

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I AND II, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER X

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The special action reports of the various organizations of the 6th Marine Division appended hereto as Annexes A thru K contain comments and recommendations of subordinate unit commanders. In addition to those listed in the various annexes the following comments and recommendations are considered to be of such import as to merit special consideration:

1. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Personnel):

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) Requisitioning of personnel:

(a) COMMENT:

Present system of requisitioning replacements does not permit requisitioning unit to anticipate normal losses by attrition.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the division be allowed to requisition upon the basis of T/O plus 5%.

(2) Rotation:

(a) COMMENT:

The lack of any announced policy for rotation of officers handicapped planning for this operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That higher authority enunciate a definite rotation policy for officers. Rotation should be effected immediately following a unit's return from combat, with replacements being furnished at that time.

(3) Replacements:

(a) COMMENT:

Replacements for the present operation reached the Division at a later date than is considered desirable from a training standpoint.

RECOMMENDATION:

That immediately following the return of the Division from combat, sufficient replacements be furnished to cover battle losses, losses by rotation, and anticipated losses by attrition prior to the next operation.

(b) COMMENT:

Two replacement drafts were assigned for use as shore party labor and for later release to replace battle casualties. These drafts proved invaluable, both as shore party labor and as on the spot replacements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the present system of supplying two replacement drafts for each operation be continued. That these drafts total approximately 125 officers and 2500 enlisted.

(4) Promotions:

(a) COMMENT:

No authority was ever received by the First Provisional Marine Brigade and none has been received by this Division for promotion of communication personnel or engineer personnel. There are many men in this Division of these classifications who have served overseas for more than two years without promotion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this Division be given authority immediately to effect promotions in communication personnel and engineer personnel ranks.

(b) COMMENT:

There is a definite need for authority to effect field promotions of those enlisted who take over and effectively discharge the responsibilities of a senior NCO during combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

That division be allowed to effect field promotions of men who, because of battle losses, assume and satisfactorily discharge in combat, the greater responsibilities of a higher ranking non-commissioned officer.

b. EMBARKATION:

(a) COMMENT:

Use of an APA as command ship for a transport squadron and a Marine Division is undersirable due to lack of adequate space for staff billeting and serious restrictions on office space for division headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION:

Whenever possible an AGC should be made available for embarking the headquarters of a Marine Division.

c. MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

(a) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments assigned this Division had no experienced personnel in their complements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That personnel with practical field experience be used as cadres for newly forming Military Government Detachments.

(b) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments were restricted seriously by lack of adequate transportation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That each Military Government Detachment (A or B) be assigned three additional $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6x6 trucks and two additional $\frac{1}{4}$ ton 4x4 trucks, with a driver for each.

(c) COMMENT:

During this operation, A and B detachments were required to perform functions beyond their capacity and which the plan called for to be performed by C and D teams and G-6 hospitals.

RECOMMENDATION:

Plans should be sufficiently flexible to permit landing of the larger Military Government detachments when needed, thereby obviating the necessity for augmenting the small detachments with combat troops and organic medical personnel.

(d) COMMENT:

Military Government Detachments assigned for this operation were made up of a mixture of Army and Navy personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That detachments be made up of personnel from only one branch of service, preferably the branch under whose command they are going to serve.

d. CASUALTY REPORTS:

(1) Periodic Reports:

(a) COMMENT:

A revised form for submission of periodic reports was received by this Division subsequent to embarkation of assault wave troops. This last minute change from a relatively simple form to a much more detailed form created confusion during the first few days of reporting.

RECOMMENDATION:

Any change to be made in procedure should be made sufficiently prior to embarkation to permit dissemination to all units and indoctrination in the new procedure.

(b) COMMENT:

The weekly periodic report form required by Tenth Army took between 6 and 8 hours for preparation at the Division level, and proportionately as long in lower echelons.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the periodic report form be simplified. Reversion to the form used by III Phib Corps in previous operations is recommended.

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(2) Daily Report:

(a) COMMENT:

The dispatch partial daily report form used by Tenth Army proved extremely valuable, allowing the Division additional time in which to compile an accurate, complete report.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Marine units retain this form and use it for daily reports.

(3) Reports of death and Missing in Action:

(a) COMMENT:

Subsequent to embarkation the established method of reporting dead and missing was altered by ALPOA 164. This Division had embarked without Airmailgram forms and communication personnel had not been indoctrinated as to the proper method of handling these reports.

RECOMMENDATION:

That divisions in combat be permitted to report dead and missing by Airmailbrief to CG, FMF, Pac, who can then forward the information to SECNAV by dispatch.

(4) Classification of Casualties:

(a) COMMENT:

Much difficulty was experienced in determining the line of demarcation between killed in action and died of wounds received in action, also between wounded in action and injured in action, and between injured in action and injured.

RECOMMENDATION:

That to attain uniformity in the use of these designations a directive be published giving exact definitions of the designations, illustrating such definitions by examples of the proper classification of border line cases.

(5) Evacuation Reports:

(a) COMMENT:

The use of NCO's remaining aboard each transport report evacuations to that ship proved exceedingly valuable.

however, it did constitute a drain on trained administrative personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Marine Transport Quartermaster aboard each APA be required to record and report to the landing force commander with copy to the division whose troops were embarked, on evacuees received aboard that ship. These reports should be daily while in the target area, with a complete report at time of withdrawal showing patients remaining aboard. When the ship reaches a rear area and patients are removed the Transport Quartermaster should send a final report to the same addressees showing the time and place of debarkation and hospital to which removed, or other disposition. To accomplish the above it is further recommended that each Transport Quartermaster be assigned an additional clerk of 405 specification.

e. STRAGGLERS:

(a) COMMENT:

During movement to the target area this Division discovered over twenty stragglers from rear area organizations. Report was made to CG, FMF, Pac and it was requested that this personnel be transferred to this Division by staff returns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all stragglers discovered after the ship has sailed be reported to FMF, Pac by dispatch and transferred by staff returns to the unit embarked with. That unit can then take necessary disciplinary action and the men's status will be settled within a minimum of paper work.

2. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence):

a. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Numerous changes have been found necessary concerning equipment carried by the G-2 Section in the operation. The majority of those changes can be made within the section itself. A list of recommendations for changes in the Table of Basic Allowances has been made and will be forwarded.

2. It has been found that the transportation with which the section attempted to operate during this operation was entirely inadequate. In order to carry out its functions of liaison, observation, the collection of prisoners, the collection and transportation of captured enemy material, and other minor functions the following vehicles have been requested: five $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks, two $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailers, one 1 ton truck, one $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, and 2 weasels.

3. The G-2 radio net uses SCR 610 radios at present. These have been found to be unsatisfactory, and other types are under consideration. It is believed that at least four SCR 608s are needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Organization: It is considered that Public Relations and Photography should be separated from the G-2 Section for the mutual betterment of all concerned. The association of these two sections with the G-2 Section is not based on common functions. Neither of the two sections contribute solely to the collection of dissemination of information of a military nature. By the same token, neither of the two sections benefit materially by being attached to the G-2 Section.

2. It is recommended that provision be made for a counter-intelligence section as an organic part of the G-2 Section. It became necessary, during the operation, for the G-2 Section to attach such a section from Army in order to handle the large number of counter-intelligence problems that arose.

3. The changes noted would call for an increase of four officers, while the total enlisted personnel would remain the same. The breakdown covering the increase of officer personnel would call for one captain for administration, training and liaison; one lieutenant counter-intelligence and censorship, and two lieutenants for observation and collection purposes.

b. AERIAL PHOTO INTERPRETATION:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. In general, aerial photographs furnished the 6th Marine Division were adequate though improvements was possible. There was a scarcity of low oblique photographs which were not forthcoming prior to L-Day. The first low oblique of the landing beaches were received by the 6th

Marine Division as its troops were embarking for a landing. No submarine photographs were provided. In most cases, scales of photographs were unsatisfactory and many sorties were flown with poor photographic results. For example, a sortie flown on 29 November and subsequent photographs received on 14 January contained a scale of 1:70,000. These photographs had an average 70% cloud coverage. In spite of the deficiencies of these photographs, a total of 560 prints were sent to the Division. This was a waste of material and air shipping space.

2. Photographs furnished after L-Day were generally unsatisfactory, principally because of the rapidity with which the situation moved following the landing. Photographs were generally slow in being delivered. Though a part of the reason for this lag in time between requests for photographs and delivery may have been poor flying conditions, a great deal of the difficulty was undoubtedly due to other reasons which should be corrected for future operations. Those photographs received after L-Day rarely were flown at the altitude requested.

3. Interpretation reports from higher echelons were satisfactory though not complete. Some minor errors in plotting were noted and in a few instances, and differences in the interpretations of higher echelons and the 6th Marine Division Aerial Photo Interpretation Section were noted.

4. Little use was made by higher echelons of Sonne strips and consequently the hydrographic information to be gained from them was not forthcoming.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Aerial Photo Interpretation personnel are well occupied during the planning phase of an operation. After completion of this phase, there is not enough work to keep anywhere near the section strength busy. Personnel should be trained for and utilized in other G-2 work during an operation, provided that they are available for aerial photo interpretation during the planning period.

2. Aerial Photo Interpretation personnel should be given underwater depth determination in addition to their present training which is considered to be excellent. It is also advisable that they be made familiar with some aspects of photogrammetry.

3. Duplicate negatives should be furnished with two prints to divisions. This could obviate the necessity of furnishing numerous copies of air photos which may not be of use to the recipient and conversely, would permit the division to print as many photos of desirable negatives as required.

c. PHOTOGRAPHY:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. The only two cameras found to be satisfactory under combat conditions were the Speed Graphic and the Magazine Loading 16mm Motion Picture Camera.

2. Each division requires at least two 35mm "Eymo" movie cameras if 35mm film is desired.

3. Extreme difficulty was experienced before the operation in getting the proper film in the proper quantities and in a fit condition for use. It was only through fortunate circumstances occurring at the staging area that the division photo section was able to get enough to fulfill their function in the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is believed that at least three darkroom technicians should be provided in the Table of Organization, in addition to the present allowance of combat photographers.

2. Photographers in addition to regular photographic personnel, must be attached to the divisions as early as possible prior to an operation. This extra allowance of personnel is essential to the thorough photo coverage desired. The attached photographers, however must join the division fully equipped for an operation- with camera and combat gear - and must also join the division in sufficient time to be properly trained and briefed.

3. It is essential that all photography undertaken within the division fall under one control unit. This unit should receive and process all photographs and be responsible for all photographic activity within the division.

4. A reorganization of Table of Basic Allowances for equipment within the photographic unit is considered to be necessary and recommendations to that effect are being prepared.

d. JAPANESE LANGUAGE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Information received from higher echelons concerning Order of Battle and enemy information was satisfactory after L plus five.

2. Information as gained from documents, prisoners, civilians and order of battle in this operation was unerringly timely, complete and accurate. It is believed that in no previous operation has Japanese Language been put to better use or achieved more accurate results than in this one.

3. Enemy documents and prisoners were forthcoming in sufficient quantities, and personnel in lower echelons were satisfactorily indoctrinated in regard to the taking of prisoners and the preserving of all enemy documents. It was noted, however, that units having language personnel forwarded captured documents with greater rapidity and in greater quantities than others.

4. There has not been any noticeable improvement in the effect of our propaganda on the Japanese soldier.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that at least one corpsman be assigned to the POW stockade during an operation.

2. Regularly assigned and specially trained military police are needed for the prisoner of war stockade. These men can be trained in their duties and receive special training in language prior to an operation.

3. Enlisted personnel in the section are doing work over and above the ranks they hold at present. Promotion to Table of Organization strength upon recommendation by G-2 should be made possible.

4. Portable sound equipment designed for field use should be furnished the language sections. At least two of such sets, and preferably four, per division are recommended.

5. Standard warning and instruction signs for civilians should be printed prior to an operation. These should be designed to control civilians - warning them not to move at night, to avoid troop concentrations, to retire to certain villages, and to carry out various other military orders consistent with the desires of our forces.

c. PUBLIC RELATIONS:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. This section experienced a shortage of enlisted combat correspondents. Every possible effort was made to obtain qualified personnel but all results were negative.

Complete news coverage of the division activities will be impossible until more men are available.

2. The release of the news that the 6th Marine Division was on OKINAWA came so late as to make its final announcement anti-climactical. The news value of well-known civilian correspondents attached to the division was seriously impaired by this restriction.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is strongly recommended that the release of names of the participating units be made as early as possible after H-Hour. In any operation such late announcements of unit designation tend to stifle all public relations efforts on behalf of the unit as well as to lower morale of the troops engaged.

f. ORDER OF BATTLE:

(a) COMMENTS:

1. Preliminary reconnaissance prior to L-Day due to limited observation was not of great aid.

2. API was not as useful to the OOB officer as it might have been, due to time lags in photo coverage and the lack of understanding, by echelons making sorties, of the problems of land warfare OOB analysis.

3. Pre L-Day estimates by higher echelons as a general rule were received in time to make evaluation and analysis.

4. Interrogation of POWs was the primary source of OOB information during the campaign. Because of the unusual movement of enemy troops immediately prior to landing, our POW reports were practically the only clues to enemy strength and dispositions. On one occasion a POW reported the presence of enemy forces as large as 1,000 in number which had not been discovered by any other indication up to that time. Information from POWs proved astonishingly correct as to disposition and armament.

5. The OOB officer received accurate, timely and complete interrogation reports throughout the campaign.

6. Documents as a source of information were second only to POW reports. Many documents were translated in time to give interrogators and the OOB officer time to check with POWs. Cooperation by the Language Officers in the regiments

was excellent in this regard. Their selection and screening of high priority documents for transmittal to Division was very good and reflected experience and training. One example during the campaign was the dispatch from the 4th Marine Regiment on L-Day of a map which was discovered by the language officer among the many documents around YONTAN Airfield and which revealed the presence on OKINAWA of four or five units unlocated. Collection teams did not function efficiently. During the campaign two division OP teams were converted to collection teams, but the value of documents recovered by these teams was not high compared with those sent in by the regiments. It is considered that these results were due to lack of trained collection teams and that these teams, with proper training, would be extremely valuable in the future.

7. The CIC team attached to Division rendered valuable assistance by reporting detailed civilian interrogations. Much tactical knowledge was obtained in this manner as well as strategical information of interest to higher echelons.

8. Liaison with G-2 of the next higher echelon was not good until L plus 5 when III Phib Corps moved ashore and direct telephone communication was established. After that time, liaison was effective, and timely reports were received from Corps.

9. Morale: During the first days of the campaign, with one exception, the Division was in contact with remnants of airfield labor battalions, who were only seeking escape. On the afternoon of 2 April, 1945, the 4th Marine Regiment contacted an enemy force of about 300 who made a determined stand. During the MOTOBU Peninsula action, enemy morale was high. Until the final day of the battle there was no sign of disintegration or failing of the spirit with which the enemy conducted his stubborn defense.

10. The following units were opposed to the Division. During the early stages, the Division was pursuing remnants of OKINAWAN labor and guard companies, which had been attached to the 44th and 56th Airfield Battalions formerly stationed at YONTAN and KADENA.

- (a) On 2 April a sharp action was fought with elements of the 12th Ind Inf Bn, 63d Brig, 62d Inf Div.
- (b) During the battle of MOTOBU PENINSULA the following units were contacted by the 6th Mar Div:

Hq, 2d Bn, 2d Inf Unit, 44th IMB
4th Co, 2d Bn, 2d Inf Unit, 44th IMB
5th Co, 2d Bn, 2d Inf Unit, 44th IMB

6th Co, 2d Bn, 2d Inf, Unit, 44th IMB
 2d MG Co, 2d Bn, 2d Inf Unit, 44th IMB
 1st Btry, 100th Ind Hvy Arty Bn
 1st Plat, 1st Co, 26th Shipping Engr Regt
 27th Torpedo Boat Unit (Navy)
 33d Midget Sub Unit (Navy)
 9th Naval Gun Unit (Navy)
 3d Commando Unit
 4th Commando Unit
 1st Veterans Unit
 2d Veterans Unit

g. GENERAL COMMENTS:

There is a decided need for the use of information and intelligence by all echelons in planning and executing a combat mission. There was ample evidence in this operation that though excellent information was made available, little consideration was taken of it initially. There will be an increase in the need for the employment of intelligence as operations carry us closer to JAPAN. A failure to take advantage of this essential combat medium is bound to be costly to our forces in material and men.

3. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 (Operations):

a. PRELIMINARY TRAINING:

(a) COMMENT:

Following the conventional small and intermediate unit training, the 6th Marine Division emphasized coordinated division combined arms training. The beneficial result from this effort cannot be overemphasized.

b. REHEARSALS:

(a) COMMENT:

The rehearsals at GUADALCANAL, (See Chapter IV above) were of questionable value to the 6th Marine Division. The principal reason for this situation may be described in the simple expression that realism was lacking throughout. --

a. While 17 LSTs were required to embark properly the assault elements of the Division, the first day of rehearsal was attempted with only 7. This number was gradually augmented until on the final day of the rehearsal a sufficient number of vessels were available, and an exercise of some realism, insofar as ship-to-shore activity is concerned, was undertaken.

During the intervening period the inequities resulting from absence of important tactical units from the ship-to-shore scheme so reduced the realism of the exercise that, from the troop viewpoint, only limited benefit was gained.

b. A further wide divergence from actual circumstances resulted from the terrain conditions in the rehearsal area. Beaches were poor and the immediate foreshore consisted of swampy jungle which did not permit the movement of anything other than foot troops. In consequence, the landing and deployment of LVTs, tanks, and vehicles was impracticable.

c. Due to understandable circumstances it was impossible for fire support vessels which would participate in the actual operation to be present for the rehearsal. The unrealistic results obtained from conducting naval gunfire with vessels which were not destined to participate in the operation is apparent.

c. ORGANIZATION:

Based on the fact that Phases I and II of the OKINAWA Operation presented the 6th Marine Division with a variety of situations which permitted an effective test of the current organization it is considered that the following organizational modifications are worthy of consideration and action in accordance therewith is recommended.

a. Inclusion of a reconnaissance element in each regimental headquarters and service company. Just as the Division Reconnaissance Company provided the Division Commander invaluable information (see Chapter VII above) so was it apparent that the infantry regiments were in need of a similar agency. One platoon, similar in all respects to a platoon in the Reconnaissance Company, would be quite adequate for this purpose. If personnel limitations preclude such a measure this Division would readily sacrifice one 37mm platoon from each regiment for the purpose.

b. Flame Thrower Demolitions Personnel:

COMMENT:

While at this writing flame throwers had been given only limited use, due to terrain conditions, it is considered that the flame thrower demolition

principle followed by the Division is entirely sound. In effect it embraces the addition of 54 men to each infantry regiment for the discharge of this special task. The 6th Division has provided this personnel at the expense of artillery and service troops - a most undesirable expedient. So long as the personnel are made available it is believed that any one of several organizational schemes will meet the problem. The scheme favored by this Division involves the addition of 2 men to the 3d squad of each rifle platoon for discharge of the flame thrower task and providing 2 members of that squad with particular training in handling of assault demolitions under the covering support of flame throwers and automatic weapons.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the infantry strength of each regiment be increased by 54 men, organized either way as described above in a flame-thrower demolitions platoon for each company.

c. LANDING OF TANKS:

COMMENT:

The 6th Marine Division had the unique opportunity to examine three methods of landing tanks in the same operation. One company was landed from an LSD in LCM (6)s; one company mounting T6 tank flotation devices was landed from LSTs; a third company was landed directly on the beach by LSMs. All schemes functioned effectively, with the LSM combination the least desirable because of the necessity for fording deep water from the LSM grounding point.

The T6 device worked extremely well. Tanks swam easily to the edge of the reef, moved without difficulty across a very rough reef floor, discarded their pontoons without incident, and all but one of the company's tanks were in operation by H plus 29 minutes. The one tank which failed to get ashore did so because of motor breakdown.

The company transported in LCM(6)s landed at high tide without incident.

RECOMMENDATION:

That tank flotation devices T6 be stocked in

forward depots on the basis of 18 per tank battalion to be available on demand when the hydrographic and tactical situations require.

e. WAR DOGS:

COMMENT:

Prior to the OKINAWA Operation the 6th Marine Division reserved judgement on the question of retaining war dogs within the Fleet Marine Force. Dogs were employed on numerous occasions during the Division's operations and it is the consensus of using organizations that their performance did not justify retention of the organization.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the war dog program be abandoned.

f. NAVAL GUNFIRE:

(a) COMMENT:

Until such time as the present JASCO Tables of Organization are modified to provide additional Shore Fire Control personnel, shortages will continue to exist. The composition of Shore Fire Control parties is still inadequate to efficiently perform its mission in combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Spotter Team should consist of:

- 1 Spotter, Lt or Capt, Field Artillery FO
- 1 Assistant Spotter (Scout) Arty NCO
- 3 Radio operators
- 4 General duty men

The Battalion NLO Team should consist of:

- 1 Naval officer, (Lt (jg) or Lt)
- 3 Radio operators
- 1 Wireman
- 1 Driver
- 2 General duty men

The Regimental NLO Team should consist of:

- 1 Naval officer, Lt
- 3 Radio operators
- 1 Wireman
- 1 Driver
- 2 General duty men

The Division team as provided for in FMF, Pacific Special Order No 86-44 is adequate.

It is recommended that the present Tables of Organization be modified based on the above.

(b) COMMENT:

The state of training of the naval officers and spotting officers was excellent.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is, however, recommended that Shore Fire Control Officers be returned to FMF, Pacific to take advantage of naval gunfire training available there to Marine divisions.

(c) COMMENT:

The communication teams under the Shore Fire Control Officers were excellently and thoroughly trained.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(d) COMMENT:

The SCR-694 radio again showed its outstanding value as the ideal naval gunfire control means of communication in the battalion level. Due to the limited voice range the unanticipated rapid rate of advance and extended communication lines the SCR-694 was found to be inadequate for regimental and divisional control.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommendations for Shore Fire Control communication equipment above that which is provided for in FMF, Pacific Special Order No 86-44 should be as follows:

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One vehicular mounted TCS radio for the regimental team in order to provide the Regimental NLO with greater range and relieve one radio for monitoring a spotting frequency.

The Division Naval Gunfire Team should be equipped with an SCR-193 in order to be able to communicate with higher echelons when distances outrange the SCR-694.

(e) COMMENT:

Although the SCR-300 served its purpose when our front was narrow and not too far distant from command posts, the same conditions prevailed for this set as did for the SCR-694, i.e., terrain distance.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(f) COMMENT:

The maintenance of both radios and their functional performances left nothing to be desired within their limitations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

(g) COMMENT:

Preparation fires against beach defenses were good. The beach areas were very well covered and had there been the beach defenses expected, effective neutralization would probably have been accomplished.

(h) COMMENT:

Fires on targets of opportunity were conducted in a most expeditious manner obtaining effect on the target with not too high an expenditure of ammunition.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(i) COMMENT:

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Counterbattery fires were of a minimum, but once the enemy battery was located effective fire was brought to bear

almost immediately. On one occasion a "Charlie" spotted counterbattery and knocked out a Jap 77mm field piece which occasionally fired on one of the fire support ships.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(j) COMMENT:

Night harassing fires were not employed except for one mission which was spotted and controlled by a SFC. The fire was presumably effective.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(k) COMMENT:

Interdiction fires were not fired by this Division using fire support ships. However, III Amphibious Corps employed some of our ships for interdiction on one of two occasions.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(l) COMMENT:

Fires against coastal targets were fired in the main by an LCI mortar support division which accomplished the effect desired. Their primary mission in this case was keeping abreast of the Division Reconnaissance Company while they advanced along the southwest coast of the MOTOBU Peninsula. A SFOP of 1 naval officer and two radio operators with an SCR-610 accompanied the Reconnaissance Company and called fires on villages and installations in front of their route of advance. These mortar boats are highly effective and more accurate than rocket boat types. Fire of these mortar boats was laid as close as 500 yards to friendly troops.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(m) COMMENT:

Naval gunfire using air spot was employed on most call missions. The airplane is still the best observation post for naval gunfire control and expenditure of ammunition is considerably reduced by its employment.

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[REDACTED]

(m) COMMENT:

VOF air spot was rather disappointing, particularly regarding relief of spotting planes and briefing between relieved plane and relieving plane. As in the past, ships own OS2Us with parent ship spotters came through with an outstanding performance in both spotting and tactical air observation.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is believed that VOF spotting and coordination could be improved by more training.

(n) COMMENT:

Due to comparatively light opposition, rapid movement, and the small number of targets, this Division fired only 76 call fire missions. Some call fire missions were fired by regiments based on target information passed down by Division TIC through naval gunfire channels.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(o) COMMENT:

Coordination between adjacent units firing HE and illumination was excellently handled within regiments and by Division as long as communication was in. Star shell illumination was particularly well handled as proven by the fact that adjacent units were not illuminated through inaccurate firing or lack of control. No reports were received of star shell cases falling within our lines.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(p) COMMENT:

✓ Coordination between artillery, naval gunfire and air left much to be desired in the lower echelons especially in battalions. Coordination of supporting arms in Division was efficiently accomplished by TIC.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(q) COMMENT:

Chain of command between various echelons of naval gunfire control was adhered to for the most part, exceptions were made by Task Force Gunfire Control calling regiments direct which resulting in the bypassing of division control.

RECOMMENDATION:

More firm control in higher echelons.

(r) COMMENT:

There were no unusual features in the employment of naval gunfire support worthy of note.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

(a) Spotting frequencies initially assigned to SFCs be retained as long as possible throughout the campaign.

(b) Shore fire control officers be permitted to brief fire support ships prior to an operation for the purpose of establishing command liaison by personal contact, so that both parties can further understand and more efficiently accomplish their respective missions. These ships should remain as fire support ships assigned in direct support until it becomes necessary to resupply their magazines, or until some other contingency precludes their employment.

(c) Relief of ships not take place until the assigned Fire Support Ship has first briefed its relief. A ship awaiting relief must never leave until its relief is in position and has established contact with its assigned SFC.

(d) COMMENT:

Several violations were noted in chain of command procedure.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Task Force Naval Gunfire Officers monitoring spotting primary frequencies refrain from transmitting. This practice is a direct violation of command and should not occur.

[REDACTED]

(e) COMMENT:

The naval gunfire common net was overloaded to such a degree as to defeat its purpose, ammunition and destruction reports accounting for the majority of traffic.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that some auxiliary channel be used for such reports or, if absolutely necessary, to use the NGF common to set specific times, preferably during period from 2400 to 0500.

(f) COMMENT:

Information regarding the tactical situation ashore, request for fire support ships special missions, Division pre-attack bombardments etc, will in the future be transmitted over the naval gunfire control net as information becomes available. Constant request for information that is not available overloads any net.

RECOMMENDATION:

Better net discipline should be enforced.

(g) COMMENT:

Radar beacons were not called for by the ships. Unfavorable conditions of terrain precluded any extensive use of the beacon.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the radar beacon not be a part of shore fire control equipment if future operations are carried out under similar terrain conditions.

(h) COMMENT:

One of the most valuable items of equipment was the $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, 2-wheel trailer. For the OKINAWA operation one trailer was provided each shore fire control party.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this item of equipment be permanently made a part of the JASCO Table of Allowances.

(1) COMMENT:

Recommendations submitted regarding the future employment of naval gunfire support following the Guam operation have not been rectified and put into operation for the OKINAWA campaign. In brief they were:

(1) Spotting of counterbattery during hours of darkness by ships organic spotting planes.

(2) Trained Marine aerial observers to spot ships gunfire particularly on targets of opportunity affecting friendly troop advance.

(3) Modification of JASCO TO and TBA to fit existing needs for proper functioning.

g. AIR SUPPORT:

(a) COMMENT:

The defensive air cover from the time of mounting until the completion of the assault phase was at all times adequate. No large scale enemy activity was observed over the Division zone of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(b) COMMENT:

The preliminary heavy strikes resulted in YONTAN Airfield being put out of commission. The equipment remaining on the field was rendered unservicable. The concentration of installations was not sufficient to permit air strikes to be employed with maximum efficiency.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(c) COMMENT:

The air attacks on LOVE-Day were more than adequate. In absence of suitable targets it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(d) COMMENT:

The air liaison parties did not show enough aggressiveness in maintaining liaison with artillery and naval gunfire representative or in keeping their unit commanders informed. Good contact was maintained between the ALPs and the Air Support Control Units.

RECOMMENDATION:

Throughout the training period, and rehearsal phases, prior to an operation, it is recommended that the liaison parties of the three supporting arms train and work as one team. One of the officers, preferably the artillery liaison officer, should have the definite responsibility of insuring that close coordination at all times. This would result in more economical and efficient employment of the three arms.

(e) COMMENT:

The communications equipment and nets between AGL teams and ASC were adequate for this operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(f) COMMENT:

The terrain in which air support was employed to the greatest extent was of a very mountainous nature. The marking of front lines by panels was employed when necessary, with good results. Better coordination resulted when front line battalions marked enemy targets with organic weapons in lieu of having targets marked with artillery.

RECOMMENDATION:

That organic weapons be used for marking targets whenever possible.

(g) COMMENT:

The number of aircraft available was, in the majority of cases, adequate. When aircraft for the daily air preparation was furnished by carrier groups, a great deal of the effectiveness was lost because of the uncertainty of the time of arrival over the target. Pre-jump off strikes are definitely limited to the time interval assigned because of the coordination required with other supporting arms and the maneuver of the

infantry. When shore based aircraft became available planes were on station at the desired time. An average interval of about forty-five minutes between origination of air support missions and the beginning of the strike, was satisfactory. However the time required to complete the strike was too long.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the ALPs be permitted to communicate directly with the aircraft, while conducting strike.

(h) COMMENT:

Dummy strafing attacks to cover advance of friendly troops proved to be of great value. Approved dummy attacks were made on all targets before live runs. The use of dummy runs to get on the target and short strafing bursts to pin-point the target resulted in more effective employment of aircraft and lessened the danger to friendly troops.

RECOMMENDATION:

More effective direction should be attained by direct communication with aircraft.

(i) COMMENT:

At no time did the AGLPs communicate directly with the aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION:

In cases involving targets that can be observed from the ground it is recommended the AGL party communicate directly with the strike groups on the SAD net. The ASC could remain on the SAD and act as net control negating any transmission and adding suggestions that are deemed necessary.

(1) COMMENT:

Throughout the training phase the ALPs had direct communication with the airplanes and excellent results were obtained in a minimum amount of time. During the operation the ASC units acted as relay station between the AGL Parties and the support groups.

RECOMMENDATION:

The basic difference between air support as carried out in the OKINAWA Operation and that which is desired by this command is that instead of having the ASC direct the strike group it is advocated that the ALPs be permitted to contact the airplane directly on the SAD net, while directly on the SAD net, while directing a strike. If the personnel on the ground is not considered sufficiently qualified to do so, steps should be taken to place capable officers in these positions. The practicability of this latter method has been proved by the use of naval gunfire spotting planes on targets of opportunity. These planes were directed through the naval gunfire net with very good results.

It is considered impracticable to allow the ALPs to direct the planes. It is then recommended that an Air Support Control Unit be made available during the training phase to enable the employment of the same procedure in the operation as in training.

It is imperative that the pilots and the AGL Parties be provided with the same maps. This made execution of the mission very difficult and consumed an excessive amount of time.

OTHER COMMENTS - RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) COMMENT:

Napalm and rockets were found to be particularly suitable weapons against caves and concealed positions.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that provisions be made for extensive use of napalm followed by rocket attacks and strafing because the napalm properly employed often revealed a target very difficult to observe prior to attack.

(b) COMMENT:

No use were made of the flare signals to indicate the completion of an air strike.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that strike planes follow this practice in order to enable the ground forces to execute jump-offs as soon as possible. This is considered the quickest means of informing all personnel on the ground that the strike has been completed.

4. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 (Quartermaster):

a. MOTOR TRANSPORT:

(a) COMMENT:

For reasons stated in Chapter VII, the organic motor transport of this Division proved inadequate on this operation. It is believed that if the Division were to operate over a fairly good two-way road system and with a divisional supply radius of not more than 15 miles, the present authorized motor transport would be sufficient. As always, the greatest need is for general purpose cargo carriers. The 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo truck is admirably suited for this purpose. During this operation each infantry regiment was assigned from the Motor Transport Battalion, nine (9) additional 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks for supply within the regiment. Even though unit distribution was made by the division to infantry regiments, the 9 trucks were insufficient for distribution within the regiment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the organic motor transport of infantry regiments be increased as follows:

- 2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each battalion
- 2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each regimental headquarters company
- 4 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each weapons company

Total increase 12

(b) COMMENT:

The Headquarters Battalion cannot move or subsist itself with the general cargo transport now authorized. Regarding trucks, ½-ton, 4x4, cargo, the number authorized is sufficient for the staff sections of Headquarters, but no provision is made for many elements of Headquarters Company who have to be furnished transportation. Examples are the auditor, chemical officer, division inspector, postal officer, recreation officer, liaison officers, inspection parties from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and other agencies, visiting senior officers, observers assigned during

operations, and special small units such as naval gun-fire liaison teams, which the Division is directed by higher authority to provide with transportation. The recommended addition will provide a Headquarters Battalion pool for such officers. Likewise the military police and signal companies proved unable to discharge their normal duties during the operation with transport assigned.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Division Headquarters Company transport be increased by:

- 1 Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo
- 6 Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, cargo
- 1 Truck, 1-ton, cargo

(2) That the Military Police Company transport be increased by:

- 1 Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo
- 4 Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, TCS or with SCR 528 (1 to each Road Platoon, 1 with Company Headquarters for G-4 control).
- 3 Trucks, 1-ton, cargo

(3) That the Signal Company transport be increased by:

- 1 Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo
- 3 Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, cargo

(4) Reconnaissance Company, increase by:

- 1 Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, cargo
- 1 Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 2 wh cargo
- 1 Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, with TCS or SCR 528
- 1 Truck, 1-ton, cargo

(c) COMMENT:

The Reconnaissance Company was called on to execute rapid, far reaching missions. It was not adequately equipped for the purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Reconnaissance Company be provided the following transportation, considered adequate to mount one platoon:

9 Cargo carriers, M29-C (3 to be equipped with SCR 610)

1 Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, (equipped with SCR 528)

1 Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 2 wheel, cargo

RECOMMENDATION:

That the motor transport of the Ordnance Company, Service Battalion, be increased by 6 trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, cargo.

RECOMMENDATION:

That each transport company of the Motor Transport Battalion be given an additional allowance of one convoy lubricating unit with spare parts.

(d) COMMENT:

The motor carriage, M29C, (Weasel) has proved an invaluable supply, wire laying and general purpose vehicle. It is recommended that the allowance be increased to eighty (80) per Division, complete with spare parts.

(e) COMMENT:

Difficulty was experienced in keeping DUKWs operational due to lack of spare parts.

RECOMMENDATION:

That complete spare parts, as authorized, be furnished.

(f) COMMENT:

LVTs remain the best means for moving supplies across a reef. They lack the terrestrial mobility of the DUKWs, but this is offset by the facility of unloading. As long as reef landings are in prospect, 2 LVT battalions are deemed necessary to unload a division and it is recommended that they be attached to the Division initially, as was done in this operation.

(g) COMMENT:

The addition of 2 DUKW companies to the division in the assault was invaluable. One was a Marine and one an Army DUKW Company. No difference could be observed in technique of handling or in amount of cargo moved, but the

Marine Company was parts-poor in comparison with the Army Company. DUKWs were employed in the assault to land and emplace divisional artillery, and proved excellent for this task.

b. RATIONS:

(a) COMMENT:

The K ration is not popular, even when the new type package is issued. On the other hand, the new C ration has received enthusiastic endorsement by all units. The only advantage of the K ration is that it can be readily issued, carried in the pack and more conveniently eaten in the initial phases of the assault. The 10-in-1 is the most popular assault ration, but it is wasteful to issue to front line units in a moving situation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That not more than 2 D and 3 K be carried on an amphibious operation, the remainder to be divided equally between C and 10-in-1.

c. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS:

RECOMMENDATION:

Since resupply would appear to be possible within five (5) days sailing time from any probably future target, it is recommended that not more than twenty (20) days petroleum products be carried in the assault. This, it is believed, gives ample margin for possible losses due to enemy action.

d. CLASS II ITEMS:

(a) COMMENT:

The resupply of spare parts, vehicles, paulins, tentage and housekeeping articles was insufficient.

RECOMMENDATION:

That these types of Class II equipment and supplies be increased, in resupply echelons, by fifty (50) percent.

e. LABOR:

(a) COMMENT:

As in the past, labor troops remain a major requirement. The Service Battalion cannot perform its functions properly without additional labor sources. No dependence should be placed upon using civilian labor. On L plus 20 Day, out of an estimated pre-invasion population of 50,000 in the northern half of OKINAWA only 8,000 civilians had entered our lines, although the entire Division area was occupied by us. Of these, only 350 could be classed as able bodied males. The rest were emaciated, wounded, sick, aged or infants. Ammunition and depot companies are used by Corps in depot and beach areas and furnish no assistance within the Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Service Battalion be increased by one depot company and one ammunition company, preferably of white personnel.

f. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER:

(a) COMMENT:

The Standing Operating Procedure of this Division was used and proved satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That one transport quartermaster from the embarked division be assigned as Logistic Control Officer to work in liaison with the Shore Party Commander, LST Flotilla Commander, Transport Squadron Commander and Transport Squadron Control Vessel.

Recommendation regarding modifications of embarkation forms have already been submitted to the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps.

g. ORGANIZATION:

(a) COMMENT:

The present T/O arrangement by which there is a commanding officer of Service Troops is not deemed practical or conducive to good administration. The various service

SECRET

elements of a division; engineer, pioneer, medical, service battalion, motor transport have missions which have little relation to one another. Located in different areas and split between infantry regiments, the several service units are better able to handle their administration alone than through the medium of a Commanding Officer of Service Troops. Furthermore, the strictly service personnel are employed primarily by or for the Division Quartermaster, so that the Commanding Officer of Service Troops has little control over the employment of his troops.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the office of Commanding Officer, Service Troops be abolished.

That the G-4 Section of the Executive Staff; T/O F-93, approved 4 April, 1944, be revised to include only the following:

1 LtCol	- G-4
1 Major	- Ass't G-4
1 Captain	- Ass't G-4
<u>1 Lieutenant</u>	<u>- Ass't G-4</u>
4 Total Commissioned.	

1 Staff Sergeant, Clerical	(213)
2 Sergeants, Clerical	(213)
<u>2 Pfc/Pvts, clerks</u>	<u>(213)</u>
5 Total enlisted	

(b) COMMENT:

While in a strict sense outside the province of a division recommendation, the experience of this Division is outfitting and in the supply of the assault phase has indicated the following to be most desirable; the echelons of command of the Supply Service should be parallel to and equal in number to the echelons of line command and in each case directly under the corresponding line command.

h. COMMUNICATIONS:

(a) COMMENT:

Radio communication in a rapidly moving situation is a necessity.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a voice radio net be established for division administration, supply and evacuation. This net should include G-4, Division Quartermaster and S-4 of infantry and artillery regiments. The recommended net should be separate from any net which is used by echelons higher than division.

5. Communications:

a. PERSONNEL:

RECOMMENDATION:

That a wire section comparable to that allowed for the Engineer Battalion, be included in the Table of Organization of the Service Battalion.

b. MATERIAL:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Transportation:

- 4 Weasels, M-29, Cargo Carriers, for Signal Company
- 3 1-ton, 4x4, Reconnaissance, for Signal Company for wire laying
- 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, 4x4, for Signal Company (2 wire laying, 1 Message Center)
- 1 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, truck, 6x6, for repair section
- 4 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, 6x6, for Division Signal Quartermaster
- 2 1-ton trucks, 4x4 Reconnaissance, for Division Signal Quartermaster

(2) Equipment:

That six vacuum tube voltmeters be included in the Table of Allowances on the basis of 2 per Signal Company and 1 per regiment.

(3) Replenishment rate:

That replenishment rate on field wire W-110 and W-130 be increased by about 100%.

c. TRAINING:

RECOMMENDATION:

That RCM training be made available to all radio personnel.

6. Ordnance:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The personnel of Motor Transport allotted the Division for handling ammunition are not adequate to maintain the supply when the Division is operating over extended areas. It is recommended that the Ordnance Company be increased by an ammunition platoon of fifty (50) men and six (6) 6x6 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton cargo trucks.

(2) The M49 flare as now built with laminated paper absorbs moisture. It is recommended that the container be made of metal. It is further recommended that all artillery ammunition be packaged in metal containers rather than in wooden crates or laminated paper cartons.

(3) It is believed that the CINCPOA unit of fire as now prescribed should be modified in some respects, to permit amounts prescribed to more nearly fit operational needs. Recommended changes are shown below:

<u>CINCPOA</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>TYPE OF AMMUNITION</u>
<u>U/F</u>	<u>U/F</u>	<u>75mm Gun</u>
20%	50%	HE, M48 (SC) W/F M48
10%	20%	HE, M48 (SC) W/F M54
40%	15%	Proj APC M61 W/F M66A1
20%		Shrapnel
10%	15%	Shell, WP, M64 W/F M57

(4) Use of either fuze PD M45 or TSQ M77 with the shell HE M56 for the 81mm mortar will allow greater flexibility in the use of the shell, as it would then be equally effective against personnel, pillboxes and entrenchments. It is recommended that these fuzes be provided for all shells HE M56.

(5) It is recommended that fuze T80E6 VT, for 75mm and 105mm howitzer, together with shells HE M48 and HE M1 with supplementary bursting charge, be furnished this Division for trial and practice at the earliest practicable date.

(6) This operation indicates the need for certain minor changes in the weapons of the Divisional units shown below. In order to provide adequate perimeter defense and local unit security, it is recommended that the below units' weapons be increased as follows:

Headquarters Battalion

3	Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Rcn Co)
2	Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Hq Co)
2	Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (Sig Co)
6	Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4 (MP Co)
13	Total

6 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun Cal. 45 (MP Co)

Service Battalion

Headquarters and Service Company

6	Browning Machine Gun, Cal. 30 M1919A4
4	Browning Automatic Rifle

Medical Battalion

4	Browning Automatic Rifle	(Hq Co)
4	Browning Automatic Rifle	(A Co)
4	Browning automatic Rifle	(B Co)
4	Browning Automatic Rifle	(C Co)
16	Total	

7. Division Surgeon:

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is recommended that one 6x6 truck be added to the table of organization for each medical company in the medical battalion, and that two 6x6 trucks be assigned to Headquarters and Service Company of the medical battalion, to be used to back up any unit that needs advance rapidly with its equipment and personnel intact.

(2) Because of the excellent performance of the surgical trailer, and because its use unquestionably saved many lives and reduced the incidence of infected wounds to practically zero, it is recommended that one trailer be added to the equipment of each medical company.

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(3) In regard to making any recommendations as to change in the present field units, it can be said they have proved extremely satisfactory in combat, therefore no changes are indicated.

(4) The addition of whole blood to the supplies of the medical department of a marine division was timely, and has proved an invaluable aid as an adjunct to plasma.

a. TRANSPORTATION AND EQUIPMENT:

Transportation for the OKINAWA Operation from a medical department standpoint, was inadequate, particularly as units of the medical battalion moved forward many times, and always had to proceed in two echelons, returning vehicles for the second echelon after the first had been displaced forward.

In conclusion it is believed that the painstaking and thorough field training in which the Medical Department of this Division participated in the staging area under field conditions, plus the personal efforts of all officers and men concerned contributed tremendously toward the performance of duties by this department. Special mention should be made of the surgical background of many of the officers, which included completion of internship and residencies at some of our largest hospitals in the United States. Many of these surgeons are fellows of the American College of Surgeons and Diplomats of the American Board of Surgery. Their services have been a credit to the U. S. Navy and to themselves.

There would seem to be no reason to criticize in this report, but rather to praise all concerned for their wholehearted cooperation in enabling the medical department to complete its mission in a satisfactory manner.

OP

011640

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : CO ARCHON, CALEB, MAESTRO, ELECTRIC, ENVIOUS, MESSENGER
INFO: NYMPH.

OPN O NO 1A X BASTILLE CEASES ATK AT SHACKLE SOXB UNSHACKLE X
DEFENDS LINE HELD X BD BETWEEN REGTS NO CHANGE X ARCHON HOLD
FORWARD POSITIONS X CALEB COMMA BLT STITCHY ATTACHED HOLD
FORWARD POSITIONS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO LEFT FLANK X MAESTRO
AND EXPOSITION REGISTER DEFENSIVE FIRES PRIOR DARKNESS X ELECTRIC
REUNDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT SHACKLE OPTM DOG UNSHACKLE X
ENVIOUS CONTINUE UNLOADING DURING NIGHT AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE
PLAN WITH PERS NOT REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X MESSENGER ASSEMBLE
IN ALL ROUND DEFENSE VICINITY SHACKLE OPEG JIG UNSHACKLE X ALL
UNITS MAKE POSITIVE CONTACT WITH ADJACENT UNITS X OVERLAY OF
POSITIONS TO BASTILLE BY SHACKLE SFKB UNSHACKLE X BASTILLE
CP NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
1 Apr 45, 1700

Opn O
No 2-45

Maps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-REITO, A.M.S. L891.
(b) 1:10,000 RYUKYU-REITO.

Task Orgn

a. OT 4

4th Mar
1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co
1st Plat S&S Co
1st Band Sec
1st SFCP 6th JASCO
1st AGIP 6th JASCO
1st Sec 3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co

b. OT 22

22d Mar
1st Plat Co B 6th MT Bn
2d Plat Ord Co
2d Plat S&S Co
2d Band Sec
2d SFCP 6th JASCO
2d AGIP 6th JASCO
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co (less 1 Sec)

c. 1st Bn 29th Mar

1st 37mm Plat Wpns/29th Atchd

d. Div Arty

15th Mar
1st Armd Amph Bn
VMO-6

e. Tank Gp

6th Tank Bn less 1 Co plus 1 Plat

f. Engr Gp

6th Engr Bn
58th NCB

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Opn O No 2-45

Opn O No 2-45 (Cont'd)

g. SP Gp

6th Pion Bn
26th and 33d Repl Drafts
6th MT Bn (less Dets)
4th Amtrac Bn
9th Amtrac Bn
6th DUKW Co
814th DUKW Co
1/2 11th Spec WCB
Det 6th JASCO
6th MP Co
6th Med Bn

h. 6th Ser Bn

i. Div Trs

Hq Bn
6th JASCO (less Dets)
Early Air Warning Team

j. Military Govt Gp

Dets A-3 and B-3 Military Govt
Co C 1st Prov MP Bn (USA)
Det 6th MT Bn (3 trucks)

k. Rcn Co

1. a. D-2 summaries as issued.

b. Air preparation 0700-0710 on located targets.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 2 Apr to seize LOVE plus five and ZAMPA MISAKI Peninsula. LD present front lines. Boundaries, scheme of maneuver, operations overlay.

3. a. OT 4: Advancing with Bns abreast in a contact imminent formation seize L plus 5 within zone.

b. OT 22: Advancing with Bns abreast in contact imminent formation seize L plus 5 within zone.

c. BUE 1/29: Seize TOKESHI and UZA and clear ZAMPA MISAKI Peninsula. Atchd units less 1st 37mm Plat operate under control OT 29.

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Opn O No 2-45

Opn O No 2-45 (Cont'd)

- d. Rcn Co: Seize NAGAHAMA and reconnoiter waterfront for possible supply landing areas.
 - e. 15th Mar: Support Atk. 1/15 direct Spt CT 4. 2/15 direct Spt CT 22. One Btry 4/15 direct Spt BLT 1/29. 3/15 and 4/15 less one Btry general Spt. Operate VMO-6 from YONTAN FIELD as soon as possible.
 - f. 6th Tank Bn: Spt Atk. Place one (1) Co in Spt CT 4. One (1) Co less one (1) Plat in Spt CT 22. One Plat in Spt BLT 1/29.
 - g. Engr Gp: Assist SP in clearing egress routes from beaches and repair roads in Div Z.
 - h. Div SP: Continue unloading supplies. 6th Med Bn establish field hospital vicinity 7993 Roger. Provide collecting teams for assault units.
 - i. 6th Ser Bn: Land Green 2 and execute normal missions.
 - j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.
 - k. Mil Govt Gp: Land Green 2 and initiate control of civil population .
 - x. (1) Assault units advance in small columns preceded by scouts maintaining contact by connecting Gps.
4. Adm details see Adm O 1-45.
- x. (1) Gas masks will be collected in Bn dumps.
 - (2) Serve hot food at earliest practicable time.

██████████

Opn O No 2-45 (Cont'd)

5. a. Div CP operation overlay.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC
D-3

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981
Opn O No 2-45

OP

021845

FROM: CG, 6TH MAR DIV
TO : CO OF 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BMT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN, 6TH RCN CO,
DIV SP, 6TH INGR BN.

INFO: CG III CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN O NO 2A-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 AND DEFENDS LINE HELD
AT THAT TIME X OF 4 AND OF 22 DEFEND LINE OCCUPIED AT 1630 X
BOUNDARY NO CHANGE X BMT 1/29 DIV RES OCCUPY ALL ROUND DEFENSE
IN 7995 HOW ITEM JIG X BE PREPARED TO REPEL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING
AT MAGAHAMA OR ON BLACK BEACHES X RCN CO OCCUPY ALL ROUND
DEFENSE 8095 GEORGE PREPARED TO MOVE TO ANY LOCALITY THREATENED
BY AIRBORNE ATTACK X 15TH MAR SUPPORT DEFENSE X REGISTER CONCENTRATIONS
IN FRONT OF MLR PREPARED TO MASS ALL FIRES IN FRONT OF 4 SECTOR X
6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA 7993 YOKE X DIV SP CONTINUE
UNLOADING AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN WITH TRS NOT REQUIRED FOR
UNLOADING X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X ESTABLISH GALLEYS AND SERVE
HOT FOOD TO TRS X DIV CP 8194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT CPs X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC
D-3

072/171

6th Mar Div
In the field
2 Apr 45, 1715

Opn 0

No 3-45

Maps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-REITO, A.M.S. 1891.
(b) 1:10,000 RYUKYU-REITO.

1. See current D-2 summaries.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0715 3 Apr, with main effort on the left, to seize O-A. LD front lines held at HOW hour. Boundaries, objectives and scheme of maneuver; Opn overlay.
3.
 - a. CT 4: Atk to seize O-A in Z of action. Be prepared to protect own right flank if advance exceeds that of 1st Mar Div.
 - b. CT 22: Making main effort on left, Atk to seize O-A in Z of action. Be prepared to protect own right flank in case advance exceeds that of CT 4.
 - c. 15th Mar 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk. 1/15 direct Spt CT 4. 2/15 direct Spt CT 22. 3/15 and 4/15 general Spt.
 - d. 6th Tank Bn: Spt Atk, with one Co in Spt of CT 4 and one Co in Spt of CT 22. Attach one additional platoon plus dozer to Rcn Co.
 - e. Rcn Co 1 Plat 6th Tank Bn Atchd: Be prepared to execute Rcn to LOVE plus 15 on order.
 - f. Engr Gp: Assist SP in clearing egress routes from beaches. Repair roads in Div Z with particular attention to routes in zones of assault Regts. Assign Ln O to each assault Regt. Continue work on airdrome.
 - g. Div SP: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
 - h. 6th Med Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide collecting teams for assault units.
 - i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
 - j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention throughout entire Div Z.

Opn 0 No 3-45

-1-

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Opn O No 3-45 (Cont'd)

k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control
and subsistence of native population.

l. 1/29 Div Res: Await orders present position.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP Opn overlay.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

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Opn O No 3-45

OP

031800

FROM: CG, 6TH MAR DIV
TO : CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BMT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN,
6TH RCM CO, DIV SP, 6TH ENGR BN.

INFO: CG III CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN C NO 3A-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 AND DEFENDS
LINE HELD AT THAT TIME X CT 4 AND CT 22 DEFEND LINE OCCUPIED
AT 1700 X BD NO CHANGE X 15TH MAR SUPPORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES
AT 8398 SUGAR X 6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT
8294 TARE 4 X RCM CO OCCUPY ALL ROUND DEFENSE VICINITY OF
YAMADA 8598 PETER WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFENSE AGAINST
POSSIBLE LANDINGS ON NORTH COAST X DIV SP CONTINUE UNLOADING
AND EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN USING ONLY THOSE TROOPS NOT
REQUIRED FOR UNLOADING X BMT 1/29 DIV RES OCCUPY ALL ROUND
DEFENSE IN 8396 YOKE 8395 EASY X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X
DIV CP 8194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT CPs X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
3 Apr 45, 1700

Opn O
No 445

Map: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-RETO, A.M.S. L891.

Task Orgn

a. 4th Mar (Reinf)
Atchd:

1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
1st Band Sec
1st SFOP 6th JASCO
1st AGLP 6th JASCO
1st Sec 3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co

b. 22d Mar (Reinf)
Atchd:

2d Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
2d Plat Ord Co
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
2d Band Sec
2d SFOP 6th JASCO
2d AGLP 6th JASCO
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co (less 1 Sec)

c. 15th Mar (Reinf)
Atchd:

1st Armd Amph Bn
VMO-6

d. 6th Tank Bn less one Co (less one Plat)
Atchd:

Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co

e. 6th Engr Gp

6th Engr Bn
58th NCB

f. SP Gp

6th Pion Bn
4th Amph Trac Bn
9th Amph Trac Bn

Opn O No 445

Opn O No 4-45 (Cont'd)

1/2 11th Spec NCB
26th and 33d Repl Drafts
Det 6th JASCO

- g. 6th Ser Bn (less Dets)
h. 6th MT Bn (Reinf) (less Co C)
Atchd:

6th Amph Truck Co
814th IUKW Co

- i. 6th Med Bn

- j. Hq Bn
Atchd:

Early Air Warning Team

- k. Military Govt Co

Dets A-3 and B-3 Military Govt
Co C 1st Prov MP Bn (USA)
Dispensary Units G-10 and G-11

1. 1/29
Atchd:

1st Plat Co C 6th MT Bn
Det AGLP 6th JASCO
Det SFCP 6th JASCO

1. See current D-2 summaries.

2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 4 Apr to seize line LOVE plus 15. LD front lines held at HOW hour. Boundaries, objectives and scheme of maneuver; Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize LOVE plus 15 in Z of action.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize LOVE plus 15 in Z of action. Organize and defend that line.
c. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk. 1/15 direct Spt CT 4. 2/15 direct Spt CT 22. 3/15 and 4/15 general support. Emplace one Co in vicinity YONTAN AIRDROME for defense against airborne Atk. Remainder 1st Armd Amph Bn general Spt.

159

Opn O No 4-45

- d. 6th Tank Bn: Spt Atk, with one Co in Spt of CT 4 and one Co in Spt of CT 22. Bn less 2 Cos rendezvous in assembly area. Await orders.
- e. Rcn Co: Be prepared to execute Rcn beyond LOVE plus 15 on order.
- f. Engr Gp: Assist SP in clearing beach areas. Repair roads in Div Z with particular attention to maintenance and marking of routes in zones of assault Regts. Assign one Plat to support each assault Regt. Continue work on airdrome.
- g. SP Gp: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
- h. 6th Med Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide collecting teams for assault units.
- i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
- j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 25 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6 trucks 1/29 CP at 0800.
- k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.
- l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
- m. 1/29 Div Res: Prepare to move on order by truck to seize ISHICHA (9097L).
- x. (1) If advance of 22d Mar exceeds that of 4th Mar, exposing 22d Mar rear during turning movement to north Div Res will be dispatched to occupy and defend ISHICHA (9097L) and protect 22d Mar south flank.

(2) Road priority to 15th Mar 0600-1200 4 Apr.

- 4. Adm details no change.
- 5. a. Div CP, Opn overlay.
- b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

160

Opn O No 4-45 (Cont'd)

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK

LtCol, USMC

D-3

161

Opn O No 4-45

-4-

~~TOP SECRET~~

OP

032305

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV.
TO : CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BLT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN,
6TH RCN CO, DIV SP, 6TH ENGR BN.

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN O NO 5-45 X INT REPORTS INDICATE POSSIBILITY ENEMY AIRBORNE C U
COUNTERATTACK X 6TH MAR DIV WILL ATK AND IMMEDIATELY DESTROY ANY
AIRBORNE TRS LANDING WITHIN DIV Z X 1/29 WITH ONE CO 6TH TANK BN
ATCHD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY BY MARCHING TO ASSEMBLY AREA EAST SIDE
YONTAN AIRFIELD X BE PREPARED TO DESTROY ENEMY TRS ATTEMPTING
TO LAND ON AIRFIELD OR ADJACENT AREAS X 6TH TANK BN DIRECT
ONE CO TO PROCEED TO EAST SIDE OF YONTAN AIRFIELD FOR ATTACH-
MENT TO 1/29 UPON ARRIVAL OF THAT BN X ALL OTHER UNITS MAKE
PLANS FOR COMBATING AIRBORNE LANDINGS WITHIN RESPECTIVE AREAS X
TANK CO COMDR REPORT TO CO 1/29 AT NE CORNER AIRFIELD X RIGID
BLACKOUT DISCIPLINE WILL BE ENFORCED BY ALL UNITS X ALL
PROVISIONS EXISTING DEFENSE PLANS NOT IN CONFLICT HERewith
REMAIN IN EFFECT X THIS CONFIRMS FRAGMENTARY ORDERS PREVIOUSLY
ISSUED X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

-041210

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: CO CT 4, 22, 15TH MAR, BLT 1/29, 6TH TANK BN,
6TH RCN CO, DIV SP, 6TH ENGR BN.

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 6-45 X ON SEIZURE LINE LOVE PLUS 15 6TH MAR DIV
CONTINUES ATK TO SEIZE LINE O-C 9002 NAN 9101 NAN 9201
VICTOR 9300 KING AND O-D 9203 BAKER 9202 OBOE 9301 YOKE
9400 FOX X 22D MAR WITH 1ST BN 29TH MAR ATCHD ADVANCE
TO NORTHWARD IN TWO COLUMNS WITH ONE COLUMN ALONG WEST
COAST AND ONE ALONG EAST COAST, RECONNOITERING INLAND
AREA WITH PATROLS X SEIZE O-C, PREPARED TO RESUME ATK TO
SEIZE O-D X 4TH MAR ASSEMBLE VICINITY ISHICHA PREPARED
TO SUPPORT ATK ON EITHER FLANK X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

041730

FROM: 6G 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

6TH MAR DIV OPN O NO 7-45.

6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 AND DEFENDS THE GROUND HELD
AT THAT TIME X 22D MAR (REINF) DEFEND GROUND HELD PAYING
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO LIKELY ROUTES OF APPROACH ON BOTH
FLANKS X BDS NO CHANGE X 15TH MAR AND CORPS ARTY SPT DE-
FENSE X MASS FIRES AT 9402 CHARLIE 4 X 6TH TANK BN RENDEZVOUS
IN ASSEMBLY AREA AT 8498 DOG X SP GP CONTINUE UNLOADING AND
EXECUTE BEACH DEFENSE PLAN USING ONLY THOSE TRS NOT REQUIRED
FOR UNLOADING X RCN CO REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION X PREPARE ALL
ROUND DEFENSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFENSE AGAINST
POSSIBLE ENEMY COUNTERLANDINGS ON N COAST X 4TH MAR (REINF)
DIV RES REMAIN PRESENT ASSEMBLY AREA X PREPARE ALL ROUND
DEFENSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO COAST LINE FROM 9198
PETER TO 9196 KING 3 X BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE 22D MAR
(REINF) IN CASE OF COUNTERATTACK FROM NE PAYING PARTICULAR
ATTENTION TO E COAST ROAD X PRESENT INTENTION HOLD PRESENT
FRONT LINE 5 APRIL FOR REORGANIZATION X DETAILS LATER X ATM
DETAILS NO CHANGE X DIV CP 8194 ITEM X UNITS REPORT Cps X

Released

J. C. McQueen
J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

165

041825

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS; CG 1ST MAR DIV

6TH MAR DIV OPN O NO 8-45.

6TH MAR DIV CONDUCTS RCN OF ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS 5 APR X
4TH MAR DISPATCH ONE CO WITH ONE PLAT 6TH TANK BN PLUS
ONE TANK DOZER ATCHD TO CONDUCT RCN OF E COAST OF ISHI-
KAWA ISTHMUS X RCN CO ONE PLAT 6TH TANK BN PLUS ONE TANK
DOZER ATCHD CONDUCT RCN W COAST ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS X 6TH
TANK BN HAVE REQUIRED TANKS AT RCN CO AND 4TH MAR CHARLIE
PETERS PRIOR 0800 X 6TH MT BN PROVIDE 3 2½ TON TRUCKS TO
EACH 4TH MAR AND RCN CO TO BE AT RESPECTIVE CHARLIE PETERS
PRIOR 0800 X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X LIMIT OF RCN
LINE CHUDA-KOCHIYA X RCN COLUMNS REPORT LOCATION AND
SITUATION AT 30 MINUTE INTERVALS X AVOID ENGAGEMENT WITH
SUPERIOR FORCE X DEPART FRONT LINES 0900 X RETURN PRIOR
DARKNESS X

Released

McQueen
for
J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

051445

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV.
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

THIS IS MY OPN O NO 9-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X
DEFENDS GROUND HELD AT THAT TIME X 22D MAR, 1/29 ATCHD,
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1700 X 4TH MAR ASSEMBLE
AT ISHIZA, ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE PARTICULAR ATTENTION
TO POSSIBLE ENEMY PENETRATION ON E. COAST ROAD X 29TH MAR
LESS 1ST BN ASSEMBLE ONNA XRAY ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE
PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE ENEMY PENETRATION ON W
COAST X 15TH MAR, 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD, SPT DEFENSE WITH
TWO BNS X REMAINING BNS BIVOUAC PRESENT LOCATIONS PREPARED
TO DISPLACE TOMORROW MORNING X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE.X

Released

V. H. Khulak
V. H. KHULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
5 Apr 45, 1700

Opn O
No 10-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Direct Air Spt and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0830 6 Apr to seize O-E. LD, Bds, -
Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Advance along E coast road, covering in-
land area by patrols. Seize O-E in Z of action.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Advance along W coast road, covering in-
land area by patrols. Seize O-E in Z of action.
c. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk with 2 Bns in firing
positions and one Bn in direct Spt of each assault Regt, ad-
vancing by bounds.
d. 6th Tank Bn: Place one Co less 1 Plat in direct Spt each
assault Regt. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area.
e. 6th Engr Bn: Place one Plat in direct Spt of each assault
Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in
Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
f. Rcn Co: Assemble 8800 ~~QUETN~~ prepared to execute Rcn missions
on order.
g. SP Gp: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
h. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 1 Plat 6x6 trucks
to 4th Mar CP prior 0800.
j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular at-
tention to traffic control throughout Div Z.
k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and sub-
sistence of native population.
l. 22d Mar, Div Res: Assemble by Bns along line ATSUTABARU-KIM.
Prepare to Spt either assault Regt. Thoroughly patrol area
between line ATSUTABARU-KIM and line YAKADA-YAKA.

168

Opn O No 10-45

-1-

Opn O No 10-45 (Cont)

- x. (1) 1/29 reverts parent control 0600, 6 Apr.
- 4. Adm details no change.
 - x. (1) Regts take steps to move all organic equipment to forward areas.
 - (2) Div CM assemble and store all gas masks.
- 5. a. Div CP at 8800 NAN.
 - b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

061350

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV

TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 11.45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK ON SEIZURE OBOE EASY X
ORGANIZE AND DEFENDS THAT LINE FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 29TH
MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE EASY X COVER REAR AREA BY
PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE
EASY X COVER REAR AREA BY PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 15TH MAR,
1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT 0711 TARE X
PREPARE TO DISPLACE TWO BNS DAWN TOMORROW X MOVE 1ST ARMD AMPH
BN TO NAKAMA AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME X 22D MAR DIV RES ASSEMBLE
BY BNS ALONG OBOE DOG X ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X BE PREPARED
TO SUPPORT DEFENSE OF FRONT LINE REGTS X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/167

6th Mar Div
In the field
6 Apr 45, 1500.

Opn O
No 12-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Direct Air Spt and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes advance 0730.7 Apr to seize O-F. LD, Bds, Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Advance along E coast road, covering inland area by patrols. Seize O-F in Z of action; thereafter patrol to 1612 BAKER.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Advance along W coast road, covering inland area by patrols. Seize O-F in Z of action; thereafter patrol to 0517 ITM, 0619 CHARLIE and 0918 FOX.
c. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk with 2 Bns in firing positions and one Bn in direct Spt of each assault Regt, advancing by bounds. Displace entire 1st Armd Amph Bn to vicinity NAKAMA at earliest opportunity.
d. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co less 1 Plat in direct Spt each assault Regt. Place 1 Plat direct Spt Rcn Co. Remainder of Bn displace to assembly area vicinity NAKAMA.
e. 6th Tngr Bn: Place 1 Co direct Spt each assault Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
f. Rcn Co, 1 Plat 6th Tank Bn plus 1 tank dozer Atchd: Assemble at KISE. Move at dawn to reconnoiter W coast road as far as western outskirts of NAGO. Report results and return to KISE assembly area.
g. SP Gp: Continue unloading supplies and establishment of dumps.
h. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.
k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

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Opn O No 12-45

Opn O No 12-45 (Cont)

1. 22d Mar Div Res: Move by marching with 1 column on either coast road to line O-E. Assemble by Bns prepared to Spt either assault Regt. Thoroughly patrol area between line ATSUTABARU-KIM and O-E.
- x. (1) 29th Mar pass control 1/2 1st MWDP to 4th Mar prior 0700 7 Apr.
4. Adm details no change.
5. a. Div CP at 8800 NAN.
b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Keulak
V. H. KEULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OF

071445

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 13-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATTACK ON SEIZURE
OF OBOE FOX X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS THAT LINE FOR NIGHT X
BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE
FOX X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE FOX X
COVER REAR AREA BY PATROLS UNTIL DARKNESS X 15TH MAR,
1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT ROGER
JIG 0919 MIKE 1 EAST X 22D MAR, DIV RES, ASSEMBLT BY BNS ALONG
LINE OBOE EASY X ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X BE PREPARED
TO SUPPORT DEFENSE OF FRONT LINE REGTS X ALL OTHER UNITS NO
CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/167

6th Mar Div
In the field
7 Apr 45, 1600

Opn O
No 14-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Direct Air Spt and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0730 8 Apr to seize O-G and O-H.
LD, Bds, Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Occupy and defend area indicated along O-G; -Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Seize O-H.
c. 22d Mar (Reinf): Move from present positions by marching to vicinity NAKAOSHI. Occupy and defend area indicated along O-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling.
d. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). Atch 1 Plat plus 1 dozer to Rcn Co. Remainder of Bn remain assembly area vicinity NAKAMA. Reconnoiter for future rendezvous and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.
e. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with 1/15 and 4/15. Displace remaining two Bns to designated positions.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt each Inf Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges.
g. Rcn Co, 1 Plat 6th Tank Bn plus 1 tank dozer Atchd: Assemble at YOFUKE. Move at dawn to reconnoiter S coast MOTOBU PENINSULA as far as SUGA, 9720 SUGAR. Report results half hourly. Upon completion of mission return to assembly area.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opn. Reconnoiter NAGO beaches. Prepare to initiate unloading in that area. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.

176

Opn O No 14-45

Open O No 1445 (Cont)

- k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. MP Co pay particular attention to traffic control throughout Div Z.
- l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
- 4. Adm details no change.
- 5. a. Div CP 0510 EASY.
b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GWN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

081430

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 15-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATTACK 1700 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR
REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 22D MAR ORGAN-
IZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 29TH MAR ORGANIZE AND DE-
FEND LINE HELD 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SUP-
PORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT RJ 9825-NAN 3 X FRONT LINE REGTS
MAKE AND MAINTAIN PATROL CONTACT X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK

LtCol, USMC

D-3

046/167

6th Mar Div
In the field
8 Apr 45, 1645

Opn O
No 16-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Direct Air Spt and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0730 9 Apr to seize O-J, prepared to resume Adv to O-K. LD, Bds, Opn overlay.
3. a. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Conduct Rcn with 1 Co as far as 1623 UNCLE.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Seize O-J, prepared to resume adv to seize O-K on O. Adv along roads, covering inland area by patrols.
c. 4th Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G, Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Conduct Pcn with 1 Co as far as ABU (1911V).
d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with not less than 2 Bns.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Co in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of Bn displace to new assembly area; location to be announced later.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt each Inf Regt. Continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z. Particular attention to bridges. Displace remainder of Bn to new assembly area; location to be announced later.
g. Rcn Co: Move to new assembly area at 0817 ABLE. Await orders.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns. Prepare to initiate unloading in NAGO area. Displace to new location 0517 JIG.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location at 0617 NAW.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Reconnoiter for assembly and maintenance area in vicinity of NAGO.
k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location in vicinity of 0717 CHARLIE, DOG, EASY. Unit assignments later.
l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Establish Hqs at town of NAGO.

Opn O No 16-45

Opn O No 16-45 (Cont)

4. a. Adm details no change.

x. (1) Principal fuel and ration Dn, located at CHUDA (0411 TARE), is available to all units in 6th Mar Div area.

(2) All supply agencies prepare to displace to NAGO area.

5. a. Div CP 0510 EASY.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

091415

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 17-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATTACK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND OBOE DASH GEORGE X 22D MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND
OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME X 29TH MAR ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1700 X
15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SUPPORT DEFENSE X MASS FIRES AT
1520M AND 0629D X FRONT LINE REGTS MAKE AND MAINTAIN PATROL CONTACT X
ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/169

6th Mar Div
In the field
9 Apr 45, 1645

Opn O
No 18-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Combined Air, Arty, NGF strike UNTEN 0500-0745.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0730 10 Apr to seize O-K and O-L.
LD present front lines. Bds, - Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Continue organization and defense of area indicated along O-G; - Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Direct 1 Co to proceed by marching to ABU, prepared to continue the advance northward the following day with amphibian Spt.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G; - Opn overlay. Conduct active security patrolling. Adv with 1 Bn to vicinity of 2225 ITEM; with 1 Co moving by motor to 1623 UNCLE, thence by marching to objective. Establish all round defense.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Advance with main effort on right to seize UNTEN and O-K. Prepare to resume Adv to O-L on order.
d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with not less than 2 Bns; particular attention to UNTEN area. Spt Adv of 22d Mar (Reinf) with 1 Btry. Direct 1 Plat, 1st Armd Amph Bn report to CO 29th Mar (Reinf) at GAGUSUKU prior 0600 10 Apr.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Place 1 Plat in direct Spt 22d Mar (Reinf) and 2 Plats in direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 2 Cos direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar (Reinf). 1 Plat direct Spt 4th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co: Await orders present location.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Displace to new location at 0714 MIKE. Furnish 6 2½-ton trucks to 22d Mar (Reinf) to report 22d Mar CP prior 0700 10 Apr.

Opn O No 18-45

Opn O No 18-45 (Cont)

- k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.
- l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
- x. (1) Armd Amoh Plat Atchd to 29th Mar (Reinf) to be employed in seizure of UNTEN area.
(2) 6 trucks furnished 22d Mar (Reinf) revert to MT Bn control immediately on discharge of Trs at 1623 UNCLE.
- 4. Adm details no change.
 - x. (1) 4th Mar Co patrol take two days' rations and adequate water purification material.
- 5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.
b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GWN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

101445

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 19-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF
CONTINUE ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAINTAIN-
ING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT ABU 1911 VICTOR X
22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE OF OBOE DASH GEORGE
PRIME MAINTAINING ONE BN IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO
2225 NAN X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1700 X
15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEFENSE X LEAVE ONE PLAT 1ST
ARMD AMPH BN IN DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ALL UNITS EXERCISE
VIGOROUS PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
10 Apr 45, 1645

Opn O
No 20-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv 0800 11 Apr to seize O-L and O-M, LD present front lines. Bds, Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Continue Orgn and Def of area indicated along O-G;-- Opn overlay. Direct 1 Co to proceed by marching from ABU to ATTUBAHU (2317 X) and to establish an all round Def prepared to continue the Adv northward the following day.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Organize and defend area indicated along O-G;-- Opn overlay. Direct 1 Co from 1/22 to proceed by marching to TAIRA (2522 S) seize O-M and establish an all round Def.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf), 1 Plat 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Adv to seize O-L. Continue mopping up of interior of MOTOBU PENINSULA.
d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk of 29th Mar (Reinf) with not less than 2 Bns. Continue to Spt 3/22 with 1 Btry.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Remain present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 2 Cos direct Spt 29th Mar (Reinf). 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar (Reinf). 1 Plat direct Spt 4th Mar (Reinf). Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z; emphasis on bridge construction. Make Rcn preliminary to establishment of cross-island road from OBO (2225 ITEM) to TAIRA (2522 SUGAR).
g. Rcn Co: Await orders present location.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Ops.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.
l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.

Opn O No 20-45

-1-

190

Opn O No 20-45 (Cont'd)

- x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling in assigned areas.
- (2) Unit Comdrs take swift disciplinary action in all cases of promiscuous firing discovered.

4. Adm details no change.

- x. (1) Co from 1/22 take 3 days' rations and adequate water purification material.

5. a. Div CP 07170060E.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

McKulak
V. R. KULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

191

Opn O No 20-45

-2-

OP

111445

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 21-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH
MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAIN -
TAINING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT ATTSUBARU
PAREN 2317 YOKE PAREN X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF
OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE BN LESS ONE CO IN ALL ROUND
DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO PAREN 2225 NAN PAREN AND ONE CO IN
ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT TAIRA PAREN 2622 KING PAREN X
29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD 1700 X 15TH
MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEF X LEAVE TWO PLATOONS 1ST ARMD
AMPH BN DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ALL UNITS CONTINUE VIGOROUS
PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 22-45 X 6TH MAR DIV RESUMES ADV 0800 12 APR TO SEIZE OBOE
DASH LOVE AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN MOTOBU PENINSULA X LOVE
DOG PRESENT FRONT LINES X BDS NO CHANGE X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF
CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE X DIRECT ONE CO TO PRO-
CEED BY MARCHING FROM ATTISUBARU PAREN 2317 YOKE PAREN TO CONTACT
22D MAR AT TAIRA PAREN 2622 KING PAREN X THIS CO UPON MAKING CONTACT
ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF X PARA X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF
OF OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO LESS TWO
COS IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO PAREN 2225 NAN PAREN
AND ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT TAIRA PAREN 2622 KING
PAREN X DIRECT ONE REINF CO OF ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO TO MOVE BY
MARCHING TO SEIZE PENINSULA AT 2535 JIG AND ESTABLISH ALL ROUND
DEFENSE X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF CONVERGE FORCES TOWARD CENTER OF
PENINSULA TO DESTROY ENEMY RESISTANCE THERE X CONCURRENTLY DIRECT
ONE CO FROM THREE SLANT TWENTY NINE AND ONE CO FROM TWO SLANT TWENTY
NINE TO PROCEED BY MARCHING TO MEET AT IMADOMARI PAREN 0130 CHARLIE
PAREN AND TO ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE X PARA X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD
AMPH BN ATCHD SPT ATK 29TH MAR REINF WITH NOT LESS THAN TWO BNS PLUS
TWO PLATS 1ST ARMD AMPH BN X CONTINUE TO SPT THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO WITH
ONE BTRY X PARA X RCN CO PROCEED BY TRUCK TO 9725 KING X THENCE BY MARCH-
ING TO SEIZE BISE PAREN 9631 KING PAREN X ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEFENSE AND
AWAIT ORDERS X PARA X 6TH ENGR BN X TWO COS DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X
ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 4TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X
INITIATE IMPROVEMENT OF CROSS ISLAND ROAD FROM OBO TO TAIRA X ALL OTHER
UNITS NO CHANGE X ADM DETAILS NO CHANGE X DIV OP 0717 OBOE X

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
E-3

196

OP

121600

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 23-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK AT 1700 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR THE NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH
MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE MAINTAIN-
ING ONE CO IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT KAWATA PAREN
2722 KING PAREN X 22D MAR REINF LESS 3D BN LESS 1 CO CONTINUE
ORGN AND DEF OF OBOE DASH GEORGE PRIME MAINTAINING ONE BN IN
ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT OBO PAREN 2225 NAN PAREN AND
ONE BN IN ALL ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AT 2535 DOG X 29TH
MAR REINF DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD
AMPH BN ATCHD SPT DEF X LEAVE TWO PLATS 1ST ARMD AMPH BN
DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X RCN CO ASSUME CONTROL FOX CO
29TH AT OBJECTIVE PREPARE ALL ROUND DEFENSE X 3D BN 22D
MAR LESS ONE CO IN DIV RES PROCEED TO 0119 ITEM PREPARE
ALL ROUND DEF PREPARED TO ASSIST 3D BN 29TH MAR ON ORDER X
ALL UNITS CONTINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING WITHIN THEIR AREAS X
OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

121715

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 24.45 X 6TH MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0800 13 APR TO DESTROY ENEMY
RESISTANCE IN INTERIOR MOTOBU PENINSULA AND CONTINUES ADVANCE TO HEDO
MISAKI PAREN 3751 HOW PAREN X BDS NO CHANGE X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF MOVE
THREE SLANT FOUR TO KAWATA PAREN 2722 QUEEN PAREN AND ONE CO FROM THREE
SLANT FOUR TO ARAKAWA PAREN 3725 ABLE PAREN TO ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF
AT THAT POINT X MOVE REMAINDER OF REGT BY MARCHING TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICIN-
ITY CHUDA PAREN 0511 HOW PAREN X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS THIRD BN AS-
SEMBLE ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO LESS CHARLIE CO AT 2225 ROGER X CHARLIE CO
REMAIN AT 2635 ROGER X MOVE TWO SLANT TWENTY TWO BY MOTOR AND MARCHING
TO SEIZE HEDO MISAKI PAREN 3751 HOW PAREN X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF DRIVE
VIGOROUSLY ON ENEMY FORCE IN VICINITY OF TARE ABLE 9925 COMMA 9924 COMMA
9923 COMMA 9824 COMMA 9823 FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST X LOCATE AND DESTROY
ALL ENEMY FORCES IN THAT AREA X CONTINUE ACTIVE PATROLLING TO NORTH AND
NORTHWEST OF ITOMI X RCN CO FOX SLANT 29 ATCHD REMAIN IN DEFENSIVE POSITION
VICINITY BISE PAREN 9631 PETER PAREN X CONDUCT PATROLS AS FAR EAST AS 9930
MAN AND AS FAR SOUTH AS 9623 YOKE X 15TH MAR 1ST ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD SPT
ATK 29TH MAR REINF WITH NOT LESS THAN TWO BNS X SPT TWO SLANT TWENTY TWO
WITH ONE BTRY X MOVE THREE SLANT FIFTEEN TO POSITION WHERE IT MAY SPT 29TH
MAR REINF X PARA X 6TH ENGR BN X TWO COS DIRECT SPT 29TH MAR REINF X ONE
PLAT DIRECT SPT 4TH MAR REINF X ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X PARA X
6TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN PROVIDE TEN TRUCKS AT 22D MAR CHARLIE PETER
0600 13 APR TO TRANSPORT KING CO TO AWA X THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO DIV
RES REMAIN PRESENT POSITION PREPARED TO ASSIST 29TH MAR IN MOPPING

198

Opn O No 24-45 (Cont)

UP MOTOBU PENINSULA X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X ADM DETAILS NO
CHANGE X DIV CP 0717 OBOE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

OP

131500

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 25-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK AT 1700 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR THE NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH
MAR REINF ESTABLISH 2/4 IN ALL ROUND DEF AT 9721 FOX GEORGE
KING X RETAIN 3/4 IN ALL ROUND DEFENSE PRESENT POSITION X
REMAINDER REGT ESTABLISH ALL ROUND DEF VICINITY YOFUKE PAREN
0715 NAN PAREN X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS 3/22 ORGANIZE
AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1700 X 3/22 DIV RES
REMAIN IN ALL ROUND DEF PRESENT LOCATION X ALL UNITS CON-
TINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
13 Apr 45, 1730

Opn O
No 26-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty, and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 14 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the MOTOBU PENINSULA.
3. a. 29th Mar Reinf (less 3d Bn and less FOX Co): Atk in the direction ITOMI-MANNA, and by flanking action from the north, drive the enemy to the south and clear the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road; - Opn overlay.
b. 4th Mar Reinf, 3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd: Commencing at 0830 attack to seize ridge in 9723 CHARLIE HOW MIKE and ROGER, Opn overlay. Move 3/4 by motor and marching from present location to vicinity of AWA. Upon arrival at AWA 3/4 passes to Div Res and will move 1 Co by motor to 9629 GEORGE for relief of FOX/29.
c. 22d Mar Reinf: Maintain 2/22 in all round Def at HEDO MISAKI (3751 HOW) and 1/22 disposed with 1 Co at KAWADA (2722 MIKE), and 1 Co at 2635 TARE and the remainder of the Bn at 2225 NAN. All units conduct Rcn patrolling within 3000 Yds of positions.
d. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd: Spt Atk.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Remain present assembly area; await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: One Co direct Spt 29th Mar. One Co direct Spt 4th Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co, FOX/29th Atchd: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling. FOX Co be prepared to move by motor to ITOMI.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Provide 30 trucks at 2225 NAN at 0700 14 Apr to transport 3/4 to AWA (0119 GEORGE). Thereafter provide 10 trucks to transport 1 Co of 3/4 to 9629 GEORGE and to return FOX/29 to 0324 HOW. Remainder of trucks move 3/22 from AWA (0119 GEORGE) to 1322 SUGAR when 3/22 is released from Div Res.
k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

201

Opn O No 26-45

Opn O No 26-45 (Cont'd)

1. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.
- m. 3d Bn 22d Mar (Div Res): Maintain contact with enemy in general area 0020 ABLE BAKER and CHARLIE and 0120 ABLE, BAKER and CHARLIE. Be prepared to revert to regimental control on order and move to 1322 SUGAR by motor and marching.
- x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling assigned areas.
(2) FOX/29 reverts to Regtl control on entrucking at 9629 GEORGE.
4. Adm details no change.
5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.
b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

202

OP

141615

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 27-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X BDS NO CHANGE X 4TH MAR REINF
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE
ATK 0800 15 APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT
POSITIONS X PREPARE TO MOVE THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO TO VICINITY
2733 NOW 15 APR AND TO WITHDRAW CHARLIE CO 22D MAR TO OBO COMEA
2225 ITEM X ESTABLISH REGTL CHARLIE PETER VICINITY OBO X PARA X
29TH MAR REINF LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT
1700 X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF PREPARE TO PLACE ONE BTRY FROM ONE
SLANT FIFTEEN IN DIRECT SPT ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO AND ONE BTRY
FROM ONE SLANT FIFTEEN IN DIRECT SPT THREE SLANT TWENTY TWO X
PARA X THREE SLANT FOUR DIV DES REMAIN IN ALL ROUND DEF PRESENT
LOCATION X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released: *[Signature]*

V. E. KRULAK

LtCol, USMC

D-3

304

6th Mar Div
In the field
14 Apr 45, 1930

Opn O
No 28-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0800 15 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the MOTOBU PENINSULA.
3. a. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d Bn: Defend present positions. Conduct vigorous Rcn patrolling to determine strength and locate flanks of enemy position.
b. 4th Mar (Reinf) less 3d Bn (3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd): Atk to seize high ground at 9923 GEORGE, and O-N; - Opn overlay.
c. 22d Mar (Reinf): Move Regtl CP to vicinity of (2733 HOW). Maintain 2/22 in all round Def at HEDO MISAKI (3751 HOW). Assemble 1/22 less 1 Co vicinity OBO (2225 ITEM), with 1 Co at KAWADA (2722 MIKE). Move 3/22 by motor and marching from present location to defensive position in vicinity of 2733 HOW. Conduct vigorous patrolling into interior of island and southward on east coast as far as DANA (4245 HOW).
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. Place 1 Btry from 1/15 in direct Spt of 1/22, 2/22 and 3/22 respectively.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt CT 22; remainder of Bn remain in present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co, KING/4 Atchd: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling and Rcn of beaches.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Oons.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Provide 10 trucks at 1322 SUGAR at 0700 15 Apr to transport 3/22 to vicinity of 2733 HOW.

205

Opn O No 28-45

Opn O No 28-45 (Cont)

k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

l. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Initiate steps to encourage return of civilians from mountain hideouts.

m. 3d Bn 4th Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to north and northwest;-- Opn overlay. Be prepared to Sot Atk of 4th Mar (Reinf).

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.

b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK

LtCol, USMC

D-3

OP

151400

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 29-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1700 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND
LINE HELD AT 1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA X
22D MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X SUBMIT GARRISON
DEF AND PATROL PLAN FOR AREA NORTH OF LINE CHUDA-SUKKU X PARA X
29TH MAR REINF LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT
1700 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 16 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF
SPT DEF X PLACE 1/15 DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X PARA X 3/4 DIV
RES REMAIN IN ALL ROUND DEF PRESENT LOCATION X ALL UNITS BE
PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER
DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
15 Apr 45, 1800

Opn O
No 30-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk 0730 16 Apr to destroy enemy forces in the southwest portion of the MOTOBU PENINSULA.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf) (3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd): Atk 0900 with main effort on right to seize O-N;-- Opn overlay. 3d Bn revert to control 4th Mar at 0600 16 Apr.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st Bn with 3d Bn 1st Mar Atchd: Organize and defend assigned sector in accordance with approved plan;-- Opn overlay. 1st Bn pass to Div control at 0600 16 Apr.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d Bn: Atk to seize O-N in Z of action;-- Opn overlay.
d. 1st Bn 22d Mar: Move by motor to AWA and when in position Atk to seize O-N in Z of action.
e. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
f. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar; remainder of Bn remain present assembly area. Await orders.
g. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
h. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling and Rcn of beaches. Upon arrival of motor vehicles K/4 revert to control 3/4 and move by motor to vicinity of 0019 KING.
i. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
j. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
k. 6th ME Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 35 trucks at 2225 MAN prior to 0630 to transport 1/22 to AWA. Upon discharge of Trs at AWA, 10 trucks proceed to 9630 ROGER to transport K/4 to 9919 KING.
l. Div Trs: Execute normal missions.

269

Opn O No 30-45

Opn O No 30-45 (Cont'd)

- m. Military Govt Go: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.
- n. 3d Bn 4th Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to north and northwest;-- Opn overlay. Be prepared to Spt Atk of 4th Mar (Reinf) and 29th Mar (Reinf) by attacking in direction 0019 ITEM 0021 HOW.
- x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
(2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly Trs.
- 4. Adm details no change.
- 5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.
b. Report location CPs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

210

Opn O No 30-45

CONFIDENTIAL

OP

161600

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, INFO CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 31-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF 3/29 ATCHD ORGANIZE
AND DEFEND LINE HELD AT 1630 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 17
APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF LESS 1ST BN COMMA 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X SUBMIT GARRISON DEF AND PATROL
PLAN FOR AREA NORTH OF LINE CHUDA-SUKKU X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF
LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630 PREPARED TO
RESUME THE ATK 0800 17 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF SPT DEF X PLACE
1/15 DIRECT SPT 22D MAR REINF X PARA X 1/22 DIV RES PREPARE ALL
ROUND DEF OF GROUND HELD AT 1630 X PREPARED TO CONTINUE VIGOROUS
PATROLLING AT 0800 17 APR X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT
AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

C. W. Shisler
C. W. SHISLER
LtCol, USMC
Asst D-3

CONFIDENTIAL

212

046/166

6th Mar Div
In the field
16 Apr 45, 1800

Opn O
No 32-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 17 Apr to seize O-P. LD present front lines. Bds and scheme of maneuver:- Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf) 3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd: Atk 0800 17 Apr to seize O-P in Z of action:- Opn overlay. Continue vigorous patrolling in 9821, 9921, 9820 and 9920.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st Bn, 3d Bn 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Def of assigned sectors in accordance with approved plan.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3d Bn: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action by flanking action from the south. Opn overlay.
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th ME Bn: Execute normal missions.
k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.
l. 1st Bn 22d Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling to the north in assigned Z as far as O-P, paying particular attention to the high ground in the right (east) half of Z. Establish contact with 4th Mar and 29th Mar.

Opn O No 32-45

-1-

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Opn O No 32-45 (Cont'd)

x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.

(2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops.

4. Adm details no change.

5. a. Div CP 0717 OBOE.

b. Location CPs: see overlay. Report changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
Cofs

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

214

Opn O No 32-45

OP

171500

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV.

OPN O NO 33-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND
DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF 3/29 ATCHD ORGANIZE
AND DEFEND LINE HELD 1630 PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 18 APR X
PARA 22D MAR REINF LESS 1ST BN COMMA 3RD BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CONTINUE
DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH
MAR REINF LESS 3/29 ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT 1630
PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 18 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF
SPT DEF X PARA X 1/22 DIV PES PREPARE ALL ROUND DEF OF GROUND
HELD AT 1630 X BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE VIGOROUS PATROLLING
0800 18 APR X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST
INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

C. W. Shisler
C. W. SHISLER
Lt Col, USMC
Asst D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
17 Apr 45, 1500

Opn O
No 34-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NFG available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 18 Apr to seize O-P. LD present front lines. Bds and scheme of maneuver: - Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf) 3d Bn 29th Mar Atchd: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action: - Opn overlay. Be particularly vigilant to prevent escape of enemy to northward.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf) less 1st Bn: 3d Bn 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Def of assigned sectors in accordance with approved plan.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf) less 3rd Bn: Atk to seize O-P in Z of action by flanking action from the south: - Opn overlay.
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.
l. 1st Bn 22d Mar (Div Res): Continue aggressive patrolling in assigned zone (Opn overlay) paying particular attention to the right (east) half of zone. Prepare to support attack in zone of 29th Mar (Reinf).

Opn O No 34-45

-1-

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Opn O No 34-45 (Cont'd)

- x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
- (2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops. Employ front line pyrotechnics freely.
- (3) Comdrs take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.
4. Adm details no change.
5. a. Location CPs: see overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

Opn O No 34-45

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
17 Apr 45, 1915

Opn O

No 34-45 - Modified

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and WGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 18 Apr to seize O-Q. LD present front lines. Eds and scheme of maneuver: - Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Remain present positions. Mop up rear area. Opn overlay. Direct 3/29 to assemble at TOGUCHI by 0900 18 Apr. Upon arrival of trucks entruck and revert control 29th Mar.
b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Continue Orgn and Def of present positions on northern peninsula. Move 1/22 from AWA to vicinity MAJIYA (1322 OBOE). Protect bridge at 1623 UNCLE. Conduct vigorous patrolling between Div rear Ed and HEDO-MISAKI, with particular attention to east coast between HEDO-MISAKI and KAWATA WAN.
c. 29th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize O-Q in Z of action. Block withdrawal of enemy to eastward by seizure of hill at 0237 QUEEN. Mop up area in Z of action south of O-Q.
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
h. Co C 6th Pion Bn: Continue SP Opns.
i. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 30 2½ ton trucks at AWA (0119 GEORGE) at 0600 to transport 1/22 to vicinity MAJIYA (1322 OBOE). Thereafter return to TOGUCHI (9725 HOW) to transport 3/29 to assembly area vicinity 0425 QUEEN.
k. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and sub-
sistence of native population. Confine all males of military age and retain them under strict surveillance.

Opn O No 34-45 Modified

-1-

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Opn O No 34-45 Modified (Cont'd)

1. 1st Bn 22d Mar (Div Res): Assemble vicinity AWA. Upon arrival of trucks embark and revert to control 22d Mar.
- x. (1) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
- (2) Comdrs coordinate supporting arms with all possible care to avoid fire on friendly troops. Employ front line pyrotechnics freely.
- (3) Comdrs take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.
4. Adm Details no change.
5. a. Location CPs: See overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. E. Krulak
V. E. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

Opn O No 34-45 Modified

USS

046/165

OP

181500

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 35-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS
GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT
POSITIONS X BE PREPARED TO RESUME ATK 0800 19 APR X PARA X 22D MAR
REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL
OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS
HELD AT 1630 X BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 19 APR X PARA X 15TH
MAR REINF SPT DEF X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST
INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
18 Apr 45, 1700

Opn O
No 36-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NGF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Atk at 0800 19 Apr to destroy enemy forces in northern MOTOBU PENINSULA. LD present front lines. Bds and schomo of manouwer:- Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Atk with main effort on the left to seize high ground in 0027 VICTOR and 0026 MIKE:- Opn overlay.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Atk to seize high ground in 0327 PETER by flanking action from the east:- Opn overlay.
c. 22d Mar (Reinf) 3d Bn 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Def of present positions on northern peninsula. Emphasize rapid junction of patrols moving south from HEDO MISAKI and those moving north from KAWATA WAN.
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Atk. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area. Await orders.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plt direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Ren Co: Remain present position. Continue active patrolling not to exceed 1000 yards southeast of present positions.
h. 6th Ser Bn: Execute normal missions.
i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions.
j. Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.
k. (1) Assault Regiments maintain patrols north of ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road to provide security for Engr and mine clearing activities.
(2) All units continue vigorous security patrolling of assigned areas.
(3) Comdrs take vigorous steps to suppress promiscuous firing.

Opn O No 36-45

-1-

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Opn O No 36-45 (Cont'd)

4. Adm details no change.
5. Location CPs: See overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

225

Opn O No 36-45

-2-

046/171

6th Mar Div
In the field
19 Apr 45, 1000

Opn O
No 37-45

1. Enemy guerilla raiding and sabotage activities may be expected to intensify as organized resistance in northern OKINAWA comes to an end.
2. 6th Mar Div initiates active program to apprehend or destroy all enemy personnel engaged in guerilla activities.
3. The following steps will be taken to implement the foregoing:
 - a. All civilians, male and female, will be apprehended and assembled in concentration areas in accordance with further instructions to be issued by Civil Affairs Administration.
 - b. All units will organize bivouac areas and supply and service installations for defense against night infiltration. Liberal use will be made of barbed wire, trip flares, ambushes, and coordinated security patrolling.
 - x. (1) Orgn Comdrs will take steps to enforce rigid fire discipline within respective Comds to prevent promiscuous firing and consequent danger to friendly Trs.
(2) All Orgns will submit to next higher Hqs a comprehensive plan for counter-infiltration security within their assigned areas.
4. Special munitions and materials required for execution available on demand through Div Ord O and Div QM.
5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

J. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

Opn O No 37-45

CONFIDENTIAL

227

OP

191600

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN C NO 38-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ATK 1630 X ORGANIZES
AND DEFENDS GROUND HELD FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE
AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X BE PREPARED TO RESUME ATK
0800 20 APR X PARA X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CON-
TINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X
PARA X 29TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND POSITIONS HELD AT
1630 X BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE ATK 0800 20 APR X PARA X
15TH MAR REINF SPT DEF X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY
VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS
NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6th Mar Div
In the field
19 Apr 45, 1700

Opn O
No 39-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries.
b. Air, Arty and NCF available on call.
2. 6th Mar Div resumes Adv at 0800 20 Apr to seek out and destroy enemy forces remaining in northern MOTOBU PENINSULA. LD, present front lines. Bds and scheme of maneuver:- Opn overlay.
3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Adv to north coast of MOTOBU PENINSULA within Z of action. Conduct vigorous patrols throughout Z of action to seek out and destroy small enemy groups remaining. Opn overlay. Move 1 Co by truck to relieve 6th Rcn Co at 9630 XRAY prior to 0830 20 Apr. Co designated will continue to provide security for radar site in BISE area.
b. 29th Mar (Reinf): Adv to north coast of MOTOBU PENINSULA in Z of action. Conduct vigorous patrolling to seek out and destroy small enemy groups remaining. Opn overlay.
c. 22d Mar (Reinf) 3d Dn 1st Mar Atchd: Continue Orgn and Def of present positions on northern peninsula.
d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Spt Adv. 1/15 remains direct Spt 22d Mar.
e. 6th Tank Bn: Retain 1 Co direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn remain present assembly area.
f. 6th Engr Bn: 1 Co direct Spt 29th Mar. 1 Co direct Spt 4th Mar. 1 Plat direct Spt 22d Mar. Remainder of Bn continue maintenance and repair of routes of Com in Div Z.
g. Rcn Co: Upon relief by 4th Mar entruck and return to bivouac at 0818 UNCLE. Assemble and await orders.
h. 6th Sor Bn: Execute normal missions.
i. 6th MT Bn: Execute normal missions. Provide 10 2½ ton trucks at TOGUCHI at 0700 to transport 1 Co, 4th Mar, to 9630 XRAY; thereafter to transport 6th Rcn Co from same point to bivouac at 0818 UNCLE.

ocs Military Govt Gp: Continue concentration, control and subsistence of native population.

Opn O No 39-45

-1-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 229

~~SECRET~~

Opn O No 39-45 (Cont'd)

x. (1) Assault Regts take all possible measures to prevent enemy individuals or groups from making their way southward on the MOTOSU PENINSULA. All critical avenues of approach will be covered by patrols or outposts.

(2) All civilians encountered will be apprehended and moved to concentration area at TAIRA (1020 GEORGE).

4. Adm details no change.

5. Location CPs: see overlay. Report all changes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
Cofs

Annex A -- Opn overlay

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

230

ess
Opn O No 39-45

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
20 Apr 45, 1300

Opn O
No 40-45

Task Orgn

Amph Rcn Bn FMF Pac.

1. a. See current Int summaries and D-2 studies on SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA.
b. Friendly naval forces are operating in the NAGO WAN-KUSHICHIN area.
2. 6th Mar Div undertakes Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA night of 20-21 Apr to locate suitable beaches for subsequent landings and to determine enemy strength and dispositions thereon.
a. Amph Rcn Bn FMF Pac: Execute Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA with force of not less than one Plat on each island. Locate beaches suitable for LVTs landing of a Reinf Bn. Determine enemy strength and dispositions in so far as possible without becoming engaged with a superior force. Return to mainland prior to dawn 21 Apr.
4. 4th Mar assume logistic responsibility for Rcn Bn elements in TOGUCHI area; 4/15 assume logistic responsibility for Rcn Bn elements in KATENA KO area.
5. a. 6th Mar Div CP 0717 OBOE.
6th Rcn Bn CP - CHUDA (0511 WAN).
b. Commencing 1700 20 Apr establish radio contact on 5990 kcs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

Distribution: Special

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Official:

McKee
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

Opn O No 40-45

046/165

201600

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG, III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 41-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CEASES ADV ON REACHING NORTHERN
COAST MOTOBU PENINSULA X ORGANIZES AND DEFENDS POSITIONS HELD
FOR NIGHT X 4TH MAR REINF ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X
PARA X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD CONTINUE DEF PRESENT
POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF
ORGANIZE AND DEFEND PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 15TH MAR SPT DEF X
PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST INFILTRATION AND
SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

OP

201800

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 42-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES PATROLLING AND SECURITY
OF ASSIGNED AREAS X 4TH MAR REINF CONDUCT PATROLS WITHIN 1500
YARDS OF PRESENT POSITIONS TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ANY REMAINING
ENEMY ELEMENTS ENCOUNTERED X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF
OF PRESENT POSITIONS IN NORTHERN PENINSULA X 29TH MAR REINF CON-
DUCT PATROLS WITHIN 1500 YARDS OF PRESENT POSITIONS TO SEEK OUT AND
DESTROY ANY REMAINING ENEMY ELEMENTS ENCOUNTERED X PARA X ALL
UNITS INTENSIFY LOCAL DEF PREPARATIONS X CONTINUE CONCENTRATION
OF CIVILIANS X NAKAOSHI PAREN 0430 PETER PAREN DESIGNATED ADDI-
TIONAL CONCENTRATION POINT FOR CIVILIANS APPREHENDED IN NORTHERN
MOTOBU PENINSULA X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
21 Apr 45, 1100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Opn O
No 43-45

1. a. See current Int summaries and D-2 studies on SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA.
b. Friendly naval forces are operating in the NAGO WAN-KUSHICHIN area.
2. 6th Mar Div executes Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA and YAGACHI-SHIMA 21 Apr to locate suitable beaches for subsequent landings and to determine enemy strength and dispositions thereon.
3. a. Amph Rcn Bn FMF Pac, 1 Co 1st Armd Amph Bn Atchd:
 - (1) Execute daylight Rcn of YAGACHI-SHIMA 21 Apr with 1 Rcn Co transported in LVT(A)s. Cover island thoroughly to determine whether enemy is in occupation, and if so in what strength. Avoid engagement with superior force. Return to mainland prior to darkness.
 - (2) Execute Rcn of SESOKO-SHIMA after nightfall 21 Apr, employing 1 Rcn Co. Pay particular attention to character of landing beaches in vicinity of 9524 QUEEN and VICTOR and to suspected enemy installations in vicinity of 9424 ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOG, FOX, GEORGE and HOW and in 9423 DOG, HOW and ITEM. Avoid engagement with superior force. Return to mainland prior to dawn 22 Apr.
- b. 15th Mar (Reinf): Attach 1 Armd Amph Co and FO team to Amph Rcn Bn, FMF Pac, reporting at 0724 ABLE prior to 1230 21 Apr.
4. 4th Mar assume logistic responsibility for Rcn Bn elements in TOGUCHI area; Div QM assume logistic responsibility for Rcn Bn elements in KATENA KO area.
5. a. 6th Mar Div CP 0717 OBOE.
6th Rcn Bn CP - CHUDA (0511 NAN).
b. Establish radio contact on 5990 kcs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC

D-3

Opn O No 43-45

235

046/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
21 Apr 45, 1100

Opn O
No 44-45

1. a. See current D-2 summaries and study of SESOKO-SHIMA.
b. Friendly naval craft are operating in the NAGO WAN-KUSHICHIN area.
2. 6th Mar Div lands on beach ABLE, east coast of SESOKO-SHIMA 0800 23 Apr 45 and destroys all enemy resistance thereon. Annex A Opn overlay.
3. a. 29th Mar (Reinf): Land 1 Bn on beach ABLE, east coast SESOKO-SHIMA 0800 23 Apr. Destroy all enemy resistance encountered on island. Remainder of Regt less one (1) Bn to be assembled in Res in vicinity of TOGUCHI.
b. 15th Mar, 1st Armd Amph Bn (less Co C) Atchd: Spt Atk with not less than two Arty Bns. Provide one (1) Armd Amph Co to precede landing wave, providing direct fire Spt.
c. Det 4th Amtrac Bn: Land elements of 29th Mar (Reinf). Carry assault waves 500 Yds inland. Upon discharge return to beach by most direct route, reporting to TOGUCHI for succeeding trips.
x. (1) Task group Comdrs submit detailed plans for execution of this order prior 0900 22 Apr.
(2) Det 4th Amtrac Bn and designated Bn 29th Mar assemble AWA prior to 1600 22 Apr. Embarkation for Opn will be accomplished at AWA beach.
4. a. All Trs carry one days KING rations and two canteens of water.
b. Div QM establish supply point vicinity TOGUCHI for supply of units on SESOKO-SHIMA by LVT.
c. Evacuation of wounded to TOGUCHI via LVT thence by ambulance to Div field hospital at NAGO.

Opn O No 44-45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Opn O No 44-45 (Cont'd)

5. a. CPs:

6th Mar Div 0717 OBOE.

29th Mar 0725 HOW.

15th Mar 1020 GEORGE.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Annex A:

Opn overlay

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK

Lt Col, USMC

D-3

363 Opn O No 44-45

-2-

237

III 29

00 + 25

046/165

211500

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PIR CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

ANNEX A TO 6TH MAR DIV OPN O NO. 44-45
OPN OVERLAY MAP: RYUKYU RETTO 1:25

BY COMMAND
MAJ GEN SH
J. C. McQ
COL US
G OF S

OPN O NO 45-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUE CONTROLLING AND SECURITY OF
ASSIGNED AREAS AND PREPARED TO SEIZE SESOKO-SHIMA X 4TH MAR REINF
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X
4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X MOVE ON 22 APR AT
0730 22 APR BY MOTOR TO ANA PREPARED TO ENGAGE 23 APR FOR ATK ON
SESOKO-SHIMA X MOVE REMAINDER OF REPT LESS ON 22 APR BY MOTOR
MARCHING TO TOGUCHI DURING DAY OF 22 APR X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF
DEF X BE PREPARED TO SPT ATK ON SESOKO-SHIMA X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF
PROVIDE 30 TRUCKS AT NAKASOBI (0626 TIME) 0700 22 APR
2/23 TO ANA X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR
INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS TO CHAIRMAN

OFFICIAL

V. H. KRULAK
LT COL USMC

Released

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
ACofS, D-3

APPROACH

239

00
+ 25

DIV OPN O NO. 44-45
WUKYU RETTO 1:25,000

BY COMMAND OF
MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
COL USMC
G OF S

EMBARKATION
POINT

238

APPROACH

046/165

211500

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 45-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES PATROLLING AND SECURITY OF
ASSIGNED AREAS AND PREPARES TO SEIZE SESOKO-SHIMA X 4TH MAR REINF
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X 22D MAR REINF 3D BN 1ST MAR ATCHD
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS AND PATROL OF ASSIGNED AREA X PARA X
29TH MAR REINF CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X MOVE ONE BN AT
0730 22 APR BY MOTOR TO AWA PREPARED TO EMBARK 23 APR FOR ATK ON
SESOKO-SHIMA X MOVE REMAINDER OF REGT LESS ONE BN BY MOTOR AND
MARCHING TO TOGUCHI DURING DAY OF 22 APR X PARA X 15TH MAR SPT
DEF X BE PREPARED TO SPT ATK ON SESOKO-SHIMA X PARA X 6TH MT BN
PROVIDE 30 TRUCKS AT NAKASONI (0628 TARE) 0730 22 APR TO TRANSPORT
2/29 TO AWA X PARA X ALL UNITS BE PARTICULARLY VIGILANT AGAINST
INFILTRATION AND SABOTAGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC
ACofS, D-3

OP

221600

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO: 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPIN O NO 46-45 X 6TH MAR DIV CONTINUES ORGN AND DEF OF ASSIGNED
AREA X PARA X 4TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF PRESENT POSI-
TIONS X MOVE ONE BN BY MOTOR TO VICINITY OF TAIRA PAREN 2522
OBOE PAREN 0730 23 APR X PREPARE TO MOVE ONE BN ON 24 APR TO VICINITY
OF ORANIATA PAREN 1313 JIG PAREN AND REMAINDER OF REGT ON 25 APR
TO VICINITY OF 1823 JIG X PARA X 22D MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND
DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF CONTINUE ORGN AND DEF
PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 15TH MAR REINF BE PREPARED TO FIRE IN
ANY PORTION OF 6TH MAR DIV AREA WITH AT LEAST ONE BN X PARA X 6TH
MOTOR TRANSPORT BN PROVIDE 30 TRUCKS AT 0030 MIKE AT 0730 23 APR
TO TRANSPORT 3/4 TO TAIRA PAREN 2522 OBOE PAREN X ALL OTHER DETAILS
NO CHANGE X

Released:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
D-3

05/165

6th Mar Div
In the field
24 Apr 45 1500

Opn O
No 47-45

Maps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-RETO
(b) 1:100,000 RYUKYU-RETO

Task Orgn

a. 4th Mar (Reinf)

Col SHAPLEY

4th Mar
Co A 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)
1st Mar War Dog Plat
1st Band Sec

b. 22d Mar (Reinf)

Col SCHNEIDER

22d Mar
Co B 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co B 6th MT Bn
2d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)
2d Band Sec

c. 29th Mar (Reinf)

Col WHALING

29th Mar
Co C 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co C 6th MT Bn
3d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
3d Plat S&S Co (less PX Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)
3d Band Sec

d. Div Arty

Col LUCKEY

15th Mar
1st Armd Amph Bn

e. Tank Gp

LtCol DENIG

6th Tank Bn
Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co
5th Prov Rocket Det

Opn O No 47-45

Opn O No 47-45 (Cont'd)

f. Engr Gp

Maj SACKETT

6th Engr Bn
Co B 1st Separate Engr Bn FMF Pac
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disp Co

g. 6th Ser Bn (less Dets)

LtCol BELL

h. 6th Med Bn (less Dets)

LtComdr COWAN

i. 6th IE Bn (less Dets)

LtCol GOULD

j. Mil Govt Gp

LtCol MAY

Det A-3 and B-3 Mil Govt
Disp Unit G-10 and G-11
1st and 2d Plat, Co A, MP Bn, FMF, Pac
3d Plat, Co A, 2d Prov MP Bn (USA)
Civil Affairs MP Det

k. Div Hq Trs

LtCol STEPHENSON

Hq Bn
6th JASCO (less Dets)

l. a. G-2 summaries as issued.

- b. (1) Air and NGF Spt available as required.
(2) III Phib Corps will garrison and defend OKINAWA and adjacent islands north of the BISHA GAWA.
(3) 1st Mar Div will garrison and defend OKINAWA from the BISHA GAWA north to the line YOFUKE-SUKKU.

2. 6th Mar Div garrisons OKINAWA Island north of the line YOFUKE-SUKKU. Organizes and defends area including islands of SESOKO SHIMA, YAGACHI SHIMA and KOURI SHIMA against sea and airborne Atk. Conducts patrolling within assigned sector to capture or destroy all remaining isolated bands of guerillas. Defensive sectors and areas of responsibility Annex A Opn overlay.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol E coast at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay. Maintain one (1) Bn in readiness to move on three hours notice to Spt or reinforce any threatened sector.

Opn O No 47-45

- b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol E coast at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay.
- c. 29th Mar (Reinf): Garrison, organize and defend assigned sector against sea and airborne Atk. Patrol assigned area to capture or destroy remaining enemy resistance. Patrol SESOKO SHIMA, YAGACHI SHIMA and KOURI SHIMA at least once each week. Annex A Opn overlay.
- d. Div Arty: Occupy designated areas. Spt defense with supplementary defensive fire for infantry regiments; paying particular attention to beaches suitable for large scale landings. Be prepared to fire in any sector with at least one (1) Bn.
- e. Tank Gp: Occupy assigned area. Conduct Rcn and prepare plans in coordination with sector Comdrs with a view to supporting defense in any sector by swift and decisive tank-infantry counter-Atk. Maintain one (1) Co available to move to any sector on one hour's notice.
- f. Engr Gp: Improve, maintain and construct defensive sector routes of communication. Be prepared to mine or destroy critical points in road net and critical bridges. Execute normal Engr missions as directed.
- g. 6th Ser Bn (less Dets): Execute normal missions.
- h. 6th Med Bn (less Dets): Execute normal missions.
- i. 6th MT Bn (less Dets): Execute normal missions.
- j. Mil Govt Gp: Continue screening and rehabilitation native population. Apprehend and intern all able bodied males.
- k. Div Trs: Execute normal missions with special emphasis on the control of traffic, marking lines of communication, villages and road junctions.
- x. (1) This plan effective on receipt.
(2) All units submit plan of defensive fires and patrol plan 72 hours after occupying designated areas. G-3 will coordinate fire plans within Div Trs area.
(3) All units provide defense against Air Atk. (GO 5)

Opn O No 47-45 (Cont'd)

- (4) Senior Troop Comdr of adjacent units will coordinate defensive fires on boundaries.
 - (5) Sector Comdrs emphasize patrolling of inland areas.
 - (6) All units pay particular attention to internal security of billeting and outpost areas to prevent infiltration and raids by guerillas.
4. a. All units service equipment, particular attention to motor vehicles. Submit requisitions for shortages and prepare for future amphibious operations.
- b. Unit distribution to 4th Mar (Reinf); 22d Mar (Reinf); 29th Mar (Reinf). Dp distribution all others.
- c. Maintain 3-day levels of Classes I and III in unit Dps.
- d. Maintain 2 U/F in unit Dps.
5. a. CPs and axis of Sig Com:

6th Mar Div	0717 OBOE
4th Mar	To be reported
22d Mar	To be reported
29th Mar	To be reported
15th Mar	1020 GEORGE
Tank Bn	0727 WILLIAM
6th Engr Bn	0921 UNCLE
6th Med Bn	0716 DOG
1st Armd Amph Bn	0318 DOG
6th Ser Bn	0617 NAW
6th MT Bn	0418 KING
Mil Govt Gp	To be reported

b. See Annex B (Sig Com).

c. Pyrotechnic Code.

Visual Sigs:

Meanings assigned to various Sigs will not be altered. If special Sigs are required, local units may assign meanings to Sigs left unassigned in the lists which follow.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

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Opn O No 47-45

Opn O No 47-45 (Cont'd)

Annexes:

ABLE -- Opn overlay

BAKER -- Sig Com

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak

V. H. KRULAK

LtCol, USMC

G-3

6th Mar Div
In the field
24 Apr 45, 0900

Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O No 47-45

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

1. G-2 summaries as issued.
2. This Sig O becomes effective upon receipt.
3. a. 6th Sig Co: operate and maintain existing Com agencies and be prepared to install additional facilities as required.
 - (1) Scheduled messenger runs will leave Div CP at 0930 and 1500 daily. Special messenger service as required.
 - (2) Radio nets will be established as follows:

III Corps Comd (CW) - - - - -	1918 kcs.
III Corps Comd (Voice) - - - - -	2404 kcs.
Div Comd "A" (CW) - - - - -	P. 2656 kcs.
	S. 5990 kcs.
LAW (Voice) - - - - -	3115 kcs.
- b. 6th JASCO, less SP Com Teams; furnish Com for SFC and AGL as required.
 - (1) Subordinate units install, operate, and maintain signal system in their areas as required.
 - (2) All units police existing wire lines, overhead where possible, and reroute as necessary to by pass all villages.
 - (3) Time checks on Div Comd "A" daily at 1200 ITEM.
 - (4) Existing Jap telephone lines will not be destroyed or damaged.
 - (5) Within 48 hours after receipt of this order, subordinate units will submit a complete line route map and circuit diagram to Div Sig O.
4. a. Div Sig Dump located in vicinity of Div CP.
- b. Sig repair facilities available at Div CP.
- c. Any enemy Sig equipment which may be discovered will be forwarded to Div Sig O.
5. a. CentComTwo, III Corps MARSOI, (Index 2-10) and 6th Div SOPSIG 2 are effective.

Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O 47-45

~~SECRET~~

Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O 47-45 (Cont'd)

b. Div Sig O at Div CP.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
Cofs

Appendices:

1. Circuit Diagram
(to be issued)
2. Pyrotechnic Code

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
G-3

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Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O 47-45

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~~SECRET~~ 248

6th Mar Div
In the field
24 April 45, 0900

Appendix 2, Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O No 47-45

RD:

PYROTECHNIC CODE

1. VISUAL SIGNALS:

Meanings assigned to various Sigs will not be altered. If special Sigs are required, local units may assign meanings to Sigs left unassigned in the lists which follow:

a. BY GROUND FORCES

<u>Sig</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Sig, ground, green star cluster, M20A1	Arty or Gunfire or Bombs falling within own lines
Sig, ground, amber star cluster, M22A1	Objective taken
Sig, ground, white star, Prcht, M17A1	(Use for illumination)
Sig, ground, red star cluster, M52A1	Enemy landing in this sector
Sig, ground, white star cluster, M18A1	

b. BY AIRCRAFT

Sig, aircraft, double star red-red	Display front line markers
Sig, aircraft, double star, green-green	My mission has been completed
Sig, aircraft, double star, yellow-yellow	Not understood

- (1) The Sig meaning, "MY MISSION HAS BEEN COMPLETED", will be given at the time the last bomb is released by the last plane in the last group to participate in the particular mission.

Appendix 2, Annex BAKER to 6th Mar Div Opn O 47-45 (Cont'd)

c. COLORED SMOKES

<u>Sig</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Sig, ground, red smoke T-38, or yellow smoke T-40 or equivalents	Friendly Trs (one grenade or Sig, ground)
Grenade, smoke M-18, in any one of follow- ing colors: green, red violet and yellow	Friendly front line (two or more grenades or Sigs, ground)
Sigs, ground and grenades may be used simultaneously.	
(1) White or Black smoke will be used for screening and will not have any meaning assigned.	

d. TANK FLAG SIGNALS DISPLAYED FROM TANK TURRET

<u>Sig</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Orange Flag	Tank is low on Am and fuel; is pulling back to replenish supplies, but will return to lines.
Green Flag	Request Tp Com with ground Trs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
Lt Col, USMC
G-3

██████ (PRIORITY TO INFO ADEE)

271800

FROM: CG 6TH MAR DIV
TO : 6TH MAR DIV

INFO: CG III PHIB CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV

OPN O NO 48-45 X LARGE ENEMY GROUP REPORTED VICINITY
TARE ABLE 3024 X PARA X 6TH MAR DIV MOVES IMMEDIATELY
TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCE X PARA X 4TH MAR
LESS 3/4 CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X MOVE ONE CO
FROM 2/4 0730 28 APR TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR 3/4
SECTOR VICINITY TAIRA X PARA X 22D MAR 3/4 ATCHD MOVE
1/22 AND 3/22 IMMEDIATELY TOWARD REPORTED ENEMY POSITION
WITH 1/22 EMPLOYING TRAIL INLAND FROM HAMA AND 2/22
EMPLOYING TRAIL INLAND FROM HICHI X PROCEED AS FAR INLAND
AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO HALTING FOR NIGHT X MOVE 3/4 AT
SUCH TIME AS WILL PERMIT DAWN JUMP OFF FROM 3022 UNCLE X
LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCE X PARA X 29TH MAR REINF
CONTINUE DEF PRESENT POSITIONS X PARA X 15TH MAR SPT ATK
WITH AT LEAST ONE BN X PARA X 6TH MT BN PROVIDE 10 TRUCKS
AT ORA 0730 28 APRIL TO MOVE ONE COMPANY 2/4 TO TAIRA X
PARA X ALL OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X

Released

V. H. Krulak
V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
G-3

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