ANNEX A

TO

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III OKINAWA OPERATION

4TH MARINES
HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH MARINES
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD

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1. The purpose of this Special Action Report is to describe the activities of the 4th Marines as part of the Sixth Marine Division and III Amphibious Corps in southern Okinawa. The results of operations, lessons learned and recommendations made will be discussed. The period covered is from 1 May 1945 to 30 June 1945.

Chapter II: Task Organization

1. The following units were tactically attached to the 4th Marines during the entire southern Okinawa phase:
   - 1st Marine War Dog Platoon
   - 1st Platoon, Company A, 8th Motor Transport Battalion
   - 1st Platoon, 5th Ordnance Company
   - Air Ground Liaison Parties, 5th JASCO
   - Shore Fire Control Parties, 5th JASCO

2. The following units were tactically attached to the 4th Marines at certain stages of Phase III:
   - 5th Reconnaissance Company
   - 1st Battalion, 29th Marines
   - 1st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) US Army
   - 5th Provisional Rock Detachment
   - 3rd Platoon, 1st Bomb Disposal Company

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation

On 1 May the 4th Marines were bivouaced in assigned defense sector in northern Okinawa. The 1st Battalion, Regimental Weapons Company and Regimental Headquarters were assembled on the west coast and the 2d and 3d Battalions were on the east coast. Troops were rehabilitating and daily patrolling was conducted to reduce isolated enemy resistance in the sector.

The 27th Infantry Division was moved to northern Okinawa to relieve the 6th Marine Division, which was ordered to southern Okinawa as part of the III Amphibious Corps, prepared for offensive operations against the remaining enemy resistance. On 4 May the Regiment was moved by truck convoy 54 miles south to an assigned area near Beerawa, approximately 10 miles north of the front line.

On 13 May the regiment moved by truck convoy to relieve the 29th Marines on beach defense positions on the Okinawan west coast in the vicinity of Mabunato airfield when the 29th moved into the lines on the left of the 22d Marines. The regiment was in Div-
The division was meeting very heavy resistance in its battle for Naha, the capital of Okinawa. The other division in the III Amphibious Corps, the 1st Marine Division, was on the left of the 5th, and the army XXIV Corps was on the left of the III Amphibious Corps. The attack all along the line had been slowed to a walk by a very strong Jap defense built around the Shuri hill mass, with Yanbaru on the east and Naha on the west as the anchors of the line.

The 4th Marines relieved the 29th on the line on 19 May. The 22nd Marines and the 29th Marines had successively been badly mauled in making relatively limited advances. The terrain was broken by countless small hills, ravines, terraces and tombs. Every hill was a Japanese strong point and was undermined by elaborate tunnels with gun ports sighted for defense from all directions. They were all mutually supporting and the positions were well camouflaged and impregnable to any kind of artillery but a direct hit. There was little concealment and troop movements were under constant observation from the dominating Shuri hill mass on the left. The enemy was using mortar and artillery liberally and well.

The three depleted battalions of the 29th Marines which were on the lines were relieved by two 4th Marines Battalions, the 2d on the left and the 3d on the right. The relief was a very difficult maneuver and was accomplished at a cost of over 70 casualties, due mostly to mortar and artillery fire. The 4th had to practically fight its way into the lines and the 29th to fight its way out. All units of the 29th Marines were relieved at 1430. The 5th Marines of the 1st Marine Division was on the left and the 22d Marines were on the right with a static front line running generally along the north bank of the Agato River, a natural barrier.

The 4th Marines' front lines ran across two terrain features which had been and still were hotly contested. On the right the 3d Battalion lines ran across the top of the famous Sugar Loaf Hill, an elaborately honeycombed Jap strongpoint which had been taken, lost and retaken many times by the 22d and the 29th. All the countless caves on the north slope had been blasted shut, but there were Japs in the hill who were still defending it from the reverse slope by heavy knee-mortar fire. Enemy artillery fire registers on the top of the hill made it practically untenable. On the left the 2d Battalion had a slim foothold on Half Moon Ridge, a T-shaped ridge which commanded the regimental zone of action from the left. The ground around Sugar Loaf was littered with wrecked tanks and LVTs.

At about 1300 the enemy made a counterattack against the left flank, which was trying to hang on to that part of Half Moon Ridge which it then precariously held. The attack, which was supported by heavy mortar fire, was successfully broken up, 56 Japs being killed. The left flank was withdrawn from Half Moon to more favorable positions in the area.
able around 300 yards to the north, giving the regiment a tighter defensive line for the night. Sporadic heavy-caliber artillery fire harassed the entire regimental zone of action throughout the night, the reserve battalion, Weapons Company and the regimental CP included.

The objective for the next day's attack, 20 Nov, was the 0-2 line, running across the regimental zone of action just north of the Ato River, which runs east and west through the northern outskirts of Naha. Proceeded by heavy artillery barrages and supported by the 5th Tank Battalion, the 21st Chemical Mortar Company (Army) and the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment, the attack jumped off at 0200. The immediate objectives were Half Moon Hill on the left and King Hill on the right, both about 300 yards to the south of Sugar Loaf Hill. The 3rd Battalion assigned their reserve company the mission of clearing out the caves on the south slope of Sugar Loaf. Supported by tanks, this took until 1200.

The attack moved rapidly ahead for 200 yards, when strong opposition was met at both hills. Many machine guns and knee mortars shot from caves sharply slowed the advance. Artillery fire kept the troops off the tops of the hills. There was no concealment. The method of attack was to send the tanks out ahead, supported by infantry fire, to methodically close or reduce all visible caves facing the marines by fire from their 75mm guns and by flame from the two flame-throwing "Zippo" tanks which supported the attack. The marines then quickly closed in and resumed closing caves by portable flame throwers and demolitions. It was soon apparent that many tons of demolitions would be needed to blow the countless caves. Engineer demolitions teams were requested and were soon to work. A charge or smoke shell would be placed in one cave entrance and smoke and dust would come out five or six other entrances in the vicinity and on the other side of the hill. The number of casualties began to mount rapidly.

By 1300 the 3rd Battalion was on the forward slopes of King Hill, although several spurs running south from it were still in enemy hands. The 2nd Battalion on the left had a firm hold on both ends of Half Moon Ridge, the top of it being untenable because of artillery and mortar fire from the Shuri hill area. The attack was stopped at that point and contact was established all along the line for the night's defense. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire continued to harass the lines all night. At 0300 it suddenly increased on King Hill and was accompanied by enemy WP and colored smoke. A strong counterattack by an estimated 700 enemy was launched in the King Company sector. Baker Company of the regimental reserve was committed at 2214. With the aid of heavy, massed artillery, the counterattack was successfully broken up, the Japs losing approximately 500 men. At 0400, enemy activity once again indicated a possible Jap counterattack at the same place, but artillery quickly broke it up.
The attack to seize the O-3 line was resumed the following morning, 2 May, at 0800 with the 2d Battalion on the left, 3d Battalion on the right, and the 1st Battalion less Charlie Company committed in the center. Charlie Company was regimental reserve. Immediate objectives for the day were the remainder of Half Moon Ridge on the left and the south slopes of King Hill on the right. The attack progressed at a slow steady pace throughout the day against the same heavy resistance and enemy artillery fire. It started to rain in the afternoon, which slowed the attack even more. The method of attack remained unchanged. Closing and reducing caves with tanks, flame throwing tanks, portable flame throwers and plenty of demolitions was the order of the day. By 1730 the lines had been advanced an average of 300 yards. The 3rd Battalion lines were on the forward slopes of the noses running south from King Hill, and the 2d Battalion had reduced many cave positions on the western slopes of the ridge running south from Half Moon. The rainy night was spent in comparative quiet, the only enemy activity being about 30 Japs who had extricated themselves from partially sealed caves behind the 3rd Battalion lines. It was not until two hours later that the enemy troops were either killed or driven back into caves and quiet was restored.

The attack was resumed at 0900 the following morning, 23 May, to seize O-3 line. It was still raining. The lines had lengthened very much by this time, due to the fact that the 1st Marine Division on the left was stopped and, since responsibility for contact was from right to left, the regimental left flank was held back keeping contact with the 5th Marines. Consequently, the 2d Battalion, on the left, was ordered to organize and defend ground then held, while the 1st and 3d Battalions attacked to seize O-3 along the north bank of the Asato River. This line was seized at 1230, and orders were issued to organize and defend that line. Patrols were immediately sent across the shallow Asato River for a distance of 200 yards into the outskirts of Naha before they drew scattered fire.

The heavy, soaking rain continued, as did the sporadic heavy-caliber artillery and mortar fire. These factors, combined with heavy casualties, had greatly lowered the combat efficiency of the regiment and there was an increasing number of cases of exposure and exhaustion. The use of tanks was made increasingly difficult, and less effective as a consequence. Supply and evacuation were by amphibious tractor and Weasel, and even they were getting stuck in the sticky red mud. One favorable factor was that the quantity of enemy artillery received was decreasing.

It was still raining hard the next morning, 23 May. Patrols were sent across the river again. They received machine gun fire from several guns concealed in the high ground about 500 yards south of the river. At 1130 the Asato River was crossed, 1st Battalion on the left and 3rd Battalion on the right. A bridgehead...
was rapidly established against light opposition. The day's objective was an east-west ridge 500 yards south of the river. The advance moved ahead smoothly against scattered small arms fire until 1315, when resistance suddenly increased. As had been suspected, the high ground was hollow with defensive positions, many Okinawan tombs in the forward face of it adding to the defensive capabilities. Heavy machine gun fire and knee-mortar fire from the reverse slope of the ridge slowed the advance to a crawl. During the late afternoon, enemy artillery and heavy mortar fire once more began falling in the lines. The attack was halted 100 yards short of the objective, and orders were issued to organize and defend in high ground held. It was still raining, and the ground a sea of mud. Supply and evacuation to the lines across the river was by head, even the LVTS bogged down. The boundary between divisions was changed. Consequently, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines had relieved our 2d Battalion on the left by 1400, and the 3d Battalion moved up to the right to relieve the left company of the 1st Battalion to ease the tension in the strained lines. The 22d Marines were still in position on the 4th's right, along the north bank of the Arato River. However, the direction of the attack of the bridgehead was southwest, the continuation of which would soon envelop the ground on the south side of the river opposite the 22d, since the river was too great an obstacle to warrant a crossing by the 22d. The engineers were struggling to get a bridge across the river.

The night was quiet except for occasional rounds of enemy artillery and the continuing rain. It had been raining constantly for three days and all hands were wet and miserable.

The next morning, 24 May, the 2d Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 29th Marines, who assumed responsibility for the defense of that line, which still ran almost north and south due to the fact that the 1st Marine Division on the left was still not advancing. The orders for the day were to organize and defend the ground held. Bridging operations across the river continued and supplies were replenished. The 3d Battalion moved to relieve the battered 3rd Battalion on the right, which, upon relief at 1300, moved to an assembly area in regimental reserve. None of the companies had over 90 men. A Bailey bridge and two foot-bridges across the river were completed late in the afternoon, and immediately became targets for enemy artillery. The 5th Reconnaissance Company, which had been attached to the regiment the previous afternoon for use as regimental reserve, when all three battalions and the weapons company were on the line, reverted back to division control when the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines were ordered up to an assembly area just south of the river. They were attached to the 22d. 

245 The attack was resumed in the rain the next morning, 25 May,
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The regiment continued to organize and defend the ground held on 26 May. Supplies and ammunition were moved up and reorganized as much as possible. Patrols were sent to the front and discovered no organized enemy resistance within 300 yards.

Patrols were again sent out the following morning, 27 May, with the same results, meeting only scattered rifle fire. The 2d Battalion 22d Marines established themselves on the right of the regiment, with their right flank on the beach. The advance was therefore resumed to seize the rest of Naha with two regiments abreast. The 4th Marines with 1st Battalion on the left, 2d Battalion on the right were to seize the O-F line. The 3rd Battalion was ordered up to fill in on the left flank between the 3rd Battalion 22d and the 1st Battalion 4th. The 3rd Battalion 22d still stretched north to maintain contact with the 1st Marine Division, who were still held up.

At 1700 all units were on the O-F line. At 2000 the 1st Battalion returned to parent control. Spasmodic shelling continued to fall on the front line areas. The rains continued.

The 29th Marines commenced relieving the 4th Marines 0700 the next morning, 28 May. Units were again shelled during the relief, causing some casualties. The regiment moved by motor and marching to beach areas vacated by the 29th Marines north of the Naha airfield.

The troops were utterly exhausted. The battalions were badly depleted, having taken a total of over 1100 casualties during the nine days in the line while destroying 2035 Japs. Almost 13 inches of rainfall during the same period and the constant battering from...
enemy heavy artillery and mortar fire greatly lowered the health, morale and combat efficiency of the troops. They had cracked the
main Naha-Shuri defense line despite many Jap reserves thrown at
them, but the price had been high and the struggle had been bit­
ter.

The regiment, in division reserve, rested and rehabilitated
while the 22d and 29th Marines continued the attack to seize the
remainder of Naha. Replacements were received and assimilated
into the regiment.

On 1 June the regiment received a warning order to prepare
to make an amphibious landing 3 days later on the north-west tip
of Oroku Peninsula, which lay just across the bay south of Naha
in an east-west direction, 3000 yards wide and 5000 yards long.
The prized Naha Airfield, the biggest on Okinawa, was located on
the western tip of the peninsula.

The 6th Marines' mission was to land on designated beaches
on the northwest tip of Oroku Peninsula and seize 0-J line, pre­
pared to: (1) continue attack to seize 0-K; or (2) have the
29th Marines pass through left elements, and thereafter to con­
tinue the attack to seize 0-K line with regiments abreast. Kin­
day was designated as 4 June. Hour Hour was set tentatively for
0545.

The designated beaches were about 200 yards wide, protected
by a rough coral shelf approximately 200 yards wide. It was the
only place to land, a sea-wall surrounding the rest of the Penin­
sula. The regiment assigned them designations as Beaches RED 1
and RED 2.

It was decided to land two battalions abreast, the 2d on the
left and the 3rd on the right. The landing was to be a shore-to
shore landing, the trip to be made in LVTs. Only 70 LVTs were
available, and many of them were in very bad condition due to
the heavy use of them the previous ten days in the rain and mud.
The LVTs were to be preceded by LVT(A)s. Company B of the 3rd Ar­
cored Amphibian Battalion was assigned to support the attack. Com­
pany C of the 6th Tank Battalion was assigned to support the
attack initially. The 91st Chemical Mortar Company (USArmy) and
the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment were attached to the regi­
m, and were assigned the mission of supporting the attack by
prearranged and called fires from positions in Naha on the north­
side of Naha Bay.

The Oroku Peninsula was heavily worked over by naval gunfire,
air and artillery on May 2d and 3d. A conference of all partici­
cipating units was held the afternoon of 3 June, at which time de­
tails were ironed out and the operations order was issued.
The shore-to-shore movement was a comparatively simple one. There were no wave guides, control boats or any other control agency other than radio communication between tractors. The Line of Departure ran east-west 1200 yards north of the designated beaches. The Line of Departure was marked by a red beacon on the Naha shore pointing straight west.

The troops embarked in the LVTs according to waves and, preceded by LVT(A)s, proceeded south in column. All three battalions were bivouacked along the beach, the 1st the farthest north and the 3rd the farthest south. Consequently, the running time from the battalion assembly areas to the Line of Departure was computed, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions and regimental headquarters were given definite times at which to get underway from the beach off their bivouac areas. The two battalions proceeded south off the Okinawa west coast in two columns 400 yards apart, the 1st Battalion on the outboard side, since they were landing on the west beach, RED 2. Then the lead LVT(A) of each battalion column reached the Line of Departure, they signalled column left, and each separate wave executed column left. When all tractors had completed the movement, all tractors executed ship right, and the seven waves headed for the beach according to plan, 2d Battalion on the left and 1st Battalion on the right. Four LCTs carrying 20 tanks followed the assault waves in, followed by 10 LCTs carrying elements of the Weapons Company. Regimental headquarters was landing on order, but was tentatively scheduled to land immediately after the last troop wave. A designated number of LVTs were scheduled to return for the 3rd Battalion, while the rest of them were to proceed immediately to a forward supply dump to start moving supplies to the beach as soon as possible.

The landing was preceded by heavy naval gunfire and artillery concentrations by 15 battalions of artillery, with good observation from Observation Posts on the north side of Naha Bay, which was only 1000 yards across at its widest point. The 8th Reconnaissance Company occupied Ono-yama island at 0500 King-Day. Ono-yama island was a tiny island in the center of Naha Bay, and was the center point of a damaged bridge which ran between Naha and Oroku Peninsula.

Troops embarked and the LVTs got under way according to schedule on King Day. However, things started to go wrong about half was to the LD. Amphibians of the 1st Battalion started to break down. A total of nine tractors broke down. Some of them were able to get underway a little later, but troopers in others had to be picked up by the several available spare LVTs in regimental headquarters. The result was that elements of two companies of the 1st Battalion did not land on schedule.
Intelligence indications showed that the Peninsula was defended by between 1200-1500 Japanese naval troops, but there were no indications of activity or defense of the landing beaches.

The first wave hit the beach at 0558. Resistance on the beach was light, consisting of scattered machine gun fire and fire from one 20mm gun. When the troops were 300 yards inland the resistance increased, with knee mortars being added to increasing machine gun fire. The terrain was very open and was generally flat, although several 50 to 100-feet hillocks broke up the flatland. The entire central, southern and western parts of the Peninsula consisted of ridges and sharp hills, the highest one of which was 62 meters high. The small hills captured initially were not defended, but an inspection showed that they were honeycombed with tunnels and had firing ports on all sides, an indication of what was to come.

The tanks landed on schedule and were immediately sent to support the advance on the left, since the main resistance was from the center and left. Four M-7 self-propelled 105mm Howitzers were soon landed and were also sent immediately to support the attack. They were both very effective and the attack ground ahead slowly against increasing opposition on the left. At 0850 the 3rd Battalion landed and were committed on the right. The advance continued with three battalions on the line. All units reported on the O-J line at 1045, and they were ordered to continue the attack to O-K. By 1300, the 2d Battalion 29th had landed and were relieving the 2d Battalion 4th in the 29th Marines' zone of action. By 1430 the 3rd Battalion 29th was ashore relieving the right elements of our 3d Battalion. At 1700 the 2d Battalion was in an assembly area in regimental reserve and the attack ceased. The lines were 1500 yards in from the beach and included part of Naha Airfield. The resistance had stiffened all along the line as the troops had moved inland. Many mines of all types were encountered and the mine-disposal teams were swamped with work. As in the battle for Naha, demolitions and demolition personnel were immediately employed in sealing the many caves. Very heavy rains in the afternoon had slowed the attack, as had the mines.

The attack to seize the O-K line was resumed at 0730 the next morning, 5 June, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right. Heavy resistance was met immediately all along the line. The type of resistance was similar to that experienced in the battle for Naha. The attack was now into terrain broken by many sharp hills, all of which were tunneled extensively and had machine guns sighted for all round defense. The hills were all mutually supporting. The number of machineguns was unusually high, due to two factors: The naval guard force defending the Peninsula had an unusually large number of organic machineguns; and many aircraft machineguns had been stripped from the many wrecked planes on Naha Airfield. There was considerable knee-
mortar fire too, but there was very little heavy mortar and no artillery fire, which was a relief to all hands. However, the Japs introduced a new weapon to chill the marines: an eight-inch rocket. There seemed to be many launchers, and the rockets seemed to be firing at no particular target. Their accuracy was poor but the concussion was terrific. Fortunately, there was little fragmentation.

Due to the muddy ground it was possible to use tanks in direct support only on the right, where they skirted the seawall and came up on the airfield to support the 3rd Battalion, which was battling to overcome an enemy strongpoint in the high ground just east of the airfield. The attack was slow and steady. The 1st Battalion was meeting strong resistance all along the line. Difficulty of supply and evacuation also hindered the attack. There just weren't enough LVTs to go around. The attack ceased at 1700, and the lines had been advanced 1000 yards during the day. The 3rd Battalion had cracked the strongpoint beside the airfield, and now controlled 75% of the airfield.

The attack was resumed the following morning to seize the O-K line. The 1st Battalion was stopped almost immediately by heavy fire from "Little Sugar Loaf" Hill, a strongly-defended dominating hill in the center of their line. The muddy roads were pocked by shell and bomb craters, which prevented tanks or M-7 self-propelled 105mm howitzers from supporting the attack by direct fire. Tank dozers and armored bulldozers were immediately put to work, but the progress was slow, and was slowed even more by the constant danger of mines, which were still being discovered in abundance. On the right the 3rd Battalion was receiving some heavy-caliber and some 30mm fire from Senaga Shima, a small rocky island lying about 1000 yards off the Peninsula's southwest coast. Air strikes, naval gunfire and artillery soon silenced the big guns, but 20mm fire was still being received spasmodically, and the air strikes continued. The 3rd Battalion attack moved rapidly against scattered small-arms fire over comparatively flat terrain, and the airfield was soon completely in American hands. The 1st Battalion suffered moderate casualties in unsuccessful attempts to take "Little Sugar Loaf" without the aid of direct fire support from tanks or M-7s.

At 1615 the 2d Battalion was ordered to relieve the left company of the 3rd Battalion, since the 3rd's advance had stretched the line thin. The relief was completed at 1810. When the attack was halted good gains had been made on the right, with only local gains on the left. The day had been warm and clear, and the roads and ground were drying out.
At 0730 7 June the 3d Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion, who reverted to regimental reserve. By this time tanks, 105mm's and 37mm guns were all brought to bear on "Little Sugar Loaf". The attack of the 3d Battalion to take it was coordinated with the 3rd Battalion and the hill was captured at 1100 by George Company who had flanked it from the right. Heavy machinegun fire continued to meet both battalions. The 2d Battalion successively took two small hills to their front. All possible supporting weapons were successfully brought to bear. The first hill was taken by a wide flanking movement from the right, Easy Company passing through the Item Company of the 3rd Battalion to attack it while Item Company supported the attack by fire. In taking the next hill, a unique method was employed. The forward face of the hill Easy Company was on was swept by enemy fire. Rather than have the troops advance down the face of the hill, the troops moved through the hill through a Jap tunnel. A fire team was sent through first, followed quickly by a section of machineguns. The line continued to be built up on both sides of the base of the hill, and the troops were soon advancing to the next hill. This maneuver was very successful employed several times when the circumstances demanded it.

The attack forged ahead slowly against the same still resistance. Machinegun fire came from everywhere. The countless caves were methodically being cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame and demolitions. The resistance being encountered indicated that the Peninsula was defended by a stronger force than the 1200-1500 previously estimated. Captured documents and POW's substantiated this, showing (1) that a number of naval troops which had originally been ordered south to Itohama had been ordered back to help defend the Peninsula and (2) that the number of naval troops on Okinawa was considerably more than anticipated because of the addition of Okinawan conscripts to the ranks. The fighting was tough, many Japs being killed, and our casualties were mounting.

The 3rd Battalion attack was advancing more rapidly southward along the Peninsula's south coast, and at 1515 they reported high ground at the southeast base of the Peninsula captured. However, they were driven off by very heavy machinegun fire from their left and front; so they formed a strong defensive position around the next high ground to the west. It was a hot spot, and supplies had to be brought up to the lines after dark. The 3rd Battalion lines extended in a south-easterly direction across north while the 2d Battalion, on their left, was still attacking toward the south east. The boundary between the 6th Marines and the 26th Marines ran southeastward down the middle of the Peninsula.
The next morning, 9 June, the 1st Battalion was committed on the right of the 3rd Battalion, and the battalion boundaries were changed so that the 3rd and 1st Battalions were attacking in a northeasterly direction, directly toward the regimental boundary. The 2nd Battalion's zone of action was in an easterly direction, forming a junction with the 3rd Battalion's at the boundary between the 4th and 29th. The regiment seemed to be attacking in a counter-clockwise circle.

The type of resistance remained unchanged. The maximum use was made of all available supporting fires by tanks, M-7s, 37mm AT guns, .50-cal. Machineguns and fire by other infantry units. Battalions coordinated their attacks so as to aid each other, and the maximum use was made of maneuver. The attack was slow and steady. Use of much maneuver together with close coordination with other units and of all supporting fires kept the casualties to a minimum, considering the nature of the enemy's strong defenses. Hundreds of pounds of demolitions were being used in scaling caves, and mines of all types continued to be detected and removed.

The attack the next day, 9 June, was similar to the previous days. The front lines were advancing into the high ground and the direction of attack was still northeast toward the boundary between the 4th and 29th Marines. The 29th, which was attacking southeast in its zone of action, was held up by strong resistance. The rest of the Tenth Army line, meanwhile, had advanced south so that the 22d Marines were advancing northwest from the base of the Peninsula. Consequently, the Japs remaining on the Peninsula were trapped, with the 22d on the west, the 29th on the east, the 4th on the south, and the 22d on the east.

The advance was still slow and tedious against the bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machinegun, and there was still some light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount, and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to have been defending the Peninsula, and there were still plenty of enemy troops who were contesting every inch of ground. A general advance of about 300 yards was made during the day, except on the left flank, where very strong resistance plus the fact that the 29th was stopped cold and responsibility for contact was ours, impeded the advance.

The next day, 10 June, the momentum of the attack picked up. The 2d Battalion on the left broke through and seized successfully Hills 55 and 58, two bulwarks in the Jap defensive system which had been holding them up. The 3rd and 1st Battalions were also
advancing against diminishing resistance. The battalion boundaries were changed so that the 3rd Battalion would be squeezed out by the advancing 2nd and 1st Battalions. With the 29th attack still stalled by a heavy pocket of resistance, the 2d Battalion stretched out along the boundary between regiments, its left flank tied in with the right flank of the 29th.

At 1330 the 3rd Battalion was pinched out as contact was established between the 2d and 1st Battalions. The 3rd assembled in regimental reserve. The 1st Battalion had been advancing northeast along a ridge which was defended more lightly than expected. Their right flank was advancing along the boundary between the 4th and 22d Marines, who were advancing from the southeast. At 1430 the 1st Battalion reported they were on Hill 58, the point where the regimental boundaries of the 22d and 29th Marines joined. The 4th was on its boundary all along the line, which was its objective. Consequently, it was pinched out, or would have been had the 22d and 29th advanced far enough in their respective zones of action.

The 22d Marines were abreast of the 4th on the right, and a big ridge of high points extended from a point between the 22d and 4th front lines north to Naha Bay. Consequently, the regimental boundaries were again changed, and the 4th had a zone of action approximately 600 yards wide extending to Naha Bay. The 22d was advancing abreast of the 4th in their zone of action toward the Bay. The 29th was advancing slowly against stubborn resistance. The pocket which held the remaining Jap resistance was becoming increasingly smaller, and as a consequence, fires had to be carefully coordinated. No supporting fires could be used except mortars, and soon only 60mm mortars could safely be employed.

The regiment resumed the attack north to the water at 0730 the following morning, 11 June. The 1st and 2d Battalions were ordered to remain in position, and the 3rd Battalion was ordered to pass through right elements of the 1st Battalion and attack in the new regimental zone of action. Item Company moved out and were immediately met by a hail of fire from Hill 52 to their right front and the ground surrounding it. The attack was stalled. Item Company finally fought its way part way up the hill with the aid of tank support, which was brought to bear only after two tanks were knocked out by land mines and another route was found for the tanks. The 2d Battalion from their vantage point on their high ground on the left, was supporting the attack of both the 29th Marines and the 3rd Battalion by fire of their own weapons and also M-7 105mm self-propelled howitzers. King Company was sent around to attack Hill 52 from the right, coming through the 22d Marines' zone of action. It was getting late and the attack to seize the hill failed, so the lines were withdrawn slightly and dug in for the night.
The attack to seize the hill was resumed the next morning, 12 June, Item Company advancing frontally, King Company advancing from the right. At 1030, Love Company was committed between the two assault companies. Heavy machinegun fire was still being received from numerous well concealed caves on the hill and in hills and draws surrounding it. At 1225 Hill 62 was captured, and the attack continued. The advance was slow, the front line troops methodically cleaning out all resistance and sealing caves as they advanced. As the day ended the front lines were 500 yards from Naha Bay and had only one more large hill to clean out.

The attack was resumed the following day, 13 June. The advance was steady against diminishing opposition, and there was every indication that the remaining Jap defenders were completely disorganized. The 29th Marines suddenly broke through the stubborn pocket of resistance which had been holding them up. Their advance southeast in their zone of action was rapid, and the 2d Battalion and then the 1st Battalion were pinched out as the 29th advanced past them. The 22d Marines were on the high ground next to the beach in their zone of action, and the 3rd Battalion was advancing rapidly toward the beach. The battle soon turned into a rout. Japs jumped out of their holes, threw down their weapons and ran. Some surrendered. Many of them committed suicide by blowing themselves up with grenades. The front lines advanced to the sea wall and the battle of Oroku Peninsula was over. All units were ordered to assembly areas as the day ended.

The battle had been a bitter and costly one. The regiment had accounted for 2923 Japs killed or captured. The price: 89 killed and 511 wounded in the 4th Marines. The regiment had captured over 75% of Oroku Peninsula in their advance which had progressed in a big counter-clockwise circle, the left flank at the end being only 3000 yards from the point where we landed. The troops were tired, and the large number of casualties had again cut down the combat efficiency.

The 4th Marines stayed in unit assembly areas, patrolling daily in the assigned regimental sector, mopping up and sealing caves. More replacements were received and assimilated into the regiment. It was indeed a much different regiment from the one which had originally landed on the island.

Meanwhile, the Tenth Army had advanced southward until the Japs were trapped in an area of only 13 square miles. The 1st Marine Division was advancing in the III Amphibious Corps zone of action on the right and needed help. The 6th Marine Division passed through the right elements of the 1st Marine Division on 17 June, advancing in its assigned zone of action in column of regiments, the 22d Marines leading off.
The 4th Marines moved to an assembly area north of Mezado Ridge on 19 June, the movement completed at 1400. In compliance with division order, the 3rd battalion was ordered to move into defensive positions along the left (east) end of Kawanga Ridge, attached to the 22d Marines for the night.

The 4th Marines were ordered to attack in the Division zone of action the following morning, 20 June, to seize, with the main effort on the left, the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass at the southern tip of the island, Ara-Saki, and to destroy enemy remaining in the division zone of action. The 1st Battalion proceeded at dawn from their assembly area to come into position on Kawanga Ridge on the 3rd Battalion's right. The 8th Marines, attached to the 1st Marine Division, were on the left. Tanks were supporting the attack. The initial objective was small but commanding Ibaru Ridge, which stretched across the left side of the zone of action 500 yards across open, flat terrain from the front line on Kawanga Ridge. One battalion of the 22d Marines were on the west end of Kawanga Ridge, with orders to support the attack and protect the right flank by fire from their positions.

The attack jumped off at 0815 with two battalions abreast. Resistance was encountered by both battalions, the 3rd Battalion on the left meeting the heaviest resistance, consisting of small arms fire and knee mortar fire. By 0950 both battalions had fought their way up to and on Ibaru Ridge. The 2d Battalion moved from its assembly area to a new area north of Kawanga Ridge and were then ordered in on the right of the 1st Battalion to protect the right flank by echeloning to the right rear and to patrol the open ground to the west to the sea. The attack continued against stiffening resistance. At 1400 the 1st Battalion reported that Charlie Company was up to the first ridge in the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass.

At this time the 29th Marines were ordered in on the regiment's right, and a regimental boundary was issued. The bulk of the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass still loomed up in the 4th Marines' zone of action, a great, sheer-faced, rugged coral ridge. By 1700 the 3rd, 1st and 2d Battalions were lined up at the rocky foot of the ridge, and were catching plenty of fire from the holes and crevices in the jagged coral. By 1830 the 2d Battalion had been relieved by one battalion of the 29th Marines, and it was ordered to an assembly area in regimental reserve. The attack was stopped for the night.

During the day the 1st Marine War Dog Platoon was used to thoroughly comb the rear areas for the many by-passed Japs, 76 in the day's bush-beating in the low ground next to the sea.
At 1600 the Weapons Company landed on a small island 300 yards off the coast and secured it, killing 20 Japs, taking 5 prisoners, and destroying several machineguns and mortars. The Weapons Company and one battery of LVT(A)'s had been shelling the island earlier in the afternoon, when suddenly several Japs came out with their hands in the air and surrendered, wading across the coral shelf to the mainland. One of them was sent back to induce the rest of the Japs on the island to surrender. The answer that came back from the Japs was a definite no, and also included a remark which was not exactly complimentary to the marines. So a task force was immediately organized, consisting of the LVT(A)'s, two 37mm Platoon's organized as infantry, and the 1st Marine War Dog Platoon. Under the command of the Commanding Officer of the Weapons Company, the island was immediately stormed and was cleaned out without a casualty.

The attack to seize the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass was resumed the following morning with the 3rd Battalion on the left and the 1st on the right. On the regiment's left, the 8th Marines were on the beach on the southern end of the island. The 3rd Battalion started flanking action from the east by sending one company around the east end of the rocky ridge. The 2nd Battalion received heavy fire from Hill 72 to their immediate front. Since the frontage was wide, the 2nd Battalion was ordered in on the right of the 1st Battalion to take over the right 400 yards of their assigned zone of action. At 1025, the 3rd Battalion reported that Item Company had its left flank on the beach and was working up to the high ground in very rugged and heavily overgrown terrain. The 1st Battalion worked slowly up the steep side of Hill 72 in a frontal attack, and were taking a beating doing.*

The 2nd Battalion were working up the sides of Hill 80 from the right, and at 1600 was on top of it, trying to support the attack of the 1st Battalion by fire. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion had secured a foothold on the other end of the hill mass by capturing a big hill on the west flank. Both the 3rd and the 2nd Battalions sent out patrols to the south, who reported almost negative results. The 3rd Battalion had meanwhile fed Love Company around the left (east) flank next to the beach, facing west. They immediately reported much activity in the rocky and heavily overgrown cliffs at the water's edge. There proved to be hundreds of natives there, in addition to many soldiers of Japanese, Okinawan or Korean origin, none of whom apparently had much fight left in him. LCI boats with loudspeakers were off the beach instructing them all to surrender. Then started a parade of surrenders which was certainly unique in Pacific fighting. Between 1700 and dark, hundreds of Okinawans and over 500 prisoners-of-war bearing surrender pamphlets had filed through our lines.
It definitely appeared that the bulk of the Japs who were still fighting were in the caves and crevices of the jagged coral Kiyamu-Gusuku Hill mass. The 1st Battalion's frontal attack was still meeting no success. The day's attack ended with troops on either end of the rugged ridge, but with troops on the north face of it no further than they were the previous night.

Since continuation of a frontal attack was obviously out of the question, it was decided to attack the ridge from the rear. It was to be a double envelopment, and the direction was going to change 180 degrees, from straight south to straight north! The plan was for the 1st Battalion to hold in their positions on the north side of the ridge while the 3rd Battalion and the 2d Battalion worked around the south side of the ridge, made contact, and attacked in a northerly direction.

At 0930 contact was established between the 2d and 3rd Battalions, and supported by tanks, they worked north to seize the objective. Against moderate resistance the marines surged over the top of Hill 72 and the rest of the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass at 1020 and immediately went to work with the flame throwers and demolitions to finish off the Japs who were in the various natural and artificial caves, crevices and holes in the jagged coral ridge.

All organized resistance had ended in the Division zone of action. More hundreds of Okinawans were coming out of their holes, and many soldiers continued to surrender. All the ground in the Ara-Saki area, the southern tip of the island, was secured, and the battle was over. At 1400 word was received that all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended as of 1305 22 June. Hopping up continued and in late afternoon, the battalions moved back to assembly areas.

The next day, 23 June, the three battalions and Weapons Company were assigned sectors of responsibility to mop up. In the first few days, several hundred Japs were killed or surrendered. However, the number fell off sharply as the entire area was thoroughly scoured.

During the battle for the Ara-Saki, 2753 Japs were killed or captured, the proportion of them surrendering being unusually high. In the fighting, 61 more officers and men of the 4th Marines had given their lives, while 263 were wounded.

On 26 June, the regiment started to move to its assigned rest and rehabilitation areas on Oroku Peninsula.

By 30 June the 4th Marines were rehabilitating on Oroku Peninsula, awaiting shipping to take the regiment off the island.
Discussion of the following points is based on additional experience in Phase III in southern Okinawa. The discussion in the regimental special action report for Phases I and II holds true except as modified by the following comments and recommendations:

**Naval Gunfire Support:**

During Phase III a total of 10,665 rounds of naval gunfire was expended in support of the 4th Marines. 233 call-fire targets were fired, using both ground and air spot. Some of this fire was counter-battery fire, and was reported to be very effective. 61 night harassing targets were fired, results unobserved. Illumination was required during 19 nights, and 1,107 star shells were fired.

An unusual use was made of Naval Gunfire facilities during Phase III on two occasions. This was the use made of the naval spotting plane in spotting bombs dropped during air strikes. The correction spot was given by plane to the NAF liaison officer at the battalion calling the air strike. The NAF liaison officer relayed the spot to the AGL team of the battalion, who in turn relayed the spot to the Air headquarters who were in contact with the planes making the strike.

During Phase III, the same spotting frequencies were kept for a period of several days, which was an improvement over the frequent changing of frequencies as was the case in Phase I and II.

A half-hour of preparation fire consisting of 350 rounds of 5" and 8" was laid down on the two beaches on Oroku Peninsula on which the regiment landed on 4 June. The results of this fire was apparently effective.

**Air Support:**

Bad weather prevented close air support during much of the battle for Naha, and with the exception of the first several days of each action, the battles for Oroku Peninsula and Aka-Saki Peninsula were fought in so close quarters that air strikes were unfeasible except for a very small percentage of time. During the favorable flying weather many strikes were called with apparently excellent results. Planes were usually plentiful, although the time lag between the request and the delivery of the strike is still too great. It is again strongly recommended that communication arrangements be made so that the AGL officer with the battalion may contact the pilot directly.
Artillery Support:

Massed artillery was used almost constantly during Phase III. On one occasion, a favorable target was fired on by 21 battalions at once. Artillery was effective in keeping Japs well in their holes in the forward faces of the hills and ridges, but was ineffective at reducing the positions or killing the Japs except in case of a direct hit. Night harassing fire with Time-on-Target concentrations on suspected troop concentrations or road junctions was apparently very effective, since enemy troop movements all had to be made at night.

Tanks:

Tanks were easily the outstanding support weapon in Phase III fighting. Without them the casualty figures would have been much higher than they were. With the Japs' defenses entirely underground and from fortified strongpoints, all mutually supporting, an infantry attack not supported by tanks is murderous, as was discovered by this regiment on several occasions when the mud prohibited close support by the tanks. When Japs are defending the reverse slopes of hills, as they so often do, the tanks can, protected by infantry fire, circle the hill and bring fire to bear on the Jap emplacements. It is recommended that each tank company have a platoon of flame-throwing "Zippo" tanks in addition to the present organization. The "Zippo's" were invaluable time after time in cleaning out enemy strongpoints.

Tank parks and night assembly areas should be kept as far forward as possible. On several occasions the attack had to be held up in the morning due to the late arrival of the tanks. If the tank park is too far back, it recommended that the tank bivouac in the vicinity of the regimental CP, and have supplies brought up to the tanks.

Amphibian Tractors:

Considering the short time for planning the amphibious operation against Oroku Peninsula and the lack of wave guides or control boats, it is felt that the amphibian tractors had a large part in the success of the landing. However, it is strongly recommended that a landing never be risked again because of LVTs in poor condition. In this operation, it was known before the landing took place that the amphibian tractors were in poor condition, due to their hard use for supply and evacuation in the rain and mud the previous ten days. As a consequence, nine LVTs failed to land on schedule. Had the beach been strongly defended, this might have been the difference between success and disaster.
LVTs were invaluable in the supply and evacuation for the regiment during the battle for Naha and during the first two days on Oroku. They were the only type of vehicle consistently getting through the heavy mud to the front lines. Without them the attack would have bogged down completely because of logistic difficulties.

**Armored Amphibians:**

The company of LVT(A)s which supported the 4th Marines - Oroku Landing, Company B, 3rd Armored Amphibian Battalion, executed their part in the landing flawlessly and effectively.

They were used for beach defense at night. During the day they were used for two reconnaissance missions on small islands off the coast. The last five days, they were used very effectively as artillery, firing indirect overhead fire over the head of troops as the troops advanced north toward our artillery, thus making the regular artillery less effective for close support.

**Infantry Combat:**

It is believed that the type of fighting during Phase III of the Okinawa operation will be duplicated in future operations particularly on Japan, since the Okinawa terrain is so similar to that of Japan. The same type of Japanese defenses can be expected in the future; in fact, they will probably be more elaborate. More mines and more artillery will probably augment future defenses. The method of overcoming the Jap resistance in Phase III was as follows: hill strongpoints would be reduced one at a time. All possible direct fire weapons would be brought to bear on the key openings. Tanks would maneuver around to reduce the emplacements on the flanks and rear, tanks firing HE and tanks shooting flame both being employed, the infantry supporting the tanks by fire. Then the infantry would advance on the hill, reducing the caves with demoliitions and flame throwers, and being careful to keep off the crest of the hills, which were untenable usually because of artillery and mortar fire.

The importance of thorough coordination between adjacent units and of all supporting units and fires cannot be stressed too highly. An uncoordinated attack will usually be a costly one.

It is felt that, in future operations, the need for train demolitions and mine disposal men will be great and constant.
The Engineer Battalion cannot be expected to meet all demands for demolitions or mine disposal teams. Consequently, certain men in company and battalion headquarters will, in the 4th Marines, be trained to detect, remove and disarm the common types of mines, and all infantrymen will have a working knowledge of demolitions.

Because of the large number of relatively untrained replacements absorbed into this regiment during this operation, many men became casualties due to failure to observe fundamentals of cover and concealment, in which they had apparently not been trained. Men persisted in needlessly exposing themselves. There were many cases of walking on the skyline. Even the Jap prisoners expressed amazement at the carelessness of the marines in exposing themselves so much and so needlessly.

The importance of taking all ground in the zone of action and carefully mopping up behind the front lines cannot be emphasized too greatly. The enemy defends the ravines, draws and low ground as well as the dominating terrain features. Unlike the situation in a war of movement, the capture of high ground will not obviate the withdrawal of the Japs from the low ground. Their only hope of winning this war is to make the war so costly that America will quit. Therefore, the Jap is assigned to an emplacement and told to kill as many Americans as possible before he gets killed. It makes no difference to the Jap whether he dies on low, poor ground or high, dominating ground.

Engineers:

It is recommended that mine disposal teams and demolition teams be always available on call from the regiments. Demolition personnel should be equipped to handle jobs too big for the infantry. It is felt that the mine disposal and demolitions personnel should be in a separate unit from engineer personnel used for engineering work.

Supply and Logistics:

Activities against Naha: This Regiment was in the line for a period of nine(9) days during the Sixth Marine Division Operation against the City of Naha. The movement into the line prevented no unusual supply difficulties. The period of operation was marked by heavy rainfall beginning about the second day. This rainfall seriously hampered the supply of the regiment and brought to light transportation weaknesses which had previously not been recognized. It was found that jeeps could not negotiate the heavy mud. It was further found that weasels could not negotiate the heavy mud. 2½ ton cargo trucks, 6X6 could be used in this sort of weather only with the greatest difficulty. Without the use of LVTs, the regiment could not have operated effectively from a supply and evacuation viewpoint. Many LVTs were made useless by mechanical breakdown and by loss of tracks.
The landing against Oroku Peninsula: On 4 June this Regiment conducted an amphibious landing against the Oroku Peninsula and conducted operations against the enemy on that peninsula during the period 4-13 June included. The landing was ordered on very short notice and little advance planning was possible. Sufficient landing craft was not available. No shore-party was made available. Because of the shortage of landing craft and the impossibility of moving vehicles through the mud to embarkation points, it was possible to bring only a bare minimum of vehicles on the initial landing. It was several days before the remaining vehicles of the Regiment were able to catch up. During the early days of the landing, supply was carried out entirely by LVTs. The LVTs used were well beyond their scheduled overhaul period and breakdowns were frequent. Supply of water and ammunition was critical during this period because of: (a) Lack of shore-party personnel and equipment. (b) Lack of LVTs in proper condition of maintenance. With the establishment of a Division Dump on the beach, and the arrival of engineer equipment for the building and maintenance of roads, the situation eased and there was no further difficulty.

In the battle for Ara-Saki, this Regiment conducted offensive and mopping-up operations against the enemy south of Itoman. The only unusual supply difficulty was the necessity of an air drop to elements of the 3rd Battalion on and near the beach the evening of 20 June. This was executed successfully except that some of the water cans broke.

Medical Section:

During the later stages of combat, especially involving the attack on Sugar Loaf and Oroku Peninsula, the problem of combat became increasingly important. There are a certain number of men whose nervous systems are so affected by combat experience that they are not further useful as combat soldiers. This group of men need hospital care and in many cases necessitate evacuation.

Aside from the above legitimate groups of C.F. cases, there are a considerable number of cases which a platoon leader or company officer considers temporarily of no further combat value and in fact are a detriment to the effective combat men. This group includes many men who are just plain physically tired to the point where they can no longer perform their duties. These men are not sick and do not need hospital care. They need a place to sleep away from the front lines and an opportunity to restore themselves with good food.

Formerly, for lack of any other method of providing for these men, they have been sent to sick-bay and under the urgent front
line conditions it was necessary for the Battalion Surgeon to evacuate these men to a Medical Company under the label of Combat
fatigue or Physical Exhaustion.

As soon as a man is tagged with an emergency medical tag with a diagnosis written thereon, he considers himself a sick person entitled to several days hospitalization and in many cases is psychologically rendered unfit for further combat duty for over a week or even permanently.

In addition to this group of men who are honestly physically tired, there is another group of poorer moral fibre who assume symptoms of exhaustion as a means of getting away from the front lines. Amid the rush of battle casualties it is virtually impossible for the Battalion Surgeon to differentiate between these people.

In this regiment it was considered important by both line and Medical Officers to adopt some scheme whereby the honestly tired could receive food and sleep without the deplorable procedure of making a psychologically sick person out of him by turning him in to the hospital. To accomplish this, the following scheme was used: The line officer who considered he had a man who was physically no longer effective sent this man to the Battalion Surgeon. If the Battalion Surgeon noted frank mental disturbance, he admitted the man to a Medical Company as C.F. If, however, there was doubt of this condition in the Surgeon's mind, he sent the man to the Battalion section where a record of the man's whereabouts would be established and from there he was sent to the rear regimental quartermaster dump, where sleeping and feeding facilities were available under the direction of a line officer. At this rest area only one corpsman was in attendance for first aid work. The Regimental Surgeon or his assistant, visited this area once a day for the purpose of helping the line officer decide who was sufficiently rested to return to duty or in some cases, to make the decision that actual C.F. existed and the man needed hospitalization.

This system returned many men to duty within 24 hours and furthermore, we feel that it discouraged that group of weaker moral individuals in trying to assume symptoms of C.F. in order that they might get from one to two weeks away from the front lines in a hospital.

Actually, the plan met difficulties because of lack of adequate facilities at the quartermaster rear area and the fact that the idea was new and not fully understood by the line officers.
The suggestion is offered that in future combat a definite pre­arranged plan should be used to that the rest area would be equipped to take care of these men, and so that all line officers would understand the working of the scheme.

The later phases of the medical activities of this regiment, in so far as were for wounded and their evacuation was concerned, were conducted in the same manner as described in the Special Action Report on Phases I and II. Once again the need of a 4x4 ton ambulance for each battalion and regimental use was very apparent.

Casualties among the corpsmen in this regiment were heavy. Corpsmen and line officers directing corpsmen, were reminded that corpsmen should exercise every personal precaution consistent with faithful performance of their duties. Line officers cooperated well in trying to afford a corpsmen all the protection possible in his care for the wounded. It is felt that there were occasional cases in which corpsmen used poor judgement in the matter of their personal safety, but as a general rule, all casualties were unavoidable and no constructive criticism can be offered as a means of lowering the corpsmen casualty rate.

Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics, Organization and Equipment

The drive down the west coast of Okinawa by the First and Sixth Marine Divisions compelled the Japs to commit their last reserves, and the chewing up of these reserves in the fighting from Machinato Airfield through Naha was a deciding factor in the ultimate cracking of the main Jap line of resistance. To maintain their static line of resistance, the Japs fed the following nine infantry battalions into the lines:

Third Infantry Battalion of the Second Infantry Unit,
FORTY-FOURTH INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADE
First, Second and Third Infantry Battalions of the FIFTEENTH INDEPENDENT MIXED REGIMENT
First, Second, Third Independent Infantry Battalions,
Hiraga Unit - Composed of Shipping Personnel of the Sixth Specially Organized Regiment, and the Tabuchi Naval Unit.
Yamaguchi Battalion - A Naval Unit.

This troops were supported by one company from the Seventh Anti-Tank Battalion, thirty-second Independent Anti-Tank Battalion.
Eightieth Field Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and Eighty-first Anti-Aircraft Battalion, plus a Naval Mortar Company and several hundred naval troops from the vicinity of Oroku.

At one time or another in the period from May 19 to May 27, the Fourth Marines encountered individuals or groups from almost all of these units, although the main opposition came from the Fifteenth Independent Mixed Regiment, and particularly from the Third Infantry Battalion, the Yamaguchi Battalion, and approximately three hundred naval troops from Oroku. In typical Jap fashion, these units were organized about their officer personnel, sent into the lines as needed, and kept there until destroyed. Little effort was made to maintain them at their Table of Organization strength, although as the fighting progressed, service troops and laborers were often pushed into the lines to replace losses. The tendency of the Japs to keep a unit in the lines until it was completely decimated made it necessary to exercise care in estimating enemy strength since the presence of a few individuals from a unit, or a few documents from a unit, could not be taken as any indication that large numbers of that unit were present.

The troops encountered on Oroku Peninsula were a heterogeneous mixture of naval troops, Okinawan conscripts, and some Army units. Initially, the Fourth Marines encountered elements of the Iwao Unit - a naval force. Subsequent information from either documents or prisoners-of-war or both indicated that elements of the following units were present:

- **Hamori Unit** - A Naval unit.
- **Yamane Unit** - A Naval unit composed of Okinawan conscripts, attached labor troops, and regular Naval personnel.
- **Okinawa Naval Base Force** - Naval troops and laborers commanded by Admiral Ota.
- **Twenty-Seventh Anti-Aircraft Battalion**.
- **One hundred-Fourth Independent Machine Cannon Battalion**.

In addition to these units, at least a dozen smaller units were encountered. One captured map showed mine Platoons defended the Nebara area - each platoon being assigned one hill.

It is difficult to obtain an accurate overall picture of the Japanese organization, since there is no way of telling how the myriad of miscellaneous small units fitted into the larger administrative units, or if they were in any way connected with them. A captured document contained orders for the withdrawal to Ite- man of a substantial portion of the Iwao Unit and the Okinawan Naval Base Force, and it is known that a partial withdrawal took place. However, the troops were subsequently ordered back to
fight on Oroku, and did return. The casualties suffered enroute are an unknown quantity, and for that reason it is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the enemy troop strength actually overcome on Oroku Peninsula.

The progressive deterioration in the Jap organization reached its apex in the fighting on Ara Saki Peninsula. In an average group of fifty prisoners-of-war, twenty different units were represented. Prisoners-of-war had only the vaguest notions of what had happened to the remainder of their units, but generally thought that it had been annihilated. However, wherever leadership was present, the remnants of sundry units would be assembled and a stand attempted, or the troops divided into 3 man teams to function as suicide squads. Without leadership, individuals and small groups gave way to their instinct for self preservation and surrendered in many instances. On one occasion four hundred and one prisoners-of-war surrendered en masse, but it is noteworthy that not one officer was in the group, and the single warrant officer among them was filled with misgivings about his conduct.

The tactics employed by the Japanese on OKINAWA show a striking departure from the earlier doctrine of the "annihilation of the enemy at the waters' edge" as advocated and exhibited by the Japs in previous campaigns in the Central Pacific. Here, the Jap chose to let us land unopposed, and then to hold a main defensive line of his own choice, using all his supporting weapons to best advantage. Orders were to hold this line at all costs and the Jap proceeded to do so until his position was overrun or became absolutely untenable. No uncoordinated, reckless banzai charges were made by the Jap; instead he endeavored to exact the highest rate of attrition in men and materiel for as long as possible with the forces he had available.

The tactics pursued and the defensive organization employed by the Jap in the Battle for NAHA are characteristic of all those used on OKINAWA. When the Fourth Marines entered the lines on May 19, enemy resistance was centered around partially secured Sugar Loaf Hill on the right flank, and Half Moon Hill on the left flank. King Hill, another strongpoint, was located approximately three hundred yards to the south of Sugar Loaf and Half Moon Hills. The SHURI Hill mass on the left flank overlooked the entire regimental zone of action and gave the enemy excellent observation of all troop and vehicular movements.

A strong point type of defense was centered around the key terrain features mentioned - namely Sugar Loaf, Half Moon, and King Hills, and these strongpoints were all mutually supporting. Terrain between strongpoints was open and offered only the barest of concealment to friendly troops, and conversely gave the Japs excellent fields of unobstructed fire.
Each individual strongpoint consisted of a honey comb of caves, trenches and tunnels dug into all sides of the hill, presenting an "all around defense". Each hill was self-sufficient in that it contained living accommodations and food, water and ammunition supplies sufficient to maintain the defending personnel for at least thirty days.

Firing ports for riflemen, machineguns, mortars and anti-tank guns were located so that fire could be directed in any direction. Mine fields were located at likely tank approaches and these fields could be covered by fire.

Then these strongpoints were attacked frontally, fire would be received from flanking strongpoints and the Jap would adopt a reverse slope type defense from caves and installations located on the reverse slope of the position being assaulted. Heavy mortar and grenade fire usually greeted troops attempting to assault the forward slope or even after occupying the crest of the position. Flanking maneuvers by infantry troops resulted in receiving heavy fire from the forward and reverse slopes of mutually supporting strongpoints. At night, the Japs would use the tunnels on strongpoints occupied by our troops to infiltrate behind our lines unless precautions were taken to seal all caves and tunnels behind our lines.

Supporting Jap artillery fire covered the approaches to the strongpoints and the strongpoints themselves were registered in. Heavy artillery fire was also directed against our observation posts, command posts, bridges and other rear installations.

The reverse slope type defensive tactics were very effective as the effect of friendly artillery fire on reverse slope positions was practically nil. Only direct fire supporting weapons such as tanks and M-7s could effectively seal or destroy such positions to the extent where supporting infantry could complete the job.

The Jap realized that our direct fire weapons were essential to the destruction of his strongpoints and consequently every effort was made to knock them out. Heavy artillery, mortar and anti-tank fire was directed at our tanks when operating with our infantry. In addition, suicide teams composed of two or three men armed with satchel charges made desperate attempts to knock out our tanks whenever an opportunity presented itself.

Counter-attacks were made only on two occasions in any appreciable strength. One such attack occurred at approximately 2315 on 20 May when an estimated force of 700 Japs made a desperate attempt to retake King Hill - a key point in the NAHA, SHURI and YONABARU defense line. A heavy mortar and artillery barrage...
preceded the attack and smoke was employed by the Japs to cover his movement and to confuse friendly troops as to his intentions. Friendly artillery and mortar fire were extremely effective in repulsing this attack.

Again on the night of 25 May, small local counter-attacks of estimated platoon strength or less occurred along the center and right flank of our lines between the hours of 2000 and 0200. Smoke was again employed by the Japs to conceal his movements and intentions. Later from the captured orders and documents, it was ascertained that these local counter-attacks were made by rear guard forces to occupy and confuse our troops while a large force was executing a general withdrawal to the South as ordered.

The tactics and defensive organization employed by the Japs on OROKU PENINSULA were similar to those used in the Battle for NAHA, except that the Japs were without artillery support. However, eight-inch rockets were used but proved to be quite inaccurate and ineffective. A high percentage of automatic weapons were used by the naval troops contacted which can be attributed to two factors; the navy units include a higher percentage of automatic weapons in their table of organization than the army units contacted, and the machine guns and twenty millimeter cannon from the wrecked planes on NAHA Airfield were removed and used as ground weapons.

Enemy defended in ARA SAKI PENINSULA consisted of the familiar type strongpoints previously encountered on OKINAWA but the badly disorganized Japanese forces offered less stubborn resistance than had been encountered.

Jap anti-tank fire from 47 millimeter anti-tank guns was accurate and effective, particularly in the fighting in vicinity of Sugar Loaf Hill. Guns were usually situated in pairs and covered likely tank approaches to the strongpoints held. Fire was usually withheld until tanks were within three hundred yards or less range; at which ranges, penetration was achieved on our medium tanks.

Horned chemical anti-tank mines were used in the Sugar Loaf Hill area and mine fields were covered by small arms and anti-tank fire. More extensive mine fields were found on OROKU PENINSULA. Road junctions, road intersections, bridges, likely by-passes around road demolitions and likely avenues of tank approaches were especially heavily mined. Numerous types of mines were found on OROKU, including horned anti-tank mines, electrically wired aviation bombs, depth charges, yardstick mines, wooden box mines and horned anti-tank mines wired to artillery shells, torpedoes, bombs, and other horned mines.
Suicide anti-tank teams, usually composed of two or three men carrying satchel charges, were employed to destroy our tanks. Spider trap trenches located at likely tank approaches were used by these suicide teams, and any tank venturing too far ahead of its infantry support was in danger of such attack.

Heavy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire was also used against our tanks, both in the front lines and in the rear areas.

Jap artillery fire was the most concentrated encountered by this regiment to date. Although massed artillery fire was not received on the same scale and volume as we employ against the Japs, heavy concentrations were received that proved to be both accurate and effective. Artillery fire was received by the regiment when in an assembly area near Machinato Airfield and during the battle for Nahu. The Japanese enjoyed excellent observation of the entire regimental zone of action from observation posts located in the Shuri Hill Yass on our left flank, and could place observed fire on any target that presented itself.

Concentrations of over one hundred rounds were received in the space of fifteen or twenty minutes on many occasions. Artillery fire of 75mm, 15cm, 12cm, and 8 inch calibre were received, although the greatest portion were of 75mm and 15cm calibre. Shelling usually occurred during the hours of 0600 to 0800 and 1630 to 2300. Friendly tanks drew especially heavy and concentrated fire when operating with the infantry units. Some delayed action and timed fuzed fire was reported, but it is believed that this fire was received principally from anti-aircraft artillery used for ground missions.

Eight-inch rockets were employed by the Japs on Oroku Peninsula, although they proved to be both inaccurate and ineffective. The blast effect from the exploding rocket was considerable.

Poison gas was not used by the Japanese, and no evidence was found indicating that he intended to use gas. No poison gas or gas shells or bombs were discovered.

Many of the Japs killed carried gas masks, or had them in close proximity. Gas masks were usually found in caves and installations occupied by the Japs. Some of the larger caves entered and investigated had curtains rigged in them which were suitable for anti-gas or anti-flame purposes.

Enemy documents captured and translated indicate that the Jap is gas conscious, having been thoroughly indoctrinated in the use and effects of gas, and also in the protective measures to be used in combatting gas.
Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations

1. Area secured: The 4th Marines secured approximately five square miles of ground during Phase III of the Okinawa operation.

2. Enemy casualties:
   (a) Killed: 7,410
   (b) Captured: 725

3. Operational material damage to enemy:
   - 18" gun
   - 3 6" guns
   - 3 5cm guns
   - 8 12cm coast defense guns
   - 15 4.7" dual-purpose guns
   - 2 8" howitzers
   - 2 3" guns
   - 5 75mm guns
   - 11 47mm AT guns
   - 1 37mm AT gun
   - 10 rocket launchers (2")
   - 1 40mm gun
   - 1 25mm gun
   - 27 20mm guns
   - 5 90mm mortars
   - 3 81mm mortars
   - 46 heavy machineguns
   - 93 light machineguns
   - 84 grenade launchers
   - 3 searchlights
   - 3 radar installations
   - 3 radio direction finders
   - 31 trucks, cargo
   - 2 trailers, truck
   - 3 rangefinders
   - 10 parachute supply packs

   In addition quantities of enemy ammunition, food and clothing, mines and other equipment were captured in caves and dumps.

4. Own losses:
   - Killed in action: 404
   - Wounded in action: 1,677
   - Missing in action: 0
   - Total: 2,081

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations

All comments and recommendations made in Chapter X of the 4th Marine Regiment's Special Action Report for Phase I and II still apply, except as modified or elaborated upon in the following:

S-1

1. It is recommended that in future operations, no replacements be furnished to, or units required to accept replacements while engaged in combat on the front lines. All replacements should join the unit while in rear areas.

2. It is recommended that all men being returned to duty from hospitalization be fully equipped and armed prior to their reaching forward areas. On numerous occasions men returning to duty without
3. It is recommended that routine correspondence and mail be delivered to the Commanding Officer, Rear Echelon, rather than to the Forward Echelon. An excessive amount of mail received in the field such as "Court Martial Orders", "Bulletins", "Pamphlets" including many classified publications marked "not to be taken into combat zones" were received while this unit was in the front lines and required remailing to the Rear Echelon. The Commanding Officer, Rear Echelon, with delegated authority could open and examine all mail and forward such correspondence as required immediate action of the Commanding Officer.

4. Morale has been excellent but it is recommended that more athletic equipment be made available to troops while in rest camp or rear areas. Also that beer be furnished to troops whenever possible.

S-2

1. It is recommended that the S-2 section be provided with two SCR 300's as organizational equipment to be used for observation posts exclusively.

2. Low oblique photos of the front lines and the area 1000 to 1500 yards to the front proved very useful. It is recommended that in future operations this type of photo support be continued. Low obliques of the forward and reverse slopes of known enemy strong-points were especially valuable and useful.

3. It is again recommended that regimental S-2 section be provided with at least one 4X4 (one ton) truck to transport POWs and wounded civilians from battalion collecting points to the regimental stockade, and to provide transportation for the supplies and equipment.

4. It is recommended that each battalion be provided with at least four qualified enlisted language personnel or Nisei interpreters. In addition it is suggested that at least two men from each infantry platoon and company be given elementary training in Japanese language. It is suggested that a regimental school be organized and conducted by the language officers attached to regiment during the training period, and that this school be included in the regimental training program.

5. The standard operating procedure for treatment and evacuation of wounded prisoners of war and civilians should be completely changed. In neither case should responsibility for these functions be allocated to the medical section. In practice, the medical
section will not and does not handle wounded prisoners of war or civilians.

(a) In the case of wounded POWs: They are in fact handled by the S-2 section. Therefore, responsibility should be placed with the S-2 section, and personnel and transportation allocated accordingly. One corpsman, some stretchers, and transportation (See recommendation #3) are needed.

(b) In the case of wounded civilians: Responsibility should be placed with the military government team attached to regiment, and they should be given facilities sufficient to do the work.

6. Military government liaison teams should be charged with the responsibility of getting civilians (including the wounded) from battalion to rear collection points, with appropriate screening at S-2, and should be given appropriate transportation and corpsmen.

7. At least two (2) squads of military police should be attached to the regiment to assist in handling POWs and civilians, and to maintain a stockade. Despite the tens of thousands of these people encountered by this regiment in the past operations, not one (1) military policeman was ever made available to aid in guarding or evacuating them. Had the civilians been more hostile, as they may be in future operations, line personnel would have had to be used to adequately guard the civilians.

S-3

1. All infantry weapons and units of fire were satisfactory. Weapons were clearly superior to the Japanese weapons.

2. Every effort should be made by the navy to insure an adequate amount of illumination ammunition for fire support ships. Naval gunfire illumination was, except in case of a counter-attack always rationed, a battalion sometimes only getting 2 or 3 rounds per hour. Oftentimes 60mm illuminating shells were either not available or the supply situation was such that it was very difficult and sometimes impossible to get that ammunition up to the companies. The importance of illumination cannot be stressed too highly, both from the standpoint of security and of saving the lives of civilians who may be wandering about at night.
3. It is believed that in future operations against the Japs, more and more caves, tunnels and dug-in emplacements will be met. In mopping these positions up, it is essential that they be sealed. It is recommended that some organization be set or provided for in the Engineer Battalion which will have demolitions experts with equipment to do all types of demolitions missions. Some positions encountered on this operation were so large that it was an engineering job to destroy and seal them. In the future, all men in this regiment are going to be trained in the use of demolitions.

4. Mine disposal personnel must always be available to the regiment on call from the Engineer Battalion. It is believed that Japanese defenses in future operations will include the use of all types of mines in quantity. So far, Japanese mines have been crudely laid, and their detection is simple. However, improvement and finesse in mine-laying can be expected from the Japs in the future. In the future, all personnel of this regiment will be trained in fundamental mine detection and mine disposal. It is planned to have certain company and battalion headquarters personnel sufficiently trained so as to be able to detect, lift and disarm all known types of enemy mines if engineer mine-disposal personnel are not available.

5. There were many cases of poor marksmanship, particularly among the replacements. The BAR marksmanship was especially poor in many cases. The need for marksmanship training cannot be emphasized too strongly.

1. It is recommended that a total of twenty-four (24) Weasels with spare parts be permanent organizational transportation in the Marine Regiment. It was found, during operations against Naha, that Weasels were not as effective in heavy mud as either the one (1) ton, 4X4, or the 2½ ton, 6X6, truck. It is believed that the supply of Weasels for an infantry regiment should be made the subject of further study and that the number assigned should depend upon the type of operation contemplated.

2. It is recommended that at least fourteen (14) 2½ ton cargo trucks, 6X6, be made permanent organizational transportation for the Marine Infantry Regiment.

3. It is recommended that six (6) additional one (1) ton trucks, 4X4, be made permanent organizational transportation for the Marine Infantry Regiment. These six (6) trucks would be utilized in R & S Co.
4. It is recommended that the number of jeeps assigned to Marine Infantry Battalions be increased by at least fifty (50) percent, and that trailers be provided for all except radio vehicles.

5. It is recommended that at least five (5) 300 gallon water trailers be made part of the organizational equipment of a Marine Infantry Regiment.

6. Freon bombs should be available in quantity to supplement the DDT mixture in controlling insects.

ALAN SHAPLEY
Col., USMC
Commanding
4th Marines
CHAPTER I

GENERAL

This report is submitted in accordance with existing orders with the purpose of showing this unit's activities during phase III of the Okinawa Operation.

CHAPTER II

TASK ORGANIZATION:

The 1st Bn., 4th Mar., commanded by LtCol. George B. Bell, U.S.M.C., had the following task organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company A</th>
<th>Captain Clinton B. Eastment</th>
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<tr>
<td>LtLt David A. Schreiner</td>
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<td>2ndLt John H. Keeley</td>
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<td>LtLt Robert D. Cullison</td>
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<th>Company C</th>
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<td>LtLt Robert W. Killoran</td>
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CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION:

(1) The Battle for NAHA.
(2) The Battle for OROKU.
(3) The Capture of ARA SAKI PENINSULA.
(4) Narrative by separate sections.

(1) The Battle for NAHA (18 May - 1 June).

On May 18 the battalion was in bivouac along the sea wall about three miles north of MACHINATO AIRFIELD. The battalion was alerted that day to move into the front lines and relieve a battalion of the 29th MARINES which was holding the north slope of SUGAR LOAF HILL. The Battalion Commander, his Executive and Operations Officers and Company Commanders went forward to a 22nd MARINES OP, on the high ground north of NAHA, to look over the situation and pick out the best route into the lines. The next day the battalion moved to an assembly area east of ASA, using trucks and marching, and went into regimental reserve. The location during the day of the 20th being subjected to intermittent artillery fire, which caused some casualties. That night 3 Company was detached and attached to the 3rd Battalion, 4th MARINES, which was in the lines at that time. On arrival the company
thrown into the lines and assisted the 3rd Battalion in breaking up a determined enemy counter attack during the latter part of the evening.

At 0730 of the 21st this battalion moved in on the left of the 3rd Battalion and jumped off to seize the south slopes of SUGAR LOAF HILL. Initially the attack was launched on a one company front but by 1000 A Company was pushed into the assault, on the left of the battalion zone of action. Rain had been coming down steadily all morning and a thick film of mud covered all of the battered SUGAR LOAF HILL. Supply and evacuation were next to impossible but all hands refused to be whipped by the conditions. The enemy still held out in pockets and caves all along the slopes of the hill. Progress was slow and the fighting bitter. There was little cover left on SUGAR LOAF and the men were constantly exposed to enemy fire as they pushed ahead. By nightfall the battalion was on the hill to stay. The next morning the battalion continued fighting, slowly wearing the enemy out and getting into position for the crossing of the ASATO RIVER, which was to take place the next day. On the 23rd the battalion fought across the ASATO with A and B Companies in assault in the face of determined enemy resistance from the high ground around HACHISHI. M7 s and tanks bogged down, but the infantry continued to push into the enemy using what weapons it could take with it. The rain continued without letup and mechanized equipment found it next to impossible to get as far forward as the Battalion CP. In spite of all the difficulties encountered that night the battalion held a two company bridgehead across the ASATO. On the 24th both assault companies held their positions, Company C on the right and Company A on the left, covering the engineers as they worked to bridge the river. On the 25th, with the bridge completed, the attack was pushed forward to take the village of HACHISHI. C Company moved out on the right and B Company, which had suffered heavily in crossing the ASATO and had been in reserve, was fed in on the left of C Company to keep contact with A Company. That latter unit held its position and remained tied in with the 3rd Battalion, 22nd MARINES on the left. At the end of the day the battalion held all companies on the line with only local reserves held out, the bridge had washed away and men were swimming across the river in order to get from the Battalion CP to the front lines. The situation was a precarious one as the companies dug in for the night. On the right the 2nd Battalion was across the river, but back at the north, while on the left the lines extended back at right angles to the front. A railroad fill ran parallel to the flank and not more than 150 yards away from A Company. The enemy controlled this and could work up it under cover of darkness. To the left rear the enemy held high ground not 400 yards distant which controlled all the ASATO RIVER valley in the battalion zone of action and looked right into the backs of A, B, and C Companies. All thru the day of the 25th rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire rained into the rear of the battalion. In addition enemy artillery fire had switched from SUGAR LOAF to the river valley and front lines of the battalion. The picture as night fell was not good. The battalion formed a deep salient into the enemy lines and if pushed farther would...
cut NAHA off from SHURI. The enemy knew this and at 2000 under cover of darkness and using smoke he launched a counter attack. Coming up along the railroad fill he apparently planned to jump across and break into the left rear of the battalion in A Company's sector. The Japanese were spotted by A Company as they started forward and artillery fire was called down. For two hours mixed time and percussion fire came down with hardly a let up. The Battalion 81mm mortars kept up an incessant fire in their prearranged concentration areas. At 2200 the mortars and artillery were lifted and for half an hour small arms fire continued. By 2230 the enemy had been badly mauled and broken. No more attempts to break thru took place that night. A few of the enemy penetrated the lines, but were mopped up the next morning by vigorous patrol action. Thru the 26th the battalion held its position, vigilantly patrolling to the front and flanks. During the day a new bridge was constructed across the ASATO and by evening vehicles were getting up to within 200 yards of the lines. The swollen river had receded and supplies were getting thru rapidly. On the morning of the 27th A Company moved up on the ridge which ran thru the village of IACHISHI. I Company of the 3rd Battalion fed up on A Company's left, the movement being carried out rapidly with excellent coordination between the two battalions. The next morning guides were sent to the Regimental CP to pick up the 3rd Battalion, 27th MARINES and lead that unit into position. By 1500 the relief was completed and the battalion was on its way back to the old bivouac area north of IACHINATO AIRFIELD for rest and rehabilitation.

(2) Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (3 June-16 June).

On June 1 a warning order was received, stating that a landing on the north beaches of OROKU PENINSULA was being planned. The peninsula was located south and west of NAHA and held the largest airfield on the island, NAHA AIRFIELD. The battalion was ordered to ready itself for the projected operation and on the morning of June 3 the Battalion Commander, Operations Officer, and Company Commanders went to a ruined lighthouse on the southwest side of NAHA to make a visual reconnaissance of the beaches and terrain inland from them. That afternoon the Battalion Commander and Operations Officer attended a regimental conference where the landing order was issued.

The 1st Battalion was to land in the right of the regimental zone of action in assault on BEACH RED 2. H-hour was 0545 of D-day, June 4. The battalion had already made up tentative boat assignment tables and a landing diagram in expectation that it would land in regimental reserve. A last minute change put the battalion in assault and corrections had to be made in both the boat assignment tables and landing diagram. 30 LVT's were assigned to the battalion. Later the number was changed to 25 Lk IV LVT's and 7 Lk IV LVT's. One company of LVT(A)'s was assigned to the battalion and would go ahead of the first wave and provide direct fire support.
The battalion landing order was given late in the afternoon and loading of ammunition, water, food, and medical gear began at once. The LVT's were backed up against the seawall, near the bivouac area, facing seaward with the tractors to be used by the assault companies on the left and the ones assigned to the reserve company, battalion headquarters, sick bay, and the quartermaster on the right. Some of the tractors were understowed and three amphibion trailers were used to haul the rest of the supplies. By 0300 of the 4th all equipment was loaded and personnel started to embark. At 0400 the battalion moved out.

The plan was that the 1st Battalion the farthest away from the LD, would pick up the 2nd Battalion, the left assault battalion of the regiment opposite the latter's embarkation area. The two organizations would then continue in column with the 1st Battalion on the right, until they arrived at the LD, where each wave would do a column left, and then ships right when they were in line with the beach.

From the start things began to happen. The lead tractors started too fast and the column became strung out. As planned the 2nd Battalion was sighted and the two columns continued abreast. By this time however, tractors began to drop out because of mechanical trouble, radio communication went out, and the column lost contact. When the battalion arrived at the LD 9 tractors had dropped out and only 6 were present for the landing. A request was radioed to regiment for a delay in H-hour, but refused; so the first wave consisting of 4 tractors, went into the beach and landed at 0605. These first units ashore pushed on to the high ground about 300 yards inland against little resistance. Other units of the battalion continued to come ashore for the remainder of the morning. A and C Companies had lost the most personnel due to tractor breakdowns, so B Company was immediately committed on the right of the battalion and ordered to take the high ground overlooking KAGAMISUI. As men from A and C Companies came ashore they were sent up to their units and C and A Companies started pushing ahead to the high ground about 600 yards inland. Resistance had been light initially. B Company on the right was blowing caves and had received only a few casualties. As A Company moved off the initial objective machine gun fire from the vicinity of KAGAMISUI pinned down the forward elements. C Company was receiving fire from the 2nd Battalion's zone of action to the left. Two M7's were sent forward, one to A Company and one to B Company, with mine disposal teams and once in position were able to knock out the enemy resistance. B Company pushed thru KAGAMISUI, with I Company of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines echeloned to the right rear and covering the flank. A and C Companies moved forward and occupied the ground east of KAGAMISUI. By 1100 the battalion was on the 0-J line about 1000 yards inland from the beach.

The attack continued at 1140 and started to swing southeast. As the battalion continued to move forward resistance stiffened. More machine gun fire was encountered, heavy mortar fire
started coming down and caves became more numerous. The battalion had hit the beginning of the real enemy resistance and was starting to get casualties in large numbers. In addition the rain had started and was coming down in a steady stream. The rain and mine fields made it difficult for the supporting weapons to get up quickly when needed. In spite of this the battalion continued driving forward until 1700 when ordered to dig in. A and B Companies on the right, with A Company in assault and B Company echeloned to the right rear in contact with the 3rd Battalion, were receiving continual rifle, machine-gun, and knee mortar fire from the high ground and revetments east of NAHA AIRFIELD and from the ground north of TOLI A VILLAGE, as A Company dug in for the night the enemy was so close that the detonation of his knee mortars could be heard when he fired. C Company was across the valley and about 200 yards short of the village of OROKU-LURA. As they dug in fire was coming from three directions; from the left in the 29th Regiment's zone of action, from the front in the high ground back of OROKU-LURA and from the TOLI A area to the right front. Sporadic fire continued all night and snipers were prevalent all thru the rear areas. A satchel charge was thrown into the Battalion Sick Bay but failed to go off.

At 0800 of the 6th the attack jumped off. A Company was almost immediately pinned down by fire from the right flank and front. C Company had fought its way into the outskirts of the village to its front. With the 1st Battalions right flank held up the 3rd Battalion pushed forward, then swung southeast and cleaned out the pocket holding up A Company. In the meantime H7s were firing on the high ground north of TOLI A and by accurate shooting knocked out two heavy machine guns and one mortar. As the battalion dug in for the night A Company held the high ground overlooking ASHIIHIKI and TOLI A and C Company was in the high ground southeast of OROKU-LURA with B Company in reserve in the west end of the village. C Company had received heavy casualties late in the afternoon, but held onto its ground.

On the morning of the 6th B Company passed thru C Company and continued the attack with A Company on the right. The plan was to take the high ground on either side of the valley to the front by double envelopment and push tanks up the center. The rain continued, making it impossible for tanks to operate anywhere but on the roads. The roads in the area had been well mined and cratered and required a great deal of work before tanks could get up to supporting positions. In the meantime A Company's assault platoon had been pinned down south of LITTLE SUGAR LOAF. B Company on the left was making little progress in the face of vicious resistance. At 1530 the tanks got into positions and with C Company covering them, started moving. The attack picked up momentum, but by the time the high ground to the front could have been seized it would have been dark, so the battalion fell back to the lines occupied in the morning. The fighting during the day had been hard and the battalion had little to show for its efforts. A Company's assault platoon had been pinned down for six hours and was finally pulled out under cover of smoke and HE fired by the H7s. The Batallion had, however, found the way to break the enemy in this zone, but was not to have the satisfaction of doing the job itself.
The following morning the battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion and went into regimental reserve on TOWER HILL, east of the airfield. During the day, the men had an opportunity to dry out, cook some hot food, and clean their weapons which were in particularly bad shape. Late in the morning the Operations Officer and Company guides reconnoitered routes of approach to the high ground on the right of the regimental zone and south of the airfield. That evening the order was received that the battalion would attack next morning on the right of the regimental zone of action and seize the high ground in that area. At 0500 of the 8th the battalion moved out in column with A, C, B, and Headquarters Companies in that order. Under cover of smoke the battalion crossed the taxiway east of the airfield and south of TOIJA and proceeded to the village of GUSHI on the right of the 3rd Battalion. A Company was to go into the assault and at 1030 jumped off, but was at once pinned down by a hail of rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire. Tanks had been placed on the north edge of a stream to deliver supporting fire, but the enemy was located in long narrow valleys running up from the base of the ridge and the tank's fire was masked until they could cross the stream and move further south. Under cover of smoke fired by the tanks A Company was pulled back to cover. The battalion then waited till the stream could be bridged and tanks were across. After a 20 minute tank preparation A Company attacked and was on the high ground in 15 minutes, overrunning enemy machine guns and mortar emplacements. At 1430 C Company jumped off to the south with the tanks in support and proceeded to clean the enemy out of the high ground down to the seawall. In the meantime B Company moved in on the left of A Company and tied in for the night with the 3rd Battalion on the left. After clearing the ground to the rear C Company moved into position on the right rear of A Company covering the exposed flank which overlooked the North-South Road leading to ITOKIAN.

On the 9th the battalion attacked to seize the high ground in the vicinity of HILL 55 and UI3ARU, with A and B companies in assault, A on the right. The attack was delayed until tanks could get into position on the road which ran along the right flank of the battalion. Once in position these tanks were driven back by an enemy 77mm gun, which it was discovered later was mounted on a railroad track and had two firing ports in the side of a cliff. The attack moved out at 1230 in the face of enemy machine gun and mortar fire. The ground was honey combed with caves, and it was necessary to blow each cave before it was passed. Progress was slow, and casualties were moderate. By evening the battalion was holding a ridge with the right flank north west of CHIWA and the left in the outskirts of UI3ARU. C Company was in reserve still on the exposed right flank, and the 1st War Dog Platoon was used to complete the Battalion CP perimeter in GUSHI.

The morning of the 10th the battalion attacked to seize HILL 55. The night before tanks had reconnoitered the road to the outskirts of CHIWA, knocked out a 77mm gun, and were prepared to deliver support on the right flank. At 0830 A Company jumped off and took the ridge...
running north of CHIWA followed by C Company. As the attack
continued northeast up the corridor, C Company was pushed up
on the left abreast of A Company. By 1130 A Company was on
HILL 55 and C Company was on the high ground to the left rear.
B Company had been moved from its original position, occupied
when the battalion jumped off, to the high ridge running south
from HILL 55. At 1600 after a 30 minute tank preparation, A
Company attacked HILL 58 being followed by B Company which
occupied the ridge to A Company's right and ran back to HILL
56. C Company in the meantime had moved across, occupied HILL
56, and tied in with B Company. That night three platoons of
Regimental Weapons, the 1st MR Dog Platoon, and the Battalion
10mm Mortar Platoon were placed on the ridge running from
HILL 55 to CHIWA. At 1930 all units were in position for the
night.

This day had been a particularly successful one. Tanks
and M7's had provided timely support all day and the battalion
had driven 1400 yards seizing the key HILLS 55 and 58. It was
notable in another respect: The battalion had worked to the
flank of the enemy's last defensive position on OROKU. Once
we were on that flank the enemy had been unable to turn his
weapons so as to deny the approach up the CHIWA-HILL 58 corridor.
Demolition teams worked hand in hand with the assault units
blowing caves as fast as the smoke from the WP grenades cleared
away. As A Company took HILL 55 the enemy was so hard pressed
that in one case the forward units were past the retreating Japa-
namese who were pulling out toward HILL 75 and TOHIGUSUKI. Knee
mortars were being fired at ranges of 100 and 150 yards. The
assault troops would listen for the pop of the mortar as it was
fired and then follow the projectile with their eyes till it hit. In this way they were able to warn those who could not
see the shells whether to duck or not.

On the 11th the 3rd Battalion passed thru the 1st Battal-
on and continued the attack on HILL 75, the last strong point on
OROKU PENINSULA. It was a tough assignment, but using all the
supporting weapons they had available the 3rd Battalion pushed
forward and took the hill on the 12th. This battalion assisted
during these two days where it could with small arms and 60mm
mortar fire.

On the 13th the battalion went into bivouac along the sea
wall west of the airfield and patrolled in an assigned sector
till the 17th of June.

(3) Capture of ASA SAKI PENINSULA (17 June'-- 21 June)
Late in the morning of June 13th the battalion marched
off to an assembly area east of ITOHAN, arriving there at 1500.
The day had been particularly hot and a large number of troops,
principally replacements, had fallen out, but by 1800 the com-
panies were set in for the night. Orders were received at this
time stating that the battalion would march south the next
morning and attack from KUWAMA RIDGE to seize HILL 49, the vil-
lage of KIWAMI-GUSUKU, and the high ground south of that village.
The Battalion Commander, Operations Officer, and Company Commanders went forward to look at the line of march and LD. It was found that there was only one good road up the LD and this would have to be used by the battalion.

At 0530 of the 19th, the battalion moved by marching to the LD and arrived at 0730. The Battalion Commander and Operations Officer went ahead of the battalion to the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines CP where they got the latest information on the enemy. At 0830 the battalion attacked, in column of companies, C Company in assault, B and A Companies following in that order. By 0945 C Company was on HILL 49 and in the adjacent village. B Company was moved up on the right of C Company to complete the occupation of the village and protect the battalion’s exposed right flank. The 3rd Battalion, on the left, was fighting on the high ground and making good progress. Enemy fire had been very light in seizing the first objective and the battalion had suffered no casualties.

At 1130 the attack was continued using the same formation that had been employed initially. The terrain leading up to KIYAMU-GUSUKU RIDGE was flat and open with a few cane fields dotted across the route of advance. By 1300 C Company was on the north slope of the ridge and B Company was moving up to support. No enemy resistance had been encountered, but at about 1330 an intense enemy mortar barrage was laid down in C and B Companies’ area. C Company was forced off the crest of the ridge by the enemy fire and proceeded to organize the reverse slope. B Company was now on the right and tied in. Artillery and 81mm mortar fire had been brought down and the enemy mortars silenced. At 1700 the battalion was in position for the night. The right was tied in with the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and on the left the battalion was in visual contact with the 3rd Battalion. Two platoons from A Company had been sent forward to complete the organization of the position. The battalion had taken 1400 yards in the face of little enemy resistance, but the day had been unusually hot and by midafternoon the assault troops were so tired that the battalion could not push to the last high ground overlooking the sea. An average of four canteens of water per man was used during the day.

At 0730, June 20, the battalion continued the attack to seize the high ground to the front and from there push on to the sea. C Company again went into the assault and B Company was to follow it when a foothold had been gained on the ridge to the front. A Company moved up to a position where it could deliver overhead support fire. By 0800 C Company gained the top of the ridge, but was driven off by concentrated small arms, knee mortar, hand grenade and 81mm mortar fire. In the space of an hour C Company suffered 25 casualties, but still held on to the base of the ridge. By 0930 B Company was pushed across the open ground to the rear of C Company and fed in on the right of the battalion zone. Coming across the open B Company was constantly under fire, and upon reaching the base of the ridge the men had to fight their way into position. For the remainder of the day the battalion tried without success to seize the top of the ridge. Attempts were made to flank from the right and the left, and tanks tried to push through a road cut in the ridge. The latter
scheme failed when an armored bulldozer was completely destroyed by a satchel charge thrown from about 15 feet. The fighting all thru the day had been bitter and at very close range from 15 to 50 yards. The nature of the terrain was such that only a few men, a fire team at most, could work up the approaches to the top of the ridge. With the enemy covering these approaches the battalion was unable to get to the crest. That night the enemy held the top of the ridge, at no point more than 20 yards from the battalion lines at the base of the cliff. Attempts at infiltration were broken up all along the line during the night.

The next day the 3rd and 2nd Battalions, which were on the high ground on either flank of the 1st Battalion, carried out a double envelopment of the ridge and at 1305 the island was secured. That evening the battalion pulled back to the high ground in the vicinity of HILL 49, and continued patrolling in its zone of action until the 27th of June, when it returned to the bivouac area occupied prior to moving south to the ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

(4) Narrative by Separate Sections,

(a) Naval gunfire support proved to be very good, particularly in the SUGAR LOAF area where it was used for counter-battery fire against enemy 6" and 8" guns; which were concentrating in the battalion zone.

The liaison party stayed with the CP and either observed fire from the OP or went forward to one of the assault companies. Night illumination was registered in late every afternoon when the troops were digging in. The Company Commanders controlled this fire and placed it where they wanted it for the night.

(b) Air support when used responded rapidly and proved to be adequate. In the SUGAR LOAF area the weather prevented the battalion from using air strikes as much as it would have liked.

On the ARA SAKI PENINSULA a Napalm preparation was dropped but when the troops occupied the area bombed, little evidence of damage could be found. Because of the small area into which the enemy was compressed, no further air strikes were called.

(c) Artillery support was excellent all thru the campaign, breaking up one enemy night counter attack south of the ASATO and battering the enemy all thru the OROKU Operation. Except for the last three days on OROKU and the last two days in the KIYANU-GUSUKU area, artillery was on call at all times and responded rapidly when fire was requested.

(d) The tanks proved most effective and absolutely necessary on OROKU and ARA SAKI. Without their support infantry progress would have been much slower and casualties for greater than they were.

Around NAHA, when tanks could not operate effectively because of the mud, it was demonstrated all too clearly how essential a part of the infantry-artillery-tank team they are.
(e) Amphibian tractors were used in the landing on OROKU, but were in such a poor state of repair that no accurate conclusions can be drawn about their work.

(f) Armored amphibions supported the OROKU landing and proved to be very mobile and effective in keeping the enemy down till the troops were ashore.

(g) Infantry Combat.

Combat in Phase III was in relatively open country dominated by well-defined ridge lines. These ridge lines were, for the most part, separated by large open spaces with sparse growth on them.

Since the enemy controlled the high ground with automatic weapons in each case it was found virtually impossible to move without tanks. Using tanks it was found that maneuver and movement could be effected.

It was found that by-passing the low ground between ridges was not successful. The enemy frequently dug-in in this open ground, then, when by-passed, fired into troops from the rear. Maneuvering using high ground and approaches thereeto is feasible only if the intervening low ground in each case is cleared out.

This battalion used the reserve company for such work.

It was found that since the enemy utilized cave positions it was necessary to blow each cave entrance with demolitions, and that none could be considered safe until this was done.

In the battle for NAHA massed artillery fire was encountered. It was found that by proper dispersion and utilization of cover undue casualties were avoided. The slightest bunching up of personnel usually drew artillery fire, and the above countermeasures were rigidly enforced.

(g) Supply and Logistics.

Supply during this period was good, but the extreme bad weather conditions made the transporting of supply difficult. Class I supplies were insufficient but there was an adequate supply of the more important class II, III, V (with the exception of 60mm Mortar Illuminating and 81mm Mortar ammunition).
CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS:

Discussion of enemy tactics is separated into three periods: I The Battle for Naha; II The Battle for Oroku Peninsula; III The Capture of the Ara Saki Peninsula.

I. The Battle for Naha. (18 May - 1 June).

Units facing this battalion were mixed survivors of several Army and Navy organizations, evidently thrown into action in an attempt to hold the Naha-Shuri Line. All types of weapons were encountered from small arms to what appeared to be massed artillery fire from weapons ranging in size from 77mm to 6" or 8" Naval guns. The enemy built his infantry defense around 6.5mm and 7.7mm machine guns dug in in cave positions. There was a definite tendency to reverse slope positions, the enemy adopting this type of defense whenever possible.

One counterattack in force lasting from 2000 to 2230 was delivered against this unit on 25 May. The apparent objective of this counterattack was the recapture of the South Bank of the Asato River and possibly Sugar Loaf Hill. The enemy used smoke on our positions during this attack. It was repulsed by the use of artillery and small arms.

A definite tendency on the part of individuals and small units to attempt infiltrations at night was noticed during this period.

No new weapons or tactics were observed.

II. The Battle for Oroku Peninsula.

The enemy presented a well coordinated defense of the high ground with a light beach defense. He utilized caves extensively. The standard infantry weapons were encountered plus aircraft machine guns converted to ground mounts. His defense was augmented by 20mm and 25mm machine cannon. At least one 77mm gun was encountered sited for AT defense. One weapon new to the battalion was encountered; a so-called "spigot mortar". This weapon appeared to be about 6" in diameter; the shell emitted a peculiar whistling noise in flight, and threw very little shell fragment on impact.

The enemy did not counterattack this unit with any force over two squads. There was a definite tendency shown on the part of the enemy to show increased resistance in the form of mortar barrages and machine gun fire once tanks had been released late in the day. The enemy at no time showed any sign of a counterattack or so called "Banzai" charge with a large force.
III. The Capture of Araya Saki Peninsula.

Only small pockets of enemy dug into connecting cave positions were encountered in this operation. These units were mixed remnants of larger units. Only small arms and mortars up to 90mm size offered resistance during this part of the campaign. No new weapons or tactics were observed. The enemy used his normal night tactics of attempted infiltration during this period.

CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:

1. Area Secured.
   (a) Battle for Naha. This Bn helped secure the Southern slopes of Sugar Loaf Hill, seized a bridgehead on the South banks of the Asato River, and took the village of NACHISKI.
   (b) Battle for Oroku Peninsula. This Bn secured the high ground from the beachhead North and past Naha Airfield to and including the village of Tomia and Ashmine. The Bn then moved to the SW corner of the peninsula and attacked NE through Gushi, Chiba, and seized hills 56 and 58.
   (c) Seizure of Ara Saki Peninsula. This Bn seized Hill 49 and the Kiyana-Gusuku ridge in TA 7456.

2. Enemy casualties.
   (a) Killed 382) From 4 June only. Prior figures destroyed by enemy action.
   (b) Captured 76)

3. The following material was captured or destroyed:
   13mm MG 6 Gun, Lewis Machine 1
   Rocket Launchers 2 Mortar, "spigot" 2
   Range Finders 2 Sight, aerial bomb 1
   Radar 1 Gun, 20mm DP 3
   Mortars, 50mm 8 Searchlight, 60" 1
   Mortars, 81mm 3 MG, light 15
   Mortars, 90mm 1 MG, heavy 5
   Gun, 75mm 1 Dischargers, Grenade 2
   Gun, 47mm AT 1

   Lists complete only since 4 June. Prior records destroyed by enemy action.

4. Own Losses.
   (a) Killed in Action 98
   (b) Wounded in Action 513
   (c) Missing in Action 0

   286
CHAPTER VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

S-1 Section: None.

S-2 Section: (1) It is considered that more effort should be made by higher echelons to secure low angle oblique photos of terrain in BN Zone of Action when requested. The few times these were supplied in answer to requests they were of considerable value in planning attacks.

(2) A more comprehensive plan for handling POW guards must be worked out. The practice of sending combat troops as POW guards to the rear is not sound. Military Police should be furnished Bns for POW guards when requested.

(3) Higher echelons should pass information of the enemy down to Bns on time for the attack. This En very seldom was furnished timely information of the enemy.

S-3 Section: (1) In planning a landing LVT's that are mechanically reliable only should be included in those sent to the unit for the shore to shore or ship to shore movement. It is better to not embark all the unit in a shore to shore movement and get all those embarked on the designated landing beach than to embark the whole unit and have only a portion arrive at the beach.

(2) It is recommended that the commanding officer of a tank unit operate with the supported infantry commander rather than in his tank. It is felt that by this means of operation more efficient tank support can be attained.

(3) Insufficient illuminating shell was furnished by Naval Gunfire.

(4) Insufficient 60mm mortar shell illumination was furnished.

(5) Considerable interference on the SCR-300 nets was experienced. This interference came from other nets. It seems that frequency assignments were not kept according to III Div Corps 30-1 and interference resulted.

S-4 Section: (1) It is recommended that each CPL have a graves registration unit with transportation attached to the 4 Section; thereby eliminating the unnecessary delay in the burial of Marine dead.

(2) It is recommended that the WM Section be given an additional 1/4 ton trailer bringing the TO strength to six trailers per battalion.

(3) Availability in greater quantity of fruits and juices, individual heating units (not boxes) for combat troops in the front line.
Medical Section: It was found practicable to evacuate wounded at night under adverse conditions of mud using LVT's.

G. B. BELL,
LtCol., USMC,
Commanding.
SECOND BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD.

23 June, 1945.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASE III

Chapter I - General

1. This Special Action Report covers the actions and operations of the 2d Bn., 4th Marine Regiment and Battalion Landing Team 2/4 from the initiation of plans for the "Battle of Saipan" through the "Battle of Okinawa Peninsula" to the conclusion of the operation brought about by the fall of A&-Saki Peninsula. The period covered by this report is 13 May - 21 June, 1945. In view of the fact that the report is a continuation of 2d Bn., 4th Marines Special Action Report, Okinawa Operation, Phases I and II, that report will be referred to wherever possible in order to prevent needless duplication. To simplify matters the report of Phases I and II will be referred to as reference-(a) throughout this report.

2. The mission of this Battalion in the initial stage of part I of Phase III was to defend an assigned sector of the beach on the 6th Marine Division right (east) flank immediately north of MACINTYRE Airfield. On 19 May, 1945, this Battalion was committed to the attack on the left (west) flank of the 6th Marine Division line in the 4th Marines Zone of action.

In the second part of Phase III (Battle for OKINAWA Peninsula) this Battalion landed as the left flank assault element of the 4th Marines on 4 June, 1945, with the mission of securing a previously designated beach head in their Zone of action. Upon accomplishment of this mission on the same day of landing, the Battalion reverted to Regimental reserve for a period of 48 hours at the end of which they were again committed to the attack in the central sector of the Peninsula relieving the 1st Bn., 4th Marines with the mission of continuing the attack to seize a series of objectives within the 4th Marines Zone of action.

On being committed to the attack in the third and last part of Phase III (Capture of A&-Saki Peninsula) the Battalion mission was to attack in echelon of companies along the regimental right (west) flank, thereby protecting that flank. The mission was then changed to attack to the south and seize a section of the HIYAMA-GUSUKU ridge upon completion of which the Battalion was then relieved and reverted to regimental reserve. The following day the Battalion was again committed in the regimental right (west) sector with the mission of seizing and destroying all enemy positions in the assigned Zone of action.

Chapter II - Task Organization

1st Part - Phase III

Bn 2/4
Co. "M"

LtCol H. IDEM
Capt. REYNOLDS
Chapter III - Progress of the Operation

In order to eliminate all possible confusion in describing the participation of this Battalion in Phase III of the Okinawa operation, the following narrative is divided into three parts.

Part I - "Battle for Hill 205"

On entry of the 4th Marines, Sixth Marine Division into Phase III of the Okinawa operation the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was assigned a sector of the west coast to defend against enemy counter-landings. This beach defense sector was located about 1500 yds North of the Asahina Estuary and to the immediate Northwest of Macinato airfield. The Battalion remained in defense of this sector from 13-15 May, 1945, with the only enemy activity taking place on the night of 13-14 May, 1945, at which time friendly picket boats sank an undetermined number of enemy barges about 1500 yds off shore. Shortly thereafter, "E" Company observed and fired on, an estimated 12 enemy troops wading in the water over the reef, a distance of about 500 yds off shore. Results of this action were never determined.

On 15 May, 1945, the Battalion moved by marching to an assembly area along the west coast about 800 yds south of Asahina Estuary from which position they were given the mission of protecting the Sixth Marine Division right (West) flank from the position of the 22d Marines to the Estuary.
The next two days were spent in mopping up in caves and native tombs scattered throughout the area, enemy contacts being few and in every case with Japs that had burrowed themselves out of previously sealed caves. Sporadic bursts of enemy artillery were received in the area during this period with heaviest concentrations being received during the hours of darkness.

On 18 May, 1945, the Battalion moved to an assembly area located about 900 yds southeast of the Estuary and set up an all round defense, for the night. Shortly after arrival in this area a friendly TP crashed in "E" Co area killing 4 men and injuring 13 others.

At 0600 the morning of 19 May, 1945, orders were received to relieve elements of the 29th Marines on the left flank of the 6th Marine Division line in the 4th Marines Zone of action.

Reconnaissance of routes of approach to, and of the front lines was made commencing at 0700, and with "F" Co on the left and "E" Co on the right the relief was completed by 1330. Considerable enemy mortar and artillery fire was received during the period the relief was being effected with a result of light casualties being suffered in spite of the fact that the relief was made in open terrain under full surveillance of the enemy.

At about 1530 "E" Co became engaged in a fire fight with the enemy in the vicinity of Half Moon Hill which was actually a cluster of ridges dominating the approaches to the SH smaller mass from the West. At about 1700 "E" Co succeeded in driving the enemy back from their left (East) flank positions on the Wester slope of Half Moon Hill, however, in view of the fact that the "E" Co left flank was still vulnerable to attack from three sides it was decided to pull the left flank elements down off the slope and about 150 yds to the North at which point they could tie in physically with the right (West) flank of "F" Co.

At nightfall the Battalion was tied in with the 3d Bn., 5th Marines on the left (East) and 3d Bn., 4th Marines on the right (West).

The night of 19-20 May, 1945, was spent comparative quiet with light enemy mortar and artillery fire received in the lines and around the CP throughout the night.

At 0800 20 May, 1945, the Battalion commenced the attack to seize the 0-E Line (Division objective line running generally East and West along the North bank of the aSsato river to a point about 1500 yds inland from the mouth of the river thence in a North-Westerly direction toward the SHull mass for a distance of about 800 yds).

The attack commenced with "F" and "G" Companies in the assault and "E" Company in reserve, having been relieved by the Company earlier in the morning. Initially, progress was rapid on the left with only light enemy resistance being encountered, however, as the advance began to carry the left flank element into the higher ground along the left boundary, the resistance increased sharply and it soon developed into an inch by inch advance.

At about 1000 "E" Company was committed on the left to maintain contact between "F" Company and the right (West) flank element of the 1st Marine Division.
In the meantime "G" Co. was involved in attacking to seize Half Moon Hill from the west.

About 1130 it became apparent that to continue the attack against the enemy half moon hill positions from the west would prove to costly, so it was decided to envelop it from the north and southwest. "F" Co. to execute the envelopment from the north, "E" Co. to hold and support by fire, then pick up the contact with the 5th Marines on their left (east) and "G" Company to make the envelopment from the southwest, joining forces with "E" Company on the reverse (west) slope of the Hill, on completion of the maneuver.

The coordination being completed, the attack was resumed at about 1245, with "G" Company moving out rapidly. "E" Company maneuvering in the more exposed terrain, up against a different proposition, receiving fire from three sides with the result that casualties were high and progress slow. The enemy was supporting his defenses with knee mortar, heavy mortar and artillery which combined with his heavy machine guns and terrain advantage made for an almost impregnable defensive position. At the close of the day, however, our gains were substantial and the battalion was able to set up a good defensive position for the night.

The next three days of fighting were limited to holding attack tactics with but slight changes in the line. Heavy rain hampered the operation of tanks and any attacking without their support was slow and costly.

On 24 May, 1945, the battalion was relieved by a battalion of the 29th Marines and then proceeded to the regimental right (west) sector where they relieved the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on the line then held on the south bank of the Kuma River.

The following morning found the battalion attacking in a southerly direction with "G" and "E" Companies in the assault and "F" Company in reserve. After advancing about 100 yards contact was made with the enemy who immediately started throwing knee mortars all over the front. It was the same old story of the Jap defending from reverse slope positions so the advance slowed down.

On the right flank the tanks immediately sent in to support and the advance continued at a normal rate of pace, but again on the left flank it was slower. Tanks could not maneuver due to the condition of the terrain after two days of rain. By early afternoon the rain began to fall again and the attack was continued without the use tanks.

By nightfall all companies had advanced an average of 400 yards and with the exception of "E" Company which had been committed on the left flank about mid-afternoon, were well dug in for the night.

In view of the fact that the tanks were unable to get into position to support "E" Company, they were required to attack with the aid of the organic supporting weapons only, and the cost was high. At the close of the day their strength was one officer and about forty men. They were still fighting when darkness set in so naturally their position was not too secure. It was still raining. Supply and evacuation was all by hand.
At midnight the Japs launched a counter-attack against "E" Company which was immediately reinforced by one platoon of the 1st Battalion 29th Marines. The counter-attack was strictly localized in the "E" Company sector and was successfully repelled after a hand grenade duel which lasted about two hours. Our casualties were light.

The next two days saw the attack stalled due to continuous heavy rains and all units continued organization and defense of the positions held at dawn of 26 May, 1945.

At about 1030 28 May, 1945, this Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion 29th Marines and returned by motor and marching to the area they had previously occupied north of OSHIKU Airfield for rest and rehabilitation.

Part II - "Battle of OSHIKU Peninsula"

On 1 June, 1945, the Battalion received warning orders to prepare for a shore to shore assault landing on the northwestern shore of OSHIKU Peninsula during the early morning hours of 4 June, 1945.

Supply in preparation for this movement was slow as a result of the previous heavy rain spell; however, by 1900 3 June, 1945, the Battalion was prepared for the job and all elements got off on schedule under cover of darkness the following morning.

Due to LVT failures, contact with the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at the off shore rendezvous was delayed about 45 minutes; however, this did not hamper the landing in any serious degree.

The Battalion crossed the Line of Departure commencing at 0530 with "F" and "G" Companies in the assault on the left and right respectively, "E" Company was in Battalion reserve.

Pre-landing bombardment was delivered by Naval Gunfire, Artillery LVT(a)'s.

At 0530 the assault elements hit the beach under light enemy resistance. All units were ashore by 0630 and the reorganization complete without delay.

The advance to the first beach head objective line slowed down after the initial foothold due to extensive enemy minefields that were encountered in the plateau immediately joining the beaches. Regardless of this obstacle the, the O-J line (1st Objective) was seized by 1000, after a short delay to reorganize, the Battalion with "E" Company now committed on the left flank, resumed the attack to seize the O-K line.

As the attack progressed, the enemy resistance grew steadily heavier and heavier, and by 1200 all units battling an enemy whose defenses were well organized and stubborn.

It became extremely noticeable that the enemy was employing an exceptionally large number of 20mm and heavy machine guns in the defense of the Peninsula. Our tanks, having been landed at 0740 had again proven invaluable with their support; however, due to the extensive mining of all possible tank approaches by the enemy,
With "F" Company supporting by fire, "G" and "H" Companies resumed the attack at 1300. The advance was slow due to the situation of the enemy in well constructed cave positions; however, by 1530 both units were on the objective and busy with the job of organizing their defenses for the night and mopping up the cave positions to their rear. Light enemy mortar and small arms fire was received during the night.

At 0715 9 June, 1945, orders were received to attack to seize the last remaining high ground in the Battalion zone of action. In order to accomplish this mission the Battalion had to attack frontally across a valley 400 yards wide. "F" Company still occupying the same position held the two days previous had to execute a turning maneuver to the left in order to be facing in the right direction for the attack. The terrain over which "F" Company had to execute this maneuver was exposed and afforded little protection from enemy observation or fire.

The attack jumped off at 1145 with tanks, M7's and 37's supporting. The advance was slow due to the lack of approaches for the tanks, and enemy situation in general. At 1445 "F" Company started moving into line on the left against heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire. By 1530 "G" and "H" Companies had advanced some 150 yards against stubborn enemy resistance from well prepared positions in the ridge mass to the front. Due to the terrain, enemy minfields, and a tank trap it was impossible to employ but a few tanks at a time. The tank trap was located just behind the "F" Company lines and before tanks could be placed in position to give maximum support, a by-pass had to be constructed. There were no armored bulldozers or tank dozer available so plans to continue the attack were given up for the day. All units dug in for the night.

At this point it seems fitting to mention that the Battle of OMAKO Peninsula was in the final stage and all three regiments of the 6th Marine Division were converging on the remainder of the Jep defenders from three sides. This situation alone caused many delays due to the close coordination required in attacking in a gradually decreasing zone of action. Due to limited ranges and jammed communications some supporting weapons must necessarily be abandoned in a situation like this, and the assaulting units are confronted with the problem of changing their tactics in accordance with the weapons they have to work with. Ordinarily to gain the fire superiority over the enemy which was required to permit the continuation of the attack of this battalion on the afternoon of 9 June, 1945, artillery could have been employed. In view of the fact however, that we were now attacking toward our own artillery and across the front of the regiment on the left, direct support weapons such as tanks, M7's and 37's were the only support that could be called upon. Consequently when they could not be moved into position from which they could support the attack, then the advance of the infantry had to stop.

Early the morning of 10 June, 1945, equipment was obtained to clear all tank approaches to the front lines and by 0815 tanks and M7's were moving into position to support the attack. Once in position they started the reduction of enemy defenses in preparation for the advance to the objective.

At 0945 in coordination with the movement of the 29th Marines on the left, the attack jumped off with all companies being supported by tanks, M7's, 37's, and 50 caliber machine guns. Fifty-five minutes later all companies were on the objective and commenced organizing their positions for the defense. The rest of the day was
devoted to mopping up, sealing caves and supporting the attack of the 29th Marines by fire.

A few enemy attempts to infiltrate our lines during the night were quickly discouraged and dawn of 11 June, 1945, arrived with the situation well in hand.

The next two days, 11 and 12 June, 1945, found the Battalion executing a holding attack and supporting the advance of the 29th Marines by fire.

On 13 June, 1945, at 1015 the Battalion was squeezed out of the line by the 29th Marines attacking from the left (West) and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines attacking from the right (East).

The Battalion then moved back to an assembly area on the west central part of the peninsula for rest and rehabilitation, their part in the battle of Capu Peninsula being over.

Part III - Capture of Kiyaku Peninsula

After four days of rest and rehabilitation the Battalion moved on 18 June, 1945, to an assembly area just north of the town of Takuho preparatory to joining the attack to seize the remainder of Kiyaku Peninsula.

Orders were received that evening to move to an assembly area north of Kiyaku Ridge in the 4th Marines Zone of action, and to be ready prepared to cross the line of departure by 1000 19 June, 1945, on the right of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, echeloned to the right rear to protect the regimental right flank. All units crossed the line of departure on schedule at 1000 at 19 June, 1945, and at 1145 "G" Company had contacted the right flank element of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines as ordered.

At 1530 with "G" and "E" Companies in the assault, the Battalion was committed to the attack against Kiyaku Ridge. Both companies reached the objective by 1630 and were ordered to defend the positions held at that time. At 1645 information was received that an element of the 29th Marines would relieve the 2d Battalion upon completion of which the Battalion would revert to regimental reserve and move to an assembly area about 600 yards north of the Kiyaku-Gusuku ridge in the west sector of the 4th Marines Zone of action. The relief was completed at 1900 and the Battalion went into an all around defense for the night.

The attack jumped off the following day, 20 June, 1945, with the Battalion in regimental reserve, prepared to support either the 1st or 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on order. At 1040 the Battalion was committed to the attack of the right of the 1st Battalion in the right sector of the 4th Marines Zone of action, the mission being to seize hill 80 of the Kiyaku-Gusuku ridge. "G" and "E" Companies were in the assault with "F" Company in reserve.

"G" Company reached the objective at 1330 against moderate resistance. "E" Company by that time had arrived at the base of hill 80 and was well occupied with a pocket of enemy resistance in the cliff on the west side of the hill. At 1520 it was decided to by-pass this pocket leaving one platoon of "F" Company to guard it and
by passing "E" Company through the right elements of "G" Company, seize the remainder of hill 80 on the right (West). By 1645 "E" Company was on the objective and all units digging in for the night.

There was considerable enemy activity along the entire front during the night, however, it was not organized and cost us no casualties.

21 June, 1945, found the Battalion resuming the attack with all hands anxious to get started as the end of the campaign was in view. The scheme of maneuver called for a turning movement to the left (East) then to attack from the South to seize the Eastern edge of NiYumu Gusuku Ridge wherein lay the last remaining organized enemy resistance in the 4th Marines Zone of action.

The attack jumped off on schedule at 0800 and both assault companies moved out rapidly. After completing the turn to the East it was decided to continue the attack in that direction instead of attacking from the South. This change in the maneuver was highly successful and at 1150 the Battle was over.

The remainder of the day was spent in mopping up and at 1600 all units had assembled for the night on the Southern Slope of Hill 80.

On 22 June, 1945 the Battalion moved to an assembly area midway between the NiYumu and NiYumu-Gusuku ridges from which position mopping up operations were conducted in a sector 1000 yards wide and extending to south of hill 80 a distance of 400 yards.

On 26 June, 1945, the Battalion moved to a bivouac area in the central part of Okinawa Peninsula for rest and rehabilitation.

Special Comment by Separate Sections

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Shore Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Naval Gunfire Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Air Support</td>
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<td>(d) Artillery Support</td>
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<td>(e) Tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Amphibian Tractors</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Armored Amphibians</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Infantry Combat</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Communications (including J-300)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Engineers</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) Medical</td>
<td>In the third Phase of the Okinawa-Operation it was found almost impossible to evacuate patients by means of ambulance jeep. The ambulance jeep was found to be impractical because of its' inability to carry large numbers of patients and to travel over muddy terrain. It is recommended that recon-ambulances be used in future operations by Battalion Aid Stations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Through the chain of evacuation, exchange of stretchers was not maintained causing Battalion Aid Stations to run short.

With exception of the stretcher re-supply, Division Supply Units are to be re-stocked for keeping Battalion Aid Stations equipped with plasma, dressings and other essential medical supplies.

Plywood molded splints were found to be of great value for the treatment of compound fractures of the leg and far surpass other types of splints for field work.

Supply and logistics, as will be noted in reference (a), the transportation problem throughout the first two Phases of the Okinawa-Operation was acute. Throughout Phase III the inadequacy of the transportation system became more and more apparent as this Phase progressed. In view of this fact this opportunity is taken to re-emphasize the recommendations set forth in reference (a).

During the second and third Phases of the operation when this organization was directed to re-equip and prepare for further operations it was found a near impossibility to scour every battlefield to salvage equipment of casualties especially where the casualty rate is as high as it has been throughout the Okinawa-Operation, therefore the higher echelons of supply will have to take care of greater losses in the future.

Chapter IV - Enemy Tactics

Enemy tactics as observed by this Battalion during this Phase were the same as those encountered on Okinawa Peninsula while fighting the 5th Force, only on a much larger scale.

It was found that the Japanese Naval Forces defending Okinawa Peninsula were a much more tenacious fighting force than the Japanese Army forces engaged in the "Battle for Okinawa" and during the "Capture of Okinawa Peninsula." Both the Japanese Army and Naval forces were found to employ like tactics in defending from reverse slope positions, however, the Naval forces on Okinawa Peninsula employed mines of all types to a much greater extent than the Army defenders.

Chapter V - Estimated Results of Operations

(1) Area secured:

Approximately one and one-half square miles.
(2) **Enemy casualties:**

- Killed: 1162
- Estimated and sealed in caves: 208
- Captured: 117

(3) **Operational material damage to enemy:**

Due to the great number of caves sealed without investigation, it is considered impossible to give an accurate account of material damage to the enemy.

**Material actually captured or destroyed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knee mortars</th>
<th>LMGs</th>
<th>.30 Cal. LMGs</th>
<th>Lewis type LMGs</th>
<th>.50 Cal. LMGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm, LMGs</td>
<td>.37mm, AT Guns</td>
<td>.50mm, AT Guns</td>
<td>.75mm, Guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; Naval Gun</td>
<td>5&quot; Naval Guns</td>
<td>8&quot; Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>Radar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>Knee Mortar</td>
<td>assorted small arms ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ammunition destroyed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>81mm Mortar</th>
<th>Knee Mortar</th>
<th>assorted small arms ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97 cases</td>
<td>23 cases</td>
<td>34 cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) **Own losses:**

- (a) Killed in action: 3 Off; 167 Enl;
- (b) Wounded in action: 20 Off; 568 Enl;
- (c) Missing in action: None

Chapter VI

Comments and recommendations classified according to Staff sections.

(1) S-1: No Comment. See reference (a).

(2) S-2: No Comment. See reference (a).

(3) S-3: It is recommended that Tank Liaison Teams be attached to the Infantry Battalions in the same manner as Artillery Liaison Teams and further that they remain with the Battalions throughout.
a specific action as is the case with liaison parties of other supporting arms.

This recommendation is predicated upon the fact that too much time is lost in coordinating tank and infantry tactics. Throughout this phase of the operation, where tanks played such an important roll in the action, a new Tank Liaison Team would be assigned to an infantry battalion each day. They would arrive on the scene about twenty minutes prior to the commencement of the attack. Then by the time their radio was set up and they had established communications with their tanks, it would be time for the jump-off. This leaves no opportunity for the responsible infantry commanders to make last minute changes as may be required by the situation and the only alternative is to hold up the attack.

(4) S-4: No Comment. See reference (a).

E. F. CARNEY, JR.
Major, USMC
Commanding.
Special Action Report.
PHASE III

CHAPTER I

The purpose of this report is, basically, to give a clear, concise picture of the THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION's part, and method of taking part, in the battle of NAHA, the landing and participation on the OROKU PENN, and the final drive on the ARA SAKI PENN.

In these three individual battles this organization took a leading, aggressive role, cooperating to the fullest extent with units of higher and of lower elements.

The first role this battalion was given in the Southern drive, was the final breakdown of the resistance behind SUGAR LOAF HILL; the taking of KING RIDGE; crossing of the ASATO RIVER; the capture of a position in the town and overlooking strategic NAHA. Despite extremely adverse conditions and inclement weather the deed was accomplished.

The second task was the landing on the OROKU PENN; securing of the OROKU AIRFIELD; a drive across the OROKU PENN; the final cleaning of the Japs in their last pocket of resistance just outside the town of OROKU.

In accomplishing this mission, a three quarters circle was made, bringing the THIRD BATTALION almost back to the same beaches on which they landed.

The third job was a drive down the center of the ARA SAKI PENN; taking over the left boundary and cleaning out the last vestige of resistance on the extreme tip of the PENN.

CHAPTER II TASK ORGANIZATION:

Co I  
Capt 'McMASTERS

Co K  
Capt SEXTON

Co L  
Lt PERSKIE

81 Mortars  
Lt SMITH

CHAPTER III OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE:

Section I
NAHA Phase

After the Northern expedition of the THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES, and the brilliantly conducted 1 day battalion patrol, in which over 150 Japanese were killed, the THIRD BATTALION was given a period of rest and reorganization. At this time the physical standards
the fighting ability, and the teamwork of the battalion was at a fine point of proficiency. As a fighting machine, it was a deadly weapon, well coordinated and having a strong feeling of Esprit De Corps.

From the fourth day of May when the battalion was shifted to the vicinity of DERIGA, in preparation for its Southern push, until the 19th of May, when it was committed in the 29th MARINE zone of action, it was moved once more this time to the MACHINATO AIRFIELD. This move was expeditiously planned to aid in the rapid deliverance of troops to the front immediately on call.

On the 19th of May, 1945, the THIRD BATTALION was moved forward and took over the 2nd BATTALION, 29th MARINES lines, on hazardous, battle scarred SUGAR LOAF HILL. The relief was effected smoothly with well coordinated movement and a minimum of confusion, great stress being laid on rapid movement and cover positions. A few casualties were had resulting from well placed enemy mortar and heavy artillery fire from both the SHUHI and OROKU PERRN directions.

K and L Co's dug in on the line with I in battalion reserve, placed to be effective immediately on call in either Co zone of action. Near I Co's CP, in its' well protected perimeter were established a forward medical station and a forward priority supply dump.

In getting into position L Co killed 35 Nips, K Co killed only 2.

During the night the Jap Arty fire made itself felt starting a sporadic almost incessant fire, that lasted until May 24, when the battalion was relieved for a short rest period.

Jumping off from the established positions on SUGAR LOAF HILL at 0800, May 20, both Co's immediately encountered heavily organized Japanese resistance in the form of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and all types of artillery up to an 8 inch shell immediately nicknamed "Box-Car Charlie", by the MARINES. It was this weapon that contributed more than any other to the heavy casualties in men and materials suffered in the battle across the ASATO into the town of NAHA.

Tanks were used very effectively, supported by infantry equipped with demolitions and flame throwers in blasting the numerous caves in K Co's sector during the morning. Several tanks were put out of commission by "Box-Car Charlie" which also took a heavy toll of infantry.

In the early afternoon I Co was out on the line to maintain contact. Anticipating possible trouble, B Co of the 1st BATTALION, 4th MARINES, was briefed on the 3rd BATTALIONS situation, routes of approach, possible support and methods of support.

As had been anticipated a counter-attack was received lasting from 2000 until 2400. B Co, with perfect timing, moved in coordination with the 3d battalion's lines, giving every possible aid.

- 2 -
The Japs reached as far as KING ridge to K Co's lines but were beaten back in a fierce hand to hand fight. The lines held and morning showed the battle-field strewn with the grenade torn and knife ripped bodies of nearly 500 of the Emperor's soldiers.

All the next day the enemy laid heavy fire on the SUGAR LOAF area getting two direct hits on an ammo dump but the damage was almost negligible, due to several men rushing out and segregating burning cases of grenades from the dump.

Tanks giving direct support from KING ridge drew a tremendous amount of fire and had several direct hits. The only damage incurred was the loss of a Trac by one of them. It was repaired before noon.

Ground was gained up to a position midway between the ASATO and KING ridge. A number of Nip weapons were captured in the way of small arms, Nambus and KnI mortars.

During the day K and I were on the lines with L Co in reserve. After the lines were tied in securely, L Co sent 1 Plat behind K and 1 behind I Co for possible support. Artillery fire was received all night long and at midnight it started raining, making the loose shell torn ground muddy and extremely treacherous.

On the morning of the 22nd, conditions were miserable. The ground was covered with a gooey slick mud making walking difficult and vehicular transportation almost impossible.

The process of supply and tank support were greatly detrimented and tanks were not able to give any but long range support. Priority gear was brought up in LVT's, all other transportation was ineffective.

Weapons were wet and many of them didn't fire, despite all the men could do to keep them in operative condition. At this time Co's were greatly under strength, one being down to 83 men and the other two in little better shape. Despite adverse conditions the men fought on doggedly, more determined than ever to keep slugging until the final objective was reached.

Because of the previous night's outpouring the ASATO RIVER was rampaging down its muddy course, offering a serious obstacle to the weary troops. A halt was called and under cover of tank fire, troops were given orders to dig in, the crossing not to be attempted until the following morning. 37's were placed strategically in position to defend road gaps and possible river crossings should the enemy attempt another counter-attack.

It was a long tedious job, but supplies were brought up, even after nightfall, by the limited LVT's. Even they had a rough show maneuvering the knee deep mud plastered over the undrained roads. Supplies were distributed by carrying parties to the Co's.
Extensive patrol work, cave blowing and supplying of vitally needed ammunition was carried out in the morning. It wasn’t until the battalion was again in fighting trim, with weapons in condition and with a full unit of ammunition, chow and water, that the crossing of the ASATO RIVER was attempted and carried to a successful completion.

At 1200, I and L Co’s on the line, moved in a rapid skirmish up to the river and across it, gaining 300 yards and the strategic forward ridge inside the town of NAHA in less than two hours of hard fighting. From the newly taken position a great deal of Nip activity was seen. Sniper, automatic weapons, and mortar positions were seen and fired on by artillery and mortars with about 60% result.

Four officers were hit in the afternoon. They and all other casualties were evacuated across the chest high, swiftly moving water by hand. Each stretcher took at least 12 men to negotiate the crossing safely. Supplies were carried by the same means, the men working in the chest high water hour after laborious hour under intense enemy artillery and mortar fire in a successful attempt to supply the Co’s sufficiently.

In the late afternoon several rounds of Arty, fell in the battalion CP killing the battalion interpreter and wounding three other men. All wounded were given immediate care and transferred out as quickly as possible on the LVT’s.

For the first time in several nights Nip fire was almost nil. Heavy concentrations of 60’s, 81’s and artillery were given over the entire battalion front in the morning, still a deadly hail of sniper fire persisted.

By 0800 in the morning of the 24th the engineers had put 2 footbridges across the river in the 3d BATTALIONS sector and the crossing was greatly expedited. For the first time the weather cleared giving enough clearance for an effective air strike. Flustered under the combined shelling and bombing, a number of Nips started running about and were coolly picked off by grinning MARINES.

Relief was affected by 2nd BATTALION, 4th MARINES, by 1230, 3d BATTALION going into Regtl reserve.

The battalion stayed in reserve until May 27, when they were again committed to the lines. On moving forward the mud, sticking tenaciously to the mens shoes, caused a slow torturous advance.

A guide was secured at SUGAR LOAF HILL to lead the THIRD BATTALION into position. The ASATO RIVER was crossed on an Engineer built footbridge, a larger bridge under construction but not finished until several hours later.

No enemy activity was encountered while the battalion was moving up.

Lines were in by 1330, filling the gap between A Co and the 22nd MARINES on the narrow rail track. All Co’s were needed for a solid line and Regtl Weapons were brought up for a reserve.

Seven Nips pinned in a house by long range machine
gun fire were the target for artillery fire. The house had 4 direct hits, the Nips were believed deceased. No other enemy activity except 3 mortar bursts and a little long range sniping were encountered.

The next day, May 28, guides were sent to the 3d BATTALION, 29th MARINES to bring them up for relief. It was effected by 1400 and the battalion moved back to the MACHINATO AIRFIELD.

Section II
OROKU PENN

On June 2 and 3, the staff of the 3d BATTALION walked the two miles to the Regtl CP, in order to make the plans for the landing on OROKU PENN. In less than 24 hours a boat loading diagram was made up and every man was made aware of the coming maneuver.

On June 4th, the battalion landing in Regtl reserve effected a landing at 0645 and within 20 minutes was committed on the right boundary and pushed to the edge of the OROKU AIRFIELD.

The field appeared to be in very poor shape, rough grass overgrown, swampy. Along the edges of the three runways were large revetments, excellent for cover but dangerous to use for the Japanese seemed to have them well ranged in with mortars. On the field, bombed and strafed to a mess of useless wreckage, were several planes, ranging only to a light 2 motored bomber. On the right of the airfield ran a sea wall overgrown with palmetto growth and heavy brush, on the left were a series of foothill ridges criss crossed with caves and the revetments for housing airplanes. The center of the field was swampy with canals criss crossing it, impossible for the proper maneuvering and open to flanking fire from both the sea-wall and the hills on the left.

The only road approach to the airport in the 3d BATTALION sector and only possible tank approach route was mined and blown out in several places. It was foreseen that tanks would be of great supporting value, and a tank with blade, and a mine disposal crew were sent up to make the road passable. The blade cleared the road but in the process mired in the soft mud caused by a heavy noon-time shower.

The En had a three Co front extending from one side to the other of the airports width and having a secure beach defense as well as defense on the inner sectors. Jumping off the next morning at 0800 I Co immediately encountered sniper fire on the left flank front. Tanks were ordered in for support fire but the mud made it impossible for them to negotiate the water-soaked terrain.

Using a Nip cave running entirely through a hill the Japs were well ranged in or, for an OP I Co attacked the well defended mountain fortress. Before the fierce on-slaught of the MARINES charging behind deadly well controlled fire, the position was gained and soon made non-effective by demolitions and grenades.
During the morning K Co patrolled on the high ground to the right, using the sea wall as an approach. Defense in that sector was negative.

As soon as I Co cleared the snipers out, L Co was moved through to contact B Co on the left.

About 1400, 5 tanks crossed the airfield to I Co's right flank and concentrated on direct cave fire. The airfield, however, was covered by artillery and mortar fire and when K was pulled back at 1600, from the right it was necessary for security to walk behind the sea wall and back along the defended line of march to rejoin the battalion.

A 50 man working party was sent by Regt to carry supplies in to the 3d BATTALION. LVT's could not maneuver in the tanks route of approach due to heavy concentrations of artillery, laid by the enemy on the field.

Before attacking the next morning an air strike was called on the numerous ridges to the front. I Co received surprise fire from the island to the right of the airfield and another airstrike was called immediately.

The fire was a rather large piece but the missile, which seemed capable of both air and ground bursts, traveled in wobbly fashion and over end, with a peculiar whistling sound. The tanks which had come up earlier trained their 75's on the position and began firing into the caves on the island. The air strike which had been called as urgent was given in less than half an hour. As each after rack of bombs fell directly on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered.

About this time the Japs introduced a rocket immediately named "Whistlin' Willie". It gave a terrific demoralizing shriek as it was launched then in 5-15 seconds a terrific blast. For its' size it was inefficient having very little shrapnel effect, and unless landing very close to its' target, was almost useless. Its' nerve wracking qualities, however, were outstanding, and two rounds landing close to troops killed 2 and wounded 4 others, literally breaking them apart with the blast concussion.

Later several of the weapons were captured and proved to be nothing but a shell about 8 inches in diameter and just an inch shorter than an M1 rifle. Launched from a pair of horizontal rail tracks about 15 foot long, the aiming was strictly a hit or miss affair, a process of sandbags, guesswork and luck.

K Co was swung onto I's right flank and L was stopped to await relief of the 2nd BATTALION. About 1600 L Co was relieved by E Co and was attached to K Co's left flank making a complete battalion perimeter defense, still having a Co reserve. Some incendiary and explosive bullets were received in the late afternoon and early the next day, but no casualties were had from them.

During the night the Japs had evidently slipped down and mined the tank tracks in front of the front lines. In the morning the lead tank was shifted several feet and test a track from a terrific land mine explosion, while in the
ruts of the day before.

It was on this day, June 7, that the battalion got wheeled transportation, greatly expediting the movement of supplies.

L Co in frontal assault, trying to take the last high ridge on the PENN’s West coast, received a deadly cross-fire of well directed Nambu and snipers fire, supported by extremely heavy mortar barrages thrown with great accuracy on the only route of approach. Direct and indirect supporting fire was thrown repeatedly on those Jap positions but with negative results. Finally it was deemed wise for the forward elements of the Co to pull back and hold the ground already taken, rather than to push on with a heavy toll of casualties.

On the following day the 1st BATTALION was given the mission of taking the position from the flank approach along the sea wall and the 3d BATTALIONS direction of attack was changed to cross the PENN. The terrain here was extremely rough, with an excessive amount of criss-crossing ridges. Every lane had its allotment of caves, each covering the other from flank and rear. These caves were sometimes dangerous to blow, some of them being filled with enormous amounts of high explosives and ammunition.

As soon as the village of AGASUKU was secured a tank with blade was sent up to clear a road for supplies.

In the morning a rocket barrage was used in preparation before the battalion jumped off. The going was very rough and contact difficult to maintain but working in close coordination with the 2nd BATTALION, 4th Marines the village of UIBARU was gained as the day’s objective.

No sooner had the troops arrived there than the Nips put a mortar barrage on the position that resulted in 20 casualties.

During this time the front was being gradually narrowed and a one Co front was all that was necessary the succeeding day. L Co was chosen to push on until squeezed out of the line as planned. The maneuver was carried out with beautiful coordination between the right 1st BATTALION and the left 2nd BATTALION. By 1400 L Co was able to pull back and join the rest of the battalion in reserve.

Monday, June 11, I Co was committed through the 1st BATTALION in what proved to be the last phase of remaining opposition on OROKU. With cover of 1st BATTALION sniping on the left and with tank support from the rear I Co valiantly attacked the red clay hill which almost proved to be another SUGAR LOAF. For the best part of the day I Co strove mightily against this fortified embankment. In the afternoon it was apparent that the day had not been quite long enough, the surface of the hill was under control but the underground still swarmed with the creeping malignant Japs.

K Co was ordered through the right flank in the 22nd MARINES zone of action to pull a strategic flanking movement on the ridgeline. I pulled back just far enough
to defend the slopes against any Banzai charge the Japs might pull.

I Co had been hit heavily by sniper fire receiving about 35 casualties. L Co was passed through them in the morning to continue the attack in conjunction with K Co. The last vestiges of resistance were soon wiped out in the area. On the left flank L Co had a grenade warfare with Nips hiding in spider traps. A solid defense line was established for the night closing the remaining pocket to a minimum and all to lower ground.

In the past few days a number of Nip graves had been encountered giving evidence of the huge uncounted toll the BATTALION had been inflicting on the Japs.

On the final day of the OROKU drive, June 13, it was apparent that the last organization of Nip resistance was over. A few casualties were had from some instances of individual effort such as grenades being thrown from caves and at least one Nambu, but on the whole the Japs were done and knew it. Sweeping down from all sides the MARINES drove toward a large field outside OROKU covered on three sides by ridges, occupied, and on the fourth by the sea.

The MARINES formed a skirmish line, I Co on the right and elements of the 29th MARINES on the left, flushing the Japs from the cane fields. Explosion followed rapid explosion as Jap bodies hurled through the air, torn into mangled corpses by their own form of Hari Kiri. Delightedly the MARINES watched the Japs in their self-destruction, cheering and applauding when a body was blown to unusual heights. As the skirmishers closed in a few Japs began to surrender, evidently not so firm in their convictions of honorable death (probably Nip atheists). A few were used to persuade others to give up by going before the lines and talking to them.

From one field these human 'bird dogs came back reporting to the interpreter that there were Japs in the field but that they wanted to kill themselves. The interpreter shrugged his shoulders phonetically, "Tell them to hurry up, we haven't got all day." Several explosions rent the air and jagged hunks of human flesh went hurtling skyward, then suddenly fell back to the ground. The MARINES pushed on.

The air was soon black with powder smoke and saturated with the stench of burning flesh. Flame throwers were put into play along the sea wall, burning and destroying, bringing agonized screams from the Japanese, cremating them in their positions. Tremendous explosions occurred as the Japs increased their mass suicide, blowing themselves up in groups at a time.

As suddenly as it began it ended. There were no more explosions, no more shots fired. There were no more Japs, living targets for eager rifles. The excitement was over. Suddenly tired the troops realized it was a hot day and walked away, still jubilant but tired after the hard drive.

OROKU PENN was secured.
June 18th the 3d BATTALION again went to war. This time moving along well secured roads they marched in a battalion column off the OROKU PENN to an assembly area in the vicinity of ITOMAN. Expecting to remain the night the battalion was nonetheless ready to move out when ordered less than two hours later.

Attached for the night to the 22nd MARINES, all three Co's of the 3d BATTALION, 4th MARINES, were committed to the lines. Despite several rounds of Nip artillery and mortars the battalion was gotten into position without a casualty.

With good artillery support the next day the battalion jumped off encountering but little resistance. Hundreds of civilians started passing rearward through the lines and continued the entire day. With good tank and artillery support lines pushed forward 2000 yards tying in on the left with the 8th MARINES.

During this period the weather turned very hot. During midday it was exceedingly hard for the troops to maneuver with the same high efficiency of morning and evening hours. Nevertheless, realizing that this was the final push, the men were always eager to move forward.

June 20, 1945 — The ridge to the front, final obstacle in the securing of OKINAWA, was steep with rock cliffs ranging from 50 to 200 feet in height. In the 3d BATTALION zone the only two possible approaches to this ridge were unfeasible for attack. One was a road, tank blocked and covered by a cross fire of inaccessible sniper fire. The other was a cut between two high noses jutting from the solid rock. A difficult approach had there been a Jap nowhere in the area.

Realizing the futility of attacking from a frontal direction the 3d BATTALION CO dispatched I Co on the left, through the 8th MARINES zone, to take the ridge from the accessible left flank nose.

Moving along the ridge with great care I Co cleaned out several bunkers and numerous caves making way for L Co to use the same approach and maintain left flank security. In reality the ridge was a plateau sloping back to the sea, having seaward facings of from 20 to 50 foot cliffs of rough coral, making a natural barrier to LVT's or any type of landing craft. The ground was pitted, jagged coral with wicked niggerheads and overgrown with thorny palmettos, tangled into a twisted jungle of matting treacherous to the foot. To pass through these choked up barriers was a herculean task, yet it was accomplished courageously by the troops who fought their way through maintaining contact and slaughtering the Japs as the hid in foxholes and spider traps.

K Co patrolled the face of the cliff in the battalion zone of action during the day, locating and cleaning out Nip barracks in the rocky hillside.
In the afternoon an LCI had been working up and down the beach persuading the Japs to surrender by the means of a loudspeaker. At 1700 a great horde of civilians and POW's started turning in. A few men were detached to search and strip the prisoners while the civilians were sent rearward down the road. The job was done; thousands of civilians being sent backward and over 400 POW's being taken without a mishap.

Supplies were gotten in by an airdrop, and the POW's were made to distribute them before being taken to the rear. June 21, 1945 - LVT's came up over the rocky coral tank trail. They brought in more supplies and sorely needed water.

The last objective for the 3d BATTALION was a little hose of the ridge. After thoroughly burning it over with a Zippo tank, troops moved on it and had no difficulty securing the position. One Jap had a MARINE helmet and carried an M1 rifle. Dubious MARINES not wanting to kill one of their buddies hesitated to fire on him. The Jap caused one casualty then was killed in a MG burst. A little later while the Co's were assembled waiting for word to secure a pocket was discovered where the Nips had evidently infiltrated the night before. Machine gun and 60mm mortar fire was laid on the area. A few minutes later when sniping still occurred, 1 platoon of L Co moved rapidly over the position accounting for 15 Japs without a casualty.

An Am-Trac sent up to take out gear was stuck, necessitating a delay in removing supplies. The battalion less 1 platoon of L Co for security of the LVT, went rearward while another Am-Trac was ordered up to pull the other out. With as little delay as possible all gear was loaded including the salvaged chutes from the air drop and the battalion was entirely removed from the scene of operations. On this day the island of OKINAWA was declared officially secured.

Section IV
Spt Wns and Units

1. Air Support

Air support given the 3d BATTALION, 4th MARINES in this phase of the OKINAWAN Operation was on the whole excellent. Always on call, one strike on the OROKU PENN was given in less than 30 minutes after it was requested as urgent. Other strikes were well coordinated with infantry and artillery to make efficient gains.

On one occasion the Bn was supplied by air drop. This was on the ARA SAKI PENN and was given correctly with a minimum of breakage to material.
It is suggested that the system of direct infantry liaison coordination be reestablished between pilot and liaison teams attached to battalions. When calling an airstrike once it is under way the liaison teams cannot effectively control the aircraft by the system now being used. In some instances casualties have been had which could have been averted had the liaison team been able to contact the pilot of the airships more quickly and directly.

2. Tanks

For the first time this battalion was able to use tanks with good results. On the SUGAR LOAF area inclement weather kept tank effectiveness to a minimum but on the OROKU and the ARA SAKI PENNS they were able to give excellent support at all times. Coordination with the infantry was good and target designation, predetermined, was carried out with fine control.

Zippo tanks were especially suited to several occasions on which they were used. In the securing of heavily wooded or brushy areas, especially on the ARA SAKI PENN area, these tanks were of inestimable aid. They undoubtedly saved many casualties by forcing the Nips out rather than necessitating the clearing out by infantry.

Tanks with blades were also of great value. They cleared roads not approachable by any but armored vehicles, making possible more extensive use of tanks and LVT's.

3. Am-Tracs

The Am-Tracs, especially in the SUGAR LOAF hill area, were the only means by which this battalion could be supplied. The roads in that vicinity were muddy to the exclusion of all but these vehicles.

In evacuating wounded these AM-Tracs saved many lives by removing wounded quickly where no other means of evacuation was possible. They were able to approach within a few hundred yards of the front lines and have stretcher cases to a rear aid station with a minimum of delay and confusion.

4. Naval Gunfire

Naval gunfire was at all times effective. All men were well trained and did their job quickly and efficiently.

The SCR 64 radio proved to be an excellent radio. It required little repair through the entire operation. The SCR 300, however, did not
stay operative over any long length of time.

Naval Gunfire was good against artillery positions. If the guns could not be hit directly, the gunfire was able to keep them quiet. This was concentrated on at night when harassing fire was delivered on known gun positions.

Naval Gunfire was also used extensively against caves with good results. Also, troop movements were spotted by ships spotting planes that did good work throughout the operation. The planes were able to strafe the troops and then call in Naval Gunfire.

It is recommended that firing ships should be more careful of their harassing-fire missions at night. Ships have crept over their targets into front lines when the target was as much as 2000 yards in front of the lines. However, if this is negligence on the ship's part, it is not common.

It is thought that the present Naval Gunfire Control plan is adequate.

5. Artillery

Artillery on this phase of the OKINAWAN Operation was at all times excellent. On many occasions rapid delivery of artillery on assigned missions quieted irritating enemy nuisance fire. Working in close coordination with mortars, Naval Gunfire and other supporting weapons, Artillery paved the way for infantry assault.

On at least two occasions on the SUGAR LOAF hill area artillery rounds fell short into front line troops. It is thought that part of this was due to weapons beginning to loosen up after long use.

Communication between liaison teams and Artillery was generally good. It was found an excellent idea to have an Artillery Liaison team with each assault Co. When this was done strikes were carried out with great efficiency and tended to be used more as a supporting weapon.

CHAPTER IV  ENEMY TACTICS

The tactics encountered consisted of a strong defense of excellent terrain. The enemy had very elaborate cave type positions on both forward and reverse slopes connecting tunnels between. Open areas between ridges and hills were covered with small arms fire and Anti-Tank weapons. The enemy had excellent
observation of our routes of approach and coordinated his artillery and mortar fire to inflict the heaviest toll of casualties possible on our advancing troops. At all times tanks were a priority target along with other vehicles and OP’s. Troops in the near vicinity were subject to heavy mortar and artillery fire.

The enemy attempted to retake lost terrain at night, by driving our troops to reverse slopes with mortars and artillery then attacking using large numbers of hand grenades and Knig mortars.

As soon as we broke the enemy's main line of resistance, his tactics turned to uncoordinated cave defense of independent areas. At all times his sniper fire was effective. The big problem for the infantry was the clearing of caves. There is a definite need for further development of a more effective manner of dealing with a cave-type defense.

Points of equipment worthy of note:

- The extremely large numbers of machine guns encountered in OROKU PENN. This primarily was due to the enemy stripping planes of the weapons and improvising mounts on them for ground use.
- The use of a rocket which did have a psychological effect but due to its extremely crude launching device it was ineffective.

- Idiot sticks aren't too effective against MG's and BAR's.

CHAPTER V: RESULTS OF OPERATION

Section I
Area secured

In the three phases of this operation; NAHA, OROKU, ARA SAKI, this battalion secured approximately 2 square miles of area.

Section II
Enemy Casualties

A-Killed
1 Counted 2,283
2 Estimated 1,225

B-Captured
1 POW 454
2 Civilian 500-6000

Section III
Operational damage to Enemy

- Machine guns, including aircraft. 50
- Mortars, all types. 40
- Artillery, Coast Def. MT/AA 37
  (Including 3 rocket launchers)
- Also captured 1 range finder and 3 searchlights.

Captured
Section IV
Own Losses

A-Killed in Action 117
B-Wounded in Action 646
C-Missing in Action 0

CHAPTER VI

Section I
Suggestions for Administration in the Field.

USMC Morning Report would give all necessary information as to men on duty, sick, Hosp, etc., joinings, transfers, temp att, temp det, by ranks and if desired by companies. Additional data could be given on reverse side as a Change Sheet.

Bn-1 should operate near sick bay Records area.

Replacements in the field should be transferred with signed orders indicating complete roster of transfers, even if only a memo and not transfer order. Take into consideration time and distance factors in getting men transferred.

Transfers by Staff Returns of men evacuated to rear area hospitals should be delayed long enough to ascertain whether men will return to same organization.

Each company should have a company clerk or one reasonable NCO as Graves Registration NCO to record location by coordinate or terrain features and to direct Div Graves Registration. Also he could mark isolated (removal) graves.

Some definite policy should be established in the handling of personal effects. This Battalion has a NCO in charge. All effects inventoried, labeled and packed in accordance with MCM.

Administrative policies and procedure should be established prior to sailing. Changes in the field are not always feasible in the lower echelons.

MORALE When pulled off line after seven (?) days' fighting morale was at its lowest ebb. In rear area, showers, clean clothes, good chow will restore some fighting spirit, though will not restore combat efficiency.

Replacements in the field lack proper indoctrination and Regimental Spirit.
Combat Fatigue cases usually should have longer rest and rehabilitation period. Most cases are unfit for front line combat for several months. Men returned to their companies too soon tend to lower the spirit of the remaining troops.

A decrease in paper work in higher echelons would give lower echelon personnel more time to handle immediate pressing details; should result in greater accuracy of records.

When men are transferred (as replacements) in the field the senior officer or NCO should take charge of detail and maintain discipline. A guide should be furnished by the transferring echelon. This would save time, clerical work and would insure arrival of replacements at earliest moment at a time when hours count most.

Preparation of numerous sets of personnel cards by En-l works hardship, invites errors, causes inevitable delay in completion of same. Each echelon should at all times maintain its own files and records as orders pass through their control. Lower echelons often cannot obtain even necessary items of stationery, and an office set-up is often impossible.

Section II
Intelligence Sec

When operating in terrain such as has been encountered on this island, it is advisable that the En-2 Sec be equipped with a portable high-powered scope; at least two rifles with telescope sights for picking off enemy observers and snipers.

Section III
Operations

Some new type of cave warfare needs to be introduced into the training program and carried out in combat. On this phase of the OKINAWA Operation the 3d BATTALION alone cleaned out over 1000 caves. It has proven time and time again that the Japs will crawl back into caves already cleared causing much nuisance in rear areas. Some type of persistent agent needs to be introduced to make these caves uninhabitable for an indefinite period after they are once blown out.

B. A. HOCHMUTH
Lt. Col. USMC
Commanding.
RECRIMENTAL WEAPONS COMPANY, FOURTH MARINES
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD

27 June, 1945.

Recommendations for changes and improvements in training
and Table of Basic Allowances of Weapons Company, Infantry
Regiment. These recommendations are based primarily from experience
gained during the southern phase of this operation.

I. 105mm PLATOON.

A. Changes in equipment.

1. Increase from four (4) to six (6) M-7's. These to be broken down into two (2) sections of three (3) M-7's each. This is thought necessary for the following reasons.

a. When used to support two battalions, two guns per battalion is often inadequate. An additional gun in support would not only provide the added fire power, but would also provide against the entire section being made negligible in use because of mechanical breakdown in the gun carriage or gun.

b. Ability of rotating the guns so that maintenance could be done on that gun in the section, which was being used.

c. In situations where only indirect fire is possible in direct support of a battalion, two guns per section does not give enough fire power.

d. Several times in this southern phase of the operation, it was found necessary to use three battalions on the line, and all three requested 105's. Had six (6) guns been available two could have been assigned to each battalion.

2. Substitution of K-5 vehicles for 1 ton 4x4 trucks. (See company maintenance section report).

3. Addition of one ammunition trailer per gun carriage.

a. Terrain or ground conditions have often made it impossible to supply the M-7's with ammunition by truck from a dump. This necessitated the 105 to cease supporting the attack for a period, and returning to a rear dump to resupply itself. This situation was found to exist during a very great portion of the southern phase of this operation.

b. The addition of a trailer to each gun would enable the carrying of a full unit of fire and a little over. All return trips to a rear area, would thereby be eliminated during the support of an attack.
4. The addition of a scout car- armored (37mm) for each section. (See 37mm anti-tank platoon report).

5. The substitution of a 20 power field glass for the 6 power glasses now used. One of these to be issued to each track.
   a. Spotting targets at any appreciable range with the present type field glasses is an impossibility.
   b. These six power field glasses are used primarily for infantry and to attempt to stretch their use to cover artillery work has definitely proven unsatisfactory.

B. Ammunition.

1. A great increase in the percentage of time fuze (M-54) ammunition allotted per unit of fire. An increase to 40 rounds per unit is recommended.
   a. During this southern phase time fire was used approximately fifty percent of the time and proved most effective against mortars and enemy harassing fire.

C. Armament.

1. The substitution of .30 cal light machine gun for present .50 cal machine gun in the "pulpit" of the M-7.
   a. Greater ease in handling will result, thus allowing more freedom of movement for fire direction by track commanders.
   b. The .30 cal light machine gun is wholly adequate for all purposes here, the .50 cal machine gun simply over runs the track.

2. The M-7 drivers and gun captains should be armed with pistols instead of the present TS94 and carbine, as the TS94 is unwieldy for firing out of the drivers part in the cramped drivers compartment.
   a. There is no need for the gun captain and driver having a more formidable weapon than a pistol.

D. Miscellaneous recommendations.

1. A bulldozer made more readily available directly through regiment.
a. This bulldozer should be part of regimental equipment so as to facilitate its use by either the battalions or this company.

b. Many times during this southern phase the use of the M-7 was hampered or made impossible by road conditions which could easily and quickly been cared for by one bulldozer. There were several glaring examples of unnecessary casualties being suffered by rifle units because of the involved process required to obtain this piece of equipment to clear a slight obstacle preventing the use of the 105mm. The time factor involved in obtaining this equipment at the point of use has never proven adequate when it has been obtained from any higher echelon than regiment.

2. The use of mine disposal men for clearing mines, etc., particularly on initial landing.

a. It is recommended that two mine disposal men be attached at such times.

E. Tactical handling of 105mm Platoon.

1. The use of M-7's to support tanks by providing a second echelon with greater observation.

a. This was discussed in the special action report submitted for the northern phase of this campaign.

b. This usage was actually made in the operations around Yager Loaf Hill and proved to be highly successful.

c. Further development of the tactical plan and greater and more wide-spread training with tanks during the next training period is recommended.

2. As close-in, indirect firing, artillery support for a battalion on the line.

a. This weapon can be used in this manner when terrain and weather condition hamper the use of ter

b. In some conditions this gun can bring fire to bear closer to the infantry lines than normal artillery is permitted.
3. As a means of bringing time fire to bear on
defilade enemy positions, containing mortars,
troop concentrations and etc.

4. It is recommended that in training company commanders
as well as battalion S-3 be given the opportunity to
direct and control the use of the K-7's in order that
greater liaison unity be established. Here the method
of designation of targets be given more careful consid-
eration. Before firing, complete agreement between
the 105mm platoon leader and the company commander or
battalion S-3 should be attained as to designation and
location of possible targets.

   a. The above was found difficult during the southern
   phase of this campaign because of the extreme
   inaccuracy of the maps and the irregularities
   in the terrain.

F. Communications.

1. It is recommended that the TCS radio in the K-7 be
replaced with the SCR 528.

   a. The TCS is not built sturdily enough to stand up
   under the jarring it is subject to in the
   operation of the K-7.

   b. The connections in the antenna control box are
   continually snapping.

   c. In order to obtain maximum performance of the TCS
   all sets must be zero bared frequently, because
   of drifting. Because of the shortage of OP person
   it is impossible to instruct operators in the
   proper procedure for this.

   d. The time required for changing frequency on a
   TCS is much greater than that of the SCR 528.

II. 37MM ANTI-TANK PLATOONS.

A. Changes in equipment.

1. The vehicles used were adequate for the efficient
handling of guns, ammunition and men.

2. During foul weather it is advised that LVT's be
made available by regiment for transporting guns
and ammunition to the lines. During the operation
preceding the break-through at NAHA, rolling stock
could not be moved because of road conditions.
Without LVT's, moving the guns would have been impossible.

3. Addition of a scout car—armored (37mm) for each 37mm Platoon.
   a. This would give cover for the platoon leader and a forward reconnaissance, thereby enabling a more complete reconnaissance.
   b. This car has great maneuverability, and since it is armored can be employed as an additional supporting weapon for covering fire.

4. Substitution of 20 power field glasses for the 6 power glasses now used. One of these to be issued to each gun (Total 12) (See 105mm Platoon Report).

B. Ammunition.

1. The ammunition as to type and quantity was completely adequate.

C. Armament.

1. Substitution of M-1 rifle for all personnel carrying carbines.
   a. This is deemed necessary because often the 37mm platoon is used for reconnaissance or infantry line work, hence requiring greater fire power than that obtained from carbines.
   b. Since all movements are made by some vehicle, no hardship in handling guns will be experienced by gun crews when carrying M-1's.

2. An allowance of one BAR for each 37mm gun squad is recommended for same reasons as indicated above.

3. Make increase in allowances for personnel to man machine guns to ten (10) corporals and twenty (20) privates. (See recommendations as made on special action report for northern phase of this campaign).

4. Increase personnel for bazooka.
   a. No allowance has been made in TO and this company used truck drivers. At times when bazooka could be used the drivers were performing their regular duties, thus leaving no personnel to man bazooka.
b. Greater ability to provide an anti-tank weapon for an infantry unit when such conditions as weather and terrain prevented use of the 37mm gun.

D. Tactical handling of 37mm Anti-tank Platoons.

1. After being used very sparingly in the northern phase, the 37mm gun was used to good advantage in the southern phase of the campaign. A well dug in and organized enemy resistance required a preparation on various localities before ground forces could move. Using the accurate rifle marksmanship of the 37, we were able to knock out several enemy 47mm AT guns and 20mm DP guns, firing from within caves. It was often possible to designate targets with AP tracer for the 105mm gun quickly and accurately.

2. It is advised that on initially landing the prime mover for the 37mm be landed simultaneously with the gun or as close thereafter as possible. In the landing on OROKU Peninsula this was not done and adverse weather conditions prevented their being manhandled.

3. It is recommended that some allowance be made in training for all line company officers to become further acquainted with emplacement of the 37mm gun, and the possible positions for such emplacement.
   a. This would result in quicker emplacement of guns.

4. It is also advised that the same recommendation as made for closer liaison unity between the infantry companies and the 105mm gun, be applied to the 37mm platoon. (See paragraph E-4 of 105mm Special Action Report).

III. MAINTENANCE SECTION.

A. This company at present is equipped with the following vehicles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 - 1 ton 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>1 - 1 ton 2 Whl trailer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 1 1/2 ton 4x4 cargo</td>
<td>1 - 300 Gal 2 Whl trailer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 1 1/4 ton 4x4 radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following changes and recommendations are suggested.

1. Replace four (4) 1 ton 4x4 vehicles with four (4) 2 1/2 ton M-5's. Three M-5's to be assigned to the 105 section; two (2) for ammunition and the third to be used as maintenance section and repair shop. The remaining M-5 to replace one (1) 1 ton in headquarters.
section and to be used as shop truck and wrecker. This change will also dispense with the necessity of the 1 ton trailer, as well as providing a capable prime mover for the water trailer; inasmuch as a loaded water trailer over the rough terrain as experienced during this campaign. Regarding the 1 ton 4x4 cargo radio vehicles, no recommendations or changes are suggested.

a. Addition of five scout car- armored (37mm). One each to be used with the three 37mm anti-tank platoons and one each with the two sections of K-7's.

b. Prior to embarking for this operation all wheel bearing were reparked and general maintenance was brought up to date. From previous experience with this type vehicle on past operations the following extra spare parts were stored with the company repair section; seven(7) sets spider gears 1 ton; six (6) front axles, 1 ton; two (2) rear axles, 1 ton; eight (8) shackle bolts, front spring, major parts were replaced due to breakdown; ten (10) sets of spider gears 1 ton; nine (9) front axles, 1 ton; four (4) rear, axles 1 ton; and sixteen shackle bolts, front spring, rear, 1 ton. These items were the most constant reasons for breakdowns and seem to be the weakest points of the 1 ton 4x4 prime mover.

a. The following list of spare parts for first and second echelon maintenance is recommended as essential on the basis of one (1) ton vehicle,

- 1 set of spider gears
- 1/2 front axle (special attention to convoluted joint and inside race).
- 1 shackle bolt, front spring, rear
- 1 set (6) spark plugs
- 1 set breaker points
- 3 feet of ignition wiring
- 1 distributor cap
- 1 coil, twelve volt
- 1 battery, storage 6 volt

b. Due to constant exposure to climatic conditions the wiring and ignition system were inclined to become faulty and defective causing failure to start, hard starting, missing and consequent lack of sufficient power. It was found necessary to replace all spark plugs and ignition wiring. The water proofing material also contributed greatly to the deterioration of these parts.
3. Maintenance of the ¾ ton 4x4 cargo and radio was minor on all first and second echelon repair. The main trouble arising from the ignition systems and starters motors. Aside from the standard parts carried, the following are recommended as essential on the basis of one vehicle.

- 1 set of spark plugs (2 sets in the case of radio)
- 1 battery storage, 6 volt
- 1 distributor cap
- 9 feet of ignition wiring
- 1 coil, 6 volt
- 1 set breaker points
- 1 starter switches
- ½ starter motor

4. The repair of all vehicles in this company was handled by two (2) auto-mechanics (general). The use of third, fourth and fifth echelon repair was found to be unadvisable due to the inaccessibility of these sections, the lack of parts available and the length of time required due to their over-worked and limited facilities.

   a. (See spare parts appendix for total parts replacement during this operation).

5. At the present time no allowance is made on the table of organization for the providing of auto-mechanics (general). As outlined in the preceding paragraph maintenance and repair would have been impossible without the services of these men. In order to increase the efficiency and expedite the maintenance section of this unit, it is strongly recommended that the table of organization for this company be increased by three auto-mechanics (general).

6. This unit landed with thirty (30) vehicles and at the present time all vehicles are in operation. It is believed that this is due mainly to the smooth and efficient maintenance section established within this company.

7. Heavy maintenance equipment should be made available to the weapons company to facilitate repair work, both in training areas and in the field. The desirable solution would be attaching directly to each weapons company a complete maintenance and repair section with the necessary tools and spare parts. Present conditions require an excess
3. Maintenance of the 4 ton 4x4 cargo and radio was minor on all first and second echelon repair. The main trouble arising from the ignition systems and starters motors. Aside from the standard parts carried, the following are recommended as essential on the basis of one vehicle:

- 1 set of spark plugs (2 sets in the case of radio)
- 1 battery storage, 6 volt
- 9 feet of ignition wiring
- 1 set of breaker points
- 1 coil, 6 volt
- 1 starter switches
- 1 starter motor

4. The repair of all vehicles in this company was handled by two (2) auto-mechanics (general). The use of third, fourth and fifth echelon repair was found to be unadvisable due to the inaccessibility of these sections, the lack of parts available and the length of time required due to their over-worked and limited facilities.

   a. (See spare parts appendix for total parts replacement during this operation).

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7. Heavy maintenance equipment should be made available to the weapons company to facilitate repair work, both in training areas and in the field. The desirable solution would be attaching directly to each weapons company a complete maintenance and repair section with the necessary tools and spare parts. Present conditions require an excess...
of improvising and field expedients, thus restricting the efficiency and dependability of valuable equipment.

8. This company before another operation will require either replacement of the M-7 by the improved model M-7BL or four new 9 cylinder radial aircraft type engines.

B. Spare parts appended replaced on one ton vehicles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 sets of spider gears</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 front axles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 rear axles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 shackle bolts, front spring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 generator, 12 volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 feet ignition wiring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 coils, 12 volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 front spring, 90 spark plugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 distributor caps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 breaker points</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 battery, 6 volt, storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 battery, 6 volt, storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Breakage of front axles occurred in the convergent joint particularly in the inside race of the joint.

Spare parts used in maintenance of 1/4 ton vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Breaker points</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Distributer caps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 starter motor, 12 volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 starter switch, 12 volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 battery, 6 volt, storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 coils, 6 volt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 spark plugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 feet ignition wiring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. TACTICAL USE OF ENTIRE WEAPONS COMPANY

A. It is advised that recommendations be made by higher echelons for the greater stress in training of replacement infantry officers regarding use of anti-tank weapons.

1. For the most part it was noted that the line officers who were replacements in this phase of the campaign were completely unacquainted with 37mm guns or 105mm guns.

2. Since a large percentage of officer casualties were suffered in the line companies, a condition resulted whereby few people in the line company had any previous training with anti-tank weapons.

B. It is recommended that increased training hours be provided for training in infantry tactics to operate as rifle or reconnaissance units.
SUBJECT: Special Action Report; RegtVnCo, 4thMar; 27Jun45

1. This company was very often used in part or as a whole to fill gaps in the line.

2. After the breakdown of organized resistance we were extensively used for patrol and cave sealing work.

3. The use of this company, in whole or in part, as infantry has proved highly satisfactory, and such usage will probably be increased in future operations.

C. To be used to fill a gap in the line.

1. It is preferred that when so used we fill the gap as a company attached to a battalion when possible.

2. Since we have the organization to cope with this, it is better to be so used, rather than to be broken up, because control communications and supply can be more adequately handled.

3. Often when the 37mm gun cannot be emplaced, the same defensive measures can be set up by employing .50 cal and bazookas.

V. MEDICAL.

A. When given the defense of the beach on OROKU Peninsula we found ourselves completely isolated from any adjoining units.

1. Since we were considerably removed from regiment and the regimental aid station, it was practically impossible to give any professional medical aid to our wounded.

2. It is recommended that when isolated we are provided with one doctor in the area to give treatment at night.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS.

All recommendations for communication as reported in the annex for the special action report submitted for the northern phase of the OKINAWAN campaign has been found adequate.

These recommendations all pertain to the southern phase of this operation and therefore will be here repeated.

VII. A. EQUIPMENT.

1. It is recommended that the TCS radio in the 7-7 be replaced with the SCR-528. It has been found that
the TCS will not perform satisfactorily under extreme conditions imposed on it when installed in a tracked vehicle. If this change is made, the three (3) TCS radio jeeps will have to be replaced with SCR-508 radio jeeps. One TCS radio jeep should be retained in the company for communications with other echelons.

2. It is also recommended that the SCR-608 radio jeep be replaced by two (2) SCR-610 radios. The present allowance of SCR-508's is sufficient.

3. The SCR-536 radios, under proper conditions, performed satisfactorily; however, they are too fragile to be dependable. If they are used in future operations, each 37mm platoon should have five (5) instead of the present number of three (3). When deployed, the distance between guns is such that some method of communication is necessary; usually the conditions are such that a wire circuit is impracticable. One SCR-536 per gun would correct this situation. The total amount of equipment required under these changes is as follows:

4 - SCR-528 (M-7 installed)
3 - SCR-509 radio jeeps
1 - TCS radio jeep
2 - SCR-610
9 - SCR-300
15 - SCR-536 (three(3) different channels).

4. The present allotment of telephone equipment proved ample and no change is necessary in the present table of basic allowances.

B. Training.

1. The training period allotted was sufficient. All phases of communication were thoroughly covered, and personnel had ample time to review.

C. Personnel.

1. It is recommended that the present number of communication personnel be increased. In the past operation, the lack of trained men in proportion to the equipment used in this company, has caused inefficiency, especially in the operation of radios.
2. The minimum amount of communication personnel required for this organization is twenty-two (22) as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - StfSgt</td>
<td>- Comm Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Sgt</td>
<td>- Repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Corp</td>
<td>- Radio chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Corp</td>
<td>- Radio operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Corp</td>
<td>- Wire chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - PFCs</td>
<td>- Radio operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - PFCs</td>
<td>- Wiremen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. General.

1. As a whole the communications during the past operation were satisfactory. It is believed, however, that if the above changes in personnel and equipment are made, it will insure excellent communications during future operations.

[Signature]

GILDO S. CODISPOTI
Captain, USMC
ANNEX B

TO

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III OKINAWA OPERATION

22ND MARINES

(NAVMC—QUANTICO)

187994(1) MCG Quantico, Va., 1-24-45—1M
TWENTY SECOND MARINES. SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

CHAPTER I:

GENERAL

The purpose of this report is to cover that period of the OKINAWA campaign not covered in Reference (b).

The mission assigned this Regiment for Phase III of OKINAWA was to operate normally as part of the Division.

On two occasions (crossing of ASA-KAWA, attack of KUNISHI Ridge) the 22d Marines made the Division's main effort on a Regimental front.

CHAPTER II:

TASK ORGANIZATION

The Regiment operated normally with 1 platoon of Motor Transport and an Ordnance Platoon attached. Direct Artillery support was provided at different times by 1/15, 2/15, and 1/15. "C" Company, 6th Engineer Battalion, usually supported the Regiment with elements varying from two bulldozers to the entire company. LVT's from the LVT Group were attached when required, as also were LVT(A)'s from First Armored Amphibian Battalion. Much use was also made of the 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) (USA), the Fifth Provisional Rocket Detachment, and tanks of the 6th Tank Battalion. Bomb Disposal and Mine Detection teams also operated almost continuously in the Regimental zone.

CHAPTER III:

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

ASA-KAWA - THE BATTLE FOR Naha

The battle for Naha can be said to have begun with the crossing of the ASA-KAWA as the key terrain features guarding the approaches to Naha lay to the south of this estuary.

Footbridges were completed under cover of darkness by the Engineers for use by 3/22. There was no enemy activity until bridge was completed. Engineers returning from bridge received machine gun fire. "K" Company guarded the bridge at 0300. 3/22 began crossing of estuary. At 0550 movement had been completed and "A" Company had also crossed. By 0600 1/22 had crossed the ASA-KAWA by fording shallow eastern portion, and took the high ground south of the sugar mill. Bridge was knocked out by heavy mortar fire. Engineers began repairs. At 0830 "G" Company set up a strong point at 7674 L.

At 1130 1/22 went into center of line and began advance. They received no artillery preparation as requested until four hours after request had been made. Second Battalion 22d Marines held left flank and pivoted right flank forward to cover 1/22 flank as they advanced, Third Battalion 22d Marines continued to advance 500 yards south in right zone of action, and held for the night.

Third Battalion, 22d Marines advanced up nose of hill on west unsupported by Air, Naval Gunfire, and Artillery. Support fires were excellently coordinated.
First Battalion, 22d Marines reached ridge line at 1700, tied in with 2/22 and 3/22. First Battalion, 22d Marines advanced 1000 yards. Tanks were not used as they could not cross ASA-KAWA due to bridge out and soft muddy bottom. At 2200 Engineers began erecting a Bailey bridge over ASA-KAWA. Intermittent shelling of bridge and Command Post area from 2300-2330. Two direct hits on Command Post. No casualties. Construction of bridge held up due to artillery and additional members were needed to complete the work. Request made at 0440 to receive 0500, work continued. Bridge completed at 1000. Twenty five 105mm shells dropped in immediate vicinity of Command Post last night.

Third Battalion, 22d Marines jumped off 0700. First Battalion, 22d Marines held up till 0715 then advanced 100 yards when pinned down by machine gun and mortar fire. At 0830 continued advance. Second Battalion, 22d Marines advanced on left in with 3/1 which had advanced 400 yards thereby shortening our lines by 700 yards. First tanks crossed bridge at 1100. Bridge under sporadic artillery fire. "C" Company has met strong point of many interconnecting caves in 40 foot of solid rock. Called Naval Gunfire to reduce hill top with 90 projectiles. WP also used.

Third Battalion, 22d Marines advanced slowly in zone of action and at 1700 making final push to reach O-a. Three companies of tanks, one in support of each battalion were sent into action at 1130. Four flame thrower tanks were attached to support 1/22 on hill strong point. Tanks did not arrive in time so 1/22 advanced on hill after Naval Gunfire preparation using flame throwers and quickly secured the hill. All battalions reached or were within 100 yards of O-a line. Attack ceased at 1700. Defensive line established for the night. Third Battalion, 22d Marines in beach defense position along right (West) flank supported by LVT(A)s.

At 1900 artillery and mortar fire falling on lines and Command Post. First Battalion, 22d Marines killed 30 Nips during night. Came out of caves in "C" company area. Second Battalion 22d Marines sent a quiet night-some artillery on Command Post. Third Battalion 22d Marines located mines on West coast road. During night, killed 54 Nips, small infiltrating groups. Third Battalion 22d Marines reports West coast road heavily mined. Regiment gave them sufficient mine disposal and demolition personnel to do the job.

Third Battalion 22d Marines advanced slowly, "I" company on left, "M" company on right. "M" Company mopping up caves on cliffs facing seaward supported by LVT(A)s. Third Battalion 22d Marines reached the outskirts of NAPA. Third Battalion 22d Marines will defend ridge line just north of NAPA limits. First Battalion 22d Marines advanced to ridge line above NAPA limits. First Battalion 22d Marines advanced to ridge line above NAPA against moderate resistance and tied on right with the Third Battalion 22d Marines for night defense. Tanks support used. Second Battalion 22d Marines advanced slowly against stiff resistance from ridge line to top of ridge and was pinned down by heavy fire. "F" Company advanced slowly on left and rear of "G" company. "E" company was moving up to fill gap between "G" and "F" companies. At 1400 Third Battalion 29th Marines was attached to 22d Marines and committed on left flank of Second Battalion 22d Marines to close gap between 3/1 and 2/22.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd):

One Tank Company was in support of each Battalion and were very effective. Tanks accounted for many caves and killed large numbers of Japs as they ran from caves. Engineers and bomb disposal teams continued to clear mines.

2300- Nip Artillery barrage along beach from ASA-KAWA North 1500 yards for one half hour of approximate 300 rounds. At 2400 Nip barges were reported 3000 yards off beach approaching from NAHA. LCI (G) and DD's intercepted them using 40mm and 5 inch shells. Two barges seen sunk. Third Battalion 22d Marines reported killing 30 Japs on roof off our right flank. Light infiltration and heavy Artillery and mortar fire during night. Approximate 150 shells of 150mm fell in Command Post area. Five casualties.

13 May

0730- Patrols left from: First Battalion 22d Marines to reconniter to front.

0800- Third Battalion 29th Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines jumped off on time.

Report of patrols...Third Battalion 22d Marines patrol of 2 squads investigated area to bridge. At 7573 U. At 7573 P they were fired on by knee mortars and Machine Guns, withdrew at 1030 and then placed 4.2 inch mortar and tank fire on it. At 1400 "L" Company attacked and cleaned out village in Target Area 7573 T and 7573 P and U. Intense preparation by tanks and 4.2 inch mortars, killed 80 Japs, 6 light machine guns. First Battalion 22d Marines patrolled area north of river in Target Area 7573 W-N, Target Area 7572 H, I, C, D, O. At 7572 O set up ambush but encountered no Japs. Killed 125 Japs in mopping up, 25 of them in patrolling. Second Battalion 22d Marines with tanks and 4.2 inch mortars, plus artillery preparation started to attack but were held up by Third Battalion 29th Marines who were unable to occupy high ground in 7673 Q plus southern slope of high ground in that area. Japs had enfilade fire in that area on Second Battalion 22d Marines. Second Battalion 22d Marines kept pounding high ground 7672 A, 7673 P, F, and G. Main effort on right with Fox, Easy attacking to front. At 1400 Third Battalion 29th Marines occupied 7673 Q. Then advanced to 7572 F#. Final lines at dark as follows: 7573 X, X3, Y3, Y4, 7673 U, Y2. Estimated 1 battalion in area of attack and 300 killed.

Third Battalion- I Company 29th Marines in Regimental Reserve. It made main effort on left, "G" on right took over "F" Company 22d Marines lines and supported How by fire. Advance negligible during day. 50 Japs killed. 1/29 passed to 29th Marines at 1800, but under our control for night defense.

2100- Easy company digging in and illuminated by enemy. Lines are tied in both on left and right. Up to 2100 Pistol Pete has not fired at Regimental Command Post.

2200- Regimental Command Post received 29 rounds of artillery in 10 minutes during night. quiet on First Battalion 22d Marines and 3/22 front. Second Battalion 22d Marines had heavy knee mortar fire and Japs running around in front of lines on right flank.

0530- Gun, boats shelled Northwest end of NAHA.
14 May

Second Battalion 22d Marines jumped off at 0730 and moved very slowly against hill G but was unable to take the hill due to infilading fire from left flank. Third Battalion 29th Marines could not cover and keep contact with 2/22. Second Battalion 22d Marines made no appreciable gains against heavy and fanatical resistance. "K" company sent to support Second Battalion 22d Marines. First Battalion 22d Marines began advance at 1200 due to Second Battalion 22d Marines who could not move on the left. "A" and "B" companies reached the O-C line generally at 1500. "C" company assisted 2/22 by fire and movement. Third Battalion 22d Marines reached O-C line with "I" and "L" companies. "K" company sent to assist Second Battalion 22d Marines at 1500. Troops thinly spread along front line. (LVT(A)'s defending right (beach) flank. Combat efficiency 62% due to casualties.

1500- Third Battalion 29th Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines were ordered to take O-C line regardless of consequences. Line could not be reached and 3ns dug in on north side of Sugar Loaf Hill - the enemy strong point holding up our advance, which was the key terrain feature to the approaches of LAMA. (Target Area 7672 G).

2000- Began digging in.

2330- Third Battalion 22d Marines reported infiltration into Command Post by 25 Japs. Several killed and they withdrew south.

2400- Enemy launched a counterattack against Second Battalion 22d Marines to retake hill. Force estimated 1 battalion making attack. Artillery and mortar fire heavy. Our artillery laid down normal barrage. Situation critical and we alerted 29th Marines to support Second Battalion 22d Marines.

0400- Counterattack still strong, organized, not Banzai. Our casualties extremely heavy. Combat efficiency 30%.

15 May

0600- Second Battalion 22d Marines report still holding Hill 7672 G, but in danger of being thrown off by Nip artillery and mortar fire.

0820- First Battalion 22d Marines reports direct hit on Observation Post killing Major Meyers and wounding all three Company Commanders. Major Cook took over and began reorganization.

0830- Second Battalion Twenty Second Marines being counterattacked and had to withdraw from Sugar Loaf Hill due to heavy mortar fire.

0930- First Battalion alerted to send "A" and "B" companies to their left flank and support 2/22 by fire in case of break through. Third Battalion alerted "I" company to move in behind 2/22 in case of break through. Both plans executed at 1000.

1130- Second Battalion 22d Marines reports counterattack over. Enemy smoking lines of 1st Battalion.22d Marines.

1200- Plan to relieve 22/2 by 3/22 executed. Second Battalion 22d Marines to then take over Third Battalion's front.

1615- Third Battalion 22d Marines effected full relief of Second Battalion.

1730- Second Battalion 22d Marines began moving into position. Received 50 men, 10 from 29th to bolster defense. Division Reconnaissance Company attached to 22/2 for night defense and extend from 7474 J5 to 7473 15. Second Battalion 4th Marines located at 7474 G0. Commanding Officer Second Battalion 22d Marines in charge of both units for defense coordination.
2400- Negative report.
0600- Negative report except Third Battalion, 22d Marines. They killed 7 Nips and received artillery and mortar fire during night.

16 May

Third Battalion 22d Marines was to advance and take Sugar Hill after Third Battalion 29th Marines and First Battalion 29th Marines had advanced to the left flank far enough ahead to permit Third Battalion 22d Marines to take Sugar Hill from the left in encircling movement. The left battalions were pinned down and were unable to advance far enough to cover I Company in move around Sugar Hill. I Company attempted attack on Sugar Hill supported by 3 tanks. One tank was knocked out when it reached reverse side of Hill due to heavy artillery fire. I Company was forced off of Hill by heavy artillery and mortar fire. At nightfall lines remain the same — no advance.

1900- Third Battalion 22d Marines received heavy artillery fire and mortar fire on lines and Command Post. Commanding Officer Third Battalion wounded and evacuated. Fire continued for one hour; then intermittently. No other night activity. Combat efficiency 40% due to casualties.

17 May

First Battalion 22d Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines held in present position. Men cleaning up weapons and also themselves.

Third Battalion 22d Marines held left flank of Regiment and supported 29th Marines in their attack of Sugar Loaf Hill. We supported them with small arms fire, 81mm and 60mm ammunition, and 105mm. During night Command Post was shelled sporadically. Third Battalion and Second Battalion 22d Marines received heavy mortar and artillery fire during early morning. TOT fire was requested and fired on located targets with some effect. Night activity quiet. At 1430 Colonel H. C. Roberts and Lt-Colonel A. Larsen relieved Colonel Schneider and Colonel Louther as Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, respectively.

19 May

First Battalion 22d Marines jumped off at 0730 to straighten out lines. Impeded by fire from left front in 7672 K. At 1100 held ground gained and went into defensive position. No elements on our left could advance. Second Battalion 22d Marines and Third Battalion 22d Marines held present position.

1530- K Company attached to First Battalion. Headquarters and Service Company and all Battalions subjected to artillery fire throughout period. Night fairly quiet except in First Battalion 22d Marines where small groups of Nips attempted infiltration.

20 May

First Battalion 22d Marines made minor adjustment of left flank to conform with advance of First Battalion 4th Marines. By 1330 night positions were tied in. Commanding Officer 22d Marines inspected front. Lieutenant Colonel Ensler reported at 1600 as Commanding Officer Third Battalion 22d Marines. No other incidents.
First Battalion 22d Marines made slight advance on left flank to O-E line, held up by slowness of 4th Marines advance but finally on objective at 1630. No opposition. Patrols to river revealed many dead Nips.

Second Battalion 22d Marines no change.

Third Battalion 22d Marines at 1300 had completed movement of battalion to new area located at 7474.0 T, 7574 K E, in reserve. Arrangements made for Division Reconnaissance Company to pass through our lines at 0900 for river crossing but was cancelled due to Third Battalion 4th Marines illuminating continually. Otherwise night very quiet.

First Battalion 22d Marines advanced left flank to O-E line and supported advance of Third Battalion 4th Marines on the left who was unable to reach O-E.

Second Battalion 22d Marines continued defense of position and sent one company into reserve.

Third Battalion 22d Marines in reserve.

No night activity. First Battalion 22d Marines assisted night reconnaissance by Division Reconnaissance Company of Naha.

First Battalion 22d Marines held in present position. Tied in for night defense with Third Battalion 4th Marines.

Second Battalion 22d Marines held in present position.

Third Battalion 22d Marines relieved to relieve Second Battalion 4th Marines.

24 May. Held present position. During day First Battalion 22d Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines fired at targets in 4th Marines zone to help their advance.

0100-0600—Night quiet.


First Battalion 22d Marines, Second Battalion 22d Marines continued defense of present positions on ASATO river. No night activity.

"G" Company came off lines at 1500. "E" and "F" Companies now hold Regimental front.

Third Battalion 22d Marines still holding left flank.

0700—"G" Company relieved Reconnaissance Company on river line 7472 03, T1, T2, 7572 P5.
Second Battalion 22d Marines adjusted front lines to use two companies, first Battalion 22d Marines in reserve. "C" Company relieved from line. No night activity.

27 May

0800- Patrol of "C" Company returned to area. Investigated high ground in 7472 R Q. No activity reported in vicinity. Received fire from sniper in 7472 M. Then went to 7472 K, L and F. Tombs there occupied by Fips. Received knee Mortar and small arms fire. Killed four Fips - three Marines wounded in action.

0815- Artillery began firing into 7472 F, G, K and M. Commanding Officer 22d Marines and S-3 working on details and alerting Second Battalion 22d Marines.


1900- Lines tied in all around, First Battalion 22d Marines alerted to pass through Second Battalion 22d Marines 28 May by 0530. Reconnaissance Company to pass to reserve. Second Battalion 22d Marines to echelon left and right to protect First Battalion 22d Marines advance. Night quiet. No activity except for scattered rifle fire.

28 May


0530- First Battalion 22d Marines in position, relief effected. Held up fifteen minutes for platoon leaders to get oriented on ground.

0545- Attack to front. Patrols in advance, Third Battalion 22d Marines at 0515 reported several rounds of 15 CM on Command Post. One casualty.

0630- First Battalion 22d Marines began advance to reach the O-K line, with the Second Battalion 22d Marines protecting right (west) flank, and east flank. First Battalion 22d Marines reached the objective at 0845 and "C" Company was alerted to reconnoiter island. Island reconnaissance dismissed at 1400, due to First Battalion 29th Marines which had not reached the O-K thereby permitting fire to come from our rear.

Third Battalion 22d Marines remained in defense position on left flank of 6th Marine Division, and maintained contact with Third Battalion Fifth Marines on left and Third Battalion 29th Marines on right. No night activity.

29 May

Engineers completed foot bridges across canal at 0420. "A" and "C" Companies crossed at 0430 and reorganized on east side.

0500- First Battalion 22d Marines continued the advance to reach the O-K objective line.

0530- Receiving scattered rifle and machine gun fire, resistance light. First Battalion 29th Marines ordered to close gap on left and tie in with First Battalion 22d Marines. Second Battalion 22d Marines alerted at 0540 to move out behind First Battalion 22d Marines. Third Battalion 22d Marines began
Special Action Report (Cont'd).

to pull out of line as they were pinched out by Third Battalion 29th Marines and Third Battalion Fifth Marines, at 0700 to assembly area this side of A510 river. First Battalion 22d Marines gained 700 yards against stiff machine gun and rifle fire. At 1500 Second Battalion alerted to pass through right flank.

1710 - Second Battalion 22d Marines ordered to pass through right flank of First Battalion 22d Marines and continue the attack. Commanding Officer First Battalion 22d Marines advised against continuing the attack. Suggested First Battalion and Second Battalion 22d Marines dig in on most suitable defensible ground.

Third Battalion 22d Marines in assembly area at 7472 F, L, P.

1610 - Commanding Officer 22d Marines alerted Third Battalion 22d Marines to pass thru First Battalion 22d Marines on 31 May.

Night quiet. Jump off to be at 0730 but postponed because of 6-2 waited to use loudspeaker to capture Fins.

30 May

Loudspeakers ineffective. Division orders attack at 0900. Alerted all units. Third Battalion 22d Marines will pass through First Battalion 22d Marines.

0945 - Third Battalion 22d Marines not ready to jump. Artillery to fire anyway and give us a cover if needed.

0900 - Artillery had to cease fire due to short rounds on Second Battalion 22d Marines. 0945 - Third Battalion 22d Marines ready to go - relief effected. Artillery and naval gunfire preparation at 0955 to 1010, then jump off.

1200 - LtCol E. C. Woodhouse Jr., Commanding Officer Second Battalion 22d Marines, wounded and evacuated. 3/22 advancing slowly - 75 yards - Second Battalion 22d Marines and First Battalion 29th Marines advancing abreast.

1350 - Colonel Woodhouse officially reported killed in action. Major Johnson assumed command.

1345 - Tanks arrived for Third Battalion 22d Marines. 1430 - tanks arrived for Second Battalion 22d Marines.

1530 - Third Battalion 22d Marines took Knob Hill, radio towers, and Hill 27.

All units resuming attack to O-H line - have contact with adjacent units. 1605 - O-H line reached by Second Battalion 22d Marines and Third Battalion 22d Marines. Night defense tied in with First Battalion 29th Marines.

2200 - Report from Battalions that hills are in rear areas. Night quiet though enemy did have men in rear of front lines.

31 May

0730 - Third Battalion 22d Marines jumped off on time. Second Battalion 22d Marines unable to jump off due to Fins activity in rear. 0830 - 2/22 jumped after killing 75 Fins.

First Battalion 22d Marines at 0815 attacked between Third Battalion 22d Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines attack progressed favorably throughout the day until 1400 when up against fire from 7669 P, C, D, X. Second Battalion on Fox Hill but had to withdraw because of fire from left. Finally held for the night just short of the hill mass. Night quiet. Little or no enemy activity. Second Battalion reported rocket bombs landed in their area.
1 June

0730- Naval Gunfire preparation started. 0745- Artillery preparation started.
0800- Jumped off on time, 5 tanks and 4 M7's with Third Battalion 22d Marines, 3 tanks with Second Battalion 22d Marines.
0830- Second Battalion 22d Marines on forward slope of hill F at 7669 Cl, First Battalion on forward slope of 7669 F and J. 0845- Third Battalion 22d Marines secured hill at 7667 X. 1000- Third Battalion 22d Marines has patrols on 7669 J. 29th Marines has not moved on our left so will not occupy in force until they are abreast.
1000- Report from First Battalion 22d Marines. They received 3 rounds of friendly artillery on their lines, 17 wounded, 3 killed in action, checking further.
1030- 29th Marines report they are moving out now. Third Battalion 22d Marines supported attack of Second Battalion 29th Marines.
1055- Reached objective on all fronts and now patrolling to river.
1120- III Phib Corps orders us to patrol in 7769 Q, V, 7669 T. Third Battalion 22d Marines now executing this order.
1600- Patrol reports only occasional sniper activity. Bridges out but can be repaired. River fordable. Night lines outposted. All units warned against use of flares because of Division Reconnaissance Company reconnaissance of OROKU Peninsula. Night quiet. NATCA entirely secured.

2 June

First Battalion 22d Marines was relieved from the line by elements of Second Battalion 7th Marines at 1300 and moved into rest area at 1400.
Second Battalion 22d Marines was relieved from the lines by elements of Second Battalion 7th Marines at 1130 and were in their assigned area at 1200, area 7471 M.
Third Battalion 22d Marines was relieved from the line at 1215 by elements of Second Battalion 7th Marines.

3 June

Troops rehabilitating. All report harassing fire from 20mm and 50 caliber fire from vicinity of OROKU. Weapons Company alerted to support the attack of 4th Marines on the Peninsula. Two 37mm Platoons and 105mm Platoon alerted.

4 June

Continued rest and rehabilitation.
THE BATTLE FOR OOKU PENINSULA

5 June

First Battalion 22d Marines reverted to 6th Marine Division reserve at 0700 and moved to protect right west flank, on new boundary between First and Sixth Marine Division, of 7th Marines from KOKUNA River to 7566 E. Second Battalion 22d Marines, Third Battalion 22d Marines continued rest and rehabilitation.

6 June

Twenty Second Marines reverted to Sixth Marine Division. Third Battalion 22d Marines alerted and moved out at 1130 to take position on Division boundary to protect right west flank of 7th Marines. In place at 1500 from 7565 E southwest to 7565 E southwest; tied in on right with First Battalion 22d Marines. Second Battalion 22d Marines alerted to move to new defense position on Division Boundary.

7 June

Third Battalion 22d Marines advanced to 7366 N as First Battalion 7th Marines advanced to sea at 7365. At Hill 103 (7566 E) Third Battalion 22d Marines had fire fight, but seized hill by double envelopment. 124 Nips killed.

Second Battalion 22d Marines in assembly position at 7665 J, O, T, by nightfall. First Battalion 22d Marines still in position on Division Boundary.

8 June

At 0730 Third Battalion 22d Marines, "E" Company attached, moved out to reach the sea in 7266 and to contact 4th Marines in 7166 E. First Battalion 22d Marines moved out to patrol to 7367 O and 7467 R and to seize and hold high ground at those two points. Second Battalion 22d Marines attached "E" Company to First Battalion 22d Marines for this mission. Weapons Company supported patrol mission by fire from all weapons on 7566 E. Third Battalion 22d Marines reached sea by patrol, scouted out LST landing beaches at 7364 W, cleaned out area at 7366 D and E. Difficulty of supply being overcome.

Second Battalion 22d Marines at 1530 moved down to river and occupied positions held by First Battalion 22d Marines.

First Battalion 22d Marines patrolled as ordered. At 1600 captured high ground vicinity 7467 R, S. Many Nips and fire received from front and flanks. Unable to have Third Battalion 22d Marines contact 4th Marines due to short advance by 4th Marines and artillery fire being placed on route of patrol by First Battalion 4th Marines.

Weapons Company 22d Marines moved company along river and supported attack by harassing fire.

1515- First Battalion 22d Marines driven from Hill at 7477 R and S by heavy mortar and grenade fire. We ran out of ammunition and withdrew 150 yards after removing all casualties.

11 June

enemy 1000 fired 62 at T Battalion, is ordered our left in place.

12 June

About 5 minute through killed by 2 and Se 22d Marines explosion 1 Marine
2200- First Battalion 22d Marines fully resupplied with ammunition -

night quiet.

9 June

First Battalion 22d Marines to jump off at 0830 to attack hill at 7467 R

Second Battalion 22d Marines to jump off at 0830 and seize hill at 7367 O.

Third Battalion 22d Marines to seize hill at 7367 L.

0700- All units delay jump off till 0900.

0900- First Battalion 22d Marines jumped off, Third Battalion 22d Marines

secured Hill 26 at 7367 Q at 1000. Cannot move until right moves. First

Battalion 22d Marines after hard fighting and heavy casualties secured Hill

35 at 7467 R. At 1610 Second Battalion 22d Marines: ready to attack all day

but unable to do so since First Battalion 22d Marines didn't secure hill in

sufficient time.

1800- Third Battalion 22d Marines tied in for night defense with First

Battalion 4th Marines,

10 June

0400- First Battalion 22d Marines sent patrol from 7467 O to probe out

enemy position. Patrol reached objective, heard much enemy activity, was

fired on by a Light Machine Gun.

Third Battalion 22d Marines killed 13 Nips during night.

0730- Second Battalion 22d Marines jumped off on time. By 1100 Second

Battalion 22d Marines had secured Hill at 7367 Q. Third Battalion 22d Marines

is ordered to advance to Northeast as First Battalion 4th Marines advances on

our left. First Battalion 22d Marines and Second Battalion 22d Marines hold

in place until 4th Marines take high ground on our left.

11 June

Night activity consisted of infiltration throughout all battalions.

About 30 Nips killed.

Second Battalion 22d Marines attacked hill 62 at 0730 preceded by 30

minute preparation (6 battalions 105s and 1 battalion 155s). Secured Hill

62 at 1145.

Third Battalion, 22d Marines with artillery and mortar preparation passed

through Second Battalion, 22d Marines and seized hill 53 at 1455. Total Nips

killed in action for day estimated to be at least 400. Night defense tied in

by dark. During night there was infiltration. Killed 51 Nips. Headquarters

and Service Company killed 4 Nips.

12 June

Day spent mopping up areas which we had taken yesterday. 10 tons of

explosives and four 105s working over cave areas in Third Battalion, 22d

Marines gone of action. 390 Nips killed in action by mopping up.

1550- Artillery Forward Observer secured. Night line tied in with 4th

Marines.
13 June

Night activity - 90 Nips killed while attempting infiltration. Mopped up during day.

14 June

All units patrolling and rehabilitating.

15 June

Troops continue rehabilitation. Battle for ORUWU completed.

(3) THE BATTLE FOR ARA-SAKI POINT

16 June

Meeting of Battalion Commanders at 0900. Warning order to pass through First Division lines and attack 0700, 17 June.
Regimental Command Post moved and ready to operate 1300. Located at 7462 U5. First Battalion, 22d Marines and Third Battalion, 22d Marines ready for jump off. Night quiet. Enemy activity on west coast near ITOMAN.

17 June

First Battalion, 22d Marines and Third Battalion, 22d Marines moved forward at 0300 to effect relief and passage of lines of Seventh Marines at 0300. Relief completed at 0515. Third Battalion, 22d Marines on the left. Advance continued. Contact with Third Battalion, Seventh Marines on left established by patrol.
Third Battalion, 22d Marines reached Hill 62, which controls O-a by fire, at 1700. Tied in with Third Battalion, Seventh Marines for night defense. First Battalion, 22d Marines was unable to advance further than ORUWU ridge. Second Battalion, 22d Marines to new assembly area. Third Battalion, 22d Marines and Second Battalion, 22d Marines night activity. First Battalion, 22d Marines broke up counterattack of fifty Nips while they were organizing night defense lines. Nips killed. No further activity.

18 June

Second Battalion, 22d Marines to pass through Third Battalion, 22d Marines and continue attack at 0300 to seize NUNANGA ridge. Enemy in front of Third Battalion, 22d Marines held up line on our right initially, but Second Battalion, 22d Marines finally secured ridge at 1000 after heavy Artillery, Air, Mortar and Naval Gunfire preparation.
First Battalion, 22d Marines continued mopping up. Colonel Roberts killed at Observation Post at 1115.
1600- Third Battalion, Fourth Marines attached for night defense and tied in with Second Battalion, 22d Marines by dark.
Eighth Marines - No contact.
Night quiet,
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

19 June

Night quiet. All units mopped up areas today.

20 June

First Battalion, 2d Marines, Second Battalion, 22d Marines (less "G" company), Third Battalion, 22d Marines continued mopping up VUVISHI-MEZADO area. "G" Company attached to First Battalion, 29th Marines to secure ARA-SAFT point. Flag raised at 1800 by "G" Company who also raised the flag over the northern tip of OWIHAMA. Night quiet. Approximately thirty Nips killed in action.

21 June

All units continued mopping up assigned areas. Advised all units to establish close liaison with adjacent and near by units due to the large number of troops in area.

Sixth Marine Division zone of action officially declared secured at 1000.

At 1715 Tenth Army announced that the island of OWIHAMA was officially declared secured.

22 June

All units continued to mop un assigned areas. Units required to bury all enemy dead, seal caves, and salvage equipment and supplies in their respective zones.

Due to large number and size of caves, units were furnished Engineer personnel and unlimited amount of explosives.

23 June

All units continued patrol and salvage operations.

24 June through 27 June

All units continued patrol and salvage operations.

On 27 June Regimental zone of responsibility officially announced as completely mopped up and all possible gear salvaged. However, units will continue to patrol daily their assigned zones.

(4) (a) Shore Party. - No comment.

(b) Naval Gunfire Support.

Effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Party Personnel.

The number of men in the Forward Observers Team was too small in this operation during the early phases due to the rapid rate of advance and the large amount of communication equipment which must be carried. However, during the second phase, the number was sufficient.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

The number of men in the Liaison Officers Team was sufficient. With very few exceptions the officers and enlisted men understood their respective jobs thoroughly.

Effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Communications Equipment.

The communications equipment proved very successful.

Effectiveness of Gunfire.

This RCT made no assault landing during this phase; therefore, no beach preparations were needed.

A total of 1,350 rounds of illumination was used which proved very helpful. The only complaint is that it was sometimes very difficult to obtain additional star shells when they were urgently needed.

A total of 35 harassing targets were fired. Of course, there was no way of determining how successful these fires were.

Fourteen preparations targets in advance of troop movements were fired. One hundred and forty call targets were handled with very good results.

Total expenditures of ammunition during this phase was as follows:

14,220 rounds 5" A.A.C.
2,250 rounds 6", 8", 14" HC and AP.
1,380 rounds 5" Star Shells
265 rounds White Phosphorous
15,115 Total rounds

Effectiveness of Coordination

Coordination with Artillery and Air was very good.

The chain of command between various echelons of Naval Gunfire Control worked very well.

No specific outstanding features of Naval Gunfire were noted.

Recommendation for future employment of Naval Gunfire.

The use of telephone communications should be stressed more and more. Several of the fire support ships should be made to better understand the situation ashore.

If possible, the Officers assigned to Shore Fire Control Parties should be of higher rank, as specified in the JASSO Tables of Organization.

The regimental Liaison Officer should have a TCS radio in addition to the SCR 694. This would enable him to be in contact with the Battalion FLOs, and, at the same time, maintain a watch on the Naval Gunfire Common Net.

Comments.

Each Shore-Fire Control Party did not keep its frequency for more than three days at a time. This is very undesirable. Each battalion should keep its own frequency throughout the operation. A secondary frequency should also be assigned.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

Net discipline was fair.
Two Naval Gun Fire Spotters and several enlisted men were wounded.
More replacements should be available.
The present Naval Gun Fire communication plan is adequate but could still be improved by adding a TCS radio to the Regimental Team.

(c) Air Support.

Close Air Support on OLOCU Peninsula was handicapped considerably in the later stages due to the encirclement of the enemy troops. However, in the pre-jump off strikes they proved of great value especially the Napalm and rocket strikes.

On the southern tip of the island from KAWANGA ridge south, all the strikes proved of considerable value. Napalm helped to burn all camouflage netting and concealment and left the entrances to caves exposed to the attacking troops and their close supporting weapons observers. The 1000#, 500# bombs and rockets all tended to disorganize resistance and knock out Machine Gun and mortar positions. Combined with Naval Gunfire and Artillery it proved its effectiveness in dealing with targets especially on reverse slopes of ridges.

Suggest ordnance experiment with Naplam and perfect it - especially as regards accuracy.
The S.A.R. not was on the whole cluttered up with unnecessary transmissions by various units. This was later rectified and helped immensely in speeding up the directing of planes on target.

Another frequency should be used for air drop direction and requests.
If the Air Ground Liaison parties in the future do not have direct communication with the strike group and must relay the messages thru S.A.C., I believe a new communication set-up should be established and proper training with the S.A.C. put into effect at least one month prior to embarking on an operation.

The delay in strikes should be controlled so that it would be possible to coordinate strikes with any of the other supporting weapons. There were very few instances where a strike group was on station ready to make their initial dummy runs as soon as artillery or Naval gunfire ceased firing.

Also the air coordinator and the pilots should be briefed more thoroughly in a divisions zone of action so that no more than two dummy runs would be necessary to spot the targets and begin the live runs.

All planes not of the strike group should be cleared through the territory through some means and the Air Ground Liaison Party should be briefed by S.A.C. as to the type of plane, bomb loads and number of planes.
Planes that come off of patrol and wish to expend their ammunition should be familiar with S.A.C’s frequency and check into net so that he can be given a target far enough from our front line troops. Otherwise they should be warned beforehand to stay out of particular zones of action.

A situation map should be kept by a strike group or groups and the pilots be thoroughly briefed as to operational plans and terrain.
A better distribution of photographs should be made to all Battalions and Regiments. They usually arrived too late to be of any value. Air observer planes should be available within a reasonable length of time.
A radio communication net should be installed between Battalions and Regiment because of the uncertainty of wire communication. The SCR 300 has proved adequate.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

It has been found that a radio mounted Jeep will break down under continual rough usage. Therefore a radio mounted on a larger chassis would seem more adequate.

Air Support was conducted to the satisfaction of most Battalion and Regimental Commanders. Several Battalion Commanders would not permit air strikes in their zone of action without direct control of striking group.

In conclusion, I believe it be of material value to have an oral discussion by all the officers concerned in Air Support and the S.A.C. and a study made of conflicting points during the discussion.

(d) Artillery Support

Artillery was much used by this Regiment during Phase III. No new lessons were learned and this Regiment found present Infantry-Artillery doctrine to be sound. However, it was apparent that certain doctrinal points need re-emphasis. Some of these follow:

The Infantry must jump off as soon as the preparatory fires lift. If the troops cannot do this the Artillery must be notified by H-30 so as not to waste a preparation.

155mm Howitzers firing very close preparation (400-600 yards) deliver the maximum of shock power against an entrenched enemy and renders him vulnerable to assaulting infantry who closely follow the preparation.

Time on Target is the most effective of all fires from the infantry standpoint.

Tanks were dug in and have nothing to fear from close artillery support. The men know this and feel no lasting resentment if a short round falls on them. There was only one case of short rounds (still doubtful if it was friendly or enemy) during Phase III.

The Regimental Artillery Liaison Officer must function in accordance with Division SOP with regard to co-ordinating Air, Naval Gunfire and Artillery support.

A short intense preparation is perhaps better than a long one of lesser intensity. Twelve battalions of artillery firing three rounds per minute for five minutes is much better than the same twelve battalions firing one round per minute for fifteen minutes.

(c) Tanks

Tanks operated in direct support of this Regiment on many occasions during Phase III. Here, again, standard tank-infantry doctrine proved sound. Two points need re-emphasis: The infantry must stay closely with the tanks; tanks should be released by 1700 to return to the tank park. It is recommended that the flame-throwing tank be added to the tank battalion organic equipment and that mine-lifting teams be organic within the battalion.

(f) Amphibian Tractors

The Amphibian tractor was used to supply this Regiment during the second phase of this operation in three different manners. First by shore to shore, second during heavy rains and third through enemy sniper fire.

When the Regiments became separated from Division supplies due to heavy rains and the stopping of traffic, LVTs were used to bring up supplies.
This was the only means of supply available except by air-drop and it provided invaluable during this period. This means of supply was also used to supply one battalion of this Regiment during the occupation of the OROKU Peninsula. Supplies were landed and casualties were evacuated to waiting LSTs (H).

During heavy rains when all other transportation was bogged down, LVTs were used to supply front line troops. This proved very effective as it saved long hand-carrying parties and made evacuation more rapid. Some difficulty was experienced during this period as the mud was so heavy that the LVTs often sank down. The track is so narrow and the bottom so low that the LVTs are not an effective means of transportation in heavy mud.

LVT's were also used to supply front line troops where they had to pass through sniper fire. This proved very effective as the LVT provides good cover from small arms fire.

(g) Armored Amphibians.

This supporting arm operated almost continually in support of the 22d Marines from 9 June until the conclusion of the operation. They were employed almost exclusively in beach defense, but were assigned some deep harassing fire missions on enemy rear areas when appropriate. This latter type of employment is profitable and it's continuance it recommended. However, it is believed that these missions should be assigned and controlled by the Division artillery.

These armored vehicles are excellent for beach defense, especially at night and did good service in that capacity. They helped considerably in breaking up two attempted counter-landings on our sea-flank between the ASI-KAWA and the ASATSU-GA'U during Phase III.

The two most important recommendations concerning these vehicles are as follows: That they be given 60mm Mortars for illumination, and that they be given protection by covering fire of infantry when emplaced in beach defense position.

(h) Infantry Combat.

Infantry combat during Phase III re-emphasized the fact that standard doctrine, modified when appropriate by field expedients, is sound and admits of no particular criticism. Some general comments relative to this follows:

The most successful commanders are those who understands and use their supporting arms and weapons to the limit of their capabilities and who have a thorough knowledge of terrain appreciation.

Terrain appreciation by junior leaders is not all that could be desired. Too often squads and platoons were led into unfavorable tactical situations by leaders who failed to make a proper preliminary reconnaissance of the terrain and evaluate same before committing troops. A thorough reconnaissance, plus a knowledge, based on experience, of how the enemy defends the ground, by many of the junior officers, enabled them to set their objective without being involved in unfavorable tactical situations. All officers should be thoroughly instructed in terrain appreciation, as well as Japanese defensive tactics, during our next training phase.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

As our casualties increased during the operation, combat efficiency decreased rapidly due to an extreme shortage of non-commissioned officers. Battle replacements for a unit must include sufficient NCO's to replace casualties. With such a rapid turn-over in officer and enlisted personnel in rifle companies, it is a necessity, if we are to maintain battle efficiency, to keep as nearly up to strength as possible in our NCO personnel.

A shortage of 81mm shell, 60mm illuminating shell, and grenades, wp, and colored smoke, hampered infantry operations at times. This is not a reflection on the S-4 for there were none available to the Division. Sound tactics does not limit the amount or type of ammunition to be used in seizing an objective. "Even artillery was sometimes hampered by a lack of ammunition in giving the necessary preparation for an attack. Higher echelons must plan so that the infantry troops have available to them at all times any amount and type of ammunition which they deem necessary to use in taking an objective.

(i) Communications.

Personnel.

There is a need for 33 additional radio men for the regiment, broken down in the following way: 4 men for two new SCR 606, 20 men for the 15 new SCR 610, 9 men for 9 new SCR 300. These sets are authorized by the Table of Basic Allowances, without a corresponding increase in personnel to man the sets. Also needed are 1 non-CP clerk and clerk (QM supply) in the Regimental Communication Platoon.

Training of personnel was adequate.

Special training should be carried out in Open Wire Construction for both enlisted and officers. It is expected that a great deal of dependence will be placed on this type of construction in the near future.

Personnel losses during this phase were as follows: WIA-42, KIA-10, MIA-0.

Communication personnel were not employed for other use with the exception of Command Post security watches.

Battle casualties were replaced by line duty men and Communication personnel from replacement drafts.

Equipment.

There were no overages in major equipment. The only shortage was alignment equipment for the SCR 600 series.

There were no losses of major equipment from landing to the end of the operation.

The equipment was suitable for the particular task that was to be performed in this phase of the operation.

The SCR 694 is recommended for long range radio communications. The pack board strongly recommended for the type of operation just concluded. Open wire equipment is recommended if similar operations are planned.

This organization used the following new equipment with the listed results:

SCR 606—Excellent set. No improvements necessary.
SCR 610—Excellent set, but should be easier to change frequency. Set also gets out of alignment easily.
No non-Table of Basic Allowance items were used.
All Table of Basic Allowances were used.

Supply,
Wire and batteries placed the greatest strain on supply.
No change in replenishment rates is recommended.
An arbitrary list was made of inventory levels to be on hand at all times in each outfit of the Combat Team, as well as arbitrary inventory levels to be carried as full supply for entire Combat Team. Each unit made daily reports on major expendable items and were daily re-supplied.
Much better repair facilities were available during this phase of the operation. All major repairs were made by Division Signal Repair.
The SCR 610, SCR 300 were the major items that required repairs.
Equipment spares were on hand.
Equipment spares were adequate.
Sufficient spares other than equipment spares were available with the exception of SCR 300 handsets.
There was an outstanding handicap in the operation due to lack of transportation.
Recommended transportation:

2 Two and one half ton truck.
2 One ton, 4x4 trucks.
3 One quarter, 4x4 trucks.

Operations.
No agencies were established that were not normal.
The overloaded agency in this phase was telephone communications.
The radios were used to overcome this overloading of the telephone agency in many instances.
There were no unnecessary duplications on agencies.
All frequency assignments were used.
Difficulties encountered were:
(a) Wire - Wires in many instances were destroyed by fire from native huts, bulldozers, amphibian tractors, even when overheaded.
(b) Message Center - Lack of transportation to maintain scheduled runs.
Wire communications were hard to maintain due to the rapid advance of the Combat Team.
No officers were required to operate any agency due to enlisted casualties.
No enemy installations were captured.
Infantry-Tank communications were maintained by use of the SCR 536 to contact GF/RU sets in the tanks.

Security.
Cryptographic Aids used were: CSBP 0130-03, CSP 1500, Shackle.
There is no criticism of present aids.
The shackle was used for Authentication with undetermined results. Enemy did not try to use our Authentication System. Personnel of the Combat Team Communication sections were sufficiently trained in security.

It is specifically recommended that all officers be given more extensive security training especially when using FM sets. The enemy did not use countermeasures during this phase. ECM instruction by competent personnel is advisable to overcome future countermeasures by the enemy.

Summary

Recommendations:

Additional transportation for Regimental Combat Team Communication Platoon. 2-2 1/2 ton trucks, 2-1 ton 4x4 trucks, 3-3/4 ton 4x4 trucks.

More communication instruction, voice procedure and security for officers.

Basic essentials in personnel and equipment for maintaining Open Wire lines by lower echelons.

More repair equipment and personnel in Regimental Combat Team. Test equipment is not adequate. At least four repairmen are need for FM sets, 33 are recommended.

Sufficient equipment should be on hand during training period. Personnel should be sent to Regimental Combat Teams in time to receive adequate training.

Packboards and long range radio equipment be furnished RCT. That more channels be furnished the Regimental Combat Team for SCR 300. 10 is recommended. 5 for primary and 5 for secondary channels.

General.

During this phase Communications in general were excellent. Both radio and wire Communications were maintained whenever possible. At no time were both agencies out. The battalions were tied in at night by Wire Communication. Signal supply was excellent as well as signal repair. No unnecessary delay was noted in repairs. The morale of the Communication Personnel was excellent during this phase of the operation.

(j) Engineers - See report of 6th Engineer Battalion, also comments of S-4 in section (1) of this chapter.

(k) Medical.

Medical Section set up bivouac areas with their respective organizations. Six (6) Company Aid men were attached to each Company and one Company Aid man to 60mm Mortars of each Battalion. Twenty Hospital Corpsmen and Two (2) Medical officers to each battalion Aid Station. Ten (10) Hospital Corpsmen and two (2) Medical Officers to Regimental Aid Station plus three Hospital Corpsmen to Regimental Weapons Company. Time of arrival at Southern Okinawa was approximately 1200, 5 May, 1945.
Full unit 3's were carried by Medical Personnel and a twenty-five day supply of Medical equipment was carried on ambulance jeeps and with S-4, and S-6. No losses of Personnel or equipment.

Medical Installations:

Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations were set up with the best coverage available with their respective Command Posts when consistent with proper care of casualties and their expeditious evacuation to Medical Companies. Occasionally forward Aid Stations in advance of Command Posts were necessary. These Command Posts were usually along roads and trails and were natural lines of drift for the walking wounded. Medical Companies of the Sixth Medical Battalion always advanced behind the assault forces as they moved forward, to facilitate evacuation.

Protective measures taken:

Local security was provided for the most part by Regimental and Battalion Command Posts. Battalion Aid Station personnel on occasions helped form an outer perimeter of defense for their respective Aid stations. For holes were dug and shelters and dug-outs were available. No black-out tents were available.

Hospitalization:

Adequate as to functioning, equipment, supplies and personnel.
Number of patients for the Regiment - 3600.

Evacuation:

Evacuation facilities were generally quite adequate. Patients were evacuated to Aid Stations by litter bearers and ambulance jeeps, field ambulances furnished by Medical Companies, 6x6 trucks and LVT's. Ambulance jeeps and LVT's were rough riding while evacuating critical patients and it is believed that in future operations it would be advisable to concentrate more on using field ambulances for evacuating casualties from Aid Stations.

Casualties Treated:

Number of casualties —- 3600.
Retained 97
Evacuated 331s
Killed in Action 185
(does not include those evacuated directly by Graves Registration).

Sanitation:

Adequate, except for insect control which was insufficient because of inadequate amount of DDT. This Regiment was allowed seventy-five (75) lbs of DDT powder per month and this is deemed inadequate. Flies were the greatest factor in causing a small epidemic of Gastro-enteritis. Sanit was issued in adequate amounts but insecticide powder was not always available.

Instructions were given to treat all fresh water with Halazone tablets.
Disposal of dead:

Our dead were evacuated to Division Graves Registration. Enemy dead were buried by our troops when possible.

Epidemics or unusual diseases in troops:

There was a small epidemic of gastro-enteritis due to the numerous amount of flies.

Dental Services:

Dental services were supplied by the Regimental Dentist in emergencies or by a Dentist in one of the Medical Companies. Additional duties - Dental Officer would operate a Collecting Point when necessary for evacuating patients.

Prisoners of War, care of:

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>RAS and RAS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>NAAN, OKINAWA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>First Aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated</td>
<td>Civil Affairs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Care of Civilians:

Three hundred and fifty civilians were treated throughout the Regiment and then evacuated to Civil Affairs.

Types of service rendered was for the most part minor injuries and a few burns and gunshot wounds. Facilities for treating natives were adequate and no diseases were noted.

Medical Organization:

Adequate as it is at present.

Suggested changes - For increase in transportation this Regiment should have two (2) ambulance jeeps and trailers or preferably one (1) ambulance jeep and trailer and one (1) one-ton Army type field ambulance to each Battalion Aid Station and two (2) ambulance jeeps with trailers and one (1) one-ton truck for the Regimental Aid Station. This transportation is needed to move essential Medical gear and to prevent its loss and pilferage.

Medical Personnel:

Adequate as it is at present.

There were severe losses of Medical personnel from both illness and gunshot wounds and the Regiment was considerably under strength during the latter part of the operation. Losses have now been replaced.

Field Medical Equipment:

Medical Units one (1), three (3) and five (5) to ten (10) inclusive were carried ashore by each Battalion and Regimental Aid Station.
Adequate for treating combat casualties but impossible to obtain many sick call preparations for the treatment and prevention of minor diseases such as athlete's foot, and so forth.

No pilferage and no losses except in evacuation.

Supplies were adequate and the present type is suitable.

Re-supply - More attention should be paid to Malaria Control and Sanitary equipment.

Medical Supplies:

25 day initial supply was carried on trucks and ambulance jeeps and with S-4 and Bn-4.

No losses or pilferage.

Adequate.

Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock:

One (1) ambulance jeep and trailer to each Battalion Aid Station and two (2) ambulance jeeps and trailers to Regimental Aid Station.

Losses - none.

Utilized to carry medical supplies and to evacuate patients.

Maintained by S-4 and Bn-4.

Inadequate.

Improvements - Two (2) ambulance jeeps with trailers or preferably one (1) ambulance jeep and trailer and one (1) one-ton Army type field ambulance for each Battalion Aid Station and two (2) ambulance jeeps and trailers and one (1) one-ton truck for Regimental Aid Station.

Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies:

Sanitation and Malaria Control - Regimental supply of seventy-five (75) pounds of DDT per month is not adequate.

Not available - Insecticide powder and fumigating bombs.

Reclothing of patients - adequate.

Quartermaster supply suitable except for lack of DDT, Insecticide powder and fumigating bombs.

Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment and Supplies:

Seventy-five (75) pounds DDT per month for Regiment is inadequate. Spray cans available.

DDT used as a local spray.

Suitable.

AFTER COMPLETION OF ASSAULT PHASE

Hospitalization:

All patients needing hospitalization were sent to one of the Medical Companies.

Medical and Quartermaster supplies and equipment:

Adequate.
Sanitation:

Squat areas are policed daily and all refuse, cans and garbage burned or buried. Enemy dead also buried.

Slit trenches and some two and four hole heads are being used.

Fly proof galleys are being constructed in order that hot chow may be served.

Food and Water

Personnel have been issued 10 in 1 and "C" rations where hot chow was not available.

Water is issued one (1) five gallon can per ten (10) men daily.

Showers have been constructed nearby for bathing. Laundry is done by Laundry Platoons and individually and is satisfactory and adequate.

Sickness - Epidemic or unusual Diseases in Troops or Native population:

No Epidemic or unusual Diseases have been noted in troops or native population since completion of assault phase.

Supply and Logistics:

Phase III of this operation presented different problems of supply from Phase I and II. Phase I and II presented mainly problems of transportation in a fast moving situation. Phase III brought out the problem of moving supplies forward to the troops over roads and trails impassable to organic transportation. This was caused by heavy rains and the lack of a good road net.

The Infantry Regiment is not equipped to transport supplies and evacuate casualties during heavy rains and on muddy roads. LVTs were used to bridge this gap, but they are not satisfactory for this purpose. They are too large and heavy, have a too narrow track and their bottom is too low. These factors cause the tractor to mire down and to be abandoned until such time as weather permits removal. Regardless of this LVT's did a wonderful job of bringing up supplies and evacuating casualties and should be commended for this job. They were also used to supply one Battalion by water during the occupation of ORIEN Peninsula. The LVT also gives some protection from enemy small arms fire and was used for this purpose in crossing the flat lands under sniper fire.

The M29C Cargo Carrier was also used to supply during wet weather. This means of transportation is excellent over rice paddies and soft fields, but will not hold up in heavy mud. This Regiment started Phase III with five (5) M29C Cargo Carriers. As the rains became heavier and the mud became thicker these soon were out of commission. The tracks either broke or were thrown off. The two small bands holding the track together are not heavy or strong enough to stand a heavy strain and if the track is not kept taut it will be thrown off on turn.

One Army ammunition carrier (Tracked) was used for two (2) days with good results. This vehicle also has its faults. The track is too narrow for soft ground and the body it too high giving it a tendency to turn over on a small slope.
It would be helpful if some vehicle were devised with a strong wide track, low in silhouette, and have a small amount of armor for protection against small arms fire, and also have a cargo carrying capacity of at least one (1) ton.

Resupply was excellent on all classes of supply except some types of class V. The main items were 50mm shell, and 60mm Illuminating shell.

Salvage collection was done on a limited basis in this regiment, normally one truck was dispatched daily for this purpose. Poor roads and the detachment of the Division salvage section slowed down these operations considerably. The Division Service and Supply Platoon, consisting of a Commissary and Salvage section, was detached from this Regiment on 17 May. From that time on it was not attached again except for a period of one (1) day. This caused a shifting of personnel, as an Infantry Regiment does not have a salvage section.

During the whole of this operation the Division Service and Supply Platoon proved to be of more trouble than value to this Regiment. This was due to attachment and detachment several times. This caused confusion in the keeping of records of rations and fuel and the lack of personnel for salvage operations.

Wheel and trailer transportation of an Infantry Regiment is not adequate for supply purposes. Twelve (12) 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were assigned from Division Motor Transport. This proved to be sufficient and there were only a few cases where extra trucks were called for. It is believed that these trucks could be more efficiently handled and better control maintained if these were organic in the Regiment.

The 105mm Platoon of the Regimental Weapons Company required extra transportation for hauling ammunition. The two (2) 1-ton, 4x4, cargo trucks assigned for this purpose proved insufficient.

The three (3) ½-ton, 4x4, cargo trucks assigned to Headquarters Company of the Regiment is far below requirements. Five (5) were allotted for this purpose, but that even proved one (1) short. For the Regimental Staff to properly perform their duties it is necessary for each staff section to have some means of transportation at hand. With transportation assigned the commanding officer and Executive Officer, this would require a total of six (6) ½-ton, 4x4, cargo trucks assigned to Headquarters Company of the Regiment. These do not include the two (2) ½-ton, 4x4, cargo trucks now assigned to the Service section.

The Infantry Battalion and Headquarters and Service Company do not have proper transportation for handling of small supplies and for the pulling of water trailers. The 1-ton, 4x4, cargo trucks as recommended in the Phase I and II report are considered essential transportation for these units.

The Infantry Regiment is not properly equipped for transportation during rainy weather over muddy roads. Some means of transportation should be provided for this purpose. The M29C cargo carrier, being the only type vehicle available for this purpose, should be assigned. It is believed that at least eight (8) per Battalion plus four (4) for H&S Company would be required for a Regiment.

Maintenance facilities and adequacy of spare parts is far below requirements for a Regiment. As experienced in this operation, we were cut off from Division Maintenance due to impassable roads for almost one (1) week. During this time many vehicles required third echelon work. This was done where parts were available. Some vehicles were cannibalized during this period in order to keep the majority of vehicles in running order. As recommended for Phase I and II it is deemed essential that Regiments be equipped to do third echelon work, or unit replacements made available.
Supply Communications are not adequate in the Infantry Battalions. The Commanding Officer of a battalion must have continuous communications with his supply dumps. If this is not done proper supplies cannot be brought forward at the proper time. In one battalion communication were not made between the Commanding Officer and the S-4 of the battalion for a period of one day. This resulted in the calling for an air-drop and the S-4 of the Regiment sending supplies direct to the troops. Continuous liaison must also be maintained. One officer of the S-4 section of each battalion must be in the Battalion Command Post and one with the supply dumps at all times with continuous communications between the two.

Battalion must be properly instructed to request supplies through the proper staff sections. Also to give specific information of what is needed and where. This will save many phone calls and much needed time. In one instance; one Battalion Commander made a request for ammunition and food direct to G-4. G-4 called the Division Quartermaster, Division Quartermaster called the Division Ordinance, Division Ordinance called the Regimental Ordinance, Regimental Ordinance called the Regimental Quartermaster, Regimental Quartermaster called the Regimental S-4, Regimental S-4 called the Battalion S-4 to find out what was needed and where. All these phone calls were unnecessary as the Battalion S-4 could call the Regimental S-4 who would notify the proper persons to deliver the items needed to the proper place. Battalion Commanders should also not send requests direct to the Regimental Commanders without checking first with their S-4. This also involves extra calls and wasted time. Requests must be definite in what is needed, where it is needed and the time desired.

Air-drop was used to one Battalion for food for one day. This was successful except one thousand rations were requested and only 600 received. It is believed that some organizations count one ration as one meal. All organizations should be instructed that a ration is three meals for one person for one day.

Dump distribution was used from Division to Regiments. Supply Point distribution was used from Regiment to Battalion except for the five (5) days. One truck was assigned each Battalion for Supply Point distribution and two (2) assigned for Dump distribution. Supply Point distribution is the most effective method of supply with consideration for transportation. Dump Distribution makes the Battalions more independent and is preferred by them.

Periodic reports were submitted every five (5) days. This plan is more convenient and reports are more accurate than if submitted daily. Reports from 1500 to 1800 and had to reach Division by 1930. Since message center runs cannot be coordinated with the time the reports are due, it required a special run for this purpose. Since these reports are not emergency requisitions for supplies, this special trip does not seem of value as the report would reach Division the following morning on a regular trip.

The following transportation was either destroyed, worn out or lost during Phase III:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>WORN OUT</th>
<th>LOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 3-ton, 5x4,</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo Carier, M29C</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo Bed, M39G</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trailer, 2 wheel, gre</td>
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Total: 353
Engineer equipment and personnel must follow as close to battalions as possible. Therefore constant liaison and reconnaissance must be maintained by supporting engineers. The Division Engineer Officer should make a personal reconnaissance and contact each assault Regimental Commander almost daily to find out his needs, which was seldom done during this phase of the operation. The Regimental S-4 does not have time to check on all roads and engineer work required so it should therefore be required that engineers use their initiative to help assault troops without being instructed to do so.

Main supply roads should be built or repaired with a view to the future under any conditions of weather. This was not done from the ASA-WANA river to WANA, which resulted in much time and labor being wasted after heavy rains closed the proposed Division main supply road. A paved direct route was available at this time and only required two bridges to be constructed.

The ammunition supply was adequate except for 81mm, M43A1 w/f M52 and 60mm Illuminating. The unit of fire for 81mm ammunition is adequate, but a higher percentage should be given of the M43A1 w/f M52. This type of ammunition is effective against personnel and is favored by all units. The unit of fire of 60mm Illuminating is sufficient, but was not obtainable.

The Illuminating grenade was used on this operation and proved very effective. Being a new type grenade it was not obtainable in large enough quantities.

The 15 second delay detonator is useful on all demolition charges and should be furnished in greater quantity.

The M-1 ammunition package is too large and bulky to handle. The package could be made smaller containing about 1000 rounds or less.

Ammunition expenditure, 8 May to 22 June:

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<th>TYPE</th>
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<td>AP, M51</td>
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<td>Canister, M2</td>
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<td>105mm Howitzer</td>
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<td>HE, M1, w/f M48</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE, M1, w/f M54</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE-AT, M67, w/f M62A1</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP, M60, w/f M57</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE, M49A2</td>
<td>28282</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP, M6</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illuminating, M33A1</td>
<td>5420</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE, M43A1, w/f M52, light</td>
<td>38543</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE, M56, w/f M53, medium</td>
<td>30345</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP, M57, w/f M52</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE-AT, 2, 36&quot;, M6A3</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP, 2, 36&quot;, M10</td>
<td>384</td>
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### Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>EXPENDED</th>
<th>APPRX. UNIT OF FIRE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grenades</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illuminating, MKII</td>
<td>950</td>
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<td>Fragmentation, MKII</td>
<td>141,340</td>
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<td>WP, M25</td>
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<td>HC, M8</td>
<td>975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smoke, colored, M15</td>
<td>1632</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grenades</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>AT, M9A1</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP, M2</td>
<td>510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smoke, colored</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapt, Grenade, Proj, M1</td>
<td>192</td>
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<td>Adapt, Chemical, T2</td>
<td>144</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>.50 Caliber</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>API - T Linked (4-1)</td>
<td>4870</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>.45 Caliber</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>37900</td>
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<td><strong>.30 Caliber</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>AP, M2, 5/ctp</td>
<td>148,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP, M2, 8/ctp</td>
<td>33,344</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP-T, Belted, (4-1)</td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tracer, M2, 20/ctn</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Carbine</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>159,400</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shot Gun</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shell, 12 gauge, #00</td>
<td>5025</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pyrotechnics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Flare, trip, M48</td>
<td>872</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flare, trip, M49</td>
<td>520</td>
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<td><strong>Demolitions</strong></td>
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<td>Block, Demo, chain, M1</td>
<td>260</td>
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<td>Cap, Blast, non-electric</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Primacord, spool</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detonator, 15 sec., M1</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosive, TNT, 1/2 lb.</td>
<td>1,3800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuse, Blast, time, ft.</td>
<td>4,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lighter, Fuse, M2</td>
<td>1,505</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cylinder, Nitrogen</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ignition, cylinder</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm, can, (5½ lb.)</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-2, Haversack blocks</td>
<td>4,200</td>
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**Weapons used and destroyed or lost over forty-five (45) day battle employment:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>USED</th>
<th>DESTROYED OR LOST</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun, 12-gauge</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, .30 caliber</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>460</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle, .30 caliber, M-1</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAR, .30 caliber</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG, .30 caliber, M1919A4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>MG, .30 caliber, M1917A1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSMG, .45 caliber</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, .45 caliber</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, .50 caliber</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 60mm</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 61mm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, 37mm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, SP, 105mm, M7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Launcher, Rocket</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Launcher, Grenade, M7</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Launcher, Grenade, M9</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame Thrower, M2-2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Public Relations.**

Public Relations coverage was thorough and excellent throughout the operation. It was found that cooperation between correspondents and photographers required supervision. Public Relations personnel worked directly with the Division Public Relations Officer and consequently there was a need for information in battalions and regiment as to their activities. A solution was found in increasing liaison between correspondents and staff sections.

**Military Government.**

During the southern phase of this operation, civilians were encountered in large numbers many times, which caused a tremendous load of work for this section which could have been eased had there been a sufficient number of Military Government personnel assigned to this regiment to handle these civilians. Also, an acute shortage of transportation was noticed in trying to transport these civilians back to the rear areas where civilian compounds had been established. Many times we were forced to use combat troops to handle civilians thus diverting them from their normal duties of eliminating the enemy. A large body of civilians can easily hinder an operation by blocking main supply routes and also affords a way for enemy personnel to sneak through our lines disguised as civilians. This would be eliminated if we had sufficient Civil Affairs personnel with language sections attached to handle civilians.

**Special Reconnaissance Missions - none.**
CHAPTER IV:

ENEMY TACTICS

The enemy's main defensive positions were well camouflaged and organized for mutual support. In general, the enemy continued to defend the high ground in a series of strong points, covering the intervening flats by small arms and flat trajectory fire. Caves were employed to the utmost in all positions, many of these were elaborate in the extreme. Natural caves and mines were made use of by the enemy, but tombs were only made use of in a few isolated cases.

Throughout the Southern Operation the Japanese based much of their tactical plan on reverse slope defense. This was dictated by our meagerness of artillery and the excellence of available observation. There was some evidence that would indicate a withdrawal from defensive positions at night to avoid bombardments and a return before dawn.

In planning his defense, the enemy used terrain to the maximum. No key feature was without its defense even though available numbers and weapons might be small. There was an increase in the use of heavy volume surprise fires. The enemy would allow friendly troops to approach to short ranges or pass through, and then open fire on our rear, rear elements, or front lines. This was particularly true of reverse slope defenses, the best example being the defense of Sugar Loaf.

The order of battle made little difference in the nature of the defense tactics. This Regiment was opposed by two distinct groups of Army organization, a separate Naval Base Defense Force, and service units, during the various phases of the Southern Operation. In all cases, the defense was patterned on the overall tactical plan as devised by the 32d Army Commander.

Weapons employed were small arms, grenades launchers, Light Machine Guns, 47mm AT guns, mortars, mines, and artillery ranging in caliber from 77mm to 15cm. Some large, erratic rockets were encountered as well as small numbers of other weapons. There was a noticeable slackening in the use of heavy mortars and heavy machine guns in the later phases, mainly due to the difficulty of moving them under fire.

Grenades, both hand thrown and launched by discharger, and light machine guns formed the basis of all defensive positions. The machine guns were principally employed in forward slope defense and sniping activity, while grenades were extensively employed in reverse slope and cave tactics. The volume frequently reached an intensity which could be described as extremely heavy for both weapons, particularly when key positions of vital positions were endangered.

Anti-Tank activities were well organized and worthy of considerable comment. It was evident that a great deal of stress had been placed on this form of defense.

The ground was organized for defense with natural obstacles such as escarpments and water being tied in and supplemented by tank ditches, mine fields, road blocks, and excavations, and bridge demolitions. Whenever possible tank obstacles were covered by effective fire from flat trajectory weapons and small arms. These weapons were extremely well covered and concealed. They frequently had very narrow fields of fire. Several guns were located in caves with their mouths partially walled up and camouflaged.
Fire was held until an excellent target was presented and then opened rapidly and accurately.

Small tank hunter teams were organized and defended from concealed positions at key road junctions or passes. These teams consisted of several men and were suicidal in nature. They carried demolitions in the form of shaped charges. They were familiar with the weaknesses of our tanks and preferred to attack disabled or stalled units with no infantry protection. These teams were frequently provided with effective bases of fire.

Mines were used extensively both on and off roads and paths. Although improvement was noted later on, the camouflage of mines were poor or nonexistent. Frequently duds were encountered in all types. Many attempts were made to set electrically controlled fields, but none were known to be successful due to our artillery cutting the wiring. Many tracked vehicles and trucks were lost by bombs rigged as mines. Some of these, possibly a large proportion, were actually artillery or mortar duds. It is believed that a small percentage of all mines laid were converted shells or bombs.

A great deal of enemy artillery of all calibers was encountered, but it was considerably weakened by poor tactical use. No effective massed fires were employed. Fire was usually limited to single guns firing a few rounds at a time. Use was made of dual purpose weapons against personnel, with a large proportion of air bursts. The enemy limited in his artillery by our effective counter-battery fire, sound and flash location, air and ground observation, and the destruction of his communications. Several instances were observed of the forward observer communicating with his guns by pigeons. POW's report that it was not unusual for fire mission to take six hours to go from forward observer to the guns. Most of the fire was encountered at dawn and dusk.

Few booby traps were located, many of those found were duds or easily disarmed. They were generally box type or personnel mines and grenades boosted by picric acid blocks.

When the enemy employed cave defenses, he frequently failed to protect their entrances by outside infantry. This enabled our troops to get close enough to employ flame throwers and demolitions.

In summarizing enemy defenses, they were effectively planned to limit our strength and to use their advantages to the maximum. The enemy was tenacious up to his breaking point, at which time he would execute excellent, organized withdrawals. His fire was economical, effective and accurate. An increase in the accuracy of small arms fire was noted, probably due to excellent visibility and fields of fire. In no instance during this operation did the enemy offer evidence of disorganization within his front line positions or failure to make maximum use of the weapons under his immediate control. His choice of positions took into account the natural defensive features of the terrain as well as his diminishing forces. Noticeable in its absence was the traditional Banzai charge.
CHAPTER V:

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

(1) Area secured. - See Overlay

(2) Enemy Casualties

Killed - 5,710
Captured - 179

(3) Operational retaliatory damage to enemy.

- Grenade Dischargers - 64
- 20mm Dual Purpose - 30
- 17mm AT Guns - 10
- 90mm Dual Purpose - 2
- Field Piece (Unidentified) - 2
- Rifles - 1309
- Trucks - 82
- 30 Caliber Twin Mount - 1
- 3-inch Naval Gun - 3
- Light Machine Gun - 130
- Heavy Machine Gun - 25
- Suicide Boats - 63
- Ammunition Dumps - 47

(4) Own losses.

Killed in action - 333
Wounded in action - 1676
Missing in action - 3

CHAPTER VI:

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G-1

It is recommended that in supplying replacements to an assault unit while in the line, care should be taken that as many trained replacements as possible be made available to that unit instead of sending up personnel who are in reality non-combatant personnel, such as cooks, post exchange stewards, fire fighters, etc. Many casualties occurred in this regiment among replacements received who were not trained combat replacements.

It is recommended that a Civil Affairs team with sufficient language personnel attached to each infantry regiment to handle efficiently and quickly all civilians encountered. It has been found that the language personnel, assigned to the S-2 section, for interrogation of Prisoners of War, do have ample time to aid in helping the S-2 section handle civilians.
G-1 (Cont'd)

It is also recommended that a Military Police platoon be assigned permanently to each Infantry Regiment to handle Prisoners of War and police within the regimental boundaries. The present Table of Organization does not provide for enough personnel in the Regimental Headquarters to handle this problem.

G-2

Comments - It is evident that a greater use has been made of all phases of combat intelligence in this operation then in any previous Marine Corps operation. The basic organization, with modifications, and procedure is sound, but there is a definite need for more trained personnel initially and as replacements. A more definite division in the table of organization is needed in order to provide for command post and field personnel. It is felt that two complete command post teams and two complete observation-collection teams are required. The following organization was found to be satisfactory:

- S-2 No specific duties, supervised CP and OP activities.
- A-S-2Primarily supervised CP, occasionally located CP.

2 CP teams, each;
- NCO in charge Telephone, journal, and dissemination.
- Draftsman Situation Map and reproduction.
- Runner

NCO in Charge of CP's and Collection Coordination and Supply of teams, location of new CP's and supervision of their activities.

2 Observation Collection Teams, each;
- NCO in charge, Team leader
- 5 enlisted scout observers
- 1 enlisted still photographer

In addition to the above personnel, this section uses one enlisted photo interpreter and two language officers, the latter being attached from Division. Combat correspondents, as well as one still and one motion picture photographer were attached to each battalion. The senior NCO in each case, coordinated their efforts in addition to his regular duties.

Liaison with higher echelon was good, and in the case of Aerial Photos could be considered as excellent. A need for training in adjacent liaison and standard procedure is felt to be necessary within the Regimental and Battalion's S-2 sections.

Command Post activity could be classed as fair, more training and practice is required, definite improvement has been noted.

Observation Posts, with the advent of supervisions and standard procedure, were excellently operated. It is necessary to take active steps to eliminate interference from all ranks and activities with this activity. OP security is needed constantly, existing publications should be followed to the letter. Collection missions in battalions and Regiment were not efficient or well carried out, although individuals were normally conscientious about turning in all documents.
Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

Additional training and thought, as well as organizations, must be given to collections. Sanitation measures were handled entirely by Medical personnel, in connection with enemy dead; better cooperation is called for.

Language personnel were excellent and did an outstanding job. A more efficient method handling POW's has been recommended to S-1. This, if adopted, will eliminate unnecessary loss and mis-handling of Prisoners. Language personnel were frequently diverted to handling civilian populations due to the shortage of Military Government language personnel. This civilian problem can very well be of major military importance in future operations.

API activities were good, a great deal of information was forthcoming. A master map of installations located, as well as a card index system using target areas as a basis, were found to be of infinite value. Greater use of this information should be made by operating sections and supporting weapons. A daily overlay of installations was distributed to all interested persons. Further training in the maximum use of oblique photos is needed by API personnel and all other officers, platoon leaders and company commanders, particularly. Photographic coverage was timely and of excellent quality. Separate recommendations have been made to higher echelons for future operations.

Recommendations.

The table of organization for a Regimental S-2 should be altered to include 1 Sergeant Intelligence (631) in addition to present allowances and to include at least four additional scout observers (636) or (761) to be used for collection purposes.

Minor reorganization of the Table of Allowances is required along with a breakdown forwarded through quartermaster channels setting out the items noted by H&S Company that are intended for use by this section. It is felt to be essential that S-2 have transportation to the extent of at least one truck ½-ton cargo and one ½-ton trailer, an additional 1 ton truck would be highly desirable.

It is recommended that at least four enlisted and three language officers be assigned to the Regiment for intelligence purposes only. An increasing need will be found for trained counter-intelligence personnel in each Regiment. These should be attached prior to the beginning of the planning phase. It is further recommended that complete material for indoctrination programs, cover the Japanese Military and Civilians, be furnished. These should be issued in quantity to Regiments in training and should include, language, tactics, sociological background and culture, value of documents, POW's, and captured material, etc. A marked increase in interest in the Japanese language has been noted. Future programs can expect excellent results, at least one man has taught himself enough to qualify as a language specialist.

The additional API enlisted men now in this section is felt to be necessary and a change accordingly is recommended in the T/O. The following general recommendations as regards photo coverage were made to higher echelons:

- Complete vertical coverage at about 1:5,000 with 60% overlay.
- Sufficient low obliques of beaches to be used and other critical terrain features.
- Some strips of reefs, beaches, and covering the probable beach head.
- Color photos of areas within the beach-head and deep enough to cover any areas likely to affect its establishment.

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Special Action Report, (Cont'd).

A photo printed mosaic of the entire area, preferably made from the photos referred to in (1) above, gridded with the same 1,000 yard squares as appear on the standard maps, regardless of the distortion. An equal number (about 200) of the same mosaic having form lines drawn in on it. Half-tone mosaics are of little value.

Combat obliques taken at intervals of 1,000 yards across the entire front along the proposed line of advance.

Obliques taken toward the direction of our advance from key terrain features, for use in determining the extent of enemy observation.

Pinpoint verticals and obliques of critical areas as called for.

All of the above photos should be made in sufficient time for planning purposes. Additional vertical and oblique coverage as need for interpretation and tactical purposes.

It is recommended that the use of target area gridded maps at scales of 1:100,000, 1:25,000 and 1:10,000 be continued. An initial issue of 300 copies per regiment of the 1:10,000 and 1:25,000 is required with immediate replacement available. Increased use of existing, available, enemy maps for contours and control is strongly recommended. Much greater terrain detail is required, particularly in large scale maps. It is not believed that ten-meter contour intervals can provide this detail.

Models of the terrain are of the greatest value in both planning and operation. They should be at a scale of 1:10,000 and preferable at 1 to 5 vertical exaggeration. They should be made with the greatest possible care and of sponge rubber. Sufficient models for distribution to battalions as well as Regiment as needed.

It is recommended that all photographic processing and supplies be handled by Division Photo Section. The organic photographers and cameras are needed, but the rest can best be handled by the higher echelon.

S-3 Section.

The comments pertaining to the S-3 section contained in the Special Action Report for Phases I and II of this operation apply without change to Phase III.

Further recommendations are:

The personnel of the S-3 section should be definitely set by the Tables of Organization. A recommended organization:

1. LtCol - S-3
2. Major - AS-3
3. Capt - AS-3
4. Lt's - Liaison
5. StfSgt - Tyntist
6. Cpl - Draftsmen and clerks.
7. Pfc or Pvt - Other duty (only when in the field)

If the S-3 section cannot operate 24 hours a day it fails in its mission. Communications are the key-note without it the S-3 is unable to function. Every 3-officer must be a Communication Officer.

Basic doctrine as set forth in the manuals is sound. Deviations from doctrine is a certain cause of trouble. Stick to test methods.
The Table of Organization should include three (3) extra trucks, ½-ton, 6x6, cargo to Headquarters section of Regiment and two (2) extra to each battalion. These extra vehicles are necessary for the various staffs to properly carry out their missions. This is an increase over the recommendation that was made in the Phase I and II reports.

The Table of Organization should include one (1) trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, grease under the maintenance section besides the one (1) now assigned to Weapons Company. This extra grease trailer will give better service to the vehicles in the Regiment.

The Table of Organization should include twelve (12) trucks, ½-ton, 6x6, cargo assigned to Motor Transport and Maintenance section of the Regiment. Seven (7) trucks were recommended on the Phase I and II report, but on long operations such as Phase III more trucks are necessary for proper supply.

Phase I and II report included recommendations for assigning eight (8) M29C cargo carriers to the Regiment. This number would not be sufficient during heavy rains when all wheeled vehicles are mired down as experienced during this operation. It is recommended that twenty-eight (28) should be assigned each Regiment, with eight (8) assigned to each Battalion and four (4) to Headquarters and Service Company.

The Table of Organization should include one (1) extra officer assigned as AS-4. To maintain liaison with Battalions and for continuous reconnaissance of forward areas, this addition is deemed justified.

Vehicle resupply should be brought in by higher echelon and made available to units on a replacement rate of at least 15% per month. This would give immediate replacements to vehicles worn out or destroyed. The replacement rate should be between 20% and 25% on all tracked vehicles.

That experiments be made to determine the suitability of a one-ton tracked vehicle. This vehicle should have a wide track to traverse mud with sufficient clearance at the bottom. It should be low in silhouette with some protection provided against small arms fire. The track must be strong enough to stand heavy mud and have hard rubber cleats so it can be used on good roads. This vehicle need not be amphibious, but should be water proofed enough to traverse shallow swamps. The motor should be powerful enough to tow a loaded one-ton trailer.

The Table of Organization should include one (1) FCO and ten (10) Privates as a salvage section under the Service Platoon or the Regiment. Since there is no assurance that the Salvage section of the Division Service and Supply Platoon will be assigned permanently to the Regiment during an operation, it is necessary that this section be formed so that they are always available.

Recommendations were made on the Phase I and II report on changes in percentage of types on 81mm mortar ammunition to 70% HE, M43A1 w/f M52, light; 20% HE, M56 w/f M52 and M53, medium; 10% WP, M37 w/f M52. All units prefer the 81mm light shell as it is easier to handle and does not wear the bore as rapidly as the 81mm medium shell. There was a definite shortage of 81mm, light ammunition on this operation. If percentages were changed as recommended above and a full unit of fire were available daily, there would be no shortage in 81mm ammunition.
BY ORDER OF COLONEL JOHN D. BLANCHARD:

A. LARSEN
Lt-Col, USMC
R-X

OFFICIAL:

W. W. BROWN,
1st-Lt, USMC,
S-I.

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