily while in the target area, with a complete report at time of withdrawal showing patients remaining aboard. When the ship reaches a rear area and patients are removed the Transport Quartermaster should send a final report to the same addressees showing the time and place of debarkation and hospital to which removed, or other disposition. To accomplish the above it is further recommended that each Transport Quartermaster be assigned an additional clerk of 405 specification,

c. STRAGGLERS:

(a) COMMENT:

During movement to the target area this Division discovered over twenty stragglers from rear area organizations. Report was made to CG, FMF, Pac and it was requested that this personnel be transferred to this Division by staff returns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all stragglers discovered after the ship has sailed be reported to FMF, Pac by dispatch and transferred by staff returns to the unit embarked with. That unit can then take necessary disciplinary action and the men's status will be settled within a minimum of paper work.

2. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence):

c. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Numerous changes have been found necessary concerning equipment carried by the G-2 Section in the operation. The majority of those changes can be made within the section itself. A list of recommendations for changes in the Table of Basic Allowances has been made and will be forwarded.
2. It has been found that the transportation with which the section attempted to operate during this operation was entirely inadequate. In order to carry out its functions of liaison, observation, the collection of prisoners, the collection and transportation of captured enemy material, and other minor functions the following vehicles have been requested: five ½ ton trucks, two 2½ ton trailers, one 1 ton truck, one 2½ ton truck, and 2 weasels.

3. The G-2 radio net uses SCR 610 radios at present. These have been found to be unsatisfactory, and other types are under consideration. It is believed that at least four SCR 610s are needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Organization: It is considered that Public Relations and Photography should be separated from the G-2 Section for the mutual betterment of all concerned. The association of those two sections with the G-2 Section is not based on common functions. Neither of the two sections contribute solely to the collection of dissemination of information of a military nature. By the same token, neither of the two sections benefit materially by being attached to the G-2 Section.

2. It is recommended that provision be made for a counter-intelligence section as an organic part of the G-2 Section. It became necessary, during the operation, for the G-2 Section to attach such a section from Army in order to handle the large number of counter-intelligence problems that arose.

3. The changes noted would call for an increase of four officers, while the total enlisted personnel would remain the same. The breakdown covering the increase of officer personnel would call for one captain for administration, training and liaison; one lieutenant counter-intelligence and censorship, and two lieutenants for observation and collection purposes.

b. AERIAL PHOTO INTERPRETATION:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. In general, aerial photographs furnished the 6th Marine Division were adequate though improvements was possible. There was a scarcity of low oblique photographs which were not forthcoming prior to L-Day. The first low oblique of the landing beaches were received by the 6th
Marine Division as its troops were embarking for a landing. No submarine photographs were provided. In most cases, scales of photographs were unsatisfactory and many sorties were flown with poor photographic results. For example, a sortie flown on 29 November and subsequent photographs received on 14 January contained a scale of 1:70,000. These photographs had an average 70% cloud coverage. In spite of the deficiencies of these photographs, a total of 560 prints were sent to the Division. This was a waste of material and air shipping space.

2. Photographs furnished after L-Day were generally unsatisfactory, principally because of the rapidity with which the situation moved following the landing. Photographs were generally slow in being delivered. Though a part of the reason for this lag in time between requests for photographs and delivery may have been poor flying conditions, a great deal of the difficulty was undoubtedly due to other reasons which should be corrected for future operations. Those photographs received after L-Day rarely were flown at the altitude requested.

3. Interpretation reports from higher echelons were satisfactory though not complete. Some minor errors in plotting were noted and in a few instances, differences in the interpretations of higher echelons and the 6th Marine Division Aerial Photo Interpretation Section were noted.

4. Little use was made by higher echelons of Sonne strips and consequently the hydrographic information to be gained from them was not forthcoming.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Aerial Photo Interpretation personnel are well occupied during the planning phase of an operation. After completion of this phase, there is not enough work to keep anywhere near the section strength busy. Personnel should be trained for and utilized in other G-2 work during an operation, provided that they are available for aerial photo interpretation during the planning period.

2. Aerial Photo Interpretation personnel should be given underwater depth determination in addition to their present training which is considered to be excellent. It is also advisable that they be made familiar with some aspects of photogrammetry.

3. Duplicate negatives should be furnished with two prints to divisions. This could obviate the necessity of furnishing numerous copies of air photos which may not be of use to the recipient and conversely, would permit the division to print as many photos of desirable negatives as required.
c. PHOTOGRAPHY:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. The only two cameras found to be satisfactory under combat conditions were the Speed Graphic and the Magazine Loading 16mm Motion Picture Camera.

2. Each division requires at least two 35mm "Eymo" movie cameras if 35mm film is desired.

3. Extreme difficulty was experienced before the operation in getting the proper film in the proper quantities and in a fit condition for use. It was only through fortunate circumstances occurring at the staging area that the division photo section was able to get enough to fulfill their function in the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is believed that at least three darkroom technicians should be provided in the Table of Organization, in addition to the present allowance of combat photographers.

2. Photographers in addition to regular photographic personnel, must be attached to the divisions as early as possible prior to an operation. This extra allowance of personnel is essential to the thorough photo coverage desired. The attached photographers, however, must join the division fully equipped for an operation - with camera and combat gear - and must also join the division in sufficient time to be properly trained and briefed.

3. It is essential that all photography undertaken within the division fall under one control unit. This unit should receive and process all photographs and be responsible for all photographic activity within the division.

4. A reorganization of Table of Basic Allowances for equipment within the photographic unit is considered to be necessary and recommendations to that effect are being prepared.

d. JAPANESE LANGUAGE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Information received from higher echelons concerning Order of Battle and enemy information was satisfactory after L plus five.
2. Information as gained from documents, prisoners, civilians and order of battle in this operation was unerringly timely, complete and accurate. It is believed that in no previous operation has Japanese Language been put to better use or achieved more accurate results than in this one.

3. Enemy documents and prisoners were forthcoming in sufficient quantities, and personnel in lower echelons were satisfactorily indoctrinated in regard to the taking of prisoners and the preserving of all enemy documents. It was noted, however, that units having language personnel forwarded captured documents with greater rapidity and in greater quantities than others.

4. There has not been any noticeable improvement in the effect of our propaganda on the Japanese soldier.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that at least one corpsman be assigned to the POW stockade during an operation.

2. Regularly assigned and specially trained military police are needed for the prisoner of war stockade. These men can be trained in their duties and receive special training in language prior to an operation.

3. Enlisted personnel in the section are doing work over and above the ranks they hold at present. Promotion to Table of Organization strength upon recommendation by G-2 should be made possible.

4. Portable sound equipment designed for field use should be furnished the language sections. At least two of such sets, and preferably four, per division are recommended.

5. Standard learning and instruction signs for civilians should be printed prior to an operation. These should be designed to control civilians - warning them not to move at night, to avoid troop concentrations, to retire to certain villages, and to carry out various other military orders consistent with the desires of our forces.

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. This section experienced a shortage of enlisted combat correspondents. Every possible effort was made to obtain qualified personnel but all results were negative.
Complete news coverage of the division activities will be impossible until more men are available.

2. The release of the news that the 6th Marine Division was on OKINAWA came so late as to make its final announcement anti-climatical. The news value of well-known civilian correspondents attached to the division was seriously impaired by this restriction.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is strongly recommended that the release of names of the participating units be made as early as possible after H-Hour. In any operation such late announcements of unit designation tend to stifle all public relations efforts on behalf of the unit as well as to lower morale of the troops engaged.

f. ORDER OF BATTLE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Preliminary reconnaissance prior to L-Day due to limited observation was not of great aid.

2. API was not as useful to the OOB officer as it might have been, due to time lags in photo coverage and the lack of understanding by echelons making sorties, of the problems of land warfare OOB analysis.

3. Pre-L-Day estimates by higher echelons as a general rule were received in time to make evaluation and analysis.

4. Interrogation of POWs was the primary source of OOB information during the campaign. Because of the unusual movement of enemy troops immediately prior to landing, our POW reports were practically the only clues to enemy strength and dispositions. On one occasion a POW reported the presence of enemy forces as large as 1,000 in number which had not been discovered by any other indication up to that time. Information from POWs proved astonishingly correct as to disposition and armament.

5. The OOB officer received accurate, timely and complete interrogation reports throughout the campaign.

6. Documents as a source of information were second only to POW reports. Many documents were translated in time to give interrogators and the OOB officer time to check with POWs. Cooperation by the Language Officers in the regiments...
was excellent in this regard. Their selection and screening of high priority documents for transmittal to Division was very good and reflected experience and training. One example during the campaign was the dispatch from the 4th Marine Regiment on L-Day of a map which was discovered by the language officer among the many documents around YONTAN AIRFIELD and which revealed the presence on OKINAWA of four or five units unlocated. Collection teams did not function efficiently. During the campaign two division OP teams were converted to collection teams, but the value of documents recovered by these teams was not high compared with those sent in by the regiments. It is considered that these results were due to lack of trained collection teams and that these teams, with proper training, would be extremely valuable in the future.

7. The CIC team attached to Division rendered valuable assistance by reporting detailed civilian interrogations. Much tactical knowledge was obtained in this manner as well as strategical information of interest to higher echelons.

8. Liaison with G-2 of the next higher echelon was not good until L plus 5 when III PHIB Corps moved ashore and direct telephone communication was established. After that time, liaison was effective, and timely reports were received from Corps.

9. Morale: During the first days of the campaign, with one exception, the Division was in contact with remnants of airfield labor battalions, who were only seeking escape. On the afternoon of 2 April, 1945, the 4th Marine Regiment contacted an enemy force of about 300 who made a determined stand. During the MOTOBU PENINSULA action, enemy morale was high. Until the final day of the battle there was no sign of disintegration or failing of the spirit with which the enemy conducted his stubborn defense.

10. The following units were opposed to the Division. During the early stages, the Division was pursuing remnants of OKINAWA labor and guard companies, which had been attached to the 44th and 56th Airfield Battalions formerly stationed at YONTAN and KADENA.

(a) On 2 April a sharp action was fought with elements of the 12th Ind Inf Bn, 63d BRIG, 52d Inf Div.
(b) During the battle of MOTOBU PENINSULA the following units were contacted by the 6th Mar Div:

HQ, 2d BN, 2d Inf Unit, 44th INB
4th Co, 2d BN, 2d Inf Unit, 44th INB
5th Co, 2d BN, 2d Inf Unit, 44th INB
6th Co, 2d BN, 2d Inf Unit, 4th IMB
2d MG Co, 2d BN, 2d Inf Unit, 4th IMB
1st Btry, 100th Ind Hy Arty BN
1st Plat, 1st Co, 26th Shipping Engr Regt
27th Torpedo Boat Unit (Navy)
33d Midget Sub Unit (Navy)
9th Naval Gun Unit (Navy)
3d Commando Unit
4th Commando Unit
1st Veterans Unit
2d Veterans Unit

g. GENERAL COMMENTS:

There is a decided need for the use of information and intelligence by all echelons in planning and executing a combat mission. There was ample evidence in this operation that though excellent information was made available, little consideration was taken of it initially. There will be an increase in the need for the employment of intelligence as operations carry us closer to JAPAN. A failure to take advantage of this essential combat medium is bound to be costly to our forces in material and men.

3. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 (Operations):

a. PRELIMINARY TRAINING:

(a) COMMENT:

Following the conventional small and intermediate unit training, the 6th Marine Division emphasized coordinated division combined arms training. The beneficial result from this effort cannot be overemphasized.

b. REHEARSALS:

(a) COMMENT:

The rehearsals at GUADALCANAL, (See Chapter IV above) were of questionable value to the 6th Marine Division. The principal reason for this situation may be described in the simple expression that realism was lacking throughout.

a. While 17 LSTs were required to embark properly the assault elements of the Division, the first day of rehearsal was attempted with only 7. This number was gradually augmented until on the final day of the rehearsal a sufficient number of vessels were available, and an exercise of some realism, if not for as ship-to-shore activity is concerned, was undertaken.
During the intervening period the inequities resulting from absence of important tactical units from the ship-to-shore scheme so reduced the realism of the exercise that, from the troop viewpoint, only limited benefit was gained.

b. A further wide divergence from actual circumstances resulted from the terrain conditions in the rehearsal area. Beaches were poor and the immediate foreshore consisted of swampy jungle which did not permit the movement of anything other than foot troops. In consequence, the landing and deployment of LVTs, tanks, and vehicles was impracticable.

c. Due to understandable circumstances it was impossible for fire support vessels which would participate in the actual operation to be present for the rehearsal. The unrealistic results obtained from conducting naval gunfire with vessels which were not destined to participate in the operation is apparent.

c. ORGANIZATION:

Based on the fact that Phases I and II of the OKINAWA Operation presented the 6th Marine Division with a variety of situations which permitted an effective test of the current organization it is considered that the following organizational modifications are worthy of consideration and action in accordance therewith is recommended.

a. Inclusion of a reconnaissance element in each regimental headquarters and service company. Just as the Division Reconnaissance Company provided the Division Commander invaluable information (see Chapter VII above) so was it apparent that the infantry regiments were in need of a similar agency. One platoon, similar in all respects to a platoon in the Reconnaissance Company, would be quite adequate for this purpose. If personnel limitations preclude such a measure this Division would readily sacrifice one 37mm platoon from each regiment for the purpose.

b. Flame Thrower Demolitions Personnel:

COMMENT:

While at this writing flame throwers had been given only limited use, due to terrain conditions, it is considered that the flame thrower demolition
principle followed by the Division is entirely sound. In effect it embraces the addition of 54 men to each infantry regiment for the discharge of this special task. The 6th Division has provided this personnel at the expense of artillery and service troops - a most undesirable expedient. So long as the personnel are made available it is believed that any one of several organizational schemes will meet the problem. The scheme favored by this Division involves the addition of 2 men to the 3d squad of each rifle platoon for discharge of the flame thrower task and providing 2 members of that squad with particular training in handling of assault demolitions under the covering support of flame throwers and automatic weapons.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the infantry strength of each regiment be increased by 54 men, organized either way as described above in a flame-thrower demolitions platoon for each company.

c. LANDING OF TANKS:

COMMENT:

The 6th Marine Division had the unique opportunity to examine three methods of landing tanks in the same operation. One company was landed from an LSD in LCM (6)s; one company mounting T6 tank flotation devices was landed from LSTs; a third company was landed directly on the beach by LSMs. All schemes functioned effectively, with the LSM combination the least desirable because of the necessity for fording deep water from the LSM grounding point.

The T6 device worked extremely well. Tanks swam easily to the edge of the reef, moved without difficulty across a very rough reef floor, discarded their pontoons without incident, and all but one of the company's tanks were in operation by H plus 29 minutes. The one tank which failed to get ashore did so because of motor breakdown.

The company transported in LCM(6)s landed at high tide without incident.

RECOMMENDATION:

That tank flotation devices T6 be stocked in X - 15.
forward depots on the basis of 18 per tank battalion to be available on demand when the hydrographic and tactical situations require.

c. WAR DOGS:

COMMENT:

Prior to the OKINAWA Operation the 6th Marine Division reserved judgement on the question of retaining war dogs within the Fleet Marine Force. Dogs were employed on numerous occasions during the Division's operations and it is the consensus of using organizations that their performance did not justify retention of the organization.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the war dog program be abandoned.

d. NAVAL GUNFIRE:

(a) COMMENT:

Until such time as the present JASCO Tables of Organization are modified to provide additional Shore Fire Control personnel, shortages will continue to exist. The composition of Shore Fire Control parties is still inadequate to efficiently perform its mission in combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Spotter Team should consist of:

1 Spotter, Lt or Capt, Field Artillery FO
1 Assistant Spotter (Scout) Arty NCO
3 Radio operators
4 General duty men

The Battalion NLO Team should consist of:

1 Naval officer, (Lt (jg) or Lt)
3 Radio operators
1 Wireman
1 Driver
2 General duty men
The Regimental NLC Team should consist of:

1 Naval officer, Lt
3 Radio operators
1 Wireman
1 Driver
2 General duty men

The Division team as provided for in FMF, Pacific Special Order No 8644 is adequate.

It is recommended that the present Tables of Organization be modified based on the above.

(b) COMMENT:

The state of training of the naval officers and spotting officers was excellent.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is, however, recommended that the Shore Fire Control Officers be returned to FMF, Pacific to take advantage of naval gunfire training available there to Marine divisions.

(c) COMMENT:

The communication teams under the Shore Fire Control Officers were excellently and thoroughly trained.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(d) COMMENT:

The SCR-694 radio again showed its outstanding value as the ideal naval gunfire control means of communication in the battalion level. Due to the limited voice range the unanticipated rapid rate of advance and extended communication lines the SCR-694 was found to be inadequate for regimental and divisional control.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommendations for Shore Fire Control communication equipment above that which is provided for in FMF, Pacific Special Order No 8644 should be as follows;
One vehicular mounted TCS radio for the regimental team in order to provide the Regimental NLO with greater range and relieve one radio for monitoring a spotting frequency.

The Division Naval Gunfire Team should be equipped with an SCR-193 in order to be able to communicate with higher echelons when distances outrange the SCR-694.

(e) COMMENT:

Although the SCR-300 served its purpose when our front was narrow and not too far distant from command posts, the same conditions prevailed for this set as did for the SCR-694, i.e., terrain distance.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(f) COMMENT:

The maintenance of both radars and their functional performances left nothing to be desired within their limitations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

(g) COMMENT:

Preparation fires against beach defenses were good. The beach areas were very well covered and had there been the beach defenses expected, effective neutralization would probably have been accomplished.

(h) COMMENT:

Fires on targets of opportunity were conducted in a most expeditious manner obtaining effect on the target with not too high an expenditure of ammunition.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(i) COMMENT:

Counterbattery fires were of a minimum, but once the enemy battery was located effective fire was brought to bear
almost immediately. On one occasion a "Charlie" spotted counterbattery and knocked out a Jap 77mm field piece which occasionally fired on one of the fire support ships.

RECOMMENDATION:
None.

(j) COMMENT:
Night harassing fires were not employed except for one mission which was spotted and controlled by a SFC. The fire was presumably effective.

RECOMMENDATION:
None.

(k) COMMENT:
Interdiction fires were not fired by this Division using fire support ships. However, III Amphibious Corps employed some of our ships for interdiction on one of two occasions.

RECOMMENDATION:
None.

(l) COMMENT:
Fires against coastal targets were fired in the main by an LCI mortar support division which accomplished the effect desired. Their primary mission in this case was keeping abreast of the Division Reconnaissance Company while they advanced along the southwest coast of the MOTOBU Peninsula. A SFOP of 1 naval officer and two radio operators with an SCR-610 accompanied the Reconnaissance Company and called fires on villages and installations in front of their route of advance. These mortar boats are highly effective and more accurate than rocket boat types. Fire of these mortar boats was laid as close as 500 yards to friendly troops.

RECOMMENDATION:
None.

(m) COMMENT:
Naval gunfire using air spot was employed on most call missions. The airplane is still the best observation post for naval gunfire control and expenditure of ammunition is considerably reduced by its employment.
(m) COMMENT:

VOF air spot was rather disappointing, particularly regarding relief of spotting planes and briefing between relieved plane and relieving plane. As in the past, ships own OSGUs with parent ship spotters came through with an outstanding performance in both spotting and tactical air observation.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is believed that VOF spotting and coordination could be improved by more training.

(n) COMMENT:

Due to comparatively light opposition, rapid movement, and the small number of targets, this Division fired only 76 call fire missions. Some call fire missions were fired by regiments based on target information passed down by Division TIC through naval gunfire channels.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(o) COMMENT:

Coordination between adjacent units firing HE and illumination was excellently handled within regiments and by Division as long as communication was in. Star shell illumination was particularly well handled as proven by the fact that adjacent units were not illuminated through inaccurate firing or lack of control. No reports were received of star shell cases falling within our lines.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(p) COMMENT:

Coordination between artillery, naval gunfire and air left much to be desired in the lower echelons especially in battalions. Coordination of supporting arms in Division was efficiently accomplished by TIC.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.
(q) COMMENT:

Chain of command between various echelons of naval gunfire control was adhered to for the most part, exceptions were made by Task Force Gunfire Control calling regiments direct which resulting in the bypassing of division control.

RECOMMENDATION:

More firm control in higher echelons.

(r) COMMENT:

There were no unusual features in the employment of naval gunfire support worthy of note.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

(a) Spotting frequencies initially assigned to STOs be retained as long as possible throughout the campaign.

(b) Shore fire control officers be permitted to brief fire support ships prior to an operation for the purpose of establishing command liaison by personal contact, so that both parties can further understand and more efficiently accomplish their respective missions. These ships should remain as fire support ships assigned in direct support until it becomes necessary to resupply their magazines, or until some other contingency precludes their employment.

(c) Relief of ships not take place until the assigned Fire Support Ship has first briefed its relief. A ship awaiting relief must never leave until its relief is in position and has established contact with its assigned STO.

(d) COMMENT:

Several violations were noted in chain of command procedure.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Task Force Naval Gunfire Officers monitoring spotting primary frequencies refrain from transmitting. This practice is a direct violation of command and should not occur.
(e) COMMENT:

The naval gunfire control net was overloaded to such a degree as to defeat its purpose. Ammunition and destruction reports accounting for the majority of traffic.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that some auxiliary channel be used for such reports or, if absolutely necessary, to use the NGF common to set specific times, preferably during the period from 2400 to 0500.

(f) COMMENT:

Information regarding the tactical situation ashore, request for fire support ships special missions, Division pre-attack bombardments etc, will in the future be transmitted over the naval gunfire control net as information becomes available. Constant request for information that is not available overloads any net.

RECOMMENDATION:

Better net discipline should be enforced.

(g) COMMENT:

Radar beacons were not called for by the ships. Unfavorable conditions of terrain precluded any extensive use of the beacon.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the radar beacon not be a part of shore fire control equipment if future operations are carried out under similar terrain conditions.

(h) COMMENT:

One of the most valuable items of equipment was the 3-ton, 4x4, 2-wheel trailer. For the OKINAWA operation one trailer was provided each shore fire control party.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this item of equipment be permanently made a part of the JASCO Table of Allowances.
(1) COMMENT:

Recommendations submitted regarding the future employment of naval gunfire support following the Guam operation have not been rectified and put into operation for the OKINAWA campaign. In brief they were:

(1) Spotting of counterbattery during hours of darkness by ships organic spotting planes.
(2) Trained Marine aerial observers to spot ships gunfire particularly on targets of opportunity affecting friendly troop advance.
(3) Modification of JASCO TO and TBA to fit existing needs for proper functioning.

6. AIR SUPPORT:

(a) COMMENT:

The defensive air cover from the time of mounting until the completion of the assault phase was at all times adequate. No large scale enemy activity was observed over the Division zone of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(b) COMMENT:

The preliminary heavy strikes resulted in YONTAN Airfield being put out of commission. The equipment remaining on the field was rendered unserviceable. The concentration of installations was not sufficient to permit air strikes to be employed with maximum efficiency.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(c) COMMENT:

The air attacks on LOVE-Day were more than adequate. In absence of suitable targets it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.
(d) **COMMENT:**

The air liaison parties did not show enough aggressiveness in maintaining liaison with artillery and naval gunfire representative or in keeping their unit commanders informed. Good contact was maintained between the ALPs and the Air Support Control Units.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Throughout the training period, and rehearsal phases, prior to an operation, it is recommended that the liaison parties of the three supporting arms train and work as one team. One of the officers, preferably the artillery liaison officer, should have the definite responsibility of insuring that close coordination at all times. This would result in more economical and efficient employment of the three arms.

(e) **COMMENT:**

The communications equipment and nets between AGL teams and ASC were adequate for this operation.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

None.

(f) **COMMENT:**

The terrain in which air support was employed to the greatest extent was of a very mountainous nature. The marking of front lines by panels was employed when necessary, with good results. Better coordination resulted when front line battalions marked enemy targets with organic weapons in lieu of having targets marked with artillery.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

That organic weapons be used for marking targets whenever possible.

(g) **COMMENT:**

The number of aircraft available was, in the majority of cases, adequate. When aircraft for the daily air preparation was furnished by carrier groups, a great deal of the effectiveness was lost because of the uncertainty of the time of arrival over the target. Pre-jump off strikes are definitely limited to the time interval assigned because of the coordination required with other supporting arms and the maneuver of the
infantry. When shore based aircraft became available planes were on station at the desired time. An average interval of about forty-five minutes between origination of air support missions and the beginning of the strike, was satisfactory. However the time required to complete the strike was too long.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

It is recommended the ALPs be permitted to communicate directly with the aircraft, while conducting strike.

**(2) COMMENT:**

Dummy strafing attacks to cover advance of friendly troops proved to be of great value. Approved dummy attacks were made on all targets before live runs. The use of dummy runs to get on the target and short strafing bursts to pin-point the target resulted in more effective employment of aircraft and lessened the danger to friendly troops.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

More effective direction should be attained by direct communication with aircraft.

**(1) COMMENT:**

At no time did the AGLPs communicate directly with the aircraft.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

In cases involving targets that can be observed from the ground it is recommended the AGL party communicate directly with the strike groups on the SAD net. The ASC could remain on the SAD and act as net control negating any transmission and adding suggestions that are deemed necessary.

**(1) COMMENT:**

Throughout the training phase the ALPs had direct communication with the airplanes and excellent results were obtained in a minimum amount of time. During the operation the ASC units acted as relay station between the AGL Parties and the support groups.
RECOMMENDATION:

The basic difference between air support as carried out in the OKINAWA Operation and that which is desired by this command is that instead of having the ASC direct the strike group it is advocated that the ALPs be permitted to contact the airplane directly on the SAD net, while directing a strike. If the personnel on the ground is not considered sufficiently qualified to do so, steps should be taken to place capable officers in these positions. The practicability of this latter method has been proved by the use of naval gunfire spotting planes on targets of opportunity. These planes were directed through the naval gunfire net with very good results.

It is considered impracticable to allow the ALPs to direct the planes. It is then recommended that an Air Support Control Unit be made available during the training phase to enable the employment of the same procedure in the operation as in training.

It is imperative that the pilots and the AGL Parties be provided with the same maps. This made execution of the mission very difficult and consumed an excessive amount of time.

OTHER COMMENTS - RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) COMMENT:

Napalm and rockets were found to be particularly suitable weapons against caves and concealed positions.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that provisions be made for extensive use of napalm followed by rocket attacks and strafing because the napalm properly employed often revealed a target very difficult to observe prior to attack.

(b) COMMENT:

No use were made of the flare signals to indicate the completion of an air strike.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that strike planes follow this practice in order to enable the ground forces to execute jump-offs as soon as possible. This is considered the quickest means of informing all personnel on the ground that the strike has been completed.
4. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 (Quartermaster):

a. MOTOR TRANSPORT:

(a) COMMENT:

For reasons stated in Chapter VII, the organic motor transport of this Division proved inadequate on this operation. It is believed that if the Division were to operate over a fairly good two-way road system and with a divisional supply radius of not more than 15 miles, the present authorized motor transport would be sufficient. As always, the greatest need is for general purpose cargo carriers. The 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo truck is admirably suited for this purpose. During this operation each infantry regiment was assigned from the Motor Transport Battalion, nine (9) additional 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks for supply within the regiment. Even though unit distribution was made by the division to infantry regiments, the 9 trucks were insufficient for distribution within the regiment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the organic motor transport of infantry regiments be increased as follows:

2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each battalion
2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each regimental headquarters company
4 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each weapons company

Total increase 12

(b) COMMENT:

The Headquarters Battalion cannot move or subsist itself with the general cargo transport now authorized. Regarding trucks, ½-ton, 4x4, cargo, the number authorized is sufficient for the staff sections of Headquarters, but no provision is made for many elements of Headquarters Company who have to be furnished transportation. Examples are the auditor, chemical officer, division inspector, postal officer, recreation officer, liaison officers, inspection parties from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and other agencies, visiting senior officers, observers assigned during...
operations, and special small units such as naval gunfire liaison teams, which the Division is directed by higher authority to provide with transportation. The recommended addition will provide a Headquarters Battalion pool for such officers. Likewise the military police and signal companies proved unable to discharge their normal duties during the operation with transport assigned.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Division Headquarters Company transport be increased by:

1 Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo
6 Trucks, ½-ton, 4x4, cargo
1 Truck, 1-ton, cargo

(2) That the Military Police Company transport be increased by:

1 Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo
4 Trucks, ½-ton, TCS or with SCR 528 (1 to each Road Platoon, 1 with Company Headquarters for G-4 control).
3 Trucks, 1-ton, cargo

(3) That the Signal Company transport be increased by:

1 Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo
3 Trucks, ½-ton, 4x4, cargo

(4) Reconnaissance Company, increase by:

1 Truck, ½-ton, 4x4, cargo
1 Trailer, ½-ton, 2½ ton cargo
1 Truck, ½-ton, with TCS or SCR 528
1 Truck, 1-ton, cargo

(c) COMMENT:

The Reconnaissance Company was called on to execute rapid, far reaching missions. It was not adequately equipped for the purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Reconnaissance Company be provided the following transportation, considered adequate to mount one platoon:
9 Cargo carriers, M29-C (3 to be equipped with SCR 610)
1 Truck, 1½-ton, (equipped with SCR 528)
1 Trailer, ½-ton, 2 wheel, cargo

RECOMMENDATION:

That the motor transport of the Ordnance Company, Service Battalion, be increased by 6 trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo.

RECOMMENDATION:

That each transport company of the Motor Transport Battalion be given an additional allowance of one convoy lubricating unit with spare parts.

(d) COMMENT:

The motor carriage, M29C, (Weasel) has proved an invaluable supply, wire laying and general purpose vehicle. It is recommended that the allowance be increased to eighty (80) per Division, complete with spare parts.

(e) COMMENT:

Difficulty was experienced in keeping DUKWs operational due to lack of spare parts.

RECOMMENDATION:

That complete spare parts, as authorized, be furnished.

(f) COMMENT:

LVTs remain the best means for moving supplies across a reef. They lack the terrestrial mobility of the DUKWs, but this is offset by the facility of unloading. As long as reef landings are in prospect, 2 LVT battalions are deemed necessary to unload a division and it is recommended that they be attached to the Division initially, as was done in this operation.

(g) COMMENT:

The addition of 2 DUKW companies to the division in the assault was invaluable. One was a Marine and one an Army DUKW Company. No difference could be observed in technique of handling or in amount of cargo moved, but the...
Marine Company was parts-poor in comparison with the Army Company. LRMNs were employed in the assault to land and emplace divisional artillery, and proved excellent for this task.

b. RATIONS;

(a) COMMENT:

The K ration is not popular, even when the new type package is issued. On the other hand, the new C ration has received enthusiastic endorsement by all units. The only advantage of the K ration is that it can be readily issued, carried in the pack and more conveniently eaten in the initial phases of the assault. The 10-in-1 is the most popular assault ration, but it is wasteful to issue to front line units in a moving situation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That not more than 2 D and 3 K be carried on an amphibious operation, the remainder to be divided equally between C and 10-in-1.

c. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS;

RECOMMENDATION:

Since resupply would appear to be possible within five (5) days sailing time from any probable future target, it is recommended that not more than twenty (20) days petroleum products be carried in the assault. This, it is believed, gives ample margin for possible losses due to enemy action.

d. CLASS II ITEMS;

(a) COMMENT:

The resupply of spare parts, vehicles, paulins, tentage and housekeeping articles was insufficient.

RECOMMENDATION:

That these types of Class II equipment and supplies be increased, in resupply echelons, by fifty (50) percent.
e. LABOR:

(a) COMMENT:

As in the past, labor troops remain a major requirement. The Service Battalion cannot perform its functions properly without additional labor sources. No dependence should be placed upon using civilian labor. On L plus 20 Day, out of an estimated pre-invasion population of 50,000 in the northern half of OKINAWA only 8,000 civilians had entered our lines, although the entire Division area was occupied by us. Of these, only 350 could be classed as able bodied males. The rest were emaciated, wounded, sick, aged or infants. Ammunition and depot companies are used by Corps in depot and beach areas and furnish no assistance within the Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Service Battalion be increased by one depot company and one ammunition company, preferably of white personnel.

f. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER:

(a) COMMENT:

The Standing Operating Procedure of this Division was used and proved satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That one transport quartermaster from the embarked division be assigned as Logistic Control Officer to work in liaison with the Shore Party Commander, LST Flotilla Commander, Transport Squadron Commander and Transport Squadron Control Vessel.

Recommendation regarding modifications of embarkation forms have already been submitted to the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps.

g. ORGANIZATION:

(a) COMMENT:

The present T/O arrangement by which there is a commanding officer of Service Troops is not deemed practical or conducive to good administration. The various service
elements of a division; engineer, pioneer, medical, service battalion, motor transport have missions which have little relation to one another. Located in different areas and split between infantry regiments, the several service units are better able to handle their administration alone than through the medium of a Commanding Officer of Service Troops. Furthermore, the strictly service personnel are employed primarily by or for the Division Quartermaster, so that the Commanding Officer of Service Troops has little control over the employment of his troops.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the office of Commanding Officer, Service Troops be abolished.

That the G-4 Section of the Executive Staff; T/O F-93, approved 4 April, 1944, be revised to include only the following:

1 LtCol          G-4
1 Major          Ass't G-4
1 Captain        Ass't G-4
1 Lieutenant     Ass't G-4
4 Total Commissioned.

1 Staff Sergeant, Clerical (213)
2 Sergeants, Clerical (213)
2 Pfc/Pvts, clerks (213)
5 Total enlisted

(b) COMMENT:

While in a strict sense outside the province of a division recommendation, the experience of this Division is outfitting and in the supply of the assault phase has indicated the following to be most desirable; the echelons of command of the Supply Service should be parallel to and equal in number to the echelons of line command and in each case directly under the corresponding line command.

h. COMMUNICATIONS:

(a) COMMENT:

Radio communication in a rapidly moving situation is a necessity.
RECOMMENDATION:

That a voice radio net be established for division administration, supply and evacuation. This net should include Q-M, Division Quartermaster and S-4 of infantry and artillery regiments. The recommended net should be separate from any net which is used by echelons higher than division.

5. Communications:

a. PERSONNEL:

RECOMMENDATION:

That a wire section comparable to that allowed for the Engineer Battalion, be included in the Table of Organization of the Service Battalion.

b. MATERIAL:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Transportation:

4 Weasels, M-29, Cargo Carriers, for Signal Company
3 1-ton, 4x4, Reconnaissance, for Signal Company for wire laying
3 ½-ton trucks, 4x4, for Signal Company (2 wire laying, 1 Message Center)
1 2½-ton, truck, 6x6, for repair section
4 2½-ton trucks, 6x6, for Division Signal Quartermaster
2 1-ton trucks, 4x4 Reconnaissance, for Division Signal Quartermaster

(2) Equipment:

That six vacuum tube voltmeters be included in the Table of Allowances on the basis of 2 per Signal Company and 1 per regiment.

(3) Replenishment rate:

That replenishment rate on field wire W-110 and W-130 be increased by about 100%.
c. TRAINING:

RECOMMENDATION:

That ECM training be made available to all radio personnel.

6. Ordnance:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The personnel of Motor Transport allotted the Division for handling ammunition are not adequate to maintain the supply when the Division is operating over extended areas. It is recommended that the Ordnance Company be increased by an ammunition platoon of fifty (50) men and six (6) 6x6 2½-ton cargo trucks.

2. The N49 flare as now built with laminated paper absorbs moisture. It is recommended that the container be made of metal. It is further recommended that all artillery ammunition be packaged in metal containers rather than in wooden crates or laminated paper cartons.

3. It is believed that the CINCPOA unit of fire as now prescribed should be modified in some respects, to permit amounts prescribed to more nearly fit operational needs. Recommended changes are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINCPOA</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: *75mm Gun

4. Use of either fuse PD N45 or TSQ M77 with the shell HE M56 for the 81mm mortar will allow greater flexibility in the use of the shell, as it would then be equally effective against personnel, pillboxes and entrenchments. It is recommended that these fuses be provided for all shells HE M56.

5. It is recommended that fuse TSQ M6 VT, for 75mm and 105mm howitzer, together with shells HE M48 and HE M11 with supplementary bursting charge, be furnished this Division for trial and practice at the earliest practicable date.
(6) This operation indicates the need for certain minor changes in the weapons of the Divisional units shown below. In order to provide adequate perimeter defense and local unit security, it is recommended that the below units' weapons be increased as follows:

**Headquarters Battalion**

3 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Rcn Co)
2 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Eq Co)
2 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Sig Co)
6 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (MP Co)
13 Total

6 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun Cal. 45 (MP Co)

**Service Battalion**

Headquarters and Service Company

6 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4
4 Browning Automatic Rifle

**Medical Battalion**

4 Browning Automatic Rifle (Eq Co)
4 Browning Automatic Rifle (A Co)
4 Browning Automatic Rifle (B Co)
4 Browning Automatic Rifle (C Co)
16 Total

7. **Division Surgeon**:

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:**

(1) It is recommended that one 6x6 truck be added to the table of organization for each medical company in the medical battalion, and that two 6x6 trucks be assigned to Headquarters and Service Company of the medical battalion, to be used to back up any unit that needs advance rapidly with its equipment and personnel intact.

(2) Because of the excellent performance of the surgical trailer, and because its use unquestionably saved many lives and reduced the incidence of infected wounds to practically zero, it is recommended that one trailer be added to the equipment of each medical company.
(3) In regard to making any recommendations as to change in the present field units, it can be said they have proved extremely satisfactory in combat, therefore no changes are indicated.

(4) The addition of whole blood to the supplies of the medical department of a marine division was timely, and has proved an invaluable aid as an adjunct to plasma.

a. TRANSPORTATION AND EQUIPMENT:

Transportation for the OKINAWA Operation from a medical department standpoint, was inadequate, particularly as units of the medical battalion moved forward many times, and always had to proceed in two echelons, returning vehicles for the second echelon after the first had been displaced forward.

In conclusion it is believed that the painstaking and thorough field training in which the Medical Department of this Division participated in the staging area under field conditions, plus the personal efforts of all officers and men concerned contributed tremendously toward the performance of duties by this department. Special mention should be made of the surgical background of many of the officers, which included completion of internship and residencies at some of our largest hospitals in the United States. Many of these surgeons are fellows of the American College of Surgeons and Diplomates of the American Board of Surgery. Their services have been a credit to the U. S. Navy and to themselves.

There would seem to be no reason to criticize in this report, but rather to praise all concerned for their wholehearted cooperation in enabling the medical department to complete its mission in a satisfactory manner.
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CO ARCHON, CALEE, MAESTRO, ELECTRIC, ENGIOUS, MESSENGER
INFO: NYPH.

OPN 0 NO 1A X BASTILLE CEASES ATK AT SHACKLE 50X3 UNSHACKLE X

DEFENDS LINE HELD X RD BETWEEN REGTS TO CHANGE X ARCHON HOLD
FORWARD POSITIONS X CALEE COMA HIT STECHY ATTACHED HOLD
FORWARD POSITIONS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO LEFT FLANK X MAESTRO

AND EXPOSITION REGISTER DEFENS'E FIRES PRIOR DARKNESS X ELECTRIC

RENSERVUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT SHACKLE OPEN DOG UNSHACKLE X

ENGIOUS CONTINUE UNLOADING DURING NIGHT AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE

PLAN WITH PERS NOT REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X MESSENGER ASSEMBLE

IN ALL ROUND DEFENSE VICINITY SHACKLE OPEN JIG UNSHACKLE X ALL

UNITS MAKE POSITIVE CONTACT WITH ADJACENT UNITS X OVERLAY OF

POSITIONS TO BASTILLE BY SHACKLE 50X3 UNSHACKLE X BASTILLE

OF NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
In the field
1 Apr 45, 1700

Maps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKU-REPTO, A.M.S. L891.
(b) 1:10,000 RYUKU-REPTO.

Task Orgn

a. OT 4

4th Mar
1st Plat Co A 6th MT En
1st Plat Ord Co
1st Plat S&S Co
1st Band Sec
1st SFCP 6th JASCO
1st AG IF 6th JASCO
1st Sec 3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co

b. OT 22

22d Mar
1st Plat Co B 6th MT En
2d Plat Ord Co
2d Plat S&S Co
2d Band Sec
2d SFCP 6th JASCO
2d AG IF 6th JASCO.
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co (less 1 Sec)

c. 1st Bn 29th Mar

1st 37mm Plat Ups/29th Atchd

d. Div Arty

15th Mar
1st Armd Amph En
Vic-6

e. Tank Gp

6th Tank En less 1 Co plus 1 Plat

f. Engr Gp

6th Engr En
56th NCB

Opn O, No 2-45

-1-
Opn 0 No 2-45 (cont'd)

g. SF Gp

6th Pion En
26th and 33d Repl Drafts
6th MT En (less Dets)
4th Amtrac En
9th Amtrac En
6th DUKV Co
611th DUKV Co
1/2 11th Spec NCB
Det 6th JASCO
6th MP Co
6th MP Co

h. 6th Sgr En

i. Div Trs

Hq En
6th JASCO (less Dets)
Early Air Warning Team

j. Military Govt Gp

Dets A-3 and E-3 Military Govt
Co C 1st Prov MP En (USA)
Det 6th MT En (3 trucks)

k. Rcn Co

l. a. D-2 summaries as issued.

b. Air preparation 0700-0710 on located targets.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 2 Apr to seize LOTE plus five and ZAMPA MISAKI Peninsula. LD present front lines. Boundaries, scheme of maneuver, operations overlay.

3. a. CT 4: Advancing with Bns abreast in a contact imminent formation seize L plus 5 within zone.

b. CT 22: Advancing with Bns abreast in contact imminent formation seize L plus 5 within zone.

c. HMT 1/23: Seize TOKUSHI and UZA and clear ZAMPA MISAKI Peninsula. Atchd units less 1st 37mm Pltf operate under control CT 29.
d. Fan Co: Seize YAGAHAMA and reconnoiter waterfront for possible supply landing areas.


g. Engr Gp: Assist SP in clearing egress routes from beaches and repair roads in Div Z.

h. Div SP: Continue unloading supplies. 6th Med Bn establish field hospital vicinity 7993 Roger. Provide collecting teams for assault units.

i. 6th Ser Bn: Land Green 2 and execute normal missions.

j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

k. Mil Govt Gp: Land Green 2 and initiate control of civil population.

l. (1) Assault units advance in small columns preceded by scouts maintaining contact by connecting Gps.

m. Adm details see Adm 0 1-45.

n. (1) Gas masks will be collected in Bn dumps.

(2) Serve hot food at earliest practicable time.
Cpn 0 No 2-45 (Cont'd)

5. a. Div CP operation overlay.

   b. Report location CPs.

---

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CO, 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, Bn 1/29, 6TH TANK BN, 6TH RCT CO, DIV SP, 6TH MGR BN.
INFO: CO III CORPS; CO 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN C NO 2A-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 AND DEFENDS LINE HELD AT THAT TIME X CT 4 AND CT 22 DEFEND LINE OCCUPIED AT 1630 X BOUNDARY NO CHANGE X Bn 1/29 DIV ORS OCCUPY ALL ROUND DEFENSE IN 7995 HOW ITM JIG X BE PREPARED TO REPUL AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AT HAGAHAMA OR ON BLACK BEACHES X RCT CO OCCUPY ALL ROUND DEFENSE 8095 GEORGE PREPARED TO MOVE TO ANY LOCALITY THREATENED BY AIRBORNE ATTACK X 15TH MAR SUPPORT DEFENSE X REGISTER CONCENTRATIONS IN FRONT OF MLR PREPARED TO MASS ALL FIRES IN FRONT CT 4 SECTOR X 6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA 7993 YOKE X DIV SP CONTINUE UNLOADING AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN WITH TRS NOT REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X ESTABLISH GAILEYS AND SERVE HOT FOOD TO TRS X DIV CP 8194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT CPs X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div

In the field
2 Apr 45, 1715

Opn 0
To 3-45

Haps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-RHITO, A.M.S. L691.
(b) 1:10,000 RYUKYU-RHITO.

1. See current D-2 summaries.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0715 3 Apr, with main effort on the left, to seize 0-A, ID front lines held at HOU hour. Boundaries, objectives and scheme of maneuver; Opn overlay.

3. a. OT 4: Atk to seize 0-A in Z of action. Be prepared to protect own right flank if advance exceeds that of 1st Mar Div.

   b. OT 22: Making main effort on left, Atk to seize 0-A in Z of action. Be prepared to protect own right flank in case advance exceeds that of OT 4.


   d. 6th Tank En: Spt Atk, with one Co in Spt of OT 4 and one Co in Spt of OT 22. Attach one additional platoon plus dozer to Rcn Co.

   e. Rcn Co 1 Plat 6th Tank En Atchd: Be prepared to execute Rcn to LOVE plus 15 on order.

   f. Engr Co: Assist SP in clearing egress routes from beaches. Repair roads in Div Z with particular attention to routes in zones of assault Regts. Assign Ln 0 to each assault Regt. Continue work on airdrome.

   g. Div SP: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.

   h. 6th Med En: Execute normal missions. Provide collecting teams for assault units.

   i. 6th Ser En: Execute normal missions.

   j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. HP Co pay particular attention throughout entire Div Z.

Opn 0 No 3-45

154
Opn 0 No 3-45 (Cont'd)

k. Military Govt Sp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

l. 1/29 Div Rts: Await orders present position.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP Opn overlay.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
COFS

Distribution: Special

Official:

McQueen
V. H. KRULIK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG, 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CG 4/22, 15TH MAR, HKT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN,
6TH ROY CO, DIV SP, 6TH ENG R BN.
INFO: CG III CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN 0 NO 3A-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 AND DEFENDS
LINE HELD AT THAT TIME X CT 4 AND CT 22 DEFEND LINE OCCUPIED
AT 1700 X BD NO CHANGE X 15TH MAR SUPPORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES
AT 6396 SUGAR X 6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT
6294 TANK 4 X ROY CO OCCUPY ALL ROUND DEFENSE VICINITY OF
YAMADA 8396 FEDER WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFENSE AGAINST
POSSIBLE LANDINGS ON NORTH COAST X DIV SP CONTINUE UNLOADING
AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN USING ONLY THOSE TROOPS NOT
REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X HKT 1/29 DIV RES OCCUPY ALL ROUND
DEFENSE IN 6396 YOKE 6395 EASY X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X
DIV CP 6194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT CPs X

Released
V. K. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
3 Apr 45, 1700

Map: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-FUTTO, A.M.S. L891.

Task Order

a. 4th Mar (Reinf)
   Atchd:
   1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
   1st Plat Ord Co
   1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
   1st Band Sec
   1st STCP 6th JASCO
   1st AGLP 6th JASCO
   1st Sec 3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co

b. 22d Mar (Reinf)
   Atchd:
   2d Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
   2d Plat Ord Co
   2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
   2d Band Sec
   2d STCP 6th JASCO
   2d AGLP 6th JASCO
   3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co (less 1 Sec)

c. 15th Mar (Reinf)
   Atchd:
   1st Armd Amph Bn
   VMo-6

d. 6th Tank Bn less one Co (less one Plat)
   Atchd:
   Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co

e. 6th Engr Co

   6th Engr Bn
   56th NCB

f. SP Gn

   6th Pion Bn
   4th Amph Trac Bn
   9th Amph Trac Bn

Opn O No 4-45

158
1/2 11th Spec NCB
26th and 33rd Repl Drafts
Det 6th JASCO

g. 6th Ser En (less Dets)

h. 6th MT En (Reinf) (less Co C)

Atchd:
6th Amph Truck Co
814th WKW Co

i. 6th Med En

j. Hq En

Atchd;

Early Air Warning Team

k. Military Govt Co

Dets A-3 and B-3 Military Govt Co C 1st Prov MP En (USA)
Dispensary Units 0-10 and 0-11

l. 1/29

Atchd:

1st Plat Co C 6th MT En
Det AGLP 6th JASCO
Det SFCP 6th JASCO

1. See current D-2 summaries.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 4 Apr to seize line LOVE
plus 15. LD front lines held at HOW hour. Boundaries,
objectives and scheme of maneuver; Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize LOVE plus 15 in Z of
action.

b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize LOVE plus 15 in Z of
action. Organize and defend that line.

c. 15th Mar, 1st Arm Amph En Atchd: Spt Atk. 1/15
direct Spt CT 4, 2/15 direct Spt CT 22, 3/15
and 4/15 general support. Emplace one Co in vicinity
YONTAN AIRDRONE for defense against airborne Atk.
Remainder 1st Arm Amph En general Spt.
Opn 0 No 4.45 (Cont'd)

d. 6th Tank Bn: Spt Atk, with one Co in Spt of CT 4 and one Co in Spt of CT 22. Be less 2 Cos rendezvous in assembly area. Await orders.

e. Rec Co: Be prepared to execute Rec beyond LOVE plus 15 on order.

f. Engr Gr: Assist SP in clearing beach areas. Repair roads in Div Z with particular attention to maintenance and marking of routes in zones of assault Regts. Assign one pl to support each assault Regt. Continue work on airstrip.

g. SP Gr: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.

h. 6th Med Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide collecting teams for assault units.

i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.

j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 25 2 1/2-ton 6x6 trucks 1/29 CP at 0600.

k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.

l. Military Govt Gr: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

m. 1/29 Div Res: Prepare to move on order by truck to seize ISHICHA (9097L).

x. (1) If advance of 22d Mar exceeds that of 14th Mar, exposing 22d Mar rear during turning movement to north Div Res will be dispatched to occupy and defend ISHICHA (9097L) and protect 22d Mar south flank.

(2) Road priority to 15th Mar 0600-1200 4 Apr.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP, Opn overlay.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV.
TO: CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BLT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN, 6TH RON CO, DIV SP, 6TH ENGR BN.
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV.

CPH O NO 5-45 X INT REPORTS INDICATE POSSIBILITY ENEMY AIRBORNE COMING COUNTERATTACK X 6TH MAR DIV WILL ATK AND IMMEDIATELY DESTROY ANY AIRBORNE TROOPS LANDING WITHIN DIV Z X 1/29 WITH ONE CO 6TH TANK BN ATTACHED PROCEED IMMEDIATELY BY MARCHING TO ASSEMBLY AREA EAST SIDE YONTAN AIRFIELD X BE PREPARED TO DESTROY ENEMY TROOPS ATTEMPTING TO LAND ON AIRFIELD OR ADJACENT AREAS X 6TH TANK BN DIRECT ONE CO TO PROCEED TO EAST SIDE OF YONTAN AIRFIELD FOR ATTACHMENT TO 1/29 UPON ARRIVAL OF THAT BN X ALL OTHER UNITS MAKE PLANS FOR COMBATING AIRBORNE LANDINGS WITHIN RESPECTIVE AREAS X TANK CO COMDR REPORT TO CO 1/29 AT NE CORNER AIRFIELD X RIGID BLACKOUT DISCIPLINE WILL BE ENFORCED BY ALL UNITS X ALL PROVISIONS EXISTING DEFENSE PLANS NOT IN CONFLICT HEREWITH REMAIN IN EFFECT X THIS CONFIRMS FRAGMENTARY ORDERS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BLT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN, 6TH R CN CO, DIV SP, 6TH W NGR BN.
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV
OPN O NO 6-45 X ON SEIZURE LINE LOVE PLUS 15 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK TO SEIZURE LINE 0-C 9002 MAN 9101 MAN 9201 VICTOR 9300 KING AND O-D 9203 BAKER 9202 CROWN 9301 YOKE 9400 FOX X 22D MAR WITH 1ST BN 29TH MAR ATCHD ADVANCE TO NORTHWARD IN TWO COLUMNS WITH ONE COLUMN ALONG WEST COAST AND ONE ALONG EAST COAST, RECONNOITERING INLAND AREA WITH PATROLS X SEIZE 0-C, PREPARED TO RESUM ATK TO SEIZE O-D X 4TH MAR ASSEMBLY VICINITY ISHICA PREPARED TO SUPPORT ATK ON WESTERN FLANK X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: 6G 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

6TH MAR DIV OPN 0 NO 7-45.

6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 AND DEFENDS THE GROUND HELD AT THAT TIME X 22D M.I. (REINF) DEFEND GROUND HELD PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO LIKELY ROUTES OF APPROACH ON BOTH PLANKS X BDS NO CHANGE X 15TH MAR AND CORPS ARTY SPT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT 9402 CHARLIE 4 X 6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT 5498 DOG X SP OP CONTINUE UNLOADING AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN USING ONLY THOSE TRS NOT REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X RON CO REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION X PREPARE ALL ROUND DEFENSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE ENEMY COUNTERLANDINGS ON N COAST X 4TH MAR (REINF) DIV R.S REMAIN PRESENT ASSEMBLY AREA X PREPARE ALL ROUND DEFENSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO COAST LINE FROM 9196 PETER TO 9196 KING 3 X BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE 22D MAR (REINF) IN CASE OF COUNTERATTACK FROM NE PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO N COAST ROAD X PRESENT INTENTION HOLD PRESENT FRONT LINE 5 APRIL FOR REORGANIZATION X DETAILS LATER X AIM DETAILS NO CHANGE X DIV CP 8194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT OPs X

Relesed
J. C. McQuire
Col, USMC
CofS

165
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV

6TH MAR DIV OPN 0 NO 8-45.

6TH MAR DIV CONDUCTS RON OF ISHIKAWA ISTMUS 5 APR X
4TH MAR-DISPATCH ONE CO WITH ONE PLAT 6TH TANK BN PLUS ONE TANK DOZER ATCHD TO CONDUCT RON OF E COAST OF ISHIKAWA ISTMUS X RON CO ONE PLAT 6TH TANK BN PLUS ONE TANK DOZER ATCHD CONDUCT RON W COAST ISHIKAWA ISTMUS X 6TH TANK BN HAVE REQUIRED TANKS AT RON CO AND 4TH MAR CHARLIE PETERS PRIOR 0800 X 6TH MT BN PROVIDE 3 2½ TON TRUCKS TO EACH 4TH MAR AND RON CO TO BE AT RESPECTIVE CHARLIE PETERS PRIOR 0800 X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X LIMIT OF RON LINE CHUDA-KOCHIYA X RON COLUMNS REPORT LOCATION AND SITUATION AT 30 MINUTE INTERVALS X AVOID ENGAGEMENT WITH SUPERIOR FORCE X DEPART FRONT LINES 0900 X RETURN PRIOR DARKNESS X

Released

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV.
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

THIS IS MY OPN O NO 9-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X DEFENDS GROUND HELD AT THAT TIME X 22D MAR, 1/29 ATCHD, ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1700 X 4TH MAR ASSEMBLE AT ISHIZA, ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE ENEMY PENETRATION ON E COAST ROAD X 25TH MAR LESS 1ST BN ASSEMBLE ONNA XRAY ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE ENEMY PENETRATION ON W COAST X 15TH MAR, 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD, SPT DEFENSE WITH TWO BNS X REMAINING BNS BIVOUAC PRESENT LOCATIONS PREPARED TO DISPLACE TOMORROW MORNING X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div  
In the field  
5 Apr 45, 1700

Opn No 10-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Direct Air Spt and NGF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0830 6 Apr to seize C-E. LD, Bds, 
   Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Advance along E coast road, covering in- 
   land area by patrols. Seize C-E in Z of action.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Advance along W coast road, covering in- 
   land area by patrols. Seize C-E in Z of action.
   c. 15th Mar, 1st Arm Amph Bn Atchd; Spt Atk with 2 Bns in firing 
      positions and one Bn in direct Spt of each assault Regt, ad- 
      vancing by bounds.
   d. 6th Tank Bn: Place one Co less 1 Plat in direct Spt each 
      assault Regt. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area.
   e. 6th Engr Bn: Place one Plat in direct Spt of each assault 
      Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in 
      Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
   f. Rec Co: Assemble 0800 QM prepared to execute Rec missions 
      on order.
   g. SP Co: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
   h. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.

i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 1 Plat 6x6 trucks 
   to 4th Mar Co prior OSCO.

j. Div Trg: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular att- 
   tention to traffic control throughout Div Z.

k. Military Govt Co: Continue concentration, control and sub- 
   sistance of native population.

l. 22d Mar, Div Reg: Assemble by Bns along line ATSUTABARU-KIM. 
   Prepare to Spt either assault Regt. Thoroughly patrol area 
   between line ATSUTABARU-KIM and line YAKADA-YAKA.
x. (1) 1/20 reverts parent control 0600, 6 Apr.

4. Adm details no change.

x. (1) Regts take steps to move all organic equipment to forward areas.
   (2) Div QM assemble and store all gas masks.

5. a. Div CP at 0800 MAN.
   b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC

Distribution: Special

V. E. KJULAK
LtCol, USMC

OFFICIAL
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0 NO 11145 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK ON STH ZONE OBOE EASY X
ORGANIZE AND DEFENDS THAT LINE FOR NIGHT X RDS NO CHANGE X 29TH
MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE EASY X COVER REAR AREA BY
PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE
EASY X COVER REAR AREA BY PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 15TH MAR,
1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT 0711 TARE X
PREPARE TO DISPLACE TWO BNS DAWN TOMORROW X MOVE 1ST ARMD AMPH
BN TO NAKAMA AT EARIEST PRACTICABLE TIME X 22D MAR DIV RES ASSEMBLE
BY BNS ALONG OBOE DOG X ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X BE PREPARED
TO SUPPORT DEF'MST OF FRONT LINE REGTS X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
0-3
1. a. See current P-2 summaries.
   b. Direct Air Spt and EGF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes advance 0730-7 Apr to seize O-F. LD, 3ds, Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Advance along E coast road, covering inland area by patrols. Seize O-F in Z of action; thereafter patrol to 1612 BAKER.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Advance along W coast road, covering inland area by patrols. Seize O-F in Z of action; thereafter patrol to 0517 IWM, 0619 CHARLIE and 0918 FOX.
   c. 15th Mar, 1st Armored Div in Atchd; Spt Atk with 2 Bns in firing positions and one Bn in direct Spt of each assault Regt, advancing by bounds. Displace entire 1st Armored Div to vicinity NAKAMA at earliest opportunity.
   d. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co less 1 Plat in direct Spt each assault Regt. Place 1 Plat direct Spt on Co. Remainder of En displace to assembly area vicinity NAKAMA.
   e. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co direct Spt each assault Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
   f. En Co, 1 Plat 6th Tank Bn plus 1 tank dozer Atchd; Assemble at KISE. Move at dawn to reconnoiter W coast road as far as western outskirts of NA50. Report results and return to KISE assembly area.
   g. SP Grp: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
   h. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
   i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
   j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.
   k. Military Govt Grp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
Opn 0 No 12-45 (Cont)

1. 22d Mar Div Reg: Move by marching with 1 column on either coast road to line 0-E. Assemble by Bns prepared to Spt either assault Regt. Thoroughly patrol area between line ATSUTABAHU-KIM and 0-E.

x. (1) 29th Mar pass control 1/2 1st MWDP to 4th Mar prior 0700 7 Apr.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP at 0000 1 Mar.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF Maj Gen SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KEULAK
LtCol, USMC
N-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0 NO 13-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATTACK ON SEIZURE
OF OBOE FOX X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS THAT LINE FOR NIGHT X
ECS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE
FOX X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE FOX X
COVER REAR AREA BY PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 15TH MAR,
1ST AMPH BATT BY ATCHD SPT DEF WST X MASS FIRES AT ROGER
JIG 0919 MIKE 1 EAST X 22D MAR, DIV RES, ASSURREL BY EMS ALONG
LINE OBOE EAST X ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF WST X BE PREPARED
TO SUPPORT DEFENSE OF FRONT LINE REGTS X ALL OTHER UNITS NO
CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC

D-3
In the field
7 Apr 45, 1600

6th Mar Div

Opn 0
No 14-45

1. a. See current P-2 summaries.
   b. Direct Air Spt and NCF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0730 8 Apr to seize 0-G and 0-H.
   LD, Eds, Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Occupy and defend area indicated along 0-G; Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Seize 0-H.
   c. 22d Mar (Reinf): Move from present positions by marching to vicinity NAKAMA. Occupy and defend area indicated along 0-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling.
   d. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf).
      Atch 1 Plat plus 1 dozer to Ren Co. Remainder of Bn remain assembly area vicinity NAKAMA. Reconnoiter for future rendezvous and maintenance area in vicinity of NAG0.
   f. 6th Eng Bn: 1 Co direct Spt each Inf Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
   g. Ren Co, 1 Plat 6th Tank Bn plus 1 tank dozer Atchd: Assemble at YOFUKI. Move at dawn to reconnoiter S coast MOTOBU PENINSULA as far as SUGA, 9720 SUGAR. Report results half hourly. Upon completion of mission return to assembly area.
   h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opn. Reconnoiter NAG0 beaches. Prepare to initiate unloading in that area. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAG0.
   i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAG0.
   j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAG0.
k. **Div Trq:** Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.

l. **Military Govt Grp:** Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

4. **Adm details no change.**

5. a. **Div CP 0510 Easy.**

b. **Report location CPs.**

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BY COMMAND OF MAJ G.W. SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULIK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV
OPN O NO 15-45 X 6TH MAR DIV FIGHTS ATTACK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINFORCE ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 22D MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 29TH MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH EN ATCHD SUP- PORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT RJ 9825-NAN 3 X FRONT LINE REGTS MAKE AND MAINTAIN PATROL CONTACT X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Direct Air Spt and HGF available on call.


3. a. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Conduct Fcn with 1 Co as far as 1623 UNGE.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Seize O-J, prepared to resume Adv to seize O-K on O, Adv along roads, covering inland area by patrols.
   c. 4th Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Conduct Fcn with 1 Co as far as ABU (1911Y).
   d. 15th Mar, 1st Arm Arch En Atchd: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with not less than 2 Bns.
   e. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of En displace to new assembly area; location to be announced later.
   f. 6th Engr En: 1 Co direct Spt each Inf Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges. Displace remainder of En to new assembly area; location to be announced later.
   g. Recon Co: Move to new assembly area at 0817 ABLE. Await orders.
   h. Co C 6th Pion En: Continue Spt Opns. Prepare to initiate unloading in NAGO area. Displace to new location 0517 JU.
   i. 5th Ser En: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location at 0617 NAL.
   j. 6th MT En: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.
   k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location in vicinity of 0717 CHAUL3, DOG, EASY. Unit assignments later.
   l. Military Govt En: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Establish Hqs at town of NAGO.
4. a. Adm details no change.
   x. (1) Principal fuel and ration Dp, located at CHUDA (0411 TARE),
   is available to all units in 6th Mar Div area.
   (2) All supply agencies prepare to displace to EACG area.

5. a. Div CP 0510 EASY.
   b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC 2-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV
OPN O NO 17-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATTACK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 22D MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME X 29TH MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARM AMPH BN ATCHD SUPPORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT 1520M AND 0629D X FRONT LINE REGTS MAKE AND MAINTAIN PATROL CONTACT X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
1. a. See current D-2 summaries.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0730 10 Apr to seize O-K and O-L.
   LD present front lines. Eds:- Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Continue organization and defense of area indicated along O-S; Cm overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Direct 1 Co to proceed by marching to AJU, prepared to continue the advance northward the following day with amphibian Spt.
   b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-S; Cm overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Adv with 1 Bn to vicinity of 225 ITEN; with 1 Co moving by motor to 1623 UNFES, thence by marching to objective. Establish all round defense.
   c. 29th Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat 1st Armd Amph En Atch’d: Advance with main effort on right to seize UNTEN and O-L. Prepare to resume Adv to O-L on order.
   d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph En Atch’d: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with not less than 2 Bns; particular attention to UNTEN area. Spt Adv of 22d Mar (Reinf) with 1 Btry. Direct 1 Plat, 1st Armd Amph En report to CO 29th Mar (Reinf) at GAGUSUKU prior 0600 10 Apr.
   e. 6th Tank En: Place 1 Plat in direct Spt 22d Mar (Reinf) and 2 Plats in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of En remain present assembly area.
   f. 6th Engr En: 2 Cos direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat direct Spt 4th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of En continue maintenance and repair of routes of Cm in Div Z.


5. Co C 6th Pion En: Continue SF Opns.

6. 6th Ser En: Execute normal missions.

7. 6th MT En: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location at 0714 MIKE. Furnish 6 2½-ton trucks to 22d Mar (Reinf) to report 22d Mar OP prior 0700 10 Apr.
k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

1. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

x. (1) Arm Amph Plt atchd to 23th Mar (Reinf) to be employed in salvo of UNTEM area.

(2) 6 trucks furnished 22d Mar (Reinf) revert to MT En control immediately on discharge of Trs at 1623 UNCLE.

4. Adm details no change.

x. (1) 4th Mar Co patrol take two days' rations and adequate water purification material.

5. a. Div CP 0717 030E.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GW SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 19-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CHASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAINTAINING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT ABU 1911 VICTOR X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE OF OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE BN IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO 2225 MAR X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEFENSE X LEAVE ONE PLT 1ST ARMD AMPH BN IN DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ALL UNITS EXERCISE VIGOROUS PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. KHULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
10 Apr 45, 1645

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty and MG available on call.


3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Continue Org and Def of area indicated along C-G; Opm overlay. Direct 1 Co to proceed by marching from ABU to ATISSANAI (2317 X) and to establish an all round Def prepared to continue the adv northward the following day.
   b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along C-G; Opm overlay. Direct 1 Co from 1/22 to proceed by marching to TAIRA (2522 S) seize O-M and establish an all round Def.
   c. 29th Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat 1st Armd. Amph. Bn Atchd: Adv to seize O-L. Continue mopping up of interior of MOTOBU PENINSULA.
   e. 6th Tank Bn: Remain present assembly area, await orders.
   g. Pan Co: await orders present location.
   h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue Spt Ops.
   i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
   j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
   k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.
   l. Military Govt Gr: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.
Opn 0 No 20-45 (Cont'd)

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling in assigned areas.

(2) Unit Comdrs take swift disciplinary action in all cases of promiscuous firing discovered.

4. Adm details no change.

x. (1) Co from 1/22 take 3 days' rations and adequate water purification material.

5. a. Div CP 071700G3.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF Maj Gen SHAPERED:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. R. KULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN: NO 21-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CHASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH
MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAIN -
TAINING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT ATTSUBARU

PARENT 2317 YOKE PAREN X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF
OBOE DASH GEORGE MAIN MAINTAINING ONE BN LESS ONE CO IN ALL ROUND
DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO PARENT 2225 MAR PAREN AND ONE CO IN
ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT TAIRA PAREN 2622 KING PAREN X

29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD 1700 X 15TH
MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEF X LEAVE TWO PLATOONS 1ST ARMD
AMPH BN DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ALL UNITS CONTINUE VIGOROUS
PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KNIJLAK
LtCol, USMC
7-3
FROM: CC 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CC III PHIB CORPS, CC 1ST MAR DIV

CPH 0 NO 22-4S X 6TH MAR DIV RESUMES ADV OCEO 12 APR TO SEIZE OBOE DASH LOVE AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN MOTOKU PENINSULA X LOVE DOG PRESENT FRONT LINES X BDS NO CHANGE X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE X DIRECT ONE CO TO PROCEED BY MARCHING FROM AKTSUBARU PARE 2317 YOKE PARE TO CONTACT 22D MAR AT TAIQA PARE 2622 KING PARE X THIS CO UPTON MAKING CONTACT ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF X PARA X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO LESS TWO COS IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO PARE 2225 MAR PARE AND ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT TAIQA PARE 2622 KING PARE X DIRECT ONE REINF CO OF ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO TO MOVE BY MARCHING TO SEIZE PENINSULA AT 2535 JIG AND ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF CONVERGE FORCES TOWARD CENTER OF PENINSULA TO DESTROY ENEMY RESISTANCE THERE X CONCURRENTLY DIRECT ONE CO FROM THREE SLANT TWENTY NINE AND ONE CO FROM TWO SLANT TWENTY NINE TO PROCEED BY MARCHING TO MEET AT IMADOMARI PARE 0130 CHARLIE PAREN AND TO ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X PARA X 15TH MAR 1ST AMPH BN ATCHD SPT ATK 29TH MAR REINF WITH NOT LESS THAN TWO HBS PLUS TWO PLATS 1ST AMPH BN X CONTINUE TO SPT THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO WITH ONE BTRY X PARA X 6TH ENGR BN X TWO COS DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 4TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X INITIATE IMPROVEMENT OF CROSS ISLAND ROAD FROM OBO TO TAIQA X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X DIV CP 0717 OCEO X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
7-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0 NO 23-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CHEASES ATK AT 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR THE NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGH AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAINTAINING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT KAMATA PAREN 2722 KING PAREN X 22D MAR REINF LESS 3D BY LESS 1 CO CONTINUE ORGH AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE BN IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBOO PAREN 2225 HAN PAREN AND ONE BN IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT 2535 DOO X 29TH MAR REINF DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEF X LEAVE TWO PLATS 1ST ARMD AMPH BN DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X BN CO ASSUME CONTROL FOX CO 29TH AT OBJECTIVE PREPARE ALL ROUND DEFENSE X 3D BY 22D MAR LESS ONE CO IN DIV RES PROCEED TO 0119 ITEM PREPARE ALL ROUND DEF PREPARED TO ASSIST 3D BY 29TH MAR ON ORDER X ALL UNITS CONTINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. ERLAX
LtCol, USMC

197
From: CG 6TH MAR DIV
To: 6TH MAR DIV

Info: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPE 0 NO 24-45 X 6TH MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0600 13 APR TO DESTROY ENEMY RESISTANCE IN INTERIOR MOTOBU PENINSULA AND CONTINUES ADVANCE TO HEDO MISAKI PAREN 3751 HOW PAREN X RDS NO CHANGE X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF MOVE THREE SLANT FOUR TO KAWATA PAREN 2722 QUEEN PAREN AND ONE CO FROM THREE SLANT FOUR TO ARASHI PAREN 3725 ABLE PAREN TO ESTABLISH ALL ROUND THE AT THAT POINT X MOVE REMAINDER OF REGT BY MARCHING TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY CHUDA PAREN 0511 HOW PAREN X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS THIRD BY ASSEMBLE ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO LESS CHARLIE CO AT 2225 ROGER X CHARLIE CO REMAIN AT 2635 ROGER X MOVE TWO SLANT TWENTY TWO BY MOTOR AND MARCHING TO SEIZE HEDO MISAKI PAREN 3751 HOW PAREN X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF DRIVE VIGOROUSLY ON ENEMY FORCE IN VICINITY OF TARE AILE 9925 COMMA 9924 COMMA 9923 COMMA 9924 COMMA 9923 FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST X LOCATE AND DESTROY ALL ENEMY FORCES IN THAT AREA X CONTINUE ACTIV PATROLLING TO NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF ITOMI X ROGER X CONDUCT PATROLS AS FAR EAST AS 9936 X AS FAR SOUTH AS 9623 X ROGER X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATTACHED X ATK 29TH MAR REINF WITH NOT LESS THAN TWO RDS X SPT TWO SLANT TWENTY TWO WITH ONE RDS X MOVE THREE SLANT FIFTEEN TO POSITION WHERE IT MAY SPT 29TH MAR REINF X PARA X 6TH TNG BN X TWO COS DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 4TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X PARA X 6TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN PROVIDE TRUCKS AT 22D MAR CHARLIE PETER 0600 13 APR TO TRANSPORT KING CO TO AMA X THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO DIV REMAIN PRESENT POSITION PREPARED TO ASSIST 29TH MAR IN MOPPING.
UP NOTOBU PENINSULA X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X ADM DETAILS NO
CHANGE X DIV CP 0717 OBOM X

Released

V. H. KULAK
LtCol, USMC

199
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG 3RD PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 25-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK AT 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR THE NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF ESTABLISH 2/4 IN ALL ROUND DEF AT 9721 FOX GEORGE XING X RETAIN 3/4 IN ALL ROUND DEFENSE PRESENT POSITION X REMAIN INE KEEP ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF VICINITY YOKOHARA PARK 0715 MAN PARK X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS 3/22 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X 3/22 DIV RESIST IN ALL ROUND DEF DEFEND LOCATION X ALL UNITS CONTINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KULIK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
13 Apr 45, 1730

Opn 0
No 26-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty, and NGR available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 14 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the MOTOBU PENINSULA.

3. a. 29th Mar Reinf (less 3d Bn and less FOX Co): Atk in the direction ITOMI-MANNA, and by flanking action from the north, drive the enemy to the south and clear the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road; - Opn overlay.
   b. 4th Mar Reinf, 3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd: Commencing at 0830 attack to seize ridge in 9723 CHARLIE HOW MIKE and ROGER, 0Opn overlay. Move 3/4 by motor and marching from present location to vicinity of AWA. Upon arrival at AWA 3/4 passes to Div Res and will move 1 Co by motor to 9629 GEORGE for relief of FOX/29.
   c. 22d Mar Reinf: Maintain 2/22 in all round Def at HEDO MISAKI (3751 HOW) and 1/22 disposed with 1 Co at KAWADA (2722 MIKE), and 1 Co at 2635 TARE and the remainder of the Bn at 2225 ITOMI. All units conduct Rcn patrolling within 3000 Yds of positions.
   d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt atk.
   e. 6th Tank Bn: Remain present assembly area; await orders.
   g. Rcn Co, FOX/29th Atchd: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling. FOX Co be prepared to move by motor to ITOMI.
   h. Co C 6th Fion Bn: Continue SP Ops.
   i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
   j. 6th MT Bn: Provide 30 trucks at 2225 HAW at 0700 14 Apr to transport 3/4 to AWA (0119 GEORGE). Thereafter provide 10 trucks to transport 1 Co of 3/4 to 9629 GEORGE and to return FOX/29 to 0324 HOW. Remainder of trucks move 3/22 from AWA (0119 GEORGE) to 1322 SUGAR when 3/22 is released from Div Res.
   k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.
1. Military Govt Co: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.

m. 1d Bn 22d Mar (Div Res): Maintain contact with enemy in general area 0020 ARLE BAKER and CHARLIE and 0120 ARLE, BAKER and CHARLIE. Be prepared to revert to regimental control on order and move to 1322 SUGAR by motor and marching.

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling assigned areas.

(2) FOX/29 reverts to Regt control on entrucking at 9629 GEORGE.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF Maj Gen SHEPHERD:

J. C. McCUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC

Opn 0 No 26-45 (Cont'd)
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CC III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

CPI: 0 NO 27-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CHANGES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X EDs NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINT
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE
ATK 0800 15 APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINT CONTINUE DEF PRESENT
POSITIONS X PREPARE TO MOVE THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO TO VICINITY
2733 NOV 15 APR AND TO WITHDRAW CHARLIE CO 22D MAR TO OBO CO/DA
2225 IN X ESTABLISH FISTL CHARLIE FIER VICINITY OBO X PARA X
29TH MAR REINT LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT
1700 PARA X 15TH MAR REINT PREPARE TO PLACE ONE HORY FROM ONE
SLANT FIFTEEN IN DIRECT SET ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO AND ONE HORY
FROM ONE SLANT FIFTEEN IN DIRECT SET THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO X
PARA X THREE SLANT FOUR DIV TIES REMAIN IN ALL ROUND DEF PRESENT
LOCATION X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released: 
V. E. McMillan
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
14 Apr 45, 1930

Opn 0
No 28-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.

b. Air, Arty and N/GF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0800 15 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the HOTOBU PENINSULA.

3. a. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d En: Defend present positions. Conduct vigorous Rcn patrolling to determine strength and locate flanks of enemy position.

b. 4th Mar (Reinf) less 3d En (3d En 29th Mar attached): Atk to seize high ground at 9923 GEORGE, and O-Mt.- Con overlay.

c. 22d Mar (Reinf) ; Move Regt CP to vicinity of (2733 HOW). Maintain 2/22 in all round Def at HEDO MUSAKI (3751 HOW). Assemble 1/22 less 1 Co vicinity OSO (2225 ITON), with 1 Co at KAWADA (2722 MIKE). Move 3/22 by motor and marching from present location to defensive position in vicinity of 2733 HOW. Conduct vigorous patrolling into interior of island and southward on east coast as far as DANA (4245 HOW).

d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. Place 1 Btry from 1/15 in direct Spt of 1/22, 2/22 and 3/22 respectively.

e. 6th Tank En: Retain 1 Co direct Spt CT 22; remainder of En remain in present assembly area. Await orders.


g. Rcn Co, KING/4 attached: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling and Rcn of beaches.

h. Co C 6th Pion En: Continue SP Oms.

i. 6th Ser En: Execute normal missions.

j. 6th MT En: Provide 10 trucks at 1322 SUGAR at 0700 15 Apr to transport 3/22 to vicinity of 2733 HOW.
k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.

m. 3d Bn 4th Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to north and northwest; Opn overlay. Be prepared to Set Atk of 4th Mar (Reinf).

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.

b. Report location CPs.

By command of Maj Gen Shepherd:

J. G. McQueen
Col, USMC
Gof 3

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. McKullak
LtCol, USMC

7-3
FROM:  CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO:  6TH MAR DIV
INFO:  CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPM O NO 29-15 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X SUBMIT GARRISON DEF AND PATROL PLAN FOR AREA NORTH OF LINE CHUDA-SUKU X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF SET DEF X PLACE 1/15 DIRECT SET 22D MAR REINF X PARA X 3/4 DIV RES RETAIN IN ALL ROUND DEF PRESENT LOCATION X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KULAK
LtCol, USMC
2-3

268
1. a. See current D-2 summaries.

b. Air, Arty and MGF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 16 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the MOTOBU PENINSULA.

3. a. 8th Mar (Reinf) (3d BN 29th Mar Atchd): Atk 0900 with main effort on right to seize O-H; Opn overlay. 3d BN revert to control 4th Mar at 0600 16 Apr.

b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st BN with 3d BN 1st Mar Atchd: Organize and defend assigned sector in accordance with approved plan; Opn overlay. 1st BN pass to Div control at 0600 16 Apr.

c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d BN: Atk to seize O-H in Z of action; Opn overlay.

d. 1st BN 22d Mar: Move by motor to A'A and when in position Atk to seize O-H in Z of action.

e. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.

f. 6th Tank BN: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar; remainder of BN remain present assembly area. Await orders.


h. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling and Rcn of beaches. Upon arrival of motor vehicles K/4 revert to control 3/4 and move by motor to vicinity of 0019, KING.

i. Co C 6th Pion BN: Continue SP Opns.

j. 6th Ser BN: Execute normal missions.

k. 6th Inf BN: Execute normal missions. Provide 35 trucks at 2225 AAN prior to 0630 to transport 1/22 to A'A. Upon discharge of Trs at A'A, 10 trucks proceed to 0630 ROGER to transport K/4 to 0519, KING.

l. Div Inf: Execute normal missions.
Opn O No 30-45 (Cont'd)

m. Military Govt Co: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.

n. 3d En 4th Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to north and northwest. Opn overlay. Be prepared to Sgt Atk of 4th Mar (Reinf) and 29th Mar (Reinf) by attacking in direction 0019 ITM 0021 HOW.

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
(2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly Trs.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 0303.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. E. KREULAK
LtCol, USMC
C-3

210
CP

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, INFO CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0100 31-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF 3/29 ATCHD ORGANIZE
AND DEFEND LINES HELD AT 1630 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0900 17
APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS 1ST BN COHDA 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X SUMMIT GARRISON DEF AND PATROL
PLAN FOR AREA NORTH OF LINE CHDA-SUKU X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF
LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630 PREPARED TO
RESUME THE ATK 0900 17 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF SPT DEF X PLACE
1/15 DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X PARA X 1/22 DIV REINF PREPARE ALL
ROUND DEF OF GROUND HELD AT 1630 X PREPARED TO CONTINUE VIGOROUS
PATROLLING AT 0900 17 APR X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT
AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

C. W. SHIGLER
LtCol, USMC
Asst D-3
Opn 0
No 32-45

6th Mar-Div
In the field
16 Apr 45, 1600

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty and MG available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0600 17 Apr to seize O-P. LD present front lines. Eds and scheme of maneuver: Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf) 3d En 29th Mar Atchd: Atk 0600 17 Apr to seize O-P in Z of action: Opn overlay. Continue vigorous patrolling in 921, 9311, 9320 and 9120.
   b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st En, 3d En 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Def of assigned sectors in accordance with approved plan.
   c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d En: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action by flanking action from the south. Opn overlay.
   e. 6th Bank En: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of En remain present assembly area. Await orders.
   g. Rem Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
   h. Co 'O' 6th Plt En: Continue SP Opns.
   i. 6th Ser En: Execute normal missions.
   j. 6th ME En: Execute normal missions.
   k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.
   l. 1st En 22d Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to the north in assigned Z as far as O-P, paying particular attention to the high ground in the right (east) half of Z. Establish contact with 4th Mar and 29th Mar.
x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

(2) Comdr's coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 0000.

b. Location CPs: see overlay. Report changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUADE
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN C NO 33-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CHASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF 3/29 AT OHD ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1630 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA 22D MAR REINF LESS 1ST BT COMRA 3RD BT 1ST MAR AT OHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA X 1ST MAR REINF SFT DEF X PARA X 1/22 DIV X THIS PREPARE ALL ROUND DEF OF GROUND HELD AT 1630 X BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING 0800 16 APR X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released
C. W. SHISLER
LtCol USMC
Asst D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field.
17 Apr 45, 1300

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty and INF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 17 Apr to seize O-P. ID present front lines. Eds and scheme of maneuver: Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf) 3d En 29th Mar Atchd: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action; Opn overlay. Be particularly vigilant to prevent escape of enemy to northward.
   b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st Bn 3d En 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Dof of assigned sectors in accordance with approved plan.
   c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3rd Bn: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action by flanking action from the south; Opn overlay.
   g. Ron Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
   h. Co C 6th Pion En: Continue SP Opns.
   i. 6th Ser En: Execute normal missions.
   j. 6th Med En: Execute normal missions.
   k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.
   l. 1st En 22d Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling in assigned zone (Opn overlay) paying particular attention to the right (east) half of zone. Prepare to support attack 1st 9th Mar (Reinf).

Opn 0 No 34-45
x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

(2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops. Employ front line pyrotechnics freely.

(3) Comdrs take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Location CPs: see overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC

D-3
Opn 0
No 34-F5 - Modified

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.

   b. Air, Arty and MG available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 13 Apr to seize C-3. ID present front lines. Eds and scheme of maneuver: - Opn overlay.


   b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Continue Crgn and Def of present positions on northern peninsula. Move 1/22 from AVA to vicinity IWYA (1322 030E). Protect bridge at 1523 UNCLE. Conduct vigorous patrolling between Div rear Ed and EMO-HISAMI, with particular attention to east coast between EMO-HISAMI and IWYATA MAN.

   c. 29th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize C-3 in Z of action. Block withdrawal of enemy to eastward by seizure of hill at 0237 QUEEN. Mop up area in Z of action south of C-3.


   e. 6th Tank En: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of En remain present assembly area. Await orders.


   g. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.

   h. Co C 6th Pion En: Continue SF Ops.

   i. 6th Sdr En: Execute normal missions.

   j. 6th MG En: Execute normal missions. Provide 30 24 ton trucks at AVA (C19 GEORGE) at 0600 to transport 1/22 to vicinity IWYA (1322 030E). Thereafter return to TOGUCHI (9725 0925) to transport 3/29 to assembly area vicinity 0425 QUEEN.

   k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.

Opn 0 No 34-F5 Modified
Opn 0-10 31-45 Modified (Cont'd)


x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

(2) Comdr coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops. Employ front line pyrotechnics freely.

(3) Comdr take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.

4. Ada Details no change.

5. a. Location CPs: See overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McCURRIE
Col, USMC
Org's

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KUPAK
LtCol, USMC

Opn 0-10 31-45 Modified -2-
FROM: CO 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CO 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O 10 35-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X BE PREPARED TO RESUME ATK 0800 19 APR X PARA X 22D MAR.

REINF 2D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630 X BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 19 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF SPT DEF X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released: V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
18 Apr 45, 1700

Cpn C
No 36-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty and MGF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 19 Apr to destroy enemy forces in northern NOTOBU PENINSULA. ED present front lines. Eds and schema of maneuver:- Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Atk with main effort on the left to seize high ground in 0027 VICTOR and 0026 MIKE:- Opn overlay.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize high ground in 0327 PETER by flanking action from the east:- Opn overlay.
   c. 22d Mar (Reinf) 3d 3n 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Do of present positions on northern peninsula. Emphasize rapid junction of patrols moving south from KAMATA to those moving north from KAMATA MAN.
   e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of En remain present assembly area. Await orders.
   g. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
   h. 6th Ser 3n: Execute normal missions.
   i. 6th MT 3n: Execute normal missions.
   j. Military Govt Co: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

   X. (1) Assault Regiments maintain patrols north of ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road to provide security for Engr and mine clearing activities.
   (2) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
   (3) Command take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.
4. Add details no change.

5. Location CPs: See overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC

D-3
1. Enemy guerrilla raiding and sabotage activities may be expected to intensify as organized resistance in northern OKINAWA comes to an end.

2. 6th Mar Div initiates active program to apprehend or destroy all enemy personnel engaged in guerrilla activities.

3. The following steps will be taken to implement the foregoing:
   a. All civilians, male and female, will be apprehended and assembled in concentration areas in accordance with further instructions to be issued by Civil Affairs Administration.
   b. All units will organize bivouac areas and supply and service installations for defense against night infiltration. Liberal use will be made of barbed wire, trip flares, ambushes, and coordinated security patrolling.
   x. (1) Orgn Contras will take steps to enforce rigid fire discipline within respective Conds to prevent promiscuous firing and consequent danger to friendly Trs.
   (2) All Orgns will submit to next higher Hqs a comprehensive plan for counter-infiltration security within their assigned areas.

4. Special munitions and materials required for execution available on demand through Div Ord 0 and Div QM.

5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special
Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6th MAR DIV
TO: 6th MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O HO 35-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X BE PREPARED TO RESUME ATK 0800 20 APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR AT CHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630 X BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 20 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF SPT DEF X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
Opn '0
No 35-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
   b. Air, Arty and NEF available on call.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv at 0600 20 Apr to seek out and destroy enemy forces remaining in northern MOTOSU PENINSULA, yes present front lines. Sds and scheme of maneuver:- Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Adv to north coast of MOTOSU PENINSULA within Z of action. Conduct vigorous patrols throughout Z of action to seek out and destroy small enemy groups remaining. Opn overlay. Move 1 Co by truck to relieve 6th Reo Co at 9630 XRAY prior to 0630 20 Apr. Co designated will continue to provide security for radar site in BISE area.
   b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Adv to north coast of MOTOSU PENINSULA in Z of action. Conduct vigorous patrolling to seek out and destroy small enemy groups remaining. Opn overlay.
   c. 22d Mar (Reinf) 3d Bn 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Dof of present positions on northern peninsula.
   e. 6th Tank En: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of En remain present assembly area.
   g. Reo Co: Upon relief by 4th Mar entruck and return to bivouac at 0612 UNCLE. Assemble and await orders.
   h. 6th Sor En: Execute normal missions.
   i. 6th MT En: Execute normal missions. Provide 10 2½ ton trucks at TOGUCHI at 0700 to transport 1 Co, 4th Mar, to 9630 XRAY; thereafter to transport 6th Reo Co from same point to bivouac at 0612 UNCLE.

Military Govt Co: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
x. (1) Assault Rgts take all possible measures to prevent
enemy individuals or groups from making their way
southward on the MOTOSU PENINSULA. All critical aven­
ues of approach will be covered by patrols or outposts.

(2) All civilians encountered will be apprehended and moved
to concentration area at TAIRA (1020 GEORGE).

4. Add details no change.

5. Location CPs: see overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Annex A - Opn overlay

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
6th Mar Div
In the field
20 Apr 45, 1300

Opn 0
No 45-45

Task Orgn

Amph Rcn En FMF Pac.

1. a. Sec current Int summaries and D-2 studios on SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA.

b. Friendly naval forces are operating in the NAGO-WAN-KUSHICHIN area.

2. 6th Mar Div undertakes Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA night of 20-21 Apr to locate suitable beaches for subsequent landings and to determine enemy strength and dispositions thereon.

a. Amph Rcn En FMF Pac: Execute Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA with force of not less than one Plat on each island. Locate beaches suitable for LVTs landing of a Reinf En. Determine enemy strength and dispositions in so far as possible without becoming engaged with a superior force. Return to mainland prior to dawn 21 Apr.

3. 4th Mar assume logistic responsibility for Rcn En elements in TOGUCHI area; 4/15 assume logistic responsibility for Rcn En elements in KATEHA KO area.

4. 6th Mar Div CP 0717 OBOE.

5. a. 6th Rcn En CP - CEUDA (0511 HA1T).

b. Commencing 1700 20 Apr establish radio contact on 5990 kcs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

Distribution: Special

Official:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

V. H. KULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG, III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0 NO 41-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ADV ON REACHING NORTHERN COAST NOTOBU PENINSULA X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS POSITIONS HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 15TH MAR SPT DEF X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INfiltrATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INTO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OCTO NO 42-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES PATROLLING AND SECURITY
OF ASSIGNED AREAS X 4TH MAR REINF CONDUCT PATROLS WITHIN 1500
YARDS OF PRESENT POSITIONS TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ANY REMAINING
ENEMY ELEMENTS ENCOUNTERED X 22R MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF
OF PRESENT POSITIONS IN NORTHERN PENINSULA X 29TH MAR REINF CON-
DUCT PATROLS WITHIN 1500 YARDS OF PRESENT POSITIONS TO SEEK OUT AND
DESTROY ANY REMAINING ENEMY ELEMENTS ENCOUNTERED X PARA X ALL
UNITS INTENSIFY LOCAL DEF PREPARATIONS X CONTINUE CONCENTRATION
OF CIVILIANS X MAKASHI PAREN 0430 PETER PAREN DESIGNATED ADDI-
TIONAL CONCENTRATION POINT FOR CIVILIANS APPREHENDED IN NORTHERN-
MOTOBU PENINSULA X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

234
6th Mar Div
In the field
21 Apr 45, 1100

1. a. See current Int summaries and D-2 studies on SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA.

   b. Friendly naval forces are operating in the NAGO WAK-KUSHICHIKIN area.

2. 6th Mar Div executes recon of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA 21 Apr to locate suitable beaches for subsequent landings and to determine enemy strength and dispositions thereon.

3. a. Amph Rec Bn FMF Pac, 1 Co 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd:

   (1) Execute daylight recon of YAGACHI-SHIMA 21 Apr with 1 Rec Co transported in LVT(A)S. Cover island thoroughly to determine whether enemy is in occupation, and if so in what strength. Avoid engagement with superior force. Return to mainland prior to darkness.

   (2) Execute recon of SESOKO-SHIMA after nightfall 21 Apr, employing 1 Rec Co. Pay particular attention to character of landing beaches in vicinity of 9524 QUEEN and VICTOR and to suspected enemy installations in vicinity of 9424 AILE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOC, FOX, GEORGE and HOW and in 9423 DOG, HOW and ITEM. Avoid engagement with superior force. Return to mainland prior to dawn 22 Apr.

   b. 15th Mar (Reinf): Attach 1 Armd Amph Co and FO team to Amph Rec Bn, FMF Pac, reporting at 0724 AILE prior to 1230 21 Apr.

4. 4th Mar assume logistic responsibility for Rec Bn elements in TOGUCHI area; Div QM assume logistic responsibility for Rec Bn elements in KATMA KO area.

5. a. 6th Mar Div CP 0717 OBOE.

   6th Rec Bn CP - CHUDA (0511 NAV).

   b. Establish radio contact on 5990 kcs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

Opn C No 47-45
Opn 0
No 44-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries and study of SESOKO-SHIMA.

b. Friendly naval craft are operating in the NAGO WASHI area.

2. 6th Mar Div lands on beach ABLE, east coast of SESOKO-SHIMA 0800 23 Apr 45 and destroys all enemy resistance thereon. Annex A Opn overlay.

3. a. 29th Mar (Reinf): Land 1 Br on beach ABLE, east coast SESOKO-SHIMA 0800 23 Apr. Destroy all enemy resistance encountered on island. Remainder of Regt less one (1) Br to be assembled in Res in vicinity of TOGUCHI.

b. 4th Mar, 1st Arm Amph Br (less Co C) Atchd; Spt Atk with not less than two Arty Ens. Provide one (1) Arm Amph Co to precede leading wave, providing direct fire Spt.

c. 4th Amtrac Br: Land elements of 29th Mar (Reinf). Carry assault waves 500 Yds inland. Upon discharge return to beach by most direct route, reporting to TOGUCHI for succeeding trips.

x. (1) Task group Comdrs submit detailed plans for execution of this order prior 0900 22 Apr.

(2) 4th Amtrac Br and designated Br 29th Mar assemble AWA prior to 1600 22 Apr. Embarkation for Opn will be accomplished at AWA beach.

4. a. All Trs carry one day's Kilo rations and two canteens of water.

b. Div QM establish supply point vicinity TOGUCHI for supply of units on SESOKO-SHIMA by LVT.

c. Evacuation of wounded to TOGUCHI via LVT thence by ambulance to Div field hospital at NAGO.
Opn C No 44-45 (Cont'd)

5. a. CPs:
   6th Mer Div 0717 CBOE.
   29th Mar 0725 HON.
   15th Mar 1020 GEORGE.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Annex At

Opn overlay

Distribution: Special

Official:

\[Signature\]

V. R. KEULAK
Lt Col, USMC
D-3
FROM: 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: 3RD MAR CORPS, 3RD MAR DIV
OPEN # NO 44-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUE CONTROL AND SECURITY OF ASSIGNED AREAS AND PREPARE TO SEIZE SENDAI-SHIMA X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PLOTTED POSITIONS X 22D MAR REINF 3D IN 1ST MAR ADVANCE CONTINUE DEF PLOTTED POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 32D MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PLOTTED POSITIONS X NOTT OUT AT 0930 22 APR BY MARSHALL X REMAIN OF REMAINING AREA X PARA X 2B X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN CLOSED X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN RETURN TO CLOSED X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN MARSHALL X PARA X ALL UNITS ARE IN SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT AREA X PARA X ALL UNITS 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ARE IN SUBSEQUE
DIV OPN O NO. 44-45
RYUKYU RETTO 1:25,000
BY COMMAND OF
MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:
J.G. McQUEEN
COL USMC

EMBARKATION POINT
APPROACH
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN 0 NO 45-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES PATROLLING AND SECURITY OF
ASSIGNED AREAS AND PREPARES TO SEIZE SESOKO-SHIMA X 4TH MAR REINFORCED
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X 22D MAR REINFORCED 3D BN 1ST MAR AT CHD
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X
29TH MAR REINFORCED CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X MOVE ONE BN AT
0730 22 APR BY MOTOR TO ANA PREPARED TO EMBARK 23 APR FOR ATK ON
SESOKO-SHIMA X MOVE REMAINDER OF REGT LESS ONE BN BY MOTOR AND
MARCHING TO TOGUCHI DURING DAY OF 22 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR SPT
DIV X BE PREPARED TO SPT ATK ON SESOKO-SHIMA X PARA X 6TH MT BN
PROVIDE 30 TRUCKS AT NAKASOFI (0626 TME) 0730 22 APR TO TRANSPORT
2/29 TO ANA X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST
INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released
V. H. KRULIK
LtCol, USMC
ACOFS, D-3
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CG 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG I II PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OP No 46-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES ORGN AND DEF OF ASSIGNED
AREA X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF PRESENT POSI-
TIONS X MOVE ONE BIT BY MOTOR TO VICINITY OF TAIRA PAREN 2522
OP PAREN 0730 23 APR X PREPARE TO MOVE ONE BY ON 24 APR TO VICINITY
OF ORIG/AREA PAREN 1313 JTG PAREN AND REMAINDER OF REINF ON 25 APR
TO VICINITY OF 1823 JTG X PARA X 229 MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND
DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF
PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF BE PREPARED TO FIRE IN
ANY PORTION OF 6TH MAR DIV AREA WITH AT LEAST ONE BN X PARA X 6TH
MOTOR TRANSPORT BN PROVIDE 30 TRUCKS AT 0030 HRS AT 0730 23 APR
TO TRANSPORT 3/4 TO TAIRA PAREN 2522 OBOE PAREN X ALL OTHER DETAILS
NO CHANGE X

Released:

[Signature]

V. H. Krulak
LtCol, USMC
D-3
Maps:  
(a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-RETTO  
(b) 1:100,000 RYUKYU-RETTO

Task Orgn

a. 4th Mar (Reinf)  
4th Mar  
Co A 6th Med Bn  
1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn  
1st Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)  
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)  
1st Mar War Dog Plat  
1st Band Sec

b. 22d Mar (Reinf)  
22d Mar  
Co B 6th Med Bn  
1st Plat Co B 6th MT Bn  
2d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)  
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)  
2d Band Sec

c. 29th Mar (Reinf)  
29th Mar  
Co C 6th Med Bn  
1st Plat Co C 6th MT Bn  
3d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)  
3d Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)  
3d Band Sec

d. Div Arty  
15th Mar  
1st Armd Amph Bn

e. Tank Gp  
6th Tank Bn  
Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co  
5th Prov Rocket Det
f. Engy Co

Maj SACKURT

6th Engr En
Co D 1st Separate Engr En FMF Pac
3d Flt 1st Bomb Disp Co

g. 6th Ser En (less Dets)

LtCol BELL

h. 6th Med En (less Dets)

LtComdr COYAN

i. 6th IM En (less Dets)

LtCol GOULD

j. Mil Govt Co

LtCol MAY

k. Div Hq Trs

LtCol STEPHENSON

Hq En
6th JASCO (less Dets)

l. a. G-2 summaries as issued.

b. (1) Air and MF Spt available as required.

(2) III Phib Corps will garrison and defend OKINAWA and adjacent islands north of the BISHA GAWA.

(3) 1st Mar Div will garrison and defend OKINAWA from the BISHA GAWA north to the line YOFUKI-SUKI.

2. 6th Mar Div garrisons OKINAWA Island north of the line YOFUKI-SUKI. Organizes and defends area including islands of SESOKO SHIMA, YAGASHI SHIMA and KOURI SHIMA against sea and airborne Atk. Conducts patrolling within assigned sector to capture or destroy all remaining isolated bands of guerrillas. Defensive sectors and areas of responsibility Annex A Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol E coast at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay. Maintain one (1) En in readiness to move on three hours notice to Spt or reinforce any threatened sector.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol E coast at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay.

c. 23th Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol SESOKO SHIMA, YAGACHI SHIMA and KOURI SHIMA at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay.

d. Div Arty: Occupy designated areas. Spt defense with supplementary defensive fire for infantry regiments; paying particular attention to beaches suitable for large scale landings. Be prepared to fire in any sector with at least one (1) En.

e. Tank Op: Occupy assigned area. Conduct Rcn and prepare plans in coordination with sector Comdrs with a view to supporting defense in any sector by swift and decisive tank-infantry counter-Atk. Maintain one (1) Co available to move to any sector on one hour's notice.

f. Engr Op: Improve, maintain and construct defensive sector routes of communication. Be prepared to mine or destroy critical points in road net and critical bridges. Execute normal Engr missions as directed.

g. 6th Ser En (less Dets): Execute normal missions.

h. 6th Med En (less Dets): Execute normal missions.

i. 6th MT En (less Dets): Execute normal missions.

j. Mil Govt Op: Continue screening and rehabilitation native population. Apprehend and intern all able bodied males.

k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions with special emphasis on the control of traffic, marking lines of communication, villages and road junctions.

l. (1) This plan effective on receipt.
(2) All units submit plan of defensive fires and patrol plan 72 hours after occupying designated areas. C-3 will coordinate fire plans within Div Trs area.
(3) All units provide defense against Air Atk. (GO 5)
Opn O No 47-45 (Cont'd)

(4) Senior Troop Comdr of adjacent units will coordinate defensive fires on boundaries.

(5) Sector Comdrs emphasize patrolling of inland areas.

(6) All units pay particular attention to internal security of billeting and outpost areas to prevent infiltration and raids by guerrillas.

4. a. All units service equipment, particular attention to motor vehicles. Submit requisitions for shortages and prepare for future amphibious operations.

b. Unit distribution to 4th Mar (Reinf); 22d Mar (Reinf); 29th Mar (Reinf). Dp distribution all others.

c. Maintain 3-day levels of Classes I and III in unit Dps.

d. Maintain 2 U/F in unit Dps.

5. a. CPs and axis of Sig Com:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Mar Div</td>
<td>0717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Bn</td>
<td>0727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Engr Bn</td>
<td>0921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Med Bn</td>
<td>0716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Arm Amph Bn</td>
<td>0418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Sdr Bn</td>
<td>0617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th MT Bn</td>
<td>0618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. See Annex B (Sig Com).

c. Pyrotechnic Code.

Visual Sigs:

Meanings assigned to various Sigs will not be altered. If special Sigs are required, local units may assign meanings to Sigs left unassigned in the lists which follow.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN

Col, USMC

CofS
Annexes:

ABLE - Opn overlay
BAKER - Sig Com

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
0-3
Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn C No 47-45

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

1. C-2 summaries as issued.
2. This Sig 0 becomes effective upon receipt.
3. a. 6th Sig Co: operate and maintain existing Com agencies and be prepared to install additional facilities as required.
   (1) Scheduled messenger runs will leave Div CP at 0930 and 1500 daily. Special messenger service as required.
   (2) Radio nets will be established as follows:
       III Corps Comd (CW) - - - - - - 1918 kcs.
       III Corps Comd (Voice) - - - - - - 2404 kcs.
       Div Comd "A" (CW) - - - - - - - - - - - - - P. 2656 kcs.
       S. 5990 kcs.
       LAW (Voice) - - - - - - - - - - - - 3115 kcs.
   b. 6th JASCO, less SP Com Teams; furnish Com for SFO and AGL as required.
      (1) Subordinate units install, operate, and maintain signal system in their areas as required.
      (2) All units police existing wire lines, overhead where possible, and reroute as necessary to by pass all villages.
      (3) Time checks on Div Comd "A" daily at 1200 HRS.
      (4) Existing Jap telephone lines will not be destroyed or damaged.
      (5) Within 48 hours after receipt of this order, subordinate units will submit a complete line route map and circuit diagram to Div Sig O.
4. a. Div Sig Dump located in vicinity of Div CP.
    b. Sig repair facilities available at Div CP.
    c. Any enemy Sig equipment which may be discovered will be forwarded to Div Sig O.
5. a. ContCom Two, III Corps MARSOL, (Index 2-10) and 6th Div SOPSISG 2 are effective.
Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn 0 47-45 (Cont'd)

b. Div Sig 0 at Div CP.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Appendices:

1. Circuit Diagram
   (to be issued)
2. Pyrotechnic Code

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
G-3
Appendix 2, Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O No 47-45

PYROTECHNIC CODE

1. VISUAL SIGNALS:

Meanings assigned to various Sigs will not be altered. If special Sigs are required, local units may assign meanings to Sigs left unassigned in the lists which follow:

a. BY GROUND FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, green star cluster, M20A1</td>
<td>Arty or Gunfire or Bombs falling within own lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, amber star cluster, M22A1</td>
<td>Objective taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, white star, Prch, M17A1</td>
<td>(Use for illumination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, red star cluster, M52A1</td>
<td>Enemy landing in this sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, white star cluster, M58A1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. BY AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig, aircraft, double star red-red</td>
<td>Display front line markers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, aircraft, double star, green-green</td>
<td>My mission has been completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig, aircraft, double star, yellow-yellow</td>
<td>Not understood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The Sig meaning, "MY MISSION HAS BEEN COMPLETED", will be given at the time the last bomb is released by the last plane in the last group to participate in the particular mission.
Appendix 2, Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn 0 47-45 (Cont'd)

c. **COLORED SMOKES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig, ground, red smoke</td>
<td>Friendly Trs (one grenade or Sig, ground)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-35, or yellow smoke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-40 or equivalents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade, smoke M-18, in any one of following colors: green, red violet and yellow</td>
<td>Friendly front line (two or more grenades or Sigs, ground)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sigs, ground and grenades may be used simultaneously.

(1) White or Black smoke will be used for screening and will not have any meaning assigned.

d. **TANK FLAG SIGNALS DISPLAYED FROM TANK TURRET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orange Flag</td>
<td>Tank is low on Am and fuel; is pulling back to replenish supplies, but will return to lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Flag</td>
<td>Request Tp Com with ground Trs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:**

J. C. McQUEEN
Col., USMC
GofS

**Distribution:** Special

**Official:**

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol., USMC
G-3
(PRIORITY TO INFO ADD) 271800

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV
INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPT 0 NO 46-45 X LARGE ENEMY GROUP REPORTED VICINITY TAKEN ABLE 3024 X PARA X 6TH MAR DIV MOVES, IMMEDIATELY TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCE X PARA X 4TH MAR LENS 3/4 CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X MOVE ONE CO FROM 2/4 0730 28 APR TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR 3/4 SECTOR VICINITY TAIRO X PARA X 22D MAR 3/4 AT CHD MOVE 1/22 AND 3/22 IMMEDIATELY TOWARD REPORTED ENEMY POSITION WITH 1/22 EMPLOYING TRAIL INLAND FROM HAMA AND 2/22 EMPLOYING TRAIL INLAND FROM HICHI X PROCEED AS FAR INLAND AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO HALTING FOR NIGHT X MOVE 3/4 AT SUCH TIME AS WILL PERMIT DAY JUMP OFF FROM 3022 UNCLX X LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCE X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 19TH MAR SET ATK WITH AT LEAST ONE BN X PARA X 6TH MT BN PROVIDE 10 TRUCKS AT ORA 0730 28 APRIL TO MOVE ONE COMPANY 2/4 TO TAIRO X PARA X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGES X

Released

Y. H. KEULAX
LtCol, USMC
G-3

251