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PART 1 OF 2

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASE III

VOLUME THREE

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HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD

30 June 1945

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASE III

References: (a) Annex C to 6th Mar Div GO-5
(b) 6th Mar Div GO-36
(c) FMF, Pac Confidential GO No 66-44
(d) Pacific Fleet Confidential Ltr 1CL-45
(e) III Phib Corps GO No 34-45
(f) 10th Army Operational Directive No 10
(g) 6th Mar Div SO 154

ENCLOSURE (A)

[redacted]

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SIXTH MARINE DIVISON SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this special action report is to record in chronological detail the activities of the 6th Marine Division in the campaign for southern OKINAWA, during the period subsequent to that covered in 6th Marine Division Special Action Report, OKINAWA Operation, Phases I and II.

2. Since this Division actually completed Phases I and II as originally conceived, the period covered by this report has been arbitrarily designated as the Sixth Marine Division's Phase III of the OKINAWA Operation.

3. During the period covered by Phase III, the Division was assigned three principal missions in succession:

a. On 8 May. To seize NAHA and the line of the KOKUBA River in its zone of action, to assist the 1st Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps right (west) flank.

b. On 2 June. To seize the OROKU Peninsula and NAHA Airfield.

c. On 16 June. To pass through elements of the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of KUNISHI Ridge; to seize the KUWANGA Ridge, and destroy all enemy in zone of action.

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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER II

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Upon movement to southern OKINAWA for commitment on the III Amphibious Corps front the task organization of the Division was as follows:

FOR OPERATION ORDER NO 52-45:

6th Mar Div (Reinf) - Maj Gen Lemuel C. SHEPHERD, Jr., USMC

29th Mar (Reinf) - Col William J. WHALING, USMC

29th Mar
Co C 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co C 6th MT Bn
3d Plat Ord Co
3d Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
Det 6th JASCO

22d Mar (Reinf) - Col Merlin F. SCHNEIDER, USMC

22d Mar
Co B 6th Med Bn
Co A 9th Amph Trac Bn
1st Plat Co B 6th MT Bn
2d Plat Ord Co
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co
91st Chem Mort Co (Sep) (USA)
5th Prov Rocket Det
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
Det 6th JASCO

Div Arty - Col Robert B. LUCKEY, USMC

15th Mar
Co E 6th Med Bn

Armd Amph Gp - LtCol Louis METZGER, USMC

1st Armd Amph Bn
3d Armd Amph Bn (less 4 Plats)

Tank Gp - LtCol Robert L. DENIG, USMC

6th Tank Bn
Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co

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Amph Trac Gp - LtCol Clovis C. COFFMAN, USMC

4th Amph Trac Bn
9th Amph Trac Bn

6th Engr Bn - Maj Paul F. SACKETT, USMCR

6th MT Bn (less Dets) - LtCol Ernest H. GOULD, USMC

6th Ser Bn (less Dets) - LtCol Alexander N. ENTRINGER,USMC

6th Med Bn (less Dets) - LtComdr John S. COWAN, USN

Div Hq Trs - LtCol Floyd A. STEPHENSON, USMC

Hq Bn
6th JASCO (less Dets)

4th Mar (Reinf)(Div Res) - Col Alan SHAPLEY, USMC

4th Mar
Co A 6th Med Bn
Det Co A 6th MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec)
Det 6th JASCO

2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF THE OPERATION:

The task groupment of the Division for all operations subsequent to that included in Operation Order No 52-45 remained essentially unchanged excepting for the movement of the 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) (USA) and the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment from one infantry regiment to another in order to provide support for the main effort.

On 28 May the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (USA) was attached to the Division and remained attached until 22 June.

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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER III

Progress of the Operation

The activities of the 6th Marine Division in southern OKINAWA fall naturally into three parts:

1. The Battle for NAHA (from initiation of plans for crossing the ASA KAWA to completion of the NAHA Operation on 1 June).

2. The Battle for OROKU Peninsula (commencing with planning for the OROKU landing and concluding with mopping up operations through 16 June).

3. Capture of ARA SAKI Peninsula (commencing on 17 June and continuing through 21 June).

Each of these parts actually constituted an operation in itself, and the whole series might well be termed a campaign.

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Following the conclusion of Phase II the Division patrolled its assigned sector north of the line CHUDA-SUKKU until 2 May when displacement southward, preliminary to commitment on the southern front, was begun. The responsibility for defense of the northern sector passed from the 6th Division to the 27th Infantry Division at 0900, 4 May and movement of all major elements of the Division to assembly areas in the vicinity of CHIBANA was completed by the evening of 6 May.

Orders for commitment of the Division on the right of the III Phib Corps front were received on 6 May and the 22d Marines was moved forward to the high ground north of the ASA KAWA River on the 8th, relieving elements of the 1st Marine Division at that time.

THE BATTLE FOR NAHA

1. ASA KAWA to SUGAR LOAF HILL.

A day of active patrolling south of the ASA KAWA Estuary by the 22d Marines disclosed the high ground to the south of the river to be held in some strength. The Estuary itself constituted a barrier of considerable dimensions, since it is too deep to ford near the mouth and the bottom is too soft to support any type of vehicle. In order to assist the planned infantry crossing, the 6th Engineer Battalion commenced construc-

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tion of a footbridge across the Estuary under cover of darkness during the night of 9-10 May. This footbridge was completed prior to the hour for crossing, but before an appreciable number of troops could pass over it a section was destroyed by a group of enemy who gave their lives in placing satchel charges on the span.

At 0330, 10 May, the 1st and 3d battalions of the 22d Marines commenced movement across the ASA KAWA Estuary, the 1st Battalion on the left by wading, and the 3d Battalion on the right employing the Engineer footbridge until the span was destroyed. Thereafter elements of 3d Battalion were forced to detour upstream using the same route as the 1st Battalion. Each battalion succeeded in advancing two companies across the river under cover of darkness and a coordinated attack was launched at 0520 behind a protective smoke screen. During the early morning hours enemy resistance was limited to small arms and machine gun fire, but as the day wore on 105mm and 155mm artillery began falling in the Estuary area. By noon assault units had succeeded in penetrating only 150 yards into the enemy's defenses and the volume of fire, both artillery and small arms, increased steadily. Under heavy covering fire each assault battalion was able to cross its reserve company and as the afternoon wore on the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, gained momentum and drove inland about 350 yards. Our bridgehead measured over 1400 yards by darkness, and the two battalions dug in for the night under continuous enemy fire.

During the night of 10-11 May front line troops underwent minor infiltration and the 6th Engineer Battalion initiated construction of a Bailey bridge across the ASA KAWA Estuary. Enemy artillery impeded the bridging operation, 15cm shells falling in the Estuary area throughout the night. At dawn, as the bridge site became visible to the enemy, the artillery shelling increased in intensity. Despite this fact, the bridging effort was successfully concluded and the bridge was open to traffic by 1130. For further details see Annex F, Special Action Report, 6th Engineer Battalion.

The 22d Marines launched its attack at 0700 and advanced slowly against a stubborn and well organized defensive system built around machine guns and mortars in well concealed cave positions. In the early afternoon the advance of the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, on the left was held up by a formidable coral hill formation in 7573 E. (see Appendix 1) Attempts to seize the high ground from either flank failed and the battalion delayed its attack to permit heavy shelling by the main battery of the INDIANAPOLIS. Upon conclusion of this bombardment the battalion moved forward under cover of tanks which had crossed the recently completed Bailey bridge, and succeeded in reducing the position with demolitions and flame throwers after bitter close-in fighting. The hill, upon inspection, proved to have

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been a key element of the ASA KAWA defense, and contained an extensive headquarters and supply installation within a network of tunnels and caves.

In order to maintain momentum of the advance the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, was committed on the regiment's left and advanced slowly during the day, conforming in its movements with the 1st Battalion, which bore the brunt of the fighting. The 3d Battalion engaged in a particularly bitter three hour fight in capturing the precipitous cliff area on the regiment's right.

By 1800 the regiment had taken 700-1000 yards of strongly defended enemy territory, with mopping up continuing into the evening. The Bailey bridge which had been completed in the forenoon under continuous enemy artillery interdiction and sniper fire provided a strong link in the logistic chain required to maintain the momentum of the advance.

On 12 May resistance to the advance of the 22d Marines continued undiminished. On the right the 3d Battalion moved slowly forward in the face of stubborn resistance from tombs and crevices in the rocky cliffs in its zone. The 1st Battalion in the center, making the regiment's main effort, was under constant and heavy machine gun fire from concealed positions on the high ground to its front. (see Appendix 1) On the left the 2d Battalion advanced very slowly, receiving continuous small arms and mortar fire from the dominating terrain standing between the Division's left flank and the SHURI hill mass. This was the forerunner of a situation which was to have serious and continuing influence on the operations of the Division for the difficult two weeks to follow. The observation afforded the enemy emplaced on the western slopes of the SHURI massif made it possible for him to direct fire with great effect on the left of advancing 6th Division troops. The 1st Marine Division, in whose zone the troublesome area lay, was unable to advance abreast the 6th Division because of extremely heavy resistance encountered in the WANA DRAW, 1000 yards to the northeast of our left flank.

During the day's advance, which was closely supported by tanks, a large number of enemy mines were encountered resulting in the destruction of 3 tanks. Excellent direct fire support was provided by elements of the Armored Amphibian Group, which covered the attack from the reef at the mouth of the ASA KAWA Estuary.

In view of the heavy fighting undergone by the 22d Marines during the preceding 3 days, it was considered advisable in order to continue the momentum of the attack, to commit additional elements of the Division. Accordingly the 3d Battalion, 29th Marines, was moved forward and attached to the 22d Marines at 1350 and was committed on the regiment's left at 1605 to assist in the night defense, prepared to resume the attack in the morning.

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Throughout the day and during the hours of darkness the enemy continued to shell the bridgehead area and front line troops.

During the night of 12-13 May an enemy counterlanding attempt was broken up by naval patrol craft and 40 Japs who managed to make their way ashore were killed by the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines.

On the morning of 13 May, the Division's attack was launched with the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines and the 3d Battalion, 29th Marines, in assault. The main effort was made on the left with the objective of seizing the high ground overlooking the upper reaches of the ASATO River. (see Appendix 1) Despite excellent artillery, naval gunfire and tank support the resistance encountered was intense and grew more determined as the day wore on. By the end of the day the two assault battalions had advanced between 200 and 300 yards in the face of heavy machine gun fire coming from the exposed left flank.

During the day the remainder of the 22d Marines pushed patrols into the village area immediately north of the ASATO River, preparatory to reconnaissance into NAHA proper. These patrols were met by stiff sniper opposition.

At the close of the day it was clear that the battle efficiency of the 22d Marines had been reduced in the difficult 2000 yard advance south of the ASA KAWA, during which period the regiment had suffered about 800 killed or wounded. Consequently plans were laid and troops disposed for the resumption of the attack on the 14th with the 29th Marines on the left making the main effort, and supported by the 22d Marines on the right. The 29th moved to assembly areas behind the front lines in the late afternoon. During the regiment's forward movement, front line elements were subjected to destructive artillery harassment.

The attack on 14 May was launched at 0730 to seize the high ground running generally along the north bank of the ASATO River within the Division zone of action. From early morning the resistance encountered was strong and well coordinated. In order to maintain the momentum of the advance of the 29th Marines on the left, a pocket of resistance at 7673 S was bypassed, but proved so troublesome that its immediate liquidation became necessary. By mid-afternoon the attack was deadlocked in close fighting in the vicinity of this pocket. 29th Marines forces were regrouped at about 1630 and the attack renewed to liquidate the strong enemy center of resistance. By nightfall the pocket had been compressed and partially neutralized but not completely wiped out. During the entire day's action assault units were under accurate mortar and long range interdictory machine gun fire coming from the vicinity of SHURI heights. In addition, movement was seriously impeded by continuous artillery fire of 75mm and 150mm caliber coming from the same direction. Troops

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dug in for the night on suitable defensive ground in the vicinity of the still troublesome pocket. During the progress of the day's fighting supporting tanks suffered heavily from enemy anti-tank mines which accounted for 7 vehicles.

The 22d Marines, attacking in coordination with the 29th Marines, encountered numerous stubborn light machine guns and sniper positions on its right, but succeeded in seizing about 1100 yards of the ASATO River bank. On the regiment's left however, the advance was slow and bitterly opposed. Casualties mounted as the day wore on, and by 1500 the attack was brought to a complete halt by a strongly defended and thoroughly organized terrain system centered about a precipitous rectangular hill which was promptly named "THE SUGAR LOAF".

THE BATTLE FOR SUGAR LOAF HILL

SUGAR LOAF HILL (see Appendix 2) is, in actuality, one member of a triangular system which formed the western anchor of the enemy's SHURI defense system. So long as this anchor remained in his possession the enemy had little to fear from a flanking move on the west by anything short of an amphibious landing. In consequence, the terrain system was organized in great strength. It will be seen from examining the map that the three elements of the SUGAR LOAF defense are mutually supporting. SUGAR LOAF HILL, as the apex of the triangle, overlooks the entire countryside. Its flanks and rear are well covered by extensive cave and tunnel positions in "HALF MOON HILL" and "THE HORSESHOE." (see Appendix 2) In addition, the sharp depression included within the HORSESHOE affords mortar positions which are almost inaccessible to any arm short of direct aimed rifle fire or hand grenades. Any attempt to capture SUGAR LOAF by flanking action from east or west is immediately exposed to flat trajectory fire from both of the supporting terrain features. Likewise, an attempt to reduce either the HORSESHOE or THE HALF MOON would be exposed to destructive well aimed fire from the SUGAR LOAF itself. In addition the three localities are connected by a network of tunnels and galleries, facilitating the covered movement of reserves. As a final factor in the strength of the position it will be seen that all sides of SUGAR LOAF HILL are precipitous, and there are no evident avenues of approach into the hill mass. For strategic location and tactical strength it is hard to conceive a more powerful position than the SUGAR LOAF terrain afforded. Added to all of the foregoing was the bitter fact that troops assaulting this position presented a clear target to enemy machine guns, mortars and artillery emplaced on the SHURI heights to their left and left rear.

Not yet recognizing the tremendous strategic importance of the SUGAR LOAF position the 22d Marines launched a combined tank-infantry assault on the hill in the late afternoon of the 14th. Tanks attempting to move around the east and west flanks of the

HILL were taken under severe 47mm fire and those that were not disabled were driven off. Troops of Company G drove up the north slope of the hill and were thrown back, in three successive tries, by heavy mortar fire coming from the HORSESHOE depression. Shortly after dark, Major J. L. COURTNEY, Executive Officer of the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, rallied the remaining 20 effectives of Company G. He supplemented this number with 26 more men from supply elements which had brought ammunition forward. With this group he launched a fourth attack on the hill under cover of darkness. Troops were instructed to move up the slopes of the hill in a line, upon reaching the top to throw hand grenades as rapidly as possible, and under the cover of the grenade explosions and supporting mortar fire to dig in furiously and hold the hill top. Major COURTNEY is reported by several survivors to have said, "The only way we can take the top of this hill is to make a Jap Banzai charge ourselves." Following this plan the troops successfully made their way to the crest of the Hill, threw their grenades and commenced digging in. Enemy mortar fire and infiltration gradually cut down the small force, until at dawn our foothold on the SUGAR LOAF had dwindled to one officer and 19 fatigued men.

May 15th developed the most bitter fighting in the history of the 22d Marines. The enemy could not afford to relinquish SUGAR LOAF HILL, and it was on this day that his determination to hold it began to make itself vigorously felt on the 6th Marine Division.

The attack was set for 0800, with naval and air preparations from 0630-0700 and an intense naval gunfire and artillery preparation commencing at How-hour. The 1st Battalion, 22d Marines on the right launched its attack on schedule. As the attack commenced the enemy laid down a heavy artillery and mortar concentration during which the battalion commander and all company commanders became casualties. Despite this bitter setback the battalion continued to move slowly down to the ASATO River within its zone.

The situation in the zone of the 2d Battalion, 22 Marines, making the main effort, was even more serious. At about 0730 the enemy launched another counterattack in the vicinity of SUGAR LOAF HILL, and the few Marines remaining on the hill were driven off. The pre-jump-off artillery barrage temporarily halted the counterattack but it soon regained momentum and by 0900 had spread over a 900-yard front, extending into the zone of the 29th Marines on the left. By 1315 the enemy effort, which was at least of battalion strength, had lost all of its momentum. The 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, had taken the brunt of the enemy counter-offensive and, in doing so had given up the ground immediately to the north of SUGAR LOAF HILL. The battalion, by virtue of fatigue and heavy casualties numbering 400 during the preceding three days, had lost its offensive capabilities and was replaced by the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, in the late afternoon.

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The 29th Marines meanwhile had attacked abreast of the 22d Marines in an effort to seize the HALF MOON segment of the SUGAR

LOAF defense system. (see Appendix 2) Fighting of the same bitter nature as encountered by the 22d Marines took place in the 29th Marines zone throughout the day, with both the 1st and 3d Battalions engaged. The troublesome pocket which had been by-passed on the preceding day was cleaned out and the advance moved slowly forward under heavy fire from the SHURI heights area. By late afternoon the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was fighting at grenade range in the valley fronting HALF MOON HILL. Throughout the day our tanks were employed in direct support of the infantry and came under heavy direct fire from enemy 15cm guns as they moved into the exposed ground around the base of SUGAR LOAF HILL.

The night of 15-16 May was characterized by enemy artillery and mortar interdiction along our entire front line. The day's attack involved, as on the preceding day, a coordinated effort by the 22d and 29th Marines to reduce the SUGAR LOAF-HALF MOON position.

The attack was launched at 0830. In the 22d Marines zone assault elements met vigorous opposition immediately upon moving out. The 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, was taken under continuous intense automatic weapons fire from positions on the edge of the town of TAKAMOTOJI. (see Appendix 2) The fact that this area had previously been quiet contributed to the growing presumption that the enemy was moving additional troops to bolster his left flank defense. By 1400 the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, on the left of the regimental zone had worked itself in position to again assault SUGAR LOAF HILL, and the attack was launched at about 1500 with strong tank and artillery support. The Battalion closed in rapidly, moving up the steep north slope of the barren hill in the face of mortar, grenade and automatic weapons fire. Our troops gained the high point of the hill several times and each time were engaged in bitter close-in fighting. As the struggle progressed the enemy in the SHURI area turned more and more weapons on the north slopes of the SUGAR LOAF causing heavy casualties. This fire, coming from our left rear, coupled with heavy fire from the positions supporting SUGAR LOAF, forced the battalion to withdraw to positions north of the hill for the night.

In the 29th Marines zone of action operations during the early part of the day raised hopes that the HALF MOON fraction of the SUGAR LOAF area would be reduced. Closely supported by tanks, troops had worked forward to the crest of HALF MOON Ridge by late afternoon, and at 1700 commenced digging in under intense mortar and artillery fire coming from the SHURI area. As the evening approached the volume of enemy fire grew so intense that even extensive smoking was unable to cover our troops in their effort to organize the ground held. Casualties were heavy, and shortly before dark the battalion withdrew from the exposed forward slopes to defensive positions on the high ground immediately to the northward.

This was the bitterest day of the OKINAWA campaign for the 6th Division. Two regiments had attacked with all the effort at their command and had been unsuccessful. Two facts were now clear beyond question: first, that the SUGAR LOAF defense had been greatly strengthened during the preceding 24 hours; and second, that the intense enemy fire from the Division's left and left rear would continue to be a serious threat until the SHURI area was reduced.

On the 17th the burden of the attack was carried by the 29th Marines since the bitter fighting of the preceding 8 days had reduced the offensive capabilities of the 22d Marines to a point where further effort was inadvisable. In an effort to neutralize the enemy's powerful defensive system, the jump-off was preceded by an intense combined arms bombardment, including 16" naval guns, 8" howitzers and 1000 pound bombs. Under a heavy and continuing artillery barrage and closely supported by tanks the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 29th Marines advanced slowly southward into the bowl of HALF MOON HILL. As this advance uncovered the eastern side of SUGAR LOAF HILL, E Company of the 2d Battalion, 29th Marines, commenced a flanking attack around the left of that key terrain feature.

The first effort was in the form of a wide movement attempting to employ the railroad cut (see Appendix 2) for cover. This proved unsuccessful because of fire received from the left flank by the troops as they moved into position. In a second effort the company attempted a close flanking attack around the left of the hill but it soon became apparent that the precipitous nature of this side of the hill made the chosen avenue of approach impracticable, and accordingly the attack was reoriented to move up the northeast slopes of the hill. E Company then worked its way slowly to the top of the hill through a barrage of heavy mortar fire from covered positions in the HORSESHOE. On reaching the crest the attacking force was struck by a heavy Banzai charge which drove them back off the hilltop. Quickly reorganizing, the company launched another attack and succeeded in gaining the crest again, only to be forced to withdraw in the face of another hand-to-hand Banzai, grenade, and bayonet charge. The same company, now fatigued and depleted, once more drove to the hill top and were thrown back a third time. At 1830, as darkness approached, the company found strength to assault the hill once again. Upon reaching the crest they were met again by an aggressive enemy counterattack. This time the effort was beaten off and the fatigued troops held their ground. In so doing, however, the company's ammunition supply was completely exhausted and casualties were so heavy that personnel could not be spared to assist in carrying wounded to the rear. Due to the difficulties of conducting supply and evacuation in the dark under continuous enemy fire, the company was ordered to withdraw for the night, and painfully relinquished the position on which 160 officers and men had been killed or wounded during the day.

At dusk the enemy attempted a bold reinforcement of SUGAR LOAF HILL, moving troops in the open. They were taken immediately under accurate time-on-target fire by 12 battalions of artillery. The enemy suffered heavy losses and the reinforcement threat was broken up.

The advances made by the 29th Marines during the day provided further left flank security for the Division, but the key objective, SUGAR LOAF HILL itself, remained to be taken.

On 18 May the 29th Marines launched its attack at 0830, determined to seize and hold the SUGAR LOAF locality. Tanks, working their way through mine fields and under heavy fire, attempted to move around both sides of the key position with little success. Six tanks were disabled by mines and enemy fire during the morning, but by 1000 it was considered that a combined tank-infantry effort at reducing the hill was feasible. Accordingly, D Company of the 2d Battalion, 29th Marines, conceived the plan of advancing one-half of the company around the right flank of the SUGAR LOAF under tank support and, as the enemy's attention was drawn to this group, to attempt a similar move close around the left flank of the hill, also with tank support. The effort was successful. One tank succeeded in making its way through the enemy fire to assist the enveloping force on the right. As the enemy directed his efforts against this threat, a similar force, likewise supported by one tank, struck the left flank of this position. After an hour of heavy fighting the company was in possession of the SUGAR LOAF and digging in under continuous mortar fire from the HORSESHOE. (see Appendix 2) In order to reduce the volume of fire coming from that area the 2d Battalion, 29th Marines, pressed F Company toward the enemy mortar positions, and upon reaching the lip of the HORSESHOE, engaged in a close-in grenade battle with enemy entrenched in the deep ravine. During the afternoon additional troops were fed into the line to the south of the SUGAR LOAF and dug in under heavy fire in a strong defensive line. Commencing at about 1900 enemy activity gradually increased in intensity, until by midnight it assumed the proportions of a counterattack. Normal barrage concentrations were fired again and again, but despite this fact many Japs worked their way into our lines, and close-in fighting continued throughout the night. Our lines held, however, and the morning of 19 May disclosed the SUGAR LOAF position to be still in our hands.

This brought to an end the SUGAR LOAF phase of the operation. In the 10 days following the crossing of the ASA KAWA the enemy's vital left flank anchor had been fractured, although not destroyed. Viewed in analytical retrospect it now appears probable that plans for evacuation of the compromised SHURI position were initiated by the enemy upon the loss of SUGAR LOAF. This signal victory, which subsequently proved of such great significance, came only at great cost to the 6th Division.

During the ten-day period up to and including the capture of the SUGAR LOAF position our losses numbered 2662 killed and wounded. In addition to this heavy drain, which came principally in the infantry, the front line regiments suffered the loss of 1289 men due to exhaustion, sickness, and combat fatigue.

2. SUGAR LOAF HILL TO THE KOKUBA RIVER

The preceding 7 days of bitter fighting had left the 29th Marines fatigued and depleted, and in order to maintain the momentum of the Division's attack the 4th Marines were moved into the fight. The day of the 19th was spent in accomplishing the relief which, because of the great volume of heavy fire and the enemy's excellent observation, was a hazardous and slow process. The relief was completed at 1430, with the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 4th Marines making preparations to resume the attack in the morning.

After a night under heavy and accurate artillery shelling, the regiment jumped off at 0800 with the upper reaches of the ASATO River as its objective (see Appendix 1). By enveloping action from the west the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, seized the high ground dominating the western half of the HORSESHOE, and thus was in a position to look down upon the enemy mortar installations which had previously caused so much damage during the battle for the SUGAR LOAF. Extremely heavy fighting took place on the left of the regimental zone as the 2d Battalion attempted to seize the forward slopes of the HALF MOON position. Infantry resistance in this area was strong, but the enemy's principal defensive strength rested in the well observed artillery and machine gun fire originating in the SHURI Hill mass, outside the Division zone of action. The battalion had advanced 200 yards, but was still short of the HALF MOON crest, and dug in under heavy fire.

Beginning at about 2130 the enemy launched a determined effort to retake ground lost during the day. The 3d Battalion on the right received the brunt of the attack, which was estimated to be in strength of one battalion, and was preceded by an intense 90mm mortar barrage. As soon as the attack struck our lines continuous naval illumination was begun and supporting artillery laid down intensive fire with 6 battalions on normal barrage concentrations. Despite this strong opposition the enemy pressed his attack stubbornly, and it was necessary for the 4th Marines to commit elements of the Regimental reserve to maintain the integrity of the 3d Battalion position. By about midnight the attack had been completely broken up. During the battle the regiment gave no ground and killed between 200 and 300 of the enemy at a cost of one killed and 19 wounded.

The 4th Marines continued the attack on 21 May to reach the

ASATO River line (see Appendix 1). The advance moved slowly forward under continuous enemy artillery and mortar fire, which was of greater intensity than at any previous time during the operation. A forward movement of about 250 yards was made on the right flank of the regiment, through the extensively tunneled low ground in the interior of the HORSESHOE. On the critical left flank however, our troops were held to negligible gains, while suffering heavy casualties from the intense artillery and mortar fire brought to bear by the enemy on all slopes exposed to the SHURI Heights area.

Thus, after 5 days of fighting the HALF MOON area on the Division's left still could not be held by our forces. Further, it was clear that the enemy power which prevented our holding this ground was centered in the SHURI area, a circumstance beyond the capabilities of the Division to cope with. In consequence, after an estimate of the situation, it was determined to establish a strong reverse slope defense on our left flank, making no further attempt to drive to the southeastward in the face of fire from the SHURI position, and to concentrate the Division's effort on a penetration to the south and southwest. Such a maneuver, it was believed, would to a great degree relieve our forces of the left flank menace, and at the same time permit a continuation of our envelopment of the enemy's western flank.

After a night in which the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, sustained a counterattack on its right flank, the regiment attacked at 0730, 22 May and advanced its front lines slowly to the north bank of the ASATO River in the face of the same sort of resistance encountered on the preceding day. In preparation for crossing the ASATO River the 4th Marines dispatched two patrols across the stream. They penetrated about 200 yards to the vicinity of the town of MACHISHI, receiving machine gun fire from their front and both flanks. At the same time a strong reverse slope defensive position was organized on the Division's left flank to provide security for the penetration to the southward. Operations during the day were complicated by continuous rain, and routes of communication throughout the Division area deteriorated steadily under the heavy traffic load.

During the night of 22-23 May, continuing reconnaissance reports indicated that it might be feasible to attempt a crossing of the ASATO without tank support, since movement of those vehicles had been rendered impossible by the continued rain. In consequence, the 4th Marines were ordered to intensify reconnaissance south of the ASATO on the early morning of 23 May, and if the resistance proved light to be prepared to execute the ASATO crossing.

Between dawn and 1000 patrols were pressed 400 yards south of the river line, all receiving moderate machine gun and rifle fire. Decision was made at 1000 to execute the ASATO crossing at 1200, with the 4th Marines moving two battalions by infiltra-

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tion across the stream. By 1330 assault companies of both battalions had waded the river under cover of smoke. Resistance, initially light, grew to moderate and then heavy as troops began their assault on the high ground west of MACHISHI (see Appendix 1). Enemy artillery which had been comparatively quiet during the early part of the day grew very active, and in conjunction with mortars and machine guns, emplaced on the high ground north of the KOKUBA Estuary (see Appendix 1), made the advance slow and costly. The remainder of the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 4th Marines infiltrated across the river during the afternoon. In order to support the advance, engineers undertook the construction of a vehicular crossing immediately north of MACHISHI. Engineer operations were carried on under continuous enemy artillery fire and the by-pass was completed by 1600. By dark, however, heavy traffic coupled with continuing rain rendered the makeshift crossing impassable and it was necessary to conduct all supply and evacuation by hand carry.

On the morning of 24 May the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, was moved to take over defense of the Division left flank in order to release the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines for continuation of the offensive effort to the southward.

Rain continued without interruption during the night of 23-24 May and impeded supply and evacuation so that even hand means were most difficult. In consequence, it was necessary to restrict the 4th Marines activity to vigorous patrolling to the southward during the day.

Since the impetus of the advance depended almost entirely upon establishment of vehicular crossings over the ASATO, the 6th Engineer Battalion labored without stop throughout the night of 23-24 May and during the entire day of 24 May to construct crossings over the river. An attempt was made during the night to install a makeshift bridge built on LVTs. The attempt was unsuccessful due to the large number of enemy mines encountered along the river bank. During the effort two LVTs were seriously damaged. At dawn work was commenced on a Bailey bridge. This structure was completed by 1430, and a tank by-pass was in operation before dusk. Both crossings were constructed under the most adverse terrain and weather conditions, and in the face of accurate enemy artillery shelling. (For further details see Annes H, 6th Engineer Battaion report).

The attack was resumed at 0730 on the 25th, and during the day succeeded in seizing the greater part of the north-south ridge line west of MACHISHI, in fighting that was seriously restricted by continuous rain and deep mud. Shortly after dusk intense enemy activity commenced in the front of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and by 2015 had developed into a counterattack of one company strength, which was thrown back after 45 minutes of close-in fighting.

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Concurrent with the activities of the 4th Marines in the eastern outskirts of NAHA, the 6th Reconnaissance Company moved across the ASATO near its mouth, and into the urban portion of NAHA west of the canal (see Appendix 1). This area was quickly cleared and the Reconnaissance Company dug in for the night holding their line against intermittent machine gun and mortar fire.

Rain throughout the night of 25-26 May made movement of any type of vehicle impossible on the primitive road net south of the ASATO. In consequence, the activity of the 4th Marines during this day was confined to patrolling. The Reconnaissance Company, however, pressed 300 yards farther into NAHA against light opposition. (see Appendix 1)

During the day of 26 May and the following night, evidence grew that the enemy might be executing a withdrawal along the entire 10th Army front. In order to determine to what extent this was true in the 6th Division zone, vigorous patrols were initiated prior to dawn. One company of the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, moved across the ASATO, passed through the Reconnaissance Company, and pressed well into urban NAHA, receiving rifle and knee mortar fire. Concurrently, patrols from the 4th Marines moved between 200 and 300 yards forward of our front lines under machine gun and knee mortar fire. In order to take advantage of what at this point appeared to be enemy weakness, the 22d Marines held half of the NAHA area west of the canal (see Appendix 1), and the 4th Marines were abreast in the eastern outskirts of the city, where numerous sniper positions were encountered in tombs and ruined buildings.

At this time the 4th Marines, having completed 10 days in the line, were in need of rest, and the 29th Marines were alerted and preparations made for effecting a relief to commence at 0630, 28 May.

On 28 May, the 22d Marines moved out before daylight and, meeting light resistance consisting of machine gun and knee mortars, advanced southward to the bank of the KOKUBA Estuary, completing capture of urban NAHA west of the canal prior to 1000. An attempt to reconnoiter ONO YAMA Island was unsuccessful due to heavy fire received from the high ground south of the KOKUBA River.

Commencing at daylight, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 29th Marines relieved left elements of the 4th Marines while the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, effected a passage of lines through the right of the 4th Marines under continuous small arms fire. That battalion advanced slowly southward against determined opposition, in an effort to maintain contact with the 22d Marines on its right. At the end of the day the battalion had advanced to within about 800 yards of the KOKUBA River (see Appendix 1).

The Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of defending the NAHA area west of the canal in order to release

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the 22d Marines for further offensive action to the eastward. It was considered that two regiments would be required for this effort, since the difficulty with which the 29th Marines had advanced during the day left little doubt that the high ground immediately north of the KOKUBA Estuary was still held in strength.

Completion of the occupation of NAHA proper was a significant landmark in the Division's southward advance, since it secured the west flank and permitted a reorientation in an east and southeasterly direction, in conformity with the scheme of maneuver which had been conceived on 20 May when the wisdom of avoiding the heavy fire from the SHURI area had become apparent.

Prior to dawn on 29 May the 22d Marines executed the Division's third opposed river crossing in a space of 20 days. Under cover of darkness the 1st Battalion crossed the NAHA canal at three points, utilizing footbridges constructed by the 6th Engineer Battalion during the night. Upon reaching the east bank the battalion reorganized and launched its attack at 0530, advancing about 400 yards prior to noon. The 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, followed closely behind the 1st Battalion, and in the afternoon both units were in the vicinity of Hill 27 (see Appendix 1). Resistance was stubborn, and darkness found the majority of the high ground still in enemy hands.

The 29th Marines made its main effort on the right during the day, gradually swinging its front to the eastward in conformity with the 22d Marines. As in the case of the 22d Marines, the advance during the afternoon was slowed by mounting resistance. At dark the regiment was generally abreast of the 22d Marines on its right, and was also heavily engaged.

On the 30th, in a day characterized by torrential rains, the 22d and 29th Marines pressed the Division's attack to the eastward in an effort to clear the north bank of the KOKUBA River. Heavy enemy resistance, built around a framework of machine guns located in tombs, was rendered even more effective by our inability to employ armored vehicles for the greater part of the day. In the late afternoon 3 tanks were able to reach positions on the road north of Hill 27 (see Appendix 1) and rendered effective fire in support of the 22d Marines. At the end of the day assault regiments had advanced about 800 yards and were in possession of the key high ground overlooking the KOKUBA River from the north.

On 31 May the two regiments jumped off at 0730 and moved rapidly forward for several hundred yards before resistance suddenly intensified. The strong enemy defense was centered around Hill 46 and the high ground west of SHICHINA. This position, which dominated the surrounding area, held up the advance until 14 tanks were moved forward to supporting positions. A coordinated attack, launched at 1300 in the face of intense mortar and machine gun fire, resulted in a gain of about 400 yards, but by late afternoon our front lines were still short of the key Hill 46 position although there was some

evidence that the defense was weakening. The enemy area was heavily shelled before dark and kept under constant pounding throughout the night.

The heavy pressure brought to bear by our forces on 31 May resulted in swift collapse of the Hill 46 position on the morning of 1 June. The assault regiments broke through the SHICHINA area and seized the line of the north fork of the KOKUBA River and Hill 98 by late afternoon. (see Appendix 1) Patrols were immediately sent across the north fork of the KOKUBA, meeting only sniper fire.

In the early evening verbal instructions were received from the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps to study the practicability of a shore-to-shore landing on the OROKU Peninsula. Plans were immediately laid for an amphibious reconnaissance, employing the 6th Reconnaissance Company, which moved out at 2100 in plastic boats. The reconnaissance was completed by 0300, 2 June, disclosing that the northern part of the Peninsula was occupied and that there was considerable activity in the high ground north and east of the NAHA airfield. The Reconnaissance Company Commander estimated that the northern OROKU area was occupied but not in great strength.

By noon on 2 June final instructions had been received for the OROKU landing, and detailed planning commenced. These preparations continued through 3 June, during which period landing craft were assembled (72 LVTs, 6 LCTs, 6 LCMs) and an order issued for the assault landing.

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THE BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSULA

The tactics underlying the OROKU Operation were twofold; first, to maintain the ever increasing threat to the enemy's west flank; and second, to free NAHA Harbor and seize NAHA Airdrome for base development operations.

Examination of the Peninsula problem indicated three general schemes which might be followed for an amphibious landing:

1. To move directly across the KOKUBA Estuary near its narrow mouth, and to capture the high ground looking down into NAHA proper.

2. To land on the NISHIKOKU beaches and drive southward generally astride the high ground in the center of the Peninsula.

3. To move well out to sea, and making the approach

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in a northeasterly direction, to land on the west coast of the Peninsula, immediately south of the NAHA Airfield.

The first and third schemes both suffered from an important drawback in the fact that a high seawall fronted the beach and would require extensive breaching operations. Likewise, execution of the first scheme would involve preparation for the landing under direct observation of the enemy entrenched in the high ground south of the KOKUBA Estuary. The second sheme offered the best beaches and oriented the attack in a direction which lent itself well to artillery support. Accordingly, this plan was selected.

It was determined, mainly because of shortage of amphibious craft, to land the Division in a column of regiments, with the 4th Marines in assault, and to drive rapidly inland with that regiment to seize the dominating terrain in the vicinity of KAGAMISUI, in order to provide cover for movement of the remainder of the Division ashore.

Since continued supply by amphibious means was not feasible it was determined to seize ONO YAMA Island concurrently with the main landing, and to install bridges from NAHA to the island, and from the island to OROKU Peninsula, at the earliest possible time in order that the Peninsula operation might receive adequate logistical support. The 6th Reconnaissance Company, reinforced with a company of armored amphibians, was set up as the task force for this mission.

Logistical preparations for the landing were rendered extremely difficult by the complete breakdown of road communications resulting from the continuous rain. In consequence, all movement had to be by water. Even the Divison command post, displacing to a forward location in the vicinity of AMIKE (see Appendix 1), was required to effect the displacement entirely by DUKW. Despite all of the difficulties interposed, the Division had completed all preparations for the operation by 2300 on 3 June.

Embarkation of personnel and equipment was executed under cover of darkness without event, and the southward movement of troop carrying LVTs, led by a wave of armored amphibians, proceeded according to plan. Prior to the landing an intensive naval and artillery preparation was laid down. During the period from 0445 to 0545 over 4300 rounds of high explosive ammunition, varying in size from 75mm to 14", were placed on the high ground immediately fronting the NISHIKOKU beaches.

Leading waves reached the beach at 0551 under intermittent machine gun and 20mm fire, and by 0650 24 tanks and 4 M7s were ashore, and moving inland to support the attack. By 0730 the two assault battalions had seized a 900 yard beachhead and were

advancing slowly in the face of machine gun, knee mortar and 20mm fire which appeared to be gaining in intensity. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was landed at 0900, and was committed on the right flank where reverse slope machine gun positions were holding up the advance.

By 1000 it was considered that the bridgehead was of sufficient size to warrant landing of a second regiment; accordingly the 29th Marines was ordered embarked immediately near the mouth of the ASATO River. Two battalions were quickly transported to the OROKU area and moved into the line on the left of the 4th Marines on the Peninsula.

Concurrent with the dawn landing of the 4th Marines, the 6th Reconnaissance Company embarked on and supported by vehicles of the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (USA) executed a landing on ONO YAMA Island. The island was secured by 0600 after about 25 Japs had been killed. Preparations were immediately begun for covering bridging operations between NAHA and OROKU. Bridge construction commenced in the early afternoon under continuous enemy automatic weapons fire, and by 1845 a Bailey bridge was completed between NAHA and ONO YAMA. Meanwhile pneumatic pontons were made ready for spanning the broad estuary between ONO YAMA and OROKU, but their emplacement was rendered impracticable by enemy machine gun fire which, it was feared, would puncture the pontons.

Several noteworthy factors developed during the day's operations. First was a strong indication that the enemy's defense was very heavy in automatic weapons, ranging from light machine guns through 40mm cannon. The reason assigned for this was the proximity of the defense force to NAHA Airfield where, it later developed, many damaged aircraft had been stripped of all of the automatic weapons. These weapons were integrated into the ground defense system, and subsequently formed a strong element of the OROKU defense.

Another interesting characteristic of the first day of the OROKU operation was the manner in which wire communication was established with assault regiments. At 0900 a four-trunk cable which had been spotted at the NAHA lighthouse on the preceding day was carried across the mouth of NAHA Harbor in rubber boats. It was overheaded on the mast of a sunken ship and by 1100 direct wire communication was in operation.

During the ensuing night the entire front was under intermittent mortar and spigot mortar fire of such volume as to indicate that the defenders were well equipped with these weapons.

The attack on 5 June was launched at 0730. Troops advanced slowly against stubborn resistance which was generally uniform along the front until about noon, at which time advance of the

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3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was stopped by an enemy strongpoint located in the vicinity of TOMA (see Appendix 3). The strongpoint was overrun in the late afternoon.

The 29th Marines met resistance of a similar nature to that encountered by the 4th Marines and at 1400 were heavily engaged with a strong center of resistance in the vicinity of Hill 57 (see Appendix 2), which locality was also delaying the advance of left elements of the 4th Marines.

By dark the Division's beachhead had been deepened by about 1000 yards and NAHA Airdrome was 90% in our hands.

The 300 foot pneumatic ponton bridge between ONO YAMA and OROKU was floated into position during the afternoon. Despite enemy machine gun fire coming from the vicinity of OROKU Town, the installation was completed and the bridge placed in operation by dark, thus permitting vehicular transportation to move across the Estuary.

Operations on 6 June developed the fact that the major enemy defenses were centered along the axial ridge line running northwest and southeast along the length of the Peninsula. Both the 4th and 29th Marines were held up in this area by stiff resistance from many automatic weapons, mortars and rocket bombs concealed in elaborate emplacements. The 4th Marines found progress least difficult on its right, and consequently every effort was made to drive to the southward in order to place the regiment on the flank of the strong enemy defense. The troublesome enemy position in the vicinity of Hill 57 encountered during the preceding day was subjected to a coordinated attack by both regiments. Despite the fact that armored support was badly needed it was necessary to conduct the attack without tank assistance, because of extremely adverse terrain conditions. Fields were muddy, and roads had been extensively cratered by the enemy and were heavily mined. As the day's fighting drew to an end, the Hill 57 strongpoint still held out and our troops dug in, preparing for another coordinated attack the following day.

It will be seen from inspection of Appendix 1 that the boundary between the 6th and 1st Marine Divisons passed through the base of the OROKU Peninsula, and in consequence as the 1st Division advanced to the southward its right flank was left unguarded. In order to remedy this situation the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, released the 22d Marines (until this time held in Corps Reserve) to the Commanding General, 6th Marine Division, with instructions that the regiment be used to protect the right flank of the 1st Division. Accordingly, the 22d Marines was moved across the KOKUBA Estuary and into the area near the base of the OROKU Peninsula. (see Appendix 1).

Heavy opposition continued during the entire day of 7 June. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that the 4th Marines' right

flank which had advanced against light opposition on the preceding afternoon was confronted by a stong defense in the vicinity of the town of GUSHI, giving rise to the deduction that reinforcements had probably been moved to this sector to protect the enemy's vulnerable western flank. The 29th Marines continued to meet stiff resistance from caves concealed in the rocky outcroppings of the coastal ridge and were able finally to work 37mm guns by hand to commanding locations on the ridge from which point effective fire support was delivered.

In the late afternoon, following intensive mine clearing efforts on the part of the 6th Engineer Battalion, 3 platoons of tanks were able to work forward to support the 4th Marines in its attack on Hill 57. The hill was finally captured in the late afternoon.

Along the boundary between divisions, the 22d Marines conducted patrols into the high ground immediately east of CHIKUTO (see Appendix 1). Heavy machine gun fire was received by all patrols. Having fixed the location of the enemy in this vicinity the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, moved two companies to attack the high ground, which was overrun in the late afternoon, thus providing a considerable measure of security for the advance of the 1st Marine Division. Having reduced the commanding ground east of CHIKUTO the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, continued to move to the southwestward where heavy fire was received from the vicinity of Hill 69 (see Appendix 3).

Early on the morning of 8 June the 4th Marines moved the 1st Battalion into positions on its extreme right flank under a protective smoke concentration. This battalion jumped off at 0730 to seize the high ground immediately south of the town of UIBARU (see Appendix 3). Bitter fighting continued throughout the day, and by late afternoon our troops were in possession of the high ground. On the remainder of the 4th Marines front the heaviest fighting occurred in the vicinity of Hill 38, northeast of TAKAMIYA, where every attempt to advance around the flanks of that hill was met by heavy fire from supporting automatic weapons positions. Consequently, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, contrived the scheme of moving assault elements through the extensive tunnel system in Hill 38, thus making their approach through, rather than over and around, the hill. This technique proved highly successful, and was employed on two other occasions during the day. On the left of the Division zone the 29th Marines made very slow progress, and developed further the already apparent fact that the logical avenues of approach into the enemy's powerful mountain positions were from the south and southwest.

In exploitation of this fact, the 22d Marines moved one battalion to capture Hill 69 south of ZAHANA (see Appendix 1) thus gradually orienting the power of that regiment in a northerly

direction. By 1500 one company from the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, had patrolled to the west coast across the ITOMAN Airfield site, encountering no resistance.

On 9 June the Division continued to concentrate its power in an encircling move to compress the enemy force into the southeastern end of the OROKU Peninsula. The 22d Marines attacked to the northward and captured Hills 28 and 55 south and southeast of CHIWA. Meanwhile the 4th Marines drove eastward and seized the key Hill 47 position directly north of CHIWA. In the late afternoon 4th Marines' patrols cleaned out the town of CHIWA and contact with the 22d Marines was established, thus sealing off any possibility of the enemy escaping from the OROKU area to the southward. The day's attack was strongly supported by tanks and flamethrower tanks which suffered heavy damage from both mines and antitank weapons.

It is of significance at this point to observe that at no time during the OKINAWA Operation to date had the 6th Division encountered enemy mine fields to the extent in which they were present on OROKU. All fields were carefully laid and many were supported by automatic weapons strong points. This fact, coupled with the extensive road demolitions executed throughout the Peninsula, rendered all armored support extremely difficult.

During the night the 6th Reconnaissance Company executed a reef and beach reconnaissance of SENAGA SHIMA to determine the feasibility of landing on that island. Landing conditions were found to be satisfactory and no enemy activity was detected.

On 10 June concerted pressure was brought to bear on the enemy position from the north, west and south, with the 4th Marines pressing eastward to seize Hills 55 and 58, the 22d Marines driving northeastward toward TOMIGUSUKI while the 29th Marines moved slowly through the town of OROKU following flamethrower tanks. The advance in the zones of the 4th and 22d Regiments was slow, but steady. The 29th continued to meet stubborn resistance, and made only limited advances.

During the succeeding night evidence of the extreme pressure to which the enemy had been subjected came in a series of local counterattacks all along the front. The heaviest, in the sector of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, continued during the greater part of the night. After daylight over 200 dead Japs were counted.

At 0730 on the 11th a powerful attack was launched employing the greater part of 8 battalions in an effort to crack through the enemy resistance, which up to this point had continued without faltering. The 4th Marines worked slowly forward between Hill 58 and TOMIGUSUKI (see Appendix 3) into a heavily held pocket covered by mutually supporting machine guns and 20mm anti-aircraft cannon. As tanks were brought forward to assist in the advance, several cleverly concealed mine fields were

encountered. Their removal was rendered most diffibult by covering automatic weapons which prevented engineer personnel from lifting the mines. A lane was finally cleared by engineers working under direct fire, and tanks moved forward to assist in reducing the pocket. Meanwhile the 22d Marines moved off under an intense artillery preparation to seize Hill 62, east of TOMIGUSUKI. The initial impetus of the advance was not sufficient to carry across the hill and about noon the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, launched a second attack to seize the hilltop while the 3d Battalion prepared to pass through and continue the attack to Hill 53 as soon as Hill 62 was secured. By 1330 Hill 62 area was overrun, and by late afternoon troops of the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, were on Hill 53, the high ground overlooking not only the KOKUBA Estuary but the entire OROKU area to the northward where the 29th Marines were having great difficulty. The 29th Regiment attacked repeatedly throughout the day in the high ground west of OROKU Town, but made only limited advances through the heavily held series of small mutually supporting hill localities.

12 June marked the first real break in the enemy's stubborn and well coordinated defense. During this day our converging forces compressed the enemy pocket west of TOMIGUSUKI, while the 22d Marines drove further to the northward in the direction of OROKU Town which had held up the advance for over a week. As this key terrain locality came into our possession the enemy was forced into the open in the flat paddie land along the coast between OROKU and Hill 53. In the late afternoon enemy troops commenced displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loudspeaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to do so. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laying down their arms.

A final sweep of the remaining enemy held area was completed on 13 June, with the 29th Marines engaging in a bitter last ditch fight with an estimated company of Japs firmly entrenched in EASY Hill, immediately south of OROKU Town. The final drive of the assault forces across the flat coastal area was unique in that certain of the enemy resisted bitterly and had to be attacked and destroyed in conventional fashion, while some offered no resistance. Others killed themselves, while still others surrendered voluntarily. During the day 861 Japs were killed and 73 prisoners taken.

At 1200 orders were issued the 6th Reconnaissance Company to seize the island of SENAGA SHIMA at 0500, 14 June. All preparations were completed in the afternoon for a movement across the reef supported by armored amphibians. The island, which had been subjected to heavy bombardment during the preceding four days, was kept under continuing interdiction throughout the night.

The attack on SENAGA SHIMA was launched according to plan at 0500 on the 14th. No resistance was encountered. During the day the island was combed and 5 4.7" coast defense guns were found as well as several mine fields. Two Japs were killed. Meanwhile mopping up operations were initiated on OROKU Peninsula where small pockets of enemy continued to be liquidated, and captives taken from caves.

Operations of 14 May marked the completion of the OROKU Operation which brought into our possession the important NAHA Airfield and NAHA Harbor. The ten-day battle was a bitter one, from its inception to the destruction of the last organized center of resistance. The enemy had taken full advantage of the terrain which adapted itself extraordinarily well to a deliberate defense in depth. The rugged coral outcroppings and the many small precipitous hills had obviously been organized for defense over a long period of time. Cave and tunnel systems of a most elaborate nature had been cut into each terrain feature of importance, and heavy weapons were strategically sited for defense against attack from any direction.

Despite the powerful conv rging attack of three regiments, the advance had been slow, laborious and bitterly opposed. The capture of each defensive locality was a problem in itself, involving carefully thought out planning and painstaking execution. During the 10 days of heavy fighting almost 5,000 Japs were killed, and prisoners numbered nearly 200. These successes were, however, not without cost. Thirty tanks were disabled, many by the complex system of cunningly laid and well protected mine fields. One tank was destroyed by two direct hits from an 8" naval gun fired at point blank range. Finally, 1608 Marines were killed or wounded.

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CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PENINSULA

During the following two days mopping up in the OROKU area continued, concurrent with preparations for commitment of the Division on the southern front. Plans were laid for the 22d Marines to pass through elements of the 7th Marines and to attack southward on the right flank of the Corps on 17 June.

As the Division prepared to take an active part in the final drive to the south coast the 1st Marine Division, responsible for the west zone of the 10th Army front, was heavily engaged along the KUNISHI Ridge. (see Appendix 1) Advance elements were on the reverse slope of the KUNISHI Ridge and were suffering from serious supply and evacuation difficulties because of the heavy enemy fire which was brought on the valley between TERA and KUNISHI whenever vehicles appeared in that area. All movement had to be effected under cover of darkness with emergency supply by aircraft, and evacuation in tanks. This was the situation which existed on 16

June when the 22d Marines prepared to pass through the 7th Marines.

The passage of lines was begun at 0300, 17 June. It proceeded without event and the regiment continued its forward movement under cover of darkness. By dawn front line elements had advanced to positions on the northern slope of MEZADO Ridge, prepared to attack at 0730 in coordination with the 1st Division on the left.

The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery, naval gunfire and air attack on the MEZADO Ridge, Hill 69 and the KUWANGA Ridge. (see Appendix 1) The regiment moved out at 0730, with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast, working slowly up the northern slope of MEZADO Ridge. Resistance consisted of machine gun and intermittent mortar fire. Tanks were moved across the reef around the Regiment's right flank and were able to support the attack firing into caves on the western tip of MEZADO Ridge during the day. By noon the highest peak of the ridge had been secured by the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines. The 1st Battalion, however, was held up by heavy machine gun fire on the reverse slope of the hill mass. The 3d Battalion, maintaining its momentum, cleaned out the town of MEZADO and by late afternoon had captured the key high ground around Hill 69, overlooking KUWANGA Ridge.

Preparations were made during the night to pass the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, through the 3d Battalion which had borne the main effort during the day, thus maintaining a maximum of pressure on the enemy. The passage of lines was planned to take place prior to dawn but enemy activity immediately in front of the 3d Battalion lines increased steadily during the early morning hours, and it was necessary for the 3d Battalion to reduce the strong pocket of resistance immediately south of Hill 69 before the passage of lines could be effected.

The 2d Battalion finally launched its attack at 0700 and advanced rapidly to KUWANGA Ridge against steady automatic weapons fire. By noon the battalion had a foothold on the high ground, and commenced simultaneous drives to the west and east to clear the ridge of enemy resistance. Both advances were opposed by rifle, machine gun and mortar fire but by late afternoon the greater portion of the ridge was in our hands. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion spent an active day in cleaning out hidden enemy pockets in the MEZADO area. In this connection a most unfortunate and bitter blow was sustained by the Division when, at about noon Colonel H. C. ROBERTS, Commanding Officer of the 22d Marines, while moving forward through the MEZADO area to inspect the progress of his regiment's attack, was shot through the heart by a sniper.

The KUWANGA Ridge is 1800 yards long and it became apparent in the early afternoon that a proper defense of this area was beyond the capabilities of the depleted 2d Battalion, 22d Marines.

Accordingly, at 1345 orders were issued to the 4th Marines to move one battalion into the line on the left of the Division zone to strengthen the night defense in the KUWANGA area. By 1600 the battalion was in position, and in visual contact with the 1st Marine Division on the left.

In order that the forward movement of the Division would not be impeded by mopping up operations in the areas seized during the preceding two days, it was determined to continue the attack on 19 June with the 4th Marines, leaving the 22d Marines to continue cleaning out the area recently captured. The 4th Marines moved out at 0800 with the 3d and 1st Battalions abreast, and before noon the IBARU Ridge (see Appendix 1) was in our hands. Resistance during the morning was not heavy. Immediately upon reorganizing on the IBARU Ridge, the regiment attacked to the southward again in conjunction with the 1st Marine Division on the left, and as troops moved into the low ground between IBARU and the KIYAMU-GUSUKU hill mass they came under small arms and knee mortar fire. As advance elements drew closer to the base of the KIYAMU-GUSUKU ridge, mortar fire grew in intensity, coming from defiladed positions behind the ridge line. Machine gun fire also increased sharply in volume in the late afternoon when assault troops commenced movement up the slopes of the KIYAMU-GUSUKU ridge. Prior to darkness a foothold had been gained on the high plateau but the key terrain remained in enemy hands. During the day masses of civilians attempting to move northward interfered with front line units and temporarily restricted tank activities.

At 1600 a prisoner of war reported that an enemy force of about 20 was entrenched on the small island just to the seaward of the town of NAGUSUKU (see Appendix 1) and that the group was armed with mortars and light machine guns. Following an intense concentration laid down by M7s, 5 Japs waded to the mainland and surrendered. One prisoner of war was sent back to persuade the remainder to give themselves up but without success. Within the ensuing 30 minutes a force consisting of 3 LVTs, 2 37mm platoons and the 1st Marine War Dog Platoon, was assembled and moved on the island. By 1840 the island was secured, with 20 Japs killed and 3 additional prisoners taken.

As the 4th Marines had committed all battalions in the day's attack, it was determined that additional forces were required to complete the destruction of the enemy now pocketed in about 5000 square yards in the southern extremity of our zone. Accordingly, the 29th Marines, which had commenced displacement to forward assembly positions earlier in the day, were directed to move with all dispatch and attack to the southward abreast of the 4th Marines. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines moved south from KUWANGA ridge at 1700, followed an hour later by the 2d Battalion. The advance was rapid, resistance being light, and by dark both battalions were abreast of the 4th Marines and commenced digging in for the night.

On 20 June the attack was launched at 0700 to seize the last remaining terrain feature of importance in the 6th Division zone. The 4th Marines on the left, making the main effort, came immediately under heavy and sustained small arms and mortar fire from the KIYAMU-GUSUKU ridge. The precipitous nature of this hill mass rendered approach from either the front or flanks most difficult. Deep fissures and large boulders offered excellent cover for the stubborn last ditch defense. After a day of bitter fighting the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, had succeeded in working two companies on to the Hill 80 peak but the remainder of the enemy position still held out. The 29th Marines on the Division right advanced to the south coast against little opposition, except on their left flank where long range fire was received from the KIYAMU-GUSUKU area.

Indications during the day gave rise to the opinion that a surrender effort might prove fruitful at this stage of the campaign. Accordingly, an LCI, equipped with a loudspeaker, was dispatched to the southern coast and commenced propaganda intended to coerce the enemy to cease resistance. The attempt was eminently successful, resulting in the surrender of 715 Japanese officers and men.

Since attacks from the front and flanks on the KIYAMU-GUSUKU position had met with very little success, it was determined to strike the position from the rear. The 4th Marines, therefore, on the morning of 21 June moved elements of its two flank battalions to the southward, swung their axes of advance back toward the rear of the position, and struck it in a coordinated double envelopment at about 0800. Sharp fighting ensued, but within two hours the enemy position had been overrun.

At 1027 on 21 June all organized resistance in the 6th Marine Division zone of action ceased, in the 82d day of a campaign during which the Division was actively engaged for 69.

The results of the OKINAWA Operation in statistical terms will be found tabulated in Chapter V below. Those statistics, however, revealing as they are, do not describe completely the far reaching results of the Division's part in the 82-day campaign. The killing of 23,000 Japs was undoubtedly of considerable importance, as was the capture of 3,500 more. The seizure of key localities; NAHA Airfield, YONTAN Airfield, NAHA Harbor, likewise have their significance, but more important still was the Division's part in proving our superiority over the Japanese in operations on his native soil which had been well prepared for defense, and further that when confronted with an aggressive, well trained adversary who refuses to accept anything short of complete success, he fails to bear out the reputation which he gained in the early years of the war.

The Division proved that even the most powerful defensive locality may be reduced by a determined attack wherein maneuver is the dominating factor, that if pressure is aggressively and

relentlessly applied, employing all of the combined arms to the fullest, the Jap will not stand up to the pounding and in exactly the same manner as any other animal whose spirit is broken, loses his aggressive character and becomes easy prey to our arms.

Section 1 - Shore Party

1. During Phase III of the OKINAWA Operation the 6th Marine Division Shore Party was under operational control of the III Phib Corps Service Group and operated on the original landing beaches. It is evident that under these conditions the tactical situation had no effect upon the functioning of the Shore Party.

2. During the period the various units attached to the Pioneer Battalion were detached so that on 17 May, the date on which the replacement drafts were disbanded, the 6th Division Shore Party in essence consisted wholly of the 6th Pioneer Battalion reinforced by some elements of the 6th JASCO.

3. A complete report of Shore Party operations during the reportable period may be found in Annex G to this report, Special Action Report of the 6th Pioneer Battalion. A brief condensation of this report is given below.

4. Shore Party activities were confined entirely on and adjacent to Beach Green One with one exception. Company C of the 6th Pioneer Battalion operated beaches under various control agencies at NAGO, ATSUDA and MACHINATO in succession. This company unloaded approximately 7300 tons of cargo during the reportable period. A summary of cargo unloaded by the battalion, less Company C, is given in the table below:

PERIOD	*DW TONS	PERS	VEH
30 April - 6 May	11,416	1103	418
7 May - 13 May	15,298	869	630
14 May - 20 May	13,847	1293	217
21 May - 27 May	1,656	0	51
28 May - 30 May	0	0	0
TOTALS	42,217	3265	1316

*Does not include DW Tons of vehicles landed.

5. The problems encountered on the various beaches were typical of this stage of Shore Party operations, and no recommendations other than those already made in the previous report are deemed necessary at this time. However, it should be reiterated that a Marine Division Shore Party is not designed or organized to function for extended periods of time as a garrison or resupply agency.

Section 2 - Naval Gunfire Support

1. Naval gunfire support during Phase III of the OKINAWA Campaign consisted of heavy pre-attack bombardments of known enemy strong points and artillery installations as well as normal call fires, illumination, and harassing fires.

Section 3 - Air Support

1. During Phase III air support proved to be of great value in attacking enemy troop and supply columns, and in destroying strongpoints on reverse slopes after extensive destructive fires had been laid on the forward slopes by artillery.

2. As Phase III progressed a marked increase was noted in the number of aircraft available. In consequence planes were employed in sufficient numbers to have a palpable effect on the progress of the operation. Planes were also prompt in arriving on station which greatly facilitated coordination with the other supporting arms.

3. Air support proved of great value against targets of opportunity in addition to the conventional support missions. In the field of opportunity targets, much effective bombing was executed on enemy troop movements during the withdrawal from the SHURI defense line. During this period planes operating under poor weather conditions kept columns of troops and supplies under continuous attack, and heavy casualties and damage were inflicted on the withdrawing enemy force.

Section 4 - Tanks

1. Annex E hereto describes in detail the activities of the 6th Tank Battalion during Phase III of the OKINAWA Campaign and includes comments and recommendations which have the approbation of the Division Commander.

2. If any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than any others during the progress of the campaign, the tank would certainly be selected. OKINAWA represents an accurate foretaste of what is to be expected in the Japanese homeland. Our enemy, an inveterate digger, contrives to place himself so deep in the earth that neither artillery nor bombs can visit the full force of their destructive effect upon him. A powerful direct fire weapon, of great accuracy and well protected, is required. The M4A3 tank fills this requirement admirably.

Section 5 - Armored Amphibians

1. See Annex H, Special Action Report, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion.

2. Due to the fact that during the entirety of Phase III the 6th Marine Division held a flank position along the coast, it was possible to utilize fully the varied capabilities of armored amphibians. In addition to the usual mission of beach defense, armored LVTs were assigned direct support missions, functioning as both assault guns and as artillery. The armored amphibians were able to place their fire on targets along the coast and inland, in direct support of advancing infantry elements. By maintaining close liaison with the infantry, the versatility of the vehicles was fully utilized. The ability of armored amphibians to fire as artillery was made especially apparent in the levelling of NAHA when their fire was used to cover those targets along the water's edge which were not considered profitable for regular artillery.

3. As in the preceding two phases, armored amphibians demonstrated their adaptability to landing assault troops. On both ONO YAMA and SHINAGA SHIMA assault elements were embarked on the armored LVTs and transported to their destination successfully.

Section 6 - Amphibian Tractors

1. The general performance of the LVT (cargo) battalions was in all respects similar to that experienced in Phases I and II of the operation.

2. LVTs performed creditably, and without them supply and evacuation would have been extremely difficult during certain phases of the campaign. Due to inclement weather and the resulting poor road conditions during the period 24 May to 4 June the amphibian tractor battalions assigned to this Division were employed extensively in supplying front line troops. Although the vehicles performed satisfactorily, it is believed that if the present large unit ground pressure were reduced by 20% an outstanding "mud vehicle" would result.

3. It is the studied opinion within this Division that the LVT 3 proved to be a superior vehicle to the LVT 4.

4. For further details see Annexes I and J, Special Action Reports of the 4th and 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalions.

[redacted]

Section 7 - Special Reconnaissance Missions

1. During Phase III, four occasions arose requiring special reconnaissance effort.

a. Upon seizure of the ASATO River line by the 4th and 22d Marines (see Appendix 1) it was considered necessary that the Division Commander be acquainted with the nature and strength of enemy installations south of the ASATO. The 6th Reconnaissance Company waded the stream under cover of darkness and examined the area northwest of MACHISHI in detail, reporting a number of enemy defensive positions, of which only a small percentage were occupied. This information subsequently proved accurate and of material value since it contributed to the decision of the Commanding General to force the ASATO River despite the lack of tanks.

b. Following the ASATO crossing, apprehension grew as to the strength of the enemy in NAHA proper west of the canal. (see Appendix 1) If this area were heavily held, the force advancing east of the canal would suffer from an exposed right flank. Accordingly, the 6th Reconnaissance Company moved across the lower ASATO, examined the northern section of NAHA, and found it to be lightly held. The company was then directed to remain in position and was subsequently relieved by infantry of the 22d Marines.

c. After the seizure of NAHA and the north shore of the KOKUBA Estuary, orders were received to execute an amphibious landing on OROKU Peninsula. The 6th Reconnaissance Company was directed to conduct a reconnaissance of the northern end of the Peninsula during the night of 2-3 June. The crossing was made under cover of darkness by swimmers supported by plastic boats. Four 4-man patrols examined the OROKU area from NISHIKOKU to KAKIBANA, including the high ground near KAGAMISUI. (see Appendix 1) At the same time a detailed reef and beach reconnaissance was made of the NISHIKOKU beaches. The report submitted described the NISHIKOKU beaches as suitable for LVT landings, and capable of supporting wheeled traffic. These conclusions were subsequently proven correct. Reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses was reported to indicate that the northern end of the Peninsula was occupied, that entrenching activity was in progress, but that defenses in that area were not heavy. These conclusions also proved entirely sound. It was not, of course, within the capabilities of the Reconnaissance Company to determine that the center of the OROKU Peninsula was held in great strength, as ultimately proved to be the case.

d. Sporadic fire from SENAGA SHIMA, off the west coast of OROKU Peninsula, had on occasion been a source of annoyance to troops advancing down the Peninsula. Likewise, so long

as enemy occupied that island the coast-wise movement of LVTs and landing craft was subject to close range fire. Accordingly, it was decided to bombard the island heavily and thereafter to execute a reconnaissance in force.

On 14 June the 6th Reconnaissance Company, reinforced with an infantry company of the 29th Marines, moved on the island under cover of darkness. By dawn troops were on the high rocky plateau moving rapidly westward against no resistance. By 0800 only 2 Japs had been located, and it was apparent that the island had been evacuated. The Reconnaissance Company destroyed military stores, sealed caves and remained on the island in security for the remainder of the day and the following night.

2. The foregoing, in conjunction with the activities during Phases I and II, emphasize the fact that a division reconnaissance element is an extremely useful organization in warfare of the type encountered in OKINAWA. It is considered that the 125 men involved in this organization served a most important purpose during the campaign, and that operations to follow in this theatre will manifest a continuing need for such an agency.

Section 8 - Engineers

1. Tactical Employment

a. In this phase the Engineer Group was composed of the 6th Engineer Battalion and a mine removal detachment from the 1st Separate Engineer Battalion. On 15 June the 6th Pioneer Battalion (less Company B) was attached. The Engineer Group was under the command of the Commanding Officer, 6th Engineer Battalion.

b. Due to the nature of the action in southern OKINAWA all earth moving and road construction equipment was put under the operational control of Headquarters and Service Company, 6th Engineer Battalion, to facilitate the task of developing road routes 1, 36A, 36, 38 and a newly constructed road later designated as route 9. Route 1 was the Division main supply route and when taken over was in poor condition, very narrow, and involved many bridging problems. Due to enemy fire being received on Route 1 in the vicinity of KURAN and NAKANISHI a by-pass route was constructed around the west flank of MACHINATO Airfield, which was largely in defilade, and rejoined Route 1 just north of ASA KAWA. The above roads were largely logistical and were handed by the Headquarters and Service construction section. After entering NAHA it was found more advantageous to revert the heavy equipment back to individual company control in order to have sufficient equipment in direct support of the assault regiments. Routes 40, 46, 44, 9 and 1 became main

supply routes and many streets through the city of NAHA had to be cleared of debris to provide tactical and logistical routes of communication. When the 22d Marines moved into the TOMIGUSUKA-MURA area the road net was very poor and due to torrential rains maintenance of these roads was a major engineering project. Route 11 was little more than a cow-path. On the OROKU Peninsula Route 3 soon became the main supply route and routes 60, 7, 62, and 66 were developed for tactical deployment of tanks. In this area the enemy had used every known type of engineer obstacle and much armored dozer work was required to do the repair and removal work because of heavy enemy fire covering these obstacles. Armored dozers operated in close conjunction with tanks which furnished protective fires. As the advance progressed southward a good, but narrow concrete road was present as far south as the southern end of ITOMAN Airfield. From that point to ITOMAN Town the road was narrow and ran through rice paddies. As was the usual case rapid deterioration took place and large amounts of heavy fill were required to build up the road to handle sustained heavy military traffic. All roads south of ITOMAN were narrow and generally poorly constructed, but were made passable for tactical needs and maintained by employing rigid traffic control.

c. Generally speaking one engineer company was placed in direct support of each infantry regiment, except when a regiment was in Division or Corps reserve the engineer company was utilized to execute special engineer missions. Each company was assigned one armored dozer to pioneer tactical routes under fire and to assist forward movement of tanks. A liaison officer from each company worked directly with the regimental staff acting in an advisory capacity as well as to expedite completion of requests for engineer support. In addition to the liaison officer an engineer reconnaissance officer served with the regiment to make advance studies of engineer requirements, such as mine removal, bridging, road improvement, water supply and demolitions. In this manner the engineering support required by the regiments could be anticipated and expeditiously handled. Occasionally when certain work exceeded the capabilities of the supporting company, additional equipment and personnel were assigned by battalion headquarters until the task was completed.

d. Due to the complete and effective enemy destruction of all bridges and stream crossings the bridging problem soon became the largest single responsibility of the engineers. Because of this fact the erection of bridges was rotated amongst the engineer companies to provide an equitable distribution of work and the not inconsiderable hazard involved.

e. Enemy resistance was so tenacious and well coordinated that tank support was vital to the assault troops at all times. The extensive and effective mining of all roads and adjacent areas by the enemy necessitated a large, efficient mine removal group to insure the necessary tank advances with a minimum loss of tank equipment. A mine removal platoon was organized and put under the control of the 6th Engineer Battalion mine removal officer. This platoon worked and billeted with the Tank Battalion which aided in providing the efficient coordination required between tank and mine removal crews. Armored dozers were used as required to fill in craters, by-pass smaller destroyed bridge sites and generally insure the tactical advance of the tanks. After the amphibious landings on OROKU Peninsula and until the conclusion of the operation, the tank-engineer support problems increased so much that an engineer construction liaison officer was attached to the Tank Battalion, as well as all armored dozers in order to provide adequate support. The combination of an attached mine removal platoon, along with armored dozers proved a satisfactory solution to the problems involved.

f. Enemy area mining was so extensive that the mine removal detachment from the 1st Separate Engineer Battalion, also under the control of the 6th Engineer Battalion mine officer, was kept as a group so as to effectively handle all requests for mine removal personnel from all Division units. This group removed hundreds of mines of all types and modifications thereof, and was normally able to handle all requests.

2. Missions Assigned Division Engineer

a. Building, repairing and development of supply routes and tactical roads.

b. Mine removal.

c. Heavy demolitions.

d. Bridge construction, both foot and vehicular.

e. Water supply.

f. Armored dozer support for Tank Battalion.

g. Marking of mined areas, towns, and road routes in Division zone of action.

3. Adequacy of Equipment Carried

Same as in Phases I and II.

D. [redacted]

4. Explosives and Mines

a. Large quantities of explosives were used. approximately 21,724 lbs. of composition C and C2, 8,950 lbs. of TNT, 3,492 lbs. of Tetrotol and 4,900 lbs. of dynamite were expended. Caves and underground emplacements of every size and description were so profuse that engineer heavy demolitions squads were continually used in support of the regiments. This plus extensive coral pit development accounted for the large expenditures. No mines were used.

5. General

a. Many new type defensive structures were encountered during phase III. All were excellently camouflaged, mutually supporting and well fortified. Combination pill-boxes and caves were utilized, varying from flimsily plastered mounds to well-constructed reinforced concrete emplacements that had actually been poured inside of caves thus utilizing exposed natural terrain features for ideal camouflage. The outstanding characteristics were the quantities of such emplacements that existed and the excellent choice of positions utilized within given areas.

b. Practically no deliberate mine fields were encountered, that is, no regular pattern or spacing was used. Those few discovered were usually at main road intersections and a simple pattern was used. Untold quantities of mines were utilized by the enemy, including every variety, type and modification of all known mines. Numerous devices never before encountered were found, including electrically detonated mines, use of many types of booster charges and several combinations of anti-lift or booby-trap devices. Almost no anti-personnel mines, as such, were found. Some horned mines had trip devices so as to detonate by a heavy force on the trip line, but few small pressure type AP mines were encountered.

(1) Mine technique was quite skillful and showed thorough knowledge of their use. Most mines encountered had been laid with strict attention to terrain features, natural avenues of approach, coordination with AT weapons and the possibility of using AT teams with satchel charges. Camouflage is difficult on horned mines, but many were cleverly concealed, and all were well placed. By avoiding the use of regular patterns the enemy rendered clearing

of areas difficult, and there was rarely time to cover all of the ground, thus making it possible for mines to be safely left in an area, endangering vehicles that were to follow the attack. It was necessary to erect signs in all areas, warning friendly troops of the remaining mine hazard.

(2) The one outstanding failure on the part of the enemy was his neglect to properly arm the mine after placing it. This was possibly due to the enemy's intention of using the roads and areas as long as possible before activating the fields, then not having sufficient time to do so while withdrawing in the face of our attack. This one failure probably saved us the loss of many tanks and vehicles during the period.

c. Traffic control was handled by engineer troops only at construction sites and critical bridges until relieved by military police. Maintenance crews were left on all prefabricated bridges, and these crews assisted MP's by restricting load limits, enforcing proper vehicular spacing and speed limits.

d. Water supply equipment and output was more than adequate for all Divisional needs, but at times had to be restricted due to the many non-divisional units drawing from our water points. This was particularly true in the later phase of the operation when many Corps and Army units had moved within the Division zone of action. Mobile and portable purification units were used exclusively except in the initial phases of the OROKU Peninsula landing when distillation units were set up to provide water for the assault elements when water supply equipment was worn out at the end of the operation due to long continuous operation. Canvas water storage tanks deteriorated and many had to be replaced. Some replacements were made, but generally replacement was not adequate for unserviceable units. Frequent checks were made by the Division epidemiological unit and at all times the water produced tested perfect and in accordance with directives of higher authority.

e. Enemy equipment and construction supplies were found in quantities. Most of the equipment had been destroyed by friendly forces, but some still serviceable was put to good use. Construction supplies in and adjacent to NAHA were plentiful, and must was advantageously used. Large quantities of high explosive stores were found, but little was utilized due to comparative inefficiency with our own explosives. Quantities of supplies are still available for garrison

forces, such as cement, reinforcing rod, bailing wire, beach matting, bolts, nails, paint and electrical equipment.

f. The enemy's principal engineer efforts to delay the advance of the assault troops consisted of large quantities of expertly laid mines, complete and expert demolishing of every bridge and stream crossing the Division zone of action, many large craters blown in roads where the road was built up on heavy fill, side hill demolition to block road cuts, many types of road blocks, both hasty and deliberate, these combining the use of mines and demolition charges to delay their removal, and some few flame fougasse devices were found in narrow side roads.

g. Statistical Review

(1) Mine-disposal teams removed or neutralized a total of 800 mines and duds from routes of supply and in support of the Tank Battalion. They were as follows:

472	Single Horned Mines.
33	Model "93" - Tape Measure Mines.
70	Terra Cotta Type Mines.
72	Improvised Box Mines.
6	New A.P. Fragmentation Mines.
12	Improvised Charge.
4	Conical Shape Charges.
4	Depth Charges.
25	Improvised Can Mines.
4	Yard-Stick Mines.
17	Charges, 1000 lbs., Electric Timed.
25	63 KG Bombs.
3	50 KG Bombs.
3	500 lbs., Bombs.
2	Knee Mortar Shells.
7	Stick Grenade Booby Traps.
8	War Heads, Torpedo.
25	Shells, 5".
2	Shells, 6".
800	TOTAL

In Addition:

50	Tape Measure Mines recovered from caves.
10	Yard-Stick mines recovered from caves.
250	Tape Measure Mines destroyed in caves.

53----------Box Charges destroyed in caves.

363----------TOTAL.

(a) A total of 1163 mines and duds by actual count have been neutralized, recovered or destroyed by the Mine Disposal Teams of the Sixth Engineer Battalion. Other elements of the Engineer Battalion have destroyed unreported numbers of various types of mines in caves and in enemy supply dumps. The mines destroyed and removed by the Engineer Battalion were, to all indications, only a small portion of the mines used by the enemy, and it seem that at no time was the enemy seriously ha dicapped by a lack of manufactured mines although in many cases he improvised.

(b) Standard manufactured mines used by the enemy were:

Single-Horned Mines.
Terra Cotta Mines.
Type "93," Tape Measure Mines.
New Type A. P. Fragmentation Mines.

Improvised mines used by the enemy were:

63 KG Bombs.
50 KG Bombs.
Depth Charge.
Torpedo War Heads.
Artillery Shells.
Improvised Charges of Picric Acid.

(c) Although the enemy did mine several large areas, there has never been any indication that he used a definite pattern or interval. The enemy had intended to use many of the mines and charges as controlled mines to be fired from remote points by electric hook-ups. Among the charges and mines found to be wired for electric detonation were:

Single-Horned Mines.
Depth Charges.
63 and 50 KG Aerial Bombs.

Artillery Shells in cluster.
Large Improvised Charges in
Wooden Boxes.
Improvised Charges in Cans.

(d) The enemy displayed a knowledge of mine technique and camouflage, that at times, was excellent. Indications are that the Japanese have ample knowledge of mines and minefield tactics and are handicapped only by lack of training of their lower echelons. In the future they can be expected to become experts in the use of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

(2) Bridging operations were highly important to the successful completion of many missions assigned the assault regiments. The majority of the bridges were constructed under adverse conditions including enemy fire, torrential rain, night operations and difficulty in procurement of bridging materials. The majority of assault bridging utilized the Bailey bridge and normally the enemy was on one side of the crossing while the Engineers erected and launched the bridge from the other. Some men were killed or wounded each time a bridge was placed under such conditions, and trucks hauling to the site at times received damaging enemy fire. Damage to these bridges by enemy fire was negligible, but enemy artillery persistently attempted to destroy them. One long-span Bailey received a direct flat trajectory 75mm burst doing enough damage to require replacements on some sections, as well as taking its toll in wounded. The 6th Engineer Battalion constructed a total of 1180 linear feet of Bailey bridge as follows:

230 feet of double double
400 feet of double single
550 feet of single single

The above represents 50% of the total Bailey bridge erected by four Engineering Battalions operating under III Amphibious Corps control.

Quantities of Model 1938 Army foot bridge were placed and proved most useful for assault regiments in river, canal and estuary crossings.

585 feet of M-3 Army foot bridge were laid.

275 feet of improvised 55-gallon drum ponton float foot bridge were used prior to placement of any prepared bridging.

45 feet of Pier, temporary, 35 ton was used for crossings that warranted its use.

125 feet of Jeep bridges were constructed.

300 feet of M-3 Army floating ponton bridge was placed and utilized while a more permanent crossing could be erected.

136 feet of timber bent bridge of varying load capacities were erected.

150 feet of rubble fill was used for vehicular crossings over NAHA canal for no current was present and damming had no ill effects.

(3) Road construction, improvement and repair was, as to be expected on an operation covering large land masses, most important and required continual operation of all earth-moving equipment.

25½ miles of two-lane highway were improved, widened and repaired.

15 miles of tactical roads were improved and constructed.

2½ miles of pioneer highway were constructed.

3 miles of bivouac access roads were improved, repaired or constructed.

(4) Water supply, always vital, was not much of a problem as far as usable locations were concerned, but the extended lines of communication required frequent displacement of water points. At no time did any unit in the Division run short of water.

(a) 27 water points of varying capacities were used within the Division zone of action during Phase III. An average daily total output of 80,000 gallons was produced.

(5) Miscellaneous.

16 drums culverts were repaired or replaced.

6 by-passes were constructed around craters or destroyed bridges.

3 wooden box culverts were placed.

Section 9 - Supply and Logistics

1. Immediately upon receipt of information that the Sixth Division was to be committed on the right flank of the Tenth Army in what was then the zone of action of the First Division, plans were formulated for the establishment of supply and evacuation installations in the proposed zone of action. Route One, a two-way coral-surfaced road, running north and south parallel to the coastline, was designated as the main supply route. Supply dumps for Classes I, II, III and V supplies were established in the vicinity of the village of UCHITOMARI, and normal combat supply routine was established. The three infantry regiments were supplied by unit distribution, other units by supply point distribution. Items of Classes II and IV were supplied upon requisition to Corps by the Seventh Field Depot. Class I and Class III supplies were drawn daily from Island Command Dumps in the vicinity. The supply of Class V items, based on the Army ammunition credit system, was provided by Army ammunition supply points.

2. Concurrent with the crossing of the ASA KAWA and the beginning of the assault on the city of NAHA, extremely heavy rains fell. The rain was of such duration and intensity as to render the main supply route impassable to all but track-laying vehicles. In an effort to preserve the usefulness of the main supply route, rigid traffic control measures were undertaken. In spite of these efforts, however, the road could not be maintained in the condition necessary to carry the truck traffic required to supply a division. Of necessity, assault units were supplied by amphibian tractors and "weasels." The heavy strain placed on these vehicles resulted in a large number being deadlined for repairs. It soon became apparent that units would have to be supplied by water, and a forward fuel, ration, and ammunition dump was established at the mouth of the ASA KAWA. Supplies were brought by water to this dump in amphibian trucks dispatched from a Corps forward dump established at MACHINATO. The problem of supply of front-line battalions by regiments was still present, however, due to the extremely heavy mud. All available track-laying vehicles were assigned to the regiments to alleviate the situation. Supplies were delivered to front-line units by means of LVT's, "weasels," and hand carry. As the assault units advanced into the city of NAHA, another forward dump was established at the mouth of the ASATO River, which dump was maintained by amphibian trucks and replenishment of the ASA KAWA Dump was suspended. Approximately one day's supply of Classes I, III and V were delivered to this dump daily by Corps, and Division units were supplied from this dump until the seizure of NAHA was completed.

3. During this phase of the action, three tractors, 115, high-speed, and three Athey Trailers were alloted to this Division, to assist in moving ammunition forward. These vehicles proved to be of inestimable value, contributing directly to tactical successes, although the slow-speed trailer is not well suited for use with the high-speed tractor.

4. Plans for the logistical support of the amphibious operation to seize the OROKU Peninsula were drawn up thirty-six hours prior to the commencement of the operation. It was planned that assault units would carry one and one-half KING and one CHARLIE ration, one-half gallon of water per man in filled canteens, one-half gallon of water per man in five-gallon cans, and one unit of fire. Vehicles were to be landed with filled tanks and their normal number of filled five-gallon cans. It was further planned to increase Classes I and III supplies to two days, and Class V to two units of fire by KING plus one day. For this shore-to-shore movement this Division had only sixty-eight LVT's, six LCT's and ten LCM's. The LVT's were employed initially to land assault and reserve units. Thereafter they were assigned logistical missions. Five LCT's were assigned to land units of the Sixth Tank Battalion. One LCT was designated as a floating ammunition dump, to be beached and unloaded, or to be unloaded by smaller craft as the situation might permit. This LCT was directed to stand off NAHA Harbor, but because of typhoon storm warnings, it left station and did not return during KING day. The five LCT's assigned to land tanks carried out this mission but withdrew also before a scheduled second trip was made. After the danger of the typhoon had passed, these LCT's were made available for another trip. The ammunition LCT returned to its station in NAHA Harbor on KING plus one day and its cargo was unloaded on the OROKU beaches. The withdrawal of naval resupply support at this critical stage in the operation jeopardized the success of the landing in its initial phases. Classes I, III and V supplies were landed on OROKU beaches by LVT's and DUKW's pre-loaded at MACHINATO and at the Division Dump at the mouth of the ASATO River.

5. Company A, Sixth Pioneer Battalion, was ordered to OROKU to develop the beaches and handle supplies coming ashore. A logistical control officer (Division Transport Quartermaster) was in charge of the movement of supplies over the beaches and into unit dumps ashore and landed with the assault regiment to supervise the initial logistic phase. Another logistical officer (Assistant Division Transport Quartermaster) was afloat in NAHA Harbor to control the flow of traffic of small craft and LVT's arriving at and leaving the OROKU beaches. Logistical control was exercised through the medium of an administrative radio net which was guarded by these two logistical officers and G-4, located at the Division CP. Unit dumps were established inland

[redacted]

from the landing beaches and a two-day level of Classes I, III and V supplies was stocked. Subsequently, these installations were consolidated and a forward Division Dump established. With the establishment of this Division Dump, amphibian trucks ferrying supplies from MACHINATO to the ASATO Dump were diverted to OROKU and replenishment of the ASATO Dump was suspended. No supplies could be brought overland at this time due to the fact that the bridges between NAHA and the OROKU Peninsula terminated on the Peninsula within the enemy lines. Repairs to these bridges were difficult because the area was under extremely heavy enemy fire at all times. When the front lines were sufficiently advanced to permit the construction of one bridge from NAHA to ONO YAMA Island, and another from ONO YAMA to the Peninsula, supply was effected overland thereafter.

6. Concurrent with the landing of two regiments on OROKU Peninsula, the third regiment, the 22nd Marines, was ordered to move overland and attack southward on the right flank of the First Marine Division. This regiment moved to a position southeast of the OROKU Peninsula and began attacking to the northwest. Any supply roads that might have been used to support this regiment were prohibited from use by enemy fire or by irreparable defects in the road. Supplies were moved over roads as far as possible, and consistent with enemy fire, by 2½-ton trucks, and from that point over trails to a farther point by ½-ton truck. When the trails became impassable, an M5 tractor was attached to this regiment to aid in supply. In many cases it was necessary to complete the movement of supplies by hand carry. As elements of this regiment reached the southeastern coast of OROKU Peninsula, LVT's were dispatched around the Peninsula and emergency supplies were landed in coastal areas accessible to these units. When this regiment joined lines with the two regiments attacking southeast, supply was carried out by road from Division Dumps.

7. Upon completion of the seizure of the OROKU Peninsula, this Division was ordered to be committed in the battle for the ARA SAKI Peninsula. Route Three, partially hard-surfaced, partially coral-surfaced and partially unimproved, was designated as the main supply route. An unloading beach, capable of receiving LVT's was established in the vicinity of ITOMAN. Three LST's were dispatched daily to this beach, commencing 17 June and continuing through 21 June. One was loaded with LVT's preloaded with CHARLIE rations; two were loaded with LVT's preloaded with ammunition. These LST's were designated for both the First and Sixth Marine Divisions. As the supplies were unloaded over this beach, a Division forward dump was established at ITOMAN 500 yards from the front lines and was employed to maintain the forward units of the Division. Replenishment of supplies was effected by truck and by LST.

[redacted]

8. An LVT pool was established in the vicinity of the Division forward dump to meet any urgent demands for amphibious transportation. These vehicles were employed to carry supplies to units not accessible by road, to reconnoiter beaches and to evacuate enemy civilians, prisoners of war and our own casualties.

9. On the last day of organized resistance, it became impossible to supply one unit which had been isolated by enemy fire and terrain. For the first time throughout Phase Three, the Division resorted to air delivery of rations and ammunition. Nine TBF's made a successful drop of one day's supplies for six hundred men near the tip of the ARA SAKI Peninsula.

Section 10 - Ordnance

1. Methods and Problems of Supply

a. A division dump was established in GINOWANMURA on 9 May, 1945, for supply of the southern phase of the OKINAWA SHIMA Operation. After the taking of NAHA, the OROKU Peninsula operation was planned. An initial supply of two (2) units of fire of infantry ammunition was loaded on an LCT at PORT LOOMIS (MACHINATO). This LCT was landed on KING plus one day after a beachhead of approximately 600 yards depth was established. At this point a forward division dump was established on the OROKU Peninsula. Approximately 200 tons of ammunition were landed in this manner, supplemented by amphibian trucks pre-loaded by 10th Army supply units. At the same time an additional dump was started across the bay from the OROKU Peninsula at the mouth of the ASATO GAWA. Trucks and tractors were used to move the remainder of the rear dump forward to this point. From this dump it was possible to shuttle ammunition by LVT across the bay to the OROKU dump.

b. Upon completion of the OROKU Peninsula Operation the dumps at the tip of the OROKU Peninsula and at ASATO GAWA were consolidated on the south shore of NAHA Harbor. As the Division moved southward, another forward dump was established in the center of ITOMAN. This dump was re-supplied by truck from Army ASP #10, located just north of NAHA. Later, Corps provided one (1) LST per day containing LVT's pre-loaded with ammunition. This final dump was established initially about five hundred (500) yards behind the front lines.

c. The second platoon of the Third Ammunition Company was attached to this Division throughout the southern phase of the OKINAWA SHIMA Operation. This platoon was able to operate a maximum of three (3) dumps and to draw all ammunition for infantry regiments.

[redacted]

d. The artillery ammunition was initially supplied by trucking from rear area Army ASP's. As Army ASP #10, located in NAHA, became capable of supplying all categories of ammunition, the rear trucking route was discontinued.

e. The practice of leap-frogging Division dumps was found to be absolutely necessary behind a swiftly moving division in order to insure the regimental dumps a ready source of re-supply.

2. Ammunition

a. Number of rounds by exact nomenclature, expended or lost:

37mm Gun, TK-AT

14,800	HE, M63 (RIGBA)
4,500	APC, M51
1,559	Canister, M2 (RIGHB)

75mm Gun

23,323	HE, M48, sc, w/F M48A2 (.05 sec)
8,596	HE, M48, w/F M54
7,012	APC, M61A1, w/F BD M66A1
1,987	WP, M64, w/F M57
822	Shrapnel

75mm Howitzer

44,796	HE, M48, w/F M48A2 (.15 sec)
27,844	HE, M48, w/F M54
959	HE-AT, M66, w/F BD M66A1
6,120	WP, M64, w/F M57
558	Canister, T30

105mm Howitzer

77,923	HE, M1, w/F M48A2 (.15 sec)
25,450	HE, M1, w/F M54
2,293	HE-AT, M67, w/F BD M62A1
9,835	WP, M60, w/F M57
1,766	HC, BE, M84, w/F M54

2" Mortar

3,050	Bomb, smoke, Mk I/L

[redacted]

60mm Mortar

142,852	HE, M49A2
22,830	Illuminating, M83A1
8,784	WP, T6

81mm Mortar

56,157	HE, M43A1, w/F M52
16,738	HE, M56, w/F M52 (SQ)
28,237	HE, M56, w/F M53 (.10 sec)
9,469	WP, M57, w/F M52

4.2" Mortar

7,737	HE, M3
4,226	HE, M2
4,551	HE, M4

Rockets

5,662	HE, AT, 2.36", M6A3
967	WP, 2.36", M10 (T26E2)

Grenades, Hand

2,775	Illuminating, Mk I
101,523	Fragmentation, Mk II
18,029	WP, M15
2,897	HC, M8
726	Incendiary, M14
504	Smoke, colored, M18, Green
732	Smoke, colored, M18, Red
400	Smoke, colored, M18, Violet
400	Smoke, colored, M18, Yellow
360	Smoke, colored, M18, Orange

Grenades, Rifle

6,514	AT, M9A1
1,720	WP, M19 (T5E1)
64	Smoke, colored, M22 (T8E1), Violet
50	Smoke, colored, M22 (T8E1), Red
85	Smoke, colored, M22 (T8E1), Yellow
25	Smoke, colored, M22 (T8E1), Orange
15,529	Adapter, gren. proj., M1
1,812	Adapter, gren. proj., Chem., T2

[redacted]

.50 Caliber

126,635	AP-T (4-1)
800	API, bulk
5,030	Tracer, bulk
30,770	Links, metal

.45 Caliber

133,999	Ball, M1911

.30 Caliber, Rifle

73,300	AP, M2, 5/cp/bl
2,529,476	AP, M2, 8/cp/bl
1,213,484	AP, M2, 20/ctn
6,405,850	AP, Tracer, belted (4-1)
36,450	Tracer, 5 rd clip
103,920	Tracer, Carton
72,349	Ball, M1, 8 rd

.30 Caliber, Carbine

1,121,302	Ball, M1
27,243	Tracer, M16 (T24)

Shotgun, 12-gage

8,000	Shell, 12 ga., brass, #00

Pyrotechnics

4,859	Flare, trip, para, M48
1,791	Flare, trip, M49

For Launcher, Grenade

240	Sig., grd, amber star, clus, M22A1
144	Sig., grd, amber star, para, M21A1
192	Sig., grd, green star, clus, M20A1
288	Sig., grd, green star, para, M19A1
144	Sig., grd, red star, para, M51A1
144	Sig., grd, red star, clus, M52A1
144	Sig., grd, white star, clus, M18A1
240	Sig., grd, white star, para, M17A1

Demolitions

11,604	Block, demo, M2
6,353	Block, demo, M3
1,988	Block, demo, chain, M1
2,678	Cap, blasting, eng., special, elect

52

[redacted]

Demolitions (Cont'd)

8,325	Cap, blasting, eng., special, non-elect
902	Cord, detonating, 100-ft spool
5,468	Explosive, Comp. "C," 2lbs
96	Explosive, shaped charge, 40 lb, T3
17,608	Explosive, TNT, ½-lb. blocks
16,660	Fuze, blasting, time feet
15,930	Lighter, fuze, M2
795	Torpedo, bangalore
4,959	Dynamite, lbs

Flame Throwers

266	Charge, M2-2 (5 Gal)
40	Cylinders, ignition, M1
143	Napalm, can (5½ lb)
12	Cylinders, CO_2
85	Pots, smoke M4A2

Fuzes

483	CP, M78 (T105)

b. Artillery ammunition expenditures by units were as follows:

15th Marines:

105mm Howitzer Ammunition

75,194	HE, M1, w/f M48
23,480	HE, M1, w/f M54
9,835	WP, M60, w/f M57
1,766	HC, BE, M84, w/f M54

75mm Pack Howitzer

26,547	HE, M48, w/f M48
23,314	HE, M48, w/f M54
3,026	WP, M64, w/f M57

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion:

75mm Pack Howitzer

18,249	HE, M48, w/f M48
4,530	HE, M48, w/f M54
3,094	WP, M64, w/f M57
959	HE-AT, M66 w/f BD M66A1
558	Canister T30

[redacted]

Howitzer, 105mm, SP, M7 (Reg. Weapons):

105mm Howitzer

2,729	HE, M1, w/f M48
1,970	HE, M1, w/f M54
2,293	HE-AT, M66 w/f BD M66A1

3. The following unserviceable or surplus ordnance material was turned in to the Seventh Field Regiment during the period 9-20 June, 1945.

2,255	Rifle, Cal. .30, M1
222	Carbine, Cal. .30, M1
8	Rifle, Cal. .30, M1903
39	Rifle, Browning Automatic
29	Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, M1917A1
9	Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, M1919A4
3	Shotgun, 12 gauge
21	Flame, Thrower M2-2
29	Launcher, Rocket M9A1
3	Mount, Tripod, Cal. .30, M1917A1
2	Mount, Tripod, Cal. .30, M2
3	Tubes, w/cap, 60mm
1	Base Plate, 60mm
1	Mort[illegible], 81mm, complete
1	Tube, 81mm, w/mount
3	Base Plate, 81mm
726	Slings, Leather, M1907
1	Mount, Tripod, Cal. .50, M3
1	Mount, and Cradle, Cal. .50
1	Cradle, Cal. .30, M1917A1
1	Barrel, Cal. .50
2	Tubes, 81mm
3	Tank Destroyers, M7
2	Gun, 37mm

4. Additional weapons drawn from Seventh Service Regiment. to supplement lost and W.O.I.S.

25	Pistol, Cal. .45
80	Rifle, Browning Automatic Cal. .30
25	Gun, Machine, Browning M1919A4
18	Mortar, 60mm
6	Mortar, 81mm
50	Launcher, Rocket, AT 2.36" M9A1
100	Launcher, Grenade M7
100	Launcher, Grenade M8
33	Gun, Machine, Browning, M1917A1

[redacted]

26	Flame Thrower, M2-2
3	Howitzer, 105mm M7B1, S.P.
26	Tank, Medium M4A3
2	Gun, 37mm, A.T.

5. Number, Type and Caliber of Weapons Lost and Repaired.

(Period covered from 9 May to 21 June, 1945)

	Totally Lost	Repaired
Shotgun, 12-gauge	20	20
Carbine, .30 cal.	1977	855
Rifle, .30 cal.	1114	4308
B.A.R., .30 cal.	169	429
M.G. .30 cal., M1919A4	94	144
M.G., .30 cal., M1917A1	0	36
Sub-M.G., .45 cal.	28	7
Pistol, .45 cal.	468	108
M.G. .50 cal.	0	21
Mortar, 60mm	20	53
Mortar, 81mm	0	42
Gun, 37mm	0	8
Garrett, 60mm	0	0
Howitzer, 75mm	0	2
Howitzer, 105mm	0	6
Launcher, Rocket	7	29
Launcher, Grenade, M7	311	0
Launcher, Grenade, M8	1015	0
Tank, Med., 75mm gun	21	146
Howitzer, 105mm, S.P. M7	0	9
Flame Thrower, M2-2	21	39
Flame Thrower, E4-5	0	1
Vehicle, Tank recovery	0	0
Launcher, Rk, M4, 4.5	0	6

Section 11 - Military Government

1. The Division retained military government responsibility for northern OKINAWA until 15 May, 1945, despite movement of the Division from that area on 4 May, 1945. Military government detachments originally assigned were retained in northern OKINAWA and passed to Island Command control on 15 May, 1945.

2. Upon commencement of active operations in southern OKINAWA, no military government personnel were assigned, and initially the few civilians encountered were delivered to the 1st Marine Division stockade, located on this Division's main route of evacuation.

3. On 19 May 1945, the following military government detachments were assigned this Division:

Military Government Detachment A-100-X
Military Government Detachment B-100-X
G-10 Dispensary Unit A
G-10 Dispensary Unit B

The above detachments corresponded in personnel and equipment to those assigned during the preceding phases of the operation. Similarly, these detachments were comprised of a heterogeneous group of Army and Navy personnel with no prior field experience in military government work. The detachments were hastily formed immediately prior to their assignment to this Division and were completely lacking in organization.

4. To meet these deficiencies, the above detachments were centralized under a Division Military Government Section, and a senior Marine officer having extensive practical experience in military goverment work was appointed Division Military Government Officer and placed in charge of all Military Government activity within the Division.

5. Teams of military government personnel consisting of 1 officer and 5 enlisted were assigned to each regiment in the line both for liaison purposes and, where it was within their capabilities, to relieve regiments immediately of the responsibility for the safeguard and evacuation of civilians.

6. From 8 May to 8 June 1945, only a limited number of civilians were apprehended within the Division zone of action in southern OKINAWA, the total for the period being 586.

7. From 8 June to 18 June 1945, civilians surrendered at the rate of approximately 450 per day. To assist in handling this increase, a platoon of military police was attached to the Division by III Phib Corps. Organic division motor transport was used to evacuate civilians to rear area camps, with assistance being given by III Phib Corps when necessary.

8. It was not until 18 June 1945, when the Division was committed in the extreme southwestern tip of OKINAWA, following completion of mopping up on OROKU Peninsula that civilians constituted a problem of any importance within the Division zone of action. At that time, as had been anticipated, civilians, apparently aware of the hopelessness of the enemy cause, began surrendering in overwhelming numbers.

9. In anticipation of this situation, the Military Government Section had displaced to the vicinity of ZAHANA and were in a position to temporarily handle almost unlimited numbers of civilians. The Military Government Section was further augmented by assignment from III Phib Corps of a second platoon of military police.

10. On 21 June 1945, military government teams with the infantry regiments affected the movement of over 8,000 incoming civilians to Highway Number 3 where they were gathered at a collecting point established at ITOMAN. Able bodied men, women and children were moved from ITOMAN to ZAHANA by marching under the supervision of military police, while the sick, wounded and aged were transported to ZAHANA by such organic transport of the Division as was returning empty from the front lines.

11. In the days immediately following, the general procedure outlined above was continued. To handle the ever increasing number of civilians surrendering, additional man power was made available from within the Division when the 15th Marines furnished a provisional military police detail consisting of 2 officers and 75 men.

12. Evacuation of civilians from front line areas to the division stockade continued to be by marching. Such organic division motor transport as could be spared was made available for movement of the increasing number of medical cases entering our lines. Evacuation of civilians from the division stockade to permanent military government camps far to the rear was undertaken by III Phib Corps. Such evacuation proceeded smoothly, relieving the Division of the necessity for furnishing more than transient facilities. Evacuation to rear areas was both by motor transport (furnished by III Phib Corps) and by LST to rear area beaches where III Phib Corps trucks met the incoming ships, further transporting the civilians to nearby camps.

13. Within the civilian stockade, arriving civilians were handled in an extremely efficient manner, being registered, tagged and processed with a minimum of delay. Camp maintenance and feeding of civilians was performed by a trusted group of civilians gathered over a period of time from the most intelligent and cooperative internees.

14. Medical care was given all civilians requiring it, although facilities became severely strained as the number of incoming wounded increased. G-1C facilities were augmented by extra medical personnel furnished by III Phib Corps and by the use of native nurses.

15. Order and discipline among civilians was maintained by civilians of former prominent position who were retained in the camp for that purpose. No difficulties in that respect were encountered at any time.

16. The 310th CIC detachment augmented by carefully chosen civilians aid, rapidly processed all incoming civilians. Through their efforts hundreds of military personnel disguised as civilians were apprehended and delivered to the prisoner of war stockade.

17. At the close of the operation, military government activities were proceeding with marked efficiency.

Section 12 - Communications

1. Personnel

Q. What changes, if any, are specifically recommended in personnel allowances?

A. (1) A wire section for the Service Battalion comparable to that currently allowed the Engineer Battalion.

(2) An increase of 24 wiremen for the Signal Company to provide wire liaison teams for each of the reinforced regiments. The eight-man teams have been used with the regiments in this operation with notable success, but the Signal Company was thereby handicapped in the accomplishment of its other numerous missions.

(3) This operation has indicated a need in the Signal Company for some personnel qualified to accomplish heavy wire construction missions. While it is realized that the Corps Signal Battalion normally is responsible for such work, it has frequently worked out that their own work prevented them from assisting the Division when necessary. In future large land mass operations the same conditions will exist and steps should be taken to authorize qualified personnel for the Signal Company.

(4) This operation has indicated a need for a limited number of voice radio operators within the Military Police Company.

(5) The officer in charge of the message center, Signal Company, should be a captain and should also be the CWO. Inasmuch as coding and officer messenger are both functions of the message center the coding officers should be under the supervision of the Message Center Officer and removed from the Signal Officer's section.

Q. List losses of personnel in the period from after landing until the operation was completed.

A.

	KIA	WIA	MIA
Officers	0	3	0
Enlisted	43	133	4

Q. How were battle casualties replaced?

A. The communication personnel in the original replacement drafts assigned to the Division were absored within units prior to loading out in order to fill the then existing shortages. As casualties reduced the units below operating strength, replacements had to be made by assigning personnel temporarily from other units. In one instance, some of the general duty replacements were given an intensive period of training in wire work, after which, they were sent to infantry units. Communication replacements were received toward the end of the operation but a large percentage of these were radio repairmen and technicians, and radar personnel. These men were not needed in their particular specialites and were not qualified for other types of duty, as a result they were of little value as replacements.

2. Equipment

Q. List losses of equipment in the period from after landing until operation was completed.

A.

ITEM	QUANTITY
Telephone, EE-8	50
Switchboard, BD-71	6
Switchboard, BD-72	4
Radio, TBX	3
Radio, SCR-536	70
Radio, SCR-300	25
Radio, SCR-608	3
Radio, SCR-610	14

Q. Was equipment suitable (design and quantity) for the particular task to be performed? If no, list equipment and state reason.

A. Some changes should be made:

(1) SCR-300: very easily shaken out of alignment, handsets (TS-15) were a great source of trouble because the contact springs in the transmitter switch failed.

(2) SCR-610: not sufficiently portable for lower units; cable from battery box to transmitter receiver box broke in many instances.

(3) BD-71: satisfactory in quality but has inadequate number of drops and is too bulky for an infantry battalion.

Q. In light of the specific operation, what changes in equipment are recommended? State reason.

A. (1) Redesign the SCR-610 or replace it with a set of similar operating characteristics which is more portable. The present set is not sufficiently portable to satisfy the demands of lower units.

(2) Design a switchboard for units the size of battalions which is lighter than the BD-71 and has greater number of drops.

(3) Delete the SCR-624 from the T/O for the Signal Company. During this operation there has been no need for this set, nor is it anticipated that a need is likely to exist.

(4) Anticipating future operations on large land masses, it is considered that 50% of the 1/4-ton trucks and 1/4-ton trailers allowed the wire platoon should be replaced by 1 ton, 4x4 recon trucks and 1-ton trailers; also an additional allowance of two 1-ton trucks and trailers should be authorized. At least two more 1/4-ton trucks should be authorized the message center platoon.

Q. Was all signal equipment authorized by T/A used? If not should it be deleted from T/A? State reason.

A. SCR-624 was not used. See (3) above.

3. Supply

Q. What repair facilities did you have available? Were they used? What major items of equipment were repaired?

A. A converted small arms van was used for a repair shop and in addition there was a jury-rig trailer capable of limited third echelon repair available for a forward repair shop. The below list shows the number and types of major items of equipment repaired from 1 April to 21 June.

SET	AMOUNT REPAIRED
SCR-536	569
SCR-300-A	429
SCR-610	325
SCR-508 and 608	92
SCR-509	26
SCR-193	6
BC 312 and 342	11
SCR-299	2
SCR-694	7
TEX	44
TCS	107
RBO-2	1
RBZ	3
RCB	2
ATC	1
Amplifier	1
Dynamotor and Generator	1
EE8 (*)	266
Switchboards	30
EE2C	10
RL-27	6
Hand Sets	238
Head and Chest Sets	25
Mine Detector	30
Microphones	6
CS-79 (Bty Box) SCR-610	103
TOTAL EQUIPMENTS	2371

Q. When was Depot Signal Company ready to supply, equip and assist in repair?

A. Approximately L plus 16.

4. Operation

Q. What agencies were established that were not normal?

A. A BD-72 was set up in the G-3 tent and had the following trunks and locals into it: 1 trunk direct to each assault combat team, 2 locals, 2 trunks to Division switchboard. This proved eminently successful.

Q. What was the most overloaded agency?

A. During the initial stage, radio was overloaded because the situation was changing too rapidly to maintain reliable telephone communication. Later, telephone became considerably overloaded; as a general average there were 1976 calls made daily and 282, or 14 per cent of the total, were refused because of busy circuits.

Q. What steps were taken to overcome trouble experienced in question above?

A. The separate switchboard mentioned above for G-3 relieved this load considerably inasmuch as a sizeable percentage of all calls are made by or to the G-3.

Q. In the light of possible operations on large scale land masses, would present normal operating agencies be adequate?

A. The agencies are adequate, in some instances, however, the tools with which they must work would not be sufficient.

Q. Where would the agencies break down?

A. The lack of adequate transportation would cause a breakdown more quickly than anything else that can be foreseen. The message center must make scheduled and special runs forward to tactical elements, and also to the rear to service units, to higher commands, and to adjacent units. Their present allowance is not sufficient to permit this, and transportation must be borrowed; a communication system which has such a dependency is now sound. On large land masses, frequently, special units of the Army such as MP companies, mobile AA units, etc., are not attached to the Marine divisions. These units are nearly always equipped with SCR-508 or SCR-510 and the Signal Company should be authorized two SCR-508's to meet such a contingency. This Division was faced twice with such a situation, during this campaign. Eventually it was possible to obtain one SCR-508 and the difficulties were eliminated. Two such sets would provide for command post displacement and give a spare should one become a casualty.

Q. Were any communication improvements noticed between this operation and previous operations?

A. Yes. Radio communications were made more reliable as a result of the SCR-608 and SCR-610. Telephone communication to Corps was improved because of the use of the radio link (carrier) equipment; in the rapid movement northward this equipment more than proved its worth. Each division should be authorized sufficient equipment to provide its own station in a net without having to be dependent upon Corps Signal Battalion for such service.

Q. What methods were used for tank-infantry communications? Were they successful?

A. The tanks of this Division had been equipped with GF/HU radios and the tank liaison teams were furnished SCR-536's. This type of a radio net met with a limited amount of success; the main difficulties arose as a result of occasional interference from adjacent frequencies and the limited working range of the portable set. The system worked to a definite advantage in several instances, however.

5. Security

Q. Is any criticism made of present aids?

A. Yes. It is believed that the time of change of the daily shackle cipher should be such that the grid for a day is effective from 0001 to 2400 local time. The present system results in a considerable amount of confusion because of the fact that the effective grid number lags the date almost by 24 hours. The more the use of the shackle cipher is simplified, the more effective it will be. It is not believed that any loss of security will be realized by making this change, inasmuch as each grid is usually effective for only one 24-hour period. The effective list was changed frequently. Thus, even should the enemy know at which hour the change becomes effective, his knowledge would be of little value. It is realized that for Fleet operations throughout the Pacific a GCT time change is the logical one, but within the immediate vicinity of shore-based operations, a local time change would be of considerable value.

Q. What authenticator system was used, and how effective was it?

A. The CSP 1286 was originally employed on CW nets of Corps and higher headquarters but this was subsequently changed to the use of shackle cipher throughout all Corps nets, a change which proved of great benefit. It is believed that at this point, mention should be made of the need of a standardized station authenticator based on the shackle cipher, in much the same way that the message authenticator is presently constructed. Many instances arose in which station authenticators would have been of assistance, but the present system allows authentication only if a message is transmitted.

5. Air Warning

Q. What type of system was installed--Air Warning, Fighter Direction or Air Defense Control Center?

A. An air warning team from FMF Pac was attached to this Division during the initial stages of the operation. They monitored the LAW, the FDC, and the ADCC nets. The system was very effective. It is believed that in the future on large land masses, the team should be attached to the Division throughout the operation because frequently air alerts effective in one section of the combat area were of no concern whatsoever to the other sectors. After the AW team was detached, the Division became dependent upon Corps for flashes, some of which were not applicable to division and lower units. The plotting board used by the AW team provided information on the positions of the bogies and estimates could be made accurately when conditions Red should be announced.

6. Air Liaison Communication

Q. What were the losses in men and materiel of Air Liaison Parties?

A. Losses in men: 2 killed, 6 wounded. Losses in equipment: 1 SCR-694, 2 SCR-300's and 5 EE-8A's.

7. Shore Fire Control Communication

Q. What were the losses in men and materiel?

A. Losses in men: 2 killed, 17 wounded. Losses in equipment: 2 SCR-300's.

Section 13 - Medical

In describing the activities of the Medical Department of the 6th Marine Division for Phase III of the operations on OKINAWA SHIMA, RYUKYU ISLANDS, from the period 9 May, 1945, until 30 June, 1945, it is believed that the report should stress the importance of great mobility of all Medical Department units. In previous operations involving the seizure and occupation of smaller atolls and islands in the PACIFIC, it was unnecessary to displace medical units forward more than once or twice. On OKINAWA with the rapid advance of the assault units and the large land mass involved, it became apparent almost at the outset, that in order to render adequate medical care to the sick and wounded, medical installations would have to be mobile to keep the pace. To achieve this necessary mobility, medical companies were streamlined and succeeded in rendering field treatment with a minimum loss of time. As the distance between the Field Hospital and the front lines increased, medical companies were displaced forward in "leap-frog" fashion and placed in direct support of the assault units. This procedure resulted in an even-metered flow of sick and wounded from front to rear. In the southern operation the Division Field Hospital was seldom

more than a few miles from the front, and all casualties received at this point were readily evacuated by the road net to the III Amphibious Corps. In the initial stages of the southern operation, as adverse weather conditions made roads impassable, casualties were evacuated to an LST(H) lying off PORT LOOMIS.

Four surgical teams, composed of personnel from the Division Field Hospital with equipment pre-loaded on a truck, were organized for the express purpose of assisting the medical companies during periods when the evacuation load exceeded the capabilities of organic means.

A Medical Dump was maintained well forward, at which point blankets, plasma, whole blood (refrigerated), battle dressings, drugs and other field items were available as needed. As a result, there was no failure of medical supply at any time. It might be noted at this point that the automatic exchange of a "litter for a litter and a blanket for a blanket" was a highly sensitive problem, particularly when evacuation from shore to ship occurred by means of LCM's, DUKW's and amphibian tractors with personnel not attached to the medical units organic to the Division. Unless a careful check was made, the inevitable result of this phase of evacuation was the accumulation of litters and blankets aboard LST(H)'s and hospital ships.

To aid in the efficient evacuation in the early stages of this operation, a specially-trained evacuation officer was utilized in each medical company. To complete the chain of evacuation, two additional such officers functioned in similar capacities--one at an ambulance loading post just forward of the Division Field Hospital, and a second at the beach evacuation point. These posts were connected by telephone to the switchboard at the Division Field Hospital, and prompt information as to the evacuable load of patients was readily available. At the forward ambulance loading post the Evacuation Officer supervised the operation of an ambulance shuttle system, which functioned most satisfactorily. Mention should be made that Corps, working with Army elements, constantly maintained at the post field-type ambulances in sufficient quantities. Excellent support was furnished this Division by VMO Squadrons, whose planes flew out many critically wounded patients from small landing strips constructed adjacent to medical company areas. This saved badly wounded men the tedious trip over the road net and reduced the time element to an absolute minimum. The total number of sick and wounded that passed through medical installations of this Division during the southern phase of the operation was approximately 12,000.

In the southern phase of the OKINAWA Operation the time lag between the occurrence of a casualty and the reception of

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the individual at the hospital was cut 50% by maintaining the close liaison and controlling the movement. Seldom, day or night, did the trip from the front to the forward medical company require more than an hour. This contributed immeasurably to the excellent morale among patients that was manifest continuously throughout the operation.

It soon became apparent that the small jeep ambulance, while serving its purpose admirably in jungle warfare, offered a definite handicap by dint of its carrying capacity, which frequently proved inadequate for the extensive operations demanded by the tactical situation in the southern phase. However, there is still a need in the evacuation chain for a small-type ambulance in the areas forward of the battalion aid stations. The field-type ambulance, either the Dodge or the International with its 4-wheel drive, or the larger Army-type ambulance with panel body carried patients from the battalion aid stations to medical companies in greater comfort than did the smaller vehicles. Furthermore, for a period of two weeks when the road net was well-nigh impassable, the large ambulances were still able to operate effectively.

Transportation presented a problem of considerable proportions, and only by means of supplement from the Division Motor Pool were medical companies enabled to displace forward in one convoy. When this source failed, it was necessary to commandeer all transportation in the Medical Battalion to effect forward displacement of even one company. To prevent recurrence of similarly difficult circumstances in future large-scale operations, it is urgently believed that a Motor Transport Section should be included in the Table of Organization for the Medical Battalion, which would provide for the assembling of all cargo transport in a pool, adequate maintenance and maintenance personnel and operators.

Surgical trailers proved invaluable. One such vehicle, constructed by medical officers in the training area, was landed with the 6th Medical Battalion. The satisfactory manner in which this vehicle operated prompted the construction of two additional trailers by medical personnel of the Battalion, both of which served throughout the operation. Providing a dustless, insect-proof, well-lighted, mobile and adequate operating room easily blacked out, these units, together with the surgical team, carried surgery to the front lines. As a result, many lives were unquestionably saved, which otherwise would have been lost had it proved mandatory to follow the conventional evacuation trail. Plaster was used as far forward as battalion aid stations by surgeons trained in orthopedics. The Division Orthopedist personally checked the individual application of casts and supervised all orthopedic procedure. Much could be written about the use and value of whole blood. A plentiful supply and a prodigious use resulted in the saving of many lives.

Tactical training involving long hours spent in the field in the training areas by medical personnel paid dividends. The careful selection of adequate sites for medical companies in defiladed positions and the utilization of sandbags at dressing stations allowed little interference in routine as a result of enemy action. While in several instances areas containing medical installations were shelled by enemy artillery, no casualties resulted. Local security was maintained by organic personnel, and numerous attempts on the part of the enemy to infiltrate into medical company areas were prevented by appropriate and strict counter-measures.

Casualty rate among hospital corpsmen attached to infantry regiments was high. Because of their mission this is usually the case. In this connection, it is important to realize that carefully laid evacuation plans formulated in advance in the same manner as infantry operation orders, reduce the losses in trained personnel. This includes, for example, the utilization of smoke and covering fire during evacuation operations carried out of necessity in areas under enemy observation. The Epidemiological and Malaria Control Units attached to this Division rendered invaluable service in the promotion of disease-prevention measures. The highly successful reduction of flies, mosquitoes, fleas, biting spiders, centipedes and the control and eradication of rodents resulted from a liberal use of DDT. All areas occupied by our troops received frequent dustings by means of EMCU Squads, equipped with hand sprayers, and by R4D's. It is believed that as a direct result of the efforts of this group the morbidity rate in the Division reached a new low. From all figures available at this time the rate may be estimated to be 0.45%.

Section 14 - Infantry Combat

1. See Annexes A, B and C, Special Action Reports of 4th, 22d and 29th Marines respectively.

2. The experiences in infantry combat described in the report on Phases I and II of the operation were corroborated during Phase III. The same predisposition to maneuver, both in large and small units, was present throughout the Division and had the same beneficial results as in the northern campaign.

3. On two occasions during Phase III the full force of the Division's infantry strength was aligned against the enemy. On OROKU, and again during the advance on ARA-SAKI, all battalions were committed in offensive action.

4. An interesting example of rapid preparations for an amphibian operation is found in the circumstances surrounding preparations for the OROKU landing, wherein all plans were laid, orders issued, and the operation executed within a space of 36 hours. The significant point to be noted here is that with trained troops and competent staffs in all echelons, the amphibious landing of a Division is not a matter of excessive complexity.

5. Operations under cover of darkness and behind a heavy and well-maintained smoke screen were invariably successful.

All three of the opposed river crossings undertaken by the Division during Phase III were executed on the above basis and on every occasion the attack was furthered by the enemy's lack of visibility.

6. If any single factor in infantry combat during the third phase could be characterized as outstanding, it is the reaffirmation that, in fighting the Jap, infantry alone, even though highly trained, is not enough. To defeat the Jap with a minimum of loss requires constant and reemphasized employment of the infantry-tank-artillery team.

7. 81mm mortars were fired in battery on many occasions. This system, in conjunction with the heavy shell, brings to bear a shock effect and a weight of metal which in numerous instances forced Japanese soldiers to abandon their positions and flee in the open.

8. An interesting technique and one which may well prove of value in subsequent operations within the Empire was the practice followed by one regiment of passing through a hill, employing the existing network of enemy tunnels rather than moving over and around the high ground. This, on occasion, proved most effective. A small group would work its way through the tunnel system, break out on the forward slope, and cover the further infiltration of reinforcements through the same tunnel system. When a base of fire had been established and enemy resistance located, additional elements would pass through the tunnels as well as around the flanks and over the top of the hill. For further details see Annex A, Special Action Report, 4th Marines.

Section 15 - Artillery

1. Division Artillery continued to render timely and effective support in the final phase of the OKINAWA Campaign. In addition to normal preparation fires, this support was characterized by: (a) concentrated smoke and neutralization missions, which covered troop movements and vital engineering projects, and (b) counter-battery. Established techniques and procedures proved sound; there was nothing unique in the employment of Division Artillery.

2. In the Battle for NAHA the Division was confronted with the problem of operating in a zone of action which was dominated by strongly held positions on SHURI Heights, in an adjacent unit's zone of action. It was relized that any deep penetration by the Division along the west coast would result in the bulk of our supporting fires being placed in the adjacent zone. Such a salient was subsequently developed, and our dispositions were exposed to the full fire power of the enemy. Succeeding days

became the bitterest of the campaign with Division Artillery firing heavy preparation and lengthy smoke missions throughout each day, and prearranged barrages at night.

3. Artillery played a large part in breaking down the vicious counter-attacks at SUGAR LOAF HILL. In addition to these missions, artillery fired counter-battery throughout the period.

4. In the Battle for OROKU Peninsula 15 battalions fired a 30-minute preparation in support of the landing. Subsequent to the landing, several time-on-target missions were fired, employing as many as 15 battalions. Counter-battery still continued to be the major problem through each night.

5. The Battle for ARA SAKI was supported in a similar manner. Due to the reduction in enemy artillery strength, counter-battery gradually became negligible.

6. The OKINAWA Campaign was the first operation in which our forces were confronted with massed enemy artillery. Though not entirely prepared to undertake a thorough counter-battery program, this Division, in conjunction with the sound-and-flash battalion of the Tenth Army and flash teams of its own and adjacent units, accomplished the mission in an effective manner, utilizing such means as were at hand.

7. The Target Information Center, which was established by Tenth Army Operational Directive, proved to be of considerable value in the OKINAWA Campaign. In addition to supplying targets to front-line units and supporting arms, it maintained coordination in the attack of targets, both for prearranged fires and fires on targets of opportunity.

8. The manner in which the Target Information Center was conducted proved particularly effective. The installation was established in Division Headquarters, immediately adjacent to the G-3 Section and the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center. The Target Information Center was conducted under the direction of an assistant G-3, who was a qualified artilleryman.

9. The Division Air Officer and the Division Naval Gunfire Officer both worked in close conjunction, and the effective control which resulted from this system was of material value throughout the operation.

10. During the 82 days of the campaign, Division Artillery functioned as a powerful and reliable supporting arm. The 191,820 rounds fired over the heads of our troops played an important part in steady advances made by the Division.

11. For additional details see Annex D, Special Action Report, 15th Marines.

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Section 16 - Public Information

1. In the period 8 May through 21 June, 1945, the Public Information Section originated and forwarded to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 671 news stories, four one-hour radio recordings, and 23 completed drawings.

2. Close contact was maintained with members of the civilian press and every effort was made to keep them informed of the Division's activities and progress. Material developed by the combat correspondents was distributed freely to the civilian correspondents in order to speed the news concerning this Division to the United States. A summary of each day's activities was telephoned to the III Corps Public Information Officer daily for relay to correspondents assigned to Headquarters, Tenth Army.

3. This section also provided transportation and protection for those members of the civilian press who visited this Division's zone of action.

4. On four occasions Public Information personnel and loud speaker equipment were utilized on G-2 psychological warfare missions.

5. Coverage of the Division's activities was accomplished by the assignment of one combat correspondent to each infantry battalion and two to the artillery regiment.

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS

I. General

The tactics employed by the enemy in Phase III of the OKINAWA Campaign were defensive in nature. Their overall concept varied little from that encountered in previous operations in the PACIFIC theatre. In execution, however, certain characteristics came to light which promise to be of great and continuing importance throughout the remainder of the PACIFIC War.

II. Terrain

The enemy's defenses were built around the rugged natural terrain features that predominated in the Division's zone of action, and the ground which the enemy chose to defend adapted itself admirably to his purpose. It consisted of a principle axial ridge line from which perpendicular ridges ran to the coast, thus providing a series of cross corridors as the basis of the defensive organization. Within the principal cross corridors there were many small precipitous hills of clay and coral formations, interspersed with widening streams that developed into estuaries as they approached the coastline.

III. Organization of the Ground

It is in this detail that the enemy demonstrated important innovations during the OKINAWA Campaign.

The terrain selected for defense had as its principal installation a strong natural line extending along the south bank of the ASA KAWA River westward through SHURI to YONABARU. The western anchor of this line lay within the 6th Marine Division's zone of action and was organized around the powerful defensive system known as SUGAR LOAF HILL (see Chapter III above).

Within this area the enemy had established a defense in depth, built around extensive cave and tunnel positions. While trench systems were not uncommon and the familiar concrete or log emplacements were occasionally encountered, the defense was based on the cave framework. Likewise, the OROKU Peninsula, a thoroughly

integrated defensive system built around a series of well organized terrain compartments, was characterized by extensive cave and tunnel construction. And lastly, in the KIYAMU-GUSUKU position, where the enemy made his final stand at the southern tip of the island, naturnal caverns were employed wherever found, and all possible effort put to their development and improvement.

This cave technique, a considerable departure from previous schemes, is worthy of detailed study as it is believed it will have material influence on operations in the principal home islands.

From careful analysis of the cave defense system coupled with interrogation of prisoners of war, it appears that the enemy decided, following defeats in the MARSHALLS and MARIANAS, to abandon the log and pillbox scheme in favor of one which would provide greater protection against our air, naval gunfire and artillery superiority. It was considered that organization of each hill and hill system into a large scale pillbox, by construction of extensive tunnels and caves within the hill itself, would result in positions which were almost impervious to our supporting arms, and at the same time would provide the defending force with strong tactical positions and adequate cover for personnel and supplies. While even the strongest pillbox is subject to destructive bombardment, a hill with caves and tunnels under 30 to 100 feet of earth and stone is essentially undestructible. It was on this principle that the cave defense was conceived.

In late 1944 the Japanese on OKINAWA initiated their cave defense program. Each tactical locality of importance was examined by the appropriate sector defense commander who laid out the basic cave and tunnel system. Thereafter, the appropriate subordinate unit commenced the necessary work employing organic troops, attached labor, BOEITAI (local militia), and quotas of native civilians, levied on a day-to-day basis. The more extensive installations, such as those embracing major caliber weapons, headquarters, or principal supply localities were constructed under the supervision of engineer troops. In every instance where practicable, native tombs were employed as entrances or firing ports.

1. Characteristics of the Cave Type Defense

a. Tunnels or galleries within the cave system sufficient to quarter and mess all personnel assigned the position.

b. Primary and alternate weapons positions on all sides of the selected terrain feature, interconnected by underground tunnels.

c. Octopus type foxholes outside the various cave mouths.

d. Communication trenches connecting important positions on the surface of the ground with the various cave entrances.

e. Development of mutual support between adjacent terrain features.

2. Defensive Technique

The defensive technique around which the cave and tunnel idea is built involves the retention of the great bulk of the enemy's forces within sheltered cave positions during period of heavy bombardment. Only such personnel as are required for observation are left in exposed positions on the surface of the ground. As the bombardment lifts infantrymen move quickly to their assigned positions in the open, availing themselves of the most advantageous fields of fire possible. As the attacker closes, the Jap, employing covered communication trenches, moves to his assigned cave position where, although his fields of fire are immediately restricted, he is well protected against all supporting arms excepting direct fire trajectory weapons.

Side exits and communication trenches are freely used in reinforcing and supporting trench positions in cases where reinforcements are required. Finally heavy emphasis is placed on the great importance of manning positions opening on the reverse slope when the attacker has overrun the forward slope apertures. By such action the defender is able to fire into the rear of advancing troops.

In summary it will be seen that the cave and tunnel defense scheme has the following advantageous characteristics:

a. It affords a maximum of protection from our powerful supporting arms.

b. It provides considerable safety for command, supply, and barracks installations.

c. It adapts well to mutual support and defense in depth since troop movements may be made underground in comparative security and without detection.

The disadvantages of the cave and tunnel defense system while by no means fatal, do offer our forces certain logical means of defeating the technique. Those disadvantages are:

a. Inflexibility; the immobile character of the technique prevents the execution of an active defense. Likewise, once a position is taken, not only are the personnel involved lost, but supplies and emplaced weapons as well.

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b. Sealing of even a small number of cave apertures result in a blind spot over which advancing infantrymen may work and ultimately seize the top of the terrain feature, from which point a methodical destruction of the remaining cave exits may be undertaken.

c. The enemy is restricted seriously in his ability to bring all of his forces to bear in defense of any point subject to particularly heavy attack, since only a limited number of weapons apertures are available. In consequence it is often the case that weapons assigned to an unengaged side cannot be committed.

Prisoner of war interrogations indicate the Japanese realization of the foregoing weaknesses, and further describe their greatest apprehension to be the tank-infantry-flame-thrower assault, preceded by heavy artillery and mortar bombardment. It would appear, therefore, that our most effective efforts towards countering the cave and tunnel technique lie in continued emphasis and expansion of the tank-infantry team.

3. General Observations on Enemy Tactics

a. Enemy antitank measures were particularly effective. 47mm guns were advantageously sited and well camouflaged. Tank hunter teams, armed with shaped charges, were organized and trained to execute suicide missions on advancing tanks. Antitank mines were used extensively and, while in many instances were not laid with uniformity, it was noted that numerous formal minefields were carefully established, and were well covered by supporting automatic weapons.

b. The enemy demonstrated a strong tendency to employ every weapon at hand, and to improvise freely in his employment of weapons. Many aircraft machine guns with improvised ground mounts were captured. Aerial bombs and artillery shells were frequently used as mines. On one occasion an enemy 8" coast defense gun was used for antitank purposes.

c. The enemy employed smoke effectively on several occasions to mask troop movements and to cover preparations for counterattack.

IV. ORGANIZATION

No innovations in basic organization were noted during the progress of Phase III. One corollary factor, however, came to light which promises to be of major importance during operations to come on the main Japanese islands.

The BOEITAI (local militia) were looked upon initially to be of small tactical significance. The manifest error of this

conclusion became apparent as the attack moved forward. As the enemy's first line forces became depleted the local home guardsmen were fed steadily into the ranks of front line units to maintain their numerical strength. These militiamen, though certainly not trained to the level of crack MANCHURIAN troops, insofar as maneuver and open warfare operations are concerned, still served most effectively in conjunction with the static cave and tunnel type defense. It is apparent that broad military education is not required of an individual whose sole task is to remain in a hole and fire in a predetermined sector until his ammunition is exhausted. In consequence, it soon developed that the enemy had a powerful source of effective replacement personnel. An added factor is the demonstrated tenacity with which the local militiamen fought in defense of their homeland until the discipline of their unit deteriorated. However, when demoralization set in among the militiamen, it took hold and developed with much greater rapidity than with the regular Japanese soldier. This is to some degree evident in prisoner of war figures compiled on conclusion of Phase III. During that phase the Division took 3040 prisoners. This number, which as without previous precedent, included 1178 native Japanese, 482 Koreans, and 1380 Okinawans. Since the number of Okinawans engaged was certainly less than the number of native Japanese, it is apparent that their willingness to surrender was far more widespread than in the case of the professional soldier. This is of significance since it in all probability indicates that a similar tendency will be encountered in the large home islands.

V. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE BY PHASES

A. THE BATTLE FOR NAHA

1. ASA KAWA to SUGAR LOAF HILL

During this phase, which commenced on 9 May, the Division was opposed by the 2d Independent Battalion, the 2d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 9th Company of the 3d Battalion, 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. This Brigade had apparently been moved into position on the enemy's left (west) flank sometime between 3 May and 8 May.

These units were supported by the 32d Independent AT Gun Battalion with probably twelve 47mm AT Guns and one Company of the 7th Independent AT Battalion with four 47mm Guns. An undetermined quantity of artillery was in general support of these troops, and it is probable that the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery groups of three 150mm guns were in direct support. A naval mortar company with 81mm mortars was also included in the task group.

The 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was in reserve in the area, and possibly the 1st Battalion of the same regiment.

As the Division drove toward the ASATO River, the 2d Independent Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment were annihilated, and the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was committed to the defense.

2. SUGAR LOAF HILL

In the battle for this critical terrain feature which commenced on 13 May, the enemy shifted the 1st Independent Battalion out of NAHA to reinforce the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment which was holding the hill. The 103d Independent Machine Cannon Battalion with twelve 20mm Guns and twelve 13.2mm heavy machine-guns was moved up for direct support.

As the fighting for the hill increased in intensity, the enemy committed a battalion of naval troops, the YAHAGUCHI Battalion, in a vigorous counter-attack on the night of 20 May. The Division was also in contact during this phase with the TABUCHI Naval Battalion. It is now believed probable that the 1st Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment and also some elements of the 15th Independent Infantry Battalion, 64th Brigade, 62d Division, were brought forward and engaged in this battle.

3. SUGAR LOAF HILL to the KOKUBA River

After the severe defeat suffered by the enemy at SUGAR LOAF HILL, he was forced to withdraw from the SHURI hill mass. To cover this withdrawal he occupied the high ground south of the ASATO with the 6th Specially Organized Regiment - a unit composed of former shipping transport personnel, and operating under the command of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. This regiment was reinforced with a naval battalion (the TABUCHI Battalion) and was charged with the defense of NAHA and the north bank of the KOKUBA GAWA. The regiment was supported by the 2d Company, 79th Field AA Battalion, and the remnants of the 103d Independent Machine Cannon Battalion. It is believed that most of these units were destroyed during this phase.

B. THE BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSULA

For some time previous to L-Day the naval forces of OKINAWA Naval Base Force had been trained as infantry. Large detachments of naval troops had been sent to SHURI and SUGAR LOAF HILL. On 27 May, two-thirds of the naval troops on OROKU PENINSULA marched south to the ITOMAN area. Due to reported friction between the Japanese Army and Navy commands, the naval troops were ordered back to OROKU PENINSULA to make their last stand there. When the division landed on OROKU PENINSULA on 4 June it was faced by elements of the IWAO, MAMORI, YAMAMI Forces and the OKINAWA Naval Base Force HQ Group. These forces had been organized into two battalions supported by a naval mortar company. An engineer unit and other small service groups also existed on the peninsula. These forces were surrounded

on the peninsula and wiped out.

C. THE CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PENINSULA

This Division, during this phase, was in contact with almost the entire remaining strength of the 32d Regiment, 24th Division. The 2d Battalion of this regiment had apparently been badly cut up at SHURI and disintegrated at TSUKASAN during the withdrawal south, but the 1st and 3d Battalions were reconstituted and faced the Division at the start of this phase. The 1st Battalion was disposed on IHIZADO Ridge while the 3d Battalion was along KUMAKA Ridge. The 63d and 64th Brigades of the 62d Division occupied a defensive position to the southward, on the KUYAMU-GUSUKU plateau and the high ground in the vicinity of MABUNI. On 18 June, the enemy attempted to reinforce his right (east) flank by shifting the 63d Brigade into the sector of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 64th Brigade into the sector to be left vacant by the 63d Brigade. Before this shift could be accomplished, the 6th Marine Division drove through the two ridge positions of the 32d Regiment and engaged the 64th Brigade in the KIYAMU-GUSUKU area. This rapid advance coupled with pressure exerted by the 7th Infantry Division on the east flank succeeded in completely destroying the enemy's capability for organized resistance.

VI. POWs TAKEN IN PHASE III: CLASSIFIED

Unit	Japanese	Okinawan	Korean
7th Fortress Construction Co	35		
3d Ind Bn	14	1	
32d Army	30	78	16
62 Div Hq	10	15	
u/i ISHI	5		
62d Div Transport Unit	5	24	
62d Div Field Hospital	3	13	
62d Div Signal Unit	6	12	1
62d Div Engineering Unit	3	11	
63d Brigade	11	26	
64th Brigade	15	44	5
12th Ind Inf Bn	67	24	
13th Ind Inf Bn	7	18	
14th Ind Inf Bn	34	21	
15th Ind Inf Bn	8	17	
21st Ind Inf Bn	13	27	
22d Ind Inf Bn	12	41	
23d Ind Inf Bn	25	38	
11th Ind Inf Bn	6	19	
1st Ind Bn	19	6	
2d Ind Bn	17	13	
27th Ind Bn	5	7	

[redacted]

Unit	Japanese	Okinawa	Korean
29th Ind Bn	4		
23d Shipping Engineers	27	15	1
26th Shipping Engineers	15	10	
11th Shipping Bn	11	5	6
29th Shipping Bn	9	9	
7th Shipping Hq		2	3
1st Shipping Transport Command	4	9	4
u/i AKATUSUKI Com Units	9		
6th Specially Organized Regt	18	35	5
81st FA Bn	4	7	
15th IMR	16	19	1
80th AA Bn	2	6	
1st Specially Organized Regt	8	19	
44th Airfield Bn	10	16	
28th Service Unit	1	2	
9th Div (TAKE)	2	2	
HIRAIZUMI Unit	1		
KAZE Unit	4	5	
u/i Ind Attack Co	1		
TOKURA Force		1	
FUKUOKA Force	1		1
Civ Spec (Attached Army and Navy Forces)	13	5	11
YASHIMISHO (AF Maintenance Unit)	1	1	
149th AA Defense Unit (Navy)	1		
OSHIMA Force		2	
TANIYA Force		1	
SHIGEMOTO Force		1	
MATSUMARA Force		1	
TOKURA Force	1		
MORITA (Med Arty Unit)	1		
NAKAGAMI Force		1	
DOKU Force	1		
ITO Force		1	
HIRA Force	1		
1st Light Mort Bn Hq	1		
KAIZAKI Force		1	
YOKASA Force		1	
NAKASHIMA Force		1	
3d Bn, 15th IMR	1		
NAKATO Force	3		
TOKUSHESU Force	1		
TAKAMOTO Force	3		
ISHIKURU Force		1	
Meteorlogical Unit (Navy)	1		
TAIWAN 19023	7	20	
TOYA 5614		1	
32d Ind Construction Unit	1		

[redacted]

Unit	Japanese	Okinawa	Korean
1st Specially Organized Brigade	15	11	
62 Ind. Transport Co		4	
IWAO Naval Force	66	24	
YAMADA Naval Force	60	110	9
HAKORI Naval Force	21	14	
OKINAWA Naval Base Force	37	23	6
ISHIZUE Naval Maintenance Unit	9	8	
3d. Ind. MG Bn	6	7	
3d. Ind. AT Bn	7	6	
83d. Construction Co	1	1	
66th Ind. Engineering Bn	7	1	
22d. Inf Regt	27	19	2
32d. Inf Regt	22	45	1
89th Ind. Inf Regt	15	24	
24th Div Rcn Regt	3	12	
24th Div Transport Regt	5	13	
42d. Field Arty Regt	4	15	
Army Hospitals	15	36	
100th Heavy Arty Bn	13	24	
3d. Ind. Maintenance Unit	8	9	
14th Ind. MG Bn	12	7	
u/i Airfield Labor Bns	4		
32d. Field Frt Depot	33	31	
503d. Spec Gd. Engr Co	2	16	
504th Spec Gd. Engr Bn	1	7	
1st Arty Int Regt	1	2	
36th Signal Regt	8	2	
5th Air Repair Depot		1	
26th Amph Raid Squadron	13	2	
27thth Amph Raid Squadron	2	2	
28th Amph Raid Squadron	1	1	
29th Amph Raid Squadron	2	1	
5th Amph Raid Hq		3	
102d. Construction (Sea Duty) Co	7	23	384
103d. Construction (Sea Duty) Co		1	
104th Construction (Sea Duty) Co		5	26
105th Construction (Sea Duty) Co		2	
101st Construction (Sea Duty) Co	1	2	
TAIA 1666 (Mort Bn)	5	4	
79th FA Bn	4	3	
80th FA Bn	2		
23d. Med. Arty Regt	2	7	

Unit	Japanese	Okinawa	Korean
7th Heavy Arty Regt	6	3	
1st Med. Arty Regt	3	3	
27th Field Water Supply and Purification Unit	9		
17th Ind. MG Bn	1	7	
4th Ind. MG Bn	8		
3d. Ind. MG Bn	2		
7th Ind. AT Bn	1		
44th IMB	33	19	
44th IMB, 2d Inf Unit	19	29	
44th IMB, Arty Unit		1	
223d. Spec Gd. Co		8	
49th L of C	33	33	
259th Ind. Transport Co	5	4	
63d. Land. Duty Co	1		
2d. Field. Frt Depot	1	4	
27th Ind. Bn	1		
27th Tank Regt		4	
3d Ind. Mort Co	1		
4th Ind. Mort Co	5	2	
5th Ind. Mort Co	1		
103d. Machine Cannon Bn	5	7	
104th Machine Cannon Bn		1	
9th Ind. Mort Co	4		
27th Ind. AA Bn	1	4	
272d. II Bn	4		
273d. II Bn	3		
32d. Ind. AT Co	9		
u/i BOEITAI		7	
HORIGUCHI Naval Force		1	
UCHIMURA Naval Force	4		
OKAMURA Naval Force		1	
MAIAZURA Naval Force	1		
MIURA Naval Force	6	1	
HIRAYAMA Naval Force	1		
ULYU Naval Force	5	1	
TSURUGI Naval Force	2		
MAIAMO Naval Force	2		
MITSUYUYE Naval Force	4		
MARUYAMA Naval Force	9	1	
KITSUDA Naval Force	1	1	
u/i BOEITAI (Navy)		9	
Merchant Marine	2		
Navy Supply Corp	1	1	
Navy Fuel Depot		1	
24th Div	1	12	
44th IMB Engr Unit		3	

Unit	Japanese	Okinawan	Korean
6th Div		1	
32d Field Ord Depot	7	11	
29th FA Construction Unit	1	5	
5th Amph Raid Base Eq		3	
MANAGUSHUKU WAN Fort Construction Co		1	
1st Inf Mort Arty Regt		3	
NAGO MP Unit		2	
ITOMAN Police Force		1	
7th Inf Inf Mort Co		2	
TOTAL	1,178	1,380	482

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. Area Secured

See Appendix 4.

2. Enemy Casualties

(All totals recorded are complete up to and including 2400, 30 June, 1945):

Enemy Killed In Action

Counted	Estimated	Buried
18,008	4,266	11,704

Prisoners of War

Military	Unarmed Laborers	Combatant Civilians	Spies
*3,254	152	4	0

*Includes 36 officers and 8 nurses.

Civilians Apprehended

Unclassified	Class I	Class II	Class III
17,938	3	158	6,209

Class I : Appear to present a potential threat.
Class II : Harmless, but of intelligence value.
Class III : All others.
Unclassified: Have not been screened.

Note: The following figures represent the complete totals for Killed in Action and Prisoners of War from 1 April 1945 to 30 June 1945:

Killed in Action: 20,532
Prisoners of War: 3,307

3. Operational Material Damage to Enemy

a. Ordnance and equipment captured:

HMGs	LMGs	Unspecified MGs	Grenade Dischargers	47mm AT Gun
108	321	2	120	19

Lewis Gun	37mm AT Gun	25mm Gun	20mm Gun	20mm AT Rifle
5	2	2	79	2

40mm Gun	90mm Mort	70mm Mort	81mm Mort	Unspecified Mort
3	13	2	23	68

Spigot Mort	Bn Gun	Regtl Gun	105mm How	75mm Gun
2	2	1	4	18

120mm How	120mm CD Gun	3" Naval Gun	4" Gun	6" Gun	8" Gun
1	16	3	1	3	4

12cm Gun	15cm Gun	Unspecified Naval Gun	13.2mm MG	Rocket
8	3	3	16	3

Rocket Launcher	Aerial Bomb	81mm AA Parachute Mort	Balloon
15	6	1	14

Parachute Demolitions	Range Finder	RDF	Radar	Radio
10	3	2	3	2

Truck	Wireless Set	Searchlight	Trailer	Auto	Half-Track
43	1	5	2	2	1

Suicide Boat	Large Barge (Daihotsu)	Small Barge (Shohatsu)
12	15 1 (possible)	3 2 (possible)

Barges-General
20

b. Aircraft material (taken at NAHA Airfield):

Parts of 53 enemy planes; (types include: Betty, Frank, Helen, Nell, Jill, Kate, George, Oscar, Topsy, Toby, Jack, Zeke, Judy, Tony, Type 2 Trainer, Model 11); 61 airplane engines; 42 propellers; 10 Baka warheads; 7 crates of balloons; 16 bomb sights (Model 2, Drift Sight, Modification 5); 1 Bomb Sight Test Stand, Model 1, Modification 1, Improvement 1; Type 9.7 Medium Bomb Shackle; Type 9.8 Special Large Bomb Shackle.

c. Ammunition and explosives:

BOMBS

No.	Type	Unit Weight	Remarks
1	30 kg		Only 1 50-kg Army bomb had been dropped from plane. Other bombs were used as contact or electrically controlled mines. The A-3 series modified to take electrical detonator were most commonly used.
12	50 kg		
8	60 kg		
9	63 kg		
15	250 kg		
8	300 kg		
4	1000 kg		

PROJECTILES

2900	12.7mm	.5 lbs	
1200	20mm	.57 lbs	
1560	37mm	2.63 lbs	
56	47mm	2.5 lbs	Duds
6	70mm	8. lbs	Duds
8	75mm	15. lbs	Duds
3	105mm	35. lbs	Duds
139	120mm	26. lbs	For naval gun. 80 in dump. 11 duds. 41 used as land mines
28	150mm	78. lbs	For army gun.
6	200mm	160. lbs	For naval gun.
76	300mm	675. lbs	

[redacted]

ROCKETS

No.	Type	Unit Weight	Remarks
34	120mm	50. lbs	High explosive on suicide boats.
2	120mm	51. lbs	Incendiary, shrapnel. First recovered on OKINAWA on suicide boats, with projectile fuze as detonator.
4	200mm	110. lbs	Ground launched. "Whistling Mimi."

LAND MINES

451	Horned mine Type JG	55. lbs	
151	Tape measure	3. lbs	
209	Box Mines	15. lbs	Average weight. Assorted fuzes.
78	Terra Cotta Type 3	11. lbs	
4	Yardstick	10. lbs	
4	Dutch Mushroom	12. lbs	
5	Magnetic	4. lbs	
4	Serrated	12. lbs	

NAVAL MINES

*1	J.C.	456. lbs	Only complete mine recovered to date.
4	J.F. (Type 94,M2)	500. lbs	One mine was constructed with skirt.
*1	J.H.	903. lbs	"Persimmon" mine. First recovered on OKINAWA. DESIGNATION NOT CONFIRMED.
*28	J.B.	484. lbs	Type 93 mine assemblies, various Mods and marks found.
*1	Improvised		Consisted of 55-gallon drum with 2 single horn mines welded to sides.

*Indicates new ordnance recovered.

[redacted]

MORTARS

No.	Type	Unit Weight	Remarks
563	50mm	1.9 lbs	
49	81mm	6.75 lbs	
3	150mm	70 lbs	
4	320mm	675 lbs	

MISCELLANEOUS

*18	Suicide Boat Warheads	685 lbs	
11	Warheads	528 lbs	2 types
*6	Flying Bangolore	20 lbs	
80	Bangolore	10 lbs	
14	Torpedo Warhead	2000 lbs	Used as land mines for road blocks
49	Molotov Cocktails	2 lbs	
72	Flare Floats	4.2 lbs	
850	Bomb Fuzes	1 lbs	A-2c Mechanical Impact Fuze-Nose B-1a Mechanical Impact Fuze-Tail B-1b Mechanical Impact Fuze-Tail C-3a Long Delay Time Fuze-Tail D-5a Aerial bursts or Impact Fuze New A-2d M.I.F. Tail New Always Acting Fuze Type 4 - 2 second delay
24	Anti-Tank Grenades	2 lbs	Conical Type
183	Grenades	1 lbs	Various Types, shrapnel and pottery
769	Incendiary Grenades	2.5 lbs	
	Loose Explosives	975 lbs	
4	Depth Charges	491 lbs	Type 2, Mod 2, 120 kg., used as auxiliary charge under land mines.

* Indicates new ordnance recovered.

4. Own Losses - Phase III

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted
a. Killed in action	54		1091
b. Died of wounds received in action	10		248
c. Wounded in action	262	4	5248
d. Missing in action	2		11
e. Injured in action	11		182
	339	4	6780

5. Own Losses - OKINAWA Operation, Phases I, II and III

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted
a. Killed in action	66		1267
b. Died of wounds received in action	11		278
c. Wounded in action	304	5	6019
d. Missing in action	2		13
e. Injured in action	17		245
	400	5	7822

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CHAPTER VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The special action reports of the various organizations of the 6th Marine Division appended hereto as Annexes A thru K contain comments and recommendations of subordinate unit commanders. In addition to those listed in the various annexes the following comments and recommendations are considered to be of such import as to merit special consideration:

1. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (Personnel):

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) Promotions:

(a) COMMENT:

The need for authority to effect field promotions of enlisted who take over and effectively discharge the responsibilities of a senior NCO during combat was further emphasized in Phase III. There are numerous instances of record within this Division of enlisted men of the rank of PFC who, of necessity, performed the duties of a Platoon Sergeant or even a First Sergeant.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Division be allowed to effect field promotions of men who, because of battle losses, assume and satisfactorily discharge in combat, the greater responsibilities of a higher ranking non-commissioned officer.

(b) COMMENT:

In some cases NCO's were found to be unqualified to perform duties consonant with their rank under combat conditions. The difficulties inherent in reduction of senior NCO's under existing regulations forestalled reduction and necessitated assignment of senior NCO's to ignominious duties considerably below their rank but continuing to allow them to undeservedly enjoy the pay and other priviliges to which their rank entitled them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That power of reduction for all enlisted ranks be decentralized by delegation of complete poweres to all division commanders.

(2) Reclassification.

(a) COMMENT:

It was found necessary to recommend various officers for reclassification for failure to satisfactorily perform duties with assault combat elements such as platoons, companies, and battalions. In some cases, these officers were known to possess qualifications for capable performance of duties of their rank in positions not requiring the possession of certain qualities of force, leadership and physical endurance so essential to the commander of an assault unit. Still their nomination for reclassification was dictated by the combination of an absence within the Division of vacancies in non-assault positions calling for officers of that rank and the desirability of removing officers from the rolls who were not performing duties consonant with their rank in order that a replacement of that rank might be requested.

RECOMMENDATION:

That some procedure for reassignment of such officers be instituted which does not carry the stigma presently associated with reclassification.

(b) COMMENT:

There were numerous cases within the Division where previously reliable and well qualified enlisted men could not satisfactorily perform the duties of their rank either by reason of physical disability, not disqualifying, but still handicapping, due to advanced age, or an inability to adjust themselves to the rigors and increased tempo of combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

Rather than reduce those NCO's who have loyally given many years of valuable service to the Marine Corps, it is considered preferable there will be instituted some procedure similar to officer reclassification but without the accompanying stigma, whereby they could be reassigned to a non-combat organization.

(3) Replacements:

(a) COMMENT:

Replacements were received in the following major drafts during Phase III:

46th	Replacement	Draft	16 0	-	428 Enl
54th	"	"	17 0	-	552 "
57th	"	"	9 0	-	580 "
55th	"	"	22 0	-	623 "
62d	"	"	28 0	-	653 "
63d	"	"	30 0	-	424 "

At no time after the first day's action in southern OKINAWA were infantry units furnished with adequate replacements to meet continuing casualties. When one regiment fell to 1800 effective strength it became necessary to transfer headquarters, pioneer, artillery and service personnel to infantry units to enable them to retain their effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION:

That planning for future operations provide for greater flexibility in furnishing replacements to units engaged with a minimum delay and that such replacements contain a great preponderance of infantry personnel with liberal allowances of tank and medical personnel.

b. MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

(a) COMMENT:

After the Division had gone to considerable trouble to convert an unorganized group of specialist personnel into an efficiently functioning military government team, upon movement of the Division the team was detached and another inexperienced group of specialists was assigned to the Division necessitating complete reorganization during actual combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

That military government teams initially assigned be allowed to remain with the Division during the entire operation. The standard counter arguments to this procedure of the desireability of allowing teams to remain in areas with which they have become familiar can be solved by closer follow-up of divisions by the semi-permanent camp and hospital teams functioning under Island Command.

(b) COMMENT:

Evacuation of civilians from temporary division internment camps to semi-permanent camps far to the rear was made the responsibility of combat divisions thereby further accentuating the already existing scarcity of transportation. Such evacuation was manifestly beyond the capabilities of the Division and was only accomplished through the assistance of III Phib Corps.

RECOMMENDATION:

That responsibility for the evacuation of civilians from the internment camps of divisions engaged in combat be assumed by Island Command.

c. CASUALTY REPORTS:

(1) Reports of death and missing in action.

(a) COMMENT:

Transmission of casualty reports via communication facilities resulted in frequent confusion due to transmission failures, reports apparently reaching their destination garbled beyond intelligibility. These failures necessitated a continuous interchange of dispatches seeking clarification of previous dispatches.

RECOMMENDATION:

That casualty reports be submitted by mailbrief, or if dispatch is considered more appropriate, that paraphrased airmail copies be forwarded simultaneously with the dispatch and that addressees withhold requests for clarification of garbled dispatches until arrival of the paraphrased airmail report.

(2) Admission and Disposition Reports and Reports of Evacuation:

(a) COMMENT:

Almost all the difficulty encounterd by this Division resulted from lack of information from medical and evacuation facilities outside the Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That in an operation of the magnitude of this one, where tracing of patients is complicated by a confusion of numerous and varied routes and means of evacuation both

within the target area and to rear areas, some central agency be established to record the movement and evacuation of patients of all units, such records being open to consultation by any unit uncertain as to the correct status of any of its personnel.

d. MORALE:

(a) COMMENT:

There was an initial delay in receipt of mail at the target area. To correct this, the Division Postal Officer was sent to Guam in an effort to speed the forwarding of mail. He was able to arrange shipment of such backlog of mail as had developed in the MARIANAS area and was also able to arrange shipment of a considerable amount of parcel post and second class mail that had accumulated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That postal forwarding agencies be impressed with the fact that prompt and frequent receipt of mail is the foremost means of raising morale of personnel engaged in combat.

(b) COMMENT:

The Division Quartermaster established a reception center for personnel returning from hospitals. The center furnished barber, bathing and laundry facilities. Personnel were issued new clothes, equipment shortages were filled, and Red Cross facilities were made available. Personnel were retained at the center for approximately twenty-four hours and then transported to their units.

RECOMMENDATION:

That establishment of such a center be made standard operating procedure in any operation of relatively long duration where personnel are returned direct from nearby hospitals to duty.

[redacted]

2. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence):

a. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE:

(1) COMMENT:

The Combat Intelligence Line consisting of an officer in charge, a journal man, a worksheet man, and a situation map man functioned very satisfactorily. Three teams were formed which relieved each other in sequence. In this manner, a continuous Combat Intelligence Line operation was maintained.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this information be disseminated to other combat intelligence units.

(2) COMMENT:

From experience gained in this operation, it was found that the following duties should be performed by one officer who was given the title of "Recorder".

(a) Preparation of Periodic Reports
(b) Intelligence Observer
(c) G-2 Liaison Officer

RECOMMENDATION:

That this information be disseminated to other divisions.

(3) COMMENT:

It was found that the G-2 Periodic Report was the most effective means of disseminating intelligence information. The following procedure was followed in the preparation of this report.

The G-2 "Recorder" visited regimental command posts, division outposts, and other key installations during the day to accumulate information for his report. The Order of Battle Officer simultaneously maintained close liaison with the Language Section and acquired information derived from interrogation of prisoners of war and translation of captured documents. Upon the return of the G-2 Recorder, a conference was held with the Order of Battle Officer and the Officer in Charge of the Combat Intelligence Line Team to acquaint the G-2 Recorder with information that had been received during his absence.

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[redacted]

Near the close of the period, the G-2 held a conference of subsection heads. Information received during the day was discussed and the Periodic Report was formulated. At the close of the period, the G-2 Recorder prepared his report.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this information be disseminated to other combat intelligence units.

(4) COMMENT:

During the operation several men were fired upon due to their failure to remember the pass word. It is believed that pass words used during the operation were too complex and proved difficult to remember.

RECOMMENDATION:

That pass words of a simpler form, such as cities, states, colors, names, be employed and remain in effect for longer periods of time.

(5) COMMENT:

It was found that the number of typewriters allotted to the G-2 Section was not sufficient to enable the section to turn out the volume of work required of it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the number of typewriters in the G-2 Section be increased to the following: 3 standard machines for Combat Intelligence, 1 standard machine for the Language Section, 1 portable machine for the Photo Section, and 1 standard machine and 5 portable machines for the Public Information Section.

(6) COMMENT:

Following Phases I and II of the OKINAWA JIMA Operation it was recommended that additional vehicles be provided for the G-2 Section. The operation in Phase III served to confirm this recommendation. Transportation is required by the G-2 Section for the use of collection teams, who are often required to move rapidly from one location to another and to transport documents; by outpost teams and for the movement of outpost teams in the field; for the transport of psychological warfare equipment; for the transport of documents from lower echelons; for the transport of photo personnel on intelligence and public informa-

tion photo missions; for G-2 liaison officers and observers who make daily visits to higher, lower, and adjacent units; and for other essential purposes.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the following vehicles be provided to the G-2 Section: five ¼-ton trucks, two ¼-ton trailers, and one 1-ton truck.

b. PHOTO SECTION:

(1) COMMENT:

The work of this section fell into three general categories:

(a) Recording the progress and events of the operation by both still and motion picture photographs.
(b) The panoramic photographing of enemy terrain and the dissemination of these pictures to higher and lower units.
(c) The collection and recording of still pictures for the Division photographic library to be used for intelligence, training, and historical purposes.

Intelligence photographs were used extensively in this operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all combat photographers be given instruction in the application of photography for intelligence purposes.

(2) COMMENT:

Still and cine film were sent unprocessed to CINCPAC. All intelligence pictures were processed in the field and sufficient prints were retained by Division for file and distribution to units concerned. In order to check on work done by still photographers, an occasional film-pack was processed in the field. This enabled photographers to correct mistakes, both technical and mechanical. Negatives with two prints were then forwarded to CINCPAC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That division photo units periodically receive a report from the Photographic Officer, Headquarters, Marine Corps, pertaining to work done by that unit during an operation. Such

reports would materially assist in improving results obtained and give units the opportunity of making timely corrections.

(3) COMMENT:

Information has been received that the proposed table of organization provides for a reduction of personnel permanently attached to the Division Photo Section. If such is the case, greater care than has been experienced in the past must be exercised in the selection of combat photographers. It has been found that a large number of photographers were not fitted for combat duty.

RECOMMENDATION:

That personnel assigned to combat photography possess a knowledge of photography, physical endurance, and are psychologically suited for combat duty.

(4) COMMENT:

Photographers assigned to this Division arrived just prior to departure from the final staging area. This prevented proper briefing and indoctrination in division photographic section procedure.

RECOMMENDATION:

That photographers from the Photo Pool be assigned to Division Photo Sections sufficiently in advance of embarkation to correct the above deficiencies.

(5) COMMENT:

During briefings given by the Division Photographic Officer, prior to the operation, photographers stated that at schools and units to which they formerly had been attached, they were instructed not to photograph certain subjects, such as: dead Japanese with faces showing, dead Marines, civilians in stockades, faces of Japanese prisoners, etc.

RECOMMENDATION:

That photographic personnel be instructed to photograph these subjects unless otherwise directed. It is believed that inasmuch as photographic coverage is of documentary value, the horrors of war and conditions as encountered should be portrayed.

(6) COMMENT:

It was determined during the operation that the pistol was the only practical weapon for photographers to carry in combat.

RECOMMENDATION:

That photographers be armed with pistols.

(7) COMMENT:

The Division Photographic Section is allotted only one 35mm Eyemo Camera, which was found to be inadequate for complete 35mm coverage of the operation. In order to give full coverage, the 16mm camera, of which there were sufficient numbers, was used exclusively. From experience gained it is deemed desirable that only one type of movie camera be employed by a division photographic unit. Since practically all cine film has newsreel possibilities, it is believed that the 16mm color film is the best for all purposes because of its adaptability to enlargement.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all cine film required of division photographic sections be 16mm color.

(8) COMMENT:

Experience has proven that the 16mm Bell and Howell Automaster with wide angle 1" and 3" lenses is by far the best combat cine camera. Its lightness, ease of handling, loading, and durability make it particularly suitable for combat work.

The 4" x 5" Speed Graphic was found to be the best all-around still camera for combat work. The photographers did not use the "Combat" Graphic because of its bulk and mechanical deficiencies. The cocking and release mechanism for front shutter was constantly getting out of order. The Kodak "35" and the Medalist were not used because of inferiority for reproduction purposes as compared with the Speed Graphic.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the only cine camera issued to division photographic sections be the 16mm Bell and Howell Automaster with wide angle 1" and 3" lenses.

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That the only still camera issued to division photographic sections be the 4" x 5" Speed Graphic Camera.

(9) COMMENT:

The Photo Trailer is an excellent innovation and proved invaluable during the operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a print-washer and a print-drier be provided the Division Photo Section to be used in the Photo Trailer.

That the water tank in the Photo Trailer be increased in capacity from the present 55 gallons to 300 gallons.

(10) COMMENT:

The wooden "Crown" tripod for still cameras was found to be unsatisfactory. Moisture causes the wood to swell and despite care given, the legs bind.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a lightweight but sturdy metal tripod replace the wooden one.

(11) COMMENT:

Photoflash was used extensively for interiors. The synchronizors need frequent adjustment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a synchro-testing device be included in the T/A.

(12) COMMENT:

Due to rough usage in the field, photo equipment required frequent minor repairs and adjustments which could not be made without adequate tools.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a small kit containing basic tools required for normal camera repair be furnished each division photographic section.

c. LANGUAGE SECTION

(1) COMMENT:

The increased demand for language personnel resulting from an operation on Japanese soil is self-evident. Perhaps on no previous campaign has so much vital intelligence information been received through the employment of language personnel. Accurate enemy order of battle information was obtained from captured documents and prisoner of war interrogations.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the complement of division enlisted language personnel be increased to eighteen men.

(2) COMMENT:

It became apparent during the operation that the services of a clerk are essential to write the volume of interrogation and translation reports required.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a clerk be provided for division language sections. It would not be necessary for the clerk to be Japanese language personnel.

(3) COMMENT:

Great quantities of enemy equipment and documents were captured during the operation which were of primary interest to JICPOA and were reported by division to higher echelon. In most instances, G-2, 6th Marine Division, was not advised as to the disposition of the articles of enemy equipment reported, so it was assumed that they had been evacuated by the proper authorities. After the close of the campaign, orders were received by division to evacuate all items of enemy ordnance to a designated collecting point. Discrepancies unavoidably occurred in the amount of enemy ordnance reported by division and that actually turned in at the close of the campaign.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a JICPOA team, consisting of enemy equipment, interrogation, and translation personnel be assigned to the Division G-2 Section prior to embarkation for an operation and that such personnel remain attached to division for the purpose of supervising the evacuation of intelligence material.

f. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

(1) COMMENT:

In view of the unprecedented success achieved during the operation in persuading large numbers of the enemy to surrender, it is considered advisable that a general psychological warfare campaign be mapped out well in advance of D-Day and that pertinent material be supplied to division and to lower echelons prior to embarkation.

The instruments of psychological warfare must be considered weapons of opportunity. They are of particular value only in the presence of a disintegrating situation, but, under such circumstances, it is of great importance that there be a sufficient quantity of psychological warfare equipment to insure coverage of the entire front.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Division be provided with nine portable loudspeakers capable of more than a range of five hundred yards. Two of these loudspeakers would be issued to each regiment and three would remain at the G-2 Section.

(2) COMMENT:

By far, the most potent propoganda messages are those composed by local civilians and prisoners of war, and the most satisfactory broadcasts are those in which such persons are utilized. Natives attached to the G-2 Language Section have been found to be excellent for these purposes, when employed under the careful supervision of language personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the drafting of leaflets be made the responsibility of division and that higher echelon merely set the limitations of promises that may be made in these leaflets.

(3) COMMENT:

A total of 3,208 prisoners of war taken and processed fell into the following categories:

	Number	Percent of Total
Japanese Soldiers	1224	38.2
Okinawan Boeitai	1492	46.5
Korean Laborers	492	15.3

In this group there were 41 officers including 2 lieutenant commanders, 4 lieutenants (senior grade), 4 ensigns, 10 first lieutenants, 7 second lieutenants, 13 warrant officers, and 1 probationary officer.

The conclusion which may be drawn, is that in the case of Okinawan home guardsmen, propaganda was definitely successful in inducing them to surrender. It is possible, although not conclusively proved, that the willingness of the Okinawan home guardsmen to surrender caused a number of Japanese to surrender. The fact that approximately 850 Japanese were captured from 17 June to 21 June bears out this theory. In one instance during the campaign, two Korean laborers induced a Japanese soldier to surrender. It is believed probable that if determined efforts are made in future campaigns, Japanese home guardsmen can be induced to surrender.

RECOMMENDATION:

That propaganda be directed at the home guardsmen some time prior to landing.

e. ORDER OF BATTLE SECTION:

(1) COMMENT:

Due to the magnitude of this operation and the large number of enemy units involved, it was necessary to assign a language officer and two clerks to maintain the complete order of battle records.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the G-2 Section be increased by one language officer and two enlisted clerks to perform the above duties.

(2) COMMENT:

Interrogation of prisoners of war was not the primary source of Order of Battle information during Phase III of the operation, as it was during Phases I and II. Due to a more static situation documents became, as in former campaigns, the primary source of unit identifications. Trusted native civilians were used to translate documents.

It was definitely noted that the Japanese were more security conscious than in previous operations. Front-line documents such as letters, diaries, and lower-echelon orders were relatively scarce. Identification tags were seldom found on enemy dead.

RECOMMENDATION:

That local civilians be employed to assist in the translation of documents, handling of prisoners of war, and psychological warfare. Their knowledge of local linguistic peculiarities and names is of great assistance to translators.

(3) COMMENT:

In accordance with a Tenth Army directive, prisoners of war were to be classified as "soldiers" and "unarmed laborers". In the final phases of the campaign the enemy employed service elements as combat troops. These units, which were well armed, fought stubbornly as evidenced by the heavy casualties suffered by this Division. Upon capture it was found that these service troops had been assigned to combat units as replacements and therefore should be classified as soldiers.

RECOMMENDATION:

That prisoners be divided into two categories, namely, "first line troops" and "second line troops". In the first category, all members of the National Army, 1st and 2d Reserves should be placed. All other prisoners of war should be included in the second category.

f. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH INTERPRETATION SECTION

(1) COMMENT:

The card-system of target designations employed by the Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section proved highly successful during the operation. This system of maintaining a card file of located targets in all enemy-held territory systematizes the interpretive results of the section and offers itself as a simple but accurate source of references. Target information recorded on cards came from all sources of intelligence information, in addition to aerial photograph interpretation.

The quantity and quality of photographs received were excellent. An example of the quantity in which photographs were furnished when requested was that of OROKU Peninsula, when over 10,000 photographs were supplied to the Division.

The pinpointing of targets was often inaccurate due to existing errors in maps. All revisions of the AMS 1:25,000 map were unsatisfactory from the aerial photo interpretation standpoint.

RECOMMENDATION:

That every effort be made to increase the accuracy of maps for future operations.

That 1:5,000 gridded mosaics be furnished in sufficient quantity so that all units, including aviation, naval gunfire spotters, and air observers, can be provided with copies prior to an operation. All targets should be designated on this gridded mosaic. Though small errors might arise due to the grid, these errors would be compensated for by standardization in target designation which such a gridded mosaic would afford. This gridded mosaic would not be designed to replace the map, but to augment it.

(2) COMMENT:

Numerous ungridded mosaics were supplied to the Aerial Photograph Interpretation Section by higher echelons. While of considerable value, their usefulness would have been increased by superposition of a grid.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all mosaics be either gridded or contoured prior to delivery to division.

(3) COMMENT:

Combat obliques have proven their worth in this operation and those furnished the Division by higher echelon were excellent. The value of such obliques taken from enemy territory toward our front-lines should not be underestimated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That combat obliques be furnished in quantity in future operations.

g. PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION

(1) COMMENT:

In general, the Public Information Section functioned in the third phase of the operation in the same manner as it did in Phases I and II.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

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3. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 (Operations):

The comments and recommendations expressed in the report on Phases I and II were substantiated by subsequent operations in Phase III. In addition to those comments the following are submitted:

a. TRAINING:

COMMENT:

The success of the 6th Marine Divison on OKINAWA is believed to have stemmed mainly from the realistic training which the Division underwent prior to embarkation. Insistance upon extensive small unit exercises, frequent and realistic combined arms training, and large unit exercises of considerable duration are considered an essential. Likewise, the intensive conduct of formal schools for both officers and enlisted cannot be overemphasized.

b. ORGANIZATION:

COMMENT:

The recommendation concerning a reconnaissance element in each regimental headquarters and service company and the addition of 54 men per infantry regiment for flame thrower demolitions employment were re-emphasized during Phase III.

c. TANK REQUIREMENTS:

COMMENT:

A pressing and continuing need for more tanks was apparent throughout the period. For specific recommendations see Annex E, Special Action Report, 6th Tank Battalion.

d. MINE LIFTING PERSONNEL:

COMMENT:

As the enemy's employment of mines increases, there is growing evidence that the presently established engineer mine lifting personnel are inadequate. During the OKINAWA Operation certain engineer personnel were assigned the 6th Tank Battalion permanently; they lived and worked with that organization throughout the campaign, not returning to parent control until the operation was completed. This worked a hardship on the 6th Engineer Battalion in that other requirements existed for more mine lifting personnel than remained available

RECOMMENDATION

That there be established, within the tank battalion, a mine disposal platoon of one officer and 38 enlisted to serve as an organic element of the tank battalion. See Annex E, Special Action Report, 6th Tank Battalion.

e. ROCKETS:

COMMENT:

Rockets demonstrated themselves to be most effective in delivering concentrated shock effect against targets where great accuracy was not required. It is considered that they are of sufficient value to warrant their incorporation within the Division framework.

RECOMMENDATION:

That a rocket platoon, similar in composition to the present provisional rocket detachment, and employing the latest model spin stabilized rocket, be made an organic element of each regimental weapons company.

f. 37MM GUNS:

COMMENT:

No opportunity was presented for employment of the 37mm gun in its role as an antitank weapon. They were used, however, on numerous occasions as a front line direct fire supporting weapon -- actually in the form of a large caliber sniper's rifle. Caves were neutralized and enemy weapons silenced by 37mm guns pressed aggressively forward to the front line. At no time, however, was any regiment able to use as many as two-thirds of its 37mm guns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That one 37mm platoon be deleted from each regimental weapons company.

g. RECOILLESS WEAPONS:

COMMENT:

Recoilless weapons were not tactically employed during the campaign, but test and demonstrations indicated that the principle has considerable promise.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That this Division be furnished at least three 75mm and 4.2" recoilless weapons with 1500 rounds of each type of ammunition for test.

h. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

(1) COMMENT:

LCI type supporting craft were employed more extensively and with better coordination than during previous phases. Where neutralization of an area for a long period of time was desirable and where reef conditions were favorable, these craft proved invaluable in delivering fire. Maximum advantage was taken of their neutralization capabilities as can be seen in the tabulation of ammunition expended. Some difficulty was experienced in keeping on the target, but by the employment of a cruiser with organic air spot for counterbattery in protection of the LCI division, and coaching on of LCI mean point of impact (MPI) using cruiser air spot, the difficulty was remedied.

These craft were also employed in conjunction with unit intelligence and language officers in contacting enemy soldiers and civilians in inaccessible coastline areas inducing them to surrender.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above uses, and any logical additional employment of these invaluable small craft, should be widely disseminated to interested parties.

(2) COMMENT:

VOF fighter air spot showed marked improvement over that during Phases I and II. Perhaps this is due to operation being conducted from airfields instead of carriers, as well as to experience and practice. Reliefs were made on time. Relieving planes were properly briefed, and their spotting skill was superior to that of shipboard plane spotters. VOF spotters were used to spot for cruisers and battleships when organic float planes were not operational.

RECOMMENDATION:

More extensive use of VOF in future operations will undoubtedly increase spotting efficiency.

(3) COMMENT:

Communication with VOF planes is superior to that with SOC or OS float-type spotting planes. VOF spotting planes communicate with ship, plane and themselves, resulting in more exacting control of fires.

RECOMMENDATION:

Number of VOF planes available should be increased.

(4) COMMENT:

This Division was keenly disappointed to learn that VOF were ordered not to strike with rockets or machine guns on targets of opportunity which could be best attacked by this weapon. Strikes of this nature were conducted on MOTOBU Peninsula during Phase II with marked success and excellent control.

RECOMMENDATION:

VOF spotting planes should report on station with full armament load, so that advancing troops may take advantage of a most formidable weapon of opportunity.

(5) COMMENT:

The overall control exercised on the naval gunfire control net was excellent and showed great improvement over Phases I and II, resulting in increased efficiency and coordination. Net discipline and observation of the rules of chain of command were rigidly adhered to. The employment of a supplementary radio channel for NGF administrative traffic and destruction reports proved invaluable in keeping the naval gunfire control communication net available for its intended use.

RECOMMENDATION:

A similar control setup should be employed on future operations.

(6) COMMENT:

Enemy artillery, not necessarily active during the day, would become quite active and most annoying after spotting planes had withdrawn at evening time to parent ships. Consequently, when gun flashes were observed, several fire support ships of a small command group would be ordered to shoot counterbattery blindly at the suspected enemy gun without regard to a safe line of fire. This practice endangered front line troops.

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RECOMMENDATION:

Ships should be assigned a counterbattery zone of responsibility commensurate with operating areas at sea. This was done during the closing days of the operation and should be doctrine in the future.

The following is a tabular representation of the number of rounds of naval gunfire ammunition employed by this Division during Phase III of the OKINAWA Campaign:

	No of Missions	HC Major Calibers	5" Secondary	4.2 Mort & 5" Rockets	5" Stars
Division Control	154	1,621	5,516	21,624	
4th Marines	203	493	7,685		613
22d Marines	262	2,506	13,386		2,074
29th Marines	77	506	3,921		882
Totals	696	5,126	30,508	21,624	3,569

i. AIR SUPPORT:

The comments and recommendations outlined in the report on Phases I and II apply to Phase III of the OKINAWA Operation. In addition the following are submitted:

(1) COMMENT:

Large bombs and rockets were requested on numerous occasions for use against strongly defended and deeply entrenched enemy positions. In spite of the fact that the supply of 2000 pound bombs in the area was more than adequate to comply with these requests only one strike group with nine such bombs was furnished this Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

The types of defensive positions encountered on this operation indicate that provisions should be made for the use of the largest bombs available. It is recommended that heavy bombs be used in preliminary strikes and that they be made available for continuing support missions.

(2) COMMENT:

Extensive use was made of supply drops to troops operating over difficult or impassable terrain. The supply planes were directed to the area by using the SAR net, thus putting an additional burden on a circuit that was already crowded.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That a separate frequency be provided for air delivery missions.

j. ARTILLERY SUPPORT:

(1) COMMENT:

Since organization for combat remained basically the same throughout the operation, frequently, when reinforcing fires were required from units not organic, coordination had to be effected through devious channels of command and communication. This resulted in delays and difficulties in coordination. In future operations even more artillery may have to be employed, and the situation will not warrant such delays.

RECOMMENDATION:

That consideration be given to the use of flexible groupments in the organization for combat.

(2) COMMENT:

Artillery had little effect on the enemy disposed in caves. Tanks were used to a considerable extent in closing or neutralizing caves. However, it is considered that the caliber was inadequate.

RECOMMENDATION:

With the prospect of the enemy continuing cave warfare, it is recommended that a heavy caliber gun be obtained on a self-propelled mount. It is suggested that the M26 tank be considered for such employment.

(3) COMMENT:

Fires were frequently placed on targets which appeared formidable but had actually been previously attacked and destroyed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That responsible echelons circulate accurate destruction reports.

(4) COMMENT:

The Division Target Information Center was established and operated at Division Headquarters in close proximity to the G-3 Section. It was considered that closer coordination with supporting arms could be obtained by establishing it there. Results were most satisfactory.

Other advantages realized were the early availability of the operational developments and plans and ready access to the latest target data from the target gathering agencies of the Division. These agencies centered at Division Headquarters and were indoctrinated to forward all information obtained to the Target Information Center. Information was obtained from the G-2 Aerial Photo Interpretation Section, Artillery S-2 sections, Naval gunfire air spot, Division tactical air spot, Corps tactical air observers, Prisoner of War reports and front line units.

RECOMMENDATION:

That provisions be made to provide personnel - two officers and six enlisted - and equipment for the operation of the Target Information Center at Division Headquarters.

(5) COMMENT:

It was often found that a combination of supporting arms attacking a strongpoint was the only method in which that area could be cleared of the enemy. Naval gunfire reinforced artillery fires, and both arms either followed up or preceded air strikes with bombardment.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(6) COMMENT:

Enemy artillery was frequently attacked by adjusting one or two guns then firing three or six rounds for effect with a battery or a battalion. Although neutralization was obtained the effect sought was not. As a consequence the target had to be attacked again when it became active.

RECOMMENDATION:

That observer's training emphasize the technique of attacking targets by precision adjustment with one gun.

(7) COMMENT:

Reports as to the effect of firing were at times inaccurate. This not only resulted in an erroneous estimate of the enemy's strength and disposition but also affected the counter-battery program and the preparation of fire plans.

RECOMMENDATION:

None.

(8) COMMENT:

Even though counter-battery was accomplished to a degree by Divisional Artillery, it is believed that an efficient program is beyond the capabilities of a division. Not only was difficulty and delay experienced in clearing and observing missions in adjacent zones, but coordination between flash stations of own and adjacent units was so slow as to be most ineffective.

RECOMMENDATION:

That counter-battery be exclusively a corps function.

4. By Assistant Chief of Staff G-4:

a. GENERAL:

(1) The experience gained in this phase of the operation has confirmed the recommendations made in the previous action report, with exceptions as listed in the succeeding paragraphs.

b. MOTOR TRANSPORT:

(1) COMMENT:

If, as appears probable, Marine divisions are to be employed with Army divisions, at considerable distances from the original beachhead, and drawing supplies from supply points whose distances from the front lines are based upon the Army's ability to transport supplies, then the transport of a Marine division should be augmented above that previously recommended.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That the organic motor transport of infantry regiments be increased as follows:

2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each battalion
2 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each weapons company
8 Trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, to each regimental headquarters company.

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(2) That the division be provided with two (2) motor transport battalions, one (1) organic and one (1) to be assigned prior to mounting out. If deemed more economical, additional motor transport battalions could be assigned to Corps on a basis of one (1) for each division.

(3) That three (3) M5 tractors and preferably nine (9) one-ton, rubber-tired trailers be assigned the division for emergency supply in extremely muddy weather. Separate recommendations regarding the use of the M5 tractor are being submitted in the action report of the 15th Marines.

(2) COMMENT:

At the end of a two-weeks period of heavy rain, the Motor Transport Battalion had approximately forty percent of its 2½-ton, cargo trucks deadlined for lack of brake lining and brake shoes. Every effort had been made to obtain these items prior to mounting out and during the first phase of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Division carry brake replacement parts for fifty percent of its motor transport.

c. CLASS II ITEMS:

(1) COMMENT:

Later echelons of resupply contained adequate Class II items. The apparent shortage of these items noted in the previous action report resulted from delays in unloading of resupply ships, rather than from failure to appraise the need for such items.

RECOMMENDATION:

That proportionate spare parts, vehicles, paulins and tentage be set up to arrive prior to L plus 15.

(2) COMMENT:

The Army field boot with extra leather top, worn in lieu of leggins, has proved popular. Although these boots were not issued, men obtained them whenever possible, either from Army sources or by adding the upper leather to the issue field shoe.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Army type field boot or similar high-topped boot be adopted for field use in lieu of the present field shoe.

(3) COMMENT:

The jungle hammock was used by the Division during the operation. Comments from using units are uniform in their praise. The hammock is light, mosquito and insect proof, dry in wet weather and comfortable.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the jungle hammock be furnished during combat operations on a basis of one per individual.

5. By Division Surgeon:

(a) COMMENT:

The jeep ambulances authorized by the Table of Organization for the medical battalion proved too light and were unable to carry profitable pay loads of wounded. On occasion this small ambulance was unable to move on wet and rutted roads.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that all jeep ambulances in the Medical Battalion be replaced by larger field type ambulances, preferably the Dodge with four-wheel drive and low silhouette, retaining the jeep ambulances now included in the Table of Organization for infantry regiments.

(b) COMMENT:

It was found that with a small motor transport group now included in each medical company the maintenance of transportation was inclined to be spotty, i.e., one company would be outstanding in this respect, one good, one fair, and one unsatisfactory.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that a motor transport section be included in the Table of Organization for the medical battalion where all transport of the battalion could be kept in a motor pool, serviced, and assigned to each organic unit by a dispatcher on request.

(c) COMMENT:

The surgical trailers constructed by the Medical Battalion during the training phase and in Phases I and II of the OKINAWA Operation proved exceedingly satisfactory, and were of great value in rapid movement.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that one surgical trailer be provided for each medical company.

(d) COMMENT:

The vehicles at present in the Table of Organization for the medical battalion are inadequate when an operation involves rapid and frequent movement over a large land mass.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that one 6x6 truck be added to the Table of Organization for each medical company, and that at least two 6x6 trucks be assigned to Headquarters and Service Company of the battalion, to be used to back up any unit which is required to advance rapidly with its equipment and personnel intact. It is further recommended, if the recommendation in paragraph b. of this report be accomplished, that this extra transportation be placed in the motor transport section.

(e) COMMENT:

The plywood operating rooms which were furnished each medical company proved most unsatisfactory. They became warped during wet weather, and went to pieces after they were set up and taken down more than twice. The time interval required to set this unit up in the field is excessive.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this unit be discontinued as equipment for the medical battalion in a Marine division.

(f) COMMENT:

There has been no provision in the supply table for a small anesthesia field unit. In the OKINAWA Operation, when each medical company did a tremendous amount of surgery, the absence of such a unit was keenly realized. Several were provided by local construction, and one Japanese unit was renovated and used.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that a small anesthesia field unit be added to each medical company to facilitate the surgical teams; this unit to be a gas-oxygen apparatus with ether attachment.

(g) COMMENT:

All field units and supplies as furnished by the Supply Depot, Brooklyn, New York, were found to be adequate and were securely crated and packed. No breakage was noted. All items on the Supply Table requisitioned were promptly furnished, with the exception of brandy, which became available in sufficient quantity only after landing in the target area. This item has a definite medicinal value in the field, and its intelligent use has proved many times to have been a life saving measure.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that an adequate supply of brandy be made available for Marine Divisions prior to embarking for their target area.

(h) COMMENT:

Replacements of trained hospital corpsmen for a Marine division during combat are difficult to obtain, due to many factors -- transportation, availability of such personnel, and delays in dispatches and correspondence reaching proper echelons.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that replacements of hospital corpsmen, the number to be determined by the computation of casualty figures of previous operations, be embarked with each Marine division as a replacement pool and accompany them to the target area. This would obviate the necessity of cannibalizing medical companies and shore party personnel to make up for attrition in forward areas.

6. By Division Engineer:

For comments and recommendations on engineer matters see Annex F; Special Action Report, 6th Engineer Battalion.

7. By Shore Party Commander:

For comments and recommendations on Shore Party procedure see Annex G, Special Action Report, 6th Pioneer Battalion.

6th Mar Div
In the field
30 April, 1945, 1600

Opn O
No. 49-45

Maps: (a) 1:25,000 RYUKYU-RETTO
(b) 1:100,000 RYUKYU-RETTO

Task Orgn

a. 4th Mar (Reinf) — Col SHAPLEY

Co A 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co A 6th MT Bn
1st Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
1st Plat S&S Co (less PX, Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)
1st Mar War Dog Plat

b. 22d Mar (Reinf) — Col SCHNEIDER

Co B 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co B 6th MT Bn
2d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
2d Plat S&S Co (less PX, Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)

c. 29th Mar (Reinf) — Col WHALING

Co C 6th Med Bn
1st Plat Co C 6th MT Bn
3d Plat Ord Co (less Arty Sec)
3d Plat S&S Co (less PX, Bkry and Graves Reg Secs)

d. 15th Mar (Reinf) — Col LUCKEY

15th Mar
Co E 6th Med Bn

e. Tank Gp — LtCol DENIG

6th Tank Bn
Tank Maint Plat, Ord Co

f. Engr Gp — Maj SACKETT

6th Engr Bn
3d Plat 1st Bomb Disp Co

g. Ser Gp — LtCol ENTRINGER

6th Ser Bn (less Dets)
5th Prov Rocket Det

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h. 1st Armd Amph Bn — LtCol METZGER

i. 6th Med Bn (less Dets) — LtComdr COWAN

j. 6th MT Bn (less Dets) — LtCol GOULD

k. Div Hq Trs — LtCol STEPHENSON

Hq Bn
6th JASCO (less Dets)

1. Enemy continues to offer stiff resistance in XXIV Corps Z of action. See current G-2 summaries.

2. 6th Mar Div moves by motor and naval craft during period 2-6 May 45 to southern OKINAWA preliminary to commitment in that area.

3. a. 4th Mar (Reinf): Commencing 4 May move overland by truck convoy to designated assembly area. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

b. 22d Mar (Reinf): Commencing 5 May move overland by truck convoy to designated assembly area. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

c. 29th Mar (Reinf): Commencing 3 May move overland by truck convoy to designated assembly area. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

d. 15th Mar (Reinf): Commencing 3 May move 15th Mar to designated assembly areas. Move all tracked vehicles by assigned assault shipping. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

e. Tank Gp: Commencing 4 May move in two echelons overland to designated assembly area. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

f. Engr Gp: Commencing 2 May move tracked vehicles by assigned assault shipping and wheeled vehicles overland to designated assembly areas. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan. Immediately upon arrival of equipment in area commence improvement of road from 9289 DOG to 9192 OBOE.

g. 6th Ser Bn: Commencing 2 May move tracked vehicles by assigned assault shipping and wheeled vehicles overland to designated assembly area. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

h. 1st Armd Amph Bn: Commencing 4 May move tracked vehicles by assigned assault shipping and wheeled vehicles overland to assigned assembly areas. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

i. 6th Med Bn (less Dets): Commencing 3 May move to designated assembly area by truck convoy. See Annex A, Opn overlay and Annex B, Movement Plan.

j. 6th MT Bn: Commencing 2 May move tracked vehicles by assigned assault shipping, and maintenance vehicles overland in 2 echelons, to designated assembly area. Provide cargo vehicles for troop movement. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

k. Div Hq Trs: Commencing 3 May move to designated assembly area in 2 echelons. Provide MPs to control traffic on route of march. See Annex A, Opn overlay, and Annex B, Movement Plan.

x. (1) Truck transportation will be provided each Inf Regt in accordance with Annex B, Movement Plan, on the afternoon of the day preceding the scheduled move.

(2) All elements which are transported by water will embark at NAGO in accordance with instructions to be issued later. On debarkation assemble in area in vicinity of debarkation beaches to be designated by ISCOM.

(3) All motor movement will be by convoy. Vehicles on road maintain 40 Yd interval. Sub-serials not to exceed 20 vehicles.

(4) Each vehicle maintain antiaircraft sentinals.

(5) Upon arrival at assembly areas all units go into bivouac. Disperse vehicles, dig fox holes and employ all possible Cam measures against Air Atk and for protection from falling antiaircraft fragments. Units provide own local security, to consist only of interior guard.

(6) All movements to be completed prior to 1800, 6 May 45.

4. See Adm O No 2-45.

5. a. 6th Mar Div Adv Msg Con 8989 DOG - 1. Subordinate units report location of CPs on establishment.

b. Furnish 5 radio jeeps to MT Co 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 May 45 for use in traffic control.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN SHEPHERD:

J. C. McQUEEN
Col, USMC
CofS

Annexes:

A - Opn overlay.
B - Movement Plan

Distribution: Special

Official:

V. H. KRULAK
LtCol, USMC
G-3