
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FIRST BATTALION, TWENTY SECOND MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION.

THIRD PHASE

OKINAWA, RYUKYU RETTO. 5 May to 21 June 1945



GEVERAL-

The purpose of this report is to review the tactical and logistical situations undergone by this battalion during the third phase of the OKINAWA Operation, from 5 May to 21 June 1945 inclusive.

CHAPTER II TASK ORGANIZATION

When the battalion moved south the following was the task organization:

1st Battalion, 22d Marines.

1st Platoon, 37mm, R/W Co.

SECP - 6th JASCO.

AGL - 6th JASCO.

3 FO Teams - 2d Bn 15th Marines.

During the course of operations other units were attached, depending on the mission of the battalion.

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

- 5 May The battalion moved by truck from MOMABARU to an area around CHIBANA.

 Here the battalion went into bivouac and was designated III Amphibious
 Corps reserve.
- 6 May- The battalion remained in bivouac. No enemy acitivity.
- 7 May The battalion prepared to move south to area at MACHINATO AIRFIELD, prepared to relieve the 7th Marines, First Marine Division.
- May Entrucking at 1100 the battalion moved south. Designated as regimental reserve, the battalion relieved the first battalion 7th Marines and took up positions along the coast west of MACHINATO AIRFIELD. The first battalion 7th Marines remained in their positions for the night.
- THE BATTLE OF NAHA

 Enemy activity during the night consisted of light infiltration and sporadic artillery fire in the battalion's area. The battalion was alerted to support the attack in the morning, shortly after daybreak.





- O May Under cover of darkness "A" Company crossed the ASA-KAWA and assumed position on the high ground, just to the south, prepared to support the advance of the 2d and 3d Battalions. Due to enemy opposition encountered the battalion was committed. "C" Company committed on "A" Company's left flank and "B" Company on the right flank of "A" Company. At 1345 "B" and "C" Companies jumped off toward the next ridge. During the day enemy artillery, machine gun and rifle fire was encountered, this ranged from light to heavy. Set up defensive position at 1700 tied in with 3d battalion on the right and the 2d battalion on the left.
- 111 May An attempt to infiltrate our lines was made by the enemy during the night but was repulsed by "A" Company. They killed 8 Japs and captured two light machine guns and one heavy machine gun. At \$7\$\$ the battalion resumed the attack to seize the O A line. "C" Company encountered a strong enemy pocket on the battalions left flank. They pressed the attack and after suffering heavy casualties withdrew and Naval Gunfire was placed upon the strong point. At 163\$ "C" Company supported by tanks again assaulted the strong point (later to be known as CHARLIE'S RIDGE) and succeeded in capturing and destroying the enemy strong point. "A" and "B" Companies then advanced to CHARLIE'S RIDGE supported by "C" Company fire. Enemy artillery and small arms fire during the day was heavy, causing many casualties. A total of 81 Japs were killed during the action centering about CHARLIE'S RIDGE. The battalion had 144 casualties.
- 12 May A force of 30 Japs counter-attacked "C" Companys position on CHARLIE'S RIDGE during the night. This attack was repelled with 12 Japs killed and the remainder withdrew into the caves under CHARLIE'S RIDGE.

 "A" and "B" Companies continued the attack, with "C" Company assigned the mission of cleanining out CHARLIE'S RIDGE. "A" and "B" Companies reached the objective assigned at 1400 and pushed patrols into NAHA. The battalion tied in with the 3d battalion on the right.
- Company used captured enemy "knee mortars" with good effect and confused the Japs. The battalion was ordered to clean out the town of MAHA, north of the ASATO River, and determine the enemy's strength and dispositions. At 1640 patrols returned and submitted their reports on the river, conditions of the bridges and enemy resistance encountered. The battalion remained in its positions on the high ground overlooking NAHA.
- 14 May Enemy activity during the night was limited to artillery and mortar fire. The battalion was ordered to remain in position due to the heavy fire received from the unsecured high ground to the regiments left front. Night defense was organized, physical contact with 2d and 3d battalions on the right and left flank.
- 15 May The battalion was alerted to assist the 2d battalion (on the left flank) in the event of a break through. Patrols were sent to the front, no other activity.

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16 May - The battalion was ordered to support, by fire, the movement of the 3d battalion onto SUGAR LOAF HILL. At 1830 regiment ordered the battalion to send all available men in the Command Post to bolster the 3d battelion's right flank as they could not hold SUGAR LOAF HILL and expect a breakthrough. The battalion remained in position for the night.

17 May - The first battelion was ordered to remain in its present positions during the day. Activity was confined to patrols and mopping up caves in the battalion zone of action.

18 May - The battalion was ordered to hold present positions.

19 May - The battalion reached the O-C line as ordered. Set up night defense along the north side of the ASATO River, tied in with units on both flanks.

20 May - The battalion supported the advance of the 4th Marines, on left, by fire. "B" Company moved forward and consolidated their position. The battalion holds same positions as last night.

A May - The first battalion seized and occupied the O-E line as ordered. Physical contact with units on both flanks.

22 May - The left flank of the battalion moved to the ASATO River maintaining contact with the 3d Battalion 4th Marines. Continued clearing out Japs and caves in battalion zone of action.

23 May - The battalion was alerted to assist the Reconnaissance Company on their mission south of the ASATO River. "B" Company was pulled off the line. Remainder of battalion remained in position.

24 May - "C" Company took over the battalion front. "A" and "B" Companies in bivouac. The battalion was assigned to guard the mailey bridge across the ASATO River.

25 May - The battalion was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, and demi designated as regimental reserve.

8 May - The battalion remained in bivouac. No enemy activity.

7 May - The battalion was moved into an assembly area along the north side of the ASATO River in preparation for moving across.

 28 May - Commencing at $\phi 3\phi \phi$ the battalion moved south across the ASATO River. At \$6545 the first battalion completed a passage of lines thru the 2d battalion and jumped off in the attack. At \$845 the battalion reached the assigned objective, the O-G line. The Division Reconnaissance Company took over the defense of MAHA and the battalion moved into a defensive position in NAHA as ordered.

29 May- Beginning at \$43\$ the battalion crossed the NAHA CANAL with two Companies and resumed the attack to the South East. At \$845 contact with the First Battalion 29th Marines was established on the left flank. The battalion set up a defensive position on the high ground near the radio towers.

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- 30 May The 2d and 3d battalions passed thru the 1st Battalion's lines and the first battalion reverted to regimental reserve. Mopping up continued in the battalion zone of action.
- 31 May As the attack progressed, the first battalion moved into the gap between the 2d and 3d battalions and joined the attack. At 1318 "A" and "C" Companies occupied "FOX" HILL in the battalion zone of action, this being the assigned objective. The battalion set up all around defensive positions for the night.
- 11 June The battalion continued the attack in the morning and seized the KOKUBA-GAWA line in the battalion zone of action. All companies conducted patrols to the north side of the KOKUBA-GAWA. All units mopped up in the battalion zone of action.

THE BATTLE FOR OROKU PEVINSULA

- 2 June The battalion sent a reconnaissance patrol south of the KOKUBA-GAWA to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy. The patrol reports were negative. At 1230 the battalion was relieved by the 7th Marines. The battalion then set up a perimeter defense in an assembly area as designated.
- 3 June -) Remained in bivouac, conducted mopping up of area. 4 June -)
- 5 June The battalion was ordered to move south across the KOKUBA-GAWA and assume the mission of protecting the right (West) flank of the 7th Marines. The battalion was further designated as division reserve.
- 6 June The first battalion conducted local security patrols along its front. At 1300 the battalion reverted to regimental control.
- 7 June Vigorous patrolling was conducted by the battelion to the West and South West. The battelion remained in its present defensive positions.

 "B" Company was ordered to the 3d battelion.
- 8 June The battalion was ordered to take Hill 55-1 and Hill 55-2 by strong patrols. The patrols received light small arms fire throughout the day. A shortage of ammunition and intense enemy fire caused "A" and "C" Companies to withdraw from Hill 55-1 under cover of darkness. The battalion dug in for the night. "F" Company of the 2d battalion was attached to the battalion.

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- The patrol returned with information concerning the terrain and possible approaches to HILL 55-2 no enemy activity noticed. The battalion was ordered to support the attack of the 2d Battalion by fire from present positions. The battalion was ordered to new defensive positions on the regiments right (East) flank and to the South. All companies were in new positions at 1500.
- The battalion was ordered to support the attack from its present positions. "C" Company was moved upon HILL 55-2 to support the attack from that position. "B" Company ordered to the 2d Battalion. The battalion set up defenses in designated areas as ordered for the night.
- 12 June "C" Company supported the advance of the 4th Marines on the regiment's left flank. "A" and "B" Companies continued destroying the enemy in the battalion zone of action.
- June The battalion conducted local patrols and maintained its defensive positions on the regiment's right (east) flank. "B" Company reverted to battalion control.
- 14 June Warning order received that the battalion would go into the assault on the 16th or 17th June. The battalion conducted local patrols, closing caves and mopping up the battalion zone of action.
- 5 June The battalion moved to a new assembly area about 2000 yards southwest of CHIKUTO. The battalion was alerted to move the next day to TERA.
- 16 June The battalion moved to an assembly area north of TERA and was in bivouse by 1600.

17 Juli - CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PENINSULA

- 17 June Beginning at \$3\$\$\$\$\$ the battelion left its assembly area and proceeded south to the MEZADO RIDGE and relived units of the 7th Marines. At dawn the battelion attacked and seized the high ground of the MEZADO RIDGE in the battalion zone of action. Here the battalion set up night defensive positions. As it got dark the enemy launched a counter-attack with an estimated 100 Japs this attack was repelled with a loss of 50 Japs killed.
- 16 June The bettalion remained in its positions on MEZADO RIDGE and conducted mopping up operations in the battalion zone of action. Also supported the attack of the regiment by direct fire from its present positions.
- 19 June The battalion continued eliminating the enemy in its zone of action. Patrols were sent to the North and South of the battalions position. The coast road from ITOMAN to KUWANGA RIDGE was secured by battalion patrols.
- down The battalion continued local patrolling and sealing caves in its area.
- 4 June The battalion conducted local patrols. Further continued scaling caves and eliminating the enemy.

THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE



(a) MAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

- A. Effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Party.
 - 1. SCR-694 radio was satisfactory throughout the operation.
 - 2. Training of personnel was satisfactory.
 - 3. Close supporting fire was used once with good results.
 - 4. Illumination was used often and was satisfactory.
 - Preparation, harrassing, destruction and interdicting fires were used.
 - 6. The Firing Ships' gunnery was excellent. However some of the older battleships main and secondary batteries were both unsatisfactory.
- B. Effectivness of Naval Gunfire.
 - 1. For most targets only the main battery of battle, ships and "high-capacity" were effective.
 - 2. SFCP working with a spotting plane and firing ship had satisfactory results. This combination was used often.
 - 3. Cooperation with the artillery forward observers in regard to targets, OP's, air photographs and equipment, was good.

(b) AIR SUPPORT

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In the concluding phase of the operation close air support was used extensively, but only once directly by this battalion.

The target consisted of two enemy artillery pieces located east of NAHA. The results of the strike showed that they were destroyed.

Observation of strikes showed that bombs and rockets along ridge tops and reverse slopes proved very satisfactory.

Napalm strikes also proved to be of much value in cleaning out areas, thus enabling the troops to advance.

Communications during the operation were very good. Many air drops along with air strikes caused the net to be overcrowded at some times but this liaison party had no trouble. The equipment provided was sufficient.

There is too much delay between time of request and time of strike.

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
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(c) ARTILLERY SUPPORT

The use of artillery was extensive and all types of fires were utilized. The alertness of the FO teams on many occasions caused enemy artillery to be brought under fire in a very short time. The artillery effectively neutralized, if not destroyed, enemy positions harrassing our own units.

The cooperation and performance of FO teams, in all instances was excellent. . .

(d) TANKS

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Upon nearly every occaision when tanks were assigned to this battalion they arrived later than the time specified. Thereby the attack would be delayed, or the attack would start without their support. Once they were committed their performance was excellent. Their use to blast caves and fortified positions with direct fire was of immeasurable value, on many occasions they eliminated automatic weapons that were holding up the infantry &s advance.

The Flame-thrower tank was used on two occasions and its performance was excellent. The frame_throwers capacity enabled it to reduce many enemy positions and caves in the shortest possible time.

On one instance when the only sumply and evacuation route was denied to vehicles by enemy fire the tanks were used to evacuate the wounded and also to carry supplies to the front line units. No tanks were lost during this

The bull-dozer tank aided in keeping roads open until either the enemy fire ceased or the Engineers could supply an armored bull-dozer.

In all instances the cooperation of the attached tank units was excellent.

(e) AMPHIBIOT'S TRACTORS'

When the battalion forced a bridgehead across a river the only means of supply and evacuation were the amphibious tractors. Then too, when a prolonged period of wet weather made supply by vehicle difficult, the amphibious tractors supplied and evacuated for the battalion. Care had to be taken however to prevent them from "bellying - up" in the mud.

On all occaisions when the amphibious tractors were assigned to the Dattalion their performance and cooperation was satisfactory.

(f) ARMORED AMPHIBIANS

During the latter stages of the campaign use of armored amphibians Was made by this battalion. The armored amphibians took position on the reef, near the sea wall, and supported the battalion's advance by direct fire on enemy positions. They remained in position during the night and were used for beach defense.



(g) INFANTRY COMBAT

The comparatively flat, rolling terrain in the southern end of the island afforded infantry units opportunity for maneuver. The employment of organic arms primarily, and supplemented by supporting arms was very good. Small units utilized terrain and cover to excellent advantage. Flanking movements were used often as it was this maneuver which caused the enemy to withdraw time and again no matter how strong his defensive position was. Fire and movement was excellent, though in the final stages, because of the large number of replacements and lack of non-commissioned officers, the units had a tendency to lag behind their supporting fires. When tanks were used the infantry - tank team tactics as taught were used to good advantage.

Movements during the night were carried out in excellent fashion with little or no confusion.

(h) COMMUNICATIONS.

The communication plan (SOI) was adequate. Sufficient frequencies and calls signs were assigned. No duplication of systems was noted. The battalion did not contribute to the formation of a communication plan. The plan was received in time for study and indoctrination. Plans did include measures for avoidance of destruction of means of communication by behicles.

Personnel allowances should be increased in therradio and wire sections. Additional radio men should be added to the T/O to cover the use of SCR 610's. Personnel training was adequate. Message center was short three men. Casualties sustained included the following: 4 radio operators KIA, 5 radio operators WIA and 1 radio operator combat fatigue. In the wire section: 1 wireman KIA, 9 wiremen WIA, and 1 wireman combat fatigue.

No shortages or averages existed in authorized equipment. During the operation two SCR 300's were shot up and three EE-8's were lost. The SCR-536 was not used during the operation as they were not operable. During the operation the Radio "Jamp" (TCS) was replaced.

It is recommended that a wire jeep with an RL-31, plus a 1/4 ton jeep trailer be furnished as an item of signal gear. It is also recommended that the SCR-694 radios be used in place of the SCR-300. There should be a change in switchboards, from the BD-71 (six drop) to the BD-72 (twelve-drop) enclosed in a carrying box of much lighter material.

Wire laying and trouble shooting was frequent due to continued interruption by tanks and other tracked vehicles.

No new items of signal communication gear was employed. No items of extra equipment were used.

The maintainance of an adequate supply of wire and radio batteries was a difficulty which had to be surmounted by the method of self supply from the next higher echelon. There was also an insufficient number of DR-8's. Both regimental and divisional radio repair facilities were utilized.

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(j) MEDIC

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Telephones and switchboards were repaired by battalions. No spare parts for radios were carried as none were furnished the battalion.

Normal communication agencies were established and none were overloaded, our present means of communication were adequate in this operation and all assigned radio frequencies employed.

Difficulties noted in communication were:

Radio - None in actual communication. However a high percentage of faulty batteries and SCR-300 handsets.

Wire - Shortage of adequate means of transportation of equipment. Lack of wire supply on DR-8's.

No visual or messenger difficulties were noted, a pair of field dases might be provided for use in any visual communications.

Signal communications during the operation was adequate and successful tall times due to the efficient work of the battalions communications platoons personnel. No officers were required to operate any means of communication due to enlisted casualties. No enemy communications installations were captured or nut to use.

The Assault Code, Hagelin machine, shackle and pre-arranged message codes were used and all proved adequate to the demands of the operation. The shackle authenticator was used successfully for message authentication. No enemy counter-measures in the use of codes was encountered. All personnel were sufficiently trained in the use of security measures.

No enemy communication counter-measures were encountered.

(i) ENGINEERS

Engineers were employed extensively in detecting and lifting of mines. At times teams were attached to the battelion and in other instances they were requested from regiment. The work of these teams was excellent and thorough. In many cases this battalions route of supply and evacuation was maintained by the rapid removal of mines.

(j) MEDICAL

a. When the battalion moved south the Medical section lacked one man of being up to full strength. Material was according to basic allowances.

b. During the assault medical installations consisted of a forward and a rear aid station. These were set up at locations suitable for rapid receiving of casualties, i.e., on roads and large trails, set up as near the front lines as possible without unduly exposing the aid station personnel to enemy fire. The distance was usually about 100 to 400 yards behind the lines along the line of drift. Use of natural and man made cover and concealment was made in all instances. Night security consisted of a rifle squad provided by one of the rifle companies.

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All patients were sent immediately to a medical company. A few were handled at the rear aid station (minor cellulitis, sprains, exhaustion, etc) and returned to duty in a few days.

Evacuation was by "Jacp" ambulance, though conditions at times were such that amphibian tractors and tanks were used.

No special sanitary measures were taken aside from the well established methods of sanitation in the field.

The dead were removed as soon as possible under existing conditions. A point deserving attention here is that this removal of the dead on the aid static stretchers without replacement of these stretchers constituted a great number of stretchers lost.

Diarrhea and desentery constituted our only epidemic diseases of import with approximately 30% of the battalion personnel afflicted. No facilities were available to establish their etiology. About 5% had bloody stools. Diarrhea has been associated with increased numbers of flies and it is strongly recommended that more DDT and sprays be made available for the companies use. It is also recommended that hot food not be served in the field unless means for washing mess gear is made available.

The aid station treated 968 casualties as of 21 June 1945. The number of KIA as of 21 June 1945 were 96. Approximately 60 civilians and POW's were given first aid and evacuated. No definite diseases were noted.

The present medical organization is suitable. It has been proved, however, that any one collecting point for the three battalions is unsatisfactory. It is recommended that the collecting point transportation and personnel be divided among the three battalion aid stations for their respective use.

The medical personnel has been very adequate in quality, very inadequation quantity. Roplacements have been too slow in coming, resulting in the aid station being understaffed to the point of being critical on occasions when the going was roughest.

Field medical equipment on the whole has been adequate and satisfactory Medical supplies have been adequate and satisfactory. There has been an inadequat supply and availability of epidemic control equipment like DDT, sprays, bombs, flea powder, scat, etc.

(k) SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

A. Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies.

Class I Adequate throughout operation.

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At times enough vehicles were not available for the operation.

Class III
Adequate throughout operation.



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Class IV Adequate throughout operation.

Class V Adequate throughout operation.

- B. Resupply sufficient in all classes.
- C. Shore based supply facilities were efficient throughout operation.
- D. Salvage: The companies returned selvaged materials to central points from which S-4 picked it up. Regimental QM also conducted salvage operations. Nearly all of the salvaged material came from battle casualties.
- E. Transportation: Adequate, except as noted in previous report.
- F. There was a 42 day battle employment of all weapons.
 - 1. The number of spare parts and accessories for machine gun and browning automatic rifle was inadequate.

G. VEHICLES H. WEAPONS LOST Browning Automatic Rifle 8 Trucks 1/4 Ton 4x4, Cargo. 60mm Mortars 1 Truck 1/4 Ton 4x4, Radio

1 Truck 1/4 Ton 4x4 Ambulance	Flame Throwers	3
C		

6 Trailers 1/4 Ton 4x4, Cargo Carbine Cal. . 30 200 1 Cargo carrier M 29 (weasol) Pistol Cal. .45 10

- I. 2 Trucks 1/4 Ton 4x4 Cargo were damaged beyond repair.
- J. Ammunition expended during last phase of operation.

Some Herter	ROULIDS EXPENDED	
60mm Morter, HE M49A2	12304	
Illuminating M83Al	1754	
81mm Morter HE M43A1 W/M52	5045	
не м56 w/м53	9321	
WF M57 W/M52	1303	
Grenades. HE, AT. 2.36 M6A3	420	
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	ROUNDS EXPENDED	
Illuminating, MKl	275	
Fragmentazation, MK II	4075	
WP, M15	975	
HC, M8	375	,
Incendiary, M14 Smoke, Col., M18, Green Smoke, Col., M18, Red Smoke, Col., M18, Violet Smoke, Col., M18, Yellow	932	•
AT, M9Al	\$60	
Adapter, Grom, Proj, MI	96	
Adapter, Gr, Proj, ChT2	48	
Ball, .30 Cal.	10,600	
AP, M2, 8/CP	125,104	
AP, M2, 20CJM	41,500	
AP-T, belted, (4-1)	154,000	
Tracer, M2, 20/CJN	4,500	
Flare, trip, M48	250	
Flare, trin, M49	128	
Block, demo, chain, MI	60	
Caps, Blast, Non-Elec	800	
Prima cord, 100 Ft SQ.	10	
Detonator, G15, SP MI	150	
Explosive, TNT, 1/2	8100	
Fuze, Blasting, T.F.	7:00	
Lighter, fuze, M2	680	
Ignition cylinders	300	
Napalm Can (5 1/4)	50 _z	370

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	ROUNDS EXPENDED	
C-2, Haversack, Blocks	1304	
WP, T6	1760	
WP, 2.36" MIO	120	
WP, M19	250	
Ball, MI	53,400	
Shell, 126A #00	750	
Smoke, Col. M22 Viôlet Various colors	100	

K. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The system for handling prisoners was generally good, although the manner in which natives were handled was far from satisfactory. Civil Affairs seemed reluctant to send their trucks to forward units. The regimental S-1 does not have sufficient personnel to handle civilians; hence the job, was far as battalions were concerned, was done by intelligence personnel.

CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS

No new or distinctive enemy tactics were encountered. Enemy positions were well chosen in regard to high ground and fields of fire. Occaisionally however, he sited his automatic weapons on a single point rather than a field of fire. The reverse slope defense was often employed by the enemy. He chose his positions so that they were mutually supporting and well comauflaged. The automatic weapons were supplemented with riflemen and grenade dischargers. The enemy utilized supplemented positions, caves, and tombs to emplace his weapons to good advantage. His defense was arganized in depth; a series of strong points on key terrain features. However strong his position was the enemy would invariably withdraw when threatened by a flanking maneuver. In every instance as he withdraw a few soldiers and an automatic weapon would be left to fight a delaying action. Snipers were used by the enemy to fire into the rear of our troops and thus cause confusion. In all cases his fire discipline was excellent.

Enemy small arms weapons and ammunition were generally good although the Weapons captured during late stages were badly rusted. Enemy artillery ammunition was faulty. At times the frequency of duds was over 50%.



CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

- 1. Enemy casualties.
 - a. 1461 Killed
 - b. 64 Prisoners
- 2. Operational damage to the enemy.

The following weapons were destroyed:

20mm, AA	3
13 mm, MG	8
Grenade discharger, mod 89	37
70mm barrage mortar	3
LMG, model 99	24
HMG, model 92	7
13mm, twin mount, MG	4
75mm Gun	3
20mm DP Gun	9
47 mm Gun	2
30 Cal. twin mount	1
LMG model 11	3

3. Own losses:

- (a))7 Officers 126 enlisted killed in action
- (b) 39 Officers 548 enlisted wounded in action
- (c) O Officers 1 enlisted missing in action

CHAPTER VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

S-1

During the period 37 officers and 554 enlisted replacements were received. With but very few exceptions the replacements were furnished to this battalion while it was actively participating in the assault, which required the attention of approximately one half of the S-1 section in obtaining pertinent personnal data by individual interview. It is recommended that replacements not be sent to a battalion while it is engaged, as it requires the attention of all hands of the section to accurately and promptly process the casualties which are constantly coming through while in the assault. Further, the replacements were not assigned to the companies until this battalion was withdrawn from the lines, but were in the meanwhile

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sent to the battalion supply dump to work. The figures shown on the daily G-1 report included these replacements who for some time were not available to the rifle companies, therefore presented an untrue picture of combat strength of this battalion.

It is recommended that rosters of replacements be furnished either before or when the troops arrive in person, as upon several occaisions the replacements reported for duty one day and it was not until the following day the rosters arrived.

The replacements were inadequately trained in combat proceedure, especially in the use of automatic weapons.

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Maps furnished during the third phase of the operation were of the same scale and type as those used in the first two phases. During our advance we received two revisions of these maps, which confused all hands. The further south we proceeded the more inaccurate the maps became until finally platoon leaders and Company Commanders were unable to give their positions accurately.

Photos from higher echelon were again stero pairs, National Georgraphic type obliques and large scale verticals. Assault battalions need small scale verticals.

The intelligence disseminated by higher headquarters was timely but its effectiveness for assault troops was limited in that it doalt mostly with generalities, probabilities, eventualities and dispositions of larger units and weapons. Higher echolons seemed reluctant to admit the fact that small groups of well trained troops employing automatic weapons from well prepared, mutually supporting positions can hold up many times their number for relatively long periods of time.

All hands were very cooperative and prompt in reporting and turning in all captured enemy documents and material.

The enlisted interpretor attached to this battalion was invaluable in dealing with both POW's and civilians.

Our written propaganda was a primary factor in the surrendering of large groups of natives and soldiers, a large percentage of these prisoners were carrying these propaganda leaflets when captured.

Counter-intelligence measures were non-existent during the third phase. Virtually no attempts were made to comafflage positions or vehicles. Light and noise discipline was poor among most units. Disregard of O.P. discipline was flagrant-especially among senior officers. O.P.'s were generally crowded by "visitors" who exposed themselves on the skyline and then departed. The unit who had to remain in the OP usually caught mortar and artillery fire shortly afterwards. This bunching up and skyline exposure

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was a general and continued practice and cost the lives of a few men.

Enemy counter-intelligence was confined generally to propaganda stressing the losses we have suffered since the start of the campaign and the effectiveness of the Kamikaze attack force.

It became increasingly evident as the attack moved south that the number of native men of military age not conscripted was very small. Although most were evidently used as labor troops initially, they were put on the lines more and more as the campaign drew to a close and more weapons became available to them from casualties.

S-3

ENGINEERS

Mine lifting teams should be assigned to the battalions during movement forward. These mine teams would report the area and roads cleared during the day to a central agency, such as regiment, also mark the areas cleared. Failure to do so in one instance caused two vehicles to be blown up while traversing roads that were thought to have been cleared. When teams are assigned to regiment it is usually difficult if not impossible to find any of the teams.

LDA

The calling of air strikes could be improved by allowing the AGL officer to converse directly to the pilot. Once an air strike was authorized by a central agency the AGL officer in conjunction with the battalion commander could direct the air strike observing from the battalion OP. This would eliminate delay and put the strike where it was requested by the AGL officer who can observe and not by someone in a rear area working only from a map.

TANKS

The addition of a 100 foot hose to the flame thrower tank would facilitate the reduction of enemy positions, such as caves and pillboxes. Such an extension would conserve fuel and eliminate the infantry's need for expending their comparatively small fuel supply - saving their flame throwers for areas inaccessible to tanks.

S-4

MEDICAL

It is recommended that two additional "Joep" ambulances be assigned the battalion aid station, or one additional ambulance and one 6x6 truck. It is further recommended that additional "Joep" ambulances and collecting section personnel attached to the battalion aid station be used solely and totally at the discretion of the battalion surgeon.

- 1. The new type wooden stretchers are unsatisfactory.
- 2. There should be a smaller "small" battle dressing.

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3. The glass tubing adapter on the IV needle of the serum albumin is not of sufficient length to permit adequate visualization of returning blood when vein is cut.

4. Company corpsmen should carry with them in combat two WP smoke grenades and a 30' coil of rose to facilitate their treating of casualties while under fire.

5. Throughout the operation there has been an insufficiency of DDT, sprays, bombs, flee powder, scat, etc.

BY ORDER OF LT. COLONEL G.C. HUMPHREY; USMC:

NORMAN E. SHERMAN; Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Bn-X

OFFICIAL:

DWARD G. KURDZIEL,
Major, U.S. Marine Corps,

S-3.

CONTRACTOR

win the field The 2/22 received an operations pitch associated the 22nd Augustan not Marine Division properators to selecting designed in the contract to the This order will be first of long norths of order which cash the E/C2 into a major role will be of the long and most in the commission in the form Corps history The following the server for as colorful temperature the verious norselled o in the full ion should have enabled faithful Bullilmont of daily think Coppendent bastles in Southern the faire Bettellen on the right with the first September 12 September 19 September The control of the co Sixtle Marine Division Contint genualties. One of them was one of the two spaining formula observers



2d Bn, 22d Marines 6th Marine Division In the field

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

This report is prepared to provide a complete and accurate record of the part which BLT 2/22 took in Phase III of the occupation and defense of Okinawa Shima.

CHAPTER II

TASK ORGANIZATION

Normal attached units were present

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

THE BATTLE FOR NAHA

7 May, 1945.

The 2/22 received an operations order announcing that the 22nd Regiment would move from its present bivouac area by motor to zone of action of the 1st Marine Division, preparatory to relieving designated elements of that Division prior to 1600, 8 May and to be prepared to resume the attack to the South on order.

This order was the first of a long series of orders which cast the 2/22 into a major role in one of the longest and most important campaigns in the Marine Corps history. The following account serves not as colorful description of the various personalities in the battalion whose deeds enabled faithful fulfillment of daily operations orders, but only as a routine day by day account of the part this battalion played in the three major battles in Southern Okinawa.

8 May, 1945.

As ordered by Regiment the Second and Third Battalions, Twenty Second Marines, were to pass through and relieve the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines prior to 1600 this date, occupy their present front lines and be prepared to Continue the attack on order. The Second Battalion was to be on the left and the Third Battalion on the right with the First Battalion in Regimental reserve. While a slow but persistent rain made footing treacherous and the roads a veritable quagmire. It was a dismal beginning for so bright an ending. Relief was effected with a maximum of coordination and speed. By 1400, as ordered the Battalion had completely relieved the Second Battalion Seventh Marines with George and Easy Companies on the line and Fox in reserve on a line running generally parallel to the Asa River and on the high ground overlooking the same river. We were tied in on the left with the 3rd Battalion First Marines and with the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines on the right, Light artillery and sniper fire were received throughout the day producing the Battalions first combat casualties. One of them was one of the two artillery forward observers attached to the Battalion. During the night sporadic artillery, mortar and sniper fire found our location with annoying accuracy causing several casualties. SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

9 May, 1945.

The orders for the day were for the Regiment to occupy and defend their present positions. The Battalion Commander ordered Easy and George to reconnoiter 500 yards to their front. Easy patrolled to their front and loft front and found no enemy activity. George patrol crossed the Asa River to their from and promptly draw heavy enemy fire. A short fire fight ensued and a George casualty was evacuated across the river. An artillery spotter plane was shot down to the front of George. Both pilot and observer escaped to our lines. During the efternoon, commencing at 1500 artillery fire fell on our positions again. Fox sustained three casualties and the Battalion executive officer. When while returning from the Battalion observation post was wounded by a shell fragment in his left leg. Major Honry A. Courtney had received his first wound of the campaign and was ovacuated by the battalion surgeon. The enemy's artillery fire has hurt the battalion in more than one way in that all hands were experiencing helplessness in combatting so distantan enemy, one which had not yet been located. His shells were approximately 150mm which rendered an "express train 'collision'" jar to the deck and was preceded by an unusually woird whistle.

That evening at 1900 Lt. Col. H.C. Woodhouse Jr., the Battalion Commender, received a fragmentary order for the following day. The 3/22 was to move across Asa River at 0300 and attack the high ground to their front at daybreak. The 1/22 was to provide one company to attack on the left of the 3/22. The 2/22 initially, was to set up a strongpoint in TA 7647 L4 and to support the attack of the Third and First Battalions by fire. The Battalion Commander decided that George would send two plateons to establish a strongpoint the following merging and that further patrols from either Fox or Easy might be ordered. Fox was to move forward to occupy the lines vacated by George's third plateon.

That night, again, the onemy raised havor with artillery fire, wounding and killing several mon. An artillery forward observer and two of his team were killed. His fire was fairly evenly distributed over the three commanies and the battalion command post area.

10 May, 1945.

More specific orders reaffirmed the previously received fragmentary order and further stated that the 2/22 would be prepared to seize and hold outpost positions to its front if the situation and the terrain permitted, also maintain contact with 3/1 on the left. By 0730, two platoons of Captain C.T. Stebbins's George Company had set up a strongpoint in the designated area. At 0830, Easy Company under 1st Lt. F.E. Gunter was ordered forward to establish a line and tie in with Goorge at TA 7674 S. Throughout the morning enemy artillery was active. In the process of establishing our left flank, George ran into intonso enemy machine gun fire and was forced to employ flame throwers to silence samo. Regiment consented to the Battalion Commender's plan for connecting Goorge and Easy across the Asa River generally along the line TA 7674 15, Q2, R, M, O and TA 7774 K. The 2/22 had made its first advance into defended enemy territory. During the day the Battalion Executive Officer returned to duty. Casualties had been light throughout the day but artillery and high velocity guns continued to herass the entire Battelion. Artillery revisited the Battelion at 2330 and paid particular attention to the Battalion command post.

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The Regimental attack order for this date allowed for the main effort to be made on the right by the 3/22 and 1/22 with the 2/22 attacking on the left at 0700 to seize the high ground in the vicinity of TA 7673 K and 7673 C. We were further ordered to maintain physical contact with the First Marine Division on our left. The Battalion Commander ordered George to move out in accordance with the advance of the 1/22 on its right and ordered Easy not to move at all until ordered to do so.

At 0700 the attack jumped off as planned after a heavy artillery barrage. The 1/22 was immediately pinned down on George's right, also the 3/1 on Easy's loft was not moving. At 0830 the situation was this. Both our left and right flanks were held in place, but rapid advances had been made in the center. To alloviate our extended lines, it was arranged for Easy to tie in with the 2/1 at TA 7774 U5 along rail road track. Easy was thus enabled to move out summerted by tanks. At 1014, George's right flank was still in the previous nights' position so one plateon of Fox was moved forward to maintain contact with 1/22 on right. George was now also permitted to advance to seize the high ground in TA 7673 C. Enemy artillery was firing sporadically at the road junctic in TA 7674 I2. Some fire was received by Masy from enemy territory in the First Marine Division zone of action. George received enemy mortar fire from their front and semi-automatic fire from their right rear. Fox had filled in the center and on the right flank by 1325 in order to straighten up the line and to make contact possible on the right. Slow but steady advances were made until about 1700 whon prevarations for the night were bogun. Front lines for the night were TA's 7673 O. C3, 7674 V1, 7673 B2, and C. During the night there was little activity except for the usual artillery fire which was spaced throughout the night. By noon the Battalion had experienced a bit of everything the enemy had to offer suffering only a moderate rate of casualties and inflicting the usual penalty on all of enemy that stood in its way.

12 May, 1945.

The 22d Marines were ordered to attack and seize 0-B line in its zone of action making the main offort on the right. Time of attack 0730. The 2/22 was to seize C-B in its zone of action and to protect the regimental left (east) flank. The Battalian, as directed by Lt. Col. Woodhouse, would attack with Easy and Goorge abreast and Fox in reserve. At jump off time the tanks had not yet arrived and thus the jump off was delayed. At 0807 tanks got into nosition and the companies jumped off. The attack had proceeded only 30 minutes before heavy and extremely accurate machine gun fire was encountered by both Easy and George Companies. Lts. Thorne and Mc Dowell of Easy and Lt Carrigan of George were wounded. Lts. Harris and Lynch were sent forward as replacements. At 0850 orders were received from regiment to mush hard on the left and to disregard the 2/1 in that the 3/29 was available to fill any gan created on the left. At 1000 Fox Company under Capt M. F. Ahearn was ordered to move up to the immediate rear of Goorge Company and be prepared to continue the attack. We were in visual contact with the 1/22 at this time. The village to the front of George Company proved to be a strong point and tanks were utilized. At 1030 Hasy Company was being hold up by heavy fire from their left front in the First Marine Division area and was hit hard. Word had been received that the 1/22 and 3/22 on the right had progressed favorably and it was deemed mandatory that 2/22 advance likewise in spite of its lagging left flank. By 1340, P. . .

George on the right had reached the high ground in TA 7672 Al and had physical contact with 1/22 on its right. George reported that they were meeting light resistance and were moving at a rapid rate. Fox still moving along behind George mopping up and Hesy necessarily advancing very slowly on its left. at 1405, George had moved for to the front and reported they were on a hill overlooking Waha in Th 7672 F. They received very heavy fire of all types from the left and were forced to withdraw. They reported their present position as in the draw in TA 7573 V. where they were receiving heavy mortar fire. Bot Hesy and George Companies were receiving heavy casualties by this time and evacuation was a serious problem. However, at 11/20 Easy, George and the1/22 were tied in. At 1430 word was received to the effect that the 3/29 would take over Easy's zone of action. At 1543 this had been accomplished. George's executive officer, Lt. D.W. Bair, was directing artillery fire at the time in an attempt to neutralize terrific mortar fire his company was receiving. One platoon of Goorge was in severe trouble at 1545. All artillery fire was knocked off to permit the remainder of George to attempt to extricate one platoon pinned down by fire in the vicinity of TA 7673 Q. A terrific fire fight ensued involing the whole of George and a platoon of tanks. By heroic efforts this feat was accomplished with heavy losses in marines dead and wounded and the loss of two tank. Capt. Stebbins, Lt. Fair, and Lt Ruess were all seriously wounded and evacuated. Lt. H. Crane assumed command of George. By 1730 the situation had cleared up considerably. Easy had been relieved and Fox had moved in on the left of George. For the night it was necessary to again emplace Masy due to George's heavy losses. The night defense consisted of Fox on the left. Basy in the center, and George on the right. The 2/22 was tied in with the 3/29 on the left and 1/22 on the right. Decause of the extremely unfavorable tactical situation which existed at the time it was 1945 before the front lines were completely in position. Supply, as well as the evacuation of constantly occuring casualties, was a great problem. The front lines for the nite were in 7573 N4, 7572 N2, 7673 U3, P2 K2 and 7673 F5. Major Courtney infor med the Battalion Commander that it was too late for him to return. He thought it best that he spend the night with George which had experienced a terrioly rough day and was still quite shaky. The Battalion Aid Station had treated a total of 116 cases during the day and George Company had about 75 officers and men remaining. Artilleryand sniper fire was encountered through the night.

13 May, 1945.

The 22d Marines with the 3/29 attached were to resume the attack at 0730 to seize the remainder of the 0-B line. Without stating so, this order meant that the 2/22 must attack one thousand yards and make the Regimental main effort in that the 1/22 and the 3/22 on the coast had already reached their portion of the phase line which over looked Maha. From the previous day the 0.0 knew full well that to-day he must attack through prepared and heavily defended enemy p positions. He must necessarily employ Easy and Fox for the attack as George had been badly shattered. The supply situation as had been true for the mast four days, remained difficult and a serious menace to operations. Lt. Col. Woodhouse ordered the company commanders to the road junction in TA 7573 I5 to look over the ground and to issue his orders. Fox was ordered to attack over the high ground in TA 7573 P, Q, V, and 7672 B. Easy was ordered to attack over the high ground through TA 7573 R, X, and 7572 E, and J. The attack was to

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

be preceded by heavy rocket and artillery concentrations. However, the attack did not jump off until 1115 because of the supply situation and the difficulty in getting rockets forward to a firing position. The attack commonced with Basy supported by tanks in low ground to their left. One plateon of Fox moved with the tanks. The remainder of Fox moved out after the 3/29 on their left finally moved. At 1400, Fox was receiving very heavy machine gun and sniper fire which caused several causalties including their C.O., Capt. Ahearn. Fox requested and received tanks to assist them in the fire fight and to evecuate casualties. Anti-tank guns were making it difficult for the tanks. At 1800. the yards gained along the Battalion front had been dearly paid for and the attack necessarily ceased when the tanks retired at time. Again today, one of our companies had penetrated to the prominent hill in TA 7672 G but were driven off because of insufficient troops. The front lines for the night were 7673 Q2, 7573 Y5, to 7573 R4, in order to tie with the 3/29 on the left and 1/22 on the right. It was by now quite evident that the 2/22 was facing a very strongpoint of enemy resistance which would prove a difficult job for any unit to perform.

14 May, 1945.

Fortunately the enemy activity during the night was limited to several three man attacks with grenades in Fox area. As was expected by all the 2/22 was ordered by Regiment to continue the attack to seize a new phase line, the 0_C line, in its zone of action; and to maintain contact with 3/29 on the left. Jump off time scheduled for 0730. At this time, as explained by the C.O. to his companies, the situation was as follows. The enemy's defenses were built around a triangular pattern of strategically located hills, hereafter referred to as hills 2 and 3, were heavily defended by enemy personnel armed with rifles, machine guns, and a very large number of grenade dischargers. Each hill was mutually supporting with fields of fire which covered the other two. Several reviously located 47mm anti-tank guns had locical tank approaches well covered. The 2/22 could not profitably move out until 3/29 on its left had moved out to pull up abreast and there protect 2/22s left rear from the murderous fire encountered from that direction yesterday. It was decided that Fox and Basy would attack as soon as practical over the same high ground as yesterday with the peculiarly shaped hill in 7672 G as the ultimate objective. (This hill was popularly referred to by Lt. Col. Woodhouse, as "Sugar Loaf Hill"). George consolidated its remaining rifle platoons to form one under Lt. Nealon to aid Fox in the coming attack.

While manuvering to get into position at 1130, tanks and infantry received

heavy fire immediately and Lts. Lynch and Harris were casualties ...

Flame throwing tanks, M-7 tank destroyers, 4.2 mortars, 81 mortars, and tanks were being employed simultaneously. By 1500 Fox had taken Hill #3 and had one platoon on the rear slopes of Sugar Loaf Hill but their ranks had been sadly depleted by deadly fire from their front. Even worse, in that it should not normally have been expected, they received heavy fire from their left rear because the unit in that direction had not kept abreast of Fox's advance.

Easy found them selves in possecion of the crest of hill #1 on the right, but only after suffering slightly less casualties than Fox. Easy had an even break in their effort in that 1/22 on their right had kept abreast. Several tanks had been knocked out. The one platoon of Fox under Lt. Gaumnitz was in an impossible situation on Sugar Loaf Hill. The tanks and Easy and Fox covered.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PEASE III (Cont'd)

the withdrawals of the remnants of his plateon. Lt. Bystry of Fox was wounded while covering the withdrawal. At 1500 the C.C. considering his losses and the obvious strength of the enemy to the front requested more troops to aid his battalion to hold what had been taken. At 1515, he received direct orders from the commanding General stating that 2/22 must achieve the O-C line which included Sugar Loaf Hill this date at any cost. The task before the battalion nearing the close of the day was obviusly tremendous. At 1610, all companies reorganized on their respective hills #3 and #1 while awaiting fresh tanks with which to resume the attack. King Company of 3/22 was attached to 2/22 at 1630, but was held in reserve.

The plan at 1630 was for Easy to remain on Hill #1 and support the attack of Fox against Sugar Loaf. Fox, under an artillery smoke screen and following tanks, attacked Sugar Loaf for the second time at 1722. At 1930 approximately 15 men and 2 officers of Fox and 25 men and one officer of George attached to Fox were in position on the rear slopes of Sugar Loaf commencing to dig in. Major Courtney, Lts. Pesely, Hutchins, and Mealon were the officers remaining with the mon on Sugar Loaf. Lt Gaummitz had been mortally wounded. Constant smoke attempted to cover them. Three additional tanks had been knocked out and casualties were every where. Evacuation was impossible in many cases due to constant enemy fire. Snipers were everywhere and all approaches to Sugar Losf were covered by knee morter fire from adjoining hills in 3/29 zone of action and the reverse slopes of Sugar Loaf Hill and Hill 熱. The 2/22 small defensive here was tied in on both left and right but the forces at the foot of Sugar Loef were pitifully low and suffering casualties at frequent intervals. They were almost out of all kinds of ammunition and had none of the necessities for a might defense. The Bettelion C.C. ordered 26 newly arrived remlacements and two new officers to carry supplies forward to Sugar Loaf and to thereafter report to Major Courtney for use that night. Major Courtney thickened the existing lines with them at 2000 and sized up the situation. He decided to attack and seize the crest of Sugar Loaf Hill. To remain in their present position the remainder of the night would have proven disastrous for all. The Jans were rolling grenades down the hill side onto them.

At 2300, all illumination was knocked off. Major Courtney and approximately 40 men stormed the crost of the hill with grenades and dug in. Many casualties were suffered and Major Courtney was killed. The top of Sugar Loaf had been secured.

15 May, 1945.

At 0230 only a handful of men remained on top of Hill # 2 or Sugar Loaf Hill Lt. Col. Moodhouse, ordered "King Company under Lt. Fink to reenforce Sugar Loaf. Lt. Fink was killed while moving up and Lt. Roe took over King Company. At daybreak, the forces on Sugar Loaf were back down again to 20 men and three officers Lts. Peseley, Mealon, and Kurda had been seriously wounded. Lt. Hutdiand about 6 men of 2/22 were ordered off Sugar Loaf by the C.O. at 0.00. Lt. Roe with his remaining men were being counterattacked at 0830. One platoon of Dog Company 1/29 under Lt. Murphy was ordered up to Sugar Loaf to relieve Lt. Roe and 8 of his men had been relieved but Lt. Murphy of Dog Company, 1/29 had alread been killed and only 11 men of his original 60 were left at 1136. The remaints of his platoon withdrew to hastily constructed defensive line on next ground to rear of Sugar Loaf defended by the other two platoons of Dog Company. 391

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

At 1220 the Battalion was notified that 3/22 would relieve 2/22 as soon as possible. 2/22 at this time was badly disorganized and the remaining members of the Battalion were exhausted. At 1800, 2/22 had been completely relieved and moved to the west coast to assume the 3/22's former defensive position along the banks of the Asato River.

16 May, 1945.

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Regimental orders for 2/22 for this date stated that we would continue the occupation and defense of the Asato River Line. Replacement officers and men filled the diminished ranks of 2/22 today.

17 May, 1945.

Themy artillery is very active in this area. His 155mm, 20mm, and 47mm gure sporadically fire throughout the day and night. The heaviest fire was received at dusk, daybreak, and during the night. Small arms automatic fire from ruins of Naha across the river caused casualties with increasing frequency. Thanks to excellent observation from hill in TA 7473 J our Maval Gun Fire and Artillery officers are spotting many of enomy gun flashes. Counterbattery fire is effective 2/22 remains in present defensive position.

18 May, 1945.

2/22 remains in present position and orgaine and defend present front lines. Major J.G. Johnson USMC, joined the Battalian as executive officer.

19 May, 1945.

Anomy artillory fire continued in 2/22's area. Sniper fire from opposite bank of Asato River constantly harasses the companies on front lines. 2/22 remains in present postion.

20 May, 1945.

22nd Marines continues the organization and defense of present positions. Maintain physical occupation fo north bank of Asato River. Advance left flank to comform with novement of 4th Marine Regiment on left.

21 May, 1945.

Mission of 2/22 romains the same. The Battalian is rapidly reorganizing during this breathing spell. New men and officers are being instructed in their duties. Past few days would have been pleasant but for the sporadic harassing artillery fire of the enemy daily reaps its tell in marines.

23 May, 1945.

Battalion orders remain the same.

24 May, 1945.

Battalion orders remain the same.

25 May, 1945.

22d Marines continues to defend present position and support the movement of Division Recommensance Company into Waha by fire. More replacements joined

the Battalion. The above orders were superseded at 1500 when Regiment ordered 2/22 to relieve the Division Reconnaissance Company on river line at TA 7472 Q, 05, T1, U1. Relief must be affected in time to allow Reconnaissance Company to attack to south at 0730. George Company was alerted for carrying out of above mission.

26 May, 1945.

George moved out at 0530 and had relieved the Reconneissance Company at 0730. A heavy rain set in which delayed the attack of the Reconneissance Company Because of the existing weather it was decided that the attack should not take place. The Reconneissance Company was ordered to tie in with George in their present general location for a night defense. 2/22 was ordered by Regiment to send a strong patrol into TA 7872 to develop enemy strongth and dispositions in that area, and to avoid a general ongagement.

27 May, 1945.

No activity during the night. George Company departed at sunrise on the mission assigned to 2/22. Patrol proceeded rapidly. Encountered an unknown number of Jans armed with at least three knee mortars and two light machine guns. AT 0950, 2/22 received orders to stand by to move the remainder of the Battalian across the Asato River. At 1115 orders came for 2/22 with two companies abreest to attack and seize the high ground in TA's 7327 S, T and 7472 U, V, V. Attack will be preceded by an artillery and mortar concentration. George on the left and Easy on the right will attack as ordered. Attack jumped off on time. At 1330 Easy reported rapid advance and little resistance. Front lines for the night were 7472 Y1, W1, V5, O4, 7372 T5, N4, 7472 F5.

28 May. 1945.

Regimental orders for the day allowed that 1/22 would mass through 2/22 at daybreak and take up the assault. 2/22 was to perform a wheeling movement as 1/22 advanced, keeping in contact with 1/22's right flank. The Division Reconnaissance with 37mm platoon attached was ordered to relieve the 22nd Marines at 1200, 28 May on 0-6 line. At 1345, regiment notified 2/22 that it would not be responsible for any thing but its own security for the night, and that it would be prepared to move out in the mornin. Fox, however, at 1800 received orders at the last minute to be attached to Reconnaissance for the night and aid them in their night defense along the west bank of the canal to TA 7471 D.

29 May, 1945.

22nd Marines to attack at dawn, 29 May, to seize Q-K line in zone of action Formation is a column of battalions. 1/22 in assault, 2/22 in support, and 3/22 in reserve. 2/22 to assemble at dawn in vicinity of TA 7472 R, V. Be prepared to effect canal crossing in support of the attack. Lt. Vincent was wounded and evacuated while on an anti-sniper patrol in vicinity of canal. At 1500, 2/22 was ordered to relieve 1/22 at the present front lines as soon as the situation permitted. 1/22 was having considerable trouble at this time, however; and decided against our relieving them immediately. The Battalian received more replacements at 1600. Instead of relieving 1/22 altogether, at 1800, Basy and George assumed responsibility for part of its nights defense.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

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22nd Marines to attack at 0730 to seize 0-H line and north bank of Kokuba Gawa in its zone of action. Formation to be 2/22 on the right and 3/22 on the left. Tanks to support the attack in so far as termin permits. Division delayed the time of attack long enough to allow language personnel to broadcest to the Japs to our front asking them to surrender. The results were negativo. The attack jumped off at 0900 after a 15 minute artillery preparation.

The attack actually jumped off at 1010 with Easy on the left and George on the right. Hasy reported receiving extremely heavy and accurate sniper fire. Lt. Col. Woodhouse moved out early to confrol the attack as usual'. Besy requested artillery fire to continue on hill and cave country to their direct front. At 1145 Masy reported that the C.O. had been wounded and to alert the Aid Station. Upon reaching battalion Aid Station, our Battalion Commander Lt. Col. H.C. Woodhouse Jr., UMIC, was dead. Major Johnson immediately assumed command of the battalion and moved forward to take over. At 1210. George reported that they were advancing slowly, just a bit to the rear of Masy, and mosting only slight resistance. Both Basy and George advanced on schedule with Easy meeting most of the resistance. The advance consisted of methodically cleaning out caves and improvised pill boxes in tembs. Hasy suffered many casualties. At 1630, Fox was ordered forward to tie in on Georges right flank at TA 7470 S along the estuary to TA 4740 M as flank security against the island in the estuary. Hasy tied in with 3/22 for the night at TA 7570 RL. Lines for the night TA 7570 RL, Q2, 7470 04. During the night Easy had numerous attempts at infiltration by the Japs, but more serious were the alarming number of Japs that had been by passed during the day. These Japs attached the comment commend post and the rear of the front lines through out the ni, ht.

31 May, 1945.

The 22d Marines were to attack and seize O-H, and C-I lines in its zone of action and protect its own south west flank. 2/22 was ordered to resume the attack as ordered, but to make contact on its left flank soon thereafter to allow the entry of 1/22 between 2/22 and 3/22 on the left. 2/22 was ordered advance rapidly and soize the high ground in TA 7669 F. Basy and George jumped off at 0800 after a heavy artillery concentration. Both companies advanced while under heavy morter fire from the enemy at 1135. Both companies and 3/22 hold. it up at 1130 to wait on an artillery preparation needed to their front and had to weit until 1230 before it was fixed, At 1300, Easy and George were reported moving up to the objective in TA 7669 F. Fox was ordered at 1430 to relieve Besy company who had been, by new hadly shot un. at 1645, the situation on "Fox Hill" was similar to "rear boaf. Both companies had gotten on the rear slopes of the hill but could get no further due to intense morter and sniper fire. Charlie commeny of 1/cz was ordered to defend helf of "Fox Hill" for the night and tie in with Goorge on their Right. Fox to be in on high ground perellel to estuary with George's right. Front lines for the night were as follows. TA 7569 35, 02, 14, D5, C1, and 31. Jans rolled groneles down "Fox Hill" onto George Company during the night.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Con't)

1 June. 1945.

22nd Marines were ordered to attach with the main effort on the right to seize Kokuba River line in zone of action to assist 29th Marines, and protect its own right flank. Artillery and Naval Gun fire preparation from 0730. 0800. At 0800 the fire was shifted to deep support. The Battalion plan was for George to attack and seize the crest of "Fox Hill" and thereby in position to support by fire the attack of Fox Company around the sides of the hill and to the forward slopes.

At 0846, George had completed its mission with few casualties. At 0926, Fox had successfully finished its mission and was engaged in morning up the

caves around the perimeter of the hill.

The Battle for Naha was concluded for the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines.

THE BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSULA

2 June, 1945.

The 22d Marines was ordered to organize and defend its present front lines with maximum fire power and minimum men and to conduct patrols south of the Kokuba River as far as TA 7668 B.C.D. Upon relief by elements of the 1st Marine Division the regiment is to withdraw to assigned areas east of the Naha Canal to be designated later. At 0800, it was learned that this Battalian would be relieved by the same Battalian that 2/22 had relieved earlier in the campaign—the 2/7. Relief was effected at 1030 and therepuon, the 2/22 retired to a rear area for the first time in twenty five days. Needless to say, the experience was easerly anticipated by all hands. 2/22 set up its command post in a Japanese auditorium in TA 7471 MI with Easy, Fox and George companies forming a Battalian perimeter defense.

3 June, 1945.

2/22 washed, shaved, and slept today. Battalion is in division reserve. glmm mortar platoon was attached to Division Reconnaissance Company to provide mortar for thier invasion of Ono Park in the Naha estuary.

4 June, 1945.

Last night at approximately 2000 2 men were killed and three wounded by an enemy artillery shell in George area. 2/22 remains in its present area.

5 June. 1945.

2/22 was ordered to remain in its bivouac area. The Battalion continues to receive much 20mm fire from Oroku Peninsula. No casualties remorted thus far-Cantain Robertson joined the Battalion this date as Operations officer on the Battalion staff. The former operations officer, Major Clon T. Martin, was elevated to position of executive officer of the Battalion. Slmm Mortar platoon was ordered to revert to 2/22 as of 0800, 6 June.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT PHASE III (Con't)

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Orders for 2/22 remained the same for this morning. At 0825, several rounds of 20mm fire fell in Easy area killing one of its few veterans. Training of new replacements on use of demolitions and flame throwers was conducted this date.

At 1130, Regiment elerted 2/22 to stand by to move up on the lines and be prepared to take over the following position: TA 7465 J to 7364 3.

7 June, 1945.

The situation within the Sixth Marine Division this date is as follows:
The 4th and 29th Marines amphibious assault on Oroku Peninsula has been successful and subsequent advances have forced the enemy to retire to the east on Oroku. The 1st Marine Division, attacking to the south, has advanced through the neck of Oroku Peninsula, thus creating an exposed right flank and rear. To counteract this condition, the 22nd Marines have been filling in between the 1st Division's right flank and the Kokuba Gawa fo the north. The 1st and 3rd battalions have already been employed in this mission. 2/22 was agai alerted at 1022 to join in this mission. At 1655, 2/22 less one company was ordered to proceed immediately to the vicinity of 1/22's command post. For and George companies moved out immediately. The C.O. ordered the rear command post and Easy Company to follow the next day.

8 June. 1945.

At 0715 rear command post and Masy Company moved forward to join the rest of the Battalion. The new command post and battalion perimeter defense in general area of TA 7668005. At 1050 orders were received which necessitated Fox Company's moving to TA 7566 B in an assembly area and to prepare to support the attack of 1/22. Captain Sims is the new C.O. of Fox Company.

Defensive lines for the night for Essy were TA 7567 D4, 7568 X3 5, Y5-

for George: TA 7568 S 5, L1, M4, M2 and I4.

At 1939, after having set up a perimeter defense for the night, Fox was ordered to TA 7567 K and Q to help 1/22. This move was accomplished in near darkness.

9 June, 1945.

22nd Marines to attack this date at 0800 to seize the hightground in TA's 7367 N.O.S.T., 4767 F.G.H.K.L.M. 2/22 less Fox will initially remain in present position prepared to relieve 1/22 on line when regimental objective is reached. Then hill in 7467 RL is taken by 1/22, 2/22 to move through and seize hill in TA 7367 O.

Lt Col Johnson's plan was for Fox to move to rear of 1/22. When 1/22 takes the hill in TA 7467 R (hereafter referred to as hill 55-1) Fox will mass thru and attack hill in TA 7367 O (hereafter referred to as hill 55-2). George from position on hill in TA 7466 G and H (referred to as hill 41) will support the attack by fire. Easy in Battalion reserve.

Steps were immediately taken to mut the above plan into operation. For and George moved into their assigned positions. Both George and Fox received known

mortar fire at 1450 and throughout remainder of afternoon.

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1/22's attack, at 1650, had not progressed as rapidly as had been expected. They had at the moment, finally secured Hill 55-1 but daylight hours remaining were few. It was decided by our C.O. and recommended to reciment that 2/22 not resume the attack this date. His recommendation was accepted by recimental C.O. Captain Sims of Fox was wounded by knee mortar fragment on hill 55-1. At 1750 Lt Hutchins assumed command of Fox Company. Lt Sutton of Finm mortars was also wounded by sniper bullet.

10 June, 1945.

Artillery preparation from 0715 to 0730, 22nd Marines to resume the attack at 0730 to seize hill 55-2 and complete occupation of hill; in TA 7367 Q. 2/22 seize, occupy and defend hill 55-2. 3/22 support attack of 2/22 by fire. 1/22 hold initially in present position.

The battalion C.O.'s plan of attack was as follows: Fox to assault Hill 55-2 by way of high ground in TA 7467 H.G. and F. supported by Easy. George

from present position on Hill 41 will support Attack by fire.

At 0800 the 37mm platoon with George was firing furiously to knock out enemy machine cuns and morters spotted on reverse slope of Hill 55-2. Fox was

in position to jump off.

Fox moved out at 0545 and promptly received know morter and machine cunfire. At 1040, Basy who had been trailing Fox pulled out rapidly. At 1045, Fox was on crest of Hill 55-2. Our mission was considered accomplished at 1145 and had been concluded with few casualties. At 1500, George had joined Fox and Basy on the high ground in vicinity of Hill 55-2. Front lines for the night are TA 7467 P 3, 7367 T 5, \$65, 7467 F 4, G5, H5, and H4. Many land mines located in this area.

11 June, 1945.

The Japs attempted infiltration at many points the past evening.

Lt. Tashjian of the 37mm platoon was killed. Orders for 2/22 this date was a follows: 2/22, making the regimental main effort, to seize high ground in TA 7468 V and D and be prepared to continue the attack to seize Hill 62 in TA 7468 S and T and Hill 53 in TA 7468 F. Line of departure to be present front lines. Artillery preparation from 0700 to 0730.

Battalion blan of attack was as follows: 2/22 to attack in column with Mast initially in assault followed by Fox. George from present nosition will support

the attack by fire.

Fox and Easy moved out at 0825. By 0900, Fox and Easy reported their possession of the high ground over looking Tomigusuki. At '0950, the commanies were still on the same high ground. The left flank of the battalion was now open and it was decided that Easy would remain in its present position in TA 7468 W to make contact with 3/4 approaching from the left rear. George was to move forward with Fox to push off and attack hill 62 which was known to be a strongly defended position M-7's and \$1's were called upon for supporting fires at 1055. Word was received that after 2/22 secures Hill 62, 3/22 will move thru and secure Hill 53. At 1110 the M-7s after moving over a mined road threw a heavy bombardment on Hill 62. The companies jumped off again at 1115 in good order.

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SOMCIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

At 1210 a heavy fight was in progress. The town of Tomigusuku, was declared secured by Lt. Col. Johnson at 1220. At 1300, 3/22 moved thru our lines toward Hill 53. Todays advances were over terrain extremely favorable to the enemy. Our success was due to excellent usage of the existing terrain, and excellent coordination between the companies and their supporting weapons. We had suffered many casualties however. Our lines for the night were TA 7468 V, R4, S4, T4. Left flank of Easy company not tied in with 4th Marines a gap of 300 yards existed. Many Japs attempted infiltration throughout the night. Others attacked our rear from by-passed caves.

12 June, 1945.

An inspection of the area over which 2/22 fought the previous day and night disclosed hundreds of dead Japs littered throughout the area. Regimental orders for the day directed 2/22 to mor up present position. Number of PONs taken during the period exceeded those of any previous date. Sniper fire from unsecured ground in front of 3/4 caused many killed and wounded today for Easy. Lines remain the same.

13 Jun. 1945.

Enemy attempted infiltration into battalion command post and front lines again last nite and threw many grenades. They caused some casualties. Orders for 2/22 are to continue to mop up in present area. Many Jan soldiers surrendered today. New replacements for the battalion arrived today. Lines remain the same. 4th Marine Regiment bulled out from their position on our left without notifying our headquarters.

14 June. 1945.

Many Jans were enabled to enter our lines last night due to nonexistance of friendly troops on our left. 2/22, at 0750 was ordered to move to town of Chikuto in TA 7466 and to set up bivouac in that area. Battalion command post in TA 7466 D3 in town of Chikuto with companies forming perimeter defense.

15 June. 1945.

6th Marine Division continues operations to destroy remaining enemy on Oroku Peninsula. Reorganize and prepare for further operations on order. Infantry Regiments patrol assigned sectors eliminate enemy remaining therein. 2/22 remains in present area.

16 June. 1945.

All companies be prepared to move to vicinity of Tera at 0530, 17 June. Companies to move out in the following order: Masy, Fox, Headquarters, and George.

Thus our part on the Oroku was played.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PEMINSULA.

17 June. 1945.

All companies moved out at daybreak as previously ordered. At 0710, 2/22 had arrived at a new location. The Battalion command post was set up in TA 7361 Jl and the three rifle commanies deployed in a valley to the north of this position awaiting further orders at 0755. All companies were alerted to more out on one hour's notice. Word was received at this time that 3/22 and 1/22 who relieved elements of the 1st Marine Division at dawn were making rapid progress in their drive to the south. At 1140, 1/22 and 3/22 were reported on the high ground which was their day's objective. Friendly troops were also in the town of Mezada. Replacements reached the Battalion this morning. At 1115, all companies moved out in the following order: Tasy, Fox and George. Major J.P. Overstreet joined the Battalion today. Lt. Jamieson who was wounded four hours after joining the Battalion during "Sugar Loaf" as returned to duty today at 1420. At 1830 word was received that Lt. Jamieson had been wounded again while moving up to the Battalion command post in a Fox Company property jeep. 2/22. less Tasy who was attached to front lines for the night in TA 7460 L4. 92. 91 WH. Ll. I2. Sporadic mortar and sniper fire was received in battalion command post area during late afternoon and the night.

18 June, 1945.

6th Marine Division resumes the attack this date at 0400 to seize 0-B line. 22d Marines attack to seize 0-B. Non up Mezada Ridge in zone of action and prepare for passage of lines by the 4th Marines thru left elements prior to daylight 19 June. The Regimental order stated that 2/22 would pass through 3/33 now situated on Mezado ridge and on Hill 69 in TA 7459 Q and, making the main effort, attack Kuwanga Ridge to the south which constituted the 0-B line.

Permission was received by Lt. Col. Johnson, not to jumo off at 0400, but to do so as early as possible. The battalion plan of attack was as follows: For 2/22 to attack Kuwanga Ridge in column in this order, Easy, George, and Fox. Route to be followed was down the nose of hill 69 to the southwest until the valley floor was met and thence for Tasy to ascend Kuwanga by the way of the path in TA 7358 0. Upon reaching the crest of the hill, Tasy would perform a left flank movement and George a right flank movement. Fox to be used where needed most upon reaching the ridge. The above maneuver under enemy fire would require fine coordination, of attacking forces and those supporting fires given us by artillery, M-7's, LVTA's, 1.2 inch mortars, and tanks.

After the orientation of company commanders and platoon leaders from an observation post on Hill 69, the attack was launched undercover of smoke at 0800. Masy C.O. Lt. Gunter, expressed concern over the number of enemy positions still active on hill 69 which would be capable of firing into his company's rear. However, Masy jumped off in fine fashion and at 0000 reported their position astride Kuwanga Pidge. They had received less defensive fire from the ridge than had been anticipated. At 0020 George also reported making favorable progress in working down the ridge towards the sea and Nagusuku town. However, all was not going to well on Hill 69 from which the attack had been I launched. Japs from cave positions and a pillbox down the nose were firing upon all expants of the crest of the hill. The Battalion and Regimental observation posts and Fox command pott were all receiving casualties. To return fire was difficult because of the position of friendly troops. Light fire was being received by companies on Kuwanga Ridge from TA 7058 A, B, 7450 U, V, 7352 E, and 7359 Y. 1177 C. 1015 C. 1016 C. 1140 C.

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CIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

At 1037, those companies on Kuwanga reported that there was no organized resistance on the ridge. Their action consisted of flushing bands of Japs from tombs and caves. Flame throwers and demolitions were used extensively. At 1040, Fox commandoest on Hill 69 in TA 7359 Yh reported that a sudden fusilade of sniper fire from a near by camouflaged pillbox had killed Lt. Flynn and seven others. While attempting to evacuate the wounded and to combat the enemy other casualties were sustained. At approximately 1245, aid was received from 3/22 in form of a rifle platoon and tanks to extricate the members of the fox command post and to knock out the strong point. At 1330, 2/22 hid secured that portion of Kuwanga ridge in its zone of action. At 1500, the Battalion command post received 15 rounds of airburst directly overhead but sustained only one casualty. This fire later proved to be friendly naval gun fire.

The 3/4 relieved the left flank elements of 2/22 on Wuwanga Ridge at 1700.

2/22's lines for the night were TA 7259 Y4, 7358 A3, F4, H3, and I4.

19 June. 1945.

Attempted enemy infiltration proved unseccessful last night. 22d Marines ordered to eliminate remaining enemy in the vicinity of Hill 69 and to protect the Division left (east) flank by advancing units as necessary to maintain contact between hth Marines and 1st Marine Division on the left. 2/22 to remain in present position for the day. Thousands of civilians passed through our Battalions area today on the way to the rear, Front lines remained the same as last night.

20 June, 1015.

2/22 less George company ordered to remain in present position on Wuwanga ridge and continue morping up operations. George Company attached to 1/20. Command post at TA 7357 M2.

At 1200 word was received that George Company was attacking on the right of 1/29's front. George Company and one company of 1/29 reached the southern end of the island at approximately 1700. Japs launched a counterattack against George during the night.

21 June, 1945.

2/22 less George, remain in present area and continue morping up operations.
20th Marines and George Company, attached, to attack to seize Ara Sake Point,
and the remainder of southern Okinawa in its zone of action.

At 1145, word was received that all organized resistance had ceased on Okinawa at 1200. George raised the same flag on the southern tip, which 2/22 had raised on the northern tip of Okinawa.

All organized resistance on all fronts was declared ended at 1305 this date iv to Talina & . no. r.

SHORE PARTY See Reference 600

NAVY GUN FIRE

Personnel were well trained but in number were a bare minimum.

Communication equipment was efficient but transmissions difficulties were

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (cont'd)

almost invariably encountered between the hours of 1800 and $2^{1}00$ - a oritical time. The difficulties were mainly due to CW interference.

Due to the length of the operation and poor condition of the roads, several breakdowns of vehicular equipment were experienced, causing slight inconvenience

but repairs were expeditiously effected by Division Motor Transport.

Naval Cunfire is a powerful weapon for pre-How hour preparations. Its dispersion makes it more suitable for area than oinpoint targets. Unfortunately Maval Gunfire did not achieve its maximum effect in preparation fire for two main reasons: (1) Requests for this fire were not made in sufficient time to make necessary arrangements: (2) if the instructions were to lay down a 10 minute preparation commencing at 0745, the first round would be fired at 0745 but by the time the forward observer had the fire adjusted where he wanted it, most of the 10 minutes had elapsed and only a small fraction of the specified rounds were fired. This difficulty is accentuated by the increase in required time of adjustment due to smoke and dust kicked up by other supporting weapons. The solution of this difficulty is to commence adjusting the fire at least 5 minutes before the preparation is scheduled to begin, both to facilitate adjustment by ing" smoke and dust of previously "registered-in" weamons and to have a solution set up so that fire for effect may be commenced on schedule and the required number of rounds fired. In addition Naval Gunfire mersonnel must be impressed with the importance, in preparation fire, of intense volume of fire in area rather than the exact adjustment on some feature of terrain.

Targets of opportunity were scarce due to good camouflage discipline of

enemy and their keeping under cover. Few were fired.

Counterbattery fire was ineffective for destruction although it was excellent for neutralization. A few field pieces or AA guns were knocked out but in the main either the guns could not be definitely located or direct hits could not be obtained due to dispersion. Indirect counter-battery fire is not a good Naval Gunfire mission.

Night harassing fire produced good results by reducing the volume of enemy

artillery fire. It was often and well used.

Due to lack of observed enemy movement, interdicting fire was nil.

Only one attempt was made to coach the firing thip onto a target for direct fire using optics. It failed because of low visibility and inability of the ship to locate the target.

Air spot was invaluable both in locating targets in areas suspected by the Shore Fire Control Party or locating them independently. The rolling nature of the terrain greatly increased the value of air spot since ground observation was often impossible. Spotting planes operating with this unit reported knocking out 4 guns, damaging 1, and sealing 1 in a cave. The one sealed in the cave was later put back in action by the enemy.

The specialized training and slower speed planes of cruiser and battleship airspot makes it superior to VOF spot, but the latter renders a valuable service and is often better than ground observation.

Approximately 50 missions were fired exclusive of illumination which were

about 25.

Illumination is by far, the greatest selling point of Naval GunFire. The only other source of illumination is mortar illumination which can be more accurately placed but is not as bright nor does it last as long as Naval illumination. In addition the ammunition supply is a difficult problem. If Naval Gun Fire did nothing but illuminate, it would still be considered an important

supporting weapon,

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The unfortunate necessity of using constant illumination all night on two occasions with the expenditure of a total of almost 1000 rounds, resulted in a serious restriction in star shell allowance. That such and expenditure was warranted is borne out by the fact that Sugar Loaf Hill was one of the wedge that cracked the main line of resistance of the Japanese. The resultant curtailment of starshell worked a real hardship on the front-line troops. It is suggested that greater quantities of illuminating ammunition be made available even at the expense of Anti-aircraft common. I consider this the most important point of this report.

. Coordination with adjacent units and with air in artillery was satisfactory The NGF chain of command was effective.

AIR SUPPORT

Communication equipment was adequate. A lot of relaying of messages occured, but I believe this was due to the terrain. Met discipline was a little lax at times.

In marking front lines we used both panels and colored smoke which was satisfactory - colored panels being more effective.

The number of aircraft for missions was not adequate. Missions had to be cancelled or postponed because there were not enough aircraft available. There should be more strike groups on station or standing by for missions.

Interval between orgination of request mission and execution was too long. This was probably due to lack of available aircraft. Interval was from 14 to " 2 hrs long.

Dummy attacks and air cover proved very effective. It kept enemy fire and activity to a minimum. The advance of our troops was made a lot easier. Dummy runs on targets proved very effective. It gets the bilots squared away as to the actual location of the target and may prevent a serious error. It saves time later on when giving corrections on the attack.

Communications should be set up in a manner so the ALP could have direct control of the strike group. It would save a lot of time and unnecessary communications. Also attacks could be called off immediately in case planes got off the target. Corrections on the attack would be a lot easier and also be more plain because you could go into detail while planes are over target. I believe strikes could be handled more effectively this way. There should be more strike groups available for missions. This would cut down on the interval between origination and execution, also the ALP's would have their missions run and there would be no need of having priority missions.

ARTILLTRY SUPPORT (Omitted)

Inf-tank coordination in general was very good. There were several occasions when tanks could be used but they failed to arrive in time for the attack. The presence of tank liaison in the Battalion C.P. aided greatly in the coordination. There were no unusual cases reported in the use of tanks.

AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS

Amohibian tractors did a wonderful job for this battalion. Used extensively for carrying supplies from rear areas into forward dumos. hey were the only means of carrying our 37mm's across the Asato Gawa prior to the construction of foot or vehicular bridges.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

In the rainy weather that was encountered our supply problems increased. The ability of the "am-tracs" to negotiate mud impassable to wheeled vehicles increased their value to us ten fold.

The "am-tracs" were used extensively in the evacuation of casualties. All stretcher cases were evacuated from Sugar Loaf by the "am-tracs", Again their ability to go where no roads existed helned us greatly.

ARMORED AMPHIBIANS

The use of the armored "am-tracs" as assault artillery in Phase III was greatly limited because of the enemy's well coordinated A.T. defenses. When bull defilade positions could be found the LVT(A)'s were most helpful.

INFAMTRY COMBAT

Upon completion of the second Phase of the Okinawa operation, the Second Battalion found time to conduct some training while carrying out rehabilitation measures. There were also opportunites to train replacements as they arrived.

Initially each man in the battalion was well trained in the use of the flame thrower and emolitions. This condition however, did not exist after Sugar Loaf. We, therefore, conducted schools for one-third of each group of replacements on these subjects. This action gave us a group of men who could cope with the Japanese defenses.

Our stressing the conduct of the individual andounist tactics maid great diffidends. The Japanese defenses encountered consisted of a series of fortified caves and pillboxes and necessituted the separate coordinated action of squads within a platoon andfire teams within the sound.

Our flame thrower demolition teams actions were coordinated with the rifle squads, not only in mopping up; but also in the assault. Many times the flame thrower succeeded in bringing the enemy out in the open where all other weapons had failed. In Tomigusuki flame thrown into one opening of a cave drove 34 of the enemy out another where they were all cut down by the squad covering th movements of the flame thrower - demolition team.

We found it absolutely necessary to blow each cave shut or else we encountered trouble from the rear after we passed on. Some caves were too large for the organic demolition units to handle so engineers were called in to assist in the mopping up.

All organic weapons were used in the accepted manner with one or two exceuti tion. One Lt. on Sugar Loaf fired a light machine gun from the hip and covered the evacuation of casualties from the scene. One company commander used his bazookas to place high explosive fire on groups of the enemy who were leaving their positions and succeeded in inflicting heavy cosualties.

The AT Rockets were not used as such but they proved to be of inestimable value in the reduction of pillboxes and the placing of high explosive fire in fortified caves. The sigh, M-15, for use with the AT grenades improved the accuracy (therefore the effeciency) of these grenades by 50 per cent. The WP rifle grenades were used effectively and extensively for screening and casualty effect on the enemy in closed positions.

There were occasionswhen our mortars were used incorrectly because of the lack of proper ammunition. It must be remembered that the demolition shell is of no value for fragmentation. Our mortars were not too effective when used against the well dug in enemy, but they did serve to keep him well within his holes. The morters were at their best when neutralizing the reverse sloges of SPECIAL AC

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

ridges. This fire on the reverse slope cut down on the enemy's communication and reinforcements. When mortar fire was brought down on the enemy following, at a short interval, the artillery proparation it caught the enemy unaware and to therefore caused heavy casualties.

Extensive use was made of attached wearons from our own Regimental Wearons

The 37mm AT gun was never used against tanks, but it was of great value in the reduction of pill boxes and caves which housed enemy machine guns, and other weapons. In the reduction of such positions it is necessary to place high exolosive fire in the entrances.

Our attached 37mm's were usually positioned to deliver overhead supporting fires and were freducatly used in firing at targets whose ranges exceeded. 1500 yards. In the battle for the Oroku, one 37mm gun accounted for three 20mm guns and two Mambus.

In the night defense the 37mm's were usually emplaced right in the front lines. Not many occasions were found for the use of cannister, but one night in "omigusuki a round of cannister accounted for five of the enemy.

There was no occasion to test our beach defenses, but our "37'2 were frequently emplaced to cover such critical areas.

The destrictive power of direct high explosive fire is absolutely necessary to the successful annihilation of the enemy defenses encountered on Okinawa. Our 37's were used on every possible occasion where the terrain permitted their travelling.

In the attack on Tomigusuki the 371s were manhandled with the aid of mearby troops tuo a precipitous ridge and gave us invaluable supporting fires.

The most helpful assault weapon proved to be our own M-7's. There were numerous occasions when artillery could not cover assigned targets and direct hig explosive fire was needed to destroy enemy positions. It was possible to deliver overhead fires until troops came within the bursting radius of the projectile. The ability of the M-7s to get to positions inaccessible to tanks afforded them many apportunities to be used.

The ability of the M-7's to lay smoke on any point desired also helped us to accomplish our mission with fewer casualties.

Since the Japanese for the most part were dug into the sides of hills and ridges, the barrage rockets were not as effective as had been clanned. Their use, however, did serve to neutralize the reverse slopes of those hills and ridges. The morale of the men was aided greatly by the sight of so much . explosive falling into the enemy positions.

In summing up these paragraphs on Infantry Combat, I should like to say that our tactical doctrine is sound.

COMMINICATIONS

The number of personnel is not sufficient to carry on the desired types of communication in a Bn.

It is recommended that more Radio and Wire personnel be added and less MsgCen personnel.

The training of personnel was adequate. No recommendation for special training.

The losses of personnel have been as follows: Radio -- 2; Wire -- 11; '. Cr Msg Cen -- 2. 71 -1 (19)

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

Communication personnel was not employed for other duties.

Battle casualties were replaced through Regt and also by checking with company C.O.'s or Sgt Maj to see if there were any personnel in the Battalion that had experience with Padio or Wire before or after entering the service.

No overages or shortages of equipment existed.

Replace TBX with SCR 694, provide Battalions with 3 S6R 610's 3 additional SCR 300's and 4 additional SCR 536's per company.

A set comparable to the SCR 300 but with a greater range in distance is needed, also a set comparable with the SCR 536 but with a greater range in distance so that commanies can remain in communications with their patrols.

No equipment was employed that had not been used before. SCR 610 recommended - 3 SCR 610's be included in Infantry Battalions T/A. All equipment was used that was authorized by T/A.

Wire and batteries placed the greatest strain on supplies.

No change in replenishment rates.

Regiment to Battalion was the method employed by our organization for resupplying.

No repair facilities were available.

The Regimental repair shop and supply dump was used for repairs and supplies Repair facilities could be improved by increasing the number of Material personne in Regiment.

Equipment spare parts were not carried with equipment. Equipment spares wer

not adequate. Spare parts other than equipment were not sufficient.

Transportation was not sufficient. 2 ton trailers be included in the T/A. There were no agencies established that were not normal. The most overloaded agency was Radio. To overcome the avove statement more Radio equipment and personnel are needed. There was no unnecessary duplication of agencies used.

Present normal operation agencies would not be adequate in operations on larger land masses. Agencies would probably break down on extended patrols and movement overlarge areas in Battalion zone. Some frequencies assigned to this unit were not used because they were too high for standard equipment.

The difficulties encountered were; insufficient allowance of frequencies, interference from higher power stations attached to unit, insufficient means of transportation, officers and personnel not familiar with limits of various sets, radio communications overloaded by unnecessary transmissions by officers, and Radio Procedure used incorrectly by officers.

Officers were not required to operate nor maintain any agency of communicati

because of enlisted casualties.

There were no enemy communication installations captured. Tank-Inf communication was by means of a SCR 300 and a phone in rear of tall Recommend that officers be made to realize the full importance of Radio security.

MEDICAL

Medical Installations - Battalion Aid Station was set up for operation at all times within the Battalion C. P. area. . The Battalion Aid Station was loscated, whenever possible, in close proximity to roads or trails which were passible by vehicles. All the natural cover and concealment was utilized when available in the C.P. area. Personnel were dispersed as much as working conditions would permit. Location of the natural line of drift of walking wounded was kept in view if possible.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

Protective measures taken: Battalion Aid Station formed a part of the Battalion C.P. Security perimeter. Cover, Concealment, and blackout precautions were observed in keeping with the tactical situation.

Hospitalization: Mild exhaustion cases and the like were kept within the Battalion Aid Station for a period of 24 to 48 hours, conditions permitting. Moderate cases were kept in S-4 section under the care of a corpsman for varying periods of time. Only when the exigency of battle would not permit this proceedure, were these cases sent to higher echelon.

Equipment, Supplies and Personnel: Equipment, supplies, and personnel were maintained at an adequate level at all times. Mumber of patients treated during this period were as follows:

Wounded and Evacuated -- 764
Non-battle casualties evacuated -- 408
Number returned to duty without higher echelon Hospitalization:
Miner wounds -- 87
Exhaustion cases -- 60
Mild dysentery -- 25
Total 172

Evacuation: Evacuation was effected by means of Jeeo ambulances, field ambulances, trucks, and amphibious tractors. Cooperation of all units and sections with vehicles made transportation of wounded from Battalion Aid Station to the Medical Companies adequate.

Sanitation: D.D.T. spray was used in all areas when possible.

Pottable heads were erected when time permitted. All trash was either burned or buried.

Food and Water: All water used for drinking and cooking ourposes was obtained from authorized water points only. Food consisted mainly of "K", "C" or 10 in 1 rations and was adaquate.

Disposal of Dead: our dead were tagged, logged in and evacuated. Graves registration men were attached to this Battalion Aid Station. Enemy dead were buried as soon as the tactical situation permitted. Badly decomposed enemy dead were burned with oil or gasoline prior to burial.

Epidemic and Unusual diseases: There were no Foidemic or unusual diseases among the troops of this Battalion,

Dental Service: No dental service was performed at this Battalion Aid Station. All severe cases were referred to the Medical Companies for consultation and treatment.

Care of Civilians: First Aid was given to civilians when necessary. All civilians were evacuated to Civil Affairs stockades by S-1 section.

Prisoners of War: Care of prisoners consisted of First Aid treatment to the wounded. Prisoners were evacuated by S-1 and S-2 section to POW stockades. All other medical treatment was given at POW camps.

Medical Organization: Present type of medical organization is

Medical Personnel: "Medical personnel was adequate in numbers and t training. Replacements as a rule were timely and sufficient in numbers for the occasion.

Field Medical Equipment: Equipment was adequate except for the below suggested improvements. Unit #7 contained and insufficient number of small battle dressings as the space was taken up by the larger type which were found not to be needed in this number. Units 5a and 5b (Sick Call) are

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SPECIAL ACTION PEPORT, Phase III (Cont'd)

inadequate and unsuitable for a prolonged assault phase such as the present. Resupply was fair.

Medical Supplies: Medical supplies were adequate except. as not ed

above. Motor Vehicles and Rolling . Stock: One jeep ambulance and trailer were carried. The trailer was not supplied by the T.O. of vehicles but it is suggested that one be supplied because of the amount of Medical supplies carried. In addition, one jeep ambulance was furnished by "B" Medical Company for use during the assault Phase. No vehicles were lost due to enemy action but frequent mechanical breakdowns occured. Vehicles were serviced by Regimental maintainence.

Quartermaster supplies and equipment: Allowance carried, none. Availibility and supply of insect repellent and insect nowder was very poor. The small supply obtained was through other sources. It is suggested that the forward S-4 or Battalion Aid Station carry a supply of socks and dungarees for patients returning to duty from the Battalion Aid Station in order that foot infections and ect. be reduced.

Malaria and epidemic Control equipment and Supplies: Atabrine was given in doses of 12 gr. daily to all personnel. The supply of D.D.T was generally inadequate. Present types of Malaria and epidemic control equipment is entirely adequate but lacking in amount and availability.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

The performance of the newss correspondents and two photographers attached to the 2/22 for the three battles in southern Okinawa may be termed as satisfactory. However, serveral questions may be raised in regards to the relationship which should exist between the photographers and the higher echelons. Thoughout the operation the two photographers were, at frequent entervals, summomed to regimental and division headquarters in person. Often this interfered with the plan of the photographer for that day, and furthermore, due to the milage between echelons, they were often gone overnight. It seems that some system could be devised where by photographers temperarily attached to a battalion could be left alone by higher headquarters. If their work becomes unsatisfactor the higher echelon will be informed.

As was the case, however, the photographers attached to 2/22 managed to do

outstanding work throughout the campaign. They are to be commended.

The news correspondent attached to 2/22 originally was in progress of doing an excellent job but was relieved because of illness. Subsequent news correscondents appeared to spend the majority of his time at the division command post instead of with his Battalion in order to write his stories. This proved unsatisfactory in that he missed many stories while absent. The last correspondent assigned to 2/22 performed best of all for the short period he was with us prior to the end of the operation.

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CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS

The enemy's defenses were much more highly developed than those previously encountered by the 2/22. The Japanese had expended much labor in the construction of positions and the improvement of tombs which were used as pillboxes.

For the most part the defenses were constructed so that hills on ridges

and the caves on hills were all mutually supporting.

The enemy also conducted a well organized anti-tank defense. Principal routes of approach were mined and mined areaswere covered by A.T. guns. In towns where tank movements were canalized and observation was cut down numerous tank hunter teams were encountered. The effectiveness of these tank hunter teams was greatly reduced because of the spresence of supported infantry.

The enemy's artillery was not too effective. It has a greater nuisance

than destructive effect.

In the battle for Oroku numerous automatic weapons were captured. Most of those weapons had been taken from planes wrecked on Naha airfield.

The enemy's fire discipline was excellent. Little firing was done at individuals except by snipers. Rarely did his machine guns fire except when paying targets presented themselves. A machine gun firing from Ona Yama did,

however, snipe at individuals on the North bank of the Kokuba.

Some reverse slove defenses were encountered. In the battle for Yuwanga Ridge our greatest casualties came from the slove of a hill secured on the previous afternoon. It was normal upon over running the enemy defenses to encounter intense and accurate knee mortar fire from that reverse slove and from adjacent supporting hills to our front and from our flanks. This knee mortar fire was frequently received while we were on the forward sloves indicating that his communications were very good.

Night activity has been encountered throughout. The Japs succeeded in infiltrating through our lines on occasions but not too much was accomplished by these movements. The enemy was reluctant to pursue his old strategy of attempting to destroy us in "one great blow". There were no large scale

Manzai attacks carried out in our zone of action.

One point that might be of interest is that the Japanese not actually in contact with our front line troops (Japs in O.P.s and C.P.s) were prone to expose themselves unnecessarily. For instance, while this battalion was in the process of securing the Kokuba River line the Nips on the ridge North of Tomigusuki were sunning, bathing, and in general acting indifferent to the entire situation.

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CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Enemy casualties
Killed. 1885
Captured. 97

Own losses

Killed in action. 127

Wounded in action. 478

Missing in action. 2

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CHAPTER VI

COM TENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

S-1 Casualties:

Over the second phase of this Battalion's particepation in the Okinawa Shima Campaign, the "Casualty Report Card and Roster" system of reporting casualties, as previously described, has proven exceptionally meritorious. Its simplicity insured accuracy and its adequacy excluded necessity of collateral reports. Only in action on such reports - in the aspect of replacements did a breakdown appear, which regardless of cause, produced a most unfavorable result. The efficiency of any unit can reach just so far: from there onward. it has neither control nor influence. Implicit accuracy can be used in listing the Military Specification Serial Number of a casualty, yet there are no means by which a subordinate unit can insure its proper regard. That was the unwholesome experience of this Battalion. When replacements were urgently needed, and there best professional placement bore a definite result on the combat efficiency of this Battalion. When this "paper work" was put to its most important single use. - the means of outting the best man in his best job in the field, - its failure made necessary ineffectual "spot" interviews and hazardous delays. While organizational inefficiency is not inferred, the determining of a more effectual means of meeting this difficulty is urgently recommended.

. Morale:

Morale within this Battalion was excellent. Through difficulties of supplies, bitter fighting, high casualties, and sustained commitment, the men of this Battalion maintained a high level of pride in their organization, loyalty to their companions and their leaders, and unquestioning confidence in their ability to meet the enemy and defeat him. These factors embody the "Payoff" of morale, which in this Battalion is observed to have the following causes: (a) Capable and proven leadership; (b) Our officers' continuous and earnest regard for the welfare of the men: (c) A strict evaluation of the need of regulations and common sense enforcement of those deemed beneficial: (d) Excellent supply of food and water.

The maps provided this Battalion for Phase III were for the most Part quite adequate and complete. However, it would have been very desirable If the superior map for the operation had been selected orior to Phase III and could have been used throughout. As it happened, three different sets of maps Were issued with orders accompanying each stating that they would supercede the orevious set. As a result of either oders not being carried out or of being misconstrued, it was not uncommon to find two officers in the same Regi-Nont using differently revised maps. Actually each successive map possessed Improvements over its predecessor, but in the case of the last man issued, MUKU RETTO, 1:25,000, 3rd revision, the roads and towns represented were an improvement over the previous man, but the contouring was far inferior to the previous ones.

More and better aerial photographs were made available to the Battalion for Phase III than for Phase I and II. Still, much remains to be sought. 10 always have photographs of the terrain over which you must attack the following day is the goal. This goal is far from being attained as yet. There Vere numerous occasions that no photos were available of the area to our front when they might have aided considerably. On the other hand, in the ajority of cases, photographs were available and were used extensively in the

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

planning of a days attack, and subsequent stages. The low obliques proved best for the needs of the infentry Battalian. Verticals provided were too high to be of any great appreciable value.

Most unsatisfactory were the methods employed in the transfer of orisoners war and civilians from fowward areas to rear areas. This subject has been the source of one of the biggest headaches of the campaign. The Infantry Battalin dos not possess sufficient ogganic transportation to evacuate its own PO's and civilians. Its limited vehicles are fully occupied in the supply and evacuation of Marines. When transportation was requested of Civil Affairs (in case of civilians) or of the Regiment it was frequently not available, or was flatly deni As a result, much time was lost in the derivation of intelligence information from prisoners and the preservation of the health and well-being of civilians. Removal of civilians from a front line defense area prior to darkness is mandatory for obvious reasons. The Battalion definitely needs aid in this problem during future operations. Another disturbing question is the proper channel for the evacuation of badly wounded civilians and POWs. The only logical channel and the one attempted on several occasions by this Battalion was through medical channels. Upon reaching the Medical Company they were not accorted. A definite SOP must be developed to handle this problem and the transportation provided to permit functioning.

Considering the results obtained near the close of Phase III, the further and increased usage of propaganda leaflets is recommended. Their utility has been proved. Assault troops must be further encouraged to cooperate with surrend plans and to take prisoners whenever possible.

5-3

When 2/22 came into the operation it was a very welltrained unit, but after the heavy casualties of Sugar Loaf the ranks were sadly depleted. There was not available a sufficient number of trained NCO's for replacement of those lost.

It was necessary on many occasions to place junior experienced NCO's in charge of units in which replacement senior NCO's were present. In the first platoon of Easy Company a corporal is the platoon commander and there are three sergeants and one platoon sergeant who came as replacements that are admittedly undualified to fill that position. Thegreat burdens thereafter fell upon the shoulders of the company and platoon commanders and a few experienced men.

It is therefore recommended that trained NCO's be made available in

the replacement drafts.

In this Battalion the training of the individual and small unit tactics were greatly stressed and helped us no end. It is planned that even greater emphasis be placed on such training.

All units have been lax in the guarding of supply dumos and in failing to mick up ammunition and supplies left along the way. The Japanese have thrown

our own grenades at us on many occasions.

Troops have been careless in the sanitation of bivouac areas. It is suggested that the course of instruction at the Platoon Commanders School place greater emphasis on the duties of junior officers in regard to the dangers of leaving areas in poor police, leaving grenades and other amountain in the area and their duties in the matter of salvaging gear in the field. All officers in each organization should also be so indoctrinated.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

The "am-tracs" should not be permitted to use the same roads that are used by wheeled vehicles. If no hard surfaces track is available it is suggested that one be provided that will serve on hard surface roads. During the supply of Sugar Loaf the excessive use of hard surfaced roads by the "am-tracs" brought about the destruction of two bridges that could only be repaired by engineers. This destruction held up traffic on a vital supply route for 36 hours.

Our 37's were frequently unable to negotiate the terrain covered by infantry. The direct high explosive fire of the 37's is an occasion absolutely necessary. It is recommended that the 37mm Gun T 16 be placed in the Weapons

company as a supplementary weapon.

Tanks were frequently late in reporting for the attack because adequate road reconnaissance had not been made or because the roads to the front lines had not been cleared of mines. This condition tends to show that either adequate preparation had not been made or that sufficient personnel for these purposes was not available.

There was not sufficient W.P. rifle grenades available. It is strongly recommended that the unit of fire on all of the rifle grenades be increased.

It is recommended that at least three sniper rifles and six snipers be made and organic part of the rifle company. This is the first time that this Battalion has been in terrain where enemy installations could be observed at long ranges. While we were in Naha as the Regimental reserve there were enemy troops visible across the river. During the taking of Wuwanga Ridge there were some Japs who could not be seen from the front lines yet they were visible to troops one thousand yards away. We were afraid to fire at those Nips because we were not properly equipped for such firing. On these two and on many other occasions the presence of trained sniper personnel would have greatly impeded enemy activity.

The trip flares M48 and M49 were not too effective because of the long delay between the projection and the illumination. We need a flare that illuminates immediately following the pull on the firing mechanism. The present delay is sufficient to permit the enemy to take cover before illumination is effected. Instantaneous illumination would prevent this.

There were not enough colored smoke grenades for marking front line tositions. A minimum of 20 colored smoke hand grenades should be allowed daily. The excessive use of our mortars has brought the following deficiencies

to our attention

(1) In using the Shell H.E. M56 it was found that one round out of every seven fell short. This is also true of the W.P. M57. This fault is believed to be due to the inadequacy of the fin assembly. The increments on the H.E. M56 require an excessive amount of time to assemble. It is suggested that the increments come assembled as is the case with the H.E. light.

(2) The plastic fuzes have been found broken. On one occasion 4 of 200 rounds were found defective. The emergency was extreme and the lot

numbers was not taken.

(3) The ignition cartridge is inadequately seated in the tail assembly and falls to the bottom of the tube when fired. This fault causes miss fires on succeeding rounds.

(4) The clip which secures the increments to the tail assembly is made of spring steel. When the shell is fired the clips, break loose and strike the overheated tube with sufficient force to nick it. Over a period of extensive

SPECIAL ACTION PEPORT PHASE III (Cont'd)

firing, as this tactical situation required, a ring is developed in the tube. The tube becomes sufficiently weakened to cause a bulge and replacement is required.

(5) It is suggested that the unit of fire be changed so that we receive 90 H.E. N43, 30 H.E. M56, and 30 W.F M57.

(6) More tubes should be carried in regiment and division for

replacement.

(7) A minimum of two 13 6x6 trucks are needed for ammunition supply

(8) The communication is inadequate. A minimum of three SCR 300'

is required.

(9) The local security of the 81mm Mortar Platoon could be greatly

augmented by the addition of four BAR's.

The performance of the 60mm has been excellent throughout. The new white phosphorous shell has been of great value. In many occasions it has taken over when the 81's lifted their fires and continued the screening. The communication of the mortar section could be greatly improved by the addition of two wiremen in the section. In cases where prolonged firing is necessary, a spare tube for each mortar is required.

In the employment of the M-7's by this Battalion it was noted that if the entire platoon was not attached there was not enough communication between the observer and the guns. When needed the fire is needed ouickly and their fires must be lifted promptly. The officer in charge must remain available to the O.P. at all times.

When occasions arise wherein previously fired artillery concentrations are to be used for a preparatory barrage it is absolutely necessary that a sufficient number of rounds be fired in the presence of the infantry commander, if he so desires, so that he knows that the preparation is exactly where he wants it.

It has been noted that the forward observers are reluctant to use concentrations as reference points in bringing fire quickly on targets of opportunity. In some cases they have refused to fire for effect without detailed adjustment. This delay warns the enemy and he moves out of sight and danger before effective fire is called down.

The practice of one units's firing into another's zone of action without the permission of that unit must cease. Many casualties have resulted from this promiscuous firing. Short rounds cannot be helped but this sort of promiscuous firing is inexcusable. In the event that fire is called into another zone of action sufficient communication must be maintained so that the nearest unit can call off the fire at any time it desires.

S-4

Adequacy of supplies:

Supply of fruits, fruit juices and coffee was not adequate for the needs of the men. Supply of classes of II, III, IV, and V was adequate.

Ordnance:

Weapons brought into operation

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III (Cont'd)

Shotgun, 12 gauge		5
Carbine, .30 Cal.		329
Rifle, .30 Cal.		433
BAR, .30 Cal. M1		81
MG, .30 Cal. M1919, A4		18
MG, .30 Cal. M1917, A1		18
Pistol, .45 Cal.		94
Launcher, Rocket		9
Launcher, Grenade, M7		99
Flame Thrower, M2-2		27

Spare parts and repair facilities are adequate and all weapons are in serviceable condition.

Ammunition expended:

	Ball, .45 Cal.	0.300
AP	AP, M2, 5/co, .30 Cal.	43,000
	AP, M2, 8/cn, .30 Cal.	99,672
	AP-T, Belted, (4-1), .30 Cal.	120,000
	Tracer, M2, 20/ctn, .30 Cal.	4,500
	Ball, Ml, Carbine	39.000
	Shell, 12 Ga., #00	500
	Flare, Trip, M48	200
	Flare, Trip, M49	164
	Tet. Block, Demo, Chain, Ml	104
	Cao, blast, non-elec.	700
	PRIMACORD, spool	16
	Detonator, 15sec, M1	300
	Explosive, TMM, 1 1b.	3,500
	Fuze, Blast, Time, ft.	4,000
	Lighter, Fuze, M2	485
	Ignition	300
	C-2, Haversacks-Blocks	1,392
	HE, M49A2.	10,620
	Illuminating, M83Al	1,576
	WP, 16	850
	HE, M43A1, w/f M52	4,648
	HE, M56, W/f M53	3,072
	WP, M57, w/f M52	953
	WP, M57, w/f M52 HE-AT, 2.36", M6A3	400
	WP, 2.36" M10	120
	Illumination, MKI	300
	Frag., MK II	4,684
	WP, M15	96
	Smoke, Color (Grenades)	300
	AT, M9Al	400
	WP, M19	77万0
	Smoke, Color, (Grenades, rifle)	100
	Adapt, Gren, Proj, Ml.	48
15	Adapt, Chem, T2	lig

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, PHASE III, (Cont'd)

It is recommended that illuminating hardgrenades be provided in larger quantities as they proved very useful. 81mm mortar light shells and 60mm mortar illuminating shells should be made available in larger quantities as the demand far exceeded the supply. The supply of 15 second delay detonators was not sufficient and success of demolitions work was seriously hindered when needed most. The trip flare M 49 is much more desirable.

Flame throwere were used extensively and found satisfactory in most respects. It is recommended that dome type pressure regulators be used in preference to spring type regulators as the trouble encountered was with spring type regulators. Maintenance and repair facilities were adequate.

J. G. JOHNSON, Lt. Col., USMC, Commanding. COL

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HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BA TALION,
TWENTY SECOND MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX B
6th MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OKINAVA OPERATION
PHASE III

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HEADOUARMERS, THIRD BATTALION, THE SECOND MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD.

27 June, 1945.

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From:

The Commanding Officer.

To :

The Commanding Officer, Twenty Second Marines.

Subject:

Special Action Report, Phase III, Okinawa Operation.

Reference:

(a) 6th MarDiv SO 154.

Enclosure:

(A) Subject report.

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is herewith submitted.

C. W. SHISLER.



CHAPMER I

GENERAL

The purpose of this report is to provide a complete and accurate record of the operations of the Third Battalian, Twenty Second Marines, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, in Phase III of the seizure of OKIMAWA SHIMA and to provide a basis of study for future planning and operations.

The mission of the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, was to assist the Tenth Army in the reduction of enemy resistance in the RYUKYU ISLANDS by the complete destruction of the enemy in each of the successive battalion zones of action assigned by the Twenty Second Marines SIXTH MARINE DIVISION.

CHAPTER IT

TASK ORGANIZATION

At no time in this Phase of operation did the mission of the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, require it to prescribe a task organization of its subordinate units.

Although from time to time the supporting weapons and services were attached to the Battalion for the accomplishment of certain specific missions, they were invariably employed under the direct control of the Battalion in order to provide maximum support to all elements of the Battalion.

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

1. BATTLE FOR NAHA:

On May 3, 1945, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, received orders to move on the morning of May 5th from its position at HICIHI south into assembly area in vicinity of INUBI, bivouse in vicinity of TA 9190 and await further orders.

On May 6th, the Battalion received the Division warning order that commencing 0500, 8 May, the SIXTH MARINE DIVISION would move by motor and marching to zone of action of the FIRST MARINE DIVISION, relieve designated elements of that organization along the general line of the ASA MAWA, prepared to resume the attack to the South. A reconnaissance was made of the Seventh Marines' position on May 7th, and at 1830, the Battalion Commander briefed the officers on the situation and issued the order for the relief of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, to be effected prior to 1600, May 8th. The mission of the Battalion was to organize and defend lines held, prepared to attack on order. Company K was directed to relieve the right elements of the Seventh Marines within the Battalion zone of action, and Company I, the left elements. Company L was assigned initially as Battalion reserve.

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At 0725, May 8th, the Battalion entrucked for the movement south. By 1530, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, had completely elieved elements of the Seventh Marines and had taken over the responsibility of the assigned front overlooking ASA VAVA.

On May 9th, the Battalion was assigned the mission of reconnoitering the ASA "AWA and the bridge spanning the river for contemplated crossings and to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy. Patrols from Companies I and K were dispatched at daybreak to perform this mission. The patrols, upon their return, reported the bridge impassable to foot troops and motorized traffic. Further, that the depth of the water at high tide at its shallowest point was approximately. I feet and that the bed of the river consisted of mud. At noon the same companies sent out other patrols to reconnoiter for suitable points for crossing and to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy.

The patrol from Company I grossed the river at 7674 F at low tide by wading. The patrol drew fire from positions along the river bank and located other positions in the form of mill boxes and caves further South from which no fire was received. The patrol from Company K crossed the river at its mouth and reported the stream bed not firm enough to support tanks. The patro encountered resistance from superior forces on the opposite river bank and withdrew, accounting for 12 Japs dead, but suffered 2 Marines killed. It located one anti-tank gun which was destroyed by 37 mm gun fire. At 1600, following receipt of the Regimental attack order to seize the O-a line, the Battalion Commander issued the attack order. The Battalion was to cross the estuary by a footbridge, constructed by the Engineers during darkness, beginning at 0400, and attack at first light to seize the 0-a line. Company K was to lead off and move to the right along the sea wall and await light to attack. Company I was to follow Company K and take up a position along the road and await light. Company L was to move from its position to the night position of Company K and be prepared to cross the river as soon as sufficient area had been gained. At 1730, the time of crossing the estuary was changed by higher authority from 0400 to 0300.

At 0300, May 10th, Company K moved out. Companies F and I crossed the bridge and took up assigned positions without casualties. At 0530, the bridge was destroyed by a Jap suicide crew. The attack jumped off at daybreak. Company K was immediately binned down by enemy fire from all sides and cosualties were heavy. Company I moved out but advanced slowly against stubborn resistance. All direct fire supporting weapons were employed against enemy positions to the front of the assault elements. Although numerous emplacement in caves were destroyed, the terrain was such as to make it difficult for Company K to maneuver. Company I was deterred in its mission of assisting Company K by flanking action because of insufficient neutralization of the enemy fire consisting of machine guns and mortars. Themy artillery registered on the OP, CP and Weapons Company positions, requiring alternate positions to be taken by these weapons. At 0900, Company L was ordered to cross the river and move to a position in rear of Company I. By 0915, Company K had suffered 4 officer casualties, including the Company Commander. Amohibian Tractors were used to evacuate wounded after the sea wall was breached by the Engineers at 0950, and the advance Aid Station was moved across the estuary to care for wounded. At 1130, the Battalion Commander crossed the estuary to get the

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No ene 10-11, but off to seiz the road an further up right flank slow due to ground. At 1103, tanks support the attack jump line. Foll received by "Through hi ridge you s icipated in exercised b terrain fea traditions

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and maneuver the companies to spur the attack. Front lines at 1100 were: Company I on the left TA 757h L3 to K3; Company V in rear of Company I flanking the high ground that had been holding up the attack, Company I was crossing the estuary and moving into the rear of Company I and K. "aval gunfire and artillery were firing continuous missions in support of the attack, but because of its limitations, close supporting fire could not be brought in close enough to destroy or neutralize the fire which had slowed the attack. It was, therefore, imperative to move tanks across the river to fire direct fire into the caves and billboxes. At 1200, casualty report estimated 15 KIA and 55 WT', including 5 officers WIA. At 1300, Company I had me platoon in position at TA 7574 L with two platoons moving around the left of the road to take the next high ground. From 1400-1500 air strikes were called in TA 7474 E and J and TA 7573 A. B. and C. Results were very effective. Armored Anphibians attempted to cross the estuary and climb the opposite bank in support of the attack, but were unable to negotiate the seawall. Failing in this, they supported the attack from the sea, but such fire was partially ineffective because they soon drew enemy artillery fire. Company I was succes ful in taking the first high ground, but thereafter the attack was held up to await tanks.

No enemy activity was reported by the companies during the night May 10-11, but enemy artillery fell in the CP area. At 0700, the companies jumped off to seize the next high ground and the O-a line, with Company I moving up the road and flanking the first ridge line and with the reserve advancing further up the road to support the attack. Company K was to move to the right flank to clear the low ground and caves in that area. Progress was slow due to intense rifle, machine gun and mortar fire from caves and high ground. At 1100, Company reported in position at TA 7573 H3 to G4. At 1103, tanks started across the bridge, constructed by the Engineers, to support the attack. Tanks and Infantry were in position at 1130 and the attack jumped off. By 1600, the Battalion was successful in seizing the 0-a line. Following the seizure of the 0-a line, the following message was received by the Battalion Commander from the Commanding General. Quote: "Through high power glasses I observed your courageous attack up the steep ridge you seized this afternoon. I commend every officer and man who participated in this assault for his personal bravery and the fine teamwork exercised by all units in capturing this precipitous and strongly defended terrain feature. The actions of your men are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Coros."

28 Japs were killed during the night May 11-12. The attack order was issued for the Battalion to continue the attack and seize the O-b line, TA 7673 N4, 7672 O3, L1, K1, 7572 J5, D5, 7573 W5, K3, 7473 N4. Companies I and L were to attack abreast in the Battalion zone of action and seize the O-b line. Company K was to continue morning up operations on the low ground and then move up abreast Company L on the coast and be prepared to defend the coast line against counter landings. The attack was launched at 0700. The O-b line was seized at 0920, 12 May. Orders were issued to defend these lines and mop up by-passed enemy pockets of resistance and to provide maximum support to the First Battalion on the left, in its seizure of the O-b line: A patrol was dispatched through the suberbs of NAHA and to the ASATO River. The patrol met no enemy fire, but found the bridge demolished and the river unfordable because of its muddy bottom. Enemy artillery fire fell in all positions during the day and night, and casualties were received

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on almost every occasion.

On May 13th, Company L sent a patrol into the suburbs of MAHA, but the patrol received heavy fire in the same area through which the patrol the day before had passed. The patrol returned, and Slmm mortars fired on the village. Company L was then ordered to send a platoon accompanied by tanks to destroy the resistance in the village. At 1400, after a heavy mortar preparation, the platoon moved out, supported by tanks. One tank was disabled by a satchel charge as it entered the village, and the platoon met strong machine gun and rifle fire. Another platoon was ordered to move out accompanied by a platoon of tanks to attack the village from the north with the holding attack on the west. The enemy was well covered and concealed within the village causing Company L to suffer heavy casualties. The town was then ordered burned by the tanks and enemy blasted out. The troops and tanks withdrew at 1830.

75 Japs were killed in the operation. The movements of the tanks within the village were restricted by the conventional narrow streets encountered through out the operation.

On May 14th, the Battalion was ordered to seize the O-c line which was the north bank of the ASATO River. Companies I and L were ordered to seize, occupy and defend the O-c line in assigned zone of action with Company I on the left, Company L on the right, and Company K in reserve was to occupy the high ground to the rear. Companies I and L moved out at 0900 with Company L securing the village and occupying its position at 1230. Company I moved out into the First Battalion area, but was detained in its movements because artillery and mortar fire had halted the attack of the First Battalion. Company I reported its area secured at 1730, but was unable to occupy the defensive position until after dark due to machine gun and mortar fire from positions across the ASATO. At 1545, Company K was attached to the Second Battalion and moved out to the area in rear of SUGAR LOAF FILL, the high ground in TA 7572 G.

During the night 14-15 May, 25 Jaos infiltrated the Battalion CP during enemy shelling. 13 Jaos were killed at a cost of 1 KIA and 4 VIA from a grenade tossed into a cave. Company K had been committed by the Second Battalion during the night to hold SUGAR LOAF HILL against repeated counter attacks. At 1105, 15 May, Company I was alerted and at 1115 ordered attached to the Second Battalion. Company L was to cover the entire Third Battalion front. At 1155, the situation on SUGAR LOAF HILL improved and Company I reverted to Regimental Reserve. At 1205, the Third Battalion was ordered to relieve the Second Battalion. By 1500, relief had been effected with Company I occupying the hill in TA 7672 B on the left, Company L occupying the hill in TA 7672 F on the right and Company K disposed at 7572 I.

On May 16th, the Third Battalion was ordered to make a coordinated attack to seize SUGAR LOAF HILL. At 0630, the Battalion Commander issued the following order to the Company Commanders: "The Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines on the left have agreed to take the high ground just east of SUGAR LOAF HILL before we attack. When they have occupied this high ground, it will protect the left flank of Company I which is to move, to the east of SUGAR LOAF HILL and assault the objective from the flank. Simultaneous with Company I's assault, Company L will cover the west and south slopes of SUGAR LOAF HILL with fire and move to the next ground to

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the south of their present position. The First Battalion on the right has planned to support the movements of Company L by fire and to occupy the adjacent high ground. The attack will be launched whenever the Third Battalion Twenty Minth Marines, occupy the high ground east of SWAR LOAF HILL." At 1500, the Third Battalion, Twenty Minth Marines, had not fully occupied the high ground, but Company I was ordered to attack, supported by tanks. Company I moved out without difficulty until they started to assault the slope of the Hill, where they began receiving machine gun and mortar fire from the reverse side of SUGAR LOAF HILL. Company I moved out to assist Company I with fire and movement. At 1710, Company I was successful in reaching the top of SUGAR LOAF HILL, but was still receiving heavy fire from the reverse slope and from the South. The First Battalion reported that it was unable to occupy the high ground which had been assigned them causing Company L to be pinned down from three sides, short of their objective. The Third Battalion, Twenty Minth Marines, were forced back exposing the left flank of Company I. At 1750, with both flanks exposed and receiving heavy knee mortar and machine gun fire, and their strength depleted by casualties, Company I was slowly forced down the hill. The Battalion then took up new positions and was able to hold the same lines held the night before. The artillery fired effective harassing and interdictory fires to prevent counter attacks by the enemy! The enemy attempted to disrupt evacuation, supply and reorganization with artillery fire and the use of smoke, but were unsuccessful. It was during this artillery fire at 1845 that the Battalion Commander was wounded, and the Executive Officer assumed command.

On 19 May, following its withdrawal from SUGAR LOAF HILL, the Battalion reverted to Regimental Reserve and from positions then held to the rear and right flank of SUGAR LOAF HILL, supported the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, by fire and movement and covered the relief of the Twent. Ninth Marines by the Fourth Marines by fire in TA 7671, 7771, 7772. At 1530, Company K was detached from the Third Battalion and attached to the First Battalion.

At 1815, May 20, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel C. W. SHISLER, USFC, assumed command of the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines. On 21 May, the Battalion moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 7474 T where it remained in Regimental Reserve until 24 May. During this period, the Battalion reorganized and trained personnel for key positions requiring replacements resulting from casualties suffered up to this point in the operation Replacements were received during this period which assisted materially in improving the Battalion's combat efficiency.

On 24 May, the Battalion relieved the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, of its mission to defend the Division left flank. Relief was to be effected by 0900, but due to the delay of the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, in accepting relief, it was not consummated until 1440 at which time the Battalic assumed full responsibility for the defense of the Division left east flank.

During the period 24-28 May, the Battalion remained in its position on the left flank, and, in addition to fulfilling its primary mission of defending the left flank, it supported the advance of the FIRST MARINE DIVISION by flanking fire. As the Fourth Marines, the left assault Regiment, advanced and became over extended on its left, changes in the disposition of the Battalion

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were made so as to insure the fulfillment of the Battalion's primary mission. As the FIRST MARINE DIVISION advanced and came up on line with the SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, the need for the Battalion on the left flank disappeared and as companies were pinched out, they were moved into an assembly area in TA 7572 I, H, and B.

At 1330, 29 May, the Battalion was directed to move into NAHA to the area selected by the Battalion Commander during his reconnaissance of the NAHA area earlier the same day. At 1400, the Battalion commenced its movement to its new assembly area at 7472 F, G, K, L and P, and by 1740, the movement had been completed. At 1810, the Battalion received a warning order that it would pass through the First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, who was then holding the general line 7471 K5 - 7571 P5, the following morning and continue the attack to the southeast through NAHA. A reconnais sance of the Battalion zone of action was made by the Battalion and Company Commanders prior to darkness, and plans completed for passing through the First Battalion and coordinating the attack with the Second Battalion on the right and the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, on the left.

Reconnaissance revealed that the high ground in 7571 U and 7470 E was strongly defended and the defenses mutually supporting and covered by fire from positions in adjacent zones. Fortunately, excellent covered routes of approach to the rear of these positions existed, and therefore, the plan for the seizure of these objectives was based on the maximum use of these routes. The plan for the seizure of this high ground to front was as follows;

To have Company K execute a passage of lines in column of platoons in the right of the Battalion zone. To push forward and execute a holding attack at 7470 E with one platoon. To swing the other platoon to the left (North) to assist by fire the main effort on Hill 7571 U and to cover the approach of Company I up the ravine to the left of Company K. To have Company L make the main effort on the left and by flanking action from the left, approach Hill 7571 U from the rear, seize and occupy that hill, cover movement of Company I, prepared to continue the attack to the southeast on order.

Company I, initially in Battalion Reserve, upon seizure of hill 7571 U, to advance up the deep ravine between Companies L and K, sweep around the left flank of Company K, seize the high ground in TA 7570 A and F, prepared to continue the attack southeast on order. Upon seizure of the immediate commanding terrain features, which was the initial objective of the Battalion, to reorganize and continue the attack to O-h with Company I and L in assault. I on the right and Company K in reserve.

Although the time of attack was initially set for 0730, at 0200 the previous night, it was learned that the time of attack was to be changed. At 0815, the time of attack was set for 0900. Enemy artillery and mortar fire delayed the disposition of the units with a consequent delay in time of attack subsequently set for 1010.

At 0955, artillery, Naval gun fire, rockets and mortars began the preparation which proved to be very effective. At 1010, the preparation lifted, and the attack was launched as planned. By 1430, Company L had

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the ation had secured its initial objective, and by 1508, Company I had seized its objective Although the preparation had been effective in neutralizing the enemy, because of the intricate system of caves connected by tunnels, the task of liquidating the enemy proved to be a slow and difficult task requiring much hand to hand fighting. Upon seizure of its initial objective, the Battalion reorganized and continued the attack to the O-h line against disorganized resistance from remnants of the enemy force which had unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the Battalion from seizing its initial objective. The position having been lost by the enemy, it was not long until the attacking troops began receiving intense artillery and mortar fire. By night fall, the Battalion had seized the C-h line and was occupying and defending the most favorable terrain.

During the night of May 31, the enemy attempted to infiltrate the Battalion's lines costing him 80 killed.

At o600 the following morning, the order for the resumption of attack to seize the KOKUBA River line within zone of action was issued and at 0800. the attack jumped off with Companies I and L in assault; Company I on the right and Company K in reserve. The attack progressed rapidly the first 1000 yards against light to moderate resistance. Upon approaching the ridge line just north of the KOMUBA GAWA, intense rifle, machine gun and mortar fire was received from the hills at 7669 F, B, J, 7670 X and 7769 A which will be referred to as hills FOX, BAFFR, XRAY, JIG, and ABLE. Because of the intense fire, the attack was halted temporarily until the exact nature of the resistance could be determined and neutralizing fires brought to bear on it. Reconnaissance revealed Hills XRAY; JIG, and half of BAVER within the Battalion zone of action to be heavily defended by automatic weapons in cave positions and by mortar positions on the forward slopes. All hills were covered by positions on commanding ground in adjacent zones. To attack in any zone independently of adjacent units would be extremely costly since all enemy fire power could then be concentrated on a single unit. It therefore, became obvious that the soundest most economical plan which offered the best chance of success was to wait for a coordinated attack by all units of the Twenty Second Marines and the Twenty Ninth Marines on the left who were then approximately 500 yards to the left rear of the Third Battalion. In consequence, the Battalion ceased the attack and defended the ground held. prepared to continue the attack to seize hills XRAY and JIG the following morning in a coordinated attack.

During the night, continuous harassing fires were placed on the ridge line overlooking the KONUBA GAWA. Preceding the attack, the following morning an intense preparation including 155mm fire was laid down along the entire ridge line which proved to be extremely effective and, in the opinion of the writer, largely responsible for the rapid seizure of this objective at minimum losses. At 0800, the attack jumped off supported by tanks and M-7's. Company I, executing a holding attack on hill BAWER with one platoon, sent another platoon around the left flank of the hill to assist the First Battalion and to relieve the pressure on Company L by neutralizing enemy positions on the forward slope of hill YRAY. Company L making the main effort on the left, moved in on hill XRAY by flanking action from the left. Company K was disposed in the gap on the left between the Twenty Minth Marines and the Battalion, and supporting the attack of the Twenty Minth

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Marines by fire obtaining excellent results. By 0815, hill "PAY was occupied and the early success exploited by sending strong patrols to hill JIG immediately. After a brief but sharp engagement, hill JIG was secured. Having occupied the high ground overlooking the VOYUBA GAVA, patrols were dispatched to reconnoiter the area down to the river and to report the condition of the bridges, depth of the water and nature of any resistanceor enemy instillations encountered. Upon return, the patrol reported encountering only sniper fire, that 2 bridges within the Battalion zone had been destroyed and that the river was not fordable.

Following the moroing up of the objective, it was then organized and defended by the Battalion while awaiting further orders. At 2120, the Pattalion was informed that on 2 June, 1945, it would be relieved by elements of the FIRST M PINE DIVISION and, upon relief, would move into an assigned area east of the MAFA CANAL.

At 1215, June 2, the Battalion stood relieved by the Second Battalion. Seventh Marines and moved into bivouac in TA 7571 M, N, R, and S, where it remained to reorganize until 6 June. See Annex ABLE, Operations Overlay.

2. BATTLE FOR OROXU PENIUSULA.

At 0900, June 6, the Third Battalion was assigned the mission of filling the gap in Division left boundary between the First Battalion and the FIRST MARINE DIVISION from TA 7566 E to 7465 0; to occupy and defend this general 1 line and protect the Division left flank. The B-ttalion moved out at 1300 and arrived in assembly area, TA 7667 P, K, G, H, at 1545. Upon reconnaissance of the terrain and after conferring with the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, relative to its situation, a decision was made to fulfill the assigned mission by occupying and defending the general line from TA 7566 E to 7565 D with three companies on the line for night defense: Companies L, I and K, right to left. At 1615, Company L began moving into its position on Hill 58, TA 7566 E. All approaches to this hill chosen by the Commanding Officer were covered by automatic fire from Hill 103, TA 7566 F. By 1930, it became obvious that Company L would not occupy Hill 58 and therefore, it was directed to set up night defense along the line TA 7667 P3. P4. V1. V5. V4. tying in with the First Batt lion on their right. The Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, did not have the success that was indicated early in the afternoon which altered the proposed defense line which was partially occubied by elements of the FIRST MARINE DIVISION. At 1845, Company K was ordered to fill the gap by occupying the line TA 7666 F5, K5, and P5, tying in with Company L on the right and the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, on the left. Company I in Battalion Reserve, set up all around defense at TA 7666 I and N.

On June 7, orders were received to continue the occupation and defense of the gap between the First Battalion and FIRST MARINE DIVISION on the Division left flank and to patrol 500 yards to the front (West) with special attention to Hill 103. Since fire had been received from this localithe previous day, it was known to be occupied, but the strength was undetermined. At 0700, a platoon patrol from Company L was dispatched to reconnoite the hill for enemy strength and dispositions and, if successful in reaching the top without encountering superior forces, to hold its position and cover

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the approach of the remainder of the company which was held in readiness on Hill 58 to move in immediately. The patrol experienced success and by 1400, Hill 103 was completely occupied by Company L. This terrain feature proved to be an important observation post and was occupied by a large number of the enemy, but their defense proved ineffective since they chose to remain in their caves which had definitely confined the fields of fire which could easily be outflanked by use of the numerous covered routes of approach.

Hill 103 having been occupied, the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, advanced further south uncovering the ridge extending south from the hill. This ridge was then occupied by Company K. At 15^hO, Company I was directed to pass through Company K, seize hills 69 and 49 and the high ground in TA 7366 O, N and I. Simultaneously, Company K was to seize Hill 88 and occupy the ridge line extending southwest from Hill 88. By the end of the day, the Battalion occupied the general line Hills 103, 88 and the ridge line as far south as TA 7466 U. Darkness overtook the Battalion in its effort to reduce the stubborn resistance encountered along the ridge line extending southwest from Hill 88 and therefore, prevented it from completing its mission. At 1630, Company B was attached to the Battalion and was assigned a defensive mission along the general line 7566 R, W and 7565 B.

The following morning, June 8, Company B was assigned the mission of seizing Hill 49, TA 7465 A and F, which was accomplished by 0915 without opposition. Immediately following the seizure of Hill 49, Company B was directed to dispatch a patrol to Hill 69, TA 7366 X. By 1000, the natrol had reported that Hill 69 was unoccupied and Company I moved out immediately to occupy it. Following the occupation of Hill 69, Company I worked to the north and occupied the ridge line extending to 7366 D encountering only light resistance from the immediate area but heavy fire from Hill 55 in TA 7467 E and TA 7367 Q.

Patrols from Company B were dispatched from their position on Hill 49 to cover the entire area between the FIRST MAR INE DIVISION on the left and the sea to the front. The patrol returned and reported encountering only light sniper fire.

At 0500 the following morning, June 9, Company B reverted to the First Battalion. At 0800, Company I sent a patrol to Hills 26 and 28 to determine strength and disposition of enemy, and at .0815, Company L sent a patrol to the coast in TA 7266 to more up all enemy in that area and to make contact with the Fourth Marines. Company I reported their patrol on Hill 26, TA 7367 Q, V, at 1040 and wad ordered to continue to strengthen their position with entire company and to seize Hill 28. Company I reported that fire from Hill 55, TA 7367 O, prevented occupation of Hill 28 until after dark when it could be outposted. During the day's operation, the Observation Post reported numerous enemy positions and movements which were either fired upon by this Battalion or their locations relayed to the Fourth Marines and Twenty Second Marines. At 1515, Company K was ordered to move to the position vacated by Company I for night defense and to put one outpost on Hill 69. The 37mm gun Platoon was brought up and put into position at TA 7366 H where it rendered excellent direct support of the attack on Hills 55 by the First and Second Battalions. The M-7 platoon was moved up but was unsuccessful in selecting a

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suitable position from which to fire direct fire in support of the attack. At 1700, Company L was ordered to hold Hills 103 and 88 and place an outpost at TA 7567 V to tie in with Company T, Second Battalion. Company G tied in with Companies K and L. Company I was tied in with Fourth Marines for the night. 3rd 37mm gun platoon was in position for night defense at TA 7366 H and 7466 Q.

On June 10, the Third Bettalion was assigned the mission of supporting the attack of Second Battalion in seizing Hill 55 TA 7367 0 and to complete consolidation of Hill 28. At 0500, 37mm gun platoon began firing at Hill 55 and knocked out 3 20mm gun positions and neutralized the southwest slope for the attack of Second Battalion at 0730. Companies I and K supported the attack by fire. At 1245, Company L was ordered to relieve Company A and occupy high ground in TA 7467 Y; 7567 U, V, R, and defend the draw, tying in on the left with Company C and on the right with Company A. At 1505, Company I reported occupying Hill 28 and was ordered to set up night defense tying in with Fourth parines on the left and Company K on the right and using 2 M-7's to cover the draw to their front. Company K remained in position.

On June 11, the Third Battalion was to assemble initially on the south slope of Hill 55 TA 7467 R prepared to reinforce or exploit attack of Second Battalion. Company I was to remain in the area it then occupied prepared to moout on order. Company K was to move to an assembly area in TA 7467 Rl and 2. Company I remained in position on Hill 28 and supported the attack of the Second Battalion and Fourth Marines by fire until he was masked then was to move to an assembly area at TA 7466 G and H. At 1050, the Battalion Commander had received orders to support the Second Battalion in the attack on Fill 62 and to seize Hill 53. In executing this mission, Company L was directed to seize the east shoulder of Hill 62 in TA 7468 T, Y and 7568 U and from there support the attack of the Second Battalion on Hill 62 by fire. After Hill 62 had been taken, Company K was to move through the rear of the Second Battalion west of Hill 62 to seize Hill 53 from the west with Company I supporting from the south and enveloping the hill from the east. Company I was moved to an assembly area in TA 7467 M. At 1145, Company L had reached its first objectiv and the Second Battalion moved up to hill 62. At 1345, Company K was in position to attack. The 81mm mortars were registered in and firing on Hill 53 covering the movements of the companies. At 1415, the mortar platoon was directed to fire for effect on Hill 53, to lift fire on order and follow by three (3) smoke shells. At 1435, the 81mm mortars ceased fire, and at 1450, Hill 53 was occupied by Company L. Company K in its movement around the left flank encountered stiff resistance from the high ground in the Fourth Marines zone to the left and although they were mable to assault Hill 53 simultaneously with Company L, they did contribute materially in reducing the pressure on Company L, thereby facilitating its movements. All companies continued to mop up and at 1910, were in night defensive positions with Company K at TA 7468 03 to .74; Company L at TA 7468 J5, E4, 7568 A3, F2; Company I at TA 7568 F4 to K3. Total Japs killed, 125.

During the June 12-15 period, the Third Battalion conducted operations to mop up in the area which it occupied in the vicinity of Hill 53. (See Annex ABLE, Operations Overlay.)

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At 03 between IT plans for by the uni position o 0400 to 06 mortars, t 0755, Comp fire from until the to the for From 1110 moved out. immediatel Hill 69. drawn, mov Commanies assault on to be lift move aroun attack wit artillery H111 69 wa positions. tying in w Company X in with .Co E was atta Third Batt the attack

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3. CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PENINSULA

At 0900, June 16, the Battalion received an order to move into an assembly area in the vicinity of TERA prior to nightfall, prepared to pass through elements of the FIRST MARINE DIVISION the following morning and contime the attack to the south. The Battalion began its movement to the new assembly area at 1600, completing it by 1745. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance was made of the route which the Battalion would move over the next morning and the ground over which it would attack, and at 1830, the Battalion Commander issued the order for the attack. Companies K and I were to attack abreast with Company K on the left, and Company L in reserve. Company K was to pass through elements of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, cross the KUNISTI RIDGE in assigned zone of action and attack to seize MEZADO RIDGE from the north and east. Company I was to pass through elements of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, pass around the end of WUNISHI RIDGT within zone of action and attack to seize PWZADO RIDGE from the west. Company L in reserve was to be prepared to support the attack of either company or to exploit the success of either company. Companies were to move out from assembly area at 0300 by assigned route and attack at 0/30 following an artillery preparation. At 1900, the hour for the attack was changed by Regiment to 0400. June 17. and the artillery preparation was cancelled.

At 0300, June 17, the Battalion moved out and crossed the open ground between ITOMAN and KUNISHI RIDGE before devlight without casualties. Since plans for the coordination of the movement into position were not observed by the unit on the right, a consequent delay in time resulted in the disposition of the Battalion for the attack and the time of attack changed from 0400 to 0645. Preceeded by a preparation of artillery, Naval gun fire, and mortars, the attack jumped off at 0645, supported by tanks and M-7's. At 0755, Company K was at TA 7460 O-R and at 0810 at TA 7460 V5-W5 receiving fire from caves on forward slope of KUNISHI RIDGE. The attack was held up until the forward slope of KUNISHI RIDGE was mopped up. Company I moved to the forward slope of YUNISHI RIDGE to support the attack on MEZADO RIDGE. From 1110 to 1130, a mortar preparation was fired, and at 1130, Company K moved out. At 1150, Company K had reached its objective, and Company L immediately moved up to reinforce it, mon un and prepare for the attack on Hill 69. Company I, who was still drawing fire and unable to move was withdrawn, moved into position on the left of Company " via the route over which Companies K and L had moved successfully, to make the main effort in the assault on Hill 69. At 1400, an artillery preparation was laid on Will 69 to be lifted on order to KUWANGA RIDGE. Plan of attack was for Company I to move around the left of Company W through the eastern edge of 1987ADO and attack with Company K sending a patrol out to the northwest of Hill 69. The artillery lifted at 1415, and the commanies moved out supported by tanks. Hill 69 was seized at 1620 against stubborn resistance from numerous cave positions. Company I was ordered to occupy and defend Hill 69 for the night tying in with the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, on the left and with Company K in the southern edge of the village of 192ADO. Company L was to tie in with Company K and the First Battalion, "wenty Second Marines. Company E was attached for night defense and used to tie with the First Battalion and Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, in a completed all around defense. At 2030, the attack order for June 18, was received requiring the Third attalion to mop up in its present area and be prepared to expedite and support the attack of the Second Battalion on KUWANGA RIDGH.

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This mission was executed with Company I and one platoon of tanks in support morping up all resistance around Hill 69 and the village at TA 7450 U-V. Because of the intricate defense system of MEZADO RIDGE, and Hill 69. all units were employed throughout the day in mopping up operations. At 1800 Company K was ordered attached to the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. At 1830, the order was changed to one platoon, and at 1845, Company K was ordered to remain in position.

On June 19, the Battalion remained in position and morped up assigned area, prepared to change its position in order to protect Division left flank by maintaining contact between the Fourth Marines and the Eighth Marines if contact was lost. At 0700, Company I sent out a patrol to mor up the area between Hill 69 and KUWANGA RIDGE to the east, likewise Company K dispatched a patrol with similar mission to the west. At 1600, the Battalion was ordered to place outposts at TA 7458 R, W, X and M, N, I. At 1645, Company F plus one platoon of Company I attached was ordered to man these outposts for the night and protect Division left flank and road net in that area.

During June 20-21, the Battalion remained in position and continued to mop up. At 1027, June 21, Division Zone of Action was declared secured of . all organized resistance, and at 1305, June 21, all organized resistance was declared secured on OKINAWA. See Annex ABLE, Operation Overlay.

SPECIAL MATTERS

a. Shore Party: No comments.

b. Naval Gun Fire Support:

Fatigue was evident in the spotter team personnel after 10 to 11 dows in the front lines without relief. The spotter tram should be relieved as is the practice of the Artillery Foward Observer teams who exposed to long periods with the assault companies. Spotter team personnel should be rotated with the Liaison team personnel during these periods.

Fires in practically all cases were effective. Pincoint targets are difficult to hit directly without loss of time in adjusting. Such targets should be only direct fire targets.

. Total rounds fired:

4353 rds 5" AAC 5" Ill 1071 rds 5" HC 327 rds . 880 rds 5" WP 54 rds g" AP 32 rds 14" HC .

c. Air Support: .

. Two air strikes were called and completed for the Third Battalio during Bhase III. Results were effective. Air Observation missions were called and gave good information on targets.

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rd Battalio missions Air Ground Liaison communications were very good and provided excellent means of emergency communication in event of the failure of battalion communications system.

The time interval between requesting air support and its delivery are too long.

Far too many stations were on the radio net.

d. Artillery Support:

The doctrine that was followed in the assignment of Forward Observer Teams to the rifle companies and Liaison Officer team to the Battalion insured the Infantry Battalion of timely and very effective artillery support at all times. Experiences of this Battalion with supporting artillery left nothing to be desired.

e. Tank:

The medium tank has proven to be an effective weapon in providing direct support of the infantry in the assault of fortified and cave positions whenever the terrain and weather permitted their employment.

f. Amphibian Tractors:

The Amphibian Tractors rendered excellent support to the Battalior throughout the operation by providing logistic support and in their employment for beach defense.

g. Armored Amphibians:

Armored Amphibians proved effective by providing indirect and direct supporting fire from both land and sea positions.

h. Infantry Combat:

Officers and senior non-commissioned officers are not familar with the capabilities and limitations of the infantry weapons, namely: Bazooka, rifle anti-tank grenade and flame thrower. Throughout the operation it was observed that these were the first weapons to disappend but the largest percentage of targets that confront the company could have been liquidated by their proficient employment.

Unnecessary casualties have occured because of the failure to use the principal of fire and movement and the failure to select covered routes of approach.

Insufficient men are trained as flame thrower operators, bazooka men, rifle anti-tank grenadiers and in the use of demolitions.

There is a noted inexperience of all hands in the technique of map reading.

Marksmanship, fire discipline, fire control and target designation must be improved before the next operation.

An assault engineer unit should be attached to the Battalion to

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mop up the fortified and cave positions with demolitions in the rear of the assault units and thus permit a more rapid advance and exploitation of any successes which may have been obtained.

i. Communications:

Communications were satisfactory throughout Phase III of the OKINAWA operation. Personnel were adequately trained, and allowances were sufficient. Radio communication with the SCR 300 proved good with the exception of difficulty encountered with hand sets during inclement weather. Repairs to radio equipment by fourth and fifth echelons were considered below standard in that equipment was returned to assault units in inoperative condition. Maintenance of wire was difficult due to tracked vehicles, enemy artillery, and in some cases, cutting by the enemy. Mo enemy interference was detected over our communication installations. Shackle cipher proved satisfactory.

j. Engineers: No comment.

k. Medical:

The Battalion Aid Station moved with Headquarters Commany, and usually set up in conjunction with the Battalion Command Post when consistent with the proper care of casualties and their expeditious evacuation to medical commanies.

Evacuation facilities were generally adequate, although evacuation on several occasions was very slow because of the military situation and difficult terrain. Amohibian tractors were indispensable, and usually available when needed, though evacuation was delayed several times as a result of breakdown. Their principal drawback is their very poor riding quality: "Except under fire, "Weasles" would have been much better, from the patient's standpoint. Mal Tanks were used one day, and were an excellent means of evaduation, riding far better than Amphibian Tractors. On OROKU PENINSULA when a two mile carry was necessary from the aid station, valuable help was received from the rear aid station of the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, where casualties were re-treated and transferred to collecting section ambulances, In general, it is felt that closer contact should have been maintained between battalion and regimental medical organizations, and that on one or two occasions, handling of patients would have been expedited by early establishment of water evacuation.

Number of casualties treated: 1,225.

Sanitation was adequate, except for insect control which was difficult because of lack of DDT.

Our own and enemy dead were disposed of properly.

Civilians and Prisoners of War were given emergency treatment and evacuated in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure.



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Medical organization and equipment were adequate. There were losses in medical personnel, and organization was considerably under strength during the latter part of the operation. Losses were subsequently replaced.

Medical supplies for emergency treatment were available in adequate amounts. It was difficult and often impossible to obtain many "sick call" preparations necessary to treat and prevent minor disorders. Some could be obtained but not through prescribed channels. A particularly important lack was fungicide for treating "athlete's foot". In this connection, the lack of foot powder should be mentioned. The small amount obtained was supplied in bulk, and could not be distributed properly. Incidence of foot infections could be greatly reduced by supplying powder in cans to each man.

Two jeep ambulances (one supplied by Company B, 6th Medical Battalion) were available, and maintenance was excellent. However, it is felt that the ½ Ton, 4 x 4 ambulances leave much to be desired as an ambulance because of noor riding qualities. It is recommended that on future operations one Ton ambulances, preferably of the army type, be made available for evacuation from the Battalion id station.

1. Supply and Logistics;

Sumply and logistics during Phase III of the OKINAWA operation were in accordance with that prescribed in the basic operation order and Standing Operating Procedure, and with the exception of the points covered in Comments and Recommendations, Chapter VI, sumply and logistics were considered to be satisfactory.

m. Public Relations:

Perhaps it is too soon to appraise the work of correspondents and combat photographers without knowledge of the total coverage, but certain matters in connection with their work bear noting.

From the standpoint of covering the activities of this Battalion, much was left to be desired particularly from a historical and training point of view. On numerous occasions actions of historical importance and training value occured, and the men assigned to the Battalion for the purpose of recording such events were not available. Under orders given them by a higher echelon, there was no restriction on their movement, and consequently, the Battalion rarely, if ever, knew their location.

- n. Military Government:
 No comments.
- o. Special Reconnaissance: No comments.

CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS

It is deemed appropriate in discussing JAPANESE TACTICS, organization, and equipment encountered in this campaign that their elements be considered

in light of the three phases of the campaign. The Battle of NAHA, The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA, and the Capture of ARA SAKI PENINSULA, for in each case, the enemy troops opposing us were essentially dissimilar in organization, in equipment and in morale.

When the Battalion entered the lines relieving the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, it took over positions facing the western anchor of a veritable Siegfried line of fortified ridges and peaks which the enemy had built from YONABARU to SHURI to NAHA. To the front the natural barrier of the ASA KAWA and a series of East-West ridges barred the way to NAHA.

On the left, funneling the enemy's fire, and out of the Division's zone of action, ran the highly strategic draw in TA 7773 and 7774 which the enemy had made into a primary defensive position.

Since the Battalion was constantly pressing the attack, the conception of Japenese tactics is naturally confined to those of defense and such counter measures employed by him in fruitless efforts to relieve the pressure brought to bear on him which in the strict sense could not be considered attacks.

In conducting this defense, skillful use of the terrain was always, employed. Well prepared and mutually supporting positions occupied the forward and reverse slopes of every hill and ridge.

Caves and tombs were extended and converted into defensive positions containing automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons and frequently artillery, of the size of battalion or regimental guns. These positions were connected by expertly camouflaged trench systems.

This system of defense supported by artillery, mortar and rocket fire was uniformly characteristic throughout the drive.

As for morale, the troops opposing the Battalion initially on the ASA KAWA were well trained and disciplined Army troops of exceptionally high morale and splendid physical condition. On OROKU PENINSULA, regular Naval personnel were mixed with Okinawan Naval Base troops and most of these were confused and disorganized so that they could not be compared to the Army troops previously encountered.

In the APA SAKI phase the Jap was at the end of his rope. His morale and physical condition had suffered accordingly.

Enemy artillery fire in the drive on NAHA was extremely severe and maximum use of his excellent observation from high ground in the SHURI region brought our advancing observation posts and command posts under heavy fire. Time fire was reported frequently, and much of the artillery fire was of high velocity and probably came from dual purpose weapons. The most severe fire of this period was identified as 105mm Howitzers.

Our advances were opposed by small arms, machine guns and mortar fire. The morale of the enemy was high and resistance was tenacious. The eleven

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suicide demalitions men who blew themselves up when they destroyed the bridge over the ASA KAWA testify to the high morale of the Japanese troops opposing us at this time.

When the high ground north of NAHA had been taken, the Battalion was subjected to frequent infiltration attempts. In one case, the enemy succeeded in destroying 4 trucks of an attached 37mm platoon and on another occasion the same group penetrated our Command Post. On the same evening, a counter landing in our area was crushed by Armored Amphibians, light Navel craft and troops of this Battalion.

Mines were frequently encountered but proved to be no serious obstacle to our advance. Anti-personnel mines were not found so numerous as other types.

Enemy artillery fire on tracked vehicles was frequent and severe and the presence of friendly tanks and amphibious tractors was often cause for grave concern because of the enemy artillery fire they were sure to draw.

The enemy had made skillful use of personal camouflage. Enemy infantry remained undetected in their positions when completely by-passed by our troops by virtue of green painted faces and leaf entwined body and head nets.

In the reduction of the enemy key defense point of SUGAR LOAF HILL, the full brunt of his supporting weapons was encountered. By skillful use of the terrain and employment of automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons and mortars, he repeatedly made untenable the terrain which our troops had won by relentless attack. Direct fire of 150mm on tanks was encountered. The fury of his knee mortars and grenades reached unprecedented heights.

In villages and where the terrain afforded cover, suicide tank destroyer groups were often successful in their attacks on our tanks. Close in support by our infantry limited the success of these tactics.

The enemy made maximum use of the ruined buildings and rubble of NAHA to construct a network of defenses at the same time using mines, obstacles and anti-tank weapons to retard the progress of the Tank-Infantry teams.

The seizure of SUGAR LOAF HILL and the capture of NAHA in which the same fanatical resistance was encountered brought a lessening of artillery fire though fire from 20mm and other automatic weapons from OROKU PENINSULA were especially severe.

The enemy's use of mortars was extensive throughout the operations. In the first phase he coordinated his mortars with artillery, but in the Battle for OROKU PENINSULA, Slmm mortars proved to be his heaviest weapon. The dreaded grenade discharger or knee mortar was employed effectively and in some stages so extensively that the number of troops immediately opposing the Battalion could have erroneously been reckoned to reach that of a regiment.

Enemy rocket fire was encountered on entering NAHA and in the push south. However, the fire was infrequent and seldom accurate.

The enemy made considerable use of carrier pigeons. On numerous occasions expertly trained observers in our observation posts located enemy command posts by noting the flight of pigeons.

Concerning Japanese organization, on moving south to the ASA WAWA, it was believed that elements of the 62nd Division were defending that sector and that the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, a powerful unit, was being held in general reserve.

Subsequent developments established the presence of elements of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Division zone of action up to and including the capture of NAHA. By this time as an organization, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade no longer existed.

The 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was composed of the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, the 6th Special Organized Regiment and lesser attachments of artillery, mortar, tank destroyer and service units.

In the closing stages, the strength of the units had been so reduced and units so combined that it was well nigh impossible to identify the organizations with which the Battalion had contact.

The defense of OROKU PENINSULA was entrusted to Naval personnel. Positions were prepared with care equal to those of Army design and occupation and resistance was just as tenacious and fanatical. The enemy possessed an incredible number of automatic weapons including 20mm guns, and as usual, was well supplied with knee mortars and 81's, though there is some indication, that his training with these weapons was recent and not extensive. Morale by this time showed signs of lessening, especially when Jap defenses were constricted by our pressure.

Three other factors contributed to a lessening of morale. First, two-thirds of the troops were ordered to ITOMAN ahead of the date selected by the Army and on arriving there were irrately ordered back to OROKU PENINSULA. Much confusion and disorganization leading to decreased morale arose for on their return move, the troops were subjected to terrific shellings, bombings and strafings. Only scattered units could have returned. The third factor contributing to a reduction of morale was the presence of the the native OKINAWAN Naval Base Force whose will to resist was never as strong as that of the regular Japanese troops.

On moving to attack the left flank of the YAEJU DAKE, YUZA DAKE and MABUNI DAKE Line, we immediately encountered a situation comparable to that of the previous battles. We faced a series of rugged ridges running at right angles to the axis of our attack, prepared positions, trench works, anti-tank weapons and artillery so sited as to bring all roads, draws and approaches under direct fire. An enemy at bay stood in the path of final victory.

By this time, however, the enemy units were in disorder and disructed communications, augmented by the fury of our attacks along the entire line,

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led to complete disorganization. Large numbers surrendered and though scattered groups continued to resist, by 21 June, organizations as such did not exist.

CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. AREA SECURED

a. Battle for NAHA

5,000 yards were secured on an average battalion front of 400 yards.

(See Annex ATLE - Operation Overlay)

b. Battle for OROKU PEVINSULA

4,600 yards were secured on an average battalion front of 600 yards.

(See Annex ABLE - Operation Overlay).

c. Capture of ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

1800 yards were secured on an average battalion front of 600 yards.

(See Annex ABLE - Operation Overlay)

- 2. ENEMY CASUALTIES (See page 20).
- 3. OPERATIONAL MATERIAL DAMAGE TO EMEMY. (See page 21).
- 4. OWN LOSSES (See page 22).

CHAPTER VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. The following comments and recommendations based on experiences gained in this operation are considered worthy of note:
 - an By S.I.

Comment - The handling of replacements was not satisfactory.
Replacements often reached the Battalion command post in the midst of battl or late in the afternoon, without or with incomplete rosters. This necessitated a hurried assignment to duty without reference to military speciality numbers. Without complete and accurate rosters, it was impossible to secure the necessary information needed to complete a personnel card until several days had passed. In some instances, men were killed or evacuated before this information could be obtained.

Recommendation - Personnel file cards could be made at the regimental replacement pool so that complete and correct information on each man would be available to all echelons and an adequate roster could be completed and



The second of th (2) Enemy Casualties.

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The state of the state of the state of the	DATE	KIA	POW	BURLED	Sealed in Caves
	10 May, 1945 11 May 12 May 13 May 14 May 15 May 16 May 19 May 24 May 26 May 30 May 1 June 2 June 7 June 7 June 10 June 11 June 12 June 13 June 14 June 17 June 18 June 19 June 20 June 21 June	33 50 188 124 15 15 76 1 2 7 80 1 135 246 33 40 137 216 47 17 154 45 9 25 53	1 2 1 3 1 12 1 1 1 7	4 3 2 2 2 5 5 5 12 32 64	1¢¢ 3¢ 23 37 5¢ 46
-	TOTALS	1749	59	* 129	286

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^{*} This figure is necessarily low due to the fact that the Third Battalion was constantly attacking and moving up.



(3) Operational material damage to enemy.

DATE	77mm Field Piece	Gun	47 AT Gun	20mm D. P. Gun	H MG	L MG	Lewi	Rif.	90mm Mor- tars	Mort-	Sui- cide Boat	cks	Other Veh- ic- les
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made immediately available to the Battalion upon the arrival of its replacements.

The information contained in the individual personnel card on file with the Rear Administrative Groupd should be mide more ininclusive and the eard enlarged. For instance, the submission of recommendations for awards now requires a statement of prior awards to the individual. In the case of posthumous awards, the service record book is the only source for this information. Pertinent information of this kind could be included on the onlarged cards,

b. By S-2.

Comment - There were insufficient Jap interpreters assigned to our Battalion.

Recommendation - One officer and two enlisted Jap language personnel be attached to each infantry battalion.

c. By S.-3.

Comment - Operations orders from the next higher echelon invariably arrived so late that proper reconnaissance could seldom be made prior to the issuance of a Battalion attack order. On many occasions, the order was received just prior to the time set for the attack.

Recommendation - It appears that a solution to this situation would be to assign to a Battalion a mission which would require it approximately three (3) days to complete. This would permit the Battalion to plan ahead and know well in advance what it is going to do the following day. Coordination between assault battalions would be a continuous process between the respective battalions with regiment intervening only when such coordination between adjacent battalions fails or is beyond the limitation normally expected of a Battalion.

d. By 5-4.

Comment - Requests of the battalion for Engineer equipment for the improvement and maintainance of advance lines of communication essential to proper supply of the battalions were not always honored. It is considered that when a unit has fought for a whole day, it should not be called upon to man handle supplies from a point 2 to 3 thousand yards to the rear especially when the assignment of a bull-dozer could put a road in fair condition in just a short time.

Recommendation - That an Engineer platoon with road building equipment be permanently attached to the infantry battalion so long as the battalion is in the attack, or that a TD-14 tractor with angle dozer be made organic equipment of an infantry battalion.

Comment - Throughout the operation there was a definite shortage of transportation which placed a definite burden on the transportation available.

Recommendation - That four (4) one (1) Ton, 4x4, cargo trucks with one Ton trailers be made organic equipment of the supply section, Headquarters Company of the infantry battalion, and that the transportation be in addition to that presently authorized. Weasels to be used when terrain does not permit the use of wheel vehicles.





Comment - The issue of beer to a battalion when it moves into an area for brief rest periods, would aid greatly in bolstering morale and lessening the strain resulting from battle.

Recommendation - That an allowance three (3) cans of beer be made available in the combat area and issued to all hands during brief rest periods following combat.

Comment - There was a noticeable absence of fruits and fruit juices during this operation.

Recommendation - That the allowance of fruit and fruit juices be increased and that every effort be made to see that front line units obtain their proportionate share.

Comment - There is need aboard ship and in the field for an individual sea bag smaller than the one presently issued. Such a bag would replace the lower portion of the pack which is seldom if ever carried in an operation, and provide a means for the individual Marine to safeguard his property. Such a bag could be easily handled and transported closely in rear of assault elements to be available at the end of a day's fighting.

Recommendation - That a small canvas sea bag with water proof lining and zipper fastener, capable of fitting inside the standard sea bag be adopted and issued as an appendage to the present sea bag. This recommendation will be followed by a special letter accompanied by appropriate examples at a later date.

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