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Part 1 of 2

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ON

OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASES I AND II

VOLUME ONE

- CONTENTS -





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046/171

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HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD

30 April 1945

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASES I AND II

References:
(a) Annex C to 6th Mar Div GO-5
(b) 6th Mar Div GO-36
(c) FMF, Pac Confidential GO No 66-44
(d) Pacific Fleet Confidential Ltr 1CL-45
(e) III Phib Corps GO No 34-45
(f) 10th Army Operational Directive No 10

ENCLOSURE (A)

[redacted]

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

ANNEXES

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER I

## GENERAL

1. The purpose of this report is to describe in chronological detail the execution of the 6th Marine Division's part in the OKINAWA Operation, Phases I and II, and by factual analysis to emphasize lessons learned, in order that other organizations similarily employed may gain profit therefrom.

2. The mission of the 6th Marine Division, reinforced, as assigned in III Phib Corps Operation Plan No 1-45 was "To land on Beaches Green and Red and, initially making the main effort on the left, seize YONTAN Airdrome and line L plus 3 in zone of action; then on Corps order to seize line L plus 5 and succeeding objectives; protect Corps left (north) flank." It will be seen from the foregoing that the 6th Marine Division was assigned two simultaneous tasks, first, to seize the YONTAN Airdrome which was the prime initial objective for the 10th Army and second, to protect the left flank of the entire OKINAWA enterprise.

3. The mission of the 6th Marine Division, reinforced, as assigned in III Phib Corps Operation Plan No. 1-45 (Alternate) was "To land on Beaches Green A-4, Green A-3, Green A-2, and Green A-1; maintain contact with and assist advance of 1st Marine Division by fire and maneuver; seize objective line O-a within zone of action and protect the Corps left (south) flank; resume the attack on Corps order to seize IWA (Town), airfield west of ASHIMINE, objective line O-1 within zone of action; prepared for further operations on order." As in the case of the Preferred Plan the mission assigned the 6th Marine Division in the Alternate Plan involved protection of the 10th Army left flank and the seizure of the key airfield in the Army zone of action.

4. The 6th Marine Division's Preferred and Alternate Plans were based on the corresponding plans of the III Amphibious Corps and were so related that the execution of one plan by Corps would result in the execution of the corresponding plan by the 6th Marine Division. Subsequent decision by higher authority placed the Preferred Plan in execution.

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER II

## TASK ORGANIZATION

1. FOR OPERATION:

6th Mar Div (Reinf) - Maj Gen Lemuel C. SHEPHERD, Jr., USMC

CT 4 - Col Alan SHAPLEY, USMC

4th Mar (less 1 Bn (less 1 Co))
Co A 6th Engr Bn (less 2d Plat)
Co A 6th Pion Bn (less 2d Plat)
Co A 6th MT Bn (less 2d Plat)
Co A 6th Med Bn (less 1 Collecting Sec)
Det 26th and 33d Repl Draft
1st Plat MP Co (less Det)
1st Plat Ord Co (less Det)
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec and Det)
Det 58th NCB
Det 11th Sp NCB
Det 6th Amph Truck Co (5 DUKWs)
1st Band Sec (less Det)
1st SFCP 6th JASCO (less Det)
1st AGLP 6th JASCO (less Det)
1st SP Com Team 6th JASCO (less Det)
1st Sec 3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co

CT 22 - Col Merlin F. SCHNEIDER, USMC

22d Mar
Co B 6th Engr Bn
Co B 6th Pion Bn
Co B 6th MT Bn
Co B 6th Med Bn
Det 26th and 33d Repl Draft
2d Plat MP Co
2d Plat Ord Co
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
Det 58th NCB
Det 11th Sp NCB
Det 814th DUKW Co (6 DUKWs)
5th Prov Rocket Det
2d Band Sec
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co (less 1 Sec)
2d SFCP 6th JASCO
2d AGLP 6th JASCO
2d SP Com Team 6th JASCO

[redacted]AL

Div Arty - Col Robert B. LUCKEY, USMC

15th Mar
Det 6th Amph Truck Co (40 DUKWs)
Det 814th DUKW Co (40 DUKWs)
VMO-6

LVT(A) Gp - LtCol Louis METZGER, USMC

1st Armd Amph Bn
E-9-A Unit

Tank Gp - LtCol Robert L. DENIG, USMC

6th Tank Bn (less 1 Co)
Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co

1st LVT Gp - Maj Theodore P. WATSON, USMCR

9th Amph Trac Bn

2d LVT Gp - LtCol Clovis C. COFFMAN, USMC

4th Amph Trac Bn

Engr Gp - Maj Paul F. SACKETT, USMCR

6th Engr Bn (less Dets)
58th NCB (less Dets)

SP Gp - LtCol Samuel R. SHAW, USMC

6th Pion Bn (less Dets)
Repl Drafts (less Dets)
Det 6th JASCO
814th DUKW Co (less Dets) (2 DUKWs)
½ 11th Sp NCB (less Dets)

Ser Gp - LtCol George B. BELL, USMC

6th Ser Bn (less Dets)
6th MT Bn (less Dets)
6th Med Bn (less Dets)
Atchd:
Disp Units G-10 and G-11

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[redacted]

Div Trs - LtCol Floyd A. STEPHENSON, USMC

Hq Bn (less Dets)
Co C 1st Prov MP Bn (USA)
6th JASCO (less Dets)
6th Amph Truck Co (less Dets) (3 DUKWs)
Dets A-3 and B-3 Military Govt
Corps Arty Ln Teams
Early Air Warning Team

Div Res - LtCol Reynolds H. HAYDEN, USMC

2d Bn 4th Mar (less 1 Co)
2d Plat Wpns Co 4th Mar
2d Plat Co A 6th Engr Bn
2d Plat Co A 6th Pion Bn
2d Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
Det Collecting Sec Co A 6th Med Bn
Det 26th and 33d Repl Draft
Det 11th Spec NCB
Det 1st Band Sec
Det 1st Plat MP Co
Det 1st Plat Ord Co
Det 1st Plat S&S Co
Det AGLP 6th JASCO
Det SFCP 6th JASCO
Det SP Com Team 6th JASCO

2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ALTERNATE PLAN AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS:

Task organization for Operation Plan No 1-45 (Alternate) did not vary from that specified for Operation Plan No 1-45. As soon after the landing as the situation permitted, commencing on Love day, units composing the combat teams reverted to the control of parent organizations and were subsequently assigned to assault infantry units as the daily situation demanded.

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER III

## PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Included herein is an outline of preliminary planning undertaken by the various general and special staff sections.

1. G-1

a. Personnel planning for the OKINAWA Operation was coincident with conversion of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the 6th Marine Division. Upon activation on September 7, 1944, the Division was approximately 6000 below Table of Organization strength, and included in its strength some 1500 having more than 24 months continuous overseas duty. Requisition was immediately made to bring the Division to Table of Organization strength, plus 5%.

b. Replacements arrived in the following increments on the dates noted:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| September 10, 1944 | 54th Replacement Battalion | 1100 |
| October 28, 1944 | 7th Replacement Draft | 640 |
| November 28, 1944 | 14th Replacement Draft | 1250 |
| November 28, 1944 | 15th Replacement Draft | 1250 |
| February 1, 1945 | 29th Replacement Draft | 600 |
| February 8, 1945 | 43d Replacement Draft | 600 |

c. Key officers for particular jobs were obtained after representations were made to Headquarters, Marine Corps, and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

d. In addition to the above, on 8 January, 1945, the Division received two replacement drafts totaling 125 officers and 2500 enlisted men which were to be retained intact for shore party use. In early February, there being no immediate prospect of normal replacements, authority was obtained from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to assimilate sufficient personnel of these drafts to bring the Division to Table of Organization strength, which was done. Subsequently when variegated groups of replacements arrived just prior to embarkation they were fed into the drafts, again bringing them up to near their original strength.

e. In no instances did replacements received correspond to the classification requested. This was particularly noticeable in artillery where anti-aircraft personnel were furnished as the equivalent of field artillery personnel.

f. Requisitions were, by existing orders, restricted to actual shortages at the end of the reporting period. No provision was made to anticipate normal attrition to be expected in tropical areas, which in the case of this Division averaged between 350-400 per month. As a result, the Division was always in need of additional personnel. Drafts received had been formed on the basis of actual shortages existing several months previous, and by the time of their arrival they were inadequate to meet the Division needs.

g. Rotation was effected for enlisted personnel with more than 24 months continuous overseas duty, up until 1 January, 1945, at which time all rotation ceased.

h. Rotation of officers, although requested on numerous occasions, was not effected. No established policy was announced until 26 December, 1944. Planning was made difficult by this lack of enunciation of policy in that there was no certainty as to whether officers with more than twenty-four months continuous overseas duty would be available for the coming operation. The uncertainty of status affected the morale of these officers, and to some degree affected their usefulness to the Division. This was particularly apparent in cases where officers had, in anticipation of rotation, foregone the opportunity of taking 30 days leave.

i. At the time of embarkation the Division as a whole was slightly over Table of Organization strength. It was necessary to detail 82 officers and 1434 enlisted to the rear echelon due to the prospective movement of that group.

j. Upon final embarkation the Division was able to embark with an organic strength of 951 officers and 16,267 enlisted or 14 officers and 563 enlisted below Table of Organization strength. An additional 75 officers and 1900 enlisted were embarked for use as shore party labor troops, later to be used as battle replacements.

2. G-2

a. The preliminary intelligence planning of the OKINAWA JIMA Operation was achieved by a planning staff organized within the G-2 Section. This staff, which included the entire Aerial Photo Interpretation Section took the required security measures, and devoted itself entirely to the gathering of data concerning the target area. The administration of the G-2 Section and the training of its personnel were handled entirely by a staff not engaged in the planning of the operation.

b. The following documents containing information of the target area were prepared by the G-2 Section, excluding Aerial Photo Interpretation reports:

D-2 Study of the Theater of Operations, OKINAWA JIMA
Estimate of the Enemy Situation:

7 February, 1945
19 February, 1945
28 February, 1945
16 March, 1945
24 March, 1945

Annex A to 6th Marine Division Operation Plan No 1-45
Annex A to 6th Marine Division Operation Plan No 1-45 (Alternate)
D-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation (Alternate) 3 March, 1945
D-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation (Phase II) 25 March, 1945
New Doctrines in Japanese Defenses
Roster of enemy units on OKINAWA JIMA including estimated T/O and list of known officers
Miscellaneous Studies, bulletins, and overlays connected with planning and briefing
Reproduction of material received in insufficient quantities from higher echelons

c. The function of the Aerial Photo Interpretation Section in the planning phase may be divided into three component parts:

Interpretation of aerial photos and the checking of such interpretations as were received from higher echelons

Preparation of special studies on subjects assigned specifically to the Aerial Photo Interpretation Section, namely: terrain, beaches, airfields, defenses

Special map and terrain work, including sketches of ground forms, road maps, overlays of installations, beach sketches, etc.

d. The work of the Aerial Photo Interpretation Section progressed concurrently with that of the planning staff of the G-2 Section, often serving to illustrate the data prepared by the planning staff. All reports, studies, and other documents prepared by the Aerial Photo Interpretation Section were reproduced in quantity for dissemination, as were aerial photos that were considered of potential value to specific units.

e. One officer was detailed to Order of Battle work. Various publications were arranged and made available, in particular, the War Department Publication "Order of Battle of Japanese Armed Forces" and SOWESPAC publication "Organization of Japanese Ground Forces" were brought up to date and completed.

f. Lists of enemy units which were estimated to be in or near the target area and a roster of the officers believed to be members of those units were made. A loose leaf index system was adopted, and later a personality card index system was initiated. Prior to embarking, OOB officers of higher echelons and other divisions were contacted and arrangements were made for mutual exchange of OOB information.

3. G-3:

a. Preliminary information on the concept and general scheme for the execution of the OKINAWA Operation arrived in 6th Marine Division Headquarters in late December. This preliminary concept indicated the 6th Marine Division to be an interior unit in the III Amphibious Corps. Terrain studies and evaluation of the tactical problem were initiated on this basis. Subsequently, in early January, 10th Army Operation Plan No 1-45 was received, followed shortly by III Amphibious Corps Operation Plan No 1-45 which placed the 6th Division on the Corps left (north) flank and further specified that the 29th Marines, reinforced, was to be withdrawn from the 6th Division for employment as Corps reserve.

b. Immediately upon receipt of III Amphibious Corps Operation Plan No 1-45, work was begun on an estimate of the situation. Upon completion of this estimate, and based on the decision resulting therefrom, 6th Marine Division Operation Plan No 1-45 was prepared and issued on 10 February 1945.

c. In late February, III Amphibious Corps Operation Plan No 1-45 (Alternate) was received and an abbreviated estimate of the situation was prepared for the Alternate Plan. In accordance with the decision arrived at in this estimate 6th Marine Division Operation Plan No 1-45 (Alternate) was prepared and issued on 7 March 1945.

d. During the progress of the preliminary planning frequent conferences were held with subordinate commanders to acquaint them with the character of the operation and to provide information to permit formulation of their basic plans.

e. An outline of targets to be destroyed and neutralized by naval gunfire prior to L-Day and on L-Day before H-hour were submitted to the next higher echelon, III Amphibious Corps. Each target was chosen and given priority rating to insure that those targets affecting our landing on the preferred beaches were destroyed or neutralized. Since the ammunition was allotted by higher headquarters no specific amount was requested on any given target.

f. Personal liaison with III Amphibious Corps Gunfire Officer and 1st Marine Division Gunfire Officer was established while the aforementioned officers were on duty at Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Headquarters. Personal liaison was also established with the gunnery staff of ComTaskForce 53 by the division gunfire officers concerned.

g. All matters concerning naval gunfire support were brought to the attention of division gunfire officers and decisions made at planning conferences.

h. The preliminary planning for air support was accomplished by higher echelons. The Division Air Officer and all air ground liaison officers were acquainted with the procedure to be followed in the operation by frequent conferences held by III Amphibious Corps.

4. G-4

a. Information of the OKINAWA Operation was first received from III Amphibious Corps at a conference on 3 January 1945. Pertinent data for embarkation was furnished units of the Division from time to time in the form of administrative warning orders. The 6th Marine Division Administrative Plan No 1-45 was issued 8 February 1945. Due to lack of information concerning ships assigned, their characteristics, dates of arrival and amount of preloaded cargo and equipment, it was not possible to issue all annexes at the time of issuing the Administrative Plan. The last annex to be issued was Annex K - Unloading Plan, on 1 March 1945.

b. The primary difficulties encountered during this preparatory period resulted from unavoidable reasons incident to the distance of the Division from its supply agencies. The problem which caused the greatest concern was the uncertainty as to dates of arrival of many items of equipment and supplies. This concern became acute as the date of embarkation neared. As an example, seven (7) 105mm Howitzers were due to arrive 7 February 1945, from the Depot Quartermaster, Depot of Supplies, San Francisco. They did not arrive on schedule and arrangements finally had to be made at a late date to draw these howitzers from Army sources. The relations of Marine Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to the several combat and service

commands in the area were cumbersome and caused many delays. The 4th Service and Supply Battalion, located at GUADALCANAL, which was the supply agency of this Division, was a transfer rather than a stocking agency. The primary source of supply for the Division was the 4th Base Depot located in the RUSSELL Islands. The immediate superior of the 4th Base Depot in all supply matters was the 2d Field Service Command, located at GUADALCANAL. Supply problems, many requiring written correspondence and decisions by high authority, were not simplified by the addition of another senior echelon, the South Pacific Echelon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The recent change in the concept of operation of the Corps, by which administration of divisions is theoretically divorced from the Corps, has not benefited the Division. Supply and administration cannot, in practice, be separated from command. Continuity of administration of Corps and its Divisions throughout the rehabilitation and planning phases is essential. Every effort was made by all echelons of command to furnish the required supplies and equipment, and this Division embarked with no major shortages which effected the combat efficiency of the Division.

5. Division Artillery

a. Upon receipt of the Operation Plan for the OKINAWA Operation the following organization for combat was determined: one battalion would be placed in direct support of each assault regiment, and two battalions in general support. The attached Armored Amphibian Battalion would be used in general support upon the completion of its initial and primary missions. Based on map and aerial photo study, position areas and routes thereto were selected, and a survey plan determined. See Annex Dog.

6. Engineer

a. Equipment

The major equipment to be carried was prescribed by III Amphibious Corps from a recommended list furnished by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. No additions or deletions were permitted on the part of Division.

b. Training

Terrain information, aerial photographs, and engineer studies furnished by higher echelon, were examined and intensive training instituted in the most important subjects. These were: (1) Road building in extremely rough terrain, particularly heavy side hill cuts; (2) Rapid erection of organic bridge equipment and Bailey bridge; (3) Bridging using local materials and dimension timbers; (4) Water purification, with particular emphasis on new procedure necessary to eliminate blood fluke and amoebic cysts; (5) Mine removal and mine laying technique for

each individual in the Engineer Battalion and approximately 20% of the Pioneer and Naval Construction Battalions. A limited number of personnel from all other units were also trained in mine removal.

c. Special Equipage

Maps were studied and signs were prepared to mark all entrances to towns, control traffic, and mark roads by route number and direction of traffic. Signs were also prepared in quantity for marking mine fields.

d. Shore Party

It was mutually agreed that all dozers and all cranes would be initially attached to the shore party to expedite beach improvement and unloading. This equipment was to revert to parent control as soon as the unit concerned landed.

7. Ordnance

a. The Division Ordnance Section requisitioned and supplied the Division through the 4th Base Depot with ammunition, ordnance materiel, spare parts, accessories and cleaning gear for T/A allowance plus 30 days replenishment. Needed items not readily available were flown in by the Base Depot. Cleaning gear for 15 days ship board use, organizational spare parts and accessories were carried by the regimental combat teams, 30 days maintenance parts and cleaning gear being carried by the Ordnance Company for the Division.

8. Transport Quartermaster

a. In December, 1944, a Transport Quartermaster School, lasting five and one-half days, was conducted by the Division Transport Quartermaster Section. Each regiment assigned to the school one field officer (Regimental Transport Quartermaster) and two enlisted men; each battalion (including separate battalions), one field officer or senior captain (Troop Transport Quartermaster), one junior officer (Ship Loading Officer) and enlisted men as desired. The course covered the following subjects: Amphibious Force Organization, Naval Customs and Terminology, Administration and Command Organization of U.S. Naval Vessels, Tables of Allowances, Preparation of Embarkation Forms, Characteristics of Landing Craft, Ship-to-shore Movement, and 6th Marine Division Transport Quartermaster Standing Operating Procedure. During the last three days each Transport Quartermaster team worked a transport loading problem using the principles of combat-unit loading executing forms, and planning stowage by means of vehicle templates. After completion these problems were corrected by the Transport Quartermaster Section and returned for further study and guidance in loading out during embarkation phases.

[redacted]

b. Upon completing the school course personnel returned to their units and began to maintain up-to-date UP&T tables on file in order that when preliminary forms were called in, the bulk of the information would be at hand.

c. During the preliminary planning stages, the Division Transport Quartermaster prepared forms and charts showing the number and types of vehicles and equipment expected to be lifted, based on data from previous operations. These sources of information were revised from time to time upon recommendation of units concerned. Such data gave the Transport Quartermaster Section a general outline of total square feet and cubic feet of shipping required to lift the various vehicles and equipment expected to be taken.

d. Preliminary UP&T tables, upon which shipping allocation was based, were called in on 24 January, 1945. Allocation of ships to the various units was promulgated in the form of a Preliminary Embarkation Plan on 8 February, 1945.

e. Final UP&T tables and complete loading plans were completed by 22 February, 1945, the day before the first of the transports arrived. The Ship Transport Quartermasters, working with the units prior to the arrival of ships, proved to be of great assistance to the Troop Transport Quartermaster in planning the stowage of cargo.

9. Signal

a. The signal planning phase was initiated by a conference called by Commanding General, 10th Army, early in December, 1944. Present at this conference were the Signal Officers of III Corps and of the 1st, 2d and 6th Divisions, plus the Battalion Commander of the III Corps Signal Battalion. Those attending the conference were briefed on the operation and were given a general preview of the signal plan as drawn up by the 10th Army. Concurrently, the three division signal officers set about drawing up the frequency plan to meet radio communication requirements for their respective divisions. This plan was approved by ComPhibs Pac and by the Commanding General, 10th Army, prior to the close of the conference.

b. Subsequent to this, another conference of the signal officers of the three divisions of the III Corps was called by the Commanding General, III Corps, during the latter part of February, 1945. At this time the final details of the Corps Signal Plan were discussed and advance copies of the Signal Annex to the Corps Operation Plan were distributed for study. During this conference the Assistant Corps Signal Officer met with the commanders of the 4th and 6th JASCOs to work out the details of the Shore Party Communication Plan.



[redacted]

c. After these two conferences there was sufficient information available to permit the drafting of the signal annex in its final form based on tactical requirements set forth in the Division Operation Plan. This annex was discussed in sufficient detail with the communication officers of the subordinate units early enough in the planning phase to permit them to make the communication plans for their organizations.

d. The planning phase was culminated by the issuance and distribution of a Division Signal Communication Plan which was designed to support both the Operation Plan of the Commanding General, 6th Marine Division and the signal communication plans of higher headquarters.

## CHAPTER IV

## TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

The training program of the 6th Marine Division, based on the tentative target date, reached its culmination at almost the precise time when it was necessary for training to cease and embarkation to commence. This circumstance contributed in a large measure to the high state of training which the Division exhibited in the subsequent operation, and to the high state of morale enjoyed by the troops.

1. The 6th Marine Division training period commenced on October 1, 1944, and proceeded from small unit exercises through a full schedule of combined arms problems involving the reinforced battalion and the reinforced regiment. Individual marksmanship and combat firing exercises employing all weapons and supporting arms were conducted with emphasis on the training of flame thrower-demolition teams, tank-infantry and air ground cooperation, village fighting and amphibious operations. The training program was concluded with an eight-day division maneuver in which tactical principles for large unit employment were emphasized. Anticipating the probable nature of the forthcoming operation, the character of this division exercise involved a simulated landing and movement along the GUADALCANAL seacoast wherein one regiment had its flank on the ocean, a circumstance identical with that later to confront the Division in its landing on OKINAWA. During the exercise the execution of large unit maneuver, swift movement and redeployment of troops were stressed. The organization and employment of shore parties was emphasized and the actual landing of supplies and equipment were carried out. This training proved of the greatest value during the landing and the rapidly changing situations that arose on OKINAWA.

2. Rehearsals were conducted initially by deploying the two assault regiments on the ground in the general attitude in which they were to land on the beach, moving forward elements across an imaginary beach line and requiring them to deploy in a manner similar to that outlined in the scheme of maneuver.

3. Ship-to-shore rehearsals were conducted in the GUADALCANAL area during the period 1-6 March, 1945, inclusive. These rehearsals included the following:

a. One day of basic ship-to-shore exercise in which debarkation and landing craft deployment was stressed, with no troops landing on the beach.

[redacted]

b. Two days in which debarkation and landing craft deployment were stressed with assault elements landing on the beach and attempting to simulate initial deployment.

c. A one day full dress rehearsal landing of assault troops and certain items of equipment and supply.



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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER V

## LOADING AND EMBARKATION

### Loading

1. Commencing 19 February, 1945, rations and fuel were placed in dumps for eighteen of the twenty-four LSTs at Army LST landings at KUKUM Beaches, GUADALCANAL. Upon completion of initial loading at KUKUM, the LSTs moved to unit beaches where water, distillation units, ammuntion, and vehicles were embarked. On 27 and 28 February, 1945, amphibious vehicles and troops were loaded for rehearsals, which took place from 28 February to 6 March, 1945. Six of the LSTs loaded entirely at unit beaches. Final loading of vehicles and troops commenced on 9 March 1945; all LST loading was completed prior to 12 March, 1945, the time of departure for staging area. LSTs departed for staging area on the latter date. At the staging area those assault troops which had been embarked initially on APAs were transferred to LSTs.

2. Ten LSMs loaded fuel and rations at KUKUM from 25 to 27 February, 1945, according to times of arrival. Final loading of vehicles and troops of these vessels was made at unit beaches from 9 to 12 March, 1945.

3. The LSD loaded its entire cargo at unit beaches.

4. Allocation of the twenty-four LSTs, ten LSMs, and one LSD to units was as follows:

6th Tank Battalion: five LSMs (three to five tanks, medium, M4A3, in each); two LSTs (seven tanks, with flotation units in one, eight tanks with flotation units in the other); one LSD (one tank in each of sixteen LCMs).
6th Engineer Battalion: two LSTs.
1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion: two LSTs, five LSMs.
58th Naval Construction Battalion: two LSTs.
15th Marines (artillery): four LSTs (guns loaded in DUKWs).
22d Marines: six LSTs.
4th Marines: six LSTs.

5. Nine APAs and one AKA were loaed with rations and fuel at KUKUM Beaches from 23 to 25 February, 1945. These ships then-



19

moved up to unit beaches for loading general cargo prior to rehearsals. Four APAs and one AKA loaded at unit beaches, with the exception that fuel and rations were transported directly to these ships by small boats from the dumps at KUKUM. Not until after rehearsals were the majority of vehicles loaded; this loading commenced on 13 March, 1945. All APAs and AKAs had completed loading their entire cargo by 14 March, 1945, and troops were embarked on the afternoon of that date, the day before departure for staging area. A total of one LSM and two LCTs were available to the Division for loading heavy equipment on the APAs and AKAs.

6. Allocation of the thirteen APAs and two AKAs was as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Division Troops | - three APAs |
| 4th Marines | - four APAs |
| 22d Marines | - three APAs; one AKA |
| 29th Marines | - three APAs; one AKA |

7. Initial rations and ammunition to be issued to troops prior to debarkation were top-loaded on all ships for immediate accessibility upon arrival at target area. Such rations consisted of two days DOG and three days KING per man; the ammunition was one unit of fire.

8. Additional cargo space was afforded by understowing LSTs. Six LSTs were each understowed with two and one-half units of fire of 105mm Howitzer battalion ammunition, three LSTs were each understowed with one and one-half units of fire of CT ammunition, and one with five units of fire of 75mm Howitzer battalion ammunition. The ammuntion understowed on the tank deck did not exceed twenty-two inches in height, including generally one layer of Marston mats and one layer of one-inch dunnage, providing ample clearance for LVTs which were embarked over the understow.

9. Effort was made to stow all heavy equipment exceeding an LCM-capacity in LSTs. This was not accomplished in all cases, and it was necessary to load a few tractors in APAs and AKAs. The shore-to-ship transportation for such vehicles was made possible by prearrangement with the Naval Cargo Operations section of the island for the use of one LSM and two LCTs.

Embarkation

1. Final embarkation was conducted in accordance with Embarkation Order No 1-45. Troops were moved from bivouac areas to assigned embarkation points by water and road and execution proceeded on schedule without incident.

2. In preparing embarkation assignments the following difficulties were encountered:

a. Rated troop capacity could not be relied upon. In many cases, ships had made local alterations in the interest of comfort of the ship's company, thereby reducing troop space. In other cases ships exceeded their rated complements, with the result that troop space was diverted to the use of ship's company.

b. Use of an APA, designed for a battalion landing team, as a command ship for both a Transport Squadron and a Marine Division Headquarters, restricted officer accomodations while only partially utilizing enlisted troop space. It was necessary for the Division to split its staff thereby reducing efficiency enroute. Office space was so limited as to make it impossible to function properly while aboard.

## CHAPTER VI

## MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

1. Briefing

a. All prepared information concerning the target area was reproduced at GUADALCANAL and aboard ship, and was disseminated to units of the Division during the period of movement to the target area. This information was supplemented by excellent briefing kits issued in quantity by higher echelon.

b. A shipboard briefing program was instituted within the G-2 Section. This program was climaxed by an open competitive quiz program with highly favorable results. Officers and enlisted personnel of all embarked units attended this briefing program.

2. Events En Route

a. Full advantage was taken of the time interval which occured at the staging area. Recent aerial photos were received, interpreted, and disseminated, as well as all other important information that had been assembled while the task force was in transit to the staging area.

b. On L-1 Day, the reconnaissance parties which had been attached to the Underwater Demolitions Team, joined their respective units at sea and proceeded to provide those units with the most recently acquired information.

c. All units carried out a program of inspections of personnel and equipment to insure that the Division arrived at OKINAWA in the best possible condition for combat. In addition an intensive program of physical exercise was carried out so that the physical hardness achieved during training would be maintained.

d. Probably the most important program carried out by the Division was the thorough briefing of all hands. Every unit was ordered to see that every man knew not only his assigned task, but that of his own unit and of adjacent units as well as the general scheme of maneuver.

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER VII

## ASSAULT PHASE

### Narrative of the Operation

6th Marine Division Operation Plan No. 1-45 (Preferred) was placed in effect at 2315, 31 March 1945. It set in motion as operation which subsequently proved unique in Marine Corps history.

Landings commenced at 0837, 1 April 1945, under ideal sea conditions and covered by excellent air and naval gunfire support. Assault battalions of the 4th and 22d Marines, landing in accordance with the Preferred Plan (see Appendix 2) were almost unopposed on the beaches. They drove rapidly inland over the rising terraced terrain leading to the YONTAN Airfield and HANZA Town. Only minor resistance was met in the Division zone and consisted mainly of isolated pockets built around light machine guns in cave emplacements. The YONTAN Airfield was secured by the 4th Marines by noon of Love Day and found to be essentially intact. Following the assault units, succeeding elements of the Division moved ashore with great rapidity, until about noon when the receding tide exposed an exceedingly rough reef floor, which impeded the landing of reserves and supplies. Two assault tank companies scheduled to reach the beach at 0850 were actually entirely ashore and moving to support the infantry at 0905. The entire 15th Marines was ashore by 1530 and had registered along the defensive perimeter prior to nightfall. During the day contact was made and maintained with the 1st Marine Division on the right.

At the close of operations on Love Day, the Division had secured the O-2 line (see Appendix 1) and was well disposed for a vigorous resumption of the attack on the following morning. The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, in Division reserve, landed shortly after noon and was assembled in the zone of the 4th Marines preparatory to early release. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, released by III Phib Corps to the 6th Division at 1300, was landed at 1500 and was assigned a defensive position in support of the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, which was protecting the critical Division left flank. Love Day had proved successful beyond all expectations; the only unsatisfactory element was the slow movement ashore of supplies, due, for the most part, to undesirable reef conditions which prevented LSTs from beaching without extended reconnaissance.

The 22d Marines passed a relatively quiet night being subjected only to minor infiltration attempts. The 4th Marines on the right, however, received intermittent machine gun and mortar fire throughout the night.

The attack was resumed at 0715, 2 April 1945, to seize the Love plus 5 line (see Appendix 2) and to clear the ZAMPA MISAKI Peninsula, which was still considered to constitute a serious hazard to the Division's left flank. Likewise it was desired to uncover the Black Beaches at the earliest possible moment in order that they might be available for unloading operations.

The attack proceeded rapidly throughout the day. The 22d Marines encountered only light resistance but the 4th Marines met steadily increasing opposition during the afternoon. By nightfall the 4th Marines was actively engaged on its right with an enemy force entrenched in mutually supporting cave positions and bunkers east of the YONTAN Airfield. The enemy force, actually partly in the 1st Marine Division's zone, was employing both machine guns and mortars.

During the day ZAMPA MISAKI was seized by the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, who found only a few soldiers in the area, which were quickly liquidated. The Reconnaissance Company was dispatched on a mission to scout the north coast in the vicinity of NAGAHAMA and MAETA SAKI (see Appendix 2). Only scattered resistance was encountered and the NAGAHAMA Beach was disclosed to be satisfactory for landing supplies. The 6th Engineer Battalion was employed in repairing YONTAN Airfield during the day and planes from VMO-6 landed in the afternoon, thus becoming the first American aircraft to land on captured Japanese soil.

The advance of the Division on L plus 1 day had gradually slowed down due to the rough and rising terrain on the approaches to the YONTAN ZAN massif. The night of 2-3 April was quiet with the exception of the sector of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. This unit, as on the preceding night, received intermittent machine gun and mortar fire and frequent infiltration attempts.

On the morning of Love plus 2 the attack was resumed with the same troop deployment as on the preceding day, with the Division O-A line as the day's objective (see Appendix 2).

In a most effective day the 4th and 22d Marines advanced over an average of 7000 yards through difficult and heavily broken terrain seizing the dominating YONTAN ZAN hill mass, the O-A line, and subsequently the O-B line. The enemy resistance which had opposed the 4th Marines for the preceding two days was liquidated as were other minor pockets encountered by the 22d Marines. Throughout the day the advance was supported by tanks operating along the narrow trails that existed on the precipitous ridge tops.

In an attempt to develop the situation to the Division's front and to determine the character of enemy defenses in the ISHIKAWA Isthmus the Reconnaissance Company, supported and transported by two reinforced platoons of the 6th Tank Battalion, was ordered to drive forward on the north coast road and cross the ISHIKAWA Isthmus from NAKADOMARI to ISHICHA. The reconnaissance was completed

shortly prior to nightfall and disclosed only small enemy groups in the Isthmus area. The tank-infantry reconnaissance column was taken under mortar fire in the vicinity of ISHICHA and returned the fire at long range. Mortars ceased firing, though results were undetermined.

The 6th Engineer Battalion, assisted by the 58th Naval Construction Battalion, continued its work on YONTAN Airfield and prior to nightfall one F6F had made a successful forced landing on the field, while O-Y planes of VMO-6 operated from the field throughout the day. By nightfall of L plus 2, after 3 days of vigorous operations, the 6th Division's left flank rested on the base of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus, thus placing the operation of the 10th Army in this area approximately 12 days ahead of schedule.

During the night of 3-4 April the possibility of an airborne attack was announced by III Phib Corps. To counter the threat the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was moved to the vicinity of the YONTAN Airfield and deployed with one company of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion in support. The airborne effort was reported to have consisted of seven transport aircraft which were turned back or destroyed by fleet aircraft at sea.

On Love plus 3 the attack was resumed at 0730, to seize the Love plus 15 line, with the 4th and 22d Marines in assault and the 29th Marines, which had reverted to the Division, in reserve (see Appendix 2). No resistance was encountered during the morning although the area was honeycombed with caves connected with an intricate tunnel system. By 1130 it was apparent that the Division's objective would be reached shortly after midday, and continuation of the attack to the Division O-C and O-D lines was ordered (see Appendix 2). By 1400 the 4th Marines had reached the east coast of OKINAWA and the base of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus had been seized. During the afternoon patrols encountered scattered enemy groups, and at 1530 an enemy strongpoint built around several heavy machine guns was encountered and reduced by the 22d Marines. Nightfall saw the Division disposed in a defensive position across the ISHIKAWA Isthmus after a rapid advance of over 7500 yards (see Appendix 1). The day's attack through the rugged axial mountain range extended supply lines almost to their limit. Troops, however, were adequately fed and were prepared to continue the advance on the following day. The night of 4-5 April held to the pattern of the preceding three nights with the enemy attempting infiltration all along the line but with little success.

Due to the necessity for moving supplies forward to support the advance, the attack on Love plus 4 was not ordered to jump off until 0900. At that time the advance was resumed with armored reconnaissance columns moving up both sides of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus. The assault regiments, advancing with great rapidity, deployed units as necessary to dispose of enemy resistance encountered in inland positions. The tempo of enemy activity increased somewhat during the day and the 22d Marines was forced

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to deploy companies on several occasions to eliminate enemy pockets entrenched in caves and dugouts.

The day's advance, again averaging 7000 yards over extraordinarily rough terrain, concluded with the 22d Marines deployed along the line ATSUTABARU-KIN (see Appendix 1).

At this point the Division had diverged so far from the 1st Division to the southward that it was considered advisable by III Phib Corps to readjust boundaries in order to relieve the advancing 6th Division of the responsibility for rear area security. This redefinition of boundaries assigned the area south of the general line NAKADOMARI-ISHICHA to the 1st Marine Division. The night of 5-6 April was quiet with only minor infiltration by the enemy and the hours of darkness were employed by the limited transportation of the Division for the forward movement of essential supplies to the assault units.

The advance was resumed at 0830 on Love plus 5 with the 4th Marines assigned the task of advancing up the east coast of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus, and the 29th Marines, passing through the 22d Marines and advancing up the west coast. By 1330 the 29th Marines, preceded by a swift moving tank-infantry column, had reached its portion of the day's objective. The advance of the 4th Marines was retarded due to destruction of bridges which had been executed by the enemy on the principal supply road on the east coast. Numerous pockets of resistance were encountered during the advance of the 4th Marines and were liquidated by detaching elements of required size from the advancing columns. The Reconnaissance Company patrolled the mountain area between the line NAKADOMARI-ISHICHA and the line YAKADA-YAKA, destroying Japanese remnants in that area.

The day's advance was the longest yet covered by the Division, averaging almost 10,000 yards. The troops engaged in combing the mountainous inland area during this swift move were extremely fatigued at the close of the day. Two battalions patrolling the rugged interior were forced to replenish supplies and ammunition by the employment of "Weasels" moving along native foot trails. During the day aircraft of VMO-6 conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the MOTOBU Peninsula. The results of this reconnaissance indicated scattered enemy activity throughout the Peninsula. Located targets were attacked by aircraft loaded with rockets and napalm.

The advance was resumed at 0730 on Love plus 6 with the general line NAGO-ORA as the day's objective (see Appendix 2). By noon tank-infantry elements of the 29th Marines had reached and reconnoitered the large town of NAGO. By late afternoon the regiment had cleared the town and occupied positions on its outskirts. The advance of the 4th Marines was again retarded because of the restricted nature of the road net and continuation of enemy destructive demolitions, but by late afternoon the objective was reached (see Appendix 1). Meanwhile the 22d Marines in Division reserve combed

the area behind the assault regiments destroying numerous small pockets that had been by-passed.

In an effort to determine at the earliest possible time the character of the enemy's resistance in the MOTOBU area, the Reconnaissance Company supported and transported by tanks moved up the west coast road as far as AWA and then returning to NAGO, swung north to cross the base of the MOTOBU Peninsula as far as the town of NAKAOSHI (see Appendix 1). This reconnaissance revealed more enemy activity than heretofore, the Reconnaissance Company encountering several groups, which were killed or withdrew with casualties.

During the first seven days of the OKINAWA Operation combat in the 6th Marine Division zone of action had been characterized by an extraordinarily swift advance, generally in a contact imminent formation with assault regiments dropping out units as required to destroy located center of resistance.

The Division, committed to the task of advancing with extreme rapidity, was confronted with serious problems revolving about a great shortage of transport, a restricted and damaged road net, and the extremely rough inland terrain over which the infantry had to move and be supplied. The 15th Marines, though heavily taxed to deliver supporting fires and maintain ammunition levels with the limited transport available, managed to effect displacements with sufficient rapidity to maintain at least two battalions in support of the infantry at all times. Casualties to this point aggregated 47 killed and 150 wounded, with 556 enemy dead and 21 prisoners.

As reconnaissance was extended westward on the MOTOBU Peninsula it became evident that the enemy had selected the Peninsula's rugged mountains for his final defensive position. Air observation and aerial photo terrain studies confirmed these indications.

Upon arrival at the base of the MOTOBU Peninsula the Division was confronted with the problem of reorienting for operations aimed at the reduction of the Peninsula, and at the same time maintaining security of its northern flank. Consequently on Love plus 7 the 22d Marines were deployed across the island from NAKAOSHI to ORA, covering the right and rear of the 29th Marines, which was assigned the task of seeking out and fixing the enemy defenses in the MOTOBU Peninsula. The 4th Marines were assembled in a condition of readiness in the vicinity of ORA where they might be used either to participate in the MOTOBU operation, to support the 22d Marines on the north flank, or to conduct offensive operations to the north if the situation permitted.

On the morning of Love plus 8 the 29th Marines moving in three columns, one along the north and one on the south coasts and the third up the center of the MOTOBU Peninsula, commenced its efforts to locate the enemy's main force. Light resistance was encountered

by all columns, and the character of the opposition was such as to indicate without question that a force of considerable proportions confronted the Division.

During the period L plus 8 to L plus 12 the 29th Marines, supported by tanks and engineers, conducted continuous probing operations, gradually developing the character of the enemy situation. During this period frequent contacts were made in the rugged territory northwest and southwest of ITOMI (see Appendix 1). Ambushes were frequent, and the enemy's employment of artillery gradually accellerated. Counter battery fire was experienced on one occasion by the 2d Battalion, 15th Marines, whose position areas were accurately shelled on the afternoon of the 13th. About 2000 rounds of ammunition were destroyed as well as one gun.

At the same time night counterattacks increased in frequency. One particularly bitter fire fight occurred during the night of Love plus 9-10, when the enemy struck the defensive perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines. The attack, supported by artillery, mortars, machine guns and 20mm antiaircraft cannon was broken up shortly before dawn. During operations on Love plus 9, the 2d Battalion, 29th Marines, on the right flank seized UNTEN KO, the area in which the enemy had previously maintained a submarine and torpedo boat base. The base had been abandoned, four midget submarines sunk, and much equipment and supplies left behind. Naval personnel, numbering about 150 men, were reported to have moved into the mountain area to the westward.

On Love plus 10, ComTaskForce 51 expressed a desire for capture of BISE Point (see Appendix 3) at the earliest possible time in order that radar facilities might be installed there. On Love plus 11 the Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of passing through the left of the 29th Marines, reconnoitering the BISE area and, if resistance was light, to seize and hold the point. As anticipated, resistance encountered was sporadic. A group of naval personnel were killed and the point was seized and occupied without difficulty.

By Love plus 12 the enemy situation was thoroughly developed and the hostile position firmly fixed. At that time the 29th Marines was disposed with the 1st and 2d Battalions in the ITOMI area, and the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of TOGUCHI (see Appendix 3). Mounting intelligence indications placed the enemy strength at about 1500 troops including infantry and artillery. The position selected was rugged in the extreme and was built around precipitous Mt YAETAKE the key terrain feature on the MOTOBU Peninsula.

The Mt YAETAKE area had been intelligently selected and thoroughly organized. Its commanding elevations provided excellent observation of all of NAGO WAN as well as the outlying islands, including IE SHIMA. Furthermore, the character of the terrain was such as to preclude the employment of mechanized equipment in its

reduction. Actually the terrain was of such an impassable nature that it offered serious difficulties even to infantry. Organization of the ground had obviously progressed over a long period and all likely avenues of approach into the position were heavily mined. Intelligence indicated the force defending the YAETAKE area to be built around elements of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and known as the UDO force, after its commander. Its composition included infantry, machine gun units, light and medium artillery, Okinawa conscripts and naval personnel from the submarine base at UNTEN KO. In addition to the supporting artillery which consisted of 75 and 150mm guns the enemy had emplaced two 6" naval cannon capable of bearing on the whole of NAGO WAN, IE SHIMA and the coastal road for 10 miles south of MOTOBU.

Upon study of the situation it became apparent that additional troops would be required to reduce the enemy stronghold. In consequence the 4th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, was moved to the vicinity of SAKIMOTOBU while the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was placed in Division reserve in the vicinity of AWA. A coordinated attack was planned for Love plus 13 with the 4th Marines (3d Battalion, 29th Marines attached) driving inland in an easterly direction while the 29th Marines drove west and southwest in an effort to reduce the enemy position by action from two flanks and isolate the enemy forces on Mt YAETAKE from those in the northern tip of the MOTOBU Peninsula (see Appendix 2).

It is of interest at this point to examine the character which the MOTOBU operation had assumed. The high YAETAKE hill mass intervening between the two assault regiments permitted the rare situation wherein two large forces of combined arms could attack in opposing directions without great danger of overlapping supporting fires.

The attack of Love plus 13 proceeded as planned, in the zone of the 4th Marines, where the initial high ground set as the day's objective was seized (see Appendix 3). Resistance was bitter and casualties high. During the progress of the day one battalion commander was killed and several company commanders were casualties. As the attack developed in the 29th Marines zone it became clear that the enemy was so disposed as to render further advance in a west and southwesterly direction most difficult and costly. The attack was therefore reoriented initially in a south westerly direction in order to assault the YAETAKE position by a more favorable avenue of approach.

On Love plus 14 the attack was resumed at 0900 to seize the line O-N (see Appendix 3). The 4th Marines with the 3d Battalion, 29th Marines, still attached, drove inland, fighting its way up the steep slopes of Mt YAETAKE, encountering pillboxes and caves. In the later afternoon the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, seized, lost and subsequently regained a key hill mass immediately southwest of the Mt YAETAKE peak. The fighting in this area was extremely

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bitter, as the enemy, entrenched on the dominating terrain covering all approaches, was able to bring heavy and effective fires on assault units as they climbed the steep mountain side.

During the day the 29th Marines continued their drive into the rear of the YAETAKE position, advancing in a west and northwesterly direction, encountering intermittent resistance throughout the period and, by constant pressure, assisting the 4th Marines. Concurrent with the day's offensive activities the 4th Marines moved the 3d Battalion northeast from AWA preliminary to initiation of operations against the southern flank of the enemy positions on the following day. During the day casualties continued to mount, and evacuation was extremely difficult due to the precipitous nature of the terrain. Casualties at the days end aggregated 109 killed, 375 wounded and 6 missing. 1120 enemy dead had been counted.

On Love plus 15 the Division was oriented to attack the enemy position from three sides. The 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, assembled in Division reserve in the vicinity of AWA to relieve the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was directed to advance northeastward and establish contact with both assault regiments thus closing the gap between the two and forming a continuous line around the south, east and west sides of the enemy position. This day, which marked the heaviest fighting of the MOTOBU operation, resulted in complete achievement of the assigned objective. At dark the 4th Marines had seized Mt YAETAKE hill mass while the 29th Marines had swung their front to the west and north destroying fixed emplacements and isolated enemy groups of platoon size. The 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, effectively closed the gap between the assault regiments and the day ended with units disposed as shown in Appendix 3, for a final push down the north-south ridges of the YAETAKE position.

On Love plus 16 in a coordinated attack with the axis of the attack of the 4th and 29th Marines gradually shifting to the northward (see Appendix 2), assault elements drove rapidly through the remaining YAETAKE resistance, and the day ended with both regiments in contact on the high ground overlooking the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road.

On Love plus 17, following the vigorous fighting of the preceding four days, activity in the MOTOBU area was confined to reorganization, resupply and patrolling of the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road.

On Love plus 18 a coordinated attack was executed by the 4th and 29th Marines abreast aimed at the seizure of the high hill mass remaining between the ITOMI-TOGUCHI Road and the north coast which reconnaissance indicated had been strongly organized. This attack proceeded rapidly, meeting only scattered resistance, and nightfall saw the 3d Battalion, 29th Marines, which had reverted to regimental control and had moved swiftly around the MOTOBU Penninsula to the right of the 29th Marines line, in possession of the objective. (See Appendix 3). Apparently the enemy had failed to occupy the previously prepared position in strength, although a



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considerable number of dead bodies were found, presumably killed by artillery and naval gunfire.

Movement to the north coast of the MOTOBU Peninsula was completed on Love plus 19. Intelligence at this time indicated that several hundred enemy troops had fled the MOTOBU trap and would probably attempt to escape from the peninsula to northern OKINAWA. This estimate was later to be borne out.

On Love plus 20, following a night rubber boat reconnaissance, the island of YAGACHI SHIMA was seized without resistance by the Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Battalion, which had been attached to the 6th Marine Division. The force was transported from the mainland to the island on armored amphibians. The same process was repeated on Love plus 21, on SESOKO SHIMA. On Love plus 22 Division Reconnaissance Company executed a daylight landing, mounted and supported by armored amphibians, on KOURI SHIMA, likewise finding no resistance.

The MOTOBU operation may be characterized as mountain warfare of the most rugged sort. Infantry combat was at short ranges, and the cave and pillbox positions demanded the heavy employment of demolitions. At the conclusion of the operation our casualties had reached 207 killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing. The enemy had lost 2014 dead. The framework of the defense was most apparent from the variety of weapons captured. These included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150mm caliber, two 6" naval cannon and quantities of mortars, machine guns, and 20mm antiaircraft guns. For a complete analysis of the enemy's material losses see Chapter IX.

Concurrent with operations on the MOTOBU Peninsula steps were taken to seize the remainder of the area resting south of the line SHANAWAN-KAWATA WAN which marked the completion of Phase III. During the period Love plus 7 to Love plus 10 the 22d Marines advanced up the west coast while the 4th Marines advanced up the east coast, both regiments conducting extensive inland patrols and destroying numerous small enemy groups in the process. On Love plus 10 the Phase II line was secured. Commencing on Love plus 11 the 22d Marines assumed responsibility for further advance to the northward. Moving in two columns, one on either coast, the regiment advanced rapidly against scattered opposition to the line MOMOBARA-AHA. On Love plus 11 information was received from ComTask Force 51 that occupation of the HEDO MISAKI Peninsula in the northern tip of the island was desired at the earliest possible date. In consequence the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, moved by forced march during the lay of Love plus 12 and seized the HEDO MISAKI Point. Scattered resistance consisting of small hostile patrols was encountered during the march, which was further complicated by well executed demolitions on the part of the enemy.

Following occupation of HEDO MISAKI Point the 22d Marines immediately sent patrols down the east coast from that point, and on Love plus 18 patrols from north and south made contact at AHA.

During the period Love plus 18 to Love plus 20 units of the Division reorganized and commenced movement to garrison defense sectors established in Division Operation Order No 47-45, while conducting vigorous inland patrols to locate any enemy resistance remaining. On Love plus 20 the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, patrolling in the area immediately south of the MOTOBU Peninsula located a group of about 200 enemy which had escaped from MOTOBU. The battalion in two days of vigorous fighting surrounded the group and destroyed 102 enemy troops who were firmly entrenched on the mountainous area east of NAGO in previously prepared positions including caves and pillboxes. As it subsequently developed, elements of this group escaped and joined with a further Japanese group which likewise was a remnant of the MOTOBU battle. This group, estimated at 200 Japanese, was located on Love plus 26 and swift steps were taken to prevent its escape to the north and east coast (see Appendix 1). Two battalions of the 22d Marines moved southward in a forced night march from HENTONA toward the suspected area, while the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved inland from KAWADA. The latter unit made contact with the enemy force at about noon on Love plus 27, swiftly maneuvered around its flank and forced it to fight on unfavorable ground without opportunity to dig in. The result was destruction of 124 Japs, including 3 officers, with a high probability that the remainder of the 200 man force was also wiped out.

Thereafter extensive patrolling by all units was conducted until the 6th Division was relieved by the 27th Army Division on Love plus 33. During this period only a few scattered stragglers were encountered and either taken prisoner or liquidated.

This concluded the offensive operations conducted by the 6th Marine Division during Phases I and II of the OKINAWA Operation. During that period the Division had moved 84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, counted over 2500 enemy bodies and captured 46 prisoners. Our losses during the period were 236 killed, 1061 wounded, and 7 missing. During the rapid advance of the Division from YONTAN Airdrome to the northern tip of OKINAWA practically every type of maneuver was employed and all types of supply problems encountered. The successful execution of the mission assigned gives conclusive evidence that a Marine division is capable of extended operations ashore.

## Section 1 - Ship-to-Shore Movement

The ship-to-shore movement was executed according to plan, with a few minor variations which are considered of small importance. The first waves reached the beach about 7 minutes following the appointed H-hour due, according to estimates by the Group Able Control Officer, to unpredictable current variations. One platoon of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, scheduled to land on Beach Red 2 actually landed on Beach Red 3 immediately adjacent. The dispatching of boat waves, the execution of wave guide duties and the control of landing craft was satisfactorily performed. Particularly effective was the means adopted by mutual agreement between 6th Marine Division and ComTransRon 12 for landing of non-scheduled waves. Parallel communications were employed, channelling through both Navy and Marine circuits. The receipt of the order via either channel was considered a valid order to land, and on no occasion was a non-scheduled wave held up because of communication or control failure.

Other elements of the ship-to-shore movement were routine and without event.

## Section 2 - Shore Party

1. The 6th Marine Division Shore Party was composed of the Pioneer Battalion as a nucleus and with Pioneer officers as the commanders of the various components. The organization was planned to employ initially Battalion Landing Team Shore Parties, under the command of platoon leaders of the Pioneer companies. Upon the assumption of control of the RCT's by the CT commanders, the CT Shore Party Commanders assumed coordinating control of their landing team beaches. At 1800 on L Day the Division Shore Party assumed control of all RCT Shore Parties.

2. Each LT Shore Party was composed of a pioneer platoon; a JASCO Shore Party team; a detachment of the Engineer Battalion as equipment and still operators, mine removal personnel and camoufleurs; a detachment of the 58th Naval Construction Battalion as equipment operators; detachments of the Service & Supply platoons and ordnance platoons and battalion quartermaster and battalion S-4 representatives to control the dumps and keep the dump records; motor transport personnel to operate trucks, repair and de-water-proofing stations; MP squads to control beach traffic and provide control of civilians and POWs; detachments of the 11th Special Naval Contruction Battalion

as ships' platoons for the LSTs; Pioneer Battalion medical personnel to provide aid and evacuation stations; detachments of the 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts as labor.

3. The above organization was found to be efficient and adequate both as to control and performance of work.

4. No Field Depot personnel were available to the Shore Party. The Replacement Drafts were organized into groups of 25 men under command of a lieutenant or senior non-commissioned officer. Each BLT Shore Party was assigned 175 replacements and officers to furnish labor and boat riders. The labor on the beach was assigned by groups to work the various dumps and beach landing points. Depending upon the situation these groups were shifted from their prior assignments to other working areas. On L Day due to the rapidly moving advance, replacement labor was loaned to the regiments to assist in working the forward dumps. The rapid unloading and advance forward could not have been accomplished without the remainder of these replacements as Shore Party labor.

5. The equipment consisted of 37 various types of bulldozers, including all the organic equipment of the Pioneers and additional equipment from the 6th Engineer Battalion and 58th Naval Construction Battalion; 14 cranes, 6 of them TD-14 swing cranes, the remainder TV-9 cranes; transportation consisted of 11 6x6 dump trucks of the Pioneer Battalion and 6 Pioneer 4x4 $\frac{1}{2}$-ton trucks; the use of the 6th and 814th Amphibian Truck Companies and the amphibious tractors of the 4th and 9th Amphibian Tractor Bns; 10 distillation units of the 6th Engineer Battalion were set up and operated initially by the Shore Party; 8 3/8-Yd and 3/4-Yd cranes were provided by the 6th Engineer Battalion, the 58th Naval Construction Battalions and the 11th Special Naval Construction Battalions to act as reef transfer barge cranes.

The equipment was adequate, but the efficiency would have been increased if sufficient TD-14 swing cranes had been available to replace all the TV-9 A-frame cranes. The addition of one 3/8 yard truck-mounted crane as organic Pioneer Company equipment would greatly increase the efficiency of the Shore Party.

6. No mechanized deveices other than those mentioned above were initially available. By L plus 3 a pontoon pier was in operation.

7. The defenses established on L Day consisted of a perimeter defense of each beach, the frame-work being the organic weapons and men of the Pioneer platoons, reinforced by the use of amphibian tractors spotted on the reef at the flank of each beach and by two platoons of armored amphibians sighted for seaward firing and prepared to place artillery concentrations on possible counter-landing points to the north. Except on the left flank of beach Green 1, machine guns, including flank guns, were sited so as to fire in the direction of the sea to avoid shooting into forward troops. The left

flank of Green 1, the Division left flank, was protected by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, trip flares, and booby traps. The protection of all dumps was by means of riflemen bivouaced in slit trenches around them.

8. Prior to leaving GUADALCANAL, 20 replacements were attached to each Pioneer platoon and trained primarily as MPs and weapons personnel. These men were used to augment the small detachments of regular MPs. By L plus 1 all MPs were provided with sketches of their immediate vicinity to show the layout and traffic scheme.

9. Issues of supplies and dump control was under the men of the service and supply platoon and controlled successively by battalions, regiments, and division. In many cases in the first three days, supplies did not enter the dumps but were hauled direct by DUKWs and amphibian tractors direct to using units. As a result, in the rapid advance of the troops, small dumps of supplies and equipment marked the route forward.

10. a. Control from ship to shore was by means of the beachmaster communication channels, and by the G-4 logistical net On L Day an initial supply was provided by preloading LVTs with 1000 pounds each, the material being thrown out on the beach and assembled by the Shore Party. All other unloading on L Day was on call for specific items through the beachmaster channels.

b. At 0600 on L plus 1 general unloading commenced. Beachmasters controlled boat traffic bringing material ashore. Specific requests for priority materials went out over the G-4 net to the Division logistical control officer, who arranged for the ships to place these materials into craft. The system was both efficient and flexible. The logistical control officer also provided for periodic and special reports of the percentages of unloading.

All craft and amphibian vehicles reported to a control boat off their respective beaches, delivered their cargo tickets, were kept there until directed to the beach, where they delivered a cargo ticket to the beach checker. The cargo tickets were periodically delivered to the CPs in order to provide a record of supplies landed.

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## Section 3 - Naval Gunfire Support

1. The four assault battalions were each assigned a fire support ship of destroyer type or larger, and a primary spotting frequency. The initially assigned ships were in direct support of battalions and one battlehsip was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, as a Division general support ship for ready protection for our vulnerable left flank.

2. During the preparatory fires on the beach defenses, the Naval Gunfire Control common circuit was guarded by the Division Naval Gunfire Officer aboard the CAMBRIA while the Assistant Division Naval Gunfire Officer with his radio and communication team proceeded to shore in the Assistant Division Commander's Section. Communication was established with regiments and the command ship at 1300 Love Day which was about 30 minutes before the arrival of the Division Naval Gunfire Officer. From this time on through the capture and organization of the final phase line, Naval Gunfire Support functioned in the normal manner except as noted in Chapter X below.

## Section 4 - Air Support

1. Prearranged air strikes were carried out prior to the landing of the assault elements. This included bombing and strafing of the landing beaches and strikes on installations that might hinder the establishing of the beachhead. After the ground forces were established ashore, air furnished support by carrying out missions against deep support targets, and executing pre-jump off and called strikes. During the first thirteen days of the operation the need for air support was limited by the rapid advances of the Division and the lack of suitable targets.

2. When enemy resistance stiffened on MOTOBU Peninsula air was called on to destroy enemy emplacements, observation posts and troop concentrations. Napalm was employed very successfully to burn off camouflage. During the period Love plus 11 to Love plus 18 air was used on artillery emplacements and fortified caves. The caves proved very difficult to locate, but once located were effectively attacked with rockets.

3. After Love plus 18 the need for air support was greatly reduced. Airplanes were available on call from April 19 until the Division zone of action was secured, but strikes were limited to nearby islands on which enemy activity was suspected.

4. VMO-6 remained under the tactical control of Corps Artillery.



[redacted]

## Section 5 - Tanks

1. Employment of tanks in the operation in no wise departed from sound tactical and tank-infantry doctrine. Details of employment are included in Annex Easy, Special Action Report, 6th Tank Battalion, and comments on the relative effectiveness of LSMs, LCMs and T6 flotation devices are included in Chapter X below.

## Section 6 - Amphibian Tractors

1. Two amphibian tractor battalions loaded 17 LVTs on each of 12 LSTs for movement to the target. These formed the assault waves at the target. After the assault troops had been landed, the LVTs were assigned to the Shore Party and were employed in reef transfers for unloading supplies and equipment. Control of LVTs during the unloading followed usual practice and was very satisfactory. Operational losses were high. Approximately 20 percent were continually inoperative due to necessity for minor repairs. LVTs were employed successfully on occasion to supply isolated units when Division Motor transport was insufficient or when water transportation was required. Units of company size, patrolling in mountainous terrain adjacent to the sea were readily supplied by 4 LVTs, operating over a sea distance of 10 miles from the nearest dumps. For details see Annexes Item and Jig and reports of the 4th and 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalions.

## Section 7 - Armored Amphibians

1. See Annex How, Special Action Report, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion.

2. The salient characteristic of armored amphibian activity in the OKINAWA Operation was the manner in which the diverse capabilities of that weapon were demonstrated. Armored LVTs were employed in the conventional manner to cover the ship-to-shore movement of assault waves. Immediately thereafter they assumed the function of direct fire assault guns under the control of combat team commanders. Upon landing artillery forward observers, armored amphibians checked into the forward observer radio nets and commenced delivery of supporting artillery fires under the control of 15th Marines. During the rapid advance to the northward, armored amphibians were frequently moved to points of vantage where they were employed as artillery in battery by the 15th Marines.

3. On two occasions armored amphibians were employed to transport and support a reconnaissance in force on outlying islands. In the landing on SESOKO SHIMA Company Able, Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Battalion, was transported on armored amphibians and later at KOURI SHIMA the 6th Reconnaissance Company was similarly

[redacted]

transported. It was found that eight men can be comfortably carried on the vehicles and that firing enroute to the beach does not disturb the passengers. One deterrent, however, is the fact that the armored amphibian is already overloaded with armor and ammunition, and the addition of one ton of personnel further accentuates this fact.

## Section 8 - Infantry Combat

1. See Annexes Able, Baker and Charlie, Special Action Reports of Regimental Combat Teams 4, 22 and 29 respectively.

2. Employment of infantry elements of the 6th Marine Division in the OKINAWA Operation covered most of the spectrum of offensive operations. Following the conventional ship-to-shore movement and landing on a hostile shore it became swiftly apparent that the operations of the Division were to be characterized, at least initially, by rapid movement embracing open warfare of a scope heretofore foreign to the Marine Corps.

3. Small unit activity was of a routine nature and of such quality as might be expected from well trained squads, platoons and companies. There was a desirable predisposition to maneuver freely on the part of small units, which resulted in the outflanking of each element of opposition as it was encountered. Training in assault demolitions proved most valuable, and the willingness of small units to close and seek a decision with these arms was apparent. Little need arose for flame throwers until the battle for Mt YAETAKE began. The terrain in this area was of such a precipitous and rugged nature that flame thrower employment was rendered almost impossible. This fact emphasizes the need for a light highly portable expendable one-shot flame thrower, which comes to the assault troops loaded, primed and ready to fire.

The extraordinarily rough mountain terrain in the MOTOBU Peninsula rendered employment of 81mm mortars most difficult. While this experience can by no means be characterized as representative, it indicates the need, under such circumstances, for a lightweight mortar of large caliber (81mm or greater).

4. Infantry combat in the larger units was likewise characterized by freedom of maneuver. During the initial phase of the campaign, the essence of the 6th Division's operation was that of swift movement. During the period from Love plus 1 to Love plus 8 the Division advanced rapidly in a contact imminent formation, under cover of a reconnaissance screen. Units making contact were quickly deployed, and maneuver instituted to destroy the resistance.

Upon development of the resistance in the MOTOBU Peninsula it became necessary to modify the character of the Division's attack and to effect a swift redeployment wherein the major part of the Division's power could be brought to bear on the strong center of enemy resistance.



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It was estimated that reduction of the strong YAETAKE hill mass would require the employment of two infantry regiments. The 29th Marines and the 4th Marines were so deployed as to strike the position from front and rear (see Appendix 3). This maneuver, rarely possible in large units because of the considerable danger from interfering fires, was made feasible by the presence of a high intervening hill mass. As the regiments converged, the attack gradually shifted direction to the northward until, as the position was overrun, the regiments were abreast, in contact, and each pointed in a direction ninety degrees from the original azimuth. This complicated maneuver, conducted over extremely rough terrain where visibility and control of supporting arms was particularly difficult, is considered worthy of mention as an exceptional situation in infantry combat.

## Section 9 - Communications

1. During this operation the rapid advance of the Division and the distances which often existed between Division Headquarters and those of subordinate units, combined to tax greatly all agencies of communication. During the first two weeks wire crews received little rest, being constantly on the road extending lines forward, shooting trouble, and striving to keep wire lines out of the zones of engineer activity. Messenger service usually required three to four hours travel on a crowded road in order to effect deliveries. Conditions decreed that radio received the bulk of all traffic and this agency initially was considerably overloaded; however, congestion was relieved somewhat by providing a functional net for the Operations Section; this net remained under the control, and for the sole use of, G-3. The distances involved frequently dictated the use of relay stations in order to maintain contact between the various stations, especially when high land masses existed between them. Likewise, alternate means such as tank, artillery, aircraft and naval gunfire circuits were used during emergencies.

2. In spite of the difficulties which arose during the operation, it is considered that sufficient communications were at all times available. The signal activities can best be reflected by reference to the attached list of answers to the questions listed in 6th Marine Division General Order No 36-45. The attached list includes both the questions and answers.

[redacted]L

a. Communication Plan (SOI)

Q. Was the plan adequate?
A. Plan was adequate.

Q. Were sufficient frequencies made available to tactical organizations?
A. Frequencies were sufficient.

Q. Were sufficient call signs assigned?
A. Call signs were sufficient.

Q. Was there duplication of communication systems? If so, to what extent?
A. Duplication of communication systems not evident.

Q. Was liaison effected during the planning stages?
A. Liaison was effected during planning stage. Officers from units concerned were present at all conferences. Liaison officers from attached units were available when needed.

Q. Was sufficient time available to draw up communication plan?
A. Time allowance was adequate.

Q. Were communication plans received by lower echelons in sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and make necessary changes?
A. Yes.

Q. Did plan include preventative measures for avoidances of destruction of wire lines by our own vehicles? Was this part of plan successful in the operation?
A. Yes. Plan was very successful after movement from beach area was completed.

b. Rehearsal

Q. Were there any changes in the communication plan as a result of the rehearsal? Why?
A. Yes. Movement of Division command post ashore during rehearsal indicated need for different technique in order to avoid break down in communication and to insure messages being received by the proper headquarters echelon.

Q. Were any deficiencies found in equipment? If yes, how were they corrected?
A. No deficiencies in equipment found.

Q. Did the rehearsal provide an adequate check on all communication facilities?
A. No. Many agencies were not completely established. Wire installations were not fully exercised.



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Q. How could the rehearsal be improved?

A. Assault phase should last two days in order that agencies may be operated over normal distances, and thus given a more complete check.

c. Embarkation and Voyage

Q. Was equipment loaded according to plan?

A. As nearly as possible.

Q. Was any equipment damaged in loading?

A. Yes. One 6x6, 2½ ton truck had drive shaft broken.

Q. Were such items as storage batteries checked during voyage?

A. Yes.

Q. What type of training was carried out aboard ship?

A. Schooling of radio and message center personnel on code names, units involved, terrain, and the operating procedure to be used aboard ship and ashore. Wire personnel schooled as to terrain, studied maps, given the wire plan they were to execute. Radio operators stood watches in ship's radio room.

Q. Were personnel of any assistance to ship's communication officers? If yes, what did they do?

A. Yes. They stood radio watches and copied press.

Q. Did landing force message center and ship (or flag) communication officer operate jointly? Comment.

A. No. Marine message center operated as an independent agency altogether. Close liaison was maintained between message centers however. For unit the size of division, or lower, this type of operation seems most efficient.

d. Personnel

Q. Are you satisfied with present allowance of personnel?

A. No.

Q. What changes if any are specifically recommended.

A. Recommend a wire section for Service Battalion comparable to that allowed an Engineer Battalion.

Q. Was training of personnel adequate?

A. About average. Many general duty men were received just prior to embarkation and were trained as wiremen and radio talkers.

Q. What recommendations if any were made for special training?

A. Wire: Recommend training in basic open wire construction for Division Signal Company.

Radio: Personnel need to become more familiar with use and installation of "Flat Top" antenna.

Q. List averages or shortages of communication personnel in your unit embarked aboard ship for the operation.

A. Short 198 trained communication personnel. Shortage was made up from general duty personnel.

Q. List losses of personnel aboard ship before landing?

A. None.

Q. List losses of personnel in effecting the landing?

A. None.

Q. List losses of personnel in the period from after landing until operation was completed?

A.

| KIA | WIA | MIA |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | 36 | 3 |

Q. Were communication personnel employed for duties other than communications? What were their duties?

A. No.

Q. How were battle casualties replaced?

A. Drafts were obtained from JASCO personnel, through the Corps Signal Officer.

e. Equipment

Q. List overages and shortages of major items of equipment.

A. Overages: 39 SCR-300.

Q. List losses of equipment aboard ship before landing.

A. No loss of equipment aboard ship.

Q. List losses of equipment in the period from after landing until operation was completed.

A.
10 - SCR - 610
5 - SCR - 300
1 - TCS Radio Jeep
1 - TBX
16 - SCR 536
2 - BD 71
1 - BD 72

Q. List losses of equipment in effecting landing.

A. Losses in landing: 1 SCR - 610, 1 TCS.



[redacted]

Q. Was equipment suitable (design and quantity) for the particular task to be performed? If no, list equipment and state reason.

A. No. The SCR-300s are too easily shaken out of alignment. Also some of the capacitors in this set do not have high enough voltage ratings.

Q. In light of the specific operation, what changes in equipment are recommended? State reason.

A. More transportation. Amount on present T/O not sufficient for efficient continuous operation of signal agencies, nor for problem of supply.

Q. What new equipment is recommended? Explain specific proposed employment and whether or not additional personnel would be required to operate it.

A. Four "Weasels" for Signal Company, three 1-ton 4x4 trucks for Signal Company, wirelaying; 3 additional jeeps, 1 message center, 2 wire, for Signal Company. No additional personnel required.

Q. Did your organization employ any equipment which it had never used in action before? If yes, state items and describe performance. Give recommendations for improvement.

A. Yes. SCR-610s and SCR-694s. Both excellent, particularly the SCR-694 which performed far better than similar types of portable radios presently authorized by T/A.

Q. What water proofing was done and how effective was it?

A. None on vehicles. Prefer not to use them as long as LVTs (ramp type) and DUKWs are available; waterproofing bags were used on all portable sets.

Q. Was there any equipment used not included in T/A? If yes, list and state how employed. Make recommendation for inclusion in T/A.

A. Vacuum tube voltmeter. Had only one available. Division should have allowance of 6: 1 each regiment, 2 Division Signal Company.

Q. Was all signal equipment authorized by T/A used? If not, should it be deleted from T/A? State reason.

A. All equipment was not used; however there are no recommendations for deletions as need still exists on occasions for such equipment as was not used in this operation.

Q. Was all your equipment unloaded from the ship during the operation?

A. Yes.

Q. Was your equipment landed at the proper beach? If not, why not?

A. In most cases, yes. Some Signal Company gear was unloaded at wrong beaches due to beaches being used by other units with higher priority of unloading.

f. Supply

Q. What equipment could not be loaded and was left behind?

A. Public address system not loaded. Brackets and heavy cable not landed. TBWs not taken.

Q. Did this effect the operation in any way?

A. Did not effect operation.

Q. What specific items placed the greatest strain on supply?

A. W-130, W-110. Batteries: BA-39 and 40, 70 and 80.

Q. What changes in replenishment rates if any are recommended?

A. Replenishment rate on W-110 and 130 should be increased. Initial and 90 days supply of these items lasted 23 days.

Q. What method was employed by your organization for resupply?

A. Resupply achieved partially through 7th Field Depot. Units initially resupplied from Signal Quartermaster Dumps.

Q. What repair facilities did you have available? Were they used? What major items of equipment were repaired?

A. (1) Well equipped repair section using a converted ordnance van as a repair shop.
(2) Yes.
(3) SCR-610, 300, SCR-299, TCS, TBX. In three weeks time, 511 pieces of radio equipment were repaired.

Q. What method was employed for resupply and repair?

A. Replacement was made immediately whenever possible and the equipment turned in for repair was in most cases immediately repaired and made ready for reissue. Supply was maintained from Division Command Post and was available to all subordinate units on call.

Q. How could repair facilities be improved?

A. Need more spare parts in order to make repairs. Recommend a 6x6, 2½ ton truck for the repair section.

Q. Were equipment spares carried with equipment? If not, state why.

A. Yes.

Q. Were equipment spares adequate?

A. Grossly inadequate because equipment continues to be furnished from depot stripped of its spares.

Q. Were sufficient spare parts available other than equipment spares?

A. None available.

Q. Was there sufficient transportation available for transporting equipment?

A. No. Division Signal Quartermaster had only two 6x6 2½ ton trucks to transport 110 tons of gear. This is inadequate.

Q. Are there any recommendations for changes in transportation?

A. Recommend six 6x6 2½ ton trucks and two 1-ton Recons for Division Signal Quartermaster.

Q. Did the Field Depot Signal Company operate under the Signal Officer command? If not, under whose command was it?

A. No. Under Commanding Officer, Field Depot.

Q. How was the Depot Signal Company employed in the early stages of the assault?

A. Was not ashore and hence not employed.

Q. When was Depot Signal Company ready to supply, equip and assist in repair?

A. During last stages of operation (D plus 16).

Q. Were any tactical signal units furnished signal repair detachments from the Depot Signal Company?

A. No.

Q. Did the Depot Signal Company deliver supplies and equipment to Corps and Division signal dumps?

A. No. It was picked up by Division Signal Quartermaster.

Q. Comment at length on method of operation of Depot Signal Company.

A. No comment as Division requisitions were submitted to Corps Signal Officer who screened them and arranged directly with Field Depot Signal Company for resupply of Division.

g. Operation

Q. What agencies were established that were not normal?

A. None.

Q. What was the most overloaded agency?

A. Radio.

Q. What steps were taken to overcome trouble experienced in question above?

A. Telephone used as much as possible to relieve overload conditions on radio and thus effect more prompt delivery of messages.

Q. Was there any unnecessary duplication of agencies used?

A. No.

Q. In the light of possible operations on large land masses, would present normal operating agencies be adequate?

A. No.

Q. Where would the agencies probably break down?

A. Radio would break down due to lack of high power sets in lower echelons. Message Center would be unable to make necessary runs and the wire teams would be incapable of keeping up in a fast movement over large areas of land; both the above are due to lack of transportation.

Q. Of the frequencies assigned to your unit, were there any not used? If yes, state why.

A. No.

Q. List the difficulties encountered in: Radio Communication, Wire Communication, Visual Communication, Messenger Communication.

A. (1) Radio: (a) Light to heavy interference on all nets at one time or another; however, nets continued to operate but at a somewhat reduced efficiency. (b) Terrain was rough, and except along coastline, radio was not always reliable.

(2) Wire: (a) Division was extended over such a large area and moved so rapidly that it was often impossible to provide wire communication. Distance was quite often in excess of talking range of field wire, W-110. Limited road nets prohibited shortening truck loops as units advanced.

(3) Visual: (a) None employed.

(4) Messenger: (a) Too many urgent messages were sent via special messenger runs. Vehicles in Message Center Platoon inadequate. Should have total of five to operate efficiently.

Q. Were any communication difficulties encountered in this operation that were not encountered in the previous operation? If yes, what do you attribute the difficulties to?

A. Yes. The difficulties listed above are due to large area over which the Division operated and the rapidity of the advance.

Q. List communication failures during the ship-to-shore movement.

A. None.

Q. Were any communication improvements noticed between this operation and previous operations?

A. Yes. Radio communication was improved because of the SCR-600 series, equipment.

Q. Were officers required to operate and maintain any agency of communication because of enlisted casualties. If yes, describe.

A. No.

Q. Were any enemy communication installations captured? If yes, what use was made of them?

A. Open wire lines repaired and used to great advantage.

Q. What methods were used for the infantry-tank communications? Were they successful?

A. Radio. Tank liaison teams to infantry equipped with SCR-536 which netted with GF/RU installed in command tanks. Plan was successful. Telephones. Worked exceptionally well.

Q. What methods were used for the infantry-amphibious tractor communications? Were they successful?

A. Radio. Amphibian Tractor Battalion entered infantry unit command net. Plan was successful.

h. Operation in Headquarters Ships

Q. Were additional personnel required other than those normally assigned to the ship?

A. No.

Q. Were headquarters ships signal or Marine Corps communication detachments assigned to landing force circuits?

A. Marine Corps personnel operated own nets and Naval personnel handled Navy Task Force nets.

Q. Was additional equipment operated in addition to that normally installed aboard ship?

A. Yes.

Q. If answers to above three questions are yes, explain.

A. Radio room with fourteen transmitters and receiving positions turned over to Marine personnel; in addition, organic SCR-608 and 610 equipment was used.

Q. What facilities were made available to landing force headquarters?

A. SCR-610 equipment set up aboard ship for use in addition to ship's facilities.

Q. Was net discipline satisfactory?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there interference between radio nets?
A. Minor interference but not serious.

Q. Was there interference between radio and radar equipment?
A. None noted.

Q. Were messenger boats available to landing force on call?
A. Not on call, but could have been obtained easily had their use become necessary.

Q. Describe operation of ship-to-shore teletypewriter circuit.
A. None employed.

i. Security

Q. What cryptographic aids were used?
A. We used mainly channels, 109, 110, 145, and CCBP 0130-D3 and III Corps MARSOI. We held class two less CSPs 412, 818(c), 1403/04, 1405/06, 1605, and 1967.

Q. Is any criticism made of present aids?
A. No criticism.

Q. Did the enemy attempt to use our authenticator system? If yes, describe. How effective were their attempts?
A. No.

Q. What authenticator system was used and how effective was it?
A. Shackle cipher within Division. CSP 1286 on Corps CW circuits. Systems are effective; however, personnel evidenced need for more training in their use.

Q. Were personnel sufficiently trained in signal security?
A. Training was good as evidenced by observation of security measures.

Q. What specific recommendations are made to insure proper security?
A. Further schooling in security emphasizing its importance, especially among officers.

Q. Did your organization have a "Signal Security Plan"?
A. Yes.

j. Countermeasures by Enemy

Q. Did the enemy use radio countermeasures? Describe.
A. Yes. Intermittent interference on all nets.

Q. What measure was employed to overcome enemy interference?
A. Circuits continued operating and interference would finally disappear.

Q. What recommendations do you make to aid in training personnel to overcome enemy interference?
A. Train operators to copy through heavy interference. The RCM team sent by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to this Division in January, 1945, aided this training greatly.

k. Air Warning

Q. Was air warning centralized?
A. Yes.

Q. What type of system was installed:- Air Warning, Fighter Direction, or Air Defense Control Center?
A. Early Warning Team assigned this Headquarters under Air Defense Control Center.

Q. Did the system or systems employed prove adequate or too elaborate?
A. System was very good.

Q. Were there other systems. If so, what was the relationship?
A. Air Warning also passed to this Division via Corps over radio and telephone. This information was from Corps Early Warning Team.

Q. Were radar sites selected from maps, photos, etc. before the operation? If yes, describe.
A. No radar units assigned this Headquarters.

Q. Was there interference between radios or radar stations? If yes, what corrective measures were taken?
A. No interference.

l. Shore Party Communication

Q. What type of air warning was established by Shore Party?
A. The Division Shore Party Com Team set up the TBX on the LAW frequency. Warnings from this station were relayed to the various beaches then broadcast over the beaches public address system.

Q. Was there coordinated training before operations?
A. Yes. Coordinated training was held with Pioneer Platoon, Company, and Battalion.

Q. When was inter-beach wire communication established after landing?
A. Inter-beach wire communication was established by H plus 3½.

Q. Were wire lines damaged to a great extent by our vehicles? What steps were taken to overcome this?
A. Main trunks were not damaged by vehicles as it was possible to erect a pole line from timber found in the vicinity of the beach. During the first day locals were damaged by vehicles but by the second and third day these were all put on pole lines. In future operations excellent wire communication could be assured by the Shore Party communication elements bringing in about 400 poles 2" by 20' for use in pole line construction.

Q. Was the ship-to-shore administrative radio circuit satisfactory? If not, why?
A. Yes.

Q. What were the losses in men and materials?
A. Losses in men: 7 wounded. Major losses in equipment: 1 MPA system, 8 phones and assorted small items.

Q. How were these losses replaced?
A. The losses in men and material were replaced from personnel and equipment in Headquarters section of JASCO.

Q. Was unit held afloat until operationally required?
A. No.

Q. How was consolidation of beaches accomplished as pertaining to communication?
A. All shore party activities were declared under Divisional control during the afternoon of the first day. Communication was consolidated as far as the regimental phase the first day. Further consolidation was impossible for two reasons: Shore Party personnel working the beaches preferred a set up by which they would not have to go through a Divisional board for every call they made; JASCO lacked enough TC-4s to handle all locals and trunks in one centralized exchange.

Q. Was coordination between Shore Party and beachmaster communication accomplished satisfactorily?
A. Yes.

m. Air Liaison Communication

Q. Was the support air request circuit overcrowded?
A. No.

Q. Were aircraft available when requested?
A. Generally aircraft were available, but sometimes only after a considerable period of waiting, in which cases the delay made use of the aircraft considerably less effective.

Q. What was the average time from a request until aircraft reported?
A. 30 to 45 minutes.

Q. What method was employed to direct aircraft?
A. All aircraft had to be directed through ComAirSupport. Instructions from battalion air-ground liaison officers were sent directly to ComAirSupport who then relayed them to the planes. It is felt that the system would be more satisfactory if battalions could control aircraft direct.

Q. Was lateral communication maintained between air liaison parties? If not, why not?
A. No. Such communication could not be maintained for the following reasons: first, the rapidity with which the various battalions moved; second, the great distances which often separated the battalions; third, lack of personnel in the air-ground liaison section to lay and maintain such lines.

Q. How were front lines marked for aircraft?
A. By panels and smoke grenades.

Q. What were the losses in men and material of air liaison parties?
A. Losses in men: 3 wounded; losses in equipment: 1 SCR-694, 2 SCR-300s and 5 EE-8As.

Q. Was present equipment adequate?
A. Yes.

n. Shore Based Air Support Communication

Q. When were communications established after landing?
A. L plus 16.

Q. Was control jointly operated?
A. After shore base air support control was established it assumed control of the aircraft.

Q. How were air support missions called for?
A. Pre-jumpoff missions were called for by Division with battalions directing strikes. Call missions assigned in battalions.

Q. Was original planning of personnel and material adequate?

A. Yes.

o. Shore Fire Control Communication

Q. How soon after reaching the beach did Shore Fire Control Parties establish communications with its assigned firing ship?

A. Assault units established communication on H plus 15 to 30 minutes.

Q. Did each Shore Fire Control Party keep its frequency throughout the operation?

A. No.

Q. Was net discipline practiced?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the losses in men and material?

A. Personnel lost: 4th Marines - 3 men
22nd Marines - 1 man
29th Marines - 2 men

Equipment lost: 2 SCR-300s.

Q. How were these losses replaced?

A. No replacements available.

Q. Is present naval gunfire communication plan adequate? If not, how may it be improved?

A. Plan is adequate but recommend that additional equipment be furnished as follows: each regiment - 1 TCS; Division Naval Gunfire - 1 MAA.

p. Summary

Q. Give account of difficulties not covered in previous questions.

A. None not already previously covered.

Q. Comment and recommendation.

A. Recommendations are those embodied in answers to the above questions.

## Section 10 - Engineer

### Tactical Employment

1. Initially the Engineer Group was composed of the 6th Engineer Battalion and 58th Naval Construction Battalion under the command of the Commanding Officer, 6th Engineer Battalion.

2. All tractors w/dozers and cranes (including all shovels rigged as cranes) with operators were initially assigned to the Shore Party and so loaded that beach work could be expedited.

3. For the initial landing one Engineer Company was attached to each regimental combat team. These companies reverted to Engineer Battalion control on morning of L + 1 and were thereafter employed in support of the Division as required. At the same time all Engineer Battalion equipment was released by the Shore Party and the Engineer Group commenced improving egress roads and supply routes. On the afternoon of L + 2, 58th Naval Construction Battalion commenced to land and Shore Party released the 58th Naval Construction Battalion equipment to Engineer Group control. The general plan at this time was to employ the 6th Engineer Battalion in direct support of the assault with the 58th Naval Construction Battalion following and improving road communications as much as possible. The 58th Naval Construction Battalion, however, reverted to Corps control on L + 6.

4. a. Due to unusually rapid advance of infantry and inability of higher echelons to take over road communications to the rear of the Division, the Engineer Battalion became extremely extended and experienced great difficulty keeping up with front lines and maintaining roads to the rear at the same time. At times the Engineer Battalion was maintaining and improving in excess of 100 miles of poor road while advancing over as much as ten miles of road per day, repairing demolished bridges, lifting mines, removing road blocks, and filling tank traps and bomb craters.

b. Missions assigned Division Engineer:

(1) Assistance to Shore Party on access roads to beaches.
(2) Mine removal.
(3) Building, repairing, and developement of supply routes.
(4) Emergency repair of YONTAN Airdrome.
(5) Construction of OY-1 airstrip.
(6) Water supply.
(7) Large scale demolitions.

c. Adequacy of equipment carried.

(1) The equipment carried is considered adequate, in general. All Tables of Organization earth moving and construction equipment were carried with minor exceptions. All except the ripper were used continuously, and that was on loan to an Army Engineer Battalion

(2) Comparatively few spare parts were carried. Tractor parts were the major shortages. The unusual track and track roller wear, particularly, had not been foreseen. 7th Field Depot could not supply these parts. Due to the rapid advance of the Division it often became necessary to complete a job, walk a tractor as much as ten miles, start a new job, and continue work around the clock. These long walks caused great wear on track rollers, and it became necessary to remove the track rollers from one TD-18 w/power control unit to keep two TD-18 angledozers in operation.

(3) It is believed that the shovel allowance should be changed. Two 3/4 yard shovels and two 3/8 yard shovels were carried. Recommendations are:

(a) Delete 3/8 yard from tables of allowance shovel except for depot and shore party use.

(b) Change allowance of 3/4 yard shovels to one per company in Engineer Battalion.

(c) Add one 3/8 yard truck mounted crane, equipped with clamshell and dragline, to Headquarters and Service Company allowance.

These recommendations are predicated on large scale land warfare where road surfacing and drainage are of paramount importance.

(4) TBX radios now authorized are not mobile and do not have enough range and power to cover the area and rugged terrain encountered in this operation. Several TCS radios were borrowed, begged, and built from parts. This radio was quite satisfactory. A vehicle mounted radio could then go to major job sites, patrol roads for trouble, and be capable of getting word through permitting immediate action on the part of the Engineer Battalion Headquarters. The radio also afforded contact with nearby Engineer and Naval Construction Battalion activities and was a valuable agency in the coordination of 100% use of all equipment and obtaining critical material, parts, and information. It is recommended that five TCS radios, mounted in 1/4 ton 4x4 truck be allowed the Engineer Battalion to be distributed one per company and one for battalion headquarters.

d. Explosives and mines.

(1) Very little explosives used. Approximately 5,000 lbs. composition C was expended. However, it was noted that this explosive is a superior substitute for heat tabs in the preparation of meals.

(2) No mines used.

e. 58th Naval Construction Battalion.

(1) Initially assigned dozers, cranes and operators to Shore Party, resumed control of all equipment evening of L + 1. Then assigned to further develop roads and water points behind 6th Engineer Battalion which was in direct support of the advance. Reverted to Corps control L + 6.

(2) Personnel and equipment considered adequate.

(3) Made emergency repairs to YONTAN Airdrome commencing at dawn of L + 2. The first emergency landing was made at 1100 the same day. By 1000 the next day all three runways were ready for emergency landings. Available equipment ashore from 6th Engineer Battalion, 58th Naval Construction Battalion and a Construction Battalion Mobile Unit was utilized. On L + 1 the 6th Engineer Battalion had placed one taxiway in condition to take OY-1 aircraft by 1500 L + 1 at which time the first plane landed. 58th Naval Construction Battalion and the 6th Engineer Battalion searched YONTAN Airdrome for enemy mines with negative results.

f. General.

(1) No underwater or beach obstacles were encountered by this Division; however, Underwater Demolition Team had removed numerous lightly placed pine poles which were spaced at 8 to 10 feet intervals just off the beaches.

(2) No new type defensive structions were encountered.

(3) No mine fields were encountered; however, numerous haphazardly placed mines were found along roads. These were in general carelessly placed and poorly concealed.

(4) Traffic control was handled by Engineer troops only at construction sites and critical bridges until relieved by military police.

(5) Water supply equipment was adequate. Water was a problem for two weeks. Troops moved so fast that by the time water could be produced by the new purification method troops were out of reach. Distillation plants ere used largely

at this stage, because they could produce water more quickly after operation had started and could be set up more quickly.

(6) Enemy equipment and construction equipment was practically nil. His fuse lighters were used and found to be excellent. Considerable quantities of picric acid explosive were found, but were not used after experiment showed it difficult to detonate. Some enemy demolitions efforts failed because apparently only a part of the charge detonated and the balance of the picric acid was merely scattered.

(7) The enemy's principal engineer efforts to delay the advance consisted of bridge demolitions, an occasional side hill demolition of a road, hand-dug tank obstacle in high narrow road fills (obstacle usually 15 feet wide by 8 feet deep), and felling of pine trees across roads.

(8) Statistics:

(a) Advanced over 130 miles of poor road.
(b) Built 41 miles of tactical road.
(c) Installed 4 temporary pier bridges.
(d) Installed 1 Bailey bridge 130' double double.
(e) Built 6 timber trestle bridges.
(f) Repaired 14 concrete bridges.
(g) Built 9 fords or bridge by-passes.
(h) Installed 40 new culverts.
(i) Repaired or replaced several hundred native culverts.
(j) Installed 41 water points outside the shore party area.
(k) Removed 576 mines (wooden box, tape measure, single horn, and 63 KG aircraft bombs).
(l) Made emergency repairs YONTAN Airdrome.
(m) Built OY-1 airstrip.

## Section 11 - Medical

1. The Sixth Medical Battalion commenced debarkation at H minus 1 hour, and began landing at H plus 2 hours. One hour later (H + 3) installations were set up for the emergency handling of casualties under field conditions. Company A was attached to the 4th Marines (Reinfroced), Company B to the 22d Marines (Reinforced), and Company C to the 29th Marines (Reinforced). Headquarters and Service Company, and Companies D and E operated the Division Field Hospital. The command post of the Division Surgeon was established on high ground just off Green Beach Two, in the vicinity of the Division command post. The command post of the 6th Medical Battalion was established in the same general vicinity southeast and about 1,000 yards away. After landing all organizations dug in, and preparations were made against possible air attack and sniper fire. The first night was clear and cold, and some discomfort was experienced by all personnel becuase of the rapid change from the tropics to a temperate zone. "K" rations were used, and the water supply was limited. On 2 April, 1945, the remaining echelons of Companies D and E landed and augmented the Division Field Hospital, which was established at the site of some burial vaults in the vicinity of the YONTAN Airdrome. Medical equipment was landed rapidly, with no serious losses.

2. All medical equipment was ashore and the Division hospital established and functioning by L + 2 days under routine of field and combat conditions. The outstanding characteristics of the advance inland were the numerous displacements, made necessary by the rapid advance of the assault troops. One medical company displaced forward five times during the first week. Complete medical coverage was in operation for the 6th Marine Division without interruption. At no time was there a break in the continuity of the evacuation chain. Especially trained surgical teams operated often times day and night, using modern equipment in blacked out operating rooms. Of special interest was a mobile surgical trailer which was constructed by medical officers in the training area. This one mobile unit proved of invaluable aid many times during this operation.

3. The malaria and epidemiological unit functioned in an outstanding manner. The entire 6th Marine Divison area was infested with fleas. There were many malaria bearing mosquitoes present, stagnant water, open heads, decaying food, all of which presented a difficult problem. The control program consisted of spraying the entire area and the dwellings and quarters with DDT, both from the air and by the use of details equipped with pack sprayers. DDT powder in the possession of each officer and man was used lavishly on clothing and bedding. Impregnation of clothing was done under the supervision of medical officers in the staging area, using dimethylphthalate. Rice paddies were drained, all mess halls were screened, all open heads used by the natives were covered, and atabrine discipline was carefully supervised.

[redacted]

3. At NAGO the Division assigned the 6th Medical Battalion the area formerly occupied by a Japanese doctor who maintained a private hospital. The electricians of the 6th Medical Battalion very skillfully converted the captured Japanese equipment, which included infra-red and ultra-violet lights and operating room lights and heating units to good use. The performance of the hospital corpsmen of this Division was commendable.

4. Living conditions for the Medical Battalion varied, but it was noticeable that everyone made the best of the situation. The areas were immediately cleaned up and native buildings and schools were used whenever possible. Hot palatable food, "C" rations and Ten-in-One rations, as well as the standard hospital rations, were amply provided for sick and wounded. The Engineers rendered valuable service in establishing water points, and water was ample and safe. Portable generators furnished electricity for the Medical Battalion facilities. Comfort articles were provided in ample quantities by the American Red Cross. Navy chaplains conducted church services, performed the last rites of the church, and officiated at burials. Local security was provided by the Medical Battalion, using attached Marines and hospital corpsmen, whose performance was outstanding.

5. During Phase One the road net became well nigh impassable, because of wet weather, and ordinary vehicles bogged down in many instances. DUKWs and Weasels were commandeered to assist in evacuation of the wounded. As the roads were rapidly improved by the Engineers and bridges which had been destroyed, the evacuation of casualties became simplified. It was a matter of record that not once did the elapsed time in transporting a patient from the front to the Division Field Hospital exceed five hours, and the shortest time noted was one hour and ten minutes, the average mean time being in the neighborhood of two hours. With the cooperation of the Corps Surgeon, an LST(H) was ordered to be on station daily at NAGO, and all blue cases and white cases were evacuated every twenty-four hours, DUKWs coming up to the loading port at the Division Field Hospital and transporting the patients in one loading direct to the hospital ship.

6. The Medical Department had landed prepared to experience some trouble from scrub typhus. Interrogation of several Japanese physicians who had lived on the island all their lives elicited the information that this disease was unheard of. This information was taken with reservation, but in the approximately forty days of the occupation of the central and northern parts of the island, it is a matter of record that there have been no cases of scrub typhus encountered, and that the information of the Japanese was undoubtedly correct. With this knowledge, a 10th Army order has rescinded further impregnation of clothing. Preliminary medical intelligence also placed emphasis against bathing in all streams because of flukes. After extensive investigation of snails which

inhabit the areas, and repeated samples of water all over the island, the epidemiological unit has failed to find any types of snails bearing cercaria or flukes of any type or leeches. Malaria vectors have been found, and it is most interesting to note that filariasis has been found in the blood of between 20 to 35% of all natives, men, women, and children, who have been examined. Therefore, it would seem that filariasis was reasonably prevalent in this area. Because of this fact, mosquito control has been stepped up and carefully supervised. Leprosy is not uncommon, there being a large leper colony on an island adjacent to OKINAWA. Medical intelligency preliminary to the invasion stressed the presence of two varieties of poisonous snakes, and stated that they were very prevalent on this island. On the contrary, there have been but two cases of snake bites reported in the entire Division, both of which made an uneventful recovery. Natives on interrogation say that snake bite is not common. Apparently these snakes live in holes in the ground and under rocks, and are seldom seen unless disturbed by blasting or excavating. Two of the Habu variety have been killed, but both were small and the fangs were rudimentary. A substantial amount of Japanese anti-venin has been captured and the local Japanese physicians have been cooperative in telling our medical officers the technique of its administration. In the two cases in which it was used, it was apparently effective. Samples of this serum have been sent to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for study and analysis.

7. A new technique of psychiatric treatment including the administration of plasma and high caloric diet was initiated by the Division Psychiatrist.

8. A complete record of all casualties was maintained by this section throughout the operation, and a statistical analysis is presented in graphic form in the accompanying charts. Chart 1 represents the total casualties, day by day, including wounded in action and deaths for the entire Division. Charts 2, 3, and 4 show the same data broken down for the 4th, 22d, and 29th Marines. Chart 5 is a comparison of the three regiments and the Division with reference to total casualties, total wounded in action, and total deaths for the entire operation. Chart 6 illustrates the relative percentage, disposition, and total casualties wounded in action and deaths for the entire operation.

## Section 12 - Supply and Logistics

1. Adequacy of All Types of Mounting Out Supplies

a. Class I - Adequate.

b. Class II

In general, minimum combat equipment and 30 days supplies, all types, were taken, with the exception of vehicles. About 80% of 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo trucks and 50% of all other types

were embarked. Lack of shipping space prohibited taking more motor transport. These quantities were insufficient because the condition of roads in the target area prevented full and efficient use of transport and resulted in an apparent need for additional transport which would not have risen if traffic had been more rapid and fluid.

c. Class III

30 days petroleum products for all vehicles and fuel-consuming equipment were embarked. The gasoline supply was exhausted in 20 days, but only a small fraction of the diesel fuel was consumed in the same period. For Division use only and for a beachhead area of not more than 10 miles inland, the amounts would have been adequate. However, this quantity supported at least 30,000 troops from L to L + 5 Day over greatly extended supply routes and provided fuel for LVTs and DUKWs for continuous unloading operations.

d. Class IV

Quantities considerably in excess of T/A allowances were loaded. Prefabricated heads, pre-cut galleys and garbage enclosures were brought in the 1st Echelon which were to be on call on L + 5 Day, but which were unloaded on L + 18 Day. Bridging materials were not excessive, although more were taken than are normally carried. Pre-cut lumber for galleys and garbage enclosures suffered about 25% breakage and loss.

e. Class V

5 CinCPOA U/F for all weapons were taken. In addition, mines and flame-thrower fuel were taken as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Mines, AT, HE, M1A1 | 2500 |
| Mines, AT, HE, M5 | 375 |
| Mines, AP, M2A3 | 3000 |
| Napalm | 6000 lbs |
| Cylinders, Nitrogen | 750 |
| Cylinders, Ignition, M1 | 1800 |

Ammunition was adequate. The only type of ammunition which approached exhaustion was 60mm mortar, illuminating. Mines were in excess, due to absence of enemy tank units in the Division zone of action.

2. Adequacy of Resupply

a. Class I - Adequate.

b. Class II

Inadequate in blankets, motor vehicles and heavy engineer equipment. The shortage of the latter two was due to the fact that demands on transport and engineer equipment were so heavy as to render many items unserviceable. Much of this equipment had been long in service before this operation. Against this should be balanced the fact that the enemy inflicted only minor damage to our equipment.

c. Class III - Adequate.

d. Class IV - Adequate.

e. Class V - Adequate.

Resupply began on L + 9 with the unloading of the first block-loaded ship on 6th Division's NAGO beaches. The system is highly satisfactory.

3. Palletized Cargo

The only items palletized were barbed wire and pickets. Palletizing where unloading takes place over coral reefs is not recommended by this Division. Pallets are heavy, difficult to handle, use an excessive amount of shipping space and break easily. No Wilson drums were employed.

4. Distillation Units

40 were brought on the operation. 1 was placed on each LST to provide water for troops embarked. On L + 5, when the 58th Naval Construction Battalion reverted to III Phib Corps control, 20 units were taken from the Division. 2 were lost. The distilling capacity of the Division (Reinforced) on L + 20 was 27,000 gallons per day, working on a 20-hour day basis.

5. Water Purification Units

14 portable units, capacity 7 gallons per minute each, were loaded. 2 became inoperative by L + 10 due to lack of spare parts.

9 mobile units, each with a capacity of 35 gallons per minute were loaded. The rated purification capacity of the Division, (Reinforced) on L + 25 was 478,800 gallons or 20 gallons per man per day. The apparent capacity is deceptive, and, in fact, barely sufficient. This is true for the following reasons:

a. It was necessary to chlorinate to 3ppm, with longer than the normal settling period, in order to eliminate all bacteria from the highly infected water.

b. Purification units were of necessity widely dispersed in order to supply troop units over wide areas, thus requiring constant use of all apparatus.

6. Shore Party

Details are contained in the report of the Shore Party Commander. The standard operating procedure of this Division was followed with outstanding results, resulting in commendations from higher authority. The success of the Shore Party operation can be attributed to the following:

a. A simple operating procedure was adopted several months before the operation.

b. Comprehensive instruction for all Shore Party personnel was held by the Shore Party Commander about 2 months prior to embarkation.

c. The Shore Party Commander had control of the employment of all Shore Party personnel for about one month prior to embarkation.

d. A full-scale division rehearsal was utilized to land, and unload over separate regimental beaches, supplies amounting to about 2 U/F and 2 days ration and petroleum products.

e. 2500 replacements were available as labor to augment the Shore Party structure.

f. An able, energetic officer, familiar with engineering and pioneering problems, was put in command of the Shore Party.

7. Field Depot

On L + 9, the 7th Field Depot was established as the source of resupply for the Division. It began to function immediately and, within its capabilities, in a very satisfactory manner. Requisitions for Class I and Class III were forwarded direct to the depot by the Division Quartermaster. Class II (with the exception of clothing, individual equipment, camp expendable supplies, and those items of non-critical nature) and Class IV were forwarded to Corps Headquarters for approval. Class V was issued only after credits had been established by the Corps Ordnance Officer. Except for certain Class II items such as spare parts, vehicles and heavy equipment, the Depot was able to resupply the Division on L + 25 Day. It was not able to accomplish third and fourth echelon maintenance.

8. Efficiency of Shore Based Supply Facilities

The only facilities available from L to L + 9 Day were the Division and Corps dumps. These functioned satisfactorily, except that records could not be accurately kept because of night unloading, rapid movement of the front lines, non-divisional

supplies being unloaded on the beaches and flowing into and out of the Division dumps. After L + 9, the 7th Field Depot functioned satisfactorily.

9. Salvage and Salvage Collection

Due to the rapid movement of our troops over mountainous terrain in widely separated sectors and to the fact that there was never, during the assault phase, any static tactical situation, it was impossible to follow normal and standard procedures for salvage collection. Controlled Division salvage was initiated on L + 4 Day.

10. Captured Material and Captured Material Collection

The following enemy material was captured:

| | |
|---|---|
| 265 | Rifles |
| 139 | Crew-served weapons |
| 222 | Cases, ammunition (small arms) |
| 13 | Cases, ammunition (mortar) |
| 100 | Cases, grenades |
| 295 | Cases, bombs |
| 60 | Mines |
| 40 | Torpedoes |
| 36 | Grenade launchers |
| 575 | Rounds ammunition (artillery) |
| 1 | Radio, w/equipment |
| 2 | Trucks, radar |
| 27 | Generators and electrical supplies |
| 26 | Trucks |
| 2 | Prime movers |
| 1287 | Petroleum, (barrels) |
| 3 | Tanks |
| 16 | Suicide boats |
| 1 | Ice plant, civilian |
| 1 | Power plant, civilian |
| 50 | Telephone wire, miles, installed |
| 49,000 | Rations |
| 245 | Blankets |
| 50 | Shoes, pairs, army |

Several truck loads and dumps containing medical supplies and motor transport equipment have been located but not inventoried. The bulk of these supplies have been, or will be, turned over to the Military Government.

11. Transportation

a. Adequacy of embarked wheeled and trailer transport.

Organic vehicles were not adequate for this operation. See Chapter X for recommended changes.

b. Efficiency of cargo carrier M29C (Weasel).

An efficient supply and all-purpose vehicle; particularly good at bypassing breaks in road, going through rice paddies, and moving over rugged terrain and muddy roads.

c. Efficiency of DUKWs (2½ ton amphibian cargo truck).

An outstanding vehicle. There was a shortage of spare parts in the 6th Amphibian Truck Company, due to non-availability at GUADALCANAL.

d. Efficiency of Amphibian Cargo Trailer, 3½-ton.

It was adequate on this operation for one trip from ship to shore. It is too difficult to handle inland when towed by DUKW or 6x6. It should have springs and brakes.

e. Adequacy of Spare Parts.

Inadequate.

f. Maintenance facilities.

Adequate.

12. Efficiency of Supply Communication

An Administration Command Radio Net established by 10th Army was made available to the Division Supply Section. Difficulty was experienced in the submission of outgoing dispatches except during the early hours of the morning. This was due to distance from higher echelons and the fact that the radio frequency of the Tactical Net closely paralleled that of the Administrative Net. In this operation the Administrative Net included only G-4 of Army, Corps, and Divisions. Since the Corps was unable to exercise control of the supply situation until L + 5 and since 10th Army exercised little control over Division supply at any time, it is believed that, insofar as Division is concerned, little benefit was obtained. Although heavy traffic resulted in overloading all lines, telephonic communication was satisfactory. See Chapter X for recommendations.

## Section 13 - Public Relations

1. During the period at sea, prior to the landing, the Public Relations Section of G-2 covered the pre-landing aspects of the operation. Also during that time, plans were made for the operation of the section in the combat zone.

2. After the landing, two public relations men were assigned to each regiment with the assistance of volunteers who were not public relations personnel but who were attached to the section for the covering of the operation. The two officers in the section covered all news emenating from the Division Headquarters Battalion as well as directing the activities of the section.

3. Combat correspondents returned to Division Headquarters every second or third day to write their stories. Correspondents then returned to the units to which they were assigned.

4. This system of coverage was found to be satisfactory, though lack of transportation made it exceedingly difficult for the correspondents to travel to and from Headquarters from their units.

5. It is particularly noteworthy that following the completion of the first phase of the operation, the Public Relations Section was called upon to cover the Northern OKINAWA Operation for the civilian press as well as for the Marine Corps.

6. Up to and including the period ending 20 April, 1945, the Public Relations Section forwarded 388 news stories and eight one-hour battle recordings. In addition, visiting members of the civilian press were conducted on tours of the Division zone of action that totaled over 800 road miles. Only one jeep was available to the section for this function as well as the numerous other functions requiring transportation.

7. In addition to the problems of transportation, already noted, the Public Relations Section was further impeded by the refusal of higher echelons to release the news that the 6th Marine Division was engaged in the OKINAWA Operation.

8. In spite of these problems, the Public Relations Section, G-2, succeeded in having more stories picked up by the civilian press than had been picked up on any previous operation. This fact was confirmed by the CINCPAC Press Representative.

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## Section 14 - Military Government

1. The following specialist units were assigned this Division to assist in the conduct of military government in the OKINAWA Operation:

Military Government Detachment A-3
Military Government Detachment B-3
G-10 Dispensary Unit No. 10
G-10 Dispensary Unit No. 11

In addition to the above detachments Company C, 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion (USA) was assigned for use in connection with military government affairs.

2. The above detachments reached the Division on 4 February, 1945. They consisted of a mixture of Army and Navy personnel none of whom had previous field experience in military government, either as participants in an operation or as observers. The detachments were activated as such immediately prior to embarkation, and only nominal organization had been accomplished upon arrival at the Division.

3. These detachments arrived totally unprovided with organizational and personal equipment. Division supplied them with such items of equipment as were on hand. Remaining items, including most organizational equipment, were supplied from local Army sources.

4. Shortages in personnel were supplied by the Commanding General, 10th Army, upon dispatch request.

5. It was necessary to indoctrinate personnel of these detachments in basic military principles including such matters as field sanitation, firing of small weapons, physical conditioning, etc.

6. Planning for the military government aspects of the operation conducted through informal conferences between Military Government Officers and interested staff officers of the Division.

7. During the planning phase it became apparent that the military government detachments assigned were so limited in personnel and equipment, particularly motor transport, as to limit their capabilities to preliminary reconnaissance and collection work. In view of the projected establishment of large capacity camps and civilian hospitals behind advancing combat units, plans were based upon utilization of the assigned detachments in accordance with their intended use and their limited capabilities.



[redacted]

8. No accurate information was available relative to the number of civilians likely to be encountered in the Division zone of action, neither was it possible to assess the probable attitude that the civilians would assume. In view of such limited information, plans were based upon an assumption that the civilian attitude would be hostile and that the probable number of civilians to be encountered within the Division zone during Phase One would not exceed 100,000.

9. Shortly prior to final embarkation it was found desirable to reorganize the detachments assigned, placing the senior Military Government Officer in command of all military government personnel and charging him with control and coordination of these heterogeneous units to the extent necessary to maintain unified military government within the Division.

10. Upon reaching the target area, military government detachments were scheduled for debarkation on call at any time after L-Day.

11. During the early hours of L-Day, no contact was made with any civilians, despite the rapid advance of the Division. However, shortly before dark, front line units began reporting the presence of civilians, requesting assistance of military police and military government personnel to take the civilians into custody. The emergency was met by assigning personnel of the G-2 Language Section assisted by personnel from the Division Military Police Company to take custody of these civilians. By nightfall, approximately 700 civilians were in the custody of the Division. These civilians were sheltered in a cave in the vicinity of the village of TOYA during the night of L-Day and furnished food and water from military rations.

12. Request was made that all military government personnel be landed as early as possible on L + 1, and shortly after noon on that day the detachments were landed, however their vehicles and equipment were not landed until L + 2.

13. On L + 1, civilians continued to enter our lines in increasing numbers. They were taken into custody by combat units and delivered to TOYA by marching or by use of combat transportation. The village of TOYA was set aside as a civilian compound and military government detachments took over control of that village on the afternoon of L + 1. Subsistence of civilians from military rations was continued in the absence of any other readily available foodstuffs. A hospital was established at TOYA by G-10 units to care for the great percentage of wounded among civilians surrendering.

14. On L + 2 efforts were continued to develop initial establishments at TOYA and reconnaissance was initiated for the selection of additional possible internment sites and for rations with which to subsist civilians on hand.

15. Reconnaissance details selected the villages of JIMA and TOKESHI as suitable for development as civilian internment centers and instructions were immediately issued to divert incoming civilians of non-military age to that area. Overcrowding in TOYA necessitated movement of some of the civilians there to the above camps. A collecting point was established at CHINA. On L + 3 before JIMA and TOKESHI could be fully developed, numerous other villages were uncovered by the Division's advance bringing increasing numbers of civilians within the Division's lines. Transportation available was inadequate to move all civilians to the internment areas established, consequently authorization was given to establish civilians in their own localities, allowing them to subsist themselves from their own foodstuffs. Military government personnel was inadequate to man each of these small villages, consequently only nominal control by military police was maintained to enforce simple curfew measures. Sick and wounded, and males of military age continued to be moved to TOYA.

16. As the Division reached ISHIKAWA Isthmus and advanced over two divergent coastal roads, difficulties of control increased. Military government personnel were thinly scattered from the original landing beaches to ISHIKAWA Isthmus. While on the Isthmus remaining personnel were split into two teams to advance up each coastal road behind the combat units. Internment camps were established at NAKADOMARI and ISHIKAWA, on L + 4. One G-10 unit was retained at TOYA leaving only one to advance with the Division, the east coast team being left without any medical facilities. On L + 4, III Phib Corps assumed nominal control and responsibility for military government south of the line ISHIKAWA-NAKADOMARI. However, it was not until L + 6 that the military government and military police personnel of the Division were released and one G-10 unit was retained at TOYA until L + 8.

17. During the advance up ISHIKAWA Isthmus additional camps were established at KIN and ORA on the east coast, and a collecting point at ONNA on the west coast.

18. As the Division reached MOTOBU Peninsula, an initial collecting point was established at NAGO on L + 7. On L + 8 the village of TAIRA was selected for a permanent internment camp. On this same day, III Phib Corps assumed responsibility for camps at ISHIKAWA and NAKADOMARI. However, it was not until L + 10 that all military police were released from these camps, and not until L + 10 and L + 11, respectively, that the two G-10 units were released and moved to TAIRA. NAGO continued as a collecting point.

19. On L + 15, III Phib Corps assumed control of KIN and all other camps below NAGO.

[redacted]

20. From L + 15 to the completion of the operation in central and northern OKINAWA, activities within the Division zone centered at TAIRA. The number of civilians in custody there increased daily by anywhere between 500 to 1500 a day. During this period the military government detachments were assembled in one group for the first time since the operation began. Presented with a comparatively static situation, the detachments were given their first opportunity to do more than meet the day-to-day situation. In TAIRA the use of screened natives began. Leading citizens of the area were placed in positions of trust. Plans were laid for the future development of military control and supervision over the MOTOBU Penninsula area and northern OKINAWA. Military government detachments sought out and collected foodstuffs and clothing. Horses, cattle, and other livestock were impounded in a corral established at TAIRA. The two G-10 medical units, despite their limited facilities, established a hospital and handled over 150 patients daily, many of whom had to be retained for prolonged hospitalization. As the casualties of the Division decreased, organic personnel from the 6th Medical Battalion were detailed to assist in the maintenance of what had rapidly grown into a large sized hospital.

21. Transportation remained critical until the end of the operation. Only two captured trucks could be maintained in running condition. Organic transport of the Division was made available when practicable. However, such support was necessarily limited by tactical considerations.

22. Lack of sufficient shelter constituted another serious problem. Native structures at TAIRA were crammed with natives until they could hold no more. Requisitions to Island Command for tarpaulins went unanswered.

23. Shortage of military police seriously handicapped efforts of military government to relieve combat units of the burden of gathering able bodied civilians, and retarded establishemnt of the necessary collecting points. Establishment of control over civilians in the northern peninsula of OKINAWA was held in abeyance until organized resistance had been broken and combat troops could be diverted to lend aid to military government.

24. These shortages were greatly accentuated on L + 19 when the Division received orders to intern all civilians regardless of age or sex. Immediate compliance with these orders was impossible. Primary emphasis remained directed toward internment of all able-bodied males of military age, the remainder of the civilians to be gathered for internment at such time as the situation would permit.

25. Throughout the entire operation military government operated under severe handicaps. Despite elaborate plans to relieve combat divisions of the responsibility for any permanent

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or semi-permanent care of civilians, the 6th Marine Division was required to proceed without any assistance whatsoever except for that given by III Phib Corps, whose facilities were no greater than that of this Division. At no time were the projected camp or district teams or large hospital units furnished to relieve the Division of maintenance of internment camps which reached considerable size. At no time during the operation did military government representatives of Island Command visit the 6th Marine Division area to ascertain the problems being contended with. Repeated requests for additional military police resulted only in withdrawal of the company assigned, replacing it with one platoon and additional personnel furnished from the already hard pressed III Phib Corps. Requisitions for additional materials for shelter and additional transportation were never answered. The directive to place all civilians in camps greatly accentuated the above difficulties, adding the further problem of subsistence.

26. Throughout the operation, however, it is considered that military government accomplished its mission, as set forth in the military government plan, in a satisfactory manner. That the mission was accomplished is a tribute to the sincere efforts of the small military government detachments assigned and to the whole-hearted cooperation of combat units.

## Section 15 - Special Reconnaissance Missions

1. Prior to initiation of the OKINAWA Operation, a determination was expressed by the Commanding General that the 6th Reconnaissance Company would be employed in actual reconnaissance missions - tasks for which the unit had been trained and was particularly fitted - and that the pitfalls of improper employment noted on previous occasion would not be repeated. That policy was rigidly adhered to, and the 6th Reconnaissance Company performed excellent work as a mobile information gathering agency for the Commander. Its missions may be summarized as follows:

a. On Love + 1 the Commanding General desired particularly to know the nature of enemy dispositions and resistance in the vicinity of NAGAHAMA (TA 8197) and to obtain information on the character of landing beaches at that point. The Reconnaissance Company, moving between the 29th Marines and 22d Marines, entered the town, disposed of the few snipers located there, conducted a complete reconnaissance of the beaches and returned before nightfall.

b. In the advance up the ISHIKAWA Isthmus the Reconnaissance Company preceded the entire Division for 3 days, searching out the routes of advance and keeping the Commander informed of the situation to his front. During this period the task organization for the Reconnaissance Company included



[redacted]

2 platoons of tanks. In certain circumstances where situations indicated troops were transported on motor vehicles covered by tanks, in still others where contact was imminent, troops moved afoot in accordance with tank-infantry doctrine.

c. Upon arrival at the MOTOBU Peninsula the Division received instructions from III Phib Corps to seize BISE Point (TA 9631) at the earliest possible time to permit the installation of radar equipment. The Reconnaissance Company was dispatched beyond the front lines with instructions to reconnoiter the BISE area and if only light resistance was encountered, to seize and hold the point pending the arrival of additional troops. The mission was successfully executed, only scattered enemy resistance having been encountered.

d. Upon receipt of instructions from III Phib Corps to seize the islands of SESOKO SHIMA, YAGACHI SHIMA and KOURI SHIMA at the earliest possible time, night rubber boat reconnaissance of the first two named islands were conducted. Upon receipt of indications that the areas were unoccupied or lightly held, in daylight the following day the Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Battalion (attached to the 6th Division) embarked on armored amphibians, moved across the straits from MOTOBU Peninsula, and landed successfully on the islands. All indications being negative for the last island (KOURI SHIMA) no night reconnaissance was undertaken. Instead, the 6th Reconnaissance Company was embarked on LVT(A)s and landed without incident.

e. It is considered that the Reconnaissance Company contributed materially to the Division's success, and that its performance indicates the soundness of a reconnaissance organization. Certain shortcomings in transport were apparent, there being an obvious and pressing need for a fulltrack reconnaissance vehicle which can accompany tanks or even proceed cross-country on its own. Recommendations in the premises will be found in Chapter X.

## Section 16 - Casualty Reporting

1. Casualties were reported by name on cards furnished basic reporting units for this purpose. Company first sergeants wrote in the casualty's name, and filled in the blanks on the form covering all pertinent information desired. In view of the fact that the system was new within this Division, it was several days after L-Day before conflicting interpretations of instructions had been resolved. In a relatively short time all units had become completely familiar with the cards and the system functioned very smoothly. Cards were forwarded through normal command channels along with the daily numerical casualty reports. Upon receipt of cards at the Division command post, airmailgrams were immediately prepared on all personnel killed, died of wounds, or missing. Cards were the forwarded to a rear administrative group consisting of administrative personnel representing all

echelons from Division down to battalions. This group then prepared wounded in action reports, amplifying reports, and maintained contact with evacuation stations, medical installations, and the graves registration section in an attempt to keep up-to-date on the status and whereabouts of all casualties.

2. A daily casualty change sheet was published showing casualties by name, giving the disposition, showing those returned to duty, and otherwise noting any change of status or whereabouts. A daily list of burials was published giving information required for preparations of amplifying reports of death. Division hospital admission and disposition reports, shore party evacuation reports and transport casualty reports were circulated within the administrative group to enable each unit to maintain a record of the last reported whereabouts of their evacuated casualties. File cards were maintained on each casualty and every change of status or whereabouts were noted thereon.

3. Non-commissioned officers were detailed to remain aboard each transport and hospital LST until its departure from the target area, to report daily on the casualties evacuated to that ship, and their disposition. These non-commissioned officers gathered much valuable information. In one instance the non-commissioned officer assigned was ordered off the transport on L + 1, thereby depriving the Division of any information regarding casualties evacuated to that ship.

4. The methods used within the Division for personnel accounting functioned exceedingly well. In all but a few exceptional cases it was possible to trace positively evacuated casualties to a definite ship or hospital. At the end of the operation in central and northern OKINAWA no Personnel Liaison Group reports had been received to enable personnel to be traced to base hospitals outside the target area.

5. The following difficulties were encountered in maintaining absolute coverage of casualties:

a. Hospital ships refused to allow Division representatives aboard to determine casualties of this Division embarked.

b. Non-divisional hospitals in the target area refused to make distribution of admission and disposition reports to the Division.

c. The distinction between killed in action and died of wounds proved confusing, reports from front line units often being at variance with reports from hospitals.

6. Numerical reporting of casualties was done in accordance with 10th Army directives. The directives as finally placed into effect required submission of a daily report of casualties, and a weekly periodic report. This change from the original plan was not received until shortly before final embarkation, and subsequent to departure of LSTs. Inasmuch as the entire Division had been indoctrinated during field exercises in a much less detailed method of reporting, the receipt of these revised directives necessitated a complete alteration of technique, instructions and forms for which had to be disseminated at the staging area. In most respects conversion to this unfamiliar system caused little difficulty; however, in several respects, new and undefined classifications of casualties not current in Marine Corps administration, caused considerable confusion. For example, the classification of Injured in Action, under Army usage considered a form of battle casualty, was completely unfamiliar to Marine personnel and the distinction between that classification and non-battle injuries remained vague throughout the operation. The weekly periodic report required another unfamiliar set of figures entitled "Assigned Strength" as distinguished from "Authorized Strength" and "Present for Duty". Lacking definition of the term, it was agreed upon by III Phib Corps and the two Marine divisions that the figure sought was the number of personnel that were brought to the target area. Since the figures submitted on the basis of this interpretation were never questioned by 10th Army it is assumed that they are least approximated those desired.

7. Daily reports covering the period 0001 to 2400 were required to reach 10th Army Headquarters by 1200 on the following day. Since a dispatch form was furnished for these reports, the time allowed generally proved sufficient, although in some cases reports had to be submitted with a subordinate unit or two being unreported due to the considerable distance that at times separated the Division from various subordinate units, which situation was invariably accompanied by a lack of telephonic communication.

8. Weekly periodic reports covering the period ending at 2400, Saturday night, were not required to reach 10th Army until 1200 on the following Monday. However, the detailed work involved in preparing this four page report and insuring its accuracy down to the last man was such that it required between six and eight hours to prepare the Division reports, and subordinate units reported similar difficulties, further aggravated by the necessity for preparing so voluminous a report with the limited facilities available to front line units.

## Section 17 - Morale

1. Morale of troops was excellent throughout the operation in central and northern OKINAWA. It was found unnecessary to take any active measures to maintain high morale.

2. It is believed that this condition resulted from the speedy completion of the mission and the fact that casualties were much lighter than had been expected. It is also considered that the change from a tropical to a temperate climate had an extremely invigorating effect on the troops.

## Section 18 - Photo Intelligence (G-2)

1. During the assault phase, and during the entire operation in central and northern OKINAWA, photographers were assigned to units offering the best opportunities from a photographic point of view. The assignments of these men were shifted as the situation demanded. A group of still and motion-picture photographers were retained at Division Headquarters for special public relations and intelligence missions.

2. All processing was done in the Division photo trailer by personnel specifically assigned to that duty. Public relations photos were forwared to CINCPAC unprocessed.

3. The operation was a difficult one from the photographic standpoint because of the small amount of continued action which occured, the long distances involved in the Division zone of action, and the excellent concealment of installations made possible by the skill of the enemy and the nature of the terrain which he was defending.

4. Particularly excellent work was done by the Photo Intelligence Section of intelligence ground shots. A large number of photographs have been collected showing terrain, installations, and other features of intelligence interest within the Division zone of action.

## Section 19 - Ordnance

1. Methods and Problems of Supply

a. By the end of L + 3 Day a Division ammunition dump had been established just north of Green Beach 1. On L + 4 Day the 3d Ammunition Company was landed and assisted in the completion of this dump. Prior to this time the front line units were supplied from two regimental dumps, one immediately north of YONTAN Airfield in the zone of action of the 4th Marines and the other about five hundred yards inland in the zone of action of the 22d Marines. As the attack progressed and the regiments moved away

from these areas, these dumps reverted to Division control and were used to supply the Division. The Division rear dump was meanwhile being built up by the 3d Ammunition Company. On L + 6 Day III Phib Corps assumed control and the 3d Ammuntion Company and the rear dump reverted to Corps control.

b. Under Corps control the ammuntion credit system was placed in effect and allocations were made to divisions. Supply by dump distribution was effected by motor transport. Due, however, to the rapid advance of the 6th Division, it became inadvisable to rely entirely on motor transport for moving ammunition and plans were made to move it from the vicinity of Green Beaches to NAGO by water. This water transport was supplemented by several motor convoys. On the occasions when it became necessary to move ammunition overland the move was made at night in order to interfere as little as possible with the tactical use of transportation. In spite of the great distance between regimental and divisional ammunition dumps, combat units of the Division were sufficiently supplied throughout the operation.

2. Methods and Problems of Storage

a. This Division encountered no difficulty in loading, unloading and sorting of ammunition on the beaches. Ordnance officers and non-commissioned officers of the Ordnance Company were employed to assist the Division Ordnance Officer and staff and the Shore Party in the initial sorting and storage of ammunition on the beach. It was difficult to find adequate space for dump as the entire area was filled with small rice paddies. Barricades were bulldozed and dumps drained as time and means permitted.

3. Adequacy, Types and Packaging

a. This Division received all new ammunition for the operation. The new type packaging was checked frequently. The ammuntion was and is in excellent condition with the exception of the M49 Trip Flares, which were found to be ninety percent duds due to wet quick-match and igniting charge. Whether this condition existed upon issue to the Division, occurred in transit or in storage has not been determined.

4. Weapons Mounted Out With

| | |
|---|---|
| 161 | Shot-gun 12 gauge |
| 12,200 | Carbine Cal. .30 |
| 8,726 | Rifle, Cal. .30 |
| 1,009 | Browning Automatic Rifle Cal. .30 |
| 471 | Machine Gun Cal..30, M1919A4 |
| 173 | Machine Gun Cal..30, M1917A1 |
| 319 | Sub-Machine Gun Cal. .45 |
| 2,045 | Pistol, Cal. .45 |

7. Number and Type of Combat Vehicle Used

| | |
|---|---|
| 70 | LVT A (4) |
| 50 | Tank Medium M4A3 |
| 12 | Howitzer, 105mm Self-propelled M7 |
| 3 | Vehicle, tank recovery |
| 5 | LVT (2) |
| 102 | LVT (3) |
| 115 | LVT (4) |

8. Ammunition

a. Number of rounds by exact nomenclature, expended or lost:

37mm Gun, Tk-AT:

| | |
|---|---|
| 4,700 | HE, M63 (RIGBA) |
| 1,100 | APC, M51 |
| 425 | Canister, M2 (RIGHB) |

75mm Gun:

| | |
|---|---|
| 240 | HE, M48, sc, w/F M48A2 (.05 sec) |
| 46 | WP, M64, w/F M57 |

75mm Howitzer:

| | |
|---|---|
| 4,911 | HE, M48, w/F M48A2 (.15 sec) |
| 314 | HE, M48, w/F M54 |
| 150 | HE-AT, M66, w/F BD M66A1 |
| 980 | WP, M64, w/F M57 |
| 60 | Canister, T30 |

105mm Howitzer:

| | |
|---|---|
| 23,323 | HE, MI, w/F M48A2 (.15) |
| 6,606 | HE, MI, w/F M54 |
| 806 | HE-AT, M67, w/F BD M62A1 |
| 2,513 | WP, M60, w/F M57 |
| 85 | HC, BE, M84, w/F M54 |

2" Mortar:

| | |
|---|---|
| 36 | Bomb, smoke, Mk I/L |

60mm Mortar:

| | |
|---|---|
| 10,768 | HE, M49A2 |
| 4,146 | Illuminating, M83A1 |

81mm Mortar:

| | |
|---|---|
| 9,047 | HE, M43A1, w/F M52 |
| 3,708 | HE, M56, w/F M53 (.10 sec) |
| 1,947 | WP, M57, w/F M52 |

Rockets:

| | |
|---|---|
| 661 | HE-AT, 2.36", M6A3 |

Grenades Hand:

| | |
|---|---|
| 873 | Illuminating, Mk I |
| 14,997 | Frag, Mk II |
| 3,634 | WP, M15 |
| 355 | HC, M8 |
| 100 | Incendiary, M14 |
| 166 | Smoke, colored, M18, Green |
| 268 | Smoke, colored, M18, Red |
| 242 | Smoke, colored, M18, Violet |

Grenades Rifle:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1,145 | AT, M9A1 |
| 6 | Smoke, colored, M22 (T8E1), Violet |
| 384 | Adapter, Green, Proj, M1 |

.50 Caliber:

| | |
|---|---|
| 14,500 | API, M8, w/Tracer, MI (4-1) |
| 65,180 | API, bulk |
| 7,595 | Tracer, bulk |

.45 Caliber:

| | |
|---|---|
| 78,498 | Ball, M1911 |

.30 Caliber Rifle:

| | |
|---|---|
| 218,700 | AP, M2, 5/cp/bl |
| 521,632 | AP, M2, 8/cp/bl |
| 40,000 | AP, M2, 20/ctn |
| 1,131,150 | AP-Tracer, belted, (4-1) |
| 63,700 | Tracer, M2 5/rd/cp |
| 116,454 | Tracer, M2, ctn |
| 28,188 | Ball, MI |

.30 Caliber Carbine:

| | |
|---|---|
| 571,382 | Ball, MI |
| 27,600 | Tracer, M16 (T24) |

78

Shotgun 12-Gauge

| | |
|---|---|
| 3,225 | Shell, 12 gauge, brass, #00 |

Pyrotechnics

| | |
|---|---|
| 371 | Flare, trip, para, M48 |
| 245 | Flare, trip, M49 |

For Launcher Grenade

| | |
|---|---|
| 50 | Sig, grd, amber star, clus, M22A1 |
| 50 | Sig, grd, green star, para, M19A1 |
| 50 | Sig, grd, red star, clus, M52A1 |
| 50 | Sig, grd, white star, para, M17A1 |

Demolitions

| | |
|---|---|
| 400 | Block, demo, M3 |
| 62 | Block, demo, chain, MI |
| 400 | Cap, blasting, Eng, special, elec. |
| 600 | Cap, blasting, Eng, special, non-elec. |
| 37 | Cord, detonating, 100 ft spool |
| 426 | Explosive, Comp. "C"--, lbs. |
| 200 | Explosive, TNT, 1/2 lb blocks |
| 1,500 | Fuze, blasting, time feet |
| 346 | Torpedo, bangalore |

Flame Throwers

| | |
|---|---|
| 350 | Cylinders, ignition, MI |
| 30 | Napalm, can (5 1/4 lb) |

9. Artillery Ammunition Expenditures by Units

15th Marines:

105mm Howitzer Ammunition

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22,421 | *1,047 | HE, MI w/F M48 |
| 6,454 | * 232 | HE, MI, w/F M54 |
| 357 | * 55 | HE-AT M67 |
| 2,366 | * 86 | Shell, Smoke, WP M60 |
| 85 | | Shell, Smoke, HC, BE M84 |

* These quantities were lost in a fire caused by enemy action and are included in the unit expenditure.

75mm Pack Howitzer

| | |
|---|---|
| 2,729 | HE, M48 w/F M48 |
| 39 | HE, M48 w/F M54 |
| 540 | Shell, Smoke, WP M64 |

1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion:
(Period 1 April to 11 April)

75mm Pack Howitzer

| | |
|---|---|
| 2,182 | HE, M48 w/F M48 |
| 275 | HE, M48 w/F M54 |
| 150 | HE-AT M66 |
| 206 | Smoke, WP, M64 |
| 60 | Canister, T30 |

6th Tank Battalion:

75mm Gun, M3

| | |
|---|---|
| 240 | HE, M48 w/F M48 |
| 46 | Shell, Smoke WP w/F M54 |

Howitzer, 105mm, SP, M7 (Reg. Weapons)

| | |
|---|---|
| 902 | HE, M1 w/F M48 |
| 152 | HE, M1 w/F M54 |
| 451 | Shell, HE-AT M67 |
| 147 | Shell, Smoke, WP M60 |

## Section 20 - Transport Quartermaster

### 1. Loading and Embarkation

a. Initial loading commenced 19 February, 1945, at which time the first of the LSTs arrived, and terminated 28 February, when the last of the transports completed loading just prior to rehearsals. Final loading (vehicles only) took place after rehearsals on 13 and 14 March. There was a total of twelve days of actual loading.

b. Landing Ships

(1) Due to the fact that the amount of cargo which higher echelons required this Division to lift was in excess of shipping capacity allotted, it was necessary to find additional space for stowing ammunition. This was accomplished by understowing LSTs. Six LSTs were each understowed with two and one-half units of fire of 105mm howitzer battalion ammunition, three LSTs were each understowed with

one and one-half units of fire of RCT ammunition, and one with five units of fire of 75mm howitzer battalion ammunition. The ammunition understowed on the tank deck did not exceed twenty-two inches in height, including generally one layer of Marston mats and one layer of one-inch dunnage, providing ample clearance for LVTs which were embarked over the understow.

(2) The following difficulties were encountered in loading LSTs:

(a) LSTs arrived with preloaded naval ammuniton which was in most cases in areas planned for vehicle stowage. Furthermore, the pre-loading of LCTs, pontoons, causeways, and extraneous cargo was at variance with preliminary information, resulting in making numerous adjustments of cargo.

(b) LSTs arrived in several cases at dates other than those anticipated, causing hurried movements of supplies and vehicles to the beaches from the several camp areas. This hurried loading made difficult the efficient use of available space.

(3) Allocation of the twenty-four LSTs, ten LSMs, and one LSD to units was as follows:

6th Tank Battalion: five LSMs (three to five tanks, medium, M4A3, in each); two LSTs (seven tanks, with flotation units in one, eight tanks with flotation units in the other); one LSD (one tank in each of sixteen LCMs).
6th Engineer Battalion: two LSTs.
1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion: two LSTs, five LSMs.
58th Naval Construction Battalion: two LSTs.
15th Marines (artillery): four LSTs (guns loaded in DUKWs).
22d Marines: six LSTs.
4th Marines: six LSTs.

c. Transports

(1) Effort was made to stow all heavy equipment exceeding an LCM-capacity in LSTs. This was not accomplished in all cases, and, therefore, it was necessary to load a few tractors in APAs and AKAs. The shore-to-ship transportation for such vehicles was made possible by prearrangement with the Naval Cargo Operations Section of the island for the use of one LSM and two LCTs.

(2) One of the chief difficulties in loading-out lay in the fact that the ships' characteristics on hand were found to be inaccurate in that the ships were using more space than characteristics indicated. This caused last minute exchanges of cargo from one ship to another.

(3) Due to the amount of cargo being carried and the limited shipping space available, it was difficult to conform to the principles of good combat loading on some ships.

(4) Initial rations and ammunition to be issued to troops prior to debarkation were top-loaded on all ships for immediate accessibility upon arrival at target area. Such rations consisted of two days DOG and three days KING per man; the ammunition was one unit of fire.

(5) Allocation of the thirteen APAs and two AKAs was as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Division Troops | - | three APAs (Cambria, Menifee, Middleton) |
| 4th Marines | - | four APAs (Gage, Adair, McIntyre, Noble) |
| 22d Marines | - | three APAs (Monrovia, Wayne, Sumter); one AKA (Aquarius) |
| 29th Marines | - | three APAs (Leon, Clymer, Clay); one AKA (Caswell) |

2. Unloading

a. Transports

(1) All fifteen transports commenced general unloading at 0800 on L + 1. On L-Day only a few high-priority vehicles were disembarked from transports. Each assault battalion's priority cargo needed initially on L-Day was preloaded in two LCVPs and in those LVTs (one thousand pounds of cargo in each) carrying assault troops. All transports retired to sea the first night to avoid making concentrated targets for air attacks. During the night of L + 1, ten transports retired; the five which remained at the anchorage area accomplished only a minimum of unloading due to the frequent air attack warnings. Thereafter only those ships which had completely discharged their cargo left the transport area for the night. During the daytime unloading took place from 0700 to 1630.

(2) At 1630 on L + 1, the first day of general unloading, five of the transports were over 50 per cent unloaded; three were under 15 per cent unloaded. At 1630 on L + 2, five ships were 100 per cent unloaded, six over 50 per cent, the remaining four ships (including the two AKAs) 21 to 40 per cent. By 1230 on L + 3, the third day of general unloading all APAs were completely unloaded. The two AKAs

worked slowly due to their greater cargo capacity and to the fact that more attention was given to the APAs as far as unloading facilities were concerned. Both the AKAs were moved on L + 6 to adjacent beaches where they completed unloading on L + 7, 8 April, 1945.

(3) The following table shows the time and date each transport was unloaded:

| SHIP | TIME AND DATE UNLOADED | |
|---|---|---|
| Cambria (APA-36) | 2000 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Adair (APA-91) | 1430 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| McIntyre (APA-129) | 0930 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Gage (APA-168) | 1200 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Noble (APA-218) | 2000 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Monrovia (APA-31) | 1430 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Wayne (APA-54) | 1230 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Sumter (APA-52) | 0400 | L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| Menifee (APA-202) | 1230 | L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| Clay (APA-39) | 2400 | L+2, 3 April, 1945 |
| Middleton (APA-25) | 1030 | L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| Clymer (APA-27) | 0430 | L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| Leon (APA-48) | 0400 | L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| Aquarius (AKA-16) | 1800 | L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| Caswell (AKA-72) | 1800 | L+7, 8 April, 1945 |

b. Landing Ships

(1) The one LSD and seven LSMs were entirely unloaded by 1800 of L-Day. The seven LSMs reported immediately upon unloading to those transports carrying heavy equipment of high priority in order to discharge that cargo on the beaches. The other three LSMs discharged their cargo on 2 April, for they carried one tank company in Corps reserve.

(2) Due to poor beaching facilities the LSTs required a longer time to complete unloading than was expected. The tank decks of LSTs carrying amphibious vehicles were cleared on L-Day. At 0700 on L + 3, 4 April, 1945, six LSTs were completely unloaded; at 1500 the same day twelve other LSTs were over 75 per cent unloaded. At 1430 on L + 4, seven additional LSTs had completely discharged cargo. By 0800 on L + 6 a total of eighteen of the twenty-four LSTs were 100 per cent unloaded. By 0800 on L + 7, 8 April, 1945, the remaining six LSTs had completely discharged their cargo.

(3) The following table shows the time and date each landing ship was unloaded:

| SHIP | TIME AND DATE UNLOADED |
|---|---|
| LST 451 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 794 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LST 947 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LST 945 | 0800 L+6, 7 April, 1945 |
| LST 769 | 0800 L+6, 7 April, 1945 |
| LST 833 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 712 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 125 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 752 | 0800 L+6, 7 April, 1945 |
| LST 1013 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LST 791 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LST 951 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 952 | 0800 L+6, 7 April, 1945 |
| LST 627 | 0800 L+6, 7 April, 1945 |
| LST 483 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 681 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 1015 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 568 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 704 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 576 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 708 | 0700 L+3, 4 April, 1945 |
| LST 926 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LST 1030 | 1430 L+4, 5 April, 1945 |
| LST 916 | 0800 L+7, 8 April, 1945 |
| LSM 246 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 175 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 277 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 288 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 270 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 271 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 274 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |
| LSM 278 | 1200 L+1, 2 April, 1945 |
| LSM 326 | 1200 L+1, 2 April, 1945 |
| LSM 325 | 1200 L+1, 2 April, 1945 |
| LSD 13 | 1800 L-Day, 1 April, 1945 |

c. The major causes of delay in unloading to be noted were:

(1) Weather -- On L + 3 and L + 4 unloading almost ceased due to rough sea.

(2) Reef -- When the tide went out, the small boats were not able to beach and, consequently, could be unloaded only at the reef transfer barges, which were able to accomodate only a few boats at one time. Many boats

were delayed as a result, particularly on L + 1. Thereafter the situation was somewhat relieved by having a better channel cut through the reef and by completion of the causeway on L + 4.

(3) Air attacks and warnings -- Unloading ceased generally at 1630 daily to allow the transports time to prepare for night retirement at sea. Those ships remaining at anchorage could do very little unloading after this time each day. Some attempts were made to unload after dark, but the amount of cargo discharged was negligible due to the smoke made during each air warning. The entire afternoon of L + 5, 6 April, 1945, was lost to unloading due to continuous air attacks in the transport area.

(4) Re-rigging -- One-fourth of the ships lost an average of two hours on account of time required to re-rig.

d. Difficulties in Unloading

(1) Difficulties encountered in unloading ships and landing craft both in the transport area and at the beach were generally in the form of delays mentioned in the above paragraphs. An additional statement can be made, however, in regard to the limited area for LSTs to beach - only one place was available, and only a total of five LSTs could beach at the same time.

e. Equipment Used and Miscellaneous Comments

(1) The rigging and slings used were standard types.

(2) All unloading personnel believed the cargo ticket system to be highly satisfactory and of great assistance in keeping up-to-the-minute unloading status data. Another aid of the cargo tickets was that it provided a means of knowing what cargo was in the boats in rendezvous about the reef transfer area.

(3) One causeway was constructed off Red Beach 1. A total of two landing ships and two to three barges could tie-up and unload at one time. The causeway was ready for use on L + 4. It greatly accelerated the unloading of LSTs, which, before its construction, had been working slowly due to a limited beaching area for these ships.

(4) Cranes on the barges set up at the reef transfer area transferred loads from boats to LVTs and DUKWs.

(5) The equipment on all ships proved to be adequate.

(6) Small boat losses were exceptionally light. Losses which did occur were due to storm conditions and mechanical failures.

# SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
# CASUALTIES
## OKINAWA OPERATION

Chart No. 1







APRIL 1945

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

# 4th MARINE CASUALTIES

## OKINAWA OPERATION



SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

# 22nd MARINE CASUALTIES

OKINAWA OPERATION

Chart No. 3






SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

# 29th MARINE CASUALTIES

## OKINAWA OPERATION




COMPARISONS IN CASUALTIES
Chart No. 5
CASUALTIES
1800
1500
1200
900
600
300
0
4th 22th29th DIV.
DEATHS
4th22th 29th DIV.
W.I.A.
4th 22th29th DIV.
OTHER
4th 22th29th DIV.
TOTAL CASUALTIES




Chart No. 6

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CASUALTIES
April 1–28

| | Position: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Co. A | Arrival Date | 1 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 14 | 17 | 26 | [4] | |
| | Distance | - | 1 | 12 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 20 | 40 | |
| Co. B | Arrival Date | 1 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 17 | [5] | | | |
| | Distance | - | 2 | 8 | 29 | 15 | 52 | | | |
| Co. C | Arrival Date | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 15 | 22 | [4] | |
| | Distance | - | 4 | 12 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 17 | 47 | |
| Co. D | Arrival Date | 2 | 6 | 13 | [3] | | | | | |
| | Distance | - | 30 | 18 | 30 | | | | | |
| Co. E | Arrival Date | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 29 | [1] | [2] | [3] |
| | Distance | - | 1 | 2 | 5 | 25 | 20 | 20 | 30 | 1 |
| H & S | Arrival Date | 1 | 2 | 6 | 9 | [3] | | | | |
| | Distance | - | 1 | 7 | 25 | 30 | | | | |

## K E Y  T O  M A P

Dates are for April, 1945, unless enclosed in a box, thus: [2], in which case they are for May, 1945.

Distance is in nearest mile from former position.

Example: Co. E moved from position 4 on the map to position 5, on the 9th of April, a distance of 25 miles.

[redacted]

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER VIII

## ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

1. There was little of significance disclosed in enemy tactics prior to the arrival of the Division at the MOTOBU Peninsula. During the first eight days of the operation that fraction of the enemy which had not withdrawn to the south retreated in the face of the Division's advance offering only sporadic resistance from advantageous positions.

2. Upon arrival at the MOTOBU Peninsula it became immediately apparent that the enemy had developed a sound tactical plan based on a thoroughgoing appreciation of the terrain, and painstaking preparation of his position. It is of significance to observe that the great tactical strength of the YAETAKE hill mass is by no means obvious and only a commander of excellent tactical background could organize it with the effectiveness that this position embraced. However, no tactical innovations were observed and, except for the extraordinarily intelligent appreciation of the terrain coupled with the customary Japanese fanaticism, there was much in the enemy's conduct which might be described as weak. Among those weaknesses, the uncoordinated employment of artillery was outstanding. During operations on the MOTOBU Peninsula a total of 15 artillery pieces ranging in size from 70mm to 6" naval pieces were captured. These weapons were well supplied with ammunition. It was within their range capabilities to cover the entirety of the MOTOBU Peninsula, including the town of NAGO which was being developed as a primary logistical center for the III Corps. Despite this fact, enemy artillery was employed only intermittenly. Its fire control was poor and selection of targets most unprofitable.

3. The customary decisive loss occasioned by banzai charges was present and the result quite similar to that usually encountered.



[redacted]

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I and II, OKINAWA OPERATION

## CHAPTER IX

## ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. Area Secured

a. Distance moved by 6th Marine Division (air line) 55 miles.

b. Distance moved by 6th Marine Division (map) 84 miles.

c. Area captured -- 436 miles.

2. Enemy Casualties

a. During the period between L-Day and L + 27, the following number of enemy killed in action were reported: 2375.

b. During the period between L-Day and L + 27, the following number of prisoners were captured with designations of POWs included:

| Soldiers | Labor Troops | Detained Civilians |
|---|---|---|
| 23 | 21 | 29 |

It is significant, in regard to the prisoners captured and interrogated by the 6th Marine Division, to note that a very broad range of information was received from POWs in this operation. Among the enemy captured, were Japanese aviation, midget submarine, nursing, and home defense personnel.

It is further significant to note that probably on no previous Marine operation have POWs played as significant a part in the collection of information as they have in this first opera-tion on Japanese soil.

3. Operational Material Damage to Enemy

The following is a list of enemy material and equipment captured by the 6th Marine Division on northern OKINAWA between L-Day and L + 21. (Numerous items have not been included in the list that follows because of their minor nature.)

a. Enemy Material Capture and/or Destroyed Between L-Day and L + 21:

*RIFLES

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 17 April | (TA0323)B |
| 6 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 17 April | (TA0223) |
| 2 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 19 April | (TA0425) |
| 5 | 22d | | |
| 29 | 3d Bn, 29th | - | |
| 25 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 2 April | (TA8394)C |
| 40 | 2d Bn, 4th | - 6 April | (CHIMU) |
| 4 | Patrols | - 11 April | |
| 21 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 16 April | (TA9922)R |
| 41 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9922)X |
| 88 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9924)M |
| Total 265 | | | |

Destroyed:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 48 | 3d Bn, 29th | |
| 313 | Total Rifles | |

* This is not a complete report on captured or destroyed rifles. Not all units kept complete records in the case of rifles.

LMGs

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 22d | | |
| 1 | 22d | - 4 April | |
| 4 | 22d | - | |
| 1 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 11 April | (NAKASONI) |
| 1 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 13 April | (TA0226)E |
| 3 | 2d Bn, 29th | - 16 April | (TA0223) |
| 8 | 3d Bn, 29th | - 16 April | (TA9823)D, G |
| 5 | 3d Bn, 29th | - 15 April | (TA9923)Y |
| 3 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 1 April | (YONTAN) |
| 3 | 3d Bn, 4th | - 2 April | (TA8394)M |
| 6 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 2 April | (TA8394)C |
| 1 | H&S, 4th | - 6 April | (TA8997)M |
| 3 | 1st Bn, 4th | - 14 April | (TA9822)J |

100

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 15 April | (TA9822)V |
| 3 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 16 April | (TA9922)E |
| 3 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 16 April | (TA9922)F |
| 1 | - 3d Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA0023)C |
| 1 | - 3d Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA0023)R |
| 3 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9922)X |
| 7 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9924)B, G |
| 4 | - 3d Bn, 4th | - 18 April | (TA9924)D, E |
| 6 | - 2d Bn, 4th | - 19 April | (TA9926)A |
| Total 68 | | | |

Destroyed:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | - 3d Bn, 29th | |
| 72 | Total LMGs | |

HMGs

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | - 1st Bn, 29th | - | (NE of ITOMI) |
| 2 | - 29th | - 17 April | |
| 1 | - 2d Bn, 4th | - 1 April | (YONTAN) |
| 1 | - 2d Bn, 4th | - 14 April | (TA9822)D-1 |
| 2 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9922)B |
| 5 | - 1st Bn, 4th | - 17 April | (TA9924)B, G, H |
| 4 | - 3d Bn, 4th | - 18 April | (TA9924)D |
| 1 | - Patrol, 29th | - 8 April | |
| 4 | - G-2 | - 6 April | (TA9903)D |
| 1 | - G-2 | - 10 April | (TA0324)T |
| Total 24 | | | |

Destroyed:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - 3d Bn, 29th | - | (MANNA) |
| 5 | - 2d Bn, 29th | - 9 April | (TA0625)M |
| 1 | - 2d Bn, 4th | - 14 April | (TA9822)D |
| Total 7 | | | |

| | |
|---|---|
| 31 | Total HMGs |
| 103 | Total of LMGs and HMGs |

[redacted]

20mm

Captured:

1 - Patrol, 29th - 8 April
3 - 1st Bn, 29th - 16 April
Total 4

Captured or Destroyed:

5 - 29th - 17 April
9 Total 20mm

25mm

Captured:

10 - 29th - 17 April
10 Total 25mm

40mm

Captured:

4 - G-2 - 10 April (TA0324)T
6 - 3d Bn, 29th - 10 April (HAMASAKI)
10 Total 40mm

ARTILLERY

Captured:

1 - 75mm 22d -
2 - 75mm 3d Bn, 29th - 16 April (TA9823)B
1 - 75mm 3d Bn, 29th - 16 April (TA9823)G
2 - 6" 3d Bn, 4th - 17 April (TA9924)D
1 - 75mm 1st Bn, 4th - 17 April (TA9924)G
1 - 37mm 1st Bn, 4th - 17 April (TA9924)H
1 - 75mm 3d Bn, 4th - 18 April (TA9924)S
2 - 6" 2d Bn, 4th - 19 April (TA9926)A probable
1 - 75mm 29th - 14 April (TA0023)A
Total 12

Destroyed:

1 - 75mm

13 Total pieces

108



[redacted]

[redacted]

## AMMUNITION
(Small Arms)

Captured:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | cases .25 Cal, 2d Bn, 29th | - 3 April (TA8392)I |
| ½ | case .25 Cal, 2d Bn, 29th | - 3 April (TA1319)N-5 |
| | Other quantities | (TA8294)H |
| | Dump, Patrol, 29th | - 8 April (TA0625)M |
| 50 | cases, 1st Bn, 29th | -11 April (NE of ITOMI) |
| | Dump (steel jacket) 2d Bn, 29th, 17 April | (TA0323)B |

Destroyed:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | cases, 2d Bn, 29th | (TA9923)B |
| 1 | (cave with Ammo) 2d Bn, 29th | (TA0427)T |
| 12,000 | rounds, 2d Bn, 29th | (TA9924)A-5 |
| 300 | clips, 2d Bn, 29th | (TA9924)P |
| 35 | cases, 2d Bn, 29th | (TA9923)U |

Captured: 13.2mm

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | boxes, G-2 | - 8 April | (TA9963)D |
| | small dumps | - | (TA0625)M |
| | small dumps | | (TA0324)T |

Destroyed:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | small dump | | |
| 1 | large dump | - 9 April | (TA0625)M |

Destroyed: 20mm

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | large dump | - 9 April | (TA0625)M |

Captured: (larger than 20mm)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | cases - 6" - 2d Bn, 29th- | | |
| 500 | rounds 6", 4th- | | (TA9924)D |
| 50 | rounds 75mm, G-2 | - 6 April | (TA9903) |
| | dump of 40mm | - | (TA0324)T |

Destroyed:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | rounds 47mm, 22d | |
| | large store Ammo | (TA9924)U |
| 150 | rounds 40mm, 2d Bn, 29th- | (TA9624)V |



[redacted]

[redacted]

## GRENADES

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | cases 3d Bn, 29th | - 11 April | (TA1319)N-5 |
| | dump, 2d Bn, 29th | - 17 April | (TA0323)B |
| 32 | cases (Frag) | | |
| 50 | cases (KISKA Type) G-2 | - 6 April | (TA9903)D |
| 3 | ceramic concussion G-2 | - 6 April | (TA9903)D |

Destroyed:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | cases (Frag) | (TA9923)U |

## BOMBS, ROCKETS, AND MINES

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | cases 100 Kg bombs (Army type) | | |
| 167 | cases 13 Kg bombs (Army type) | | (TA8193)A |
| | Dump bombs in Bldg, CofS | - 2 April | (TA8345)M, S |
| | Dump bombs, 4th | - 2 April | (TA8394)B-5 |
| 12 | smoke bombs, 29th | - 11 April | (UNTEN) |
| 1 | aerial hand bomb, 2d Bn, 29th | - 11 April | (TA0923)L, Q, R |
| 42 | cases 12 Kg pararockets | | (TA8193)A |
| | large dump bombs - CHINA YAMADA Rd | | (TA8496) |
| 50 | floating mines, 29th | - 11 April | (UNTEN) |
| | large dump mines, fuses, detonators | | (TA8294)H-1 |
| 10 | horned sea mines - (TA3545); (TA3445); (TA3444) | | |

Destroyed:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | (cave with dynamite) 1st Bn, 29th | - 14 April | (TA0019)Y |
| 2 | 75 Kg bombs, 4th | | (TA9623)X |

## TORPEDOES

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | aerial torpedoes - CHINA YAMADA Rd - | | (TA8496) |
| 20 | war heads | | (cave at UNTEN) |
| 7 | torpedoes, G-2 | - 10 April | (TA0324)T |
| | dump torpedoes, G-2 | - 10 April | (TA0423)T |
| 5 | torpedoes, 29th | | (TA0728)M |
| 40 | Total torpedoes | | |

194



[redacted]

## GRENADE LAUNCHERS

Captured:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - | 2d Bn, 29th | - | 12 April | (NAKASONI) |
| 6 | - | 3d Bn, 4th | - | 17 April | (TA9924)H-1 |
| 1 | - | 3d Bn, 4th | - | 17 April | (TA0023)R |
| 1 | - | 2d Bn, 4th | - | 19 April | (TA9926)A |
| 10 | - | 4th | - | | (Green Ridge Area) |
| 15 | - | 3d Bn, 29th | - | 11 April | (TA1319)N-5 |
| 2 | - | 29th | - | | |
| 36 | Total Grenade Launchers | | | | |

## MORTARS

Captured:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | - | 50mm, 22d | - | | |
| 1 | - | 81mm, 2d Bn, 4th | - | 14 April | (TA9823)J |
| 2 | - | 81mm, 1st Bn, 4th | - | 15 April | (TA9822)V |
| 2 | - | 81mm, 1st Bn, 4th | - | 16 April | (TA9922)E |
| 1 | - | 81mm, 22d | - | | |
| 1 | - | 90mm, 4th | - | 16 April | |
| 1 | - | 81mm, 1st Bn, 29th | - | 16 April | |
| 1 | - | 81mm, 29th | - | 17 April | |
| Total 11 | | | | | |

Destroyed:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - | unidentified | - | 14 April | (TA9823)J |
| 1 | - | 81mm | - | | (TA9922)A |
| Total 2 | | | | | |
| 13 | Total Mortars | | | | |

## MORTAR AMMUNITION

Captured:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | rounds 50mm, 2d Bn, 29th | - | 13 April | (TA0323) |
| 1 | case 50mm, 6th Tank Bn | - | 14 April | |
| 3 | cases 81mm, G-2 | - | | (TA3750)G |
| 50 | cases 81mm, 4th | - | | (TA9923)B-3 |

## *RADIO GEAR

Captured:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - radio, 4th | - | 3 April | (TA8595)T |
| | radio gear, G-2 | - | 6 April | (TA9405)U, V |
| | signal gear, G-2 | - | 6 April | (TA9300)Y; (TA9400)B, H, Q, U |
| 79 | - boxes, Cathode Ray tubes, G-2, | | 15 April | (TA3750)G |

105

*RADIO GEAR (Contd)

Destroyed:

batteries and antenna, 4th - 11 April (TA8595)T

Captured or Destroyed:

10 sets - others not located

* Many isolated incidents of signal gear not reported

RADAR

2 - Radar sets on trucks, 1st Bn, 4th - 4 April (TA8596)U

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Elect supplies and generators, 4th - 4 April (TA8195)
Generators (TA9405)U,V
Generator, G-2 - 10 April (TA0324)T
Generating apparatus at ITOMI
General supplies at UNTEN
7 - motor speed regulators (TA3750)G

Total 27 generators and other equipment.

TRUCKS

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | - | (Radar), 2d Bn, 4th | - 3 April (TA8596)Y |
| 14 | - | 2d Bn, 4th | - 2 April (TA8395)M |
| 2 | - | 1st Bn, 4th | - 8 April (TEIMA) |
| 2 | - | Prime movers, 3d Bn, 4th | - 17 April (TA9924)D |
| 2 | - | Trucks, 3d Bn, 4th | -17 April (TA9924)D |
| 1 | - | 1½ ton truck | |
| 1 | - | passenger car, 4th | - 7 April (OSAWAN and O-E Line) |
| 4 | - | Patrol, 29th | - 8 April (TA0625)M |
| 1 | - | 1st Bn, 29th | - 9 April (TA0324)H |
| 1 | - | G-2 | -10 April (ITOMI) |
| Total 30 | | | |

Destroyed:

4

34 Total trucks

[redacted]

## FUEL

Captured:

1287 - Bbls gas and oil in 86 caves (TA8396)Y-2
General fuel supplies (UNTEN)
Sub-Fuel, 1st Bn, 29th - 2 April (TA3648)B
Aviation fuel, 22d - 14 April (TA3750)G-3

## MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Captured:

General supplies in dumps, G-2 - (TA8095)O,P;
(TA8195)K,P
Surgical instruments and bandages (TA9903)D
Large medical dump (TA0324)T
3 truckloads general supplies (not located)

## TANKS

3 - (TA1015) (not located)

## SUICIDE BOATS

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - | 22d | - 3 April | (TA9400)B |
| 4 | - | G-2 | - 18 April | (CHIMU) |
| 6 | - | Probable | - 18 April | (CHIMU) |
| 2 | - | Undetermined types | | (TA1029)P;(TA0826)H |
| 3 | - | G-3 | - 3 April | (UNTEN) |
| Total 16 | | | | |

Destroyed:

1

17 Total suicide boats

## BARGES

Captured:

Number of barges, 29th - 14 April (TA4337)Y

Destroyed:

10 - 2d Bn, 22d - 14 April

[redacted]



[redacted]

[redacted]

## PLANES

Captured or Destroyed:

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - | DINAH | 1 | - | PEGGY |
| 15 | - | FRANK | 1 | - | SALLY |
| 6 | - | FRANCES | 4 | - | SONIA |
| 1 | - | GEORGE | 18 | - | TONY |
| 7 | - | JUDY | 1 | - | TOJO |
| 1 | - | JILL | 1 | - | THELMA |
| 5 | - | LILY | 1 | - | TOPSY |
| 1 | - | NICK | 1 | - | VAL |
| | | | 17 | - | OSCAR |
| | | Total | 82 | | |

Destroyed:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | - Unknown | - 14 April | (TA8622)S |
| 1 | - OSCAR, III Corps | - 16 April | (TA3625)J |

## FOOD

Captured:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | bags rice, G-2 | - 6 April | (TA9903)D |
| 25 | bags rice, 3d Bn, 29th | | (TA1319)N-5 |
| | Misc food | - | (TA0625)M |
| | Ration dump | - | (TA0625)M; (TA0324)T |

Destroyed:

Many scattered dumps

## CLOTHING

Captured:

Naval clothing, 29th - (UNTEN)
35 Army blankets, 3d Bn, 29th - 11 April (TA1319)N-5

Destroyed:

Many scattered dumps

## GENERAL AND UNCLASSIFIED SUPPLIES

Supply dump, 4th - 2 April (TA8395)
1 periscope, 29th - 11 April (TA[redacted]M
2 range finders (AA), 29th - (cave S of NAKASONI)

[redacted]



[redacted]

GENERAL AND UNCLASSIFIED SUPPLIES (Contd)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dump | - | | (TA9903)D |
| large dumps | - | | (UNTEN) |
| dump | - | | (TA1319)N-5 |
| Army dump, 22d | - | | (TA3038)I |
| Dump, 4th | - | 19 April | (TA9924);(TA0024) |
| large dump Arty ranging gear | | | (TA9924)L |

b. Among the unusual pieces of enemy material captured or destroyed were:

(1) Many ceramic grenades made of a white chalky material. These are slightly larger than a baseball and covered with thin rubber. They have a scratch-type detonator set in a well inside the grenade.

(2) Glass frangible smoke grenades were also noted. They were approximately the same size and shape as the ceramic grenade. This grenade was filled with liquid and came packed in a sawdust filled can. The grenade had no detonator.

(3) Among the weapons captured were several old Remington manufactured Russian rifles, single-shot Meiji '18 rifles, shot guns, experimental Skoda machine guns (early type), Diana air rifles, and "idiot sticks" (long poles with knives affixed to the ends.)

(4) Several new items of chemical warfare equipment both offensive and defensive, were captured.

(5) The largest weapons captured were two 15cm guns complete with caissons and prime movers, and two 6" guns (naval rifles) on improvised mounts. These naval mounts were unsatisfactory and were destroyed by firing the pieces, thereby rendering them useless shortly after the landing of the Division on L Day.

4. Own Losses

| | Officers | Warrent Officers | Enlisted |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. Killed in action | 12 | 0 | 176 |
| b. Died of wounds received in action | 1 | 0 | 30 |
| c. Wounded in action | 42 | 1 | 771 |
| d. Missing in action | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Total Battle Casualties | 57 | 1 | [redacted] |

e. Injured in action, treated as battle casualties under Army procedure, totalled 6 officers and 63 enlisted. Since under Marine Corps usage these do not constitute battle casualties they are not included in the above totals.