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Childhood and High School Years

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BGEN SIMMONS: In this first session, General, we will explore your childhood. A good place to start is at the beginning. When and where were you born?

GEN MUNDY: I was born the 16th of July 1935 in Atlanta, Georgia.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you born in a hospital or at home?

GEN MUNDY: Born in a hospital, the Crawford W. Long Hospital in Atlanta. Actually, my parents at that time lived in Tifton, Georgia, but my grandmother's home was in Atlanta, so my mother came home to have her first baby, me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Citron? How would that have been spelled?

GEN MUNDY: T-I-F-T-O-N. Tifton.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were named for your father, Carl Epting Mundy, Sr. Your middle name, Epting, is unusual. I presume it was a family name?

GEN MUNDY: It was the name of the doctor who delivered him in Greenwood, South Carolina. You are going to ask, I think, about his Georgia connections, but he is a South Carolinian. So, Dr. Epting, of Greenwood, South Carolina.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was my next question. I am now going to ask you to tell me a bit about your father and his background.

GEN MUNDY: He was from South Carolina. He came from a family of seven and was the fifth in that line-up, with two older brothers and then the rest were sisters. He came from ordinary people. Benjamin Zachary Mundy was his father. And his mother was Margaret Verelle, a French name. Not much to distinguish him; a very ordinary man, a man of modest income, a guy who finished the eighth grade. His father died and he had the two remaining sisters and his mother at home. So, as a young boy with eight years of education, he had to go to work full time to support his mother and his sisters. So, he was a self-educated man and one that I always respected a great deal because of his common sense education, but not because of his academic credentials.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your grandmother's maiden name, Verelle, how do you spell that?

GEN MUNDY: V-E-R-E-L-L-E.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will ask the same questions about your mother.

GEN MUNDY: Her maiden name was Dunn. D-U-N-N. She is a native Georgian. She was born and raised in Atlanta. She was the 11th of 13, so a big family. Her father was William Edwin Dunn, but his name actually was William Edwin Sherman Dunn.

He was born in 1864 during the battle for Atlanta. The Federals had come in and taken the area where a lady in a house was about to have a baby. And so, they posted a guard on the house. Allegedly, it was General Sherman who put the guard on the house.

And therefore, they named him William Edwin Sherman Dunn.

At about age 18, when he was becoming a young man in Atlanta, Georgia, he realized that probably to be named Sherman was not the best credential to have, so he dropped Sherman. However, his birth certificate is William Edwin Sherman Dunn.

He went on to become one of the city fathers in Atlanta, and in fact was quite a distinguished man and a leader. Among other things, he was sent to New York to select all the animals for the Atlanta zoo down in Grant Park, which was about two blocks from my grandmother's house.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is kind of an old-fashioned and perhaps outdated question, but what else do you know from the kind of ethnic stock that you come from?

GEN MUNDY: My great grandmother's maiden name was Seagle, S-E-A-G-L-E, German. She was up in Chattanooga, Tennessee. She married William Montgomery. My grandmother came from that family. Elizabeth Montgomery Dunn would be her name when she was married.

So, there is German in there. There is a little bit of Irish. The name "Mundy" is English. There was a sheriff named Jojhn Mundy in particular England many years ago who was not of any distinction, but that is as far back as someone has traced our family name.

Mundy is a coat of arms that you would find more often up in Scotland than other parts of the UK. So, some Scot, some German, the Dunn would suggest a little bit of Irish. And then Verelle on my paternal grandmother's side would be the French connection.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you have any brothers or sisters?

GEN MUNDY: I have none. I am an only child.

BGEN SIMMONS: What is your earliest recollection? What is the thing you remember first in your life?

GEN MUNDY: I can remember at about age 3, living in Lake Junaluska, North Carolina, for the first time. We will come back to Lake Junaluska again in later years, but my father was in the five and ten cent store business. He was a store manager. He was a set-up man. He was with McCrory's and the McClellan

chain over time. He would be sent out to open a new store, run it for about six months or a year, get it set up and then they would transfer him. So, we moved around quite a bit.

But I can actually remember life at Lake Junaluska, North Carolina at about age 3. What I remember about that, if you ask what is my first specific recollection, is being out on a pier with my mother, who was probably sun bathing.

I had a little boat and I can remember loading it up with lead soldiers and a little tank or armored car or on a string and pulling it around the pier. It sank and I lost all my soldiers and my tank. So, that was probably my first touch with amphibious warfare. That is my first recollection that I can recall.

BGEN SIMMONS: Great. Tell me a little bit about Lake Junaluska, which appears and reappears in your boyhood.

GEN MUNDY: Lake Junaluska is the southeastern jurisdictional Methodist assembly grounds. I am a Methodist, but the two don't come together by any reason.

When my father was transferred from middle Tennessee — we were in Tennessee two or three times but he would keep being transferred back and forth across the western North Carolina, eastern Tennessee border with the companies that he was with.

So, Lake Junaluska is a place where I lived initially for — no more than a year from age, say, three to four — then back to Tennessee again.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where were you in Tennessee?

GEN MUNDY: Tennessee would be McMinnville, Murfreesboro, but most notably Cookeville. Those were my formative years. That was when I was from, say, about age five to ten years old. That is in middle Tennessee, out toward Nashville.

But Lake Junaluska, then, is the place when ultimately my father came to settle and went into business for himself. I spent from about the fifth grade through the eleventh grade living in Lake Junaluska.

BGEN SIMMONS: And it was a Methodist campground.

GEN MUNDY: Is a Methodist campground; a lot of lifeguarding and gate house tending and suntanned girls in the summertime and all those good things about the good years of growing up.

BGEN SIMMONS: In my county in South Jersey, Gloucester County, we had Lake Alcyon, and it was a Methodist campground. And that is where the county fair would be with the lake and the boats on the lake and the canoes.

GEN MUNDY: That's me. Those were really my formative years, because I worked and delivered papers lifeguarded, ran boats, and spent a lot of time swimming. The lake is about a mile long. One of my great achievements, one of my father's greatest prideful moments, was when I swam the lake and he rowed alongside me. It is a beautiful place and you ought to go there sometime, in western North Carolina.

BGEN SIMMONS: You said you were a Methodist. Would you characterize your family as being a church-going family?

GEN MUNDY: Very much so. My mother was a Sunday School teacher. My father, being a fairly ordinary man, probably went more because he was expected to go, but he was a steward in the church and so on. And my mother would always use me, I thought, as the guinea pig. When she would be teaching a Sunday School lesson, if no one else could answer the question she would always say, "Well, Carl, how do you spell Bible?" or whatever the issue was. And I was expected to answer.

That worked pretty well until we moved to Waynesville, North Carolina. My first day in Sunday School, I found that there was a little pigtailed girl who could answer more questions than I could. Her name happened to be Linda Sloan. And she is Linda Sloan Mundy today.

BGEN SIMMONS: And that is how you met Linda.

GEN MUNDY: That is how I met Linda, in Sunday School in the fourth grade.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about that! You mentioned that your mother was a Sunday School teacher and you were her star pupil. You probably memorized verses, a verse for every session, you got so many verses and then you got a little red Testament and so forth. It sounds familiar.

GEN MUNDY: You have been there. That was me.

BGEN SIMMONS: And the chain of attendance medals.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that's right.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did any minister or any other Sunday School teacher leave a lasting impression on you?

GEN MUNDY: I came from a family of preachers. In fact, I probably am the black sheep, because most of my uncles were ministers of one denomination or other. A couple of them were Methodist, Church of Christ, and christian, southern types of organizations. So, I had a great deal of influence, I think, from those who were in the ministry or associated with it. No single Sunday School teacher, however, particularly, stands out in my mind.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any restrictions on how you passed your time on Sunday?

GEN MUNDY: Well, when I grew up, one of my earliest girlfriends was the daughter of the Baptist preacher in Waynesville, North Carolina, which is near Lake Junaluska. In fact, we lived in Waynesville at that time.

I can remember that there wasn't much going on in a country town on Sunday. But I can remember that Elizabeth could not play cards, could not dance and, while there was a drug store that was open downtown where you could get an ice cream soda or something, Elizabeth could not go to that drug store on Sundays. So, as long as I had some affection for this young lady, I was constrained on Sundays.

But no, my father viewed Sunday as a time for recreation and we washed cars on Sundays or went fishing on Sundays or whatever. I didn't have any familial restrictions placed on me on Sundays.

BGEN SIMMONS: How else did you pass the time up to say, age 12—grammar school days?

GEN MUNDY: Well, beyond school, I enjoyed public speaking and I entered oratory contests, always trying to get "Four Score and Seven Years Ago," because that always won every year, whoever gave it.

I guess I grew up a fairly ordinary child. I had my chores around the house. I filled the coal bucket and I emptied the ashes. And on Saturdays, unless I could get away, I found myself helping dust rooms or make up beds.

We rented rooms. My family didn't have a lot of money, and so we supplemented my father's income by renting rooms in this big house we had.

BGEN SIMMONS: You weren't chasing girls by age 12, were you?

GEN MUNDY: As I remember back, I had some really nice looking girlfriends in the fifth or sixth grade.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you go to the movies frequently?

GEN MUNDY: I did.

BGEN SIMMONS: By yourself or with your parents?

GEN MUNDY: My father used to take me to the movies. He was a great fan of two things, Marines and cowboys. So, as I grew up, I would say that at least one night a week in my younger years, my dad and I would go. Sometimes mother would go along, but usually it was my dad and I.

We would go to the movies and we would watch, you know, John Wayne in "Stagecoach," or if there was anything at all about Marines on, my father would see that I went to see it. We can talk about his admiration for Marines and how that came to be later on.

So, I watched, you know, Saturdays, the serials, Hopalong Cassidy, Zorro, any John Wayne movie, Randolph Scott, John Payne, "The Shores of Tripoli," all those. "Sergeant York" I saw 11 times. I met Alvin York in my father's store in Cookeville, Tennessee, a short, fat, Tennessee farmer wearing a pair of overalls and an old hat. If you ever wonder what a Medal of Honor winner is not supposed to look like, Sergeant Alvin York would fill that bill for you.

BGEN SIMMONS: Nothing like Gary Cooper?

GEN MUNDY: He is nothing like Gary Cooper.

BGEN SIMMONS: By coincidence, I saw that just night before last.

GEN MUNDY: I am sorry I missed it. That would have made 12 or 13 for me. I love that movie.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was an influential picture.

GEN MUNDY: I love that movie very much.

BGEN SIMMONS: What games did you play in these early years? You mentioned swimming. As I remember growing up in a small town, life had a cer-

tain rhythm. There was a season for marbles, a season for kites, a season for tops.

GEN MUNDY: I think all of that. I can recall a lot of bicycle riding. I had a bicycle and I was very proud of that. You either walked around town or you rode around town on your bicycle.

We used to play bicycle hockey, which was always a favorite and usually resulted in busted shins and what not. But that, I think, was maybe a little bit older. I think maybe that was early teens. That would have been around 12 years old.

But marbles, I had some great shooters. I had, you know, agates. And I kept them in a gallon jar. So, yes, a lot of marbles. A lot of jacks. Tic-tac-toe or whatever, things that you would play.

Then, again—I know that I am not very exciting — I wanted to be a Marine when I was six years old. So, every time that a bunch of my buddies and I got together, usually we wound up one way or the other playing Marines, running around the woods shooting at each other, playing war.

Each of us had a set of soldiers or a couple of P-40's or a P-38 or something like that. We would dig out trenches and set up the soldiers and get the little airplanes and fly over. And as you went over you could drop a rock or something and you would bomb the lines. Or sit and throw acorns back and forth at each other's companies or platoons dug into the ground.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you do any airplane model making?

GEN MUNDY: Sure, I did. I did that, and also a model boat, actually built at about 13 or 14. My dad and I built a little racing boat over the winter and then put a 7-1/2 horse engine on in the summer, and I was the hottest thing on Lake Junaluska for a couple of seasons there, ripping around. So, all of those sorts of things were fairly ordinary boyhood growing up types of things.

BGEN SIMMONS: Little League, did you have Little League?

GEN MUNDY: We did not have Little League. I was a Boy Scout, made it all the way up to second class and then lost interest and stepped over the side. We didn't have Little League.

When I was growing up, I had a fairly severe hay fever and asthma problem, wheezed a lot, and had some difficulty breathing, worried to death as I got in

my teenage years whether that was going to keep me out of the Marine Corps. I would have lied, cheated or stolen to have avoided that. So, that inhibited my team sport play.

I swam competitively, but there wasn't much competitive swimming out there in those days. You had races in the lake. I boated a lot. I was a boater. I was a pretty good canoeist. I would win canoe races at the Boy Scout camp or elsewhere, and also swimming races.

Swimming for one reason or other didn't seem to affect my breathing, but playing sports on a field with probably pollen or dust or whatever would choke me up.

BGEN SIMMONS: In addition to the lake, were there any rivers you could take your canoes down?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not really, I didn't canoe on a river because most of the rivers up in the mountains where I was growing up were fairly turbulent rivers. So, there was not a Shenandoah gently flowing along. The Pigeon River is the local river in the area and you would go up there and pick up garnets or stone snakes or occasionally get in when you could stand it, because the water in the mountains is usually chilly.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any Indian relics, artifacts, that type of thing?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, the Cherokee Indians are close in Cherokee, and so I spent a lot of time going back and forth over to Cherokee when people would come to visit. At Linda's ancestral home, a little piece of which is still existing there, there was and is today a place they call the Indian Mound.

One of her forebears was the number two in his regiment during the Civil War. He was a lieutenant colonel, I think. He raised a regiment of Indians. The Indians, long after the war, used to come when he was then a gentry land holder up there. The Indians would come over from Cherokee to trade with Colonel Stringfield. They would always go to this one mound on his farm. So, that became known as the Indian Mound.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is that property still in Linda's family?

GEN MUNDY: That property is not. Her mother's home and an uncle's home totalling about two acres are the residual of probably 10 or 15 thousand acres that were granted to an early forebearer of hers by the

King. Practically all the western tip of North Carolina was in the possession of the Stringfield family. And she is Linda Stringfield Sloan. They had quite a landholding there for a while. But it has dissipated to a couple of acres.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have a dog growing up?

GEN MUNDY: Always, usually a dog and a cat, but as long as I can remember we had dogs, cats, ducks, Easter chickens and those sorts of things that were pets. My dad had a great affection for animals and he liked cats. I prefer dogs. But together we usually had a dog and a cat.

BGEN SIMMONS: House dog or hunting dogs or both?

GEN MUNDY: No, ours were usually dogs that wandered up and you fed them and they would be yours. They were mongrel dogs and as often as not you had them for two or three years and then you just didn't have them and you never knew what happened to it. But they were pets. They lived in the house with us.

We never had a hunting dog. I had friends that I used to hunt with that raised hunting dogs.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned fishing with your dad. You did that frequently?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Living on a lake, you know, I walked down a hill and went fishing. At Lake Junaluska, you couldn't fish on Sunday. And since he worked six days a week, he was usually home on Sundays and we wouldn't fish then. We would go out to Pigeon River and fish.

On Wednesday afternoons, they closed the stores. So, he was home every Wednesday afternoon. As a general rule, we would go down and get in a boat or get on the bank of the lake somewhere and catch brook or occasionally a bass, not a very sporting fish. He was not a trout fly fisherman or anything. We would put the worm on the hook and drop it in and something would bite it and you would pull it up.

BGEN SIMMONS: He was not a hunter?

GEN MUNDY: We did hunt some together. We hunted — in that part of the country we went squirrel hunting, a lot of squirrel hunting. That was .22 rifle. He had a favorite .22. I still have it. We would go out together and shoot squirrels. But a squirrel, you know, you have to work awfully hard and kill a lot of

squirrels to get a mouthful of meat.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did the squirrels translate into Brunswick stew?

GEN MUNDY: Squirrel stew, which my mother would make up. It may have been Brunswick, but we called it squirrel stew. It was squirrel meat and anything else you had to put in there — peas, carrots, potatoes. Bear hunting, you do some bear hunting up there. We killed a bear one time together and had the bear dressed and so on.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is something.

GEN MUNDY: But it is not a Daniel Boone story. You know, I mean this is a 30/30 rifle at 200 or 300 yards. But we brought it home. Bear meat — I mean you have to really be hungry to eat bear meat. And some deer hunting. We did that both there and subsequently down in Alabama.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were a very small child, seven to ten years old, during World War II. Do you have any particular recollections of World War II and how it may have affected your family?

GEN MUNDY: My father was over 30 years old when the war began, so he was near the 38 draft age limit. So, he was not in the military. But World War II was the formative period for me. I grew up just devouring it, and I think idolizing, those who fought in World War II.

So, it has been very significant to me, during this fiftieth anniversary period, to be back on so many occasions with those of you, who were the warriors of World War II.

As vivid recollections go, I can remember my father waking me up to tell me that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. I can remember him waking me up and saying, get up, son, you need to know about this. So, he then told me about it and it didn't mean a lot to me. I didn't know who the Japanese were and I didn't know where Pearl Harbor was.

He then — this can get long, but I can remember that he got a call from his boss at that time and he said, "Mundy, go down to the store and take every piece of Japanese merchandise that we have and throw it out in the trash."

So, we went down on Sunday afternoon, and they had a lot of toys and things like that that came from Japan. I can remember my father literally throwing out two or three boxes of merchandise just because it

was made in Japan.

Then, of course, came Wake Island immediately. I was captivated by Wake Island. As you know, because you have gone there with me on at least one occasion, Wake Island still is a haunting memory for me.

I was stirred by all the accounts of, "Send us more Japs," and the Marines held out. So, I became at that age — I would say in December of 1941 I became a Marine convert for life. And every battle that I could follow, every newsreel, — I followed the whole war. I followed the "Battling Bastards of Bastogne," or I followed whoever was anywhere doing anything. But I followed the Marines with a real vengeance.

During the war we were in Cookeville, Tennessee. That's where the Army came up to middle Tennessee and did maneuvers. My best friend wanted to be a sailor but wound up retiring as a colonel in the Army, but anyway, Manson Henderson and I were two best friends at the time.

My mother made me a little fatigue — utility to us — but, fatigue, uniform. I had my fatigue uniform and then my father made me a Thompson submachine gun which I still have. He made it out of wood because you couldn't buy metal toys, as you know.

So, Manson Henderson and I would go down to the USO Saturday nights. All day long my mother made sandwiches for the troops that were going to come in for a shower and a dance with a local girl. And my mom and dad and I would go down to the USO. And Manson Henderson and I would stand guard at the entrance to the USO as these mud covered young soldiers came in from the field. So, we were awed and inspired by the soldiers.

So, everything that happened in World War II made an impact on me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you do much reading during these years?

GEN MUNDY: Very much. My favorite — well, adventure books on the non-military side would be the Hardy Boys, something like that. A lot of cowboy and Indian stories. But my very favorite hero was Horatio Hornblower, by C. S. Forester.

I found the Horatio Hornblower series to be — it just fascinated me, and to this day my favorite book, not because I ever read it before I went to the Naval War College, is C. S. Forester's *The General*; maybe because it is short, maybe because the printing is big, but really because it really sends, in my mind, a classic message.

It is what all of us hope not to be but what I, as I



Carl Mundy, right, wears the Marine Corps uniform homemade by his mother when he was seven years old. To his left, in a homemade sailor's uniform, is his best friend, Manson Henderson, who later retired as a colonel in the U.S. Army.

analyzed myself over my career, many times I have come back and said, I think I am about to mount my horse and buckle on my sword and ride to the front because I don't know anything else to do, and that's not necessarily the thing to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is a remarkable book. It may be apocryphal, but Hitler is supposed to have required all of his generals to read *The General*. It is also supposed to have been removed from the libraries in Britain during the war for exactly the opposite reason. You used a public library?

GEN MUNDY: A lot of use of the public library where I would draw books and hopefully return them. In those days you either listened to the radio or you read. Today you watch television. So, yes, I read. My interest was always in adventure stories.

If it happened to have some history in it, fine, but I didn't go after academics.

BGEN SIMMONS: What magazines did you read?

GEN MUNDY: *Reader's Digest*, I suppose. As I remember, *National Geographic* and *Reader's Digest*.

BGEN SIMMONS: *Saturday Evening Post*?

GEN MUNDY: Certainly, *Saturday Evening Post*.

BGEN SIMMONS: Every week, five cents.

GEN MUNDY: I wasn't buying them, but absolutely.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are we tracking all the places you might have lived during these years?

GEN MUNDY: Again, we settled when I was in the fourth grade, and that was in Waynesville, North Carolina. That was during the war. I think we moved over there in 1944. We lived for a year in a house that was sold. You know, you didn't have a lot of options. We moved to another house. That was sold. And then we wound up, after two years, in 1946, down in Lake Junaluska, North Carolina.

Before that, again, my roots I guess go to Tifton, Georgia, although I couldn't tell you a thing about Tifton, Georgia. Atlanta was always the crossroads for me, because my grandmother's house was large and we would spend almost every Christmas there, a big family. All of the ties in the families, aunts and uncles and cousins, aunts that were as old as grandmothers to me because my mother was at the bottom end of the chain.

So, a lot of time visiting in Atlanta. But Tennessee, to western North Carolina, back to Tennessee, back to western North Carolina. And then, of course, eventually, at the end of my junior year in high school, to Montgomery, Alabama, and then to Pensacola and back to North Carolina.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's suppose now you are 13 or 14 years old getting ready to go to high school. I note that you went to Waynesville Township High School in North Carolina from 1948 until 1952 and then the following year you went to Sydney Lanier in Montgomery, Alabama. How did that come about?

GEN MUNDY: My father was a partner in a store in western North Carolina and then got an opportunity to go back with a former associate to Alabama. So, he bought into a partnership down there and we moved at

the end of my junior year and broke my heart. But I survived.

Although Alabama, of late, has wanted to claim me, really I never had any real attachment to Alabama. I was there a year and I went to school. I only went to Auburn because I couldn't afford to go to The Citadel and I could hitchhike up to Auburn. Those were the circumstances.

BGEN SIMMONS: I understand that Linda was your high school sweetheart. You had renewed that friendship during those years.

GEN MUNDY: I really had two, and the other one was her best friend and is still probably our best friend. She married a Marine captain. He grew up there, too, but he went into the Marine Corps two years before me and stayed until he was a captain and got out. They still are there and we see them every time we are back there.

So, somewhere between Linda Sloan and Nink, was her nickname, Nink Prevost at that time, Swift today, were my two childhood sweethearts.

You know, a summertime romance would fade in or fade out while I was lifeguarding. But Linda was always my real sweetheart. I was trailing her usually.

She had other boyfriends and I was usually coming up number two. But we dated on and off. She was my first date. I can remember one of those humiliating times when you get in the back seat of the car and you call properly at the door and her father meets you and then you pick her up and then you get in the back seat of the car. Then your dad takes you to the movies and then you finish the movie and you get into the back seat of the car. It is a very uncomfortable scenario. But that was my first date. We went to see the movie, "Cinderella," as a matter of fact — our first date.

BGEN SIMMONS: You graduated in 1953 and it was rather unfortunate you went to Sydney Lanier because you missed that last big year as a senior in Waynesville, high school prom and all those things you might have gone to. How did you do scholastically in high school; any favorite subjects?

GEN MUNDY: History and English were always my forte, I guess. I enjoyed history, not the rote memorization of what year was the Declaration of Independence signed or something like that, but more the events of history rather than the dates of history, because so much of our education in those days, as you will recall, you could pass if you could memorize

five things. But I enjoyed history.

I never did like mathematics and I had great difficulty with math, simply because I wasn't interested in it. There is a good story there and in fact it is probably one of the most formative leadership tales that I can reveal, and that occurred down at Lanier High School.

In my senior year, I transferred from western North Carolina, probably a lesser quality education system than Alabama had at least at that time, or at least Lanier High School, which was the leading uptown high school. And I was forced to take trigonometry. I had completed algebra in North Carolina.

So, anyway, it was very tough for me and I flunked trigonometry. My teacher was a lady named Margaret Gorrie — that is an Alabama name, Miss Gorrie lived, as it turns out interestingly enough, on Montezuma Avenue. But anyway, Miss Gorrie, the classic spinster teacher who, would rap her desk with a ruler and all those classic rigid teacher stories. After the grades came out I got a note, see Miss Gorrie after school.

I went in with great trepidation and she sat me down. She said, I want you to go home tonight and write me a letter and tell me why you failed trigonometry and bring it in to me tomorrow morning.

So, I went home that night and whatever I wrote, I don't even have any recollection of. But I know I worked hard at it. I came in and dropped the letter off and got a note, see Miss Gorrie after class today. And I thought, oh, boy, this is going to be bad.

I went in and this little lady, who is still in Montgomery, Alabama, said, sit down. She said, I read your letter. And she said, you write very well and you express yourself very well and that is a strength. So, you continue that strength, and next semester you and I are going to pass trigonometry together.

I have gone back to that so many times. In fact, Lanier established a hall of fame, and of course I popped up in the hall of fame in Lanier about three years ago. There were three of us inducted in the first hall of fame. One of the other two was Margaret Gorrie, who I assumed had died and gone to heaven by that time.

Anyway, I didn't go down for that appearance. When I went down later they had me address the student body, when I was down at the Air War College one time. And I said, please have Miss Margaret Gorrie there.

So, they went over and got her and brought her over and sat her on the stage with me. I told that tale and it meant a lot to her and it meant a lot to me. I said, this is the best leadership lecture that I can give you, that even though you failed, you have qualities and we

are going to pick you up. So, I passed trigonometry, courtesy of Margaret Gorrie.

BGEN SIMMONS: How large was your graduating class?

GEN MUNDY: There were 254.

BGEN SIMMONS: A good-sized school, much bigger probably than Waynesville.

GEN MUNDY: A lot bigger school. Waynesville would have been 60 in the graduating class and Lanier was a big school.

BGEN SIMMONS: What extracurricular activities did you pursue in high school?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I started off running track. As I said, we discovered that I had some difficulty with breathing. In those days nobody said, go out and get an inhaler and that will open your lungs up for you. So, I was constrained on that.

I went out for football, again limited because of that. So the coach, who was also the assistant principal, said you can keep coming out if you want to but really you are going to sit on the bench. After a year of that, I didn't.

I pursued the band. I played trombone in the band. I was in the debating. I enjoyed that. We didn't have big debates — again, the oratory contests more than debating, we seemed to do more of that. Swam competitively, even during the winter we'd go over to Western Carolina College and have some swim meets.

I was in plays. You know, I would usually act a part in a play. So, those types of organizations rather than athletics. I always regretted that and to this day I regret it. But it seemed to me I just physically wasn't cut for that.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did you become interested in country music?

GEN MUNDY: [Laughs] I despised country music when I grew up with it because in those days in Tennessee and western North Carolina you got really what today would be nearer blue grass music, which would be Sunday morning singing on the radio, "I heered the crash on the highway but I didn't hear nobody pray" or something like that, which was plinka-plinka type country music.

I came to enjoy country music when I was a lieutenant general commuting back and forth from

Bolling Air Force Base to Headquarters Marine Corps, listening to WMZQ in Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: So, it was not ingrained in you from birth?

GEN MUNDY: I loved Tommy Dorsey and Glenn Miller. That was ingrained in me, the big band sounds of the 1940's. So, the country music is a come-lately.

BGEN SIMMONS: You say you played the trombone in the high school band. Any other instrument?

GEN MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you continue with the trombone or did it get packed up the day you graduated?

GEN MUNDY: No, it got packed up the day I graduated and in some respects I wish I had continued it, because once you lose your lip, it doesn't come back. My bandmaster was a former Marine named Charles Isley.

Isley had been in the Parris Island band and, frankly, didn't have a great deal of respect for the Marines because he had gone in because he had to, and he played in the band, and as soon as he could get out of the Marine Corps, he got out.

I had him back to a parade about a year ago and it is amazing how now he is a real Marine supporter.

Anyway, he was a disciplinarian and we were a good band and not only in terms of musical quality, but because, I think, of his Marine background, we were probably one of the sharpest marching bands anywhere in the country because he had come off the drill field at Parris Island and we all marched like Marines, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have mentioned several teachers who obviously had a lasting effect on you, Miss Gorrie and Mr. Isley and the assistant principal of the high school. Any other teachers you can remark on?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, one, but this would be a negative one. This was a next door neighbor. Again, this was another spinster. Her name was Stephanie Moore and she lived next door to us in western North Carolina. I can remember on that occasion, when I knew I had just beat "Four Score and Seven Years Ago." I knew I had won the oratory contest that year. And when the judges — there being three, she being one of them — went in and in 10 minutes they came

out with the vote and I came in second. And the whole student body said, “Ohhhh.”

So, after it was over she realized it wasn’t the popular choice. And that afternoon when I got home from school she came up to see me from next door. She said, “Listen, you won but the only reason I didn’t vote for you was because I was your next door neighbor, and I assumed that everybody would think it was because you were the next door neighbor.”

That made an impression of some sort on me, which was to say, vote your conscience and don’t necessarily vote for what you think is politically correct or, you know, because of other factors.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you make any good and lasting friendships in high school? You have mentioned one or two here.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, sure. I grew up coming up in a small school system. I grew up with people who, at the time, because of the really strong family relationships that existed there, I mean we had mothers and fathers who genuinely cared about their youngsters and who groomed us along and allowed us to grow up and chaperoned us and shepherded us. So, there are a half dozen of my associates — there are more than that, but there are a half dozen that I went to the fourth grade with who, to this day, are still blood brothers and sisters in our relationships.

I mentioned Nink Swift, her husband is Jim Swift, who was a Marine captain and one of my best friends. Nink was my other girlfriend. There are about a half dozen of us who are still bound together by very, very strong ties.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any part time jobs or summer employment during these high school years?

GEN MUNDY: Sure. Again, my dad ran a five-and-ten-cent store. So, I would go in after school. In the summertime he would frequently cause me to come work in the store for a day or two. But my real jobs — paper boy, you know, delivery on a bicycle or walking around the lake in later years.

Because Lake Junaluska was private assembly grounds, there was a gate at each end. As you drove in, you had to get a gate ticket. So, I was a gate boy. That probably was one of the junior positions. You would stand at the gate for about a six-hour watch and you would sell or issue tickets for admission to Lake Junaluska.

You had a lot of time — because it would get bor-

ing — you had a lot of time to read. I read *Battle Cry* four times while sitting on a gate at Lake Junaluska. That was later, that was in my college years.

We had boats, as I mentioned earlier. I tended to the boats one summer. As soon as I could get into the lifeguarding business I did, and I pay the price for that with liquid nitrogen all over my forehead to this day. Those types of summer jobs were the types of things that I did.

I think I cut grass one season. I would work, you know, in somebody’s yard and do those sorts of pick-up jobs. Really, the type of job that you would come home and have lunch or dinner, as we called it, dinner was the middle of the day meal, at your mother’s table, and then go back to what you were doing in the afternoon.

BGEN SIMMONS: Looking back over your childhood and your high school years, how would you sum it up? What events or persons or activities might have had a significant influence on your future? We have already identified some of these, but sort of summing up.

GEN MUNDY: Probably a repeat of what I have said. I grew up in the grass roots part of the country. I grew up where people went to church and where, you know, if you want to eat, you work, and if you want to stay warm you cut fire wood. So, the fundamental values, I think.

I grew up certainly in a Christian environment, in a religious home, as we characterize it. I ushered in church, I was in the Methodist Youth Fellowship. We talked about Sunday School and that sort of thing.

I can remember when young Billy Graham was riding around just becoming somebody. Even though he was a Baptist, we allowed him to come to Lake Junaluska. The Lake Junaluska assembly has a big auditorium that seats probably a couple of thousand people.

They would have their conventions in the summer. If you worked there, you had to usher on Sunday. So, we would go and usher and skip out and usually go somewhere else.

I remember Billy Graham driving in in a red 1949 Ford convertible and we thought that was great.

I think that those influences — in other words, the influences on my youth were wholesome. It didn’t mean that I didn’t cut a rug and get in trouble with the law from time to time such as young boys will do, or that I wasn’t from time to time the subject of some disciplinary action and so on. But it was a wholesome environment.

Then, as I said, the impression on me commencing in the same year that I started to school was World War II. So, for those five years, that was the most influential thing, I think, in shaping at least my goals and ambitions, which never were to be the Commandant, but were to be able to get over asthma and go to boot camp at Parris Island. That, I thought, would be the best thing that one could ever do.

My father was a tremendous influence on me, and again, a common man, a self-educated man. When he was a young man and finally left home — as I mentioned, he worked long hours.

He went to Philadelphia to work. He recounts the story with great zest. One night when he had gotten off at about 10:00 o'clock at night and was headed back walking across the Schuylkill River Bridge to go back to his apartment where he lived, two thugs, as he described it, were coming along behind him. It was late at night, 11:00 o'clock or so. And he said, "As I would speed up, they would speed up . . . I knew that in the morning I was going to be floating in the river and my wallet was going to be gone."

About that time, up from below on one of these ramps that comes up from another walk along the river, comes two Marines in dress blues, headed back to the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

Anyway, my dad hooked with them, did an about face, and said, "Hey, fellows, where are you going." They said, "Well, we are headed back to the Navy Yard." And he said, "Well, I'll walk a way with you." And the thugs turned around.

So, anyway, my dad must have told me that story a thousand times. As a result of that, he thought that Marines were all there was to be and I guess he raised his son to be a Marine. He certainly tried to. So, he had a tremendous influence.

My mother was the disciplinarian. I mean, if I needed to be spanked, my mother would do that for me. Or if I needed a lecture, why she would do that. My dad was my coach and, to the day he died, I never ever did anything which dissatisfied my father. I knew no matter how badly I knew I had fouled up, in my father's eyes, I still was top notch.

BGEN SIMMONS: How far up the Marine Corps ladder were you when your father died?

GEN MUNDY: I was a two-star. I was a major general.

BGEN SIMMONS: He must have been tremendously proud of you.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, he was. And gosh, I would have given anything if he could see me to this point. But to him, it really didn't matter. I mean, he was proud of me because I was a Marine.

And when I made brigadier general — I have a humorous story that I have told many times. What it amounts to is that in western North Carolina, being a sergeant is a heck of a lot more important than being a general. Can I tell you that story?

BGEN SIMMONS: Please do.

GEN MUNDY: This is one that I have used in a lot of my NCO speeches, but it is a true one. There is an old fellow named Mr. Mchaffey who ran the city barber shop in Waynesville. So, I would go up and have my hair cut. And then when I went off to school and would come back, still the same.

When I got in the Marine Corps, Mr. Mchaffey was still there. So, in the early years, when I would be home on leave, I would always go get a haircut, one, because I wanted to go back to the City Barber Shop, but because, two, a Marine gets his hair cut every week regardless of whether you need it or not.

The conversation was almost rote, and it would always start with, "Well, are you still in the Army?" And I would go through a great explanation of how I wasn't a soldier, I was a Marine. Mr. Mchaffey would say, "Well, where are you now?"

"Well, I am at Camp Lejeune" or "I am on sea duty."

"Well, if you are in the Marines, why are you on a ship" or this sort of thing?

He would always end up somewhere along the way. He would say, "What are you now?" And I would say, "Well, I am a captain." He died when I was a major and by that time he was the old fellow that sat in the back and whittled while the other barbers cut the hair, but he would still talk to you.

He would ask me, "Did you ever make sergeant?" I would go through this explanation of how I came through the PLC program and how I was commissioned and so on. You could always see, never spoken, you could always see disappointment. I wasn't a sergeant, so I really wasn't a real man.

When he died, as I said, I was a major. Then when I made brigadier general, I wrote to the *Reader's Digest* — they didn't print it but I wrote to them and said, you know, I am a brigadier general now, but I guess Mr. Mchaffey would still be not satisfied with me because I never made sergeant in his context, although I was a sergeant in the Reserve. He wanted to know if I had come up like a real man.

Those were, I think, the major influences along the way. Plus, gosh, my mother-in-law is not my mother-in-law. I don't tell mother-in-law jokes. She is my second mother. Many, many people, my aunts and uncles all of whom believed in me.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did your mother die?

GEN MUNDY: She is still alive. She is 86 and she still lives in the house at Lake Junaluska. (Mrs. Mundy died May 1996.)

BGEN SIMMONS: She wasn't at your retirement?

GEN MUNDY: She was not. She is at that stage she wouldn't have known whether she was there or not. She would have had a good time. We have a companion who lives with her and she is still very warm and affectionate and, you know, we are still very close. But if I call her tonight and then call her tomorrow she will say, it is good to hear from you because it has been so long since we have talked. So, she is becoming frail, but she is still there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Anything else you would like to say about your boyhood?

GEN MUNDY: No, except that, again, you know, I got in fights and I got licked and sometimes I won. And I cut up and I got bent over the teacher's desk and had 10 licks laid on me and things like that. I think I had a fairly normal and average coming up.

I guess my boyhood was the American ideal of what we would wish, you know, that all youngsters had come up in the environment and with the persuasions and with the coaching and the confidence and prodding and the experiences that I had. They were all good.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think this is a good point to end this first session.

SESSION 2

College Years and Platoon Leaders Class

Joining the Marine Corps an early objective . . . Decision to go to Auburn . . . Life as an undergraduate . . . Army ROTC . . . First Lieutenant of the Auburn Rifles . . . Platoon Leaders Class . . . Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve . . . The Civil War as an Influence . . . Linda Sloan as a pen pal . . . Summers at Quantico . . . 38th Special Infantry Company . . . Graduation and commissioning.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your childhood and high school years. In this session, we will explore your college years and your initial entry into the Marine Corps.

You graduated from Sydney Lanier High School in Montgomery, Alabama in June of 1953. That fall you entered Alabama Polytechnic Institute, better known as Auburn. What decided you to go to Auburn?

GEN MUNDY: Well, a chain of events. I wanted to go to The Citadel. As I mentioned earlier, my father was a South Carolinian and we had some South Carolina ties.

In my senior year, I applied to The Citadel for admission, and they came back with the admission papers. You had to buy your uniforms your first year up.

My father had just gone into business, and so when we got the applications and looked at the cost, we concluded that that just wasn't something that the Mundy family could afford at that particular time.

His business partner was an Auburn graduate and he said, "Well, why don't you go to Auburn? It is 60 miles up the road." So, that is how I went to Auburn; just through default, if you will.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your career ambitions at this point. Had you decided what your major would be?

GEN MUNDY: My major was to go to college for a couple of reasons. Number one, because I wanted to join the Marine Corps when I graduated from high school. In fact, I wanted to drop out of high school because the Korean War was going on in my latter years of high school, and join the Corps.

Neither my mother or my father had an advanced education. As I mentioned, my father was only an eighth grade graduate. My mother had finished high

school. But they were insistent that I would get some degree of college education.

So, the deal that I cut with my mother was, if I went to college for a year, I could then make my own choice. I could either go in the Marine Corps or I could continue on to college.

So, I entered college to fulfill my mother's mandate that I have at least one year of advanced education. And as far as a major or a focus, my focus was to get in the Marine Corps by whatever means it took. And if college was a means to getting there, that was fine.

But really, I had no specific major as far as an education or degree focus, beyond just doing whatever it required to get in the Marine Corps. I figured that liberal arts was probably a better route to pursue for a Marine than would be one of a more scientific or a more specific discipline.

And so, I went off as a business administration major, because that afforded you pretty good latitude in taking political science and history and English and those sorts of courses that I thought would be of greater use to me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did this lead to a Bachelor of Arts degree in business administration?

GEN MUNDY: It was a Bachelor of Science. It is in business administration, but Auburn characterized it as a BS degree.

BGEN SIMMONS: That first year, did you live in a dormitory or in town or a fraternity house?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I lived in a dormitory all four years and in fact lived in the same room for four years. As I mentioned, my parents were of modest means so I needed to work while I was in school. So, number one, I lived in a dormitory. It cost us \$30 a month. That was a buck a day, I guess, for a room, in

Auburn Hall. It is an old dorm. It is still down there. It has been substantially modernized.

In my junior year — this is jumping ahead a little bit — but what that afforded me was the opportunity to be a dormitory counselor, which meant that I got my room free.

About a block up from Auburn Hall was a place called the Green House. I took my meals there and I hopped tables. If you would work two meals a day, you got your full meals free. So, in other words, I hopped tables for meals, I worked in the dormitory for my room eventually, and I hitchhiked back and forth to wherever I was going, until my senior year in college, when I finally did get a car.

BGEN SIMMONS: I hear some parallels to General Bob Barrows' experience at Louisiana State. What was Auburn like in those years?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Auburn was and is a great institution, not just because of the educational values that one gains there, but I guess if the university wasn't at Auburn, Alabama, there probably wouldn't be any Auburn, Alabama. The town exists because of the university.

So, it was a very wholesome place. I mean, it was a fun-filled place and it was a place where you could shoot pool or catch as many movies or drink beer or whatever you wanted to do. But the whole community supported the university.

Auburn was about 8,500 students in those days and as I recall there may have been about 800 girls, because at one time it had been a military school when it was established, and it was an all male school, being a Land Grant College in Alabama.

But when I was there, probably about 7,700 or 7,800 males and a very small population of girls, who were confined to some rather isolated dormitories right in the middle of the campus right behind the president's home, so he could keep a close eye on the girls.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was ROTC compulsory?

GEN MUNDY: It was a land grant college, and in those days such institutions did have compulsory ROTC. Auburn being a big school, and with the entire freshman and sophomore classes being involved in it, you had an ROTC of 3,000 or 4,000 people, Army, Navy and Air Force.

When I got to Auburn, I knew I wanted to get in the Marine Corps. So, I saw a Marine officer on campus

on day, which surprised me, because I wasn't smart enough to know that the Marines were involved with the Navy ROTC.

Anyway, he was a captain. He was Jim Gasser, who we will talk about perhaps a little later here. In any case, I wandered up to him and said, "Are you a Marine?" And he said, "Yes." And I said, "Are you here?" And he said, "Yes, I teach here in the ROTC program." And I said, "Well, I want to get in the Marine Corps." And he said, "Navy ROTC," as it was then referred to—vice naval, I think, today is more used — but he said, "Navy ROTC." And I said, "No, I want nothing to do with the Navy, I want to be a Marine." So, I just abruptly cut that off, as opposed to even considering Navy ROTC.

I went into the Army ROTC because to me land soldiers, the Army, was closer aligned to what I wanted to be than the Air Force or even the Navy, for that matter.

BGEN SIMMONS: What kind of uniforms did you get or wear and how often did you wear them?

GEN MUNDY: Well, in those days the uniform for freshman and sophomores was the old Army OD, olive drab, which would have been an Ike jacket and just the olive drab trousers and overseas cap. The officers, or the upper classman, wore what we called pinks and greens out of World War II, which is the same cut as our Marine uniform. It is a belted blouse and, in fact, a very handsome uniform. I always thought it was a good-looking uniform.

I wound up on the drill team because I had a fascination with things military, and certainly with the drill team. I was an armor ROTC student. They had armor and signal corps and artillery there, I guess. And armor seemed more like infantry to me, so that is what I wanted to be.

I joined the Auburn Rifles. So, we got pinks and greens because it was a drill team outfit. So, we wore starched khakis in the summertime and then you wore pinks and greens in the wintertime, and a white scarf and white leggings and spit-shined double-soled shoes and all those sorts of things — a really sharp outfit.

In my sophomore year, I rose to be the commander of the Auburn Rifles, so I got to be the first lieutenant of the Auburn Rifles.

BGEN SIMMONS: As a sophomore?

GEN MUNDY: As a sophomore.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was rushing the cadence a bit.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I went to Marine PLC's the summer between my freshman and sophomore years, and when I came back the old Army sergeant who oversaw this watched me march and decided that I had definitely picked up something in my summer off.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you belonged to the Junior ROTC at Lanier?

GEN MUNDY: I did, for the one year that I was there. And again, enjoyed that very much, just because of the military structure and the military lifestyle.

BGEN SIMMONS: It gave you a little headstart.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it gave me a headstart, and remember I had been a bandsman, taught by a Marine, taught by Charlie Isley, so I could march. And I was fascinated with all of those things about sword drill and the manual of arms. I got to travel a little bit, take some competition trips and perform in various places, the state capital, that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have a Scabbard and Blade unit?

GEN MUNDY: We did have Scabbard and Blade, and as I recall, the Scabbard and Blade was for the contracts. That would have been the juniors and seniors, in other words, those who had made a commitment to go into the military. And since I had joined the PLC program my freshman year, I never went into junior year of Army ROTC because I was going to be a Marine.

The Army sought me to do that, and at the time that we were able to commit, they even guaranteed me a regular commission as a sophomore if I would enter. But I was going to be a Marine and wanted nothing to do with anything else.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have an annual military ball?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. And usually the Auburn Rifles, we would go and hold the sword arch or we would be the color guard, or you know the fanciest of drills were allocated to the drill team.

So, you would take a date and you would go and perform, not unlike being in the Marine Corps

Birthday Balls ceremony. And when that was over you would take off your Sam Browne belt and your other stuff and appear back on the dance floor and enjoy the ball.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have a Corps Day at Auburn where all three of the ROTC's mustered in a big parade?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we called it President's Day. In fact, I think they still have it, although the ROTC is almost shrunk up down there.

But during the time that both of my sons were there, they still had President's Day. And the president of the university would come out and review and they would give awards for the year and announce next year's battalion commanders and that sort of thing. So, the essence of a Corps Day, I guess.

BGEN SIMMONS: I was an ROTC product, too, and what you say is very similar to what we did at Lehigh. And I think it is too bad. I think that ROTCs, to a large degree, were a casualty of the Vietnam War.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, and I hate very much to see those go because although I joined a fraternity, I never had the affection for the fraternity that I did for my ROTC. And then subsequently my Reserve unit filled that gap after I finished ROTC.

And in the case of both Sam and Tim, both my sons, their fraternity was the ROTC and it was very much the bonding and within the structure of the military that is so wholesome. Like you, I wish there were more of it and not less of it.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have a well-deserved reputation as a public speaker and we talked earlier about some of your public speaking activities in high school. Did you take any speech courses in college?

GEN MUNDY: I did. I took speech. But again, in all candor, so that I am properly recorded, I can tell you that most of the courses that were not mandatory courses that I signed up for, I sought depending upon how difficult they were going to be, because remember that my goal and objective was simply to get out of there and get in the Marine Corps.

Because in high school I had done fairly well in speaking, speaking I knew would be something of a crib course for me. So, I took it and enjoyed it, once again. There was nothing remarkable about that, but as I recall, I probably did fairly well in that course.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your earliest Marine Corps record that I have seen is your application for Platoon Leaders Class, which gives you a conditional enlistment date of 9 December 1953. You must have decided on getting at least a Reserve commission in the Marine Corps almost as soon as you enrolled at Auburn and you have indicated as much. Do you have anything to add to that?

GEN MUNDY: You remember my earlier recount of running into Captain Gasser and talking about getting in the Marine Corps. He told me, when I waved off any consideration of Navy ROTC, he said, "Well, the other program you can think about is the Platoon Leader's Class." And he lined me up with Earl Litzenberg, Jr., who was then the Officer Selection Officer [OSO] in Birmingham.

And when Captain Litzenberg came to campus, I saw him and went down in the basement of Brown Hall, which was the old ROTC building. I can recall taking the test. I guess it was probably the officer qualification test, I am sure it was that, whatever we called it in those days; taking it while standing in a storeroom writing on top of a stack of cardboard boxes. So, they weren't very sophisticated about the test and I managed to muddle through it, qualified for the PLC program.

Litzenberg said, "Your other qualification is to be physically fit and to achieve a "C" average." And it so happens that the 8th of December is when we finished our first quarter exams and I achieved a "C" average; not a "C-plus" average, but in those days a 1.0, which was a "C" average.

I stood in line at the Registrar's Office to collect my grades and then immediately hitchhiked to Birmingham and put myself up in some fleabag hotel overnight and appeared in the basement of the Post Office in Birmingham the next morning and presented my grades and took my physical and got in the PLC program.

So, again, it was the motivation to get into the Marine Corps in some form or another and then the PLC program. It was just a means of getting in the Marine Corps for me.

BGEN SIMMONS: That 9 December 1953 date would become your all-important "PEBD," Pay Entry Base Date, the date from which all your future Marine Corps service, for pay purposes, would be calculated.

You mentioned Jim Gasser, James C. Gasser, who was a Marine officer instructor for the Naval ROTC at Auburn. I knew Jim and I knew his irritation when anyone would pronounce his name "Gasser." He

always insisted on "Gas-SAIR." I believe he was an artillery officer. What are your recollections of Jim?

GEN MUNDY: My recollections were, one, the first time I saw him I was impressed. That is a Marine officer—sharp. I don't believe I perhaps had ever seen a Marine officer before. I had seen Marines, but usually it was a Marine PFC or maybe a Marine sergeant. I don't recall seeing a Marine officer.

But whatever the case, I was taken. He was dressed in the tropical uniform that we used to wear and a bar-racks cap, and he was just a sharp looking officer.

My other recollections of him would only be that, again, as an elective I signed up for some naval ROTC courses, the history of warfare, that sort of thing, which he taught. He was a good instructor. He was a likeable fellow.

And as I recall he made home brew. He had beer in his home. And when he would have a gathering of the Marine students, he would include the PLCs — this gets on probably another year — but he would include the PLCs and we would go over to his house and he would have home brew. I never learned how to drink home brew beer without drinking the sediment in the bottom of the bottle. The answer, of course, is pour it out of the bottle into a glass and let the sediment stay.

Anyway, I recall him as a good role model, as a good example of a Marine officer for young students.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you may know, Jim Gasser died as a colonel under mysterious circumstances in Thailand in 1970. And you have mentioned Earl Litzenberg, who was the Officer Selection Officer in Birmingham. Were these the only two Marine officers with whom you had contact on campus?

GEN MUNDY: Well, on the campus, more or less, yes. There was one other but this would be about my senior year, Vince Dooley, who is now Coach Dooley at the University of Georgia. Vince had been the quarterback at Auburn my freshman year and then was commissioned into the Marine Corps.

And in those days, of course, a reserve officer did two years, so he did his two years my sophomore and junior year. Then he returned to be a backfield coach at Auburn my senior year, and became my platoon commander in the satellite platoon of the Reserve unit that was at Auburn. That is one.

The other, he retired as a colonel. His name was Jim Wilkinson. He is now retired. In fact, last week I just autographed a picture for Colonel Jim Wilkinson, who I had not heard from before or since, but who wrote to say, I am your old I&I at the 38th Special

Infantry Company in Montgomery, Alabama.
So, those were the officers that I recall there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your application and examination seem quite straightforward. I note that your GCT, your General Classification Test score, was 123. That is good but not exceptional. Can you comment on that?

GEN MUNDY: It has probably dropped off a bit or is no better than that today. I recall taking the GCT test in a Butler building, which was a classroom, at Camp Goettge in Quantico in August of 1954. And it must have been 200 degrees in there. I can remember people falling asleep while taking the test and it was just miserable.

Now, whether that had any effect or not, I don't know, and I doubt it, but I have never counted myself as being in the upper echelons of the IQ test takers. You needed a 120 to be commissioned. A 123 was good enough.

BGEN SIMMONS: On enlistment, you were given the grade of corporal, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Was that the usual grade for those entering the two-year status?

GEN MUNDY: Well, actually, when I enlisted, as I recall, my first ID card, which I still have as a matter of fact, was private. I hitchhiked back from Birmingham, through Montgomery to go back to Auburn on that weekend, and showed my folks my ID card in the Marine Corps Reserve.

My mother almost had a heart attack and tried to talk me out of it: "go back, and give it back to them; the Marines are good but you don't want to do that yet."

But I was a private. As I recall, when you completed your first six weeks as a PLC, you were then made a corporal. A corporal then is a lance corporal today. You went from E-1 to E-3 and then when you came back for your second six weeks, you emerged as a sergeant. So, that is the clue. We were paid as a corporal and paid as a sergeant, and therefore held that pay grade in the Reserve.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your home address at that time was 2037 Ridge Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama. Montgomery would be the scene of considerable civil rights dissension a few years later. Do you have any recollection or racial discord or tension during your college years?

GEN MUNDY: No, I don't.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any black students at Auburn at this time?

GEN MUNDY: None that I recall. It was a pretty Caucasian atmosphere.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have a considerable reputation as being a people-person. Is there anything that happened to you or that you observed during your college years that moved you in that direction?

GEN MUNDY: There is no notable occurrence that I can think of. Again, I learned, because as I mentioned earlier, by being an ROTC leader, by being in the Reserve and so on, I learned about dealing with people outside of just being a member of a class; in other words, as we both know, the most difficult leadership job you will ever hold is one when you are dealing with your contemporaries, when you are trying to motivate those that, you know, had no reason to say "Aye, aye; sir, other than your personal persuasion. So, you had to learn a lot about it.

In the drill team, you had to motivate them. In the Reserve Unit, the Reservists were not quite as structured and disciplined as the Regulars, at that time anyway. So, I can't think of anything particular in my experiences at Auburn in those days.

In the summer, summer jobs, again, lifeguard jobs that we talked about earlier, which continued on through my college years. You found, once again, that those that seemed able to get ahead were people who could deal with people, and were thoughtful enough to say thank you or no, thanks, or you know, to go out of your way to try to help people, that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: In what student activities — and we have already talked about the military activities — what other student activities did you take part in?

GEN MUNDY: I pledged the Phi Kappa Tau fraternity, Leonard Chapman's old fraternity, as a matter of fact. We found out we were fraternity brothers some years later. But as I mentioned, the ROTC was rather fulfilling in terms of not only the drill teams, which was an after-hours activity, but the social events that were attached.

The fraternity was one social outlet. The ROTC, you had sports activities, you had competitive teams. You know, you ran relays or you did things like that. So, there was a lot of weekend activity occasioned

with the ROTC. So, probably those were my main involvements.

I didn't go into acting, I was never in student government. It didn't appeal to me. I guess I always felt somewhat, after leaving North Carolina, when I went to Alabama for a year of high school and then on to Auburn, I always felt a little bit like an outsider or a transient or a temporary — I was only going to be here one year, I wasn't really from Alabama and everybody, it seemed to me at Auburn, was from Alabama but me. That wasn't so, but it seemed that way. So, I never really became involved in a lot of the things.

And I think the other thing, as I reflect back on it, was simply this compulsion or this almost singular focus that I had on the Marine Corps. So, anything short of getting on active duty in the Marine Corps was simply a transitory phase that I had to go through until I could get where I wanted to be.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you make any particular lasting friendships while you were there?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, many. My college roommate for the entire four years is still a good friend, was here for my retirement ceremony, was my next door neighbor at 2037 Ridge Avenue. He was in the house next door. So, he was with me and his name is Gene Sylvester, who is a very good and lasting friend.

Probably my best friend is one that you know, was Gene Arnold. Gene, who was a lifetime friend until his untimely death a few years ago, I met as a big, roly-poly overweight staff sergeant in the Reserve unit in Montgomery. He was not at that time going to Auburn. He was going to Huntington College.

Anyway, I was at my locker getting out my uniform to get dressed for Reserve meeting and here came this big, happy staff sergeant who chimed in next to me and got his gear out, introduced himself. And we just had — there was a magnetism about Gene, as we know, that drew people. And he became a lifetime friend. So, he and Jeanine and Jennifer, their daughter, were probably the closest and enduring friendships that I had out at Auburn.

I could list probably a half dozen names of people who are still in contact, that we see each other and we write to each other from time to time.

BGEN SIMMONS: And your life would continue to intersect with Gene Arnold later on several times?

GEN MUNDY: Many, many, many times.

BGEN SIMMONS: We will pick up on that as we go forward. Were there any particular faculty members or courses that left a lasting impression on you?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the main faculty member was a little short Army major named Bill Bushey and he was my principal ROTC mentor, I suppose. He was the armor officer in the ROTC unit. So, I was sort of one of his proteges. And he was very interested in me and I in him, and probably was much closer with him than I was, for example, with Jim Gasser, who we talked about earlier, even though he was Army.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did he spell his name?

GEN MUNDY: B-U-S-H-E-Y. I never heard of him being distinguished in the Army after that.

But Bushey probably manifested many of the characteristics of interest, always there, always the coach, you did that well, you need to do this a little bit better, whoops, kicked that one in the grandstand; but always an understanding, caring leader. And so, he impressed me more than any of the others that I can recollect.

I took in my senior year, a course entitled "Great Leaders of History." And we each had to select a figure of history that was a leader. I had never thought about it, but somebody beside me selected Jesus Christ as a leader. Somebody else selected Hitler. So, we were at those extremes. So, I took Robert E. Lee.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did I guess that?

GEN MUNDY: [Laughter] I took Lee and studied him — if I say closely, I took a quarter on Robert E. Lee and read a lot of *Lee's Lieutenants* and things like that. And I can recall that the thing that I suppose struck me about Lee, not only his military genius, his ability to direct the Army, but the term "noblesse oblige" was used in describing him and his calling, if you will. And that always struck me.

But I still have, in fact, tucked away somewhere back in one of the boxes at home, I have a folder on Robert E. Lee by senior Carl Mundy, Jr. at Auburn. And that course stuck with me. Lee stuck with me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Robert E. Lee is still a palpable presence here in Virginia, particularly Alexandria and Lexington.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Thereafter, I didn't become fascinated with Lee and pursue it. I have been by his birthplace. As you know, the Commandant's House

has the mirror, as you walk in, that used to hang in the Lee Mansion, and of course I have been over to the Lee Mansion and over to Arlington on many occasions. But beyond that, I never really sat down and followed.

A lot of Bruce Catton's works on the Civil War I read, those were not specifically focused on Lee in every case but yes, Lee is a presence pretty strong around here.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you continue to see Linda during these college years?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Linda went to Greensboro College, which was at that time a girl's school in Greensboro, North Carolina. Because my parents — when my father moved from Montgomery, Alabama, he went into business in Pensacola, and Milton, Florida along the panhandle of Florida, but my mother was not fascinated with Florida.

In the winter she would go down and stay with him in Pensacola. But then she would come back to Lake Junaluska, North Carolina in the summer where we still had our home and the one she lives in today.

So, most of my summers were spent either involved in Marine Corps activity — PLC's, reserve training — or being back at Lake Junaluska. And in the winter, because really my nest of friends were here, at Christmas I would find a way to get up to North Carolina.

So, yes, Linda was a pen pal and at some distance, but Linda was still the very intriguing little girl. She had grown out of pigtails at that time, but she was still very much in my mind.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was she going to school at that time?

GEN MUNDY: She was. She was going to Greensboro College. She was going to be a director of religious education and then she was going to be a teacher. And I married her and made her a Marine wife and she never got to do either one of those things.

BGEN SIMMONS: Going back to your Platoon Leaders Class, in April 1954 you received your orders assigning you to active duty with the Platoon Leaders, Class Junior Course, at Quantico, with a reporting date of 26 July. How did you travel to Quantico?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I took the Trailways bus over to Asheville, North Carolina. In Asheville, I caught the train and went by train to Washington, D.C. and

arrived at Union Station overnight. You know, you connected along the way in Greensboro, I think it was, and came up to Washington.

You got in there at 6:00 in the morning and then my orders said to wait for the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac that would take me to Quantico, I think, at about 2:00 in the afternoon.

So, I can recall coming out of Union Station, never having been in Washington before at 6:00 in the morning. And there was a glen of trees, or at least a lot of green expanse. So, I walked across the street and walked up through those trees.

And I can remember to this day, still, on my morning run, many, many times when I was living at the Commandant's House or at the Marine Barracks on other assignments, I would make the loop down to Union Station and come up toward the Capitol.

You pass the Senate and the Senate Office Building on the left through that swath of beautiful green trees and grass there. And suddenly, not being aware of that, I can remember the Capitol of the United States appearing before me. And it was an exhilarating and inspiring time and remains so to this day. Then I stood around and waited for the train and went off to Quantico on the RF&P.

BGEN SIMMONS: That made it quite a journey to get from Lake Junaluska to Quantico. Had you ever been that far away from home before?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had been to Florida with my parents traveling. I went one year with my dad to a buyer's show in New York City when I was 13 or 14 years old. So, yes, I had been far, but it had been generally north-south, along that line. I had never been to Washington. And I had never been away that far on my own before.

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your recollections of those first six weeks of training in the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: I recall, as I guess we all do, arriving at the train station in Quantico and having a drill sergeant in my face greeting me. We boarded "cattle cars" and they took us out to Ellis Hall, which is the Amphibious Warfare School, then Junior School. It didn't mean anything to me, but that is where you went for your processing in.

And I can recall — and you were fitted with your uniforms there. So, I donned my first pair of both boondockers and boots — we got one of each that summer — on the stage at Ellis Hall. I have got that wrong — Ellis Hall is down at the Command and

Staff College. I have lost the Junior School or the Amphibious Warfare Building.

BGEN SIMMONS: Geiger.

GEN MUNDY: Geiger Hall. We went up to Geiger. Anyway, so every time that I have been back now, probably some eight or ten times to talk to classes there, I have always begun by going over and standing on the left side of the stage and said, "On this very spot I was issued my first pair of boots in the Marine Corps."

We were processed in there, got on the cattle cars, were taken out to Camp Gettge, which is no more. That camp has been torn down. We were taken out to Camp Goettge and there underwent Junior PLC training.

You know, I was so stunned with boot camp, as it were in those days, that I frankly can't remember my officers' names for that first session, company commanders or whomever. I can recall, I do recall one of the officers, who was a second lieutenant by the name of Dan Fillmore, who later became a brigadier general in the Marine Corps and I knew in later years in my Plans Division assignment, worked with him considerably on the subject of Marines in Europe, pre-positioning in Norway, that sort of thing.

But I remember reporting in — in Camp Goettge we reported to a squad tent, which was a processing center, and you delivered your orders and what not. I had come clothed in my summertime attire, which was a short-sleeve shirt, green trousers and white buck shoes.

And I remember vividly, as I came out of the processing tent, at the double of course, that an arm caught me right in the chest and stopped me and almost knocked me down. Anyway, it was Lieutenant Fillmore. I didn't know him then, but it turned out to be him, who said, "Stop candidate!"

And then he said, "Candidate" — I will not choose the words we used in those days, we were fairly loose in the types of words that would be used to describe you — but anyway, I was aptly described as being a lowly thing and excrement and that sort of thing.

But then he came to focus on my white bucks. And he said, "Tonight, after the sun goes down, we will meet at this tent and we are going to turn those white bucks black. Marines don't wear white shoes." Marines wear black shoes, or brown shoes, I guess, in those days.

Well, I was terrified at that. It never came to be because he was not my platoon commander, but that

was one of my early recollections of trauma in the PLC business.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the other facilities? You mentioned a tent, a receiving tent. What were the facilities at Camp Goettge?

GEN MUNDY: Camp Goettge was a Quonset hut camp with Butler buildings, the Butler buildings being the two classrooms. Then Quonset huts, a mess hall, the larger variation of the Quonset hut. And it was there that we lived. They were, of course, un-air-conditioned and we had about 40 people in a Quonset hut, upper and lower bunks.

So, the facilities were fairly austere, but you know, it really didn't matter. We survived. I went back to Basic School at Camp Goettge. My class was a very large one, so they put all three companies of us out at Camp Goettge. So, I had two sessions at Goettge. I totalled about nine months of my life there.

But it was austere, it was fundamental. Very few of us had cars. You didn't go anywhere after hours.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have liberty after hours?

GEN MUNDY: No, you didn't. I think for about the first — oh, the first three, maybe four weeks we were there, we got a couple of weekends liberty toward the end. But you would stay and linseed your stock or bottle shine your rough boots that had to be spit shined.. And then, you would wash your clothes, scrub out your belt, dry your clothes, press your dungarees, and get yourself all ready to go.

And then the great treat. In those days your DI would spend a lot of time schooling that Marines don't eat ice cream and candy. But on the weekends the ice cream truck came back. It was cold and it was good and your DI wasn't around to keep you from it. So, we would load up on ice cream. That was the main treat I recall.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any married officers at PLC at that time, Candidates, I should say?

GEN MUNDY: If there were — there may have been, but I don't recall. Not many of us were. Well, I was 19 years old and most of my class were 19, 20. So, I don't recall that many were married..

BGEN SIMMONS: During that first summer at Quantico, you participated in some sort of testing for physiological strain imposed upon unacclimatized

trainees for hot weather conditions. Do you recall any details of that test?

GEN MUNDY: I recall every detail of that test. It was my first award in the Marine Corps. I still have the certificate of appreciation for my participation. Apparently that was about the time, shortly before we got there, that the Marine Corps began realizing that one canteen of water a day and you shave first and you wash your feet second and if you have any left over that you drink it, that physiologically that wasn't good. They had had, I think, a couple of heat casualties and had deaths at Quantico as a result.

So, we had a Navy lieutenant, a doctor, and we had a couple of corpsmen assigned to the second squad of the first platoon of my company at that time, Company B. And so, what we would do on any event, be it a drill, be it a hike, be it any activity, as soon as whatever it was that was done was completed, everyone else would then be given inspection arms and dismissed. And my squad would continue to march in a circle. Or if we were on a hike, everybody else was given a smoking break and we would continue to move at the same pace as we had been going until we could, one by one, be pulled off.

As I recall, one by one you would be taken over to a tripod scale that the corpsman carried and weighed.

And then we would all drop our trousers and he would come around and insert a rectal thermometer.

And you would stand and, of course, your buddies were having a cigarette and waving at you as you stood there with your trousers at half mast and your rectal thermometer being checked. And once that was done, then, we could drink water and so on.

But they were testing, you know, body heat under certain conditions. And of course, those were the days when you took the big salt pills and they made you put it in the canteen and it ruined your water for the whole day. So, that was a test for what I guess eventually became the wet bulb/globe temperature system of determining what the heat conditions were as they impacted on us physiologically. And I got a certificate of appreciation for that. So, that was the test.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned smoking breaks. In those days just about everyone smoked cigarettes.

GEN MUNDY: Me, too, Lucky Strike. And we went through all of the routines that you would read about in a *Battle Cry* or something like that, where you would get a smoking break and you would field strip your butts and sprinkle the ashes and eat the paper or stick it in your pocket or do whatever you had to do with it.

If you were caught smoking during a non-smoking break, you got in a wall locker and smoked a pack of cigarettes, or got a bucket over your head and smoked a pack of cigarettes; all those things that seemed so effective in reflection, but that we would court martial somebody for doing this day and time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you find Platoon Leaders Class physically stressful?

GEN MUNDY: In those days, the physical demands were considerably different than they are today. Whereas today we would test for the normal PFT types of demands, in those days it was hiking and walking and just endurance. As I recall, hiking would be the real test of the man. If you could hike a long way, then you had it made.

We double-timed, but double-timing was usually a penalty, only if you were out doing drill and you weren't doing well in drill, then you would hear the hated, "double-time march." And it meant you were going to port arms, double-time or you were going to run until somebody fell out. And when that somebody fell out, then you would get quick time.

But it was stressful more from the standpoint, that we were still limited in water intake. It was terribly hot. As all boot camp experiences, you may have secured at 2200 but you stayed up until 0100, you know, cleaning your rifle or cleaning your gear or trying to study on what you were going to do the next day. And at 4:45 you were up again.

So, you didn't have enough sleep and probably didn't drink enough liquids. So, as a result it was stressful, more so in that context than it was in any physical demand, lung capacity, muscle strength or anything that we would examine today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get into Washington or perhaps elsewhere during that summer?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes. I will give you a copy of the "Boys of 357" sometime. This goes on into Basic School, but it is something that I wrote up that I thought was pretty characteristic. We would get into the Willard Hotel for \$5.00 and your ID card would get you a room for the weekend on your military fare.

So, a couple of us would go up and check into a room and then 12 or 15 of us would sleep in the room and it would cost us \$10.00 amongst us. And then we would wander around the sights of Washington. I can recall doing that two times, both liberty weekends.

And of course, the other, on Saturday, the most exciting possible thing you did as a PLC was to go

downtown Quantico and to wander through S.W. Rice's or over the Bolognese and to look at an officer's uniforms and a sword or gold second lieutenant bars. Those were distant and hopefully someday touchable things. But that was exciting.

French apple pie at the Southernaire Restaurant was probably the best place to eat. And I think you either would go downtown and stop in at Diamond Lou's, which was a great watering hole — I drank my first Michelob beer in Diamond Lou's — or you would have Gunther beer. That was a Baltimore beer and we called those Gunther sandwiches. So, you would stop in and have a couple of Gunther sandwiches before you caught the train, usually, and headed to D.C. And sometimes, if somebody had a car, you would ride up with them.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you say that that first summer at Quantico lived up to your expectations?

GEN MUNDY: Absolutely. I spent the summer before I went to Quantico — again, I was a gate guard. Remember, we talked about lifeguarding, or the gate guard. I did a gate guard tour, so I would go on for about six hours on a gate and I must have read the book, *Battle Cry*, which had just come out by Leon Uris, I must have read that three or four times, as I recall. I would finish it and go back to page one and start again. And of course, it had the boot camp sequence. So, everything that we seemed to do in my PLC training I reflected back into some chapter of *Battle Cry*.

So, it did fulfill. We felt tough. We were lean. We lost an awful lot of weight there. I think I probably went — in those days I must have weighed 160 or 170 or more, 175 pounds maybe because I was laying around college not doing too much. And I can recall going to about 152 pounds in PLC training. So, you were lean and you were trim and I felt, boy, I was ready to be a Marine.

BGEN SIMMONS: After your summer at Quantico, you returned to Auburn for your sophomore year. And as you mentioned earlier, your family — mom and dad — had moved from Montgomery back to Lake Junaluska. And you are back in school.

And then in June 1955, you received a stiff letter from Headquarters, Marine Corps, placing you on strict academic probation for failing to maintain a "C" average and not completing a normal course load. You were told that if there was not a definite improvement by February 1956, you would be disenrolled.

You seemed to be in rather serious trouble. Tell me about it?

GEN MUNDY: Let me clarify, first, that my parents had moved to Pensacola, although we retained a home in North Carolina, just a minor correction there.

Well, I had finished PLC's. Remember that I had gone through a freshman year successfully with, once again, not much better than a "C" average. You know, straight "A's" in the ROTC business and the other things were there because they had to be.

So, when I went back I had been rushed for much of my freshman year by fraternities to join. I had not joined in my freshman year. I was made the CO of the drill team at the outset of my sophomore year, and I decided to pledge a fraternity. So, I pledged Phi Kappa Tau.

Remember, I was waiting on the tables and dorm counseling and that sort of thing, so I was pretty busy in extracurricular activities. So, I think all of those things combined to just make me goof off a little bit.

I don't recall exactly what it was. I think you had to take a minimum of 17 hours and it was an elective that somehow fell out, so I was taking 15 hours instead of 17 hours.

But at any rate, I believe that that was the quarter that I flunked Accounting 202. I went back and passed it later, but I didn't have much fascination with that. And so, I failed that. Anyway, that dragged my grades down.

I got this letter, and of course, that was very sobering although, once again, I will not tell you that I was greatly concerned because very frankly, remember me, I was the guy who wanted to drop out of high school and join the Marines.

So, had they called me to active duty I could say, "Hey, mom, it just happened that way. But I was concerned enough to study and get my grades up. And I found that I was probably over-committed. The fraternity was making demands on me, pledge demands. And the drill team, I was now commanding that. So, I just fell down in my grades. But I got them back up.

But now the story of that is lingering, because when I then was promoted to lieutenant general and received a bigger commission than normal, I came home and framed that and was, I guess, probably standing around admiring myself. And about three weeks later, there appeared beside it this letter that you have talked about, framed. Linda had kept track on it. I am a pack rat. I keep pretty good records of all of my things. And she went back and found it and had it framed.

So, we have subsequently, any time that I put up one of my I-am-great pieces of paper, beside it goes

the great-men-come-from-humble-beginnings, to include in my study at the Commandant's House.

And believe it or not, there were two things as we get on into that era, two things that drew the attention of everybody throughout my four years as a Commandant. One was a little Marine suit my mother had made for me when I was a four- or five- year old. And the other was that document that was hanging beside my appointment by President Bush to be the Commandant.

People, particularly the young people, the Marines that would come through, would be genuinely inspired, although it was humorous. But they really were inspired to know that generals aren't born generals, that they come from fairly ordinary stock.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September 1955, you accepted orders voluntarily assigning you to Class II Reserve and to the 38th Special Infantry Company in Montgomery. Tell me about that assignment and its implications.

GEN MUNDY: That was me joining the Reserves. In other words, I chose to do that. In those days, if you were a member of the PLC, you could belong to a Reserve unit. You have looked at the records. I would have thought that I was in the Reserve unit before that time, but whatever the case.

The 38th Special Infantry Company, which is now Company L of the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines in Montgomery, still not in the same training center, but very close to it, was the nearby Reserve unit. You could elect to participate in Reserve drills. I elected to do so, and went down and joined it. And it was there that I met Gene Arnold, as I recounted, and then Captain Jim Wilkinson.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think the difference might have been that the organized Reserve is Class II and the Platoon Leaders Class was Class III, I think it was.

GEN MUNDY: Exactly, I didn't answer your question. That is right.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was this usual, for members of the PLC to do this? Did your other friends on campus do this, or were you sort of solitary in this?

GEN MUNDY: I was solitary among the PLC's that I knew, at least, and there were probably four or five of us that I was familiar with. I don't recall any of them being in the Reserve unit. But it was just a means, again, of more time in the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: The main effect of that assignment is that it seems that you were issued a lot of additional uniform items. What were your drill obligations for the company?

GEN MUNDY: In those days, the Reserves met weekly, vice monthly, as they do today. So, we went down every Tuesday night. Gene Arnold and I, as it turned out, would drive down to Montgomery. And it was, in large part, a waste of time, to be very candid about it. You would go down and I think the Reserve meeting went from 7:00 to 9:00. It was a two-hour drill.

So, you would arrive, you would go draw your gear. You would go have a rifle inspection. You would maybe have a half hour of drill or something. You would come back in and have a class and then your last 30 minutes would be turning in your gear. So, it was not really very professional training associated with it. But it was association and it was being in the Marine Corps every Tuesday night and I liked that very much.

In my last year at Auburn, a platoon of the company was established at Auburn since there were several in the company going to school there. Our platoon leader was First Lieutenant Vince Dooley, former half-back at Auburn, who came back after his two years of active duty to coach at Auburn. Anyway, Gene Arnold and I were then in that unit, and we drilled at Auburn every Tuesday night instead of having to drive 60 miles to Montgomery.

Gene Arnold had a small row-boat, and I remember the one night the platoon took the boat out to a small lake behind the campus to conduct some amphibious training. We put a squad of aggressors on the other side of the small pond, which was only about fifty yards wide, and then mounted a .30 caliber machine gun in the bow of Gene's boat, piled about eight or nine of us in it, and paddled across the darkened pond.

The aggressors opened up, and we did, too, with the machine gun, and since the small boat was only about an inch above the waterline with all of us in it, all the commotion sank the boat. We saved the machine gun, and the pond was shallow, so we just finished the amphibious assault by charging ashore in about two feet of water.

That was the kind of training we did. Sounds not too sophisticated, and it wasn't, but it molded us into a tight outfit, and we had a lot of spirit; the "Auburn Marines" we called ourselves.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was the company having a hard time rebuilding as a result of Korea?

GEN MUNDY: I was not aware of that. It was pretty well up to strength. We had a lot of Korean veterans, a lot of the people from Korea who came back who went into the Reserves.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall your company commander's name?

GEN MUNDY: It was William D. Rummans. He was the manager of the ladies' underwear department at the local Sears, Roebuck, which always somehow just would not fit with me, a Marine major in the ladies' lingerie department; but never an impressive individual.

The I&I was Captain Jim Wilkinson. So, if we had a role model Marine officer, it was the I&I. Major Rummans was, you know, sort of necessary to the occasion, I suppose, but not much more than that.

BGEN SIMMONS: You improved your academic standing satisfactorily. There is a January 1956 letter in your file from Headquarters noting receipt of your transcript, and also that your expected graduation date had advanced from June 1957 to August 1957. You were asked to provide a certified statement as to your correct expected graduation date. That letter, incidentally, was signed by "O.F. Peatross." I am sure in later years you got to know Major General Peatross, holder of the Navy Cross from the Makin Island raid. And as Commandant, did you not approve the naming of the parade deck at Parris Island in his honor?

GEN MUNDY: I did. I never knew General Peatross well. That is to say, we never served together. When I lived at Quantico as a first lieutenant, he lived right up the hill in Whiskey Gulch from me. And I can recall that he had hunting dogs and so every morning at about 0600, why Colonel Peatross would loose his hunting dogs and they would go baying about the woods around Whiskey Gulch and wake up all of our sleeping babies and what not. But none of us saw fit to go up and complain to the colonel about that.

But yes, then I knew him when I was aiding General Walt some years later. They were great friends. So, I knew Oscar Peatross through the Walts. And yes, that proposal was put forth by Major General Gene Deagan, who was then commanding the recruit depot and who took the ghastly step in his last months of tenure to re-name — number one, to half the size of the drill field, which we never used all that, I guess. Maybe we did in wartime, but to reduce the size and dress it up a little bit.

And Gene and I connived so that he would do this

in about his last three months of command, so that I could always say he did it, when we got all the hell from the former Commandants who wanted to know why we were cutting the size of the drill field at Parris Island.

We figured, light-heartedly, that I could always point to him and he could say, "Well, I am retired, and it is over and done with now." But it was the right thing to do, and we did designate that as Peatross Field.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April 1956, you requested, as a member of the 38th Special Infantry Company, active duty for training for about four weeks of on-the-job training at Camp Lejeune. What was the purpose of this training?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the purpose really was to fill an entire summer with Marine training. I had six weeks of PLC training to go to following that. So, I really had a summer that was once again truncated, there was no summer job.

But number two, the Reserve unit went off to Corpus Christi, Texas for two weeks. We trained down there. This next four weeks then got me another four weeks followed by another six weeks. So, I had a full 12 weeks of time with the Marine Corps that summer.

I put in for the ITR, the Infantry Training Regiment in those days, to advance my infantry training, I guess, was my thinking. It was a course that was available to Reservists and I went off to Camp Geiger at Camp Lejeune and took that six weeks.

A fairly miserable experience. I recall going down to Camp Lejeune by bus and arriving on Court Street in Jacksonville, you know, after an all-night bus ride from western North Carolina. Anyway, got there at whatever time of day it was and began trying to find someone who was interested in me at all, which was hard to do. But I finally got to what I imagine was the Reserve Liaison Unit, which was then housed in some really run down Quonset huts off Marine Drive there, or off Lejeune Boulevard, rather, going into the base.

I was finally told to catch the bus, come out to Camp Lejeune, and there I would be picked up. I was, by a staff sergeant who picked me up in his own vehicle, who took me back and put me into a Quonset hut. It was then about 1800 at night. He never asked me if I was hungry or anything.

I was the only one. There were no lights in this building. And I slept on a mattress. There were no sheets or things like that. I just slept on a mattress and got up the next morning and somehow or other

shaved. And then he took me out to Camp Geiger and dropped me off at Hotel Company.

I was at that time a corporal, as we talked about. So, I was the only corporal there for training among just graduated boots coming out of the boot camp. And once again, we had about 40 of us in a Quonset hut, hot, chiggers, you know, all those sorts of things that Camp Lejeune is in the summertime.

And there, again, I learned another lesson of leadership, because not knowing what else to do — I mean, I was an NCO, but I was a Reservist, I was there to train. So, I was just thrown in amongst the other privates and a few PFC's.

And that was a test of leadership for the summer because the NCOs in the company, the training NCOs, would look to me as the platoon right guide, to try to organize field days or to try to get people to be quiet at night, or to try to get us falling out on time.

It was a real test of manhood because the trainees who had just come out from under the iron hand of a drill instructor were now under the somewhat looser hand of the ITR troop handlers. And it took a lot of leadership to get these guys to move.

BGEN SIMMONS: Also it improved your MOS. You moved from a 0300 to a 0311, a qualified infantryman.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: This was the first time you saw Lejeune?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Close on the heels of these four weeks at Camp Lejeune came your orders for your second summer at Quantico, your assignment to the Platoon Leaders Class, Senior Course. And it carried with it a promotion to sergeant, as we discussed earlier. What are your recollections of that second summer at Quantico? Was that again at Goettge or elsewhere?

GEN MUNDY: No, that was at what is today OCS, then Test and Training Regiment, T&T Regiment, as we called it, down past Brown Field in the Quantico complex. They are more vivid, I think, in the second six weeks than the first, which is rather blurry except the Goettge experience.

My platoon commander was a lieutenant named Byrd, Charlie Byrd. I never heard of him again. He was a second lieutenant. And I was in Company B

this time, in the second platoon.

And I can remember sleeping — we slept right beside the railroad tracks in the old wooden buildings down there, 2175 and 2176. They are torn down now. But it was kind of a miserable, hot, sweaty, wooden barracks in the summertime without air conditioning, that sort of thing.

But I there began to see, from the first six weeks, which was probably what it was intended to be, not much structure. I don't know what I emerged with, I emerged with pride but not a lot more. But in the second six weeks, we were — you could see us beginning to sharpen up.

I can remember vividly, as you would march to morning chow, one of the inspirational sights that would strike me is that, depending on where you were in the company column, I can remember seeing the sun came in at just an angle that as the left leg swung forward on the, once again, bottle-shined boots, but the highly spit, shined boots, the gleam of the left boots going forward, 100 of them or whatever you were looking at, as we moved off to chow.

I had been in the Reserve, I had gone to great pains to take my herringbone dungarees to Panama City, Florida with me, to soak them in the ocean, to lay them on the beach, to fade them out, to get them all bleached out and nice. And they really were. They really had that blue-green look to them and they were really salty.

And I can remember on one of our early inspections — my dungaree cap, was starched up and it was just perfect. It was faded out just right.

And I can remember being inspected about the third day or so that we were there and getting good marks, but being told by my platoon commander, when he had taken a look at the uniform — it was especially well turned out, your belt is almost white — he said, "Candidate, you probably think that is a pretty salty cover." And I said, "Yes, sir," or whatever a candidate does. And he said, "Candidate, it is not salty, it is rotten, get rid of it," because it was all frayed around the edges and so on.

So, I lost my favorite utility cap because my platoon sergeant, of course, ripped that right off my head. So, here I am now for the rest of my time with beautifully bleached out herring bones, but a dark green sateen cap. [Laughter] It was a complete mismatch.

But that was good training. The hill trail lives vividly in anybody's mind who has been down there and hiked it, and the evening runs. I began to meet people that I then stayed around the Marine Corps with.

I remember a midnight hike, as we were coming

back down what is today McGuire Road, then Engineer Road, we were a long ways out and we were very tired. And I remember, just as we could see the lights of camp and knew we were coming in, I remember hearing somebody call out, Candidate Winglass — I had never heard of Candidate Winglass, now retired Lieutenant General Bob Winglass.

I can remember, "Candidate Winglass," "aye, aye, sir," and chunk, chunk, chunk, he comes to the head of the column. And in a minute I heard, "Column halt, about face, forward march, double-time march." And we double-timed back with the lights of camp fading behind. It was one of the most demoralizing moments I can remember under the command of Bobby Joe Winglass. But for a mile, and then turned around and hiked back in.

But it was a good formative experience. When I left my senior PLCs, I went downtown because I knew I had made it now. And I bought an officer's barracks cap from Al Bolognes, because his was the best looking. So, I bought an officer's barracks cap with the cordovan visor on it, and put an enlisted cover on it. And wore my tropicals home. And flew this time. I had flown out. I was upgraded from the train. I flew to and from training. And flew home to Asheville, North Carolina. And Linda met me, and boy, I will tell you, I had fore and aft creases and a spit shined barracks cap visor and I was a sharp Marine sergeant and very proud of it.

BGEN SIMMONS: You must have done very well that second summer because in October, Headquarters, Marine Corps, informed you that you had been selected as a principal candidate for a regular commission. Incidentally, that letter was signed "By direction" by "F.L. Churchville." Frank Churchville was a Mustang major who for years ruled Marine Corps officer procurement with an iron hand. Did you ever know him?

GEN MUNDY: I don't think I ever knew Churchville. He was a name on paper. Like the most vivid name that I recall was G. Gnall, George Gnall, who retired as a civilian employee. In fact, I think I was a lieutenant general at Headquarters or something at that time. It may have been earlier.

But your correspondence would come in from Headquarters, Marine Corps, and it would be from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, whoever it was, Mundy. And then it would be signed somebody "By direction."

I always thought that G. Gnall was the Commandant because I didn't know what "By direc-

tion" was about. It took me years to figure out that it was Shoup or it was Pate or it was someone else that was the Commandant. But I didn't know Churchville.

BGEN SIMMONS: My copy of your military record is not all that legible, but it seems to tell me that you stood 54th out of 269 in the Junior Course, and 4th out of 292 of the Senior Course of the Platoon Leaders Class. Is that about right?

GEN MUNDY: I think. Yes, I stood high in the second session.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were 25 principal candidates for regular commissions from the Platoon Leaders Class that year. But yours is the only name I recognize. Were there any other career officers on that list that you remember?

GEN MUNDY: I don't even remember the list, frankly. That may be but I am not aware of it. I don't remember any, unless Winglass is on there. He is the one name that I would recall coming out of PLC.

BGEN SIMMONS: I don't recall his name on the primary list. It may well have been but I missed it. In January 1957, you wrote Headquarters asking to be assigned to paratroop training at Fort Benning after completion of The Basic School.

The reply you got back from Headquarters essentially said to wait until you finished Basic School and then, perhaps, re-submit your request. Did you ever get the paratroop training you requested?

GEN MUNDY: I did, but not then. You get a fairly standard answer from Headquarters. They always tell you to wait. Eventually, as a captain, when I was on OSO duty, I had the ADPP, the Assistant Director for Personnel Procurement, whose name was Mutt Emils — he retired as a colonel, but he was then a Lieutenant Colonel Emils, I guess.

To make a long story short, a fellow named Earl Piper and I excelled as first year OSO's, against Emils' assertion that we could not because we had only an aviation quota that year. We couldn't take a ground person into the PLC program or the OSO program. The Marine Corps was looking for aviators.

So, he began with — this is going to be a year of failure, you guys aren't going to make it. You guys aren't going to be able to do it. Well, we did, at least Earl and I did. So, at the end of the year he was just all high on us and what could he do. And I said, well, you can get me ordered to jump school.

So, to make a long story short, while I was on OSO duty in Raleigh, North Carolina, I finally got to go to jump school. It was a permissive quota, so I recall I used three weeks leave because I wasn't sent down. I paid my own way, paid my own expenses, and tore the cartilage in my left knee. But yes, I became a parachutist and subsequently did some jumping in other assignments.

BGEN SIMMONS: In preparation for your commissioning, you were transferred out of the 38th Special Infantry Company in March 1957. Your conduct and proficiency marks while in the company had been 4.8's and 4.9's and an occasional 5.0.

On the 3d of June that year the registrar at Auburn certified that you had satisfied all requirements for a Bachelor of Science degree, which would be awarded on 4 June. You had successfully passed through the last barrier to your commissioning.

You will be pleased to learn that the transcript I have of your grades at Auburn is almost illegible. [Laughter] I do see on your first Officer Data Sheet that you list Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Wright, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Phil Nichols, U.S. Air Force, as references. Were they with the Army and Air Force ROTC instructors at Auburn?

GEN MUNDY: They were both cousins by marriage, I guess. Colonel Wright, Ed Wright, is married to one of my mother's nieces. He was assigned at Auburn for about two years of my tenure.

And then the other one that you talk about is Lieutenant Colonel Phil Nichols. Phil Nichols married another of the sisters. In other words, they were married to sisters. So, one was Army, one was Air Force, and it was somebody from my family that was around Auburn.

BGEN SIMMONS: That brings us to your graduation from Auburn. Your degree was in business administration. Is there anything else you would like to add concerning your college years?

GEN MUNDY: They were good years. We had come out of the Korean War. We were in the Cold War. One of the things that occurred in 1956 was the McKeon incident at Parris Island where the recruits were drowned. And there was great debate on campus about that, about the Marines, and how we trained people and we were brutal and what not.

But I think on balance, I would say only that really the big recollections are the ROTC, and my association with Gene and Jeanine Arnold. Because you are



2dLt Carl E. Mundy, Jr., attending The Basic School, posed in his summer service white uniform. As Commandant, Mundy would phase out this uniform.

a friend of theirs, you may have heard this story before, but Gene Arnold, being the great, gregarious fellow that he was, you know, they never had a dime. He was a veteran and they lived over in veterans housing. You could see daylight through the window sill outside. But it was wonderful. I mean, it was a happy time in America.

I recall that Gene invited me over for dinner one night. And I said, "Well, gosh, I should bring something, what can I bring?" And he said, "Bring anything you want to." And I said, "Why don't I pick up a couple of steaks." And he said, "That will be fine." So, I went up town and bought steaks and went over and Jeanine had a nice dinner, steak and a baked potato and a salad and probably some bread. And thereafter, Gene would make always great to-do about how hard Jeanine had worked making the salad, baking the potatoes and what a tough job that was. And I always felt inferior in that I was only bringing the steaks to be cooked. But we became really very close friends. We were brotherly in our association. That was a very close rapport.

When I graduated from Auburn, of course I was commissioned. Colonel George Bell was the Professor of Naval Science and administered the oath of office to me.

In my early PLC training you didn't wear any brass with lacquer on it, you always took that off. So, my bars and subsequently even my major's leaves, were shined and really probably looked like first lieutenant bars.

And I can remember that my greatest concern, as Linda pinned one bar on one shoulder and my mother pinned the bar on the other shoulder, was that they not get their fingerprints on the bars that I had worked so hard on.

And interestingly, both sons have been commissioned with those same bars and we have our initials and commissioning dates engraved on the back of the bars for Sam and Tim.

BGEN SIMMONS: Unless you have something else on your Auburn years, this is a good place to end this session.

SESSION 3

The Basic School and Marriage

Physical profile . . . The 1939 Buick . . . Reporting in at The Basic School . . . Basic School Class, 3-57 . . . Influence of Colonel William K. Jones . . . Classmates . . . TBS training and routine . . . Some memorable instructors . . . Marriage to Linda . . . Class standings.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session we covered your college years and your initial experiences in the Marine Corps. In this session, we will explore your time at The Basic School and, that very important event, your marriage to Linda.

Your physical examination for your appointment as a second lieutenant found you physically qualified “to perform all the duties of [your] grade or rank on foreign shore and in the field.” The report of this examination shows your hair as “blond,” your eyes as “blue,” your blood pressure as 122 over 74, your eyesight as 20/20, and your waist as 30 inches. Has any of that changed?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I think probably the blood pressure must be about the same, the hair is still blond depending on the amount of time I spend in the sun. Weight is 185 now. That is probably five pounds more than I would carry. The waist is probably about a 35. And the height, I don’t know. The 5’10” kind of confuses me because I have always tried very hard to be six feet tall and I have always measured about 5’11-1/2”. And of course, when I am in my shoes I am six feet. So, there is something magic about being six feet. So, I think 5’10” is a little short.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is a little short, as we will see later when we get to a later examination. But your appointment physical, your original physical, showed you as 70 inches and 170 pounds. Now, do you remember your officer service number?

GEN MUNDY: 073382.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April 1957, you received your orders to active duty. The Basic School Class, 3-57, was due to convene at Quantico on or about 24 June. You were to report not later than 17 June. A few days later you received your official appointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps to rank from 7 June 1957.

But there were some administrative details. You had to submit evidence of your graduation, which was scheduled for 4 June. And there was another physical examination; this one showed that you had grown an inch, to 5 feet 11, and had lost five pounds to 165. I wonder how that came about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the five pounds I probably had lost in the time between them because I would fluctuate. But the growing an inch I can’t attribute except to how the corpsman was measuring at the time he was measuring.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you travel to Quantico?. Did you have a car by this time?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did. My first automobile — well, actually, my father had a 1939 Buick that he bought in 1941 that we drove throughout my growing up years. So, of significance, I went to first grade in that car, and he gave it to me my senior year in college. And so, I drove off the campus at Auburn some 16 years later in that 1939 Buick special that he had and loved and painted himself and finished and took such great care of.

I rushed right off on leave, now, having an income, and went down and bought a 1953 Buick Special in Pensacola, Florida. That was exciting.

I drove that for a very short spell because then I became fascinated with a V8 Chevy, which was a hot car in those days. So, we bought a Bel Air V8 Chevy about the time that I finished Basic School. But I drove off to Basic School in my 1953 Buick Special, and graduated from Basic School with that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was The Basic School located at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Basic School was at Camp Upshur. That was the headquarters. And the satellite, as I mentioned a little bit earlier in our discussion here, I

was in a very large class of lieutenants. We had three companies. There were 547 of us in that class. So, they put us back out at Camp Gettge, which was a satellite camp from Camp Upshur.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the commanding officer of The Basic School?

GEN MUNDY: Colonel William K. Jones.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you know Colonel Jones' wartime record as a battalion commander in the 6th Marines, 2d Division?

GEN MUNDY: I did not at the time. I don't think we dwelled on that or didn't have any real recollection of that. I knew that he was a decorated officer, and held the Navy Cross. And then the XO of The Basic School was a lieutenant colonel named Reginald R. Myers, and he was a Medal of Honor recipient from Korea.

And I remember that part of the early instruction that was given to us was that after we had had one of our initial social occasions, was that the wives, the young lieutenants wives, should not go up and tap on the Medal of Honor or tap on the Navy Cross of the colonel or the lieutenant colonel and say, "What is that pretty ribbon," that that was not professional. But I didn't know Colonel Jones' record. I just knew that he was highly decorated at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any personal contact with Colonel Jones?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did. And it came only through the fact that in those days we had, on mess nights at The Basic School, because of the constraints on the two Quonset huts that were put together to be the officer's club, we held all our mess nights by platoon.

So, we had 12 platoons in that class of three companies. I was the mess president of my platoon, so I delivered the invitation to the mess night to Colonel Jones at his office in my blues, as was proper to do, and I met him there. And he came.

And in retrospect, I have great admiration because I think, my goodness, that guy did 12 mess nights in that one class alone. And in those days, of course, I had never seen a Manhattan and had no idea what a martini was. But when you went to your mess night you were served only a choice of two drinks. The waiter would come around and they had a brown one with a cherry in it or a white one with an olive in it. And I have never been high on olives, so I took the brown one.

But I had to admire Colonel Jones who, I guess, every week for 12 weeks straight would go over and slurp down a couple of Manhattans or martinis. My humorous recollection with him that we relived later, in that Basic School mess night was that in those days as you concluded the mess night after the remarks had been made, you sang the first and third verses of the Marine's Hymn — and I had probably never drunk wine before and probably had one Manhattan too many, one glass of wine too many — and I remember as the president of mess, when I stood them up to sing the Marine's Hymn, and Colonel Jones was there beside me, we burst forth and sang the first verse of the hymn, and then I burst right into the second verse of the Hymn.

And I can remember, still, Colonel Jones putting his hand on my shoulder as I started the second verse and he started the third, and then just taking his hand off and banging right into the second and we sang all three verses of the Hymn.

And we repeated that later when we had the 30th reunion of my Basic Class. We had retired Lieutenant General William K. Jones as the guest of honor down here at the Navy Yard club. That was about my only touch with him in Basic School. Colonels were a high and holy thing. You know, you never saw your colonel.

I never saw my regimental colonel when I was a second lieutenant in the 2d Marines. The colonel was somebody that was way off there. He didn't run with the troops and eat in the mess hall in the mornings and things like we do today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you see much of Reggie Myers?

GEN MUNDY: Not too much. He would, you know, occasionally pop up somewhere, but really not too much. More at social affairs. And we were taken with him because he had a Medal of Honor. If we were in whites, depending on what form of dress it was, we were all struck that he had earned the Medal of Honor. But I never saw nor heard of him again after I graduated from Basic School. I don't know where he went.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you heard of "Base Plate McGurk" at that time?

GEN MUNDY: It was in the *Gazette*. I didn't know who Base Plate McGurk was then. I, of course, did subsequently.

BGEN SIMMONS: And it was, indeed, Colonel Jones.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: These were later collected and published as a booklet.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the other members of the staff at The Basic School who stand out in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I began with — my original company commander was a colonel named Edmund — no middle name, no middle initial — Valdez, Edmund Valdez. He was a major. And I was in Golf Company, 3/57. We were immediately turned off by Major Valdez, who, in his early incantations to us, or charges to us, had to do with 100 percent.

Everything that we were to do, if we donated to Navy Relief, it was 100 percent. If we would qualify with a rifle, it had to be 100 percent. So, we kind of became negatively, in our own minds, the “100 percent company.” And people didn’t respond to that.

But at any rate, he only lasted through our five-day war. There is a good story there and we can tell it later. William F. Gately, “Wild Bill” Gately, as we knew him, became our company commander. He was probably our favorite instructor. He taught us machine guns.

And he was a very dynamic leader. He would call us tigers. I can remember his pronunciation was “ti-gahs,” “ti-gahs,” and it inspired you. So, when Major Valdez was relieved, why up showed Wild Bill Gately to take charge of us. And I can recall Gately walking into the classroom where we were rather sobered — our company commander had been relieved.

And I can remember Gately walking up on the stage and saying only one thing to us when he took command of the company. He walked up, stood, and looked at us for about two or three minutes. Then he reached up on his collar and he held it up and he said major, major. And then he looked at us and said, lieutenant, lieutenant, and walked off the stage. And we got it.

Paul Riegert, Lieutenant Colonel, retired now, was my platoon commander. I still see him. I have seen him for the past several years. He has a striking young son who is a captain now, Captain Riegert, that we ran into in Guam, in fact one of the escort officers.

We had Harry Fields. Colonel Harry Fields,

retired, was in there, and a number of other officers that are still around. Bob Thomas, Colonel Bob Thomas here in town, that we stayed in touch with because of the tightness of the 3/57 Basic Class and our coming back together for now 30 years.

BGEN SIMMONS: Which of these were members of the staff and which of them were members of the class?

GEN MUNDY: These were all staff members and I recall them. I recall we had a major whose name was Streeter and he was a tanker. I don’t think he ever came to be distinguished, but he was probably the best instructor. He would fall somewhat into the Bill Drumright—Colonel Bill Drumright—instructor mold, as being one who entertains you but taught you a lot at the same time.

But those were the principal names that came out of that era. Well, I didn’t realize at the time that I saw a picture in some of my parent’s holdings, of my class — a news account of my class, my PLC class, being charged by the CO of Basic School and responsible for PLC training by Colonel Lewis W. Walt. I didn’t know who he was. I think it transitioned from Walt to Jones in The Basic School.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your classmates?

GEN MUNDY: Classmates were, well, of those who stuck around the Marine Corps, I think about 30 of us became colonels. We had five generals. Major General Hollis Davison was a classmate. Major General Mitch Waters, Brigadier General Jim Joy, and General Joe Hoar, I think would be the most notable.

I knew Waters. I did not know either Hoar or Joy. They were up in another company. And although we were in the same camp together, we were somewhat distant from each other.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you organized alphabetically?.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we were. Really, Echo, Foxtrot and then Golf picked up with the “M’s,” so I was in the first platoon of Company G. About three weeks into our Basic School, the decision was made to shift all of the athletes into Golf Company.

So, as a result of that, we became a little bit messed up in the alphabet, because we transferred some people out of each of the platoons in Golf Company and put in some people who didn’t begin. For example,

we had a fellow named Amadon who was in Golf Company, but it was because he was a jock strap.

And partially as a result of that, I think Golf Company established quite a notoriety during our days in Basic School, because we had all of these rather irreverent athletes, who were all playing football for Quantico or were running track for Quantico, or were doing something for Quantico.

And so, when our company would go to the field, we would go to the field 100 percent effective, however at about 1400 in the afternoon, why all the athletes would climb on cattle cars and go down main side and work out or sit in the whirlpool or whatever they were supposed to do. And the rest of us would wind up carrying two machine guns or a mortar tube and a base plate back in, and cleaning the weapons, if you weren't one of the athletes. So, we became rather ill disciplined as a result of our attitude toward things in general as a company.

BGEN SIMMONS: Describe briefly the routine of The Basic School.

GEN MUNDY: Well, Basic School was 8-1/2 months long, 34 weeks, in those days. We were in Quonset huts, about 40 of us. I can recall, of course, we brought this array of uniforms that we still have, only we had an extra one or two in those days because you had the big heavy overcoat and the summer service alpha as well as winter service alpha.

But we had two 15-inch wall lockers and you had a couple of locker boxes and that is what you lived in if you were a bachelor. The brown baggers, you know, or the married officers, were different.

Basic School routine was morning musters and then out for training of whatever sort. It seems to me that we considered ourselves as third lieutenants, as less than real officers, second class officers.

We had, again, in those days the physical training was, frankly, not very good, because by that time we had taken to running, but we ran in boots. And anybody will tell you that the worst thing you can do is to run in boots. We did the duck walk. We did a lot of things that now any coach in America would tell you not to do because of the wrong types of development in your body.

We did log runs. That was always a tough one. We had some trees that had been cut down and the log exercise, as you know, pushing up the logs with a full squad, about a 20-foot log. You put the log on your shoulder and the squad would then double time down to the PT field carrying the log.

You always wanted to be between two tall guys

because the log was on their shoulders and you just had your hand under it going along. So, you tried to form up that way. It didn't always work. Those types of physical training.

Rifle exercises. That sort of thing. A lot of time put on marksmanship, as the Marine Corps did in those days. I think we were probably about three weeks or so in the rifle range.

BGEN SIMMONS: What rifle were you using?

GEN MUNDY: We had the M-1 rifle. So, we spent a lot of time at that. You got some good instruction. You learned to shoot. You definitely left there being able to shoot.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any women in your class?

GEN MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any foreigners?

GEN MUNDY: No, I don't recall any foreign officers.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any black officers?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall any.

BGEN SIMMONS: In thinking about your time in The Basic School, what stands out most strongly in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think The Basic School more than anything else established a very strong bond among the lieutenants. We were there a long time. When you live in a Quonset hut, when you shaved or showered even in a snowstorm, you ran about 20 yards and your towel wrapped around you bareback over to the head, the shower and the head facility.

And on the weekends, you know, you did much as we had in PLC's, even though you had a car now. But you still had a lot of shoes to spit shine, boots to shine, rifles to linseed, and that sort of thing. So, we spent a lot of time together, I think far more time together than do today's lieutenants. Today's lieutenants, you break and go your own way on the weekends. We were, because maybe of the remoteness of where we were and the type of living and wooden stocks instead of molded stocks, we spent a lot more time together.

The Basic School, I think the instruction was definitely inferior to what we have today and the types of teaching that we had.

My own company, I mentioned earlier that we gained a notoriety for being a largely undisciplined company. There is a humorous tale, I guess, that maybe we can talk about a little bit later here that has to do with our five-day war.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's hear it.

GEN MUNDY: This is the event that eventually got Major Valdes relieved [sic], I am sure. But we went out on our five-day war in December just before Christmas. It was raining on us when we went. We wore the old snowpacs — shoepacs, in those days. You had those—if it was wet—you put those on. It was very little warmth. You are familiar with them.

So, we walked out and got soaking wet and stayed out for five days. It snowed on us. It was cold, we were wet, we were miserable. And on the final day of the war, we moved up to Copps Farm, moved past Copps Cemetery, went down into the woods there. A Lieutenant Colonel Kenny Houghton was then the chief of tactics at Basic School, and there was a major named Bloom, whose son is now a Marine Lieutenant Colonel Paul Bloom, as a matter of fact.

But anyway, Major Bloom had whatever it was, the offensive tactics section. I had managed to skate all the way through the five-day war by being a fire team leader, by being, in other words, an insignificant billet holder. So, you weren't responsible for anything. You just carried your mortar tube or you dug in when you were told to, and suffered the misery of trying to stay warm and so on.

But we got to Copps Farm and it was, oh, I think about 1800 and we stopped for chow. And this was the last event. We were to move through the woods to Davis Crossroads, conduct a dawn attack, the five-day war was over, and we would go home and clean up and go on Christmas leave.

So, we got there and the word came down the column, "Lieutenant Mundy up." So, I went up forward and the company commander was there, Major Valdez, and Colonel Houghton. And they said, "Okay, you are going to be the student company commander, now, for the night march and the night attack," which I did not seek. I didn't want — I was very content with being in the rear rank.

Anyway, they explained to me, "You will move through these woods, you will arrive, deploy the company and conduct an attack." And I said, "Well, okay, I can read the map, but there is a trail through the woods here and I don't know where this trail is." Major Bloom said, "Not to worry, I know exactly where the trail is. I will lead you, show you."

So, about 2100 we set off out of the opening that was Copps Farm and we stepped into the dark deep woods of Quantico in wintertime, dark night, a little bit of snow falling, and almost became the lost command, because never again were we seen in darkness.

But as soon as we stepped into the woods on this alleged trail, you know, shins began to crack against fallen pine trees and pine branches began to swish back and swat people across the bridge of the nose. And pretty soon there were cries of pain going on.

Major Bloom now is in the rear of the company. So, I would send the word back, "Major Bloom, where is this trail?" Well, he didn't come forward, but I would keep getting the word sent up from Colonel Houghton to get control of this company and move out.

BGEN SIMMONS: You said Colonel Houghton.

GEN MUNDY: Lieutenant Colonel Houghton was on the tail of the column as the chief of tactics, just following the company on the night march, which was just a wandering in this black forest with a compass and so on, but we were just walking through forest. There was no trail there.

At any rate, I can remember classmates, you know, really going temporarily out of control and charging off in a screaming — after they had gotten a branch in the face or something and being tackled and brought back, and cigarette lighters being lit and the word coming up, "Get those lights out, this is a tactical move."

So, we were tired and we were wet and we didn't give a hoot any more. We were moving but we didn't know where we were and we couldn't find the trail. Major Bloom did not make his presence known by coming up and saying, "Here, it is right over here, come on, let's get on it."

So, we wandered around until about — oh, all hours of the night. Bull Fisher, then Major Bull Fisher —

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, that is Joseph Fisher.

GEN MUNDY: That is Joseph Fisher, yes, was the chief of the aggressors. And they were, of course, all mounted on horses. We used the horses out of the stable. The aggressors would mount and do cavalry charges against you and things like that.

They were setting up the defenses up around Davis Crossroads and so finally, when it became apparent that we were lost and we were radioing and we couldn't find where we were, and so Fisher would relay



2dLt Carl E. Mundy, Jr., was photographed upon graduation from the The Basic School on 15 February 1958. LtGen Merrill B. Twining, Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, presided over the graduation, along with Commanding Officer, Basic School, Col William K. Jones.

back. Then Major Bloom is up forward and he is trying to get us out of there. And he would say, "Okay, we will fire a flare." Did anybody see the flare? "No." "Okay, we are going to shoot off a quarter pound charge of C-4." Okay. "Anybody hear anything." Nope, didn't hear anything. "We will run trucks around the perimeter of that particular section blowing the horn all the way." Not a sound. We tried everything to locate this company. Nobody ever heard anything. It was just dead silence.

So, finally, after many chastisements by my platoon commander telling me that I was miserably failing and it was my responsibility to get this company out, we held up and we waited. We sent out a couple of patrols and they went out and came back and nothing.

And we waited until daybreak and now we could begin to see some light. And honest to goodness, we went no more than about 75 yards and there was the Ho Chi Minh Trail, just as big as life, running straight through the woods. So, we had the sand road, the dirt road, that Major Bloom had known about but hadn't found for us.

So, we got on that and walked out to Davis Crossroads and it was too late for a dawn attack. So,

they mounted us up and sent us back to camp in considerable disregard.

As it turned out, when we got back to camp and started turning in our weapons — we had mortars, rifles, mortar sights, machine guns, anything that could be dropped, discarded or anything, was out there on the trail of tears.

So, the word was passed very quickly that Golf Company would not get Christmas leave until every piece of ordnance equipment was recovered. So, the next day, the next morning — we were in and really fatigued — but the next morning a group of volunteers went back out to Davis Crossroads and backtracked. And it was amazing, just this little crashing and you could see where the company had come through.

And right there on the spot with no effort at all, it was just a matter of picking up a mortar tube, picking up a mortar sight, grabbing a pair of binoculars, picking up a rifle, picking up a machine gun. And we got every piece of gear in about an hour and a half and took it back and turned it in. We were then given Christmas leave. And when we came back, Wild Bill Gately, not Edmund Valdez, was our company commander.

BGEN SIMMONS: How was leadership taught in The Basic School? What leadership opportunities were you afforded? You just told me one example.

GEN MUNDY: Well, the leadership instructor at that time was a major named Clark Ashton. Clark Ashton had had a tour with the Royal Marines and was a big man and a very splendid image of a Marine officer. And so, he would come and give us the scholastics of leadership training and would tell you things like officers don't carry packages in uniform and officers never fail to shave even on Saturday or those sorts of types of things.

And it was good. I took a lot to heart. I put a lot of stock into what I was told because it sounded like a professional officer to me. But it probably was about 1934 vintage leadership. I mean, it was of the old Corps type of leadership.

Beyond that, we were given billets, much as we do today. You were a platoon sergeant or a platoon commander and student company commander or what-not. You wore red tabs or yellow tabs, depending on what — yellow was an NCO, red was an officer billet. And you held that billet for a week and then you got a leadership chit at the end, telling you how you did. We did peer evaluations, much as is done today.

But by and large, the leadership instruction, leader-

ship experience both tactical and administrative assignments to leadership — you didn't necessarily have to be a student company commander, but when you went out for BO3O2 for an infantry tactics problem or something, you might be nothing. Somebody else would be the tactical company commander for that particular event.

That was about it. I recall being taken as one — I think each platoon was allowed to take two lieutenants and their platoon commander and we went to an Education Center mess night. The Ed Center was then headed by a Brigadier General "Brute" Krulak. I had never seen him, had never met a general.

But my platoon commander said to me, as we were standing down in Harry Lee Hall, in our blues, General Krulak is right behind you, turn around and I will introduce you. And I can remember to this day turning around with my hand all poised to shake hands and almost swatting the "Brute" right in the face as I turned around, because he was so short.

There was a lot of emphasis on the social aspects of leadership, what an officer should or shouldn't do. There was then fundamental leadership. What do you if a Marine comes along and says, I don't want none of them peas and rakes them back with his hand off of his mess tray. What type of leadership, lieutenant, what do you do about that?

But not much refinement beyond that, just example and officers do this and officers don't do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned earlier that your class consisted of bachelors and brown baggers. About what percentage of your class would you say was married?

GEN MUNDY: A very small percent. I would say in my platoon there were maybe, out of a 40-man platoon, 10 percent, maybe a little bit better than that, but there weren't more than four or five that had wives. Most of us were single.

BGEN SIMMONS: Sometime during this period, maybe at the end of Basic School, you and Linda were married. When and where was that?

GEN MUNDY: We were married on Thanksgiving Day in 1957 during the period of Thanksgiving leave. And that was in Waynesville, North Carolina, which is Linda's hometown and my home of some considerable period of my formative years.

Linda was a very popular girl and was sought by many. It is an interesting tale. She had pretty well hitched her star to a friend of mine, who is still a

friend of mine. But he went in the Air Force, and of course I couldn't abide that at all. But this guy was an Air Force lieutenant who was a couple of years older than I was. So, he was a lieutenant while I was still a college student.

But anyway, Linda was quite infatuated with him and that probably would have come to pass and she would have been Mrs. Robert Massie today instead of Mrs. Carl Mundy, were it not for the fact that we had always had a fascination for each other. I had been really pursuing Linda now to sign up with me.

So, I picked up my blues on a Friday. We got early liberty. We jumped in the car and it was about a 10-hour run to western North Carolina, I remember, barreling — got a ticket for doing 80 miles an hour and got a fine, but nonetheless, got to Waynesville early enough — actually got to Waynesville about 9:00 o'clock in the evening. I think.

I had to stop in Asheville, North Carolina to buy a pair of black socks, because I didn't have any black socks. And we wore black shoes with blues and brown shoes with everything else. So, I got some black socks, arrived home, cleaned up, got in my blues, went over to Linda's house and walked in, and here is a second lieutenant of the United States Marines in dress blues and she wilted. So, she agreed to become my fiancée.

That was probably in August maybe or so. I came back at Thanksgiving and we were married at Waynesville, me in blues and she in a beautiful wedding dress.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was your best man?

GEN MUNDY: My father was my best man. And her brother was in the wedding party. The other Marine there was a Basic School classmate and platoon-mate named Dan Mullally, who retired a major from the Marine Corps some years later, and we are still good and fast friends to this day.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was this in the Methodist Church in Waynesville?

GEN MUNDY: It was. It was the church in which she was christened. We grew up there together, joined the church there, attended MYF, and so it was our church.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you go on your honeymoon? You didn't have much time for a honeymoon.

GEN MUNDY: We were married on Thanksgiving

Day. I got out — as I recall, of Basic School after a physical readiness test on Tuesday. We got an early out. So, we got Wednesday off. I drove to Waynesville on Tuesday night, got in the wee hours of the morning. That Thursday we were married. Left there, went to Asheville, North Carolina. Someone had given to us as a wedding present a room overnight at a very fashionable country club in Asheville.

We spent the night there. That would have been Thursday night. Friday, got up and headed for Quantico. Got as far as Charlottesville, Virginia and the alternator on my car began to go. Whatever the case, it was getting about dark and the lights were on and the lights were going dim, the battery was going down.

So, I was en route to Orange and Culpepper, on Route 22 coming up that back road coming from Charlottesville. And it was dark and my lights were going out, and a truck passed. So, I swung around and got behind the truck, cut off my lights and used him to navigate along the road. And we finally made it to a motel in Charlottesville, which was on a hill. And I parked the car so that the next morning I could get out and roll off in it. We spent the night at the motel.

The next morning we went out and rolled off the car and got it started. We drove to Quantico — this is now Saturday — arrived in Quantico, went to first of all, to the PX to buy what was the most critical element that a Marine lieutenant had to have, which was an iron and an ironing board so I could press my uniforms up.

I might mention that earlier I had gotten quarters in Thomason Park about a month earlier, and we had bought a couple of pieces of furniture from a fellow named Paul Horsey, who ran a furniture company out in Triangle. He still runs that furniture company right down here south of Springfield, Virginia. So, we had a table and we had a bed and we had a sofa.

We stopped at the PX, left the car idling out in the parking lot, because I didn't want to cut it off and it die again, and got our things at the PX, drove down to the commissary at Quantico, left the car idling, went inside, bought groceries, came out to the car and it quit. I got in the car and it couldn't start. I remember a nice lady in a Buick offered to give us a push, did, and the car wouldn't start.

So, I called a wrecker from Triangle. He came in and hooked up the car. Linda and I got in the cab of the wrecker and we drove up to Thomason Park. We got out of the cab, grabbed the groceries that we had out of our car and asked him to wait, and he did. So, we walked up to our 128-A Thomason Park and I put down the groceries and picked up Linda and lifted her

over the threshold and put the groceries in and said, "I will see you as soon as I can get the car fixed," and went back out and we towed the car out. And he put a new generator/alternator in the car and I drove home.

I had gone to get married — I remember that I had \$41 in my pocket and since it was going to be the 28th of November, pay day was coming up. So, I came back with whatever amount of money, it didn't cost us much, but I must not have had more than \$10 or \$15.

Of course, we got in on Saturday, we were there Sunday, and I reported back to duty at The Basic School on Monday. That was the honeymoon.

BGEN SIMMONS: And Linda stayed in Thomason Park while you finished Basic School?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. That was in November and we were there essentially December and January and then graduated mid-February. So, really, only about two-and-a-half months.

BGEN SIMMONS: In looking at your first fitness report, I see that your actual time in Basic School was from 17 June 1957 to 15 February 1958. And your reporting senior was your company commander, Major William F. Gately, Jr. You referred to him earlier.

I knew Wild Bill Gately. He retired as a colonel in 1975 and died of cancer in 1981. He seems to have thought highly of you. He rated you as "outstanding."

All of your individual markings are "outstanding" with the exception of an excellent in "endurance." Your academic standing was either 33 or 53 out of 183 in the company.

Your leadership standing was a resounding 5 out of 183. Your overall standing in the class was 44 out of 546. In his comments, Major Gately says: "Lt. Mundy demonstrates the highest qualities of force, leadership, attention to duty. A natural leader with an outstanding growth potential. He has all the requirements necessary to assume greater responsibility and will be a positive credit to the Marine Corps." Now what do you say to that?

GEN MUNDY: I say that I appreciate that fitness report. I have had some others that were not as glowing as that. But I got along very well with Gately. I got along well with Paul Riegert, who is a good friend to this day. And when I say I got along well, I guess I got along well because I was doing well.

Academics were never my forte. I was not a scholar, never have been, never will be. Leadership was a

very easy and natural thing with me. And again, I would count much of perhaps the early success in leadership because of the extensive time in the Reserves and what not, when I had a leg up on all of my friends who had just come out of the ROTC or something and came to Basic School. I had been going off to ITR, to Reserve training, and that sort of thing for several years. So, I felt very good.

Basic School was a good experience, but I guess like most lieutenants, I left there thinking, "Okay, that one is done, I didn't learn anything there." I was amazed, always, for the first few years I was in the Corps, I was amazed as I was faced with various assignments, different duties and so on, how much of what I had been taught at The Basic School had been injected into my mind and was there in the reservoir when I needed it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, with Major Gately's glowing words of praise ringing in our ears, this is probably a good place to end this session, unless you have something else to add.

GEN MUNDY: I can't think of anything. I think that pretty well closes it off.

SESSION 4

Service as a Young Lieutenant

Reporting to the 2d Marine Division for duty . . . Assignment as a platoon leader in 2d Battalion, 2d Marines . . . Life as a married second lieutenant . . . Deployment to the Mediterranean . . . Lebanon Intervention of 1958 . . . Birth of a daughter, Elizabeth Anne . . . Promotion to first lieutenant . . . Regimental staff assignments . . . Orders to the USS Tarawa . . . Sea Duty and life ashore . . . Re-assigned to the USS Little Rock . . . Transferred to Quantico . . . Duty as an instructor at The Basic School . . . Birth of first son, Carl III . . . Impressions of Col Louis H. Wilson . . . Duties as a map-reading instructor and tactical officer . . . Promotion to captain . . . Seniors and associates at TBS . . . Boating and pistol shooting.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your Basic School experiences and your marriage. In this session we will explore your service as a second and first lieutenant.

In December 1957 you received your permanent change of station orders. Graduating from The Basic School on or about 15 February 1958, you were to proceed to Camp Lejeune for duty with the 2d Marine Division. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, was requested to assign you the Occupational Field 03; that is, Infantry. And after 90 days satisfactory performance in that assignment, your own MOS was to be changed from 9901 to 0302.

I see that on arriving at Camp Lejeune, you were assigned to Company G, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, a rifle platoon commander. Who was your company commander?

GEN MUNDY: To answer, the company commander, was Captain Russ Hudson. Interestingly, I have come across him in latter years through his son, who is a Navy flight surgeon assigned to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing out in El Toro today. So, some background on Russ Hudson.

He was subsequently relieved as company commander. You know, you are not allowed to have a company fund. But we had a company fund. And to make a long story short, he was relieved rather abruptly, and my company commander became a then-captain named Terry Allen.

But let me correct one point here. When I joined 2/2, actually I joined D Company—Delta Company—because that was at the time—that was the first company in the 2d Battalion. About a month after I got

there, we went to the—I think it was the H series T/O, in which we put four rifle companies per battalion. So, the Delta Company designated moved back to the 1st battalion and then the company that I was in was re-designated Golf Company of the 2d Battalion. So, both Delta and Golf Company were my first assignments.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that your battalion commander was Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hadd, who gained fame in Lebanon, and we will get to Lebanon in a minute. What sort of shake-downs or orientations did you get as a new platoon leader?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first of all, we called him “Harry the Horse.” He was a big man and if you know him you will recall him perhaps in that capacity. As to a shakedown or orientation as a new platoon leader, you really didn’t get much in those days.

The battalion was working up for a Mediterranean deployment. I actually got there in March of ‘58 and we were to deploy on the 15th of May to the Med. So, I was only there for a couple of months.

But I reported in to the battalion. I believe, as I recall it, I saw only the executive officer at that time, who was a major named Wendell Waskom. Major Waskom told me that I would be assigned to Delta Company and, in fact, told me which building it was in and sent me down there.

So, I reported in to Delta Company. I was received there by the XO and the CO, told that I would be the third platoon leader. And not a lot more than that.

I inquired as to where was the third platoon and was pointed toward the squad bay and tracked down,

I think, my platoon guide, because the platoon sergeant was on the rifle range.

I asked that the platoon fall out so that I could meet them and, despite the training that I just completed in Basic School that told me about 44-man rifle platoons and so on, 13 men fell out. We had people in school, we had people here, we had people there. But I think that my first platoon at that particular point numbered no more than about 24, 25 Marines. It eventually grew to about 39 by the time we deployed.

But there wasn't much orientation. You sort of picked it up and ran with it on your own.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you remember your platoon sergeant?

GEN MUNDY: My platoon sergeant was a man named John Meakam, a staff sergeant.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is a long-standing belief in the Marine Corps that it is the platoon sergeant that makes or breaks the new lieutenant. Do you agree?

GEN MUNDY: That may be the case on occasions. In my particular instance, Staff Sergeant Meakam, again, subsequently after we had gotten into Lebanon, was relieved as a platoon sergeant. He was not very efficient. He had a very florid complexion. I just thought he stayed out in the sun a lot because I was young and naive and then I came to find out that he stayed in the staff NCO club at the bar a lot. And that probably had something to do with the color of his face.

But he was not very effective. And while we worked together as a team, I never felt like I learned a lot or was trained by Staff Sergeant Meakam. The company first sergeant was another story. His name was Howard, a master sergeant in those days. He was nonetheless, the top. But I felt very well taught by First Sergeant Howard.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your wife's address is given as Box 4, Waynesville, North Carolina. Is Waynesville close to Camp Lejeune?

GEN MUNDY: No, Waynesville is about 400 miles from Camp Lejeune. That was my parents-in-law, their home, and as was to become a frequent occurrence in the Mundy family, when I finished Basic School and we returned to Waynesville on leave, then I left for Camp Lejeune on my own and left her there, because I was uncertain about quarters. Also, I knew that I was going to be deploying soon.

So, she actually remained with her parents from the time that I reported to the division until late April, and then came down for about two weeks and we lived out in the Hostess House at Paradise Point before I deployed to the Mediterranean.

BGEN SIMMONS: You didn't have much social life as a newly married second lieutenant at Camp Lejeune, then?

GEN MUNDY: Not too much, at least in that particular stage. Again, we lived in the Hostess House, a single room. You would walk over to the club and eat at night, get in your car and drive out into Jacksonville, which was not much excitement, maybe go to a movie.

And then, of course, we had friends that were Basic School classmates. We would get together with them and you would play — in those days you would play bridge or canasta. You would get together and that is just what you did. We didn't drink much because we hadn't really learned to drink in those days. Usually you played bridge and ate popcorn or something like that, for an exciting night.

The club did host bingo fairly regularly and I can recall that we were regular bingo participants. And Linda won an 8mm Kodak movie camera, which I was very impressed with. So, we wandered around taking pictures of ourselves on the beach and in front of the azaleas at Camp Lejeune with our new bingo 8mm camera.

BGEN SIMMONS: And you probably went to Snead's Ferry and Morehead City for seafood dinners?

GEN MUNDY: In Morehead City, I think I got as far up as Captain Bill's. And Swansboro and Sneed's Ferry, there was a great shrimp house just as you turned off to the — Southernaire, I believe, restaurant, just as you turned off to the rifle range.

I was on the range, in fact, during part of that period and I always shot very well with rifle and pistol. So, I enjoyed that, but it meant that I got up at 2:30 in the morning to go to the range. But I would get home early in the day and then Linda and I would go out and eat some shrimp.

BGEN SIMMONS: Lieutenant Colonel Hadd was not a generous marker. I see that for your first fitness report from him for a four-month period, mid-February through June 1958, he gave you an overall marking of excellent, but a number of the individual

markings were no better than above average.

In his comments he says: "This officer at times becomes side-tracked by small issues. Additional experience should correct this, as he has the growth potential to become an excellent to outstanding officer."

Did Harry give you any individual counseling or mentoring on how you could improve?

GEN MUNDY: No. I never saw the battalion commander other than at a distance. Actually, I am certain that those remarks were written by Terry Allen, by Captain Allen. Captain Allen, you know, would counsel you on your fitness report, although there wasn't a lot of counseling. You generally were called in and given the report and asked if you had any questions. And you usually said, "No, I don't," or, I usually said, "No, I don't."

So, I don't know what it was, what I was side-tracked by, but I would say that in all candor, as I look back and reflect upon myself and on the past four years, yes, from time to time I do tend to get into the details, so that may have been a fairly accurate forecast.

BGEN SIMMONS: You also sort of hinted at the fact that this was a troubled company that you joined. This was a company with problems.

GEN MUNDY: As I said, Russ Hudson had been relieved. Terry Allen was the S-4, although Allen had, himself, come out of the company to be the S-4, because he, too, had been sort of relieved. They called him the "black whip." And he had apparently, down in Vieques, had become known for his hard-riding ways. So, yes, he was a rather tyrannical company commander. He did a lot of shouting and screaming. He was a big man and he had a great ego.

So, when you are in a situation like that, as is so often the case, the XO and the platoon commander sort of huddle together and deflect the tirades of the company commander. And that was somewhat the case in Golf Company.

BGEN SIMMONS: About this time you went afloat as the Mediterranean battalion landing team. Do you remember just when that was?

GEN MUNDY: That was the 15th of May 1958.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was your ship?

GEN MUNDY: The ship was the USS *Monrovia*, an

old converted liner in World War II. I didn't know it at the time, but subsequently learned, that in fact it was General Patton's flagship for the landing in Sicily.

BGEN SIMMONS: And probably a bit more comfortable than the run of the mill APA?

GEN MUNDY: It was pretty good. We lived — I think there were 12 of us lieutenants who shared a bunk room. But it was on the main deck. And because this had been a cruise liner, it actually had windows in it rather than portholes, that you could crank down. So, we were privileged in the heat of the Mediterranean — and of course ships weren't air conditioned in those days — but we were always privileged to be able to run the window down and get a little sea breeze back there. We were back aft. But it was pretty good living.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you mount out from Morehead City?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Almost immediately you were plunged into expeditionary duty. The equilibrium in the Middle East was upset by the coup d'état and the assassination of Feisal, the pro-Western king, of Iraq. Lebanon was threatened with civil war aggravated by Syrian troops poised on Lebanon's borders. On 14 July 1958, President Eisenhower directed the JCS to land troops in Lebanon. Your battalion landing team, BLT 2/2, was just off the southern coast of Cyprus and was closest to Beirut.

Also present was the headquarters of a brigade equivalent, the 2d Provisional Marine Force, under command of Brigadier General Sidney Wade. Your battalion was ordered to land over Red Beach at 1500 on 15 July. Red Beach was about four miles south of Beirut and about a half-mile from the International Airport. What do you recall of these events and what was your role?

GEN MUNDY: I recall — I will start by saying that when we arrived in the Mediterranean to relieve BLT 2/8, that relief was done in those days in Gibraltar. So, we pulled into the Port of Gibraltar, got off. All the senior officers rushed in to buy Volkswagens to be delivered and picked up by the ships when we went home.

Most of us went in and bought a Harris tweed sport coat to be made while we were gone that we could

pick up later. And then we had a turnover. Platoon commanders didn't turn over. Battalion staffs did, I am sure. I can recall to this day, as all the ships got underway about the same time, we had four ships with us and I don't recall specifically but I am sure the 2/8 also had that number.

I remember, as we pulled out of the harbor in Gibraltar, that 2/8 should have turned right and headed into the Atlantic and we would have turned left and gone into the Mediterranean. And I can remember seeing the ships of 2/8 also swing left, and then we got the word that there was something abuzz at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and that the 2/8 was going to be held there for a while.

So, we razzed them and flipped good natured insulting gestures back and forth. And they went one way and we went the other, but all of us headed east, not west.

We then proceeded to Point Yankee, which I couldn't tell you where that is, but it was a spot, as you have described it, probably, out of Cyprus and off Lebanon. And there we floated for about 34 days, very boring, very monotonous. The highlight of the day was swim call. And we had a good captain who loved to, you know, heave the ship to at about mid-afternoon. We would stop the screws and they would lower a cargo net or two and you could go over the side, put on a shark guard, in an LCVP, and we would dive over the side and swim, those of us who could swim.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were in your element, then?

GEN MUNDY: I was in my element. I was a good swimmer. I can remember frequently coming up and that someone had forgotten to turn off the sewage disposal valve. And you would be facing some obstacles in the water that you hadn't planned to, with the ship there.

But anyway, we floated there for a while. Then we went on a liberty call into a place called Antalya, Turkey, a little small place. And not much there. We were in there for a couple of days. We went from there to Salonika, Greece, and had a fairly decent port call there.

In Salonika we had to field a soccer team. I was not on it, but some of my Marines were, so I went to the soccer game. And we discovered what I believe in Turkey was called a raki, which is ouzo in Greece, which is anisette in France, which will shut out the lights if you drink it in the sun, as we know.

Well, the young Marines didn't know that. And so, for those of us in the rooting stands, the hawkers would come by with these wooden cases of what

looked like 7-Up to us. And you would buy it and it tastes like licorice. It tasted very good. And the young Marines would have a couple of those and just literally fall out of the stands. And we had to take them back to the ship in baskets. I can recall that, in the medical litter baskets, to get them back aboard.

We then put back to sea. And it wasn't long after that that we got the word that we would be landing; in fact, only a day or so before.

It was probably, as I reflect back on it, one of the most exciting times of my life, because remember, I had always wanted to do this. And all of a sudden, we were going to hear "land the landing force."

So, we prepped. I can recall that we weren't — I hope that we are more professional today — but I remember that we issued ammunition and we got all ready to go and that the ship that I was on had no .45 ammunition on it. So, none of the officers, thus, were armed. We had our pistols, but we had no ammunition. The troops all had their ammunition.

We got down in the LCVP's over the side, the classic, you know, World War II style, move to your debark stations, go down the side into the bobbing boats. And then we circled for a long time.

And of course, between the smell of the exhaust of the boats and the bobbing in the ocean, by that time you were standing ankle deep in vomit, your own and everybody else's in the boat.

But we landed, we went on ashore, and in the photograph that was made of the landing — by whom I don't know but there is a kind of a pan shot of the entire beach with all of the waves going ashore — everybody is moving across the beach, less one. One is facing to the rear. And that person facing to the rear is me.


The story behind that, which has a little humor to it, despite all the teachings that we had in Basic School, despite all the drills that, number one, the lieutenant should be in the rear of the boat and should be the last man out supervising his platoon, what Marine lieutenant worth his salt wants to be the last man out of the boat. So, I was up front where I shouldn't have been.

Number two, of course, we were taught to never step off the front of the ramp, because the boat could wash in and break your leg. You should step off the side. So, I charged straight off the front of the ramp as soon as it went down. I was carrying a PRC-6 radio and when I stepped off the ramp, the water was deeper than I had anticipated, so I went completely under, just fell completely under. And when I bubbled up and finally got my footing and got back to my feet completely soaked, my platoon was streaming ashore on either side of me.

But I was soaking wet. My radio wasn't working. So, to make a long story short, when we got on the beach and I was trying to establish communications, I couldn't because the radio was wet. So, I turned around I guess to look and see if I could find my company commander. And at that point they shot the historical photograph. So, I am the only man in the Lebanon landing facing the wrong way.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will look for that photo. Is the legend true, was the beach really littered with bathing beauties that had to be stepped over to get ashore?

2dLt Mundy served in Beirut, Lebanon, in July 1958, as a platoon commander in Company G, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines.



GEN MUNDY: No, it wasn't that crowded. There was a little bit of exaggeration in the press. We were deadly serious. I remember, you know, as we were approaching the beach, I remember getting my boat team locked and loaded. And there was no light-heartedness about what we were about. We expected to go ashore and start shooting at people.

There were some people on the beach and as we then moved up into the dunes — now remember, physical fitness was not something you paid much attention to in those days. We had been aboard ship for a long, long time. The best you could do was get on the forward cargo hatch and do some side straddle hops or push ups and that was about it. So, when we hit the beaches of Lebanon in the summer in the Eastern Mediterranean, we started taking stragglers before we ever got to the dunes.

So, as we stopped to reorganize, the people on the beach were there, but I don't recall seeing any more than 10, 15, there might have been 20 people around. And then up over the dunes, and again we would stop. And every place that we stopped we would dig in. We were tactical.


BGEN SIMMONS: Once ashore, what happened? What was your role?

GEN MUNDY: The first day we moved up to, it would probably be the western edge of Beirut International Airport, and set in — my company set in a defensive perimeter there, looking across the runway. We had dug in. And since we had landed at 1500, it was getting nightfall then. So, we dug in and nightfall came and we put out listening posts and nothing happened.

I did hear some gunfire off to the flank. One of my Basic School platoon-mates, a fellow by the name of Dan Cupit, who was a rather aggressive fellow that apparently loosed his machine guns on a herd of goats or something, he had heard something and opened up. But that was about the only excitement of the night.

The next day Captain Allen was given orders to go up and secure the tower, the control tower at the airport. And it happened to be me as the lieutenant to go along with him and probably a squad out of my platoon. So, we went across the runway and up to the tower and Captain Allen went in and shooed the controllers out — why, I don't know — but we ran the controllers out of the tower and the tower secured.

And then while we were there, we got the word that we would be moving into Beirut. We came back down, got the platoon ready to go. And we got in trucks. I happened to get in an Amtrac. We had the



The caption accompanying UPI photograph taken of 2dLt Mundy in Beirut on 29 July 1958 reads: "Lieutenant Carl E. Mundy relaxes in his 'temporary home' here as U.S. Marines remain on duty in the face of possible revolt. Slabs of marble serve as walls for Mundy's home, and a tarpaulin protects him from the elements."

Amtrac platoon, that is what my platoon was mounted in. And we started moving down the road into Beirut.

And I can recall that the U.S. ambassador and the naval attache and some Lebanese officers came and stopped the convoy and tried to convince Colonel Hadd to turn around and go back. The U.S. ambassador was not high on our moving into town.

But Hadd had his orders and so they talked for a while and we mounted back up and drove into Beirut. A very exciting time. People hanging out and waving American flags and giving us V for victory signs, and once again, I thought I was a conquering hero.

BGEN SIMMONS: You must have done well, for you received a certificate of achievement from General Wade. Among other things the certificate says that "Lieutenant Mundy maneuvered his platoon with aggressiveness and skill to seize his assigned objectives." Lieutenant Colonel Hadd moved you up half-a-notch in his next set of markings. He put you between "excellent" and "excellent to outstanding." In his comments he says:

"A real sharp young officer. An excellent leader. During the initial Lebanon landing, his platoon functioned extremely well. He can be depended upon to

do a thorough job. Growth potential considered to be outstanding."

In light of today's inflated fitness report markings, your markings seem very low when measured against Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's glowing comments. Do you have any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think we were more, you know, probably objective. You didn't worry in those days. Outstanding was something that you got rather infrequently. And there was no — I mean, being marked excellent was a pretty good mark. You felt pretty good about that.

I think also that that probably reflected something that I have come to understand in the Marine Corps, and that is that any reporting senior generally starts off, you know, with a fairly subdued rating. And then that way, why his leadership can be reflected in the fact that you grow under his tutelage, I guess, to become a much more efficient officer.

I would only back-track — it is interesting, on the awards, this would be something to be recorded. We were all called into the ward room, all the officers, after we re-embarked after Lebanon, and were told that we would write each other up. So, all of us got a designation to write somebody else up. So, I don't

know who wrote me up as being such a hot shot platoon commander, but it probably was one of my buddies. And then, if you were one of the captains, you got a Navy Commendation Medal, and if you were a lieutenant, you got a certificate of commendation. And we probably gave some troop awards, I imagine. I don't recall those because there wasn't a lot of excitement while we were there.

When we moved into the city, we were down in the docks for about two weeks. We did have a sniper that would come out at night and shoot at us, and we would have some people that would ride by in cars occasionally and spray the area with machine gun fire. But they never hit anybody and that was fairly exciting.

I would personally go out with one of my fire teams and get an M-1 and get all set up. And because we had the authority, if we could tell that we were definitely being fired upon, we could return the fire. Without that, we could not. So, we would lay in wait for hours, hoping that some bastard would ride by and at least point something at us so that we could shoot at him. And we shot a couple of times but I don't think we hit anybody.

We moved up into the hills between what would be the Shouf Mountains and the seaport itself and got a little respite from the heat out there. Boy, it was hot in Beirut. We eventually, in about two weeks, moved up into a cedar grove, I can recall, and bedded down. And life was a little bit more it wasn't so hot. But it was fundamentally pretty hot and boring in Lebanon and we didn't do much other than just go there and be there.

BGEN SIMMONS: I was in G-4 at Headquarters, Marine Corps, when Harry Hadd came back to debrief on the Lebanon landing. I found him very impressive. He looked and sounded the part of a rugged, aggressive Marine battalion commander. Do you agree?

GEN MUNDY: I think he probably was. As I mentioned earlier, in those days, we didn't see a lot of more senior officers. I saw the battalion S-3. I would see the battalion exec. I was summoned up one time to play poker with the PHIBRON commander, who was himself a rather walrus-like Navy captain who was called "commodore." I couldn't figure out why he was a captain but called commodore. I have learned since.

But anyway, the commodore liked to play poker and Colonel Hadd did. And so, he would bring up officers and you would play poker and that is about the only time I saw him. I would see the colonel

going over the side when we hit a liberty port.

So, I really had no real up close to him. But he was held with a certain amount of affection and I think respect in the battalion as being, as you characterized him, a pretty rough, tough, "Harry the Horse" type battalion commander.

BGEN SIMMONS: At some point in here, you and Linda had your first child, your daughter Elizabeth Anne. When and where was she born and were you present or were you still afloat?

GEN MUNDY: No, I was — I got the message that I had a daughter about one day out of Gibraltar headed west, coming back to the United States. Betsy was born on the 7th of October. We were supposed to have gotten back, I think, about mid-September. We had sailed in mid-May, we would be back by mid-September. But we were extended because of the events.

So, that was it. Linda was once again back at Box 4, back living with her parents in Waynesville. And her mother took her to the hospital and she had our first child. And I got a telegram in the middle of the night on the *Monrovia*.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you one of those who had bought a Volkswagen and was taking it back to North Carolina?

GEN MUNDY: No, I didn't even know what a Volkswagen was, but I knew all the senior officers would go in. A Volkswagen was \$870, as I recall, and you could buy them in Gibraltar. The dealer would then have them there. And then when we pulled back into Gibraltar to turn over to the relieving 3/6, I think, was relieving us, when we pulled in there, then they would open the cargo hold and in would come 10 or 12 Volkswagens into the cargo of the ship. And they would take them back to Morehead City. It was all legal.

I didn't buy one. I think I did get my Harris tweed sport coat and I gave a guy a favorite photograph of Linda and he turned it into an oil painting. And I still have it at home and it is still one of my favorite pictures. And that is what I brought back from the Mediterranean.

BGEN SIMMONS: Promotions came fast. I see that on 19 August 1958 you took a physical examination for promotion to first lieutenant. At that time you were still a member of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and at that moment you were embarked in the APA-

31, USS *Monrovia*. I see that your height and weight were holding steady at 5 feet 11 and 165 pounds. How come such a fast promotion?

GEN MUNDY: That was normal in those days. I think 18 months to first lieutenant was fairly standard. So, nothing extraordinary.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your actual promotion came on 7 December 1958 and it was a temporary appointment. At about the same time you were taking a course in amphibious staff planning at the Landing Force Training Unit at Little Creek, Virginia. Colonel Victor Harwick was the officer in charge. Any strong recollections of that course?

GEN MUNDY: They were from the Landing Force Training Unit, but actually it was a mobile training team that came down to Camp Lejeune. So, it was one of those, "Here, lieutenant, go to this course." And I did. And it was a week long. There was nothing remarkable about it. I think we had probably pretty well covered the material while I was in Basic School. But it was something of a refresher; FMF3-1 and how a staff works, staff estimates, op orders, that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: You could hardly characterize it as a course in staff procedures, then?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Lieutenant Colonel Herb Woodbury, another friend of mine, took over the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, from Harry Hadd. He gave you a "not observed" report. With your newly acquired skills as an amphibious planner, you were transferred to Headquarters Company, 2d Marines in mid-December and, for the next six months, served variously as an Assistant S-2 and Assistant S-4. You were also detached for the month of April to serve with the rifle range as a competitor and team captain of the rifle and pistol team. First, what are your recollections of staff duty at the regimental level?

GEN MUNDY: I was brought up to be the Assistant S-2 of the regiment and you know, never knew or thought too much about why. That was not something that I dwelled on, but it was just a reassignment. The battalion broke up when we returned from deployment. It was not unusual then or, for that matter even now. You know, you lost all the officers, they went off to other jobs.

So, I went up to be the S-2. No extraordinary rec-

ollections. [I] Would write the intelligence annex for various regimental plans and orders, stand regimental OD instead of battalion OD.

Then I was called in one day about the Eastern Division Matches and told that it was noted that I shot expert with the rifle and pistol and the regiment needed to send a team out for those matches and I would be the lieutenant and I would be the team captain.

So, I went out and shot the range at Camp Lejeune for a good month or six weeks, and thoroughly enjoyed every moment of it. While, again, it was the usual reveille at 0230, leave for the range at 0330, be out there at 0430 so that you could get the first round off at 0545 when the light come up, that is all we did. And you were through generally by 11:00 or 12:00 in the day and then you could go home and have a nice afternoon at the beach with your wife. So, it was kind of a laid-back period.

I shot well then and continue to shoot well, but I was far from a distinguished shooter. And as I recall, the 2d Marines did not do anything extraordinary in that particular match.

As far as the S-4, when I came back to the regiment, the S-2 Alpha had been filled and I was then in receipt of orders to sea duty. And so, I was kind of stuck in the S-4 shop just as a holding pattern and was made, really, the regimental police officer. I wandered around making sure that the area was policed well for a short while before I left for sea duty.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned going to the beach with Linda and the baby. At some point in here you moved Linda and the baby from Waynesville to 247 Eastwood Street, Jacksonville. What kind of accommodations were these?

GEN MUNDY: Those were rental apartments and it was pretty nice. They are still there. There weren't quarters available. When I returned from the Med, Betsy was 10 days old. I went home on leave for probably a couple of weeks and then brought Linda and Betsy back with me. And we went out and rented this small two bedroom place in Jacksonville.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any problem finding housing.

GEN MUNDY: No problem. It was not hard at all. It was there to be rented. They weren't — we talked earlier about the number of officers that were married in my Basic Class. And probably many of us were married by that time. But there were not a lot of married enlisted men in those days in my platoon. Staff

Sergeant Meakam was married, but his wife was back in Tennessee. I had a platoon guide, a sergeant, who was married. And his wife lived in Hubert, North Carolina, which I didn't know where that was, but never saw her. But that was it. I had no other married Marine in my platoon.

So, family housing was not as tough, perhaps, as it is today because of the larger volume that do get married.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your regimental commander, Colonel Charles R. Baker, gave you good markings, putting you in the "excellent" category and noting that you were a "most conscientious and sincere Marine officer" who "demonstrate fine leadership qualities." What are your recollections of Colonel Baker?

GEN. MUNDY: Well, again, you didn't see the colonel much. I really dealt with Lieutenant Colonel Paul Treitel, who was the regimental exec, when I was dealing at that level. Usually I dealt with the S-2 or the S-4. But I remember Colonel Baker — I think we were in the field only one time while I was there. I was there as the S-2, assistant 2. And we were in the field and he seemed to me to be a fairly competent officer.

But again, in those days, colonels were far and distant entities. Unlike today where the colonel runs at the head of his troops and eats every meal in the mess hall and is constantly around displaying leadership and what not, in those days, colonels mostly talked to generals and played golf and lieutenants didn't worry too much about what the colonel was doing.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your reporting senior at the Rifle Range was Major Fred Eubanks. He marks you as "excellent to outstanding" and gives you good comments that you are "most conscientious," but he doesn't say much about your shooting. Was this the end of your competitive shooting?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. I never pursued it from there.

BGEN SIMMONS: But you continued to qualify as expert with the rifle and pistol for a good number of years after that?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: In March, you received orders detailing you to the Marine Detachment, USS *Tarawa* (CVS-40), to report by 15 July. On 29 June 1959 you were detached from the 2d Division and after proceed

time, joined the *Tarawa* at NAS, Quonset Point, Rhode Island. What kind of a ship was the *Tarawa* ?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the *Tarawa* was a World War II CV, and of course the Navy was just getting into the anti-submarine business with P-3's and sonar buoys dropped from airplanes, patrols by airplanes, as opposed to just destroyer-type ASW work.

So, they converted some several of these carriers and made them CVS's, anti-submarine warfare. And the aircraft that we carried were ADs, able dogs, as we called them. They were guppies. They were the AD-5-W, which was an aircraft that was specially designed to, one, drop sonar buoys and, number two, to monitor sonar buoys. So, there wasn't too much glamour to the ship.

But we would go to sea. We were alongside *Lake Champlain* which was CVS, I believe, 39. We were 40 and she was 39. The hull number may be wrong. But anyway, those were the two carriers. One would be out and one would be in and we would patrol the Northern Atlantic and go out for about three weeks, come back into port for about two and then back out for three. So, it was a fairly constant in-port, out-of-port routine.

Tarawa was a pretty good ship. Marine detachments, were then, and are now, a sharp bunch of sea school-trained Marines. All the things that I really enjoyed — saddles in your barracks caps and double-soled leather heeled shoes highly spit shined, and a lot of ceremonial duty. And you know, overwhelming the Navy with our military bearing and that sort of thing.

I found life aboard ship then, as I have subsequently, to be fairly boring for a Marine. A sailor has a generator or now a computer or a missile system or something to focus himself on while he is at sea. And a Marine can basically, you know, shine his shoes, press his uniform or clean his rifle and wait for the next watch to come on. That is about what we do. So, it was rather monotonous.

I ate a lot and gained a lot of weight. I don't know what my fitness report would reflect there, but as I recall it, I topped up to about 185 there, because there was a lot of chow in the wardroom in those days and not much activity to burn it off.

BGEN SIMMONS: How large was the detachment and who was the commanding officer?

GEN MUNDY: The commanding officer was a captain named Jack Davis, "Black Jack" Davis, a rather colorful character. The detachment was 65, I think. I

may be off a number or so. We had a first sergeant — the first sergeant, again, was a master sergeant in those days. The gunnery sergeant was a — well, we had a gunnery sergeant or a tech sergeant, and then we had a staff sergeant who was the guard chief, and the lieutenant.

They were good Marines and, again, very sharp. I used to enjoy the fact that about once, oh, once probably every two months when we would fall out for morning quarters, we were among the Navy, of course. And to impress the Navy, for no other good reason, Captain Davis would inspect the Marines and he would find some Marine ostensibly whose cover was not exactly right. So, he would take this white barracks cap, look at it. It wouldn't be right and he would throw it over the side. And the Navy couldn't believe that. But he loved the Marines, but that was the type leader he was.

Jack Davis had been the company commander of the other company when I was in PLC's in my second, in 1954. He was colorful, sort of the Robert Debs Heinl color. He would come in after hours and he would wear his highly spit-shined black boots which had cleats on them. He would wear khaki walking shorts, khaki shirt with the sleeves rolled up and a pith helmet. So, you would see Jack Davis in all sorts of regalia there.

He was colorful and his lifestyle was amazing to Linda and me, but not necessarily our own. He had quite an eye for the ladies and enjoyed his liberty very much. But he was an effective leader.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was his terminal rank?

GEN MUNDY: He commanded 2/3 in Vietnam and was a very, very good battalion commander, lieutenant colonel. He left there and came back to Camp Pendleton. He retired as a lieutenant colonel following surgery and removal of a brain tumor.

He still lives on the West Coast. He plays golf. He has been somewhat debilitated by the operation. But I saw him last at the Mustang Association annual reunion in Las Vegas year before last. And we had a very warm reunion.

BGEN SIMMONS: Quarters at Quonset Point seemed to come with the assignment. What kind of quarters were they?

GEN MUNDY: They were Wherry Housing, which was World War II housing. They probably were made completely out of asbestos, but they were the old standard, flat roof, double decker, very clean design. We

thought they were pretty nice because, again, we were at that point where if you had an extra closet, we thought it was a good set of quarters.

We enjoyed living there, although as I said, I was really, because of the nature of the deployments on the ship, I was in for two weeks and gone for three and in for two and gone for three. So, we really didn't establish any fascination. Linda was a young wife and was doing what young Navy and Marine wives do, is just trying to take care of the babies — baby at that time — and have a few friendships around the neighborhood.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that you soon qualified as an "In Port Officer of the Deck." What were those duties?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine officers were allowed to qualify for in-port duties, which means you stood the watch on the quarterdeck when the ship was in port. But it took a long time, number one, to qualify for underway duties. And there was a certain reluctance in the Navy to allow the Marine officers to qualify, although some did pursue it, some of my contemporaries.

BGEN SIMMONS: You knew of some who did qualify?

GEN MUNDY: I knew some who pursued it. And I know at least one who — I will tell you his name if I thought of it, Malcolm — well, it doesn't matter — who did qualify underway. But for the most part, we stood the watch and carried the looking glass under your arm and saluted people aboard and made the log entries that the quartermaster reported to you.

My most exciting time at that, we were anchored out in Hampton Roads in Norfolk in January of 1959, and the winds came up and she got to howling around. And the quartermaster of the watch came down and reported that we were dragging the anchor. So, here you have got an aircraft carrier out in the middle of the harbor with the anchor dragging.

And my duty was simply to call the command duty officer, which I did with some angst, because we were moving around a bit. And he came down and we lit off a couple of boilers and got enough momentum, at least, to maintain the anchors in place. And then the winds subsided and all was well again.

But that was about it. It was more ceremonial and there wasn't a great deal of responsibility to it.

BGEN SIMMONS: You said that you would go out

for about three weeks in the North Atlantic on anti-submarine patrol. Did you ever scoop a Russian submarine? Did you ever have any contacts?

GEN MUNDY: Not that I am aware of. It was fairly boring duty. I flew. I used to talk the squadron into letting me fly with them. So, we would lumber off in the AD and fly around for two or three hours and drop a sonar buoy here and circle and listen and hear nothing and come back to the ship.

I tell you, the most exciting thing that happened to me up there had nothing to do with matters operational. But I had found a friend who was in the destroyer squadron out of Newport at that time, a Navy officer, and he invited me, he said, when we are at sea sometime, come over and spend some time on a tin can. I said, well, I would like to do that.

Well, the next deployment out, we went out and his ship was in the escort. So, I arranged to high line over to the destroyer during an underway replenishment and was going to spend a day or so and then high-line back.

The worst experience I ever had in my life. I can't think of many times, combat or other times, when I was more frightened than when I got in that bos'n's chair, because the North Atlantic generally was pretty rough. And we started high lining over and of course the ships would roll together and you would have the roiling wake of both ships down there below you.

And it came to me suddenly that I was buckled into a metal chair that was suspended on a rope that was being pulled across by a sailor on the other end. And as the ships would roll together, of course, the rope would slack and you would surge down toward the water. And then as the ships would roll the other way you would come back up. And I just knew that at any moment this line was going to break. And it came to me that I wasn't going to swim far strapped into the bos'n's chair if the line broke.

We got over to the destroyer. The seas were pretty rough. I got out of the bos'n's chair grateful to be across and tried to gain my footing on the destroyer, which was substantially different than standing around on an aircraft carrier.

I made my way to the bridge, reported to the captain out of courtesy. My buddy had picked me up. And we went down to the wardroom to have a cup of coffee. I think the coffee was poured. I didn't drink it. I went straight to my stateroom and racked out and spent my time aboard the destroyer hanging on and in the rack. And the next day the seas were a little bit calmer and they did come over and pick me up. It felt good to be back on a carrier deck after you had ridden a destroyer overnight.

BGEN SIMMONS: From Quonset Point out and back, did you ever have any interesting ports of call or did you ever go anywhere?

GEN MUNDY: No, we did not. I joined the ship in July, as you have indicated, and we were on North Atlantic patrol duty for that whole period. You would come up the Narragansett Bay. I can remember wind always blows on the Narragansett Bay, and the Marine Detachment was formed on the bow of the ship.

I can recall that we dropped our chin straps to keep our covers on and I would lean on the point of my sword, because you were really leaning into the wind as we came up.

But we didn't make any ports of call. The ship was to be de-commissioned and, indeed, we left Quonset in January and went down to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to de-commission the *Tarawa*. So, no, no port calls, no foreign duty, just Quonset Point to sea and back.

BGEN SIMMONS: Captain Jack Davis, your detachment commander, gave you three fine fitness reports. One rated you as "excellent to outstanding" and two rated you as "excellent." In his comments in one he says that "Lieutenant Mundy is one of the finest young officers it has been my privilege to command." It makes me wonder what you would have had to do to be rated as "outstanding." At some point in here, just for getting to this, your ship was changed from the *Tarawa* to the cruiser USS *Little Rock* (CVG-4). How did this come about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was CLG. It was a light cruiser. It was a guided missile cruiser. They were modifying several of those. I think the *Oklahoma City*, *Little Rock* and *Springfield* are the three that I recall. There may have been others. But these were World War II light cruisers, six-inch main batteries, five- and six-inch guns. But you did have wooden decks up there, so it was a little bit more Navy.

But when the *Tarawa* was taken in for de-commissioning to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, the detachment then was — we remained aboard for a period of time while they tore up the ship, and that is a very depressing thing for anybody who has been into the yard aboard a ship, knowing how hard you worked to polish every piece of metal and to keep it painted and to buff the decks and so on. And then, of course, the yard workers come aboard and there are black, oily pipes all over the place and the ship is just

destroyed, in terms of its character.

So, we then moved the detachment off to the Marine Barracks in Philadelphia and remained there on, I might say, full per diem, which was \$12 a day in those days. And since, as I recall, my total pay and allowances — I guess my pay as a first lieutenant was \$347 a month. So, \$360 per diem was like drawing double pay. So, Linda and I lived pretty well and ate out a lot in those days.

But the *Little Rock* was being modified or turned into a TALOS missile cruiser in Camden, New Jersey at the New York Shipbuilding Company. So, when the *Little Rock* was ready, she came out, as I recall, in about April. We picked her up, embarked, the detachment was down-sized to 39. We still had a first sergeant and we got a staff sergeant named Smith. Jack Davis, who retired as a colonel while I was CMC, and me, and moved over to the *Little Rock*.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that you and Linda moved from Quonset Point to 12-A Oakwood Manor, Woodbury, New Jersey?. What did you think of Woodbury?

GEN MUNDY: We weren't there long enough. We were there in the winter. I returned Linda, again, as I frequently did — I don't know why my in-laws, except they were such great people — ever put up with me as a son-in-law, because every six months I would keep bringing their daughter and an increasing number of babies back to stay with them.

But when we left Quonset Point in December, I took Linda down to North Carolina, dropped her off, and I went back after Christmas leave.

And when we arrived in Woodbury in, as I recall it, probably late January, then all of us went ashore and literally rented an apartment building, the crew of the ship. So, we lived in the same building, for example, that Jack and Barbara Davis did and that a lot of Navy officers did.

So, it was January in New Jersey, not the most appealing time of the year with the cold, bleak. And we were there until April. So, again, not a lot of time to gain much of an impression, just sort of transient living.

BGEN SIMMONS: I should tell you that Woodbury is virtually my hometown. I was born and raised in Paulsboro five miles away.

GEN MUNDY: Well, since you have mentioned that, as I recall, Woodbury was an absolutely delightful place!



Capt Jack W. Davis inspects the Marine Detachment on board the USS Little Rock. Mundy, at far right, served under Davis as the detachment's executive officer until his transfer to Quantico in October 1960.

BGEN SIMMONS: Maybe Woodbury did not work out too well for you, as I see Linda — you have already alluded to this — moved back to Waynesville.

GEN MUNDY: The ship left. We picked up the ship and then departed for shakedown training in Guantanamo Bay. So, again, I turned around and took Linda back to Waynesville to await my completion of sea duty, or a home port.

BGEN SIMMONS: I note that the Marine Detachment from the *Little Rock* interacted with the 68th Rifle Company, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, in Camden, New Jersey. What was the nature of that interaction?

GEN. MUNDY: We did some, as Marine units do, we would join them in training exercises. Since we were about a platoon in size, we would act as an aggressor force for them. We participated in — I recall that another impressive time for me was being the commander of the detachment when we marched in Armed Forces Day in Camden, New Jersey, and really, feeling the warmth and applause of the crowd.

It is always great to be a Marine in uniform when

there are other services around, but you know, the Army Reserve or the National Guard or a Navy detachment of some sort would go by. And then when the Marines come by, the crowd goes wild, because you out-look everybody and you out-march everybody and basically out-do everybody.

That was one of my early experiences with the public in realizing the acclaim and the admiration and affection that people had for Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: What did you think of Camden?

GEN MUNDY: Not much time in Camden, other than that that was where the ship was. So, for a short period while we were getting ready to — well, as a matter of fact, we did not embark the ship in Camden.

When it came out of the yards, it was brought over to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. So, we actually embarked the detachment from the Marine Barracks into the ship in Philadelphia.

Then we left — we probably went into Yorktown to pick up ammunition. But then we went straight to Guantanamo for shakedown training.

BGEN SIMMONS: At some point along here, the *Little Rock* acted as flagship for the Second Fleet. Did that happen while you were on board?

GEN MUNDY: No, and in fact wound up eventually as flagship Sixth Fleet as well. But no, I sailed with the ship to Gitmo. We were there in — I think we got down there in the early part of July, you know, after some shakedown training. But we went into the Fleet Training Center at Gitmo and all new ships went in there.

We were in there with *Springfield*, which was our sister ship and another CLG, a TALOS cruiser. So, the name of the game became “Beat *Springfield*,” you know, out-shoot her, out-maneuver her or whatever we were doing in our training.

I was, as I had been on the *Tarawa*, with the Marine junior officer, as he was termed, or the XO as we chose to call ourselves, was usually a Mark 37 director control officer, which meant that you were a 5-inch gun director high somewhere in the ship. In the case of the *Tarawa*, it was right at the stack. I can remember that because to this day I can smell stack gas from a ship and probably damaged lungs and everything else. But we used to sit right there in the stack gas.

Then on the *Little Rock* I was right out over the bridge of the ship. You had a pair of binoculars affixed to a set of bicycle handles with levers on them.

And you could slew this gunfire director around. So, your job was to pick up an aircraft coming in and then once you locked onto it, you would then send down “commence firing,” and they would fire, depending on your holding on the target. The guns would simply lock in automatically with you and track wherever you steered the bicycle handlebars.

So, I did that. That was, you know, the nature of my competition, if you will, in the “Beat *Springfield*.” But we were in Gitmo and those were the, I suppose, good old days of colonialism, when you still caught the officer’s motorboat at the end of the day, when you came into port, anchored, caught the motorboat, made the officer’s landing, went up to the club and sat there and, you know, rolled the dice, playing “ship, captain, crew,” and buying cuba libras for 10 cents.

BGEN SIMMONS: And Castro had just taken over a year or so before that, 1958.

GEN MUNDY: He had, and so we pulled no liberty out of the gate. We didn’t go into Guantanamo City or anything. We were confined. But the base was, one of those types of naval bases that were, very nice. You ate cheap.

BGEN SIMMONS: While you were serving on the *Little Rock*, you lost your sword. How did that come about?

GEN MUNDY: I don’t recall losing my sword in the *Little Rock*.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were some papers tucked away in your jacket about a claim being made for a sword.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, no, it was my grandfather’s sword. And it was, when we moved from Quonset Point, as I was checking the quarters, as the movers were closing up the doors on the moving truck, I was checking the quarters and I looked in a closet, and there, leaning up against the forward edge of the closet wall, was my grandfather’s sword, which I think was a Mason’s sword, as a matter of fact.

But anyway, I had it and I was very proud of it. So, in my naivete, I ran out and waved at the packing crew and said, “We left out my sword.” And to this day, I can remember the guy saying, no sweat, I will put it in this clothes hamper here. As soon as we get to the warehouse I will put it in there for you.

And trusting and wide-eyed innocence that I was, I said, “Good on you, thank you for your help.” And I

can remember the guy riding off, holding the sword up at me. And it hangs probably on his wall somewhere today, I am sure. So, that was the claim for that sword.

I later lost a sword in Miami, but this one was not my sword.

BGEN SIMMONS: I had a mental picture of you coming to your sword salute as some dignitary came on board and your sword flying out of your hand and over the side.

GEN MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: It never happened?

GEN MUNDY: No. But during that period I do recall an inspection with the carrier group commander — we are back to the *Tarawa* now, but one of the earliest experiences that I had had, I had not learned at that point that if you were going to handle a sword with gloves on, that you either spit on your gloves or you wet them down so that you can get a grip.

I had saluted. The admiral came up to inspect the detachment. And then, when I flipped my sword and was going to come back to the carry, I dropped the sword. And it clattered to the deck and put a very nice chip in the handle and a little bit of a dent, one of those things you could tell sea stories about. There was nothing more to it. I recovered it and sheathed it and escorted him on the inspection and that was the end of that. But it was always a nice notch in your sword to have, to be able to say, “I remember the day I dropped this on the admiral’s toe during inspection.”

BGEN SIMMONS: You and Captain Davis requested that you be designated as Naval Aviation Observers, as you were acting as Naval Air Spotters for the *Little Rock*. Did you get that designation?

GEN MUNDY: Did not. I went to the Naval Gunfire Spotters course in Little Creek, which was a very, very good course, about three weeks long. We flew — it was a little bubble, well, I don’t remember the designation of it, but one of these little helicopters where there is a glass bubble and then just looks like a piece of a crane sticking out of the back, and two men ride around in it. And that flew off the *Little Rock*.

So, they wanted a spotter and both he and I trained for that. What we really wanted, of course, was the NFO wings or the NAO wings, the observer wings, because it was another piece of paraphernalia to pin on the uniform.

Headquarters, Marine Corps said that until you had flown 1,000 hours or sunk two ships or something like that, you couldn’t qualify for the wings. So, while we flew in that capacity, we were never designated and thereby never drew flight pay, which also was another motive. Nor were we ever qualified for the wings.

BGEN SIMMONS: In October, 1960, you were transferred to Quantico for duty as an instructor at The Basic School. I see that you found a place to live at 119 Purvis Drive, Triangle, Virginia. Also, at about this time, you acquired your first son, Carl Epting Mundy III. When and where was that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Carl or Sam, as we have nicknamed him, and as I most often refer to him, Sam was — it looked like the number two child to be born while dad was at sea. I was in Guantanamo. Sam was due in late September. I was to be detached from the ship the 15th of September and fly out of Guantanamo to come home. But at the last minute, we were going over for a final qualification in a surface fire shoot at Culebra.

And the XO of the ship decided that I had become indispensable, and that therefore I should stay aboard the ship and sail with it and do the shoot, which meant that I would be detaching about the first of November — I said September, I am sorry, I mean October, was Sam’s birthday, the latter part of October — so I would remain with the ship and therefore was at risk of missing Sam’s birth.

So, I called Linda from Guantanamo to give her the news, that I wouldn’t be coming home as scheduled. Linda had an uncle who was the family doctor, so there immediately appeared in the mail a Red Cross message that said that the family doctor recommends serviceman’s presence.

And she told me on the phone, bless her heart, she just said, “I am tired of having my mother take me to the hospital to have our babies, I would like for you to be here.”

So, to make a long story short, we did go and shoot at Culebra, but then the ship immediately left Culebra and, at high speed, wheeled into St. Thomas, hardly stopped moving, they swung a boat over the fantail. I came aft and I remember to this day the two bells, ding, ding, “first lieutenant, United States Marine Corps departing” and over the side.

I went in the boat into St. Thomas, straight to the airport, caught an airplane over to San Juan, caught my first jet ride back to New York. It cost me \$750, I can recall that, it was a hefty price, and then back to New York, a train down from New York, and got

home two days before Carl E. Mundy III was born in Waynesville, North Carolina.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the commanding officer of The Basic School at this time?

GEN MUNDY: When I reported in, it was Colonel Louis Wilson.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have much personal contact with him?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my first impression of Colonel Wilson, who I had not known before, of course is a giant of a man, a Medal of Honor and all those sorts of things, so the types of things that would awe a young lieutenant.

I recall that shortly after getting there, we went into an amphitheater, which was in a field which is now where the swimming pool and other facilities are at The Basic School. There was an amphitheater there, outdoors, where all the new officers went out and sat down. And I remember Colonel Wilson coming out and giving his famous "I-am-they speech." "While you are here, you will find a lot to complain about, things won't be right, and you will talk about, they won't let us do this, they make us do that." And so, he would stand there, imposing in this big 6'4" frame looking down at you and saying, "When you get to the height of griping about how they do things to you, remember, I am they." So, that was an initial impression.

Then-Colonel Wilson, I saw him perhaps once or twice there, and then he detached, was reassigned, and Colonel "Black Bob" McDonough became the CO of Basic School for the majority of the time that I was assigned to The Basic School.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your duties?

GEN MUNDY: I reported in, was assigned to the General Subjects Group as a map reading instructor, primary duty. You were a secondary instructor on practically everything that was given, you did scouting and patrols, tactics problems, and so on. But my primary duty was map reading instruction.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your reporting senior was Lieutenant Colonel Dick Taylor. This would be Richard M. Taylor. He was the General Subjects Group chief. What do you recall of Dick Taylor?

GEN MUNDY: Well, in those days there were two Taylors out there. One of them was known as

"Roughhouse" Taylor and Richard Taylor, Dick Taylor, who was my boss, was a small man and we call him "Roughmouse" Taylor. So, we had "Roughhouse" and "Roughmouse" Taylor. A good man, a pleasant individual. I didn't find him to be a striking officer and, very frankly, I don't think he had much more tenure in the Marine Corps after that.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have several fitness reports from Lieutenant Colonel Taylor. He consistently rated you as an "excellent" officer. About this time you moved into quarters on the base — I have it as Quarters 318-A. What kind of quarters did you get?

GEN MUNDY: That was in Whiskey Gulch. We had really moved up now, because we had started out in 128-A and now we were up to 318-A. The quarters saga at Quantico accounts for about four of the Mundy's 32 moves over our career together. You remarked earlier that when we arrived at Quantico we rented a commercial apartment out in Melrose Gardens on Purvis Drive. We were in there for several months.

Then quarters came available. In those days, from Whiskey Gulch as you come down from the Officers Club, the back way if you will, not down past the swimming pool at Quantico, that was called Whiskey Gulch.

And there were old World War I barracks that had been given to the Marine Corps by the Army, floated down the river from Fort Belvoir, rolled up the hills on logs, in-placed, and made quarters. The pipes ran up the wall, they were of course un-air conditioned, they were really un-insulated.

But they were superb because you could bowl in them. They were the largest house we had ever lived in. You had one set upstairs and one set downstairs, and we all had garages that went along with those. So, we moved into that.

They were substandard quarters, and so we paid \$70 a month for them. But the Capehart Bill that constructed Capehart Housing in 1960 mandated that all substandard quarters had to be vacated by 1 July 1962. So, despite the fact that what is today called Lyman Park, or what was known as Capehart Housing at Quantico was still under construction and would not be finished until September, by God, the Marine Corps had orders to get you out of those substandard quarters by the first of July. So, although we had been in there for only about a year, we were then caused to move temporarily over to Thomason Park. We were there for three months, and then we moved in and were initial occupants in what is today Lyman Park.

In those days, of course, unlike today, when you moved, if the government gave you another set of quarters to move into, they would move you from off base to on base. But if it was a convenience of the government move on base, then they would give you a six-by, and you hired a couple of Marines and picked up your household goods and moved them yourself. So, that is how we did that twice at Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you and Linda like living on board Quantico?

GEN MUNDY: Very much. Remember, we had gone from an initial tour of only about three months at Basic School at Quantico, during the time I was at Basic School, to Camp Lejeune; not a lot of home life there, a few months, but I was only there for about 16 months before I went to sea duty.

We went off to sea duty. We were then assigned aboard the Navy base, and that is not the same. You are not with your own family then. So, when we returned to Quantico, we were back now with Marines, we were back aboard a Marine base, with which we were familiar.

I loved The Basic School. One of the best jobs I ever had was teaching at The Basic School. So, it was kind of a Boy's Town environment. You were at that stage of your life and career where you were a little bit seasoned and you enjoyed going to the clubs, enjoyed the camaraderie of friendships, and it was good to be back aboard a Marine base. We liked Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you say, Colonel Robert McDonough relieved Colonel Wilson as commanding officer. How well did you get to know McDonough?

GEN MUNDY: Not well. Again, you know, in the same context I mentioned earlier, you didn't see the colonels a lot. They had staff cars. They arrived in their staff car. The CO's didn't spend a lot of time in the field checking problems or training exercises. Occasionally on the five-day war the colonel would come out.

I remember Colonel McDonough very positively. He was a very fine image of an officer. We called him "Black Bob" only because of his very heavy, bushy black eyebrows, and he was a Scotsman, I think. So, "Black Bob" McDonough had nothing to do with his personality. He promoted me to captain on the first of May 1962. So, I had a good recollection, just simply because of a few minutes in his office with him.

Promotions were much simpler in those days. We

didn't make as much of them then as we do today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your associates, peers, while you were at The Basic School?

GEN MUNDY: Of those who went on to stay in the Marine Corps, that I recall, Howie Lee, or Howard B. Lee, who received a Medal of Honor as a company commander in Vietnam subsequently, lost an eye in the process and then retired subsequently as a lieutenant colonel.

A captain named Ray Stevens was the head of the Map Reading Section when I got there. And Ray retired as a colonel. Dick Esau reported in about the same time I did. There were fewer first lieutenants there. One of them was Bob Milligan, one of them was Carl Mundy. Another one was Tom Kennedy, who was subsequently killed in Vietnam, and a fourth was "Red Mike" Edson's son. Terry Turner — who retired a lieutenant colonel, Ed Tipshur — we were lieutenants together. Those are some of the names.

BGEN SIMMONS: Lieutenant Colonel Stanley B. Voth relieved Lieutenant Colonel Taylor as chief of the General Subjects Group. In a fitness report covering the summer of 1962 he rates you as "excellent to outstanding" and comments that you were "the initiator of an outstanding change of the Map and Aerial Photo Reading course of instruction." What do you recall about that?

GEN MUNDY: That was land navigation. We instituted land navigation. So, I think I was probably at the front edge of that, recognizing that we really needed more than to just read a map and adjust artillery. We might be able to get around in a way better than blindly following a compass into the next tree.

So, we implemented the land navigation course. We plotted a number of locations around Quantico in the various training areas, had white engineer stakes with ammo cans welded to them made up. And then we would go around reading the map — it was really a very pleasant period of time, because they would give us a jeep and a trailer and we would pile these things in the back and the two captains would take to the field with a posthole digger and a sledgehammer. And we would find a spot on the map that we thought this navigation point was supposed to go on and then we would implant it. So, it was good physical work, kind of like working during the summer while you were in college.

And we had a good time with that. Later the way we would determine how good our map reading was,

when we'd send the lieutenants out, if more than 25 percent of the class failed to find this particular point, we would say, we must have misread the coordinates. So, we would take a consensus of the coordinates and change the exam around. But that was it, the land navigation course at The Basic School.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next reporting senior was Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Nichols who was destined to retire as a lieutenant general. What do you recall about Bob Nichols?

GEN MUNDY: One of the nicest men that I ever met. I think he was a tremendous personality, very interested in everybody that worked for him, very positive. And he was — I don't think we overlapped, we were not there very long together.

I subsequently knew him in a number of places, you know, along the way. But my impression is just of a very fine officer and a very nice man.

BGEN SIMMONS: Bob Nichols marked you in the "excellent to outstanding" category and also commented on the improvement in map reading instruction. Toward the end of your tour, Colonel Jonas Platt, a future major general, had taken over command of The Basic School. He was considered one of the brightest and the best of the Marine Corps' colonels. Did he have an impact on The Basic School?

GEN MUNDY: He came in just as I was leaving. And I saw him there once or twice. He brought with him one of the most impressive men I have ever known and that was then-Lieutenant Colonel Joe Fegan. They were very, very close and had just come up from the 6th Marines together. I think Platt had the regiment and Fegan was his XO, as I recall.

But anyway, he brought his own S-3. So, really, I was more impressed by then-Lieutenant Colonel Fegan, who came in advance of Platt. And Joe Fegan captured me there and held my attention until he retired, and indeed even after he retired many years later as a lieutenant general.

BGEN SIMMONS: During your years at The Basic School you also had collateral duties, at times, as a platoon commander of one of the student companies. How did that work out?

GEN MUNDY: It was fine. Most of us, for a while you were in the instructional groups and then you came down to A Company. I was in two companies. Alpha 1/62, the company commander there was then

a captain, retired later as a colonel, Gary Wilder. Gary ran a pretty good company. We had some good officers, Joe Burger, Captain Joseph C. Burger III, or Jr, Lieutenant General Burger's son. Bob Crabtree a fine officer, a good friend of mine, who was killed in a helicopter crash with General Hochmuth in Vietnam some years later.

That was a good company. Chuck Robb, now Senator Chuck Robb, was the honor man of that particular company. For a while we had a thing of switching platoons halfway through the course. So, I became Chuck Robb's platoon commander in Basic School.

And he graduated as the honor man. I always had a good rapport with him. And eventually, now, Senator Robb was a very strong supporter of the 30th Commandant on the Hill some years later, who he still considered his staff platoon commander. So, it was a nice formative experience.

The other company was in Golf Company, or Company G-162. That was headed by Major — he retired as a colonel — Don Cliff. That was a good company. It was a large company. We had about seven platoons, about 270 lieutenants, I think, in there.

So, some good associations. I think that wearing a skunk hat, as we termed it — in those days you wore a green helmet with a white stripe around it and the Marine emblem on it at The Basic School if you were a staff platoon commander. And being a skunk hat wearer was a lot of fun and a lot of fulfillment, watching brand-new lieutenants become trained lieutenants when you turned them loose after about six-and-a-half months.

BGEN SIMMONS: What did you and Linda do for recreation during these years?

GEN MUNDY: Primarily boating. We bought a boat, the first boat I owned. I grew up on a lake water skiing. We talked about that. I loved the water, still do. And so, we bought a boat down at the Quantico marina and we would go out. Our neighbors had boats, so usually a bunch of us would get together and we would load our kids aboard the boats and we would take off for what was known as the Quantico skiing beach, which is about three or four miles north on the Potomac, up above Quantico.

And we would all get to the skiing beach. It was a little kind of cove and the water was fairly calm there.

And then we would put the kids ashore. We had babies, so we would take the babies in the playpen, set the playpen up on the beach. You know, one couple

would watch the kids while the other couple skied, or the men would go ski and the wives would watch.

And among those others that skied up there in those days was a then-major named John Glenn, who was of course an astronaut. He loved to water ski, still does. He water skis now behind his 70-foot boat, not his 16-foot boat. And Tom Miller, Lieutenant General Tom Miller, who I didn't know personally. I just knew Miller and Glenn were there. Of course, we were all captured by, there goes the astronaut, John Glenn, skiing by you.

So, we did that. In those days — well, again, we have talked about shooting. I have always loved guns and loved to shoot. And in those days, for the purpose both of recreational shooting but more to enable you to keep your marksmanship up, you could draw 50 rounds of every caliber of pistol ammunition from The Basic School.

Well, I had a .22, a .38 and a .45. So, I would draw 150 rounds a week of ammunition. And you didn't have to account for it. In those days you could carry your rifle home with you if you wanted to, or take it out and shoot it on the weekends if you wanted to. And the same with the government .45.

So, they had a pistol range down at Quantico where the computer science school is today. We would, after dinner at night, load up the kids and go over and pour pounds of lead into the red mud. That is the pistol range at Quantico.

So, those sorts of things plus just good friendships, plus an occasional foray, when we could afford it and when we could get a babysitter. We would get another couple and drive up to Washington and park the car and go eat at the Blue Mirror Grill, which was a tremendous steak place, and then catch a movie up on F Street or thereabouts, and then haul back to Quantico. And that was kind of what we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 3 August 1963, you were detached from duty at The Basic School, with orders to proceed to recruiting duty in Raleigh, North Carolina. Unless you have something else you would like to add about Basic School, I think this is a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: I would only say about The Basic School that it was probably one of the most formative periods because you were exposed to a lot of officers, certainly the lieutenants, but you were exposed to people like you have mentioned like Joe Platt or Joe Fegan, most especially in my case, and to others that were there. "Quickstone" Quillian was the 4 before Platt became the 3.

And I saw some both negative and positive leadership examples.

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SESSION 5

Recruiting Duty as a Captain

Assignment to recruiting duty in Raleigh, North Carolina . . . Combing the Carolinas for officer candidates . . . Family life . . . Public speaking and public service . . . Birth of second son, Timothy . . . Qualifying as a parachutist . . . Getting the Commandant's attention . . . Gaining praise as a recruiter.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your service as a young lieutenant in the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, at sea with the USS *Tarawa* and *Little Rock* and as an instructor at The Basic School.

Now you are a captain and assigned to recruiting duty. You were assigned as the OSO in Raleigh, North Carolina, in the spring of 1963. What does OSO stand for?

GEN MUNDY: OSO is Officer Selection Officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who did you work for?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was assigned, as you said, to the Recruiting Station, and Major Phil McIntyre was the CO. There were two captains there. One was the XO of the station that dealt with enlisted recruiting. And then the OSO was also quartered at the Recruiting Station.

But the man that I actually reported to, if you will operationally, was a colonel named "Mutt" Emils, who was the Assistant Director for Personnel Procurement in the 6th district in Atlanta, Georgia.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your duties?

GEN MUNDY: I had all the colleges and universities, and for that matter, the MARCAD, the Marine Aviation Cadet selection, for the state of North Carolina and eastern South Carolina, which meant, in effect, that I had from Charleston up through Laurinburg, North Carolina and all the North Carolina schools.

And I would go to the colleges and universities looking for applicants for the Platoon Leaders Class program, for the Officer Candidate program. I would go to Camp Lejeune, to Cherry Point, to look for Marine aviation cadets. We would go out to the infantry training regiment and screen recruits that

were coming out of Parris Island to find out if they could qualify for aviation programs. Very heavy emphasis on aviation interest. In those days our real deficiencies were in aviation. In fact, the first year out there we had only aviation quotas. We couldn't put anybody into a ground officer program.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you live in Raleigh?

GEN MUNDY: I lived on Poole Avenue, or just off Poole Avenue, which is out to the east in Raleigh, nothing really definitive about it, just a suburb. We were about three miles out.

And in those days, we were just coming into running. You know, the Marine Corps hiked when I came in. And then, America started turning to physical fitness. But I would walk to work from time and time and I can remember how absolutely peacock proud I felt because I would walk in in my alpha uniform — you know, it would be in the wintertime — right past the state capitol, to the oohs and aahs of the residents of Raleigh, who were impressed by the sharp, young Marine captain strolling the streets of Raleigh, sometimes even with his swagger stick in those days, en route to work.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did your family enjoy Raleigh?

GEN MUNDY: Very much. That was the first house that we bought, a little small brick house. It had three pecan trees in the back yard. So, for the next three years, everybody on every occasion got pecans from the Mundys as Christmas presents and gifts of any sort.

But that was a formative period. We had two children then, two youngsters, and then Tim, our third, was born there eventually. So, it was a good neighborhood. I traveled a lot, but I traveled principally driving around North Carolina. I would be gone for

two or three days a week, not every week but during the school year anyway.

But we had a nice little house. Linda's brother was getting his doctoral degree from North Carolina State in Raleigh at that time, so we had kind of a family closeness during that period, a very nice tour.

BGEN SIMMONS: What is her brother's name?

GEN MUNDY: Her brother's name is Ben Sloan, Jr. Her father was Ben Sloan. We call him "Skipper." So, it was "Skipper" Sloan. He was a vice president for Semiconductor Research, made computer chips for Texas Instruments down in Dallas. Now he has his own company and is doing quite well.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you say, the officer in charge of the Recruiting Station in Raleigh was Major Phillip G. McIntyre. What do you recall of Major McIntyre?

GEN MUNDY: He was a Mustang, and I recall that only because he related, I thought, among the Recruiting Station commanders, there being five of them at the time in the district, Phill McIntyre related very well with his NCO's. And he had been, I think, a staff sergeant or perhaps a gunnery sergeant, I don't recall. But he had come up through the ranks. So, he was one of those officers that related extremely well.

He was a good leader and Raleigh usually ran pretty close — Macon was generally speaking the top producing station in the district, but Raleigh and Macon were always neck and neck for first place.

BGEN SIMMONS: Major McIntyre gave you your first straight "outstanding" fitness report. He starts off his comments with, "This is undoubtedly one of the finest young officers ever encountered by the undersigned." That is high praise. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Phil McIntyre got to the station after I did and when I came onto the duty there were two of us — a fellow named Earl Piper, I mentioned Earl earlier. But Earl and I came to OSO duty, he to Atlanta, me to Raleigh, at the same time. And Colonel Emils predicted great failure that first year because again, as I mentioned, we had only aviation quotas. And he just had a gloomy outlook that we weren't going to be able to make it.

Both Earl and I excelled that first year, whatever the circumstances that brought that about. I think at the time that Phil McIntyre came in, and probably when he wrote that report, we had just upset the forecast of the district by exceeding the quota. They were

very high on us. They were very pleased. And I think that was probably accountable for that comment.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were some others who were well pleased. In January 1964, General Wallace Greene, who was then the Commandant, sent the Director, Sixth Naval District, a commendation for his district's outstanding recruiting effort. At that time the Marine Corps was building to an end strength of 190,000. I am sure you contributed heavily to this effort.

GEN MUNDY: Well, you know, I contributed, inasmuch as any OSO does. That is a successful recruiting area, I think is to this day, the southeast, North Carolina. The schools, I had three of the top ten producing schools in the nation in terms of PLC's and OC's at the time.

The Citadel, we didn't have an NROTC unit there, so in fact, I have a good tale on The Citadel.

My first visit to The Citadel, Mark Clark was the president. When the Marine captain would come on campus, you were confronting an Army colonel and an Air Force colonel who were fairly well entrenched.

And the Marines had, the year before I got there, taken the regimental commander into the PLC program. So, there was a lot of animosity.

When we would get there with a visit request, we would find ourselves stuck away in some obscure room where you couldn't display your board and your sword and your dress blues and the things that appeal to cadets.

So, anyway, we would worm our way out of that and eventually get down to where the cadets could see us. But it was a very kind of stressful relationship, with a captain attempting to do business with these two colonels and being shoved off.

I guess that Mark Clark got wind of that, because about the second day I was there I was told by his executive assistant that General Clark would like to have me pay a call on him. So, I suited up in my full blues and went over and called on this legendary figure, and a giant of a man.

And we had a few minutes of conversation about not much, just where are you from, we are glad to have you here at The Citadel, I want all the Citadel men that we can get into the Marine Corps, so you have my full blessing to go after them.

Then he said, how long will you be here? I said, "Well, through this week." He said, "Will you be here Friday afternoon?" And I said, yes, I would. He said, "I would like for you to come out and be with me at the parade on Friday."

So, Friday came and I suited up again, white gloves, blues, and walked across the field. And lo and behold, I was seated to the left of General Mark Clark. So, it was Mark Clark, Carl Mundy, and then a bunch of other people. And then about the third row back were the two colonels who were my irritants there.

Mark Clark, that is all he did. He never said anything to anybody. But the signal was very clear from General Mark Clark that the Marines were in at The Citadel. And thereafter, when I went to The Citadel, I had front row billing and I never had any more problems.

So, I always admired his leadership and, again, not saying anything to anybody, but just sending a very clear message.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was a strong endorsement. The District Director was Colonel James D. McBrayer, Jr., a distinguished Marine. Did you have much personal contact with him?"

GEN MUNDY: Not much. You know, I knew who he was and when you arrive in the district you called on the colonel and he gave you your mission. But we then were pretty well relegated down to — again, my superior was Lieutenant Colonel Emils, and subsequently Will, Ken Will.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you know about Colonel McBrayer's escape from the Japanese prisoner of war camp in China during World War II?

GEN MUNDY: I did. That was something that was known in the district and that was something that we admired. We didn't know the details much, but we knew that he had been a POW and that he had escaped.

BGEN SIMMONS: He has now published his autobiography.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I didn't know that. I would like to see that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Colonel McBrayer appended a handwritten comment to the "outstanding" fitness report given you by Major McIntyre. In part it said: Captain Mundy has undertaken a program to make known to Marine dependents at the Marine installations in his area which is a real service to the Corps...He has furthered the interests of the Corps by instituting a highly successful personalized individual advertising campaign utilizing radio and TV tapes.

Do I see the beginnings of the "Marine Family" concept in what you were doing?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I recall, trying to relate to what he said there, I think that what he is referring to is my campaign to the Marine dependents to come into the Marine Corps as PLC's. And indeed, there were several sons of Marines at Camp Lejeune and Beaufort and Cherry Point that I got.

So, I believe that what I did was to go down to Camp Lejeune and call on the regimental commanders, for example, and to go call on the base chief of staff and say, "I am the local OSO and if there is any interest here, why I would be glad to come down from Raleigh and talk to you." That, I believe, was probably what he was talking about.

From the standpoint of the television and radio campaign, that, too, was recruiting. But of interest, the recruiting station in Raleigh was located on McDowell Street. And right up about a block-and-a-half away was WRAL, still an active radio station in Raleigh.

And the then most known commentator on that station was a commentator named Jesse Helms, now Senator Jesse Helms. Whatever your politics may be, the fact is that Jesse Helms was fairly conservative, was supportive of defense. So, I went up to call on Jesse Helms and to say what are the chances of getting some free advertising here on your radio station. And he was very supportive of that.

So, we got free radio spots, and as I recall I did an interview. And I would cut a spot and they would play it and so on. So, for that I got these glowing remarks here, in the fitness report.

BGEN SIMMONS: In more recent years, did you ever have occasion to remind Senator Helms on this?

GEN MUNDY: I did on one occasion. He came up to the Commandant's Office when General Gray was the Commandant. And it was a man from North Carolina that General Gray was recognizing, giving him his World War II medal or something like that. And I was included in that ceremony.

And while the Senator was there, I mentioned to him, I said, "You and I have crossed before" and here were the circumstances. And he was amused by that and chuckled and claimed to remember it well, although I am not certain that it wasn't just a nice comment.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you do much public speaking during this tour?



In the spring of 1963, Capt Mundy was assigned to officer recruiting duty in Raleigh, North Carolina. In this public relations photograph, he and a female lieutenant explain the selection process to two prospective candidates.

GEN MUNDY: Probably — well, more than I had in previous times. I had just come, remember, from The Basic School, where I had been teaching for three years. So, it was a natural to me to be on stage, if you will. But my public speaking would have been fairly low level. You know, when people are looking for a Marine captain to come speak, it is usually not one of the high priced outfits in town.

But I would speak to Semper Fidelis societies, speak to Naval ROTC units, to groups on college campuses, fraternities, go down to the athletic director and see him and say, how about talking to your teams about the Marine Corps. But really, I was in a salesman position at that time. But yes, I did a reasonable amount of public speaking at that time. Commissionings, making a few remarks and then commissioning some officers.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your next fitness report, you fell off just a tad in Major McIntyre's estimation. He moved you down to "excellent to outstanding." But in the third and fourth reports he moved you back to outstanding. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: I couldn't tell you why. You know, in those days you tended, as we did up until about a decade ago, maybe a little bit longer in that, you were measured by your productivity. So, if you had a good period, if you were the top OSO, you were just outstanding. If the next time around somebody out-ran you and did a little bit better, why you probably dropped off a notch. So, I don't recall.

I mean, there was no personal run-in or I didn't do anything that I recall that was unsatisfactory. I may have just not produced as well that particular semester as I had for the one previous.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your second son was born while you were in Raleigh. You mentioned that. Just when was that?

GEN MUNDY: Tim, Timothy Sloan Mundy, bearing his mother's name of Sloan, was born on March 19th in Raleigh. We always called Tim the no-sweat kid. He was about three weeks late and was very well developed, and I still to this day claim that he slept through the second night he was home. Linda tells it somewhat differently, but Tim has been a very steady and solid, to this day, youngster for us.

BGEN SIMMONS: And this was March 1965?

GEN MUNDY: March 1965.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were determined to get airborne training. You mentioned that a couple of times earlier, too. You so requested it in February 1965 and once again you were turned down. The officer who turned you down was Colonel Dolph Schwenk who retired as a lieutenant general. Do you recall this disappointment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the disappointment turned to success, but yes, we were disappointed, because one of my good friends, a now-retired colonel by the name of Fred Vanous, Fred was the MARCAD Selection Officer in Atlanta, and he went to Fort Benning, much in the same capacity that I would go to Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point as we have talked earlier. And he came to know the Marine liaison at Fort Benning, who made known to him — because we both wanted to go — he made known that he could get what was called a local quota. And it meant that it wasn't chargeable, the Marine Corps didn't pay for it. It was just another body. If you would take leave and pay your own expenses and what not, you could go down and go through jump school.

So, anyway, we became interested in that and sought simply, not necessarily to get a quota to jump school, but simply to get authorization to go. And the Marine Corps rigidly said, "No, you are not in a jump billet, so you don't need to go to jump school."

We came to Headquarters in, I believe, in about April or May of 1965 after having been turned down. I didn't remember that it was Dolph Schwenk, it would have been a name on a piece of paper.

We came up, and again, we had had a notably successful season of recruiting. And I would give anything if I could think of the lieutenant colonel's name at Headquarters then, anyway, who I sat in his office when he called over and spoke to a Colonel Bill

Barber, who I now know, didn't know then, didn't have any idea who he was, who was in G-3 Training.

I can remember him saying, Bill, these are not ordinary — these guys have worked their heart and soul out, they deserve this, and he made a real plea for us. To make a long story short, about a month later we got — and I am saying we, there were three of us, Earl Piper, Fred Vanous and myself — we got an approval to go at no cost to the government to the jump school at Fort Benning, and subsequently did that summer.

BGEN SIMMONS: In July 1965, there was another letter from General Greene commending the officer procurement effort in the Sixth District. Your team in Raleigh achieved 143.9 percent of quota. The letter said in part: "This had to be accomplished during a period which was as difficult as any ever experienced by our Officer Selection Officers." Does this mean that the negative reaction to the Vietnam War on college campuses had already set in?

GEN MUNDY: It was beginning. About 1965 is when you began to see the Students for a Democratic Society, the SDS, for example, show up. And they would set up a table alongside where we were. But in those days, by and large, the student bodies at the University of North Carolina or some school like that would hoot them down. They really didn't interfere. They were an annoyance, but we were not in the bad days where they really, some of those who went on OSO duty a few years later really bore insults and being spat upon and paint thrown at them and things like that. I didn't experience any of that.

I think what this was referring to is probably the fact that the Marine Corps, for whatever the reasons at that time, I mentioned earlier, was on an aviation kick and it was tough to qualify pilots.

But our quotas were very large. Aviation. We were really just beginning to focus on minority quotas, on getting African Americans in. We were being coached along on that. So, we were facing pilots and minorities. And the Marine Corps was growing, so our quotas became larger each time we got them. So, it was a tough recruiting environment in those days, so I think that is probably what the comment was more in reference to.

BGEN SIMMONS: During the summer of 1965 you received a commendation from the American Legion, Department of South Carolina, for your service as Director of Recreation for the Palmetto Boys State. Do you recall that, and what kind of recreation did you direct?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Palmetto Boys State invited, through the contacts with the Sixth District, invited the Marines to come down and put a team — there were three of us, in essence, the OSO team. And I took down my gunnery sergeant, myself and then our corpsman, who became the Palmetto Boys State Corpsman. So, if there was a sick call — they had a clinic at The Citadel where this was run, but he would do the morning, you know, I am not feeling good or I have got a blister on my foot, that type thing that a corpsman would normally do for you.

We wore red shorts and a white T-shirt with Palmetto Boys State staff insignia on it, and then a red ballcap with USMC all over it. It was a recruiting effort, from my viewpoint. It gave us three weeks of, number one, very, very wholesome and enjoyable and upbeat lifestyle, being exposed to the best of South Carolina high schools coming in to Boys State, some very fine people, American Legion sponsored, that were good strong citizens and leaders in South Carolina. So, it was personally enjoyable.

But the recreation aspect of it was simply that we were the — I guess it really would almost be athletics would be a more appropriate term. We would organize in the afternoon after they had had the various classes on government and so on, and then it would come time for PT, if you will. So, I and my gunny would have organized the activities for that day and we would supervise that and oversee just really the organization.

Then we would, on occasions, we would make sure that, for example, when the governor of Boys State was elected and inaugurated and they had the conventions and so on, of course there would be a Marine color guard there that would perform. And I would usually come in in my blues and draw my sword and do something that would exhibit to them who I was.

And whether we ever got anything out of that or not, I don't know, but it was a good Marine Corps relations effort.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, the American Legion was so pleased with your effort that they invited you to attend the National Boys State Conference in Indianapolis in October. Did you attend?

GEN MUNDY: I did. And I think that was, as much as anything, something of a reward for having participated. But they brought us up, about a three-day conference, and I did attend.

BGEN SIMMONS: Colonel Dick Amerine had replaced Colonel McBryer as the Director, Sixth

District. Colonel Amerine was so pleased with your performance that in March 1966 he recommended you for the Navy Commendation for Achievement ribbon; it was not yet a medal. Do you recall that recommendation?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do. I was very pleased with that. In those days, you didn't — you know, medals were few and far between. And I went through the early stages of my career with two shooting badges. And eventually I think we got the — the National Defense ribbon was reauthorized or something. But as young officers do today, every time you got a new ribbon, that was important.

But I was very pleased to be recommended because we didn't get a lot of commendations in those days. You got a lot of nice letters, you got nice fitness reports, but rarely did you get a Napoleonic ribbon to hang on your chest.

BGEN SIMMONS: We will see some more later. And to further refresh your memory, that letter recommending that award says in part: "During the period 20 August 1963 to 1 March 1966, Captain Mundy...led all Officer Selection Officers in this District, both in quantity and quality..."

The letter also notes your outstanding leadership and participation with youth organizations and says: "While accomplishing all of the above, he also, at his own expense, completed the U.S. Army Airborne Course, Ft. Benning, Georgia, and was designated a qualified parachutist."

General Greene personally forwarded the recommendation recommending approval, but the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals turned it down. Do you recall this?

GEN. MUNDY: I recall that I was recommended and that it was turned down, and of course that was a disappointment. But it was a disappointment only in the sense that you had never had one before, so you didn't have one now, and I didn't feel personally put down.

But I thought it seemed to me that you had to wonder what you would have to do around here to get the recognition. So, yes, I was a little bit put down by that. But that may have put on me a trend for the future. I have worked insistently to change the system whereby we have a Marine recommend a Marine for something and we have a Navy Board that turns it down.

That irritated me my entire career and we have been fairly successful, up to this point, in getting, for

example, even the medals in the Department of the Navy renamed the Navy/Marine Corps whatever, as opposed to just the Navy. We left the Navy Cross alone, but the Distinguished Service Medal and things like that, have been redesignated.

BGEN SIMMONS: In this case we had the Navy Board overruling the Commandant of the Marine Corps for a minor decoration. However, General Greene did what he could. He gave you a certification of commendation.

In Fiscal Year 1964 you had a quota of 50 officer prospects. You signed up 77, or 130.5 percent of quota. In Fiscal Year 1965, your quota was 66 candidates and you signed up 95, or 143.9 percent. Fiscal Year 1966, as of March 1, 1966, you are not through the fiscal year at that point, with a quota of 103, you had already signed up 90 candidates or 87.3 percent.

In today's Marine Corps your level of achievement would probably have gotten you a Navy Achievement Medal if not a Navy Commendation Medal. The District Director would probably get a Legion of Merit. Should we be parsimonious or generous with peacetime medals? Is the decentralization of award authority good or bad? Is increasing the number of meritorious service medals good or bad? You touched on that, but maybe you could expand on it a bit more.

GEN MUNDY: I think we have gravitated, graduated, moved forward, what have you, a system whereby we recognize Marines, and particularly junior Marines although even seniors now, for meritorious performance.

Back some years ago, you may recall when we got in what is now the Navy Achievement Medal, one notch lower than the Navy Commendation Medal, that we were encouraged to recognize particularly young enlisted and junior officers for their achievement to give them, again, a Napoleonic incentive.

As all cases like fitness reports, you know, the pendulum swings back and forth. We inflate too much and we knock it back and we go too far. And it takes — rarely does it settle right in the dead center. We are probably somewhat inflated today. But that said, the Marine Corps in comparison to any of the other services is by far, I think, at the bottom end of the stick in terms of the awards that we give for just routine service. So, I think it is probably about right now.

BGEN SIMMONS: They apparently centralized the fitness reporting for OSO's, as your next report was made out by the Assistant Director for Personnel Procurement, 6th District, Lieutenant Colonel K.E.

Will, who you mentioned earlier. He continued you at the "outstanding" level. He saw you as having "unlimited potential."

His successor, Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Critchett, was not quite so generous. He marked you down to "excellent to outstanding," but did say that you have "completed an outstanding tour as Officer Selection Officer in this District."

Your recruiting experience would stand you in good stead in years to come. Did you carry away any ingrained beliefs about recruiting and recruiting techniques? And were you able to put these ideas to good use later?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I carried away an experience in recruiting, and I guess like many things, if you go out on one form of duty, you tend to view others as being the soft, cushy job. When I was a recruiter, I thought that the inspector/instructors were really fairly laid back and only worked about half the time. Then when I became an I&I, why I felt like I was really putting forth the effort and it was the recruiters that were laid back.

But I think it gave me a sensitivity to recruiting. I subsequently, of course, was assigned as the Director of Personnel Procurement. It really was there, I think, that I gained the very strong feeling that recruiting is, indeed, the forward-most regiment of the Marine Corps. You know, without successful recruiting effort, there is going to be no Marine Corps.

So, for those who do not recognize the sensitivity of recruiting and the significance and the importance of recruiting, we do so only at our doom, because we will never be a Marine Corps if we don't have an effective recruiting service. But that came more later in my career than it did explicitly from the OSO tour.

My OSO tour was a great tour. Even though it was not my native state, it was, in effect, my home state. I felt very comfortable there. When I would go to western North Carolina, for example, to recruiting at then Western Carolina Teachers College, now Western Carolina University, I would stay at my parent's home and drive over and spend a day on campus and come back and spend the night with my folks at night. And I spoke the language, people understood me, I knew people around the state. So, it was a successful time.

The governor of the state at that time was a fellow named Dan Moore. Linda had grown up with his daughter and they had been very close. He became a successful lawyer and eventually the governor of the state.

So, while in Raleigh, we donned mess dress many times and would go to the Governor's Mansion and be

entertained beyond the level that a captain normally would in those days.

BGEN SIMMONS: You left Raleigh in August 1966. You were on your way to Vietnam by way of Camp Pendleton. Is there anything else you would like to add about your tour of recruiting duty?

GEN MUNDY: You know, as far as confidence building in a young officer, you go through a series of experiences. When you are in the FMF, for example, if you are a platoon commander, there is always somebody that you admire and respect as better than you. You really don't have a self evaluation. You don't know whether you are doing well or only average or just how you are doing.

I think when I got to recruiting duty — this will sound like an ego and I don't mean that — but that is when I realized probably, for about the first time in my life, that I could step beyond the pack, that I could — you know, you had to work very hard at it, but that indeed, if you put your shoulder to the plow, so to speak, that hard work paid off. So, I found that I could step forward a little bit. So, I left recruiting feeling very satisfied with that tour.

BGEN SIMMONS: And in this case results were very measurable. You had a tangible measurement of success.

GEN MUNDY: They were.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think this is a good place to end this session.

SESSION 6

A Year in Vietnam

Orders to Vietnam . . . Indoctrination at Camp Pendleton . . . Assignment to III Marine Amphibious Force staff . . . Briefing LtGen Lewis Walt as a G-2 watch officer . . . Impressions of other senior officers . . . Promotion to major . . . Assignment to 3d Battalion, 26th Marines . . . Dining with the commanding general . . . Arriving at Khe Sanh . . . Duties as the battalion executive officer . . . Task Force Mundy . . . Assignment as battalion S-3 . . . Action near Con Thien . . . Bronze Star with Combat V . . . Orders to Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session, we covered your service as a captain on recruiting duty working out of the Recruiting Station in Raleigh, North Carolina. In this session we will cover a very important year in your Marine Corps career, your year in Vietnam.

You were detached from recruiting duty in Raleigh on 25 August 1966 and you reported to the III Marine Amphibious Force for duty on 9 November. How did you spend that intervening time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, two ways. Number one, as I characteristically did, I took Linda and the family back to Waynesville, North Carolina. We moved into a house owned by her uncle, which was directly in front of her parent's house. So, it was a nice place to put her. Her uncle was then working for the Army down in Huntsville. And this was kind of a summer place. So, we put them there.

And I can recall, because he had been a World War II medically retired Army lieutenant, he had great compassion that I was going off to war. So, when I inquired of Joe — Joe Sloan, the uncle — as to the rent, he said, well, \$60 a month. So, we lived — Linda lived in a four bedroom house in front of her parents, due to the patriotic fervor of her uncle, for \$60 a month while I went to Vietnam.

As I recall, I had probably a month's leave, because while there was an enthusiastic tendency of all of us to rush to Vietnam to be there before it was ended, I was assigned to take a replacement unit and go through the replacement battalion training at Camp Pendleton.

Some had escaped that. Some had gone directly. So, we made many phone call pleas to my monitor at Headquarters, how come I need to go back through that, why don't I go straight to Vietnam.

But the fact is I had been, I guess, on independent duty for about three years and they needed to put captains in there. Earl Piper, my good friend from OSO duty, and I went at the same time. And he was my exec and I was the CO of the replacement unit.

We arrived at Camp Pendleton, again, crying, the war was going on and here we are, two young captains ready to go. And we were told, okay, we will have a replacement unit for you in three weeks. And we couldn't believe that. We said, my gosh, put us on an airplane and send us on. But no, we were there to take a replacement unit.

So, after reporting to Pendleton, to be candid, it was probably the best physical shape I was ever in, because all I would do is get up in the morning and Earl and I would suit up and go run 10 miles and check in to see if there was a replacement unit coming in a little bit earlier that we could get in. But it turned out that we spent almost three weeks just kind of running the beaches in California and running the hills of Camp Pendleton, to get in shape to go through staging battalion training.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get any indoctrination or orientation for Vietnam?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, that was the three-week course at Camp Pendleton was fairly characteristic, I think. We had done it in Korea. And we did it again.

And you got lectures on pungee pits and on taking your salt tablets. And then we trained in guerrilla warfare tactics and environmental and ethnic orientation, all those sorts of things in preparation for going.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were a few new infantry weapons coming in at about that time. The M-16 was about to replace the M-14.

GEN MUNDY: It may have been. I was M-14 oriented. We had come in to the M-14. So, we were carrying M-14's. And in my early days in Vietnam — the M-16 was introduced to Vietnam while I was over there. But I got no indoctrination on the M-16.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about the grenade launcher?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we had the grenade launcher there that shot the M-79 grenades. And we did train with that and fired it. Machine guns, those sorts of weapons. I don't recall anything specific beyond that. The M-79 would have been the newest, the most intriguing because it shot a great big bullet, I mean a grenade. We were dubious of that a little bit.

BGEN SIMMONS: Troops called it the blooper.

GEN MUNDY: You know, the concern was, you know, you thought of a rifle as something you aimed at somebody and shot, as opposed to lobbing this grenade. But it was an effective weapon.

BGEN SIMMONS: It certainly was. Tell me about — well, first off, did you feel prepared for duty with an infantry battalion when you went to Vietnam?

GEN MUNDY: I did. I felt prepared to be a company commander. Now we have to go all the way back to Raleigh now. When I got my orders to Vietnam, I was told I was going to Vietnam. We were enlarging the Marine Corps dramatically. And all of a sudden I popped up on the major's list earlier than I would have expected. I was not deep selected, per se, but we selected a bunch of captains to be major. So, I was suddenly a major selectee a year early in August, the same month that I detached from Raleigh.

I, in the meantime, got my assignment that came in from FMFPac, from General [Victor H] Brute Krulak at FMFPac, that said, congratulations, you are going to be assigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force. And I said, what is III Marine Amphibious Force. And I still have and thought it was a grand letter that I wrote back to General Krulak saying, "Look, I have been selected for major, but I am way down on the list, it is going to be a long time. I have time to be a company commander. Please don't send me to a staff. Send me someplace where I can be a company commander." And I got the pro forma you-are-going-to-III MAF response to that.

So, I was very disappointed, frankly, to be assigned to the MAF staff and not to go out to be a company

commander. I felt like I was in good shape, I had led a company. The replacement units were about 160 men, so it was in effect a rifle company and I had led that effectively. And I felt, yes, I was ready to go into combat in Vietnam.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tell me about your arrival in South Vietnam. What were your first impressions on arriving?

GEN MUNDY: We flew in. I think one of the real culture shocks — I suppose it is a good way to get there, but I am not sure it is psychologically the best way. We flew in on chartered airlines. I happened to fly over on Continental Air.

So, we left the west coast on a 707 Continental, the earphones, the movies, stereo music, great food, stewardesses and all of that sort of thing, and flew into Okinawa. Then from Okinawa, also I went Continental into Vietnam, after about three days of getting gamma globulin shots and storing your gear at Camp Hansen and getting orientation forward about Vietnam.

Flew into Da Nang, got in there mid-day. I was struck as we were coming in, you could see — not too far off you could see air strikes and artillery fire impacting. It was rather eerie to be sitting here with a gentleman-fasten-your-seatbelts-for-the-landing-and-we-hope-you-have-enjoyed-this-flight and so on, and looking out the window and watching F-4's coming in dropping napalm.

But we landed and of course the hatch was opened. I was an officer so I was up front seated in the airplane. And I remember when they opened the hatch on the airplane this overwhelming heat and humidity that flowed in upon us. That was the first impression.

The second was then a Marine captain who was with the transient unit, or the receiving unit, to brief us. He was wearing a .45. That impressed me. We were in a combat area. And he was covered with red dust and he was very sun-tanned. He was the only one who wasn't perspiring profusely by that time.

And there wasn't much. Get off the airplane and go into this building and you will be processed. And that was about it.

So, I got processed and, again, they said, all those with orders to the 1st Division here, and the 3d Division there, and all those going to III MAF over here. And a few of us went over and got in a truck, a 6-by, and went off to III MAF and that was about it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your initial duty was as assistant watch officer in the G-2 section, Headquarters, III



Capt Mundy is seen at the III MAF Headquarters in Da Nang, South Vietnam, in November 1966. At the time, he served as a watch officer in the G-2 section.

Marine Amphibious Force. Were you disappointed in that assignment?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I was. My good friend Major [Robert A.] Bob Crabtree, was an assistant O3 monitor at Headquarters. And before you went to Vietnam, if you had ever done anything, if you had walked a dog, why you picked up an additional MOS for that.

So, I had been — remember in an earlier session we talked about the regimental S-2 for a very brief time, three or four months. And suddenly I popped up as an 0302/0202, as a secondary MOS, which I felt very ill qualified for. I never wanted to be an intelligence officer, didn't want to be in it.

Like most infantry officers, I figured if I was going to staff, if I got into the G-3, that was operations. That sounded better. So, G-2 was kind of a turn off for me. I wasn't too excited about that.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your duties?

GEN MUNDY: I was a watch officer in the Combat Operations Center. And you would stand watches about 12 hours a day. You would stand a couple of six-hour watches, six on, six off and then back for six. Or more ordinarily, we would stand 12 on, 12 off, just port and starboard. And rotate that between day watches and night watches, which kept your sleep screwed up.

But III MAF was not hardship living. It was, I guess, in comparison to the States, but we lived in the plywood and screen wire buildings that had been built by the Seabees.

I got there the 8th or 9th of November, and the first thing that I was told is, get your tropicals pressed up because the birthday ball will be in the club here on the 10th and Martha Raye is going to be the guest of honor and General Walt will want all the officers there and it will be in tropics instead of in utilities. You could at least wear your boots with your tropicals, as I recall.

So, you would go in. The club was air conditioned. And they had ice cream and beer. And I felt a little bit less than a warrior at that particular point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was Headquarters III MAF located at that time?

GEN MUNDY: It was in Da Nang right on the banks of the river looking straight across. We were down from the Seabee camp, which I can't recall the name of. But it was where III MAF was located pretty much through the war.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is this what you expected of Vietnam, this comfortable base camp?

GEN MUNDY: No, it wasn't what I was expecting and, again, it was disappointing to me to be there. I had expected to go to war in Vietnam, and although occasionally the runway over at Da Nang, which was across the river and a good several miles away would get rocketed or mortared, so you would hear booms at night and explosions and what-not, there really wasn't a hell of a lot of combat environment where I was.

I was a briefer. As part of your watch officer duties you would give the morning brief. General Walt would come in and then the other staff officers there and the G-3 and the G-2.

BGEN SIMMONS: Lieutenant General Lewis [W.] Walt was the commanding general at the time?

GEN MUNDY: Was the CG. And Jonas M. Platt was

then the chief of staff. And I think Norman J. Anderson was the deputy CG. But you would give the morning briefing and, you know, if it was a busy night, you had to rely on cards. You would make up 3x5 cards and then you would point out, at this location a squad was attacked and here the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines attacking a bunker complex. You would report the results of that.

Although I was the G-2 watch officer, the fact of life was that we simply, in the watch sections, broke Vietnam into northern I Corps and Southern I Corps. And one of the briefers would brief the incidents in the north and the other in the south, regardless. They had no operational or intelligence distinction. It was just a matter of lightening the load. So, you really just had a couple of briefers Captain Dick Esau was the other, and Captain Hank Stackpole was at all briefings as the combat information officer. Captain Tim Gerraghty was the Recon breifer.

If you were on the night watch, which went on at 1800 at night, then you would be on until 0600 the next morning, go change your uniform, shave, and come back and brief at 0700.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is this the first time you had met General Walt?

GEN MUNDY: It was. I didn't realize until many years afterwards when I was looking at a picture of my PLC class in 1954 convening, that we were welcomed by Colonel Lewis Walt, who was the CO at Basic School. But I didn't remember that. So, this was my first — yes, the first time that I was ever associated with him to any degree.

BGEN SIMMONS: As watch officer, you were now briefing him on a daily basis?


GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Considering your later assignments, you must have attracted General Walt's attention some way. How do you think that came about?

GEN MUNDY: A very easy explanation. Generally speaking, people were — I can't say terrified, but General Walt was a looming figure and he was quick to fire a breifer. He was quick to chew you out on the spot. He had a lot of pressure on him. So, we were generally apprehensive by the prospect of facing this three-star grunt who was the Silent Lew of World War II fame and so on.

But, on his birthday, somebody said, "today is General Walt's birthday," before the briefing. Well,

While with III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam, Mundy was promoted to major on 14 February 1967 by LtGen Lewis W. Walt. The following year, Mundy would be serving as Walt's aide de camp.



the G-2 briefer happened to be the first man up and I don't even recall what date that was, but it was fairly early in my tenure. But generally the briefings were very pro forma and they were very fixed and they were not lighthearted. And I got up and began my briefing by saying, "Happy Birthday, General Walt Birthday." And his face lit up and everybody in the room was stunned that a captain would get up here and start off his briefing saying happy birthday. You could just see the kind of shock effect. And he loved it. And later he said to me, "when is your birthday." So, we established a rather, due to unusual circumstances, good rapport.

That resulted in my being then included many times when we would give a briefing and something would be going on. He would say, "Okay, I want to go out there," he would say to his aide, which meant line up a helicopter and get ready to go. And then he would take along a staff officer or two. So, I began to be frequently that staff officer who accompanied him. And we would go down to land in the middle of some firefight or something and I would be his intelligence officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: When I was there a year earlier he did a lot of briefing in the evening. He would give dinners for visiting celebrities or VIP's or press personalities and there would be a lot of stand-up briefings. Did you take part in any of that?

GEN MUNDY: I was invited by him a couple of times to where he lived on the beach. And he would bring in the doctors and nurses from the *Repose* and the *Comfort*, the hospital ships. And we would have a social affair. There usually were a couple of us there. He would say, now Major Mundy — I think I was a major by that time, Captain or Major Mundy or whatever I was — "Why don't you just give them a little run down on what is going on here." So, you gave sort of a dinner briefing.

I would mention one light thing here, because we mentioned Jonas Platt before and I thought so much of him. He, too, was a tremendous man. He was the chief of staff.

If you gave an especially good briefing, you would get a little piece of paper from the chief of staff and it would say, "good briefing," or something; "JMP." And we called them "Platitudes." So, that was after the birthday greeting, when I got up and gave the "happy birthday, General Walt," that I got my first "Platitude" from Jonas Platt, who said, "nice job, JMP."

BGEN SIMMONS: Jonas Platt himself was a virtuoso briefer.

GEN MUNDY: He was very articulate. I had heard him in earlier years as a colonel at Basic School.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your impressions of General Walt as the senior Marine in South Vietnam? And do you have any anecdotes to illustrate those impressions?

GEN MUNDY: Well, one, he believed fervently in what we were there to do and in the mission. He believed in the doctrine of the hearts and minds, the civic action program, all of those sorts of things that were done by the Marines, not exclusively perhaps but somewhat uniquely to capture the hearts and minds; in other words, gain the people.

He believed in that and he thought that that was being achieved. Although I know that he was quick to relieve commanders and so on, in the briefings you could see his compassion. When you would brief casualties, that we had taken a dozen casualties in some firefight or a couple of people had stepped on a mine and gotten blown up, you could see a great deal of compassion on the part of the man for who you were briefing.

Now, I don't know who he chewed out later for that, perhaps, but when we would go out — he would go to the hospital regularly to see the troops who had been wounded. In the field, when I was with him, he always, spoke for the troops — and in fact, I never saw him on any occasion be harsh in the field.

One of his favorites was a Lieutenant Colonel Ed Bronars at that time. Ed Bronars was operating down at Duc Pho. It was a bad place, I don't think we ever won down there, but we were fighting there all the time. So, we would drop in on him there periodically. He liked Ed a lot, so they would kind of a bear hug, "how are you doing."

And he was a troop leader in the field. He was, "how are you doing, Marine." "How is it going there, son, well, you are doing a good job." He was just that type of leader.

But I think his impressions of how things were going were perhaps a little naive. I am not sure that everybody saw that we truly were gaining the hearts and minds to the degree that General Walt did.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your presence, did he ever show any impatience with COMUSMACV, General [William C.] Westmoreland at that time, or with CG FMFPac, who was General Krulak at that time?

GEN MUNDY: No, not in my presence. General Westmoreland would come periodically to III MAF and would be in on the morning briefing or would come and we would have a special briefing for him.

General Walt was a very strictly regimented professional and it was "Yes, sir, No, sir." If there was any disaffection between them, it was not apparent to me. Nor was it with General Krulak. In fact, even to the days when I can recall that General Walt was the Assistant Commandant, General Krulak was still, "Sir." He would refer to him, "Yes, sir, No, sir," to General Krulak, even though he presumably outranked him as the ACMC. But no, I didn't detect any of that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any contact with the commanding generals of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and who were they?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the 1st Division was Herman Nickerson at that time. The 1st Division Commander routinely would be at the III MAF briefing in the morning, would come across the river. The 3d Division CG was not always there.

The 3d Division, Wood B. Kyle at that particular time, I would see from time to time. But if I had contact, it was principally with General Nickerson, as far as one of the commanders, because any time that you were briefing a 1st Division incident, of course, as is usually the case, one staff has different information than another. So, I would brief an incident and sometimes General Nickerson would say, "Well, that is not the way I understood it happened, here is the way I understood it happened." And so, I had more interface.


I learned from that, usually, before the briefing, to go up and say, General [Herman] Nickerson, here are the three incidents I am going to brief here is what I have got. And he would say, "Yes, that is good," and then there would be no problem. So, I would kind of clear it with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Backing up just a little bit, who was the commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing?

GEN MUNDY: In reflection, I think it was Major General [Louis B.] Robertshaw.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any contact with him?

GEN MUNDY: Again, he was routinely at the morn-



Maj Mundy visited an orphanage at China Beach, Da Nang, South Vietnam, in April 1968. By then he was an aide to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Lewis W. Walt.

ing briefings. So, not too much other than just seeing him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who is the deputy commanding general of the III Marine Amphibious Force?

GEN MUNDY: The deputy CG, as I recall him, was Norm Anderson, Major General Norm J. Anderson. And as I said, then Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt was the chief of staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the G-2 at that time?

GEN MUNDY: The G-2 when I went in was a Colonel Bob Thompson, Robert H. Thompson.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the stronger personalities on the III MAF staff?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Platt certainly was. The feel-

ing was that really you had Walt and Platt. They were good friends, they thought a lot of each other. But Platt was very strong.

Colonel D. J. Barrett, Drew Barrett, was the G-3 at that time and I thought a lot of him. He was kind of an — how would I describe it — a Jimmy Stewart maybe type of character, sort of a down home, very smart man. But he was as the G-3 might be expected to be. He was sort of the dominant figure that I recall.

Colonel Thompson, I think, was a good officer. And he subsequently became the regimental commander of the 4th Marines. But I was not struck by him. I was by Drew Barrett.

BGEN SIMMONS: Early in February 1967 you were informed of your promotion to major with the date of rank of 1 February. Did you celebrate this promotion in any particular way?

GEN MUNDY: Well, General Walt promoted me in his office and I don't think — you know, again, I was standing watches and so on, so I probably bought a round over at the bar at the club, but no extraordinary celebration.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have fitness reports as a G-2 watch officer from two G-2s, Colonel Robert H. Thompson, whom you have mentioned, and Colonel Ben S. Read. You have given your recollections of Colonel Thompson. How about Ben Read?

GEN MUNDY: I thought Ben Read was a — seemed to me to be a much more energetic, outgoing, positive man. Thompson was, again, sort of a neutral assessment. He was a good officer. I thought well of him. But I felt a friendship, I felt more leadership from Ben Read.

He would come and see you — sometimes at 2:00 a.m. the door would pop open and the G-2 would come in and talk with you, what is going on, give me an update. How are you doing, have you heard from your wife lately, that sort of thing. So, I felt a little more kinship with Read.

And I thought both of them were good. I thought Read, perhaps, had a little bit more of an intelligence orientation than Thompson did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Colonel Read gave you the better set of markings. Colonel Thompson sort of had you in the middle of the pack with an "excellent to outstanding" overall rating. Colonel Read is more enthusiastic. He gives you an "outstanding" and writes approvingly of your daily briefings of General

Walt. Do you have any further comment on this?

GEN MUNDY: No, I don't think so.

BGEN SIMMONS: You stayed on as a G-2 watch officer until the 17th of June 1967, when you were transferred to the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. For your service as a watch officer you received a Certificate of Commendation from General Walt. Did you seek this transfer actively, or were split tours routine in III MAF at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I sought the transfer actively from about the day that I got there. And as I recall, at the five-month point you could go and see the adjutant and formally request a reassignment and it would be entertained, anyway. And I think most of those who sought them probably got it, particularly if you were a junior officer or a captain, or major by the time I got out of there.

So, I actively sought it but it was somewhat routine and it was not extraordinary that I would request it. All of those of us that I can recall that were captains — Captain [Henry C.] Hank Stackpole was then in the Combat Information Bureau, and Dick Esau who I mentioned who is a lifetime friend, retired a colonel, but he was in the G-3 section.

And Colonel Tom Fields, who later became a very good friend in my aide association with General Walt. Tom Fields ran the Combat Information Bureau.

But Hank Stackpole, Dick Esau, all of us who were young and frustrated to be there in the first place, all sought to get out as soon as we could, and we were successful.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 26th Marines was a 5th Division regiment temporarily activated for the Vietnam War, and at that time joined to the 3d Marine Division. Who was commanding the 3d Division at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The 3d Division was — this was prior to General Hoffman's arrival — I am sorry, when I reported to the division, it was General Bruno Hochmuth, Major General Bruno Hochmuth. His ADC was Brigadier General Lou Metzger.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did he or they interview you on your arrival?

GEN MUNDY: They did. I saw General Hochmuth. I was summoned to dinner very pleasantly, and had a CG's mess that night with General Hochmuth,

General Metzger, I think the chief of staff of the division was there, there may have been another staff officer, and then about three or four of us who were being posted to various units in the division. And we had a very pleasant dinner and talked about, as I recall — it is very interesting that the discussions at that time focused on some of the emerging tensions that we were experiencing racially in the division, from the standpoint of concerns — I think that was about the time that fragging, you know, began to occur.

And there was some discussion of the CG's concerns about the racial tensions within the division and that was about it. We didn't talk about much operationally or focus on the division's activities beyond that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was the 26th Marines CP?

GEN MUNDY: 26th Marines were at Khe Sanh at that time. They had moved up and relieved the 3d Marines, who had been at Khe Sanh during the spring of 1967 sieges of hills 861 and 881. The 26th Marines, then a regiment was positioned there. The 3d Marines had fought that battle, but a regiment was put up there, and it was the 26th Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you know who decided that you would go to the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines.

GEN MUNDY: Not beyond having reported in to the G-1 tent. And I can't remember who the G-1 was. I don't even think I saw the G-1. I saw probably the division personnel officer maybe and he just said, you are going to 3/26 and that was about as much as I knew.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was commanding the 26th Marines at this time?

GEN MUNDY: It was a Colonel John J. Padley when I reported in June.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you report to him personally upon your arrival in the regiment?

GEN MUNDY: I did. I arrived, we helicoptered up. Brigadier General Metzger took the incoming CO of the 1st Battalion 9th Marines and myself in his Huey, and we flew out of Phu Bai in the early morning of the day following having reported aboard and had the dinner the night before. We dropped the CO of 1/9 and picked up his predecessor, put him in the Huey,

and then we flew up to Khe Sanh. And I say up to Khe Sanh because Khe Sanh was a pretty good elevation and you came out of Phu Bai where it was sweltering, steamy, just soaking hot.

As you got out of Dong Ha and started going up toward Khe Sanh, you increased elevation and it began to get very pleasantly cool for Vietnam. So, we flew up. I was dropped off on the runway, was met by the then-exec of 3/26, who was a major named [Wallace E.] Wally Fogo. Wally is now retired down in Lexington, Virginia.

But anyway, he met me and picked me up and we drove right off the runway not 100 yards to the 3/26 CP. I dropped my gear and then, as I recall, I was taken over to regiment, checked into the regiment, called on Colonel Padley, and somewhere in there, of course, in all that, met Lieutenant Colonel Kurt L. Hoch, who was commanding the 3/26.

BGEN SIMMONS: What portion of the perimeter did the 3d Battalion occupy at Khe Sanh?

GEN MUNDY: At that time, the 3/26 was there and two companies of 1/26. That battalion was split. So, the battalion commander was there. There were six rifle companies there. 3/26 occupied the north and western portions of the perimeter. And the perimeter, to be very candid, wasn't much. The combat base was not very well defensively prepared at that time.

Basically the battalion had some fighting holes and a few mortar positions, but I was struck by the fact that here I had come into a base camp in which there had been a fierce battle at least out to the north of it only a few months earlier.

And the mess tent was set up right there, and the Marines were living in their shelter halves that were plain and obvious. And again, you could jump into a fighting hole, but they were sleeping in shelter halves. So, but we operated to the north and to the western portion.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your own personal living conditions there?

GEN MUNDY: The XO, which I came to be — I thought I was going in as the S-3 of the battalion, because I had just only been a major for a couple of months, but when I got there, Major Fogo said, I am detaching and you are going to be the XO. So, I kind of broke in as Wally Fogo's relief.

We lived in a normal command tent, one of the CP tents, with cots set up, a little wooden 2x4 stand for shaving outside with your aluminum bowl, and fairly

good conditions. I didn't have many clothes, a couple of sets of utilities. But you had something, an ammo case or something like that, that you put gear in.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did Lieutenant Colonel Hoch use you as an executive officer?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Kurt Hoch was, I thought, a pretty good battalion commander. Now, we never operated in the field together, so I only saw him in a field garrison, if you will, environment.

His guidance to me was not a great deal. It was just sort of, here, you are the exec, go do what an exec does. I really probably functioned as much as a sort of super-3 because we had a fairly junior captain for a battalion S-3 at that time, and we had a battalion COC set up. I had just come out of III MAF COC, so I was pretty tuned in to the intelligence and the operations interface and all that sort of thing.

So, I probably spent as much time there as a super-3, as I did doing anything that an XO did. As an XO, I made myself concerned about the supplies and the motor transport and things like the mess and things like that. I made a couple of trips back down to Phu Bai where the rear was, and the adjutant was there, and the assistant supply officer was there. So, that was our rear. I made a couple of runs down there.

But beyond that, I then began to be used more tactically. We had an Alpha and Bravo concept, and when the decision was made to structure a reaction force to rush out Route 9 and reinforce the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, which we also had a responsibility for, we put together Task Force Mundy.

It was, as I recall, a platoon of tanks and a couple of companies of infantry and some Ontos, the old 106 vehicles we had. And we were supposed to move artillery, displace artillery forward a little bit, race out Route 9 and reinforce Lang Vei. So, we practiced that a couple of times and would drive out through the Bru villages that were along the route. Beautiful country. Beautiful country. Magnificent country.

So, after I had been there about a month, I was more an operational task force commander than I was really a battalion executive officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was the nature of the enemy at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, remember that the NVA had engaged pretty heavily in April, Hills 861 and 881. The 3d Marines had fought a major battle, taken a lot of casualties, and had pulled back some.

Now, they probably were, at that time, moving for-

ward for the eventual siege of the combat base, or at least positioning themselves. I had been there for, I think as I recall, it may be three weeks and we were mortared one night.

The enemy, the NVA, 325th NVA Division had moved a mortar team forward and had really just mortared us badly, the 3/26, because as I mentioned, we were not very tactical. We learned right quick to be tactical. We learned about bunkering. We went out and cut down all the coffee plantation trees and built bunkers thereafter. But we took a number of casualties — I don't remember how many — because the troops — it was at night, everybody was asleep, lying out there in their shelter halves.

I had a habit when I would get in my cot at night there I would hang my utilities up over the rope that we had in the tent. And I can recall lying under my rack when the mortar rounds started going off.

I remember immediately at least taking shelter on the ground and hearing the tent taking the fragments coming through. And of course it peppered the tent and left me seeing a lot of daylight through the tent. And it also peppered my brand new jungle utilities, of which I was very proud. So, I had these shredded utilities that I put on to go out thereafter.

But we were not tactically disposed at that time and, again, that was a hard lesson to learn. That was when the Khe Sanh Combat Base, as opposed to the outlying outpost from the combat base, really began to tighten up and become a fortress, which it eventually did.

We had mosquito nets, but what one found is that when you dropped your net, you sweltered. You didn't get a lot of air through there. Of course, the sides of the tents were rolled up so that you could get a little bit of air in the tent. But if you then double netted yourself, so to speak, by dropping the mosquito netting, why it was awfully hot. So, after a couple of nights out, you learned, you know, to rub a little bit of mosquito repellent on your ears or something like that, and try and sleep through it.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was a mountain strain of malaria. Was your battalion bothered by that?

GEN MUNDY: Was not.

BGEN SIMMONS: Colonel Read had recommended you for a Bronze Star for service as a G-2 watch officer but it had gotten downgraded to a Navy Commendation Medal. The citation was signed by the awarding authority, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, then the commanding general of the Fleet

Marine Force Pacific. I believe you received this award in August. Maybe you were at Khe Sanh when you received it?

GEN MUNDY: Actually, no, I received the award in September. Yes, in September. And that was after we had come back from Khe Sanh. We had moved down to Camp Evans in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan Valley. And the award was presented to me by Major General Hochmuth at Camp Evans.

BGEN SIMMONS: Lieutenant Colonel Hoch thought you were an “excellent to outstanding” officer. He was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman. Was this about the time you left Khe Sanh?

GEN MUNDY: Very shortly before. Colonel Alderman flew in. I met him on the runway, brought him in to the battalion. He and Colonel Hoch had, as I recall, maybe a day or so of turnover and then Colonel Hoch left.

Colonel Hoch was an extremely popular battalion commander. The troops liked him. He was concerned about people, he was very attentive and spent a lot of time doing the things that a battalion commander did; you know, roaming around the lines at 2:00 a.m. in the morning and that sort of thing. So, he was very well thought of, very popular among the officers.

When Alderman arrived, we had already split and the Alpha commander and the CO and the sergeant major and two companies had moved up to a position just southwest of Con Thien. The Bravo command group with me, the Task Force Mundy, as it were, had been kept back there for the purpose, again, of reacting to an attack on Lang Vei Special Forces Camp.

Colonel Alderman came in and came up through Khe Sanh initially. I briefed him on the battalion, kept him there for about a day, and then he went on forward to relieve Colonel Hoch over with the Alpha command group.

BGEN SIMMONS: So, you were there with Task Force Mundy?

GEN MUNDY: I was.

BGEN SIMMONS: At some point, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman gave you an “outstanding” fitness report. And in his remarks he wrote, “I have observed Major Mundy under fire when this battalion was attacked by a North Vietnamese regiment, and his cool, calm demeanor as he carried out his duties was

inspiring to say the least.” Had you moved back to Con Thien at that time?

GEN MUNDY: That particular incident occurred on the 10th of September. In early September, we were directed to displace 3/26 rear, the Bravo command group, and to move to join the Alpha command group, and to relieve the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, who had been pretty well mauled in the southwest of Con Thien, Leatherneck Square, up in that area.

So, we displaced from Khe Sanh on fairly short notice. I recall that we lifted out of there. We had the CH-53 Alpha helos that were lifting us out. And a front was closing in. And to this day, as we have in recent years wrung our hands over whether we should carry 30 troops or 35 or 20 or what not in a helicopter, I can remember walking into the 53 Alpha in which there were no seats and we all stood up and leaned against each other. And we flew out of Khe Sanh. The helo that I was on had 67 Marines combat loaded on it, all standing up like cord wood.

But at any rate, we lifted out just in the nick, before the front closed in and would have prevented flying, and then flew down to Dong Ha and set up a rear in Dong Ha. I was there for about two days establishing the battalion rear as the XO.

The battalion, and now the additional one company — we detached one company, Lima Company, to be a rough rider security company, he rejoined, and so the battalion was in the field with four rifle companies and Colonel Hoch. I was in the rear, setting up the rear.

At about that time, about two or three days after we had gotten there, we got some reliefs in. The Amphibious Warfare School had just emptied out and so we began to get captains and majors. And there showed up a major by the name of [Major Joseph M.] Joe Loughran and a Captain [Matthew P.] Matt Caulfield, who reported in at the same time just out of the AWS class.

So, anyway, I briefed them and told Loughran he would go out to be the 3 and told Caulfield that he was going to be the battalion S-4. Later that evening Loughran came back in to get spun up on being a battalion S-3 and I said, “Oh, by the way, what is your date of rank?” It turned out that his date of rank was one month earlier than mine. So, I said, “Joe, you are the XO and I am the 3.” So, I became the battalion S-3 on fairly short notice. Notified the colonel that we had reliefs aboard. So, Major Loughran went out to meet him, spent a half day there, came back, and then I was to go out the next day.

That night, the battalion was engaged in pretty heavy firefight and we took fairly significant casualties, lost a company commander, a couple of lieutenants down, and I would think 20 or 30 Marines that were either killed or wounded seriously enough to be evacuated. So, the next morning I was going out.

I flew out with a resupply chopper onto a little ridge line that was about four clicks southwest of Con Thien. And landed at about noon.

I was struck by the fact that some of the basic lessons that a lieutenant is taught never go away, because as I landed in this zone which had just been under, you know, mortar and rocket fire and which had been attacked by NVA infantry, right on the ridge-line were two Marines. It was hot and they had their flak jackets off and their white T-shirts, and they were passing a helmet like a football back and forth, running and receiving passes and so on. And I chewed them out and told them to get tactical and get back down in their holes.

I went on over and reported to Colonel Alderman and thus became the battalion S-3, relieved the captain who was the S-3, who became the 3 Alpha and I became the 3. That was on the 10th of September. Within three hours, then, I was learning what it was to experience incoming and we sustained a pretty heavy attack by what was at least reported to be an NVA regiment.

The 3/26 was, at that time, strung out. We had commenced a movement even before I got there with India Company commanded by Captain Matt Caulfield. When Matt came in, he was going to be the 4 but, to make a long story short, he became the CO of Company I when Captain Wayne Coulter was wounded, and was evacuated.

Matt Caulfield had moved over to a small hill about 1,000 meters out from where the battalion and two rifle companies were located — Captain Jim Brown and Kilo Company, and Captain Dick Camp with Lima Company. And then we had Captain [Andrew D.] Andy DeBona and his Mike Company strung out, moving out toward where India Company had reconnoitered and displaced.

The NVA had caught us in that movement at about 3 in the afternoon, and with Mike Company strung out, had commenced a fairly heavy mortar and rocket attack. And then I can remember to this day walking out on the ridge to see what was going on and looking down and it was almost — if you had said to me, characterize it, I would have said Pickett's Charge. Here came an NVA battalion, that were almost lined up in ranks, just coming up at the ridge at us, in an almost beautiful scenario. It was a beautiful day, a beautiful

bright blue day almost what Gettysburg must have been like.

BGEN SIMMONS: A most unusual sight.

GEN MUNDY: It really was, all the khaki pith helmets, and red tabs of the officers glittering. You almost expected a sword glittering in the sunlight there.

So, anyway, Kilo and Lima Companies had engaged that particular attack. We were receiving a lot of mortar and rocket fire. They had 140mm rockets and 81mm mortars. And Mike Company, in the meantime, another NVA formation of some strength — battalion, I would call it — had attacked Mike Company. And India Company had run into obviously the NVA's very carefully planned attack on it.

So, India was under fire and thought that he was the main point of effort and was reporting back, I have got to have help, I need artillery support, mortar support, all that sort of thing. Mike Company was reporting stretched out, pinned down in rice paddies. And then Lima Company's machine guns were beginning to chatter. You know, as the tempo of battle increases, you can hear sporadic rifle fire and when the machine guns really get chattering away, you know that you are engaged.

So, at any rate, we were pretty heavily engaged, and that engagement lasted well on into midnight, so several hours of probing and fairly intense infantry-to-infantry close engagement.

I was back in with the battalion command group, although I would foray out from time to time. The rolled tanks up. We had a heavy section of tanks attached and we rolled the tanks around one edge of the hill to give some relief to Mike Company. And as soon as the tanks got out there, they fired a couple of times and then B-40's hit them and set them afire.

We had a couple of ONTOs. We ran the ONTOs up on the ridge line to try and provide some fire support, and they were quickly knocked out. So, we really lost two ONTOs, lost one tank — one of them limped back in but one was knocked out completely and the other one was in the rear and wouldn't start up. Anyway, that engagement went on.

So, I think that was probably that encounter that Colonel Alderman was referring to.

BGEN SIMMONS: You received a Purple Heart for wounds received on 10 September. Was that part of this action?

GEN MUNDY: It was. Those were mortar fragments in the leg.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were also recommended for a Silver Star for heroism on this date. Lieutenant Colonel Alderman in his recommendation states:

“While serving as the Battalion S-3 Officer with 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, Major Mundy’s battalion came under attack by an estimated North Vietnamese Army Regiment southwest of Con Thien on 10 September 1967. Having arrived on the scene only several hours prior, Major Mundy immediately grasped the overall situation, showing calm attention to the details of coordination of both supporting arms and battalion fire power. He repeatedly exposed himself to coordinate supporting arms and to insure that the various elements of the command post were functioning properly. At one point, when the enemy had advanced to within 30 meters of the command post, Major Mundy ensured the appropriate steps were taken to strengthen the endangered sector.”

Is that about the way you remember it?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you know, I don’t remember being particularly heroic. Like anyone else, I can remember trying to find a fold in the ground and wishing that my mother was there from time to time. But at any rate, that probably characterizes the engagement pretty well. The enemy did get pretty close in. They had penetrated earlier the 1/9/CP, subsequently penetrated the 2/4/CP when we were relieved.

To be very candid, the tactics employed by Marine battalions, or at least 3/26 at that particular time, were not very good. We made the mistake of occupying the same ground. One battalion would come out and relieve another battalion right on the hill where the NVA’s almost had — they had trails up to attack those positions.

So, we really were not too well disposed, and I think while we withstood the attack, and as the recounts go, we killed more of them than they killed of us, but we didn’t do much maneuver. We fought to preserve ourselves.

The penetrations close to the CP, yes, the NVAs were within — you could hear them, you could see them. We were all locked and loaded. You know, every time you would hear something in the brush, why we wanted to shoot. We were aware that there was a rifle company in security just forward of us anyway, so you didn’t want to, because you didn’t know who was a Marine and who might not be. They did not penetrate the CP, but they were close by.

BGEN SIMMONS: Wasn’t there something about your giving away two clips of .45 caliber pistol ammunition?

GEN MUNDY: My good friend, Dick Camp, I think, wrote this up in one of his books. I can recall sometime during the night, my main effort was supporting arms. I was keeping artillery coming in from C2 which was right behind us, an outpost with an artillery battery.

We had a spooky gunship on station. We had a lot of air support coming in by F4’s. We were trying to get ammo re-supplies, get the casualties out. So, those were the types of things that I was focusing myself on.

But I remember hearing some crashing in the brush right close to me, and I remember, you know, I was already locked and loaded. I can remember cocking back the hammer on the .45, getting ready to repel boarders. And fortunately, didn’t shoot and out of the brush came this young Marine. He was looking characteristic of a combat Marine, you know, disheveled and tired and so on. But it was dark, so I couldn’t really see his features.

But he said, “Sir, is this battalion.” And I said, “who are you.” And I don’t know his name, but he told me. And he said, “Sir, we need an ammo re-supply.” And I said, “Well, we are trying to get ammo in,” thinking he was talking about a helo re-supply. And I said, “What do you need?” And he said, “Sir, we are out of .45 ammunition.” He was an assistant machine gunner. And I thought, boy, when you get low on .45 ammo, it’s bad.

Well, I had, I don’t know, whatever I had, three or four magazines there. So, I pulled a couple of them out and said, “Here, this is the best I can do for you.”

And I remember how grateful, polite and respectful this kid was, you know, and he said, “Thank you very much, sir,” as he took off with 14 rounds of .45 and disappeared. And I don’t remember who he was. Shortly after that we detached Lima Company and I couldn’t tell you whether he survived or not. But he needed it worse than I did, at that particular point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your recommendation for a Silver Star came back as a Bronze Star with Combat V and it arrived while you were en route home. I believed you continued as S-3 until your detachment on the 27th of November. Had you taken any R&R during your Vietnam tour?

GEN MUNDY: I did, before I joined the 3d Division, that is before the III MAF and the 3d Division reassignment, I went back to Hawaii, met Linda there, we

stayed at the Ilikai Hotel next to Fort DeRussy and had, in many respects, a delightful probably three or four days, because by the time you got your system turned around, why you really had about three days of R&R.

Were I to do that again, I wouldn't. Personally, while I think maybe R&R is healthful, I am not sure meeting your wife on R&R in a combat tour is the best thing, because it was awfully hard to part again and it was awfully hard to return to Vietnam. So, psychologically it was a tough time. I wouldn't do it again.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were ordered to Headquarters, Marine Corps, to be the Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Commandant, who was now General Walt. You were to report to that duty on 3 January 1968. I think this might be a good place to end this session, unless there is something else you would like to add about Vietnam.

GEN MUNDY: I would only clarify, I was really ordered to Headquarters and I knew I was going to go into the Personnel Procurement Section. While I was home on leave, I detached Vietnam, right at the end of November, 1967, was home for a month's leave over Christmas. And shortly before Christmas, I had a call from General Walt, who was then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower. And he said, "I am going to be the Assistant Commandant. I would like you to be my aide. What do you think of that?" Well, what are you going to say? You thought it was wonderful. And I did. I was very excited about that.

So, there was a change of assignment. I was bound for Headquarters, but it was by General Walt's pull that I became his aide.

SESSION 7

Aide to General Walt

Assignment as aide to the Assistant Commandant, Gen Walt . . . Traveling and speech-making with Gen Walt . . . Other members of Gen Walt's official family . . . Gen Walt's good friends Martha Raye, MajGen Walter Churchill, and Bishop (soon to be Cardinal) John O'Connor . . . Gen Walt's perception of communism and Vietnam . . . Writing Strange War, Strange Strategy . . . Role of Col Don P. Wyckoff . . . Gen Walt's style of mentoring subordinates . . . Lessons learned at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session, we covered your service as a captain and a major in Vietnam. In this session, we will cover your service at Headquarters Marine Corps as the Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Commandant, who was then LtGen Lewis W. Walt.

In the close of the last session, you recounted the circumstances of how you were informed that you were going to be his aide. You left South Vietnam on the 27th of November, and you reported to Headquarters Marine Corps on 3 January, 1968. How did you spend that intervening time?

GEN MUNDY: I was on leave, rejoining my family in western North Carolina, picking up Linda and moving to Springfield, Virginia. We came up house hunting, bought our second home out in Springfield. Then back for Christmas leave, and reported to Headquarters on the 3d of January, 1968.

BGEN SIMMONS: And what was the address of this house in Springfield?

GEN MUNDY: 6912 Gilbert Street, just behind the Springfield Shopping Center.

BGEN SIMMONS: How long did you own that house?

GEN MUNDY: Not long enough, because I lived there for — let's see, I left in 1970, after I graduated from Command and Staff College. So we actually owned it from January of '68 until about June or so of 1970. I can recall that I had a four and three-quarter percent loan on it. My payments were \$155 a month.

When I got ready to leave, interest rates had increased to about eight percent or so. Everybody

was really wringing their hands. My neighbor across the street was an Army colonel. As I put my house up on the market, he said, don't sell your house. You can rent it for \$220 or \$250 a month right now. No, I said, I'm going to take the money and run. So I sold it and made \$5,000 on the house, and thought I had gotten rich quick. Now we drive by it occasionally, and all our trees are now big trees, and the little steel case-ment windowed Virginia home is still right there. I would have been reaping a nice monthly income from it.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think you have already answered this, but Gen Walt had not done anything to bring you home to be his aide. This was a target of opportunity, rather than an idea that he had that he would bring you home to be his aide?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, by no means. I was ordered to Headquarters Marine Corps. As I say, I was to go into the Personnel Procurement Division. I had been in OSO and was being brought back for that. I got the intervening call in December. He said, "I want you to be my aide," and I said "It would be my honor," or whatever you say.

BGEN SIMMONS: As we discussed before, you had attracted his attention when you were at III MAF headquarters. Didn't you have some role to play in the change of command when —

GEN MUNDY: I did. I was the adjutant when Gen [Robert E.] Cushman relieved him. I was the adjutant who delivered the colors to the commanding general. As we discussed earlier, I had established a fine rapport with Gen Walt. I admired him, and obviously I had caught his attention.



As aide to Gen Walt, Maj Mundy accompanied the Assistant Commandant on trips to Vietnam. Here at Con Thien in April 1968, Mundy, right, poses with Maj Richard D. Weede, the S-3 for 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were the other members of his personal staff?

GEN MUNDY: Well, then Capt [Harvey C.] “Barney” Barnum was the junior aide. I came in to be the senior aide, a major and a captain. When he was up in the Manpower Department, he had two of them. He had a Capt [Douglas M.] Doug Davidson, who got out of the Marine Corps. Doug had been his aide in Vietnam, and Doug was getting out to become a stockbroker, and has been very successful.

BGEN SIMMONS: I know Doug Davidson. He is very smooth, very smooth.

GEN MUNDY: He was, he was very good. Then he had brought in Barney Barnum. Barney really functioned — though he was cast as the junior aide, he was the other spokesman. He was a Medal of Honor, young bachelor. Cigar, driving a Cadillac. Then it was all right to say a gay blade around town. But he also was used by Gen Walt when — Gen Walt did an

enormous amount of speaking, both in his manpower job and in his Assistant Commandant job. So Barney, was more than a working aide, they would go off together, and both of them would make speeches. Or Barney would be sent in this direction, and Gen Walt would go in that direction.

Lois Parham was Gen Walt’s long-time secretary, a very, very attractive lady, a very accomplished executive secretary, and very, very jealous of her prerogatives as a secretary. So to be the aide with Lois Parham meant that Barney Barnum and I suffered sometimes the tongue lashing of one who considered that she was probably old enough to be our mother, and that we were a couple of boys that were supposed to carry the bags when Gen Walt went out of town. From time to time, things would get a little bit tense in the office.

But anyway, those were the principal members of the staff at that time.

BGEN.SIMMONS: Some saw Gen Walt’s assignment as Assistant Commandant as a consolation prize

for not having been selected as Commandant. Word at the time had it that President Johnson could not choose between the two prime candidates, Generals [Lewis W.] Walt and [Victor H.] Krulak, so he picked a dark horse, Gen [Leonard F.] Chapman. Were you aware of this rumor?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I was. I think that was fairly well perceived at least throughout the Marine Corps in those days, because we knew that — as a part of that, as I recall, there came out the scandal that Gen Westmoreland had recommended in his final fitness report on Gen Walt that he should be the Commandant, and how dare him play in the politics of the Commandant and that sort of thing.

But I know Walt was then and was subsequently a great favorite of President Johnson's. Gen Krulak was viewed by many to be the frontrunner, or at least a frontrunner. Gen Chapman had the grade of major general, and was something of a surprise. We had not focused on Gen Chapman as being a likely Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did Gen Walt ever discuss his disappointment at not being named Commandant with you?

GEN MUNDY: Never, not in any way. Lew Walt was probably the ultimate in loyalty. What he may have done privately, I don't know. But I can tell you that in any situation in which I ever saw him, the Commandant was the Commandant. If Gen Chapman said "fall on a grenade," I have no doubt but that the first man in line would have been Lew Walt. He was tremendously loyal, and he never discussed that. He also was of the school that I think we probably have gravitated from a little bit. I say that in my own experience. I perhaps have been more open than others, but I never have had any qualms about discussing my frustrations or my disappointments with those who were around me, my aides, my military secretary, the other generals. But with Gen Walt, general officer matters were something that majors didn't discuss — it didn't matter what the generals were doing, it is none of your affair. You're a major, stay out of it.

I was only the hearer of rumors or the former of an opinion, based on what I saw. But I never heard him discuss that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Special legislation was soon passed, elevating the grade of the Assistant Commandant from lieutenant general to full general. Do you recall the circumstances of that legislation,

and who was the prime mover?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the prime mover — it was my perception, it was rumor, or it may have been fact, but it was the understanding that Lyndon Johnson had agreed that Lew Walt would not be the Commandant, but only under the circumstances that he be made a four-star general. So it was necessary then to achieve legislation that would authorize the Assistant Commandant to be a four-star, because he never had been before.

I didn't really get too much into that. It seems to me it was Joe Bartlett on the Hill — I can't remember now. My mind is ranging between General [Louis H.] Lou Wilson's campaign to gain equality in the JCS. I think that was Bartlett orchestrated. But to answer your question directly, I really didn't play in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were some special particulars in the legislation tied to end-strength of the Marine Corps.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. In fact, I think that is the way they got it done. So long as the Marine Corps was at 200,000 the Assistant Commandant should be a four-star.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Walt continued to be an ardent and articulate supporter of United States intervention in Vietnam. His support of the war became what appeared to be a virtual full-time effort, and took the form of many tours and many speeches. Did you help write these speeches?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. In fact, with some frustration, because Gen Walt never used any of the speeches that you wrote. But he wanted — as was characteristic of the times then and probably good practice now, he always wanted a speech, a bluetop or something that you would release to the press when you got out there, and to anyone else that wanted one. So I would carry a briefcase full of speeches that we had written out. We had more or less after a while the "duty speech." We would change the, "it's good to be here in Cincinnati" to, "it is good to be here in Chicago." If there was some current event we would write it in and update the speech a little bit.

But yes, in those days he relied on the aides to do a good bit of his writing. I was a speechwriter as well as a trip planner.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you accompany him on any of these tours?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, yes, many times.

BGEN SIMMONS: If so, describe a typical tour and the audiences to whom he spoke.

GEN MUNDY: Gen Walt would go anywhere and speak to any group, because he truly was passionate in the belief that you alluded to earlier. That is, that we were winning in Vietnam, that it was a winnable war, that the North Vietnamese were a people without a just cause and the South Vietnamese truly relied upon, trusted and believed that the United States would win for them. So he was passionate on that.

As a result, I can't think of any instances where he would turn down an invitation if it came to the office. Now, there may have been invitations that came in to Public Affairs that we never saw. But if somebody wrote him and said, "Would you come to Martinsville, Virginia and talk to the Homeowners Association," he would go, and we would go down with him. So we travelled a lot.

I viewed Gen Walt's function as really, more the Administration's uniformed advocate for the war in Vietnam than any degree of focus that he put on or was involved in being the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. That is not to say that he abdicated his duties, but he had many ask him — we would get requests from the White House or from Congress. Gen Chapman liked to see him go out on that, so we travelled an enormous amount of the time.

A typical trip would be going out to Andrews and catching an airplane. Being Walt, he was tough. Any of us, the [Paul X.] P. X. Kelleys, the [Clyde D.] Dick Deans, the Barney Barnums, the {Donald R.] Don Gardners, any of us would tell you that Lew Walt was a taskmaster. He was viewed as a big fuzzy teddy bear to the rest of the world, but once the doors closed and the aides were alone, believe me, it had better be exactly like it was supposed to be.

So a typical trip would be, get in the airplane, brief him, depending on how long a trip it was, precisely who was going to meet him at the airport and what he would do when he got there, and whether there would be press there or not be press there. You had better be right, because if the person you had told him was going to meet him was not there, whatever the circumstances, it was fine, it was no problem at all until you got to the hotel, and you paid the price, or if the assistant mayor showed up and not the mayor. There was a price to be paid by the aide.

More often than not, the event was an evening affair, and we would go to a hotel of some sort. There would be a reception before the affair, and then there

would be a dinner. I would be around, being part of the social circuit. Gen Walt wanted I think — this would be a personal conjecture, to somehow have more ribbons on his chest than Chesty Puller did. He would not allow us to mount his ribbons on a ribbon rack. He had 27 at the time. We had to mount the ribbons on single ribbon bars. They had to be spaced with a nickel, an eighth of an inch apart. That was the spacing. Again, the aides would pay holy hell. He was a big-chested man. He would put on his blouse, one of the ribbon bars would pop loose, and he would summon the aide, and you had to on the spot fix the ribbon bar.

So a lot of my time would be spent — when we got to the hotel and he had taken off his coat and gone in to shower, I would be back out there, making sure that the clasps held on the ribbons and whatnot.

As far as insuring that he had a drink in his hand, insuring that something wasn't wrong with his uniform — if he passed a mirror and saw that his tie was off to the side or that one of the ribbon things was crooked or something, there on the spot he would eat you alive. You're my aide, you're supposed to take care of this.

He loved "Texas Pete" on everything that he ate. If he was eating oatmeal, I think he would probably put "Texas Pete" seasoning in it, and always on his eggs in the morning, or whatever he had. So early in my tour, I learned — I think we were at the hotel in some city. We went down together for breakfast in the morning, and he asked for "Texas Pete," and they said of course, and they brought back Tabasco Sauce. He didn't want Tabasco Sauce, he wanted "Texas Pete," and they said, "I'm sorry, we don't have any 'Texas Pete.'" So he was immediately glowered up. It was a tough morning. When we got back on the airplane, he wanted me to insure that by God, when we went somewhere, there was "Texas Pete." So thereafter, for the rest of my days with him and to my successor, I passed bottles of "Texas Pete," which I carried everywhere we went, usually in my — when we went out to eat together, it was always in my pocket. If they didn't have "Texas Pete," I would set the bottle of "Texas Pete" there.

But at any rate, we would go to a reception. He would make a speech. Gen Walt was a man with an ego. He had been a successful commander. He was Silent Lew of World War II fame. He had a tremendous ego, and he loved to have it stroked. So he enjoyed all the compliments that came his way.

We would spend a lot of time on the West Coast. There was an organization known as the International Orphans Incorporated that was made up of young

Hollywood starlets. When Gen Walt would arrive, he was the toast of Los Angeles and Hollywood, and again, he thrived on that sort of adulation.

Then we would get up and head off the next morning, usually to some other place. So the trips were good or they were hard, depending upon how it went with matters that the aide literally could not control at all. Whatever happened, he was happy if it went smoothly, and he was idolized, and if anything went wrong, it was your fault and you knew about it.

BGEN SIMMONS: During those trips to Hollywood and the West Coast, was his old friend Martha Raye in evidence?

GEN MUNDY: Martha Raye was frequently: she was a frequent caller at the quarters, the Assistant Commandant's quarters. She would come for extended visits. She would be frequently at affairs that we would go to, and he thought the world of her. There was a great deal of affection between them.

When Martha Raye was there, he would always task me to be especially watchful of taking care of Martha Raye, who liked vodka on the rocks. It was not vodka and tonic on the rocks, it was vodka on the rocks. It wasn't small glasses. Martha would very quickly get into her cups, and she would turn into the comedienne that she was. So I would look after Martha Raye whenever she was around.

The other favorite — of the two personalities that were more or less the constants in the Walt environment, Father John O'Connor, now Cardinal O'Connor. But the retired Chief of Navy Chaplains was then Capt O'Connor, J. J. O'Connor. He was a Walt favorite, and was practically at the house all the time. So between Martha Raye and O'Connor and the IOI girls, I moved from the strict disciplines of the Catholic Church to serving tall glasses of straight vodka to the twinkling eyes of the IOI girls on the West Coast.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall MajGen Walter A. Churchill of the U.S. Marine Corps, retired, who was his close friend and supporter?

GEN MUNDY: Very well, and also he was frequently at the events that Gen Walt would go to, and a promoter. Gen Churchill would come into Headquarters, he always had an open door to Gen Walt. He would go in and when he came out, he would have lined up Gen Walt to go to two or three things. He would give us the details, and the aides would plan the trip.

BGEN SIMMONS: I believe that the National Grocers Association, of which Gen Churchill was an influential member, underwrote some of these tours.

GEN MUNDY: I believe that he did. In retrospect, I think he did. I know that Gen Walt spoke at affairs. I'll tell you one that is probably longer than it ought to be, but it dealt with him being presented — I think the trip was hosted by the Purina Dog Food Company. At that affair, they gave him as a gift a small pedigreed bulldog. We couldn't fly the bulldog back on the government airplane, so the bulldog was left in Cincinnati, as a matter of fact.

Well, Purina made arrangements to get the bulldog down here. So Barney Barnum went over to National Airport to pick up the bulldog. Mrs. Walt had let it be known that she wasn't into dogs and didn't want the dog in the house. But Gen Walt had received the dog, and wanted the dog.

Barney picked up the dog and took it out to the quarters. Mrs. Walt said, "the dog is not going to stay here." To make a long story short, they finally agreed the dog could live in the basement of the Assistant Commandant's quarters, but was not to come on the main floors. But the little dog was a pup, and being an English bulldog was not only young and small, but was fairly low slung. It was a male dog. In those days, the stairs down to the basement in the Assistant Commandant's quarters were rubber tread, the typically non-skid rubber tread.

We had five, today enlisted aides, then stewards in the house, headed by a mastery gunnery sergeant. The little dog would get down in the basement and would howl and yipe, and begin to come up the stairs toward the kitchen, where he could probably smell the food. As he did so, he would drag his underparts on these roughened up rubber steps and in a matter of a few days, we had a little dog who was infected in his privates.

So we took the dog to the vet. The vet prescribed some ointment to take care of this inflammation. Capt. Barnum was overseeing the dog. I was overseeing from afar, but Capt. Barnum brought the dog back, and the next day I got a call from MGySgt Jones, the senior aide, and he told me, the major, that he cooked, he cleaned house, he took care of the general's personal matters, his laundry and everything, but that he was not anointing any bulldog with ointment, nor were any of the other enlisted aides. So we really had a dilemma on our hands.

I can recall that I passed this one off to Barney Barnum, as to how the dog was going to have the ointment applied, and however it eventually occurred, it



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LtGen Lewis W. Walt poses with Maj Carl E Mundy, Jr., and his family after awarding Mundy the Bronze Star with Combat "V." The ceremony took place on 13 February 1968 in Washington, D.C.

did. The dog didn't last long. Mrs. Walt just was not having this dog. So we cleverly designed — I wrote the letter, a presentation by the Assistant Commandant to the Marine Corps base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, of a mascot, this bulldog. MajGen [Edwin B.] Ed Wheeler was then commanding the base, was an old Walt confidante. We made arrangements with Gen Wheeler that he would take the dog, wrote this presentation which made it official, and therefore we could fly the dog on a government airplane.

We sent the dog with the four-star letterhead stationery to Camp Lejeune. Gen Wheeler wrote back a most glowing appreciative letter of thanks to Gen Walt, assuring him that this dog would serve as an inspiration to Marines by the thousands. We were down there two or three months later and didn't see the bulldog. As we were walking over to dinner in the

club together — Gen Wheeler had come over and I happened to be walking with him, and I asked about the bulldog. He only turned to me and smiled and said, "the dog is doing fine." That was the end. I have no idea whatever happened to the little bulldog, but I hope it found a good home and lived a long and pleasant life.

But that was characteristic of the types of things, and I think that Walter Churchill was probably a sponsor on that event.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Churchill and Gen Walt were also allies in the Young Marines program, the various Marine Corps physical fitness programs. Were you involved in any of that?

GEN MUNDY: Toward the end of my time with Gen Walt, he and Gen Churchill wanted to establish —

Gen Churchill had long been involved with the youth physical fitness program, and they wanted to get the Young Marines. Eventually, what Gen Walt did when he retired was to go into a foundation that Gen Churchill had helped put together that sought to bring all of these organizations together. But similar to his passion for the war in Vietnam, I think he saw youth as a point on which the Marine Corps could focus that would be healthy one, that would be embraced and recognized by the American people. So yes, they were very active in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: I believe there was a problem with the degree of support that the Leatherneck Association was giving some of these programs. Do you recall any of this?

GEN MUNDY: I don't.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Walt was always a most active anti-Communist. He saw Vietnam as an anti-Communist crusade. Can you comment on this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, all of his speeches were flavored to that degree. In other words, he saw Ho Chi Minh as the ultimate Communist threat. He did focus a great deal on Communism. His focus was on the war in Vietnam, but there was no question that it was a part of the spread of the red terror in Communism.

BGEN SIMMONS: From my own acquaintance of Gen Walt, I saw that he was increasingly convinced that most of the world's ills were as the result of a giant conspiracy controlled from Moscow. Can you comment on this?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall as much focus on Moscow as being the seat of all ills. Intellectually with Communism you would think that. But as he did the world — I can't recall the name here, I'm trying to think

BGEN SIMMONS: (Comments off mike.)

GEN MUNDY: No, this was — as he came to believe — it is the Commission on One World, or something like that. I can't recall the name of it. But he saw a conspiracy to subvert the world and to subordinate it, controlled by powerful men. I'm trying to think, the World — it will come to me.

BGEN SIMMONS: At some point, Gen Walt envisaged a great organization that would combine all the

veterans of America's wars and this organization to control the Presidential and Congressional elections. Were you aware of that?

GEN MUNDY: I became aware of his concern about the controlling of world affairs after his retirement. I don't think I ever recall him talking about it.

BGEN SIMMONS: While he was on active duty?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall that. But afterwards, in fact, his subsequent writings in his first book dwelled in some part on that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have a close association with Gen Walt's amanuensis Col Don P. Wyckoff?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I met Col Wyckoff when Gen Walt decided he wanted to write a book. He called me in and said, "I want you to write a book for me." I said, "Gosh, I've never written a book. I don't know if I can do that." But he was convinced because I wrote a lot of his speeches, I did all of his letter writing, I did any of that sort of thing, I wrote for Gen Walt. He said, "But you write like I talk." So he said, "I'll tell you the stories and you can write them up, and you will write them like I sound." I said, "Well, I'll try."

So anyway, I was detached as his aide and sent up to be a special assistant, and was officed with then Maj [Joseph F.] Joe Cody, who was Gen Chapman's speechwriter. So I was a special assistant with the CMC speechwriter at that time, but focused on his book.

BGEN SIMMONS: This was the first book?

GEN. MUNDY: *Strange War, Strange Strategy*. It was not named at that time, but this was his book. He wanted to write about Vietnam, about his experiences, and tell details of what had happened there. My early efforts — I began putting the book together. He would tell me, he would say, go down and talk to John Chaisson and find out about the standoff with the South Vietnamese. So I would go talk to then-MajGen John R. Chaisson, who was Director of Plans I think in Headquarters at that time. He would tell me what had happened, and I would come back and write it up, and then I would send that in to Gen Walt, and he would put a couple of polishing points in — or say, go talk to somebody else.

We did that for a couple of chapters. It was appar-

ent that this was going to be a painful process, not necessarily because I didn't write well, or not necessarily because he didn't have a lot of recollections. But what we came to realize was that out of two or three vignettes, he was not going to create a book.

So he then got in contact with, — or somehow or other, and Don Wyckoff, colonel, retired at that time, came on the scene. I recall Col Wyckoff coming into the office to see Gen Walt and being included on that particular evolution and him saying, "Don, you can help with the book."

So anyway, the relationship then became that Wyckoff became the ghost writer, I became the editor to insure that it was in Walt language. So Wyckoff would write a chapter, send it to me. I would fool around with it a little bit, and then I would send it in to Gen Walt, updated with my twists of grammar more than of any substance into it, for the most part. Then Gen Walt would okay it and send it back out. So that was my relationship with Wyckoff.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think his later book, *The Eleventh Hour*, was written after he retired.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. We were separated then.

BGEN SIMMONS: Don Wyckoff later told me that — I think he was referring to both books, that 90 percent of the words were his, Don Wyckoff's, but that 95 percent of the ideas were Gen Walt's. Did you think that was an accurate statement?

GEN MUNDY: I have no axe to grind here. I would not assign those same percentages. That has no meaning. I don't remember how many chapters were in it.

The first three chapters were probably Mundy, and that would have been Walt ideas. Thereafter, it became my notion that because the style of the writing changed, and it changed for the better — Wyckoff was a good writer, and I thought did a fine job on giving character to the book. He would talk about, "The VC came down the trail, and meanwhile the sunlight dappled the ground through the overhead leaves." I thought it was very colorful writing. I did not have that talent.

But I think what I got as the later chapters began to come in, I can tell you that they were Wyckoff creations, edited by Mundy and approved by Walt. I know because I was there that Gen Walt did meet with Wyckoff. So I would give him more credit probably for the way in which the book was written. Certainly the thrust of the book was Walt's, and many of the vignettes that we talked about, about the little girl

returning a watch and all of those, those were classic Walt stories that I wrote up in the first few chapters.

So for what it is worth, no, I wouldn't give that high percentages.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Walt gave you four fitness reports, each one better than the last. The last three were straight outstandings with correspondingly complimentary remarks. Do you recall any mentoring or counselling that Gen Walt might have given you?

GEN MUNDY: There undoubtedly was. But Gen Walt's mentoring or counselling was routinely fairly harsh. In other words, you learned by getting something thrown at you. Rarely did he sit you down and say, "Let me talk to you about your future and where you're going."

Now, I knew — it was a love-hate relationship, I guess, because I knew he thought well of me. I have always been of the conviction that you don't need a lot of counselling. You know if you're doing well or not, and you know when you are meeting the mark, and when you finish doing something, somebody doesn't have to tell you that you did it well. They might tell you that they are real pleased, and that makes you feel good. But I knew that I was doing well, and I knew that I was serving him well. I knew that he was a very — I think Lew Walt was a fish out of water. He was a Chesty Puller type or a Lou Diamond or something. He was happiest on the battlefield.

He and Mrs. Walt, the second Mrs. Walt — there were three Mrs. Walts; this was his long-time wife. She didn't like being the Assistant Commandant's lady. She was not a tea party wife. Emily Chapman, who was the ultimate in blueblooded ladyship, and I say that as an admiring statement, but Emily Chapman and Nancy Walt were not the same social ilk, and so she was pressed into doing things that she didn't really enjoy. So there was stress at home. There were family stresses of the boys and of the daughter. So he was a man under a lot of pressure.

But when I say love-hate, I admired him, I thought a lot of him. He was an idol in my view. But at the same time, I and I know my successor, [Curtis G.] Gene Arnold, we spent many anguished hours ourselves, trying to grit our teeth enough just to tell this man to stick it in his ear, we were through, we quit, because he was very hard to work for. It was probably more in the form of — I remember vividly his favorite saying: "Don't assume the prerogatives of the commanding general." That meant that if you had presumed to say yes to a Space A, even though we

were flying on an airplane with 30 seats on it and we were only occupying two of them, you had better make sure you cleared with Gen Walt before you took any initiative on your own for something like that.

My dad was a great admirer of his. My dad would write, and Gen Walt would always write back and tell him what an absolutely superb son I was. I think Lois Parham probably wrote those letters; I didn't write letters back to my dad. But anyway, he thought well of me, so I am not surprised that he rated me well. But his mentoring was a painful experience.

BGEN SIMMONS: What do you think you learned from this tour near the apex of the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Vietnam, being at III MAF, probably was my first introduction to general officer command and decision making. But there, I was well removed from it. In this assignment, I was able to learn a little bit about the mechanics of Washington and how the Headquarters staff worked. I didn't really learn much about JCS or about the relationship between the Secretary and the Marine Corps. But I did come to understand the Headquarters.

Our title was not aide-de-camp, it was Administrative Assistant, so the Administrative Assistant was thrust into more in the Headquarters than just being the bag carrier, the aide. I came to know the Headquarters. I read a lot of P-4s from generals. I understood how the generals were maneuvered. I was certainly not privy to — because we were in the days as I said earlier when it seemed to me that the generals really didn't like each other very much, and there seemed to be cliques all around the place. The way you would get rid of a general would be — instead of just calling him in and saying, I'd like for you to go, you would give him some intolerable assignment that you knew he wasn't going to take, and he would get out.

But I came to understand the workings of the Headquarters.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the officers with whom you interacted?

GEN MUNDY: I mentioned Gen Chaisson. MajGen Jonas Platt was then the G-1. We had not gone to the executive staff. BGen [Kenneth J.] Kenny Houghton came in to be his assistant. You were there, down in G-4. No, you were Fiscal Deputy Director. G-4 was —

BGEN SIMMONS: Bill Van Ryzin?

GEN. MUNDY: That's right, he was G-4. He went off to Vietnam. In fact, I wrote the P-4, because Gen Walt happened to be acting, but I wrote the P-4. That is something that I found very exciting, was that I would write a message to Westy, Gen Westmoreland. Gen [William J.] Van Ryzin I know is of great value to you, and so on. But I want to make him a lieutenant general and he will be vital as my Chief of Staff up here. So I wrote the message that went to Gen Westmoreland, from Gen Chapman, and notified him that Gen Van Ryzin, who had just been there for a short while, was to be promoted and brought back as Chief of Staff. That was a Van Ryzin story.

But at any rate, Gen [Henry W.] Buse was then the PP&O, Chief of Staff. I think he came up from PP&O, but he was the chief. Of course, he was a good-natured man, big man, always had time for the aides, always pulled your chain a little bit.

I mentioned Barney Barnum. [Clyde D.] Dick Dean, then-Maj Dick Dean, was a briefer down in the Command Center. [Joseph P.] Joe Hoar was down in the G-3 office, and subsequently relieved me as the junior aide. There were other personalities that I'm sure I came across, but none of them spring to mind.

I mentioned Col Tom Fields earlier. Tom Fields was the Director of Public Affairs, probably should have been a brigadier general. We could have made him the Director of Public Affairs, because he was great at his job, but the Marine Corps didn't. But we used to take him along. He could pacify Gen Lew Walt like no other person. So when we would go on a long trip somewhere, frequently Col Fields would go along because it had public affairs overtones. If Gen Walt was in a bad mood, I would always get Col Fields and say, "Super Aide, I need your help." We called him "Super Aide." So I would give him a cigar, and he would take it back into Gen Walt's compartment, and within five minutes, I would hear these loud guffaws of laughter, and cigar smoke would come boiling out, and he would come back up in a little while, and Gen Walt would be in good humor for the rest of the trip, if we could loose the "Super Aide" on him.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did Gen Chapman use Gen Walt as his Assistant Commandant? How would you describe their relationship?

GEN MUNDY: I think the relationship — Gen Chapman of course was very formal and rather aloof — that's not snobbish, but Gen Chapman was the Commandant. I did not perceive that there was a great deal of interface. I perceived as I said earlier



Then-Maj Mundy shakes hands with President Lyndon B. Johnson at the White House in March 1968. At the time, Mundy was aide to Assistant Commandant, Gen Walt.

that there was a tremendous loyalty on Gen Walt's part toward Gen Chapman. He would do anything. The Commandant spoke, and it was law.

I had the feeling that Gen Walt served the purpose of being the spokesman for the Administration for the war in Vietnam. Gen Chapman and the Headquarters staff, it seemed to me, functioned rather independently of the Assistant Commandant, but not exclusively.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did Gen Walt go to the JCS very frequently as Gen Chapman's alternate?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall that he did. Gen Chapman was fairly faithful to his primary duty, which was to be a member of the Joint Chiefs. Gen Chapman, though he travelled occasionally, he did not travel frequently. These were still the war years, and I imagine that the Chiefs considered that their main focus was in Washington, and in the tank. So my impression, my recollection, is that Gen Chapman probably took a great majority of those, and Gen Walt

subbed only when necessary, and infrequently.

BGEN SIMMONS: In retrospect, did you detect any signs of mental illness in Gen Walt during these years?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I certainly at the time did not characterize them as such. Knowing that he later did suffer mental illness, I suppose I could go back and say, "Oh, well, come to think of it, this might have been indicative." But I certainly didn't. He was not forgetful. He remembered. He was very well recollective of names of places, of events. People that he had known, small people, corporals, sergeants in Vietnam who he might have met one time in somebody's battalion, he would remember them and remember the circumstances.

So other than again his extremely — the extreme tension under which we operated almost all the time, that might have been an indication. But as far as his faculties on a day to day basis, no.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were detached from Headquarters Marine Corps on 30 July 1969. Did you remain in touch with Gen Walt after this time?

GEN MUNDY: I did, though rather indirectly. Again, I went off to Command and Staff College from there. One seeks, I think, or I sought at least not to be labeled as here comes Gen Walt's aide. So I think you try and shed those trappings as quickly as you can. But I saw him on a couple of occasions. I was succeeded by then LtCol P. X. Kelley and Maj Joe Hoar. Gen Walt when his fourth star was approved by the Senate and he was going to be promoted, at that time, I was still working on the book. But he called me down one day and said, I want you to come back in as the aide, because the aide that he had, Gene Arnold, about whom we had spoken earlier, didn't work out. I think Gene was a splendid aide, but he was not the man for Lew Walt. But anyway, he said, I want Maj Arnold to go to Command and Staff College and I want you to come back in as the aide, and I did.

When I got there, he said, "Now I'm going to be promoted to four stars and I rate a lieutenant colonel now. So you go down and see who is available. I went down to the Personnel Department, to BGen Lou Wilson, as a matter of fact, and told him I needed him to find out what lieutenant colonels were coming in, and he gave me a list, and there was coming out of the Air War College, LtCol P. X. Kelley. So I called — no, I said to Gen Walt first, how about P. X. Kelley? He said, "Great, get him." So I gave Col Kelley a call

and said, "Do you want to be the Assistant Commandant's aide?" P.X. was delighted by that so I said, "Okay, you've got the job. That is what you'll do when you come in here."

So anyway, that got Kelley in. Then I lined up my good friend, my classmate and good friend, Joe Hoar, who was then down in G-3 working for, I think, Gen John McLaughlin. No — it doesn't matter, he was in G-3. Joe Hoar to this day will — when we meet his first greeting to me is, "You rotten son-of-a-bitch," because I sold Joe Hoar on the notion of what an inspirational job this was going to be. After Joe had been there for about a month, I was then down in Command and Staff College, and he called me one day — he had now been on a couple of trips with Gen Walt. That was the first time he called me by that degree of affection. He said, "You're a lying sack of horsefeathers. I have had my rear end chewed out more times than the law allows for everything I do."

So we had a lot of humor about that over the years. Even P. X. Kelley, who — if there was ever a halo in the Marine Corps, P. X. Kelley must have worn it most of his career, and was certainly held in high esteem by Gen Walt. But P. X. will tell you tales of forgetting the general's white cover on a trip or something, and how painful it could be.

So at any rate, those were my reliefs. Yes, I left the Headquarters, having had a pretty exciting tour, and having learned a lot about functioning at the senior level.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you feel about going to Command and Staff College as a student?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was surprised by that. As I mentioned to you, Gen Walt had said to me, send Arnold to Command and Staff College and you come down and be the aide. So it was fairly short notice that he said, "You have been here about a year and a half. I don't want to keep you around here too long, where would you like to go." I said, "I would like Command and Staff College." He said "Go down and tell them to assign you to Command and Staff." So even though the class had already been made up, I was a late add-on. I think I only had about a month's notice.

But I was pleased and excited. It was a good tour. I now turned right out of Springfield and drove against the traffic, and thumbed my nose at all those people that I had been stuck in traffic jams with in the past year and a half.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is probably a good place to

end this session. We will take up your experiences at Command and Staff College, and perhaps as the I&I of an ANGLICO the next time.

SESSION 8

Quantico and Anglico

Orders to Command and Staff College, Quantico . . . A Navy Commendation Medal . . . Two trips to Vietnam . . . Arriving at Quantico . . . Some classmates . . . Relations between Gen Walt and LtGen Lewis J. Fields . . . Orders to 4th ANGLICO . . . Life in Miami . . . Casualty calls and military funerals . . . Other extra duties . . . Deep selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session, we covered your service as a major as the Administrative Assistant or Aide to the Assistant Commandant, Gen [Lewis W.] Walt. In this session, we will cover your attendance at the Command and Staff College at Quantico and your subsequent assignment as Inspector-Instructor of the ANGLICO in Miami, Florida.

In July 1969 you were detached from Headquarters Marine Corps and ordered to Quantico to attend the Command and Staff College, where after a month's leave, you reported. I imagine that your family stayed in place in Springfield, and that meant that in commuting, you headed south in the morning rather than north?

GEN MUNDY: That is correct, a delight after a year and a half of fighting Washington traffic.

BGEN SIMMONS: I should note that on your detachment, Gen Walt recommended you for your second award of the Navy Commendation Medal. You received a gold star for your original NCM in recognition of this second award. The citation cites you for meritorious service while serving as Aide and Special Projects Officer to the Assistant Commandant. That is a more descriptive title of your duties than "administrative assistant." The citation says in part: "exerting an unusual degree of endeavor and effectiveness. You developed plans for numerous official functions incumbent on the Office of the Assistant Commandant, as well as itineraries and schedules for command inspection trips and visits, both in the continental United States and abroad." What trips did you take abroad with Gen Walt?

GEN MUNDY: Most of the travel in those days was back and forth to Vietnam. I made two return trips

with him to Vietnam through Hawaii. A lot of West Coast activity, because we would routinely stop en route, either going to or from or both, coming and returning. But the trips that I took were to Vietnam.

BGEN SIMMONS: Could you give me a few details of those trips?

GEN MUNDY: The first one was in April of 1968. That was his first return. I had come to duty as we discussed earlier on the first of January, 1968, when he became the Assistant Commandant. In April we returned. We went by commercial air.

I can recall one of my early lessons learned. We flew commercially out to the West Coast and then caught a MAC channel flight to continue on from there into Vietnam. I will never forget that my first glitch was in booking us out of National Airport, where we had to stop with an intermediate stop that was to be in Kansas City, as opposed to going out of Dulles, which would have been a nonstop to the West Coast. But it was convenient to National, and for a lot of reasons, I did that.

Well, we got out over Kansas. They were having a terrific storm, so we couldn't go into Kansas City as we had anticipated. They diverted us to the brand new Mid Continent, which is now the principal international airport out there. But at that time, it was just being built. It was a concrete runway and not a lot more.

We diverted the plane into there. We landed. There was no reception, there was no tower or anything. They were going to run some busses out to pick us up. I remember Gen Walt just demanding of me that I should go forward and get the pilot and get him to take extraordinary measures, because we had the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps on board. Of course, there was nobody, it was only dark outside.

But anyway, that was typical of once again the aide enduring a situation, whether it was of my making or not. We went on to the West Coast, caught the MAC channel flight, got out to Hawaii, were late arriving. It was an exhaustive trip, because as we would get to various places, I would immediately get on the telephone and start reporting to the Command Center our whereabouts and our delays. The Director of the 12th District would make arrangements to get us on another MAC flight from the one we had been originally scheduled to go on, because we were delayed in getting there and missed the flight.

All of that work. We got into Hawaii. I can remember that we got there as I recall about mid-morning. Gen Krulak, LtGen Victor "Brute" Krulak then, the CG, FMFPac, hosted a luncheon, and to this day, — I didn't drink much in those days, and I can remember going into the club there. I was late again, having been the aide coordinating details. Gen Krulak very graciously came up to me and said, "What will you have to drink?" Not knowing what to order at a noonday affair, and being sort of disoriented anyway, I said, "What are you having, sir?" He says, "It doesn't matter what I am having. What will you have?" So I think I ordered something like a vodka martini or something, that I had no business drinking.

But anyway, we slept over, and on into Vietnam. We would go into Saigon. We would be met there by the Marine liaison officer, normally remain there for a day or so. Gen Walt would make calls on Gen Westmoreland, see the Marine officers who were there at the time. It seems to me that BGen Chaisson was then there as the J-3, and some others that were in Saigon.

Then we would go by military air, T-39 or some other form of transportation, up to Da Nang, and he would feel at home again. We would then go out and see everybody in the I Corps tactical zone, I thought, and spend a lot of time in the field, a lot of dinners, that sort of thing, and then turn around and come back. Usually get to the West Coast, and the IOI girls would be waiting. We would have some grand gala, where we would get out of our utilities and jump into our whites and be Hollywood heroes.

BGEN SIMMONS: While you were in Vietnam, this was an important period in the history of the Vietnam War. It was immediately after the Tet Offensive and immediately after the battle for Khe Sanh, just before Gen Westmoreland left and was relieved by Gen Abramson. In your position, did you get any feedback from Gen Walt as to what he thought about the progress of the war, his reactions to either Gen

Westmoreland or Gen Cushman?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I believe I tried to communicate earlier, Gen Walt didn't give a lot of feedback. If it was a general officer matter, it was definitely in his perception not in the purview of those subordinate to generals. In other words, generals were a special echelon and we were not to dabble in there. So most of the after-action trip reports which he loved, I don't think he ever changed a word in my after-action reports, but I learned to watch him and watch his body language. If he asked a question during a briefing, I would draw inferences as to what he was really after. When I would write it up after the fact, I would always write it as, "I asked this because I wanted to know that." Either I was extraordinarily perceptive, or he had forgotten about it and it sounded good — I think it was as much as anything the latter; nobody reads trip reports, anyway. But it was nicely written, and it made it look like he had had quite a discussion.

But I could sense, while it was a pleasant relationship, there wasn't a great deal of esteem or admiration by Gen Walt for Gen Cushman in particular. We were all surprised when Gen [Robert E.] Cushman was sent out there to command III MAF. We considered him to be about the most unwarrior-like one that we could perceive. But anyway, there was not a lot there.

I never detected anything other than hail-fellow-well-met, a lot of back slapping, a lot of smiling and so on between Gen Walt and Gen Westmoreland. Admiral Zumwalt was then ComNavForV, commander of naval forces. I remember, we went down and had dinner with him one night. It was a very pleasant event. He was a very fine man, and I thought that Walt and Zumwalt for whatever reason seemed to get on very well.

The XXIV Corps had moved in to Northern I Corps at that time. Gen Dick Stilwell was commanding that.

We would fly in. 101st Airborne was now in Camp Evans or Camp Eagle, as they retitled it, where I had done earlier duty. Gen [Raymond G.] Ray Davis was then deputy CG of XXIV Corps. You had the feeling you were among soldiers again when you got up into that part of the country. Stilwell and Davis seemed to have formed a long-time association that manifested itself in the Korean War follow-up. But I thought a lot of — Gen Stilwell just seemed to me to be the epitome of a soldier. I was really impressed with him.

So those were the personalities. But I never detected — other than a little bit of disregard for Gen Cushman, but that was it. A great deal of respect as we would pass through Hawaii. Even though he was the Assistant Commandant, there was no question but

that LtGen Krulak was “Sir,” and Gen Walt definitely felt a deference and conveyed a deference to Gen Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: Then you made a second trip to Vietnam.

GEN MUNDY: We did. We went back over in the fall in, I would say October. It may have been October or November. It was pretty much more of the same. We had a little bit smoother trip that time. We didn’t have any weather holds or glitches, but it was about the same itinerary. I don’t remember anything remarkable about that, other than at that one, rather than going into Northern I Corps, we seemed to focus more around Da Nang. We went out to several of the orphanages that were sponsored by the IOI girls. It was more or less kind of like a farewell visit. I don’t think he went back again after that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your class at Quantico convened in August. Who were some of your classmates?

GEN MUNDY: My good friend, about whom we have spoken earlier, Gene Arnold, had been assigned there. Remember that Gene was sent down there when I was brought back to be the aide. Then on short notice I wound up being in that class.

One of my closest friends was a then-major and now a retired colonel named [Thomas E.] Tom Campbell, a Texan who was just a fine man. I liked the man, I like him today. He commanded a regiment in the 2d Division and retired a few years ago. Fred Vanous, who I mentioned earlier, now retired Col [Frederick J.] Fred Vanous, who had been the MARCAD Se-lection Officer in Atlanta when I was doing my OSO duty. We had come to know each other and found a fast friendship. That is still strong over these years.

A fellow named King [Albert K.] Dixon, who retired as a major from the Marine Corps. As a matter of fact, King was a famed University of South Carolina football player, was the South Carolina Man of the Year. We all thought a lot of King Dixon. He got out of the Marine Corps shortly to go back to pursue a career in South Carolina, and has done very well in public life down there.

Major Terry (Matthew T.) Cooper I first met there. We were in the same conference group. I was impressed with Terry, and our friendship continued, and still now today. He was my Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower when I was Commandant, and is my retired neighbor today.

Then the allied officer and my seminar group, or

den, as we called it, den daddies and Cub Scouts type of a typical focus of students, was then a lieutenant colonel named Kahpi, who was an Indonesian officer and who went back to become the Commandant of the Indonesian Marine Corps. We maintained a liaison, still exchange Christmas cards to this day. Haven’t seen each other but once. He came back here for a visit when I was the Commandant, and I saw him.

Those are the main personalities that I would recall.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Director of the Command and Staff College at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Colonel [Eugene H.] Gene Haffey.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the staff and faculty members?

GEN MUNDY: I recall that Col — these were all lieutenant colonels, but Col Wes Hammond, who I know to this day. Wes had been the CO of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, that relieved my battalion up southwest of Con Thien. Regrettably, as I mentioned earlier, while we moved right back in behind 1/9 and they came up the same trail as us, regrettably 2/4 moved in and did about the same thing. So it is unfortunate, but they took a shellacking there, too. But I recall, we actually flipfopped battalions. 2/4 was in Camp Evans. When 3/26 moved back, 2/4 moved up. We moved into the 2/4 base camp area. One of the things that to this day I kid Wes Hammond about is that when I moved into what had been the CO, XO hooch at Camp Evans, there was a refrigerator there, and there was still a cold pitcher of martinis in the refrigerator. Wes Hammond was then and I believe still is today quite a martini man.

But anyway, he had a great deal of humor. He was a heck of a good instructor. Col Gene Schultz, who subsequently went on to become — I think he will go down in history as the father of the modern amphibious shipping. He is now with NAV-C and has been the principal driver behind the LHD, the LSD-41, and new LPD and all of the new classes of amphibious ships. Gene taught amphibious shipping at that particular time.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was his rank?

GEN MUNDY: He was a lieutenant colonel also. Those were a couple that stand out in my mind.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the high points of your school year in CSC?

GEN MUNDY: That was the year — in fact, we had been convened for only a couple of days when then-Gen Leonard Chapman came out with his ALMAR that said we have a racial problem in the Marine Corps. So we tended to focus on racial matters. In fact, I wrote my paper that year on matters dealing with racial problems in the Marine Corps, and perceptions and how we could work around that. As I recall, it was pretty well received. I've still got it around somewhere; I don't recall that it was particularly insightful.

So that put kind of an interesting twist into our studies, because we started off up front with what might normally have been more of a professional focus on amphibious warfare or staff procedures and whatnot, and we did that during the year. But really, the overshadowing effort of the whole year was in human relations, and in racial tensions in particular.

The high points I think were probably the personal associations. This was the first time that I had really been associated with a lot of my Marine peers, because I missed Amphibious Warfare School. With Vietnam, I just wasn't sent. This is the first time that I had come back to a formal schooling of that sort since Basic School, so it was a re-association. That gives you a certain balance. We all would be less than human if — when you're in a crowd of your peers, you size up the people around you and estimate how you stand among them, and admire some and don't think so well of others and so on. So I gained a feeling of confidence out of that, because I realized that I felt pretty good, as to how I stood among my peers.

I also got early association with other service officers. I started expanding my awareness of how the other services view the world, how they do business, the differences in the perceptions of a soldier and a Marine, for example. Those began to emerge in my mind, and I think have probably evolved over time in my own perceptions and feelings about jointness.

We remarked earlier on my academic excellence at various stages of my career, but school has always been rather boring to me. School has been something that it is necessary to get through with and then get on to something exciting again. So there was nothing extraordinary about the school year. It was useful, but not extraordinary.

BGEN SIMMONS: You did regard it as a year well spent, in peer relationships and knowledge of the other services.

GEN MUNDY: It was, and we were all for the most part reasonably fresh back from Vietnam, or had been

seasoned. So we were combat experienced, and that probably added a little bit of flavor to the instruction. It certainly gave us a basis for challenging many of the yellows, as it were, the theses that were put forth by the school. We had many people who would stand up and say, it just doesn't work this way. I just got back and I can tell you, it didn't work that way.

But it was a year well spent. It was a year — again, I would count it as a year of professional association, more than anything else.

BGEN SIMMONS: You obviously did well in the course. Col Gene Haffey, the Director, gave you a straight outstanding fitness report. Do you have any recollections of Gene Haffey?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I recall him to be a nice man. Now, what do I mean by that? In other words, he was not flamboyant, he was not a character in his own right. He was a fairly steady and pleasant fellow.

To be candid, I think that probably it was the nature of school, but colonels were still very significant men to me, and I never really liked too much the relaxed academic atmosphere with a colonel who it seemed to me was probably trying to be one of the boys, trying to relate to his crop of students. But he did that very well. He was a very affable man, he was very congenial. He was polished socially. But I don't remember anything remarkable. I believe if I am not mistaken, Col Haffey had been a CO of The Basic School, had come in to be the — either came to be the Chief of Staff or was not selected for general anyway at that point, and was assigned to the Command and Staff College probably to give him another shot. But he was not selected then.

We were aware of that, and as far as our perception of him, it was that here is a colonel who probably isn't going to go far, and is a little bit too nice. We would like him to be a little bit more colonel-y, if you will, a little bit more noble or aloof.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is also a letter in your jacket appointing you to the Honors List, signed by LtGen Lewis J. Fields, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. This meant you were in the top ten percent of your class. Did you have any personal contact with Gen Fields?

GEN MUNDY: Well, very infrequent there. I had had some personal contact earlier, when I was aide to Gen Walt.

I had known Gen Fields a couple of times, and thought him to be a very pleasant fellow, and came to

know him better after he retired and when I became a general. Although he has passed on, and Cheryl Fields, his second wife, is a very good friend. We see her frequently, and we like her very much and liked him very much.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Jeff Fields was certainly one of the nicest generals we had during that period. I'll suggest that there might have been a little bit of friction between Gen Fields and Gen Walt, going back to 1965 in Vietnam. If you will recall, Gen Walt was a very junior major general, commanding the 3d Marine Division. Gen Fields was a senior major general, commanding the 1st Division. When the 1st Division began to come in by regiment, Gen Fields was held back in Okinawa until Gen Walt was promoted to lieutenant general, and then, only then was Gen Fields permitted to come forward.

GEN MUNDY: I didn't know that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your orders when they came were to the 4th ANGLICO in Miami, Florida. You were to be the Inspector Instructor. What was your reaction to those orders?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was very favorable. My good friend, Bill Keys, Maj Bill Keys, now LtGen Bill Keys, was then the major's monitor. He came down as I recall midpoint in the year and talked with each one of us. He said, "you don't really have to go anywhere. You have had high level staff duty, you are not going to go back to Vietnam from here." He said, "I can do anything with you; what would you like to do?" I said, "How about sticking me someplace where I can draw jump pay, 110 bucks a month, give me an assignment there."

So when he came back, he said, "How about ANGLICO down in Miami?" I said, "What is that and why Miami?" He said, "It is a jump billet and it would be a nice place for you to go for a year or maybe a year and a half or so, and then we would be pulling you out and sending you back to Vietnam." So I said, "Fine, it sounds good to me," and off I went.

So not knowing a lot about what an ANGLICO was, but knowing simply that I was going to go down to Miami, which sounded rather nice for the family, and was going to be drawing jump pay, it sounded good to me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just what is an ANGLICO? Are they only to be found in the Reserve force?



Maj Mundy gets ready to jump with 4th Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) during his duty as the unit's inspector instructor in Miami. Through Little League baseball, the Mundy's socialized with Don Shula and other coaches of the Miami Dolphins.

GEN MUNDY: No, they are not. The ANGLICO, the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, is that organization that flowed from the Marines' experience in World War II, when we would attach both then naval gunfire, now surface fire, teams, spot teams and air control teams to either Allied formations or, more frequently, to U.S. Army formations, because the Army didn't do close air support like us, still doesn't, so the Marines would go over and be tactical air control parties for them, and gunfire spotting was something that we did. So it is a combination of Navy and Marine personnel forming this odd organization.

More lately, it has come to be extremely useful with the new Special Operations Capable concept that Gen Gray put in. The ANGLICO detachments that go out now are extremely useful for almost a modified form of reconnaissance personnel today. But they were both in the active and the Reserves, still are today. We

have two in the active and one in the Reserves today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you live in Miami?

GEN MUNDY: We lived at — let me see if I can recall, 6641 Lake Blue Drive. That was in a development called Miami Lakes, which was an old dairy farm that was owned by Senator Bob Graham's father, as a matter of fact. Senator Graham and I have great rapport, since both of us were here in town. He still lives there, so I knew that area.

It was a delightful place to live. It was a development where everybody had access to one of these Florida lakes. In South Florida, you can scoop out two bulldozer scoops and it fills up with crystal clear water that bubbles up, and you've got a lake. So we had access to Lake Blue. We were on Lake Blue Drive. The kids grew up in the water in Miami.

On the other side of the road it was the same development, but there were definitely more than one price range house. Coach Don Shula of the Miami Dolphins and Howard Schnellenberger and some of the young dynamic Dolphin coaches lived nearby, so all of our kids went to school together and played Little League ball together, so we came to know Don Shula and his wife and Howard Schnellenberger and so on socially. That made it a very pleasant tour, thoroughly enjoyable for the Mundy family, and one that I think all of us reflect back on as one of the best we ever had.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that you sold your house in Springfield in June of 1970. Didn't you think you would return to Washington for duty?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I didn't think much about it. The interest rates were increasing about that time. As I believe I mentioned, I had a five and three-quarters percent loan. They had gone all the way up to eight percent. People were sure that the bottom was going to come out. So I sold the house, made \$5,000 on it, took the money and went down to Miami. From a practical standpoint, there were no quarters in Miami, so I was going to have to rent or buy a house down there, and it was pretty expensive. So I really needed the money to go to Miami and buy a house, which we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Duty in the 4th ANGLICO in Miami apparently got you involved in the Orange Bowl. What was that involvement?

GEN MUNDY: The Orange Bowl Committee sought

from the Marine Corps — ANGLICO was a very communications intensive organization. Again, we have gunfire spotters and everything. So what we would do, the service that we provided to them was, number one, color guards and things like that for all games or anything. The Orange Bowl is a stadium, but the Orange Bowl is also an organization, and it does a lot of things other than just football games.

So in the Orange Bowl parade, for example, we would send spot teams of Marines downtown, and we would put them on buildings. The normal perception would be, oh, you assisted the police. But in point of fact, what we would do is keep an eye on the parade. They would be spot teams with a good communications net, and when a float would break down up on Seventh Avenue somewhere, we could relay that instantly and the city would send a wrecker or somebody up there to help the float get started, so the parade didn't bog down. We did that just for command and control of the parade, is what we provided. Plus again, just a lot of color guards and a lot of Marine presence.

BGEN SIMMONS: What would you say were the highlights of your service with the 4th ANGLICO?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the 4th ANGLICO was one of the better organizations that I have ever served in. So I learned a lot about Reserves. Remember that I began as a Reserve, and while I was aware of what Reserves did, I didn't have an estimation for the quality that we had in our Marine Corps Reserve. So that was a good formative experience, because it taught me something that I value to this day in the total force view of the Marine Corps. If you can call up a Reservist and tell the difference between him and her and a regular, why, you are better than I am.

So it was a very professional outfit. We used the ANGLICO operationally for a number of operations, sending detachments off to Europe and that sort of thing. I can recall, we went down with Col [Calhoun J.] Cal Killeen then, and now retired MajGen Killeen. When he had the 10th Marines, we took the ANGLICO down for a 10th Marines firing exercise on Vieques for a month with that regiment, and just blew the socks off the ANGLICO spotters, and could out-call artillery or gunfire beyond anyone that the 10th Marines had on board at that time. So Cal Killeen was swept away with the unit.

But I think the main thing that I brought back from the ANGLICO, from the standpoint of a reinforcing perception of how I have always thought it proper to run an organization. When I got there, I relieved a



Maj Mundy had an official photograph taken in September 1970. At the time, he was serving as the inspector instructor for 4th ANGLICO in Miami, Florida.

very, very colorful and flamboyant character by the name of [Robert E.] Pat Carruthers. Pat retired as a lieutenant colonel. Pat was the original hot dog. He is a good man and I like Pat. He has a fine son in the Marine Corps today. But Pat was the original hot dog. He was very proud of every ribbon that he had. I don't recall that he had any significant personal decorations, but he had all this array of campaign — he had been an enlisted man and came up, and he was proud of that.

But he was a parachutist. He had been a force recon company commander. So Pat lived and breathed parachuting. As a result, when I got there, the 4th ANGLICO in my perception and in the perception, we subsequently found out, of others was one big parachute club. All they did on a drill weekend was get ready for, go out and make a parachute jump, drink some beer in the zone, cut somebody's tie off or whatever the initiation was, and then that was it. So it was a parachute club. People wore whatever, French jump boots, various styles of personalized equipment and so on.

When I got there, I didn't like that. So I fairly quickly, even though I was not the CO of the unit — the I&I and the CO was kind of an unusual relationship. But I got there and put out a directive that one, we would wear Marine Corps uniforms, number two,

you would jump with a steel helmet on like all other paratroopers in the world did, that parachuting was important, but it was only a means of getting there. It doesn't matter how you get there, it matters what you do when you get there.

So I really relegated — even though we jumped as much as had been the case when Carruthers was there, but I regulated parachuting to professionalism and to training in the skills that we ought to be proficient in.

As is often the case when one comes in to do something like that, you are uncertain as to the impact, whether you're going to have a reaction in the unit that is going to be negative, or whether you should be bold and do the professional thing. I think the lesson learned by me is that Marines fundamentally want to be as professional as they are taught in boot camp or OCS. They want to do all of those things. If you allow them to do it, you will always have a good professional outfit.

So for me, the learning experience at 4th ANGLICO was turning it from something of a club into a very, very professional organization, of which I am very proud today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the CO of the ANGLICO? Or was there more than one?

GEN MUNDY: They were Reserve officers. Both of them were lieutenant colonels. The first one was LtCol Bill [William L.] Snyder, who was an engineer that had come down from Baltimore, Maryland, into Miami. The way that Reserve COs are made is that the Inspector-Instructor, I was a major. The CO was a lieutenant colonel, so there was a certain deference there. I made sure that I moved aside. When Carruthers was there, he had been unquestionably the leader. He was a lieutenant colonel. It was a lieutenant colonel's billet. But anyway, I definitely took a step backwards and said the CO is the CO and I am his advisor.

But the way that we selected COs, the I&I found out who was in the area and we would call the District — they would apply and you would call the District and tell them who should be the CO. So everybody knew that the I&I for all practical purposes named the CO. I selected LtCol Snyder early on. We saw eye to eye, a very professional officer. Together, — when I said I did all this, the I&I is the mover and shaker, but Snyder was very good.

We changed subsequently to a lieutenant colonel whose name I — oh, Al Ridgeway. Ridgeway had been the exec, Snyder's two years were up. Ridgeway was a clear heir apparent and was the CO when I left.

He was a fireman and Fire Chief in Miami.

BGEN SIMMONS: How much of a full time staff did you have to work with?

GEN MUNDY: The 4th ANGLICO, because we had both the ANGLICO and then we had the 33d Interrogator-Translator Team, which was a Spanish linguist team. Of course, in Miami we had very little problem filling Spanish language. We had a lot of Latin Americans and Cubans who were in the area, so we had a very good ITT, very professional.

I had a 16-man I&I staff with a motor transport chief, communications chief, supply chief and a couple of clerks. I had two captains there, one of whom got out of the — Robbie Robinson was his name, got out of the Marine Corps and went in the FBI and rose to be a Special Agent out in Denver in the FBI. The other one was a then-Capt Bob McLaughlin. The one was an Assistant I&I and the other was a Casualty Assistance Officer. In those days in Vietnam, the I&I had to have some assistance with making casualty calls, though the war was winding down when I got there, and wound down and ended for all practical purposes when I got there, or after a while I was there. So that was the size of the I&I staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get personally involved with these casualty calls and funerals and so on?

GEN MUNDY: I did. Again, we were winding down. Because I had an assistant, Capt Robinson made most of those calls. I made some. I would say I made a half a dozen. For the most part, those were not — well, they certainly were not pleasant experiences under any circumstances to do, but people were reacting to the war. When you went up on a porch to tell someone that their son had been killed, they knew why you were there. I had one lady who just went to pieces, so I was almost like a corpsman. We took along a Chaplain, but after awhile we learned that it was probably wise to take along a Hospital Corpsman, too. But I was fanning her and trying to revive her; she was by herself.

Other cases, when you came up on the porch and announce that, the father would chase you off the porch and tell you to get out of there and never come back, would call the Marine Corps names and you and the President, in their grief and emotion of the moment. I understood that, but sometimes it was rather hard to take.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was the chaplain or chaplains, were they active duty or Reserve chaplains?

GEN MUNDY: They were Reserve chaplains. We had a good one assigned to the unit there. We had awfully good ones. The talent that is out in the Reserve, for example, the doctor with the 4th ANGLICO was a captain in the Navy Reserve and was a very, very affluent Miami doctor who knew his business. So we had the good advantage that even during non-drill weekends, because Dr. Ostroski's office was nearby, you could always call him up and say we need to do a physical on somebody for some reason or another, and zip, go right down, walk into the doctor's office and get free assistance in that sense.

The chaplains were of the same ilk. They were local. All you had to do was call them and they would go with you.

BGEN SIMMONS: I guess there was a second wave of this. You had the notification, but then you must have been involved in a great number of funerals, providing color guards and body bearers.

GEN MUNDY: We had a drum and bugle corps that had been formed many years before. Miami was a colorful town, and it was good to have a musical unit down there, Marine Corps unit. There was then a staff sergeant, subsequently a chief warrant officer named Jim Rogers, who organized this thing. To this day, Jim Rogers, though he is probably — Jim is probably getting close to 70 years old, but he is a very young looking man, and he will to this day still suit up in a Marine dress blue uniform and take his bugle and go out in the cemetery and play taps for anybody that was being buried. A very dedicated fellow.

But we had the drum and bugle corps, so we had music available. Because of that, we had a lot of blues in the unit. People had bought their own blues, they didn't have to have them in those days. So it was very easy to fall out a color guard or to fall out a burial detail. It always amazed me that the Marine Corps — we would occasionally castigate ourselves for not taking care of our own or somebody else's own, but I don't think there was ever a Marine or a Navy Corpsman who was buried in Miami, not just because I was there, but during the time I was there and after the time I was there, that was not met by a Marine in dress blues from the funeral home, taken out with a Marine burial detachment, a bugle or firing detail. It really drew a lot of emotion from the community.

I recall shortly after I got there, this had a good effect to it, but we had the son of the owner of a limousine service in Miami who was in the Navy. He was killed, not with Marines, I don't know where he was, but he was killed. Anyway, the father got a call,

a telephone casualty call; some of the other services did it that way. Then he got a notification that his son's remains would be arriving, and gave him the flight number. So we fortunately had one of our Reservists who worked for him, who had been my I&I first sergeant, and said this guy is a great man and he is deeply grieved by his son. He said, "How about us taking this thing over?"

So we did, without even asking. I said, "Go down and get him, bring him back. We will bury him." And we did that for him. Thereafter, no one — had you come to visit Miami in those days, believe me, you would have had a brand new Cadillac Coup de Ville that would have picked you up wherever you were and hauled you around for the whole weekend. No Marine after that ever rode in any other than a Cadillac who came to Miami.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned going off on an exercise with the 10th Marines to Vieques. What were some of your other exercises or deployments?

GEN MUNDY: If the Inspector-Instructor was doing his job, ANGLICO goes as detachments. ANGLICO dispatches platoons, dispatches detachments. Very rarely does the company go and function as a company. So we sent people off to, I can recall, exercise Deep Furrow, which was a —

GEN MUNDY: I had just mentioned that probably, as far as a farflung exercise, Exercise Deep Furrow in NATO was one to which we sent each year a detachment of ANGLICO.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was that geographically?

GEN MUNDY: That was in Turkey, and I think went into Greece. But it was Deep Furrow in Turkey.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get to go to these?

GEN MUNDY: I did not. The I&I was doing his job. This was a captain that took a detachment of 15 or 20 Marines and went off. I was involved in the administration of getting them there, but not in the actual going with them.

But remember, the Marine Corps was just turning from the Pacific. We had been a Pacific force, and NATO was some other place that nobody really cared much about. But the nation was beginning to turn from the Pacific and focus on NATO. So to get Marines into those early exercises and particularly Reserve Marines, was very significant for the

Reserves. So that would be typical. But for the most part, our exercises were sending detachments up to Camp Lejeune for some II MEF exercise or down into the Caribbean. I don't recall that we sent anybody into South America. The ITT, the Interrogator-Translator organization, did do some of that, and in fact was very useful in the Cuban migration. For all practical purposes, those people were almost on active duty, because they would go out to Opa-Locka Airport. They were such excellent linguists that the Immigration Department and Customs and that sort of thing would use these Marine Reservists almost full time out there in processing the Cuban refugees.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any official relationship to the ITT team?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was the Inspector-Instructor. In other words, I was with 4th ANGLICO and 33d ITT, there being two Reserve units there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your reporting senior for much of your tour with 4th ANGLICO was Col Woodrow W. Taylor, then Deputy Director of 6th Marine Corps District in Atlanta. How much personal contact did you have with Woody Taylor?

GEN MUNDY: Not much. I knew him. Occasionally he would come down for a visit or a conference when we went up to Atlanta for a District conference, you would see him there. But not a lot of day-to-day activity. We were at that point transitioning the Reserve, which had always been responsible to District Directors of the 4th Division and 4th Wing had been stood up. We had always had them, but they were being activated and were being given responsibility for the training and operational directive of the Marine Corps Reserve.

So we sort of had two masters. The district was fading out. You were still responsible to the district for recruiting Reservists and responsible in the district a little bit for administration. You got your funds from the district. But that was shifting to the division. As well as Col Taylor, Col Gene Goldston was there, the Director of the District. You had almost a dual allegiance to then MajGen Leo Dulacki, who was the CG of the 4th Division. So as far as command relations, that might explain why there was not a greater interaction with Col Taylor.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you mind commenting on that just a little bit more? The district director was an ancient and honorable title and position, but he had

almost an impossible standard of control, didn't he, with recruiting and training and all the myriad offices he had?

GEN MUNDY: Many used to make the point that a district director was really a general officer slot. When we had the naval districts, there was always a rear admiral out there, and they had other responsibilities for ports and other facilities, more so than our district directors. But the district director, it is an enormous span of control and is to this day. Even though the Reserve is no longer a responsibility, the District Commanders as they are called are the recruiting region commanders, same AOR, but they focus on recruitment.

But what I came to realize, not then so much but subsequently, for a colonel in the Marine Corps, the very most demanding job we have is not being a regimental commander; it is being a District Director and managing that broad expanse of territory with the very light forces that you have out there to engage to accomplish your mission.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Taylor gave you good but not exceptional fitness reports, hovering between "excellent to outstanding" and "outstanding." In his comments, he underscores your work in community relations. You spoke a bit earlier about some of that, the Orange Bowl and so on. Were there other manifestations of community relations?

GEN MUNDY: There was a Marine Corps committee of South Florida, which was comprised of for the most part former Marines. Some of them were — the U.S. Attorney, for example, was a colonel in the Reserve, he was a member of that. Down to as ordinary people as some guy that ran a produce distribution company, a fairly low-level individual, but all of them Marines at heart and all of them eager to promote the Marine Corps in the community.

So the Marine Corps committee was available to the Inspector-Instructor to use for those types of public relations activities. I don't think I did anything extraordinary with that, but it was ongoing, and it was rather unique to Miami. So perhaps in the District Director's view, he saw all of this activity that went on, the Orange Bowl Committee, the Marine Corps Committee in South Florida, Toys for Tots, we ran very successful campaigns, had about 350 Reservists down there, so we had a lot of people to be involved in that.

So I think that probably was a reflection of the fact that Miami was a very active place when I got there,

and all I did was continue it rolling along from my perception.

BGEN SIMMONS: How often might Col Taylor visit you?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Director would come around probably annually. Maybe more than that. We held a district conference down in Miami one year, so Col Goldston and the district staff were down there for that. As I recall, he was down on another occasion for just a routine visit. Col Taylor, the deputy, would be — maybe once a year he would get down, and you would see him again at a conference. Occasionally, if the Commandant — the Commandant never came when I was there, but Gen Walt did on a couple of occasions, come to South Florida. When he would come down, one of the District officers would come down to be on hand when he was visiting. As I recall, Col Taylor may have come down for an occasion like that. Not too frequently.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your reporting senior for the second half of your tour was Col William R. Miller. There have been so many "Bill Millers" in the Marine Corps that I can't quite place this one. His markings are in the same general bracket as Woodie Taylor's, and we again see comments singling out your "especially effective" community relations, and the statement that Maj Mundy, "has an interest in human relations and is not influenced in the performance of his duties by consideration of race or creed." In another report he says you are a "completely competent, self-motivated officer . . . exceptionally well qualified for independent duty." Do you wish to elaborate on this?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I think my experience with fitness reports is that for better or worse, reporting seniors tend to view you the first time around, particularly if they are the incumbent and you are new, you don't stand out. Then they shape you and groom you, and you get better as you go along. If it is a new reporting senior coming in, and you are one of the old guys on the block, you have the upper hand on him. So I think it was probably as much that as anything.

Col Miller came in my last year, my third year in Miami. I was an experienced I&I, the senior in longevity. I&Is knew the business pretty well, and I'm sure when we had our first district conference, I was articulate or had ideas, and he probably found merit in that and thought I was doing pretty well.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that on 1 July, 1973, you

were promoted to lieutenant colonel. How did you celebrate that?

GEN. MUNDY: Well, it was a very undistinguished promotion. I have had some others since, and we can talk about them at later times in my career, but as I recall, I was detaching from the 4th ANGLICO — I believe it was about the 12th of July, mid-July, it may have been the 18th or something. I had been deep selected for lieutenant colonel, which surprised me, but the first year that I was there, when the lieutenant colonel list came out, the Marine Corps had just done a study to determine whether deep selection was good or bad, and had concluded that we should deep select about ten percent. So I popped up in that batch the next year and was deep selected. But I was so far down that I waited 22 months —

BGEN SIMMONS: You didn't benefit too much.

GEN MUNDY: — for a promotion, so it was nice to have been selected, but 22 months later, around came my promotion. So about — as I recall, the day before I was detaching from I&I duty, in the mail comes an 11x14 brown manila envelope to me. The admin chief brought it in, and I ripped it open, and there was my promotion to lieutenant colonel. So like all excited officers, when I was selected probably 21 months before, I rushed to the PX and bought some lieutenant colonel's leaves and had them in my desk drawer. They had gotten dusty and so on, but looked still usable. So I opened it up and walked over to the mirror in my office, and pulled off my major's leaves and stuck my lieutenant colonel leaves on and went home, and Linda didn't even notice the difference.

As I said, I always polished my brass, so my leaves were always polished, and unless I hadn't polished them in a few days they probably looked silver, anyway. So I finally had to draw to her attention that I was a lofty lieutenant colonel.

But that was it. So I left Miami certified. I signed my certification sheet and sent it off. The admin chief ran me on the diary, and I left Miami a lieutenant colonel.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had received orders to join the 3d Marine Division in Okinawa. What was your reaction to these orders?

GEN MUNDY: I was very excited. Remember that I had come to Miami with the forecast by Bill Keys that I would be there for probably about a year, maybe a year and a half. It would be a nice place to leave the

family, and I would go back to Vietnam.

Well, I got there, and the war started winding down. We began pulling out units. Eventually the draft ended and all that sort of thing. That took place while I was in Miami, so I wound up extraordinarily remaining in Miami for 37 months, which was the longest tour that I ever had, except for my tour as just-concluded Commandant.

I had really expected to go back to — either as an advisor or to the operating forces very quickly, but did not. So it was very exciting to me to be returning to the FMF.

BGEN SIMMONS: For your service with the ANGLICO, you were again recommended for a Navy Commendation Medal. It got knocked down to a Commandant's Certificate of Commendation, signed by Gen Robert E. Cushman, then the Commandant. Is there anything else you would like to add concerning your attendance at the Command and Staff College or duty in Miami?

GEN MUNDY: I don't think so, beyond the fact that that particular age and grade for an officer probably is a strong formative period. You are becoming somebody, you are moving up. You passed through the novice stages of lieutenant and captain, and you are beginning now to understand where you fit into the organization. A lot those things go through your mind at that stage in your career: should I stay in, should I get out. If I got out, I could live like he does, or I can get a better paying job. When you are in a place like Miami, they are offering you jobs. I can remember Jim Ryder of Ryder Truck Company. He was a good friend and Jim Ryder kept saying, "Boy, if you want to get out of the Marine Corps, I can sure take you in to the Ryder Truck Company." Burger King was headquartered there, and I had friends in Burger King that would promise me incentives.

So you then begin to realize that within your chosen profession — number one, I have never had any serious thought about leaving the Marine Corps. But you begin to realize that you now are becoming someone who, when you speak at a conference, it is of substance, people listen. You are beginning to become an influencer, as opposed to just another voice that people tend to ignore.

Public relations, all of those things we talked about, I began to realize that yes, I could do well in that area. So kind of finding yourself maturing.

BGEN SIMMONS: You are touching on something that I think is very important. I'll state it as a hypoth-

esis, and you can explore it. When a green officer reaches the rank of lieutenant colonel in 20 years service, that is a decision point, when he assesses how far I'm going or think I'm going, should I go out for that second big career or should I go all the way. It is a very important decision.

GEN MUNDY: I think that while we seem to flourish on stories of people that say, "Shucks, I never intended to — I didn't even know I was going to come into the Marine Corps, or I went in the Army and they said we'll give you a regular commission if you go in the Marines," and that sort of thing.

As I have said earlier, that was not the case with me. I wanted to come in the Marine Corps as early as I knew what a Marine was, and I never changed from that. However, I think it is very natural that you come to that point of a decision where you realize that yes, I don't have to go back for a year unaccompanied without my family ever again if I don't want to. Yes, I am still young enough to where I can step out and become very successful.

So there is a career decision point. In my view, it is at that juncture that you mentioned, because you realize that you can retire with a pension and change your life.

I never had any emotional symptoms at that point. For me, it just plowed on. It was later than that for me. This was 1973, and I would not achieve 20 years until 1977, so I was still a few years off there.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think this might be a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: Before we close, let me go back and mention one event that occurred during ANGLICO tour that was one of the close calls in my career.

I mentioned earlier that 4th ANGLICO, when I got there, was pretty much of a Jump Club for parachutists. Every drill weekend would be tied up with a parachute operation, and only about a quarters of the Unit was qualified, so the rest just stood around and watched the Jump on Sundays. I commented that I had tightened that up a bit in terms of the uniform, and the focus on training to accomplish the mission of an ANGLICO, rather than just on the means of getting there. At any rate, during one of our Jumps, I experienced the one in ten thousand failure of a parachute to open. I can remember counting to four in the "thousands" that a parachutist uses until he lifts his head to look up and see if his chute is properly deployed. When I looked up, I saw nothing but a wad of green material all twisted up in the parachute lines. As is

called for in Jump training, I went back into a tight body position and pulled the rip-cord on my reserve parachute. It deployed, and in one of those you come down a little faster than in the regular, large parachute. At any rate, it turned out that the Drop Zone Commander had miscalculated the wind aloft over the zone so that when our chutes opened, we were being blown at a high rate of speed across the zone. When I finally hit the ground, I did about four head over heels turns because my parachute was still fully inflated, and was being blown across the drop zone at about fifteen miles an hour. I finally got on my back, and what followed was one of the worst beatings I've ever experienced. We were jumping into a South Florida bean field, and what I came to realize is that about two inches under the soil in Florida is pure coral. As I was dragged along, I keep being slammed into these chunks of coral. Finally, I blew into a Sugar Cane field, and the chute caught on the cane and I came to a stop. I could hardly get up, but did, and for about the next ten days, I could hardly walk, and the "strawberries" all over my body looked like I had been spray painted! We had to send three of the jumpers in my "Stick" to the hospital, although no one turned out to be badly injured.. The point of all this is that I probably deserved the beating I took for not ensuring that the winds were safe to jump, and I was also fortunate to not have been relieved for the incident. Thereafter, you better bet that the 4th ANGLICO Drop Zone Commander knew how to read a wind velocity meter accurately!

SESSION 9

Duty as a Battalion Commander

Orders to Okinawa . . . Given command of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines . . . MajGen Mike Ryan and BGen Paul Graham . . . Condition of the battalion . . . Racial tensions . . . MajGen Fred Haynes . . . Life at Camp Hansen . . . Afloat with the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit . . . Col Dave Twomey . . . On the string for Eagle Pull.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your services as a student in Quantico's Command and Staff College, and then your assignment as the Inspector-Instructor of 4th ANGLICO in Miami, Florida. In this session, we will cover your year-long tour of the 3d Marine Division in Okinawa.

You were detached from your duties at the 4th ANGLICO on 24 July, 1973. You arrived in Okinawa just one month later. Where did you leave your family while you were on this unaccompanied tour in Okinawa?

GEN MUNDY: Once again, I returned them to Waynesville, as was always the custom. We lived at 110 Connolly Street in Waynesville, North Carolina.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you know before arriving in Okinawa that you would be given command of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines?

GEN MUNDY: Absolutely not, no information. In fact, I had been told by my good friend Earl Piper, who was then the XO of 2/4, who was returning before I got back — but Earl had given me a call to tell me that I was being looked at for the Recon Battalion.

BGEN SIMMONS: What sort of reception did you get on arriving on Okinawa?

GEN MUNDY: We arrived as the flights brought you in at about 0300 in the morning, Okinawa time. We were met by my old Command and Staff classmate, Maj [Albert K.] King Dixon, who was then G-1 in the III MAF. King came down and welcomed us, and put us on busses and so on. He said to me, "You're going to be the deputy camp commander at Camp Hansen." I said, "What is that?" And he said, "It is like being the regimental XO for camp matters." So I was not too excited about that, but got on the bus and rode off

to Camp Hansen, where we were quartered, to change clothes and come back down for my intro.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the division commander at this time?

GEN MUNDY: It was MajGen [Michael P.] Mike Ryan, and the ADC who actually was running the division, because in those days the division commander was dual-hatted as the MEF commander. So as a matter of fact, he sat up topside with the MEF staff, and the ADC sat down with the division. So it was BGen Paul G. Graham as the assistant division commander and Mike Ryan as the division commander.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you meet with both of these officers on arrival?

GEN MUNDY: I did. I called on — first, the process was when I got there, we were all — your time clock was upside down and you were wishing that you could have a day to get some sleep or something before you called, because you wanted to make a good impression. But whatever the case, we were taken up to Camp Hansen, put in a temporary billeting area, changed clothes, showered, shaved, got back in the uniform of the day, and got in transportation and were taken back down to Camp Courtney for a call.

The initial call was with BGen Graham, who would see you first, and then he would send you up to see the division commander. I had flown over. I don't think I had drawn any pay as a lieutenant colonel at that point, but I had flown over with a good friend who had been a platoon commander in my Basic Class, then a lieutenant colonel named Harry Field, Harold J. Field, USMC, retired now, colonel. Harry Field had just finished the Air War College. He was always a heavy man, and he had had a good year at the Air War College. I would estimate that Harry Field probably

weighed 270 pounds at that point.

We arrived in Okinawa. I mentioned that we were met by Maj Dixon, put on the bus, but significantly, the XO of 2/4, Maj John Mahoney, came to pick up LtCol Field in the 2/4 commander's jeep to take him back, so that was a fairly significant sign. I didn't think anything about it, but it happened that way.

Well, the last guy in the world — when we returned for our in-calls, the last man in the world that you would ever want to report to weighing one pound over weight is Paul Graham. So the first interview was with LtCol Harry Field, who went in to see BGen Graham. We were waiting outside in the aide's office. I could hear a loud voice, not loud voices, but one loud voice. The interview was very short. The door opened, and an ashen-faced LtCol Field exited, and I was ushered in.

I had known Col Graham when he came to be the CO of 8th and I on the heels of then-Col Joe Fegan, and knew him to be a taskmaster and to have an eye for perfection. So I was smart enough then — and thereafter, any time I saw Gen Graham, you walked in and stood at attention before his desk, and if he said "at ease," you went at ease, and if he didn't say "at ease," you didn't relax at all.

So I walked in and reported in military fashion. Gen Graham looked up at me and said, "It is good to have you here in the division." He gave me a few words on the racial tensions that then existed in the division. Told me to be especially watchful during all hours of the day and said, "I am recommending to the division commander that you be the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

I said, "Aye-aye, sir," and he said "That's all," and I did a snappy about-face and marched out of his office, and went outside and jumped up and down in the aide's office, because I was very excited about that.

So I became the CO of 2/4, and Harry Field became the Deputy Camp Commander at Camp Hansen, by virtue of weight displacement.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is a very interesting combination, Mike Ryan and Paul Graham. Then you went to see Gen Ryan, and he confirmed your assignment.

GEN MUNDY: Then after that, as I recall, there wasn't much of a delay. We went up to see Gen Ryan, and he was clear — he had my record there. Gen Graham had written a note, so when I reported in to Mike Ryan, he was very gracious and said "Welcome aboard, work hard and do good, and I see you're going to 2/4. So it was very clear who was running the division. It was the assistant division commander.



LtCol Carl E. Mundy is passed the "colors" of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, upon taking command of the battalion in Okinawa in August 1973. During his command, the battalion would deploy as the ground combat element for 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU).

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that your regimental commander was Col Gary Wilder. Was that the first time you met Wilder.

GEN MUNDY: No. Major, but really captain who made major during the tour, Gary Wilder had been the CO of Company A of Basic Class 1/62. I was a platoon commander with Gary Wilder. As I think I mentioned earlier, the honor man of that class was then-lieutenant — now Senator — Chuck Robb.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines has a distinguished record. At least one future Commandant, then-LtCol Paul X. Kelley, had commanded the battalion in combat. Somewhere along the line, they decided to call themselves "the Magnificent Bastards," which I always thought was a

bit much. What was the condition of the battalion when you took over?

GEN MUNDY: I loved “the Magnificent Bastards.” It sounds like it was spoken by an old 9th Marines guy. We tried to establish — I think Bull Fisher hung that label on them when they went off from Kaneohe Bay to Vietnam. Allegedly, as you have since disproved to me when I queried you one time, but it had something to do with the fact that that battalion was created from one of the later battalions after the 4th Marines were surrendered on Corregidor. I think William Holden played the part, whatever the movie was. But anyway, they were known as “the Magnificent Bastards,” and I’m sure that is where Bull Fisher got it.

The battalion was in fairly ordinary shape for a 3d Division battalion. This was before the days of unit deployment. We did individual rotations. If you came in in the summer, as I did, in August, the battalion was very bloated. Those were the days of the four rifle company battalions. T/O was 1080 Marines in a battalion, and there probably were about 1200 there when I got there, because people were waiting on flight dates to go home. Our personnel system was not very good in those days.

So as a result, as it was a year later when I left, you had more Marines than you had 782 gear. Your training programs were inhibited by the fact that half the battalion was getting ready to go home and didn’t really care for going into the field anymore, and the other half had just gotten there and were still trying to acclimate to the heat.

But, by and large, as far as battalions went, I thought 2/4 was about like any other battalion in that state.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who did you relieve as battalion commander?

GEN MUNDY: LtCol Jim Paige, although Jim had been the G-3 training officer. In those days, we rotated battalions pretty quickly. He had only been there three months. The real battalion commander before him had been LtCol Rip Kirby, who had had the battalion for its normal cycle, about a year’s period of command, and then there was a three-month gap, and Jim Paige got a ticket punch as a battalion commander for a short time.

You asked about — so that we don’t miss it, — well, no, let’s go ahead with your questions. I’ll catch up at another point later in a later question.

BGEN SIMMONS: In his first fitness report on you, which covered less than two months from 22 August to 31 October, 1973, Col Wilder put you into the “excellent to outstanding” category, along with some favorable comments. He said in part, “During this period, LtCol Mundy completed the forming of his battalion, completed individual and unit training, and has joined attachments prior to deploying as a BLT.” You went afloat. Where and with that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we went afloat in December, but we were the ground combat element of the 31st MAU, Marine Amphibious Unit, in those days. So we were working up in our pre-deployment training for the MEU assignment out of III MAF at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Wilder also notes, “LtCol Mundy is acutely aware of his responsibilities in regard to Human Relations. He is deeply and personally involved with Marines, [with] minority racial/ethnic programs.” This is a recurrent theme in many of your fitness reports. There were racial problems, as you have already mentioned amongst the Marines on Okinawa at this time. What did you do to relieve those problems? Perhaps you could tell me what the problems were and what did you do?

GEN MUNDY: Sure. First with regard to the statement, remember that out of Gen Chapman’s proclamation that we had a racial problem in the Marine Corps, there came the mandated requirement out of the Headquarters that your fitness report must certify that you were racially balanced. So it became almost an automatic statement on a fitness report, unless you weren’t. If you hadn’t been, you wouldn’t have lasted very long. So I’m sure that everybody probably has that recorded to one degree or another. It was a mandatory statement.

The racial tensions were horrible at that particular time. We were at perhaps one of the most intense periods of racial disharmony in the Armed Forces that has ever been. We had come out of Vietnam, where the tensions had been apparent in the latter stages of the war. Officers were fringed, groups of racists identifying themselves with some particular movement or cult or organization would flaunt disciplinary authority, or flaunt authority altogether.

When I arrived in Okinawa, it was significant that the only thing of substance that the assistant division commander had to say to me focused itself on the racial tensions that were then present.

Those were the days when dapping, for example, the ethnic handshake or greeting, which consisted of

a ritualistic pounding of fists and waving of hands around and so on, dapping was in. The white troops were for the most part intimidated by a lot of the black racists. I want to be quick to say that there were some very fine Marines of all ethnic cuts there, who are today sergeants major and fine senior officers, who were around in those days, too. But we had in the Marine Corps an element of just absolute unquestioned black racists in those days.

There were Puerto Ricans. The Puerto Ricans wore red berets, somebody else wore black berets. But it was a horrible time. The white troops were intimidated. Black gangs rolled out in town and beat up a Marine, not always a white Marine, but some of their own kind. They identified with different movements.

They consumed the leadership with request mast for various — most of the time whiff of smoke types of infractions. I'm not allowed to wear this black thong around my neck with a fist at my throat, and that is part of my culture, and it was contrary to Marine Corps regulations. We wouldn't let them wear a gold cross around there, for that matter, either. But you have request mast, and it would take forever.

You would have NJP. I can recall that routinely, I would leave my office as a battalion commander if I was in garrison at 2100 or 2200 at night. That was about the time that we would end request mast and NJP almost on a daily basis. Mess halls, dapping to the head of the line. You would meet your buddies and dap this one and dap up to the next one, and pretty soon all we had was — at that point you would have black Marines who were dapping in to the head of the chow line, and white Marines who had been standing there for an hour, waiting to get in the mess hall. So it just wasn't right. It was a very threatening situation.

We had one of my better company commanders, who had just come up from the 2d Division, and had had one of the companies in the 2d Division, where a couple of Marines had been shot, had personal weapons in squad bays, one of them beaten to death with an entrenching tool, again by these black minority roving gangs. He gave me two bits of good advice.

The first one was, he said, always watch. When you see the minorities, the racists, in tennis shoes and blue jeans, there is going to be trouble in the "vill" tonight. If they are in their dashikis, if they are in their fancy clothes, it is probably going to be a calm night, and you can get some sleep.

But I would venture to say that in my first three months as a battalion commander, I never said — when I checked out with the OD at the end of the day, all I checked out was, "I'll see you later," because I

knew I was going to see him that night, because at two a.m. in the morning, there would be an incident. Somebody would come in and have torn up the place.

Now, that was the racial environment, very tense, very worrisome. Leadership was intimidated by these racists at that point, up to and including the division level or maybe even higher. The lower you got down the chain, the more you realized that you could deal with it, in standard Marine Corps form. But all of the concern at the higher echelons — every incident that occurred required an immediate special incident report or "SIK." It required a call from the battalion commander to the division commander to explain what was going on, and all this sort of thing. So it just consumed us. Instead of being able to focus on the good aspects of training or what have you, we were consumed with this disharmony.

Add to that two other factors that were very significant at this time. Thirty-seven percent of my infantry battalion were high school graduates in those days, 37 percent. No radios worked, the mortars were shot out of Vietnam, the vehicles didn't run, supply was all fouled up, because we were pretty battered coming out of Vietnam, but number two was, we didn't have people who were trainable or motivated to be trained.

Then when you add to that this disharmony I talked about, — the third factor was that on a given day, you could fall out the battalion or fall out a company or whatever group it was for muster in the morning, and literally a third of them were stoned on something. There were Marines standing in ranks that, when you talked to him, you knew he wasn't there; he was somewhere else. They were literally reeling and swirling. We had Marines drown in their own vomit in the squad bays, from overdoses, overimbibing. So it was a horrible personnel situation. It has to be a low point for the Marine Corps and for the Armed Forces.

But for us, every night was an incident. Officers were caused to go on courtesy patrols. We would get in our uniforms, and you would go out and roam through the town and greet Marines and say hello, and just be present, officers and staff NCOs, to insure that the groups didn't get into a brouhaha out there.

The thing that came apparent to me in this, because this gets at what I did do, after about three months of this, it became apparent to me two things. One was that the racists had us by the stacking swivel. They had intimidated and throttled the leadership. We reacted to them instead of them reacting to us.

The second bit of advice then that then Capt [Edward J.] Ed Ball, now retired LtCol Ed "Rocky" Ball, as he came to be known, and was the best com-

pany commander I have ever seen in my life. He was the one that had come from Lejeune, that was experienced when he got there. But Ed Ball said, "We have to do something about this. We own the bats and balls in this game, it is our game." I took that on board, and was inspired by it.

I can recall the night that I went and sat down in my hooch and said, "We have to do something to stop this." All the division commanders' meetings focused on it. Anyway, I called in all my company commanders and said, "Tomorrow morning, we knock off dapping in the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. You can dap with anybody you want to under any tree that you want to go out and greet one of your buddies with, but in no formation, in no chow line, in no barrack, not under the roof of a building occupied by 2/4."

They said "Aye-aye, Sir," and went out to pass the word. I hunkered back, and in one of those uncertain times of leadership said "What is going to be the reaction, are we going to have a riot, or what is going to occur?"

About an hour later, word sifting around as it does, I got a call directly from MajGen Fred Haynes, who had now assumed command of the 3d Division, who asked me to rescind that directive, and who very passionately said, "We will have a race riot here in Okinawa that will spread all over the island, and I am fearful of this." He didn't tell me to. He just said, "I want to ask you to reconsider." I said, in probably one of my grander moments, as I look back, and admire at least one or two of the things that I have done, was to say, "General, we simply have to do something about this."

So I issued the order. Let's let it run and see what happens. You know if my head is delivered to you on a pike tomorrow morning or something, we will know it didn't work.

The next morning, I must have been up at 0400 in the morning or something, and I specifically didn't go down to the mess hall. I told none of the officers to. I wanted only the OD doing his normal duty, and I wanted the sergeants supervising. We had the first sergeants together. Honest to goodness, there was not then, there was not subsequently, other than a couple of plaintive Requests Masts, but there was nothing. The companies formed in the chow line, went in the mess hall, got their chow, sat down and ate it. When my sergeant major, who was a pretty good man at that time, actually a first sergeant named Carrasco, who was a Mexican, had gone in and surveyed the situation and he came excitedly over to see me in my office, and burst right in, as a company first sergeant wouldn't ordinarily do, and he said, "Colonel, that

mess hall is the happiest place I have seen it since we have been here."

On the reverse side of things, the non-minorities are happy and smiling and talking to each other. The minorities very clearly are sitting there with a scared look in their eye because they'd lost control. We never had another ounce of problem with that.

So I called Gen Haynes and said, "General, we will wait until tomorrow morning, but let's see how it goes."

To make a long story short, I think thereafter, 1/4 put that into effect a week later, and then 3/9 did or somebody else did, and eventually it became the way in the division. But that is what I did. Again, I did it with great trepidation and great uncertainty. But it worked, and it proved to me again just exactly what Ed Ball had told me, and that is that we own the balls and bats in this business. If leadership goes back to the standard ways that Marines are taught to be, they will be that way.

BGEN SIMMONS: That prompts several comments and questions on my part. First, it was interesting to me that the division commander queried you directly, whereas the regimental commander in this chain and the company first sergeant came to see you directly. We can talk a little bit more later, if you will, about where the regiment fits in all of this. But you had a sergeant major. Do you recall who that was, and how were you using him?

GEN MUNDY: As I say, the sergeant major, whose name was Edwards, SgtMaj Edwards, never did — he was not my image of a sergeant major, but he was the battalion sergeant major. I had sent him to the mess hall, because I wanted him to not do anything, just be there like a sergeant major might ordinarily be. He was, but I can't tell you why the sergeant major didn't come, but it was Carrasco who came excitedly. He was Capt Ball's first sergeant. He undoubtedly was going back to report to his captain, but he came by the battalion CP and in a moment of exuberance charged in and saw me and conveyed the thought. Carrasco and I had a very good rapport. He later became my regimental sergeant major when I was CO of the 2d Marines, so there may have been an affinity there that caused that as well.

But I think it was just the exuberance of the moment, that we were all so shaky on this, and we realized that my God, if we take charge of the situation, the leadership can handle this, and we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Maybe you would describe for

me the geography of the situation, where the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was encamped, and also, you mentioned in passing “Kinville.” This was the infamous village of Kin Crossroads. Describe that a little bit. And wasn’t it true that there were certain areas of ours which were de facto out of bounds to whites, and vice versa?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, there were. It was that way in Okinawa, it was that way in the Philippines. There were streets in the Philippines, and when you would go into Olongapo, there were streets that the white men did not go down, and white men did not go into bars. I know, because I went with a lot of shakiness, but in my uniform as a battalion commander in those cases.

Kin Village was the village that was literally right out of the main gate. You stepped out of the main gate at the base —

BGEN SIMMONS: Which camp was this?

GEN MUNDY: This was Camp Hansen. Camp Hansen was built on an old Japanese airfield. There had been a runway there, so it was a very flat area. Then you walked up to the main gate, and there was some high ground there. On top of that high ground was Kinville. 2/4 was — the 4th Marine Regiment was in there at that time. Ordinarily, there would be two infantry battalions, but just one was deployed. The engineer battalion was in there. That was an awfully bad outfit. That was a seething cauldron, because the infantry battalions would pick up and deploy and would break this underground chain, the infrastructure, if you will, of those racist organizations. The engineers would only send out detachments, so it was one of those organizations in which there was a permanent structure there.

The engineers were in there, the 7th Comm Battalion was in there, there were some other cats and dogs organizations. But basically, it was regimental camp. 2/4 occupied some of the buildings there. We ate in the battalion mess hall, so all of the company and the entire battalion ate in one mess hall in those days, so you ran your own mess, which was another story in itself. We really had some bad feeding. You can see why there was a little bit of disquiet, because we didn’t have any good cooks or mess men. Most them had gotten out, so we fed the troops slop in those days, frankly, it was bad.

It was nothing remarkable. We lived in a little single story typical Okinawa hut of that day. Not air conditioned. The windows were open, and there were

fans blowing. I can recall that we would not allow the troops to leave anything out, even their bedding, because it would be stolen. You took your sheets and blanket off, put it in your wall locker, you kept your 782 gear on top of the wall locker. It was in the wall locker. If you had any kind of a radio or sound system, it was stuffed in the wall locker, too, because to leave out a hi-fi system or a stereo would mean that it was gone or smashed, just maliciously — somebody would walk by and reach in a window and go right through the screen and just smash it. It was bad times, bad times.

BGEN SIMMONS: You spoke of the stereo systems. Of course, these were very cheap through the post exchange and so on. Do you recall any problem if there were a problem, of music duels, with blacks at one end of the barracks blasting out soul music and whites at the other end blasting out country music?

GEN MUNDY: I recall more so the intimidation, not necessarily duels, but just the intimidation of the loud music being played. And it would be soul music as a general rule, and there would be a congregation of the black racists.

We had a pretty good identity on — these people were pretty obvious. They were always on a crutch in the daytime until liberty call went, and then somehow their foot and leg felt better and they were headed to the ville.

BGEN SIMMONS: Problems with shaving?

GEN MUNDY: Folliculitis, can’t shave. LtCol Ed Green was still growing an Afro haircut to exhibit what you could wear and you couldn’t wear as the Commandant’s minority advisor in those days. So we had tremendous problems with, the hair is too long, the hair can’t be that long. It was just — everything was a problem. Can’t shave, haircuts, can’t wear the ethnic devices. My back hurts, my foot hurts. So what we would find is that any time the battalion took to the field, which was a lot of the time in Okinawa in those days, that all of your light duty shifts, not exclusively, but about 80 percent of them, were these agitators and racists who were then left back in garrison, and who didn’t go to the field.

The thing that would aggravate me the most as we would see new groups of young Marines coming in, I used to always greet them, and when we got an arrival of new troops coming into the battalion, why we would process them. I would always go out and usually stand under a tree somewhere, and I would talk to



In 1973, LtCol Carl Mundy assumed command of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. In this November 1973 photograph, Mundy is seen with two of his officers, from left, Commanding Officer of Company H Capt Arthur S. Weber, Jr., and Commanding Officer of Company F Capt Larry S. Schmidt.

them and tell them about “the Magnificent Bastards” and how it came to be, try to inspire them a little bit about the battalion. Then tell them that we were there to be Marines and whatnot.

I would break up from that, go back to my office and look out the window, and I could see coming out of the barracks to recruit them these agitators. You could identify them and call them by name, coming out of every company in fours or fives, that would then come over and pick up the young black Marines predominantly — the Puerto Ricans were also there, but the Puerto Ricans were almost a reaction to the blacks, rather than — we never really had any Puerto Rican-white difficulties, but you had a lot of friction between the Puerto Rican groups and the black groups. So there was almost a triangle here. But you would see the racists that would come out and would approach the new young black Marines that had reported in. I could watch visibly as one of these guys would hail his brother, and that was understandable, and then would stand there and talk to him for a little while. I knew very well what he was saying — don’t believe anything “he” said.

Then I would see him start showing him this ethnic dap. Sometimes, the kid wouldn’t have any idea what he was supposed to do. But you would see him shaping up and being recruited by that infrastructure.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were two terms describing groups or societies which may or may not have been

organized. One was Black Muslim, the other was Mau Mau. Were those two terms in currency at that point?

GEN MUNDY: They were. The Black Muslims, I think, were the lesser intimidating, although you would see people with a Malcolm X T-shirt on or something like that. Bush jackets in those days were — could be made out in town, or you get them when you went to Olongapo. Troops today still wear them with all these places that they have been, when they go on a Mediterranean cruise or something. But there, the bush jackets would take the form of ethnic expression. There would be bush jackets with a bloody knife and a head held by the hair, the knife having just cut the head off. It would be a black hand with a chain hanging on it that would be woven into these jackets and so on.

When I first got there, people would put these on and go on liberty. I don’t recall that that was explicitly one of my initiatives, but we kept going to the division meetings and saying, we ought to knock these things off, just put the word out, you can’t wear a bush jacket. I don’t care if it is a nice bush jacket, you can’t wear it. Eventually, the division came up with the gumption to do that, so we pronounced that any ethnic symbol on clothing could not be openly worn, and that was another one of the steps of pulling this thing back.

So there were all sorts of groups. I mentioned the one that had to wear the black knotted thong right at the throat. It had to be right at the adam’s apple, and that was visible with the uniform. We would say, “Take it off,” and then you would get a request mast about, “This is my heritage” and all that. It may very well have been, but it was very clearly an in-your-face to authority in all of these things. And identification as a group and intimidation of others, be they ethnic or be they non-ethnic groups, Caucasian or minority groups.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have human relations counsels?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, miserable training. It was the old HUMREL (Human Relations Training). Everybody hated the taste of it, hated the word itself. I can’t say that it was all lost, because it caused us to talk. But even as a battalion commander, I can recall that I couldn’t be certified — or placed in permanent command or something, this sounds absurd, until I had my whatever it was, ten hours of human relations training. S-3 had to religiously keep that the colonel

had gone out there and sat under the tent and talked about the matters that we discussed in human relations.

There probably was some value to that, because it did focus us on the fact that there are myths, that there are prejudices, which are deep seated, many, and many that are without basis, and that should be countered in any organization that counts on organizational values rather than individual myths and perceptions.

But it was very boring and not very effective. The troops would do anything they could to get out of doing that.

BGEN SIMMONS: In addition to the human relations instruction and indoctrination, how about the councils themselves? Did you have councils that met, of mixed rank?

GEN MUNDY: I'll say yes, because that is familiar to me. If it was, I wasn't on one of them. It would have been my XO, if it was at that level. But I don't recall those being as —

BGEN SIMMONS: They were very active in Vietnam, up and down Vietnam. They always reminded me of the soldiers' and sailors' soviets that the Communists —

GEN MUNDY: Yes. It was just a substitution for fundamental leadership, all of those things that we did. I don't think that will come across wrong, and it would be my sincere belief, that they increased our awareness and our sensitivity to those things that offend and so on. They are very important, to those things that are not true. But even to this day, I think one can draw offense from about anything you want to, and some things that are not at all intended offensively can — if one has a cause, you can make them offensive.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have a report as BLT 2/4 commander from Col David M. Twomey, a future lieutenant general and a very strong-minded individual, who must have been the Marine Amphibious Unit Commander. What MAU was that?

GEN MUNDY: He was. That was the 31st MAU.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did it deploy and where did it go?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the 31st MAU deployed essen-

tially all the time, really. He lived aboard ship, and he would phase back in to Okinawa and pick up battalions and squadrons and so on. We deployed out of there on four month cycles, not six months. So for example, I deployed in December, and we returned in April, so it was probably more like four and a half months. There was a cycle, 31st MAU, then the ships would come into White Beach, and you would discharge one BLT and the other one would get aboard and the squadrons would fly aboard, and back to sea they would go.

So the 31st MAU really, one might say, was homeported in the Philippines, even though it would come to Okinawa where we stayed. So Col Twomey was assigned, so far as I know, directly to the 31st MAU, and that is what he did. It was not as we do today, when we would come ashore and stay ashore for 12 months and then go back out on another pump, in this case, it was, go on, stay on.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Twomey marked you in the excellent to outstanding category, along with two other lieutenant colonels. His comments, however, are very complimentary. He speaks of your "fine leadership ability and innovative training procedures. "What were some of your innovations?

GEN MUNDY: I couldn't begin to tell you. I always got along well with Dave Twomey. We liked each other. I think that perhaps, we spent so much time at sea, because we were on a string, on a time line to execute Operation Eagle Pull, which was the evacuation of Phnom Penh in those days. So you spent a lot of time tied to the ship, even when you were in port, Cinderella liberty and that sort of thing. So the troops could not be loose for three days liberty or for a weekend; we had to have constant control. So it required a lot of doing things when we were aboard ship. Steel beach parties. I don't know how innovative that is, or drill competitions on the flight deck of the ship, those sorts of things, to keep the troops occupied. If he found innovation in that, I'm happy. I thought it was fairly standard stuff.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Twomey also compliments you on your fine appearance and physical fitness, and says that you are "an outstanding writer and fine public speaker." Do you have any anecdotal recollections of your personal relations with Col Twomey and his command style?

GEN MUNDY: Dave Twomey was as black and white as they come. There is no middle ground. With

Twomey you are either doing good or you're doing bad. There is no middle of the road. He was high on me. Personally we got along just fine. We enjoyed each other's company. When we were in Hong Kong, we would go ashore together. I can recall that he had a blazer emblem, which when he was CO of the Marine Barracks he had gotten off of the old Marine Band uniform.

It was a stiff thing; I think they wore it on their shoulder, but it was stiff.

I was talking about his blazer emblem, of all things. But anyway, I admired this and every time I would see him, I used to always talk about that blazer. To make a long story short, I borrowed it when we were in Hong Kong and went over and had them make up two, one for one of my company commanders who wanted one, Pat McDonald, and myself. So we had the two only replicas of that. But instead of saying the U.S. Marine Band, it said the U.S. Marine Corps.

It is beautiful, it is magnificent. It is too big to wear on a blazer, but it is a handsome thing to open and look at in your drawer from time to time.

I found that Dave Twomey was the type of man who was fascinated by whatever he was interested in at the moment. He would almost fix on something and become intent on the way he wanted to do it, then he would shift completely from that to something else.

So it was rather easy as he got into, I'm concerned about appearance. You started holding inspections and you started checking haircuts. You did a little bit of that all the time, but then you would invite him out to inspect the battalion. He would come out and inspect them and he would say, "that is outstanding, that is good." Then he was no longer interested in appearance, now he was interested in something else.

So I guess I played him in that sense, not for any purposes — it was just, that was what your senior wanted, so it was very easy for me to emphasize. He had been the CO of 8th and I, and yes, I do love pomp and circumstance. Yes, we would put Marine detachments on the ship in quarters for entering port. Yes, we spit and shined and did all those sort of things that would appeal to him. So I think we got along well.

But again, Dave Twomey, when he didn't like something you were doing, he was not one to mince words. He was not harsh, but if he didn't like the way you were wearing your tie today, he would say to you, "Ed, you're a fine fellow, but I don't particularly like the way you're wearing your tie, so change it," and that was it. You would go change your tie, and that was the end of that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next fitness report is by Col Douglas Kane, who apparently relieved Dave Twomey. Doug gave you a straight "outstanding" report, and leads off his comments with the statement that, "LtCol Mundy is unquestionably the finest battalion commander of my experience." That report is dated 9 April 1974. What did you do to deserve such an accolade?

GEN MUNDY: I don't know. Doug Kane and I had met when he was in what was called the Policy Group at Headquarters in my days as Gen Walt's aide. The Policy Group was Kane, it was Ed Bronars, I can't remember. But obviously they were talented writers, and they did a lot of the Commandant's speech writing. It was policy analysis. I don't really know what they did, but they were a handful of talent. Doug Kane and I just hit it off well from those days. So when he came out to be the new MAU commander, I think he was looking for a friendly face. I was one. We knew each other. I took him on liberty his first time in Olongapo. He relieved Col Twomey down in the Philippines. I took him on liberty, took him ashore. Showing him what Olongapo was all about.

Doug Kane, though he was a colonel and retired with a very successful career, was a man who was probably a little bit lacking confidence as he came out to be a MAU commander. I was an oldtimer at that point. I had been around, so I think I was his primary source of information, confidante, whatever you want to call it. So we had a good rapport.

But I am delighted that he thought so highly of me. I should flash back and talk about — because other names come to play there. There were a couple of incidents during the time that I was deployed that I will record.

First of all, I mentioned that we were on the string for Eagle Pull. We would go out into the Gulf of Siam and literally drop the anchor on the ships, and just sit there for days and for weeks, ultimate monotony. There were a lot of sea snakes out there that would swim by, so we would hold swim call, but with a little bit of goosiness. I don't think anybody was attacked, but some guy would stand there with an M14 and shoot up the water. Probably more danger to the swimmers than the sea snakes, but they would scare off the sea snakes if they came around.

But we would hold sea snake catching contests. We would bend coat hangers and go out on the flight deck and stand over the side, and these guys would come by and you would try to hook a sea snake. I don't think anybody ever did, but it was something to entertain the troops. We would have rubber lady races

around the ship, put the inflatable rubber mattresses in and have races around the ship and that sort of thing, that may be part of Gen Twomey's innovative training thoughts.

I went into Phnom Penh. We went in in civilian clothes. Col Steve Olmstead, now LtGen Steve Olmstead, was the CO of the 9th Marines, and had been originally the designated ground force commander for the evacuation of Phnom Penh, and that irritated Dave Twomey no end, because he was the king on scene, and if anybody was going to evacuate Phnom Penh, it was going to be him. But the U.S. Ambassador had formed an attachment of affection, admiration, confidence or what have you, in Steve Olmstead.

So anyway, Olmstead would come winging his way down to Olongapo to link up and then come out to the ship. He, Twomey, LtCol Steve Folger who was the squadron commander, and I would don civilian clothes, and we would go into Phnom Penh and decide how to blow the lights down around the stadium, or how we were going to get in, the collection points. The plan that we developed was the plan they used a year later when they executed.

But that was for me very exciting, because that was the first of what we now have come to do fairly routinely around the world. It was very exciting to go in rather clandestinely. I'm sure everybody knew who we were, but we were roaming around in our sport shirts and —

BGEN SIMMONS: Tell me a little bit about Phnom Penh at that point. It was almost at the end at that point.

GEN MUNDY: It was almost at the end. There was a lot of nervousness in the embassy at that point. It was still — I'm trying to think. When we would go in there, we would land at the airport. We put into the thick-windowed embassy cars and whisk in to the embassy. Then we could do a certain amount of reconnoitering around the town. But for example, we did not — as a matter of fact, we couldn't stay in overnight, that was one of the provisions. So we would have to come in very early in the morning and we would reconnoiter during the day and come out. So we never went to a restaurant, we never went out in town, we never walked the streets, but as far as the city itself went, it was fairly ordinary. It was business as usual, a lot of Southeast Asian motorbikes and taxicabs and crowds of people moving about. People would tell us that right across the river, the Khmer Rouge were set up over there, and we would look and

see nothing but trees, and go back out of town again.

But the U.S. Embassy personnel, the country team, were very nervous. They knew that something was coming, and they knew they were going to have to get out. It was almost a year later before they did pull it off.

BGEN SIMMONS: Interesting time, interesting places. You received a concurrent report from your regimental commander, Gary Wilder. He now moves you up to the "outstanding" category. He acknowledges the two fine reports you received from MAU commanders, and speaks of the good work you did ashore in Okinawa. Do you have any comments on the respective responsibility of the regimental commanders and MAU commanders, now called MEU commanders, in situations such as this? Would you go so far as to say that the prestige once attached to being the regimental commander has been supplanted by the prestige of being a MAU or MEU commander?

GEN MUNDY: Let me answer those in phases here. One, the responsibilities of the regimental commanders in Okinawa then, I can't judge whether it is the same now or not, but then, the regimental commanders were really camp commanders; they were dual-hatted as such. As we talked earlier, we had a deputy camp commander. That is what they focused on, and it was probably because of the nature of the beast at that time. The problems were camp problems. There were riots, there were all sorts of infrastructure problems. So the regimental colonels, or at least Gary Wilder was focused on camp problems. I think the regiment may have gone to the field once while I was there. I don't recall, it may have. But it was a camp situation.

So it was quite natural that for matters operational, the battalions looked to somewhere else. The regiments, as we were talking earlier about Gen Haynes calling me directly, Gen Graham would call directly. So the link from the division directly to the battalions was not extraordinary at all. Gen Graham would call and say, how are you deploying your M79s or whatever weapons system, and I would tell him back. Or he would come and inspect my supply warehouse. I don't think Col Wilder ever came over to check the 2/4 supply warehouse; I don't recall it.

I'm not personalizing this. I guess I am just saying that the regiment was almost — operationally at least, was almost an extra layer.

Now, how has that evolved to the present time? I would have to say in all practicality, although I didn't do anything about it in my tenure, the regiment has

probably become for the most part an extra layer in the ordinary command relations of the Marines.

One of the reasons for that — the Army is beginning to get into this a little bit, because they are being forced into it. But Army officers generally are taught to deal at certainly the battalion level, but they are taught to deal at the brigade level, at division, at corps and at echelons above corps. So Army officers tend to think in larger groupings than perhaps Marines do. I think all Marine officers are fundamentally battalion commanders; that is where we focus. That is what we do a lot of. Battalions go a lot of places in the Marine Corps. The Army divisions displace, Marine battalions deploy. So our focus is different.

As a result of that, the regiment, though useful on occasion, is something of a layer that is from time to time not very useful, because even a division commander of one of the big divisions, the 1st Division, the 2d Division, will have on a day to day basis — if you go to Camp Lejeune, probably five of the battalions are gone somewhere. They are down in the Caribbean, they are deployed to the Med, they're chopped to a MEU, so the division commander probably only has four or five or six battalions to look at, and he tends to look at those instead of his regiments.

So I think the Marine Corps holds to the regiment, and I certainly did. I am one of those who hears drumbeats and bugle calls in my reverie all the time. I would never want to let go of the regiment. But at the same time, it has become something of an anachronism.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you see it being an administrative and training command then?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Almost nondeployable?

GEN MUNDY: It is deployable, but to deploy, because of our fixation — I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that, but we have gotten into MAG TF-ery, so that every place we go it is a MAG TF. So if the regiment goes anywhere to do anything, the regimental commander becomes some sort of air-ground task force commander as a general rule, unless the division takes the field, and we don't do that too often.

So when I was a regimental commander as the CO of the 2d Marines, although we went to the field a number of times, but the times I operated was that I was dual-hatted as either the 36th or the 38th MAU. So the regimental staff or some part of it made up a

now-MEU staff and deployed with operating forces, sometimes more than one battalion, acting like a regiment. Whereas, the regimental rear stayed back and became the camp police.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 July 1974, Col Wilder closed out your service as a battalion commander with another fine report. Do you have anything to add to your recollections as a battalion commander in the Western Pacific?

GEN MUNDY: Only that I left there very proud. I was very proud of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. I left it much in the state that I described it. We had about 1,200 Marines there. Col Al Gray now had relieved Gary Wilder in July, and I left in August. So I had about a month with Al Gray. He was putting his different mark, which was a very healthy one, on it. Believe me, Al Gray wanted to be an operational regimental commander, and came into the regiment and began to do those things that was characteristic of anybody that has ever served with him, to put an operational flavor on everything we did. Everything was in operations. Somebody was in charge all the time, those sorts of things.

But for me, it was a very exciting time. I knew that 2/4 had excelled; we did. It was a good battalion. My only regret was that if we were going to do something like Phnom Penh, it could have happened on my watch, but it didn't.

I knew we had done well. We had had our usual share of — we had murders in the battalion. We had a platoon sergeant gunned down by a Marine in the Philippines. We had some very bad — we have Marines that are in Leavenworth today that were out of that battalion. We had roving gangs aboard ship that would catch a white sailor and beat him in the head with a fire hose and try to throw him over the side. Fortunately, the kid caught in the net down below, and we could then catch the racists and put in the clink.

So we had our fair share of bad incidents. But on balance, it was a good battalion. As I look back on it with no self admiration here, but I was a good battalion commander. Things went well for me. So I left again with very much a stroke of confidence and with my chief learning experience being what I have already spent too much time talking about, that is, that if you don't know what else to do, go back and read your Basic School manual, and it will tell you what to do. If you do that, Marines will respond to that. I have not since found a situation in which that is not true.

BGEN SIMMONS: On your departure of the 3d Marine Division, MajGen Fred Haynes, then the commanding general, recommended you for yet another Navy Commendation Medal for your exceptional meritorious performance as a BLT commander. In his recommendation, Fred, who was a classmate of mine, speaks of your, “responding to a sensitive contingency requirement.” Was that the preparation for Phnom Penh?

GEN MUNDY: I don’t remember any other than that being on the string for Phnom Penh.

BGEN SIMMONS: Fred also cites you for “one of the most intensive civic action programs ever attempted in that area.” Again, that is a direct quote. Apparently, this was at Olongapo in the Philippines.

GEN MUNDY: It was, what we had learned in Vietnam. We would give a company some mission, let them pick out something they wanted to do, paint a church, paint a school, rehab a school, give them the engineers, send them in. So the Lions Club of Olongapo fell in love with “The Magnificent Bastards,” and we did a lot of good things down there of that sort.

BGEN SIMMONS: Once again, the recommendation for a Navy Commendation Medal was downgraded to a Certification of Commendation, this one signed by Gen Louis H. Wilson, who was Commandant.

This is probably a good place to end this session. You are now ordered to Quantico, to what sounded like a lackluster assignment. We will take that up in the next session.

SESSION 10

At Quantico and Newport

Assignment as protocol officer at Quantico . . . Handling VIPs . . . Working for LtGen Ed Fris . . . Acting chief of staff . . . Working with BGen Bill Maloney . . . Assigned as Assistant Head, Facilities Department . . . Ordered to the Naval War College . . . Marine classmates . . . A pleasant year at Newport.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session, we covered your service as commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 3d Division, in Okinawa. In this session, we will explore your two-year tour at Quantico from August 1974 through July 1976, and your subsequent year at the Naval War College.

On your arrival at Quantico in late August 1974, you were assigned as the protocol officer, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Did this assignment come as a surprise to you?

GEN MUNDY: The assignment to Quantico did not, because I had requested to come to Quantico. The assignment, — although I was aware of the assignment before arriving at Quantico, but my posting as the protocol officer definitely came as a surprise to me.

There is a little story that goes along with this. When I was in Okinawa in my last three or four months, we were at that time up in the northern training area for a 30-day extended training period. I received a letter from a long-time friend and former commanding officer at The Basic School when I was a staff platoon commander there, Col Don Cliff. It said, “Welcome to Quantico. We have your orders and we are delighted that you are coming here.” He said, “I look forward to seeing you again and look forward to working with you. You are going to be on the” — in those days, MCDEC, we had not changed it to MCCDC, but MCDEC staff, and . . . “you will be the Protocol Officer, working directly for the commanding general and with me.”

I got his letter with mixed emotions. First of all, I was startled. Then I said, “No, this is a joke. This is my good friend Don Cliff, who is pulling my chain.”

BGEN SIMMONS: You had known him from The Basic School?

GEN MUNDY: I had known him. He was the commanding officer of one of the companies at The Basic

School, in which I was a staff platoon commander. So I had known him then. I knew him earlier, in fact. When I was an OSO, I followed him as the Inspector-Instructor in Raleigh, North Carolina. Though we didn’t have much contact, I had known him. But I knew him well from The Basic School.

So I wrote back to him and told him that I was pleased to hear from him, that I was delighted to be coming to Quantico, I had asked for that. And because I knew at that time Col Dutch Schulze, who was the commanding officer of The Basic School, we had taught at Basic School together earlier, and Col Schulze had told me on more than one occasion that if I could make my way back to Quantico, he would assign me as the S-3 of The Basic School, a prize assignment to which I was most eager to be assigned. I thought that coming back after a year of command in the 3d Division, I was exactly right to be the S-3 at The Basic School.

But anyway, I wrote back to Col Cliff and had a laugh, ha-ha, that is jolly good, I appreciate it, but I’m going to The Basic School. I got a letter back from a command and staff classmate, a major named Al Lucas, who was then the staff secretary, who said, “Col Cliff is on leave, but it is no fooling around, you’re going to be the protocol officer.”

Well, it was a low point in my career, because I could not believe that here I would be coming from what I thought was one whale of a tour as a battalion commander, that anybody would make me the protocol officer.

But at any rate, I executed my orders and reported to Quantico, reported in, and sure enough, I was made the protocol officer. So again, was I surprised by the assignment? I was absolutely taken aback by the assignment.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your duties in this billet?

GEN MUNDY: To be very candid with you, when I got there, the man who had preceded me had built an empire, but it was an empire out of myth and legend. There was enormous activity which I would term much ado about nothing. We had very few true protocol visitors that came down to Quantico. Occasionally an Assistant Secretary of the Navy would come down to go visit something or other. If the Secretary came, or any high ranking official, generally speaking they were coming to visit one of the schools or were coming to a mess night or something, that I had nothing to do with.

At any rate, I had a two-office suite, one for me. I had an absolutely executive secretary quality sergeant, who was the secretary there. There was a master gunnery sergeant, one of the old time stewards, food service specialist, who was assigned there to assist. Then there was a driver. We had a sergeant who again was a general officer level driver. So here was this, including me, four-person office that didn't seem to me to have a lot to do.

My duties were to assist the commanding general with the responsibilities of protocol that he had. The CG was just changing as I got there. LtGen Ed Fris was becoming the commanding general. I cannot say here at this moment his predecessor's name, because I did not work for the man. But I got there at any rate on the day of the change of command, so Fris was the only CG that I worked with.

But at any rate, I set out to examine the files and find out what they did, and I came to find out that there had been three or four visitors there in the previous year. I looked at the schedule ahead. I had the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management that was coming down in about two months to visit OCS. So fundamentally, I went to work every day and very soon came into the habit of coming in late and taking off early, and taking a couple of hours to do PT at noon, because there was just not much to do. I was very frustrated by this, because I felt that I was to some degree a talent who was going to waste.

I approached Col Cliff and gave him my feelings, that there is no job here. I can be put to better use in a lot of places. He said, "Well, we're just getting into the fall season. Let's let it ride a little. We've got the Birthday Ball coming up, and you will be very busy with the Birthday Ball, and the general will have a lot of guests and so on that you'll need to take care of. So ride it out for awhile. So I said, "Aye-aye, sir," and returned to my nonexistent responsibilities or duties at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: He, Col Cliff, apparently thought you were doing a good job. He gave you your first fitness report in May of 1975, a fine set of marks in the "outstanding" category. In his remarks, he calls you a "truly exceptional officer" and says how well you handled distinguished visitors to the command. Col Cliff says you handled your portion of the human relations program with "calm efficiency." He says he is "impressed with the thoroughness of your planning and execution" of your protocol responsibilities.

LtGen Edward S. Fris, the commanding general, as the reviewing officer adds his own nugget of praise, saying: "I am greatly impressed by his performance. I have complete faith in his ability to handle any assignment at any level." How closely did you work with Gen Fris? Did you in effect become a super aide or an administrative assistant?

GEN MUNDY: I was in effect a super aide. In fact, when I got there, that is precisely the term that Col Cliff used. He said your title is the Protocol Officer, but in point of fact you will be a principal aide — or I think he said super aide, to the commanding general, because you will be more senior and he can deal with you in ways that he might prefer not to with his aides.

But I came to know Gen Fris very well, and his wife Min. They were, I thought, extremely fine individuals. Gen Fris had just come down from being the deputy chief of staff for aviation, and he had been very rapidly advanced to lieutenant general as I recall. I think he was a brigadier general when he was the DCS Aviation. I'm not sure whether he passed right through two stars to get to three, but I know that he was a three-star pretty quickly.

He was on extremely good relations with Gen Earl E. Anderson, who was then the Assistant Commandant, and obviously thought a lot of him. Very fine people. I would characterize somewhat of a laid-back commanding general, but a man whose heart was as big as gold, and his wife was a princess of a lady. So it was a pleasure to be associated with them. He was always satisfied with everything I did. I received very little guidance; I would make it up.

But then we had very few visitors, maybe one, perhaps two, that I can recall. The Birthday Ball was fundamentally taken care of — making sure that the table assignments were right and so on. So I had no doubt but that Col Cliff found me to be a very effective planner, because I had essentially nothing to do, and I had plenty of time in which to plan to do those few things.

BGEN SIMMONS: You apparently were acting chief

of staff for a one-month period, 7 May to 9 June 1975. Wasn't that unusual for a lieutenant colonel?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was, and there is a story there, too. First of all, let me go back and say how did I get out of the protocol job. The way I did that, Col Cliff was reassigned from being the chief of staff at MCDEC to become the commanding officer of the Officer Candidate School. So he was to leave, as I recall — in fact, he left on the sixth or seventh of May. But when that was known, that he was going, he took some leave. When he would take leave, I was the lieutenant colonel there, the staff secretary and then an aide or two, so I was the next senior officer in the command, and routinely I would fill in for Col Cliff.

So when he took a couple of weeks leave preparatory to going down to the Officer Candidate School, as soon as he departed the building, I walked in to see Gen Fris and laid out my case and said, "General, I have written up a paper here, and analyzed this protocol job, and believe me, we are wasting four fine Marines down there. My recommendation to you would be that we do away with this office, do away with this billet, and assign it where it used to be," which was over in the G-3 section.

Anyway, whatever the rapport between us, Gen Fris took my advice and he said, "that is not a bad idea." He said, "We'll do that." He said, "We're going to re-establish the Marine Corps Base at Quantico as a command." Heretofore, the CG at MCDEC was dual-hatted as the CG Marine Corps Base, and he wanted to break that loose and it be just the CG of the combat center.

So he was going to make the colonel, who was the chief of staff at the base, the commanding officer of the base. As a result, the MCDEC staff would be a very small entity, consisting essentially of what I named before. He said, "I don't need to get another colonel to do that, you can be the chief of staff." I said, "Well, General, that is rather unusual. I will be dealing with directors of the schools who are colonels, I will be dealing with the CO of the base, who is a colonel, and I'm still a relatively junior lieutenant colonel. I don't know what my throw weight will be." He said, "Don't worry about it. It will be my throw weight. You can do the job." So anyway, he posted me there.

But he had apparently another motive. After we had done that, did away with the Protocol Office, put it in G-3, I became the chief of staff, he then approached me to say that there was a new colonel coming in, and that colonel would become the chief of staff after my interim here. He said, "One of the

things I want to get going on the base, I am disappointed in the operation of the clubs here at Quantico.

The Officers Club is not what I want it to be. I want somebody who can get up there and set those clubs into motion. I was standing there with my notepad taking notes, saying, "Yes, sir." I said, "General, shall I identify some candidates for you?" He said, "I have one in mind." I said, "who is that," ready to write, and he said, "You."

So here in the space of less than a year, my career had plummeted from being a lofty battalion commander of an infantry battalion to protocol officer, and now I was told that I was going to be the clubs officer at Quantico.

So I walked out of the office, and went in the depth of, what is happening here. About an hour later, I came back in and said, "General, I don't know how to put this to you. I know the importance that you're attaching to the club system, but to be a clubs officer is the kiss of death. Am I getting a signal here or what?" Well, he was very positive. "I need somebody good there, and you can do the job."

So I sucked in my gut and said, "Why me, Lord," and turned around and walked out again. I then probably was mildly disloyal for what I hope was one of the few times in my career. I sat down in my office and I thought, what can I do? I picked up the phone and called my good, long-time, dear friend and classmate, LtCol Joe Hoar, who was then the lieutenant colonel monitor at headquarters. I said, "Joe, I've really got a dilemma here. I am being considered to go off to be the clubs officer." I said, "I think the General intends to pay me a compliment, and he intends it as a good mark, but in point of fact, this is not good." Of course, Joe came right back at me with his Boston Irish slant on this, and used frames of reference I hadn't even thought about, as to how dastardly a deed this was. He said, "I'll tell you what. I will — we are looking for a new XO at the Marine Barracks in Washington. Would you be willing to move? You have only been down there a year." I said, "Tomorrow." To go to 8th & I had always been a boyhood aspiration.

So he said, "Okay, we'll write you up. I've got to put in two or three names, but you will be the recommended replacement to go to 8th & I." I was euphoric, because this was like a dream come true.

So I went home feeling better than I had. In about a week, he called me back and said, "I've got some bad news for you." He said, "Gen Wilson's nephew, Gordon Busby, LtCol Gordon Busby," who I knew well — he said, "We sent in the list of names with you as the recommended nominee, and Gen Wilson didn't

even initial the package, he just got on the squawk box and said, assign Gordon Busby to be the XO of 8th & I."

So anyway, Gordon Busby is going now to 8th & I, and I'm still hanging around Quantico, waiting to be the Clubs Officer. So Joe says to me, "but there is another opportunity. They want to commission — Gen Wilson is going to commission a study group to study the manpower quality issues in the Marine Corps." He said, "we are going to propose various lieutenant colonels and a few colonels." He said, "we will need an infantry lieutenant colonel, so would you like to be on that?" I said, again, "Joe, I'll do anything in the world to not be the Clubs Officer."

So to make a long story short, there arrived at MCCDC a request for an infantry lieutenant colonel to serve on this very supposedly high priced board that would report directly to the Commandant, and probably Joe made a phone call or two, and the next thing I knew, I was the named member.

BGEN SIMMONS: Obviously, Gen Fris thought you did very well in your tour as chief of staff. He calls you "one of the most outstanding officers at this rank that I have observed." Then you went to the study group chaired by BGen William R. Maloney, then the Director of Information. This study group was apparently the manpower component of the so-called Haynes Board. Was this a transfer, or was this a TAD assignment?

GEN MUNDY: This was TAD.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was to be a full-time assignment?

GEN MUNDY: It was to be, yes. I think it was five months, was the maximum. So I was told to expect to be at this for a full period of five months TAD.

BGEN SIMMONS: Distinguishing now between the Haynes Board and the study group under it, what was the overall purpose of the Haynes Board?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the entire — both the manpower quality study and the force structure study were entitled the Haynes Board. MajGen Fred Haynes, who had come back from being my CG out in the 3d Division to be the deputy chief of staff for research and development at Headquarters, was given this tasking by Gen Wilson.

The Haynes Board was to do two things. Number one, Gen Wilson had come into office, as we talked

about earlier, at perhaps an historically low point, in terms of the manpower quality of the Corps. We had some bad people. He had brought in with him as his deputy chief for manpower then LtGen Bob Barrow, who came up from Parris Island with a vengeance in his heart, to correct all of these recruiting malpractices and to begin to bring quality recruits back into the Marine Corps.

So Gen Haynes was charged on the manpower quality study to look at those policies or those practices or those things, from training to anything we wanted to talk about, that would re-spark the quality back into the people that made up the Marine Corps.

On the other hand, down at Quantico here, under — that group, the Manpower Quality Study Group, though the deputy director was then-BGen Bill Maloney of that board, actually was Col Spike Connolly and seconded by Col Al Croft, with LtCol Tony Grimm, myself and two other majors comprised the manpower group.

At Quantico meanwhile, Col Gerry Hindman, with LtCol Art Bloomer and George Leach and a couple of others were the force structure study group. So we had no specific interrelationship as to purpose. One for manpower, and one was looking at improving force structure and things we should do to get a better structure in the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you stay in quarters and commute to Washington each day while the Haynes Board was in session?

GEN. MUNDY: We did. We lived in Quarters 117, right at Quantico. Remember that July of 1975 was when there had been a look-back provision in retirement pay opportunities. Both the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant had retired early, at least, presumably because of that very significant monetary opportunity. So all of the colonels' quarters at Quantico had been vacated because all the colonels retired to take advantage of this pay opportunity.

That means that the lieutenant colonels at Quantico were all offered the opportunity to move into the white quarters up on the hill. So we moved from Lyman Park up into Quarters 117. A very, very delightful — about a year in quarters there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were the children going to the post school?

GEN MUNDY: They were, yes. My daughter was in high school, and then the boys were in junior high and elementary school.

BGEN SIMMONS: You received two fitness reports from Gen Maloney. The first was a fine fitness report, putting you in the top five percent of all the lieutenant colonels. MajGen Fred Haynes as reviewing officer said "outstanding in all respects" based on daily observation. Obviously, you were building an enviable reputation in high places.

As you were away from your assigned duties as Protocol Officer, which apparently had not been changed formally, the new commanding general, LtGen Joseph C. Fegan, gave you an "unobserved" report for this period. Your time on the Maloney study group went through the end of February, 1976. Gen Maloney gave you a very fine fitness report, stating, and I am quoting, "LtCol Mundy made an invaluable contribution to the integration of the two parallel study efforts which together formed the Haynes Board's product. First he tied together the final conclusions of the 'manpower' oriented report, which was provided to Senator Nunn's subcommittee of 31 December, 1975. Without missing a beat, he shifted to the 'force structure' team and deftly melded his early experience into that parallel final phase, insuring that the separate parts were 'mutually supporting' and complementary."

That is high praise indeed, and I presume that this early exposure to "Force Structure" would serve you in good stead in the future?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it did. The truth of the matter is that while we wound up the manpower quality study a little bit earlier than the force structure study, the other factor that was involved was that my five months of TAD — I had to be given PCS orders that I was going to be kept at Headquarters longer — my five months' TAD had ended, so I was sent back down to Quantico and assigned directly over to the force structure study group. So there was a little bit of a practicality to it.

But indeed, because I was working with some really — I mentioned three names earlier, Art Bloomer, George Leach, Gerry Hindman. Bill Ball — retired Colonel Bill Ball was on there. We had some really talented good thinkers. So I was injected among them and was a junior member of the crowd there.

It is interesting that one of the projects I was given was to design a mechanized organization. We called it the mobile assault regiment, MAR. We envisioned a mechanized force. We envisioned light armored vehicles with this force.

It is interesting, though I did not subsequently, when I became the Commandant and commissioned the force structure planning group, I didn't aim them

at anything specifically. But the structure of the mechanized regiment that we were setting out to put into each division was almost precisely the structure of the mobile assault regiment that had been developed by the Haynes Board. I never even thought about that. When we got through the force structure study group, I found that one of their prime reference pieces had been the Haynes Board. So the mobile assault regiment lived on for 20 years in concept.

BGEN SIMMONS: When you went back to MCDEC, you were given a new assignment, that of Assistant Head, Facilities Department. Your reporting senior became Col Lawrence S. Sullivan, the Head, Facilities Department. This was for only a two-month period. Col Sullivan gave you good marks. The reviewing officer, Col Vincente T. Blaz, then Chief of Staff, MCCDC, endorsed them enthusiastically, saying you were "a truly outstanding officer with whom I would like to serve anytime, anywhere."

Among other nice things, he called you "an exciting officer who exudes competence, enthusiasm and respect." The reviewing officer, Gen Fegan, stated "this officer has shown general officer potential." What were you doing as Assistant Head, Facilities Department, to garner such glowing reports?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had been selected to go to top level school. So this was a stash, if you will, of the remaining few months in Quantico. As the Assistant Head of Facilities, I did work for Larry Sullivan, who I thought was a superb man. He was selected for brigadier general there, and I liked him very much.

The deputy at the time that I got there was a lieutenant colonel named Jim Phillips, who also was a tremendous facilities officer. He subsequently had a heart attack and died. But Jim Phillips was a great fellow to work under. I really spent more time in direct relationship with him than I did with then-Col Sullivan.

But since I had a very limited amount of time to do, I tended to pick up special projects. We were then in the bicentennial year, so there was extra money around to do things with. I can recall, I think the last one of them has disappeared now, but one of my great contributions was to mount 55-gallon drums on a stanchion of some sort and put them in each of the gates, hopeful that the troops would throw in their beer cans and MacDonald wrappers. We painted them red, white and blue, and they were down there for years.

We put up some directories at the gates and what-not. And I worked with the housing office. This is

where I learned one of my early lessons about the attitude of some of the civilian agencies that served the military. I had gone down to the housing office on two or three occasions, representing complaints from people who would call the CG and gripe about something about the quarters, the maintenance, and it would pass to facilities, and I would be given it, and I would go down to talk to housing about it. I can remember finally, on one of these calls, I was saying, but there has to be a way that we can help these people, when the very frustrated head of the Housing Department at that time, a civilian who had been there for many, many years, got up from his desk and slammed his coffee cup down and said, "You know, this would be a damn fine place to work if we didn't have all these Marines to contend with." I thought, well, that is an attitude. It is still pervasive in many quarters today. It would be wonderful if we didn't have to give these people houses. We could have a nice quiet job.

But I did that. I was given the project of preparing the base for the bicentennial, things like that. The Royal Marines sent over their military tattoo to perform in Wolf Trap as a part of the bicentennial celebration. I was made the project officer for that. We put on a show down at Quantico. So I picked up little odds and ends like that. But in all that, I also learned a little bit about facilities and about maintenance, and came to appreciate the difficulty of maintaining bases.

I think from that, more than at any other time I can think about in my career, I gained an appreciation for the importance of the supporting establishment, the basics. It has always been the right thing for a Marine to talk about the FMF and all like that. But what I learned from that experience was that if you don't have a good base structure, if you don't have good support for your families, if you don't have good exchanges and good commissaries and whatnot, the FMF is not going to be very good, because people are going to be basically unhappy and dissatisfied with their quarters.

But I was there for only a short time, about five months. Then I cut loose from that assignment and headed north, up to Newport.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were detached in July 1976 for assignment as a student at the Naval War College. Did you have quarters at Newport?

GEN MUNDY: We did. We lived down on Polk Court, in the Fort Adams housing area, which was when we got there a delightful place, because we

would sit on our front porch or look out our bedroom window directly at Narragansett Bay and watch the World's Cup boats coming up the bay, and it was beautiful. We came to realize a few months later that it got cold there in the wintertime, and it wasn't so beautiful at that time, when you couldn't put your nose outside.

But we lived in quarters. It was a cluster. They were student quarters, so you literally lived with bunches of your fellow students. Our Army officers introduced us to the custom of "lion on the lawn parties," which was — you would come home from school on a Friday afternoon and walk in your house, and if you happened to look out your front door, there was a stone lion, and if that lion was sitting on your porch, you had better have the hors d'oeuvres and the glasses and ice ready to go in about two hours. If you didn't look on your front porch and notice it, it was all right, because they came in anyway, whether you were ready or not.

Those were great times, when you really got to know your — not only your service peers, but the sister services. It was a wonderful year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was President of the Naval War College then?

GEN MUNDY: The President at that time was a vice admiral. We called him Frenchy, because — Frenchy LeBoeuf. I can't spell his name. He had had a heart attack and was awaiting medical retirement, so he was undergoing medical processing shortly after that. The flag list had come out, and the dean there, who was at that time Capt Hunt Hardisty, was selected for rear admiral, so he was promoted and was made the president.

So the president as I would recall it in my time was RAdm Hunt Hardisty, later to become US CINCPAC and Vice Chief of the Navy.

BGEN SIMMONS: How would you summarize your year at the Naval War College? What did you get out of it?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I got a lot out of it. One, we had trimesters. The first trimester when I was there was on strategy and policy. I ate that up. I guess it was shades of things to come, but I really delighted in strategy and policy. We had to read as the first book of the year *The Peloponnesian Wars* by Thucydides, the Greek. It was a horrible book, horrible reading. But they sent it to you in advance, and you were supposed to take a couple of weeks leave before you got

there and read the book, and of course, none of us did that. We all tried, and I can remember that finally, one of my friends related to me that he had found the Cliff Notes over in the bookstore. So we all rushed and bought out the Cliff Notes and read them. It turned out that I had to write a paper on Thucydides my first week there. So to this day, I can tell you that you can write a passing paper right out of that little thin 30 or 40 page Cliff Notes as opposed to reading the whole book. It was a horrible book.

BGEN SIMMONS: Thucydides was the legacy of Admiral Stan Turner's time.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. It was the classic land power versus the naval power contest. It was a good framework, but it was painful. I probably read more of the book than I am recounting here, because I tried hard to read the book. I was there the year after Stansfield Turner left. Stansfield Turner had come into what had been characteristic of war colleges in those days. It was a pretty laid-back year. Kind of, do what you want and think about what you want to read, play a lot of sports and have a great social time. But his philosophy was, this is a year off from responsibility, they are not commanding ships or commanding battalions, so let's work them.

So the reading list and the writing, everything we did was graded. It was a fairly heavy academic year. It was certainly not a year off without a lot of pressures on you.

That was the first trimester, strategy and policy. I thoroughly enjoyed that, studies of how the world wars got started, and Bismarck and Roosevelt and Churchill and everyone else. I ate that up. I took as a sub-course, interestingly, during that as an elective, the JCS, the first 25 years, by a professor there at the time, Larry Korb, Lawrence Korb, who later turned out to be Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Nixon Administration, and with the Hudson Institute right now, writing about defense policy matters. Larry changed complexion, from a very staunch supporter of the military to a major critic of the military.

The second trimester was defense decision making.

That had two elements to it. One was non-quantitative factors, which was leadership by another name. That was taught — my professor was Larry Korb. That was my thing. We would have projects like, for example, we talked about the racial problems earlier, the riots on the *Kitty Hawk*, analyze this, tell us what the captain did right and what he did wrong. So for Marines, that was bread and butter. We ate that up and usually turned in the top papers. The Navy would

have some I'm okay-you're okay solution to it, but the Marines were generally pretty good at that.

The other one was quantitative factors, which was really for me a tough course. It was operations analysis. It was a very — a lot of arithmetic and those sorts of things. I have never been very good at that. I am less than a Rhodes scholar when it comes to tough math studies. Had it not been for the fact that I was carpooling with, and happened to be in a class with my good friend, then LtCol and subsequently MajGen Ray Franklin — he was a whiz at this. He had just come out of the Defense Research and Development Agency. Ray had all these things down. So we would ride back and forth to work. We would have a project like, design a support system for the F-14 aircraft, and I didn't have any idea what they wanted me to do. So Ray and I would get in the car and ride home, and he would say, here is what you need to do. Look at it this way and focus on these three things. So I would go home that night and write out something and come back, and the next day on the way in to work I would tell him what I had written, and he would give me a couple of rudder changes, and I would write my paper up and turn it in, and get pretty good marks.

But I rode Ray Franklin's coattails then. Then later when I came to Headquarters many years thereafter, and I was a two-star and he was a two-star, I still listened when Ray Franklin had something to say, because he was one of the best and brightest minds we had in the Corps.

The third trimester, the spring trimester, if you will, was the naval operations. Again, Marines prevailed. Even though we studied sonar systems and submarines and learned about the thermal layers and all those things that the Navy officers had to worry about, there was enough in it that was operational, to where the Marines could once again shine.

So in the midst of all that, great friendships, a pretty hard year of work, a lot of social activity and — the pleasures of dining in Newport. Learned how to ski with my boys. It was a good year, and we thoroughly enjoyed it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your other Marine classmates?

GEN MUNDY: I mentioned Ray Franklin. Jim Mead, who became a brigadier general, was a classmate. We had been PLCs together. Jim Orr, who retired as a colonel, who had been my Basic School bunkmate, we wound up together. Lou Piantadosi, now down at Quantico. We had Fred Anthony, now Head of Decorations and Medals and Fred Sisley, and

Walt Donovan, both later brigadiers. Those were some of the major names. We had a lot of other officers in the other services who went on to become two and three stars. I don't know of any other four-star officers out of that class, but many of my Army peers were major or lieutenant generals when they retired.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall any names?

GEN MUNDY: I'm struggling to here, because I can see faces and I can call first names. Chuck — in fact, I sold him my motorcycle while I was up there — became the Director of Intelligence for the Army a few years ago, and I cannot for the life of me say his last name. I'm not recalling the names.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about Navy friends?

GEN MUNDY: The Navy did not — that was during a time when the Navy was not sending its best and brightest to the War College. They simply got hammered for that in Goldwater-Nichols. The Navy viewed a year at the War College as a place that you took an officer who was waiting to go to command, and you sent him there and he did one of the trimesters, and then they would yank him out mid-stream and send him off to Idaho Falls to learn how to be a nuclear skipper or something. So none of the Navy officers that I was there with ever became very notable. The Navy tended to send its future stars, if you will, to the National War College. I believe, from my estimation, that most of the Navy officers of that class never achieved a great deal — a sad testimonial to the Navy's regard for its own war college.

BGEN SIMMONS: You got a straight "outstanding" report from the President of the War College, RAdm Hunt Hardisty. Did you have much personal contact with Hunt?

GEN MUNDY: He lived in Fort Hunt. Fort Hunt had been built by LtCol Robert E. Lee of the engineers when he was in the Federal Army. President Eisenhower used to come up there and spend some time in the summer at what was called Eisenhower House, that had been the CO's post. So there were some large quarters out there that were occupied by the faculty, and then there were some smaller efficiencies, student quarters that we lived in. They were right across the street.

So Adm Hardisty, when he was Capt Hardisty, lived diagonally up the street. We would see him washing his car, pass the time of day. But not too

much personal contact beyond that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your overall grade for the course was 3.61, presumably out of a possible 4.0. Your class standing is not given. Do you have anything else to add to your ten months that you spent in Newport?

GEN MUNDY: My class standing would not have been notable. I was definitely not in the cum laudes in the graduating class. But I think what I learned there, I just conveyed last week at Amphibious Warfare School that the studies are important, but the studies are not what endures. It is the associations and learning from your peers that are in my judgment the greatest product that one brings from those years of professional schooling.

So what I have ever since advised those who were selected to go off to Newport, when they have said to me, "What should I do?" I said, "They are going to give you a stack of books that would break the back of an elephant. You are going to be astounded. You are a Marine, you will be eager to excel, you will dive into these and start plowing through them, and you will beat your brains out. If you read them all, you will go home every night and do nothing but read books. So what I am saying to you is, lean back a little bit. You should have time for your family. It is one of the rare years that you will be able to do that. You should mix it up with your peers in every opportunity you have. If you have time to read those books, read them too, but let that be a lower order priority. That tends to surprise the officers of this particular era, because they have all come from colleges and universities where A's were something that you fought for, where high grades were what it was all about. I said, "You're going to graduate, or they wouldn't be sending you there. Go there and profit from your associations."

So that was my summation. But again, a very good year at Newport. I think we probably in the next session will go into this, but I got my orders to come to Headquarters from there, which could not have been a better suited thing than coming out of that year and on to my next assignment.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the next session, we will take up your tour as a Plans Officer in the Plans Division at Headquarters Marine Corps.

GEN MUNDY: As a final note, I should mention that Col Bill Wiese, later a brigadier, was the senior Marine on the facility at Newport while I was there.

SESSION 11

Plans Officer at HQMC

Assignment to the Plans Division at Headquarters . . . Working for LtGen Andy O'Donnell . . . Planning for the use of Marine Corps forces in Europe . . . Briefing Gen Lou Wilson and Gen Bob Barrow . . . Working for LtGen D'Wayne Gray . . . Maritime prepositioning.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session, we covered your two-year tour at Quantico, from August 1974 to July 1976, and your subsequent year at the Naval War College. In this session, we will explore your three-year tour, from July 1977 until July 1980 as a plans officer at Headquarters Marine Corps.

After the Naval War College, you were ordered to Headquarters Marine Corps and assigned to the Plans Division of the Plans, Programs and Operations Division as a plans officer. How did this assignment come about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not extraordinarily. It was just an assignment that I received. But my good friend — I keep saying good friend, but these were good friends — Tony Studds, later MajGen Jon A. Studds, was then the lieutenant colonels monitor. He called me while I was in Newport and said, “You’re going to be coming to Headquarters Marine Corps.” I said, “That’s fine. He said, “I’m looking at you for the Plans Division.”

Well, very candidly, my knowledge base to that point was essentially with G-3 operations, even though I had not been in a G-3. But I knew that the real men, as we perceived them, at the lower grades were the G-3 ops guys, while the G-3 plans guys seemed to be the fuddy duddies who wrote action reports and did other things that none of us really wanted to do. So plans seemed to me a rather stodgy assignment. So I said, “If I have any option at all, I would like to be a monitor. I would like to go into the manpower business. I realize you’re there, but that is what I would be interested in.”

So Tony said, “We’ve got you slated for the Plans Division. It is a premier job on the headquarters staff, and you’ll enjoy it.” So I said “Fine,” and that is how I came to be assigned to the Plans Division, not with a lot of enthusiasm, though it turned out to be one of the absolutely finest jobs I have ever had.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Plans, Programs and Operations at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The Big O, then LtGen Andy O'Donnell.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did he interview you on your arrival?

GEN MUNDY: He did. Welcome aboard, glad to have you, all of that sort of thing. He was a rather flamboyant character, a rather big man, as those who know him will recall. One of the most impressive sights in the world that I can recall in my first few days there was watching him, because he would accompany the Commandant to JCS meetings, but was watching Gen Lou Wilson and LtGen Andy O'Donnell walking out of the building in their alpha uniforms, giants, each one was six-four, six-five feet tall. I thought, my God, I bet the Marine Corps wins every issue “in the tank” with two like that. It was very impressive.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you ever met Gen O'Donnell before?

GEN MUNDY: Had not. I had known him — he had been the Military Secretary to the Commandant a few years earlier. He had been a face that I would see, but I never had any dealings with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Director of the Plans Division at this time?

GEN MUNDY: That was BGen Frank Quinn, who had just been selected for brigadier, and had just come back to be the Director of Plans.

BGEN SIMMONS: Of course, he interviewed you and sounded you out, and then assigned you to a branch or section.

GEN MUNDY: I was assigned to the Western Regional Branch, which was the NATO European Matters Branch. We were then organized in a division as an Eastern region, which oversaw the Pacific and Asia, and a Western region. I was rather surprised by that, because if I had had an orientation in my experiences to date, I kind of figured that I was a Pacific-oriented Marine. My good friend, LtCol Buzz Bowlin, who was a classmate coming out of Newport, had taught at the Joint Warfare Establishment with the Royal Marines, had an exchange tour in the UK. So I assumed that it would be he who went to the Western Branch and I who went to the Eastern Branch, but it was just the other way around. He went to Eastern and I came to Western. I later learned that another career friend, LtCol Hank Stackpole, was leaving the Western Branch, and had lobbied hard too get me into his job — eventually one of the best I ever had.

BGEN SIMMONS: Buzz Bowlin, how does he spell his last name?

GEN MUNDY: B-o-w-l-i-n, retired as a colonel. Let me also mention that Colonel Jerry Hagen was the deputy director, followed by LtCol Norm Smith.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were soon involved in planning for the use of Marine Corps forces in Europe. Was this specifically for the prospective NATO employment in Norway?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was. We had two plans officers that oversaw NATO European matters. The way we started initially, — that other officer was LtCol John Delaney — we split NATO initially by saying that one of us would handle U.S.-European command matters, and the other one would handle the Alliance matters, NATO. That didn't work out very well, because you generally would find yourself tripping over each other, because those were hard lines to break apart.

So we went to a Northern Europe and a Southern Europe desk officer. John Delaney took Southern Europe, though we would back fill each other and I worked those issues, too, and I took Northern Europe, or I was assigned Northern Europe. So Norway came into my AOR, but I also had responsibility for Jutland and for the Baltic, in addition to purely Norway focus.

BGEN SIMMONS: The general plan for the employment of Marines at that time was either on a northern flank or a southeastern flank, isn't that true?

GEN MUNDY: That's right, yes. The Marines really didn't want to get involved in that. It is amazing to look back and look at some of the things that we fought so hard against, then become wonderful Marine Corps initiatives later, and we can talk some more about those in this session. But the Marines had been a Pacific-oriented force; we liked that. But when the United States lost the war in Vietnam and turned in a national guilt syndrome away from the Pacific, we then discovered Europe. So all hail to NATO, and we became then focused on NATO.

The bottom line was, in Washington, if you did not have a stake in the European soil, when resources were passed out, you weren't going to get any. So the Marine Corps rather reluctantly turned our orientation toward NATO. But because NATO was strictly a land and an air theater, one might argue that SACCLANT was there, and you had to get across the Atlantic, and that is true. But really, the people in NATO thought of navies as navies that would run patrol boats up and down the Baltic or the Mediterranean. Nobody really thought much about the Mediterranean, because the whole focus of NATO was the central region.

So as the Marines came to that, we were immediately challenged by a lot of thinkers and ops analysts as being too light for the heavy war with the Soviets in the center region. No one contested that. We never planned to go into the center region. In fact, there never were any plans for the Marines in the center region. But we tried very hard to create an awareness and to make a case for amphibious capability. To do that, you had to operate on the flanks, because you weren't going to conduct an amphibious assault into France or across the English Channel unless all had been lost. But in the Mediterranean, which we had for the past 40 years been involved in, and on the northern flank, we saw great utility for the capabilities that amphibious forces could bring.

So initially, the plans as you cite them correctly were that two Marine expeditionary forces would be allocated to NATO in wartime, and that they would serve as SACEUR's, strategic reserves, to be employed wherever and whenever he needed them. While a lot of Marines saw great utility in that role, as a practical matter, those who were the NATO planners planned in a very structured and rote and nonrealistic mode that Army planners tend to plan, that is, that we would somehow rush these masses of U.S. divisions through either Pomcus airlifting them over, or sealift, and rush all these divisions to Europe on short notice, and they would take form and launch off into combat. Marines found that to be a rather illogical concept to begin with. But we were always characterized —

because they viewed us in the amphibious role, and therefore, by the time you embark and set sail and arrive and did a rehearsal and got ready for an amphibious operation, Army planners who dominated the NATO scene, tended to say, the Marines will never get here and forget about them. So anything that the Marines came up with to do was okay with the SACEUR planners, because they didn't care and they didn't want us there in the first place. It was an Army and an Air Force theater.

Second to that, we brought the Marine air-ground task force. That was beyond the comprehension ability of any of the allied officers in Europe. There were some very fine minds there, but the European armies were just that: the army was the army and the air force was the air force, and any degree of coordination between the two was nonexistent. Nobody cared about it. Whatever the Air Force wanted to do, they could go do. So the U.S. Air Force prospered from that, because with their philosophy of air power being a dominant arm, if not the dominant arm, the U.S. Air Force was able to embrace all of the European air forces and become relatively independent, while the U.S. Army thought in terms of corps, German corps and U.S. corps and Belgian corps, and so on.

So it was classic fragmented, non-integrated planning for the employment not of an entity, like a MAGTF we brought, but rather just the pieces of war-making capability. So when the Marines arrived, we were confronted with this — when you come, you'll give us your air and we'll take your divisions, and of course, we resisted that with much effort. That was one of the more painful episodes in my career, but it taught me a lot, and it certainly got me ready for roles and missions. To this day, I will be more than happy to take on anybody at any time on the subject of tactical air and win, because Marines have the best story to tell of anybody in that regard.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you involved in prepositioning in Norway?

GEN MUNDY: Extensively. When I arrived in the Plans Division, one of the initial briefings that I got was, you are to be the Marine Corps member of the Norwegian-U.S. bilateral study group, which was looking at the defense of Norway, at what the Norwegians needed to do and what types of reinforcements they needed. So I was assigned to that.

Whoever heard of Norway? I think I had probably seen it in a movie or something like that, but I wasn't too excited about the northern flank. But at the same time, I was told that I would be the representative.

There had been one meeting of this group before I got there, and it was just taking form. So my three years of association with that group and with the overall subject of prepositioning in Norway was the formative time. I don't seek to put myself in the spotlight. I happened to be the man on the scene at the time.

So yes, I was extensively involved with that. I would go so far as to say I was probably more involved than anybody else.

BGEN SIMMONS: And you worked actively with the Norwegians?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes. We met — every six months we would go to Norway and they would come here. The chief of their team was their then-Under Secretary of State for Defense, which would have been an Assistant Secretary for Defense in our terminology. But Johan Holst, who later became their Minister of Defense, we remained friends for many years. He had an abrupt heart attack and is not alive now. But one of your neighbors at the time, lived on Sherwood Hall Lane with you, was in our ISA, International Security Affairs element in OCS, was an Air Force major general named Bowman. I don't recall his first name right now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was that George Bowman?

GEN MUNDY: It may have been George. But anyway, he is still around. He sells the BV vehicles for Hoagland's, a Swedish corporation.

But anyway, we would meet twice a year, and then there would be a lot of inter-activity in between. Sometimes one or two officers would come over, or we would go. In addition to that, of course, I was involved as the Regional Plans Officer. I would go to the planning conferences that would be hosted by various — either in EUCOM as a U.S. conference, or by the Allied Forces in Northern Europe Command.

So I would routinely go two, three, maybe sometimes four times a year into Norway.

BGEN SIMMONS: The conventional wisdom, I believe, was or is that the Norwegians are quite xenophobic, and for good reason, and that they were not very keen having foreign troops on their soil. You have already used the term bilateral. Did this become more of a U.S. Marine region thing than a NATO thing, would you say?

GEN MUNDY: Very much so, not by our intent. The

interesting thing that ought to be recorded is that this was one of the greatest failures that I ever experienced in my career. It turned out all right, but my specific instructions by Marine leadership were to get the Marine Corps out — go and attend the meetings, but obligate the Marine Corps to nothing, keep us out of this. Every time I would write up responses, they would come in with staff queries, and I would prepare the responses back to either the OSD or back to Norway. I would go in with what type of air-ground task force could be put together to be prepositioned in Norway, so I would work hard with my counterparts over in I&L. I would go down to Quantico and I would get the operations counterparts, lieutenant colonels, for the most part. Col Dick Sulik was one of those that was over in I&L at the time, Strategic Mobility Branch. Then LtCol Dave Henderson, who has since done a lot of work for the Marine Corps in that project.

But we would put together this response, which had to be legitimate, and we knew that it had to be legitimate as we could put it. I would take it up front. We could not find a colonel in I&L, for example, who would sign any of these responses. They wanted nothing to do with it. So it was a bunch of bandits running around getting this done, with explicit guidance to kill it, to get out of it. Frank Quinn would bring me in, when I would come in with a submission to go back, and he would say this is too positive. Go back and make this negative. We want nothing to do with this. So I would go back and caveat it.

So interestingly, the Marine Corps did not want to become involved in this. There was great concern, including — probably Gen Barrow now had left and gone down to CGFMFLant. He probably had a little bit more of an orientation. Gen Wilson with his Pacific orientation, wanted nothing to do with this prepositioning in Norway. So I was rather the bad boy, because I would keep trying to answer the mail, but being told to go back and make it not sound so good.

Finally, to end a lengthy tale here, after many negotiations, I began to see some merit in this. I began to realize that we could do worse. It was going to be additive. Bowman would keep telling me, “Listen, you guys sign on for this. We will buy you additive equipment. The howitzers you put up there will not be out of Marine Corps supplies. You will get additional ammo, you will get additional money out of this.”

The only guy that saw a ray of hope in this was then- LtGen Hal Hatch, who was then the Deputy Chief of Staff for I&L. I think what Hatch realized

that many others didn’t and I certainly didn’t, but what he realized was that this could be a cornucopia for the Marine Corps, that we could have our cake and eat it, too. We could conceive that we would preposition some equipment up there, OSD would buy us additional equipment, it would become in anybody’s mind additional PWR for the Marine Corps. So he was fairly supportive.

But at any rate, I went over in June of 1978 to the meeting that would be held in Bergen, Norway, which is in the western part of Norway. Beautiful place. We had the meeting in a 14th century castle that was called Haakon’s. Haakon is one of the legendary kings of Norway, back there in the 13th and 14th century. But anyway, King Haakon’s Hall, castle or home. We had the meeting there. It was a grand place to have it, and it was a pleasant time in Norway.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Holtz and Bowman — I made the Marine Corps presentation. The Navy was there, they had a representative, and the Joint Staff as always was there. The Army didn’t want to touch Norway with a ten-foot pole, so they never played. I had given our presentation on what the Marine Corps could do and the way we could organize.

So Bowman and Johan Holtz said that’s fine, “It is time that we put this on paper and get an agreement on it.” I was petrified, because I knew I was going to be in a tough way when I got back to Washington. I said, “You know that I’m not authorized to make a commitment for the Marine Corps here.” Gen Bowman, Air Force general, said “That’s all right, Col Mundy, I am authorized to make commitments for the United States of America, and I’ll make the commitment.”

So anyway, we signed that element of the study. I signed it, then Holtz and Bowman signed a tentative agreement on the prepositioning of the Marines in Norway. I left, went right back to my hotel, fired a phone call back to the deputy director of the Plans Division, then-Col Norm Smith, and said, “Norm, I think I’m in trouble, because we just signed up to preposition in Norway.” He said, “Well, let me get you right to the horse’s mouth.” Gen O’Donnell had been relieved by LtGen Dolph Schwenk. Schwenk was always cool as a cucumber, a solid rock. If he ever got excited about something — I imagine he did, but I never knew it.

But anyway, the other end of the phone picked up, and he said, “Schwenk.” I said, “Well, General, the prepositioning agreement is about to be signed, and we’re hooked into this.” He said, “Tell me about it, and I told him about it,” and he said, “Okay, when are

you coming back?" I said, "I had planned to take a few days leave while I was over here." He said, "Enjoy your leave," and hung up the phone.

So when I came back, the deed was done, and we were prepositioning in Norway, and I wound up briefing many people, the Commandant two or three times, and Schwenk. Nobody was overly excited about it. So that is how we came to be prepositioned in Norway.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the first half of your tour, Colonel Richard D. Taber was your branch chief and reporting senior.

GEN MUNDY: Dick Taber, right.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the three fitness reports he gave you, he consistently marked you as "outstanding," but so apparently were the other three lieutenant colonels in the branch. Can you recall who these other lieutenant colonels were?

GEN MUNDY: I mentioned John Delaney. John retired as a lieutenant colonel. We had Faustin Wirkus. Faustin became a colonel eventually. He was the Middle East officer, or Eastern Mediterranean. We also had LtCol Merle Schweitzer, the South American Action officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was he the son of the famous Faustin Wirkus?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. His father was a Marine. Was he a famous Marine?

BGEN SIMMONS: The King of Gonaives in Haiti.

GEN MUNDY: The King of Gonaives in Haiti. It was Faustin Wirkus' father. As you mention that, one of the things that he became preoccupied with, they were going to make a movie for awhile there, and he was dealing with a Hollywood agent. I never saw the movie, if it was made. I imagine it must have fallen out somewhere along the way.

But at any rate, Wirkus, Delaney, Schweitzer, Taber. We had an officer, Hank Stackpole, had just left. I took over then-LtCol Hank Stackpole's desk. It was he who had convinced Taber that — the assignment had been Bowlin coming to the Western Regional Branch and me going to Eastern, and Hank Stackpole who was a good friend had spoken in my stead and convinced Taber that I was the man for this job. So that was what had gotten Taber high on me.

Yes, I had a good rapport with Col Taber.

BGEN SIMMONS: In fact, in his first set of comments, Col Taber says, "I fought to have him assigned to my branch after reviewing his record, and he has fully justified my expectations." You have explained how that came about.

GEN MUNDY: I think that is owed to Hank Stackpole.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were some of the other matters you worked on?

GEN MUNDY: Everything involved with Europe in those days, because as I mentioned, even though we had split northern and southern, as a practical matter you couldn't do that. If I was off on a conference somewhere, John Delaney had to pick up the northern branch, and when he was off I had to pick up the southern region.

So I became as familiar with the issues in the southern region as I had been the northern region. Those issues that continued to be of concern about the Marine Corps worked their way around the inclusion of the Marines in the plan, and their being properly included. So if it was a plan for the southern region, we had to insure that the wording and the concept for employment was identical with the northern region. So I began to wash over into the southern region as well.

We had at that time the mutual and balanced force reductions, the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, many of those political military types of things, the review of all of the doctrinal manuals, amphibious operations or tactical air operations. First and foremost, the cross that I had to bear, which again has served me extremely well, was that Marine aviation was always under attack by not only our friends in NATO, but often by our Air Force, who bore us no ill. I found that some of the greatest admirers of Marines are the U.S. Air Force. Indeed, I think the Air Force as an institution admires Marines.

But they still consider that they are the air power authorities, and that airplanes would be employed the way that airmen seek to employ them. Marines of course see it the other way; airplanes should be deployed as ground officers see they should be. So we had a great continuing confrontation. I would go over to Brussels to present the Marine response to the annual NATO defense planning questionnaire on the commitment: how many artillery pieces you were going to have, how many Marines, what is the state of

their training and all this sort of thing at NATO headquarters? And the only questions that I would ever receive would be, when are you going to become realistic and turn over your air when it comes here to an air commander, and knock off this nonsense of this Marine air-ground task force.

As a result of that, I became within the Plans Division — because Marine air was not under attack in the Pacific. There was nobody out there in the eastern region that was contesting this — I became the Marine aviation doctrinal expert. Even though there was a doctrinal branch in the Aviation Branch, I would go down — as we would get these challenges to Marine aviation, I would go down there and I would talk to Col Bob Sheehan, who was then the head of that, and I would say “Here, over to you.” And he would say, “Oh, no, I don’t do that, back to you.” I would say, “Look here, I am a Marine infantry officer. What in the hell am I doing carrying this banner for defense of Marine aviation?”

Well, what I came to realize, and what I have appreciated so much in subsequent years was that I am not a Marine infantry officer, I am a Marine air-ground task force officer, and if I can’t speak combined arms, then who can? If those who use the aviation as a weapons system can’t justify it, then who is going to?

So very painfully, I went through many, many very painful sessions, confronting the Air Force in the Pentagon, confronting the Air Force in Southern Europe, confronting the German air commanders in Northern Europe, confronting the Norwegian air commanders, all of whom could see no logic to our system. As a result of that, I think in these past four years as the Commandant, when the consistent challenge has come against Marine aviation, I have not had to turn to staff to give me answers. I have felt pretty confident in my knowledge of Marine aviation.

Those are the types of things with which we dealt.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you involved in preparing the Commandant for his JCS duties, or were you working chiefly in Service plans?

GEN MUNDY: No, I was a joint planner. We had a service plans branch, which was then headed by Col Paul Frappollo, and subsequently a Col Joe Knotts, who became a general. Those dealt with the service plans. But service plans in the NATO arena were joint plans, because that was the Marine Corps’ element of this particular joint plan. So I really probably crossed over everything. We worked very closely with the Operations Division, how many tanks were we going to have in the tank battalion next year, how we were

going to structure the Marine Corps. That was all important in the joint plans business.

But the Commandant, you saw a lot of the Commandant. First Gen Wilson and then Gen Barrow, probably saw more of Gen Barrow than I did Gen Wilson, because the issues that I was involved with were the type that — even though there was no question that the generals in between me and the Commandant had to be knowledgeable of that, but the experts I came to realize and value were colonels. To this day, any general worth his salt will tell you that colonels know what is going on, and the generals represent what the colonels know needs to be done.

So I was a firebrand in the Headquarters, and —

BGEN SIMMONS: You briefed Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow?

GEN MUNDY: Frequently. The good experience there was that you became — I hope not cocky, maybe that, but I was the expert on prepositioning matters. There may be philosophical questions. Or I was the expert on command and control issues in NATO, and no one had a better hand on that than I did. So that level of involvement and expertise brought with it the confidence to go in to the Commandant.

I can remember briefing Gen Barrow one time when finally the issue of command and control of Marine aviation had gotten into “the tank.” I remember my briefing to Gen Barrow after I confronted the Air Force as stridently as I could. I began that briefing — I remember the paper, and then my briefing with, go for the jugular, General, this is one you have to win. I know you try and get along with your counterparts, but this is why you get the big house and the big cars. It is time for you to earn your pay. So you had that ability to discourse with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, literally like a football coach, working up your quarterback. You had to fire him up and get him smart and energized, and send him into the arena, and he had to win for you, because you knew the Marine Corps had to win this one.

So it was an extraordinary relationship of a plans colonel, at that time, to the Commandant and to the other generals. The generals sometimes didn’t want to engage on this. I understand that completely, because I have just been the Commandant, and there were many times when I wanted to back away from it. It is hard in a collegial atmosphere to go on the attack, but we had to fire the Commandant up to attack.

So that was a very exciting time for me. And we usually won.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you work directly with the Joint Staff? Did you journey over to the Pentagon frequently?

GEN MUNDY: All the time. Long hours. When I reported to the job, Col Taber said, we usually come to work here at 5:30 in the morning. He said, I know that is a little early, but your family is still asleep when you come to work, anyway. So we start at 5:30, and then we can finish our work and take off. I never got home for three years before seven or eight o'clock at night. So you put in a 12 or 14 hour day every day, and it was intense.

But you journeyed to the Pentagon for plans meetings, and that would be usually chaired by a joint staff equivalent. If you were an action officer, then it was a lieutenant colonel level, or a planner, the formal term was a colonel. You went over and you sat among your peers and you wrestled these issues, and if you all couldn't resolve it, then it went up to the one or two stars and then the three stars and eventually to the chief.

So contrary to what a lot of people believe, the joint chiefs of staff really deal with a very few issues. But the things that are done in their name are done for the most part by colonels and brigadiers and major generals. Yet the record will recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided this, but it is below that level.

So a great deal of involvement, and a very, very hyper busy time.

BGEN SIMMONS: During this period, you were selected for promotion to colonel, but you had to wait awhile before your actual promotion. Where were you living at this time?

GEN MUNDY: At this time, we had realized that the best neighborhood in Washington was where BGen Simmons lived, down off the Fort Hunt Road area. You will recall that Gene Arnold had lived down there, and we had come to like that area. So when I was coming down from Newport, I drew a circle around Fort Hunt High School and told a realtor, find me a house there.

So we lived in a house at 1806 Stirrup Lane in Alexandria, which we have just sold. We bought that house in 1978.

BGEN SIMMONS: I hope you realized a nice profit on it. I'm sure you did.

GEN MUNDY: Compared to what I paid for it in 1978, I will. I think I am giving somebody a good

price on it now, but it is still about four times what I paid for it.

BGEN SIMMONS: So your children were going to the Fort Hunt schools?

GEN MUNDY: They were.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any pets at that time?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, the Mundys have never been without, usually dogs. Ned, who is our now-17 year old combination — we get all of our dogs at the dog pound, but Ned came as a puppy in 1978, and right now he is a blind, deaf, stumbling old fellow that I can commiserate with, because when I get up in the mornings, a lot of times I feel about like Ned looks.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall handling the visit of a party of Swedish dignitaries who were —

GEN MUNDY: The Swedes, who of course had been neutral, although I think as a practical matter, we in the United States national plans business probably viewed them as not certain as to how they would roll if the Russians came through the Baltic and seized Jutland and Denmark and all of the approaches. We weren't really sure how the Swedes would stand. So we were perhaps a little bit suspect.

But the Swedes wanted to come over and discuss how the U.S. Marines would attack Sweden amphibiously, were we coming from the Baltic. Their point was to say, we need to know how to frame our defenses to resist an attack — because they were neutral, they didn't want to say by the Russians coming through the Baltic, but they said, were we attacked from the Baltic world, very clear what they were looking for.

So they came over to be educated on the types of capabilities that we had. I was made responsible for that visit. We briefed them at the Headquarters. We sent them off to Quantico. I'm not certain whether we sent them down to Camp Lejeune or not, but characteristically we might have done that.

We briefed them on equipment. They wanted to talk about things that were just emerging with us, about the air cushion craft, because the Russians had some of those even before we got in that business, and what would be the best defense against them, and what concepts would be used and how they would defend.

As I recall, they may have sent a general. If it was, it would have been a one or two star. They really

don't have one star generals, so it probably would have been a two star. Maybe it was even at the colonel level.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall meeting with the House Armed Services Committee staffers and briefing them on NATO matters?

GEN MUNDY: Many times, many times. The United States was focusing on NATO, so all of the Services were involved with the Congress. We would brief them on the Marine Corps plans. The plans were classified, you're not supposed to brief a classified plan, so you had to make up your briefing to skirt that, where you could tell them that we had two MAFs that were committed, and tell them as much as you could, and then answer their questions.

So yes, there were many occasions of that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you make any connections with any staffers or Congressmen that continued later on?

GEN MUNDY: Then-Captain Arnold Punaro got off active duty. I can recall, I was in the Plans Division when Capt Punaro, USMCR was brought over and we were told that he was going to work for Senator Nunn on the Armed Services Committee, and we had to bring him up to speed on Marine Corps matters. So Arnold is one that I remember from an early time.

Jim Locher, who subsequently became an Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low intensity conflict. Jim Locher was a staffer over there at that time, who was very interested in Marine aviation. And because — not that I justified airplanes, but I did justify employment concepts and doctrine of Marine aviation, so I had occasion to meet with him.

Beyond that, and as far as the members themselves, they were not people with whom I dealt too much. I knew who Senator Nunn was. I knew Senator Glenn, Warner and Thurmond, that were big names and are big names today. But not too much direct contact with them.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was a hijacking incident in late August 1978. You were involved in it in some way. What was that about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I have tried to recall as you mentioned that. I can recall that in that time, we were entering the era of terrorism, and there were hijackings.

The one that I specifically recall was the Moluccan train incident, involving the Dutch Marines. They were hostages on a train in the Netherlands. What would usually happen, any time there was an international incident, plans officers become the operations officers for the joint environment. So a cell is stood up in the National Military Command Center when that occurs, and a representative from each Service is on watch down there, depending on the region involved. If it was a crisis in Europe, then it was the European guys that stood. If it was in the Pacific, then the Eastern Region people would take it. We called those CAT teams, Crisis Action Teams.

The worst word you could hear on a late Friday is that there has been a CAT team, because you would say, "Oh, God, there goes the weekend," and you would be in the Pentagon for the weekend.

But there were probably several incidents like that, and I don't recall specifically a hijacking. But had it occurred in Europe, I would have been the Marine that was on watch and engaged with the Joint Staff on the Crisis Action Team.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September 1978, although you were still lieutenant colonel, you moved up to be head of the Western Region Branch. What was your new range of duties?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the head of the branch of course oversaw generally the European matters. We had the Middle East desk officer, and we had the South American desk. So if you will, the Western Hemisphere came to the Western Regional Branch. That began to clutter a bit, as we began to create the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force with Southwest Asia. Nobody in those days knew or cared where the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf was. That was the other side of the world.

But as that developed, we began to bump up against the Eastern Regional Branch. So we had some issues out there with the RDJTF, for example. The Western Regional Branch oversaw those issues. Then it would shift over to the Eastern Region.

But that generally was my hemispheric responsibilities. Then again, with the prepositioning, by this time we had not gotten into the appropriate position at that point, so prepositioning was pretty well — most of the activity that was going on in the world at that time seemed for one reason or another to descend upon the fine officers that always wound up catching the duty or having the action in the Western Regional Branch.

You mentioned that I had been moved up to the

branch head. Remember, as you said earlier, several of us had been selected for colonel that year, but there was a great backlog, so it took about 19 months until I could don my eagles. So we had gotten to a point where even the deputy director, who was then LtCol Norm Smith, also selected for colonel. But there was not a colonel in the plans division.

That put us in a disadvantage that caused me later on, at the end of my tour, to press very hard for frocked plans officers. The reason was, as I mentioned earlier, if you were a planner, which I was, and you went to the Pentagon and you sat down to represent the Marine Corps position, everybody else at the table but you were a colonel or a captain, an 06. Action officers were generally lieutenant colonels or commanders. So here is the Marine planner, wearing silver leaves, sitting at a table with 06's from other services who were seconded by 05's, as it were. So it was not a healthy situation as a result. When you spoke, the colonels, who were fairly well impressed with themselves because of their very premier assignments were not too impressed with a Marine lieutenant colonel.

So all of us in that era, Smith, Bowlin and Mundy, we all endured that. But then, as soon as we were promoted, I went to see Gen D'Wayne Gray, who is now the director. I said, "We need to press in getting plans colonels-frocked." That was done; they put it into effect right away. Thereafter, we frocked the lieutenant colonels.

BGEN SIMMONS: Including yourself?

GEN MUNDY: No. All of us had been promoted. We agreed — Buzz Bowlin, Norm Smith and I said we won't say anything about it and look presumptuous.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your reporting senior was BGen Francis. X. Quinn, the Director of the Plans Division. In his first report, he graded you as a lieutenant colonel and found you to be a straight "outstanding." His comments were carefully phrased and included such statements as, "A low key individual who is always on top of things," and, "No assignment is too difficult for him and he consistently produces quality results." Were you in daily contact with Gen Quinn?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, as a rule of thumb, unless I was going somewhere. In those days, every day in the Plans Division usually began with a morning meeting. If you were a planner you always met with the director. If you were an action officer, many times because you had an action going on, you were there.

But you would have the morning meeting. We would start about 5:30 with the JCS items that day. You would work up your briefing, and at 8 o'clock you would brief the director and the deputy director on the agenda that day and the issues, and you would get whatever guidance he had. Then later in the day, if it was going to be an operations deputy or a JCS, you would brief the lieutenant general and the Commandant, usually about 1300 in the afternoon.

So as a general rule, about once a day you would see him routinely. Because of the nature of that particular assignment, there was a tremendous flow of all of us into the director's office, because we were dealing with national security matters. The National Security Council would pop up and was going to meet this afternoon, and you didn't have time to write a paper. You just walked up there and said here is what is going on, here is what the plan is, and he would give it back and say, "Okay, go ahead."

BGEN SIMMONS: The reviewing officer for your fitness report was LtGen Dolph Schwenk as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs and Operations. Not known to be an easy marker, Gen Schwenk in his comments says, "Promoted to colonel," Mundy is well to being a top competitor for general officer rank.

An *outstanding* colonel!" He ends that with an exclamation point. I think you told me that you were almost in daily contact with Gen Schwenk.?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Schwenk was one of the most delightful men I have ever worked with. He was a profane man, he was outspoken. He loved to smoke, but he would not smoke in the presence of a lady. He was always the ultimate gentleman in the presence of a lady. Up until about two years ago — she retired — we had a civilian named Lou Gardner, who was the Manpower Action Officer for manpower policy matters. So if you were dealing with a pay raise for the Services, if you were dealing with an assignment policy or with some joint manpower policy, usually Mrs. Gardner would be at the table to brief that morning.

We went by agenda items, item one, item two, item three and so on. Wherever she was briefing, Gen Schwenk would always say, "Well, let's begin this morning with Mrs. Gardner." She would say, "Sir, I have item three." "No, you go right ahead." So she would give her briefing. He would say, "That's fine, Mrs. Gardner. I don't see any reason that you have to stay for the rest of this. You can leave. Thank you very much." Out the door would go Lou, and Dolph Schwenk would reach over and pick up his cigarettes and fire up a cigarette, and then would relax.

He loved to discuss not just the issue, but the personalities involved with the issues. So those were fairly earthy meetings, and they were great. D'Wayne Gray had been a plans colonel, he knew the business. Quinn had been. D'Wayne Gray was an easier man. I like Frank Quinn a lot, but of the two personalities, D'Wayne Gray was easy and down to earth, and Schwenk was.

So as a result, once we had gotten down to the real guts ball, he would debrief the meeting of the day before, and we would take up the issues of the day. As we would brief a particular issue, he would say, where is the Air Force coming from on this? You would say, this was so and so. Well, has the Ops Dep dealt with it? Yes, the operations deputy, yes, he has chopped off on it. Schwenk would go into one of these, "That dumb SOB, what does he know, we're going to wax them in the tank." So it was good. It was war fighting, it was Service politics at its height, and Schwenk was a master at it.

But he was a very professional man. He knew his business. He was smart. He was good natured. He loved a joke, to tell it or to hear it. So the sessions in his office that were again dealing with matters that were being addressed at the highest levels of government were truly sleeves rolled up, no holds barred. You could say anything you wanted, you could argue as strongly as you wished. You could — he was a wonderful man. I thought the world of him. And I think he of me. To this day, we have a good rapport, so I'm sure I ranked high in his measure.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Quinn's next report has you competing with three other colonels, those who were promoted with you. Three of you including yourself were rated as "excellent to outstanding." Only one was rated as "outstanding." I wonder who that paragon was.

GEN MUNDY: The paragon had to be Norm Smith, who was the Deputy Director and probably the hardest working man, even though the gunfighters or plans colonels were running back and forth at the Pentagon, knocking heads. Norm Smith was reading every word we wrote and correcting most of them, and giving the guidance and framing the issues. Again, to this day he remains one of my not only friends, but great heroes. He is another one of the most steady and solid we ever had. So I am sure that it had to be Norm Smith. I don't feel inferior at all to that grading.

BGEN SIMMONS: And he would retire as a lieutenant general?

GEN MUNDY: He would, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Schwenk continued to be enthusiastic over your performance. As reviewing officer he says, "One of my best — will no doubt be a frontrunner for general officer consideration — and is so recommended with enthusiasm!" Again there is an exclamation point. Were you aware that you were getting this kind of rating?

GEN MUNDY: I don't know, probably through inference I was.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were comfortable, in other words.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, I was very comfortable. Schwenk wasn't one to call you in and say you're doing a great job. You knew you were doing a great job with Schwenk. He was a leader. He didn't have to counsel you; you were counseled every time you walked out of there.

But I had a philosophy throughout my career that has lasted me to the present, that I have offered many times to schools and groups of young officers as I talked. When a fitness report has been handed to me across the desk to say, read this, or when I have from time to time gotten an envelope and opened it and there is a fitness report there, I have looked at it. But I have never opened a single one of these printouts that you get, saying whether you are excellent or outstanding, all the X's and O's on these automated printouts. Someday my boys can open those and see how I did, but I have long had a philosophy that if you had to be concerned with a fitness report, or if you had to ask whether you're doing okay or not, that you probably weren't.

So I just always erased that from my mind. As a result of that, I have never paid much attention. I think when I was a lieutenant, I came up one time and looked at my record because I was interested to see what it was. Beyond that, I have never read fitness reports or paid attention to them.

But again, with Schwenk, you knew you were doing okay. I don't think I ever read that report, but you knew.

BGEN SIMMONS: You received your permanent promotion to colonel on 2 April 1979, with a date of rank of 1 April. One other officer was on that same promotion list. That was John G. Miller, one of your Basic school classmates. I see that he out-ranked you

by one number. Had you and John stayed in touch during these years?

GEN MUNDY: Somewhat. When John was on the deep selection list for lieutenant colonel, which I had also come out on, we had been trekking along as peers. I had seen John from time to time when I was at Headquarters in an earlier tour. He did some speechwriting for the Commandants. So I would bump into John from time to time. In 1976 we went to the War College together. But we have become much closer in years after his retirement than we were during our active service together.

BGEN SIMMONS: I also see that your height and weight were holding firm at 72 inches, 175 pounds. What were you doing for exercise while you were working these long hours at Headquarters?

GEN MUNDY: The salvation of a plans officer — and I would say almost all the Headquarters officers, because so many of them have so far to drive in and come in early and whatnot — is the daily workout at the gym. It was a religious thing. I don't care how hot it was or how cold it was. We would, a group of us, get together and go over and work out, and you had a lot of fun. That was a great time of relaxation. It was the old gym, the old Butler hut that would flood about twice a year, so you always went for an upper locker than a lower, because you were going to have to buy a new pair of running shoes when your old ones filled up with mud in the lower. And there was no air conditioning or anything, but that was good. Those were tough circumstances, and we loved it.

So we would all go down. Norm Smith's phone would ring, I would pick it up, it would be Norm Smith. He would say, want to go to the gym? You'd say "I can't do it right now," or you would take off. If you had an agenda item, you had to be on hand up, and through the time that the Commandant left for "the tank," or the OpDep. The meeting was at 1400, so if you were on the agenda that day, we would go forward to our final briefing carrying our gym bags. You would drop it off outside. Then you would brief the general, and when he stood up and put on his coat and said okay, I'm on the way, as soon as he drove off, we would head for the gym and work out, because you had to be on hand when he came back for the debrief. So you would go and run your four or five miles, come back sweating like a pig, get in your clothes and rush back to the office and be standing by when he returned.

So we always prayed for a long — we loved it when there was a JCS meeting with four or five agenda items on it, because you knew it was going to be long, and you had time for a five-mile run instead of a three-mile run.

But daily workouts. I was probably in some of the best shape I have ever been in in those days, because you needed that break.

BGEN SIMMONS: You got a new reporting senior. You've already mentioned him by name, BGen D'Wayne Gray, who became the Director of the Plans Division. Had you known him from before?

GEN MUNDY: I had. I knew Col Gray. I think I had run across him in Vietnam when he commanded the 1st ANGLICO there on an intermittent occasion. When he was the Under Secretary of the Navy's aide, I had bumped into him when I was Gen Walt's aide, and had known him as an individual. So I did know him.

BGEN SIMMONS: He also found you to be an "outstanding" officer, and said so in two reports, again with strong endorsement by Gen Schwenk. In his second report, Gen Gray says, "I know no better colonel." You seem to have had a change of assignment about the middle of February 1980. You became the Deputy Director of the Prepositioning Plans and Programs Group. What were your new duties?

GEN MUNDY: Immediately prior to that, the Marine Corps had, not unlike the Norwegian prepositioning, had been yanked into the prepositioning afloat business. The way that came about bears some telling here.

One day, Norm Smith walked down to my office. I was a planner then. Keep in mind, as I said, it seemed like most of the action came to the Western Regional Branch, or so we perceived it. He came down and said, we have a tasker from OSD to look at five ships.

They were named. Most of them were breakbulk ships. There was a fuel ship, a water ship and three breakbulk ships, and to identify what we can put on those ships to put afloat in Diego Garcia to support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force there.

It was one of those times where I guess I was about up to here in whatever I was doing, and I exploded at my good friend, and just in effect said, "Norm, how much more can you dump on this branch? We're carrying the whole damn division as it is in my perception; why do we have to take that." Norm said, "Look, you're the prepositioning man, this is preposi-

tioning afloat, you've got it. Lock your hells, colonel, and get going."

So I inherited that, even though I was a colonel and a planner, and it should have been an action officer level thing. But the practical matter was that the lieutenant colonels were overcome with their other jobs, so I became the action officer or the planner, whatever you want to consider it.

Our tasking was again the reverse of what Marines are taught from the get-go, that is, to define your force list and the structure that you need, and then figure out the shipping you need to haul it. In this case, we were told, here are five ships; what can we put on it?

I contacted Col Dick Sulik over in I&L. We allowed as how we would load a brigade with — we didn't know what it would be, but we would figure out one and put a brigade in these things. We ordered up some embarkation officers from FMFLant, put I&L on a port and starboard watch, at least the strategic mobility people. We had about five days to do this.

So with the embarkers, with the I&L people, with me as a planner, we went about this hatching of a brigade in such sophisticated ways as saying — the embark guys were saying, in those ships we can't get all the trucks aboard. So in frustration, I would say take the truck company out. We'll just take the truck company out of the structure. It is not at all a good way to do business, but we didn't have time to do it any other way.

In those days, there was no other agent. Different from today, where you have MCCDC, which Gen Gray put into being. You have the tremendous analytic and force structure concept and doctrine integration down there. In those days, the Plans Division did all that for Headquarters. So the planners were very much more architects than they are today. Today they are issue handlers, but the architects are at Quantico. Then, the architects were one and the same.

So we had to design this thing. To make a long story short, we designed it. I can recall that the final briefing of what the force structure would be, we gave at 6:30 in the morning in Gen Schwenk's office, because we had to be in to see the Commandant at eight. Gen Hatch was over, Gen Schwenk was presiding, D'Wayne Gray was there. Dick Sulik and I were the two action colonels on this, so we were there.

So we laid out on Gen Schwenk's table literally the templates. We had embarkation templates that showed each ship, showed that it would fit. Then I quantified it: this is what we would have aboard, this is the type of organization we would have in this. Gen

Schwenk said okay, they asked a couple of questions.

What happened to the trucks? We had to take the trucks out. How come there is only a half a battery of Hawks? Because that is all the room we got, and that is all we could put in. So again, it was kind of a roughshod deal.

We briefed him. We then went up and briefed Gen Barrow. That afternoon, we had to brief the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Russ Murray, who had conceptualized this idea. The issue was that both the Army and the Marine Corps had been tasked to develop this capability. Once again, all of the voices around said, "Stay away from this, we are amphibious, this is a dumb idea, stay away from it." But we had to answer the mail.

So anyway, we briefed Gen Barrow. Then briefed Secretary Murray that afternoon. He loved the brief. We did it well. We had a good briefing, and he was very impressed.

The next day it was to go to the Chiefs, to make the decision of whether the Army or the Marine Corps was going to do this. Following Murray's briefing, we all started to leave. D'Wayne Gray was there, Gen Schwenk was there. But when we left the Commandant's conference room and started back down the hall, Gen Barrow came out and looked at me and at Norm Smith, and beckoned to us to come in and see him. So we detached ourselves from our generals and said, "We've got to go back to the briefing room for something." Then we sneaked around the corner and went in the Commandant's Office. I can remember Barrow standing there, very anxious, very obviously agitated because it was decision time. He said to Norm Smith and I, "I just don't know what to do. I worry about this. I am fearful of this, because I think that for us to sign up to putting our equipment aboard commercial ships, these maritime then called, prepositioning ships, I think that will be the death knell of amphibious capabilities, and I really am concerned about that."

So I thought for a minute and I said to myself, "My gosh, here I am, standing with the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He doesn't know what to do; who the hell does know what to do if the Commandant doesn't?" So I said, "General, if it comes from the sea, if it comes off of ships and goes ashore, it has got to be Marines. If we ever let the Army into that in this context, I would say the Army will go full bore for this and we will be out of business."

So anyway, he walked over to the window and stood there and looked a little while. Norm gave some assurances that the Marines should do this, we are as apprehensive as you are about it. I can remem-

ber Gen Barrow standing there for probably not more than half a minute; it seemed to me it was three or four minutes. But anyway, standing there, looking out the window. He turned around and he said, "I have real misgivings about this, but go for it."

So we walked out of the office. The next day it was to be briefed at the JCS with the Chiefs present. So we decided that instead of me, it would be Dick Sulik who would brief. Dick called me frantically the next morning and said, "I've got a brief in 'the tank.'" I just got my uniform out of the cleaners. I forgot my ribbons, I'm not ready to go, you take the briefing." I said, Dick, "I'll lend you my ribbons, and you're going to give the briefing. So I went in and got the ribbons off my blouse, we stuck them on Dick Sulik. We still laugh about that to this day. He went off to 'the tank' and briefed them.

The Army had not done well. They had gone in and stated that they could place an armored cavalry regiment in these ships, but we knew better; they couldn't get all that stuff in there. When the Marines briefed, we had the embarkation plans, we had square and cube. We showed them a diagram of the templates of the ships. It was our business; we should have been able to do that. We blew away the competition, so they closed the meeting. When Gen Barrow came out, he said, "You guys won, we got it. Now, don't foul it up." So that is how we came to be in the prepositioning business.

I then was reassigned to take all that preparation and knowledge and go into a special small group, the Prepositioning Plans Working Group. We tried to get the Headquarters to provide officers. Nobody wanted to give up officers, so it wound up being a 3-man office under BGen John Cox.

BGEN SIMMONS: This was the Near Term Prepositioning Shipping, which was the predecessor to our present Maritime Prepositioning Force.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that's right.

BGEN SIMMONS: You may have only had three present, but Gen Cox reported on six colonels, so there were three more hiding in the woodwork.

GEN MUNDY: Gen Cox was dual-hatted as AC/S R&D. The other 5 colonels were in R7D. Dick Sulik remained a — I would call it an associate member. He was the I&L point of contact. But he stayed in I&L and ran the Strategic Mobility Branch. They moved LtCol Lenny Hayes, Len Hayes, from Requirements and Programs. That was then —

MajGen Paul X. Kelley was R&P at that time. So Len Hayes came up from R&P to be their member. Then-LtCol Mike Byron, who was over in Ops, now MajGen Mike Byron, was sent over.

So really, it was me as the colonel, Mike Byron and Lenny Hayes as the lieutenant colonels. We were the permanent members. Col Jake Moore, MajGen Jake Moore, retired, down in aviation, was the aviation point of contact.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you known Gen Cox from before?

GEN MUNDY: Not well. I knew who he was, but he was in aviation when he was promoted, I think, and I didn't know him well. I thought a lot of him. He was a stickler for detail. John Cox was really "in the weeds" on everything that went on, because he wanted to know. But there was no such thing as giving him a briefing and saying, "Don't worry about this part, I know it will work and we'll move on from there." He wanted to know every detail.

BGEN SIMMONS: After about six months, BGen D'Wayne Gray moved over from the Prepositioning Plans and Programs Group. When you were detached at the end of July 1980, his final comments, which he underlined, was, "The sooner the Marine Corps promotes Carl Mundy to brigadier general, the better we all will be for it." You didn't know that, because you never looked at your reports.

GEN MUNDY: But D'Wayne Gray on that occasion was walking down the hall with me from a briefing we had just given. He said, "I have just written your fitness report, and I will send you a copy." I said, "General, don't bother." He said, "No, I want you to see this because it is very important to me." He didn't send it, he brought it down and stuck it in front of me and said, "Read this." I was very appreciative of that. But he wanted me to know — and again, to this day he remains one of my mentors and one of my close friends. I think we think a lot of each other.

So it was important to him that I see that. So yes, I saw that one, but only because he stuck it under my nose.

BGEN SIMMONS: At the end of this tour you were recommended for and did receive a Legion of Merit for your services. Your next assignment would take you again to Camp Lejeune. Unless you have something to add, this is probably a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: I would only add it by saying that these three years that I spent, though I had not wanted the assignment, it is the proper thing to say for a Marine, any time you're talking to anyone, that command was your most formative or your most enjoyable. But the most fulfilling three years that I can recall in the Marine Corps, and the most challenging, the hardest — I was uptight a great deal of the time because of the pressures of that job. But these three years in this job probably formed me more than anything else, to come into the four years of my tenure, because almost every issue that I faced when I was a plans colonel was back in the spotlight again during my tenure here.

I worked with great officers. You couldn't help but learn there. But I really — this was the time when you would be coming at that stage in your career where you could feel a little bit heady because you would open the *Washington Post* and you would read words that you had written, that now were in the national security business. Or the President would make a speech and there would be a sentence in there that you had crafted and had added in, as you edited the top level speeches or policy papers. So you really began to feel cocksure of yourself. It was heady wine. It was the highest levels of policy making, big stuff.

So a very, very exciting period for me.

GEN SIMMONS: Very good.

SESSION 12

Duty with 2d Marine Division

Assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 . . . MajGen Dave Twomey as 2d Division commander . . . War gaming . . . Duty as Chief of Staff, 6th MAB . . . Working again for LtGen Dolph Schwenk . . . Command of the 2d Marines . . . Working for MajGen Al Gray . . . Command of the 38th and 36th MAUs . . . Exposure to Norway . . . Selection for brigadier general.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session, we explored your three-year tour, July 1977 until July 1980 as a plans officer at Headquarters Marine Corps. In this session, we will cover your two-year tour of the 2d Marine Division as a colonel. You arrived at Camp Lejeune about the middle of August 1980 for duty with the 2d Marine Division. You were assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the division. Was this assignment a surprise to you?

GEN MUNDY: It was not a surprise, because I had been advised before I came down there that I would be posted as the G-2. The chief of staff of the division had given me a call and told me I was going to do that. He had also intimated that Gen Twomey had a policy of not putting newly reporting colonels directly into command, but the policy was, you would spend some time on the staff and then hopefully you would get out to command.

So I viewed that with a mixture of emotion. I was not particularly happy to be going in as the G-2. I would rather have gone directly as regimental commander. But I was optimistic.

BGEN SIMMONS: You probably were still bearing a secondary O2 too at that time.

GEN MUNDY: I had at that time or shortly thereafter, I don't know, I can't remember my time line, but I had gotten the O202 removed, because I really didn't feel qualified as an intelligence officer. It seemed to me that it was a qualification that I didn't feel I had.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned Dave Twomey. He was the division commander when you —

GEN MUNDY: He was, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did he interview you upon your arrival?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes. Remember, in an earlier session, we had talked about Col Twomey with the 31st MAU, when I was BLT commander, so we had a good rapport. We had long had a good rapport.

He did, upon arrival. I saw him. In his direct way, he sat me down and said, "You're going to be the G-2, but I have the 6th Marines in mind for you." I said, "Well, that's good news. I am privileged to be here."

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the chief of staff?

GEN MUNDY: The chief of staff was a Col Lloyd Smith. He was a helicopter pilot, as a matter of fact. This was an extraordinary situation. He was tremendously effective, later became a brigadier general out of the division there. But for a Marine division to have a helicopter pilot chief of staff was sort of a newsmaker.

I think that Smith had come in to be the division air officer, and served in that capacity for some time. Gen Twomey was so taken with his ability that he apparently called the Commandant and said, I want to make him chief of staff, and the Commandant said, go ahead. So we had a helicopter pilot division chief of staff, Lloyd Smith.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you known him from before?

GEN MUNDY: I had not. That was the first time I met him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the G-2 you relieved?

GEN MUNDY: I physically relieved the assistant G-2, who was a major by the name of Skip Hartnett. Skip was holding down the position because Col John Donovan, who had been the division G-2, had moved over to the 2d Marines before I arrived in the division. So as a colonel, I relieved Col John Donovan. As a practical matter, John had been gone for about a month and Skip Hartnett, who became my assistant G-2, was the man whose desk I took.

BGEN SIMMONS: I remember Col John Donovan as a very effective officer.

GEN MUNDY: Very fine officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: What officers did you inherit in this section in addition to Maj Hartnett?

GEN MUNDY: The only one of note — and I say that as a career officer — was a major named Robinson. Robbie Robinson, we called him. He was the counterintelligence officer, and he was a professional G-2. I think he went on and subsequently retired. But he was a mustang, he knew the business, as did Skip Hartnett. The others for the most part were lieutenants and captains who subsequently got out of the Marine Corps. So at that time, the G-2 section was not a heavy section in terms of staffing of officers.

BGEN SIMMONS: In my experience, most counterintelligence officers were mustangs.

GEN MUNDY: Most of the ones that I have run into were. Again, he was an unusually effective one.

BGEN SIMMONS: You continued in this assignment until the 25th of March 1981. What were some of the challenges that faced you?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the normal array of duties associated with the G-2. I would say that one of the major challenges that faces any intelligence officer in peacetime is the challenge of accomplishing work that really isn't there in peacetime. In other words, what the G-2 does is mostly during conflict or war. So there is a lot of busy work, a lot of training, a lot of attempts — Intel studies in some part of the world where the division happened to be focused at that time. We would keep track on South America, for example. We would look out into the Middle East and as far as Europe. Although you wouldn't think the 2d Division wouldn't be focused, we were really focused on Southern Europe and the Middle East.

So intelligence studies of areas, countries out there, those sorts of analyses, the normal funnelling of sensitive traffic, running the scif, that sort of thing. But in garrison, the G-2 then at least, and perhaps even today is a busy work, in many cases, activity.

Now, in addition to that, Gen Twomey had gotten excited about war gaming in the division. So he had talked Col Donovan with setting up the division war gaming center, which we did in one of the old clubs. Beautiful buildings there, that weren't in much use. So we had a lot of space. So I inherited that. That was one of Gen Twomey's favorite places to take visitors when they came to the division. He wanted to go up to the war gaming center. We had sand tables and maps that the topographic platoon would make up. As a practical matter, we didn't do a lot of war gaming, but we had a good facility, and we had a lot of training aids there that Gen Twomey was very proud of. That took a lot of my time.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would think that a peacetime division G-2 had to divide his effort between intelligence activities related to contingency plans, in other words, possible areas of employment, and intelligence efforts to support exercise deployments. The first very important, but probably doesn't raise much awareness on the part of the rest of the staff, or perhaps even the commanding general. The second would give you more visibility. Could you comment on that?

GEN MUNDY: Since the evolution, or at least the pre-eminence of the MAGTF, to be very candid with you, what the division G-2 does, unless the division is fighting as a division, which is rare except in exercises, and certainly in Southwest Asia, they did. But for the most part, the intelligence fusion that we have come to know today is down at the MAGTF level. So the division G-2 in my experience at that time was primarily a disseminator of information that came down from other echelons.

I think your analysis is probably correct. When we would have exercises, we wrote the Intel annexes to the operations order and that sort of thing. Did a lot of meaningful work. We would engage the regimental S-2s that we were attempting to train. You do a lot of training of intelligence officers that are out in regiments and in the battalions. The sensor platoon, that sort of thing.

So there is a lot of training, but as a practical matter, they are unlike the G-3 that is involved with the physical movement of units and the making up of the training and employment plan, the physical move-

ment of units and so on. The G-2 was sort of an administrative job.

For that reason, perhaps, because it was under-utilized, there was not a lot of excitement in G-2, Gen Twomey used his colonels — and there were a flock of them down there; we had some of the others that happened to be in the division when I got there, people like Jim Joy, who had the 8th Marines, and later a brigadier general, Col Terry Cooper, a retired three-star now, Col John Grinalds was the G-1, Col Tom Stokes, who retired as a colonel, but was one of the best we ever had. So we had a real array of talent in that division. As a result, Gen Twomey used his colonels in extraordinary ways.

I was made the chief of staff of the 6th MAB nucleus, 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade, a nucleus staff, which was a small staff. So for me, it was an additional duty. But it became as a practical matter the primary duty at the time, even though I was the G-2. The 6th MAB was then the RDJTF with Gen Kelley, just taking form. We were just beginning to get into the prepositioning business, as we discussed before. The 6th MAB was detailed to the RDJTF, so we did a lot of studies and a lot of coordination with Gen Kelley and his staff down in CENTCOM. We focused on the Middle East, because that was a part of Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

So that is what I did. My main focus was in developing the embarkation plans for the division, to be able to put a MAB in the field. So that was my main point of focus.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who relieved you as G-2?

GEN MUNDY: I left, and again, Maj Hartnett — I left the G-2 rather abruptly, because John Donovan made a decision to retire from the Marine Corps out of nothing other than an opportunity that he had to get into professional teaching, which he had always wanted to do and intended to do, and he had an opportunity. So he announced that he was going to retire, and on that announcement, Gen Twomey — I got a call one Sunday in my quarters, said “You’re going to be going down to the 2d Marines, not the 6th Marines.” I was delighted, because the 2d Marines is the regiment of my youth. “You’re going to be going down there in about two weeks.”

So there was a pretty quick turnover, and he brought John Donovan up to be his chief of staff, because BGen Lloyd Wilkerson was then departing. So John served out the remainder of his time; I think he retired in the summer. But Gen Twomey and his very clear-cut black and white decision making did

not want a regimental commander who was aimed at retirement. He did not want you to retire from a regiment. You should be a more active colonel. So I got it rather abruptly.

Therefore, Maj Hartnett took my job back as division G-2.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Twomey in his fitness report rated you as straight outstanding, as he did ten other colonels in the division. I don’t have the “truth tellers” available to me, but in his remarks, Gen Twomey says that you were, and I’m quoting, “as good a colonel as I have ever observed.” Incidentally, your previous reviewing officer, LtGen Dolph Schwenk, who is now the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and again your reviewing officer. Did you have any contact with Gen Schwenk in your new capacity?

GEN MUNDY: I did, and it was probably a carryover from the days in the Plans Division, because remember, Gen Schwenk had been the PP&O when I was a plans colonel. So the evolution for example — as I mentioned to you a minute ago, the 6th MAB being assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force under Schwenk, with Mundy as the action officer in doing that. The Near Term Prepositioning Force allocated in effect to RDJTF had been Schwenk and Mundy.

So when he came to Norfolk and I went to the division, which was just a couple of months apart, yes, that linkage continued. As I would develop the plans for the 6th MAB’s embarkation deployment, structure and whatnot, that put me in effect as a subordinate. That was a MAGTF level, so though I would always brief Gen Twomey and so on, I would be sent off specifically with BGen Joe Hopkins, who was the ADC of the division and the CG designate of the 6th MAB. Hopkins and I would go north to Norfolk and would brief Gen Twomey and his staff about what we were doing about the 6th MAB.

So there was more focus by him, and I would dare say by FMFLant in those days, on the evolution of the 6th MAB than there was on the division. So I had fairly frequent contact with Gen Schwenk.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was on the 27th of March, 1981, that Gen Twomey gave you command of the 2d Marine Regiment. Command of a regiment is usually considered to be the highest accolade for a colonel. Would you agree with that?

GEN MUNDY: I certainly would then. I think any

colonel that was going to the division aspired to be a regimental commander. Again, of that crop that was there, most of them did unless they were detaching and going somewhere else. That happened, too. But they had all been commanders.

That may have swung around now, although regiments and aircraft groups are still premier assignments. The practical fact is that the MAGTFs in terms of the excitement, vitality and true operational command, have superseded the regiments. A MEU commander this day and time is a far more active — and arguably, most of the colonels that I know today, though they are very happy if they are sent off to command one of the regiments, most of them really aspire to be MEU commanders, because they know they are going to be a point of the spear.

BGEN SIMMONS: We discussed that a little bit in the past and we'll come back to it again, because I think it is an important point.

You relieved Col John Donovan as CO of 2d Marines. Do you recall any details of the relief?

GEN MUNDY: Very pleasant. John and I had been friends. We had known each other before. Since I was literally within walking distance of the 2d Marines' headquarters from the division CP, I would walk down. So our turnover was very informal. Though there was only a couple of weeks there, I think I went down a few days before, maybe two or three days before, and we had a formal turnover.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there a regimental parade?

GEN MUNDY: There was a regimental parade. That was on the 27th. I have always tried to include — when I say the family, at least the immediate kids, the two sons in particular. Sam was a midshipman, Tim was still in high school. So Sam came up, and as always, his father would cause him to be put forth in his midshipman uniform, and he would stand in the shadow, appropriately.

But we had a good parade, full parade. One of the highlights of — though it occurred later, but since we're talking about the 2d Marines and its structure — was, the 2d Marines of course had the three battalions of the 2d Marines, one of them usually deployed. But later in my tour, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, when we withdrew from PCS to Okinawa, 2/4 came back and was assigned to the 2d Marines. So I was very excited, because I had not only the battalion of my youth, 2/2, but I had my own battalion. I had commanded 2/4. The numbers, if you inverted them,

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines became the 4th Battalion, 2d Marines on my watch.

So the regiment was very healthy. We had a good healthy regimental parade, in utilities, combat review, and it was a grand event.

BGEN SIMMONS: In June, MajGen Al Gray relieved Gen Twomey as CG, 2d Marine Division. In his final report, Gen Twomey said that you had recently taken command of the 2d Marines and were performing in your quote "usual superlative manner." Do you recall any further specifics as to the status of the 2d Marines and its deployments in the Spring of 1981?

GEN MUNDY: I do. The 2d Marines at that point was becoming unquestionably the busiest regiment in the division. That had to do with a couple of things. At that time, the 2d Marines were pretty much oriented toward Northern Europe, the 6th Marines were oriented toward the Caribbean, and the 8th Marines were a caretaker regiment that produced battalions for MAUs going into the Mediterranean. So the 8th Marines didn't operate, 6th to the south, and the 2d Marines had about everything else.

So at the time that I came in, the 2d Marines were then involved immediately. In the spring we had a division CPX, so I was able to take the field with my regiment fairly early on. That was one of our drills around Camp Lejeune. We didn't go anywhere, but we did have a CPX in the field.

We also then were planning what had traditionally been a fall exercise in October at Camp Pickett in Virginia. It was called a tank exercise. The tank battalion was deployed up there and stayed up there for about a month or six weeks. That became, with Gen Gray's emphasis on the regiment being the primary maneuver element in the division, a regimental, an RLT, exercise. So the 2d Marines were given responsibility for planning and executing that. In that particular structure, I had four battalions, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, the tank battalion and two infantry battalions, that would participate in that month, six weeks long evolution up at Fort Pickett.

So we were planning that from the regimental standpoint. In the meantime, the 2d Marines were dual-hatted. Or, I was dual-hatted as the commanding officer of the 38th MAU. That was to conduct Exercise Ocean Venture with the newly created Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force that was headquartered down in Key West. The Ocean Venture, a scheme of maneuver that we ran in Puerto Rico and Vieques, was precisely the scheme of

maneuver and the same force composition, although that was at least initially planned for Operation Urgent Fury when they went in a couple of years later into the Caribbean, at Grenada.

So I had a 38th MAU headquarters planning an exercise as a MAGTF. I had the 2d Marines coming out of the field planning for the Tank-Ex, or now the RLT-Ex at Camp Pickett. And at about that same time, I got the tasker to become the 36th MAU for the winter exercise that would take place in Norway. That was a last minute add-on, because the 6th Marines had done it the year before, that was not to be a MAU level exercise in Norway that year, in 1982 by original planning, but it suddenly got changed because the previous year they had sent a MAU, so to send back a battalion alone was seen by Headquarters Marine Corps as a step backwards. So the 2d Marines also got tagged with that.

So I really had — as far as a regimental commander could ask, or an operational commander, I had the busiest year. I probably saw less of Linda that year than at any I can recall. I would literally head from Fort Pickett, Virginia, where we would have the RLT setup, over to Norway with my 36th MAU commander hat on, to plan for the Norwegian operation, and then turn around and come back and embark with the 38th MAU, and sail off to the Caribbean for about six weeks to conduct Exercise Ocean Venture.

So a very, very busy year and a lot of units. If you add all that up with the four battalions at Fort Pickett, opcon at a given time, with — we had a standard MAU, but with a Dutch company joined for Ocean Venture in the Caribbean, so there was some international relations there, and when I got to Norway, the British who were to command the exercise that year had just fallen out due to defense funding, so the commander of Northern Norway turned to me and said, could you command all of the south forces. I said, sure. So I was given 42 Commando, Royal Marines, the Netherlands Amphibious Combat Group, and was given a battalion of Norwegian infantry in addition to the MAU. So when I took 36th MAU up there, it became the exercise force, was about 5,500 people. So it was an extraordinarily large undertaking.

As a personality test here — this is an interesting fact, too — at that time, the 42 Commando was commanded by a LtCol Nick Vaux, had been the liaison officer at Quantico, who later became a major general in the Royal Marines. The Commander of the Amphibious Combat Group, the Dutch component of that, was then a LtCol Hank van de Bremmen, who is today the Chief of Defense of the Netherlands, the first Marine to hold that position. The commanding



As a colonel, here in his official photograph, Mundy held a number of key billets, including Commanding Officer, 2d Marines, from March 1981-1982.

officer of the 3d Battalion Brigade North with the Norwegian Army which I was given, was then LtCol Arne Solli, who is today Chief of Defense of Norway. So I can't take credit for training all these guys, but once again, as I had with my battalion commanders and as the division, I had a lot of people that made me look awfully good.

BGEN SIMMONS: Maybe they are taking credit for training you. Let's have the spelling of the Dutch minister's name and the Norwegian minister's name.

GEN MUNDY: Hank — and that is his name, not Henry, but Hank van de Bremmen is again a Dutch four-star today, and the first Marine to hold that position. Then Arne Solli was the 3d Battalion Brigade North. We just had a very pleasant final visit with the Sollis. They came over here for an exchange last year with the Marine Corps, and then I went back this May to be hailed by Arne Solli. So very good friends who achieved high positions in their respective Armed Forces.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was your executive officer, first of the regiment?

GEN MUNDY: The exec when I assumed command of the regiment was a LtCol Dick Widener. Dick was a very fine officer who I had known before when he was commanding the Marine Barracks up in Iceland. He was extremely effective. Dick would retire from there. So I had two more. I had Maj Klaus D. Schreiber, or Nick Schreiber as we knew him in the Marine Corps. He was battalion exec and then came up to be exec pending a return to be a battalion commander.

BGEN SIMMONS: Spell his last name.

GEN MUNDY: S-c-h-r-e-i-b-e-r. Nick was a native German, came to this country when he was 18 years old. Big man. Just retired last year as a colonel. Very fine professional officer.

Then LtCol Fred Fagan, who is also a retired colonel, who was exec when I turned over the regiment. In those days, the regimental executive officer was usually a lieutenant colonel awaiting battalion command, so it was a fairly high pace of them through the regiment.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your battalion commanders?

GEN MUNDY: The 1st Battalion was then LtCol John Ripley; 2d Battalion, LtCol Tom Barton, and the 3d Battalion was LtCol Joe Nardo, to be succeeded by LtCol Bert Speicher, my former S-3 in 2/4 in 1973-74. So I had those four in the 2d Marines' battalions, and then LtCol Jim Murphy was the CO of 2/4. We brought 2/4 back from Okinawa and joined it to the regiment. So I had four of those battalions there.

There were some other particular officers in the regiment at that time that I liked. Maj John M. Himes, who is today the chief of staff of II MEF, just passed command of the Marine Barracks at Guantanamo Bay. Capt Dave G. Dotterrer, who just assumed command of the Marine Barracks, had been 2dLt. Dotterrer with LtCol Mundy in 2/4 and then had Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines as a captain. A superb officer, witness his recent assignment here at the barracks. And a Capt James R. Battaglini, who is today sitting afloat off the former Yugoslavia as the MEU commander, who was the S-3 of the 36th MAU. So I really was blessed with extraordinary talent, and a lot of it. Having three staffs in action at the same time, I really had about 12 battalions and about three staffs, was the opportunity for a lot of good people.

BGEN SIMMONS: We'll be talking a little bit more about the 38th and 36th MAUs here in a moment. Who was your sergeant major and how did you use him?

GEN MUNDY: My sergeant major was a man named Angel Carrasco, one of the finest I have known. You might recall that when I talked about the bad old days in Okinawa, and talked about 1stSgt Carrasco with Company E, 2/4, that it was Carrasco who came directly to me.

Carrasco had been a Pachuco. He literally came across the Rio Grande River, his hair swept back in ducktails, carrying a switchblade knife, and made his way into the United States as an illegal immigrant. He was picked up eventually by the authorities. As he tells it, and I talked to his mother, so I know it's true, but he had a judge in South Texas who said, "Okay, boy, it is jail or the Marine Corps." So he came into the Marine Corps, and turned out to be the classic sergeant major. Angel Carrasco was the epitome of a sergeant major.

So it was not so much how I used him as it was how he used me. Probably he knew how to be a sergeant major. My experience with sergeants major over my tenure has been on and off. Some of them are very good and know their business, and some of them just jump in the back of a jeep and ride with you, and stand around respectfully one pace to the right rear.

Carrasco was not that. Carrasco was out all the time. I encouraged him to do that. He was in the mess hall for breakfast in the morning, he was on his own seeing units in the field who were training, he was everywhere. He was exactly what a sergeant major should be doing. Always plugged in with the battalions' sergeants major. Never hanging around the battalion commander's office, but always working that senior staff NCO net.

So he would come to me, and when I say he used me more than I used him, I mean Carrasco would come in — I could always tell when he had something serious that he wanted to talk to me about. Usually it was something that I had done that he wanted to coach me a little bit on. He would appear at my door very early in the morning by the time I got there, and he would have two cups of coffee. As was usually the case, the sergeant major's driver can make better coffee than anybody else in the CP, so it was a good cup of coffee.

But he would come in and he would say with his still lingering Mexican accent, "Hey, Colonel, how about a cup of coffee," and I knew I was going to get

a lecture. He would come in and he would close the door in my office, and he would sit down and talk about something he had done on liberty the night before, or something that was going on, or fishing this weekend. Then after about five minutes of that, then he would break into the subject that he wanted to talk about. Oftentimes, it would be the good and valued staff NCO feedback on something that one of the battalion commanders was doing. He was never disrespectful. He never cut the colonel down in any way, but he would always let me know that the CO of 2/2 is a little bit off track, he is going down the wrong trail, you might want to watch this. Or from time to time, he would come in —

I remember one day, because we had a very good rapport behind closed doors. Never a first-name basis. He was the sergeant major, I was the colonel, no question about that. But he walked in one morning, we had the coffee and everything, and he said, "Hey, colonel, I need to tell you, you are really screwing up bad." I'll never forget that. I said, "What have I done." It had to do with policy in the mess hall. But he was very concerned about that. So you got that kind of good invaluable advice from Carrasco.

I retired him. He retired while I was there, shortly before I left the division. I tracked him all the way out to — he still sends me smoked salmon from Seattle, Washington to this day. We remain good friends. He was the best I had ever seen.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next fitness report was from Gen Gray and went to the end of September, 1981. He found only six of his colonels to be "outstanding," but you were one of them. He concludes his comments with, "If I had to pick a general officer from the 2d Marine Division today, it would be Carl Mundy." Was this the first time you had served with Gen Gray?

GEN MUNDY: No. I met Gen Gray in Vietnam, but it was only a meeting. I think he was the S-3 of the 12th Marines, under Col Ben Read in those days. I met him up at Dong Ha when I was at III MAF, and saw him a couple of times. Of course, he had quite a reputation for go on, stay on in Vietnam.

Then he assumed command of the 4th Marines when I had 2/4, so he was my regimental commander for about a month. It was at Headquarters Marine Corps in the plans business, he was then at Quantico as the Director of the Development Center. When we began to get into prepositioning and explicitly when we got into considering the light armored vehicle, Gen Gray was a very active proponent, probably the

proponent for the light armored vehicle. So he spent a good bit of time in my prepositioning working group office at Washington. He would come in and want to know what was going on, and we would talk about how NTPF was coming, how MPS was coming, and the light armored vehicle, which played in all of that. One of the quids for getting in the prepositioning business was that then, Bill Krulak, Gen Krulak's older brother, was over in OSD, and he pressed the Marine Corps toward the light armored vehicle, if we thought we could put it aboard the MPS, and that is how we came to be on that subject.

So I had known Gen Gray before, and thought a great deal of him and always profited from his professional views and discussions.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now, as you mentioned earlier, during this same period you commanded two Marine Amphibious Units, the 36th MAU and the 38th MAU. First, what is a Marine Amphibious Unit?

GEN MUNDY: A Marine Amphibious Unit is a term that has disappeared. It is now Marine Expeditionary Unit; then it was MAU. But that is the smallest of the Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. That is built around a battalion landing team, a reinforced squadron. It can be either an all-helicopter squadron or it can have Harriers in it. So a big squadron of usually about 24 to 30 aircraft in one of these reinforced squadrons. And a MEU Service Support Group, which is a Combat Service Support Element. And over that entire structure, essentially three lieutenant colonel level commands, is imposed a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander, in that case, a colonel, with a staff that oversees that entire organization, about 2,200 people.

BGEN SIMMONS: About 2,200 in all?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: From your previous remarks, I understand that the 38th MAU preceded the 36th. How is the 38th MAU composed? You've already given it to me in general, or perhaps you can give it to me in specifics. To where was it deployed, and who were your principal subordinate commanders?

GEN MUNDY: It was composed of Battalion Landing Team 1/2, and that was LtCol Don Myers. It contained the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron, though once again, this is a composite squadron, of some medium light helicopters, 365. That was LtCol

Darrell Lowe. Then it had a Combat Service Support Element, that MEU Service Support Group and frankly, I can't remember the name of the — I think we had a major who led that.

That was the composition. My exec of that organization was LtCol Tom Fine, who was a pilot. Usually in the structure of the MAGTFs, if you have a ground commander, you have an aviator XO. If you have an aviator CO, you have a ground XO, was the way those were normally put together. So Tom Fine was a very fine pilot, to make a play on his name, a very fine man with whom I enjoyed working.

As I mentioned, we worked under the Combined Caribbean Joint Task Force, and for the exercise that was to take place in the Caribbean, Ocean Venture '91, this is the first time it involved the 101st Airborne, it involved the 75th Rangers.

BGEN SIMMONS: Ocean Venture '91 or '81?

GEN MUNDY: '81. The Rangers, the Airborne, the Puerto Rican National Guard, some other contingents. I mentioned the Dutch company that came from Antilles up to be with us on that exercise, embarked and operated with us. So it was termed joint and combined, meaning U.S. Joint Forces and combined, meaning allied forces included. It had almost explicitly the scenario — it was a takeover of one of the islands in the Caribbean. It didn't involve students and things like that, but we had to evacuate nationals and so on.

When they went back to do Urgent Fury a couple of years later, the initial organization that was put together to do that by Admiral Wes McDonald down in USCINCLANT was that structure precisely. As we know, the Joint Staff got into it and added on some Army forces. So we were the precursor to Operation Urgent Fury.

BGEN SIMMONS: What island or islands did you use for your landing portion of the exercise?

GEN MUNDY: We used — as far as our landing, we used Vieques, and the Marines operated in Vieques. We seized a beachhead. We then expanded the beachhead. Then the 75th Rangers flew in from Fort Lewis, Washington, and actually jumped in to Vieques on a night parachute jump. So we then had a link up between the Marines and the Rangers.

Meanwhile, over in Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican National Guard and 101st Airborne was over there, and whatever other cats and dogs. I'm sure there was somebody's flag from every organization around.

In fact, interestingly, one of the after action comments that I made then, and believe very much to this day, and we can perhaps expand on that a little bit later on, is that that was the fusion of jointness at too low a level. What we proved there is that if you put everybody who has a different style of headgear or style of uniform to wear in at too small a level, what you get fundamentally is a lot of confusion. Jointness is made to be at the higher echelons. If we went to the lower echelons, we would have done a hell of a lot better if we had put the 6th MEB for example together and sent it down there and let it do that type of operation, than trying to stick in a little piece of everything.

But that said, we all got accolades when it was over, and got nice letters from the commander, and sent out nice messages to each other, and had a pretty good walk in the sun.

After Vieques, we backloaded the MAU and went over and did a reinforcing exercise in Guantanamo. So we brought the ships just out of the bay at Guantanamo Bay, and we did a helicopter reinforcement of the lines with the Marine Barracks. That was a ground defense force exercise in Gitmo. Then we backloaded, came back through, washed our gear down in Roosevelt Roads, sailed on up, got off the ships, and we were done in about six weeks.

BGEN SIMMONS: Same questions for the 36th MAU. How was the 36th MAU composed, where was it deployed, and who were your principal subordinate commanders?

GEN MUNDY: As I mentioned earlier, that was headed for Norway. In terms of magnitude, that was a much larger scale exercise than Ocean Venture.

The XO of the 36th MAU was a lieutenant colonel named Carl Yung, Y-u-n-g. The BLT in this case was BLT 2/2, and that was LtCol Tom Barton. Then the MAU Service Support Group, which was a much larger, more capable organization in this particular case because of the scope of the exercise, was commanded by LtCol Don O'Connor.

I mentioned also the attached battalions that I had and who commanded them earlier, Solli for the Norwegians, van de Bremmen for the Dutch and Vaux for the UK Marines. So all together, that made operationally a rather large organization. To be quite candid, we did not staff adequately to command. It was an ineffective brigade.

In those days, the exercise MAUs were oftentimes pick-up organizations. So you would designate, as they did with me, a regimental colonel to be the MAU

commander. You would then put together a staff of some people that were either getting short or were about to go to school or something like that. So you didn't always get what you rated in the quantity that you rated. I had Capt Jim Battaglini, for example, as the S-3 of the 36th MAU, which was a job that arguably we should have had a lieutenant colonel for, because of the magnitude of the operation. But Jim did a superb job and is today an officer of top calibre.

That was an amphibious deployment, in five amphibious ships to Norway. We embarked, sailed in February, went over through Plymouth, stopped there en route. We had a couple of days liberty with the Royal Marines in the UK. We embarked what was in effect the 3d Commando Brigade headquarters. As I mentioned earlier, the Brits had formally fallen out of the exercise that year because of reduction in defense funding. So the brigade commander, the brigadier, Julian Thompson, who was the man at that time, could not take his staff *per se*. But we fed them in until we integrated them with the MEU staff, picked up a few Dutch liaison officers, and that became the overall combined force staff that then sailed with me in the USS *Guadalcanal* through the North Sea, into the Norwegian Sea and Inner Leeds to North Norway.

We went to North Norway, disembarked the majority of the units and trained for about two weeks in some of the --

GEN MUNDY: I had just said that we moved up by amphibious ship and went into one of the fjords there, debarked the ships and trained for a couple of weeks in some of the camps up there. We lived very basically. The Marines lived in tents, even though there were buildings there. We were trying to acclimate them and teach them Arctic procedures, so we all lived in tents there, in fairly harsh conditions from time to time.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the temperature ranges?

GEN MUNDY: It would get down to — I think about the coldest I was aware of was probably five or perhaps six, seven, eight degrees below zero Fahrenheit. Most of the time, the weather was pretty good, but in that part of Norway, snow and rain — if it is a warm year, it was not that year, you can be in bright daylight, and five minutes later you can be in a snowstorm, and ten minutes later you're back in broad daylight. It just sweeps across through the fjords.

So it got fairly cold. But you acclimated to that. You learned how to dress, you learned how to sleep in

the snow, as always. You being a Korean veteran and perhaps other places would know, the very worst thing that can happen to you is that you drank too much fluids before you got in your bag at night, and if you sleep properly, you learn to skin down, take all your clothes off because you will sleep warmer that way in a sleeping bag, if it is just your body heat adding to the warmth.

But I'll tell you, when you wake up and you have that urge to go and you know you're going to have to get out of that bag into the snow to go find a place, that is harsh. At any rate, that is the humorous part of the Arctic training.

After we had trained for a couple of weeks, we re-embarked. We sailed down to Trondheim Fjord, or Trondhjem, if you are a Norwegian, did a rehearsal landing there. I can vividly remember, as I was following the — we were moving the artillery ashore by helicopter. We had 105 artillery, and we were moving them ashore by helicopter. To this day, I can vividly remember, I was coming along behind the artillery lift. We were using CH-46s to lift the artillery — and watching the suspension line on a howitzer part, and seeing this artillery weapon plunging down toward the fjord and hit with a great splash, and right on down it went. Of course, fjords are very deep. So I saw my career passing in front of my eyes. I would be summarily court martialed for having dropped an artillery piece in a Norwegian fjord.

I sent a missing/lost/stolen report, which is the technique of reporting, and got back, "Don't worry about it, we're going to get rid of those anyway, don't try and salvage it." The Norwegians couldn't believe this, that we wouldn't go after that. But I assured them that the U.S. Government didn't desire to expend the resources to go down and get it. So we wrote it off.

An interesting aside is that two years later, my good and dear friend, then-BGen Norm Smith, was commanding the 4th MAB in Norway. As they were backloading, a five-ton truck moved down to an LCU to board it. The LCU had not been properly anchored to make sure that the bow would stay against the banks of the fjord when the truck came on. So the truck hit the bow and pushed the boat off, and the truck plunged on down. The driver got out, there were no injuries. I got a message in one of those very nice times, a message from Norm Smith that said, remember that howitzer that you prepositioned in the Trondheim Fjord two years ago? I just put the prime mover with it. So anyway, we lost some gear out there.

To get on with the saga here, we then backloaded,

came down, did our rehearsal landing in Trondhjem Fjord, and then sailed back up the Inner Leeds, which is a little series of Norwegian rocky islands that is between the coast and the submarines threat. A tough job for the commodore. We went into Vest Fjord. We went up to the landing area that was at the small town of Bjerkvik in Bjerkvik Fjord. We were to land there.

We had scoped all this out. We pulled in at about 0200 in the morning. The ships dropped anchor. The winds were howling so strong through the fjords, it was almost a hurricane, typhoon force winds, that we crossed anchors on the ships, we literally sawed a hole in the bow of one of the LPDs that was along with us. In the morning, when H-hour was coming — we were going to try to do this at 0400 in the morning, have a night landing. I went out on deck and could hardly stand up. We tried to put a boat in the water, and it was almost swept away, one of the U-boats. We were fearful of putting the assault amphibians in because they would not be able to navigate.

The water was white. It was whipped into a fury. I thought it was frozen when I first looked at it, but it was just the white froth on the water.

So at any rate, here we are, D-Day, the mighty U.S. Marines have arrived. My British colleagues, who had coached me into this landing site, in the meantime had gone around with British task force into Levangen Fjord, which was placid. So of course, the Brits landed, but the American Marines couldn't land. Here's all the press sitting in the hotels in Bjerkvik, waiting to see this mighty assault by the U.S. Marines.

MajGen Gray, division commander at that time, had come over and was in there with the press. It was at that point, I think, that I gained a true appreciation for the value of having a good public affairs officer, because the MEU public affairs officer, who had been sent ashore to coordinate the press coverage of the landing, was able to convince the Norwegian press that the Marines could land without question, that we had the capability to do it, but that the landing force commander was such a humane and compassionate man that even for the importance of this exercise, he was willing to sacrifice his reputation to insure that no one was injured, which was frankly the last thing in my mind. The only thing I was thinking about was "What do I do?"

But at any rate, as the press recorded it, the Marines came out heroes, because we had not taken a chance, we had not risked life and limb to do this, and we were able by about mid-morning to get the helicopters off and to conduct the helo assault and link up with the Brits, even though it took us about two days to get

rolling stock in, and be able to get our equipment and artillery in, that sort of thing.

Gen Gray — I remember, after we had done the helo assault we managed to get a helicopter in and picked him up and brought him out to the ship. We hadn't landed anyone at that point. I made a mistake.

We got a helicopter in and picked him up. He came out and he said, "The conditions are pretty bad." And I said, "Yes, sir, they sure are, I have really been strapped." I had the Navy commodore there, who didn't know what to do, either.

Gen Gray said, "I'll tell you, I don't know what you ought to do, but you ought to do something. And whatever you do, you won't be criticized for it." I thought that was a superb touch of commander's guidance, in effect saying "It's your show, I'm not here to tell you what to do, but you need to do something. If you call it off, I'll support you, if you do it I'll support you."

Well, inspired by that confidence, I went up and said to the commodore, "We've got to land, we've got to get some people ashore." So we launched the helos and got them ashore, and went on with the exercise.

Of course, the four maneuver elements had all of the British helicopters that were flying under the op con of Col Marvin Pixton, who was the commanding officer of the helicopter squadron that I had in that MEU.

BGEN SIMMONS: How do you spell his last name?

GEN MUNDY: P-i-x-t-o-n. He is a retired colonel here in Washington right now. Marv was the project officer for the AH-1W Cobra helicopter before he retired, and has become very successful in the private sector.

But anyway, we conducted the exercise. We learned a lot of lessons. As is always the case, everybody praises everybody at the end of an exercise. My experience with exercises remains consistent, that is, we made some mistakes, we learned a lot, and comm was all fouled up. That is the critique of any exercise I have ever participated in.

But they were very gracious. Even though we had had some problems with the weather, the Norwegians were used to that. Instead of being critical, and instead of being critical in their press as I mentioned earlier, they were very interested in the allied forces coming and experiencing the extraordinary conditions in Northern Norway. So that we had an extraordinary condition and that it caused us to have to delay and so on was in their minds a great teaching lesson and learning lesson for us. They were grateful that we had

been confronted, rather than just having the exercise go smoothly.

BGEN SIMMONS: To what extent did you use or try to use skis in this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: At that time, not very much. The Marine Corps — as we got into operations in Northern Norway, because we were not skiers, the Marine Corps attempted to make the case for snowshoes, that snowshoes were fundamentally better than skis. We of course wore the vapor barrier boots, which are very warm to stand around on a cold night in, but are not much good for hiking or skiing. They are not very good, because they are wider than the ski, and you trip and they are hard to get around in.

So to legitimize, if you will, our inadequacies, we had invented that snowshoes were better for us. So we were primarily — the reconnaissance platoon was taught to ski, and they skied. We learned though that we were hearing our own praise, and that that was not the way to get around up there. So when we came back from that evolution, we included in the after action report that we had to get ski-capable, and thereafter, the organizations that went there underwent a significant preparation to be able to ski. Today, the young Americans that go over there can ski, probably not as good as the Norwegians; they grow up doing it. But I'll tell you, all the allied forces involved, including the Brits and the Dutch Marines, spend a lot of time up there, the young Americans. We are now equipped, we are now capable, and we can outmaneuver anybody in that terrain.

BGEN SIMMONS: Selected units? Or how do you decide who will ski and not ski?

GEN MUNDY: The 2d Marines are still focused on the northern region, down in the 2d Division, and have been since those days. The last time, I mentioned that I went up there as the CO of 2d Marines. The year before it had been the 6th Marines. But ever since 1982, the 2d Marines have been the Arctic regiment. So every year, the 2d Marines undergo training and prepare a battalion, or usually one of the Reserve battalions, the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines out of upstate New York are pretty capable of skiing. So we always try to take some of the Reserve organizations and then one of the battalions out of the 2d Marines.

Now we have reached a level of expertise, to where there is a pretty good cadre of cold weather expertise in the Marine Corps, but certainly down in the 2d Marines. So we have the new young Marines that you

start teaching to ski on plastic grass matting, sliding down a make-up hill or two at Camp Lejeune. You squirt water on this thing, and you can ski. So you will go down there in September and see young Marines in shorts and T-shirts with skis and boots on, learning how to ski. By the time we take them over there, they are very effective.

You have to have units that are trained to some degree to be able to do that. I think the Arctic training — you don't have to have as extensive as we originally thought you would have to. You have to understand the fundamentals of how a tent team works. Don't drink the yellow snow and things of that sort that you learn about the Arctic, taking care of your body and drinking a lot of hot fluids, recognizing hypothermia, that sort of thing. But that is a fairly short term training. One of the best places to do it is in Northern Norway. So you don't necessarily have to be totally ready when you get there. You can pick it up fairly well, we found subsequently, after you get over there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Our cold weather training camp is Pickle Meadow. Did the East Coast battalions get a chance to go to Pickle Meadow for cold weather training, or do we use Fort Drum or some alternate site?

GEN MUNDY: When I was going to Norway, we used at that time Fort Drum. Subsequently, when I went back for example as a brigade commander a couple of years later, at that time we started using — my second year in the 4th MAB, we started sending the unit out to Pickle Meadows for some training there, and then up into one of the more extreme cold conditions that you find in Wisconsin or Minnesota. Then on to Norway. That probably is a step too far. To be very candid with you, we would almost do better as an economy move, and may in the future just send units directly into Northern Norway and train them there, because the terrain and the conditions are all standard. Otherwise, we spend an enormous amount of resources to move a battalion, for example out to Pickle Meadows. It is good training, and it uses our facility, to train them there, then to bring them back into Wisconsin or Minnesota or Fort Drum — Fort Drum got too expensive. I don't think we have used that in a number of years. And then on to Norway, there is an enormous expense connected with this. So a cheaper way to do it that I discussed with Gen Solli when I was over there this year, was that we maybe just go directly from Camp Lejeune into Northern Norway, train in their camps for a couple of weeks, and then conduct the exercise.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Schwenk gave you strong concurrent fitness reports for both your command of the 38th and 36th MAUs, complimented you for the training of your Marines and your logistic readiness. Did your work with prepositioning earlier have anything to do with this logistics readiness?

GEN MUNDY: I don't specifically attribute that. I would say that in the case of the 36th MAU, I had been a plans officer and I was familiar with North Norway, so I may have been focused a little bit on insuring that we had what we needed when we went over there.

For the 38th MAU, the only thing I can think of that might have generated a remark like that, we had a philosophy for a number of years that an exercise for us going forth was simply that. You went to the Caribbean to do an exercise, you flew down there and you did the exercise. You didn't worry about being contingency capable.

I would have to attribute I think to Gen Gray probably, more than me, but let's say that between us, as he had come to the division, we realized that any Marine force that sets sail on a ship anywhere should at least have the capability to be used in a contingency. Therefore, you needed not to go forth simply with blank ammunition for an exercise. All ships had landing force operational ready munitions in them of some sort. But you needed to be trained up and you needed to be equipped and you needed to be logistically organized to be able to at least support yourself, had we been committed to a crisis somewhere.

So I worked hard on that. It may have been that fact that generated Gen Schwenk's comment.

BGEN SIMMONS: During this period, you were selected for promotion to brigadier general. How did you learn of your selection?

GEN MUNDY: My selection to brigadier had some humorous aspects to it. The year before, a couple of my buddies from the Plans Division, when the brigadier list was being rumored about, the year before I was eligible, had started the rumor down in the gym here at Headquarters that I was on the brigadier list. This spread like wildfire, because it was so unbelievable, because I wasn't even eligible. This would have been a deep, deep selection, below zone. So we had all of this going around. The list came out, and of course I wasn't on it and didn't expect to be on it, and never had any concern about that.

So as a result of that, I was constantly chided in the

division about the man who was always making brigadier general. So there was a little humor there.

But the next year, to perhaps violate the confidence of the board here, which certainly is legal and should be kept sacrosanct, because I was deploying to Norway, when I went up to my deployment brief with Gen Schwenk, after we had finished, he called me in his office and he said, "Listen, this is not something that ordinarily I would do, but we had to make a decision. If you are selected for brigadier, which you are — so I was told in Gen Schwenk's office in late January or early February that I had been selected by him — was told by him that I had been selected. He said, "We had to make a decision whether to leave you on or to pull you off, because the brigadier general orientation course will be held while you're gone, so I had to make sure that I had that cleared." So I inquired. LtGen John Miller was the president of that board, and he had called John Miller. Miller had said, "I can't tell you, but if the sun comes up tomorrow, maybe that's right." Anyway, he had given him the information that I was selected through and in effect, code of no denial.

What Schwenk said is, "So you are going to be deployed. You are out as an operational deployment, not only as an exercise. So I want you to know that you have been selected, but you won't be coming back for the orientation course." I said, "Fine."

So that was my informal notification. Then I proceeded to embark and head for Norway. The list came out, as I recall, about the middle of February, I believe, is when it was officially announced. Gen Barrow called me at about 0230 in the morning my time. We were then en route in the Inner Leeds, heading for the exercise in Norway, about two days out of D-Day itself. The comm watch came down and got me and said the Commandant wants to talk to you. So I went and got on one of these single side band communications that was filled with burbles and gurgles. Gen Barrow notified me that I had been selected.

I was in my skivvies, I was up in the Navy comm center. All of the sailors were standing around listening, because it was an audible announcement. So my formal notification was standing in my skivvies at about 0230 in the morning on the USS *Guadalcanal*, to the cheers of the Navy, who knew that I had just been selected for brigadier general.

Gen Barrow was also gracious enough, characteristic of his style and manner, to call Linda and to tell her that, so both Linda and I got the word at about the same time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you know the names of some

of the other members of your selection board?

GEN MUNDY: Sure. Those who were on with me, Jack Dailey was selected for brigadier on that list, Ernie Cook, Ed Cassity, Jim Mead, Mike Sheridan. Those are some that come immediately to mind among my closer friends.

BGEN SIMMONS: You continued through the end of April, 1982 as the CO of 36th MAU. You got two more fine reports from Gen Schwenk and Gray. We have done this before, but let's philosophize a bit more on the relative decisions of the regimental commander and the MAU or MEU commander. We both remember that Gen Gray, as Commandant, changed the "Amphibious" in our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces back to "Expeditionary," a broader context. It had become something like the British, in that the regiment is now primarily a training and administrative command, and the MAU is the task-organized fighting command, roughly equivalent in size to an Army brigade or a brigade of most European countries.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I think so. For most of the things that Marines do on a day-to-day basis, MEUs are the point of the spear, MEUs are in an operational context the force of choice. Though you may recall that as recently as last year in Haiti, we used the 2d Marines with Col Tom Jones as an instant MEU commander. So he went down, not designated as a MEU, but designated as an RLT-2, and conducted that operation. So the regiment still had some utility.

But I think to be very candid, I don't know a better way to do the housekeeping chores. No colonel that we send off to the 2d Division, 1st Division or anywhere else wants to be just a housekeeper or just a camp commander, as we talked about earlier in Okinawa. He wants to be an operational commander.

So we keep the regiments tuned up, but we have a pretty heavy overhead, of having an additional six Marine expeditionary units, staffs, all of that manpower consumption, to be able to be the forward going units while the regiment stays behind.

When I was there, albeit that I was gone for only limited periods of time, but when for example the 2d Marines deployed to Camp Pickett, only a few hundred miles from Camp Lejeune, from our home base, the CO, the XO, the 3, the regimental staff in effect went with me. In the rear we left the assistant S-4, who was a camp commander, if you will, or responsible for the operation of the regimental rear.

But as a practical matter, we went up there with only one battalion in the 2d Marines. As I mentioned

earlier, there were at least two that were still remaining in the rear. We had displaced the regimental headquarters in that case.

When I left as a MAU commander, I had a separate staff for the MAU from the regiment, but I left the regimental executive officer. I left, took my driver with me, my sergeant major went with me, as I recall probably a couple of clerks out of the three and four shops, communicators and whatnot that you pull out of a regiment. So that which was left in the rear was nothing more than a housekeeping — had no operational capability at all, with the lieutenant colonel executive officer in charge.

We have a redundant layer there. Yet, keeping in mind that this nation, if you go back and average, maybe over history some come closer together than others, but it is only about every 20 to 25 years that we send a divisional sized force forth from these shores, Army, Marines, or anybody else.

We sent both the 1st and 2d Divisions off to the desert. There, the regimental structures were very important to fighting that battle. So our dilemma is, if we ever swayed away from the regiment as an entity in the division, one could argue that a MEU staff could probably pick up and run a regiment, and to be sure, it could. Witness my experience in the northland with four combined force battalions up there. We did a pretty good job with the MEU staff, running that.

So if we intend in the future to field a Marine division, the regiment is important. If we expect to fight at brigade levels and below, then I could argue for you that a MEU staff could become the ground combat element of a brigade, very easily. We have done that as a practical matter on occasions where we have brought two Marine expeditionary units together. We should if we haven't done it before, if we put them side by side, we would usually chop the elements of one to the other, or one of them is in charge, somebody is the senior commander. You could expand the MEU command element and probably make up what we do today with the regiment in the Marine brigade.

BGEN SIMMONS: Our Marine expeditionary brigades are much less often deployed or exercised than our MEUs. You already made that point. Although we call these organizations "brigades," the size and combat power of a Marine expeditionary brigade equates to a division in almost any army in the world. So maybe we are doing ourselves a disservice by calling it a brigade. As you have already said, the core of a MEB is an infantry regiment. You have spoken about the readiness of the 2d Marines to take the field, if they had to take the field.

Exploring this just a little bit further, if you look at our history, ever since the beginning of this century we have deployed to major conflicts by brigades, but we have consolidated as rapidly as we can to a larger unit, be it a division or an expeditionary force. I am anticipating something that should be discussed later, but part of the lessons learned process of a deployment to the Persian Gulf was a re-examination of the role of the brigades, in fact, the very designation of the brigade. Would you like to speak to that now, or would you rather wait until later?

GEN MUNDY: We certainly can. The term "brigade" for MEB has of course been removed from our lexicon, and we now use Marine Expeditionary Force Forward. It is not a very practical term, because nobody in the world except us, and only if you have recently graduated from the Command and Staff College, do any of us understand what a MEF Forward is.

We can talk about this later on, but that is one of these accommodations or maneuvers or tactics that we used in this particular case in the justification of the size of the Marine Corps. We stripped out brigades and the brigade headquarters, or command elements, as we termed them. That was structure savings, and made great hay and great success, I might say, in taking out an echelon of headquarters in the Marine Corps. There were many who had argued for years that there was redundancy somewhere, that either the division was redundant or the brigade was redundant.

But the brigades came out, and that picked up for us about 2,000 force structure spaces as we were drawing down the size of the Marine Corps. So we then were faced with, what do you do if you are not a MEU, but you are a larger MAGTF, what are you? What we concluded then was that a Marine Expeditionary Force, if you can adopt the JCS definition, which would only capitalize Marine, and the E and the F are small case, as opposed to our customary way of making expeditionary and force capital, then any Marine formation that goes forth is a Marine Expeditionary Force. A MEU is a Marine expeditionary force in the little case sense.

So we said, therefore, if we go off to any contingency in the future, that force which goes, if it is not one of the specifically identified MEUs, as the only Marine entity, we will always get a general on the ground as quickly as we can. That is one of the advantages of the brigade, is that you now get a star on the ground to talk to other stars, because believe me, the Army and everybody else will have three and

four stars in there in today's world as quickly as they can get them there.

So we said therefore, what we will call this organization is an expeditionary force. But to un-confuse our own minds, or to arguably confuse them further, we realized that if we're going to have designated standing Marine Expeditionary Forces, like II MEF, that if we deploy a part of it into the Caribbean, we can't call it II. We've got to call it something; we call it II MEF forward. The deputy MEF commander goes out, puts together whatever he has got, and the rest of the MEF is prepared to come, and to become the big MEF if necessary.

So it is rather confusing. It actually is a good scheme, but it is confusing in the structured organizational definitions of military forces.

So we always confuse everybody when we get off and talk about MEF forwards, and what is a MEF forward. It can be 4,000, it can be 25,000; it can be whatever we want it to be.

So there is a little bit of confusion. Again, the utility of the brigade, and the utility of a MEF forward in my mind is what we all have learned as we have gotten more heavily into the world of jointness, and certainly into combined operations. Probably contrary to our World War II experience, where the first echelon ashore was a rifle platoon, which seized some ground, and eventually you introduced a command element or a commander and his staff, nowadays, with the crises that we face in general around the world, the first C-141 out of town ought to contain either the assistant or the deputy commanding general of whatever organization it is, and a capable staff, because you are going to have to immediately contend with the very large and heavy ranked joint structures there, even arranging for a place to position your force or to develop the landing scheme.

That was our experience in Saudi Arabia. We could reach back and say that one of the lessons we wish maybe now we had learned a little bit more quickly was that, if we were doing it all over again, right into Riyadh, that we would pop at least a Marine two-star with some structure that would be designated as the Marine force there to deal with Gen Schwarzkopf and his staff, and then let somebody else bring in the operational force behind it.

So there is great utility in the brigade. I think when the 9th MEB, for example, went into Vietnam, BGen Fred Karch was a Marine general on the ground. Whether it was necessary to have a brigade there or not was not so much the issue as it was to have a general officer and a staff, and a brigade provided that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good. How did you and Linda celebrate your promotion to brigadier general?

GEN MUNDY: I returned from deployment, as I recall, about the 10th or 12th of April. I had orders detaching me from the division the 1st of May.

But to answer you, in the Mundy household, if you do real good, if you make A's in school or if you're All American or you get your letter in sports or something, you usually make the refrigerator door. That means that whatever it is gets pasted up with magnets on the door.

In this case, when I drove up to Quarters 2212 on Paradise Point, which was — I came home in my jeep like a conquering victor. Linda was very excited.

When we got in, I made sure I did not do what is logical to do, but is not the Marine way of doing it. If you're going to anchor off Morehead City and look at the lights all night long, and then in the morning steam into port and climb off the side of a ship. If you're on a helicopter carrier, you ought to get on a helo and fly off and let the gunny unload the ship. But true to Marine fashion, I stayed right with the ship and debarked portside, and then drove down from Morehead City.

Went to the 2d Marines, checked into the regiment and checked in with Gen Gray, reported myself back aboard. He said, "Go home and take the rest of the day off." So I drove home, and there on the front door was a big silver star, which I still have. It is made out of plywood. So I had moved from the refrigerator door to the front door of the house.

We then jumped up and down probably, very excited. There descended upon us along about dinner time — the neighborhood came in with bottles of wine and what not. My good friend to this day, then Col Don Lynch, now MajGen Lynch, showed up at my house — he is a Texan, and he showed up at my house with a six pack of Lone Star beer. It took me years to get the connection between the lone star and the fact that we were celebrating my selection to brigadier. So it was characteristic, a very exciting time of having friends that have done so much to support you, come over and rejoice with you and your successful accomplishment at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your promotion brought you a transfer effective 1 May, 1982 to Headquarters Marine Corps, where you were further assigned to the Manpower Department. Do you have anything further to add about your tour as a colonel in the 2d Marine Division?

GEN MUNDY: Well, maybe a couple of things. But to go back to the last point, because I didn't end it, was how did we celebrate. Eventually, I think the things that have been for me very high points that I probably have gotten to enjoy maybe even more than others. I have always thought that high moments should be celebrated on the field. There is no such thing as a good indoor ceremony. If you have to be promoted indoors or change command indoors, that isn't the way to do it.

When I was promoted to brigadier general, which happened just shortly before I detached the division, about the 28th of April or so, we had a change of command of the 2d Marines. Col Bob Milligan was relieving me of the 2d Marines. So Bob and I changed command, and then he stepped out and took the regiment from the exec. Then Gen Schwenk came down, and I walked out front, and I was frocked to brigadier general in front of my own regiment, and walked back up and got in the jeep and rode around, trooped the lines of all the Marines in the regiment. They could see that their colonel had become a general. So I was very fortunate to have my first gun salute, for example, fired for me on the field with my regiment displayed before me. So that was a very high way to get promoted to brigadier general.

But my time within the division was too short. While I was happy to get promoted, as all of us are, at the same time it truncated the amount of time I spent in the division, because I got there in August of '80 as you have recounted, and in April of '82 I was on my way out of there and headed back to Headquarters Marine Corps, so less than two years. I would have wished for a little bit more time.

But that said, I don't know how I could possibly have done any more in that period of time that I had in the division than I did. Combined operations, north, south, east, planning for what would eventually become RDJTF or CENTCOM operations, MAGTF commander, regimental commander, division staff officer. I had a tremendous year and a half down there in the division.

BGEN SIMMONS: So you did. This is probably a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: Before we do, let me add one story that will be of humor to those who look back on some of the lighter happenings in the life of a general-to-be; may be a little irreverent, but is a testament to the spirit and humor of Marines.

I've mentioned BGen Joe Hopkins, the Assistant

Division Commander during this period earlier. Joe was a first rate Marine, and the epitome of what we would want the public image of a marine to be. If he had a failing, it was not of professionalism, but may have been of the effort to try and act like what many think a general should be. As the ADC, he was given many of the relatively colorless jobs to do on behalf of the commanding general — still to this day, a fate of ADCs. Joe was a stickler for attention to detail — a product of being the XO of the Marine Barracks in Washington as a lieutenant colonel, perhaps. At any rate, he wound up, as do many “assistants” in peacetime, sometimes looking for things to do, and focusing on minutia since the CG was involved with the macro issues. Joe would come through the various regimental areas frequently checking out things like the cleanliness of the men’s head in the regimental gym, whether or not the left-over raw vegetables in the mess halls were properly covered with Saran Wrap, and things of that magnitude. After a pass through, I would occasionally get a call from his aide saying that the ADC would like to see me. I would get in my jeep, drive up to the Division Headquarters, and report to the ADC. Joe, in serious tones, would tell me that he had visited the Second Marines’ mess hall, and that he had found a tray of left-over salad makings uncovered in a reefer, or something like that. I would respond that I would immediately take care of it, and return to the regiment, call in the S-4, and say something like, “For God’s sake, tell the Mess Hall Chief to cover the raw lettuce!”. To make a long story short, such actions on the part of a general — or any officer, for that matter — don’t take long to get to the troops, and before long, the regimental Sergeant Major, on one of his morning coffee stop-bys, would wind it up by saying, “Colonel, we got word that the ADC will be checking messhalls for the next couple of days, so you better get them raw vegetables covered up!”

A second part of the story relates to the fact that in those days, generals rode in their staff cars with the small car, or boat, flag fluttering from the right fender — a grand symbol, which I personally hated to see go away, but it pretty much has. Anywayl when the ADC would come to visit, his car — usually with the driver still inside — would sit outside the facility announcing to the world with the fender flag that a general was inside. One day, I received a call from the ADC’s aide with a little more frantic than usual note in his voice telling me that the ADC would like to see me right away. I went up to the Headquarters and was shown in promptly. BGen Hopkins was sitting sternly behind his desk and without pause, said to me, “I was at your regimental mess hall at noon today, and when

I came out to get in my car, my flag had been stolen. I expect the flag to be returned by tomorrow noon.” I expressed appropriate concern, and assured him that I would look into this transgression right away. I then returned to my regimental CP, called in Angel Carrasco, my Sergeant Major, explained the problem and concluded by saying, “Sergeant Major, this is sergeant’s business, not officer’s. Find the flag!” The next morning at 0700, the door to my office opened, and there was Carrasco with two cups of coffee. He came in, closed the door, and said, in his inevitable manner, “Hey, colonel, we need to talk about this flag thing.” There followed, one of the most humorously poignant outpourings a Sergeant Major could make. “Colonel”, he said, “just imagine that you’re a PFC in the barracks, and every day or so you look out after chow, and here’s this shiny car that the general rides in, and it’s got this flag on it. The general comes in, and he’s not really interested much in what you’re eating; he just goes back and looks around for something that don’t matter much and then gives some corporal a ration over it. You watch this go on, and then you and your buddies begin to formulate a plan. You plan how a couple of you will keep watch, and then, at just the right time, you, the chosen one, make a run for the car, grab the flag, and probably run all the way into the woods on the other side of the mess hall and dive in a ditch for cover. After a while, your buddies give you the all clear signal, and you come out. You’re a hero in your platoon; you captured the general’s flag! Colonel, we wouldn’t want to take that away from that kid, whoever he is; and colonel, the ADC’s gonna look real bad if we go shaking down the regiment to try and find the general’s flag. If he can’t hold onto his flag, how’s he gonna look?”

I had a hard time keeping a straight face, but finally said, “O.K., Sergeant Major; I’ve got it.” He left and I drove up to the division CP and went in to see Hopkins. He had mellowed a bit from the day before, and I gave him the same thrust as the Sergeant Major had laid on me: “Somebody’s going to look bad if we go shaking down a regiment because the general lost his flag”. Joe Hopkins looked at me across his desk for what seemed like ten minutes, and then said, “That’ll be all, colonel”. I left, and never heard another word about the flag from him.

Now we fast-forward to my last day as a regimental commander. I had returned from deployment, prepared to turn over the regiment to Bob Milligan for a couple of weeks, and then, on the day before the change of command, made my rounds to the battalions and the Headquarters Company to fall out the Marines and tell them how much I appreciated their

service, and how the star I would pin on the next day was really a product of their performance. The last battalion I visited was my old one, 2/4, my “fourth battalion of the Second Marines”. My old regimental exec, Nick Schreiber, had moved down to command the battalion, and after my brief remarks to them, I started to walk away. Nick said, “Just a minute, colonel; the battalion has something to give you.” His Sergeant Major walked up and gave me a box, which I opened, and there was a framed one-star flag with a brass plate under it wishing me well from “The Magnificent Bastards” of 2/4. I started bubbling with thanks, and then it hit me. “Nick”, I said, “Where did this flag come from?”.

His response was sober and direct:

“Sir: we did not touch the car!” The one-star flag is, to this day, displayed proudly among my most meaningful memorabilia, as the first gift I received upon becoming a general, and as a testament to the undying spirit and humor of young — and not-so-young - Marines!!

SESSION 13

Duty as Director of Personnel Procurement

Assignment as Director of Personnel Procurement . . . Gen Bob Barrow's interest in Manpower . . . Working for LtGen Ed Bronars and MajGen D'Wayne Gray . . . The Capstone course . . . Family life in Springfield . . . Working for LtGen Charlie Cooper . . . Role of Marine Wives . . . The creep of jointness . . . "Good, better, best" . . . Working again for LtGen Bill Maloney . . . Green sweaters, blue sweaters . . . "Flocking" as a policy . . . Some thoughts of recruiting.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your two-year tour with the 2d Marine Division as a colonel and your promotion to brigadier general.

In this session we will explore your two-year tour, your first as a brigadier general, as Director of Personnel Procurement at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

You arrived at Headquarters in May 1982. At that time Gen Robert Barrow was Commandant and Gen Paul X. Kelley was the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff. Do you know who determined your assignment as the Director, Personnel Procurement Division?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, I do but before I get into that I would like to record in my history that today, this date that you mentioned, is a very special day because it is your birthday and so I wanted to say "Happy Birthday" to you on your 74th and to say that of that 74 years, as I count it, 53 of them have been spent in service as a Marine, whether in civilian clothing or the great bulk of it in uniform. And, as I also know, you have been in effect the orchestrator of the Marine Corps, commemoration of the 50th anniversary of World War II 50 years ago. You were sitting somewhere on Okinawa, probably on top of a stack of C-rations in the 7th Service Regiment being glad that the war was over and getting ready to go into China to be part of the occupation troops. That may be one of the most significant contributions to my oral history, is recording the fact that today is your birthday, but to get on with business, yes, Gen Barrow —

BGEN SIMMONS: First, thank you very much.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, you are welcome, you are wel-

come. Gen Barrow determined my assignment. I know that because when I arrived at the Headquarters I was sent down early on, in fact the first day that I got there I saw him in the mess and as he was want to do he came and sat down beside me and we had lunch. He said, "Come and see me, if you have time today," which is a rather extraordinary invitation from the Commandant, so I found the time. I went right into see him and he explained to me where I was going.

He also made clear to me that this was to be, in his view, a stash; that he did want me to direct recruiting for the Marine Corps if I was to stay there but that he had just nominated me to be the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and that he hoped that I would get that job instead of staying in the Marine Corps.

My heart sank, butterflies flipped around in my stomach because here I was a brand new brigadier general and about the last thing that I wanted to do was to disappear into the bowels of the Pentagon, as I perceived it.

A couple of days later MajGen D'Wayne Gray, who was then the Director of Personnel for the Marine Corps, called me and said, "You are off the hook. Sec Def has decided to extend his military assistant for another year so you are off the hook." I was mightily relieved, though this came back again and a year later I was called by D'Wayne Gray to say, "We are nominating you again to be the Military Assistant to Mr. Weinberger." Again my heart sank because I was having a great time as a recruiter.

I went to see him and I said, "Look, how do I get out of this?" We were good friends as I have talked about him before. He was always congenial with me but he stiffened a little bit on this one and as a two-star speaking to a one star said, "General, the Commandant is nominating you to be the Military



BGen Carl E. Mundy's official photograph was taken on 5 July 1982. His first duty assignment as a general officer was Director, Personnel Procurement Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.

Assistant to the Secretary. Your job is to get the job so you look happy when you go over for your interview."

I was subsequently interviewed, was not selected. Interestingly my competition, there were two of us apparently that were in the running and the officer selected was none other than MajGen Colin L. Powell. I never felt like I had run very far in second place and I was delighted that Colin got the job and I got to continue to direct Personnel Procurement for the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is a very interesting story. I had no inkling of that. That is a real contribution. Do you think your tour as an Officer Procurement Officer so many years before might have influenced your assignment or do you think it was more that Gen Gray might have recommended to Gen Barrow or Gen Barrow, with his own great interest in manpower might have thought of this, at least as your temporary assignment?

GEN MUNDY: I do not think it was connected to

being an OSO, that might have been one of those things on your brief sheet that said he's had some experience in this. At the risk of sounding somewhat vain or affected, and I certainly do not mean to, the fact is that Robert H. Barrow and I speak with the same southern accent and we had had a tremendous rapport during my days as a plans colonel at Headquarters.

I had received inquiries from MajGen Dutch Schulze, who was the Director of Personnel before D'Wayne Gray took that, when I was a colonel and had just left the Headquarters to go to the 2d Division that Gen Barrow would like for me to return to the Headquarters and be his Military Secretary. Gen Schulze asked me what I thought of this? I struggled with that decision to recognizing that a call to sit at the Commandant's right hand was a premier assignment but I had only been in the 2d Division for a very few months at that time so I called Gen Schulze back and said that I would really like to stay in the FMF and I had the possibility of becoming a regimental commander and I would really like to stay. The word came back from Gen Barrow through him to stay where you are. I had a great rapport with Barrow.

Gen Barrow, I have always characterized although I might throw certainly Gen Wilson and even Gen Chapman in the same category as our great manpower generals. Gen Barrow's focus during his tenure as the Commandant was not exclusive but was intensely upon manpower and recruiting and upgrading quality of the people in the Marine Corps.

I knew when I had been aimed at that assignment while there might have been others I would have been more excited before I got into it I knew that it was because of the Commandant's confidence in me and his personal rapport with me. I knew that if he put me there that he put stock in the importance of that assignment.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you also have an early interview with the Assistant Commandant, Gen Paul X. Kelley?

GEN MUNDY: A very quick passing. Gen Kelley and I, again, had been friends since days when he was a major and I was a captain teaching at The Basic School. We had met, we crossed many times, the most recent when he was at the RDJTF and I was with — remember I was the Chief of Staff of the 6th MAB so I would go down to Tampa for conferences and what not so I was seeing Gen Kelley off and on. We had a good rapport and there was not a lot of interview to be done but, yes, I did call on the Assistant

Commandant and he received me warmly but let me know that really the assignment of generals was what Gen Barrow did and was not what he did and he understood I was going to recruiting and go up and do a good job.

BGEN SIMMONS: The name of LtGen Ed Bronars comes in here somewhere. What was his position?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Bronars was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs at that time. He was my boss. The Manpower Department included really three or four, we did not have four up there at the time but it included the Manpower, Plans and Policy Division with then BGen Tony Lukeman. It included the Personnel Management Division with then, when I got there, MajGen D'Wayne Gray; the Personnel Procurement Division and I inherited that division from BGen Don Fulham, one of the great recruiters of the Corps and who detaching to go out and command the Recruit Depot in San Diego — I beg your pardon, he was going to the J-5 in Korea at that particular point. He subsequently came back and commanded the Depot; and then of course Mr. Jim Marsh or Col Jim Marsh who was the grand old man of Manpower in the Marine Corps for years and years. It really was a senior executive service billet and a general officer equivalent billet.

That was the structure. Ed Bronars was the DCS/Manpower for at least the early part of my tenure. He then retired and then in fact in that two-year tour I had three bosses. Bronars was succeeded by LtGen Charlie Cooper who was there for in fact less than a year because he was posted to go out and be CG Fleet Marine Corps Pacific, he was followed by LtGen Bill Maloney who was my eventual boss.

Interesting story on that. During the days when Maloney was the DCS/Manpower the names of the seniors in those positions that I talked about were Maloney; Marsh, of course, as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff; Mundy in Personnel Procurement; BGen Jim Mead relieved Tony Lukeman in Manpower Plans and Policy; MajGen Dennis Murphy relieved D'Wayne Gray as Director of Personnel Procurement. We called it the "5M Corporation".

BGEN SIMMONS: (Laughter.) Was there a "Cap Stone" Course or other orientation for newly-promoted brigadier generals?

GEN MUNDY: There was a "Cap Stone" Course. I did not attend it because it had been in existence for I think only two maybe three years at that particular point. The Marine Corps resisted the "Cap Stone"

Course, we thought it was a waste of time. I say this now back to my days as a plans colonel when my job was to torpedo the "Cap Stone" Course if I could but we couldn't. We considered that it was a waste of time for a newly-appointed general. I do not think it has turned out that way. I think it has turned out to be a very useful course but the Marine Corps was not signed on in the early days of "Cap Stone." You had to send some but not all generals, so as I recall the Marine Corps probably sent a token number of maybe two or three initially.

We did have the Orientation Course, that was conducted while I was deployed in my previous assignment with 36th MAU. Linda came to the Brigadier General Orientation Course but I did not. She came with great trepidation and I was very proud of her because I encouraged her to do that and I thought that was a fairly good statement of a Marine wife to come on her own and, again, what is for all new brigadiers a rather threatening environment, you do not know how to be a general and you are worried about how you will look in front of your soon-to-be general officer counterparts but Linda came in my stead.

BGEN SIMMONS: As I recall, part of that orientation is apprising the newly-selected generals of their additional uniform requirements. Do you recall that?

The dark trousers and red vest... when did you get measured for those?

GEN MUNDY: Well, all of the books from the orientation course were sent to me. I was en route back from Norway aboard ship so I had plenty of time to read and that was very exciting. When did I get measured? Whenever I came to Washington for duty, I think. I went down to Harry Elms and he stuck me for \$125 for a new pair of blue trousers. As far as the red vest or weskit that generals wear, I was getting ready to buy that and got a call from MajGen Ed Megarr who was retiring who said, "I would like to give you my weskit," so actually I wear Ed Megarr's weskit to this day.

The black trousers are an interesting saga that you would recall because in those days in the symposiums, the General Officers Symposiums that you will remember well we dealt with some fairly substantive matters and we dealt with a lot of trivia, trivia would be voting on whether we had V-neck T-shirts or round-neck T-shirts or green T-shirts or white T-shirts or things like that. It was fun but it was trivial.

One of the things that Gen Barrow wanted to do, you will recall well, was to return even generals to the traditional dress uniform of the sky blue trousers and

the blue blouse. As I recall it there were alternatives. We put the wider stripe on for the generals or we kept the stripe the same. I think Gen Barrow favored just the standard Marine officers' uniform with different rank insignia on the shoulder but I can recall that we voted, as the generals did on such things, we voted on that. Of course, my peers and I, we had all just paid out \$125 for a new pair of trousers, we were adamant that we were going to keep the black trousers.

Interestingly, as I came back to be the Commandant, you will recall that just this past year or maybe a year and a half ago that I revisited that issue to dredge it back up. As Gen Barrow did not do anything about it I did not do anything about it either.

BGEN SIMMONS: I remember that well. I was President of the Marine Corps Uniform Board, of course I remember those things. The use of the dark trousers was deeply rooted in tradition back to the Civil War and earlier, generals and staff officers wore dark trousers in the Army as well as the Marine Corps.

Where did you live during this assignment?

GEN MUNDY: We returned to the house that we have owned now for about 18 years down in Alexandria. It was at 1806 Stirrup Lane. There was a colonel — I assured my tenant, I rented it to an Army colonel and assured him that I would be gone for an extended period of time. A year and a half later I called him to say, "I'll be back." and he very graciously moved three doors down the street and we reoccupied our house.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your family was growing up. Where did your children go to school?

GEN MUNDY: Betsy, our daughter, had completed high school at Quantico in the time I was there as a lieutenant colonel. Sam, our oldest son, graduated from Fort Hunt High School and was enrolled in Auburn University at the time we returned. We brought Tim, the youngest son, back to Fort Hunt from whence he had just left two years before so he was delighted. He had finished the ninth grade at Fort Hunt High School and then we went to Camp Lejeune and he finished two years of school there so he came back and graduated with his ninth grade class at Fort Hunt.

BGEN SIMMONS: Fort Hunt High School was a marvelous school. It was one of the magnets that attracted persons to live in that area. It is just too bad that it was a casualty of the political wars of Fairfax County.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Well, of course I know you live in that same area and I think that your kids went there as well. When we returned to Washington I, having lived our first tour over in Springfield, I went to a realtor and drew a circle around Fort Hunt High School and said, "Find us a house there," because as you just suggested we moved to that section of town explicitly because of the quality and the appeal of Fort Hunt High School. It is a loss to Fairfax County.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had your dog, Ned, arrived on the scene at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, dog Ned arrived with us in 1978. Ned came from the Alexandria dog pound. He was just about a six week old puppy. He was with us at that time so he returned to his point of origin.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were your favorite forms of family recreation at this time?

GEN MUNDY: We had transitioned through boating. We always had a boat of some sort. The kids now had moved on, except for Tim who was in his senior year in high school, they were on their own so the family began to break apart, not as a family but with everybody going their own ways. Sam would be off on an NROTC cruise in the summertime and then home only for a few weeks and then back to school. We all enjoyed skiing, snow skiing although it would be local down here in Virginia down to Wintergreen and so on. It would be our wintertime family get together sport.

We liked water skiing. I sold the boat because it was apparent because we were not going to use it as a family much anymore and it was just sitting there getting covered with leaves in the backyard.

That essentially is what we did other than the normal things. We were sort of past the point of all loading up in the station wagon and taking off for Florida for two weeks of camping or something that we did when the family was young.

BGEN SIMMONS: Somewhere in here I believe a motorcycle entered your career. When was that?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, well, motorcycling — I have always been high on things that burn a lot of gasoline. Others choose to sail which is a rather economical way to boat, for example, but I like the gas guzzlers. When I was at Quantico I bought — we had three motorcycles. We had — actually it started with the kids. I got Sam a little 50cc Honda motorcycle when

he was in Waynesville in the year I went to Okinawa and he rode it in the cow pasture that we lived next to and enjoyed it. When I came back from there then I bought a street and trail bike so we could go out and ride the hills of Quantico. I bought Sam a bigger motorcycle and then we had the smaller one for Tim so we had the three mounted Mundys roaring around tearing up the trails in Quantico on the weekends.

I kept a motorcycle, sold the small one and then took the other two off to Newport with us when I went to school there in 1976, sold one of those when I was up there, kept the third one. I think I had a motorcycle — I used to — in fact a couple of times I very foolishly, although enjoyably, rode a motorcycle, back and forth to work at Headquarters Marine Corps. After — when you are in the Washington morning traffic about twice you realize that in your car you have a bumper and on a motorcycle you have your legs so I did not do that too much and eventually got out of it.

When Sam reached the age of getting his driver's license I really did not want him riding a motorcycle on the streets and highways so I got out of the motorcycling business and took up bicycling and used a bicycle from our house down in Fort Hunt into the Pentagon.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is a great bicycle trail along the river.

GEN MUNDY: It is wonderful. Twelve miles in, 12 miles back. My thighs, of course, were like the trunks of trees by the time you did that a few times. That is an interesting one that I will put a little bit of a flashback here. I would do that — started doing that when I was a colonel.

I would get up in the morning, shower, shave, get all suited up and so on, get on a pair of shorts and a T-shirt, hop on the bicycle. It would take me one hour. That was hard. That was physical training. I would ride as hard as I could getting in. I would leave my uniform in the office and I would usually either stash — drive in on Monday and stash four or five sets of underwear and socks and a couple of pairs of shoes and that sort of thing or I would just stash a set of skivvies in my little bicycle pack and take it in with me.

I would go into the office — and of course you would work up quite a sweat.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just for the record, this was when you were in the Plans Division?

GEN MUNDY: I was in the Plans Division and I

even did it a couple of times after I had become a lordly general. I would ride in and — when I was in the Plans Division and specifically in the Prepositioning Working Group is the focus of this tale. I would ride in, be covered with perspiration of course. There was no place in the Annex to shower, you could go down to the gym if you chose to do that. I would come into the office, stash the bicycle outside and lock it in the rack, come on up to my office and would just stand there and just cool down and dry.

BGen John Cox never could understand me. He said, "You mean you don't take a shower?" I would say, "General, it is clean sweat. I showered before I left home, it is good clean sweat, besides I will take it off and run at noon and I will get my shower then when I come back."

Anyway, we would take what we would call an "O'Donnell shower". The origins of the "O'Donnell shower" is that when LtGen Andy O'Donnell, we called him "The Big O", as much of the Marine Corps did — but Andy O'Donnell would everyday at noon when he was the DCS/PPO he would run down to the tennis court, play tennis, come back to the Headquarters, he would dress in his office and he would raise one of the windows in his office there and pull off his shirt and stand bare chested in front of the window drying himself off and then he would get back into his uniform. So for all the world to see here is LtGen O'Donnell displayed on the second deck of the Annex looking out the window drying off. We called that an "O'Donnell shower".

I emphasized to BGen Cox that I was only following leadership style of "The Big O" and I was taking an "O'Donnell shower" every morning.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your friend Gene Arnold also had a motorcycle. Did he follow your example?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Gene — let's see, Gene, I believe, got a motorcycle some time after I did. I cannot remember the exact time frame.

BGEN SIMMONS: He was working for me when he did that.

GEN MUNDY: All right.

BGEN SIMMONS: In '75-'76.

GEN MUNDY: So, yes, we probably owned — I was down in Quantico, he was up here. Come to think of it, in fact Gene and Janine came to have dinner with us one time on his motorcycle. He had a considerably

bigger one. I think he had a Harley Davidson 750 or Gold Wing or big one. I was strictly a mud bike — I loved to get out on the weekends with the boys and the more muddy holes you could find on a trailbike the better. We usually came in scratched up and covered with mud.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Barrow was known as a recruiting and manpower expert, we have already mentioned that, did he give you any particular advice or counseling in these early days, weeks or months?

GEN MUNDY: I think I would answer you by saying “yes”. Gen Barrow made it clear to me, clear not in any unnecessarily authoritative sense but it was just clear that his interest in recruiting was intense. He had come in and insisted that the best majors that we had would go to be the recruiting station commanders, did many many things to create or to polish the systematic recruiting system that had been developed by BGen Alexander P. McMillan when he had that job. Pat McMillan really is the architect of the Marine Corps recruiting.

Gen Barrow polished that and ensured that we put very best colonels that we had into the district director jobs. Walt Boomer, for example, called me excitedly from the Naval War College and said, “My God, how come I am going to go be a deputy director for the 4th District in Recruiting?” I said, “Walt, it is because you got a feather in your cap. The Commandant has taken personal note of you.”

We put our best colonels and we put our best majors out there on recruiting duty. Gen Barrow let me know when we had our initial interview that he wanted to ensure that he knew — he told D’Wayne Gray to do that, Gen Gray being the assigner of people, that he wanted to make sure that I understood that I, on his behalf, had the ability to reach out and pull anybody that we thought we needed into the recruiting business to keep it going strong and it was going strong.

Gen Barrow — I do not suspect that he was the first Commandant to do this but he would go out of his way, and I learned that from him and I followed it very much, anytime that he went anywhere, if he went to give a speech in Minneapolis or something he would always go down to the recruiting station and stop and just chat, you know, “How is it going? Tell me what is going on with the recruits.”

When the Commandant does that a serving staff officer knows very well where his boss’s interests lie so it did not take a lot of personal counseling. He told me of the importance that he attached to it and again

gave me pretty much carte blanche. The year before I came there the Marine Corps had failed miserably at gaining its 16 and 2/3 percent of midshipmen graduating from the Naval Academy. Gen Barrow wanted that 16 and 2/3 percent. It had to do probably, in all candor, it had to do as much with the fact that if the Navy owed us 16 and 2/3 percent of anything then Gen Barrow and Gen Wilson before him by God wanted that 16 and 2/3 percent because they wanted to hold the Navy’s feet to the fire was my perception at least.

The colonel who had been the senior Marine representative at the Naval Academy was in effect relieved, he was reassigned. Gen Barrow took Col Gene McDaniel who was one of the district directors, 6th District down in Atlanta, and moved him as the senior Marine up to the Naval Academy with explicit guidance to me and to Gene McDaniel, I being also responsible for the Naval Academy procurement, that next year he expected to see every Marine lieutenant walk out of there that we rated and we did. So we were successful — or Gene was successful. I am taking too much credit for that, he did that, I was simply sitting in Headquarters.

Yes, there was guidance. Gen Barrow had a masterful leadership technique and style of saying to you in the mess or having the Military Secretary give you a call periodically. I think he did it expansively, with most of the generals in the Headquarters — you would get a call or you would see him and he would say, “Come in and see me when you have a chance.” Again, he did not say — he did not put a time limit on it.

If it were in the mess I would say, “Yes, sir.” and I would then finish lunch and I would go back up to my office and I would pull out every paper that I had and stuff my head with every statistic that I could think of — you know, how our quota was being achieved and what percentages and what the various categories were and then I would go back down all primed to dump all this information on the Commandant. I would go back down to see him, and he would always welcome me. He would sit behind his desk and put his feet not up on his desk but he would prop his foot against the leading edge of the desk, which would lean him back and then he would always take his hands, as the transcript cannot record visually but Gen Barrow would always bring his fingers together in a cathedral style in front of you and say, “Now tell me what is going on.”

You could have sat there and talked about your dog or you could have sat there and talked about how you played golf last Saturday or more ordinarily of course



In January 1983, BGen Mundy served as the Commandant's representative to the Shoup family at the funeral of former Commandant Gen David M. Shoup. Here, Mundy is seen saluting in the background, while Gen Robert H. Barrow presents the flag to Gen Shoup's widow, Zola.

you sat there and you talked about recruiting because that is what you had been brought down for. He would only listen and as you made a point he would say, "Uh huh, uh huh." and that is about it. You would have about 20 minutes of pouring out your best story to the Commandant and he would usually say at the end of that time, "Well, that is very good. Press on." That was a great Barrow saying, "Press on."

You would get up and leave and I would walk out with two feelings. Number one, had I really told him what he wanted to know but the other one was the elation that comes from being able to sit down with your boss or with the Commandant in this case and be stroked by the Commandant, not with any "Atta boy, you are doing a good job, I am proud of you." or anything else but simply taking time to listen to a subordinate was a masterful leadership style that I always have thought Bob Barrow perfected to the 10th degree.

In those sessions if you said, "General, I do not know how to handle this one. We are just not cutting it on minorities or on women or something and I am

looking at doing this." Sometimes he would say, "Well, that is good, have you thought about this?" You would say, "No, I haven't." So that is counseling or guidance Barrow style, although Gen Barrow also, as we all know, if there needs to be a sterner form of counseling he can also deliver that too.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your time under Gen Bronars was brief, about three months. He rated you as "outstanding" as he did the other brigadier general under his direction. Who was that other brigadier general?

GEN MUNDY: Tony Lukeman at that time. Tony was promoted to major general, I think, I believe the second year I was there he got his second star but he was a brigadier while Bronars was there.

BGEN SIMMONS: And also became known as a manpower specialist.

GEN MUNDY: Lukeman? Yes he did, and of course subsequently was brought back — he was going to, I

think, command the 1st MEF and he was pulled back by Chapman Cox who was then—had been the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower while Tony was there. Chapman thought a lot of Tony Lukeman. When Chapman was moved up to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense he reached out and pulled Tony in with a third star to be his assistant, his military assistant. It was a promotion.

BGEN SIMMONS: Deputy Assistant.

GEN MUNDY: Deputy Assistant Secretary. Tony, I know, as we often are it is hard to explain I think in the civilian world but you know there are times when a promotion is a grave disappointment because it brings with it the inability to go do what you thought you were going to get to do and Tony was going to command the Marine Expeditionary Force but he saluted and executed and returned to Washington and served his remaining time in the Corps as the ASD for M&RA.

BGEN SIMMONS: The new Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower was, as you mentioned earlier, LtGen Charles G. Cooper. Had you known Gen Cooper before this?

GEN MUNDY: I had. He was a company commander of the other company in The Basic Class 1/62. Gary Wilder was my CO, Charlie Cooper had Company B.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there any difference in his style of management from that of Gen Bronars?

GEN MUNDY: Very much. Charlie Cooper is a very gregarious man, a very authoritative type leader. I say “authoritative”, I mean decisive, I mean not abusive or hard to work for at all but he knows what he wants to do and he gives you direction and he gets on with it.

Bronars was—I thought knew Manpower very well but was a much quieter man, a very articulate fellow, a tremendous writer, given to editing any piece of paper that appeared on his desk. Ed Bronars would always rewrite that piece of paper. I cannot — that is not much criticism because I too am known for really wanting to be an action officer and doing a lot of editing on things that came to me.

Bronars would spend his time focused on details, it seemed to me, again, we were there for a very short time together, but on details. He liked that. Cooper was a broad arrow man. He was a comman-

der. His focus was on a broader axis of advance than on the precisely following one patrol’s trail within the department. Again, an impressive man, captain of the Naval Academy football team when he was there.

Charlie Cooper used to say, in fact he said in his first leadership meeting to us he said, “Now, I want all of you to understand that I have never been accused of not having an ego.” Indeed, that is Charlie Cooper. Charlie Cooper is not one to hide his candle under a bushel but he does it knowingly, that is just him. He is outgoing and he was a great leader. I thoroughly enjoyed working with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Both had been outstanding battalion commanders in Vietnam. Both had that confidence that comes from having succeeded in combat. You mentioned one of his first leadership whatever, talks — this has always been a thing with Charlie Cooper. He still pursues this. His theories of leadership, can you expand on that at all?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Charlie Cooper still goes around, as you talked, handing out the cards that he had printed up entitled, “Band of Brothers” which was a little piece that he wrote up about the Marines from his experiences in Korea. I believe, and subsequently I know that out as a company commander in the 1st Brigade in Hawaii that when he left his company gave him a sendoff that was pretty much unheralded for the style out of their, in their admiration for him as a leader.

Charlie Cooper is a man who inspires others. He is gregarious. He is good natured. He has always got a slap on the back, punch in the arm, a broad smile. If you need to be chewed out though he has that ability. His theories on leadership I think were probably the “Band of Brothers”, you know, take care of your Marines.

Charlie had been the CG of the Recruit Depot in San Diego. This would be three tours back. He had gone from San Diego up to the 1st Division, he had come from there to the Base at Camp Lejeune for only one year and then up to the DCS Manpower.

He had had a strong hand in recruiting too. I guess that if Charlie Cooper were sitting here in the room with us today he would be telling you that he, that all I did really was to ride the crest of the wave that he had put into effect from the Recruit Depot during his days there. We used to have great discussions — he would always remind me when I would go in and say, “Here is something that is going right.” He would always put a big grin on his face and say, “Yeah, I started that back when I was at San Diego.” And he

probably did start a lot of it but as I say, Charlie was a good man to work for.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April 1983 Gen Cooper gave you a very fine report. Linda would probably be pleased to know that he ended his comments with, "He is especially blessed with a wife who is charming, attractive and very capable in her own right." He might say that about his own wife, Carol. How important do you think Linda has been to you in your advancement to the top of the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first I would echo and say that he would say that about Carol Cooper because all who know her know that she is a lady of southern charm and graciousness and probably one of those who really helped mold Linda along the way, did help mold Linda. That probably, and I would say regrettably is most likely one of the last comments of that sort that is entered on any officer's fitness report because as we know shortly thereafter the Air Force had an incident in which some colonel's wife complained of her husband telling her that she — he was the commanding officer — that she had to go to the Wive's Club meeting or something like that. She complained about that and caused an investigation in the Air Force and caused as a result of that for the Defense Department to react to the political winds as we so often regrettably and unfortunately do.

The result of that was that there is a directive now or there was a directive put forth then and still stands today that directs that you cannot say anything about a wife's participation in a fitness report. What a loss because those who do not understand, number one, a wife who complains about participating in the activities of the service is not a part of that service. She views her husband as — that is his job, I am something else. What a loss. You cannot go through a career of the hardship and the demands of the military profession with only one member of the family being a member of the team. They both need to be.

I have, for example, always considered that there are, in the case of the Marine Corps, I will confine it to my own service, that there are wives whose husbands are Marines and then there are "Marine Wives" and I capitalize both the "M" and the "W" in the case of the Marine wife because I think they are full participants. They may have their own careers but they are fully a part of the military structure.

It is a pity that we cannot record that because when you ask, "Has Linda been a part of my success?" without question. Never because we planned it that way, willed it that way or indeed attempted to put her

forth for any reason, but a husband-wife team in the military which is made up of husbands and wives the leadership of the senior wives is fundamental to the health and wellness and stability and indeed readiness of the Marine Corps. That is why in my four years there are probably many who will offer the views, if they already have or will in the future, this guy went overboard involving the wives but I will tell you that if you are a battalion commander or any other commander you deploy and the first messages you start getting a day out of port are Red Cross messages saying "family can't cope, wife can't cope," all that sort of thing and you have to have a structure in the rear to handle that and "Marine Wives" do that for you.

So, it's two for the price of one, when you get a wife like I'm sure Frances has been during your career, as Carol Cooper was and as Linda has been to me, so there is a definite impact.

GEN MUNDY: . . . I was saying that as a practical matter we cannot go forward and say that we talk about the wives because we are prohibited from doing that, reporting it. I have never sat on a selection board in which we have formally addressed the subject of, "Okay, tell me about his wife." But as a practical matter you know when you are making the very difficult decision of which of these 10 colonels out of these 100 colonels, and remember that colonels are winners in their own right, you do not get to be a colonel unless you are already at the top of the heap, so when you are attempting to pick 10 of those colonels to be 10 brigadier generals, and there are within 100 colonels there are probably about 70 ties. You could pick 70 of them and people would say — any one of 70 of them and people would say that is a great selection.

One of the tie breakers always, at the coffee mess or standing around as you are trying to struggle with how do we differentiate, always becomes is, "Well, his wife is a solid rock, a leader wife, she is a participant, she is interested in the Marine Corps." and if the other guy's wife isn't, it makes sense that you get two for the price of one over here and you get one over on the other side.

So the wife does play a very very important part. For those that would believe that she should not, they do not know anything about fundamental leadership that is required for more senior persons to mold, groom, lead and help bear the hardship of this family that we call the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Without being specific, I would guess that a Commandant, not necessarily yourself, when he is considering placement of the general offi-

cers must take this into consideration.

GEN MUNDY: Without question. I can tell you that this Commandant did and I think some maybe more than others. In my case you realize very well, I think, that the officer that you are going to send to the Marine Corps University in Quantico's wife should be a role model for brand new 2d lieutenants' wives, for captains' wives, for majors' wives and indeed for anyone who is at this grooming academy of Marines at Quantico.

Without question you think about that. This man would be a good commander of a Marine Corps base somewhere. Part of the job of a commander of a Marine Corps base is to be the Marine Corps community representative. He has got to be in San Diego, he has got to be in Oceanside, Los Angeles, Jacksonville, North Carolina, wherever it is and his wife is a part of that social structure. So, if the wife is isolated or not interested in the Marine Corps or a non-participant then we hamper if not indeed in some cases cripple the effectiveness of that commanding general to be able to deal effectively in the matters that the Marine Corps needs him to deal with in the private sector.

I can tell you that on any major assignment, yes, I would always think how was whoever the wife was, how would she fit into this. If we are looking at San Diego we are looking at a magnificent set of quarters, one of the finest in the Marine Corps, we are looking at a commanding general and his lady who must host hundreds of educators and influencers who come through the recruit depot with receptions at their homes so that those people go back to their schools, back to their communities and say the Marine Corps', recruit training is good and the people who lead the Marine Corps are very impressive and we enjoyed the hospitality and the graciousness of that. You cannot put somebody in up there who cannot carry that particular bit for the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: I do not know whether they still do or not but foreign service selection reports used to require a section on the spouse. Foreign service selection system did something else that might or might not work for a military service. They had, and as far as I know they still have a public member of the selection board. Do you think that would work in a military service?

GEN MUNDY: A public member of the selection? You mean a private citizen?

BGEN SIMMONS: Some distinguished citizen from

outside the foreign service.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I do not think so. You would spend more — the board would spend an enormous amount of time to bring this person on line. The fact is, and we could run off four or five of your tapes here if you get me started on this, the fact is that we of the military service are distinctly different from the rest of society. For those who would take exception and say, "You're an egoist or something," it is just not true. We are different.

To understand why it is that a leader in the Marine Corps will get up and talk about women in combat or will talk about gays and homosexuals or will talk about the necessary involvement of wives or will talk about all of these sorts of things in terms that are different from what people out here walking down the street in the civilian sector happen to believe is because we are fundamentally different.

So, if you take someone from outside this entity that we know as the military mind-set as well as military service but the frame of mind, the orientation, the values, all the things that are military to bring somebody from outside and put them into a position of voting on who shall be a leader in this organization would be completely without any use that I can think of. It might be an interesting thing for them to come in and observe and to watch how fair a selection board is and how detailed the selection process is. They would be surprised by that and they would say we do not do it this well in the corporate world, we do not do it this well in government, no where else in the world do we do it like we do at least in the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: In this era of increasing emphasis on jointness and joint operations, etc., do you see a possibility that there might be members of other services and selection boards or even joint selection boards at certain levels? We already have the certification that the person's qualified as a joint services officer, do you think that might happen?

GEN MUNDY: I worry a lot about the creep of jointness. Now, I am not anti-jointness but then again my understanding of jointness which I would argue, again without hopefully ego of any sort but I have spent essentially the last 12 or 13 years of my career in one form or another, with some years off to go down to the 2d Division and what not, but in the joint environment and studying in my own mind what jointness is all about.

We can go too far in jointness in things like you just

mentioned. The Marine Corps has to remain the Marine Corps. "Such things as Regiments Hand Down Forever." Marines fight for a different reason than a sailor fights. That does not make sense to anybody in the world except a Marine. We inspire our people with different motivations.

I spent a lot of time with Navy chaplains. I would say, "Remember now you are preaching to a different flock. You are not preaching now to the First Methodist Church in Paulson, New Jersey, you are preaching to a bunch of young Americans that you motivate with different vibes than you might elsewhere."

Each service bears its own individuality and to attempt to change that in the name of jointness would be to lose what it is that causes men to go forth into battle. No one has, and I would wager to say, is ever going to jog around a track in formation chanting, "Jointness, jointness all the way." They are not. They are going to chant, "Airborne all the way." They are going to chant, "Marine Corps.," whatever their product but their pride, as Fehrenbach said in *This Kind of War*, which is one of my favorite books, is, "Their pride was in their colors," and while many Americans would believe that pride is in the American flag in point of fact that pride is in that battalion's battle color or in that Marine Corps battle color and not in some purple flag that is flying around.

The essence of jointness is taking this beautiful rainbow of capabilities that we have with each service still being green or red or blue or whatever it's proud color and heritage and motivation and spirit and reason for being is all about and blending that, not blurring that, blending that into a set of capabilities that will get the job done.

If we ever try to get into a situation where we are putting an Air Force officer into a Marine Selection Board, no, I do not know any reason for that. Will we have Joint Selection Boards at some point? I could see — I would offer to you to use an example today, and I use this admiringly because this is one of our best and brightest, but Gen Jack Sheehan today is the product of a joint selection process implicitly.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense really selected Gen Sheehan for his last two promotions and assignments. It does not mean that the Marine Corps, that I opposed it or did not have anything to do with it but he was serving in a joint capacity, he was recognized as having extraordinary potential in the joint arena and in effect he was advocated by Adm Paul Miller who was his boss at CinCLant or at the U.S. Atlantic Command to be the J-3. Gen Powell knew him from earlier assignments,

thought a lot of him. So, between them then consulting with me, Gen Jack Sheehan got promoted by a three-member joint selection board comprised of the Chairman, the Commandant and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command — a Sailor, a Soldier and a Marine.

Then of course when he became the CinC down there he was very much in that same way. Gen Shalikashvili, the Deputy Secretary Deutch thought the world, as did many others, on the NSC and elsewhere of Jack Sheehan because of his brilliance and his capacity. So, once again you have got even the civilians into the selection process.

I think what you suggest, as far as sitting down a board and saying, "Alright, let's consider some array of service members here for selection as joint, as a general in the Joint Staff." I can see no practicality and I can see a lot of down sides.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would guess that retired Gen Don Hittle was sitting here he might say that with this emphasis on joint service and being certified as a joint service officer that we are moving ever closer to the German General Staff. I have also heard comments, you probably have too from some officers, "He has left the Marine Corps. He is now on the White House Staff or he is now a unified commander, we are proud of him but he has left the Marine Corps." Do you think we are moving towards a de facto general staff?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we can talk here, I have just concluded an exchange, a very pleasant exchange with the Chairman just before I left office on that very issue, that the Joint Staff was beginning to trail towards becoming a General Staff.

A lot of people, again crediting myself with credit that maybe is not due but there are thousands of people out there everyday that think they understand the intent of Goldwater/Nichols and the provisions of Goldwater/Nichols vis-a-vis the Joint Staff and the service relationship that really do not.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a commander explicitly, by law he is not a commander. A General Staff serves a commander. The Joint Staff in the past year has been drifting towards serving a commander and in my view, though again I think that Gen John Shalikashvili is a superb man and tremendous soldier and he is a great Chairman, I really do, but in my view he has taken his eye off that ball and was dealing with really much more compelling issues of Bosnia and the spread of nuclear weapons and that sort of thing the Chairman has cause to deal with.

As a result of that the Joint Staff was beginning to

drift off the mark and was becoming arrogant and was becoming authoritative. The services would provide a non-concurrence with a particular position, the CinCs would provide a non-concurrence or offer a different view and the Joint Staff would just throw in the trash can and get on with business in the direction they are going.

Somebody had to call a marker on that and I did. It worked well. Gen Shalikashvili was very concerned about that. We had a couple of good discussions on it. Our people, the Marine plans colonels, again, you owe a lot for that because it was people like Col Chandler C. Crangle who is over in the Plans Division today who kept that noose tight.

So, yes, to answer you, I think we will continue to drift. Hopefully there will be some service chief around who will continue to yank back on the leash because the service chiefs do have a hand on the leash. My concern is that we are going to migrate through this joint staff officer process and through this reverence, to jointness, that has crept in amongst us to a point where all of the service chiefs will be products of that system and therefore we will have neutered their persuasion toward individuality.

I do not think a Marine, when we say "he has left the Marine Corps," I do not think that is necessarily true because I fervently believe and I passionately believe as you do, I know, in "Once a Marine always a Marine." You never leave the Marine Corps but as a practical basis an officer who gets — Jack Sheehan again is a classic example. One can say that Jack Sheehan has "left the Marine Corps" and yet I know for a fact that Jack Sheehan is as proud to be a Marine today as he was the day he was commissioned second lieutenant. He has not philosophically left the Marine Corps but for intents and purposes, yes, Jack has left.

If we get to a point where we have neutered our service individuality and we bring up service chiefs then who, because they have been CinCs or because they have been subordinate in the joint system, have come to salute the Joint Staff, yes, the Joint Staff can become a General Staff. Colin Powell, for example, understood very clearly what the roles of the Chairman and the Joint Staff and the service chiefs were and he never ever moved to assume authority or to assume power that was not vested in him. He was always respectful of the service chiefs.

A Chairman who came in a product of the joint system might weigh in heavily in creating a general staff.

That would be to the detriment of the effectiveness of the armed forces of the United States and to America's ability. If we ever get to that point that we denigrate the authority and the individual experiences

and different views of war fighting and operations and what not that each service brings to the table that would be a loss not a gain.

It would be convenient because it would take some of the friction out of the system but the traction would be far less in the system if we took that friction away. I worry about that and so one of my last efforts has been to kind of try to pull that back in. I have spoken to members of Congress on this. I talked to Ike Skelton to say Goldwater/Nichols has been in effect for about a decade now, it would be well for the Congress maybe to hold some hearings, just to say "How is it going out there?"

If you do do that, will cause the system to look at itself and to say, "Oh, by the way, is this the way it is supposed to work." If you just let it go the system will reinvent the law and we will have a neutered joint force. I worry about that.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was a very interesting and I think important excursion. We will revisit that when we get to your years as Commandant.

Something else on leadership style, earlier you mentioned Gen Bronar's tendency to edit everything that crossed his desk and that you had something of the same tendency and being your own action officer and liking being your own action officer. This must be a great problem for a general officer as he moves to successively higher positions and he has to learn that he has to accept good as good enough and not necessarily try to make it better. Could you comment on that a little bit?

GEN MUNDY: You may have taught that expression to Gen Barrow because the first time I ever heard it used was exactly those words. Believe it or not, no matter how high and lofty you are, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant or whoever, you deal more frequently than many would know with really fundamental problems affecting the circumstances involving a private first class somewhere.

A mother writes in and complains and in my view one of the strengths of the Marine Corps, though it is consumptive of a lot of senior officer time, is for example, that when I was the Director of Personnel Procurement I would get a letter from some mother that would say, "Look, my son signed up and he was going to go in the MPs and he got to Parris Island and he is in the infantry and by golly the Marine Corps is a rotten outfit and you guys welshed on your contract." I would spend hours researching that and getting to the bottom of it.

In many cases I would write her back a letter and I

wrote these myself personally, this was not the staff because I would sit there with my Lanier dictating machine and say, "Dear Mom, you are absolutely right. We kicked this one right in the grandstands. Your son is going to be an MP, effective tomorrow." The staff would never have given you that straight-forward reply.

That said, to get back to your point, yes, there are times when a very significant package, paper, decision or something comes through that you have to sit back and say, "If I had the time I would probably turn this 10 more degrees to the left but it is good enough, it will do the trick. I mean, this answers the mail, go ahead and put it out." Those I would think are generally more in the form of policy matters than they would be what I was talking about earlier. It is not good enough if it does not fully either explain to or correct the situation that one of the mothers and fathers of America or a Marine private first class or sergeant or something comes in, that, I think, deserves a full up 100 percent on the mark answer but other things you have to sign off and say, "I could write this better but it will answer, it is good enough."

That is hard to adjust to, particularly for somebody like me. The Plans Division business consisted of wordsmithing. I mean, it was my job to read every word that came out of the Joint Staff or that was coming out of the OSD staff or the National Security Council and to make doggone sure that as best as I could write it that the meaning was right — if it needed a stronger word or you needed to rephrase it for effect or something. I spent a lot of time word-smithing. It is very hard to do that for three years and then to suddenly become a general and stop doing it so, yes, there is adjustment.

BGEN SIMMONS: The full quotation is "Good, better, best, never let it rest until the good is better, and the better is best." but that is not really good advice because at some point you have to let it rest.

GEN MUNDY: You have to. It is not so much in the paper, as it is the difficulty of not making every decision yourself. Now, indeed we profess from the earliest stages of our leadership training to delegate responsibility, delegate authority, let the subordinates act, take responsibility for what they do but don't get in their way in trying to tell them specifically what to do. That is all good philosophy and it is all good in practice but indeed it is difficult to sit still and let others do it.

In my case, when we get reflecting on the past four years, to sit as the Commandant and to say, "Ron, Gen

Christmas, run Manpower for the Marine Corps." and then you read an ALMAR that comes out and you say, "Gosh, I don't know whether we should have done this or not but then the lieutenant general leading Manpower for the Marine Corps did so let me turn my head and focus on something else."

Rarely do those come back to bite you, sometimes and I guess we will probably have the occasion to talk about at least one here later on. But for the most part you just have to adjust to realizing that you cannot make every decision in the Marine Corps. You have good people around you, let them run it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Cooper extended his earlier report, the one that had given the nice comment about Linda through to his detachment on 27 May 1983. The new deputy would be LtGen William Maloney for whom you had worked on the Haynes Board. At the end of September 1983 Gen Maloney gave you a superlative report, noting that the Marine Corps had had its best recruiting year in history with "92 percent high school graduates and the highest upper mental group ever." He concludes his comment with: "It has been opined that one more column is required on the right side of this report entitled, 'better than me'. If that column were present I would be obliged to so mark it!" I do not know if you want to comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I guess I —

BGEN SIMMONS: I wanted to make that a matter of record.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I appreciate that. I guess I owe Bill Maloney a real vote of thanks. Many of things that you are reading to me or that you have come up in your own research in my case are for the first time because as I have said earlier, I do not read fitness reports. I quit reading them, I think or I hope, about the time that I was a captain because I did not want to be distracted by something somebody wrote good or bad about me. I figured it would influence the way I acted around them. But that is very flattering and to me I would consider that I would not mark me in that extra column better than Bill Maloney but I am very flattered that he put it that way.

BGEN SIMMONS: As I recall, in those years you wanted a blue sweater for recruiters. What happened to that suggestion?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that is a humorous one of which you would have both ends of the answer here.

When we went to the woolly-pully sweater in the Marine Corps we adopted the green British model of that and that is fine. It is a very practical piece of gear because it keeps you warm and it looks good and it is more casual, easier to work in uniform but in the early phases we authorized that throughout the Marine Corps. Here you had a Marine on recruiting duty running around with his modified blue uniform, his blue trousers, his khaki shirt, his white cover and this rather fundamentally ugly green sweater. Well, we knocked that off so now the recruiters had no sweater, they had no alternative except to put on their all-weather coat, their raincoat, the pewter colored coat that Gen Barrow had brought in.

So as I would go around the country I would show up and even though it would be a bright sunny day and everybody else might be walking around in business suits were it a little chilly the recruiter had no alternative but to put on his trench coat. Getting in and out of cars and walking around town, it just looked rather illogical to have to be wearing a trench coat when everybody else was not and it was not raining.

So, anyway, to make a long story short I started looking around. The Army of course had a black sweater, the Navy had gotten a blue sweater. Everybody had sweaters by that time.

I got one of the Army sweaters which was black/navy blue if you choose to call it that and we tried various variations with it. We put red and gold chevrons on it, we put on a black — we had a black shirt from the Navy or navy blue shirt and put that on and used a dark tie and what not and it really was a fairly good looking uniform. The good aspect of it was that you could then wear a sweater and shirt combination that would be the same color combination as the dark blue blouse which is very uncomfortable to wear, sharp looking uniform but it is not something to wear except when you are doing parades, but you would have consistency in the uniform and it looked good and it went with the uniform.

At any rate, I put together a package on it. Got photographs of a sharp young sergeant made with these various variations and sent it off with a recommendation that this be considered by the Uniform Board. I got a very quick reply which probably was signed "Simmons" as I note at that time. Got a quick reply back saying that this just was not a good idea. I do not even remember what it said but anyway it was an impractical thing to do.

So, anyway, I filed that away and one of my successors along the line, BGen Gary Brown, again brought it out and sent it forth and tried to do some-

thing with it. Again it came back as an illogical idea.

When I became the Commandant guess what I pulled out early on and sent in and it was a wonderful idea. We tested the blue sweater. We adopted the blue sweater. It is very popular with the recruiters today. I wish, we had been able to afford the shirt and the tie because fundamentally going back to my days on sea duty and proud as I am of Marine Corps uniforms, I do not think anybody would go out and buy a set of sky blue trousers and put on a khaki shirt with green chevrons on it and a white hat and wear it around.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is not a logical combination but we have done it for so many years that we become color blind.

GEN MUNDY: "Such things as "Regiments Hand Down Forever" and I think we are on it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your permanent promotion to brigadier general came through on 1 July 1983. Your increased pay and allowances were to accrue from that date. Does that mean that you had served for a year as a frocked brigadier general?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I had.

BGEN SIMMONS: What do you think of the frocking process? And you better explain it for the benefit of future generations of readers.

GEN MUNDY: Well, frocking is an entitlement that is governed in the case of generals, well in the case of all officers but certainly in the case of general officers, governed by the numbers of generals that you can have on active duty on any given time or the numbers of officers in any grade.

What it enables you to do is when an officer is selected, we will focus on generals here since that is what we are talking about — when the brigadier general selection list comes out that list is predicated on the retirements that will occur in the Corps over the really about next 18 months because you really select in October nowadays for promotions beginning the following October. That is to enable planning and that sort of thing.

I think we have a validated requirement in the Marine Corps for 83 generals today in our current structure and organization, Headquarters positions and so forth, and yet we rate only 67 generals, promoted star-wearing generals. The frocking authority gives you the ability to frock a certain number in each grade. What that means is you can assume the office,

wear the uniform but you are not officially, your permanent grade is still a colonel. What that enables the service to do then is to place a frocked brigadier general in a general officer's billet and to gain the throw weight and the authority and the prestige and that sort of thing for the Marine Corps that a general officer brings with it.

Then at such time as someone retires to create a vacancy, the whole list moves up one notch and eventually you get promoted. In my case it took about a year to do that. It has taken, you know, in every case going back to my — well, going back to lieutenant colonel I have waited for a number of months to get promoted but in this case, frocked.

There are many who have complained about, "Well, I have been frocked and I did not get the pay." but I have said to them on many occasions, "Which would you rather be, a colonel in this job driving yourself to work or would you rather be a brigadier general with all of the support and the trappings even that go with that without the pay?" And everybody always comes down to they would rather have the stars as soon as they can.

I think the frocking policy is a good one. It went too far a few years ago, not in the Marine Corps but in the other services. We got to the point where I can recall in the Navy that as soon as a list for any grade, lieutenant JG or lieutenant or captain or — I think admirals were still held off but as soon as any grade selection board came out immediately you went to the mirror and pinned on your new rank insignia just because your name was on the list.

What that meant is that it was not unusual at all on capital ships, on an aircraft carrier for example, to have four captains. The CO would be a captain, the XO would be a captain, the air boss would be a captain and it may be that the engineering officer got selected too so you had four or five captains running around or if the Marine Corps had done it, we did not do it, but four or five colonels running around in a single colonel command.

The Congress got excited about that and pulled the leash back a bit and then we had provisions come that limit the number of officers of a given grade that can be frocked..

BGEN SIMMONS: I do not recall much of any frocking of Marine officers below the rank of brigadier general. Did it occur very frequently?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Our policy, in fact, used to be a little bit more liberal than it is now. We are probably back about the middle of the pendulum swing. We go

from the ultraconservative over to liberal. The policy right now is that officers can be frocked if they are going to a joint assignment. We will remember back to my Plans Division when Norm Smith and I were all lieutenant colonels for a year trying to deal with colonels.

Well, if you are going to a joint assignment now we ordinarily would frock the officer when he goes there. If you are going to command, Col Dave Dotterer, came here as a lieutenant colonel, was frocked to colonel to assume command of the Marine Barracks. There are priorities as to when you can be frocked.

It is not very liberal beyond that we have no authority, for example, on the Headquarters staff. If you get promoted, if you are in a lieutenant colonel's billet and you are selected you remain a lieutenant colonel. Indeed, if you are in a colonel's billet as a lieutenant colonel on the Headquarters' staff you would remain a lieutenant colonel.

So we tried to control that internally in the Marine Corps while at the same time using the effectiveness of the additional rank external to the Marine Corps. Before I left I just signed off an authority to frock more captains in the Marine Corps. That would seem to be rather extraordinary — but if you stop and go back to your own experiences we have companies that were led by first lieutenants who had been selected for captain, why not go ahead and give them their railroad tracks and let them be the skipper? They are arguably more effective in their relationships as a captain company commander than they are as a first lieutenant company commander. We have done that.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is what the British might call local rank. We seem to be using more and more official correspondence and so forth that I think was originally an Army usage, where we put parenthesis in rank. Captain so-and-so (Major Select). Do you think that is a good idea?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had not thought about it much. The Army uses the term "promotable", lieutenant colonel(P). In the Army it is quite an ego thing.

When you have been selected, then you definitely want to let people know that you are not ordinary anymore, that you are promotable. The Marine Corps, yes, we use "select".

BGEN SIMMONS: Is that a formal or informal practice? Is that —

GEN MUNDY: Formal. It is formal. Army orders will come out with BG(P) Ed Simmons, here are your

orders or here is your promotion or social list invitations, anything that I see in the Army as soon as your name is on that list there is a (P) after your name until you are promoted. In the Marine Corps I think we do it more socially or congratulatorily, if there is such a word. When our list comes out for colonel, for example, I will ordinarily screen down that, check out the lieutenant colonels or captains or whoever, whatever grade we are talking about that had been selected that I know and then I send them off a quick note just to say congratulations, and usually I will address that as "Colonel Selectee John Smith" because on the other end it is exciting.

We do not, in the Marine Corps, there may be exceptions and if there are they are local rather than by policy but we do not put down in a man's orders — we do not say, "Colonel Selectee Carl Mundy, you are ordered to the 2d Division." The orders would still come to Lieutenant Colonel Mundy until he or she was promoted.

BGEN SIMMONS: I believe that by now Gen Kelley was Commandant and Gen J. K. Davis was the Assistant Commandant, is that right?

GEN MUNDY: That is correct.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were transferred in June 1984. Gen Maloney sent you off with essentially an extension of that same glowing report that I quoted earlier. You now had orders to be Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. Do you have anything further to say about your two years as Director of Personnel Procurement?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I have two things to say here with regard to the Personnel Procurement. I would say that I went to that job even with the OSO experience, not really appreciating recruiting. I came to realize in that job what I have professed consistently ever since and that is that the toughest job in the Marine Corps is recruitment. It is very proper, it is very popular to talk about how rough it is in the FMF or how hard it is out there because you are gone or you are in the field or you are sweating a lot or you are under threat of danger. That is exciting, that is fulfilling.

If you think about the organizational structure that is out there we do not relieve regimental commanders except for incompetence maybe in combat but if your supply account is going under as a regimental commander the division supply officer floods you with supply experts that come down and fix it for you. If your comm is fouled up, a contact team shows up and

props it up. If your motor transport is not working well people prop you up.

If you are a recruiting district commander you are out there by yourself and you either run that district well and achieve the mission that you have been given or you do not. There is very little help, there is some, there are contact teams now in Recruiting Command that will come out to assist you but you are not sheltered in this big bosom of a division, you are out there on your own.

The sergeants we send out, we break a lot of Marines on recruiting duty. We ruin a lot of marriages on recruiting duty because if you stop and think about it when do people recruit? Not on normal working hours, they recruit at nights and Sundays and on weekends. They spend all of their time out making contacts.

I have referred to the Recruiting Service since my experience of being dipped in the oil of recruiting as really the only, because it is about a regiment in size that we have got out there, it is about 2,500 Marines that comprise the Recruiting Command now, I refer to that as the only regiment in the Marine Corps that is in daily contact with an opposing force that really does not want to join the Marine Corps and has to be convinced that they do and in which there is no such thing as victory until you leave, until you successfully complete your recruiting tour.

When you complete the month of June you are at a zero balance again. There is an old saying in recruiting, "I don't care what you did for me today, what I want to know is what are you going to do for me tomorrow." That is the business of recruiting.

Recruiting is taking the hill every 30 days 36 times in a row.

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . history interview with Gen Mundy.

GEN MUNDY: We were talking about recruiting and you were allowing me to make a few final remarks on that. I was opining that recruiting is the toughest job in the Marine Corps. I was concluding that by saying that for years before I went to that particular assignment, I considered that recruiting was time off the line in the FMF or was an easy job, you got a car and you got to wear your blue uniform, you hung around high schools, you were out in the civilian community, you were with your family. I viewed it as a pretty cushy job.

What I came to realize is you are with your family far more in the Fleet Marine Force than you are on recruiting duty. You may be gone for six months but

then you are back. On recruiting duty you are gone most of the weekends and most of the nights. It is a tough assignment.

So I gained an appreciation for what recruiting is all about. More than that, I think that it imbued in me a recognition that recruiting is really what the Marine Corps is all about. Without an effective recruiting machinery we will not have a Marine Corps, that is what brings people in because the youth attitude tracking surveys that are done by the marketing agencies that serve the Department of Defense and each of the services will tell you that about 90 percent of America's youth says they are not going to join the military at all.

As you break it down further as to what will you join, the Marine Corps for years ranked at the very bottom of the four services because you can join the Air Force and, you know, up in the wild blue yonder is exciting, it is a nice colored uniform. It is appealing, you know, "I'll get to fly."

You can join the Navy and see the world. You can be an engineer. You can be technical. You can ride on a big ship.

The Army and the Marine Corps run about the same but even in the Army you can join the Army and be a specialist. You do not really have to be in the infantry, you can be something else.

The perception of the Marine Corps was you can join the Marine Corps and go get killed. And the parents of America remembering Iwo Jima and remembering Okinawa and remembering Tarawa and remembering Korea or Vietnam or wherever you want always assumed that if you joined the Marine Corps you are going to be a fighter.

We are very proud of that and we advertise that fact but indeed it is not innately appealing to all of the young people of America. The Marine Corps Recruiting Service is unchallengeably, and I say this — I would take anybody in the country on this, the Marine Corps Recruiting Service is the best of the Armed Services by a country mile.

I would also tell you that you could take one of the Marine Corps districts out there with the two colonels that lead it and all of the structure, turn Ford Motor Company over to them and sales would go up. I believe that fervently. We have the best recruiting and sales organization in the world but it has to be kept fine tuned. For those who have not come to realize that — Gen Barrow understood that, more so than many others.

It has to be kept fine tuned because once a district or once a station or once the Marine Corps starts losing it you do not turn that around in a year, you turn it

around in five years. We learned that in earlier times. It was very painful experiences.

Again, that is Mundy philosophy. I hope that — I know that Gen Krulak shares that belief and so I think we are good for another session but if we ever get a Commandant in who does not appreciate that fact, it will take two or three years for it to start trailing off but his successor is going to pay holy hell unless he keeps his eye closely fixed on the Recruiting Service.

The only other thing, again, it was a great tour. I would say about my orders, you mentioned I received orders to the Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. That had a dual-hat with it as Commanding General of the 4th Brigade. That brigade has now gone away and we no longer assign a general down there.

It is an interesting arrangement because while we were ordered to the Landing Force Training Command which really made my reporting senior on that assignment the commander of the Naval Surface Force of the Atlantic Fleet, indeed the Marine Corps' undisguised intent was to send you down there as the brigade commander but because of the Navy's investment, which we can talk about the next time around, the Navy's investment in resources and the facilities and everything else in the LFTC the general was sent to be the CG of the LFTC with additional duties as the CG of the 4th MEF.

MajGen Dennis Murphy came down and told me that. I said, "Well, I am delighted. Gosh, this is back to the operating forces. I am tickled to death going to 4th MAB." I said, "I'll go up and work out when I am detaching with Gen Maloney."

He said, "Well, don't do that because Maloney," who was my boss, "Maloney does not know."

I said, "What do you mean he doesn't know?"

He said, "No, no. General officer assignments are only me and the Commandant."

I found that very unusual, although I guess maybe it had always been that way. When I became the Commandant I probably changed that. We were much more open in the assignment of generals. Murphy said, "No, no, don't say anything to Maloney until you get your official notification from the Commandant, then you can tell Maloney."

It was rather odd to go to your boss and say, "Guess what? I am leaving." And he says, "Oh, no kidding? Where are you going?" Particularly if he is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think that was a very fine session. I think we have a very interesting one coming up. Thank you very much.

SESSION 14

Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic

Assignment as CG, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic . . . Life at Little Creek . . . Relations with the Navy . . . Collateral command of the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade . . . Planning for employment on NATO's flanks . . . Serving under LtGen John Miller . . . More on Norway . . . Selection for major general.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your two-year tour, your first as a brigadier general, as Director of Personnel Procurement at Headquarters, Marine Corps. In this session, we will explore your two years as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. You arrived at Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, to take up your new duties as Commanding General in June 1984. Where was LFTC located and what was its mission?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the LFTCLant, as the acronym would term it, is at Little Creek, Virginia, the amphibious base there. It had formerly been only a few years before that the Landing Force Training Unit, so you will still see cross references to an LFTU or the LFTC. When the Marine Corps decided to put a general there, which is another story as to why that came about, but to keep a general there rather, they changed it from unit to command, because that implied a more significant post.

Its mission was to train landing forces, certainly with an emphasis on Marines, but not exclusive to Marines. We trained some Army units there that were going to do amphibious training and on occasion we would train allied units if they came up. It ran schools for individuals such as the Embarkation School, the Landing Force Operations courses. It ran the Naval Gunfire Spotters course, and it ran courses that generally had anything whatsoever to do with the service of Marines with the Navy, less Sea School. We did not train the Marines that were going off on sea duty. But aviation operations, landing force aviation, those sorts of things is what it focused primarily on.

BGEN SIMMONS: As I recall, you were an alumnus of this unit. Was it the school you attended after the Mediterranean?

GEN MUNDY: I had taken — I think you talked about the Staff Planning Course that was a mobile training team that came down from there, and then I went back up to Little Creek when I was a first lieutenant and trained as a naval gunfire spotter when I was on sea duty. So I had been to Little Creek. It's a delightful place. It at that time was very remote from the rest of Norfolk. Now Norfolk has grown up around it, so Little Creek is wedged right between Virginia Beach and Norfolk. But it is still an ideal place to live and a very pleasant place to do duty.

BGEN SIMMONS: What sort of quarters did you draw and where did your children go to school?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the children at this time — had graduated. Sam was a lieutenant, and Tim was enrolled at Auburn. So we didn't have any children there. But we moved into Quarters C at the Naval Amphibious Base, which was actually Wing C, the maternity ward of the 1950s vintage hospital that had been built there at Little Creek. They had taken the wings and turned them into quarters. For example, BGen Al Gray, when he lived there, lived in Quarters B, which was next door to the ones I had.

But literally, they took about the first third of the wing of a hospital and partitioned it and then turned it into quarters. So it was concrete block. When it got cold in the winter, the wind came right on through the concrete block. But it was still very pleasant living because it was isolated out on a little island there in Little Creek. So there were only about ten people that lived out there. It was very quiet, a very pleasant place to live.

If you opened your back bedroom door, you looked down the rest of Ward C in which we had a total of 17 rooms including the nurses station that extended on behind us. That was not air conditioned or not kept

up, it was not painted, but it was still usable. So we literally had a storage room for the skis and a storage room for the bicycle and a storage room for anything that you wanted.

The ward ended in the center hall of the hospital that had been abandoned. There were no lights in there, and the kids in the neighborhood would run up and down there and spray paint on it and what not, so we called it Spook Hall, but to get into your quarters there were two entrances.

You could either come through the front door, or more ordinarily, each of us had two parking spaces in the old ambulance bay, and we would park our cars there. And Linda discovered a gurney back in one of the storage rooms, so we would roll the gurney down, load either the luggage if we were traveling, or load the groceries up on the gurney and roll it down Spook Hall, take a left up Ward C, wind up at our bedroom door, unlock the bedroom door, roll the gurney on in and unload the groceries in the kitchen which was next up from the bedroom.

But it was a wonderful place to live, even though that sounds—many I think who would read this would wonder how could you exist in a place like that. You existed very very pleasantly if not always totally comfortably depending upon the season.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have your own beach?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we did. There was a small officers' beach and there was an enlisted beach there at Little Creek. The flag officers and the one general, the Marine brigadier who were there, had a little cabana designated to them, so we had our own private, my padlock on it. You would go down to the beach and unlock it and pull out your beach chairs or whatever you kept there, and your floats, and you were there.

The only problem with that was, while it was very pleasant and was really a nice secluded little beach there on the Chesapeake, but the jelly fish on the Chesapeake Bay are just absolutely horrible. So you really had to be gutsy to attempt to swim. So we did a lot of sitting on the beach. We didn't really do a lot of swimming off the beach.

BGEN SIMMONS: How large a staff did you have for the LFTC portion of your command? Who were some of your key officers?

GEN MUNDY: My key officer was Col Red Trader, who was my Chief of Staff there. Red was the Director of Training when I got there and then moved

up, because the Chief of Staff, who was Col Rip Kirby, was retiring. Red moved up to be the Chief of Staff. I had known him over our careers together. Red was actually senior to me, he made each grade a couple of years ahead of me, so he was one of those very senior colonels, and I was a brand new brigadier, but we were good friends. He was probably the key man there as far as running the LFTC and for all intents and purposes did run it.

The rest of the staff, there was one other colonel, the Director of Training that, as I said, it was Kirby and Trader when I got there and then it was Trader moved up to be the Chief of Staff, and I'm temporarily at a loss for who came in to be the Director of Training.

There were about 130 people on the LFTC staff. It was quite large. In addition to its mission, which really what I quoted earlier on was a Navy mission, because I worked for the Commander of Naval Surface Forces of the Atlantic Fleet. That was the Navy mission. The Marine Corps had also placed requirements on the Landing Force Training Command, although I could go back and build you a superb case as to how we really had the Marine Corps sticking its nose into a Navy command and using the facilities and resources for that matter for purely Marine Corps purposes. Nobody worried about that.

We ran the Logistics School for the Marine Corps, and out of that school we produced all the basic logisticians, the embark, the 0401s that became 0402s, the second lieutenants that came from Basic School, the new PFCs and lance corporals that came out of whatever echelon of recruit training to the School of Infantry and so on and then over for their formal schools training. That was all done at Little Creek. So it was a fairly large volume of logisticians that came out of there.

In addition, at that time, the Marine Corps' Intelligence School was there. We did our training of our basic intelligence officers. That has subsequently moved out to a joint Naval/Marine Corps Training Center. But at that time, I had a fairly large number of intelligence types, mostly staff NCOs and warrant officers who did the basic intelligence training.

So it was rather large, about 130 and that was an academic staff in the Naval Amphibious Schools Building, which had the dual capacity as the Headquarters of the Landing Force Training Command. It was a big operation.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Trader, how did he spell his name?

GEN MUNDY: T R A D E R. I know him and have always known him, his first name was Everett, but he went by Red. I don't think anybody in the Marine Corps ever knew him other than as Red Trader.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned the beach. What were some of your other recreation opportunities?

GEN MUNDY: Well, to be candid, number one, there in the tidewater part of Virginia, you could do anything. Williamsburg was about 40 miles up the road. There was great fishing, both inland either on the rivers or of course out in the ocean. I didn't have a boat at that time, but it was very easy to get Special Services boats. We had a little lake right—I mentioned that we were on an island, actually it was an island connected by just a small land bridge from the mainland, only 10 feet out, really a creek running between the mainland and it.

But we had a small lake there where the Navy trained its prospective commanding officers. They had little ships that were about 20 feet long there, and you could see these commanders and captains up in the little aircraft carrier or the little cruiser or the frigate, whatever it was. The ship reacted exactly as a ship at sea would, so they taught these PCOs as they called it, how to come alongside and how to do refueling and what not. And you would hear all these shouts across the lake as these guys rammed the pier and bounced around while they were trying to learn how to maneuver a ship.

But on the weekends, that lake, of course, was not in use much, and it was an excellent fishing lake. So I did mainly those sorts of things.

The second part of the answer, I guess, derives from the fact that it was a tremendously busy command not having to do with the LFTC side of the house, but rather having to do with the dual-hatting of the billet as the 4th MAB. I just wasn't at Little Creek a lot during that period.

BGEN SIMMONS: What geographic feature gives Little Creek its name?

GEN MUNDY: There is the Little Creek Cove in which certain of the amphibious ships were berthed at Norfolk. You have what used to be called the NOB, the Naval Operating Base, or the main base at Norfolk, which is where the carriers and the cruisers, destroyers, submarines were in. And then as we got larger classes of amphibious ships, LPHs, LHAs, LHDs, those were put around at the main base, as were eventually the LSDs and LPDs.

But Little Creek really then became the home for the assault craft units, the boats of the amphibious force, for the LSTs, for the Seals, for the amphibious Seabees, all of those types of one would say the less glamorous—well, Seals would certainly be glamorous, but I mean the hard workers, the chiefs that ran the LCUs and the Mike boats and eventually now the LCACs are based at Little Creek. But it was the Little Creek Cove in which those ships were harbored that gave it its name.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your other military associates other than your own staff in the Little Creek and Norfolk area, both Marine and other services?

GEN MUNDY: Well, RAdm Bob Rogers was probably my closest friend. He was the Commander of the Amphibious Group II, that's the Atlantic Fleet. He had been Gen Leonard Chapman's Navy Aide at the time that I was Gen Lou Walt's senior aide shortly after I came back from Vietnam. So I knew Bob Rogers very well, thought a lot of him, still do. He was one of the Navy's true "gator" sailors. He was truly an amphibian right to the end, which is probably why he retired as a one-star admiral instead of going much further. So Bob, we lived next door to them and we had great rapport with them.

I mentioned the Traders. Col Pony Baker was the—I think I will wander into the 4th MAB here now, but Col Pony Baker. Rip Kirby I mentioned, the Chief of Staff that retired and had taught map reading with me at The Basic School some years before, so I knew him very well. And LtCol Howard Long, or Howie Long as we knew him, Medal of Honor from Vietnam, had retired there. We were friends from the days as instructors at The Basic School.

The retired general officer community there was very very wholesome. Mrs. Joseph Burger was there, she was one of the really grand ladies, just a grand genteel southern lady.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had he already died at that time?

GEN MUNDY: He had, yes. And his son, Joe Burger, Jr., and I were roughly contemporaries. Joe got out of the Marine Corps, but we were captains at about the same time.

Major General Art and Katie Adams. They would have splendid parties. Also Brigadier General Dan Fillmore, my old Nemesis from PLCs in 1954, and Major General and Irene Anderson.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about Gen Youngdale?

GEN MUNDY: Major General and Jean Youngdale. He died shortly after I left.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about Gen Berkeley?

GEN MUNDY: Lieutenant General Berkeley was there, didn't see much of him. He would come up on the wire about once a year, he would after something had appeared in the newspaper, he would write you a gracious note in very elderly handwriting . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: Usually on a postcard.

GEN MUNDY: That's right and tell you that you were doing well if things were going good, or he was satisfied. I went and called on him.

Gen Weede, Dick Weede, who died in fact while I was down there. I had trained his son, Dick Weede, Jr., in Basic School some years before. So a very warm, embracing community for the young Marine brigadier who was there.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your capacity as Commanding General, LFTC, you were under the command of Commander, Naval Force, Surface Force Landing at that time, VAdm William F. McCauley. In his first fitness report covering period 30 September 1984 to 31 March 1985, Adm McCauley in addition to straight "outstanding" markings says in his comments: "BGen Mundy serves quadruple duties. By primary assignment, he commands the Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. He is responsible for joint training of over 12,000 Army, Navy and Marine students annually in the spectrum of courses relating to landing force evolutions, amphibious warfare, and to single-site, military occupational specialty producing forces for the Marines in the intelligence and logistics occupational fields. As a collateral duty, he commands the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade — the principal exercise and operational planning agency of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, and is the principal active operational Commander for Marine Corps activities throughout the Northern Region of NATO Europe. Related thereto, he serves in a NATO capacity as Commander, Marine Striking Force, Atlantic..."

I think that's a rather full description of your duties.

GEN MUNDY: Well, that may give you—now, the real story. I would say this, I don't know whether this is typical of the Navy or not. Of course, we always had great concern about the inflation of Navy fitness

reports. If you write a Navy officer and don't recommend him for early selection and say that he should be the next CNO and so on, well you're condemning him to death. So I used to resist that. And when I got there, the chief—he didn't call me—but the Chief of Staff at SURFLANT, Naval Surface Force Atlantic, called over to Col Trader and asked if we would submit the fitness report on Gen Mundy. Gen Mundy would write his fitness report and send it over and the Admiral would sign it. And I said "No, I'm not going to evaluate myself. That's his job. If he doesn't know me, why, then he should get to know me and he should be able to evaluate it.

So we didn't have any real tiff over that, but nothing got done, and the fitness report was late. And the Chief of Staff called back and said "We've got to have the report" and Col Trader said, "Well, Gen Mundy is not going to rate himself outstanding."

So to make a long story short, what I finally agreed to do was simply to write up a description of my duties and provide them to SURFLANT, because it was very apparent that the Admiral didn't really know what was going on. We would try to invite him over and we were never successful in getting him over.

So, to be very candid, what you have just read flowed either from mine or a combination of mine and Red Trader's pens. We sent this over as just a straight statement, and I did not put in any "he performs his duties in a superb manner" or anything like that. It irritated them a little bit over there, and so to be very candid with you, as I've mentioned before, I've never read fitness reports, so I don't really know what came, whether he added on any other superlatives or whether he just wrote it as we submitted. But I just thought that was a little bit flaky. You had every opportunity there to write yourself up as the fellow walking around on water every day and it would have been signed and sent in. But I resented that and resisted it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Implicit in this is his lack of interest in what you were doing. And it being something of significance, some years before this they did away with amphibious forces, Atlantic Amphibious Forces and Pacific type command. And so amphibious forces were left without a flag rank daddy. Do you think we suffered because of that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think that that is the reason that the Atlantic Force Training Command, the Landing Force Training Unit in fact was kept around and that we kept a general there, because, to be very candid, today for example, it's commanded by a

colonel on both coasts. We changed that during my watch, because it was a very pleasant place to do duty, but if you had not had the second hat of the 4th MAB tapped on, it is just not worth it for a general officer to go down there and oversee the training of lance corporals and embarkation duties. That can be done by a good colonel and is done today, and had been done before.

So the Marine Corps, the very thing that you cited, as I recall about the time I was going to naval gunfire spotters course down there, we had Austin R. Brunelli was the brigadier general who was then commanding and a good friend of mine was his aide, and so I saw the general from time to time. I was a lieutenant. And at that time, he was headquartered in the old PHIBLant or Amphibious Forces Atlantic headquarters. And they had a vice admiral there at that time, a three star.

When they reorganized, you're exactly right that the Marine Corps' concern, I can recall it being talked about at the time, even though I was not really in the policy making echelons, but the Marine Corps was gravely concerned about the Navy losing sight of amphibious warfare, if they did away with the admiral's billet. So in part for that reason, we assigned a brigadier general onto the staff of the Naval Surface Force Commander, just to kind of keep the admiral's head turned toward matters amphibious.

One would like to say that it worked. Perhaps it did, depending on the admiral that was in there. McCauley was a very very nice man, certainly most gracious to me as a neighbor, because he also lived out at Little Creek, to his irritation I might add. None of the admirals wanted to live out there, they all wanted to live over on Dillingham Row with their fellow admirals. I could easily understand that. But he lived out there in very nice quarters and was most gracious. But that said, he had no eye, nor did his successor, nor I imagine that many of those surface force admirals had much eye for the amphibious side. They fixed ships and maintained ships and their focus on amphibious warfare and the particulars of that style of warfighting is not first and foremost in their minds.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now that we have talked about your duties as CG LFTC, let's take the second of your responsibilities, that of being Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Did you have a separate staff for this responsibility?

GEN MUNDY: I did. At that time, the 4th MAB, as we referred to it, was a nucleus staff, all of them, all of the brigades, less the 1st Brigade in Hawaii which

was pretty much a fullup staff. But the rest of them were really nucleus staffs. And they were planning staffs. There were about 20 officers at that time, and we had about 30 enlisted as I recall, so in round numbers about 50 of us that were the 4th MAB staff. That was certainly not a warfighting operational or exercise staff for that matter.

So what would happen, this group of planners would go about planning the various exercises or keeping watch over the contingency plans that we were tasked to be prepared to execute, but any time the 4th MAB took the field so to speak, went to sea, went off to an exercise, it was like a gigantic vacuum cleaner turned in to Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, because we would pull up, literally would increase the size of the staff by two or sometimes three times with draftees, if you will, augmentees that were pulled up temporarily from the major subordinate commands, to come up and flesh out.

But it was a spirited outfit. It was comprised of some crackerjack young officers. There were two colonels on there. I mentioned earlier Col Pony Baker, who was the Chief of Staff. Pony was a very experienced planner, had had duty in Europe, a good orientation on the focus of 4th MAB. Col Sam Turner, Gen Barrow's senior son-in-law, was the G-3. So we had Sam and Barbara Turner, one of the Barrow girls that was the classic Marine wife. The rest of them really were some high, fast-stepping young majors like Col Greg Newbold, the Secretary of the Navy's just-past aide-de-camp and one of our absolutely best and brightest. Also, Major Geoff Higgenbotham and Rob McAlerr, and my Vietnam battalion mate, Tom Earley.

We had some of that caliber that would just go off to Europe and perform wonders. They knew what they were doing, they were young, they were eager. So the 4th MAB was a pretty fast-stepping outfit. And it was there that was really my principal office if you will, because we were embarked aboard the USS *Mount Whitney*, the Second Fleet flagship with the MAB staff. So my office was principally out at Little Creek as LFTC. But indeed, the consumption of my time and focus was on 4th MAB matter, vice LFTC matters.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just what contingency planning did you do and in what exercises did you take part?

GEN MUNDY: The principal focus of the 2d Marine Amphibious Force of FMFLant at that time was Northern Europe, even though we had contingency requirements to provide two MAFs to either the

Southern Region of NATO; i.e., into the Mediterranean, or the Northern Region of NATO. But as a practical matter, we had by that time in the evolution planning, we, the Marine Corps, had broken that apart where I MAF was focused principally on the Mediterranean and then II MAF was focused on the Northern Region. Remember that we had only a few years before gotten the prepositioning there, the Maritime Prepositioning Force was just coming to be at that point. And we were still the amphibious force.

The commander of the U.S. Second Fleet bore the NATO principal subordinate commander title of the Striking Fleet. NATO was the Striking Fleet, and that was comprised of the U.S., the UK, the Dutch, the Portuguese, whoever had a ship to provide. Within that structure then, the Marine commander, which was the 4th MAB at that time, CG 4th MAB, designated as you mentioned earlier the commander of the Marine Striking Force. You had the Anti-Submarine Strike Force, the Marine Strike Force and those were the two principal elements under the—oh I'm sorry, and the Amphibious Strike Force. So PHIBSTRIKFOR, MARSTRIKFOR, SUBSTRIKFOR were the three major elements of the Second Fleet in his Striking Fleet.

So, we were really oriented, those were the big days that we were just following Adm Ike Kidd and focused on keeping the Soviets constrained into the Barents Sea, keeping the submarines from coming down past Iceland and achieving the "cork-in-the-bottle" strategy that was talked about in those days.

So the II MAF in its entirety was really focused from the Baltic approaches up to the tip of North Norway, and that northern-most element was almost exclusively the purview of the 4th MAB, with the rest of the MAF then going into the Baltic approaches, probably into Denmark or maybe down into the Jutland Peninsula of North Germany. So in planning for exercises, the 4th MAB was generally II MAF Forward in today's sense. It did all of II MAF's work in Europe. And so we would do exercises in Germany. We did exercises in the Danish Isles, a lot of association with the Fleet Marine Force Europe staff in London, and then, of course, Northern Norway.

As a practical matter, even though I MAF had the planning responsibility for the Mediterranean, as a practical matter, the experts in Europe were the 4th MAB officers. So even if there was an exercise going off down in Greece or Turkey, none of which occurred during my watch there, but the 4th MAB generally under a I MAF umbrella would be the main planning agent for that.

We had the responsibilities in the Caribbean. Reinforcement of Guantanamo, would generally call on the 4th MAB as the headquarters. It was the ready-duty brigade of the II MAF or the Atlantic Fleet at that time. So the contingencies were as widespread as from the tip of Norway to the Caribbean into the Mediterranean and the exercises, principally while I was there, we had one small one down in the Caribbean, but almost totally my exercises were in the Northern Region of Europe, that is to say Jutland and northward to Northern Norway.

BGEN SIMMONS: If you went into the Mediterranean, did you chop to the Sixth Fleet then?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, you did. I mean you would be a landing force, came in as a brigade. Although the Sixth Fleet also had, and still has today, a NATO path.

And it was called the Striking and Support Force, Southern NATO. You had the Striking Fleet, which was the Atlantic Second Fleet and then the Striking and Support Force was the U.S. Sixth Fleet in his NATO hat. So any Marine formation that went into the Mediterranean, in U.S. channels would chop to the U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander as an amphibious force.

As a NATO force, you then got into the quagmire of trying to figure out the command relations with the allies, and that's a very difficult situation into which many many hours of planning had been borne by me during my career and others, trying to work out air command and control relationships and that sort of thing in the Mediterranean, a very complex area.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was the troop list for the 4th MAB and did it vary?

GEN MUNDY: There was no permanently assigned troop list, although the 2d Marines, RLT-2, Regimental Landing Team -2 was, the whole time that I was there, was in effect the ground combat element of the 4th MAB. If it went into the Mediterranean, and it had on earlier times, again not on my watch, but the 8th Marines were focused more or less toward the Mediterranean, the 2d Marines toward the northern Europe and the 6th Marines were focused toward the Caribbean. I mentioned for example that we had one minor, it was a CPX type exercise involving troops in the Caribbean while I was there. And that was RLT-6, that was the ground combat element of the brigade at that time.

But really, if you would ask anybody, what is the 4th MAB, they would have told you that it was RLT-2 MAG-40 which was a designated group and it real-

ly was MAG-14. That was the colonel and the staff that came and turned their hats into MAG-40 and became a provisional Marine Aircraft Group. And then the Brigade Service Support Group, which was a standing entity, there was a colonel with a nucleus staff in the Force Service Support Group at Camp LeJeune.

BGEN SIMMONS: LtGen John H. Miller, Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic gave you a report covering the period 6 June to 29 August 1984 in your capacity as CG 4th MAB. In addition to the straight “outstanding” markings, in his comments he says in part, “BGen Mundy has taken over the 4th MAB in exceptional fashion ... I have no doubt the 4th MAB will flourish under his guidance.” I also have no doubt that BGen Mundy has a brilliant future in the Marine Corps. I see many more ‘stars’ for Carl Mundy; he will be distinguished Division commander—and more—in the future.” How frequently did you see Gen Miller during this period?

GEN MUNDY: Well, reasonably frequently. He was in effect my boss, even though as we discussed earlier, I was detailed to the Commander of Naval Service Force Atlantic, but I saw far less of my Navy boss than I did Gen Miller. He invited me to attend the weekly FMFLant staff briefings and I would do that. So I probably saw him once a week. And then if we were involved in exercises, well I would see him more frequently than that.

The comments, I was going to remark on the comments, remember if you will that John Miller was the President of the Board that selected me to brigadier general, so I suppose he had to make me look good after he had presided over the board. But he was a fine man and true gentleman. If he ever became excited, I’m sure he did, but he kept it well to himself. He never was one of those who would blow up or flame out or get overly excited. He was a very calm steady commander and I enjoyed working for him very much.

BGEN SIMMONS: We were in the same battalion in Korea, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines . . . , I was with him when he was wounded.

LtGen Al Gray succeeded John Miller as CG FMFLant and he gave you a fine letter type report dated 31 December 1985. One sentence reads, “Throughout NATO’s Northern European campaign, North Germany to North Norway), Carl Mundy’s reputation is synonymous with that of our Corps as he is

held in the highest esteem.” Does that refer to a specific NATO exercise?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we have discussed earlier in my plans days that I went back a long way in Norway. I had been the U.S. representative on the Norwegian Bilateral Planning Group. I had been, if you recall, the guy who wrongly or rightly signed up to the prepositioning up there. So I had a lot of ties with Norway. I knew, I think practically speaking, most if not all of the generals and certainly all of the up and coming generals in the Norwegian military at that time. So I had had a lot of experience in Norway. So when I would go back to exercise, they had in me not only an exercise commander coming in, but they had one who was extremely knowledgeable. I could give the briefings on the prepositioning program as opposed to them briefing me.

So I understood I think the Norwegian politics, I certainly understood the Norwegian political military constraints of U.S. forces on their soil and all of the very difficult line that they tread being a border country with the-then Soviet Union. It was a very fine line for the Norwegians to make sure that they didn’t provoke the Soviets too much as they did these exercises. I appreciated that and understood it. So yes, I had, and I think have to this day, an unusual rapport with Norway. You remember that the Chief of Defense there today, Gen Arnie Solli was—when I was a colonel, he was a lieutenant colonel, we were associated as were the Dutch Chief of Defense.

When I was a brigadier there, not because of me, because of the evolution of things, by this time Marines, U.S. Marines, had come to be recognized I think rather more or less as the arctic experts. In every exercise engagement that we took on, the Royal Marines or the Dutch or anybody else, the umpires, it was a hands-down success story for the U.S. Marines. Our ability to ski, our over-snow mobility, our equipage, our clothing, we had become the envy of the people that went to Norway to train. And they kind of hooked that to me because I had been at it for so long. So yes, I had a fine, I think, rapport and a solid reputation in the northland.

BGEN SIMMONS: I heard stories of the King of Norway being quietly present at exercises and making himself known at odd moments in the day. Did you have any —

GEN MUNDY: A grand man, a grand old man.

BGEN SIMMONS: Haakon — know him well?

GEN MUNDY: No, his son is King Haakon, H-A-A-K-O-N, I called on him on my last call through Norway last June and he decorated me with the Norwegian Cross. But that was King Olav. He was the classic Viking. He looked the part. He was an old man, he was 80 years plus at that time. The first time that I went to Norway, as a colonel, you remember that we talked about not being able to land due to the harsh weather conditions. Well, right in the midst of all of this, about the second day, we get the word that the King is coming to visit. He loved to be — he had been a soldier, he had been the prince in exile. He had soldiered for Norway, so he loved being a soldier. And like most of royalty, he was the Admiral of the Fleet, he was the Commander of the Army, he was the Commander of the Air Force, so he had different uniform. But he loved soldiering. His favorite uniform was his Army uniform because that was native to him.

But at any rate, here came the King. We were all really in bad shape ashore. We had very little mobility there. The winds were still high, it was horrible conditions, but we had established a service support area over in an old German camp there, Elvegardmoen. But at any rate, so the King arrived and we picked him up in a Marine helicopter. LtCol Marv Pixton picked him up, he was my squadron commander, and brought him aboard the *Guadalcanal*, the flagship. And the Commodore briefed him and we showed him the ship. He's a tremendously technical man. I mean, he was interested in things. So as you ran up the elevator, he wanted to see how the elevator took the airplanes up, and he was interested in the boiler room. He didn't want to sit and eat in the wardroom, he wanted to go mess around the ship.

He spent about an hour and a half out there and then we put him in a helicopter and I took him. The only place we had to take him was into this Combat Service Support Area, which didn't seem very dashing. We landed on a frozen pond. There was a pond there that was an open area in the camp. So we were on solid ice with the helicopter. We got out and started across. The wind was blowing awfully hard. The wind would actually turn the helos. We had shut them down and it would blow the tail around. It must have been a 60, 70 mile, almost hurricane force wind.

The King, who was dressed like the rest of us in his field uniform, gets out of the helicopter, I helped him out, and as soon as he got down on the ground, he shoved me off. He didn't want to be held. And his aides as we started moving across the ice realized it was quite slippery and the wind was blowing hard, and they would come up and try and take his arm and

he would throw them off. He would just cast them off; he didn't want to be helped.

I took him over and I took him into a parts trailer, one of these long vans where you have thousands of parts, screws, pieces of radios, pieces of brake drums for trucks and all that sort of thing. I was really feeling humble because I thought, this is a horrible thing. I should be showing him a battalion in the attack or artillery firing.

Well, we got inside this van and there was a lance corporal who wasn't expecting us there, a kid. But as Marines do, he stepped right up, and I can remember when I introduced him, I said, "Lance Corporal, this is His Majesty, King Olav of Norway." The Lance Corporal said, "Good afternoon, King."

[Laughter.]

But that was fine, that started it off, and so the lance corporal then took the King and walked him through these bins and trays and would say this little widget goes together with this one over here and it fixes the radio. And the King was fascinated. So we would have spent ordinarily maybe 15 minutes there, we spent an hour and a half.

When we got to the weapons, they had some armorers in there and some weapons for us, and my goodness, he was quite a marksman, and he loved weapons. So we got to the rifles and I thought we were going to spend the night there, because he was fascinated with disassembling these rifles and seeing how they functioned and how the bolt worked.

I ran into him later at a planning conference, when I was up to my 4th MAB days, we had a conference in Norway for planning, and all the allies were there. And we go down to this conference and the King would come and sit right in the front row. And one day he would wear—the first day he was there in his Army uniform, the second day he was there in his Air Force uniform. I think we broke up the third day and he didn't come, he might have been in his naval uniform. But he was very interested. He asked questions during the conference, and was very much engaged.

And obviously the Norwegian people loved him. The first time that I walked up to his residence in Oslo there, there's no fence around it, there are some ceremonial guards, and certainly there's some security, plain clothed security inside I'm sure. But I asked one of my Norwegian counterparts, how about he security for the King, don't you have security? And he very very almost offensively said the Norwegian people are the security for the King. And so it's a very good monarchy. He is beloved by his people. Haakon is the King now. Olav died in the late eighties.

A final story, we had a mess night, we had a ban-

quiet, but it was a mess night in effect in the historic Oslo Castle. You can imagine a Viking evening. And the King came the King would sit at the head of the table and he would enjoy the merriment and of course the good fresh Norwegian salmon and reindeer steak and all that sort of thing that was being served, in this magnificent hall, all in our evening dress. And he was very much a participant until the speaker, who was the Minister of Defense, who was a civilian got up to give his speech, and the King closed his eyes and went sound asleep. And the Minister went on with his rambling remarks and so on, and when it was over the King's aide was standing right behind him and it was time now to end the evening. I think we had a final toast, probably to him. But it was time to end the evening, and I can recall his aide very gently coming up and shaking him by the shoulder and the King came back alive after the speech was over.

So, I guess one of the privileges of kings is not to have to listen to ministers of defense giving political speeches.

BGEN SIMMONS: From here on I have fewer personnel records with which to track your career. You were detached on 2 April 1986, is that about right?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you been selected for major general by then?

GEN MUNDY: I had been.

BGEN SIMMONS: If so, who was the senior member of your board and who were some of the other members?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the senior member was LtGen Al Gray, my boss, so I probably had a pretty good run. The officer who briefed my case, I know that only because he was a good friend in battalion commander days was MajGen Jack Godfrey. Jack had—we had a long-time friendship, so those were the two that I recall. Frankly, beyond that, I'm not sure who else was on that board.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the other members of your "class" of major generals?

GEN MUNDY: Many of the same that had come up as brigadiers together, Jack Dailey was on that list, Ernie Cook, we were running mates, Ed Cassidy who retired later as a major general, I think Hollis Davison

who had been a Basic School classmate. Those were ones that I remember, but generally speaking the block list brigadiers probably one or two more or less moved up.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you celebrate your promotion?

GEN MUNDY: Not much. This will sound strange to anyone. I did not yearn to become a major general. I had been for four years wearing a single star and as a brigadier, and it was unquestionably, as I look back on it, the high point. I mean it's fun to be a new brigadier, it is fun to be a frocked brigadier because you know you've got miles to run, but you still have all the privileges and the excitement. And my assignments as a brigadier, recruiting, the 4th MAB were just thrilling. There were four straight years of absolute enjoyment going to work every day, not without some stresses here and there along the way, but it was fun.

So I viewed the move from brigadier to two stars, realizing that I wasn't going to go be the division commander at least at that point, that John Miller had forecast, but I was going back to Headquarters, that was rather a pall if you will returning to Headquarters again. And it seemed to me that major generals, as I thought of major generals, were sort of older men. And I enjoyed really being a youthful boyish brigadier.

So it was sort of—I mean it came, and I certainly was happy when the list came out, but it was not the same exhilaration that it had been to become a brigadier.

BGEN SIMMONS: VAdm McCauley gave you a fine detachment letter-type fitness report. He says that you "Developed and commenced presentation of a highly complex 12-week course which trains 120 Marine logistics officers annually. You trained over 11,000 personnel in a total of 34 different courses of instruction. You developed and commenced presentation of a course to train MSC ships' crews and ship self-defense organization, tactics and operations." And that's a new thought. What was that about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, at that time the Navy became concerned about having a security force aboard ships, of course terrorism, we were all focused on that. And the Navy came to realize that on the ships, they really had no mechanism for a trained force to be able to handle terrorists or to handle anyone who comes aboard the ship to do mischief. If it was an amphib,

you had Marines aboard, you would call on a Marine platoon or something to do that for you. But for the regular ships of the fleet, they didn't have much organization.

So they asked us to put together a course that would train an element of the crew, usually a make-up, like a damage control party or something like that, that came together that had fundamental training in riot control, in some degree of organization, understood weapons, gas masks, things like that.

So from a Marine's perspective, it was fairly basic or fundamental, really non-exciting training. But it was something that sailors didn't routinely get.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you describe it, it sounds like a reinvention of the old landing party manual.

GEN MUNDY: It was essentially that. It was just to get sailors back to some ability to at least defend themselves aboard ship, and have an organized group to do that. The monotony of the ship was usually in the yards. That's kind of a dirty miserable time for anybody embarked on the ship. So they would send them over to us at Little Creek for about 10 days, and it was adventure training. We let them run the 110" course, and we would take them down and get wet or get muddy or do something with them to kind of give them that Marine-type training, that remarkably sailors eat up. They were very excited about doing it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any close order drill?

GEN MUNDY: We didn't do close order drill. We would do riot control drills. We would put them in formations and teach them how to foot stomp and go forward with the riot control gear and their billy clubs.

They were not carrying rifles at that time, they were armed with the riot control sticks or billy clubs.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another duty, restructured amphibious refresher training, presented to over 25 Marine and Army rifle companies.

GEN MUNDY: I don't think anything remarkable probably in most of these. This was evolutionary type stuff where you would polish your force. To be very candid to you, as I mentioned earlier, this would be more like Red Trader writing his fitness report and printing it on mine, because as I mentioned the CG was for all intents and purposes consumed by the 4th MAB duties with an occasional stop in to graduate a class, generally to approve things. But Red Trader, probably more than anybody I've known at least in

that job, is the man that would be credited with really having done a fine job of restructuring the curriculum and I was the general, so I got the credit on the fitness report.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your new orders would take you to Headquarters, Marine Corps to be Director of the Operations Division, Plans, Programs, and Operations. Do you have anything further you would like to add on your service at Little Creek?

GEN MUNDY: Not substance, other than to say, as I mentioned here just a couple moments ago, it was very exciting to be a brigadier general, I probably had more authority as a brigadier because of the structure of the 4th MAB in Europe and in the Striking Fleet. There probably was a little bit more zing if you will, to being the CG of the 4th MAB because I was routinely an allied commander. Routinely the British and the Dutch would chop in under us. We would deal with very senior staffs in NATO, always at the three star level, so you really were a couple of notches above where you ordinarily would have been. It was heady wine. I enjoyed it.

But all of the aspects of this particular tour, it was just a good time in my life. Little Creek is flat, I could go out and run five or six miles and didn't have to go up any hills. There were all sorts of good aspects of being there. So it was one of the better assignments that I've had.

BGEN SIMMONS: This may be a good place to end this session.

SESSION 15

Director, Operations Division, PP&O, HQMC

Assignment as Director of Operations Division . . . Acquisition sponsorship . . . Restructuring naval security forces . . . Defining the amphibious force of the future . . . Coming of age of Maritime Prepositioning . . . Deactivating Marine barracks . . . Structuring for antiterrorism . . . Major exercises . . . Entry of the LCAC . . . Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . Cold weather training . . . Closing the Sea School . . . Promoted to lieutenant general.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your two years as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic. In this session, we will explore your year and a half from mid-1986 until early 1988 as Director of the Operations Division of the Plans, Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters Marine Corps.

In May 1986, as a newly promoted major general, you returned to Headquarters, Marine Corps. Your assignment was again to the Plans, Policies, and Operations Department. This time, however, instead of the Plans Division, you were assigned to the Operations Division and you would be the Director of that Division. Who was now the Commandant of the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Paul X. Kelley.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did he call you at Little Creek before your transfer to tell you what he had in mind for you?

GEN MUNDY: No, he didn't. I knew that I was coming up, and actually the officer that I was relieving, MajGen Jack Godfrey, gave me a call and said, "You're coming to the Operations Division." So that was the extent of my communications from Headquarters.

BGEN SIMMONS: On your arrival at Headquarters, Marine Corps, what was the sequence of your reporting? First to the Commandant or first to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I arrived and went into the Operations Division Office. As I said, Jack Godfrey and I had been long-time friends, and so it was very easy to take a perch there and hang up my uniforms

and what not. So I really saw Godfrey first.

At that time, LtGen Tom Morgan was functioning both as the Deputy Chief of Staff for PP&O and was acting as the Chief of Staff. So he was a tremendously busy man. As I recall it, I was probably there for two or maybe three days before I got a chance to see Gen Morgan.

Gen John K. Davis was the Assistant Commandant at that time. I saw him as a matter of course, and you scheduled with Gen Kelly, and I would say that it probably was about a week after I got there before I saw the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did any of these officers give you any special guidance as to your new duties?

GEN MUNDY: No, not really. It was—in-as-much as I was late of the Headquarters, I really was fairly familiar with the issues at the Headquarters. I had been a plans officer there, as you already noted. So I think that my familiarity with the PP&O Department was such that they didn't feel it really necessary to sit me down and give me the fire hose treatment of what the department was all about. So as much as anything, I went through simply a series of orientation briefings on what the Operations Division was doing, each of the branch heads briefing me and bringing me up to speed. And that was about the way that I came up to speed.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the boundaries separating Plans, Policies, and Operations?

GEN MUNDY: Operations, looking back on it, and in fact even during my tenure as Commandant, Operations probably is something of a holdover from the days when the Marine Corps was formed not on the executive staff but on the G staff lines, where you

would have a G-3 Plans and a G-3 Operations. And indeed, the Commandant in those days, I'm sure, I wasn't a part of the senior echelon in those days, but I think the Commandant probably directed more actions of the Marine Corps then than he certainly does now, and has since the advent of Goldwater/Nichols.

So, the Operations Division was, as it turned out, something of a catch-all and almost a misnomer in its own right. Plans was really the joint side of the house, although Plans Division also had in it the Service Plans Division, which one would presume would be something that one of the Marine divisions or aircraft wings was planning to do. It was not that. It was rather such things as the Marine Corps Mobilization Plan, as the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, those sorts of things that really were of more use in the joint arena. So you had Service Plans and Joint Plans.

And then the Operations Division, actually, probably most accurately described, did about three or four different things, and that was to oversee in the sense of the watchdog, the Command Center eye on current operations of the Marine Corps. We were reporters, not initiators of action. We would keep track of what was going on in the field and do the SIT-reps and prepare the Daily Operation Summary which went up to the Commandant that told him a lot of things, how many Marines were on Marine security guard duty, or what II MAF was doing today or what some MAU was doing somewhere or other.

It ran the Command Center, which in itself is a misnomer because really the Commandant doesn't command through that Command Center. It really is a communications center. It facilitates easy communications and it keeps a watch on current operations or current events.

So that was sort of the operational focus. Its primary function for the past probably two or three stewards of that division was to act as the sponsor for acquisition and program sponsorship for the ground combat element and the command element of the Marine Corps. Aviation being down in the Department of Aviation and Logistics or the Combat Service Support area being over principally in I&L. So the Operations Division, even though the name would not suggest that, was really a program and acquisition sponsor for the Ground Program.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was no Policy Division as such?

GEN MUNDY: There was not at that time. There had been at one time the Service Plans and Policy



An official photograph was taken of Mundy as he was promoted to major general in April 1986. He initially served as Director of Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps.

Division, but it had been done away with and had been rolled into just a Service Plans Branch under the Plans Division. I guess I'm confusing this. But you had a brigadier general at one time, a one- or a two-star, in charge of the Plans Division, usually a two-star of the Operations Division, and intermittently a brigadier general or sometimes a very senior colonel as the Service Plans and Programs Division, there being three divisions in the PP&O Department at that time. That had been done away with and now the Service Plans Branch was a branch in the Plans Division. So you had Plans Division and Operations Division.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Director of the Plans Division at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The Plans Division was BGen Mike Sheridan.

BGEN SIMMONS: You described for me that "operations" was not a very exact title for your billet. Were you however the Junior Operations Deputy for JCS affairs?

GEN MUNDY: Not as a routine. The Director of Operations served as the Alternate Deputy Operations Deputy. And that was because of the fact that, not well understood by many—we can talk about that more about the PP&O Department a little bit—but not really well understood outside or inside the Marine Corps is the fact that the Operations Deputy of the Marine Corps, we know him as the DCS PP&O, and his assistant are actually JCS billets. He wears a JCS badge. The Director of Operations, me in this case, was not a JCS credential holder. But I could fill in, when Gen Sheridan wasn't available to go to the Deputy Operations Deputies Meetings, then they would get me, or for that matter get any other one- or two-star general at Headquarters. But as a general practice, anytime that Sheridan was tied up or committed elsewhere, I stood in for him "in the tank." And I was very comfortable with that because I had been a Plans Officer, so it was not much of a come uppance for me.

BGEN SIMMONS: On a personal note, Mike Sheridan was a very bright officer who retired prematurely to become the head of a meat packing company. Do you have any comments on that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Mike is a good friend and he is one of those who, I will go so far on the record here as to say, he is one of those who suffered from a stumble by a selection board, which in fact selected him to be a major general. Mike had been, passed his first time. And the board met, selected him to be a major general, but there had been Secretarial guidance to expand the board after the board had been convened and so Mike was one of the two officers that had been picked up. That was looked into by I suppose the DODIG or someone else when the guidance was found to be inappropriate, not flawed, not wrong, not slanted toward anyone, but was found to be inappropriate.

So as a result, even though having been selected, Mike suddenly found himself deselected, or his name not forwarded and I think he just had had about all that he needed from Marine Corps selection boards, had a tremendous opportunity and is today a very very successful and a very happy native of Chicago, Illinois, where he's still with I think the Meat Packing Company.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the major problems or issues waiting when you took this job?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the major problems had to do,

as I said, with probably the major emphasis of the division, and that was the acquisition of equipment. Remember that we had been, and were still to some degree, enjoying the Reagan years of the defense build-up. So the defense budget had been large, and essentially anything you could make reasonable justification for, you were able to get. That was ending as I arrived, even though the Reagan Administration was still here. But the resources were beginning to become a little bit more constrained and so it was becoming more difficult.

The Marine Corps still had an enormous vision of the future that had to do with large numbers of the landing craft air cushion vehicle, replacement of the assault amphibian vehicle. We were well into the light armored vehicle. We wanted to replace the howitzer for the Marine Corps. We had our eye on a 120-millimeter mortar. In other words, we were looking at all of the new gadgetry that was out there with still a very hungry appetite for that. So that was the biggest point of focus that I had.

The related focus, that would later become a crisis for the Marine Corps, that I think we will talk about a little bit later, had to do with the Marine Corps security forces. Security forces had long been in the Manpower Department of the Headquarters, but had been the year before I arrived here, had been transferred, sort of consolidated into a single branch, established as a Security Force Branch, and placed in the Operations Division. So all military police, the Marine security guards, any Naval security forces, the detachments aboard ship, that sort of thing, that previously had been monitored elsewhere in the Headquarters, had come to the Operations Division.

Secretary John Lehman, at the time that I got there, had just given direction to the Marine Corps to come up with a way of providing fairly extensive security to naval bases around the world that we did not have a Marine Barracks located at. He had realized, because we were then focused of course very heavily on anti-terrorism, distinguished from counter-terrorism, but we were focused on means of preventing terrorism on military bases. And John Lehman had been to visit an Air Force base and had realized that the Air Force for a number of years had been buying air policemen. They had been programming for, and they had a superb security system at all of the Air Force bases. And he looked around Navy aviation principally and realized that the Navy had not invested anything in that type of security.

And so, he turned quickly to the Marine Corps and talked in terms, as I recall it, of even doubling the size of the Marine Corps security forces that actually pro-

vide naval security. We had at that time about, as I recall, about 7,500 Marines that were involved in Marine barracks and ship's detachments and admirals orderlies and people like that that we provided the Navy.

Lehman made the comment that if it was necessary that maybe we would have to even double that number. Of course to the Marine Corps, this was a direction of considerable concern because that meant we were going to have to reach out and find 7,500 Marines — that's in round numbers about half a division of Marines — to go out and guard the Navy airfields or other installations.

So, the Operations Division was tasked with the job of reorganizing, restructuring naval security forces in coordination with a just established agency in the OPNAV staff that was also given responsibility for naval security. So you had a rear admiral, and you had the Operations Division Headquarters that was supposed to put this thing together.

BGen O.K. [Orlo] Steele was then the Legislative Assistant at the Headquarters. But because of OK's extensive background in—he had been a seagoing Marine, he had had command at the Barracks and was stationed at another as I recall and had a great amount of awareness on this, and also, although I didn't realize it at the time, but without question because of OK's credibility and because of his considerable association through his job as Legislative Assistant with Secretary Lehman—OK Steele was then assigned additionally to me to do this study, to be the Marine Corps' general officer on that study.

And so that would become one of the major issues that faced the Operations Division, was doing the security force reorganization. And then again as I said, primarily the acquisition sponsorship and the security force reorganization.

The third one that I will mention, not quite so extensively, is that we were still at that time in the throes of attempting to define the amphibious force of the future, the Navy shipping. We knew that we had the landing craft air cushion coming in. But the amphib ships were aging, and while we had some new ones on the scene, the plan was not very firm with the Navy for replacing the amphibious fleet.

In addition to that, maritime prepositioning, although we had gotten the last of the squadrons afloat I believe in 1986, it was still just coming of age. So we were still kind of smoothing out the wrinkles in the Maritime Prepositioning Force. So we had a section that was headed by then Colonel selectee Tony Zinni that oversaw MAGTF doctrine matters in the Headquarters and that oversaw the maritime preposi-

tioning and amphibious matters, not the amphibious force per se, but if you will, the doctrine or the concepts for amphibious warfare, as well as for Marine Air/Ground Task Force warfare. So that was very big, because as is usually the case, we were at considerable odds with the Navy over amphibious warfare and the expensive replacing of the amphibious fleet and the cost of the MPS program. Those I would say were the three big issues that were looming.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned Col Tony Zinni, now a lieutenant general. Who were some of your other G subordinates in the division?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the deputy in the division when I got there was then Col Bill Eshelman, of course, one of our very finest, as is Tony Zinni. Bill Eshelman retired as a major general, having a tremendously distinguished career. I had Zinni, I had in the current Operations Division, then lieutenant colonel, but selected that year as a matter of fact, Nick Schreiber or Klaus Schreiber, he was a native German, who was running Current Operations. We had the Amphibious Plans Branch—now this will get confusing—but we had a branch that oversaw the LCACs and the amphibious matters and the V-22 for that matter did not oversee the program, that was down in aviation, but at least building that over the horizon projection capability. That was under Col Marshall B. "Buck" Darling. Again, Zinni was more the concepts man, how are we going to employ this, what are the missionary analyses we need to do, what's the concepts and doctrine for the future.

Remember that at this point, that MCCDC, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, was still about a year away. When Gen Gray came in, he transferred many of these functions to Quantico. But at that time, they were resident in the Headquarters, and so thus Tony Zinni had that.

The Security Branch was there, that was headed by lieutenant colonel and his name escapes me right now.

And then the Ground Combat Element Staff was headed by Col Jim Lloyd. So that was the make-up of the division.

BGEN SIMMONS: Getting back to security matters, in May 1986, the Marine Barracks at Mare Island was deactivated. The Marine Corps was in the process of closing out one of its long-standing missions regarding Navy Yard stations. You've already indicated that you were involved in this process. How did you feel about giving up this historic mission?

GEN MUNDY: Well, being something of a traditionalist as I am and having been on sea duty in my early years, I viewed those types of missions as essentially as you've characterized them. In other words, they certainly had a practical basis and a practical utility in providing security often times for nuclear weapons or for very sensitive facilities. But at the same time, there was something very special about the days when a Marine that was on that type of duty had a slightly saddled barracks cap, he probably was in double soled shoes, you could hear him bring his heels together a block and a half away and say, "Good morning, sir!" And the good impact of that was when the Navy were inspired by Marines on gates, by Marines doing guard mounts, by the Marine barracks that always had the shiniest metal of any place around, the best kept lawn, and the whitest rocks along the sidewalk.

So it was a colorful mission, and I hated to see this go. And I worried that the cause of it going of course was because of the reorganization, if I can drop back to that for a moment, that BGen Steele had masterfully orchestrated for the Marine Corps. Again, remember that Secretary Lehman's guidance was I don't care if you have to double the number of Marines. Gen Kelley's guidance was keep it exactly no more than 7,800 or 7,700 whatever it is was his guidance. So Steele had to come up with a reorganization keeping the numbers the same if he possibly could, but spreading those Marines out. So what we wound up doing was sprinkling in many cases, one, in some cases here for example at the Washington Navy Yard, there are two Marines that are assigned to the Commander of the Naval District of Washington for the purpose of assisting the security officer here in performing his duties. So we put a lot of cadres out, one, two, some places three, Marine usually a sergeant, sometimes a lieutenant, maybe a warrant officer, to do that. And we had to take down some of the old structures in order to do this.

The study envisioned the creation of two security force battalions who would more or less oversee the security forces in each fleet area of responsibility, east and west. And in each of those battalions, there would be what we still have today is a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Company. And this would be really a hot shot outfit, which it is. It is not at all colorful, they have blues, but they're a utilities-clad organization. They were to accomplish the security for the nuclear refueling and defueling of submarines and nuclear ships, which they do today, very monotonous boring duty, bless those young kids' hearts, because they do nothing but stand there for four hours while somebody is pulling rods out of a nuclear reac-

tor or cutting a hole in a submarine.

So, in order to generate the manpower for that, but not to increase the manpower, we had to pull in some of the old golden locations like Mare Island, like the Marine Barracks in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. You haven't asked about it, but I was up to conduct its decommissioning. And the entire town of Kittery, Maine closed the doors on Tuesday, all the businesses shut down. They came out to the football stadium and we went out there and had a tremendous ceremony for these 100 or so Marines that were going to be leaving the barracks at Portsmouth. I never even thought about it. Portsmouth was the second oldest post of the Corps. And when you close places down like that, and realize that the Marines had sailed for Havana during the Spanish American War, they had sailed out of Portsmouth, New Hampshire and here you are shutting it down, there's a sadness. You can see some of the, a little bit of fading of "Such Things as Regiments Hand Down Forever," you have to give up these old missions.

So a bit of sadness, but at the same time it was in many respects a very practical organization for today's world, vice the world that we like to affectionately remember.

BGEN SIMMONS: It diminished, however, the already diminished opportunities of Marines serving cheek and jowl with the Navy. Fewer and fewer opportunities for sea duty, fewer and fewer Navy Yard opportunities, a long way from pre-World War II, when every young officer could expect to go to sea. Maybe it makes it a little bit more difficult for us to maintain our naval character.

GEN MUNDY: I think so. I see, for example, as I'm sure you do, or I have noticed in recent years that we seem to lapse a little bit on our naval terminology. I mean we will still hear a good DI, talk about "the deck," but you don't hear people talking too much about "hatches" any more. If you turn to a younger Marine and say "Yes, you will find him up on the second deck, you should go up the ladder down by the scuttlebutt," he would be wondering why you were sending him up a ladder instead of riding the escalator or walking up the stairs.

So I think we still probably have a flavor of that in the right places. Certainly you do at 8th and I, certainly you do in the recruit training, more or less I would imagine at OCS. I'm not sure at The Basic School and places like that, we don't bring that seagoing flavor with us. So it is something of a loss. Indeed, it was for that very reason this transition

wound up to my time as the Commandant, but when the mission was taken from the Navy, not unwillingly, they were very glad to give it up, but when that great time in our nation's history came when we could take nuclear weapons off naval vessels, which is only about three years ago now. Adm Kelso and I made the deal, if you will, that even though there was no requirement for a Marine Detachment now aboard an aircraft carrier, there was no nuclear weapon security to be conducted, the Marines really don't have much to do except raise and lower the colors and provide the bow watch and the quarters report. But we agreed to maintain about 25 Marines on the carrier. There are no more capital ships around that can accommodate, the Marine spaces fell out in favor of more computers and missile launching controls and things like that on cruisers. But we still had them on aircraft carriers. And it is a good tradition to perpetuate.

My concern would be that years down the road, in fact in my own tenure here, I can see the Navy and the Marine Corps becoming more adversarial because so much of what we do is to fight each other here in Washington for resources and we don't have that — when Marines are embarked aboard an amphibious ship, as good as the Navy skippers and the crews are, you're a transient. You're not a part of the ship's company and you don't have that feeling for really knowing what life as a member of the naval establishment is all about.

BGEN SIMMONS: The big exercise in the Caribbean, Ocean Venture 86, was underway when you reported in, did your division have any involvement in this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: None, other than as I mentioned watching the situation reports that would come in to the Current Operations Division. They would put it on a map at the morning operation summary or whatever briefings we would have principally in PP&O. I don't recall the Commandant getting many briefings of this sort. But it would say that Ocean Venture's going on and so many Marines are involved, and today the Chairman is going down to visit or today they land in Puerto Rico, or something to that extent. But we were not drivers of the exercise, we were monitors.

BGEN SIMMONS: There's a tremendous number of major and repetitive exercises throughout the world. How are these all meshed together? What is the responsibility of Headquarters Marine Corps for that schedule?

GEN MUNDY: Very little any more. It has long been that way, although prior to Goldwater/Nichols, the Commandant probably thought he had more to do with the scheduling of those types of exercises than as a practical matter he did. Because in those days, I'm sure that the Commandant probably spoke with the commanding generals of either the Marine Force Atlantic or Pacific, and they told him that they were going to do a certain type of exercise, and he probably more or less tacitly approved it or maybe approved it from time to time. Nowadays, of course, that's done really through the CinCs. So the force commanders talk to the unified commanders about what the exercise requirements are going to be, and the Headquarters generally monitors it.

As a practical matter, the force commanders, if there's something significant going on, I know during my tenure, and I'm sure during my successor's that the force commanders would call and say we've just been tasked by the CinC to provide a squadron to go over and fly out of Aviano, and we're going to send VMFA-533 out of Beaufort. And the Commandant, if he's on his toes and has kept up pretty well with what's been going on, might say, "Gee, didn't 533 just redeploy from WestPac two or three months ago?" Well, "Yes, they did." "Well, that's a pretty high operating tempo. Do we have to send 533 or can we send another squadron," that sort of thing might get into it. But as far as directing, or "I want you to run this exercise," or "I want you to commit this type force," there's not too much of that type of influence.

BGEN SIMMONS: In May 1986, a development contract for the V-22 Osprey aircraft was signed. Did you have any involvement in any way in aircraft development and procurement?

GEN MUNDY: Not in the development and procurement, in the concept almost totally so. To his credit, and one that should go down, I think, as a very significant player in terms of the really fusing of Marine aviation and the ground side into a true philosophy of an air/ground task force is LtGen Keith Smith. Keith Smith was then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation. And when I got there, you were asking about who gave you guidance or coached you, Keith Smith probably spent as much time with me as any of the generals in Headquarters. And his philosophy was one that has served me well and that I adopted almost immediately. His philosophy was that look, my job, or the job of the Aviation Department here, is to conceive, program, and sponsor the development, the acquisition, the equipping, the maintenance, the train-

ing of pilots, in other words the technical side of the house of aviation. But his philosophy was when it comes to the point that you have to call an aviator to explain or defend Marine aviation, if we are indeed a true air/ground task force, then a ground officer ought to be able to explain aviation, certainly as well as if not better, because he's the user, if aviation is a supporting arm in the Marine Corps, which we maintain it is.

So Keith Smith caused me, as a result, to go to any major meeting in the Department of Aviation. He would take me to the Marine Corps Aviation Association, and he really dipped me in the oil of Marine aviation. And I came to realize that he was exactly right. So if we have to defend why Marines have tactical aviation, we should never turn to an aviator to do that. That should be the job of those who are the consumers.

So, as I mentioned earlier, Col Tony Zinni, and then following Tony Zinni, Col "Buck" Darling, we expanded that division and he took over what Tony had been doing when Zinni left. But Col Tony Zinni and Col Buck Darling were the conceptualizers of the way we would use the V-22 and the way we would employ it in both operations ashore and from sea bases, from amphibious operations.

As a result of that, we in the Operations Division stayed very close with the development and testing of the aircraft because of our conceptual view of how we were going to use it, once we got the airplane.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about landing craft and amphibious ships, what was your involvement in their development?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the landing craft air cushion, as I mentioned, was just coming in. That's the hovercraft as many would refer to it. Amphibious ships, we had the LHAs, of course, had been built or been programmed. The LHD was now beginning to become a concept, transitioning in program. The LSD-41s the first of them had been commissioned. We were looking at variants of the LSD-41, a cargo variant. And then in the longer term, but not coming to fruition until during my tenure as Commandant in the past couple of years, was the replacement for the Landing Platform Dock, the LPD ship.

So we had, because of the Amphibious Matters Branch, that was headed initially by Col Darling, as I mentioned earlier, the Operations Division had almost total oversight of matters amphibious in the Headquarters. As always of course, the Requirements and Programs Division were keeper of the golden keys to

the treasure box, so they were the people who really had all the details on the program as far as its fiscal standing and so on. But as far as the continuing representation of how many we needed, what type capacities we should have, the amount of troop and square and cargo that you needed, how we blended this altogether into a amphibious ready group eventually, that was in the Operations Division.

BGEN SIMMONS: The battleship USS *Missouri* was recommissioned in May 1986 and the Marine detachment was provided the ship. Again, did Operations Division have any involvement in this?

GEN MUNDY: Well it did, because of the Security Branch. One of the functions of that branch, in coordination with Navy OP09N happened to be that Security Branch sent teams comprised of equal-ranked Navy and Marine officers around to assess every security requirement we had and to determine, to validate the post, to validate the requirement, to determine how many you needed and what grades they should be, that sort of thing.

Now, in the case of the battleship, to be very candid with you, I suspect that what we did was break out the old T/O for what we used to have on a battleship, but it had been modified because a lot of guns had been taken off in favor of more modern technology missiles. But the Operations Division would have been the division that created the Table of Organization for the *Missouri* detachment, that sent out the activation messages, that did all the work in determining the size and the structure, and then in implementing that detachment coming to be.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you concerned at all, conceptually or otherwise, on how a battleship would be employed?

GEN MUNDY: We were not. We were, of course, very interested and we would do a good bit of advocacy with the Navy for example on the types of munitions that they were developing for the 16-inch guns, the rocket assisted projectiles, the more sensitive the longer range, 60-mile range, 16-inch projectiles, that sort of thing. We had a great deal of interest. We coordinated with what was then on the OPNAV staff a branch that was called the OP734, which was the Strike and Amphibious Warfare Matters Branch within OP-07 which was the war-fighting branch in the OPNAV staff. Usually was a rear admiral that headed that up. So my opposite number on the OPNAV staff was Strike and Amphibious Matters, Strike being

aviation, Amphibious Matters being obvious things, but to include naval gunfire support, or as it is now termed naval surface fire support, with the advent of the cruise missiles and so on.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just for the record, I note that on 30 June 1986, the mid-year strength of the U.S. armed forces is 2,143,030 of whom 196,325 were Marines.

GEN MUNDY: We were growing at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 4 July 1986, the 100th anniversary of the Statue of Liberty, celebrated with considerable Marine Corps presence. Did you attend by any chance?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. I know the Commandant did, but I didn't.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there any involvement of your division?

GEN MUNDY: Only in the coordination once again—in those cases now, since those are not unified command-directed type of operations, in many cases we would have a request for a Marine detachment of some sort, or perhaps an aircraft or some helicopters to support or some Harriers to put on an air show, those usually would come directly into the Headquarters and they would be most often received in the Current Operations Branch and coordinated within the Headquarters.

So, I don't remember anything specific and anything of great significance, but I'm certain that there was some of that sort of thing, and that would have been handled by the Operations Division.

BGEN SIMMONS: UNITAS XXVII, the 27th annual series of exercises linking the United States and South American military forces began in July 1986. There was a detachment of 2d Marine Division Marines embarked. Again, did the Operations Division have any involvement?

GEN MUNDY: Not beyond just monitoring.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Marine Corps hosted the 25th Annual Inter-Service Rifle Championship Match at Quantico in July 1986. Any involvement of the Operations Division?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only me as is often the case, when something happens of that sort, everybody

wants generals to attend. And the generals, despite the popular image that we play golf every Wednesday afternoon or something, the generals around Washington are pretty busy most of the time. But there is always some sort of directive that comes out of the Headquarters that says if you're a general go down and watch the matches at some time. I did that year. I shot, we've already talked earlier about the fact that I've always enjoyed shooting and shot in the Eastern Division Matches. So I went, but I went purely as a Marine general, the Operations Division had nothing to do with that.

Generally speaking, marksmanship came at that time under the training side of the house, and still today does. So you would find the trainers either at Quantico or in the days when we had a training department or training division at Headquarters, the trainers would be overseeing that.

BGEN SIMMONS: When I went to Camp Perry years ago as the Commandant's rep for an inter-service marksmanship competition, the Marine shooters gave me a field hat to wear for the occasion. Did you get a field hat?

GEN MUNDY: Didn't get one then. But while I was in Basic School, we went out to shoot as lieutenants, and a buddy and I bet a campaign hat on our qualifying scores when we qualified at Basic School and I beat him. So I still have that campaign hat. I think he went down to Bolognese and bought me my campaign hat right there and I still have it.

BGEN SIMMONS: In July and August, Exercise Gallant Eagle 86 took place on several Southern California bases. About 35,000 Marines, Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen took part. This Gallant Eagle series was sponsored by the U.S. Central Command. How close did the scenarios for the Gallant Eagle exercises approximate the eventual Persian Gulf War?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think all of those scenarios over time, I think we've watched by that particular CinC, have focused generally interestingly on the other side of the Gulf. Because we were at that time, of course, concerned with Iran and not at all with Iraq. So the scenarios envisioned the introduction of forces, usually the Marines were down around Bandar Abbas somewhere, down around the Strait of Hormuz, went ashore there, established a base of operations and commenced to operate with the Army, the air assault division or the airborne division, which went up into the Zagros Mountains. So we were really focused on

the eastern side of the Persian Gulf rather than the west.

So while the flow of forces, while the airbases we operated out of in large part down in Qatar and the U.A.E. and those places were probably very much the same the direction of attack and the direction of the conflict was entirely different. So some similarity probably in the flow of forces and the overall scenario of getting forces out there, command relationships perhaps, but not at all with regard to the opposing force.

BGEN SIMMONS: Cobra Gold 86 involved 10,000 U.S. And Thai troops in August. This is another recurring exercise. Any comment on Marine Corps involvement?

GEN MUNDY: It continues through today and is held by our people in the Pacific, either Marine Forces Pacific or at III MEF. It continues to be one of the very best exercises, but has scaled back. You had mentioned that about 10,000 were involved in Cobra Gold 86. I believe I would not be more than a couple hundred off one way or the other if I said that we were more likely maybe 3,000 this past year and the years preceeding, and very likely will diminish further and further in the future, simply because of the expense of strategic mobility and the commitment of forces from real world contingencies.

BGEN SIMMONS: In late August and early September, there was another major exercise, Northern Wedding 86 Norway. This one must have been very familiar to you.

GEN MUNDY: It certainly was. Since it was successful, I will claim credit for planning it. But that would have been in my 4th MAB hat. We did in fact plan for that. I was relieved by then BGen Matt Caulfield, and so I can recall sending him a "personal for" message out of the Headquarters when he left to set sail to head for the northern flank of Europe, and it said, "Give 'em hell, Matt." And he got a great kick out of that because it was a large undertaking.

Speaking of the "personal fors," we had at that time, you had to be very careful what you sent out because the policy in the Headquarters was that the Commandant read all "personal fors," even though the name itself would suggest otherwise. But he read all of them, both coming in and going out. So sometimes if you got a little bit too folksy in your personal communications, the ACMC or the Chief of Staff would call you and say the Commandant kind of

raised his eyebrows at the communication. But he didn't say anything to me.

It was a large exercise, and it was conducted extremely well. Gen Gray at that time, of course, was down at Fleet Marine Force Atlantic. He had a lot of stock invested, had done the exercise himself as a brigade commander, and was standing on the beach probably watching Caulfield execute throughout the whole thing. So it went very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September 1986, the first of three "LCACs," or landing craft air cushions, arrived at Camp Pendleton. You mentioned the LCACs earlier. Eventually there were to be 90 LCACs. I don't know whether we reached that goal or not, can you comment?

GEN MUNDY: We have. As a matter of fact, interestingly we are programmed, currently we are procuring more LCACs than we need. I think the number is about 108. And that has to do largely with the politics—we just keep getting LCACs stuck into the program. They're good vehicles. And indeed, that may turn out to be very fortuitous, even though neither the Navy or the Marine Corps sought those. But as we have looked for solutions to the mine warfare problem, at that time nobody envisioned an LCAC being involved in that. We had a level of confidence that an LCAC would be able to, because of its speed and because of the pressure on the water and so on, would be able to pass over at least some of the mines. And if it detonated them at all, by the time they detonated and the plume came up, the LCAC would be over it and you would get a geyser of water behind you, but maybe not break the back of the craft itself.

So it may be useful that we have an extra few of those to turn into mine countermeasures types of craft. So we eventually would reach that requirement level.

The LCAC in development was something, because it was new in the United States, because it was larger than any of the hovercraft that were used in some places commercially, came under a lot of flak. Generally speaking, the concepts that Marines come up with, of course, we come up with the concept, we manage to get it over on the Navy. The Navy is now going to have to pay for it. And so usually there will be a lot of bad mouthing. In this case, in the case of the LCAC, there was much highlighting of the flaws that are inherent in any developing vehicle of that type. But as it turned out, when they got them to sea for their operational trials, the things just worked like gangbusters and we found that we could offload ships something in the order of three times as fast. We

could load at sea or backload at sea ever so much faster. And the craft just performed extremely well. They had a CH-46 engine in them, so we have a proven aircraft engine that turned the propellers on the things. There were very few problems with the LCAC. And so, all of the criticisms went south.

BGEN SIMMONS: I have not heard it discussed previously that it had a potential for mine clearance. Is there any empirical data or testing to support this?

GEN MUNDY: Oh yes, we use them today, called MCACs, Mine Clearance Assault CRAFT—I think it's Mine Cushion or Assault Craft, I'm not sure what MCAC stands for. But LCAC versus MCAC, now the practical side of it is that what they have been able to do is to mount some—they're electronic, in other words the craft speeds along and you're beaming electrons down into the water and they will both detect and can blow up the mines.

That's for shallow water mine, that's not for deep water mines. That would be for shallow water. So you strap this thing on, you can turn an MCAC into an LCAC simply by removing the mine countermeasures paraphernalia that you have in the well deck of the craft.

BGEN SIMMONS: At this time we began to add applique armor kits to our M60A1 tanks to stretch out their operational life, until we could get the M1A1. Can you comment on this?

GEN MUNDY: We did. Of course, that really was in the research and development side of the house. And so MajGen Ray Franklin, who then headed the Marine Corps R&D Division, and then-MajGen Bob Milligan, BGen Milligan I guess he was at that time, who had the Marine Corps Development Center, it now is part of the Combat Development Command or the Research and Development Center, but it was then the Development Center, those were the real overseers of that, together with I&L. So the Operations Division, again, was cognizant, was aware, attended any meeting that was held on that, but we really weren't procuring or installing them directly.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September and October of 1986, we had Exercise Bold Guard 86 in Germany and Denmark, another recurring exercise. In this one, we tested for the first time the capabilities of maritime prepositioning shipping in support of the MAGTF and the European environment. Can you comment on that use?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, that is tied to Northern Wedding/Bold Guard. I mean you said Bold Guard, but Northern Wedding and Bold Guard were a single deployment, and Northern Wedding usually occurred in one region while the Bold Guard always occurred down in the Baltic approaches for us. We had for years done a lot of war gaming. Gen Gray had been in there in an earlier expedition with a large amphibious force and had conducted one of these. But they would do a landing at Oksbol, O-K-S-B-O-L Beach there in Denmark, and then would just move the assault force ashore and then they would stop what they were doing and embark all the vehicles on trains and run them down into the Jutland area of Northern Germany and then transition to another exercise there, which really was Bold Guard.

So this time, in addition to bringing the amphibious force, I believe they took along a single maritime prepositioning ship and offloaded it in the port there. That was the extent of my knowledge, but again it went very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: Goldwater/Nichols, the Organization Act, which we mentioned several times in the past, became effective in October 1986. How did this act specifically affect the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: I believe that it strengthened the Marine Corps, and that would be perhaps a different view than others might have. We will recall, I think, that Gen Paul X. Kelley was probably the most strident opponent to Goldwater/Nichols, and even in his farewell remarks at a joint review for him and Gen Wickham of the Army, why Gen Kelley had many strong statements to make, because there were those who believed that Goldwater/Nichols was being crafted without really a full understanding of what the implications were and to be sure that is, to a degree, true I think.

The Marine Corps as an institution led by the Commandant was generally opposed to Goldwater/Nichols. I think that after the fact, it's interesting to note that the Marine Corps Command and Staff College—that was about the first year that I became the Commandant, not because I was the Commandant, simply it would have happened whoever was there—but the Marine Corps Command and Staff College was the first of the Command Staff Colleges of any service that was fully accredited as the joint professional military education meeting all the criteria that had been ordained by Goldwater/Nichols.

Goldwater/Nichols enabled the Marine Corps to

gain componentcy status in the unified commands. Because Goldwater/Nichols said that the senior officer serving in a unified command, senior service representative, shall be that service component. Heretofore, Marines were always subordinate to the Navy fleet commander, who was the Navy component commander for a given area.

So you would have the anomaly, for example, my good friend, now retired LtGen D'Wayne Gray, used to call it the "velvet rope syndrome." The CinC for example in Hawaii, when D'Wayne Gray was CG FMFPac would—somebody, the President, or the Chairman, or a visiting head of state or someone would be coming to visit and the CinC would say "I will be there to meet him and fall out the component commanders with me." So you would fall out the fleet admiral, CinCPac Fleet. PacAF, Pacific Air Forces had a four-star out there, had half the number of airplanes that the Marine Corps had, but you still had a four-star, so he stood out front. And then you had the Army Force Commander, who was a component commander because he was designated such, but usually was a three-star, with 36,000 soldiers, while CG FMFPac with about 110,000 Marines and 400 or 500 flying machines stood behind the velvet rope because he was not a component commander. It irritated the living daylights out of generations of Marines.

And so Goldwater/Nichols enabled us then, when we decided to make that fight, to say wait a minute, the law says that the senior service representative is the component commander. So the Marine is a component commander. That has taxed us, and again we can talk more about this as we get into the actual implementing of this and how we got it done, that has taxed us because it now takes what we used to know as Fleet Marine Force commanders, we today know as Marine force commanders, are pointed in many different directions with essentially the same size staffs as they used to have. So we are taxed for people.

But it means that we vote on every issue. It means that we are at the table on every issue. It means that the Marine voice, regardless of the number of stars, is as loud as anybody else's there, and it means that we don't stand behind the velvet rope any more.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 December 1986, Secretary of State George P. Schultz and the Commandant, Gen Paul X. Kelly signed a new memorandum of understanding concerning the State Department and the Marine Corps Security Guard Program. Secretary Schultz, of course, was a World War II Marine. Was the Operations Division involved

in drawing up this revised MOU?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, very much so. That was my Security Force Branch, and we redrafted in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Section of the State Department, Ambassador Bob Lamb, L-A-M-B, a former Marine also, headed that Diplomatic Security Branch. We drafted that. In fact, Gen Kelley and I went over for a very nice luncheon in the State Department with Secretary Schultz. I was on hand for that signing ceremony and had lunch by Secretary Schultz who was very proud of his Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, we ended calendar year 1986 with 2,177,862 uniformed persons in the Armed Services, of whom 198,245 were Marines. Still going up a little bit.

GEN MUNDY: We were programmed to go up to the tune of about 2,000 to 3,000 a year.

BGEN SIMMONS: I'm not going to keep repeating all the recurring exercises which we have already covered in some detail in 1986. In the new year however, there was a lengthy Exercise Alpine Warrior 87 in Fort McCoy, Minnesota [but it is in Wisconsin] involving 6,300 Marines and sailors from your old outfit, the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Exercise Cold Winter 87 followed thereafter in northern Norway. Any comment on these cold weather exercises?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only to the extent that that was the second time that we had used Fort McCoy and the very-near located airbase that was up there, Volk, V-O-L-K Air National Guard Base. When I say I, I say that we of the 4th MAB had discovered that in 1985. Actually, Col Harry Jenkins who had the 2d Marine Regiment at that time, Harry had taught at our Cold Weather Training Center, mountain warfare training center in Pickle Meadows, California as a captain. And so he had an orientation toward matters regarding cold weather.

We had found that we had been for years going up to Fort Drum, New York. We had gone to Camp Ripley, Minnesota. Those places were good, they were cold. They had become very expensive. Each one of these states, because it is a state-run operation, is able to charge whatever they want. And Fort Drum had just priced itself out of business. The 10th Mountain Division was being established there, and so they really didn't have to look for business. They were going to have plenty of jobs and plenty of activity for the base. So it became overly expensive.

But at the same time, we, I dare say, stumbled upon, Col Jenkins stumbled upon this combination of Fort McCoy and Volk Air Base which were about 15 miles apart. What that gave us was the perfect MAGTF cold weather training. Volk was, for example, was an austere base which had—there was an Air Force lieutenant colonel or an Air National Guard lieutenant colonel, and a cadre of maybe 10 or 15 people. So when you went there with your aviation element, you ran the tower, you ran the maintenance, and had all the facilities there, but whatever you wanted to fix your airplanes with you brought with you and if you wanted to eat, why you ran the mess hall. If you wanted to show movies, you ran the theater. So for an expeditionary outfit, it was a very good drill.

Fort McCoy was a little bit more sophisticated than that, but much the same. So we found that we could then have the ground combat element over at Fort McCoy, which was excellent in its maneuver area, and then the aviation combat element at Volk, only 15 miles away. Then we could run a real MAGTF exercise.

When I went up there for the first time in 1985, we found it to be tremendously good training there. That year was small, we probably had 3,500 maybe total Marines. So the 1987 exercise sort of culminated, it really became the biggest, of the four cold weather exercises in Norway with which I was involved..

The cold winter exercise that you mentioned is a biannual Norwegian exercise that we participate in. Every other year is supposed to be a large amphibious exercise along the lines of Northern Wedding/Bold Guard and then the odd years are Norwegian unilateral exercises, unilateral, that's a Norwegian exercise where they allow U.S. Marines to participate in the cold winter exercise.

BGEN SIMMONS: Then in February, another familiar exercise began, Team Spirit 87 in South Korea. Exercise Team Spirit, whatever the year, is often regarded as a thermometer of relations in the Far East. Do you care to comment.

GEN MUNDY: I think that's a very good characterization because of note is the fact that we did not run Exercise Team Spirit last year, even though it was scheduled, and it's a very large exercise with a lot of participating forces and an enormously expensive exercise. But it's a statement of the alliance of the Koreans and the Americans to North Korea each year. Last year, because of the sensitivity having to do with the nuclear reactor issue in North Korea, one of the quids that the government of South Korea and the

United States government agreed to make to placate the North Koreans was that we did not run Team Spirit, which from their viewpoint is a very provocative exercise, reinforcement of Korea to build up the exercising up to the DMZ, they see that as provocative, so we fell off of that.

So it is not only a thermometer might be a better term, but rheostat. We can turn up the power a little bit or wrench it back, depending on how we want to use Team Spirit every year.

BGEN SIMMONS: The end of March, the entire 28-man Marine Security detachment was withdrawn from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Was this the Sgt Clayton J. Lonetree incident?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was.

BGEN SIMMONS: And to what extent was the Operations Division involved?

GEN MUNDY: Well, once again, the Operations Division would have cognizance over that, because of our security force responsibilities. I had been made the point-man on what was known as the Moscow MSG crisis—that was the Sergeant Lonetree case—and had been sent over to testify before the Congress who just absolutely ate me alive. They had to have somebody to vent their anger on, and so they used me, both myself and Ambassador Lamb, Bob Lamb, as I mentioned, the State Department counterpart.

So we did replace, we redesigned, we mentioned the MOU that had been redesigned with Ambassador Schultz. That was a product of the MSG crisis. The 28 Marines were removed, which really was an over-reaction, but it was a reaction that was driven, as is so often the case in Washington, by the need to do something to placate the press and to placate the Congress. And they really have to have some sacrifice. So bad things did not happen to the Marines that were removed at all. Some of them we would have removed anyway, but not all of them. But it was a flushing. We flushed out all 28, we replaced them with hand-picked second-tour Marines, all of whom had done at least one Marine Security Guard Post before, and we assigned them throughout that way. One of the positive fallouts from this sensational, and as it turned out, over-reactive event was that we established a significant psychological testing and evaluation program not only in the MSG Battalion, but eventually, for the guards from Marine Barracks, Washington, that were being assigned to Presidential security at Camp David. I have mentioned a close

life-time fellow Marine and friend, Colonel Peter J. Finley, USMCR (Ret) earlier, I believe. Pete became a psychologist after service in the Marine Corps, and while with that degree, we would have not originally commissioned him, he continued as a Marine Reservists, and over the years, made substantial contributions to various manpower studies and analyses. I called Pete in the midst of the MSG crisis and asked him to come down and give me an assessment of our screening of candidates for the MSG Program. He did so, and as part of a group commissioned to study the problem, made some significant recommendations concerning both selection screening, and screening during training. These were put into effect, and Pete was contracted to implement and oversee them. They had a dramatic effect on ensuring we selected and assigned only psychologically stable Marines for MSG duty, and as I mentioned, eventually presidential security duties. That was in 1987, and as we speak, Pete Finley, affectionately known by the Barracks Marines as "Doc Finley" continues to travel with the interview teams from the Barracks to select Marines to come to 8th and I, and to conduct psychological screening at the Barracks of those being considered for Camp David. Much as we Marines might like to think that any Marine is suitable for any assignment, the fact proven by Pete Finley over a decade is that while they may be good in another assignment, all Marines aren't best suited for the boredom and stresses of what may appear to be glamorous duty. Pete Finley's efforts and contributions significantly contributed to the reduction of attrition from these types duties of some highly trained Marines over the years. So it was the right thing to do from a public relations standpoint. It probably was not a necessary thing to do in terms of the effectiveness of the detachment itself.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April, there was a reorganization within your division, which I presume you organized and directed, to include creation of a new branch to take care of amphibious warfare, Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations and prepositioning matters. Were you responsible for that?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I was. And it was driven by a couple of factors. Number one, I mentioned that we had Col Buck Darling, who was himself a very dynamic visionary, good conceptual thinker, very bright officer, and then we had Col Tony Zinni at one time. When Tony left, it was apparent that we had less work than those two quality colonels needed to keep them effectively occupied. So what I in effect

did was to merge the two branches that had heretofore been led by each of them into one and put Col Darling in charge of it. So Darling did what he had been doing and took over what I had described or attributed earlier to Tony Zinni being the concepts and the doctrine man.

BGEN SIMMONS: This branch must have had a short title, it's a real mouthful.

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall that we had an acronym for it. No acronym would have made much sense. But generally speaking, I think we referred to it as the MAGTF and Amphibious Matters Branch, and prepositioning was included in there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another major exercise, one that occurred every two years was Solid Shield that you said one phase of it was conducted at Camp Lejeune and the other in Honduras. What was your involvement?

GEN MUNDY: I really had no involvement. I went down to Honduras to visit, simply because again we were using the maritime prepositioning ships and because it was a means of breaking free of the Headquarters for a while and getting out into the field putting on your utilities. But there again, Solid Shield was a unified exercise. It was run under the auspices of U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic Command. So that would have been one that we would monitor and that we would keep track of very much as we did with Bold Guard and Northern Wedding and Team Spirit.

BGEN SIMMONS: Marine Corps Security Forces was in the process of reorganization as you mentioned earlier. We had the activation of the first of the two Marine Corps Security Force Battalions at Norfolk in April 1987. What was your involvement? How did these MCSF battalions fit or interface with Marine ship's detachments?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they eventually took them over. The ships' detachments in each fleet chopped to that particular security force battalion. We put a colonel, one in Norfolk, one back in Mare Island as a matter of fact to establish their security force battalions. They were then responsible for the training of Marines to go into the various security force structures, whatever they might be. They had resident with them the fast companies that I mentioned earlier, anti-terrorism security team companies. And they had a normal staff section there that oversaw the operations, the assign-

ment of Marine training and assignment of Marines out to the various what we now call security force companies, vice Marine Barracks around the world. In rare exceptions, we did not change the name, in fact we didn't do away with the Marine Barracks in Yokusuka, Japan, simply because it was historic and because we really had no better structure. We didn't want to—with the fleet commander, the Seventh Fleet Commander being located there and that still being one of the residual barracks on distinctly foreign shore, not U.S. possession somewhere, but on a foreign nation shore, we wanted to have a colonel there. So we left it as a barracks and it remained. So it did not fall under the security force battalion.

Until Subic Bay closed, we didn't change it. That remained a Marine Barracks as well, with a colonel in command. But for the others that were around, the Marine Barracks which you found here or there in the Pacific area, they would become a Marine Corps Security Force Company, usually downgraded in the level of officer assigned to command them and they were a company under the security force battalion colonel headquartered in Mare Island or in Norfolk. Rota, Spain for example transitioned from Marine Barracks to Marine Corps Security Force Company, Rota, kept a major there, but the major answered the colonel in Norfolk.

BGEN SIMMONS: Headquarters, 27th Marines, at Twentynine Palms was deactivated on 30 June 1987. Why had this regiment stayed so long on the active list?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the 27th Marines stayed around because, remember that when the Near-Term Prepositioning Force, predecessor to the Maritime Prepositioning Force was taking form, the 7th Marine then- Amphibious, subsequently Expeditionary Brigade, was established as a dual hat to the commanding general of the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, at that time Gen Hal Glasgow. Hal Glasgow had stood up the 7th MAB and the ground combat element of that organization was the 27th Marine regiment.

However, even though it makes sense to create these things, the fact is that the Marine Corps never has enough manpower, or enough capability when we do an expansion like that, so we had the 27th Marines, but it really had for example, no communications platoon. We didn't have that many communicators, so every time the 27th Marines would take the field, why a large segment of the 1st Marine Division would go out to Twentynine Palms and would become part of

the 27th Marines. It eventually evolved to an issue whereby, for example, the 7th Marines' Comm Platoon, and major elements of the Headquarters of the 7th Marines would go chop to the 27th Marines every time the brigade took to the field.

So with a great amount of weighing back and forth in favor of keeping or in favor of deactivating the 27th Marines eventually, the decision was made to deactivate the 27th Marines and move the 7th Marine regiment out of Camp Pendleton up to Twentynine Palms where it is today. So ironically now, the 7th MEB is gone. It also helped with some of the space problems at Camp Pendleton. We were building new facilities at Twentynine Palms, we had new barracks and superb training areas. So we today have one of the regiments of the 1st Marine Division there at Twentynine Palms.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 1 Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters, the 24th MAU and the VMFA-314 exercised with the Egyptian 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from July to September 1987. This was the U.S. Central Command's Exercise Bright Star 87. The Bright Star exercises have been called the rehearsals for the Persian Gulf. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: I think they were. This was fairly old stuff at the time that the Central Command had come to be, or even before that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which of course Gen Paul X. Kelley commanded, the predecessor to the Unified Command. Exercising with these type forces, with the Egyptians exercising with the Omanis, with other Arab nations if you will in the region, was new to the United States. It certainly was new to the United States Marine Corps. So these were fairly bold undertakings.

The interesting fact was that remember that the way I MAF got into this in the first place was, you will recall when we were talking about earlier NATO operations, that while there were two MAFs, the I and II MAF apportioned to NATO in a general war plan, remember that as I pointed out, II MAF had generally been swung to the north, and I MAF swung into the southern region with no one ever expecting that I MAF would come all the way from California and go into the Mediterranean and conduct an operation because that really was II MAF's territory. We sent the MAUs out there, we did that sort of thing.

So, I MAF was, it was useful politically to have I MAF associated, but no one ever thought practically that I MAF would go down and operate. Ironically, the fact that I MAF was involved in those Central Command exercises, which really were because of its

Mediterranean orientation, led I MAF to become the MAF in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Otherwise, it probably would have been II MAF, just because of the force flow and the general orientation.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get to observe any of these major exercises with the Arabs?

GEN MUNDY: I did not.

BGEN SIMMONS: In December 1987, we closed the Sea School at San Diego. This ended an era. Did you have any part in this decision?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes. I mean I was the staff officer that was signing these decision papers up to the Commandant. That was part of the security force reorganization, whereby we were assigning the training of ships detachments to the security force battalions. While we don't have many Marines that go out there, I will tell you it doesn't take you long this day and time aboard one of the carriers on which we still have a Marine detachment, it doesn't take long to see that whatever the judgment value, we have changed dramatically the training that you got when we had that kind of sea school out at San Diego.

We now train security forces. We train Marines to be gunslingers, to shoot well, to know how to handle anti-terrorism situations, and they do that very well. But if you go aboard an aircraft carrier today, I would venture to say, either in port or at sea, less the sentry that is on the bow or at the gangway coming up aboard the ship, less the detachment that will be pulling morning and evening colors, you'll find every Marine there in utilities. When I was on sea duty, we wore our utility uniform maybe when we had ship's landing force party operations off the ship. But other than that, boy I will tell you there was a red stripe down your leg every day of the week.

So that element of sea duty, that chrome-plated bayonet, that presser in the Marine detachment compartment — I used it when I was a lieutenant aboard ship, I would stand morning quarters and then go down to the compartment and pull off my uniform, I had only been in it for about an hour, and hand it to the presser, he would press it, I would put it on and go somewhere else and do something, you wore out your uniform pressing it. But we dwelled on spit shine and on brass shining and on creases in your uniform and on the degree of saddle that you could have on your barrack cap, and you know, double-soled shoes with cleats or without cleats. And all of that was kind of the classic seagoing swaggering image of a Marine

and we have lost that now in the seagoing detachments.

So yes, it was something that I particularly hated to do. Again, remember that both Gen Steele and I had been seagoing lieutenants, so we both had affection for that side of it. But there was no, simply put, there was no way to placate John Lehman's requirement without taking a lot of Marines out of the operating forces to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, we ended 1987 with 198,437 Marines of a total of 2,074,725 U.S. Armed Forces. Where did you live during this tour?

GEN MUNDY: When I came here, it's an interesting tale, I had rented out the home that we will sell this week as a matter of fact, but that we had owned for several years down in Alexandria. I had rented it when I left the Headquarters in 1984 to my good friend, then BGen Bob Winglass, who retired subsequently as a lieutenant general. And Bob had said to me at the time he rented it, "Gee, we want Laura," (his daughter,) "to finish high school while we're there; we really don't want to move." And I said, "Bob, I'm leaving, I won't be back for several years." Well, lo and behold, 18 months later I had orders back.

So, I came here and told him to keep the house, because I wanted to hold good on my promise, went out and rented a place just out the back gate of Fort Myer over in Arlington, a townhouse. We had been in there for about six weeks and I got a call from the Chief of Staff at the Headquarters who told me that the quarters at Bolling Air Force Base that were normally occupied by one of the three-stars, but they didn't have a three-star that wanted them, that they were coming available, would I like to move there? So I said yes. I had to buy my way out of that lease. It cost me about \$3,000, I think, to induce someone to pick up my lease on the townhouse. But we then moved over to Bolling Air Force Base and had a very very pleasant stay with the Air Force. Living on Air Force bases is generally a good experience because they take extremely good care of their occupants. So the great majority of this tour, to include even after I had been promoted to lieutenant general, was at Bolling Air Force Base.

BGEN SIMMONS: I'm getting a little ahead of myself. I'm glad you cleared that up. I wasn't sure whether your Bolling Air Force Base quarters came with your promotion or not. You already were there as a major general?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they went with my promotion.

I was there as a major general. And when I was promoted in April 1998 to lieutenant general, Gen Gray asked if I wanted to move to the Marine Barracks, and I said sure. So we moved again. So in that one tour in Washington here, we really occupied three different sets of quarters, the Arlington townhouse, 82 Westover Boulevard at Bolling, and then Quarters 2 at the Marine Barracks.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where were your children by this time?

GEN MUNDY: They were all gone from home. The daughter, Betsy, was married. Sam was a lieutenant in the Marine Corps, and Tim was a student and a midshipman down at Auburn University.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any grandchildren?

GEN MUNDY: Our first grandchild was born in 1987, July of 1987, so during that time, yes. That was a grandson, Rob Mele.

BGEN SIMMONS: As a major general, you did not receive fitness reports as such. How are major generals evaluated and is there a record of these evaluations?

GEN MUNDY: We changed some years ago, when the fitness reports were revised back in the mid-eighties, to a letter-type report on general officers, and in the case of major generals, you would get an end-of-tour report as opposed to an annual report. Brigadier generals still get a report every year. But a major general stood his last time for promotion. A lot of people don't know that, you certainly do, but many people are very surprised to learn that three- and four- star promotions are really not promotions at all, but appointments to a grade for a particular job. And so, the last time that you appear before a promotion board is for consideration for promotion to major general.

As a result, the fitness reports are of less utility. The Commandant knows who his major generals are, and he knows whether you're doing well or whether you're not doing so well and you really don't need a fitness report to tell him that. Interestingly, that I think is what General Lou Wilson used to refer to when he made you a major general, as joining the "no sweat club," because you no longer had fitness reports.

But at any rate, you get a letter report. It goes to the Commandant, or in my experience all of them would be addressed to me and would come to me, and I

would read it and usually would annotate it in some way to say I agree, this officer very clearly is capable of any job that we have for him or could easily be a three-star, whatever you would put on it. And that would guide you eventually. I'm sure that Gen Krulak would look at my annotations from last year and would understand my feelings toward the various two-stars.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your personnel file is mute on this point, there is a "pro forma" letter report from LtGen John Phillips dated 27 January 1988 stating that "your solid record of important contributions to the Corps and nation are well known by the senior leadership of the Naval Service." This letter report also says that you were a nominee for the "rank and position of lieutenant general." The report in question has a brief concurrence by LtGen Lou Buehl, then the Chief of Staff, and a penned endorsement by the Commandant, Gen Al Gray, saying, your nomination for LTGen duty as OP DEP/PPO says it all!"

Would you distinguish a little bit more for me the difference between selection for major general and appointment as a lieutenant general. Who makes the appointment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, if you back it down, the President with the advice and consent of the Senate makes the appointment of course. But that's true of a second lieutenant, you can go all the way down to that. The Secretary of the Navy actually signs the recommendation, or the nomination, if you will, for the general officer or for that matter for any officer, but it's on an individual basis for generals. And that by and large, for the selection of lieutenant generals is a matter between the Commandant and the Secretary. I think that probably we have vacillated over time from a situation in which the Commandant names who he wants to be his lieutenant generals, and the Secretary of the Navy would simply sign the piece of paper that the Commandant gave him.

More recently, and as a matter of a little bit of concern to me, the Secretary has become more involved in the Marine general officer nomination process. He has long been involved in the naming of three- and four- star admirals. And the Marine Corps was able for a number of years, I think, to maybe hold back with a little bit less scrutiny. There's no reason to. There's no concern about why we wouldn't—we certainly were not hiding anything. But we are at a point now where a Commandant can go over and recommend a slate of two or three major generals that he wants to promote to lieutenant general and can have a

very hard time getting maybe one or perhaps more of them through simply because the Secretaries have become more involved in that, and as a result, of course, their staffs are more involved. The staffs are more inclined to ask questions about routine things that the Commandant's already considered, but now he's got to go over and justify them.

At the time that I was nominated, I frankly don't know how Gen Gray did that. I know that my stock, I say this with no breast beating, but my stock with Secretary Jim Webb was pretty good. I knew him personally and had had some discussions with him that might be of interest here. So I'm not sure that Gen Gray talked to him about me, or whether he talked to Gen Gray about me, I don't know. But the Secretary of the Navy nominates.

It may be an appropriate place here to record something pertaining to the selection of the 29th Commandant, because we are moving from the Kelley tenure to General Al Gray.

Secretary of the Navy Will Ball served only a short time, and was succeeded by Jim Webb in the midst of the time-frame for the selection and nomination of General Kelley's successor. As, perhaps, are all such selection processes, this was an especially interesting one, and to my astonishment, I became rather personally, if indirectly, involved. Whether P.X. Kelley deserved it or not, during his tenure, Marine Corps senior officer leadership — not just the Commandant, but general officers in general — came under increasing criticism from some of the military reformists — notably Mr. Bill Lind — and less directly, but nonetheless measureably, from mid-grade, serving officers. There were fundamentally two three-star candidates to become the 29th Commandant — Lieutenant Generals Al Gray and Ernie Cheatham. A fairly clear perception "in the ranks" was that General Kelley favored Cheatham, and the military reformists favored Gray. Somewhere in between these two camps was an advocacy, essentially among some of the colonels, that the entire hierarchy needed to be cleared, and more junior candidate nominated — something of a repeat of the selection of David Shoup as a major general to become the 22nd Commandant over all the eligible three stars.

As he was in the process of taking office as the Secretary, together with a number of the other Headquarters generals, I received a call asking me to come over and talk with Mr. Webb. We talked for about an hour about where I thought the Corps was going, and what ideas I might have for change, and also in fairly specific terms as to who I thought was best qualified to become the next Commandant, what

their various strengths were, to which constituents they would appeal, and so forth. During the conversation, we touched on the feasibility of reaching down for a two-star, and I advised Webb that to do that would, in my view, be de-stabilizing to the Corps. Dramatic actions like that generally go over well in the Army, but the Corps would be better served by selecting from the three-star, or ACMC ranks. We concluded the discussion without anything further of significance.

A couple of weeks later, I was on leave from some pre-season maintenance of our beach cottage in North Carolina, and, our phone not yet being connected for the season, received a note delivered to me by our rental manager to call Colonel Joyhn Ripley, then the Senior Marine at the Naval Academy, and a much admired Marine and friend, as soon as possible. I went to a telephone booth beside a Shopping Center in Cape Carteret, just off Emerald Isle, and called John, who advised me excitedly that Mr. Webb was fast approaching a decision on the Commandant, that he was leaning toward clearing out the hierarchy and selecting a two-star, and that I was the candidate of choice in that scenario. I recall saying, "John, here I am standing in a phone booth beside a Piggly-Wiggly store being told that I may be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps!" At a social function in Washington a few weeks earlier, Molin Ripley, John's wife, had conveyed the same message to me: "You may be the next Commandant!", which I had promptly dismissed as a flattering statement from a good friend. At any rate, John and I talked at length from the phone booth, and I reinforced with him what I had told Webb relative to what I considered would be the de-stabilizing effect of such an action. Nonetheless, John advised, I was forewarned, and should stand by.

I returned to Washington from leave with a belly full of butterflies, which as I recall, stayed with me for several days. A few days later, on the eve of the announcement of the nominee to be the new Commandant, I received a call at home at night from another friend of long standing, a retired colonel with strong Pentagon connections who I won't mention here because I believe he would prefer not to be named. The caller excitedly advised me that the announcement was imminent, and that "It's going to happen!" I don't think I slept at all that night, or the next one. Two days later, the Secretary of Defense announced that Lieutenant General Al Gray's name had been forwarded to the White House as the nominee to become the 29th Commandant.

Whatever the sequence of events, or the accuracy of my friend's forecasts, suffice it to say that those

few weeks were a period of considerable difficulty of focus for me. When the announcement was finally made, I must admit relief, and I continued then, as I do now, to believe that a two-star pick — me, or anybody else — would have been de-stabilizing. Finally, as it seems to turn out with Commandants, Al Gray was the man for the four years that followed, and the Corps will reflect his stewardship for a long time to come.

BGEN SIMMONS: — and we're talking about the difference between selection as a major general and appointment as lieutenant general.

GEN MUNDY: I had already spoken of the appointment, and the selection as a major general, again is a normal selection board. In other words, normally a board comprised of lieutenant generals and sometimes the Assistant Commandant may preside over that board. But whoever is appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to select major generals.

The nomination of lieutenant generals, although I did that differently and we can talk about that when we get to my term as Commandant, but generally speaking was, so far as I know, the Commandant named whoever he wanted to talk to the Secretary about and that's the way it was done.

BGEN SIMMONS: We'll talk about that a little bit more when we get to that point. I think the general perception is that with the new Commandant, he gets to name his lieutenant generals, the persons that will be working most closely with him and so forth, and a lot of individual discretion goes into that.

I see that on 20 January 1988, the President— would that be Reagan or Bush?

GEN MUNDY: President Reagan.

BGEN SIMMONS: Submitted your name to the Senate for confirmation in the grade of lieutenant general. What do you remember of the confirmation process?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there was very little process beyond administrative. They did not call me to testify, for example. We started more recently in the confirmations calling I will say, unless there's specific reason to call an individual, usually a token individual is called. That means that they might have three officers nominated to be lieutenant generals at a given time, and the Senate Armed Services Committee will call one and will ask him a series of questions. I pre-

sume that that gives the Congress sort of a legitimacy in saying yes, we held a hearing and we know all these officers by record, but we did hold a hearing.

When I was nominated, there was no hearing. I know that I was nominated along with MajGen Chuck Pitman was nominated to be the DCS Aviation, and neither of us went for a hearing. But it took an awful long time. I was actually notified in mid-November I think that I had been nominated. It took, you've indicated until about the 20th of January to get that through the White House. It was the Christmas period. Things moved slowly and it took until January to get it out of the White House and then it took on into mid-April until I was confirmed by the Senate.

That's crippling. I initiated an effort, which I can't take credit for because ultimately OSD does this, and the Secretary of Defense does this, but I initiated an effort when I was Commandant to say we have got to find a way that's better to be able to move these nominations along, because we cripple the institution when we cannot get a new lieutenant general confirmed for three or four or in some cases five months.

We're in that situation in the Pacific right now. Gen Krulak is the Commandant and has been so since the 1st of July, but his successor has not yet been confirmed and can't be promoted and it's getting toward the 1st of October. That hampers the institution.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were promoted to lieutenant general and assumed the duties of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies and Operations, in mid-April. Did this interfere with John Phillip's personal plans at all? Was he sort of standing by from November to April?

GEN MUNDY: No, it did not. He left. He retired the 1st of February, and I was posted as the DCS/PP&O. The Commandant can post anybody in there he wanted to. As the Operations Deputy to the JCS, that technically should not be done. I've seen no other service put a two-star as the Operations Deputy. I think we did it more out of one, Gen Gray was new, Gen Gray did not have an awareness of that, nobody else thought about it or said anything about it. So when Phillips retired, I simply moved from OPS up the hall to his office and went to the JCS meeting the next day. So I served really February, March and half of April as a two-star, as a three-star nominee "in the tank."

The other services will generally let the Deputy Operations Deputy just hold down the billet, because in effect until you are promoted, you really are, again you're not credentialed, you don't wear the JCS badges we talked about earlier. But we did it, and

nobody said anything. So I held that. But John Phillips retired the 1st of February.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there anything else you would like to bring up about this tour?

GEN MUNDY: I don't think so. I began by saying that the Operations Division was somewhat of an enigma then and even now, because we frankly really don't have a requirement for an Operations Division. If you stop and think about it, what we know as the Command Center, which really is a Communications Center, would be better positioned were it run by the Chief of Staff, or today as we call it the Director of the Marine Corps Staff. Because it serves the senior echelons in terms of facilitating communications back and forth, in terms of ensuring that rapid reporting messages, OPREP, threes, things like that, immediately get handled 24 hours a day. So it is not so much a command center as it is a communications center.

When you get beyond that, again security forces could be anywhere, it used to be in Manpower. It could be just about anywhere you think about it. When Gen Gray—we will discuss this later I suspect—but when Gen Gray stood up the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and directed the functions that would go down there, it emaciated the Operations Division. I don't mean it was a bad move, it was a good move, but it in fact took the major responsibilities of the Operations Division and transferred it.

You mentioned the Junior Operations Deputy, I didn't say at that time, and it might be most accurate to say that probably at that time, and maybe even today, the Director of Operations more effectively serves as the Junior DCS/PP&O. That is, separating the Service half from the JCS half. Plans division would be the Operations Deputy and OPS Division would be the DCS/PP&O Deputy. It gives the Deputy Chief of Staff of PP&O two generals to be able to respond to requirements and boards and war games and things like that.

But as far as the division itself, I cannot take any credit for having done anything about it. But our Headquarters structure is still not pure today. We have never truly learned how not to be G-3s, G-4s, G-2s. A Marine still thinks like that because if you stop and think about it, everywhere else in the world except here, we are like that. Gs are as high as we go. So, it's very difficult for us to change our mindset. I know that no Commandant would probably ever want to take the bold stroke of saying let's do away with the Operations Division because it would send a signal

that somehow the Marines were not operational. That's about all I had for that session.

BGen SIMMONS: Well, I think that's probably a good place to end this session. I think it was a very good session.

SESSION 16

Duty as Operations Deputy

Assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations . . . Living at Marine Barracks, Washington . . . Adm Bill Crowe as Chairman, JCS . . . Appraisals of the other Service chiefs . . . Duties as the Operations Deputy . . . Interfacing with the JCS and the Joint Staff . . . Effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . Frank Carlucci as Secretary of Defense . . . Thoughts on some of the unified commanders . . . Some of the important issues . . . Other duties as DC/S PP&O . . . Gen Gray's Balanced Fleet Marine Force Study Group . . . Trouble in the Persian Gulf . . . Women in the Marine Security Guards . . . "Amphibious" becomes "Expeditionary" . . . Trouble in Panama . . . Visit of Marshal Akhromeyev . . . Gen Gray's vision for Quantico . . . Employment of the LAVs . . . Restructuring the FMF . . . Significance of the V-22 Osprey . . . Death of Gen Lew Walt . . . The Ollie North Affair . . . President Bush visits the Marine Barracks . . . Commissioning of the USS Wasp (LDH-1) . . . The drug war on the Mexican border . . . Transition from F-4 Phantom to F-18 Hornet . . . Intervention in Panama . . . Transfer to Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session we covered your year and a half of mid-1986 until early-1988 as Director of the Operations Division of Plans, Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

In this session we will explore your services as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations. As such you would be the Marine Corps' Operations Deputy or principal assistant to the Commandant in JCS matters. Just when did you assume these duties?

GEN MUNDY: We had discussed the fact earlier that I assumed them on 1 February 1988 with the retirement of my then boss, LtGen John Phillips. We also noted that I assumed those as a major general which is extraordinary and probably in retrospect might not have been the right way for the Marine Corps to play it but it went over all right. I was not promoted until mid-April to lieutenant general, so I really served in that capacity for about two and a half months as a two-star, while I was a designated three-star.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did we discuss whether a new set of quarters came with this position?

GEN MUNDY: Well, a new set of quarters came, but they did not come with the position. The quarters

were, at the time that I was nominated and for the period that I had been the Director of Operations theretofore, I was living in the Marine quarters at Bolling Air Force Base, 82 Westover Drive in Bolling, still occupied by a Marine today. A very good set of quarters, but this — my promotion occurred as a part of Gen Gray's initiative which was a good initiative to thin out the more senior ranks of the Marine Corps. He had asked some of the general officers to retire earlier than they might have otherwise have expected just in order to begin to move some of the younger officers up to make us comfortable, at least age-wise and perhaps time-in-grade-wise, with the other services who generally would run, oh, anywhere from four to six years younger in their promotions than most of us.

As a result of that, instead of John Phillips retiring as he normally would have, probably the next summer if he had done a two-year assignment, he retired 1 February. That meant that that thinned out a number of sets of quarters. LtGen Dick Dean, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, also retired at about — not at that same time but the next summer, as I recall, and I think I am right on that — but that freed up Quarters 2, at the Marine Barracks. Those initially were to be assigned to LtGen Lou Buehl, who was becoming the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps, but at the last minute Lou turned them down and called

me and said, "Would you like to move in?"

Of course, for any Marine, moving to Marine Barracks is like moving into Camelot. We opted for that and we moved in there in June of 1988 after I had been posted in February and promoted in April.

You asked whether these, I think, were the traditional quarters of the PP&O. As a matter of fact they were not. They had been occupied by LtGen D'Wayne Gray when he was Chief of Staff. I know that LtGen Bill Fitch had had them when he was Aviation, LtGen Bob Barrow when he was Manpower. There was not a traditional PP&O set of quarters.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there any operational convenience of the commandant having his operations deputy at Marine Barracks or is the geography unimportant?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think probably the geography is unimportant in terms of a go/no go situation because you do most of your business by telephone and most of it by secure phone which can be installed anywhere, much easier to do it in government quarters but it could be done in private quarters as well. But as a practical matter, it was very useful to me as the Commandant to be able to wander out my back yard and see somebody walking their dog or to give a quick call over and say, "Can I come over to see you?" or "Can you come see me?" and two minutes later you could sit down and talk about something. There is — probably depending upon the personality of the Commandant — when Gen Gray was the Commandant, he did not seek us during time out. I was in the quarters there, it was myself and LtGen John Hudson, who was Manpower, and I know that Gen Gray — I do not remember any occasion when he called me to come over or when he came over or when we met and discussed something out in the garden. I did that several times but I think it is dependent upon the Commandant's personality.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did your JCS duties occupy the major part of your time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I would say yes to that because those were still the days when the JCS met on something of a "pro forma" rather than always a substantive basis. We had a policy whereby the Chiefs and the Operations Deputy met by a schedule, at least, by a plan three times a week. There still are those three times although they are different hours with Gen Shalikashvili's arrival. In those days we were sched-

uled to meet three times a week and from time to time we would meet just for the sake of having a meeting.

We heard an enormous number of briefings that probably as I would describe them to you you would say that is very important, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the various agencies like that that would come in and kind of give you their, what we used to call "I'm doing just fine" briefings, "Here's where we are. We are making progress. We made more money last year. We are making more maps this year than we did last." and so on. They were not really briefings that required the Service operations deputies and certainly not the Chiefs to sit down and undergo an hour or so of this.

They were, at that time as I recall, the agencies all came in and gave a semi-annual briefing. That has now been slipped to an annual at best, some times not at all depending upon the interest of the Chiefs or a mission that might be going on. So, we met a lot and that took a lot of time.

To say — it would be hard for me to break out specifically and say that the majority of my time, I would say that that is not understood well by many, of course, the primary duty of not only the Commandant but of the Operations Deputy is the JCS matters so if it took all of your time you would be doing your duty if you did nothing at the Service level, that is why we have an Assistant Commandant. At least implicit in law is that he should run the day to day operations of the Marine Corps and the Commandant should focus on JCS matters.

It did consume a lot of time. We were also involved, as I think maybe we will talk later, in some fairly meaty issues having to do with the pending end of the Cold War and with arms control and that sort of thing so it took a lot of time.

BGEN SIMMONS: At least your weekly schedule had to take into account these three possible meetings, everything else sort of was scheduled around those three benchmarks.

GEN MUNDY: You framed around those as did the Chiefs and as do the Chiefs today. The chairman gives a call and says, "I need to get together at 1700 tonight," then you, to use the old Marine Corps terms, you stop what you are doing and you appear at 1700, you or the Assistant Commandant or the Vice Chiefs depending on who is in town but it is obligatory for the Chiefs of Service if they are in town and for the Operations Deputies if they are in town to attend the meetings when called on however short notice.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

GEN MUNDY: Adm Bill Crowe, now the Ambassador to the Court of St. James but then the Chairman.

BGEN SIMMONS: How would you characterize him as Chairman?

GEN MUNDY: A very thoughtful and intelligent man with a dumb-like-a-fox approach. He enjoyed very much, he is a Sooner, he is from Oklahoma, he enjoyed very much being the Oklahoma country boy, the hayseed, the redneck just come to town, whatever it was, and profess a lack of understanding of all this sophisticated Washington style life but he was sharp and in that cover a very intelligent, very insightful man. He was persuasive, well spoken.

He, I thought, used the Chiefs very well in the sense that he would never come in and decree that here was an issue and here was how it was going to be handled but he would always seek their advice, seek their counsel and often times at great length. Many times he would have already, it was very clear as you sat there taking notes, which the Operations Deputies generally do in those meetings — OpsDepts don't talk.

When the Chiefs are meeting the Chiefs talk and the Operations Deputies are really high-priced note takers but it is their job of course to record that and to get the substance out of that and then with or without consultation with their Service Chief to go back and initiate whatever actions are required of the staff, debrief, get the Manpower Department moving or get the Aviation Department moving or what have you.

We listened a lot. As you sat and listened you could perceive that some times Adm Crowe already had it made up when he walked in, but he had a masterful way of allowing everybody to feel like they had contributed to the solution. Then when he came out and said, "Okay, as I understand it, we will go this way," you would sit there and say, "Well, that is not really what they said," but they all thought they had contributed. He was very good.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you said, Gen Gray was the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Who were the other Service Chiefs at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Gen Carl Vuono was the Army Chief of Staff, Gen Larry Welch was the Air Force Chief of Staff, Adm Carl Trost was the Chief of Naval Operations. Of course, those changed. Vuono and

Gray changed at the same time, without rhyme or reason because simply I guess whoever retired at some point or other the Army and Marine Corps turned over in the same month each four years while the Air Force and the Navy, again not by design, turned over in that month, they are a little off that stride now.

Gen Welch retired mid-stream two years into Gen Gray's tenure and Gen Mike Dugan came into relieve him and then Adm Trost retired and, of course, Adm Frank Kelso came into be the CNO.

BGEN SIMMONS: Going back to the original of the JCS at that time, how would you describe the relationships among these several persons? Your own perceptions?

GEN MUNDY: Let me do that, let me first of all inject because sometimes it is forgotten. In fact, we indeed to this date still forget we also had a Vice Chairman, Gen Robert T. Herres, Air Force officer who was the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs after Goldwater/Nichols.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very important.

GEN MUNDY: It is important because as you will recall, or as history will record I think there was great resistance to having a Vice Chairman to begin with among the Chiefs. Gen Paul X. Kelley fought that battle hard and long as did some of the other Service Chiefs but nonetheless Goldwater/Nichols included a Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman, to the absolute ire of every Service Chief was made to be the second senior officer. The Service Chiefs, I think, felt this to be a genuine put down because of the fact that a vice is a second and so even if it is the Chairman's vice, to have elevated him in seniority over the Service Chiefs was really a point of irritation.

That probably has moderated a bit but very frankly there still is within that organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from time to time you can see the Service Chiefs twist in their seat a little bit when the Vice Chairman gets a bit too uppity, if you will.

So, a good Vice Chairman realizing that sensitivity as in the case of Adm Bill Owens, I think Bill Owens always realized that it was necessary for him to be properly attentive to in most cases the seniority of the Chiefs, at least in time and grade and time of appointment over him. He was always a little bit, he would defer to the Chiefs. Whatever the case, that is a soliloquy, I guess, on the Vice Chairman.

You ask about the personalities and the interface among them. A bit strained. Not at all as collegial as

it was on my watch. Has nothing to do with me I think but it was simply the nature of the Chairman and of the Chiefs themselves.

If you remember Gen Gray who did magnificent things for the Corps and will go down, really I think recorded in terms of the things that he accomplished and the orientation that he put the Marine Corps back on as one of the greatest Commandants. He was outspoken and when he came in as the Commandant we irritated the Army a bit through the good insistence that he made that in effect we were the nation's expeditionary force. He and Gen Vuono, while in the collegiality of the moment, in other words back slapping and exchanging quips that is characteristic of the Chiefs but there was a little strain there.

The CNO, Adm Trost at the time, was a charming and congenial man, but very clearly, from their days together down in the Atlantic Fleet when Adm Trost was CinCLantFlt and Gen Gray was CGFMFLant, there was not a warm marriage there. There had been some friction over Navy control of operating funds, as I recall. Adm Trost had a background as a Navy programmer, and that tends to taint their view forever toward the Marine Corps. Senior Navy officers with such a background tend to hold the philosophy that the Navy somehow pays for the Marine Corps. This, in my judgment, is ill and wrong and we can talk further about this philosophy later.

Adm Trost would frequently offer comments like, "Well, the Marines are great but they sure do cost me a lot of money," things like that that were just irritating. Gen Gray, I think, probably barbed him back.

Gen Welch was a very intelligent man, a man of a fairly certainly dry wit but a fairly serious man most of the time. I think that he probably — everybody got along pretty well with him. But the Chiefs, when you walked in the room you could feel most of the time that there was something of an air of electricity, that was there was a little tension among them and particularly if Gen Herres was presiding instead of Adm Crowe. Crowe brought the old boy, the laugh, the "How's it going, Al? How's it going, Carl?" type of thing to the tank but they did not like the Vice Chairman. It had maybe not so much to do with Gen Herres himself who was a fairly nice man but they did not like the Vice Chairman being senior so when he was presiding it was pretty tense.

BGEN SIMMONS: And you say this was an effect of the Goldwater/Nichols Act. The Goldwater/Nichols Act was in process of being fully implemented at this time, you were beginning to feel the effects and this was one of the effects, the quasi-resentment over the

Vice Chairman. Can you think of any other effects of the Goldwater Act taking place about that time?

GEN MUNDY: Not under Adm Crowe. Adm Crowe being the "bridge" Chairman, I will use that term without having really thought it in advance but I would use it probably calling him the "bridge" rather than the transition. I think Gen Powell was the transition to the full effects of Goldwater/Nichols. Adm Crowe having come in under the old system, if you will, being a product of the old system, did not change much, nor did the Joint Staff. We had Gen Robert W. Riscassi at the time who was the Director of the Joint Staff. Bob had come off the Army staff, was promoted out of the directorship and became the Vice Chief of the Army. He, I think, had an understanding of the way it had formerly been done.

The way it had formerly been done was not all bad. I mean, this is not to say that they were not men of appreciation of the new authority vested in them but the fact was that they realized that it had worked pretty well before. There was not much change on Adm Crowe's watch. He indeed consulted, as I have talked about earlier, extensively, I think, with the Chiefs, involved them, would share his dilemmas in the arms control issues, for example, "We need to get our hands around this. I do not understand it all so I am looking to you all to help me get a handle on this."

I think that during Adm Crowe's watch he represented the old school of the Chairman, carrying forth positions that had been very clearly agreed to and supported by all of the Chiefs in collective meeting. I do not mean that would suggest that somehow or other that has changed dramatically. It has changed but it has not changed by virtue of the intent, I think, of either Gens Powell or Shalikashvili to ignore that procedure. We began to drift off the mark a little bit but again that is later in my watch and we can talk about that, when I was the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who are some of the senior Marine officers on the Joint Staff at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The two that I remember, of course MajGen John Grinalds had become the Deputy J-8. J-8 was a new creation in the Joint Staff that occurred about 1987. It was the agency that put together in effect the resource and budgeting assessment agency and increasingly now it is more than just an assessment agency, though it does that but it truly influences the way the resources are spent and indeed, arguably, perhaps the way the resources are allocated among the Services. So that was just coming to be.

John Grinalds was the right man to go into that. He was a brigadier when he went in. He was then promoted to major general and Adm Crowe was so high on him, he thought that John Grinalds, was the salt of the earth. Adm Crowe, when he was selected for promotion, wanted to keep him as the J-8 so John moved from a Deputy to the J-8.

The other on the Chairman's staff group was then Col Tom Wilkerson who is today MajGen Tom Wilkerson, one of the brightest minds that we have in the Marine Corps in terms of strategic thought. Tom Wilkerson probably as a colonel certainly personally wrote Adm Crowe's Roles and Missions Report which was while it was not claimed because everybody expects a Roles and Missions Report to either do away with somebody or dramatically change something, Tom Wilkerson wrote that document so he was a very very influential and strong being on the Joint Staff at that time. Those are the two pre-eminent ones that I recall.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's go into some detail on the JCS process. How did an item get on the JCS agenda?

GEN MUNDY: Well, several ways. That is essentially the Director's job, the Director of the Joint Staff is the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff. His opposite number are the Service Operations Deputies. As you have mentioned earlier in one of the early questions, the Operation's Deputy of each service is truly in function and as viewed by the joint side of the house is the Chief of Staff of that service for joint matters. That means that most people, for example when Gen Gray came in he did not, I think, fully appreciate that. I worked hard to help him understand that but his perception was that the DCS/PP&O was essentially the G-3 and therefore that you saw to operations matters.

I do not think he understood that in the joint arena that it was the operations deputy who signed even the manpower issues or the logistics issues or the fiscal issues, whatever it was, and the authority in the joint staff for all service operations, not just tactical operations but for nominations of general and flag officers for joint ceremonies honoring the Secretary of Defense of whatever it is that the OpsDep is the chief of staff for that.

We had inherently in the staff then a little bit of geeing and hawing because we had LtGen Lou Beuhl, himself a very strong personality and a very experienced chief of staff, a magnificent officer, Lou would keep trying to wrench from me, for example, the authority of "I'm the Chief of Staff, I'll sign this." I

would say, "No, Lou, very frankly the check will bounce. Your signature is not recognized over there." We stretched back and forth.

Now, I have used too many words to say then that the agenda is the Director's function as it would be any chief of staff's function to more or less identify the issues that would want to go to the commander's attention or that he would want to bring there.

Any service chief can request that an issue be addressed by the Chiefs. There is a process that we can talk a little bit more at different echelons where issues are handled but in effect even an operations deputy can formally request that the Chiefs consciously address a particular issue if that Service has enough interest and belief that it should go to the Chiefs' level. So, an item can get on in that fashion. The Secretary of Defense can request a briefing on some operation plan or on arms control or on a pay matter or on anything else.

BGEN SIMMONS: Or the unified commanders.

GEN MUNDY: The unified commanders could, I suppose at that time — well, I would have to say definitely at that time that the unified commanders could bring an issue. If, for example, as we were planning the Operation Just Cause in Panama or as we were planning operations in the Gulf, a unified commander could bring his plan in and brief it to the Chiefs but more normally he would be asked to come in. The Director would say to the OpsDepts, "You know, I think we have got some fairly — things are tightening up in Panama, I think we need to get the Chiefs up on the step as to what the plan is."

Now, the operations deputies would normally have worked in exhaustive detail through line in, line out with the plan and reviewing the plan and ensuring that it was, at least from our standpoint, in balance. From time to time one of us would say or the Director would say, "I think we better get the Chiefs up." I have asked Gen Crist to come up and brief. So you would go back and tell your boss to be sure and try to be in town on Tuesday because it would be an important issue. More normally the Director controlled the agenda.

BGEN SIMMONS: The JCS has its own lexicon or grouping of the terms, jargon. Were the terms "flimsy", "purple", "corrigendum", "red stripe" used at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Not at that time. When I was a colonel, a plans officer, as we talked in the earlier dis-

cussion, the JCS system was, and you have described it, to ensure that JCS actions would be recognized apart from any service or even OSD action. We used long paper, you used legal size paper and it came in different colors as you have suggested. A “flimsy,” for example, was a white paper and it was an action officer level document. Just for example, let’s have a review of an operation plan that is sent in by a unified commander, the action officers would pour over it and would usually tear it apart and wordsmith and change it and everybody’s — and the Marines would grow from a MEU to a MEF and the Army would go from a brigade to a division or whatever we sought to do. I say this with some humor but it was fact.

The joint process was in part ensuring that each Service had a place at the table. That was the flimsy. The flimsy when the action officers could agree on it the flimsy would then turn “buff” colored. It would come back again exactly but that was a planner level, now colonels were going to deal with it.

Once the buff had been approved at the colonels’ level then it would turn “green.” Green meant that that ordinarily went either to the deputy operations deputy, two-star officers, to the operations deputy, three-star officers or to the Chiefs depending on the issue. So, assume, for example, that after the planners had turned it from buff to green it would go either to the two- or three-star level and in many cases would be “voted off” there. The two stars would concur in it and then there would be a Director of Joint Staff, a DJSM as we call it, Director of the Joint Staff Memorandum, that would then come out and say that in their meeting on such and such a date the deputy operations deputies approved CinCent’s O Plan 1011, now that is not a good example because that would not have been — that was a significant enough matter it would come at least to the OpsDepts for the OpsDepts approval.

Once it had been approved then in the green it was then “red striped” and it literally had a candy stripe around it so that you knew that this was a final Joint Chiefs of Staff action. That was the rather laborious but very functional, frankly, very functional system that I had known as a colonel.

When I returned to be the Operations Deputy, that system had faded somewhat. We used regular sized paper, we did not go for the long paper and the process had modified for simplicity to be — I mean things were printed on white paper. I think we had, we may have had green still around but I know that red stripe was no longer done even though we, the old school, would refer to a red stripe meaning that’s a done deal or “purple.” Purple was the term used to

non-concur. So at a non-concurrence level, at any level to include the Chief of Service level you referred to “purpling” a paper. If the Marine Corps did not agree with a particular issue then some level, the operations deputy, for example, could issue and could sign in the Service Chief’s name a non-concurrence and that was called a “purpling” the paper even though it was not colored purple paper, it was purpled.

BGEN SIMMONS: This in itself might have been a side effect of the Goldwater/Nichols Act, simplification of the structure and centralization rather than decentralization of a decision making process. Would you say that at this time the Service Chiefs were still in the decision loop?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, very much so. As I talked earlier, in Adm Crowe’s bridging of the Goldwater/Nichols they were very much in the decision. Just without amplification I would say yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: And we have already discussed that there was a process, a sort of set of reducing rings that operated so as to clear the agenda early on so that very few papers or issues reached the level of the Service Chiefs. The operations deputy sort of sat on top of this process. I think you really described this. You may have something you want to add to it.

GEN MUNDY: No. I think, as we discussed, I think that is about all that I can...

BGEN SIMMONS: And who were the other service operation deputies at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Service operations deputies almost without exception moved very rapidly through that position and onto a four-star position. In most cases, service operation deputies other than the Marine Corps would be there for a year, sometimes less than that or at a maximum 15 months or 16 months and then would be promoted. It was sort of a, if you will, a grooming assignment for your movement to become a CinC or to become the, in the case of Gen Riscassi, I mentioned, the Vice Chief of the Army or to go on to four-stars fleet commander or something like that, so for that reason I will mention many names.

When I arrived, Norm Schwarzkopf, LtGen Norm Schwarzkopf was the Army Operations Deputy. VAdm Hank Mustin, “Hammerin Hank Mustin”, was the Navy Operations Deputy. He did not go on to four-stars but he was the only one. Gen Mike Dugan was just incoming as the Air Force Operations

Deputy, we came in essentially at the same time. Mike, of course, went onto be the Commander of European Air Forces and then came back to be the not so successful Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I mentioned Gen Bob Riscassi who went onto become the Vice Chief of the Army and then the U.S. Commander in Chief in Korea before retiring.

They were followed, to continue this, by LtGen John Foss who was the Army Operations Deputy. He was there for about a year and advanced to four stars and went to TraDoc and then LtGen Gordon Sullivan came in as the Army Operations Deputy. I was there in this billet for about two years and four or five months or whatever that equates to but I spent an extraordinarily long time. I would say, no acclaim to me, the fact that I could not get out of there, but I was probably the longest serving operations deputy maybe over a long period of time.

Mustin was followed by VAdm Chuck Larson who was in turn followed by VAdm Barney Kelly. Both went onto be CinCPacFlt and of course Larson retired as CinCPac and was recalled to be the Superintendent of the Naval Academy where he is today.

Dugan was the Air Force OpsDep when I got there.

We served together for about a year. He was promoted and then he was followed by LtGen Jimmy Adams. An interesting story here is that Jim Adams and I were commissioned at Auburn on the same day but never knew each other until we were lieutenant generals. His bio came around when he was being sent in to be the Air Force OpsDep and I saw, "Auburn University, 7 June 1957." We must have been there together and sure enough we were. Interestingly, Jimmy Adams lives 50 yards from my backdoor right now. We both retired and settled in the same area.

Gen Riscassi was followed by LtGen H.T. Johnson, later to become the Transportation Command and Johnson in turn was followed by LtGen Mike Carns, later to become the Director of the Joint Staff and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

So, there were a whole flock of names. As I said, with the exception of VAdm Mustin which was unusual because usually the Navy players went on to four-stars, OpsDep was about a year holding pattern and then you went on to four stars. It took me longer but those were my counterparts, some very notable names.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very notable. Quite a string of illuminaries. How often did you meet with these individuals face-to-face?

GEN MUNDY: We would usually see each other a couple of times a week. You were not locked into town and you could travel and most of us did to keep our hand, if you will, on the pulse of the Service, what our Services were doing out there. Some times you would be gone for a week or 10 days on a road trip but if you were in town as a general rule you would see each other two, some times three times a week. I do not think very often much more than that even in times of strife, if you will, did we see each other more than three times a week.

BGEN SIMMONS: And these meetings would ordinarily take place "in the tank?"

GEN MUNDY: They did. All of the meetings at the flag and general officer level, that is the deputy OpsDeps, OpsDeps and Chiefs meet "in the tank" although there is in the Pentagon an Operations Deputy Conference Room, the ODCR, up on the next level. That really is almost a war or conflict meeting space. It is a room that is much more of a command center. In other words, you sit around a horseshoe table, the screens at the end of the room light up. You are in direct voice communications with the NMCC, National Military Command Center. So, if a crisis is going on you would do much better to sit in the ODCR and some times the Chiefs did that, than you would to go down into "the tank" which was in effect simply a conference room. Communications would be to holler out the door and ask somebody to come in.

BGEN SIMMONS: Hollywood idea of "the tank," of course, is a super technically advanced room where Chiefs are sitting and they are pressing buttons and they are seeing screens and so on. That is not so.

GEN MUNDY: No, that is not so. "The tank," also known as the "gold room", came to be called "the tank" — it is called the "gold room" because it has just been traditionally decorated in some form of gold. It is very handsome, like a board of directors conference room, that is what it amounts to. The chairs are extraordinarily comfortable and designed for being able to sit for a long time without your feet ever going to sleep or without getting a kink in your back. It is a very congenial thing with two screens at the end of the room on which briefings can be given but that is handled in the projection room behind it. That is not something that you would bring in in some automated sense out of the National Military Command Center which is the room that you describe where

walls light up and you can put up any map up anywhere that you want and talk directly to a CinC and get him — I mean there is a lot of sophistication at command and control in the Pentagon.

But “the tank” came to be known as “The Tank” when the Chiefs met in World War II when the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to be. They met in a room that was, for security reasons you went down in a basement and as you walked into this room you went through something of a tunnel. It was like an oil tank or something like that and they used to refer to “going into the Tank” in order to get into the conference room where they met. It has been referred to ever since as “The Tank.”

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the Secretary of Defense at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Frank Carlucci.

BGEN SIMMONS: How frequently did the Chiefs meet with him?

GEN MUNDY: Not too frequently, certainly not as frequently as with Secretary Perry in this day and time. I can think of oh, during the time that he was there remember that there was an election, of course, and then Secretary Cheney came in as the Secretary of Defense about midway or less than midway through my watch. I remember Secretary Carlucci being in perhaps three or maybe four times but not often. To be very candid with you, in my judgement, not very substantively, it was more a “pro forma” the Chiefs had met with the SecDef and he would come and Adm Crowe would say, “We have a briefing for you,” usually in those days on arms control.

He would listen to the briefing and then he would usually recount something that had gone on in his meeting with the President or meeting with the other NSC principals or something like that or usually more often than not it was political. Goldwater/Nichols was still going around. We were still trying to come to grips with many of the impossibilities of Goldwater/Nichols even though it had many good factors, there were some things that you simply could not do.

We could not assign officers and educate them in the way, at least initially, that the framers of Goldwater/Nichols would have or no one would ever command a ship, everybody would always be off in some school or on joint staff somewhere. That was very difficult to come to grips with. I do not know that we have mastered it yet but the Chiefs and the

Chiefs with their political leadership spent a lot of time talking about the activities of the Congress and the persuasions of the Congress over the management of the military.

BGEN SIMMONS: How large a staff did you have to support you in these JCS matters?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had about 60 officers and 35 enlisted in the PP&O Department, it was about 100 person staff with the bulk of those on the Operations Division side of the house but the Plans Division, one of the strengths probably of the Marine staff was that it was relatively small. We organized a little bit differently than did the other Service positions. As a result of that most of the plans officers, the 30 or so colonels, lieutenant colonels and occasionally a major, that worked in the plans of the joint plans business were generally knowledgeable of all the issues.

A Marine planner who would go to a meeting was not in all cases quite as tunnel-visioned as some of his other service counterparts who only worked arms control issues. We might work arms control issues but just because of the size of the organization we also knew that this arms control issue impacted perhaps on conventional force levels in Europe or something like that another branch would be working. There was great interplay. It was a superb organization when I was there as a Plans Officer. Again, this sounds rather an egotistical statement but the cream of the crop were put there so you were dealing with some of the best and brightest that the Marine Corps had. It was really a first-class team and there was a very fine collegiality, a “Boys Town” atmosphere. People would sit down on thumbtacks and all that sort of thing because of the misery of the working hours. It was often 12 and 14 hours a day and the tensions and strains.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of these individuals?

GEN MUNDY: Well, during the time that I was there my deputy when I became ...

BGEN SIMMONS: ... working for you at this time?

GEN MUNDY: And I had mentioned that BGen Mike Sheridan was my Deputy when I went in. He was there for several months. I came in in February, as we discussed, and Mike retired that summer, as I recall. I do not remember the month but we would have been there maybe six months or so. He was fol-

lowed by BGen Duane Wills, “Bash Wills,” as we came to know him. He is a retired lieutenant general today.

My Director of Operations was initially BGen Charlie Wilhelm and then followed by BGen and subsequently MajGen John Hopkins. Those were the generals that I had. Again, if you know those personalities and as history will I think pick up on them, those were some real long-ball hitters and they were seconded by colonels who moved in and out of that pack that were of equal caliber with them. I really had a first-string team.

BGEN SIMMONS: You mentioned earlier, we discussed briefly earlier that unified commanders could be summoned and would some times ask to come and appear before the Chiefs. Who were some of these unified commanders and what were their concerns?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the ones that immediately come to mind, Gen John Galvin was SacEur, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, his NATO hat had been the Commander and Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe. Gen George Crist followed shortly, as I mentioned, by Norm Schwarzkopf was the U.S. Commander in Chief in the Central Command. Adm Lee Baggett was down at the Atlantic Command and — I have lost the name here of the CinCPac at the time, his name illudes me for the moment. Those were the principle unified commanders.

Altogether different relationship than exists today with the unified commanders. Number one, the Chiefs, I do not recall, although there were annual Chairmen, Chiefs and CinCs conferences, I frankly can remember only one and it was done magnificently. We all boarded airplanes and flew off to Pensacola and stayed in the BOQ and War Gamed; brought in Walter Cronkite and Mike Wallace and people like that and let them see the Chiefs in action.

That was a dramatic, the Chiefs and the CinCs in action, all sitting around the table we had a war game that simulated the threat of nuclear strike on the United States. They benched it with a number of Senators and Congressmen and Mike Wallace of “60 Minutes” and Walter Cronkite and some personalities of that sort who just sat silently or sat in the back and watched the Chiefs in action and were, as any American would be, mightily impressed with the degree of deliberation and the anguish and the efforts of the Chiefs to avoid, contrary to many people’s opinions that the Chiefs would be sitting there yelling, “Hit the red button! shoot, shoot, shoot.” To the contrary, the uniformed military are usually the most cau-

tious at those sorts of things.

At any rate, that was one such meeting. More routinely, the unified commanders were kept relatively at arms distance. Interestingly, in those days even though Goldwater/Nichols had saluted the CinCs as, I think very candidly perhaps, my own judgement, maybe heralded them a little too much, but the CinCs very clearly were responsive to the Service Chiefs, meaning, I mean they were responsive to the Joint Chiefs and certainly to the Chairman but when Adm Crowe, for example, would say something like, “We need to do something in Europe. We need to get to John Galvin and get something done,” he would more ordinarily than not look at Gen Vuono and Vuono would say, “I’ll talk to John and I’ll get that through.” If you were an Army CinC you sort of responded to the Army Chief of Staff in his Joint Chief hat.

BGEN SIMMONS: Kind of an invisible executive agency arrangement.

GEN MUNDY: Exactly. There was no question, this may have been more dominant in the case of the Navy than in the other services whereby any time something came up with CinCPac or CinCLant, who were both Navy admirals, the Chairman would almost consistently defer to the CNO, Carl Trost, “How about you give Lee Baggett a call and tell him such and such?”

That struck me because very frankly the image that many had that the Chiefs somehow were, I mean that the CinCs, were responsive to the Secretary and the Chairman, certainly they were but I guess they knew who turned in their accounts to Kansas City, and I guess they knew who they would depend upon for their next assignment, if any. So, the Service Chiefs were very heavy players.

To some degree today to this time that continues. You find that probably today find it most pronounced in the Army and the Navy. As the Commandant I never presumed, though I would from time to time speak to Gen Hoar when he was at CentCom we would speak as friends but I never presumed to call him, Joe Hoar, and lobby Marine Corps positions with him or Jack Sheehan who is now down at LantCom. I saluted that they were now joint officers and that they responded to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were some of the important issues that were being considered by the JCS at this time? You have mentioned arms control, mentioned Panama coming up on the horizon. These

things seem to be endemic to the agenda of arms control, it comes and continues year after year.

GEN MUNDY: I would say that at that particular stage, arms control was the dominant issue because remember we were then fumbling around with the START II Treaty, still are. We were moving beyond the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We were dealing with limitations on conventional forces in Europe.

We still had the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which meant you had nations, if you exercised with more than 25,000 troops you had to give notice so people did not start breaking out their nuclear weapons.

In the Pacific we were concerned about arms control and negotiation matters out there on force levels. Remember that is when Nunn/Warner Agreement came to be passed in the Pacific. That limited the numbers of forces that we could have out there. So, now you have this accounting process whereby if the Marines moved an extra company out there it kicked the ceiling up by 100 and then we had to either offset that or the Army had to take out 100, all sorts of things like that that were really — the things that we dealt with were almost, in those days, of bean counting deliberation, how many nuclear warheads we had, how many the Russians had. That still goes on.

Certainly the Persian Gulf, the initial — our very short war with Iran over the blockading of the Persian Gulf took place and Panama came up at that particular time. Those were more, though they were enduring in Panama in particular, as we dealt with Gen Noriega, that was a long drawn out period of time over which that occurred and then you flash up and have a shooting conflict for a few days and then it is all over.

We dealt with hearing the — lost my term here, that is something, I am daydreaming. The SIOP, Strategic Integrated Operations Plan, which was the plan for the targets that would be shot if we had to engage in nuclear war, that consumed a lot of time because CinCSAC the Strategic Air Command, now STRACOM, would come in and would brief the retargeting. We would have various targets set and so on and that was rather tortuous. Those were the sorts of things that principally we found ourselves dealing with in addition to the routine review of operations plans.

In Goldwater/Nichols, the law mandated each Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would every two years, or at least on his watch, turn in a report on the roles and missions of the Armed Forces. So, for the latter stages of Adm Crowe's watch we got into roles and

missions issues, though there was not much issue. Remember, as I mentioned, Col Tom Wilkerson was really the architect of that. Those were the sorts of things that we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Beyond your JCS duties what other duties fell within your scope as DCS/PP&O?

GEN MUNDY: Well, on the operations side, what we have been talking about principally would be the Plans and Policies side. Policies, again, for clarity and understanding here, the Operations Deputy really did not have much to do with internal Marine Corps policies. That is to say I was not the policy man for manpower policy, for example. That is vested in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs or for Reserve Policy. Policies generally dealt with the national policy.

Now, on the operations side the duties that we discussed more or less during my days as the Director of Operations were things that I was still involved in and regrettably though it was fine for me but probably one of the worst things that can happen is for an individual to move up from one job to the next because you never really turn loose of the other job.

When Charlie Wilhelm or John Hopkins were in the operations side of the house I was still, because of the Moscow MSG crisis and what not, I was probably still the most knowledgeable of the two of us or the three of us on the matters dealing with security forces. I had been around when we reorganized Marine Corps Security Forces. I had been through the MSG crisis with the State Department so I still probably had an upper hand on their knowledge of things like that.

We were dealing — during that time I would say that the thing beyond the joint matters that consumed most of my focus was in implementing or attempting to implement or be a part of the implementation team of several initiatives that Gen Gray had kicked off. I think we will speak of those a little bit later here.

Whether we set out to do it or not, we were reorganizing the Headquarters by virtue of some of the Gray initiatives though that was not the purpose of it, that was not the intent. It was very difficult because in at least a couple of the initiatives they have turned out to be wonderful but in a couple of initiatives we had in effect just yanked a chunk of the body out and there were bleeding arteries and ligaments hanging loose and so on so to speak in the Headquarters. Trying to tighten that up and figure out who did what and when was a major part that all of the DCSs focused on during my watch.

BGEN SIMMONS: In January 1988 Gen Gray convened a study group to develop proposed balanced Marine force total structure. This study was to be in the mold of early structure boards such as the Shepherd Board in 1946, the Hunt Board in 1950, the Hogaboom Board of 1957 and the Haynes Board of 1976. As we discussed earlier you were an important junior member of the Haynes Board. Who chaired this new board? What was your role, if any?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the origins of this, though it might have been done otherwise, go back a ways. When Gen Kelley was still the Commandant, I would say in the last four or five months that he was the Commandant and I was the Director of Operations I was reading the tea leaves that I could see in the future. One, it was fairly apparent that the Soviet empire was beginning to at least develop fissures at that point.

I believed that we needed to focus the Marine Corps more on being a crisis response force than to continue, what I would say the peak of the Cold War, planning and structuring and equipping that I had known as a colonel when I was in the Plans Division in which we were envisioning a Marine Corps that would grow heavier and would have more tanks and would be a European Theater warfighting entity. I guess that the word "crisis response" kept, from wherever or whatever purpose, kept creeping into my thoughts more so than warfighting because it became increasingly doubtful to me that we were going to fight a war and that if we continued to structure the Marine Corps to be a heavy war fighting force that we were going to maybe get too heavy or maybe were. Many believed that we were too heavy at that time.

I had talked with Gen Phillips and eventually authored a memo which I gave to him to send on up to the Commandant suggesting that a great thing that any Commandant might do would be to convene a structured study group such as Gen Gray did a few months later and that that Commandant, Gen Kelley in this case, could convene that group but let them do their work and that their focal point would be at the conclusion of his tenure, he would then be able to hand to the new Commandant a product that might be flawed or that we might not want to do or that the new Commandant might not like but nonetheless it would give him a well- thought out study regarding the force structure, the purpose, the organization, the direction of the Marine Corps and would enable him then to just step off and say, "Okay, I like it. Let's get on with implementing it." or "Let's talk about this. Let's take that out."

Well, that kind of fell on deaf ears and did not — I think it went on up to Gen Kelley but nothing came of it. So, when Gen Gray came in, after he had been there a couple of months, I again triggered Gen Phillips to send this memorandum back up to Gen Gray, who liked it. Gen Gray liked very much the idea of doing studies and that sort of thing all the time. Gen Gray liked it and actually more or less implemented it exactly as it had been proposed.

Now, you ask who was in charge. I think history should accurately record this, generally speaking during Gen Gray's tenure as Commandant, Gen Gray was in charge. He wanted it that way and so many of the things that we did, most of the things that we did, Gen Gray sat as the hub — if you think of a wheel, Gen Gray was the hub of the wheel. You would say should it be different? Well, maybe it should have been.

So, when we convened this study group it was composed of some of our absolutely best and brightest colonels and lieutenant colonels and it kept growing. My thought had been a fairly small organization, probably a dozen people or something like that to do this but it kept — the recon captain would come in and then some other specialty would come in and then the maneuverist, Bill Lind, would have some ideas as to somebody who ought to be on it. Pretty soon it grew to be a fairly weighty organization with a number of junior officers on it. Gen Gray wanted that and I think that was, in hindsight, that was probably a good idea.

He wanted the junior officers in the Marine Corps to feel that they were participants in prescribing the future of the Marine Corps as well as the seniors. Essentially it was a colonels-heavy outfit. As Gen Gray was wanted to do, whether he did it by intent, sometimes he did I think, or whether it just happened that way, there really was nobody in charge and that caused a good bit of wrenching among the staff and Quantico. Then- MajGen Bill Etnyre who was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs said that R&P should preside over this. As PP&O I thought I should preside over it and Gen Ernie Cook who was down at Quantico and he thought that it was being done at Quantico and by gosh if it was on Quantico soil it was going to be his, then you have the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps thinking that he somehow or other had some oversight of this, then Gen Joe Wendt became the Assistant Commandant and he figured he ought to be on top of it.

As flawed as it may sound, the fact is that there was not anybody in charge of this and as a result of that there developed some fissures or cracks between the staff and Quantico. Quantico was becoming Marine

Corps Combat Development Command. We were not sure who was going to do what down there. The officers had all been ripped out of all of our hives to send down there. We had gaping wounds. It was a time of great turmoil.

I probably described more the environment than I have the specific question on the board. My role then became one of — anytime I wanted to drive down to Quantico and meet with the study group that was there I could do that. If the Commandant was going down I tried initially to shadow that, to be on hand when the Commandant was there as did most of the staff principals.

Eventually, I don't know, it just became so independent of any of the senior oversight, less again I think Gen Ernie Cook because he was at Quantico more or less was the resident lieutenant general and was probably as much in charge of it as anybody else.

You had a number of players that kind of wended their way in and out of that.

The results were not all bad. It was pretty good. What I had proposed to both Gen Kelley and Gen Gray and Gen Gray grabbed it like a hot iron, although in a little bit different context than I had intended, but I said this study group should not report out through the layerings of the staff that heretofore have served only, my experience with the Haynes Board, when we finished the Haynes Board and then we turned it over to the Headquarters staff. Of course, immediately Gen Bill Maloney got called in by the Deputy Chief of Staff of Aviation and told his future would be short lived if they did not get the number of fighter squadrons built back up and I am sure others came to play in that same sense.

My thought was that the study group should report out directly to the Commandant before any of their ideas were massaged. The Commandant then having received the report and so on could then say to his staff, "Look at this." or "I want to look at that."

As it turned out, Gen Gray took that and I believe his understanding was that the study group would report to the Commandant and the Commandant would make decisions and would fine-line and decide what we would do exclusive of senior staff input and so it became, it just became a rather difficult period for all of us that were trying to do what we thought, were our jobs.

BGEN SIMMONS: You confirmed my impressions in your discussion. This study group never assumed an identity of its own such as the Mundy Board, the Cook Board, the Etnyre Board. Also, there was never a neatly bound report saying, "Here is the results of

this board." It was an ongoing continuing group with changing membership and its findings were implemented, where they were implemented, more or less incrementally. Is that right?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, or argued over incessantly until death did them part or until they were significantly modified, altered. Many of them we never came to grips with because we never — and some would argue this. I am not the only voice or the only perspective at that time. We never really sat down with an issue or a discussion to say, "All right, let's take up issue number one." We must have gone back a hundred times over whether the MEFS were going to be big robust staffs. Etnyre's solution was lean but robust. Somebody else had the lean MEF staff. One was a warfighting staff. The other one was some different kind of staff. We wandered back and forth until eventually I could not give you any coherent recollection of the totality that took place.

You mentioned that there was no formal report, there was, at least there was a report and it identified things to be done. Again, the only recipient of that report was Gen Gray and he never provided that report to the staff to review. He would focus on an issue, on the size of the reconnaissance company or artillery, some very substantive things but he would focus on that and we would find ourselves in very very long meetings and sessions to discuss that.

Most of the time by the end of the — I think the longest session that I recall was 11 1/2 hours and if you needed to take a head call you could do it at your own liberty but the thing just went on for 11 1/2 hours.

At the end of that time there was no group in being that isn't exhausted, that isn't frayed, that isn't aggravated with each other. Finally, you would vote for anything just to get the hell out of the room. In many cases that is exactly what we did.

There was a report but the report disappeared and the Commandant massaged it. I suppose there was some utility in that but it was an enormous frustration and disaggregation of the staff at the time. Al Gray was one of my heroes, but I never knew anybody who kept his staff in greater disarray and confusion. As the "hub," he was the only one who knew what was going on, and he kept the staff in disarray and widespread frustration.

BGEN SIMMONS: What I am able to find in the records the study group did report out in effect in June 1988 but I have certainly never seen a report nor would I know where to find one. The changes seemed to have come about incrementally.

One of the first visible changes was the reduction in the number of active infantry battalions, 27 to 24 but which added a fourth rifle company to eight of the Corps' active infantry battalions. Would you discuss these changes if you will?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will because they are both practical and political. First of all, the architect of the infantry battalion side of the house had been then-Col Ray Smith, now MajGen Ray Smith who worked for me in the Operations Division.

Ray had long had a philosophy that we could do with fewer battalions but more companies and that was a philosophy and he made a convincing case out of it. The fact of the matter was that while we wanted to add a fourth rifle company — and I say “we wanted”, the study group concluded, I was a battalion commander when we had four companies. I like having four companies. It was a big battalion and so on. So, we liked the idea of a fourth company. It gave tremendous flexibility to deployed units and all of that.

We wanted to do that but at that particular time the Marine Corps was being denied an increase of 3,000 and strength that was being sought. The Marine Corps was headed, I know that you from time to time recite the numbers but we were headed towards a 200,000 or potentially 200,000 plus Marine Corps at that point. We were a growth industry.

Gen Gray's concepts in those days were that what we had known as long as the 4th Division-wing team, the Reserve, would become IV MEF and that there would be a V MEF, that we would be a five Marine Expeditionary Force organization. So the concept, although thinning in some areas as we perhaps will discuss here a little bit later, the concept was that the Marine Corps was going to grow larger and expand.

When we were on the Hill because of fiscal and perhaps other influences at that time, stabilizing our smaller armed forces, the defense budget, all those things come into play, when we were not going to gain the 3,000 additional in strength the decision was made as a practical as well as a political ploy that the Commandant would now go forth and say, “Because I am losing 3,000 end-strength I am going to have to reduce the warfighting capability of the Marine Corps by taking down the number of battalions from 27 to 24,” you know, thousand-men battalions.

BGEN SIMMONS: Almost an exact match.

GEN MUNDY: That's right. There was politics in that as, although it was a partial maneuver, but the belief was that if we went to the Hill and cried out that

we were going to have to take down infantry battalions that somebody would say, “Oh, no we are not going to do that,” and we would get the 3,000.

As a practical matter even with the 3,000 back we might still have taken down the numbers of infantry battalions in order to gain the four companies but the initial move was we would go to the Hill and tell them that we are having to take down the warfighting capacity of the Marine Corps. It did not work. We did not get the 3,000 back.

BGEN SIMMONS: But eight of the battalions did get the fourth rifle company. These were the SOC.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. The SOC, the 8th Marines, I think was the new deployer in the Atlantic Command at that time and eventually the 1st Marines built up to four company battalions. So we had for some time there we had — I mean we were bigger, we had multiple companies and we all felt pretty good about that.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think most of us have been experienced in these things in combat like the fourth rifle company and we like to protect it. Too often we do it at the expense of the weapons company which we also need.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just to give us a benchmark, strength of the U.S. Armed Forces on 1 January 1988, shortly before the board was convened, was 2,166,611 of whom 198,437 were Marines.

The next question I think you have already addressed but I will repeat it. What were the principle conclusions of the study group?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that probably, because of the very thing that you and I just cited, I have never read the whole study so I am not sure I can cite but the principle conclusions were that we should make adjustments in the amount of artillery that we have in the Marine Corps. There was a feeling that we had heaved up too much, that we had too much artillery. Tanks, there was an issue for years on tanks.

Gen Gray truly wanted to lighten the Marine Corps. He wanted to grow the Marine Corps but he wanted to lighten it. He spoke of raider battalions. He spoke of light infantry. We met with a lot of the German attaches that were in town and talked about German organizations because, again, remember that the maneuver doctrine that the Marine Corps was moving into and very positively so at that time decreed that

we had a lot of influences coming in from outside sources on how the Marine Corps should be structured.

Artillery and tanks were two of the issues. Reconnaissance was a very heavily focused upon, the Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group that combined all of these disparate organizations that existed in the, the interrogator translators and the various intelligence agencies and reconnaissance and so on, it put them into one group headed by a colonel.

Light armored infantry, we had had the LAV battalions, light armored vehicle battalions, heretofore but as part of the growth concept we wanted to put scout infantry into the light armored vehicles, at least into the LAV-25s. Of course, the concept for the employment of the LAV battalion at that time was wide ranging, again, warfighting—two, three, four hundred miles out here on the flanks somewhere screening for us. We needed scout infantry vehicles to do that.

That too was hooked to this notion that we were still going to become the 200,000-man Marine Corps and have all of these people to assign around. Anyway, the name of the light armored vehicle battalion was changed to LAIs light armored infantry.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 January 1988 a larger but similar MAGTF, Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force CM2-88 was organized with about 400 Marines and sailors from the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and the 2d Force Service Support Group, all under the command of Col William M. Rakow and sent out to the Persian Gulf to relieve the larger but similar MAGTF, CM1-88, commanded by Col Frank Libutti. Do you recall these MAGTFs and did you have any involvement in their deployment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not so much in their deployment I guess you would say in the conceptual structuring of them. Now, again, there is an interesting story there. These were put together, as in many cases the Marine Corps is pressed into doing things and we resist as strongly as we can and then claim parenthood for it and proclaim it a great Marine initiative.

In this particular case when the Persian Gulf, when the Iranians became aggressive in the Persian Gulf and began to run out the attack boats against tankers coming in and other merchantmen, essentially pirate-type of operations to shoot up the ships as they were coming into the Persian Gulf, we had had a Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf that was comprised usually of about five ships. It was an LSD that had been configured to be a Command Ship out there for

whatever the rear admiral that we had out there at the time, Commander of Middle East Force and then usually were three or four destroyers or frigates of some sort.

It was decided because of the mine threat that the Iranians were imposing and because of these boats that we would put some floating platforms into the Gulf to operate helicopters off of to surveil as well as a reaction force, and is always the case so frequently the amphibious ships were looked at to do that. The want was not for a MEU to go in but the want was for the large deck amphib.

Gen Gray very strongly and very wisely said, "By God if it is going to be an amphib it is going to have Marines on it." So because they did not want an entire amphibious ready group and only wanted a LPH, that was what we were sending in there in those days, we stripped down. The tasking was to take a MEU, and that is what Frank Libutti did initially, and strip it down to what you can carry on an LPH effectively.

So the Special Purpose MAGTF or the Contingency MAGTF, as we termed it those days, was a very small force with the helicopter squadron mixed. It was not a full up squadron as I recall, 12 CH-46s, for example. It was a mixture with some attack and I think about eight CH-46s and totalling about 400 Marines. I frankly cannot remember whether it was battalion-minus or if it was simply a reinforced rifle company that was the ground combat element. I believe the latter, that we had a company, a squadron, some combat service support and of course we kept the colonel on there to call it a Contingency MAGTF.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 2 February Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci directed the assignment of women Marines to the Marine Security Guard program, that is the guarding of embassies and consulates. Did the Marine Corps resist this directive?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Commandant sure did. I guess if the Commandant is the representative of the Marine Corps you would say that the Marine Corps resisted it mightily. Gen Gray adamantly opposed doing this and to this day were he sitting in my chair here, he would probably tell you that contrary to your opinion that Secretary Carlucci had not directed him to do this but everybody else in the elevator would tell you that however you think you heard what was said that it was direction that the Marine Corps do it because we had resisted it.

This was a product of the continuing focus by the

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service, acronym, DACOWITS, which exists today and it existed for some years. It is in many respects, at least began and one could argue perhaps even today is in many respects a healthy organization that indeed brings to the Secretary of Defense's attention things that might otherwise — like medical care for women which we know to be now, we probably did not think about it five years ago, but know to be less than it should be as the number of women grow in the Armed Forces.

It can bring some healthy focuses but it also generally speaking complains about everything that is not absolutely barrier free with regard to women. One of those things was the Marine Security Guard Battalion in which there were no women Marines. There was good philosophy for that, good rationale for that rather. I would say that most of the MSG detachments are five, maybe seven Marines that are out in some desolate country.

Many of those countries require women to wear veils. They do not respect women. They were many macho individuals coming into an embassy who would be stopped by a woman guard, we had grave concerns, as did the State Department, that these people would just roll right over the top of them.

State Department facilities rent houses in most cases. We call it "Marine House", that is where the Marine security guards live. Usually, it would be just a house with maybe three or four bedrooms in it that was occupied by all males and in many cases a community bathroom facility or maybe a couple for six or seven Marines. There were difficulties with this.

Gen Gray just philosophically opposed it very strongly, perhaps embodying many of these things but also just on the belief that women, this was a combatant assignment even though the individual might wear blues and so on he had to be prepared to shoot quick, to wrestle people to the ground if they tried to get into the embassy and it was not an assignment for females.

DACOWITS continued to press us on it. In one of Gen Gray's early speeches before the DACOWITS, I think that shortly after he had gotten there, he got up and in the style that those of us who know him and admire him so greatly but in Al Gray style he got up and enraged the audience saying, "Women are not suited to this" and then he made the statement, "I am the guy that has to make these decisions and if you do not like it you need to get another Commandant." Well, in effect even though he was trying to make a statement to say this is what I believe and I guess if I am wrong then maybe we need somebody else, in effect that went forth as a challenge. It was a percep-

tion of most of us as a challenge to the Secretary of Defense's committee, to the Secretary of Defense.

To make a long story short, and I have made it a long story, yes, the Marine Corps was directed, encouraged, depends on who you want to talk to, to put women into it. Gen Gray's guidance to me was that it would be "about a squad" no more. We did a study of that and the Marine Security Guard Battalion and concluded that in order to maintain a sufficient number of women for assignment, for cross-assignment, in the two posts that they serve, to be able, desirably in some cases, at least have two women instead of having one female and nine males, maybe we would have some companionship, two women. In order to do that we would need to plan on probably about 30 women in the 1,500 person Marine Security Guard Battalion. That did not go well with Gen Gray whose fairly firm and stormy guidance to me reaffirmed that it would be a squad and no more or no less.

It was very difficult to work that because when we sent people off to school we could not guarantee how many were going to graduate. I tried to make that point with him to say if we send 4 women down there, if we have 12 in the program and we send 4 to the next school if they all graduate we have got 16. We cannot constrain it nor should we, I think, constrain it. That did not go down easily with him and he never really totally accepted it but, yes, we were directed and yes, we did let women into the MSG.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the two posts?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we did a survey of posts with the State Department that could accept them, places like Frankfurt, Germany, places like London, Paris, those were posts in which you could assign women because those were large detachments. Most of them had individual rooms in nicely established parts of town and the State Department could accommodate it.

Those were the types of posts. I do not remember the first post to which assigned, it has now become fairly genera that you will find them at a wide variety of places but initially, at least, it was to the larger more secure posts.

BGEN SIMMONS: We should note in passing that it was on 5 February 1988 Gen Gray formally changed the designations of MAGTF from "amphibious" to "expeditionary." For example, the III Marine Amphibious Force now became the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Would you like to discuss the significance of this change?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think it was brilliant and had he not done it, I certainly would have tried to do it on my watch because as you will know and other students of history may recall we had been “Expeditionary Forces” up until ...

GEN SIMMONS: ... talking about the change of designation of the MAGTFs from “amphibious” to “expeditionary.”

GEN MUNDY: And I believe I was saying that those that will recall, for those that know, will recall that we had been designated Expeditionary Forces, MEF, MEUs, that sort of thing, MEBs, brigades, up until the time that we introduced the III MEF into Vietnam. At that point the Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam came back, I believe, to the Joint Chiefs, may have come directly to the Marine Corps, I do not know exactly, but came back and said that we should recall that the French Expeditionary Force had been defeated in Vietnam only a few years before and therefore “Expeditionary Force” had the wrong political ring to it for the American forces coming into Vietnam. I think on the spot, I believe, and others probably you could recount this better than me, but I believe that with no effort at all Gen Greene who was the Commandant simply said, “Well, let’s call it Marine Amphibious Forces.” There may be more to it than that.

At any rate that was the fact that we returned then to “Expeditionary.” The notable aspect of that was that it characterized us for what we are and that is that if you look in the dictionary you find “Expeditionary” only means overseas service so I guess we could argue isn’t everybody made for overseas service? Yes, however, remember that the Army is tasked with a lot of things that Marines are not tasked with, the land defense of the Continental United States is an Army mission, it is not a Marine mission, though indeed we would probably as a practical matter use Marines if they were down in Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton to do that.

“Expeditionary,” which means then that you exist for service beyond the shores of America, characterizes naval forces in general and Marines as an element of our naval capability. I think it was a tremendous move. It generated a great deal of hype in the Army who rightfully pointed out that there had been expeditionary forces and that the Army was also an expeditionary force. This was the Association of the United States Army, headed by Gen Jack Merritt who is still in fact the President of the AUSA organization.

Jack Merritt was just beside himself that the Marine Corps could somehow lay claim to being the nation’s expeditionary force when indeed the Army, if we recall, Gen Vuono was trying to characterize the Army now as a strategic force, power projection force as opposed to the more staid European Continental Force. For Gen Gray to come out and claim “Expeditionary,” flew right in the face of the Army’s emerging effort for themselves to become, one might argue, expeditionary. They have not achieved that yet. They are still working at it.

Yes, “Expeditionary” was reinstituted. Great move.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 February Basic Warrior Training, a pet project of Gen Gray began at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island. Did you have any involvement in this?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. That really was a training issue and so between Quantico and the CGs at the depots that was instituted.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 February LtCol William R. Higgins—“Rich” Higgins—assigned to the United Nations Supervision Organization, or UNTSO, was kidnapped by pro-Iranian terrorists on a coast road in Lebanon. This must have caused a furor at Headquarters Marine Corps. How was this event treated at Headquarters Marine Corps and by the JCS?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it certainly caused a furor, again, with the Commandant. Gen Gray is a very passionate man who truly, as much as any one of us and arguably more than most, treasures each Marine and Sailor for that matter, that is in the Marine Corps. For somebody to do something to one of his Marines is to him a personal attack. I say that with a great credit to the man because I have seen him go out of his way and fly hundreds of miles to attend a funeral, a Marine PFC that ordinarily the best you would expect to happen would be that the local recruiter would come bring a flag to the funeral or something but Gen Gray is very passionate.

He knew Rich Higgins. He knew Robin Higgins, Rich’s wife, now LtCol retired Robin Higgins. He knew them well. Remember that Gen Gray because of his background and his involvement in covert operations, being the father of the signals intelligence business in the Marine Corps had done a great deal of time in intelligence, a great deal of time of association with the national intelligence agencies, the CIA, that sort of thing. To him for terrorists to seize an

American Marine, an American officer for that matter but certainly an American Marine was the gauntlet being thrown down to fight. He was extremely hyped, I would say, by this circumstance.

He established personal and direct liaisons with the agency, for example, with the CIA and perhaps elsewhere to follow this matter and to cause effort to pursue the release of Col Higgins.

As far as JCS this was viewed more broadly, and I do not mean to water it down but the JCS were concerned but they did not dwell on this matter. I mean, we had had an American hostage taken, it had happened before. This was another in a series of events that had occurred so the Chiefs did not really dwell on it.

Gen Gray, however, would from time to time come in, if you will, and whip up some focus. He would not let the issue die within the Chiefs. He made the Chairman and he made the joint system continue to focus on this and to probe such as it did and then he personally was involved, I would say, outside the box. In other words, there were to this day I frankly do not know with whom Gen Gray dealt and consulted on this matter because it was a personal vengeance to him and remains so to this day.

BGEN SIMMONS: It turned out to be a long drawn out affair. On 7 August 1989, over a year later, Gen Gray had the sad duty of informing Maj Robin Higgins that it was virtually certain that her husband, Rich Higgins, had been killed. We will get back to the funeral a bit later. On 22 February the Secretary of the Navy, James W. Webb, Jr., who had resigned because he could not agree with budget decisions being made by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, sent a final message to the Fleet, a rather inflammatory message. Do you recall these events? Did you have much contact with Jim Webb either then or later?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I recall the events. I frankly could not recite the message to you but I know the dispute of course was over Secretary Webb's representation of the number of frigates that the Navy needed as opposed to the Secretary of Defense's decision in the matter. As we know, Jim Webb rather abruptly just dropped off his letter and walked out of the Pentagon and that was the end of him as the Secretary.

I remember those details. I remember that it was a short-lived event or as such things go a few days in the paper. I really was not involved too much in that. My associations with Jim Webb as the Secretary had been, I believe we spoke earlier that during the selection of the 29th Commandant that Secretary-

Designate Webb had consulted with a number of people and I was one of those, so I had come to know him before he became the Secretary.

After he became the Secretary, he nominated me to be the PP&O but in my Director of Ops hat, because he really stepped out about the time I became the PP&O, I was over in his office for a couple of briefings and I saw him perhaps at a couple of events.

I can remember that he came to the Headquarters on one occasion for a briefing on the V-22, which he was not supportive of. Jim Webb believed as did many others believe, that the Marine Corps was going to too sophisticated machines, too expensive a machine, that we need more not fewer numbers of that type of flying machine. He said, "I think that anything that expensive eventually we will be loath to put it into a hot zone." His experience being in Vietnam and he thought that we should have more, a significant number more helicopters and that they would be at least inexpensive enough that we would be willing to expend them somewhat as the Army had done with Hueys in Vietnam.

I can recall that there was a gathering of generals in the room there with the Secretary with him trying hard to debate this in a gentle way so that he did not just come over and say, "We're not going to do the V-22." At that time, of course, it was still a viable program. I felt it my duty to give as persuasive a representation for the Osprey as I could and I did so. I can remember that he looked at me rather like, "You are not agreeing with my side of the argument here," but that was one of very few associations with Secretary Webb.

BGEN SIMMONS: From 26 February to 11 March 1988 the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade executed Field Exercise 1-88 at Twentynine Palms. It was the largest field exercise ever conducted by the 7th MEB.

The exercise involved some 8,000 troops and pitted the 7th MEB against the Army's 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, in a desert environment. Do you have any recollections of this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only that it went and that it was, as you have accurately described it, it was a product of a growth in the operations of 7th MEB which really was our premier crisis response force, it having been the hook with the Maritime Prepositioning Ships that were then positioned in Diego Garcia. The 7th MEB was sort of perceived to be, as far as immediate reaction, as a Crisis Response Force. It had been building in those types of exercises. Twentynine Palms is a tremendous maneuver area

and live fire range. The Army has been, to this day, still is, eager to come up there and fire their multiple launch rocket systems and things like that. It was not hard to get the Army up there.

I recall the exercise. I recall that it was a good exercise. I had no specific involvement beyond as we spoke earlier kind of tracking it at the Headquarters rather than being an architect or implementer.

BGEN SIMMONS: William L. Ball III, succeeded Jim Webb as Secretary of the Navy, effective 24 March. What are your recollections of Secretary Ball?

GEN MUNDY: Well, a very short association, a very congenial, warm, hail fellow well met type of person. I think that he was a good Secretary although he was there for a relatively short period of time. He was a fellow Georgian so, you know, I could understand him when he spoke and just an altogether pleasant man but our association was — indeed, I do not recall any occasion other than a social occasion when I was in the presence of or associated with Secretary Ball.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April 1988 the Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team, so-called “FAST”, attached to the Marine Corps Security Force Company at Rodman, near Panama City, was reinforced with elements of the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Unfortunately, in guarding a petroleum storage facility one Marine was mistakenly shot and killed by another. Do you recall these events and were we working up to a showdown with Noriega?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we were. I do recall them and we were working up to a showdown. The operation plans for the defense of the Panama Canal Zone included a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The plan itself was conceived to defend the Panama Canal against attack by an external aggressor, try and make somebody else somebody up as to who you might want that to be, but presumably in a conflict if somebody wanted to come in and try and seize and put out of commission or seize and deny the Panama Canal, then there would be an offensive operation to defend and/or to regain the canal.

There were a couple of Army divisions in there and there was a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, not a MEF but a brigade, that is how we came to reinforce this very small contingent of Marines, never did get to be a big contingent, with what was called the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It was because, again, in this particular one Gen Gray did play because while ordi-

narily we would have reinforced with a company of infantry or perhaps a battalion-minus or maybe a battalion reinforced for that matter. In this case because the Marine Corps was striving, as we often had to do in those days, make the case for Air-Ground Task Forces. In spite of the fact that there was no Marine aviation involved in this organization we nonetheless put the advance of the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade down there and put a colonel in charge. It was somewhat like the Contingency MAGTF that we spoke about earlier in the Persian Gulf.

That was the origins of the 6th MEB. The incident that you refer to was when Marines were guarding the Araján, spelled with a “J”, not an “H”, Araján Tank Farm which was down adjacent to the canal there and that is what the Marines generally watched over during the succeeding months as we came more and more to confront Gen Noriega.

We were beginning to at least have reports of increased aggressiveness on the part of the Panamanian defense force, or the Panamanian secret police, presumably penetrations into the gas farm. There was concern that somebody would come in there and blow up a gas tank or something like that. I doubt, in my own judgement, I doubt that Noriega even tried that.

What really occurred in that period is that I think it was the Panamanians simply pulling Uncle Sam’s beard a little bit. We had all these armed troops down there and we were in effect in a defensive position and they could run through the bushes at night and draw a little fire and have a few laughs and go drink beer somewhere. I think much of it was that type of activity.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 April Marine forces attacked two Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for attacks against civilian shipping in the Persian Gulf. A Marine light helicopter, HMM-167 was lost in these operations. Do you recall these events and wasn’t this part of the so-called “Oil Tanker War”?

GEN MUNDY: It was. Again, as I have commented earlier, the Iranians were running bog hammer boats and other forms of boats out to attack merchant vessels coming by, and they were using the oil platforms, which are numerous in the Persian Gulf, as observation posts and, if you will, as observers who would report the ships coming in. I am not aware that they would actually use the platforms, they fired on the ships, may have, I do not recall that. They were the eyes and ears and they would summon out the attack boats.

After repeated warnings and after some other escalating events, yes, two of the platforms were taken down along with one of the landing craft medium, LCMs, that would be used to drop mines off. It was attacked and sunk. So, yes, that was part of the emergence toward the eventual "Gulf Tanker War".

BGEN SIMMONS: As you mentioned, Marine Gen George Crist was commander of Central Command at this time and so he would be in charge of the forces involved in the "tanker war."

GEN MUNDY: He was.

BGEN SIMMONS: And he probably came up from time to time to brief the Chiefs as to what was happening in the Gulf.

GEN MUNDY: As I recall he did. Having been the Vice Director of the Joint Staff he was at ease in the Joint Chiefs' operations. I believe that he came up and briefed at least once before and then of course came up after the fact and briefed the results.

The interesting thing, we spoke earlier of how the Chiefs function and I spoke of the OpsDepts conference room during that "tanker war," very short few days of fairly intense engagement with the Iranians, at least at sea.

One of the interesting things that, again, much of America would not perceive, I went over to the OpsDepts conference room, we spoke earlier of it sort of being the Operational Center, if you will, for the OpsDepts. Adm Crowe and his assistant, the Assistant to the Chairman is a three-star officer, in this case it was VAdm John Howe, Jonathan Howe, interestingly who is married to the daughter of a former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Mangrum's daughter, Harriet Howe. John Howe was always a very good supporter.

I noticed that although from time to time at the Marine Corps Annual Worship Service in conjunction with the Marine Corps Birthday Ball at the Washington Cathedral some sailors were occasionally there, more often than not medical officers or dental officers that had served with Marines. But John and Harriet Howe were always there. I did not think anything of it except that I appreciated it but I thought it was unusual until Harriet explained to me that her daddy was a Marine and therefore that's why they were there.

Any rate, on this particular day here is the war going on out in the Gulf and here sitting in the OpsDep conference room as I went into it was the

Chairman, Adm Crowe, and of course the various displays there are displaying the digital location of vessels and who is moving where and maps superimposed so you could do this with all this computer stuff. In the middle of the room sitting there holding a small grease map, I mean a map sheet overlaid by acetate with a grease pencil is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with his three star assistant and they are sitting there talking on the red phone to Gen Crist saying, "Now, George, look here, I think that the," whatever it was ship, "she is steaming southeast now, I think we better move her onto about here."

BGEN SIMMONS: (Laughter.)

GEN MUNDY: So some things never change. I think the lesson learned in that and this will go on — I can talk to you about the invasion of Panama and what not but the lesson learned is that in spite of all of the technology around us, in spite all of the displays and all the information that is available fundamentally when you come right down to it every senior leader I have ever seen is sitting there with a map sheet and usually acetate covered plotting with a grease pencil how we are going to fight the war. That is just a little aside.

BGEN SIMMONS: In July 1988 Marshal Fedorovich Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union explored the United States as part of a JCS-sponsored visit reflecting a thaw in Soviet/United States relations. He visited both Camp Lejeune where he saw a MAGTF demonstration and Quantico where he observed training and professional education. Did you have any involvement in this visit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as the OpsDep I was involved in the planning for the visit. That is to say, he was the guest of the Chairman and therefore the Joint Staff worked the itinerary and so on so I was involved in the planning. I did meet Gen Akhromeyev, Marshal Akhromeyev when he was here but really I met him at a social. I met him when he came to the Commandant's House for a reception and attended a parade and had some discussions. I was privileged to sit in "the tank" when he came and gave his presentation as Chiefs of Defense and others usually do when they are visiting the Joint Chiefs.

He was accompanied, I might add, by then BGen, now LtGen Ivan Skuratov, S-K-U-R-A-T-O-V. Skuratov is the Head of the Russian Coastal Defense Forces, formerly known as the Soviet Naval Infantry. He was then the Soviet Naval Infantry Commandant,

if you will. He came along on that visit and I met him there and subsequently visited him in Russia when I was the Commandant.

That was my involvement. I did not go to Camp Lejeune, I was not down at Quantico, those were command visits and Gen Gray did go down to Camp Lejeune. I am not sure whether he went to Quantico or not. I believe he did. He was on scene most of the time when Marshal Akhromeyev was visiting. It was quite an expansive visit.

I can say that Adm Crowe wanted this to be more than just the normal staff to staff visit so he took him around the country, he took him to a brewery, he took him out to Oklahoma and they had a barbecue on a cattle ranch. He wanted him to understand American way of life and system beyond just the military aspect. They formed a great and enduring friendship.

BGEN SIMMONS: By 8 July 1988 Marine Corps Development and Education Command at Quantico had become the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. What was the significance of this change?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the significance really flowed from Gen Gray's vision that Quantico, number one, had at some point in our history, earlier years, had been really the seat of doctrine development, combat development, if you will, training, all that sort of thing. He wanted to return Quantico, which had atrophied somewhat over the years and become a fairly rundown, fairly second-rate place to which most of those who were assigned there, I cannot say that completely because both Hank Stackpole and I were assigned there about the same time but we had gotten to a point where generally speaking if you were going to retire in the Washington, D.C. area you got sent to Quantico and were allowed — or if you were passed over a couple of times, well Quantico was a nice place to stash them. It was not a front-running place. Gen Gray wanted to re-establish it as such.

He wanted to move, he wanted to reinforce doctrine development. He wanted to establish a Doctrine Center and did as a part of that. He wanted the doctrine and the development process to be tied together so that we were developing and buying things that related to the way that we were going to structure, organize and fight. He wanted training to be all a part of that. He wanted thinking to be placed at Quantico.

We did not go round and round, it did not take very long. I think that at that time his primary mechanic in getting all this done was Col John Kopka who had been a long time principal that Gen Gray placed a great deal of confidence in, his organizational abili-

ties. Kopka knew Gen Gray very well, knew what he wanted to do and got on with it. It was really John Kopka at Quantico who was putting this together, conceptually at least.

To title it instead of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, which it had formerly been, MCDEC, Marine Corps Schools to MCDEC, a development and education center really did not describe what Gen Gray wanted. He wanted combat development command and he envisioned that the training of a lieutenant is combat development or the development of a rifle is combat development or the doctrine is combat development and the schools, professional military education was part of combat development. So the Combat Development Command fitted very well and still does to this day. It was a superb choice.

BGEN SIMMONS: A Marine Battle Skills Training Program was approved in August as an extension of the Basic Warrior Training. The school was to train all Marines to serve effectively in a rifle squad, defensive or offensive operation should the need arise. Have we achieved that goal?

GEN MUNDY: I believe we have. This, again, was another one of the brilliant Gray initiatives. He started, he began as Commandant in one of his early meetings with us that you may recall, but when he came in the words that he used really captured me because he said we are supposed to be gunslingers. I thought that was a tremendous way to characterize the fact that our forte is, despite the fact that on my watch perhaps I did not emphasize that as much but I would like to think as I reflect back on it that it was because it was going well and I saw no reason to do anything dramatic. He wanted to get us back to focusing on the fundamentals of being warriors. Of course he used the term "warriors" extensively and almost too much in many cases.

The Marine battle skills training was that echelon, that continuum rather of training which began with Basic Warrior Training which occurred at the recruit depots and then evolved on up to the School of Infantry, re-established the School of Infantry as part of this. Really we had never had a school of infantry, we had the Infantry Training Regiment and the Infantry Training School. This was called the School of Infantry. Col Paddy Collins was probably the primary mind set and action behind this, Gerry Turley, Paddy Collins, people like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: How was this different from the old creed, "Every Marine a Rifleman"?

GEN MUNDY: I think it seeks to make every Marine really a “weaponsman,” if you will. In other words, not just to know musketry or riflery or not to be just a rifleman, to be that in the philosophical sense. In other words, every Marine is fundamentally a rifleman but then a rifleman can also fire a machine gun, a rifleman understands the fundamentals of firing the complete array of weapons so that if you need to pick up an anti-tank weapon and shoot it whether you are an anti-tank assault man or not you can do that. This was Gen Gray’s philosophy, that we should be rounded in our battle skills and that every Marine, whether they were going to aviation skills training or wherever they might be going was going to go through some level of battle skill training. Again, it was a great initiative.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you think we keep these battle skills up as we advance in grade and rank?

GEN MUNDY: I believe we do, through the schools system that has now been instituted. Through the professional military education there is a continuing re-emphasis. We just got going, on my watch, not brilliance on my part but just because it was part of that evolutionary process but we now have the sergeants, all sergeants — I mean if you expect to be promoted to staff sergeant you better go to the Sergeant’s School. The Sergeants Course is a course that again takes you, not back to and starts all over again with how to fold a map or how to disassemble a rifle but it takes you back again to those fundamental skills that flow from the battle skills training.

BGEN SIMMONS: It gives you hands-on-training with the saw and other things.

GEN MUNDY: It does. Again, literally every young recruit coming out of recruit training, not only do they start at Parris Island with a different kind of training, for example, you go down there most of the time and we still have the known distance qualification where you lie down but now most of their firing is done under, at least field firing whether it be on the rifle range or not but helmet, the war belt, their suspenders, their cartridge belt, their canteens and they are firing their rifle now in their helmet as opposed to as I came along at least you know the range was a place where you were given a special jacket with padded elbows and a padded shoulder and you wore yellow glasses and you always wore your soft cover. Well, now you don’t have pads. If you fall down on your elbows you

fall down like you are going to hit the ground any-time. It is much more realistic training. It is much more exciting training for the young recruits.

To answer you, do I think we have arrived? As I have said so often during my most recent tenure here, if you wonder whether Marines really have absorbed all that and whether we are that just watch them on TV. Watch as you look at a place like Somalia or if you look at any place that you go today and you watch troops moving down the street in whatever chocolate chip utilities or whatever they are wearing unless you get up close and see the emblem on the helmet or the emblem on the utility jacket or something you do not really know if those are Marines or soldiers but you do. You can pick it out. There is a confidence, an aggressiveness, a gunslingerish approach among Marines that does not exist in the other Services. So, yes, it was tremendously successful and, again, to Al Gray’s credit. He deserves to have that notch in his gunhandle.

BGEN SIMMONS: In October 1988, our LAV or light armored vehicle units, were redesignated as light armored infantry or LAI units as part of the reorganization of the Fleet Marine Force. Would it be stretching a point to say that we were changing their orientation from cavalry or reconnaissance to dragoons or mounted infantry?

GEN MUNDY: I think as a practical matter the answer to that is yes. As a philosophical matter at the time that was not the intent. The intent, again, was to put scout infantry or scouts, if you will, into the backs of the LAVs because while we had a vehicle that could range — and again, the concept was two, three, four hundred miles out here, rapid moving and so on. With a bunch of LAV-25s, for example, you in effect had an empty crew compartment back in the back because we had never generated the manpower, that was part of the 3,000 growth and so on that we talked about earlier. We never generated the manpower to put back there and so you had a LAV-25 that could go out and could engage with its chain gun or with its machine gun but why did you want to do that exclusively?

We wanted a vehicle that could snoop around and that would be able to discharge scouts who could observe and get back and employ the mobility of the vehicle and that could fight if it had to but it was not being sent out to engage because we did not want, we knew that we did not want light armored vehicle battalion commanders and captains and sergeants and so on to believe somehow that they were as tough as the

guy in the main battle tank because there is no contest there. Now, we do have the TOW variant which can shoot a tank but you do not want to engage a tank with that 25-millimeter gun and expect to survive.

Interestingly really the title that was come up with from the study effort that we talked about earlier was light armored reconnaissance battalions which was, whether we used scout infantry we did not at that time seek to combine the reconnaissance battalion with the light armored vehicle battalion. The scout infantry we would have a reconnaissance battalion and then we would have a light armored reconnaissance battalion which would be far wider ranging and so on.

Gen Gray did not want to — he did not buy the light armored reconnaissance battalion so almost as a compromise it became light armored infantry. Your point is is that is what it has become and I think very healthily so. We fought with the LAI in the desert and we fought them as you have described them here, more as dragoons than we did as light cavalry.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another name change came in November when the 1st Tracked Vehicle Battalion on Okinawa became the 1st Armored Assault Battalion. Did they get new prime movers to go with the change in title?

GEN MUNDY: No, the only new vehicles that were coming in at that time were — LtGen Jack Godfrey had had III MEF and had pressed hard to get a company of light armored vehicles to Okinawa. It was a very difficult thing to manage because of the rotation base necessary to do that. We just did not have enough LAV persons, men, LAV people to do that. Even if we put the vehicles out there and left them we just did not have that rotation base.

At any rate, we started it and then we fell back from it and we did not do that. At the time we were bringing down the numbers of tanks, we were bringing down as part of the force restructuring process the numbers of amtracs. I believe we went down to two companies there.

You did not have really an armored — I mean an amphibian assault battalion, you did not have a tank battalion out there, we brought it back. We called it the “tracked vehicle.” Tracked vehicle is not really a very handsome term and it does not fit the macho image that we have of ourselves, so more as a practical, more as an esoteric matter than anything else, “armored assault battalion” sounded tough, sounded good. It was, in effect, really a non-tactical organization that was simply the administrative battalion that

overwatched the tanks and assault amphibian vehicles and the light armored vehicle company that went out there.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will note in passing that on 1 January 1989 the strength of the U.S. armed forces was 2,121,142, of whom 195,027 were Marines. In a year we had lost 3,000 Marines.

Do you recall the inauguration of President Bush in January 1989?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have a part to play in this?

GEN MUNDY: Did not have a part to play. I had not been to a presidential inauguration, thought conceivably it could be the last one that I would be around Washington for and so Linda and I bought tickets at about \$125 apiece. BGen Rick Phillips was the Marine Corps representative on the Inaugural Committee so we were able to get them through him. I put on my uniform which again is, you know in our generation we wore our uniforms more than today. Hopped on the Metro from the barracks and rode downtown and was seated in the bleachers. These were fairly expensive seats, may have been \$150 apiece as I come to think of it.

We were the one bleacher up facing the presidential review box on the other side so we were literally sitting looking directly at the Bushes and the Chiefs as they reviewed the inauguration. So, I attended that part of it, the parade rather than the swearing in.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 3 March 1989 as part of the re-structuring as we went 27 to 24 infantry battalions, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, at Camp Lejeune and the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines were put into a cadre status. It is always painful to deactivate or cadre a unit. Do you recall these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes I do. It is painful, but I would say we have been that route before. We are indeed at it again. The cadre-ing of battalions as early as when I was a lieutenant we had placed three battalions in cadre and I recall when I taught at The Basic School as a first lieutenant, I had a dual-hat as a platoon commander in the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines that was comprised of the School's Demonstration Troops, the Enlisted Instructor Company at The Basic School and a company I recall out of the Marine Barracks.

We had been this route before and those have been

temporary fixes that we furl the colors for a few years and then unfurl them back as was the case in the case of these two battalions.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 19 March, a prototype of the V-22 Osprey flew for the first time. You mentioned the Osprey in passing earlier. Would you comment on the significance of the Osprey to the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Osprey is, I use it most often to respond to those who approach me with a currently in-vogue term and that is "RMA" or "Revolution in Military Affairs". Since that is a rather vague term and could imply most anything I say, "Yes, well let me give you an example of a revolution in military affairs and that is the Osprey."

This is not just another helicopter, this is a flying machine that literally will revolutionize our ability to respond to crisis, to project power from sea bases. Now, we can do it as well from a land base. We can, for example, load, if you would want to do this, we can load this helicopter-like machine at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, you could do it at Fort Bragg if the Army was buying it there, and you could launch from the New River Air Station and fly into the naval base at Guantanamo or fly into Haiti or some locale like that and set down in a zone if you wanted to and it could be loaded with troops.

That is dramatic. And you would be doing that at 250 knots. A helicopter today the best you could get if you were shaking the thing apart might be 160 or 170 knots. It is a dramatic step forward not only in the capability, this means that a ship in which Ospreys were embarked in the Mediterranean if sitting generally speaking around Sicily could launch a reaction force from the deck of that ship to any point on the littoral of the Mediterranean Ocean, Eastern Med, Western Med, anywhere else with an aircraft and could set it down not on a fixed runway or even a dirt strip but could set down on a one landing zone site. That is dramatic. Plus all the other characteristics of the aircraft, the new and modern survivability, crash worthiness, all of those sorts of things that are built into new styles of aircraft as compared to the CH-46. If the CH-46 crashes today the two engines will come right through the airplane and hit you in the head as they are coming down, that does not happen with Osprey.

It is a tremendous revolutionary step forward and we are now into starting the production and we will be acquiring the aircraft, I hope, in a much faster way than we are currently scheduled to.

BGEN SIMMONS: With the Army, with the restrictions on what the Army is allowed to fly would the Army be able to operate Ospreys?

GEN MUNDY: I think the answer to that would be yes. I think the restrictions on what the Army is able to fly are of far less concern in this day and time than they were at that point when the Air Force was striving to gain control of anything that could be associated as being a fixed wing aircraft. They wanted to restrict the Army to helicopters but state of the art helicopters have become fairly sophisticated. I do not think there would be — if the Army put its ...

GEN MUNDY: I think I was saying that if the Army really put its bow toward acquiring the Osprey it would be able to do it. I do not think that would be at issue because if the Marines had it it would make no sense to deny the Army simply because of Air Force relationships. If the Air Force were going to oppose this as a transport aircraft they should oppose it for Marines as well as soldiers.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 26 March your old commander, Gen Lewis W. Walt died of a long illness. Did you go to his funeral?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did. It was very well attended. It was down at Quantico. Gen Gray gave the eulogy there and did just an absolutely magnificent job of memorializing Lew Walt. Gen Walt regrettably had become an Alzheimer's victim and had been given admission, though I think this took Gen Kelley to get this done for him, he was placed in the Naval Home which is really an enlisted man's home down in Biloxi, Mississippi, beautiful place. He lived there. I started at one point to go down and see him, never got there and regret that I did not. I am not sure I did because I am told by those who saw him that he, as in the case of Alzheimer's victims, that he would not have necessarily remembered who I was.

At any rate, he was buried with style. He wanted to be buried at Quantico in the extension of Arlington, the National Cemetery that exists at Quantico. It is a beautiful place. Gen Gray did a superb job and there were many many people in attendance at that funeral.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 4 May former White House aide, LtCol Oliver L. North, who was involved in the Iran-Contra scandal was convicted by a federal court on three felony counts: obstructing Congress, unlawfully mutilating government documents and taking an illegal gratuity. How well did you know Ollie North?

GEN MUNDY: I knew him, I think I would categorize it as very well, but it was from a late arrival. When I was a battalion commander at Okinawa, Ollie North was then commanding and running the Northern Training Area. I knew him there as Capt North. I knew him —

BGEN SIMMONS: He always managed something dramatic, didn't he?

GEN MUNDY: Always. I would say to his credit, most effective instructor I have ever seen in my life. He always shot up the room or did something that was dramatic but he did a superb job of training there and then later I knew him when I then came back to Quantico and when he returned to Quantico, whatever the circumstances of his situation at that time. He did come to see me after he had been in Bethesda for some psychiatric treatment and told me that because we were close enough friends. I knew him at Headquarters. Ollie North was at the time the Haynes Board was going on, about 1975 this same time frame, Ollie was in Manpower, Plans and Policy with then Maj Bob Johnson, with BGen Jim Meade who was Col Jim Meade at that time who put together the unit deployment program to Okinawa. Ollie was a brilliant guy.

When he retired from the Marine Corps he was an action officer back in the Plans Division and I was the DCS/PP&O so Ollie, on his last day in the Corps, he came up to pay an out-call on me and we embraced in a brotherly fashion. I had a great deal of affection for him at that particular time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you say that the Ollie North affair helped or hurt the Marine Corps' reputation?

GEN MUNDY: I think at the grassroots level, that is out there where the real people live and this is not a value judgement of Ollie but if you went to the mountains of western North Carolina, if you went to the hills of Tennessee or to the bayous down in Mississippi or Louisiana right now there are a lot of people who admired Ollie North. He projects tremendously well and there are people out there who admire someone who takes on Congress.

I think a lot of us have come to appreciate what the Congress really is but most of America believes the Congress is against them, not with them, so for a Marine who would standup proudly in his uniform and in effect defy the Congress and take on the

Congress and argue with the Congress and with his charisma I think the — I mean there are still buttons out there that say "I Love Ollie". In that sense probably many people, many people as I would travel around the country as a Commandant would still speak very positively about Ollie North.

I think that the Marine Corps was not hurt in Washington because I think that this town recognizes that individuals do things and it is not the institution. He was not serving as a Marine in the National Security Council when this occurred, had in fact been gone a long seven years from the Marine Corps.

I do not think we suffered from it. I think the revelations that come out now with various, his unsuccessful effort at campaigning for the Senate this last time around, his book, has some challengeable descriptions in it, some of the other books that talk about him or get into Iran-Contra and how it went on, I think Ollie does not come out quite as clean as he did before the television cameras but at that time and for the image in America, I do not think the Ollie North affair did the Marine Corps any damage, if anything strengthened us with grassroots.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 May, H. Lawrence Garrett, III, replaced William L. Ball, III, as Secretary of the Navy. Why did Secretary Ball resign?

GEN MUNDY: I do not know. I should know I think but I do not know. As I mentioned earlier, I never had much association, I just did not see much of Secretary Ball. He had been there a very short time and whether it was to pursue — I believe it was unsensational. I believe it was to pursue business interests as opposed to any falling out with the then administration.

BGEN SIMMONS: Garrett had been Under Secretary since 1987. He had been a career legal officer in the Navy, retiring as a commander after 20 years of service. Tailhook was still ahead of the Navy and of the Marine Corps. Is it fair for me to ask you for an assessment of Garrett's effectiveness before Tailhook?

GEN MUNDY: Larry Garrett nominated me to be the Commandant so I am, or certainly should be, beholden in that sense. I consider him a friend. I think well of him. I saw him as recently as a week ago. He was presenting one of the awards at the Marine Corps Aviation Association. I think that he identifies very positively with Marine Corps, perhaps even more so today than he did at the time that he was the Secretary. The reason for that is that perhaps, just perhaps, he

believes that he was undone as the Secretary by the Navy as opposed to by the Marine Corps. There were not many Marines involved in Tailhook and those that were were not significant figures.

I believe that at the time, I know in one of his last discussions with me before he was caused to resign or was fired as a result of the Tailhook incident that he said, "I am sitting here on a precipice alone and I am listening for voices out there and there aren't any." which was another way to say, "I have been hoisted on a petard. Yes, I was there but where are the people that are going to stand up for me."

I think he felt rather abandoned by his own service. While the Marine Corps certainly did not stand up — but we did not have the people there who could stand up. There was really only one Marine general that was there and he had had no involvement whatsoever.

But, as to his effectiveness as the Secretary I would want it to go said that I have a great deal of personal affection and esteem for Larry Garrett. He was, I believe, a rather insecure man and as a result he was — you know, Gen Gray was a powerful personality, he had been the under, and then he is elevated to the Secretary, so that is kind of like being promoted over somebody because the under is junior to the Commandant or the CNO so it is difficult to move in and become the leader when you have been not the leader.

He was a little bit insecure I thought and he was a very — he had a close knit group that he worked with and it was rare that you ever really had much of a discussion with Secretary Garrett. We traded a lot of paper back and forth and it was a fairly legalistic — maybe that is the best term. From my perspective, from Gen Gray's perspective who was actually the Commandant for the majority of his tenure as Secretary might give a different perspective but I found him a little bit distant, at that time very very much oriented toward the Navy rather than the Marine Corps.

The Marines were upstarts and continue, regrettably to this day, we were fighting for the V-22 and that was a lot of money in the Department of the Navy and so he was faced with this torment that I think all of the secretaries face and that is a domination by the admiralty with people whispering in your ear, "Put the Marines down," and when you try and stand up for the Marines, there is a powerful lobby of gold braid that pounds on top of any Secretary's head that if he is too good to the Marines it is going to cost him.

So, I think that Secretary Garrett will go down as an effective Secretary. In my judgement, and we will discuss Tailhook later, I think he did not merit what he

received from that. He was not one of the easier men that I have known and worked with to engage with. He was rather distant.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 June, 15 Marine gunners graduated from The Basic School to serve as infantry weapons officers. Gen Gray revived the old title "Marine gunner" for infantry-qualified warrant officers. How effective has this program been?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think the intent of the Gunner Program has been markedly effective and it is right in there with Battle Skills Training and Combat Development Process, all of that that Gen Gray instituted, in that sense it is effective. If you go to a regiment, you go to a battalion today, there on the commander's staff you will have one of these Marine gunners who will be advising on the employment of weapons and they in fact know their business. I have been very impressed that this is a good individual to have around.

That said, I do not think that Marine Gunners have regained nor will they the stature of the days of the old Corps when a Marine Gunner was — I wasn't around, we did not have any but you know he is a legendary grizzled, ornery, tough, disassemble anything in the arsenal and tell everybody how to work but it usually came from years and years and years and years of being a practitioner of the art.

Today we have taken the relatively same young Staff NCO and have made him a Gunner and he does not bear the leathery face and the dueling marks and all that sort of thing that I think the image of the Marine Gunner does. So, respected, appreciated, valued but we will not return to the Gunner that we knew of yesteryear.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 26 June, President Bush attended an evening parade at Marine Barracks, 8th and I. Were you present that evening?

GEN MUNDY: I was.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you remember the dropped rifle?

GEN MUNDY: I certainly do. A great moment. This was a damp evening. It had been raining and in fact as often is the case at 8th and I, there is a threat of maybe cancelling the parade. No one ever wants to do that. At any rate, had not had to but I believe it was misting. It was perhaps drizzling a little bit but when the Inspector came out with the Silent Drill Platoon to

inspect he did fine on his first inspection and then he moved to his second inspection site and as he spun the rifle it was wet and his gloves were probably wet and he dropped the rifle.

The crowd thought, "Oh, poor kid." I mean, here you are in front of the President of the United States and gosh this is horrible. The young Marine picked up the rifle, composed himself as they do so magnificently, spun it again and dropped it again. We all thought, "He will never recover." Picked it up again, recovered, did his routine. The crowd went wild with applause but as he walked off you could see this kid, proud as he wanted to be, you could see in his shoulders the statement, "My God, I had to be the inspector to drop the rifle not once but twice in front of anybody but most of all in front of the President of the United States."

The President left and the next morning the young Marine was summoned to the White House for breakfast with the President which was, again, characteristic of George Bush and his style of leadership which was a magnificent thing to do. So, on the one hand from an evening of absolutely, I am sure that his buddies went in and said, "Oh, it was okay," but you knew they weren't really saying it was okay. But the next morning you are a hero, you have been to breakfast with the President. What a nice leadership touch by the Commander-in-Chief.

BGEN SIMMONS: It certainly was. On 30 June, the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines was deactivated at Camp Lejeune leaving the 10th Marines with four battalions as part of the restructuring. There seems to have been some uneasiness in the Marine Corps at what was seen as perhaps a de-emphasis on artillery in the Marine Corps of which this was only one small part. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the uneasiness really in the restructuring lay in two camps, and one was the artillery camp and the other was the tank, the armor camp. The young tank officer — not, I mean we do not have anything that you command as an armor officer but the rate of lieutenant colonel. The tank colonels, few as they were, and lieutenant colonels lobbied and did much work behind the scenes to ensure that we kept the tank levels up.

The artillerymen, I think to this day, to this day there is a feeling that we may for warfighting we may be a little light in artillery but the fact is as I found when I became the Commandant to begin to try and restructure and retain hopefully a coherent warfighting capability is that you get big bunches of — the

only places that you get large numbers of people is from battalions of infantry or battalions of artillery. So, as we were looking at reducing, creating the fourth rifle companies and yet not gaining the 3,000 that had been expected, as we were looking at doing things like that, the only place to get those big bunches of people were from places like the artillery.

Cash in an aircraft squadron you get 175 people. You cash in an artillery battalion you get 800 or 900. That was the way we opted again in Gen Gray's focus on lightening up the Marine Corps we opted to maintain infantry at the expense of artillery and indeed of tanks.

BGEN SIMMONS: The USS *Wasp*, (LDH-1), the first of a new class of multipurpose amphibious assault ships was commissioned on 29 July 1989 at Norfolk Naval Base. What was the significance of this class of ship?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is the centerpiece of the present amphibious Navy and indeed, though many would argue that the carrier remains the centerpiece of the Navy the carrier is an entity which is going to fade further. Now, that is a Mundy prognosis as we sit here in 1995. We can talk further about that.

The multi-capable platform that is the LHD will be the most useful vessel in the Navy in years to come because of the things it can do. You can make it a carrier, as we did in the Gulf. It happened to be an LHA, similar ship but we put 20 Harriers on deck and ran strikes against the Iraqis from the deck of an amphibious platform with the VSTOL aircraft. We are moving more in that direction.

In the case of the LHD you had a ship that was capable of truly being the centerpiece for the Marine Corps concept of operational maneuver from the sea, a ship that can carry and launch air cushion craft that can carry and launch the V-22, that you can operate fixed wing aircraft and rotary wing aircraft, air cushioned craft out of the well deck, modern state of the art command and control, second only to an aircraft carrier. An LHD is awesome in terms of the command and control capability that it has. A hospital if you were going to have an operation today, I doubt you would do it but a good place to do it would be to go down to Norfolk and find yourself an LHD that was pier-side. It is one of the most modern medical facilities in the world. Just a tremendously capable and efficient and well-designed ship.

That is owed to Col Gene Schultz, USMC (Ret), who is in the Naval Sea Systems Command who real-

ly is the, I hate to say “granddaddy” but I guess he is of the modern classes of amphibious ships and the LHD in particular.

BGEN SIMMONS: *Kearsarge* is an LHD?

GEN MUNDY: *Kearsarge* is LHD-3.

BGEN SIMMONS: There are three?

GEN MUNDY: There are six in construction right now and the seventh one is in the Fiscal Year 1996 budget. The Marine goal has been seven LHDs and it appears that we are going to get seven LHDs.

The *Kearsarge* and now the *Essex*. You have *Wasp*, *Essex*, *Kearsarge* in commission right now and then coming along behind them, I do not remember the name of LHD-4 but LHD-5 of which Linda Mundy is the sponsor is the *Bataan* which fate could not have handed a nicer one to the Mundys, at least this part of the family who grew up idolizing World War II and every battle in it and to be given a ship for my wife to sponsor of *Bataan* is significant. *Bataan* will be christened, not commissioned, and it will become a living entity about next April and then will be commissioned in 1997 and that will be the 5th of the class and then hopefully 6 and 7 by the year 2000 we will have seven LHDs.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Marine Corps University, another Gen Gray initiative, was activated on 1 August as an integral part of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico. Did you have any role in this?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. Again, the training and education initiative, again, when you say did I have a role, I was one of the members of the Board of Directors, I guess, in those days and we all sat in various meetings on this sort of thing but I was not an architect. I did not have a significant role in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 13 October it was announced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the Marine Corps would conduct joint training and surveillance operations along the southwest border of the United States in support of the Bush Administration's war on drugs. How large did our participation become?

GEN MUNDY: It goes on today. We began at that time with some reconnaissance platoons. We grew to company size. We use the Surveillance and Target

Acquisition, the STA Platoons that are existent in the infantry battalions because of the night observation devices and some seismic devices that they usually have.

We did this initially with active forces that came principally out of I MEF, out in Camp Pendleton and then we began to evolve toward the Reserve side of the house and today the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion that has elements at least down in Texas, San Antonio, keeps a fairly significant level of activity, albeit small, 10, 20, occasionally a couple of helios would go down. At the most, I would say, at a given time we would have perhaps maybe 50 or 60 Marines involved.

A Joint Task Force, JTF-6, was put together to oversee the border operations. We have another one, JTF-4, down in Florida that was looking out over the Caribbean and trying to detect and conduct the intercept operations for the flow of narcotics coming up by air, at least, and boat out of the Caribbean Basin.

The JTF-6 was the southwest border and it is still down there. Gen Gray wanted to become very much active in these. These, again, these were characteristic of Gen Gray's penchant for covert operations. He saw great utility for Marines. He also was smart enough to see, as did we all, that the name of the game in town in those days was the “War on Drugs”. Bill Bennett had been brought in.

The DEA, the Drug Enforcement Agency, was headed by a Basic School classmate of mine, Jack Long, former Marine lieutenant. Jack leaned very much toward the Marines in terms of getting some staff officers over to help him with normal staff processes. We wound up giving away about a half dozen Marines to DEA.

Gen Gray wanted to ensure properly so that the Marines were represented in all of this. We sought these types of opportunities as opposed to sitting back and being asked, the Marine Corps was usually out pressing to get into these things and did so. I might say we did so at a time when the Army was dragging its feet and did not want to get involved. The argument can take place in later years who was the wiser of the two but we got into that and then eventually after the Marines and then the Marine Corps Reserve became involved then the Army National Guard began to drift in and is very very active in it today.

That was as much as anything to have a foot in the water based on Marines acting in what the nation was interested in and at that time the War on Drugs was the biggest war we had going on.

BGEN SIMMONS: How effective have they been?

GEN MUNDY: I do not know that I can measure that. I think that the briefings that, in the last couple of years that I would have had, and there were not many of them, but as we, as the Chiefs attempted to look at that because of the enormous amount — for example, the Caribbean, the enormous number of steaming hours that the Navy would send any, a ship, any ship, whoever was down there. We put a frigate, which probably is a pretty good ship, we put an amphib which is not a good ship for that but just whoever was down there there was this presumption that if we had ships steaming around they would observe boats and would be able to track and detect drug runners coming in. I do not think we have been very effective in that.

We have probably all of our southwest border operations, all of our efforts at stemming the flow of drugs coming up, we have been successful probably in diverting the route whereas a decade ago it would come directly from Colombia, fly into Texas or California or Arizona or some place and land and dump the stuff off. We probably have curtailed that but now we ship it around through Europe and bring it in, ship it around into the Orient and bring it in. We have made it more difficult for the drug merchants to get it in.

What really has curtailed it I think is things like the South American government is cracking down on the drug cartels. That is what will eventually stamp it out because as long as there is demand there will be supply. We have not yet been successful in our own country at curtailing demand and that is the only thing that, in my judgement, will ever get rid of the drug problem. I do not know how to do that. That is kind of like saying we will go back to prohibition and nobody will have a drink at night when they go home.

When you try and quantify that and when you try and answer the questions like you have just put forth, say to Congress, with all of these resources that we put into this, give me the measure of effectiveness, show me what you have stopped, we do not have a good measure on it.

BGEN SIMMONS: We do not have a large number of Marines involved but we have had some real world testing of some of our equipment. So, on balance would you say that our involvement has improved our readiness or detracted from our readiness?

GEN MUNDY: I do not think it has detracted from it at all. If it has — the drain as in the case of many of

the things that we do is against the operating tempo for our people. Until the Reserves became almost totally involved in that — for example, to put a detachment of four helicopters down on one of the Caicos Islands as an operating base, the Army had some Blackhawks down there for a while and we were asked to go down there. We used to send OV-10s when we had the OV-10s down to operate out of there. That was a tremendous operating tempo because we had other requirements for the craft.

The reconnaissance platoons when we were coming out of I MEF, those platoons would come down and do a little while on the southwest border and then rush back just in time to get into training site to get ready to deploy with a MEU or to rotate in Okinawa. That is hard on people.

As far as the points that you make our reconnaissance people have gotten some doggone good training out of going out and sitting up an OP and staying on it for three or four days and observing and in some cases MEUs. In other cases infiltrators coming in, that is good reconnaissance work. STA platoons have had some good play at that. It has been valuable and I do not think it has impacted our overall readiness.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 13 November the transition of the Marine Corps from the F-4 Phantom to the F-18 Hornet was completed. Can you comment on these two great aircraft?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Phantom of course was an aircraft, as I recall, early 1960s vintage. That was the workhorse of all of the tactical air services, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps. It was really a Navy aircraft, designed by the Navy and the Air Force bought into it and the Marine Corps flew it. That was our Vietnam-era aircraft. It was a great airplane that many to this day love.

It was replaced by a smaller aircraft, much more agile, much more capable aircraft and that is the FA-18 Hornet. The Hornet arguably is the finest airplane in the world today. The FA-18C, the single seat version, far more from the Marine Corps perspective a far more useful aircraft is the FA-18D, the two-seat version.

The FA-18D with its flir and targeting, night targeting capability and its ability to carry a versatility of ordnance on the same mission at the same time is unique in the inventory. Probably the F-15E would most closely to it and is a more sophisticated aircraft but what you can do in Bosnia, for example, and what we have done in Bosnia with the FA-18s compared with the other F-16s and other types of aircraft — the

Air Force has sent down there F-15Cs, no good to us, fighter aircraft. I mean you really do not do air/ground with the FA-15Cs.

The versatility of the FA-18 and specifically I think you would have to say more specifically the versatility of the Marine FA-18 because as we get into some discussions of Marine aviation later I will be glad to give you a three-hour treatise on the value of Marine aviation compared to anybody else's aviation. Talk about the pilots now but the aircraft as well are superb.

The FA-18 can dog fight, it can engage with missiles and it can do superior air to ground work in one airplane so that is versatility to the maximum extent. So we got a better, a more efficient, a more versatile, maneuverable, all that sort of thing, maintainable aircraft in the FA-18 than we did have in the Phantom.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another aviation landmark was the close-out of the last A-6E aircraft on 22 December. What do we have now in the inventory that is the equivalent of the A-6?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we really have nothing. In as much as the A-6 carried the bombload of World War II B-17 in a single aircraft so it was an extraordinary aircraft in terms of its intermediate bombing capability. But the equivalent, the replacement for it is the FA-18D, that is the two-seat FA-18. Again, with precision-guided weapons and even with dumb bombs, the targeting system on the FA-18C or D is such that instead of having to drop 28 500-pounders somewhere to try to knock out something they will do it with two or three today. If it is a PGM you do it with one and maybe one to follow up to make sure you got it. Today even with the dumb bomb, you can get much much better hits on targets.

The aircraft and the technology of the aircraft in the FA-18D more than, I think, makes up for the brute force of the A-6.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 December 1989, Operation Just Cause was launched in Panama. Its announced purpose was to protect American lives, restore the democratic process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty and apprehend dictator Gen Manuel Antonio Noriega. It was predominantly an Army show but we did have a significant Marine Corps presence. What was your personal involvement in this operation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first of all, I would change — you are exactly right in your quotation of its purpose

but if you really want to know about its real purpose was the latter point, it was to get Gen Noriega which it did of course.

BGEN SIMMONS: I had my tongue in my cheek.

GEN MUNDY: My involvement in it was long and extensive, no not from a practical standpoint but from the OpsDep viewpoint. Operation Just Cause was originally entitled "Operation Blue Spoon" because that was in the days when you simply computer-spat out two words that did not necessarily go together and those were used as the code names for an operation. Gen Powell had just come in and he said, "Where did we ever come up with 'Blue Spoon'?" He said, "Who can get inspired by 'Blue Spoon'?" So, if you notice that was the first in the series of now "Just" titles to Enable Democracy or Provide Relief or Provide Comfort and that was "Just Cause". It was viewed as a just cause.

There are those that will argue that we went down and did it "just 'cause."

BGEN SIMMONS: (Laughter.)

GEN MUNDY: I had reviewed the plans on that. Interestingly, the way that the ultimate operation plan came about — we may recall that Gen Max Thurmond had been in place as the—though he had scheduled retiring, but was placed as the CinC, with the relief for cause of a Gen Warner, who was the CinC, who I am not sure he deserved the relief for cause but anyway he was not aggressive enough for the Administration and so Gen Max Thurmond, who if one word described him, was aggressive, he was sent down to be the CinC.

He on the QT contacted, this is after the fact knowledge, not then, but he contacted Gen Carl Stiner who had the 18th Airborne Corps and said, "Hey, Carl, I want you to make up the plan for this operation that we are going to do down here." So, you had Stiner who had come out of the Joint Special Operations Command to assume command of the 18th Airborne Corps, you had all of the makings then of an airborne and special operations operation by background of the commander and indeed those that were involved with the planning.

The planning was done off-line by the Army, by the 18th Airborne Corps with Gen Thurmond presiding over that. The Chiefs and OpsDeps were one day short — I could not give you a time frame, I want to say November, before the operation went in December but let's make it perhaps early November.

Gen Powell brought in rather unflamboyantly to “the tank” one day a briefing by Gen Stiner with Gen Luck, Gary Luck who was then the 82d Airborne Division and the JSOC people. Brought into “the tank” this briefing that he said, “Oh, by the way, I wanted you to have this briefing because we have given this at the White House and I thought you all ought to be in on it.”

This, when you want to talk some time about a little bit of a break in how Goldwater/Nichols says it might ought to be done this was a turnabout but nonetheless, so here is this briefing that is given and it was beautiful. The Army does a lot of things well but the one thing they do weldest of all is to give briefings with immaculate charts and all the right terminology and the players all look their parts and so on so it was a superbly rendered classic Fort Leavenworth briefing.

It had the Seals swimming in, the paratroopers jumping in and the SOF(?) jumping and everybody had an oar in the water. Because there were Marines there, there were Marines involved because they were there but they set up a defensive perimeter as they eventually did over at the Bridge of the Americas and so on. The Marines, our oar was in the water too but not because we placed it there. Had we not been there on scene, I can assure you we would not have been involved in it.

Anyway, we were briefed on this, on Blue Spoon. Subsequently, there were identified in that plan certain trigger events that would cause things to happen. If Noriega did this then we will position aircraft at Howard Air Force Base, if that happens we will do this. Well, as it evolved over the next — the planners had at least been very insightful because we checked off just about every one of those trigger mechanisms so you implicitly knew we were getting close to it. We positioned forces, we had, of course, a position there so really we had an area very well supported operation coming in where you almost had people waiting for you to catch you when you came down out of the sky.

That was it. The operation, as we know, went down — wasn’t it 22 December, I think? Did I miss my date?

BGEN SIMMONS: Twenty.

GEN MUNDY: Twenty December we launched it. I would say that it was, in my judgement something of a modified Grenada, Urgent Fury Plan of a few years before, the Rangers jump in and seize the airfield, airborne drops in a couple, we had elements of the 7th

Division, I think brigade and the 4th, Command Element of the 7th Division were down there. The Marines were there. The gunships were overhead. We had every piece of American hardware. We flew in the F-117s and dropped a couple of bombs, allegedly to make some noise. I do not know who did not get a piece of the action but most everybody did in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, all those successful in accomplishing its objectives Operation Just Cause were widely criticized as being much too heavy handed, clumsy in execution and too costly in lives and property. Will you comment on these criticisms?

GEN MUNDY: I can see some justification to that. I do not mean to say, “Gosh, it didn’t happen on my hands,” but as a practical matter this was not one which the Chiefs nor the OpsDepts really dealt deeply into. Had we, I don’t know, maybe we would not have changed anything about it but this was almost an off-line. This was a Chairman or CinC to the Army, approved by the Chairman, info to the Services.

When you are being briefed on something like that, it is compelling that every “T” has been crossed and every “I” has been dotted. It is hard to say that we will then come in with the F-117s and drop a couple of bombs, nobody wants to say that’s a dumb idea. Unless you really get into it and do the planning and then you might see it but as we were briefed on it there was not that degree of involvement to enable us to do that.

Was it clumsily handled? One might argue so. It was a very difficult situation. I think the introduction of forces was far and away beyond what was required.

We really had no need to jump paratroopers in at night and break their legs on concrete and put some of them out of the zone and land them in swamps. We had no real reason that I can think of to use the Seals except the Seals had to have a piece of the action. I mean as much admiration as I have for sailors I do not have much admiration for Seals. They can do some things well and they ought to focus on that but we turned the Seals, in cases like that, into an assault force coming across a runway. Why Seals? I mean, what possible role can you think of for a bunch of sailors assaulting across a runway when an infantry company or platoon would do it much more effectively?

I think we could have gotten in with less flamboyance but that is not the 18th Airborne Corps way of doing business, no criticism there but when you try and get a corps headquarters and a corps commander doing a small operation you do a corps-sized opera-

tion but with smaller pieces and that is kind of what we had. You have to take all the elements of corps-sized operations as opposed to having said maybe you could have gone down there with a couple of battalions and done the same thing or achieve what you wanted to achieve.

I think I probably would come down and say that once again ...

BGEN SIMMONS: ... Just Cause Operation and whether it needed to be that big or not.

GEN MUNDY: Again, hindsight is always good and my answer would be "no." I think we piled a lot of people and things in there that we probably could have done a little bit more sophisticated job of achieving the same thing that we wanted to do. But, remember that Gen Powell came and I am not at all — I do not really oppose this line of thinking, the philosophy became then and has continued until now that by gosh if we introduce force it is going to be overwhelming force, we are not going to have a situation where we go in with a modest operation and then come to find out we need reinforcements right away. You go in and black out the sky with paratroopers and have the SOF doing whatever it is supposed to do, that is sort of characteristic of joint operations today.

Yes, we were heavy there. We did accomplish what we wanted to do, albeit with perhaps arguably with some embarrassment. That was Just Cause.

I went, interestingly I got up at about 0100, got a couple of hours sleep and then went into the Crisis Response Center which is where Gen Powell and Secretary Cheney were seated and overseeing the operation. Once again, as I characterized earlier with Adm Crowe and Adm Howe, here is the Chairman and we were watching — principal thing to watch is CNN, so CNN is going on over here, we have got a couple of screens over here depicting force levels and what not, and then you've got a telephone line that is just held open in which Gen Powell is talking directly with Gen Thurmond at the other end, and as CNN would report that they are taking hostages in the hotel, I forget the name of the hotel, but anyway, hostages and Panamanians had moved in and taken hostages, well, Gen Powell would say, "Max, you better get some people over to that hotel," and so we moved. So, it really is operating the war by telephone in front of the television network.

Again, the J-2 who was there, the admiral who was the intelligence officer, characteristic of my earlier comment, with all of this going on around you, all of this technology, there was a grease map in the J-2's

hand and as Gen Powell, as they would talk about on the phone with Gen Thurmond he would say, "Well, Max, I am looking at the map here, looks like to me, that so-and-so side street would run right up there or something." So, once again we are back to the map sheet and the grease pencil.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 January 1990, the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 2,098,394 of whom 197,102 were Marines. We had come up a little in strength while the overall total of the U.S. Armed Forces had gone down. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: I don't think so. I think those are probably fluctuations. They may have risen, we may have frozen some enlistments or things like that as a result of the conflict in Panama but there was nothing that, there was no authorized end-strength increase that I am aware of.

BGEN SIMMONS: In January 1990, another recommendation of the Structure Board was implemented. The 7th Marines and its direct support artillery battalion, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines were moved from Camp Pendleton to Twentynine Palms. Any comment on the significance of this move?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this flowed again really from two factors and the principal one being, as we addressed I think in the last session, we talked about the 27th Marines and how it had come to stay at Twentynine Palms. Remember that the point was that though we had the 27th Marines we really did not have — we had a regiment, we had a regimental commander, we had some people in it, but we did not have the command and control capabilities, so when the 27th Marines would take the field the 7th Marines Comm Platoon would go up and be the 27th Marines.

So, the decision was made to do away with that regiment and to instead use one of the active regiments. The second factor was that Camp Pendleton, as we had gotten into the unit deployment system and as the battalions had been headquartered resident in ConUS and then simply fully deployed out to Okinawa we had overcrowded Camp Pendleton. We had, I believe, about 11 infantry battalions in there at the time in a camp which really was structured, or base, which was structured to hold nine infantry battalions. It was a little bit crowded.

We had the third element, I said two but the third element was that we had a good bit of construction going on at Twentynine Palms and so some of the best barracks and some of the best facilities that we would

have and maybe some of the best we have today compared with Camp Pendleton were being constructed at Twentynine Palms so it made sense to move troops up there to those facilities and to keep the 7th MEB alive.

BGEN SIMMONS: In June you were detached from your duties as DCS/PP&O. On 1 July you assumed command of Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic and the II Marine Expeditionary Force relieving LtGen Ernest T. Cook. Are there any other events that occurred while you were DCS/PP&O which you would like to discuss?

GEN MUNDY: I do not believe so again except to highlight that I was there for a long period. As you combined my three years in the department as a Plans Officer, lieutenant colonel and colonel, then that ending in 1980, then I found myself again in 1986 back in the department as Director of Operations. Really from April of 1986 to July 1990, as you characterized it, four years in the PP&O business, so a total of seven years of my senior years in the Marine Corps were spent in that department.

I guess, though I claim no expertise, I do not look back necessarily and think, "Boy those were the days of brilliance and so on." but the fact was that there was very little about the plans and policy business that I was not, generally speaking, the resident authority on. As I am going through my papers back here, I notice continuing education pieces that I would write on the origins of how we came to be prepositioned in Norway or the origin of Maritime Prepositioning Ships or no, no, we did not do it for that reason, we did it for this reason. I had an enormous amount of experience, and I would say that that experience, though it was not by design, but that experience coupled with my experience in recruiting which gave me a little bit of a manpower orientation probably prepared me about as well to be the Commandant as any combination of circumstances as I could think about.

It was a very natural move, subsequently, when I, as we will talk about later, when I came back to town, moving back into the Joint Chiefs of Staff business was like coming home after you have been away at college for a semester or something, it was a very easy and natural move. So, good preparation I think in my career for eventually coming to be the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is probably a good place to end this session.

Commanding Fleet Marine Force Atlantic

Change of command . . . Three major titles . . . Quarters on Admirals Row . . . Functioning as a component commander . . . Principal subordinate commanders . . . Deployments for Desert Shield . . . Other competing deployments . . . Embedding 6th MEB in II MEF . . . Reserve augmentation . . . Nomination by President Bush to be next Commandant . . . The confirmation process.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we explored your service as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations. As such, you were the Marine Corps' Operations Deputy and the principal assistant to the Commandant on JCS matters. In this session, we will cover your tour as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.

When it was announced that you were to be the new Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, two rumors flew around Headquarters Marine Corps. One rumor was that Gen Gray was sending you there so that you would have a major command to set you up to be the next Commandant. The other rumor was that he was sending you to Norfolk because you were getting too much high-level exposure. Did you ever hear those rumors?

GEN MUNDY: Interestingly, I never did. That's the first time that I've heard those. But I would say that probably the latter had more credibility than the former. If there was rumor, I suppose that came to my ear, when I went over to check out enroute to Norfolk with the Secretary of the Navy, then Larry Garrett. He made mention of the fact that I had been brought over by Gen Gray as a potential retiree, but that he wanted me to be around, so that he had played some part in insisting that no, I should go off and command after having spent several years in Washington.

Now, I don't know the credibility of that, but you will recall that when Gen Gray came in, he instituted what I thought was a rather good policy, and I did the same thing continuing as Commandant. He told all of us that when you were appointed to lieutenant general that he would want you after two years in grade to offer him your letter to retire and then he would be able to manage the general officer corps that way,

because somebody has to move aside in order for others to come up, especially in the Marine Corps with the small number of spaces in the three- and four-star ranks that we have.

So, at that point about the two-year mark, which had been coming up in 1990, I sent him up my letter and just said, "If you need for me to go, why I can certainly step aside and let me know when." He did not get—Gen Gray was not one to respond when you sent him a note, you rarely got a response back, sometimes he would orally see you in the hall or something. So I never heard anything back from that. But I am told that that letter, at least that offer to retire went over for discussion with the Secretary and the Secretary said no, keep him around another year.

BGEN SIMMONS: You assumed your new duties on 17 July 1990, relieving LtGen Ernest T. Cook. Do you recall any of the circumstances or ceremonies surrounding this assumption of command?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a fairly straightforward change of command. Gen Cook, who had long been one of my heroes, he was an absolutely splendid officer and was himself one that bore I'm sure significant consideration to be the Commandant at that particular time. Had done just a magnificent job down at Norfolk at leading the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic. He wanted to do a fairly clean-cut easy change of command, so we had about a week. I reported in, he had some other affairs that he was attending to elsewhere around the force, a quick trip to Europe to make his farewell. So I was handled by the staff being brought up to speed and then he came back and we had a change of command right there in Norfolk. A late afternoon affair, it was in the summer service Charlie uniform with only a representative company from each of the major units. A company from the



Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1988, Mundy served as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic/II Marine Expeditionary Force. He served three years as a lieutenant general prior to his selection as Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1991.

wing, a company from the division, the security forces, the Force Service Support Group and the Headquarters Battalion. And we had that right in front of what had been the Marine Barracks at the main Navy Base.

So, nothing remarkable about that. It was the standard change of command. Ernie wanted to hold that in Norfolk, unlike the previous changes of command over the past few years, of which the CG, Gen John Miller, or then Gen Gray, went down to Camp Lejeune because that was the bulk of the Marine Corps. But when you did that, you got very few of the admirals and very few of the Navy contingent would come down to Camp Lejeune. So I think Ernie wanted more than anything else just to tighten our lines with the Navy. So we held it in Norfolk so the preponderance of attendees were the SACLant, the CinCLantFlt, the Second Fleet Commander and the admirals with whom the CG FMFLant worked.

BGEN SIMMONS: The day after the change of command, a large party of Czechoslovak Army officers headed by LtGen Anton Slimak, S-L-I-M-A-K, paid a two-day visit to Camp Lejeune. Were you involved in this visit?

GEN MUNDY: No, I was not. And as I reflect back on it, I can't tell you why I was not, other than the fact that they were handled by the Deputy, that is MajGen Bill Keys was down there, and that was not extraordinary in itself. I believe, as I reflect upon it, that there was some reason because of a meeting at the CinCLantFlt Headquarters or something that I stayed around Norfolk. But I was aware he was there. I had no specific play in his visit.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your new assignment brought you three major titles: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic; Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Europe. Where were the headquarters for each of these commands?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Norfolk, of course, headed the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. The II Marine Expeditionary Force was headquartered at Camp Lejeune. The Fleet Marine Forces in Europe were at that time still headquartered in London, although they moved during my tenure up to Stuttgart, Germany so that they would be close to the U.S. European Command. London had become rather—it was a nice place to live and a nice place to have a staff, but it was not a scene of activity. And so, we needed it as a component to the CinC, vice as a Fleet Marine Force element, we needed to get up closer to the unified commander. So Stuttgart was an ideal place and it's working out very well.

There was a fourth title. I think at the time that we were talking about, my duties as CG 4th MAB a few years earlier, at that time, the Commander of the Marine Striking Force, Atlantic, which was a NATO hat, was vested at the MAB level. Gen Gray came in and changed that for good reason and wisely I believe, to be vested in the II MEF hat, as a dual hat. It was the NATO hat. For example, the Commander of the U.S. Second Fleet has a dual title as the Commander of the Striking Fleet, Atlantic, which is a NATO one. So he in that capacity then responds directly to SACLant as opposed to the U.S. Commander CinCLant.

I had a similar relationship. So really the title was too long, as a practical matter. The striking fleet activities, the NATO activities were handled somewhere amongst any one of those former three that we talked about. If it was a matter in Europe, then usually the FMFEur staff would deal with it. If it was in Norfolk, it was a SACLant matter, why that was something that the FMFLant handled. So there were

really four hats and three staffs to deal with each of those functions.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you divide your time between these commands?

GEN MUNDY: When I got there, I would as a general rule, I would spend three days in Norfolk and two days in Camp Lejeune. It was a pretty easy flight. You would go over and get a C-12 aircraft and fly down to New River, about a 45-minute flight, and almost that long to drive over to the main base. But anyway, within an hour and a half, you would be in your other office. So I would routinely start off the week in Norfolk with a staff meeting with the Fleet Commander on Mondays. Sometimes would spend Tuesday there, go down to Camp Lejeune Wednesday and Thursday and then back up to Norfolk on Friday. And it would vary, because there was travel both down to the Caribbean for the Southern Command and then over to Europe. So sometimes, I would go a couple of weeks maybe not being at Camp Lejeune.

But that changed very quickly, as I'm sure we will get into here, because with the outset of the buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf, more of my focus went really to Camp Lejeune and to Europe, as we can talk about the relationship of those two later. So then, I would spend maybe three days at Camp Lejeune and a couple of days in Norfolk as a routine.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where were your quarters?

GEN MUNDY: We actually lived in two houses in the Dillingham Boulevard area, which is where the admirals live down at Norfolk. Those houses were part of the 1907 Jamestown Exposition that was held on that land, and they were built just as shells, any state that wanted to build a house for the Exposition. Then when the Jamestown Exposition was over, they were turned over to the Navy because it was on Navy property and the Navy was expected to maintain them. So the way that they maintained them was to turn them into flag and general officer quarters. And they are grand. The wind blows through some of the cracks because they're not well made houses, but they're grand in style.

We lived first in Farragut House, because the traditional Marine quarters which is Michigan House since about 1947. Since that time, that house has been occupied by a Marine. It was undergoing fairly extensive renovation, so we were in Farragut House from our arrival there about the first of July until the end of December, then moved over to Michigan House and really only lived there through May when I was

detached to come back to Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you also have quarters at Camp Lejeune?

GEN MUNDY: Did not. The Puller House, which is the senior officers guest quarters there is very accommodating, has a kitchen and a nice living area. So I became, I guess I'm the most frequent name recorded in the guest register in Puller House there. There are five suites in there—no, there are three suites. I stayed in all of them a good bit during that next year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have three distinct staffs for these commands or did the staffs overlap?

GEN MUNDY: There were three distinct staffs. There were three chiefs of staff and the staffs were distinct. However, as a practical matter, where you live and where you are becomes the dominant staff. So the FMFLant staff was without doubt, not by my intent, but was without doubt the dominant staff. It was the largest. I was principally headquartered there personally. It had the Deputy Commander of FMFLant was there, and so as a practical matter the other staffs tended to—for example, the chief of staff at II MEF would as a matter of routine call the chief of staff at FMFLant to check on a matter even though it dealt with II MEF. Sometimes he would call me direct if it needed to be done.

But there were three separate staffs. The staff in Europe was very small, about 35 people, probably which made it one of the most efficient that I've ever seen because we had staff sergeants doing things that we would have lieutenant colonels doing back in Norfolk or down in Camp Lejeune. We were rank heavy in the two staffs in the United States, and rank thin in Europe and extremely efficient and admired in Europe perhaps as a result of that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's talk about each of these commands in turn. First Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Your Deputy Commander until 31 August 1990 was BGen Frank A. Huey. On 1 September, he was succeeded by MajGen Michael P. Sullivan. Were these full-time assignments?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, they were.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you use your deputies?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Norfolk deputies served a great utility, because as we had reorganized since

then, what I had a notion of when I went down there and what I came to be convinced of, was that the main function that could be accomplished in Norfolk was that of a component function. Because while the Marines would dispute that we were a type commander, a Navy type commander — the destroyers, the cruisers, the air and the Marines and the service elements — would be considered as one of the fleet type commanders. The Marines resented that, but as a practical matter, we were that to the fleet commander. But with the increasing weight and authority of the unified commanders, the Marine commander—I spent more of my time and focus dealing on matters with the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, and because of my NATO hat with SACLant, that was his other hat. So I dealt with those two staffs far more than I dealt with the fleet staff.

So componency is what the Fleet Marine Force staff did. Now, as to what a component staff does, a component staff is really a managerial staff as opposed to an operational staff. That is to say, when the aircraft in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing were not being adequately supplied with parts or when our flying hours were being curtailed, we had to represent that issue in Norfolk. And so, the Deputy who was historically there, I don't think in every case, but in 90 percent of the cases, was an aviator, his principal interface was with the Commander of Naval Air Forces of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet because that's where the sustenance for Marine air came.

The deputy therefore played a very significant role in matters relating to aviation, but because the commanding general, me in this case, was on the road so much of the time dealing with matters in Europe and dealing with II MEF matters, he in effect was acting a great majority of the time. The deputy at Lant had no relationship with the II MEF or with the Fleet Marine Forces in Europe. He was focused strictly in the Norfolk area, and on the componency.

BGEN SIMMONS: We had de facto component status, but not yet —

GEN MUNDY: That's right. Everything that we did was the same as any one of the component commanders did, but we were a little bit cluttered because we had to deal both—if I went to CinCLant for example and represented an issue, then I was obligated because of my Lant Fleet connection to then run out that door and run to the next building and go tell the fleet commander what I was about, otherwise he would assume that the Marines were trying to jump the chain of command. So it wasn't a very neat arrangement. It

was, as you say, a de facto componency arrangement. But depending upon who the fleet commander was, and in my case there was really not much friction there that I could tell, but some fleet commanders could make it very hard on their Marine commander for feeling that they should be representing issues to the CinC, not the Marine. And that wasn't the way Goldwater/Nichols came out.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will name your principal subordinate commanders. Most would soon have a key role to play in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I ask that you give a brief assessment or description of each. First, MajGen William M. Keys, Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.

GEN MUNDY: Well, Bill Keys I will characterize as a classic division commander. He's really a man of considerable sophistication. He likes to disguise that behind the image of a rough, tough Marine, and he is the latter. He was one of the most distinguished company commanders in Vietnam and highly decorated, Navy Cross, Silver Star, very well decorated in his company grade years. And is recognized then, and I believe now, as one of the best operational, the best warfighters, if you will, that we have. So I could not have had a stronger division commander than Bill Keys. He knew the division, he had been the Assistant Division Commander. He had commanded the 6th Marines, he had been in the division several times I think in his career, and so he had a good handle on it. Very well thought of in European circles for example. When I would send Bill over to one of the conferences, he represented what people wanted in a Marine. He was tough and he was no nonsense and if somebody wanted to fight, well Bill Keys was ready to join in. A very good division commander.

BGEN SIMMONS: MajGen Richard D. Hearney, Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

GEN MUNDY: Well, Rich Hearney, I had become associated with the first time when we served on a selection board. He was then a colonel and I was a two star. He was working for the then-DCS/Aviation, LtGen Keith Smith. When the board was over, I wrote Keith Smith a note and said I had not known Rich Hearney before, but I would say this about him. I would want him on any board that I could think of, I would want Rich Hearney to brief my case unless there was something wrong with it. Rich was one of the quickest studies, most thorough, most insightful men that I have known to this very day. He's the

Assistant Commandant now as we speak.

As a wing commander, he was a good leader, but his forte I think lay in being literally on top of every operational matter in that wing. When we deployed the Marine aviation to the Gulf War, a little bit later in our saga here, Rich Hearney put that entire package together. And the Marines were lauded by the European Command for the way that the Marine aviation flowed through Europe, not a dot was failed to be put on top of an "I". He just was magnificent in his attention to detail. Though one might think of a wing commander flying around the sky, the wing commander must above all be a good, efficient, safety-oriented, technically-oriented manager of aviators and aviation machines themselves. And Rich Hearney was that in spades. So a superb man for that particular time in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

BGEN SIMMONS: MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, Commanding General, 4th Expeditionary Brigade.

GEN MUNDY: Harry Jenkins and I had served together on more than one occasion when I had his job as CG 4th MEB some years earlier, Harry had the 2d Marine Regiment at that time, and that was more or less the cold weather regiment. So Harry would go off to Norway with me for various expeditions that we did. And he was known and admired there. Tremendously competent from the tactical standpoint. He had just, as I recall, he had come to that particular position of command from being the Deputy Chief of Staff for Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs and then had some C-4 experience as well. Harry was competent in all areas and was again an superior tactician. He had not had I think extensive, that is to say more than most of us had, experience in matters amphibious. He knew about as much about being a deployed brigade commander as I guess any of us did at that time. But, of course, he gained and became if anything the most experienced of us because of his upcoming lengthy deployment. And I would say to his credit here, in the event that it doesn't come in later, that the current Marine Corps view of operations into the 21st century, which we had titled "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," was authored by MajGen Harry Jenkins after his experiences in the Gulf. So Harry turned out to be one of the best amphibians, if you will, that we had in the Corps, and could not have been more experienced with regard to running the brigade than he was.

BGEN SIMMONS: BGen Charles C. Krulak, Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support

Group.

GEN MUNDY: Well, if you have Chuck Krulak around, you very rarely want for information. He again is on top of everything. I called him lightheartedly the "whirling dervish," because we had a joke going around down there, at least between myself and the Chief of Staff, that no matter where you went at Camp Lejeune, Gen Krulak would come out from behind a bush, he was always there.

He had been the Assistant Division Commander and then had just moved over to the Force Service Support Group. And characteristic of him, tremendously knowledgeable professionally and a quick study. He's the type individual that when he was given command of the Force Service Support Group, within two or three weeks he knew more about it than just about anybody there.

So, as it turned out, as far as the man to deploy the II MEF forces to the Gulf, we could not have had a better man in position than Chuck Krulak. He literally knew his business, he knew logistics and was a tremendous leader as well with his orientation on families, and looking after our families was certainly my own philosophy. But I think within the 2d FSSG among all the elements there we talked about, that they had the strongest family support program as well.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col William C. Fite, Commanding Officer, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

GEN MUNDY: Bill Fite, a favorite of mine, a superb professional. I wish Bill would have been a general, as many did. It's a function of the number of spaces at the time, but he certainly was a contender. He was a superb colonel and a first class Marine expeditionary unit commander. I saw him both in the Mediterranean, I saw him back at Camp Lejeune as he was working up for deployment, and I have nothing but admiration for him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col James L. Jones, Jr., Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

GEN MUNDY: Another one of our best and brightest. I know that it would seem like I should say that well this one wasn't too strong, but as a matter of fact as you come down the list, I really couldn't have made a mistake with subordinate commanders like this. Jim Jones, many thought when Col Jim Jones emerged from five years in the Senate Legislative

Affairs Office that he had probably been spent out, that he had been used up on Capitol Hill and had become more the politician and less the Marine. Nothing could be further from the truth. Jim Jones, of course, comes from great Marine Corps stock. His father Jim, and his uncle, William K. Jones, both having been Marines of distinction, in World War II. But Jim, I think was the right man for the times because the nature of so much of what the deployed units do is not so much warfighting for a Marine expeditionary unit, but it is alliance building and peacemaking, if you will, peace enforcement, as it turned out to be. So that requires a tremendous amount of diplomacy, as we send a colonel and a couple of thousand Marines off into the Mediterranean or into the Western Pacific and they're expected to oftentimes exercise or engage with eight or nine foreign countries and their armed forces. They're most of the time Marines, but often times Army or even Air Force units.

So it takes a lot of diplomacy. Jim Jones from his days on the Hill and from his own personality brought the very best to that. And subsequently, when he led the American forces that went into northern Iraq during Operation Provide Relief there, and was—even now, I know that Gen Shalikavili to this day would remember back to Col Jim Jones and the magnificent job he did, not only of employing his force, but of his diplomacy face to face with Iraqi commanders and with the Kurds and many others in the area.

So a young colonel, he had just come down from being the Military Secretary to the Commandant. Had not been in the FMF for some years, but it took him about 30 seconds to get up to speed.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Granville R. Amos, Commanding Officer, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit, succeeded on 21 September by Col Wheeler A. Baker.

GEN MUNDY: Granny Amos, as we knew him, that was his nickname, Granny Amos had the aviation combat element in an earlier deployment when we introduced forces going into Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury, and was acclaimed because of the way that he employed his reinforced squadron during that time. So he's very well thought of. I think he was a good man. I would be very candid, Granny was deployed when I got there. He was off the coast of Liberia shoring up operations there. He then came back in and was relieved and was transferred. So I really in effect, I was aware that Granny was out there. I was at his change of command, and that's the exposure. He subsequently was selected for BGen at

that time and retired as a general in the Marine Corps. So obviously a good man.

He was relieved by Colonel Wheeler Baker. Wheeler Baker was probably one of the best that we could have had in that type assignment. However, he was one of the most frustrated men, because Wheeler was always a bridesmaid. He was not able because of the demands of deployment in the Gulf and then our back-to-back subsequent use of the other two MEUs, Wheeler did not get much activity as a MEU commander. He sat around and waited with great frustration and with many many approaches to me to in effect say "put me in, coach." He really wanted to get involved in some of the operations, but we simply didn't have the shipping, we didn't have the troops, we didn't have a MEU's worth of capability left to give to the 22d MEU after we deployed the force to Iraq.

BGEN SIMMONS: I don't think I ever met him, but he enjoyed a tremendous reputation.

GEN MUNDY: Deservedly.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just was sort of pinched out by lack of opportunity.

GEN MUNDY: He did, it was one of those times when had you been there six months earlier, fate would have dealt with you differently. It was unfortunate from the standpoint of the contribution that he might have made. We had to have some, if you will, reserve in the force, and Wheeler and his staff wound up being very much that reserve, though we had a possibility that we would have to use another element. We never did, so he kind of stood by and waited and the war passed him by.

BGEN SIMMONS: Col Gary A. Blair was the Commanding Officer of the Ground Defense Force at Guantanamo at this time. Did anything exciting happen during this period at Guantanamo or on the surrounding waters?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall something that happened, unless it was migrants, which we had dealt with for several years down there. But I don't recall, that one escapes me, if it did.

BGEN SIMMONS: There must not have been something.

GEN MUNDY: Okay, oh I thought you knew some-

thing I didn't.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. Col Thomas C. Taylor was your Chief of Staff at Norfolk. Did you choose him or inherit him from Gen Cook?

GEN MUNDY: I inherited him. I inherited a number of officers. One of Ernie Cook's strengths was not only that he could identify some of the best and the brightest, but that he also had the ability to reach out and get them. He had, I think, no reservation at all about calling the Personnel Management Division and having officers assigned down to II MEF. He was successful at that. I have always operated under a different philosophy. Sometimes, most of the times, it served me well and sometimes it hasn't, and that's the Commandant's job or the Commandant's staff officers' job and whoever they sent me would be fine and it worked out.

But Ernie had built up a group of very very fine officers. And Tom Taylor was probably the best Chief of Staff that I've ever seen. Another officer, who I know must have—though I was not on his selection board—but he must have stood very strongly in consideration for general. He was dominating because of his professionalism, but he was not dominating in personality. Tom Taylor was a leader, and people followed him, the classic chief of staff and I was pleased to have him.

The other inheritants that I got from Ernie Cook, there were several others, but the other one of note was LtCol Wallace Duncan, or then Maj Duncan. He's a Floridian—we called him Gator. He's a helicopter pilot, Gator Duncan. And he remains to this day one of my really closest friends. He was Gen Cook's aide and then I inherited him as an aide. He was the Cunningham Award winner this year, Aviator of the Year for Marine Aviation. I'm extremely proud of him.

So, I was served by an aide-de-camp that I didn't even have to think. Gator Duncan knew every direction I was supposed to go and had been experienced for a year with Ernie Cook before I got there. So he knew how to get around, what the buttons were to push and was extremely good. He and Col Taylor were a twosome. They were both racquet ball players, they ran together, they were good friends. And so it worked very well that my Aide and the Chief of Staff were so close together. They knew me like a book and as a result I never wanted for information or being sent on the right track at the right time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Obviously, you were well served

by your subordinates. Who were some of the other key officers you might think of?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Chief of Staff down at Camp Lejeune at II MEF was Col Tim Roberts—Tom Roberts was his name actually, but we called him Tim. Tim Roberts again was equal in every capacity, different personality, but very much as effective as Tom Taylor. So I had a tremendous Chief of Staff there.

The Chief of Staff in Europe at that time was Col Don Gressley. Don had just come from the European Command over to that job, so was also extremely knowledgeable. I was well served there.

Col Mike Hayes became the Chief of Staff at II MEF when Tim Roberts was transferred on fairly short notice out to Hawaii to be the brigade Chief of Staff out there.

I had Col Tom Wilkerson as the Assistant G-3. Tom had just come down from Washington. Remember that he had been on the Chairman's Staff Group with Admiral Crowe. We talked about him in an earlier session. So Tom Wilkerson, who is today a major general, was one of the best and brightest that I had there. Also underplayed, we were heavy in colonels. And as usual, seniority counts. So Tom worked for a colonel named Ron Oates, who was also a superb officer. Ron was a G-3, Tom as the Assistant G-3 under him.

I had Col Gary S. McKissock, today BGen McKissock as the G-4 down at II MEF, a superb logistician, one of the best I've ever seen. He was the Chief of Staff for Chuck Krulak with the 2d FSSG in the desert, a very experienced warfighter.

Those were characteristic. Again, the staffs in Norfolk and in Camp Lejeune were probably top heavy. We had too much talent, and as a result, you had people like the Tom Wilkerson's of the world who should be able to stand on their own right that were really seconded to another colonel. That's not a good relationship to have, but it was sort of a place to be able, for the monitors to be able to assign a colonel to the operating forces to get in some operational experience. But we oftentimes, we under-used them.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just for the record, the strength of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, when you took command in July 1990, was 3,775 officers, 41,492 enlisted Marines. The strength would stay virtually level until December 1990. Do you recall any significant personnel problems in staying at this level? And were you satisfied with MOS and grade distribution?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there were not significant prob-

lems staying at that level that we at least managed at the force level. That would be Headquarters Marine Corps' concern, keeping us up. We were still under-strength even at that level. As you know, the wartime T/O for that MEF would have been about 53,000 or 54,000 Marines, and so we were probably about 10,000 under what it would have taken to round it out.

As to grade and MOS shortages, we continue today, we have not solved that problem yet. We continue to have significant difficulties with the small or the low density occupation specialties. That is in the electronic maintenance company, for example, or ordnance or those types of combat service support elements, you have a very few radio repairmen. But when we deploy in smaller units, it's necessary to pull one or two of those out of that particular company to send them on deployment. When you only have five or six there, and when usually you're manned at about 85 percent, so you've really only got maybe four out of five that are there, and you take one off on deployment or so, then you're down to 75 percent effective here and you're very thin with your forward deployed units. So that was a difficulty that we experienced then.

The other area would be in aviation. We are today, I think really in threadbare conditions in the maintenance side of our aviation house. And that's not an accusation of anything either before or subsequent to me. I was not able to correct that. It may be that we kept too many squadrons at the expense of thinning out those squadrons, not in terms of pilots, but in terms of the maintenance, the lance corporals and corporals that maintain the aircraft and do that sort of thing.

The third element that had to do with personnel matters was that we were fairly severely impinged by the women Marine deployment and employment policies in those days. We had then, as we have now, I don't know how many women we had in the Corps then, probably maybe 9,000 or so, 8,000 or 9,000. And these women in many cases very fine Marines, in the majority of cases very fine Marines, were assigned to billets within say the division, in the division communications company, but they could not deploy by Marine Corps policy. So as a result, as you made up deploying units, you pulled from only the male population to deploy. And the women were frustrated that they couldn't go and the men were frustrated that they were on their second time out in a year.

So that was a very difficult area to manage. And it came to be a fairly significant problem when we got to deploy forces off to the Persian Gulf, which we can talk about later. But those were the main personnel

difficulties.

BGEN SIMMONS: In reviewing your command chronology, I see that you were authorized 464 aircraft and had 474 on hand on 31 December. These would all be in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, I suppose or its detachments. Among the more significant types you had on hand 30 A-6Es, 97 AV-8Bs, 88 CH-46Es, 19 CH-53Ds, 39 CH-53Es, and 74 FA-18As. This is a rather large air force. In ground equipment, you had 3,770 trucks, 89 tanks, 200 amphibian assault vehicles, 117 light armor vehicles, 342 pieces of artillery. In almost every category of major end items, you were at or above your authorized level. I would guess that Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic was never at a higher peacetime level of material readiness. Do you agree?

GEN MUNDY: I would agree. We were in very good shape. In some of the aviation numbers, though not many, we were in transition. For example, we were transitioning out of the A-6s and into the FA-18Ds, so we had both FA-18s and A-6s on hand. And even during my year there, we thinned down a little bit of that. But we were, I think, in very good material condition. The gear was up and working. The aircraft were flying. We did have an A-6 problem. The A-6s were having to be rewinged because of some fractures in the metal wing of the A-6 and they had come up with a fiberglass fix to that. So we were limited in the number of Gs for example that an A-6 could pull. You had to more or less fly them on the straight and level unless they had these new wings on them. So we really were not—to put those in wartime use would have been risky and we didn't send any of them to wartime use.

But other than those sorts of things, and the routine, like the fact that tank engines cost a lot of money and we burn out a lot of tank engines. So we would have had some areas that on any day in the various commodity area of the force, that a commander would be concerned about. But not concerned in the sense that we could not go to war or that we could not fight once we got there.

BGEN SIMMONS: The deployments of FMFLant forces in support of Desert Shield dominated all else during the period from your assumption of command to the end of 1990. But there were other continuing requirements such as providing a landing force for the Sixth Fleet, the so-called LF6F deployments, the continued counter-narcotic operations and so on. Would you comment on the tempo of operations and how did

you cover all of these requirements?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the tempo of operations three weeks after I arrived in Norfolk became extreme, because it was at that time that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and we began the deployment of our forces very early in August. And then that flowed over, as you accurately characterized it, that became the dominating feature of my almost year of command down there.

As to covering, we did that a couple of ways. One we can talk about a little bit in more depth later, and that was that the Reserves were activated to come in to backfill and in fact to go off to war and then to back fill some of the active duty forces later on when we had deployed the bulk of the MEF.

But as far as the other commitments, it was my belief, and I know that Gen Gray shared that belief, that the Marine Corps should virtually, at all expense, should continue to meet our commitments, because what was apparent was that the Army—I won't speak so much for the Air Force, I think that probably relates there, too—but the Army in particular when it became time to deploy to go off to war, had to literally stop almost everything else it was doing. And I believe that if the Marine Corps was to live up to the characterization as the nation's force in readiness, that we had to continue to meet all the requirements on us until simply that became impossible to do. So as a result of that, we stretched thin, we . . .

GEN MUNDY: . . . And I was saying that we used our people very hard but we met the obligations that the force was obligated to do. We continued to deploy without break. We continued to deploy the Marine expeditionary units to the Mediterranean. We did, because the Fleet, when we deployed the 4th MEB off to the desert, that cancelled the major NATO exercise that was being held in September of that year. I personally went up there into Norway, and I went along with Admiral Bud Edney who was then the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. We went to Norway on our own because the other allied forces had been unable to come, just to represent the fact that even though we could not send ships, or in my case send Marines, at least a few principal commanders would continue to be on hand.

So, whether or not that is meeting the commitment in the eyes of the Norwegian, it was meeting the commitment because the commitment to them as we talked before was more political than it was practical. And here in the midst of our very heavy deployment of forces, for the two principal commanders to come

up for about three days of exercises, I think was significant for them.

On the other areas, the counter-narcotics operations, the continued support for that both in the Caribbean and along the southwest border and even into South America, we just continued to do that. And timing worked out probably well for us because many of those were fall exercises that we were able to deploy to. So we in some cases, we sent Marines off to do an exercise and brought them home and 10 days later they were on their way off to Operation Desert Shield in the desert.

BGEN SIMMONS: Both the 26th MEU and 22d MEU were involved in Operation Sharp Edge, standing by for the evacuation of non-combatants in Monrovia, Liberia were they not?

GEN MUNDY: They both were. You will recall that that's where Col Amos and his MEU were when I got there, then he was relieved by Col Bill Fite with the 26th MEU.

GEN SIMMONS: That was an operation that wouldn't come to an end.

GEN MUNDY: Wouldn't. It was I think the longest period, I think it was something on the order of 11 months or so that a ship with Marine—one or more amphibious ships with Marines remained off the coast of Liberia, sustaining the ability of the United States to maintain an embassy there. And it was a superb example of the use of a sea base to do exactly that. The Marines were, the capability was in the ship, the Marines were in the ship. We would send a platoon ashore for security around the embassy, and then they would come back out. But the engineers would go in, I recall when water was not available at the embassy, why they took in a reverse osmosis water purification unit and made fresh water. So the embassy was at a time when Liberia was almost crippled, the embassy—don't mean to sound too soft—they were eating ice cream and steaks and lobster there because the ship could sustain that and take good care of the diplomats.

But it's quite an expensive commitment of resources to tie up a ship and 400 or 500 Marines for that type of diplomatic initiative. What we found is once the State Department gets hold of you—we found it again in Somalia later on—no ambassador is really willing to give up those Marines. He feels very good when he has a platoon of Marines or battalion of Marines for the matter.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your first deployment for Desert Shield came with the dispatching of a 10-man public affairs fly away team on 2 August. Did you do this to ensure the Marine Corps story would be told?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I would like to take credit for that. Really, we were tasked. The Headquarters was looking to build a public affairs organization there consistent with the deployment of I MEF, and so we were simply levied upon by the Director of Public Affairs to send out a team. So it really wasn't my initiative, but I think it's a great tale. And if we want to record it that way, we can so record it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, let's hope the U.S. Army never discovers that our first deployment to the Gulf was a 10-man public affairs team. It would confirm all of their worst suspicions. [Laughter]

GEN MUNDY: Yeah. Well, you will remember one of the subsequent notable reports that CNN did was of that warrant officer from II MEF who took over that detachment. There was a news piece where some public affairs people were escorting the reporters moving up through the desert and all of a sudden out came I think 15 or 20 Iraqis who wanted to surrender and here is this public affairs officer with his pistol out, shepherding them up. So even a Marine public affairs person can be a combat trooper when it's time to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 7 August, you sent the 2d ANGLICO to Fort Bragg to join the 82d Airborne Division. This must have reminded you of your own days with the 4th ANGLICO. Did the 82d use the 2d ANGLICO profitably?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think so. Actually, the closest relationship with units at Fort Bragg were between the rangers and the ANGLICO. The Rangers really liked to have the ANGLICO, the Rangers interestingly because of the type work they do and because of the type of air support that Marine air gives, the Rangers, I think, would take air support by Marine air any day over anybody else that's around. They really liked it because we fly at night, we did the laser target designation, so the ANGLICO came with the capability to enable the Special Operations Forces rally to exploit the air support. So the Rangers, once they "glommed" on to the ANGLICO platoon that was sent to them, they didn't want to let go.

As far as the 82d, the 82d as a practical matter with

the, I won't say demise, but with the significant decrease in naval gunfire support, the most Army units now, the 82d included, has its own FST teams, or Fire Support Teams, that can call in air support pretty much. So the real desirable function of the ANGLICO is that not only does it expand that capability for you, but it gives you a liaison with Marine units if they are on the plan. So as far as the use of ANGLICO by the 82d in the desert to a large degree, no I don't think they were really exploited there. The Rangers, again, we had a long time commitment of an ANGLICO platoon to the Rangers.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your first major deployment to the Persian Gulf was the deployment of the 4th MEB ordered by U.S. CinCLant Fleet on 10 August. Will you describe your role in this deployment?

GEN MUNDY: I will, both in the positive and I will have a couple of maybe less than positive things to talk about here. The 4th MEB was getting ready to embark to head off to Norway for one of the exercises there that would be a fall exercise. This would be a Teamwork type, Northern Wedding—Bold Guard Teamwork type exercise that was not one of the winter exercises north of the Arctic Circle, but it was in southern Norway and in the Baltic approaches. So we had a brigade that would be something on the order of probably 5,000-man brigade that was scheduled with Gen Jenkins in command.

At the time that the Iraqis invaded Kuwait and we were told we were going to deploy U.S. forces, I called then-LtGen Joe Hoar, who relieved me as the Operations Deputy and said, "You know Joe, we are getting ready to embark an amphibious brigade here and I think we could expand that. It's not in the force list for that contingency, but it is going to be Marines embarked." So anyway, that was presented "in the tank" by Gen Gray and Gen Hoar, and the Chairman bought it. So we swung, I think this is a characteristic flexibility of the Marines, from an outfit that had been training and working up the cold weather operations that was in fact completely oriented toward cold weather operations, we swung them almost immediately with no notice at all into configuring for desert operations. And we enhanced, we in effect, we wanted to move all, we wanted to assign to the 4th MEB all that we could of II MEF dependent upon amphibious shipping.

I went to see the Fleet Commander to tell him—of course he knew this because it came down through official channels to embark and deploy the 4th MEB. And what I found, I must say this with a modicum

certainly of respect for my Navy counterparts and so on, but I was stunned that at a time when we were deploying forces for strongly potential conflict, that the Navy's focus did not change in that the main concern of the Fleet Commander and of principal staff around him was the operating tempo of the ships. If we send these ships out there, it will take them six weeks to get out there, it will take them six weeks to get back, that's about three months. They're going to be able to be out there three months. And I was astounded. I said, "We're sending to potential war, if they're out there for three years, they will be there for three years." But I had great difficulty in penetrating the Navy mindset that was peacetime operations. We normally go out for six months. If you stay longer than six months, the families will come apart on us back here.

So at any rate, to get the eventual 13 amphibious ships that we were able to, meant that the Navy had to roughly double. I think it was as I recall, the exercise was to have about seven or eight amphibs in it, so this was roughly doubling the number. They had to pick up ships from a lot of places to deploy.

So, that was something that startled me frankly, because the Navy was not in a warfighting mindset. The Navy viewed this as just another annoying deployment, which would impact their operating tempo.

BGEN SIMMONS: In addition to the 13 amphibious ships, the Command Chronology indicates that six MSC, that would be Military Sealift Command ships were used to mount out the 4th MEF. You've indicated that there were some problems in marshalling the necessary shipping. From where did the 4th MEB mount out?

GEN MUNDY: Well, principally. Morehead City is the primary embarkation port for the II MEF in North Carolina. We also embarked some at Wilmington, the Port of Wilmington, and then out of Sunny Point, North Carolina which is the ammunition depot run by the Army but that's where we would bring in the ammo ships for example to load them up the ammo. And because it was nearby, we could get some other equipment down there that we would put aboard the commercial ships when they came in.

A brigade would require the then-classes of amphibious ships that we had, would take about 19 amphibious ships to deploy a full-up brigade. Again, we had 13, so we were short ships. The black bottoms, or the commercial ships that were brought in, the MSC chartered ships that were used provided

some capacity, but not an assault capacity. They were bulk carriers for the most part and you had to offload with a crane. Pierside you could do it, you could do some at sea but not very well with some of the Ro-Ro ships.

So the brigade was not well configured. We really stuffed everything we could get into those ships. The decision was made for example on the LHA that was going, that because of the desire for as much aviation as we could get over there, that we would embark a fourth squadron of 20 Harriers on board that ship, which made it in effect a Harrier carrier as opposed to a helicopter assault ship, which it's wonderful that it can fill both roles.

So we really had something of a bobtail MEB. We knew we needed fire power, so we took all the tanks we could get, we took artillery heavier than a brigade would normally have in it and we had a regiment of infantry, but we had to curtail a great amount of the combat service support that we would take along. We did send engineers and so on, but as far as a lot of the maintenance equipment, the brigade was short.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you go down to observe some of the mounting and sailings?

GEN MUNDY: I did. Well, that's what was going on, so I did that. Now, that's an interesting note, because I think Gen Gray became a little bit aggravated with me over that. Apparently the Commandant was getting some heat from the retired community of his advisors and counselors talking about why aren't we hearing anything about Marines deploying? All we're hearing about is the Air Force flying over and the Army flying over. So we got the word down, I got a call from Gen Hoar that said, "Look, the Commandant wants to get Marine faces on television, so do whatever you can to get the press attracted to the Marines." So I got my public affairs officer in and said "What can we do." He said "You're the magnet. If we offer up a lieutenant general, we will get the local press."

So I became really a chief public affairs person to try and get the views out that the Marines were embarking. That was very easy and natural for me to do because they were. And so when I would go down there and be around them while they were embarking, when CNN would show up, I would give an interview. What are you doing here, we're deploying a brigade, a brigade is this. Here we go.

I got a call about three or four days into this from Gen Gray one day, which was, to be very honest with you, it was the one call that I received from the

Commandant during my year of command. One Saturday morning, he said, "I was just in the Command Center here and I'm watching you deploy your forces." I didn't pick up on it, I said "Well, that's great. We have been successful in getting a lot of coverage here." He said, "Well I'm aware that, I see you every time I turn on the television set." So I got the message that the Commandant wasn't particularly happy that I was on as much television. But we did generate focus on Marine deployments. Of course, they would focus on me and then they would go talk to the troops. So I was really just kind of the magnet to draw them. But so much for that saga.

BGEN SIMMONS: It's a great dilemma isn't it, troop deployments and sailings are classified a big military secret, but make sure we have them published?

GEN MUNDY: Oh yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: There wasn't any doubt as to where the forces were going. I mean they weren't going to the Southern Atlantic for a UNITAS cruise or anything like that.

On 9 September, you hosted RAdm Carlos Hugo Robacio, Commandant of the Argentine Marine Corps at Camp Lejeune. Do you recall that visit?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I recall it very well. Admiral Robacio was, I thought, number one, a very personable and enjoyable man, number two a very fine commander. He had commanded the Argentine Marine battalion which had performed notably in the Falklands War, even the British had great respect for Robacio. He had been above-board, he had been, if you will, a worthy opponent and had fought honorably and had surrendered honorably when it was his time to do that. So he was very well thought of and still is today.

It was one of those things that is characteristic of the shift of focus that one must be in the midst of a very significant operational deployment. We were deploying aviation fairly heavily at that point. And suddenly you have to turn into an entertainer, into an escort for a visiting chief of service. But it was a nice visit. Of course, we had a lot of things going on that we could show him that were real world activities.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 25 September, you attended the dedication of the MOUT, Military Operations Urban Terrain Facility at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune. Will you describe that facility and its purpose?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it has been described as one of the most modern cities in eastern North Carolina, and that's a joke of course. But it was built as a complete town if you will. It has all of the type buildings that you would find in a town. It has a motel, it has a hotel, it has a church, it has a stadium, it has a fire hall and many other smaller buildings, some of which had been constructed to show battle damage so that you would have in some cases a house that was only half standing and there would be piles of stones and concrete blocks around, indicating that it had been hit by a bomb or had been hit by artillery. It has a sewer system where the Marines coming to train there could actually enter on the other side of the creek and come underground under the pipe and find their way around under the streets of the city and come up for clandestine operations.

So it is designed to enable us to do the complete range of combat operations in urban terrain or builtup areas, fighting in builtup areas but of street fighting, and house to house fighting, how to get into a building, how to clear a building. So it is just an absolutely superb facility. We have a retired master sergeant who is known as the mayor of the MOUT facility that runs it and that maintains it. And every unit at Camp Lejeune will at one time or another come out there to conduct training. It has given us a tremendous leg up in the preparation of our MEUs that are deploying because they're trained to an extent far greater than we ever had when we used to just put up some old wooden buildings out there and you would be taught how to throw a grappling hook up and climb a wall and swing through the window and go in and clear rooms. But this is a very sophisticated kind of device.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the next day, the 26th September you were interviewed by Vince Thomas for *Seapower* magazine. I presume this was a friendly interview?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, it was and always has been. Vince Thomas has always done a very positive interview. He is seeking to promote the naval services, so his purpose is not to find fault but rather to find strengths and to advertise that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 5 October, there was a posting and relief of the FMFLant sergeant major. Did you attend his ceremonies?

GEN MUNDY: I did, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you recall who the outgoing and incoming sergeants major were?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the incoming was Sergeant Major Tom Strzeckli, and that is S-T-R-Z-E-C-K-L-I, who I had known and I had asked to be posted as the sergeant major. The outgoing sergeant major escapes me for the moment, because I knew over the years that I was down there, I knew several of the sergeants major, but I'm confused on just which one it was. He was not my sergeant major. I had been there for a relatively short period of time, so he really was Ernie Cook's sergeant major and I did not serve extensively with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you ordinarily take your FMFLant sergeant major when you went to Lejeune and so forth?

GEN MUNDY: I did. That was something of a conflict and it had to do with our attempting to get coordination between the staffs. I believed that you have one commanding general, you have one sergeant major as the command sergeant major. But we had, because of again if you will, availability or excesses or what not, we had also a sergeant major that was posted as the II MEF sergeant major. As a practical matter, he was on limited duty. He was waiting to retire and he was on a medical hold for some extensive period while I was there.

But this was a little complicated because really a sergeant major should be a right arm of any commander. He should do things for you that instinctively you as a team do together. He should know you and know what your interests are and come back to you with the type of information that's useful or handle it in the way you want to handle it.

BGEN SIMMONS: He's more a member of your personal staff than the command staff.

GEN MUNDY: He is, yeah. And so as a result, the sergeant major of II MEF, I never really—when I was there, he would go along with me. But I made it clear, as it was becoming apparent that he was going to retire, that I did not want him relieved and that I wanted the Force Sergeant Major to be the Force Sergeant Major, whether it be in Europe or here—we didn't have that problem in Europe, we didn't have a sergeant major there. So Strzeckli would be that sergeant major.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 11 December, the deployment of the 2d Marine Division to Southwest Asia

was commenced. This was a very major deployment.

To what extent were you personally involved?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I guess I was pretty personally involved in fact up to the final hour. We had a II MEF review. We wanted to send these troops off right, and so before we begin the major deployments of the division, the force service support group, and indeed we were deploying even some elements of the wing. We assembled them all on the parade field at Camp Lejeune. We didn't have a parade, they didn't pass in review or anything. But we just assembled them in their combat gear, and the dependents were there, and it was to this day just a stunning sight. Because we had about 24,000 Marines on the field down there with MajGen Keys at the head of the division, and we had the entire division. We didn't have just a company from each outfit, we had every Marine that was going that could get out there. So it was an extremely impressive sight.

We had Gen Gray come down, we asked the CinC to come down. He didn't, the Fleet Commander came down for it. So we had them review the troops. And it was just a send-off. Gen Gray made remarks to them and fired them up, and I can recall that I really felt like a wimp, but I was the CO, it was my force, so I was out on the field there. I can recall turning around and saying, "Gentlemen, take charge of your formations and deploy them to South West Asia." It was a fairly historic moment.

But the deployment, as I mentioned earlier when we were talking about commanders, Bill Keys had foreseen, he thought the 2d Division would be deploying, so he had done a tremendous amount of training to prepare the division for that. A lot of mine-breaching operations, getting them task organized to where he really had an outfit that was ready to go to war. And, of course, we had good contacts with the other Marine units that were in the desert as to how to come and how to organize.

Probably the key man, I would say, in the deployment was then BGen Chuck Krulak. I mentioned earlier that Chuck knew the force service support group business hands down. When the deployment order came down for us to prepare to deploy, he walked in 10 minutes later with a complete schedule and layout of exactly when we needed to stop operating vehicles, how much time he would need to prepare them for deployment and to get them down to the embarkation sites, all of the medical support. He really was on top of everything.

So I would have to credit the force service support group and Gen Krulak as being the spark plug in the very successful deployment of the whole MEF that

was going over. This can get long, but I think that subsequently we will have a chance to discuss some of the reserve call-up and the anticipated commitment of the II MEF. But it was a very significant undertaking. Most of the troops went out of Cherry Point, which, of course, is our area port for departure on the East Coast, an enormous airlift, some 25,000 or so people that we lifted out of that area. And most of the equipment then was embarked in commercial shipping and was sent over to join up with the division when it got there. So for a while, we had embarked the equipment and sent it, and we had the division personnel standing by waiting to go. So we were at that point about as unready as we could have been to do anything, because our gear was gone, less small arms, and the Marines were waiting to leave at a time that they could link up with it when it got to the desert.

BGEN SIMMONS: From what you've said, Gen Krulak in effect was the embarkation officer.

GEN MUNDY: He was the MEF embarkation officer, without question.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was it ever contemplated that II Marine Expeditionary Force would take the field? And if so, would you have been its commander?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Gen Gray had mentioned to me as early as October, when I was here on a selection board, he stopped me in the passageway one day and said he intended to relieve I MEF. In other words, he also was viewing this, I think, as I MEF would be there for a period of time, maybe six months, I don't think the time was developed, but then we would relieve I MEF, perhaps leaving equipment and sending out II MEF. So he had alerted me to two possibilities. One, that if Gen Boomer was going to be relieved, that I would be the relieving commander. And number two, at that point, it had not been decided to double the size of the force or to bring the VII Corps down from Germany and so on. The force that was in the desert at that time was pretty much it.

Very shortly thereafter, Gen Schwarzkopf requested and in effect we doubled the size of the American commitment there. So II MEF's deployment actually was conceived as a relief for I MEF, but changed very shortly to a reinforcement of I MEF.

BGEN SIMMONS: Could you have been Commanding General, II MEF in the field and still execute your duties as Commanding General, Fleet

Marine Force, Atlantic?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, with the deputies that I had. Remember, that I had a major general at FMFLant at that time. And so, yes I could do that. That staff would have remained essentially in place. You had a deputy commander there and I could have deployed. Because as a practical matter, with the deployment of II MEF, there was very little other than the bases and whatever residual non-deployables that you had and families to take care of and so on. But there was no significant number of Marines or operating units there, so there would be very little for a lieutenant general to do at that time. So yes, I believe I could have done that.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you mentioned earlier, your chief of staff, II MEF, was Col Thomas W. Roberts until 12 September, after which it was Col James Mike Hayes. The II MEF Command Chronology says that during the second six months of 1990, the "embedding process of 6th MEB into II MEF was completed." What does that mean?

GEN MUNDY: Well, (laughs) we could go back for years probably, probably at that point five or six years, with the Marine Corps' efforts to define precisely what the structure of a MEF command element as we termed it—remember that when Gen Gray came in, he reminded us all that Marine Air/Ground Task Forces had four elements, a command element, a ground combat element, aviation combat element and combat service support. So the titles of what would have previously been known as headquarters of a MEU, headquarters of a MEF, or headquarters of a brigade was changed to command element of a brigade, a MEU or a MEF. So the command element of II MEF had been activated as a nucleus. And that meant that it had, as I recall, about 45 people in it initially for what would be a headquarters of probably 200 or more.

It had grown over time to be, at the time I was there, probably something on the order maybe of 140 or 150, but still was not an operational capable headquarters. This goes back some years again, but we had stood up brigade headquarters that were more capable than were the MEF headquarters under the compositing philosophy that if a brigade went out and was committed and needed to get larger, then you would bring this MEF command element in, pop it down on top of it, and you would have the capability of command and control on it which remained your MEF.

We tried that in a number of exercises, and exercises generally work. If you make a mistake, you learn some things, the problem was fouled up, the normal critiques. We had done that as exercises, we had never done it as a practical matter. But along the way, eventually, the leadership of the Corps concluded that the brigades as independent entities in addition to the MEF command elements were an expense that we weren't then affording and couldn't afford. So the concept then became to embed the brigade staff into the MEF command element, thus enlarging the MEF for normal day to day operations. And if and when the time came that you were going to deploy a brigade, you would simply uncouple this embedded staff, all of whom were identified as "MEBsters" as we called them, and that would be the brigade staff that would go off.

That has evolved into our doctrine today which envisions the fact that any force that goes forward, however large, a MEU if you get right down to it, is a Marine, little "e" and little "f" (ef) expeditionary force. And when we send out a unit of any size, that it really therefore becomes a forward element of its parent large Marine expeditionary force. We have now begun to title them a MEF forward, which could be a brigade size force, but then the main part of the MEF would come out and settle down on that and expand operations.

That's essentially what, if you think about it in the desert, when Gen Boomer took I MEF forward, actually 7th MEB went out with Gen Hopkins, and the MEF command element, more or less satellited on that until it grew and became independent and the 7th MEB went away, was absorbed into the other staff. So it worked fairly well in the desert.

BGEN SIMMONS: This might be a little redundant, but the term "CE II MEF" or command element, II Marine Expeditionary Force" keeps appearing. What does this mean?

GEN MUNDY: Well again, we would speak of a headquarters of a Marine Corps base. We would speak of a headquarters of the 2d Division, a headquarters of a wing, but for a MAGTF, we speak of a command element. It's a little bit confusing, and to be very candid with you, I think Gen Gray came in with a need and with a very strong direction to reorient the Marine Corps operationally and to make us begin once again to focus on warfighting and matters operational. And so, things like that were fundamental, to say look, if we only fight as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, and if the MAGTF has four elements and if

the headquarters element is a command element, then by God we call it a command element.

But unfortunately, to our sister services and allies, a lot of the Marine verbiage becomes very confusing. Any military outfit in the world, if you say I need to go to the Headquarters, you know where you're going. If you say I'm looking for the command element, most Germans and Koreans or anybody else will stop and say, "Well, what is it you're looking for?" So we tend to do it to ourselves, but for Marines, it causes you to think in terms that the function of this entity is to command that particular operational unit that's out there. So that's what command element is all about.

BGEN SIMMONS: You identified requirements for Reserve augmentation and reinforcement of forces in support of Desert Shield. As a result, 10,987 Reserve Marines were activated and brought on duty in December 1990. I'm sure you recall this. How smoothly did it go?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was one of the most smoothly accomplished events of that magnitude that I've ever witnessed. If you were not already a believer in, an advocate for, a rooter for the Marine Corps Reserve, all that you needed to do was be at Camp Lejeune during that particular period and you would become so overnight. Our mobilization and activation procedures and processes, that had been so painfully devised and planned and practiced over the years, just worked like a charm. There was nobody in any other one of the Armed Forces that came up like the Marine Corps Reserve did. Units flowed into these processing centers that were established principally by the Reserve Augmentation Units that were designed to do that, were set up in the gymnasium. The battalions arrived or the units of whatever structure, independent companies arrived, the aviation units the same way. And I will tell you, when they walked in, there wasn't a step missed and inside an hour they were processed, integrated and assigned to billeting.

There was a 10-day orientation program that was put together for them. I can recall an interview down at Camp Lejeune in which the interviewee had made the remark in response to, "What are you going to do when they get there?", was "Well, we will bring them in, we will get them a haircut, we will get them an ID card, check out their weapons and that sort of thing." I will tell you, there wasn't a Reservist that showed up at Camp Lejeune that needed a haircut or didn't have his ID card, that wasn't wearing his dog tags, that his



LtGen Mundy shares a Christmas day meal with his youngest son, 1stLt Timothy S. Mundy, in Saudi Arabia in 1990. Tim deployed to Southwest Asia for Operation Desert Shield, and was serving as the executive officer for Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

weapon was not functioning. It was magnificent.

I came out of that experience, I came into the Marine Corps as a Reservist, so I go all the way back to Reserve days, and I was an I&I and had a great deal of admiration for the Reserve. But I will tell you, anybody that saw the Reserves come in Desert Shield realizes that we indeed have one Marine Corps. Some of them may be stationed in Kansas City, but there's no difference when it comes down to it.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were some of the principal Reserve units you received?

GEN MUNDY: Well, principally the 24th Marines came up on this coast, eventually the 25th. The 8th Tank Battalion came through. A lot of the combat service support from the 4th Service Support Group headquartered down in the Southeast but nationwide. Comm companies, 6th Comm Battalion out of New York. Military police units and individual units like that, 14th Marines Artillery. We activated on both coasts, depending upon what they were doing. The bulk of them were activated on the East Coast because the East Coast was the principal sourcing location for units that would be going on into the Gulf. So the bulk of them came through Camp Lejeune. And the

bulk of the aviation units, not all of them, came to the East Coast because we were going to move them to the desert. A number of those that embarked with the 5th MEB from the West Coast had sailed out really to relieve the 4th MEB but didn't, again became a double up. A lot of the Reserve units, aviation units in particular, embarked on those ships. And many of them went to Okinawa and backfilled for the active units there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did any Reserve generals come to you as part of this call?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we had then-MajGen Mitch Waters was my Reserve deputy at Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. He would periodically come on active duty. So Mitch Waters, I've known him our entire career, we began together in the Marine Corps. But Mitch Waters is the type guy that if the Marine Corps paid him nothing it wouldn't matter, he would be here. So he was there most all of the time during the activation and the preparation of the Reserve units. Just because he was a Reserve general, he wanted to make sure it went right.

Gen John Cronin came down. To answer you, were there any generals assigned to me directly, no there

were not. But they were on hand depending upon their relative activity. Now the 4th MEB—I must take that back. None were assigned, but remember that FMFLant housed a Reserve brigade, which was the 2d Brigade, that was a Reserve outfit. And it was headed by a brigadier general. Gen Waters had just turned over that outfit. It was there as a regular unit that was stationed as a command element, that was stationed in the same building as II MEF at Camp Lejeune. That was BGen Joe Wilson at that time. But he was assigned before the conflict and he remained assigned during the conflict.

BGEN SIMMONS: The strength of the U.S. Armed Forces on 1 January 1991 was 2,340,354, of whom 197,764 were Marines. The call-up of Reserves was just beginning to make itself felt in the active duty figures. Almost half of the Corps' active duty strength would be in the Persian Gulf by mid-January, the largest number of Marines we had ever committed to a single campaign. On 16 January, Desert Shield became Desert Storm. On 24 February, the ground assault began. To what extent were you involved personally in Desert Storm? Did you visit the Gulf at any time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my involvement in Desert Storm was only one of support. I was the supporting commander. The Commandant had designated, properly, Gen Milligan, CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to be the Fleet Marine, the component commander, if you will, for the I MEF. The II MEF elements that went out were reinforcing elements to I MEF. It remained I MEF and FMFPac was the principal headquarters. However, because the flow of forces, as I mentioned earlier, was principally through the East Coast, I became largely—I and the staffs that were there—the coordinator of the deployment and the sustainment of Marine forces there. This is an anomaly of reality in Marine Corps operation organizations: FMFPAC was the operationally proper headquarters but FMFLANT was, the practical headquarters.

Again, much of the sustainment the Fleet Marine Force, Europe staff did an absolutely heralded job, which was heralded by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and others there in putting together the plan for example for the use of the hospital, they were the people that planned for where Marine casualties would come, into which hospitals, they got the uniforms shipped over there. The Marine Corps was the only outfit in Europe as we brought back fortunately very few casualties that came through, the Army was borrowing utilities and rain-

coats from the Marine Corps because we had them positioned over there. The FMFEur revised medical evacuation plan when the conflict was over, was requested by U.S. CinCEur as the model medical plan for all of Europe.

We didn't realize at the time just how rusty our entire mechanism—I'm talking the United States now—our entire United States mechanism in Europe had become. We had truly become garrison units. The hospitals that were there were accustomed to dealing with sick people in Europe and occasionally when a hostage would come out or something, they would be flown through. But the idea of massive wartime casualty flow had more or less stymied the overall medical operation there, and they just didn't know how to plan for it. And this little group of 35 or 50 Marines that did so much over there . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: — Fleet Marine Force, Europe, Desert Storm and Desert Shield. This is something we don't really think of very often.

GEN MUNDY: We do not, and I did not. Colonel Don Gressley was the Chief of Staff in Europe, and as I mentioned had come from U.S. European Command. So he had a masterful grasp—he had been in the J-5 at EUCOM—he had a masterful grasp of what EUCOM was supposed to do and he had just a most impressive ability to blend the Marines into that.

But to make a long story short, the FMFEur staff was the model staff and did so much. I was about to say that EUCOM in the Army view became in the after action view, became what they termed the COMMZ, the Communication Zone. And that means for every theater of operations you have, you have a Communication Zone. In this case, most of the supplies, most of the reinforcement, the hospitalization, all of that sort of thing came out of Europe to support the war in the Gulf. So the United States Communication Zone, communication not just in the sense of radio and telephone, but communications in terms of the flow of material and forces, the staging bases, the recovery bases and so forth, that was all in the European Theater.

So the FMFEur staff had a far greater impact in the deployment and the preparation for support and indeed the actual support of the forces in the Gulf than even the FMFLant staff, or certainly did II MEF. And arguably, had at least as much function as did the FMFPac staff in support.

BGEN SIMMONS: How much of this got your personal attention?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, a good bit. Because when I began to realize that, if you will, the center of support activity for the Marine Corps was going to be through Europe, I realized that it was my staff in Europe that was going to be the principal agency for doing this. So I was back and forth there two or three times to go over and visit the people in the European Theater.

So I focused on that. Principally, my focus for the most part was getting the forces deployed, and then receiving the Reservists. We talked about the Reservists that came on after the fact, after the mobilization for the war, or to deploy forces to the war. The 25th Marine Regiment was then activated and was sent in bulk to Camp Lejeune. So I inherited the 25th Marines, although again they were very thinned out because many of our Reservists had been augmented into other units. So it was a fairly light organization, but that would have been the II MEF rear. So what I had now in effect was a Reserve regiment and some residual aviation, we had a good bit of tactical aviation, fixed wing aviation still left down at Beaufort, the A-6s had all gone, but we had some F-18s and we still had some Harriers. Most of the helicopters were gone. We had the Reserves who came in, both Reserve squadrons and Reserve ground elements. And then remember, Col Wheeler Baker and the 22d MEU staff, that was the coherent staff that I still had remaining there.

I got a call from Gen Gray, in fact I said I heard from him once, I guess I heard from him twice, but I got a call from him to tell me that he was arguing for a second front in the war and that front would be through Northern Iraq, essentially where Col Jim Jones had gone in with his MEU, and that he wanted me as II MEF to prepare to execute that. So we did a good bit of contingency planning and looking at that part of the world and trying to figure the avenues in. As a practical matter, we had very very little with which to do it. It would have been a very light force going in there, but it was thought that if the operations bogged down and came to a stalemate, that one way of breaking that would be to introduce a force through the back door if you will and II MEF might have conceivably been that force.

BGEN SIMMONS: Political implications are mind boggling.

GEN MUNDY: They are mind boggling.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think there was probably more of a chance of an amphibious operation and do you

think that there was ever a real chance of an amphibious operation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think that as I would look back and as I spoke after that fact, that really if you think about the options that Gen Schwarzkopf had in the desert, he in effect had all of his forces on line in the attack. There was no reserve. Individual units may have—you know, I MEF may have had a reserve and XVIII Airborne Corps may have had one, but he had no division held in reserve. There were no exploitation force or reinforcing force. I always viewed, number one, that the afloat Marines provided him that capability, and number two, the only maneuver that he had after he went on line and was attacking, if the “Hail Mary” had not worked, had the Republican Guards come down and stopped or slowed down the U.S. attack, then the only maneuver that he had at that point would have been his amphibious assault force, which would have been introduced.

We did not have to go in through Kuwait City, could have gone on further north up into Northern Iraq. That would have been risky, but when I was over for a visit there over Christmas, Gen Jenkins and I sat down in his cabin on the ship and pulled out the maps and conceptualized various options for the amphibious force. And one that would have definitely gotten the Iraqis’ attention and caused them to divert main-line forces to come back up through Northern Iraq out into the swamp area, I can’t say the name of the place—not El Sabob, but where the river comes down, the contested island, just almost at the border of Iran, it would have been “iffy” because Iran could have reacted to that, we would have been very close to their borders. But there was an area up there which an amphibious force could have been landed and then there were road networks that ran right into the rear of where the Iraqi forces would have been. We knew that that was a possibility.

And again, I think that there was too much discounting of whether or not we could have landed at Kuwait. This generation does not tolerate easily the nature of amphibious landings that we had experienced 45 years earlier, but indeed we have sunk ships and blown mine fields apart and had a lot of people killed in amphibious operations before if you needed to do that.

I don’t think that Gen Schwarzkopf really ever envisioned using it. I think he found it to be a very good deception force with the many landings that were attempted and putting the Marines ashore. It did in fact draw five Iraqi divisions to face to the east instead of to the west to defend against what they thought would be a landing. But as far as the practi-

cality, it could have been done, it would have been very costly, and it should have been done only in the event that the war had gone downhill. So it was really a reserve option, as I view it.

BGEN SIMMONS: If there had been a large-scale amphibious operation, was there any contemplation that you with the II MEF would have been the commander?

GEN MUNDY: These things were not clear. I think to answer you, that was probably considered. It was indeed discussed at least once. I can recall up here at a meeting with Gen Gray when he mentioned II MEF could go out and do that. But as a practical matter, we had Gen Jenkins by that time was a major general, we had BGen Pete Rowe with the 5th MEF that had come around through the Pacific.

So you had, at that time, I think we had something on the order of, oh about almost 30 amphibious ships out there, because we had the Marine Expeditionary Unit with then Col John Rhodes embarked 13th MEU, so you had a pretty credible outfit out there.

My recommendation would have been, because of continuity and because the focus that MajGen Jenkins should be the amphibious force commander, whatever we wanted to call it, a MEF, if we chose to call it that, but that it would be Harry Jenkins. He was experienced, he had worked up, he had been out there for several months. I would have found it complicating if we then sent another staff down on top of an already experienced staff to do that operation.

BGEN SIMMONS: The redeployment of II MEF forces from the Persian Gulf began on 27 February 1991, almost immediately on the cessation of hostilities. Can you describe this retrograde process?

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course, it was a very happy moment for America and certainly for most of us who had sent off either those for whom we were responsible or loved ones, or whatever category you were in. But they began to fall back the same way they had gone out, principally by airlift coming in to Cherry Point, reactivating, hadn't been gone that long. Most of the units of II MEF had deployed over in December and here it was February we began receiving them back.

Now, the 2d Division was held a little bit longer, as it should have been. One, Gen Keys and his division were in a key location; it was a lousy location, but it was considered to be key for maintaining an effective presence. So we retrograded other U.S. forces or

other Marine forces back to the rear and left Keys and some of the 2d Division up there for a longer period of time in Kuwait itself in something of a blocking position if you will.

So he came back, as I recall, in April I believe, we began to get the bulk of the 2d Division forces back. The aviation forces retrograded as rapidly as tanker support could get them back in. That was one of the most impressive events that I've ever attended. We brought two squadrons back into Beaufort, two of the FA-18 squadrons. They had flown in from, they had come over from Rota, transatlantic from Rota then stopped out of the Gulf into Rota and on in. And they flew into Beaufort and we had all the dependents there and the bands playing and the Congressmen and me and everyone else. Here came these 24 FA-18's beautiful formation, bright, clear day and flew over and landed. And then they taxied in and they had really put this together well because they taxied the two squadrons in just perfectly. The squadron commander taxied them in, and the two behind him and three behind them and four behind them until we had all 12 of the aircraft in two squadrons.

And then the pilots climbed out, the squadrons themselves, the ground crews had come back about two days before by airlift. They marched to the center of the field and the squadron pilots came forward and the squadron sergeant majors unfurled the battle colors and the colors were home again. So it was very nice.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 April, President Bush nominated you to be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. When did you first learn that you were going to be nominated?

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course officially you learn when the Secretary of the Navy calls and says "I'm pleased to tell you that the President has nominated you." Before that time, I doubt that we have ever had a nomination of a Commandant that hasn't carried with it a few months of rumors and so forth about who it was going to be and the paper prints something and you get calls.

Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard was a very good friend of mine. And Dan had called me as this was emerging, I would say I guess a couple of weeks before that time, had called to say it's beginning to shape up. Secretary Garrett is coming down to the final calls and he said "I think you're going to be it." So, I had indications, I suppose, as early as, oh the 1st of April that it looked like I was going to be the Commandant. But of course, you don't know until

the White House announces those things.

So you would say, how did I find out, I guess I was given a very strong indication by Secretary Howard in early April. Then I found out formally by phone call. In fact, I was undergoing the Top Quality Leadership Training that had been mandated for all of the senior officers out at the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California, had gone out for that course, it was a scheduled course. I was out there that week, so I checked into the hotel and went off to class the next day and lo and behold, was besieged by phone calls. I tried valiantly to remain and be a student and to master the skills for about four days and then finally gave up and said, "I may as well get out of here and go home because every time I would sit down in class, the Chairman would call to congratulate me or somebody else would call," so it was a very disruptive time. So I went home and was the Commandant Designate, or Nominate, I suppose at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you think you were Gen Gray's first choice?

GEN MUNDY: No, I don't. Gen Gray has been my mentor and certainly one of the best teachers that I've ever had, and Lord knows he has been a patron in that sense. I served under him as a battalion commander when he had the 4th Marines, I served under him as a regimental commander when he had the 2d Division, as a MAU commander for exercises, as a brigade commander when he was FMFLant, as his Operations Deputy when he was the Commandant. So we certainly had a long linkage together and I have always known and admired him and respected him for his tremendous professionalism.

That said, we are completely different personalities. And Gen Gray, I think with what he had sought to achieve in the Marine Corps with returning the Marine Corps to an operational orientation. He wanted gunslingers, he wanted tobacco chewers, that was his image of a Marine. I think that very frankly, I believe that Gen Gray's first two preferred candidates would have been either Gen Bob Milligan who had an equal tenure of service with Gen Gray, or Ernie Cook, with me coming in at best as a third.

We would all have people that we would think more of than others. I think that Gen Gray thought to continue the operational focus that he himself saw, and if you will the revolution in military affairs in the Marine Corps, that Milligan was the man most like him in thinking and in operational orientation. But he has been, during my tenure as the Commandant, and certainly to this day, no one has been more supportive,

has given me more—when times were tough, would give me a call or come to see me or offer advice when it was sought. Gen Gray has been a very strong supporter.

BGEN SIMMONS: Describe the process by which a Commandant is chosen, nominated and confirmed.

GEN MUNDY: Well, there is a formal process, and I guess that would be the one to describe. There is an informal process as well. The process is political, there's no question about that, in that ultimately a political appointee is—the man who nominates you, the President ultimately nominates you, an elected official. But as a practical matter, I think that we emerge batches of officers who will contend to be the Commandant, and you could conceivably—I could have been a lieutenant general in 1987 and I would never have been considered to be the Commandant because I would have, as many others before me did, I would have passed out in midstream. It so happened that that group would come up. Usually, if we were fortunate, we would have at least three or four who could be considered and who the Marine Corps would throw its hat in the air and say we have a great new Commandant. Sometimes, it's been one or two and that doesn't give you a very good choice.

But at any rate, the process is a series of interviews. I mentioned earlier I believe, that when Jim Webb was the Secretary, that he had called me over and interviewed me at that time because he was looking for a two-star for a Commandant. But successive to that, of course, I had worked in Washington, so the Secretary of the Navy knew me. When I left in my out-call with him, I mentioned earlier in this interview that he said, "You were offered for retirement, but I want you to be around next year to consider you for Commandant." He didn't tell me I was the choice, he just said, "I would like you to be one of those that's up."

So at any rate, about a year ahead that process probably starts or even longer. Then there's a series of interviews. I was called to Washington to see the Secretary.

BGEN SIMMONS: Of the Navy?

GEN MUNDY: Secretary of the Navy, I was called to see him. Then I was called back to see the Secretary of Defense. So I saw Mr. Cheney. During those interviews, usually you were—if they know you, I knew both of those gentlemen, so the questions were rather—with Secretary Garrett was more of a discussion. "Would you like to be the Commandant?" Do

you think you could be the Commandant? What direction would you proceed?" With Secretary Cheney of course, it was "What do you think of the V-22" because he had cancelled it and I suppose it was a loyalty check-in there to say, "Well I think we shouldn't buy it," but I didn't. I said, I understand the affordability issue, but I think it's the airplane for the Marine Corps."

So anyway, an interview with him. I was called back to interview with Gen Powell. Now, I happen to know that Gen Milligan for example went through this same trek. So there were one or more of us that were interviewed. Outside opinions are sought, I believe. I know that former Commandants on occasion have been called to talk about who they thought would be best suited. I believe they were in this case. I know they were by Secretary Dalton the last time around.

There's political sponsorship that's there. When I was coming along, Senator Howell Heflin, is an Alabamian, I went to school in Auburn. Heflin is a Marine World War II Marine, he would like to see an Alabamian be the Commandant. So I had no doubt that Senator Heflin probably made a couple of calls to Secretary Cheney or someone else and I know that I'm sure others had their advocacies as well.

But eventually, the choice comes down to a nominative process, in which case normally I believe more than one name is sent forward by the Secretary of the Navy for consideration. He might send two or three forward, but he would recommend the one that he believed to be the choice. That I think occurred in my case. I know again it did this last time around. The Secretary of Defense then either interviewed or put his stamp on it and it went to the White house with a Sec Def recommendation and emerged from the President.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were not interviewed by the President?

GEN MUNDY: Was not interviewed by the President.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about the confirmation process?

GEN MUNDY: Well then, confirmation, after I was nominated, and as you pointed out that was the 22d of April. Secretary Garrett called and said, "I would like to meet with you, I'm going to be coming through Cherry Point on the way back from a trip and could we get together." Of course, we can get together.

So I went over and met. We spent an afternoon together just talking about directions and policies. He—it will be remembered that the Marine Corps had bucked the system in terms of the V-22s. Secretary Garrett gave me a fairly lengthy, I would say lecture. It was a very congenial lecture, but a lecture on loyalty and how to be a Commandant. One had to carry out the political guidance and the V-22 had been cancelled and the Marine Corps had to get down off that stump and had to be a loyal player. And of course, you sit and listen to this and I made no commitment that, "Oh yes, Sir, that's exactly what I will do." But we had that get-together.

He then suggested that I come to Washington and establish an office, which I did out at the Center for Naval Analysis. And we set that up in about mid-May, so two or three weeks after I was nominated, we set up an office. I had determined, there was a lot of concern in the Marine Corps at that time about if you didn't know a general, you couldn't get a job. So favoritism, "bubbaism" as it was referred to—so I had determined that I would not name an officer whatsoever to my personal staff. I got a communication that a good fine young officer that had worked for me in PP&O, then colonel selectee Pete Metzger had let it be known that he was interested in being the Military Secretary to the Commandant. So on one of my trips up here, I dropped in to see Col Metzger and said, "Pete, I understand you want to be the Mil Sec?" And he quickly demurred and "Oh gee, I wouldn't presume that." I said, "You got the job, set us up."

And so that was about it. So Pete Metzger went over to CNA, got a couple of admin types. I brought Col Tom Wilkerson up with me to work in Washington to assist me with preparation for confirmation. You receive from the Senate a list of questions, many of which are policy, but many of which deal with ongoing matters. For example, what do you think about the V-22 or what do you think about the role of women in combat, or policy matters of that sort. Those vary in size and length. My responses will be a matter of record. I've got them back in the office and they can be put in the papers here.

But you come to town. I then had an office here where I would come and spend a week or 10 days making calls on the Hill, principally on the Senate side because it was the Senate that was going to confirm me. I called on all members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, just "pro forma," get-to-know-you-type calls, very little of substance. You remind Senator Nunn that you were born in Atlanta. You remind Senator Strom Thurmond that your father was a South Carolinian. You remind Senator Heflin that

you went to school in Auburn and you were laying your political groundwork.

And then you would come back to the office. I had again Tom Wilkerson who was my primary assistant in drafting the responses to the formal questions that were put to me, and in focusing on those issues that I felt I should be up on the stand and prepared for when I went over for my oral confirmation hearing.

Those were then submitted, the responses to the questions, and the confirmation hearing was set I believe for the 16th of June. I may be off. It was about mid-June. Gen Gordon Sullivan was nominated to be the Chief of Staff of the Army, so our hearing was conducted as a single hearing. We went over together and Senator Nunn was chairing the Armed Services Committee and most of the Senators were there. And it was like any other hearing. They ask you questions about—Senator John Glenn would say don't you think the V-22 is the finest airplane that Marines could possibly have. And of course, you sit there trying to tread this fine line of being loyal to the Administration which had nominated you, but at the same time saying what you honestly believed.

The Senate, their most certifying question to you is will you promise when asked for your personal views to give your personal views. A lot of people don't understand that. But the Service Chief is confirmed by the Senate only by his certification that when he is asked for his personal views, he will not recite the Administration position but he will give you his professional views. And the Senate understands this clearly as does the House. And so in subsequent testimony, they will usually be very clear to say I want to ask you your personal views, what flying machine do you believe would best serve the Marine Corps. In that case, you are completely involved to say that as you know, the program as been deemed unaffordable by the Administration, it is a very expensive program, but the V-22 is the most, flies further, higher, more crash worthy, it will bring tremendous capability, but that said, "Senator, you understand that the Administration position is," and they understand that.

So anyway, but you were caused to, as I have termed it, to prick your thumb and put the bloody fingerprint on the parchment and say that I will give you my personal views. We came subsequently in years to come to the social issues. But as they would come up, there was much criticism that the Chiefs would dare to go over and would dare to say something other than what the President had said he wanted to do. But I think America understands that you're sworn in law to do that.

So anyway, that hearing is conducted and it was not

a difficult hearing. The questions were pretty good ones all around. And then you leave and about three days later you get the word that you've been confirmed by the Senate. So that's the confirmation process.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 July 1991, William E. Keys was promoted to LtGen and succeeded you in command in FMFLant and II MEF. What was the nature of this turnover?

GEN MUNDY: It was a very happy turnover, because Bill Keys had been my nominee to succeed me, so that slate had gone forward and he was promoted very deservedly to lieutenant general. He was a hero, he had fought well in the desert. And it was a happy occasion because the night before, BGen Chuck Krulak had returned. He had been kept in the desert to see to the retrograde of II MEF equipment and he had returned the night before. So we had the Commandant come down to preside at this change of command. He was able then to decorate all of his wartime generals there on the field because Hearney had come back earlier and Keys was here and Krulak. So we had not only the change of the command and promotion of Gen Keys, but then we fell all of the principal commanders out and Gen Gray was able to hang a Distinguished Service Medal on his generals and then we changed commands and I got in the car and left and came to Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there anything else you would like to say about your year in Norfolk?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think my year as the CG of FMFLant crystallized things that I then came to the Commandancy with a firm belief that we needed to get done. We can talk about those later, but we've already talked componentcy, things like that that I had a better understanding that number one we needed to do that, and number two why it needed to be done.

It was a short year and it was a year again that was frustrated somewhat by not being able to do the things you thought you were going to do because I gave away my entire force to Walt Boomer. But it was also an exciting year, and I learned more about embarkation and logistics and deployment and support for deployed forces than I had ever known. So it was another very good formative year.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think that's a good point to end this session.

First Days as Commandant

Change of command . . . A new sergeant major . . . Building a personal staff . . . Choosing an assistant commandant . . . Deputy chiefs of staff . . . Other lieutenant generals . . . The hierarchy at the Pentagon . . . Working with the Congress . . . Moving into the Commandant's House . . . Impact if the Base Closure and Realignment Commission . . . Some uniform changes . . . Paring down the Marine Corps . . . The Force Structure Planning Group.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session, we covered your tour as Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and your selection to be the Thirtieth Commandant of the Marine Corps. In this session we will explore your first days as Commandant.

On 28 June, at an evening ceremony at Marine Barracks, 8th and I Streets, Gen Gray presented to you the battle color of the Marine Corps, symbolically passing to you the command of the Marine Corps.

Vice President Dan Quayle participated in the ceremony. There were about 3,000 spectators present. What are your personal memories of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: To answer this properly, I think I need to drop back a bit to the process of becoming the Commandant. My personal recollections of the evening, regrettably, are very cold recollections. It was not a warm event. But there is some background to that that probably it will be useful to record.

Gen Al Gray and I are at this time and have been for years good friends and I have been a professional admirer. I think we have had a good rapport. Indeed, as I mentioned during an earlier interview, I really am a protege, I suppose, of Gen Gray because I served under him in about every capacity since I was a lieutenant colonel as a commander with him being my direct senior. And I learned a tremendous amount from him and, indeed, have a good rapport.

That said, the making of the Thirtieth Commandant was fraught with a great deal of brittle and fairly, at times, harsh circumstances among the various participants. It should be remembered that Gen Gray at the time that his last year as Commandant was occurring, that we had just committed, as you remarked earlier, almost the entire operating forces of the Marine Corps to the war in the desert, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And of course, the selection of the Commandant occurred at about the time that the build

up was taking place, but the war had not yet begun.

There is a provision in the law, wherein a Service Chief can be continued in office in wartime circumstances. So, Gen Gray and those who supported Gen Gray in this particular issue had let it be known that he would be willing to continue to serve and, in fact, had consulted, I believe, with one or more of the former Commandants in that regard.

And there was among certain of the younger general officers, who were confidantes of Gen Gray, there was an open effort in the Secretariat to cause that to be done. Now, there was no wrongdoing there because, again, it is a provision of the law and we didn't know what was going to happen in the war and to be very candid, looking back, had we become engaged heavily in the Persian Gulf and had it become a protracted conflict, it might have, indeed, been wise to keep, you know, the serving—the Chief of Service around at that time.

But, unfortunately, the circumstances that then prevailed resulted in some fairly significant discrediting efforts on the part of those really outside the Marine Corps more than inside, who were great proponents, and these were principally the reformists that Gen Gray had embraced for a good reason and to the good benefit of the Marine Corps. One of them notably is Mr. Bill Lind. Bill Lind has done an awful lot for the Marine Corps, but he also began to dabble into the personalities of the general officer corps and on at least one occasion was made unwelcome at Quantico because he had been at Quantico talking with junior officers and identifying those generals who could be, so to speak, trusted or relied upon and others that he felt were not into the military reform movement and, therefore, should not be supported by the junior officers.

And, of course, this is a matter of almost tyranny in the Marine Corps, but at any rate there had been some letters that had been put out and very clearly written

by Lind in my judgment at least because the language was his, the phraseology, the terms were consistent with other things. There were newspaper articles, all of which sought to discredit any other contenders for the Commandant, except those that were endorsed more or less or that were part of the military reform movement.

These had been, at least in one case, fairly vicious.

That occurred, I think, in the early part of 1991. I would mark it about January or February that I came into possession of a copy of this letter that had been sent to Secretary Cheney by a man named Wyrich, who I didn't know then, don't know now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you spell that name?

GEN MUNDY: It was W-y-r-i-c-h, and his letterhead was something to do with the Voice of Congressional Concern or something like this.

But at any rate, it went through each of the candidates, those among us who were around, at least, to be considered and advocated--that the Assistant Commandant could conceivably be a contender as well as LtGen Bob Milligan-- a fine officer, considered to be Gen Gray's first choice. But then for the remaining lieutenant generals, Gen Ernie Cook, myself and perhaps another, it really sought to put the black ball on us as being non-supporters of what Gen Gray had accomplished and assuring Secretary Cheney that if we came in, we would move to turn around all of the things that Gen Gray had done.

I have a copy of this letter somewhere. I don't have it at hand here as we speak, but—and I will make it available here for the records. But at any rate it became a very tense situation. I flew up from Norfolk to see Gen Gray with the letter in hand and said to him that I certainly was not campaigning to become the Commandant but that I believed firmly that we did not need a sensational back-biting character assassination campaign and that I knew that he personally was the only man I knew, who had any control at all over Mr. Bill Lind and that I thought it would be useful for him to get to Lind and tell him to knock off this campaign.

BGEN SIMMONS: Incidentally, it is L-I-N-D, is it not?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was his position at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Bill Lind is—again, has written a great deal on the theory of the maneuver warfare and was instrumental in instituting this type of doctrinal thinking into the Marine Corps. So, to him, goes great credit for being one of those reformers, which caused the Marine Corps to at least adapt to maneuver warfare. Gen Gray supported that. I support that. A great many of us did. And Lind was one of the prime movers in that effort.

He had been a staffer on the staff of Senator Gary Hart in the early days of the military reform movement. So, again, someone who has done good things to help reform the military, but unfortunately who swayed from that effort into, again, the personalities and in this case trying to not only influence but almost direct the selection of the next Commandant so that that reform movement would continue as he considered it.

He is in private endeavors. I don't really know what he does, other than from time to time he will write for the *Marine Corps Gazette*. We have continued to allow and encourage him to engage with the schools down at the Marine Corps University because he presents some very challenging thoughts and provocative ideas and he gives the students an opportunity to think and argue and debate among themselves. And that is good for the education process.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was his relationship to Senator Sam Nunn?

GEN MUNDY: I am not aware that he had any close relationship. He was a Senate staffer, again, before Senator Hart left the Senate, but I know of no specific close rapport with Senator Nunn.

But at any rate, to set this in stages, I mentioned I came up to see Gen Gray and attempted to lay out for him that whoever became the next Commandant, we should allow that process to occur, based on, you know, a fair and open assessment of the individuals, but to get control of this character assassination effort by Lind.

Well, at any rate, that created a little tension and it was a tense time because we had deployed our troops to the Persian Gulf. Gen Gray and I had had a bit of a conflict over the deployment of women to the Gulf. Gen Gray had—did not want to deploy any women Marines into the Gulf at the outset of the conflict and I came back to him to tell him that we were about to deploy the most sophisticated aircraft we had, EA-6Bs, into the Gulf and that seven of the plane captains of those very sophisticated aircraft that we had in II MEF were women and many of the maintenance per-



Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr., passes the Marine Corps colors to Gen Mundy during the change of command ceremony at Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. Four days later, Gen Mundy officially assumed the duties of Commandant during a ceremony at the Pentagon.

sonnel. We had to deploy them or we would have, indeed, deployed an unready outfit.

So, we went through some trauma getting these matters resolved and I think Gen Gray probably felt that I was, you know, opposing him in some reason because I challenged the Wyrich letter, which he told me he had not seen, to his credit, and I gave him a copy of it.

But at any rate, matters were a little tense. So, we thus move into my nomination and the move to become the Commandant. When I was nominated, as I mentioned earlier, I was in Monterey, California. Four days later, as I returned to the East Coast, I flew back into Washington to call on Gen Gray, just to make my manners, as it were, and we had a talk. That was a weekend. So, I went up to the Commandant's House and spent about three or four hours with him. We went over the general officers and discussed a potential slate as to who might be best suited to go where and then I took that back and worked it as my own slate.

We had a cordial meeting. Linda came up from Norfolk to meet me. We took some flowers to Jan and, again, sought to make this a very cordial transition. And we were certainly well-received and warmly received and had a nice time, a nice visit with the Grays.

In the subsequent weeks and months of working up to become the Commandant, on more than one occasion, I had reason to see Gen Gray having to do with the nomination of officers to be lieutenant generals and I thought that there would be a time when we would perhaps sit down, as I have always done on any transfer of command and, you know, discuss matters or to keep the continuity going or to receive advice or tips or coaching. That never occurred.

I saw Gen Gray only twice as a matter of fact before our transfer of command and on one of those occasions I left the office because I had an appointment as I recall at 1400. I had flown up from Norfolk to be there for that and having stood for an hour outside the Commandant's office at 1500, I just left the office and—you know, I walked down the hall and did some other business and then the aide came down and got me about a quarter past 3:00 and took me back up to see Gen Gray — an hour and 15 minutes late.

But there was very little transition between us. So, now we get to the occasion of the change of command. Again, speaking candidly, we have—there were some 600 people at the reception preceding the change in command. I had been held to 50 personal guests for that event and while I certainly understand the need for officialdom to be in attendance at such things, to give you some comparison, when my suc-

cessor's invitees came, the guest list for his approved personal visitors was more than 270.

So, we went in with a little bit of a chill there. We had, again, no turnover whatsoever in terms of any meeting. We simply didn't. We would get communications from the aides as to the details of the change in command. We never rehearsed it. It was a fairly "pro forma" thing and both of us knew how, but we had no discussions.

So, as we got ready to go up on the 28th of June for the evening reception, which was, as I recall, 1830, we had been told to come to the House ten or fifteen minutes early and be received there and then we would go out and form the receiving line. So, we arrived at 20 after, but as we arrived, the Navy aide came out of the house on the front steps and said that we really—that it was awkward, that could we possibly go somewhere—you know, could we delay, that the Commandant would prefer it if we not be there at that time.

Well, it was awkward in that we were being, you know—that the ladies were on the arms of the escort officers at the Barracks. We were standing at the foot of the stairs. So, I said "No, we have to come in."

So, we did. Secretary Garrett was just arriving at that point and a few of the family members and Mrs. Gray was given a Distinguished Service Medal by the Secretary of the Navy and we were privileged to be there. But, you know, my children were with us, both serving Marine officers, and my mother was along and what not. They were ushered directly out into the garden. Only Linda and I stayed in the house.

So, it was cold. It was stiff. The subsequent reception, which was, again, very crowded, very hot day, was, again, you know, a standard receiving line—Gen Gray meeting the people there and then introducing me to them. So, we had a standard receiving line.

Following that, as the crowd was seated, we went back in the House. Vice President Quayle had now arrived and I—it is a very extraordinary feeling because while I knew Senator Quayle, I had not met Vice President Quayle. I introduced myself to him. I was not introduced as the Commandant-designee. You know, we hung around the house with Secretary Cheney and Secretary Garrett for a short time and then proceeded out to the parade.

The change of command was fairly standard, as you indicated. We passed the battle color of the Marine Corps and that signifies a transfer of command. I made remarks, you know, and, as I recall, my remarks made an effort to say how proud I was to be there and that I followed a great lineage and that the things that Gen Gray had done would be legacies the

Marine Corps would benefit from for scores of years to come and that I hoped to continue that role and, you know, build on the foundation.

Vice President Quayle gave a tremendously folksy, what I would characterize as a political speech. He extolled Gen Gray—Al, rather—I don't think he ever said Gen Gray, but it was one of these Washington first name—he talked about Gen Gray and about his great service, which he should have, and, you know, went on for awhile, told a few jokes, a few quips.

I was not impressed. Whether this needs to be said or not, he had both hands in his pockets. At a Marine ceremony, this is heresy. But at any rate, he gave a fairly laid-back presentation and concluded. And that was it. I didn't know whether I was there or not. I didn't know whether we were changing command of the Marine Corps or not because there was no mention of that or the change of command or was there any mention of me.

So, the thing that was missed, that I thought was a gross error there, is that the Vice President of the United States came to be on hand, representing the President, at the transfer of command of the Marine Corps and never even knew it, I don't think, and never acknowledged it.

BGEN SIMMONS: A last minute substitute for the President?

GEN MUNDY: No, he was not. There had been a great deal of turmoil. Gen Gray had wanted, as we all do, to have the President there. That had been fairly early decided that the President would not attend, but we had been—you know, the dates had moved around. I had to finally call and say, listen, I don't want to be, you know, a fly in the ointment here, but I have got family that are trying to make airline reservations to come into town and we have got to settle on a date. So, we finally on fairly short notice settled on the 28th, but it was Vice President Quayle all along.

We then transferred command and in general, Gen Gray made—you know, it is an emotional time. I have just been through it, so I can attest that one's, ghosts are passing through your recollection and your memories of the days of your youth and all that the Marine Corps and service in it has meant to you and all the—you realize that in just a few more minutes, you are not going to any longer, you know, be serving.

So, it is an emotional time and one is to be, I hope, forgiven for omissions at that particular time. In my own transfer of command to Gen Krulak, I mentioned 25 people probably in the stands, but overlooked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was sitting

there. And I dropped him a note and told him I was deeply embarrassed not only for me but for the Corps, that he should be recognized.

But at any rate, Gen Gray made his remarks, again, without making any reference whatsoever to the transfer of command or to me personally and concluded his remarks. We then both moved in. We exchanged the flag. We moved into the reviewing area. I had been told that since the actual date of the change of command would not be until the 1st of July, that I would not stand, as is customary, to the right as the new commander, but that I would remain on the left as the junior member of the team. So, I remained on the left.

Gen Gray and Mrs. Gray came out. That is a wonderful thing to have your wife, I think, stand with you, but Mrs. Gray came out and then Gen Gray brought into the reviewing area SgtMaj and Mrs. Sommers, the latter having retired the night before.

So, the line-up on the change of command of the Marine Corps at that particular time, from left to right, starting with me—in other words, in inverse order of

what in my judgment would have been seniority at that point—was me, Mrs. Gray, Gen Gray, Mrs. Sommers and SgtMaj Sommers. It was rather dramatic. And I swallowed hard and realized this was not really my ceremony. So, it turned out to be a retirement ceremony, but any mention or semblance of a transfer of authority over the Marine Corps was not present in that ceremony.

At the end of the ceremony, after the troops had marched off and the crowd was beginning to come down out of the bleachers, then Col Pete Pace, now MajGen Pace, was commanding the Barracks, went over to Gen Gray, who was beginning to, you know, greet people and shake hands and as I knew later—I didn't know at the time—but Pete Pace said to Gen Gray, "Sir, you know, you made no mention at all of Gen Mundy."

So, Gen Gray grabbed the microphone and as the crowd was breaking up, came back on to say, you know—not to say I forgot or I overlooked it, but just to say, you know, Mundy is going to be the new Commandant and, as I recall, his charge to me was if

Gen Mundy receives a congratulatory handshake from President George W. Bush, immediately following Mundy's promotion at the White House on 28 June 1991. Also pictured in the Oval Office are Gen Mundy's two sons, Timothy, left, and Carl, right along with Mrs. Mundy.





Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps, swears in Gen Mundy as the 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Looking on is Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.

you want to change some things, do it quickly because time flies like an arrow. And that was it.

So, again, while I would wish that I could tell that it was warm and congenial and that it was a smooth transition with a lot of advice and counsel, indeed, it just wasn't that way. So, I recall it as a cold and an unfulfilling occasion not only personally but I thought for the Marine Corps, it was extraordinary.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you actually assume the duties of Commandant as of that moment or did that occur officially on 1 July?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it occurred officially 1 July, because the Commandant is appointed for four years.

At that point, the interpretation was that four years meant, you know, four years and so many minutes and so many hours. I view four years as a framework. For example, when Gen Krulak and I turned over here just

this past July, we happened to turn over on the 30th of June because that was the convenient night. The calendar brought that to be, but at that point, when I passed the battle color to him, I went to the left and went so far as to then return for my own retirement ceremony to unbraid my cover. The Commandant, of course, wears the laurel, if you will, on his—the only officer in the Marine Corps to do that. So, Gen Krulak put on, if you will, the laurel and I took it off my cover to symbolize that he was the Commandant, even though technically by date of rank, if you will, he becomes so on the 1st of July.

We didn't do it that way in my transfer. Indeed, the 28th was a Friday night. The 29th and 30th were Saturday and Sunday. My staff had not been able to get in to interface to do a turnover with the Commandant's staff. It was not then welcome to come in and the few forays that had been made by the aides to attempt to go in to work some transition had

just been rebuffed, you know, by the aides that were there at the time and, in effect, they had been asked not to come in.

So, as I recall, my Military Secretary, then Col Pete Metzger, went into the office about noon Sunday. Gen Gray was still working there to tie up some loose ends and they knew each other well, so, at about 1630, Pete called me down in quarters and said Gen Gray just left and gave me the keys to the office, so, I guess we have got it and I will be ready for you tomorrow morning. So, the following morning, the 1st of July, I became the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have already mentioned SgtMaj Sommers. On the day before your ceremony, SgtMaj Harold G. Overstreet became the Twelfth Sergeant Major in the Marine Corps at a Post and Relief ceremony at the Barracks, relieving SgtMaj David D. Sommers. How is the SgtMaj of the Marine Corps chosen and to what extent did you participate in the process?

GEN MUNDY: Well, to a very great extent and the way that, at least, SgtMaj Sommers was chosen and SgtMaj Lee, his successor, because we used the same process—I presume they have all been done this way, but actually the Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps, who desire to be considered to become the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, in effect, apply. They notify the serving Sergeant Major that they would like to be considered.

Their names, together, perhaps, with others that may or not have responded are then considered by a selection board, if you will, that is chaired usually by the Director of the Personnel Management Division. It will have, you know, two or three generals on it and at least, I know, in the case of the selection during my tenure that SgtMaj Overstreet sat as a member of that board and I think the Personnel Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps does.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the selection of SgtMaj Lee?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, for the selection of SgtMaj Lee. And I presume it to have been, you know, essentially much the same with SgtMaj Overstreet. There were then five candidates who were selected by that board. When the Commandant is named, in my case, and the same with Gen Krulak—when the Commandant is named, those names and their records were, for example, sent to me by Gen Sheehan, Jack Sheehan who actually then was in Personnel Management Division, and I looked them over. I called their commanders

and talked to them about them and there was no question among the five that I had, that SgtMaj Overstreet stood out.

He was then the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego. I was going on leave in late May to the West Coast and to, among other things, make my manners to my predecessors. Then I flew down to New Orleans to see Gen Barrow and Mrs. Barrow, went out and paid my respects on Gen Wilson, went to see LtGen Brute Krulak, who was one of the—if you will, those who keep a watchful eye on Commandants in the Corps.

I stopped at San Diego and asked the Commanding General there, MajGen John Grinalds, if he would occasion a meeting between SgtMaj Overstreet and Mrs. Overstreet, Jeanne, and Linda and me. And he did that at his quarters. We went in, in the afternoon and had tea, in effect, and met the Overstreets and talked to them a little bit and were taken by both of them. They are absolutely superb people and certainly I think that Gene Overstreet will go down as if not the, certainly one of the most effective Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps.

So, we were very pleasantly impressed with them. We talked about, you know, how we saw the Corps and where we thought we needed to go and all the answers that I got back from him were good and right and so on. So, I said, “Okay, you are it” and came back to Washington and notified Gen Sheehan and Gen Gray put out an ALMAR that announced that SgtMaj Overstreet would be the new Sergeant Major of the Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: SgtMaj Overstreet, along with his wife, would prove to be a particularly active, and I believe effective, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. You described your early meeting with him. Did you give him further guidance on how you would expect him to function? What guidelines did you give him?

GEN MUNDY: What I told him is what I told most of the Sergeants Major that I have been privileged to serve with and that is a sergeant major should be far more than just someone who gets in the back seat of a jeep and rides around with the commander doing little more than to, you know, kind of trail along behind the colonel or the general or whoever it might be. I wanted him to be independent. I wanted him to certainly coordinate with me and consult with me and so on, but I wanted him to take initiative on his own and to tell me what he had done, rather than asking me whether or not he could do it.

So, I gave him, I suppose, fairly unfettered guidance to go out and be the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. I told him that I wanted to continue the training initiatives that Gen Gray had instituted for all the Marine Corps, but certainly for the noncommissioned officers of the Corps, to include the Staff NCO Academies and the Sergeants' Course, you know, the Squad Leaders Corps, all of those sorts of things.

And I asked him, as I had SgtMaj Sommers before him, to keep his eye on that and to focus on those as matters of priority. We were just coming out of the desert war. We had tremendous personnel instability because we had people who had been kept, you know, in the Marine Corps beyond their enlistments. We had called up Reservists. We had people in a great deal of unsettled—their transfers had been frozen and so on. So, I knew that we needed to stabilize personnel.

I wanted him, again, to play a major role in getting out and talking to the units and helping to do that. And then the final thing that I conveyed to him was that I wanted to, as best we could, to return the Marine Corps, as have other Commandants, I think, to the hands of sergeants. I wanted staff noncommissioned officers to resume their rightful place, that, in my judgment, had been lost when we commissioned most of them during Vietnam and, thus, raped our staff NCO ranks of quality and mature, seasoned staff NCOs. We had regained a certain amount of that, but I wanted to bring the NCOs back to the level of clearly being the backbone of the Marine Corps.

Generals and colonels make speeches about sergeants being the backbone of the Marine Corps, but to be very candid with you, until at least the past few years, in my case, they were very hollow speeches because my personal view was that lieutenants and captains were the backbone of the Marine Corps and that we were struggling to get back to an NCO structure that could resume their rightful place.

I wanted to do that. So, those essentially would have been about the three points that I addressed specifically with SgtMaj Overstreet and he fulfilled to a degree I think unprecedented in his efforts to follow that guidance during the upcoming four years.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you form your personal staff—your choice of Military Secretary, your aides, both enlisted and officer, and your personal civilian aides? And how many of these were carry-overs from Gen Gray's tenure?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the only carry-overs were one of the two drivers continued, which is—you know, I

think that is normally done with the Commandant. We kept one, perhaps two, of the junior clerks in the office. As I recall, we had a corporal, maybe two—a lance corporal that stayed for continuity in the day-to-day operations of the office. And then the Social Office, which Ms. Elaine Stem, S-t-e-m, who had long been a very active civilian employee around the Headquarters, was at that time running it. Elaine remained with the Social Office. And beyond that, the aides at the House and everyone else were a complete turnover.

I did not select anyone who worked for me and that may seem extraordinary, but we were at that time—there was a strong strain of what was termed at least by the more junior officers in the Corps of “bubbaism,” and it was—it concerned them very openly. It was a matter of discussion at Happy Hours. It was a matter of discussion among the general officers, that if you didn't know somebody, you didn't get a job. If you didn't know a general, you didn't a good assignment in the FMF and, indeed, there was a feeling that, again, largely I would accredit to this military reform movement that where if you were, you know, one of those who espoused the reformist line, that you were in and if you weren't, you know, you weren't.

So, part of my early advice as I consulted with others was that I didn't want to bring in my own, quote, team. So, I got a call that LtCol Pete Metzger, whom I had known in my days in PP&O and thought a great deal of, that Pete had let it be known that he would be interested in being the Military Secretary. So, on one of my visits to the Headquarters, I walked back in his office and found him and said, “Pete, I understand you want to be the MilSec and he, you know, appropriately got up and told me that he knew he wouldn't be up to it and all that sort of thing, but that, certainly, if he was called to serve, he would do it.

So, I said, “Okay, you have got the job. Get us a location over in the Center for Naval Analysis as a transition office and pick the staff.” So, all of the selection of aides of the administrative staff, all of the personnel matters of the Office of the Commandant, were at the hand of Col Pete Metzger and not me. I simply—I showed up and met my aides when I reported up there to be the Commandant. LtCol Chip Parker was my senior aide and was the only aide at that particular time, and I met him on the steps and said, “Hello. I look forward to working with you.”

So, I didn't do a hand-select pick of my personal staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very interesting. Who was your senior enlisted aide?

GEN MUNDY: The senior enlisted aide was then Gunnery Sergeant Jerry Boice, B-o-i-c-e, who had come, when we went to Norfolk, the aide who was there was transferring to Quantico with LtGen Cook. So, I had a call from BGen Dick Huckaby, who was the commanding general out at Camp Pendleton, who indicated to me that the enlisted aide at the Ranch House had not had an East Coast tour, was seeking one, and Dick commended him to me and said he was very good, which he turned out to be.

So, Gunnery Sergeant Boice was then assigned to me in Norfolk and when we got ready to leave—we had been down there for about nine months and we were getting ready to leave Norfolk, I asked him if he would prefer to stay there since he had only just moved there or whether he would like to come to Washington. And he responded the latter and, so, he came up with me.

By the same token, I told him that while I knew the enlisted aides around the Barracks, that I would leave it up to him to meet them and talk to those that were eligible for assignment and just select his own team. Gunnery Boice put together an enlisted aide team. I had thought, as we did here, that perhaps there would be some continuity with one or more of the enlisted aides that had been with the Grays remaining in the House, but, again, we were told that no aides were to stay. So, it was a completely fresh team that went into the Commandant's House when we got here.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did the old aides take the camouflage aprons with them or were they still in the closet? [Laughter]

GEN MUNDY: Well, I couldn't tell you. I think, probably they were—you know, they were matters of affection. They were Gen Gray's mark and ours didn't wear them. We didn't subscribe to that, although I found some humor in it on the right occasions here in Gen Gray's tenure.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was your Assistant Commandant and how long would he stay with you?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was Gen Jack Dailey. He would stay with me one year, although he was wanted to stay by the Secretariat for even longer than that, because Jack Dailey was tremendously well thought of, admired and particularly in the Navy Secretariat. He was—he is smart. He is smooth. He knew—you know, his judgment was always sound and the Secretariat, particularly the Under Secretary, had a great rapport with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was Dan Howard, wasn't it?

GEN MUNDY: That was Dan Howard, yes.

So, he was the Assistant Commandant and, again, he would stay for a year. His departure was interesting because he came in to me one day and he said I can't quite believe this, but I have just gotten a call from the new Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, a man by the name of Goldin, and he said this fellow called me and said I want to hire you to be the Operations Director for NASA and Jack told him, "Look, you don't hire generals and we don't—this isn't a corporation. You don't just hire an executive away with a bigger salary."

Well, to make a long story short, Goldin came back again and again to Dailey and, finally, Jack came into me and said, "You know, this guy is really after me and is really making it appealing." I had thought about that, even though we had discussed it, and I said to him, "You know, that one of the best pieces of advice that had ever been given me was given by Gen Joe Fegan, one of my great heroes in the Corps, who said to me that remember that everybody is going to retire and you should make it at the time and place of your choosing."

So, I told Jack, "This is an unprecedented opportunity for you and also for the nation. So, you are at complete liberty, you know, as far as any constraints by me. Do what you think you should." So, he said "I would really love to take the job" and I said "Go."

So, on about 30 days notice, we let him go to NASA and then he was on terminal leave and brought in LtGen Walt Boomer as the next Assistant Commandant in my second year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there a separate Chief of Staff at this time? If so, who was he?

GEN MUNDY: There was not. After LtGen Lou Buehl died in—I think, in early 1989, the Chief of Staff was not replaced. It had, as many will recall, been vested on again and off again in the Assistant Commandant. So, Gen Joe Went was becoming or had just become the Assistant Commandant and when Lou Buehl died, that transferred back and Gen Went became the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: At what point did you substitute a Director, Marine Corps Staff for Chief of Staff and what was your rationale and who was he?

GEN MUNDY: At the time I was coming in to be the Commandant and successively for the next couple of years thereafter, the senior officers, particularly those in the Headquarters, but even those outside the Headquarters, would attempt to make a point with me that we really needed a Chief of Staff function, that they needed somebody that they could look to, as opposed to going individually to the various Deputy Chiefs of Staff, that they needed a central point of focus.

We had no lieutenant general authorization that we could afford for that. The three-star authorization at Headquarters had been used to create the first MEF commander as a three-star and I didn't want to change that. So, I didn't have a three-star allocation I could use.

So, I thought about that and continued to work at it and finally, was convinced that we should do this. MajGen Bill Eshelman was then serving as the J-5 at the U.S. Forces, Korea. Bill had, remember, been my deputy when I was the Director of Operations. He had gone from there to U.S. Central Command, where had been the Assistant Chief of Staff as a colonel, selected brigadier general. And Bill was one of those people, whose manner and whose professionalism was such that no one would be concerned about how many stars he was wearing.

So, in my second year—that would have been in, I guess, '93—the slating of '93, I brought in Bill Eshelman to be the Director of the Marine Corps Staff. Now, that is a new term because we had not previously used that. And I derived the term because I could not make a two-star a chief of staff over lieutenant generals. And I derived the term also because the Chief of Staff, for example, of the Joint Staff or of the Army Staff is called the Director of the Army Staff or the Director of the Joint Staff.

So, I chose that term and put Bill Eshelman in and, in effect, reestablished the function of the Office of the Chief of Staff, taking that from the Assistant Commandant and investing it in the Director of the Marine Corps Staff. As a practical matter, it never quite worked because even though he sat as a lieutenant general on all the councils of the three stars, as a practical matter, the lieutenant generals would continue, not in any rejection of him but just as rank has its way of causing things to happen. They would continue to go to the Assistant Commandant when they really wanted to discuss a matter that normally they might take to the Chief of Staff.

So, it seemed to serve usefully, but I am not sure that we have it right even to this time and we are on our third one now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Every new Commandant brings with him an agenda, of what he hopes to accomplish during this tenure. This agenda may be formally stated, as Gen Krulak has done with his Commandant's Planning Guidance or it can be something the new Commandant can carry in his mind. What form did your agenda take and what were your particular goals and objectives?

GEN MUNDY: Well, if there is a formalized or the informal in your mind, I guess I would fall into the latter category. I had an agenda in my mind. I never announced it formally as Gen Krulak was able to do in his Commandant's Planning Guidance, which I think is a wonderful step that he was able to step right in on the first day of his commandancy with that. We can talk a little bit more about that in, you know, the successive years because it was something that I have wanted to achieve and that we were able to do for the new Commandant, whoever he had been; Gen Krulak in this case.

The Marine Corps, when I assumed command of the Corps, was still returning from the Gulf War and although that had not been a lengthy war, it had been the most significant deployment that we have made in many years and most of the equipment that we had was now in the Gulf, you know, with the effects of sand and sun and the salt, the climactic conditions of the Gulf. So, we had to get the Marine Corps back from the Gulf. We had to get the Maritime Prepositioned Ships backloaded. We had to return that equipment to Albany and get it checked and worked over and fit again.

We had to get our people back. We had to discharge those that had been extended, get the Reserves off active duty, restabilize the Corps. So, I guess that the number one agenda was to restabilize the Corps as we were withdrawing from a theater of operations.

The second thing that I focused on was that the Marine Corps had come to be associated perhaps since Vietnam, with the amphibious assault mission role, as a basis for existence. And that had to do largely with the fact that we were constantly during at least a decade or more of the Marine Corps' existence, we were at issue with the Navy over the refurbishing, the replacement, if you will, of the amphibious fleet.

So, Marine planners and Marine programmers had for many, many years had to justify just about everything that the Marine Corps was all about on the basis that would legitimize the requirement for amphibious shipping. Otherwise, we wouldn't have gotten them. So, as we had come from the Pacific, having lost the war in South Vietnam, we turned our focus now to

NATO by national direction and the only contribution that the Marines could make in the NATO environment was amphibious in nature, as opposed to being put ashore for extended operations, as we did in the Gulf War.

So, we had become viewed in the minds of almost the entire hierarchy of the Department of Defense purely as an amphibian instrument and if you didn't need to do an amphibious landing involving three Marine Expeditionary Forces, then why did you need that much? We had the continuing question, if we had more Marines than we had amphibious ships, why shouldn't we cut the Marine Corps down to match the number of amphibious ships? It is a dumb question. It is about like saying if we have only got 234 C-141s, why don't we cut the Army down where they will all fit on the 141s?

Gen Gray had reinstituted the term "expeditionary," as we spoke earlier. I realized that if the Marine Corps did not reidentify and educate those outside the Marine Corps on what has been a traditional crisis response, "First to Fight" role, whether you came by amphibious ships or whether you didn't come by amphibious ships, the Marine Corps had to be the nation's primary crisis response force. We had to be a force of combined arms. I believe in that, the MAGTF and we had to have amphibious expertise as well.

So, I wanted to turn that effort into recognizing us as the primary crisis response force and to do that from sea bases would embody the amphibious assault that we were being weighted down with.

Another issue that I focused on was the agenda to gain componentcy for the Marine Corps, to gain equality and status for the Corps. We had served long enough, in my estimation, as subordinates to Navy fleet commanders. It was—we talked about that, I think, in an earlier session, the "velvet rope" syndrome with the Marine being in the rear when the Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders stood forward.

It was clear to me as the Armed Forces got smaller, that Marines were going to have a bigger, not smaller, role to play in our national security and we had to get the Marines up on level footing. So, gaining componentcy was a major focus.

Getting the Navy—in fact, I will have a fairly interesting file, I think, on what I have told several in shaping the Navy. We were still be set with a Navy that was apologetic for its performance in the Gulf. It should not have been. It should have, you know—instead of apologizing for not being able to receive the air tasking order from the Air Force in the Gulf

War, somebody should have asked how come the Air Force developed a system that was not compatible with Navy carriers. But the Navy was in this humbling, apologetic, "we are all wrong, we will get squared away mode" and I didn't see much strength for the Department of Navy in there.

The other fact was that it was very apparent to many in "the tank," to many on the Hill, to me, I mean, to Marines, in general, that the Navy was still looking for the Cold War, even though we were out of the Cold War. You know, for years and years and years, the primary focus of the United States Navy was anti-submarine warfare, but the Soviets had faded. Now, they are still out there and there are still some submarines around, but it was still the primary focus of the Navy.

They hadn't gotten the message yet that the way of the future was going to be what we have now adopted in "From the sea" as littoral operations, i.e., amphibious operations and the use of sea bases. Carrier ops and amphibys were going to be the wave of the future, not submarines.

So, how we would go about turning the Navy from its fixation on Cold War matters and to get them up out of the dregs of this, you know, we are sorry, we didn't do well in the Gulf syndrome was a major concern that I had, a major focus.

I wanted to strengthen the total force. I wanted to get away from the separatism, although it was pretty good at that time, I mean, pretty unified, but I wanted the Marine Corps, the active structure and the Reserve structure truly to be a total force. I had learned a great deal in the mobilization of the Reserves to go off to Desert Shield and Storm as we talked about in the last session here and I had tremendous admiration for the Reserves. So, I wanted as much as we could to knock down any barrier that said "Reserve" on one side and "regular" on the other and I wanted this entire organization to be reflected that we had, you know, the 2d Marines—if you were in the 2d Marines, you served at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. If you were in the 24th Marines, you happened be stationed in Kansas City and what difference did it make. We are not quite there yet, but I think that Gen Krulak is continuing that effort toward erasing the distinction between the two.

We, for too long, had a mindset in the Marine Corps Reserve that is similar to what the National Guard and Reserve of the other services, principally, the Army and the Air Force see, and that is that they are completely separate, you know, a state entity that is federalized from time to time and, therefore, they become a tremendously political instrument in the way that

they work with Congress and work within their own state structures. The Marine Corps Reserve is not that. Its only function is federal in nature and I wanted to blend that together.

Then the final thing, that it goes back, I think, to my very lengthy oration at the outset of this session, was that there was a great deal of feeling that needed to come about in the—not just in the general officer structure—but, indeed, in the officer corps because there really were—at that particular point, there were factions in the Marine Corps that vied with each other, that promoted, again, what others chose to characterize as “bubbaism.” You were either on the team or you were off the team.

So, again, I can tell you that knowing Gen Al Gray, he never intended that and, indeed, he would have—you know, had he been aware, I think, that that seemed to be prevalent, he would have been very concerned about it. And if we were sitting here talking today, he would say as much.

But the fact is, it was there. There was a great deal of this just—I would just say instability in the officer corps. So, I wanted to make everybody a player—Gen Gray had sought to do that. He had certainly given, you know, the audiences for the occasions for all of us to speak. He had developed a warfighting focus of the generals. I hold him accountable, I think, for the Marine success in Desert Storm was directly attributable to Gen Al Gray and his refocusing us on matters operational and, indeed, on operational maneuver, as opposed to attrition style of warfare.

So, he is to be credited, but there was a lot of broken glass around and I needed to heal that as best I could and bring some happiness back into the Corps and to reestablish, I thought, some of those traditions that I think are very important more to the Marine Corps, perhaps, than any of the other Services and that is the pride and appearance and the pride and the elan of being a Marine that is very important to our Corps. We had lost that somewhat. It was fashionable to be a gunfighter, but we had lost the fact that some of the most vicious and heroic and successful men who had worn the uniform of Marine, who had been absolutely ferocious on the battlefield have also been some of the most genteel and polished when they came off the battlefield and returned to the stature of being a professional Marine.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good.

Your first operational crisis began on 30 June, when the Marines from the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, returning from Desert Storm in Amphibious Group Three were diverted to Bangladesh to aid sur-

vivors of a devastating cyclone. What are your recollections of your personal involvement in the Bangladesh relief operations?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had very little involvement because really, as we had discussed earlier, the unified commanders exercise authority over—operational authority over Marine forces, and in this case, this was—U.S. CinCPac was tasked to execute this mission. He, in turn, identified LtGen or then-MajGen Hank Stackpole, who was commanding the III MEF to be his Joint Task Force Commander. Hank and a small staff flew down and joined the forces. The 5th Brigade, the 5th MEB, which was returning from Desert Storm, as we have mentioned, commanded by BGen Pete Rowe, was selected and, in effect, swung up to Bangladesh and conducted that operation literally from the sea. He was using sea bases with a very small footprint ashore, a unique and very significant characteristic of Marines and amphibious forces that we can't get otherwise.

I had very little to do with that. Simply as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I was here, of course, monitoring the reports, and I certainly called and spoke with Gen Stackpole and told him anything I could do to support. But my involvement was not very much.

BGEN SIMMONS: But he kept you informed informally, as well as your official . . .

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, yes. The SITREPs would come back, of course, were addressed and occasionally a P4 [personal for]. In other words, there is a communication between the Commandant and between the operational commander in the field, but, again, once committed, the Commandant's responsibility to recruit, train, organize, equip and provide operational Marines and operational forces, the line is drawn in the sand there and that unit that has been provided or those people that have been provided now are under the operational authority of others.

BGEN SIMMONS: As I believe we mentioned in the last session on 1 July, MajGen William M. Keys was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed your previous duties as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic). Had you influenced his selection for that appointment?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I had. I think that Bill Keys would have been a candidate under any circumstances, regardless of who had become the Commandant. He is, as I described him earlier when

we were talking about my commanders in FMFLant. He was one of the very finest. We had an operator, a division, a successful, you know, warrior, classic warrior, and, so, I had selected him to be my successor and advanced that to Gen Gray and he to the Secretary, and I was delighted to see him become that.

Remember he had been frocked to lieutenant general on the 25th of June, when we changed command at Camp Lejeune and then you rightfully point out that his date of rank was the 1st of July, when he became a legitimate three-star.

BGEN SIMMONS: The usual perception is that a new Commandant gets to choose his lieutenant generals. Was that true in your case?

GEN MUNDY: It was true in my case. That probably is a partially accurate perception going back to my—just my most recent efforts at promoting three stars, it depends very much on the Secretary of the Navy. And I can espouse that to some degree. I believe that we have a flaw in our system of civilian control over military and that we have civilian appointees, who however good they may be, come in as the Secretary and with only a few months on board suddenly become the yeas or nays over the promotion of officers, who, indeed, have been certified and confirmed by the Senate for a quarter of a century or 30 years. You know, a “yes” or “no” from a Secretary can result in, you know, continued success.

I think you are right and I know that in earlier times—I suspect that in days of yore, whenever that was in the old Corps, I suspect the Commandant simply told the Secretary who he intended to promote and the Secretary signed it and sent it off. But nowadays there is a little bit more hand in the kettle by the Secretary than there used to be.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Secretary of the Navy this time was Garrett?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, at the time that I was appointed. And he went along with all of my recommendations.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who now had Fleet Marine Force, Pacific?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that was—at the time that I assumed command, LtGen Bob Milligan commanded the force. Bob had, as generally is the case when a new Commandant is named, the lieutenant generals will offer their sword and, you know, that gives the Commandant the ability to say “Thank you, I will take

it and you can step aside” or it gives him the ability to say “No, I would ask you to stay if you can for another year” or “I have another assignment for you.”

Bob Milligan had offered his sword and he told me that he would be prepared to stand down the 1st of September and that he would like to. So, I was able to accept that and to nominate then-MajGen Royal Moore to be the new commanding officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were your Deputy Chiefs of Staff at Headquarters?

GEN MUNDY: In Manpower, LtGen Norm Smith was DCS/Manpower. He was retiring. He was already—had planned to retire and statutorily needed to retire on the 1st of August. So, he was there for one month. LtGen Hank Stackpole had been nominated to become the Deputy Chief for Plans, Policies, and Operations, but there would be a gap between the time that he got there—oh, because Gen Hoar, Joe Hoar had left that position at the same time that I became the Commandant, he went down to become the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command. So, we had a gap. So, at that particular time, there was no lieutenant general in the PP&O slot and it would take about a month or so to get Stackpole back.

LtGen Duane Wills, serving DCS/Aviation, continued to serve and LtGen Bob Winglass, who was DCS/Installation and Logistics, would continue to serve.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who had command of Quantico?

GEN MUNDY: LtGen Ernie Cook, at that point. Ernie had also offered his sword and I had taken it and had nominated LtGen Walt Boomer, who came back about two months later to command Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any Marine Corps three-stars or four-stars on the Joint Staff or in the Unified Commands. You’ve already mentioned Joe Hoar?

GEN MUNDY: And he was the only one.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 August 1991, MajGen Matthew T. Cooper was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, replacing your old friend, LtGen Norman H. Smith, who retired, as you mentioned. I presume that you nominated LtGen Cooper for this . . .

GEN MUNDY: I did nominate him. One of the frustrations of any new Commandant coming in is that you must select from an eligible population of absolutely superior human beings and officers and you must sort out those who are to continue on in the Marine Corps. As a matter of historical note here, MajGen John Grinalds had been my initial candidate to become the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and I had actually forwarded his name to Secretary Garrett for nomination.

John Grinalds is one of the most talented officers we have ever had in our ranks and one who performed superbly and had tremendous potential in the Marine Corps, but he also had a unique and a great opportunity on the outside.

So, when I first talked to John, he was excited and said "yes," but he called me about a week later—I was to be in San Diego. I mentioned that he had gotten the Overstreets together with us. We called on John and he sat down with me, really a man torn as to which direction he should go. He had been offered the headmastership—I think that is the word—of the Woodbury Forest Academy, which is an academy, a boy's school, if you will, over in Culpeper, Virginia.

It is a beautiful place. It was a lifetime opportunity, for John, at least, and perhaps for others, it would be a lifetime guarantee, that this would be something you would do forever. John wanted to do that. He was really torn between being promoted and continuing in the Marine Corps.

So, he asked me what my intentions would be, whether he would continue on and become a Force Commander and so on. And I had to be candid and tell him that at that point at least that my focus on lieutenant generals was a two-year assignment and that he should be prepared at that point to step aside.

So, John had to choose between, in effect, an offer of a two-year appointment back in Washington and then, perhaps, retirement and he would have lost the opportunity at Woodbury Forest or to take Woodbury Forest. He chose the latter and I am happy for him that he did.

So, that then freed me to be able to select, if you will, the next man on my list, who was Terry Cooper, a lifetime friend and turned out to be one of the very best of the DCS/Manpowers we had ever had, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 16 August, BGen Harold W. Blot was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Again, I presume, you selected Gen Blot for this assignment?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 September, MajGen Royal W. Moore, Jr. was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific relieving LtGen Robert F. Milligan, who, as you indicated earlier, retired on that date. I presume, again, that this was your choice.

GEN MUNDY: It was my choice. Royal Moore had led the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and had performed absolutely magnificently. I have known Royal since we were colonels together in days earlier, thought the world of him, still do today, and so I also thought that it was well from time to time that we have a senior aviator in the position of command like that. So, that worked out very well. It had nothing to do with having to pick an aviator just for the sake of an aviator, but Royal, indeed, bore the qualifications and I was pleased to nominate him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Early on, and you have already intimated this, you issued some fairly "stiffish" guidance on how long you expected major generals and lieutenant generals to serve. Do you recall that guidance and how did you promulgate it?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I recall it very vividly. It was something of an expansion from the policy that Gen Gray had instituted, which I thought was a good one. When Gen Gray came in, he made the point that in the Marine Corps because of the constraints on the number of positions that we have, we really have very few opportunities for lieutenant generals to be promoted to four-star officers.

So, in order to continue the upward mobility in promotions and, indeed, in order to move our generals up into a comparable status, so that they can be considered for joint assignments and for assignments outside the Corps, we had to move the crop on along. Gen Gray had a policy letter, which he promulgated by Green Letter, as I did this one, which advised those nominated for lieutenant general, that they should at about the 18-month mark submit a letter to him indicating a willingness to retire if he chose to, or needed for you to do that.

We had all done that. I submitted one earlier, as we talked about in the last session. I made that a little bit more specific because I had gone through the very painful experience as I was becoming the Commandant, in order to move the younger, if you will, to lower the age of Marine generals because we were far and away older than our other Service counterparts and in many cases that I was specifically

aware of, a Marine would be discounted for a particular joint assignment because he was, quote, too old and they would take a 51-year-old Air Force two-star instead of taking a Marine two-star, who might be 54 years old.

So, we wanted to lower that threshold a little bit and this, again, was a consensus of the Marine general officer corps, at least the senior leadership, with whom I consulted. So, what I put into effect was that if you became a major general, you should plan on retirement at the end of three years service as a major general, even though, you know, it was altogether likely that there would be another opportunity.

I had had to contact several of my close friends, who were at about that point of three or four years service, and ask them to retire in order for me to move the generals on upward. That is a painful thing to have to do for the Commandant and for the individual to receive a call to say you are my good friend, but I would like for you to retire in six months is a traumatic thing in many cases.

So, I wanted them to be prepared. So, I asked that the two-stars be prepared to retire in three years and I asked those nominated for three stars to understand that while there might be another appointment for them, that they should have their insurance and, you know, all of their plans laid to stand down at the end of two years.

BGEN SIMMONS: Retracing our steps just a bit, I have a copy of your desk calendar and the first entries in it are for 9 July. The most significant entry seems to be a call you made on the Secretary of the Navy that morning. I presume that was your first official call made. Do you recall anything about that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I—if it was my first official call, I think if it is so indicated, it probably was. There had been earlier activities. The 1st of July came on a Monday. So, I really was in there Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday and then the 4th of July was a holiday. So, really I didn't get to—my second week in the job—I don't want the record to show that I laid out of any meaningful work . . . [Laughter]

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . real world, your personal staff hadn't shaken down.

GEN MUNDY: Well, that is right. And we were doing some other things. But, for example, the Commandant, like all Service Chiefs, is normally sworn in at a ceremony in the Pentagon. Now, I changed that for Gen Krulak because I believe the Commandant

ought to be sworn in on the field of honor here at 8th and I. So, we did that for Gen Krulak. Whether that is the first time or not, I don't know. It was the first time in many years. But normally there is an affair hosted by the Secretary of Defense and, as it was for Gen Sullivan, the incoming Chief of Staff of the Army and me—and as I recall, that was about the—I think that was maybe the 5th of July or at least—or maybe earlier than that, the 2d or 3d of July, where I was over for an official swearing in.

The word that was passed to Col Metzger from the Secretary's office was that whomever I desired to have swear me in would be completely acceptable, that the Secretary of Defense would do it, unless I had a preference. I did have a preference and that was Gen Leonard M. Chapman, the 24th Commandant, who I had admired as a major when he was the Commandant. I still admire him to this day.

He was more or less, although Gen Greene is still alive—Gen Greene was not doing much extracurricular activity at that time. So, I wanted to be sworn in by a Commandant. And I guess I am just parochial enough to want that. So, I had asked Gen Chapman to do that. He did. He swore me in.

The Secretary of the Army swore in Gen Sullivan. And as I stood there looking out into the small group that were assembled in the Secretary of Defense's conference room there, I was looking straight at Secretary Garrett and I could read in his eyes that this had not made him very happy because, after all, he had nominated me. Here was his opposite member, the Secretary of the Army, swearing in the new Chief of Staff, but I had not asked him to swear me in.

So, one of my first points with my secretary was to go over and tell him that I apologized for—you know, if I had offended, I had not intended to. And he assured me that he was not offended, but I felt badly about that and, yet, by the same token because Secretaries—you know, we have had some Secretaries, who have been in there for six months or some that are there for a year. They are not enduring personalities. So, I was then and have been since very happy that I was sworn in by Gen Chapman.

But as far as the call on Secretary Garrett, that would have been probably an icebreaker. We certainly knew each other, had met before I became the Commandant on numerous occasions and while I was the PP&O.

I recall that that was probably the first thing I talked to him about. As to the other agenda, those were the days when I was receiving a fairly steady dose of guidance from the Secretary and I am sure through the Secretary, that loyalty meant getting off this kick on

the V-22, that I was expected to salute the flagpole and the downsizing in the Marine Corps to 159,000 and, you know, discounting the V-22 and things like that, that I was expected to toe the mark.

So, for my first few sessions with the Secretary, I generally got sort of a lecture on loyalty, you know, and those sorts of things.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of 10 July, according to your calendar, there was a White House picnic. What are your recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was—of course, it is very heady wine to be receiving invitations from the President and, you know, certainly you are impressed with yourself suddenly—I hope not too much, but it is nice to receive those invitations. So, I recall it specifically because when the invitation came in, I asked Col Metzger—Col Metzger, of course, had been President Reagan’s Marine aide and so he had some insight into the workings of the White House and had, in fact, been the catalyst for enabling me to be promoted by the President to four stars, as we talked of earlier—as opposed to that being done by somebody else. I don’t know who has done it in the past, but we were able to get President Bush to do it for me and at great effort, only because of the staff, not because of the man himself, but to get President Clinton to promote Gen Krulak.

And I think that is important. It establishes a tie between the President and the Commandant that is unique in comparison to the other Service Chiefs, who come as four-stars. President Bush said to me, “Gee, this is the first time I have ever promoted anybody to four stars,” and I said, “Well, Mr. President, I can assure you it is the first time I have ever been promoted by a President.” So, it starts a good rapport with him.

The picnic, however, is kind of a humorous story because I asked Pete Metzger to inquire what should one wear to a White House picnic and the answer came back that the President usually wears a blazer and an open-collared shirt. So, I said, okay, blazer and an open-collared shirt. I remember that Linda went in a picnicish type of dress and that she wore flat shoes, ready for a picnic on the south lawn of the White House.

However, that afternoon, it rained fairly heavily and when we arrived at the White House, it had been—the event had been moved inside instead of being a picnic on the grounds, but, nonetheless, we arrived as I have just described. We were met by the Chief of Protocol, who was in a double-breasted suit

with a white shirt and a conservative tie and everyone that I was in line with, most of them ambassadors and other notables around town, everyone was in at least a business suit and their wives were, you know, dressed for a social occasion at the White House.

So, I thought, “Well, this will be my—my mark will be that here comes the hick from North Carolina to town.” But when I arrived inside and we were standing waiting to go up and meet the President and Mrs. Bush, as the crowd formed, I looked across the room and there was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, with a blue blazer and an open-collared shirt, as I had on, plaid sport shirt.

I looked across the way. There was the Chief of Staff of the Army in a blue blazer and an open-collared shirt. So, we were all dressed uniformly, essentially the same. We went upstairs, passed through the receiving line, were greeted by President Bush in a blue blazer with an open-collared checkered shirt. So, I felt like I was in uniform and everybody else was out and Linda was very much relaxed because Barbara Bush, who was always a very, very earthy and congenial person, was standing there, as I recall, in a pair of colored tennis shoes when we went through the line. So, we felt good about that. That was an enjoyable occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 9 July, your calendar shows you having an interview with the *Amphibious Warfare Review* and on 10 July with Bart Gellman of *The Washington Post*. On 15 July, you had a video interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN. These would be the first of many media interviews. Not all would turn out pleasantly, as we shall discuss later.

Any comments on the media’s introductory interviews, so to speak? What I mean by that is that a Commandant’s persona is sort of shaped early in his tenure and then many things that follow seem to follow in that track or to reinforce that persona.

GEN MUNDY: Well, number one, they, perhaps, are just that. On the part of the media, I think they are sorting you out to find out what makes you go. What they hope for, I believe, in most cases, because it would make news is that you come in and say I am going to change the uniform and the Marine Corps is going to become something different from what it is today and many—in some cases, my Air Force counterpart, Gen Tony McPeak came in, I am going to redesign the uniform. We are going to flatten out the Headquarters.

And the fact of the matter, they didn’t flatten out the Headquarters at all, but you get great press out of

that. But, he Air Force has stepped ahead of the other services and has flattened its Headquarters. So, I think there is a hope on the part of the press that you will say something that can be if not sensational, at least news making. I don't think I gave them any of that, but I think you are absolutely right, that your early impact on the press probably creates your image with the press, throughout your tenure.

So, the interviews were as much as anything a love-in type interview. I mean, the questions were—there were no challenging questions certainly at that point because you hadn't done anything to be challenged on, but there were questions on some of the more sensitive—I mean, the V-22 would come up and you would have to dance the light fantastic to try not to get in trouble with the Administration that had killed the program, but to at the same time make sure you didn't get in trouble with the Congress that was maintaining the program. So, you had to straddle a barbed wire fence there.

Social issues, women in combat, what do you think of women in combat, those would be perhaps the most dramatic types of questions, but, generally speaking, they sought to inquire where are you going, where do you see the Marine Corps going and they were easy interviews.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the afternoon of 15 July, you left for New Orleans. The calendar shows you are having cocktails at the Fairwinds Club and dinner at Brennan's. The next day there was a change of command at the 4th Marine Division. Who was relieving who?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was MajGen Jim Livingston relieving LtGen-nominate Terry Cooper, who was coming up to be DCS/Manpower. Interesting tale. I don't remember the Fairwinds Club. If we had cocktails there, that was fine, but I had—there was only the six of us that went to dinner, the Livingstons, Coopers and Mundys, and I wanted it that way to be personal. When I say "I wanted it that way," it was their call, but I communicated to them that let's not have a big—you know, you don't have to call all the colonels and Reserve generals down there. Let's just make it cozy.

And I passed on to Terry Cooper, still a very good friend, that I really would like to go eat some good, old, Cajun New Orleans food somewhere. The Coopers being people of fair sophistication selected Brennan's, which is certainly a restaurant of note in New Orleans. It is a French restaurant, as a matter of fact. And while the cuisine is spectacular, instead of

as I had imagined it, that we would be going out in our boat shoes and a pair of jeans, and sucking the heads off of crawfish or something, we went in our evening wear for a very nice dinner and when we split the bill, I can recall that I think that the bill came out to about \$200 apiece. I was looking for some cheap, crawfish or jambalaya type of meal.

But we had a nice evening and it was a nice way to—again, not begin totally, but to begin to be more personable with the general officer corps and thereby create some good relationships.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's go through the hierarchy in the Defense Department at this time, along with any comments you might want to make about your relations with the principals named. Who was the Secretary of Defense?

GEN MUNDY: Secretary Dick Cheney, who I have thought to this day that—I think a lot of Dick Cheney and I still see him from time to time. However, he was a rather cold and formal individual. He showed not a great deal of emotion. That was just not his personality makeup. But he was approachable and in my subsequent dealings with Secretary Cheney, some of which were of the nature that have gotten other Service Chiefs fired on the spot, we had a good rapport and I always felt that I could approach him and that I could talk very frankly with him.

So, good, but cold.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

GEN MUNDY: Was a man named Donald Atwood, Don Atwood, who you would want to be your father or your grandfather. He was a very warm, personable man. Both he and his wife could not have been more congenial. He was—I think he had come down from General Motors Corporation. He was, obviously, a very good businessman, but was notedly and if not outspoken, was at least very obviously deeply frustrated with Washington. He came, as many do, to Washington believing that, if you're right, that things will get done. If you have a good idea and can explain it, that people will buy it. And I think he didn't appreciate the full impact of politics, that it may be a good idea, but, if it is counter to, what one faction or the other wants to achieve, that you just don't get it done.

So, he was very, I think, frustrated by that, but that said, he was easy. He was very approachable. He was very congenial; socially, very easy. We had them to dinner, had all of these people to dinner at one time or

another, but at dinner, you never felt any strain for conversation or for just warm, family congeniality with the Atwoods. Very fine people.

BGEN SIMMONS: You already mentioned the Secretary of the Navy, but let's have a little summary on Mr. Garrett.

GEN MUNDY: Larry Garrett, was a fairly effective Secretary. He had been the Under and he had done some, I think, fairly good management of the department.

He was and is to this day, I believe, somewhat insecure. He is a man, who, is a hail fellow well met, but it is difficult to become very close with Larry Garrett. And as a result of that, most of the meetings and dealings that I had with him as the Secretary were either a very formal meeting, where it would be a briefing or, you know, where there would be several people in the room or it would be one-on-one.

There was only one occasion during his tenure when the CNO and the Secretary and the Commandant ever sat down in the same room at the same time just to talk. And this would probably surprise a lot—it surprised me. I assumed that that was the big three in the Department of the Navy and that we would sit around all the time. But that was not Secretary Garrett's style. He is a lawyer and preferred to do business on memorandums back and forth and to give explicit guidance, as opposed to—you could not sit down with Larry Garrett and say, "I think we ought to go this way, what do you think. He would have to go back and form an opinion and then, you know, send you back a memo.

and I was just concluding by saying that I thought he was a capable and I—and we worked well together, but we never really formed a tight relationship.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Under Secretary of the Navy.

GEN MUNDY: The Under Secretary of the Navy was Dan Howard. Dan had been a friend of long standing. I would suspect that Dan Howard was instrumental, perhaps not finally so, but was certainly instrumental in supporting me to be the Commandant.

We had had a good rapport. He had come down as a Birthday Ball guest of honor when I was Norfolk. He stayed with us at our house. We came to know him. We had flown off to Norway together and spent some time there on a visit the year before.

So, Dan Howard and I had a great rapport. He

worked, as the Under does, primarily with the Assistant Commandant, while the Commandant works primarily with the Secretary, but a fine man, very outgoing and very—he was a Marine corporal—very supportive of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GEN MUNDY: Colin Powell. Colin was first class all the way. I am very high on Gen Powell personally, and I would give him high professional marks as well. My first call, I think I was riding to work in my new car from the quarters on—I would make this maybe about the 3d of July, the second or third day that I was on the job. And the phone rang and it was the Command Center and it said the Chairman is calling you. This was about probably along about 0700 in the morning and I thought, "Boy, this is the way it is—we are going to war or something."

So, anyway, I answered and he said, "Hey, Carl," and I said, "Yes," and he said, "Look, I got tickets to Phantom of the Opera this Saturday." The Powells would like to have the Mundys join them. He had the President's box, as a matter of fact in the Kennedy Center and said how about coming to the "Phantom of the Opera."

So, I thought that was a tremendous—that was Colin Powell. He reached out and he embraced you and he brought you in. We had a tremendously warm, I think, genuine and to this day very genuine relationship. There are many who, perhaps, could cite Colin Powell as being a politician. He is that. As being a soldier. He is that. Whatever you want to characterize him as, but he is a fine man and he and Alma Powell were always good friends with us. He became my champion on more than one occasion. I championed him.

I think probably it would be bold of me to say this, I think, but probably among the Chiefs, while Colin was the Chairman, that he and I may have been closer and more easy with each other. I mean, it was very easy to pick up the hot line and when he would answer at the other end, you know, pop an early morning joke on it and just wish him a good day or something or he back to me.

So, we had a good rapport and I think very highly of Gen Powell.

BGEN SIMMONS: Chief of Naval Operations.

GEN MUNDY: Admiral Frank Kelso, a Lafayette, Tennessee country gentleman, solid gold, grass roots,

American, good father, husband, anything you want to say about him, and a good friend to me and a CNO, who truly embraced the new Commandant. And I think he had had good rapport with Gen Gray before. He is just a likeable friend.

We had a great rapport. He certainly made sure that I was invited to social activities that he was hosting. He included me in his Fleet Commanders Conference. He bent over backwards, I think, to extend the hand of friendship and partnership to me.

That said, for all of the great affection that I have for Frank and Landess, his wife Frank was one who had been, I think, colored by duties in Washington that had to do with programming and budgeting and regrettably, though some of my best friends have gone that way, I think that once you are a programmer, you never change from being a programmer and in the case of Navy programmers, they tend to focus on things at the expense of overall capabilities or broader issues.

So, where Frank and I separated, not with any clash, but he viewed the future as, you know, it is all going straight down hill and we have to hit the bottom and break and pick up the pieces and put it back together. That was his view of the fiscal situation and the force structure situation.

Mine was very much, as I sat many times with him and said, "Frank, we have got to catch it before it hits the bottom, shape it. Let's let the other guys hit the bottom. The naval services are the light of the future for this nation that we have got to shape and go forward together."

I think that Frank Kelso, again, will probably go down, although he was subsequently blemished by the Tailhook incident, he will go down as one of the—as really one of the finer CNOs, perhaps. But he was not a visionary and he was not a man who could understand that we needed dramatically to change the United States Navy for the betterment of the Navy and for its utility to the nation.

So, that is the Kelso that I know with great esteem and affection to this day.

BGEN SIMMONS: Chief of Staff of the Army.

GEN MUNDY: One of my best friends, still is. Gordon Sullivan. We had been the Operations Deputies together. I left to go be FMFLant. He became the Vice Chief of the Army. I thought a lot of Gordie Sullivan. We were confirmed in the same hearing, as I mentioned, and from the outset our rapport was very good. That was fortunate because there would become some fairly stressful times between the

Army and the Marine Corps in years to come, having to do with tanks and things like that that we can talk about later.

But that never existed between Gen Sullivan and me. Any time that we would flash up in the news or on the Hill, when a battle between the Army and the Marine Corps would get going, I would go directly over to Gordie's office and sit down and say, "Look, here is what is going on. And, you know, I am not trying to stimulate this. This is political in nature, but we will have to balance it together because I can only move this far," and Gordie would always say, "I gotcha." So, we never had a cleavage in the senior ranks of the Army or Marine Corps, at least from my perspective, we didn't.

A very good man, good soldier.

BGEN SIMMONS: Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

GEN MUNDY: Merrill McPeak, Tony McPeak.

Again, I hate to—I know that I sound like I am on a record here, but I honestly believe that during the tenure in which I was privileged to serve, that there probably has not been a better time—there may have been equal times in history, but there probably has not been a better time in history when the Chiefs were truly as friendly and collegial and thought as much of each other as was the case on my watch.

I truly liked all those men with whom I served. And while we had to fight on occasions because it is the nature of the beast to do that, we had to—I mean, Tony McPeak, who was the original iconoclast, Tony used to say of himself, he said, "You know, as long as I have been in the Air Force, the word is if it is working okay, don't send McPeak because he is going to change it all around."

Tony wanted to, restructure the entire Armed Forces. He used to sit very candidly with me and say, "When it comes time for you and me to fight, let me tell you that I am—" he said, "I want the Marines to have all of the air support they need. I want you to fly those areas, but he said the FA-18s, I do that, and so when it is time for us to fight, I am going after your FA-18s."

You can't ask for much more than that. I mean, the guy can't be any more honest than to tell you how he is going to come at you when it is time for roles and missions, and he subsequently did. And I understood that.

So, again, Tony McPeak is somewhat enigmatic personality because he truly is one of the wittiest and the most fun to be around men I have known, but his professional persona is a bit cold and because he is

tremendously intelligent, very clipped in his phrases and terms. He was taken, as he left the job, particularly, as being outside the web of the Joint Chiefs.

To be sure, he and Colin probably, had some differences and the Army and the Air Force always fight, regardless of who they are, they fight. But Tony was a good friend and a very, I thought, effective Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any other key players in the Department of Defense or military services that you would like to mention?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we had left out, which is not uncommon, because of the—remember that Goldwater-Nichols instituted the Vice Chairman as the second senior officer to the irritation of the Chiefs and many others. Vice Chairman to this day still gets left out of the equation, as he has just now. Gen Bob Herres, U.S. Air Force was the first Vice Chairman and Bob Herres was just retiring and Admiral Dave Jeremiah, who came in from CinCPac Fleet to be the new Vice Chairman—Dave Jeremiah, again, while a pleasant fellow and one would like to think a friend of Marines, the fact is that, again, Dave Jeremiah had been the Navy programmer and that is the kiss of death for rapport from then on because to one who has borne that office, Marines are viewed only as a cost that should be avoided if at all possible by the Navy.

So, he brought into the Vice Chairmanship with him that focus on Marines and because the Vice Chairman presides over the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which is the consideration by the Vice Chiefs of Services as a joint matter of weapons systems. Believe me, any Marine program, the V-22, the advanced assault amphibian vehicle, anything that the Marines brought into the Joint Requirements Oversight Council underwent extraordinary scrutiny and challenge by the Vice Chairman. More, he could not separate himself from having been the Navy programmer to now being the Vice Chairman.

So, Dave Jeremiah, I think, a very brilliant man, but not the best friend the Marines have ever had.

You mentioned—we were talking about other individuals. We talked about the Vice Chairman. I should mention as well the Assistant—the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, who would subsequently become the Secretary of the Navy, Sean O’Keefe, who was a very interesting figure and we can talk about him later, but, again, a very congenial, easy man to work with, although he was caused to sign all of the letters that went back to the Congress, saying that the V-22 is unaffordable for the Marine Corps, but off

line, when Sean would ask me what is your preferred solution to the medium lift requirement of the Marine Corps, I would say the V-22 and we would have a laugh over it and he would go back and write a letter and say it is not affordable and, so, we had great rapport.

David Addington was another—he was the counsel to the Secretary of Defense and nothing went to Secretary Cheney that didn’t come through Mr. Addington; a young fellow, young, successful Washington attorney. But David was known on Capitol Hill as the “thought police.” It was well—you were well-advised on the Hill that, for the Marine, more so than anybody else, when you came over to the Hill and the Congress wanted to talk about the V-22, that you had better be aware because the “thought police” were listening and if you got too far askance, that there might be some payback to that.

Now, those were principals. There are others, but I think that generally describes the main players that I interacted with.

BGEN SIMMONS: During the rest of July, your calendar shows you were making and receiving a great number of calls. Amongst them—I see you made calls on Senator Heflin, Senator Thurmond, Senator Seymour, Senator Symms, Senator Johnston, Senator Inouye and Senator Leahy. There was also a barge cruise for Congressman Murtha, hosted by the Secretary of the Navy. SecNav also hosted a breakfast for Senators Cochran and Sasser.

Can you comment on the importance of these calls and visits?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they are fundamentally important to what the Commandant does because the charter, as I said, to recruit, train, equip the Marine Corps, is directly associated with the responsibility of the Congress to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a Navy. They are the people that you go to have your programs approved or to get money to run the Services.

So, those early calls were—indeed, were the foundation laying. They were more than representation of any program or anything that I was seeking to achieve, they were simply establishing the rapport with members of the Senate in this particular case and certainly the House was not excepted from that, but you checked the calendar and I was, obviously, working the Senate at that time.

So, nothing extraordinary to report on them. They were sort of the standard establishing a network type of call.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 26 July, you held what I think was your first garden party at the Commandant's House. The guest of honor was your friend, Gen Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army. He was the reviewing officer for the parade that followed. As you mentioned, he was a close personal friend?

GEN MUNDY: Indeed so.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday evening, 28 July, you had a barbecue at the Commandant's House. That was one of your favorite forms of entertaining, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, it was. You probably were there. So, you would know that that was sort of the Mundy mark. We favored more casual entertaining when we could do it. We certainly had our fair share of dark suits and white shirts and, you know, the grand entertaining that one is privileged to do in the Home of the Commandants.

But as far as—I believe that that first barbecue probably was for the generals and the SES—the Senior Executive Service members in the Washington area. So, yes, I enjoyed that type of entertaining. People were relaxed and the Commandant's yard was a great place to do it.

Let me drop back for a minute. You mentioned the first parade. Actually, my first parade, there had been no—there was no schedule for parades when I got here. I assumed that the parade season, kind of like the football season or anything else, had been laid out. But it ended abruptly on the 30th of June. So, it turns out that we had the parade coming up—the next Friday was the 5th of July and there was no one to review the parade then or at any time in the future.

So, fortunately, Gen Lou Wilson's Special Basic Class was having its reunion and I called him and said how about reviewing the parade and he said, "Sure, I will do it." So, we wound up hosting that—that was my first parade, the 5th of July, even though we hosted no social event because we weren't in the Commandant's House and, as I recall, Gen Wilson and his Basic Class members were having a dinner somewhere. So, they just came directly. We met them there and then had the parade.

The parade for Gordon Sullivan, I called him when we were both nominated and said, "Gordie, I would like to have you be my first official parade guest and reviewing officer. I said there was no plan, that at least Gordon Sullivan was laid on, but he came and as he walked in the door, the bottom fell out and it almost washed Washington away. So, we had a nice

reception and I promised him another parade in fairer weather.

I came to realize—I had a parade later that season at which I had included an Army lieutenant general, who came in his blue uniform, and it rained it out. So, I communicated to Gordie Sullivan that henceforth I was not going to allow any Army officer to come here in his blue uniform because, clearly, it was a bad omen. And we had a lighthearted—he subsequently hosted a parade and reception for me over in Fort Myer and one of the last three parades that I gave before I retired was for Gen Sullivan.

We had a reception in the garden. We walked outside and it rained out the parade. So, we still owe the Army a good credible, non-rained out parade.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did you and Linda move into the Commandant's House? There was a period of renovation, was there not?

GEN MUNDY: There was a period of renovation. Gen Gray, I think, had been out of the House for about six months in order for them to come in and do the heating and the air conditioning system. When we came here, the House was to undergo renovation for, again, about six months and it was—that was largely structural. There were some leaks in the ceiling. They removed all of the paint, the many coats of paint from the original wainscoting and wood in the house and so on. So, the House was taken down literally to nothing, but bare wall, the chandeliers removed and that sort of thing.

We moved in the 11th of December and at which time I was off traveling somewhere. I came back, but my wife would want me to recall that the first dinner party we had was on the 18th of December, so a week after she had moved us into the House with me gone, why I caused her to put on her first dinner party and we had that for all of the former Commandants, an occasion that is on the basis that I had asked them to come back. We had now finished—I am getting a little ahead of myself, but we had finished, I, we, those of us that were working on the Force Structure Planning effort, we finished that and I asked the Commandants if they would come in. We had a one-day session with them, where I could give them an overview of where I was going and what had come out of the Force Structure Planning Group and sort of the future as I saw it and seek their counsel.

They did that. We had a dinner for them. I am told that it is the only occasion on which all the former Commandants—Gen Greene did not come, Zola Shoup didn't come, but everyone, including Audrey

Cushman, Gen Cushman's widow, came. So, we had a tremendous photograph that should be a matter of historical record and I will turn it over at some point, but it is hanging in my house right now, where we stood on the steps going up to the second floor, starting by number, with General and Mrs. Chapman, 24, Mrs. Cushman, 25, Gen Wilson, 26, right up the steps, to Linda and me on the top step, as the 30th, and it is a grand picture of the Commandants and their ladies for that dinner party.

So, a very nice event and a nice way to kind of christen the—that was the first dinner that we hosted in the Commandant's House.

BGEN SIMMONS: We will be including a selection of photographs in the finished product here.

Where were you and Linda living while you were waiting for . . .

GEN MUNDY: We were back in Quarters 2. We had occupied Quarters 2 as the DCS/PP&O and we returned—The Hoars moved into Quarters 2 behind us. They vacated it, so when we came back from Norfolk after a short period of, you know, refurbishing it—well, we told them we didn't do anything to it because we didn't want to repaint the house again after just one year of occupancy. So, we sort of moved in just directly behind the Hoars and occupied Quarters 2.

So, it was a relatively easy move to transition to Quarters 2 right past the Assistant Commandant's House and into the Commandant's House when we moved in in December.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 July, you officiated at the retirement of MajGen Jerome Cooper, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Gary Cooper has been one of the most influential of our black generals. Would you care to comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think evidence of that is he is today the Ambassador to Jamaica, appointed by President Clinton. So, Gen Ambassador Cooper or Ambassador Gen Cooper is, as you point out, one of our very finest—Gary Cooper is an extraordinary officer. He was one of the pioneer successful black officers in the Marine Corps, and I think has done a great deal to impress the image of a very fine serving officer. He was well thought of in Vietnam. I didn't know him there, but the accounts that come from Vietnam related that he was well thought of. Many wanted him to stay in the Marine Corps. He got out because he was a very successful Alabama business-

man; served in the Alabama State Legislature; became a major general in the Marine Corps, retired from that position, became the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Personnel Matters and, again, is currently serving as the Ambassador to Jamaica.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 July, the House of Representatives approved a list of base closures advanced by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. This list included the Marine Corps Air Station at Tustin, California. I believe this was the first of the BRAC—so-called BRAC, B-R-A-C, actions to affect us. Did Tustin, indeed, close?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Tustin is still closing because the Base Closure Commission directions give a period of six years for that base to be closed. So, Tustin is still in the process and is to be closed by 1997. We are still about a year out from it ultimately being closed.

This was one of those unfortunate things that occurred as a part of the Force drawdown and we can talk at length about the fact that however you want to conceive the Base Force, however you want to conceive the plan that was put together by Secretary Cheney and Gen Powell in about 1989, it was a flat 25 percent off the top of everybody and when we got into the base closure business, despite the fact that the Marine Corps bases were then and are today fully occupied, fully garrisoned for all the—you know, we are deficient, not sufficient in quarters, both for bachelor Marines or married Marines. Our training areas are cramped. Our air bases are in good use. Despite this fact, the politics of the season were that everybody had to give at the altar. So, the Marine Corps was caused to offer up the Marine Corps Air Station at Tustin.

The regrettable part of that is that not seen at that time, but very obvious in later years is that with Tustin going down, that dragged El Toro down with it and now, of course, subsequently, the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro will be closed and we won't relocate that air station. But when we close the base at which the largest aviation group in the Marine Corps, MAG-16, Marine Aircraft Group 16, albeit a helicopter group, is located, we wound up with no place to put those aircraft and eventually are going to have to close El Toro because of the closure of Tustin.

There was a plan that had been put together that kind of flew against the eye of reality and it envisioned that we would close Tustin, that the Marine Corps would then get—it was estimated to be about \$800 million. It would have been far more than that,

to go up to Twentynine Palms and build a major air station, where we would relocate Marine Aircraft Group 16 to the desert.

It was simply an ill-fated plan. There is not sufficient water there to do that. That is not the place to move another seven or eight thousand Marines and their dependents. We didn't have the housing. It just was ill-fated. So, the first year that I got here, while that was the, quote, deal, that we would close Tustin, move up to Twentynine Palms, as soon as I got here and began my maneuvering on Capitol Hill, the word I got very quickly was you all are simply not in your right senses if you imagine that at a time of draw down and declining budgets, we are closing over five or six hundred bases, we are going to spend a billion dollars to go up and build the Marine Corps a new base. So, we were hooked, and I regret that.

I don't fault that to the Marine Corps. It was, again, one of these everybody has got to give up something. We were able to fight that off in subsequent years, but for that first year, we gave at the altar.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you have just indicated BRAC closures would occupy a good deal of your attention during your time as Commandant. To a degree, you have anticipated my next question or questions.

How was Headquarters organized to handle BRAC?

GEN MUNDY: The Department has—there are a lot of acronyms. There is the B-SAC, the B-SAT and the BRAC. Let me avoid those and say simply that the structure is headed within the Department by a civilian. This happens to be Charlie Namfakos, N-a-m-f-a-k-o-s, who is a long-time civilian serving under the Department of the Navy. But, anyway, the Navy and the Marine Corps assign officers and support personnel to work over in the Center for Naval Analysis headed by Mr. Namfakos.

There is a tremendous gathering of detailed information. How many square feet of parking ramp space do you have in a certain air station? How many school kids do you have? What is the civilian school capacity? How long does it take them to get to school? Are there commissaries? Are there PXs? How is housing? What is the economic impact on the community of that volume of military?

What is the impact both direct in terms of the number of civilians that would be laid off if we close a base, together with the indirect cost? How many McDonald's hamburgers will not be bought and how many McDonald's or Sears Roebuck or service sta-

tions will go under if we move, you know, forty or fifty thousand people out of that base?

So, it is an enormously detailed effort that literally becomes a cross to bear for those assigned. When we went through the second of the base closure commissions, as I have tried to do and continued throughout my tenure to do, any time the Navy put up a two-star, the Marines put up a two-star. I wanted to make sure that we were not the "little brown brother," as we so often are within the Department.

So, to make a long story short here, LtGen Winglass, the DCS, I&L our lead player, he was seconded by LtGen Rich Hearney, who was then serving as the DCS/Aviation because much of the focus had to do with air bases, as well as the ground side. And then we had other officers, who served on there, but our three principals were Winglass, Hearney and LtGen Norm Ehlert, who was the DCS/Plans, Policies, and Operations.

The Navy matched that with three equal three-stars and then there were a couple of our—facilities director, whoever that might have been at the time, was the would have been a one-star and the Navy had their one- or two-star on the plus Reservists that we brought in.

They would sit down and go through all of this amassed data to determine the relative weight that various installations bear, based on all this. So, the decisions to close an installation might have as much to do with the economic impact on the outside as, does indeed, the utility of the facility to the military or it might be the other way around, you know we're going to hit them hard economically but, you know, we just have far more capacity than we need.

None of the Marine bases have excess capacity. Many of the Navy bases, particularly their shipyards and the air bases had some excess capacity because, you know, the Navy had been coming down more dramatically in size than the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the final results, at least as they were when you left all this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the final results overall, I think the nation has closed something on the order of about 800 and—I am not sure of the exact number, but it would be between eight and nine hundred installations and facilities both overseas and in the United States. In the case of the Marine Corps, again, citing earlier my feeling that the Corps really had given when we shouldn't have given, we—Tustin is the only Marine Corps Base to be closed. El Toro is a relocation. The Navy was going to close Miramar,

which, interestingly enough, is where the Marines moved out of Miramar up to El Toro to establish that base in World War II.

So, really the Marines are returning to Miramar. We were driven to do that, as I mentioned earlier, because we would have—there are about five or six times the amount of space at Miramar as we had in a very encroached-upon El Toro, that will enable us to go down there and to locate both the fixed wing elements of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro and Yuma, where they are currently located and then to increase the number of helicopters we have at Camp Pendleton desirable and to relocate our heavy helicopters down inside Miramar as well.

So, it is a relocation. So, technically, two signs will come down at El Toro and Tustin, but as a matter of fact, the Marine Corps through all of this will have literally closed or lost only one base. So, we feel real good about that.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, we seem to have run out of time for this morning. I suggest we recess this session and will continue with Session 18 at the next time we meet.

This is Thursday, 19 October. We are in the Marine Corps Historical Center and we are continuing Session 18.

On 7 August, Maj Harry Elms of the Marine Corps Uniform Shop paid a call. Did you have some uniform requirements for Harry?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am sure I did because as one comes to that point where you are selected to be the Commandant, usually, when you take a good close look at the braid on your evening dress or the collar, that sort of thing, why it usually needs some refurbishing. I believe that was the case with me.

In addition to that, I would imagine that I was probably buying at least one more green uniform at that point. Interestingly, I had chosen to wear the 14-ounce green gabardine uniform as an all-season uniform. Unfortunately, it was not that because while you could get by with it inside in the summertime, if you had to go out for any type of event, you melted and the uniform melted very quickly.

So, it was—as a matter of fact, interestingly, it was on the Guadalcanal Commemoration at the Iwo Jima Monument, which as I recall was held on—that would have been a year later, but that was that same date, 7 August '42, that I came to realize that when I sat out there with President Bush and the other dignitaries, I was in greens and by the time we got around to the ceremony, I was literally a wrinkled mess.

So, I was probably talking to him about an all-weather uniform at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: It has become customary for every Commandant to meet with the President of the Permanent Marine Corps Uniform Board early in his tenure and that is to give the Board his goals and objectives with regards to uniforms. What goals and objectives did you have for Marine Corps uniforms?

GEN MUNDY: As much as anything, stability, because I believe we can change the uniforms too much and, indeed, while we had gone through—I remember on Gen Shoup's tenure, we looked at the beltless coat. We studied whether to wear Sam Browne belts all the time or to go back to campaign hats.

Gen Barrow, I thought, probably had the most insightful and decisive guidance than any of the Commandants that I have been aware of because he was fairly precise in trying to not only perhaps improve the wearability of uniforms, but he also wanted to dress us up a little bit more as opposed to the tendency to dress down that we were going through at that time.

Mine was very sparse. As I recall, I came to the assignment with a fairly humorous initiative in mind and that was to acquire the blue sweater for our Marine recruiters. I had tried that as a brigadier some years earlier to model a blue sweater because they really had nothing to wear at that time but the topcoat, even if it was a fairly mild day. So, here came a Marine with a full length coat on when he really just needed something light.

At any rate, I set that up as a brigadier and the Uniform Board immediately rejected it and told me that this was an absolutely inane idea. It was amazing when I came back as a Commandant and forwarded it again, it got quickly voted in. So, we got the recruiters—at least we gave them a blue sweater.

I had, as you mentioned, I think, earlier in this session, I had a certain penchant for the blue/white uniform. Now, that said, I have long been a believer that—and what I was taught in my earliest days and that is that everybody on the field is in the same uniform. So, it never made much sense to me why at a formal affair at the Marine Barracks with the Commandant or whatever general officer hosting this affair, why he would be in a white social uniform, when the troops on the field were in another uniform.

So, I wanted in part to standardize to get us all in the same uniform, but, number two, I had a lifetime passion for the blue/white uniform, going back to my

early days on sea duty when we did have white trousers and we wore the blue/white uniform as a seagoing detachment.

So, I believe I asked that we take a look at that, but the only modification there was at that time in uniform regulations if you wore the blue/white uniform and were not ceremonial or under arms or with troops, you wore white shoes and your blue blouse. And it was really a rather—at least in my judgment a really kind of a sissy looking outfit. So, I wanted to go to black shoes all the time and I recall directing that that be done and there may have been some other minor things, but, on balance, my view towards uniforms was let's maintain stability.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 9 August, you went to King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where you were the guest of honor at the banquet of the Marine Corps League's National Convention. Could you comment on the relationship of the Commandant to the Marine Corps League?

GEN MUNDY: I will. First, a humorous mention there. That was probably about the first affair of that sort that I had attended as the Commandant. We flew in by helicopter, landed—King of Prussia is a very small place. We landed and the fire department was providing security. And then we got in a recruiter's sedan and drove down to this motel, where the National Convention was being held. I had never been to one of these, didn't really know what it was all about, but as we drove up to the hotel, they—all of the Leaguers had fallen out en masse, literally en masse, not in formation, to see the new Commandant.

So, as we drove up, I could not even get out of the car before I was besieged by Leaguers, who all wanted to have their picture taken with me. When we finally got inside, got into our white uniforms and they didn't know who I was, had no idea. My senior aide, LtCol Chip Parker, and I came out of the motel room and by the time we got into the lobby of the motel, headed for the banquet room, they had besieged, again, to have their picture made with me, but not knowing the difference. About half the people there would come up to Chip Parker and say could I have my picture taken with you.

So, the aide got his picture taken as many times as I did and to this day, I am sure that they are wondering why the Commandant was wearing a silver leaf instead of a silver star.

But you asked about the relationship. The Marine Corps League, of course, is, without question, I think,

our largest Marine Corps organization of that type. The Commandant, at least on my tenure, I made an effort to go to each of the National Conventions. It is not possible to accept all of the individual invitations that come from League detachments all over the country. The League has gained in importance as we decided to put more effort into the Young Marine's Program as a national effort to help youth. We assigned that to the Marine Corps League and, in fact, gave them some funding in 1993 to be able to support what had heretofore been handed off to the active duty establishment.

And I might say that they have taken it on with a certain zest and are doing pretty well at it. That said, and with nothing but admiration and appreciation for what the League is and for the golden shape of the Marine Corps emblem that is the heart of everyone of those people in the League, it really has, I think, moved to a fairly low echelon of effectiveness in comparison with organizations like the Navy League or like the Association of the United States Army, which are very powerful political entities, the Marine Corps League is far more an opportunity for—you know, for old Marines, most of them enlisted, retired gunnery sergeants or former lance corporals, to get together and just, you know, celebrate being a Marine.

So, it is a different type organization. I tried very hard during my tenure to support it on a continuing basis and I believe that most of the Commandants had done that.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 13th and 14th of August were fairly much taken up by your attendance at the Commanders-in-Chief Conference that was being held at the National Defense University. Who were some of the CinCs at this time and what happens at the annual CinC Conference?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as to who were some of the CinCs, Gen John Galvin was the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the European Forces. SACEur, he was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Gen Joe Hoar had just been down in the Central Command for about four months at that time. Admiral Bud Edney had the Atlantic Command and Admiral Hunt Hardisty was the Pacific Commander.

Those were the principals. There were other Unified Commands; the Space Command, the Strategic Command and what not and while those are important, they really are more functional CinCdoms, as I would call it, as support. The Transportation Command is not a warfighting CinC. He provides services. The Unified Commanders that I just mentioned

really are more or less our global warfighting commanders.

So, they were there together with all the CinCs. You asked what goes on at a CinC's conference. This one, as best I recall it, was focused on the subject of Force Structure and a continuing addressal of what Gen Colin Powell had introduced as his Chairman's view of the future and his view of the future had with it a scenario in which threats subsided substantially with the demise of the Soviet Union, which they have.

And it also had with it the Base Force Structure to contend with that.

So, I think as much as anything, it was sort of a how-goes-it in terms of how is the vision holding up. We had promulgated that or come up with it in about 1989, a couple of years earlier. It had been interrupted by the massive deployment of troops to the desert, both the force downsizing and the view of the future.

So, I think it was as much as anything kind of a thermometer check on the Chairman's view of the future, as well as on the force downsizing.

At the CinC's conferences routinely—that was not an annual conference. The annual conference is usually held in August each year. There are other one-day conferences during the year and, you know, from time to time as the issues—this was one of those, but at the annual conference or for that matter at any CinC's conference, usually it is very much as a board of directors-like meeting.

There is a social aspect to it.

I was saying that as a routine, though some of them varied, but we would meet at about 0700 in the morning for breakfast together and that is a working breakfast. There is really very little warm-up time. I mean, you know, there is the usual amount of handshaking and greeting and good to see you again types of greetings, but then you get right down to business. So, at 7:00, we would usually begin with a couple of briefings because you would be eating in a conference room more ordinarily than not.

Then you go through a number of items until noon, break, go around to the Chairman's mess, which, of course, is really the mess for the Joint Staff. So, it is a very large place. And we would have lunch. That usually is without issues. That would be a break. And then in the afternoon, you would go right back into the conference room and you would plow back into it, breaking probably by about 1700 in the afternoon and then more ordinarily than not, the Chairman would host dinner at his house that night at say 7:00 or 7:30 and you would break up.

On the longer meetings, on the more recent ones that I attended, they would be, as a general rule, about

two-day sessions and to be very candid, at the end of those two days, you were not only physically dead from having done little other than to sit and eat all day, but you were also somewhat brain dead because two days—you know, in the military, we don't know how to civilly meet for five hours a day and let executives apply the brain power. We tend to do it for 10 or 11 hours a day and just really exhaust ourselves.

But it is good to get together and I think that that off line, when those occasions occur, why a Service Chief is able to talk with a CinC about some matter of concern to that particular service in the CinC's theater; the movement of maritime prepositioning ships around or how a particular evolution is going or even reports back. The CinCs will occasionally come in and usually with me it was always a case that they would express great satisfaction with the Marine component matters they had, but on occasion, they could get with the Service Chief and say, look, I am having a little bit of a problem with so and so and here is the problem I am having and then the Service Chief might enter with his FMF Commander, for example, to discuss that problem later on.

BGEN SIMMONS: This particular conference apparently was held at the National Defense University. From what you said, though, ordinarily it is in the Joint Staff area . . .

GEN MUNDY: Would be. In that case, we meet up in a little room that is up on the top deck of the National Defense University, off to the side. It has a name but I couldn't tell you what it is, but there is security there and they bring in food, just as I have described. We would meet for breakfast. In that particular case since you have no mess to go to, we would break, you know, you have got to break in mid-morning, but then you would break about 11:30 and step out and they would bring in new plates of food and you would eat again there. And, again, you can certainly push food away, but, frankly, you tend to eat a little bit too much and sit too long, in my judgment.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you say there is a good balance of the field talking to Washington and Washington talking to the field? Or does Washington dominate these conferences?

GEN MUNDY: I would say it is the Chairman's conference. I mean, he is the Chairman of the board there. So, the Chairman dictates the agenda and generally, more or less—when I say “dominates,” that sounds like it is a negative term. It really isn't, but he

presides over the discussions. However, when the Joint Staff gets up to brief a particular issue, and it is the Joint Staff—occasionally a Service will have something to brief, but usually if that is the case, it is the Service Chief that will stand up and say I have got something I want to bring to the CinC's attention.

So, if it is the Joint Staff briefing, then the CinCs are not at all uncomfortable about taking on the J-5 or the J-3 or the J-4 or whoever is briefing. And the Chairman will usually stand for his briefer and if there is some disagreement with what has been briefed, then the Chairman will usually say will he moderate it or say, well, we will take that on board and go back and look into it.

BGEN SIMMONS: This might be a good time to comment on the style of Gen Colin Powell and Gen Shalikashvili in situations like this. Was there a noticeable difference in their style?

GEN MUNDY: The noticeable difference, I think, comes from—would come from confidence. I will get to that in just a minute. , but it is true the two men themselves, Colin Powell is a masterful group consensus achiever. One, he is knowledgeable. He knows at least enough about most subjects to be conversant in them, if not, a lot about them. Number two, he seeks comment and he seeks consensus. I never was in a meeting where Colin did not say, "Okay, well, let's—what do you guys think about this or I need to hear from you what you think about this. I need some thoughts on this."

And as you come to know him and I would say this for both men—you could say anything you wanted to. Colin might disagree with you or Gen John Shalikashvili might, but they would not resent your views.

I will make this observation. When Colin was the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army was a much more subdued individual at meetings. When Colin passed and Shalikashvili came in, we, the other members of the Chief found it relatively amusing that the Chairman would refer to Gordon Sullivan as Chief. So, there was a certain deference, understanding, that here was a fellow who had been senior to him for some period of time at least and the military culture, of course, makes us recognize—I mean, we all know who is senior to who else.

So, it was interesting to see when Colin left, Gordon Sullivan became very much more an authoritative figure. I am told that when Gordon left and when I left, being one of the old-timers, Gen Shalikashvili and I had been two stars together and,

knew each other, but when I left, having been, quote, senior to him in the sense of being a four- star before he was, I am told that he has also blossomed and became more comfortable with his role.

I don't think that says anything about him or about anybody for that matter. To be told that you are now going to be first among equals is a tough notch to fill even for a Commandant because all of our Commandants are lieutenant generals, who become generals although—not all of them have been. We have had, I guess, Gen Kelley and Gen Barrow came from four-star positions to be the Commandant.

But for the most part, when you take a lieutenant general and elevate him to be the Commandant, number one, he has just become senior to the Assistant Commandant that he has been calling "sir" for a year or more and he may be junior, indeed, to other lieutenant generals about him. So, there is, a need to become comfortable with your role as now sitting at the head of the table as opposed to being one of the voices off on the side.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 16 August, you had a garden party and parade for the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso. The following day you left on the first of your overseas visits and spent the night at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, and then went on to Yokota Air Force Base in Japan.

Then on Tuesday, 20 August, you went to Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, flying from there to Seoul, Korea. A very busy but typical flight schedule. What was your business in Korea?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was going for two purposes. One was to pay a very brief call on the Commandant of the Korean Marine Corps. He happened to be coming to the United States about a month later, but my real—I suppose that that was a sub-purpose because really my main purpose was to go and to pay a call on the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea, on the U.S. Commander, as it was. That was Gen Bob Riscassi, who was a good friend from the days when he had been the Director of the Joint Staff and then the Vice Chief of the Army. And I knew him well and thought well of him then and still do today.

He was the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, Korea, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea. So, it was to make a call on him to check in with the Marines in Korea and then secondarily, although what I learned from that visit is one cannot go into another country without being, in effect, a guest of the Commandant of that country. So, I was quickly taken over by the Korean Marines for a very

pleasant visit, but a very short visit, really a one-night visit. That was one of those times when your system, of course, is back on the East Coast of the United States somewhere or still nearer there and you must go through the series of toasts and eating foods that you are not accustomed to and I can recall at the end of that, I was probably about to fall asleep by the time we broke from dinner and I remember that my Korean host in rather broken English said, "Do you like singing?" and I said, "Well, of course, I love singing. I enjoy music." And as we were sitting there together, as the Koreans do it, you know, with the women isolated on the far side of the room in stiff-back chairs and the shoguns over on this side in the big soft plush chairs.

So, they brought out a karioke and he said to me, "There." So, I said, "Oh, I am too tired to sing." I didn't sing anyway. So, to try to get me off the spot, MajGen Bill Eshelman was then the J-5 in Korea, the U.S. Marine officer there and Pat Eshelman, his wife, who is a delightful lady, Pat Eshelman stood up and said, "Oh, he has been traveling all day. He is too tired to sing, but I will stand in for him. So, we will all come out here and we will do the hokey-pokey." And for those that don't know the hokey-pokey, it is that idiotic dance, where you put your left foot in. You put your left foot out. You put your left foot in. You shake it all about. You go through this routine.

The Koreans loved it, so Pat Eshelman bailed me out of having to do the karioke and sing that night.

BGEN SIMMONS: I looked at your itinerary and anticipated how tiring it might have been. I wondered why you hadn't broken it on the West Coast and/or in Hawaii considering the commands that were—to visit there. I think that sort of became your routine later, that you would try to do one or the other as opposed to the trip to the Far East.

GEN MUNDY: I think more than anything if one, so to speak, covers the waterfront of the area that you are going to stop say en route at both—on the West Coast and then in Hawaii and then into the Western Pacific, it becomes a very long trip for you to spend any amount of time either place.

Now, the other side of that is that I saw benefit to going to the far reaches and then coming back through the Fleet Headquarters to debrief to the FMFPac staff and Commander what I had picked up during my travel through his AOR. I, on occasion, would take the Force Commander with me. But it was really a matter of how much flying you wanted to do in a given day. Elmendorf is a very nice stopping location

because it would be about a 7 1/2 hour flight out there and then you could get a nice rest. Turn your time clock a little bit and get a run in, get a workout, you know, sit around a little bit and then get the air crew some rest. And then the next day you could fly on into Japan, Yokota or down into one of the U.S.-Japanese bases in another eight or nine hours with a fueling stop. And that made it tolerable.

BGEN SIMMONS: After less than a day in Korea, you flew on to Okinawa and then came home the following day by way of Recruit Depot, San Diego, where there was a change of command, Thursday, 22 August. Who was relieving who?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the relief was between MajGen John Grinalds and MajGen Tony Studds. As a matter of fact, I believe what he must have in hand was the original plan whereby I was bound and determined that I would make it back for the change in command. At the last minute, it just became a bridge too far and we realized we couldn't do that. So, I remained, contrary to what you have on paper, I remained in Okinawa and then back through Hawaii and when I returned through the West Coast, I stopped and took Gen Studds to dinner, you know, and said welcome aboard. I wasn't able to be here at your assumption of command, but wanted to extend our best.

So, we modified that schedule you just . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, that makes more sense. I was going by the paper record.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: And according to the paper record, after San Diego, you went back out to the Pacific [with laughter] on Saturday, 24 August, to flying first Cubi Point, the Philippines and then going on to Agana. I was going to ask you what your business was in Guam?

GEN MUNDY: I came—if you omitted the boomerang back and forth to the West Coast, you have the trip exactly right. We did stop in Seoul, as you—but we stopped in Yokota actually and saw the Marines there and we stopped in Seoul, stopped in Iwakuni, spent an overnight there on into Okinawa for, as I recall it, probably three days.

Then I wanted to pass through the Philippines en route back to a stop at Guam. We could do that because we were at that time, of course, disengaging from the Philippines, closing out of Subic Bay. We

still had Marines down there. We still had the vestiges of the Marine Barracks. So, I wanted to go through there. As it turned out, they were in one of the truly monsoons and when we stepped off the airplane, water was running over your shoes. So, it was a very sodden—just about a four-hour stop. And then on into Guam. Why Guam? One, Marine Barracks, Guam was still active at that time and I wanted to stop and make a call there.

And number two, it was a good stopping place for a trip and eventually on into Wake Island and then into Hawaii.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you say, you came back by way of Wake Island and Hawaii. Was this your first visit to Wake?

GEN MUNDY: No. I had been through Wake—the first time when I was a lieutenant general and gone out on much a similar swing when I was the DCS/PP&O to kind of get a feel for the Pacific Theater.

As I believe you know from our common journeys together, I stop at Wake Island anytime I can and probably, in fact, if I can carry through with my plans, I would say I will probably go to spend a week on Wake Island every year, simply because it is a haunting place to me and it was the inspiration for me really to become a Marine. So, I just—Wake is almost like going home to me.

But I stopped in Wake for two purposes. One of them was because I enjoy stopping there. The other one, though—we could have made it into Hawaii—had to do very candidly with the fact that LtGen Bob Milligan was getting ready to retire. I did not want to arrive prior to his day of retirement simply because, if you remember back to earlier discussions, Bob and I were and are good friends. Probably, the two of us had been, you know, the final contenders and I didn't want to, in any way, take the spotlight off this absolutely magnificent Marine and friend by coming in the day before and that would have meant they would have had to invite me to probably a farewell dinner for him or something and that is just not good.

So, we opted to stop in Wake and spend the better part of a day or at least a half day and then leave. We left there the next day at such an hour, as I recall, that we arrived in Hawaii about mid afternoon, were met and went to our quarters, changed into my blue uniform and went to the change of command and didn't overshadow Gen Milligan on what should be his—you know, his farewell.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you make any other official calls to CinCPacFlt or CinCPac?

GEN MUNDY: I did. Well, I—anytime that I would pass through Hawaii or, for that matter, if I went to Seoul or whatever Unified Commander's theater I was in, if he was available, I would always make the call. So, in this particular case, yes, I called on the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and then the day following the change of command, I remained with—you know, with explicit guidance to then, now LtGen Royal Moore, who had just assumed command, was in his first day of command. I told him that I would like to go over and visit the Marines at Kaneohe Bay, the 1st Brigade, but that I didn't want him to feel compelled to be involved with that and he didn't.

So, he was able to have his first day in his office with his staff getting himself settled in. I was over on the other side of the island visiting the 1st MEB and then we got together and had a pleasant dinner with some of the other retired officers in Hawaii that night and then we got on the airplane and left the next day.

BGEN SIMMONS: You left Hawaii on Wednesday, the 28th of August. You overnighted at San Diego and that would be the occasion of your dinner with Tony Studds that you mentioned, and then came home to Andrews Air Force Base the following day.

On 30 August, you retired MajGen Don Beckwith and that evening you had a garden party and evening parade in honor of the Secretary of the Navy. I noticed that you were wearing the blue/white uniform.

GEN MUNDY: Well, we commented on my affection for that uniform earlier. I began wearing it actually when I moved to the barracks as a lieutenant general under this philosophy that I have earlier espoused. Every time I was involved with a parade in an official capacity, I wore the parade uniform. When I was just attending as a guest and it was purely social for me, I wore the white uniform that had been in style until that time.

So, when I came here as the Commandant, I told my aides and office staff that we—while the invitees would continue to be invited as a white dress B uniform, that if I was hosting the parade or if I was in an official capacity, I would be in the troop uniform.

BGEN SIMMONS: Sometime in August, the decision was reached to eliminate the fourth rifle companies in the Corps' eight Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) battalions. The head-

quarters and service companies of these battalions were also reorganized. The result was a net saving of 48 officers and 1,536 enlisted spaces.

This must have been a tough decision. I presume the decision was yours.

GEN MUNDY: Well, the decision was actually one of those that had been evolving even as I became the Commandant. It was nothing that I came in on the 1st of July and decided to do, but we knew that we were going to have to do something about end-strength because, again, the Marine Corps' direction from the Secretary of Defense at that time was to draw down by 1997 to 159,000 Marines. We were still at wartime strength. We still had something better than 190,000 Marines on the rolls at that time.

But many of those were short-timers, who were going to be discharged because they were enlisted, they had been extended or they were Reservists or what have you. So, this was one that had been fairly well, as I recall it, decreed as something we would have to do at the time that we were back in the 1989 time-frame where we were looking at what we would do if the Marine Corps were mandated to go down, which it subsequently was.

So, while you might say "yes," the stroke of the pen on paper was mine, indeed, this was evolutionary, but it would have been my call under any circumstance because it was a luxury we couldn't afford. Had we decided to maintain four rifle companies in those new (SOC battalions), it would have had to be at the expense of battalions. We would have been (furling) battalion battle colors in order to maintain the companies in a smaller number of battalions with more companies rather than a larger number of battalions with three companies.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is an off-the-wall question. Was there any consideration then, later or now of using a Reserve company as a fourth company to round out a battalion?

GEN MUNDY: There was. There had been over the experience of my—I would say starting back about the time we were looking at downsizing as a potential, as well as an absolute, when we were directed to do it. So, that would go back to through the 80—make it 1988 time frame.

We looked at various options. One of them was the affiliation concept that you mentioned. Now, the reason—there probably were several reasons that we never really got into that too formally—one of them is that the Army had the round-out concept, in which a

division would be comprised of two active brigades and one Guard or Reserve brigade.

It will be recalled, I think, that during Desert Shield [and] Desert Storm when they tried to bring these brigades to active duty, they found out that they couldn't get them there.

So, the Army had had a great deal of difficulty with the round-out concept. It would be difficult to explain how a fourth rifle company in every Marine battalion was anything much more than a round-out concept if you kept the Table of Organization at four and said, oh, but by the way, 25 percent of the warfighting capability of the battalion is in the Reserve.

But we did look at it and as I recall at one point, it was a little bit more formalized than that. We did actually go through the Marine Corps Reserve and identify companies and batteries and perhaps other types of units that would be assigned to a given battalion. The thought was that—now, again, this was before my tenure as Commandant, but the thought was that that way we would be able to send, let's say, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines to the field on a training exercise and that Company A of the 23d Marines would be able to fly in from wherever it was located and link up, participate in this exercise.

What we learned is that the Reserve was simply not that responsive for good and valid reasons. Two-thirds of the strength of a rifle company in many parts of the country is made up of college students and you couldn't unless you booked your active duty exercises around semester breaks, which would be enormously difficult to do, we couldn't make it work practically.

So, we never really formally got into that as a standing arrangement.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 August, you had convened a Force Structure Planning Group at Quantico to assist you in defining the optimum structure for the Corps within the constraints imposed by the Congress and the Department of Defense. The head of this 17-person planning group was BGen Charles C. Krulak, who was serving as Director of the Personnel Procurement Division at Headquarters. What led you to choose Gen Krulak to head this group?

GEN MUNDY: Well, two factors. Remember, as we discussed in an earlier session, that during Gen Gray's tenure, when we were looking at Force Restructuring, BGen Jack Sheehan and BGen Mike Myatt were the—were sort of Gen Gray's "Krulaks," I guess, at that particular time. We had a lot of clutter around that because there were several of us that thought we

had the baton that we didn't have, but that is beside the point in this discussion.

Gen Sheehan was still at the Headquarters at that time, but was being assigned to a Joint assignment down in Norfolk. While under ordinary circumstances, had it not been Joint, it might have made a certain amount of sense to use Sheehan because of his institutional knowledge. The fact is that it couldn't be done. You couldn't ask a CinC to give up, you know, one of his principal staff for that.

Second to that is that I thought we needed a fresh face on it. Those of us who had been involved since 1988 and '89, trying to help Gen Gray with this, were pretty well burned out. . .

The third factor, I guess, of the four—and I am really building up to a crescendo—the third factor would be that Chuck Krulak was right—sat literally directly above my office. Had we a hole in the floor, we could have passed notes back and forth through it on the fourth deck. He was there. He was in the Headquarters. He was in an assignment, which was of great importance to the Marine Corps, that of directing personnel management, indeed, could be gapped because you had—you know, it was an affordable brigadier, but the real reason is probably the very reason that Chuck Krulak became my successor and that is that he is a man of enormous vision and energy and comprehension, not of just a specialty, but, indeed far more than many that I have known in my career, he truly understands what makes a division work or what makes a force service support group work or what makes a wing work.

The politics associated with that, componency, all of those sorts of things, I just thought that, as I looked about me, it seemed to me that Gen Krulak had the most to bring with, again, his crowning jewel being that latter point, those latter qualities that I have just talked about.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did it become a full-time assignment for him?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it did for all practical purposes because Ed, number one, anyone who knows Chuck Krulak knows the number of hours in the day are only constraints on what you can do. They are not limitations on the amount of effort that you put into it. So, he devoted himself to it almost entirely and it was—I would say that it was a primary mission and, therefore, though it never came to a question between him and me or between the Deputy Chief of Staff of Manpower, I would have told anybody that, "Yes, that is his primary duty." We will get by on the personnel

management for a few weeks or months here.

So, it was full time. He selected the officers to serve with him on it and all of them were accommodated down at the Marine Corps Association Building in Quantico, who made all the facilities available, and they went at it full time and I would say even so much as to say occasionally a Sunday was off, but it was a six to seven day a week effort.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the key members?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the people that I have a specific recollection of, then-Col Tom Wilkerson, who I have spoken of two or three times before as being, again, a very significant assistant to me in a number of areas in the past. Then-Col—now MajGen Marty Steele—Marty Steele was a tank officer, an armor officer, but a man with a tremendous analytic ability, just an ability to address a problem and get it done, one of the brightest minds we had then and have today in the Corps.

Col Russ Appleton, who is today the Military Secretary of the Commandant, was then at Quantico and was drafted into this project. Now, he had been a primary assistant to Gen Sheehan and Myatt, when they were working the Force for the first Force Structure. So, it became very useful to have Russ Appleton because he sort of had the keys to the box that had been worked in a couple of years before.

Col Mike Strickland, who was an enormously effective voice at that time. LtGen Wills, "Bash" Wills or Duane Wills, was a Deputy Chief for Aviation, assigned some very good officers. I think Col Bobby Magnus who is today a major general and those are some of the principal names that I recall.

The guidance was that there were no holds barred, we wanted the very finest colonels and lieutenant colonels, not exclusive of them. As I recall, we had maybe even a captain or a couple of majors on there, but it was principally a lieutenant colonel and colonel effort, chaired by BGen Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: What specific guidance did you give?

GEN MUNDY: It was very specific. I had tasked the DCS/PP&O to come up with that and that was LtGen Hank Stackpole at the time. It came to me a couple of times as far too generic. I wanted—undoubtedly, I think, and I will let others judge this, but the Force Structure Planning Group was probably the most significant effort of my tenure because we would rest the

future structure and legitimacy of the size of the Marine Corps on that particular effort.

So, I wanted it to be very crystal clear. I knew that this was something I was going to have to market and explain a thousand times to a thousand questioners and perhaps critics in Washington and about the Marine Corps.

So, I didn't want anything that wasn't crystal clear as a tasking. And as a result, after about two iterations, I recall that Gen Stackpole and I stood at my stand-up desk in the Commandant's Office shortly before we issued the guidance and I just hand wrote it out. It was very short and very specific.

But what I told him was that he was to conduct a Force Structure Planning effort. I did not want to call it a study because we have studied ourselves to death and because studies are a dime a dozen around Washington. Everybody has one, and a study does nothing more than give you a basis for somebody to come up with a counter-thesis and to challenge your study. So, I wanted to call it a planning effort, which was to say this is the way the Marine Corps is going to go.

I was treading the very—the Marine Corps was treading a very, very tenuous situation in which, we were executing the will of President Bush, Secretary Cheney, the Chairman's vision of the future and we had been told to decrease the size of the Marine Corps to 159,000. We all knew that was too far and we all knew that that would emaciate the Marine Corps, but how to prove that point, while still being loyal, was really a fence-straddling idea.

So, my charter was to design and structure the most effective Marine Corps possible at a strength of 159,000, which was our mandated strength, to preserve our statutory requirements; that is to say, that we would provide security detachments for Navy installations to meet our national responsibilities, that we would continue to provide Marine security guards for the State Department, to do all of that, in other words, meet our national commitments, to maintain the MAGTF structure, in other words, we would not give up aviation en masse nor would we stay all-aviation and give up infantry, but to maintain a balanced force, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, to maintain the three Marine Expeditionary Forces, which meant you could make them smaller. You could make them more compact, but we would maintain three of those.

Then the most critical part of that was the last tasking and it was that after you have built this 159,000 person Marine Corps, then assess it against the national military strategy, against the requirements for Marine forces worldwide and if it is adequate, fine. If

it is not adequate, identify what it would take to make it adequate.

I will say for the record that I knew at the outset that 159,000 would be inadequate, but my tactic or my strategy was that by promulgating this guidance, a copy of which, went to everybody in the Pentagon because you don't write anything down on paper in Washington that you don't want to have circulated around—that I was answering the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps was being roundly criticized inside the building and I had been given many loyalty lectures on saluting and getting on with business, that I was doing what I had been told to do, but at the same time, I was doing an assessment to come back and give advice, that that was inadequate. I knew it was going to be inadequate.

So, those were my specific taskings and I would say that Gen Krulak followed them to the letter of the law. He adopted—he discussed it with me and I said "Yes," let's do it—he adopted a process whereby at the end of each day's work by the Force Structure Planning Group, they would put onto the electronic mail system a communication to all general officers in the Corps that day on this is what we have done. We are looking at, taking this many squadrons down or restructuring a battalion thusly or doing this to the tank battalion and that would enable then any of the general officers or as far as they chose to distribute it on their own behalf to quickly come back in and say I have some real concerns about this or have you thought about this.

So, it became a very interactive process between the planning group and the generals of the Corps and in the long run, that paid great dividends for us..

BGEN SIMMONS: We will be coming back to this Force Structure Group and effort time and time again as we go through these future sessions.

Your first 60 days in office have been very busy indeed. Unless there is something else you would like to add, this is probably a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: I don't think there is. I think I have put enough emphasis on the Force Structure Planning Group and, as you say, we will come back and discuss it later.

SESSION 19

September to December 1991

Visiting on Capitol Hill . . . Importance of the V-22 Osprey . . . Women in aviation . . . Plans for the Marine Corps Reserve . . . Retirement of MajGen Royal Moore . . . Relations with CNO Adm Kelso . . . The "Road Warriors" . . . The Royal Marines . . . Marine Corps Birthday observances . . . The Marine Corps Marathon . . . "Articulating the Corps" . . . Role of the Commandant's Staff Group . . . His own speech techniques . . . Using the Staff Chaplain . . . Summit meeting on force structure . . . Visiting Pearl Harbor and Wake Island . . . Off-site retreat with SecNav and CNO . . . The return of Col Rich Higgins. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session just completed, we covered your first several months as Commandant. In this session, we will continue a chronological examination of your tenure as Commandant, beginning with September 1991.

On the 11th of September, the Commandant of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps arrived on an official visit. You said in our last session, you were anticipating this visit. This would be the first of the Commandants of other Marine Corps you would host.

Do you recall his name?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. It was a LtGen Kim, K-i-m.

BGEN SIMMONS: And you had met him the previous month. Do you recall any particulars of the welcoming ceremony?

GEN MUNDY: I chose to receive the foreign visitors, depending on how they flew in, some of them by military air, some of them would come directly by commercial air into Washington, but in this particular case, I believe that we met Gen Kim on the West Coast and we flew him into Andrews Air Force Base.

I chose not to meet out at Andrews for a couple of purposes. Number one, it is about a half hour ride out there and a half an hour back and you want to be there a half an hour early. So, it is an hour and a half of your time.

Number two is that usually that amounts to getting off the airplane and shaking hands and the baggage is all coming off and it is kind of a melee. So, I elected to send the Director of Special Projects out as the chief escort officer to meet them at Andrews and then they would return to quarters here at the Navy Yard up in the Visiting Flag Quarters and Linda and I would

meet them there. We would be on hand when they arrived and we would come and meet them and usually have flowers for her and have usually a bottle of champagne, I think, depending on the hour of the day. This was afternoon. So, it worked out well.

We would pop open the champagne and have, you know, a short toast, spend 15 minutes with them and then leave to let them get settled and to get prepared for their next events.

The formalities then of the reception would be that would come up to the Commandant's House after they had gotten in and gotten settled. We had an honors ceremony for him at the Barracks and that was followed then by a reception and a buffet down in the Sousa Band Hall, which is a very nice reception area and we were able to accommodate all the Marine generals in there, but remember that we were not in the Commandant's House at this time, so we couldn't entertain there.

An interesting twist on that, I began to use—and I mention this only because of my affection for the blue/white uniforms, but I also began to use the green uniform with the Barracks troops for all ceremonies of this type simply because, number one, I think the green uniform is handsome and it is more the mark of our Corps than is the ceremonial uniform. And most of the foreign visitors come not adorned in their dress uniform, but come in the service uniform.

So, we did those honor ceremonies routinely in the green uniform. Took the Barracks about two times through to adjust to this latest of the Mundy idiosyncracies on uniforms, but it is a magnificent display of these ceremonial Marines in the greens instead of the blues from time to time.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 12 September, during the

day, you resumed your congressional office visits. It was now time for the House of Representatives. On that day your schedule shows you visiting Congressmen Lanaster, Byron and Montgomery. The following day you called on Congressmen Martin and Blaz. Delegate Blaz, of course, was our old comrade, retired BGen Vince or Ben Blaz.

Any recollections of these visits or of your subsequent relations with any of these Congressmen?

GEN MUNDY: My relations with all of them was subsequently very good. Delegate Blaz or Congressman Blaz, as he might prefer to be referred to, I think was there for the first two years that I was in office and then he left the Congress. He is still in Washington, but he left the Congress.

But those names that you mentioned were all supporters of the Marine Corps. Bev Byron, who was the Chairperson of the Manpower Subcommittee on the House Armed Services Committee, was very important because she saw to all of the people issues, if you will, and her husband had been a Navy pilot and she had a great deal of affection for all the servicemen and women, but I thought especially for sailors and Marines.

So, that was a good one. Lancaster, Congressman Martin Lancaster was the congressman from eastern North Carolina and so he had Cherry Point and right up to the border of Camp Lejeune in his district. So, he was very important to our local interests there.

You mentioned Blaz, of course, from Guam, but a very good friend of the Corps and, in fact, very, very devoted to me. We had previous association, as was reported in an earlier interview, when he was Chief of Staff down at Quantico and I was on the staff there. So, we knew each other and to this day are very good friends.

Congressman Sonny Montgomery, of course, is probably—although he is an Army Reserve major general and is really the champion of the Guard and Reserve, is—statehood in Mississippi had brought him close to the Marine Corps when Gen Lou Wilson, a fellow Mississippian, was the Commandant. So, Sonny Montgomery was always equally supportive, although in the future years to come, we had to go head to head on a couple of issues with the Guard and Reserve lobby and he understandably took their position, but never with malice toward the Marine Corps.

So, these were continuing education and rapport establishment calls I was making on the Hill.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Republic of Korea Marine Corps Commandant's visit actually extended from 7

to 15 September. You saw him off on Sunday, 15 September. What all goes into one of these official visits by the Commandant of another Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: It can be as involved for the U.S. Commandant as he chooses to make it. As a practical matter, most of these officers, most of the foreign Commandants, are, at best, three-star officers and in many cases, one-star officers. When you get into the South American Marine Corps, you frequently have a brigadier or a rear admiral and in the case of the Portuguese Marines, for example, it is a captain. He is in the Navy, but he is a Marine officer, but he is a captain.

So, to them, what I had found over time is that for them to be sent down, to be hosted by one of the force commanders or by even a division commander or wing commander was still a position of recognition. Of course, we treat them all by previous policy—I think of—I believe Gen Wilson put it out when he was here, but he said that regardless of rank, they would all be treated as senior to the U.S. Commandant, i.e., as a four-star officer. So, they get their fine treatment.

But more ordinarily than not, I would receive them in town here and as we mentioned a minute ago, have something social for them, sometimes have them to the Headquarters for briefings going in. I prefer to do it the other way around, but they would usually come to visit, to call in the Headquarters. We would have an exchange of gifts in my office. I would treat them to lunch. We would give them some briefings.

We would then usually send them down to Quantico for a day, where they could get associated with our combat development process, with the schools, you know, OCS, The Basic School and so on. And then would fly them down to Parris Island for a one day stand, about a day and a half at Camp Lejeune and then back into Washington. I think I probably got an extra day in here, but that would be the flow of an East Coast visit. They come back into Washington. We would give them some time to go see their ambassador or whatever, some shopping time, whatever they would like to do and then if it is during parade season, we would have them to a parade, sometimes as the guest of honor, not always, and then see them on their way the next day usually with a goodbye on Friday night at the Commandant's House.

Sometimes I would see them again on Saturday or we would go shopping with them or go tour Arlington Cemetery or do something around Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 September, you paid a call

on Senator John Glenn. Was there anything special to do about this meeting and did it have anything to do with the V-22 Osprey program?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think as history will record, any meeting with Senator John Glenn had something to do with the V-22. He was its primary proponent in the Senate. The Congress had some constituent reasons for the constituency from Texas and Pennsylvania that would be supportive, but Senator Glenn supported it because it was right, because it was something that the Marine Corps needed and that he believed in.

So, any time that you were ever in John Glenn's office, yes, you generally underwent once again a reminder that the V-22 would fly further, faster, was more crashworthy broad capability, things that you knew, but that it was good for the Senator to recount again because you knew that you had his continuing support.

The other side on this, this being really my second call—I called on Senator Glenn as part of the confirmation process, but this being, if you will, my first call as the Commandant, Senator Glenn had been very strong, because he headed the Personnel Subcommittee on the Senate Armed Services Committee, in maintaining the size of the Marine Corps. What he had not maintained, he had signed on at an early point for about 190,000 Marines, but, as we know, that number had not been maintained by the Administration. So, Senator Glenn was on the Senate side probably the champion for maintaining a higher structure for the Marine Corps than the 159 to which we had been mandated.

I mentioned earlier in the last session the rather painful circumstances of my coming into office in which it was at least advertised that I would seek to undo everything that my predecessor had done before me. So, I believe that, although I had known Senator Glenn before, only at a distance, I believe that he probably was somewhat suspect, particularly after I had issued the guidance to the Force Structure Planning Group to structure the Marine Corps to 159,000. What they had missed, of course, was the bottom bullet that said, "Oh, and if that is not good enough to meet our national commitments, tell me what is."

I don't think that he and, indeed, among others, then-Colonel, or really Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee Majority Staff, Arnold Punaro, I don't believe that they understood the strategy that I was attempting to undertake.

So, Senator Glenn was a little bit uneasy with me,

feeling that, indeed, the prediction that Mundy would sell out everything that Gen Gray had started was coming true because one of the first things I was doing was selling off end-strength. So, I tried to explain to him where I was going. I tried to make clear to him that as a serving officer of the President, I had really little option except to execute the orders I was given, but that I would attempt to build the most solid case I could to convince my Executive Branch superiors, at least, that the number was wrong.

But even with that assurance, there was a little bit of edginess, I think. As it turned out, Senator Glenn and I became, indeed, fast friends. We have been on the Chesapeake Bay on his boat on many occasions over the past four years and he has bought me crab lunches and I have bought him crab lunches and we have had a great time together.

But there was a little suspicion of this new, you know, whippersnapper Commandant that was going to come in maybe and unsettle things. So, that was it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did retired LtGen Tom Miller play any role in this?

GEN MUNDY: Tom Miller knew and has long known that I have a tremendous admiration and appreciation and I would flatter myself and say understanding of Marine aviation. I do. It is the best aviation in the world and I can—if you want a three-hour interview on that sometime, I will tell you why. But Gen Tom Miller and John Glenn were squadron mates in World War II. They had come along together over the years. They owned a boat together. They owned property together. Both of them fly their private airplanes and I think that Tom Miller maintains Senator Glenn's, simply because he likes to fiddle around with the airplanes.

So, they are very fast friends and Tom Miller, having been at least one of two, and I don't think any question being the father of the VSTOL aviation in the Marine Corps, had seen, you know, light and very important relevance of this new flying machine known as the V-22 Osprey. So, he had been very supportive of that.

He was the main stimulant, I think, for Senator Glenn's continuing knowledge and interest and persuasion toward the V-22.

BGEN SIMMONS: The V-22 Osprey program at this moment was in trouble because of the crash of the fifth V-22 on its maiden flight in June 1991, just before you became Commandant. What do you recall of this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the crash took place up at Philadelphia. It was under test and the aircraft rolled over on takeoff and turned upside down and crashed. Now, we sought to make a good news story out of this. It is very difficult to, you know, convince those who really want to kill the program and who have now a means of saying, see, it won't fly, but the good news was that this V-22 turned completely over, crashed. Both crew members walked away from it without any injury. I think one of them had a skinned knuckle, as I recall—walked away without injury.

The aircraft did not burn when it crashed. As it was designed to do, the engines, as soon as these tremendous propeller blades that are on it, struck the earth, instead of bending and fragmenting and slinging themselves through the cockpit, as others have done, they disintegrated on the spot and so there was no injury.

So, if anything, it is a heck of a way to prove the crashworthiness of an aircraft, which is one of the strong features of the V-22 is that it is designed so that when you crash, the engines, which are way out on the tips of the wings of this aircraft do not come crashing through the crew compartment, but if they break off or splinter or catch on fire at all, they are way away from the occupants of the aircraft.

So, we sought to make a good news story out of this crash and, again, whether it worked or not, you know, the fact is that the V-22 was not—I mean, it was cancelled at the time, but it continues on now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Having said all this, just what is the Osprey and how important is the Osprey to the future of Marine Corps aviation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think the Osprey is important to the future of national aviation if not international aviation because the Osprey is the first of the prototypes of the tilt rotor technology and that means that it can take off like a helicopter because the engine nacelles, the housing of the engine actually rotates upward so that the propellers, as it were, are turning overhead just as a conventional helicopter. So, it can lift off exactly as a helicopter. Once in flight, the nacelles then are transitioned forward and when they are fully forward, you can fly at about 250 to 300 knots in this particular craft. There's nothing to say you couldn't fly 500 knots perhaps in a future design, but you can fly then like an airplane.

So, the importance is this, that from a military application standpoint, we could, if we chose to do it, with this figure in mind with the range of the aircraft, we could load those aircraft at New River Air Station

in North Carolina, take them off like helicopters. We could fly into Cuba or into any one of the Caribbean Islands at 250 knots loaded, unrefuelled in route, and we could set them down in a helicopter landing zone, not on a long runway that it would take us for a C-141 or a C-5 aircraft.

So, it is revolutionary. Now, if you apply that then to the civilian or the private sector, we have the ability here in Washington for short range commuters, for example, the shuttle that goes back and forth to New York daily takes you into LaGuardia or Kennedy. You can from there catch a helicopter or catch a limousine, but if you catch a helicopter, you fly into, say, the 34th Street helo pad and you then get in a taxi and you go where you are going.

With a V-22, you can launch from the White House lawn. You can fly 250 knots to New York and you can set it down on the 34th Street helo pad or on top of a building if they want to. So, in the long term, as we look at—as cities and states look at rebuilding the infrastructure of airports that are very costly to maintain, it will be possible with a tilt rotor technology, perhaps, to create just square pads, as opposed to 10,000 foot runways and to be much more responsive, timely and be able to do that right in the middle of Central Park in New York if you wanted to build one there.

So, it is truly—we use the term right now in thinking of the military affairs, the term "RMA" or revolutionary in military affairs. The V-22 Osprey, the tilt rotor technology is truly one of those revolutions that is not just a step forward, a modest step forward from the helicopter, but it is a giant step forward into the 21st Century. And the Marine Corps as the pioneer of this, once those craft are introduced into the Marine Corps, we would be able today to put it in context to sit on an amphibious platform off of Sicily in the Mediterranean Sea and to, without moving the ship, to respond to a crisis, to an embassy reinforcement, to a noncombatant evacuation anywhere on the Mediterranean littoral, from that ship unrefuelled with a V-22 aircraft and land it like a helicopter on top of an embassy, if you want it to when you got there.

So, it is a dramatic leap forward in the operational maneuver capability.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 11 October, you met with BGen "Butch" Neal and the Assistant Commandant on the subject of women in aviation. Do you recall what that was about?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. When I arrived, the subject of "Women in Aviation," not women in combat, but

"Women in Aviation" was then very much alive and it was apparent that—at least it was a serious consideration being given to modifying the combat exclusion laws, which precluded women from flying in combat aviation.

So, BGen Neal was the Director of the Manpower Policy Division of the Manpower Plans and Policy Department and I got together with him and with Gen Dailey, Jack Dailey, our senior aviator, to talk about matters related to the likelihood that the combat exclusions were going to be lifted and whether or not we as an institution wanted to move forward with women in aviation, even if we had any choice.

So, it was a policy discussion.

BGEN SIMMONS: Continuing with "Women in Aviation," in November you responded to the Secretary of the Navy regarding the provision for the Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act, which lifted the 43-year-old ban imposed on women flying combat aircraft. You said, in part, "...The Marine Corps has no requirement for women aviation officers in combat squadrons and I believe that no gain in operational effectiveness would be achieved by their assignment."

Were you able to maintain that position?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I continue that belief, which is not in any way a derogatory belief towards what, you know, a woman Marine, female Marine can bring, but I continue the belief that as stated, there would be no—we have no requirement. We have had then and we have now adequate applications, in fact, over-abundant applications for aviation from male officers.

Second, there is no specific enhancement of a squadron's capability or indeed an aviator's capability by including women. So, once again, the argument would be coming through the contrary. Is there a diminution or a derogatory—not derogatory, but a negative impact to having women in. That is what we really wrestled with the most because, once again, having nothing to do with the proud, young Marines, of whom I am tremendously proud, who are women Marines, but having to do with the change in the ability of a squadron at sea embarked in either a helicopter carrier or embarked in an aircraft carrier, an attack carrier for a fixed wing squadron, who, with a rough weather night at sea, when those aircraft had landed with some very young pilots, who had been truly challenged and stressed, getting back aboard this postage stamp in the middle of a roiling ocean in bad weather, the ability to walk in as they are tense and unable to go to sleep at night, the ability to get up out

of your stateroom and walk into the squadron ready room in your underwear, as pilots have done since we have had pilots, and sit around and as the pilots would characterize it, to smoke and joke and relax themselves and talk about things, we would lose that type of ability.

Is it a critical loss? Probably not. Is it a loss in male bonding? Yes. So, those were the types of issues that we struggled with in trying to be completely fair and objective with the fine young women, who choose to be Marines. They are a cut above to begin with, I believe. But as we ensure that they are placed into positions where not only they can function most effectively, but where the structures and, right or wrong, the male bonding and identification that some might say is wrong, but I think those of us who have fought in wars would say it is not necessarily wrong. It is—you know, love can build between men, affection and bondage can build between men, that would not be present if—because of the very natural offset of having a woman in the same capacity. That is why, I guess—you know, that is why male goats and sheep fight. It is just that—it is part of the instinct.

I would not—you asked would I be able to hold that position. I have gone at great length to try and say that I believe that the statement that was made was correct. At the same time, with the removal of the exclusion and, more specifically—this gets well on into my tenure, but when Secretary Aspin became the Secretary of Defense—we were well beyond the Commission on Women in the Service now and so on—all of the Chiefs were brought in and were lined up and were told there is going to be a news conference. You will stand behind the Secretary and he will announce that there is no restriction on women in aviation. Fall in.

So, I was not able to hold the position of exclusion and I am not sure that I would have held the position of exclusion in aviation, but in combat squadrons, we very likely would have held that exclusion, had it been the Marine Corps' option to do so.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do we have any women Marines flying combat aircraft today?

GEN MUNDY: We do not today because, of course, when that—when the exclusion was lifted, we had no Marine pilots flying combat or noncombatant aircraft. So, we had to begin anew and Lt Sara Deal, D-e-a-l, is the first woman to—that had applied for, been qualified and has now undergone flight training. And to my knowledge, she completed her basic flight training, requested assignment into rotary winged aviation

and is at some point right now in her finalization of her qualifications as a helicopter pilot. And she will be assigned without restriction.

My determination was that if we—once the combat exclusion was lifted, if we were going to assign women into aviation, it would be completely unlimited. There would be no areas in which you could not fly and I think that is the right policy and that is the policy that we are pursuing.

So, very shortly, I would say, by the time that this oral history is typed up, we probably will have a woman flying in a combat squadron, Sara Deal.

BGEN SIMMONS: Backtracking a bit, on 20 September, you spoke to the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board and on 30 September, you went to a luncheon at the Sheraton National, marking the 75th anniversary of the Marine Corps Reserve.

I would guess that you might have had complimentary remarks to make about the performance of the Reserve in the Persian Gulf and this might be a good place for you to comment on the Marine Corps Reserve as you found it and what plans you had for it.

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I have, you know, touched upon earlier, if not spoken at length about, the Marine Corps Reserve had been called up—well, I won't say—mobilized implies the entire mobilization of the nation. We didn't do that, but we called up selected Marine Corps Reserve units and other Reserve units. This was the first time in 40 years that we had done that because the last call up of the Marine Reserve had been during Korea. The Reservists had volunteered in large numbers during Vietnam and had, indeed, served, you know, at many times along the way, but not as a call up of them. And there had been—in fact, that had damaged both the confidence of the Reserves when they weren't called for Vietnam and it had also created something of a wider chasm, if you will, between the regulars and the Reserves feeling like, you know, they weren't really members of the team.

So, as we talk about during my days down at FMFLant when the Reserves were called up, I was tremendously impressed with the Reserves. It might be recalled here, if nowhere else, that Company D of the 4th Tank Battalion, which was a Reserve company called up, driving M-60 tanks, underwent training into the new M-1 tank, flew to Saudi Arabia, joined their tanks there and achieved the greatest number of vehicle kills of any Marine Corps tank outfit during Operation Desert Storm.

So, what we learned— and that would be characteristic, I think, if we went through any organization

of tanks or helicopters or anything you wanted to talk about, that we found that the Reserves came. They were tremendously capable. They were well-trained and that by this time, of course, we had them fairly well-equipped in comparison with the regular forces. So, they did a tremendous job. So, I had great confidence in the Reserve.

I should mention further, as I believe maybe I alluded to in an earlier interview, that we had been unable to send the 4th MEB to Norway for an—exercise in Southern Norway. They were supposed to go in the fall. The next exercise coming up was in the winter months, in February and March. We had no regular forces to send. All of the United States Armed Forces had dropped out of the Norwegian exercise—the Navy was sending nobody. The Air Force had pulled back their squadrons. The Army, of course, wasn't involved.

So, I determined just out of, I hope, grit of some sort that, by God, the Marines were going to meet their commitment there and as a result, we assigned that mission to the 2d MEB, the Reserve MEB. The 25th Marines had been called up. So, we used Reserve reconnaissance platoons from Hawaii. We used Reserve artillery battalions from California. The 25th Marines happened to be from the northeast. So, they might have had a little bit more cold weather orientation. And with a minimum of predeployment training, we sent them into northern Norway and they performed superbly.

So, I came back a rooter for the Marine Corps Reserve. So, you are right. When I went to talk to the Reserve Policy Board and subsequently to the MCROA and on any organization that I could talk I was high on the Reserve.

Now, you asked for my plans for the Reserves. My plans were, as I have commented earlier, that we do as much as we possibly could within the confines of the law and within the necessary constraints of enabling the Reserve to—or Reservists—to identify with the Marine Corps Reserve, of which they are so proud. They are very proud to be citizen Marines out there. So, I don't want to denude them of that, but I did want to remove as many of those differences as I possibly could. I mentioned even to the extent, perhaps, of taking the term "Reserve" out of the Marine Corps Reserve and simply calling it the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, Kansas City, Kansas. What difference does it make? That is where you assigned your Marine and if you happen to be a Reservist, well, so what.

I think Gen Krulak—we had several impediments to get over and I believe Gen Krulak intends to implement that title designation on his watch.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 26 September, you attended a White House dinner in honor of King Hassan II of Morocco. What are your recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: A very pleasant event. It was a black tie, an evening dress for me. I sat at a table beside or separated—you know, it was male, female, mixed tables. Linda sat somewhere else, but I sat in discussion with then Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who, you know, dominated the conversation because the Secretary of State has got a lot to say about international affairs. We were one table away from President and Mrs. Bush and from King Hassan. There was no Mrs. Hassan there. I think he was by himself.

I met him and the conversation was not broad, but I have a very nice picture of President Bush introducing me to King Hassan. His garb, which was a robe of sorts with a hood, out of a ceremonial custom, was made of gold threads. The press focused on the fact that he came to dinner in a solid gold gown, but he was a pleasant man. I didn't have much exchange with him personally. You are a face in the crowd with many other diplomats and personages around Washington.

And as I have found and may have commented about lightly heretofore, when one is at the White House, even though the President and the First Lady may be very personable and they have no reason to focus on you, everyone else in the room is sizing up everybody else in the room. You know, if they are Democrats, they are wondering when they are going to get in. If they are Republicans, they are wondering how long Eagleburger is going to last and who will be the Secretary after him and could it be so and so over here.

So, it is rather a—for one who has no political ambition, it is rather an enjoyable occasion to watch as these people maneuver around each other and, again, size each other up. So, that is one of the entertaining aspects of going to the White House.

BGEN SIMMONS: Had you ever heard that King Hassan was a particular fan of the Marine Corps because of his boyhood friendship with John Canton, who retired as a Marine colonel after a career largely spent in intelligence?

GEN MUNDY: I had not heard that. No, not until now.

BGEN SIMMONS: John Canton is an interesting person, cut from the same cloth as Victor Croizat,

North African background and in his case, I believe, a French father and an American mother or perhaps the other way around. And at least the belief was that he had quite an influence with Hassan.

On 11 October, you had a meeting with LtGen Royal Moore, the new CG, FMFPac. You have already spoken very highly of Gen Moore. Did this have to do with FMFPac matters or his personal problems which were beginning to bubble over about this time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it had to do with FMFPac. He was here, as I recall it, on the Selection Board. We run the General Officer Selection Boards each October, usually following the General Officer Symposium, which, at least on my watch, was the last week of September and into early October. So, during that time, routinely, the out-of-town officers would call on the Commandant and I am sure that it was, you know, an occasion, more of a call. He had been in position for only a couple of months at that time and it was probably just to discuss how things were going at FMFPac.

His personal problems, it took several more months for that situation to evolve.

Would you like me to discuss that?

BGEN SIMMONS: Please comment as appropriate on that. Here was an aviator, very popular and a tremendous reputation. The little bit I know about it, he did something that many other aviators have done before and probably since.

GEN MUNDY: To put this in context, the past three years have seen an almost intense hunt for any flaw or indiscretion or even human failing on the part of senior military officers, more so than any time that I am aware of.

It bothered me greatly during my tenure to learn, for example, that in the view of the press primarily and even of some, you know, in the bureaucratic sector, that military officers could be viewed the same as elected politicians. What I mean by that is I think our way of life is such that a person who decides to run for public office and exposes himself and perhaps his or her family to, you know, examination by the press and by the voters, that you expect some degree of challenge of your integrity and you are accused of having an agenda and everything.

I was amazed when I came to town and first began to run up against this, the questions that would be put forth of what is his agenda, referring to me, what is his agenda, not meaning what is his plan for the Marine

Corps, but what is his political agenda here. That disturbed me greatly because basically it was to raise, provide and maintain the Marine Corps and there was no agenda to become the Chairman or to become the Secretary of State or something, as many others might have.

But at any rate, beginning with the Tailhook situation—we will talk about that later—but it became in vogue for the Department of Defense Inspector General to go after any officer, who had committed any infraction and that commission would become exaggerated out of all proportion to something that anyone in private America or even in public office might have done. And because we are defenseless out of probably pride and service and we stand and take the arrow in the chest if one is to be fired, a military officer is very easy to shoot at.

In Gen Moore's case, I would agree with you—and I can give the details and it might be useful for the record to do those because, it might not come out in later recording of history.

Royal Moore, as I mentioned in my nomination of him to be CG, FMFPac, was one of the most distinguished aviators that we had had. He had led the biggest wing to war and had done it enormously effectively and successfully in the harshest conditions that we had experienced at any time, any place, and that is the heat and the sand and the corrosive atmosphere in the Persian Gulf. He was extremely well thought of in many quarters of the joint community as being, you know, an aggressive, forceful, incisive wing commander, who flew with his pilots, who knew what was going on, who just did a magnificent job of deploying and employing the wing.

When he arrived in Saudi Arabia or shortly thereafter, he, as is routine, he was going to fly the A-6 aircraft, which is what he flew. He was an A-6 pilot. But in order to do that, the NATOPs requirements are that you must, you know, not only demonstrate your ability to drive, but you have got to take a driver's test, if you would.

Here is a man who has been flying this airplane for a quarter of a century. He is building a wing in the desert. He is in the midst of not knowing when he is going to be told to commit that wing to combat and he has got to stop and take a driver's test. So, what occurred, regrettably, and not at his behest, the Chief of Staff told another younger officer, who was an A-6 pilot—"Look, you know, fill out the test here" and he was directed to do that.

He, the young officer, found that to be unethical. I would, too. I think in hindsight, I probably would have said, "Look, the hell with the test. We don't

have time for that right now. Get in the airplane and fly." He was flying the airplane already.

But the young officer brought that as a grievance. He, this young officer, later had some difficulties and ran into some problems, I think, in the Marine Corps. So, he brought to a head the fact that he had been directed to take the commanding general's flight test. I think that that would have been permissible, except for the fact that Gen Moore when then confronted—this is, you know, a year and a half later—confronted by the DOD IG, said, "Look, I didn't direct him to do this." That was his initial response.

The test was passed on to Gen Moore. He filled in, you know, whatever parts of it he subsequently completed and the test was turned in and that was it. He made the cardinal mistake as he pulled out his copy of the examination and realized that the handwriting on the test or the marks were not his. In human frailty he made the mistake of marking over those answers that were not his, which he knew, but had not been scribed down by him—he marked over them to show them in his handwriting and the DOD IG caught him in that fact and there was nothing we could do . . .

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that there was nothing we could do to avoid the eventual revelation to the press of the details of this because the DOD IG is not an organization known for, you know, security and usually when a senior officer is being investigated, someone has wind of that. Once the press begins to ask questions and begins to poke around, if you will, into it, eventually it comes out. So, the advice of any of our Public Affairs Officers is it is better to lay the details out and to take it up front and then let it be over and done with than it is to drag it out with the press, finding bits and pieces out and so that is what we did.

That was one of the most painful things that I had to do because I had to call Royal Moore knowing what was coming and say, "Royal, we have no option here," and he agreed. He understood because there had been inquiries to his office and his Public Affairs Officer was being subjected to a hounding by the press to get the details of this.

So, I said "Steel yourself and here we go," and we released the details to the press. It terminated his career. Obviously, he was then—I had to ask him to retire. He would have offered to retire. The Secretary of the Navy gave him a letter of censure, which to be very candid with you for purposes of history, Secretary Garrett signed the letter of censure and gave it to me to deliver and he said, "Here, you deliver this to Gen Moore," and I said "Aye, aye, sir" and I took it back in my office and held it for several months.

My explanation would have been that I wanted to deliver it to him personally but I just could not bear, you know, after Royal Moore was taking this beating in the press, to also send him out a letter of censure from the Secretary of the Navy.

So, I held that for some time and eventually, well after he had retired and gone on, I mailed the letter and I hope that (unintelligible) hurt a little bit less than it might have under those circumstances.

So, a fine man, who, again—there was error there. There is no question, I think, that any one of us would say, “Well, you shouldn’t do that. You shouldn’t mark over that test,” but then we are all human beings and this was an enormously fine officer and a prince of a man and a tremendous human being, who bore that brunt of being a military officer with the bare chest when it is time to take the shot.

BGEN SIMMONS: In retiring, he lost his third star and reverted to major general. Do you know how he is faring in retirement? Do you think he has adjusted to this?

GEN MUNDY: I am—we exchanged Christmas cards for some time and I have not heard from him, but those who have, he retired up into the Whidbey Island, Washington area, Seattle, up around the A-6 community. They owned a house there. And I am told that he went in and enjoyed refurbishing the house and just getting away from the spotlight of the press. And I think that he has been rather low key because very frankly, you know, an impact like this, unlike—you know, we have politicians, who are convicted of felonies, who make more money after they have been convicted than they did while they were serving and come back, as witness the current mayor of Washington. They come back and run again and are elected again.

So, they are not at all hurt by this. And, yet, a military officer, for Royal Moore to now seek any significant second career in which his military credentials could be brought to bear, would immediately draw the focus of, ah, ha, but he was cashiered and he lost his third star in the deal.

LtGen Buster Glossen, U.S. Air Force, who was the—one of the most well thought of Air Force officers coming out of the Gulf War, ironically, went this same route and was retired as a major general for what many would consider a relatively minor infraction and not even one of integrity, but rather one of procedure in his case.

So, I don’t mean to legitimize wrongful acts, but this is tantamount to any one of your children, who

made a mistake after they—you know, as they were growing up, who went out behind the barn and smoked a cigarette and you then remove them from the will and banish them from the family. I mean, this is—it is just—it is a little bit too heavy a hit in my view.

BGEN SIMMONS: From 19 through 23 October, you and Mrs. Mundy visited the West Coast, with stops at San Francisco, Coronado and Yuma. This visit for the most part seems to have been centered on the annual meeting of the Marine Corps Aviation Association. Have you any particular recollections of this?

GEN MUNDY: I do. It was, as you suggested, it was the Marine Corps Aviation Association being held in San Diego—I mean, in San Francisco. We went to that. I am a member of that association and I think I made three of the four Association meetings during my tenure as Commandant.

It was also tied to the Marine Corps Recruiting Conference, which is held annually at San Diego. So, our reason for going down from San Francisco to San Diego, after only about one month’s hiatus since we’d been there was to attend the Recruiting Conference and to, you know, convey my feeling of the importance of recruiting and my confidence in the Marine recruiters.

I think we perhaps will have more to say about that later. If we don’t, I would certainly talk on the subject of recruiting. And then to visit the Marine Corps Air Station and the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics School at Yuma, Arizona. That was the primary purpose of the stop at Yuma, was, again, just a base orientation.

We were having some very minor encroachment problems there from the companies that were seeking to mine in the Marine Corps bombing range, then not the least of the trip to spend a night with the aviators and go out and eat some nachos and have a couple of beers at Critene’s, which is one of the more notable Mexican food places around Yuma.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 28 October, you visited Gulfport, Mississippi in a fast one-day visit, you covered the status of the LCAC, or “landing craft air cushioned.” You visited the Naval Home and you toured the SeaBee Center. What are your recollections of this visit?

GEN MUNDY: They are as you describe them. I visited the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation. That is

where the LHD class ship is being produced and went through just an orientation. Here is how we build ships. Here is how we put them together down here. That was an educational visit, better enabled me to come back to Washington and to deal with matters concerning the LHD construction.

Then we visited the other places. The LCACs were being built at two locations there. I went to both of those. I did visit the Naval Home because they were in the process of selecting a new superintendent of that home and I was a voting member, along with the CNO and others on the selection. So, I went and met the incumbent, who was active duty captain. They were going to civilianize it. He wanted to retire and stay there and subsequently did.

Then, finally, I had been asked by Congressman Gene Taylor of that district to be the guest of honor at the annual Military Appreciation Ball, which was hosted in Gulfport, Mississippi. So, I was there to do that as well. So, it involved about five different evolutions in a, you know, two-day trip. You can get a lot done, see a lot of things, get a feeling for—and represent the Marine Corps at the Military Appreciation Ball.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 October, you seem to have gone to Annapolis by helicopter to sit in briefly on a CinC conference being held by the CNO. These would be Navy CinCs. The CNO, of course, was Adm Kelso. How were you and Adm Kelso getting along?

GEN MUNDY: We were getting along just fine. As I mentioned earlier, I had great esteem for Adm Frank Kelso. We got along fine the whole time that he was the CNO, although he was subsequently distracted by and bludgeoned by the Tailhook situation. So, we—but we never parted friendships. In fact, the weekend before last we spent a weekend together as part of a group. He is a fine man.

We were getting along fine. You are right that these were the Fleet CinCs Conferences as opposed to the Unified Commanders Conferences and usually it involved the three principal fleet CinCs and that is Pacific, Atlantic and Europe. The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces, Europe bears Fleet CinC status.

They come in together with all the Navy four-stars, to include the Unified Commanders, so you would have CinCPacFlt and CinCLantFlt, as well as CinCPac and CinCLant, if those were Navy officers and they were at that time. So, you would have the Fleet Commanders, the Unified Commanders, all the

Navy four-stars and then you would usually have the Chief of Naval Personnel. That is a three-star. And you would have the Deputy CNO for Plans, Policies and Operations, Vice Adm “Snuffy” Smith at that time or Leighton, L-E-I-G-H-T-O-N, Smith, as he would prefer to be called. We know him as “Snuffy,” but he probably prefers Leighton.

And the Navy programmer, in this case VAdm Hank Mauz, and it is an opportunity not unlike what the other services run. The Air Force runs a conference annually that they call their Corona Conference and it involves all the four-stars in the Air Force. Of course, they can muster as many four-stars as we muster in the whole general officer corps in the Marine Corps.

The Commandant was very cordially invited by Adm Kelso. I believe Gen Gray had been earlier, you know, included as well. And it was an opportunity to sit in. The Secretary would go up for one day and the Commandant was invited for one. I usually didn’t spend the whole day, but would go for part of it. And presumably there would be matters of, you know, discussion that concerned the Marines, but as a practical matter, they usually weren’t. When I was there, it would just be a chance for you to mix it up with the Navy Fleet CinCs.

It will be remembered that I was at that time maneuvering to gain competency for the Marine Corps, to get out from under the Fleet CinCs. So, one of the reasons that I did not go and spend the entire conference for which I was invited, was because it—since the CNO presided and since it was all the Navy four-stars, it put the Commandant into the relative capacity of equality with the Navy four-stars presided over by the CNO. I didn’t want that relationship. So, I would stop in for a couple of hours or maybe an afternoon and then I would give the review and I would leave again. I wanted to be a visitor rather than to be considered as many in the Navy would, you know, one of the type commanders. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . Were there any other senior Marines there—Gen Hoar?

GEN MUNDY: No. And, you know, I would have—at one, subsequently I mentioned to Adm Kelso that if we were going to have all of those in—the VCNO was there, why didn’t you bring in the Assistant Commandant? So, Gen Boomer, when he subsequently became the Assistant Commandant—came to one. We came together on that.

But as a practical matter, those are meetings at which just as if we were at a Marine Symposium, it is

nice to have the CNO come over and address the group, but you don't want them around too long because you want to talk Marine Corps matters. That doesn't mean you are necessarily talking about the Navy. It just means that you want to focus in that.

Even at that point, however, the Navy—in fact, starting with that conference, Adm Hank Mauz, who was the Navy programmer, and I have spoken earlier that once you have been a Navy programmer all objectivity or sense of why we have Armed Forces escapes in my judgment. Hank Mauz and I had been War College classmates, were good friends, but that is where the Navy's initial runs on Marine aviation began to emerge, when Mauz got up and briefed that we were going to have to come down in Force Structure. The theme around the Navy at that time and subsequently for—perhaps until this day, was the Marines must bleed, too. In other words, it made no sense what the relativity of your capability was. It was just a matter of fact that if the Navy was going to take some losses, then the Marines were going to take some.

So, Hank Mauz, thesis was that we could take all of the Marine FA-18s away from the Marines. The Navy could fly all the FA-18s and then the Marines could take the pilots and turn them into infantryman and, therefore, we would, you know, be able to maintain some more structure, you know, presentations like that. To have an admiral making that sort of presentation in front of other admirals with me sitting at the table just flatly, you know, aggravated me no end. So, I just did not choose to be around when the Navy presumed its authority to make decisions on Marine force structure because you got nowhere by fighting—the only issues with the Navy hierarchy in sessions like that that I have found is that you are speaking economics only. Warfighting, military capability, has no relevance whatsoever. We are talking here about a number of blue dollars that go to support Marines. That also infuriates me and we can spend some time later on that.

So, any argument you might make about capability just—you can see eyes glazing over. All that is of interest is if we strike Marine aviation, we save money and we can buy more things for the Navy. So, that used to just enrage me and does to this day. So, we will have plenty of time in future sessions to beat that one to death.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the following day, 31 October, you attended an FBI Day at Camp Smith, New York. What is the linkage between the Marine Corps and the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

GEN MUNDY: The linkage is very strong. It is both philosophical and practical and the philosophical aspect is that as many know, the FBI Academy is located at Quantico and has been for years. So, all FBI agents are trained aboard a Marine Corps base and as a result, come away with a little bit of identification with the Marine Corps. That probably results in the fact that for a number of years, and it may still be the same, the highest percentage of former military officers in the FBI was Marines, perhaps because of that linkage.

But at any rate, we have a very strong association, the FBI-Marine association, which really is a law enforcement association. Each year then, after a small training camp up in—just up from West Point, New York, at Stewart Air Force Base, New York. Each year there is a gathering hosted by the—organized by the New York FBI, to include all law enforcement officers and anybody basically who wants to come that has any association either with the Marine Corps or with the FBI or law enforcement, is invited up to Stewart Air Force Base and they use a hangar there, but you—the Commandant flies in—we send the Drum and Bugle Corps and the Color Guard up there—the Commandant flies in. You fly up. You land at Stewart. Ordinarily, we would get on a helicopter and helicopter over to this small base and you land and here in formation is the Drum and Bugle Corps and the Marine Color Guard. There are four companies of former Marines, who are law enforcement officers, who are wearing every form of garb that they preserve from their time in the Marine Corps.

So, you have got people that are out there in wheel-chairs with tech sergeant stripes on in a row, squared off at the bottom and Marine Corps League hats and baseball hats and pilot's jackets and all this accumulation of field gear for the FBI with Marine Corps identity on it.

But they are the proudest group of human beings you have ever seen. So, they are all in formation. There is a staff from the First Marine Corps District Headquarters, the colonel and his staff, that is, the parade staff and the companies are comprised of these veterans who are law enforcement officers.

There is a review. They shoot 19 guns for the Commandant. In other words, they really put it on for the onlookers, many wives and people there and you go out and take the reviewing area. They give some awards and then the Commandant and whoever the—in this case, Special Agent Jim Kallstrom, K-a-l-l-s-t-r-o-m, who is now the Deputy Special Agent in charge in the FBI Region, in the FBI. You ride around. You

review the troops and it is an emotional moment because I mean, again, as I have described, there are people in wheelchairs, people with no left arms. I mean, there are a lot of veterans, but many of them are veterans of injuries that they have sustained in the law enforcement field. So, some of them got out of the Marine Corps whole, but, you know, got shot after they were in the FBI.

And you ride by and then you take the reviewing area and then they pass in review and they are in step and they are ragtag and they are motley looking, but by gosh, they are just filled with a pride that you can't believe. They pass in review. Then you move up to the hangar. You go inside and here is the grandest banquet that you have ever participated—all the Marines are in utilities, of course, and all of these other people are in FBI and characteristic of New York, you know, you have got the organist that plays in Dodger Stadium or something. He is in there and he is playing the music.

The Drum and Bugle Corps comes on a couple of times. They give scholarships to any Marine that has done anything. They introduced one mother, who was the mother of five Marines, three of them serving and two who were former Marines and all five of them were there.

And it is just a—it is somewhat akin to either an Irish wake or to an Irish wedding, one or the other, but it is just a splendid event. So, you start eating about 1300 in the afternoon, roast beef, all the trimmings, and I suppose if you stayed there until 2200—I used to—you know, about 1700, I would make my adieu and make my way out, but it is a grand afternoon of tremendous camaraderie between the law enforcement agencies and the Marine Corps.

I realize this is a long answer, but that is the philosophical side. The practical side is that unique to the Marine Corps, and this was started by Gen Gray, the Commandant has a senior FBI Special Agent assigned to him to oversee the Special Operations Capability Training for the Marine Corps or to participate in that and specifically to oversee the training in an urban environment, to which we subject all deploying in Marine Expeditionary Units in major cities in the United States. So, these are very daring ventures, where, you know, Marines in a downtown part of the city are in some cases firing live sniper fire in downtown Atlanta. Of course, it is midnight and there aren't too many people on the street and they are shooting at a fixed target in an abandoned building, but it is helicopters flying between buildings and all sorts of very, very sophisticated training.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 November, you promoted Maj LeHockey. He would be with you throughout your tenure as Commandant, would he not?

GEN MUNDY: I don't know. John LeHockey is a superb officer, who has gotten caught in the web of being a great service to both the Thirtieth and now the Thirty-First Commandant. Maj LeHockey was on my group that was—that I put together called the Commandant Staff Group and it began as three officers, eventually went to two and when I left was one. I think that Gen Krulak is—we staffed it at initially four officers and one of those is leaving this year. So, it will be down to three again, but they were the thinkers, the writers, the conceptualizers for the Commandant on a personal basis.

Now, what does this mean? It means—it doesn't mean that you had a private staff or a shadow staff. It means that you simply need some young minds around you that from time to time you can say, "Look, I would like you to think about women in aviation. I know I am going to get the staff response, but give me your thoughts." These with me were majors. So, they are at a very formative period in their careers and occasionally they would come to you with an extraordinary idea.

They also served as speechwriters, such as a Commandant wants to use speechwriters and I found them very useful. Maj LeHockey was a member of that group. He was, indeed, selected to lieutenant colonel. I promoted him to lieutenant colonel, as you point out, and he remained with me for only a few—about a few months thereafter. I think he probably completed that year and that following summer, he went down to Quantico to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College to be a senior instructor there.

But as we began then to do more Force Structure Planning, he was drafted by Gen Krulak and became a member of a group that became known as the "Road Warriors" because what we found is that to be able to out-think the opposition here in town or out-think our competition here in town, we needed to have someone that was directly infusing the Commandant with thoughts. And rather than keep that large body at Headquarters, we opted to have four officers at Quantico that—because they were in the web of the Combat Development Center, that would assist.

So, whether it was women in aviation, whether it was, you know, gays in the military, whether it was training issues, if it was an aviation issue, their mission was as an issue was emerging or more likely as a crisis was emerging or a hot political issue in town,

they would take that on and they would immediately begin preparing the Commandant with thoughts and infusing—they “murder boarded” me, for example, they would come up and we would sit in the conference room and I would say, “I—you know, I have got to think of a better way to articulate, you know, the force structure. I have got—I am getting stale on this.” And they would come at me and would force me to think and I found that a very useful stimulant.

John LeHockey was among those. As I say, he went to Quantico. He came back as a “Road Warrior,” as we termed these people and then he received orders to 2d Division and was going down to become a battalion commander in the 2d Division, 10th Marines, he was an artilleryman.

But about that time, the Thirty-First Commandant—was named, and Gen Krulak, knew where talent was and he grabbed LeHockey again and LtCol John LeHockey is today the senior aide to the Thirty-First Commandant. I understand that he is going to break free maybe sometime after the turn of the year when a new senior aide who is currently deployed is going to come in.

So, John LeHockey deserves his very special place in the history of the Corps as being one of the thought provokers and one of those who sit and counsel with the Commandant in those very unstructured times when any or—I don’t know that any Commandant has it, but I certainly did—when you want to surround yourself with just a few people that you are able to say I don’t know what to do on this and I need four minds thinking about this, that have time—the Deputy Chiefs of Staff have got thousands of duties going on and we wanted people that could stop and focus only on your problems.

The others of note that I would mention were LtCol Phil Shutler, of course, the son of LtGen Phil Shutler, who has to be one of the very brightest minds we have in the Marine Corps and certainly in Marine aviation. Phil Shutler served the Marine Corps extraordinarily well during this period. And I always refer to Phil the younger and Phil younger and Phil the elder, but the other side of that is when you have got Shutler the younger working for you, his dad was always there for consultation. So, you really got two great minds working on problems.

The third, the other two names I would mention are LtCol Kelly Bergeron, who was a female lieutenant colonel, second generation Marine, a tremendously focused officer, who helped me very much to focus on women officer issues because Kelly was not a feminist who was in it to expand the world for women, but Kelly was in it to ensure that women were properly

and effectively employed, but consistent with the best interest of the Marine Corps.

Finally, LtCol John—he was a major then, but LtCol John Allen, who again is one of our best and brightest, and LtCol Allen was deployed to the Mediterranean as a battalion commander as of right now.

Those were the “Road Warriors” for the Thirtieth Commandant that deserve to be recorded because they were the young minds, who occasionally ripped me apart when I wasn’t going in the right direction. They would come in and attack me because I had invited them to do so and would either inspire me or would set me off on that 10 degrees right or left rudder that I needed to be able to engage even during the very tension-filled days as with President Clinton on the gay and homosexual issue which we will talk about later, but these were the young “Road Warriors” that would come up and, you know, would give me the impetus and the stimulus to be able to decide how I was going to think and maneuver my way through this mine field.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 1st of November 1991, you and Mrs. Mundy left for a trip to the south, going first to Camp Lejeune and then to Miami. Do you recall the purposes of that trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the purpose of the trip was to attend the Birthday Ball in Miami. I don’t really recall the details of the stopover at Camp Lejeune, except to say that we would frequently when en route somewhere drop off into a base to do something, visiting or a ceremony perhaps or, you know, to be on hand for a change of command. It may be—I do recall that my former aide, then LtCol Wallace Duncan, was assuming command of a helicopter squadron and he more or less dared me to come, inviting the Commandant, not really expecting that the Commandant would accept.

We did drop in. That was one occasion. The other occasion was when the youngest son, Tim, was being promoted to captain and that, too, was a pop-in. He was out at Camp Geiger; we landed at the airfield en route somewhere and I went over to promote him and a couple of young captains. So, it was probably one of those two occasions, but the real purpose of the trip was to attend the Birthday Ball in Miami, which really was my last touch with Miami after many many years of great support and great attachment to that community; going back to my Inspector-Instructor days.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 25th of October, you had attended a reception marking the birthday of the Royal Marines. Do you have any recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do. The Royal Marines, like us, celebrate their birthday each year and I attended—I think I only missed one in four years and had gone to several before. It is held out at the British Embassy here in Washington and there were two forms. Of late, the Ambassador has taken to hosting it in his residence, which is a very—it is a castle here in Washington, a grand place, but at that time, they had a more or less social hall that they called a rotunda and the Brits would invite, you know, all of the Royal Marines that are serving in the United States to come in to Washington for this. So, for example, the color sergeant from Camp Pendleton or the color sergeant from Quantico and so on, coming in with their wives.

And then they all, because of the great association between the two Corps, they are very gracious in inviting anybody who has ever served with the Royal Marines or even likes the Royal Marines.

The Commandant usually would go—it is a very crowded affair, obviously, and at a given point, they bring over some fifes and drummers and they will have a little show, play a few tunes and march around a bit and then the Royal Marine colonel, who is the—at that time was the Chief of Staff of the Defense Staff in the British Embassy here would bring forth a cake and he would say a few words and I would reciprocate, you know, congratulating the Royals and charging them never to try and return to Washington to torch the Capitol again. And we had some fun.

Then we would cut the cake and would be on our way. I, of course, I enjoyed—during my time, I knew both of the Commandants; Sir Henry Beverly, who was a very good friend of our brigadier days together and came up very actively, and then eventually LtGen Robin Ross or Robert Ross, who became the Commandant General and has just stood down from that post in the U.K.

It was his about five times removed uncle, MajGen Robert Ross, who was the conqueror of Washington. I had great fun times during my tenure, always baiting Robert Ross or Robin Ross about the debt that he owed to the U.S. Marines and we would have a lot of fun.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Royal Marines seemed to exert an influence on the United States Marines that far exceeds their present size. Can you comment on that?

GEN MUNDY: I you look at our uniform, however we may claim our traditions, but if you look at a U.S. Marine officer's uniform in particular or an enlisted Marine uniform, you know, we wear a trouser, with red stripe and the Royal Marine wears a thin stripe, but if you look at the uniforms, they are in many respects very close and our habits are close. As I re-call, I think that Randolph McCall Pate reinvigorated the mess nights, perhaps it was Shepherd or I am not sure which of the Commandants brought that back, but those really, while they exist in many countries, the traditions and the habits of the Corps are very, very closely tied with the British Royal Marines. There are many Royal Marines, but in the case of the British Royal Marines, the ties are close. We have—of course, fought with them in Korea, Task Force Drysdale.

When I was a lieutenant on my first cruise to the Mediterranean, we met a British cruiser, and there was a detachment on there and we exchanged and went on liberty together and played soccer against each other. So, yes, the ties are very close and I think more the exertion of influence is probably more from U.S. Marines affection for traditionalism and for those things that we can see, you know, in the Royal Marines that are handed down, you know, a hundred years or more longer than we have been handing them down. So we tend to image them.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your first Marine Corps Birthday as Commandant was coming up. On Sun-day, 3 November, the Sunday before the Birthday, you attended the traditional ceremonies at the National Cathedral. Do you have any recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I have vivid recollections of all of those because that is and has long been for me one of the most important days of the year. I rarely miss one if I am anywhere within reasonable distance of Washington. Even I can recall when I was years ago in The Basic School teaching, we would be encouraged to don our blues—of course, in those days, you wore the uniform a good bit more than the current vintage of Marines do, but we would put on blues, drive up from Quantico, go to the worship service and then go downtown and eat at a fancy restaurant in your blues and then back to Quantico.

So, it was always for me a very inspirational time. This particular one was—there was nothing extraordinary, I think, about the service itself in comparison to others, it is a fairly standard event, varied only by who reads scripture at what point or that sort of thing.

But I attended the Navy's birthday ceremony,

which was conducted about a month earlier at the Cathedral and the Secretary was there. The CNO wasn't. The Vice CNO was. And I would dare say that there were—if there were more than five Navy persons, be they admirals or be they seamen in uniform, they were not apparent. The minister, who had been imported to deliver the sermon that day, began his sermon, I can recall, with saying I really don't know a lot about the Navy, but I am pleased to be here and then he held forth on some vague subject.

So, I always coached the chaplains of the Marine Corps very specifically that I wanted a sermon about Marines and I wanted it to stir the fire of enthusiasm among Marines. So, we did that that day Chaplain Larry Ellis was—had just become the Chaplain of the Marine Corps and Larry, fortunately, had married a retired Marine's daughter. So, he was very heavily influenced by the Marine Corps and he gave an absolutely splendid sermon about Marines.

But other than that, Secretary Garrett, I recall, was there with us and had a scripture reading part, as does the Commandant and the Sergeant Major usually, each year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Earlier, on Sunday, 3 November, on coming back from having reviewed the finish of the Marine Marathon. What is the Marine Marathon and what is its importance to the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine Corps Marathon began as I—I think 20 years or so ago and it began at the initiative of a now retired colonel by the name of Jim Fowler, who I knew very well. He was—when my battalion was temporarily attached to the 4th Marines in Vietnam, Jim Fowler was the S-2 of the regiment and we came to know each other and have ever since. He is still here in Washington.

He is the father or the grandfather or whatever you'd call it, of the Marine Corps Marathon. But it began at his initiative. For the first few years, it was a rather—it was, obviously, a fledgling and had some rough edges about it and a couple of years, I can recall, we took some bad press because there wasn't enough water out and the heat was up and things like that.

The Marines learned from that and today, I think, one of the most fulfilling parts of the Marine Corps Marathon is that as you go up and talk to the people who have run the Marathon, they will tell you that of all the marathons that they participate in, New York, Boston, wherever it is, that the most organized, best supported one anywhere around is the Marine Corps Marathon.

It is really not the Marine Corps Marathon. Many people think, well, that is where Marines run and to be sure, there are a few Marines each year that run, but of the—I think, this year about 18,000 people who participate, they come in from all over the United States, indeed, from all over the world. There is a Royal Navy team that comes over from the U.K. and I believe this year for the first time, the U.S. Marine team captured the trophy from the Royal Navy because they always have professional athletes. They are physical fitness instructors as a profession and they field a very credible team.

But it is really the People's Marathon because it is broad based. The Marine Corps sponsors it. It takes an enormous amount of effort, but it is truly a first class marathon and it is a good image. It is a healthy image. It is a positive image for the Corps. And as I would travel around, I would be, you know, out maybe for a jog down the street in some remote city somewhere where there weren't Marines and you would see some guy come by with long hair, who, obviously, wasn't a Marine, but he was sporting his tee shirt that said the 18th Marine Corps Marathon or whatever event he had participated in.

So, it is a good wholesome image for the Corps and I think there is great utility in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is this financed by appropriated funds or non-appropriated funds?

GEN MUNDY: No, it is not appropriated funds, although, you know, Marines are there to support. Corpsmen are there. We use tents, some Marine Corps tents, not a great many of them. But for years we had shied away from commercializing the marathon and on my watch, the year before last, I was—it was recommended and I approved the recommendation that we allow some commercialization because, very frankly, without that, the fee for the runners to run—they pay to enter the race, of course, and for that they get a tee shirt and they get to run the race and there are awards at the end. But generally it was a non-profit and self-supporting event.

As costs went up, we have to pay Arlington County for blocking off the streets and for police support and everything. You pay all those types of services. That was gradually increasing to a point to where the marathon fee had to be so high that it probably would have shut the thing down.

So, we did allow some of the—you know, the beer companies, for example, Budweiser, a big advertiser at all of these events and would give you a free beer if you want to recharge your electrolytes after you have

run. So, we allowed them to come in and some of the other—Nikes and other, you know, athletic sponsors and were able thereby to keep the fee down to where it is a very attractive race for marathoners to enter.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next week there was a series of Marine Corps Birthday observances, including one in the Pentagon, one in the House of Representatives, one with the Capital Marines, one with the Barracks Marine officers in Center House, one in the Senate and one with the Marine Corps Reserve.

I would guess that over time this would kind of dissolve in a blur. It must have been a challenge to you to try to find something fresh to say at each of these ceremonies.

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes. They do tend to blur. However, I never really—it would not be accurate to say that I didn't tire of these in that volume over the next four years because, indeed, the Birthday period is a period of work for the Commandant and for many of the, you know, senior officers of the Corps going about doing this.

For me, in the first year, that is exhilarating. I mean, everything is new and so you are very active but you thoroughly, you know, thrive on being there and doing that. As far as something to say, in a given framework, that is to say in a given two-month period or maybe even longer, generally, your themes are about the same.

While you might—at the National Defense University, you might strum jointness a little bit more, you know, we are here to celebrate the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is one of the proud members of the family of Armed Forces and, therefore, we're delighted to have all these representatives from each service and our allies to be here with us.

At a pure Marine Corps event, you whip it up and you don't say anything about jointness or anything about anything except the Navy contributes to our Corps, our Chaplains, and so on. So, you hit the same theme or I do, but you can vary it to the audience. I thoroughly enjoyed the ones with the Congress. When I came here, we had not held a ceremony on Capitol Hill with the Congress.

To be candid with you, there is an element of lobbying in this. When you go up there, it is a Marine Corps event and you draw in as many congressional staffers and actual principals as you can that you influence for the Marine Corps. But there are also a number of Marines on the Hill, and they're very proud of that fact. So, instead of going up and—we have a luncheon up there, some people will come, not many,

over the succeeding years. But I decided why not in Congress—as I mentioned earlier, I believe, if, in fact, as Gen Lou Wilson had coached me before I even became the Commandant, the Marine Corps never would and never will exist without the will of the Congress. It never has existed because of any secretary of anything or, indeed, even because of the President.

So, if, indeed, we were a product of and supported by the Congress, why not go up and let them celebrate with us. So, we took that up, both to the House side and to the Senate side and it has grown each year to where it is quite an undertaking on the Hill, very significant. We would have, I think—last year, we had something like 11 Senators, plus the Inouyes or Stevens,, who weren't Marines, but are—you know, have Marine constituents in their district. We would have 15 or 20 Senators, who would come and hundreds of staffers and well-wishers and take the Drum and Bugle Corps up. Nobody else will do that. And nobody can do ceremonies like we do.

So, I discovered, whether it is valid or not, and I have used it consistently, the story—I think you have probably heard it and I hope you weren't sitting there saying "You made this up," but about the origins of Marines, you know, why the Continental Congress decreed that we should have Marines, having to do George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the northern campaign to connect cities during the Revolutionary War.

It fits in very nice because its thrust at the end is that even though Gen George Washington is, at least, alleged to have said, "No, I don't want to waste two battalions of perfectly good infantry to make them Marines," the Continental Congress said do it anyway. So, indeed, the Marine Corps owes its allegiance to the Congress.

So, we would go up and hold this rather tinsel affair and march on a cake and cut the cake and pass around champagne and then the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant, the brigadier general, would offer a toast to Corps and country and then I would follow that toast by saying—by proposing a toast to those, you know, to whom the Marine Corps is, always is, indebted for its being, for its sustenance: to the Congress of the United States and they like that.

So, we made a lot of political hay. Any Commandant who tells you he is not political has forgotten how he did business when he was in town. But that was not the main motive. The main motive was just this effort to get out and share the Marine Corps with as many people as you could.

So, it is still going on and I think it a very successful undertaking.

BGEN SIMMONS: The culminating events were the traditional memorial services held this year in 1991 at 1100, Saturday, 9 November, at the Marine Corps War Memorial of Arlington, and the Birthday Ball at the Washington Hilton, preceded by a stopover visit to The Basic School Birthday Ball at the Ramada Renaissance Hotel.

Do you recall who the guests of honor might have been at these events? Do you have any other special recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, I do. The guests at the War Memorial, which is the, of course, morning affair that you mentioned, was Secretary Cheney. Remember, in earlier times, I think we talked about, perhaps a little more, about the fact that I was treading a very fine line of trying to—of being a loyal serving—you know, a Commandant appointed by the President and, yet, I was—on the other side of my face, I was caused to oppose the dictates of the sizing of the Marine Corps that was being driven by Secretary Cheney.

So, I was looking for all the ways I could to—you know, to gain favor with him. I actually, as I recall, I invited him to be the Birthday Ball guest of honor and he could not, but he did accept the War Memorial and then Secretary Larry Garrett was the guest of honor at the Birthday Ball.

I chose to emphasize the Marine Corps family at that ball and did it almost as a hindsight. We had a flag—or a uniform pageant that is fairly common around the Marine Corps, but, in addition to the uniformed members and recognizing the women Marines and the pilots and the nurses and everybody else, at the end I brought on a Marine captain and his wife and three children and the crowd just absolutely thought it was tremendous, and I hadn't really thought that much about it, but it attributed the Marine family as being part of the Corps, as well as all those people who were in uniform.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday, 10 November, you left Washington for yet another Birthday Ball, this one in Waynesville, North Carolina. Then the next day, there was a dedication of a statue in Waynesville. What are your recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Birthday Ball would really be something of an exaggeration, though accurate, in the sense that I have a very good friend who to this day remains so. He was in high school about a year

ahead of me, went in the Marine Corps, came out as a captain and we have been lifelong friends. But, anyway, he is now crippled and can't move about anywhere.

So, the birthday celebration really was simply to go up to his house and take a birthday cake and a bottle of champagne and he still has got his Marine sword. He didn't know we were coming. So, I took his sword off the wall and cut the cake and we celebrated the birthday.

So, that was all the ball there was to it. The North Carolina contingent of hillbilly Marines that were up there had always been, you know, very proud of the fact that they had produced a Commandant from that region.

And I saw some others while there. But the real purpose was to dedicate the monument to the services, all the services were represented, at the County Courthouse the next morning that was the event for which I really went. I suppose that all of us, you know, at one time or another during your tenure, you go back to your hometown to be a hero. Well, that was my moment to go back and be a hero, was to dedicate the monument, have all of the folks who had helped to paddle me along the way, and tipped me for newspaper delivery or whatever it is that they had known as I had grown up, that they could all come out and listen to a general make a speech.

So, that was the purpose of that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 14 November, you met with LtGen Hank Stackpole on "Articulating the Corps." What was that all about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, being one of the finest practitioners of the art of the American language that I have known, you probably would find "Articulating the Corps" to be somehow grammatically out of balance. But I was very much aware when I—even before I became the Commandant, that one of the major problems that the Marine Corps had was that the perception of Marines was "Tarawa" and the idea that existed in many people's minds having to do with the two land armies, why do you have two land armies and amphibious assaults are too costly. They are archaic. We're not going to do those again; so, therefore, you don't need Marines.

Or if you have only got x number of amphibious ships, why don't you just have the number of Marines that could fill those ships. Secretary Cheney used to constantly pose that question to me. If we only have, you know, 2 1/2 MEBs worth of lift, why must we have more than 2 1/2 MEBs? That was a hard ques-

tion. So, I realized that we had to explain the Marine Corps. We had to talk up the Marine Corps, not in terms of this heroic assault against a defended beach, which is a capability that we have, but it is not the—you know, the singular and the sole reason for the existence of the Corps.

So, I wanted to be able to promulgate to our own generals, to Marines themselves, but most especially to those outside the Corps what the Corps is all about, what it is that we do and to focus on a variety of operational matters, but also to tell them that we were facing the base closures, you know, the 15 bases that we have that were little cities unto themselves that were full and robust and so on. We had to figure out some way to sell them.

So, my term applied to that was “Articulating the Corps,” explaining the Corps, very specifically causing people to understand what the Marine Corps was all about.

Hank Stackpole was the DCS/PP&O at that point. I had charged him with the mission of doing that and we worked very closely on it because I knew exactly what I wanted to convey. And to be very candid with you, one of my weaknesses is that I probably was the most active action officer at Headquarters, Marine Corps and I tended to want to rewrite things and to be very deeply involved in those sorts of . . .

So, at any rate, that is what the—the meeting was to continue the emphasis on coming up with some packages and some themes and things that we could make very clear to the Cheneys and to the Congress and to the Powells and all these people that were around influencing the future of the Corps what we were all about.

BGEN SIMMONS: In November at Quantico, the Marine Corps Art of War Studies—a program of professional education for lieutenant colonels who demonstrated superior academic skills—was renamed the Marine Corps War College, placed directly under the President, Marine Corps University. Was this one of your initiatives?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I wish it were because I think it is a splendid one. This, in fact, was one of the Gray initiatives, still flowing from the evolution of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps University, those thing—really which, you know, maybe not exclusively to him, but at least on his watch. He wanted to make the Marine Corps education system equal in quality if not in size, but certainly in quality, equal or better than anybody else’s. And one of those initiatives had to do with try-

ing to acquire the credentials to be able to give War College credit to a select number of officers that came to attend the Corps.

So, that was evolutionary and it just happened to come to fruition on my watch through Gen Boomer’s efforts down at Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 November, you went to Boston to be the keynote speaker at a dinner being held at the Fletcher School of Law. The subject of your talk was “Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection into the 21st Century.” The conference on the usefulness of Naval Expeditionary Forces was being sponsored by the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law with the co-sponsorship of the Marine Corps University.

There was a copy of your speech amongst your personal papers and it is a good one, summarizing the deployments in 1991 and predicting that we were entering a golden age for the utility of naval forces.

Do you recall anything about this particular evening or this particular speech?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I recall the evening and, in fact, I recall the speech because it, together with a couple more, were really my naval theses. When we talked about “Articulating the Corps,” yes, necessary to do that, but as I will talk about a little bit later, I really saw also the need to turn the U.S. Navy and we can discuss that in detail.

So, these were emerging theses, which I was—I must admit, again, I was treading a little delicately because I was beginning to subtly challenge some of the Navy’s longings as to principles and theses and, again, more about that, but the point is that, for example, the term “Naval Expeditionary Forces,” the Navy had not yet embraced and, indeed, it took a few years to get them to embrace the term “Naval Expeditionary Forces.” The Marines could do that but the Navy wasn’t quite ready to do that.

So, by the Marines getting up and talking matters naval, it was my belief that we would significantly influence the Navy in the direction that I and many others, even outside of the naval services, thought that it needed to go.

The evening at the Fletcher School—the Fletcher School, of course, is a very prestigious school. We usually have a Marine major up there each year, together with a smattering of other Service officers, as well as a lot of civilian students, but it is really oriented on strategy and policy and sort of a War College level school.

It was sponsored by them in Boston. We bring out

all of the, you know, intelligentsia there and try and influence them. Gen Gray attended. It was one of the first time, I believe, I'd seen him since he retired. So, it was a nice event, but I simply gave a speech and answered a few questions and went to bed and got up and got on the road again the next morning.

BGEN SIMMONS: In this Fletcher School speech, you referred to a speech you had given the previous week at the Naval Academy. I have also read this speech. It was a Forrestal lecture and the subject was "The Golden Age of Naval Force Utility." The fit between the two speeches is obvious. Do you have any particular recollections of your evening at Annapolis, which incidentally was on 13 November?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do. That to have been invited for the Forrestal lecture series was significant and that was a big platform for the Commandant, if you will. It is the type of thing, you know, not to flatter the Commandant to that extent, but it would be the major policy speech for a President to go and announce a policy in Bosnia or something. So, this was a major policy speech. This very likely was the major policy speech for me in my tenure in the sense that I have just spoken about.

The theme of the Navy for as long as I have been mature enough or Washington-wise or what-not had been ASW—Antisubmarine warfare is our top priority and that had been driven by a number of CNOs who were submariners and who, obviously, wanted to promote submarines and, indeed, at the time of the threat from the Soviet Union, one could argue that that was not a false thesis. But it was continuing and the Navy just seemed to be unable to view the future and to realize that the world had changed quite significantly.

When I came here, the counsel that I received, never from within the Marine Corps, but from outside the Marine Corps, to include on the Hill, in the think tanks around Washington and even written communications, I think, vividly could be put into a characterization that one of the people at the Center for Naval Analysis—I would put it in these terms—he said what you have got to realize is that the Marine Corps at this particular time is like a parachutist in an over-water jump and you look down at the water that is coming up at you very fast and tied to your left boot is a concrete block and it has "U.S. Navy" painted in blue and gold.

The charge to me—I say to me—to the Marine Corps from a number of quarters was you have got to get the Navy going because if the Navy sinks, you guys are going right straight down with it. So, part of

the thesis of my tenure was not—was certainly, first and foremost and always would be, to—you know, to develop a case for keeping the Marine Corps as a relevant institution, but also to cause the Navy to come along.

The Navy was suffering from a guilt complex out of the Gulf War. They were—every time I had ever heard anyone in the Navy get up and speak or write anything, all the articles in the *Proceedings* would be "bleeding heart." We didn't do anything wrong. We didn't—you know, the carriers were there. There were six carriers. We launched this many strikes and all that sort of thing. But they were suffering from a feeling that they had not been a dominant service. They had been badmouthed because of the Air Force air tasking order, this ten-ton document that the Air Force put out every day that the computers on the carriers couldn't receive. That was—the problem was technical. It was not operational. It was technical.

But the Navy was really bleeding all over the table and also in an effort to then dispel this after-action report syndrome that the Navy has not joined, they began to reach at any straw that went past and that is where all of this talk of, "Well, we can put an Army general aboard a Navy ship and we can have a Joint Task Force."

So, I realized that the Navy leadership not really understanding how to be Joint and not to understand that the Navy arguably is the most jointed of any one of the services because of the mediums in which it operates and the way it is structured.

So, the Forrestal speech was my—I wrote that one. I mean, there may have been some help, but it was written by me, put together by me, and I had been working at it for a long time and I had been hinting at it for a long time. So, that was a major effort.

As far as the evening at the Naval Academy, RAdm Tom Lynch, who I—unfortunately, Tom had some problems later in his tenure that caused him not to advance on up through the Navy ranks, which I regret, but he was one of the best superintendents, I think, that they had up there and he certainly related to the midshipmen. It is an awesome feeling when you are led—you simply walk out into Memorial Hall and there is the brigade of midshipmen looking down at you because you are down on the stage and they are arrayed like an amphitheatre around you in a horseshoe fashion. And you are the lone figure on the stage to speak to that very large audience, all of them sizing you up and all of them figuring that in a few years they'd be able to do it better than you are.

So, you are very conscious of your bearing and your appearance and that sort of thing. But as is the

usual case with midshipmen, even if you give this thesis on Naval Expeditionary Forces and the golden age of naval forces, and I told them—I recall—I swallowed hard on this one because I knew I was going to take the CNO on directly—I sent him a copy of the speech before I went, but in it I said to them that if you have aspirations of becoming a nuclear submariner, you better start thinking in a different direction, because that isn't going to be out there in the future. And you had better start thinking about amphibious ships and about power projection.

You know, the midshipmen, probably some of them listened to it, but then when the question period comes, as is always the case, rarely do you get many sophisticated questions. The questions are rather what do you think about women in the Navy or women in the Marine Corps as opposed to anything that we'd talked about.

The feedback from that—I know I am going a long time on this—

BGEN SIMMONS: I'm pleased you're identifying the importance of this.

GEN MUNDY: It is an important point. The response to that speech, I think, was good on balance. I expected that Adm Kelso, who was the Chief of Naval Operations, might haggle a little bit because, again, he is a submariner and I wasn't taking on just submarines but what I was really trying to say is the Navy has got to change.

I did not get any negative—when I talked to him later about the speech, telling him I had been warmly received at the Naval Academy and so on and the only thing he said, “Well,” he said, “I guess I really wish you wouldn't—don't tell them that they can't be submariners.” And I said, “Well, Frank, I didn't tell them that but I just—what I was trying to tell them is far fewer of them are going to be submariners than have been in the past.”

So, we really didn't have any friction over it and, again, I think it began to set the case for a major effort, which I had undertaken on the heels of giving the briefing of the Force Structure Planning Group effort to Secretary Garrett, Gen Powell, Cheney, all them, eventually on to the Hill. That had been extraordinarily well-received. I don't think anybody had ever thought through the work that was done by Gen Krulak and his crew in delving into the fundamentals. Nobody ever thinks about the training and transient and patients and prisoners, the T2P2 pipeline, which is about sixteen or seventeen thousand Marines at any given time that don't belong to the FMF or

Headquarters Marine Corps. They are out there training. So, when you begin trimming away at the size of the Corps, those are things—those are costs of doing business, the Marine Security Guard Battalion. If, told the State Department we are not going to provide Marine security guards for you anymore and so who would pick that up? When you start reminding people of those types of details, it really went over very well and it began to win for the Corps.

What I had done, consistent with what I have been talking about earlier, as early as, oh, October, after I had come into office, was to begin to talk to the CNO about doing a—I didn't want—I said we need to do a Naval Force Planning Effort, very much like the Marine Corps has. We need to decide—we need to find out what kind of Navy that we need in the future, what size? He was not really an eager player in that and while he would acknowledge—listen to me, he—there were no positive responses.

I would send over memos. I would send over notes. I would walk down the hall with him. But Adm Kelso's thesis at that particular point, the great man that he is and was as a CNO, and he was a good CNO, but Frank Kelso's view of the world at that point was, as I have spoken earlier, regrettably the Navy program is really in free fall. It was not a Force Structure. It was not a vision of how shall we shape the Navy for the future, but it is what shall we do about the budget.

Anytime you start to lose your vision based on how much money you got this year or think you are going to get next year, you lose objectivity. So, I was trying to be visionary or cause the Navy to be visionary and get out a program focus. His view of where we were, as he used to say to me, is, look, he would say, “I know this is all important for you, but he said we are in a free fall in the defense budget.” And he said, “I think we have just got to hit the bottom and pick up the pieces and put it all back together once we have hit the bottom.”

And I would say, “Frank, God almighty, we—you know, let's arrest the free fall. Let's shape it on the way down and see if we can't slow the free fall. You know, I mean, the name of the game here is not beat Marine Corps or beat Navy. The name of the game here is beat Army or beat Air Force. I mean, —we have got to structure the naval services to be the pre-eminent services of the future. It is the golden era of the future of the naval forces.”

It took me several weeks, I would say a couple of months, into November until finally one day coming out of a JCS meeting, as we were walking up the stairs—I had been working on his Plans and Policy

Officer, VAdm Leighton, L-E-I-G-H-T-O-N, Smith or “Snuffy” Smith, as we knew him.

“Snuffy” is a tremendous man and had a lot of things that made him very popular with the Marine Corps—his form of service, Navy pilot—good man. I would back door—I would take “Snuffy” aside and say, “Snuffy, we have to convince the CNO to do this” and I think Snuffy Smith understood that we had to do that. So, eventually, in November, we walked out of a JCS meeting and as we started to part, me to leave the building and him to go up on the second deck and go back to his office.

He [Kelso] said, “Well, he said, I guess you and everybody are telling me that we have got to—you know, study the future and take a look at what we ought to be. So, I am ready to go along with that.” And I really left the building and almost threw my hat in the air because I thought we had the possibility going. So, we now have the CNO’s okay to do this planning effort.

I think at this point I will continue on this because the end of this, I think, is, indeed, one of the very important points that I would want to have recorded.

In talking with him. . .

GEN MUNDY: In then discussing that with the CNO, who said okay to that particular effort, in discussing it with principally Adm Smith, I now plugged in—Gen Stackpole, Hank Stackpole, who was my—Stackpole and Krulak were my two visionaries, my two, you know, crafters and creators of the future, as was at that particular time BGen Charlie Wilhelm or he had just been selected for major general, BGen Tom Wilkerson and MajGen Matt Caulfield. Those were the people who could envision the future and make it come to pass.

So, as the team was being put together, I tried hard to convince the Navy that we should do this with captains and colonels, lieutenant colonels, commanders and—but, you know, in the Navy, an admiral has got to be in charge. So, we finally wound up with a rear admiral that regrettably very clearly a deadwood admiral, that was not going anywhere, that was not—you know, it was a job that they could assign him off into and to be sure he retired in grade not long after he completed this effort.

I wanted to put the young visionaries on, who were going to have to be around to implement and live with what they planned and conceived. We really sandbagged on this. I personally selected the officers that were going to be on this group. I put MajGen Caulfield as the—because the Navy had put a two-star in on it. I companioned that with Caulfield. I put

Wilhelm on there as a one-star. This also fit the, you know, the structure that was taking place, so that the Marine Corps shadowed, not only shadowed, but counterpointed the Navy in every respect with literally our best and our brightest.

We picked the best colonels and lieutenant colonels that we could get and put them into this group and the Navy also sent some fine young officers who were not inhibited by programmatics. Regrettably, however, the Navy being the Navy, they could not keep RAdm Dave Oliver, who was the programmer of the Navy, managed to get in the door on this thing. In my thesis, even with Kelso, was, you know, once you have let a programmer’s nose under the tent, he is going to shoot down every noteworthy idea you have by saying, “Oh, it is not in the program. We can’t afford it,” as opposed to letting them think broadly.

So, anyway, we managed to offset that, but the product of that particular very lengthy and sometimes extraordinarily painful experience for the Marines that were involved, trying to drag the Navy along, the became, after it went dormant for awhile, because of Adm Kelso’s uncertainty in finishing the effort, but the product became the thesis of changing—I called it turning the bow of the aircraft carrier toward the land.

And I said to all those Marines who worked on it at the time and afterwards, “You guys must shape this. You must be the crafters of turning the Navy, but we must do it without the Navy realizing that they are not doing it.”

So, for that reason, while I would have given anything to be able to stand up and proclaim that it is a Marine Corps product, I counseled everybody that the Navy has got to believe that they successfully brought about this change on their own.

Someone on the blue side might tell the story a little bit differently, but the fact is that it was a very carefully thought out and crafted and energized and staffed effort by the Marine Corps to be able to bring this about. And I felt very good ultimately. Remember, if you will, if anyone goes back and studies history, that and now a major general, Tom Wilkerson, was the man who even as early as Adm Crowe’s first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Roles and Missions Report, wrote about littoral warfare and the expertise of Marines and sailors in being the principal agents in littoral warfare in the Crowe report. Then Wilkerson was on the Naval Force Planning Group effort and, thus, gave the focus on littoral warfare.

So, much credit is due to Caulfield, Wilkerson and Wilhelm, as the principal generals and certainly Stackpole being the next echelon going and coming

directly in to me. Those were the real crafters of the “from the sea” strategy.

Adm Kelso, when we reached that point of saying, okay, the next step now is that we have now defined the concept. We now know where we are going. Now we need to define the Fleet that it will take to execute this. We need to—instead of talking about 600 ships or 500 ships or any number of ships, we have got to talk about force capability and define what a Fleet is, as opposed to just a 600-ship Navy, 600 aircraft carriers, 600 frigates? What kind of Navy? People have got to understand what kind of Navy.

That shocked Kelso when we threw that thesis forth in the conference room because he, again, I think, in his albeit realistic view here in Washington, but in a programmatic view, he realized that if, indeed, these bright, young whippersnappers came up with a Navy that did not support CVN-76 and CVN-77 or, you know, the *Sea Wolf* submarine if, or whatever it might be, that the Navy would be in big trouble on the Hill, trying to go up and revise themselves.

So, he was more prudent than those of us that were involved with this effort would liked to have been because we thought if we could define the Fleet, we would be able to then sell capability and to come together on the Hill to promote Marines to speak for the Fleet as well as Marine problems. It took about another two years to get that done. Adm Bill Owens came in, linked very tightly with Gen Krulak and with me and went to work on that thesis. But it took a couple of years to do it.

That has been long and windy and so on, but, again, I just think that it is very important as a tribute to the Marine Corps at this particular point in history, that it was the Corps that brought about the reorientation of the U.S. Navy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very fine.

As Commandant of the Marine Corps, you had to give talks and speeches virtually on a daily basis, sometimes, in fact, several times a day. These speeches or talks ranged from impromptu remarks, to extemporaneous speeches, to very carefully crafted major expressions of policy, just as we have just examined.

As we have seen earlier, you have been interested in public speaking since your days as a boy at Lake Junaluska. Public speaking well done is a very powerful leadership and management tool. You do it extremely well.

I am now going to ask you to share with future readers your secrets, if they are secrets, of speech preparation and delivery. First off, how do you prepare yourself to deliver a speech? To what extent did

you use speechwriters while you were Commandant? Who were the best of these? How did you use them?

Take us through the steps of preparation for a major speech, such as that given at the Fletcher School or the Forrestal Lecture at the Naval Academy.

GEN MUNDY: Well, let me begin with the last and say let’s go through how a speech takes form and is developed. Periodically, and I would like to say once, probably once a month, but as a practical matter it was more likely every couple of months, I would sit down with my staff, the Commandant’s Staff Group that I started when I came in that were more than speechwriters. They were as close as I could—as I thought we could afford, they sought to be something like the old Policy Analysis Division that we have spoken of earlier, that would be a group of young officers that I could throw out something and say “Think this through for me and then come back to me,” generally at the major level.

But at any rate, I would sit down with them. I would sit down with Col Pete Metzger, who was my Military Secretary, Jim Flynn was subsequently, but those—I would sit down, depending upon what phase of the campaign we were in, for example, if it is Force Structure or something, I would bring in Gen Krulak or others; the Assistant Commandant from time to time.

But I would sit down with these young officers and we would go through what the upcoming events were. Okay. You are going to the Army War College in, you know, the 1st of November or you are going to a birthday ball, whatever.

And I would try and go through and say, “Okay, this one we want to be—this or this is policy and we want to be on the Naval Expeditionary Force theme. This one is historical. So, let’s talk a little bit about, you know, Marines in World War II or the evolution of naval warfare or something.” So, we would go through each of the speeches.

So, pick any one of those you would like. After that was done then, there would generally be the speechwriters, although we didn’t call them that as such, but that those that were working the speech sometimes would be down in the Plans and Policy Operations Department, but most of the time would be the Commandant’s Staff Group.

They would then come up with an outline or a draft that would come usually back to Col Metzger because Pete Metzger and I did fit like a glove. I mean, we were a lot different in personalities, but if anybody around knew me, knew what, you know, my themes, my mannerisms and what not, Pete Metzger probably

would be the one as well as anybody around. So, it would come back to Pete and he would give it a twist and it is about right, you know, it is a little bit off or he would want to emphasize that. So, I had a lot of help out of Col Metzger.

I found, very frankly, that to send things to generals, because generals are very busy and are over-committed and, you know, you get a speech from the Commandant to read and you say, "Oh, it is something else to do at home tonight." From generals sometimes you would get some valid input, but most of the times, you got a, you know, looks pretty good and you press on.

So, I wanted a bunch of young officers, who would be critical and who would really challenge you. To make a long story short, they would come in with the outline. After Col Metzger would look it over, back with whatever requirement, it would come to me as a proposed draft. If we did it right—and in the major speeches, we did do it right—I would then work it through and change it around and edit it and rewrite some sections or add in a section, send it back. They would come back up again and literally that process of up to me, a few fixes, back, up to me, a few fixes, back, would continue right to the point that I was on the airplane landing to go give the speech somewhere or in the car driving down to give it when I would be sitting back there working it with a pen.

I think that is probably not extraordinary because what you find in the executive levels is that what may be good today may still be good in two months, but it will be—you need to expand or to, you know, take a little bit different tack or maybe to emphasize more heavily a point or throw in a new point.

So, it is an evolutionary process. By the time you have worked through a written piece enough, it is generally pretty well imbedded in your head, maybe not verbatim, but the thrust of it is and the major thoughts are.

Then when you get up to go give it, yes, you can usually just talk. I despise to read speeches, but I came to realize probably in my first six months that I wasn't going to be able to simply go out and extemporize every time I stood before an audience. I was going to have to have some sort of something to do that with.

But you can then either go read the speech or you have got enough of it in mind if you work it as I have described to where you can almost talk it with only the framework before you. So, I would frequently take a 15-page speech and on the airplane, I would get out a three by five card and I would make the first point and then I would put down the second point and

then I might pen in, you know, "read page 3," because it was particularly good or accurate or quotes or something like that. And then the fourth point and the fifth point. And I would actually get up and talk it.

That was the technique of the development of the speech. As far as the, you know, style, it has always served me well to work very hard to be at the level of the audience to which you were speaking. In many cases, I felt myself that I couldn't get up to that level. If it was the CSIS or, again, you know, up in Harvard somewhere, I felt a little bit insecure from time to time. But what I was saying is that I can remember as a junior officer in the Corps, I remember specifically as a battalion commander in the Philippines putting on a fire-power demonstration for the Commandant and it was good and it was well-received and he thoroughly enjoyed it.

It was Gen Lou Wilson, who, you know, is one of my two greatest heroes—I said to him "Would you like to talk to the troops" and he said, "Well, yes, I would." So, Co. G double-timed in, all covered with sweat and with dirt and powder burns and what not and assembled in a school circle around the Commandant. When Gen Wilson got up to speak, even as great as he is, he could not get out of the Washington syndrome. And I could watch my Marines, two companies of Marines, sitting there with their eyes glazing, trying to figure out, because the theme that he was on at the time was non-expiration of active service, non-EAS attrition, a big deal in the seventies with colonels and so on. But he was talking about non-EAS attrition and you could see the troops wondering "What is non-EAS attrition?"

So, you know, that taught me to if you are going to talk to troops, get down on their level of play. If you are going to talk to a midshipman, confess to them that you have been there. You have been out in the seat where they are and that you, too, fell asleep and got bored and wished the speaker didn't talk so long or whatever it is and try and talk to them in terms that they can relate to.

If you are talking to the 50th anniversary of World War II group, you know, you want to make as much as you can about what great Americans they are. So, you know, you go after patriotism. There is no secret, I think. I enjoy speaking very much.

In the latter years, I think, I became all too quick to simply—to start thinking about the speech sometimes an hour before I went to give it. And I also learned that for war college presentations or any school presentations, for those types of venues, where you are talking to your own kind, military professionals, that the worst thing you can do is to stand behind a plat-

form and try and deliver a speech. You do that extraordinarily well because you make a historical presentation and I have always admired the way you deliver. But for me to walk to the center of the stage, sometimes carry a folded in half three by five card in my hand, not to be seen, and talk to them for 45 or 50 minutes and then take their questions, they loved it, and it wasn't perfect and it was sometimes rambling and sometimes I would miss a point but during the question period, "Listen, I meant to say this about that." So, that worked very well with a non-prepared speech, just off the cuff. Here are the views of the Commandant. Let's see, what are the views of the Commandant, and lay them out.

BGEN SIMMONS: I listened very carefully to what you said about targeting the audience. I think that is very important. The audience deserves to have remarks specifically meant for them. Of course, there is also the exception to that and we have already covered it. The Forrestal Lecture is a separate and distinct audience. It is rather like the President of the United States going to Harvard to deliver a graduation speech. He is talking to the graduates but he is also talking to the country.

I think the Forrestal Lecture is sort of in that category. We have two audiences, brigade of midshipmen, and also a much larger audience.

GEN MUNDY: The real intent was to the Navy leadership, using that as a venue. President Clinton spoke last night about commitment of troops to Bosnia and one of the commentators said he is really giving a speech to the Congress, but he has to direct it to the American people. I think that is the case but rarely in my case. Naval Institute seminars and conferences were my other venue for being able to speak to a bunch of old, retired guys, who were falling asleep in the stands and really were interested in what time their next meal is going to be, but trying to communicate my views to the notetakers who were up there and they were sending my words back into the OpNav staff and probably were, you know, saying bad things about me, but it was a means of getting through into the Navy hierarchy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there anything else you want to tell us about speech preparation and delivery?

GEN MUNDY: No, I don't think so, except, again, as I was talking about, talking at the level of the audience. I think something else that people appreciate that served me very well and that has to be to flow

from one's personality. But I believe that audiences generally appreciate knowing that you are human and that it is quite all right—I used to do this frequently at the war colleges—to admit where I tripped up. I tried to do this and it fell apart on me and the reason was that I didn't follow through. So, the lesson learned for you is follow through or whatever you want to communicate.

I found that to be—always found that to be very appealing when you would be a little bit humble and admit that you, too, were of human frailty.

BGEN SIMMONS: I might mention that all of our recent Commandants, Barrow, Kelley, Gray and now Krulak are effective speakers, each with a very different style, ranging from the oratorical to the vernacular. Would you comment on the importance of public speaking in today's world?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think public speaking enables you to communicate your own personality and in the case of a military officer, the personality of your institution. And that is important not from an ego trip, not from the standpoint of building yourself, you know, an audience of admirers or anything, but you can write and people will read the words and often times writing, I have found, is maybe a more effective means of communication around Washington because a piece of paper gets around; a speech or a few remarks or comments may or may not unless you are a Colin Powell and everything you say gets in the newspaper.

But I think that you gain confidence by letting people see you and hear you or you lose confidence. I mean, it can go the other way, too. For a military leader to get up in front of the troops and speak to them, they now know who their leader is. They understand his personality. They either respond to you or you are a failure as a leader if they don't respond to you.

So, it is the ability to speak publicly, however that might be defined, I think, for a leader in any walk of life, corporate chairman of the board or certainly a politician, as we know, or a military leader it is fundamental.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you think we do enough to develop this ability in our officers as we bring them up?

GEN MUNDY: I think so. If we had more laxity in the school curricula, you know, then you might have more time to spend on public speaking. I also attend-

ed the Instructor's Orientation Course at Quantico years ago and I profited very much from Col Noble reminding me not to jingle the change in my pocket, not to have any change in my pocket. Then I wouldn't stick my hand in there and jangle it or, you know, not to carry a pencil because I would fool with the pencil and the audience would focus on the pencil instead of what I was saying.

So, I learned a lot from those and from my own speaking that we talked about in my early years, I enjoyed speaking. But I don't know—I think there are some persons who simply would not be an effective speaker, perhaps, no matter how much you coached them and there are others who in their way can communicate what I've talked about without being a great speaker. I frankly don't know whether Chesty Puller was a tremendous speaker or not. I haven't read anything that indicates to me that he would be, but he sure fired up the troops and led them effectively in combat. So, however he did it was his personality.

BGEN SIMMONS: We live in a world today where television is so important and so-called sound bite and so forth, and we will get into some specifics on this later with respect to yourself, but there has been some effort to train the leadership in television techniques. There is a studio at the Pentagon and so forth and so on.

Did you make any use of it?

GEN MUNDY: I did at a later point. I did not—we do that as a part of the brigadier general orientation course each year. In fact, I think that really is probably the most significant effort put in is on public affairs, you know, speaking, interviews, that sort of thing.

I wasn't here. I didn't attend the BG SOC, as it is called, when I was selected, because I was out in Norway, but I did attend that particular course at a later point. As I recall, during one of the symposiums, if I'm not mistaken, had an opportunity to do that. And it was very useful in—but more so, I think, in respect to how you come across on camera and that is to say that if you don't sit up straight in your chair, it is doubly noticed—I am slouched with you here as we speak this morning and you are not. I don't think you are particularly capable of that, but if you were looking at me on camera, you would really notice it and I wouldn't come across very good.

You know, how you speak with inflections in your voice, if you monotone on camera, you just come across as a deadhead, as a deadbeat. So you have to

be a little bit theatrical in how you come across. That was of great use to me. I am not sure that—some of the instruction on continuing to try and put your theme across as opposed to reacting to the questions that are asked. There is good training, but it is awfully hard to do at the time and place. There is preparation but when you get into a tough interview, it is matter of your wits against their wits, you know, in my experience.

BGEN SIMMONS: You occasionally got to see a football game, as on 24 November, when you went to the RFK stadium to see the Washington Redskins play the Dallas Cowboys. Are you a Redskins or Cowboy fan?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am a Dolphins fan. Remember, we spoke earlier about the Miami experience and growing up with the Shula children and with the dynamic young Dolphins. So, we became Dolphin fans early on. And I found that over the years when we moved to Washington, I don't instantly become a Redskins fan. I bear the Redskins no ill will and never, you know, except when it was the Dolphins and the Redskins, have I really rooted against them, but I am not a Redskins fan.

My youngest son, Tim, always believed, although he, too, was a Dolphins fan, but he considered that the Dallas Cowboys in that particular era, who advertised themselves as America's Team, Tim took to the Cowboys. So, we sort of have a Dolphins and Cowboys focus. So, if you had asked me when I went to the game, since I was sitting with a bunch of Redskins fans, it would not have been the thing to jump up and own over the Cowboys perhaps, but I would be a Cowboys fan over the Redskins.

The Commandant, of course, has the privilege of long standing of buying season tickets and, so, whether you were a professional football fan or not, you buy the tickets. They are very, very easy to give, you know, to make available to your staff or to other officers or Marines around the Headquarters. So, that is what I did.

We would usually go to one or maybe two games in a season and otherwise just make the tickets available . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of 25 November, you were the guest of honor at an anniversary dinner at the Chaplains Corps. What is it, Chaplain Ellis, the . . .

GEN MUNDY: No, I believe that at that particular time, Captain Don Krabbe was the Chaplain of the

Marine Corps, preceding Larry Ellis. If my memory serves me well, it was Don Krabbe, who retired about that time. Now, you know, you have just—however, we have just said that Larry—I think I am in error as I go back to the Birthday worship service. I don't think that Captain Ellis, as I reflect upon it, had reported at that time. So, that would have been Krabbe. So, let me go back and correct the record and say it was Krabbe in November and it was Krabbe at this particular dinner of the Chaplains Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think they are both particularly fine chaplains.

GEN MUNDY: They are.

BGEN SIMMONS: How do you use your Staff Chaplain?

GEN MUNDY: Probably not too well. My management style, not a self-developed style, I guess, but my habit or my strength, my weakness, whatever it might be, has generally been to let people do their jobs; in other words, to establish my direction but not to be specific in other than a few major issues—I was specific in some of the things I wanted to do on force structure and what not, but that done, once I had sort of said this is where I want to go, then I sat back and let people have at it.

So, the chaplains arguably, I might have used them better. I have spent a great deal of time in the senior years of my career, graduating a class of the Chaplains School up in Newport, Rhode Island. I also am talking to whatever level, whether it be the force chaplain or the regimental chaplain or the brigade chaplain or what not, certainly chaplains in the Marine Corps, to say to them that you must understand that you are a minister and you are a man of the cloth, but you have a very unique flock here and you motivate and inspire and, indeed, reach evangelically, I think, Marines with different—in a different way than you do the people in the congregation of the First Methodist Church in Alexandria, Virginia.

Young Marines have to believe that their chaplains represent what the Corps represents. So, the length of your trousers as a chaplain can be very significant in the effect that you have in reaching your flock out there and your haircut will—a Marine is going to check out your haircut, we just do.

o, you have got to understand the peculiarities of your flock. I found that the good chaplains—and Larry Ellis as the Chaplain of the Marine Corps probably is the best that I have known, maybe because I

knew him more closely, but Larry Ellis epitomized that. He was a high-and-tight haircut and not an extremist. He was a fine looking man to begin with, but he wore the—when he put on the Marine uniform as chaplains and doctors do, Larry was indistinguishable from a Marine colonel. He looked as good as any colonel that fell out at the Headquarters in uniform, properly tailored, properly fitted, properly carried and he was a very, very effective man.

So, my use of chaplains has been generally to say though you have got to relate to your flock and you have got to represent what they expect, but at the same time, don't try and be one of them." Some of the worst chaplains that I have seen were least effective, you know, have had grenades taped onto their belts and K-bars taped onto their harnesses and they are trying to be a recon Marine, thinking that Marines would relate to them. Marines's view with a certain amount of amusement and derision in those cases, I think.

So, how I used them was pretty much to say 'You are the Chaplain of the Marine Corps. Go do your job.' Now, when, as we can discuss later, when we got into the gay and homosexual issue, the chaplains and I were tightly wired because I knew that I—I am using the vertical pronoun too much here and I don't like to do that, but I knew that there was an avenue of communication that a chaplain could do even though he might be criticized but—and he could communicate at a very high level of the Marine Corps but with different reactions than if it were me or another general, that is to day as Chaplain Gene Gomulka did so very well. He could write articles and express his views as a Catholic priest, but still be on the theme that the Marine Corps was on an occasions that I would have been chewed up and spit out.

So, I used them—that was a crisis situation in which I specifically used the chaplains and I often accused them of using me from time to time because it was they who would send me forth into battle from time to time.

BGEN SIMMONS: I know from my own experience that it is partly denominational and partly personality-driven, I suppose, but chaplains have a very wide spectrum of opinion or belief as to what role they play. There is the one extreme, who says "I am a man of God not an instrument of command." There is the other person who sees himself as a working staff member of the command.

Was there ever a time—this may sound a little gross—was there ever a time when you said to the staff chaplain, whether it was Chaplain Krabbe or

Chaplain Ellis or Chaplain Gomulka, “This is the party line. I want to make sure you get it to every chaplain in the Marine Corps, whether it is suicide prevention or homosexuality or something?”

GEN MUNDY: Perhaps that communication was there but not that direct. That just simply was not my—that just wasn’t me to say “Here is what I want to convey, precisely, do you understand.” I have rarely done business like that, not because it’s improper, but it was just not me. I was much more inclined to consult with and as I have with all of those about me. My opening touch at any time with my major commanders and staff would be “Where do you think we ought to go and what do you think we ought to do” and then once we had corporately decided on that, I realized if I was the leader, if I was the commander, if I was the Commandant, that I was now the standard bearer for what we had concluded.. So, I would consult with the chaplains on how do you think we ought to approach this or what do you think is the best thing to do. They would come in formally and tell me what they were doing periodically, about once—usually once a quarter. We would have weekly updates of what the chaplain was doing. And, yes, I—I mean, the things that I have said here about what we’ve got to convey to the chaplains that they just can’t be a minister in uniform like they would be in Raleigh, North Carolina. They have got to relate to this young flock on suicide, and on marriage policy.

Captain Gene Gomulka is an extraordinary man. He personally calls the Pope. I mean, they are related to each other. They are both Polish. Gene, literally, when he was in the Mediterranean would go to the Vatican and the Pope would have him for dinner. So, he is quite well plugged in and is an extraordinarily talented writer and perhaps more so a writer than a speaker and a very knowledgeable man. So, he was a good instrument to use on those types of themes. But I didn’t have to ever say, “Gene, do this.”

I would say “I am very concerned about this, Gene, and I don’t know how to get my arms around the suicide issue or how do you think we ought to approach that.” And it would be done. And it would generally be—you know, I would think that was pretty good what they were doing, but I was never as specific as you just described.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you know if any of these chaplains then or perhaps now, the chaplains’ letter that they send out to reporters or newsletter or pastoral letter?

GEN MUNDY: I am not aware of one. To answer

you, I don’t know. I have a sensing that had they been sending out something like that they would have info’d a copy to me, I think. But I didn’t see one..

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 28th of November, you celebrated Thanksgiving and also two days later, your wedding anniversary, your first in the Commandant’s house. Did you celebrate these twin events in any special way?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the—as I recall, Betsy and her family came over because the boys were spread yonder and so we had a rather quiet—we did. It was our first Thanksgiving in the—no, we were still in Quarters 2 at that time. We had not moved into the Commandant’s House. So, we did have—Betsy came over and we had a standard Thanksgiving dinner. We have never been—today is my 38th wedding anniversary. This is the 28th of November, too. We were married on Thanksgiving Day. The nice thing about the Mundy anniversary is that you can claim either Thanksgiving Day or the 28th, generally, whichever comes last because when you wake up on Thanksgiving Day, and I realize that, oh, oh, you can always say, well, I really want to do it on the 28th. If you happen to miss both of them, you are in bad shape.

But we have never been big anniversary celebrants, we don’t go out and spend a lot of money and eat at some fancy restaurant just because it’s the anniversary. We exchange cards and this morning I dropped off a card and a pair of very nice shoes from Nordstrom’s that I picked up yesterday. So, pardoned again.

BGEN SIMMONS: Monday morning, 2 December, began with an early breakfast, hosted by Gen Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Present were the other Service Chiefs and CinCs of Unified Commands. The major item on the agenda for the meetings to follow seems to have been Force Structure.

There was a luncheon with the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense. Now, who would this be at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The Secretary was Dick Cheney and Don Atwood was the Deputy Secretary.

BGEN SIMMONS: That afternoon, there was a briefing on Force Structure. Was this for all the Services?

GEN MUNDY: It was. It was a briefing given by the Joint Staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: If so, the Marine Corps did not

present its position?

GEN MUNDY: Did not. Rarely, although far more so in the current Administration, that is with Secretary Perry and Secretary Aspin before him, the Services—I think when Secretary Aspin came in as the Defense Secretary, he brought with him the idea of testimony on the Hill. So, when he would come in for our initial meetings in “the tank,” his conference room, wherever, he was more inclined to say, well, “Let’s let each of the Services, you know, tell us what they want to tell us.” It was kind of like Congressional testimony.

With Secretary Cheney and with Gen Powell, generally speaking, it was the Joint Staff briefing and each of our staffs had had some input. I don’t recall—I believe that this particular session was one of those more or less annual occasions when the CinCs come to town for the annual JCS and CinCs Conference, which is usually a couple of days and ordinarily is in August each year.

But they would then come in at other times of the year. For example, they were all here to testify in the early spring. But more ordinarily in the late fall or early winter, they would come in because the budget generally has been approved now and you know where you are going and the Chairman will bring them in to say, “Okay, here is where we are and, you know, here are the major programs that have been approved” and just kind of an update for them.

So, I believe it was that. Since Force Structure was the major thesis at that time and since the Army, more so than—the Army and the Air Force at that particular time were beginning very major downsizing, you know, a couple of hundred thousand people in the Army in a year that represented a major bite. I believe that more than anything else, it was simply to come in and say kind of a status quo. Here is where we are going. We will be pulling down, you know, a division and a couple of brigades out of Europe and we will be withdrawing this and—that is the type of thing that I would believe to have gone on.

And then the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and their assistants, who would come in for the meeting, would be generally brought up to speed and if the CinCs had any concerns over something, you know, I don’t think we can come down that fast. Gen Galvin at that time, who was CinCEur—SACEur—was very concerned about the rate of draw down in Europe.

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . the CinC conference and specifically about Gen Galvin and the draw down in Europe?

GEN MUNDY: I was saying that as an example of

how the Chiefs and the CinCs and the Secretary would interface, you might use the Army’s draw-down in Europe. Gen Galvin, of course, had a great concern about holding NATO together. He was SACEur, even though he was the U.S. Commander-in-Chief. He also was the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief. So, his concern was we must hold NATO together and that a precipitous draw-down of too much American Armed Forces from Europe would be destabilizing to NATO.

On the other hand, you have the Army Chief of Staff, Gen Gordon Sullivan, in this case, who is faced with a declining budget, who is faced with the need to—if I am going to reduce a couple hundred thousand people, I need to do that as quickly as I can for a lot of reasons, logistically closing housing areas, shutting down bases, finding housing back in CONUS to move European dependents into and that sort of thing. So, you have the Army saying we have got to get on with business and you have the CinC saying not so fast and you have the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and their staff listening to this interchange and then being able to conclude, not—very rarely there in “the tank”—but in the normal staff process over the next few weeks being able to conclude the direction that we needed to go. They either supported the CinC or they supported the Chief of Staff of the Army, and told CinC to adjust what it is going to be.

So, that is the type of meeting that we had. So, as far as me having a speaking part, more ordinarily the Service Chiefs—the Army would have had a big speaking part. The Air Force might have talked about drawing down fighter wings. The Navy may have had something. The Marines really, because we are—you know, we are based in CONUS. So, unless it was a major draw down in the Western Pacific, we weren’t much effect on a CinC.

Adm Larson, let’s see, Larson was not the CinC at that time, but we might have been talking about the negotiations in the Philippines and the eventual closure out of the Philippines and what we were going to do with that Force Structure. Those were the types of discussions.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 4 December, you had a two hour speaking engagement with the students of the National War College and the Industrial College in the Armed Forces. These annual meetings with the students of the National Defense University are always regarded as very important. Why?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you know, the War College level, which is the lieutenant colonel level predomi-

nantly, maybe a colonel or a captain or two in there, but that is a very formative level for officers. Before then, no matter what you are doing, even up to battalion command, you are relatively junior and relatively service-oriented, I think, in your perspective. The War College becomes that broadening experience, where you now began to understand better the other Services. You begin to think jointness more and it is just a formative time.

So, I think for any one of the Service Chiefs, we view that as an extremely important audience. Those are the officers that are going to come on to our staffs and be the major action officers in the future or that are going out to command.

For the Marine Corps, for any Marine Commandant, I think you view those as the time when—at the lieutenant colonel level and on to the colonel level, that is when people begin to think about joint combined arms. An Army infantry company commander doesn't think much about whether the Marines have got close air support integral to the Marine Corps or not. But lieutenant colonels and captains begin to do that.

So, as a result, it is a time to influence young emerging leaders in the other Services and to help them to understand your particular Service and to appreciate the differences and appreciate those contributions. So, yes, the War College presentations, either the National Defense University or Army, Navy, Air Force colleges are viewed as very important.

BGEN SIMMONS: From the other side of the hill, it gives students a chance to size you up as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. That is probably the greatest thing I got out of the National War College is seeing all those national figures and being able to make my own judgments and evaluations.

GEN MUNDY: Yeah. Well, I think so. And it is to a degree a—the Marines are rooting for—I mean, they want you to—

BGEN SIMMONS: Shine.

GEN MUNDY: —shine. And you come—so, you come to shine. You come to be—you know, to try to out do your other Service counterparts and you can—and, you know, that feedback is instant. When you are talking to them, you can tell whether you have got them or whether they are drifting off and getting bored and, therefore, you had better start home again. And as I said, the thing that—I mean, you know, cer-

tainly my predecessors have done this, too, but the thing that I found that I did almost—well, I would say not almost, that I did habitually in the schools and especially at the war colleges was never to stand behind the lectern. The lectern was something you passed on your way to the center of the stage.

And I found that to be extremely useful. They liked that. They thought they were being talked to and not read to and they could size you up and you get—you know, the Marine—the senior Marine—at Fort Leavenworth one year two or three students had come up and said, I wish I had that kind of uniform. That is the best looking uniform. I mean, the fit of the uniform, the hang of the uniform. Boy, I wish our Chief looked like that. You know, so it is a big payday for the Marines. Their leader has performed theatrically up to their expectations. So, it is kind of a fun thing to do.

And the other thing is that I when I said talking at the level that you feel comfortable—if you stop to think about it, some will argue this, but Marines are fundamentally battalion and squadron commanders. None of us ever leave that view of the world—we may be regiment, brigade, division, whatever. But fundamentally, we really like being a battalion commander or a squadron commander. And that is who you are talking to.

So, you are talking at a—to a level of audience that probably, arguably was the best time in your career and you can relate. Their families are where your family used to be and they are mature enough now to be able to realize that they are going to make a contribution and they are able to look up, as you just said, at the leadership and figure, “Ah, I could probably be about as good as he is or I could be better than he is.”

So, it is a fun group to talk to and it is a fun group to engage with and it is a group that you can be absolutely candid with because they want you to. They are still challenging and they haven't become so politically correct at that point and when they ask you what do you think about women in the military, they are not interested in what the Secretary of Defense thinks about women. They want to know what you think about it. And you can convey to them what you think about it. They are not—you have, of course, women there, too. I don't mean that in any sense of being able to make a fool of yourself, but I think that is an audience in which you can say, you know, I am extraordinarily proud of the women who are Marines but that said, there are places in the Marine Corps in which they would not best serve and in which their career interests will not be best served.

And then maybe some Army lieutenant colonel

female will pop up and challenge you on that. And then you can explain to her why and you don't have to explain—you are not going to be written up in *The Washington Post* with extracts of what you had said and you can—thus, you can influence the thinking of a generation of officers. It is a fun—that is a highlight. So, that is one of those that is never a—you never leave the office saying, “Oh, gosh, why did I have to go and do this again?”

BGEN SIMMONS: The next day, 5 December, you left for a trip to the Pacific that would take you to Pearl Harbor and to Wake Island. This trip had to do primarily with the 50th anniversary of our entry into World War II. What are your recollections of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: Very vivid. As we have spoken before, you know—I mean, my eyes still water up with thinking about World War II because I always view that as the war that I missed and I was born in the wrong generation. This was just me. We took a video crew from Quantico because I had it in mind to try and record the World War II battles as I went around over the next four years. It didn't work out. You know, getting some pieces, but it didn't work out well to do that, but that is what I had in mind.

So, it was a fast trip. We flew out to be in Hawaii on the 7th of December. I was there. We got there, I think, on the 5th. We went to a couple of the celebrations with the—went to the Marine Barracks and, you know, there were the old-timers who were either ship detachment Marines on some of the ships that were attacked on the 7th of December or who had been coming in from liberty and looked up and said, “Hey, they are shooting at us” and, you know, had been on the scene in the barracks.

So, that was enjoyable. And there was a parade at the Marine Barracks that evening, which I think I reviewed and enjoyed with the veterans. And then on the—then my tasking—the Chiefs were tasked to do things, I was to meet the President at the punchbowl when he arrived. So, I suited up and I was there and then President Bush and, you know, really nothing more than just being, you know, heavy brass to meet the President.

So, I saluted him, said “Good morning” and he went out to speak and I went up and sat down. And then I went down to Pearl Harbor. I did not go out on the CINCPac barge with him. None of us did. I think that—let me see, who was there? I believe—I don't frankly recall if the CNO was there. I suspect he was. Frankly, it may have just been me, as far as a Service

Chief. I can't believe that, but anyway I was there.

Then when he came back in and gave a speech, President Bush., well, you know, I was in attendance for that. So, I represented the Marine Corps, if you will. But then I beat feet as fast as I could back to the airplane and we shot out of there, you know, with the pedal to the metal to make Wake Island, to be there on the 8th, because that was the day on which Wake Island was attacked. But as the time zones dictated and the schedule in Hawaii, we got there after the ceremony had been held, I think there were some Japanese there and there were some Chimoros there and regrettably, you know, there were no Americans there, except the Americans who were on the island. But they came out and polished up the monuments.

But I got there on the 8th. So, I was able to be there on the 8th and, once again, in my haunted Pattonesque view of the world, I was able to roam privately about the island a little bit, just say, “Boy, that was 50 years ago, when the first wave of bombers came over,” which we talked about before, is my favorite place and I spent the night there on Wake and turned around and I think we, I think, as best I can recall, shot on back in to Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 13 December, you hosted a retreat for the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. I suspect that the central issue of the retreat was the fit between the Force Structure review of the Navy and of the Marine Corps. Am I correct?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that would be one way of putting it. I would say that the principal theme of the meeting, number one, when Gen Gray—when Secretary Garrett became the Secretary of the Navy and then when Adm Kelso became the CNO, we on the staff at that time encouraged Gen Gray to try and meet with the Secretary and the CNO in an off site. It sounded good at the time. And he did. They went off and played golf and talked and then this was going to be a quarterly event. It turned out to be a one time event.

Well, when I got in, anyway, that was continuing. So, the Secretary, I believe it was, who proposed that we get together for an off site. We were to go somewhere else and we—the fact of the matter, I think we were going to go to—down to Norfolk or something, but their time compacted and we couldn't leave town overnight. So, we went to Quantico at the last minute, down to the FBI Academy.

But the real theme—I had been pressing the Secretary, and there will be in my papers some—a lot

of memos and things like that that were—many of them were to the Secretary and the CNO. Some of them were just to the Secretary himself, that were once again attempting to encourage him to cause the Navy a shift. For example, I talked too long here a little bit ago about reshaping the Navy and the effort that we had to that.

I would talk to the Secretary about that and after the fact, after that decision between the CNO and I was made, the Secretary realized that he had better direct this. So, he put out a memorandum directing the Marine Corps and the Navy to get together to do this.

To make a long story short, I had been—I had spoken very candidly and personally to the Secretary and what I had told him is, “Mr. Secretary, what you have got to realize as you look at your resource apportionment and at the emphasis that you place on appropriations, what you have got to realize that at this moment in history, at this period in history, the lead service in your department is the Marine Corps. It may have always been the Navy, but the Marine Corps is the lead service in terms of relevance and in terms of focus right now. We have got to get the Navy on board.”

So, Larry Garrett had been—he was a man of his own personality which was different from mine, but he had been attentive to this. At any rate, we got together for this off site and I prepared for that meeting. What I found was that once again, I will say it—it will probably appear a hundred times in here—the programmers’ noses had gotten under the tent [laughter] and that what we—I found myself suddenly beset upon by the Secretary in a very executive manner, supported by that great CNO, Frank Kelso, but supported in Frank’s way, which was never an attack. Adm Kelso was one of the most supportive CNOs of the Marine Corps that I’ve ever met.

But he had a programmatic background. So, the thesis of that meeting became closer integration of the Navy and the Marine Corps, which was fine with me when we started out because I approached it on the standpoint of that is right, we have to define the fleet.

We have got to, you know, come together and shift and focus on the future.

What they really were saying was—what I concluded after a couple of hours is we are not talking integration here. We are talking absorption here. So, that was probably the wake up call for the new, young Commandant, that some things never change and one of the things that never changes is the Navy’s quest for absorption of the Marine Corps.

TAC Air is probably—we talked tactical aviation. We have too many FA-18 squadrons in the

Department of the Navy. “Well, Mr. Secretary, the Marine Corps doesn’t have too many because, you see, we have done this study. We have defined close air support requirements, with force structuring, we know what our warfighting requirements are and, in fact, we have fewer squadrons than any of our studies say we need to do that.”

“Therefore, if we have got too many squadrons, they must be somewhere else besides in the Marine Corps.” That may be a very logical argument to you. It was, I thought, a very logical argument to me. It doesn’t matter. If it is Marine air and if there is too much air around, then the solution to the problem is get rid of Marine air. So, what came from that off site was the Secretary’s—was my general agreement to take a, together with the Navy, to take a closer look at how we might better integrate the capabilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps, to achieve cost savings. And implicit in that was to look at ways in which Navy and Marine Corps aviation could be better integrated.

The CNO was then and throughout the succeeding months of study and, in fact, years of focus on this, was never other than completely open and balanced. He said, “Look, I understand. We have got to reduce aviation. He said you have got to take down some squadrons, but I, too, am prepared to take down more squadrons than you take down.”

Regrettably, as the plot thickens here, or the plot sickens, as some would say, regrettably, what I came to realize that I did not realize before, that Adm Kelso conveyed to me in confidence with great frustration was that he did not have control of the Navy aviators. I was dismayed by this because while there is a Marine aviation community, it is—it may have been the case in the past, but it has never occurred to me that they were other than Marines who happened to be aviators, rather than aviators who happened to be in the Navy, a very significant difference.

So, the CNO could not get straight answers out of his Deputy CNO for Aviation. I went to a couple of meetings where LtGen Wills and I would sit there and our eyes would roll back and we would walk out of the room and I would say, “Bash, I can’t believe what I have just sat through. The CNO would ask his vice admiral how many squadrons of FA-18s do we have?”

Ten minutes later, we would have been all over the sky and I would be sitting there knowing the answer because Wills had prepped me on it and I would have listened to this vice admiral tell his boss that, “Well, some of them are structured at eight and some have twelve planes in them and we are going to restructure” and, therefore, when you came out, Kelso would

walk out of the room not knowing.

And in church, the next Sunday, we'd see each other in church, generally speaking, or down on the Mall riding our grandchildren on the merry-go-round from time to time. Some of our best conferences were held following church, but he would say to me, "I am so frustrated, I can't get a straight answer." So, as a result of that, the Marines had a very precise plan and the Navy did not and the CNO could not get his hands around where the Navy was and as a result, the impact was that we were pressed to lower the level of the water together.

And it became a very frustrating thing. But the real purpose of that then was from the Secretary's standpoint—from the Secretary's standpoint and to a lesser degree, the CNO's, "How do I get better control of the Marine Corps?" And that quest continued over the succeeding four years and arguably even to next month, when the Commandant moves himself and part of his staff into the Pentagon. Both Gen Krulak, I know, in reaching that decision, and I in support of that decision, we think the Marine Corps will be more effective in the Pentagon by being on the scene, in the halls and a presence there.

However, I can assure you that there will be—that there are other views that are there today that will say get those guys over here and we will get them under our thumb. And as one vice admiral, we are good friends, said to me when I was talking to him about how do you think we can ever resolve the differences, you know, of this wrenching of the Navy and the Marine Corps on so many issues instead of being a true team, and his answer was, "make the Commandant a three-star." So, there is still yet today a very strong bent in the Navy to get the Marines back under control. That was the thrust of this meeting.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very interesting.

On 16 December, you hosted a luncheon for LtGen Victor H. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired. Would you care to comment on your relations with the elder Gen Krulak over the years?

GEN MUNDY: Second Lieutenant Mundy, taken by his staff platoon commander, then-Capt Paul Riegert, to an Education Center Mess Night probably in about February or January of 1958, was introduced to BGen Krulak, Director of the Education Center. And the humorous tale is that as Captain Riegert said to me, "I am going to introduce you to Gen Krulak, who is directly behind you. So, turn around now and extend you hand, and as I swung around—it is a true story—I almost swatted him in the face with my hand. I did-

n't. But my hand was at such a level that when I came around, my forefinger was just about pointing directly at his face.

But I met BGen Krulak, admired his writings, admired his style. He was the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Commander when I got to Vietnam. When I was Gen Walt's aide, Gen Krulak was still at FMFPac. I was not an insider on who shall be the 24th Commandant race, but I read enough of the P-4s and I was in on enough of the traffic to know that Gen Krulak was certainly a candidate.


I always admired and respected him. I read his books. And he was the singular non-former Commandant that I went and paid my respects to when I was nominated to be the Commandant. When I passed through San Diego and I made a call on Gen Krulak to pay my respects and to ask him for any thoughts that he had and he offered them.

Through my tenure, I found it useful from time to time to consult various people. Gen Krulak was one that I consulted on several occasions, probably a couple times a year, to say "This is the way it is going, what do you think," because he still has a good feel for the Washington scene. For example, women in combat, it was he who gave me the theme that became my theme on that particular issue.

When I talked to him and said "This is what is happening on women in combat, what do you think?" and in his usually clipped way of giving you information, he said "You can impale yourself on this issue to no avail because opportunities for women are going to be expanded. You should draw the line at the point of the bayonet and that was his counsel. And I seized upon that and subsequently drew the line at the point of the bayonet.

So, it was that type of counsel. He is a good counselor and, of course, I think that probably Gen Krulak foresaw—he certainly had great ambition for his son. He had almost become the Commandant. I think history has recorded that. He almost became the Commandant and here was his youngest son, who was very clearly moving and shaking in the Marine Corps as a brigadier, subsequently as a major general, almost instant lieutenant general and I think he came quickly to realize that Chuck Krulak would be a very serious contender to be the Thirty-First Commandant.

So, he, too, probably stayed tied in with me. I would get frequent calls from Gen Krulak, just to update me on the feeling in San Diego relative to the move from El Toro to Miramar or when the base closure was being considered, when the Navy decided to close the Recruit Training Center at San Diego, you know, the impact, and his views on whether we



Gen Mundy posed with four of his predecessors during a general officer's conference on 18 December 1991. From left are Gen Mundy; Gen Robert H. Barrow; Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.; Gen Louis H. Wilson; and Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr.

should—we, the Marine Corps should move to gain the Navy's buildings and facilities and centrally locate all the recruit training there or not.

I found him to be a very wise and able counsel.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 December, evangelist Billy Graham, accompanied by the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary, called on you. Was this a last ditch effort on the Secretary's part to lead you to salvation?

GEN MUNDY: Probably so. I don't recall that Billy Graham said integration or absorption or anything else to me. [Laughter] I had met Billy Graham when he arrived at Lake Junaluska, North Carolina in a 1949 red Ford convertible as a young, fiery evangelist and I ushered him down to the auditorium that Sunday when he preached. And since he is headquartered about 35 miles from Waynesville, North Carolina, he

was somebody that I had seen. I saw him in Vietnam. But the reason for his call was simply —

BGEN SIMMONS: Would he know you by sight?

GEN MUNDY: Absolutely not. He would not—he might now, but he would not have then and did not then. I reminded him of those things. But he came to call because he was going around and—it was Christmas. It was an outreach. It was a good gesture. I don't recall the occasion that he was in town or why he was in town, but he made a point to go around and call on the Service Chiefs just to spread the good will, I guess. There was no purpose for the call, other than just the call. So, it was a very pleasant—I didn't remember that both the Secretary and the Under had come, but if it is so recorded, I am sure they were.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think he was quite close to

President Bush.

GEN MUNDY: He was. He would come in—let's see, 17 December was not—he was always here for the National Prayer Breakfast, which I was privileged to attend every year and I would see him then, but I don't—I think probably this is about the time that the White House would be hosting receptions and that they light—or the lighting of the national Christmas tree, something like that—I don't remember.

BGEN SIMMONS: A round of Christmas parties now ensued. I see no point in enumerating them all. Do you have any comments on this holiday season?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only to the—your comment, boy it must have gotten tiring to go give all those Marine Corps Birthday speeches, not nearly so tiring as a round of Christmas parties because, you know, you can only make Christmas punch in so many varieties and egg nog is egg nog.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 December, the bodies of Col William R. "Rich" Higgins and William F. Buckley, former CIA station chief in Beirut, arrived at Andrews Air Force Base. Both had been killed by their kidnappers in Lebanon; Higgins in 1989 and Buckley in 1987. Col Higgins was buried at Quantico National Cemetery. You attended. What are your recollections of the ceremony and who else attended?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we met the flight coming into Andrews. The Vice President was in attendance for that. The President was not. Vice President Quayle. And let's see, the Chairman, I don't believe, was in attendance there, but the Vice Chairman very likely, yes, it was the Vice Chairman, and the Director of the CIA, not Bill Gates—I am lost on the identity of the person here, but at any rate, the CIA Director and I went out there with a large crowd. It was a horribly cold, horribly windy day. I recall that. It is about the only time that I can recall—short of coming in Narragansett Bay on sea duty as a lieutenant—dropping the chin strap on my barracks cap to keep my cover on my head. I remember that.

But at any rate, we met them. The two of us went to the back of the plane and then followed the casket in and words were spoken and then we left and Robin Higgins, Maj Robin Higgins, of course, was present, Gen Gray, who was, of course, quite emotionally involved with Rich Higgins was there and others.

We then went down to Quantico to the extension of Arlington, Quantico National Cemetery, and had,

again, a very well-attended crowd. Secretary Garrett, as you pointed out, was there. Gen and Mrs. Powell, Colin and Alma Powell came down. I offered Colin the—I was the flag presenter at the gravesite and so on and I offered Colin the opportunity to do that.

And as was characteristic of him, he always, when it was a Marine Corps event, he deferred perhaps to the Service Chief or at least to me—I don't know about the other. So, he said, "No, this is Marine Corps. You are the Commandant." Anyway, I presented the flag and we had the firing of the volleys, very nice ceremony. It was really a day, perhaps, befitting the occasion because it was cold and gloomy and windy and chilled and just not a—I mean, there was no reason to be happy that day except that we had returned Rich Higgins to America to the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let me note in passing that on 31 December 1991, the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,933,855 of whom 193,060 were Marines.

Do you have anything else that you would like to add to this session?

GEN MUNDY: No, I think not.

BGEN SIMMONS: We will end it there.

SESSION 20

Green Letters and White Letters

Green Letters and their purpose . . . “Roles, Mission, and Structure of the Marine Corps” . . . “Performance Evaluation System” . . . “Official Visits of Foreign Commandants and Foreign Dignitaries” . . . “Legal Restrictions on Lobbying” . . . “Management of General Officer Quarters” . . . “Musical Unit Participation in Community Relations Events” . . . “Leadership” . . . “General Officer Authorizations, Frocking, Promotion and Retirement” . . . “Distinguished Guest Quarters” . . . “Refurbishment of General Officer Quarters” . . . “General Officer and SES Member Participation in Fund-Raising Events” . . . “Marine Corps Drug Abuse Policy” . . . “Utilization of Judge Advocates and Civilian Attorneys” . . . “Contacts with Representatives of Industry” . . . “Selection Board Membership: . . . “Environmental Law Compliance” . . . “Visits by General Officers to the Washington Area” . . . “Logistic Discipline” . . . White Letter series.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last two sessions we have covered in a generally chronological fashion your first six months as Commandant. In today's session we will examine in some detail a specific action that you took almost immediately upon becoming Commandant, that is your review and use of "Green Letters." For the benefit of future readers of this interview, "Green Letters," so-called because they are printed on green paper, are a traditional device used by Commandants of the Marine Corps to communicate in a personal and sometimes confidential way with the general officers and Senior Executive Service members.

We will examine a similar file known as "White Letters." These Letters, broader in distribution, go to all general officers, all commanding officers and all officers-in-charge. We have compiled notebooks of all your Green Letters and White Letters and these notebooks will be with your Personal Papers Collection. Therefore, we will not repeat much of the substance of the Letters, but rather, I will ask you why you thought the subject important enough to issue a Green or White Letter. In many cases, I am sure the impetus did not come from you personally but from one of your principal staff officers.

The file of Green Letters is maintained by the Special Projects Division, at that time headed by Col Al Ponnwitz. On 5 August 1991 you completed your review of the extant Green Letters. Green Letter 1-91, you list those Green Letters which would stay in effect. I will ask you in turn why you consider these

Letters to be of such importance that they should stay in effect.

The purpose of the first Letter you retained, 1-56 is obvious. This is the Letter in which the 21st Commandant, Gen Randolph McCall Pate set up the Green Letter series. In this Letter Gen Pate says, "The subjects I shall discuss in my green Letters will range in importance from matters of passing interest to those which review major problem areas and the preservation of the Marine Corps as a vital and useful military force and which appraise our present position in that regard."

Is that still a valid statement of the purpose the Green Letters? Were you guided by that statement of purpose?

GEN MUNDY: I think it is still a valid reason for Green Letters. As a practical matter we have transitioned from the days when I suspect there were not as frequent gatherings of the Marine general officers as we have done over the past few years. We have a symposium annually in which, with a few exceptions, all of the generals come in. So the Commandant is able to sit collectively with his generals and not only espouse his own policies or his own thoughts but to gather from them theirs in response on a particular subject.

More recently we have moved into electronic communications and specifically this day in time the E-mail or electronic mail whereby even the Commandant sits at his desk for probably an hour or

more every day responding to, answering or if he is a good enough typist, even sitting there and typing his own thoughts and policies. It is very easy with the selection of a key and the touch on that key to electronically send that throughout the Marine Corps to whatever addressees you want to receive it.

So, as a practical matter it may be that Green Letters are a little bit of yesteryear in terms of the technical utility, but as a means of communicating policy or conveying emphasis on a particular subject that the Commandant or that the principal staff feels needs to be emphasized at a given time, it still serves, I believe, a very useful purpose. In that context, yes, I did try and use Green Letters in that general sense.

You mentioned that, you know, I had as of August, 1991, I had had those reviewed. It should be noted that from time to time the letters that are in the file, both Green and White Letters, come up for review and that is to say that not only the Commandant himself, as I did, I sat down and read the entire file and selected those that I thought were most useful. Some of them, if they had been prepared by the staff, I saw the need for some upgrade or revision, so indeed, some of the Green Letters that are signed "Mundy" and put out by me were, in fact, updates of previous Green Letter subjects at least that had been put forth by other Commandants that I saw the need to put renewed and more current emphasis on. So, that is an overview of Green Letters.

BGEN SIMMONS: The second letter you kept in effect was Number 1-80 dated 7 January 1980. Subject: Roles, Mission and Structure of the Marine Corps. Signed by Gen Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Why did this letter continue to be important?

GEN MUNDY: Some of them are enduring and it makes no difference who signs them. The fact is that the Commandant puts out something that is, I believe in this particular case, and in others, a very significant policy. As I read through that particular letter, I must admit to having had some participation back in the days when I was a colonel in the Plans Division in the Headquarters, even though this one was put out after the fact. But, I was very sensitive to the need to record and to promulgate throughout the Marine Corps the basis for the Corps, our role and law, our structure and law which is unique to the Marine Corps. That is the structure and size of the Marine Corps. But to ensure that all of us understood that the Marine Corps exists because of a very specific purpose given it by the Congress over time and unless we

continue to understand that, it will very easily be swept aside by those who do not. Not those who are enemies of the Marine Corps, but those who simply wonder why you have four air forces or two land armies or all of those types of recurring questions that come up that there is an answer for, but that Marines must always be the articulators of.

So Gen Barrow had put down our purpose, if you will, our roles, missions and structure, about as good as anyone could and it is an enduring statement of policy that I believe needed to be continued.

BGEN SIMMONS: The third letter you left in effect was Number 8-80, dated 12 November 1980, and again signed by Gen Barrow. The subject was "Performance Evaluation System." Gen Barrow addresses several endemic problems in our performance evaluation system. Will you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I thought that the points covered and the policies espoused therein again are of an enduring nature. We have never been quite satisfied in the Marine Corps with the way we write fitness reports. We probably find more fault with ourselves on this issue than is really due because in fact our personal evaluation system, our fitness reports as it were, is a pretty good system in comparison of any other that I have personal knowledge of or that I think we have studied institutionally, and I think maybe we can talk more about that later.

But, the point at that particular time was that the fitness report system had become a matter of concern generally within the officer corps of the Marine Corps. I know that. There was a feeling that we were inflated. We always are inflated and every effort to deflate the system has maybe worked for a couple of years and then we find ourselves creeping right back up in our estimate of Marines. But in this particular case, I believe Gen Barrow's concern flowed from what eventually, as he commented in that letter, flowed into a pretty expansive study of our reporting system. And it was that a number of reports were being reviewed by the Board for the Correction of Naval Records and were being eliminated from an individual's record because the reviewing officer had not paid sufficient attention.

It is very easy in a fitness report, as we know, to damn a person with faint praise or to make subtle remarks which in effect cause that report to be what we term a marginal report without it being categorized as an adverse report, which by our directive at that time had to be referred to the individual. So what would happen is, the reports would go in. The indi-

vidual would be passed over for promotion or something like that. It would be referred to the BCNR. The BCNR would come back and say, "These types of comments are, in effect, adverse to the individual and therefore we will throw that report out." This just caused a great deal of turmoil in the Marine Corps.

So Gen Barrow sought to get control of that by reinforcing the responsibility of the reviewing officers to ensure that reports were fair, and that if they needed to be referred to the individual Marine, they would be. Second, reports were late. Fitness reports were oftentimes submitted too late to reach a selection board in time for that board to consider them and there was just a need for tightening up our fitness report system. So, that was Gen Barrow's intent and the points that he made relative to the responsibility of not only the reporting seniors but the reviewing officers, of marginal reports, inflation and so on, were good and are enduring and so I saw fit to leave that one in as a statement of policy concerning fitness reports.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would guess the issue of Green Letters and White Letters had sort of a pulsing effect. It brings attention back to and then probably that attention kind of slackens off.

GEN MUNDY: It does and there are several that we will talk about later in this session perhaps in which when the question is asked, why did you do that, it is simply a means of refocusing attention or heating up a little bit the attention to detail.

BGEN SIMMONS: The fourth letter is again a Gen Barrow Letter. It is Number 1-81 and the subject is "Official Visits of Foreign Commandants and Foreign Dignitaries." In it Gen Barrow stresses that such visits should emphasize professional and informative matters rather than social and recreational activities. Would you comment on that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, when you have a foreign or official visitor of any sort to come as a guest of the Marine Corps, there needs to be a balance of all of those elements. You do need to have a warm and genuine social approach and you need for them, if they come from another country, part of their education is being able to see parts of our country and all of that is not necessarily included on the Marine Corps base.

But I think that Gen Barrow felt that we had drifted perhaps too far into the former category whereby visiting Commandants or officials from other countries would come and in effect it would be a sight-see-

ing tour for a few days perhaps topped off by a parade at the Marine Barracks, just a social venue as opposed to educating them on the Marine Corps and letting them get a little bit of hands-on time.

I am not personally aware, I could not cite you instances of that occurring but I thought that it, too, served well to remind us that when the Commandant sends a foreign visitor off to some base that there should be more to it than just a reception in his honor, a trip to Disneyland, some shopping in Los Angeles and then catch the airplane and head back. During my watch this was not a problem, and perhaps because the Green Letter cited the need to be attentive to it. But we got a lot of mileage out of them in the field and involved with Marine activities.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you notice in this morning's paper that President Clinton kept your friend, King Harold of Norway, waiting at the White House unattended?

GEN MUNDY: I saw it on last evening's news and I do not know the details of that. But those are the type that there will be a lot of breathing through teeth in the protocol office I imagine.

BGEN SIMMONS: Obviously, you found much of the guidance promulgated by Gen Barrow still pertinent. Green Letter 1-83, dated 2 March 1983, has as its subject, "Legal Restrictions on Lobbying." It gets into the nature of testifying before Congressional committees and other thin lines that must be walked. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: I think probably the best characterization of the intent of that letter, whatever the words, lie in the thin line that must be walked, as you just commented. The fact is that a Service Chief's, and thereby his lieutenants, his generals or his officers, function in recruiting, training, organizing and equipping the service that he is affiliated with requires that we raise the money, if you will, from the Congress to be able to do that. As is often the case, the Congress is focused on programs — a new airplane, a ship, a new weapons system of some sort — and it is necessary for the Service Chief to go and represent that to a wide body, generally in the Congress, an individual cause.

But I think what I understood from this particular promulgation is that maybe we had slipped too far into lining up contractors or people in the private sector who have an interest in this program going forth and to colluding, if you will, with them. I do not think

there is anything necessarily illegal about much of what is done but maybe getting together with an aircraft manufacturer and suggesting that he might bring a little pressure to bear, you know, on a particular congressman or in a particular quarter to get the job done.

So it is a fine line that is walked by the military in Washington. On the one hand, if we do not represent the program and represent it to those who will fund it, then the chances are it is not going to come about or come about in a way that we would want it to occur as a program. On the other hand, we are prohibited by law from lobbying and so it is a fine line to tread.

I would just say as an aside, and this leaps forward a little bit although it was ongoing at the time, that even though a Commandant must put out policy guidance like this and it is sincere when it is promulgated, the fact is that the classic example of the Marine Corps maneuvering — I will use that term since it is a little more feeling than lobbying, but in effect lobbying — is the success of the V-22 aircraft. It is something the Marines believed strongly in, as did the Congress. We were shut down by the Administration who had made a decision to cancel it and the Marines had to continue to, in effect, lobby or maneuver to keep that program alive even contrary to the explicit direction of the then-in-power civilian authorities.

BGEN SIMMONS: Green Letter Number, 2-85 dated 26 April 1985, and signed by the 28th Commandant, Gen P.X. Kelley again addressed "Performance Evaluation." In general it seems to sum up the extensive review of our reporting system undertaken by LtGen Bill Maloney who was then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower. This relates to the previous Green Letter, 8-80, Gen Barrow's letter and you have already commented in some detail on that. Do you have anything to add with respect to 2-85?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only that Gen Barrow mentioned in the earlier Green Letter that he was going to conduct an extensive review and this was the results of that. It, in effect, went out and gave the guidance that had come forth from the review. I was privileged, not in 1985, but indeed in 1982 to 1984 to be up in the Manpower Department. That is when that study was going on. I was in Personnel Procurement but the generals in the department generally met with LtGen Maloney to oversee the study as it went along, so I was very close to that study if not involved in the actual conduct of the study.

And I think the points that were put forth were very reflective of the earlier concerns about the involvement of the reviewing officer, about the, you know,

we did a lot of things like doing away with fitness reports on general officers. Now you have a letter instead of a fitness report. A fitness report rating a general excellent in initiative is not necessarily, you know, of great use to the Commandant. The man has become a member of the Board of Directors, if you will, and the Commandant probably knows pretty well how he is doing. So a letter summary by his reporting senior once a year, instead of every six months, was certainly sufficient.

But I believe that that study was about the best we have had, and again, it reflected that with some minor changes in the fitness report form, for example, after we had looked broadly across corporate America, had looked into the other Services and so on, what it revealed was that the Marine Corps personnel evaluation system is a pretty good one so long as we apply it with due diligence, if you will, by not just the reporting senior but indeed by the reviewing officer, you know, to ensure that the reports are accomplished and the counseling associated with the reports. We have a good system and this tweaked it up a bit.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, Letter Number 3-88, issued on 10 August 1988 signed by the 29th Commandant, Gen Al Gray, addresses another continuing problem, or what seems to be a continuing problem, "Management of General Officer's Quarters. Will you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Gen Gray's focus, which again I believed worth continuing, was that in the management of general officer's quarters which are overseen differently and indeed are funded differently from the management of ordinary quarters, if you will, in the Marine Corps, there are things you can do. There are restrictions on the amount of money that can be spent annually on general officer's quarters that is not explicitly applied to quarters for sergeants or captains or colonels in the Marine Corps, so it bears some attention. Number two is the fact that that subject occasionally draws attention from the Congress because some Service or other or perhaps in general all of the Services will occasionally begin to be not as frugal and will be somewhat lavish in the appointments and in the work done on and around general officer quarters.

What he said was, be frugal. Have a sound long-range plan. This in turn would prevent the, you know, when you change the quarters every two years you have a new occupant who comes in who suddenly wants to do something extraordinary, you know, plant red roses instead of yellow roses around the house.

Well, that is expensive to the government. So his point was, if we had a plan laid out for the quarters for an enduring period, then that plan should be the blueprint by which we maintain the quarters whoever they are.

He directed a very good thing and that is that a house book be maintained which would indicate what had been done to the quarters and would also be available to the new occupant to look for. And one of the final things that he did in that that I really thought was a superb initiative was to put emphasis on the fact that the officer moving out of the quarters should bear the weight of allowing that time for the quarters to be prepared for his successor to move into because as we all know, when you are the man going out you are essentially eating a lot of dinners and going to a lot of farewell parties and you could afford to move your things out. The new guy coming in needs to be able to arrive, to move into his house, to get started and to move on. So that was something that I took to heart and certainly have always followed in my successive moves out of quarters and I thought it was a very good policy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 4-88 is another Gen Gray letter. Issued on 12 September 1988, its subject is "Musical Unit Participation in Community Relations Events." Now why should this be a problem?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it arose as a problem, if you read that letter, because we had become a little bit lax in meeting our commitments. Gen Gray cited them there, a couple of instances in which Marine Corps musical units had been approved for participation in an event, at the last minute it had rained and so as not to ruin uniforms, the band had canceled out. This is very disruptive, and I am sure that what occurred from that is that the Commandant probably got a lot of Congressional heat because in many cases these were events that were arranged by a Congressman and when we bail out at the last minute and leave a big hole we probably took a lot of heat.

So what Gen Gray said is, "If you make the commitment, meet the commitment and if the problem is that you do not want to ruin your dress blue uniform, then put on your utilities and march in them but meet the commitment." So, it is one of those, you know, I thought enduring reminders to the field commanders that if the Marine Corps commits, it is bigger impact than simply a local parade. It can have reverberations all the way up the chain and indeed on the reliability of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Every civic event and every veterans event wants a Marine band and on the one hand they seem to be just as satisfied if they have a field band as the Marine band. It is a Marine band.

On the other hand, there are a lot of hurt feelings out there at such and such post, or the Marine Corps League, or the 1st Marine Division Association. They cannot understand why they cannot have a Marine band for their meeting. Congressman so-and-so cannot understand why he cannot have a Marine band. The few bands that we have and the cost of moving them around. This is a real problem.

GEN MUNDY: It is. It is one of the reasons that as we went through the earlier Force Structure Analyses, back, for example, as we have spoken in earlier sessions, to the one that was done early on Gen Gray's watch, the youngsters doing that study down at Quantico would consistently come up with a decision to strike out a number of bands. We would take out the band here. We would take out the band there. And you would thus save 40 manpower spaces.

But my philosophy, which I hope was clearly understood, and I think it was by — it certainly was by the man in command whoever he was at the time gets back to exactly what you say. There is a dramatic difference in Marine bands and anybody else's bands. There is no other service band of any type — "Pershing's Own" here in Washington is a wonderful big, large Army band but if you compare it with the Marine band at Albany, America will always vote for the Marine band in Albany. They are better. We produce the best marchers and musicians anywhere in the world, similar indeed to our Royal cousins over in the UK. The Marine bands in the United Kingdom are the bands of note. Maybe it is the color of the uniform but it is more than that. It is the swagger and the pride and the musical ability.

The other point that you make that I believe is a good one is, yes, there is great frustration from time to time among the Marine Corps-related organizations, the Marine Corps League would be a very great example, as to why it is that the band can be sent for the Navy League Council in St. Louis but we cannot get it for a Marine Corps League meeting somewhere in some small town. The answer lies purely in public relations. Marines recruit based on the performance of our bands. We sustain the Marine Corps. The image of the Corps to the public, to the American citizen, is manifested by the performance of a Marine band. And, of course, all of our bandsmen look like Marines.

I was in St. Louis not too long ago and someone

said it to me better than I could have said it. This is an event which cycles around and each Service is represented each year so you go through about a four- or five-year cycle with the Coast Guard in there. But this person came up to me — this was the Marine Corps year; I was the guest of honor and speaking and the Marine band, which happened to be from Albany, was there — and this lady came up to me and said, “You know,” she said, “the very significant difference is that when I see a band from another Service I say, ‘Oh, there is a trombone player or a tuba player or a bandsman and he or she is in the Air Force.’ And the Marine Corps, when your band comes, I say, ‘Oh, there are some Marines and they play instruments.’”

So the image that the band creates through their looks — again, there are no moustaches, there is no long hair, there is no big belly hanging over the belt of the uniform — the impression is very clearly, these Marines could at a moment’s notice lay down their clarinet or their trumpet or their trombone, pick up a rifle and go into combat. So it makes an enormous impact around the country, the way that our bands represent us.

BGEN SIMMONS: I concur. Green Letter Number 1-90, another Gen Gray letter, issued on 12 February 1990 addresses, “General Officer Travel.” This seems to be a continuing problem and sometimes a headline maker. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is probably less a problem than it is a, as you say, a headline maker. It is a very convenient thing to focus on on a dull day in the press and that is that some general has flown in an airplane somewhere that, of course, with the Freedom of Information when they ask “How much does it cost to operate that airplane” you come up with some enormous figure that it is \$65,000 because we amortize the cost of the airplane, we amortize the crew’s salaries, we cost the fuel and all of that sort of thing. So it is a matter of sensation, as opposed to the more practical aspect that we have the airplane, it is there for an explicit purpose and the fact that it is available to fly a general somewhere is, you know, the cost of the airplane is going to be there whether he flies in it or not.

The other side of that is that from time to time as we have flown wives with the general officers this occasionally comes under scrutiny. “Why did Gen So-and-So get to take his wife along on a trip?” And no matter how you can rationalize that as being her part in representing the Marine Corps as a team at a ball, as opposed to going stag you take your wife along, that is good for the purpose for which you

went. But it does make the news.

Nonetheless, it is a very easy thing to abuse and if we simply lose that authority to the Marine generals without question we would find it abused very quickly, not so much by intent as just by a lack of awareness that a general and his wife getting off an airplane someplace does bring attention and that it can reflect very adversely.

That, coupled with the fact that the Department of Defense frequently, because more, far greater numbers than the military users, our civilian authorities who come from the corporate world who are used to getting on a jet, nobody asks questions, you can fly it anywhere you want; come into government, get on a Marine Corps or a government aircraft and flies off and suddenly you are hounded by the press and the impact is that suddenly some Executive Branch policy comes out which says that executives should not do that and it rebounds on down to general officers. So it more ordinarily is a problem generated by non-uniform abuse than it is by uniformed abuse.

BGEN SIMMONS: A bit earlier in that discussion you used the word “awareness.” General officers come and go. The shelf life of a general officer is about six years. But these problem areas or pitfalls are sort of endemic. They continue; quarters, travel, et cetera. Is there a finite program to indoctrinate newly promoted general officers in these pitfalls and how to avoid them?

GEN MUNDY: There is and that began, I frankly do not know when it began, but it has been ongoing for some years and it is called the BGSOC which is the BGen Selectee Orientation Course that is held for a week here in Washington usually in the spring of the year, about March or April, for newly selected or newly promoted general officers and their wives. Because when you become a general, you now have a car and a driver assigned usually if you are in command. You move into general’s quarters. Brigadiers usually do not get enlisted aides but you get aides.

The impression is that you must now live a little bit differently and must, you know, your house should be finer, you have more entitlements. And it simply is very easy, particularly for general officer wives who have viewed other generals, usually senior general officers, to presume that now I am supposed to act in a certain way. Which is to say, those draperies do not meet the qualifications of a general officer’s home to me. Therefore, I am going to throw them out and buy new ones because I am a general’s wife and I can say so.

You have to guard against that because we can throw out \$4,000 to \$5,000 worth of draperies that were only put in couple years earlier. We can talk more about that in just a minute. But I think that, yes, you are treated differently. Yes, it is very easy to assume perks.

And the third point is that generals, it would be far easier for a colonel to abuse anything, including even the use of an airplane, it would be far easier for him to do that. He would not make the spotlight nearly as quickly as will a general or an admiral simply because the press loves to shoot at generals and admirals.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 2-91, issued on 5 August 1991, is your own first substantive letter. It seems to have been drafted by the Judge Advocate. The subject is "Leadership," but it addresses misconduct, operational safety, suicides, dependents, and retirees. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I wanted to address that collection of areas in which we were experiencing some problems. We had just come out of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We will get more into that in the logistics matters, perhaps, as we discuss these letters. We were a little bit lax. I suspect that in any quote, wartime, unquote, drawdown period that we tend to slack off a bit. We have gotten used to tearing up our equipment in the field. We have gotten used to the relative lack of accountability that occurs in a battle-field area as opposed to around a base.

We were experiencing, I thought, whether it was caused by the trauma of the conflict or the times, whatever it was, we were seeing increases in spousal and child abuse. We were just seeing a number of areas, suicides, the complaints of dependents, the griping of retirees and so on, a number of areas that we needed to pay attention to. I knew of no better way to encapsulate that than to try and put it under the mantle of leadership. That is, leadership not just of the unit that you are leading at the time, but indeed expanding that on out into an awareness of the family stresses, of the retiree stresses, of our discipline in a great many areas. So I chose to use the term leadership as opposed to problems that we must address or some negative term like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 3-91, issued on 12 August 1991, is another of your early Green Letters. The subject is "General Officer Authorizations, Frocking, Promotion and Retirement," and in it you set forth your philosophy on these points. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: This is one that I worked at myself extensively. I personally wrote this one as I did from time to time — not all of these, but without very much staff support — and it derived from a couple of things. One, when I was nominated to be the Commandant and received in my hands the task of slating or assigning the general officers of the Corps, there is far more to it than simply putting round pegs into round holes at that moment in time. You have to look ahead. And what I came quickly to realize was that I had to look ahead about eight years in order to be able to maneuver and groom the general officers into the assignments that they, one, needed to have if they were going on, and if you were not going on — and there is nothing wrong with not becoming a lieutenant general or a full general — but if your potential in the Corps was limited, then I needed to convey explicitly that, you know, with greatest affection and respect you needed to plan to retire from the Corps so that we could move others into the positions that would enable them to go on, or give them the opportunities that you had had. As you mentioned, five, six years or so is about the ordinary course.

But by law, general officers are entitled to stay until they have achieved some combination of five years in grade and thirty-five years service. So this means that a general officer, if promoted early or whatever the circumstances might be, can continue to stay for up to five years as either a one-star officer or as a two-star officer.

In the Marine Corps that is a problem because we are limited on being able to bring up colonels that are standing around waiting to be promoted. We are limited on the assignment ability because we have come more and more in the external assignments as well as in internal assignments to requirements that an officer will not have failed a selection. For example, if we are going to put an officer on the Joint Staff or in any of the Unified Commands, you would never be able to send a brigadier general who had failed selection to major general. The CINC or the Chairman would simply say, no, send me another nomination. So we really constrained ourselves.

The more human point was that at the time I began to realize that and began working the slate I had to go to some of the very best friends that I had had over a career in the Marine Corps who were then major generals or who were very senior, four years in grade or so brigadiers to say I need you to step aside so we can get the general officer population moving. And while they did and while I think for any Commandant they would, there was no tension between us, but it is a very uncomfortable feeling. And for them, in com-

passion for them, I spoke to very fine men and gave them six months notice in effect that the life to which they had been dedicated for the past 30 years plus needed to change in six months. So I wanted to serve notice that you have to be prepared to retire. And what I asked them to do is if you are a major general — which really is my principal focus on this — but if you are a major general consider that three years in grade, if you have not been notified that you are going to be advanced to lieutenant general at that time, because I will notify you — at least on my watch I would be the person who would — then you should have your affairs in order to be prepared to stand down at the end of three years. And that would enable us to manage the process.

With regard to lieutenant generals, I wanted them to be aware that they should, when nominated to be a lieutenant general, they should put in their minds and in their future plan that two years later they were going to retire. In fact, in both of the cases that I just talked about, I also wanted to make it clear that there were the possibility of other assignments and many of them went on for three or four years, many of the two-stars, many of the three-stars and some of the one-stars. But I wanted them to at least be psychologically ready to go at a given time.

Finally, I wanted them to understand the unique aspects of the general officer promotion and assignment philosophy as opposed to as it had, I think, in perhaps days of old, Commandants had used various devices. You know, somebody that you did not want to stay around you gave them orders to Okinawa. You knew he would not go and therefore you would force him to retire. I did not think, I thought we should be more collegial in our associations with one another and wanted them to understand clearly where I was coming from. I gave them a guarantee that they would never get anything other than an up-front notification from me that I need for you to retire and that I hoped and expected that they would reciprocate by saying, “Right, you told me that in your Green Letter, and I am ready to go.” And it worked pretty well for me.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same date, 12 August 1991, you issued a Green Letter Number 4-91, the subject, “Distinguished Guest Quarters.” The letter seems to have originated with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics. In passing, may I say that our guest quarters seldom seemed to be up to the standards of those of the other Services. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I might take some difference of view with you on that latter point. First of all, I think the purpose of the Green Letter was much the same as the maintenance of general officer’s quarters. We had to be frugal. We had to make sure that we were not lavishly expending. But at the same time, we wanted to have first-class quarters.

With regard to the quality of the quarters, I would have to agree with you in, I think, in some earlier days, at least in my reflections. To be sure, we today have some that are better than others, but as I travel around I find a couple of things. Number one, you can never, never even approach the lavishness of staying in Air Force VIP Quarters. They are, you know, you can sink out of sight in the carpeting. The lavatory knobs are gold plated and it is just superb. It is better than anywhere, than your own quarters or better than indeed I think most of us would maintain in our own houses.

I would almost come in second and place the Marine Corps probably at this point in about second ranking to the Air Force. I think we have come far in recent years and not because of anything I did. We have evolved. We have learned how to do that. There is a warmth and a genuineness and a congeniality to Marine Corps VIP Quarters that I find. For example, in the case of Army quarters, the Army quarters are certainly big and well appointed but they are not as warm. I think maybe our Marine wives, the Commanders’ wives have gone in and have ensured we have decorative plants or flowers or things like that that give it a very warm and personal atmosphere. So, again, I would, my impression is I enjoy going off and staying in most of the Marine VIP Quarters increasingly over the past few years.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 5-91, also issued on 12 August 1991, addresses a similar subject, “Refurbishment of General Officer Quarters.” You advise your generals to follow the prudent landlord concept.

GEN MUNDY: Well, now this again was another specific initiative of mine when I came in and it relates back to some earlier points made here. We, you know, generals as a fair average, I think, would spend at the most two years and in some cases a year or even less than a year in a —

— and I was saying that it is entirely possible, and indeed in my own personal experience had been the case, whereby a set of quarters would be occupied for, let’s say, two years. A new general officer would

come in and he and/or his wife would want a whiter shade of carpet on the floors than the beige that had been put in by their predecessors or perhaps the predecessors before that. Or the wife would want a different style of drapery, would not want sheers or would want sheers at the windows and things like that.

While there is no question that that was intended to decorate the quarters and make them more appealing, at least from the perspective of that individual, what my thought was and what my experience was — to give a very good case at hand, we lived in a set of quarters for 18 months which were carpeted when we moved in because they were upgraded — before we moved in there was new carpeting put in.

We got there. When we checked out the draperies — this was one of the quarters at the Barracks which, of course, is very expensive to appoint, and the draperies had been put in there about three years before. They were not the draperies that we would have picked had we been asked to put them in but they were okay. We knew we were going to be there for two years at the most and you can adapt to that and you can live with that. But we did some other refinements to the quarters.

When the successors to us came in, carpeting that we had laid down on the porch of the quarters which had not been carpeted theretofore, which had been in there for less than a year was pulled out and another shade put in. Some of the porch furniture that we had had recovered, that had been a pass-me-down from the Commandant's House several years before that had probably been on these cushions on these chairs for, I would think, five or six years we had recovered because they had become dirty and worn, they were changed over again.

So, about \$3,000 worth of upgrades the year before was cast out and done over again. This and other examples I thought were just too lavish. I wanted the Marine Barracks, above all, which took a lot of effort to get done because those were our premier quarters, I wanted to establish the policy that if the draperies in one of the sets of quarters over there was of a certain type, when we put in the next set, they would be exactly like those. In other words that we would have one standard and everybody could cycle in to their year or two years there and enjoy it and move on.

So I set forth time frames. For example, seven years for carpeting is what we should reasonably expect of fairly good quality carpeting. And if you happen to prefer a different shade, you know, when you got there, you were just going to have to adapt to what we had on the floor. So that was the purpose, to

kind of jerk the chains away from those who would come in and recover everything or throw out the draperies or recarpet.

BGEN SIMMONS: I wonder how much of this problem can be attributed to eager and enthusiastic supply officers anxious to ingratiate themselves with the new general and the susceptibility and vulnerability of general officer's wives who suddenly find all this is available to you?

GEN MUNDY: At the Marine Barracks more than anyplace that I ever lived, that was the case. Generally, when I moved into the quarters, for example, down at Little Creek—they were Navy managed, I was aware from my predecessor. He came and told me when they had put in carpeting and the things that they had done. And when the Navy manager came over he pointed out — they had better control — he pointed out that these quarters were carpeted two years ago. They would not be due for recarpeting unless there is a bad spill or stain or burn or something like that, they would not ordinarily be recarpeted for another — at the time it was three, four, five years.

In our case, however, when you arrived at the Marine Barracks you got it nailed exactly down. Number one, though, the occupants there are three- and four-star generals. The commanding officer is a colonel. He lives amongst you. He must exist with the wives of the generals and so the call when we moved into Quarters Two the first time by the CO and the Supply Officer essentially said, "Anything we can do to make you more comfortable here, we are here to do." And as a result, someone who heard that the wrong way would be very easily able to say, "Well, I want white on white draperies. Yes, ma'am, we will be glad to do that for you."

And so we had, I thought, a good bit of waste; not clearly, intended abuse, but simply waste at the Marine Barracks that relates back explicitly to your point. A young major supply officer eager to make the general happy and eager to make the general's lady happy can very easily agree to things. And if he does not, there is always the fear by the time, you know, the general is told, I am trying to do something nice for the house and this major will not let me get it, then the general makes a call to the colonel and the colonel says, get this guy off my back. So, yes, the Marine Barracks, I think, reflects that more than any other post of the Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were quite busy in the middle of August 1991 issuing this series of Green Letters. Did most originate with your own thoughts,

perhaps that you had brought with you to the Commandancy, or were the Deputy Chiefs waiting with their pet policies for your signature?

GEN MUNDY: No, I think it had to do with probably a combination of those. One, I came in with some things, with some policies that I wanted to espouse. We have talked about a couple of those. Number two, I reviewed as a matter of priority, the existing files and directed that some of them be rewritten. And, number three, yes, there were probably two or three things that the staff routinely would want to espouse to the field.

But it was not, I think, anything of a pet project nature that we could not get Gen Gray to sign this; we will get Gen Mundy. And I do not think that was your implication there. But rather to say that as we faced changes and situations like environmental law and policy, that we issued a couple on and can talk about here later. Those were things that were emerging that we needed to address. So yes, the Deputy Chief of Staff for I&L or the Legal Advisor, Counsel of the Commandant, would come and say, I think we need to emphasize this point. But it was a combination of all of the above.

BGEN SIMMONS: Green Letter Number 6-91, issued on that busy day, 13 August, has as its subject, "General Officer and SES Member Participation in Fund-Raising Events." What was this letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that was probably one of those continuing heads-up because it is very easy for a general officer in the field or, for that matter, in Washington, to be involved in something that is not sanctioned by the Department of Defense or by the Executive Branch. You have to be very careful even though you may be very close to the Congressman that represents the district in which your base is located. You cannot send the Marine Band out or you cannot go out and be on the stage introducing him at what is purely a political rally, a fund-raiser for him. We are explicitly prevented from doing that.

So, with no intent to necessarily endorse a particular party or a particular candidate, a general officer just through friendship can very easily tread into circumstances that, you know, would put him at odds with policy. And I think as much as anything, this was another of those just heads-up. Be very careful and make sure you understand what you can do and cannot do.

BGEN SIMMONS: Green Letter Number 6-91 was

apparently drafted by the Counsel to the Commandant, that is, Peter Murphy. Would you comment on the importance of legal counsel to the Commandancy?

GEN MUNDY: Well, through our careers, with the exception perhaps of base commanders and the logistics commanders, most of us that come up, the, if you will, [through] the FMF or the non-specialized route are served by the Judge Advocates, by military lawyers. Their specialty is in matters of military law, in other words, in the application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on matters of discipline and administrative propriety in dealing with Marines.

However, when a utilities company or railroad wants to run a line through your base or wants to sue you for shooting close to where they are trying to raise a particular breed or particular type of rooster or something like that, those are matters which are civil in nature. And any base commander, or indeed the Commandant, has to be served by someone who specializes in that.

For example, the use of the Marine Corps emblem. That is a trademark of the Marine Corps and it is guarded by permission from the Marine Corps to use that. If you want to, you know, sell cigarettes or something and put a Marine in uniform with the Marine Corp emblem on it, you have to have the permission of the Marine Corps. Frequently that does not occur and so an ad will appear which is not representative of the Marine Corps and we need to take that on in a legal fashion.

The Counsel to the Commandant, who is a civilian, Senior Executive Service Member, Peter Murphy at the present time, for the past few years, will provide that service. He has a network at each of the bases and major installations around the Corps, again, counsels, most of them civilians, some uniformed, that work for him in these matters of so to speak, non-military law. And then as a practical matter, the Commandant, because of the intricacies of treading the fine line of what you can do in, you know, with regard to the Congress, what you can do in attendance at affairs of a wide variety, you need some counsel that can advise you on this and that also is the function of the Counsel to the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is the Counsel to the Commandant responsible to the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy as well as to the Commandant?

GEN MUNDY: He is. And of course, the General

Counsel, who in my view is exactly the same as the Counsel to the Commandant, i.e., someone who can advise on matters that are normally outside of the military, pure military law side of the house, the General Counsel of the Navy has become remarkably during the current Secretary's tenure, dramatically increased in involvement in matters that in my judgement extend far beyond what the charter of that individual should be, simply because of the fact that today in our legalistic society one cannot think of some things that you can do without the advice of a lawyer that have even the most mild legal implication. You had better have a lawyer to make sure that you are consistent with whatever the state laws or the environmental laws or the constructions laws — you used to be able to go down to the county courthouse and read what it took to put a back porch on your house and decide that you would go ahead and do that because you were within the law. Now you can find that if you have dug a foot too low you may have gotten into the aquifer which runs through that land which, you know, will cause you some grief legally.

So, I think that the civilian counsels have spread too far in their impact on the decisions made by our appointed civilian authorities in matters that should be explicitly military in jurisdiction.

BGEN SIMMONS: Again on 15 August you issued Green Letter Number 7-91, "Marine Corps Drug Abuse Policy." In it you state your policy as being clear cut. "The Marine Corps does not tolerate the use of illegal drugs." Now recently, very recently, there has been a spate of negative media mention that the Marine Corps is not as drug-free as it thinks it is. How successful have we been?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think we have been, we as one of the military institutions, we have been probably more successful than has society-at-large. If one considers that all be the best training we can give young people and the best efforts we can make at making them better members of society, we nonetheless are an element of society and Marines who serve on a military base during the daytime or are gone for six months from that base, wherever they may be, they still, at night, on the weekends, are out with that broad element of society. They still watch television. They are normal human beings. And so, we have to expect that until our society is absolutely drug-free that probably the Marine Corps is never going to be either.

I think that drugs, Gen Barrow, of course, back about 1979 or maybe 19 — I think later than that, 1980, 1981, in that time frame, came out with, recog-

nizing that we had a drug problem and stating the Marine Corps will not tolerate drugs. Each Commandant has reiterated that and indeed, we continue the programs to deal with drug offenders, with not recruiting people who have used drugs, once you have committed a drug offense, with processing your discharge and that sort of thing. We are not drug-free but we probably are as or more drug-free than any comparable element of society with the same age and organizational structure that a, you know, a service institution would have. I feel that we have been successful. We have not been absolutely victorious but we certainly have been successful over the past 15 years.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next of these 15 August letters seems to have been drafted by the Judge Advocate. We mentioned that Peter Murphy was your Counsel. Who was his opposite number, the Staff Judge Advocate?

GEN MUNDY: It was BGen Jerry Miller when I became the Commandant, a very fine officer. An infantryman turned aviator turned lawyer. That seems to be of greater predominance in the Marine Corps than the other services whereby officers who come into the Corps serve first as a generalist, if you will, before realizing that they want to leave it to find a law program or that somehow or other they get their degree in law and then stay around as a judge advocate. That gives us, I think, a very sensible perspective oftentimes on the law that is a strength of Marine Corps judge advocates because they knew what it was to have been a platoon commander or to have been a squadron officer. They understood troop behavior. They understood, if you will, life in the field, life on liberty, a little bit more than the purist who comes in straight from a law school somewhere who is never exposed to that but goes right into the trial or defense business without the experience of serving first with the troops.

So, Jerry Miller brought a tremendous balance and will go down in my judgement as one of the absolute best that we have had to serve as Judge Advocate General or the Staff Judge Advocate of the Marine Corps, not the Judge Advocate General — pull that out — but the SJA.

BGEN SIMMONS: However, don't we offer rather constricted career opportunity for our lawyers? They do get some very interesting situations as staff judge advocates and military judges, but here we have just this one, one-star Staff Judge Advocate who serves for

what, two years, and then he is gone. That does not seem to be much of a career opportunity to me.

GEN MUNDY: Well, whether it is for the individual or not, the fact is it is a loss within the Department of the Navy. History, and you probably — I hope you would validate this — would reflect that the first Judge Advocate General in the Navy was a Marine officer but one of the things that frustrated me greatly in Jerry Miller's case — there were cases before that and there may be again — is that as an example, at the time BGen Jerry Miller, who had been selected by a board of Marine officers, had served for three years or was approaching the end of three year's service, would have under ordinary circumstances been eligible for consideration for selection to major general. And my own personal view, though I do not comprise the only opinion on selection boards, is that had Jerry Miller gone up for selection for two stars he would have been selected.

But at the same time that Jerry was reaching that particular point in his career, the Navy had, because of Tailhook and some other factors, had lost its judge advocate generals, there being two of them, a JAG and a deputy JAG. Those officers are ordinarily officers who the Secretary reaches down himself personally, there is no selection board, but that the Secretary on advice of the CNO or others will go down to captains serving in the Judge Advocate General Corps in the Navy, pick one that he wants to be his JAG, if you will. That man goes immediately from the eagles of a captain in the law profession to a rear admiral two-star, upper half in the naval service.

At the same time that that process was taking place, here is a three-year experienced Marine brigadier general who could have very easily been promoted to two stars legitimately — and I say legitimately in the sense of my perspective and that of others — moved over. He was the senior, you know, naval judge advocate officer on active duty at that point but that gets back again to the all caps, NAVY, lower caps, usmc, relationships in our department whereby the Navy would simply, and did when I made the thrust with first Secretary O'Keefe to move Jerry Miller over to let him be the JAG, and subsequently after O'Keefe had left with the incumbent secretary to move Miller in. The Navy simply went "Hog" i.e., wild, you know, in the idea that a Marine would become the Judge Advocate General. And so we do lose a very talented officer of tremendous potential only because he is a Marine officer as opposed to selection of a lesser experienced officer because he is a Navy officer.

BGEN SIMMONS: And yet as you say, the first Judge Advocate General of the Navy was indeed a Marine, and for the benefit of future readers of this interview, that was Col Remey and he served for a long number of years in the latter part of the 19th century. And there was a long tradition going up to World War II and beyond where, you might have experienced this, too, where the Marine detachment commander on board ship was regarded as the captain's legal officer, handled deck courts and all the rest of it.

GEN MUNDY: Exactly. It was that way when I was on sea duty in the 1960s. And the feeling again at that time, or our perception was that the Marine officer was viewed more as a generalist than as an engineering duty officer or a deck division officer who did not do anything but explicit functions aboard ship.

And so, I think that this will, we will see some shift in this but we can discuss later on in our subsequent interviews my feeling that the Marine Corps is indeed gaining increasingly, steadily equality with the Navy. But we still have a ways to go. And this is one of those areas. There is no reason whatsoever but that the Staff Judge Advocate of the Marine Corps should be considered right along with any officer serving in the Navy to be the Judge Advocate General.

BGEN SIMMONS: The present Staff Judge Advocate is BGen Mike Wholley. He was the immediate successor to Jerry Miller?

GEN MUNDY: He was.

BGEN SIMMONS: And a very active Staff Judge Advocate.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 8-91 has as its subject the "Utilization of Judge Advocates and Civilian Attorneys." We live, as you mentioned, in an increasingly legalistic world. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think I did perhaps just a moment ago in saying that almost anything that we do as a matter of policy or procedure in the Corps today, even to include matters operational in nature, need to have the focus of a lawyer because we, now as we have entered this era where the scrutiny is much greater on military operations than it was in the past, you generally, you know, took reports from the front and accepted them and whatever judgement the general or the admiral had made, you know, to the broad

American public was, you put him out there to make those decisions and he made them and so you accepted them. And he was a hero or maybe he was not as heroic as some others. But nowadays in the framework in which we work, even the rules of engagement, the rules under which a rifleman can fire his weapon oftentimes in a combat situation, are governed by international rules which must be, you know, overseen, interpreted and espoused by a keen legal mind. So the Staff Judge Advocate to any commander, be he a base commander or be he an operational commander, has grown steadily in recent years.

This particular letter that you made mention to, the utilization of judge advocates, was simply to, once again to express to commanders, use your judge advocates because of this very fact that I was just citing, just about anything you do out there is going to have some legal implication. So if you have a staff meeting, make sure and include your judge advocate along with you.

And also, I think we talked about the broader use because this again was driven by Jerry Miller who, as I mentioned, was a product of both the infantry, the aviation and the legal side. He wanted, as had his predecessors, I think, he wanted to expand the employment of judge advocates to make them a Marine officer who was also a lawyer as opposed to just a lawyer who also looked like a Marine officer. As a matter of fact, we have the commanding officer of the Marine Barracks, as we would term it, or the Marine Corps Security Forces in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba right now, the colonel that was just sent down there is Col Joe Composto, who was the deputy SJA. He is a very, very fine officer and is in a command position that has nothing whatsoever explicitly to do with being a lawyer but it is rather to being a Marine colonel.

BGEN SIMMONS: Even as we sit here, a very painful case is playing itself out in Okinawa, a case where two Marines and a sailor purportedly raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl. There is a case of a crime or an alleged crime which undoubtedly will have great impact and effect on our base rights in Japan and might even lead to expulsion. You do not like to be too morbid about that, but I think this case illustrates how important these things are in today's world. Maybe you would like to comment on that.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think we have reached an era unlike previous ones in World War II — and I was not there — but as a general reflection, generals and admirals fouled up. The general, you know, attacked in the wrong direction. The admiral sailed the fleet

off to some place where he missed the enemy or something like that. And that drew news and it may have been that he was disciplined or relieved for some infraction.

But this day in time, it is the private who can affect indeed the entire policy of the nation. A private who goes into Haiti or who goes into Somalia or who goes into any one of these international circumstances that we find ourselves in, who unlocks and fires a few rounds at the wrong time will make the news the next morning, if not that evening. That news will reverberate directly into the White House. The White House will react to it.

And indeed, you know, the loss of the 18 Americans in Somalia in an engagement which has nothing to do with the valor or the professionalism of the individuals, but which has to do with again, in my judgement, a rather dumb decision which was, we are seeking to seize the leader of the country that we are in — whether we consider him to be a criminal or not, there are many people in this country who do not — and we will do that at 3:30 in the afternoon by fast roping into a crowded marketplace and snatching him out of it.

They fought back. They won, and the American public could not understand why. So that very small engagement, and again, not that 18 lives are insignificant, they certainly are not, but that very small engagement with the, again with the legal implications that flowed from it, caused the United States and indeed the United Nations to disengage and to withdraw from Somalia.

So we do have a situation in which a lawyer with a legal mind might have sat down in that circumstance and said, "but have we considered this legal aspect of that particular force employment?" I cannot draw that analogy explicitly, but I guess that's why this Green Letter that we just talked about sought to say involve your attorney because, you know, he is either going to be with you on the planning and is going to help keep you out of trouble, or he is going to have to defend you because there are so many pit holes to fall into.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 9-91, again with a 15 August date, has as its subject "Contacts with Representatives of Industry." It has about it a general aura of possible wrongdoing. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, from time to time, but explicitly as I think back on this, we had just undergone or were in the process of an investigation called ILL WIND and it had to do with some kickbacks and some other malfeasance in the acquisition practices,

some by uniformed officers, some by civilians in that capacity. In fact, we had one Marine contracting officer, as I recall, that was charged and found guilty of accepting kickbacks by a federal court.

So, this really focused more on the purity of the acquisition process as mandated in law. And that is, we now have developed a cadre of acquisition specialists who understand all of the, and are trained in, all of those finite steps that the acquisition process demands in order to ensure that the very significant layout of taxpayer resources for weapon systems is not affected by such things as we have just been talking about, by deals or kickbacks or by payoffs, payola, if you will, to individuals that will make the decisions.

Commanders are enjoined to stay away from the process. The acquisition specialists, in our case down at the Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition Command, MajGen Mutter who currently commands that organization and those before her have explicit authority under the law responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy, into which a Commandant or a field commander, if he or she should tread, can get into a lot of legal trouble and can cause a procurement process that is ongoing to be thrown out after appealed by a competitor because of unfair command influence or because the Commandant stepped in and said, "I do not care what you buy, but I sure like the looks of that missile that is painted red, white and blue." That is influence that is counter to the law. So, this in effect said stay clear of that and beware.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 10-91, also dated 15 August, has as its subject "Selection Board Membership." In it you enjoin your generals "to make their best qualified Marines available for board duty." Why was this injunction necessary?

GEN MUNDY: Over time there was continuing concern, not so much in the senior boards, the general officer boards, but when we went to the E-8 or E-9 selection boards, to the gunnery sergeant board or something like that, that commanders would send in "availables," as opposed to some of our best and brightest.

There is a logic behind that. If you are a division commander you only have so many colonels. You are struggling to meet the demands on the division. You certainly do not want to detach your G-3 and send him off on a six-week tour up in Washington on a selection board, none of us do. So you would tend instead to select an officer who was in a lesser important job or who perhaps is an officer who is waiting to retire who

has just a couple of months to do. So you elect to send him or her off for selection board duty.

What this sought to say is that we have no more important process in the Corps than selecting the next echelons of leaders and we need to put people who are conscientious about that, focused on that, and also the people who are probably going to be around when those that they select come up the way. So it was just again a reminder. I believe that my predecessors, at least one or perhaps more of them, had similar charges to the field. I know it is difficult. I know it is very tough to give up a key officer in your organization, but, you know, we want to select good NCOs or officers, so send us your best.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 11-91, also with a 15 August date, has the subject "Environmental Law Compliance." Why was this one of your major concerns?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the environmental concerns and environmental law flowing from that concern over the past few years in the nation indeed has caused, you know, a tremendous amount of expense in the private sector as well as in the public sector and most of it good; some of it, maybe a bridge too far, but most of it very good. If you think about the recycling companies that now exist, about the constraints on the types of fertilizer you can put on your yard, about the concern for oil spill cleanups and containment and that sort of thing, all of that has been increasingly in the public focus.

Military bases, because for years we have shot ammunition into the ground, we have poured oil, we have buried hazardous materials, just like the rest of America has, but the military bases are, you know, are places that are very easy — we live in a glass bowl — and they are places that it is very easy for a state or a county or a municipality to cite for infractions of now what is environmental law. In the state of California alone at one time, I recall back maybe two to three years ago when the Counsel to the Commandant got up during the General Officer's Symposium and reminded the general officers that California was turning out environmental law at the rate of, I think, several thousand pages a week of constraints that were being imposed. And therefore, practices that we had undertaken for years suddenly became illegal so you had to stop doing that.

And by newly passed environmental law, we had to go back and clean up all of the sins of our forebears, if you will. So we found ourselves digging up tanks that had been underground maybe since World War II.

We found ourselves cleaning up oil spills where motor transport lots had not had adequate security and oil or fuels had run into the ground.

And the fact is that as the law has been passed, in many cases as the environmental inspectors come around to inspect they will give you a rating and tell you this has to be cleaned up and it has to be done within a certain amount of time, two years, three years or maybe even less than that. Commanders have to understand that if we do not do that their next visit will shut down the installation.

So we have to not only budget for that and expend an enormous amount of resources that we have been over the past couple of years, and we have to be attentive because number one, a commander can be locked up or number two, the installation can be shut down. We can be told you cannot paint trucks out here at Camp Pendleton anymore because you have not met the environmental code standards.

So this was to say, get smart. And I think there was more yet to come on the subject of environmental concerns but all of us should survive I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: Number 12-91, with that ubiquitous date, 15 August, has as its subject, "Visits by General Officers to the Washington Area". Why did you consider this letter necessary?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was a repeat of one that had been issued earlier and was updated, as I mentioned earlier. It sought to do two things. Number one, to ensure that generals coming into the Washington area would have the opportunity to call on the Commandant or the Assistant Commandant. We needed to have a coordinating agency for that. And number two, as generals came to town, it is much easier for them to notify the Director of Special Projects who has that responsibility of when they will be there and what they need to accomplish and then let him coordinate a schedule of calls to see staff principals or to see the Commandant rather than having the general officer call about and make his own commitments.

The other side of that is, when say the, you know, the Commander of the Recruit Depot in San Diego is coming to town and the Chief of Staff, the Director of the Marine Corps Staff, the Assistant Commandant and the Commandant are notified, it may be that we have something that we want to use that opportunity for, that we would say, I need to see him while he is here. So, more than anything else, it was simply a matter of coordinating and gaining the most utility out of a general's visit.

BGEN SIMMONS: It takes a very good colonel to fill the billet as Director of Special Projects Division. I know that you as Commandant and every other Commandant used them very extensively. Would you care to comment on the activities of that Division role?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that was, that came into being, as I recall, about 1974, thereabouts, may have been 1973. And I think Col Roger Barnard was the first incumbent in that office. There had long been a Special Projects Office — I do not think it was a directorate, I think it was a Special Projects Office — that had been used principally to assist the Commandant, to prepare the Commandant when he was going on trips, to do trip books, to ensure that items were brought in for the Commandant to review when he went to the field, that sort of thing, and maybe more functions than that.

But it was expanded by Gen Cushman and Gen E.E. Anderson who were then the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant. I believe it was Gen Anderson who put this in. But anyway, he wanted an agency that did more than to do what I have just described. They continue to do that, however, he wanted somebody that would take care of all these disparate functions in the Headquarters for which there really was no central focus. It also became something of the Protocol Office for the Marine Corps. And the coordination of conferences, the coordination of visits by foreign dignitaries, that sort of thing. We needed a responsible agency to do that.

As a practical matter, the Director of the Special Projects Directorate has not, I believe, been one that has been seen as a, if you will, as a top-drawer colonel. In other words, the Commandant has not personally looked at that, or I did not and I am not aware that the others did, but as I came to know and appreciate the functions of the office during my time, I will tell you, it is the Protocol Office of the Marine Corps. The Commandant's aides cannot go arranging schedules for visiting dignitaries or cannot do a lot of the things that need to be done and the Special Projects Directorate does that extremely well in addition to such things as you mentioned earlier; overseeing and maintaining the Green Letters and the White Letter file. Who else in the Headquarters would do that? You would have to either expand the Commandant's staff to do it — that staff would, there would not be as much accessibility by the other staff agencies if it were explicitly held as, so to speak, the Commandant's papers. Someone has to do that. So SPD picked up a number of rather disparate functions

and has a very important function within the Headquarters, I believe.

BGEN SIMMONS: It all comes to a head with the General Officers' Symposium.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGen Simmons: After that great outpouring of Green Letters in August, you do not seem to have had a requirement for another letter until 24 December 1991 when you issued Number 13-91, "Logistics Discipline." This seems to have originated with the Inspector General. At least he seems to have been tasked with this drafting. Who was the Inspector General at this time?

GEN MUNDY: MajGen Rick Phillips.

BGEN SIMMONS: You obviously saw the lack of logistics discipline as a serious problem permeating the Corps. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: We were, of course, on the heels of Desert Shield and Desert Storm so that, again, we had used our equipment very hard. We had a lot of it broken, a lot of it in bad need of maintenance. We were replenishing the maritime prepositioning ships. We were at the same recognizing what was going to be very clearly a more austere fiscal environment. We simply were not going to be able to buy as much. We were not going to have as much money to spend. So, this was one of those, we have to pay attention and take care of our equipment.

We also had some reports from the field as we had returned our equipment. In many cases the equipment, let's say the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines had taken off for the desert had just come back in as a glob and there was no strict identification of that equipment with the unit. And so the possessors of the equipment became a little bit cavalier and, you know, we turned in a good piece of gear and we get back a piece of junk, why should I care about this?

And I saw, along with the DCS/I&L and the IG who had been out conducting those inspections, we saw continuing reports of a rather cavalier attitude with regard to the maintenance of the equipment, the responsibility for it and indeed to performing —
— I was giving some examples of the responsibility and accountability and was saying such simple things as the sort of the pay-me-now or pay-me-later context of, you know, change the oil in the vehicle, take good care of the vehicle because we are going to have it for

a while. You cannot consider that we can simply throw away tank engines and put new ones in. I think tank engines were enormously expensive, \$800,000 a copy to replace a tank engine and yet at Twentynine Palms we were burning out a high number of engines through overuse or by just maintenance abuses, not paying attention to our equipment . . . so this was one of those, again, occasional jerk-the-chain a little bit and put everybody's focus back on the fact that we have to take care of what we have.

BGEN SIMMONS: At this point we will leave the Green Letter series and move to the White Letters. As I said earlier, White Letters serve a similar purpose to Green Letters but get a broader distribution going to all general officers, all commanding officers and all officers in charge. The first White Letter that you issued was on that magic day, 15 August 1991. The number was 3-91 and the subject was "Senior Leader Seminar on Total Quality Leadership." It was apparently drafted somewhere in Manpower and Reserve Affairs and in it you report having attended a Senior Leader Seminar on Total Quality Leadership at Monterey the previous April. You enjoin the entire senior leadership to attend a similar senior leader seminar. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: TQL or Top Quality Leadership was the adoption within the Department of the Navy of the Deming Management Method. I will not go into this in great detail here except to say that it was a modern management procedure which the Japanese, principally, had adopted early on and it had to do with quality, it had to do with involvement of people at all echelons. In other words, with management getting down among the people—what we would often, and what many have over time, often categorized as fundamental Marine Corps leadership.

To be sure, we do as leaders tend to get down with our people and make sure that the troops are getting mail or getting good chow or wearing boots that are not worn out and that sort of thing. But in terms of management, a term which Marines for centuries have rejected — I am a leader, I am not a manager — very frankly, that is why we named what is called in many other quarters, top quality management, top quality leadership because it would be more appealing to Marines.

But what it sought to do is some of what we just discussed a moment ago, and that is to recognize that we were going to have to be smarter in the ways we used our resources, whether they were people or because we were going to have fewer of them or

whether they were processes or whether they were dollars or spare parts, logistics items. And that frequently there was a lance corporal down there who had a better idea how to do this and so we needed to exploit his thinking.

Gen Gray had done that superbly. When he first became Commandant he went out of his way to say that he wanted to hear from young Marines as well as the more senior Marines. And I recall that one of his first acts was some young kid at Quantico, a lance corporal or corporal came in with a good idea, wrote to the Commandant, "Here's a good idea." And Gen Gray jumped in his car, drove to Quantico and pinned a medal on the kid to send that signal throughout the Corps that the Commandant is personally interested.

Well, that was one means of involving the people, but TQL sought to, indeed to revolutionize our thinking and our management processes so that we could operate in a much more frugal environment that we were entering. It had been mandated. Gen Joe Went, I think, the Assistant Commandant before I got there had mandated that our senior leadership should go to these courses and learn what the Deming Management Method was all about. I took mine at Monterey as you have mentioned here, and as we have talked earlier, I was out there undergoing that course when I was nominated to be the Commandant. So, I was able to come back to Washington and say, see, "If you go to the TQL course they will make you the Commandant of the Marine Corps." It became a very lighthearted thing but it was a means of focusing people on the necessity for becoming aware of what we were talking about in TQL.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same date, 15 August, you issued White Letter number 4-91; subject, "Mental Strength." Again this was apparently drafted in Manpower. In this letter you relate maintaining a clear, positive public image in our recruiting practice to our professed attribute of mental strength. Please comment.

GEN MUNDY: Marines, the recruiting surveys of the times were showing us that Marines were viewed as tough, as victors on the battlefield, but generally speaking as being people who charged over bloody beaches and eventually built up enough of us to where we won the battle. There was no question as to the physical strength, the physical toughness of Marines, but we also, the reviews told us, were viewed as being dumb grunts. If you wanted to be sophisticated you wanted to go into the Air Force or you wanted to go

into the Navy or increasingly, into the Army, which of course was advertising technology and a high tech approach.

So, there was a sensing by our marketing agency, J. Walter Thompson, in coordination with the recruiters, that we needed to advertise the fact that to be a Marine you had to be not only physically tough but you had to be mentally tough as well. And so this particular campaign, which you have seen manifested in recruiting advertisements like chess which has to do with, you know, with one group of chessmen out-thinking another and winning on the battlefield. When you raise the visor of the mounted knight who finally wins on the chess board, he is a United States Marine captain. You know, something like that to convey to the young people of America that to be a Marine you have to not only be physically tough but you have to be smart, and therefore we are looking for high school graduates and for education as opposed to just football players.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next White Letter was Number 5-91, issued on 20 August 1991, and its subject was "Operational Safety." The letter enjoins all Marines to exercise their leadership skills to improve operational safety. Why did you consider this injunction necessary?

GEN MUNDY: There was tremendous focus at that time coming out of Operation Desert Storm on the friendly fire incidents. That really does not bear specifically on this particular case but it was related. We were seeing, we were being subjected to a great deal of inspection from the outside on matters like friendly fire incidents.

We had had some injuries. This was not a rampant situation at all, but again it was one of those things where we just wanted to go back out and say, remember that no exercise that we are undertaking is worth the life or the limb of any Marine. If there is a question of flying the airplane, then the pilot should say, "I cannot fly today." Or if there was a question of putting boats in the water we should not do that. Or if, you know, there was a question of exercise safety that we were pushing too far or that we were not being adherent to adequate controls on weapons and so on, that we needed to back off and stop off and think about that. So it was more of a heads-up than something caused by an endemic problem.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next White Letter is number 6-91, dated 13 November 1991, and the subject is "Command Attention to Internal Controls." This

seems to have come out of the fiscal division. Why did you consider this letter necessary?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, going back to the thoughts on accountability for equipment and gear, we had had some sting operations in which a few Marines and some civilian employees at various locations, California and down in the Carolina bases, were caught by the FBI in an explicit operation with equipment stolen right out of Marine Corps warehouses — I mean, that should have been a better accountability — but with thousands and tens of thousands of dollars worth of equipment.

We had just had an experience in our Morale, Welfare and Recreation account down at Quantico in which about a half million dollars had been embezzled from those funds by turning them over to an investment counselor who had misused the funds and had ripped us off, to put it in the vernacular.

So, the feeling that came out of the staff was that we needed to heighten commanders' attention to say, ensure that when you are responsible either for the public trust or for MWR funds which are generated as a profit within the Marine Corps, make sure that you have controls, periodic audits, that you personally put your attention on ensuring that we are not having an occurrence like we had experienced.

So this one, this White Letter, unlike say the previous one we talked about, was because of explicit incidents that had occurred that showed we were getting a little bit lax in our internal controls about monies and properties.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think we are beginning to see an overlap or an interaction between some of these subjects. There is also a parallelism to some of the Green Letters. Some of these White Letters reinforce things which have also been set forth in the Green Letters. As for example the case of the next letter.

On 24 December 1991, you issued White Letter 7-91, subject, "Equipment Accountability and Maintenance. It seems to have been drafted by the Inspector General. Are there any particular implications in this letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you are exactly right that if you go back and look at Green Letter 13-91 that was issued about that same time, the White Letter tracked and amplified to the field at large on this same subject. Now, one might ask the very logical question, why do you have to, I mean, why do you send out two letters that essentially address the same subject?

Number one is because a Green Letter will get the

attention of the general officers. A White Letter probably will get the attention but to be candid there are some of those that can pass right on through that you do not take note of. The Green Letter is mailed explicitly to me, Gen Carl Mundy and it comes from the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I read it. A White Letter comes out generally, you know, through the ordinary mail system. It may go into your staff secretary. It may go to the G-1. You may not see it or you might see it but say, "Oh, I am not really too interested in that" and kick it on out to somebody on the staff to take a look at it.

The other aspect is that a Green Letter affords you the ability to speak more specifically to a unit. You might want to highlight problems and say, we are doing this because, like in this particular case that we just talked about, we lost a half million dollars through embezzlement. That is something you might want to convey to the general officers but you might not want to convey to everyone who passes a bulletin board in a Marine Corps barracks where White Letter such-and-such is posted on the bulletin board. You might want to say it in a different fashion. So that is the reason for the tracking of a Green Letter with a White Letter which more than once was done, as you have cited.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 December you issued White Letter Number 8-91, subject, "Operation Security." The acronym for operation security is "OPSEC." What occasioned this Letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this again was an occasional heads-up. We had, a lot of these that you see were tightening us up after we had deployed to the desert. You tend to become lax when you get away from the day-to-day operations and we now go, in this case, off to war. And so this was not occasioned by any loss of operational security but it was simply, as I recall, to say, "All right, the Russians have seemed to have gone away. We just, "you know," won the war in the desert." But we have to keep in mind that operational security is still a matter that we have to be attuned to. We cannot assume that there still are not people out there listening. So this was a periodic awareness letter.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 December we have the issuance of White Letter 9-91, "Environmental Law Compliance." It seems to have been drafted by Counsel. And again, you see parallelism to the Green Letter. I do not know whether you have anything to add to that or not.

GEN MUNDY: Track Green Letter 11-91 which was on generally the same subject.

BGEN SIMMONS: December 27, 1991 was, excuse me, there was another letter, Number 10-91, on 27 December 1991 which had as its subject, "Marine Corps Uniforms." Why did you consider this letter important?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as we have discussed previously in uniforms, the Commandant needs to, from time to time, come out with or put a little emphasis on uniforms in one fashion or another. This one sought to emphasize standardization in uniforms, uniformity, and of course, appearance, as always. We tend from time to time to drift into high-water trousers. That is, eventually the Commandant has to come out and say, "I notice as I go around the Marine Corps that trousers are getting a little bit short" and then everybody goes out and starts paying attention to trouser length. Or he emphasizes "we need to," as Gen Barrow did, "We need to dress up, not down."

We had gone through an era with Gen Gray in which his emphasis on many of the things that he wanted to imbue the Corps with that needed to be done at that time, his emphasis led us to an almost complete adoption of the utility uniform as the uniform of the day. Because if you were a field Marine, if you were a warrior, if you, you know, Marines wherever you were were supposed to be ready to go into operations immediately and so commanders tend to say one means of doing this is to increase the wearing of that uniform that brings the mindset of matters operational. For example, in our schools at Quantico, even until today you will see students going to class almost every day in their utility uniform as opposed to the uniform of the day. One, it is probably more comfortable. You can wash it at home. You do not incur a dry cleaning cost. There are a lot of arguments that one can make, but we tend to slouch from time to time.

So, the other side is, and this would be my own perception, but it is virtually impossible to get a group of ten or more Marines in the same uniform at the same time on the same day. One of us will choose to wear our woolly-pully sweater. The other one will choose to wear our tanker jacket. Someone will be in the modified blue uniform because he is the career planner. Someone else is in greens because he is the admin chief. And the rest of the outfit is in utilities because they are outside today. So, you know, fore and aft caps, barracks caps, those sorts of things. I think I was attempting simply to say, "Let's standard-

ize, become uniform and pay attention to appearance," probably something that every Commandant has to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another 27 December letter is Number 11-91, "Marine Corps Retirees." In it you pick up where Gen Gray left off on the same subject two years earlier. Have we done well in making our retirees feel still a part of the Marine Corps community?

GEN MUNDY: You probably are better qualified to answer that than I am at this particular stage, but I do not know whether we have or not. I know that for some time friends of mine who retired said, "You know, the day after you retire you could have fallen off the end of the earth because you are gone and forgotten." I do not know that we would ever adequately continue to, or pay adequate attention to our retirees. But I think it has gotten better with these sorts of commitments. The Commandant goes over each year to address the Secretary of the Navy's retired — I forget what the name of it is, the organization — but it is a group of retired officers currently headed, in fact, by LtGen Jack Godfrey, Marine Corps, Retired from the West Coast. And they come together — they are petty officers and senior NCOs and retired officers — and are updated on what is going on. And it also gives them an opportunity to advance concerns that they have, medical care or treatment or the pay system or pay increases or whatever it may be, and to bring that, at least, to enter that at the Secretary of the Navy's level. And that, like many things, that tends to then filter down and so the Service Chiefs will put a modicum of attention to it.

But, as I say, I did not receive a lot of gripes from retirees. The most significant one came to me from Gen P.X. Kelley when we went into the automated pay system in Kansas City, when that was transferred from the Marine Corps to the Defense Automated Servicing System. They changed the designations. Instead of the Marine Corps preference for putting BGen or Col or something, they went strictly to the numerical pay indication. You are on 07, an 06, an 05.

But the computer initially was programmed only to receive two digits, 06, 07, 08. And of course, when you get to 010 which there are too few of, it dropped the zero at the end. So Gen P.X. Kelley sent me a note and said, "I have finally gone to the bottom." He sent me a copy of the communication he had from Kansas City that was to 01 P.X. Kelley, 2d Lieutenant Kelley. And he was rightfully offended and, of course, we go back in and there are apologies and two months later

the error is corrected and it comes out 010. So, anyway, I am not sure we will ever do all that we could do for retirees, but there is an effort.

BGEN SIMMONS: The chaplain had a White Letter ready for your signature on 27 December. The number is 12-91 and the subject is "Religious Program Ministry Objectives." Do you recall who your Staff Chaplain was at this time?

GEN MUNDY: It was Capt Don Krabbe.

BGEN SIMMONS: And why did you consider the publication of this letter advisable?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, this was a staff product, as you mentioned earlier. The Chaplain, you know, you would get this proposed letter down with a cover sheet or, indeed, in many cases the Chaplain or another staff officer would come in to see you and say, "I think we need to pump up the field a little bit and remind them a little bit of the proper use of chaplains or of lawyers," as we discussed earlier. So, this is another one of those awareness, use your chaplains properly, and here is a good program for their use. That was its purpose.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another 27 December letter is Number 13-91, subject, "Environmental Policy." It would seem to be closely linked to White Letter Number 9-91 issued the same date. Why were both letters needed?

GEN MUNDY: As I read through them here I am not sure why we could not put it into one letter. The fact is that one addressed the legal implications, that is to say as we have discussed earlier, "You are responsible and you are accountable under the law." And the other one was to say, "You know, we need to care for the environment because we now are realizing the sins against it that have been perpetrated against it by us in our past and by our perpetrators and so let's be good stewards of the lands and the properties that have been given to us," on the one hand. And the other Letter said, you know, watch out, because if you break the law you are going to get locked up. In retrospect we probably could have put it into one letter.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your first White Letter for 1992 was issued on 21 January, subject, "Command Screening." In it you report your thoughts on the results of the first Command Screening Board for colonels held in September, 1991. Was command

screening one of your initiatives?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was.

BGEN SIMMONS: And what are its pros and cons?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the background on command screening in the Marine Corps goes back more than just me coming into office as one of my initiatives. But indeed, for a number of years the Marine Corps had watched as the other Services had created command selection processes which indeed told an Army lieutenant colonel that he had been selected for command and that he would be assigned to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry or to command such-and-such a brigade or group or something like that.

The Marine Corps had never felt comfortable with that because we indeed believe that all of our officers come in and aspire to command. They all want to be leaders or they choose to be something other than a Marine because that is what we cut our teeth on. And therefore that we did not want to adopt a command selection process. We wanted to let them compete in their own right.

But what the field commanders continually fed back to the Commandant, even on Gen Gray's watch, was that we are not getting the best qualified people into command positions and that that is, from their perception, one of the reasons for the logistics accountability slack situation, for the personnel leadership. It makes no sense to assign an officer to be a battalion commander who commands a battalion very well but who is then passed over two times for colonel. There is something wrong. Either he has not done well as a battalion commander or indeed, we have not given an officer who is going to continue on to further positions of increasing responsibility the experience of being a battalion commander.

So, at any rate, when I got here I was persuaded by my own experiences, having just come from the Fleet Marine Force, and by the opinions of others; we believed that we needed to screen for command as opposed to select for command. That is to go through an eligible population of officers of a certain grade for various assignments — the first one that we ran was for colonels — into command. And to look at officers that number one, clearly had from their background and their demonstrated performance to date led effectively, commanded effectively in the Marine Corps in various types of duties. And then, using that as a basis, to select a population of officers that we would then provide to the Director of Personnel Management Division, to the monitors, if you will,

who could use this body from which to assign regimental commanders or district commanders or indeed, the recruit training regiment or base commanders about the Marine Corps. And we intended to leave that to the discretion of the monitors rather than having a board at Headquarters specifically select an officer who would be a regimental commander or a MEU commander or a district commander.

So, our first pass-through had some rough edges on it. We learned some lessons from it. But I wanted to report the results to the field and also to stem the concerns that we had instituted a command screening process which would thereby nullify the opportunity —

BGEN SIMMONS: You misspoke. You said command selection —

GEN MUNDY: Okay, I did misspeak. A command selection process as opposed to screening a broad body of officers for assignment.

You asked for the pros and cons. The pros are that as the succeeding four years have, I think, proven, and my estimate of proof is from the communications back from the commanders in the field, the proof is that we have put the best qualified officers into the positions of command. There appears to be a payoff that goes into, you know, the leadership of the organization. We appear to have lowered a number of areas of concern in the Marine Corps. You know, rates of absenteeism, crime rates are down on balance, I think, and that is attributed by many to having the best leadership we can at the battalion, at the squadron, at the group and at the regimental levels in the field.

So, that is the pro side of it. The con side of it is, I think, a con explicitly for the Marine Corps as compared with our other service counterparts. And that is to say that once again, those who choose to become Marine officers, in my experience, generally speaking — there are some exceptions, but as a general population, aspire to the ultimate fulfillment for a Marine officer and that is to command other Marines.

So, when an individual does not make the command screening list, there is a message to him or her and that is that, you know, a board of your seniors has looked over the population and does not consider you among those best qualified to lead Marines. A number of *Gazette* articles, a number of people in the retired community have cited this as something that will perhaps create two classes in the Marine Corps in the officer class, the haves and the have-nots, and that the have-nots eventually will become less enthused about being a Marine or, you know, that we are throw-

ing away some potentially fine officers by serving notice to them that they have not screened for consideration for assignment to command.

I hope that is not the case. Again the counterweight, it is the conviction across the board, at least through my last discussion with the general officers of the Corps, I found no one who did not say that we are on the right track. We are deriving such tremendous benefit.

And secondarily, we are developing a, I hate to say “class,” but I will use it with a little c, a class of officers who can compete with anyone in the joint environment. Because so many of the joint assignments this day in time have, you know, insist that an officer must have commanded or that he or she will be guaranteed to go to command after having served as the Chairman’s aide or having served one of the Secretaries. To do that, we simply have to sort out by some means or other those officers that clearly are going to be the contenders to become the more senior leaders of the Corps in the future. And command screening has sought to do that and I think is doing it fairly effectively at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: What percentage are we talking about, for instance in the case of colonels, of the population, what percentage can be found qualified for command?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there is no explicit, it has to do with the number of vacancies. We know, for example, the manpower planners or personnel managers will know that next year we can expect the recruit training regiments to turn over, for example. Those colonels have been in there, are in their second year and we are going to turn them over. So we need to select two colonels to go out to, or not select but to screen two or more colonels — usually there are at least four. There would be sort of a primary and alternate situation. That gives the monitors and indeed the commanding generals in the field some latitude in saying, “All right, we have four people that have good experience that should make them effective recruit training regiment commanders, and we will assign two of those.”

So rather than there being a specific, select a certain percentage of the eligible population, you could apply a percentage to that, but it is driven rather by the numbers of vacancies that we know are going to occur in new commanders, regimental commanders, you know, various types of commanders in the field. It is a relatively small percentage just as is the top level school selection every year.

It would be a larger percentage, I think, than the

selection percentage is, for example, to colonel which would be very, very small, looking at the overall population. Yet, that also is a factor of who is eligible to be considered at that particular time. If you have been, for example, if you have been passed for promotion you would not be eligible to be considered for command so that limits the population. So I cannot give you a specific percentage.

BGEN SIMMONS: Forgive me for getting into mechanics, but frankly, I do not understand it fully. Can a person, LtCol So-and-So or in this case, Col So-and-So, be found qualified for a number of billets or is he pegged to one billet?

GEN MUNDY: When he or she is screened by the Screening Board, they are screened generally for command. Now, because the board has just gone through their records and has looked very closely at them, the board then is further empowered — this was an add-on; we did not do this the first board or two — but now the board is further empowered to make recommendations for whether they should be assigned to the operating forces, to the supporting establishment or elsewhere. I think those are the two principal assigned areas. And even within that category, the board can identify an officer who has exceptional potential, for example, to be a district commander. He or she was a tremendous recruiting station commander, went on to serve in the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. This colonel would make an ideal candidate to be a district commander. But he also could be a regimental commander if the monitors chose to so assign.

So, implicitly if you select a supply colonel and we have a key supply billet that is coming open, that is tantamount to saying that this is the officer to assign there, but those would be in the smaller occupation fields. As a general rule the screening will be conducted, the list will come out, they will be identified for supporting establishment or operating forces and then the monitors will come up with a slate based on those officers; in other words, letting those who manage their cases take a look.

That slate will be usually, on my watch at least, will be advanced to say, the commanding general of the 2d Division. We would say, here are the colonels who have been screened and that are coming to you next year. Now, whether he chose to assign one of the colonels to command the 6th Marines or to command the SRI Group in the Expeditionary Force would be up to the commanding general. We would simply give him a body.

And then from that process would emerge the colonel slate. And of course, that slate, in turn is then briefed to the Commandant who personally approves the assignment of the colonels and to a lesser degree, the assignment of lieutenant colonels. But primarily colonels and generals are pretty well assigned by the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same day, 21 January, in White Letter 2-92, entitled "White Letter Review," you listed the effect of White Letters. We have already considered all the new letters promulgated by yourself on the list, let's go back now and consider those letters you carried over from your predecessors.

First there is Number 1-89, "Casualty Assistance Calls," signed by Gen Gray on 6 February 1989. Why did you consider its continuing importance?

GEN MUNDY: A continuing emphasis on a very, very significant matter to Marines. Marines have been credited since the Vietnam War, perhaps even before that but that is my first recollection, with providing the most, if you will, personalized casualty assistance and survivor support of any of the Services. We literally, if a Marine is killed or seriously injured, that message is delivered physically by a Marine in uniform no matter where, no matter how far out in the woods it may be. If we bury a Marine or for that matter, indeed if we bury anybody who has been in the Service, Marines will always be there with a color guard and firing detail.

So it is something that, again, consistent with the image of Marines throughout the nation, something that we feel very strongly about. And Gen Gray had articulated this very well. I saw it as a very useful matter of continuity to continue from Commandant to Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: Then there is another Gen Gray letter, Number 3-90, "Marine Corps Sports Program and National, International Sports Competition." There is a general perception that sports are no longer as important in the Marine Corps as they once were. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will give you my perception and say that in my personal view that is true. Sports, as we address sports in this letter, are probably not as important as they were at one time. At one time Marine Corps football teams took on universities around the nation and won and that was of very great importance, at least to the leaders in the Marine Corps at that time. The commanding general at Quantico

wanted to field a team, and he had all the lieutenants there to pick from, that could go out and beat any university in the country. And then commanding generals in the 3d Division or down at Camp Lejeune or elsewhere sought to do that.

We tended, I think, over time to get too carried away with professional sports, and that is with attempting to compete in the major leagues and we lost that ability. And more important is, that when we identify a group, either a single or a group of athletes, they are Marines who would otherwise be doing something in the Marine Corps other than working out and getting ready for competition every day. At the same time, in certain of the sports, particularly the international types of sports that all of the military services still compete in and internationally do so, we are Marines and we must field credible competitors.

So, on the one hand, again, the broad everybody, every commanding general has his own football team or his own winning soccer team—I think that has gone from the Corps and is of far less importance. But from the image of Marines competing effectively in the international arena, and that is what this was addressing, we have to represent the Corps credibly. So that is still emphasized and that is what this Green Letter was all about.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think time has run out for us today so I would suggest we stop here and we will finish up this session at our next get together.

SESSION 21

First Six Months of 1992

Some more White Letters . . . Travel procedures . . . Some significant speeches . . . Joint Task Force Guantanamo . . . Eliminating the Marine Expeditionary Brigade . . . Broadened opportunities for women Marines . . . A visit to London . . . Arguing for the budget . . . Adoption of the blue sweater . . . A promotion for BGen Chuck Krulak . . . More travels and speeches . . . the nation's 9 1 1 force . . . Last of the OV-10s . . . Remote piloted vehicles . . . Conducting joint operations and down-sizing the military . . . Tailhook scandal and its aftermath . . . The Barry Zorthian group . . . Parades and garden parties . . . Seven days in Europe . . . Summary of his first year as Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered your review and use of Green Letters and White Letters. In today's session we will cover the events of the first six months of 1992. But first, we have some catching up to do. We have a few unanswered questions on White Letters left over from Session XX.

Gen Gray signed Number 4-90, "Computer Viruses." Is this a cautionary letter or are computer viruses really a problem for the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: This is cautionary, or it was cautionary and I think to this day remains cautionary. We have had a couple of incidents where we have had computer viruses and the fact is that in this day and age as we have entered into the electronic mail system and have been putting a lot of our directives and so on in the computer base, and just a large reliance on the computer, if we had a virus or something that fouls up the operation of the computer it can be a very serious problem for us and it can, in effect, shut us down.

So, I think as much as anything, as we have evolved into knowing more about automated systems in general and as computers have become much more dominant that Gen Gray saw fit to put out a cautionary letter to say, "Be careful out there." We may, I do not recall specifically, we may have had an incident of that at the time. I know that on my watch there was one time where we suspected we had a virus and we had to go in and purify the system. That took several days and it really impeded operations, at least in my office, if not throughout the whole Headquarters.

BGEN SIMMONS: In White letter 7-90, subject, "Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action," Gen

Gray announced the creation of a Task Force on Equal Opportunity. Is that task force still in existence?

GEN MUNDY: Not formally as it was then structured. The Manpower Department still has a working group, or had during my tenure a working group that from time to time would come together and address a particular issue. But those were officers who were assigned to the Manpower Department. In the Equal Opportunity Working Group, as I recall it, that was a group that was comprised from Marines that were brought in from other locations, down at Quantico — principally here on the East Coast — to look at the problem of equal opportunity and those sorts of matters. So it is not still a standing organization.

BGEN SIMMONS: How is the Marine Corps' record on equal opportunity and affirmative action?

GEN MUNDY: It depends upon your own perception of those issues. I think that I would answer, as I did during my tenure, that I believe the Marine Corps' record is fairly good. It perhaps could be better.

But on the other hand, the thing that I learned, and that I found to be very frustrating in attempting to explain to others, was that not all organizations are the same and it may be, it may sound very right in that sense of correctness to assume that equal opportunity is the same everywhere as it is measured in statistics or in promotion percentages or anything like that, but in point of fact, the shape of an organization, the structure, the function of an organization can, in fact, dictate equal opportunity, for example, as it pertains to women.

There are some places in the Marine Corps that

women will serve extraordinarily effectively and outshine their male counterparts and you could point in about any direction today and give examples of that. But, there are distinct areas in which opportunity is not equal, nor should it be.

In the case of minorities, I think that you are hard pressed to make any case other than that we should be absolutely equal in opportunity and I would never attempt to make any case otherwise. Indeed we have extraordinary success among our minorities.

The Marine Corps, if we had a hole in our fabric that those who do not understand the background of the organization or the organization itself have, it would be in both the, principally the minority, and I separate minorities and females. They are both minorities but I talk and separate gender from minorities, generally speaking, about ethnic balance. We are and have long been, short of minority balance in the officer corps of the Marine Corps. There is not necessarily an excuse. One could argue that there is not even a justification. But there are some reasons for that.

If one looks at the history of our armed services, we will remember that in the Revolution we had formations, regiments or whatever they might have been of colored soldiers, black soldiers, if you will. There were black officers. There were the buffalo soldiers. In the War Between the States there were regiments of colored soldiers who were raised and who fought. As the Army sprung up across the entire United States, it was the Army who went to the Plains to fight the Indian wars or who populated the forts along the routes going west, so the Army became a, indeed a force, an armed force, that was sourced from throughout the nation.

The Marine Corps, being of a naval character, was sourced principally from, initially from the East Coast of the United States and subsequently a little bit more from the West Coast, and of course, World War II saw us, you know, probably enlarge from all quarters and maybe arguably even World War I. But our officer corps was always formed from those lines.

If you look also at factors like, however wrong or however right, we did not have minorities in the Marine Corps for 100 years after the Army had had minorities. And so we were behind from the get go. Now, since the Marine Corps then commissioned its first officer in 1945, the same year that the Army promoted its first African American to brigadier general [Benjamin D. Davis, 25 Oct 1940], we were that far behind.

We were a generation behind. I think that we have done fairly well in catch-up ball in terms of quality accessions. So I think we have had equal opportunity.

I am not sure that our affirmative action effort has been, perhaps, as strong as it would be politically correct, and maybe in hindsight as it would be institutionally correct to have done so. But the Marine Corps is an extremely competitive organization and especially the officer corps. We could never have a strong fiber in our officer corps which was built upon that competitive environment that exists but with an accepted category that was promoted just because we needed numbers. And that was always, that was the thing that those who were able to increase diversity, for example, through lateral moves. You know, if you need to create diversity in your Congressional staff or in the corporate world or indeed in government, you simply go out and find yourself a successful minority executive. If you pay him enough money you can move him across laterally and your percentages get high. We do not do that in our pyramidal, highly competitive promotion system.

So, I would say yes to equal opportunity although some might argue to the contrary, and I would say affirmative action maybe we have not been as strong as we could have been.

BGEN SIMMONS: White Letter 1-91, issued on 26 June 1991 by Gen Gray, just days before you became Commandant, is entitled, "C4I2 Concept." I suspect that this was something near and dear to Gen Gray's heart. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: It was. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability is what C4I2 means and Gen Gray had worked very hard during his tenure to evolve the Marine Corps into a more effective fusing of all of these automated systems; the national intelligence systems, the analysis and fusion and integration of intelligence as it came in from a wide variety. . . . the rapid dissemination through automated systems, all those sorts of things that go into C4I2. He had long sought having a very precise concept and to ensure that the Marine Corps got on board and, in fact, arguably led. I think his vision was out further even than the other Services. So, this was one of those that had been developed on his watch and he signed it out shortly before he went and I am delighted.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was probably one of those items in 17 suitcases.

GEN MUNDY: As a matter of fact, a lot of those that were dated 26, 27, 28 June had been there for a while. They were waiting to be signed.

BGEN SIMMONS: White Letter 2-91 signed 27 June 1991, is another last minute White Letter from Gen Gray. The subject is "USMC Intelligence Center." Again this would seem to be a subject close to Gen Gray's heart. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Gray had a vision and in fact, a passion, for establishing at Quantico an intelligence center that would again do many of the things that we just talked about, to be the center for Marine Corps intelligence. We were then and we are today as an institution a little bit behind the eight ball in the intelligence field. The Marine Corps has never invested heavily in building a core of intelligence officers. I suspect that today if you looked at the number of colonels in the Marine Corps you might find that there might be three or four that are intelligence colonels with suitable background; lieutenant colonels, a few more than that. But, we never had really, we have always considered intelligence something of a secondary specialty and we have relied on others, because Marines generally have fought alongside others. We either were aboard ship and we could rely on the Navy to provide us intelligence or we were fighting ashore right alongside the Army and that sophisticated intelligence and analysis and whatnot we could kind of piggyback, if you will, off of. Gen Gray wanted the Marine Corps to stand on its own legs in this area and so he worked hard at that.

Now, not everyone agreed with him, and that is not a subtle way of me saying that I did not, because frankly I was not this close to it. But there were many who felt that the investment in people and in resources needed to establish and operate a world class intelligence center at Quantico was simply beyond the Marine Corps' ability. We did not have the resources, we did not have the equipment, we did not have the people to do it. But Gen Gray wanted very badly to do it, and I think that this was another one of those that had been up and down the flagpole two or three times on his tenure. He finally, I believe that quite understandably, he thought that if I leave here and do not put this thing down on paper and create it, it will likely be lost forever and he may very well have been right. So, he put forth the concept. To be very candid with you, I do not think we probably have yet arrived at the intelligence center that he envisioned. In fact, I am sure we have not, and I very frankly doubt that we ever will. But it was his vision and it was very important to him.

BGEN SIMMONS: We have now closed the loop on Green Letters and White Letters as they stood at the

beginning of 1992. From now on I will try to introduce new letters in both series into the chronological sessions and maybe we will see an interrelationship of the letters with occurring events.

Now I think we are ready for 1992. Your desk calendar shows you beginning the new year by hosting the annual New Year's Day reception and Marine Band serenade at the Commandant's House. What are your recollections of this traditional event? Did the invitation list give you any problems?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my recollections are that it is one of the high times of the year. It is a very upbeat time. The Marine Band, I think dating back to — I cannot even tell you what it dates back to — one of the early Commandants, the Marine Band came up on New Year's Day, surprised — I think it was Gen Heywood if I am not mistaken; I may be off — but came up anyway to surprise the Commandant with a surprise serenade on New Year's Day. To which the Commandant welcomed them and invited them into the House and served them with some food and drink.

So since that time we have had the annual tradition that every New Year's Day the Marine Band comes to surprise the Commandant although it is hardly a surprise anymore. So it is a high time. It is after the holidays. It is the start of the new year. It is done, I think always, or at least as long as I can remember, it is done in blues. There are a lot of guests and it is just a very happy reception.

On that particular year, you asked about the guest list, no, the guest list I do not think posed any particular problems. One of the aspects is that occurring on New Year's Day, a lot of people are out of town so you really do not have a large Congressional entourage or a large number of the members of the Administration who come, other Service Chiefs, that sort of thing.

I decided, again keeping in mind, keeping in focus my, it was my impression that over the years the reception had become another opportunity for the Commandant, certainly that. It was an opportunity to invite a lot of the heavies around Washington for a reception at the Commandant's House and then for a little entertainment in the form of this band serenade out back. I wanted to turn it more into a Marine Corps event and so I had, as I recall, very few "official," guests. And the other thing I did was to try and, as I recall, we fixed the invitation to say, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Mrs. Mundy invite you and your family or you and your immediate family, or however we phrased it, to come, so that people would not feel inhibited because at least on some occasions,

and I think the Grays were very open, but there had been occasions at the Commandant's House previously where to bring one's child who was home from college for the holidays or something was not in good form. And I wanted to make sure that everybody knew that look, if your mother and dad are here with you or if your kids are home for Christmas or whatnot, bring your family and put on your blues and come on over here and enjoy it. So, we focused it more on the family.

To end this, just for the record, following the reception, any time after the Commandant and his lady go out and stand on the back steps of the Commandant's House, the crowd gathers in the yard or up on the porch overlooking or wherever they want to be and listens to the serenade, a couple of numbers. And then the Commandant says something nice to the band and invites them inside. That is the signal. Everyone then, the guests who have been there for about an hour for this reception then exit through the garden gate or go back in the House and get their coats and leave and the band goes into the basement of the Commandant's House where they deposit their instruments. They then come up the basement steps up onto the second floor, through the residence area, if you will, so that they can come down the formal steps into the Commandant's House and they are then received by the Commandant and his lady and usually with Col Bourgeois and the band officers being there to introduce. They are all received and you speak to them and they have something to eat and it is just a very pleasant time.

I have found that always an enjoyable occasion because the band, the Marine Band, are professional musicians, of course, and while they are absolutely respectful and proper in their military bearing and so on, they are not inhibited by the same induction into the Marine Corps as a recruit, you know, at Parris Island who is taught that, you know, you should only say, "Yes, Sir," and "No, Sir" and "No excuse, Sir." These are people with whom you can talk, that are uninhibited and they are conservatory-level musicians. They are a very enjoyable group to be with.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your desk calendar shows you going on leave 2 January until 7 January. Then on the 8th, you went on a three-day trip to the West Coast. This included attendance at a Sea Power Industrial Symposium in San Diego and a visit to Camp Pendleton. Do you have any special recollections of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: Very vivid recollections because it

was a ski trip. The family and I all left for Park City, Utah where we skied for that period of about the 3rd through the 6th of January, got some good winter skiing. And then, that was of course on my tab, then an aide and the aircraft came out, landed at Salt Lake City. I met them there. They picked me up and I came off leave, went back on duty and went out to these other events on the West Coast. Linda and the kids came back commercially, at my expense, back to the East Coast.

BGEN SIMMONS: It might be of interest to future readers to know how your aircraft was set up and staffed for trips such as this. How did you stay in touch with Headquarters Marine Corps and elsewhere while traveling?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the aircraft that I had, although there were several — you could have taken one of many aircraft. You, for example, we went on the C-9 when we went to some of the 50th Anniversary commemorations because of the capacity of the airplane, but the usual aircraft is a C-20 Gulfstream. It can seat about 14 people. That would be a very short flight to do that. More ordinarily we would have five or six or seven on there.

But it is a flying office. Usually, when I would travel I did not take big staffs. I was always rather amused at principally my Army and Air Force counterparts who take, you know, a doctor with them in case they collapse during the flight and have a protocol officer to make sure that, you know, the right cereal is available for breakfast or whatnot, and an aide or two and all sorts of this entourage. Marines, I think, are far more frugal. I do not think Marine generals enjoy that same amount of trappings.

My traveling party would routinely be the aide, whichever — I had two military aides and they generally alternated; one of them planning the next trip while this one was executing the current one. There would be an aide. We had a communication's detachment assigned to the Commandant. It is actually up in the Communications Division of the C4I2, Department at Headquarters, but there were three NCOs that manned both ends of a net. One would travel with me, the C-20. We would plug in. We had satellite communications so you could talk. I have been flying over the Indian Ocean talking to Headquarters Marine Corps, very easy to do. You have satellite communications.

We had an onboard fax capability to be plugged in so I could receive written matter, the *Early Bird* from Washington or endnotes or updates on the Marine

Corps Uniform Board or something like that en route.

We had lap top computers so we would do a lot of our paperwork in the airplane during long stints and in many cases would type it up on a computer, print it out, put it in a fax machine, send it back to the office.

So I would have, not that these were the most important matters that we did, but if the aide was on his toes and if I was on my toes, most of the thank-you notes for a trip would have gone out before we got back off the trip because we would write them in the air, fax them back, pen sign them at the other end and the letter was in the mail. So it worked very well.

Those, generally, those, when you ask how then did I communicate when I would get off the airplane, the communicator would go with the aide and he would be set up and he would simply tend, if we were going to a Marine base all he would do is tend communications meaning he would check whatever point we were given for a fax terminal or whatever point we were given for communications receipts and go pick that stuff up two or three times. And he would also maintain a phone watch because technically a member of the Joint Chiefs is supposed to be, you know, you are supposed to be able to be reached any time of the day. So we would have a communicator on watch. Not very good liberty a lot of the times, unless, frequently I would say, "Look, I am in all night tonight. You go out and have a good time and I will listen for the phone to ring."

We had, the airplane itself, of course, you had a flight attendant on board. Master Sergeant Dennis Mellow in my case served us well and faithfully. He was not assigned to me but he was in the flight detachment and usually, though there are two Marines out there usually one of them more or less attaches to the Commandant and flies with him. So you would have, you have somebody that can feed you and the crew and the other occupants. The sergeant major would most ordinarily be traveling with me.

So me, frequently Linda, the sergeant major, an aide, a communicator and the flight attendant. That would be the norm. But the good thing about the airplane is that you had a working office and you never were really out of communications any more than you wanted to be. So you could make a worldwide trip and communicate and operate very effectively from this flying office.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about classified information? How is that handled?

GEN MUNDY: We could receive, most ordinarily the classified would come into a ground station and we

would pick it up there. Sometimes you would fly into a base to refuel and they would have something for you there. We could receive classified. We had the capability and the SATCOM was a secure transmission so you could go secure, as is always the case. It is not as reliable, you know, the connection is usually not as good and you break up a lot. But there are ways of simply saying, "You know, we have had an incident. We will bring you up on it. It involved this.

We will bring you up on it when you get on the ground." That was the general way.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 1st of January 1992, the strength of the active-duty U.S. Armed Forces was 1,933,855 of whom 193,060 were Marines. That was a reduction of 406,499 spaces for the Armed Forces as a whole but of only 3,909 spaces for the Marines. We were doing rather well, weren't we, with respect to end-strength.

GEN MUNDY: Well, we were on a planned glide slope as effectively as we ever planned the manpower management process. The Marine Corps, arguably none of the Services, but the Marine Corps in my awareness has never really been able to get a firm grasp — I remember Gen Gray early in his tenure wanting to know how many Marines we had in the Marine Corps on active duty today and you would say, you cannot come up with it. You are pretty close but you cannot come up with it because reporting isn't that timely and people die or, you know, people get locked up. So probably plus or minus a couple of hundred people.

But in the plan to decrease the Marine Corps from the strength — it was about 196,000 when I got in — down to 159,000, we had a slope and a plan. Fewer accessions of officers, fewer NCO promotions, fewer recruits — although not a lot fewer recruits coming in because of the shape of the Marine Corps. We were not really thinning out a lot of troops. We were thinning out the structures and the overheads that were officer and NCO organizations.

So, we had a glide slope. We had, we used to refer to the off-ramps because that had been very carefully developed to have off-ramps because we knew that we were going to fight dearly for every Marine that we had to give up. So we had to make sure that if we were successful in the campaign and somebody said, "Okay, that is far enough, stop," we wanted to be able to pull off the road at that point.

Unfortunately, it does not work that precisely and what we found just this past year, for example, when we were authorized to maintain 174,000 Marines, we

could not stop the train and so we actually — not proclaimed, of course, not advertised — but we actually went down to a strength of about, I think, it was 171,000 plus, simply because when you are in a dive, you know, it takes a little bit to buoy out and then to come back up in manpower management. So, I suspect that our, “doing well,” as you have characterized it, had to do simply with our controls on the way that we had chosen to come down.

BGEN SIMMONS: I also was saying that while the Marine Corps represented 10 percent of the strength of the Armed Forces, we were only losing 1 percent or less of our spaces that year so we were doing pretty well.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that was by design. Now the factor, of course, there is that the other Services, as I mentioned earlier, the Army was coming down by a couple of hundred thousand a year so there would be a dramatic skewing of the percentages. We were not coming down as much as the others, but the others were coming down by a designed plan. I recall that the Army took big chunks out rather than a more gradual slope.

BGEN SIMMONS: In January, 1992, Team Spirit 92, the annual training exercise with South Korean forces was canceled as a conciliatory gesture towards North Korea. Was that a military or political decision?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a political decision for the very reasons that you cite. We were trying to warm to the Koreans and trying to stabilize the situation. So when you say, “Was it a political decision?” “Yes, that is a political decision.” “Was the military involved in the decision?” “Of course.” The Joint Chiefs consulted on that and talked about it. “What is the impact?” The CINC was brought in. You know, “What would be the impact of the loss of the exercise?” And as a practical matter we concluded that there was not really a lot of loss. There were some exercises that truly were more useful in terms of the interoperability and the interworking of the Republic of Korean forces and the American forces than was Team Spirit, which was a big demonstration and had been created for political purposes. It was a strong signal to the North Koreans each year that we could come in sizeable force and would do so if we needed to, somewhat akin to the Reforger Series that were run for years in NATO to demonstrate to the Russians that, you know, we can really rush divisions over there if we have to.

BGEN SIMMONS: Marines have been in the Philippines almost 100 years but in January negotiations on base rights between the U.S. and Philippine government broke down leading to an order to evacuate Subic Bay by the end of the year. This would mean the closing of the 550-man Marine Barracks at Subic Bay. We will come back to the actual closure later but what was your immediate reaction to this order and what planning steps did the Marine Corps take?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the reaction was not dramatic because we all had seen this coming. I mean, it was only a matter of time or a matter of another year of negotiation with the Philippines before U.S. bases would be closing. So, this had been pretty well forecast.

Any time that we, you know, draw down from one of the, so to speak, historic sites of the Corps, Guam, the Philippines, places like that, for those who remember the good old days of colonialism and so on, it is kind of a sad time. For those who are focused on national security interests, we worry a lot about having an advance base in the Philippines, about having, you know, a staging base. That base was, of course, of great significance during the war in Southeast Asia; probably not too much in Korea. But we worry about giving up those types of bases so there was some concern.

On the positive side, remember that the Marine Corps was reducing people. So, to be able to reduce by a 550-person presence was a savings to the Marine Corps that meant we did not have to give up a battalion somewhere. So there was good news in that, too.

As to what the Marine Corps did, we put together a plan that would not be extraordinary. It was how do we order the closedown procedures and we then apply manpower controls to stop staffing the barracks or to let it decrease in size. We covered that, as I recall, at that time Gen Moore, Royal Moore out in the Pacific, covered by putting BGen Ron Christmas, a headquarters and a few Marines in the 9th MAB or 9th Brigade down in the Philippines. So we had a brigade staff and a brigadier general there. We had an operational force present and then we had the Marine Barracks which was drawing down.

As a practical matter, the last people literally off the runway at Cubi Point when we flew the last Americans out of there, not under siege, although we always worry about that and you leave enough credible force to make sure that if they have to shoot their way out or man the perimeter as they are coming out — but we did not anticipate that — that we can do it,

and those were Marines, of course. So the last U.S. to evacuate was a platoon of Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 January you went to Montgomery, Alabama for a busy day. You spoke to Air University at Maxwell Field. You visited the governor. And you spoke again that evening to the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce. As I think I said earlier, we have an almost complete set of your speeches in your Personal Papers Collection. I do not find a copy of your talk to the Air University but there is a copy of your talk to the Chamber of Commerce. It is a kind of status speech; where the Marines are and what they are doing. This seems to be a more or less standard format for your talks of this type, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: It sure was. Probably gets monotonous as you read through those in that file because, you know, a different scene, the same message. As I talked earlier, in an earlier session when we were talking about how do you do various speeches, as I mentioned I think you would find very few written speeches for War Colleges and for schools. You would find them for the Chamber of Commerce in Montgomery. That was another of these hometown boy makes good. Let's have him back, give him the key to the city and let him talk to the Chamber of Commerce. It was a very nice evening and always enjoyable to go to the Air University.

I found over time, this is an aside, but of course I had gone to high school in Montgomery and lived, my next door neighbor was the son of an Air Force tech sergeant and his mother taught at then-the Air University. So I spent a lot of time out at Maxwell Air Force Base and I found, interestingly, that among all of the war colleges that you can go to or that you do go to and speak as the Commandant or otherwise, that the warmest reception that I ever received was consistently and always at the Air War College.

It had very little to do with the Alabama ties, but rather it is that even though I had spent, as we have talked about earlier, I had spent many of the formative years of my senior officership in almost, from time to time, hostile encounter with the Air Force over the issue of command control of Marine aviation in the NATO theater, I found that the Air Force truly, more than any of the other Services, looks upon the Marine Corps as the first string.

When the Marine Commandant came to the Air War College I was never challenged by any Air Force officer about Marines. They were proud. . . . all they wanted to do was get in their airplanes and fly right alongside Marines in the air. And if the Marines were

fighting on the ground, why they knew we would win. It was a very positive and enjoyable place to go.

Gen P.X. Kelley, of course, his picture is on the wall as the only Service Chief ever to have graduated from the Air University. So they have a certain attachment to the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 January you apparently spoke to the Senior Seminar of the Foreign Service Institute in the morning, then flew to New York and spoke to the Council of Foreign Relations in the evening. We have copies of both these talks in your personal papers. In both you stress the importance of naval expeditionary forces in today's military strategy.

You were back from New York on 28 January in time to attend the State of the Union address by the new President. What is the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at these affairs?

GEN MUNDY: Presence. Just like members of the Cabinet, the Chiefs are seated always in what is the first row to the left of the rostrum in the House. It becomes usually the second row because they put folding chairs in front of you for members of the Cabinet as the Cabinet has expanded. So you are there as one of the President's men, to be in attendance for his State of the Union.

It is interesting, as I think many of my recollections here will reflect, I find amusement in many of the things that we did. Because as you know if you have watched the State of the Union — you may or may not be aware of this — but you can only see, you rarely see the man who is in the, either of the last two seats.

What has happened over time is that when we got a Vice Chairman, the Vice Chairman always goes. I would argue that point and wonder why he is there because none of the Vice Chiefs are there but the Vice Chairman is there. So that kicked everybody down one notch. Then you add in the Coast Guard Commandant who usually is the junior member of the team and always sits on the end.

But there is, you know, you want to be where you can be seen when the television camera swings around because it is important because as America looks at the audience and says, "Oh, there is a Marine general, that is important, or an Air Force general." But some of my colleagues from time to time were very, very taken with their seniority, if there is such a thing as seniority among the four-star officers, but they were very taken with that and they would eagerly, you know, want to make sure that they sat in video-covered seats.

I used to have a good time and sitting in, I remember that the last year that Adm Bill Kime was the Commandant of the Coast Guard, I said, "Bill, move up. Come on, I will sit in the last chair."

"No, no, no. I am the junior man."

I said, "Bill, go and get your face on television." So, there is a humorous aspect to sitting there from time to time.

The other thing that is, again, in the humor of the moment, my first year there was this year, of course, so I talked to Gen Powell before and said, "Hey, what do we do?" And he said, "Well, look," he said, "You have to remember that you cannot get political in this." So he said, "If the President says America is the greatest country on earth, why you just applaud wildly. Or if he says that the Armed Forces are, I am so proud of them I cannot tell you how much — then you can applaud. But if he says I am for Medicare or I oppose abortion or something, you do not want to be caught clapping because that is a political matter."

So, I said, "Well, how will we know?" And he said, "Well, watch me." As a result of that, if you watched that particular time and even subsequently, if you were watching the Chiefs all the time, you would notice that there is something of a ripple effect in applause. If the Chairman begins to applaud, it will work its way down and we are all applauding. If the Chairman stands up, you now, we all stand up.

My own sons asked me a couple of times when there was a partisan matter that had been raised and as the television would record it, here were all these people on their feet applauding with the President wildly and here are all the Service Chiefs sitting there with their hands folded in their laps not on their feet. He said, "What is the matter, Dad, that you did not get up and applaud like everybody else?" So I had to explain to him the non-partisan aspect of our function.

But it is a nice night. You see the members of the Congress, many of them troop by the Chiefs. The Marines will all come up and report in. Congressman Murtha or Senator Glenn or Lott or Warner or whoever it is will always make a point of coming over to extend their hand and reach across and say hello to the Chiefs, and many others who were not, you know, Armed Services members. So it is a nice gathering from that standpoint and it is a tremendously exciting thing to be sitting there while the President is ten feet away from you making the State of the Union speech.

BGEN SIMMONS: At this time, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, commanded by BGen George H. Walls, Jr., is providing support for nearly 10,000 Haitian

migrants. On 31 January U.S. policy towards these migrants changed in that the U.S. Supreme Court voted to allow the U.S. Government to repatriate the Haitian refugees. What practical effect did this have on the operation of the migrant center?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the migrant center, of course, continued. We have a second, you know, most recently and still a few of them down there. But Cubans and Haitians came across in great numbers and in effect caused us to evacuate Guantanamo and turn it into a large migrant holding facility down there. But the various policy, I would say, vacillations between — you cannot repatriate them, you can repatriate them — of course, caused a lot of, just a lot of, activity on the part of the U.S. Armed Forces because all of the transporting of these people, feeding, maintaining the control of them, it all, all falls to the Armed Forces even though it is, arguably it is either a Justice Department or a State Department issue. It is not a Defense Department issue. But the only organizations you have that can, you know, oversee these migrant operations are your military. And so from that standpoint it just created quite a burden of providing people and resources and using up, you know, war reserve tentage and things like that to house these people that would come out of the Defense budget that really was not a defense function.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Walls had some rather strong personal opinions on the repatriation policy. Were you aware of these feelings?

GEN MUNDY: No, I was not. I know George Walls and admire him very much for the job that he did down there. I think he was extraordinary in his handling. But if he had, whatever his personal feelings were, no, they were not communicated to me and remember that even though he was the, his primary job, Marine Corps job was as the commanding general of the 2d Force Service Support Group, when we gave him up, if you will, to go be a Joint Task Force Commander, he now is directly responsive to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command and to the Chairman. So in that capacity, Gen Powell probably talked to Gen Walls more frequently than I did because the Service Chief had no real function. He commanded a task force that had some Marines in it but it had more Army and more Navy personnel than it did Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February the Department of Defense announced force reduction rules which

would reduce the Marine Corps to 159,100 Marines by 1997.— this would have put us into rather a steep dive. How did you react to this announcement? Did you know it was in the wind?

GEN MUNDY: I did know it was in the wind because it had previously been conceived and the Marine Corps had been given that direction as early as 1989, 1990, I guess was when we got that tasking, the year before I became the Commandant. There was no surprise there. It was more a statement of here is where we are going. And indeed, by 1997, was exactly the glide path that the Marine Corps was already on.

However, there are some interesting aspects to this. First would be the derivation of the number, 159,100, and there is a, if not reassuring — which it is not — but it has a little bit of humor to it as to how that number came up. I mentioned, I think, in an earlier session that Gen Gray had been tasked with, you know, with reducing the size of the Marine Corps and part of my charter as his Deputy Chief of Staff for PP&O was to help identify what a valid number was. We never did that effectively, and, in fact, did not until the Force Structure Planning Group effort were we able to accomplish that.

But the 159,100 came about like this. Gen Gray had resisted so strongly cuts to the Marine Corps below, although we vacillated, and he would, one day he would say that we were not going to go below 180,000 and we would say, okay, and we would start working on 180,000 and a couple of days later he would come in and say, 190,000. So we would go for 190,000 or we would then conceive what would happen if we went to 175,000. We worked back and forth on that. But officially the Marine Corps never went forth, though we were asked to do so repeatedly, with a figure of less than 180,000 as the minimum that the Marine Corps could shrink to.

The other Services named their own structure. Adm Kelso, before he became the CNO, got a group together down at Norfolk and concluded that about a 450-ship Navy would be about right. So the base force decreed a 450-ship Navy.

The Army decreed that they would want to have 16 active divisions, I think it was — or not 16 active but a total of 16 divisions and that became the base force.

The Marine Corps said 180,000 because it could not just say three MEFs, that did not amount to anything.

We said 180,000 and that frustrated, because that was not 25 percent which was the answer to the question, how much can you reduce? The answer that was sought and expected and almost mandated was 25 percent.

The Marine Corps did not go back in with that answer and so finally Secretary Cheney told Secretary Garrett, “Look, the hell with them. Tell them it is 150,000,” which would have been about 25 percent. Garrett called in Gen Went who was the Acting Commandant — Gen Gray was out of town at the time — and said, “Joe, 150,000. Program the Marine Corps for 150,000.”

Gen Went wrung his hands and lamented and said, “Gosh we just cannot go below 160,000.” Garrett said, “Look, it is a 150,000.”

And so anyway, Gen Went prevailed upon Secretary Garrett to go back to Mr. Cheney and say this is really going to break the back of the Marine Corps. So Cheney said, “Look, 150,000 to 160,000, somewhere in there.” Garrett called him back and said, “Okay, Joe, it can be more than 150,000.” So Gen Went said, “How about 159,900?” And Garrett said, “Come on, get serious.” So Joe said, “159,100?”

And Garrett said, “Get out of here, it’s 159,100.” That is the legitimacy of the 159,100.

BGEN SIMMONS: In that same month, February, you changed some long-standing practices with regard to the organization of a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. You planned to eliminate a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command, of which there were six in being, and replace them with Marine Expeditionary Force CEs or “Command Elements.” We have discussed this a little bit previously. Was this a distinction without a difference?

GEN MUNDY: In one sense it was. But, there were real savings because there were about 1,500 structured spaces in the brigade command elements that we had structured, six of them throughout the Marine Corps. So, as we were decreasing in size, yes, we could pick up 1,500 structured spaces back and some number of manning to do that.

The distinction without a difference is that we, though, we had been back and forth from the days going back to Gen Kelley’s times. We had had two brigades and a MEF and then, no, that is not the way it is, there is one brigade and then there is a MEF. So we really were struggling to come up with what our structure should be.

As the distinction without a difference answer the fact is that a MEF Forward commanded by the deputy MEF commander is, in effect, a brigade structure. We achieve savings and we recognize that we would then strengthen — some of those savings went into building the size of the Marine Expeditionary Force Command Elements to be more robust and with a plan

that we would uncouple a smaller staff, a forward staff, if you will, an Alpha Command Group, if you will, from that particular structure, send it forward with a one or a two-star officer and we would call it the forward echelon of the MEF. It would be, distinction without a difference, a brigade.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February it was announced that the Marine Corps in 1993 would begin getting a refinement to the "Stinger" missile called the "Avenger." Essentially it would be a pedestal-mounted "Stinger" designed as a low altitude air defense (LAAD) system. Accordingly it would be assigned to the LAAD battalions. How many of these battalions do we have and where are they organizationally located?

GEN MUNDY: We have two. One is in Cherry Point and one is in El Toro and Yuma, Arizona, the 1st and the 2d LAAD Battalions.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would the "Avenger" replace the "Hawk" system?

GEN MUNDY: It would not. The "Avenger" was actually a vehicle and a system that shot "Stingers". We had "Stingers" but they were Man PADS, Man Portable Air Defense System, as they called it. So instead of having a system in which you had exclusively a vehicle with a two-man team in it and with a, if you will, about a four-pack of "Stingers" on the back where the vehicle would drive up, the gunner would get out, uncrate one of the "Stingers," get it up and fire and then get another one if he needed it, what the "Avenger" did for us was to mount two "Stingers," already mounted, and they could be fired electronically. In other words, the vehicle would do the tracking and then you could pickle off "Stingers" and reload, have of course to do that.

So, it was a question of the mobility and the automated responsiveness of the "Stinger" missile rather than a new weapons system. The "Avenger" was mobility and multiple launch capability.

BGEN SIMMONS: Does the Marine Corps really need "Hawks?"

GEN MUNDY: I think you could make an argument that we have never fired one in anger and therefore you would say, do you really need something that you have never used to shoot down an enemy airplane with? The "Hawk" missile and particularly the improved "Hawk" missile that we have today is an

extremely good air defense, or more important today, an extremely good antiballistic missile defense weapon system.

The "Hawk" cued with the Marine TPS radar which is one of the better air defense radars around, expeditionary radar, the "Hawk" missile cued with that, we have now done some testing in the past four or five years that revealed that you do have the ability to intercept an incoming ballistic missile with the "Hawk," combining this radar system. So, it has been improved to where it is very responsive. It is smaller, it is lighter, it is quicker. And we have refined our structure.

Now, that says that the "Hawk" is a good system. What it does not say is must the Marine Corps have that system? Air defense specialists would argue that a "Stinger" is a short-range air defense system, which it is, and that if you expect any enemy aircraft to be coming toward an airfield, you do not want to be able to pick them up visually and then shoot at them. You want to be able to hit them 60 miles or so out. The "Hawk" will do that for you. The "Stinger" will not do that for you.

Can we rely on other systems, sea-based? The Corps SAM, the Army's systems that are coming along, could we rely on that? The answer is probably yes. But it will be unnerving to have a major airbase somewhere with a lot of Marines and a lot of Marine aircraft operating out of there with only short-range air defense around it.

So the answer lies, I think, more in your forecast of what the air threat is going to be against a fixed installation in the future. And if you conceive that it is not too likely that we are going to have manned aircraft coming at us, then you could make a case for the "Hawk" going out.

We are the last, the Marine Corps is the last of the active "Hawk" structures remaining. And that is not that we are archaic. Indeed the improved "Hawk," which many of the NATO nations have now bought and which the Defense Department puts a lot of pressure on us to maintain "Hawk" because of the international development and acquisition of that system rather than because of a Marine Corps requirement. My own guess? Within this Commandant's tenure we will be out of the "Hawk" business.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February the Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition Command was redesignated as the Marine Corps Systems Command. What was the significance of this change?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the significance is significant



The Joint Chiefs of Staff meet in the old “tank” on 10 February 1992. The meeting was held as part of the 50th anniversary of the first Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting.

and that is that for the first time the Marine Corps chose to institute a single agency, command in this case, which would have cradle to grave responsibility for weapons systems and for acquisition matters. And you would say, “Well, isn’t it always that way? Well, no, it is not.”

In the previous case, the Marine Corps Research and Development Command would research and develop a system or determine something we wanted to buy, a hand grenade or a new missile system or a new computer or whatever it might be. The research and development would be done. It was then handed off to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics and his Materiel Division to acquire the system. He then in turn would pass it down to the commanding general of the Marine Corps Logistics bases to maintain and sustain the system. So you really had three actors that had a player part, had a phase in the development, the acquisition and the management of the system. What the Systems Command did was to put all of that under one authority, the commanding general of the Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisitions Command.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was this command located?

GEN MUNDY: In Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is it still there?

GEN MUNDY: It is still there. MajGen Carol Mutter who is the senior woman officer on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces is the commanding general today.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 19 February 1992 ALMAR 039/92 was issued revising the assignment policy for women Marines and allowing them to serve in the combat service support elements of an air-lifted Marine Expeditionary Force unit. Supposedly this change was based on Desert Shield, Desert Storm experience. Is this true or was the change the result of political pressure?

GEN MUNDY: No, the change was truly based, not just on Desert Shield, Desert Storm experience, as that probably was the catalyst that caused me when I

first came into office to set down LtGen Terry Cooper and BGen Chuck Krulak, and say to them, among the other guidance for the Manpower Department, was I want to assign women into every occupation specialty that we can reasonably accommodate them. Direct combat is out for the time being because it was the law of the land that women cannot be assigned into aviation.

But I was struck in my experience as the commanding general of FMFLant during the Gulf War, it makes no sense, and indeed it flies in the face of rationality, to assign a Marine to a peacetime assignment, plane captain, that you cannot deploy to war. This just does not make sense. So we either had to go back and revise all of our peacetime assignments and say there will be no women in combat squadrons, even maintenance personnel. Or we had to say, if you are assigned to that job and the job goes to war, you are going to go to war with it.

So that is what the women assignment policy was, it was an attempt to say if we put them there, they are going to serve. We cannot have Marines who can not perform duties assigned wherever, whenever. We will remember, I think, earlier as we discussed during our deployment for the Persian Gulf, Gen Gray simply did not want to deploy women into combat and there were many who, you know, I could have perhaps emotionally given you that argument. But I think I commented on the day that I called him and said, "General, we are deploying the EA6B, the most sophisticated aircraft we have, 12 of them, off of Cherry Point down here. Seven of the twelve plane captains are female sergeants. I cannot deploy the squadron without the plane captains." And so we had a little bit of friction between us and finally we deployed them because it made no, we could not send the squadron off incapacitated to combat.

So it was a genuine assignment policy. Was the whole subject of women a result of political pressure? Sure. The same thing that got women into the Marine Security Guard Battalions when the Secretary of Defense told Gen Gray, "Put them there." I mean, there was no question that it was political, but it was a conviction that we had good Marines who were trying to do a job and we had assigned to a job and by golly, we are going to deploy them in that capacity.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 19 February you and Mrs. Mundy departed for a four-day visit to London. What was the purpose of this visit?

GEN MUNDY: That would be a visit to the two commands there; one to the Naval Forces Europe.

CINC USNAVEUR was headquartered in London. And the second to the Fleet Marine Force Europe and also to the Marine Corps Security Forces in Europe. They were then out at Heathcote near London. And finally just a quick touch base. The Commandant General, Royal Marines, was headquartered in London at that time. He has since moved. And so it was an opportunity just to touch base. So it was as much as anything a touch base, you know, go and visit Marines in the field, touch base with your allies and the senior U.S. commanders.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 February you and the Chief of Naval Operations testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. You were reporting on the state of your respective Services and arguing for the budget for Fiscal Year 1993. Unlike previous years, you and CNO had a unified statement. How did that come about?

GEN MUNDY: Straight out of the offsite that we discussed earlier and Secretary Garrett's desire for closer integration. He made the point at the offsite — and it was a good one; I found merit in this — he said, "Do you know, I am the only Secretary who cannot go up. I mean, every other posture statement that is signed out of the Department of Defense is signed by the Secretary and the Chief of Service, but in my case, you know, I sign up with the CNO and then the Commandant submits a separate one." It is a good point.

I assessed that. I worry about all of those initiatives. I worried then, I worry now to some degree. But at the same time I said, "Wait, there is, perhaps there is strength here in having the Secretary of the Navy sign up to a document that sets forth the Marine Corps program as well as the Navy program." So, that is how it came about, Secretary Garrett's initiative.

BGEN SIMMONS: A week later on 3 and 4 March you made similar appearances before the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee and the House Armed Services Committee. You warned the Congress that a reduction of 30,000 Marines from our end strength would cut into the muscle of the Corps. You pointed out that the Marine Corps was the nation's "911" force, that in 1991 the Marine Corps had rescued 20,000 civilians and helped another 2 million in humanitarian operations. Was this the first time you used the "911" analogy?

GEN MUNDY: It was and it came about, two days

before I was to go testify, David Hackworth a somewhat debated author around town came out with a piece in the *Washington Post* that made reference to the Marine Corps as the nation's "911" force. And I said, "Well, that is kind of nifty." So when I went up to testify I used that and it was electrifying. To the day that I left Capitol Hill this past June, staffers would still step out into the passageways when I went by from time to time and say, "Hey, 911!" And so it stuck. It was a label that helped sell the Marine Corps. But that was the first time I used it and thereafter, though I began to taper off because after awhile you get to worry about whether you are sounding corny or not, but the staffs and many of our authors and our legislative people on the Hill always clung to that "911" force. The Army began, in my last year the Army began to try and say, we are "911," too, but it was an Army colonel that gave us the label, "911 Force."

You, let's see, go ahead. I was going to comment further that this particular testimony was occasioned by the fact that even though we were, I will not say muzzled because I was not muzzled, I had already broken the news in the *Washington Post* about, complaining that the Administration was taking the Marine Corps down too far, and we have not talked

about that but that was a fairly exciting time for me in my interface with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy.

But shortly before we went over, the word came drifting back from the Hill to the Defense Department that the Congress, indeed that a base force was not even going to hold and that we were going to likely sink below the base force. So, as an act of absolute divine providence the Secretary of Defense let it be known through the Chairman that he wanted us all to go over and really bleed for the base force. You know, to talk about how much we were taking down and how we had to hold that line.

Well, what that enabled me to do was to absolutely create a blur between the base force Marine Corps of 159,000 and the reality that we did not want to go down to that level. So I was able to say, "My goodness, look at 159,000. Here is what we will have to do. We will be incapacitated."

I do not know whether the point ever caught up in the Pentagon or not that what they had actually done, while the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Air Force and the CNO were over there testifying emotionally for their base force level, I had been enabled to go over there and testify emotionally not to go to the base force level but to indeed maintain the Marine Corps

One of the Commandant's responsibilities is informing Congress of the state of the Marine Corps. Here Gen Mundy provides a posture statement before a House Armed Services Committee hearing on 4 March 1992.



at, you know, 20,000 or so higher than that and I got away with it. So Providence kind of shined on us and gave me an opening through which I could surge on this particular testimony in legitimizing the Marine Corps structure.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were your principal helpers in preparing you for Congressional testimony?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the principal helper is your Legislative Assistant. In this case it was BGen John Admire. Lieutenant colonels — now colonels — but then LtCols Terry Paul and John Sattler were the Senate Liaison Officer and the House Liaison Officer respectively.

Col Pete Metzger, as I have mentioned earlier, Pete was sort of my alter ego and was a sounding board and would always come into me and say, “Be careful, don’t punch too hard on this.” Or, Pete was a tremendous man for working the town. He had been President Reagan’s Marine aide, so he was very well connected in town and he would plug in and punch all these political notes and come back and give me advice on things that we needed to plug.

Arnold Punaro to a degree was a helper but Arnold would usually —

BGEN SIMMONS: Identify him, please.

GEN MUNDY: This is now BGen, USMCR, Arnold Punaro. But Mr. Punaro, in that sense, was the Staff Director, the Chief of Staff, if you will, of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He was Senator Nunn, the chairman of the SASC in those days, he was his Chief of Staff and a very powerful man. He was a Marine, and while Arnold was faithful — and I credit him with this — he always served the Marine Corps very well but he always made sure that he was Mr. Punaro and from time to time he would take the Marine Corps to task right along with any of the other Armed Services. If we deserved to be, you know, smacked across the bridge of the nose, Arnold would smack you across the bridge of the nose.

So, he was a tremendously effective man there for the nation and tremendously effective for the Corps. Arnold’s coaching would usually be, when I would call him and talk to him, he would say, “Well, here is what you do not want to say. This will go wrong if you come over and say this. So, do not say that.” He would not necessarily say, “You should come over and punch for this,” but he would say, “Be careful here.”

Those were the primary helpers and there were, I

think I did most of this myself. Not the formal statements. The staff does the posture statement and you edit it and make sure it reads okay. But then nobody ever reads the it. I mean, you know, it is another one of these reports that we all put out. We put a picture and we put a fancy bow on it and people do not read that stuff. They listen to what you have to say. They listen to your statement for the record.

So it was the statement for the record that I would focus on and I would go so far as to say that for four years in a row with some counsel and, you know, people stimulating my thought, I sat down and wrote the statements for the record. It was me. But you had help from many quarters of people.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about the role of the Fiscal Director. Was Tom Comstock still the Fiscal Director?

GEN MUNDY: He was at that particular time and his role was more in preparation for testimony. That is, the Fiscal Director had the responsibility, because we were up representing or testifying on the budget, the Fiscal Director had the responsibility for ensuring that you were up to speed on what was in the budget because while it may sound strange to some, there are many little things in the budget that, you know, the Commandant does not deal with on a day-to-day basis. You know how many V-22s you want to buy but you do not necessarily know how many “Stinger” missiles you are buying that year. So he would prepare the backup papers that would help you do your homework, to go home and study and get the major programs that you had.

Your legislative people would help with enabling you to say the right thing at the right time. Now what does that mean? It means this. When you go to represent the budget in testimony before the Hill, as an officer of the Administration then in power you are representing the President’s budget. The President has said, this much for the budget and this part for the Marine Corps and you are there to represent that.

The line that one must tread, and it is an extraordinarily delicate line, it is, I mean this is a, any Commandant who tells you that he sleeps well during the budget testimony period or that he does not take a lot of, you know, acid liquidators of some sort or other, Maalox or whatever it may be, isn’t telling you true. Because you really know that it is very difficult to straddle that fence.

My thesis was, I am here to support the President’s budget and I am damned glad the President’s budget isn’t any smaller because if it was we would go

straight down the tubes. That has to be said subtly because the Congress will remind you repeatedly that it is the Congress that provides the resources to build the Marine Corps or the Air Force or whatever, and that the Congress makes the decisions on where the money will go, not the Administration. The Administration frames a program that they would like to have.

So, a Service Chief is pitted in this very unique situation by, as an officer of the President going forth to say, I support what the President is trying to do, but the other side of a serving officer's countenance, face, personality, function is to remember that he is sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, which is the people. And the people's representatives are just that, the Congress.

So, you are on the one hand saying, I support the President's budget. I understand that there is not but so much money in the bank and that the Marine Corps' part is this much. I support that, which is to say I do not support anything less than that. But on the other hand to be able to say, however, Congress, the other message from me as a professional soldier is, it is not enough.

That is a delicate balance, because implicitly if the Marines say it is not enough, you are saying, change the President's budget and give the Marines a bigger piece of the pie. And we all do that. Everyone of us that wears the uniform. It is part of the job, but it is an enormously delicate and stress-filled part of the job to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did Tom Comstock go with you to the hearings?

GEN MUNDY: He probably, on the first hearing he probably did, or sent his deputy. Mr. Comstock, who is certainly legendary in the Corps and who was a longstanding Fiscal Director and a very effective one, an enormously effective one, but he was a very shy man and he preferred to send his deputy off on those types of duties. I do not think he wanted to sit there. So I cannot — if I answered you, "Yes," he may have gone. It was my first year. He may have wanted to prop me up.

I chose, after I had been through about one hearing, for effect, this is theatrics, but I chose to take the minimum number of officers. You always had your Legislative Assistant because he is that, he is your legislative aide. So I had me at the table. I had BGen Admire, at that time, behind me. If it was a House hearing, then LtCol Sattler was there; if it was the Senate, LtCol Paul. They were there. The first time

that I went the Military Secretary went, Col Metzger went and there were probably two or three others. Former Commandants had taken what were called "bag boys" that would be a major or two that would have big bags full of reference material, and if somebody asked you how many "Stingers" are you buying this year, he would slip you a quick piece of paper and you would whip it up and say 165 or whatever the number was.

I chose not to, I did not want to get into that level of detail. And the other thing that I wanted to make an impression of was that when I was testifying, usually with the CNO and the Secretary, sometimes with the other Service Chiefs and perhaps the Chairman, each of them had that entourage behind them. I wanted people to look out there and say, this fellow must know what he is talking about because he does not have this big line-up of people that are coaching him from behind. So I got to the point where I would have those two behind me and no others.

And the other thing that I tried to do in testimony that I was more successful at some times than others, and that other Commandants, Gen Barrow probably did this one better than any of us, Gen Gray would endeavor to do it and I certainly did, and that is, that while many went over and read their testimony, I tried, as did my predecessors, very hard, to not read but to talk to the committee and they seemed to appreciate that. "I have a statement for the record. It is submitted. I would like to just amplify a couple of points." And then you talk to them.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about the role of the appropriations sponsors, I&L, Manpower and so forth?

GEN MUNDY: All of those, all of the sponsors, all of the staff agencies, as coordinated by the Fiscal Director, come in with briefing papers. And usually in Congressional testimony preparation there are, I would spend probably ten, twelve, fourteen hours of working, that is, of daylight time, if you will, in sitting down with, for example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower would come in and would present me the manpower budget and what we were buying, how many men, how many man years, how many people, what school seats, all that sort of thing. He would give you all this, inundate you with paper and with information. Then you would go home at night and study your book and get yourself up to speed on manpower issues.

I did that for two years and then came to realize that the Congress really wasn't going to ask me how many missiles we were buying. They wanted me to talk

policy and me to talk big picture. And then LtGen What's His Name would go over and talk about the specifics. So although we went through all four years of testimony preparation, I finally came to realize that I was really looking for the big bullets that you wanted to be prepared to stress. And those generally fell into major aviation programs.

The Commandant is expected to be the flag bearer for matters amphibious to include, you know, amphibious ships in the Navy. It is not my program, it is not my money, I do not build ships or buy ships but if the Marines do not represent amphibious ships, they do not get represented in the Navy. I mean they would be there, but the CNO is not going to extend himself talking about amphibs. He is going to talk submarines and aircraft carriers.

So, you would focus on those big issues and on the things that you really wanted to get across. As you come to know how the Congress works and as your legislative people become better in coaching you, what you realize is that when you go to appear before a committee, that members of the committee have constituent interests. You know very well that Senator Thad Cochran on the Senate Appropriations Committee, who comes from Mississippi wants to build amphibious ships and you know that Senator Cochran is going to ask you something about an amphibious ship. You know another senator is going to ask you, Senator John Glenn, Marine aviator, is going to hound you on the V-22 unless you pump the V-22 and so you almost find yourself, when you become a little bit more educated, preparing for the senators individually as to what their interests are because your posture statement lays out the general information.

And once you become knowledgeable of that, you ensure that when the Senator from Ohio says, "I am delighted to be here and I would ask you whether you have any matters you want to talk about in the area of Marine aviation programs," that he has just unlocked the door for you and so you roll in with the V-22, the F-18D or the AV8-B remanufacturing program or whatever it may be. Helicopters, you would go to Sikorsky or you would go to various constituent members to satisfy their interests and they, in turn, would ensure that you got the right questions to enable the Marine Corps to go on the record as saying, "Yes, we understand that the V-22 is not affordable but we have to have something and it is becoming critical and it is the best machine out there and we know that the Administration cannot afford it, we regret that, but we have to have something." And then he would say, "Wouldn't the V-22 be the best?"

"Without question." You have given him all he needs to go on to the committee to then represent and argue for money to give the Marine Corps for a given program.

BGEN SIMMONS: Making and defending the budget is one of the Commandant's most important functions. I wonder what percentage of your time actually went into it, starting with programming through defense of the budget? Ten percent? Twenty-five percent?

GEN MUNDY: I would be hard pressed — I think probably your first year arguably 20 percent of your time might go into that. Remember that a program is five years so the key thing is that you inherit a program and you cannot just throw it out and start all over again. But, you can establish your priorities or the priorities of your team — I would prefer to think of it in that sense — and I am talking about the Marine Corps team at that point. You can establish your priorities in your first year and the program that a Commandant lays down, it really, the way we change command, the program for your first year is already laid, you have got it. You are representing the previous Commandant's budget on the Hill, not yours.

So, your first time up becomes your second year in office when you have developed a program that you are going to lay down. And that is it for you because you might not get all of it or you might emphasize a little bit more, but your program is effectively in place for your tenure your second year. So thereafter, you spend less time probably on the program and you spend more time working the Hill. That is going up to make calls to say, "Senator, the Marine Corps has to have some help in this particular area."

That is, again I cannot stress the tension of the high wire that you walk because I found it extraordinary, for example, that when Secretary John Dalton became the Secretary of the Navy, he was new, at least to Defense and to that part of the business, and he would from time to time express dismay if not outrage that, how is it that we are representing the President's budget, how can you be over there talking to the Senator and telling him that you need something that is not in the President's budget? And, you know, I said, "Mr. Secretary, you cannot be that naive. That is my job, is to go over there and to talk the Congress into buying what the Marine Corps needs. I am not here to buy what the Army needs. I am here to buy what the Marine Corps needs." So it is hard for the appointed officials to recognize that just because it has the President's budget printed on top of it, that that is not

the ultimate in loyalty, that you go over there and say, "We are bleeding to death and it feels very good." So that is a fine, fine, line.

But the Commandant, if not the personality, but indeed the image of the Commandant, that is a revered entity on the Hill. There are many people for whom the Commandant on the Capitol Hill is a respected individual and the Congressional members want to know from you what it is that the Marine Corps needs. They understand your role in representing the President, but they want to know, what do you say the Marine Corps needs, not the President, but you. And you have that obligation to them. And again, it is rather awkward but it is the way our law and our structure is built.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 2 March your desk calendar shows an office call by LtGen Ma Li Sui, the Commandant of the Nationalist Chinese Marine Corps. I presume this was part of a longer official visit.

GEN MUNDY: No, it was not. He was a Command and Staff College classmate and he was in town. And, of course, as we know at this particular time in our history we, the United States did not recognize the Republic of Taiwan as the Chinese Government, and as a result, many, many fine Chinese Marine Corps friends that we trained at Quantico, that we grew up with and everything, can no longer wear their uniforms in this country.

So, Ma — as I know him — Ma came through, dropped me a note and said, "I am going to be in Washington." Came through and I think he brought me a bottle of fine Chinese wine or something like that and we just reminisced over old times and he went on with his visit, but you cannot discuss formal matters. I mean, you can say, how are things in the Chinese Marine Corps and he can tell you. But you cannot sell them school seats, you could not then, you could not talk about equipments for them. So you had nothing really formally to talk about.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 3 March, in ALMAR 050/92 you announced "the eradication of sexual harassment as a high priority on the agenda of every Marine and civilian within the Corps." This ALMAR followed Secretary of the Navy, Garrett's pronouncement on 1 March that any officer or enlisted person found to have committed a sexually harassing act would be processed for administrative separation. Was this linked to the Tailhook scandal?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, of course. I mean, big time. That was a reaction to Tailhook. It was mandated. The Secretary said, "I am going to put this thing out. I want each of you to, to the CNO and me, implement a directive." And so we did so. There was an element of sincerity in that we did move, I moved sincerely to address the issue of sexual harassment. It was there. It is there today. It is probably not as pronounced as an occasional sensational story makes it, but nonetheless we did have sexual harassment and I did want to stamp it out. But, yes, it was a specific reaction to the Tailhook saga.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 March you spoke at a banquet of the American Bandmasters Association. This was a different sort of speech. In it you speak of military music. You also speak of a Marine fiddler, Staff Sergeant Pete Wilson. What was that all about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Bandmaster Association, Col John Bourgeois, arguably one of the best, maybe the best band director in America today, was the president of the Association and so he invited me to come and address it. I was, you know, I was a bandsman when I was in high school and have an affinity for music, for bands in general. I thoroughly enjoyed the evening because I met many of the greats, you know, names that I had seen on the corner of the sheet music that had written some march that I had played when I was in high school or something like that were there, you know, they were present.

The reason for the reference to Staff Sergeant Wilson, as I recall it, Staff Sergeant Pete Wilson is and remains one of my real great friends. He lives down near you and me, down in Mt. Vernon Square, as a matter of fact. He is just a wonderful young man. He is a concert violinist — I was saying that he was one of the finest concert violinists anywhere. Goes down and plays at the White House, you know, at national formal occasions. But, he can turn that violin into a country fiddle in a heartbeat. So he played in a group that was very special to me, a country music group.

However, the reason for the mention of him that night was that one of those being honored by the American Bandmaster's Association, and therefore a head table guest on the dias, was his former high school band director who did not have any idea of that fact. But I, having foreknowledge of that, was able in my remarks to make reference that here is the tie between the Marine Band and the bands of America, and made reference to Pete Wilson.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had announced plans to dis-

establish the six Marine Expeditionary Brigades, but the disestablishment would take time. In March 1992, your old command, 4th MEB, took part in Exercise Teamwork 92, the annual exercise in the North Atlantic, the North Sea, Norway. Did you visit that exercise?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did. That was BGen Carl Fulford then in command of the brigade and I, in my continuing association with the northern region of NATO, the Norwegians, which we discussed earlier, and certainly my affection for the 4th MEB. It was a good exercise.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 16 March, you announced the adoption of the blue V-necked sweater as an optional duty uniform item for Marine recruiters. That was one of your uniform objectives about which we talked earlier. Has it proved to be a popular item? Gen Mundy: I think it was initially popular and it may still, the newness has worn off so maybe you do not see as much of it. It served a useful purpose. However the continued authorization — and I do not say that critically; I was a continued authorizer, too — of the wear of what we know as the tanker jacket or the pewter-colored jacket with any uniform that we have, to include the blues. While it does not go well with it, we have authorized it, so, it is a much more practical and comfortable piece of uniform accessory.

Number one, everybody owns one and you wear it with greens or you wear it with blues. Number two, you can unzip it if it is warm, or unzip it to a point, at least. You can take it off when you get there. The sweater is a sweater. So, I would imagine that probably the Marines in New Hampshire are probably wearing the blue sweater a lot. The Marines in Atlanta, Georgia are wearing the blue sweater a lot less. So, it has not been a catch-fire, but it still is a practical alternative for those Marines who prefer a sweater to wearing a topcoat.

BGEN SIMMONS: Also on 16 March, Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, launched its last A-6 Intruder. One of the workhorses of Marine aviation for nearly 30 years was passing from the scene. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: It was, number one, the aircraft was obsolescent. It was going out. The F-18D was brought in to replace that and we were receiving those. It was a dollar-saver. We deactivated them. We turned them over to the Navy, turned them back to the Navy, if you will, and deactivated them, our squadrons early. That was a force structure issue but

it was also a dollar-saver. We were not paying for airplanes — it was a workhorse of the Marine Corps but it was also the gas hog of the Marine Corps. It was an extraordinarily expensive aircraft to maintain and operate. So we saved a lot of money by getting out a few months early.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were sort of political implications in the length of time it stayed in the inventory, were there not?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, there were because Secretary John Lehman was an A-6 crewmember. I cannot remember if he was a pilot. I think he was a crewmember and then he became a pilot after he became the Secretary, as I recall. But anyway, he had a deep affection for the A-6 and therefore you did not want to talk about getting rid of the A-6s during Lehman's watch. So he kept them around. But it was an aircraft that carried the bomb equivalent of a B-17 in World War II in this two-man aircraft. It was a tremendously capable machine.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 March you visited The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. The next day you went to Pensacola, Florida to speak at a National Prayer Luncheon and on the third day you went to Mayport and Blount Island. Any special recollections of this visit?

GEN MUNDY: Those were "show the flag" visits. You know, you go to Pensacola, that is the seat of training for Naval aviators, to include Marines. We have the Marine Air Training Support Group there. I went there to visit them. Blount Island, the Maritime Prepositioning Servicing Port. Mayport was simply, we landed there, got on the helicopter and went over to Blount Island, so did not make a visit to Mayport. But it was just, again, one of those stop-by by the Commandant and an update by the Commandant.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 March you frocked BGen Chuck Krulak as a major general. He was moving up fast, wasn't he?

GEN MUNDY: Well, he was about normal at that point. He, let's see, I think he became a brigadier in 1989, I think. Yes, 1989. So that was about his, you know, he was a little short of the three-year mark. That was probably about par for the course.

BGEN SIMMONS: Later that day you made a quick trip to Beaufort, South Carolina. I wonder if you kept

a log of just how many miles you flew during your four years as Commandant?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. Someone may have. I did not and I am not aware if we did or not. But we traveled a lot and that was enabled largely by the C-20 aircraft, a very fast aircraft, very capable. Again, the flying office.

And unlike the days when had Gen Barrow decided to fly off to Beaufort he would have — Beaufort is not a good example because it is such a short distance — but it would have meant the R5D four-engine aircraft cranking up with a big crew and all of that and lumbering off. Whereas now you can run out and hop on a jet and you are airborne and in an hour and a half you are in Beaufort, you do what you have to do and turn around and come back. So it really enables — the speed of air travel of a C-20 enables you to be very nimble and very quick.

BGEN SIMMONS: I wish you had kept a log. I bet the number is surprising, the number of miles.

GEN MUNDY: It might have been. And again, that may have been kept. If it was it probably is in the C-20, I mean out here in the aviation detachment. They may have kept that. It would be very easy to define that number simply by asking them to tabulate all the miles. It might be worth doing.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 24 March you went to Quebec for a two-day visit. What was the purpose of that, General?

GEN MUNDY: Each year the Canadian Forces Council which is their equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff get together for, really it is as much social as anything else. But one year the Canadians come to Washington and the next year we go to Canada to someplace, Quebec this year or Montreal, where we might have gone.

We arrive in the afternoon. We go to the hotel. We have a dinner that evening. We then have a meeting the next morning of about a half day's duration and then do some things. You know, go see somebody's — in this case it was at The Citadel in Quebec that we had the affair and then you leave in the afternoon and come back. So it really is only about a half-day exchange, but it is where all of the U.S. Joint Chiefs and all of the Canadian Armed Forces Chiefs come together just to talk about matters in general.

That was historic in the sense that they chose to have it because that was the 50th anniversary of the

meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Combined Chiefs of Staff together with Roosevelt and Churchill. And they had their pictures made at a point overlooking the St. Lawrence River on The Citadel. So they took us back up and put us in the footsteps, if you will, and then gave us as a memento, which I have now turned over to you or turned over to the Archives here, a picture, a side-by-side of them, the original picture, and us.

All I can remember is that to have this picture made we had to, because they had been in uniform and you would want to be in your uniform, not your overcoat, we divested ourselves of our top coats and I want to tell you that the St. Lawrence River was frozen and you were really eager to have the shutter snap.

There is another very humorous aspect that happened at this meeting. We had flown up — this was one in which all of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman and everybody, gets on the same airplane and goes off together. We flew up on what is now Air Force II. It is the 707 which used to be Air Force I. It was the plane in which President Kennedy was carried back from Dallas or Lyndon Johnson was sworn in to be the President on. But it is now Air Force II and of course, it is old. It is still very splendid. It is the Vice President's plane at this day and time.

So we flew off. We landed. We had the affair. The next day we pull out and all the Canadian Forces Chiefs and their wives come out, the Chief of Defense, and they line up and we shake hands and say goodbye and get on the airplane. And Colin Powell, our Chairman, is the last man aboard. He turns around and they salute him and he salutes them and we get on the airplane and the doors close.

And as we sat down and buckled in there came an electric smell through the airplane. Of course the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen Tony McPeak, was on board who is a very, Tony is a very straight, he really is a fine and fun-loving personality but all outward appearances are very conservative, straight fellow. Anyway, the airplane will not start. The electrical system, you know, a fuse is gone or something. So we sat there for a few minutes and the crew was running back and forth, you know, telling Gen McPeak, "Sir, we will have it fixed in just a minute." And they run back up and a few more minutes go by.

And finally, Gen Powell said, "Open the door." So all the Canadians are still lined up freezing to death outside the airplane waiting on us to crank up and take off. So they opened the door and Colin called out and said, "Look, you all, get on the bus and go home. You know, we are going to be all right. They are going to get it fixed."

"No, we'll wait."

"No, get out of here and go home." So we had this exchange. So the Canadians finally waved and got in their cars and took off. Well, at about the same time, simultaneously, the electrical problem is solved and Air Force II fires up and all engines are go.

We took off, and of course with all the Chiefs sitting there with our wives, we were harassing the Chief of Staff of the Air Force unmercifully. You know, "If this had been a Marine airplane, I said, this would have never happened, Mr. Chairman. You know, I am deeply embarrassed, you know, we would have gotten home on a Marine plane. And even the Army, if it had been an Army helicopter, it would have never happened. So we were really giving Tony McPeak a hard time. Well, we got airborne and McPeak, to escape this harassment from his peers, decides that he is going to take a nap. So he said, "Well, guys, enough. I am going to catch a nap here." Reached down and grabbed the handle on his seat to recline it a bit and the back of the seat fell off [laughter] and McPeak right over on top of it. So here now is the Chief of Staff, the airplane will not start, we had harassed him, and now his seat falls apart right there in the VIP section of the airplane.

So McPeak has never, to this day, he is out in Oregon now, but to this day any time that I see Tony McPeak I remind him of that flight. We all vowed that we would never again fly with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

That is, however, that is one of the, maybe in telling that maybe what I have depicted for you is that I think among this group of Chiefs, the Chiefs with whom I was privileged to serve, even though we had our differences and different views or different opinions and occasionally we would, you know, occasionally you had to fight a little bit, but this was probably the most collegial group of Joint Chiefs, certainly that I am aware of. We all were genuinely friends and we all, I mean there were good times like I have just described for you among the Chiefs. And that was good because we had some political stresses during our tenure and it was important that we grew close together.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 27 March, you went to Annapolis for a Mess Night. This would probably be a good place to discuss the importance of the Naval Academy as a source for Marine Corps officers.

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Mess Night is an annual event, Marine Corps event, and sometimes the Commandant goes. They always try to get the Commandant or the Assistant Commandant, and so it

is an enjoyable affair.

The Marine Corps draws, by agreement with the Navy longstanding, draws 16 and 2/3ds percent of a graduating class. That amounts to about 160, maybe 165; highs I would say would be 175 officers a year. And sometimes we do not, "make that quota." Sometimes there will be less. This past year we had a far smaller number that came into the Marine Corps. So that is what the take is.

There are those who would argue pro or con on the value of the Naval Academy. The incumbent, the current Commandant is a Naval Academy graduate so that probably is proof that we get some extraordinary officers out of that.

However, the Naval Academy over time has tended to produce officers that were, in the sense of professional performance, either black or white; very few gray officers. They were either very good, they were the Krulaks, and they were the Milligans and they were the Draudes and the Deans and the Deegans and people like that who were, indeed, superb officers. Or, in at least some number of the cases, and a few years ago when a study was done, in a higher proportion than other comparable program's cases, they were also not so good. They were people who had been to the Naval Academy who had either tired of spit shining shoes and wearing uniforms and had kind of come to the conclusion that, "Look, I will serve my five years and then I am out of here."

So, when I headed a Captain's Board many, many years ago, I was startled to find the number of Naval Academy graduates, first lieutenants coming up for captain, who really had sour records to that point.

So, the point I think that I seek to make is, that we have not, in the Marine Corps, I think, concluded in our studies of officer programs over the years that the Naval Academy really gives you any consistently higher quality young officer or career officer than do our other programs. And as a result the Marine Corps has never really been too hung up on the Naval Academy [graduates] that we get. You know, we count on getting about 160 a year. If you have a year in which you only get 130 then your officer accessions are shorted that year so we try to maintain the level but not because they are innately of greater quality than are the officer candidates or the PLCs.

It was that analysis that led to the actions by the Congress here just a few years ago that decreed that, I think starting this year that all officers would be commissioned into the Armed Forces as Reserve officers vice regular officers out of the Academy so that a selection can be made further along as to who are really the cream of the crop officers. There are pros

and cons to that but in the main I do not think we would suffer.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next evening, the 28th of March, you attended the Gridiron Dinner. During the previous month, on 1 February, you had attended the Wallow at the Military Order of the Carabao. Somewhere on your calendar I saw the Alfalfa Dinner. Do these dinners have anything in common?

GEN MUNDY: What they have in common is that they generally are all along the same style as far as the organizations that sponsor them and that hold the affairs. The commonality would be only that the Marine Band, Col John Bourgeois, Master Gunnery Sergeant Mike Ryan and other members of the Marine Band are the consistent performers and, in many cases orchestrators and, you know, and planners of these events.

The three are, the Gridiron Club is the national press corps, and that is, not the, you know, the reporters are all there, the Mike Wallaces are there or whoever you have seen on television last night, Brinkley or whoever it might be, they are there or can be there. But, more importantly, their bosses are there, the Chairman of the *New York Times* or the Chairman of *Time* Publishing and Broadcasting and those sorts of people are there.

So, it is white-tie affair, tails, white-tie. It is the one time, probably, the once or twice a year — no more than twice a year — that a Marine gets to wear this horrible looking white weskit that we have instead of the red one with your formal wear. Look like you have hung your shirt out, you know, but nonetheless that is a white-tie affair.

The Alfalfa Club is a black-tie affair. It is a political affair and so it is the Democrats and the Republicans that host this affair. And the Alfalfa party is, they get up and begin by announcing that, what does Alfalfa do? And the answer is, not much. But it is only a, it is an opportunity to bring the President and in the case of the Gridiron Club, the national press that, of course, is hounding him most of the time, bring them together in an evening of comradeship and fun and first class food and drink. The Alfalfa Club is a chance for the Democrats to rip the Republicans apart and the Republicans to rip the Democrats apart in a, you know, with a great deal of humor.

The Carabao Wallow is the military counterpart of all of this and generally speaking, those who attend are either retired military or active military officers or friends who have come in. And it would be, if I had

to categorize them, realizing that you had been the Grand Paramount of the Order of the Carabao, it is probably, it would rank third in order of class. We do not have the money or the resources to go at it as these others do, but. . . . typical of the Gridiron Club, the President is in attendance at the first two, the Gridiron and the Alfalfa, and he is roasted and the First Lady is roasted and anybody else of any national prominence is roasted. Last year Newt Gingrich was roasted. Dole will be roasted.

The president of the Gridiron Club will get up and make a very humorous roasting speech to begin. Then you have the meal. This thing goes on usually about four hours. You will have the meal and between courses of the meal on will come a theatrical performance.

It begins with the Marine Band — it begins with the Marine Drum and Bugle Corps parading in and absolutely stirring the crowd to a height of patriotic frenzy. The Marine Drum and Bugle Corps marches out, the doors open, another band comes in and as Tony McPeak said to me the first year, "Hey, that was a great Marine Band. Okay, now it is the Army Band." And I said, "No, Tony, it is the Marine Band." So the Marine Corps owns the night. It is all Marine musicians who are there and people love it. So the Commandant is naturally a big figure.

The Joint Chiefs come. I went three of the four years. You sit at the head table. The Cabinet members are up there, all the White House, Chief of Staff, press secretaries and so on, you sit with them. So it is a very illustrious head table.

The President and the First Lady are there. You get some time to mix it up with them. You have cocktails with them beforehand. And then it is just a grand dinner evening and there is, the skits in between will be, some national figure will be the, I remember the year that Secretary of Education, Lamar Alexander, you know, the curtains part and here is Lamar Alexander playing the piano and singing. He has a wonderful voice and he entertains for awhile. And then it will be some national columnist or a politician that will, out will walk, Congressman Dick Gephardt last year, the curtains part and there he is in a Boy Scout uniform with short breeches and leggings and he gives his piece. It is a tremendously fine evening.

At each of those affairs there is only one toast during the evening and after they have roasted the President unmercifully and roasted, and the Democrats have roasted the Republicans and counterpart, the president said, "Ladies and gentleman, we have only one toast. Will you stand?" And the toast is to the President of the United States. So it is a time

to come together and you toast the President. And then he stands up and I will tell you, I mean, these are professionally developed scripts but they are rib splitting. Every President, Bush did a swami act with a pink cape on his back that just would absolutely throw you in the aisles.

President Clinton is, you know, when he finishes being the President, I hope he will go into acting because he is splendid in the humor that comes back across. It is, you leave, everybody leaves there feeling warm about each other but the high and the mighty gather.

The Carabao Wallow, I could say only that it is sort of more of the same. It is, the entertainment afterwards put on by members of the Carabao but orchestrated pretty much by the Marine Band generally prongs anything that has been a military sensational issue. You know, they had a song that they would sing about the B-2 or the V-22 or women in combat or whatever the issues of the year have been. Grand evenings of camaraderie.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were off once again on 1 April, this time for a two-day visit to Kansas City. While there you spoke to the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. From your notes, this talk addressed Army and Marine Corps operational relationships in the past and outlined a "Corps of the Marines for the Future." You also visited the various Marine Corps activities in Kansas City. Any particular comments on this trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, more of the same. War College presentations, a chance to influence the young Army officers of the future. What I found over my years is that, number one, remember I started out in Army ROTC and I have great affection for, enduring affection for the Army, but the Army understands the least as an institution about anybody else other than itself. And so, the Army perception is that a Marine is a soldier just like they are and, you know, they frequently do not understand the differences in the service operations. So I found them a very fertile and ripe field to try and sow the seeds of understanding better of the Corps, but nothing remarkable.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about a comment on the importance of Fort Leavenworth to the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Fort Leavenworth is the Army Command and General Staff College and other schools, other Army schools, but arguably over the years, you know, one would say the premiere or the

prima donna school to have attended. I think in the early years of our, the Corps coming along, you know, the cream of the crop of the Army officers went to the Command and General Staff College and Marine officers went there, fairly select. It is a tremendous school.

As a practical matter, it is no better than what we have at Quantico in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Indeed, the first of the Command and Staff Colleges to be accredited by the Joint Professional Military Education Accreditation Commission overseen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico. But it is big. When you walk out on stage there are about 800 Army majors and a few Marines and some sailors and a few airmen, but it is big. It is one of the Army's very proud institutions and it is a very good school.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 1992 Defense Authorization Act required the creation of a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. The 15 member commission held its first meeting 25 March. Did the Marine Corps have membership on the Commission?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine Corps, you know, as far as a Marine on the Commission, yes, BGen Tom Draude was assigned to the Commission. We also had a Reserve colonel named Ron Ray from Lexington, Kentucky who served on that Commission. So that was the, quote, the Marine Corps representation on the thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did Tom Draude and Ron Ray see eye to eye?

GEN MUNDY: No, they did not. BGen Draude's daughter was a Navy officer and aspired to be a pilot and is a pilot today, a beautiful young woman and I am sure a very fine officer taking after her father. But Col Ron Ray was on the "right hand of Attila," I guess, in terms of his views of women in the military and saw as his purpose to prevent them from being there. He was, he probably had some Marine encouragement from other Marines.

But no, they were dramatically polar in their views and, in fact, really regrettable, but on the Commission Col Ray and some of the board, extreme members of the board — not necessarily with whom I disagreed in total in what they were trying to do, but they simply were not real rational in doing it — they actually got up and walked out on one session and refused to vote.

So the Commission came to some very tense deliberations.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's note in passing that on 1 April the Command Element of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the unit that had been the nucleus of our buildup in the Persian Gulf was deactivated.

On 1 April 1992, Camp Lejeune increased in size from 111,000 acres to 152,000 acres by the purchase of 41,000 acres by DOD for a nominal \$41,000. How did we ever bring this off?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is extraordinary and had I been a betting man I would have probably lost a few cases of beer on this, but actually that initiative began back about 1985. The officer, I suppose we should say, then-MajGen Lou Buehl who was commanding the base at Camp Lejeune was responsible for it, in point of fact, a colonel named Bert Speicher who I had known over the years and thought a great deal of, still do, he is retired now, but Col Bert Speicher was the training officer for the Marine Corps Base at Camp Lejeune and became aware that the, I believe it was the Weyerhaeuser Corporation had a stand where they had been raising timber that was adjacent to the base down near the Varona Loop area where the Infantry Training Regiment School and now School of Infantry had trained over the years. They made it known, I guess, that they would be willing to sell this to the Marine Corps and Bert Speicher took that over as a project, again under the command of Gen Buehl, to give credit to the commanding general, and began to develop the very deliberate program that has to go forth with the acquisition of land by the government.

That is, you know, notification of everybody, coming up with a plan for moving the graves and for buying the properties that are on there, contacting those people and gaining their willingness to sell or going through the condemnation process. It takes a long time but it continued to move steadily and steadily and steadily along until lo and behold. . . . I do not think it ever went out of step, I do not think it ever lapsed, it simply trudged ahead. And every time someone would mention to me about the land acquisition, I would say, "We will never get that done."

The Congress appropriated the money and we bought the land and so Camp Lejeune was, at a time when we were closing bases and reducing structure, the Marine Corps was able to as you point out increase that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday the 4th of April, you

went to Chicago for the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Leatherneck Ball. This might be a good place for you to comment on the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation and its relationship to the Marine Corps.

GEN MUNDY: The Scholarship Foundation is a private foundation and really bears, other than through its name, has no, you know, is not any official part of the Marine Corps, but it is certainly sanctioned by the Marine Corps. It is long standing. It has for years raised monies to provide scholarships for the dependents of Marines, both serving Marines and Marines who have died in the service. Generally speaking, about anybody who can form any attachment to the Marine Corps at all can apply for one of these scholarships. It does not mean they will get it but they are eligible to apply.

If it serves. . . . I am not one who is extraordinarily high on scholarships today. I think there was a time in our nation when there were indeed many and truly needy people who would not otherwise have gone on for an advanced education. There are still some today. So there is a place for scholarships, but there are a lot of scholarships and there are a lot of institutions that support scholarships.

So one might argue that maybe it is not so much the value of the scholarship that I believe is a great service to the Marine Corps, however, it is the image for the Marine Corps that is created by the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation. It can be no more wholesome. It is like Toys for Tots. It is like many things that the Corps does that simply generates a good popular image.

There are five of these balls around the nation in various major cities. They are usually 500 to 1100 or 1200 people. They raise on the order of per, I would say that each ball probably raises \$25,000 for scholarships. There are now some, about a dozen golf tournaments that are sponsored by this organization. Each one of those raises, \$25,000 to \$30,000. So there is a lot of revenue.

One of the most impressive things that I experienced with the Scholarship Foundation is that I was privileged to introduce into "the tank" at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs the then president and one of the original, the founders of this, retired, former, World War II, U.S. Sergeant Major Pete Haas, who was the president. At the end of the Gulf War, when we had identified all of the school age children of the military members, both men and women, who had been killed in the Gulf, it turned out to be 134 children that were at least eligible or young enough that they were going

to need support in education. The Scholarship Foundation presented each of those with a \$10,000 bond, which I thought would be wonderful to bring him into "the tank" and let him give to each of the Service Chiefs this tremendous, the gracious offering.

At the expense, I would say, one of my Service counterparts in particular, well, all of them accepted it graciously, did not accept it warmly because it was really something that it was the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation passing out \$10,000 bonds to Army dependents and Air Force dependents when there was no Army or Air Force outfit, or Navy, that was doing anything similar.

So they do a lot of good things. But the principal one is creating a very healthy and wholesome image of Marines as servants of the nation out of affluence in any community.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 8 April you paid an office call on Congresswoman Pat Schroeder. I bet that was an interesting meeting.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it really wasn't. In fact, I never really had an interesting meeting with Pat Schroeder, even despite her image and the fact that she is outspoken in the press and so on. She writes you absolutely caustic letters. She will tear you apart in the press. She will sometimes, although I can tell you that after we had the testimony on women in combat, and if I am not mistaken that was in about 1992, Congresswoman Schroeder just simply quit coming to hearings. We did not see her anymore with the Chiefs.

But, that was a courtesy call. I went to see her simply to say, "Here I am and I am proud to serve and I look forward to working with you." So it was not interesting and even though I called on her another year for the same purpose of simply going in to say "I appreciate the support you give to people in Armed Forces," we never had a substantive discussion. But then you would leave there and get an absolutely snotty, letter from Congresswoman Schroeder that would just castigate you, you know, for something you never heard of, but it would just rip you apart for something.

So, I decided to deal with her instead of the usual, you know, subordination to the Congress and always as we usually respond, "Dear Congresswoman, we appreciate your interest and regret the confusion, you know, and sorry about that." This is usually the way. But I just chose, if she wrote me a caustic letter I just sent her a three-liner right back and said, "No, that is not so. C.E. Mundy, Jr." And we, our communications stopped except until she could get to me on tele-

vision or something. Pat Schroeder, or as we knew her, "Peppermint Patty", was the epitome of the Congressperson who disguises herself under a flag of patriotic support for those in uniform while actually supporting a very narrow feminist and gay right agenda.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, on Friday 10 April you went to New York for the Scholarship Ball and from there went on to Atlantic Beach, North Carolina for a Rotary dinner on Saturday. Do you have any special recollections of this weekend?

GEN MUNDY: My only recollections of it was it was a fast weekend, obviously, for that amount of travel, but it was covering a number of bases. The Scholarship Foundation and the balls and the golf tournaments that are associated with it, I think we have spoken about before and I will not tell that over again except to say that I was endeavoring to attend a majority, not all of them, a majority of those gatherings that year. And the other to Atlantic Beach for a Rotary Club dinner is simply a, you know, means of getting out to the grass roots and talking about the various issues. So, it was a fast weekend, not a great deal of substance. But, actually before I end there because we ended our last session, as you recall, by mentioning an office call on Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, we must have triggered an event because you will note that in the four or five days since we last met that Mrs. Schroeder announced her retirement from the Congress at the end of her current term. I think that is just worthy of getting into the record here. She will not be missed.

BGEN SIMMONS: Yes, it is. We have a couple more stalwarts who are leaving the Congress, Senator Alan Simpson and Senator Mark Hatfield. This is the end of an era, I think, as far as Congress is concerned.

GEN MUNDY: Many of the, if you will, as you say the stalwarts, the Sonny Montgomerys, Senator Sam Nunn, that have been long in the Congress have announced their plans to step aside and it will be, within the next couple of years it will be a distinctly different Congress. That is not a value judgement. We have had changes before. But we do have a large number of the old core, if you will, that are stepping aside at this moment.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April it was announced that all 48 of the Corps' OV-10 Bronco observation aircraft would be phased out of service by March, 1994. Was

this accomplished and what was the follow-on aircraft for the OV-10?

GEN MUNDY: It was accomplished and, in fact, as plans moved along we accomplished it before March, 1994. I frankly do not remember the exact time, but as we were facing fiscal constraints and downsizing the structure and the number of people that we had and a number of cases, we had the opportunity to execute the plan a little bit faster and we did so. So the OV-10s came out earlier, as I recall, than March, 1994.

The necessity for that was driven by the fact that we had very limited use for the OV-10 in the active force and had practically moved them all into the Reserves. And the practical use of the aircraft had become essentially that the Marine Corps supported counter-narcotics operations down in the Caribbean by sending down a detachment of OV-10s, which are excellent observation aircraft and which have, you know, long endurance and are reliable platforms. So they served a very good purpose in a rather non-hostile environment.

However, even in Desert Storm we really wrenched back and forth with whether or not to send OV-10s and finally sent them at the last minute, embarked them aboard an aircraft carrier and floated them over, because of the hostile threat and the threat that a slow-moving aircraft like that could face an increasing missile and Stinger-type missile weapon system environment.

So, at any rate, they had come to the end, if you will, of their useful life. They were nice to have around but they were expensive to maintain. The envisioned replacement for the OV-10 would be the F-18D, that is the two-seat F-18 which would fill the TAC-A, FAC-A, tactical air control or airborne, forward air control, airborne role from a jet aircraft instead of from a slower moving OV-10. Many would argue, and I think correctly so, that you cannot do it as well at 450 knots as you could at 120 knots. No question about that, but then you are not as vulnerable at 450 knots as you were at 120 knots.

We also envisioned that as the V-22 or, you know, an aircraft, a tilt rotor-type aircraft would come into the inventory in the next couple of decades that we probably will have a, the term would be VMAO or an observation aircraft that might or might not be exactly the V-22 but would be something like it that would replace the Huey helicopter, for example, that we use in that capacity as well as the OV-10. It would be faster. The V-22, of course, is about 250 or 300 knots. That is double the speed in round numbers of the OV-

10. So that was the saga of the OV-10.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about the drone aircraft or the RPV, Remote Piloted Vehicle, which we had some success with in Desert Storm?

GEN MUNDY: We did in Desert Storm and in the earlier engagement, Praying Mantis, in the earlier Gulf War which was principally the naval war. The Pioneer aircraft which the Marine Corps, again to Gen Gray's credit, he saw the need for this, and we quickly bought some off the shelf UAVs, as they are termed, from the Israelis. That was the Pioneer aircraft. They developed it.

It was very useful. As is always the case, this is kind of like flying a very large model aircraft around by remote control, and if you have ever tried that you know that it takes a skill and that you break a few of them doing that. So we had a high attrition rate with the aircraft, more so in training than ever in combat. But they would simply crash upon take-off or crash when someone was trying to land them or they would for some other reason.

As is usually the case, recognizing the great utility of the Pioneer, which was principally Navy and Marine Corps, the Navy bought some and put them aboard the battleships. We tested them on the amphibious ships. They are space consumptive. It took a lot of space to put these things on and you would have to clear the deck of the amphib which, you know, limits its utility if it was going to be embarked with a full amphibious force. But, they were launched from the battleships when we had those, and also could fly off the amphib. This made for a very useful platform.

When we became then jointly interested, when the other Services moved to get a single type of aircraft — it is worth noting that that was about 1991 or so we began, it is now, we are about to enter 1996 and we are still fooling around, I use that term loosely but meaningfully, with trying to come up with a replacement for the Pioneer. The current version is called the Hunter. But it is a joint service endeavor and any time that you undertake such a thing each Service wants another bell or another whistle hung on this particular piece of equipment and so it just takes forever to get it designed and built. And because of all the capabilities that are sought to be built into it, it sometimes becomes overly complex and difficult to introduce into the operational inventory.

That is where we are today. We still have some Pioneers around. The Hunter will be the intended replacement and that does offset, as you very accu-

rately made a point relative to our observation capability, it does offset some of the need that perhaps an OV-10 or another type aircraft might provide.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where do these unpiloted aircraft fit into the organizational structure?

GEN MUNDY: Okay, well, the term “unmanned aerial vehicle,” you are right, it is an unpiloted aircraft. We had a company, we called it in those days before UAV, it was RPV, Remotely Piloted Vehicle. The RPV companies were built into the, interestingly, into the Marine division and we had a company that was initially within the Headquarters Battalion of the division and then ultimately, I believe that we put the RPV company into the Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, SRIG, as it was known, when that came into being. So it is something of an orphan outfit that really, you know, it is very small. We had difficulty in acquiring the pilots because we found that people who built model airplanes or liked to fool around with model airplanes made the best pilots. So rather than creating a training school or coming up with an MOS, we went out and scavenged the Marine Corps for people who had that type of interest. So you might find a pilot who was an administrator by MOS or he could be an infantryman or any occupation specialty. So it was rather a bastardized organization. And as those pilots, as we began to then run through those pilots and need to get that particular Marine back into his or her regular occupational specialty, we found that we were coming up short on the side of people who had the skills and the interest to go off and play with the joystick and fly these RPVs around. I think it has gotten a little bit better than that in the interim, but it has always been a rather lightly organized, never up to full T/O, never up to full T/E, for that matter, because the aircraft are expensive and we have crashed them. The Marine Corps moved at one point to build six companies, a company being a very small organization like a platoon, but we never got to that level of six companies.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are they still to be found on the ground side rather than the air side?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, they are, they are, because they are the the ground commander’s instrument for surveillance and they are coordinated in our various direct air support coordination center, fire support coordination center integration. Very useful. For example, in the desert we used them to spot when the artillery would be brought up and the 155 artillery

would shoot. The RPVs would provide a direct forward observer for long range artillery fires.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was a story, perhaps apocryphal, that a group of Iraqis surrendered to one of these RPVs.

GEN MUNDY: They did. The vehicle, the aircraft was being used to survey them, you know, to look at them and they saw it flying over and came out waving their white flag, as I recall, thinking that this was probably a manned aircraft — it looks very much like an airplane when you can see it — and assuming that, you know, that the pilot might land and take them prisoner or. . . but anyway, signaling that they wanted to surrender. It did occur.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 23 April you went to Annapolis as the speaker at the U.S. Naval Institute Awards Banquet. You were a link, so to speak, between the afternoon’s panel discussion on “Joint Operations in the New World Order” and the discussion scheduled for the following day on “Downsizing the Military.” You pulled it together with a question that was the theme of your remarks. “How do we ensure that we can successfully conduct joint operations while downsizing the military and at the same time avoid unnecessary duplication?” That is a pretty good summation, I would think, of the main thrust of your four years as Commandant. Would you agree?

GEN MUNDY: I think so. I was going to say it was a very long question. That was probably about all I had to say for the evening by the time I got through that couple of sentences long question, but my, yes, I believe I can say that that pretty well summed up my efforts. I wanted, I recognized that the Marine Corps, instead of as we had tried for years — and I had been one of the, you know, those who “carried the mail” and sought very much to have the Marine Corps be, you know, stand alone and to keep Navy and Marine Corps-only operations — it was very clear to me after my years in Washington and my experience down at Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, that that was not to be. We were going to have to fit all the pieces of the puzzle better together because with a reduced-size military, indeed as we have seen over the past three or four years, we wind up sending a battalion of Marines and two battalions of soldiers and a security element of Air Force air police and some Navy seabees or SEALs or something, even into organizations that number only 4,000 or 5,000 personnel.

At one time this would have been a Marine regiment, brigade, MAGTF, or an Army brigade or something like that and we would have not, you know, mixed it up quite as much as very clearly we are set upon doing today, partially in the name of jointness, and I would say, you know, positively, in the sense that when you are able to do that you do get all the instruments within the tool box available to a joint force commander in a given scenario. So he has some Marines if he needs to do something that Marines do well and he has, you know, mixed with the other forces but in ever increasing smaller numbers than most of us would think about jointness in the days of World War II where it was, you know, two or three Marine divisions and three or four Army divisions went off and formed an amphibious corps or the Tenth Army or something like that. We are down to the battalion and oftentimes down to the company or the squadron level. So it was clear to me that we were going to have to fit into this puzzle.

I also have long believed, and do to this day, that the most joint of the joint forces is the Marine Corps. We are truly the only combined arms organization in the U.S. inventory and we are the only organization that has over not just a fashionable period of time or an event, scenario event, we have historically and consistently focused on combined arms integration, on fire support coordination, on the coordination of air support into fire support from the sea, ashore, all of those sorts of things that indeed are the essence of jointness. So, I believed that if the Marine Corps could get out front in, as I termed it, articulating the Corps or even in this case, articulating jointness, that we could lead the way and instead of people always asking why do we have four Air Forces, although they continue to ask that, or why do we have both Marine divisions and Army divisions, that we could educate the public on the fact that the Marines really would be the model for any joint task force that I can think of.

If you take a Marine air-ground task force and you used it as the blueprint to form what are, in fact, joint air-ground task forces, then, you know, the Marines have pioneered that particular thinking. So I used as many platforms as I could to espouse that philosophy. On this particular one, as I recall it, however, the Naval Institute had tightened my jaws a little bit because characteristic, as I have spoken earlier, of the Navy's follow-on to the Gulf War, as I mentioned, there was, I believed or I perceived it, a tremendous guilt complex in the Navy and as a result of that there was a tremendous embracing by the Navy of things for the sake of jointness to prove that the Navy was joint, that really were destabilizing.

For example, the Navy went full bore at the issue of we will have joint command ships. In the future, we will use naval platforms. They were trying to say as a joint force, but they habitually said, with an Army general on board or with an Army element on board, which to me, we have always had Army generals that have ridden on Navy ships and we should do that because it is a national capability, but the Navy was, in effect, discovering amphibious operations and in their quest for jointness could not recognize that the best general you could have on board for any joint operation would be a Marine general if it was going to operate from the sea. But in the Navy perception, of course, you could never afford, at that time at least, you could never afford to have a Marine general in charge if you had an admiral afloat. But it would be okay to have an Army general in charge.

So this really rankled me and it caused me in this particular forum, I believe, to focus on the fact that, of the things that I have just said. We can downsize the military. We need to use the instruments that exist in the military for the purpose for which they were designed instead of remaking a sledge hammer into a ballpeen hammer. If you need a ballpeen hammer, take the ballpeen hammer. If you need a sledge hammer, go for it. But do not try and change one into the other if you have, you know, an adequate supply of ballpeen hammers. And that is how I kind of equated the Marine Corps.

So, yes, this was one of my passions and if anything, it probably was a forum to attempt to subtly, because I did not want to take on the Army, this was from the outset of my tenure when Gordon Sullivan and I were confirmed together, I had determined that I did not want to fight the U.S. Army. I wanted to be complimentary with them. We did not need to be fighting the Army and at the same time be fighting the Secretary of Defense for taking down force structure and so on. So I did not want that fight. And though there were some clashes over the succeeding four years, we never did have a big Marine Corps/Army brouhaha akin to, you know, 1947.

But at the same time, I wanted to, you know, at least use the razor blade selectively enough to begin cutting away at this notion that somehow jointness meant the Army was in charge of everything and the Navy took them there. Long answer, but very impassioned thesis.

BGEN SIMMONS: Continuing more or less in the same vein, on 28 April you went to Harvard to speak at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Your topic was "Planning in the Face of Uncertainty." In it

you speak of how the military in a democratic society plan for uncertainty. This might be a good time to comment on the usefulness of such seminars and meetings as are hosted by activities such as the U.S. Naval Institute and the JFK School of Government.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think they are useful. They, to be candid for a Service Chief, and I will speak for myself but I think I generally could presume to speak for all the Service Chiefs, they are somewhat of a burden and not so much the Naval Institute, but the JFK School, for example, is a rather captive audience. They are, generally speaking, O5 and O6 grade, that is, captains and colonels and lieutenant colonels and commanders, officers and some Defense Department civilians and other agency civilians that are mixed in to this particular course. So you go up, it is like doing another War College speech but it is to a very small group.

And to be absolutely candid about it, the Marine Commandant is probably the most faithful attendee at that because the course is run by LtGen Mick Trainor, USMC Retired. Mick is a great guy and he puts the strong arm on you to come up there and you almost have to do it out of respect and appreciation for Mick.

The Naval Institute, of course, is closer and it is closer to home and it is naval and so, you know, both the CNO and the Commandant should play in that. However, I think those are good forums for again educating a broader audience. They enable a speaker to go up and to give, as we spoke earlier, in effect a policy speech that the people that are there may or may not be attuned in to. Most of the people at the Naval Institute are members of the Naval Institute so these are retired Navy and Marine officers. There are a few outsiders, but for the most part you are speaking to the choir there. But it enables you to lay down a thesis that then gets circled around the Pentagon or that gets into Navy circles — kind of like the Forrestal Lecture Series as we mentioned in the last interview — that can, you know, that the real ears that you intend to get the message can receive it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Here comes some more on Tailhook. On 30 April, the Naval Investigative Service report and the Naval Inspector General report were both released and forwarded to Adm Kelso, the CNO, and yourself. For future readers, the Tailhook affair involved the actions of naval aviators, both Navy and Marine, who attended the 35th annual Tailhook convention at Las Vegas in September, 1991. The investigation stemmed from charges by Lt Paula Coughlin, U.S. Navy, that she and other women

had been sexually abused by fellow naval aviators at the convention. Adm Kelso attended the convention and so did Secretary of the Navy Garrett. Their presence blighted the future of their careers. In fact, Garrett would resign on 26 June, a resignation that was demanded, or at least so it has been reported, by the White House. Aren't you glad you did not attend?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you know, in hindsight, yes. I had never heard of Tailhook, did not know anything about it. Perhaps had I known about it, I might have gone because I did, I felt very deeply and still do today, and wanted during my tenure to be very supportive of aviation in general. I believe in Marine aviation. I believe in Naval aviation. And I have always considered, this was a lesson taught to me by a great officer in our Corps, LtGen Keith Smith, when he took me under his wing some years ago when I came back to Headquarters as Director of Operations which had historically had only a ground focus while the DCS/Aviation had an aviation focus, Keith Smith made me, LtGen Smith made MajGen Mundy attend a great majority of the aviation gatherings under the philosophy that if a ground officer does not understand and cannot explain and cannot justify and represent the requirement for aviation and does not understand aviation then we really are not a MAGTF. We would be two separate services within one.

So Keith Smith taught me an awful lot and caused me to learn a lot that led me when I became the Commandant to realize that while. . . Gen Lou Wilson used to have a neat little trick that he would go around every time he would address a War College and he would say, "I am a Marine but I am going to talk to you about aviation." And he would flip up the lapel of his uniform and pinned on the back of his uniform was a set of naval aviator wings. He would say, I am the head aviator of the Marine Corps, even though he was in background an infantry officer.

So I adopted that same philosophy and I probably would have gone had I known that this was a gathering of naval aviators. But, as you point out, yes, under the circumstances it was rather nice, as I was subsequently formally interviewed by, in the presence of counsel, by the Secretary of the Navy on my activities with regard to Tailhook, it was rather nice to say, I have never been there, never heard of it, and I was not there.

A little bit more on Tailhook, if you would like. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: That leads to my next question, really. What actions did you take as a result of Tailhook charges?

GEN MUNDY: Well, let me end first, so that I can get into perspective my view of Tailhook. Number one, the actions of a few junior officers were completely reprehensible. I mean, it is just the type of conduct that you would never expect anyone, it does not have to be an officer; you would not want a PFC doing this; you would not want a high school student, you know, exposing himself in a crowd of people. So it was a drunken brawl to begin with.

But that was a very small element of the some 3,500 people who were either members of Tailhook or who came to attend the Tailhook Convention who came for professional seminars, and came for the enjoyment of Las Vegas, no question about that. It is a nice place to hold a convention and a lot of other organizations do it.

But in this particular case, these youngsters just were completely out of control in their conduct. There were some oldsters there. There were some senior officers, most of them in the grade of captain and colonel and there were a couple of admirals. We really had no Marine generals other than LtGen Wills who attended only for the seminar and then met his wife who had flown in from Hawaii where she had been visiting their children. They stayed in a separate location and never even participated in any of the social activities. So we had no Marine generals that were wandering the halls but there were some other senior officers. They should have put a stop to this and they did not. And so they are to be faulted not for their involvement in anything like a gauntlet but because the leadership failed to react to this very, very seedy circumstance that prevailed.

My actions then were twofold. From the outset, while the Secretariat principally, and indeed the many who were looking at the Tailhook situation were seeking to condemn, I sought to compartment that very small element by saying, "This was a bad incident. It should never occur. We should never tolerate the conduct. Officers should never act this way." But that said, neither should we indict the entirety of naval aviation. Because you are in naval aviation, even because you were at the Tailhook gathering does not mean you are less than a professional. Those are some of our very finest people in the Armed Forces today.

So, I attempted to put a little bit of a spin on it of "Let's not go out of control on this. Let's find the people that misbehaved and let's go after them, but let's not indict the entirety of naval aviation." Unfortunately, you know, the press, and in a sensational moment like that there is a heyday with indicting broadly, and so as a result of that we had things,

that unless I am mistaken, continue perhaps even to today unless they have been terminated in the last five months. And that is that, for the Navy and the Marine Corps every selection list for promotion of officers that was sent forward, each officer had to execute a certification that he or she was or was not at Tailhook.

You know, this is a monstrous administrative penalty that was imposed on the naval services.

And the bad side of it is not only that it consumes an enormous, enormous, I cannot describe the burden that this is to, you know, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Manpower and the deputy CNO for Personnel in the Navy, that is an enormous burden, but what it does is to continue even five or six years after Tailhook, when a first lieutenant who was not even around during Tailhook is selected for captain, he or she still has to certify, "I did not do anything bad at Tailhook," and it creates a stigma on the aviation community.

So, that is not my style of leadership, and I do not endorse that. But I am now smart enough after four years in Washington to realize that there are political things that we have to do to satisfy the public at large and the press and politicians and, indeed, in many cases, the mothers and fathers of America.

BGEN SIMMONS: And it still goes on. It is not limited to the aviation community. Even as we sit, tomorrow the remainder of my civilian employees must go for a mandatory sexual harassment class. All the officers and enlisted have had to go to a mandatory annual sexual harassment class. I can tell you this builds up considerable resentment and is very damaging to morale.

These persons look at each other and say, "Look, I do not do these things. Why do I have to get tarred with that brush?"

GEN MUNDY: I wish I could tell you the number of letters that came into the Office of the Commandant, you know, addressed to me. As we both know, there was more than one article in our formal publications, *The Gazette*, *The Navy Time*, things like that that came out and said exactly that. "Look, if you have some people that misbehaved, you know, slap them on the wrist or hang them, whatever it is you have to do to them, but do not come at me. I do not do this."

But, you asked what we did in response to Tailhook. Number one, we imposed the sexual harassment training that you have just described as being mandatory. Every organization had to have, as I recall, a one-day stand down in which they did nothing but focus on that issue. I put out a video. I know that Adm Kelso did. And indeed, I must say that I

had, I do not mean to wave this off as this is absurd that we did anything because the actions of those officers that were involved were, if not criminal — and there may have been some though very few were found criminally responsible after, you know, tons of investigations and Gen Krulak, being the adjudicating authority for the Marine Corps, reviewing all these cases and holding hearings on the officers involved. We literally had almost, I think one or two that received any disciplinary action at all as a result of that because there simply was no evidence of criminal involvement. Wild behavior, yes, but not such that you can, you know, lock somebody up.

So that principally was what was done. There was a great deal of emphasis on it. And of course my concern, I recall when the DOD investigators completed their investigation out at El Toro — which was where the predominance of our aviation community, that was the West Coast, most of the people who had gone to Tailhook had come out of El Toro and Yuma — when they finished at El Toro, morale in the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and indeed in the whole base was just about on the ground. I would have hated to have sent that wing to war at that particular time. There was genuine concern that we had pilots that might be dangerous in the air to themselves and perhaps to others because of this brainwashing interrogation that they had been subjected to, demanding that they had been involved in all this conduct and insulting them, questioning their morality, you know. In some respects rather threatening, you know, if you do not tell us who was in the gauntlet, you know, we will do something to you. It was a horrible investigation. The DOD IG is not covered with glory on this one.

The NIS, Naval Investigative Service, that was condemned for not having done a thorough investigation, I can tell you that the DODI investigation was not a cent better than was the original NIS investigation which said, in effect, we had a lot of people that misbehaved but there is not a lot of criminal evidence. But we, the Navy, and to a far lesser degree, but nonetheless implicitly, the Navy and Marine Corps on the aviation side were hounded for years on this particular issue and still are today. There are still people that wave the finger in your face and talk about Tailhook and that is the way you Marines are, that is the way you sailors and pilots operate. So it really is a regrettable thing that we were so smudged for the actions of a few. But their actions were reprehensible, if not criminal.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 May you had breakfast with a number of former Marine journalists. Would

this be the Barry Zorthian? group?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it would.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the other members?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I recall them we had Ed Foue, who was a writer. Art Buchwald was there from time to time, a humorist but nonetheless a former Marine and very proud of his Marine ties. Bernard Shaw of CNN. And there were, in and out, there were others. I cannot frankly recall their names at this time.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was the purpose of this group?

GEN MUNDY: This was a group, because they were not only still active in some cases in writing or broadcast journalism, in the case of Bernard Shaw, for example, it was to bring them up to speed on what, they were all former Marines and it was to bring them up to speed on where the Marine Corps was, and we could speak very confidentially to them about the sizing of the Marine Corps or about Tailhook, about minority concerns that we had or women in combat, whatever it might be that were the current issues and try and give them some educated balance so that they, in turn, could, you know, exert that education and influence out into the journalism sector.

That was part of it and the other part of it was that it was kind of fun to do because you know, Barry Zorthian I had known when he ran the Combat Information Bureau in Vietnam in 1966, 1967. I was not associated with that but because of my association with Gen Walt who, of course, had a great friendship and rapport with Barry Zorthian, I came to know him in those early years.

They were fun. You know, I can remember that Art Buchwald, at one of these luncheons after whatever hammering I had had in the press over whatever issue it was, Art Buchwald came into the luncheon and presented me a framed little humorous certificate which has a dragon on it and just says, "Some days the dragon wins." They were fun and they were upbeat and they were supportive.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did these meetings divide themselves? To an extent they were briefings by you on current Marine Corps issues. To an extent, they were advising you on perhaps media relations. Did you find this advice useful?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I did. It was more of the former than of the latter although they would always say, well, here is how you want, you know, you want to make sure that you play this honestly. Many of them, because they were older and because again the media would chose to be more sensational than we could afford to be, you know, many of them were ready to take on, "Well, I will write a piece on that, I will tell the Navy or we will get the Chairman or whatever," and we would say, "No, no, we are not looking for you to do that." It was more of the former, of educating them and also seeking their counsel.

We used them extensively, in fact, probably the most active time of the continuum of meetings or the closer aligned meetings was during the Roles and Missions Commission, the year of that Commission's activities because we really wanted them to be close and many of them had been around when we had done the earlier, the 1940's and 1950's Roles and Missions Commission and they had views.

But their views generally went back to the National Security Act of 1947, you know, in 1951, and the extinction of the Marine Corps. So we had to draw them away to say, the Marine Corps is not faced with extinction here, but we could be challenged with some functions rather than existence. And they would tell us how, from their perspective how they would play these things in the press and as we can discuss later, the Marine Corps did run — I will not take credit for that because, of course, technically the Commandant has no knowledge of how all these stories get into the *Wall Street Journal* and so on — but I would say that part of the campaign during the Roles and Missions Commission examination was a very effective press campaign by the Marine Corps as part of that. Some of that came from advice from the Zorthian group.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday evening, 8 May, you had a garden party and parade in honor of the Secretary of State. This would have been Warren Christopher, would it not?

GEN MUNDY: No, this was still Secretary James Baker, Jim Baker. Secretary Baker was a, of course, is a Marine captain reservist, had long since served in the Corps, but a very devoted Marine. At the instant he walked into the front door of the Commandant's House with a great list of luminaries befitting a reception by the Secretary of State there, the skies fell out and it was as though someone was standing on the roof pouring buckets of water down on the front steps because it rained out his parade. But we had a nice

reception such as those, they are awfully crowded in the Commandant's House when you are, you know, when you cannot go outside and you have a couple of hundred people that are going to be in, or more probably in this case.

But he was very good natured about it, and we presented him his gift as our guest of honor, even though he did not get the parade, we presented him a plaque that I can recall. I believe we had a K-bar or something like that on it and then we had the plate under it that said "Presented with admiration," or whatever words we used, "to Capt James Baker, United Marines Corps Reserve and Secretary of State." And he got great enjoyment out of that, as do many. Many men in high places really want to be recognized as a private in the Marine Corps and whatever else they have achieved.

The parades are very useful, of course, to any Commandant. I used them arguably more so than any of my predecessors. Number one, I enjoy them enormously. I do not think Linda and I were ever in the city of Washington on any Friday night when we did not view, either because we were involved in the parade or sitting on the porch of the Commandant's House, that we did not watch the parade. It continues to this day to be, you know, one of the most moving experiences that I have ever had.

But I chose to use them to the point that, as I recall, about midstream in my tenure, I actually hosted and held receptions for half the parades of the season which is about nine or ten parades. My predecessors, I know Gen Barrow told me one time, "Why do you do so many? I only did, you know, three or maybe four a season?"

And there is no answer to that except it was very useful. So we hosted a large number of dignitaries. Once you have them to the Marine Barracks and you make them the guest of honor or once for example, we hosted a parade for the Senate Armed Services Committee and we had several members. We hosted one for the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Ron Dellums, when he was the chairman, Private Ron Dellums, U.S. Marine Corps. They would be swept away by the graciousness and the ambience of the Commandant's Home and then out to the Barracks, and many times, of course, there were miserably hot evenings or it can be raining on you but you tend to forget that because the troops are just so magnificent. Nobody, nobody in the world, nobody anywhere in the world can put on a show like we do at the Barracks.

So when they leave, you've got them! And it does not mean that there is a direct payoff, but the fact is

that the good will of the Marine Corps, the image of the Marine Corps, however badly we may look in Tailhook or however badly we may do something elsewhere, the fact is that the image that thousands of Americans, and many of them influential, a year walk away with is that crisp, precise, magnificent Marine that they see in the parade at the Barracks. So it is very useful to the Marine Corps and I used them heavily every chance I . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: Can you give me any insights as to the uses, and perhaps problems incident to a Commandant's use of the parade season? What are some of the problems that are involved.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will finish off, I think I was saying about the time that we changed tapes here that Linda finally got around to ask me, why do we have to do so many? And the only answer I could give her was because I, this was my last year and I would take the whole season if I could get it I liked them so much.

But as to the problems of the parades, they are really not monstrous problems. In many cases, high-ranking guests of honor, the risk that you take is that they can fall out on 30 minutes notice. You will have somebody lined up to be the guest of honor and it is virtually a no-show because in most cases it is a demand for their presence elsewhere. In some cases it, frankly, is just one of the syndromes of, "Oh, I do not want to do a parade tonight," but not being aware that this is not something where you are going to go sit on the curb of the street and wonder why everybody stands up when the flag goes by or something, you know. It is not, this is a very, very formal and honored occasion.

Most people recognize that, but a few do not and when that happens you, of course, are left with kind of a hole, in which case I have stood in. This year, because of his great support and admiration, stated and voluntary, makes films for us and everything, I invited Charlton Heston to come back to be a guest of honor. He accepted gratefully and then he went off somewhere and in the succeeding weeks as we would communicate with his secretary it was very clear that she did not understand anything about it. She viewed it as another participation without fee, I guess, and so about three days before the event, well, we were notified by the secretary that Mr. Heston would not be able to make it.

Well, so I stood in and my good friend with his humor, Gen Jack Dailey called me and said, "Listen, I can, if it would serve a useful purpose, I can get a

robe and a fake beard and a staff and play the role of Moses at the reception."

BGEN SIMMONS: And there is a resemblance between the two.

GEN MUNDY: Might be, white hair. But at any rate, those are the problems. I, occasionally, you would be amazed at the number of people that it is easy to offend as the Commandant because there are people who deserve to be, you know, invited or who have long been invited to various affairs but who a new Commandant coming into office may not even know, may not even be aware of this linkage that has so long existed. And so as a result, once the guest list or the social list that exists in the Commandant's social office is purged, once you go through the list — and I did and Linda did — we would go through these, you know, thousand or a couple of thousand names and, you know, if you do not know them you strike them from the list. So frequently, you will get a communication, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect that so and so is very offended that they have not been invited to the Commandant's House. And they take it personally as a gesture from you. And you say, "For goodness sake, put them on the list and invite them to something then." You do not want to do that. So there are problems with that.

But the receptions are grand. It is an enormous load for the enlisted aides who work at the Commandant's House to prepare these because they are garden receptions. They are outside. There is food that, you know, must be prepared and we do not have a lot of them. And so they really break their backs. The people behind the scenes contribute every bit as much to the graciousness that you can only do in the Commandant's House.

When I had Gen Colin Powell to dinner early — this is aside from parades — but he came to dinner and he had some people with him and he, as we were walking around the House, he had been there before, of course, with other Commandants, but he said to me, "I do not understand why it is that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lives in this old, red brick, non descript, colorless, I mean, has no class to it, set of quarters up in Fort Meyer, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps lives in this beautiful house downtown." I said, "Colin, do not get any designs on the Home of the Commandants because we would muster a division of former or retired Marines that would assault you in place if you ever made a move on this."

It was light-hearted, of course, but indeed, one has to wonder as the Chief of Naval Operations' home at

the Naval Observatory fell prey to the Vice President's quarters and the CNO was moved out, one has to wonder if southeast Washington, if the Marine Barracks and that home were in a more seemingly desirable part of town, a more upscale part of town, I think the Marine Corps would have to watch very closely that it would not become some Secretary of Something's quarters and the Marine Commandant be moved up on the Hill with the other Service Chiefs at Fort Meyer.

BGEN SIMMONS: It does float by every once in a while as when they were looking for an additional residence for the Vice President and about the same time I heard, well, why not the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court? There are numbers of very, very senior persons who do not have official residences.

You are much more tolerant by nature than I. Something that has tended to annoy me from time to time, something you said triggered the thought, not everyone realizes the formality of the occasion and just what a garden party is and just what a parade is. And I have seen garden parties which were more or less overrun by little, tiny tykers that had been brought in great numbers by usually young, politically appointed persons. Did that ever annoy you? Would you ever admit to being annoyed by that?

GEN MUNDY: People, it is amazing the number of people who would accept and would show up with six. You would have invited a couple and people would walk in the gate having brought a little more. The greater annoyance to me was, "Well, we were coming and we had some friends from out of town," or "I wanted my secretary to see this so we just brought them along." Well, for the most part that is not, you know, four or five people at a 150-person reception is not a big imposition. It does occasionally foul up the seating plan because the Barracks takes great pains toward protocol seating to ensure that people are seated in their proper place and that there are adequate seats. So occasionally, something like that can. . . . or someone will show up who probably is as embarrassed as anyone around, that they walk in in a pair of blue jeans to a reception where there are bemedaled military officers and very dark-suited and highly-dressed — dark-suited gentleman and highly dressed ladies. So that occasionally happens.

But I never, I never was offended, I started off because I for one, I think at an early point I went to a reception, a New Year's Day reception, in fact, it was in Hong Kong, hosted by the British Commander in Hong Kong and it was a mid-day reception filled with

pimms cups and pink gin and all of this sort of thing but, it abounded with children because the British brought their children who were all dressed up in their finest clothes, you know, crawling around in the mud and the dirt but having a great time. And I said, "That is rather nice." I mean, for the Marine Corps to bring, you know, bring its young up understanding what we are all about.

So I always encourage. . . . now, in saying that in my own case on a couple of occasions my own granddaughters would show up who were at that stage about four or five years old and they do, you know, they can dart about among the crowd. But I was never really offended. It may be that it was my grandchildren that you are talking about that were running about stepping on your shoes.

Some people take advantage and some people are thoughtless, and I can remember others who had hosted parades who would talk about the Secretary of such-and-such, whatever it might be, usually an under Secretary or Assistant Secretary who would show up with the Sunday School class or something to come to the parade, not realizing that this was a very formal occasion and was not a place where there were going to be balloons and cotton candy for the kiddies.

BGEN SIMMONS: From the 13th to the 17th of May you were visited by your Spanish counterpart. I am sorry but I do not have his name at hand.

GEN MUNDY: His name was Admiral, Radm Jose Estevez. He is now retired but a great friend.

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your specific recollections of the visit, and also what are our ties to the Spanish Marines?

GEN MUNDY: The Spanish Marines are the oldest Marine Corps in existence, older than either of the Royal Marine Corps or other organizations, and indeed, than us. They, I think hold several decades on the United Kingdom Royal Marines, as a matter of fact, 1630, I believe or thereabouts is when the Spanish Marines came to be. They are very small. They are a Corps that is essentially light infantry. They are, I would say, whether they are of critical importance to the security of Spain or not, one could argue, but on the other hand, one could argue that the Spanish Army which is not as professional, I might add, as the Spanish Marines, you know, whether or not it is needed in the size and structure that it is in.

But setting aside the nationality, the fact is that our ties continue to be good with the Spanish Marines.

We train at Sierra de Retin which is a training area on the littoral of the Mediterranean that is convenient to take our embarked forces in and train for a few days. It is very small but we can shoot some live ordnance there, artillery, or shoot live fire and maneuver.

So we maintain a relationship with the Spanish Marines and indeed, during my tenure though not completely attributable to me — I did champion it but it really germinated even before in staff channels — we tried to get together an amphibious organization which would be comprised of all the European Marine Corps and the U.S. Marines, a MEU or something that was there. Because many of those nations have seen the relevance of Marine forces and as in the case of the Netherlands, although they have reduced by very substantial, more than half, their Army, they have indeed increased the size of the Marine Corps by a battalion, which only had two to begin with — they now have three — and they are building new amphibious ships as is the UK, as are the Italians. They have transformed what was at one time the San Marco Battalion and then Brigade and now Division into an amphibious division and are building some superb amphibious type ships.

So, back to my thesis, the era of Marines is back internationally. We tried to put together an organization that would bind — we are bound philosophically, I guess — but that would bind us together with the European Marine Corps, the Portuguese, the British, the Dutch, and the Spanish and the Italian San Marco Battalion, even though not Marines but Marine-equivalents. The Greeks have a Hellenic Division, the 1st Hellenic Division that they tout as their amphibious division. So we sought to tie those lines and it was useful for that reason to maintain good relations and I did so, I think probably in an organizational sense, maybe more so than my predecessors. Instead of having just individuals visit I would bring all the Commandants together, either over there or over here and thus kind of tighten our bonds a little bit here on my watch. But that is our, the relations are positive but we really do not do many active operational things with the Spanish Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: Perhaps in some way connected with this, on 21 May you and Mrs. Mundy departed for a seven day trip to the Netherlands, France and Germany. What was the purpose or what were the purposes of this trip and what were the highlights?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the principal reason for this trip was that I had been invited to come over and lay the wreath at Belleau Wood on Memorial Day in France.



Gen Mundy poses next to the Marine Corps memorial at Belleau Wood, 24 May 1992. As part of his first tour of Europe as Commandant, Mundy made a special visit to lay a wreath at the nearby Aisne-Marne American Cemetery in France.

That was the primary focus. We went by way, however, of the Netherlands to pay a short, two-day visit, very, very brief, not really a counterpart visit but just a courtesy visit, if you will, on the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and my opposite number who was MajGen Roy Spiekerman, Commandant General of the Royal Netherlands Marines. We had a brief stop in The Hague. Had dinner with him. Went out and toured the Royal Marines training camp. Saw the U.S. Marine liaisons that are there and generally just about, really a one-day visit.

And then we went on into Stuttgart to stop at the U.S. European Command, just again to touch base because it is useful for the Marine Commandant to, from time to time, keep our oar in the water in EUCom. And then again, ultimately into Paris to remain there for, I think we were there for about three

days. It was over a weekend. The actual Memorial Day was on a Saturday. So we arrived, I believe on a Friday — no, Memorial Day was on Sunday. We arrived on Saturday. We drove out to Belleau Wood on Sunday, laid the wreath, which is an annual event and some Marine general goes over and does it every year. The French people adore the Marines in that region. They will bring you pictures of their grandparents that were taken with some Marine during the World War I battles and present you with flowers and gifts.

They held a gigantic outdoor luncheon for us and of course, this is, I was in blues and it is warm in France that time of year, a very pleasant warm, but you know, good old blue, elastique uniforms are warmer so you get a little bit wrinkled and tattered. But they had a nice luncheon following the wreath laying for us at what would be the essence of the county commissioner, I guess, in the U.S. with a lot of attendees and of course, a great amount of good French wine, predominantly red. And the last thing you want to be doing is standing out in the French sun at about 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon, you know, sipping red wine in your blues trying to maintain your dignity. But we did so and had a very pleasant occasion.

And then I remained over the next day to make calls on the Service counterparts, the Navy, the Army and their equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I had lunch with him and made formal calls on the others and then we returned.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 June MajGen James E. Livingston was named the first commanding general of the Marine Reserve Forces. You went to New Orleans for this occasion. What was the significance of this assignment and designation?

GEN MUNDY: There is a practical reason and I suppose that we would want history to record that I had a belief, and that belief was, I think, shared by the Marine generals, that I wanted to upgrade the Marine Corps Reserve. Indeed, had I had the boldness to do it during my tenure, I would have eliminated Reserve from the title and simply had a philosophy involving a total force Marine Corps, wherein some Marines were stationed at Camp Lejeune and were on full-time active duty and other Marines were stationed in Kansas City or in Augusta, Georgia, or wherever they might be and they were on part-time duty but that there would be no other significant distinction. The laws cause you to have a distinction in Reserve and the Guard forces but I was trying to blend them together.

So I wanted to get to a point where we could have Marine Reserve generals that commanded the major reserve formations; the division, the wing and indeed, the Force Service Support Group was commanded usually by a Marine Reserve brigadier. But the other, the wing and the division had long been commanded by active duty Marine major generals. So I wanted to change that.

From a practical standpoint, with the reduction in forces, the Marine Corps had been directed to reduce its general officer structure. I did not want to do that.

That was part of my, you know, arguing the case for maintaining the Corps because we have so very few flag or general officers in comparison to the flag and general officers in the other Services. There is no Army division that does not have three generals in it, the commanding general and then two assistant division commanders, one for support and one for operations. There is today no Marine division that has two generals in it all because we cannot afford the ADC. Well, we do today, because we have built to that but we did not for about the first three years of my tenure.

So, it is another one of these salami slice philosophies that says we are going to reduce the numbers of flag and general officers in the Armed Forces and therefore everybody will give at the altar. My thesis was, let those who have excesses give but not the Marine Corps.

The way that had been laid out though, was that there had been an agreement between Gen Gray and Gen Powell, essentially, on how the Marine Corps would reduce from a level of, I think, we had 70 and we were supposed to go down to a level of 62, 61 or 62 generals by 1997. Reducing to that level we would have had to, by law, give up a lieutenant general as we came down below, I believe 63 was the magic number.

So, while there was a formal agreement on paper, the Joint Staff worried about it a lot. I decided for better or worse, and maybe to the detriment of my successor if he had to downgrade significantly, I decided when we got down to about 67 which was already underway, I decided simply to ignore that agreement and to continue keeping Marine generals around in the numbers that, we still do not have enough, we need more, but keeping at least that number around. And it worked. That has, no one worries about that anymore. No one questions.

Gen Powell at one point asked me, "Are you, are you coming down like we have agreed?" And I said, "Well, Colin, we can come down if we have to, but I want to ride for a couple of years with 67, which is what we had on board." And so he, Gen Colin Powell

was, I would say with great admiration and respect, was always a supporter of the Marine Corps during my watch. I do not think I ever sought Colin Powell's assistance on any issue, to include the force structure of the Marine Corps, maintaining it, that he did not support me, however subliminally it may have been. There were some things he could not step forward on but he supported me.

So, from the practical standpoint, at the time that we created the Marine Reserve Forces, now changed to say, Marine Force Reserve, this year, but Marine Reserve Forces, there was a practical aspect that if we were going to have to decrease the numbers of generals in the Marine Corps, why not go to one active duty general down there instead of two. So that fit very nicely with my thought of we will have an active duty general to preside full-time and we will have the Reserve generals as the major commanders of the formation. That is the background of the general officer . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there any thought to parallelism with the Marine Forces, Atlantic and the Marine Forces, Pacific that you were also beginning to work on at that time, as in the total force concept, as with a parallel title?

GEN MUNDY: Well, at this time we had achieved the Marine Force, Atlantic and Marine Force, Pacific components. We achieved that. To be candid with you, no, there was not in my mind an attempt to do that although subsequently exactly that is what came to pass because we now have, of course, a Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Force, Pacific and Marine Force Reserve. So we have, in effect, some would want to argue it is the same. Arguably there are similarities. I mean the Marine Force Reserve commander does preside over many of the same training- and resource-related issues, equipment and so on that the Force commanders do. But that was not, at that point, on my mind although I could reach back and say, "Of course, it was because we did it." But to be very candid with you I had not thought of it at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 12 June you had a garden party and parade for the Secretary of Defense. Who was that at this time?

GEN MUNDY: That was Secretary Dick Cheney.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you have any particular recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: No, it was a nice, again as I have discussed here previously, it was a nice event. It did not rain out Secretary Cheney. But he was always a, although a rather, you know, a rather distant — not in any way cold — but I mean, Secretary Cheney did not have a lot to say but he was very pleasant. Lynn Cheney, his wife, is a delightful person. So, it was a warm, nice reception where it gives you a chance to parade your Marine officers by.

I tried very hard during my tenure to make the parade, the Marines that were at the parade representative. There were some generals there and we would bring up some second lieutenants from Basic School and their wives and we would bring up some captains and majors and so on so that we gave the, whoever we were trying to impress with the Marine Corps, you know, the complete spectrum. And also we trained some of the young officers, you know, we let them see what it was like at the higher echelons. Very nice evening.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was also an Executive Retreat that weekend. Where was that and who was the host and what was the agenda?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was done down at Quantico and so you could say that Gen Boomer, who was the CG, MCCDC at that time, was the host. We did it at the FBI Academy and it was a civilian clothes get together to focus on the beginning to undertake the necessary steps in the Total Quality Leadership, TQL, effort that was then ongoing within the Department of the Navy and within the Marine Corps, of defining the strategic concepts and the enabling objectives. To, you know, get to the strategic concepts meant that you sat for hours with these facilitators, there were two of them, two ladies who were the facilitators, and they would cause you to think. It was almost like defining the subject of your staff study. What is it that we are really after here? I know the Marine Corps does amphibious operations and is MAGTF but what is the Marine Corps really all about?

So, it was from that session distinctly, as a matter of fact, as I recall it, that came the notion as we worked through them that if you, that though everyone properly wants to focus on the reason for the existence of the Marine Corps is to fight wars, fight the nation's battles — certainly that is true — but it came through to me, and I made that presentation down there and then began to use it subsequently, that it may be that the most important contribution to the nation the Marine Corps performs is to make Marines.

So, we make Marines "became a thesis of mine,

meaning that we take fairly ordinary citizens, a Barrow theme, and turn them into something extraordinary; not supermen, not superwomen in all cases — some cases — but we make them Marines and that is a different mindset, a different view and a different value set and so on then much of the rest of America has.

So that was, but that was the purpose of it and we gathered for two days down there, stayed and ate. You know the FBI has always been very gracious to the Marine Corps, allowing us to use their superb facilities which, after all, the Marine Corps gave them the land to put there. I guess they owe us. But they are good friends.

BGEN SIMMONS: You said that this retreat, and I presume other meetings of this sort that were going on at this time, observed the tenets or the framework of TQL, Total Quality Leadership, and that two women acted as facilitators. Where did these facilitators come from?

GEN MUNDY: They were, they are doctoral level management experts that were experts in the, TQL is the Deming Management Method. Dr. Deming, who went to Japan after World War II to help the Japanese rebuild their economy and obviously did quite well at that, gave the Japanese and developed with them the focus that work, the fundamental thesis of Total Quality Leadership is, workers will excel if management enables them to. That is to say that it is management's job to take away the problems that the worker faces. If management can do that, then you will produce automobiles that have tolerances where there is no seam on the car that is wider than anywhere else on the car like the Japanese vehicles do, with the precision of excellence. And you produce a work force that is of very high morale and so on.

It works. And you produce by allowing, by empowering the people, as the term would be, you allow ideas to come up from the bottom, that, you know, we can save a lot of money or we can do this better if we would do this at 4:00 in the afternoon instead of 9:00 in the morning. And if management will listen to those type ideas then, you know, the company or the organization becomes more effective.

Applied to the military which a great many people resisted and resented, and I must admit at the outset that I thought that this was kind of a, "Don't we do this, aren't we leaders, don't we — we encourage corporals and sergeants to come up with ideas?" But as a practical matter, in many of the industrial-based aspects of the Marine Corps, Albany, for example, the

Marine Corps Logistics System, many of the administrative procedures, and indeed, many day-to-day operations in a motor transport, if you subscribe to these philosophies and realize that if the motor transport officer would focus himself not so much on whether we are dripping oil on the pavement out here and it looks unsightly, if he will focus himself on ensuring that each mechanic has a full tool set and that that tool set does not have to be gotten from another building two blocks away and brought over to the lot every morning, worked with and then turned in at the end of the day, if we can improve that process, the lance corporal who is maintaining the truck out here will have all the tools he needs and the chances of him dripping oil are not as great because he has a bucket to catch it in. . . . you know, I am being absurd here but I am saying that this mind set does work although you can go overboard with it as well.

So, Gen Boomer was, you know, the greatest believer we had. The assistant Commandant sort of shepherded this. Both Gen Dailey and Gen Boomer were the Marine Corps architects in this Total Quality Leadership training and effort that we were putting forth. So they tried to subscribe as accurately as possible to these management and leadership methods. And we all went through the process of getting trained. It was Departmental policy and so the Marine Corps participated.

BGEN SIMMONS: These facilitators, were they Department of the Navy employees or were they contracted?

GEN MUNDY: No, they were Department of the Navy and I wish I could think of her name — Dr. Linda Doherty and, I cannot say her assistant's name, but anyway they were, they had come from the Naval Post Graduate School and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Dan Howard who was the Department of the Navy's overseer of Total Quality Leadership transferred Dr. Doherty back here to Washington where she became very, in fact, a very influential. . . . the Navy really led on this and indeed when the Clinton Administration came in and the Vice President was given the charter of deregulating government and doing away with regulations that were not needed and making things simpler, Linda Doherty interacted with the Executive Office Building and the Office of the Vice President in getting this done, in getting the Vice President his thesis on whatever we termed it, I guess, what was it, simplifying government or —

BGEN SIMMONS: Reinventing —

GEN MUNDY: Reinventing Government. Well, Reinventing Government is classic Deming Management Method, Total Quality Leadership, Total Quality Management, whatever you want to call it.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 16 June you went to Norfolk for the deactivation of the headquarters of your beloved 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Have you ever had any second thoughts about the wisdom of doing away with the brigade echelon?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I have and I had second thoughts at the time we did it. There were about 1,500 structure spaces associated with these brigade staffs, command elements, six of them that we had and we simply could not afford that. I mean, it was either keep that and do away with infantry battalions or an artillery battalion or something or get rid of those. And so we got rid of them.

As a practical matter, the MEF Forward as we chose to term it, better—doctrinal—is a brigade. It is a brigade command element that goes forward. And the thing that I, when I say I had second thoughts at the time and even now, is that while since Smedley Butler took one to China and I guess Fred Karch landed the 9th MAB at Da Nang in 1965, we really do not employ brigades much. And yet, they serve a very useful function. If I could go back and do it again, retitle the Marine Corps, and that gets too hard, if you stop and think about it, a Marine Expeditionary Unit which is a couple of thousand Marines, a Marine air-ground task force, some helicopters, some Harriers, some infantry, all that sort of thing mixed into this very, very useful instrument, I would go back and term that a brigade. Because a brigade — in any army in the world but us, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 people, 5,000 would be a brigade. And if we had today sailing the seven seas Marine Expeditionary Brigades, as opposed to a Marine Expeditionary Unit, whatever that is, MEU just does not inspire fear in anyone, but we are set with it at least for the time unless the new Commandant wants to rewrite all the books and change all of that.

I would have liked to have seen the brigade stay around in that context. As a practical matter, we, as a parochial and practical concern, the Marine Corps might have been a little bit loathe to do that because the Army still has brigades as opposed, you know, we maintained regiments, the Army maintained brigades. And so an Army brigade, which could be 4,000 or 5,000 soldiers, had we, we would have perhaps in the minds of some been too much like the Army. It would have been like sewing nametags or doing things. But

I would give anything if we had the term “brigade,” because it says something. MEU does not say anything. Brigade says something.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, obviously as a traditionalist, I agree with you and, of course, over 100 years we have deployed as brigades. We may not have always fought as brigades but we deployed as brigades.

On Friday, 19 June, you had a garden party and a parade in honor of your old friend, Gen Joseph Hoar, who is now the Commander in Chief, Central Command. This was also the weekend of the reunion of your Basic School Class. Do you have any comment on either or both of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes. Gen Hoar and I were in the same Basic Class and were friends since we were second lieutenants. So, we were, I do not know if we were the first class, our class was a very large one. We were not in the same company, for example. We had three companies. There were 547 lieutenants in the third Basic Class of 1957, a very large one out at Camp Goettge at Quantico, which is no longer there.

But those were the days of the long Basic School. My Basic School was eight and a half months long. We lived in Quonset Huts and ran through the snow to take showers and, you know, things like that. So we endured a lengthy association together. And arguably in a tighter bonding than you might achieve today because we, you know, you swapped bunks. One guy went on the bottom bunk and the other went on the top bunk at the four and a half month mark and we endured together in a Quonset Hut. Different bonding. Open squad bays and that sort of thing. You learned that, your buddy came in drunk off liberty and you made up his rack for him or you got him dressed and handed him his rifle and fell him out. You know, those sorts of things that today we generally have gotten away from.

But at any rate, 3-57 was a rather special class. We have had three reunions of that class by this point, the most recent one two weeks before I stood down because I was the sole surviving son at that point. At the time of Gen Hoar's parade, there were three of us still remaining in some degree of active service. And that was Gen Hoar, myself and MajGen Mitch Waters, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Mitch had been, at that time, I think was on active duty as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs. So we had three of us in the reviewing area and that was kind of a, you know, a nice thing for a 3-57 reunion to have.

But it also honored Joe Hoar, who literally was one of the greats of our Corps and certainly was, I do not

think anybody around during those days would have told you that Gen Hoar was not the best CINC that we had in the uniformed command. And as we know, subsequently, not at this point but when the Chairman was chosen this last time around it was between Gen Hoar and Gen Shalikashvili and up until the morning of the announcement, the betting money was on Joe Hoar to be the first Marine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

So, pleasant occasion. Good old boy network. A lot of telling of the old Corps as it never was and never will be, but you have been to those events.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 June the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces stood at 1,854,743 of whom 189,433 were Marines. In six months the strength of the Armed Forces had come down 79,110 and we had lost 3,627 Marines. Was there any talk around town that we were not losing our share of strength?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, there was, and much as I hate to say it, that was predominately in the Navy. I certainly, in no way do I want to come across as critical of my own closest or what should be closest, sister service, the Navy, but indeed the battles that were fought by the Marine Corps, the most vicious battles that were fought by the Marine Corps in not acquiring resources, in the case of the replacement of our critical equipment — replacing the CH-46 with the V-22, the assault amphibian vehicle, the size of the Marine Corps — all of the most vicious attacks that we received were from the Navy.

I have gone home at night to my wife and said, “You know, I feel like Clifton Cates. You know, the enemy is to my front; there is enemy on my left; I am receiving fire; I will hold.” And having sent that transmission, suddenly I am receiving enfilade fire from Team Blue on my right flank that is supposed to be on the same side as me.

So, I can get very emotional about this and even as recently as this Naval Institute *Proceedings*, you will find me emotional on this. I just believe that the Navy had, and I am not talking about the Navy as an institution, I am not talking about Adm Frank Kelso who was a great friend and a supporter of Marines — such as any admiral ever supports Marines, he was a good friend — but in the Navy hierarchy of the vice admiral and the fleet commanders and so on, the absolutely verbatim thesis was the Marines must bleed. The Navy was taking down ships and therefore, without any rationality of the utility of an instrument, the Marines have to come down, too. Why do the Marines have to come down? Because we are coming down.

Well, you guys are getting rid of cruisers. How come we have to take down Marines?

It does not matter. The Marines have to come down, too.

So the most difficult confrontations that I had on the subject of maintaining the Marine Corps or gaining the resources for the Marine Corps were always from the Navy.

There were voices perhaps elsewhere that might have said, there certainly were, I think within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, some of the Assistant Secretaries, perhaps indeed Secretary Cheney although he never chastised me, even when I made the front page of the *Washington Post* as early. . . I remember, Valentine's Day of 1992, one of the worst days of my life because I thought that I was probably going to get fired. Secretary Cheney had had a passion for smacking a service chief now and then and I popped out in the *Washington Post* as, you know, opposing the Administration's downsizing of the Marine Corps and that is an interesting tale, too. But I was never rebuked in any way or chastised by the Secretary of Defense for that. The Secretary of the Navy got pretty excited about it, but I went to see Secretary Cheney immediately. When I called over to request to see him they said, “Oh, you do not have to. He understands.” I said, “No, I want to see the Secretary of Defense.” And I went to see him and said, “Mr. Secretary, I have briefed you. I have told you that we are taking the Marine Corps down too far. I have briefed the Chairman. I have briefed my own Secretary and so on and I am now on the Hill telling them and you must know that.” And he said, “I understand that.” And that is when he said that “We need to revisit this. We will call in the CINCs and look at requirements.” And so Secretary Cheney was fairly understanding, if not supportive.

But elsewhere, I am sure among his assistants and whatnot, they viewed my pop-upishness on this issue as getting back on the box. The plan is the Marine Corps is coming down by 25 percent. You know, get the Marine Commandant off the soapbox and back in the box. There was a little bit of that. I would get veiled messages from time to time about things that could be visited upon the Marine Corps or upon me if I did not kind of cool it a little bit. I cannot tell you you do not worry about those things but you have to chose a course of action and go for it.

But the Navy, again I can —

BGEN SIMMONS: We were talking about the Navy reaction to the protection of the end strength of the Marine Corps.

GEN MUNDY: And I would only close that out by saying that I really felt most undercut throughout at least the first year or even longer than that, even — and it is not through the first, through my entire tenure — probably not unlike other Commandants, I was most undercut by my own Blue teammates in my efforts to champion the cause of naval forces.

It frustrated me greatly that I do not think I ever went forth in a major speech that I did not speak of naval forces and of the utility of naval forces. And my last testimony, as I recall it, here on the Hill was advocating the Aegis, the Destroyer DDG-51 with its Aegis system and the importance of that to the theater missile ballistic defense and all of those sorts of things, the utility of the Navy. And I simply could not understand why it was when I was or when the Marine Corps was fighting for not its existence as an institution but for the existence of arguably the most useful capability that the United States Navy is going to have in the future, and that is amphibious response, crisis response and power projection — you know, without Marines and without amphibious capabilities, in 20 years the United States Navy is going to be at a Roles and Missions contest with the Coast Guard because that is all it is going to be. So it frustrated me then and it frustrates me now that some vice admiral would pop up somewhere and would say, “The Marines must bleed.” And there were a lot of vice admirals popping up and there were one or two four-star admirals popping up.

Never Adm Kelso, I will say that in defense of Frank Kelso. He never did that and he may have, indeed, when somebody popped up he may have dampened them. I am not aware that that always, that that was the case. But it was never him and it was only indirectly, perhaps the vice chief. But I will tell you there were a lot of pop-up Blue teammates out there that were putting sniper fire right down our throats every time we would try. . . . my programmers used to tell me, used to say, “Sir, you have no idea. We walk into a room in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, one of the ASDs, to make a presentation on the Marine Corps and it is almost like a shadow following you inside. You can meet them coming up the passageways as we leave, with somebody going in right behind you to discount the presentation that has just been made.”

That has changed, I believe, in the succeeding years, but I will go down as one that feels very emotionally undercut by my Blue teammates.

BGEN SIMMONS: You wound up your first year as Commandant with a short period of leave from 27

through 30 June, 1992. Do you have any summary statement you would like to make about this first year?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think as you characterized in an earlier statement about one of my speeches at the Naval Institute, the first year one creates the direction, if not the course and speed that you are going to be able to proceed. But I probably had in the first year laid down what I think were the main thrusts of my tenure. And that was, first and foremost, to define a plan for maintaining a ready, relevant and capable Marine Corps. Those were the buzz words that we picked up on; ready, relevant and capable. We did that in the first year and then it became a campaign to legitimize that.

To explain and to hammer home Marine Corps utility in general as a general-purpose force but also as an element of naval power and, as you pointed out earlier, as an element of the joint force structure. That was a major thesis.

To gain equal status for Marines in joint and in naval organizations and structure and indeed within the Department of the Navy. Componentcy was an element of that. Enabling Marines not to stand behind the velvet rope but to be one of the four service components out front regardless of the number of stars that were being worn. That was a major effort.

Finally, as I mentioned, to attempt to begin to reorient the Navy, as it was so clear to me that we needed to do. I would only amplify, I have said earlier, I told the, albeit unflattering but it is factually so, the, you know, the concrete block on the boot routine. But I was in that first year on two separate occasions, you know, enjoined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get the Navy moving, to get them, to get them moving out. And his frustration was similarly shared in that we just have to get the, the Navy is missing what is going to be relevant in the future if they do not, you know, get saddled up and move out. So the naval force planning effort that we talked about earlier was a success in that first year although it did not come to fruition for another couple.

And then, of course, not that this, this probably was just me more than it was any cause that I had although I did have some concerns about the professionalism and the values and the direction of the Corps in terms of things that I considered traditional and important to maintain and that was, you know, if my — Gen Gray used as a very useful thesis during the tenure, because of where he knew the Marine Corps needed to go, and there is much tribute due to him for getting it there, but he adopted the term “warriors.” We were all war-

riors and there became a mindset of sorts among the younger Marines, in particular, that, you know, if you did not wear utilities all the time and if you did not, you know, chew a cigar or chew tobacco or be rough cut and so on that you could not be a warrior. And I just knew that some of the most vicious warriors we have ever had, perhaps including you, you know, are men of great gentility and men who could be the gentlest of men when it was time to do that and then could kill you in the twinkling of an eye when you needed to be shot.

So I wanted to return the Marine Corps back to the standards that if you are a Marine, you are a warrior. But you are a Marine and you manifest those things that are traditional about our Corps in terms of appearance, in terms of performance, in terms of the Corps values that we talked about earlier.

Those, I guess, we could almost stop the oral history at this point except for the sensational things all in the future and say that that probably is what I, sought to get into place in my first year.

BGEN SIMMONS: If you have nothing else to add, this would seem a very good place to end this session

Second Six Months of 1992

More on Tailhook and sexual harassment . . . Sean O'Keefe as Secretary of the Navy . . . the 50th anniversary of the Guadalcanal landing . . . Gen Jack Dailey and Gen Walt Boomer as Assistant Commandants . . . Promotion of Chuck Krulak to lieutenant general . . . Humanitarian service in Florida and Guam . . . Re-organization of Marine Corps artillery . . . An evening parade for Bob Hope . . . Integration of Marine Air into Navy carrier air wings . . . Toys for Tots headed for trouble . . . First involvement in Bosnia . . . A lengthy trip to Russia . . . "From the Sea" White Paper . . . Name tapes for utility uniforms . . . A Green Letter on "Hazing" . . . Closing Marine barracks and minimizing sea duty . . . Restore Hope in Somalia . . . Repetitious Green Letters . . . Sudden popularity with television commentators . . . Preparing for newly elected President Clinton . . . A Christmas visit to Somalia by way of Germany and Italy . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we completed the review of your Green Letters and White Letters up to that point in time and covered the events of the first six months of 1992. In today's session we will cover the events of the second six months of 1992.

Just for the record, on 30 June 1992 the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,854,743 of whom 189,433 were Marines.

Now, let's continue with the Tailhook matter. On 1 July, Undersecretary J. Daniel Howard, in an address to senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders announced specific steps by the Department of the Navy to quote, "drive out attitudes," unquote, that led to the Tailhook incident. Among these steps was a quote, "special training stand down," where every command and unit had to suspend operations for one day to conduct training on the policies and expectations regarding sexual harassment. We spoke briefly of this stand-down in our last session, but do you think this stand down accomplished anything?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think it probably increased awareness and at the lower levels, for example in the recruit training echelons and so on, there probably was not an awareness of sexual harassment, which is, indeed, a problem even though we might say, as we discussed earlier, that there is rightful offense taken on the part of some people that say, "I do not do that, why am I in here taking this training?"

But, indeed, there was overt and, you know, subtle and some covert sexual harassment. There has been

along the years. A poster, you know, a *Playboy* poster inside an office that is run by a male gunnery sergeant and you have a couple of WM lance corporals in there typing. That sort of thing should not go on and you were harassing to put it out.

But I think that it heightened awareness. We did put the videos out before the standdown, as a matter of fact, and as I started to mention earlier in the DOD IG investigation, I went out to El Toro just to be on hand and to watch that standdown day and to just be around. I did not have a speaking part. I did not have anything to say. I did meet with the aviators who had been interrogated by the DOD IG and gave them a . . . tried to give them a feeling of "we cannot do this sort of," you know, "we cannot tolerate this nor do we intend to. But, at the same time, I recognize that not each one of you is involved."

It has continued, as you remarked earlier, and it may be that we have reached a point of futility in causing everybody to undergo this annually as opposed to an indoctrination when you come in or in the formal schools as we do in training right now. It might be useful to continue an emphasis on this. But we perhaps have overdone it at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: The fallout from Tailhook included investigations by the House Armed Services Committee on the criminal investigation process within each service, which is larger than just the Tailhook thing, and how sexual harassment in the military can be eliminated. Do you remember these investigations?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, I have spoken earlier about the NIS, Naval Investigative Service investigation and, of course, when that did not satisfy, why the Secretary, then Secretary Larry Garrett, asked the Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate these ongoing.

The problem with these type investigations is that, though some might argue this differently, those investigative agencies are really not focused on this type of activity. The DOD IG was, you know, existed for the most part to investigate criminal activities involving principally contracting procedures or misappropriation of government equipment properties or matters, misuse of government funds, those sorts of things. When you then turn those investigators loose on what ordinarily would be a command investigation that a commanding officer in the structure, a commanding general or an admiral is more or less used to conducting within the uniformed legal side of the house, you generally get a more understanding and comprehensible investigation because a civilian investigator investigating something that he or she does not ordinarily delve into, as was the case in Tailhook, becomes focused on matters that may or may not be of great consequence. And they become fascinated with the pictures that they see that were taken by somebody with a camera and draw conclusions and make recommendations from that that might or might not be the same conclusions that would be drawn by the more regimented and educated military mind used to dealing with these sorts of matters.

BGEN SIMMONS: I was under the impression that the House Armed Services Committee went further than just asking for a DOD IG investigation. I thought that the House Armed Services Committee did its own investigation to an extent to include hearings and —

GEN MUNDY: There were hearings and there was, perhaps a better term, though I am trying to recall specifically, but a better term might be an inquiry rather than an investigation. I do not recall that the Congress employed trained investigators who did, you know, personnel interviews, to attempt to come up with an investigative report. But rather, more characteristic of the Congress, an inquiry was done which reviewed the information coming out of the more formal investigations and called witnesses including the Service Chiefs, at a later time, to testify on this subject. And that more or less, I thought, as I recall it, constituted the Congressional inquiry.

BGEN SIMMONS: But I thought part of this was implicit, if not explicit, expression by the House Armed Services Committee of dissatisfaction with the criminal investigation.

GEN MUNDY: I think it was. Again, as many things are driven politically, and I do not mean that this was not a sincere investigation because all of us were concerned about this issue, but it serves to be dissatisfied with the investigation because the press was dissatisfied with the investigation, as well they might have been. What people tend to look for in cases like this, as I mentioned earlier, they want criminal activity and there is a wide belief in the media if not, perhaps, in the private citizenry at large, that somehow or other those that were in the military are different in their rights than you would be if you were accused of something in the civilian sector.

The presumption is those people misbehaved at the Tailhook convention, bring them in, courtmartial them and throw them out of the military. As you know we cannot do that. The service person has rights just as does any ordinary citizen.

So I think that there was, the press could not comprehend how it was that we did not, when we identified someone who was associated with this, how you did not lock them up for that, how it was that it took so long to have these hearings and so on.

You may have a better recollection of this specific aspect of it than I do. I recall that the HASC did look into this but I recall it more in the form on what I characterized as an inquiry than an investigation per se.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is a better word for it, perhaps. One of the consequences of these investigations was the temporary suspension of more than 4,000 Navy and Marine Corps officer promotions by the Senate Armed Services Committee. How did this affect the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it slowed down the train. We had people that had been selected for anything, from first lieutenant to captain or brigadier general who could not be promoted as a result of this investigation and this look into the Tailhook situation. And again, there were people who had not even been near Tailhook, who were not aviators or anything else. But it is a necessary, you know, it is our bureaucratic, or in this case, the Congressional means of satisfying the public concern over this, is to say we will promote nobody in the Naval service until we certify that you did not have anything to do with going to Tailhook nor were you a supervisor of anybody who went to

Tailhook. You even had to acknowledge that.

"Yes, I am the commanding officer of such and such an organization and three officers in my organization went to Tailhook." That did not mean that you did not ultimately get promoted, but it slowed us down and it became, as I mentioned earlier, a tremendous administrative burden. And even more important than any of that, the impact on the morale, here you are bearing a piece of paper that says the President reposes special trust and confidence in you, but only after you certify, you know, that you did not attend. Until then, we repose special trust and confidence but only so far.

BGEN SIMMONS: Injured innocence. Very powerful. On 7 July Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced that Sean O'Keefe, who had been Comptroller of the Navy for seven years, had been appointed to serve as acting Secretary of the Navy. Later he was confirmed in this position. This jumped him over Dan Howard's head, did it not?

GEN MUNDY: It did. Secretary or the Undersecretary of the Navy, Dan Howard, who was a very good one, I might add and well thought of in many quarters, Dan Howard could reasonably have become the Secretary, and many might have argued, should have. Indeed, his Secretary, Larry Garrett had been the Under and had moved up in a previous arrangement like that.

But I think that there were two factors, there were undoubtedly multiple factors in the determination of the selection. First and foremost, Sean O'Keefe was a very, very trusted and well-thought of Assistant Secretary by Secretary Cheney. So here was someone that he had a great deal of confidence in.

Number two, it probably, since Dan Howard was the sitting Undersecretary, the Secretary had been fired, there were some who thought that probably Howard ought to go. There were some who thought that Kelso and GEN MUNDY ought to go, I imagine, that we could behead the whole apparatus. So it would have probably run into some political difficulty making Dan Howard the Secretary while he was serving as the Undersecretary.

Related to that is the fact that in the investigations and the inquiries and what not that went on about this, Dan Howard played a part. He was not at Tailhook but he was, as the Undersecretary would well have been, he was part of the recipient of information, the directing of the investigation and the actions that took place. He was almost a party to the investigation or an accessory in some fashion or other, one could say.

And the third major factor, I think, is that as I had commented on earlier, there was in OSD and there were in a number of quarters a feeling that the Navy was simply, you know, awash, or was not headed in the right direction. And I think that Secretary Cheney wanted to put somebody there that he knew he would have distinct ties to. Sean O'Keefe was very close to and well thought of by the Chairman, by Gen Powell. Gen Powell had some frustration in this matter, as I have commented earlier.

And so I think Sean O'Keefe for all those reasons, a new face, a trusted Assistant Secretary, well thought of, respected in many quarters, although he had been the primary duelist with the Congress on the V-22, for example, but Sean O'Keefe was a man that was very well thought of, and that I believe Secretary Cheney thought would bring about action in the Navy, which indeed, he did, within the Department of the Navy, both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: A very vivid personality by name, appearance and demeanor.

GEN MUNDY: Sean O'Keefe was one of the quickest minds I have ever seen, as one might expect, you know, the Comptroller of the Department of Defense to be. He was a man who required no sleep. His Marine aide, Col Waymon Bishop, who used to travel with him would almost die on trips because O'Keefe was the type fellow who would get in the airplane, fly all night, stay awake. He would, when he became bored he wanted to play cards and so, you know, Col Bishop would be up playing cards with him as they crossed the Atlantic or somewhere. He would get off the airplane the next morning fresh as a daisy and those who needed sleep had a hard time keeping this pace.

BGEN SIMMONS: Heavy smoker.

GEN MUNDY: He was a heavy smoker. He enjoyed a beer now and then. When he was up in the OSD circles at about 1800, 1900, Sean was given to loosening his tie and bringing in a couple of beers and having a beer in his office and continuing to do business.

He was very, so very energetic, very intelligent and very persuasive man. One of his earliest actions was to bring the CNO and me in. The Marine Corps had offered to the Navy during my first year, we had talked about the Navy had no doctrine command. Generally speaking the fleet commanders published what they called Fleet Instructions or tactical notes that said here is how we operate the Pacific Fleet or

here is how we operate the Atlantic Fleet.

The coordination of that, generally by the Navy, had fallen, you know, not for all bad reasons, but had never been coordinated specifically into a common doctrine, so they combined all fleets together. So they omitted this and as we got into various doctrinal issues in Washington the Navy had a small staff agency embedded in the OpNav staff that more or less oversaw doctrine. But they had had a strong recommendation from Adm Hank Mustin who did a study after the Gulf War.

BGEN SIMMONS: How do you spell his last name?

GEN MUNDY: M, u, s, t, i, n, great Navy name, one of the great sailors from a great Navy family. Adm Mustin had done an earlier study for the Navy, even prior to the Gulf War that said “we are way behind. We do not have a doctrine center. The joint doctrine is going to run away with us unless we get a doctrine center.”

They established one in the OpNav staff but I had offered at an early phase in my tenure to, why not have a, if the Navy needed space and wanted to have a doctrine command and if it, as they believed, must be near the OpNav staff, we would provide them space and facilities at Quantico and they could move in there. Then as we got in to “From the Sea . . .” we conceived, “Let’s have a Naval doctrine. Let’s put the Navy together with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in the development of doctrine.”

The unofficial response to that was, “we are not going to be held captive to the Marines at Quantico.” So for that reason, perhaps among others, why this thing never got off the bench.

When Sean O’Keefe became the Secretary one of the first meetings we had was, we are going to establish a Naval Doctrine Command. And for a lot of good reasons, and reasons that I do not contest, the CNO believed that that should be put at Norfolk. They did not lodge it at Quantico. That eased his problem of the criticism that he would have had by putting it on a Marine base. You know, Fort Monroe, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Joint Doctrine Center, the Air Force over at Langley, though they did not have one, but there were a lot of reasons to put it in the Tidewater Virginia area. Sean O’Keefe directed that that be done and then Sean O’Keefe resurrected, remember that we talked about that from “From the Sea ...” we developed the concept, the doctrinal concept. But then Phase II would have been the definition of the fleet — not necessari-

ly the force structure — but the type fleet that we needed to do what we were talking about. And that is the one that Adm Kelso had some strong reservations about when we got to that point.

So, “From the Sea ...” sort of went dormant. O’Keefe came back in being aware of that and resurrected it. I was delighted by that. He and Adm Bill Owens who had become the N-8 of the newly reorganized Navy staff that Adm Kelso brought about on his watch, between Owens and O’Keefe they got this effort going again on the “From the Sea ...” and it was, of course, subsequently published as we will maybe discuss later.

BGEN SIMMONS: You took a short leave, 2 through 6 July. On 9 July you went to Camp Lejeune for BGen Mike Downs’ retirement. Saturday, 11 July, you went to Philadelphia to speak to the 5th Marine Division reunion. Any comments on any of these trips or events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I would only note that I appear to have been on leave a lot of time there since I was on in the end of June and then the first week of July. I do not remember specifically but it was pretty good. As I think back on it I am glad I took some leave.

BGen Mike Downs was Chesty Puller’s youngest son-in-law. He married Martha Puller, one of the twins of the Puller marriage and was an officer of tremendous capability and widely respected for a long time in the Corps. I thought a lot of Mike Downs and so wanted to be on hand. He held a major assignment in the Marine Corps, that of commanding the Marine Corps Base at Camp Lejeune. That is, without question, a major general’s billet. And Mike had gone down there as a brigadier, as we often do, and then failed at selection the second time around and retired per the policy of retiring soon thereafter. So, I have only good recollections of that.

With regard to the 5th Division, there is nothing significant there. I wanted to make as many of those association meetings and I made, I believe, all of them in the Marine Corps that I can recall, with the exception of my own, you know, division of my youth, the 2d Division Association, that I never made it to one of their events. But the 4th and 5th, the 3d, the 1st, all of which were big World War II battle commemoratives, over the period of my tenure I made those, and this was one of those early ones with the 5th Division.

BGEN SIMMONS: From your desk calendar I noted that you were briefly the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 17 July, and again on

Friday, 31 July. Now that there is a Vice-Chairman, the Service Chiefs are seldom the Acting Chairman, is that not so?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, less frequently than might have been the case earlier. The current arrangement is that each Service Chief is designated for a quarter, for a three-month period, to serve as the Acting Chairman in the absence of both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. So, on those occasions, for example you pointed out two days, from the 1st of July to the end of September each year I was designated to be the Acting Chairman and that meant that both the Vice-Chairman and the Chairman were gone on the 7th and the 31st of July and I was Acting.

BGEN SIMMONS: I imagine that the threshold effect was that you would have to coordinate any travel that you planned with the Chairman's and the Vice-Chairman's office.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, you did and you deferred to, if they were not going to be in town as a general rule I told my staff that we will not travel on any days that they are not there.

As a more practical matter, we have relaxed a great deal from the days, say, of the 1970s and early 1980s. Gen Powell brought that about to a great degree. And that is that with today's communications and fast aircraft and real time video and video teleconferencing, the absolute necessity to be standing in the halls of the Pentagon on a 24-hour basis is just not there anymore.

So, in the circumstances that we just talked about, even were I the Acting Chairman, and the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman were going to be absent for some period of a day or for a couple of days, what more normally would happen is that we would simply notify his office that I really needed to be on travel and it would pass to another Service Chief. They would determine that Gen Sullivan was going to be in town.

So you would have a national command authority locator list that would say the President, the Vice President and work on down through the Service Chiefs. And it would say, Acting Chairman from 0700 to 1200 is Gen Sullivan. From 1200 to 2400 is Gen Mundy or something. So there was always an identified person but we could accommodate if I needed to go somewhere. As a matter of policy I tried always to be there when it was my turn.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would guess that in light of what you have said about transportation and commu-

nications, that as Acting Chairman you would not act substantively on an issue unless there was a crisis, unless there was a catastrophe.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, in which case the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman would probably be back in town in two hours.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am thinking of a big —

GEN MUNDY: A big catastrophe or something like that. I never had occasion, though I probably was Acting a number of times. On some occasions the Director of the Joint Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff would call and say this is going on, this is what is happening. Here is what I have caused to be done. Or, at least on one occasion I recall that Adm Macke when he was the director of the Joint Staff, called to say, "Here is what I think we ought to do, what do you think?" And I would say, "You know, it sounds great to me, go ahead." He would say, "I have spoken to the Chairman. He thinks this is about right. So, you know, subject to your concurrence, here is the way we will go." It was a rather pro forma.

But you are exactly right, it would have meant that if we suddenly got word that there was incoming and you had to rush to the Pentagon and go into the National Military Command Center and we would have been in a case like that, we would have the screen lit up and I would have been looking face to face with the Chairman, wherever he was, talking to him real time.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 18 July, you went to New Orleans for the first leg of what would be a lengthy West Coast trip. You conferred with MajGen Livingston in New Orleans. There was also a reunion of the 4th Marine Division Association and I believe you spoke at their dinner. Any recollections of those events?

GEN MUNDY: Routine. An update by Gen Livingston and then the real focus was the 4th Division Association.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 20 July, you went on to El Toro and then on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday you visited in rapid fire fashion, Camp Pendleton, Barstow and 29 Palms. You spent the weekend at 29 Palms observing Operation Tandem Thrust which was a major exercise testing the capabilities of approximately 20,000 Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Special Operations personnel.

This was the first of a series of exercises emphasizing regional crisis response to a low or medium intensity conflict. Do you have any special recollection of this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I do. The exercise commander was LtGen Bob Johnston who was commanding the I MEF at that time. The commander-in-chief of the Central Command, Gen Hoar at that time, had given each of his major grouping commanders, and that is I am saying a corps commander or a numbered fleet commander or, you know, a MEF, the equivalent of those two commander, he had given them regional responsibilities. So I MEF had been given planning responsibility for operations in the Horn of Africa.

And Gen Johnston, late of the Central Command as its chief of staff during the war, of course, Gen Johnston came back and was successful, although the Marine Corps paid for some of this, but was successful in taking his own staff, the I MEF staff, to 29 Palms, creating a joint staff from the MEF staff nucleus. We used the headquarters of the 1st and the 4th Marine Divisions, the reserve division and, of course, the 1st Division out of Camp Pendleton, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. He had managed to get the III U.S. Corps, Army III Corps headquarters element up together with the 1st Cavalry Division. And as I recall, I do not think there was, there were some other Army elements there but it was principally a Corps headquarters and the 1st Cavalry Division headquarters.

So he had three divisional headquarters. He had himself as the joint task force headquarters and then he had an Army Corps headquarters and Marine wing headquarters under it. It was a very successful, classic, characteristic of Gen Johnston who, you know, never really did anything second rate at all. It was a first class operation. And, interestingly, of course, prepared him for the upcoming expedition when he deployed to the Somalia with 1 MEF.

BGEN SIMMONS: We seem to have been very lucky throughout modern history of doing the right exercise to prepare us for —

GEN MUNDY: At the right time.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday evening, 26 July, you returned to Camp Pendleton. The next day you went to San Diego for a two-day visit to the Marine Recruit Depot. And on Wednesday, 29 July, you returned to Washington. Any special recollections?

GEN MUNDY: That whole week was a West Coast sweep. In other words the intent was to go out and cover all of the nodes on the West Coast that I had not done in recent times. It is good periodically to stop through the recruit depots and check on how things are going and that was the purpose of the trip.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next day, 30 July, you testified at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on sexual harassment. This would be part of that inquiry or investigation that we discussed a few moments ago. Do you have any special recollections of that testimony?

GEN MUNDY: It was a rather non-emotional hearing and that is to say that some of them became emotional. You know, the women in combat and things like that would from time to time, there would be a bit of dueling between maybe one of the Service chiefs and one or more of the members.

In this case, however, I think the Congress was looking simply to get down as a matter of fact what it was that the services had done in response to the Tailhook situation, to sexual harassment training and those things that we discussed earlier. So as much as anything, as I recall the hearing, it was fairly short and fairly simple saying here is what we have done, here is what we are doing.

Now, there were two or three Congressmen or Congress persons really, who wanted, you know, to, do we need to pass a law that says as soon as you commit sexual harassment you are out or something like that? I think the Service Chiefs tried to put a fairly balanced focus on it. That we are in charge of this. It is going forward. Let us implement.

And I can recall recounting, I think, in that testimony the number of reported sexual harassment incidents or cases that we had in the Marine Corps and it was in the very small numbers. I think that it was probably double digit but as I recall it was maybe 10 or 12 that had been reported, and these were very minor.

The important point to make in this is that a lot of what is reported to this day as sexual harassment, of course any time that a female or in some cases it has been a male, but most ordinarily a female complains of sexual harassment, in some cases those cases are documented as a female lance corporal who has asked a male lance corporal in the same office with her to stop sending her cards and flowers and trying to get a date with her. And she complains and that is reported into our tracking system as a sexual harassment incidence. In which case the male corporal is counseled



Gen Mundy's tenure as Commandant coincided with the 50th anniversary of World War II. On 7 August 1992, Mundy, along with President George Bush, left, and Col Mitchell Paige, USMC (Ret), center, lays a wreath at the Marine Corps Memorial on the anniversary of the Marine landing on Guadalcanal.

by his superior, whomever it is, knock it off, she does not want to date you; quit harassing her.

So, the public perception is that all sexual harassment consists of some salivating demand for sexual favors or something. Some of it is just as simple as what I mentioned there. You know, I do not want to date you, quit sending me flowers. That, you know, over time in America that has not been something that nationally we have become too upset about.

BGEN SIMMONS: That day, 30 July, was also marked by the retirement of one of your long time friends, LtGen Bob Winglass. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Bob Winglass, the first time I ever heard the name, Winglass, it was Candidate Winglass in 1956 as we were coming in past midnight from a forced march over the hill trail down at the then-Testing and Training Regiment, now Officer Candidate School, worn out, you know, beat to a frazzle and we could see the lights of the barracks glowing in front of us and we were almost into the base camp and would be able to get some sleep and some rest and clean up a little bit. I can vividly remember hearing the cry, "Candidate Winglass, up." And hear-

ing, "Aye, Aye, Sir," in this now all familiar voice of Bob Winglass. Chunk, chunk, chunk, down he goes, down the column.

And immediately I can recall Candidate Winglass, after he received his instructions from the Candidate Company Commander saying, "Column right march, column right march." We reversed our direction and then, "Double time, march." And we ran for a couple of miles, you know, just for the harassment of it, and then turned around and came back in. So, Bob Winglass had stuck in my mind as the guy that I was always going to get even with for that 2:00 a.m. two-mile run that we had up the Engineer Road of T&T.

As I subsequently came to know Bob Winglass, we really came back together late in our careers. In fact, the next time I saw him he was a colonel reporting to Camp Lejeune and I was a colonel, brigadier general-selectee leaving Camp Lejeune. But over the succeeding years Bob Winglass came to Headquarters and I know of no officer that I can recall who probably contributed any more to the Marine Corps. He served in all of the jobs that are the hard jobs. He was the Director of the Materiel Division which is the brigadier general logistician slot which meant that he was responsible for procuring and managing most of

the things that came into the Marine Corps, on the grounds side at least.

Then when Gen Gray created the Marine Corps Research and Development Command, Bob was sent to Quantico to be the deputy of that organization and indeed, put it together. Bob conceived it and made the parts come together and work as the deputy on-site.

He then had been, he had been promised the plum that all Marine Corps supply officers aspire to, command of the Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany, Georgia, a good, nice command job, and just as he was getting ready to go to that, as I recall, we needed the most effective man that we could put into Requirements and Programs, the worst job in the Headquarters, arguably, from the standpoint of the work load. Bob Winglass was assigned to that and lost his opportunity to command.

He was tremendously effective as Requirements and Programs, served as the initial Marine Corps representative on the Base Closure Commission, or the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, a very difficult job, a very difficult job. And then was, eventually though his reward was that he received his third star and became a Deputy Chief of Staff at Installations and Logistics and served two years there, one year of which was on my tenure. And I would again just say that as we know him now, Representative Winglass of the state of Maine where he was elected to the Legislature in Maine, that there have been very few who were better human beings or more effective officers than Bob Winglass.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 7 August you attended the commemoration held at the Marine Corps War Memorial of the 50th anniversary of the landing on Guadalcanal. On the following evening, 8 August, you were the guest of honor at the 1st Marine Division Association reunion banquet. What are your recollections of these two events?

GEN MUNDY: The first event, the national commemoration of Guadalcanal at the War Memorial was attended by President Bush so I was, even though Gen Powell and the other Chiefs were there I was able to meet President Bush because Gen Powell had said to me early on, this is a Marine show. You know, I will sit in the gallery, you got it. And he was very gracious about that because the Chairman could very easily have said, wait a minute, you know, there were some soldiers there and it was Navy and the Air Force bombed it for us, or whatever you want to make it joint. But he gave it to me.

So I met President Bush and we went out and had a

very nice commemorative ceremony. There were, I think, on the order of 3,000 or 4,000 people who were assembled there, a large number of them veterans and families of veterans and then just well-wishers who came to celebrate that event. So, it was the national event for the commemoration of Guadalcanal and a very, literally a warm day but also a warm event.

As was the 1st Division Association's banquet the following night. And that was routine, another evening in evening dress and another speech by the Commandant after dinner with people probably wishing that I did not talk so long and would hurry and get through with it so they could go back to having some fun.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 August training restrictions on women Marines attending Basic School were modified. The 22 women in then forming Company E would be fully integrated into the training program including offensive tactics rather than being separated into a separate all-female platoon. How did this come about?

GEN MUNDY: It might be said that it came into place because it was time for it to come into place. But the primary reason that it did was that many of us, I have spoken earlier about the fact that when we got ready to deploy the EA-6 B's to Desert Shield and subsequently Desert Storm, that even though Gen Gray did not want to deploy women Marines, the fact is 7 of the 12 plane captains were women. We had to do that.

So, it was the feeling of my generation, I guess, and that would be me, it certainly was Gen Boomer's feeling, it certainly was Gen Krulak's feeling and LtGen Terry Cooper, who was my Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, it was our feeling that if, indeed, women were going to 1, be in the Marine Corps and number 2, be assigned to occupation specialties in the Marine Corps that we really, the Marine Corps could not have stood and held the line and said, we are only going to have women in administrative duties and non-deploying units. We simply were beyond that point, and we deployed proportionally, the Marine Corps deployed the highest proportion of its women in the Marine Corps to Operation Desert Shield and Storm than any of the services so we had already passed that gate. It was our belief that if women were going to be so employed that we had to train the leaders, the lieutenants, to be as effective and as knowledgeable as possible.

We did not envision and I do not envision and I would resist strongly even in private life any suggestion that we are going to have women lieutenants

commanding infantry platoons in the Marine Corps now or a decade hence, though social ways may, could bring that about but it would be over my strong objection and that of others.

However, in the new world order, I guess is the term that we have found ourselves in, even a rear area can be an area in which you might have to engage in combat. If we are going to have women Marine officers that are commanding, leading echelons that might be in the combat service support element but that nonetheless are going to perhaps be attacked, they are going to have to know what they can about the employment of weapons, about how to repel a counterattack and that is offensive combat, I guess. You could argue whether it is defensive but in other words, they need to be educated if we expect them to lead Marines of whatever job.

BGEN SIMMONS: So this complete integration in training has proved to be a good idea?

GEN MUNDY: I hope it has. I wish perhaps that there were other ways of doing it because my concern is that while having probably the best trained women officers and indeed, even in the recruit training where the women recruits do full hand grenades and, you know, fire the weapon in a combat stint, wear helmets and all that sort of thing, I think we train our women very well, but I believe, and I worry, that by the integration of women into the training process, anyone who tells you that we do not use a double standard for that is wrong.

A female officer carries a lighter pack than does a male officer on hike. It has to do with the strength of the male versus the female. We have a different physical fitness test although I think Gen Krulak has moved to more standardize that. But the fact is that we do tend to drop the standards a little bit to enable the women to compete effectively with the males. So for the male trainee we have probably given in to a common, but less demanding standard.

So for me to say that I think it has worked out perfectly. No, I would say that we may have weakened our training to some degree by doing this.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 August President Bush announced his decision to provide 145,000 tons of food to Somalia via military airlift. This was the beginning of Operation Provide Relief. BGen Frank Libutti was named to head the military relief operations. Did you choose him for this task?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. Gen Libutti was

assigned to the Central Command as the commander of the forward headquarters element of the Central Command. And that had, since the command was stood up had been a Marine brigadier general. So that was the CINC's call. So Gen Libutti went in in his capacity as a member of the Central Command.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 August your Assistant Commandant, Gen John R. Dailey, retired at a ceremony held at Marine Barracks, Washington. You had had a farewell dinner party for the Daileys on the evening of the 18th. His replacement would be Gen Walter E. Boomer. The custom, more or less, is that this position goes to an aviator. Why did you give this post to a ground officer?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first of all, even though as you point out it is customary that the Assistant Commandant has more ordinarily than not been an aviator, indeed, you know, Gen Barrow was the Assistant Commandant, Gen McClennan was the Assistant Commandant and Gen Kelley was the Assistant Commandant. So we had had ground officers before and probably if you go back further than that somewhere there have been other ground, so it is not extraordinary although I think the Marine Corps endeavors to keep a four-star aviator in because it is useful as an air/ground team to have that. So this did not necessarily break the rice bowl.

The Dailey departure is an interesting one. It was a tremendous opportunity for a tremendously talented individual to continue service for the nation. But the way this all came about is Gen Dailey came to me one day. He was extremely popular and effective with the Navy Secretariat as an Assistant Commandant and the Secretary had let it be known to me that he wanted and intended for Gen Dailey to remain for another year which would have been a three-year assignment as the Assistant Commandant, the first year with Gen Gray, one with me and now to stay for another and that was fine with me.

But Gen Dailey came in to see me one day and said, "I have had an unusual call. I got a call from the newly appointed director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, who called me to say, listen, I want to hire you to be the, in effect the number 2 man at NASA, the Director of Operations at NASA."

And Gen Dailey said, "Listen, you do not hire Marine generals, you know, you do not just hire us away from the Marine Corps and I am not available. I will not be retiring until next summer, thanks very much."

The guy persisted and came back in another couple of calls and said, "Well, who do I have to call to get you over here at NASA?" So, anyway we had some humorous exchanges on this.

But finally one day Gen Dailey came in and said, "Listen, this guy is really after me," and he said, "I do not know what to do."

So I said, "Jack, are you interested in the job?" And he said, "Well, you know, it is an interesting job." And I said, "Look, you are a test pilot. You are one of the finest men that ever flew an airplane. If you remain in the Marine Corps for the remainder of this year, you are going to retire next year and you are going to get a good job and go do something perhaps, but you have a rare opportunity to continue in your own chosen field, in the field of the management of our space effort. You are the ideal man for it." And I said, "So, if you want my view I hate to see you go because I depend upon you a great deal around here, but we are all expendable and you have an opportunity. Go for it if you want to do that."

He left and in about ten minutes he came back in and he said, "I do want to do it." And so we, so to speak, I want to say, ramrodded, I do not mean against any opposition, but we got a very quick retirement package nomination approved for Gen Dailey and he retired one day and showed up at NASA the next morning and is still there and has proven to be extremely useful to the nation in this important position at NASA.

BGEN SIMMONS: Both Gen Dailey and Gen Boomer were very effective Assistant Commandants. You have already mentioned that they were both very much imbued with the TQL concept. Would you comment on how you used your Assistant Commandant?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Gen Dailey, who had long been a very good friend. We had known each other for many, many, years, were selected to brigadier general on the same list and generally came up through the Marine Corps together. He was promoted to Assistant Commandant, of course, the year before I became the Commandant. That is not unusual for the Corps. Many would assume that, look, if you have a four-star officer as the Assistant Commandant, doesn't it constitute being passed over? No, it does not really because the Marine Corps has historically gone down and taken a ground officer. We have not had an aviation officer to be the Commandant.

Jack Dailey was masterful in his relations anywhere. He is that type man. He has that personality.

He is smart. He is sharp. It takes him about a third of the time to understand the complex problem that it does me. He was a tremendous value in the Secretariat where his judgment, his opinions, his views on practically any subject were sought by the Secretary and the Undersecretary.

So, I used him most effectively in the relationships in the Department of the Navy. For me, he provided the bridge to get me from being a new Commandant where everything was the first time round, Jack Dailey was my coach. Here is the way you do this, as we would consult together on those issues. So he was very useful in being an alter ego for me and in helping me learn to be the Commandant.

He was extremely effective in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council which is the council that the Assistant or the Vice Chiefs sit on in their capacity in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. So, Jack was, to me, he understood that the Commandant needed to be out traveling and needed to be out seeing the Marine Corps. And he understood that the Assistant Commandant served in the shadow of the Commandant and would stay behind and manage the Marine Corps, manage the Headquarters, manage the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enabling the Commandant to get out.

He was not, however, a chief of staff-like Assistant Commandant. Not because he would not have been but he had not been that way with Gen Gray and I did not change that around. So really those were the primary things that Gen Dailey did for me and that was consistent with what I wanted him to do.

Now when Gen Boomer came in, he came in straight from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command which we were still endeavoring to refine and to continue with Gen Gray's vision of getting this thing going the right direction. It had stumbled a little bit. The war had come along and that had caused it to be a little bit out of kilter for a while. And the reason that I brought Gen Boomer back was 1, his recent experience in the Gulf and number 2 because he is a tremendous organization man. He can really structure something for you and I knew this about Walt Boomer. So, training, all those sorts of things were his forte. I brought him to Quantico to do that and he did it tremendously well.

He was clearly the man to be the Assistant Commandant although it was premature because Gen Dailey went one year early. But at any rate, he came up. I wanted him to blend the Headquarters and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command more closely together. We had not reached that point. We had a, not a personality schism but we simply had a

functional schism between what the Headquarters staff had historically done — a good bit of which was now transferred to Quantico — but you still had the requirement for the Commandant to function in Washington and yet part of that support, more of that support was being done at Quantico than had been the case earlier.

Gen Boomer brought nicely the experience from having met my tasking to him to refine the combat development process at Quantico and get that structure operating, brought that to Washington and now my charter to him was, now, let's get the Headquarters and the MCCDC more integrated and functioning better together.

The other thing about Gen Boomer is, again, he is a superb manager and a superb leader. He is a superb officer but one of his strengths is his management ability. He wanted to take a more active role in doing what one might presume to be the chief of staff where we want him to run the staff. He did not want minor decisions coming to me as they had. I kind of enjoyed that, frankly, you know it kept the Commandant involved in everything. But it took up a lot of time. And Walt, rightfully, I think, saw that he would handle the day-to-day operations of the Marine Corps and would send me up fairly tight packages to make a decision on, much as one would use a chief of staff.

So, you know, I agreed to that because I knew that he would be very good at it and I think he was very good at it. So those were the two, the principal difference between the two. He was also, he was equally effective as had been Jack Dailey in his relationships on the Navy Secretariat and his relationship in the Joint system.

He was an admired and respected individual. The difference would be that Walt was less inclined because of his recent national leadership, if not heroism, you know, to the nation of having commanded the Marine forces in the Gulf, there was a tremendous demand for him to be out speaking and for him to be going places and so on. And so, Walt was a more active Assistant Commandant, you know, away from the Headquarters. He was a tremendously effective in talent and I used him more as a chief of staff than I did Jack Dailey.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 24th of August saw another promotion. MajGen Chuck Krulak was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, the post just vacated by Gen Boomer. At the same ceremony, Gen Boomer received his fourth star which he would wear as Assistant Commandant. Chuck

Krulak's rise had been meteoric, had it not?

GEN MUNDY: It had been meteoric and while, you know, again, factors come into play which cause those things. One of them was Gen Dailey's early retirement. Had not Dailey retired early Boomer would not have come up, Krulak would have been around the Headquarters for another year as a major general. So in part that caused it.

But the other side of it is that Chuck Krulak was . . . remember that he had been, you know, my primary architect in the force structure planning group. He was tremendously experienced by having been one of the few, he and MajGen Jim Brabham were the only two officers we had who had taken a major combat service support formation forward. We had a lot of people to take infantry out and so on, but on the support side not too much experience at the senior echelons. So he had a, he came from being Assistant Division Commander, from having an infantry background to having deployed as a combat service support. He had backloaded the maritime pre-positioning ships out of the desert war. And he had done the force structure planning effort .

So, he was in Washington. It was very easy to unplug a member of your own staff and send him down rather than to have created the turmoil of trying to find a lieutenant general out there to send in. He was the right man at the right time for the right job. And yes, you know, fate smiled in his direction and he was promoted a year earlier than otherwise I would have expected him to.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you said, this chain of actions and reactions was set in motion by Gen Dailey's sudden and unprogrammed retirement.

While these ceremonies were taking place in Quantico, Hurricane Andrew was raging through southern Florida. Marines from the II Marine Expeditionary Force came to the rescue as part of Joint Task Force Andrew. Can you comment on the contribution the Marines made to this effort?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes, I think from the standpoint of the things that were done, there were two tent camps that were put up by the Marines down there for the refugees. They provided field kitchens, generators, water purification units and, of course, storage tanks and some transportation capabilities. They would be involved in that cleanup until about mid-October.

But I think that the other thing that the Marines did was to demonstrate a lot of flexibility which we would be characterized by in the succeeding years of

my tenure down in the Caribbean. My experience has been, and this is not exclusive to us but it is predominant among Marines, is that a Marine is a Marine and if he happens to be an artilleryman and we need to use him to go down and handle refugees, we send an artillery battalion.

And that is exactly what we did in this case. The 3d Battalion, 10th Marines was the organization that went down. And you would say, why artillery? Wouldn't you use MPs or something else? It is inherent in the way that we train Marines on the philosophy of every Marine is a rifleman, fundamentally, that we can use any MOS, tanker, artilleryman, rifleman, MP, administrator or what have you, to go do just about whatever job is needed. So I think that was a demonstration of flexibility that struck home with me, at least.

And the other thing is that as is characteristic of Marines, I mean, everybody is good and I am very proud of all the American servicemen, but I will tell you, wherever you send the Marines the children flock to the Marine camp. You go over to the day care center which is being run by some volunteer mothers that are refugees themselves, but the person who is sitting in there with the baby on their knee is some Marine lance corporal or corporal who has just gone over because he can help out.

The people every place that I have gone that there are Marines and anybody else, the impact that is made on the American citizen by a Marine is dramatic and is different. I do not know, you know, it has to do with the making of Marines, I guess. We certainly, I do not know why we would be any more compassionate, arguably we would not be but we just do things differently or maybe people do not expect Marines to be compassionate and to be the youngster who says, "I am off watch now. I will come over and help you take care of these little toddlers because very clearly that needs to be done and I am a Marine and if it needs to be done, I will go do it."

BGEN SIMMONS: Something similar was taking place in Guam. Typhoon Omar came through with 150 mph winds. Marines from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived a day later, on 29 August as part of Joint Task Force Marianas. Can you comment on their efforts?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, this was, again we used one of the maritime pre-positioning ships, the MV *Anderson*, which in that MPS Squadron Number 3, the *Anderson* is the ship that is configured for humanitarian assistance operations. It does not mean it does not have

artillery on it or tanks or ammunition but what it means is that the way we configured the MPS sets was so that if we needed bulldozers and water purification units off first, as Marines are used to doing, we have one of the ships in the squadron that is configured to do that for you.

So, the response, the most ready response that the nation had to this typhoon catastrophe in Guam was to bring in one of the maritime pre-positioning ships. That ship was tied to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Hawaii so we brought forth not, you know, combatant elements of the brigade but we brought forth the engineers and the shore party people and they did much as we had done in the Philippines when the sands of Mt. Penatubo came down, we did much the same thing there out of Okinawa in using the MPS ships and the aligned Marines for typhoon assistance.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are these Red Cross type activities really the business of the Marines?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think if you are, as some have characterized us, and I would, if you are the most general purpose of the general purpose forces that probably yes, because those types of operations require organization. You need a good gunnery sergeant around to organize, you know, just getting things done. There are a lot of people around that bring you a couple of dump trucks and be willing to haul, you know, dirt that you dig out of a housing area off for you, but somebody has to organize and sequence where we take the dirt when it is done and what not.

The military mind brings that to a degree that is just not ordinary in the private sector and particularly if you go into a foreign country where maybe they are not as sophisticated with construction companies or things as we are here in the states. So the military brings a great deal.

For the Marines many have been concerned, I think, not just for the Marines but for other services, that we can blunt the edge, that we can take the sharp edge off the knife, if you will, by using military forces to do this sort of thing. I do not think so. I think that is an operation. You may not be shooting but you are operating and the people that are there to do those types of operations are people that are operating very much like they probably are going to have to operate in any theater that we would have Marines that were engaged in combat. We would still be doing those sorts of things as we did, in fact, in Vietnam. You know, we ran some things in Vietnam that did not have to do with shooting people, but did have to do with reconstructing. So I think that, I do not find any

great flaw in using the military for those type things

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday evening, 28 August, you honored Bob Hope with an evening parade at the Barracks for 50 years of entertainment of the Armed Forces. What are your recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: It was a superb evening. Bob Hope had, we invited him. He had been very supportive of Marines at 29 Palms during the desert war. And so anyway, we invited him to come in and I wanted to give him a Desert Storm campaign medal. I happened to be over in Desert Storm at Christmas when he was there and it was just a very nice time.

At any rate he accepted. That surprised me but anyway we brought him back, had him to lunch in my mess up at the Headquarters. We had all the generals come in and we had a great time with Bob Hope. We presented him one of these gold putters with the Marine emblem in it so that he would have a putter. And we presented him a baseball, you know, golfing baseball cap with Marines on it.

And then that evening he came to the reception which we had because, I think principally because of a threat of weather we had the reception inside the Commandant's quarters and Bob Hope stood and shook hands with and posed for a picture with every guest that was there. I mean, just most warm and gracious and, of course, contrary to the view that well, there are a lot of young people here who will not know who Bob Hope is, I can assure you that everybody there knew who Bob Hope was and was eager to get some time with him.

His hearing is not too good. Dolores, Mrs. Hope, was along — she is a princess of a lady — but at any rate from time to time you would say something to him and it was clear he did not hear you but she would always chime in and say, "Bob, answer the question."

He walked over to the, we had a pianist there that was playing some reception music and he walked over and said to, I think it was Master Gunnery Sergeant Charlie Carrado of the Marine Band, senior enlisted man in the Marine Band, walked over to Carrado and said, "Do you know, "Jedda"?" I would be hard pressed to spell that but I think it is j,e,d,d,a, was a song of the 1940s vintage or so and Carrado said, "No, I do not." So Bob Hope began to hum it and Carrado picked up on it so Bob Hope sang "Jetta, Jetta, Jing, Jing, Jing" for us.

But at the parade what we decided to do was entertain the crowd. So instead of as we normally do with great dignity and pompousness, you know, march down from the Commandant's House with the guest

of honor and sit down in the reviewing area, I said, "Let's have some fun with this." So we got a golf cart and we moved it down through the Barracks where the crowd could not see it. We had, this will sound like I need some sexual harassment training, I guess, but we had a absolutely beautiful woman Marine sergeant to drive the golf cart with Bob Hope in it. And we put, on the back of the golf cart we put a, you know, a whip antenna of sorts with a little Marine Corps flag on it. And we put Bob in his golf hat and with his gold putter in this and then when the announcer said, "Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Bob Hope," we came out of the center portico of the Barracks, center arcade of the Barracks with the golf cart, me on one side, the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Gene Overstreet, on the other side and marched forward to the reviewing stand down center walk.

Gen Leonard Chapman was in attendance that night and I thought, well, if I am ever going to catch some grief for having diminished this aura of the 8th & I parade by throwing a little Hollywood theatrics in it, I will hear it from Gen Chapman. He loved it. He thought it was wonderful. So we had a good time. We presented the medals. He made remarks to the crowd, of course, lighthearted. So the crowd got an extra treat, an 8th & I parade and a performance by Bob Hope on the same occasion, wonderful occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 September it was announced that organizational changes to Marine Corps artillery units were completed. The active duty structure now consisted of three regiments — the 10th, 11th and 12th Marines — asymmetrically organized, with a total of 11 battalions or 33 firing batteries. Each of the battalions was configured for direct support missions. Each battery was equipped with six M198 155mm howitzers. I have a number of questions to ask you. First, did this mean that the 105mm howitzer had been eliminated from the inventory?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it did not because we still had some 105s around and we had earlier for the purposes of the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable Formations, Gen Gray had made the decision to maintain the capability in at least some battalions of dual purpose, that is manning either a 105mm or a 155mm. So we did not change that as a practical matter.

Now we have taken all the 105s out because they had just become, they are old and expensive to maintain. But that did not denude us of the 105mm capability.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did this mean that general support battalions had been eliminated?

GEN MUNDY: No, the mission of a 4th battalion in at least the 1st and the 2d Marine Divisions was to be able to fire general support missions. As a practical matter we probably watered down the mission effectiveness of the artillery battalions by requiring of them to, in effect, you know, the same weapon system, the same general structure and everything, but to be one of three things; either be light artillery with 105s or to be a direct support battalion or, at least in some cases, be general support battalions.

The artillerymen, of course, nobody liked bringing the size and the structure of the Marine Corps down, but the artillerymen generally seemed to believe this was all right. There were many who argued that we had gone too heavy on artillery when we had heaved up to in some cases five battalions in our divisional structure, that we were heavier with 8 inch and earlier than that, 175mm guns and 155mm and 105mm, that we had gone a little bit too heavy and that a lighter Marine Corps needed less artillery.

Ironically, the artillery that we have, of course, is one of the heaviest pieces of artillery anywhere in the free world, the M198 howitzer. That was a direct result of the national thesis or national pressures on the Armed Forces in the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s of quote, "heavying up for NATO." The decision was made to change all artillery to 155mm because of the threat that we were facing up against the Warsaw Pact and the Marine Corps subscribed and went along with that.

Interestingly, the Army, even after that decision had been made, the Army still maintained some of their divisions like the 82d, the 101st, I think, with 155mm artillery and got a new 155mm artillery piece which many have not been too happy with. But in retrospect I would have much rather seen the Marine Corps stick with 105mm as our direct support artillery and gotten a new weapons system, than to go to the 155mm, which we currently have today and probably are going to have because of the inventory of munitions and just the fact that 155mm is where we are today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was the self-propelled 155mm gun eliminated from the inventory?

GEN MUNDY: It was. We gave all those back to the Army. They were very maintenance intensive. The batteries, as I recall, were much more manpower intensive than were the towed artillery because of the size of the maintenance structure you had to have in

them. They were older weapon systems and they were expensive to maintain, both in people and in dollars so we got out of them.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was the 8-inch howitzer eliminated from the inventory?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. It was for much the same reason, self-propelled, but also because we were preparing, which we did about the next year and I knew that was coming, we were getting out of the ground nuclear weapons business and/or the nuclear weapons were going to be all 155mm projectiles anyway. So we did not have the requirement for a nuclear capability with the 8-inch that had long been one of its primary reasons and very frankly, my thesis had become, right or wrong as history will record it, that when we required those types of heavy capabilities we would get them from the Army. There are many who worry about this and to be candid, I worry a little bit about it because ultimately we can wind up having no artillery perhaps and being dependent upon the Army if you subscribed completely to that thesis.

But if you stop and think about it, when I was in the 3d Division in Vietnam, the artillery that we had sitting in Camp Carroll that was firing back across the DMZ, a lot of it was the Long Toms of 175mm Army artillery and the 5th Mechanized Brigade was up there roaming around with us and there were Air Cavalry squadrons of Huey helicopters that came up to support us when the CH-46s went down. So the Army has always supported and the Marine Corps, but the Marine Corps could threaten itself by becoming too incapable in some specific area but I just, if we could keep the Army focused on having a heavy capability, multiple-launch rocket system, heavy artillery, heavy armor formations and so on, and could reinforce our formations with that, it makes a lot of sense, I think, to the nation. So, that was part of the thinking also.

BGEN SIMMONS: To a large degree that anticipates my next question and that is, was the Marine Corps left with any long-range counter-battery artillery weapon?

GEN MUNDY: Well the M198 is a 30 click, 30 kilometer range weapon so that in itself is a pretty good range. But beyond that or additional to that we were not. We had no 8-inch left. We relied, we began the process of acquiring the multiple launch rocket system. Actually, there are two, either the general support rocket system or the MLRS, multiple launch rocket system which the Army had acquired.

Being candid, we might have some artillery minds that would argue with me, that is too heavy for the Marine Corps. That is corps level artillery and the Marine Corps, we just do not have to have that in our standing inventory. Any time that we required MRLS, all of the training that we do at 29 Palms the Army will always bring an MLRS battalion and roll in behind it.

So I had talked to Gen Sullivan about this, Chief of Staff of the Army, and we have since signed a memorandum of understanding with the Army that, you know, on those occasions when that type of support is required the Army will provide it to the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: So, *if* there were a risk in this gap we would expect the Army to fill it and past experience indicates they have?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, and again, if you view the future and none of us view it very clearly, I do not see on the horizon that I can see of the future — and there is one beyond that of course that I cannot see — but I do not see the engagement of forces of a type that would require a massive capability or a significant capability on the part of the Marine Corps in this heavy type of artillery. I think we can rely on that.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September it was announced that three Marine FA-18 squadrons and one Marine A-6 squadron would be integrated into the Navy's carrier air wings. There have been some fairly strident arguments on the advisability of the Marine Corps committing its aviation assets to carrier air wings. Obviously, you came down on the side that it was advisable. Would you discuss the pros and cons that led you to this decision?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the first factor pertaining, remember that we spoke earlier of the off-site and of the Secretary of the Navy's desire that we reduce the number of F-18 squadrons in the naval aviation inventory. And remember that Adm Kelso, the CNO, had said, "I will take down some Navy squadrons but I cannot take them down unilaterally." We have to balance this somewhat and in addition to that, there was a belief, and this will be an interesting fact, and it was a stronger belief on the part of Marine aviators, to include even those of yesteryear, the LtGen Tom Millers and Keith Smiths and people like that, that it was good for Marine pilots to maintain their naval abilities and that it is good from time to time for us to employ squadrons aboard ship.

As a matter of record, and my numbers will be a lit-

tle bit off here, but we were, at that point someone did research and perhaps it was you and probably was, that revealed that, you know, since World War II or beginning in 1947, something like that, more than 100 Marine squadrons had flown off of Navy carriers in various deploys.

So, number 1, it was not new. It was, if anything, the origins of Marine aviation. In World War II, you know, Marine Corsairs and Hellcats and so on flew off of carriers as well as land based. So, there was a feeling that this was good.

There was a secondary feeling that since the naval aviation inventory was going to have to be reduced and since the larger portion of that would be a reduction in Navy squadrons that we could facilitate that and thereby keep Marine squadrons if we provided the Navy offsets for squadrons that they otherwise would have had to maintain. So it enabled the Navy to reduce its squadrons.

Ironically enough, the new CNO came in and was faced with the dilemma and the Navy is buying back six F-18 squadrons because Adm Boorda came to the conclusion that they had reduced too far. None of that had to do, however, with the integration of Marine squadrons.

So, that is the background. We could afford to do it at a reasonable operating tempo while reducing the inventory of naval aviation. It was not unique. It was not the first time and it was felt, at least by the Marine aviation community, that it was good to hone the skills. It has been very warmly received by the Navy at the operating level who generally speaking, though you would expect that everybody tried to say something nice about the other fellow, but all of the carrier air wing commanders who have reported upon receiving a Marine squadron have been just overwhelming in their praise for how ready the Marines were in comparison to their own Navy squadrons. So the Marine squadrons aboard ship have been, to some degree, sort of, you know, the standard to be aspired to and they like having the Marines because of a little bit of difference in the culture?

I worried about it a lot then. I do to some degree now in that I remember when we ran the A-6 community almost out of the Marine Corps when we had problems with the A-6 and we had to re-wing it and therefore the inventory went down and in order to maintain A-6s aboard carriers we committed the Marine A-6 force to carrier deployments. And what we learned is that Marines want to be Marines. If they wanted to be in the Navy they probably would have joined the Navy. And so we began to lose a lot of our Marine A-6 community because they said, in effect,

"This is not what I signed on for. I want to be with Marines. I do not want to be a part of a Navy ship's company all of the time." So I had some concern about.

I had some concern about us, you know, over time perhaps losing Marine aviation to the Navy because the Navy views F-18s, for example, as machines that fly from a carrier base. And, oh, by the way, we have to buy some for the Marines also. There is not a recognition in the Navy that Marine fixed wing aviation is a very clear operational capability upon which we rely. It is fire support. It is a Marine weapon system. We rely on it.

The thought is that, you know, that it is simply excess aviation that could be better put to use on a carrier deck and that, oh, by the way, if you need some close air support we will just come over and do it for you. Well, what we have found out is it is not that simple. You have to train that squadron to do close air support and if it is an integrated part of a Marine organization than we can do that.

Now we have taken some Navy squadrons off and trained them and they do very well. There is not a question of whether the pilot can pilot the aircraft and do as well, but when the squadron goes aboard ship it almost totally focuses itself on the safety of flying from an aircraft carrier and the missions that are being performed by an aircraft carrier which are primarily operational in nature, that is, longer range and deeper and at greater distance than is the just out of the sound of artillery, or just out of the range of artillery employment of Marine aviation assets. So, we have to be very careful about that and I know that Gen Krulak is watching that one closely. I worried about it but it was a practical and an operational thing to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: We seem to have run out of time. Perhaps we should recess at this point and pick up this session at our next meeting.

BGEN SIMMONS: — and this is a continuation of Session 22 of my oral history interview with the 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. The interview is taking place in the Marine Corps Historical Center in the Washington Navy Yard. Today's day and date are Thursday, 14 December 1995.

In September 1992, for the first time, Toys-for-Tots Foundation was listed as an official charity of the Combined Federal Campaign. This undoubtedly seemed a good idea at the time, but perhaps it would lead to troubles later on. Would you like to comment on this now or wait until we reach the point in time

when Toys-for-Tots was in serious trouble?

GEN MUNDY: I think it's useful to comment on Toys-for-Tots and then we can talk about the later events. But of course, Toys-for-Tots, as you know, began back in 1947 out on the West Coast and has been for the succeeding decades one of the most favorable public relations stunts, if you will, that the Marine Corps has been able to put together, because it identifies Marines who are supposed to be the world's toughest fighting persons with children, and the need for getting toys to children.

The decision had been made earlier, and as I recall it, about 1989 at the suggestion of then MajGen Walt Boomer who was commanding the 4th Marine Division and thereby the Marine Corps Reserve Forces down in New Orleans, Walt had concluded, as many of us who have been inspector instructors out with the Reserve units, that the program had essentially outgrown the ability of the Marine Corps Reserve to conduct effectively, and that some overall management or a management structure was needed. Walt had suggested that a civilian, an entrepreneur who was eager to get into this in effect take over Toys-for-Tots, and while it would still be a Marine Corps Reserve Program and it would still be identified with the Corps, in effect we would have somebody that would be full-time involved in collecting funds and turning those funds into toys, buying toys at bulk quantity rates as opposed to just a local recruiter taking \$25 and going to a local store and buying something.

So Walt recommended to General Gray and General Gray approved in effect the commercialization of the Toys-for-Tots effort. So a structure was put into place and among those things that occurred subsequently were such, if you will, commercial-type endeavors as getting the Toys-for-Tots listing in the Combined Federal Campaign and doing mail out solicitations which we've never done before. More to follow on that, but that's a little bit of background at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 3 September, Operation Bright Promise began for Marines of the Special Operations Capable 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The 26th MEU was placed on stand-by in the Adriatic Sea. Four helicopters from HMM-365 searched for an Italian transport plane that had crashed in the mountains west of Sarajevo. Was this our first actual involvement in the Bosnian conflict?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. At that time, the U.S., and principally of course the United States Sixth Fleet

with its Marine Expeditionary Unit were in something of a, I would use the term, over watch position. We simply were watching what was going on in the former Yugoslavia and at this point the United States, nor for that matter substantially any of the NATO nations had chosen to become involved. But we were airlifting supplies in there. There were a few people on the ground, and as I recall this particular incident, yes that was a loss of one of the Italian aircraft and the Marines went in to look for the crew and did not find anybody, did not touch down and certainly didn't put any Marines on the ground, but simply were used as a search and rescue mission.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 4 September, you went to San Diego by way of Reno, for the weekend. You spoke on Saturday in San Diego to the Women Marines Association banquet. Was the WMA involved in any way in the sexual harassment or career opportunities for women issues?

GEN MUNDY: Well, more on the WMA in just a moment. Let me clarify, since you mentioned I had gone by way of Reno, it sounds as though I had flown out, gambled for the weekend and then gone down and made a speech. As a practical matter, Reno was the second reunion of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines in which I had served in Vietnam and they were having their reunion that weekend, so I stopped by to also give a speech and thereby legitimize my stopover night in Reno.

We went on down to San Diego, visited the base, stayed at the Recruit Depot, and then as you said, went out to the Women Marines Association. This was not the WMA as I recall it, though they certainly would have had interest in those issues of sexual harassment and for the increased opportunities for women in the Services and specifically the Marine Corps. But this was not their agenda and they had no agenda that they beset upon me with. I was just a banquet speaker. It is a sorority-type organization and they have inductions and they sang their song, they give each other pins and things like that, as many of our other professional organizations do.

But it was simply a nice gathering of some very fine women who are as proud to be Marines as any of us who had served in uniform.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 9 September, you made a string of Congressional visits, including Senator McCain, Senator Rudman, Senator Dixon, Congressman Dellums, Congresswoman Byron, and Senator Leahy. You wound up the day with a meeting

with the Secretary of the Navy. Do you recall what the burning issue might have been?

GEN MUNDY: That is the time of the year when the Congress is in session considering the budget. And although the budget testimony by the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries has occurred earlier in the year, usually in March and April, this is the time when a Service Chief so to speak works the Hill, in other words goes and makes his calls. We do that throughout the year, but this is a principal time to emphasize those programs that are very important to you and to ensure that whatever member of Congress you're calling on has all the answers and all the information and has your personal imprimatur if you will on the importance of this program for the Marine Corps.

So those were business calls. The meeting with the Secretary was probably a routine weekly meeting and I don't recall anything significant about it.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, the 11th of September, you and Linda left for a lengthy trip to Russia. Did this trip have an official purpose?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, it definitely did. When the breakthrough with the former Soviet Union occurred in 1989, and Marshal Akhromeyev and his delegation came over to visit, there was established thereafter a series of reciprocal visits. As is always the case, or I should say as is frequently the case, the Commandant was left until last. In other words, there had been reciprocal visits by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Air Force and the — I don't recall, I don't believe the CNO went over for one, but that was more a function of his availability than the fact that they invited him.

But at any rate, General Gray, who would have ordinarily in 1989, 1990, been the Commandant to go, we were impeded by the Gulf War. That delayed things. So at any rate, I became the Commandant and it was time for the reciprocal visit for me to visit the former Soviet Union at that point.

We went. I took, of course, Colonel Metzger; the Military Secretary, one aide; Linda, a linguist, with me that came out of the Naval Intelligence Service that was a trained Soviet interpreter, and we flew into Russia. Arrived in Moscow on a Sunday, were very warmly received. We were actually guests of the Russian Navy because the Commander of what was then known as the Russian Naval Infantry — it is no longer known by that term, it's now the Coastal Defense Forces — but the Russian Naval Infantry was very distinctly a part of the Russian Navy. So I was actually hosted by, and received by, the Commander-

in-Chief of the Russian Navy, by the CNO equivalent. Admiral Gromov was his name.

My opposite number was a then lieutenant general, which actually was a two-star rank, inasmuch as major general was one star in their system. But a Lieutenant General Ivan Skuratov, S K U R A T O V. I had met General Skuratov when he was part of Marshal Akhromeyev's delegation, A K H R O M E Y E V, his delegation in 1989.

We arrived in Moscow, were very warmly received.

We were taken to the Defense Ministry Hotel in Moscow, which was a rather shabby place. It was — you've been there — it was probably, I mean it was certainly as good as the government had to offer without putting you up in one of the luxury hotels and they were not prepared to do that, probably as much for security as well as for expense. But I can remember that in the lobby when you checked in, they had a little pond, a marble pond with goldfish in it, but two of the goldfish were dead in the pond when we checked in.

Anyway, we were put up in the top floor. We were put up in what I'm sure was a very elegant suite. It was a two-room suite with a sitting room, a television, a bar that was not stocked, but they had the bar there, and then of course the bedroom. One of the interesting things about this visit that Linda will vow to this day is we began to wonder whether or not the room was bugged and whether they were listening to us. We concluded that no, surely we had passed that point. But that night when we got into the hotel, we had the bed, but we had only one pillow. We didn't realize that until we got ready to go to bed, we were undressed and everything. You didn't call for room service, you just made with what was there. I think I folded my coat under my head or something and Linda had the pillow but we talked about the pillow. The next morning promptly a second pillow arrived. So after that we guarded what we had to say a little bit.

BGEN SIMMONS: I could second that because I had the same experience. I stayed there in the spring of 1989, not in a suite but in a room. This was a group of U.S. Service historians. We were harmless, we were one of the first exchange visits. I would compare that hotel to an economy hotel in this country.

GEN MUNDY: Exactly.

BGEN SIMMONS: And everything was quite spartan and we had a similar experience where someone wondered why there weren't coat hangers available

and the next day the coat hangers were there.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think there is some humor and some meaning in this visit, so I will go on about it for a little while. But the first night we had a dinner. They entertain grandly, I don't mean expensively — it probably was expensive to them — but they put on a very nice event. We were entertained by Admiral Gromov with other, the Vice Chief and General Skuravtov and his wife whose name was Olga, O-L-G-A, appropriately enough, Ivan and Olga seems right.

I can remember wearing my blues. They had not expected this, because we wore greens for the bulk of the entire — in fact that's all we wore was greens. We didn't wear the utility uniform. But I sported up and wore blues for this event and that impressed them.

But as always, an American going into that culture has to learn to control the vodka toast, because as we all know, they will continue to toast as long as you will continue to drink and to reciprocate. But at any rate, I got through the vodka pretty well. We probably hoisted two or three that night. But it was a very, very nice evening. They were very warm and genuine people, and I was struck by the fact that the Mrs. Gromov, who was the wife of the CNO, he had previously been the Commander of the Northern Fleet and had only recently become the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

So she was quite taken, they came down from Severodmorsk, S E V E R O R D M O R S K, which was the home base of the Soviet fleet and that was up near Murmansk. The amount of recollection and affection and appreciation that the Russian people still had for Americans because of the supplies that flowed into Murmansk in World War II amazed me. I had expected a rather hostile feeling perhaps toward what had been the enemy for lo these past 45 years. Not so with the Russian people, and not so with many of the military, although the military officers were probably not as ready to acknowledge that, but their wives certainly were. Their wives had been children during World War II and had seen the Americans and the American relief supplies coming in and were deeply grateful to us for that.

So anyway, she made the evening. She was my dinner partner and she would keep referring to that and how warmly she felt toward Americans. We had a nice dinner.

The next day we got up and I can recall I got up and ran the next morning. It was for me a very exciting moment to be running through, though we were on the outskirts, but to be running up the streets of Moscow in Russia. I ran up to one of the, they call them the

Seven Ugly Sisters, you probably know that these cathedral-like hotels that Joseph Stalin had built around the perimeter of Moscow, not hotels but buildings. This one happened to be Moscow University. It was probably a mile or so up the hill to it. I ran up to it and then stopped on this high ground and surveyed the city of Moscow, which is not in any way impressive. It's a dirty, dingy, gray looking place, other than the Kremlin, which of course is quite colorful.

We made some calls that day and did so to speak the formal things, calling on the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, calling on General Skuravtov. We traveled in a limousine in one of the Russian — I can't say the name of the car, but it is short, it is a three-letter, you know Zil or something like that. We traveled in it and I can remember — of course, we were uniformed and bloused and barracks-capped everywhere we went. But you would get into this car and the door, it was an extended length limousine, you could get into the door and it was about as I would estimate it, it was about four feet back to the seat. But yet, you were hunched over so you would sort of learn to get into the car and then start moving backwards which would cause you to fall, because you can't duck walk backwards, it's hard to do. Start walking backwards, and as you fell back you would land in the seat.

There were curtains, heavy curtains. There was a Persian rug on the floor. The fumes of the car came right up through the floor. And an important person in Russia signifies that importance by the speed with which you travel, plus the fact that they probably for security reasons want to move you quickly. So once you got in, there were no seat belts or anything, but once you got in and once the driver got out of the parking lot, from there on, it was pedal to the metal. No curve was slowed down for. If he was making a U-turn, you just literally you could hear the tires squealing as you bounced around these curves.

And most of the time if we were going anywhere of a distance, there would be a police escort up front that had a loud speaker on the car. We literally at whatever speed, I couldn't see the speedometer up there, I don't know how fast we were traveling, but we would go through the main streets of Moscow at I would imagine 50 miles an hour, maybe 60. And women pushing baby carriages or vendors or what were diving for cover, because here came an important motorcade.

But we made our calls there, then we went the following day down to Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast, and there they rolled out their number one show, it would be their equivalent of a capabilities exercise. They had ships off shore and they landed some of

their — probably a battalion-size landing and they had aircraft flying overhead. It was very clear to one observing the aircraft that they had no concept of close air support as we do it, because the aircraft were not making strike passes, they were simply flying in an orbit. So a jet would go overhead, but that jet never rolled over and dove for a target and then pulled out to signify that they were using them for anything, other than that they knew they were supposed to have them there.

But it was a pretty good show. Then of course you have a lunch and you drink some vodka and you exchange gifts and you go for a tour. We toured one of the museums there in Kaliningrad and then came on back to — oh, I guess we remained overnight there that night and had another dinner, drank some more vodka.

We went up to Leningrad, or St. Petersburg, as it is now called, and that was probably the most impressive part of the tour. I'm sure for you it was as well. It's a beautiful city, a beautiful setting. One is struck I think as you go into the Winter Palace, which of course is where the Czar was seized during the revolution across the patio out in front there. But as you go in and you look at these majestic buildings, beautifully colored, the Russians in St. Petersburg at least had beautifully painted buildings. But there would be large chunks of plaster missing or the grass was not tended. The garden was — this was the time of the year when you could have flowers — but the garden was simply full of weeds and overgrown, not cut back flowers and things.

That said, once you went inside and looked at all of the things, the art works that the Soviets had captured during the war and kept there I suppose over the years was very impressive. But we enjoyed staying there.

Again, I would, as much as anything, we were kept under very tight security. When you went in to stay in the dacha that they were putting you up in at night, you were of course, the gates were secured and there was a sentry there. So I took a great delight, it probably was not the thing for a Service Chief to be doing, perhaps for any American, but I would take delight in being able to evade the security and go out for a run and run out through the streets of the city early in the morning. There were ordinary people getting on buses going to work. It was very much as you would expect in any city. But I just enjoyed doing that.

We visited the Marine Security Guard there. We still had the policy at that time, which the State Department had imposed on us, that the young Marines, all of whom were bachelors except the detachment commander, must be bachelors. They

were young, healthy, good, strapping, fine looking young men. But they couldn't date. They couldn't fraternize with the locals.

BGEN SIMMONS: Still under the cloud of the sergeant.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, Lonetree, and no fraternization with the locals, even though that rule of no fraternization had been in effect, but Lonetree had violated that rule, which was one of his infractions. We still had the no fraternization, but it was a real shame because here we were supposedly now the enmity was ended, the wall was down, we were attempting to influence the Russian people, we were sending business delegations over, we were sending Commandants over and everybody else, but the Marine corporals couldn't go out at night and go to a disco. They could go and have a beer or so but they couldn't dance with the local girls. It was kind of a idiotic policy. I came back and sought to revisit it and I don't think on my watch that we ever got it loosened up, because that's still the policy at the present time.

But at any rate, we had a very nice visit and were very well hosted there. We went on from there to Severomorsk. I should tell the story that as we left what would be the equivalent what would be the equivalent of Andrews Air Force Base in Moscow, that's Airfield Number Five or something like that. It was a name. It takes about an hour to drive out there from downtown Moscow.

We drove out and we got there and it was fogged in. Instead of having the airplane there, they had planned to move the airplane from an adjoining airfield over to pick us up in the morning. Well, of course when we got there and it was fogged in, they couldn't move the airplane over, so we were socked in there at the airfield.

The Russian solution to everything, regardless of the time of the day when a delay occurs is you break out the vodka bottle. So at about 9:00 in the morning, the officer-in-charge of the airfield hauls in a couple of bottles of vodka and some cookies or something and if you asked for coffee, they would go make you some special. But anyway, he brought in the vodka. I didn't — I would usually take a glass because it was socially the thing to do, but I didn't drink much of it at that point.

Finally, after about an hour, they realized that we were not going to be able to fly. But the other airfield was open. So we got back in the car, screech around at 90 miles an hour, drive to the other airfield and it was really an eye opener. In other words, we had been

at the VIP airfield. When you got to the regular airfield where they kept the airplanes, I mean potholes and birds and limbs across the runway. It was just in an amazing state of disrepair. But here was a Cub aircraft, a Soviet Cub as we titled it, nice little twin engine jet aircraft, executive, rigged with a table in it, not unlike our executive aircraft.

But we pulled up alongside and we got out and they loaded the baggage. There was a fuel truck backing in. The man that was backing the fuel truck in to gas up the airplane was smoking a cigarette hanging out of his mouth. He pulled it on in and they said we can go ahead and get on the airplane. I said, "No, why don't we wait, let him fuel the airplane" and we began to back away, the Americans. But the guy jumped out of the cab of the truck and opened up the fuel tank access hatch on the wing and got up on the wing and pulled up the hose and began fueling the airplane. His buddy was standing down shooting the breeze with him and smoking his cigarette.

We got on the airplane, and Linda really enjoyed this one, because as we got on and they started it up and we were about to taxi out, we instinctively began to feel around for our seat belts. My counterpart said, "Oh, we don't use those, that's nonsense." So no seat belts. There were crates of apples as I recall, some wine that they had brought along for the trip, some drinks that were kind of stacked around the cabin there. So they don't have — the FAA in Russia is distinctly different than it is in this country.

We went on up to Severomorsk and there the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, who was a fairly nice man after the fact, but he saw fit for about the first half hour we were there, as we called on him in his conference room for the formal call, he saw fit to lecture me on the superiority of the Russian Fleet over anything and then to lecture me on the fact that despite the fact that hostilities were over, that intelligence gathering submarines continued to invade their territory up around the Kola Peninsula and to make demands that he clearly wanted me to carry back that this had to be stopped.

So I think that I probably represented the counterpoint fairly well and emphasized to him that we were all glad that things were not quite as tense as they used to be, but that there was still a period of uncertainty and that I thought that I'm sure that he still had some submarines that were operating, to which his eyes said yes. He clearly didn't expect that, but of course he denied. But I told him that I was certain that as we became more accustomed to this period of peace that necessary assurances that they were in fact not operating aggressively would dissipate.

So anyway, after he had gotten that off his chest, then he became a great friend. We went around and saw his base.

Linda went off to one of the schools there, fell in love with the school children. They welcomed her, sang her a song in English, gave her cards and things.

When we came back to the States we collected a couple of boxes of books and sent them over, because one of the things that she was struck with was that the school books that they had were long out of date. I mean these were books that as they depicted any form of American history were probably written about the same time that *Little Black Sambo* was still in print. So she tried to get some more current books and we sent them over. I presume that they got there. You don't know whether they did or not.

The thing that was striking, as we went to visit this very impressive fleet, their cruisers, their destroyers, we were not in the submarine pen, they wouldn't take us up there. But we went down to have lunch on one of their newer class cruisers, *Cresta* cruiser, which was of course the first line of the fleet at that particular time. It was a very impressive ship, not a spot of rust on it, not a spot anywhere on it.

But the remarkable thing, there must have been 20, maybe 30 ships in port, tied up at the various piers. There was not a sailor in sight, there was not a thing moving around that port. There was no forklift carrying supplies, there were no sailors hanging off the side chipping and scraping and painting the ship, not a sound. It was eerie. It was though there had been a radiation strike or something and that everybody was dead and there wasn't anything moving, except on the ship that we visited. There they had an honor guard turned out and of course we toured the ship. But it was their style that when an important person was in the area, get all the trash and those trashy sailors off the piers and don't clutter the place. So it was a rather eerie visit.

But very impressive. As you went in the ship, of course, the thing that strikes a U.S. military person right away is that we went into a wardroom which was fitted out very much like the *Queen Mary*. It was wooden, it had aquariums of fish in it. It had all sorts of crystal and barware and you wondered if this thing ever went to sea, if they had any thought what a fire would do in the wardroom. Heavy carpets, all that sort of thing that you would not find on a United States man-of-war.

So a very good visit there. We went over to see the Russian Naval Infantry. I can't recall the camp, but it's the closest camp to the Norwegian border. And ironically, just a few years earlier, I had stood on the

other side of the Norwegian border as a planner figuring how we would introduce Marine forces up there and knowing that that particular brigade was the northernmost brigade that we would go against. Now I was in their camp.

They had a firepower demonstration, a very impressive — the Soviets do, when they shoot, they shoot a lot and their weapons are impressive. Of course, they, like us, everything hit what it was supposed to hit. They had probably been registering it for days. But it was impressive.

However, at the end of the demonstration, I said I would like to go talk to some of your soldiers. Well, that's not on the program, but we were 20 yards away from where they were. So I just started striding toward the soldiers and this really upset them, not angrily, but they didn't know how to deal with it. They couldn't deal with any alteration to the program, or to the fact that now I was going to go out and actually talk to the crew that had been firing the guns. I'm sure they were concerned that I would ask them did you practice or was this spontaneous? But they were concerned about that.

Nonetheless, I was able to get out there and talk to some of the soldiers. I frankly was impressed. They were good looking troops. And they had the marks of field like service. What does that mean? It means that their fingernails were dirty, not clean, and that their hands showed heavy work and scratches and dirt and that sort of thing. So I had the feeling that this outfit was probably a pretty good military organization.

We left, came back to Moscow, hosted a reciprocal reception for them at the U.S. Ambassador's residence, which we paid for out of official representation funds and the Ambassador allowed us to use his residence.

Admiral Gromov was appropriately polished. There were a number of Russian officers there, my counterpart who generally speaking at any of the formal events that we had would become overinebriated and would get up and give these 20 minute toasts about brotherhood and love and affection and the admiration of one Marine for another. It was kind of — he was speaking from the heart. But then we would toast and we would have about three minutes of conversation and suddenly he would pop up again and give another 20 minute toast. So you could see in the eyes of the more sophisticated Navy officers, that they considered Marines probably not unlike our own Navy occasionally views us as rather backwoodsmen who had gotten into the mess and had to be tolerated, but you didn't want to have them there too often.

At any rate, at our reciprocal event that evening, Gen Skuratov who now was drinking American whiskey, I think it was American whiskey, it was scotch as a matter of fact is what he preferred. But it was free and he was drinking lots of it. My goodness, he really, his wife was embarrassed at the degree of drunkenness.

But whatever the case, we ended that evening after we had done a reception, we went over to the American Embassy and went up and hung out with the Marines a little bit at the Embassy and with the dependents and had a very nice evening. Then the next morning we got up and went out and formally departed, and departed I might say with great warmth and with true affection for the Russians because they literally had rolled out their best to host us. Their best was, by our standards, was at best second rate, but it wasn't because they did not put out the best they had for us. So it was a very good trip.

BGEN SIMMONS: You returned from Russia on Sunday, 20 September. On the 23d, the Commandant of the Royal Marines arrived on an official visit. Who was that?

GEN MUNDY: It was Sir Henry Beverly at that point. He was shortly to be relieved by Lieutenant General Robin Ross of who we have spoken earlier, but it was Henry Beverly at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: We spoke at some length earlier about the influence of the Royal Marines on the United States Marines. Was there anything specific about this visit that stood out in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: No, it was not as I recall a — well, as a matter of fact, it was an official counterpart visit, because while Henry had been here previously as the Commandant-General and ordinarily the Brits will be over here more than once during their tenure, but he was a good friend and though I think General Gray had hosted him, I wanted to do that also as he was getting ready to depart his office. And so, it was as much as anything sort of a reciprocal or a social visit, although it was not reciprocal because I hadn't been to the United Kingdom at that point.

He came and we put him up, of course, in the Prince Philip Suite at the Commandant's House, which was very meaningful to him. Had an honor's ceremony for him, decorated him. Henry had been an exchange officer with the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in his captaincy and in fact had actually gone off to the Dominican Republic as a company commander

until his government found out he was there and recalled him abruptly. He had to be pulled out, to his chagrin. But he is a favorite of many who know the Royal Marines, probably one of their most colorful Commandants. He was a hell-bent-for-leather fellow that would, as long as you wanted to stay up hoisting them down at night, why Henry would be at the bar with you. And yet he would get up the next morning and as they would term it "yomp," take a jog or take a run with you for 10 miles if he wanted to. He was a good hearty, true warrior in the classic sense of the hard — the classic gentleman, but hard drinking, hard fighting, a guy that you would want at your side. So I thought a lot of him, as I did of his successor.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 September, the nucleus headquarters of all the brigade service groups, the BSSGs, except for BSSG-1 were officially deactivated. This was in consonance with the earlier deactivation of the command elements of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigades. What mission remained for BSSG-1?

GEN MUNDY: Well, because the brigade in Hawaii was an independent brigade, even though it was aligned with III MEF, with one of the regiments out of the 3d Division and elements from what would be the 3d MEF, but it was an independent brigade. We had to sustain it there, had to have a logistic support element. So BSSG-1 was in effect a detachment of the 3d Force Service Support Group, and today in fact is referred to as a detachment of the 3d Force Service Support Group. But it remained because it was a structure for supporting the fixed wing, rotary wing elements of aviation at Kaneohe Bay Air Station. The infantry regiment, the artillery battalion, the assault amphibian vehicles that we had there, we had to have a logistic support element.

BGEN SIMMONS: As a further step in the restructuring, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Command Element was reactivated at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, on 21 September. The 31st MEU had been previously active from 1967 to 1985. What was the purpose of the reactivation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as you point out, up until about 1984, we had a standing Marine Expeditionary Unit. And remember that in the seventies and up until the early eighties, we still — we did not do the unit replacement system in Okinawa, but we sent individuals out there. So the MEU staff was stood up. Now, when we got into unit rotation, the decision was made

earlier on to deactivate 31st MEU because the Marine Expeditionary Units that were then sailing into the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean or wherever, all came off the West Coast or out of Hawaii. So that was deactivated.

The reason that we reactivated has both a practical and being dragged into it sense. The Navy decided to station one of the LHA, the large class helicopter carriers, the *Belleau Wood* in Sasebo, Japan. So together with the three amphibious ships that had long been kept out there and a couple of LSTs, an LSD, an LKA I think at one time was out there, they now put a flat deck helicopter carrier out there. We thus were in — then we began to plan for the utilization of forces off Okinawa. Of course now that we had a helicopter carrier, we had the capacity of truly putting together a permanent Marine Expeditionary Unit. So we were caused more or less to reestablish the 31st MEU to marry it up with the *Belleau Wood* and to plan for a Marine Expeditionary Unit off Okinawa.

That sounds like a very logical thing to do and like a simple thing to do, and indeed the stand-up of the MEU was accomplished, albeit at the expense of in effect the regimental headquarters of the 9th Marines, because we had to have command headquarter structure to do that with. We needed the MEU worse than we needed two regimental headquarters in the Far East and therefore the 9th Marines came down and the 31st MEU stood up as a standing element.

Subsequently, that has proven to be extremely difficult for us because the MEU as a standing force in the Western Pacific, number one we have unit rotations so there isn't a standing force. The pieces of battalions and pieces of the MEU are rotated out. But our problem has been that our unit rotation cycle and the deployment schedule of the amphibious ready group in Sasebo had not yet become one and the same. A lot of that is driven by the fact that if a crisis occurs in the Indian Ocean or something and the amphibious ready group is then put to sea maybe six weeks earlier than it had planned to be. This really throws a monkey wrench into our unit deployment cycle.

So for us to have a special operations capable trained, organized, truly integrated Marine Expeditionary Unit in Okinawa has become almost all consuming of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. We can't just pick up any helicopter outfit and send it up to operate off *Belleau Wood*, so a majority of the rotary wing assets that III MEF has at its disposal, which is very small to begin with, the majority of those have to be put into a composite squadron or a reinforced squadron and assigned to the 31st MEU

and to the *Belleau Wood* for proficiency and work-ups and continuity all the time. This has very significantly depleted III MEF's day to day resources for rotary wing. It takes away one of their battalions and good parts of the MEF on a continuing basis. It's good to have it there, but it has been an extraordinary problem for us.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 25 September, you published your second Green Letter of the year. It had the title, "A Message of Relevance," and it was built on Senator Nunn's 2 July 1992 floor speech. Would you review the significance of this "Message of Relevance?"

GEN MUNDY: Senator Nunn had made a speech that I mailed out, and the substance of the speech was that we're not going to be able to afford as much defense in the future. It's going to have to come down. He asked some very provocative questions, which were the usual questions. Why do we have four air forces and do we need both light infantry and Marines and all of those standing questions that are asked periodically.

But what he said was we must, as we pare down our forces, we must select those forces that —

GEN MUNDY: And what I was about to say is that whether or not Senator Nunn intended specifically to highlight the same theme that the Marines had been making, and that is remember that we had adopted as our more or less byline at that particular time in articulating the Corps and selling the Marine Corps the term "ready, relevant and capable" had been the three words that we used to try and describe the Marine Corps.

So what I gained from the Nunn speech, even though there were the gauntlets of why do we have to have four air forces and all those sorts of things that I knew we were going to have to fight in the future but I knew we could win in the future and we have today. I found that what Nunn really said was, "We have come to a time and place where we can't afford forces of less utility and we need to focus our resources on the forces of the greatest utility," and to me the United States Marines Corps is the greatest utility and the most economical and all that sort of thing.

So I sent that out I think as a statement of if we play our cards right, we will play off of Senator Nunn's speech to justify the size and the capabilities and the resourcing of the Marine Corps, and we did do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now we come to a real land-

mark. On 28 September, SecNav, CNO, and CMC signed a Navy/Marine Corps White Paper that outlined the orientation of the naval service for the 21st century. The strategy expounded in the White Paper was entitled "From the Sea." It represented a shift in naval strategy from a focus on a global threat, that is the erstwhile Soviet Navy, to emphasis on regional challenges. Another term that came into increasing use was "littoral warfare," meaning maneuver from the sea and a concentration on warfare near land and against the coastlines of the world. Have I summed this up correctly?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, you have.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did this new strategy tend to make the Marine Corps a full partner with the Navy in shaping naval strategy?

GEN MUNDY: It tended to make it a more equal partner with the Navy. To say that the Marine Corps is or has ever been a full partner with the Navy in almost anything would be an exaggeration. In our early days, for good and valid reason, but in today's world for not so valid reasons in all occasions.

But you will recall, as we talked about shaping and aiming the Navy in an earlier session, that I pointed out that the Marine architect — certainly there were some fine Navy officers on this, but as I mentioned this was a Marine effort. I mentioned the names that really caused this to come about.

We reached the end of the first phase of the study, and remember that Admiral Kelso at that point, who certainly endorsed that conceptually, but the second phase of the study was all right, now let's define a fleet, we need to do that. That was a bridge too far. Admiral Kelso simply could not take that step. So we didn't and the effort went rather lame for a while. Of course, during that same period, we were being tormented by Tailhook and crises that were taking the eye off the ball. Secretary Garrett, as you mentioned, had been fired. The CNO per law was the Acting Secretary as well as the Chief of Naval Operations, so he was bearing a double load to his great credit.

But anyway, we had kind of hit the wall "From the Sea," or what was to become From the Sea. Remember, I commented earlier that when Sean O'Keefe was sent down to be the Secretary of the Navy, part of his mandate was the same as the effort that General Powell and others had entreated me on, as I mentioned I think earlier in the session. That was that we had to get the Navy moving. The Navy was simply at that point, was not headed in a direction

with a course of speed that was clear.

So when O'Keefe came down, then-Vice Admiral Bill Owens, who had been Secretary Cheney's military assistant, was very close with Sean O'Keefe. Not that I was officially aware of that, but Owens and O'Keefe reinvigorated this earlier effort, this naval force planning effort. And we took the report that had been done, gathered as many of the captains and colonels that had done it, around and had them polish it up a little bit. Then it would come to me and I would wordsmith it a bit and it would go back into Secretary O'Keefe.

To make a long story short, after a couple of weeks, O'Keefe wanted to get this on the road because his mandate of get the Navy moving, step one would be get a White Paper, get a doctrine, get a concept out there that the Hill would respond to and that would start shaping the Navy. And so, it was as much as anything, the work in putting this together, as I've said too many times, was certainly an equal partnership driven by Marines. But the work in actually getting it on paper and getting it out was driven principally by Sean O'Keefe and with his shadow, Vice Admiral Owens, pushing in the background.

And certainly, Admiral Kelso and I were full partners in this. And it was in fact Admiral Kelso, as we fished around for a title to put on this, we had "Power from the Sea," and we had "Influence from the Sea," and we had all that sort of thing. Finally, in the last session, Admiral Kelso said why don't we just drop all of the descriptors and just call it "From the Sea . . ." So that was great, and I said, "Let's do it and get it hard copy and go."

So the three of us signed it and it became the philosophy, some would say the doctrine, the concept, the philosophy for the naval Services for the 21st century. As in many cases, we would want to believe that, as you had described it, that that is the way that it's going. But to turn the bow of an aircraft carrier takes a long time.

So to this day, to this day, I don't think the present CNO, I think Admiral Boorda is solidly on board with this concept. But the Navy would retrench back to the blue water very easily, I believe, because the systems that are in research and development and the design, that are important, but quieter submarines, or the SSN23, the sea world-class submarines, those are big major programs for the United States Navy. It's very, very difficult, even if we wanted to, to shift back from a strategy that involves that.

So instead, we tend to say we will build this submarine at the cost of billions of dollars, but we will use it in littoral warfare to sneak up and lay off shore

and look through the periscope and watch to see if we can see anybody on the beach, or with more sophisticated electronics. There probably are cheaper ways of doing that, but it is an adaptation of a capability that is extremely important to this generation of Navy officers to do things that are consistent with the concepts and philosophy and doctrine that you described, or that were described in "From the Sea . . ."

So, yes, "From the Sea . . ." I think was a landmark achievement with the Navy. Yes, it is still the focus of the Department of the Navy. I think it would be safe to say that many of the programs, certainly the amphibious ships are doing quite well in the Navy ship construction plan. The *Aegis* capable destroyers, the *Arleigh Burke* destroyers, the *Aegis* cruisers are being oriented toward ballistic missile defense, which they're very capable of, not only just fleet defense, but really fleet defense and defense of the forces being projected ashore.

So to the Navy's credit, they have turned toward the littorals. But there still is an element, it would be very easy for the Navy to shift its focus, not given the impetus of Sean O'Keefe or subsequently John Dalton, who continued O'Keefe's focus on the littoral warfare.

BGEN SIMMONS: This new strategy required joint approval.

GEN MUNDY: Well, you mean the Navy and the Marines Corps or both of us?

BGEN SIMMONS: No, Navy, Marine Corps —

GEN MUNDY: I'm sorry, you mean joint in the sense of the Chairman.

BGEN SIMMONS: The JCS, the Chairman, did he have to bless this?

GEN MUNDY: No, he didn't have to bless it. Now, he could have very easily — because it was not his to bless. In other words, this was a Service matter as to how we would do business in the future. It had nothing to do with, that business would be for the enhancement of joint operations. In fact, a thesis is that we will provide naval forces shaped for joint operations. So it was an endorsement of jointness in the littoral operations. It did not require approval, but certainly any Chairman who was not satisfied with it would have been able to, by his non-endorsement, or by his counter to it, would have been able probably to do it damage.

General Powell was not, I think that General Powell was looking for more revisionism in the Navy than probably this implied to him. I don't know what that was, because before he and I talked on several occasions about getting the Navy going, I had the feeling that he was responding more to the political suasions around town that I've described earlier which said that the Air Force seems to be doing all right, the Army is doing all right, the Marines were high as a kite in those days, but the Navy is just dead in the water, so we've got to get it moving.

I think he was saying to me, "You've got to get the Navy moving," but if I had said to him, "Colin, what is it you want me to do," I don't have a feeling that he would have said here is specifically what I think we should do. Bill Owens had very, very specific ideas as to where the Navy should go. Many of them got implemented, many of them have not yet and did not on his watch, but he certainly was a major architect.

And of course, he became, again for perhaps arguably, with at least some of the same rationale, he became immediately, he was headed to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. So he was given his fourth star one day, detached, headed for Hawaii, and was told to stop what you were doing and to come back that General Shalikashvili wanted him to be his Vice Chairman, which is an extraordinarily rapid accession. But it was as much as anything the fact that within the Defense Department they wanted him to be the Vice Chairman because they knew of his great influence and imprint to that point on the direction of the Navy and they wanted him not only to continue to help turn the Navy in the right direction, but also the joint Armed Forces as a whole.

Admiral Bill Owens, while something of a controversial figure and will be a controversial figure because he is a tremendously intelligent man with ideas that frighten many, and sometimes me for that matter. But I will tell you, he should be recorded as one who made tremendous impact on the direction, the future direction of the U.S. Armed Forces, probably more than about anybody I can think of.

He was a great friend of Marines and is to this day a great friend of Marines. He and General Krulak were put together to be the Navy/Marine Corps team when he came into his job as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Navy Operations for Resources and Programs, which was a very big — I plugged Chuck Krulak in with him and they became companions. So as a result of that, to this day, the Marines Corps still enjoys extraordinary fine rapport in the Joint Staff with the Vice Chairman because it's a good team.

BGEN SIMMONS: Coincidentally, on 29 September, you published Green Letter 3-92, "MAGTF Staff Training Program." Why did you consider this Green Letter necessary and did it represent a General Krulak initiative at Quantico?

GEN MUNDY: No, more accurately, it reflected a General Boomer initiative. That was, as in the case of all of us, that General Krulak continued to move forward with. Actually Walt Boomer had — let me take one step other than that. Let me say that this is a Lieutenant General Ernie Cheatham, USMC retired, initiative. Ernie is a member of a similar army, of grey beards, wise men, grey beards, the common term for retired officers that come back and serve as teachers or instructors.

Ernie was on an Army, they use a different term, and I think it is BSTP, Battle Skills Training Program. This is a program that's done out at Fort Leavenworth and it's where the Army will bring in a core commander and his staff and his division commanders and really put him through the wringers. I mean they make the generals earn their pay and learn war fighting skills, learn doctrine and they face them with challenges and then they grade them. And if you flunk it, they bring you back again. They bring the III Corps up again and teach them how to be Corps commanders.

General Cheatham is one of the wise men on that Army program. So he came back to Quantico early in my tenure and approached Walt Boomer and said "We've got to get something going like this," remembering that Ernie Cheatham among the MAGTFs of the Corps, you had many. General Al Gray was one of the leading proponents of the MAGTF. Ernie Cheatham was arguably — and there are some who would argue this, but I wouldn't — Ernie Cheatham was probably the only man around at that point who really had focused himself, when he had the I Marine Expeditionary Force, on building the capability to employ a MEF, command and control-wise. What does the MAGTF commander do? How deep should he go? What does he do? He has a division commander, he has a wing commander. Does he get in somebody's hair or how does he employ this MAGTF?

Ernie Cheatham had studied that for years. So he brought back to Quantico his experience as a board member on the BSTP and he convinced Walt Boomer that this is something we needed to do. Walt came to me on it and said, "This is a direction we need to go." I said, "Then let's go." So it took a formative stage. We hired Ernie. He is still under contract with the

Marine Corps for a certain amount of work each year.

We put together a very small cell, a Marine colonel and three or four other officers along with Ernie, to put together this MAGTF Staff Training Program.

It has proven to be solid gold. And while it happened on my watch, and you could point to me, in point of fact, it was my lieutenants who conceived of this and Walt Boomer was the architect. Chuck Krulak then of course carried it on, and with his energy and drive made sure that it was going well. So this was to describe what the MAGTF Staff Training Program was all about in this Green Letter.

BGEN SIMMONS: I imagine that General Boomer was conditioned somewhat by his experiences in the Persian Gulf?

GEN MUNDY: He was. Again, for me to say — I think at the point where I was crediting Ernie Cheatham with being really the man who really understood MAGTF operations, I think General Al Gray would probably say, "Well I did too." I don't mean to take nothing from Al Gray, but the MEFs have different personalities. I MEF as a general rule is the MEF that puts together a MEF command element and goes to the field with divisions and wings and what not and exercises, because they have Twentynine Palms there and they have great training areas to do it.

II MEF is sort of a provider of course, as we are always giving away, sending them off to Europe, sending them off to Norway, sending them down to the Caribbean. II MEF is sort of a warehouse. So the MEF expertise, MEF warfighting expertise at II MEF even today, if we had to send a MEF command element to war, we would want it to be I MEF, because it's the best trained big warfighting MEF command element that we have.

Boomer had led, Walt Boomer and however you want to conceive of the World War II formations, we have amphibious corps and things of that sort, but in recent times at least, Lew Walt and Walt Boomer were really about the only two people who had employed a MEF and Walt Boomer was the only man who had had a MEF formed and then committed to the offense as opposed to the Vietnam war, which was a much, much different war. This was mechanized warfare.

So yes, he was very much a — he had experience in doing the MEF and that made him especially vulnerable to Ernie Cheatham's proposal that we needed to do this. So let's give that one to Cheatham and Boomer.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 October, after considerable debate and contention, all Marines were required to wear name and service dates on their camouflage utility uniforms. The new tapes were made of olive green cloth with embroidered black letters. Surnames were spelled out in capital letters. Service tape was inscribed "U.S. MARINES." Were these name tags your decision or General Gray's? Do you recall the furor over this decision?

GEN MUNDY: I don't recall, well I do recall the furor and I can speak to that. They were General Gray's decision and oh how I regret that. I have been a name tagger since I was a 1st lieutenant at The Basic School and we wore — you pinned them on. I have always thought that it made a great deal of sense to have your name on. I liked the idea of "U.S. MARINES." So my hat was in the air. In other words, I was solidly on board.

Actually, if we're going to give credit where credit is due, or those who want to — I don't think anybody at this point in the Marine Corps — when we went from brown shoes to black shoes, I can remember that the Corps was going to hell in a hand basket and we would never be the same again once we took off brown socks and put on black socks. Somehow we survived that.

But in this particular case, this really, let's give the credit here to then-Major General Bob Johnston, who was the Chief of Staff for General Schwarzkopf during the Gulf War. Schwarzkopf had decreed, when the Central Command deployed to Riyadh and to Saudi Arabia for the war, the uniform of the day was the desert, as we called them then, chocolate chip utility uniform. And General Schwarzkopf as the CinC had said "Put name tags on." So Bob Johnston, to his credit, without any approval from anybody around, said "Put the name tags on."

So as we watched the Gulf War and as we watched General Johnston and as we watched General Butch Neal and all of those Marine faces that you saw come on and do these absolutely magnificent jobs on TV of briefing the operations, there they stood with the "U.S. MARINES" emblazoned across their chest and every one of us back here loved it.

So I don't know when the initiative even began, you would know better than I, but I'm sure that General Gray, watching CNN like the rest of us, was very, very proud, to see "Neal, U.S. MARINES" or "Johnston, U.S. MARINES" there.

So as to the furor, General Gray signed that, that was one of the many 28 June 1991 decrees, I think that he wanted to have credit for that, because as one

would want to note, though it may be a subtlety that passes by, but in his portrait that hangs in the Commandant's House, it is in the utility uniform and he has name tags on. So even though you could argue that he really never wore them, and in fact approved it on the day of his change of command, he wanted to have that credit. So he deserves it, but Bob Johnston really was the man who put name tags on.

The furor when I got here was not so much over the name tags, but it was from the Old Corps members, the retired members who came in and allowed as how it was absolutely sacrilegious to pull "USMC" and the stenciled emblem off of our utility pocket, that somehow Marines could never fight again. According to the things you would read in the *Gazette*, and letters to the Commandant, I guess that Samuel Nicholas must have had this on his pocket. [Laughter] I don't see it any where, but the Marines Corps could never stand without it.

I happen to agree, and to agree immediately with the emblem. I thought that we should never take the emblem off, but I supported the name tags wholeheartedly. So what I was able to do, I think I wrote something for the *Gazette* that went out and said "Look, 'USMC' and the Marine emblem first saw the light in World War II and a lot of the people writing are World War II veterans. In fact, we won World War I singlehandedly at Belleau Wood and places like that without 'USMC' stenciled on our pocket." So that kind of cut that debate off.

But I also stated that we would adopt the name tags, but that we would continue to stencil the emblem on our utility pocket, and moreover that we would put it on the helmet as well. So we stenciled that up here to make sure that we are recognized with the emblem of our Corps as well as the words, "U.S. MARINES."

BGEN SIMMONS: Coincident with the events we just discussed, there was a General Officers Symposium from Monday, 28 September, through Friday, 2 October. Do you recall the theme of that symposium?

GEN MUNDY: I don't. I don't recall. I'm sure it had — we themed them all. I can't frankly recall it.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 5 October, you issued Green Letter 4-92 on the subject of "Hazing." Apparently, during the course of the year, there had been a number of nasty incidents concerning "rites of passage" so-called initiations. Do you recall any specific incidents?

GEN MUNDY: Oh yes, I do recall a very specific one. I recall more than one, but the most heinous of all those that were, at least that were made public and the way that this came to my attention was through a videotape that was provided to me by the Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks, then Colonel Jim Flynn. Colonel Flynn relayed that they had come in possession of a tape, which was a video depicting the initiation of what are known on the Silent Drill Platoon of the new members of the 24. The 24 are the first string, there being 24 members in the platoon. There are super-numeraries as well, but if you make the 24, that means you're going to be out on a parade deck performing for the crowds at 8th and I for the next couple of years. That's a very competitive volunteer, extremely competitive.

And as such things happen, and as such things get off course, and they certainly did in this, you know if a little bit is good, then a little bit more is better. So what was intended to be a very intense screening of those who had the carriage and the performance, and certainly a great deal of physical strength, because it takes that to spin these rifles and do all the drills that the Silent Drill Platoon does, but it went too far. The initiation after the competition was over transitioned from, as I was told in the early days you would get akin to a coach in a winning football game, get some gatorade poured on you. You would get something like that done, you would get, as it moved on, as you got on the bus to head for the airport to leave Yuma, Arizona which is where our training is done, they would, I can recall that it was somewhat akin to cutting a tie of a new pilot. You got your skivvies ripped off. All that means is that a bunch of your buddies just good naturedly would rip your skivvies off and you had been initiated into the Silent Drill Platoon.

But this was heinous because the new kids had been stripped and their hands had been taped together with duct tape and significant for anyone to know is that none of them had to do this, but it was manhood, you had to do it because you had to be a man. Then the video, they were taken into the head, the bathroom, the shower, the head facility there, and this concoction of I don't know, tobacco juice, some said urine, the eye of a gnat and the toe of a frog and all that sort of thing that had been cooking out in the Arizona sun for a couple weeks. They would be told, if you make it boy, this stuff, you're going to get this thrown on you. So it was kind of a psychological build-up. Then they threw the stuff on the kids and it was just liquid but it must have been hideous because you could see them gagging. It wasn't thrown on their face but it was poured on their head or some-

thing. You could see them, some of them got sick and were throwing up. So it must have really been bad.

The worst part was being, they were in their skivvy shorts and their shorts were half masted and a couple of the initiators then used heel and sole dressing from shoes to paint their genitals or just idiocy. I don't think anyone was injured because of this. We had no real report of injury, although a couple of them subsequently made it public, claimed that it burned and I'm sure it did.

But when I saw this it was just infuriating. And of course, Colonel Flynn who had not — the CO of the Barracks he had already moved to stop it. So I said what goes on over there? What I learned was that the new kids that come into the Barracks were assigned to carry somebody's laundry and you eat your meals square, kind of like your plebe year at West Point.

So I put the word out to him and I got the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and I wanted to get to the commanders and say look, "If you go through boot camp in this Marine Corps, you've made the club and that's it." There are no more initiations — you may have to go through rigid training, recon school or something in order to prove — parachute training or whatever we impose as a specialty training, but there will be no hazing and initiations and rites of passage to become something. You already, when you graduate from boot camp, you just did your rite of passage.

Great words from the Commandant, the right thing to say and so on, but as a practical matter I continued to be hounded with these minor incidents, that really are nothing more than you and I have experienced in Boy Scouts, in the locker room or anywhere else. Pink belly, pouring alcohol on a guy's stomach, and if you pat it as you know, this was an old locker room trick when I was coming up in my youth, why it would inflame your skin a little bit and sting and then you had been initiated.

But of course, it passed into a mortar platoon where the new members of the mortar platoon in the 2d Division would be brought into a room in the barracks in which it would be candle lit and they would not — the faces would be masked, and they would recite an oath of allegiance to the 81 Mortar Platoon or something. Then they would be laid down and have this alcohol. Then of course, simply patting with your hand wasn't good enough. We had to go through a web belt and then after the web belt, the next step you used the tip of the web belt. So pretty soon we had Marines who were coming up with cuts on their stomachs, not severe, but stuff that shouldn't be done.

So I could go on and recount even other incidents that once you get interested in something, these things

keep popping up. Of course, I would call the commander and say, "For God sakes, haven't you read the Green Letter? Have you posted this thing?" The commanders got the word. Well, the answer is, "Yes, but it takes a long time for the corporals and the sergeants to begin to adhere to policy."

The segment that I just recounted about the Silent Drill Platoon and this really disgusting video made Prime Time Live, Sam Donaldson got it of course and showed it to America. The Marine Corps, he got it about a year and a half after this fact, and in fact after the Green Letter went out, and I didn't see fit to appear and defend it. The word that we responded to him is look that's old news at this point and we have taken action to stop that. But nonetheless, it was sensationalized.

It probably had the most negative effect principally among former Marines of anything that happened on my tenure, because Marines of any of our vintage would write in and say, "I can't comprehend that. I can't conceive of one Marine doing this to another Marine." What they had forgotten in their old age, shall we say, is that boys are boys and that the young kids that were being initiated again did not have to be there, could have walked out. Would have been humiliated to do so, and that there was no injury inflicted upon them, and that it was indeed good natured, although if you were the inductee — as we learned in the investigation of that, those who were initiated this year of course then got to help initiate the newbies, the next year, so it just got more and more and more.

I believe that the effort to eradicate that was pretty successful. I can tell you with assurance that it's not at the Marine Barracks and I think throughout much of the Marine Corps. I put Sergeant Major Overstreet to a concerted effort on this. I said this is an NCO problem. Officers are not going to be close enough to deal with this. We've got to get sergeants majors and sergeants who understand that it is their job to get this sort of thing knocked off in the barracks. He worked hard at that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Unfortunately, these things seem to center on elite units, at least that get the most focus. The Parachute Regiment in Canada, the 82d Airborne at Fort Bragg.

GEN MUNDY: The skinheads, yes. It is regrettable. Again, it's the macho, it is the immature approach to the induction to manhood.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your Green Letter 5-92, issued

on 21 October, you expanded your retirement and promotion policies for general officers to apply to Reserve generals. Wasn't this already implicit in your original statement of policy? Why did it have to be reiterated for the Reserves?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was implicit, however it has missed the mark. The fact is that the law concerning Reserve officers is somewhat different than for regular officers. The Reserve, I forget the wording for the regular officer is five years in grade and 35 years service to have that combination is when you would go. But there was almost an explicit provision in the law that Reservists would serve for five years.

So I had gotten the Counsel, Peter Murphy as I recall, or the Manpower people to look into this. We had learned that no, we were not precluded from retiring them early. So I went out as much as anything because there had been some mild resistance in the Reserve establishment to accepting the three year, in effect, retirement.

Major General Mitch Waters was at that time, he was a Reserve himself, was Director of Reserve Affairs. He came to me and said we need to make sure that we get this point to the Reserve officers as well. So yes, it was implicit, but there was a fine point of law that I think we had to wring out. So implicit, getting the law straightened out, but as much as anything making it very clear to the Marine Corps Reserve that this applied to them as well.

BGEN SIMMONS: We seem to have about run out of time, so perhaps we should recess there.

I stand corrected, we still have about 10 minutes to go.

On Saturday, 24 October, you went to New Orleans to speak to the Marine Corps Aviation Association Symposium. From there you went to Parris Island for a one-day visit on Monday. On Tuesday, you went on to Beaufort and then to Cherry Point, and on Wednesday to Camp Lejeune, getting back to Washington on Saturday, 31 October. Do you have any particular recollections of that visit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I do. The Aviation Symposium I always tried to be present. I made three of the four of those while I was the Commandant. This one happened to be in New Orleans. It happened to be the brand new Secretary of the Navy's Sean O'Keefe's hometown. So Mr. O'Keefe was down there with us.

I used that occasion, and as you look back at how you do business, Brigadier General Mike Ryan, today Major General Michael Ryan who is himself a Harrier

pilot, Mike was at that time, he was the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant. But Mike also had come out of the Aviation Weapons Systems Branch in the Department of Aviation. We had just come up with the concept of remanufacturing the AV-8B which was to take pieces of the airplane that didn't wear out in service like the wing assembly, the tail assembly. What we found is, what the manufacturer found, is that we could take the wing off the aircraft and the tail and some other components and they were like the bed of the dump truck. You could rebuild the whole truck around the bed of the dump truck because you don't really do a lot of damage to a steel truck bed.

This in effect enabled us to rebuild and to have a new, more modern, fully capable, night capable, airplane, and to get it for about, depending on how many you build, about 75 percent of the cost, three-quarters of the cost of a brand new airplane. So it was a good deal.

We had not quite triggered that initiative within naval aviation to try and get that program going. And so, I ensured that Brigadier General Ryan and Mr. O'Keefe were seated together at the Aviation Symposium. Sean O'Keefe, as I stated earlier, loved a good party any time and Mike Ryan is a tremendously engaging personality. And as they went on through the evening and had another sip of wine or another beer, why Brigadier General Ryan very artfully persuaded the Secretary that the Marine Corps should get the AV-8B Remanufacture Program and Secretary O'Keefe held good to his word and stuffed that into the program for the Marines. So just a means of doing business there in New Orleans.

The other visits that you've depicted were routine. They were the stop-in, show the presence, show the flag, talk with some Marines, have lunch with the commanders or something like that, kind of covering the East Coast on that trip.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had returned to Washington in time to get into the swing of preparations for the Marine Corps Birthday. There was a Pentagon birthday ceremony on Tuesday, 3 November; a House of Representatives birthday ceremony on Wednesday; a Senate ceremony on Thursday; a Marine Barracks birthday ball on Friday; and the Marine Corps War Memorial Ceremony, a wreath-laying at the grave site of LtColComdt Archibald Henderson, and the Marine Corps 217th Birthday Ball on Tuesday, 10 November itself. A Veterans Day observance in Birmingham on 11 November; The Basic School Birthday Ball on Friday, 13 November; and a birthday ball in Atlanta on Saturday, 14 November. I won't ask you to sort

out all these birthday events, but if you have any general or specific recollections or comments, please make them.

GEN MUNDY: It sounds like life in the Corps is one big party, doesn't it. But as we've discussed earlier, that's a very active period for the Commandant to meet a lot of obligations. You can waive a lot and not accept them and I did, but these were must dos, if you will, or important to do.

I think that we've spoken earlier, if we haven't I think I mentioned that the MUNDY's have a great affection for Archibald Henderson. He is the owner of the House, the Commandant's House, whoever among us, the 28 of us I guess that have lived in that House. Archibald was the grand old man of the Corps and certainly the 39-year resident of that House. So we have a great deal of affection for him.

Linda had embraced him when we moved into the House. The stories are told that he still is there and that various people have awakened to see a courtly gentleman standing over by the mantelpiece or something and he fades away. Well, neither of us are superstitious, but Linda decided we would make our peace with Archibald. So when we moved into the Commandant's House, she was able to redo the dining room and put in that room Archibald's official painting when he was an old man, but also got from you as a matter of fact, LtCol Archibald Henderson, when he was 37 years old and became the Commandant.

Then she found the Waterhouse painting of his wedding at the Marine Barracks and put it on the other wall. So that was sort of the Archibald Henderson Room. As we studied Archibald and studied his wedding, we just became very, very attached to him. So for the four years that I was the Commandant, on each birthday I would go down and lay the wreath on Archibald's grave. I went to other Commandants and did that same thing, but we would always do Archibald and of course, John Philip Sousa is just about 20 steps up the pathway from him. So just a little vignette of the wreath-laying for Archibald.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 10 November, more than 90 years of Marine Corps presence on Guam ended with the closing of the Marine Barracks. The barracks had been established in 1899 and Marines served there continuously except for the World War time period from December 1941 until July 1944 when the Japanese occupied the island. There are those who say that we are diluting our naval heritage by closing Marine barracks at naval stations, particularly the

overseas naval bases. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Indeed, there are those who say that as recent as the most recent edition of the *Gazette*. There is a letter in there from a Navy commander in which he, without offense, he says that same thing. I worry about that a bit, but the function of the overseas Marine barracks as we knew them, the security force companies, were really in the good old days of colonialism, you put a barracks of Marines out there because you wanted to have some troops stationed there. So Marines became very convenient and provided security for the naval base, but really as much as anything, U.S. presence.

As a practical matter, that's gone away. If there is not a specific defined mission, security of nuclear weapons, or security of an ammunition depot or those types of things, then we simply have reached a point of affordability within the Department of Defense, as well as in the Marine Corps, where the Commandant must justify to the Secretary of the Navy why that barracks should stay there. And usually since Marine security forces belong to the Chief of Naval Operations, indeed the fleet commanders, it is they within their budgets who decide whether or not they can maintain that. And in this case, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet who owned that —

GEN MUNDY: I was saying that the fleet commander essentially made that decision because it was he who budgeted for the facilities and the operation of the Marine Barracks. And we have just reached a point where we cannot afford to keep essentially nice but useless facilities out there.

That same thing has occurred in the case of ship's detachments. Of course, the only ship that has the capacity, on a man-of-war, if you do not consider amphibious ships men of war, but the cruisers and the battleships and the carriers and whatnot that have always had detachments on them. New and modern ships with the advent of technology and computers and sophisticated weapons systems we simply do not have any space on the ships, oftentimes not for the complete complement of sailors that they would like to have. So there are no more Marine detachment spaces except in aircraft carriers.

And in the case of aircraft carriers, the mission for Marines aboard those carriers had evolved into being there for purposes of guarding the nuclear weapons that we carried up until about 1992 or 1993 when we took all the nuclear weapons off ships. There, thus, is no justification for having 60 or 70 Marines stationed on that carrier.

The CNO, Adm Kelso, came to me at that point and said, "listen, for much the reasons you point out, we just, I mean, a carrier without Marines would not be a carrier. You know, it sounds very trite but when the ship goes into a foreign port and you put a Marine at the foot of the brow, foot of the ladder going up to the carrier, it is different than having a sailor there. And you would want Marines on board for security, for, you know, for external security issues."

So, we agreed to keep a detachment of about 25 Marines on each carrier. They raise the colors. They provide the captain's orderly. They do, they are a presence force.

But that has diminished significantly and it diminished significantly on my watch primarily because there was just no functional reason to continue it and because as we reduced 20,000 Marines from the ranks, you know, if you did not need the Marine Barracks in Guam anymore that was 100 or so Marines we could carve out without taking down a rifle company.

BGEN SIMMONS: Much the same thing happened at Subic Bay in the Philippines on 24 November when Marines lowered the flag for the last time. Of course, in this case, the Navy as well as the Marines was leaving the Philippines. On balance, was this a loss or a gain for our readiness in the Western Pacific?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, I think there would be no argument other than it is a loss. We lost not just the naval facilities at Subic Bay, Cubi Point Naval Air Station and the ship repair facility at Subic, the training areas that we had at Subic Bay, but even further on down the chain of the Philippines you had the Crow Valley which was a major aviation range where, which principally served Clark Air Force Base [sic] which also closed, of course, but the Marine aircraft used to go down there. It had a complete range of aviation training so you could bomb, you could strafe, you could shoot rockets, you had all the measuring devices, the grading devices. It was a tremendous range.

So we lost a lot in terms of training areas and just an advance naval base in the Western Pacific with the demise of the Philippines. So, yes, I think it as a loss, but it was a political loss.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, now we have run out of time so we will end this session here. We will recess Session XXII and pick up where we left off next time.

GEN MUNDY: This is about 3:00 in the afternoon on Thursday the 14th of December and we are resuming

Session XXII. Gen GEN MUNDY, on 16 November you published Green Letter 6-92 on the subject of "Personal Awards" which clarified end-of-tour awards for colonels selected for promotion to brigadier general. Why was this Green Letter necessary?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there is some background here. Gen Barrow instituted a policy which I personally felt was a good one and still do to this day and it still persists to this day, and that was that he, what he said in effect was no Marine general should write up another Marine general for an end-of-tour award. If you were serving in a billet outside the Marine Corps and written up for an award, then so be it, but Gen Barrow's philosophy was we should not give a general a Legion of Merit or a Distinguished Service Medal every time he or she changed command, which is pretty much the standard in the other services.

So many of us agreed with that at that time. What happened though was that many colonels who were serving probably in their finest moment and who were selected to brigadier general while serving, what became the practice, if not the policy, was, oh, he has been selected for general — so you have two regimental commanders, one of them failed selection, one is selected, both turn over their regiments. The guy who has failed selection gets a Legion of Merit. The guy who has been selected for promotion to brigadier general gets nothing.

I found, I did not think that was right so I was putting the word out to the generals to say just that. You know, when you have a colonel that is distinguishing himself and who would earn a Legion of Merit or whatever award he was going to receive under any other circumstances, the fact that he is selected to brigadier general is not a reason not to recommend him. So, go ahead and recommend him as a colonel. You do not have to wait until he is promoted. That was the reason, it was simply to ensure balance in our recognition of colonels.

BGEN SIMMONS: Emily Chapman, the wife of Gen Chapman, died after a long illness about this time. You paid a call on Gen Chapman at the funeral home on Monday, 16 November, and the next day you attended Mrs. Chapman's funeral. Funerals must pose a special problem for a Commandant's busy schedule. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think that the hierarchy in government is sufficiently compassionate that it really does not pose a problem in the sense that, for example, the Commandant is obligated to attend a JCS

meeting any time there is one when he is in town. That is a primary duty. But as a practical matter if there is a funeral that you need to go to there is no problem whatsoever in just telling the Chairman, I will be at the funeral at that time and the Assistant Commandant will be coming.

And so the town is compassionate. Meetings are rescheduled. Calendars are altered to accommodate that.

That said, the Commandant is, after all, for his period of tenure he is the steward of the Marine Corps and he has an obligation, I think, to represent the Marine Corps at the appropriate level when it is time to do that. I have been to funerals for corporals and funerals for lieutenants and funerals for former Commandants. So it is not exclusively, you know, that it has to be a four-star officer.

Emily Chapman was indeed, was someone that I came to know when I was Gen Lew Walts' aide and Gen Chapman was the Commandant. And Miss Emily, as we came to know her, was a grand lady of southern origin with all, you know, I am sure if she cut her finger the vein was blue, not red. She was absolutely of southern blue-blooded nobility and conducted herself as such. So she was a grand lady.

And Gen Chapman, in fact, asked me to give the eulogy for her at her funeral, which I did, and asked me, his only request when I said, what if anything would you like for me to say about her? He said, "Just say that she was a grand lady of our Corps." I would have said that probably anyway but I certainly said it because of that.

So I had known and admired the Chapmans for a long time and she had always been very gracious to me. It was one of those times when it was my obligation as the Commandant but my privilege as Carl GEN MUNDY to be able to be present, of course not only for her but more so for Leonard Fielding Chapman who is one of the truly great Commandants and great men and fine men that I have known in my life time.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday morning, 21 November, you visited the Erskine House. What is the Erskine House?

GEN MUNDY: The Erskine House was the home that Gen Graves Erskine and his wife, Connie, retired to here in Washington. It is over off MacArthur Boulevard. And Gen Erskine, excuse me, Gen Lou Wilson had been Gen Erskine's aide-de-camp, I think in the latter stages of World War II or perhaps even after the war. I am not sure of the phase.

So, anyway, Gen Erskine died some several years ago but his widow, Connie Erskine, survived. They were extremely affluent and the house was filled with literal treasures. Without going into what Gen Erskine did, suffice it to say that he was made an emissary, you know, by President Truman and was given an airplane and sent all over the world as a presidential emissary. And the result of that in part was that every time he and Mrs. Erskine would go somewhere, generally they were able to pick up rare and expensive and unique gifts or acquisitions.

So the house was filled with all of this. Gen Wilson had arranged with Mrs. Erskine to put into her will that the house, the Erskine House, would be donated to the Marine Corps if the Marine Corps desired to have it. And at that time for whatever the reason, I am not sure why it was specified to be the Assistant Commandant, but that it could be turned into quarters for the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Also he had arranged, the first year of my tenure I worked with him and he had gotten a codicil in the will which also called for the donation of a substantial number of the fine furnishings of the house to be given to the Marine Corps to be used in general officer's quarters at the Marine Barracks or Quantico or wherever in this area, or as has been the case, even to be sold with the proceeds to go to the Marine Corps Command and Staff Foundation down at Quantico.

So, that is the story of the Erskine House. The Marine Corps declined to take the house because by this time the house was about 50 years old and would have required substantial maintenance. It was a beautiful house but it was way away from town. We had no reason to own a residence like that way away from any Marine Corps facility or put one of our generals out there at considerable expense.

We did take, many of the belongings are now in the Commandant's House, in the Assistant Commandants house. Some went to Quantico. There were Ming vases and just tremendous works of art and fine furniture that we used in the house. And then again the proceeds, the house will be disposed of and the proceeds from the house will go to the Marine Corps Command and Staff Foundation. So, that is the Erskine House.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 23 November, you went to Fort Leavenworth for two days of Army, Navy, Marine Corps staff talks. What was this all about?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Sullivan, Gordon Sullivan, the

Chief of Staff of the Army, had initiated Army/Air Force talks and he wanted to follow up with that with an Army/Navy — became Army/Navy/Marine Corps — talks which he hosted at Leavenworth. We went out to Fort Leavenworth. Adm Kelso, and I think we each took, as I recall, many three officers with us, Adm Kelso and myself and Gen Sullivan. We were hosted by Gen Sullivan.

We met with the Army to discuss common matters of interest, doctrine, equipment acquisition. Where is the Army going, how is it organizing? Where is the Marine Corps going, how are we organizing?

I had taken a theme in attempting to define how the Marine Corps would work with the Army, of saying compatibility, that we would be compatible. And that is to say that the Marine Corps was not going to try and become something that, we were not going to become the airborne or we were not going to heavy-up unnecessarily in armor or something like that. We would rely on the Army. But implicit in that was the Marine Corps thesis that neither should the Army try and become the Marine Corps.

It was a good meeting. We met during the day, learned a lot about where the Army was going, learned a lot about the Army's education system, their Army schools at Fort Leavenworth and elsewhere and how he trained his division commanders. Had a very nice barbeque that night, a casual affair. He brought in all of his senior leaders so we had, all of the Army four-stars were there and several of his key three-stars.

Then the next morning we got up, had a nice breakfast, toured around Fort Leavenworth and left, as I recall, about midmorning on our way. But it was just one of those occasions that is good to do among the services because it, you know, it is just good chemistry, good rapport establishment effort.

BGEN SIMMONS: Thursday, 26 November, was Thanksgiving and Saturday, 28 November, was your wedding anniversary. I hope you enjoyed a quiet time at both.

GEN MUNDY: As I recall we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday morning, 6 December, you were interviewed on the "This Week with David Brinkley" show. What was the thrust of that interview?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the interview dwelt on the deployment of the I MEF to Somalia. Gen Johnston with his I MEF, as we discussed earlier, had been



In December 1992, President Bush ordered U.S. forces to Somalia to provide famine relief. On 6 December 1992, Gen Mundy, along with Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, appeared on the ABC news program, "This Week with David Brinkley."

given the responsibility for contingency planning for the Horn of Africa. So when President Bush made the decision to send in American forces to help relieve the starvation and to help reestablish some degree of order in the country, that tasking went to the I Marine Expeditionary Force. And so that is what the interview was about, was the introduction of forces into Somalia.

Now, as a practical matter I had discussed with Gen Powell when we started this deployment, you know, the media will come usually to service headquarters with requests for interviews and so on and I deferred that to the Chairman and said, "Look, if you want to take it. . . ." Gen Powell, as he always was with me, Gen Powell said, "Oh, no, it is a Marine Corps show. You have it. You do the talking on TV." So I wound up on that and as I recall, on several other, you know, Evans Novak and two or three other shows talking about Somalia.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday, 8 December, you went to Harlingen, Texas presumably to visit the Marine Military Academy. The next day you visited

with the Reserve activities in Dallas. What are your recollections of that trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine Military Academy I had been to once before and that was while, before I was the Commandant, when I was in my FMFLant hat. I just happened to be coming back from the southern region, from Panama, and visits down in that area, viewing some of the tensions, and we flew back into Brownsville, Texas and stopped by Harlingen briefly and spoke to the cadets there.

So this was an official visit by the Commandant to the Marine Military Academy to speak to the cadets, talk to Gen Glasgow about how it was going, and just, again, a stop by visit. And that was much the same in Dallas then, a visit to the Marine Corps Reserve and to the recruiters and, you know, just a Commandant stop-by.

BGEN SIMMONS: You apparently met with the Secretary of the Navy on both the evening of 9 December and 10 December. Do you recall what might have caused these back-to-back meetings?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we were at that time introducing forces into Somalia so it is not extraordinary that we would be bringing the Secretary up to speed. Sec O'Keefe had scheduled, when he became the Secretary had asked for a meeting of the CNO, him and the Undersecretary and me at 1700 daily. Probably a little bit too much because you really do not need to meet that often but we tried it a few times and then, you know, as all meetings go after a while, they found a (unintelligible). I suspect it was the daily meetings at 1700 and also the pace of operational activities having to do with Somalia.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 9 December 1992 Marines of the Special Operations Capable 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit landed in Somalia. This was the beginning of Operation Restore Hope, the largest humanitarian relief mission of its kind. Some 300,000 Somalis had died of famine or disease in 1991 and 2 million more were at risk. The mission assigned to 15th MEU was to secure major air and sea ports and other key installations in order to provide open and free passage of relief supplies. Was 15th MEU successful in its mission?

GEN MUNDY: It was enormously successful. It was commanded by Col Greg Newbold, one of our absolutely star colonels at that time, a young colonel. I had known him for many, many years so I was very proud of him and of the way that he did his business.

As ever, you know, we did this in the classic sense because unrecognized by many is that when you are about to introduce an armed force you want to do it properly and with all precautions and, you know, doctrinally so that things are cohesive and wired together. But when the Seals and some of the reconnaissance forces came into the beach of course the press was there to greet them. It was, as I recall, about 2:00 a.m. in the morning and so the press was able to, ha, ha, ha, photograph these stealthy people that were coming ashore and that gets a lot of play in the press on the negative sense. See, they did not surprise anybody.

But, that said, the MEU executed flawlessly and the port and the air field were very quickly secured which enabled then the introduction of follow-on forces. The MEU went on to be one of the primary operational entities within the joint task force and the Marine Expeditionary Force that was introduced there. So Col Newbold, then MajGen Charlie Wilhelm who had the 1st Marine Division, went in as the ground combat over(?) commander. Gen Harry Blot went in initially as the air commander but did not

remain more than a few days because we realized that we were not going to have a significant air presence.

And so again, the MEU did very well and the operation to this day, even though ultimately politically we did not accomplish in Somalia what we had sought to do, we did, in fact, achieve exactly what the initial purpose of the introduction of armed forces was to do and that was to provide a stable environment and secure areas in which the thousands of people in Somalia that were starving to death, hundreds a day, could be provided food by non governmental organizations. The Marines did exactly that and how proud I was of them.

It is unique — this is a side note — I think that anyone who has watched in the recent introduction of U.S. forces into just about any where I can think of, we are experiencing that in Bosnia today as we speak, but the difference in Marines than anybody else who is there is notable. Everybody this day and time wears essentially the same uniform and if you are in your flack jacket or your war fighting equipment you cannot see these nametags we were talking about. But you can pick the Marines out by the, I will use the term and say the expeditionary confidence that they have.

Marines look like they are the right people on the streets of a foreign city. They conduct themselves with business, much of this attributed to Gen Al Gray.

The Marines moving down a street are definitely more prepared and more operationally oriented than are our sister services.

They are at the ready. Nobody is at sling arms. They are at the ready. If they need to shoot, they can shoot. But they, I think because of our expeditionary nature and the fact that Marines become accustomed to doing business with a lot of people that speak different languages in a single six-month deployment to the Mediterranean, for example, six, seven, eight countries that they exercise with.

They are very natural about the business of foreign intervention, even be it for peaceful purposes. And you can just say, as I am looking at those people I can tell that they are Marines and pretty soon the announcer will say, "These are Marines." There is a difference and I say that very proudly about Marines. There is a swagger and a confidence and a compassion about Marines in foreign intervention that is not present in all of our armed forces.

BGEN SIMMONS: President Bush appointed your friend, Sean O'Keefe, as Secretary of the Navy on 11 December. He had been acting as such since July. You attended his swearing in on 16 December. This

appointment came rather late in the game, didn't it, considering the Bush Administration had only five weeks to go?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it did. Remember that Sec Garrett had been fired and that Sec O'Keefe had been nominated. And there was some, as I recall it, because he had already been confirmed to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller, he had been confirmed by the Senate to hold an office and so he was allowed to go over and function as the Secretary. Under ordinary circumstances until the Senate had confirmed him for appointment he would not have been able to sit in his office or sign his name or participate in any of the decision-making councils of the Department. But this was an extraordinary circumstance.

So O'Keefe kind of moved over from a level of equivalency, one could argue, as an ASD into the Secretary's job. I think it was as much as anything, you know, it was a nice confirmation by the Senate which enabled him then to have his painting done and enabled him truly to have been the Secretary of the Navy as opposed to have been the Acting Secretary of the Navy until the Bush administration went out.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 14 December you issued two Green Letters, 7-92 and 8-92 which were essentially minor revisions of previous Green Letters on the twin subjects, "Refurbishment of General Officer Quarters" and "Management of General Officer Quarters." Why did it seem necessary to repeat essentially the same information?

GEN MUNDY: You have asked that question so many times in our interviews here that I am beginning to think that maybe it was not necessary to repeat it. As we discussed before, I think probably for currency, for terminology changes, you know, we have a new regulation which makes some minor change to something or other, and as much as anything, simply to make sure that the Green Letter, which is a policy letter, is current we update them periodically. So, you know, as I looked at those in reference attempting to think why, about all I can tell you is it probably was to update it for some minor reason.

BGEN SIMMONS: I might say the same about repetition in yet another Green Letter issued on 14 December this one on "Selection Board Membership." And again, why is it necessary to keep repeating these matters?

GEN MUNDY: I stand indicted. Were I to go back and do it again having been now challenged by you so frequently, I would not update any Green Letters.

BGEN SIMMONS: I thought you were going to say that the new generals were not reading the old letters.

GEN MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday, 15 December, you were interviewed on the "MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour" and on Thursday, 17 December, you appeared on the "Today Show" hosted by Katie Couric. Why were you so suddenly popular with the television commentators?


GEN MUNDY: Well, there are two answers to that question. The first one — I am not sure how popular I was but I was available — the first one was that because of the Marine intervention in Somalia they came to, as we talked earlier, came to the Marine Corps and Gen Powell had told me to take it for action, that we did not need the Chairman. He could certainly comment at appropriate occasions but he wanted that to be my focus. So I did it as a result of that.

The second reason has to do with, probably with being blindsided by Sam Donaldson who was one of the threesome that does the interviewing on the "David Brinkley Show." President Clinton, of course, had been elected. He was the president-elect at this point, and as we recall, and I am sure we will get into in more detail later, had stated that he was going to change the policy and allow homosexuals in the military, stated homosexuals.

Sam Donaldson blindsided me in my interview on the "David Brinkley Show" at a point that we were talking about Somalia. He said suddenly, coming in from my flank, the President has stated, president-elect has stated that he intends to introduce homosexuals in the military. What do you think of that?

And I responded to him candidly, if not — well, I hope I would have responded candidly anyway, and I did. And as I recall I said to him simply that I do not believe that that is something that the American people support. And that, of course, was immediately sensational because it put a Service Chief at odds with the intended policy of the president-elect and now we will have some fun running this one to ground and so for the next six months or so the press did hound us on that issue.

So, on every interview that I had successively — I do not recall that Katie Couric asked me anything —



Gen Mundy went on his first “World Tour” in December 1992. Here, he is seen with Marines of Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, in Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope.

but on the “MacNeil-Lehrer” interview while we talked about Somalia he then got to the gays in the military issue again. And once again I said, you know, it would be fractious to military cohesion and discipline and I do not think that the people support this. So I think that as much as anything there was a sensational aspect, a wait a minute, this is the guy that looks like he is going to take on the President. But it was principally aimed at the Somalia intervention.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 December you sent a memorandum to your Commander-in-Chief-Elect on the subject of the Marine Corps. This was a singular opportunity to brief Bill Clinton, the incoming President, on the Marine Corps. Did you deliver this memorandum orally or in writing or both? What were the key points you made?

GEN MUNDY: We were invited by the transition team, the Presidential, the DOD transition team, each Service Chief to do just that. In other words, to put something down on paper that you would like to convey to the President for his briefing books. He was still down in Arkansas at the time. And we were assured that these would go into high priority books

and we could, you know, begin to bring the President and his team up to speed on the status or whatever you wanted to tell him.

It is an interesting tale because this was conveyed to us, of course, at a JCS meeting and subsequently the Chairman intimated that it would really be nice if, you know, if we would all give him a copy of our submission, maybe even give each other copies of our submission. The humorous part of this is that none of us never did because after all, we were in it for our part of the service and I think that each Service Chief responded privately though they were collectively put into a notebook and sent off to Little Rock, I think.

So, the answer to you is, no, we did not present them in person. We were alerted that we should send forward our papers and then that potentially we might, you now, the President-Elect might see fit on his next trip to town to call us in and sit down and talk with us about what we had submitted, but that never occurred.

Whether the President ever saw the letters or not I do not know. I do not know that he did. I do not believe that he did because I think they were, you know, one of the many briefing books that were passed in. But there was never any recognition during any of our subsequent discussions with President

Clinton that he had, in fact, where he said, "Oh, I read that in your paper," or "I appreciated your paper." So I suspect that he did not but I do not know whether he did or not.

That said, I had worked very hard at drafting this and it was, with a little bit of help from the Commandant's staff group, it was essentially my, I wrote it. I set up in my study in the Commandant's House and wrote it at length and then passed it, as I generally always tended to do, to my very, very valued counselor, BGen Tom Wilkerson who has a gift with the pen, you know, and is able to say things very concise and very pointed and also will tell you if it does not read well or will say this does not make sense and will rewrite it for you.

So, between Tom Wilkerson and I we were the chief, well, I guess I was the chief author and he was one of the two chief editors between him and me. But I wanted to keep it close. I eventually sent out a copy so that all the generals knew it, but this was not something that I had sent around to Headquarters and had the staff develop. I wanted it to be my conveyance to the President.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it is a very important document. Whether or not President Clinton read it, it represents your distillation of what you thought was most important about the Marine Corps at that point in time and there is a copy in your personal papers that users of this transcript can consult.

On Monday, 21 December, you departed on a world tour going first to Stuttgart, Germany. What was your business in Germany?

GEN MUNDY: I was checking in en route to Somalia. I had determined that I wanted to get down to Somalia for two purposes. One was, of course, to get a better feeling for what was going on as we introduced and built up forces there and we were about that at that time. They had been in for about two weeks.

Number 2 is that even though this was an operation conducted under the auspices of the Central Command, the European Command was the, if you will, the Army uses the term COMM-Z, which stands for communications zone. Communications zone means more than just sparks and telegraphs but it means that this is the zone or the area through which the communications, be it logistics or be it personnel matters, that it would be the supporting zone.

For example, any casualties that we took in the Central Command's theater of operation would be evacuated to the European Command. So I stopped

through to talk really with the Fleet Marine Force Europe staff who would oversee much of the support of Marine forces in our intervention into Somalia.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was your wife with you on this trip?

GEN MUNDY: No, this was just me. The second reason was this gnawing feeling that I think probably invades the soul of each one of the senior leaders because I had seen others do the same thing, but there is a true feeling of guilt that comes to the Commandant — it certainly came to me on more than one occasion — when here you are sitting in Washington about to enjoy Christmas and you had troops in harm's way. It is just not a good feeling.

So most of us assuage our, perhaps our boyish desires or our desire to, wish we could be there again, together with this guilt feeling by getting on our horse and riding to the field. And it makes you, made me feel very good to go over. I wanted to be there on Christmas Day just because I thought it important to be there on Christmas Day. So that was it.

We passed through —

BGEN SIMMONS: Sigonella.

GEN MUNDY: Through Sigonella. We stopped in, as I recall, we refueled in Egypt and then went on down into Somalia for, did not want to stay too long, I just, think we got in one day, stayed two and left the next day.

BGEN SIMMONS: According to your calendar you arrive in Mogadishu 23 December and then how did you spend your time in Somalia?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I stayed with Gen Johnston. He was in the old American Embassy compound which had been, if not razed, meaning taken to the ground, which it had not been but all the windows had been knocked out and the floor tiles had been taken up and anything of any value, I mean electrical wiring or anything else had been pulled out, so it really was a shell of a building.

It was a moderate time in Somalia. It would get a little bit warm during the day, 90 degrees or so, but it was pretty nice and so I slept with him in his office, stayed with him in his office, that was our billet. And then I got a good feeling for Mogadishu.

I went out and visited all of the units. We at that time at the 15th MEU, for example, Col Newbold, and Gen Wilhelm were out in the, about 70 miles to the

west of Mogadishu at one of the towns called Baidoa.

That was one of our objectives because that was one of the central points of starvation and that was where the "technicals" who were the gangsters in Mogadishu, there were a heavy concentration of them and the Marines had gone in and disarmed them and taken their vehicles away from them and done a splendid job.

We had several at Baledogle, an airfield where we were operating a helicopter element out of and had some more Marines. So I traveled around, got a feel for Mogadishu, saw the Marines, called, we were just starting, the Ambassador was setting up operations there, spent some time with him in my role as a member of the Joint Chiefs and talking about the effort there and, you know, discerning what I could bring back to brief the Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense on, and did when I got back.

That was my purpose, plus I guess I shook more hands on that trip than I have every shaken in my life. I got to the point by about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on Christmas Day, again, with this compulsive, I wish I were a lieutenant again instead of a general, desire to go around and just wish the young Marines a Merry Christmas, you know, I would pass through anyplace that I could see that I might get out and go in and shake hands. And boy, by about 3:00 in the afternoon my right hand was saying, if you shake another hand, I might cause you to scream in pain because it was swollen, very much like —

BGEN SIMMONS: Hundreds of pictures being taken.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, I am sure. Everybody who has a camera, yes, wants to have, so you get a handshake and a picture, but that is important to a military leader, very important. Probably, you know, you did not need the Commandant. Heck, you had a three-star general and two-star generals there, that was not the point. But it was important to me and it meant a lot to me. That Christmas was a special one for me.

BGEN SIMMONS: Having the Commandant is something special.

On Saturday, 26 December, you went on to Diego Garcia and then on to Singapore. What happened at these two places?

GEN MUNDY: Well, interestingly the reason for not turning around and coming back is that at that time of year to return to Washington via the Pacific rather than turning around and flying into the headwinds that

were prevailing, coming across the Atlantic, it was actually four hours shorter, as I recall, flying time. So when the aircraft crew came in with the best times, that, you know, it was better to come back by the Pacific.

But, more important, I had not been to Diego Garcia. That, of course, is primary support location for all our U.S. forces in the central region AOR. We had used it extensively during Desert Shield. We had a security force company of Marines there so I had reason to want to go there to see the facility. Number 2, to visit the Marines, and I did that.

We went on to Singapore only because that was a pretty long day. That made it about a 12 or 14 hour flying day which was a long day for the crew. So Singapore was a rest stop for the night. The only, we went to a hotel and got some sleep and got up the next morning. I did go over to the Marine House which is where the Marine security guards at the Embassy lived and as is very frequently the case, the young Marines love to have you come over for breakfast or if it is late in the day, love to have you come over for a beer and you tried to do that any time you could.

We had breakfast with them, back out to the airplane and onward to, I think, I do not know whether we made it only to Wake Island that time, whether we stopped in Wake or went straight on into Honolulu.

BGEN SIMMONS: In any case on Sunday, 27 December, you proceeded to Hawaii. Presumably you had a day of rest there. Then on Monday you went on Camp Pendleton and on Wednesday, 30 December, you arrived back in Washington. Quite a trip. You had outdone Phileas Fogg by far.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was an around the world in less than 80 days trip while I had not set up the trip for that purpose. But coming back via the Pacific, of course, gave me the opportunity to stop in Hawaii and to debrief Gen Stackpole who was then the Marine Forces Pacific on how things were going in Mogadishu. Talked to Adm Larson who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command even though he was not the CINC commanding. He was a supporting CINC in that case.

I went on back into Camp Pendleton for a couple of reasons. The principal one was that I wanted, we actually stopped at Pendleton, went up to El Toro and then to Yuma, and I asked in advance that we assemble the dependents, as many as would like to come or were there to come of the Marines and sailors who had just gone off to Somalia. They did so in the base theaters or clubs or wherever you were and so I went

in just to kind of give an update on how their spouses were doing. It literally was spouses because we had both men and women deployed at that time.

And that, again it was Christmas. It was just sort of the thing to do and I enjoyed it very much because I have always, my philosophy is and has long been, the better informed you keep the home front why the better things generally go with the deployed forces. So I had a lot of fun with that. I brought a lot, people would give me, when I would run into someone I would, you know, I would remind them that I was going back to Pendleton and they would say, "Oh, sir, would you take my wife a card?" So I was kind of Santa Claus the mailman, too.

One particular humorous aspect of that, Gen Johnston's personal secretary or personal clerk was a master sergeant, a female master sergeant. She had one-year-old twins. Her husband was a master gunnery sergeant and she had deployed and the husband had remained at Camp Pendleton and had the two one-year-old twins. So I saw him. He came as a spouse and I saw him and said, "Master Gunny, how is it going?" He said, "I would give anything in the world to deploy. How about sending me over there and getting my wife back here to take care of these two kids." I say that lightly. At the same time I think that is fundamentally wrong, but that said, that is the way the forces are going today.

So, anyway, that was a nurture the homefront and then I had been, before the Somalia intervention we had, as the GEN MUNDYs frequently do, had bought super saver airline tickets to go out and spend Christmas, take a week's leave with my son, Sam, and his wife who were stationed at Camp Pendleton and when I decided to go to Somalia I, you know, just threw away my ticket but sent Linda on out so she could at least spend Christmas with the kids on the West Coast. So, by stopping at Pendleton I was able then to at least have a day with them and then I picked her up there and we flew on back into Washington together.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, on the last day of 1992 the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,773,996 of whom 183,563 were Marines. Unless you have something else to add, this is probably a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: I do not.

SESSION 23

First Six Months of 1993

Re-organization of Headquarters Marine Corps . . . Another round of Congressional visits . . . More on sexual harassment . . . Talking to the war colleges . . . Views on assigning U.S. troops under UN command . . . The Navy and Tailhook . . . Marines and the Special Operations Command . . . Integration of the Navy and Marine Corps staffs . . . Honors for departing President Bush . . . Somalia turns sour . . . Floods at Camp Pendleton . . . Inauguration of President Clinton . . . Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense . . . Compromising on homosexuals . . . A trip to Scandinavia . . . Realigning from El Toro to Miramar . . . Adm Kelso as Acting SecNav . . . Getting out of Somalia . . . Dedicating the Marine Corps Research Center . . . A garden party and parade for the Clintons . . . John Dalton nominated to be SecNav . . . Meeting with the European Commandants in Naples.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered the events of the second six months of 1992. In this session I propose that we review your activities during the first six months of 1993.

You began 1993 with the customary reception and band serenade at the Commandant's house. Did anything happen to cause 1 January 1993 to stand out in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: No more so than any of the other New Year's Day commemorations.

BGEN SIMMONS: I note that you attended a New Year's reception at the Ft. Myer quarters of Gen Colin Powell on 2 January. Had Gen Powell attended your 1 January reception?

GEN MUNDY: No, he had not. The Chairman normally, I say normally, of course they do according to their own preferences, but Gen Powell and Gen Shalikasvili behind him chose to host receptions that same day and they are nice events. Most of the officialdom of Washington that is in town is there.

However, they are civilian clothed and it is a nice reception but there is no military, you know, historical attribute associated with it as is the case with the Commandant's reception and band serenade that follows. That, of course, is done in dress blues and is a very colorful affair.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, on 1 January 1993 the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,773,996 of whom 183,563 were Marines.

On 4 January you brought back to active duty your old friend LtGen Bob Winglass to chair a study group which was to review the organization of Headquarters Marine Corps. The study group was to include a senior military or civilian representative from each department and division of the Headquarters. What caused you to convene the Winglass study group?

GEN MUNDY: We were still endeavoring to get a handle on how best to organize the Headquarters staff in light of the creation of MCDDC, with its very significant increase in accomplishing those things that the Headquarters staff had long accomplished, and MCRDAC or Marine Corps Research Development Acquisition Command, which now was doing a number of those things that had heretofore been done up in the I&L Department.

You may recall earlier, I think, in one of our sessions that I talked about when I was a lieutenant general, Gen Gray was the Commandant, we had a group that got together; LtGen Bill Etnyre, LtGen Chuck Pitman, myself, there were two or three others there, that attempted to come to grips with this same issue; what would be the interface and the correlation between the two agencies? We had never gotten that right and, in fact, I would say to you with some, not pride, but with some embarrassment that it probably still is not right today and Gen Krulak who followed me is still to this day attempting to come to grips with how to realign the Headquarters.

So, the reason was, as you have stated it, to attempt to realign, if you will, streamline, refine the Headquarters staff and to make it more efficient with

regard to the two entities that we have created down at Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: What special skills did Bob Winglass have to chair this group?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Bob Winglass was and is, I believe, one of the most well thought-of officers in the Marine Corps in terms of his problem solving and just general managerial skills. He had been at the Headquarters for an initial tour. In fact, he came there, he did a tour when he was selected for brigadier general down at Camp Lejeune with the 2d Force Service Support Group but then came to the Headquarters and never left again. That was not for want of his desire to go, but he simply was so good that he continued to be put into very demanding, creative positions.

He started out in the I&L Department and then was transferred, as we, I think, had discussed earlier, down to Quantico to be the on-site Deputy Commanding General of the Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition Command when it was stood up. To Bob Winglass's credit he did much of the architectural work in creating that and its interface with the Installation and Logistics Department at Headquarters. So he had some insights into the fusion between Quantico and Washington.

Bob had also been moved from that assignment to the Requirements and Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs, which is somewhat the keeper of the keys in the Headquarters. In other words, the R&P function there is to maintain a ready knowledge and to represent in large segments of Washington the Marine Corps requirements and programs. It arguably is the biggest job in the Marine Corps. Bob Winglass did that superbly for two years and then was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Deputy Chief for I&L.

There he was the initial representative on the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. So he had a tremendous amount of association within DOD. He had already done some work on reorganizing the staff of the Headquarters and he had seven years in the headquarters staff at Quantico experience. So he was the best experience that we had to do this particular job.

BGEN SIMMONS: I imagine that it was at some degree of inconvenience to himself to come back at that time.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think not because Bob had

retired to Emerald Isle, North Carolina where we both, he and I and several others, owned a beach house. He had made the decision, as I recall he retired, I think, about the 1st of October, and he had made the decision to go back down to Emerald Isle. Well, you know, you can only live on the beach in the fall and winter months so long before you begin to go stir crazy. I stopped by to see him down there one time and he had taken up roller blading and was out in the street riding his roller blades up and down the street looking for something to do; a tremendously energetic man.

So when I called him and said would you come back and do this I thought, frankly, that he would arrive the next morning. He was extremely eager to do it. Number 1, it was a challenge, and number 2, it gave him something to do and it put him back into the Headquarters. You may know, I should note for the record here that Gen Winglass then left Emerald Isle, moved back to his native state of Maine and is now a representative in the legislature of the state of Maine.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did the group report out?

GEN MUNDY: It reported on the 30th of January. We gave him 30 days and I say 30th of January or about that time. It was a 30-day effort.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the group's principal conclusions and recommendations?

GEN MUNDY: The principal ones, there were some several but the two principal ones were that we should combine the requirements, programs and the budget process in the Headquarters. That meant putting all of the justification for programs, the cataloging, if you will, of the requirements for, you know, for continuity purposes, and the execution of those programs, i.e., the budget process, into one shop.

The budget had long, had been properly since the days, I think when MajGen Dave Shoup, you know, structured the Marine Corps financial management system, had been under a comptroller. And the Comptroller at that time was a fine, long-time servant of the Marine Corps, a civilian named Tom Comstock.

Mr. Comstock was the equivalent of a three-star officer in his general service administration rating. And the Program and Requirements Deputy Chief had always been a two-star. So we had the extraordinary circumstance where, were we to do that, we would not want to subordinate Mr. Comstock who was technically senior to the two-star, and we had no three-star to put into that position although we looked then, just

as Gen Krulak is looking now, at where to find a third star authorization to put there.

That was the primary recommendation. The secondary recommendation was to reassign a chief of staff to the Headquarters. Every one of us had known that that is a valid function because while it had been from time to time, as we have spoken earlier, passed off to the Assistant Commandant, the function of the Assistant Commandant had changed dramatically on my watch, most dramatically, not because of anything I did, but indeed because of outside demands for the vice chiefs of the Services, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps in that case.

It changed the complexion of that job 180 degrees from what anyone back to, I would say to before the past two incumbents would remember. So the Assistant Commandant had, in effect, been taken away from any ability to be the chief of staff. We needed a chief of staff. Those were the two principal recommendations of the Winglass study group.

BGEN SIMMONS: To what extent were these recommendations carried out?

GEN MUNDY: Well, at this point they both have been implemented. It took a little longer because of the Comstock equation that I discussed earlier. Mr. Comstock had told me that he intended to retire in about a year or a year and a half after that study had been completed only because it was due, it was his time and that was his plan. So what I elected to do was simply wait until that occurred and then with his retirement, in fact, shortly before his retirement because he was gracious to facilitate that, we did merge the two and created what we call now the P&R or Programs and Requirements Department, although it also includes the budget execution.

We established the next summer, I did not call it the chief of staff, again because we have no, we are limited in the number of three-star authorizations we can have. I did not want to have a Chief of Staff who was a two-star over Deputy Chiefs of Staff who were three-stars. So, I elected to track the terminology used in the joint system and that is the Director of the Joint Staff, for example. So I established this billet with a two-star and called him the Director of the Marine Corps Staff. He thus, in effect, functioned as an administrative Chief of Staff but not the classic Chief of Staff who is, you know, the number two man or number three man in any organization.

It was a makeshift arrangement and I could give you arguments that it is worthwhile and I could give you arguments that it does not function effectively.

We either should have a chief of staff or we should not have a chief of staff. But to do that would require another authorization for another lieutenant general or perhaps two.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the first incumbent?

GEN MUNDY: MajGen Bill Eshelman was the first incumbent. Bill was the unanimous vote of everyone because he had had considerable experience as a chief of staff and as a commander. Bill was the type individual that no one would have problems working with and least of all the lieutenant generals who, you know, would feel very comfortable, I thought, going to Bill Eshelman, and they did.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 5 January you made a series of congressional calls on Congressmen Murtha, Schroeder, McDade and Dicks. You resumed these calls on 7 January with visits to Congressmen Dicks — perhaps you had missed him on 5 January — Dellums, Skelton and McCurdy. Obviously you were getting ready for the fiscal year 1994 round of budget hearings. Any specific recollection of these visits?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you pointed out a very accurate factor around Washington here and that is that one's schedule can show a number of calls, and you actually go to the Hill expecting to make those calls, and frequently when you arrive because of the press of business in the Congress, one, two or sometimes all of them have been canceled or postponed or rearranged in which case your legislative assistants on the Hill endeavor to do substitutions, if they can, at the last minute. So sometimes you go to the Hill expecting to see one member and you wind up seeing another member.

But, with regard to those calls, they really were two-fold. Remember that I had just come back from a visit to Somalia at that time so I was giving updates on what was going on in Somalia because there was a fair degree of concern in the Congress over our commitment of a 20,000-man force to that conflict. So, I was making calls to pass on what I had gained in my on-site visit there as well, as you suggest, to begin working the budget and to prepare for the upcoming testimony that would occur usually in February and March.

BGEN SIMMONS: This would have been the new Congress, wouldn't it?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, this was the new Congress.

Those members that you mentioned were, for the most part, old members, former members who had been there before and I knew them.

But as a general rule I made an effort, and I do not think it is unique to me, I made an effort to call on each member of the Senate Armed Services Committee — because there are not that many, some 14 or 15 on that committee, you can do that — and to call on the key members of the, what was called then the House Armed Services Committee. It is called today the House National Security Committee, HNSC. But you wanted to call on the Chairman and the ranking minority member and other key subcommittee staffers, the Personnel Subcommittee, the Quality of Life Subcommittee, to make sure that you let them know where you stood and what you needed before the formality of the actual posture statement submission and the testimony.

Some would say that testimony is really a show. It is necessary for the record and in many cases the statements of members are geared as much to play to their hometown constituency as they are to deal with an actual issue. So the real work of raising and maintaining a Marine Corps goes on in the private offices of the members as opposed to on the floor of the hearing rooms, for the most part.

BGEN SIMMONS: Congressman Ron Dellums is a former Marine but he has never shown any particular friendliness toward the Marine Corps. How were your relations with him?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they were superb and here I will take a different tack than what you have just suggested. When Congressman Dellums became the chairman of the HASC, the House Armed Services Committee, all of us, of course, went to call on him. I had not met him before that time because he was very difficult to get an appointment with. That is more, as I came to learn it, that is more a function of a man's personality than it is any dislike for anything.

Mr. Dellums is really, while a very impressive man in many respects, is a very private man and he does not, he does not like to have a lot of calls during the day in his office. But, I found him, one, let me start out and say that on my first call with him we sat down opposite each other and he said, "Now," he said, "I need for you to understand this very clearly." He said, "I have my politics and then we can talk." And that was all he said but I understood very clearly that what he was saying is that he comes from Oakland, California, represents that district. That is, of course, a part of the country that has long been associated

with fair extremism, if not radicalism in some parts of our history, and so to play to this constituency and to represent them as they elected he has had to be fairly radical in some of his statements over the years. But if you will look at his voting record it has never been other than supportive of the military, very quietly but it is there; it is fairly solid.

As I came to know Mr. Dellums his pride in being a Marine was as obvious as is most anyone's who is a Marine. And he let that be known as he gained confidence in me, I think, as he came to realize that he could talk to me. He told a very humorous tale that I later used, I hope to the benefit of the Marine Corps.

I hosted the House Armed Services Committee at a parade at the Barracks subsequent to this time we are talking about and Mr. Dellums and Floyd Spence who was the ranking minority at that time, from South Carolina, came and were the reviewing officials. Dellums left the Commandant's House with tears in his eyes that night.

As we were going through the House we were up in my study and I had an M-1 rifle that is my own personal property that was on the mantelpiece up there and he walked over and was looking at it. I took it down and handed it to him and he opened the bolt several times and then he told me the tale about how when he was in boot camp that he had had an inspection by his drill instructor. He had opened the bolt for Inspection Arms and as the drill instructor had slapped the rifle the bolt went home, as is often the case with M-1s as many here know if the bolt is not properly seated at the rear, locked to the rear.

The DI, you know, with appropriate annoyance and everything, shoved the rifle back at him and said, "Open the bolt again, Private Dellums." And as he started to open it the DI said, "With your nose."

And so he went through there in my study, him in his dark suit and Congressional sartorial splendor and me in my blues and medals and so on, he went through, he did not open the bolt, but he showed me physically, you know, put the rifle up and began to show me. And I said, "Don't do that, you will break your nose." And he said, "I did not break it." He said, "It is amazing, I finally figured out," and again he was going to show me exactly where he had put it on the bridge of his nose. And he said, "I got it back far enough and I opened it." But, he said, "Thereafter I never failed to open my bolt."

Well, the upshot of that is that a few days later on one of these calls, I acquired the operating rod of a M-1 rifle and I had it mounted on a very handsome plaque and put a plate under it and said, quote, "The nose knows." And then I put down, Ronald Dellums,

Chairman, House Armed Services Committee and Private, USMC, and took it to his office. And again, the man's eyes welled with tears.

So the Marines rode very well with Mr. Dellums, at least on my watch, and I think that it was as much as anything a matter of our engaging the man, you know, on grounds that he felt comfortable being proud to be a Marine again. So my perception of Ron Dellums is quite different from what I think many others have and what your question suggests.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think you have explained that very well. He had a reputation of being unapproachable and you have explained that.

On Friday, 8 January, you went to New York and had lunch with Arthur Sulzburger of the *New York Times*. Did he arrange that luncheon or did you? Did this meeting have anything to do with your press relations?

GEN MUNDY: No, that had been a standing request for several months where Punch Sulzburger, as he is known, who was a World War II Marine, had, you know, had extended an invitation to come up for lunch. It was not exclusive to me, many others had gone up, and I just finally got around to doing it at that time. It was a nice meeting, of course in the very exquisite offices up there, in the executive offices of the *New York Times*, and he assembled some of his key editors and whatnot and we had lunch.

And, as one normally does on those, they serve lunch and you have a couple of bites and then they invite you to say a few words and then you are open to whatever questions they want. It is all background or off the record and those who know, know that that means no one is going to quote you in the paper the next day, but you are giving them generally a background flavor. At some future time you may see that a senior Department of Defense spokesman or a senior military officer said, but they will not, the rules of the road are that they would not say, "Gen MUNDY said."

The only significance, it was a pleasant affair but we were at that time just beginning, with President Clinton coming in we were, of course, beginning to focus on the gays, the homosexuals in the military issue. And I was amazed to find how many on his editorial board just found that to be normal life in America and said, "Well, you are just going to have to get used to, change your thinking and get used to this because it is the way it is out there." So, it was not unpleasant but we had a little bit of debate back and forth as to homosexuality in America.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, that certainly permeates the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* in the editorial pages and book review pages and so forth.

Sexual harassment was still very much in the news. On 11 January the Secretary of the Navy — at this point that would still be Sean O'Keefe, would it not — published SECNAVINST 5300.26B which defined sexual harassment and delineated the Department's policy. It applied to all DON members, both military and civilian, and stressed resolution at the lowest level. What was the definition of "sexual harassment?"

GEN MUNDY: The definition that was promulgated in the instruction was, and, in fact, I will quote it right from that, the quote. "Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when the submission to such conduct is either made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay or career or the submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person or, finally, that such conduct has the purpose or the effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." Unquote.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the principal points to the Department's policy?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the principal points were to make a very strong statement from the senior leadership, the Secretary, and then, of course, echoed by the Chiefs of Service, that sexual harassment, as I have just defined it, would not be tolerated within the Department of the Navy. That there would be a work-free environment in which people of whatever gender could work without sexual harassment.

And then it clearly defined the complaint process. As you mentioned, it emphasized that complaints should be resolved at the lowest level rather than ignored and passed on up until they became, you know, national issues, issues that must be, you know, highlighted in the newspaper and so on, but that leaders in all echelons must recognize that, indeed, we did have sexual harassment in our ranks and in the workplace and must take the steps to ensure that it did not happen.

As in all cases, the pendulum swings wildly so it goes wider perhaps to the right before it swings to the left and settles back eventually to the middle. I do not

know if we are in the middle yet or not. So, while the instruction was probably fundamentally good, as always, the implementation of the instruction and the right guaranteed by the instruction of anyone who believed that she or he had been sexually harassed should certainly have the right and should make the complaint to their superior.

So, as a result of that there were, you know, a flurry of complaints, some of which were, I recall some several that the Marine Corps had that had to do with a female lance corporal complaining to her superior that a male lance corporal would not stop asking her for a date and putting flowers on her desk in the morning. I think most people have an image of sexual harassment as groping or as explicit language or, you know, explicit requests for sexual favors and some cases they are really very minor. They are annoying to the person and so it becomes a sexual harassment complaint rather than just a get him or her to leave me alone complaint.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were some of the specific steps the Marine Corps took or had taken to implement the instruction or purpose of the instruction?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we, of course, ordinarily in a case like this track with a similar directive of some sort. It may or may not be, you know, it is not just a reprint with a different name on it. But, we began instruction. In fact, we introduced instruction as early as in the recruit training at the two recruit depots because we wanted to, you know, make people aware at an early stage. I had a little bit of uneasiness with that, to be very candid, because I did not know whether we would be, you know, more properly would conduct this after recruit training. We looked at it, for example, in the follow-on basic skills training. But we needed to start. We put it into the formal schools to make people aware of what we were talking about.

So, training and education were the fundamental things that the Marine Corps did and, of course, awareness. We participated in the Department and a hot line was set up whereby anyone could call in 24 hours a day, not to make complaints of sexual harassment but to call in for explanations of what this was all about or what their rights were and so on. We had, to my everlasting pride, we had virtually no Marine call-ins, a lot of Navy and a lot of civilians. But I think the numbers of Marines that called in were in the handfuls and it was such that after about three months of having to provide Marines along with Navy personnel to staff this hot line service, the Marines

were taken off because there were no calls coming in for Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 January you spoke to the students at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base. On 12 January you spoke to the Senior Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute and on 13 January you spoke to the combined student bodies of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Ft McNair. These are further examples of your speaking to high level schools. We discussed the importance of this earlier.

I have reviewed your notes for the remarks to the National Defense University. That would be the combined National War College and the Industrial College. They are brief. Obviously, this is one of those talks where you covered familiar territory. You gave your thoughts on Somalia. Would you care to repeat them?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will, and as was always the case I tried very hard at the war colleges and schools to speak somewhat extemporaneously. I did not use any prepared thing. So the notes that you probably have are those that were taken by an aide, in other words, as a recording of what I said rather than anything I used, but I did give them an update on Somalia.

We were, of course, still introducing forces at the time I went out there. It was a new type of situation. The thoughts that I passed on to them were some of the experiences gained while I was there and the fact that we were beginning to get a little bit tougher in Somalia and thereby the situation was becoming, the term I used was, "a little bit hotter." We had found after we went in that we had to take some actions to disarm the "technicals," the gangsters with the .50 caliber machine guns on their trucks that were terrorizing the countryside.

So, in effect, in order to draw them out, in order to engage them and to be able to deal with them in a demonstration force we actually became somewhat provocative in challenging and daring them, if you will, and then we had the authority, when they came out to confront. We, of course, could shoot them or destroy their weapons or seize their weapons.

I tried to paint a picture of Mogadishu and what it was like. It was the absolute, you know, characterization of what anarchy can do. The city had been destroyed. The buildings were still standing but there was nothing inside them. There were no water pipes, there was no electrical wire, there were no windows. In many cases, if the building had been a tin roof

building, one of these corrugated metal roofs, that had been taken off and used to make a shack somewhere. And while the building was still standing there, you know, there was no door; it was just four walls.

The “technicals” would ride around at night just for a gig, you know, and shoot at the bell tower on the cathedral or things like that. So the place was pock-marked and the destruction had been done wantonly and not neededly. That is, even though I made a reference to perhaps a roof on a building being taken off to build a shack, in many cases parts of the building, the door would have been pulled off but it would simply have been thrown in a street. A truck alongside that someone had left that the “technicals” would seize would have been disassembled, not for parts to use, but simply disassembled and strewn about the street, you know, the transmission over here, an axle up there, the wheels gone, the tires slashed, just destruction, wanton destruction.

So, I tried to create this picture in their mind to let them know what the U.S. forces were dealing with along with the starving people. And then I walked through the phases of the operation with them as we had planned that operation which was to go in and establish a cordoned airfield. It was literally, this particular expedition was not infantry landing first to seize something. To be sure we put some security ashore, but this was bulldozers and forklifts up front because we had to physically clear the port and clear the roads of all this debris to be able to get in, you know, vehicles to operate in the area.

Then we were going to move out into the hinterlands to create secure environment for the non-governmental organizations to provide relief supplies. Then we would withdraw back into the city and hopefully allow the local village officials and whatnot to be able to run their own. And this worked in some cases, not in every case, but worked in a majority.

And then, of course, our final act once we had withdrawn into Mogadishu would be to turn the operation over to the United Nations and to withdraw American forces. This was the plan from the outset and that was hoped to be done in a period of about four, three or four months.

BGEN SIMMONS: You spoke about the transition to the new administration. One of the key concerns was the matter of homosexuals in the military. You said that you and all the other Chiefs had met with John Holum. Who was John Holum?

GEN MUNDY: John Holum is a Washington attorney and he has no particular notoriety other than the

fact that he was appointed by the transition team, President Clinton and his team, to find a way to allow homosexuals to serve in the military. So Mr. Holum would come around, very nice man, very fine fellow, he would come around and sit and talk. I think we spent about two hours together with me laying out for him the difficulties that I saw in allowing professed, announced homosexuals to serve. It just would not work and all of us in uniform, I think, knew and believed that, some to more to one degree than another perhaps.

But Holum was simply the man who was attempting to figure out how to make this work and then to provide the White House staff with a means, hopefully finding some consensus that we would agree to. We never did. But they were nice interviews and he was a nice fellow.

Later on, of course, he, when the Secretaries were being considered, John Holum was a very strong contender to be one of the Service Secretaries and for a while, he was at least one of the names rumored to be the Secretary of the Navy. I believe he was also a strong contender to be the Secretary of the Army. But as the appointments worked out we had to have a minority, a woman and another. And so Mr. Holum, unfortunately, was the wrong color, I suppose, or the wrong gender to fit in at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: You spoke about the draft of the Roles and Mission statement that had appeared in the press. Was this the result of the White Commission report?

GEN MUNDY: No, this was Gen Powell's report. This was before the White Commission was brought about. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols Act is charged at least once during his tenure — I think the way it reads is every two years or at least once during his tenure because the Chairman as the record here should show is only appointed for two years, he has to be reappointed every two years — so each Chairman makes a report.

Adm Crowe had made the initial Roles and Missions report. It was not given much credence because frankly, as people think and focus on roles and missions, what they really want is a fight. They really want a Roles and Missions report that says there is no longer a requirement for the Marine Corps or there is no longer a requirement for bombers or the Army should not have light infantry. But the reports never come out that way from those who are educated to understand the balance of forces that we have

and the utility and the desirability of keeping them. This was Gen Powell's report though and it was one in which all the Chiefs and the Joint Staff and our staffs were in coming up with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: What changes were contemplated for the Unified Command Plan?

GEN MUNDY: Principally the change of the, what had been formerly known as the U.S. Atlantic Command, LantCom as it would be acronymed, it would retain that identification but it became USACOM and there is a little background on that. Gen Powell had a, envisioned the establishment of a unified command that would be the Americas Command. He saw a command in the United States that would encompass responsibility for all that probably is encompassed partially by the Atlantic Command as it pertains to the Caribbean, to South America, you know, to the waters off the coast of the United States and indeed to the [noise interference] Command or a part of that since the Pacific Command also has a responsibility for around the Americas.

He had brought that up during the first CINCs and Chiefs conference in 1991 and that had not been enthusiastically endorsed by any of us. We did not believe that was necessary. And as I believe I have commented about Colin Powell earlier, he was, Colin never drove anything down our throats. He sought consensus. He was a master at working his way around and this is a classic example because he had been, so to speak, slam dunked on the idea in 1991 but now it is 1993 and although the Americas Command had waned and gone away, the notion of a Americas Command now embodied in the U.S. Atlantic Command, which would have responsibility for all forces in the continental United States, for the training and creation of joint forces. The joint task force that we would be sending somewhere, would be crafted by and trained by the U.S. Atlantic Command.

There were discussions of whether to take away geographic responsibility. Those discussions go on, in fact, to the present but, as to whether or not, make him just a trainer of CONUS-based forces, a trainer and provider, or to relieve him with geographic responsibility. So that issue, as it turns out that was the principal unified command plan issue. There was no significant alteration of geographic space or waters. There was some addition, as I recall, of water for the U.S. Central Command to give him more ability to be, to control the passage of ships and that sort of thing. But the real issue was the USACOM which, of course, now has become a reality.

BGEN SIMMONS: How was the Marine Corps affected?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine Corps was not directly affected in the Unified Command plan. We were not affected because the Marine force commander on the East Coast, FMFLant in earlier days, Marine Forces LANT today, is responsive to the CINC, whoever he may be and whatever his charter may be. So the MARFORLANT was the Marine component commander to USCINCLant and if we changed the construct to U.S. Atlantic Command it would not affect the Marine components.

So, very little effect and very little effect on, in fact, in the roles and missions study that came out because, again, what Gen Powell concluded and submitted was that we have a pretty good balance of forces.

BGEN SIMMONS: Appended to your notes were some sample questions that might be asked or might have been asked. They are good questions even now. Let me repeat them.

What are your views on assigning U.S. forces to the U.N.?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my views are that properly assigned, that must sound like a simplistic answer, but properly assigned — if you think back to it, we fought Korea under the United Nations mantle and United States forces were assigned there — but they must be properly assigned and that is that we have to have a U.S. chain of command.

Despite the fact that the United Nations can undertake an effort to accomplish something for the good of the world, for the good of humanity, the fact is that it does not have a military command structure. There is no United Nations commander and staff and just a command and control structure. It is an ad hoc outfit every time it comes together.

We actually hire United Nations soldiers. Countries get something on the order of \$1,000 a day per soldier or per general or per admiral that they send in for a United Nations operation. So for many of the less wealthy countries around the world, to provide a battalion of troops, even though they may not have any mobility or cannot feed themselves, for that matter, but to provide a battalion of troops, if you send 500 troops, why that is \$500,000 — did I say a day; that should be corrected to a month — that would be \$500,000 or a half million dollars a month income to Botswana or to some very small country that could use the money.

In many cases the commander that is sent into a UN

command, at least arguably in a number of cases, is someone who may not be ideal to command but is politically acceptable to the circumstances that we are entering. For example, in Somalia at one time there was consideration that the Italians would provide a commander. But if you know your history, the idea of an Italian commander coming into Somalia would have been entirely unacceptable to the Somali people.

We would have really had riots in the streets then if it looked like Italy was coming back down to dominate Somalia again.

So even though the Italian officer might have been best qualified, we could not do that. We finally had to go out and find eventually a Turkish officer because he was new —

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your views on assigning U.S. forces under the United Nations?

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that everyone who had provided, every nation that had provided forces would be content with the Turkish officer and the various factions in Somalia would be content with an officer of that nationality. Now, the reason that I go into so much detail on this is again to emphasize the point that for that reason a United Nations military command may or may not be the most effective command arrangement that you could put in place. The United States, chief among any nation in the world and exclusive among any nation of the world, is the only country that can put together an effective command and control mechanism. NATO, you know, can come up with a pretty good operation but not nearly as good as an overall United States command.

So, when I say properly assigned, the assignment of a unit with its commander, with that commander having a go or no go chain of command response back to United States command authorities, to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense, I think could work. But the piecemealing of forces, simply giving a battalion away or giving a brigade away or assigning a couple of ships to the U.N., we place our people at risk without an effective command control mechanism over them.

BGEN SIMMONS: What criteria should we use in the future for humanitarian intervention and does Bosnia meet these criteria?

GEN MUNDY: Very difficult to establish a definitive criteria for these type crises because they do not fit a very clear pattern. For example, then-MajGen, subsequently LtGen Hank Stackpole commanded a very

successful relief operation, humanitarian assistance operation, in Bangladesh after a typhoon had come through and had drowned millions of people. He went ashore but he did it, but it was a different type operation.

In Somalia we entered to feed starving people. There were clans, there were, if you will, warring factions, but those warring factions, you know, while they intimidated the population they were not physically killing off the population. The population was starving because they had no economy there, no agriculture.

In Bosnia we have yet another circumstance where we have outright warfare among well-armed clans. These are not just a bunch of people riding around in a pickup truck with a rusty machine gun on top of it. These are armored and artillery and rocketry and, you know, pretty well organized armies that have been clashing back and forth and have been killing the population off wantonly. So it has been a slaughter.

It would be very difficult to say under, what is the specific criteria that we enter each of those engagements. As a general rule we have tried over the past years, Gen Powell attempted to put into place what has been referred to as the Powell or the Weinberger and Powell Doctrine. That is that you must have a very clearly defined objective and that that objective must be measurable in terms of attainment. In other words, we must know when we have done what we were sent there to do and then there must be a plan for withdrawal when you reach that particular point.

That is a nice, clean prescription and one that we would all like to adopt but unfortunately things do not work out to facilitate that. And I think as much as anything in both Somalia, and I hope not in Bosnia, but we have found that if we, for example, if the Congress mandates that U.S. forces will only be in Somalia for 12 months, then, you know, all you do is wait until month 13 if you are on the opposing force and, you know, you try to hold what you can for the next 12 months and then you know that people are leaving. So we cannot have a specific policy of that sort, I believe.

The criteria is very difficult. I think that we are led to these types of conflicts, unlike the days when somebody came over and bombed your fleet in Pearl Harbor or somebody was sinking your ships crossing the Atlantic and you had a very clear reason to go to war. Now, more often than not, we are swept into conflicts of this nature by the persuasion of the press and by the emotions of the American people.

And those emotions are very fickle. On the one hand, two years ago why everybody in the Pentagon

was being hammered because we would not go over and do something about Bosnia. So now the President has decided to do something about Bosnia and now nobody is in favor of sending anybody to do something about something in Bosnia. So we are a fickle nation in that respect and I think that generally speaking we will go in and do something when it is good to do or when the, in this case the necessity for keeping the NATO alliance cohesive, and together we will make a U.S. contribution because we want to keep the alliance together as much as any other criteria for Bosnia in this case.

BGEN SIMMONS: How could the Navy have done better with Tailhook?

GEN MUNDY: Well, in retrospect the Navy as an entity, I think the way Tailhook came about, the way it was reported and the immediate clamor and attention that it received in the press and certainly at the highest echelons of the government left the Navy with little means of doing anything better about it, if you will. They were, you know, the press was out in front. Lt Coughlin had made her allegations. The press found two secretaries who had been in Las Vegas who had been subjected to this insulting and dehumanizing treatment that they had received from a few that were at the Tailhook convention. So it became a defensive operation rather than an offensive operation and there was no, the circumstances were never right to step out into the offense and shut down the criticism.

That said, one could look back and say, "Well, when Lt Coughlin complained to her superior shouldn't he have taken action?" Yes, in retrospect he should have and so the Navy could have done better perhaps had that individual admiral done something. But he did not, and then the Navy as an institution got swept up in this.

If there is one thing that I would find that is characteristic of the Navy and that I think was a continuing problem for them in this case, is that the Navy showed itself not to be cohesive. There was no, there was a great deal of indignation and indeed almost revolution within the Navy aviation community. You know, they just stood up and refused to sit down. I mean, even though the CNO could say, "Knock this off."

I remember that Adm Kelso flew out to Miramar at one point to address them and to tell them that we had to, you know, that we had to conduct ourselves differently and they were almost insubordinate to him. There is a lack of discipline in the Navy. I never found that in the Marines and we are different, but I

think the Navy showed itself thus to truly be communities, with the Navy aviation community feeling allegiance to somewhere else other than to the Chief of Naval Operations.

We would find that dramatic in the Marine Corps. I mean, we may have aviators in the Marine Corps but they are Marines and then they are pilots as opposed to we are pilots and also in the Navy.

And I think that that led to the Navy's increasing difficulties because while the leadership of the Navy, the Secretary, the CNO, many senior officers were saying this was wrong, get squared away, do not do it anymore, we would have, we had an incident during the height of Tailhook at the Miramar Officer's Club with some Navy pilots who, you know, made some derogatory suggestions and banter and what not about Congresswoman Pat Schroeder.

I am not high on Congresswoman Schroeder in many respects but that is below the dignity of professional officers and you would want to say, well, perhaps they were ensigns or JGs that were cutting up, but they were not. These were, in many cases, commanders with a captain present. It just showed a lack of discipline.

So I think that that was the singular thing that the Navy could have done, would have been better as an institution to lock its heels and to get in step and move out as opposed to have some resistance within the ranks even though the incident was overblown, there is no question about that. But, that would be my thought on how the Navy might better have done that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Why no Marines in Special Operations Command?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that is an oft-asked question and particularly since on Gen Gray's watch, in fact before Gen Gray's watch actually, on Gen Kelley's, the Marines had come up with the term, Special Operations Capable, attached to our Marine Expeditionary Units and that is proper. It seems redundant, I wish we did not have to say it at all but it came about because at that particular time, about 1985 or so as I recall, at that particular time Special Operations was becoming a word of fascination around Washington and so as is always the case if you want a place at the table, you know, you come up with something that sounds like Special Operations, or at least we did.

But indeed, you know, the operations that were defined, the clandestine raids from the sea, that is a special operation. That certainly is not a conventional operation. So what Gen Gray sought to do was to

say, "Yes, Marines are capable of some special operations, too." However, by Department of Defense definition and prescription, Special Operations Forces, SOF, as we refer to them, are specifically designated and specifically trained forces to accomplish those special operations normally associated with clandestine operations or other types of oftentimes in the black box special operations.

Marines are general purpose forces and though we have some Marines and some Marine units that can accomplish similar, not identical in every case, but similar special operations, we prefer to remain general purpose forces. And therefore, when the Special Operations Command was created it was, it had assigned to it only the Seals, for example, that were very sophisticated. It had the Army Rangers assigned to it and it had some other, some Air Force special operations capabilities.

We have some Marines on that staff there and indeed, we have two Marines, for example, that are assigned to the Navy's Special Operation Seal team as advisors. But we have no Marine units that are designated SOF and therefore there are none assigned to the Special Operations Command.

BGEN SIMMONS: How is or how was the reorganization of the OPNAV staff going? How does that reorganization affect the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: The reorganization, I am not sure if we have spoken about that earlier or not but I believe so, that the "barons" in the Navy, as they were called, and that was the surface warfare and the submarine warfare, the air warfare, all of those vice admiral "barons" who had long competed for resources in the Department of the Navy, were, as a part of this pressure in Washington that I have spoken of earlier, that the Navy was going to have to realign and get itself, you know, oriented toward the future.

There was a feeling that with the equal "barons" there all clamoring for their part of the pie and not willing to recognize that the world had changed and that submarines might or might not be as important as they used to be or surface ships or carriers or whatnot, that they had to, in order to get control of that for the CNO, that he would reduce all those to two-star level.

So he created one Resources Programs and Budget, I think is the term that the Navy created, as a vice admiral and lowered all other, the sponsors or the "barons" to two stars. The effect of that, one might argue that there have been some positive aspects and I think I could argue that, that it has caused the Navy to look more at a unified effort as to what the fleet

should be and what Navy capability should be rather than what each one of these stovepipes should be separately, as had been previously the case.

But on the other hand there has also been some degree of, I think there is, particularly in the Navy aviation community, there is some degree of morale loss. There is a feeling that that is a major part of Navy capability but it is not represented for the Chief of Naval Operations with a three-star officer. There is a little morale loss.

But on balance, I think it is going fairly well. And interestingly, the Navy, because VAdm Bill Owens was the primary architect in driving this, he created that as the N-8. Remember that there is a J-8 in the Joint Staff. That is in effect what the Navy does at the N8 level and that particular position is becoming increasingly powerful and authoritative in Washington because budgets, budget execution, the blending of joint requirements and resources together is taking on a life of its own. So, the Navy was fairly farsighted in that. It had some kinks. It is not perfect yet but, indeed, Gen Krulak as we speak today is trying to establish, to somehow bring the Aviation Department together in the Program Resources Department and make that a three-star billet that would then be, in effect, the M-8 of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: There has been, has there not, greater integration or cross-pollination between the Navy staff and the Marine Corps staff?

GEN MUNDY: There has been. For example, the deputy, the Secretary's assessment deputy — I cannot think of the term here, I have temporarily lost it, but anyway — the admiral who ordinarily serves the Secretary as his principal assessor of the programs that are ongoing in the Navy will be a Marine brigadier general this time next year. The Congress drove the Navy to include as one of its staff principals under now the N8- structure a Marine major general on the CNO staff as the sponsor for expeditionary warfare. That could include many, many things. It kind of cuts across the whole spectrum of war fighting capability. That is MajGen Jim Jones today.

So there has been some integration. It is still a lopsided integration because as I used to make the point, there were at one point during my tenure, and that probably changed, you know, it grew more not less, but at one point during my tenure the CNO had on the OPNAV staff some 39 Marine officers. There were on the Marine staff three Navy officers. So it was lopsided.

I would not want to see the Marine staff totally

diluted. I think it is important for the Marine Corps to have a staff that is made up principally of Marine officers but we need to, a greater integration means both ways, not just one way. So, but it has increased and it will increase I think further in the future. We have to be wary of that because at some point we could become so integrated that we could also become a neuter that there would be neither sailor nor Marine. It would just be some blue-green entity out there without a clear definition of service.

BGEN SIMMONS: Specifically, our Navy officers of the Marine Corps staff used to be medical officers, chaplains. Now we have an admiral with DCS, Aviation, for example.

GEN MUNDY: Exactly. That is a good point to make. And that was Adm Boorda initially because there was an effort to, we had put the Marine, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation who is ordinarily a brigadier, sometimes a two-star, we had in effect moved him over to the Pentagon although he was still assigned to the Marine staff, but he had an office that was immediately adjacent to the Navy aviation staff. And Adm Boorda came in and made that initiative and assigned Adm Tim Beard —

BGEN SIMMONS: Which was a good choice.

GEN MUNDY: It was a good choice. His brother is a Marine pilot as a matter of fact, a Marine Harrier pilot. So, they are both pilots, one Navy, one Marine. But Adm Tim Beard is a superb officer and has been a very strong addition to the Marine staff.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your speaking chores continued. The 14th of January was a double-header with a speech to the Marine War College in the morning and a luncheon talk to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association. That afternoon there was an award ceremony in honor of President Bush. What was that?

GEN MUNDY: President Bush was preparing to depart as the Commander-in-Chief and so there was a military review in his honor hosted by the Secretary of Defense. He was there presented a gift from the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary. As I recall it was a very handsome, tall, wooden case that contained the battle streamers of all of the events that had occurred during his watch, Desert Storm and then, principally Desert Storm but together with the service seals that were included, a handsome piece of furniture.

He, of course, as always, you know, some remarks were made about him, testimony to him and then he made a few remarks. President Bush was very devoted to the Armed Forces and to this day I will from time to time receive, I will be surprised if I do not get a Christmas card again this year and it will always say something to the effect that there are, in fact his favorite saying is there are many, many things that I do not miss about Washington but one of them is not my association with the military. He really felt very close.

He was probably arguably as close as any President has been with his military advisors. He just enjoyed being around and he enjoyed playing volley ball with the Marines at Camp David or running with them. He loved the military very much. So this was his farewell.

BGEN SIMMONS: That leads into my next question. Saturday afternoon, 16 January, there was an informal get-together at Camp David. What are your recollections of that event, and this might be a good time to give your impressions of President and Mrs. Bush on social occasions.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was, my recollections are all very warm because it was quite a treat to be invited by the President on his final weekend at Camp David which he dearly loved — President Bush spent every moment he could up there — to be invited up there. The Joint Chiefs were invited. Not, I think all of us came. I do not recall that, I do not think Gen Powell was there but it was because of a conflict.

But anyway, the Service Chiefs were there together with a number of the Cabinet members and other friends. And the Bushes, and you know, you arrived and you had a chance to walk around Camp David if you had not been there before. I had but Linda had not, for example, so she was entertained to walk around there. And then you would come back into the main lodge and there were drinks and snacks there.

It was an afternoon affair. And, the Bushes came in. They had the Prime Minister of Canada Brian Mulrooney, who was visiting also that weekend. They had invited him to Camp David to be with them. And they came in.

He, President Bush in a blue denim shirt and a pair of Levis and Mrs. Bush had a way to relax people. She was a wonderful, very engaging lady and for me to say you would want her to be your grandmother would sound, you know, like I am of the wrong age to say that but she was a very motherly or grandmotherly-type person, made you feel good. President Bush,

of course, was a hale fellow well met. I mean, he was slaps on the back and he wanted to talk about ball game scores or shooting pool or whatever the manly subjects might be.

But they would come out and always he would make it around to everybody in the room. Barbara Bush came out, had on a denim dress as I recall, and was wearing tennis shoes that did not match. One of them, I think was a red plaid and the other one was a blue denim. She made the point that she had about a half a dozen pairs up here and that she always simply reached in and selected two and whatever color they were she would just, it was just something she did. But that was characteristic of the Bushes.

At the White House, again, very much the same way. I think I told earlier the tale of going to the first picnic with an open-collared shirt and a blazer on and feeling like I was out of place until the President came in with his open-collared shirt and blazer.

It was a very warm weekend. We ended it, after a few minutes of socializing or, you know, an hour, hour and a half of socializing, they had invited us to go over to the Chapel at Camp David and so anybody that wanted — everybody who was there went — and the young Marines were there and the Seabees that run the camp. It was just a gathering of everybody at Camp David who was not on post. And President Bush had invited a country and western singer — he and I shared a passion for country and western music — George Strait, to come up and so we went over for a vesper ceremony, although it was not a religious ceremony but it was at the end of the day.

We had a little western music and then President Bush simply got up and said, this is very meaningful to us to have you here for our last weekend at Camp David and we wish you all the best, and we got in our cars and left. It was a very, very nice thing for the Chief Executive to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: The first fatal casualty of the Somalia intervention occurred on 12 January when a Marine was shot and killed during a ground battle near the airport in Mogadishu. Do you recall that incident?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do recall it and while, you know, you might make a counter argument — I do not think so — the point that struck me about that was that this was an artilleryman who was on infantry patrol who was killed. He happened to catch the round that was fired at them. But the point that that struck home with me and that I used many times thereafter was that this was truly indicative of the flexibility and the

utility of Marines over anybody else around. You would never find an Army artilleryman doing anything other than what his artillery MOS called for and yet with the Marine Corps when we pulled in the Marine Expeditionary Unit, a fairly small outfit, you know every Marine, we did not need artillery, we knew we were not going to fire any artillery so the artillery battery turns into a provisional infantry company and goes to work or the engineers do it or the motor transport people depending on what was not needed.

So it was a tragic loss and, again, I do not mean to suggest that that made it any better, but there was a unique aspect of that. So I do recall that incident specifically.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was this incident an indication that the Somalia humanitarian operation was turning sour?

GEN MUNDY: Turning sour, at that point it did not seem so. We knew that we were going to have to engage some of the “technicals.” It was not spoken then but now it has been spoken by the President before the Congress and the nation trying to impress on people that as we send troops into Bosnia we should expect that there will be incidents and that we will have some casualties.

But I do not know that that was an indication that it was turning sour because as I mentioned earlier, we had been very strong in Mogadishu. The rules of engagement were the most liberal that I had seen ever, I believe, other than in a war zone, and that was that, you know, if someone were carrying a weapon and if there was any movement with that weapon that appeared to suggest that the carrier was going to use the weapon you had authority to shoot him right there on the spot.

So, we had been very decisive in the execution of that authority and, in fact, there had been a number of Somali gangsters that had been shot by Marines since we got there. So this was to be expected, that we would draw some fire as well. I do not know that it was turning sour at that point. It eventually did but I would not have called that the sour turning point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday, 17 January, you went on board the USS *Roosevelt* which I presume was at sea for a two-day visit. What was the purpose of this visit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the purpose of that visit was a very, very simple one. The then-Secretary of the

Navy, Sean O'Keefe, wanted to spend his last two days, a Sunday and then we came back on Monday, but his last two days before, of course the President would be inaugurated on the 20th, at sea aboard a ship. And, in fact, Sec O'Keefe got in a Tomcat on the 18th and was launched from the deck of the *Roosevelt* and flew back into Andrews Air Force Base. As much as anything it was the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy and me, purely, you know, a farewell to the Secretary.

BGEN SIMMONS: Somewhere in this time period and I do not have the date although I could find it, you hosted a mess night for Sean O'Keefe.

GEN MUNDY: I did. I believe that that was, I believe, well it was not the 19th, it was not the evening before the inauguration but it would have been sometime back in, you know, within a two-week time frame. That had been done for, you know, several times. When Gen Barrow left we hosted a mess night and one was done for Secretary John Lehman at which I was in attendance.

We did one for Sean O'Keefe. He was a fun-loving man and, you know, a mess night, no one can do it like Marines. We did it in the Band Hall and it is colorful and grand. I recall that the menu for the mess night, we did break with tradition there and did not have the traditional roast beef and onion soup and shrimp cocktail and that sort of thing. We went with Cajun food and I think we had blackened catfish as the fish course and then we had red beans and rice and, you know, a highly seasoned piece of beef, whatever it was. We cooked a steak some way or other. And then had some decorative, some carnival type decorations there. I mean, it was still a mess night but the table decorations were tied to New Orleans because, of course, that was Mr. O'Keefe's home town. He enjoyed it thoroughly. In fact we almost never got him out of there, out of Center House after that.

BGEN SIMMONS: You bent the rules on the smoking lamp that night, too.

GEN MUNDY: We probably did bend the rules on the smoking lamp or we may not have — did we bend the rules on the smoking lamp?

BGEN SIMMONS: He smoked throughout the dinner.

GEN MUNDY: Oh, you mean on when the lamp was

lighted? That is right, he was a chain smoker so yes, that is right.

BGEN SIMMONS: During the first two weeks in January heavy rains caused serious flooding at Camp Pendleton. The base had to be closed down to non-essential personnel from 17 to 21 January. You sent out your Assistant Commandant, Gen Walt Boomer, to assess the damage. What did he report to you?

GEN MUNDY: Well, his report was that there was \$70 million in damage. That was, of course, the estimate for the facilities damage itself. There was further damage that we did not have a handle on. We did not know because the helicopters on the air base, the air base had been completely flooded in up to seven or eight feet of water and so many of the aircraft, even though they were in hangars, had the water rise up into them and, of course, with electronics and engines and things like that to be considered it took us several months to take those all apart and to clean them out. They found snakes up in the helicopters, for example, and a lot of mud in much of the electronics. So there probably was a greater cost than just the \$70 million with the Santa Margarita River flood.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Ranch House escaped but the Chapel was ruined. The Bunk House was damaged. The old, low-lying Chappo Flats area was pretty hard hit.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. Railroad washed out and the bridge washed out, two bridges; one severely damaged and one just completely washed out so that they had to divert traffic or drive a long way to get to some of the outlying camps because there was no other way to get there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was Camp Pendleton's usefulness seriously impaired by this damage? Maybe I should say for how long was it seriously damaged?

GEN MUNDY: Well, about six months it was impaired. For example we had a limitation, we could not land fixed-wing aircraft at the airfield because it had been covered with mud and it had to be cleared off. And, as I mentioned, it was not so much Camp Pendleton as it was the Marine Aircraft Group 39 which is stationed there. So we had, in effect, shut down the Cobras and the Hueys that were based on the West Coast at that time. And there was a lot of damage to the buildings. The buildings had to be ripped, you know, when you have wallboard wet and

insulation wet that had to be ripped out and repaired on time, so the cost ultimately would have, I am sure, exceeded \$70 million. But, Pendleton continued to march although there was some temporary difficulties with getting around and so on. We had no serious loss of life and it has now come back to full use.

BGEN SIMMONS: Marines had first gone into Somalia in August, 1992 under Operation Provide Relief, as we discussed earlier. Provide Relief was absorbed into Operation Restore Hope in December. Restore Hope was sort of a last hurrah for President Bush and he promised early withdrawal of Americans from Somalia.

On 18 January the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines — about 850 Marines in all — left Somalia. Later in the month some 1,900 Marines from the 1st Force Service Support Group and Marine Aircraft Group 16 left the country. On 28 January the 1st FSSG turned over its logistic responsibilities to the Army's newly established Unified Task Force Support Command. Was this the end of our involvement in Somalia?

GEN MUNDY: No, not totally. Of course, Gen Johnston stayed on to command for a period with a staff that was certainly a joint or indeed becoming a combined staff but with a lot of Marines on it. We still had some security elements in there, not only for him at the Headquarters but we also had a Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team, or acronym FAST platoon, that was there to provide security for the, we did not have an ambassador to Somalia but for the U.S. government representative which was tantamount to the Ambassador to Somalia.

So the Marine presence as far as having a few Marines there, would continue for yet some time to come. But for all practical purposes the Marines had been sent in to secure the area, to establish the environment and then they were to be relieved by longer term Army, you know, logistics elements and by a Unified Task Force. So the plan was unfolding precisely according to the way President Bush and, you know, the military authorities had laid it out.

BGEN SIMMONS: What had we accomplished?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I believe that at that point we had accomplished what had been set out to be done and that, again, as I spoke earlier, about establishing a secure environment, enabling the, you know, getting the roads working, getting the airfields accessible because all the airfields were virtually inoperable when we got there except in Mogadishu and even it

had some generators dumped on the runway and so on to impede traffic.

So, we had gotten communications possible. We had enabled the non-governmental organizations that provide the relief supplies and provide the treatment and so on for the people to function. We had spread that out into the hinterlands of Somalia which is, the problems, the political problems and the warring was in Mogadishu. It was not out in the villages once we got rid of the "technicals" out there. Baidoa was one of the principal towns. It was about 70 miles out of Mogadishu. It was a flourishing community. I mean, the crops began to grow and animals began to be raised and life went on as it had before these gangsters had taken over the country.

So at the time that the Marines pulled out, though all the problems were not solved, indeed all of those objectives that we had gone in to do had been accomplished and things were going along very well at that point in Somalia.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were the "lessons learned" from Somalia?

GEN MUNDY: Well, in hindsight, going all the way to the end, I think the "lessons learned" may be that to go into a state in which there is a complete state of anarchy, as was the case there, in which you have planned warfare, factional warfare, factional friction, to attempt to, to introduce American forces into that will stabilize it, no question about that because you are the predominant force and you just take charge, but, we cannot do that for enduring periods of time. There comes a time when, you know, when we pull out at the will of the American people unless we want to return to the days of colonialism and leave a permanent presence there and we are not about to do that.

So the question, I think, becomes when we go in and stabilize that situation, that when we pull out, it returns to some degree or another to where it was before we went in. And you have to ask the question then, was all this really worthwhile? Were the lives that were expended or the treasure that was expended worthwhile?

Somalia was a, probably is not the best lesson because the circumstances under which we eventually came out of Somalia really were exaggerated by an incident involving some Special Operations Forces attempting to seize Gen Aidid or Ambassador Aidid, Mr. Aidid anyway, a recognized national leader in Somalia who had become an outlaw, principally at the bidding of the Secretary General of the UN, not of the United States government.

But, now here is another lesson learned, because we were there under U.N. auspices and because there was a U.N. command structure that had changed the rules of engagement, that had changed the purpose for which we went into Somalia, we then became victim to being employed in a manner counter to what we had gone in to do, even though as a nation we had acquiesced to the U.N.'s pressures to change the rules, the purpose of the operation.

So, I mean, we cannot say the U.N. did it to us but, indeed, we lost sight of what our objectives were in Somalia and our objectives, we allowed the wrong force to go in there. We should never have allowed the Special Operations Forces to go in. You should say to me, "Well, you were one of the Chiefs, why didn't you do something about that?"

I would say to you in all honesty that we kind of got the word that they were going in. We did not get consulted on whether they should go in. We simply were told that they were going in. The Chiefs were beginning at that point, and maybe we will talk about this later on in some of the interviews, but the Chiefs were beginning to be left out quite a bit. We were not consulted on every issue that occurred. And so when they put Special Operations Forces in I never thought that that was a good idea but they were already there.

We were chasing Aidid. There are many, LtGen Tony Zinni one of the most articulate, who is more knowledgeable of operations in Somalia than anyone around, who knows Aidid personally and dealt with him, you know, on behalf of the United States government, Zinni would come back and say, "We are doing this wrong. We are chasing a national leader only because the Secretary General of the U.N. does not like him." And so eventually, of course, the ill-fated operation where we, if you can imagine this, you know, at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a bright, sunny day into a crowded marketplace, you know, based on some intelligence that Mr. Aidid was in a building adjacent thereto, we fly over in helicopters and fast rope, you know, a group of fine American fighting men, Rangers, down to seize Mr. Aidid and the Somalis shoot back and win.

And it is an insult to us. How dare they fight us and how dare they kill the soldiers who are coming in there to seize their national leader? It is illogical. But at any rate the loss of those 18 U.S. servicemen in that particular engagement resulted in the end of the operation in Somalia because nobody had told the American people that the Somalis would shoot back. I think that that was a fundamental failure.

BGEN SIMMONS: In ways it is reminiscent of the

debacle in Lebanon and for some of the same reasons.

GEN MUNDY: When we go and stay, I think the ultimate lesson learned is that, it gets back to the idea that we go in quickly and do something, whether that has a lasting effect or not is questionable. But the longer U.S. Forces remain in a situation for which Americans are not really attuned, if you will, we do not live like that in the United States and we cannot understand many of the emotions and the lack of concern for human life and that sort of thing that other nations do.

Whether they are wrong or right is not the issue but we simply do not relate to it.

When you leave Americans in too long, people began to take potshots at us, they began to put mines out and eventually in the case of the UNESOM or the United Nations Expedition to Somalia, the Task Force, it became a hostage force. About all it was doing was defending itself. It was doing no good by being there other than just sitting there and defending itself. We stayed too long.

BGEN SIMMONS: — 20 January inauguration of President Clinton. I note that earlier on 7 January you went to a briefing at the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee headquarters. Why was that briefing necessary?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was probably out of interest as much as anything. Of course we had Marines participating. They had a very large military contingent. And, in addition to that the Chiefs did have a part to play in the inaugural activities and so it was a briefing to tell us where we should be and when we should be there and what we were expected to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was your role in the inauguration activities?

GEN MUNDY: The role of the Chiefs is to, we are invited. We met in the Capitol. I do not recall the hour, it seems to me about 9:00 in the morning, but we meet in the Capitol and then we are taken out onto the west front of the Capitol where the inauguration takes place and there, of course, are several hundred people; the members of Congress, the Joint Chiefs. It is, in effect, something of a Congressional setting on the outside of the Capitol. Friends, well wishers, the personal family, the Supreme Court Justices, all of those people are in attendance. And then you are present for the inaugural ceremonies simply as one of the, you know, as a national leader.

So we saw President Clinton sworn in. Of interest

I would note only for the record that I always have, had long had a fascination with boat cloaks, which probably by the time someone gets around to reading this oral history we will note they will ask what a boat cloak is and no one will know because it is a fading piece of uniform equipment. But it is grand. It is elegant. It is beautiful. And anyway, so I wore my boat cloak to the inauguration and, of course, drew a great deal of derision from Gen Powell and my Air Force counterpart and so on as to, you know, my fuzzy velvet collar and the rich, red lining. It is a very flashy piece of uniform to wear.

We went from there, Adm Bill Kime who was the Commandant of the Coast Guard was gracious to ask all of us to come over to the Coast Guard Headquarters for a lunch before we returned for the inaugural parade. And so we did that. We had lunch and then we went back down to the White House and we gathered as some of those included in the reviewing stand with the President for the inaugural parade.

It is a long parade. It is a cold day and we were outside but it is a privilege to be there. As each of the service units come by that particular Chief of Service goes down and stands with the President to review the, in my case the Marines from 8th & I, the Marine Band and some Marine reservists that were participating that came by. And that was really my first meeting with President Clinton. So he was standing there reviewing the parade.

And I recall that he was very, I went up and saluted and said, "Mr. President, it is time for the Marines." I think the Army had already been by. We were second in the line of march. And I said, "It is time now for the Marines and let me tell you about them. This is the Marine Band and it is your band, Thomas Jefferson, the President's Band. The Marines here are from the Barracks at Washington. We hope to have you come over there for a parade," which we subsequently did, and just attempted to engage him.

He was very uneasy. He is not that way now. He has grown tremendously as a President and certainly in his confidence in the military, but it was very clear to me that he did not know what to, he did not know anything to say. They look nice. They are sharp. They are squared away. Look at the angle on those rifles, you know, they are all in step or what have you. He just had nothing to say. But he was very gracious and he introduced me to Mrs. Clinton and to Chelsea, to his daughter, and to other members that were there. But it was a rather uneasy feeling.

And then, of course, when the Marines had passed I went back to sit down with Linda again and we watched the rest of the parade. That night we were

included at, had invitations to several of the inaugural balls and went to one of them. The President and the Vice President all came and since we were on the, at the head table for the dinner we again got some face time, if you will, with the President on that occasion. And he had, at that point he had become I think a little bit more comfortable.

But as he passed through I simply said, "Good evening, it is good to see you again, Mr. President." Or something to that effect. And he said, "Well, thank you very much for what you do." I think that was his initial effort to try and gain some rapport with the military, to recognize that I appreciate what it is you do.

BGEN SIMMONS: An immediate effect of Clinton's inauguration was Secretary of Defense Cheney's replacement on 20 January by former Congressman Les Aspin. Aspin did not prove to be a very effective Secretary. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Congressman Les Aspin, you know, there probably is as much outpouring of affection in this town for Les Aspin as for anybody who has spent a career working in the Congress as he had. He was, we thought affectionately of him but Les Aspin never took the handle of authority. He never, he was the Secretary of Defense but he was never in charge. I suppose that would be the best way to describe it.

He brought with him a superb team. His Deputy Secretary was Secretary Bill Perry today who succeeded him in that job who is a superb Secretary of Defense and he had some other fine people, the Undersecretary for Acquisition John Deutch who is today the Director of the CIA. Deutch is one of the finest minds in this country today. So he was seconded by a very strong staff, albeit few in number at that point.

But, it was clear that he never mastered the ability to move from the Congressional caucus rooms or the back offices of the Congress. He liked to do business on a one-to-one basis. All of the meetings that the Chiefs were included in, and we were included in all of them at that particular time, were generally having wandering meetings. He would never, he was not decisive in the meeting. He was generally there to gain information and then it would be, thanks a lot, and we would leave.

So he just never, he did not project an image of being the person in control, the number 2 in the national command authority. He never projected that and he never manifested that openly in any of the deliberations in the Pentagon.

He was, you know, he is a very disheveled-looking person. He is a good fellow but, you know, I think if he put on a freshly pressed suit in the morning by the time he got to work it would look like he had been wearing it for three weeks. He just did not look good in his clothing. And, you know, when he would come out on the Pentagon Mall for his honors ceremony welcoming aboard or to receive a chief of defense from a foreign nation, I mean, he could not keep in step. He just had no manifestations of anything military or no manifestation of an authority figure.

Gen Powell, I know, because he dealt with him far more than the Chiefs did on a day-to-day basis, but Gen Powell would get very frustrated at the lack of focus of the Secretary on things that he had to focus on. Any, the deployment of forces, the deployment of a single airplane or the deployment of ten Marines or something takes the approval of the Secretary of Defense. That is a deployment order of U.S. Forces by the Secretary of Defense and usually the Chairman will go up and will say, I have five, will give him a background that we need to send a couple of reconnaissance aircraft over. They have been requested by, you know, the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific. We need to send some Marines out to replace the ones that are in Somalia, the security elements or something. I have the deployment orders here. This is where you sign. And that is about all it is and then the Secretary signs them.

But in Sec Aspin's case, Gen Powell would come back down frequently with frustration over I just cannot get him interested in things like, you know, Somalia or deploying the tanks that eventually became an issue. There was just not a great focus by the Secretary. He was still connected to his political connections on the Hill.

All that said about him I would say this, and that is that Les Aspin probably was about as much of a visionary and a good conceptualizer of the new world order and the types of forces that we were going to need in the new world order as anybody around. He caused that to come about. He caused the bottom-up review, as it has been referred to, to occur which structured the Armed Forces. And arguable as it may be in some quarters that is mostly political rhetoric because it was a pretty good study and that was Aspin.

But he did not project and on television he came across as rambling, stumbling, you know, obscure in his answers and so he did not gain anyone's quick confidence.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another effect of the Clinton inauguration was that Sean O'Keefe stepped down as

Secretary of the Navy and it would be some time before his successor would be named and confirmed. In the meantime, CNO Adm Kelso was the acting Secretary of the Navy. Now, I think you mentioned, we have discussed that a little before, how does that arrangement come about? It is rather unusual, isn't it?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is unusual but it is the, if you will, it is the chain of command or the chain of authority in that subordinate, when there is no Secretary or there is not Under or Acting Secretary then the senior officer in the Department, who is specified to be the CNO, becomes the acting Secretary. And since no one had been appointed and confirmed — nominated, appointed and confirmed — to any post in the Department except the bureaucracy, you know, the bureaucrats that were there that remained throughout, but they were not political appointees.

So the CNO picked up the mantle as the Secretary of the Navy. And the Army, Gen Sullivan similarly a short time later, the Undersecretary of the Army was asked to stay on and stayed for several months. But then there was a gap where he left until Secretary West was confirmed by the Senate and Gen Sullivan was the Acting Secretary of the Army under the same circumstances.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am going to get back to that later because it is not at all clear to me when John Dalton became the Acting Secretary of the Navy. It was a long time before he was confirmed but he was involved, as we shall see, early on.

Following days of negotiation, President Clinton on 29 January approved a compromise agreement on his plans to lift the ban on homosexuals in the Armed Services. What were the elements of this compromise?

GEN MUNDY: Well, essentially the compromise was that instead of coming in and lifting the ban as he had stated during the campaign that he was going to do, he instead directed that a study be done, you know, of the policy and of the ways that we might accomplish this in the Department of Defense. He gave, in effect, five months, six months, I think he gave until the middle of July to accomplish that particular study. So that was the compromise, you know, that we will study it and determine a way rather than that we would just do it.

BGEN SIMMONS: I note that you made several office calls on Senator Glenn in January. On 4 February you made office calls on Senators Nickles,

Faircloth and Lieberman. On 18 February you paid calls on Senators Warner, Kamphorne and Glenn. I presume that these were all part of the budget process or did they have other purposes?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there was a mixture of Somalia, you know there was great concern among the, Sen Glenn, for example, is a Marine. He had great concern. Sen Kamphorne was a brand new senator and has turned out to be a superb one. He is in his second term now. But he had just come on the Senate Armed Services Committee and he had some concerns about the Somali operation.

So there was a combination. You would, as always I would go in and see Sen Glenn and update him on where the Corps was and, in this case, update him on Somalia and then we would talk about the legislative year ahead of us and the budget. And we were beginning at that time, of course there was concern, great concern in many quarters, about the President's intent relative to homosexuals in the military and so many of the conversations focused on that as well with the members asking for my views on that particular issue and me giving it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Mark Carder, the portrait artist, called on you in quarters on the afternoon of 11 February. He would return on 27 February to take photographs. I presume that this was the initiation of his painting your official portrait.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was, and in hindsight it was very early although I never had undergone a portrait before. I assumed that one sat for endless hours while the artist painted. Indeed, I can recall that in talking with Gen Chapman one time I asked him how he had done his portrait and I think he allowed as how he would come home one day a week or maybe it was one day every two weeks but that he would allocate three hours to the artist to come and paint and that that went on for some time.

So I thought, well, things will clearly, I think, get busier toward the end so I will go ahead and begin this process now. What I did not realize is that, you know it had been 20 years since Gen Chapman had had his portrait painted and that now, at least in the case of this artist, that he came in and spent a lot of time with you to get, I imagine to get, you know, a feeling for you and for your facial expressions and so on and then he took a lot of pictures, not so much in different poses but in different light because he wanted the light to be exactly right.

So the pictures that you refer to, the photographs,

for example, were taken for the most part on the sun porch of the Commandant's Home in the afternoon light. And then he came back again, as you mentioned, on the 27th, I think it was in the morning light, or it was vice-versa, but we had different lighting effects. And then he would spend a lot of time photographing.

I was impressed that most of his photographs were on my hands not my face. I had never thought about that and I said, "Why are you fixated on my hands?" And he said, "Well, you have to remember that I can hang your uniform over in the corner and paint it. The only thing about this that will show are your face and your hands so I will be judged on the quality of the portrait based on how faithfully your hands are represented." I thought that was, it was for me educational but I had not thought about that.

At any rate, he took pictures and then he would say, for example, we went about the house and we went out onto the grounds and we looked around to see what the setting would be behind me. He could have painted rockets in the sky, I guess, if I had wanted that. I was not particular as to the background but as he looked around the House he became fascinated with the Commandant's study and he took a number of pictures there.

So, even though the portrait as it came out depicts me standing in the study, the fact is that the picture of me was taken downstairs on the sun porch and the study was photographed and then I simply was set in the study with the background that he wanted. So that is how it went on.

I asked him when he had come back for his second photography session, I said, "When do we begin painting?" And he said, "Well, it will be probably a few weeks until I will get started on this painting."

I said, "Well, what do we do? Do you come here and do I sit?" And he said, "Oh, no." He said, "I will take the photographs and I will paint from the photographs. Then I will bring it back to you, of course, for any touch-ups." So, I said, "How long will it take?" And he said, "Well, once I begin painting it will take me about two weeks." So, as it turned out what I expected to be, you know, several months in the making, that was February, and he actually delivered the portrait the following, as I recall, June or July, brought the portrait to the House.

So we were able to, I did not know whether to put it in a closet and hide it. Finally, Linda said, "No, it has been painted, we are going to hang it up, and we will hang it up in your study and that way it will not be too presumptuous that you have presumed to hang yourself down here before you have left." So, the

portrait hung beside my desk there about the last two years that I was in the House.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February a decision was reached to assign a special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force numbering about 600 Marines to a six-months deployment in the nuclear aircraft carrier *Theodore Roosevelt*. That is the CVN-71. What was the origin of this proposal?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this proposal was really the concept of Adm Paul David Miller who was at that point the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic command. His J-5, his plans officer, was then-MajGen Jack Sheehan. So, those were the conceptualizers.

Now, in fairness, before I had left Norfolk to come up and be the Commandant, Adm Miller, then the Fleet Commander, had talked about the fact that we needed to be more versatile in our use of naval forces.

The truth of the matter is that the Navy was on a major mission of preserving aircraft carriers at that point. There was talk about reducing the number and the numbers were reduced, in fact. I think there were 14 then. They came down to about 11 total aircraft carriers. But, there was a major effort to preserve the carrier and to do that the effort was to make the carrier more versatile, more flexible, more useful.

Second to that was the belief that we were not going to be able to afford to make the large numbers of ships deployments in the future as we had been in the past and that therefore we needed to start looking at some alternatives to large amphibious forces. Well, the product of that was Adm Miller's conceptualization of what he called Adaptive Joint Force Planning.

This became a bad word around town because what Paul Miller did not understand was that even though we put 600 Marines on the *Theodore Roosevelt*, it fundamentally was a rifle company and a detachment of helicopters, two vehicles and three days of ammunition and supply. They did not fit in the aircraft carrier because it is not constructed to accommodate vehicle storage, for example, or Marine packs. I mean, those are not things, machine guns and mortars are not organic to an aircraft carrier.

So it was a tough fit and to the Navy's credit and to the skipper of the *Roosevelt's* credit, they worked overtime to make it work and they, you know, they welcomed the Marines aboard. But I would continue to engage Adm Miller with a dialogue that you are not, you are sending something to the Mediterranean that is at risk. We do not mind, if we want to put some Marines aboard an aircraft carrier here in CONUS and go try it out a little bit off the coast of the Carolinas or

something, well, let's do that. But we cannot send forward a unit that can be operationally committed that would be as thin-skinned and as light as this force would.

If they got in trouble there was no reserve. If they got ashore the only mobility they had was helicopters. If they got ashore and the fog came in, that was it. You had a rifle company ashore with three days of sustenance and no means of doing anything with it. So, this became unfortunately a very tense situation between Adm Miller and me principally with Gen Powell trying to support his bright, new CINC and to be supportive of the concept. Gen Powell thought that we would be much smaller in the future.

So, there was a great argument between the Marine Corps and in this case, the Unified Commander. The upshot of that eventually was that instead of substituting the *Theodore Roosevelt* for the amphibious group that was to go out, the decision was made to send the amphibious group but to send the *Theodore Roosevelt* configured as she was as well.

The Navy did not like this anymore than the Marines did, the operating levels of the Navy, because in order to accommodate the Marines and in order to put helicopters on board for the Marines they had to pull down the normal complement of aircraft that were on the *Theodore Roosevelt* and they had to displace, you put 600 Marines on there, there are 600 sailors who are not going to be on there. So, no one was happy with this particular arrangement.

But *Theodore Roosevelt* sailed and the Marines sailed with her. And, of course, it was another 600 Marines who had to deploy at a very high operating tempo. We did not like that, either.

I called it "the experiment" and I never did like it and argued against it and we have not done it anymore. But that was the *Theodore Roosevelt* experiment.

BGEN SIMMONS: In March, SecDef Aspin directed the Services to begin an early retirement program for selected active duty personnel with more than 15 but less than 20 years service. What was the impact of this program on the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: It was an incentive program to draw down the size of the Armed Forces so that we were not just cutting out those who were eligible to retire, which could be done. You know, if you had over 20 years we could select you for retirement. Or, if you were a first-term Marine we could just not reenlist you. But we needed to thin out the mid-grade ranks as well. So this was an incentive that would be able



From 7-12 March 1993, Gen Mundy visited both Norway and Sweden. Here he examines a Swedish rifle.

to not, you know, not hurt people by laying them out of work when you only had 17 years in the Marine Corps.

We found that, I with some pride used to report at the various sessions that we would have, both with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, that the Marine Corps was having difficulty getting Marines to subscribe to this. We did not have many takers. We found that Marines wanted to remain Marines and I, you know, that charged me up emotionally because it was a devotion to the Corps as well, unquestionably, as an economic situation. But we implemented it in relatively few numbers. As I recall the total on that was somewhere in the order of about 900 Marines that eventually took that early retirement opportunity and left the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did this fall predominantly amongst the officers or the enlisted?

GEN MUNDY: Predominantly among officers but not exclusively among officers. But it was, the officers generally would be in the, you would have a major perhaps who had 17 years service and who intended to retire anyway who would say, "Well, this is not such a bad deal. It is a reduced rate but it means

that I can get started in my second career three years early."

BGEN SIMMONS: And there was retirement pay, not just severance pay?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: And it was calculated on the 2.5 percent?

GEN MUNDY: That is exactly right. It was just a different formulation. So instead of getting 50 percent pay you would get something less than that. You would get 45 percent pay but you would take it three years early. And, of course, under normal circumstances you could not get that. You had to reach 20 years before you could retire.

BGEN SIMMONS: Although if you reached 18 you had a guarantee or at least a promise of finishing out the rest of —

GEN MUNDY: Yes, to go ahead, to enable you to reach that 20 years.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 7 March you departed Andrews Air Force Base for Keflavik, Iceland, the first leg of a six-day trip to Norway and Sweden. What was the purpose of this trip and what were some of the highlights of the trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the purpose was to visit the forces that were deployed to Norway, the Marines, at that time, to northern Norway and I did that for a very short visit, and then to go on for, again, a long-requested visit to Sweden. The Swedes had sought U.S. Marines to visit Sweden for some time. There had been a few there, Gen Gray, in fact, had gone to Sweden one time when he was the Commandant. So, it was as much as anything simply a visit to the Swedish Armed Forces, which I found to be very professional.

It was a very cold day. I made the mistake of not layering sufficiently and we went out into the Swedish archipelago where their Coastal Rangers, as they call them, which would be the closest thing to Marines that they have, were training. We spent the whole day out there with me walking around in my extreme cold weather clothing suit, but that is a layer of about four pieces that you have to wear. I had elected to go with two and I had to, I almost froze. The Swedes would keep offering me a heavy coat and, of course, to maintain the image I would keep saying, "Oh, no, I do not need that."

But at the end of the day we rode back in on one of their coastal patrol craft which was a very nice high-speed boat, 40 knots. They let me, you know, drive it in to the Coast Artillery, their closest to Marines fortress there in the harbor. We got out of it, went up to dress for dinner

We were to have a dinner with their Chief of Defense and that was in the service uniform. We were in the field uniform. But we went into a gymnasium to change clothes and into a sauna. So, you went in just bone-chilled into this sauna, which was the right thing to do. And, of course, the Swedes then shoved a good beer into your hand.

So the beer and all that heat on a very cold body, by the time we were ready to go into dinner and I had suited up, I was just about to fall over in my plate asleep because I was so relaxed. And then we had a little red wine with dinner and by the time it was time for my remarks I can recall that I did not speak long for that occasion and it was a long evening because I was tired and cold.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 12 March SecDef Aspin forwarded to the Base Closure and Realignment

Commission (BRAC) a list of recommendations for the closing, realignment or disestablishment of U.S. military bases. What Marine Corps installations were targeted on this list and who was your principal BRAC representative at this time?

GEN MUNDY: The representatives were two principally, and that was LtGen Bob Tiebout who had succeeded to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics, and LtGen Norm Ehler who was the Deputy Chief for Plans, Policies and Operations. MajGen Hearney was then also involved in that. What we had done was to match even numbers with the Navy, you know, that we had come up with a team to consider these closures and the Navy had, we had equal partnership with the Navy.

The only Marine Corps installation, though many were considered each time they stood up. The case that I used to make was that we have, though the Marine Corps has indeed to that point decreased about 20,000 in size, in point of fact our bases are still thriving communities. We have no base which is, you know, at 50 percent capacity. We were still putting about the same number of recruits through them every year.

But nonetheless, the recruit depots would always be looked at and the Marine Corps Air Station at Beaufort and Cherry Point would be looked at. Generally, air stations were looked at across the board.

At any rate, at the last moment in these negotiations, literally about two days before the report was to go in, I forget which of them came back and approached me, but one of the representatives said the Navy is going to close out of Miramar. We have the opportunity to relocate El Toro down to Miramar. Miramar had some 35 square miles of flying space. El Toro had seven by comparison. So we had a base with real estate and flying space almost five times that of El Toro. And El Toro, for the past decade or more, has been increasingly encroached upon by the growth in Orange County, California which was threatening to shut down flight operations and was creating significant problems for us.

The recommendation was that we seize the moment and realign, after the Navy moving out of Miramar, that the Marines simply be realigned from El Toro to Miramar. And so that was done in that Base Closure Commission 1993. We were directed to relocate some of our helicopter units to Camp Pendleton or elsewhere in southern California and then to locate the heavy helicopters, the 53s, and the fixed-wing aircraft down to Miramar.

That process, of course, you have seven years to do that after that is decreed so that would have to be done by the year 2000 and we are underway to doing that although at this point there are some obstacles to getting there. So, El Toro, we would see the last of El Toro and would return to that base from whence we had left to go to El Toro in I think about 1942 or so. The Marines were at Miramar and moved up to El Toro. So we are headed back there now.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 16 and 17 March there were more Congressional visits. These included Congressmen Dornan, Cox, Spence and Hutto. Any comments on any of these gentlemen?

GEN MUNDY: Well, Dornan and Cox would have been specifically related, perhaps, to the base closure because they were both concerned. Congressman Chris Cox, his district includes El Toro and Congressman Bob Dornan also adjoins that. So those were likely Base Closure Commission related.

As far as Spence, he was the ranking minority on the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Hutto of Florida was the facilities, the Military Construction Committee, Subcommittee chairman. So they were normal calls except that Dornan and Cox were probably BRAC-related.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 March you and Mrs. Mundy left for a four-day trip to California. On the evening of the 18th you were the guest of honor at the Orange County World Affairs banquet. On the 19th at Camp Pendleton you opened the new commissary and the new MOUT or "Military Operations in Urban Territory" facility. On the evening of the 20th you attended the Marine Corps Scholarship Ball in Los Angeles. Do you have any particular recollections of any of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I have specific recollections of all of them but they were not extraordinary. They were, you know, fairly routine facility openings. The MOUT facility, as you referred to, was the second that the Marine Corps had built. We built the first one down at Camp Lejeune about three years earlier. This is a superb training facility that enables us to really work on fighting in towns or military operations in a built-up area, as we used to term it, or now in urban terrain.

The opening, the commissary was the flagship commissary for the newly created Defense Commissary Agency. Theretofore, or for years heretofore, the Services have run their own commis-

saries. That has all now been put into one Defense agency and the commissary at Camp Pendleton that DECA, as it is called, the Defense Commissary Agency, commissioned and they did it in grand style. It is an absolutely beautiful commissary both in terms of not only design and appeal but in terms of flow and display and all of those things that make shopping for the military people out there very pleasant.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 29 March the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on homosexuals in the Armed Forces. Did you testify before this committee?

GEN MUNDY: I did ultimately, all of the Chiefs did and we did that collectively with Sec Aspin, with Gen Powell and with the Chiefs there, and that was the final hearing that they had later, you know, after 29 March, I believe. They conducted a series of hearings. This was principally Sen Sam Nunn, Sen Dan Coates of Indiana, who I found to be, I mean, I have always thought a great deal of both of them but they were rock solid in this particular issue. This was Nunn, and not to be omitted in mention, his principal staff that was staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee was then Col, and as we speak today, BGen Arnold Punaro, USMC Reserve. Arnold, of course, had been with Sam Nunn for many years since back in, as I recall, about the mid 1970s or so that he came to work for Senator Nunn.

They did a masterful job of going for field visits to ships and to barracks and to talk to sailors and Marines and soldiers and so on about this issue and then they came back and held a series of hearings with a variety of people culminating more or less with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs. So we were called after the policy had been defined by the Administration rather than during the formulation period because the Chiefs were in an extremely awkward position during this whole affair because technically many would argue that look, you are supposed to execute the President's orders.

There is no question about that, that is what the law provides. But at the same time the law provides equally that the authority not only to raise and maintain Armed Forces in the United States but also to prescribe the rules for the governance of those Armed Forces is vested in the Congress. Since a military officer — this is more or less my Civics 101 lecture I taught — since a military officer is sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, arguably his or her primary duty of allegiance thus becomes to the people of the United States through their elected rep-

representatives for the responsibility for doing those things that were right for the Armed Forces. There is no question but that when the Commander-in-Chief ultimately gives an order, so long as that order is consistent with what the Congress wants to do, you know, that the military officers under his command are to execute it.

So that is a very complex situation to deal in because on the one hand you want to support the President. You are obliged in law to support the President. But it became a question of being able to support the President in the creation of the policy which you held to be absolutely wrong. So that took some delicate maneuvering and there was a great, I would say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff for probably close to a year, from the time that Candidate Clinton announced that he would do this until the time that we worked our way through the formulation of the policy, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff focused, at every meeting we had we had a discussion of some sort on this particular issue.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get plenty of advice from the retired community on how to testify and if so, who were your most vociferous advisors?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I got some. The most, I would say that there was very strong support and the two that come to mind are BGen Bill Weise, USMC (Ret.) and LtGen Charlie Cooper who strongly supported, now they were more outspoken. LtGen Ed Bronars(?) also was a very strong proponent in working to prevent this from happening. And among the three of them, those were, as I recall, the principal advice from retired members.

Col Ron Ray, we have spoken of him earlier, over in Kentucky was a Reserve lawyer. He had been on the President's Commission on Women in Combat, I think was what we discussed about Ron Ray, but Col Ray also had extremely strong feelings on this. So those were the people that would, from time to time, more so than advice or anything they were trying to give you backbone, I think, to cause you to continue to oppose this even though it was a very delicate situation that the Service Chiefs found themselves in.

BGEN SIMMONS: Wasn't there a videotape involved in this?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, there was and I got hammered for that. At an early time through whatever means, and I do not even know what the means were, but there arrived anyway in my office and thus brought

into me to my desk, a video that had been put forth by a fine organization that was undoubtedly a Christian Coalition type of organization, but it was about the gay activists on the West Coast and the way that they had virtually shut down the city of San Francisco with a great deal of violence. And then it went on into a description of the practices of a lot of the gay, the more active gay elements. And it was a real eye-opener. I mean, it was stunning.

So, anyway, I had copies of this tape made. I called Gen Powell and I said, "Did you get one of these?" And he said, "No, I did not." And I called Gen Sullivan and said, "Did you get one of these?" And he said, "No, I did not get one." And so I made up copies for each one of them and took it down to them.

In the meantime they had gotten to Gen Sullivan. He sent the copy back because he had gotten one. And then I think Gen McPeak said, "Yes, he had gotten one." All the Chiefs got them but I had also provided them a copy of that.

Well, lo and behold, what the, you know, the Marine Corps, in making the copies, the Marine Corps, at our video section over in Headquarters always puts a leader on the film that says, you know, "United States Marine Corps, Property of the United States Marine Corps" and then ends it so it is something about the Marine Corps. So here when they made these tapes we had it appearing as a Marine Corps tape. And somehow one or more of those found their way into the hands of somebody on the Hill, one of the supporters, or I think into the press really first.

So, anyway, I was called, did I distribute it? "Yes, I did, but not to anyone except the Chiefs." I frankly do not to this day know how the other copies went anywhere. So I was then hammered in a number of ways for having, pandering, I think was what they gave me the Golden Dart Award for in the *Armed Forces Journal*, pandering.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 31 March you appeared before the House Armed Services Committee for the presentation of the DON posture statement and testimony on behalf of the Fiscal Year 1994 budget. Any specific recollections of this testimony?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only that by that time probably in the life of any Commandant there comes a point where you have ceased being the new man in town and you have learned your ways and you have become comfortable working with the Congress. The Bush Administration, as much as I thought of President Bush, as much as I do of all of those names

that we have talked about, Cheney, O’Keefe, Garrett, all those, remember that it was the Bush Administration that had decreed that the Marine Corps would come down to 159,000. So on the, I think about the 21st of January I had a staff meeting at the Headquarters and said, “Okay, I do not want to hear the term 159,000. We do not talk 159,000, you know, we are now 177,000 —”

GEN MUNDY: We were talking about the testimony at the commencement of 1993 and I was saying that by that time we had decided that our campaign would be a fairly matter of fact we were going to have a Marine Corps that was going to be 177,000; 159,000 was somebody else’s idea. And so I had, I engaged on the Hill, I would say now I was able to be on the offense with regard to the size of the Marine Corps, and for example, the V-22. I could now walk over to the Hill and say, “Senator, the Marine Corps wants the V-22 aircraft,” whereas heretofore I had been constrained from doing that because the Bush Administration had ruled it unaffordable. But now I was able to openly come forth very strongly.

So it was a good feeling. If you will, I had earned my spurs on the Hill now and I was rolling pretty strong. So my testimony at that time could afford to be very forceful and strong. We did not have an appointed Secretary, as we have talked about earlier, so it was just Adm Kelso and me. So, you know, I was under no constraints from any civilian authority at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the afternoon of 31 March you went with the CNO, Adm Kelso, to Annapolis for a CNO Executive Steering Committee meeting. That sounds like TQL to me. Do you recall what that was all about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it sounds exactly like TQL, but the CNO Executive Steering Committee is some mixture of what at one time was referred to as the Fleet CINCs Conference. And that is where the CNO would have in his four-stars who were usually Fleet CINCs. The Vice Chief, of course, was there and if he had a Unified CINC, like Adm Larson, would come in for that. That was changed at some point, at about this point, probably, that we are talking now to be the CNO Executive Steering Committee. But it was the Navy four-stars and selected three-stars, and as a matter of routine Adm Kelso was very gracious to invite me as I think Gen Gray before me had been invited.

The Executive Steering Committee, usually they would dwell for about two days on updates on what

was going on and then they would discuss matters of current interest and kind of bring him an update from the field. He warned me on this one. He said, “Look, there are some fairly passionate feelings about the Marines and the fact that . . .” We would not, the Navy had been after us to give up our F-18s. I mentioned before that there was concern that the Navy was coming down significantly in size but that Marines were not taking their fair share of the cuts.

So he just kind of alerted me to say they may come at you fairly hard. They did not other than Adm Barney Kelly who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Barney was the ranking aviator at that point and he was quite strong on wanting to thin out Marine aviation to the benefit of Navy aviation. And so we did not have a meeting of the minds on that.

I would usually stay for part of one day and then would leave because I, you know, the Navy, just as Marine leadership, would want to be unto itself and talk to itself. But those were routine and I went several times during my tenure to those types of gatherings.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 April there were more Congressional calls to be made, this time to Congressman Young and Senators Hollings, McCain and Shelby. Any comments on any of these gentlemen?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they deserve comment. Congressman Bill Young is probably one of the best friends that the Marine Corps has. He is on the Appropriations Committee. He was, at that time the — the House Appropriations Committee — that committee was chaired by Congressman Jack Murtha, a retired Marine Reserve colonel. And Congressman Young was a Florida Congressman who had an uncle who had been in the Marine Corps and he thought very much of the Marine Corps. Moreover, he also carpoled to work with then Col Randy West, USMC Reserve, today BGen West, the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant. Randy was on a one-year fellowship — it turned out to be two years — with the Congressman, so Congressman Bill Young was very supportive of the Marine Corps and that is nice support to have on the Appropriations Committee.

He was, along with the Congressman from Philadelphia, who had reason to be supportive of the V-22, Congressman Young was the most strident supporter of the V-22 for the Marines in the Congress at that time. So there was simply nothing that we could do that Congressman Young did not support. So, a



On 20 January 1993, William J. Clinton was sworn in as the President of the United States. On 8 April 1993, he made his first visit to the Pentagon and posed for this photograph with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To the President's immediate left is Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

fine Marine supporter then. He is today under the new, under the Republican Congress, he is the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee so that friendship indeed, nurtured then and blossomed to now, is very, very significant for the Marine Corps and our resources on the Hill.

Senator Hollings, of course, a South Carolina Senator and former governor of South Carolina. A reasonable supporter. He is a World War II supporter but he is Army and generally views, I think, the Army with a more favored eye than the Marines although he is not on Armed Services.

Senator McCain, of course John McCain we have spoken of before, one of the staunch, you know, a Vietnam hero, POW, highly decorated, badly injured over there, but a very strong supporter of the Navy and the Marine Corps. Not of Navy submarines but of Navy carriers and Marines.

And then Senator Shelby is an Alabama Senator. He was in the manpower business at the time, the Manpower Subcommittee, I believe, and so there is nothing special to note about him.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday evening, 2 April, you went to Philadelphia for yet another Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball. Do you recall this event?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do. It was held at the Union

League Club which is a very old and very prestigious club in Philadelphia to which I know you have been as well. It was, I think, probably 500 or 600 people. Of course, the Scholarship Balls, as we have spoken of earlier, are very warm and very, very patriotic Marine Corps events. So this was another in a line of very nice evenings.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 April you went to Carlisle Barracks to speak to the Army War College. I see from your notes that you again spoke on the increasing role for naval expeditionary forces.

On 21 April you went to Fort Lauderdale to speak to the Navy League. This was another drum beat for the "From the Sea ..." the strategic concept. You were back on the morning of 22 April in time for a luncheon meeting with the Council on Foreign Relations and attendance that afternoon at something called the "Course and Speed Conference" held in the Sheraton National Hotel. What was this last?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the "Course and Speed Conference" is a conference that continues. I began it when I was a brigadier general heading personnel procurement for the Marine Corps and it was sort of the mid-year conference for the recruiting service. There is an annual recruiting conference that is held each year, usually in the fall, about October, and this is the mid-year conference to come in and see how we are

doing for the year and to talk about the needs of the recruiting services.

BGEN SIMMONS: All officers?

GEN MUNDY: No, officers, there are some sergeants major there who are, of course, the senior enlisted in the recruiting service, J. Walter Thompson advertising executives, so a wide variety of people that come in to talk over Marine Corps recruiting matters.

I do not believe that I am, I certainly hope that I am not the last of those to be dipped in the oil of recruiting, but I had a very, very strong feeling for recruiters in general and about recruiting because it is, after all, the sustenance of the Corps. If we do not recruit, why we do not have to worry about whether we have V-22s or not. And it is very difficult to recruit for the Marine Corps, not like recruiting for the Air Force or even for the Navy, tremendously difficult to convince people to come into the Marine Corps. Once we get them they become passionate about being Marines, but getting them here is a difficult job. So I was very strong in my support for the recruiting service and it would have been for that reason that I went by there for their mid-year conference.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 April II Marine Expeditionary Force stood up a new organization, the Small Craft Company, which would be located in the Headquarters Battalion of 2d Marine Division. What was the nature of this company?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the company was comprised of the various small craft that had taken form down at Camp Lejeune and those were principally the 35-foot riverine assault craft that Gen Gray had initiated during his tenure. We also had put in the rigid raiding craft as opposed to the combat rubber raiding craft which had more normally been used by reconnaissance forces and indeed by, you know, boat companies going as far back, I guess, as the Marine Corps had been around.

We had gained enough of these types of craft that they needed oversight, they needed supervision. We had outboard engines, you know, they were essentially commercial craft and we really had no structure to maintain them or to operate them in the Corps. So this was an attempt to put them into a singular organization that would give them some structure and some leadership, if you will.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did the other divisions get similar Small Craft Companies?

GEN MUNDY: Other divisions did not get the companies in the same, because the river assault craft, these bigger boats, were only maintained on the East Coast. And that was because originally at the time that they were procured by Gen Gray we were getting more active into the riverine operations and this boat would provide a greater capability for riverine ops. As a practical matter there was not much enthusiasm for it when it began and I must admit having represented as a MajGen, then Director of Ops, to Gen Gray, attempting to argue the case for not wasting money on these riverine assault craft.

But Gen Gray was trying to enable a great number of initiatives on the part of the mid-grade officers of the Corps who had ideas and among those was the desirability of getting back into riverine operations as a practical matter. Riverine operations really are the charter of Navy Special Boat Squadrons and Seals. The Special Operations Forces were beginning to look at that, and Gen Gray just wanted to get Marines more active in it.

But the riverine assault craft is a nice boat, but that said, it is not of great utility to the Marine Corps nor has it been. It is, we have enjoyed experimenting with them a little bit and showing them off down at Camp Lejeune. It is a great way to take a visitor down there and you pick him up in one of these boats and you skim 40 knots down the river and it has machine guns on it, and it is a nice, again, a very nice boat.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is it the same boat that the Navy has?

GEN MUNDY: No, it is not. The Navy Special Boat Squadrons, they use a different type of boat, different manufacturer and a different structure boat. This could carry a squad of Marines. The range on it would be probably somewhere in the neighborhood of maybe, I think, 200 or 300 miles so you would be able to operate at some distance. It is a very seaworthy craft.

But, again, I suspect that those are going to go the way of something else tried and not used. There is a great deal of difference in opinion, in fact, among the now experienced new commanders of the Corps as to the utility of the rigid raiding craft which are Boston Whaler 19-foot Boston Whalers that were adapted to military use.

In fact, many of the new commanders have just stopped taking them with them. They prefer the combat rubber raiding craft as a more useful boat, much more easy to, you can deflate them. They do not take up a lot of storage space.

The rigid raiding craft consume a large amount of the well deck of an LSD, for example, an LPD, if you carry them around. They are hard to maintain. We have had some accidents with them. So, I think that those, all of those craft may very well fade from our inventory when their useful life is gone.

BGEN SIMMONS: What does the Navy think about our getting into the float business? They did not care?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they cared, but the Navy, well, they did not really care because Gen Gray's awareness was that the riverine warfare skills were atrophying. You know, it was more or less the Navy's charter but the Navy was not doing anything about it. They were not training to it and they were not equipping to it. And he thought, and again, I think he thought properly, appropriately so, that Marines would be ideally tailored for this because while the Navy has the Special Boat Squadrons, those really are boats that transport. I mean, they have guns on them and they can shoot at people, but they do not have anybody to put ashore once they get somewhere unless it is somebody else like Army forces.

So Gen Gray's thought was why not let the whole bag be Marines. Not really a bad concept overall but just, we did not have the manpower to do it at the time it was initiated. We have reduced the Marine Corps by 20,000 Marines. We still do not, I mean, we have, if anything, even less manpower. Maintenance is all commercial so it is, you know, they are not standard issue. So there is no supply chain of parts, very expensive to maintain outboard motors and to maintain the river assault craft on a commercial basis.

BGEN SIMMONS: About how many of these craft do we have?

GEN MUNDY: We have, I believe we have 14 of the river assault craft, the big ones. The rigid raiders we have, oh, a couple hundred of those scattered about the Marine Corps here and there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tailhook would not go away. On 23 April the Department of Defense Inspector General released a final 208 page report of the IG investigation. The report charged 117 officers with offenses ranging from indecent assault to conduct unbecoming to an officer. Ninety persons — 83 women and 7 men — were found to have been assaulted during the convention. Do you recall how many Marine officers were so charged?

GEN MUNDY: The number was under 20 and I do not recall specifically but I believe I want to say 16 or 17 and I think that would be in the ballpark.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 26 April you spoke to the Army Command and Staff College at Ft Leavenworth. I will not try to list all your speaking engagements, but I do want future readers of the transcript of these interviews to know that there is a full file of your speeches, 1991 to 1995, in your personal papers at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

On 28 April, SecDef Aspin announced a revised policy on the assignment of women in the armed forces. This revised policy, stemming in part from recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, which we discussed previously, directed the Services to open more specialties and assignments to women. How did this affect the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Principally it opened aviation to women Marines. Now, aviation had been open but in a very restricted sense. For example, we did have some women Marines who, a couple who would fly as crew chiefs on the C-12 aircraft, the commercial transport aircraft that was used mainly for CONUS-based use or non-combatant use anyway. We had women in aviation but they were not allowed to fly on combat aircraft. So, in effect, what this did was to open the availability of Marine aviation to women as pilots, to women as flying, a crew chief on a C-130 aircraft, for example, could now be a woman and heretofore would not have been. That was the principal effect of it, was aviation billets.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do we have any women F-18 pilots?

GEN MUNDY: We do not. At the present time, the first woman pilot, Marine female pilot, is now a 1st Lt Sarah Deal. She was the first to apply. She was in the Marine Corps and requested to go to flight training after this exception was made. She has just now completed, she is in helicopters. There are several more that I think are in the pipeline at this point, that have come out of the various academies or out of the Naval ROTC units that are applying for flight training, but there are not today.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the weekend of 1-2 May, you went to Chicago to speak to the convention of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association. This is one of our strongest Marine-linked organizations. Do

you have any special recollections of this weekend or the personalities involved?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the event, as many things in Chicago, Marine Corps-wise are, was stimulated by MajGen Mitch Waters who was a Marine Reserve Officer, a Basic School classmate of mine and a very successful businessman and respected leader in Chicago. So Mitch Waters put this together.

But this was the annual convention and it was a, rotates around from coast to coast and city to city. It usually is, you know, the predominant attendees come from the East Coast if it is on the East Coast or the West Coast if it is on the West Coast, but you keep seeing the same faces at the MCROA. The MCROA is a very solid organization because unlike regular organizations or regular force organizations, MCROA is truly licensed to lobby on the Hill. So, for example at a time when the Commandant could not be on the Hill actively seeking the V-22 aircraft, MCROA, as a recognized lobbying institution could be, Reserve officers could be all over the Hill lobbying for the Marine Corps program.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think Chicago has always been a strong Marine Corps Reserve town. It seems we always have a Reserve general in or about Chicago.

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course, Glenview Naval Air Station was for many years the headquarters of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing so we had a good population there. But it is a, there are several retired generals up in that area now and there is a Reserve, again an infantry battalion as well as aviation units that we now are moving out of there. Glenview, unfortunately, was one of those that was on the base closure list and will close down. But you are right, it is a good Marine Corps town.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 4 May LtGen Bob Johnston passed command of Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. relief operation in Somalia, to Turkish LtGen Cevik Bir. At its peak we had over 30,000 American troops in Somalia. These had given way to a multinational force. At the time of LtGen Johnston's departure, there were still 4,000 Americans in Somalia. Did this include any significant number of Marines still in-country?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there were still some Marines on the staff there for the U.S. element of the Unified Task Force. We had, as I recall, for example, BGen Pete Pace was sent back over. Then Col Buck Bedard,

and presently today BGen Bedard, was the J-3 on this organization. So there were Marines on the staff. And then there was the FAST, the Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Team platoon of Marines that were there to guard the U.S. envoy who was there at that time. So not a large number of Marines but still Marine presence in Mogadishu.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 May you officially opened the Marine Corps Research Center at Quantico, a \$12 million facility. What was the mission of this new facility?

GEN MUNDY: It was to improve the Marine Corps' ability to collect, store retrieve and disseminate information pertaining to the art and the science of war fighting. This facility is owed to the efforts of Gen Gray, my predecessor. He got it through in the Congress and at least got the money to build the building, although then the private foundation, Marine Corps Command and Staff Foundation, was responsible for equipping the building.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall any of the details of the opening ceremony?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, beautiful day at Quantico. We formed up with, I think they brought down a company from the Marine Barracks in Washington, the Drum and Bugle Corps, Color Guard, so it was a blues affair. We formed up on the lawn that had been at one time the old parking lot or drill field on which we had trained women Marines and others who were down in that older part of Quantico. We formed up. There was a good sized crowd, I would think 200 to 300 people, many of them Congressional staffers who had worked on this project. I do not recall that any members came down, any Congressional members. Some were scheduled but had to cancel at the last moment.

But at any rate we had a gathering of Gen Gray, you know, many who had done much of the work to get this tremendous facility raised were there. So it was the standard few remarks by the Commandant and then back over for a ribbon cutting and a tour of the facility and some refreshments inside, very nice day.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the morning of 7 May you made a quick trip to Maxwell AFB to speak to the Joint Flag Officer War Fighting Course. I presume this was another opportunity for you to espouse the Marine Corps' war fighting capabilities and the "From the Sea . . ." strategy?



On 7 May 1993, President and Mrs. Clinton attended the evening parade at Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. Here, Gen Mundy is seen with President Clinton, right, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen Colin L. Powell.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, probably more of the former than of the latter because the Joint Flag Officer War Fighting Course is, at this point is about five years old. It is a very good course, but it is all, it is one and two-star officers who are brought back to give them a little bit of a touch or better understanding of the capabilities of each of the individual services. So I would routinely speak to them, again, usually off the cuff presentations, I would speak to them about the capabilities of the Marine Corps, but also, because we were focused on jointness, I would speak as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would, you know, give them a spin on how duty was done in the joint world, how the Services interfaced together, how the Joint Staff worked and then an update on how things were going from the perspective of one of the Service Chiefs.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of 7 May, that same day, you hosted President and Mrs. Clinton at a garden party and parade. What are your recollections of this evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they are very vivid because it was a splendid evening. Number 1, I guess that the

Lord knew that the President was coming so the fifth [sic] of May of 1993 was one of those just absolutely perfect spring days. It does rain a lot in Washington and frequently the early part of the season is threatened with rain, but this was a crystal clear sky and clear air. It was cool, not unpleasantly so, but a nice night.

We had had an unusual communication network. The background on this was, going back, as you will recall, I mentioned that in the reviewing area I mentioned to President Clinton that these are the Washington Marines and we would like to have you come over some time. I had also learned that counter to the guidance that was put out to us from the Secretary of Defense's Office — this may sound a little bit insubordinate — but when Mr. Aspin became the Secretary of Defense there came out a directive to the services that said that any communication to the White House for any circumstance whatsoever would be done via the Secretary of Defense's Office.

Well, I did not like that at all because I believed then, and I believe today that, you know, the President appoints me to be the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I should have some means of direct contact, not for ill purposes necessarily, but simply

because, you know, I should have the authority to go to the President. So, my normal route of communications to President Clinton began when he was inaugurated.

His mother died shortly after he became the President and I sent him over a condolence note. I would handwrite it and then I would have it delivered to the Marine aide to the President and he would routinely wait until they were in Camp David or at an opportune time rather than just throwing it in the inbox, and would give it to the President who would read it.

In President Bush's case frequently you would get communications back through the aide. President Clinton sat down and handwrote me back a very warm note.

I had also written him at an earlier point — I guess I am getting ahead there — but when we finished the very lengthy and rather painful first meeting on the 23rd of January in the White House with the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and the President and his advisors on the issue of gays and homosexuals in the military — a copy of my notes of what I had to say there will be in my papers, in fact, the notes that, not a copy, but the notes that I used are there — and I had done my best to present to the President that this was a bad idea and that he would be wronging many people who wanted only to serve him and not to oppose him.

And anyway, I suppose I had been fairly passionate in my plea, but when I finished I went back and I realized that, you know, he was a new President and he had made a campaign promise. So I sat down and wrote him a note on that occasion and just said, you know, "I know this is tough for you, Mr. President. It is tough for me. I want you to know that you can count on the Marine Corps. You can rely on me. I will serve you in whatever capacity I can but I cannot agree with you on this. Nonetheless, I want you to know that you are my President and God bless you," I think is probably the way I ended it off.

Well, I got back a really nice note from him. And then his mother died, another note went over and I got a nice note from him.

The upshot of that was that at the State of the Union Address his first year, that year, when he came onto the floor and took the rostrum he turned around at me, I was sitting over on the side where the Chiefs sit, and he turned as he was acknowledging the crowd and looked at me and pointed to me and mouthed, "Thank you for your note," which, of course all my Service counterparts turned and looked at me like, "What the hell are you doing? What note?"

But at any rate we established a very warm rapport between President Clinton and, I was trying to establish it with the Marine Corps rather than for any self interest but I wanted him to identify with the Marine Corps and he did. So later I sent him over another note and said, "I know you like to play golf. I am not much of a golfer but President Eisenhower used to play down at Quantico and any time you want to come down to Quantico, well, we would love to host you down there."

He acknowledged that to me in one of the Cabinet room meetings. And again, my Service peers would turn and look at me when he would say, "Hey, I want to take you up on that golf game you offered."

So I sent him, when we got the directive saying, I think maybe that, perhaps, arguably it may have been my communications with him that stimulated somebody to say, "Hey, you know, tell GEN MUNDY to start sending it through the chain of command," but I did not do that and I continued to the end not to do that unless it was something, to come down and visit Camp Lejeune, of course that would go through the chain.

So I sent him over another note and said, "We would like to have you for a parade at the Barracks and I will formally send you an invitation, just wanted to let you know." So he apparently communicated to his scheduling staff, when that invitation comes in, I want to do it. So that is kind of the background on the rapport, the establishment of rapport with the new President Clinton and Mrs. Clinton.

We invited them, gave them a choice of any day he wanted. He seized upon the early date, in May that is, an early parade, normally only about the second or third one of the season. He seized upon it, and knowing that the Commandant's House was a national historical monument, the word came from the White House that the President and Mrs. Clinton would like to come half an hour early and just visit with the MUNDYs to get to know us and to see the House. So they did.

So, we received them at the Commandant's House, and very gracious people, very warm. We are Southern. Maybe that makes it easy because we immediately just felt good with them. I showed them around the House and he was fascinated with the history.

We spent some time talking about the tall pendulum clock on the landing on the way up to the second floor because as we started down he said, "Now, tell me about that clock." And I said, "Well, Mr. President, the clock was here when I got here and that is about all I know about the clock."

So he said, "Well, does it run on time." And I said,

"Well, no, in fact it runs a little bit fast." And he said, "Well, look let me show you." So the President got down and he said, "Have you got a matchbook?" I ran down and got one of the CMC House matchbooks. He said, "You have to balance the legs. You cannot do it with the mechanism. If the clock is not sitting right it will not run on time. I have one exactly like it down in Arkansas." So here we were, me in my blue/white uniform and the President in his dark blue suit down sticking matchbooks under the clock to get it to run on time.

But anyway, we went down from there and then went out and, you know, had a receiving line in the garden. I had specifically structured the guests that night because I wanted to impress him with the Marines. So, of course, we had the general officers and their ladies there, but I reached down and got, as I did routinely anyway, but I wanted representative lieutenants out of the Basic School. I wanted captains and majors and lieutenant colonels and some NCOs because I wanted him to come to meet a lot of Marines and to feel very comfortable and to, again, identify with Marines.

So it was a very, very successful gathering. The Clintons are warm and gracious people. I would venture to say that no one who wanted a picture walked away without a picture that night, to include my own children or at least my daughter and one son that were up in this area.

As the receptions go there comes a time when they seek the crowd and generally there is time for then the guest of honor and the Commandant and their ladies to go either sit and relax a minute or go to the powder room, or usually, in my case, I never got anything to eat during the receptions so as soon as the crowd would leave, why I would head for the table and get something to eat.

Well, we went in and that was in the days when President Clinton was renowned for his appetite. He was still, you know, stopping at McDonalds and eating. The aides at the House, we sat down in the living room there and the aides brought in a fairly ample tray of shrimp and hors d'oeuvres of various types. I thought I was never going to get him out of there for the parade. His appetite was healthy and he helped himself.

But we enjoyed sitting there and just conversing very, very lightly about families and about, you know, where are you from and how do you shoot in golf and that sort of thing. Hilary Clinton is truly a, as far as the social contact that we have had with her, is one of the most charming and delightful people that I have known.

So, we went from there out to the parade and, of course, he is a bandsman. He plays the saxophone, as history will record, so when the Marine Band and the Drum and Bugle Corps were playing, his, I would look over to him to tell him or explain something and his eyes were almost glazed. He was in a trance at this magnificent affair.

We reviewed the parade, went out, you know, shook hands with some of the Marines and then I asked, I said, "Mr. President, would you like to go down to Center House and meet some of the Barracks officers and their wives?" Yes, he would and so off we went to Center House.

We got into Center House and the parade officers and the Barracks officers were there. Colonel Solis had a presentation for him. We would customarily give a gift, we shot gun, we fired 21 guns for him that night and Colonel Solis would have one of the shined shell casings and would present it to him on behalf of the Barracks. He did that that evening.

Secretary Aspin was there at the affair along with a number of the other higher ranking members of the Administration and so when we were inside someone at the bar at Center House, you know, if you do something wrong — of course, we know all that here — but anyway, if someone rings the bell that means that that person who has committed the offense then buys a round for the house. So Secretary Aspin was back there and someone rang the bell for some infraction, more or less to demonstrate it.

I was in the front room with the President talking to some of the officers and he turned to me and said, "What is that bell?" I said, "Well, let me show it to you." So we actually went through the dining room and through the, to the back of the bar. We were standing behind the bar and I said, "Well, the bell, if you draw your sword or if you commit an infraction or address a lady improperly or something like that, why, one of your mess mates will ring the bell on you and you have to buy the house."

So the President went right over and grabbed the clapper and rang the bell and then signed the chit so that he could buy the house a round. I do not think they ever sent him a bill but they did keep the chit and it is framed and on the wall over at Center House.

He stayed until about midnight and then he and Mrs. Clinton got in the limousine and Linda and I saluted them off and saw them off and I remember that they drove out the gate of the Barracks looking back through the rearview window waving very warmly at us. So it was a splendid evening.

BGEN SIMMONS: You went to Daphne, Alabama

on 11 and 12 May to preside at the dedication of a Vietnam Veterans Monument. What are your recollections of this affair?

GEN MUNDY: My recollections are that that is one of those occasions where a Marine with some pull can drag you into some very inconsequential events. MajGen Art Poillon a retired Marine two-star was then the port director in Mobile, Alabama, and he had been after me to come down and dedicate this Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and, of course, that puts a little emphasis on it. To make a long story short, I agreed to go on Art's behalf.

We dedicated the memorial over in Daphne which is a small town out of Mobile and that was it, not much more to say. Crowd of 60 or 75 people, trip all the way to Alabama, lunch with Art Poillon and the deed was done.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 14 May, you went to Camp Lejeune to observe a CAPEX. What is a CAPEX?

GEN MUNDY: CAPEX is an acronym for Capabilities Exercise and it is a, it really is a demonstration but we call it an exercise for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that at one point one of the Commandants, I think probably Gen Barrow or someone, put out the word that demonstrations cost a lot of money and we should not do demonstrations. And so immediately all field commanders who nonetheless have to exhibit their commands and, you know, make good demonstrations, we chose the term, exercise, that it would be a capabilities exercise.

But it lays out the complete capabilities of the Marine Corps starting with the infantry squad and going through the organization and divining, you know, how a Marine rifle company is comprised and then we roll out the tanks and the light armored vehicles and the anti-armor weapons systems and then the helicopters come flying in and the fixed-wing comes in and you land a Harrier and the Harrier refuels and uploads its ordnance and takes off right in front of the crowd. It is a real crowd-pleaser. The Force Service Support Group is set up with all of its repair capabilities and the field medical system with the corpsmen and the doctors in there, operating on rubber dummy patients, but all of the intelligence collecting, the rigid raiding craft, everything that we have in a Marine Expeditionary Force is there to be shown to a wide variety of people who want to learn about the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who was the audience in this case?

GEN MUNDY: The audience always for one of these includes the CAPSTONE. The CAPSTONE program is a six-week program to which all newly selected one-star officers, rear admirals or brigadier generals are sent while they are still colonels or captains, for the most part. And they receive a wide education across the spectrum of the services. So the basic justification for the capabilities exercise is to exhibit this to the CAPSTONE fellows.

However, as a practical matter, there frequently are, you know, Congressional members that come down. We will bring in educators. We, you know, if the Commandant has a guest, a foreign Commandant visiting, Secretary of Defense. I took all new, the Navy Secretary. I took Secretary Perry down, Secretary Dalton, just whoever you want to go down and learn a little bit about the Marine Corps. Usually there will be 200 to 300 people at one of these.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 18th of May you were interviewed by Eric Schmidt of the *New York Times*. Was it a friendly interview?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, Eric, my interviews with him were, I would say, consistently friendly. Eric was, as you mentioned the *New York Times* earlier, Eric was, his articles appeared to be in alignment with the gay and homosexual rights movement and so I am sure that, you know, there was some discussion of that during the interview. But it was not hostile nor has it been. In fact, Eric has been down here and interviewed me at the Historical Center since I retired and we have a fine rapport.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the afternoon of 19 May you attended, along with the other Service Chiefs apparently, a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on respective posture statements. Any specific recollections of that hearing?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not anymore so than any other hearing. There was nothing extraordinary that I can recall unless, and my dates escape me here, unless that would have been the hearing on the gay and homosexual issue and I do not believe it was.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think that was a bit later.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of the 19th you attended a mess night at the Cashtown Inn near Gettysburg. Who were your hosts?

GEN MUNDY: Well, let me begin by saying that had I made it my host would have been the Marines from Camp David and you are, once again I think you probably have a schedule that reflects that I went. What happened, I intended to go and because that afternoon was a JCS meeting with the Secretary of Defense which normally one wanted to make, particularly because of the Somalia operations at that point, I was to fly up by helicopter.

The JCS meeting was postponed because of the Secretary's unavailability, I think until about 4:00 in the afternoon that day, and the weather closed in and we could not fly. So the bottom line is, it was not possible for me to make the event and therefore, they had it anyway and I think that the commanding officer of the Barracks —

GEN MUNDY: I think we were concluding. I just said that I believe that Colonel Jay Solis, the commanding officer of the Barracks, stood in for me that night because he was up there anyway. It was one that I was sorry to miss.

Cashtown Inn — you would know this but others may not — Cashtown Inn, its historical connection is that it was the place at which I think Gen James Longstreet was staying and Gen Lee came by and they had a conference that is depicted in a painting, right there in the middle of this muddy road with the Confederate Army moving off to Gettysburg to fight at Gettysburg. So that is the history of the Cashtown Inn and I am sorry that I missed that event.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the morning of Friday, 21 May, you spoke to the CAPSTONE group in the Post Theater at Henderson Hall. You, a moment of so ago, described the CAPSTONE group. Do you have any particular recollections of your speaking to them?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that one was not unique, but all CAPSTONE classes come to the Service Headquarters and have a session with the Service Chief. So, in addition to from time to time running into them at a Capabilities Exercise — that would only be because both of you were there at the same time but the Commandant plays no role in talking with them there — they come in and usually you spend an hour with them and you talk to them much as you would to one of the war colleges. But more specifically what they are interested in, for the most part they are interested

in how do you be a flag or general officer? And I do not mean by that, how do you wear your uniform, but they are interested in what do you as a Service Chief, how do you relate to the President or how do you deal with the Congress or how do you deal with the media, those sorts of things. That would have been the thrust of my time with them.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 24 May you were interviewed by Rob Holzer of the *Defense News*. I presume this was a friendly interview.

GEN MUNDY: It was a friendly interview and remember, as I remarked earlier, that we had taken all wraps off the ability to simply state the Marine Corps we were going to have for the future. So Rob Holzer gave me the opportunity to state that, you know, 177,000 man Marine Corps was it, that we did want the V-22, that we were going for the AAV and things that I had not been as able to talk about. So it was a good statement of getting some firm positions out for the Marine Corps before the new administration had made defense decisions and had locked us in.

BGEN SIMMONS: During this period you had several meetings with John H. Dalton who had been nominated to be the new Secretary of the Navy, including at least one breakfast which you hosted. I presume you were getting to know Mr. Dalton and at the same time acquainting him with the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that is all true. In fact, there was far more than one breakfast because I made it a habit in trying to indoctrinate, if you will, the new administration, not only Mr. Dalton but Dr. Perry, Deutch, all of the officials that I could get I would bring over for a breakfast and usually would sit them down and let them get started on their breakfast with a few light remarks and then I would shut off the lights and on would come the projector, the slide projector, and I would brief them on something about the Marine Corps, the organization of the Marine Corps, capabilities of the Marine Corps. I was selling the Marine Corps to them.

So, as you say, it was to familiarize Mr. Dalton. He was in town for a long time before he was confirmed. The Senate was simply slow in getting the confirmations and many nominations were slow. So Mr. Dalton had come immediately to town when he was nominated and was here for a couple of months without his wife and so on. So we had plenty of opportunity to come to know each other and I think that oper-

ated to the Marine Corps' benefit. He was, he has been and is a very, very supportive Secretary, of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: I had mentioned earlier that there seemed to be a long waiting period in here. I note that on 27 May there was a SecNav meeting. Would that have been with Adm Kelso as the Acting SecNav or with Mr. Dalton as the prospective Secretary?

GEN MUNDY: No, Mr. Dalton was not empowered to act until he was confirmed by the Senate.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is sort of what I am getting at. Was he occupying an office at the time?

GEN MUNDY: As a matter of fact, he was up in the office, yes. I do not recall, if it was a Secretariat meeting, I do not believe Mr. Dalton would properly have been there. Indeed the Congress from time to time has pulled the chain or yanked the chain, if you will, on some who had gotten a little bit—

BGEN SIMMONS: Presumptive.

GEN MUNDY: — out in front. That is right, presumptive that they had been confirmed. So there was great care. But as a practical matter there certainly was nothing wrong with him being present there and being, you know, informed and starting to get educated and reading and that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was another round of Congressional hearings in May, 1993 on the issue of homosexuals in the military. The highlight was the emotional testimony on 11 May of Colonel Frederick C. Peck. Do you recall Fred Peck's testimony?

GEN MUNDY: I do. I was not there but, of course, it made the national news because Col Peck is 1, a Naval Academy graduate, an extremely polished officer, a very fine officer and a public affairs officer so he speaks well, he knows how to handle himself. And his stepson, he made the statement there that, as he was explaining his rationale for why homosexuals would not openly serve effectively in the military, he made the statement that his own son was a homosexual, that he just learned that a few days ago. Col Peck had been in Somalia and he had returned to find that his son was homosexual. This was an extraordinary statement because he said that even, despite that fact that he still believed that homosexuals should not be in the military.

Now he also said something that would come to haunt us a little bit later as he made the statement that, you know, "My son is the perfect image of a young man, he is six foot two and eyes of blue." That would come to be a bludgeon used against the Marine Corps in the soon to emerge racial crisis, whereas see, Marine officers only think about eyes of blue and therefore they are racially prejudiced.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 26 May, you went to Annapolis for the Academy's graduation ceremonies. Did you have any role to play in these ceremonies?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, the Commandant sits up on the stage and swears in the midshipmen who are coming into the Marine Corps and then the Chief of Naval Operations swears in those that are going into the Navy. And, of course, then diplomas are given out by the guest of honor.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you recall who the guest of honor was?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was Senator John McCain, himself a graduate of that institution, who made one of the absolutely most splendid addresses I have ever heard anywhere. It was really a remarkable speech.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of the 27th of May you spoke at the annual Maritime Dinner of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Is this the Center that is affiliated with Georgetown?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it is. CSIS, you know, a think tank of some Fellows there, some uniformed Fellows, and normally will be something on the order of a council on foreign relations type of Washington-based entity.

BGEN SIMMONS: It has always had a pretty strong Naval bent, hasn't it?

GEN MUNDY: Harland Ulman, who is the head — I want to say the president but I am not sure if president is the right title — but at any rate the many who is the head of this was a Navy officer. Adm Crowe was a fellow there. And so it does have, as a matter of fact, a naval bent.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 31st of May was Memorial Day and that included a White House reception, that was in the morning, and after that you spoke at the

dedication of the 4th Marine Division World War II monument at the Quantico National Cemetery. That afternoon you spoke at the Memorial Day Observance at Gettysburg. Was that held at the cemetery?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you have any thoughts or recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I have specific recollections. Number 1, that is an annual affair and the ceremony is held at the site where Abraham Lincoln gave his Gettysburg Address so it is on that spot, the hill up there on the cemetery. So it is very impressive to go up and stand to speak knowing that you are speaking on the same footsteps where the Gettysburg Address was given.

We had to drive, to fit all this in I was not going to Quantico. I had decided to waive that and I began to receive some of these very negative and oftentimes, hostile, vibes that will come in from something like the Division Association. That, you know, this is the 4th Division that landed at Iwo Jima and the Commandant is not going to come down here. So, at the last minute, to make a long story short, I added it in. We drove to Quantico and then we had to skedaddle, literally to make the Gettysburg address because it, too, we had foul weather and we could not fly up there.

So we turned on the, the Commandant's car has traffic lights, you know, red and blue lights and we turned those on and hit the highways about 85, 90 miles an hour and arrived in time. The affair was in whites and so I was riding in my T-shirt and my white trousers. We arrived at the cemetery and of course the crowd was already there, was already forming, and the police escort that had met us on the outskirts to bring us into town and get us out of the traffic drove us right almost up to the speech site, not quite, a few yards away.

So, I had to hop out of the car with my aide, LtCol Joe Dunford and I hopped out of the car in our T-shirts, you know, and pulled on our white coats and buttoned them up and fastened our collars and put our hats on, pulled on our gloves and then we were ready to be ceremonial. So it had a humorous slant to it also. A very nice day and a very moving event.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 5 June there was yet another Marine Corps Scholarship Ball, this one in Washington, D.C. Any recollections of this event?

GEN MUNDY: Not different from the routine ball.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the morning of Monday, 7 June, you spoke at a breakfast of the Navy League and the following evening, 8 June, you attended the Navy League's dinner dance. You frequently spoke to Navy League groups, both local and national. How would you compare the Navy League with the Marine Corps League?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there really is no comparison. The Navy League is a, really is comprised of industrialists and extremely successful business persons from around the country. So it is, unlike the Marine Corps League that is formed of all former Marines and for that part, predominantly an enlisted man's organization, the Navy League is, if you will, a very high-faluting support entity for the Navy, indeed for the Maritime Services, the Coast Guard, the Navy and the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps League is more of a social organization. The Navy League certainly is a social organization but arguably a business organization as well in promoting ship building and that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of 9 June you attended a reception at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China. Any recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I probably should not record it this way, but it was one of the absolutely most crowded, stuffiest and most boring evenings that I can recall. As I recall we did not stay long. It was not that it was not a gracious affair but there were simply too many people there and it was, the air conditioning was not working properly or they had to open the doors to let the people in so it was just an uncomfortable evening. We made a brief appearance and then got out of there and went home.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of Friday, 18 June, SecDef Les Aspin was the guest of honor at the garden party and evening parade. Any special recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a nice opportunity to get to know Mr. Aspin a little bit more in a different setting. Les Aspin thought a lot of the Marine Corps, he really did. As early as my two-star days when I was over testifying on the Marine security guard crisis in Moscow as we talked about earlier, Mr. Aspin was heading the House Armed Services Committee, and I will remember when we finished the hearing, the

microphone had not been turned off but he turned to Rudy DeLeon who was his staff director beside him and when we finished talking, even though I had been grilled because of this circumstance so it was not a pleasant hearing, but he turned to Rudy DeLeon and in a staged whisper said, "I love it when the Marines come over here. By God, they just show up everybody." Well, so even though I was having my hat handed to me it was nice to know that he was pleased with the occasion.

So I found him to be, you know, a man of great humor. He came to the House and we had the reception. He loved every moment of it. He liked being in the spotlight and he just seemed to be thoroughly delighted. He liked to engage with the guests who were there, the young Marines, he loved to talk to them about the Marine Corps. So, a very gregarious and pleasant man and a nice evening.

BGEN SIMMONS: We were apparently not yet through with Somalia. On 20 June the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was ordered to take station off Mogadishu to stand ready to assist United Nations forces ashore in maintaining peace in that war-torn country. Was the MEU landed?

GEN MUNDY: No, it was not. There were some accommodations made, you know, to allow for some training ashore with other elements that were there just to get to unlimber the Marines as we did this several more times. But the nice statement was that at a time when we were questing to maintain the relevance of the Marine Corps and were bacing that on the operating tempo and the continuing, the unabated requirement for Marines forward deployed, it was nice to have these calls for Marines to come in and to be able to say, "You know, if something goes awry, what else can you do?" I mean, you do not have anybody else there, but Marines can be brought down and positioned offshore.

So we made a lot of money on these types of things. I was not putting them there, the CINC was putting them there, but it seemed to always fall in my four years every time I would go over to testify we would have something going on or something that had just gone on that I could point to to say, "See, that is what you have Marines for and that is why we need them," and it enabled us to, you know, represent the case for the Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday, 20 June, you and Mrs. GEN MUNDY departed for a five-day visit to Naples. Was this for a conference of the

Commandants of the European Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. It was a notion that I had that, it was clear to me and I hope it continues clear on the horizon in the future, but it was very clear to me that the nations who had Marine Corps or Marine Corps-like organizations were indeed turning to those organizations as they downsized their other military elements.

I think I mentioned earlier when we were talking that the Italians were now building amphibious types of ships, that they were increasing from a battalion to a brigade, their San Marco Battalion, now San Marco Brigade which was their amphibious force. They went to Somalia with us. The British decided to hold the strength of the Royal Marines and build amphibious ships. The Dutch increased the size of the Dutch Marines.

And so I wanted to capitalize on this and gain a synergy in a couple of ways. One of them was to try and mold this support for Marines worldwide, but certainly with my European colleagues. And number 2, we had a concept that was, had been emerging for some time called Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean, CAFMED, in all caps, that was a concept wherein the U.S. would routinely have a Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Mediterranean. The French had some amphibious capability and were an interested partner and, as I have mentioned, the other nations. But our concept was that at a given time when a crisis was occurring, Bosnia is not the best case for it, but along the littorals that we would be able to bring this organization together as a multinational amphibious force because in spite of all that I talked about earlier about a disparity in a U.N. scenario among the various branches of the Armed Forces, there is a worldwide, strong, unique and common bond between Marines that is not always present among others. I think in probably the Air Force it is because we train so many of the foreign pilots here in our country, but Marines seem to speak a common language and to have a common focus as to what we do. I wanted to bind that. So, yes, it was a gathering of all of the European, my counterparts, and not even my counterparts. I think we had one of the fleet commanders from the Italian Navy who was there who would have been their amphibious admiral.

That affair was enabled by the graciousness of Adm and Mrs. Mike Boorda who were the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Region. Mike turned over his house to me to host a dinner and actually in the great humor that characterizes him actually went out the back door and came around to the front because Linda

and I were greeting the guests. So Adm and Mrs. Boorda came in as guests to their own house. So we had a good, a very useful, I believe, gathering that perpetuated itself at least one more time.

BGEN SIMMONS: What form did the conference take?

GEN MUNDY: We had the United Kingdom, the Dutch, Portuguese, the Spanish and the U.S. Marines there and then the Italian San Marco Brigade Commander and his Fleet Admiral, those were the people that were there. BGen Jim Jones was then the chief of staff for the operations ongoing in Bosnia so he happened to be down in Naples so we had him as another Marine, he and Diane, his wife.

The conference took the form of number 1, some social time, getting to know each other. The first night, we got there in the afternoon. We had dinner that night up at the Boordas. The next morning we met at the Headquarters of Allied Forces, Southern Europe and we had about a half day agenda which dwelt on the Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean matters. We talked about, each of us gave an overview of our Corps and where we were going and how we were being sustained and any new weaponry that was being introduced or the amphibious ship outlook, those sorts of things.

Then we had lunch and then, as I recall, we came back in for a couple of hours and continued that sort of thrust, talked about exercising together, just to get to know one another. Then we broke that afternoon. We went down and Adm Boorda had his barge there in the Bay of Naples and we got on the barge and rode over to one of the small neighboring islands, nice barge cruise, and then had dinner in the harbor there aboard the barge and turned around and came back, a nice evening out on the barge.

The next day I think we met again in the morning for only a couple of hours and then broke up and we had some sightseeing for the remainder of the day down at Sorrento and places like that and then came back and had a fine dinner and everybody went home.

BGEN SIMMONS: You returned on 25 June and proceeded that same day to Parris Island for the retirement of your friend, MajGen Gene Deegan. Any recollections of that day?

GEN MUNDY: Well, only that I swore it was the coolest 25 June in the history of Parris Island and one knows usually when you go to Parris Island, and particularly for an event, Gene had wanted to do it in

blues and so we were in blues. I dreaded for several days going down to Parris Island to swelter, but it was an absolutely beautiful, clear, not significant humidity evening.

Gene Deegan was about my vintage. We were about a year apart. A very, very fine officer, a superb combat record in Vietnam and again, had been the architect of much of the pre-positioning afloat and the early brigading of the Marine Corps, establishment of brigades as a special assistant to MajGen Hal Glasgow. He was just an absolutely superior Marine officer and should be recorded in history that way.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 June the Base Closure Realignment Commission completed its deliberations for the 1993 round of base closures. The most significant item for the Marine Corps was the continuance of Marine Corps Air Station El Toro on the list, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: That is correct.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 29 June I see that your Counsel, Peter Murphy, made an office call on you on the subject of Toys for Tots. I presume that this was in connection with the scandal that surrounded that effort?

GEN MUNDY: It very likely was because I believe that that was the point at which he made me aware that the Foundation, again under the leadership of the individual who had been hired to run it, and I cannot think of his name, which is not substantive, but that the Foundation had become involved in a mailout campaign which was in and of itself, as events later revealed, not really bad. But what the press had learned is that an advertisement had been paid which solicited funds saying, your dollar will go to deliver a toy to a needy child. In point of fact, the initial dollars of any campaign are used to capitalize the campaign. So the person that was doing the mailout campaign was generating income which would be used to buy equipment to do other things that would enable a much broader mail campaign subsequently. But unfortunately, when the press got a hold of this, the funds were being misused. In other words, we were advertising for toys for needy children but we were not buying toys with those dollars. So this became quite scandalous and Toys for Tots got a black eye together with some other misactivities of the man who was running it for us there. He had misspent funds and done some other very shady things. So it very likely was the case that Peter Murphy was coming in

to tell me that something is bubbling about Toys for Tots.

BGEN SIMMONS: Unless you have some further comments, this is probably a good place to end this session.

GEN MUNDY: That is fine with me.

SESSION 24

Second Six Months of 1993

Standing up the Marine Corps Recruiting Command . . . The Clinton policy for homosexuals . . . Confirmation of SecNav John Dalton . . . Selection of Gen Shalikashvili as Chairman, JCS . . . Barring enlistment of married recruits . . . The unfortunate Sixty Minutes interview . . . Bottom Up Review approves 174,000 active duty Marines and 42,000 Reserves . . . A lengthy trip to the Far East . . . The failed experiment with the Theodore Roosevelt . . . Farewell to Gen Colin Powell . . . Rebirth of the brigades . . . More trouble in Somalia . . . Commissioning the Kearsarge . . . Continuing problems at Guantanamo . . . A visit to the Royal Marines . . . Plans to relocate HQMC to the Pentagon . . . More Green Letters and White Letters.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered the events of the first six months of 1993. In this session I propose that we review your activities during the second six months of 1993.

On 1 July you attended a ceremony in the Henderson Hall theater marking the stand-up of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. What led you to establish this command and who was the first commander?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the last first. The first commander was MajGen Dick Davis who had been serving in the capacity as the Director of Personnel Procurement for some months before we stood up the Recruiting Command.

The background on the Recruiting Command goes back perhaps even further than the early 1980s but when I became the Director of Personnel Procurement in 1982, simultaneously Gen Barrow had directed that the operational control of the six districts in the field be placed under the Marine Corps Recruit Depot commanders and we actually retitled those to be, for example the Commanding General Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island and Eastern Recruiting Region, or in the case of San Diego, Western Recruiting Region.

So for all practical purposes, we then had a staff officer at Headquarters Marine Corps, usually a brigadier, who was charged with, in effect, being responsible to the Commandant for the operations of two field commands commanded by, ordinarily, major generals; from time to time a brigadier general. So usually the junior man in that triumvirate was the Director of Personnel Procurement. That was one

reason, that we just kind of had an upside-down pyramid.

As we moved along there were ideas as early, I remember that MajGen Don Fulham who was one of the more successful and earlier Directors of Personnel Procurement had a very strong belief that there should be a Recruiting Command, as did BGen Jim Joy when he had that job. So the idea had popped up from time to time and we had just never done anything about it.

I asked LtGen Terry Cooper, then the DCS Manpower to take a look at it, come up with a staffing to see, you know, the pros, cons, how we could do it and so on and he did that. But we did not quite have it right because, frankly, we could not settle on the location. One school of thought, and indeed the staff recommendation was that we put the Recruiting Commander down at Parris Island. There was another option to put him at Quantico and, of course, a third option was to keep him up here in Washington.

And we got so far at one point as some money being spent on upgrading a building down there to accept the Recruiting Command. My concern was, and is to this day, based on my strong belief that if you do not understand recruiting or if we have a Commandant that does not appreciate the sensitivity of recruiting and is not aware that fundamentally young Americans do not seek out the Marine Corps to join but we have to go out and convince them that they want to join the Marine Corps. We have, arguably, I think the best recruiting service among the four services, but if we have a Commandant who has not been dipped to some degree in that oil and that does not appreciate that without the direct attention of the Commandant, the recruiting machinery can get

out of whack, then I think we will be in that situation at our peril.

So I finally, after a long delay, wanted to keep it around Washington and the issue then became do you have a commanding general based in the Headquarters of the Marine Corps which is functionally the staff of the Commandant. That did not make too much sense.

But to make a long story short we decided upon that option and as a result, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command is headquartered, is collocated, in fact, the same office as the Director of Personnel Procurement used to be in Washington. That decision was made. We implemented it. It gave the recruiters then in the field, now we had generally gone to one-star officers commanding the depots and the recruiting regions and so we now have a major general, or in the case of Gen Jack Klimp who is there now, a selected major general, who is at the top of the pyramid. So we have reversed the point of the pyramid to the top instead of to the bottom.

That was the background on it and as of this date, in fact I was just this past weekend down in Pensacola at the Officer Selection Officer Conference — the first one that they have held — and we are exceeding, unique among the Services right now, we are exceeding both the contracting and the shipping goal with all the quality measurements being met. So it seems to have matured and it seems to be working very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: Jack Klimp came up from Parris Island, did he not?

GEN MUNDY: He was. He was the Commanding General down at Parris Island, and I would see in the future, I will not be, you know, designing that plan but I know that Gen Krulak would share with me the fact that probably in the future one of the two of the commanders at one of the Recruit Depots will more than likely fleet up and become the Director of Recruiting because it is a very sensitive science, recruiting. It takes a long time to learn it and then to be able to

On 8-9 July 1993, Gen Mundy visited Marines bases on the West Coast. Here he inspects the air-defense variant of the light armored vehicle (LAV).



manage that machinery takes a very educated and talented hand. So, I perhaps applaud myself having been in the job, but I did not come in it with education. I learned it in the job but I learned to be very, very sensitive and appreciative as to the importance of recruiting.

BGEN SIMMONS: In a way you were completing a design that was begun by Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow which I believe is a 20 year evolution.

GEN MUNDY: Right, that is it because Gen Wilson, of course, put the emphasis on manpower and Gen Barrow continued that and really, except that he, Gen Barrow, I think, probably parallels my own view — and I learned from him — that he wanted to be the head recruiter of the Marine Corps. And I think he realized that unless he kept track on the quality standards and on the production and on the making of recruits and that sort of thing, that he took to be a very significant responsibility of the Commandant, as did I.

BGEN SIMMONS: You went on leave from 2 to 7 July and on 8 July you and Mrs. MUNDY went to Camp Pendleton for a change of command for the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Who was relieving who and was this now a three-star billet?

GEN MUNDY: It was a three-star billet and it remains so today. The relief was LtGen Bob Johnston who had commanded there for two years, being relieved by LtGen Ron Christmas.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the afternoon of 13 July you had an office visit by BGen Les Palm and Col John Shotwell who apparently convinced you that you should submit to an interview by *60 Minutes*, the CBS news magazine. What was the purpose of this interview and why were BGen Palm and Col Shotwell persuasive that this was to the advantage of the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: BGen Palm was at that time the director of Manpower, Plans and Policy and thereby more or less oversaw the policies that applied to our minorities, you know, to all personnel situations in the Marine Corps. Col Shotwell was director of Public Affairs. We had been approached some several months earlier by *60 Minutes* based on complaints from a minority officer, a captain, and you know, “a” became “they.” In other words, it became a group or at least alleged to be a group. It never was really

much of a group movement but it was one officer who was aggravated and he had complained.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was he a black?

GEN MUNDY: He was a black officer and is today a major. He had been passed over for promotion and his assertion was that as he looked at promotion statistics that the success rate for non minorities was significantly out of proportion to minorities and he was right. And that said, he looked purely at the statistics. There are reasons behind the statistics but the statistics would tell you otherwise.

So, *60 Minutes* decided to take this on. BGen Palm had interviewed Leslie Stahl at this point and the bottom line is, it had not come off well. She had asked questions to which he did not have answers. That was captured on film. The presentation that the Marine Corps put forth was just not felt to be very good.

So, the public affairs people, not only Col Shotwell but principally LtCol Robin Higgins who was really overseeing this effort, came to me. Robin came to me privately as a matter of fact and said we are not going to fare well at all on this. We need to put you in the game. The only way that we can get a replay, the only way that *60 Minutes* would come back and redo an interview would be with you. They are not going to do it with anybody else.

So I had waived that off initially because I just did not think it was a wise thing to do, but under the persuasion of the public affairs people I said, “Okay, put me in the game.” So BGen Palm and Col Shotwell had come down to update me on where we were and to prepare me, to get me ready for the interview with Leslie Stahl, giving me the background which we can talk about perhaps later when we get to that point, about the whole background and what the thrust of the interview was. That was the purpose of this call.

BGEN SIMMONS: Robin Higgins is the widow of Col Rich Higgins, is she not?

GEN MUNDY: She is.

BGEN SIMMONS: And she is a career public affairs officer?

GEN MUNDY: She was and an extraordinarily fine one. In fact, Robin retired the same time as I did and has now gone down to be the public affairs coordinator for LtGen Bob Milligan in the state of Florida who is the Comptroller of Florida now. He hired Robin because she is extremely good.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 July the Commandant of the Chilean Marine Corps arrived for a week long counterpart visit. What are your recollections of this commandant and his visit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, he was RAdm Enrique Alvarez. He was, my recollection of the visit is very positive and perhaps that is reinforced by the fact that in the last year of my tenure as Commandant I went on a reciprocal visit to Chile and was again with Adm Alvarez and came to admire him and his Corps much more.

But it was more or less the standard counterpart visit where he would arrive in Washington and we would have some sort of an honors ceremony and, you know, brief him at the Headquarters and then send him out to the field and then usually bring him back on Thursday and entertain him at an evening parade on Friday, which we did in his case.

Very affable, very professional man, as is his Corps as I came to have an appreciation for them when I went down there. Kind of a feisty little fellow, you know, always ready to attack, attack, attack and, you know, make the Chilean Marine Corps ever so much better. But what I saw of that Corps when I went down there as compared to the Chilean Army was significant. The Marine Corps definitely is the more professional of the two organizations and the Chilean officers that come here to go to school at Quantico shine very brightly with us.

So, more or less standard visit but a warm one with a good rapport that then he came back up again one other time on his own for a visit and so I have seen him three times in my tenure. He probably was the closest of the South American Commandants during my watch.

BGEN SIMMONS: In our last session we talked a bit about President Clinton's campaign promise that the bars preventing homosexuals from serving in the Armed Services would be lifted. Within days of his inauguration a compromise was reached that provided for a study that would examine this issue.

On 19 July 1993 President Clinton announced the new policy on the service of homosexuals. This new policy was abbreviated to "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue." It was to be effective 1 October 1993. Can you tell us how this policy was reached?

GEN MUNDY: I believe that probably we could use the rest of this interview, that I could talk through it, but I would like to get into the record as much detail as I can on the background of this. This, of course,

came about as a campaign pledge by then Governor Clinton, that if elected he would lift this, I think it was, I forget, you now, this dumb little policy, or something like that. And he was being advised clearly by those of the homosexual persuasion, and not being in the military had no real appreciation why it should not be that way.

I, as an individual, and the Chiefs as a body, the Service Chiefs, began to focus on this issue well before the election because we knew that if he was elected we were going to have to contend with this. And indeed, Sec Cheney had also made a statement in the press about the policy that we had at the time, which consisted of asking a recruit when he or she enlisted on the enlistment form, you know, "Are you a homosexual?" Well, of course, nobody ever checked yes and was enlisted. Anybody who checked "Yes, we said, Thanks very much. We do not have a place for you here." So, it was a rather useless policy but Sec Cheney had characterized that as "a bit of an old chestnut," I think was his reference, and that kind of weakened the case.

At any rate, when President-elect Clinton came to be, the Chiefs once again, I would venture to say that the issue of homosexuals in the military literally consumed the focus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at every meeting we had, *every meeting we had*, no exceptions, for a nine-month period. We never sat together on any occasion when we did not, you know, each of us contributing our part. I talked to Sen Nunn and he told me that he would support us, you know, that sort of thing. We always had a discussion on the issue.

So the background was to be the removal of the question, "Are you a homosexual." We, as a body thought that that really made no difference for the reasons that I have just cited, but what we believed very strongly was that the military is not a place where you can get up and announce that you are a homosexual because there are, there is a broad revulsion to that in our country and it would create dissension in the ranks and fragment cohesion and all of those sorts of things.

When President Clinton was inaugurated, in fact before he was inaugurated, Gen Powell, who had met with him right after he was elected, came back and told us, the Chiefs, that the President-elect intended to meet with us on this issue to discuss it. So we all got geared up and started working up our thoughts and our positions. That never came to pass. The President was inaugurated and still, you know, this became the hot issue. Now he has been inaugurated and there was a great press by the homosexual lobby to immediately cancel the regulation and enact gays in the military.

Finally, after about three weeks, Sec Aspin came into “the tank” with the Chiefs one night and mentioned that what he believed was going to happen was that this study that you have made reference to would be commissioned and that we would, you know, go about that and then the President would make a decision at some point. The Chiefs unanimously at that point, when I say unanimously I think there were different echelons of passion in this thing and arguably, or at least I was characterized to be perhaps the most passionate on the subject, but whatever the case, I think it fair to say that none of the Chiefs supported this and there was an almost immediate reaction around the table, a cry of foul.

And I can recall vividly saying to Sec Aspin, you know, “What the hell, Mr. Secretary? We were told we were going to meet with the President on this and this is fundamentally important to every one of us in here. We want to meet with the President.”

So Sec Aspin kind of backed away from the table and said, “Gee, gosh, I did not realize that tempers were running this hot on this,” but, he said, “We will meet with the President.” So in a matter of a few days we were then summoned to the White House and went over with Sec Aspin and the Chairman and the Vice Chairman and each of the Service Chiefs.

The meeting turned out to be at 1800 in the evening. The President had the flu, as I recall, and was, you know, really would close his eyes from time to time. All of his men were tired, the Vice President was there. George Stephanopoulos was in the back row and everybody would doze off from time to time.

But we had each, we were each to be given an opportunity to speak and I had poured my heart and soul, gone home and literally rehearsed in front of a mirror on this. I have the notes from that and they will be, you know, in my papers and available. But at any rate, we made our pitches to the President and the heartening thing was that — as I found him to be consistently to be in every other meeting that I had with him — is that President Clinton did listen to you. I mean, there was no waving you off or a bored look or anything like that. He listened to you, although, as I mentioned, he was obviously not well and I think his attention perhaps was drifting a little bit.

But at the conclusion of our meeting which took probably an hour and a half, he said, “All right,” he said, “I definitely, I understand your positions” and, he said, “I do not want to do anything that will fracture the military. But I just fundamentally think it is wrong that a person, simply because they are born a homosexual cannot serve in the military and so we will have this study and I would ask the SecDef to

come back to me by the 15th of July with a recommendation as to how we do this without harming, you know, the things that you all have pointed out to me.”

So we left heartened because we thought, well, all right, we have another five months at this point that we have to work this issue. And we did that. And again during the ensuing five months, as I would reiterate again that if the nation ever wonders what its senior military leaders do, whether we are sitting there planning wars or defenses and so on, yes, we did a little bit of that, but for the next five months we did little other than to confront this issue and to try and figure how we could be loyal, serving officers and at the same time dissuade the President from doing this.

There were many, the pressures during that time were both exciting but were literally crushing at times because there was no persuasion from within the military. The letters that you got said, “Hold the line.” I can recall my own youngest son, Tim, who was very strong on this, calling and saying, “Dad, you have to stand up to this.” And me saying, “Son, this is really hard. I am really, you know, would you like to see your old man fired over this?” And what he said in effect was, “Yes, I mean, if that is what it has to be, go ahead and do it.”

So at any rate we tried very hard to work the issue and I would say on behalf of Sec Aspin, he tried very hard to work the issue with us, with the Chiefs. It finally got down in about the April or so time-frame, we had been working a policy paper that eventually, after many, many, many modifications became the DOD policy, we had been working that and the sticking point, again, by this time I think there probably were four, and I am saying the six men in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four had, you know, said this is going to happen so, “What the hell, let’s get on with it.” And there were two of us that were still trying very hard to work around this. And that eventually came down to a point of Sec Aspin calling me into his office one Saturday morning and we literally sat down and worked the paper together. And he said, “Now, how can we make this work?” This was a one-on-one.

BGEN SIMMONS: When he called you in was it just you or was your ally there? And may I ask who your ally —

GEN MUNDY: No, it was me. It was me. The strongest ally or at least the most outspoken ally, as one might expect, was the Army Chief of Staff, Gordon Sullivan. Gordon and I both knew that this was not going to play in the infantry. I mean, you might be able to do it in a squadron or something like

that but not with the young soldiers and young Marines.

No, this was just me though, and that was about the time that Jaime Gorelick, who is now the Deputy Attorney General — Jaime was a woman and an extraordinarily fine woman; she became the General Counsel of the Department of Defense — she began sending over drafts. And we would work the draft and you would submit — nobody, this was not the staff working the draft, this was me working the draft and penning the changes — so we would send it back in and then, you know, the word would come out that the White House cannot live with that. And we would say, “Well, we cannot live with it the other way.” And the White House was at that time George Stephanopolous, that was the action agent there.

But whatever the case, finally we sat down and worked the issue between Sec Aspin and me and then at a subsequent, and still, we worked it as far as I thought I could go, and at a subsequent meeting, Saturday morning meeting, we got together with, let’s see, Jaime Gorelick was there and I was there and Aspin and Powell. I, frankly I do not believe that all the Chiefs were there but my memory, though it would seem it would not on a case like this, but we had so many meetings of this type, I cannot remember whether all the players were there.

We had more or less the final draft and in each of these latter sessions the eyes would turn to me. Sec Aspin or Mrs. Gorelick, Jaime Gorelick, or the Chairman or whoever it was, would always pop to me on what we could do. The final, the thing that finally decided the issue paper was when we modified the language to say at the outset that sexual orientation is not itself a bar to enlistment. Previously it had said homosexual orientation is okay. We went with sexual orientation which was to say, whatever there might be in your mind or in your being, that if we never know that then it would not be a bar to enlistment. So if we do not ask the question which is useless anyway — we all had agreed to that earlier — then we are all right.

And the way that the final draft paper that we worked read then, while seeming to give a concession to the President to allow him to do what he wanted to do, it, in fact, did not change the policy at all, because we said, an admission of homosexuality means you are homosexual and you will be processed for discharge.

We did concede that there had been allegations, though they were not in all cases, it depends on which side you were on, of witch hunts by commanders and so they had to put in there that commanders would not

conduct witch hunts. But our feeling was commanders have not been conducting witch hunts so you can write that down.

At any rate we finally came to that — on a Saturday morning — conclusion and there was just a great sigh of relief. When I finally said, “Well, how about we word it this way,” I thought Colin Powell was going to run around the room two or three times because we had broken thought. And we felt good. The Chiefs walked out of that room feeling good that we had allowed semantics to seem to make a difference but that the policy really was not different.

The paper got massaged around a little bit and there were a couple of changes in it which had we been back working it from the outset probably we would not have allowed to be made or we would have tried to prevent being made, but they were after the fact and we had already agreed on the up-front and so they became, we got rolled a little, I guess, is what I would say.

So that is the background on the issue itself and how it evolved with, once again, the Chiefs wanting badly and intending to be loyal executives. For all of those that came to me, and there were many of them that came and said, “Well, won’t you resign if this comes to pass,” my response was, “Should I just hand this over to Gen Boomer and say, over to you, because, you know, I would stay and try to lead the Marine Corps through it.”

As a practical measure, 1.5 percent of those people who were discharged from the Marine Corps for something other than the end of enlistment were for homosexuality. So it was not a massive problem and there were not great numbers out there.

BGEN SIMMONS: One and a half percent would relate to how many persons?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, over a period of time the statistics that I had were, I think, probably 120 within the 5,000 discharges that had been for other than the end of service —

BGEN SIMMONS: Fifty to seventy-five a year?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, very, very small number. And most of these occurred in the recruit training when a youngster, arguably, even in some cases the psychiatrists who were there would think that this is a kid who will admit to anything just to get out of Parris Island, but they would come up and say, I think I am homosexual and then in some cases they changed their story or after the psychiatrists would talk to

them. So the vast majority were there.

There were a few, there were some who were preying, aggressive homosexuals that would be detected and would be usually court-martialed for that but discharged. But it was a very small number and all the Services tried to point this out, that this is not a big, I mean, this is not a raging inferno of thousands of people that are going to come out of the closet, or at least according to our statistics.

BGEN SIMMONS: The common perception, at least among older Marines or veterans, is that lesbianism is a greater problem than male homosexuality in the Marine Corps. Is that a true or false statement?

GEN MUNDY: I do not know that I could analytically support an argument one way or another because, of course, we have 95 percent males and 5 percent women. But in talking, I, actually, during my research on this I had former Marines who had been discharged for homosexuality into my office to talk to me, never widely publicized, and then I sought, I had a letter from a Marine staff sergeant who is now out of the Marine Corps and here in Washington who wrote to me to say, "I am gay. I was gay the whole time I was in the Marine Corps." And so I got the aides to call him and bring him in and I sat down with him.

I had some civilian, two lesbians who came in, one whose father was a Marine. She wrote me a very nice letter and said, "We would like to take you to lunch and just let you see that we are, you know, like everybody else." I called back and said, "We will not do the lunch but come to see me when you are in Washington and they did."

Again, very nice people, you know, in terms of meeting. Two polished, both of them were lawyers, but my thesis was to try and separate my own religious or personal convictions of what sort, to not let that be the deciding factor but rather to say, "Okay, so it works in a law firm. So you all go to work every day and you do your work in your cubicle and then at the end of the day you get in your car and you drive to Westchester or you drive to wherever you live and that is it, and occasionally you have a Christmas party. But it is much different if you live in a barracks every day and if it was known that you were gay it would just not be as cohesive."

And they accepted that because I think that the Chiefs were viewed as rabid, you know, as impassioned — all homosexuals should be done away with or something like that. We were trying very hard not to, not to make our judgements on that basis.

But, at any rate, that is somewhat the background. The President, of course you have mentioned that that was announced. He did it, and I might say to President Clinton's credit, he did it by coming to Ft McNair, assembling Eisenhower Hall full of uniformed, serving officers — each Service was tasked to provide so many — and these for the most part were majors and lieutenant colonels and colonels and generals and admirals who came there.

And the President came. He met us all down in a holding room there. This was very difficult for him because he knew he was going against people who had resisted him very strongly on this. But to his credit that is where he announced his policy, was standing on the stage there.

After he had made his announcement, as he shook hands with the Chiefs, we have a video on that and it is interesting to note because he came over to me and stood for a long time and said, "I know this was very difficult for you." And I said, "Mr. President, you have made a very courageous decision." Because I do not think that he realized that we thought we had held the line but he, there was a very, throughout my tenure, maybe because of that and some other notes or things like that, the rapport between President Clinton and me was always very good. Even though we did not agree on things, we maintained a good rapport. So, that —

BGEN SIMMONS: We spoke before about Col Ron Ray and his vociferous opposition to women in combat. He was even more vehement and vociferous about homosexuals in the Armed Forces. He had numbers of strong allies, BGen William Weise comes to mind. Did you see them during this period?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes. Yes, Ron Ray, who I have known for some years now and have had a prior association with, interestingly, Col Ray is in yesterday's paper as defending the young Army medic who refused to wear the blue beret. That is Ron Ray and his wife who are now representing him.

BGEN SIMMONS: I missed that but I am not surprised.

GEN MUNDY: So Col Ray is given to taking on, you know, the most extreme of situations and, to his credit, he believes very strongly in what he believes in. But he was, he had researched and had found a provision whereby the, unique in its wording at least to the Navy and the Marine Corps, that naval officers, probably going back to the days of, you know, wooden

ships, when they were gone for periods of time and I am sure that there was rampant homosexuality, drinking or, you know, whatever, in those days, but perhaps going back to those days, there were provisions at least in language which in effect said that no naval officer could do anything that supported an immoral circumstance, that would foster immorality among the crew or, you know, within the Marine Corps. That is a simplistic analysis but that, in effect, is what it was.

So Col Ray believed that we therefore had a basis for the CNO and the Commandant going forth and saying, "I am prohibited by law from executing your directive, Mr. President," if it came across that way. You know, a nice thought. Our lawyers, the Staff Judge Advocate and those who analyzed his position paper on that said he is stretching the rubber band too far. It is not a case. It will not hold up in any court and indeed, you are not prohibited. That is archaic language and it is not directive in nature. It is simply you should not, you should not foster immorality, in effect.

But he was, indeed, very strident and, of course, after the policy was announced in which case there are many who thought that the battle was won by the White House, if you will, and you could argue that case, but I have not heard from Col Ray since. I think I fell from his list of all-time heroes, therefore not in some way impaling myself on a sword and going down with the ship.

I might mention in retrospect on the "don't ask, don't tell" and as you have said, "don't pursue" aspect of the policy, that really was a phrase that was constructed by Senator Sam Nunn. He was the first to say, to use that phrase, I think that the policy of "don't ask, don't tell" seems reasonable. So that is where that came from.

I tried to have that, when we got into the hearing, as we can talk about a little later, I tried, though it was Sec Aspin who added on "don't pursue." So it was "don't ask, don't tell" and in Aspin's testimony he said, "And don't pursue." And I, in my corresponding testimony there said, and we should say, "don't do. Don't ask, don't tell, don't do and we won't pursue." The "don't do" never caught anybody's attention.

BGEN SIMMONS: Too bad.

GEN MUNDY: But at any rate, that is the origin of the —

BGEN SIMMONS: I think Bill Weise is still fighting a rear guard action on this, is he not?

GEN MUNDY: Those who were, he, Charlie Cooper, LtGen Charlie Cooper and some others, would like to, in the perception of those that believe that the old policy was sound, they would like to take it all the way back and say you cannot be in the Armed Forces if you are a homosexual. The new policy does not say you can, it says that sexual orientation is a private matter and if you never know, you never know. But if you come out and say, "I am," then you have said, "I do," and we will process you. Now that issue is currently being taken on by the courts, as we knew it would but then the old issue was going to be taken on by the courts and was underway at the time that the new policy was issued.

I am not aware of how active Gen Weise or others are at the present time in that, but there is still a group out there who realizes that the court challenges will continue and continue and continue and so it is necessary that we kind of keep this defensive mechanism around. And I am glad to hear if he is still active in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: According to your desk calendar, you either held or attended a press conference on this subject on the afternoon of the 19th. What are your recollections of this conference?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I believe that was the day that the President came over to Ft McNair. The decision was made and then he came to Ft McNair on the 19th and following his presentation then all the Chiefs went outside and met with the press and were then interviewed, not much of an interview when there are six of you there, you know, there was no one spokesman. But we all said we could support the policy and again, I think I made reference to it there that it was a courageous act on the President's part, to back off from a campaign promise, to come to the lion's den to make his proclamation. And even though, again, there had been some concession, it was not what he wanted or indeed what his men wanted.

BGEN SIMMONS: Future readers of this transcript might well look at the newspapers on the 20th of July; *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, et cetera, to see how this was handled on the editorial pages as well as the news page.

On 22 July John H. Dalton, after being unanimously confirmed by the Senate the previous day, was sworn in as the 70th Secretary of the Navy. SecNav Dalton was a graduate of the Naval Academy and a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve. In our last session we discussed how he had been occupying

an office in the Pentagon for some weeks pending his confirmation.

Do you recall SecNav Dalton addressing all the general officers in the Washington area in the Henderson Hall theater on the afternoon of 29 July?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I do remember that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any particulars of that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I recall, SecNav Dalton is a very sincere man but public speaking is not his forte, and this was an early venture. I believe that, as you have characterized, you know, he had reached the grade of lieutenant commander and suddenly he was, you know, he was talking to all the flags and general officers and he was a little bit uncertain of himself. And so, regrettably for his first, you know, promulgation to his officers, if you will, it was not a strong delivery and, you know, it was respectful but there was not a great message there.

He focused, as I recall it, on ethics and standards and that sort of thing, but as one would hope, at least in a meeting like that, that you would take to the center of the stage and stand there and talk to your officers — here is what I expect, here is what I want — he read from a script and so, you know, when a speaker reads from a script, generally speaking, you know, you are sometimes less taken unless it is historical or, you know, has a lot of fact and data that you would want to recover. But he should have walked out and said, “Okay, I am in charge. I have the rudder here and I look forward to working with you,” or whatever he wanted to say. But it was not a strong delivery.

BGEN SIMMONS: You honored him with an Evening Parade on Friday, the 6th of August. You have already given some of your impressions of Mr. Dalton, at least in his early days, how was he to work with?

GEN MUNDY: Well, John Dalton is probably one of the absolutely nicest men that you would want to meet. His wife, Margaret, is just a superb lady, fun to be with. Two sons, John and Chris; one son, John, is coming in the Navy. Chris has just applied for the Marine PLC program so —

BGEN SIMMONS: — how he was to work with.

GEN MUNDY: And I was just characterizing his family which I would say is more or less the all-American family, and again, he is a fine man in that particular context. I enjoyed very much working with

him. I had worked hard to cultivate him and in all candor I had the leading edge on this because Adm Frank Kelso, who had been the Acting Secretary pending Dalton’s confirmation and installation, of course was very side-tracked by the Tailhook scandal.

And, as I recall, when Sec Dalton’s confirmation was announced, we knew it was going to be announced that day so I rushed over to the Pentagon to his office and when it was announced the staff had, you know poured some champagne out and whatnot and I wound up being the senior naval officer there. So I was able to then toast the new Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps, as I characterized him. And he liked that very much, being characterized, and in fact, subsequently I would refer to him when I would introduce him, unless it was, you know, at some formal affair somewhere, I would introduce him as the Secretary of the Marine Corps and he did not resist that at all. He was very proud of that.

So, I had several months then to, if you will, to work with Sec Dalton or Secretary-nominate Dalton. We would have him over. It must have cost me a fortune for breakfast at the Headquarters but we would have him over a couple times a week if we could get him for breakfast and then after ten minutes of eating we would flash on the projector and we would brief him on the Marine Corps. So I really thought that in this particular instance the Marine Corps, with him and for that matter with Deputy Secretary Perry and Dr. Deutch, we did the same thing with them, so we really worked hard to nurture them and bring them into the Marine Corps fold, and I believe it worked with Sec Dalton.

John Dalton is, again, a fine man. He is a politician. I mean, one has to stop every now and then and recognize that what will move you politically may or may not be the same thing that would move a military officer. So we had some frictions, in fact, toward the end of my tenure, regrettably, a very significant one.

But he early on, you know, when the marriage policy was announced — I think we are going to talk about that and I perhaps do not want to talk too much now — but he saw fit, he had been in office for about a week, to have the Marine aide, Col Greg Newbold, at that time, call me from the West Coast to tell me that the Secretary would be arriving at Andrews Air Force Base at 2200 that night and I was to be there to meet him and stand by to be brought up for my, whatever I had done wrong while he was gone.

I thought that that, that sort of soured me at that point. You know, at this point in my life I do not need to be summoned to the woodshed. You do not have to, you know, you can fire me if you want to but do

not treat me like a boy and that was a little bit of that, of the latter.

So that kind of, that made me a little offset with Sec Dalton. As far as working with him though, he became very supportive of the Marine Corps in a great many ways. To his credit, I would say that it is very difficult for any Secretary of the Navy to lean too far toward the Marine Corps because the Navy hierarchy of retired CNOs or, you know, the fact that the entire structure around him, less one or two bunks of Marines, is Navy, you know, the Secretary would come under a great deal of pressure being too pro Marine at the expense of the Navy. Nonetheless, John Dalton did that on the occasion when he had to shift about \$1.5 billion in the program over to the Marine Corps, away from the Navy. And he did that, so he was supportive of the Marine Corps.

He wanted, I think, very badly to be the Secretary of the Marine Corps. In retrospect I probably could have nurtured that even a little bit further. For example, at the annual Marine Corps worship service at the Washington Cathedral, I understood he was going to be out of town. We had not included him in the ceremony out there, and that would be a nice thing to do.

At the same time, I must admit, and maybe history will record this as a weakness in me, that I still did not like the idea on certain occasions of the Marine Corps being subordinate to the civilian Secretary titled the Secretary of the Navy. So I perhaps, probably, left him out because I wanted dress blues up there in the pulpit and not a political appointee.

Sec Dalton, I would say, again, with great affection for the man, I do not think he is a very effective leader. He does not, I believe, fully understand the things that make military people or Naval persons go. He does not appreciate the sensitivities of fundamental leadership, of saying thank you to your people when you leave at the end of the day because they have worked harder than you have today, or of recognizing the troops unless somebody gives him a medal to pin on somebody. That was not a talent of his and so I think he lacked a little bit in leadership.

As far as working with him, I found that very difficult, frankly, not because we did not get along well together but Mr. Dalton was not someone to who — I would go in and make my best presentation on an issue, and particularly on personnel issues this was hard for me, but I would give the best and soundest advice I could, usually preceded by a paper, a memo, over to the Secretary, a working paper. And then I would go in and brief that and he would sit and take a lot of notes as you were talking but there was no feedback. There was not a, well, let's discuss this point a

little bit more. Generally speaking, after you had talked for a half an hour, looking for a discussion, not a presentation, it would usually end by saying, "Okay, thank you. Let me think about that."

And then the decision would be made in the counsel of others, never in the counsel of me. I say that, that is not totally true. I mean, certainly in the case of considering the next Commandant, why that was the two of us, but in many cases, if it involved the discipline, for example, of an officer or consideration for removing an officer from a selection list, I would give it my best shot and then the next thing I would hear would be a call, usually from the aide to say, "Well, the Secretary is not going to support that." And I would say, "Well, who has he talked to and usually it would be the General Counsel or his civilian appointees, very rarely his own Judge Advocate General who, of course, is the uniformed lawyer on the staff that should be advising him on military things. At least to my perception, now, someone who was in the office might say it was otherwise, but I know that both the CNO and I shared a great frustration at the ability to, you know, to sit down with the Secretary and try and persuade him and discourse between the two of you rather than just making your best case and walking out. So that was difficult, not a lot of feedback and you never knew whether you had won or lost, and rarely was there any follow-up, "Let's talk about this again." It usually just came out as the Secretary cannot support it. So that was very frustrating.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 29 July a ground-breaking ceremony was held for the Vietnam Women's Memorial on the Mall in Washington. Did you attend this ceremony?

GEN MUNDY: No, I did not. I think I was either, I do not recall why I did not attend but I was not there.

BGEN SIMMONS: This ceremony and memorial provided a kind of counterpoint, did it not, for the ongoing consideration of the role of women in the Armed Services?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it certainly was, you know, I think a deserved recognition of the contribution of women. But, yes, unquestionably, if you were then looking at women in combat and you put up a statute of a woman in combat, why, very clearly you have a piece of bronze down here that says we should have women in combat. The problem with all of that, as we may discuss more later, is that those who talk about

combat, you know, have in many cases no perception of what they are talking about or are talking about, you know, combat from an airplane is a hell of a lot different than combat in the infantry. But yes, no question about that, that it was another, again, deserved recognition, but another political statement.

BGEN SIMMONS: You and Mrs. MUNDY went to dinner at the White House on Tuesday, the 10th of August. Do you recall the occasion?

GEN MUNDY: Very well. That was the JCS and CINCs conference which usually is held a couple of times a year, but the summer one is usually the big one. President Bush had had us over earlier and the Clintons had us over. This was, after all we had some very newly appointed Secretaries. Secretary Sheila Widnall had just been appointed Secretary of the Air Force. The Army still did not have a Secretary at that time. So it was kind of a gathering of the new clan. The new CINCs had gone out and taken their post and they were back in town.

It was a nice evening. Number 1, it was a beautiful evening. The Clintons received us in the residence. We went up into the residence and he is very, he had been down in the basement of the White House and found all of the artifacts that he could. He really has a great focus on history and on bringing back out a table that some President did something or other on and it was over in the corner, and then the artwork around there. It was very, very handsomely done. He took great pride in walking you around. You, as an historian, would enjoy very much going over there and going through with him.

Very warm, very cordial. As I have said before, when you engage President and Mrs. Clinton you are the only person in the room. There is not anybody else. So they make you feel very good.

We then went to dinner. I recall that Linda sat at his table. I was at another. They split you up. Round tables down in the, down in the Blue Room or Red Room, down in that area. It was a rather informal dinner. This was not a state dinner in the dining room. We had a very enjoyable evening.

And then at the end of the evening, of course, the Chiefs, most people would not understand this but like anywhere else you go when you have a gathering like this it is much easier to load everybody on a bus and take them, so all the Chiefs and their wives go out and get in a bus and you go to the White House and you come off the bus. What we did not know at that time was that this was to be really the final interview for the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. So, when

we all got onto the bus to leave, Charlie Hoar, Mrs. Joseph Hoar, General Joe Hoar's wife got on the bus with us but Joe was notably absent. And when somebody said, "Where is Joe Hoar" there was a shh, we do not talk about that. He was kept behind by the President for the President to make his final decision on who would be the next Chairman and Joe was one of two primary contenders.

BGEN SIMMONS: And that leads to my next question. On 11 August President Clinton, the day after this dinner, announced that Gen John Shalikashvili would succeed Gen Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The actual turnover would be on 1 October. And, as you indicated, our Marine Gen Joseph Hoar, then the Commander, Central Command, was a leading contender for the post. Certainly he was a favorite of Gen Powell's. Why do you suppose that the selection went to Gen Shalikashvili?

GEN MUNDY: I would like to do two things on this question, one of them self-serving and the other one would be an answer. Let me answer your question first. Gen Hoar had emerged to be one of two primary candidates, Shalikashvili being the other one, and the betting money at that point was solid on Gen Hoar. He had been dramatically effective as the Commander of the U.S. Central Command. He was a Marine four-star.

Remember that many of the Defense establishment of this Administration came from the tutelage of LtGen Mick Trainor at the Harvard School of International Law. That is where the assistant to Secretary Aspin had come from. John Deutch came out of there. Sheila Widnall came down. And so this group came to town with the persuasion that with what they wanted to do in the future, I would like maybe egotistically to believe that maybe the letter to the President which all of them had read, as we have talked earlier I am not sure the President ever did, but which attempted to paint the Marine Corps as the most relevant force capability in the uncertain world that we faced ahead, there was a strong belief that it was time for a Marine with a Marine view of the world to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. So Joe Hoar is a good looking man, you know, was a dynamic leader and there was strong support for him.

Gen Powell, Colin Powell, one of the things that I admire about him is that he always would let the train run. In other words, whatever consideration needed to take place, or anything, Colin never influenced that prematurely. He allowed a wide thinking. So, cer-

tainly, I think that Gen Hoar was supported by Colin Powell or he would not have gotten to that point. However, John Shalikashvili was Colin's candidate for the job. So in the final hour when the final decision was being made, after allowing the press and after allowing all of the candidates to emerge as high as they could go, I know that Gen Powell offered advice and supported Gen Shalikashvili. That is one aspect.

The other is that Gen Hoar had been the commanding general at Parris Island when there had been a ring of lesbians that had been detected who preyed upon the young female recruits as well as, you know, as having a ring of their own. He commanded there. He investigated it and he broke it up. There were calls made into the White House at the last minute, you know, reflecting on the fact that Gen Hoar had been an unparched enemy of homosexuals and all of us believe, though I do not have anything in paper to support that to you, I think that had a significant effect.

The third element would be that the President, of course, came in on a theme of diversity. Gen Shalikashvili is the son of a Czarist Russian officer. He immigrated as a youngster, joined the Army, worked his way up from private and is a very intelligent man and very much a political military general. And he had been successful down in the Provide Relief operations in northern Iraq as the Task Force Commander. He had been the assistant to the Chairman which meant that he was the primary interface with the Council of Deputies for the National Security Council. In other words, he worked the White House for the Chairman, somewhat as Gen McCafferty who was just named the Drug Czar. So you get a lot of face time there. So he was a familiar face.

But, I know for a fact that Gen Hoar left the White House that night believing that the next day he would be announced, and indeed, as he later told me, he got a call the next morning early, at 6:00 a.m. or something, from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense saying, do not leave town. Stay put. The announcement will be made today. Stay where you are. Four hours later Gen Shalikashvili was announced. So it was literally a last minute decision with the money riding on Joe Hoar.

I mention that I think this is worth, not so much me, but I mention let me, you know, wave a flag here a little bit on this issue. As may be the case, you know, in these situations, I had been approached early on by several people to ask whether or not I would be interested in being the Chairman and, previous, you know, former Commandants, Gen Barrow almost became

the Chairman. Had he wanted to be, arguably he would have been.

And I told them that I really did not, you know, were I asked to be by the President that, you know, I certainly would say yes, however, that I did not want to campaign to be the Chairman and I did not want to do that. And that was pretty well respected.

I was approached, and here I will not use a name because I would just as soon respect his confidence, but I was approached by a very influential person in Washington, a very senior and military officer, but one with connections into the hierarchy, at about the time that we were getting serious contenders who said to me, "They want a Marine. You should be considered, however, I am to convey to you if you will back off a little bit on this homosexual thing." And I said, "can't do that." And that was a good friend and a military officer.

So I think, that does not mean that I, there for the want of a straw, the camel's back was broken or anything, I do not think that I would have been. I think that I was too bruised, and in a discussion with Gen Powell subsequently he said, "Well, you will be considered." And I said, "Colin, a Service Chief probably is not the right person to consider because we bear the whip lashes around town here, you know, and I am the, whatever it is, the homosexual thing, you could never make that marriage work." And he said, "Gee, I never thought about that." I said, "I think it is better if you go out of town and bring in some CINC or bring in someone from out of town because then you have a fresh approach and you are not inhibited by all the back door testimony on the Hill about Service Chiefs working the Hill, you know, that sort of thing."

So it is rather interesting anyway, but I thought the interesting element to be followed for history is that there was a, what I received from that conversation was a fairly specific communication, one of two ways — back off and we will consider you or maybe just here is a means of getting him excited, you know, we will get him to back off by dangling this carrot out there. Very interesting.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very interesting, very interesting. Had you known Gen Shalikashvili before his appointment?

GEN MUNDY: I had. We met as major generals when he was the Deputy Operations Deputy of the Army and I was then the Director of Operations for the Marine Corps but was the alternate Deputy Operations Deputy in the JCS. So we had sat in "the tank" together as two-stars.

BGEN SIMMONS: How was he to work with?

GEN MUNDY: Very good. A very fine man, a very intelligent man. We had known him, of course he had been in "the tank" as a lieutenant general when he was the assistant to the Chairman, generally speaking, and at those meetings the Chairman and Chiefs are around the table and then the assistant to the Chairman or if the SecDef is in there, his military assistant or whoever is the immediate backup. And, with the Service Chiefs, of course, your operations deputy, your lieutenant general used to be, more ordinarily than now, at your side. So everybody had a number 2 in "the tank" and Shali was Colin Powell's number 2. So we knew him well and thought a lot of him. He is a fine man.

To work with, I would say that it is a very difficult thing, in my own experience it was difficult. It is difficult to be one of the boys and then suddenly be hailed out as the leader and particularly if the boys you were associated with were all senior to you. You know, you used to call them sir and now all of a sudden you are the sir and they are somebody else.

And that was the case with the Service Chiefs. Shali was junior to every one of us in the room and not that that bothered us at all, we understand that appointments are made that way, but I think as a result of that that he probably felt a little bit cautious in his early efforts as the Chairman because he was uncertain. He had seen us in action from the back row and now he was the, supposed to lead the course. And there may have been a little bit of timidity in his early associations with us.

But whatever the case he was always very good to back brief us and to tell us what was going on. Over time, as perhaps we will discuss later, I do not mean to kick all these things out, but I came to worry a lot about the fact that the Chairman was, that the Joint Staff was being allowed to slip and to become an imperial staff and that the Chairman was, perhaps did not have his eye on the ball enough. I discussed that with him and it became a little bit, some articles got in the paper and whatnot, and to his credit he turned right around and stepped right back and did things to correct that situation. So, I think a great deal of John Shalikashvili.

BGEN SIMMONS: Compare his leadership style with that of Gen Powell.

GEN MUNDY: Colin Powell is the type leader that you would want to follow on a run, in combat, at a party, you know, that you would want to be a schoolmate. You would want to be in his class at the War

College, unless you wanted to be number 1 and then you probably ought to get somebody else. But Colin is a charismatic leader and a persuasive leader. He is all forms of leading.

He is a tremendous consensus gainer and he leads the discussion, he leads the effort. As I mentioned earlier, everybody, there are no holds, no inhibitions on what you can say in offering your advice. Colin has the tremendous means of coordinating that into a body of opinion that he then speaks for the Chiefs.

Colin, on occasion would say to a Chief, "No, I am not going to do it that way," but rarely. He was a consensus builder and he would articulate the position. So the Chiefs always felt a great deal of confidence when we sent Colin Powell off to give advice in the White House. We knew precisely what he was going to do. He was faithful to that and then he would come back and debrief us.

We became less, I think, cohesive with Shali, and again I attribute that in large part to the fact that he was junior, and secondarily remember that Powell was only there a short time in the new administration. The new administration in terms of an orderly, organized process was far different than the Bush Administration. Colin used to come in from time to time from the White House very agitated. And he would say, "You know, I went over there at 11 o'clock this morning for an 11:15 meeting. We waited an hour and a half. And then in the meeting nobody is in charge. Everybody has a speaking part and the meeting took three hours. It should have been a 45 minute meeting. I should have been back here at 1300. Here it is 1600." So I have seen him very agitated by that lack of structure that he knew as the National Security Advisor of the White House.

Shali then was consumed immediately by this seven day a week, literally seven day a week consumption of the time and focus of the Chairman. He was always at a meeting in the White House on something for extended periods of time. So I think that what built, although he was always good to come back and to call a meeting and to tell the Chiefs what was going on, that simply took the Chairman away from the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, more than it had in Colin's time.

We had a new Secretary of Defense, you know, shortly thereafter Mr. Aspin was relieved and Dr. Perry moved up. And there was not a lot of change there but I think that all of that consumed a great deal more focus on the part of Shalikashvili than had been the case with Gen Powell. But, good man to work with and I have great confidence in the Chairman today.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 11th of August was not necessarily a happy day for you. SecDef Aspin took you to task for a directive you had issued that would have barred the enlistment of married recruits after 1995. Would you review that issue for us?

GEN MUNDY: I will, and it probably is as long as all these others here. As the new Chairman was being announced as Gen Shalikashvili, at that press conference in the Rose Garden, the first question asked of the President after he had made the announcement was, "Mr. President, the Marines have announced that they are not going to take married people anymore. What do you think of that?" And the President, appropriately said, "Why, I am astounded." So the marriage policy really did not get off to a very good start at the outset.

The background on the marriage policy also goes back a number of years. During Gen Gray's tenure, and indeed even before that time, for all of us that had been commanding in the field recently, we realized that for a force of deployers, as opposed to a force of occupiers, that is, for young Americans that we are going to drive very hard, keep away from home most of the time, that marriage was a difficulty. And for the institution the difficulty was that when you have a young man who is married and living in a trailer park somewhere, in some cases to a 14-year old wife, not recognized in the newspapers, but a 14, a 16 year old girl that has come in from the hills of Kentucky to go to Camp Lejeune or Oceanside to live with some young man, that that is just not a stable marriage. And when we take him away, within two days after he is gone, in comes the telegram that says, wife cannot cope, he has to go home on emergency leave. So we had a tremendous drain because of that.

Second to that, we found that we had a number of what were called geographic marriages, marriages of convenience where a young Marine in southern California would get married, oftentimes to another Marine, two lance corporals get married, they now, we subsidize them. We pay them basic allowance for quarters. They can now go rent a place out in town as opposed to live in the barracks. Life is much better there. I do not blame them. You can now polish your boots sitting back drinking a beer in a Lazy Boy rather than on the prison furniture that we put in your barracks room for you and will not let you have a beer while you are doing it.

So, whatever the case, it was becoming a real problem and every junior leader, staff NCOs and the company grade officers were telling us that this, I spend more time as a lieutenant dealing with the problems of

three or four of my young married people than I do leading my platoon and teaching it how to maneuver in the field.

Gen Gray, Sgt Maj Summers, had all tried to look hard at a policy whereby we could at least constrain first-term marriages. You could not do it by law. You know, they could be admitted and you can get married in the military.

To make a long story short the staff had looked at that a lot. We had had several meetings on it while I was there. Gen Boomer, coming back from his experience in the desert, was very strong on this point, the Assistant Commandant, so he wanted to personally take this and run with it and did from the standpoint of developing a position. The position, we had discussed the fact of, you know, reducing the number of enlistees that we took, giving counseling, developing a program on marriage. But, what happened is, but we had never sat down and had a final approval of the program.

A package from the Manpower Department came forth with an ALMAR, an all-Marine message in it, that said all that we had talked about, but in about its last line said, "We will work toward the eventuality in 1995 to where the very small, 5 percent of the recruits that we were taking at that time were married, we will eliminate that 5 percent and we will not enlist a young man or woman who is married until they have come in and gotten counseling and we have told them what the Corps is all about and advised them. And then, if they want to get married, they can get married." That is what the policy was.

Well, that paper came to the Office of the Commandant, was initialed by the Military Secretary to the Commandant and returned somehow to the Manpower Department that looked at the route sheet and said, we have a chop and released the message and away it went.

In candor, not in defensive candor, I would not have promulgated a message that said we are going to cut out married. {sic} We did not have to do that. We could have managed that at the Headquarters. The rest of the message, the rest of the policy was superb and the Marine Corps would have been hailed, I think, for it. But this immediately, somebody, somewhere —

BGEN SIMMONS: Someone must have pointed the press at that.

GEN MUNDY: Somewhere, in fact as I recall that came back from a reporter at Twentynine Palms, that called back to our public affairs people. So, to make a long story short on that day I came in from wherev-

er I had been into the office and the public affairs officer and Gen Boomer were waiting on me and they said, "We have a firestorm brewing here, you know, on this marriage policy." And I said, "What marriage policy?" And they said "the ALMAR." And I said, "What ALMAR?" And we went from there. I had not seen the package, and if I had perhaps I would have signed it anyway.

BGEN SIMMONS: The ALMAR actually had been released sometime earlier, had it not?

GEN MUNDY: The ALMAR had gone out, I do not remember the exact time/distance factors on this but had gone out, yes, well ahead —

BGEN SIMMONS: As early as May perhaps.

GEN MUNDY: And it had been lying there but somebody had pointed to it. So, at any rate, I just missed that one. That one passed right over my head. But it created an immediate firestorm in the press because what was understood was the Marines are not going to let you be married anymore. So the immediate accusation, I can remember the number of articles that would talk about me, you know, but "He was married when he was 22 but now he is not going to let the others be married." So it got completely out of hand.

Now, the interesting thing about that was there was far more positive feedback. I got more letters from mothers and Ike Skelton immediately popped me, Congressman Ike Skelton popped me a letter saying, "I want to hold hearings on this because there is an expense associated and readiness is affected" and all that sort of thing. There was a lot of support for that and a lot of applause for that. But fundamentally we had not heads-upped our civilian leaders.

Now, here is the other interesting part. When I then learned of this late in the afternoon, let's make it about 1600 in the afternoon, I said, all right, "I need to call Sec Dalton who was on the West Coast, up in San Francisco." So I got a call through to him and I said, "Mr. Secretary, you are about to go make a speech. It is very possible that the press is going to tap you on this subject, let me brief you on it." And I did.

And he said, "Well, gosh," he said, "I want to be supportive and everything but I would really like to take a look at that. Is there any way that we can pull that back and take a look at it?" And I said, "Yes, we certainly can and, in fact, I, too, need to sit down and take a look at this." So, based on that I then told, directed the staff to rescind the ALMAR, pull back in on the ALMAR.

Because the press was heating up I called, and because I was the only one in town at that time, I called the military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, MajGen John Jumper and he said, "Boy, we are really getting a lot on that and the White House wants to know what is going on."

I said, "Okay, tell them that, all I said was explain the policy. I will be glad to go over there and do it or send somebody over there to do it, but we are going to pull that back for the moment to review it here." So he said, "Okay, I will tell them that."

Well, at about 2100, 2200, 9:00 or 10:00 at night, Jumper called me back and said, Sec Aspin needs to say that he told you to do this. And I said, "Well, okay, fine with me." So, whatever the politics in that matter, of course then the press story then became the SecDef tells the Commandant to rescind the thing when, in effect, we had already done that, not rescind it but to try and put a hiatus on it at least. And it became an "Aspin slaps the Commandant."

The next morning we had a meeting in the SecDef's office and when I walked in, of course all of my peers, Powell and all my service counterparts, were pronging me unmercifully, you know, were making light of that. But Aspin came over and put his arm around my shoulders, smiled and gave me a bear hug and we went on about business.

So, I was never hauled up and taken to task by anybody until Sec Dalton came back, you will remember I talked about a few days later being hauled out to Andrews to be upbraided by the Secretary. His ire on that subject derived from the fact that he said, "I am the SecNav. I should be making that call, not the SecDef."

I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, you are right but if you are not in town, let me tell you that when the press begins throwing cordwood on the fire and the White House gets interested, that, you know, you are going to act here, and I had to inform the SecDef so he could handle it with the White House." But his issue with me was you should have dealt with me and should not have dealt with SecDef.

Subsequently, of great interest, when he got in his first hot water with the press I went over and called on him and I said, "It is going to be okay, John, but remember how excited you were with me for trying to pour water on something that is started in the press." I said, "Now, see, this is how it feels." So he, after that had a great deal of tolerance.

That is the overlong saga of the ill-fated marriage policy. As a matter of fact, we are today doing everything that that ALMAR set out to do in terms of counseling and the education programs and everything

else, except not taking that very small 5 percent of enlisted. We could have managed that down, if we chose to.

I, frankly, would have come across in the final decision on this much as Gen P.X. Kelley did on the question of whether or not we should accept any more mental category 4s into the Marine Corps. When I was the Director of Recruiting he said, "I do not want to ever shut the door entirely because after all, it is very probable that Ira Hayes or one or more of those guys that raised the flag on Iwo Jima might have been mental group 4s and we do not ever want to completely shut out somebody just because of a test score."

I think I would have done that on the marriage policy and said, "No, we will counsel them beforehand and say it might be better for you to try somewhere else, the Marine Corps is going to be awfully difficult for you, and dissuade them, but I do not think we would have ever put forth a policy that would have said you cannot be married." We would not have gotten away with it, we would have never gotten that approved. So it was a little bit, we did not do very good staff work on that. We promulgated a policy that clearly, as soon as I read it, I said, "This is not going to fly past the hallowed halls of the Headquarters here. We are never going to get an exclusionary policy."

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 13th of August you spoke to the Command and Staff College at Quantico and the next day attended the swearing in of Secretary Dalton. Was that held at Annapolis?

GEN MUNDY: It was, yes. He was, of course, as you mentioned earlier, an Annapolis graduate.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 21 August you went to Orlando, Florida for a Marine Corps League banquet and the next day went to Canada as guest of honor at Fort Henry. What was that occasion?

GEN MUNDY: I assume you allude to the Fort Henry visit rather than the Marine Corps League. That was a standard banquet. The Fort Henry Guard, which is a civilian organization made up of college students who come and act as 19th century Canadian soldiers in this historic Fort Henry up in Canada, had been for years exchanging, every other year, with the U.S. Marines at the Barracks. And I believe that Gen Lemuel Shepherd started this because of, he was made the honorary commander of the Fort Henry Guard, as I recall, and I do not know all of the details

of that. I am sure you do. So it goes as far back as Lemuel Shepherd.

The Fort Henry Guard would come down here. They are an excellent precision marching group. They bring with them their mortars and they form the British Square and fire, withdrawing down the field with the bugler sounding. They do all this drill both at Fort Henry, but they would come to the Marine Barracks here and it would be, arguably the premier parade of the season because it would have all this musket powder smoke floating over the field. It was a long parade. If you had a good seat it was fine. If you were sitting on the bleachers sometime it was about an hour too long.

But, at any rate, there was an exchange and they customarily, I think, invite the Commandant to go up and review one of the parades at Fort Henry. So that was my year to go up there. It was a very nice visit. I recall a little bit of humor here. Of course the Marines from 8th and I go up and the Marine Drum and Bugle Corps and you go into Fort Henry and they have the joint parade together. But each takes their mascot, the Fort Henry Guard have a goat as the mascot and they lead the goat onto the field just as we lead Chesty, our bulldog, onto the field. So Chesty goes up and the goat comes out and so the reviewing officer, as, you know, as an act of tradition you go over and not only are invited to inspect the Canadian contingent, which you do, but you also meet the goat. And the way you meet the goat, they train the goat to raise its hoof and shake hands with you. So here you are besworded, white-gloved, dress blue bemedaled and all that sort of thing, and you go out and when you come to the goat you are supposed to stop before the goat and his handler will say the code word and the goat will raise his foot and you just reach down and shake hands. It is a crowd pleaser.

Well, when I went out as I stopped in front of the goat, even before his handler spoke, the goat had a full bladder and saw fit to —

GEN MUNDY: — the goat began to urinate, a considerable quantity, I might add, and it took him a full 30 seconds or so there. So as I stood, you know, at attention before the goat, hoping that it would run, you know, in an opposite direction than my shoe and the Canadians were red-faced. They did not know what to do. And I said, just, he will get through in a minute. But the crowd loved it. They were on their feet applauding at this thing.

Well, when he finished then, of course he did raise his foot and I shook the goat's hand and inspected the rest of the Guard and went back and took my spot in

the reviewing area. But it was one of those humorous moments that I enjoy recalling.

BGEN SIMMONS: And I am sure it will be told and retold at Fort Henry for many years to come.

On 24 August I see you continued your preparations for the *60 Minutes* interview. Leslie Stahl called on you the morning of Thursday, 26 August, and your interview with her went that afternoon. How did it go?

GEN MUNDY: The interview was four and a half hours long, I am sorry, two and a half hours long, and the lesson learned from that is never give a taped two and a half hour interview unless it is Shelby Foote talking about the Civil War or Ed SIMMONS holding forth on the Army operations in the Pacific during the Pacific War or something.

But the background on this issue, we spoke earlier about a complaint that had gotten the attention of *60 Minutes* having to do with promotions of minority officers. And indeed, the statistics were categorically lower than that of non-minorities. The theme that *60 Minutes* came in with was the charge that the Marine Corps was a racist institution and they had interviewed the young captain, who is now a major, who had made this complaint and some other minority officers. It was not a strong complaint but they nonetheless were on camera to represent the case. I, of course, had not seen any of that. You do not know what, as the accused you do not have access to what has been said here.

But at any rate, Leslie Stahl I found to be a very charming lady. She is very nice, very gracious, very warm and we enjoyed having a little repartee together. And then they hook you up and sat facing each other. We did it in my office.

The thesis that they were using was that the Marine Corps conscientiously had training policies at The Basic School and elsewhere that were fundamentally discriminatory and that disadvantaged minority officers. And that our boards, you know, clearly we were rigged because we did not promote at the right rate.

I feel good about it, not the way that it eventually came out, but I felt good in that I had really done my homework on this and I had answers for every question. And that, among other reasons, perhaps, is why the interview took so long because Leslie Stahl would ask me a question and I would say, "Let me explain to you," as opposed to giving her what they wanted which was just a yes, no, I am sorry, we are guilty or whatever they were looking for.

So I would go into explanations of what this cir-

cumstance was all about and Leslie would say at the end of it, "Okay, stop the cameras." And they would stop rolling the cameras and she would turn around to the production manager and say, look, "Okay, where do we go, that answers that question, where do we go from here? Well, try it this way."

So it was almost as though you were playing a game or fighting a war or something like that and you would have periodic recesses while you sat there face to face with your opponent and the coach said, "Okay, well, we did not get around this way so ask him this question to come around that way." Okay, so here we would go, turn the cameras back on and I would get that question that she had been coached to ask and then I would endeavor to answer that.

But I was not going to give them simply a yes, no, we are trying to do better or something like that. In hindsight maybe that is the thing to have done. As a result of that they had so much footage that when the production eventually came out it had been clipped, you know, segments throughout to make a case. I gave answers on tape to questions that had been reframed since they were asked. In other words, the question that was asked was not the answer that was given and it was just pasted together.

I honestly do not believe that *60 Minutes* set out to cast any negative focus on me specifically, perhaps on the Marine Corps but not on me, but they simply did not realize, I think, the way they pasted this thing together that for the Commandant to come across as being critical of minorities is a terrible, terribly demoralizing thing within the Institution, as any of us would know.

So, I found that subsequently from those that spoke with some of the people at *60 Minutes* they were somewhat dismayed. They did not think it had been too bad. They thought that both sides had had a fair play and they considered it one of their milder interviews, and perhaps we were especially sensitive to it but at any rate it came out, the questions that she focused on were Basic School standings and how they affected the promotability of officers, and the awareness that generally speaking, at least on the assessments that we had at that time, that minority officers at The Basic School did not fare as well academically as did non-minorities. Therefore, your evaluation processes at The Basic School are skewed and are racist. They are anti-minority, which, of course, they were not.

So what I was attempting in one segment I recall to point out was that we are somewhat dismayed ourselves because in swimming, in land navigation, in marksmanship, in a number of these specifically indi-

vidual measurements the minorities do not do as well as non-minorities. Why is it that an African-American lieutenant does not shoot an M-16 rifle as well as on average his Caucasian counterpart? That dismayed us. We could not figure that out.

Well, what this came across as, by the time it had been clipped down was, they do not shoot, they cannot navigate and they cannot swim. And, of course, that inflamed the minority community.

An interesting note to end this off, again — well, I will end it off with two, one I have alluded to earlier — I think that that probably was the most hurtful time of my tenure. Not only did I feel undone by *60 Minutes* with whom I had naively felt I could, if you are up-front and honest, you know, as my mother had always taught me, if you will tell the truth why everything will come out all right. Well, not necessarily on *60 Minutes*. But more so with the impact that this had made in the Corps on a great number of magnificent Marines who felt that their Commandant had put them down. I went over and gathered with as many minorities as I could in the Henderson Hall theater and told them what had happened, but I could sense, particularly in the seniors, there was just a hangheadedness, you know, we have been put down here.

Interestingly, I had a number of very positive communications from the field, from the black Marines that I had known or had served with. I was stunned by the loyalty that came forth from them. That said, “We know you, we know that is not you, never has been” and so that kind of made me feel better. But, of course, all the minority organizations then came after me. But it was terribly bruising to me personally and, for the Corps that there was even one Marine out there who would believe that the Commandant had somehow stated that the minorities were not up to standard. So, that was unfortunate.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 September the Department of Defense announced the results of its Bottom Up Review that had been going on for some five months.

This review approved the leveling off of the strength of the Marine Corps at 174,000 active duty Marines and 42,000 Reserves. This was a considerable victory for the Marine Corps, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, I believed it was. We had fought very hard for that.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was the rationale for the Marine Corps strength levels?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there were two, and this too,

like all of these it seems to take a lot of background. You will recall, as we discussed earlier, that the Marine Corps came in, I wish I had called it the Bottom Up Review because we would have been ahead of the Clinton Administration when they came in, but we did exactly, exactly what Sec Aspin directed to be done.

In fact, as we had done ours and had talked to his staff about the need for a 177,000 man Marine Corps — I am talking about to Congressman Aspin’s staff while the Bush Administration was still in — as we were attempting to sell this on the Hill, his staffer, his primary staffer had become fascinated with the technique that the Marine Corps had used to come to this conclusion. It was really, I say this with great pride, it was the, we were the only Service who could stand up and positively present the requirements for Marine Corps force structure based on what we did, based on the operating tempo, based on the organizational structure, based on flying the President around, doing State Department duty and all that. There was not another Service in sight that could even approach us on that basis.

So Congressman Aspin had become fascinated with the Marine Corps product and, you know, I do not know that that was solely the reason that he came in with the Bottom Up Review, indeed it was not because he had started as a Congressman talking about doing much of what became the Bottom Up Review. But his staffer again spent a lot of time with Gen Krulak and Col Wilkerson, then- Col Wilkerson, and the others in seeing how the Marine Corps had done business. So we had a very saleable product.

We had been making that case for a long time. We had a lot of Congressional support. There is no question but that Senator John Glenn had come down hard on the 177,000. Arnold Punaro, our Marine staffer over on the Hill had been successful in having a number of authorization bills that had been very specific in that the Marine Corps will be held at a certain level.

That was not in itself law. That was not directive in nature but it was the will of Congress and we played that card, too. So we had a very legitimate basis for the size of the Marine Corps.

Now, when it, as the Bottom Up Review went along then, each, in the case, remember the Bottom Up Review addressed the bomber force and addressed a great many, satellites and everything else, but in the case of force structure it assessed each of the Services force structure, in the case of the Army by the numbers of divisions. For example, there was an option, there were three options and as the three options were presented personally by then the Undersecretary for

Acquisition, Dr. Deutch, John Deutch, who was heading this effort, as those options were presented in usually Saturday morning sessions in civilian clothes with the SecDef, they would be presented in terms of we can have a force of eight to ten divisions in the Army. That force, here would be the limitations of that force. Ten to twelve, here would be the limitations. Twelve to fourteen, here are the limitation, you know, the pros and cons. And, in the upper right-hand corner of each briefing chart would be the amount of money required to execute any one of these options because they were looking at money.

The Navy was based on aircraft carriers, submarines and numbers of ships. So Navy would be a Navy of 345 ships, a Navy of 360 ships, a Navy of 420 ships or something like that. And the Air Force the same way. But the Marine Corps was based on end strength because we had built the case for saying we have to have this many Marines to meet the war plans and to field that size force.

The options for the Marine Corps were 159,000, 174,000 and 177,000. The way 174,000 came about, the number had never been other than 177,000 but the way it came about, after President Bush had made his first cut at the 1993 budget as a campaign measure he took a slice at defense so we were all caused to, you know, cancel some programs, give back some money for the Bush budget and that gave him a campaign advantage.

Well, he did not win the election so when the Clinton Administration came in the Department of Defense was again given a second cut at the Bush budget. By this time the Marine Corps was so threadbare that we literally cancelled the, you will remember this, we considered canceling the dress blue issue.

We finally took the blue blouse out of the dress blues and gave them the cover and the trousers and hoped they would buy the blouse. And we had to take out 3,000 end strength to make our mandated bogey, if you will, to meet that second budget cut. We had nowhere else to go.

I saw a "pony in this woodpile" in that I thought that that would demonstrate that while the other Services were able to take, peel away at programs, you know, take a little bit out here, take a little bit out there or buy fewer of these or fewer of those, that the Marine Corps would be unique in having to take out people, and indeed, taking literally the cloth off of our backs to pay this bill. We each had an opportunity in the tank to brief very briefly the impact of the budget to Sec Aspin, Perry and Deutch. And, of course, the Marines were fourth briefers. So I had the advantage of, I will never forget when I stood up to go present

my briefing charts and to brief the Secretary that my counterparts had been messing around with billions of dollars and so I said, "Mr. Secretary, now here comes the nickels and dimes."

And Aspin said, you know, to the, perhaps an indication of the future and to the, somewhat to the dismay of my counterparts, he said, "Yes, but look at all you get for those nickels and dimes." And then you could almost see him say, "Whoops, I should not have said that."

But at any rate, I briefed and I explained that I literally had to pull the blue uniform. John Deutch could not believe that. He said, "you cannot mean that. You mean we are not going to have Marines walking around in dress blues?" And I said, "Well, they are not going to be coming out of recruit training in dress blues. We are that thin."

Well, unfortunately, while that is a good message and while it catches the attention what then happens in the business within the building, now we fade back into this morass that is known as the Department of the Navy in which case a \$240,000 savings by pulling the dress blues off Marines' backs for a couple of years here, you know, just vaporizes. They do not even do calculations that low when we put together the Department of the Navy programs. So then when, as the SecDef began to review the programs he reviewed them as departmental programs vice breaking the Marine Corps out individually. So that message became lost.

Finally though, to get to the point, I had offered then 174,000 saying the number is 177,000 but I have no alternative but to take out 3,000 Marines and here is what that will amount to. When we then got to the Bottom Up Review which was in, I believe in July, we were in for a Saturday morning session, with no forewarning or announcement at that time that Sec Deutch got up to brief the force options, it came to me very clearly that we were hearing the results. And, after he had finished briefing these force options he said, "Well, maybe the Service Chiefs would like to comment on that." And I realized to myself at that time, sing now or forever hold your peace. This is going to be our one stand on this.

None of us were prepared, none of us had briefing papers. No staff had told us you are going to have to justify it. Gen Sullivan I think said generally, "Well, we can live with that option," because they had, in effect, come down to option 2 for everyone.

We got to the Navy. I can recall I had a great sinking feeling because when Sec Aspin said to Adm Kelso, "Now, Frank, how about," he said, "What is the difference in 330 ships and 345 ships?" The CNO

had no legitimate answer for that except to say, "Well, you know, 345 is more than 330 and it would give us a better Navy." Nobody was prepared, so there were not good answers. I think Gen McPeak probably did all right, but more or less said, "Yes, we can live with that but I do not want to see it go any lower."

So I thought, well, boy it is now or never. So when they got to me at the end, and I was seated down at the end of the table anyway, I decided to stand up instead of sit, as they had, and I got up and I will tell you I really, I really did well. I was, my adrenaline was pumping and I had had time to think as my sister Chiefs went through so I made the strongest pitch I possibly could and pointed out on the options what the negatives were and wound up with just an almost assertive, you cannot do it any lower, you cannot do this. You do not get anything for trading off Marines and look what you are going to do to the most relevant capability you have here.

I finished and as I was sitting down Colin Powell stood up and whistled the Marines' hymn in this gathering which broke up the atmosphere and we all had a light laugh. Aspin said, "Well, you know, you can certainly get excited about this, Carl, can't you?" But at any rate, it was a successful shot and subsequent to that I, I was now, remember that I was arguing 177,000 at that point and we finished and I walked out of the room and said, "We got it."

Well, I was called the next week, as I recall, it may have been three or four days later that I was called by the Secretary of Defense's Office to come up and see Mr. Aspin again one-on-one and that he would like to again have me, he had gotten it when he was Congressman Aspin, he would like me to again brief him on the 177,000 Bottom Up force structure thing. So I, you know, shortened it a little bit but took my charts up and sat with the Secretary at his table and walked him through the basis for the 177,000 again.

And he said, "Now, how much does that cost?" And I showed him the additional cost a year. And he said, "Okay, I got it." And again, I went out and said, "Hallelujah, we have won big time."

When the announcement came out as to the force levels the number was 174,000 for the Marines. I was surprised, but still happy about that. I was a heck of a lot happier than 159,000 and everybody else was, and that is when the *Navy Times* ran "The Marines Win," you know, with the front page coverage and we all felt very good about that. But, you know, I still felt that I had lost even though we had won. I felt like what happened to the 177,000?

So, the next meeting that we had formally with the Defense staff was the major budget issues. Those are

major issues in which the Congress has directed something that we are not doing or that we have taken a cut from the Congress or from the OSD staff that we now go back up, major issues, and those usually are very significant.

So I said to Sec Dalton, "Look, we are between a rock and a hard place. We have language that says 177,000. We have me on record everywhere in the world saying 177,000. OSD is saying 174,000. I would like to make that a major budget issue." The Navy staff argued hard against that because they did not want to hear it. But Dalton said, "Okay, go ahead."

So even though it might, in its context, 3,000 Marines is not a major budget issue; 20,000 Marines might be, 15,000 Marines might be, but because that was the only Marine issue he allowed me to make it. So when we went up for the meeting then, the way that goes is each of the Service Secretaries presents their major budget issues and then turns it over to the Service Chief to talk about it, in most cases. Adm Kelso appealed, therefore, to keep 12 carriers and said, you know, "if you will let me keep 12 carriers, I will figure a way to pay for the 12 carriers."

And, of course, I was sitting there thinking that I wish that any Marine Commandant could say I will figure a way to pay for anything other than what he has. We had no latitude at all. So that made me know that even though the Navy had been talking about how they did not have another nickel in the coffers, if you can figure a way to pay for another carrier, you probably have a couple of bucks hidden away somewhere.

Anyway, it got to me and I said, "Mr. Secretary, you have directed 174,000 and we are prepared to execute that, but I call to your attention that the number on the Hill and the number which I am on record for is 177,000 Marines." Well, Aspin really got, it was the only time I have ever seen him mad and it was at me.

And he said, "I do not see how the hell you can sit right there, you know, we have kept the Marine Corps up at what you wanted, you know, we made a deal on this, you know." And I was wondering, trying to figure out what he was talking about. He said, "We made a deal and now you come back in here and tell me you want another 3,000 Marines." He said, "I do not want to hear any more about that." I said, "Aye, aye, Sir" and sat down. When the meeting was over, no, at the meeting Dr. Deutch, sitting by SecDef Aspin said, "We met with you, we told you what this number was going to be. Why are you bringing this up again?" And I said, "Mr. Secretary, I do not have any recollection of that meeting." And he said, "It

was in the office in there. We went through this, we met, we sat down. It was you and me and the Secretary and we told you that.” And I said, “Sir, clearly, I have forgotten that and I have nothing more to offer.” And we ended the meeting shortly thereafter.

I walked out with Deutch and went back up to his office with him and I said, “John, what the hell meeting are we talking about? I never met with you and Aspin.” And he said, “I remember specifically.” I said, “Okay, I will go back and check my calendar. I would ask you to check your calendar.” I went straight to my office and said, “Did I have any meeting scheduled with the deputy and Secretary of Defense?” No, other than the force level briefing that I had given one-on-one to Aspin.

So I sent a note over to Deutch and said, “I have no record or recollection of the meeting that you talked about.” For the record, in my papers is the handwritten note that came back from Deutch with 10,000 apologies and saying, “Oh, my gosh, you know, how could we have done this. I do not have a record of meeting with you, either.” He said, “it was Kelso that we met with and we gave him the force levels,” which, of course, I had never heard anything about. Now whether he meant he gave him the Marine Corps force level or not, I do not know to this day, but they never, so the only Service Chief who was not called in in advance to be advised that here is the force level we are going to go with, ships, airplanes, divisions of soldiers and so on, was the Marine Commandant. And that was a great embarrassment.

At the farewell dinner that the Chairman hosted for me and for Gordan Sullivan last summer, Deutch came to that because we had great rapport with him. He came to that and he got up in his toast at the end and hailed me for never having turned him in or come back and reported that what you said at the table was not so.

So, to make a long story short, that is how the 177,000 did not get there but the 174,000 did. And on balance, though we really miss those 3,000 Marines today in the Corps and we are hollow in some places as a result of that, the fact is that 174,000 is remarkably better than 159,000 would have been. So, a long saga and an interesting one inside the politics of the building as to how such things get done.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who do you expect, I almost said suspect, who do you think did the arithmetic on the 3,000? Was there any rationale behind the 3,000 or just someone saying, “The Marine Corps has to take somewhat of a hit, let’s make a nominal hit of 3,000?”

GEN MUNDY: I think that the PA&E, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Bill Lind, not Bill Lind the reformist, but this is another William Lind, was never convinced by our briefing. He never understood, he would keep saying to me, we ought to pull the Marines out of Okinawa and then you would not need them if you did that. And I said, “Bill, who would be there? Who would go there? Well, we could put some soldiers there.” Well, then you are keeping soldiers so you can take out Marines. That does not make much sense.

And he said, “Well, I do not think we need to be in Okinawa.” And I said, “Well, that is not really a PA&E issue here. That is a national security issue. If the President and Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense decide we no longer need a force in Okinawa, then maybe we have something to talk about but I cannot unilaterally do that. I cannot just say we will take out 20,000 Marines and come out of Okinawa.”

So, some of the staffers never understood the mechanism that they were dealing with. They made no connection between what the National Security strategy is and what the force levels to execute that strategy are. Their thought was, we will simply, whatever the bogey is, that is how we will, we will shape the force to the bogey as opposed to the Marine Corps thesis that was, and still remains, we shape to the requirement.

So I suspect that in, I think that the fundamental factor was that every Service got the middle column and that even though 174,000 and 177,000 was not even popcorn-sized issues on the table, they could not give the Marines the right-hand column but they definitely did not do what the Bush Administration was going to do to the Marines. So I think they thought, “Well, that is as good as we can do, let’s give them option B.” I think that is the background.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 September, you and Mrs. 8MUNDY, accompanied by SgtMaj and Mrs. Overstreet began a lengthy trip to the Far East. You would not return until the evening of 20 September. What was your itinerary and what were some of your principal happenings?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the itinerary was an annual visit to the Pacific area which I think in general most Commandants have tried to go out and see the places in the Corps about once a year or couple years anyway. So it was a return to the Pacific.

We went through Hawaii. We went into, of course, my favorite place in the world, Wake Island, and spent

the night there. We went over to Okinawa. The visit in Okinawa was one of the characteristic command visits, you know, seeing Marines and making talks and just getting a sensing for how things were going.

We came back out of there and stopped at Iwo Jima, again out of my boyish passion to tread on as many World War II places as I could. We stopped there and toured the island and did some filming. I made, for the birthday video, as I recall that year, I talked about World War II and I said, and "Here on Iwo Jima," and I was on Iwo Jima.

We went on down to Tarawa. We stopped in Kwajalein and spent the night there and then flew into Bon Richi International Airport on Tarawa the next day and went down to the Red Beaches and the pier which is still there in some form or another and did some filming. Hottest place I have ever been. I did not make Guadalcanal. I am told that it will rival that but I do not think I have ever felt more like I was going to pass out and fall in the lagoon at any moment than I was standing out in the lagoon. It was low tide and you could go out there 100 yards and so and stand around an old hulk of one of the landing craft that was still there for some filming. But I just, I knew that when this film came out that I was going to have perspiration dripping off my nose and every place else. Remarkably it does not show. It did not come out that way. But, boy, it was hot.

We did that to Tarawa and then we came back to Hawaii and as I recall we stopped, usually when we would fly from Hawaii we would stop in San Diego, either go over to the Recruit Depot or at North Island just as a crew rest and stopover and then get up the next day and on into Washington. So, routine except for the visits to the World War II sites.

We went also from Okinawa, on the Sunday that we were there because we had nothing else going we flew down to Manila and heloed out, escorted by the Philippine Commandant of the Marines, but went out to Corregidor which I had been there as a lieutenant colonel but I just wanted to again go back out and tour Corregidor. So we had a good tour, just a lot of World War II stops.

BGEN SIMMONS: Great trip. Just for the record, the *Theodore Roosevelt* with its Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, returned to home port on 8 September having completed the experimental deployment we discussed during the last session. Do you think this experiment is likely to be repeated?

GEN MUNDY: I do not think so, not in the near term at any rate because what we learned from that was

pretty much what we knew going in. I think I talked about that in an earlier session here, but that a company of Marines while in many cases is, you know, certainly a force to be considered, is not a capable force to deploy to the Mediterranean and do anything significant. Marines do not fit on carriers. There is no place for packs. There is no place for, you know, for all this gear, for mortars, for heavy machine guns or anything, getting about the carrier. The carrier is not made with the wide ladders that go up to the landing areas where troops laden with gear can go. In the narrow passageways in carriers it just did not fit.

The Navy was never happy with that, the operational commanders, because it denuded the carrier of capability they wanted in the carrier. They want amphibious capability and they want carrier aviation and they did not want to mix the two. I think as the force levels of the amphibious force, which is now very healthily underway to become 36 very fine new LHDs, LHAs, a new LPD that has now been appropriated and is going to be built, I think as that force develops that we will not have any reason in the future to bastardize an outfit and put it aboard a carrier like this.

You could do it. When I was the XO of a Marine detachment on a carrier, we had a ship's landing force, two platoons of sailors and a platoon of Marines, led by the Marine officers on board. So you can always do that with a very light, let's go ashore and reinforce an Embassy or something, but you cannot do much more than that. So, it was an experiment and I would hope that it is, that that is an experiment that we tried and has gone by the wayside.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just because they are large, gray shapes with flight decks does not mean they are interchangeable.

GEN MUNDY: They are made to do certain things and they are not interchangeable.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that on 22 September you called on the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall. Was that just a courtesy call or did it have a specific purpose?

GEN MUNDY: It was courtesy. She was new, I did not call on the new Secretary of the Army specifically because I had known him so well over the years, but when the Secretary of the Army was eventually appointed, Togo West, I knew him from, he interviewed me to be an aide one time and I asked out of the job when he was the General Counsel of the

Department of Defense. But I just went over to, you know, make my manners with her and it was good politics. That way when you came to, you know, the issues of tactical air and so on, why you at least had the, the Air Force Secretary at least was comfortable with you. And we ate together at many affairs that we would go to, we would wind up sitting side by side. She is a great bicyclist. She cycles every weekend 150 miles, so we would always sit there and talk about bicycling. You would be a better, since you are down there on the bike trail you would be a much better dinner partner for her than I am who has not done any serious riding in a while. But a very nice lady.

BGEN SIMMONS: That evening, 22 September, you attended a joint session of the Congress addressed by President Clinton. What occasioned that joint session?

GEN MUNDY: As I recall it, he asked for a special meeting so that he could focus on the budget because this was to be, of course, the first Clinton budget to be submitted and it had been handed to him as a Bush budget and modified. But he was there to justify it.

He focused on the health care, you know, focused on the economy. And he made a very strong affirmation for the, you know, we are going to maintain, we have done the Bottoms Up Review and we are going to maintain a credible Armed Forces. So it was what I would characterize as a mini-State of the Union, you know, mid-year report by the President to the Congress.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of Thursday, 23 August, you and Mrs. MUNDY went to New York for dinner in honor of former President Reagan. Who were the sponsors of that event?

GEN MUNDY: That is an event that is held in the aircraft carrier, *Intrepid* which is a museum in New York and it is sponsored by the *Intrepid* Foundation which is in turn headed by Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher, two truly wonderful philanthropists who have done just unbelievable things for the various Armed Forces. He is a billionaire and he is certainly willing to give his money away to worthy causes. And he has determined that the most worthy cause around is the men and women in uniform. So he is very supportive.

He has each year a Medal of Freedom dinner. That was the first. And the Medal of Freedom was given by Zachary Fisher which is a gold medal on a red, white and blue chain. It is a black tie dinner for prob-

ably about 500 people in the hangar bay of the aircraft carrier, *Intrepid*. Really first class. Some heavy hitters there. Usually the Joint Chiefs and a number of Congressmen and anybody that has the money to pay that kind of fare is there.

But at any rate, it was President Reagan. President Reagan made his usual, motivating, great communicator speech to the crowd and if I am not mistaken that probably was about the last of President Reagan's notable appearances because as we know he has now receded because of Alzheimer's.

The next year, to give you some idea, the next year was Margaret Thatcher and then this past year was Prime Minister Rabin, two weeks before he was assassinated. They were the recipients. So it is always a leader of international stature.

BGEN SIMMONS: You held a General Officers Symposium from Sunday, 26 September through Saturday, 2 October. Do you recall the particulars of that symposium?

GEN MUNDY: I recall that we held it down at the Crystal City Marriot and that we had the usual array of sessions to consider problems facing the Marine Corps. How do we, now that we have 174,000, we are going to have to scale back 3,000 and we need to adjust to that. But kind of recurring things that you look at, updates for the generals. Gen Powell was getting ready to stand down at that point, no —

BGEN SIMMONS: He spoke at the luncheon.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, and we had him to the luncheon to say farewell and he, no, now wait a minute, no, I am a year off. He did come. We did have him and I think it was the next year that we said farewell to him at the symposium. Am I wrong?

BGEN SIMMONS: This is the year.

GEN MUNDY: All right. Well, we had a luncheon. Secretary Aspin came over and addressed the group and said 174,000 so they all loved him when he left and then we had Gen Powell for a quick stop-in luncheon because he was at that time really being consumed with, you know, with farewell efforts, but he was good enough to come over. And I gave him, as a gift we had gotten an Army cover, barracks cap, and put a gold Marine officer chin strap on it and put a Marine emblem on it and gave it to him in the name of jointness. He, you now, characteristic of Colin Powell, he put it on with great, we have some great

pictures of him and me standing there laughing and him wearing his Army/Marine hat.

BGEN SIMMONS: You attended the retirement ceremony for Gen Powell on the afternoon of 30 September. You and Mrs Mundy attended a dinner in his honor the previous evening. Who hosted that?

GEN MUNDY: The dinner was hosted by the SecDef and it was held at the Smithsonian Institute [sic]. It was a very, very, you know, uptown, first class affair, probably, I would say 200 or 300 people there, a number of his family.

BGEN SIMMONS: Which portion of the Smithsonian?

GEN MUNDY: It was in the, it would be in the American History because one of the things that I had never seen before was that they, we sat in a section where I was looking at the Fort McHenry flag on the wall and during the dinner they lowered the facade, the painting of the flag and there was the flag which, of course, they keep secured to preserve it. So the wall came down and there was the Fort McHenry flag and then the wall went back up. But that was part of the evening's special entertainment. It is an absolutely grand affair.

I am always amused by the fact that the Secretary of Defense, as you know, we are not allowed to spend money. I could host the SecDef at a parade at the Barracks or I could have him to dinner and pay for that out of official entertainment funds, but we are fairly tight and scrupulous on how we use those official funds. But my goodness, here is a, I mean, this dinner was \$125 a head probably, a couple hundred people.

But it was a fine affair. I sat at a table with his uncle from New York, who was a delightful man. He is mentioned several times in Gen Powell's book, but it was just, you know, a very nice evening. He was given a gift at the end and made remarks and, as always, he is extremely talented at turning on a crowd.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is always a special panache about anything at the Smithsonian. They always do a great job.

On 1 October the command element of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade was activated at Camp Pendleton as the West Coast counterpart of the 2d MEB command element on the East Coast. I am a little confused. On the one hand, we were doing away

with the brigade echelon and here we are creating a new one. Can you explain?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am probably about as confused as you are. We had long, and I say long, over a period of years we had dealt with the issue of whether the Reserves should provide any sort of major formation command and control —

BGEN SIMMONS: — 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that the decision to have a command control element completely Reserve had been made some years earlier when the 2d MEB had been stood up down at Camp Lejeune. There was more capacity. As you know we have a lot of senior officers in the Reserve and there was some ability to do that same thing on the West Coast. And what I think we learned from Desert Storm was that when we deployed the majority of the forces we then backfilled with, you know, not as many because we did not have that many, but with whatever Reserve forces we had called up but had not gone off to war but would have been the Reserves, if you will, literally. We backfilled and we really had set off the command and control structure.

So it served a useful purpose to have some sort of MAGTF command element on each coast. We were not going to make it a MEF. It was better than a MEU. It was commanded by a brigadier general and so it was a brigade. But it does seem a little bit odd.

Subsequently, you mentioned or because someone must have heard you and said, I am a little bit confused, so what it became, unbeknownst to me, just an informality is that we referred, when I was briefed shortly before I left as Commandant, we talked about the MAGTF Command Element East Coast and MAGTF Command Element West Coast and I said, "Boy, we have really cluttered it now. What is that?"

Well, the same answer. We do not have brigades anymore so that is what we are calling the 2d Brigade. And I said, "Look, change them back and call it the 2d MEB and the 3d MEB" and to my knowledge I think it is that way today.

We had an earlier discussion on whether or not I thought the demise of the brigade was good and I do not. It would be wonderful, I wish we had brigades in the structure today.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am a champion of the brigade echelon and I will keep niggling you on this as we continue.

GEN MUNDY: Must be Krulak's fault now.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 4th of October you and Mrs. MUNDY went to Dallas for the Texas State Fair. That must have been fun.

GEN MUNDY: It was a nice weekend. The Marine Drum and Bugle Corps, the Commandant's Own has for a number of years gone down to Dallas. It is the off-season. They really do not have anything compelling that is going on and the Texas State Fair some years ago made a bid for them to come down there to both recruit for Marines, that was a press by the local Marines down there, and then simply because of the nature of the organization.

So, over time, that has come to be about a three-week stay. Many of the members of the Drum and Bugle Corps have married Texas women. Some of them own property down there. So it is sort of the alternate headquarters for the Drum and Bugle Corps.

I had come into, when I learned of that I had questioned it and said, "I am not sure it is the right thing to do. What do we say to the Oklahoma State Fair if they come in and want us to send a band for three weeks?" I was assured that, not to worry, this was all covered. And the least of the worries was that President Bush was from Texas and so it was not going to be a big deal for the next few years. And I said, "Well, I would like to go down there and see it" and really we went down there sort of at our own invitation.

And when you see something that is this fundamentally wholesome and when all expenses are borne by the Texas State Fair and it does not cost the government anything except the salaries of the bandmen who would be off practicing somewhere anyway and here are demonstrating before thousands of people over an extended period, it cannot be all bad. So I did not mess around with that one anymore and they still return annually to the Texas State Fair.

BGEN SIMMONS: Great. On 7 October after the death of 14 American soldiers going after Aidid in Mogadishu, President Clinton announced the deployment of 1,700 soldiers and 104 armored vehicles to Somalia. In addition, he directed that an aircraft carrier and both the 13th and 22d Marine Expeditionary Units take station off the Somali coast. What do you recall of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, there really are two events to be discussed there. The second one is the easiest and the shortest perhaps to answer.

The first reaction from the White House, to the credit of the Corps, I think, because, of course, Gen Johnston and the Marines had been in Somalia and whatever the circumstances of the passage of time, the change of leadership and that sort of thing, while the Marines were there, perceptibly at least, things went pretty well. Marines came out and, perceptibly at least, things started not going so well.

So the very wholesome reaction out of the White House came, when this incident occurred the message came, get all the Marines offshore you can. So thus the two MEUs married up and of course, the reinforcements were, in part — this now goes to the front end of the question — the reinforcements, this package, was in part in reaction to the criticism that derived from the fact that the commander there had requested some armor — tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles — earlier and the background on this is a little cloudy. This ultimately was the issue, as we know, that broke the camel's back and that got Sec Aspin fired because he was felt not to have been responsive to a commander in the field and thus, you know, 14 soldiers died.

I would argue that point and have argued that point, that that was not the case. First of all, the issue of tanks or heavy armor to Mogadishu was one that only passed lightly, I would almost say over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I recall, Gen Powell came in one day and told us after the fact that the commander had asked for some armor but that Gen Hoar, the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command was lukewarm, did not really see the need. This occurred at a time when we were trying to keep force levels low and keep the U.S., or the coalition image, the military image kind of scaled back so that the nation could settle in politically. This was 1,700 more men and a bunch of tanks and everything made a lot of noise and a lot of dust down there. So there was a little bit of concern I think by Gen Hoar that they really were not needed. So the request was denied.

But that was not something that the Joint Chiefs sat and considered. Had we sat and considered it we probably would have voted that same way. I would have. I did not see the need for that.

In a similar vein, however, the Special Operations Forces, the Delta Force, which was a very, is a very sophisticated counter-terrorism force — it was designed for that purpose although we have tended to bastardize its use in a few cases in the past — but the Delta Force, some Rangers, Seals and Special Operations Forces were sent in when the rules of the game in Somalia shifted, really without the United

States, in my judgement, keeping our eye on the ball.

We had not gone in to try to take down Gen Aidid, Ambassador Aidid, Mr. Aidid, President Aidid, however you choose to refer to him, but in three of those titles is the fact that that was a national leader in Somalia, wrong, right, good guy, bad guy. We had not gone in with the mission to dethrone Mr. Aidid. However, the Secretary General of the U.N., Secretary Butros Butro-Ghali had a long-time enmity with Aidid and so as soon as the U.N. took charge of the operation we increasingly began to go, to find Aidid to be the enemy. And ultimately, the Special Operations Forces were introduced, again having passed after the fact, lightly, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, it was not our question. Somebody had made the decision that we would put the Special Ops folks in.

So some of the finest troops that we have in the United States' arsenal went there and their mission was to try and capture Mr. Aidid. And there were a couple of efforts at that. In this particular case where the soldiers were lost — I must sound, I am very proud of the American servicemen who fought there and they fought very capably; Rangers are fine soldiers and we need to think well of them — but I am lost on the logic.

They had a quick infusion of intelligence that indicated that Mr. Aidid was down in the vicinity of the most crowded marketplace in Mogadishu. We launched a raid of U.S. service personnel at 3 o'clock in the afternoon into a crowded marketplace with Rangers fast roping out of helicopters, running through this building trying to capture the leader of this throng of people who are out in the marketplace. They shot back. We lost, and we cannot forgive them. How dare they shoot back at us as we come in to seize their clan leader and then we get very excited as a nation, and it is repugnant, but we get very excited as a nation at how dare they drag an American serviceman through the streets of Mogadishu that they have killed when we attacked. So it is a little bit of reverse logic here in how that came to pass.

As to the loss of the U.S. personnel, I think that every after action look that we could take at this particular incident revealed that had we had tanks, had we had heavy armor there, while indeed it might have gotten through road blocks faster, we could not have gotten it into the city and maneuvered, we could not have relieved the force that was under siege with heavy armor in this crowded city in the narrow alleyways because a tank, there is no turn and maneuver in there.

So the tanks arguably would not have made a dif-

ference at the time of the engagement. Maybe the tanks in there earlier might have, you know, said, let's not shoot at this guys while they are trying to seize our President, our clan leader, because they might send those tanks after us. One could argue that case. But it was not well done.

It was a proud moment for those fighting the battle. It was not a proud moment for those of us back here who were responsible for doing things coherently. And it was that issue, I think, more than anything else that inflamed the American people to say, "We will never have American troops serving under U.N. command." It was not, arguably it was the fault of the U.N. in going after Mr. Aidid but we had a U.S. admiral turned Ambassador who was over there at the time that, you know, was on scene. We could have turned that off. So I think that we, I think we made the mistake here in Washington, not on the battlefield in Mogadishu.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 12 October you once again addressed the Naval War College. On 15 October you held a breakfast for members of the news media. What was that about?

GEN MUNDY: As I recall that was probably the Zorthian group again, just an update on where we were and what was going on and we talked about Somalia undoubtedly at that point. I do not recall that the news media meeting was for any reason other than that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 16th of October, a Saturday, you went to Pascagoula, Mississippi to be the principal speaker at the commissioning of the *Kearsarge* (LHD-3). What are your recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, a very grand day. I have been the commissioning speaker for two ships down there now and the *Kearsarge*, of course, was the third in the class of the most capable, most modern amphibious ship, the big LHD. Alma Powell was its sponsor so, as those who do not know, the ship's sponsor, of course, christens the ship at an earlier, a year and a half earlier so she breaks the champagne on it and it is her ship. And that, you know as in days of old, I guess, ladies tied their scarves around your lance and you rode off into battle representing the colors of a lady, well that is sort of the same context of the lady who sponsors the ship. It is sort of her ship.

Anyway, Alma was there and, of course, Gen Powell, USA (Ret) was in about the third row back

here. So I sat up with Mrs. Powell and Gen Powell was there, although all eyes still were on him.

Congressman Jack Murtha was there. Pascagoula, the Ingalls Shipbuilding used that occasion very artfully to invite Congressman Murtha who headed the Appropriations Committee or the Defense subcommittee on Defense Appropriations in the Appropriations Committee and they had him down to this commissioning and, of course, gave him a speaking part. And Jack Murtha got up there and said, "I have never seen a ship like this before. I think this is the finest ship I have ever seen. We need more of these."

And, of course, we all, the mission had been achieved because we knew that LHD-6 and now LHD-7 were going to come on the heels of that kind of support.

But it is a splendid occasion to commission a ship. The ship comes to life. The crew runs aboard. There are Marines that charge up yelling, "oorah" and it is just a very happy time. So, a nice day, not too hot. You know, October is a nice month down on the Gulf and it was a very pleasant occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, we have not finished this session but we have run out of time so we will recess at this point and pick up here later.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, on Monday, 18 October, 1993 you went directly from Mississippi to Palm Springs, California. Here you attended a dinner in honor of DACOWITS. What is DACOWITS?

GEN MUNDY: DACOWITS is translated the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service and that is a committee that is advisory to the Secretary of Defense so it is a very high level committee appointed by the Secretary. Its purpose being comprised of generally successful women around the country. It is not exclusively women. It is probably 30 or 40 percent male, but they are people that are out in the private sector and the corporate sector that have an interest in properly employing women in the workforce or in the executive levels.

So they come in and visit military installations, talk to women, talk to the commanders and in many cases are a very favorable group that feel that progress is being made and that women's equal opportunity is recognized. A few of them are passionate and are feminist and they will usually come in and there is nothing that you could say that would totally satisfy them.

Each year the old saws keep coming up, you know, when are we going to have women in all of the Marine security guard units around the world? So it is very

difficult to explain that there are some parts of the world where women would simply not be welcome and particularly in a security or law enforcement context.

But, on balance, it has been, I think, a fairly positive organization though it has created some concern in the past. Gen Gray, my predecessor, on his first appearance with DACOWITS made some remarks that were straightforward and forthwith but they were not what the DACOWITS leadership wanted to hear and so he found himself under fire a little bit in the press for his statements some years ago.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same day, 18 October, there was another deployment. This time 600 Marines were sent to Guantanamo as a stand-by force for possible employment incident to the United Nations naval embargo of Haiti. What are your recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there was almost continual presence above the normal security force battalion that we have in Guantanamo down in the Caribbean during my tenure. We had, of course, several years ago stopped sending the routine amphibious deployments down there and Marines are dispatched only when we need to reinforce the ground security force or for other purposes.

In this particular instance the organization that was sent down there was a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, as we chose to term it. That is to say it was not a Marine Expeditionary Unit. It is obviously smaller in numbers. But it had much of the composition of that force and it was sent there to, as you have pointed out, to provide the additional on-scene capability in the event we needed to do something quickly in Haiti, that is to go in and extract the U.S. ambassador or to reinforce the embassy.

The unit was commanded by a colonel. It was sent down there. It was about a reinforced rifle company with supporting elements. As I recall we sent a detachment of helicopters down there with it. Eventually, and the eventuality was not too long, but in the next few weeks the USS, I think initially the *Saipan* which was one of the LHAs, and then followed by the USS *Wasp*, LHD-1, eventually became the platform on which we embarked the Marines from Guantanamo into the ship and then they were available for the blockade or quarantine operations that were being undertaken at that time against Haiti.

BGEN SIMMONS: How large is the ground security force ordinarily?

GEN MUNDY: Ordinarily about 350, at what we used to call the Marine Barracks, Guantanamo and then really it became the Marine Corps Security Force or Ground Security Force, still referred to generically as the Marine Barracks, Guantanamo. And that normally is commanded by a colonel, a lieutenant colonel exec, so it has been a fairly critical organization.

Beautiful piece of land, I mean, Guantanamo itself is not innately an appealing place. It is rather a scrub cactus and so on, but in the good old days I can recall in the days of my lieutenancy sailing into Guantanamo Bay and catching the officer's boat to the officer's landing and getting off and going up and rolling ship's captain and crew dice and drinking ten cent Cuba libres. That was the good old days of the Empire, I guess, but those changed a little bit.

The Marines man the fence. It is a somewhat meaningless duty anymore because the Cubans are not threatening to try and seize the base. But we do have that security down there and it is usually a pretty good organization.

BGEN SIMMONS: Does the CO of the Marine Barracks still have that beautiful set of quarters and long driveway lined by royal palms as you approach it?

GEN MUNDY: He does, right out on the tip and then you are looking right out on the Bay. It is a nice location. In fact, that Marine peninsula, if you will, or that little point that they are on, you know, is pretty much Marine country. Used to have their own PX up there and you could buy furniture, a lot of good buys at the Marine Exchange which was in addition to the Navy Exchange.

The base, the decision was made by the Navy in the past couple of years, and that was subsequent to this incident as we had the great migration of Haitians out of Haiti and then Cubans that Fidel Castro loosed to put to sea on rafts and boats and they were picked up.

At one point we billeted about 26,000 or 27,000 migrants in holding camps at Guantanamo. Well, the decision was made to then evacuate dependents.

I personally did not support that and do not to this day because if you had been there you know that there are holding camps there but life otherwise was very much the same as it had been. And when we evacuated the place most of the dependents who were down there were the people that worked in the exchanges or who helped operate the clubs and so on and so we took out that workforce and it really became a rather expeditionary environment without really having cause to, I thought.

But anyway, I wonder how much longer we will hang on to Guantanamo, and it will be another one of those, you know, the folding of the flag on one of the last Subic Bay, Guantanamo Bay, those places around the world where we have historically had outposts or at least for the past 100 plus years.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 October you spent the day at Quantico speaking to the Commanders Course and also meeting with two FBI special agents, Mike Woof and Dick Webber. What was this connection with the FBI?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Gray established a post, when we went into the training of our MEUs for special operations capabilities he established a post and was successful in convincing the FBI to give him a special advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. So there is in the Operations Division at Headquarters Marine Corps a special agent who, we are now on the second, Webber is that man, who is assigned by the FBI and he facilitates the training in an urban environment. In other words, arranging with cities for Marines to go in the various cities around the country and do some pretty sophisticated training; live fire downtown, helicopters whizzing through city streets at midnight, you know, evacuations of people and hostage rescue. So that is the purpose.

The other fellow, Dick Webber really was bringing Mike Woof who was, in effect, his counterpart on the West Coast, who coordinated the West Coast training, in from San Francisco just as a hello call while I was at Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 23 October, you went to Camp Lejeune to be the principal speaker at the annual observance of the Beirut bombing tragedy. What are your recollections of this event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a very emotional event as have, I think, all of those focusing on that tragedy. I remember I was on hand for the first one when President Reagan came down. Gen Gray presided and it was a rainy day, we all got soaked, but as the chaplain said, "it is a day," you know, "The weather is befitting the day here, because it was a very sad day."

This one was the 10th anniversary so many of the families had come back. There is a very nice memorial just off Lejeune Boulevard that the city of Jacksonville put up and then planted a tree for each of the 241 MarineS, soldiers and sailors that were killed there —

BGEN SIMMONS: We were speaking about the observance of the Beirut anniversary.

GEN MUNDY: And I think I had gone back to recount some of the original gloom of the incident. But on this particular occasion many of the families had come in because it was the 10th anniversary. Gen Gray was there in the audience, Col Geraghty who commanded the unit during that time and many others.

I gave remarks. It was a very warm and embracing occasion for the family of the Corps. But it once again was an appropriately overcast and dreary day and rather chilly. It sort of set the proper stage. But it was simply a commemoration of the loss of those service people on that particular date ten years hence.

BGEN SIMMONS: You stayed at Camp Lejeune through the 26th of October. On the morning of the 26th you spoke at a National Prayer Breakfast being held there. What are your recollections of that breakfast?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the weekend was occasioned by being there on the, for the anniversary on the 23rd and at that time, Tim, my youngest son was stationed there so we were able to stay over Saturday and Sunday and enjoy the weekend with them. And then the base was having the prayer breakfast on Monday morning.

I spoke at a number of prayer breakfasts, you know, around the Corps from time to time and indeed, with the other Services because they would ask me and I thought that that was a good thing to do. So, it was unremarkable other than it was breakfast down in Marston Pavilion at Camp Lejeune, was very crowded and was a good, warm occasion. And then I left and came home from there, I believe.

BGEN SIMMONS: You began the Marine Birthday observances with an evening in Midlothian, Virginia on Saturday, the 30th of October. Who was your host then?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was invited to the ball hosted by the Marine Corps Recruiting Station in Richmond and again, back to my feeling of closeness with the recruiting service that probably would have caused me to at least consider it though the Commandant simply cannot answer all those bills to the many invitations you get. In this case, a former adjutant of mine from the 4th MAB days, Major Jack Evans, was the CO of the recruiting station and it was one of the top

notch stations in the nation so I accepted to go down there. We were to helicopter down but as it turned out we were weathered out so my driver and I jumped in the sedan and drove down, Midlothian being just south of Richmond.

They had a very, very nice ball and the thing that, at the end of it after I had made my remarks, Maj Evans said, "We did not get you a packaged gift but I have a gift for you," and with that, every recruiter, every Marine in uniform at that ball stood up and sang three verses of the Marines' Hymn and I tell you I just thought that was wonderful. It was truly one of the nicest gifts you could get [laughter].

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday evening, the 31st of October, *60 Minutes*, the Columbia Broadcasting System news magazine, broadcast its highly critical report on minority officers in the Marine Corps. We have talked about the background earlier. How was your interview used or misused?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the interview was two and a half hours long. We did not have a transcript although we managed to eventually come up with something of a transcript because *60 Minutes* had cleverly convinced my public affairs people that too much audio/video equipment in the office — we were now using my office for the scene as opposed to a theater or something — that too much, that they would get some interference. So we did not put a Marine camera on me or put a real recording machine.

Then Major, now LtCol Robin Higgins who was kind of shepherding that event sat in the background with a recorder much like we are using here going on, but at a distance. There are broad expanses of static and, you know, broken phrases and then mumbles so it was hard to reconstruct. But at any rate, we reconstructed it pretty well.

From that reconstruction, what I was able to determine was that there were questions posed on the air which had, in some cases, been revised. In other words, it was not specifically the question that was asked. And there were answers to those questions that had been answers to other questions that had been asked, sometimes about a different subject. So it truly was a product of the cutting room floor and I think the total was maybe 45 seconds of me out of two and a half hours of transcription. I was trying very hard to explain to Leslie, as I talked about earlier, Leslie Stahl, you know, to answer the questions and to explain them. Unfortunately, they just had too many words and too many answers from which they could selectively edit and paint me in a rather unfavorable

position with regard to my remarks about minorities and whether they could shoot, navigate and swim. I think we talked about that in the previous session.

BGEN SIMMONS: I remember that Robin Higgins sent out a very enthusiastic message by way of electronic mail after the interview. She thought it went very well. She thought you had a good rapport with Leslie Stahl. And, in fact, I believe she said that you had invited Leslie Stahl to come to the Birthday Ball.

GEN MUNDY: When Leslie and I parted, again, it was a very pleasant meeting, and I did say I would like to have you come down some time, and we parted smiling and I think both of us feeling very good about it. But then again, remember that then Leslie has done her duty and I have done mine and then her editor takes charge and we were all genuinely surprised, I think, by the tenor of the program when it came out.

In hindsight, as I had watched it another time, I suppose I could look back and say well, I suppose it was not really so much to be taken offense, but just the clips that they had done on me on a couple of them I was, for about the fourth time, explaining this to Leslie and so I was in some degree of, you know, of frustration, smiling and saying, well, Leslie, let me do it again. And the way that came across, of course, was a very light-hearted, flippant response. So, at any rate, it was not one of the prouder moments in terms of the impact that I think that had on Marines that did not deserve to be, feel like they had been put down by me anyway.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday —

GEN MUNDY: Let me just say another word about that that I wanted to mention with regard, you know, setting aside the interview. A very interesting aspect that I, I guess with my intelligence background had to scratch around a little bit on, was that that broadcast, although we had been told following the interview that they expected to air it in early to mid-August, then that slipped to mid- August into September and so on, it was interesting that it was aired ten days before the Marine Corps birthday and that immediately following that on I believe the next Tuesday night, my friend, Sam Donaldson and *Primetime Live* chose to run the exposé on the hazing incident at the Barracks. I just, I walked away from that feeling that someone had set up to hit the Marine Corps at its proudest moment with a one-two punch because of the timing. That could be purely coincidence but it

just seemed to me that it was too coincidental.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sure you are right. On Wednesday, 3 November, you went to New York for a reception onboard the museum ship *Intrepid*. Was Zachary Fisher your host again at this time?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that is the Intrepid Foundation and he, that was a, he hosts a number of affairs. This particular one was, in fact it relates to our previous discussion. It was honoring a Navy stewardmate first class named Alonzo Swan. Alonzo Swan was an African-American. He had been a part of a gun crew in the gun tub into which a kamikaze crashed during the battle off Okinawa. Alonzo Swan had been the sole survivor and had dragged several of his wounded buddies who eventually, of course, died from their wounds and injuries, out and had been recommended for a Navy Cross. But that recommendation had been downgraded to a Bronze Star.

To make a long story short, 45 years later the Navy had seen fit to resurrect the case and Alonzo Swan was receiving the Navy Cross at that affair. So the crowd who were there, believe me, keeping in mind that this was just a few days after *60 Minutes*, the crowd was predominantly African-American and here I am sitting right at the head table in all my glitz and glory of my evening dress uniform. And I thought, “Boy, if somebody wants to take me on on *60 Minutes* at this point I sure am a high profile target.”

Mr. Roy Wilkins, the President of the Congress on Racial Equality, big man, big, impressive man, during the cocktail hour walked up to me. I had no idea who he was but he walked up and he stuck out his hand and he said, “I would like to meet a fellow victim of *60 Minutes*. I was interviewed for an hour and a half. How long was your interview?” I really felt good about that because what he said to me, he gave me his card, he introduced me to his son who was sort of taking over his leadership, and he said, “Whatever we can do to help you, let us know.” And so what the communication was, that from the educated and sophisticated levels of the black community that they understood what had happened. And I never had any grievance or harsh letters or anything from anyone really in the upper echelons of leadership of the minority movement. Many, many from below that. So I appreciated that. That was a unique instance following the *60 Minutes*.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did the Montford Point Marine Association react in any way to the broadcast?

GEN MUNDY: They did not as far as a letter to me or any communication to me. As I mentioned earlier, I had many communications from serving Marine officers, minorities, from outside, from people that I had known earlier that wrote in to say, you know, we know that is not accurate. And I wrote them back at length to say, "You are right and here is what has happened."

Most of those letters that came in were, I think that I had, shall I say pro forma, well I think it was pro forma, but Qwasi Mfume, who has just been elected the Chairman or the President of the NAACP, was then a Congressman and the leader of the Black Caucus. So, after some period of time I got the appropriate, you know, letter from him representing the Black Caucus, "How could I say something like that?"

Secretary Jesse Brown, himself a Vietnam Marine, wounded, African-American, good friend, I had had Jesse to a parade at the Barracks, but I got, I could tell that it was, you know, the staff letter that came to me that, you know, millions of American veterans are offended by your remarks. And so I wrote him back and — it was Dear Gen MUNDY and signed Jesse Brown, Secretary — so when I wrote him back I wrote him back and just said, "Dear Jesse, "and what I said fundamentally is, "Look, here is what has happened." And then I said, "You are a great Marine. Who would you believe, the Commandant or *60 Minutes*?" And I got a tremendous response from him saying, I had to write the letter, it was necessary to send you the letter but I understand completely.

So I really never got any, you know, threats or any strong pressure but just sort of the necessary response that groups would cause their leaders to shoot in. Ironically, the greatest pressure on me over this came from within the Department of Defense as we can talk about just a minute. I will follow up on that with one of your questions that are coming up.

BGEN SIMMONS: Getting back to the Marine Corps Birthday, on Thursday, 4 November, in the morning there was a cake-cutting ceremony at the House of Representatives. That evening there was a reception by the Marine-affiliated members of the FBI. Any recollections of these occasions?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, much the same as we have discussed before. The FBI, the Tun Tavern Night, as they call it at the Marine Barracks, each year is a gathering of FBI Marines here in Washington.

And, of course, the House and the Senate had by this time grown, we were, I would venture to say, I do

not remember this year specifically but I know that by this time as we were giving away the slices of birthday cake that we would introduce the oldest Senator and the youngest Senator and we would usually line up, I think at one time, six or eight Senators. Plus we would have others that were, Senator Dan Inouye, who, of course, had a Marine constituency out in Hawaii and is himself a wounded World War II hero, people like that would come and the place would be flooded. So it became truly a very significant event for the Marine Corps on the Hill.

BGEN SIMMONS: We are getting into another event because on Tuesday, 9 November, there was a cake-cutting at the Senate in the morning and then a luncheon with the Capital Hill Marines. Any further recollections of that?

GEN MUNDY: None of significance.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 10 November, the birthday itself, there was the traditional morning ceremony at the Marine Corps War Memorial, a noon-time ceremony at the National Defense University, the acceptance of a bust of Samuel Nicholas at the Marine Corps Museum in the early afternoon and a Pentagon cake-cutting in the late afternoon. The Birthday Ball was that evening. Any specific recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: There is a specific one. Number 1, they are all grand and, as you have characterized it, it is a high pace on the birthday. You probably, somewhere you left out in there I imagine a run downtown to a gathering of Marines that meet at Mike's Bar and Restaurant every year. They are Reserve Marines, former Marines, retired that just get together at about noon, have a few drinks and then cut the cake. It is a moving thing. So add that in as a stop-by and you are tired at the end of the day.

But the thing that I remembered, I mentioned a moment ago that there was tremendous pressure. There was an enormous amount of pressure conveyed to me principally by the Undersecretary of the Navy and by the General Counsel of the Navy that there was a full expectation within the Department of Defense that there would be some sort of apology on my part for this *60 Minutes* episode.

I told Mr. Danzig at the time, the Undersecretary, that I really did not feel, if there was an apology due that I thought *60 Minutes* owed it. There was not anything I had said that was not absolutely true. It had been mischaracterized but it was true and there was



Gen Mundy takes the “wheel” of a small assault boat during a visit with the 3 Commando Brigade in Portsmouth, England. This was part of a six-day visit with the Royal Marines in November 1993.

nothing I had said that was disparaging of the minorities in the Marine Corps.

But anyway, I kept getting through my military secretary and through other whispers, if you will, that I had better click my heels and emit some apology. So I elected to do that at the Iwo Jima Memorial ceremony. I really felt very hollow at that particular ceremony. I sat down that morning, in fact I think that I got up about 4:00 in the morning and rewrote my remarks to include in there, you know, reference to the men who had put up the flag and to recognize that one of them was Ira Hayes; that he was not from the majority of the American population. And I went on to recognize that I hoped as people like him had listened to words that I may have uttered that they would understand that there was no, what was displayed at least was not from the heart or the feeling of the Commandant.

Well, that assuaged, that was good enough. I got my political up check and nothing more was ever said to me formally about *60 Minutes*. But I felt very badly about that because — I think it came across all right — but I felt badly about it because I hated, you know the Iwo Jima statue is the Mecca of the Marine

Corps to me and I just, it was just a hollow feeling to go up there and have to, in effect, apologize for something that I did not feel an apology was due. So, that was a recollection but other than that it was a very bright and exciting day, as were all of them.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next day, Tuesday, 11 November, you and Mrs. Mundy departed for a counterpart visit to the United Kingdom. This visit would last until Tuesday, 23 November. What are your recollections of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they are vivid. It was one of the most exciting trips that we took. As you characterized it, it was a counterpart trip. The Commandant General of the Royal Marines was LtGen Robin Ross. We have spoken of him earlier and his wife, Sarah. We arrived in London. I had for many years wanted to witness the London Remembrance Day or Veterans Day ceremony. It is a tremendously moving experience. It is done at the Cenotaph in London. The Queen is there, the whole Royal family, and, of course, with all the pomp and circumstance that the British do so well. And that is held on a Sunday. It is

Remembrance Sunday there regardless of the date.

So we went over on a Saturday, I think, and then we were there, met the Ross' in London, went to that and that evening, well, let me just summarize by saying it was all that I expected. It is really a moving event.

That evening they included us at the Remembrance Festival in the Albert Hall in London, the Kennedy Center equivalent, I guess, of London. This in itself has to be the most moving national observance that I have been to because, of course, the British can combine church and state and there is no problem with the Archbishop of Canterbury coming on and doing something and then the military or the political leaders doing that as well.

This is a concert. In this particular case it was the bands of the Royal Marines and I think the Highlanders are there with their pipes and then the trumpeters up in the ramparts. So it is a very moving concert.

And then they bring on athletes from the Services, their physical fitness people, and have there contests, you know, carry the howitzer down in pieces and assemble it at the other end so it is a festival.

At the end, and the units that march out are all these old timers, you know, with their bowler hats and their "brellies" and they hobble in and the Nurses' Corps comes and the Bus Drivers' Corps comes. But they are all so proud and they march across and review for the Queen.

And at the end they then assemble the combined units of the British Armed Forces there, the Royal Air Force, the Marines, the Navy and so on, but there is this whole floor full of young servicemen all in uniform, all at attention but none covered, none with their hats on. Then the Archbishop comes in and he holds a very brief memorial service and it ends with that, "With the rising of the sun and the setting of the day, we shall remember them," that is inscribed up in Edinburg, Scotland on the castle walls up there.

And at that time then as they play again the moving, the Sunset or their last call and so on, from the ceiling in the Albert Hall pour tens of thousands of poppy petals down on the heads and shoulders of these assembled servicemen below. The crowd, the Queen stands and sings with them and then they all turn and face the Queen and sing "God Save the Queen."

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there anything more you wanted to say about —

GEN MUNDY: No, except again, it was a tremendous, well, there is, not about the Remembrance

Festival. I was really walking through the visit. We then finished up in London and went down to Portsmouth which is the headquarters of the Royal Marines and General and Lady Ross have a beautiful set of quarters down there. We stayed with them.

We then had several days of doing the usual things that we would do, going out and watching their commandos train, going to their Combat Training Center, Royal Marines, which is their boot camp, their basic training both for officers and their enlisted people.

They host you wonderfully, really. When you go over there they put you up in their homes. You do not stay in a BOQ or VIP quarters somewhere. You stay with them, wherever you are, with the colonel that runs the CTCRM.

It so happened that they had, as they term it, the young officers "passing out," which does not mean they had drunk too much but it meant graduation for their officers basic class. So I was able to be the reviewing officer and to present the sword for the honor graduate at that particular incident.

We had, again, just tremendous social events and truly a warm and for me a very spirited visit because they, as you have commented earlier, the Royal Marines and the U.S. Marines are very, very close.

BGEN SIMMONS: There have been a few interruptions during this session but we will edit those out of the transcript later on. We are still in England and you are visiting with Gen and Mrs. Ross.

GEN MUNDY: And we have almost concluded that visit because, again, as I was commenting, I really left there with a very professional feeling for the Royal Marines. Now, in addition to the specific visit to England, I had been invited to come and address the NATO Military Committee in Brussels about Marine Corps capabilities and so I used this week to put Robyn Ross on the airplane with me to fly up to Brussels.

There we brought down the Commandant General of the Netherlands Marines and brought up the Spanish Marine Corps Commandant and the Portuguese, so we had all of the, so to speak, European or Atlantic Marine Corps there in the Military Council and then I was the spokesman and advocated the use of the Marine forces in what I thought to be the increasing role of Marines in the types of things that we would want to do in the future.

And it was well received. But that was a, probably a unique experience because, of course, the NATO Military Committee had always been a continental



In November 1993, Gen and Mrs. Mundy traveled to visit Marines serving in Somalia. While in Mogadishu, they visited their son, Sam, a Marine Corps captain.

focus and this was unusual to have Marines in there making the key presentation.

While in London I was received by Prince Phillip who I found to be a tremendous conversationalist. I had been somewhat concerned about what to wear. This was all civilian clothes and the Brits will specify dark suit or business suit and so on. So at any rate I had a dark suit and a very conservative tie. I went in and both Prince Phillip and my counterpart, Robyn Ross, were wearing the Marine Corps regimental striped tie. So I could have sported my own and really been in league there.

Now when we concluded the visit then in the UK we went out and got on the C-20 and flew straight to Somalia for a little side-line stop-in. At that time we had the 13th MEU offshore Somalia and that was a recall of the force that had gone back down there. We were out that way anyway.

So we flew down, stopped in Cairo, left the UK, got into Cairo about 2100 or 2200, stayed overnight and then got up early the next morning and launched for Somalia. Got in there in early afternoon. I got off the airplane. We did not keep the C-20 in Somalia but they would fly on down to Nairobi and, of course, Linda was along with me on this trip.

So we flew into Somalia so she got to land in

Mogadishu. Her oldest son, Sam, was a captain commanding a company there so he came out and had a coke with his mother on the airplane in Mogadishu and then they left and she went to Nairobi with the plane crew. I remained overnight out aboard ship and then spent the next day with the Marines and the Army forces that were there.

I made it a point, any time that I went in, so to speak, in my Joint Chiefs hat that I would always go see the Army or Air Force forces or whoever was there as well as Marines. Then we left late in the day, went back up to Cairo and then from Cairo straight back in to the United States the next day. So I covered a lot of bases in that stop.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was a great trip, a great trip. On Monday, 6 December, you flew to Albany, Georgia and the next day went to Birmingham, Alabama. I see that you addressed a Kiwanis Club in Birmingham. Any special recollections of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: The visit to Albany was a routine command visit. The visit to Birmingham was at the request of Senator Howell Heflin, to come over to address the Kiwanians. So I did so at his request.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 December, SecDef Aspin announced that a comprehensive study of factors affecting the readiness of first-term service members showed no statistical link between marital status and readiness. This was a follow-on to his cancellation of your directive which would have phased out the enlistment of married recruits. What was your reaction to the announced results of the study?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they were not surprised. Of course, as in many cases as the study is going along you can see the direction it is taking and you know oftentimes in advance what the conclusions of the study are going to be, so I was not at all surprised. And indeed, I could not argue a statistical link between readiness and marital status but I could argue a practical link between it and that is what the Marine sergeants and sergeants major and lieutenants and captains were telling us. It might not be statistically measurable but it was very real, the amount of distraction that they had and that the units suffered from young marriages that were not able to cope with the high pace of Marine life.

What that study did show, and there will be a chart in my papers that will reflect that because I used it habitually for the next two years in almost everything I did, to support funding, to support everything for the Marine Corps, a chart was produced which showed the average — if there is such a thing as an average airman or average Marine or average soldier — but the average deployed time for each of the services during the first enlistment. And for the Marine Corps the average deployment was 12 months out of 48 months. For the Navy I think it, the Navy came in at 7 or 8, the Army was 5 or 6 and the Air Force was 2. So that chart very specifically, it was titled, “Average Deployed Time by Service,” and the red line on the chart was the Marines going all the way to the top of the chart.

So it served my purposes to again try and educate people that the Services are different, that we are not all cut from the same mold nor do we do the same thing. We use young Marines differently then we use young airmen. They generally spend a long time in fairly technical schools and then are based in a permanent location. If they go overseas the family goes to Germany with them or goes to the Far East with them. Not so in the case of unit deployments and expeditionary deployments and the way that we use Marines.

So, although the study concluded what many might have said, “Well, that shoots that crazy Marine notion down,” but indeed, what it gave me was the ability to

articulate the difference between Marines and everybody else and it worked for us in subsequent efforts, for example, in housing. Instead of total emphasis on married quarters which is what the Department of Defense wanted to do, I would continue to say “Look, I have to do something for the young bachelor Marines here. That to me right now at this moment is more important than married housing because we have this high turbulence rate.” So it was a very useful study in that sense.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of 21 December you went to a Christmas party at the White House. Was there any difference in the entertainment patterns of President Bush and President Clinton?

GEN MUNDY: The Clintons are less formal in their entertainment patterns. When I say more personable, I do not mean that in any terms other than just maybe the personalities themselves. Certainly President and Mrs. Bush were warm and were very, very congenial on all occasions but it was a bit more formal, a bit more reserved, a bit, shall I say, less personal, I think.

The Bushes when we went to our first reception there you would go through the White House and have something to drink and some hors d’oeuvres and so on and look at the Christmas trees and the decorations and it is beautiful and the Marine Band is there playing music. And then the Bushes would form a receiving line and we would be received and shake hands and say hello and you would go about your business.

With the Clintons they would take station down in the diplomatic receiving room in the basement of the White House where there was a beautiful tree and everyone who came had a picture made with the Clintons and they were very warm and very congenial, you know, arms around each other types of pictures. So those are some very good pictures.

But as I have said, I think, before in characterizing the two, both warm and both, I believe genuine, with Mrs. Clinton in particular, when you were talking with her you had the feeling that there was no one else in the room but you. She had that ability to just make you feel genuinely that you were a guest in her home, and he as well. And as we would stand under the tree usually you would pass some small talk. In fact, if we get to 1995 and we get under the tree, why, I can recount then that it was then that Mrs. Clinton came across the floor to me as we were walking up and said, “You were right. Do you know you have 16 year olds out there —

BGEN SIMMONS: There was an interruption there but you were telling us about the Clinton's Christmas party.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I really was going on to the next year and I was talking about the warmth and the personal reception that you received and I was going on to jump ahead a little bit here that in the next year the Clintons had stopped through Kaneohe Bay in route back from a trip to the Western Pacific and they had a couple —

BGEN SIMMONS: — stopped in at Kaneohe Bay.

GEN MUNDY: While at Kaneohe Bay she went over to the Family Services Center and spent some time with them. The President played golf and so on. But at the next Christmas reception when we, which happened to be the next time that we had seen them, as Linda and I started across the floor toward the Christmas tree to be received by the Clintons, she physically came toward me and said, "You were right." she said, "do you know that you have some 16

year old wives out at Kaneohe Bay." She said, "We need to do something about that."


I said, "Mrs. Clinton, we have some 14 year old wives down at Camp Lejeune, and probably some at Kaneohe Bay, too." But she said, "Well, I am ready to back you. I think you were right on that marriage issue"

So the President said to me, he said, "You really took a lot of heat over that." He said, "I thought you were off base at the time" but, he said, "I have come to believe that maybe we ought to do something about that." I said, "Well, Mr. President, I will tell you, why don't we let Mrs. Clinton lead and I will be in direct support then on that issue." [laughter]

So you had that, that sort of very familiar and easy banter with President and Mrs. Clinton. And I do not mean that we did not with President and Mrs. Bush. Maybe we just did it to or three more times with the Clintons than we did with the Bushes. But the receptions were very, very nice affairs on every occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 December the Department

Former President George Bush was given a briefing at the Pentagon on the Bottom-up Review on 30 September 1993. Here, Mundy and Bush are seen with Gen Joseph P. Hoar, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, and a Basic School classmate of Gen Mundy's.



of Defense issued new regulations codifying the “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy for homosexuals in the Services. The new regulations would take effect 5 February 1994. Despite your defensive statements, it seems to me that you were losing on all fronts.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I do not really think so. As we discussed earlier, it was the conviction of the Chiefs at the time that while we understood that some political concession, you know, that the President had to make some modification, but we all felt that the revised policy, as we earlier discussed it, was as tight, arguably, in fact, tighter, than had been the former policy which was simply “are you or aren’t you” and then after that it was rather loose as to what the specifics were. We thought that we had a pretty tight policy.

And, as I mentioned earlier, statistically under 2 percent of the discharges that we had had for other than normal active service expiration were for homosexuality. So it simply was not a problem within the Armed Services at that time except among rightist groups who were seeking to use the military to advance their cause in general. The military made a convenient whipping boy, if you will. If the barrier had been broken in the military to say “Yes, you can say ‘I am gay’ but I am going to be a soldier or a Marine or an airman, then what could you deny in our society to gays?” So I think that it was the penetration point. But, we felt that the policy was acceptable and to this day I still believe it is.

BGEN SIMMONS: Also on 22 December you attended a briefing on the relocation plan for the Pentagon. What were the essential features of this plan and how did it affect the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: I had been, not I, but, in fact, Gen Gray before me, and perhaps even other Commandants but certainly the two of us, had been asked by the Secretary of the Navy to consider moving the Marine Headquarters down to the Pentagon so that he could have both of his Services in the same location. It was not a very practical proposal because we required, I think, something on the order of 300,000 plus square feet of office space to move the Headquarters as it existed in the Arlington annex.

What we had done, I had asked that the staff, the Marine staff look at what type staff we would want to move to the Headquarters. We know, for example, that the long-range plan, as the facilities come available, is to move the majority of the Manpower Department to Quantico because the functions that are

performed are not necessarily functions that have to be done here in Washington. They can be done at a lower expense, less trafficked location. And the Installation and Logistics Department was already out of the Headquarters. It is over in a building in Clarendon, Virginia and there were other elements that were out.

So, we looked at exactly what we would have to move down and as I recall, about 140,000 square feet would suffice to put an effective staff down into the Pentagon. I asked Mr. Leo Kelley who was Director of Headquarters Support, to brief me on the plans for the renovation of the Pentagon and therefore the phase-in of the Marine Corps into the Pentagon and he did that.

The fundamental plan would call for the Pentagon being renovated by the year 2001. That was about seven years off. There would be segments of the Pentagon that would be closed down and the people would move out of that and then that would be rehabilitated and then you would move back in. So the plan was that as that took place, the Marine Corps would move back in, not move back in, but move into the Pentagon concurrent with the Navy’s moving out and then moving back in.

That was the substance of the briefing, was just to get a time line handle and also to identify our requirements and to identify, if you will, a way that it could be done so that I could go back to the Secretary and give him a proposal as to how we should do it.

BGEN SIMMONS: By moving its Headquarters into the Pentagon do you think that we gain or lose on balance?

GEN MUNDY: I believe that in the light of Goldwater/Nichols that we gain. The Commandant and his staff instead, although still to some degree considered that in the Department of the Navy, but the Commandant being a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Marine Corps staff being very effective in its liaisons and activities in the Pentagon, if you are in the Pentagon and on the halls and can, you know, meet people coming and going and walk to the JCS meeting as opposed to going outside and getting into your car and trying to make it on time, it will be ever so much more convenient. And I think that the Marine Corps will be much better able to interface with the OSD staff as well as the Department of the Navy staff.

There is a risk in this because should we get an authoritative Secretary who would be very, very strongly disposed toward the Navy as opposed to the

Marine Corps, then certainly the Marines could be put into a second-rate position there and could come under more direct supervision and authority of the Secretary and maybe domination by the Navy on a day-to-day basis. That would be very, that would be far more difficult today under the equality given us in Goldwater/Nichols compared with ten or fifteen years ago when indeed the Marine Corps was the inferior service in the Department of the Navy.

We still have some steps to take. For example, Navy regulations, outdated as they are, still prescribe that the Chief of Naval Operations is the senior uniformed officer in the Department of the Navy and therefore will take precedence over all other officers. I do not know that I really wring my hands too much about that but it is absurd for the Commandant to be senior in the Joint Chiefs of Staff chain of command but to be junior in his own Department. I think we have to get to a point where we say, it probably never really will matter one way or another, but we have to get to a point to where the two Services, regardless of size, are equal in effect and in recognition within the Department of the Navy.

At this particular point, I believe that we will gain in that recognition by being in the Pentagon and by, as Gen Krulak has now as we are in the interview, as he has moved to the Pentagon, the Undersecretary of the Navy vacated his office so that literally you have the Secretary in the middle, the Commandant to his immediate left and the CNO to his immediate right. That is about as equal status as one can get in terms of our relationship within the Department. So I hope that it will strengthen rather than weaken us long term.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is probably a good time for us to review your Green Letters and White Letters once again, starting where we left off. You issued just five Green Letters in 1993.

The first of these, 1-93, was a review of the outstanding Green Letters. Those that had served their purpose were purged, the old favorites remained.

No. 2-93 had the subject "Senior Officer Vulnerability" and it had to do with Defense Hotline and perceived improprieties. Any elaborating comment?

GEN MUNDY: The point of that letter as to emphasize to all of the senior officers who were out there just how much on the skyline they were and indeed are today by virtue of what the DOD Hotline has evolved into. Originally established as a mechanism for calling in to report waste, fraud and abuse, and

certainly such things, perhaps, deserve to be reported, in effect the Hotline has become a means of calling in to report, you know, to tattle anything you want. If you do not like, we have had Hotline complaints that have come in about the, and they are all anonymous, we have no idea of the accuser, but have come in to complain about the treatment received by a 1st sergeant relative to a leave request.

And that is far, that means that goes to the Department of Defense Inspector General. It is relayed down to the Service. It is investigated at the high levels of the Service and it simply consumes an enormous amount of manpower on a lot of things that are not substantive and that are determined to be without substance when they are investigated.

But in the case of senior officers, as this Hotline number is advertised, any GS-5 or any sergeant or any lieutenant or any secretary anywhere in the world when she sees her general redecorate his office is able to pick up the phone and say, "I do not think the general ought to have a table like that. I think it is too expensive." Well, she really does not, perhaps, even know how much we paid for it but, so you immediately go into a great investigation.

But we had entered an era, and I think we are still in it, that concerns me greatly and that is that we, in effect, these types of revelations and investigations, perhaps emanating somewhat from Tailhook and the experiences there, but we really have had a senior officer witch hunt on. Anyone who could report a general for just about any infraction has done so. I once said to the generals I think in a gathering we had that if you are not under investigation for something out there it must mean that you are not doing much, you are certainly not lighting up the boards because there are just so many allegations of waste, fraud and abuse.

The intent, then, of the Green Letter was simply to say, heads-up and be aware that if you lease an automobile, even though as Chrysler Corporation came to us, they leased us Chrysler New Yorkers at a rate lower than we could have leased a much less expensive car from another corporation because Chrysler was struggling to survive at that point. Well, the result of that was every general who suddenly replaced his 1967 Chevy or Plymouth with a Chrysler New Yorker got a hotline call on, the general is abusing, he has rented an expensive car and yet it was a government deal.

We had had, you know, some who again, as we have spoken earlier I think, people who had done things that yesteryear would have been completely tolerable. When you air them in the sense of an IG

investigation you simply, you cannot write down on paper the facts and circumstances and apply reason to, you know, that that was a responsible way to act. So we were losing a number of senior officers and this was just a heads-up to kind of watch what you are doing.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 3-93, which I would have well to have cited in the last session, had as its subject "Homosexuals in the Military" and it enclosed your tenth draft of your intended testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee scheduled for early June, 1993. Did you get to give essentially this testimony?

GEN MUNDY: No, none of the Chiefs gave prepared testimony nor did we submit statements for the record, and that was because at the hearings that we attended SecDef Aspin led, was seconded by the Chairman, by Gen Powell, and the Chiefs were there essentially in the role of answering questions. So, indeed, we had questions put to us and we had an opportunity to speak and some of the points that are contained in that testimony were used by me to make points that I sought to make at the time, but the testimony per se was something that I anticipated and that all of us, I think each one of the Chiefs was undoubtedly preparing testimony because we envisioned that we were going to have a very, very rough hearing and we wanted to be thorough. That would have been a very long, and as you mentioned, it is there for the record as one of the Green Letters.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, the very fact that this was the 10th draft indicates the amount of thought and effort that went into preparing that testimony.

GEN MUNDY: A great deal. A great deal of, the next draft would come up and I would, based on where we were and where we were going and the discussions we had had, I would take that home over the weekend and work through it at great length. So there was a lot of personal editing there on my part.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 4-93 has as its subject "Personnel Operating Tempo." It enclosed "Stories of Marines Away From Home" collected by BGen John Admire. What particular points did these "stories" make?

GEN MUNDY: The purpose in collecting them, Gen Admire was the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant at that time and he had collected them

to use them on the Hill, use them in conveying the high operating tempo, thereby supporting the need for a higher level of end strength, in other words the 174,000, 177,000 that we were striving for, and also to let the people on the Hill know that we were really using our people very hard.

When I read those, many of them are extremely good. I recall one staff sergeant who wrote in. None of them were, "I am getting out of this outfit, it is rotten, I have to go too much." All of them were positive. But I remember one staff sergeant stating, "I have three children and in the past two and a half years in the Fleet Marine Force I have missed, I think it was, 13 event days, birthdays, anniversaries, Christmases," that sort of thing. And he was making the point that that is tough when you are a young father and you have a wife and small children at home and you are gone that much of the time.

I also felt that we, in our enthusiasm to be commanders, and I, myself, was guilty of that. I can recall being a battalion commander or a regimental commander and wanting to do it all, as much as I could do because I might not track this way again or I might only be here a year, but many of our commanders roll into a command position with an enthusiasm of just that sort. And, as a result, we seek opportunities to train. I had reports of organizations that, for example, were training over the Easter weekend. Well, now, that is a function of availability of ranges and everything else, but I just, it just seemed to me that we should, if anything, work it the other way around and say, "Isn't there some way that we could perhaps not be deployed or not go to the field over Easter or over Valentine's Day or whatever it is?" I mean, isn't there some way that we could give them a little bit more time at home and a little bit more down time? That was the thrust of that Green Letter.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now for the White Letters. As with the Green Letters, you began the new year, 1993, with the review of the outstanding White Letters, published as White Letter 1-93 on 4 January. There would be eight more White Letters in 1993.

No. 2-93 had as its subject "Resident Enlisted Professional Military Education." What were the essentials of this letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the letter emphasized, laid out, encapsulated, if you will, the progress that had been made over the past seven years because this really, though we had trained, you know, before Gen Gray got here, Gen Gray had started a professional military education effort that was now reaching fruition. We

were finally getting this going where he had envisioned it. And so I wanted to summarize that. I wanted to point out that we now had an established course for sergeants and I had told the SgtMaj of the Marine Corps that recognizing that everybody out there has a reason why you cannot release this sergeant to go to a course at this particular time, that we were just going to have to drive it very hard to insist that sergeants come to the course.

So, it was to emphasize the Sergeant's Course and to stress to commanders the need to let their sergeants go to school. We eventually, much to SgtMaj Gene Overstreet's credit, we made it almost a criteria for promotion to have gone to the Sergeant's Course and as a result commanders now realize that they are going to have to give these young NCOs a chance to get educated. It is a great course. It is a great level of professional military education.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 3-93 dealt with the "Marine Corps Family Advocacy Program." It was issued on 5 April 1993. It must have contained a fatal flaw because it was replaced on 11 May by 4-93, same subject. The two letters are almost identical. I must confess that in reading them I miss the fatal flaw. Can you help me?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I looked at it two or three times so that I could answer you on that. The only difference that I can find, and I frankly do not recall the different circumstances, but version 1, 3-93, if you will, said, outlined the program, the Advocacy Program, and outlined the reason that it was taking place and encouraged commanders to support the program and encouraged Marines to take care of it because what this amounted to in some cases was a Marine who perhaps had an exceptional family member, that is to say a child who was hyperactive or something that needed some special handling. Oftentimes, we do not highlight that but we had put into being an advocacy program that would help those children or would help with other problems be they, you know, sexual abuse or excessive drinking, but we had to know about it.

So the first letter came out and said commanders are encouraged to encourage their Marines to do this.

And as I looked at the difference between the two, you are exactly right, there are just a couple of word changes. But the words became directive rather than encouraged and I think that was the reason for the reissue.

BGEN SIMMONS: A good reason. No. 5-93 had as

its subject "Uniform Regulations." What was the thrust of this letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think summarizing it it was to just wave the flag to some over-zealous local commanders who were imposing wear regulations that were not consistent. I recall that the letter focused, among other things, but perhaps most heavily on the women Marine uniforms. At that time, you know, uniform regulations said that a female Marine had an option of wearing either the slacks, green trousers if you will, or a skirt at her preference but a number of commanders were stipulating that women would wear skirts and there had been some complaints that had come through the SgtMaj chain on this. So it was just reemphasizing on that particular issue, for example. But, a little bit of curtailment of, you know, do it according to regulations even though you might prefer it to be otherwise.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 6-93 had as its subject "Training Readiness and the Marine Corps Combat Readiness System" which yields the acronym MCCRES or MCCRES. This might be a good time for you to comment on MCCRES. What is it and is it achieving its purpose?

GEN MUNDY: The MCCRES, the Readiness Evaluation System came about at the time, I believe, that then-BGen O.K. Steele was the IG of the Marine Corps. His nickname, of course, was "Ort." Ort Steele envisioned — he was not a brigadier general, he was a major general — Ort Steele had come back from commanding the 2d Marine Division and his perception was that our traditional IG inspections in which a great deal of energy was put forth, as Gen Colin Powell used the term, "breaking starch," in other words, you know, painting the rocks white because the IG was coming did not really give a true indication of the unit's readiness.

It might, indeed, cause the unit to make sure that its files were correct and that all the personnel records were correct so there was utility in the old system, too, because it caused you to sort of do a preventive maintenance on your whole organization and then the IG would come along and for a couple of years you would probably go downhill again.

Ort Steele believed we needed to focus the IGs efforts on combat readiness and less on administrative or just adherence to uniform standards. That, too, but emphasizing the press, and so a system of evaluations was developed whereby the local commander was given an evaluation system that in effect said, "You

can examine your own organization but here are things that you should focus on. Can the unit do this given these circumstances in that amount of time” and so on?

To a MCCRES could be run internally to a battalion, let's say, or a squadron. A MCCRES could be conducted by a higher headquarters, but usually the unit commander was able to say, “All right, I want to train my unit and get up to a certain level and then I would schedule a readiness evaluation at this particular time.” And usually we would use either another battalion or perhaps a regimental headquarters or something like that to go down and evaluate the unit. So it was sort of a self-evaluation without the penalties of being reported in detail to the Commandant that so many uniforms were out of kilter or that people did not know the general orders or needed haircuts, that sort of thing.

It, I think, has served a very useful purpose. I know that if you talk to younger officers in the Corps they are aware of what it is and they see utility to it. It is altogether possible that we have slacked off a little bit in our attention to some of those things that I mentioned that were important. You know, how many Marines were wearing winter service covers with summer service uniforms or, you know, who was missing his belt on his blouse or still had corporal chevrons sewed on his blouse but was a sergeant. You know, things like that that sort of tuned the organization up. But I think on balance the MCCRES has been effective and has served the purpose for which it was constructed.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 7-93, “Marine Corps Retirees,” stresses the importance of the retired community. What lay behind this letter?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the annual Secretary of the Navy's committee on retired matters happened to be headed at that time, I think, by LtGen Jack Godfrey, USMC (Ret.) which has no reason, I mean that is not specifically why we published the letter, but there is an annual meeting at which the retirees come to town.

They are briefed on a wide variety of subjects. Usually the CNO speaks to them, the Commandant, the Secretary. They are briefed on pay issues. They are, in turn, able to represent from the retired community concerns that that community has and there is normally a report and there is some action that occurs from there, either, you know, just going out and affirming support or changing some procedure around.

More ordinarily, and as I recall this letter, I believe

that its purpose was simply to again stress to the Marine Corps that retirees continue to be an important part of the Corps and that they have served their time, they need to be thought of, considered, taken care of, treated well when they come in and need a new ID card or whatever it is that we do for them. So, it was just kind of a focus the spotlight on retirees for emphasis.

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 8-93 had as its subject “Management of Our Bachelor Enlistment Quarters.” Why did you consider this letter necessary?

GEN MUNDY: MajGen Don Lynch commanded the base at Camp Pendleton at that time and he, during one of my visits out there, he had made the point with me by taking me and showing me. He said, you know, “We have Marines who are living in absolutely substandard, in some cases World War II vintage barracks.” We had, you know, partitioned them maybe and made them more modern but they still were fundamentally the same old barracks with heating problems and with plumbing problems and with leaky roofs and unsightly and so on. But we had Marines living there because that is where the whatever, Alpha Company of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, lived.

He as the base commander was aware that he had then some very fine facilities, newer and more modern facilities that had a lot of empty space in it because the unit for which they had been built or the unit that was assigned there at the time was much smaller, did not have any requirement for that. So he had brought to my attention the rather revolutionary but nonetheless interesting proposition that, is it time, with the mobility of our young Marines, the majority of whom have cars, is it time now to think about using the best facilities we have, even, perhaps, at the expense of unit cohesion?

Would it make sense, if we have good quality spaces in a given camp, would it make sense to billet Marines there based simply on when they report? We have space for you, it is first-class, it is a nice accommodation, and then they would drive to the other camp to report for muster and go to work daily.

There was some logic to this. It might not work in the rifle company but it could very well work in other types of service organizations or the aviation organizations. And so what I was really asking on this was for commanders to be innovative in the use of the facilities that we had and to think through things like I have just talked about. I did not decree that we would do that but I simply said, “You have the latitude out there. If you can see fit to use your facilities dif-

ferently, do not be afraid to break some of the rice bowls in taking better care of our Marines.”

BGEN SIMMONS: No. 9-93 was “National Performance Review (NPR)/Reinventing the Government.” What prompted you to issue this letter?

GEN MUNDY: President Clinton directed when he came in that there be a national performance review and it was titled, Reinventing Government. He put the Vice President in charge of that and so Vice President Gore had taken a personal interest in that. We had a senior level military officer, the former Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force, an Air Force three-star who headed the DOD effort and there was an effort to do some seemingly simple things. You know, change the way that you put in a travel claim. Instead of taking all the time to fill it out and process it just basically trusting people and saying, if you spent \$150 on that trip then we will give you \$150 and not process all the paperwork.

But beyond that, the other thing that it sought, and of far more substance, to do was to challenge some of the regulations and directives that we had, for example, particularly in the acquisition process to see if we could not take out some of the red tape in the bureaucracy of, you know, 500-page directives that told you specifically how to do something. It came down to what we in the Marine Corps and the Navy had characterized as Total Quality Leadership, empower the people, give them the authority, let them run. They will make some mistakes but on balance your organization will be more wholesome if you can do that.

So, to encourage that, a system of model installations or installations given the authority to break rules was established. I do not recall the exact name of that but you could, for example we have about three or four of those exceptions now assigned to the Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany where the commander would come in and say, “Listen, if I could forget this regulation I will guarantee you that I can do it better and I can save money.”

We would then, in turn, go into OSD and say, “We would like to have an exception for the Marine Corps Logistics Base in this particular function or this area.”

And then when you were approved for that, in effect you threw the regulation out the window and said, “All right, General, do it as best you can and in six months we will take a look at how you are doing. If, indeed, you have a better way, why maybe the whole Department of Defense should adopt that.”

Sort of an experimental means of getting rid of red

tape. This letter sought to announce that and to encourage individual initiative and the relaxation of stringent regulations and authority for people to improve the processes by which we were doing business.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, on 31 December 1993 the strength of the U.S. Armed Forces was 1,675,269 of whom a good number were women and an unknown number were homosexuals. The same could be said of the 176,613 who were Marines.

GEN MUNDY: I suppose you could. I think our numbers were about 4.5 percent women. We were still very, very few in comparison with the other Services and whatever the unknown number that were homosexuals I cannot speculate on that, either.

BGEN SIMMONS: “Don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue.” If you have no further comments, I suggest we end this session here.

SESSION 25

First Six Months of 1994

Looking for 3,000 Marines . . . The Yamashita case . . . Farewell to SecDef Aspin . . . Welcome to SecDef Perry . . . Some thoughts on The Citadel and VMI . . . Resolving the Toys for Tots scandal . . . Implementing the new policy on homosexuals . . . Air action in Bosnia . . . Evacuating civilians from Rwanda . . . Retirement of Adm Kelso . . . The new CNO, Adm Mike Boorda . . . Visitors from Norway . . . Bracing for the Roles and Missions Commission . . . Frocking Carol Mutter as a major general . . . Commemorating the Normandy landing . . . Closing out Tailhook.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we explored the events of the second six months of 1993. In this session we will review your activities during the first six months of 1994.

The first of January 1994 was a Saturday. You began the year with the traditional reception and band serenade at the Commandant's House. As in 1993, on the following day, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen Powell, held his reception in his quarters. The first week of January was routine. On Sunday, 9 January, you left for Camp Pendleton by way of New Orleans. The purpose of your visit apparently was an FMF commanders' conference. You returned by way of Yuma on 13 January. Do you recall any highlights of that trip or conference?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I do. The stop through New Orleans was again a quick stop by the Marine Corps Reserve forces that was simply just an update, I think, from MajGen Jim Livingston, who was then commanding that force.

In Camp Pendleton we discussed matters of specific interest to the FMF commanders. The difference in this conference and in the normal symposium that we held each year was that the symposium tended to drift into a broad array of matters, whether it be the type of uniform we were wearing or some personnel issue or ethics briefings by the Counsel to the Commandant, as you have commented on in previous sessions, I think. But this one was specifically intended to allow the FMF commanders, and that meant the force commanders, the division, the wing and the force service support group commanders, to be the attendees and to focus me, then-LtGen Krulak, out of the Combat Development Command, and those key Headquarters

staff officers on matters of issue in the FMF.

So, we had a very profitable couple of days. MCCDC had been charged with coming up with the additional 3,000 offsets that were the difference between the 177,000 person Marine Corps that we wanted and that we had planned as being the minimum force that we thought was adequate, but we were going to have to take another 3,000. And so how would we do that? That was very much the substance of the conference. As always, there is very rarely any unanimity on a direction to go, and there are a lot of options, and whichever force you are talking about would like it very much if squadrons or organizations came out of the other force.

But we discussed, among other things, I think, probably a key issue that was not undertaken but one that is of interest, because it still is something that, at a time in the future, may very likely come to pass, and that was to centralize the two remaining tank battalions that we had in the Marine Corps and to put them at Twentynine Palms. One is already there, the 1st tank battalion. We would have moved the 2d Tanks from the east coast to Twentynine Palms and thus add a very large tank formation, forming, in effect, what had earlier been called the group, the Combined Arms or the Supporting Arms Group — I forget the actual name — at Twentynine Palms. But we would then have, in effect, our heavy artillery, our tanks, one of the light armored vehicle battalions, and so on, up in the desert.

That didn't come to pass because of the very persuasive articulation of then MajGen Butch Neal, who had the 2d Marine Division and who wasn't eager to give up his tank battalion, and so, for a lot of reasons, we didn't do it. But it was those types of issues.

MajGen Wilhelm, commanding the 1st Division at that time, was very concerned about the condition of his artillery, and we remained concerned because the M198 Howitzer, the 155 howitzer that the Marine Corps adopted, because of the very heavy pressures on us in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, to “heavy up for NATO,” we picked up 155 artillery.

My judgment in hindsight is I wish we had stuck with 105. Somehow or other, there was equipment out there, but you are a victim of the times, and we had to do that. Now we are stuck with an extremely good, extremely accurate, long-range artillery weapon but an enormously heavy one and one very difficult for us to get around the battlefield.

MajGen Wilhelm pointed out, among other things, that the carriage of the howitzer was beginning to show stress and fractures and cracks and was undergoing a lot of repair because his artillery, of course, was spending a lot of its time being dragged around through the desert in Twentynine Palms as opposed to the 2d Division that generally was taken down a hard-top road and dragged off into the soft sand of eastern North Carolina. So the two coasts seem to wear differently on the equipment that we had.

It was those types of issues that we dealt with and, again, a very productive conference. The general subject of the conference is, I don’t think any Commandant that I am aware of, at least, has ever gotten it quite right. We tend to — all of us see the need for a variety of conferences. Gen Gray had a similar FMF commanders’ conference on his watch, and I thought that was a good idea. I thought we ought to do it more often. But the problem became that as we transitioned to Marine air-ground task forces, as we established MEFs, as we became increasingly involved in unified — that is, CinC — activities, around the world, our generals are simply consumed by this, and we have very little time to be able to bring the Marine generals together and sit down as Marines and have a conference. It is hard to schedule because someone is always in Korea doing an exercise or in the Mediterranean for a conference or in Europe or somewhere, and so we haven’t been successful at that.

Gen Krulak has started out to offset a part of that frustration of not being able to get together as frequently as we would like. I know that the 31st Commandant has made a major effort, and has already had a couple of conferences, and I wish him well and hope he can continue to do these types of conferences more in the future.

The stop through Yuma was, to be very candid, simply a personal stop. Then-Col or BGen Selectee

Barry Knutson’s — K-N-U-T-S-O-N — wife was dying of a brain tumor, and frankly, we needed to refuel so we whipped into Yuma, got off the airplane, and the half-dozen of us or so that were flying back to the East Coast or were coming back with me on my airplane, just spent an hour with Barry kind of cheering him up a little bit, and that was the purpose.

BGEN SIMMONS: How was that shortfall of 3,000 between the 177 and the 174 made up?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we made no really significant structure alterations. That is to say, we did not do away with two infantry battalions nor did we take out all the tanks or other organizations. To be candid, we simply stripped away at the Marine Corps, and I would say that, partially as a result of that, today the Marine Corps is in some areas hollow. We do not have adequate aviation maintenance personnel at either our rotary-wing or fixed-wing aviation squadrons. To give an example of that, when I went to Okinawa on my first visit as Commandant in 1991, I visited a squadron, a heavy lift squadron, a heavy helicopter squadron number 464, HMH-464, and I recall that I was briefed that the squadron personnel were at that time about 240-some, 245, let us say.

Two years later, when I came back after we were taking the reductions, the same squadron was back in the rotation cycle and I happened to again run up against a 464, and the squadron commander, different squadron commander, pointed out that he had 202 Marines in his squadron. That was pretty significant.

That was 40 Marines that had been removed from the squadron. Of course, none of them were pilots because we have to have the right number of pilots to operate the same number of helicopters. So, when I inquired, “Where did those Marines come from?” it is fairly obvious. In a squadron you have maintenance or your flight equipment section or all of those technical areas where the cuts have been taken; fewer crew chiefs, fewer maintenance personnel, and I worried about that, and still do, and did until I retired.

Now you could go into the 2d Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion at Camp Lejeune. One of the companies in that battalion was in effect deactivated because we had the vehicles but we did not have the drivers and the assistant drivers and maintenance personnel to operate them. In peacetime, that’s all right, and it is not, I think — well, it is a little bit different from, say, earlier times — for example, Korea. I was not around, but as I understand then, we had gone to platoons with two squads, companies with two platoons, battalions with two companies, and so on, as

opposed to maintaining the full structure. We opted to maintain the full structure, at the time under the, I guess, political maneuver that said that the Marine Corps has not taken significant force reductions. Had we taken out a couple of battalions, we would have been very hard-pressed to maintain our unit deployment system, and if Marines were no longer able to do that, remember that off in the wings there were the adaptive joint force packaging enthusiasts — Admiral Paul Miller, and in fact Gen Jack Sheehan was a proponent of that — but who saw as an alternative we would deploy some Army troops, and so we had to maintain, I thought, the structure to continue to meet those rotational commitments for the Marines. That's a long answer to say that we thinned out the ranks.

BGEN SIMMONS: It's an important one. Let me recap it a little bit. Instead of making structural changes in the table of organization, the problem was addressed at a manning level, and part of this might have been results of the lessons of the Korean War where you had to go from an established peacetime table of organization to a wartime table with great problems of doubling your size overnight, doubling your structure and creating units out of whole cloth. This has been primarily a manning level rather than structural change.

GEN MUNDY: To a large degree, yes, and certainly, you know, we made some alterations in the infantry formations, the heavy weapons coming out, the regimental TOW platoons, things like that. But you don't get much for that. We're talking 25 or 30 people here, and we were looking for 3,000.

In the case of aviation, what was done there arguably was a good plan, and I don't fault, I'm not pointing the finger at anyone who made these, because they were attempts to deal with the problem at the time, but what we did was to combine two, or in some cases three, MOSs, OCC fields into one. For example, we took the metal workers in the squadron that fabricate a new piece of the fuselage or make something for the airplane on scene, the metal benders as they are called. That MOS was combined with another aviation maintenance MOS under the thesis that you could do, you know, we would train a Marine at school to do both jobs. But the fact is that what you were really doing is saying we will have one person do what it used to take two to do, and there was no significant formulation that we now have an aircraft that only broke half as much as previous aircraft had.

So that is what I have referred to as "hollowing,"

and it was simply a struggle to get by and to maintain the viability of the Marine Corps at a time when we were facing roles and missions issues when adaptive joint force packaging was being thrust at us, when Marines were literally in the forefront of deployments, because the Army, with great admiration for the Army, the Army is not today, never has been, a deployer. They are not used to breaking up the 10th Mountain Division and sending it off in pieces, even though that has been done, but at great trauma to the dependents and to the structure and to the ability of the Army to do that.

I thought that once we backed away and could no longer meet those types of demands like the continuing demand for Marines in Guantanamo Bay, as we have spoken earlier, a continuing trickle of companies and battalions of Marines down there that ran our operating tempo just right through the overhead for about a six-month period, we were literally meeting ourselves coming and going. But I did not want to concede that because I knew that once the "jointsters" were able to get a foot in the door on using other alternative forces, that we would be out of work. I thought, as a practical matter, that because of the press to do things jointly, that probably is coming to pass to some degree, anyway, but I just did not want it to be because of forfeit on the part of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: In 1993 we had the floods in southern California. In January 1994 we had the earthquake. Was there any substantial damage to Marine Corps installations?

GEN MUNDY: There was not because of the earthquake. That was mostly further north up in the Los Angeles area.

BGEN SIMMONS: Marines from Camp Pendleton and El Toro joined up with Marine Corps Reservists to aid the earthquake victims. What form did this aid take?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we provided some helicopters. We provided drinking water. As I recall, we used some bladders of water, that sort of thing. Transportation. But we had no major force involvement, unlike in earlier times the L.A. riots, for example, when a special purpose Marine force had gone up to assist the law enforcement officials in maintaining order and keeping down riots in the city. This was the type of civil assistance that is provided under an organization called the DOMS, Director of Military Support. The Secretary of the Army is chartered

under law to be the Director of Military Support for national emergencies, and at that time it was a very convoluted and confusing situation because the JCS did not really enter into that. When we would get into a national emergency, I would send an officer over to the Army Operations Center in which the Secretary of the Army and obviously the Chief of Staff of the Army, playing in its support of the Secretary, would direct the actions. And so they would, all forces in the continental United States were available for the Secretary of the Army for support. Therefore, the Marines would be tasked with a specific type of support: provide helicopters to support the Los Angeles refugee teams in getting out into areas, or drinking water, or transportation vehicles, or oftentimes a lot of equipment we would provide depending on, not in this case, but we would provide flak jackets or we would provide/loan M-16 rifles or helmets sometimes, or cots, tents, those sorts of things. And as I recall, in this particular instance, the amount of support was not very significant. It was just helicopters, water and things like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: In January, after a four-year legal battle, Bruce I. Yamashita was given the honor he sought: a commission in the Marine Corps. He had argued that racial discrimination at the Officers Candidates School at Quantico had kept him from achieving that goal. Apparently, the courts saw it his way, as he was awarded a commission as a captain in the Reserve and assigned to the standby Reserve. What are your recollections of this case, and did you have any personal involvement in it?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my recollections are fairly specific, and yes, I did, and I will go back, because this case was handled, if you will, at very high levels and specifically by me, by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and with a congressional focus. And contrary to your indication that it was the subject of a long legal battle, it really was not in the courts; it was, rather, a political issue.

The background on the Yamashita case. This is one that I inherited when I came in. He had actually trained, I think, in 1989 or so. So it was before I became the Commandant. But he had, as you have accurately portrayed, he had failed at Officer Candidate School, been dismissed after two hearings, I believe it was, before the Retention Board down there, and in the judgment of the Marine Corps, and certainly in the judgment of Gen Gray, who signed the first response back to Yamashita's complaint indicating, you know, just a rather pro forma letter of we

considered your request and it is denied, and that was about all there was to it.

Yamashita maintained that he had been harassed, that he had been the subject of insensitive racial derogatory statements, and, to be sure, there were, when I looked into it, after I had become the Commandant and he came back with another claim, I looked into it, and very frankly, the Marine Corps had not handled it well. This was not one of our prouder moments.

The fact is that a couple of the NCOs at Quantico had used language: "We whipped you Japanese once and we could do it again." "You slant eyes can't fight," or that sort of thing. Now, having been there, you and I sitting here would know that this is what drill instructors do to build psychological pressure on you to cause you to operate under great stress. Still, that sort of thing in today's atmosphere, arguably maybe in any atmosphere, is not the right technique.

So after I reviewed the case — and I did that with great detail; I really looked closely into these and read the whole record, read his evaluation chits from Quantico, read his own letter, read the investigation that had been done — and frankly, we had an investigation that said the first time around that we should have said, "You're right, these types of words and that sort of thing should not have been used. However, you still flunked OCS. The words didn't cause you not to be able to negotiate the obstacle course in an adequate time."

So when I wrote back and responded I said, you know, "In effect that you are owed an apology for the references that were made to you and for the derogatory comments." However, that said, "Your grades don't measure up and you didn't pass."

The next thing that occurred was that I had a call from a staff member, never from the principal but a staff member of Senator Dan Inouye of Hawaii. Senator Inouye is one of America's true heroes. He was a badly wounded Japanese-American who served in the 442d Combat Regiment in Europe and again in the Pacific and was badly wounded and is a very well-recognized, distinguished Senator, a distinguished leader and an American military hero.

This staffer advised me that Yamashita was now working through Inouye's office to try and get justice, and they, of course, wanted the facts, and I provided them, with a legislative assistant at that time providing that. This kept coming back, and apparently there was a great deal of pressure being put on Senator Inouye by the Japanese-American community in Hawaii, and there was a very significant campaign — he was up for reelection in that general time frame —

that was seeking to damage him in Hawaii because of this issue plus others, but this is one. So to me, at the expense of those who will not understand how political accommodations are made in Washington, from the staff of the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, those who give us the money to operate the Armed Forces on, there came continuing pressure on the Marine Corps and specifically directed to me by some staffers to do something about the Yamashita case, to be able to resolve this case.

Well, I offered Yamashita the opportunity to return to OCS and go through OCS again. That was the initial offer and it was rejected. The second offer would be that we would be willing to offer Yamashita a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve as a second lieutenant, that he would attend Basic School, he would attend Military Justice School — he is a lawyer — he would attend Military Justice School and then would be released to inactive duty. And this was not inconsistent with, you know, we had specialist officer programs before where we just go out and appoint a man an officer because of some special capacity.

This seemed to be, for a while, this seemed to be an arrangement that might work. Keep in mind that the Commandant can't do this. The Secretary of the Navy appoints officers, not me. And indeed, Yamashita who was, I believe, some eight years over the maximum age for officers, had gained a Secretary of the Navy waiver to go to OCS in the first place. So we had a young man that was much older than his peers, but he was going there on a secretarial waiver directed to the Marine Corps. Therefore, the negotiations on the commission, and so on, while being handled on a day-to-day basis by the Marine Corps, were really the authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

So, when we had come with this particular arrangement, which Senator Inouye's staff seemed to be very well satisfied with, thought was an equitable offer back to Yamashita and more or less said we can support that but we won't press any further, when that went over to the Secretariat for review — it was there for a couple of months while it was being thoroughly reviewed — the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Fred Pang, who had come out of the Senate, in fact was a principal staffer to Senator John Glenn and a very fine man and has been a good Assistant Secretary, but Mr. Pang, who was himself of Oriental background, got this package for action as the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and believed that it was fundamentally wrong, after he reviewed it, and that Yamashita should be appointed to a grade commensurate with that of his peers. In other words, had he graduated from OCS, he

would have been a captain; therefore, he should be a captain.

I very strongly opposed that, but I was not successful in that opposition and there was a feeling that we should give Yamashita restitution, and so the Secretary appointed Yamashita a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve. There was no requirement for attendance at the Basic School or for going to Justice School. He simply gave him a commission.

Regrettably, that's a concession, perhaps as my offer might have been, it's a concession that will not, you know, it won't go away. I think we will be plagued by Mr. Yamashita for probably years to come because he intends to persevere. He will undoubtedly will try now and claim his back pay and allowances. When he is eligible for promotion to major and we do not select him because we have no credentials on which to select him, he will "cry foul" again, and I suspect that this will go on and on and on. It has died away, interestingly, in the past couple of years for a couple of reasons. Number one, there is certainly no more support out of Senator Inouye's office for him because they believe that he has abused, you know, that he got what he was entitled to and has continued to abuse the issue. And secondarily, the 50th anniversary of World War II, you know, and the commemoration of the battles in the Pacific against Japanese is probably not the best time for a Japanese-American to be suing the Marine Corps to demand that he be commissioned in the Marine Corps.

So I imagine that the tactic has been to back off a while during this very patriotically emotional time in America. But I would suspect that we have not heard the last of Mr. or Capt Yamashita at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let me make sure I understand this completely. Was he already over age at the time of his original entry into the OCS program?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. As I recall, he was 37 years of age when he went to OCS. Twenty-eight is our maximum commissioning. I may be off. He may have been 34 or 35. As I recall, he was seven or eight years over our maximum commission, which would have made him 34 or 35 years old.

BGEN SIMMONS: And he already was a lawyer at that time?

GEN MUNDY: He was a lawyer at that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: I won't use the word "suspi-

cious,” but isn’t this just a little odd that he would pursue this at that point in his life? It looked very much like he was looking for a cause.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it’s very odd to me because, you know, one could argue that you have a sudden surge of patriotic fervor and so on, but the Marine Corps experience — and I draw this from my own recruiting experience — there are exceptions to every rule, but we have not fared well with overage either officer candidates or enlistees in the Marine Corps because, as a general thesis — and again it could be debated, and I am sure there are examples to the contrary — someone who has reached the age of 34 or 35 years old — it doesn’t take that long to get through law school — but someone who has reached that age, in many cases, has tried a few things and not done too well, and so he turns at last to, well, I will go in the military and can try there, and of course then you are really stepping into the fire from the frying pan.

So, that is a track record, generally, of lack of success that we have with the older candidates. So, Yamashita’s performance at the Office Candidate School competing against 22- and 23-year-old young men as a decade older than they were or more was not good. He did not perform well and he in effect — well, he did — flunked OCS. But, the Marine Corps, our agents, our sergeants, one of whom, interestingly, was married to a Japanese, one of the sergeants that was so accused, they were out of line in the specific sense in this case. But there is a possibility that you make a very good case for someone who sought to be a cause celebre, I guess.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was he a resident of Hawaii?

GEN MUNDY: He was, yes. He has now moved to Washington, D.C., and as I understand it, he is practicing law probably on K Street here or somewhere. But at that time, he was in Hawaii, and he had mobilized a great deal of the Japanese-American community there to pressure Senator Inouye on this issue.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 13 January, as one of his last official actions as Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin approved a new policy governing the role of women in combat. In effect, he lifted the risk rule which barred women from non-combat units in close proximity to the enemy. I just recently saw a photograph of an Army woman specialist in full combat gear standing behind a machine gun guarding a bridgehead in Bosnia. Could this happen in the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: The answer is yes, it could happen in the Marine Corps. It would happen in the Marine Corps in units that are not direct ground combat units. In other words, at the present time the arrangement that was eventually made relative to women in combat organizations, as I think we will discuss later on, allowed for women to serve in any capacity because the risk rule had been lifted, the laws had been changed, women were now not prohibited from combatant ships or combatant aircraft, that sort of thing, those laws had been changed.

The Marine Corps had no ground to stand on to be able to say, “Well, you can do it everywhere else but you can’t do it in the Marine Corps.” We would never get that type of concession if we wanted to pursue it. So there are women in the types of organizations, for example, in the force service support group at which conceivably a defensive perimeter or a defensive position would be established, and you could see a female Marine manning a weapon in that particular situation. She would not be a member of an infantry battalion, of a reconnaissance company; she would not be in a tank battalion; she would not be in the light armored vehicle battalions or, indeed, in the artillery. But, aside from those, yes you could see a roadblock sometime, I think, with a female Marine on watch.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 18 January you attended a farewell dinner for Secretary Aspin hosted by Gen Powell. On the 24th of January President Clinton announced the elevation to Secretary of Defense of William J. Perry. Dr. Perry had been the Deputy Secretary of Defense since March 1993. How well did you know him?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I knew him only in that capacity. He had, of course, been in the Carter administration. He had been in the Directorate of Research, Development and Evaluation, DDR&E. He was very well thought of in the Marine Corps. He had a very good rapport with some of our former generals. Gen Tom Morgan comes to mind, who knew Dr. Perry very well. So I think that Perry’s appreciation for the Marine Corps was very strong, and indeed, on the occasions we commented earlier about attempting to bring the new team on board, I had had Dr. Perry and Dr. Deutch, who was the Under Secretary for Acquisition, over for two or three breakfasts, as I recall, and would give them briefings, and he was always very positive about the Marine Corps. So I thought he was a superb choice, as did the rest of the uniformed military.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did his style of management differ from that of Secretary Aspin?

GEN MUNDY: Dramatically different. Les Aspin was as nice, congenial, hail-fellow-well-met, back slapper, always a ready smile as you would ever want to meet. But as an organizer, as an administrator, as a decision-maker, he was a negotiator, he was a compromiser, and having come off of the Hill as a long-term Congressman, nothing was ever final. We continued to discuss and to negotiate and maybe this and perhaps that, so there was no definitive, authoritative guidance coming out of the office of the Secretary of Defense.

In the case of Secretary Perry, he is a Stanford University mathematician, a physicist, all of those sorts of things. He is a very precise man, and I think the difference would be that when Secretary Perry would come into "the tank" to meet with the Chiefs, which he did more than any Secretary of Defense, I think, probably in history — he wanted to meet with us twice a week and unless he was out of town, he was very faithful in doing that. We would usually at 1700, 1730, we would get together in "the tank," and the good thing was that if it was an ordinary meeting, that is, if there was no crisis going on that we were driven to, but an ordinary meeting was usually 30 minutes, maximum of one hour with Secretary Perry.

He would bring in his key OSD principals and they would sit there. He would be given a briefing on issues and he would ask maybe a couple of questions during the briefing. When he had finished the briefing, he would say, "All right, let me sum up now the key points," and he would mention two or three key points that were right on the money. The man had a fantastic mind. He would say, "These are the points, one, two, three. Here's what I want to do. "On issue number one," he would say to the Chairman, "I would like for you to take that. Call the German Ministry of Defense," or whatever the issue was, "and tell them that this will be our position. Number two I will take. I will deal with such and such. Number three, I would like," and he would turn to one of his assistants, "I would like for you, Mr. Deutch," or whoever it was that was with him, "I would like for you to look into this. I would like you to have me a paper by tomorrow. I will discuss it with the President tomorrow." That was Bill Perry on every instance.

The very wholesome relationship that existed between him and Gen Shalikashvili was probably the classic civilian authority with the Chairman as his, in effect, Chief of Staff executing the will and the direction of the Secretary of Defense. It was a superb

team, is a superb team. They fit together like a hand in a glove, and Perry never, never wanted for, "Well, let me think about this." Well, that's an exaggeration. I don't mean the man was too quick to make a decision. But if he wanted to think on it — and I can remember a couple of occasions when he would say, "I need to think about this. I will think about it tonight and tomorrow morning I will give you an answer," and at 8:15 the next morning the Chairman was on the line saying, "This is what the Secretary has decided." And in every case, I don't think of a single exception where, whatever the Secretary had decided to do, I didn't say, "Boy, I wish I could think like that."

So I think that if Bill Perry does not go down arguably as the best Secretary of Defense that the nation has had to date, it would be a close contest. He is a superb leader and manager. Great compassion for people. I don't know that he is the first, but he is certainly the first in a long time to not only meet with the Chiefs, but he then put the senior enlisted into a council that met with him regularly. So the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps didn't see quite as much of the Secretary of Defense as I did, but he saw a great deal of him, and Secretary Perry even wanted to go off on field trips with the senior enlisted and decreed that he didn't want any generals going around.

So SgtMaj Overstreet, for example, hosted the visit to Camp Lejeune, and he took the other service senior enlisted. They would fly down with the Secretary, and the Secretary was completely in the hands of NCOs. When we got to the other end, I think I phoned down and told Ma Gen Jones, who was commanding the division, I said, "You certainly should meet, salute, say, 'Good morning, sir,' and then get out of the way because after that it is sergeants and corporals." He was devoted to them, very compassionate and very concerned for the welfare of the soldiers and sailors there, and the Marines. So I have nothing but absolute praise and admiration for Bill Perry.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 21 January, you and Mrs. MUNDY left for the weekend in Charleston, South Carolina. At noon on Friday, you spoke to the cadets at the Citadel on "Greater Issues." It was essentially a talk on leadership. Do you recall some of the key points you made?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes I do. At that time on my staff group, which I had put together when I came to be the Commandant — I put together a small cell of officers that, at its high point, had four officers in it,

and at its final point, for about the last year or year and a half I was there, had one officer in it. But the CSG or the Commandant's Staff Group was that group that I wanted to be, I wish it could have been, as you would recall it, the old — what did we call it?

BGEN SIMMONS: Policy analysis?

GEN MUNDY: Policy analysis group that had a talented group of lieutenant colonels led by a colonel, I believe, that would do policy analysis for the Commandant.

The other services are still able to afford this. The Marine Corps is not. We simply don't have the officer structure to be able to afford several lieutenant colonels and a colonel. So I did it with majors and they were bright. Some of the names that served me in that capacity are: LtCol Phil Shutler, who probably is one of the brightest minds in the Marine Corps today and just a superb officer. Maj Joe Dunford, who became my senior aide, started off in the CSG.

At this time the two officers who were in the staff group were Maj Fred Whittle, a Harrier pilot, and Maj Frank McKenzie, who was an infantry officer. Fred and Frank were both Citadel graduates, Fred Whittle having been the regimental commander when he graduated there in the early 1980s.

The Citadel was, at that time, undergoing a great deal of, I will say, depression in the Corps of Cadets because they were under siege by a Shannon Faulkner who wanted to become, you know, the first woman to enroll in the Corps of Cadets. It's an important point to make here. It will probably have passed before anybody reads this, but The Citadel graduates a number of women each year. They are not in the Corps of Cadets. They can matriculate at the school, but they are not cadets, unlike VMI that I think is all cadets, and you don't have a day student, if you will. But at any rate, they were a little bit downtrodden, so these two young majors fired me up to go down there and to give a speech that was red, white and blue or, better stated, was light blue and white because that is The Citadel colors and just to praise The Citadel, which was not hard for me to do because I think a lot of the institution, and to try and bring these youngsters up in their morale a bit.

So it was a, "Hurrah, The Citadel is one of the great institutions of America" type of speech. I recounted to them my early associations, the fact that I almost went to The Citadel if my family had been able to afford it at the time, and so it became a very good speech. They reprinted it in the paper; they sent it all through South Carolina and it became a best-seller

down there and still, to this day, I receive comments on that. Let's give about 30 percent credit to Gen Mundy on that.

GEN MUNDY: — I was saying that we give the credit, you know, the bulk of the credit to Majs Whittle and McKenzie because they helped me put this together and it was right on the mark. It was just one of those where the — you know, had it been a different day or a different time of day or a different theme, you know, it might have strayed off.

But actually, the first question that I received during the question and answer period was a cadet who stood up and thanked me for the message and said, "I know that I speak for the Corps that we feel much better now that you have spoken." So I became an instant star at The Citadel and was eventually asked to be on their Board of Advisors, which I am today.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, the 22d of January, still in Charleston, you were the banquet speaker at a meeting of the Military Order of the World Wars. What do you recall of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, number one, I had been asked to speak, it was the 75th anniversary of the MOWW, the Military Order of the World Wars, so it was a significant event. It was, I would say, probably 500 people. These are, although there are youngsters today that arguably could qualify for membership, most of these organizations are made up of World War II and some World War I veterans and some Korean veterans. But beyond that it begins to fade. The Vietnam veterans have not yet come, if they do, to that same patriotic involvement in organizations like this as did the earlier generations. So, anyway, it was an older group, which is always a good group to talk to, because you can stir them up with emotional patriotism. You can wave the flag all you want to. So those are fun types of presentations to give.

Gen William Westmoreland, who has retired to Charleston, was in attendance with Mrs. Westmoreland, a very, very fine gentleman, former Chief of Staff of the Army, commanded the forces in Vietnam, and they had asked Gen Westmoreland to cut the 75th Anniversary cake, which he did with the West Point sword that he, as the first captain of West Point had carried. So he had polished up his first captain's sword and brought it in, and I went down with him and he unsheathed the sword and handed me the scabbard and said, "Here, hold this," and so I was sort of the aide-de-camp to Gen Westmoreland that evening.

But at any rate, that's what we did. I had been really shanghaied into the MOWW by a lady who lives directly behind the Marine Barracks. Her name is Mary —, I cannot remember her name here. But I would see her occasionally around the Barracks, and she was very active, and so it was she who insisted that I come down, and it wasn't hard, you know, for me to accept that. I accepted, and she then saw me on the street one day and said that they would want to induct me into the MOWW, and I said that was wonderful; I was very honored to be so inducted. And very shortly thereafter, I received my application notice with my fee to send in \$45 and they would induct me into the Order. So I paid the 45 bucks and was inducted into the Order. That's about the substance. It was a pleasant affair.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday, 25 January, you attended the State of the Union message given by President Clinton to the Congress. Any specific recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not many, except that — I think I mentioned earlier that President Clinton and I established a very solid personal rapport at the outset of his tenure of office, and he would always — I felt very good about the fact that when he would come down, you know, and go up, he usually shook hands, for one reason or another, he would shake hands with the Cabinet coming in that were right in front of the Chiefs, and then as he left, he would always acknowledge the Joint Chiefs who were there. And whatever the case, he would always come down and would look directly at me. A couple of times, he started to pass on, and he came back and would shake hands with me. So it was kind of a personal moment with the President, though he shook hands with everybody, but there was a little bit more of a rapport between us.

The only thing, I don't recall that this is one of them, but I think it was last year, I think it was the '95 speech that just went on and on and on. President Clinton is not given to short State of the Union addresses. A humorous thing that, if I have not recounted it thus far, about the State of the Union speeches, of course, if one watches that on television, you will notice that the Supreme Court sits, for example, without any emotion at all. There is no applause, there are no smiles or significant display of feeling because, you know, this might prejudice or cause reason to suspect prejudice of later judgments on their case. And similarly, we were coached by Gen Powell, when I went to the first State of the Union speech, that if the President said the American Armed Forces were

the greatest institution in the world, we should spring to our feet and applaud, or that young fighting men are standing in defense of freedom, we could applaud, but if he said, "I believe we should have school prayer," even if you might agree with that, that was a very hot political issue, and you did not want to be seen, you know, applauding or showing emotion.

So in many occasions the Chiefs would sit very stodgily when your own instincts as an American made you want to stand up and cheer and say, "Yeah, I'm for that." In fact my sons would say "Dad, you know, everybody else is on their feet cheering, and you guys are just sitting there in a row, you know, without any emotion on your faces." But we would watch out of the corner of our eye, and if the Chairman, first Gen Powell and then subsequently Gen Shalikashvili, would begin to applaud, you could almost see the ripple effect coming down the Chiefs. It would pass down the line and we would applaud keyed on what the Chairman decided to do. A little insider secret here for the record.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 26 January, you spoke to the students and faculty of the National Defense University. On the following day, you went to Lexington, Kentucky, to speak to the Rotary Club, and on the same day, 27 January, you spoke to the Patterson School of Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky. Again, I will remind future readers of this transcript that there is a full file of your speeches in your Personal Papers Collection at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

On the evening of Saturday, 29 January, you went to the annual dinner of the Alfalfa Club. We discussed the Alfalfa Club earlier. On Monday, 31 January, you went to Maxwell Air Force Base to speak to the 1994 Joint Flag Officers War Capabilities class. On Saturday, 5 February, you attended the 94th Annual Wallow of the Military Order of the Carabao. What we are seeing here, I think, is a repetition of the 1992 and 1993 cycles of appearances and speech making.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that's true. There is very little difference each year. It cycles around in about the same order.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were not yet out of the woods with respect to the scandal surrounding the Toys for Tots Foundation. In February it was announced that there would be a federal investigation into the charges that the former head of the Foundation had diverted money from the nonprofit organization and had engaged in other financial

improprieties for his personal benefit. What are your recollections of this investigation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the investigation indeed did reveal that we had hired a very bad self-promoter, if you will, to run the Toys for Tots as a private enterprise. Unfortunately, even though it was a private enterprise, and although the Marine Corps was not in any way involved in administering or conducting mail campaigns or even making decisions relative to the Toys for Tots organization itself, because it is the Marine Corps Toys for Tots, its one of those you're held responsible and should be because we've allowed the Marine Corps' name to be attached to it.

So it was a very "see me" type of investigation in which funds had been misappropriated. The rules of the organization had been broken in buying toys from China and places around the world. Granted that we could get them at a better price but that was not — you know, the intent would have been that we buy American toys just for our own economy, and that was the regulations.

There had been a mail-out campaign, and it was this that drew the public attention and that drew, I think, everybody's impression of this particular scandal, if you will. The mail campaign was a completely legitimate undertaking, was done by a completely legitimate organization. They did not do it well, but they were not illegitimate in any fashion. But what occurred was that the letter that was sent out as, apparently, a common way of doing business mail-out campaigns was a trial letter to see what type of interest would be generated, and this letter stated that any money that you donate will go to buy a toy for a needy child. The giver, therefore, thought that if you sent in \$10 that you were going to buy a \$10 toy for a needy child.

But the first, I think, oh, million or more dollars that were generated by this campaign was used to capitalize the campaign, you know, to buy equipment for the subsequent mail-out campaign by the man that was conducting it. When this was found out, there came immediate charges of foul. You know, you've advertised that you're going to buy toys for kids, and you're not; you're buying mail-out equipment. So while again, legitimate, while within the art of the way you do business, it was not the type thing that America wanted to hear about Marines.

LtGen Terry Cooper retired about that time and was hired by the Toys for Tots organization to be the replacement president of that organization and serves in that capacity yet today. Terry Cooper is a bulldog of an individual when it comes to pursuing a goal and

getting it corrected. And to his credit, every cent that was misappropriated from the Toys for Tots organization has either been recovered now or — and, rather — the former president, the fellow who took us down the drain on that, is now being sued by the Toys for Tots Foundation, and this past season Toys for Tots and the Marine Corps' Toys for Tots effort was right back on the cover of the flight magazines that you would find, you know, if you were flying around on a national airline. We were on television. The local networks here in Washington had good, positive advertisement.

So the image of Toys for Tots has been corrected. The issue of its legitimacy to function has now been validated by the Department of Defense. That took an enormous amount of work by Mr. Peter Murphy and by Gen Cooper and his counsel. His counsel is an interesting — bears the telling here, because his counsel is a Washington lawyer who does not derive a cent of income, whose name, interestingly, is Bill Chip, son of LtGen William C. Chip, USMC, Retired. Bill Chip came to me some years ago and said, "My firm is required to give a certain amount of public service and I would like to do that, you know, in conjunction with the Marine Corps. So I called Peter Murphy up, the Counsel to the Commandant, and said, "We've got some free legal service here," and Peter immediately said, "This is the man to assign to the Toys for Tots problem." And so Mr. Bill Chip, Esquire, and LtGen Terry Cooper, USMC, Retired, have, as of this writing, completely corrected, and if anything, Toys for Tots is stronger and more positive today than it has been arguably for a long time in our past.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is Bill Chip, Jr., still a member of the Mac Asbill law firm?

GEN MUNDY: He is, as a matter of fact.

BGEN SIMMONS: Mac Asbill, of course, was a World War II Marine; was an aide to H.M. Smith.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, okay. That had passed me by, but yes, he is, and I know that he and Terry Cooper have formed a tremendous alliance. Chip is a very dogged and aggressive attorney, though you would not — you know, in meeting him, he's a very gentlemanly person, very pleasant man to be around, but I guess when he comes after you, you don't want to be in his gun sights because he is dogged, and he has won for the Toys for Tots.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the weekend of 11 to 13

February, you went off on a ski trip. When did you take up skiing?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as occasionally happens, one is dragged along by the interests of your children, and in this particular case my oldest son, Sam, had gone skiing while I was at the Naval War College in 1976, over Christmas, just went up with a bunch of the kids and they went up to Killington, Vermont, and came back and said, "Dad, this is it. This is the way of the future, and we have to get involved in skiing." So as a family, we began then to take the — you know, we went out and took some ski lessons around the Newport area, which was not very challenging, and then I left there, of course, and came on down to Washington, and we began to go to the local ski areas, up to Liberty, which is nearby Pennsylvania, Wintergreen, and that's where we went on this particular ski trip, or out into West Virginia, and we became enthusiasts about skiing, although for a southeasterner that usually is maybe once or twice a year that you get to go skiing.

On the particular trip in question, however, I had had a notion when I was back as a brigadier general, because I was high on skiing. I thought it would be a rather nice thing to see if we could generate the Marine generals in the Washington area and we could all go off to Wintergreen and have a nice ski weekend because it's a great time to socialize and you can ski or you can sit there and drink hot cocoa alongside the slopes. It is just very refreshing.

So I approached Gen D'Wayne Gray, who was then the Chief of Staff, about that and asked him if I could try and organize, as I termed it then, a "skiposium." Gen Gray, who enjoys a lot of things in life, but skiing was not high on his agenda, sort of tacitly said, "Well, go ahead if you want to, but I think it's a rather dumb idea." So BGen Phil Monahan and I set out to organize this, and it never got off the ground. When the Chief of Staff or the Commandant or the Assistant Commandant are not high on things like that, why, they somehow fall out. So we never got it going.

I still had this lingering, sort of like my blue sweater fascination, so I had Col Jim Flynn, my military secretary, who wanted to go on the trip, I said, "Just put out a flyer to some of the key colonels and to the generals and we'll call this thing Ski with the Stars," and so he put it out, and lo and behold, we had a tremendous turn out of the generals that wanted to go and some of the key colonels, the school directors at Quantico and around the Headquarters. So we were going to have, I think, at the high point somewhere 30

or 40 people that would be off on this weekend at Wintergreen.

As it turned out, it was the most horrible weather that Washington has experienced. It was one of those times where just as, I think the weekend before we were to go, or a few days before we were to go, we had heavy snow, and then we got thawing and heavy rain and then freeze and then more snow. So you really had one of these ice-based, very, very bad driving conditions weekends, and that occurred. The freeze after the heavy rain came on Friday. So we got ready to go Saturday. I went because I was determined to go. We had a very difficult drive. It took us about five hours to get down to what should have been about a three-hour trip. But we made it, and I recall that BGen Jim Joy, my old classmate who is retired down at Quantico, Jim and Patty Joy and their kids made it to the top of the mountain. We had the Flynns, Col Nick Pratt, who was then Director of the Amphibious Warfare School, and Gen Bob Magnus, BGen Magnus. A few made it all the way. Most called in and said, "I can't get out of my driveway and I can't come." So it turned out to be not a large gathering, but it turned out to be — you know, there weren't a lot of people there because the weather was so bad, so we had the slopes pretty much to ourselves and had a fairly nice two-day ski run with a little bit of socializing.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 19 February, Marine Barracks, Annapolis, retired its colors and was redesignated the U.S. Naval Academy Company, Marine Barracks, Washington. What was accomplished by this name change?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the real accomplishment was that, again, looking for the 3,000 people, remember, we were able to save the overhead of the Barracks command. It had been an independent company at the Naval Academy and indeed had had some, up until a couple of years before, had had a security force mission of the Naval Communications Station in Annapolis. However, that mission had been done away with. I think the Naval Com Station was being closed, and so we no longer had a requirement for Marines to perform those missions.

But we had the normal — we had a company commander and an executive officer and a 1stSgt and a gunny and an administrator and, you know, supply chief. A number of those billets could be taken away by, in effect, attaching that company to the Marine Barracks, Washington, that could then carry the administration.

The other thing, this would be on the lower order of priority, but as one will find when you are used to seeing the Marines at 8th and Eye in action, you learn how proper drill and ceremony should be done, and as you go about the Corps, people with great intention and good enthusiasm sometimes they have been to very, you know, occasionally into odd uniforms and occasionally into just not a very professionally borne style. That was a little bit the case at Annapolis. Here we had only, 50 miles down the road, the utopia of professionalism in Marine bearing and pomp and circumstance, and at Annapolis you would go up and they just didn't look quite good.

So I had long encouraged the senior Marine and the commanding officer at Annapolis to have the Marine Barracks send up a couple of sergeants and teach their troops how to drill and how to handle their weapons and how to march and all that sort of thing. So it served the dual purpose of putting the umbrella and, thereby, the special touch of 8th and Eye at Annapolis as well as in Washington and professionalize that company.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February, the new round of budget hearings before the congressional committees began. Once again you told the Congress that the Marine Corps, as the Nation's 911 Force, stood ready to answer the nation's calls. Any particular recollections of the 1994 round of budget hearings?

GEN MUNDY: Well, by that time I had established, I think, very good rapport with key members of Congress. It takes a while to do that, and that's something that, when one comes in as the Commandant, you know, there's always among those that are the staunch supporters of the Corps, there's always a little bit of "Let's see how this new fellow is going to do, or is he going to change around things that we are interested in." And it takes, you know, once or twice around the legislative track to establish yourself, and I believe at this point I had pretty effectively done that. There was tremendous support in the Congress on the subject of the gay and homosexual issue of maintaining the status quo, and the Congress knew that the Chiefs were under an enormous amount of pressure on that circumstance, and so I think that we, you know, in my dealings with the Congress, they appreciated the stance that the Chiefs had taken. So my rapport was good.

The other thing, of course, we had changed administrations, and this gave me relatively unfettered license now to talk about things like the V-22, which

President Clinton had announced as a campaign pledge to build, about the end strength of the Marine Corps which the Bottom Up review had now validated for us. So I was no longer constrained as I was in the first year or so by having to say things like, "Yes, the V-22's a wonderful aircraft, and it sure would be of great use to the Marine Corps if we could get it but, you know, that's not a program that's supported by this administration, and therefore I can't talk about it." Now I was free to be as fervent as I might want in the case of end strength. I no longer had the base force to dance around. That was a Bush Administration force level. And so it was a very healthy year, and it was a time when the Marine Corps did very well, that year and the next year, on the Hill.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 20 February, you attended a testimonial dinner at Bolling Officers' Club for retired LtGen Frank Petersen, the Marine Corps' most senior black officer. Any recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. It was a very warm event. This was the Montford Point Association, which is one of our very strong associations in the Corps. It is that association that grew out of the Montford Point or Camp Johnson, as we now know it, where all of the African-American Marines were trained commencing in 1942. This association wanted to honor LtGen Petersen, whom I had known for many years, since he was serving in the Headquarters and had an arguably good rapport with (unintelligible). So I thought that that was noteworthy. He was the Corps' most, as you have characterized, senior black officer. He had come up at an early time in the history of the African-American accessions into the Corps, and he deserved to be honored.

I would have gone under any circumstances because it was Frank Petersen. There were many who would have seen in this, I'm sure, that "Well, after the *60 Minutes* episode and so on, well, it's nice for the Commandant to go to the African-American organization." Certainly that didn't hurt, you know, to be there. But keeping in mind that these members of the Montford Point Association were — among their membership were many of the letters that I had received as Commandant of support when the *60 Minutes* issue came out. So this was not an organization that had been critical or that had to be particularly amended or amends made with. It was a good evening, a very proud Marine Corps heritage and, of course, a tremendous pride in the achievements of Gen Frank Petersen.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 26 February, you were the guest of honor at the Semper Fidelis Award dinner in Alexandria. Now, what would that be?

GEN MUNDY: The Semper Fidelis Award is given by the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation each year, and it's a formal dinner held here in the Northern Virginia area. It honors a distinguished American, usually a former Marine, and this particular year had honored Senator John Glenn of Ohio, and of course, a retired Marine colonel and the nation's first earth-orbiting astronaut. Senator Glenn, a very pleasant man, as is his wife — Gen Barrow was then the Chairman of the Command and Staff Foundation. They were there, and it's just a grand gathering of Marines each year who come together to recognize one of their own. That's the Command and Staff Foundation Semper Fidelis Award dinner.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 28 February, you made a quick trip to Ontario to speak to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Any specific recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Not an extraordinary visit. Another routine staff college or war college-level visit. That was the only time that I went up there. They do not seek to have the Commandant each year, but it usually occurs, I think, every three or four years that you're invited up. So it happened on my watch, and I went.

BGEN SIMMONS: Could you make any comment or comparisons as far as the ambiance of the Canadian Command and Staff College and our own Command and Staff Colleges, not only the Marine Corps but the Army, et cetera?

GEN MUNDY: Much more rudimentary, I would say. They have a mess, and they are very much smaller than are our schools because their Armed Forces are smaller. The buildings generally are old and, you know, and there was an element of grandeur about them. But I would say that the American military colleges are probably the envy of anywhere in the world. We, you know, state-of-the-art electronics, you know, video systems, computer automated, that sort of thing, study cubicles and so on. Many of those that I have been to overseas are far more kind of like back to the 1950s grammar school situation. So it's a good school, but I think that the caliber of our own schools would far exceed any of the Allied schools that I have been to.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 28 February, that same day, the "U.S. Marine Corps Implementation of DOD Homosexual Conduct/Administrative Separation Policy," as set forth in ALMARS 64/94 and 65/94, took effect. This new policy continued to enforce separation procedures for homosexual conduct, but a Marine's sexual orientation would be considered a personal and private matter, and that alone should not be a bar to continued service. Is that the same as the "Don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" policy?

GEN MUNDY: It is, and you would remember that we spoke earlier of the ice breaker, if you will, or the dam buster, or what have you, that enabled that policy to go forward was the inclusion of the phase that sexual orientation, not homosexual — that is an important point to mention — but that sexual orientation, whatever it might be, would be a personal and private matter. In other words, if we did not ask, as we discussed earlier when you came in, then, you know, whatever your sexual orientation was would never really be known, because what we had found, and a lot of the research revealed that young people, in particular, who eventually became homosexuals in practice at the age of 18, 19 years old really didn't know, were not in a position, to say I am or I am not. They might evolve or they might be led toward that later on by a predator.

So we agreed that that was a private matter, would not be asked. But, as soon as you said, "I am a homosexual," that that was admission of conduct as well as admission of orientation and that conduct was not allowed and you would be processed for discharge. So that was the "don't tell" aspect. If you announced that you were homosexual, then you were up for discharge.

I would also amend what you said, would not be a bar to continued service. Really, that was not a bar to enlistment. The private sexual orientation would not be considered as a bar to enlistment because you didn't know. If you later then said, "I am," then we began processing you for discharge.

BGEN SIMMONS: There were more congressional budget hearings and calls of Senators and Congressmen in March. On Monday, 7 March, you went to Parris Island. After a day there, you went on to New River and Camp Lejeune. You came back on Wednesday, 9 March, in time for several congressional calls. I am skipping over some of the dinners you attended. Any comment on this period?

GEN MUNDY: Routine.

BGEN SIMMONS: You went to a Marine Corps Mess Night at Annapolis on Saturday evening, 26 March. Any specific recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Well, those are always very warm affairs. They are the midshipmen who have declared or wish to opt for a Marine Corps commission, together with the Marines that are in the staff there, and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy has been very faithful about attending. That was RAdm Tom Lynch during this particular time. Tom Lynch, I think, unfortunately, will not go down documentarily as one of the best superintendents that they've had there, because Tom was caught in one of these witch hunt scandals in which there was cheating at the Naval Academy, and he was found to be wanting in the way that he handled it, and therefore — I mean, it was very clear that Tom Lynch, captain of the Naval Academy football team, as bright a young two-star leader as we had, for my money, in the Navy at that time, was going to his third star and probably on to his fourth star, but he was one of those who fell out of the scandal of the Naval Academy. That seems to plague the Navy even until today in those sorts of things. He was there. A very positive affair and a very enjoyable event each year that the Commandant is able to go to if he makes it. I think I was there two or three times during my tenure.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 7 April, you and Mrs. Mundy went to Ottawa. Do you recall the reason for that visit?

GEN MUNDY: Yes. That was one of the exchanges between the Canadian Combined Force Chiefs and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that went here or came there every year.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 11 April two F/A-18s from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 attacked Bosnian Serb forces outside the town of Gorazde, Bosnia. The air strikes were requested by U.N. forces inside Gorazde who had come under increasingly heavy Serb fire. They followed similar strikes the previous day by U.S. Air Force F-16s. What are your recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a proud moment, as usually is the case in the military profession when forces from your service are employed and they do well, and in this case they did very well.

This is a good time, perhaps, to cite the fact that Marine aviation in this sort of performance consis-

tently outdoes our other service counterparts. Marine pilots are trained to do this sort of thing, and they do it in a much more professional matter. What I mean by that is, for example, you mentioned the F-16 strikes the day before. On this particular day the armored vehicles that were there in Garazde were known to be there. They were still being reported by observers on the ground. But we could not get Air Force air under the weather that existed; that is down through the cloud layers and down to the minimum, the below-minimum altitudes, for safe flying. The Air Force simply has regulations against that and would not, you know, they would not get down there.

We launch Marine F-18s, and the Marine pilots will get in under the weather and do that very specialized, you know, ground attack mission, close air support, call it what you want, but Marine pilots are better trained to do that than anybody else. And so in this particular case, the Marine F-18s got under the weather when nobody else flying there could do it, and they could not get a clear bomb strike, though the F-18 has a very precise bomb delivery mechanism on it. The vehicles were in close to some buildings, and so the squadron commander, who was flying one of those two airplanes, did not want to risk a bomb, so he dived on it and gunned it with the guns off the F-18s, which was very daring in its own right and drew me some applause when I went into "the tank" for a meeting later that day or the next. I can remember that Gen Tony McPeak walked up to me with a big grin on his face, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and said, "Hey, your guys gunned 'em. That's good, that's good," because Tony was a fighter pilot and was aggressive, and I always had a great rapport with him. But he was very proud of the Marine aviators, as was I.

But again, the statement to be made, since that time, the Marine F-18D — that's the two-seat version — arguably the finest ground attack airplane in the world today, flown by Marines, and that's an important point to make that I really want heavily in the record, is the fact that I learned over my latter years in the Corps after I got into the MAGTF business and began to pay attention to aviation, that we have a remarkable national asset in that combination of pilot and airplane that is Marine aviation.

Too many people confuse the fact that, well, it's a, you know, it's a grey airplane, it's got a pointy nose and it carries a bomb, and therefore, it must do like other airplanes do. Not the case. If flown by Marines, the aircraft is a much more precise system, pilot and aircraft, of ground support, close air support, than you can find in any other Service or any other nation, for that matter. So, I am extremely high on and proud of

that element of Marine aviation and they did very well in this case.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 12 April, a contingency force from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit rescued some 230 civilians, including 141 U.S. citizens, fleeing ethnic bloodshed in Rwanda. Those persons evacuated were taken to neighboring Burundi. This operation, called Distant Runner, was fairly far inland, was it not, for a MEU?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. In my personal papers there will be a great number of briefings that were given for various purposes, whether they had a budgetary focus or whether they had a roles and missions focus or capabilities, and in the latter briefings, there will be a copy of a slide that is entitled "The 11th MEU" on, I think, the 12th of April. It's a remarkable chart, because what it shows, we had — remember, we had, earlier on, when things were not going well in Somalia, we had — we, the nation — had elected to position an amphibious ready group and a Marine expeditionary unit offshore. On this particular day, the flexibility that's inherent in one of these is overwhelming, because Gen Hoar, the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, had an exercise that had been scheduled in Dubai up inside the Persian Gulf. It was going to be the whole view, but as things go, operational commitments precluded that, but we were able to send one of the ships up to Dubai with a rifle company on it and some vehicles, so it met the commitment of having U.S. forces to participate in our very fragile alliance situation.

We were able to maintain two of the ships off watch of Somalia, which was the mission that they were there for, all with capability of either surface assault or with helicopters embarked, and then to send one of the ships, in this case the helicopter carrier, down some 700 miles south to cover the Burundi evacuation. A Marine Expeditionary Unit, among the other assets that are on call to the MEU commander, usually, if he does not have AV-8s with him, for example, he has a detachment of AV-8s that are on call that can then be flown over to him. He has, also, a detachment of C-130 Hercules refuelers or transport aircraft that he can call forward.

Conveniently, we happened to have the 130s, the Marine 130s, operating down there in support of this operation, and so we had Marine C-130s on hand, which are the only C-130 that's capable of the full range of ground refueling, aerial refueling of both fixed wing and helicopters, transport, air delivery. You can only do that with a Marine KC-130, not with

an Air Force C-130H or HC-130 or anything else. It would take several airplanes to do what one Marine bird can do. So we had a detachment of those there.

That enabled us, then, to launch troops both by the fixed wing, the 130s, and to ferry the CH-53 aircraft into 700 miles inland to position them near this strife-torn area with a force, I think, of about 400 Marines that went in with helicopters, with 130 support, that were prepared to be able to react.

So the briefing chart on this will show a map of the United States overlaying this array of forces, and it will show, if you use the points on the map, you would have from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans, Louisiana, to Yuma, Arizona, and up to Sacramento, California, that is the exact layout of the footprint of that amphibious-ready group, that MEU, on that particular date.

So what I was able to do thereafter, and did every time I had the opportunity, was to say, "For 1,500 sailors, 2,000 Marines, and four ships, we covered the East Coast of Africa, every contingency that the United States had to meet. Where else can you get a better bargain?" So it was another one of those great selling points for amphibious capabilities in general and for Marine flexibility and utility in particular. A very exciting moment. Very well done by that MEU.

BGEN SIMMONS: And back-to-back with what we were also doing in the Adriatic.

GEN MUNDY: Absolutely. Yes, absolutely.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 April you and Mrs. Mundy again flew to the West Coast. That evening there was a reception at the USO at Indian Wells. You spent Saturday, 16 April, at Twentynine Palms, and then Sunday through Tuesday at Camp Pendleton, then to Twentynine Palms on Thursday, and the recruiting depot at San Diego Friday. A busy schedule. The overarching reason for the trip seems to be a "PAC Counterpart Visit." What would that be?

GEN MUNDY: To begin, the USO visit was being hosted by a Dr. Don Vinson, V-I-N-S-O-N, who is a noted psychologist and a member of the USO World Board of Directors. Dr. Vinson hosted Mr. Chapman Cox and his wife and Gen Tom Morgan and his wife and then Linda and me at a dinner, and the purpose of the dinner — there were probably about 40 people that he invited in, and a very expensive and very exclusive scenario — he invited them in to raise money for the USO. So I was the uniformed figure, the potted palm, as I have used the term before, that

made a few remarks and was the drawing card, if you will, for these people to come in, and I talked about what the USO did for the Services. So that was the USO stuff.

The “PAC Counterpart Visit” or “Pacific Counterpart Visit” was the gathering of my Pacific Marine counterparts from Korea, from Thailand, from the Philippines, and supposed to be from Indonesia but the Commandant of the Indonesian Marine Corps, at the last minute, was not able to come because of a call from his President, so he was out at the last minute. So it wound up being three of them. They came for a counterpart visit similar to what I think I have talked about earlier and, you know, there and would do successively —

BGEN SIMMONS: We were talking about the “Pacific Counterpart Visit.”

GEN MUNDY: We, of course, took them to all of the bases on the west coast and gave them a flavor for Marine training. In fact, one of the interesting aspects of this, Linda had long had a, something of an aversion that probably a lot of the senior military wives would come to, and that is as you would go off on these trips it would be very exciting for the husband and that the wife plays a very significant role, you know, in the social aspect. But so many of the itineraries that she would go on would be going to visit the hospital or going to visit the Red Cross or things that are nice to do but there was little excitement.

So I had taken to, when we would have these visits, to including wives in as many of the field events as we could because they, you know, American wives in particular, always enjoyed going out and watching the tanks shoot or the artillery fire or being involved, if you will.

At any rate, we involved all of these ladies. We subsequently did it with the European Commandants and their wives ate it up. But in this case we had, I remember specifically, the Commandant of the Thai Marine Corps who was a Vice Admiral Treerat, and Mrs. Treerat was a grand Thai lady who, of course, did not come out in the bright sun and who was treated as a lady and was taken care of as a lady should be. So when we would go out to these, you know, to a place where helicopters would be landing, blowing dust all over the place or riding in the LCAC — we took them on that — riding in the assault amphibian vehicles — the wives went and rode those into the ocean at Camp Pendleton — well, Mrs. Treerat was not overly entertained by this style of visit. But it was a very pleasant occasion and, I think, did much to cement relations.

I was interested to note that the Koreans were discussing, for example, acquiring some light armored vehicles and it turned out that the Thai Marines were also considering acquiring that but were looking at another version. Those two Commandants during the visit were able to talk about their mutual interests and came to the conclusion that they should jointly seek the same vehicle, which is a tremendously favorable thing if you expect to work together at any time as allies if you can have a commonality of equipment or ammunition, those sorts of things. So those sorts of benefits derived plus just the rapport amongst the Marine Corps of the world.

My intent would have been had I been around for another year, and I have recommended that to Gen Krulak, that we do that same thing for South America. I got to Europe, I got to the Pacific but time ran out and I did not get the Latin American Commandants and I think that would be a useful thing to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: You returned home on Friday, 22 April, in time for the retirement of your friend, Adm Frank Kelso, who was CNO, at Annapolis on Saturday. Wasn't Adm Kelso leaving the post of Chief of Naval Operations early?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, he was. Adm Kelso would have normally stood down, should we say, or retired in the summer, probably the end of June of that year. He was a man who had been hounded by the Tailhook situation and was one in a, you know, in a line of admirals that eventually was felled by that particular incident. In his case, with my great admiration for Frank Kelso who is, again, as fine a man as I have ever known in terms of his values, in terms of his strong character and personality, he had been hounded and finally there was a hearing in which the judge concluded that Adm Kelso had been present during some of the events at Tailhook. That is completely contradictory to every other fact that existed or at least in the context that he was found.

But he and I had spoken on a couple of occasions when we both were under fire, he for Tailhook, me for marriage policy or for the *60 Minutes* minority segment or whatnot, and we had both sat privately and said to each other, you know, “When you become a liability to your Service, maybe it is time to stand aside.” In other words, you want to defend your own character but when you begin to hurt the Marine Corps or to hurt the Navy, then isn't it better to stand aside? And we had both concluded that, “Yes, that was the way to go” and he had told me earlier on, he said, “You know, if this Tailhook thing keeps going it

is not a matter of determining guilt in this case” — there was not any — but he said, “After awhile it will just be better for me to get out of the way and not provide a bull’s-eye for them to continue to shoot at.”

So this last event I think that he made that decision, that the interest of the Navy would best be served by him standing aside. And so he stood aside early and was supported by the SecDef very strongly as a man of honor but respecting his wishes to step aside. He was replaced by Adm Mike Boorda who came in, of course, very abruptly.

BGEN SIMMONS: How well did you know Adm Boorda?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I had known him because at that time he commanded the Southern Region of NATO and I had visited in his home and had dinner with him. I had known him when he was the Chief of Naval Personnel in the Navy Annex Building or the same building as the Headquarters is in, but not really closely. He was admired because one, he was a surface sailor, surface Navy, “black shoe,” if you will. He is literally the first CNO, I think, to go from seaman to CNO. There have been seaman to admirals in the Navy but he was the first to have enlisted.

His father was Navy, a Navy Chief as a matter of fact. He was very proud and devoted to his dad. So it is a good Navy family and Adm Boorda brought a lot of tenure. He was very well thought of in Washington because of his candor and his decisiveness as the Chief of Naval Personnel so he had a strong following in the Senate.

The candidates to be the CNO were Adm Paul David Miller who was young, bright, we have spoken of him earlier, was at that time down at the Atlantic Command; Adm Charles Larson, Chuck Larson, as he is known, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command and Adm Boorda. Those probably were the three candidates.

My own inclination probably would have been that Adm Larson bore all of the right marks, if you will. The Presidential aide, he initially had been a pilot when he was a junior officer and then had been sought out by Adm Rickover and became a nuclear power submariner so he was both air and submarine. He was, in my judgement, was the best CinC that we had at the time, a man of great vision, strategic vision. So I honestly thought that probably Chuck Larson would have a leading edge on that. I thought a lot of him, I liked him, we were good friends.

I thought a lot of Adm Boorda and I thought a lot of Adm Miller although I did not think that Paul

David Miller was the man for this job because he, we have spoken earlier of his focus on adaptive joint force packaging. He was Sec John Lehman’s executive assistant and he bore sort of the style of operation of John Lehman. Those who are Lehman fans would say that is wonderful. Those who are not would see, you know, a lot of weakness there.

But at any rate, I think that the Clinton Administration had shown a proclivity toward exceptional, people who were not standard issue. If you look at the Cabinet there are exceptional people, people of, you know, physical limitations, the minorities, the mix of men and women. Gen Shalikashvili, we spoke earlier, I think, you know, again a superb choice to be the Chairman, but undoubtedly one of the factors going very strongly in his favor was being the son of a Russian czarist officer, immigrating to the United States, you know, that sort of thing. So Adm Boorda had this unique seaman to admiral which was a, I think at this particular time and place was a stroke in his favor.

I think the Navy was very happy to see Mike Boorda named as the CNO. He has, I believe a very strong rapport within the Navy. He is well thought of. Certainly the enlisted men thought a lot of him, and I perceive that the officers do as well. And by getting a surface officer to be the CNO, I think that probably SecNav Dalton as well as the other Administration officials thought that in this furor of Tailhook, you know, it may have been that Chuck Larson’s aviation wings did not serve him well at this particular time as a candidate. But Boorda was a fine choice and I think will go down as a very strong CNO.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 27 April you made a quick trip to El Toro. Do you recall the purpose of that visit?

GEN MUNDY: That was to President Nixon’s funeral. The Joint Chiefs were mustered and we were put on, you know, one of the blue and white special air mission airplanes and flew out to be on hand for President Nixon’s funeral with a large number. The President went and a number of other, most of the other dignitaries in the government and from his administration. We went to the Nixon birthplace and sat and were on scene for the funeral and then got back on the airplane and flew back in and arrived I think about 2:00 in the morning or so, back into Andrews. One of the nice aspects of modern flight is the ability to fly to California, do your business and come home in the same day.

BGEN SIMMONS: Indeed you were back the next morning, Thursday, 28 April, in time to be the kick-off speaker at a U.S. Naval Institute symposium —

GEN MUNDY: In Annapolis.

BGEN SIMMONS: In effect you updated your talk to the symposium of the previous year speaking of the changed strategic landscape and the capabilities of the various Services as derived from the functions assigned those Services. You said that you welcomed yet another Roles and Missions study as mandated by the Congress. Reading it, I find it a particularly well articulated speech. Do you have anything to add?

GEN MUNDY: Well, probably in the ad libs, in addition to the text that you have, I was becoming a bit more aggressive on equality within the Department of the Navy. Indeed we had a Roles and Missions Commission that was going to undertake another look at the Roles and Missions. I felt very confident, and I do today, for the Marine Corps.

I think Roles and Missions are becoming an old, hackneyed, we have been up and down that tree so many times that it is losing its meaning. We have very clearly, I think, through the past several Roles and Missions examinations, be it by the Chairman or be it now by the Commission, established the fact that there is a place for all of the capabilities that each of the Armed Services brings and, indeed, there is a place for each of the Armed Services.

We are past that point, so I did welcome another Roles and Missions examination because I thought that the Marine Corps, after all we had demonstrated and all that we were doing, would come out strong and my judgement is that we did. The Marine Corps emerged very, very credibly from this particular examination.

I was, when I say becoming a bit more aggressive, this I carried on for the last year of my tenure as Commandant and carried, in fact, into retirement with me and perhaps we can talk more about that later, but there was just a feeling that the time has arrived, as I termed it in many speeches, that the era of Marines is back and that the equality of the Marines within the Department of the Navy was something that had to be fixed.

We have to get beyond this presumption that a Navy officer is always the amphibious task force commander. In a given scenario we would do far better to have a Marine general embarked and on the flag ship of a platform at sea running the operation than we would, you know, an admiral who arguably has

never had any experience doing this. That time has come. We have to move forward with that.

We have to move forward on a lot of issues of equality within the Department of the Navy because, after all, as we speak here today the Marine Corps is one-third of the personnel in the Department of the Navy. The Navy is roughly twice the size of the Marine Corps but it had been, for many years we were truly the little brown brother but now we are a bigger brother and so I was beginning to sound those themes.

This was a naval audience and I know that things get back out of that into the Navy staff, that the time has come when we have to look seriously at old, outmoded regulations like the CNO is always the senior officer in the Department of the Navy. That is outmoded, that is wrong. So we have to correct that and that would take some doing so I was beginning to theme on that during this particular speech, as I recall.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Solli of Norway arrived on Sunday, 1 May, for a week long visit. He was one of your long-time Norwegian friends, was he not?

GEN MUNDY: He was and is. When I was a MAU, Marine Amphibious Unit, commander, dual-hatted in my days as the commander of the 2d Marine Regiment, and went to Norway for Exercise Alloy Express in 1982 I was a colonel and I was given a Royal Marine commando or battalion. I was given Dutch forces. I had the U.S. force and I was given a Norwegian battalion to operate under my command as the commander of the South Forces for the exercise. The commander of that battalion, 3d Battalion of Brigade North, was LtCol Arnie Solli.

So we knew each other, he as one of my battalion commanders. And over the years we, you know, as we both moved on, up in rank, I watched appreciatively as Arnie Solli was one of those who moved. He was at the time of his visit the Commander of Northern Norway, which is the key command slot in the Norwegian defense establishment and usually is an indicator that one has at least the potential for becoming the Chief of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, if you will, out of that assignment, which happened in this case.

He knew that he was going to move up at this time and he expressly contacted me and said, "I would like to come and visit the U.S. Marine Corps while I am still Commander, Northern Norway," because of his great attachment to, affection for and appreciation of the Marines. He said, "When I become the Chief of Defense I will have to be the Chairman's guest and I will be purple then." So he wanted to come while he

could specifically align with the Marines.

He and his wife, Kari, a very delightful lady, came and we had a very nice visit with them. We sent them off to Camp Lejeune, as I recall, down to Parris Island and some other places, but we also had them in Washington and it was a very good event.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is too late in the year for you to take them on a Virginia version of skiing.

GEN MUNDY: That is right and he would have not been impressed, I can assure you.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that LtGen Claude Kicklighter US Army(Ret), the director of the Department of Defense 50th Anniversary of World War II Committee paid a call on you on 4 May. Do you recall what this might have been about?

GEN MUNDY: It was about the D-Day commemoration in Europe and the Normandy landings, the celebrations in the United Kingdom and so on. Gen Kicklighter, who did a superb job as the director of the 50th anniversary commemorations I thought, was very faithful in always coming over to keep me up to speed because I, again, as we commented back to my early origins, this generation was my generation. I was just born at the wrong time, but this was my generation. And so I attended all of the events that I could and was, though the Service Chiefs went to many of them, I think that Kicklighter realized that he had in me a sure shot, that I was going to go. But this one was on the Normandy landings.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday, 8 May, you flew to New River to attend the wake for SgtMaj Edgar R. Huff. What can you tell me about SgtMaj Huff?

GEN MUNDY: One, SgtMaj Huff was a friend that I had known in my days at Camp Lejeune. He was retired, in fact, when I went down there. But he was one of the original, the Montford Point "chosen few," if you will, or, you know, those who had entered the Marine Corps as the first black Americans to enter. He had stuck around, had become a fabled sergeant major, you know, as some sergeant majors tend to evolve, he had become a legend. You know, many, many stories and sea stories that were told about Edgar Huff.

He was extremely well thought of. He was extremely active in the support, the Marine Corps League, the support organizations for Camp Lejeune and just was somebody that I had admired because of

the man. So when he died, he was to be, his funeral was to take place in the Goettge Memorial Field House at Camp Lejeune so that all the people could be accommodated rather than doing it in the local church. He wanted that to occur on board the base.

I could not be there on the day of the funeral, the Monday, for whatever the commitment was I was not able to be there. So, I just took a quick flight down on Sunday to go over and pay my respects to Mrs. Huff and to the family.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 9 May, the Commandant of the Venezuelan Marine Corps paid you an office call. This does not seem to be a full-fledged counterpart visit. Do you recall the circumstances?

GEN MUNDY: There were no significant circumstances. He was on a personal visit to the United States and when I say personal, there were, you know, whatever his professional association, it had nothing to do with a visit to the Marine Corps, per se. He came in for a courtesy call. We had a nice half hour together and that was it.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday, 10 May, Mr. John White, who was chairing the new Roles and Missions Commission, paid an office call on you. Was this a substantive visit or a get-acquainted visit?

GEN MUNDY: It was a get-acquainted visit.

BGEN SIMMONS: How were we set up at Headquarters Marine Corps to respond to this new examination of roles and missions?

GEN MUNDY: We put together a Roles and Missions Cell, as we termed it, and this was comprised of some truly bell-ringing officers. I had once again more or less chartered by this time MajGen Tom Wilkerson who was the Director of Plans and who stayed at Headquarters literally my entire tour because he was, he brings a tremendous ability on the national scene, in the political arena, you know, in the joint arena. I do not think there is anybody around who can do much better than Tom Wilkerson so I wanted him to head it.

I wanted to bring in some of our very top colonels to deal with this and we did that by placing in that cell Col Mike Hayes who is now BGen Hayes; Col Wallace Gregson, Chip Gregson as we know him, now BGen Gregson; we put in LtCol Steve Cheney who was a, had just come down from a year's sabbat-

ical on the Council on Foreign Relations, had been a military assistant to SecDef Cheney so had a very high-level view of the world; and then a Col Bob Melton who had been a Marine Corps planner on the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and who brought, he was an aviator and so he brought the aviation expertise. We also had Maj Jon Hoffman who you know very well, one of our noted writers and historians. Jon came to bring that element to this, to be able to go back and research in history the things that we needed to know; a Maj Jackson whose first name I cannot recall here; and Maj Tracey Warren who is a female officer, air control officer, and absolutely one of the best and brightest that I have ever known. So she was not necessarily the token woman on the commission but she was there because she was one of the smartest and brightest minds in the Headquarters. Gen Krulak subsequently has used her on his own Commandant's Staff Group.

That was the cell, together with about three sergeants who provided the administrative support to them. So it was the best thinkers and the best maneuverists, if you will, that I felt that we could bring together, and again, under the immediate tutelage of MajGen Tom Wilkerson. But really very close to the Office of the Commandant for obvious reasons. This was a very, very important Roles and Missions Commission and while, as I have said earlier, I really had no concerns about it, I wanted to make sure we did it right.

As we had our early strategy sessions and we were already beginning to receive the, I will say the cheap shots that come in from those, again, from those who do not know or from the other Services — there were papers being floated around about how, you know, the Marine Corps, Army light infantry could do everything that Marines can do; Air Force air could do everything that Marine air could do; and you know, that Marines had not really done well in the Gulf War, that that should have been an Army war, that we did not land the amphibious force, all of these kinds of things that were well below the level we ought to be focusing on — so I had to keep pulling on my young Turks there to get them up. But I said, “We are on the high ground. Let all of that trash take place down there. Do not worry about it because it is not going to influence anything.”

“So if the other Services and their cells want to extend themselves trying to figure out why Army light infantry is like Marine light infantry, let them do that. It will not matter. We are going to stay high and we are going to focus on the strategic objectives here.”

And very frankly it worked. I think, you know, history will record, but I think it worked tremendously well for the Marine Corps. We were specifically accredited on many occasions and among those by Dr. John White, himself a former Marine, of course. That also was nice to have in our corner. But while there were temptations from time to time to go back and to gunfight some of these really aggravating issues we did not do that openly.

Now to be candid and for the record I will tell you that the other thing that Gen Wilkerson brought was a tremendous network into publications like the *Wall Street Journal* and to other publications, that principally through the efforts of LtCol Tom Linn. Tom is an officer who may be retired at this point but he was in the Plans Division. Although Tom was never destined to become a future Commandant or a future general or, for that matter, even a colonel he was a man who had considerable talent at being able to write, to author pieces that described the capabilities of the Marine Corps. So there would astoundingly keep cropping up from time to time these articles in the *Wall Street Journal* and elsewhere that would explain, you know, why the Marines could do something so much better than others around us. And they were always, of course, authored by one of the *Wall Street Journal* editors or others.

So they did a very good guerrilla effort at making sure that the Marine Corps capabilities and name were kept at the forefront during a very critical time. But beyond that, all of the maneuvers, all of the blows, if you will, were high level and we did not seek to get down in the mire and wallow with the pigs. And I think it paid off for us.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 25 May, you went to Annapolis to take part in the graduation ceremonies at the Naval Academy. Do you recall who the guest of honor was?

GEN MUNDY: It was President Clinton.

BGEN SIMMONS: In general, have you been satisfied with the quantity and quality of the second lieutenants we draw from the Naval Academy?

GEN MUNDY: In general, yes. Gen Gray had at the outset of his watch had some concern about that and it derived, not altogether by any means, but in part from similar impressions that I had experienced when I chaired the captain selection board one year. My conclusions from that board, and this was about 1983 or perhaps 1984, but my conclusions from that board



United Nations forces were deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in war-torn Bosnia. Gen Mundy visited the area in June 1994. Here he is seen in Zagreb, Croatia, with Marines from 1st Platoon, Military Police Company, 2d Force Service Support Company.

experience were that Naval Academy graduates tended to run hot or cold. There was no warm in there. It was black or white. There was no gray. They either were very good lieutenants or as soon as they were commissioned they dropped their packs and said "I spit-shined shoes for four years and I am not doing that anymore or I will serve my four years and then I am out of here." And they opted for a specialty that was, you know, maybe not combat arms. They wanted to get into something where they could begin to get themselves ready for their post-Service experience.

So we were concerned about that and the other thing that was of concern to Gen Gray was that we commissioned the officers that came out of the Academy as regular officers and we were experiencing a very traumatic ability to augment or integrate into the regular Marine Corps some Reserve officers that came out of other sources, OCS, PLCs and ROTC who were far better than these regular officers that we were getting out of the Academy.

As a result of that, this year, the year that we speak in, 1996, will be the last year that an officer will be commissioned as a regular officer in the U.S. Armed Forces. We will, instead they will be Reserve officers and then at a point further in their career they will be offered the opportunity to continue to be regulars. There are some uncertainties there as to whether or

not we can retain officers but it was driven in large part by the Marine Corps' concern for the quality we were getting.

On my watch Gen Gray had caused the senior Marine at Annapolis, Col Fred Fagan at that time, Col John Ripley before him, to begin a program that would do better screening whereby anyone that wanted to go into the Marine Corps from the Academy would come down to Quantico in the summertime and would, in effect, undergo a short but nonetheless a very specific . . . not only orientation on the Marine Corps — we had done that for years, brought them down and said here is a tank and that is a Marine helicopter — but this would be something of a screening course. And therefore, if the midshipman did not make the mark at OCS then we would send them back with a note, tell them not to select the Marine Corps on Service Selection Night because they are not going to come our way. As a result by the time that I got here I think the quality of lieutenants and, on balance, the quantity of lieutenants coming out of the Naval Academy was, and is today, fine.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 June in the Henderson Hall theater you frocked Carol A. Mutter with her second star making her the first female major general in Marine Corps history. She assumed command of

Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, two days later. Any comments?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the good thing about Carol Mutter, and this case could be made, perhaps, for others as well, but in her case had Carol Mutter been a male officer she would be exactly where she is today.

There is not, I think, a one of us serving who was reviewing the generals, and I did that as a committee — I tended to use my three-stars and the Assistant Commandant as a, in effect, selection board for those that we wanted to advance on up to lieutenant general — Carol Mutter got absolutely rave reviews from everybody who had ever known her or served with her.

She was rated at the Space Command when she was one of the Directors of Operations of a cell there. She was rated, they had four watch teams and Col Mutter was rated as the very top of the bunch and that was by an Air Force reporting senior. She continues that to this day and I suspect that we have not seen the last, and that I would make you a case and say that Carol Mutter may very well be the first three-star woman officer in the U.S. Armed Forces. And if that occurs, I would only say that she did it in absolute equal competition with her male peers and she is that good.

BGEN SIMMONS: That same day, 1 June, you and Mrs. Mundy departed for Europe on a six-day visit commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landing. What are your recollections of that visit?

GEN MUNDY: A very exciting time, again, back to the boyish thrill of being there on my part. We started the trip by going into London and we stayed overnight there and attended the commemoration in Grovesner Square which is the square where the statue of General Eisenhower is located and it is immediately adjacent to Eisenhower's wartime headquarters which is today the Naval Forces in Europe Headquarters. So we were there.

It was a grand event, very cold day, very blustery day and the wind blowing. But a large gathering and, of course, tributes. I think Winston Churchill, Jr. gave an address; Delores Hope, Bob and Delores Hope were there and Delores sang at the event, you know, one of the World War II songs and there was, I believe, there was not a member of the royal family there but Gen George Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, was there. So a good American gathering and we started there.

We went from there to, down to Portsmouth which was, of course, the site of the embarkation and in Portsmouth we had a couple of events. One was a reception by, unfortunately it was a horribly rainy day, but out on the grounds of the estate that Eisenhower had occupied as his forward operational headquarters when he gave the word to go on D-Day.

We had a reception there and again Princess Margaret came, the Queen was there and so there was royalty. Of course, the Brits do this up with great propriety. Linda was directed to wear a hat and to have gloves and to do all these sorts of things and I was, of course, in whatever uniform, blues a lot, but properly attired. We attended that.

There was a tattoo ceremony, military tattoo which the British do beautifully. That was attended by all of the heads of state. President and Mrs. Clinton were there, of course the queens and the kings of Europe, about 14 heads of state. That was a splendid affair.

And then probably the most stirring event that occurred, and it was stirring for a couple of reasons that I will explain here, was the Drum Head Ceremony at Portsmouth. The Drum Head Ceremony is an ancient military ceremony in which the, in those places where church and state are not separated anyway, you would bring your battle color, your regimental flag or whatever it was and the archbishop or at least the clergyman would come out. The band would march in, would take off its drums and would stack the drums in the form of an altar and then the regiments or the formations would come by and would lay their battle flags on this altar which made a kind of a tepee-like effect with all of these colorful battle flags.

Then there would be a very patriotic and religious service that would take place and that would consecrate the flags as they were being sent off to battle. This was an old Anglican tradition, I guess. That was attended by something on the order of a million and a half people down on the green at Portsmouth and, of course, these are full dress affairs with the British and the British generals and admirals in what they call their pajama coat which is their long frock and their sashes and their swords and their spurs and so on. And, of course, I was in blues and bemedaled and sworded and all that sort of thing, properly. But at any rate I was privileged to be included with the senior people that were there.

So here we are sitting in a section. I was sitting with the Commandant General, Royal Marines, who had been given responsibility, because this was in Portsmouth and because that part of the U.K. is generally Marine Corps territory or Royal Marine territo-

ry, the Ministry of Defense had tasked him with providing the troop support for this. So it was a Marine Corps affair. So here we are. The Queen Mother is there and the princesses and the Queen and Prince Philip and all of the heads of state, President and Mrs. Clinton. I was seated by Gen Ross and then I, with, Sec Perry was there and other American delegation and foreign delegation.

Well, at any rate, into this then, onto this beautiful green with the war monument standing there looking out onto the English Channel, the bay at Portsmouth, the Royal Marines, Robyn Ross had called me and said, "I am going to provide a platoon of Royal Marines and the band, I would like for you to provide a platoon of American Marines." It so happened that one of the organizations that was out on the flotilla, the armada of ships that were anchored out in the bay there, was the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and, of course, the USS *America* was there, our aircraft carrier. Col Pete Metzger, my old EA and an 8th&I colonel, you know, was in command. So I talked to Pete before he went and said, make sure that the Marine detachment is formed for ceremonial duties. So to make a long story short, they were perfect.

Well, so into this million and a half persons viewing the spectacle came the Royal Marines Band, splendid as always, marches on, and behind it comes a platoon of Royal Marines, a large platoon. I think there were 70 men, it was almost a company, but at any rate a very large platoon of Royal Marines. And then all of the regimental standards, very colorful British array of battle flags and so forth that came on, each borne by a soldier or a sailor from that organization that had participated in the Normandy landing. And then bringing up the rear is a 70-man platoon of U.S. Marines. So we march in to appropriate military music. I think they played "Life on the Ocean Wave," that song of the Royal Marines, as they took formation.

That is the backdrop. And then the colors were delivered and put on the drums and then the service went on for about an hour. We finished the service, a very moving event. The Royal Marines Band that had taken station behind this platform was in the center of the field.

We get ready to exit after the colors had been picked up and the dignitaries had moved off the platform, off there, with the queens and kings still sitting up here and the Royal Marine Band takes station and because they had gone in Royal Marines, flag bearers, U.S. Marines, now we are going to come out and, of course, it would be the Band, the U.S. Marines, the flag bearers and the Royal Marines.

The Band takes position, the band master lifts his baton and drops it and from the "Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli" breaks out. Instinctively, I stood to my feet. Robyn Ross beside me said, "Well, I will stand with you." So up stands the Commandant General, Royal Marines. SecDef Bill Perry said, "Well, Carl, I will stand with you." He pops up. Fourteen heads of state stood for the "United States Marines' Hymn" and the Royal Marines and all the colors in this whole international event marched off to the tune of the "Marines' Hymn" with all of us. And the British generals and admirals were turning around and eyeballing me stonily. You know, who is this upstart colonialist who dares come over here? But the Queen stood for the "Marines' Hymn." They did not know why but it does not really matter in history. It was a grand moment for the Corps. So that was a very high point.

That afternoon then we, I went back and changed clothes, got in utilities and Col Metzger sent in a helicopter for me and picked me up. The ships had already started crossing the Channel because that was on D minus 1 that we held the Drum Head Ceremony. I flew out to the USS *Guam* which was his flag, the amphibious squadron flagship, and went to visit each of the ships crossing the Channel. We had gotten a little bit later start than we anticipated and the ships were underway. So we got into a Huey helicopter and flew, honestly when we caught the *Guam* I could see the coast of France, so we flew all the way across the English Channel with great expanses of water and nothing beneath us. I took Gen Ross, Robyn Ross, along with me.

We visited each of the ships and I did the usual, you know, talk to the troops about the significance of the event, and then I spent the night on the *Guam* with Col Metzger and his staff.

The next morning, D-Day then, Linda had remained in the U.K. but she was ferried over with the rest of the wives and came over to Normandy, but the next morning I went very early, about 0600 over to the, transferred by helicopter over to the *America* and was on hand. The President then came aboard and they had a wreath ready. We lowered an elevator and I was privileged to be among those seated there with the President and the veterans. He floated a wreath off the elevator into the English Channel for the Navy losses that day.

He then left and then I caught a helicopter, a Marine CH-53, we were using Marine helicopters to ferry in all of these dignitaries. The President and everybody else was lifted by Marines of the 26th MEU that day. So I caught one of those and flew into Utah Beach and



A major highlight of the 50th anniversary of World War II was the event held on 6 June 1994 commemorating the landings on D-Day. Both Gen and Mrs. Mundy attended and are seen here at Omaha Beach.

there met up with Linda and with the other members of the party, sat during the commemoration ceremonies at Utah Beach, the coldest that I have ever been.

I was seated between the CNO, Adm Mike Boorda, and between the Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall and I had fortunately brought my topcoat along. Mike had opted to be tough and not wear his and he almost froze to death. So I had Adm Boorda hiding under my left arm trying to shield himself from the wind and the Honorable Mrs. Widnall literally cuddling to me on my right side trying to stay warm. So we had some lighthearted banter.

We went from there, from Utah Beach we went by cavalcade to a luncheon that the French were hosting near Omaha Beach that was under these very large tents that are common about this country today. But this was a full-course French luncheon —

GEN MUNDY: — put on by the French was the full-course with champagne and the finest red and white

French wines and just superb food and dessert and what not sitting out there and I think there were about 4,000 people at this affair with everybody sitting down.

From there we then went to Omaha Beach and there there was, of course, a tremendous number of American veterans and a sizeable number of Marines. I had more or less considered myself an outsider, member of the Joint Chiefs and therefore properly there, but as a Marine maybe not. Well, you have no idea the number of Marines I met that had been, you know, on the staffs of the invasion force or had been in Marine detachments. Some of them had come ashore and whatnot. But they were all attired in their Marine Corps hats or uniform articles and so on.

It was a beautiful day after it had been a rather glum day. We had now the fleet of ships. The carrier and the U.S. and the Allied war ships were offshore of Omaha Beach and as we wandered around through the American cemetery there looking over the beach and so on, the clouds parted and the sun came through

and it was an absolutely spectacular day. And then the President arrived and we had the ceremony which was done splendidly.

The rest of us now were trying to get back, get out of there and get back to our airplanes to turn around and head back to the United States or to move on. As is the case of the Secret Service, when the President is around the Secret Service freezes the air space and you cannot launch another helicopter so long as the President is there. And for about 20 minutes after the President has departed they hold the air space. So they froze the air space.

The President, in the euphoria of the moment, decided to, I think, personally shake the hand of every veteran that was in France that day so we wound up waiting for about four and a half hours, just standing around waiting. And it is a wonderful thing to be delayed for, to have the President mixing with the people and touring the beaches and so on, but anyway, he was very, very late getting out of there and so the rest of us were appropriately delayed.

We flew on up and spent the night in a government-provided hotel on the, in a small village in France and then got up the next morning. But it was a splendid occasion and one which, again, for anyone would have been a privilege but for the, you know, for me with my emotions about that period of our history it was especially meaningful.

BGEN SIMMONS: On your return you went on leave from 8 through 12 June. Were you aware that among Marine Corps veterans of the Pacific War that there was considerable bitterness that the observance of the Normandy landing completely obscured the anniversary of the landing on 15 June 1944 on Saipan?

GEN MUNDY: Well, at that moment, no, I was not. I later came to be aware of that because it made, there was some notoriety in the news coverage that the veterans felt cheated.

I guess my feelings on that were balanced by the fact that from the outset Gen Kicklighter and his committee had made a very deliberate case for saying we cannot honor every battle that took place in World War II. We are going to have to be selective and that will offend some people who fought as hard, you know, wherever they were as was being credited elsewhere.

There was no question that because of the American/European alliance that D-Day was going to be the big moment. But I came to realize that later. Frankly, I must admit that I had not been sufficiently

a student of the Pacific campaign perhaps to fully appreciate Saipan and the ferocity of that battle and the losses and the significance of the battle. So we probably passed lighter over Saipan than in hindsight I would wish we had.

I do not know that I would have diverted from the Normandy invasion and run out to Saipan myself because I think it was important for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was expected that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be at Normandy for D-Day and it was one that I would have hated to miss. But I am aware that there was a significant feeling that we fought and bled on the other side of the world and yet that passed almost unnoticed, and it did. It is regrettable.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 22 June you made a quick trip to the West Coast, including a stop at Pascagoula, Mississippi, and a combat review of the I Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton. What are your recollections of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: The trip was two-fold. One, the stop at Pascagoula was to have the keel plate for the USS *Bataan*, LHD-5, which Linda was very graciously asked to be the sponsor for, to place our initials, mine and hers, in this plate that is affixed to the keel of the *Bataan*. We did that. It is one of the ceremonies having to do with the christening and commissioning of a ship. We stopped to do that and then went on.

The actual event in Camp Pendleton was the change of command, although it was not such. That is, it was listed as a combat review because we had run into a situation with the confirmation of general officers consuming an enormous amount of time. Since that time there have been some repairs to the process by which that is done, but we had, for example that was in June, the officers who were changing command in this case, LtGen Tony Zinni, to relieve LtGen Ron Christmas of I MEF and MajGen Frank Libutti to relieve MajGen Charlie Wilhelm, who was himself to be advanced to three stars of the 1st Division — the plan was to have a dual change of command ceremony. The SecNav was going out for it. I was, of course, going to be on hand for it.

However, those officers, though they had been nominated for promotion back in February or March, were still pending confirmation by the Senate, some of that deriving from the fact that we still were, not those individuals and not even the Marine Corps, but with the Tailhook (unintelligible) the Senate had sort of pushed aside confirmations as a penalty for, I do not know, for all the Services or a penalty to the Administration or whatnot.

So, those sorts of things hurt the effectiveness of the Armed Forces very much but, at any rate we thus had a combat review that would have been a change of command but it was not because we could not do that, but the plans had all been laid.

The SecNav was there and we had a wonderful review. All of us put on our helmets and our war gear and he trooped the line in a light armored vehicle and then we fired gun salutes and then took him out to dinner at a little French restaurant in Fallbrook, California that night with all the Marine generals in a very casual setting. Once again it was a part of the wooing of the Secretary of the Marine Corps. A very successful case and a very, very nice day for the Marine Corps. It was a beautiful, very impressive combat review.

BGEN SIMMONS: From 4 June through 13 August Marine Reserve Force conducted the Exercise Pinnacle Advance, the largest peacetime training exercise in the Marine Corps Reserve's 78-year history. The exercise involved 16,000 Marines and took place at sites in Southern California, Nevada and Arizona. The play of the problem included humanitarian assistance, peace keeping, air and ground combat and amphibious operations. Did you observe any part of this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: I did not. The dates simply, although it went on for several weeks, I simply, no, did not go out for it through I would read his reports, weekly reports. We now had electronic mail, of course, so I would come in and MajGen John Cronin had sent in a report. It clearly was a superb exercise but things got in my way and I was not able to get out for that.

BGEN SIMMONS: From 15 through 23 June the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps combined with the Russian Navy and Naval Infantry to conduct an historic joint and combined exercise. LPD-8, the USS *Dubuque*, and a detachment from the 3d Marine Division from Okinawa took part. What more can you tell me about this exercise?

GEN MUNDY: This was an icebreaker. This was the first exercise of U.S. ground troops, that being Marines, on Russian soil. And while there was not a significant maneuver exercise or anything, what we did was to take the *Dubuque* in, as you have mentioned. BGen Dave Bice who was the CG of the 3d Marine Division at that point, went up to be on hand. He was met by a Russian defense force counterpart, a Russian Marine if you will, and they exchanged vehi-

cles. The Russian BMPs came into the *Dubuque* and our AAVs went out and got into one of the Russian ships. And then they went ashore and just talked some procedures and had people-to-people relationships.

Our Marines were very warmly received, were given the best that the Russians had to offer. It was a significant icebreaker with the Russians on the east coast of Russia because we had, you know, all of the US or Allied overtures to the Russians had all been dealing with Russians across the western border into Moscow and into that part of that military district. So this was significant in that it was out of the Pacific. Adm Larson, Chuck Larson about whom I spoke earlier, set this up and it went very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 24 June, a Mr. Ancell spent three hours in the morning discussing with you the quote, "Ramifications of Leadership" unquote. Who is Mr. Ancell and what was this about?

GEN MUNDY: Mr. Ancell was an author who was doing research for either an article or, I think, a book that he planned to write, and that is it. I have not seen the book. I am not aware that he is published yet. I did not know him before, but I was encouraged by our public affairs people who said that he was legitimate and he was just going around talking to people about techniques of leadership and various styles. So that is what I did with him.

BGEN SIMMONS: Sometime in June, LtGen Charles Krulak, commanding at Quantico, closed the last Marine Tailhook case. A total of 22 cases had been reviewed by Gen Krulak. Were there any punitive actions against any of these 22 officers?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was not punitive, this was administrative but one colonel who had been selected for brigadier general, a group commander who had been in attendance there and who had been, in my judgement, in a position to have affected some positive leadership and did not do so, was removed from the brigadier generals list at my recommendation to the SecNav.

Gen Krulak had done, I believe, four non judicial punishment case hearings out of these 22 cases that he overheard. The colonel, the brigadier was not, that was my action, not Gen Krulak's, but of the 22 I believe that four went to non judicial punishment, office hours. There was no significant action out of that. In other words no one was jailed or sent to court

martial because the evidence and the infractions simply did not warrant it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did this end Tailhook for the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Yes and no. Yes, from the standpoint of any, you know, continuing probes or any continuing addressal within the Marine Corps of any Tailhook matters, it did end it. From the standpoint of the effect on officers, there were yet two captains who two years later were selected for promotion to major by a duly constituted selection board. They had been present during Tailhook. They had been among those that were, among these 22. In both instances Gen Krulak had found no basis for any action whatsoever.

In the one case, one of the captains was the junior officer assigned to a squadron that was involved. This was the infamous Marine Reconnaissance Squadron which had been deactivated, was not even any longer a squadron at the time of Tailhook, but they had hired, the former members had hired a room and this was the one in which the rhinoceros had been, the Rhino Room as it was called. This young officer had been detailed the duty of as willing female participants came in and chose to involve themselves with the rhino, why this young officer had been given the duty of recording the certain statistics about what the ladies had done — well, maybe not the ladies — but what the women had done when they came in. So, Gen Krulak had heard the case. There were no witnesses whatsoever to anything that this officer had done, you know, except duly do what his colonel had told him to do.

And the similar case in the case of the other captain was that there was a, initially a charge that he had groped the breast of a civilian female who turned out to be a Marine colonel's daughter who was there at the reunion, lived in Los Vegas and had come in. But the charge was not supported and though Gen Krulak flew her back to Quantico as a witness she had absolutely no witness that it had happened and there was no basis for the charge. Now one could argue and say, well, maybe she did not want dad to know, but that was just not the case. There was just no evidence whatsoever.

And yet when these two officers were, two years later, selected for promotion to major the SecNav saw fit to remove their names from the promotion list because they had been there. I argued very strongly against that. I know that Gen Krulak and even Gen Christmas weighed in with the SecNav to attempt to say these . . . you know, this is double jeopardy. It is

very much akin, though perhaps even less incriminating to the Stumpf case, Commander Bob Stumpf, today who was heard by the adjudicating authority and was absolutely not charged with anything but he has been removed from a selection, promotion to captain in the Navy as a result of this. So, it was not the end of the Tailhook case but it was essentially the end.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you have anything else that you would like to add about this six months?

GEN MUNDY: No, I think that is a good summarization of that period.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is probably a good place to end this session.

SESSION 26

Second Six Months

The controversial transfer of Army Abrams tanks . . . A visit to the Caribbean . . . Gen Rich Hearney as Assistant Commandant . . . The 50th Anniversary of the liberation of Guam . . . Deactivation of the 9th Marines . . . A change of command at FMFPac . . . More career opportunities for women Marines . . . A change of command at U.S. Central Command . . . Shutting down El Toro . . . Marine juniors . . . A demonstration of the V-22 Osprey . . . "A Certain Force for an Uncertain World" . . . The Marines land once again in Haiti . . . Deactivation of the 1st Marine Brigade . . . A trip to France and Spain . . . Gen Jack Sheehan takes command at U.S. Atlantic Command . . . The Marine Corps Marathon . . . Air Force Gens McPeak and Fogleman . . . Meeting with the President on "readiness" . . . Resolution of the Toys for Tots problem . . . A trip to South America . . . SecDef Perry visits Camp Lejeune.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered the events of the first six months of 1994. In this session we will go through your activities during the second six months of 1994.

On 1 July the United States Senate and House budget negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense authorization bill that called for a transfer of 84 M1A1 Abrams tanks from the Army to the Marine Corps. What was the controversy behind this transfer and how was it resolved?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is a long story, and to be quite candid for the record, it is a battle that I wish we had never had to fight. As such things go, once it was joined on Capitol Hill, it was a battle that we had to win. So while, you know, my heart was in winning but my heart was lesser in the tanks that we were getting.

The background on this goes back to the introduction of the M1A1 tank into the Marine Corps inventory, replacing the M-60. When that decision was made we had some 760 M-60 tanks in the Marine Corps and that included a full battalion of tanks in each of the MPS squadrons, which would have been about 56 tanks or 168 tanks or so that were out in the afloat prepositioning, plus, each of the tank battalions, or at least the two at that time, had had four companies each.

When the decision was made in General Gray's tenure to acquire the M-1s, which we would have done under any circumstances, that was an enormously expensive piece of equipment, about \$3.5 million apiece for these tanks. And so the decision was made

to buy fewer numbers and as I recall the number was somewhere in the, about 225 to maybe 240 that we were replacing.

Now the political and the internal factor comes to play here. The armor officers in the Marine Corps at the grades of principally lieutenant colonel and below, but certainly, you know, a few of the colonels that we had that were armor officers, never really accepted this decision because they saw it, obviously, as the demise of two-thirds of the tanks in the Marine Corps. So there was always some resistance, and I do not mean by that under cover to the Commandant. They were very loyal but there were arguments back and forth in the *Gazette* and there were many, many sessions at Headquarters Marine Corps to determine if we could not increase the numbers of tanks.

At any rate the decision was made at that force level of tanks that we could put 30 M1A1 tanks into each of the MPS sets. Thus we went down by a rough order of magnitude to about half the numbers of tanks, of M-1s. The companies were smaller, 14 instead of 17 tank companies, and we had essentially to put two companies of tanks and then a headquarters element on each of the squadrons.

So, that was never a popular decision within the armor community and, indeed, there were others even outside that community that thought that maybe we were lightening up too much. Well, when we went off to the desert war, of course it was an armor conflict and we heaved up and we were reinforced by the Tiger Brigade, a heavy armored brigade of the Army, to shore up the 2d Marine Division. We called up the Reserve tanks. We borrowed tanks from the Army.



On 12 September 1994, Gen Mundy promoted Congressmen Paul F. McHale, Jr., and Frank M. Tejeda to lieutenant colonel and major, respectively, in the Marine Corps Reserve. Pictured with Gen Mundy, from left are: Representatives John P. Mutha (a retired Marine Reservist), Paul McHale, and Frank Tejeda.

We did all we could to heavy-up in armor because of that conflict. That gave new life then in the after-action reports to the fact that the Marine Corps was too light on tanks.

Among those young Marine officers who were caught up with this spirit that we needed to heavy-up in tanks was one Reserve major named Paul McHale who was just elected to Congress as a Democrat from Pennsylvania.

BGEN SIMMONS: How do you spell his last name?

GEN MUNDY: M-C, capital H-A-L-E. Paul McHale. McHale is a fervent young man. In fact he had been a lieutenant in my battalion when I was a battalion commander and is to this day one of my very good friends and someone that I think a great deal of. But at any rate, fired by the fact that as the Army drew

down in size they planned to transfer main or first-line battle tanks, M1A1s, into the National Guard and the Reserve, McHale rightfully began to raise the issue on the floor of the Congress, shouldn't the first line of defense have the most modern equipment and in adequate numbers as opposed to turning it over to the National Guard to have, you know, parades on the 4th of July with? That is not a cheap shot at the Guard but a fact of life is that except for World War II we really have not called up that type of Guard capability much.

So this caught fire on the floor, largely because of Paul McHale. It then was picked up, it had been, it did not just begin but it certainly always was a burning fire down at Quantico among the younger, the majors and the lieutenant colonels who believed that we should maintain the Marine Corps heavy-up. So, to make a long story short, we now found ourselves joined with a situation on the Hill in which the Army,

to prevent this from happening, at equally low levels, at the lieutenant colonel and colonel level and perhaps up to the one or two-star general level, began to attack the Marine Corps' effectiveness in the employment of tanks and began to, in effect, you know, challenge why the Marine Corps needed tanks at all as a means of defeating this.

They were able, Gen Shalikashvili was the new Chairman, and I think at a moment he later said to me, "I lost it on this one." But he forgot that he was now the Chairman, and so he was called by the Army to go over and lobby the Army's case from the Army's Legislative Affairs Office. This absolutely inflamed many of the Marine supporters on the Hill so we had an extraordinary leaning of support. The National Guard rolled in through Congressman Sonny Montgomery and others threatening to ruin the next election. In other words, it was just really a foul politics game, on the other side, I might say.

Thus, it became a battle we had to win. Whether my heart was in tanks or not, we could not afford to lose this one on the Hill and so, to make a long story short, we prevailed and the Congress authorized the transfer of those tanks. Gen Gray entered that fray on our behalf, did a superb job of going up and reminding the Congress that we had, you know, that there had always been exchanges of equipment back and forth between the Army and the Marine Corps.

So, that then enabled us to receive tanks from the Army that would have been going to the National Guard, to upgrade them, you know, make them Marine tanks, put fording equipment on them and so on, and then to increase the numbers that would be in the maritime pre-positioning ships about to the level that it had been before, and also to have some tanks for a reserve float, in other words, a maintenance float, as well as to increase the numbers of tanks that we had in the battalions of the Marine Corps Reserve which were very few, like 16 tanks in each of the Reserve battalions. So that is the story behind the 84 tanks.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did we have to pay for these tanks? If so, the bill would have been about \$300 million.

GEN MUNDY: No, we did not. This was just a transfer. This was a congressionally directed transfer of tanks from the Army to the Marine Corps. The Army's thesis, and I can understand the Army's position on this, was that, look, we bought the tanks. It was Army money. But the Congress' point was no, no, it was not. It was the United States Treasury that

paid for these tanks and the fact that they might have been in the Army, you are doing away with armored divisions. We want to say the nation's "first to fight" will be as credible as is, you know, more credible than the National Guard units.

So we did not pay for that. We had to pay to alter the tanks, that is to upgrade them, to put on fording equipment and so on, and I think that came out to the tune of \$30 or \$40 million. But the Congress also appropriated that money to us so we got the money to rehabilitate the tanks and to Marineize them, if you will.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 11 July you departed for a three-day trip to the Caribbean. Where all did you visit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, remember that at this time we had a large number of Marines in the Caribbean. I think the total was 4,000 plus with the Marines that were embarked in the Amphibious Ready Group. It was at this time the USS *Wasp*, the newest of our LHD-1. We had, Col Tom Jones, the commanding officer of the 2d Marines, had been embarked as a landing force commander although he was not, he really went more as a MEU commander than as a regimental commander but that is a nice dual capability to have.

So we had the Marines, a couple of thousand of them, that were embarked in the amphibious group. We had, I think, probably 1,200 or so Marines that were involved in security on Guantanamo, plus the fact that the Marine Corps was tasked to provide detachments for each of the Coast Guard cutters and the Navy vessels that were out picking up the Haitian and eventually the Cuban refugees that were floating around on rafts out in the Caribbean.

So we had really stripped down the 2d MEF forces and I, once again I was able to use, I was frankly impressed with our own abilities, but I was able to use the fact that we were using principally Marines out of the 2d Tank Battalion to provide the detachments aboard the ships in the Caribbean. And the statement was that this is evidence of the utility of the Marine Corps. Only the Marines, and I say this with fervor, but only the Marines in my recent experience would ever turn an artillery battery into a provisional rifle company or would take tankers and say you are now detachments aboard ship and just do it. And the Marines can adapt to that.

I do not find that flexibility in the other services. If the Army needs MPs they either go after MPs or they do not have MPs or whatever the division. But I do

not think you would find an Army artillery battalion simply putting covers over its howitzers and shouldering rifles and marching off as a rifle company. So I was very proud of that.

But we had a lot of Marines there. We had the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, my old battalion, under LtCol John Allen, one of our brightest young stars, was then riding the *Repose*, the hospital ship that had been brought back into active service to go down and provide a refugee haven in Jamaica in the Port-au-Prince area. There was a Russian ship that had been hired, you know, a cruise ship, that was also being used for that and we had a Marine battalion that was essentially spread over that for internal security aboard ship, albeit I think he had three of his rifle companies there and did not have the fourth.

So we had Marines scattered all over the Caribbean. I visited Guantanamo, Security Force Battalion there or the Marine Barracks as we know it, the several hundred Marines. I went over to the Grand Turks Island where the Marines and the *Wasp* were practicing, were rehearsing the amphibious landing for the introduction of forces into Haiti that would come some days later. Jamaica, Gitmo and Grand Turks were the points of landing.

Marine engineers had cleared the area in Grand Turks. It was a horrible place. The water is beautiful flying in but once you got ashore I will tell you it was sun and baking sand and it would have been hot even, it was a tent city with barbed wire all around it so we could put the Haitians — they never put any refugees up there but enormous effort was put into preparing the place as an overflow site for Guantanamo.

BGEN SIMMONS: In a way this was sort of a return to the past. First the use of Marines for ship detachments, to be used as boarding parties, to be used for security onboard the ships, in combination into landing parties to go to shore for possibly eventual interventions. It was an interesting kind of return to the 19th century or the early 20th century as far as the use of Marines in that area.

GEN MUNDY: We were at that point — I would just add as an aside, that was the highest peacetime operating period for the Marine Corps that certainly we had experienced in my recollection. We had something on the order of about, as I recall it, 27,000 or 28,000 Marines that were deployed either unaccompanied to Okinawa or in the expeditionary units deployed aboard ship or down in the Caribbean.

We even at one point — this was largely driven by Navy shipping turnaround rather than by the Marines,

but once again it was a tremendous burden on the Marines but it was one that they did not shirk — we had the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit returning from the Mediterranean after a six-month deployment. It came in, debarked in Moorehead City, went back to Camp Lejeune as is the routine and two weeks later we turned that entire organization around and sent them back up. Embarked them in the same amphibious squadron and sent them to the Caribbean as relief for the, I believe it was the *Nassau* that was the ship, the LHA at that time, down there that had to come back up for some scheduled maintenance and repair and to give the Marines that were embarked there a little relief.

But that was dramatic in the defense press, you know, that we are so committed that we are now turning people that have been deployed for six months and have come home for two weeks around and sending them off for another — as it turned out they were down there about six weeks so it was not a long deployment.

The other thing that was heartening to me and that I tried so hard to articulate and, indeed, that the press and others pick up about the Marines, is that when this sort of thing happened, unlike the television that one would watch when the 10th Mountain Division deployed with all of the wives in Fort Drum coming on and lamenting — “You know, my husband did not sign on to do this, I did not know he was going to have to leave, he came in to get an education, he did not sign on to do this” — we would turn those Marines around on any occasion and they just matter of factly threw their seabags on their shoulder, walked back aboard ship and their only question — I came back and briefed in the CinCs conference where the SecDef and all of his assistants were there because there is always a lamentation. The Navy is frequently caught up in that. “Gee, we are wearing the sailors out. We are sending them off too often. Worry, worry, worry. We have to give them a pay raise. We have to do something for them.”

And when it came my turn I said, “You know, Mr. Secretary, as I have visited those units that are deployed, those that were extended and indeed, the 24th MEU that went back out again after only two weeks, the only question that I ever get is, are we going to get a piece of the action?” It is a spirit and a character of Marines that just makes your eyes where you, you know, you sometimes get teary-eyed and begin to lose it when you are out among these kids because they have been gone, their families are riding rough.

And indeed, to continue this one forever I guess,

my pride in Marine dependents. I found repeatedly when the press would go down to Camp Lejeune or to Cherry Point and would talk about, you know, "We are turning your husband around after two weeks, what do you think?" The Marine dependents, with rare exceptions — and there certainly from time to time were some — but the Marine wives would say, "Well, that is what we do, that is it. That is what the Marines do." So I just gained a great deal of pride.

And it was that, principally this period of turmoil that helped me in the Roles and Missions period because I developed the thesis that the nation has, both of them are wonderful and both of them are necessary, but we have deployers and we have displacers, deployers being sailors and Marines, and in terms of a ground force, Marines. We know about mountout boxes and our dependents know we are going to go.

The Army tends to displace the entire camp, the refrigerators, the equipment, the support gear and to go over and create an enormous footprint somewhere whereas Marines generally can pick up, you know, grab your extra boots and another set of utilities and throw them in your pack and let's go. I am enormously proud of that and used it extensively in all of the opportunities that I had to try and influence the action around Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: Pursuing it just a little bit further, as I think we will see later in this session when we get into the Haitian intervention, you just cannot simply take a battalion of the 10th Light Division and put it aboard an aircraft carrier or a helicopter carrier and expect it to perform like a battalion landing team of Marines which is thoroughly imbued with life on board ships. Getting back to this matter of small detachments being put on these various ships, wasn't there some degree of orientation or special training that they had to have for that purpose?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, there was. Indeed that is one of those adaptive things that you do. In other words, you are a tank crew, but now we are going to train you in the handling of refugees. Marines seem, once again, whatever our, I would term it the expeditionary ethos or the expeditionary feeling or just embodiment of the Corps, Marines when handling the people coming aboard ships are enormously compassionate. You know, here are probably the people that can kill you better than anybody else around in the world, United States Marines, and yet these youngsters become enormously compassionate. They just seem to know what to do. And of course, as you point out, you know, leaning over the rail of a ship or helping people

aboard or, you know, living in a ship, that is not extraordinary for a Marine and so they adapt very quickly, but we did give them some training in Guantanamo.

This was principally a Coast Guard effort. Remember that under the laws the Coast Guard, of course, can, you know, can apprehend people and arrest them on the high seas. We cannot do that. We are prohibited from doing it. So the Marines were really augmentation to the Coast Guard. But they adapted superbly and of course life in a Coast Guard cutter is arguably about 10 percent better than life on an amphib in many cases. The Coast Guard lives a good life out there.

So the Marines that were usually in detachments of six or eight Marines on the cutters lived pretty well. They were clean and there were fresh, hot donuts every morning and they enjoyed it, I think. Their spirits were high, I think, about that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15th July Gen Richard D. Hearney was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the 25th Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. He would succeed Gen Walter Boomer who would retire on 1 September after more than 30 years of active duty. I presume that you recommended Gen Hearney to be your Assistant Commandant?

GEN MUNDY: I did, with great enthusiasm and admiration for the man.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you consciously returning to the tradition that the Assistant Commandant be the senior Marine aviator in the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was but I would have chosen Rich Hearney with or without the tradition. He is a talented officer, focused, determined and has done a superb job in my estimation as the Assistant Commandant which has become, a note here that perhaps needs to be emphasized is that during Gen Boomer's tenure and certainly into Gen Hearney's tenure as the Assistant Commandant the role of the vice chief, or in our case the Assistant Commandant, the role of the vice in the Services has changed dramatically. At the time that I was, for example, the PP&O or when Gen Gray was the Commandant or those before him — I am just using that as a point of reference — the Assistant Commandant was, certainly was ordinarily the senior aviator — although we had P.X. Kelley, we had had Gen Ken McLemmon, you know, we had had ground officers to be the Assistant Commandant and perhaps others beside that — but the role of the Assistant Commandant really

was almost, became more involved in matters of jointness than the Service Chief.

So we had virtually a shift of emphasis as the Chairman became the principal military advisory, and certainly the Chiefs continued to meet with the Chairman, but when the Vice Chairman became Adm Bill Owens, William Owens, a very distinguished officer and fine man, but Bill Owens came in with a penchant for analysis and for involvement of the Service vice chiefs almost as his deputies. So we really had the Chairman and the Service Chiefs as deputies and then the Vice Chairman virtually consuming the vice chiefs of the Services.

So Gen Hearney fit that niche very well as did Gen Boomer before him but arguably, for that particular type of involvement in all of these analyses of various war fighting capabilities that Adm Owens was seeking to do, Gen Hearney was the more analytic and might have been for that time and that place more the right man for the job, though Walt Boomer was, you know, we do not have a lot of Boomers around and he certainly was arguably the best that I have known.

But as to the Marine aviator in the Assistant Commandant's slot, as I spent an enormous amount of time in structuring and grooming the general officer corps which every Commandant has to do — I had not really realized the extent that one has to place into long term planning — I found myself trying to plan for not just the 31st but indeed to plan for the 32d Commandant. Because today if you do not maneuver the general officers through this wicket of joint assignments and into policy making assignments in the Marine Corps and then into command in the Marine Corps, if you do not manage that just right you will wind up with an officer that might be a superb candidate to be a four-star Commandant, and Assistant Commandant or a CinC, but you cannot get him there simply because he or she has not passed the necessary wickets. So there is a great deal of management.

I had recognized when I met Rich Hearney as a colonel that this was an extraordinary officer and from there on out I watched him closely. He was, of course had the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing when I was the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic commander and I knew him well. So it was my plan at the time that I came the Commandant, I knew that all other things, you know, unless something happened that Rich Hearney in my last year would be the Assistant Commandant. So I had a game plan that I kept in my desk drawer. It was my own and personal to me that stepped the officers along. There were some circumstances that came along. Gen Dailey retired a

year earlier than I anticipated. We talked about that before. Gen Royal Moore was, you know, fell unfortunately from his post and so those sorts of things upset your plan a little bit, but not dramatically.


I think it is good to have an Assistant Commandant as an aviator because we are an air/ground team. It serves the useful purpose of sending notice to that roughly 40 percent of the Marine Corps who are in the aviation side, be it helicopter, fixed wing or air control or air defense, but about 40 percent of the Corps is on the aviation specialty side. It is a nice statement to say that you have a four-star aviator here.

I do not think it is a critical thing to the Marine Corps and I believe that the Marine general officer corps and the Marines, for that matter, would, you know, if the next Assistant Commandant is a ground officer I do not think that is destabilizing. They can look at the individuals, I believe and understand that under the, unlike days perhaps in the past, and I am not here to judge that, but I think there was a time in our history when the Assistant Commandant was something of a figure head — the senior aviator and he did some things for the Commandant — but that has changed dramatically. The Commandant and the Assistant Commandant rarely meet unless it is after 1800 at night because generally speaking both of them are going in two different directions all day long.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 16 July, you and Mrs. Mundy departed for a lengthy trip to the Pacific which would include the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Guam ceremonies and change of command of Marine Forces, Pacific, in Hawaii. My wife and I were privileged to be members of your party. Who were some of the other members of your party?

GEN MUNDY: We took along, in addition to staff personnel, you know, the aides and so on, but we took along Gen and Mrs. Lou Wilson. Of course, Gen Wilson earned his Medal of Honor on Guam as a company commander. We took along LtGen Lou Metzger who had been the AMTRAC, the amphibious tractor, battalion commander, or one of them at least, in the landing there. We took along LtGen and Mrs. Alpha Bowser. Gen Bowser had been artillery battalion commander on Guam.

Then we did not take on to Guam but we picked up on the West Coast at the same place, we stopped and picked up Gen and Mrs. Wilson there, we picked up LtGen and Mrs. Victor Krulak and their son, retired Commander Victor Krulak, Jr., who is a retired chap-



In July 1994, Gen Mundy traveled to Guam for the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the Pacific island. Pictured here with the Commandant are the 26th Commandant, Gen Louis H. Wilson, who received a Medal of Honor on Guam as a company commander, and Col Jerry D. Humble, the Commanding Officer, 31st MEU.

lain. And, we picked up LtGen and Mrs. Chuck Krulak, who was the designated Fleet Marine Force or Marine Force, Pacific Commander, because he was then on leave en route, and I told him that we had space on the airplane to take your family out there, entitled to that, to take you and Zandi out. So I had, it was a particular delight to me to be able to deliver the new Fleet Marine Force Commander to his new command in Hawaii.

As you will recall, when we got there, of course ordinarily the senior officer disembarks the aircraft first but I said, "No, no, Chuck, you are the arriving King Kamehameha. You should get off first here." So they did, and they were warmly received with leis. It was a nice — in addition to a very warm adventure going to Guam with you and the others that were the veterans there, it was a rather nice thing to be able to

deliver the Krulaks to Hawaii and then to enjoy some time with them there.

BGEN SIMMONS: What stopovers did you make en route to Guam?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we stopped on the West Coast, of course, to pick up the Wilsons and the Krulaks who were at North Island. But then as you know very well, we were to stop in Wake Island, and we did so, and while the aircraft was being refueled we took a brief tour, as I recall, around the island and were able to let some who had not been there — I think Gen Wilson had been there or had been through there at least to refuel and I am not sure if you had been there, you had not been there before, this was a first stop for you, but with my great affection, indeed love, for Wake Island,

any time that I transited the Pacific I always endeavored — we did not do it on every occasion; we did not do it just as a lighthearted thing — but if we needed to refuel or if we needed to RON why we would make that Wake Island if it were possible for me to do it because it just meant so much to me.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had a very full schedule on Guam, particularly on the 21st of July, Liberation Day, or the 50th anniversary of the landing itself. More than 1,000 veterans visited the island for the celebration. The National Park Service unveiled a memorial wall honoring the casualties of the fighting there in World War II. You made eight or ten speeches that day including one at the War Dog Cemetery where a granite monument topped by a life-sized bronze sculpture of a Doberman was dedicated. What are some of your recollections of that day?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my recollections of the eight or ten speeches that you accurately cite, I do not remember how many there were but certainly every stop there would be a brief testimonial. The problem that one has, as an aside, with that, is that there is not very much different to say, you know, unless you are just going to read the history and usually, as in the case of the War Dog commemoration, the officer who had caused that to come about was there to recount the history of the war dogs and cite their names and all this and then you are left only with getting up and saying that you did a wonderful job and trying to say something meaningful. It is hard to do that eight or ten times a day. I would not make a very good political candidate because you really run out of themes to hit.

We started off the morning, as I recall, down at the invasion beach where the 3d Marine Division had landed, and, of course, you turn around and look up Bundschu Ridge, named for a company commander who was killed there, and then up to what is called Nimitz Heights or the plateau that is probably a thousand yards inland from the beach. But we started there. We then went down into downtown Agana and we had a ceremony which was the Chamorro recognition. The governor was there and others. Maybe I have them reversed. Maybe we started downtown and went to the beaches, I do not recall.

Then we went for a variety of stops to include the site of the Marine Barracks which, of course, had been there since before the turn of the century, 18, what, 1898, I think we had put the barracks there. And what I discovered was the deep affection of the Chamorros people, certainly for the veterans, but

especially for the Marines, especially for the Marines, because the Marine Barracks had been something very, very special to them.

Among those who were there at that commemoration — you certainly were and I was and others — was BGen(Ret) Ben Blaz, Vincente Blaz, went by the name Ben. But Blaz had been a young man, a child who had been liberated by the 9th Marine Regiment on Guam and who came into the Marine Corps, rose to the grade of brigadier general and as he passed through colonel, his colonelcy, he commanded the 9th Marines. And that was a very emotional thing, none of which has anything to do with the Marine Barracks here but to give a little bit of character and background to the man.

But he got up and spoke. He is an eloquent speaker. He was serving, had just completed serving as the representative of Guam in the U.S. Congress. He was not technically a Congressman but he was for all practical purposes a Congressman. He had stepped down from that or had not, I think had lost the election, but whatever the case, he was there and he told the story of the Chamorro people as they were liberated by the Marines who were then brought out into freedom after enduring many atrocities and much harsh handling by the Japanese during their occupation of the island. One elderly woman who had to be carried out of a cave on a stretcher, the only possession that she had, according to Ben Blaz, was a Marine campaign hat and how proud she was that she had kept this Marine campaign hat. It probably kept the sun out of her eyes, it probably had some practical use, but it was a nice story.

So he presented to the, I am not sure who was the reigning official at that time, but it was the State Department representative who was there, as I recall, he presented to them a hat like a campaign hat but that had been made out of reeds so it was a hat that, or was made like the Chamorro people would have made their headwear but it was in the shape of campaign hat. That was a very proud moment for him on the site of the former Marine Barracks which is now a housing area.

We went over to the other side of the island where the 22d Marines, the 4th Marine Brigade, and I think that was under BGen Lemuel Shepherd, that they had landed. The 3d Division had come in principally on one side of the island and the 4th Brigade had come in on the other side. We went to that site and commemorated the 4th Brigade.

Then we had a luncheon at the Governor's Mansion, and we went on down for a parade in the afternoon which went on forever — I do not know if

it is over yet — but it was certainly going strong when we left with everyone who desired to be in a parade, every school child or every organization there. The remarkable thing in the parade is that while they had the National Guard units from Guam and others, some Navy units that marched, we had an element of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is home based in Okinawa, that was there as the Marine Corps representation during that event and when the Marines came marching down the street, of course the crowd went wild and as you sat there and had watched units come by, I mean these were ordinary Marine rifle companies and you just had to, I mean, they swaggered with pride. They looked exactly like you would want Marines to comport themselves.

Much of the credit, MajGen Carl Fulford was commanding the 3d Division, much of the credit for the orchestration of this event and essentially all of those in the Pacific, at least during this year, goes to Carl Fulford. Though really a quiet man and nonflamboyant always, never seeking the spotlight, but Carl Fulford literally you could tell that there was more than just a pro forma Op Order in this. He had personally, you know, involved himself and made sure that everything went just splendidly for the veterans and for the Marine Corps part of the show.

BGEN SIMMONS: Part of the counterpoint, or a counterpoint to the ceremonies in Guam in my mind were the large number of Japanese tourists who were on the island. Of course, they are very important to the economy of Guam. I wonder what their feelings were concerning the exuberance that the Guamanians showed towards the liberation. I remember that huge pair of banners that was draped from the tallest building in Agana, “Welcome Liberators,” and so forth and so on. It was really a great time.

The 21st of July also saw the deactivation of the 9th Marines, an Okinawa-based regiment whose World War II predecessors had fought at Guam. How was the 9th Marines chosen for deactivation?

GEN MUNDY: Well, not an easy choice. Remember that we had gone to 24 infantry battalions in the Marine Corps. That had been done during Gen Gray’s watch as a necessary fact to be able to begin the force reductions. So we had deactivated or cadreed really, three of our infantry battalions and we had mix-mastered, as we often do, the battalions up in order to provide, consistent with the unit rotation program, to provide basing in CONUS for all the Marine battalions, CONUS to include Hawaii, of course, but basing in CONUS for the battalions and then unit deployment

to sustain our overseas operations.

As a result of that we had, for example, the battalions of the 4th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines had been among those deactivated. The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was over in the 2d Marine Division somewhere home-based and the 3d Battalion, you know, I think was in another regiment. We had broken up the 9th Marines similarly.

It made sense to me if we only were going to have 24 infantry battalions that we have eight Marine regiments. That was it, for just logic in my mind. So, as you look around at which of the regiments to deactivate, it is not an easy choice. While the 9th Marines is certainly one of our more gloried regiments in World War II, in Vietnam, fought magnificently in many very difficult encounters, as you look at the 1st Marines you find that, you know, you can counterplay that. The 2d Marines were the Tarawa regiment. So it was a very difficult thing.

And the other side of that is that while the Army I think has done a very good job of retaining the heraldry of all of its proud divisions and so on by maintaining a battalion from a certain division that now is in another brigade or something, they have maintained at least an element of the colors, the historical colors, I just did not do that and decided that we would start from the top and come down and if we were going to have eight regiments that they would be numbered one through eight.

So that was done and there was a great deal of emotion attached with that because all of the 9th Marines veterans who were among the most, arguably among the most, the proudest and the most organized, they really banged the pages of the *Gazette* and the *Leatherneck* and the mail coming into the office of the Commandant with, “How dare this young upstart, he was never in the 9th Marines, you know. What right does he have to take it down?”

A humorous tale, I was sitting out at the golf course with Gen Wilson in Hawaii after we had played golf and a retired Marine came by and recognized him and came over and shook his hand and said, “Oh, General, it is great to see you. You were the greatest Marine to ever walk around,” and so on. And after a few minutes of conversation he said, “Listen, General, who is this new, young Commandant who is doing away with our regiment? We have to get a hold of him. I want you to get to him and tell him the 9th Marines shouldn’t be stood down.” Of course, I was the other man at the table there and so I enjoyed that moment, and Gen Wilson said, “well, he had to make hard choices” or something, did not choose to introduce me. And so I enjoyed the moment and then the veteran walked on

off and we had a chuckle over that. But it was a sad time.

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your recollections of the deactivation ceremony?

GEN MUNDY: Very nice ceremony down on the landing beaches. Again a return there with the 9th Marine regiment colors. Col Dave Bice was the last commanding officer of the 9th Marines.

BGEN SIMMONS: Wasn't he already a brigadier general?

GEN MUNDY: He was at that time. He had been advanced to brigadier general and was serving as the CG of the division at that point, but he had had the 9th Marine regiment. Actually, technically we deactivated the regiment on the 1st of July, would have been the, that was the deactivation date, but I did not just want to deactivate it with a message or something and it seemed to me that doing that on Guam where the regiment had served gallantly was a nice place to do it with a good gathering.

So we furled the colors to the appropriate pomp and circumstance and parading and tribute to the regiment, with the old hands of the regiment, you and Gen Wilson and many of the other veterans who were at least present for the audience. As I recall when we took the review I think that, I know that we stood Gen Wilson and I think you stood in the reviewing area to receive the final review of the regiment as it went by.

So a sad time but one of those, we had done that before. I have to remind people from time to time that the colors of regiments have been furled previously in our history and they have come back.

BGEN SIMMONS: Readers of this transcript who want a fuller account of events on Guam might read "Guam Redux" in the Fall 1994 issue of *Fortitudine*, available at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

The next day, the 22d of July — actually two days allowing for the International Date Line — you attended change of command and retirement ceremonies in Hawaii. LtGen Henry C. Stackpole turned over command of Marine Forces Pacific to LtGen Charles C. Krulak —

BGEN SIMMONS: — Gen Stackpole should have become CinCPac. In view of some things that have happened since, it appears that he might have been a better choice than Adm Macke. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was certainly among those who held to that belief. LtGen Hank Stackpole, without question one of the most talented officers that has ever worn our uniform in every respect, be it as a warrior, be it as a gentleman, be it as a teacher, and certainly as a commander. He was beloved by many in the Corps going many years back but certainly in his last years, to include me.

Hank Stackpole was one of those, you know, there was no place to put him. He was without question four-star material and the nation would have been better served if we had gotten him to a key billet. But at the time that the change was coming, we have to go back and reflect on reality. The reality that Gen Jack Sheehan was at least being considered at that point to be, we knew that the Atlantic Command was going to change the color of the uniform. It was not going to be a Navy command again. So either the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps were going to get that. In discussions with Gen Shalikashvili he had conveyed to me privately that he believed that a Marine was the right man and that that would make a nice transition. From Navy to Marine Corps would still be a Naval officer and that was important to the NATO hat of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. And he thought, too, that a Marine would be someone good to groom that command.

So, as a practical matter it was not very likely that we were going to get both the Pacific Command and the Atlantic Command. For the record, had I at that point been caused to flip a coin and say, "All right, you are going to get one or the other and one of those two officers is going to be promoted," my vote would have, without question, gone to Hank Stackpole for that particular job. He had served in the Pacific as the base commander in Okinawa. He had served as the commanding general of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Force and now he was the commander of the Marine Forces Pacific. Vivian, his wife, is Chinese. He had a great deal, he spoke Japanese very fluently. He would have been the ideal man to have been in the Pacific. He had done the evacuation mission down in Bangladesh and received enormous tribute for that.

So, yes, Hank Stackpole was the man for the job. However, the politics of the color of uniform simply did not permit that. That said, when the procedure by which a four-star appointment is made, or even below four-star, at the three-star to joint positions, is that a vote book comes around to each of the Service Chiefs with a vote sheet, you know, for or against, yes or no, for this candidate to be nominated for that position and under it his credentials, his biography, his service background and so forth.

I knew Adm Dick Macke well, thought well of him. I had known him when he was a carrier group commander in Norfolk. He took the *Saratoga* battle group and aligned it with an amphibious ready group and Marine Expeditionary Unit. That was the first time that we deployed the carrier and the amphibious group together as a package going forth to the Mediterranean. Dick Macke was the carrier admiral, the battle force commander for that and he was superb, and he thought a lot of Marines.

But, he was clearly a political admiral at that point. He had come from that position to the Joint Staff, served as the J-6, the Command Control Communications staff member for, I think, two years, a year and a half, and then had moved up to the director of the Joint Staff. A fine job in the Joint Staff. He did both of those jobs extremely well. But I did not see in him the qualities that would make him the best man that we had to put out in the very critical Pacific area.

So when it came time to vote, I did not vote but I just wrote on there a note to the Chairman and said, "Shali, I understand the circumstances, I understand the politics, but you and I both know that we are not selecting the best officer to be sent to the Pacific with Hank Stackpole being available." And, of course, rarely do you get replies to such things, but I just wanted as a matter of record, for whatever records are kept, for it to be noted that the Commandant of the Marine Corps did not vote and that I strongly supported Hank Stackpole for that job.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Krulak took command 30 years after his father, LtGen Victor H. Krulak, who was present for the ceremony, had held the same command, then designated as Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. What do you recall of that day?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was a very nice day. As I recall there was a threat of a rainstorm coming over the Pali in toward Kaneohe Bay. The change of command was done on the airfield at Kaneohe Bay, beautiful setting, beautiful backdrop. It was a nice day. It was a relaxed day. I think I visited some of the units of the 1st MEB, or at least the Kaneohe-based units at that time, then prepared in the afternoon and went to the change of command. It was formal. The Marines were in blues. The troops were in, as I recall, their blue trousers and khaki shirts.

Hank Stackpole wanted badly, he had a great, as did I, a great affection for the blue/white uniform so he chose that as his change of command uniform. I kept sending hints that I always thought that it was nice if everybody on the field was in the same uni-

form, which is a rare instance in the case of the Marine Corps. We have a fascination with having 12 different uniforms in every formation sometimes that we hold.

But, at any rate, it was a very, very warm, and I mean that in the sense of the congeniality of the moment, it was a nice transfer of command because there is a very interesting story that I used in my remarks at the change of command that ties the Krulak and Stackpole families very closely together. Capt Hank Stackpole was badly wounded during Operation Union in Vietnam and was being evacuated on a helicopter. And if it wasn't bad enough that he had been badly shot up in combat, the helicopter was shot down with a recoilless rifle so he crashed and was further injured in the helicopter crash.

At any rate, when he was eventually evacuated he was brought in with a large number of casualties and in the sorting process, because he was unconscious and because he was so badly wounded and his leg, really, almost torn off, he was put on the dead or soon to die pile by the medical staff who were trying to handle those that they thought they could do something for, and was presumed to be dead. A chaplain, a lieutenant chaplain came walking through the area and noticed that Capt Stackpole moved, his hand twitched or something, and the chaplain, who was Lt Victor Krulak, said to the corpsman, "Hey, Doc, we have a Marine over here who is alive. Let's take care of him."

So, Hank Stackpole was pulled off the dead pile, taken in, administered to and survived, albeit with a great deal of damage to his body, but survived and went on to become what we have just spoken of him to become, by Lt Victor Krulak. And, of course, both of them were at the time serving under LtGen Victor Krulak, CG, FMFPac who was the overall Marine Force commander of the Marines in Vietnam.

So it was a remarkable story and now here, as you point out, 30 years later in relative terms, here is the youngest son of LtGen Krulak, with the chaplain who had caused him to be pulled off the pile in Vietnam, sitting there while Hank Stackpole turned over his final command and took his final salute in the Corps. So it was a rather warm and, one could say, emotional time and I enjoyed being able to tell that story, maybe a little bit more articulately than I have here this morning. But it was a good change of command and a very nice affair.

BGEN SIMMONS: You returned from this Pacific trip very early Sunday morning, 24 July. You started off the new week on Monday, 25 July, with a break-

fast for retired Marine Corps four-star generals. Who were some of those who attended and what was the purpose of the breakfast?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was an initiative that had been, it was a good initiative, it had been pressed by Gen George Crist, who was retired in Beaufort, South Carolina. Gen Crist had retired as commander of the Central Command before Gen Norm Schwarzkopf took it over. Gen Crist, having been aware of how the other Services work because of his joint experience, both there and as the vice director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, said to me one time when we were just having a conversation while he was in Washington, he said, "You know, the other Services all bring in their four-stars; the Air Force has a gathering they call Corona at which time they bring in all of their four-star officers and their retirees, the Army Chief of Staff does that routinely, the Navy, I am not sure that the Navy does that as a continuing matter but on occasion had done it."

Of course, the Marine Corps' problem is that if we assemble all of the Marine four-stars you probably have four or five. We are not able to assemble thirty or forty. But they came in for updates and Gen Crist said, "I think it would be a good idea if we did that." I said, "It is fine with me. If you all want to come in, we certainly would support that."

So they came in. I remember that Gen Crist and, of course, it would have been Gen Went and Morgan from Washington. I do not think that Gen McLennan came in. He may have. And I do not recall, I think Gen Gray may have come in, but that was the only one of the former Commandants. And what we did was simply to have a breakfast. I was committed for the day to other activities so as I recall I breakfasted with them in the Commandant's Mess and then turned them over to the staff who gave them briefings and updated them on what was going on.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 26th of July you received a Manpower and Reserve Affairs briefing on their Minority Officer Accession/Women Accession Plan. Presumably this plan was a positive approach to some of the criticism you had received in these areas.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was that. It was a long-term effort that had been going on, indeed before the, certainly before the notoriety of *60 Minutes*, that sort of thing. I had come in and my first guidance to LtGen Cooper, the Deputy Chief for Manpower when I became the Commandant, and to then-BGen Krulak, the Director of Personnel Management Division, I

told them that I wanted to explore all of the options possible to expand opportunities for women consistent with those places in the Marine Corps that we felt they should or should not be assigned, ground combat, for example. But I wanted to get away from the notion that the Marine Corps was somehow seeking to oppress or to prevent the opportunities for anybody, of any color or of any sex, for that matter.

I wanted to redouble our efforts at getting a foothold into the minority officer recruitment. When I was an Officer Selection Officer as a captain, we had essentially the same dilemmas in getting quality minority officer applicants, principally African-Americans, to apply for the Marine Corps, much less to retain them after they got in. Because if we, generally speaking when we got a quality officer in and they became a Marine lieutenant and went on in the Corps, in many cases they were highly competitive and they got out and went into enormously successful positions and well-paid positions, so it was hard to keep them.

So, we had been looking at this for some time. Now, the study, the specific study, was in part the study that had been commissioned down at Quantico that had been ongoing for a year before the *60 Minutes* evolution ever came to pass. So we had completed the study and it was in part the study that had attracted *60 Minutes*' attention. We have complaints of minority officers that they were not promoted equitably and we know that you have been studying this issue, and that became the *60 Minutes* focus.

So this was somewhat the conclusion also of looking at women and where women could most effectively serve. We looked at the fitness report system for minority officers and what we learned, interestingly enough, is that the toughest fitness report writer is a company grade female officer who goes strictly by the rules. If it says, you know, if you are doing a superb job you are average, why she would mark you average. We found that to be a rather unique, perhaps understandable circumstance.

So this whole effort was now evolving into a plan that would give us the guidelines for defining those occupation fields that women could serve in, determining the numbers of females that we could use effectively in the Marine Corps, and then also focusing on the minority accessions and how better to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: What percentage of our total force, of our 174,000, would be women?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, at that point about 4.5 percent. I

think the enlisted force was a little bit higher which balanced the officer percentage, which I think was in about the 3.7 percent and the enlisted was up about 5 percent and when you balanced those together you came out at about 4.5 percent as the total strength of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: What would be the percent of African-Americans?

GEN MUNDY: Let me make sure, our overall minority percentages were up at about 30 percent but, of course, that is Pacific Islanders and Native Americans and Hispanics as well as African-Americans. African-Americans, I think, was in the neighborhood of about 18 percent of that figure. But our officer percentages were down in the 5 percent. So we had, rightfully, those who do not understand the dynamics of the African-American dilemma, and it is real, and as politically correct as one might try to be, the fact of life is that the colleges and universities of America from whence we draw the officers of the United States Marine Corps produce a very small percentage. I think the graduates of that time, my recollection of statistics of a year or two ago, was that about 5 percent of the graduates that come out are African-American and within that percentage more than half of them are women.

So we really were drawing, we were attempting to build an officer corps, if it were reflective of the American population, say an officer corps of maybe 15 or 16 or 18 percent from an available market population of 2.5 percent.

It is almost impossible to get there from here unless you draw from within the Marine Corps and it was that emphasis that we placed. We said, "Let's go out, let's look internal to the Marine Corps and encourage our young corporals and sergeants who are proven quantities, who have now become effective, have been promoted in the Marine Corps, many of them had college degrees, many of them were pursuing college degrees. Let's look at them, into the enlisted commissioning programs, into the MECEP, the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program, and see if we cannot grow our own internally." But it takes a long time to do that.

So those were relative percentages, not well appreciated by many in America who, you know, in the corporate world if a corporation senses that it needs to hire women or that it needs to hire minorities, it depends on what salary you want to pay because you can always look to another bank or to another corporation and lure a vice president away simply by offer-

ing them a better salary. You have upped your percentages, if that is significant to do. In the military we cannot do that. We have to grow them and it takes about 22 years to grow a colonel. So you are not going to change that quotient overnight.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 28 July SecDef Perry approved the recommendations made by the Service Chiefs to greatly expand career opportunities for women in the military. The new authorization almost doubled the number of occupational specialties open to women in the Marine Corps. Women Marines, effective 1 October 1994, would be eligible to serve in 93 percent of all occupational specialties, theoretically opening an additional 48,000 billets to women. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, remember that, as I believe we have discussed earlier, that the Congress had repealed much of the legislation that restricted the assignment of women, in the case of Navy and Marine personnel, to combatant ships. An amphibious ship is a combatant ship, that had caused us to hold down, to combatant aircraft, you know, many of those the risk rule had been repealed. So the legal limitations on the opportunities for women had been removed by the Congress.

The Defense Department had, as it appropriately should have then, had undertaken to study in effect almost a reverse of saying, you know, "Where can we assign women?" The question really was more or less from the political leadership, "Why not everywhere?" In other words, "Where can't we or where should not we assign women?" And the various Services because of the different makeup and the different function of the Services, of course, had different positions.

The Army and the Marine Corps, understandably and expectedly, were similar in our strong position that women should not be included in direct ground combat units. The Air Force was neutral. Women could be assigned to any position in the Air Force. Gen McPeak was not high and is not high today on having women in high performance aviation for a lot of reasons that would have never have passed muster today. Male bonding is real but it will never pass muster somewhere out here, and also because of the physical concerns with pulling enormous force of gravity in a jet aircraft and so on on a woman's physical capacity.

But, at any rate, the Navy, of course, Adm Boorda when he became the CNO announced that women could be anywhere and could serve in any position. So you really had the Air Force and the Navy wide

open to women and then you had the Army and the Marine Corps perceived from the political viewpoint as being, you know, chauvinists and back in the dark ages. If you can be anything in the Air Force as a service member, how come you cannot be anything in the Marine Corps as a service member? So we almost had to work in reverse to defeat those arguments against some very strong support in the Pentagon that we just say women can serve anywhere.

The Army fought the toughest battle because the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, a Sarah Lister, is an extreme feminist. She literally gave the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army an awfully hard time. The Secretary yielded to her and actually went so far as to put out a directive without the concurrence or, in fact, endorsement, or indeed, knowledge of Gen Sullivan that said women everywhere, no restrictions. Gordy Sullivan came back from a trip and he called me that morning and he could hardly talk on the phone he was so mad. He said, "You know, I am out of town and here is what goes on." To his credit, to his great credit, he went in to see the Secretary and said, "I cannot support this nor can the uniformed Army." So that was withdrawn and the Army then became the, we were conveniently able to trail the Army somewhat in this.

The Army was successful and the Marine Corps was equally successful in those areas in which women could not be assigned. So the Secretary's endorsement was really the endorsement of the plan which included those restrictions on the areas in which women could be assigned. It did, as you have pointed out here, it opened 93 percent of our occupation specialties. It opened another 48,000 positions to which women could be assigned. But indeed, we do not have that many. If we have 48,000 positions, we only have about, today I think about 9,000 women in the whole Marine Corps. Nor would you want to simply put one in every location as a token because that is very difficult for a very fine, proud, young female Marine to be the token member in a squadron or some sort of organization. So we try and assign women where there are a group of women and they can serve effectively together.

For the record as we conclude this discussion on the opportunities for women, I would like to say, and I say this out of no political correctness but out of conviction, is that some of the finest Marines that we have wearing the uniform today are females. I am tremendously proud of them and of their contributions.

So it is not an issue of whether or not we want the women who choose to become Marines to have the

fullest opportunity they can in the Marine Corps, indeed that would be a firm position with me, but it is a position of practical recognition that there are places in the Armed Forces in which women can excel, can deliver in many cases a performance certainly equal to and often superior to male counterparts, I have seen this, but, there are also places where the fact of life, the difference between being a female and being a male — it has nothing to do with intelligence and nothing to do with drive — but simply the physical limitations, do not lend themselves to the assignment of women.

And we, as a nation, I think, have to be practical enough to understand that there is a difference between opportunity for anyone of any makeup and between the effectiveness of the organization and the ability of the organization to do its mission. A rifle company is not, never has been and never will be a place that we should assign a female for a thousand different reasons that do not deserve to be taken on here. But we must as a nation understand that and I would hope, though I am not naive enough to believe this, but I would hope that perhaps we have come to an arrangement in the Armed Forces in which women can succeed, the opportunities are there. We can have women generals and admirals, there is no question about that, and senior positions. Maybe someday there will be a Chief of Service who is a woman. I am fairly confident that probably will come to pass. But it should not be that we have to erase all the reasonable restraints to the limitations of the sexes in order to achieve that opportunity goal vice that effectiveness, that critical effectiveness measure.

BGEN SIMMONS: We can note in passing the deactivation of the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor on 29 July after more than 90 years of providing security to the several naval installations. We have already discussed the decision to close out Marine barracks at naval stations in considerable detail, but this gives me one more opportunity to deplore the end of a long-time traditional Marine Corps mission.

GEN MUNDY: It is deplorable. It is simply a function of modern times. The threats to our bases are arguably far less than maybe in the days when they were isolated and when some invading force could come in. There certainly are terrorist threats. But it simply became a question of affordability and of investing a large number of Marines to provide what had become largely ceremonial functions, although there is value in that.

But I, like you, I came up as a sea-duty Marine and

I was always proud to walk around in my double-soled, leather-heeled, cleated shoes clanking about the deck plates of the ship and gaining the admiring glances of sailors and ladies on the pier and so on. But it is time where practicality and reduction in numbers drove us to this.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 5 August, you made a very quick trip to MacDill Air Force Base at Tampa to attend the change of command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. Who was relieving whom and did the Marine Corps continue to have a strong presence in Central Command?

GEN MUNDY: To answer the latter question first, one of the unified commands in which the Marine Corps is most prominent is the Central Command. When that was established as the Joint Task Force with LtGen P.X. Kelley, the Army and the Marines effectively staffed the key positions. So the Marines have very good assignments there and there are a large number of Marines there.

This relief was the change of command between Gen Joe Hoar who was retiring from the Marine Corps and as the U.S. Central Command commander. He was being relieved by the former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen Jay Binford Peay or Benny Peay as we came to know him.

Benny Peay commanded the 101st Airborne Division. He is a great soldier and in my judgement has been a great CinC. Benny Peay was one of the two prime contenders to be the Chief of Staff of the Army behind Gen Gordon Sullivan. Gen Dennis Reimer was named, but Benny Peay was certainly a contender.

So for Gen Hoar a proud moment. He wanted to retire as a Marine. We sent the Drum and Bugle Corps down to be the musical unit for his retirement. While it was a unified command retirement there was no question at all but that Joe Hoar was Marine to his bone marrow and still is to this day.

BGEN SIMMONS: What senior Marines continued to serve at Central Command at that time?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the arrangement has been that when the CinC is of one service than the deputy commander is usually of another service. So, with Gen Hoar his deputy was, frankly I have lost it, I do not recall who his deputy was, but at any rate with Gen Hoar's departure then the deputy commander-in-chief became then MajGen but advanced to the grade of LtGen Butch Neal.

Gen Neal had been, I think that those who remember the Gulf War remember that after several efforts at getting a briefer, an operations briefer, Gen Neal was the Deputy J-3 for Gen Schwarzkopf in the desert, that as soon as they put Gen Neal on stage he became an instant national personality, arguably second only to Colin Powell who was, of course, the star of the show on CNN and other news networks. But Butch Neal was superb.

So he had been there as the Deputy J-3 and, in fact, at the time that the Gulf War went on he was really the Director of Manpower Plans and Policy at the Headquarters but he was so good that he was sent back to the Central Command to go to war with it; Butch Neal went back. He was the senior Marine there.

And then there were other, we had a brigadier general's billet who at that time was Brigadier General Frank Libutti, subsequently BGen Paul Fratarangelo. The Marine brigadier general is in title the Commander of the Forward Headquarters Element and so he is usually the brigadier who would be sent forward, as in the case of Gen Libutti, into Mombasa to run the operation for the support of Rwanda that we discussed during our last session, or those sorts of things. When the Central Command deploys, the Headquarters Element forwards into its Southwest Asia region. And there were an array of colonels and lieutenant colonels, of course, but Marines as well.

BGEN SIMMONS: You then went on a two-week leave, a lengthy time for you. How did you spend those second two weeks of August?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I spent those two weeks having a minor hernia repair done, so I took leave and went out to Bethesda and let them cut on me a little bit and then spent time laying around the house being served graciously by my beautiful wife as I recovered from this very minor surgery, but undoubtedly making the most of it and prolonging my invalid status as long as I could.

BGEN SIMMONS: You stayed in town?

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: During August 1994, Marine Corps Air Station El Toro began taking steps towards its scheduled 1999 shutdown. But the end of the summer some 1,500 Marines, about one-quarter of the Air Station's complement, were to move to Miramar Naval Air Station. Did those transfers take place? If so, what operations were transferred to Miramar?

GEN MUNDY: well, we began the transition of flying squadrons to Miramar and the first of those that went down was a Reserve F-18 squadron. We then, as squadrons would return from deployment, for example, from Japan coming back to El Toro, we would bring that squadron instead back into Miramar and bed it down and relocate it there. So the initial elements were F-18s going in and, of course, we could only do that — as the Navy pulled a squadron out there was now hangar and ramp space and so on and we would move a squadron in.

As to whether or not we transitioned the 1,500 people that you have cited in at that time, my recollection is that we were delayed by various events. By delays in the Navy moving out occasioned by construction that would be someplace that that squadron was going to, it would back up for a month or so. So we may or may not have made all of the marks. But the transition began immediately, was MajGen Drax Williams was the commander of Marine Corps Air Bases, West Coast and did a superb job of planning this transition and of implementing it. So it is to this day going along to my knowledge pretty much on course.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the evening of Friday, 26 August, you hosted a parade in honor of the 27th Commandant, Gen Robert Barrow. What are your recollections of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, they are very exciting ones, of course. Gen Barrow has long been, I think, the hero of many of us who have looked up and thought about what a Commandant should be in stature and nobility and war fighting ability and so on. I think we have probably admired each in his own respect. Certainly Gen Lou Wilson falls under that category, but Barrow had been, I had worked for him and had a great rapport and still do with him and great admiration.

I had endeavored to do something for each of the former Commandants during my tenure. So I had hosted Gen Chapman and Gen Wilson and now Gen Barrow to parades. Gen Al Gray came to the Iwo Jima Memorial and was the guest of honor for one of the Birthday Memorial services. Gen Kelley, I was not successful in getting Gen Kelley, I am sure due to his very busy, conflicting schedule, and Gen Greene is not, does not do that anymore at the present time.

So at any rate, Gen Barrow was the last, shall we say, to be honored. I wanted to do that. As we stepped up to the reviewing area I can recall that he said to me, "It has been 11 years since I stood on the spot," there being three white dots where you take position in the reviewing area. So for him it was very

meaningful. He had a great love for the Marine Barracks, and it was good to be back.

He came with his family, and I decided to make that parade something of a father-son or father-daughter affair. So I, number one, invited all the Barrow aides and military secretaries back so that he would have a gathering. LtGen Bob Johnston, for example, had been one of his aides, and he was there.

And then I gathered and invited all of the Marine juniors, that is to say the sons or daughters of Marines who were then serving as officers, and that principally was Marine generals as it turned. But Gen Ed Bronars has a son who is a major, lieutenant colonel I believe now, but a major then. Of course, Gen Johnston had Capt Gary Johnston. I had Majs Sam and Tim Mundy. Gen Christmas, Ron Christmas, has two Marine sons. Col John Hime, who had been a Barrow aide, has a Lt John Hime.

So we attempted to gather all those in and then did this completely, as it turned out, a disorganized effort at assembling various groups on the back steps of the Commandant's House during the reception and parade to get pictures; of Gen Barrow and his staff and their families and then to get all the generals who had sons and to bring them in. So it was [noise interference] then because it was really a two generation, you know, Gen Barrow and generals and then Marine dependents.

BGEN SIMMONS: Robbie Barrow was one.

GEN MUNDY: Rob Barrow, I should have mentioned, of course was there and there were others, but generally speaking, you know — Gen Harry Blot, Capt Harry Blot following in his father's footsteps as a Harrier pilot was there. So we had a good time with kind of a Marine Corps family gathering.

Gen Barrow was in his heyday. After the parade he, as we often did, I would invite the guest of honor to go into Center House and to join with the Barracks officers rather than going back to the Commandant's House as had been, you know, at least my predecessors had tended to do. I thought it was nice for the Barracks officers who had paraded for him to be able to have an opportunity. So we took Gen Barrow in and I thought he was never going to leave. He told stories and sang songs and they gave him a gift and he responded in kind. He had a wonderful evening.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sure he did.

BGEN SIMMONS: I notice that on 6 September you had lunch with LtGen Mick Trainor, who was a mem-

ber of the Roles and Missions Commission, and MajGen Tom Wilkerson, who headed up your Roles and Missions team. What was the thrust of that luncheon?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was to discuss the direction of the Roles and Missions Commission. Of course, as a commissioner, Gen Trainor was appropriately, and certainly necessarily, neutral and was being paid as a military mind rather than to come in and represent Marine Corps issues. But as a practical matter, each of the Services, the members who were on the Roles and Missions Commission that wore a Service uniform at one time or another, become the proponents or the, you know, the awareness creators, of the particular issue with regard to their Service.

So Gen Trainor was in 1, to discuss the direction that he thought the Commission would take, what it would say, what it would deal with, how the issues were developing, and then to get updates on the Marine Corps position on various matters, structure, you know, how we viewed things that the Commission might look at. That was the purpose of the get-together.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 8 September you went with SecNav Dalton to Philadelphia for what I believe was a demonstration by Boeing of the V-22. How did that turn out?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first of all, SecNav Dalton had been supportive of the V-22 since he became the SecNav. He is from Texas and, of course, Bell Helicopters in San Antonio, Texas, the Texas delegation had weighed heavily as had the Pennsylvania delegation in the Congress on the production of the Bell and Boeing consortium to build the V-22 aircraft.

This has political ramifications because, of course, we were at that time beginning the Congressional elections and election year coming up in a couple of months, the President had committed to the V-22, but the V-22 was still a laboring program. It had not been roundly supported by the Department of Defense.

However, the White House sent the word over to the Department of Defense, you know, the Texas vote is at issue here and the Pennsylvania vote, let's get hot on the V-22. So suddenly there came this burst of focus on the V-22. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, took off with LtGen Harry Blot, our DCS for Aviation and flew down to Fort Worth, Texas to the Bell Helicopter plant to see the V-22 and to have it explained to him and came back, I might say, very, very impressed and genuinely enthusiastic.

Although it was his assignment from the White House to get enthusiastic, he came back genuinely impressed with the aircraft.

I mentioned to SecNav Dalton, I said, "You know, the other half of this team is up in Philadelphia, and we really ought to cover that base. I know that they were looking for the Texas vote but we really ought to cover that." So SecNav Dalton and I flew up to Boeing to once again give a Clinton Administration endorsement to the V-22 but also to cover the Boeing side so that we had not favored just Bell Helicopter. So it was, as much as anything, a political statement during the Congressional political races that drove the Administration representatives to go and have a closer look at the V-22. And, of course, then there came from that great support, presumably, for the V-22.

One of the humorous aspects of how business is done, for the education of our readers who believe that, who might not understand this, I can recall that as we went into, on one session as Sec Deutch had convened the Defense staff called the Defense Resources Board, that is we were having a DRB session on the V-22, Sec Deutch would ordinarily walk directly from his office into the conference room where we would meet.

On this day he opened the conference room door to come in and he said, "Let me show you something." He said, "Just five minutes ago, he comes in and here are two dozen yellow roses sent to him by the governor of Texas reminding him, of course, that the V-22 is made in the great state of Texas." And he said, "I cannot imagine how, just as we are about to have the final decision meeting on the V-22 procurement, how two dozen roses arrive from Texas." So, part of the way that politics, some would call it poor, maybe that is poor, but that is the way the raising of major acquisition programs goes on.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think that would have been Governor Anne Richards.

GEN MUNDY: It was Governor Anne Richards.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 9 September, you went to Quantico to speak to the Command and Staff College. The next day you went to Orlando, Florida, to speak at the banquet of the annual meeting of the Women Marines Association. Any special recollections of those occasions?

GEN MUNDY: Not remarkably. That was the second time that I had been to the Women Marines

Association. I went my first year out in San Diego. We have discussed that. And then this was a return. I had been asked to do that and it is a good Association, very, very patriotic and very proud women who are Marines or who have served in the Corps. So it was another one of those Division or Marine aviation or in this Case, Women Marines Association.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the following weekend you went to Pensacola for the awards banquet of the annual reunion of the Marine Corps Aviation Association. I imagine you were hard pressed on the status of the V-22.

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was an interesting one and this also takes a little telling. I was scheduled to go down. As I have remarked before, I —

BGEN SIMMONS: — Pensacola for the annual banquet of the Marine Corps Aviation Association.

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that I, and I think Commandants before me, have been generally supportive. It is a wonderful organization. I am a member. I have paid my dues and, in fact, then they made me a lifetime member so I am a card-carrier. But it is a grand gathering of some fine Marines.

At any rate, I was to go down to participate, routinely, you know, to address the banquet and to participate in the awards ceremony. At the, literally the last minute, the day before, I got a call from the Military Assistant to the SecDef, Sec Perry, and he said, "Sec Perry wants to fly down and visit the Marines in the Caribbean." We were on the verge of invading or introducing forces into Haiti. It was about two days later that we would do that. We all knew that, of course. Sec Perry wanted to make a final visit. So he said, "He would like to have you fly down with him." And, of course, you know, of course, you go.

So what we arranged to do was I flew down with Sec Perry. We left, as I recall, about 1400 in the afternoon. We got into Guantanamo about 1700 and then we were helicoptered out to the USS *Wasp* and visited with the Marines on the *Wasp* and then had dinner aboard the *Wasp*. Of course, all this while I was checking my watch because I was due in Pensacola, Florida to speak, if I could.

Well, as we finished up at about, 7:00 or so is when we got back from the ship to the Guantanamo Airfield. I had had the C-20, the Commandant's aircraft, to trail us down. I flew down with the Secretary on his aircraft and then I trailed, my aircraft trailed down and was sitting on the runway. I said, "Mr.

Secretary, I have a speech to give and I am due in Pensacola right now as we speak, and with your permission I will break off here."

Secretary Bill Perry is a very gracious man, and he said, "Of course." So anyway, I double-timed over and got on the C-20 and said, "Put the pedal to the metal." We launched for a direct line into Pensacola. I was a little bit grubby — it was sweaty and hot in the Caribbean — but I decided that, they said, "We will take you, you can change into your evening dress at the hotel." I said, "No, we will just go into the banquet."

So there, into this black-tie affair, I strode in my dusty boots and camouflage utilities arriving just as, they had already had the banquet, but just as they were beginning the awards presentations. So I literally stepped in as Gen Joe Went, who was the president of the Association, was announcing that they were going to commence the awards. We had been in telephone contact, of course, with them, telling them that I am on the way, landing, we will get there, et cetera.

So it became a great crowd pleaser that I would stroll in fresh from the field of operations into there. So I told them the reason that I was there in utilities, however, was that I had always wanted to live up to Gen Al Gray's image and that this was my last chance. So we had a very pleasant evening. I updated them on the status of things in the Caribbean, told them how the Marines that were getting ready to go into Haiti were and they were very pleased with that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On your return you gave a dinner on Monday evening, 19 September, for Gen McPeak, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Adm Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations and Adm Kramek. I am afraid I do not know Adm Kramek.

GEN MUNDY: Adm Kramek is the Commandant of the Coast Guard. He had relieved Adm Bill Kime so he was the new Coast Guard Commandant. I wanted to have a, really it was a dinner, its purpose was to honor Gen Tony McPeak who was retiring effective the 1st of November, but I had used the occasion as well, since Adm Boorda was new and Adm Kramek was new to include them as honorees as well. Adm Boorda was not able to come at the last minute — I think Mrs. Boorda was not feeling well — but he declined at the last minute.

We had a nice dinner but it was in honor of Gen Tony McPeak and his absolutely beautiful and vivacious wife, Ellie. She and Linda had been close friends. And my rapport with Tony, though Tony was an extraordinary individual in many respects, but we

had felt a companionship in many issues and were good friends and are to this day good friends.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September in what was intended to be a highly visible sign that the Marine Corps was responding positively to the requirement to expand career opportunities for women Marines, the women in the 4th Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island were screened for candidates for assignment to Marine Barracks, Washington. Was the number of women assigned to these ceremonial duties and the parade deck markedly increased?

GEN MUNDY: It was not markedly increased, although I recognized and believed, to a certain extent, that we needed to get our very ceremonial representative-looking women Marines to 8th & I where they could reflect the fact that we did have women in the Marine Corps and very proudly so. I did not and do not endorse assigning them to the platoons which are basic, though they be ceremonial they are infantry platoons. It must be remembered that during the Desert War that Company A from Marine Barracks was sent to the desert for combat operations. So they are a rifle company and they train as an infantry battalion and they are infantry in the marching platoons.

But the symmetry of uniforms, the symmetry of the cover, the extraordinary strength that many are not aware of that it takes to handle the M-1 rifle with the precision that the Marines do is, to put it in a chauvinistically sounding term, is man's work. So I did not want to put them into the marching platoons.

However, for the staff we have a woman Marine officer or a non commissioned officer in each of the staffs now. The women Marines, I would say we may very well see a woman Marine as a guidon bearer and then just in other ceremonial duties about the Barracks, or, indeed, in the joint service flag detail that carries all of the state colors, state flags when there is a reception of a head of state or a defense minister or something in ceremonies at the Pentagon.

The Navy and the Air Force already had women in their ceremonial units. The Army had made the decision to place women in, not in their marching platoons but similarly at Fort Myer into ceremonial positions.

It was, one might argue so the Marine Corps could not have stood the light of day and that would be an argument; we would not have. But by the same token, as I was so oft to remind people, we do have, though they be few in number, we do have a very proud element of the Marine Corps that are just as proud to be Marines in our female ranks as are the males. They

are very proud, they elected to become Marines and we have to ensure that they can feel that they are, indeed, a part of the organization. So I wanted to do that for a positive reason but the numbers are not, I frankly do not know how many are assigned to ceremonial duties at the Barracks today but I suspect that it is relatively few.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 September you appeared, along with other top Department of the Navy civilian and uniformed leadership to present your strategic vision to the Commission on Roles and Missions. According to your desk calendar this meeting was held in Room 4D624, the Navy Command Center. Was this the so-called "White Commission?"

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: I believe that the over-arching title of your briefings was, and I am quoting, "A Certain Force For An Uncertain World," and that you stated that historically the Corps has adapted to the times and that it is an ideal force for the 21st Century. Is that correct and do you wish to elaborate?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I would elaborate. You have accurately cited that this was the briefing for the Commission, so Dr. John White as the chairman of the Commission was there with as many commissioners as he could muster. One of the things that astounded me is the Roles and Missions Commissions went about its work — I have never paid attention to any other commission — was that some were there for one meeting and some were not. In other words, it was additional duty, as one might expect, but one would think that for something as important as a commission like this that when a meeting took place that, you know, that would be a command performance, but it was not. So, as I recall, we had probably the majority of the commissioners but there were at least three or four that were not present that day for that presentation.

Each of the Services had been invited by the Commission to make its presentation. SecNav Dalton had opted, appropriately so, I think, that the Navy and Marine Corps would do ours together; we would not have a separate day for the Marine Corps. I had worried about that because of the time limits that the Commission had imposed of, you know, two or three hours. I wanted to make sure that we had plenty of time to discuss the Marine Corps presentation or the Marine Corps issues. But, at any rate it went fine.

Adm Boorda did, I thought, a superb job, and as he

has been since he became the CNO, very ecumenical in citing sailors and Marines. He talked in terms of the Navy and the Marine Corps. His was at a different thrust than mine but then that is what was of interest to the Commission.

I chose, after much consultation and, again, much personal involvement even though we had the Roles and Missions cell — I used to meet with them regularly and I would endeavor to direct them — on the week before the Roles and Missions Commission meeting I called in on a, I think we came in on a Sunday morning as a matter of fact, the generals from both Quantico and Washington and we sat down and went through, I went through the rough of my briefing.

I tend to do those briefings, rather than making up a script and then developing the charts, I do my work best if I sit down and make up the supporting charts I am going to use and then I am able to blend the words. I get the thrust of the points and I use the charts both as primers and as educators; primers for me, educators for the audience.

So I went through this but it was not there. I did not have it yet. So we sat around corporately and came up with this notion of adaptability. That became for me, a key element in selling the Marine Corps was the adaptability of the Marine Corps over time to changes in technology or changes in the world, that the Marines had always shown a particular ability, I thought, to adapt . . . air power to the battlefield, for example, we were the pioneers of close air support and tactical air control party. You know, the ability to bring land forces from the sea, all those innovations that were done in amphibious doctrine. Those were all Marine Corps innovations and many, many others.

So I wanted to assure the Commission that as you look to the future that the essence of the utility of the force is in its ability to adapt and innovate, both in terms of technology and new challenges. That we should never build a force based strictly on technology, that we have a new type weapons system and therefore we will change the force. Rather we should adapt the weapons system to that role or that function or that mission that the organization performs.

I also went at great lengths, as I recall, to explain “expeditionary” which, again, I define both as a capability but even more so as a mind set. We talked about that a little earlier in my thesis of displacers versus deployers. I wanted again to draw out for the Commission that the ordinary perception that someone who wears a camouflage uniform and a pair of boots is just like everybody else who wears a similar uniform is not so. That each of the Services brings a

particular and a unique set of capabilities to the arsenal and so we must never get into this quagmire of talking about light infantry can do what Marines do or, as you have commented earlier, that the 10th Mountain Division can do amphibious operations just like anybody else. You cannot.

So, my presentation was about an hour and 15 minutes. I went through the innovations of the Marine Corps over time, how we had adapted. Then it went through what the Marine Corps is. I used the 11th of April chart that we spoke about in the last session saying here are 2,000 Marines and 1,500 sailors and four ships, what else do you need on the east coast of Africa on this day, at this time with four different operational commitments, and you did it with that small force.

We also, Adm Boorda because he was, of course, driving the programmatic issue, would make the point very well, and I seconded it, is that the supplemental cost to the Congress, the supplemental budget, the additional funds that must be appropriated to do that entire operation were zero. The cost of doing business was inherent in the expeditionary, forward-deployed naval forces, Marines and sailors, that were out there.

We are today deploying, you know, a 20,000 person Army force into Bosnia at a cost of \$1 billion, estimated, for the first year. I was at an affair last night where a young Marine major stood up and asked the question of the principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, the Comptroller, asked the question, you know, “You have said that the Defense Department is going to be deficit the cost and you have cited a billion dollars to deploy this 20,000 person Army force. Do you remember the cost of deploying 24,000 Marines to Somalia?” And the answer was, of course, I do not remember the cost. But to replace the supplies and to repair the equipment that we used off the MPS ships, to put that force into Somalia for many, many, months was under \$30 million dollars for Marines, compared to a billion dollars to deploy an equivalent size Army force.

So, once again, I strived to present these arguments, not as a disparaging point to the Army, but to point out that we have an Army whose job it is to fight the nation’s wars when the wars come up and we need a credible Army to do that. The Marines are not big enough to be able to win the war singlehandedly, never have been, never will be, should not be. But for “expeditionary” we should not be fooling around with paratroopers on aircraft carriers just because somebody has this adaptive joint force packaging notion. Marines do things from the sea, not others, and

Marines can also do things ashore to complement what the other Services do.

So mine was perhaps a rather impassioned presentation. I think it was well received, and again, though we may discuss that later on, as the Roles and Missions Commission came down, I think the Marine Corps came out of that particular Commission study very well, very successfully.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same date, 20 September, as if to provide counterpoint to your statement, the Special Purpose Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean, built around the headquarters of the 2d Marines, landed at Cap Haitien. This force was the Marine Corps' share of Operation Uphold Democracy. The performance of the 1,900 Marines was also a kind of counterpoint to the somewhat clumsy performance of the Army's 20,000-person task force that landed at Port-au-Prince. Was the Marine task force under Army command for this operation?

GEN MUNDY: It was under the command of an Army officer, LtGen Hugh Shelton of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Hugh Shelton was the designated Joint Task Force Commander so he had the naval forces, the Seals, the ships at sea, the Air Force forces and the Marine forces under his command, not as an Army officer but as a Marine force under a Joint Task Force.

BGEN SIMMONS: After 12 days ashore the Marines were relieved by elements of the 10th Mountain Division and re-embarked. For us it was a clean, in and out operation. The brigade of the 10th Mountain Division was the same brigade that had landed in Somalia. With that experience one would have thought they would have done better. Any further invidious comments you might like to make?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, with genuine appreciation and respect for soldiers in general, for the United States Army, I do have great respect and indeed affection for them, and they have done well on many occasions, but we, in the simplistic view that we just discussed, of attempting to say, well, we will just take a brigade of soldiers out of Fort Drum, New York and we will send them off and have them go into Somalia or something like that, that division had never done that before. It was not a deploying division.

The inside fact was that while Gen Hoar wanted the 101st or a brigade from the 101st Airborne for the Somalia operation which would have been a very tac-

tical unit, the make-up of the division is ideally structured for what they wanted, he wanted the 101st — the 82d is the crack contingency response force for the Army — but the fact was that we were also looking at a little bit of unstable situation in Korea and the Army chose to hold the 101st and the 82d, if you will, in reserve or in readiness for a bigger contingency and opted to deploy a brigade from the 10th Mountain Division which lives in Fort Drum, New York in the deep snows of winter, almost the Arctic environment. But it was a light division and I think that it came and learned a lot.

But once again I would only offer my thesis of deployers versus displacers. For the Marines that type of operation was a very natural intervention that we have done for some 220 years or so now. For the elements of the 10th Mountain Division, fine soldiers though they may be, they were not, this was not the instrument that we used for that. And so there was great hay made, of course, as we embarked Army helicopters on an aircraft carrier to move them down. Everyone who does not know much about anything was quick to say, "See, it is an amphibious operation." It was not.

I tried to make the point that this was a transport operation. We needed to get a lot of helicopters to Port-au-Prince. There is an airfield with a single runway down there. If we had dumped the scores of C-5s and C-141 aircraft into that airfield that it would take to move the Army logistically down there it would have been very impractical. We would never have gotten there. So it was a very expedient thing to be able because we were two or three days sailing time away, calm waters, down into the Caribbean, load the Army up and send them down. But it was a transport operation not an amphibious assault by any means.

Interestingly, in that particular thing to Adm Boorda's credit, and I think there should be credit here, he foresaw that there was going to be a request for the transport of the Army helicopters and indeed, you know, some of the Special Forces and so on that were operating, that they would want amphibious ships to do that. Adm Boorda was quick, as the CNO, was quick to intervene before the fact and to designate if we would transport them down we would do it on an aircraft carrier instead of an amphibious ship. And that was a CNO who was defending or, if you will, protecting the fact that the amphibious ships are generally made for employment of Marines as opposed to transportation of the Army.

But that is the background on the use of the aircraft carrier, *Theodore Roosevelt*. There was another carri-

er that was a platform for the Special Operations Forces had we gone offensively into Haiti, that is, had we invaded vice introduced the 10th Mountain Division as an occupation force as we did there would have been Special Operations Forces operating off of an aircraft carrier for introduction into Haiti.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Army had a considerable number of women soldiers in Haiti. Do you know if we had any women Marines in our Special Task Force?

GEN MUNDY: We did not. They were embarked aboard ship and there were none.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 21st of September you were interviewed by Vince Thomas of *Sea Power* magazine, on the following day by someone from the *Naval Institute Proceedings* and on the 23d by *Navy News*. I trust that these interviews went well and resulted in favorable articles.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, they did. As is always the case when something is going on, that is, when there is an operational matter at issue, the interviews are generally always positive, at least initially. And then, you know, after awhile we get bored with the fact that things are going on well and so we tend to now start looking toward a friendly fire incident or something like that that can be more sensational.

But those were, as I recall, focused generally on, not just on the intervention in Haiti and on the Marines part, and remember that the Marines had engaged in a fire fight with some of the Haitian constabulary and some Haitians had been killed — no Marines, fortunately — and so that immediately draws the focus of the press. And I think that we probably were also focusing at that time on Roles and Missions matters as well. But they were very favorable interviews. I do not recall them as being sensational at all.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 23 September the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Kaneohe, Hawaii was deactivated. The brigade had been there since 1953. Was there any particular strategic advantage to having a brigade in Hawaii?

GEN MUNDY: Speaking as a strategist, if I can so flatter myself, no, there is no strategic advantage to having a brigade, indeed in having any specific armed force, other than Navy, in Hawaii. It is an excellent naval base. It is forward, what, 3,000 miles west of

the West Coast of the United States. It is located in mid-Pacific. It is a good place to have naval forces operating out of.

As a practical matter, to get either the Marines of then-1st Marine Brigade or now the 3d Marine Regiment, reinforced, to war or the elements of the 25th Infantry Division would mean that we would have to sail ships from the West Coast to stop there to pick them up to transport them onward, or if we were doing it by strategic airlift, we would have to fly empty aircraft from the West Coast to Hawaii to pick up, you know, to land and embark their cargos and then to move onward from there.

So, as a practical matter one could argue that you would do far better to have your forces based in the United States where the airplanes and the ships are and then load them up and send them to war. But we do things for strategic reasons and there is a, from the political military standpoint it is of advantage for the United States to be able to say we have a distinct interest in the Pacific as witnessed by our willingness to base credible armed forces in the middle Pacific, mid-Pac.

So, it has political utility. It has psychological, perhaps, utility. As a practical, strategic, military rationale having Marines in Hawaii is of no particular benefit. That is not to say, it is a wonderful base. Remember that we have invested heavily in a lot of our bases. We have superb housing for dependents out there. It is a beautiful climate. People reenlist in the Marine Corps for a tour in Hawaii. In other words, there are a lot of reasons.

Historically, remember that our fleet still lies on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, the *Arizona*. There is a great emotional attachment, patriotic, national attachment, so I think that it would be very difficult for us to completely pull out of Hawaii.

A second to that, and again this gets to the more practical day-to-day business in Washington, again, that readers might appreciate, remember that the senior senator from Hawaii, Senator Daniel Inouye, of whom we have spoken earlier, was then the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is now the minority ranking member of that committee. Remember that Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska who considers himself a Pacific senator because that is on the rim of the Pacific Ocean is now the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. From a practical matter, remembering, for those who will not remember, that all politics are local and that those senators were elected from their states to represent the interests of the states or indeed the Pacific community, one of major reasons that the Marine Corps con-

tinues in any significant size in Hawaii is because of the will, the desires and the political power of Senator Dan Inouye and Senator Ted Stevens. Any Commandant who went up and announced that he was ready to pull the Marines out of Hawaii would probably find himself eating bread in the next appropriation. That is a fact of life.

BGEN SIMMONS: What is the designation of the present air-ground element at Kaneohe?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the air element, we have removed all of the fixed wing aircraft there and the air station has been kept open only, from a Marine Corps perspective, to accommodate CH-53D helicopters which are the older CH-53 but still a useful aircraft.

We moved the training squadron for the CH-53s out to Kaneohe. That is a practical thing to do. It is a nice place to train, plenty of good flying area for helicopters and we have located all of that type model and series of aircraft in a central location. That, too, is advantageous from a maintenance standpoint. That was to maintain some capability to lift the residual of the Marines who are there, which are the 3d Marine Regiment Reinforced. There remains, you know, an artillery battalion there, one of the 12th Marines battalions and there is still a support element from the 3d Force Service Support Group which is the III MEF Service Support Group to, of course, you know, enable that force to operate. As a practical matter we have moved the airfield control, the air support elements out of there because of the reductions in the force structure and the need to place them back in CONUS.

Thus we have, if one wanted to now think back to your question of a strategic location, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, rear echelon, is the 3d Marine Regiment Reinforced in Hawaii. So as you look at the array of Marine forces in the Pacific it would be proper to say that organizationally, at least, and strategically that III MEF with its elements of the 3d Marine Division and other supporting elements extends from our forward bases in the western Pacific, in Japan, Okinawa, all the way back to the middle Pacific, encompassing its 3d Regiment back in Hawaii.

Another practical reason that I viewed retention of Marines in Hawaii and the retention of what we then retitled with the standdown of the 1st MEB, the force that is there now is based at what we call Marine Corps Base, Hawaii, and that would include all Marine activities in Hawaii. So we now have a base structure in Hawaii. If that time comes in the future when for whatever reason the United States elects to

withdraw its ground forces from the western Pacific, Hawaii offers the very nice opportunity, and now a very strategically appealing opportunity, to perhaps house the headquarters of the 3d Marine Division or to bring III MEF back to Hawaii to still be Pacific-oriented.

Those who would argue from what would seem to be a rational basis that well, you know, you could put that organization in Camp Pendleton or you could put it in Twentynine Palms or something, I think lose the fact of life that if you are in an area of responsibility or area of operations, region, whatever you want to term it, your mind is there. The Marines who are forward in the western Pacific are in the western Pacific and their operational focus is the western Pacific. If you moved out of the Pacific, you know, you could say that you still had a Pacific orientation but indeed you would have a CONUS orientation or we would be pointing them toward South America, perhaps, if something occurred there. So it is good to have people out there because the planning, the alliance-building exercising and the equipping and the orientation of the force is where it is, so it is very useful to retain a presence in the Pacific.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 23rd you flew to speak at a banquet of the Kansas City chapter of the Military Order of the World Wars and then went on the next day to speak to the reunion of the Marine Raider Association in Las Vegas. Any special recollections?

GEN MUNDY: The first was at the request of Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri with whom I had a great friendship. Congressman Skelton had asked me to come out to Kansas City and I did so. And then on to the Raider reunion. This, again, was part of our recognition of the organizations and the 50th Anniversary commemorations.

BGEN SIMMONS: On your return there was the annual General Officer Symposium extending from Monday, 26 September through Friday, 30 September. Do you have any special recollections of that symposium?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I guess my strongest recollection would be that in the golf tournament that we have on the last day — the last afternoon, at least, we go down and play golf together at Quantico and then have a nice cookout after that and that ends the affair — that I was on the winning foursome and remarkably, even though I am not a particularly good golfer, why they had laid in enough “ringers,” to enable the

outgoing Commandant at his last symposium to be in the winning foursome. And so they presented me with a "Masters" jacket. I got a Marine wool blazer out of the deal.

Beyond that, the symposium, again it was my last one and so I think that I had a session with the generals, I do not think it was a particularly profound one, at the end of the thing, but simply to encourage them to press on or whatever final guidance you try and lay on. But the symposium was much as the others have been. It was not remarkable in any particular sense.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 September the 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion, the so-called "3d LAAM Battalion" was deactivated. The battalion's origins dated back to 1938 when its ancestor was first activated. Then it was armed with .50-caliber machine guns. In World War II years it had 3-inch and then 90mm antiaircraft guns. Then it moved into the successive generations of HAWK missiles.

HAWK elements were among the first Marine combat elements to be introduced in Vietnam. Did we ever fire a HAWK missile in anger?

GEN MUNDY: Not to my knowledge.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are the 1st and 2d LAAM Battalions still in the Marine Corps force structure?

GEN MUNDY: They are. I believe that Gen Krulak is moving toward a single air defense battalion. The LAAM battalions have been consolidated with the LAAD, Light Antiaircraft Defense battalions, LAAD battalions being the Stinger missile, the shoulder-launched, man portable shoulder-launch missile and, of course, the HAWK is a very large missile with a considerably longer range that is fired from a launcher, a ground-based launcher. Those have been combined to (unintelligible) an overhead of the battalion headquarters into a single battalion. They currently exist though once again I think that the plans for the future will see us going to a single air defense battalion, probably out at Twentynine Palms or Yuma, somewhere in the desert where we have the ranges that we can fire the missiles in practice.

BGEN SIMMONS: Why are the antiaircraft missile units under the aviation command elements of our MAGTFs?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there have been arguments back and forth over the years as to where they should appropriately be. The Army, of course, had HAWK

missile battalions and batteries just as we did and operated them under the ground force commander. Now, that was always an issue between the Air Force and the Army because the Air Force was very much concerned that a soldier might shoot down a friendly aircraft. So, I think there was concern.

In the Marine Corps, the HAWKs have been employed historically more or less for air base defense; one could argue and say vital area defense. Certainly in Vietnam as the HAWKs were disposed there they would have protected the III MEF headquarters, they would have protected the port and the airfield facility and perhaps some other vital installations. But, as a general rule the HAWKs existed to provide a 60-mile range of interception of enemy aircraft coming in at an airfield.

The Stinger missile, the man-pad, is a much closer range missile and is employed generally with ground forces. The answer as to why it is in the aviation combat element lies in our ability with the Tactical Air Operations Center, which is part of the Marine Air Command and Control System, we control aircraft and missiles from that particular center. So, in order to, because of the Marines' doctrine wherein we employ aircraft of times as flying artillery, in other words, we integrate all of our combined arms, the doctrinal decision has always been that the control of aircraft and missiles should be under the same agency.

Even though the Stinger missile team might be out maneuvering with an infantry battalion somewhere, the clearance to fire the missile at an incoming aircraft is received from the Tactical Air Operations Center which has the picture of all aircraft in the area and can confirm that, yes, you are shooting at a bogey instead of at a friendly aircraft. You are cleared to fire; fire. So that is the rational. It is command and control of aircraft and missiles in the radius of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.

BGEN SIMMONS: Isn't the medium anti-aircraft missile capability a function we could turn over to the Army?

GEN MUNDY: Except that the Army is getting out of that. The Army has placed all of their HAWK missiles into the National Guard and Reserves so they do not have them readily up-front. The argument, could we not do that? Yes. I think that that could be. Now, however, to back up again and go back to our adaptability and innovation and so on, the Marines have taken, because of the Air Command and Control System, the Marines have taken the HAWK forward into a smaller, a lighter, an improved in accuracy and

range and called it the Improved HAWK Missile. That was largely an innovation of Marines. The Army, you know, signed on and bought that missile when it became available.

The Marine air control radar which is the TPS-51 radar is arguably one of the most effective command control radars for protection against theater anti-ballistic missile defense. It is a superb command and control device that we can detect incoming ballistic missiles.

There have been extensive tests as the Services have moved toward, in the case of the Navy, the Aegis system aboard the new cruisers and the new destroyers in the Navy which gives you an air detection for either aircraft or theater missile defense. The Army is moving into the corps level surface-to-air missile, corps-SAM as an acronym, which will give you shore-based deep missile coverage. The Marine radar, because we serve so effectively as the, the Marine Air Control System really transfers the Navy Air Command and Control System ashore, so you get to link the Aegis cruiser with the Marine TPS radar and you have a tremendous theater missile defense. We have also test fired some of the improved HAWK missiles against ballistic missiles and they have proved to be deadly accurate.

So you have not just an air defense but indeed a theater missile air defense, and as other systems are evolving, it is very useful at this time and this place to have that capability still extant or existent within the active structure of the Marine Corps.

I believe that eventually we will probably step out of the HAWK missile business, but for the time being it is useful to have even though, as we both accurately cite, we have never fired one in anger. But, then that says something, I suppose, for the effectiveness of our longer-range manned aircraft defense because no enemy aircraft has gotten in in recent times and threatened an American air base.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you think the improved HAWK might be as good or better defense against SCUD missiles than the Patriot?

GEN MUNDY: No, it is not. It could certainly be a defense and we had them in the Gulf and they would have been employed had we been threatened. But the Patriot is longer range, is a more precision, well, I should not say that, the HAWK would be precision, (noise interference) target but a missile as well, but the Patriot is an advanced system and I, you know, I could not knowledgeably argue the merits of the two systems except to say that I believe the Patriot would

be the more effective and was demonstrated to be effective in the desert.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 1 October, you went to the National Defense University for a presentation on Roles and Missions. Who sponsored this meeting?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was the sponsor. It was an officers' call and I had as many of the officers in the Washington, D.C. area, those assigned to the Joint Staff, those at the Headquarters Staff and what not, as we could assemble in Eisenhower Auditorium, which is a very large auditorium there. I had mustered all of my officers on Saturday morning to give them the Roles and Missions briefing. I subsequently did this same thing down at Quantico in the auditorium in Little Hall.

For two reasons; one, again, this was a very important issue to the Marine Corps, but more so because I believed then, as I do now — and I hope and I believe that a copy of the Roles and Missions Commission briefing will be in my personal papers, however characteristic of me there is no script, you know, I give the briefing so we will have the charts but not a script — but I wanted to use that as an educational device for the serving Marine officers to help them to understand the issues that we were facing and the Marine Corps position relative to those issues, and, again, this, what I considered, very informative presentation that had been put together looking at the Marine Corps and its overall utility and adaptability and flexibility — all those buzz words that characterized us — indeed as the certain force that you want in this uncertain world.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Thursday, 6 October, the SecNav held an off-site meeting, I believe in your office and theater. What was the purpose of this meeting and who attended?

GEN MUNDY: The Secretary, all the Secretaries but Sec Dalton more so than had any of the former that I served with anyway, held periodically an off-site which would be, I recall we held one at the Naval Observatory. We had —

GEN MUNDY: — and I said that we had held that at various places to include the Center for Naval Analysis. And then he proposed for this scheduled off-site, he said, "We want to have an off-site," and I said, "Well, why don't you come to the Marine Headquarters?" We tend to gather in the Pentagon for affairs, but we have a nicer conference room, as a

matter of fact, than most of those that are over on the Navy side of the Pentagon.

So, the CNO and I were the uniformed members. I believe that the Vice Chiefs were there, Adm Stan Arthur and Gen Hearney were there, and then all of the assistant secretaries, the General Counsel of the Navy, and the Secretary and the Undersecretary.

These were, I thought, useful in the sense that they built a team in the Department of the Navy, far more useful than the substance of anything that we might have discussed or decided upon. But it was just a good technique for bringing together the leadership of the Department of the Navy and bringing about an interface between the uniformed leadership and the civilian leadership, which is not always smooth.

The CNO, Adm Boorda, definitely had some areas in which he wanted that to be the preserve of the uniformed leadership. He did not want the civilian secretaries meddling in areas where he considered it pure uniformed issue. The Marine Corps had less of that sort of thing to be concerned with, although from time to time I was concerned with it.

So, it was a good bonding, a good education, kind of a relaxed time off. And, we were able to showcase the Marine Corps a little bit, give some of our briefings, feed them there. You know, show them that we, too, had some class and that we had green and white china instead of blue and white china, things like that. It was a nice gathering.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday, 8 October, you and Mrs. Mundy departed to visit France and Spain. You would return on the 12th. What were the highlights of this trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, these were return counterpart visits. Remember that I had hosted two Commandants of the Spanish Marine Corps and they had been very, you know, gracious and insistent that I come back to Spain for a similar visit. Those visits, though one would say, "Oh, I see, you got a week's vacation in Europe." Well, to be sure the pace is not heavy and there is a great amount of social work, but, like in any senior-level association, that is very useful. In other words, the establishing of rapport, the discussion of common issues and so on is very useful. So, it was a counterpart visit to the Spanish Marine Corps by the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, not precedent-setting at all.

The visit to France was similarly a counterpart to Gen Monchal who was the chief-of-staff of the French Army. The French Army some years ago, in fact, this goes back into Gen Gray's watch, had

become fixed upon, fascinated with the U.S. Marine Corps as being more like what they wanted the French Army to be than the U.S. Army. So they saw in us with our amphibious capabilities, with the helicopter, you know, integrated air-ground task force, naval orientation, they saw great utility, and the various French chiefs-of-staff had made overtures to the Commandant. They wanted to train together.

We do train in Camp de Canjuers, which translated is, the Camp of Julius Caesar, in southern France. It is a beautiful area but it is a superb training area and most of the Marine expeditionary units in the Mediterranean go in there and train. So we trained a little bit with the French Army and our association has become closer over the years.

Gen Monchal had been here for a visit to Parris Island, down to Camp Lejeune at one time and so this was a reciprocal visit. It was a superb visit because he lives, the Chief-of-Staff of the French Army lives in the — and you will be able to pronounce it because I do not speak French — but anyway in Les Invalides, the hospital of the soldiers home that Napoleon had built. It is, of course characteristic of Napoleon, it is anything other than just an ordinary soldier's home. It is a palace right downtown in France, all lit up, gold dome and so on.

Well, we went there for dinner and they, as we had done with them, they brought in one of their bands and played in the courtyard on the old cobblestones where you could just hear carriages going around. Then we walked up to a typically superb French dinner where a glass of wine would have been sufficient unto itself, but they give you a superb dinner.

I was decorated with the French Legion of Honor which, again, is not extraordinary to me but is sort of the official recognition between governments of senior officers. It is not uncommon to receive a foreign decoration. The Spanish had given me the Grand Order of the Naval Cross while I was there. So, that was the purpose of the visit.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 17 October, you went to the award and promotion ceremony for Gen Jack Sheehan. He was about to take command of the U.S. Atlantic Command. Once again we would have a Marine four-star as a unified commander. Do you think we are getting our fair share of these commands?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we are. Whereas at one time before the Central Command there would have been no consideration, I think, to placing a Marine in command, indeed we, as a general rule though there may

be some gaps, we have had successfully a Marine CinC at the appropriate time.

I think Gen Sheehan will not be succeeded by a Marine. That is not the plan, will probably, may become an Air Force officer, perhaps even an Army officer. But that is part of the jointizing, I guess, of the Armed Forces. We get our share, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: During the week of 17-25 October, 1,700 Marines of the 37th Marine Expeditionary Unit helped commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf by reenacting the landing of the returned General MacArthur to the Philippines during World War II. Not too many persons today know that Marine Corps aviation and artillery made a substantial contribution to MacArthur's reentry into the Philippines. Had you thought of perhaps attending that reenactment?

GEN MUNDY: I had thought of it and I did not for two reasons. One, I think that, you know, I was flying back and forth to these events and it took time to do that and so I chose not to attend that one. But the primary reason was that, you have just educated me because, very frankly, I do not know my own Corps' history and I was not aware. I am one of those that you attribute as not being aware of the Marine Corps contribution. But it was an Army show and even though Marines were being used as the play actors, if you will, this I felt to be an Army show. I believe, if I am not mistaken, that Gen Sullivan went out and was on hand for this. I chose to let him be the representative for that occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: Unfortunately we seem to have run out of time this morning. We will have to recess this session and pick it up at a later time.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is a continuation of Session XXVI with Gen Mundy, the second six months of 1994. It is Thursday morning, 14 March and we are in General Mundy's study at his home in Ludgate Court.

General, on 20 October, 1994 you left on a three-day trip to San Diego to attend primarily a conference of the Recruiting Command. Any special recollections of that trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was, so to speak, my final touch with the recruiting officers of the Marine Corps and the sergeants major and I wanted to do that. We have discussed before my intense interest in recruiting my belief that it is the foundation of the Marine

Corps. So this was sort of my final get-together with them. We had the usual presentation of the superior achiever awards and the recognition of the recruiters and then I was able to just talk to them for a little while.

So that was the purpose, was for me to attend, recognize their efforts and their successes and more or less say farewell to the recruiting service.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were back in time to observe on Sunday, 23 October, the running of the 19th Marine Corps Marathon. How could you have passed up the challenge of being the first Marine Corps Commandant to do the marathon?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was fairly easy. I, some years before, decided that I would undertake the marathon and I began training for it. And after about, as I recall it, about six weeks of training I was running, although I do not know the mileage, I would think up to about ten miles a day at that point in preparation. I would get up in the morning and I would massage my ankles and massage my knees and my hips and lie down and attempt to straighten out my back and finally the pain was so consistent that I just decided that maybe running marathons was something that others should do and not me.

However, in this particular one I did send a supernumerary and he was then-Maj Carl Mundy. Sam, our oldest boy, decided to run in that marathon so we were delighted to go up and watch him. It rained the whole time. It was kind of a miserable day for the onlookers but not for the runners. It was refreshing to them to be running on kind of a cool, drizzly day.

BGEN SIMMONS: Just why does the Marine Corps sponsor this marathon?

GEN MUNDY: It began, well, obviously it began now about 21 years ago and it was started by a Marine reservist, a colonel by the name of Jim Fowler. Col Fowler is still around and is honored as the grandfather or the father, what have you, of the Marine marathon.

Jim was then at Headquarters Marine Corps and I think he saw in it, he is a runner, and I think that he saw in it good, positive image for the Marine Corps, recalling that 20 years ago we were in the depths of, you know, coming out of Vietnam and the image of all of the military services was still bad in the public mind. We had napalmed babies, you know, according to the newspapers and done all of these heinous things in Vietnam. So there was an effort at image-building.

And my recollection is, though not stated as such at the time, that the Division of Reserve Affairs, at that point, with Col Fowler in it, saw a means of enhancing the Marine Corps image and, indeed, it has. I think the "Run Through the Monuments," or the Marine Corps Marathon as it is called in some cases, is hailed as one of the better marathons in the country today, so it had been very successful over these two decades.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is a story there that really ought to be captured and developed.

On Wednesday, 26 October, you went to the swearing in of Gen Fogleman, the new Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force. How would you compare the personalities and leadership styles of Gen McPeak and Gen Fogleman?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the two certainly are fine officers and I had a great deal of affection for both of them. They were, as you suggested in your question, dramatically different in their styles. Tony McPeak used to say, when he would come in with one of his revolutionary ideas he would say, "Now, the Air Force has known for years and has had a philosophy, if it is working okay, don't send McPeak."

Tony McPeak was an iconoclast who saw a need in any circumstance to change things. Now one could argue, change for the sake of change; there may have been an element of that in there. But Tony always believed that any mechanism or any organization could be made better and that the way, and he used to use the terms, for example, he would get frustrated with the Chiefs from time to time when we were working Roles and Missions or something and he would say, "You guys just want to tinker around the edges. The only way that we can ever make progress here is if we just smash the whole thing and then put it back together the way that we think best." So Tony is the type who would, for example, had he become the Chairman he would be a very pleasant man to work around but he would have sought to have made dramatic changes in the structure of the Armed Forces, in the structure of the unified commands that were simply not consistent with the way that most of us saw the world.

So we had a lot of fun with Tony. You know, he was always very serious and when he would come into "the tank" and lay down one of these theses of his as to how we might do things better, we would listen to it because he had done his homework. Tony McPeak was never without the facts to support his case. And then we would pull his chain a little bit and

usually consider what he had to say but very rarely were, either Gen Powell, Colin Powell, or the Chiefs, very rarely were we ready to accept, face-down, Tony's solution to an organizational or structural problem.

Were it an operational problem, Tony was one of the best minds around. If you want to apply air power anywhere, I would go to see Tony McPeak today. That was his business and he knew it well.

You, or maybe history will recall that at the time that he went out we were in the midst of the Roles and Missions Commission and Tony had advanced a fairly, again, extraordinary proposition that would, among other things, carve up the battlefield with definitive lines consistent with the Dupuy theory on air power, that, you know, air power is a singular, war-winning capability in its own right. For air power to be effective it can only be led, commanded, planned and executed by airmen. And therefore, if you divide the battlefield by saying that the ground forces or the naval forces or what have you, but the ground forces shall fight at some sort of coordination line. You know, we have long had a fire coordination line and a fire support coordination line, but that is really a line, as I think tacticians will know, that is a line where, you know, short of which the ground commander, who would have units perhaps in the area, short of which he controls all fires. Tony would have made that a firmer division of the battlefield to in effect say that even if you put ground forces out beyond what we would know as the fire support coordination line or fire coordination line, if you put ground forces out there that the air commander would have command. In other words that would be his portion of the battlefield and he would run the war out there.

That, obviously for we who are advocates of combined arms and who see the ground force commander using air as an interdiction weapon or as a supporting arm on the battlefield, that did not go down well with either the Army or, indeed, with me and to a lesser degree with the Navy. That would describe Tony's approach to things.

Now, as he was going out of office, to his credit, I believe that Tony did not stimulate this, but the *Washington Post* saw fit to see him out on the day before he was to retire by putting his picture in the paper and stating that McPeak sought to disrupt the organization and to overturn the way that we did business and kind of put him in a bad light. That was McPeak.

Fogleman thus came in with a mandate, if you will, implicit or inferred by him as being necessary, to heal the wounds with the other Services. There really was

no wound with me with McPeak, but there certainly was, primarily between the Army, first and foremost the Army, and secondarily, Adm Mike Boorda and Tony McPeak really never got along from the get-go, from the outset.

So, Fogleman came in with, I am sure, with a conscious effort to make amends and he did it superbly. Fogleman had come from the transportation command. He was a very personable, likeable, to say easy-going does not mean less than professional, but certainly the type man that you could like. He was a big Pennsylvania football player and he is just the type guy that you could relate to well.

Early in his tenure I took him and all of his numbered Air Force commanders and we went down to Camp Lejeune for a demonstration of our capability. We went into Cherry Point. We had them fly all the airplanes, the Harrier, fly the F-18. We gave them the air command and control show. Took them back through Patuxent River so he could see the V-22 model that was being developed, and if anything went out of, when I say my way, went out of the Marine Corps' way to attempt to bridge this chasm that has long existed between the Marine Corps and the Air Force in the area of tactical air support. You know, you have to fight the Navy programmatically for tactical air but never operationally. With the Air Force we always have an operational fight on our hands. So, what I sought to do was to end this operational conflict and I think that that was rather successful.

BGEN SIMMONS: Has any of it ever been reduced to written doctrine at this point, a memoranda of agreement or —

GEN MUNDY: Well, there is joint doctrine, of course, that was long-standing, you know, air support on the battlefield or command and control of tactical aviation, but the problem with that was that it was derived from NATO experiences where the European model of three separate services is never the three shall meet on the battlefield except by accident. In other words, air power does what Air Forces do and the ground commander can do whatever he wants to do but, you know, they really do not have a joint orientation or combined arms orientation.

So, we had long, the Marine Corps had long contested this brand of European air commander, ground commander, navy commander and the Marine Corps had a hard time fitting into that. The joint doctrine is much more compatible, in effect, as one could argue, we did in Desert Storm but it was still in its fledgling days there, but the joint force air component com-

mander is a concept, a philosophy of doctrine, if you will, in which the Marine Corps' aviation combat element can work very effectively and did work effectively, I think, in the Gulf. So to answer you, is this being set down, my answer would be yes, and it is in U.S. joint doctrine rather than in the far more controversial NATO combined doctrine that we had to deal with, you know, a good 15 to 20 years after the end of the Vietnam War.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good. I am afraid, though, that Gen McPeak will be remembered chiefly for his radical changes in the Air Force uniform. He did not have a strong uniform board to put the brake on his ideas.

GEN MUNDY: McPeak was his own uniform, McPeak was his own board in any case. He did not need two votes, all he needed was his idea. But, interesting that you mention that. Yes, Tony did in his, again, his efforts to streamline, modernize and move into the 21st century the Air Force. He did not like, for example, the barracks cap or as the Air Force calls it, the round cap, what we would know as the barracks cap so he, in effect, did away with that and wear only the overseas cap, the fore and aft cap to Marines.

He wanted to take all of the, as he termed them, gewgaws, off the uniform so he took anything but wings and if you chose to wear ribbons, and sometimes he did or sometimes he did not, he took those off. He did not like all of the stars on the shoulders so he went to the, some of the European air forces use the naval, you know, rings around your sleeve fashion and he did that.

Tony McPeak drinks pure water and eats whole grain cereal for breakfast and only fish and probably drinks vinegar and things like we were talking about. He is an extremely health-minded individual and, as a result, there is not an ounce of fat on him. He is a very, you know, one of those tall, angular fellows who can put on any uniform and it will hang beautifully on them and they will look like a million dollars in it. Tony could do that so he went to a rather, almost blazer-like Air Force uniform coat and the rest of the Air Force did not like it. They liked leaves and bars and stars and things.

It was significant that when, and I thought that this was a mark of professionalism and loyalty, when the Air Force, when Tony had his retirement ceremony, of course all the services except the Marine Corps, as some do not really understand we are the only service that really changes command, the Navy does some-

thing like it, but in the Army and the Air Force the Chief-of-Staff simply retires and the next day his successor shows up, there is no passing of the battle colors or anything of that sort. So, McPeak retired out at Andrews Air Force Base. It was a magnificent ceremony and done with great style. Every general, every Air Force general there was wearing the McPeak uniform, you know, the overseas cap, the rings around the sleeve. The next day when Fogleman was sworn in, he appeared in the traditional Air Force uniform with gewgaws and with the stars and things on it and every general, less except a couple who were looking awkwardly around the room at that point, was wearing the traditional Air Force uniform.

So, it was a rather nice way, and that was a significant thing in the Air Force, it was a rather nice way for Fogleman to honor the outgoing Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force by being there in the McPeak uniform but tomorrow when he came back he was back in the traditional Air Force uniform. And he subsequently modified the uniform, did not completely throw out the McPeak version, but he did go back to stars on the shoulders and a few other additions to the uniform; the round hat came back in. Very interesting saga, but you are right, people will probably always think of Tony McPeak as, you know, they will remember McPeak and the uniform, they will remember Gen Mundy and the marriage policy.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, the 27th of October, you went once again to Newburgh, New York for FBI/USMC Day. On the following day you flew to Maxwell AFB to address the Air University. That evening you stayed over at your old alma mater, Auburn University. Any special memories of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Only to say again, as I am sure I have earlier, that the FBI/USMC Day that is held each year is one of the most moving events that I have ever attended. I think I have described it earlier but it is just a tremendous event. I think I went to three of the four. I did not go, in fact, one year only because I felt, you know, you can wear out your presence. So I went three of the four times. This was one of them.

Air University, we have talked about that before, always a treat to go down there and talk. I had been invited by the President of Auburn University to come up and sit in his box and watch the Auburn/Arkansas game, as a matter of fact, and I told him in advance that if it was on national television that I might have to constrain my enthusiasm if Auburn was whipping up on Arkansas too much because if the President

were watching perhaps I should not be jumping up and down as we tromped his alma mater too badly. Auburn did win the game but it was just a nice event at Auburn and then we left and came back the next day.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Sunday, 30 October, you went to Quantico for a reception and awards presentation evening being held by the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. Do you recall that evening?

GEN MUNDY: I am sure that if I did not that you could handle it very well, but I do recall the evening. It was, as the Historical Foundation does, it was a very nice gathering in the new Research Center which is itself a nice place to hold such affairs. As I recall we gave all of the historical awards and I was there to say a few words and then to participate in the presentation of the awards. So, again, a nice group of people, all of whom are extremely proud of and devoted to the Marine Corps and a nice occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: For posterity, you presented me with the Foundation's Distinguished Service Award that evening.

GEN MUNDY: As I said, you could embellish. I remember it well, but I wanted you to be able to enter it for the record.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, 31 October, you flew to Norfolk for the investiture of Gen Sheehan as CinC USLantCom. Who was he relieving?

GEN MUNDY: He was relieving Adm Paul David Miller, about whom I have spoken earlier when we discussed the adaptive joint force packaging and so on. Paul Miller was the architect of that, however, Jack Sheehan had been his J-5 during that time so Sheehan, indeed, was very much into the operations and the philosophy of the Atlantic Command and was an ideal choice to go back down there and be the CinC.

BGEN SIMMONS: And he has had a very active time in that.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, he has, with the Caribbean activities and the realignment of the, what we know now as the U.S. Atlantic Command, so it has been active for him.

BGEN SIMMONS: We discussed this a bit earlier,

but it appears that the Marine Corps is at last getting its share of the unified commands.

GEN MUNDY: I believe so. The selection of unified commanders and, indeed, continue that into the key billets in both the unified commands and in the Joint Staff here in Washington has become much more flexible than it once was. Unified commands used to be characterized by the color of the uniform. You know that with one exception, I think Laurts Norstad, an Air Force officer, was at one time the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, but otherwise it has been a U.S. Army command and will continue and should be.

But many of the commands, the Atlantic command was a Navy command. The Pacific command was a Navy command. Those have been turned a little bit and we now, I believe very frankly that Jack Sheehan is probably a transition CinC because moving from a Navy commander to a Marine commander was an easier pill for our NATO partners to swallow because they could, CinCLant has always been dual-hatted as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, a Navy, you know, officer. To put a Marine in there made it a little bit easier for the NATO navies to say, well, after all, you know, we do have a Marine. That is not too much unlike the Navy. I would venture to say that the next time that that command turns, following Gen Sheehan, that it probably will be either Army or Air Force.

The Pacific Command, that is, we have just gone through, we have just posted a new CinC out there and that same argument might have been made and might yet be made but maybe the time is just not right yet. I think we will see as jointness increases its, in many respects healthy and in some respects unhealthy, hold on the Armed Forces, I think you will see a wider variety of uniforms passing through the unified commands.

But, yes, the Marine Corps with CinCLant. Of course we had CinCCent. We will, I am sure, have the Central Command again. I do not know that the time will come, we might very well have an overlap where we would have two Marine CinCs in at the same time but I think that would be rather for a short period of time than for any significant period of time. Generally speaking, I think the Marine Corps can count on having a CinC.

BGEN SIMMONS: Isn't LtGen Tony Zinni on the ready line now for Central Command?

GEN MUNDY: Well, he will go down. He will be posted this year for LtGen Butch Neal who is coming

out. Zinni would be a very, very credible candidate to become the CinC. The incumbent CinC is probably good for another year there. That may or may not be, that may change, but if he is, and Zinni is seasoned as the deputy commander-in-chief for the year that would be about the time that, you know, Sheehan should be probably moving out of the Atlantic Command at that time so that would be a logical sequence and Tony Zinni would make a superb CinC in that, particularly in the operational CinC, far more so, I think, than some of the more, than the supporting CinC. Tony is an operator and he would be superb and is already a well known figure in the Southwest Asia region because of his experiences in Somalia and the superb job that he has done working with the Central Command.

BGEN SIMMONS: In October it looked as though we might have to go into Kuwait once more to protect that country against a resurgent Iraqi army. I believe that I MEF was placed on the alert and that some 2,500 Marines were dispatched to the area to deter the Iraqis and to provide further training to the Coalition forces. What are your recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marines that went, of course, as I recall the amphibious ready group and the MEU went up into the Gulf and that was one of the early arrivers, which it is very useful to have those things around the world for that purpose, but the focus always in the Joint Staff is frustratingly inflexible to a Marine. And the reason for that is, though we have things like the maritime pre-positioning ships poised around the world, anyone would say that the first echelon that we send ought to be your amphibious ready group; follow it immediately with the maritime pre-positioning ships and get the Marines on the way and allocate the strategic lift, the air support and so on to get them out there.

But, we never work that way. We always start looking at moving some division from Fort Benning or some division from Fort Knox or somewhere like that; picking up the 101st and moving it over as opposed to reacting with the ability to get a frontline force there immediately and then follow it with the heavier force.

So this became, then the significance of this particular move was only that it will be remembered that at this particular time the Army was just getting into the afloat pre-positioning. The Army, called AR3, as a matter of fact — that happens to be just the designation of the Army pre-positioning afloat — was just coming into being. They were putting equipment

aboard ship not unlike the Marine Corps maritime pre-positioning ships and yet in one respect significantly unlike because these really were great shiploads of tanks and Bradleys and heavy equipment that could be delivered for a heavy armored brigade very quickly. They did not have the flexibility that MPS had in them, nor will they, I think, nor should they. That is not, you know, it is a different kind of set.

But, as such things go, because it was a very high skyline item in Washington and because the Marine Corps had to some degree resisted this feeling that we were about to spend \$5 billion to pre-position afloat for the Army when, in point of fact, we do not have the strategic airlift to be able to move both the Marines and the Army forces out there in a timely fashion. So we were going to spend an enormous amount of money at a time when the Defense budget was going down, and when, in the Marine Corps' eyes, without any parochial interest at all, we would have been far better served to have used those funds in another direction at that time. If we want to come along later and pre-position afloat for the Army, that is fine, if the nation can afford to do it.

But, unfortunately, this became almost a Roles and Missions fight with the Marine Corps being accused of trying to torpedo the Army's program. We were not doing that but we were asking what I to this day believe were valid questions that the resource allocators and the appropriators ought to have asked in their own light. You know, is this needed now and can we support it? The answer is no, we cannot fly enough soldiers and Marines anywhere in the world today, nor will we be able to in the near future, to quickly mount out all these ships.

So, as a result, it became a foot race with the Joint Staff, driven principally by the J-4 who was, at that point, no particular friend of the Marine Corps because we had been objecting to many of the aspects of the Mobility Requirement Study. It was and it is a flawed study. It had concluded that we needed to buy this pre-positioning. It had concluded that we needed to buy the C-17. We thoroughly supported that because the C-17 is a needed strategic airlift asset but we were pouring all of the resources into two programs that the Marine Corps simply saw as faulted in concept.

As a result there was a great deal of friction among the planners within the Joint Staff, a great deal of, you know, testament to the fact that, well, the Army's AR3 beat the Marines there. But the fact was that we flew out these 2,500 Marines you are talking about and married them off with the MPS per our concept;

began moving the ships. When the ships arrived, the causeways come down and the vehicles drove off, fueled and ready, Marines embarked in them, ammunition stowed, everything ready to go.

Correspondingly, when the Army afloat pre-positioning pulled up, they could not get the equipment off the ships because the tanks would not start. It was deadline. They had to tow inert tanks off of the ships and stow them on the pier alongside. It was the wrong way to go.

So, the bottom line is that the Army afloat pre-positioning, the Marine Corps offered and is helping the Army with learning about tactical embarkation, with learning how to maintain the equipment, learning how to stage it, learning what a survey and a liaison and a reconnaissance party does before the ships get in there — all of those things that are fundamental to the Marine Corps' way of doing business we are now helping the Army to understand and the Army will do fine. But this circumstance, unfortunately, although you are speaking from an operational slant, I am giving you the inside the Pentagon, cut-throat, you know, bad-mouthing and Roles and Missions type fighting that goes on when it was very clear to anybody that would pause and look at it that we were not bringing the forces in in the right sequence, but we were bringing them in for programmatic purposes alone. So that is the story on this particular deployment.

We sent Marines out. Fortunately the signal that was sought to be sent by the Chiefs and the National Command Authority which was to say to Saddam Hussein, do not come over the line again because once again we mean business, that worked and there was no further activity by the Iraqis.

BGEN SIMMONS: In passing, all I will say is as long as we have this tremendous preponderance of force we can provide this duplication of effort. But, if we are divided widely around the globe it might not be such a good idea and might not be possible.

Also in October it was announced that in Fiscal Year 1995 the Marine Corps would begin getting the Belgian M240 medium machine gun as a replacement for the M60E3 machine gun. As an old machine gunner myself I always thought the M60 was a poor imitation of the German M42. Did you have a role in adopting the M240 or is this a case of going along with the Army?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I guess the answer would be yes and yes, to a degree, but the adoption of the M240 was based on tests that we did down at Quantico, and the M240 compared to the M60 was a head and shoul-

ders weapon. It was a much more accurate weapon. Its reliability and maintenance, RAM, which is an evaluation of any weapons system, was calculatedly higher than that of the M60.

We were going to have to either do significant upgrade work on the M60 or we were going to have to get a new machine gun. The M240, while a heavier machine gun, heavier meaning it weighs more and is more for a man to carry around a battlefield, was in every measured respect a superior gun to the M60.

The issue became one of really the politics in the matter because the M60, as I recall, is made in Maine, I believe, and Senator Bill Cohen was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It was necessary to assure Senator Cohen and his constituents who, as industry does, rolled in hot and heavy to cause the Marine Corps to stay with the M60. Well, at least the constituents did, Senator Cohen never did but he represented them and we had to answer many questions back and forth to him and his staff as to this particular move so we did not forget the M60.

The other aspect of it was as I recall, the number. I think the Army had, somewhere the number 7,000 comes to mind — it may be 4,500 instead — but I think I recall the number 7,000 excess in M240s that could be simply transferred to the Marine Corps. In other words, it was economical for the nation. So, in effect, the Army gave us the machine guns after we had tested it, and it is a superb weapons system.

BGEN SIMMONS: We are now getting into once again the period dominated by the Marine Corps Birthday activities. The worship service at the National Cathedral was on Sunday, 6 November. The ceremony at the Marine Corps War Memorial was held on the morning of 10 November. The Ball was that evening.

The next day you attended the Veterans Day observance at the Tomb of the Unknowns. As in previous years there were many other events but I am not going to go through them all. Is there anything of particular notice or interest you might want to bring out, say, for example, at the Birthday Ball?

GEN MUNDY: Two; one, from the personal standpoint this was my final series of these events while in active service. We were very fortunate, as a matter of fact I have mentioned before that both of our sons, both Sam and Tim were at Quantico — Sam on a permanent assignment, Tim at school — and that happened to coincide with my last year. So it was just a real highlight of the Mundy's, or at least my own, and I think for the young folks as well, to be able to all be

together and attend all of these activities. You know, all three of the Mundy boys in uniform, serving officers and so on. So we had a great deal of enjoyment doing that and that characterized each one of those events you have talked about.

With regard to the Ball itself, yes, this was the last year, remember, of World War II, we have spoken many times before of the commemorations that were going on, so what I elected to do instead of having a guest of honor that would ordinarily be the SecDef or the SecNav or a high-ranking member of the Administration or of the Congress, I just said, "Let's not have an individual guest of honor and we will honor all of the World War II era generals in the Washington area."

By honoring the generals, I point that out in that one might argue why not all of the World War II veterans in the Washington area? Well, you could not possibly do that, that would take the entire Ball. So we honored the generals in the area, less one who saw fit to take a cruise somewhere down in the South Pacific, I think, that was an all-expense paid event where he could go down and make speeches about World War II. His name — we keep stumbling over his name — it seems to me it was BGen Simmons or something like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it was.

GEN MUNDY: But at any rate, so we gathered this group of generals and at the appropriate time in the ceremony, we sat them up in the head area, in the Commandant's area — they were guests of the Marine Corps or of the attendees at the Ball anyway who paid for their attendance — and at the appropriate time we —

BGEN SIMMONS: We were talking about the gathering of generals at the Birthday Ball.

GEN MUNDY: I was being light on that but it was a very significant event. At the proper time when it was time to bring on the guest of honor, as I recall, ordinarily the Commandant and the guest of honor walk up together and then the cake comes and the escorts. I went up singly and then we had all of the generals, and I believe that there were a dozen or 14 of them there, they all formed a column of twos and we played "Bless Them All," and they marched in and up to the stage to the tune of "Bless Them All," which, probably I was the only guy in the audience who knew what the song was or the lyrics, but, and then we recognized them and cut the birthday cake and gave each of

them a piece of the birthday cake as the honorees.

I forget who was the oldest Marine but it was one of them who was there, and then, of course, we had the youngest, the humiliated lieutenant that we bring up from Quantico each year who can be the youngest Marine so when they say when he was born the crowd can ooh and ah and the lieutenant can wish that it had been somebody else besides him. But it was a nice gathering, a very nice ball.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were in New Orleans on 14 and 15 November. Was that in time for their Birthday Ball?

GEN MUNDY: No, it was not, regrettably. MajGen Jim Livingston had asked me on an earlier occasion to come down there and I could not because their Ball coincided, the same night as the Washington Ball and, of course, duty kept me here and I would have wanted to be here.

BGEN SIMMONS: At that Birthday Ball, as a part of the celebration it was announced that the Marine Reserve Force was redesignated as Marine Forces Reserve. That seems like a rather small word change. What was the significance of it?

GEN MUNDY: The significance derived from an effort to, as I think I commented earlier it was certainly my intent, and I know that it is carried on with the present leadership in the Corps, to attempt to remove as much as possible the distinction between being a Reserve and a regular Marine. We are Marines. You happen to be assigned to a regiment in Kansas City or you happen to be assigned to a regiment at Camp Pendleton or Lejeune or wherever you are.

Remember that we had achieved componency for the Marine Corps and had designated our two principal commanders Marine Forces Atlantic, Marine Forces Pacific. This was simply a tracking fix to say, Marine Forces Reserve.

BGEN SIMMONS: As the Reserve component.

GEN MUNDY: As the Reserve component.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were embarked on another of your fast-moving trips. On the 16th you went on to Camp Pendleton and Coronado. On the 17th there was a Roles and Missions presentation at RAND Corporation. Would that be in San Diego?

GEN MUNDY: It was in San Jose.

BGEN SIMMONS: That evening you went on to Yuma and after a day at Yuma you went to Asheville, North Carolina. At Asheville on 19 November you spoke to the annual Leadership Meeting of Rotary International and that afternoon went on to Guantanamo. From Guantanamo you returned home on Sunday, 20 November. What were the highlights of this whirlwind trip?

GEN MUNDY: You mentioned the Roles and Missions presentation. That was set up by MajGen Tom Wilkerson who, remember, was the head of our Roles and Missions Commission cell. Gen Wilkerson had thought, and I believe wisely so, that it was good for us to get out to where the influences were in the form of the analysts who contribute so much to the debate, from time to time, of articles or various analyses in situations like the Roles and Missions Commission deliberations.

So, I went up both to the RAND Corporation which was a major study contributor, and I went also to the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. This is where Alan Millet who, of course, is a Marine historian, Professor Alan Millet held out in that location. So, at any rate, this was just an opportunity to get out with people who were beyond the Washington scene but nonetheless were influencers in their analyses and writings and to present the Marine Corps case to them. So I went to give that. That was the primary purpose of that trip and was the purpose in going to RAND.

Yuma, as I recall was a very brief stop, simply once again to check through Yuma and no significant news there. Asheville, North Carolina was, as you have characterized it, a Rotary International regional meeting. They had asked me to come and speak there and I did so. Then Guantanamo was just a means of going down again to check on our Marine forces and the joint effort that was dealing with the handling of the Cubans and the Haitians in Guantanamo.

I am very pleased to say, incidentally, that the battalion commander who was down in Guantanamo, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines at the time, there was more than one battalion, was a lieutenant colonel named Dennis Hejlik. He is a Mustang. He is a very fine officer. And I was just privileged this past week — I serve as a member of the selection committee for the Military Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations each year, and Dennis Hejlik was the Marine Corps nominee and was selected. That has nothing to do with the trip to Guantanamo but it ties together again with a

Marine who was notably effective as a battalion commander in extraordinary circumstances in this very delicate refugee staging and who will now be in New York for a year thinking great thoughts and becoming a strategist after a good foundation as a tactician.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good. On Wednesday, 23 November, you spoke to the students of the National Defense University, an annual event. Anything about this year's visit that stands out in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: No, I think that these last, so to speak, War College presentations were for me very relaxed because I was, after all, on the short end of the tour and so I could afford, I think, to be very candid and very relaxed in presenting my views. Which is to say that I had gotten to the point where I did virtually no preparation for these. I would literally walk on stage with a couple of thoughts in mind, whatever the current events were or the things that I wanted to stress, and would just begin to talk. It would sometimes go 30 minutes and would sometimes go 50 minutes, but I was able then to simply take questions that they wanted to talk about.

It is a very relaxing and enjoyable way to do business and I know that it is a very appreciated way by the audience because they really prefer it when, the worst thing you can do as a senior officer is to come in and read a speech to somebody. So they were good.

This was just an enjoyable period of phasing down and giving your recollections or your most candid perceptions of things that they wanted to talk about.

BGEN SIMMONS: That brings us to Thanksgiving and your wedding anniversary. On Monday, 28 November the —

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday, the 28th of November, the actual date of your anniversary, you went to Orlando. The following day you were the keynote speaker at the Industry Training Systems and Education Conference. Any recollections of those events?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, let me touch lightly on the anniversary and so on first. Linda and I were married on the 28th of November which was Thanksgiving Day but conveniently because, you know, care as we do for each other, the anniversary has never been one of these champagne dinner and diamond tennis bracelet every year events. We tend to oftentimes wake up on our anniversary and say, "Oh, happy anniversary," and that is about the degree of fore-

thought. But we have the opportunity because of that duality of the dates, that whichever comes first, if the 28th comes before Thanksgiving, which it rarely does, but if it happens to be that Thanksgiving comes first and we have forgotten, one or the other or both of us, we are able to say, "Oh, no, we are going to celebrate, you know, whatever the succeeding day is that year." So the anniversary is, when you say I have gone somewhere on my anniversary there probably are future leaders who will say, how dastardly of him to do this, but it is probably because the next Thursday we said, "Okay now, now it is our anniversary because it is Thanksgiving."

The reason for the visit to the Industry Training Systems and Education Conference is that is a Department of Defense event each year that brings together the technology-oriented industries that do training devices for us and the Services. So each year they rotate around and one of the Service Chiefs goes down and opens the conference. So I was the duty Service Chief that year is the reason I had to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 December your calendar shows you meeting with the President on the subject of "readiness." What do you recall of the meeting and who else was there?

GEN MUNDY: This was the SecDef and the Chiefs. It will be recalled that SecDef Perry, SecDef Aspin and SecDef Perry subsequently, had created an advisory group on readiness in an attempt to define some way to measure readiness that was more effective than what we would know today as the SORT or the Status of Readiness and Training Report that comes in which is a rather pro forma report that nobody reads, nobody uses but, you know, it is a means of going back and, as many reports, serves the useful purpose of saying after something has gone wrong, "Oh, well, you did not report it." But, at any rate, there was an effort to try and get a better handle on the readiness.

Now, the other aspect of that was that the Republicans had just gained control of the Congress and they had come in on a platform of defense readiness, too much defense takedown, the defense budget is being cut too much. So the Army happened to, either with good fortune or bad fortune, the Army happened to have at that particular point a report that reported that the majority of the divisions, of the CONUS-based Army divisions were in category C-2 or C-3. That is alright. I mean, for the record that is okay. They probably should be there and if you went out and surveyed the Marine divisions today you would find us at best at C-2 across the board.

But it served the useful political purpose to provide a club with which the Republicans could then pound the Administration, my goodness, you know, and it became media national news here that the Army divisions were falling below C-1 categories of readiness because of the Clinton Administration's defense cuts.

So, as a result we had to shore this up and we went over then to brief the President collectively on readiness. The SecDef, of course, gave an overview. The Chairman gets up and says, "Mr. President, here is how we measure readiness and here are the various levels." And then each of the Service Chiefs were then able to say, "in my case the case of the Marine Corps," you know, "Yes, Mr. President, there are a number of Marine units below levels of readiness but many of them are transitioning into new equipment, or we cycle as we deploy." You know, we come back and we are less ready six months after we get back then we are when we are on the step to go out and so on. So it was that type of informing the President.

Now, also part of that was that the Sec, Sec Perry, to his great credit, had reached an agreement with the Office of, OMB, the Budget Office anyway, had been able to get an agreement that through estimating inflation differently and through a number of other devices that the President would be able to announce that he was going to increase spending on defense by \$25 billion over the five-year program coming up. And, of course, that would serve as a political counter to the Republican charges that he was taking it down too far.

There was sincerity here but there was a degree of smoke and mirrors as well. You know, it is how you do your figuring that you increase. But there was some real increase, too, for pay raises and that sort of thing.

At any rate, we made this presentation to the President and said, "All right, that is it." And at that point the President said, "All right, now, we will go out to the Rose Garden and announce this \$25 billion plus effort." We all, fortunately we all had our ties on and we were dressed properly, but we all looked at each other. We were, I say this with some humor because it was the right thing to do politically, but the Chiefs are not used to being used politically quite as much.

But we were all led out into the Rose Garden. There was the White House Press Corps waiting. Here are marked spots, you know, Gen Mundy here, Gen Shalikashvili, Gen Fogleman, or whomever, there. We all lined up and the President made his announcement that he intended to plus up the defense budget. It was good news and it was a wonderful announcement and so on but, I felt very politicized by

that because, of course, we had many, many good friends in Congress who were and are Republicans, as well as many good Democrat friends, and a Service Chief definitely does not want to get lined up politically.

So we left there with a little bit of concern that we had been set up, certainly not by the President, but we knew that our Republican friends would say to us, "Hey, you cannot, we are trying to do something good and you guys are over in the Rose Garden saying that there is no problem and that \$25 billion is going to solve the problem when you know it is not." Fortunately, that did not come to pass and no one, they understood politics and no one ever hounded the Chiefs for being the props for a political announcement.

BGEN SIMMONS: We discussed the problems of the Toys-for-Tots Program earlier. In December the 1994 campaign got underway under the aegis of a Department of Defense directive governing the type and level of Marine Corps participation and making it more of a community effort rather than solely a Marine Corps effort. Can you discuss these changes a bit?

GEN MUNDY: Well, once again, the Toys-for-Tots Foundation had become a private entity and was separate from the Marine Corps, although because it uses the name Marine and because of the identification with the Marine Corps we clearly as an institution are liable for the good or bad of that effort. But at any rate, LtGen Terry Cooper, I mentioned earlier, had retired and had taken the post as President of Toys-for-Tots Foundation and in his style as of today — I was in Quantico last week and stopped in to see him — as of today — the Toys-for-Tots organization was virtually on the verge of lawsuit, virtually on the verge of excommunication by the Department of Defense, being questioned by the Marine Corps, was operating deeply in the red, was deeply in debt — today has been legitimized within the Department of Defense, has been given special status as an accepted organization of its type entitled to raise money, has a good structure in place, has, in fact, reversed the lawsuit tables and has sued both of the people who have been responsible for bringing the organization down and I think that Terry Cooper told me his operating reserve is up to about \$2.7 million as we speak. That is quite a come back and it certainly attests to the organization but it attests to LtGen Terry Cooper who, just the doggedly determined man that he is, you do not want to ever turn Terry Cooper loose on some-

thing unless you want to get it done.

So, the organization is restored, I think, in image. This past Christmas I noticed that one of the, I think it was U.S. Air, may have been one of the other airlines, a complete two-page color spread in there on a Marine sergeant receiving toys, and advertising for Toys-for-Tots, that we are legitimate. A couple of radio stations and television stations in Washington advertised for Toys-for-Tots, so it has been restored. So, what appeared to be the death knell of the Toys-for-Tots program is now good.

As for the changes that were made, the only thing that we institutionally approved on the, because again it was not a Marine Corps redesign, but what we worked with Gen Cooper on and were able to approve is the fact that the Toys-for-Tots program began as a grass roots program and should fundamentally remain that. That is to say that if the community in Chicago and Marine Corps Reserve structure in Chicago wants to have a Toys-for-Tots effort up there then they should and the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Toys-for-Tots Foundation will support that with appropriate literature, you know, we will provide the guidelines, but that the collection of toys and indeed the collection of funds and so on should be at the local level rather than so much at the national level.

General Cooper still raises money, still goes into charitable contributions, properly administers those funds now to buy toys and to distribute those toys to anywhere, anyone can have access to them, and provides all of the advertising and the literature. So the Toys-for-Tots operates not very unlike what I am coming to know more about, the USO, in which there is a national, USO World or an international structure which oversees the activities in the United States somewhat in the capacity of an inspector general, just ensuring that their activities are consistent with the goals and the standards of the organization and that is somewhat what the Toys-for-Tots Foundation does now at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 2 December you went for a dining-in at Sardi's in New York which I presume was the kick-off of the 1994 Toys-for-Tots campaign. What do you recall of that evening?

GEN MUNDY: It was a splendid evening. I had not met Vince Sardi, Maj Vince Sardi, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve in World War II, still a very devoted Marine.

This event was set up by one of the very best Public Affairs Officers we have in the Marine Corps today. Her name is Maj Roseanne Scignoli. Maj Scignoli, then Capt Scignoli, had taken New York by storm.

She is the Marine Corps public affairs officer in New York, still there and will be there, I think, through this year and then will be transferred. Roseanne, if you run into anyone in New York who has any dealings at all with the military they will tell you that Roseanne Scignoli owns the Big Apple. She can literally open any door that you want open. She is superb.

At any rate, she had convinced, without too much persuasion probably, Vince Sardi to host this, in effect, mess night or dining-in one might call it because there were wives included, at least on the part of some of us, not everybody. June Sardi, his wife, for example, sat with him at the head table. He served as the president of the Mess and Roseanne Scignoli was the vice president of the Mess.

The purpose of all of these well-heeled New Yorkers who came to this event was to be fined so they could contribute to Toys-for-Tots. So we went through this evening of excellent cuisine and tremendous atmosphere with Vince Sardi, who has a tremendous wit, seated at the head table and with Capt Scignoli or other members of the Mess popping up continually, you know, reporting some member for some grievous flaw in the way he tied his necktie or for some other failure. And then Vince Sardi would levy a fine.

And as the evening wore on the fines went from the early \$20 fines, as I recall the first fine of the evening was Capt Scignoli getting up and saying, "Mr. President, I am informed that not all the members of the Marine Corps who are in uniform here tonight are wearing their dogtags which is a Marine Corps regulation." And he said, "Well, this is horrible. I want all members to pull out their dogtags." And of course, here I am without my dogtags. So the first fine levied, on not only me but a half a dozen others there, was \$20 for not wearing your dogtags. I really began to worry about how I had put my medals on or, but anyway, I escaped further fines for the evening.

But, as the evening went on and someone would jump up to report an offense the fine would be \$1,500 or \$700 or \$1,000 and again, all of these well-heeled New Yorkers would throw in their money right in the hat as it would be passed around. I think, if I am not mistaken, that there was somewhere in the neighborhood of \$7,000 or \$8,000 raised at that event, over and above the expenses of the evening for Toys-for-Tots. It has become an annual event now, and Maj Scignoli is still shepherding that and Vince Sardi seems to enjoy it thoroughly and presides every year on the third floor of Sardi's in New York.

BGEN SIMMONS: Sounds like a wonderful event.

The talent to be a public affairs officer is sort of rare. There are only a few of them who have that kind of imagination and drive.

GEN MUNDY: It is, and I would only, you know, again at this particular point I would offer a genuine concern that I have. We will, this year we will retire all of the field grade officers in the public affairs occupation field and that is not good for the Marine Corps. One, we do not have much of a history of promoting. We have a colonel here, a colonel there from time to time. We have never promoted a public affairs officer to general and I do not know whether that is absolutely necessary or not but it probably would serve us well just simply to send a signal that there is a future. Because what happens is that these, the Scignolis of the world, the Fred Pecks of the world, in my day Col Tom Field who I thought was probably the premiere public affairs officer, we groom them. They are able to step out just as did Col Bill Smullen with Colin Powell, to step out from an Army career as a colonel and immediately move into a six-figure double, triple income because of the expertise that they have.

We are losing or at least we are gapping for the moment that talent in the Marine Corps and that is something I think the Corps will have to be concerned about because much as any of us might like to say, "Ah shucks, we can handle the press if they come around," there is a talent to dealing with the press, not so much just when they show up on scene letting some Marines show them what we are doing, but when you get, as I experienced more than once during my tenure, when a public affairs crisis comes, when you are absent that advisor who knows exactly what it will take to either answer the press or to point them off in another direction or to deflect the heat that is coming to bear, you know, infantry officer training just does not instinctively build that ability in you.

Gen Walt Boomer, of course, was not public affairs but he had been a recruiter. He had been a district director which has public affairs in it and then, of course, he served as the Director of Public Affairs and so one could argue that, well, we had a public affairs-oriented general and we did in Walt Boomer, probably more than any other. But that is something that I think the Corps is going to have to be very concerned about in the future.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that same day, 2 December, you had gone to Norfolk for a change of command on board the USS *Wasp*. What do you recall of that event?

GEN MUNDY: The *Wasp*, I had, remember, visited on a couple of occasions, when she had been deployed and the most recent one to that was when she was deployed in the Caribbean and served as the platform from which the 2d Marine Regiment in the form of a Marine Expeditionary Unit landed at Cap Haitien in Haiti as part of the operations there.

The CO on that ship was a very fine captain, is now an admiral, a rear admiral, and I wish I could think of his name. His nickname was Chutes, Chaplin, Captain Chutes Chaplin. He had, actually the *Wasp*, ordinarily in the hangar bay of an aircraft carrier of any sort there are painted on the bulkhead of the hangar bay usually the squadron insignia or the ship's insignia or something like that. He had seen fit to have not only the ship's insignia but also the Marine emblem placed in there — not on particular view, but the Marine emblem — and then had put across the bottom of these two, you know, emblems of the ships and the Marines, had put "Always Faithful."

So it was one of those types of relationships with a ship which truly is a part of a gator Navy and which truly values its values with the Marine Corps. That, of course, exists in more cases than not but occasionally it does not exist and there is great friction between the blue and the green team on some of the ships.

So, I thought he was extraordinary. The *Wasp* was extraordinary as a ship. She had, in effect, seen action with the Marines most recently. He invited me down to be his change of command guest speaker. So that was the purpose of my going and it was a superb event. I was honored to be there.

I always enjoyed those Navy types of ceremonies because the Navy, you know, I probably will be characterized as one who loved all the trappings of swords and medals and that sort of thing and I do. If I am characterized that way, yes, I do. But, the Navy was always awed when a Marine in full dress would come aboard. You know, you could read in their eyes, and this went back to my days as a lieutenant aboard ship with, you know, quarters for entering forward or standing or inspections by the admiral and watching the admiring eyes of the sailors looking over at the Marine detachment in their, you know, the magnificence of the blue uniform all bedecked with medals and swords and the white gear and that sort of thing. So I thoroughly enjoyed that plus being involved in the, the honor of being asked to preside at one's change of command.

BGEN SIMMONS: We are now getting into the Christmas season with many social events. More sig-

nificant, perhaps, was a trip you and Mrs. Mundy made to South America from 11 to 18 December. What countries did you visit and what were the highlights of the trip?

GEN MUNDY: First, it was only me. Linda did not go along on this trip primarily because it was close to Christmas and she has always had a, you know, Christmas is a big deal in our family and in our household and so she wanted to be here for that period. So I went with an aide and with Col Flynn, Col Jim Flynn went along because he was the military secretary. He had had a tour in the Southern Command and so he was familiar.

But at any rate, we went principally to Chile and Argentina, two of the significant Marine Corps in South America. I do not mean to say that there are insignificant ones but some of them are more professional than others.

I wanted to stop in Brazil. That was not possible due to a conflict that the Brazilian Commandant had at that particular time. We did spend the night in Brazil but only because of the lengthy distance in going to South America.

The first impression that is made on a North American who is used to traveling laterally is that, we are used to flying to Europe, we are used to flying maybe to the Orient and we think of those as long trips. Flying south is just as far when you go down to Santiago, Chile or to Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is a long flying trip. So, that was the first learning lesson for one who had only, who thought of South America as I think many Americans do, and that is of some combination between Mexico and Nicaragua and Costa Rica and maybe Panama. We think of really the Latin American side as opposed to recognizing that in South America itself, down south, that the latitudes are the same. Santiago, Chile could be mistaken on any day of the week, I think, for Sacramento, California; same terrain, same climate, same vegetation, very much alike.

I went to Argentina to visit the Argentine Marine Corps, one of the standard visits by any Commandant, reciprocal visit, if you will, and I went to Chile and that was, indeed, a reciprocal visit because the Commandant of that Marine Corps had been here to visit on my watch. The incumbent Commandant in Argentina has not been to the United States and I am sure that Gen Krulak will have him up.

I wish I had gone earlier. Indeed, I had sought to go earlier and it just did not work out because to go somewhere in your last six months, unless it is just a farewell visit to some place you had visited before,

really does not serve the useful purpose of establishing a relationship that will, you know, will see itself fulfilled in increased training opportunities or security assistance of some sort to help that Marine Corps out. So I was on the short tour. But it was important for the Commandant to go.

I thoroughly enjoyed the visits. I came to know the two countries, albeit briefly because it was about two and a half days in each one. You do not really get to know the country in that time, but I came to admire particularly the Chilean Marine Corps, one of the most professional organizations I have seen, very impressive. I had the feeling that I would want to fight alongside the Chilean Marines.

And, of course, even though we can go back to the Falklands War between the British and the Argentines, as they would say, it will be remembered that the Marines in that conflict comported themselves very well. They were very worthy adversaries, attributed by the British Royal Marines who fought against them, and they surrendered in good style, not in panic. They marched out and surrendered in style of the Marine battalion. So it is a good organization.

That was the purpose of the trip and, as I said, I wished that we could have stopped and visited in Brazil. That would have been a further important stop. We spent the night in Morales, Brazil on the way back. You know, bought a couple of trinkets and got back on the airplane and flew some more the next day.

I recommended to Gen Krulak, and I believe that he intends to follow through with it, that he would make those contacts and make those visits early in his tenure so that we might achieve the improved linkages between the Corps that an earlier visit might afford.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Secretary of Defense, and that would still be Les Aspin, would it not?

GEN MUNDY: No, this was Perry at this particular time.

BGEN SIMMONS: Perry, okay, visited Camp Lejeune on 20 December. What was the purpose of his visit?

GEN MUNDY: Sec Perry, I thought in one of the more positive things that he did, of which there were many, but he came in and, as I mentioned earlier, established as a routine, regular meetings with the Chiefs so that we saw a great deal of the SecDef. But he also invited up for lunch and established regular

meetings with the senior enlisted advisors, i.e., the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and the Army, the Master Chief of the Navy, the Master Chief of the Coast Guard, usually, and the Master Chief of the Air Force.

So he then conveyed to them that he would like to visit major service installations with them, instead of being accompanied by generals and admirals he would go with the senior enlisted. So they, the four of them, ordinarily just the U.S. Defense Armed Services, would get together. It would be arranged by, in our case by SgtMaj Overstreet and the SecDef and the four of them would go flying off and would spend the day at some installation somewhere.

Overstreet being the troop leader that he was, being the enthusiastic firebrand that he was, had set up the visit of all visits. It was the mother of all visits, I guess. When we talked about it I said, "SgtMaj, I will phone down for you and I will tell the general, MajGen Jim Jones at that time, to come over appropriately, greet the SecDef, salute him and then get in his car and leave; do this with corporals and sergeants."

So, Overstreet had the visit set up and it was perfect. They rode the SecDef in one of the river assault craft, let him drive it. Of course he liked that, got water all over him, got water all over everybody there. Put him in an assault amphibian vehicle, you know, rode him around in light armored vehicles. Took him out to the beach and had him just mix it up with the troops.

But every briefing that was given, every demonstration that was put on was done essentially by a corporal, maybe a sergeant, and it went over like gangbusters. SecDef Perry just thought that was wonderful. So all of the other Service senior enlisted advisors, Overstreet was so proud because they were all wringing their hands trying to figure how do you top this? And to my knowledge, they never did. But that was the purpose of SecDef Perry's visit.

BGEN SIMMONS: You followed in trace of SecDef on 21 and 22 December to Camp Pendleton, excuse me, Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point. What were the purposes of these visits?

GEN MUNDY: The purpose of going to Camp Lejeune was I had been given the Non-Commissioned Officer Association award for this particular year and went down there to receive it. They did that at a large gathering in Marston Pavilion. The way the NCOA works is to — SgtMaj Dave Sommers, for example, is on the staff of the NCOA — they will gather at a par-

ticular post and hold their, in effect, their meeting there, in this case Marine post, the Commandant receiving the award, but the attendees at the event were principally the, you know, noncommissioned officer staff, staff NCOs and NCOs that were there at Camp Lejeune. So I think there were probably 300, 400, maybe 500 people there and it was a social hour, you know, a beer and a soda and receive the award and make a few remarks and that was it.

The visit to Cherry Point, to be very frank with you I cannot remember the purpose for the visit to Cherry Point, but I am sure it was, again, either to present an award or to, just a pro forma stop-by, and I am in the area, how is it going type of stop.

BGEN SIMMONS: For the record, we ended calendar year 1994 with a total strength for the U.S. Armed Forces of 1,584,232 of whom 174,507 were Marines. Do you have anything else you would like to add?

GEN MUNDY: No, I think not. This, again this was the final year. Things were at that point going pretty well for the Corps in many respects. We had been operationally successful. We had been programmatically, fiscally, it was kind of a high time for me. So, I have nothing more to add.

BGEN SIMMONS: This would seem to be a good place to end this session.

SESSION 27

First Six Months of 1995

A last New Year in the Commandant's House . . . Bottom-Up Review Update . . . Final withdrawal from Somalia . . . The 50th anniversary of Iwo Jima . . . The annual round of budget hearings . . . A great day on Iwo Jima . . . Honored at a joint session of the Alabama legislature . . . More travels . . . Commissioning of the Russell . . . A parade for Gen Sullivan . . . The Scott O'Grady rescue . . . A round of farewell visits . . . Stepping down.

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered the events of the second six months of 1994. We are now in the home stretch. In this session we will go through your activities during your last six months as Commandant. Several sessions will follow this but they will be of a reflective rather than sequential nature.

The 1st of January 1995 was a Sunday. You had been on Christmas leave. I presume you observed the New Year with the traditional concert and reception at the Commandant's House?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that is correct. Of course, New Year's comes around about every seven years or so on a Sunday. We had weighed whether to have the reception on a different day, maybe doing it on Saturday or maybe doing it on the 2nd, the Monday, because of the Sabbath, if you will. And I decided no, we would go ahead and do it on the Sunday.

We did so, and the only modification to the traditional ceremony which is — I say traditional, at least has become tradition in recent years — is the reception and then about an hour or hour and a half into the reception the band is formed out in the back and the guests go out and listen to the band as it renders about three numbers, always ending with "Bless this House," or not ending — it ends with the "Marines Hymn" obviously — but "Bless this House" is one of the things they play. So I asked Chaplain Larry Ellis who was the Chaplain of the Marine Corps and a superb, really a superb one, I asked Larry, just because it was Sunday and because we were there generally at noon and therefore causing people to lay out of church as it were, to just give us a little brief sermon, if you will, or a few remarks, and he did that superbly.

So it was just about a ten-minute talk by him and then we had a short prayer at the end. I imagine, I would be surprised if that has not become now the

standard because it was so popular. I got more responses back from so many people that said, "We have been there a dozen times and never have we tied this in with the Chaplain." So I happened to just fall into that one. Had it not been a Sunday I would have gone on.

But anyway, it was a very, very nice one and as it turned out, as indeed my entire last six months turned out, right up to the evening of the retirement the Lord sure said, "Let's not rain on this man or any of his activities at all." It was a beautiful day. It was warm outside. It was comfortable to be outside. And it was just delightful.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see that a Mark Levinson, a clothier, paid an office call on you the morning of Wednesday, 4 January. Were you beginning to build your retirement wardrobe?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I was. I inquired of a friend of mine one day, that is a nice looking suit you have on, where do you get your clothes? He said, "I have a tailor. I will send him to see you."

So Mark was sent to see me. I did buy a couple of suits from him. If I did not become infatuated with him why Gen Rich Hearney, we also hooked him up with Rich and every time I see Rich he is in a new suit so I think he has really made it worthwhile. We even sent Mark over to see the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John White, one day as he was just moving into the area. And I said, "Where do you get your clothes?" And he said, "I have to get some, I have to get a tailor." So we sent Mark over there. Mark also does Sonny Jurgenson right down the street from me here. So the answer is yes, I was beginning to build a civilian wardrobe.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the afternoon of 5 January your desk calendar shows you joining a briefing being

given the SecDef, DepSecDef and Service Chiefs. The acronym is MRS-BURU. What does that stand for?

GEN MUNDY: Well it stands for something that I was talking about earlier that the Marine Corps had considerable concern over and that is the Joint Staff Mobility Requirements Study and the reason for the BURU is the Bottom-Up Review Update. That was the definition.

Now what that means is that the Mobility Requirements Study had been done by the Marine Corps, indeed, about the time that I became the Commandant. It derived from our experiences in Desert Storm and Desert Shield, and what it had concluded was, among other things, as I mentioned in the previous session, the need for afloat pre-positioning ships — not a bad conclusion — it concluded that we needed to enhance sealift — a very good conclusion — and also that we needed to enhance airlift. The study, however, had been driven programmatically — the people who were involved in the study would deny this to their dying day, but the fact is the Marine Corps watched it evolve that way — it was driven programmatically as a support to enable us to justify the C-17, and to justify the afloat pre-positioning for the Army.

All of those are good things, however, collectively, in a declining defense budget, all of them simply were not affordable. Moreover, the study had chosen to ignore either amphibious ships or to ignore the maritime pre-positioning ships that we had out there. In other words we concluded, the study concluded that we needed the ability to rush the equipment and personnel to these crisis spots around the world. Indeed we did, but it did not attribute accurately the capability that was then resident in these 13 maritime pre-position ships that were already out there and that could be responded to immediately.

So we had found flaw with the way in which the study had been done, with the conclusions, the analysis, and the Marine Corps had consistently non-concurred in that study. But, as such things happen, thank you very much for your non-concurrence and life goes on.

We had reached a point at which I finally non-concurred in the Bottom-Up Review personally and went into “the tank” to discuss it with the other Chiefs and with the Chairman. That is one of those very — I hate to say it because I believe that most people would believe that the Chiefs come together and whatever your image is of a general pounding his fist on the table, but it is not; it is a very gentlemanly association

— and so that is one of those moments when one Chief is outside the loop and everybody else is in.

Because the Air Force had a vested interest in the C-17, the Army, trying mightily to become expeditionary and to become relevant to the new world order and to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, was having to look for ways to do that and they thought pre-positioning was one of those ways. And the Navy, of course, had been so badly beaten up consistently by the Congress because of its perceived failure, at least accounted to the Navy, not to support the sealift, construction of adequate sealift ships, the Congress had almost jammed this one down the Navy’s throat, and again, I might add, to the good of the nation in the long term.

So the Navy was sensitive. The Air Force had a vested interest in the C-17 and the Army had the afloat pre-positioning and the Marine Corps was the only outfit complaining about the study. So at any rate, I took that into the Chiefs. We discussed it. We generally agreed to disagree with the Chairman saying, “Okay, we have heard your opinions but we have to go through the Secretary” and so away we went.

Vindication came as we sat in the Secretary’s conference room. SecDef Perry, after we had gone through these scenarios in which we had a scenario, for example, with an invasion of Korea and how the United States would respond — this is the way we do force building and strategic mobility building — what would we respond with in this scenario and, of course, we would respond with the afloat pre-positioning and we would fly C-17s in and we would do all of these sorts of things that then justifies the allocation of resources and the acquisition, SecDef Perry’s first question during the briefing, after we got through this, was, where are the Marines in this scenario?

And the briefer, I thought, stumbled through an answer, not a very good one. In fact, an embarrassing one, frankly. What he said in effect was, “I am not sure.” And I said, “Well, Mr. Secretary, the Marines would play. We are in afloat, in this scenario we are using Marines in an amphibious response after the major holding forces are introduced. Then the Marines, as did MacArthur at Inchon, can be used for envelopments or for other deployment,” and so he accepted that.

We went on with the briefing and at the end, as though I had slipped him a piece of paper, which I had not, as though I had, Sec Bill Perry asked every question that I had brought up in the meeting with the Chiefs, saying “I am really not certain about this study, I really have some misgivings,” and right down the line.

My Service counterparts kept shifting their eyes toward me during the briefing and I kept looking at the ceiling. What I was really saying was "Thank you, Lord," but they presumed that this was one of the biggest sandbaggings they had ever had where I had obviously gotten to the SecDef ahead of them. That was not at all the case but it added a little bit of humor. And when I was able to come back to the Marine staff and debrief to them that their concerns had been heard and aired by the SecDef or that one of them had very artfully slipped a piece of paper in up there — you know, that is laughable, we did not do that — but the point is that SecDef Perry saw the same holes in the study that the Marine staff had seen and I felt very good about that. I walked out, walked down the hall with the Chairman and said, "Shali, I swear that I did not sandbag this for you but I hope you can understand now that the concerns that I have told you about the study, SecDef Perry is a very intelligent man and he saw the same holes that we did."

And life went on, and so what are we doing, we are buying the afloat pre-positioning, buying the C-17 and buying sealift. And, as I said, that will ultimately be good for the nation but it is a terrible shame that at the expense of providing something that it is questionable whether we are going to use it under the circumstances that the Mobility Requirement Study forecast or not, that we will have invested so much of the nation's treasure at a time when we could have, you know, we offered an alternative whereby enhancing the maritime pre-positioning squadrons by one ship each.

That is to say, buying three new ships instead of 19 new ships and enhancing the pre-positioning aboard those ships that we could pretty well answer the call to where we might have to go, and invest our money in strategic sealift vice just the pre-positioning up front. That is one that when someone reads this in a few years they will be able to write an article and say, you know, "He was all fouled up because look how it has worked out."

. But what I am saying is that the choices that are made in the allocation of defense resources are not always the same choices that you as a prudent investor would make. You might ultimately buy all of those things but the sequence in which we do business and the priorities that we give were one that even in this case the SecDef questioned.

. He, like the rest of us, however, had to deal with the situation that, you know, the White House is committed to the C-17, should be, good reason, so we are going ahead with the C-17. The Army was already started on the afloat pre-positioning, nothing to do to

slow that train down. So the nation invests its resources in at least one direction, arguably for me the pre-positioning, that we could have done an awful lot for defense at this time and still come back five years hence, ten years hence or whatever it is and pre-position afloat if we still needed to do that. And I question, very frankly, whether ten years hence we really will need to do that, but we will already have it.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is a very persuasive argument. On Friday evening, the 6th of January, you and Mrs. Mundy left for a weekend at Camp Lejeune. Was there anything special about this weekend?

GEN MUNDY: Well, we were down there for an event at Camp Lejeune. Again, I would be hard pressed to remember the circumstances of it. However, we elected, because we were going to be there on Friday we then elected to stay over and on Saturday we went out to Emerald Isle and arranged to sell our beach house which we needed to do in order to move the money around to be able to buy the house that you and I are in here today.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were back in time for an early breakfast on Monday, 9 January, in the Pentagon with Adm Macke, the CinCPac. The rest of the day was filled with a CinCs', Commanders-in-Chief Conference at the Center for Naval Analysis. Was this meeting just for the Navy CinCs?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it was. There actually is a little bit of confusion in that when the, remember that we still have Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleets and as a result the CNO will host what is called the CinCs' Conference. More recently I think that Adm Boorda has taken to calling it the CNO Executive Board, I believe is the way he does that, but it was called the CinCs' Conference. So these were the Navy CinCs. However, when you get the Navy CinCs you also the Navy CinC CinCs, you get the unified commanders. In other words, all the Navy four-stars come in for what used to be called the CinCs' Conference.

. Adm Macke was then the CinCPac. He came in to talk to me about the, again I can go into great, you know, wanderings, I guess, on the actions of the Joint Staff. This is not really a specific one attributable to the Joint Staff but at the previous Unified Commanders and JCS Conference one of the things that had been discussed was the allocation of forces to respond to the two major regional contingency MRC strategy of the Clinton Administration. Not a bad

strategy although there are a dozen people I am around today — perhaps you — that would want to bring this up and contest it and challenge it.

But those who do so really I think fail to understand that in effect what that amounts to is the United States' ability to face a crisis or a conflict and still have a reserve, still have the ability to go somewhere else and do something. If you stop and think about it, the refugee situation in the Caribbean for a fairly long period of time was, in effect, a major contingency. It was certainly a major political contingency and it was a major consumption of U.S. forces, not by the hundreds of thousands but by the thousands with tremendous logistic support to keep that operation going and with an enormous focus of the command and control structure of the military hierarchy, i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SecDef with their vision focused in the Caribbean at a given time. We as a nation have to have the ability to do that and at the same time perhaps go and fight somewhere very credibly. So we do need the ability to do two contingencies simultaneously.

Well, political as that became, the fact is that what the Joint Staff began to delve into, what the CinCs began to, in my subsequent judgement, mess around in, was the precise identification of forces that would fight in those two major regional contingencies. That is to say, that what Gen Luck in Korea and Gen Macke in the Pacific Command and Gen Peay in the Central Command, those three, generally, you know, being in the same contiguous areas, what they were, or at least their staffs, were toying with was the idea that look, you get the 101st, I will take the Big Red 1. You get the Marines, I will not have any Marines. Or, I will take a MEU, you can have the rest of the Marines. In other words, kind of dividing up the allocation of forces.

Now to an analyst this makes a lot of sense. To one who has practically been involved with the deployment of forces and with the employment of forces, we realize that it never works that way. We never want to have a Marine force, for example, in particular that would only be oriented towards one type of contingency. Otherwise we would buy all cold weather gear, we would train only in Arctic conditions. But we know from history we are not going to the Arctic, we are going to the tropics instead and we would then wind up with forces that were not trained or duly equipped for the mission that they might have to perform as a contingency. So once again the Marine Corps found itself outside the loop here opposing this tendency in the joint world to try and fence forces for specific contingencies. So what Adm Macke and I

were meeting about that morning was for him to lay out for me his thesis that what he wanted to do was to capture all of the amphibious ships for use in the Pacific, not really a bad strategy, all things considered, for the most part, and then to allocate only Marines that would arrive by the maritime pre-positioning ships for a Central Command contingency.

Simplistically, this makes sense. Central Command is going to be a land theater. Yes, the MPS would do that well. Korea would give you maneuverability and mobility for an amphibious force elsewhere in the Pacific. So simplistically, it makes a lot of sense. But practically, it just does not work that way, and secondarily, we would want CinCCent to be able to have a call, depending on how his crisis might shape up he might want to have amphibious forces there.

So the Marine Corps did not want to see plans drawn up that would specifically isolate the amphibians only to a Pacific contingency, not to a Central Command and vice versa. So I tried to lay out my counter logic on this to Adm Macke but once again we have a tendency increasingly I think in our war planning to want to "bean count," as the term was used; you get so many of these and then you get so many of these. And again, if we could rely that all of them were going to fly on a given day, which we cannot, or that the mobility is going to work like the scenario, which it is not, or that the scenario is going to unfold like we guessed it, which it is not, it might be an easy way to do business.

A second part of that, and not to dwell forever on this, is that my other concern was from a parochial context, and I would have been equally concerned were I the Navy or anybody else. If you allocate, if you say we have these forces to respond to a crisis in Korea, in the very near future in my judgement, when the Koreans unify and we no longer have the Korean contingency to contend with, were I a Congressman I would say fine, the 101st Air Assault, the Big Red 1, the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, six carrier battle groups and half the amphibious fleet are hereby done away with because we only have one place in the world we've got to focus, Southwest Asia, and there weren't many Marines there and the 101st did not have a part there. That is a very, you know, that is a very dangerous step to take.

So this gets into a longer term final, I guess, debate, final Marine Corps non-concurrence that occurred later on in my tenure during the six months in a confrontation with the Joint Staff, and with the Chairman and I discussing one-on-one the way to go about this. But that was the genesis, the meeting with Adm

Macke was the genesis for that particular concern.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 10 January the Pentagon announced that 2,600 U.S. Marines would be deployed to Somalia for Operation United Shield to assist in covering the final withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping troops from Somalia. The United Nations Security Council set 31 March as the deadline for the departure of all of its forces from Somalia.

We beat the deadline considerably. On 1 March, 1,800 U.S. Marines and 350 Italian Marines landed to cover the withdrawal of some 2,500 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The withdrawal took just 73 hours. What are your recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: The recollections are very positive because it was an operation that was executed flawlessly. Because it was executed flawlessly, because it was not a Desert One or because we did not bomb the wrong building or because something did not go terribly wrong, we did not get much press coverage of it. This is — if this comes across as a slap at the press that is exactly what it is — if we had fouled it up you better bet that it would have been on every station in America that night, but because we did well it did not really make a lot of news.

This was, the nice part about this from the standpoint of philosophy is that the only way that we could return to the sea, from whence we had come into Somalia, from the sea, was with the use of an amphibious force. We knew, I am speaking as a member of the Joint Chiefs now, the Chiefs had grave concern about flying a massive lift into Mogadishu, which would be the only airport that we could get out of, because of the threat of one heat-seeking missile taking out one troop-lift plane or taking out, you know, we lost 18 American servicemen over there and America said, we want out of there now. Had we tried to get out of there, and we would not have been stopped from getting out of there, but had the warring factions just for sport been able to take down a C-5 or been able to take down a 747 full of troops or something like that, we would have had hell to pay. Nor did we want to take that risk regardless of whether we would have had hell to pay or not.

So the only way that we could retrograde that force from Mogadishu was with an amphibious operation and that was a nice thing for the nation to come to realize, our defense makers. LtGen Tony Zinni was the commander of the combined task force, combined because it had other national elements in it. Tony knew the area, had been there as part, with I MEF as

part of the original intervention force, and he made a superb commander.

We added an amphibious ship, gave him another big deck, put in some more helicopters and some additional Marines and we were able to pull this off extremely well. The assault amphibian vehicles, after they had gone in, established a defensive perimeter, retrograded the Pakistanis, retrograded the Italian forces, as you mentioned Italian Marines were involved in this, but retrograded all of our United Nations forces back into waiting shipping, either at the pier or offshore. The Marines then backed literally into the water.

So as the assault amphibian vehicles went back into the surf taking out Gen Zinni and the last of the Marines, their turrets were swung aft and they were actually firing. So it was that, it was a hot withdrawal from people that were, you know, had advanced down to the shoreline and were shooting at them as they withdrew. Not a casualty, not a single personnel injury. Again, one of the splendid, but not heralded because it went so well, events.

BGEN SIMMONS: It had been 27 months since the Marines had first landed in Somalia in December, 1992. The total cost of our intervention had been some \$2 billion. Do you think it was worth it? What was accomplished?

GEN MUNDY: It depends on how you would measure the number of lives that were saved because they did not starve to death. The tendency is to measure the success in did we somehow or other take care of all the "technicals," did we end the friction between the warring factions, did we win militarily? The answer to all of those questions is "No, we did not." But that was not the mission with which either U.S. forces or ultimately United Nations forces were introduced into this particular operation.

Our mission was to create an environment in which the 300 or more people a day that were starving to death in Somalia could be fed, in which relief supplies could get through and they could be medically treated and we would begin to save the lives of starving people. That was done. And today if you went to Somalia, if you can get out of Mogadishu and go out to the Baidoas or the Bale Doglesor the other towns outside of the capital city where the Marines and the other forces went out there and set up that stability, you will find crops growing harvest. You will find livestock again growing. You will find commerce going on.

So did we settle the political difficulties in

Somalia? “No, we did not.” Did we get rid of all of the bad guys? “No, we did not.” Did we get rid of some of them? “Yes, we did.” Did it cost us some American lives? “Yes, it did.” Two billion dollars, a lot of money? In the magnitude of things I would say, “Yes, that is worth saving a lot of lives.” And so I would think that we would have to charge it up as a success in achieving what it was intended to do rather than in what we might through, as the term is used, “mission creep” what maybe after the fact America, or more specifically the Secretary General of the United Nations, wanted us to do and that was to get rid of Mr. Aidid and in general neutralize the country so that a government could take form. We were not successful in that.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 11 January you went to Carlisle Barracks to speak to the Army War College. Any special recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Again, a very nice end-of-tour War College event.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your desk calendar entry for 12 January shows that you were interviewed by an Adm Lawrence. I will guess that this was VAdm Bill Lawrence and the subject was the Marine Corps vis-a-vis the Naval Academy. Am I right?

GEN MUNDY: You are correct in that it was Adm Bill Lawrence and he was accompanied by an author who was doing a piece on leadership. So it had nothing to do with the Naval Academy but rather Lawrence had more or less facilitated this researcher’s entry.

We talked about leadership styles, leadership processes and that sort of thing. I have not seen any product from that so whether or not the fellow ever wrote a book or whether there was any product that came as a result of that, I really cannot say, but that was what it was about. Though Adm Lawrence and I had on more than one occasion met to talk about the Naval Academy, this was not one of them.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 13 January, you went to Atlanta for the 80th birthday of Gen Ray Davis. What are your recollections of that affair?

GEN MUNDY: It was a grand affair. The Marine Corps Council of Atlanta which is that collection of the various organizations of the Corps, Marine Corps League, the Division Associations or whatever organization might be affiliated with the Marine Corps,

came together and wanted to number 1, recognize Gen Davis’ 80th birthday, and, number 2, to present him an award that is entitled the Joe Laboon Award. This is an award given by the family of Col Joseph Laboon, USMCR(Ret).

Joe Laboon was a prominent Atlanta resident, native or resident, and had been very active, among other things, in Toys for Tots in the early days of that and was a recognized civic leader. He died real prematurely, I believe of a heart attack, and his family came up with a Laboon Award which they gave for outstanding service and leadership. Gen Davis was the recipient of that that year so they asked me, they asked me to come down and present that award as well as recognize his 80th birthday.

So we had a grand occasion for one of the truly great Marines of history, Ray Davis. His entire family was there, his granddaughters and grandchildren, Knox Davis, his wife. So it was a nice event.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 17 January SecDef Perry spoke to the Department of the Navy leadership and the next day SecNav Dalton held an off-site meeting. Do you recall what this was all about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, SecNav Dalton and the Undersecretary, Richard Danzig, had throughout their tenure attempted to hold off-sites. As Washington goes, in many cases those things are carefully planned but they fall apart at the last minute. So this was, if you will, a routine off-site, a chance for the leadership in the Department of the Navy to get off, to get out of the Pentagon and out of the ringing of telephones and the distractions there and just have a day to sit down and either focus on an issue or just to focus on something of interest.

On this particular day, of interest — we held this out, the off-site out at the Naval Observatory — among the other issues or items that we were educated on or that we discussed had to do with the organization of the Department of the Navy, the relationship, for example, of the Navy and the Marine Corps. How the Navy staff had been formed and what its construction was, the Marine staff, the relationship of the CNO and the Commandant, the relationship of the Secretary to both of these staffs, was historically discussed.

The reason for that was that the Roles and Missions Commission, then in session, was known to be going to, as one of its recommendations, suggest that a greater integration of the Service staffs and the Secretarial staffs could both result in economies, perhaps, but would somehow in their perception, you

know, result in a more effective or probably more efficient and hopefully also effective operation. So it was very useful to sit down and kind of say, you know, where did we come from?

As part of that the SecNav brought in Adm Stan Arthur who was at that time getting ready to stand down from active service and Gen Walt Boomer, now the president of Babcock Wilcox, a major U.S. corporation. They had been naval companions in the Gulf War, both of them three-stars at the time, and so they were brought in to give their views on how the Navy and the Marine Corps might work best together, the difficulties that they had had, which were not many, and just to say this is kind of how it works at the operational level with the previous briefing saying this is how it has been at the organizational level.

I do not know where that has gone. It was a nice thing to review but, of course, as a Marine, as you went through this history of the evolution of the naval staffs, Secretariat, OPNAV staff and Marine staff, there was a period in which, of course, the Marines were a distinct subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. And all of the Navy staff who were there that day, the CNO and all, obviously favored that relationship very much, and they had known that many of the problems in the Department — in a humorous sense — many of the problems in the Department could probably be solved if we would just make the Commandant a three-star and subordinate him right down and we could really get on with business.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 19th of January you went to Columbus, Ohio to speak at seminar at the Merston Center. I think this is the same meeting that we discussed a bit earlier under Professor Col Alan Millett's sponsorship.

GEN MUNDY: That is right, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 January you opened officially the Marine Corps' exhibit, "The Final Campaigns: Spring and Summer 1945," in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes. This was part of our observance of the 50th anniversary of World War II. I hope that you recall this event.

GEN MUNDY: I do recall the event and if I presented you with any award or anything would you please inject it right quick.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think you gave me a warm handshake.

GEN MUNDY: It was a nice event. As I recall we had some of the World War II veterans that had come over among other places from the Soldier's Home in Washington. They were on scene. So for them it was an outing. It was in the Pentagon and they were the heroes. So it was one of those things that, again, just makes you feel good.

As always, the exhibits by the Marine Corps Historical Division and by the Marine Corps Museum are splendid and that was another one of these, as I recall the second one that we have had at that location in the Pentagon during the 50th anniversary commemoration; a nice event.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday evening, 24 January, you attended another State of the Union Address by President Clinton. Anything unusual about that evening?

GEN MUNDY: Well, if it was unusual it was unusual in that I think it was the longest State of the Union Address that anybody could remember, at least in recent history. It was about 80 minutes long and it probably was a good address but it was just one of those in which to sit there and endure through an 80 minute speech with all of the beforehand applause and the handshaking and so on, it was a rather, in that sense, trying experience. And I think that that is what drew the greatest comment from the press and everybody else, was the longevity of this particular State of the Union message rather than its content.

But again, it is always a privilege. I mentioned earlier that I had been somewhat amused from time to time by the pecking order that the Chiefs will attach to themselves and I had always had a little bit of fun in exempting myself from that and saying "No, I will sit on the end." You know, none of them could understand that.

But this year, indeed this was my last year and so I fell into the, "Wait a minute, I am the second senior member of the Joint Chiefs and therefore I am right up front there," which is a nice place because that way when occasionally they pass by the Chiefs — many Marines will express concern if they do not see the Commandant. Where was the Commandant? We did not see him. The year that I moved Adm Bill Kime, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, up because it was his last year and then I sat over on the edge I even got letters that said, "Did the President prevent you, did the President not want you at the State of the Union because of your opposition to gays and homosexuals," or something that had no relevance at all. So it is nice to be seen because it is good for the

Corps, I think, to see their leader there.

So I was sitting there and I tried to smile a lot and look pleasant and applaud when it was time to applaud —

BGEN SIMMONS: When it was appropriate to applaud. Getting back to something you said earlier about being a backdrop for a political event, I take it the Joint Chiefs have to make judgements as to when it is appropriate to applaud and when it is not just like the Supreme Court Justices do. You can applaud if it is for the nation and for patriotism but if it is political then you just sit —

GEN MUNDY: If it, even though I would be among the first to be a strong advocate for prayer in schools, but if the President gets up and says, I am for prayer in schools, that is not something that the Chiefs would applaud because of the, you know, there are opposing views there and technically we are supposed to be apolitical and that is a political issue.

But I think I remarked earlier that my first time there as we were waiting back in the holding room, usually the Chiefs are assembled back in the holding room and then usually, John Murtha, Congressman John Murtha used to always walk in and sit around with us because it was kind of a comfortable place and we would bat the breeze back and forth, then they would take you in and we would be on the floor and then we would greet members of Congress while we were out there, but I walked up to Colin Powell there and said, “What do we do about applause?”

And he said, he gave me the same thing, you know, “if it is America is great, why, get up with tears in your eyes and applaud. If it is the defense is strong, I believe in the Armed Forces, we have the best people in the world in the Armed Forces or something like that, of course you would applaud.” But, he said, “Watch the political issues.” He said, “the best thing to do is just watch me.”

So all of us watched Colin. And after that particular session was over I think it was Sam, my oldest son, who said to me, “Hey, Dad, we were watching you on television” and he said, “You know, you guys really, you really look like you are solemn. Everybody would be on their feet applauding and you all would just be sitting there. What was wrong?” So I explained this to him.

And the other thing that he noticed, he said, I noticed that anytime Gen Powell would start to applaud that then the Vice Chairman and then the next, and it would kind of echelon down until we were all applauding. And indeed, we did that. It became

rather, it became rather a light-hearted subject among the Chiefs but as a practical matter the Chairman is, and particularly in Gen Powell’s case he was very clearly aware of what was political or what was non political. So if Colin applauded we all applauded; if he did not, we did not.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Saturday evening, 28 January, you attended the annual Alfalfa Club dinner. Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow were also there. We have talked about the Alfalfa Club in some —

GEN MUNDY: And the unusual aspect of this particular one was only that Gen Wilson called me beforehand and said that they would be in the hotel there. He said, can you come up and maybe we can get together for a drink maybe an hour and a half before the event and then you can change clothes in my room if you want and not wear your evening dress, which I eventually did.

So I did. I went up and met with Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow just for an update. But the real update, of course, was we were coming into the year of the selection of the 31st Commandant. And so they, I think that that was the primary focus, was their discussion with me on how are things going? How is it shaping up? Who do you think are going to be the contenders and so on?

And I told them what I knew and we had a pleasant few minutes together. And then we suited up and disappeared down into the morass of people that is the absolutely wonderful affair that is the Alfalfa dinner each year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Throughout the month of January you made visits to various Congressional leaders as you got ready for the next round of budget hearings. On 30 January you met with the so-called Zorthian Group. You would be involved in a CinC’s conference on the 31st of January and 1st of February. Does anything stand out in your mind about any of these events?

GEN MUNDY: The CinC’s Conference stands out very much at this point and it is, now we relate back to our earlier discussion in this session about Adm Macke’s call and the fencing of forces. There were two things at work that I think should be recorded here. They are not necessarily ominous, depending on how you look at things, but there is something that would be a note of concern about these.

The two things at work were a very healthy, in many respects, involvement of the civilian leadership

of the Department of Defense in the CinC's and JCS Conference. Heretofore, we would have dinner with the SecDef or he might come in for a session or two, but, by and large, the CinC's and the JCS Conference was the uniform military getting together to discuss whatever it was that the conference was focused on.

Gen Shalikashvili saw, and I think again with many positive aspects that could be mentioned, he wanted to involve the civilian side more actively than had Gen Powell before him, or perhaps one might say that the Perry Defense team was much more closely integrated with the uniformed side than had been the Cheney Defense team. I think an historian would pick that apart and say maybe that it was not that way but to me it was that way. We were closer with the Democratic Defense leadership that came in, through the product of circumstances that I believe we discussed earlier, having those Secretaries and therefore being directly plugged in; SecDef Perry's own personality of wanting to be very close to the Chiefs.

So from a positive standpoint it is very good to have as much interface as possible between the military, the uniformed military and the Defense leadership. From the negative standpoint, that may or may not prove out in time, that is the camel's nose under the tent. So we were increasingly including the civilian leadership of the Defense Department into areas that heretofore had been largely the purview of the uniformed side. I will not render a judgement on that at this point except to say let's, ten years hence let's look back at this and see how it has gone.

So that was one aspect, a significant involvement. That means that SecDef Perry, DepSecDef Deutch, many of the back-benchers, you know, the assistant secretaries, and their counterparts on the Joint Staff were now the back bench in this now very large gathering; about ten CinCs, the Service Chiefs, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. That is 16 uniformed members, the principal J members — that gets us up to 22, maybe 23 uniformed persons — and then a half dozen or so, we are up to a 30-person conference. That is when you almost need an auditorium instead of a conference table that we used to sit around.

All right, there are positive sides of that, the civilian and the military minds were better able to exchange. One of the products of that, however, was that as we increasingly moved toward this more senior involvement, the Service staffs, in the names of the operations deputies, the three-star that seconded me, for example, or the Chief of Staff of the Army or someone, was now cut out of the CinC's and the JCS conference and instead of having my lieutenant gen-

eral back there, there now was either the J-5 or the J-2 or the J-3 on the Joint Staff or an assistant secretary or a deputy assistant secretary.

The end result of that is that though the Chiefs are there and certainly able to represent themselves and able to represent their Service, the fact is that you are there without staff support, without anyone to take notes. That sounds very menial but it is very important. Usually the, you know, whoever your assistant is is usually there taking pretty copious notes and then when you get back at the end of the day and sit down and say, "Okay, on this particular issue here is what I got, what did you get," oftentimes as we all know, what you thought you heard was a little bit different than what he thought he heard and once you have talked to each other about it you get a clearer picture. We were now absent that.

The other aspect is that, so the result of that, my long-term concern and, in fact, it became a near-term concern, that I met with the Chairman and that we made some progress, I think, to restore before I left, but my long-term concern is this is a further diminution of the Service influence, vice what have you in the joint arena. With the Joint Staff in being the note takers, being the recorders, being the briefers, they then became the only source of what went on in the meeting other than the Service Chief himself. And wrong or right, the four-stars generally do not, with the exception maybe of Wallace Greene who you described earlier as doing this, but four-stars do not, if you do your job right you by and large have a fairly clear desk before you in a conference like this as opposed to writing down everything that is said.

So, I am not sure that we had the feedback then from the Service Chiefs to the Service staffs as to what went on in the conference and when the Joint Staff would then come forth and say this is what was discussed and this is what was decided, more ordinarily than not it was the position of the Joint Staff going in. You know, you can always make that fit, I think that what they concluded was what the Joint Staff had briefed. Well, that was not always in the minds of the Service Chiefs.

So it weakened the system of what I later wrote about and later did some sessions with the Chairman on my philosophy, my understanding of what the organization known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff is all about. And that is, a collective synergy that produces military advice and military decisions rather than a Joint Staff who, after all, its fitness reports are written by who? Not by the Service Chiefs but by the Chairman. A Joint Staff interfacing with the civilian staff and coming up with solutions that are, on occa-

sion, perhaps more politically influenced, because that is the job of the civilian leadership, than they maybe ought to be. I had concern about that.

So, what made this conference, and I would say the one before it, remarkable compared to the earlier conferences that I had known of this type was what I have just characterized, a lessening of Service influence. I do not know that you could say, that you could argue there was a lessening of uniformed influence there. That certainly was not the case because I think that by and large the civilian leadership were there listening to what was being said. But as in any circumstance, if you have a conference and at the conference table are the most senior leaders in the Department of Defense, candor probably suffers a little bit among the uniformed military, the nature of the briefing, the briefings now given by the Joint Staff are cast to be in sufficiently generalized terms not to insult the intelligence of those who do not deal in this detail every day and do not need to, and that is the civilian side, and as a result the product can be much more vague or in some cases misinterpreted.

We found that case out of this conference. Later on we had an issue regarding the force allocation in which the Marine Corps once again non-concurred, me with a message to the Chairman, as all things do around Washington it leaked out and it became Mundy versus Shalikashvili. It was not at all. I went over to see Shali and sat down with him and said I am very concerned that we are slipping, that the Services are not getting their fair day in court. Our advice is being handed to your staff and it is being summarily rejected or ignored and it is a bad situation when the Service Chief has to continually be in non concurring with me taking up your time on issues which our staffs ought to be resolving because that is the way the structure is set up.

To his credit, Shali was very concerned about that and took immediate action responsive to my discussion with him to put the Joint Staff back on track and not ignoring or just brushing aside the Service input and so it got better. Whether or not it stays better is very much a function of the personalities among the Chiefs and of the Joint Staff.

But that is something that I worry about because as we bring more and more officers up through this morass of a joint system, they are going to become increasingly loyal — I am not suggesting they should be disloyal — but they become increasingly products of a joint system in which they truly do not realize the value of that oftentimes non-concurrence or different way of viewing the world that the Service expertise brings to this synergistic organization that we call the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That is very philosophical and again, I have, I will have in my papers a response to a fellow that came on line when this made the newspaper one day, who came to me and said, “I have had the same concern,” and asked me a number of questions which I wrote him back a fairly lengthy answer and gave my philosophy on how really a Joint Chiefs of Staff should be working. That will be a matter of record and can be referenced if somebody looks into this sometime in the future.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it is very important. You were at the head table of the 95th annual Carabao Wallow on Saturday evening, 4 February. The following week was studded with calls on Senators and Congressmen. On Friday, 10 February, you went once again to Maxwell Air Force Base to speak to the Joint Flag Officer War Fighting Course. Any comments on any of these events? As the year before?

GEN MUNDY: Pretty much as the year before.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 15 February you went to Lexington, Virginia to deliver the Marshall Lecture at the Virginia Military Institute. In that talk you brought together the ties between VMI and the Marine Corps, the 50th anniversary of World War II and, particularly, the anniversary of Iwo Jima, which was approaching. Do you recall that evening?

GEN MUNDY: I do. It is always for me, I have found it very moving to go back to VMI — even though I am not a graduate, I have no ties there. This lecture is conducted in Jackson Hall which, of course, is named for Stonewall Jackson, he being buried nearby in Lexington. Robert E. Lee is, you know, Washington and Lee University, Traveler is buried right down there, a lot of history in Lexington, Virginia and at VMI so it is always good to be back there.

It was a very good opportunity. I met with the members of the Marshall Foundation. They gave me a set of George Marshall's books, his biography, afterwards. And again, it was one of those times when you can afford to be a little bit nostalgic, you know, in remembering World War II, talking about the relationship of VMI and the heroes that came out of VMI to go to World War II or a fight at Haymarket or whatever you have focused on. So it comes across as something of a partial leadership and inspiration as well as a little bit of historical touch to it. It was a nice event.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will remind future readers of this transcript that there is an almost complete file of your speeches in your personal papers.

Saturday, 18 February, saw the beginning of Iwo Jima observances in Washington. In the morning you were the reader at the memorial services being held at the National Cathedral and that evening you were the guest of honor and speaker at a banquet of Iwo Jima veterans. What do you recall of these events?

GEN MUNDY: Well, because Iwo Jima and the Iwo Jima Monument, I guess the impression of the Marine Corps on me and I think on many others is the Iwo Jima Monument, so it was a very special battle in our case. As a result, its commemoration, we were now getting toward the end of the war, this was three Marine divisions, this was big stuff, and, of course, there were an increasing number of veterans.

This, the Iwo Jima commemoration was almost a duplicate of the Marine Corps Birthday Ball. That is, we had virtually the same events you mentioned there.

We had a cathedral service. We had the Iwo Jima Memorial and then, of course, we had a banquet that night with the various participating organizations, or at least the Marine participating organizations.

President Clinton was on hand. I had, as was often the case, most of these were, of these World War II commemorations, not all of them, but many of them were headed by the Chairman as the military spokesman, or at least were recognized in that fashion. The Marine battles seemed to almost take on a flavor of, you know, Marine Corps. Not exclusively because we tried to recognize the veterans of all the Services, but usually what I found is that the 50th Anniversary Commission and LtGen Mick Kicklighter who headed that, if it was a Marine event — Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima — he would come to me and say, it is your show and I would say, "Well, surely, I mean, do you want to get the Chairman? No, the Chairman's not in it. This is, people think of Iwo Jima as a Marine battle, you are it".

So, at any rate I was able to give a few remarks there, to introduce President Clinton. He and Mrs. Clinton came. Interestingly, this was another one of those occasions where when I met him, we had a holding tent just off to the left of the Iwo Jima statue —

BGEN SIMMONS: We are getting two events elided here. We are taking the Saturday events and we are moving into the Sunday events.

GEN MUNDY: You are right.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's separate those a bit. Now, President Clinton did not attend the banquet.

GEN MUNDY: He was not at the banquet, no, no, no. I am thinking ahead.

BGEN SIMMONS: So now let's move to Sunday the 19th of February.

GEN MUNDY: Well, no, let's go to the banquet just for a moment and say that that was extremely moving because they were spirited, they were proud. Of course, LtGen Larry Snowden and MajGen Fred Haynes were the two more or less organizers. They were the generals associated with, had been company commanders or I think Fred Haynes was a regimental S-3 during the battle. They were there together with all of these Iwo Jima veterans. And I just found these people to be very moving, as I did all the World War II clans.

So it was one of those times when you get up to make a rather pro forma speech at the banquet and say I do not need the speech and so you just talk to them. So for me it was a very emotional time and for them, I think they responded in kind. We had a great, you know, we stood up and we sang the Marine's Hymn and all of those sorts of things. So it was a grand day at the cathedral, very moving for them because it had all of the Marine Corps pomp and circumstances that the National Cathedral or the Washington Cathedral affords us, and then a very warm and spirited gathering of a lot of people, I think the number was up to a couple of thousand or so, I think, or maybe even more than that, that were involved in those events.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now we move to Sunday, the 19th of February, the actual 50th anniversary of the landing at Iwo Jima. Impressive ceremonies were held at the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington. And now, what were your recollections of that event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will go back now. If we were recovering some of the verbiage here it would be, I mentioned that Gen Kicklighter would come to me and say, "No, it is your show, you do this, it should be the Marine Corps instead of, for example at Normandy or elsewhere, the Chairman chairing it." I would make the remark here before getting into the Iwo Jima service, that I was, I think Gen Sullivan and I probably come from the same gilt, but I was amazed on occasion at my Service counterparts who seemed to lack this feeling for World War II. I can remark on that. In just a little while I will give you a very vivid

oration of this when Ben Frank and I were on hand for the Okinawa event a little bit later.

But at any rate, at the Iwo Jima statute it was handed off to the Marine Corps so we structured the event. It was set up as we wanted to do it and, of course, at the eleventh hour the White House staff got into it. We did not have a woman sitting in the front row or there were no minorities there or the nurses were not recognized and all of these things that were in the name of diversity and political correctness that were important.

Many of them are important and perhaps there were a few that we had glossed over or not thought about and they certainly deserved to be done. But at any rate, what it winds up with is that before you go into one of these events of this nature your staff is extremely haggard because ultimately the planning for this sort of thing, though it might be thought that that is the type thing that the CO of 8th & I would do or something, it is not, it is the thing that the military secretary of the Commandant does. And so anyway, Jim Flynn and I worked our way through many reseatings of the front row, you know, at this event.

But on that day, the President and Mrs. Clinton arrived in the holding tent a few minutes beforehand so that he could be briefed and relax a little bit. He was notably nervous about this and it came to me that he was once again thinking of what had been his experience when he went before the Vietnam Veterans in which he had been booed and not treated with the respect that veterans ought to be treating a commander-in-chief, whoever he may be, that he was worried about this.

So I said to him, "You know, Mr. President, you really need to relax. You are going to be applauded right off the podium when you finish. These are patriotic Americans. They are not here to get in the middle of politics or anything. They are very proud of what they did. Your being here is very meaningful to them. So you are not going to get hooted and howled at." I was saying this, and of course, obviously, I hoped it did not happen. It did not happen. It turned out just that way.

But, at any rate, we went out together, the President, and Linda went out with Mrs. Clinton and proceeded. I think we had a couple of spokesmen and then I spoke, made a few remarks, introduced the President. He made his remarks which were very well received, and then we followed with the Marine Corps — or, I beg your pardon — I did not introduce the President. The way the pattern of all of these was that you would have a military spokesman who would then introduce, in my case I introduced the Secretary

of Veterans Affairs, Jesse Brown, who was a Vietnam era Marine. So I was able to introduce him as a Marine and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. He introduced then Col Bill Barber — our Medal of Honor recipient from California who had been designated by the White House to be the military spokesman. Bill Barber did a splendid job. He has a deep voice anyway and his face was the face of an old and tired warrior who had fought the battles. And, indeed, Bill Barber did fight — World War II, Korea — as you did and others. But anyway he was the perfect choice for this and he made just the right remarks.

Anyway, we went ahead with the ceremony and at the end of it of course all of the veterans crowded forward and the President was able to immerse himself in them, shake hands, you know, sign autographs, get his picture taken. Felix de Weldon was there, the sculptor of the Iwo Jima Monument.

Felix had conveyed to me at the gathering the night before, at the banquet, that he had a set of the minted silver coins of the Iwo Monument that he wished he could present to the President. So that morning in the tent I said, Mr. President, if we can shed your security guys, I will guarantee you this box will not blow up when he gives you this box and he said, we will do it and make sure there is a photographer around. So we saw to it that Felix was able to come forward in the crowd and to give the President this box. And none of the Secret Service grabbed it and threw it on the ground and stomped on it or anything else. As soon as he handed it over I think I took it and passed it off to an aide and it got to the President. So we were able for Felix de Weldon to get a little face time and a picture and a moment with the President.

So, all in all, the whole event of the Iwo Jima commemoration in Washington I thought was splendid. Probably a maximum, I think the estimates were that there were going to be tens of thousands of people there. There were not. There may have been about 3,500 people at the commemoration but it was a, kind of a gloomy day, maybe that was appropriate, and it was wet underfoot. It had been wet out there and we had to sit the people, you know, in fairly soggy conditions but they did not seem to mind. So it was a good event.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was indeed. You began the annual round of budget hearings on 22 February before the House National Security Committee. Is that the new name of the old House Armed Services Committee?

GEN MUNDY: It is. That was retitled by the Republican Congress when it came in.

BGEN SIMMONS: One of the areas you focused on in your testimony was "unplanned contingency funding." Please explain that.

GEN MUNDY: This was a problem for all of the Services but most acutely for the Marine Corps because, again, a little bit will do you in the Marine Corps. We are not very deep in resources and so as I recall it, the amount of money that we needed to have restored from the Somalia contingency operations was only, it was about, no, it was about \$300 million that we needed restored. That is a lot of money in the Marine Corps budget.

So we were representing really the Administration's case with the Congress to say that we cannot, we are not operating in a budget environment in which we can go off and do contingencies for you. We have to pay for those out of our operating funds and those operating funds in the case of the Marine Corps were funds that were having to draw from the sustainment accounts or from the procurement accounts which we already were canceling programs to spend the money.

So the representation to the Congress was you must give us a supplemental budget to repay us the money that we have already spent in Somalia and elsewhere.

That has to be done as a supplemental in addition to our request for next year's budget. That was the basis for the contingency operations. It was at that point a very significant fact that had the Marine Corps not been restored with those funds we would have literally, once again, come to that point of the year, probably around July or so, when we would have had to stop what we were doing, stop training people, stop operations of some kind of other.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was also a discussion on the 22nd of February by the JCS on the approaching dedication of the Korean Veterans War Memorial. The Marine Corps, or at least its veterans, were heavily involved in that memorial, were they not?

GEN MUNDY: They were. Gen Ray Davis was then chairing that particular effort and he had contacted me and said, "Do you think it would be possible for me to go brief the Chiefs?" I spoke to Shali and, of course, we brought him in and he did brief them on what the plans were.

It would be remembered that Gen Richard Stillwell of the U.S. Army and Gen Ray Davis had been the

Chairman and the Vice Chairman, I think was their relationship. Gen Stillwell died unexpectedly of a heart attack, I believe, and so Gen Davis moved up into that position and did a superb job of getting the memorial accomplished.

Let's see, oh, I would tell a light-hearted story. You mentioned that the Marines were very active in getting this done, and that is so. This will take me back. Let me go back about three or four years earlier and tell a rather humorous story along these lines.

When the dedication of the site, just adjacent to the reflecting pool at the Lincoln Memorial, when that occurred in 1991, I believe it was August or so in 1991, it was on a Sunday. I had been invited to go and Linda and I did go to it. It was a very, very warm day. I can remember that, as was the dedication day four years later.

But among the great accomplishments of the Korean War Memorial Organization was not necessarily administrative efficiency on all occasions. The invitations would sometimes go out and not get there on time and in this particular case there had come around, as I recall it, a piece of plain white paper that had had the announcement of the dedication on the front. You had to turn the paper over and on the back it said, "Please let us know if you are coming and call to accept the invitation."

Well, the interesting thing is that I got a call, as I recall the event was at about 2:00 in the afternoon, I got a call about 11:00 in the morning from Gen Powell. He said, "Listen, are you going to this Korean dedication today?" And I said, "Sure am." And he said, "Well, I did not get an invitation to that." I said, "Colin, I am sure you got an invitation to it. You had to flip it over to the other side to accept." He said, "Well, gee whiz, I do not remember seeing it. I do not know who got it in the office," but he said, "I have to go to that." And I said, "Well, come on." And he said, "Well, if I have not accepted I may not have a seat. I said, I have seats, you can sit with us."

So, to make a long story short, up shows Gen Powell and me and Linda. And sure enough it was a very, very crowded stage because they had most of the veterans on there. So we had two chairs. So when Colin got there, I said, "Come on, we will squeeze together." So here we are on the hottest day in August sitting there, you know, in our alpha uniforms, Linda, Colin and me wedged into three chairs sweating profusely.

But, at any rate, at that point in the ceremony where they were introducing various dignitaries they got around to introducing us and they introduced, "Ladies and Gentlemen we are delighted to have here today

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin Powell,” and there was considerable applause, “and the Commandant of the Marine Corps,” and they got about that far — I do not think they ever said my name because it really did not matter — but the applause would tell you that every t-shirt in the crowd was a Marine out there because, of course, it was the only time, I think, during my tenure that I drew better applause than Colin Powell did simply by virtue of the fact that, yes, the 1st Marine Division was essentially the driver behind that.

As was so much the case in all of these war commemorations, I found that the Marine patriotism compared beyond anybody else’s patriotism — I do not mean on an individual basis but I mean on a quantifiable basis — anywhere you went comparable to their contribution, to the numbers of Marines that we had in the Pacific battles or wherever, the numbers of Marines that would be there compared to the number of their Service counterparts was dramatically different. So it was a very heavily driven Marine Corps show.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 25 February you were the guest of honor at the Semper Fidelis Award dinner. This would be the Command and Staff College Foundation once again, would it not?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that is the Command and Staff Foundation.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your remarks were short and chiefly about the anniversary of Iwo Jima. Any comments about that dinner?

GEN MUNDY: As I recall, the award recipient, I believe, was Joe Paterno of — that is not right — the award recipient was John Glenn. No, the award recipient was Congressman Paul McHale from Pennsylvania. A freshman Congressman, Paul McHale had been a lieutenant in the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines when I was the commanding officer. I had known him for years and I am very proud. He is a very, very effective member of Congress today. He was the recipient. It was another one of those very grand affairs at which the Marine Corps impresses people just by being ourselves.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 1 March you lunched with SecNav Dalton, UndSecNav Danzig, Adm Boorda and Dr. John White. I am sure that the subject was “Roles and Missions.” Am I right?

GEN MUNDY: You are right. We had asked Sec White to come over and just to corporately brief the leadership of the Department of the Navy on a “how goes it? Where do you see yourself going? What sort of issues are you focusing on and how do you think it will come out?” And it was a very useful hour. He talked about the organizational structure, about the intent of the Commission to focus on the process of the Defense establishment rather than on who has tactical airplanes or whether we have light divisions or Marine divisions and the usual types of distractors that the people who really do not understand roles and missions find themselves caught up in. So I thought that his focus was very much toward the organization of the Secretariat and far less toward anything that the uniformed military within our Service organizations would be concerned about.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 6 March you attended a BRAC Commission hearing and the next day you appeared, along with the SecNav and CNO, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Once again, how does the acronym BRAC break down?

GEN MUNDY: It is the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any particular recollections of those hearings?

GEN MUNDY: The only recollection is one that is haunting us to this day, may or may not be something that is a continuing issue, but it is at the moment at least, and that is that the issue of the realignment of El Toro and the Marine presence at El Toro to Miramar came up again. Not with a question of keeping El Toro open but rather from the standpoint of focusing on March Air Force Base which is an Air Force Reserve base located near Camp Pendleton and, indeed, an ideal base for the aerial port of departure for the Marines out of Camp Pendleton, particularly with the closure of El Toro.

It is a superb base for that. It would be located in such a way that were we able, for example, to locate the rotary wing aircraft, the helicopters, from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing at March Air Force Base. They would be closer to Pendleton. They would be out of the more convoluted, built-up San Diego area. We would not have to do significant construction at Miramar, which we were going to have to do, to accommodate both the fixed wing aircraft and the rotary wing aircraft there.

So there were a lot of arguments that could be very

persuasive going to March, with the exception of one and that is that in order to operate the base the Marine Corps would have to operate another air base. We do not have the structure to do that. The Department does not have the resources to do it. We were, after all, closing down excess air bases. To operate the entirety of March Air Force Base purely as a helicopter installation would have been flipping the whole BRAC process in the other direction.

So the Marine Corps, much as we would have certainly, had we been able to go to March Air Force Base as a tenant — the base being run by the Air Force, positioning our helicopters there as a tenant — the Marine Corps would have been most anxious to pursue that. And, the nation would have saved a lot of money.

So that reared its head as an opportunity. I discussed with the members of the Commission, both privately beforehand, testified during the hearing and then in subsequent calls in my office by the commissioners, I told them just what I have told you, that the Marine Corps would certainly consider that but we could not run the base. We had neither the manpower nor the resources.

Those sorts of arguments become quickly lost in the political world and so the Congressman representing that particular area has moved very, very aggressively in trying to change the BRAC report to cause the Marine Corps to go to March Air Force Base with our helicopters and the Air Force has been equally resolute in saying we cannot run the base for you.

That issue, as we speak today is still alive and that, of course, is one that was inherited by Gen Krulak and his staff and he and I have discussed it on several occasions as to means of dealing with it. I am not sure how that will come out at this point. That is the only significant issue in this BRAC hearing concerning the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 9 March you and Mrs. Mundy departed Andrews Air Force Base on an 11-day visit to the Western Pacific. I was fortunate enough to be a member of your party. Would you take us through that trip?

GEN MUNDY: We began by going to Los Angeles where I had been invited to speak by one of the Los Angeles organizations commemorating the 50th anniversary of Iwo Jima. So we stopped there, spent the night with Gen and Mrs. Lou Wilson in San Marino, and then the next day they went into the luncheon. You, of course, were along, as you have mentioned and came into the luncheon as well.

I spoke to them and directly from the luncheon we all went back to the — well, not we all, the Wilsons were not on this trip — but you and I and the rest of the party went directly to the airport. We flew down to, no, we could not, because of the extraordinary head winds and the bad weather that was then ongoing in the Pacific, we could not fly directly from Los Angeles to Hawaii. So at the last minute the air crew came up with a routing that took us to Cold Bay, Alaska where I guess we were the most people that had every been there at one time since World War II. As you will recall, you know, it was a couple of Quonset huts and a rusty tanker truck sitting out on this World War II Aleutian air strip. I know that there were a few houses around because we saw them coming in but any form of life beyond that and beyond the guy who came out to give us a little bit of fuel was not apparent at the time we got in.

So we all got out of the airplane and took our pictures in front of the sign of Cold Bay. But that was, in effect, flying north to the Aleutian Chain and then turning around and flying all the way back to Hawaii. We could do that because of the prevailing winds and the distance that the airplane could fly. So it was an extraordinarily long day as I recall but eventually we did get into Hawaii, stopped in my case at Hickam Air Force Base. I think we all stayed there and got a little rest for the crew and us overnight and then got back up the next day, picked up the Krulaks. LtGen Chuck Krulak and Zandi and his sergeant major and aide joined with us on the C-9 aircraft that we were flying.

We then headed from there toward, of course via Wake Island, I am sure, and then into Okinawa. We spent only a short time on Okinawa because the next day, the 14th of March —

BGEN SIMMONS: There was a big dinner that night.

GEN MUNDY: There was a dinner. We did have dinner and Ambassador Mondale was there for the dinner. Very nice event. MajGen Carl Fulford was the commander of the III MEF at that time so this was an evening dress affair, as I recall, at the Officer's Club. It was a superb evening, very well done. Ambassador Mondale is a wonderful man. He and his wife were delightful to be around. But anyway, we commemorated the 50th anniversary.

And then we got up the next day, which was one year ago today, as a matter of fact, the 14th of March, which was the day on which Iwo Jima was declared secure after the invasion on the 19th of February. I



LtGen Charles C. Krulak and Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, left, atop Mt. Suribachi during the 50th anniversary commemoration of the battle for Iwo Jima. Secretary Dalton has just announced that Gen Krulak would be the next Commandant.

think they had a counterattack that overran and killed a group of Marines and Soldiers on that day that they declared it secure but nonetheless there was still a lot of mopping up to be done.

We flew then back from Okinawa early in the morning out to Iwo Jima, landed there. Of course, the veterans were flowing in via Micronesia Airlines, I think was the airline that was supporting them, coming in from Guam and Saipan.

I had left out one step here. We ought to go back and say that we stopped in Saipan en route to Okinawa. We stopped overnight, and there are some very good pictures that I am sure you are featured in right along with me because those who know will know that if you arrive in Hawaii, for example, you are welcomed with an aloha, with a lei of flowers around your neck. In Saipan, for the warriors or for the men-folk you get a head-piece of flowers. So we have some very interesting photographs that show all of us standing around with these floral decorations on our heads and uniforms.

But we were well received by the people of Saipan, met, as I recall, by the governor and members of his

staff. We stayed overnight in the hotel. I know that you did a tour and subsequently wrote in *Fortitudine* on your going up to Mount — you can pronounce it and I cannot.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tapotchau.

GEN MUNDY: For those of us that were ragged out a bit, I opted to take a nap instead, I think, and then we went on that night to another celebration there at one of the hotels, made a few remarks to some of the veterans. On to Okinawa and then following day back toward Iwo Jima.

BGEN SIMMONS: On that big day on Iwo Jima, 14 March, several momentous announcements were made. In the afternoon, from the top of Mt Suribachi, SecNav John Dalton announced that LtGen Charles C. Krulak had been nominated to be your successor as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: — 15 March, and I had said that SecNav John Dalton had announced that Gen Krulak would be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps.

As I remember it, it was not until almost the last minute that word was received from the White House that President Clinton had indeed formally nominated Gen Krulak. Do you recall that?

GEN MUNDY: I do remember that. That was a very precise operation because Sec Dalton, this was his idea, really it was his Public Affairs Officer who said to him, “If you want to announce Gen Krulak in March why don’t you do it while you are out there at Iwo Jima?” It was a wonderful idea. So we set about pursuing the means of getting that done. The White House did not want to announce, well, I say the White House did not, the White House was a little bit concerned at announcing the new Commandant as early as March. As a matter of fact we ordinarily see that occur in the Marine Corps, I believe, usually in about mid-April. So it was about a month earlier than it has customarily occurred. There are a couple of reasons for that and I can discuss them more in just a minute, but suffice it to say that in order then for the White House to be able to announce the nomination, they did not want to do it too early and the President, as I recall, was out of town so it was difficult to ensure that that was all going to come out the right way. But we had it wired where we would get up, you know, the first thing in the morning in Okinawa, call in to Washington, the Command Center would link us together and we would be given the thumbs up that

Sec Dalton could or could not announce.

So, to make a long story short, after great effort at having everybody on watch all around the Marine Corps that day to ensure this word got through, it was successful. The White House announced it and Sec Dalton was able to follow with his announcement on Mt. Suribachi, as you have mentioned.

You were there, of course. You did not mention that but you were present for this event. This was significant in a variety of ways, I think. From the historical perspective, Gen Krulak was the godson of LtGen Holland Smith, "Howling Mad" Smith who had been, not the Landing Force Commander but the overall Fleet Marine Force Commander for the landing at Iwo Jima. And Holland Smith had come ashore with the SecNav, James Forrestal, and stood at the foot of Mt Suribachi and when the flag went up was able to look up and the Sec said, "Holland, the raising of that flag means that there will be a Marine Corps for the next 500 years." I used this repeatedly during my last year in office. Every time I would get up and introduce Sec Dalton I would remind him or whoever that that guarantee had been made only 50 years ago and therefore the Marine Corps was only entering the 51st year of a 500-year guarantee and we had 449 more to go. So, it served useful to me.

But at any rate that was then for Gen Krulak, since his father had been Gen Smith's G-3, since Gen Smith had been his godfather and for Secnav Dalton because his predecessor, James Forrestal, had watched the flag go up, now here is John Dalton, the SecNav, 50 years later standing at the flag, at the site of the flag raising able to announce the next Commandant. It was, I think, a tremendously moving and a tremendously historic occasion for the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: But sometimes even the best of intentions backfire. There was some criticism from the visiting veterans that the ceremonies on top Mt. Suribachi kept them from visiting the crest. Do you recall that and what did you do to resolve that problem?

GEN MUNDY: Unfortunately, the ceremonies, it really had very little to do with the ceremony in which the Commandant was named because indeed we had a ceremony of commemoration up there and then the naming of the Commandant was really a follow-on event that occurred. But what occurred was there had been tremendous organization and effort by MajGen Carl Fulford and his Marines at the III MEF who had brought, we brought one of the MPS ships to Iwo Jima. It unloaded an enormous number of trucks.

The trucks were outfitted by Marine engineers with steps to climb up into the beds of them. We had water positioned. We had food. We had medical support and everything. The thing had been very well organized.

As a result of that, perhaps it had been over-organized because the only flaw that we found after the fact in the organization was that the plan was for these trucks, that generally drove around the perimeter road on Iwo Jima stopping at the various sites, at the caves or at the gun positions or at the airfield and so, they would stop there, people would get off and people would get on. So it was kind of a shuttle truck service around the island.

The plan was that these trucks would then shuttle people to the base of the road that went up Mt. Suribachi. We then had other trucks that were running up and down Suribachi. But what had not come to be appreciated was that once we got a number of people up on top of Mt. Suribachi the turnaround space for the trucks was impeded by the numbers of people. As the trucks would turn around and start to come back down, the road is very narrow, it was a very slow process with one fellow, you know, pulling as far as he could over on one side of the road and the other one squeezing by. So it was a laborious process.

That, coupled with the fact that the Japanese who, of course, own the island now and have priority, the Japanese service was conducted prior to the American service. I was there for it. It was a very nice service, but it was late beginning and it was late ending. So there was a backup because of the delay in the service.

There was a backup occasioned by the Japanese then coming down the mountain and by our ability to get people up in a timely fashion. We were getting into the late part of the afternoon and we knew we were going to have to move people back so we went ahead with the ceremony.

As we finished the ceremony and came down the mountain there were a group of veterans sitting alongside the road there. I did not think anything about it. I waved at them and they waved back and we went on to the, I think we stopped at another couple of sites, but we wound up back at the hangar and we were then leaving to fly back to Okinawa from there. So as I was walking around the hangar speaking to veterans I walked up to one fellow expecting to get all this praise for how well we had done, which we had been getting all day, I said, "Well, how is your visit going?"

And this guy, who was a typical, again — now I say this — typical of the World War II generation, here is this guy who was controlling his anger but could not control it entirely, and he said, "I am so goddamned

mad I am ready to come back here and invade this island and take it back all over again.” And I said, “What happened?” And he related to me, he said, “You know, I paid,” whatever he paid, “to come all the way out here and brought my wife with me and then goddammit I could not even get up to the top of Mt. Suribachi.” So I said, “Well, what happened?” And he told me what had happened. I got to Gen Fulford, we were leaving, we were on the way out, but Fulford was staying. And I said, “Carl, if there is any way that you can cause us to,” we were through, you know, we were going to the airfield and commercial airliners were getting ready to take off, I said, “if there is anything you can do.” Carl Fulford seized that by the horns, went right up on the stage and grabbed a microphone and said, “Any veteran that is here today who has not been to the top of Mt. Suribachi, transportation will be leaving immediately and it will continue to leave and it will continue to cycle until every person here today that wants to has the opportunity. Flights will be delayed, rescheduled, we will make it happen.” So Carl stayed out there and I think they got the last of the veteran groups off at about 9:00 at night as a result of that and we were supposed to end up about 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening. So that really is more a tribute to MajGen Carl Fulford and his immediate response to the situation than it was, you know, me just mentioning it to him. So I felt very bad about that but as it came out it had a happy ending.

BGEN SIMMONS: What other events of that day spent on Iwo stick in your mind?

GEN MUNDY: I believe, again, you know, there were colorful characters that were wearing their World War II, I am not sure that they were not more recent than that, but anyway the replicas of their World War II camouflage utilities or were wearing their Marine shirts with the square technical sergeant types of rank insignia and helmets and so on. So there was a lot of that, there was a lot of association with a lot of very proud survivors. None of whom, I might add, and this again characteristic of my perception of the World War II generation, there was not this, you know in Vietnam if a guy got a Bronze Star and you show up in a bar with him in many cases the whole night was spent with him telling you how he singlehandedly whipped a North Vietnamese regiment and earned this. This generation of Americans was different, and so I never ran across anybody who had singlehandedly done anything. Most of the veterans would say, you know, “Yes, I was laying right down there and I was so scared I could not move and man,

it was crashing in around us. My buddy got blown up right beside me,” and I would say to them, as I did to Gen Larry Snowden, Capt Snowden then, as we stood on top of Mt. Suribachi with him pointing down and saying “Right there is where I came ashore.” And I said, “Well, what did you do, Larry?” And he said, “I laid there for a day and a half.” He said, “I was not, I was a company commander, to give me credit for commanding a company to do anything other than just trying to survive and trying to organize, that was what we did.” So they were a very modest group about their accomplishments and yet it had to be very moving because unlike going back to Saipan, going back to Guam, going back to Okinawa, going back perhaps to many battlefields that now look like uptown New York, Iwo Jima is still there just about like it was except for the vegetation and so on. So they could literally say “I remember that rock down there, I remember lying” — whether they could or not at least they felt they could. But they were very modest.

So, again, that very, very warm and renewing feeling that the World War II generation, at least, conveys to me. The other part of it was that this was characterized as a reunion of honor. That was done in this fashion by Gen Snowden and the other planners, the other organizers, rather than a victory celebration that we beat the Japanese here at Iwo Jima, they wanted to bring the Japanese veterans, there were not many of them, obviously not many survivors, Japanese veterans and their families out there and to have a reunion of people who had confronted each other in battle but who no longer bore each other any malice or ill will, to bring them together.

So among those that were there were LtGen Kuribayashi's widow who is now a 90-year-old Japanese lady who came and gave remarks, of course in Japanese, on behalf of her husband. And I thought for her, you know, for many of the veterans that were there they could say, you know, “My buddy got killed down here” or something, but for her to come back out there and know, not knowing because they never found his remains, knowing that somewhere on that island was her husband, I thought had to be a very emotional time for her. So that was a moving part of it and then the ceremony, as always, was overlong because if the American remarks were going to be ten minutes long, the Japanese remarks were going to be at least ten minutes long. And if there were going to be five of us there were going to be five of them. And so as a result, as I recall, we all sat there and got cooked in the sun sitting out for the memorial service.

But all in all a tremendously emotional day from a

lot of standpoints. We got back on the C-9. I had arranged, uncharacteristic of military Marine aircraft, I had arranged to have some bottles of champagne on board. So we got back aboard. We had loaded up the airplane with all the generals and their wives from Japan and whoever. We had filled up the seats so we had a collection of people. But anyway when we got back on board, we passed around champagne and toasted the 31st Commandant-designate of the Marine Corps and his lady and had a nice flight back to Japan with the Krulaks sitting there trying to act like it was not really a big deal.

BGEN SIMMONS: Readers of this transcript who want a fuller account of this day on Iwo Jima might want to read, "A Day Spent on Iwo Jima" in the Spring 1995 issue of *Fortitudine*, the quarterly journal of the Marine Corps Historical Program.

I would like to go back now to the nomination of Gen Krulak to be the next Commandant. We went through the general process of nomination when we discussed your own selection. Gen Krulak's nomination was certainly no surprise, and it lacked the controversy that often surrounded these selections. Still, there was some dissent and differing opinions. One handicapper listed the odds in the race as follows: Chuck Krulak, 60 percent probability, Bob Johnston, 30 percent, dark horse, 10 percent. Is that a fair appraisal?

GEN MUNDY: I think that were I being asked to give odds I would have probably put it more in the 40/40/20 odds and I will go through the process here in some degree.

Indeed, I had endeavored to develop, I have used the term crop, stable, whatever it might be, but a group of three-star general officers inside the Marine Corps that would afford those who select future Commandants — and that is not necessarily *the* Commandant. There may have been instances in our past where the Commandant's choice became the Commandant. There have probably been a greater number of instances in which the person that the Commandant would support or advocated did not become the Commandant.

But for those who make, the civilians who ultimately make those decisions, I wanted them to be able to have not only two choices, not three choices, if we could to hand them five or six generals and say if you blind-folded yourself and put your finger on one of these we would have a good Commandant. With some degree of pride, not necessarily because everything that I was able to do in that regard was right, but

with some degree of satisfaction, maybe I should say, in that process that I began, as I began slating the generals when I became the Commandant, we did emerge into the selection of the next Commandant with, I think, about that number, of definitely five, some might argue six, or even more than that, officers who could be a very credible Commandant.

Among those you have mentioned, of course, Gen Krulak and Gen Johnston. I think that without question they were the two favored candidates, most likely candidates in everybody's mind. Gen Rich Hearney was a very strong, perhaps the strongest legitimate four-star aviator that we have had to contend for the Commandant. He was, for the record I can tell you that he was very seriously considered by more than one in the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense. The Marine aviation community weighed in very heavily behind him because Rich is a tremendous officer and is very well thought of in every respect. So Hearney was a good contender.

LtGen Ron Christmas was not without his consideration. Gen Charlie Wilhelm, also a name that could be considered. Beyond that, those probably were the principle members. There certainly were, you know, what I did in this process was to, I began discussing this with SecNav Dalton as early as November of 1994, reminding him that after the first of the year he would be needing to focus his decision on naming the new Commandant. That I would be there to help and that certainly when that time came that I would come in and give him my most candid observations of who the leading candidates were but that for the time being what I would do for him, and what I did, was to prepare a book with a picture, listing the credentials.

I hope that, I want to get that book back. It is still in the hands of the Secretary. He asked to keep it and I think will for his tenure but it would be a superb historic document because I am not sure we have done it this way before. But I prepared him a book with every three-star and four-star general in the Marine Corps in that book. And I personally wrote a one-page, no more, everybody got one page, summary in a fixed format, not boring, but in the same format of a little bit of background, giving him their age and the age and the numbers of years that they would have as a general at the time they assumed the office because that was significant. A later entry might reflect that the briefing book was later recovered, and is in my personal papers.

We were, and have, significantly reduced the age of the Commandant at the time that he came in. Am I for that? Personally, no. I would like to see us still be 55,

56 years of age at the time that we come in, but we are far out of kilter with everybody else around us. When the incoming Chief of Staff of the Air Force is 52 and the Commandant is 56, 57 or even 58, we are out of kilter. And so we have reduced that now to where we are somewhat in league with everyone else whether that is good or bad. I think it is too short of time in grade. I think that we would have more mature generals if we would spend a little bit more time in grade.

But at any rate, I wrote those one-page summaries up. I did not make a recommendation on them. I simply characterized the individual, painting his background, painting his joint credentials and painting his strengths as I saw them. And then if there were any weaknesses and really, you know, among this group there are not a lot of weaknesses, so I did not characterize it weaknesses but I simply indicated that if there was something to be considered it might be this. Usually, that was one line or at most two lines and that would relate to something like, not a lot of time in Washington or limited joint time, might be hard to get them through confirmation because of the lack of joint association or something like that.

I provided those, then, to SecNav Dalton with an up-front write-up on the Commandant and what the selection of the Commandant is and how the SecNav, reminding him that any colonel is eligible, reminding him that David Shoup was picked from being a two-star and elevated to Commandant, but also cautioning him that that tends to fracture the organization and while it might have a certain excitement about being able to do something like that, it is not institutionally good in my mind, in my judgement.

So I gave him that up front and gave him some instruction on how to do it and then what I told him in November is, "I will bring you that book in December. You can take it off on Christmas vacation with you, if you want, but you ought to start thinking about these people and those that you do not feel that you know well enough, you need to go spend three or four days at Camp Lejeune with Bob Johnston" — which he did — "or go out and spend time with Krulak or get Ron Christmas and go hunting with him at Quantico or do whatever you want to do to come to know the leadership of the Marine Corps."

So he took that on board. I delivered the book to him, again which I, there were two authors of that book, there was one author and there was one typist and the typist was GySgt Ana Prada who was my secretary, and I was the author and the editor of that. So it was not a staff product at all, in any way. Took it to him and he used that book.

He began then in January when he came back to

interview each one in that book and he did that faithfully either by bringing them in for an interview in his office or by going out to see them in the field. He interviewed them. I think one of the reasons that he is hanging onto the book is that he did take fairly extensive notes and wrote of his impressions and you know, whether we get those or not I do not know. It would be nice if we did, but at any rate, I am still watching him closely and hope to snatch that from his personal archives at least before he goes. If not, I can replicate at least the write-ups.

He interviewed. He made his notes. I suggested to him, I said, "You should talk broadly in the Marine Corps. You should at least consult, I would encourage you, with all of the former Commandants. That is a polite thing to do as well as perhaps a useful thing to do. You should talk to other generals." Gen Bill Keys had just retired. Gen Walt Boomer had retired. "You should talk to them." Jack Dailey, one of the assistant Commandants, "Go as broadly as you wish to get opinions on these people," and again, to some degree, I believe, if I am not mistaken, that he spoke with every one of the Commandants. Perhaps not Gen Greene, I do not think he got to him. But I know that he talked to, I know that Gen Chapman called me to say that he had been called by the Secretary. Gen Barrow had told me that, Gen Wilson had. And so they were all contacted by the Secretary.

I told him that we, that while I could not see anything in the Marine Corps at the present time that would cause an unnecessarily acrimonious process that the earlier that he could get this done the better because as we begin to warm up and as the *Navy Times* begins to write up that, you know, this guy is favored over that guy or as somebody else in the press, you know, as the various segments begin forming that, the longer that goes on, the closer we get to the day, the more exciting it gets. I had not, frankly, thought, I told him that he ought to really be, in my judgement he ought to be closing in on his decision, if not making it, in March sometime, by the end of March. That it would take time to get it through the Defense hierarchy and over to the White House and so on and that would give him a few weeks to do that. So anyway, he took that on board.

Gave him the book. In about February, I would say early February, I went over and sat down with him and said, "How are you coming?" And he told me he was coming along fine. I knew how he was coming because I knew who he was interviewing. And I said, "When you have done all your interviews and you have done all your homework and studied everything you want to, then what I would suggest is you and I

sit down and I will be glad to listen to you,” I will be glad to give you advice and I will certainly give you my views. So we did that.

So finally when that time came, when I got the signal from his Marine aide that he had concluded and was about ready to talk, I said, “Okay, my office,” not his. That gets it on Marine territory, out of the Secretariat. So he came over and we spent four hours together. I said, “Take off your coat, loosen your tie, we have water here to drink” and so we really had a relaxed and a good conversation.

What I asked him to do, I said, “Why don’t you brief me instead of me briefing you? You tell me all that you have come to feel about these officers or concluded. So he walked through each one of them and I found his thoughts to be very insightful. I had more than one occasion in which I had great difficulty with SecNav Dalton’s personnel decisions — I think we have discussed a little of that before — and we would yet part with MajGen Don Lynch’s case. That would be a very tense one between us. But at any rate, in this particular case I thought he had done his work extremely well.

So he debriefed and told me that he had come down to, that he could name five officers that he thought were solid contenders. Among those, again he was extremely high, extremely high in the sense of the five, on the ones that we have mentioned, Hearney, Johnston, Krulak, Zinni — who was a very favored, he was very impressed with Tony Zinni when he talked with him, as was much of the rest of the town, so Tony Zinni was really a good, solid contender. We ultimately, I said, “Okay, if you had to narrow it then where do you come down?”

And it came down really to those three, to Krulak, Johnston and Hearney. And we then spent time together. With him what I felt very good about was that I was able to cause him, without giving him any views about I think this or I think that, that I was able, I said, “Well tell me, let’s go through again. Tell me about Hearney or tell me about Johnston or tell me about Krulak again.” And so through that process I think we were able to come down fundamentally to two cases.

I tried to represent both of them. With this individual you get extraordinary strength here, you get these characteristics. Here is the way he would operate inside “the tank” with the Chiefs. Here is the way he would operate outside. With this one you get it that way.

So we left at the end of about four hours in my office with him saying, “Okay, let’s go home tonight and let’s both think about this and tomorrow morning

I will be in the office at 7:30. Why don’t you be there and meet me at 7:30, and we will sit down again and see if our minds aren’t clear. So we got back together in the morning at 7:30 and it was very clear to me the night before that his choice was Chuck Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: What do you think finally determined it?

GEN MUNDY: All of the betting money six months before, a year before, would have gone to Bob Johnston. Indeed, had I been wagering with you a year before probably just on the chances of likelihood I would have put my money on Bob Johnston. Bob is one of the officers that I have admired longest and most in the Marine Corps. He has the immaculate record. There is not, if you look at LtGen Bob Johnston’s record today there is nothing. I doubt that Bob Johnston ever got less than an excellent mark on a fitness report. It is immaculate. He is perfect.

He had executed in Somalia to the applause of the President, decorated by the President in the Rose Garden and everything else. Bob did not convey warmly in the, he came across, those of us that knew him knew him not to be that way. Bob is a fun loving, an exciting, Sandra is a delightful lady, but Bob conveyed to the civilian leadership and indeed to much of the external, to the Marine Corps leadership, somewhat of a reserve or a cold persona. That did not help him, I think.

Chuck probably had done more of what a Commandant does in his experience in MCCDC, in directing recruiting, in manpower management and having had both infantry, if you will, through the assistant division commander, the brigade commander, but then the logistics tact as well. Chuck had a broader OSD assignment.

Bob did not have that. He had the CentCom, splendid as Chief of Staff down there. And I suspect also, though Dalton never told me this, I suspect also that in some of his consultations, whomever that may have been with, Schwarzkopf — I do not know that — or whomever he might have talked to, that he might have gotten a persuasion. But I think the fundamental issue also that has to be raised, and I would not raise it as the ultimate deciding factor, but they are classmates from the Academy and if you stop and think about it, Adm Joe Prueher, currently CinCPac, the Vice-Chief of the Navy, classmate of SecNav Dalton. So that cannot help but be a factor. Naval Academy alma mater, classmate, with an absolutely splendid record, why not? Why not Krulak?

I think the breadth of Krulak’s exposure, the impact

that Krulak had made during his days at Quantico in the Combat Development Process, the interface with Nora Slatkin), with the Assistant SecNav, Research and Development, the representation of the Marine Corps in many, many issues, V-22 or whatever it might be, in the Pentagon had caused him to be a name and a face to remember.

Bob Johnston had almost exclusive operational time. His time as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower was limited to less than a year and is much narrower, visually or impactively in the Pentagon than were the jobs of Chuck Krulak.

So I think it was a combination of those factors, but for the record I would say this, that, again, in the final analysis there were four officers who at a given point, let's say, let's pick it up at 3:30 in the afternoon of the day before, and I would tell you that there were four officers who were running about neck and neck. But by the end of the day, by about 4:30, it was clear to me that his leaning, he had pretty well narrowed down to two and his leaning was toward Krulak. And the next morning he had gone home and very clearly concluded that Krulak was the man.

And I found no fault with that. Again, I would have, I told Bob Johnston orally and I have told him in writing, if you are named to be the next Commandant, you know, you will have a rooster in me, and I told Chuck that, and I told Rich Hearney, if there is to be a first aviator Commandant, believe me you don't get nothing but hurrahs out of this particular Commandant.

Did I weigh in and make an impact? I am sure I did. You cannot help but be one man in a two-man conversation, you know, and say things that have meaning. But I honestly tried very hard, I wanted this process of this selection of a Commandant from a group, any one of whom could have been a good Commandant. Maybe not five, I mean five, any one of them would have been a good Commandant, but I would have narrowed it probably to four if I were going to narrow it. And any one of those who had been named I would have been throwing my hat in the air and saying hurrah for the 31st Commandant. But I think it came out good.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, all of that speaks very well for SecNav Dalton being very deliberate in his process. Did Gen Krulak's confirmation by the Senate proceed smoothly?

GEN MUNDY: The confirmation by the Senate did. There came, as is fashionable or was then fashionable particularly, you know, that four-star officers were, you know, were spread eagled up on a dart board and

everybody that could take a shot on any occasion did. So we had, because we had then and we have now, you know, sexual harassment had come to the fore and you can impugn an officer by simply waving your hand on that.

There was an employee down at Quantico, this would not be worth going into the lengthy details, but suffice it to say that there was a case completely without merit at Quantico involving a lady who had been in the employ of the Navy Medical Center there who had leveled a criticism of sexual harassment against her Navy superior but who saw fit when Gen Krulak was then named, she was then asking for, I think, \$300,000 in settlement plus other incentives, which I do not think she had gotten any of, but at the time Gen Krulak was named then she popped up immediately on the skyline to say that Gen Krulak had not helped her. She was sexually harassed and that he as the commanding general should have immediately come round and helped her out. It was a case where there was a complaint without merit, it was a case without merit.

And so, other than having to undergo, I called him and said, "Chuck, welcome to the National Football League because, believe me, every time you turn around in this town somebody is going to find reason to put a dart in your back if they can. So welcome aboard. This is just kind of a —

BGEN SIMMONS: In fact, you said it on the airplane because I heard you say it. The messages came onboard the airplane while we were going back. And you said "Welcome to the big leagues.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, that is right. But nothing ever came out of it and his confirmation hearing was very smooth.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am afraid we have run out of time so this is probably a good place to recess this session.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is Tuesday, the 26th of March. We are in the Marine Corps Historical Center and this is a continuation of Session 27, the first six months of 1995. On the evening of Saturday, 25 March, 1995, you and Mrs. Mundy attended the annual dinner of the Gridiron Club. We have previously discussed the importance of these annual dinners. Is there anything that you would like to add to that?

GEN MUNDY: Only to clarify it was only me who attended those. I wish that Linda had been able to

attend either the Gridiron or the Alfalfa Club because they are such absolutely grand events, but I was a head table guest at all of those and so even though, for example, the President and Mrs. Clinton were there, really we at the head table in uniform were stag attendees. But it was a tremendous privilege to be included and they were grand occasions.

BGEN SIMMONS: Monday, 27 March, was an all-day meeting at the National War College of the JCS and the JROC. What is the JROC and what was the significance of this meeting?

GEN MUNDY: The Joint Requirements Oversight Council —

BGEN SIMMONS: When the phone rang we were talking about the JROC.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, and I was saying that JROC defined is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. This was an entity which was intensely energized when Adm Bill Owens became the Vice Chairman of the JCS. The way that it was intended to function, and arguably did function over the succeeding months, was that this was a body which would assess the various programs that were being, either underway or being looked at among the Services to make sure that we, you know, that we had the right balance, that we were not duplicating the types of things that we were seeking to acquire and that they would interface properly. If it was a piece of intelligence equipment or communications equipment or even a weapons systems, that it all was in balance.

Now that is a good and a positive explanation and, indeed, the JROC did succeed in bringing some balance to things that we were looking at. A classic example would be the theater ballistic missile defense efforts where the Army was seeking to develop — they had the Patriot, of course — they were seeking to develop a corps SAM — surface-to-air missile — which would give theater ballistic missile defense. The Navy with its Aegis System Radar and its intercept missiles, you know, had that capacity. Of course, we had manned aircraft that could fire perhaps some form of missile and then the Marines had the Hawk and the TPS59 Radar. To attempt to assess that as an integral system and bring it together might have revealed, for example, that we had, that we were investing, that the nation was investing too heavily in one system or another. And one could argue that in the interest of not only effectiveness but economy that we would thus come down a little bit on this side and

continue over here or heavy-up over here. So there were some advances from that standpoint.

But, unfortunately, the JROC also, by the very definition that I have given, got somewhat into the organizing, training and equipping responsibility of the Service Chiefs under Title X of the United States Code, of the laws. In this there was considerable friction between the Service staffs and between the JCS and, indeed, from time to time with the Vice Chairman and the Service Vice Chiefs, in our case the Assistant Commandant, who sat as the plenary body on this Joint Requirements Oversight Council. It was the Vice Chairman and the number two in each of the other four Services.

The other effect of the JROC was that partly because of Adm Owens' personality, which is that of a, I think probably Bill Owens would go down in measurable sense as one of the smartest men, if not the smartest man I have ever met when it came to things like analysis or matters technical, all of that sort of thing. He had served for a long time in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He had served before going to that post as the N-8 or the Director of Naval Warfare Assessments. He was responsible for developing the Navy, and the Marine Corps in some respects, program, at least in aviation matters. So he brought a lot to that. But, he was a workaholic, to his credit. Bill Owens would start his meetings sometimes at 5:00 in the morning and he would be still going at it at 8:00 at night. He showed no signs of fatigue but others around him did to include the Vice Chiefs.

From the Marine Corps' perspective, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, who has always historically been a principle assistant to the Commandant, doing those things that the Commandant wanted him to take care of or taking care of some things that perhaps the Commandant never even had to think about, for all intents and purposes the numbers twos in each Service were then just consumed by this JROC activity. So, I, in effect, lost the Assistant Commandant. He was constantly at a JROC meeting.

They would go on to make presentations to the unified commanders. They would take what they came quickly to describe as the trips from hell which had a little bit of humor in it but not too much because they would fly to Europe overnight and make a presentation to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Europe, you know, to present him the directions that the JROC, how it was seeing the world and to get CinC input and then they would turn right around that night and red-eye down to, for example down to Tampa, and meet

with the U.S. Central Command Commander the next day and then they would shoot out to the Pacific and come back. So what happened when you did get, in my case Gen Hearney was the action man on that, when you got Gen Hearney back, you know, for three days he was almost on his knees from fatigue and then the JROC would consume again.

So the Chiefs had some concern about, number 1, the infringement on our Title X responsibilities, had great concern; number 2, on the absolute consumption of our number two and implicit with that in order to get the Assistant Commandant ready to go we had to devote a certain staff effort to keeping up with what the JROC Staff was doing. So this was consuming an enormous amount of effort in all areas, in the JCS as well as in the Service staffs.

The purpose of the meeting that occurred then on the 27th of March, as you have indicated, was for the Chiefs and the Chairman to go off-site. We went over to the National War College and we met all day long for Adm Owens and his key members of the JROC to present to us what they had done and where they were going and just for the Chiefs in effect to give something of a sanity check to this whole process.

I believe that probably in terms of endorsement of the effort, although the amount of time that the Assistant Commandant and the staff were involved in this was extraordinary, I probably came out as one of the more supportive Chiefs for the overall process because the Marine Corps in the joint requirements process had only to gain. The larger Services could have seen a very significant program to them questioned, for example, the Army's Corps SAM, the Navy's Aegis System. One could have come out ahead of the other and received resource funding out of the Department of Defense to support that conclusion of a JROC.

In the case of the Marine Corps, anything that was decided virtually involving anything that the Marine Corps might have an interest in would have been in our favor. We are naval, we are land. If Corps SAM had been plused up that would have been ultimately good because it would have put a land umbrella over us in the theater ballistic missile threat. Coming from the sea if Aegis had maintained, you know, we would have had a good cover for amphibious operations from that. So we had a lot to gain through this particular effort, still at some risk, ultimately, to programs like, for example, the V-22. You know, the JROC could have found the V-22 to be not useful or an excess. As a practical matter the V-22 had become by that time so political that nobody was going to touch it, at least in the JROC.

So it is a long explanation. The JROC is an entity today since as of this recording we have a new Vice Chairman. Adm Owens has retired and Gen Joe Ralston has become the Vice Chairman. It will be interesting to see as we go through the next months and years here whether the JROC remains as active an entity or whether it was, indeed, in large part a function of Adm Owens' personality and personal drive and interest. I do not know how that will come down.

But again, not without some utility and yet there are many who would argue that the JROC, because of its analytic and scientific orientation, was a risk in some respects to what the ordinary infantryman would do on the ground because the JROC intuitively went into systems that would, you know, that it would be at least conceived could see the entire battlefield and therefore if you knew everything that moved on the battlefield you would be able to perhaps sit 200 miles away and hit it with a silver bullet every time you fired off some piece of high-tech weaponry. Those of us who have, you know, slept in foxholes and walked in the jungle were quick to oppose that logic by saying you are never going to, you know, you might track a major convoy or you might track a train or something but catching the Viet cong in the jungle with all of these sophisticated devices and handling them with this very expensive high-tech weaponry just did not seem very practical. So the clock ticks on. It will be interesting to see quo vadis the JROC.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Tuesday evening, 28 March, you were the judge of a chili cook-off at the Congressional Club. Who was competing?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there were a variety. This is an annual event and that particular year there were several Congressmen and two or three of the Senators. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas, in fact, won the chili cook-off and I was proud to note that I voted for her chili. She, of course, is on the Senate Armed Services Committee. That was not the reason for my vote, it was good chili.

But it was one of those events completely out of, or in a different character than would have been the Gridiron, which was a white tie and long tails affair, or the Alfalfa. This was a plaid shirt and, you know, a couple of Congressmen from Texas that were up picking their guitars and singing country music and beer served in a long neck bottle and then the sampling of the chili and the votes for the chili and just genuinely down-to-earth, no pretense. Nobody was concerned about whether they were generals or secretaries or senators or congressmen on those occasions.

It was a first name, get-to-know, event.

And the utility of those, as anyone who knows executive life can appreciate, the utility of those are just not quantifiable. The ability to have eaten Senator Hutchison's chili and been on hand as she was given some ridiculous tee shirt for winning it and to have applauded her and talked with her congenially and had a few laughs and everything, the next call that you went to see Senator Hutchison on, needless to say, you had a tremendous icebreaker and you had a tremendous rapport established. So those are some good contacts in Washington.

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your credentials to judge a chili cook-off?

GEN MUNDY: Well, my credentials were that I guess, number 1, my Southern drawl might have led them to invite me. As I recall, SecNav Dalton was there, of course he a Texas Secretary. I do not recall that there was anyone amongst the judges who came out of New England, for example. It seemed to me that this was somewhat of a Southern to Southwest gathering of people. All of the singers were either from North Carolina or from Texas or out of Louisiana and most of the chili cookers, as I recall, were the Tanners of Tennessee and the Hutchisons of Texas. I am sure there were others but those two come to mind.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are you a bean or no-bean man? I understand those are fighting words in Texas.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I believe that the winning entry that night was a no-bean and I voted for it so that must have pleased my taste that evening, no-bean. However, ordinarily, with my upbringing why there would have always been red beans in chili in the southern part of the states.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Canadian Armed Forces Council was in town on the 29th. You went to a dinner in their honor at the Morison House in Alexandria.

The next day there was a luncheon at the Canadian Embassy. Did you also attend some other perhaps more substantive meetings with the Council?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was an annual event. I think we commented earlier that every other year they come here and then we go up to Montreal or Quebec City or somewhere in Canada to meet. I believe that when we discussed this before I pointed out that at Quebec City we met in the Citadel which is the head-

quarters of the Van Deux Regiment. That is one of the more colorful Canadian regiments. That was the site on which the Combined Chiefs of Great Britain and the United States came together with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at a point during World War II and they had their photograph made out on the ramparts overlooking the St. Lawrence River in March. And we were there at the same time, at an earlier meeting, and had our photographs taken. All I can remember was it was freezing cold and I wished that I was back in elastique greens instead of in some of the newer polyester, lighter weight because it was cold.

So there were colorful gatherings like that that we had. This meeting was typical. On their second trip to Washington I asked the Chairman if I could host the event, which I did, at the Commandant's house because we, on almost every event when Gen Powell was the Chairman we would have repeated dinners at his quarters and he was very gracious about doing that, but I felt that we should bear some of the load and I have the nicest house in town, the nicest setting. Unfortunately, it rained that night.

But, you know, no one can do it like we do with the young Marine officers meeting them as we came in and escorting the ladies. We took them down the arcade, out of the house and down the arcade to the Band Hall for dinner because we had a large setting and we set up and had entertainment there. It was a wonderful evening.

And thereafter, it was somewhat embarrassing because at the next couple of events while those personalities were still present in the Canadian Forces Chiefs, as we would come together they would all come seek out Linda and me and talk animatedly about the excitement of coming to the Marine Barracks. And once again, it was one of those times when your Service counterparts were sitting there undoubtedly wishing they could do that, too. But they could not.

So this was not extraordinary. These were more professionally social, perhaps, than anything else and just a chance to keep all of the, you know, both the, as they would advertise it, the North American Armed Forces in touch with each other.

BGEN SIMMONS: The 1st of April was the 50th anniversary of the landing on Okinawa. Were there any special ceremonies to commemorate this date?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, yes, there were. As a matter of fact, there was a military review down at the front of the Pentagon, on the parade field down there. This

was the full joint Service review with guns and all of that sort of thing. It was a Saturday morning, as I recall, and so, of course, that normally is a less busy time in Washington. I had signed up. As we have discussed perhaps in more detail than needed heretofore, anything that had World War II on it generally I went because I felt, 1, a desire and number 2, an obligation to do that.

I think the thing that I would note — let me continue to say that it was a very nice review. I wound up being the reviewing official and our own Mr. Benis Frank was the honoree, was the representative of the veterans of Okinawa. So it was rather nice to be up there with Ben. Ben and I made remarks, he, of course, very eloquently so, but at the time of the review we were able to troop the line or review the troops together.

Ben is not a man of small stature. He is a very large fellow who over the years has enjoyed a good life and so on, and he has a big beard to go with it. I think those who know Ben Frank would know, but gosh, he was a proud Marine that day. No one had to say Ben, suck in your gut or, you know, put three wrinkles in your chin or anything. He was very, very proud of that and he made a good presentation and represented not only the Okinawa veterans but, you know, it is always good to have a Marine out there.

As I have said before, stepping aside from that, I found throughout all of the places that I went, the exception to that would be D-Day at Normandy where we were so greatly outnumbered, but even at Normandy there were World War II Marines in their World War II Marine regalia of whatever sort they chose to wear, khaki shirt, the barracks cap, whatever they wanted to wear or just their red and gold Marine patch on their blazer, but there were Marines who came to Normandy for D-Day who had never even been in Europe but they came simply because that is sort of what Marines do, I guess. They came to honor other veterans, and probably for the fun of the trip, too, no doubt about that, but there were Marines everywhere you went and at any event — we talked earlier about that — from Korea to the World War II commemorations anywhere. There was always a disproportionate volume of Marines or Marine representation everywhere.

In this particular case, and I say this, there may be reasons that were not apparent to me at the time but those who know history will know that the battle for Okinawa was the greatest loss to the U.S. Navy in modern times because of the kamikaze attacks that they sustained there. I think they lost some 5,000 sailors at sea and I forget the numbers of ships, but it

was in the tens if not in the scores. But many, many ships were sunk, many sailors lost at sea. When I signed up, if you will, to attend this, the CNO was the reviewing official which I thought was altogether appropriate under the circumstances.

I got the word very shortly, just a few days before, that the CNO had declined and would not be in attendance and would I be the reviewing officer? And, of course, I was thrilled to have that opportunity.

When we went to that the crowd was not large because, as I said, it was in Washington. We were yet to go back to Okinawa for that visitation. It was a modest crowd but it was a good crowd of veterans but there was not a sailor. There was not a blue uniform at that commemoration ceremony that day. And I was almost astounded. There were soldiers and there were Marines and there were undoubtedly some airmen. And I believe, when I said there was not a blue uniform I am probably not accurate because I believe that another group, you know, the Coast Guard and the Merchant Marine generally show up for these things, but there was not gold braid around any sleeve in that party that day.

And it astounded me, and does to this day, the almost lack of sensitivity of the Navy to say — it is completely understandable that the CNO might be diverted to go elsewhere but if it had been a Marine show it would have been me or the Assistant Commandant there. It would have been me. There would have been no question about it under these circumstances. We did have to split for Guadalcanal. Gen Dailey, the Assistant Commandant, went to Guadalcanal. I stayed here at the Iwo but the President was coming here so I threw my weight in this direction. But that astounded me.

Anyway, just as an aside. As to what was unusual about it was 1, we had the great Ben Frank there to be the honoree and number 2 is that there was no Navy in attendance.

BGEN SIMMONS: You gave a lunch for Gen Kim Jong Din on 6 April. Was this a counterpart visit?

GEN MUNDY: No, Gen Kim, as we would refer to him, was, as I recall was the Deputy to the Korean JCS. In other words, he would have been the equivalent of the Vice Chairman of the JCS. And he was making his rounds in Washington, was visiting. He was not the Chairman's visitor but this was not an unusual occurrence when a senior military official would come over not in a reciprocal capacity but simply for a visit and normally for some business, to look

at buying airplanes or seeing a new tank or maybe just visiting Army forces. But in this case it was purely a courtesy call and he was senior enough that I wanted to have a luncheon for him and did so.

BGEN SIMMONS: Easter was Sunday, 16 April, and you and Mrs. Mundy attended the Sunrise Service at Arlington National Cemetery, did you not?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we did. That is a very moving service every year but in this particular year, you sit below the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier so you are looking up at the museum that houses the decorations and so on for them and then at the tomb and then the setting for the event is below that. It is a very early morning but very moving occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 20 April you addressed a joint session of the Alabama Legislature in Montgomery. That was quite an honor, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was to go back. I had done this earlier in Georgia at the invitation of the, you know, being from Atlanta why they adopted me as a native son. The Governor of Georgia at that time was a Marine sergeant still wearing his Marine flag. Even in his official photograph, Governor Miller of Georgia in his political photograph still has a Marine Corps flag in his lapel. So I had done that.

Back to Alabama, that was the occasion. I had been asked to do that several times so it was nice to go back to that place where you had graduated from high school and to have a very nice tour of the capital and address the legislature.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your remarks you link the Marine Corps to the martial spirit of Alabama and the numerous distinguished Marines who came from that state.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I did and probably I did the same thing wherever I was going. In other words, you try and establish some linkage because there are many people sitting there in the Legislature who would be wondering, you know, I mean they understood that I was a graduate of some schools in Alabama, but that had no real knowledge or awareness of the Marine Corps or why would you come to Alabama to be a Marine. And so I was reminding them of people like "Howling Mad" Smith and others who were distinguished and who had come out of Alabama.

That was in part also the old boy network. One of my Basic School classmates had become a represen-

tative from Huntsville, Alabama and he was in the Legislature. And so for him it meant he got to escort me and got his picture made. We called on the governor who was Fob James, is literally his name, Governor Fob James in his second time as governor. He was actually the governor and then took a few years off and then came back. Fob James had played football at Auburn when I was there so while we did not know each other well that was another linkage. So I sat with the governor and it was interesting.

This gets well in advance, but as I was leaving, Fob James, who is a very deep rural South type, acts like a countryman, probably dumb like a fox would be a characterization, but he took me aside and he said, "now we have to stay in close contact." And I said, "Why, of course we would do that" and left not thinking any more about it. But it is very interesting that when Sen Howell Heflin of Alabama, who himself is a Marine of World War II, Sen Heflin just a few months later announced his intent to retire and I immediately had several probes to come back to Alabama to run for the Senate, one of them very indirectly but it seemed to me fairly clearly from the Governor. Now I knew what he meant about we had to stay close together.

I waived that off and told them that I was very honored to even be considered but that I could not in good conscience come back to Alabama and live for whatever the required six months or so was to get on the ticket because I did not really know the constituent interests of the people of Alabama. And so anyway, to this day I continue to get an occasional call from one of my friends down there that is still waiting for me to come back to Alabama and run for something but I do not think I am going to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: They could do worse.

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am not sure if I would make a politician or not.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 21st you went to the White House to attend an award ceremony in honor of Zachary Fisher. Do you recall that event?

GEN MUNDY: I do very well. Number 1, we have spoken earlier of Zachary Fisher, a tremendous philanthropist, a man who has certainly given of himself and of his resources to all of the Armed Forces. He was being awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal which I think is probably about the number 2 award that the President gives out. But he, and usually there are, I think there were a couple of others there who

were similarly awarded, but anyway, he was down for that.

We had used the occasion, we had been for some time in discussion, if you will, with Mr. Fisher and his people about his donating a Fisher House to Marine Corps facilities. That had not been done and there is good reason for it. He had been concerned about it and had spoken with me on a couple of occasions, but Fisher Houses had been developed to be put near hospitals where families who were coming in with service members that were very ill, you know, brain tumor or serious surgery or something, would have a reasonable, a comfortable, as well as affordable place to stay at the hospital. So he had built, for example, one at Bethesda — I am not sure if we still have one or maybe two at Bethesda now — Walter Reed, down at Brooke Army Hospital, those locations where serious cases came.

When he had inquired of me in my first year his concern that he had not built one for the Marine Corps, I, after looking into it, said we really do not have hospitals in the Marine Corps where Marines would come to die or to undergo that type of surgery. So the families would not come to Camp Lejeune, for example, that we would move them to Bethesda. So we were content not to have any, but it provided a convenient opportunity when Linda, my wife, you know, working with the other Marine wives, recognized some need for some additional child care facilities on Marine bases. We were able to successfully convince Zach Fisher that this was a contribution he could make to the Marine Corps and so the first of those is, I think construction will begin in just a couple months here out at Camp Pendleton.

Zach used that occasion in the White House, as a matter of fact as the President was pinning his medal on him, Zach said, "Mr. President, I intend to build a child care center at Camp Pendleton in your honor." We are yet to know exactly what it is that we are going to wind up with when this is dedicated but I would venture to say that very likely it may see Mr. Fisher and President Clinton on scene for the dedication of this.

Zach had, I think, been taken by the emotion of the moment because really the contribution was to the Marine Corps and albeit, in your honor, would suggest that we were going to name it the William Jefferson Clinton Child Care Center, it is not. It is going to be the Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher, but anyway, that is Mr. Fisher's problem to figure out how he handles that with the President.

But, at any rate, he made that commitment and then following his award presentation we held a small

reception for him at the Commandant's House which he was deeply appreciative of and I presented him there, I did not give them to him because you would have gotten all over me somehow or other, but I presented him with a full Marine Corps battle color, that is to say with the battle streamers attached, which is extraordinary. We normally do not, for good reason, we have only the official color sets that have all the decorations on them.

But I presented him one of those which I very carefully had a letter entered in the files of the Office of the Commandant and gave him a copy that this was presented to Mr. Zachary Fisher for display in his office. It would remain on the custody rolls of the Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps because I was not empowered to give away this color. And we, of course, made great, well a very accurate presentation of the fact that these colors did not go to every Tom, Dick and Harry but that this was a very special recognition of him.

So he has that displayed. His office building, the Fisher Building, is next door to the Waldorf Astoria on Park Avenue in New York and if you go up to the top floor and walk in to see Zachary Fisher why right beside his desk is the Marine Corps battle colors. So that in itself is good. But in return for all of this, the Marine Corps got about a \$1.6 million donation from Mr. Fisher to do some good things for the Marines and their families at Camp Pendleton.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your travels continued. On Monday, 24 April, you went to Charlotte, North Carolina, to call on Mr. Hugh McColl. Now who is he?

GEN MUNDY: Hugh McColl is the Chairman of the Board of Nations Bank which is one of the most recently successful banks in the nation. He is also, of course, as are so many, a Marine first lieutenant still to the bone. When you go up to the 62nd floor of the Nations Bank corporate headquarters in Charlotte — it is an absolutely magnificent building and they call it the Taj McColl — but anyway, when you go to the 62nd floor of the Taj McColl to call on Hugh, as I did, you go into his office — he was one Basic Class behind me coming into the Marine Corps — and you would expect to see tremendous certificates from the banking institutions or credentials of that sort. You do not. You see pictures of his Basic School platoon. You see Marine Corps memorabilia. He has a Marine Corps softball on his desk. In the days when everything we had had to come in a USMC box and had USMC on it, we had softballs that had big black USMC on it and it was issued in a box probably of

World War II vintage. But he has all those sorts of things.

So, like so many of the corporate giants of America their proudest achievement in life is not being the Chairman of the Board of Nations Bank with a salary of \$4.2 million a year, which his is, but it is rather having survived OCS or Boot Camp and become a sergeant or become a lieutenant in the Marine Corps. They still go right back and relate to that and their offices manifest that.

So that is Hugh McColl. I had gone down to see him in preparation for retirement, just to talk to him and say, "Hugh, you are in the corporate world, what do retired Commandants do?" And we spent about an hour and a half together discussing how boards work and subsequently, of course, I was contacted, not by Hugh, but by a board that is affiliated with, is not part of Nations Bank, but affiliated with Nations Bank and was offered a directorship on that. So I am a director for the Nations Fund which is a mutual fund that is managed by Nations Bank.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next day you went to Boston for a two-day visit during which you spoke to the Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School and to the Boston World Affairs Council.

On the 27th in the morning you testified before the Readiness Sub-Committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. That afternoon you gave the keynote address at the 121st annual meeting of the U.S. Naval Institute at Annapolis.

The following morning you flew to Ft Leavenworth to speak to the Army's Command and Staff College and were back in time that afternoon to be the reviewing officer and guest of honor at a parade at the U.S. Naval Academy.

The next morning, 29 April, you left for San Francisco, coming back on Sunday, 30 April. I find this pace absolutely incredible. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it gets you out of the office, I guess. Those, in many cases were close-outs. Obviously, the war colleges, the command and staff colleges, those were important and I did all of those sorts of things. But once again it goes back to the miracle of jet flight and the fact that the Gulf Stream aircraft we have, the C-20 by designation, is a flying office and you can literally do as much work there as you do in your own office, and you can get to the West Coast and make a speech there or do a presentation, get back on it and fly back. It is a long day but you are able to do that.

The MCROA, I mentioned McColl, I did that on

personal leave. That was not on the Marine Corps. I drove down there myself and took a couple of days leave and came back. But I went out to the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association. That was the event in San Francisco. That is their annual convention. I had worked consciously, and I hoped successfully, during my tenure to try and build a tighter total force and to recognize the Reservists and bring them into the fold. So I attended all of the MCROA meetings.

But the others, the Naval Academy, my good friend Adm Chuck Larson, Charles Larson, was the superintendent of the Naval Academy, having been recalled to active duty. He retired as the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific and then was recalled to go up to the Naval Academy and be the superintendent there and he is today. Chuck Larson and I were good friends and he very graciously gave me a final review with a brigade of midshipmen. That is a nice afternoon. It was a beautiful day. So, those were the, it is an incredible pace but again, it is facilitated by the ability to get on that airplane and go just about anywhere you needed to be in short flying time.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Monday morning you went to The Basic School at Quantico for the promotion of your son. Which son would that be?

GEN MUNDY: That was Sam. He was being promoted from captain to major and had asked me to come down and do it and I did that with understandably great pride.

BGEN SIMMONS: Monday, 8 May, was the 50th anniversary of V-E Day. You observed it with a visit to the Holocaust Museum and then went to the parade at Summerall Field at Ft Myer. What are your recollections of those events?

GEN MUNDY: My recollection at the Holocaust Museum, I believe that I was the only Service Chief there, again, my inclination to go to all of these things, but Linda and I went. It was back on the back side on the little courtyard that they have at the Holocaust Museum, for those who might subsequently refer to it.

The sun had not yet come over the building and I recall that it was tremendously cold. I was in my green uniform and did not take a top coat and sat there most of the time wishing I had.

But it was a very moving ceremony. The Army, of course, marched in all of the division flags or pennants or I would call it battle color, but their divisional colors of each of the divisions who had been

involved in liberating one of the death camps in Europe. There were 15 or 20 of them. I mean it was just overwhelming because I do not think that even to those who have heard about, read about, seen the movies or videos on or gone to the museum, it gave perspective to the fact that we had, you know, whatever the accurate number of divisions involved in liberating these camps, which told you that there were an enormous number of these places. There were not just Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz, there were many, many of them. So that gave a proper setting to it and then the speakers did a very nice job. I mean it was not, there was nothing political in it. It was a genuine recognition.

The parade up at Ft Myer was a Joint Service parade and was, as they all are up there, one of the inspirational events also.

BGEN SIMMONS: You attended a reception at the Norwegian Embassy on 9 May marking the Liberation of Norway and on Saturday, 13 May, you and Mrs. Mundy left for a four-day visit to Ireland and Norway. What were the highlights of that trip?

GEN MUNDY: Well, let me first just go back to the Norwegian Embassy. Again, it was my proclivity to go but there were, and the Norwegian Ambassador, I think, had sought me out as a uniform and because I was certainly a known quantity in Norway and had a great deal of devotion to his country and was also going as a guest of the Chief of Defense of Norway — that is where we were headed on the trip — but at any rate, I went over and spoke briefly there and made a few remarks about Norway.

They had a number of the Norwegian veterans, so many of whom live in this country now and many of them in Baltimore and in places right around Washington. But we had the Norwegian Freedom Fighters, I mean, the underground guys that had carried the telephones around in their shoes and that had operated behind the lines and parachuted back into Norway with the OSS. One who had participated, I think, in the raid on the heavy water plant in Norway.

And they spoke. You know, Norwegians for the most part are very Viking-like, I mean they are all warriors and Vikings and they are just grand people to be around. So it was a nice event at the Embassy.

And then, as you have characterized, we then left on Saturday for Norway to arrive there on Tuesday. The reason for all this was that Monday was a national day, their commemoration, I think, of the 50th anniversary. So we would have been off at arriving that day. But we had to arrive for protocol purposes

at a precise time on Tuesday and we could not fly one day to Norway and achieve that so we were going to lay over somewhere. We had not been to Ireland. Shannon is a routine refueling spot so I said, let's just, we will go as far as Shannon and then we will remain a day in Ireland and then up to Norway at the right time on Tuesday.

I had not been to Ireland. It is an absolutely beautiful country and it is some place that I would want to go back and spend some time. We thoroughly enjoyed a very leisurely Sunday, got in there late on Saturday, were there Sunday and indeed were there part of the day on Monday before we left to go on north. Stayed in a typical couple of hundred year old arms-type hotel out in a small village and just enjoyed the Irish countryside and a little bit of Guinness stout and Murphy stout that is equally good, but just enjoyed the Irish society.

GEN MUNDY: To continue, after Ireland we went up to Norway and we will remember that the Chief of Defense of Norway by this time, Gen Arnie Solli — we talked about him earlier — he and his wife, we were very good friends and this was a reciprocal visit. He had been over to visit earlier, had been decorated. And so we went to visit.

It was a short visit. Normally one is always invited for a week anyway but I just did not have the time to devote to that. So we were there for really only about two days. I had been extensively through Norway so I did not need to go visit somewhere to learn something about Norway.

But they really paid me great honor there because there were so many, over the years so many acquaintances and professional relationships that I had developed that we had a very, very nice dinner in downtown Oslo, Norway at one of the old, restored buildings, after World War II, and I received the Norwegian Cross, you know, which was a significant decoration and very meaningful to me. You know, everybody who goes through may get one — I do not think so — but for me it had, the citation was genuinely meaningful.

And then I called on King Harald. I had known his father King Olav. King Harold was young. Interestingly, Gen Gray had called on him also in his tenure and as I walked into the King's office to be received by him there on his desk, which was very cluttered — he was obviously a man who reads a great deal so there were stacks of newspapers and lots of things around — but sitting legitimately, and I mean by that I do not think just placed there by an aide that morning, but sitting amidst the things on his

desk was a bulldog with the red ribbon around it with USMC on it that Gen Gray had given him when he was there. The King liked this, he liked dogs and so he left this Marine Corps bulldog sitting on his desk. So we had a pleasant conversation and then again I thanked him for the decoration and left.

We went out then, the Norwegians will customarily take you out into the field either to fish or to have a meal. We went out with the Port Director of Norway and his wife, the Chief of Defense and Kari, Mrs. Solli, and then Linda and me in a very casual setting and, of course, the Norwegians can overwhelm you with shrimp and fish and just all sorts of good food. So we had a very nice evening out — it was still cold — and then back in.

The following day was their Norwegian Independence Day and we were delighted to be on hand for it. We had key seats right up at the King's Palace with the King reviewing the parade in the balcony just over us and we were seated below that. It is a long, it is an all-day parade but the moving thing is that while they have, you know, the military bands and that sort of thing, they also have, virtually, I am sure it is not the totality of Norway, but anybody who has a school band, it comes from every school. The students march by. The teachers march by.

Norway remains, in my obvious affection for that country, one of the still, you know, most patriotically familial — I do not know whether those two even go together — but everybody in Norway is proud to be a Norwegian. The King reviews for hours on end all of these school children and all of these units that come by. It is not at all a military-type parade. It is a very patriotic, grassroots event.

So we enjoyed that for a few hours and then went over and had a very nice lunch with the Sollis at a near-by hotel. I think the parade was still going on and we left and got on the airplane and left Oslo and returned.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were back on 17 May in time for a Marine Corps Aviation Association dinner at Ft Myer and the next day after appearing before the Seapower Sub-Committee you left for Dearborn, Michigan. What was that occasion?

GEN MUNDY: I had received an inquiry from the Navy lieutenant commander who was the speech writer for both Sec Larry Garrett and Colin Powell and was so good — his name was Neil Golitghtly — Commander Golitghey had retired and gone to work for Ford Motor Company. So we had an inquiry, would I be available to come up there and speak to the

Ford Motor Company executives? Immediately, my interest was piqued because what he communicated was that I would go up in an afternoon, arriving late in the afternoon, that I would have dinner with the Chairman of the Board of Ford Motor Company and then would have some private discussions with him, then would stay overnight and the next morning would speak to what amounts to the Ford Motors Company's new brigadier generals, I guess. They were executives, they were people that they were promoting into executive positions all over the world.

Well, of course, I thought that that was an interesting thing to do because what I attempted to do was put fundamental military leadership and organizational process into corporate terms, and in fact, if I flatter myself, it was a pretty good presentation. But I also saw perhaps the possibility that I was being wooed by Ford Motor Company for conceivably a directorship, in meeting with the chairman. I read things into it that were not there.

We had a very nice get-together. The Chairman expounded to me on the fact that he, he said, you know, "I want these people to take charge. I want them to do something. I want them to execute, make mistakes" — all of the things that we preach in the Marine Corps. But, he said, you know, "I just cannot get them to take any risks, to take responsibility, to get out and make a decision and that is what I am trying to do here." So I said, "Well, fine, I will certainly talk to them on that tomorrow."

We had a nice dinner. I went to sleep. The next morning I got up. He had gone, and I addressed his multitude and then I got back on the airplane and came back. So it was nice to be out in the private sector and I think, they certainly seemed very appreciative and interested to have a uniformed military there. But I am not on the Ford Motor Company Board of Directors.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were back on 19 May in time for an evening parade but the next day, Saturday, you were traveling again, this time to Pascagoula to take part in the commissioning of the USS *Russell*, (DDG59), named for MajGen Commandant John Russell. That evening you attended the Auburn NROTC dining-out and Spring Formal. On your return on Sunday you and Mrs. Mundy began to sort out your memorabilia as you got ready to move out of the Commandant's House. Any comments on any or all of this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, you have highlighted, the ship was being named for RAdm John Russell and

MajGen John Russell, the Commandant, whose father was an Admiral. The sponsor of the ship was Mrs. Vincent Astor, Brooke Astor of whom we have spoken earlier. She was there with Ambassador Tony Marshall who, you know, the ship being named for his grandfather and great-grandfather. And so they wanted to, it was really very much a Marine operation. The Silent Drill Team was down from the Marine Barracks. The Drum and Bugle Corps were there and the captain of the ship was a young commander who just had been an executive assistant to one of the admirals in Washington and who had this tremendous affection and admiration for Marines. So it, truly, I felt like the crew was in the wrong uniform when we got through there. It was a Marine Corps show. That was a very nice gathering.

On that particular one, I always, of course, I was Gen Lew Walts' aide and I was aware of the demands on aides and I always made an effort whenever I could and when I did not need an aide I did not take an aide. On this occasion I took Sam, our new major son, along as aide-de-camp because he had not been to a ship's commissioning. And so he was able to act as aide.

The other thing that you commented on was that we were getting our memorabilia laid out. One receives so many things, certainly, as the Commandant, even before that time, but I am sure you have, you know, many, many plaques and knives and things like that that people have presented you over the years. Unfortunately, while all of it is well received and appreciated and treasured to some degree or another, there comes a time when the 18-inch wide and 18-inch high plaque with the tank tread on it, you know, from the 1st Tank Battalion or the 2d Tank Battalion, you simply do not have anywhere in your house to put that. So we were pulling out all of those sorts of things and sorting through them to keep those that we could keep. I did not want to keep anything that would just stay in a box somewhere stored away. I wanted to be able to display them.

So we began the sorting process and ultimately took a large number of the plaques that I received down to the Marine Military Academy. I think Gen Gray sent some down there and perhaps other Commandants. They have a lot of space and they could use them for decoration.

I do not recall that there was anything that I brought to the museum, unlike my predecessors who, I think, had given you stuffed ostriches maybe on occasion, things like that. We did not do that. And then we laid that out in the basement and we had our children come up and select anything they would like to have.

We had the aides in the house, the drivers, even some Marines in from the Barracks, just under the thesis of having a souvenir on the 30th Commandant.

And so the great amount of it went to the Marine Military Academy and then some of the less displayable pieces, you know, went to people who wanted a souvenir with my name on it or something and, of course, we kept enough to fill up the downstairs of our house. So that was the memorabilia escapade.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Wednesday, 24 May, you spoke to the Retired Officers luncheon at Ft Myer. On Thursday morning, 25 May, you flew to New York City and the next day went on to Camp Pendleton. On the following day, Saturday, 27 May, you attended the commencement exercises at the Marine Corps Military Academy in Harlingen, Texas. Here you gave the commencement address. Any special recollections of these events?

GEN MUNDY: The event in New York City was the annual Fleet Week Banquet that is hosted by Mr. Fisher. It is actually hosted by New York but Mr. Zac Fisher was putting on the banquet and it was in the Waldorf Astoria. We went up and attended a very gracious dinner there. They recognize, they select a Marine, a Sailor, a Soldier, an Airman, a Coast Guardsman of the year. I believe that Walter Cronkite, for example, received an award. It is a very distinguished guest list there.

Once again, at the expense of sounding like my head is bigger than I hope it was — it had nothing to do with me, it is the Marine Corps image — but Gen Sullivan, my very, my great counterpart in the Army and I were the two Service Chiefs there, and again, as they were introducing people around the room he was introduced. And, of course when they introduce the Commandant of the Marine Corps the whole place goes wild. It amazes me how that which the nation comes around about every five years to figure out why we shouldn't do away with always draws the popular acclaim, which is probably why we have not done away with Marines. But it was well received.

The visit to Camp Pendleton was the dedication and the ground-breaking for the site of the Fisher-donated child care center which is being constructed there. And then the commencement address at the Marine Military Academy speaks for itself. It was a nice affair. It is a tremendous institution. MajGen Hal Glasgow is its president and has done an absolutely magnificent job with the Academy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you make comment on

the official position and usefulness of the Marine Corps Military Academy?

GEN MUNDY: It is a small school. It is virtually at the border with Mexico. It is just about, as I recall, maybe 40 or 50 miles north of Brownsville, Texas, which is right down on the border. So it is deep down in Texas and for that reason is not perhaps as visible as if it were up here in the northeast somewhere. But it is a quality institution and those who send their sons there—to date I believe there are no female cadets there—but those who send their sons there it has a high rate of admissions to the Service Academies. It has a very high rate of continuing on to college and universities and it is a very professionally run institution.

As far as the value to the Marine Corps and anything that we specifically gain from it, I think I would have to marginalize that. I do not think people stand around in awe that the Marine Corps has an institution because it is a high school-level institution. In other words, you graduate from high school not from college or university-level there. But it is a splendid institution.

There are some major supporters of the institution so the monies have come in. The facilities under Gen Hal Glasgow's presidency are really taking very, very impressive form. It is a first-class institution.

It is a very homey institution. The barracks, actually the end of each barracks is a quarters for a retired Marine, staff NCO, most of them are MGySgts or Sgt-Majs. They and their family, their wife usually at that point, you know, live in the end of the barracks. And so the cadets have, you know, a mother and a father literally there because many of them are young boys.

They all eat in the mess hall. Part of the compensation package is that everybody eats in the Mess Hall. I think that, you know, Gen Glasgow goes down there and eats. So they can take all their meals, and if you choose to cook dinner you can or you walk right down the street and eat with the cadets. So it is a very family-type atmosphere and just good leadership and a good grassroots environment.

BGEN SIMMONS: Monday, 29 May, was a holiday for most but for you there was the unveiling of the POW/MIA Commemorative postage stamp and then the 127th annual observance of Memorial Day at Arlington Cemetery. The latter is always a most solemn occasion.

GEN MUNDY: It is attended routinely by the President. He was there this time. This was the 50th

anniversary commemoration and, of course, as a Service Chief you go and you are seated in one of the boxes there in the amphitheater and a lot of saluting and a lot of standing up and, you know, a lot of flags parading by, and then usually a very moving speech and President Clinton did a superb job. I had been there, I think, twice while he was there, my second or third year and then again on this occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: On the 31st of May you went first to Camp Lejeune for a change of command at the Marine Corps Base. Who was relieving who?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the Marine Corps Base, MajGen Larry Livingston was relinquishing command of the base and he was relieving MajGen Jim Jones of the 2d Marine Division at that point. So it was really a lateral move, base commander going over to take over the division. The base, the incoming base commander had already arrived. I cannot remember here as we speak, I have lost the name, but anyway the principal, it was a division change of command.

BGEN SIMMONS: You then went on to Dayton, Ohio for the retirement of BGen Larry T. Garrett. Why Dayton?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Garrett was the commander of the Defense Electronic Support Command in Dayton.

That is a joint assignment. The Marine Corps had held that consistently. I think BGen Bob Tiebout, when he was a one-star was there. Gen Jeff Oster had been there and there were perhaps others as well but those two come to mind. So there was nothing extraordinary about Gen Garrett.

That facility was being closed down, was being merged with another one so this was the last commanding general that would be there. I think there is an Army colonel who is still on scene for a much reduced capacity. We still have a general, and it is Gen Jeff Higginbotham, today, but he is up in Philadelphia at the Defense Supply Center there.

So we still have a general out on that type of joint duty and what it enables us to do is to keep not only a, we have many J-3 and J-5 types of billets but that enables us to always have a good logistics billet for one of our logistics generals. Gen Garrett was a helicopter pilot so we do not always, you know, use a logistician but it gives us the opportunity to get a general out for joint command experience in the very sophisticated field of joint logistics and then he is a better product for us when we get him back to take over a Marine Corps outfit.

BGEN SIMMONS: Friday, 2 June, you gave a parade in honor of your friend, Gen Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army. On Saturday, 3 June, there was another dinner of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation. Any special recollections?

GEN MUNDY: Well, there is a special recollection. We talked earlier about my first parade after I became the Commandant for an in-town — the first parade was for Gen Lou Wilson — but the next one was Gen Gordon Sullivan and history will recall here that it was rained out as Gen Sullivan walked in the house.

This time we got out into the garden, we had a nice reception in the garden. It began to sprinkle, rain lightly. I was determined that it was going to have to be a downpour before we canceled it again and then the rain ceased or the sprinkles ceased and so we continued and went out to the parade. We sat down and I think we got to the point where the Silent Drill Platoon was executing its part of the parade and it began to rain hard. So we called the parade and rushed Gen Sullivan out to his car. So we got half-way through his parade.

I presented him with the DON Distinguished Service Medal, not as part of the parade but at the reception beforehand. There was a little bit of concern by the CNO, you know, as to how come the Commandant, you know, the Secretary gives it to him and why would the Commandant do it? There had been some objection to it or some squirming by the CNO over that so I had not formally announced this but I just privately took the medal over there and when I was making some remarks about Gen Sullivan beforehand I said, "I am pleased to present, I cannot pin this on you, Gordy, because I do not have the authority of my Secretary to do that. That will be done, it will be acknowledged at your retirement ceremony, but I am going to give it to you here."

So I actually presented him, and that was important to me. He, in turn, you know, he had signed off on my Army Distinguished Service Medal, too, and we were then and are today good friends. I venture to say, no credit to me, but I do not think probably, even though the Army and the Marine Corps had had its Roles and Missions tiff during our service together that had never, never existed at the Service Chief level, and I do not know whether there has been a closer rapport between an Army Chief of Staff and a Marine Commandant than there was between Gordon Sullivan and me. We were and are very good friends to this day. So we at least got him a parade but unfortunately it rained some more.

On the Saturday evening event, Joe Paterno, the

coach of the Nittany Lions, Pennsylvania State University, was the award recipient. We had a grand evening. He is a very, very personable man, you know, one of the most popular coaches, I guess, in history. We were able to trade some jibes back and forth. When he got up in his remarks I can remember that he had something to say about Auburn football and pronged Auburn a little bit. And so when I got up I was able to follow by making the announcement, the regrettable announcement that word had just come in as the coach was speaking that the entire library at Pennsylvania State University had burned down and that both books had been destroyed. So we had a good repartee between us.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 7 June you spoke at the graduation of the Command and Staff College at Quantico. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that was, of course I was getting close to the end. I was able to offer, I hope, some reasonable charge to the graduates, the young majors who were graduating, leaving them with the best words I could give them.

I was presented by Gen Wilhelm, and at that time Gen Buck Bedard was the president of the Marine Corps University, Col Nick Pratt was the Director of the Command and Staff College — those were the three principals, all fine officers — but I received the Chapman Medallion which is the medallion which is presented by the Marine Corps Command and Staff Foundation for whatever reason they want to give it, for excellence or, so I was very proud of that. That was named, of course, in honor of our 24th Commandant, Gen Leonard Chapman, the founder of the Marine Corps Command and Staff Foundation and its first president. So I received the Chapman Medallion and I am very proud of that fact.

BGEN SIMMONS: Something very dramatic happened on 8 June. Six days earlier the F-16C fighter being flown by Air Force Capt Scott O'Grady was shot down near the town of Banja Luka in Bosnia. A Marine Corps TRAP team, that is to say "tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel team," from the Special Operations Capable 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, embarked in the USS *Kearsarge*, (LHD 3) made a daring and successful rescue on that day, 8 June, that thrilled the whole country. What was your involvement in this event?

GEN MUNDY: None whatsoever. Again this was an operating unit. My involvement was, of course, being

aware and being kept up to speed, but I did not influence that action. That is an employment of a deployed force and that was under the commander in the area, Adm Leighton Smith, or as we more affectionately knew him, "Snuffy Smith," probably one of the most operationally competent admirals that I have ever known in my career. It was Adm Smith's MEU and he employed it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you see some larger, doctrinal significance in this rescue?

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course, the mission that was accomplished, the tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, is one of the missions that a MEU is capable of, that is one of the special operations missions that the MEU trains to a standard. So, in effect, this was routine. It was not a routine, you know, mission in one sense, but for the MEU it was one of their routine special operations missions and they did it splendidly. They did it exactly like they are trained and are supposed to do it. It all went well.

Had overhead cover. We had Harrier aircraft off of the *Kearsarge* that were flying the escort for the helicopters to a point, of course. And then we had the Cobras, the helicopters that escorted in the two CH-53E Super Stallions that carried in the 30 Marines or so that went on this recovery operation. So it was superb. The backup force for that was a Special Operations Command Element that was located over in Italy and would have flown over, of course, with Blackhawk helicopters flying over the Adriatic and going in to effect the rescue.

There is in any circumstance like that, of course, always envy. The spotlight shines on someone but not everyone. And so as a result of that, there was, you know, there was, as always there is the after-action look to find out how we could have done this better.

This incident, what should come out of this or what should have come out of it, number 1, a great deal of American pride and hurrah for the Marines. Capt O'Grady was profound in his acknowledgment that look, I did not really do anything. It was the Marines that did something. So we got a lot of credit.

But, as always, there then comes the inevitable questions of "Well, why did they have to send in two helicopters or why did you have to send in 30 Marines, couldn't one helicopter and three Marines do it?" I mean, if we had lost 30 it would have been a bigger loss than 3, from all of those who choose to always second-guess the operation. And, of course, that is exacerbated by the Special Operations Forces saying, "Well, if we had done it we would have taken

in one helicopter, you know, and it would have been fewer people. We are trained to do that." So there does become a bit of Roles and Missions-type of conflict in these circumstances.

When I left, at the time that I retired, and I do not know as we speak what came of it, but the Joint Staff was, of course, looking at what should be the composition of the forces that do this type work? You know, with an idea being that there would be some sort, perhaps, of a standard operating procedure or standing structure that you would, anytime that you want to go in and rescue somebody it will be in a box this big with these types of things in it.

That is one of the major problems of the world of jointness that we experience. The question should be only, 1, we had a successful operation, the Marines organized to do that this way, it worked. What is your next question? What else do we have to know? But, as always, we probably will want to refine it. We will want to put together some manual and we will want to go out, you know, and have some CinC somewhere make the call as opposed to allowing the Services to organize, train and equip to accomplish the missions as they choose and as they see fit to do.

Those who, you know, would second-guess, well, my goodness, why did we take 30 Marines in? There is a very simple explanation to that. We did not know where Capt O'Grady, we knew that there was a beeper there, a voice had spoken. We did not know what we were getting into. You would always want to have a ground security force to protect the helicopters, to protect, we had to secure them while we went out to get him and bring him in. You always want to have a security force. We learn that as lieutenants, we learn that as privates, that you always have a reserve and you always have a capacity to go in and do what you need to do.

So those who would see only one helicopter with, you know, with four people in it going in, you have to ask the question, "What would you have done if that helicopter had gone down? What now do you send in?" And now you have four Americans on the ground with nobody to protect them, no security force to get them out of there.

But, it is the inevitable way of doing business at the national level when the machinery that should be looking at strategic plans and strategic operations has nothing more to do than look at what 30 Marines around the world are doing. You know, you always, we have generals and admirals who can make an art form out of studying something that a captain or a lieutenant ought to be doing today.

BGEN SIMMONS: On Friday, 9 May, you flew to Albany, Georgia and then to Cherry Point. I suppose these were farewell visits?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the visit to Albany was to present it with the Outstanding Base Award within the Department of Defense. These are awards that are made annually. The SecDef had selected Albany as a model base. It had achieved excellence. It provided a very nice opportunity for me to fly down at a ceremony with all of the, both the civilian employees and the Marines at Albany, to make this presentation and then to say farewell. And that is about what I did and then went out and left. So I really was on the ground, I think, maybe three hours in Albany for that.

The trip on to Cherry Point, I must admit to you that I do not recall specifically what it was but it was very likely, you know, a similar circumstance with yes, maybe a farewell call.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were back in time for another evening parade that evening. On 12 May Gen Shalikashvili hosted a dinner in honor of yourself and Gen Sullivan at his quarters at Ft Myer. Any final thoughts on the leadership styles of Gen Powell and Gen Shalikashvili?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, as I believe I have spoken earlier, they were both effective in their own right of personality and in the way that they operated. Without question, Colin Powell would be an almost impossible act for anyone to follow. He is a magnetic personality that just can always, you know, projects the image of the professional soldier, of the finest in military thought, is well spoken, is a good, fine-looking man and a distinguished looking soldier. So he would be hard to follow.

His style, he had had an enormous amount — I do not use the term negatively — but of bureaucratic experience. He knew how to deal in the bureaucracy of the military hierarchy or the Defense hierarchy or, indeed, at the White House level. So he would be extremely hard to follow.

Colin's style was one of consensus but consensus that was achieved through distinct leadership, of moving the Chiefs in the direction that he wanted to go. And, his style was also that of a man when the Chiefs corporately or even maybe one or two of us stood up and said, we do not think so, he would very quickly back away and listen some more. Maybe he came back to fight back another day and would eventually get his point, and that is probably the case.

But Gen Shalikashvili, as we have discussed

before, I think is one of the finest men you would ever want to meet. He would not be the Chairman if he were not. He was not as confident a leader because, you know, the Washington scene, he had not spent, he had certainly had assignments here, to include assistant to the Chairman, but that is a fairly awesome moment when you have just left the organization of the JCS as a three-star in which all the Chiefs are four-stars, you go off to be the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and a few months later they call you back and put you in charge of the people that you used to sit in the back row behind. That is a hard thing for anyone to do. He did that very well. He certainly was attentive to the Chiefs.

We may, you know, at a later time or perhaps have earlier, discussed the fact that I believed that the Chairman was perhaps drifting off the mark a little bit in not involving the Chiefs in the decision-making to the degree that he should have. But that is in large part maybe because of the magnitude of the job.

Colin was able to balance all of that, to be the Chairman, to be the national security figure that he was and at the same time ensure that he embraced the Chiefs in consultation and decisions. Gen Shalikashvili initially did not do that as well as did Gen Powell. By this time, I am not on hand to report, but I think that from my discussions with Gen Krulak from time to time he tells me that he is very actively engaged with the Chairman and the Chairman with him. So it appears that maybe Gen Shali has matured in that capacity and is doing a fine job as Chairman today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your busy travel schedule continued. On Thursday, 15 June, you flew to Newport to address the Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum and were back in time for a mess night at the Basic School at Quantico.

GEN MUNDY: Well, Current Strategy Forum is another that, of course, I think we have discussed before. It is comprised and is sponsored by the SecNav. It is the War College students and in addition to them it is a wide array of civilian executives and educators from around the country who, of course, pay their own way to come. But they then are involved. You know, it is a nice time of year in Newport and it is an event at which they get to mix it up with the students and to have some professional time there.

The mess night at the Basic School was the first event in the 38th anniversary of the 3d Basic Class of 1957. We called that event a "Passing the Torch"



Gen Mundy poses with his aides prior to retiring in 1995: LtCol Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., left, Col James C. Flynn, center, and Maj Christopher M. Bourne.

mess night. I had arranged as my Basic class, which is arguably one of the more active ones around, I think there are some of those of World War II and perhaps Korean vintage, they were smaller. Mine was 547 lieutenants so there were a lot of us. It became, has become very active and is truly a band of brothers.

I had arranged with Col Conway of the Basic School, even though it was not the time for this company to have its mess night, and it subsequently did, but this was Company C of the 3d Basic class of 1995. Each of us, each of the members of 357 bought a lieutenant for the evening. We bought his dinner. Of course, it did not include the whole company but I think it was about 120 or so of the 200 or so lieutenants in the company but it was all the capacity that could be accommodated in O'Bannon Hall.

So we went back, although we had not graduated from Basic School at Camp Barrett, we went back to the Basic School. We had a mess night. Each 3-57 member was seated with a 3-95 lieutenant. And, of course, these lieutenants were swept away by the fact of this is what you will, I think what I said to them was 38 years from now, look around the room, this is what you will look like and many of you will be as successful as have been the members of this class. So that was the "Passing the Torch" reunion of my Basic class.

BGEN SIMMONS: A very nice event. There was another parade at the Marine Barracks on Friday evening, 16 June. You and Mrs. Mundy were busy that weekend packing up and closing the Commandant's house. The actual moving out would take place while you were on your last trip to the Western Pacific.

On Tuesday, 20 June, you attended Gen Sullivan's retirement and that evening you and Mrs. Mundy left for Okinawa by way of Alaska. The 50th anniversary of the Battle for Okinawa was held on 23 June, a date that marked the end of the battle rather than the landing. You were the special guest at the commemoration which was rather muted compared with the observances at Guam and Iwo. What are your recollections of the event?

GEN MUNDY: Well, let me, as always, go back and develop a very lengthy oration here but let me just address a couple of the early points. I have spoken about the 3-57 mess night. The parade on the 16th of June was significant in that number 1, my Basic class had reported for training at the Basic School in about that time frame. As I recall, I think maybe the 19th of June was the date that we had to be, you know, had to report as lieutenants. This was the closest date to that.

So at that parade I was the reviewing official. In

other words, the guest of honor, I suppose one could make it, was me. And I used that occasion to, you know, recognize the Basic Class with the announcement that tonight we recognize the 3-57 and the reviewing official is the last officer of that class on active duty — me. And I received, did not ordinarily receive gun salutes at the parades normally, you know, for the change of command we did not. When Gen Gray and I changed command we did not do gun salutes. They take too long when everybody there gets one, so I elected that to be my final review.

So I was the reviewing official and those were my final 19 guns fired at that parade in honor of me and my Basic class and then, of course, the review was the last time that the Marines at the Barracks would pass in review for me because the next time I would appear on the field it would be as the out-going Commandant of the Marine Corps. So I set it up that way for a specific reason. We might talk about change of command later.

Yes, then on to, as you mentioned, passing through Gen Sullivan's retirement. Great soldier, one of the best chiefs of staff that the Army had or, in my judgment, will ever have.

And then on to Okinawa. That was just me. Linda remained behind to move us out of the house because this was to be a whirlwind trip. I had debated whether or not even to do this because indeed, I think by any measure anyone would have excused, you know, you are in your last ten days and surely you would stay around Washington and get moved out and get ready for the change of command. But I was ready, and once again, back to my repeated statement that I just could not in good conscience pass up these World War II events. So I wanted to be there on hand and we essentially flew straight out there and turned around, with only short stops, of course, at Wake Island or wherever I could manage to stop. We came back directly.

The event, as you have described it, on Okinawa was much more subdued because Okinawa is now, it probably is very difficult for the veterans to go back and even recognize where they were. So many of what would have been the landing beaches have been filled in and are now ports and extended areas. So probably they do not geographically resemble exactly as the veterans would recall them. The island is very much built up so, you know, the areas where they would have fought are now high-rise hotels.

But, nonetheless, there were the usual group of very patriotic Americans there, from all Services, but once again, even though it was the Tenth Army, even though it had been commanded, at least initially, by

an Army general, even though the Army, I think, outweighed us by a division — I believe, if I am not mistaken, there were four Army divisions and three Marine —

BGEN SIMMONS: Five Army.

GEN MUNDY: Five? Five Army divisions and three Marine, so it was a predominant Army show, but once again the Chief of Staff of the Army, of course he was brand-new, Gen Reimer, and he could be forgiven for not being there, but I think the Army was represented with a major general from Korea or something like that and there was no significant Navy representation again. So once again, the Marines were in the dominant position. There were more Marine veterans on the island than there were of any other Service and I was proud to be there with them.

The singular most moving part of that was the commemoration of the last day on Sugar Loaf Hill. This was the commemoration where both the Japanese veterans and the American veterans came together. Sugar Loaf is now being graded off. I think they are going to put a couple of oil tanks up there or something, but, I mean, it will not be Sugar Loaf as anyone will remember it. It was being prepared. There will be a monument there, I am sure, of some sort, but it had lost all identity.

A Japanese veteran, a lieutenant, spoke there and was assisted by his granddaughter because he had lost one arm and he gave a very, very moving speech. [Note: 1stLt Yoshinaka Yamamotu] The Japanese, of course, on such occasions write out their speeches and it is printed on one side in Japanese and the other side in English and they hand them out. So I have that and that will be, you know, in my papers somewhere. But he recounted the fact of how he had fought there and something that we do not, you know, we never make an image of, is how the other side fared.

BGEN SIMMONS: — 50th anniversary at Okinawa.

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that it was as miserable, wet, cold, muddy, bloody, however you described that, for the Japanese as it was for us. And he was very eloquent in bringing that point off. He had been wounded. He mentioned that he was a platoon commander and he had gone into battle with 51 men and I think by the third day he had only 14 men and half of them were wounded. He had been so severely wounded in his arm that he knew it had to come off and they could not get medical treatment and so he had, with his own samurai sword had cut his left

arm off. And so it was a moving tribute and then, of course, our division associations were represented there.

We had another dinner similar to the one before Iwo Jima up at the Club again. It was not, as you have mentioned, it was just not the same feeling as going back to Iwo Jima but it was a grand gathering and, of course, marked my final visit to Okinawa.

I did not make it a visit as such. I stopped at a couple of units but I was not there to see and be seen other than by the veterans and as soon as we finished the Sugar Loaf commemoration, Gen Fulford took me straight back to the airfield and I got on the airplane and left.

I might mention that I had, not on this occasion but on a previous occasion, just tying up the Okinawa route, when I was a battalion commander at Camp Hansen we had a favorite barber. She was a lady who would come to the Officer's Club and give haircuts. And a treat on a Saturday morning after we had done, I usually had a battalion run or a battalion field meet, but after we had completed that, you know, you would go up and get cleaned up and finish your business for the day and then get into your civilian clothes and whether you were going to go to town or were not, go up to the Club about mid afternoon and get a good haircut and massage, if there was time to do that, and then have a steak for dinner and maybe an extra beer with that and then that was sort of your weekend.

But at any rate this lady, we rediscovered each other after many years. I think that LtGen Jack Godfrey, who was a battalion commander with me out there, came across her. She was still cutting hair at that time. At any rate we established a contact and each time that I would go back to Okinawa why I would take a small gift. On occasion she would come down and see me at the airport and usually give me something. We still to this day exchange cards. I must have quite a thing for my barbers, as we can explain just a little bit later on as we go ahead, but at any rate, just an aside having nothing to do with the Iwo Jima or the Okinawa commemoration but being a nice thing to continue over the years.

BGEN SIMMONS: The next day on your way home you stopped once again at Wake Island. Picking up an extra day because of the International Date Line, you were home Saturday evening, 24 June.

On Sunday, you and your staff had a picnic at Bolling AFB. On Monday, you met with the new Army Chief of Staff, Gen Reimer, and there were calls by you on senators that day and the next.

On the afternoon of Tuesday, 27 June, you flew to

New River for a last visit to Camp Lejeune. You were back in time on Wednesday for a rehearsal with Gen Krulak of your change of command ceremony. I see that Mark Levinson, the clothier, made several visits to you during this period. Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, those several visits only got two suits. I think there were a number of visits. He was trying to adjust to my oddities in frame, I guess, to get me fitted.

I would only mention that even though it appears from the recount of all of this that Gen Krulak and I met for the first time on the Wednesday before we changed command on Friday, indeed we had been in frequent contact. And so not shown here on the schedule were a number of times in the office with him well before that.

He had been in town, oh, he had really established his transition office back in May, as I did when I was coming here. I recommended to him to do that. You here at the museum had been gracious enough to provide that transition office for him going in and then, of course, when he moved into the Commandant's office I moved out here to the transition office that the Directorate of History provided for us. At any rate, we had a good turnover and I think that we had exchanged all the information that is necessary. The trip down to Camp Lejeune on the 27th was purely a nostalgia trip and it was occasioned by the fact, I believe I have spoken earlier in the record here of Mr. Dan Willaford who when I reported to Camp Lejeune as a new second lieutenant from Basic School in March of 1958 — I reported in, was put up in the BOQ. I had left Linda at home with her parents to go down and report in. When I arrived there I ran into to one of my buddies in the bar at the Club that night and said, "Boy, I have to report to the Division in the morning. Where do I get a haircut?" And he said "Well, right up the hall there there is a barber."

So I went up to the barbershop, the same place that it is today at the O'Club at Paradise Point. Did not know the barber and it did not make any difference, but the man who cut my hair was a fellow named Dan Willaford and over the years as I would return to Camp Lejeune, either for duty or for a visit, I would go up to the barbershop and Dan Willaford was still there. He had begun cutting hair there in 1955.

So I think it was probably one of my trips there in, I do not know when, 1992 or 1993, Dan was failing in health a little bit. He had had a mild heart attack. His vision was beginning to fail. And so I was getting my hair cut, as usual, you know, "How are you doing, Dan?" And he said, "Doing fine," he said, but he said,

"You know, I am probably getting to about the time to where I am going to quit." So I light-heartedly made the comment and said, "Dan, you can't quit. I was going to get my last haircut on active duty from you."

Well, you could just see the man swell and I thought, what have I done here? But he said, "By golly, I will stay as long as you are going to stay then."

So, I had committed to go down and have Dan Willaford cut my hair. So we flew down, stopped, I got up the next morning, went down to the mess hall without all of the usual trappings that a general has to have about him, you know, ten cars and sergeants major opening the doors and everything, but just went down and grabbed a table full of Marines and ate breakfast with them and then came back out.

By that time Dan had opened his barbershop. I had asked the base at Camp Lejeune to get some public affairs coverage and invite in the local television and papers, not for me, but because Dan Willaford was a story in his own right that ought to be recorded. And so they did that. And so we had a couple of TV channels watching me get a haircut but it was Dan's interview. It was not my interview. We let him talk about how long he had been there. And so that was the reason.

And then we made Matt Hardiman, SgtMaj Matt Hardiman, retired Marine, runs the USO in Jacksonville and the Jacksonville USO is the oldest USO building still in existence. It is one of those that was built in World War II, an old big-frame building out in Jacksonville. It is still there and still owned by the USO and maintained. But anyway, SgtMaj Hardiman would always see me, as one of those faces that was always at every event at Camp Lejeune, always, and say, you have to come by the USO for a cup of coffee.

I had been there a couple of times but I called him, too and said, "Matt, on my way back to the airport I will be stopping in for a cup of coffee." So I did so, had a cup of coffee with him and he presented me with a USO mug which I still have. And he presented me with a tee shirt that was a design of a Marine emblem but in place of the land mass on the emblem there is a dinosaur. So the tee shirt is emblazoned, "Ye Regiment of Old Dinosaurs, A Retired Marine."

So this was my send-off from Camp Lejeune. And we got back in the airplane and flew up and, as you said, went over and rehearsed the change of command ceremony with Chuck Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 26 June SecNav Dalton approved a new award, a Marine Corps Recruiting

Service ribbon to recognize the challenges and successes of Marine Corps recruiters. This was the Marine Corps' first billet-specific award. Was this ribbon something you initiated?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I suppose, you know, it happened on my watch but even when I was a brigadier general in the Personnel Procurement Division we had discussed some sort of award for recruiters and that had probably gone on over the succeeding years. I was not specifically involved in it.

But when I came back to be the Commandant we again brought up the subject, sort of like the blue sweater, the award for the recruiters, and as such things go this bounces out to the field to see what the district directors think of it and then it comes back and the Headquarters staffs it around.

There was a great deal of non-concurrence with this. There was a lot of lack of support. Even the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, finally I overrode my own Sergeant Major, which ordinarily I listened to the Sergeant Major's advice. His position was that if we were going to give one to the recruiters we should give one to the drill instructors.

My rationale was based on the fact that recruiting is not like being a drill instructor. Indeed, being a drill instructor is one of the most demanding jobs in the Marine Corps but it is on the drill field. It is with two other drill instructors in the platoon with you. It is overseen by a structure that you have a, you know, a book that tells you when to put on ponchos, when to take off ponchos. In other words, it is a very rigid and prescribed duty in which, unless one's own personality, in which the stress or in which you, like a SSgt McKeon, you drink or something, you can only foul up, if you will, as a drill instructor by violating one of those very specific procedures.

So there is no question about the demand, but recruiting, on the other hand, is such a tremendous effort in which a young Marine — not all of them are young but for the most part a sergeant or a staff sergeant — we send out on the streets of America to indeed learn to be something that he innately has not been trained for in the Marine Corps, to become a salesman and to endure the continuing rejection of people saying "I do not want to be a Marine, no, I will not see you, get away from my son," all that sort of thing. It is a tremendously demanding job and a lot of them are not successful in it.

I wanted to make sure that those who are successful as recruiters were physically recognized as having accomplished what I consider to be one of the most demanding jobs in the Corps. And so, yes, we got the

recruiting ribbon through and I am very, very proud of that.

I might mention that I did not, that as in the case of all the awards that passed during my tenure in the personnel procurement business, we were able to get a Navy Unit Commendation, the equivalent of a, you know, of a Silver Star, a Unit Silver Star for the recruiting service back in those very difficult days of the early 1980s in recruiting. But I made sure that we exempted the Headquarters staff. I did not want this to be something that we got at Headquarters.

So in the case of the recruiting ribbon, even though Gen Davis, Gen Dick Davis who was commanding the recruiting command very ceremoniously brought me down a ribbon, I said, "Thanks a lot, Dick, I will keep it because it will mean a lot to me, but it is not an award and I do not rate it and will not wear it." So, I did not. But that is the story of the recruiting ribbon.

Yes, it was a billet-specific award and that is, it may be extraordinary, may be the only one in the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: We are now in your last few days as Commandant. Those days were marked by a very impressive series of events surrounding your retirement. I would like you to take us through that sequence of events.

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course, as you have mentioned earlier I was making calls on the Hill. I made my final calls with the SecDef, SecNav Dalton, with Gen Shalikashvili. All of those are back pat types of meetings. Those are not, even though I was prepared and had hoped for the opportunity, you know, for maybe SecDef Perry to say, "Well now, give me your thoughts as you go out the door" and to let me do that.

And, indeed, at that point most people just want to shake your hand and tell you that you have done a good job and they have enjoyed, and, you know, if they can help you in any way in the future please stay in touch and good luck. That is kind of an out-the-door.

SecNav Dalton and I did spend time. He did ask me, "I would like to have your views as you go out the door," and as I had been with him throughout, I was very candid on how I saw Navy/Marine Corps relations, which are always a little tenuous but in times of the shrinking budgets become extraordinarily stressful and are today and were then.

He asked me for my assessment of not only himself but of his staff and I gave that as candidly as I could. We have spoken earlier of my great concern with some of the personnel decisions made by the Navy

Secretariat, certainly they were ultimately decisions made by SecNav Dalton. I disagreed very strongly with a couple of those, not with all of them, and many of them I was completely on board. Even though I had taken forward a case that I felt deserved to be advocated, you know, your heart is more in some of those than in others.

So, I had, during our sessions we had had, as a SecNav and a Service Chief probably do, we had had some very tense sessions together where I was strongly in disagreement with a position the Secretary was taking. And fortunately, you know, because of the good rapport between us you were able to sit there even though his face would color red and mine would color red and we probably wanted to punch each other on occasion, but neither of us did that. But I was very candid with him on my judgement as to his personnel policies.

I was candid with him on my very express belief that the General Counsel of the DON during his tenure then, and I believe now, did not represent him well nor did it represent the Department well. The General Counsel is a necessary man and once again, I am not talking so much personalities here, but the General Counsel of the Navy in my judgement and in the experience that I had had should be an individual that advises the SecNav on those broad contractual and industrial problems, you know, that have to do with ship building, that have to do with managing very difficult situations with lawsuits against the Navy for failure to pay a bill or with lawsuits by the Navy against a manufacturer for cost overruns or, you know, failures of aircraft engines or ship design or what have you, or broad matters of, as the Counsel of the Commandant would advise me, broad matters of the use of the Marine Corps emblem or defending you against the many lawsuits by people that come in for perceived personnel grievances.

But the General Counsel is a civilian. He comes from a civilian background. He and his staff have a completely different focus than does the military lawyer. So when it comes time to judge a military person, be it officer or enlisted, on — I am not talking about criminal offenses at all, that is military law — but on judgements made, for example, by military officers that are second-guessed by those, in my judgement, not competent to second-guess them — and that is most especially the civilian counsels in the Department — I think that is fundamentally wrong.

SecNav Dalton and I had long disagreed. Were he here today he would know that. We had long disagreed on the fact that his closest advisors on personnel issues such as whether or not to promote an offi-

cer or whether or not to approve a selection board or other personnel issues, instead of relying on the military advice given him — in my judgement again, not with an inflated ego, but I was the senior-most Marine in the United States. I did have 38 years of experience in dealing with Marines and Marine Corps personnel problems. I should be, arguably, the best source of advice that he could get on that.

Second to that, if it is a legitimate legal question, the uniformed military, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, those experienced military lawyers are the people to give advice, or the personnel chiefs, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in the Marine Corps, the Commander of the Naval Personnel in the Navy. Those are the voices that should be listened to on these personnel issues in my judgement.

Unfortunately, because perhaps of the Tailhook circumstances in which the Secretary had to rely on civilian counsel because the military counsel that his predecessor had been provided — though I think history will record it differently — was arguably at question, therefore, he had to rely on his civilian counsel, he got into the habit of that. And, as a result, advice given the Secretary, which ultimately prevailed in his decisions, was given by civilian counsel that was not qualified to judge it. We had some very, very severe engagements on that issue between the Secretary and myself, with his decision being respected when he made it because, after all, I had very little alternative.

The final issue on that particular case involved the nomination of MajGen Don Lynch to be a lieutenant general. Don Lynch will retire, in fact, in a couple of weeks here, as a major general but he was the acclaimed nominee of the leadership of the Marine Corps. Every lieutenant general and general in the Marine Corps, as it was my habit to do business, had voted yes on advancing Don Lynch to three stars to handle a very responsible position in the Marine Corps. He was our considered corporate judgement as the officer most qualified to do that.

Unfortunately, without going into all of the circumstances here, there were no circumstances really, but Don Lynch's judgement as a commanding general was then second-guessed by the General Counsel of the Navy and the Secretary declined to nominate Gen Lynch.

I went back, I was very emotionally involved with this one. To put it very simply I was so mad I could not speak most of the time but I went back to reclama this and the Secretary, to his credit, agreed to go back over the weekend and rethink the case. I reemphasized it as best I could orally and I left him with all of

the documentation I could to persuade him that nothing had been done that would preclude Gen Lynch's nomination nor which would preclude the confidence that Gen Lynch could perform as a three-star officer.

I was given the advance word on Monday morning when I was to go back to see the Secretary for what I hoped would be his reconsideration, but the Marine aide called to say that it was not going to go my way, that once again he had decided to stick with the other advice. So I actually on that occasion composed my letter of resignation and carried it with me to this meeting. As I was going up the steps to the Secretary's office it was my intent, if he had said I do not intend to nominate Gen Lynch, it was my intent to lay my letter down and say well, I cannot support that decision and so I have no alternative but to resign.

That would have been, you know, only a couple of weeks, a few days before I was to retire, and as I went up the steps I guess in my final, you know, very agitated mental, you know, working this over in my mind, it came to me what advantage is there in this? Number 1, it will not get Gen Lynch promoted, number 2, I mean, the Marine Corps Commandant to resign two weeks before he was to retire would do, you know, it might make me feel good about my integrity but it would really accomplish nothing and arguably might damage us more than it would accomplish. So I did not. I never surfaced the letter and did not present it to him.

But at any rate I did, as I was checking out with him, go through once again my great frustrations over that particular area and, you know, we agreed to disagree with my views. But we parted very wholesome and good friends with good feelings and a very frank discussion between us.

The other events that occurred during that time following these checkout calls, if you will, SecNav and Mrs. Dalton hosted a very warm and congenial cruise on the CNO's barge, his big boat for those who do not know that admirals have barges, that is here at the Washington Navy Yard. It can accommodate about a dozen or so for dinner. We included Senator and Mrs. Howell Heflin. Senator Heflin had been my patron, shall we say, to become the Commandant, had introduced me at my Armed Services Committee hearing when I was being considered to be the Commandant.

Had the Heflins and the Krulaks, he said, "This really is for you," and I said "But Gen Krulak and I are such good friends, have him, too. You can hail the outgoing and the incoming." He did that. So we had a very nice evening with them. And then we both were staying, both Krulaks and us, here in the Visiting Flag Officer Quarters at the Navy Yard. We went up

and sat outside and talked, the four of us, a little bit that night.

The next morning, LtGen “Brute” Krulak and Mrs. Krulak and Zandi Krulak’s mother were here also staying in the Navy Yard so I had asked to have them all to breakfast. We did, the Krulaks and the Mundys, at a fairly leisurely hour. I think we had breakfast at 8:00 that morning or so in the Navy Yard but it was a private breakfast and just a very nice occasion where we could come together and as a blessing say a prayer for the new Commandant, if you will, as he was coming into office on his big day.

I gave each of the three ladies a gold chain with the Commandant’s flag, the metal flag, appended to it and they all wore them to the change of command later that day so they had apparently gone over. And I was able, the day before — I am skipping ahead here — but the day before we had successfully been able to get the President to promote Gen Krulak.

I mentioned that President Bush promoted me in the White House. To my knowledge, you may know differently, and I am sure that in history probably at some time or other it was done differently, but that was about the first time that a Commandant, at least of recent times, had been promoted in the Oval Office by the President with his family present. Col Pete Metzger, my executive assistant who had been military aide to President Reagan and who knew the White House well had facilitated that in my case so it was a very grand moment.

And the other purpose that it served, that President Bush even noted, he said, “You know, gosh, this is the first time I have ever promoted a four-star general.” And I said, “Well, Mr. President, do not worry about it, this is the first time I have ever been promoted by a President so it is all right.”

But it was significant for me to be able to remind through my chain of hand-written notes to the President through the Marine aide, to remind President Clinton that the only officer that the President of the United States, at least to this day, promotes at the assumption of a Service Chief or Chairman is the Commandant because usually the Commandant is a three-star going to four-stars. The other Chiefs of Services are already four stars. That, I think, triggered the mechanism that got us in the White House.

So, the Mundys and the Krulaks went to the White House. The President received Gen Krulak, made, you know, obviously kind remarks in my behalf and then promoted Gen Krulak in the presence of his mother and father and, of course, his family, his sons and daughter-in-law and so on. It was a very warm

event. We were able to get that done.

President Clinton then asked, had asked that Linda and I remain behind just for a brief moment and the, the President, my checkout call and again this would, I am not one to blow my own horn, but I think for the record for the Marine Corps it should be said that his parting words to me, in fact he said in front of the Krulaks before, but he said, “I would like for you to know that of all the generals and admirals that I received advice from and that I dealt with in my tenure, I would like for you to know that I always knew that you were giving me your most candid advice and that what you said you meant.” I could not have been paid a finer compliment personally or, I think, again institutionally, you know, by a President than that.

So I felt, I take that one away with me and I will leave it for the record here, not as a great achievement of Carl Mundy, the man, but I thought it was a tremendous statement for the President to say that of all he received advice from that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was the one that he knew he was getting it dead-head from.

So, anyway, we had a nice occasion there. And the next morning would have been the breakfast for the Krulaks. Following that we probably broke up about 9:00. I came into the office. You know, we had for all intents and purposes cleaned out of the office. At that time I came in and signed whatever I still had remaining to sign, not much, did not really have much work to do.

I also wanted to depart the Headquarters as a commander so I had told Gen Hearney that I would like for him to assemble, at least representatively, the staff. I would like to have all the generals and the key civilians. I frankly, you know, my mind was a clutter and I do not really remember, I guess maybe we just did it with the uniformed officers there.

So we had, akin to the departure of a commander on any occasion, when you go out and shake hands with your staff and greet them and they say farewell to you. We went out and someone had gotten the Drum and Bugle Corps over. That probably was more than I sought to do, but anyway we had the civilians outside the Headquarters and anyone who wanted to be there. And then I just went out on the front steps. The staff was formed up out in the parking lot, my personal staff with Col Flynn in charge, Gen Hearney in charge of the general staff with the generals being there, and then as it turned out the band there, the Drum and Bugle Corps.

We went out and they played the “Marine’s Hymn,” or something like that, which was, of course, intend-

ed to choke me up so that if I had to make any remarks I could be sure to make a blubbing fool of myself there. I think I got through that by not making a lot of remarks. But anyway, I just thanked the staff and reminded them that in any, whatever a leader may be is because of the people that serve him on a staff. And so I expressed my appreciation to them, went out, shook hands with each member of my personal staff, you know, took Gen Hearnery's salute, shook hands with the generals, walked back. My car drove up and I got in it and drove off and left the Headquarters.

Drove over to the Navy Yard. It was then, I think I had arranged to leave at about noon or so, the change of command was at 1500. We may want to correct that but I recall 1500. I had worried about that because it was Friday, it was rush hour traffic and all those worries that you just have to say, well, whatever it is it is going to be at 1500.

I have long believed, though I have been a participant more usually than not, but I have long believed that the assumption of command is exactly that — the king is dead, long live the king — and that all too often a change of command becomes a farewell to the outgoing and when people come through the receiving line or when remarks are made that there is this great attribution to the outgoing commander to the exclusion of the incoming commander who is almost not there on many occasions, particularly if it is a retirement.

So I wanted to do a change of command that was completely separate from recognition, from retirement, from all of that sort of thing. Doesn't work entirely because, I mean, obviously, SecNav Dalton was only going to speak at one occasion and so he had to extol my virtues as well as praise Gen Krulak coming in.

But we went up to the Barracks. It could not have been a more perfect day. It was one of those days, usually around the 1st of July temperatures in Washington are unforgiving but this was a blue sky day with moderate temperatures and it was a very pleasant day to be out at the Barracks. We had a change of command. Like all, they take too long but we had a lot of moving parts with passage of command, the review of the troops, the change of command.

I wanted, we had not before had the Commandant sworn in at that ceremony and I wanted to do that because ordinarily that is done, I do not know why but the SecDef hosted an affair the next week over in the Pentagon and like he does with the other Chiefs of Staff of the Services, you are formally sworn in by the SecDef as the Commandant. I thought it good to do that before the Marine Corps and so we did it on the

field at the Barracks. SecNav Dalton administered the oath to the 31st Commandant. We then brought him back into the reviewing area and fired his first guns for him which I also thought was important to do.

And so as we, unlike previous events, my own assumption of command where, as I think I have recorded earlier, Gen Gray held firm to the fact that, you know, at the stroke of midnight on the 30th of June he would no longer be the Commandant and I would. And I think that, I do not mean that Gen Gray, I think that previously maybe Gen Kelley and Gen Barrow had passed that way, but at any rate, I wanted Gen Krulak to walk off the field as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, not to stand to my left as the reviewers came by.

So we swore him in as the Commandant. We installed him. There was no question of who was the Commandant and we then put him on the right and then the troops went by and he returned the salute, I did not, because it was his. They were reviewing for their new Commandant and I had had mine on the 16th of June.

And then Linda and I, I was taken, as I lived at the Barracks, I was taken with a, called the "play-off." All the Barracks' officers when they get ready to leave the Barracks come out and the band plays a couple of tunes that they prefer and then they simply walk down the line of their fellow officers at the Barracks, shaking hands, and they disappear into Center House, usually to buy a round of cheer or something and they are gone.

So I had arranged for a "play-off." I do not think we had done that before with Commandants. So Linda and I, after Gen Krulak had the troops pass in review, the troops marched off the field; the Drum and Bugle Corps remained, played "The Blue Bells of Scotland," which is one of my favorites, "Drums in My Heart A'Drumming," and then spread and we marched off down the center, presumably to be gone.

As an interesting note here you will recall that I said the night before we had sat and talked with the Krulaks for awhile. I could tell that Zandi Krulak was uneasy about the next day, quite naturally, and we were attempting to assure them that it was going to be great and that they would really feel good.

But finally I asked her, about the time that we were to break up I said, "Zandi, there is something that you are not at ease with here." We were not, when Linda and I walked off the field it was our intent to walk out the back of the Barracks and get in the car and to leave for the Navy Yard and the Commandant would be there, Gen Krulak, the new Commandant. Zandi said, "I am worried that if you all leave like that, that peo-



Gen Mundy, center, and Gen Krulak, right, “troop the line” during the change of command on 30 June 1995. Col John B. Sollis, left, the Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., accompanies the 30th and 31st commandants.

ple will perceive that we do not get along or that we are having the reception and did not invite you” or any number of things that she could conjure up that worried her. So I said, “Does this bother you?” And she said, “Yes, it does.” And I said, “We will not leave, we will come up and stand in the receiving line with you for a short time.”

So we did not go through with our plan to walk away from the Barracks but we did go up and stand with the Krulaks, as I recall, for about a half an hour or forty-five minutes until at least the Chairman and the officialdom, if you will, could come through the reviewing area. And then we left because I did want Gen and Mrs. Krulak to be the honorees that day and not Gen and Mrs. Mundy leaving.

We left, came back down to the Navy Yard. We had our family down here — they had not gone to the reception, we had decreed that — and close friends but we had them down here at the Navy Yard. I think we went down to the Museum and we had some Kentucky Fried Chicken and sodas and whatnot and had a snack and probably left it all over the Museum for you to clean up here the next day. And then went back up to prepare for my retirement ceremony which was a separate ceremony.

To me the Mecca of the Marine Corps has always been the Iwo Jima Monument in Arlington Cemetery. It is the most striking monument, I would argue, in Washington. Someone might say the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, those sorts of things, certainly they are to an individual, but to any institution in the country I think the Iwo Jima Monument is a national monument. It should say something for all of our Armed Forces, and indeed does, but certainly for the Marine Corps. To me that is where the ghosts of the Marine Corps are. So I wanted to retire, I would have almost done the change of command at the Iwo Jima Monument but it is a tremendous logistics burden and secondarily, the Commandant should be able to receive in his house.

We had moved out of the Commandant’s House ten days or so early. I had carefully caused the Barracks to perform all the maintenance on the house over the final six months that we were there so that we could move out, they could come in and do such minor touch-up painting as they needed to, change the carpets, whatever the Krulaks wanted to do, but I wanted the new Commandant to sleep in the Commandant’s House his first night as the Commandant. Ordinarily, that has not been done

because they needed to do maintenance on the house or the Commandant chose to remain there. So we were able to force the Krulaks to move into the house and to be the occupants on the first night as the Commandant and they did that.

But, at any rate, we had set up a separate retirement ceremony. I have long had affection for the military tattoo as a ceremony. I am quite taken with the British pomp and circumstance and so I sought to copy that occasion as much as I could. We went to the monument at, I think at, we wanted to give time for the reception, that was one of the reasons for having the 3:00 o'clock, I believe. I do not recall the hour at the monument but it was at dusk, and we went up at about probably 1900 or so that we started this event.

It was full dress again. I know that, I would mention again only for the record that when I walked off the field I removed the laurel from my Barrack's cap that connoted the Commandant because, again, I wanted to send a very clear signal, there is only one Commandant and he is the only man in the naval service, as a matter of fact, who wears that Cesarian laurel on his dress cover. So my two sons and I were the participants in the ceremony in addition to the Marine Band.

I had asked Col Bourgeois and had worked with him for six months to get this right. I admire John Bourgeois. He will go down as one of the greats, but I could not cause John to realize that this was not a concert in the Kennedy Center on a Friday evening but that I wanted him to say with music what I was not going to say in words, and I did not say anything in words. I wanted all of the music to reflect the things that I might have commented on if I had commented. So it took a lot of doing to get that done and probably did not come out perfect in the end. But John would keep coming back to say, "but a great march is, you know, the Black Horse March," and I would say, but "John, I am not here to talk about black horses. I want you to play 'Waltzing Matilda' because that, you know, that is the Marines in World War II or 'I want you to play when Johnny Comes Marching Home' or whatever it was."

So, at any rate, we finally structured the ceremony and we had the tattoo and then at the end of that tattoo the boys and I walked up together. Sam, as my senior son, and adjutant read my final orders from the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "From the Secretary of the Navy, to General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Subject: Release from active duty. At midnight, 30 June 1995, you are released from active service, on that date, you will have served 38 years, 6 months, and 22 days as a United States Marine. Signed John H. Dalton." I,

then drew sword and executed my final sword salute and they played, I think, "Sunset," which is a favorite of mine and "The Last Post" which also is a favorite. We do not use it. The British usually use that but I used it. And then I returned sword and unbuckled my sword and put it on Tim, my youngest son. He has a sword of his own but I wanted to symbolize that passage on to the boys. Then they moved forward and I stood behind them and they drew sword and executed and, of course, I was neutered at this point. I was no longer a warrior because I had passed on my sword.

And then we brought out my personal color and retired it. I do not think I, I have not seen the Marine Corps do that before. I have seen the Air Force do that, frankly, I got the notion from the Air Force, but we brought out the personal color and furled it, rolled it up, with the two boys and me and the Color Sergeant of the Marine Corps bringing that out for me, and then they cased it.

So I was now, my color was gone, my personal flag was cased, my sword was passed and it was time to go. And so Sam, our oldest son, went down and fetched his mother and brought her up and the boys kissed her goodbye and I kissed her hello, I think, and took her by the arm and we marched off to the song of the Marines, "Over the Sea, Let's Go, Men," and then got in the car and drove back to the Navy Yard. As we walked off, and the music ceased. Tim my junior son, concluded the ceremony with the words, "Ladies and gentlemen, my father asked that he leave you with these words: Long live the United States and success to the Marines."

My staff, MGySgt Michael Sheftz, who ran the Social Office of the Marine Corps and a fine Marine, is also a member of the Washington Rolls Royce Club. So while I had had my personal car brought up and had ridden up in it, as a matter of fact, and was prepared to get behind the wheel and drive home, no, another driver had taken that off and here is a shiny black Rolls Royce which both he and Staff Sergeant Mike Levering also in my office got into and put us in the back seat and there was a bottle of champagne from the staff.

So we drove back to the Navy Yard through the monuments of Washington, down Constitution and through the city, past the White House and past the Monument and on into the Navy Yard and they let us out. We did not drink the champagne frankly. I would hate for the staff to know that but I just was not really in much of a celebrating mood. It was, you know, you have mixed emotions at those occasions. And then we went back to the Navy Yard and —

GEN MUNDY: — for the last time and I would like to state for the end of this long oration that I never even thought about rain. Earlier in the week I had just erased rain or anything from my mind. I had told the Barracks commander and told Col Flynn, my military secretary, both of whom had inquired, “What about foul weather?” I had said, “if it rains we get wet. If it is raining hard it is the first Marine Corps change of command in utilities that would be done for awhile, but be prepared.” And they said, “Well, what about the spectators?” And I said, “the spectators can stay home or they get wet but we do the change of command regardless.” So I had just erased that from my thinking and the weather of the day was just absolutely beautiful.

As we got into the Rolls Royce to drive off through the town the first raindrops hit the windshield and by the time we arrived at the Navy Yard there was a light gentle rain. So, you know, nothing could have been grander. I could not have stood down from the Marine Corps, either turned over command of the Marine Corps or stood down from active duty, you know, in any style that I would have preferred or with anything undone that I would have done other than exactly the way it occurred. So indeed for me it was just a spectacular day and one goes home with the emotions of the sadness of well, it is over, but really with the fulfillment of, “My goodness, how would I have done it any differently,” at least at the end piece there. So that was the change of the command of the 30th and the 31st Commandants and the retirement of the 30th.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was done with great style. It is an established custom that outgoing Commandants leave a significant furnishing for the Commandant's House. What was your gift to the house?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am going to say very briefly because I believe that Linda is going to have an opportunity to contribute to this oral history and perhaps it would be well for her to describe in detail because it was her grandmother's sofa that we left. It is a sofa of circa about 1830 to 1850. It is a grand piece of furniture. We had had it completely refurbished, all taken apart, reglued, all brilliant inlaid, I mean, beautiful inlaid wood refurbished and recovered and so on. So we left that because we thought, one, it matched the vintage of the Commandant's House. It was made in the early years of the Commandant's House and it is a very meaningful family piece that while one might argue that we would want to keep it and move it around the Marine Corps

with one of the kids some more, it is one of those things that eventually would go to the junk heap because somebody would get tired. This way we would hope that it would be perpetuated in the Commandant's Home.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 30 June Gen Krulak did indeed become the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. On that last day of your tenure as Commandant the strength of the Armed Forces was 1,547,185 of whom 171,946 were Marines. You had successfully defended a program strength of 174,000. Can you explain how or why our end strength had dropped some 2,000 Marines below that figure?

GEN MUNDY: It was as perhaps I have commented earlier, because of one, the manpower management difficulties. I think historically the Marine Corps in the summer dips because that is when we put in the majority of Marines, that is when their enlistments expire and the majority of them get out in the summer. Their reliefs are coming in but they are still just entering the recruit training depots and just beginning to come into the Marine Corps. So I believe I am accurate in saying that we probably always dip at that time.

However, the other reason is that the, in order, once, to use a colorful descriptive, once the submarine starts to dive, as the Marine Corps when I got here was diving toward a 159,000 and indeed was only pulled up a couple years earlier, the mechanisms for going down were all in place. We were discharging NCOs, we were trimming the size of the Marine Corps. The recruiting force had been trimmed down by a couple of hundred recruiters and it simply had to do with buoying the submarine, with, you know, coming out of a dive and then coming back to the surface and it takes a little time to do that. So we knew that we were going to be under and we knew that it would take us two or three years to be able to come back to a steady-as-she-goes end strength of 174,000.

BGEN SIMMONS: If you have nothing else that you would like to add, I suggest we end this session at this point.

Adjusting to Retirement

Planning for retirement . . . Primary considerations . . . Choosing a home near Mount Vernon . . . Vital statistics . . . Recreational pursuits . . . Employment opportunities . . . Travel and speaking engagements . . . Becoming President, World USO . . . Family affairs . . . The future

BGEN SIMMONS: General, in our last session we covered the events of your last six months as Commandant. In this session we will cover your activities since the 1st of July, 1995. Since you have been retired for less than a year I do not expect this to be a very long session. Nevertheless, I expect it to be a very interesting one.

When did you first start consciously planning for your retirement?

GEN MUNDY: Probably it is accurate to say about November of 1994 and, that is I will take your meaning in the sense of consciously planning as opposed to, you know, going through the normal where do we settle or that sort of thing, but we began about November because as I have mentioned, I believe, in an earlier session, I discussed with Sec Dalton the naming of the 31st Commandant and told him that I would get to him the necessary information for him to consider by December to do that and then he could begin his consultations and considerations after the turn of the year. So, I got essentially through the Birthday Ball season and then sat down to personally bring together the materials and the guidance that I thought he would need to get into choosing my successor. So that was in the, you know, in mid November into — about the 15th of December, as I recall, I delivered to him the book that I had put together, maybe about the 20th of December, just before Christmas.

We had before that time, we knew, we had come to the conclusion that we did want to stay in northern Virginia. I think that one fundamentally decides, you know, do you go where there is a job or something that you want to do or a place that you want to, you know, play golf or something or do you find a place and then let all of that come to you? We determined the latter although there might have been some influences on that and I can speak to them in a minute.

We had been for some time riding around in the area where we eventually relocated one zip code over

from where we had owned our home for 18 years in northern Virginia. We had been looking at houses and we intensified that then beginning in January. We made the decision to sell our beach house down in North Carolina to generate funds to get into a new house and we began looking sincerely then for a house up in these parts. We would go off in January and February and ride around the neighborhoods and look at different areas and different houses. So I think it would be fair to say November and on into January is when we were focused on retiring.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you seek the counsel or advice or any of the previous Commandants?

GEN MUNDY: Well, whether I sought it or whether it came freely, but it in some respects came freely but unquestionably with me from time to time saying to them as I would see them, “Well, how did you do this or, you know, what did you do?” The advice that I got, of course the summer before my retirement Gen Lou Wilson, I had hosted a parade for him that season and one of those that he included on his guest list was the chairman emeritus of Merrill Lynch Corporation, a man by the name of Bill Schreyer. And at the garden party beforehand Gen Wilson was standing talking with him. I walked up and anyway, Gen Wilson said to Schreyer, “now you know, Carl will be transitioning out of here next summer, and I talked to him some about boards and things of that sort, and maybe you could be of assistance.”

So, Mr. Schreyer said, “Well,” he said, “that is very interesting.” He said, “perhaps next spring I will give you a call and we will get together for lunch and we will discuss your post retirement opportunities.”

Well, he was faithful to that point and the following April I had a call from him saying he would like to come in for lunch. He did. He talked about board opportunities and, you know, later, I would say about the first of June, he called me back to say that he was going to, he was on the nominating committee of the

Schering Plough Corporation board and that he was going to discuss that with the chairman and the president. And I subsequently got a call saying we would like to get together and we did so — after I had retired, not before I retired.

So that was the Wilson advice, and, if you will, sponsorship that, you know, in effect put me on my first board, I think. Gen Barrow had certainly counseled. He, too, because he chose to go the board route, so to speak, he talked about the desirability of that sort of thing. The other Barrow advice that I got that I did not follow, in his classic, you know, Louisiana fashion he said, “Where are you looking to settle?” And I said, “Well, I think we may stay right here in northern Virginia.” And he said, “no, no, no.” He said, “listen,” he said, “you know a retired general is a dime a dozen in Washington. They are all over the place. All your neighbors will be some general or admiral and you will see them everywhere you go.” So he said, “you should go where you can be somebody.” I will never forget that phraseology, “go where you can be somebody.”

So, I said, “Well, what do you mean by that?” And he said, “Well, go where, you know, where it means something to be a retired general.” I said, “Well, I would like to do that but not all of us have 1700s dynasties in Louisiana, you know, that we can go back to in a small town,” where I am sure he is certainly a notable figure.

But, at any rate, that was lighthearted advice but it did give me cause to then think through the options. He may be right. Would it be better to go, for example, back to western North Carolina or back to eastern North Carolina or somewhere else in Virginia or elsewhere? Fundamentally we came to conclude that northern Virginia is the place for us. We like it here and so we did not follow that advice.

And then Gen Al Gray, who I saw and still see from time to time in town here, his advice and counsel was be very careful how much you commit yourself because everyone will come to see you to ask you to do something, most of it pro bono or would you fly out and speak at a Marine Corps League meeting or would you, you know, do something for the young Marines or all those things that we want to do. But he had had the experience of over-committing himself and, in fact, running up quite a large indebtedness on his own account by accepting so many of these things and so his counsel was to be very careful and do not feel at all awkward about saying, “Well, I would be happy to consider that, what are the arrangements? What are the travel arrangements or what is the lodging?” And if they say to you, there are none, then you

want to think very carefully whether you would, you know, incur several hundred dollars of indebtedness to go out and do something — that might be worth doing — but to watch that. So that was the type advice that I got from my predecessors and again, they all had been this way before and so they approached me anywhere from a year to a few months of retirement to offer that advice.

BGEN SIMMONS: You now have a lovely new home adjacent to Mount Vernon. What decided you on this particular location and the house itself?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the location was that we have lived for, you know, or owned a home and lived there periodically for the past 18 years, as I mentioned, one zip code over just beside Fort Hunt School. It used to be a high school. It is no longer a high school but Fort Hunt in the Mount Vernon area. So we liked that area. I liked, I used to ride my bicycle in on the bike path to work. Did a lot of bicycling, did a lot of running down along the river.

I enjoy being around water. There is something reviving about being near the water to me. And so the river had a natural appeal if you were not going to go to the ocean or go, you know, some place out on the bay. So, we liked that area.

Mount Vernon is historic. You know, I think we have discussed enough that I hear the beat of the drums most all the time and so there is something nice about being in an historic area.

And, then, fundamentally, we discovered a development there that is called Wycliffe where there were new houses. They were houses of the 90s with a great deal of space and a great deal of light and windows, a bigger house probably than we need, but one that is very comfortable to be able to completely spread out in and not crowded.

So, we became enamored of these houses and of this development and began to look there. Every time that we would go out to look somewhere we would always seem to find our way coming back along old Mount Vernon Highway and turning off into Wycliffe.

And finally one day after we had decided that if we were going to go there we probably were going to have to build, we happened to just drive by a house that had just literally the day before gone on the market. And it turned out to be a house that was about two and a half years old, was owned by a retired rear admiral and a good friend of mine and so it did not take long and we had a deal on the house. And we are in there now spending enormous resources landscaping it and painting it and putting draperies up at all

these big windows that we like so well. But we will get it eventually and I think we will be very happy there.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sure you will. What did it feel like, say on the 2nd of July, when you awakened in the morning and realized that you were retired? For nearly 40 years you had lived a very structured and demanding life. Now suddenly your life was very much your own. Were you conscious of this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I believe it takes a while for the conscious realization that you can get up today and do something if you want to or you really do not have to get up and do something today, out of that structured life that said that every morning you should get up, shave, get dressed and be in the office or on the field or wherever you were supposed to be by whatever time, usually a very early hour. To be able to realize that you did not have that compulsion takes a little while to sink in. And it sinks in, in my case, very comfortably so.

So you ask the first morning, I think that we had stayed overnight at the Navy Yard. We discussed riding back in the Rolls Royce to the Navy Yard and getting out and going up. It was late in the evening. That must have been about 11:00 o'clock and I can recall going up and sitting down and drinking an O'Douls non-alcoholic brew and probably munching on a few peanuts or something and just kind of sitting there with the feeling that I believe comes always to one who has just turned over command. I never experienced it otherwise. And that is that at the time that you pass your battle color of command there is a euphoria of satisfaction, a good feeling.

I have never been relieved of command, never been fired, so I have not had the feeling of failure when I have passed over. And even though you, as you look back you wish you could have done a dozen, if not scores of things, differently and better, or could have addressed things that you did not take on or might have, you know, done something else, fundamentally I had a great feeling of satisfaction. The Marine Corps was, whatever its end-strength, or you know, whatever its state of equipment was at least measurably, I thought, in fairly good shape. So there is that euphoria.

There is at the same time a tremendous feeling of relief. We call it "dropping the pack straps" when you, you know when you "drop your pack" you are lighter on your feet and you feel a weight off your shoulders. I never, you know, consciously walked around feeling like command was a burden, but it is.

It simply is. You are responsible, you are accountable, you are, the buck stops here or whatever you want to say about that. So there was a feeling of, the next morning as we got up, we slept until, you know there was nothing that made us get up. I think the sunlight coming through the window probably woke us up and we got up. I put on a pair of shorts and this t-shirt that I described that said "Ye Regiment of Old Retired Dinosaurs," or whatever it was. I put that on because we were about to load all of our belongings into a borrowed pickup truck.

It was a brand new truck that my gunnery sergeant driver owned. We had given him our car and we borrowed the truck because we wanted to go to North Carolina and pick up some of the family belongings. So we had to, of course, we had been living in the Navy Yard for several days and I had every uniform that I owned to be packed up plus civilian clothes plus what we were going to take with us and what we had.

We had brought several suitcases down here to the museum and stuffed them in the office that you provided for me. And then I think we drove from here and made one of our very favorite stops which is usually by a McDonalds in the morning and bought a sausage and egg biscuit and a large coffee and headed down the highway toward North Carolina.

So there was a great feeling, you have accurately, I think, described liberation and there was no sadness that was remarkable at that point. It was like when you go on leave. It is exciting. We are going to be in North Carolina for a couple of weeks and then we will come back and we have a new house to move into and it is summer and you can be in shorts and a t-shirt and it feels good outside.

We came down from the quarters, the Visiting Flag Quarters at the Navy Yard in which we were staying, with all of these loads of suitcases and things. I pulled the truck up and here I am out here loading the suitcases and it was very obvious to me that the young Marine sentry in the gate, of course his duty was to be there and was to man his post, but as I would come down and then Linda would come down hauling something it was apparent that he felt this, you know, compulsion that he should somehow come over and help load that truck. And he would keep saying, "Can I give you a hand, sir?" He was in his blues. And I kept saying, "No, son, you just keep your eye geared to your duties there and we will do this." So, he probably had a good deal of amusement and has tales to tell about watching the former Commandant and his wife throwing all of this stuff in the back of the pickup truck to get out of town.

We left. After we had hit the McDonalds and had a

good, greasy breakfast on the way down the road we swung by Quantico because both of our sons and their families were there. We just swung in to kind of touch base with them and then headed on to North Carolina.

Emotions came later, not ever, you know, really deep-seeded emotions or depressions, but as we came back to Washington two weeks later instinctively your mind says to you, "Okay, now I am coming off leave and tomorrow morning I will get back in my khaki shirt and green trousers and I will be in the office at 7:30." So you had to kind of adjust to the fact that "No, I will not be doing that." Even I never really, I did not feel any real down emotions.

The other thing that I would say, and I am going on and on with this, is that you and I have discussed, of course, the fact that I wanted to undertake my oral history and the transition right away and so you had provided an office here at the Navy Yard. Some of my staff was here, Col Jim Flynn, my military secretary who himself was retiring, and he would be here with GySgt Ana Prada who was my secretary.

So I did, in one sense, come back to work albeit in a blue suit instead of in a green suit, and was able to then be very active here for a matter of several weeks.

We began the oral history sessions at that time. So it was almost as though I was on duty again but at a very relaxed pace of coming in at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and going home at 3:00 instead of, you know, staying all day and working hard.

Did I miss the Marine Corps? Of course. As much as you do as we sit here today in the sense of still being able to be a part of it. And again, in the sense of satisfaction and a certain relaxation that comes with liberation from responsibility and from the burdens of command.

BGEN SIMMONS: In a much earlier session when we were discussing your entry into the Marine Corps, we listed your vital statistics. Part of your retirement process was a very thorough physical examination. Did your 40 years of service leave you with any lingering medical problems?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the medical problems were probably ones that would have been there anyway. You know, I had sustained no severe wounds or indeed, injuries, during my active service. My joints were a little bit stiffer, probably, you know, years of running on concrete roads or jumping out of airplanes or whatever might contribute to that. My back, lower back, you know, I need to stretch very well when I get up in the morning to kind of stretch out the lower back. That undoubtedly was some impact that, you

know, that had occurred along the way. And then your vision is not quite what it used to be; hearing, a little loss of higher frequency hearing which comes from loud explosions of artillery or riflery, I mean, musketry or whatever it is that does that to you. But the bottom line is that no, I was and am in rather good physical condition, I believe.

BGEN SIMMONS: Let's record those vital statistics once again. Height?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will record my height as I came into the Marine Corps. I will say 5'11-3/4" and the reason for that is that I always wanted to be at least six feet tall, if not taller, and I could never quite get up there. So I always was 5'11-1/2 5'11-3/4. So, I have slumped a little bit now and I am probably a good solid 5'11" and that is a good height.

BGEN SIMMONS: Weight?

GEN MUNDY: Weight right now is probably about 184. I recall that my leanest ever that I can ever recall weighing was when I was going through Junior PLCs in the heat. And the stress and the activity of my Junior PLCs, I can remember 154 pounds, but I was down by probably at least 12 maybe even 15 pounds because they literally ran it off of us and you were dehydrated most of the time.

So my normal, I would ordinarily would be, should be, if I were at a good fighting weight I would be about 175. I am about 185 or so now so I have probably relaxed and added about ten pounds, not all of it since retirement but just, you know, I am ten or twelve pounds beyond where I probably was about the time I came into the Corps.

Blood pressure is still good. My eyesight, I was a 20/20 when I came into the Marine Corps. I think I am about a 20/30 and 20/50 now. So I use glasses to watch television or sometimes to read with but most of the time I still operate without glasses.

BGEN SIMMONS: Waist measurement?

GEN MUNDY: Waist measurement? Probably I am about a 36. I was about a 33, maybe might have been 32 to 34 when I came into the Marine Corps. So, yes, you do settle toward the midsection a little bit.

BGEN SIMMONS: Not very important for the record, but your statistics are about the same as mine.

GEN MUNDY: Is that right?

BGEN SIMMONS: Not very much physical deterioration I would say for 40 years.

GEN MUNDY: No, I think I have held pretty good, haven't I?

BGEN SIMMONS: You have always lived a vigorous physical life. What physical activities have you carried over into your retirement?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I have pretty much stopped running because I developed a bone spur, or an inflammation in the heel, here some years ago and the doctor took me off running and said you can walk as actively as you want to, but you want to get away from the pounding types of exercise, anything that is causing you to land heavily on your feet or to drive your heels into the ground. So I walk fairly actively, and routinely that will be three to five miles at a pretty fast clip. A Sunday morning walk would be a five-miler, a during the week walk is probably a three-miler just because of the time constraints of getting that done.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you walk around the neighborhood?

GEN MUNDY: I do walk around the neighborhood. I go out of our house down along Ferry Landing Road past the house of one of your predecessors, usually meet him, Col Frank Caldwell who I believe was your immediate predecessor here at the Museum in the History Division. I see him usually walking his dog and we pass the time of day. And then on out to Mount Vernon Road and up the road.

On the long walk I would walk up to where Old Mount Vernon Highway passes Mount Vernon Road or crosses over it and I would take a left there and go down and then go out and come in around Mount Vernon and then back down and then up Old Mount Vernon Road, and that is about a five mile walk. That would, you know, that normally is about an hour and fifteen minute walk or so. That would be my long, right now, long range.

Still have the bicycles, both Linda and I have one. They are long out of use and I count it as an objective of this fairer weather coming upon us now to get my bike back in shape and do some time out on the bike paths because there are excellent bike trails coming down from Mount Vernon or in that area.

And we have some weight equipment, one that came in the house, a six-station universal type machine. I have a Nordic Trak. We have a treadmill

that Linda tends to use. I tend to use the Nordic Trak more. So generally speaking most every day I get some degree of either outside or inside exercise.

I am trying to learn to become a better golfer. I have about reached the point where I have decided that that is not an achievable goal. I do not think I will ever master the game of golf but people that I play with keep assuring me that I will if I keep at it.

So I am probably in more gentle forms of recreation now. I still like boating. I do not own a boat but I think that probably footwork and the things that I have described here will be my recreational activities and athletic activities in the future.

BGEN SIMMONS: Have there been any particular changes in your life style since retiring?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I mentioned earlier, much of the mental stress that I am not sure one even realizes is there, there are times when you very distinctly are aware that you are under tremendous stress, and if you can recognize that then you do something to deal with it. Usually exercise was my way out. If I was really feeling a great deal of pressure anywhere along the way, whether it was as the Commandant or elsewhere, if I was smart enough to stop whatever I was doing and go get into my athletic clothes and go out and either run or walk, by the time I came back in from that walk, much of the pressure — you can think, you can solve problems, you can work out if you have frustrations or if you want to grind your teeth a little bit. Why out running is a good place to grit your teeth and maybe take some of the tension out. So that always worked for me.

But I think that there is a tremendous amount of stress off. I feel better than I can ever remember feeling at any time in my life and am probably sleeping more and sleeping better because the numbers of evenings that you are out and having dinner at 9:00 or 9:30 and then getting up and making a speech and, you know, falling into bed at close to midnight and getting up at 5:00 the next morning to get on an airplane and come back to Washington or go somewhere else, those are not there as much. Civilian life or the private sector or however you would chose to describe it is much more, I think, gentle. I am sure there is stress with profit-oriented corporations and others but generally speaking, no one starts a meeting at 7:00 in the morning in the private, no one is there at 7:00 in the morning. So 9:00 and 9:30 and 10:00, you know, and comfortable lunches and gentle evenings, in bed at a reasonable hour and waking up at a reasonable hour. I think you just feel better.

BGEN SIMMONS: What kinds of employment opportunities did you consider?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I mentioned, Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow had coached me somewhat toward the boards, corporate boards as a director. I certainly considered that because it seemed to me that I could bring something, they assured me that I could bring something to those boards and I thought I could too. So I considered that. At about the time that I retired, Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama, remember he had introduced me at my confirmation hearing and indeed had been a, I suppose, though I did not realize it at the time, had been a patron of sorts in making me the Commandant, but, at any rate he announced that he would be retiring from the Senate so I immediately had a run from Alabama. I believe we talked about this when I went down to meet the governor, Fob James and whatnot, we talked about this at that time but I had some fairly serious inquiries from Alabama that wanted me to consider running for the Senate from there.

As I mentioned earlier, I could not in good conscience do that and secondarily I did not know that I really wanted to get into politics. The appeal of coming back to Capitol Hill, the appeal of working with men and women that I, indeed, gained a great deal of admiration for in the Senate would have been there, but politics is not my, I do not think is my cup.

I had an inquiry from a member of the search committee of the Virginia Military Institute as to whether I would like to consider having my name among those to be considered for the new superintendent. I waived that off initially and then I had a return approach from the president of the Citadel who is a very good friend of mine, LtGen Bud Watts, Air Force. He called me to say, "I really wish you would consider that. I think you would be very good for that." So I finally, after some discussion I said, "Well, Bud, go ahead and throw my name in if you want to and I will talk to them." And that never came about because that was very late in the consideration and as it turned out, for those who do not know, I believe, and I did not know or appreciate that, and perhaps do not fully now, but the states very jealously guard, and I think there is a lot of politics in who they put into those assignments and indeed in the demands that they make on people like the superintendent of VMI.

That decision had in effect already been made although the chairman of the Board of Visitors to VMI did call me back and discuss it with me. He said, "We have almost come to a decision and, frankly, I do not know if the board would even want to consider it."

And I said, "Well, please do not disrupt anything on my behalf because I am, after all, a rather reluctant warrior here. I am not sure that I would want to do this, but I would be happy to talk to you." So, nothing ever came of that beyond that particular point.

I was approached and offered the opportunity to become the president of the National Security Industrial Association, an association here in Washington. In fact, the vice president of that Association is retired Marine BGen Jerry McKay. Jerry had inquired of me as to whether I would be interested. But I think at this phase, though those are, that is a very good position, a very good job, but at this particular time I was following the counsel of the former Commandants as well as others; LtGen Tom Miller comes to mind, LtGen Bill Fitch who had said to me repeatedly, "do not commit to something right away." Be very careful of what you seize upon. Do not grab the first thing that goes by. So I was probably trying to get a feel for what was out there. So I passed that one by.

I mentioned the boards, Schering Plough, we have talked about that. Nations Fund Board came a little bit later. Those seemed to me to be security options that were not the commitment to a, if you will, to a full-time occupation but that were the types of things that you would want to do under any circumstance. So I did take that. And, as we mentioned, there were other pro bono things that I elected to do.

Now, if I may here, I will now project about eight months forwards and tell you that at this point, I just returned, I am on the Board of Advisors to the Board of Visitors of The Citadel. We had spoken earlier of my long attachment with and interest in The Citadel. I wanted to go there, did not, but I have maintained an attachment over the years. This past weekend, although it was not apparent, it was something of a surprise, but LtGen Watts announced that he would be standing down from The Citadel this summer. So I have just undergone a weekend of being approached, if not pummeled upon occasion from several different quarters to go down and be the President of the Citadel. And indeed, what I said to the most serious and most energetic among those is that had this occurred a year ago to this day, I very likely today would be living in Charleston, South Carolina as the President of the Citadel.

So my emotions have run the gamut of saying that I truly would delight in going down and leading the corps of cadets of the Citadel and returning to the Deep South, if you will, the stay of my father's origin, any number of things like that that you would want to do. However, yesterday as we were flying back from

Charleston, Linda and I sat on the airplane and I made up a list of why to or why not to, and at this point in our lives the why not tos simply outweigh the why tos.

We have elected to make Virginia our home. We have our home here although I am assured by the Board of The Citadel that that would not be a consideration, my home would just be lifted right off my back. I mean, they would buy it. They would move us down. They would do all of those sorts of incentives to get us there.

But, that would amount to, you know, a relocation from here to there. It would be another move. It would be another move in the whatever, four, five, six years later. I do not believe that we would chose to remain in Charleston, South Carolina. We might, but I think that we probably would be inclined to come back this way so you would have disrupted, you would have accepted another permanent change of station for a temporary period. So I have come to the conclusion that I will waive that one. Of course, as we will discuss a little bit later I have made a commitment to the USO so we can talk about that a little bit. But I think it would be accurate to record that this is one of those opportunities that I would have taken under circumstances eight months previous to now. I would have today been the President of the Citadel and been speaking with even a deeper Southern accent perhaps than now. But I will pass that.

BGEN SIMMONS: It must have been very tempting.

They had some marvelous previous presidents there at The Citadel. They also have a lot of problems just now. You would not be going into a stress-free situation.

GEN MUNDY: It is that, although it is interesting and, again, I would record this, it is that which most appeals to me. It is not just the challenge of getting back into stress but it is the knowledge and the confidence that amidst the trauma and the uncertainty that the Board of Visitors of the Citadel feels right now because of the potential Supreme Court decision in June that may overturn single gender education and cause them to accept females into the Corps, I would have no problem with that at all. Personally I would have no problem with integrating females into the Corps.

Do I consider it to be a step backwards? Yes, I would be less than honest if I did not say so because I think the fourth class system at the Citadel that still exists at the Citadel and at VMI, uniquely to those two schools right now, there is such a thing as male bond-

ing. There is such a thing as a system which when members of the opposite sex are introduced into it, it is not the same. Many would argue that it would be better. Many would argue that it fundamentally would make no difference and we, this society and these United States will certainly get through that and march right on and it will be, you know, it will work in the future.

Would we be better if we could keep it as it is? Yes, it goes right back to the fundamental question that any one of us would ask, you or I, would we be a better Marine Corps if it was an all-male Marine Corps as it used to be? I think when it comes to combat, if that is what we exist to do, to fight, the answer would be yes. If it comes to peacetime operations and to having a good Marine Corps that can operate efficiently, then the females in our ranks certainly carry their weight and do, in many respects, an admirable job.

BGEN SIMMONS: You said a moment ago that you did not plan to be politically active. Do you think it is appropriate for former Commandants and other high-ranking military officers to be politically active?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think that depends on what politically active means. You know, generals and admirals as a general rule are persons of stature and persons of good judgement and persons who have a good perspective oftentimes particularly of foreign affairs, maybe arguably more so than domestic affairs, but that, too. So I think that to be active in the sense of sharing your drive or your knowledge or your insights in particular cases that there certainly is nothing wrong with that.

However, I do not feel that military officers, you know, should necessarily, unless they want to run for president or something like that — I find no issue with that — but I think short of that to be active in a campaign to the point of, you know, making negative comments or putting your picture on TV or being a signatory on an inflammatory political letter, no, I do not think, I think the military dignity is above or should be above that and particularly for senior officers who are retired.

BGEN SIMMONS: In an earlier session you expressed some disappointment with Colin Powell's autobiography. We did not explore that at the time. Since then I have reviewed this book and I think I see why you were displeased. Gen Powell makes almost no mention of the role of the Service Chiefs, either as Service Chiefs or as members of the Joint Chiefs. I believe that the Service Chiefs, including Gen Gray,

at the time of Desert Storm are dismissed in a single sentence. I do not believe you are mentioned at all in the book. Would you care to comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, first, I would say that this puts one in sort of the, you know, sort of the trembling lip of "Gee, he did not mention me and therefore I do not like the book." That is not at all the case. I think, as I have stated, I think, repeatedly during our interviews here, I think a great deal of Gen Colin Powell and I think he is one of America's greats and that he has many years of service yet that he will donate to our nation and it will be positive.

My disappointment, such as it was, with the book, certainly had very little to do with the front part of the book which I found to be just superb. It is, of course, generational to me in that he and I are about a year apart. We entered our respective Services, he in 1958, me in 1957 a year earlier. As he describes his early experiences in moving through the service right up to and through the grade of lieutenant colonel as a battalion commander even the photographs in the book — when I was speaking to him one time I said, "Colin, I could give you the same pictures, you know, of me in an ROTC uniform or me as a junior officer doing those same things." So for me it was indeed, as I would read his experiences somewhere along the line my mind would blur on my own experiences of almost the same type.

So I thought that he painted himself and his early time in the military extremely well and I found his years in Washington to be extremely interesting. There were things that, I was not aware of how broadly Gen Powell had been used and been experienced in Washington in his many assignments earlier on.

The book to me, however, I found that as I approached the latter portion, and I do not know specifically how I would describe that, sitting here, but the episodes of things, I suppose, that I was involved in that I knew to be extremely involved and to have taken an enormous amount of time and focus of the Joint Chiefs, and to have been indeed, you know, teamwork to get done, I found them treated very quickly.

My impression was that the book had gotten to chapter whatever — I do not even remember the number of chapters in it — but had gotten to a certain point and that there was a realization that we had to get this book on the streets by September if it were to be useful in his consideration of whether or not to enter the race for the presidency and that, therefore, the last episodes which were of some significance had been very quickly placed into a short paragraph and

followed without a great deal of transition, just sort of checking off the blocks.

I almost from time to time, having read the front part of the book and the latter part of the book, I had the idea that someone had been assigned the mission of "listen, you know, write about these last four episodes and get them in and then we will try and color them in Colin's language." But for that reason, again, some of the things that I felt very much involved in I felt received a rather cursory treatment in the, to expedite getting to the real ending of the book which was the political manifesto at the end; here is what I believe in and, in effect, here is my campaign platform if I were to run for president. So that was my disappointment with the book, not necessarily that I was not mentioned in it or that others were not mentioned in it.

The other thing that I had not detected, though again my feeling continues to be very positive about Colin Powell, but I found the book, particularly in the parts that I was more familiar with, to be a little bit too much of the vertical pronoun. In other words, one could read that book and, indeed, the audience to whom it was focused, America, the voters of America, would read that book and would conclude that Colin Powell had indeed won the war in the Persian Gulf or had indeed made all of the decisions that led to the employment of forces here and there along the way.

And if the Chairman is doing that, then the Chairman is not performing his function. He is not the man to be back deciding where we dig the fox-holes and, you know, exactly every tactical move that is taken. And he was not in all occasions. I mean there were some very good and talented and stressed commanders in the field. Norman Schwarzkopf may have been among them. Walt Boomer was there as a major contributor to the war effort. Benny Peay, the current commander of the Central Command. Gary Luck, the commander in Korea. These were the war fighters. These were the corps commanders and the division commanders that went over and actually fought the war and I just, while the book is, I think is appropriate in reflecting that there were contributions made by many, in too many cases I think it tends to suggest that, you know, that all they did was simply steer, follow the rudder orders that were given and that all of the important decisions and all of the important steerage was given by the Chairman back here even with the advice, he mentioned. I thought he mentioned Gen Gray very credibly in a couple of places and I think rightfully so.

GEN MUNDY: And I was saying that I thought that

if there was any Service Chief that he had, you know, pointed out more frequently than another that it was Gen Gray and that is to Gen Gray's credit and that, you know, Gen Powell certainly accredited the Marine Corps adequately, I think, in his references.

But those were my perceptions and so there really is not so much displeasure as there was just a feeling that much of what was done, you know, was done almost exclusively by the Chairman.

The one issue that we spent the greatest amount of time on, bar none, during my tenure as the Chief, that almost consumed the Joint Chiefs because it was not only an issue of what was right for the military but it was an issue of loyalty and how do we serve the President and at the same time represent the Armed Forces, of course was the gay and the homosexual issue. And you know, Gen Powell, I must say that while he certainly made the appropriate statements about this would be destabilizing in the Armed Services for good and valid reasons, I think on more than one occasion, he was not the most passionate among the six men who wrung their hands for seven or eight months of our entire tenure. And indeed, I would say that in the political sense had there been reason for compromise of the issue that Gen Powell would have been on the side of compromise, in my judgement, and there were those amongst us that were not on the side of compromise. So it seems to me that to take credit for having confronted that issue and make it almost a unilateral activity on his part is simply not accurate with the way the facts are in that particular issue.

BGEN SIMMONS: Have you done much travel or much speaking in retirement?

GEN MUNDY: Not too much. I did not, as many asked, I mean there is an assumption upon retirement that one would immediately go on a world tour or go for three months to Europe or something, and many have done that. In retrospect I might wish that I had or might wish that I would some time in the future.

However, for us this was more of a transition. I knew that I wanted to continue to be active, and am, and so I did not take months and go off somewhere. Our travel has been mostly local. We have been to California in conjunction with the Sloan Foundation, took a few days off out there. We will be gone for a couple of weeks here shortly after we do these sessions. But I have not traveled extensively.

My speaking has been pretty low level. I have not been out getting the \$60,000 a speech or giving the types of speeches that both, again, Gen Powell and

Gen Schwarzkopf have been able to do. Were I able to I probably would be lured by the dollar but I hope not because very frankly that would be another inclination of mine that goes along with should generals be politically active or that sort of thing. I think that particularly in the case of Gen Schwarzkopf he exploited very much the fact that he was given the privilege of commanding in the Gulf. Gen Powell to a degree has, I know that he undoubtedly is endeavoring to raise funds, maybe for a future political campaign and one must have considerable resources this day and time. And I think that both of them have undoubtedly done some pro bono type of speaking.

But I would not feel at all comfortable with giving a speech that someone was paying me \$60,000 to do. I do not think that I have that much to offer. So I have not followed that line. And, yes, I have spoken to a group here and there but it has been, again, fairly low level and I do not anticipate that that pace is going to increase for profit anytime in the future.

BGEN SIMMONS: You have just accepted a position with the World USO or United Services Organization. Was the offer of that position a surprise to you?

GEN MUNDY: Somewhat. My good friend, Mr. Chapman Cox or Col Chapman Cox, USMCR (Ret) or former Assistant Secretary of Defense and General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Chapman Cox, in whichever title you would like to think of him, in all of which I have known him, but Chapman has been a good friend — the World USO is headquartered here in the Navy Yard only a couple of blocks from where we sit today — Chapman had come by on occasion for lunch or I would pick him up or he would pick me up. We would talk about post retirement activities, about boards, that sort of thing. The USO Board, he had intimated to me that he would like for me at some time in the future to consider at least sitting on the USO Board. That is another pro bono, you know, no-pay board, but at any rate, so we had talked in general terms.

He made it known to me not too long ago that he intended to leave the USO. He will have been there seven years. It is time for him to move on. And I thought nothing of that. And then about the week that they began considering applicants for the position of President of the World USO, Chapman, we were at a dinner party together and as we were walking out he said, "Are you interested in being the President of the USO?" And I said, "I have not even thought about it Chapman. I do not think so. I am just not sure."

To make a long story short, he came back and came



Following his retirement, Gen Mundy took over as the president of the United Services Organization (USO). In this capacity, he travels around the globe visiting U.S. servicemen and women, including these Marines serving in Eastern Europe.

back about three or four times to say you really should consider this, I would like to talk to you about it in detail. I went to see him. I agreed to meet with the search committee.

Among those on that committee were Gen Tom Morgan, our retired Assistant Commandant. I spoke with him before meeting with the search committee to ask his views and his thoughts on the USO. He was very positive about the organization and seemed to think that it would be something to which I could contribute and a great opportunity.

So I went to see the search committee with that in mind and after talking with them got in my car and drove home. As I walked into the house the telephone was ringing and they said, "We would like you to take the position." So I talked with Linda about it only briefly and really that day agreed to do so.

And as I have now come into a better awareness of what the USO does, I have always known what the USO was and generally what it does, but as I have become more educated on it I find it to be a rather exciting challenge. The USO is an all-charity organization and like any other, you know, God and the soldier in time of war we all adore, but in time of peace the USO, the coffers of America do not open quite as wide and the resources do not come in. So they have had some down-sizing, as one might say, here over

the past two or three years, but I think the organization is basically sound and I look forward to stepping into that in about another month and to leading the World USO.

BGEN SIMMONS: What do you perceive as your duties? Will you be a fund-raiser?

GEN MUNDY: There is a fund-raising aspect to it. The USO certainly generates a considerable amount of income from the contributions of private citizens through mail campaigns and those sorts of, I would say, small-dollar campaigns — somebody gives you \$25 or \$50 or \$100 or maybe a couple of hundred dollars. But then to really get the business done there is a need for very significant corporate contributions and those would be, you know, contributions of several thousand dollars, even up into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. And it is that type of fundraising that I would see myself involved in. That is to say, going to see the chairman of the board of some major American corporation to ask him for support for the USO. Yes, I will be doing that.

Beyond those fund-raising duties there is a staff, currently a staff of about 30. I think the paid staff world-wide is 54 people, I believe. That includes the regional directors and the regional offices that are out

around the world, out in the United States. There are many hundreds of volunteers in the USO. So I have the responsibility for overseeing them, generally for overseeing the business operations of the USO, dealing with the Department of Defense, dealing with the Congress and, you know, public affairs such as they come along. Those sorts of things will be, I think, the duties of the president.

And then, fundamental leadership. What I find everywhere that I go, the thing that it seems that is so wanted in many quarters of our country, The Citadel I just mentioned, one of the major themes that they came to me on was not so much that I come as an educator, not so much that I come as, you know, as someone who would improve the facilities or who would be able to do anything other than they are looking for fundamental leadership, someone who can lead people. And I think that, and increasingly I find that many, in many parts of this nation people look to Marines, disproportionately to Marines, for that. In


other words, they are aware that they can go, you know, approach the other Services but they consider somehow that getting a Marine is the essence of getting a leader.

So, the USO is a little down as we speak, if you will, is coming back or is in the valley or in a slump or what have you. I look forward to hopefully providing the leadership to be able to inspire the people who are there as well as to do the business direction of the operations of the organization.

BGEN SIMMONS: From time to time in these interviews I have asked you for a status report on your children. I will do so once again. Where are your daughter and sons and what are they doing?

GEN MUNDY: Well, our daughter, Betsy, is in Herndon, Virginia which is about 35 miles west of where we are now. She is the assistant in human resources for training for the Hechinger Corporation

One of the U.S. Army's major commitments during the 1990s was taking part in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia. As President of the USO, Gen Mundy visited the area often, including this visit in which he chatted with the commanding general of the 1st Armor Division.



here in northern Virginia and Maryland and over in Pennsylvania. She has been with Hechingers now for almost 20 years so she has been very successful in the corporation and enjoys what she does.

Sam, the oldest son is down at Quantico. He is a major. He is a company commander in the Basic School right now and again, very happy in what he does. Jenny, of course, his wife, the mother of two is there with him and a very, I would say the typical young Marine wife, active in the things she should be active in. Professional; she is a certified public accountant and she does, I think this week, she was telling me this last night, is her volunteer two weeks for tax preparation. She goes down to the Personnel Support, to the Family Assistant Center and does people's income taxes for free. I am just paying a guy several hundred dollars to do mine out here. I do not know why I am not taking up on my family, but anyway that is Sam and Jenny.

Then Tim and his wife, Wendi, are in Camp Pendleton, California. They live in the San Onofre housing area up at the north end of Camp Pendleton. Tim commands the weapons company of your old outfit, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, in Camp Pendleton and is in the typically high pace of operating tempo that our battalions in the Marine Corps are undergoing right now.

So all of the Mundy youngsters are well. The two boys continue to seem to be intent on a Marine Corps career and that is where they are and that is what they are doing.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about your grandchildren. How many are there now and what are they doing?

GEN MUNDY: There are six. There are two apiece with each of the son and daughter-in-law and daughter and son-in-law sets. They start from the top with our grandson, Rob, who will be nine this summer, so he is almost a nine-year-old. His sister is Linda, named for his grandmother. That is Betsy's daughter. Linda is five years old and a beauty.

Then we come along to Sam and Jenny who have Laura. Laura is eight and a half. She is following closely behind Rob, beautiful little girl. And then Krista Ann, who is their newest, about eight-month-old right now, daughter, beautiful little baby and is going to be, again I think that the Mundy girls are going to be eye-stoppers. They all are quite pretty young ladies.

And then Tim and Wendi have two. Theirs are Ashley — with Wendi coming from South Carolina and having gone to school at the Medical College of

South Carolina at the confluence of the Ashley and the Cooper Rivers, why what else but an Ashley Mundy would we have — but Ashley is their oldest daughter. Ashley is six years old now. Then Sloan is their youngest daughter and is about a year and a half old right now.

So five girls, five granddaughters and one grandson and all of them healthy and wholesome and beautiful and, you know, all of their fingers and toes and noses and eyes and all that sort of thing are in the right places and they are all healthy.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it is nice that Tim and his wife picked up on your wife's maiden name and made that the given name for their daughter.

GEN MUNDY: Well, Tim — I do not know how he got away with this — but Wendi, who is, Wendi Joiner Williams is her family, and a very fine family at that, but Tim's name is, of course, Timothy Sloan Mundy. We named him Sloan and he always liked that. So his first daughter's name is Ashley Sloan Mundy. And then actually Sloan, the second daughter's name, is Christina Sloan Mundy but they decided to call her Sloan because he, and obviously Wendi, have a fascination with the name Sloan.

I do consider that a real tribute. We had, as I have mentioned earlier in my, I think in our discussions, that in actuality I think that any one of our children would tell you this, that their grandparents, and especially their grandfathers, were more instrumental in raising them in many cases than I was because I would always send the family back there when I left to go for an extended period overseas. And so for the years that I was gone why the grandparents were filling my role in supporting Linda with the development of our children.

Tim was the youngest. He was the baby. In fact, his grandfather was developing the family property around their house at the time into some subdivisions for building so the street that goes, that used to just be a dirt road that you turned into and drove up to the house but that is now a street in a residential area, is named Timothy Lane because Tim was a little year and a half old baby when I was gone to Vietnam and lived in his uncle's house right in front of his grandmother and grandfather Sloan. So he was indeed embraced by both families, but he feels very close to the Sloan side of the house.

And I think also that it is quite a tribute to Linda because Linda, as has been Frances, your wife, and many others, but Linda has been just the model mother and her children adore her and are very devoted to

her. You can see that when they are around her and then I think Tim has probably given lasting meaning to it in choosing to use her maiden name right along with mine, which gives me great pleasure, too, because, as I have mentioned, her parents were like, were my second set of parents. I do not even tell mother-in-law jokes. We have a tremendous family relationship among both families.

BGEN SIMMONS: As we said, both of your sons have chosen to be career Marine officers. Would you care to comment on how this came about?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think all of us who see our children follow, so to speak, in our footsteps, or follow the same path that we did anyway, would like to say, "Oh, it was all of their choosing and I did not have anything to do with that." Indeed, I would hope that I could honestly say that although they might tell you differently, that they knew very well, at least in the case of the two boys, they knew very well that my expectation and my hope was that they would become Marines.

But I believe that more than that, my intense pride, my intense satisfaction in being a Marine, my belief that the Marine Corps, you know, literally "guards heaven's scenes" and, you know, any place in between for that matter, I think that your children can sense that. And in the case of the two boys they, I would like to think that their perception of these things was such as to say, if he thinks that much about what he does and if he is that proud of the Corps, why it must be something that we would want to be a part of. So I would hope that it was inspiration that led them this way and just inspiration derived from my own feeling about the Marine Corps.

Without a doubt, in Sam's case I did all the right things. I took him up to Annapolis to look around as he was a junior and a senior in high school. We talked about the Naval ROTC options. We talked about, of course we were at Quantico in many cases and I would take him out to The Basic School or we would be around where Marines were being trained. And here when we were in Washington I would always make sure that they were on hand for parades or activities involving Marines.

So without any question there was a persuasion that I was putting forth, consciously or unconsciously, hoping that he would choose to become a Marine. And when he was then deciding on going off to the university and where he would go, you know, I certainly made him aware, brought home literature on the Naval ROTC program and so on. And he eventually,

of course, he applied and was given a scholarship and went.

In Tim's case I think that Tim also was — he is five years behind his brother, four years literally because of birthday, because of school differences, but five years in age junior to Sam — Sam was Tim's role model I have always thought. Whatever his brother did he believed was the right thing to do to the point of, even though we kid him about this at some points, but Jenny, Sam's at that time girlfriend and eventually wife, has some beautiful younger sisters and Tim even saw fit to take up dating one of the young Edmundson girls here along the way, again modeling his brother.

So, Sam has been Tim's role model, I believe, and whatever, in the early years particularly, whatever Sam did Tim thought was good. They had a great rapport between them as brothers and so that, probably coupled with my influence and with Tim's unquestionable knowledge of how much it would mean to me if he, too, became a Marine, that probably led him toward the Marine Corps. But I believe they found their own satisfaction in the Corps and I sense from both of them that they are not just there to serve until they have satisfied my ego. I believe that they love the Marine Corps as dearly as I do.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, obviously their career choice is a source of great satisfaction to you. What do you perceive for yourself and Linda in future years?

GEN MUNDY: Well, of course, I foresee northern Virginia. We have discussed that. I foresee the involvement in the USO for, if I were estimating that right now my thought would be five years, could be less than that, could be a year more than that, but not much more. I would be, at the end of about a five-year tour, if you will, in the USO, I will be 66 years old, not necessarily time to roll over and do nothing but I think that I probably will have arrived at a point where following the board route and following, you know, not a full-time occupation will probably be more appealing than perhaps it is now, although you certainly defy that thought with your devotion and dedication and involvement with the Historical Center here, and there are others.

So I do not know. I could, something else could come along but for right now for us I think it is adjusting to our community. We, of course, enjoy the church in the community. Linda, I think has signed us up as Friends of Mount Vernon and talks from time to time about being a "Lady of Mount Vernon. I remind

her that you have to go up there at Christmas and stand around in the snow and give the tours in a tent so it can be like it was in the old days, but I think that we will become perhaps increasingly active in the Mount Vernon community.

I would like to stay plugged in to Washington to some degree. I really do not have aspirations of anything. I do not seek to appointments or I do not seek extraordinary involvement on the Hill, but it is an exciting place to be.

Beyond that we, I would hope that there will be some leisure and travel. Perhaps somebody will invite me to go on a cruise in the South Pacific to tell how the Marine Corps won the Second World War and the First World War and all of those sort of things that you sent me a postcard last Marine Corps Birthday Ball attesting to what you were doing over that period. But I think we will simply find ourselves enjoying life and growing old together here in northern Virginia.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am not sure if we have mentioned your connection with the Command and Staff College Foundation.

GEN MUNDY: I thought we had; perhaps we have not. I did accept the position of Chairman of the Command and Staff College Foundation which, of course, is a fund-raiser to expand the things that our Marine Corps University is able to do for students. For example among those would be the School of Advanced Warfare, that is, the second year program for select majors and lieutenant colonels of the Command and Staff College, to do such things as visit the battlefields of Europe. They went last year to Belleau Wood to do battlefield studies, and elsewhere in Europe.

We are able to expand, to provide the ability for them to go on staff rides and battlefield studies of Civil War battlefields, to invite, you know, speakers of note in. Sir Michael Rose, Gen Michael Rose, who recently commanded the U.N. Forces in Bosnia was down just a couple of weeks ago. I attended a dinner for him and his lecture. And so those sorts of persons of stature, to bring them in.

The Command and Staff Foundation supports that because otherwise the normal operating budget available to the Marine Corps University is simply inadequate to do that. The Foundation was primarily instrumental in raising the, I believe \$6 to \$7 million to equip and outfit the Marine Corps Research Center which Congress appropriated the money for the building but not for the interior aspects of the building.

That is a continuing association with Marines, most of whom are retired or very successful in the private sector and who are willing to, much like the USO, to raise money for the Command and Staff Foundation.

I think that that Foundation will take, we need to define the direction that it is now going to go and I will, in fact I have a lunch tomorrow with Fred Webber who is one of the Directors on the Board of Trustees to, I have asked him to sit down, and I will be a part of that and some others, but sit down and define the future focus of the Foundation and to adjust our sights to where we should be showing support to the Marine Corps.

I also, I think we have mentioned the Fisher House Foundation. I am a Director on that Board of Trustees as well which is, again is only an infrequent activity. But it is the Foundation that, among other things, will be building the first of the child care centers that Linda's, the Sloan Foundation has managed to begin, at least at Camp Pendleton, and that construction begins imminently. So those are the other activities in which I am involved.

BGEN SIMMONS: With that, unless you have something further to add, I think we will end this session.

SESSION 29

The Distaff Side

Earliest recollections of Carl Mundy . . . The wedding . . . Life as a second lieutenant's wife . . . Elizabeth Ann is born . . . Lengthy absences . . . Back to Quantico . . . Carl, III, is born . . . Life in Raleigh, North Carolina . . . A second son is born . . . A husband in Vietnam . . . An enjoyable tour in Miami . . . Quantico again . . . A pleasant year at Newport . . . Three years at Headquarters in Washington . . . A colonel's wife at Camp Lejeune . . . The husband became a brigadier general . . . Duty again in Washington . . . Life at Little Creek . . . Return to Washington . . . The commanding general's wife in Norfolk . . . Being the Commandant's lady . . . Entertaining at the Commandant's House . . . Traveling with the Commandant . . . Satisfaction in being a Marine wife. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: This interview, however, represents a departure from previous interviews in that it will be not with General Mundy, but with his wife, Linda. The interview is taking place in their new home in Ludgate Court near Mount Vernon, Virginia. Today's day and date are Monday, 29 April, 1996.

Linda, as you know, my oral history sessions with your husband have been in progress for eight months or more and we have covered his life in 28 lengthy sessions, from his childhood through his retirement as 30th Commandant. You have played a role in all of these sessions, from his childhood to the present time.

I would like to retrace those years now getting your perspective on some of the milestones along the way. I understand that through the years you have kept a sort of journal or diary. I do not know when you began it, but you may wish to read into the record passages from your diary from time to time.

First, what is your earliest recollection of Carl E. Mundy, Jr.?

MRS. MUNDY: I think it was probably in elementary school, and his wonderful sense of humor was what struck me the most, I believe.

BGEN SIMMONS: Even that early?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: It is often said that you and Carl were childhood sweethearts, but he says that this is not quite true, that you were great friends but not sweethearts; that part came later. Would you agree?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, I would.

BGEN SIMMONS: What childhood or school activities did you share with Carl?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we were both active in the same church all through elementary and high school years. We were in the bands together, took lots of trips and things with the band, contests.

BGEN SIMMONS: What church was that?

MRS. MUNDY: The First Methodist Church in Waynesville.

BGEN SIMMONS: And what instrument did you play in the band?

MRS. MUNDY: I played the clarinet and he played the trombone. And our band was really good. We won a lot and for a small school we did very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: High school band is a wonderful activity. I played fourth cornet which meant I just made a noise.

MRS. MUNDY: We also had a group of very close friends that did a lot of things together, boys and girls. We were probably at least 12 and sometimes up to 20 that just did a lot of things together.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tell me a little bit about your family. When do you suppose they first became aware of Carl?

MRS. MUNDY: Met him the same time I did, probably. Our parents have been friends through the years. Of course the same church, as I have said, and my family was very fond of him from the very beginning. My mother has Alzheimers today and for a long time she could not call the name of any family member but she always could call Carl's name when she saw him.

BGEN SIMMONS: How nice. How large a town is Waynesville, then and now?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, dear. I think it was about 3,000 then, and I have no idea now. It has gotten a lot bigger.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did you first take Carl seriously as a suitor? He tells me that his blue uniform had a lot to do with it. Would you agree?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, sort of, but we got serious off and on in college, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: What social events, at college or otherwise, stand out in your mind from those years?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, as I mentioned, the band trips were always a lot of fun. We used to go on camping trips, too. One of our good friends in this group that I mentioned earlier had a cabin out on the river and his mother was really a wonderful lady and she would take big groups of children out and we would spend the weekend. We would all take our sleeping bags and the girls would line up on one side of the room and the boys on the other and she would sleep in the middle.

BGEN SIMMONS: What river would that be?

MRS. MUNDY: The Pigeon River. But as far as college goes, I probably remember my friends more than I do the social activities and things like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: What did your family think of your decision to marry a career Marine Corps officer?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, of course, they were delighted that it was Carl but I do not think any of us had any idea what it meant to marry a professional Marine. That was something we would all learn later.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tell me about your wedding.



The Mundys were married on Thanksgiving Day, 1957. They are seen together here in a photograph from the late 1950s.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, it was in the church in Waynesville on Thanksgiving Day. We had the reception at my parents' home. It was just a small-town family wedding, I guess. We went straight back — we had no honeymoon — we went straight back to Quantico because Carl was still in Basic School and the three-day war started on Monday, so we took off. Our honeymoon was the drive back.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you first live after your marriage?

MRS. MUNDY: In Thomason Park.

BGEN SIMMONS: Thomason Park would be where?

MRS. MUNDY: Just inside the main gate at Quantico.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are they government quarters?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: After graduating from The Basic School in February 1958, Carl was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines at Camp Lejeune. Where were you living at that time?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I stayed in Waynesville with my parents for a short while as he reported in, and when he did he found out he would be leaving very soon for a six-month Med cruise. So I went down and we stayed in the Hostess House on the base for about a month and then he took off and I went back home again.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you say, shortly after Carl's arrival at Camp Lejeune the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines went afloat to the Mediterranean. This would be the first of many lengthy separations during your marriage. Was it difficult to cope with the separation?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, yes, I think it always is. But even though we had been married a very short time I felt very independent and grown-up. But my parents were wonderful. Of course, Betsy was born while Carl was gone so that was the place for me to be then, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you say, Elizabeth Ann, your first child, was born on 7 October 1958, and Carl was not present when she arrived?

MRS. MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: When did he first see her?

MRS. MUNDY: She was about two weeks old.

BGEN SIMMONS: You then moved from your parents' home in Waynesville to Eastwood Street in Jacksonville, North Carolina. How do you remember that house and those first months with a new baby?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, it was not really a house, it was an apartment. But it was fine. They are still there, as a matter of fact. Had wonderful neighbors. This was when there were a lot of Marine families out there. I guess this was the first time I realized what a difference friends could make. We still correspond with, not often but at least at Christmas time, with people that we knew in that neighborhood.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were not in Jacksonville for long. In June, 1959 Carl was transferred to the USS

Tarawa and you moved to NAS, Quonset Point, Rhode Island. These were government quarters. What are your recollections of those quarters and that Navy community?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, again, the neighbors that I had. There was one right next door that was a little older than I was and had older children. She was a great help to me. But it was not the quarters and the Navy community so much that impressed me as New England itself because I had never been in that part of the country before and it was fun to see.

BGEN SIMMONS: Again there would be lengthy absences on Carl's part when the *Tarawa* put to sea. How did you pass the time?

MRS. MUNDY: Mainly taking care of Betsy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was it lonely for you?

MRS. MUNDY: Sure, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did your family react to those absences?

MRS. MUNDY: They were supportive of me and they came to visit but they were very good in not complaining or saying anything like about how awful it was because that would have just made it worse probably.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sure they were concerned about their daughter way off there with a baby in Yankee land.

MRS. MUNDY: Probably.

BGEN SIMMONS: Carl was transferred to the *Little Rock*, which was home ported at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. You moved from quarters to Woodbury, New Jersey, an easy commute to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Woodbury is virtually my home town, as I was born and raised in Paulsboro which is five miles away. Carl was kept so busy with his new ship that he is left with very few memories of Woodbury. What are your recollections?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I hate to say this, Ed, but that is my least favorite place. I think it was mainly my first impression, because Carl had rented an apartment and we did not get there until late at night and it was absolutely filthy dirty. There were no lights. The

people who had moved out had even taken the light bulbs out of the ceiling. So when you come in and have to start coping with that sort of situation, it does not leave a really good taste in your mouth, I suppose.

But, what Carl may not have told you is that he was on per diem a good part of the time while we were there. I have forgotten the reason for that. But he was making, all of the sudden he was making almost double his normal salary. So we ate out a lot when we were in Woodbury. We found a great steak place that we enjoyed and we would — I do remember having some lovely people that were teenagers that were good babysitters. We were not there very long.

BGEN SIMMONS: Yes, as you say, you did not stay in Woodbury too long. You went home once again to Waynesville. How did that come about?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, sort of you had no place else to go, I suppose. But I was also expecting another child at that time and I was probably there four or five months. I cannot remember exactly.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sorry that your experience in Woodbury was not a happier one. It happens to be one of my favorite spots.

In October, 1960, Carl was transferred to The Basic School at Quantico as an instructor. You now moved to Purvis Drive, Triangle, Virginia. Now what was this house like?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, very much like the apartment on Eastwood. It was just a typical — I cannot remember whether it was two or three bedrooms to tell you the honest truth, probably three. But that was the time that we moved, we were in Quantico for three years and moved four times during that three-year period.

BGEN SIMMONS: Almost concurrently with your move to Quantico your second child, Carl E. Mundy, III, was born. Was he born at Quantico or in Waynesville?

MRS. MUNDY: He was born in Waynesville, too. Carl was back four days and he was born and then we went to Jacksonville.

BGEN SIMMONS: You must have had your hands full with a two-year old daughter and an infant son. Did this leave you any time for involvement in post life?

MRS. MUNDY: Not a lot, really, no. I remember

going to a few luncheons every now and then, OWC functions. No, I was fairly tied up with the children. BGEN SIMMONS: You perhaps got to know some of the more senior officers and their wives at Quantico. Were there any who particularly impressed you? Were you beginning to form your own ideas as to the role of a Marine Corps officer's wife?

MRS. MUNDY: I think so. I have always learned a lot from people who were a little older than I. But let me, if I may go back to being a newlywed at Quantico for just a minute. The day after we got there, Carl's company commander's wife came to see me which impressed me a whole lot and I thought was very nice of her and I have always remembered that. We still see them, as a matter of fact.

BGEN SIMMONS: What did you and Carl do for recreation during these years at Quantico?

MRS. MUNDY: Rode bicycles. We had the two baby seats on the bikes. And we also had a boat. We would water ski on the river.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you keep the boat?

MRS. MUNDY: In the driveway.

BGEN SIMMONS: In August, 1963, Carl was transferred to Raleigh, North Carolina, for recruiting duty. Where did you live in Raleigh?

MRS. MUNDY: It was on the east side of town, I think. But one of the most exciting things about Raleigh, being in Raleigh at that particular time, was that I have a very close childhood friend and her father was elected governor while we were there. So, Mother and Daddy came down and we all went to the inaugural balls and things like that.

BGEN SIMMONS: I just was thinking, in my day, which was half a generation before your time, we never worried about where we were going to go because there was always housing to be found at relatively reasonable cost. Now that is a tremendous problem for young officers and they have to start many months ahead of time to find a place and then often it is more than they can afford and often they have great commuting distances. I do not think I had those problems and I do not think you had those problems.

MRS. MUNDY: No, we did not. We have been very fortunate.

BGEN SIMMONS: Again, while you were in Raleigh there were many separations as Carl traveled around his recruiting district. But at least these separations were matters of days rather than months. How did you like this time spent in Raleigh?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, I enjoyed it very, very much. I also had, one of my closest college friends lived in Raleigh and had children about the same age as mine. Tim was born in Raleigh, as a matter of fact. My brother was in school there and he got married while we, he went straight through from freshman until he finished his doctorate so —

BGEN SIMMONS: What is your brother's name?

MRS. MUNDY: Ben, Ben Sloan.

BGEN SIMMONS: And your friend's name?

MRS. MUNDY: Julia Eller

BGEN SIMMONS: E, double L, E, R?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your husband was beginning to build a reputation as an outstanding officer. Were you aware of this?

MRS. MUNDY: I know that his staffs all, you know the people that he worked with, had nice things to say about him but I am not sure that I was aware of any larger reputation that he might have had.

BGEN SIMMONS: He was beginning to get a number of commendations for his recruiting successes. I am sure he must have mentioned them to you.

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, yes, yes, he did.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you mentioned a moment ago, you had your second son while you were in Raleigh. Where was he born and how did you select his name?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we just liked the name Tim, Timothy.

BGEN SIMMONS: There was no family connection.

MRS. MUNDY: No family connection there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was he born in Raleigh?

MRS. MUNDY: In Wake County Hospital, I think it was, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: During this time Carl qualified as a parachutist at his own expense. Did his parachuting disturb you?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, it did. I cannot imagine anybody wanting to do something like that but it was what he wanted to do so that was okay.

BGEN SIMMONS: Along about this time Carl got a motorcycle. How did that strike you?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, the trail riding was fine. I was not crazy about street riding. I thought that was too dangerous. Later he and Sam both had motorcycles and would ride the trails at Quantico, ride the power line trails. They enjoyed it very much.

BGEN SIMMONS: You left Raleigh in August 1966. Carl had orders that would take him to Vietnam. Where did you and the children go?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we went back to Waynesville again but this time I rented a house. My uncle had one that he let me rent from him.

BGEN SIMMONS: What was it like being a wife with three small children whose husband was in Vietnam?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, that was a pretty stressful time because, I am sure you remember, the war was on television. Not like CNN during Desert Storm exactly, but it was still there every night. I could not help but watch and sometimes you felt you wanted to see somebody you knew and other times you were grateful that you did not.

I was certainly busy with the three children. I was a Boy Scout leader and a Girl Scout leader and just, substitute teaching, I think doing a lot of different things to keep occupied. But, of course, on the other hand I had both sets of grandparents there and they were wonderful to help out with the children.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did they have any views on the subject of you being home with the children and your husband off to war? Was anyone saying, hey, maybe Carl ought to rethink this business of a career in the Marine Corps?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, no, no, no.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your husband came home from Vietnam in November 1967 and in January 1968 reported for duty at Headquarters Marine Corps. He was to be aide to Gen Walt, the Assistant Commandant. What did you think of this assignment?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, of course, all of these assignment things are new to me. I mean, I am not sure what is involved in anything until it sort of gets going. But I do not think it was particularly easy for Carl because Gen Walt was a rather difficult man to work for, but it was, I liked where we were. I liked our house in Springfield.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you get to know Gen Walt?

MRS. MUNDY: Not really. I got to know Mrs. Walt a little bit. She was the president of an organization called JANGO which stands, I think, for Junior Army-Navy Guild Organization. It is a volunteer group, teenage volunteer group. She sort of, they did a monthly newsletter and mailed it out to a lot of people. She called and asked and sort of, I felt, forced me into taking over this job. It was something that made a real impression on me because later on when it was my turn, sort of, to try to find volunteers for various things I always tried very, very hard not to make people feel like they were being forced to do something they really did not want to do. It has, I think, worked very well for me.

BGEN SIMMONS: General officers' wives often forget how intimidating senior officers were.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, and they forget that, you know, you have to get babysitters and you live way out of town and that kind of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were living in Springfield during this tour?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have any particular close friends in Washington at this time?

MRS. MUNDY: I remember Earl and Nancy Piper particularly. I was also teaching kindergarten during this time. It was probably the most active volunteer period that I have ever been through personally

because I was, I raised money for the PTA, I was, again, in Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, the boys were in Little League. We were just doing a lot of things. I think back on those years sometimes and wonder how it all worked out.

BGEN SIMMONS: Weren't Gene and Jeannine Arnold living in Springfield about that time?

MRS. MUNDY: I think, didn't they live here while we, yes, I believe they were over here on King Court during that assignment, weren't they?

BGEN SIMMONS: I think so. In July 1969 Carl was ordered to Quantico to attend the Command and Staff College. Did you stay in your Springfield house?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: He just faced south in the morning instead of at night.

MRS. MUNDY: That is right.

BGEN SIMMONS: Considerably shorter hours, I am sure. What are your chief recollections of his year at the Command and Staff College?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we met Terry and Bettie Cooper during that year, I think, and we are still very close friends. Carl was a distinguished graduate.

The ending of that year was rather traumatic because the day before he graduated, I think, I fell down the basement steps and cracked my tailbone. So I had to, it was really painful. I was not seriously injured or anything but he put me on the airplane and I flew back to Waynesville. He got to move that time. He got to do all the packing up and moving out.

BGEN SIMMONS: Next came Carl's duty as the Inspector-Instructor of the 4th ANGLICO in Miami, Florida. Where did you live in Miami?

MRS. MUNDY: We lived in a place called Miami Lakes which was out near Hialeah but it was one of the enclosed sort of communities where about every house was built around a small, fresh water lake. It was beautiful.

BGEN SIMMONS: Obviously you and your children enjoyed Miami.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: What did you do for recreation?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, that was a lot of water sports down there, obviously. We swam. We snorkeled. We got a pop-up camper and we would go down to the Keys a lot and camp on the beach.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any particular Key that you visited?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, all of them, just about. We would go all the way several times to Key West.

BGEN SIMMONS: You left Miami in July 1973. Once again there would be a long separation from Carl and you would return with the children to Waynesville. This time Carl would be away for a year as the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines which was based in Okinawa. What do you recall of this year's separation?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, for me personally it was another sort of traumatic period because this was the year that everybody had some sort of accident. When Carl left Tim had had a bicycle wreck. He had fallen off and landed on his chin, broken his jaw in three places. So he was all wired together.

Shortly after that Betsy was in an automobile accident which was, broke her leg and cut her head pretty badly. She went out through the windshield. And then later Sam had a motorcycle, not an accident but he burned his leg on his motorcycle and that developed into blood poisoning. So I felt like, I was awfully glad when that year was over.

But Carl, I think honestly both of us have been good at keeping in touch with each other because we would send tapes back and forth all the time, write practically every day. Did the same thing every time he has been gone.

BGEN SIMMONS: After the year in Okinawa, Carl would have a two-year tour at Quantico from August 1974 through July 1976. He is now a lieutenant colonel. Did you get quarters at Quantico?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, we did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Describe post life at Quantico.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, this again was where the neighbors were wonderful people. I did volunteer work in the Thrift Shop. I found Carl's boat cloak there, by the way. I do not know who had consigned

it but I think we paid about \$35 or \$40 for a boat cloak which was a real find. All the children went to school on base. Betsy was a 1976 graduate of Quantico High School. We got to know Joyce and Ernie Buschhaus and Hollis and Bev Davison.

We lived in two different houses, actually. We started out out by the Commissary, Lyman Park, and then moved to one of the big white houses on the post. The PX was right across the street at that time, the old exchange. And, of course, the museum was right down at the foot of the hill. I liked that location.

BGEN SIMMONS: In July 1976, Carl was assigned as a student to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Tell me about that year.

MRS. MUNDY: That was fun. I always thought Newport was a great place to visit and go sightseeing.

A lot of great people were in that class. We were close, all the Marines, of course. That was the Franklins, the Sisleys, Fred and Donna Anthony, Nancy and Don Bieger, Piantadosies, Jim and Pat Mead, the Orrs, Donovans, Bowlines. I know I am forgetting somebody, but I really enjoyed that year.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did quarters come with that assignment?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Carl's next assignment was a three-year stint as a Plans Officer at Headquarters Marine Corps from July 1977 to July 1980. Where did you live during this period?

MRS. MUNDY: That is when we bought our house in Riverside Gardens in Alexandria.

BGEN SIMMONS: And where did the children go to school?

MRS. MUNDY: They went to Fort Hunt, a high school which, of course, is now a junior high.

BGEN SIMMONS: It was a wonderful school in those days. Were you involved in Marine Officers' Wives activities?

MRS. MUNDY: Some. Not as much as I had been at some other times when we were on a base or something. But I was also working. I was a teacher's aide in the Fairfax County school system.

BGEN SIMMONS: What school?

MRS. MUNDY: I wish you had not have asked me that. I cannot say it right this minute. But a lot of the people that we had been to the War College with were also living in this same area. That is when I think I first met Norm and Marcia Smith.

BGEN SIMMONS: During this period Carl was promoted to colonel. Did that change your perspective as an officer's wife?

MRS. MUNDY: I think your perspective changes a little bit with every promotion, probably. You begin to feel a little bit more responsibility for your role.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of the senior officers and their wives whom you got to know during this period?

MRS. MUNDY: We got to know J.K. and Jane Davis, the Kelleys a little bit, Frank and Fran Quinn, John and Pat Cox, Dolph and Midge Schwenk and DWayne and Joan Gray.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you do much entertaining?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, we actually had entertained all along, of course, friends, but any of the staff and people who worked with and for Carl.

BGEN SIMMONS: What style of entertaining did you like to do?

MRS. MUNDY: More casual kinds of things. Of course without help all of us did buffets. We would try to think of different types of things to do. One when we were at Quantico Carl went to Lunga Reservoir early in the day because you could not reserve a place, and he plopped things down in one of the pavilions out there or one of the covered picnic areas and then we took a big bunch of friends and neighbors out and had a cookout on the lake. I do not know, we would just try to come up with something that was a little bit different to do a lot of times.

BGEN SIMMONS: Carl's next assignment, effective in August 1980, would take him to the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. Carl drew a plum assignment, command of the 2d Marine Regiment and intermittent command of the 36th and 38th Marine Amphibious Units. But these later commands would take him away from home for lengthy intervals.

Where did you live during this tour?

MRS. MUNDY: We lived on post again, it was 2212, on the river.

BGEN SIMMONS: Paradise Point?

MRS. MUNDY: Paradise Point, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very nice quarters.

MRS. MUNDY: Very nice.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did the children go to school?

MRS. MUNDY: They went to Lejeune High. Actually it was just Tim that was left at home by that time.

BGEN SIMMONS: And Sam and Betsy were going —

MRS. MUNDY: Well, Betsy went to college for a year and then she went to work for Hechingers which she still is working for. Sam was at Auburn during this time.

BGEN SIMMONS: How involved were you in post life at Camp Lejeune?

MRS. MUNDY: I would say very involved at this point.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your close friends?

MRS. MUNDY: Don and Marianna Lynch, John and Norwood Reynolds, Molin and John Ripley. Terry and Bettie Cooper were there at the same time. Got to know the Twomeys. Helen Twomey was a wonderful role model, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: The tour with the 2d Marine Division concluded with your husband's promotion to brigadier general. He was now transferred to Washington once again, this time to be the Director of Personnel Procurement. Where did you now live in Washington?

MRS. MUNDY: We had kept the house in Riverside Gardens so we went back to that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where were your children by this time?

MRS. MUNDY: Let's see. Sam was, I think, a senior at Auburn and he and Jenny got married during their senior year. Tim had graduated and was also at Auburn, and as I said earlier, Betsy was working for Hechingers.

BGEN SIMMONS: By now what were your favorite forms of family recreation?

MRS. MUNDY: Skiing, I suppose. We had gotten into that, started in Newport was the first time we ever tried to ski. Carl and the boys fell more in love with it than I did.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where did you go for your skiing?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, different places. They used to take Special Services buses from Headquarters Marine Corps for weekend trips to New York. We did that a couple of times. One time we went to Colorado and another time we "space-A'd" to Germany and skied.

BGEN SIMMONS: Carl's next assignment was as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, effective in June 1984. I believe you drew a rather unusual set of quarters. Would you describe them?

MRS. MUNDY: It was an old hospital building and it was built with a long center hallway and wings that went off on either side. The wings were large, they were long. The front part had been renovated and made into living spaces but the back had not been touched, nor had the center hallway. So you would open the bedroom door — it was sort of like a railroad house, I guess — you had to go through one room to get to the next almost. But, as I said, you would open the bedroom door to go out the back to your car. We parked our car in the old ambulance bay and to get there we passed 15 rooms that still had the numbers and the call bells over the top. Then you would go down the center hall which everybody that lived there referred to as "Spook Hall" because it was dark and the leaves and the trash would blow in. But it was, you know, it was kind of fun. I hated to see it go. They have torn it down now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Maybe you would comment in

general on frequent moves and the furnishing of various houses and sets of quarters. How did you cope with this?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I kept all the curtains I ever bought, tried to buy things in fairly standard sizes so that hopefully they would go from one place to another. It worked out pretty well. We did not buy large pieces of furniture either because I had seen a lot of people that had great big china cabinets or something like that and then they would get to a place and there is no wall big enough to put a big piece of furniture that big on. Everybody has a different solution I am sure, but that was ours.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you do much entertaining in this new assignment, Carl's capacity as a commanding general?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: How important do you believe entertaining is to a senior officer's career?

MRS. MUNDY: I think it is fairly important. It is a way to get to know people, first of all, but it is also a way to show that you care about them.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you enjoy entertaining?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes. We also got to know a lot of the retired generals in Norfolk and that was nice.

BGEN SIMMONS: And numbers of Navy families, too, I am sure.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, sure.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were some of your close friends in the Little Creek and Norfolk area?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we were very close to our back door neighbors. He was a Navy captain who was the commander of the base, Jack and Elaine Doyle. We would dog sit for each other when we were gone. But the Murphys were there, the Andersons, the Adams.

BGEN SIMMONS: This would be Katie Adams?

MRS. MUNDY: Katie and Art, Dennis and Dorothy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your husband's collateral duties as Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious

Group Brigade did take him away from Little Creek frequently and sometimes for a considerable length of time. Do you have any general comment on the effect of frequent separations on a military marriage?

MRS. MUNDY: I do not think that anybody believes that this is an easy thing to do for either the family that is left behind or the Marine who is going. But, Carl has always, even from the very beginning, talked to me a lot about what he was doing and I think maybe more than a lot of people I have a fairly good understanding of why this is necessary. You do not always like it but, and I think maybe that is something that is missing with the young people today. Of course there are a lot more wives that have their own professions and I think that is wonderful but they try too much to separate the two. The husband is going to do his thing and the wife is going to do hers but they do not come together and talk about what is important to each one of them and why, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it is probably more difficult now. Just as we said, the matter of moves, finding a place to live. I think that wives having their own careers increases the stress tremendously. You hear the term "geographic bachelor" where the husband goes to his next duty station but his wife stays in place.

In May 1986, your husband as a newly promoted major general, was transferred to Headquarters, Marine Corps to be the Director of the Operations Division. Where did you live this time?

MRS. MUNDY: We had a townhouse in Arlington for a short time and then quarters on the base at Bolling came available so we moved over there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Where were the children and what were they doing by this time?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, let's see, Betsy had been transferred to Greensboro, North Carolina and our first grandchild, her son, was born while we were at Bolling. Tim and Wendy were married. He was at TBS. Sam and Jenny were at Parris Island and six months after Rob was born, why, Sam and Jenny had their first child, a little girl.

BGEN SIMMONS: Both of your sons had decided to pursue a career in the Marine Corps. What did you think of these decisions?

MRS. MUNDY: I thought they were great decisions.

I was very happy.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you think they felt pressured by their father to follow in his footsteps?

MRS. MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did he counsel them on this?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I think Carl, if they had not decided to do this on their own Carl would have probably encouraged them to at least try it for a while because he understands the value of Marine training and that sort of thing. Both the boys made their own decisions and I think it had a great deal to do with their father as the role model that he was. I think also because that was all they had ever known, not only their dad as a role model but all of our friends and people that they had grown up with.

BGEN SIMMONS: In February 1988, your husband was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, a position of enormous importance to the Marine Corps. Were you aware that many persons were now seeing your husband as a serious contender to be the next Commandant?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, I was aware of that but it is not over until the "fat lady sings," you know.

BGEN SIMMONS: In July 1990, your husband was again transferred, this time to Norfolk to be the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, one of the two major field commands of the Marine Corps. For you it would be yet another move. What were your new quarters like?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, this is another two moves because the house that had sort of always been the Marine house in Norfolk was undergoing some renovation so we went into one house for six months and then moved to Michigan House when that work was completed.

BGEN SIMMONS: You might describe Michigan House a little bit.

MRS. MUNDY: It was a nice house. These are all the Jamestown Exposition houses that the generals and the admirals live in. They are all very different, some quite small and others that are very, very large.

Ours was, let me think, four bedrooms on the second floor, big living room, dining room, sun porch, big kitchen. It was fairly close to the water. We could look out and see the boat base.

BGEN SIMMONS: Some of those houses are or were maintenance nightmares.

MRS. MUNDY: They are because for the Exposition none of them had, it was just the shell of the house. There was no plumbing or anything like that. So I have forgotten what work they had to do on this one before we moved in but there was a lot.

BGEN SIMMONS: You would be in Norfolk only a year. On 1 July 1991, your husband became the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Do you recall when and where you first heard of his selection?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am sure you would.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, Carl called me himself. He had gone to, he has probably already told you this but he had gone to California to take a top quality leadership course and the night before that started, or the morning it started, I guess, he had gotten a call telling him he was going to be the Commandant. So he called me and I was in the kitchen. I am sure our, Gunny Boice who was our enlisted aide must have thought I was a crazy woman or something, but that is where I was.

BGEN SIMMONS: What are your most vivid memories of the change of command ceremony?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, it was a very exciting day, it really was. All of our children were there, Carl's mother. Sam had even come in from Hong Kong. He was deployed and had gotten permission to take the weekend off and come back. Carl has a thousand cousins and there were a lot of them there, probably 20 of our friends that we grew up with from North Carolina. So it was just a very, very exciting day.

In the end it did not turn out to be what I had hoped it would at all. The reception was hot. Of course that is typical of Washington in the summer time. But one of the funniest recollections that —

BGEN SIMMONS: Where was the reception?

MRS. MUNDY: The reception was in the

Commandant's garden. But we were still living in the Navy Yard and when I had packed I had forgotten to put handkerchiefs in my suitcase so I had Kleenex. I am the kind of person that suffers in the heat and I do not act like a lady. I do not perspire, I sweat. I just drip. So I was mopping my face with kleenex and every now and then I would feel this hand go into my pocket and it would be Chip Parker, the aide, giving me more Kleenex.

But anyway, we had been told before the, when all the plans were being made for the change of command that we could only invite 50 people to the reception. I fully understand that there are a lot of official guests that must be included, but I was a little bit hurt by that, that we could not, that we had to cut our list. That is not very many, and especially for the incoming Commandant. But then as things worked out, I do not know what happened, but the staff did not control the crowd at all and what should have been a fairly decent size reception was, anybody that was walking down the street came in. So we were just absolutely overwhelmed with people and I got not one bite of anything to eat. Most of it was scarfed up anyway.

So that meant it was late getting started. The Barracks was overwhelmed with trying to get everybody seated. So it started late and, oh, let me back up a little bit and say that as we left the Navy Yard and were driving up to the house, we were obviously going to be there a little bit early because SecDef Cheney was going to be there and SecNav and the Vice President was the guest, we were to be there early to meet them. But the call came on the car phone as we were driving up not to come yet, we would be too early if we came at the appointed time. And when you are already there, driving up 8th street and half a block away I do not know what else you can do except go on, so we did.

But, the ceremony, I felt, was just a disaster, and I really do not have all the words to say how awful I thought it was. In the first place, the lights and the sound system went out. After we had moved into the house and later on I discovered that it was because the squirrels had chewed through the electric cables and all of them had to be replaced. Of course nobody knew that ahead of time, obviously, and I am sure the Barracks people were as distressed about it as I was but it certainly did not lend anything particularly good to the ceremony.

But I felt that Carl was treated just abominably by Gen Gray, I really did. I know that Gen Gray had another choice for the Commandant but every other change of command at any level that I have ever

attended there was at least some recognition of the incoming person. And this never happened during the ceremony at all, not by the Vice President, not by the Secretary of Defense and certainly not by General Gray. Carl was the man who was not there for this ceremony.

Gen Gray refused to change places with Carl after the battle color was exchanged. He invited his retired sergeant major who had had his own retirement ceremony the day before into the reviewing area for the "Pass in Review." I think SgtMaj Summers is a fine guy, I really do, I am not saying anything about him but I do not think that was necessary to do at the change of command of the Commandant. It should not have been done.

During the "Pass in Review" I believe it was Pete Pace who sort of in an undertone mentioned to General Gray that he had not said anything about Carl and so after the ceremony was over, of course everybody was standing up, leaving their seats, walking out onto the Parade Deck, General Gray grabs the microphone and starts making up for, or trying, attempting to make up for what he had not done earlier. And I do not . . . I was so angry . . . I do not think I have every been as mad in my life. I honestly cannot remember anything he said, but I do —

BGEN SIMMONS: He went on for quite a time.

MRS. MUNDY: Quite some time. But the only thing I do remember is his last remark which was something to the effect that if you want to get anything done, you better get started. And that was that. It has been a very difficult thing for me to forgive and I am not certain I have done that completely yet even now.

But then we all went back to the house after for what, you know, the little reception thing and here again it was just a wholethundering horde of people. I think my brother went back with us and his family and the children but we did not invite anybody else back to the house afterwards because, and it was just another thundering horde. It was hot and you could not move.

But, you know, General Gray had to turn it over by that time. If there was going to be a party afterwards surely at some point it should have been for the new person. But there was none of that again. We stayed a little while and I could tell, you know people were patting me on the back and you could just tell by the way they looked that they were as astounded as we were by the whole event. But, anyway, we left fairly shortly.

BGEN SIMMONS: You spent the evening at the Navy Yard then?

MRS. MUNDY: Oh, we were in the Navy Yard for another two weeks after that. The Grays did not move until after the 4th of July, I don't think.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, apparently, you and Carl took these lessons to heart because your change of command and retirement ceremonies were structured much differently.

MRS. MUNDY: Very differently.

BGEN SIMMONS: And the two were separated, right? Have I talked to Carl about that?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had several times lived in public quarters which would give you some preparation, I suppose, for your new duties as chatelaine of the Commandant's House, the very special home of the Commandants. How about describing for me the process by which you took over this responsibility?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, as far as the refurbishment goes, a lot of this had been done between the Kelleys and the Grays. The house was also closed before the Grays moved in for a lot of structural work and the same thing before we moved in. And, I believe it was Barbara Kelley who chose a lot of fabrics and did a lot of redecorating and then when the house was sort of put back together again it was, all the new stuff was there. So there was not a lot that I felt needed to be done. I redecorated one bedroom upstairs, repainted the dining room, wallpapered a bathroom on the first floor.

Let's see, what else did we do? That is about all. Later on I fixed up a bathroom in the wing, the west wing, which is referred to as "the cottage," first of all to make it accessible to the handicapped people, but secondly to have another decent bathroom for the big crowds that would come during the summer months.

We skipped a couple here, Ed, did you? No, I am sorry, we did not.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you talk to the wives of any of the previous Commandants concerning your responsibilities and was their advice helpful?

MRS. MUNDY: Jane Wilson gave me some really good advice.

BGEN SIMMONS: She would.

MRS. MUNDY: She was just lovely. We saw them in California before the change of command and she helped me out a whole lot. Talked to Patty Barrow a little bit but that was about it.

BGEN SIMMONS: You would now do a great deal of official entertaining. Would you describe some of the more noteworthy occasions?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we had some foreign visitors, as I am sure you know, that were fun, Senators and Congressmen. If you want to be perfectly honest about it, the ones I enjoyed the most, the dinner parties, were the ones that we always had for the new brigadiers and their wives. They were always so excited and it was just one of the most fun sorts of affairs that we had, I think, while we were there.

BGEN SIMMONS: What were some of the other highlights of life in the Commandant's House?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I love the Barracks. A lot of people think it is, you know, there are a lot of rules and regulations and things going on all the time but I just thought it was wonderful and loved all the activity, the music I had in my backyard or my front yard, whatever it was, all the time. I a lot of times would sit with the door open upstairs if I was home so I could hear. I would always tell Truman — he never let the Drum and Bugle Corps play through anything when they were rehearsing, he would always stop them — and I would always tell him, every now and then you have to play something all the way through. But those Marines work so hard it is just, unless you live there and watch it you just have no idea of all the things that go on to prepare, especially for parade season or any kind of ceremony that takes place.

Another highlight for me was actually the staff at the House. I thought those were, those four Marines that were the aides were probably the most, best team that has ever been. They had wonderful ideas. A lot of the things that we did did not come from me but came from them like moving the, taking away the tent that had always been used for receptions. We spread it out.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were these aides?

MRS. MUNDY: There were two gunnery sergeants, Jerry Boice and Eugene Rensch, and two staff sergeants, Frank Murnane and Tim Heagy.

BGEN SIMMONS: And they were with you for the four years?

MRS. MUNDY: For the four years. Well, Gunny Boice had been with us in Norfolk. He came from Norfolk up with us. Of course the office staff was wonderful. Everybody was so helpful to us.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would guess that on occasion there were a few desperate moments or crises during your tenure in the House. Would you share some of those with me?

MRS. MUNDY: I don't remember a major crisis, to be perfectly honest with you. We always had a little bit of, well, not always but sometimes, we would watch the skies very carefully on Friday afternoon because there comes a point where you have to decide whether you are going to stay out or have to come indoors for the reception.

One Saturday morning I was upstairs in the bedroom and I heard a thunderous crash in the hall downstairs and when I went to look a great big brass light fixture, ceiling fixture, had fallen. I was just very glad that nobody had been standing under it when it happened because it dented the floor and it could have done some real damage if somebody had been right underneath. But there was always, in a house that old you certainly would expect it, but I doubt that there were two days in a row that passed that some maintenance man was not there doing something.

One Christmas we had ordered a tree for the House from the same people that bring the Christmas trees to the White House and it had been outdoors in water for two or three days before we got ready to bring it in and when the guys picked it up to carry it, every needle on that tree —

BGEN SIMMONS: — crises, at least some of the untoward things that might have happened in the Commandant's house. I will ask a question then. When you would have a very high ranking guest for a reception or a parade, such as the President or the Vice President, there would be all sorts of extraordinary security arrangements. How did they affect you?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, it was just more of an irritation than anything else. The President did come, as you know, for a reception, President and Mrs. Clinton. The dogs had to come through the entire house. There was one cabinet, the sideboard, that I had never been able to open and nobody knew where the key was. So this was a real sticking point.



Mrs. Mundy often accompanied her husband on his overseas trips. Here she poses in front of a tank during their September 1992 visit to Russia.

BGEN SIMMONS: A literal sticking point.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, and then they finally said it was okay. Actually, it probably was more bothersome to the aides than to me because they all, everybody had to be checked out and all the tables and everything.

BGEN SIMMONS: Every Commandant and his lady leave their mark on the Commandant's House. You actively pursued the refurbishment of the house and we talked about that a bit. To what extent were you involved in the preparation of the new edition of the book, *Home of the Commandants*?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I guess I can take credit for suggesting to Tony Lukeman that it was probably about time for a new book. The other one I think is 25 years old and a lot of things have changed in that time. I did . . . he was kind enough to let me see the pictures that they were thinking about using and my suggestion was that it should be as generic as possible. I pulled out a lot of things that were personal to us because this is the kind of thing that should last as

long as possible. And I believe it was Carl's suggestion that they, the original book was not going to say anything about each Commandant, as had been done before, and I think Carl suggested that that would be good to include.

BGEN SIMMONS: It turned out a very beautiful book.

MRS. MUNDY: I think it is, too.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your husband would do a great deal of traveling during his Commandancy. I am quite sure he traveled more miles than any of his predecessors. You accompanied him on all possible occasions. This must have been most demanding and most rewarding. Would you agree?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, I would. It sounds very exciting and it is exciting to go on many of these trips but you are working the whole time. You really are. You come home, or I do, very tired and especially if you have covered a lot of time zones.

BGEN SIMMONS: One thing that struck me in my interviews with your husband, his amazing reservoir of energy, how he would come off one of these trips and immediately go to an important meeting or whatever.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes. Of course he would come home and crash.

BGEN SIMMONS: I have traced each of the major trips in the course of my interviews with your husband. I would like to single out several which I see of most importance or interest for your comment. First, however, what would be your general role on these trips or visits?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, it was mostly to sort of get an idea about the things that were going on on various bases that had to do with family issues. I would normally go to Family Service Centers, mainly not to get a briefing because they all do much of the same thing, but to say what is different here? What are you doing that is unique to this area that nobody else does kind of thing? Child care is always an issue for a lot of families, especially the drop-in part, Navy Relief, Red Cross, I would just sort of check out all of these things.

One thing that I am kind of proud of is that I put together a slide show about the Commandant's House. It involves the, the remarks that go along with it have a lot of Marine Corps history, especially early Marine Corps history. In fact, I got one good little story out of your book. But it was a good way to share with people and also to make them realize that I was not a ogre, that probably it would be okay to come up and speak to me.

One of the interesting things that happened is during our trip to Barstow I had given this slide show and there were some women Marines there. After it was over they came up and asked if I would be willing to go with them to see their barracks. I said sure I would. So I went and they showed me the conditions that they were living in. They were pretty bad. I have to admit they were pretty awful. So it is that kind of thing that made me feel really good, that people thought maybe I could help make a difference on some of these trips.

BGEN SIMMONS: You and your husband had a way of searching out good restaurants on your travels. What would be some of your favorites or recommendations?

MRS. MUNDY: If you know Carl Mundy you know we always go eat at a Mexican restaurant. I remember a couple of times that we actually went out to a restaurant to eat but most of the time we were being entertained. I am not sure I can recommend anything right now.

BGEN SIMMONS: I know he had a favorite restaurant at Yuma.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, Cratenes(?).

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you like to cook?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Does Carl have any favorite family meals or recipes?

MRS. MUNDY: I am not sure about recipes but I think breakfast is probably . . . but maybe I should amend that to say old fashioned breakfast when we all used to eat bacon and sausage and eggs and that kind of stuff which we do not do any more. It is a little bit different from bagels and cereal.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your own first overseas trip —

[Tape interruption.] There was a little interruption there. Your first overseas trip was in August 1991, when you and your husband went to the Far East, including stops in Alaska, Japan, Korea and Okinawa, back to San Diego and then out to the Pacific again to the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island and Hawaii. What are your principal recollections of that trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I was just thrilled to go because, obviously, I had never lived anywhere other than the East Coast before and to be able to see all these places was just very exciting to me. I remember the Korean visit very well because they had us for dinner in their home. The first night, of course, our clock is all twisted around. Bill and Pat Eshelman were stationed there at the time and went with us, thankfully. We had about ten, it was about a ten-course meal, very tiny little plates and not a lot on each one, but I thought it all tasted exactly the same, whatever it was, and trying to swallow the sea cucumber was a bit difficult.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were you using chopsticks?

MRS. MUNDY: They did have forks so we did a lit-

tle bit of both, I guess. They were very, very nice people.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who were your hosts?

MRS. MUNDY: General and Mrs. Cho(?), I believe it was.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was he the Commandant —

MRS. MUNDY: Of the Korean Marines, yes. But neither one of them spoke English so there was obviously a lot of interpretation going on in both directions. But, you know, they like to sing songs and things after dinner and when we got up and went into the living room after the meal was over there was a microphone up at one end of the room and General Cho asked Carl if he liked to sing. Carl said yes, but neither one of us realized that what he was inviting Carl to do was to go up and sing a song. Bill and Pat Eshelman did understand this and they also understood that we were really tired and it was about time to go. So Pat said, "Let me show you an American dance." So she is, you know, really a lively person and she got everybody up and she demonstrated the hokey pokey. So there we were in the living room doing the hokey pokey with the Koreans. But that satisfied the need for after dinner entertainment and we went home and went to bed.

Let's see, Okinawa, I mean, like I said, it was just fascinating to me to see all of these places that I had never been. We were in the Philippines very shortly after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo so the families had all been evacuated but you could still see the tons of ash all over everything. That was just a very brief stop for lunch, really and a short tour around the base but amazing sights.

Wake Island was a thrill. Of course, more so for Carl than for me although I was, the thing about going to these battlefields is, of course I really have read a lot about what happened and the major ones. . . Tarawa, and, of course, Iwo Jima and for someone like me to be able to actually see the site really makes it come home. I mean, you can understand very easily what the problems must have been when you see it. It is very different from reading about it. But flying in over Wake you could, of course, see the straight drop right down to the bottom of the ocean on one side. But the Air Force was still there at the time and they were wonderful to us. They had a cookout for us on the beach and took us for boat rides.

One thing I like to do is just wander around and pick up shells. I have always been a scavenger on the

beach. And so I have little collections from all of these places that we have been. I have something that I have picked up and brought back with me.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September the Commandant of the Korean Marine Corps, this would be General Cho, arrived on an official business trip. What part did you play as hostess during such official visits?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, of course you meet and greet and get them settled. Many of our guests stayed in the Navy Yard quarters. Then I would obviously accompany them. We would try to show the ladies as much — the men were doing official things — but we would try to show the ladies as much of the sights in Washington as we could.

BGEN SIMMONS: How about shopping?

MRS. MUNDY: A little bit. The way I normally arranged things, if they were there for a couple of days we would do one full day, a pretty full day of sightseeing and then maybe the next morning. Then if we were having a dinner for them that night I would get someone else to take them, to accompany the lady on her shopping trip and I would go home and be there to fix flowers or do whatever needed to be done for the dinner.

BGEN SIMMONS: What would be the high points of the sightseeing? Would there be a White House tour?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, usually. We did different things. Sometimes took her over to Congress, to the Capitol. We discovered that it was much better to get a Marine to tour, one of the Marines that was working at the Capitol, to take us around. The tour guides are wonderful and certainly have an enormous wealth of knowledge about all these things but when you are with someone who does not speak English and you have to do all the translation, it is much better to have a shorter speech-making going on than to go with a tour guide. We had one man one time, and I cannot remember who our guest was, but he would get upset when I would ask him to please stop talking so that the interpreter could catch up. He did not want to do that. He had much too much left to say.

BGEN SIMMONS: Also in September you attended your first White House dinner. This one was in honor of King Hassan of Morocco. Give me your impressions of a White House dinner.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, obviously it is the ultimate thing to go to. It was fun to see all the people and recognize all the faces that you normally just see on television or something like that. The King of Morocco was a very tiny man, very short and when he made his grand entrance with the President and Mrs. Bush he was wearing a robe. It was different looking, but I did not realize until I read in the paper the next day that it was made out of gold. I thought it was just sort of strange when I saw him that night. Then I realized why he was wearing it.

BGEN SIMMONS: Cloth of gold.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, it truly was.

BGEN SIMMONS: You would see the President and First Lady many times during these four years. Give me your impression of the President and Mrs. Bush.

MRS. MUNDY: Very warm people, both of them. Besides the state dinner for the King of Morocco, when the CinCs Conference came around they had all the CinCs and Secretaries to dinner in the Rose Garden which was just lovely. And their last weekend before he left office we were invited to spend it with them, not the whole weekend but Sunday, at Camp David. And I know if what I read in the paper is right they loved to go to Camp David and I just felt this was very wonderful of them to share that last time that they would ever be able to go up there with a whole group of other people. I admired Mrs. Bush.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will repeat the same question for President and Mrs. Clinton.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, also very warm people, I think. I find Mrs. Clinton much easier to talk to than the President. They also had a dinner for the CinCs and met us in the upstairs. The President himself showed us the Lincoln bedroom and his office on the second floor. But he is full of nervous energy. I sat next to him at the dinner table and not for one minute did his knee stop moving. He is talking to everybody and eating, of course, but his leg was constantly jiggling up and down.

BGEN SIMMONS: And constantly his mind was somewhere else?

MRS. MUNDY: Somewhere else, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: I have always felt that the

Commandant and his lady had a special entre to the White House because of the Marine Band. Would you agree?

MRS. MUNDY: I would agree. Of course there is also HMX-1 and the Marine guards on the doors and there are Marines on the staff at the White House.

BGEN SIMMONS: Good point. Did your husband bring his office home with him? Did he discuss the problems of the day with you?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes, he did very often. He also brought a lot of work home with him. He would . . . one of the big, extra-wide briefcases would come every night and sometimes two or three on weekends. He did a lot of work at home.

BGEN SIMMONS: He usually worked in the study, did he?

MRS. MUNDY: The study or in the sitting room.

BGEN SIMMONS: From time to time your husband would take hits in the media, either newspaper or television, for certain of his actions or statements — unfair hits, I might add. How did you react to these criticisms and how did they affect the family?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I will certainly agree with you that they were unfair and they were disturbing and upsetting and all of those things. Unfortunately, as you are aware, they were, the news was never quite right. It was always slanted or taken out of context or things like that which made more news but was not correct. The *60 Minutes* interview was a complete cut and paste job.

But Carl got an awful lot of support from within the Marine Corps. A lot of times he would consult with Sam and Tim on some of these things. It was sort of a unique situation where, I mean, the boys are down where they see what actually happens. There can be a big pronouncement from up at the top somewhere and you think, Carl might think something is being done, but the boys are the ones that see what actually is taking place down in the trenches, I guess.

BGEN SIMMONS: Yes, that is interesting.

MRS. MUNDY: He would get their input on —

BGEN SIMMONS: Saturday, 9 November, was your first Marine Corps Birthday Ball as the

Commandant's lady. Any special recollections?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I enjoyed all the Birthday Balls, I really did. I believe our first one the Atwoods were the guests of honor. I get that mixed up with the second one. But anyway, Lee Greenwood came one time. The last year was the most special, I expect, just because we were able to have the boys and their wives. It was more of a family affair on the fourth year.

BGEN SIMMONS: What off-duty hours recreation could you and Carl indulge in during his four years as Commandant?

MRS. MUNDY: Golf, skied a couple of times. We like just walking around the neighborhood.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did you have the feeling that you were always on stage?

MRS. MUNDY: Sometimes but not always.

BGEN SIMMONS: How did you manage to get some time to yourselves?

MRS. MUNDY: When we started out we said that one weekend a month we were going to just block it off and say whatever comes along that is going to be our weekend, and it never happened. You just take it when you can get it, actually. That is the way it works out usually.

BGEN SIMMONS: New Year's Day is traditionally a great day at the Commandant's House. There is a reception and a band concert. Your first as hostess was on 1 January 1992. Any special recollections of this reception or of New Year's receptions in subsequent years?

MRS. MUNDY: I believe the first one was the year when we tried to make it more of a family affair and invited the people, told the people who came to bring their children, even if they were young ones, to the reception and that was fun. The thing I always looked forward to and yet it would always bring tears to my eyes was Mike Ryan when he sings "Bless This House." I know it is coming every time but that House was special to me.

BGEN SIMMONS: On 28 January 1992 your husband attended the President's State of the Union message to the Congress. You undoubtedly were in the

gallery. What are your recollections of this and subsequent State of the Union evenings?

MRS. MUNDY: I hate to burst your bubble but I never attended anything.

BGEN SIMMONS: Oh, really.

MRS. MUNDY: No, it is too crowded. The Chamber is really very small and there is no room. So I watched these on television.

BGEN SIMMONS: I see. Your husband has a great and well-deserved reputation as a public speaker. Does he ever rehearse his talks or speeches on you?

MRS. MUNDY: No, not usually, but I read them a lot of times and, in fact, have done some editing on occasion.

BGEN SIMMONS: In May 1992, you and your husband had a week-long trip to Europe taking in the Netherlands, France and Germany. What are your chief recollections of this trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, again, all of these trips are exciting when you have never been before. I had never been to Holland before and enjoyed it. The Spiechermans are really lovely people. Roy Spiecherman is the Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Marines. We were there at tulip time and got to see the windmills. I believe this is the time we went to Belleau Wood. Would that be right?

BGEN SIMMONS: It would be right.

MRS. MUNDY: That was a memorable day. It was absolutely beautiful weather and the cemetery itself was just like a park. It is gorgeous. It is hard to imagine the horror there must have been during the battle there. But we also had some very good Marine tour guides with us on that trip and they tell us that a lot of times trees will just fall over for no reason in the woods and it is because they are so full of lead they just cannot survive any longer. Also, days when it has rained, when it is damp, that you can still actually smell the mustard gas there is so much of it in the ground. So that was quite a day.

Then also on this trip I believe is the time we got to go into what used to be East Berlin. I had never realized in all this time that the Berlin Wall was put up so that the eastern side had all the great museums and magnificent buildings. And to be able to go, the Gates

of Babylon are actually in a museum in what was East Berlin. I would love to go back there again sometime.

BGEN SIMMONS: I have never been to Berlin.

MRS. MUNDY: "Checkpoint Charlie" is now a museum. We walked through the Brandenburg Gate, you know, flying to Tempelhof Airport, all these things that you read about for so many years. It was just a thrill to be there.

BGEN SIMMONS: You are now getting into the parade season. Your husband made great use of the garden parties and parades. What was your role in this?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, just to be the hostess, I guess.

BGEN SIMMONS: Were there any changes from previous practices?

MRS. MUNDY: A few, I think. I believe I mentioned earlier that the enlisted aides had some, I thought, really good ideas. We took down the tents, spread the food tables out more so that people could more easily get to the things.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will venture a gratuitous comment; the food got much better.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, you do have to be concerned about food poisoning, especially in the summertime. But our solution to that problem was that we would replenish more often and, you know, we had a lot of people working so that we were able to do that and not worry too much about what the food was so much as making sure it was fresh when it went out. But the guys, it was their idea to do things like the fajita bar. They did the ice carvings.

We would . . . instead of spending money on . . . we had a lot of parade receptions and instead of spending a lot of money for big flower arrangements all the time, they came up with the idea of doing wine and bread as a centerpiece. We got the wrought iron plant poles from Mrs. Erskine, the Erskine Estate so that we could have permanent arrangements in those things and I think it worked out pretty well.

BGEN SIMMONS: Any parades or receptions in particular that you remember?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I guess there were two. The

one for President and Mrs. Clinton was very exciting. They came early to visit with us a little bit beforehand and we took them on a House tour, being careful, of course, to tell them the story about the Commandant's House being the oldest continuously occupied public building, which they got a big kick out of. But, as I mentioned earlier, the President is very interested in everything that you tell him and as we were coming downstairs, down from the second floor, he stopped by the grandfather clock which was not quite on time, and asked if somebody had looked at it. We told him "Yes" and he said, "Well, it is not on time because it is sitting on the carpet, and what you need to do is put matchbooks under it until it, make sure it is steady and level."

So here is Carl in his blues and his Sam Browne belt and he goes downstairs and gets the matchbooks. He and the President are down on their knees sticking matchbooks under the clock. And it is late, we need to get out to the reception but nothing will do until the President feels like he has gotten it all situated the way it should be. But I think the Marines enjoy that, too, you know. To perform for the President is certainly a very special thing.

But the other reception that I remember just because it was a funny thing that happened, it was for Senator and Mrs. Nunn. It was usually my custom to ask ladies if they would like to go in and freshen up a little bit between the reception and the parade and Colleen Nunn said yes, she would. So I took her to the powder room downstairs and I ran up and came back and she was nowhere around. So I, when I thought she had gone back outside, I went out. Again, it was time to go be seated and nobody can find Colleen Nunn. So then it — well, I hear this knocking noise and I go back to the powder room and the doorknob has fallen off and it is lying on the floor on the opposite side of the door from where she is and she cannot get it open. But she was a really good sport. She said, I started to climb out and then I realized I was over a stairwell and that might not work either.

The front doorknob came off in somebody's hand one time, too, but it was not an event. I believe one of the aides pulled a little too hard on the front door and the whole thing — as I said, there was always a maintenance man around.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who would you say were your closest friends during these years, the ones you could relax with?

MRS. MUNDY: You know, I honestly felt that all the

general officers wives were my friends. Obviously some were closer than others, but I really did. I had no, there was nobody that I did not feel comfortable with. The Barracks commanders wives as well came to be good friends.

And Jeanne Overstreet, I have to say that Jeanne, I think, is one of the most, well, let me start all over again. I think that Jeanne was very unique as the wife of a sergeant major. They had never lived in quarters but once before in their whole career. She had always worked. And then all of a sudden he becomes the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. And she educated herself on every facet of family support. She was active in the Key Volunteers. She attended Champus hearings on Capitol Hill, health care reform things. She got into child care. She made speeches. She just, everybody just loved Jeanne. And she really was a big help to me as well.

But, well, I probably would say Bettie Cooper. I still talked to Marcia Smith even though Norm had retired and Zandi Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: In September 1992, you and your husband made a lengthy trip to Russia. What are your chief recollections of that trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Just amazing that I would actually be there, something that I never thought would ever happen. We were treated like kings and queens, we were. But the stark realization comes across real quickly that the Russians — of course I am talking at that time — but they are poor. They really are. The whole infrastructure is falling apart.

But we went to, of course, Moscow. We stayed in the hotel where the foreign visitors had been allowed to stay. I think there was only the one place, during the Cold War if anybody came they would all go to this certain place, and, of course, you hear the stories about the wiretaps in all the rooms. I had asked Carl on the way over there if he thought people would be listening to our conversations and he said he did not think so.

Well, we got there and it was a little suite but the bed in the bedroom was enormous. It had to have been larger than our king-size bed, just huge. It was cold, you know. We turned down the bedspread the first night and got in bed and there was one little blanket that was about a twin size. So we spent all night fighting over who was going to have the blanket. The next morning, of course, that was the big topic of conversation, about how many coats we had with us that maybe we could put over the bed the next night. Well, the next night we turned down the bedspread and

there were two blankets. So it kind of gives you an idea.

But, there is so much to say about the Russian trip. I have actually made speeches about it. I am not sure I can cut it down enough to, for our purposes here. I just would not take anything in the world for being able to go. We went, up near Murmansk we actually went out to see a demonstration sort of like Cape Pegasus(?), to the Hermitage, Red Square, Kremlin, all these things that are, as I said, places I never dreamed I would have the opportunity to go.

BGEN SIMMONS: In December 1992, your husband embarked on a tour that literally took him around the world in not much more than a week. Did you accompany him?

MRS. MUNDY: I did not go that time. We had planned to go to California and spend Christmas with Sam and Jenny. Of course, Carl could not do that when he went on this trip. But I went ahead and when he came back through California we stayed a couple of days and then came home together.

BGEN SIMMONS: In addition to your own New Year's Day reception that year you attended one the following day given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell and his wife Alma. You would see both of them at many social and ceremonial occasions. What are your recollections or impressions?

MRS. MUNDY: You are talking about of the Powells?

BGEN SIMMONS: That is right.

MRS. MUNDY: I like both of them tremendously, I really do. Admired them. I would like very much to see Colin in the, in politics.

BGEN SIMMONS: There would be three Secretaries of the Navy during your husband's time as Commandant; Lawrence Garrett, Sean O'Keefe and John Dalton. I would like you to give me your impressions of all three and with which one do you think your husband had the greatest rapport, starting with Larry Garrett.

MRS. MUNDY: Larry Garrett, of course he was only there really a short time after Carl became the Commandant. I know all of them but I cannot say I honestly know them real well; probably John Dalton

better than any of the others. I must say I admired Marilyn Garrett and Margaret Dalton. I have been with them on many occasions in meetings and things of that sort. Laura O'Keefe, the O'Keefes had young children and Laura was not as active as the other two ladies.

As far as my, what to say about my impressions of them, actually, I guess they are influenced by Carl's. I know they are, by Carl's comments. But I think probably that Carl had the greatest rapport or best rapport with Sean O'Keefe, really directly.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your husband chose Mark Carder to do his official portrait. Did you enter into this decision?

MRS. MUNDY: Not really. It was the kind of thing where, it was a trial sort of deal. It was not necessary for us to accept it if we did not like it. But Mark was a young artist and certainly much more reasonable in his cost of the portrait than anybody else. So we thought it was worth a try.

BGEN SIMMONS: He did very well.

MRS. MUNDY: He did well and now he has more business than he can handle.

BGEN SIMMONS: In June 1993, you and your husband went to Naples for a conference of the Commandants of the European Marine Corps. Any special recollections of that trip?

MRS. MUNDY: The traffic in Naples. It is the most crazy place I have ever seen in my life. Ambulances cannot even get through. They just sit there and toot their horns like everybody else.

But, no, that was a really good time. We had known and had been with Robin and Sara Ross, the Commandant General of the Royal Marines and, as I said, the Spiechermans, before and we were all friends. Of course the, golly, who else was there? The Portuguese . . . isn't that awful?

BGEN SIMMONS: No, we all do that.

MRS. MUNDY: I thought there were four of the European Commandants but I simply cannot remember but three right now. But I think it was a, it was a very good idea to get everybody together because they, and, of course, then they all came back later and visited here. It was a good time for them to get to know one another and sort of agree on their common

goals and things of that sort.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am jumping ahead now to June of 1994. In that month you accompanied your husband to Europe for ceremonies surrounding the 50th anniversary of the landing at Normandy. What are your chief recollections of this trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, our first stop was in England where we stayed with Robin and Sara Ross in their quarters. Carl actually was able to attend a lot more of these events than I was. When I went I thought I would or had hoped, anyway, that I would be able to go to more of them. I actually walked, they live right close to town, I walked to the ceremonies when the ships, I have forgotten what it was called, but when the ships sailed from, was it Portsmouth?

BGEN SIMMONS: Yes.

MRS. MUNDY: And Carl got to go to the State dinner. Sara Ross and I watched it on television and things like that. But it was still, it was very special to be there at that particular time. It really was. I got to do some of the things in Normandy.

I guess the most moving thing was Omaha Beach Cemetery and again, to see where they landed and tried to come up that awful hill, and being there with the veterans and their families. There were so many of them and it seemed to me the vast majority of them had brought their wives and children and, lots of times, grandchildren. I ran across one family, there were 18 of them that went. The soldier just wanted to have everybody there with him. It was very, very well done.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were scarcely back from this trip when, in July, you and your husband departed for a lengthy trip to the Pacific, the crowning event of which was the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Guam. What are your chief recollections of that trip? The heat?

MRS. MUNDY: The heat. The heat and the wet. If you were not perspiring you were being rained on. But, no, that was another very, very special trip. To go with you, to go with the Wilsons and Gen Metzger, the people who had actually been there, that was, and again, saw parts of Guam that I did not see the first time. There were lots of ceremonies and things, but it is another one of those things that you just would not take anything in the world for the opportunity to do it.

BGEN SIMMONS: The Guamanians are such warm-hearted, hospitable, generous persons.

MRS. MUNDY: Absolutely. They really are. Of course we stopped in Hawaii on the way back for Chuck's [Krulak] change of command.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is right. Which was very well done, too.

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: December 1994 would be your last Christmas season spent in the Commandant's House. There was the usual round of receptions and parties. Also, there was week-long trip to South America. What are your recollections of that trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Actually, I did not go on that one.

BGEN SIMMONS: Some things the desk calendar does not tell me.

MRS. MUNDY: It does not help, does it? No, it was just too close to Christmas. I just had to have some time to get ready for the holiday. It was a very short down and back, a lot of air time. Carl enjoyed it.

BGEN SIMMONS: As 1995 began you must have been thinking that retirement was approaching. How did you and Carl reach the decision to stay in the Washington area and to buy a home near Mount Vernon?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, we had always liked it. We still had the house in Riverside. Many, many friends here. We have been here a long time. It was more like home, I suppose, than anywhere else unless, the real choice was between staying here and whether or not to go back to western Carolina. Even though we also have a lot of friends there, we decided that this would be the place we would like to be.

BGEN SIMMONS: In March you and your husband made another lengthy trip to the Pacific. The culmination of this trip was the observance on 14 March of the 50th anniversary of the battle for Iwo Jima. That day was also marked by the announcement that LtGen Charles C. Krulak would be the next Commandant. What are your recollections of that day spent on Iwo and, for that matter, of the whole trip?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, again, it was a day that I will

always remember because of again being there with the veterans. It was sunny, as you remember, but the heat was not as bad as I expected it to be. Lots of speeches. I had been to Iwo one other time and to Tarawa, I mean to places that you just cannot believe you would ever go. And to be there for the second time on this particular occasion, it was just thrilling. And, of course, we had an inkling that the announcement might be made that day about Chuck. And, of course, that was exciting. We were very, very happy that it could be done at that particular time.

BGEN SIMMONS: By the middle of June 1995, you and your husband were busy packing up and getting ready to move out of the Commandant's House. There would, however, be one more overseas trip for your husband. This was a quick trip to Okinawa to observe the 50th anniversary of the battle for Okinawa. I understand you were left behind to supervise the move out of the house.

MRS. MUNDY: That is correct. One more time, the 32nd, I believe.

BGEN SIMMONS: The last week in June was filled with ceremonies and events connected with your husband's retirement. In your mind what were some of the highlights of that eventful time?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, the wonderful dinner that the general officers had for us. They were just lovely to us and it was a very, very enjoyable time. I think it was the morning after Carl had gotten back from Okinawa, we were moving down to, back to the Navy Yard and the Drum and Bugle Corps came over and did a little play-off for us in the backyard. That about finished both of us off.

I need to think a little bit more on some of this, Ed.

BGEN SIMMONS: This is a continuation of the interview with Mrs. Linda Mundy, the wife of the 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps.

It is Wednesday, the 1st of May, 1996. We are in the Mundy home, Ludgate Court near Mount Vernon. Linda, the last week in June was filled with ceremonies and events connected with your husband's retirement. In your mind, what were some of the highlights of that eventful time?

MRS. MUNDY: There were many, many of them really, but let me start by saying that I cannot begin to tell you how much I dreaded this retirement. It was

almost like the end of the world was coming or something. But —

BGEN SIMMONS: In what way?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, just because I had been so involved in this — I mean, the Marine Corps had been our life for most of it actually and it was just hard to imagine anything that would be as wonderful later on.

I am happy to say that we have both done very well and things are great. We miss it, of course, but we are both very, very busy and things were not as bad as I thought they would be. There is life after the Marine Corps.

But as far as the — prior to the retirement, it was — we had some wonderful going away events, like dinner at the Shalikashvillis, and that was shared with Gordie and Gay Sullivan because he retired about the same time.

Of course, we bought and sold a house during that period. There was a staff picnic. The Daltons took us for dinner on the CNO's barge, which was a nice thing to do.

I lost my composure a couple of times. One was at the White House. We went — President Clinton promoted Chuck the day before the change of command and we were there for that. And in his remarks beforehand, he said that he really admired Carl more than any other member of the Joint Chiefs, that he always felt like Carl was giving him his honest opinion when he asked for something, which I thought —

BGEN SIMMONS: A very generous compliment.

MRS. MUNDY: Very special, yes.

Then actually when the day came and all of the ceremonies took place, it was almost a relief because it was so hard to say goodbye and do everything that you did. Well, of course, that had been going on for a long time, but everything you knew was for the last time.

So, the day itself was almost like this ton of rocks you had been carrying around had gone away, but we had, of course, lovely weather. God smiled, I think, on us because it had rained all week really hard before that.

The retirement part at Iwo [Jima Memorial] was hard for me and the worst part of that, I think, was when furled Carl's flag and I — that was a tough one.

There was a Master Gunnery Sergeant Sheftz, who had worked in the office and he has Rolls Royces, old ones. So, when we walked away, Master Gunnery Sheftz was waiting for us in one of his antique Rolls

and drove us back after that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Do you know how he spelled his last name?

MRS. MUNDY: S-C-H-E-F — no, I am sorry — S-H-E-F-T-Z.

BGEN SIMMONS: All right. You mentioned having dinner with the Shalikashvillis. General Shalikashvilli certainly faced a very formidable task of a relatively junior Army officer moving into the shoes of General Powell. He seems to have done it quite well and effectively, although his style is very much different than General Powell's was.

Perhaps you would comment on General Shalikashvilli and his wife from a social sense, a personal sense.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I was very fond of both of them. As a matter of fact, Joan Shali said the very same thing one time at a dinner party when all the Chiefs were there that you just alluded to. She said, you know, John was promoted above a lot of other people and we are actually the youngest in this whole group and she said when we got here, I fully expected everybody to be upset and not very nice to us. But it turned out to be just the other way around.

I mean, she is very open and does a fine job, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: This dinner was in their set of quarters at Fort Myer?

MRS. MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Would you describe briefly the set of quarters as compared to the Commandant's house?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I don't think it has any real elegance at all. Of course, I have never been in any part of it except the downstairs, you know, the living rooms and dining room. It is a fairly large entertaining area.

My understanding is that it is actually two houses that were put together, and I don't even know what style of architecture you would call it really, but the biggest problem with it is the heating and air conditioning systems are most inadequate, no matter what time of year you are there. You are either freezing or burning up. When you get a group of people in, it is — that is always a problem, it seems like.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, I think we could do better by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I imagine there is a bit of envy sometimes spoken over the elegance of the Commandant's house as compared to the quarters of some of the other Chiefs.

Looking back, what have been your principal satisfactions in being a Marine wife?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I must say I have loved every minute of it. I really have. I mean not the actual moving and the separations and that sort of thing, of course, but I just can't imagine doing anything else, and I wouldn't trade it for anything in the world, but I felt good about being able to support Carl and what he did.

I managed to take care of the problems that occurred when he was gone and that sort of thing, you know. Of course, there is certainly a satisfaction to see him rise to the top and do what he has done. I am very proud of him. Hopefully, I have been able to leave a small legacy of my own in the way of the family support programs and things.

BGEN SIMMONS: Possibly there is another side of the coin. What were the principal tensions or frustrations or disappointments?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, the principal tensions, I think, came especially while he was in Vietnam and then, of course, the year he was in Okinawa. It was a long time, but you can't help but worry and that is hard. I don't think I was as patient with my children as I should have been or as understanding probably with them. I am not a very good single parent, I guess, is another way of saying it.

But you are under a lot of stress during those times. It is hard to move because either you are leaving your friends or the reverse of that, that they are leaving you. But, yet, once you get to the next place it is always in most cases just as good or better as the one you left behind. So, it all works out.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think we should have one more status report on your children and grandchildren, where they are and what they are doing.

MRS. MUNDY: Well, Betsy lives in Herndon, Virginia, and both of her two children are in school now, first and third graders. Sam and Jenny are at Quantico. They have two little girls. I am very proud of them. They are both getting a master's degree while they are there in the night school program. They will finish in July. So, that is good. Tim and

Wendy are at Pendleton, and they also have two little girls. So, that is where they are.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good.

Your husband had a most successful career. He reached the absolute pinnacle of his chosen profession. He was a popular and effective Commandant. Now, in your opinion, what have been your husband's most important strengths?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, I think his integrity and his honesty and I think his great love for the Marine Corps and his understanding of the Marine Corps and his speaking ability, as you alluded to at an earlier time. I think he can be very persuasive and he seems to have a knack for knowing the right thing to say at the right time and I think his rapport with people, he enjoys people, gets along well with them. And he does it all with a sense of humor, which is also a plus.

BGEN SIMMONS: I suppose my final question should be if you had to do it over again, what would you have done differently?

MRS. MUNDY: When I think about it, not a lot really. I do regret that we didn't live overseas at some point, perhaps, or even on the West Coast. It would have been nice to do that probably. If things had been the way they are now, being that — when Carl was in Vietnam, you know, that the wives could stay in base housing and things like that, I think I really would have done that while he was gone, be surrounded by Marines.

I had my family and friends, of course, in Waynesville, but I think it might have helped if I had been able to actually be on a base during those times.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there anything we have left out that you would like to bring to my attention?

MRS. MUNDY: Well, if it is all right, could I tell you just a little bit about the Sloan Foundation that I am working on right now?

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good.

MRS. MUNDY: I probably should give you a little bit of background on it, and some of this, of course, comes from personal experience, but back when my children were small and if I needed to go to the doctor or to the grocery store or just simply take some time off and do something fun occasionally, there was always a child care center available and you could —

anybody could take their children and leave them without making reservations and that sort of thing.

But over the years, many, many more wives have gone to work full time. There are more dual active duty families and volunteers that have gone away. Many of these centers used to be run partially by volunteers and by officer and staff NCO wives clubs. But there have also been many health and safety regulations that have been put into place. I don't mean to say that is a bad thing. We certainly want to take good care of the children.

But what has happened over the years is that the majority of the children that go to the centers now are there five days a week, all day long. So, naturally, they have to have developmental activities and a curriculum and all that sort of thing. There are no places left anymore for young mothers who choose to stay at home and take care of their children, raise them and stay home with them while they are little.

So, what the Sloan Foundation was formed to — it is a non-profit organization — it was formed to try to raise the money to build, equip, operate and endow drop-in child care centers on major Marine Corps bases and it is a big undertaking. It sounded real simple when we started.

We are fortunate right now in that Mr. Zachary Fisher has pledged the money to build and fully equip a center at Camp Pendleton. The architect is drawing up the plans as we speak and, hopefully, we will have one going out there by the end of the year.

BGEN SIMMONS: That should keep you very gainfully employed.

MRS. MUNDY: It definitely is.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think that is wonderful.

MRS. MUNDY: We will just see how it goes as far as others are concerned.

Another facet of this building will be a community center type place, so that all the training programs, like key volunteers and maybe Marine Corps Relief and Red Cross, anybody, any organization that is approved by the base CG can meet there and the parents can be in the same — I mean, children can be cared for in the same building. That reduces the staff requirements as well as, hopefully, will increase the usage of the center.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will watch the development of this with a great deal of interest.

Is there anything else you would like to add?

MRS. MUNDY: Not that I can think of right now.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, if not, this would seem to be a good place to end this session. Thank you very much for what I think is a very good interview.

SESSION 30

Reflections on a Long Career

An idyllic and patriotic childhood . . . Boyhood heroes . . . College as a rite of passage . . . The pathway to the Marine Corps . . . Marine officers and others who helped shape his life . . . Closest general officers while Commandant . . . Reactions to sea duty . . . A career low point . . . Family life . . . Recruiting and Reserve Duty . . . Forks in the road . . . Selection as Commandant . . . Ten important traits for a Marine Corps officer . . . FM/FM 1-0, Leading Marines . . . Using the U.S. Naval Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette . . . "From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services" . . . "Reflections on the Corps" . . . Relations with SecNav John Dalton and CNO Adm Frank Kelso . . . Force structure planning . . . The battle of the end-strengths . . . 159,000 or 177,000 Marines? . . . Command screening and command selection . . . Gaining "componency" status . . . "Tailhook" and its consequences . . . Relations between Quantico and HQMC . . . Gays in the military . . . Racial problems and minority accessions . . . The Krulak and Wilkerson papers. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: This is Session XXX, the concluding session of my series of oral history interviews of the 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr. This session will be a reflective one, looking back at a lifetime including more than 40 years with the Marine Corps. The interview is taking place in the Marine Corps Historical Center. Today's day and date are Friday, 3 January 1997.

In the course of our 28 sessions together, along with the very revealing session with Linda, your wife, I think I have discerned certain consistencies or coherences in your life and in your development as a Marine Corps officer. I think there is a pattern in this development, and I would like to see if you agree with me on some of the threads in that pattern.

First, you grew up in a very American family. Patriotism was very strong in that family. Your boyhood was marked by World War II, which was then being fought. Your view of World War II was largely shaped by what you heard on the radio and saw in the movies. Your father had a great influence on you in shaping your views.

In this mindset you were forming, one American institution, the United States Marine Corps, occupied a very special place. Would you agree with me so far?

GEN MUNDY: Completely. A very accurate portrayal.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your family moved frequently in your childhood, as your father contended with the

remnants of the Great Depression. But, essentially, you lived a middle-class life in a series of small southern towns. It was the kind of family and boyhood that Norman Rockwell painted for the covers of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Would you agree?

GEN MUNDY: I would again agree completely. It was, if anything, an idyllic boyhood, not that it was not filled with the usual disappointments and failed efforts in athletics or low grades or failed achievements of the boyhood romances or whatever it may be.

But I came from a family background, not only my personal family, my father and mother, but, as you have characterized, from a very large family filled with aunts and uncles and cousins, some aunts that were as old as other people's grandmothers, and what not. So that, too, was a forming experience, because it taught me the value of family and of people and all of those sorts of things.

So, yes, patriotism; yes, family values; and yes, I guess, small-town values.

BGEN SIMMONS: You were an average American boy at the time, average in size, average in school grades, average in athletic ability. Can you think of any ways in which you were different from your childhood peers?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I do not think of any ways in which I was better, or different in a better context.

Probably you have accurately characterized me: I really do not think I ever stood out from the crowd in any way—perhaps once or twice but not many times—until I got into the Marine Corps, and then, in fact, on into my Marine Corps career.

I was not . . . you have been generous to characterize me as average in athletic ability. That was something that I was not. I suffered from childhood asthma and hay fever. I mean, if I ran across a dusty field or slept on a feather pillow or anything else, I would choke up and wheeze. In those days, there was not really . . . if there was a treatment for it, I never knew of it, and my parents did not, either. You just kind of kept wheezing until you got rid of it, or kept sneezing until you got rid of it.

And so that was very difficult for me, because I never had the wind capacity to be an athlete. When I began to swim, then I began to excel in swimming, and that worked pretty well for me. But sports-wise, I never was quite up to what I would consider, you know, average in the sense of the ability to play varsity sports and that sort of thing.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your summers at Lake Junaluska had a special effect on you, I believe. The lake offered you a healthy outdoor life, and you developed skills in boating and swimming. Also, the Methodist bible camp exposed you to a good deal of evangelical preaching. Do you agree that this laid a groundwork for your later interest in public speaking, and can you trace any of your speaking skills back to Lake Junaluska? Was there any particular minister or lecturer who especially impressed you? I can remember some Baptist and Methodist revival meetings in my own childhood.

GEN MUNDY: Well, going back to the fact that I was probably an average American boy, most of the ministers who impressed me were those who gave short sermons so I could get out of there, and in fact, I remember—this was not at Lake Junaluska, it was up at our church in Waynesville, North Carolina—but I remember that, one time, one of the ministers there got up the next Sunday and made mention of the fact that Carl Mundy, and however old I was at that time—I think I had probably just about joined the church—but that it had been relayed to him that he had been paid a big compliment by Carl Mundy that his sermon the week before was the best that little Carl had ever heard, because he did not give one, or he had bypassed the sermon. I think we had had, you know, special music or something like that.

But, that said, I suppose so, and yet if you ask me

who was the most moving speaker that I heard at Lake Junaluska that I can recall, it would have to be Billy Graham. I remember when young Billy Graham and his red '49 Ford convertible came roaring over to Lake Junaluska, which, of course, was a Methodist retreat. He was a Baptist, but it was ecumenical enough to bring him over there. And, as he has been his whole lifetime, he absolutely captured you when he took the pulpit, because he was a tremendously moving speaker.

The impression on me that perhaps interested me in public speaking or that molded me toward that was more the junior high school and senior high school oratory contests. Before I even entered and competed, the whole school would come into the auditorium, and three or four, always boys, as I recall—there must have been a girls' oratory contest, but I do not recall it, but we did not compete amongst each other, at least—but three or four boys would be up there, and of course, you wore a suit and tie, I mean you were dressed up, and then you got up and gave Lincoln's Gettysburg Address or you gave some other great oratory and worked for weeks to memorize it.

So when I finally got into that and entered—I think earlier maybe in my history here I mentioned something about this—but when I got into it, you would go home and practice before a mirror and practice your gestures and listen to yourself in a room alone, and then you would go off scared to death to get up in front of your peers and hold forth on whatever it was you were to say.

I think the point that I was reaching for is that I believe I mentioned earlier that I came in second only because the teacher who did not vote for me was the next-door neighbor and later told me that though the crowd went wild with applause and I was clearly the winner, Miss Stephanie Moore came up to apologize and say the reason she had not voted in my corner was that she thought people would think she was voting for her next-door neighbor.

But it was more that that I think shaped my confidence that I could speak and my desire to speak well publicly.

BGEN SIMMONS: Who are your special heroes in your childhood? Did you have any? For example, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Jackson, John J. Pershing, and Charles Lincoln were in my pantheon.

GEN MUNDY: We probably were not too far apart. In fact, you mentioned at least one of mine. Being of southern origins and growing up at the time I did and

with a grandfather who was born on the battlefield during the battle for Atlanta in 1864, I was naturally schooled repeatedly in the virtues and leadership of Robert E. Lee.

So Lee became, to perhaps southerners of earlier generations and even into my generation, Robert E. Lee epitomized all that there was about the military leader and about the goodness of a human being. “Noblesse oblige” was the term associated as I studied him later when I was at Auburn University.

So Robert E. Lee was probably a leading hero. All of my heroes were military figures. I really, as I think back on it, I really had no . . . I mean, I knew who Babe Ruth was or I knew who Ted Williams was, but I knew who Ted Williams was not so much because he was a baseball player as was the fact that he was a Marine fighter pilot ace.

So my heroes were military officers, or I guess if I were excepting that, I was a trombone player, and Glenn Miller and Tommy Dorsey were people that I identified with very much, and again probably as much as anything not only because Glenn Miller was a trombonist but because he was in an Air Force uniform, and I was attracted to uniforms in the war years.

My father, again, having a great military influence on me, Blackjack Pershing, maybe because he was Blackjack, maybe that was the attachment, but the Doughboys, Over There, World War I, those were vivid lessons in my early life, and Blackjack Pershing was my father’s categorization of what that was all about, along with Sgt Alvin York, who . . . I grew up in Tennessee, and Alvin York used to come in and buy things on Saturdays every couple of weeks at my father’s store, and, you know, a little unimpressive man in a pair of worn-out overalls, but a Medal of Honor winner. So, Sgt York.

Movie actors were my heroes. Gary Cooper, probably because he played Sergeant York in the movie. John Wayne . . . you know, Gary Cooper, all of those of that particular vintage.

I think that if . . . I was trying to think of names that stuck out in my mind, and again, I remember that Capt Colin Kelly, Colin P. Kelly, who, at least as history will record it, dived into the smokestack of a Japanese ship and sank it and earned the Medal of Honor. That was inspiring to me. And I did not really, at that point, though I had an attachment to Marines, I really had an attachment to uniforms. So Capt Colin P. Kelly was one.

I mentioned the movie actors. But I think, that as a general rule, this is a lesson that I learned, in fact, when I was in my last year, last couple of years, in the Corps, and that has to do with the extract from Gen

“Brute” Krulak’s “First to Fight.” My heroes were Marines. I did not know their names. I did not have any Marine in mind. You know, Dave Shoup did not mean much to me, and Tarawa, or a colonel did not mean much to me. But “the Marines” meant a great deal to me.

So any time the word “Marine” came out in the news, or any time there was a pictures of Marines, I was inspired by the people. I could always look—although I think, in the early parts of the war, we probably did not differentiate—but I always looked for the camouflaged utilities and the jungle utilities or for the camouflaged helmet cover. So Marines were my heroes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did your college years reinforce or change the values you had absorbed as a child?

GEN MUNDY: Well, as I mentioned before, college was a necessary rite of passage for me. I never sought to go to college. I would have much rather, had not my mother prevailed, I would have much rather joined the Marines. Korea was still going on, and it was very exciting to me. The Marines were still my heroes, even as a high school senior.

So college was something that I needed to do in order to get into the Marine Corps, first of all, to satisfy my parents’ very wise counsel. That was step one: Okay, I’ll do it for my folks, and then I can be a Marine. And then when I got into Auburn, as I talked about earlier, there were Marines there. There was a means of getting into the Reserve. There was a means of getting into the PLC program. I could be in Army ROTC, which was for me pretty close to the Marine Corps in what we thought and studied about.

So, once again, I think that probably college reinforced for me . . . it was there that I met Gene Arnold. I will mention him later as one of the influential people in my life. We have talked about him before. But Gene Arnold. I was affiliated with ROTC, and so I continued to reinforce my conviction as I learned more about the military in whatever capacity I did that that was where I was going and that is what I wanted to do.

I think that, also, with regard to maybe personal values, of course, you know, you grow up a lot in college. You learn to drink beer if you have not done that before. You know, you probably chase girls more than you have before. But the values . . . yes, I think going to school at Auburn University, a southern university, again steeped in tradition, yes, my boyhood values were reinforced during the college years.

BGEN SIMMONS: You did find your way into the Marine Corps, which was your objective. What path in life do you think you might have followed if you had not come into the Marine Corps?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think I would have to . . . at the risk of going down recorded as being somewhat corny, I never . . . I cannot recall any time in my life thinking seriously about being anything but in a military uniform. Now, the Marine Corps was what I wanted to do. I can remember that I became fascinated with the MARCAD, or not the MARCAD . . . in those days it was the aviation cadet program for the Air Force, because it was a means by which you could get out of college two years early and go directly in and earn your wings. Well, that was fascinating to me.

But I suppose I will conjecture, because I cannot tell you that I really had aspirations to be something other than a Marine, but I suppose, had I not come in the Marine Corps, I would have most likely followed my father's footsteps. I was a business administration major in college. I would have probably, like many of my friends, gone to work with a corporation and would have continued with a successful life there. But it is hard for me to even estimate that, because I just never had any aspirations to do anything else except what I have done.

BGEN SIMMONS: You married your childhood friend, Linda Sloan, and she has been your partner all these days. It would be fatuous for me to ask how important has she been to your career, but I will ask you to comment on the demands a Marine Corps life makes upon a wife. Have these demands changed over the years? Is it getting easier or harder to live the life of a Marine Corps wife?

GEN MUNDY: Well, during the evolution of my generation and up to my present time, I would say that it is becoming harder to be a Marine Corps wife. More is demanded of them. That probably, as much as anything, has to do with the fact that society has changed, that the role of the wife that Linda Mundy was, is different, even for the role of her daughters-in-law and her daughter.

Working mothers are now a matter of course. Young women, as they have increasingly gained equality, they come up, for the most part, not wanting just to sit around the house and rock the baby, not that that is not important and that they are not willing to do that. But they have careers of their own that they want to pursue.

And so balancing the fact that the Marine Corps places great demands on Marines and sends them away from home a good bit of the time, then raising a family while at the same time pursuing a career, I think, is tougher on the wives of this generation.

It either costs more to live today or it costs more to live to the standards that young people live. In our day, mine certainly, and I am sure yours, as well, with Frances, if we ate hot dogs for the last week of the month, it was not a big deal. We did not have a TV until, I think, I was a first lieutenant. You had one car, not two. You drove the car to work if you were carpooling maybe three days a week, two days a week; then your wife was on her own. She either got a ride somewhere with a neighbor or she did not go somewhere.

So times have changed. There is no family that I know of without two cars and probably a motorcycle and a boat to go with it. The wives work. We dress well, we have expensive habits, and that is the American lifestyle. So I think it is tougher.

The other part of that is that I believe . . . and this would have to be related to the fact that while Marines have always been expeditionary, and while we have always sailed off around the world and gone on expeditions, not too many were married. I mentioned earlier, when I became a platoon leader back in 1958, there were two Marines. . . besides me, there were two, my platoon sergeant, whose wife stayed out in the Midwest, and my platoon guide, whose wife I never saw but who lived in a trailer somewhere around there. So it was not hard to deploy. You did not have that same weight.

Now, when we deploy, with 60 percent or more of the Corps married, it is very difficult, because we expect the wives not only to do whatever they did when there were only two in a platoon that deployed, but now we expect principally officers' wives and certainly the NCO wives as well to take care of this throng of young wives that we have, many of whom are 14 or 15 years old and still have to be mothered.

So you have not only your family to raise but you have your husband's outfit to look after, and I think that is different. So it is harder to be a military wife today.

BGEN SIMMONS: Starting with your time in The Basic School and going up through your selection as Commandant, I want you to give me a list of Marine officers or others whom you consider most influential in shaping your life and career. If you were asked to pick three or four role models from the list, who would they be?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I will give you the list, and I will talk somewhat about it here, and then I will flesh it out, because I have gone on for quite a long list of people here. But I will highlight some, and then, for the record, I will do that on wringing out the three or four, because I want to make sure that I wring out the right three or four or five or whatever number there is.

Of course, it goes without saying that my father continued, as most of us do, to have an influence in the early days of my life, because you are still, as a second lieutenant or a first lieutenant or a captain or even perhaps further along, you still have a lot of growing up to do. And my father never ceased to help me grow, and the way he did that, his advice was never reactive, it was never directive; it was always just thoughtful. And half the time, it would take me two or three days to figure out why he had said to me what he did. But then I would realize that it was something that I was manifesting or saying or doing, and my dad had just given me some lesson from his own past that seemed to be a story in the telling, but as I think about it, there was a message to me in it.

And so he helped me through a lot of the younger years of raising my family and of dealing with the Marine Corps. All of us had early company commanders that we felt were incompetent or tyrants or bad role models, and my father, when I would go home on leave, would kind of help me along in that. So he was always, through his entire life.

At an early stage, looking back to the time that I started out in the Marine Corps . . . you have said starting with the time in The Basic School. I would go back a little bit before that, since I was in the Reserves, and say, indeed, at The Basic School, but even before The Basic School, that our friend, Gene Arnold, retired, now deceased, LtCol Gene Arnold—then staff sergeant and then gunnery sergeant and then, of course, on up the ranks, Arnold—Gene and his wife Janine were major influences in my life, because I do not think I could recall meeting anyone that I considered any better as human beings.

Now, that means . . . what does that mean? It means simply that the Arnolds were two of the most upbeat and positive and helpful and outreaching people that I have ever seen, and Gene arguably may have been the most dedicated Marine that I have ever known, because he lived, breathed, and slept Marine Corps. I mean, everything about his house was . . . I do not mean it was Marine green; it was very much the ordinary family. But, you know, we never ate supper, we ate chow, or he would walk out in the hall with his bugle and play mess call. You know, it was just always Marine Corps. So Gene was very inspira-

tional, and he was very much of a role model for me throughout the years.

BGEN SIMMONS: A very strong Christian.

GEN MUNDY: And a very devout Christian man and . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: You sat down to eat chow, but then you held hands to say grace.

GEN MUNDY: That is exactly right. But it was always fun.

BGEN SIMMONS: Upbeat.

GEN MUNDY: It was never . . . namby-pamby Christianity kind of turns me away, but I mean, we would say a very, very meaningful blessing around the table, but then Gene would usually end it by throwing his hands up in the air and yelling, “Hallelujah, now let’s eat,” or something like that. So it was just a . . . you always felt better. I never left, I never walked away from the Arnolds’ household, even when Janine, with a brain tumor, was dying, I never walked away without feeling like I had gone there to be an uplifter and I was always the uplifted when I left.

I had a staff sergeant. He retired a captain after Vietnam. His name is Bill Weaver. He was my OSO team chief, a staff sergeant, then made gunnery sergeant and then was commissioned through the special commissioning program at the outset of Vietnam.

Bill Weaver was probably the epitome of a staff NCO. He talked the talk and walked the walk. I mean, he was just what a sergeant of Marines should be. I will not go on and dwell on that, except to say that that was my early and probably my most meaningful impression of a staff NCO, was Bill Weaver.

In my early years, Capt Fred Vanous, who retired as Col Fred Vanous, and then Capt Earl Piper, also retired, Col Earl Piper, were very good friends. We were on OSO duty together. That was when you were cast out independently on your own, and it is the first time you had not been surrounded by a structure. So we sort of formed a team down in the Southeast District, and we excelled. I learned a lot from watching them, and perhaps equally that they learned from me, but they were good role models.

Fairly early in my career, and I would say as a major, which is about the time that I came to know you, BGen Simmons—Col Simmons, I guess, first, and then you as a brigadier at Headquarters—but Joe

Fegan, Col Joe Fegan and all the way up to LtGen Joe Fegan, always epitomized to me the character, the professional arrogance. I do not know exactly how to exactly characterize him, but Joe Fegan carried himself like a Marine and had the humor to nonetheless call me when I was an aide to Gen Lew Walt and, you know, have a little humor over the telephone, but then let me know that I was not really doing my job as an aide as he saw it, but never correctingly. And then I worked for him when he was a three star at Quantico.

So he had an influence, I think, in characterizing for me what I thought a Marine colonel and general ought to kind of be like. I do not know that I ever . . . I certainly was not as tall and never got up to his standards, but he had an influence.

My very good friend, Joe Hoar, who is a retired general, Joseph P. Hoar. Joe and I came to know each other as majors after Vietnam and formed a very strong friendship, and I always considered myself sort of second runner to Joe Hoar. I always thought that Joe Hoar had a half-step on me and probably right up until the time that we both were four-star generals and one became a CinC and the other one became a Commandant.

We were Basic School classmates, did not know each other in Basic School, but Joe Hoar was the character, the personification of professional confidence, professional knowledge. He knew his business. He was confident of that. He was a New Englander, so he had that kind of cocky New England air. But I always admired Joe.

Another one, retired MajGen Matt Caulfield, who . . . he and I came together as majors in Vietnam, and Matt Caulfield . . . even to this day, Matt's business is to hire quality. That is the name of his business, and it seeks to hire military personnel and put them out in the civilian community because of Matt's still-profound ability to express the fact that if you hire a marine sergeant after four years in the Corps, five years in the Corps, you are going to get a better product than you can get off the street, or an Army sergeant or a Navy petty officer. He believes in people, and he taught me really to be compassionate and to believe in people.

My very good friend, lifetime friend, first company executive officer, was a then-first lieutenant named Peter Joseph Finley from New York, Pete Finley. He was a reservist. He got out after two years, retired subsequently as a colonel, and still to this day works as a consultant to the Marine Corps, as a psychologist.

Pete evaluates the marines at Eighth and I that we are going to send up to Camp David to be security guards for stability, so that we do not have anybody

that breaks up under stress. He is working, I think, currently with HMX-1, the Presidential helicopter squadron, and he, in the throes of the Marine security guard crisis of a few years ago, that is when I brought . . . I was then a major general for operations, and I brought Pete in under contract to work with the Marine security guards down at Quantico for the same purpose, to screen them, analyze them, work with them, and make sure that we were not sending somebody out that was going to break under the strain of security guard duty.

So Pete has wrought wonders in the Marine Corps. Our attrition rate at Camp David, our attrition rate from the guard detachments at Eighth and I and in the Marine security guard business, the Corps will owe Pete Finley a big debt.

But we came up together. It was always Pete who reached out to me, and I used to call him my shrink, because when times were bad, even before becoming the Commandant, any time that I was really having a tough time, I would either give Pete a call or I would see Pete, and he was always a good counselor.

Pete, from time to time, in the days of my commandancy, when I would be taking the heat from the press or something, I would get a call from Pete just saying, you know, "Hang in there; there isn't anybody better than you to do this. You know, you're doing fine. To hell with those other guys. Keep plugging away." So the type of solid support that you always want to have around you.

I would mention . . . you know, I will not talk about everybody that expansively . . . retired Col Tom Campbell, now a professor down at the University of Texas, in fact recently authored a book entitled *The Old Man's Trail*, which is good reading. Tom Campbell was one of those fun-loving . . . you know, in the days that you are really coming of age and coming to feel like a real man in the Corps, at about the age of major, at Command and Staff College, Tom Campbell and Gene Arnold and I were three companions that had an awful lot of fun together.

But Tom was always sort of the, again, one of those who was the epitome of what a Marine officer ought to look like and the way he ought to think and the way that he ought to function under stress. Tom would have been somebody I did not serve in combat with. He and Joe Hoar were advisors together. But Tom Campbell is somebody that I would have liked very much to have been the adjacent company commander alongside of. I would have felt very secure.

I should mention Maj Joe Loughran, an Irishman whom I had not known. Joe relieved me as the XO of 3/26, and so we only had about three months together

in Vietnam. He was killed over there, and I do not mention him to just get his name in because he was killed, but Joe really inspired me. We would get up every morning and shave together whenever we were in garrison, and he would always sing, as he was shaving, he would sing the song, "The Wild Colonial Boy." You may know it. But it is a wonderful Irish ditty, and it just kind of characterized being a Marine.

Those were some of, I guess, the associations.

With regard to generals, because, by and large, generals, I guess, were the primary role models, because they were sort of who you looked up and watched the most and decided this one was not how I would want to be if I were a general or that one is, and I would tell you, not to curry favor with you, I would tell you that you were, because I always saw in you, and still to this day see in you, that element that you have characterized as the passing generation. I mean, you are the old breed, and so that was always inspirational to me, and I thought that you personally characterized a certain elan about being a Marine.

You comport yourself always as a gentleman, you know, impeccably dressed, impeccably spoken, but who understands the beat of the drum. So I say that not because we are here today but because I wrote your name down there when I was thinking, and would have.

Fred Haynes, MajGen Fred Haynes, was one of my mentors from the days when he was a colonel and I was Gen Lew Walt's aide. Lew Walt certainly had an influence, although a lot of Lew Walt's influence was a very painful one. So I guess that Lew Walt gave me a lot of . . . he certainly was an inspirational leader, but he taught me equally a lot about how not to lead. You do not have to shout at people and throw things at them and so on to get them to . . . maybe you do in going up Walt's Ridge, and so that type leader in a given place and a given time would be superb. But on a day-to-day basis, working with people around you, Lew Walt, while he inspired me because of who he was and what he was, I probably learned things not to do from Lew Walt.

MajGen Dave Twomey, retired LtGen Dave Twomey, I had known as Maj Twomey, I knew as Col Twomey at the Barracks. Dave Twomey, I thought, probably gave me my early lessons in what we would today probably term empowerment. Dave Twomey was the first man that I had really come in contact [with] as a colonel, as my MEU commander, who would give you a mission and then forget about it. He would hit you right between the eyes if you did not accomplish it, but you would never find him wanting a report on how you were coming. All he wanted you

to do was get it done.

And so he gave me, although Al Gray taught me—and I will have more to say about him in a minute—as he did many in the Corps, the fundamentals of maneuver warfare, mission, guidance, that sort of thing, but really, as I think back on it, it probably was Dave Twomey who would say to me, "Okay, you're the battalion commander, I'm the MEU commander, here's what I do, here's what you do, here's what I want you to do, here's what I don't want you to do. You got it? Now shove off and go do it." And I never got any over the shoulder or second guessing. Occasionally he would pull me aside and tell me when I had done something wrong, and he would certainly slap me on the back. But he gave mission guidance. So I thought a lot of him.

I thought a lot of him as we resurrected from the very bad days of the 1970s in the Corps, as we resurrected the 2d Division down at Camp Lejeune. I was one of his colonels on the staff and then later a regimental commander. Dave Twomey wanted to bring professional standards back into that division, and it was badly in need of them. And so he would cause you to dress up every Friday, put on your service uniform every Friday. You had to wear it all day, and all the division colonels would go out and inspect something on Friday.

It seemed trite to those who truly wanted to think of nothing but, you know, if you are a real Marine, you . . . I do not mean to characterize anybody here, but you know, you chew tobacco, you slouch around in your field uniform, something . . . Dave Twomey wanted you to be tough in the field, but on Fridays he expected that division to look like the Marine Barracks, Eighth and I.

And so we worked hard, and we got drilled back in. We got individual accountability. We got small unit leadership. All of those sorts of things were done in that division. So Dave Twomey was a tremendous mentor for a colonel, which I was at the time.

Al Gray followed him, and despite the fact that my oral history here will contain some difficult times with Al Gray, that is the man's nature. He is that. But that said, he should go down perhaps as one of the greatest teachers and the most knowledgeable people in the operational art and in war-fighting in general that we have ever had in the Corps.

I think that all of my generation of first, colonels, and then as we moved our way up the general officer ranks, all of us were taught a lot by Alfred M. Gray, Jr. He certainly shaped my operational awareness, and shaped a lot of my association with the Navy during the time that I was in Norfolk, both as a brigadier

and then later, of course, as a three-star general.

But Al Gray was . . . he understood the Navy probably better than the Navy did. He understood the Army probably better than most of the senior officers in the Army. He knew what the Army could do and what it could not do, and he was never wrong. Every time he would say, "We have to do that because the Army can't do it, they can't mount a small operation like that, they're too heavy, they're too logey," he was dead right. He knew exactly what he was talking about.

So if there was ever a professional in knowledge of his profession, Al Gray has to be that, and I learned a tremendous amount from him.

LtGen Charlie Cooper. We started out as majors. He taught me . . . he tried to teach me how to do one-arm pull-ups. Never got there. He could do them; I never got it. But Charlie Cooper, I always thought . . . again, Charlie has an ego, and he would tell that his ego is bigger than he is, but Charlie and Carol Cooper were the epitome of professionalism, social grace, personableness, all of those sorts of things, and he and she were role models for us.

My good friend, MajGen (Retired) Ray Franklin. We came to know each other when we went to the National War College. Ray is arguably the smartest man I have ever met. Ray Franklin can take the most complex problem and put it into the simplest, most definable terms that I have ever seen. I venture to say that I never would have passed quantitative factors at the Naval War College had not Ray Franklin been my carpool-mate. I would ride in and say, "Ray, I cannot get it. I don't know what this guy is talking about." And Ray would always, characteristic of him, he would say, "Well, look. This is water. That's land. To get to that land, you gotta go across this water," or something that was so fundamentally simple in the analysis of a complex problem.

I have always admired him, and again, I think the ability to dissect something very complex and to make it simple, while I never achieved that to my own satisfaction, I think what Ray taught me was, do not be confounded by the complexity. Find out what they are really talking about, and you will understand it better than the people around you.

LtCol (Retired) Tony Grimm, Anthony Grimm. We were on the Haynes Board, the force structures or the manpower study group together. Tony also probably has more historical knowledge, second only to you, perhaps, than anybody around. If you want to know on what date the Coldstream Guards did something or not, if you want to know when Caesar's Legion went somewhere or what actually happened at Antietam or

what happened on Wake Island, Tony Grimm probably would be a man.

He missed his calling. He retired from the Marine Corps, but what we should have done is throw a lasso around him and bring him down here and put him to work, because he would have been great. He understands, and he, too, hears the beat of the drum.

I am going out a long way, but then you gave me license to do that here. LtGen D'Wayne Gray was a tremendous mentor of mine. I knew him when he was a colonel, I guess. I think he was aide to the Under Secretary of the Navy when I first met him, and I was aiding Gen Walt, or it may have been before then or around that time frame. But then I worked for him in the Plans Division, and of course, when I went to be the Director of Personnel Procurement, he was the Director of Manpower Management and then went on to be the Chief of Staff. So I knew D'Wayne Gray very well.

I think that D'Wayne was probably a coach. Whether to say he was a role model, he certainly understood the politics of Washington, and [I was] not aware of it at the time, but I learned a lot that would serve me very usefully in later years from D'Wayne Gray.

The Commandants. Wilson, gosh, you know, a hero, a giant of a man. One of the most impressive sights that I can ever recall seeing was in the days when Gen Wilson and Gen Barrow, the Assistant Commandant, and LtGen Andy O'Donnell, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, would mount out to go down to the tank, to the JCS meeting, when it was an all-hands meeting, and I would look out my window of the Plans Division where I was then located out as they were getting in the car in the parking lot, and I thought, "Lord, I don't know what the issue is, but I would hate to be on the other side." They were just literally giants in the Corps, literally giants, you know, big men who epitomized . . . if you ever wanted to know what a uniform should look like or what a salute should look like or anything else, why, pick at least Wilson and Barrow and you had the role model.

Barrow probably was my primary mentor and proponent to become the Commandant. I remember that when I was a brigadier general, I was stunned to get a Christmas card from the Commandant saying "Mundy in '91." It was stunning. And through my entire years as a general officer, Robert H. Barrow, whether on active duty or whether retired, was constantly writing, calling, never snooping but just always encouraging, and, I think, trying to perhaps pass along to me in the confidence that I might or that

he thought I would become the Commandant . . .

GEN MUNDY: I was talking about Gen Robert H. Barrow as one of the major influences and saying that he coached me along, and even after I became the Commandant, he never . . . he always worried, I think, about sticking his nose into my business, as it were. He never did. He may have thought he did, but he never did.

I have always profited from some backseat coaching from a lot of sources and a lot of people, and he was always one that was there any time I needed to call him or who would write to me and say, "Well, you're a quarter along the way now, and you're doing fine, and steady as she goes," and the type of confidence-building counsel that one wants, but again. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: You are speaking now of his counsel while you were Commandant.

GEN MUNDY: Counsel while I was Commandant, and I had said, even before that, however, he would . . . I guess he gave me the confidence of being a general officer because, at the time that I came along, you know, brigadiers were in fact one of the early counsels I was given by Charlie Cooper, as a matter of fact. When I was getting ready to go to my first symposium, Charlie said to me, "Now, remember, brigadiers sit in the back of the room and don't say anything." Al Gray certainly did not want it that way and used to insist that we call on the rear ranks.

But I think that what Barrow built in me, even as a brigadier general and certainly on down the line, was the confidence that he valued what I had to say and he valued my judgments. He would call me, and I am sure he called you, or he called many, many people, but he would call me down in Norfolk as a brigadier and say, "What's going on? What are you doing down there? I'm concerned about this," or something. And I would say, "Well, I think that." So he valued my views, and that gave me confidence that somehow, you know, I could weigh in in the general officer corps, something that a new general needs.

I would not want to pass without mentioning LtGen (Retired) Norm Smith. Norm and I came to know each other as lieutenant colonels. He was the Deputy Director of Plans Divisions, and those were tough days for the Marine Corps in the joint arena, because we had been defeated, not we the Marines but the whole nation, in the Vietnamese war, and we had turned our focus to NATO, and NATO did not understand Marines, and the U.S. Army did not understand Marines, and so I think we were probably the young turks who were given the mission of fighting the air

command and control battles in Europe and fighting with people that wanted to turn the Marine Corps into the Army, and so on.

Norm was . . . gosh, if I have ever known anyone who had endurance and patience, Norm Smith manifests that. I never came to work when he was not already there, and I do not remember not checking out and saying good night to him as I left, and usually in the Plans Division in those days, that is 7 or 8 o'clock at night. Norm literally probably worked himself into ill health there.

But on any occasion, when we were in the midst of the seeming most overwhelming crisis, Norm Smith would come back to you with his Arkansas Razorback basketball player, low slung, easy gait, and he could tell when you were uptight, and he would sit down and say, "Tell me what's going on," and we would crack a couple of jokes, and then he would tell you what he wanted you to do.

But he was a great leader. He was just a wonderful leader, I think, of Marines, as he went on to prove, but of his fellow officers and his peers. Nobody ever questioned the fact that we were all lieutenant colonels together but that Norm Smith was the leader of that crowd.

I think that probably one that I would put—when I finally refine this list and give you the three or four names, it will be very difficult for me—but one that I would put on there is retired LtGen Keith Smith. Keith Smith was a Reserve officer through the rank of lieutenant general in the Marine Corps. He was a fighter pilot.

Why should I come to have such an association with him? When I was a brigadier general, Keith Smith's son, one of his sons—they have several children—was killed in the Beirut bombing. He was then the wing commander of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. In fact, I had been a colonel while he was the wing commander, just made brigadier general and came to Headquarters.

So when I was a colonel and a MAU commander and a regimental commander, Keith Smith would go out of his way to bring me, not me alone but I would say principally me—I do not know why, but maybe we had an early association or an early attachment—he would bring me up to Cherry Point, for example. I remember one time when General Barrow, the Commandant, came down to visit Cherry Point. Traditionally, the Commandant would visit the aviators, as it were, and then would go down to Camp Lejeune to visit the "real" Marine Corps. I mean, I am not saying my own conviction, but that was sort of the image.

Keith Smith put the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing into utilities. You were either in your flying suit flying an airplane or you were in utilities. He wanted them to be Marines. He would bring the Marine amphibious unit commanders up to Cherry Point to brief the Commandant there on what the MAU was doing, not to wait until he got to Camp Lejeune to do it. He wanted Marine aviation to be very much a part of the Marine Corps and not a separate part of the Marine Corps.

When I came to Headquarters, then, as the . . . well, wait . . . I am skipping over the part that makes him truly one of my heroes. When I watched Keith Smith bury his son at Quantico, we all went . . . we wore blues. That was the first thing. I thought, that is professional. I mean, you could have done it in the way that so many would have opted to do it, we will do it in civilian clothes. But we did it in the chapel at Quantico. We did it in blues.

He carried his grandson, who was about a two-year-old baby, I think, at that time, up and sat with him on his knee, and as his son's casket draped with a flag, of course, was rolled down the center aisle and then positioned there, I can remember that the little baby, held by his grandfather, would sit there and reach out, you know, and touch the flag and say something out loud like, "Is my daddy in there?" or something.

But Keith Smith . . . I would have broken down. I mean, had it been one of my sons, I could not have done that. Keith Smith sat stolidly. They have a big family. Many of the family were in tears, but not the father. The father was a Marine first and then a father.

And then when he moved out of the chapel or when the congregation, the attendees, which was most . . . I think that probably is the fullest the Quantico chapel has ever been, with young officers who were friends of his son's and then with the whole general officer corps must have been there, but anyway, we all went outside and stood, and I can remember that Keith Smith took his family and put them in the cars as the casket was going to be rolled out and put in the hearse and taken to the cemetery, and after he had put them in there, he got again the grandson, the little baby, put him on his arm, and then came and stood at the door of the chapel and, as his son was rolled out, saluted with the little kid. It is hard for me not to choke up a little bit telling this, because it was so moving.

But that really inspired me in the quality of the man and in the leadership that a Marine officer is expected to put forth. Other fathers have done it. John McCain, you know, Adm John McCain, was bombing Hanoi when his son was in the Hanoi prison camps up

there. So others have done it. But Keith Smith just epitomized to me virtue, I guess, and values.

When I came to Headquarters as a two-star general, he was the Deputy Chief for Aviation, lieutenant general, and he made me be involved in aviation matters. Keith Smith taught me more about aviation than anybody else in my career, not directly again, but he would call me up, and he would say, "I'm having a meeting on the re-engineering of the AV8-B, and I want you to come down to it," and I would always say, "Yes, sir," if for no other reason than he was a lieutenant general. But I would hang up generally saying, "What the hell does this have to do with anything that I really care about? Why do I have to go down and listen to somebody talk about rewiring the engine on an AV8-B Harrier or something?"

But he would have me sit through that, and as a result of that, now I know what he was doing, and what he was doing was expecting that I was going to become the Commandant, and he wanted me to understand, and he used to say to me, "Aviators should not have to legitimize aviation requirements. We fly the machines. If a ground officer can't state the case for Marine aviation, then it's time for Marine aviation to go away."

I took that on board, and I think that what I learned from Keith Smith probably is what caused me, during my years as the Commandant, to really understand clearly that Marine aviation is an integral part of the Marine Corps, perhaps even more so . . . I think Keith Smith understands that better and taught that better than even some of those who will be bigger names in aviation than he may ever be, because there are many of the aviation generals . . . the older ones, particularly, to this day still believe that there are two communities, ground and aviation, and that the aviators have to stick together. Keith Smith thought that you ought to intermingle the two as much as you could, and he taught me that, and it served us well, I think, in my tenure in preserving, definitely in preserving fixed-wing Marine aviation, because there was a powerful and continuing run at Marine fixed-wing aviation on my watch, and not that I was the great savior of that—many others contributed to it—but my understanding of it, taught by Keith Smith, was one of the factors that enabled the Commandant just not to sit aside and let the DCS aviation or the ACMC fight the aviation battles, but let the Commandant fight those battles, understanding what he was fighting for and what he was saying, oftentimes more, better than others.

There are . . . I guess I could go on into . . . you have asked me up until the time that I was Commandant, so I really should perhaps hold off on

the years as Commandant. But I think that Keith Smith influenced me greatly and, because of the personality and the character of the man, again, will long be one of my genuine heroes and definitely will be one of those in that list of three, four, five, however many it eventually . . . and for the record, I will identify the three or four as you asked.

BGEN SIMMONS: I did not hear the name of LtGen Dolph Schwenk [unintelligible].

GEN MUNDY: You did not, and that is because, again, in my hand . . . you can see here, and in fact I have preserved these things so they, too, might go into my papers, but I was right, I filled up all the margins here and was going down trying to remember. But Dolph Schwenk definitely should be there, and as we speak, I am writing him down, and we will correct the record to make it reflect that.

Dolph Schwenk as the Deputy Chief of Staff, PP&O, another one of my mentors. I think there was no question in his mind that I was going to be a general, and so he taught me a lot about the joint world, and I think what he taught me, because, as I mentioned earlier, in my days in the Plans Division, we were constantly under attack from the joint and the combined world; that is, from NATO in general, from the Air Force for command and control, from the Army wanting to turn us into mechanized divisions, from OSD wanting us to be something that we were not.

So Dolph Schwenk, coming to the assignment as Deputy Chief for Plans, Policies, and Operations, came there from being the J3 in the U.S. European Command. He was probably one of the very few generals we had at that time that . . . he certainly was one of the very few that understood Europe, and he was one of the few that understood the joint staff business, the unified commands. Now, people are going to read this and argue with it and say, "No, I know somebody else that did," and I will agree that there were.

But I think that the thing that Dolph Schwenk brought back to the planners at Headquarters, who were the primary war-fighters inside the beltway in those days, was that we are better than they are, and you do not really have to be awed or scared . . . I mean, there were big, long titles, you know, Deputy CinCEur. "Don't worry about it. He is an Air Force officer, and what he knows is about the Air Force, but you can walk in there confidently and speak Marine Corps any time, and these guys will listen to you." And so he taught us that.

He was a man, he is a big German. He was a Hitler

youth in his early days, a big, profane, powerful man, but when his wife Midge would enter the room, he would become the most gentle fellow that I have ever seen. I can remember, at social events, Midge would always walk over and say, "All right, Dolph. You're the general. It's time for us to leave. If you don't leave first, they can't leave, and they want to go." And he would say, "Yes, ma'am," and he would get up, and out they would go.

They are still great friends to this day, retired down to Pinehurst, North Carolina, and plays six days of golf—sometimes two a day—a week, always rests on the Sabbath or some day during the week, but a very . . . yes, a man that I thought a lot of and still do.

And I am sure that this list will never be complete.

There is no way that I can sit down here without somebody like you saying, "How about?" and me saying, "Oh, of course." So I should record in my oral history that as I meet faces around the city here at events from time to time, or as I meet people on the West Coast, I always am struck with the fact that there is somebody that was a major instrument in my life.

I have mentioned earlier . . . let me go on . . . Ellen Dodd, with whom I spoke this weekend to wish her a happy new year, Ellen was the secretary at The Basic School when 1stLt Mundy reported back in there to teach. 1stLt Milligan was there in those days, and it was a great collection. But Ellen Dodd, starting in 1961, has never failed to have a birthday card arrive on or within two days of my birthday. It was amazing to me that on the 16th of July in 1967 in Vietnam, on that day, at that mail call, here is my birthday card from Ellen Dodd, and she has not, up until this . . . I called her to thank her for her Christmas card and to just wish her a happy new year.

Ellen, I think, adopted a generation of Marine officers. She is one of the home-grown, homespun, old Virginia country ladies; marriage broke up early, raised four very proud children, has nine grandchildren now. But Ellen Dodd was one of those who was devoted to you again in all of the times out there, all of the times. It did not matter how . . . she was almost like a mother. You never did anything wrong, according to Ellen Dodd.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think she is representative of a vanishing or perhaps vanished breed, too, the career secretary who gave great continuity to offices, great respect. A great number of persons would go to her first when they needed an answer.

GEN MUNDY: That is a very, very good characterization of her, because she was always there and was

probably overcome by . . . you know, as she grew older, why, she likely became less adept at typing or something like that, as computers came in and what not. But Ellen . . . you are exactly right that if you wanted to know, you know . . . whoever it was you were going to see. Gen Fris was her last, and I think her favorite. . . it may not have been her last, but Gen Twomey, I guess, was the . . . she retired when Dave Twomey was at Quantico. But you could always call Ellen and say . . . you know, you could call the aide and get one story. You could call Ellen and get another one. She was a friend of all of the people that worked with her.

I must not leave . . . again, I could go on forever here, and I have to stop, and maybe we will dress this up a little later. Another that was lieutenant colonel through the grade of major general, Don Lynch. Actually, he is a Texan. His name is Bertie Don Lynch. Don Lynch and Marianna Lynch again were people who . . . the happiest they ever were was when something good happened to me, at any grade that I can recall. I do not think I was as happy when I was promoted to brigadier general at Camp Lejeune as Don and Marianna Lynch, who lived a block over, not a block but a couple of houses down the road from us. I mean, to this day, to this day, I do not think any event has ever occurred in my career without a card from Marianna Lynch and a humorous call, or now America On Line e-mail, from Don Lynch, just an extraordinarily fine couple, man and Marine, and I would certainly list him among those who helped shape my professional character.

BGEN SIMMONS: We can do one of two things here at this point. Either you can winnow out the three, four, or five most influential persons or you might talk about the influences on you while you were Commandant. I did not mean to rule that out in my earlier question.

GEN MUNDY: Well, okay. The influences as Commandant, again, because of the loneliness of the position, and I do not mean that in a personal manner, but indeed, it is . . . you know, it is standing on top of the pyramid, and people who were your most confidential friends the day before you became the Commandant now call you "Sir," and you have assumed a different mantle. And I do not mean that they abandon you, but you have to work hard to make sure that people like the Don Lynches of the world or the Marianna Lynches of the world do not become awed of what they think you are now and lose sight of the fact that you are not really any different than you

were the day before you became the Commandant.

So all of those influences continued. I think that . . . I would say that influential . . . Col Pete Metzger, who retired . . . he was my first military secretary. Pete taught me about Washington. I had certainly thought I had learned that from others, but Pete had had a tour in the White House and just had an instinct for that sort of thing, was a great friend of first Senator and then Governor Pete Wilson of California, knew them well, and so Pete understood the presidency from the Reagan standpoint, the Republican years. He understood how the White House worked. He understood how the Congress worked, and Pete was enormously helpful to me in shaping how I dealt with the Presidents, how I dealt with the highs and mighties around town. He led me by the hand in my early phases of the Commandant.

I could cite a lot of generals, Hank Stackpole, LtGen Hank Stackpole, who certainly was always a great friend and I brought back to be my DCS PP&O. LtGen Terry Cooper, who lives about a half-mile from me right now, who was my manpower deputy chief, certainly taught me a lot.

Chuck Krulak, our current 31st Commandant. I guess probably during my tenure, as far as the serving generals went, while I worked, I believe, very hard to be a general officer along every general that was serving, I did that, but I think it fair to say that probably Chuck Krulak was the man that I could always call and work my way through a problem with him. He is a tremendously smart young man, anyway, or not young but a smart Commandant, anyway.

Chuck has a messianic tendency, I think, when he gets hold of something. Boy, he goes after it night and day and all hours of both daylight and darkness. But Chuck was certainly formative, and had it not been for him, I think it is safe to say that whatever brilliance may be attributed to me with the Force Structure Planning Group . . . and I do accept some of that because, indeed, this was not simply a tasking by the Commandant that the Commandant then forgot about until the report came in; this was something in which I was very viscerally involved in, step by step by step, but we would have never gotten that done, I do not think, unless Chuck Krulak had been the brigadier general who happened to be at that time in that place to be able to take on that mandate from me, because he simply . . . his insights and his ability to draw together and work to death, but to draw together people and point them in a direction and then see them to a finish line were tremendous.

So tremendous influence on the commandancy. The 30th commandancy, was tremendously influ-

enced by BGen through LtGen Krulak, and of course, then, he is now the Commandant. The nice thing, I think, about that, whatever the personalities involved and however history may judge either or both of us, the fact is that you really have . . . I think you will see about eight straight years of a fairly steady course, where the pace may be different, philosophies may vary a little bit, but it will be steady. So that was a great influence.

Colin Powell deserves mention, because I think I mentioned earlier that when I became the Commandant, and on about my, I do not know, third or fourth day on the job, there came a call on my car phone on the way to work in the morning, and I picked it up and answered, and it was, "Would you please hold for Gen Powell," and I thought we were going to war or something.

And so the line opened up, and Colin Powell, with his always positive outlook . . . and Colin always was . . . I mean, even if he had something difficult to deal with, he was always upbeat about it. But, anyway, so I get the phone, you know, grabbing for my pad to write down the operations order or whatever I was going to get, and he said, "The Powells have got tickets to *Phantom of the Opera* on Sunday afternoon. They would like the Mundys to join them." So that was my first touch . . . not the first time; I had known him when he became the chairman.

But ever thereafter, to include even the minority issue, with the *60 Minutes* issue, for always, whenever a Marine was killed, when a helicopter crashed, when I was beset upon by something or other, the popping out in the news with the Force Structure Planning Group or with a *60 Minutes* or with the marriage policy or with the loss of a parent or whatever it might be, but the first phone call was Colin Powell, as busy as he was, and he was always a friend and a mentor, and I would never hesitate to call him or go see him and say, "I don't know what to do on this."

Though many people, I think, many of those around me, in fact, judged him as being a very parochial Army officer that really was insincere with regard to Marines, I never found that to be the case. We have spoken earlier about his book and some disappointments in that, but it has nothing to do with the man. I found him to be a tremendous mentor and supporter, confidante, and someone [to whom] one could be turned.

The fact is that however the book is written or however his oral history may record it or anything else, the fact is that the Joint Chiefs turned the chairman a number of times, not by stonewalling, but he was always willing to listen to you and he always valued

what he was told, so as a result of that, he was a tremendous confidence-builder. You had no reservation at all about saying, "You know, Colin, I just can't live with that. The Marine Corps is going to stand up and come against you on that one." And he would always say, "Well, okay. Well, what do you think we ought to do?" So I have great admiration for the man, and he helped me along a great deal throughout my time. We had a great, we had a good rapport throughout.

There are others. I would be hard-pressed not to mention about every general officer I know. I should not omit Jim Flynn, who became my military secretary. Both he and Josie, his wife, an inspirational couple. You know, I can go on and on and on, but I think there has to be a point at which I pull back.

I should not . . . well, I keep going on and on and on. Chaplain Larry Ellis, Capt, USN, Chaplains' Corps Larry Ellis. I did not . . . when I became the Commandant, I had contact with the Chief of Chaplains about another chaplain who . . . in fact, the FMFLant Chaplain, whom I had known years ago when I was at Little Creek as a brigadier, one of the best men that I had known. But the Chief of Chaplains, anyway, said, "Well, we have, you know, the FMFPac chaplain. I am thinking about detailing him back there." So I said, you know, I was not going to get into trying to detail chaplains, and I expressed my preference. But, anyway, Larry showed up as the Chief of Chaplains.

His assistant was Cdr, now Capt, Father Gene Gomulka, the Catholic priest. I had known Lt Gomulka and had deployed to Norway with him when he was down in the 2d Division, and I had known him when he was the chaplain of the battleship *Wisconsin*. He had cancer, detected and fought cancer at that time and was successful and is still at it today, and also one of the more inspirational people.

So I had two chaplains that were a very good pairing, and while I never . . . the thing I used to tell chaplains in my guidance was, "Remember that you lead a very unusual flock here and that what might work in the First Baptist Church in Sumter, South Carolina, is not necessarily going to work with Marines. You have to inspire Marines not only because they are going to be saved when they go to heaven, but you also have to fire them up and send them into battle, and you have to understand that they will look at you and perhaps listen to your sermon, but they are also checking out the length of your trousers while you are talking, and they are looking at your haircut, and if your belly is hanging over your belt or if your belt is too short, whatever it is, Marines are going to judge

you. Unique. Sailors will not, soldiers will not. You know, airmen I do not think will. But Marines will. So you have to relate to us, and yet you have to not try to be a Marine.”

They both grabbed onto this, and then, of course, in 1993 when we were thrust into the gays and homosexual issue, the two of them were major mentors. I must admit to you that at times when I would, as we all do, when I would waiver and think maybe it is time to cash in the chips, why, one of them would come down and we would talk for a while and I would say it is not time to cash in the chips.

They were extremely fine chaplains, both of them. Larry Ellis is a prince of a man. I would have made him an admiral, but he is out in Memphis, Tennessee, and probably will retire there.

I ought to mention, too, and I will mention both of them . . . we will talk about Linda a little bit later. You have sons, you have daughters. We all do. My sons, during the time that I was the Commandant, were my sounding board for being able to reach down into the company-grade ranks and be assured that what I was going to get was unfettered by any need to worry about stars. You know, they were going to tell their father what he wanted to know. I do not mean that I thereby would use them. They never offered, and I never asked them, to tell me how their general was doing or tell me how their colonel was doing.

But if I had a policy that I was looking at—beer in the barracks, the changes in the uniforms, doing away with the white uniforms, the leadership, women in combat, gays and homosexuals—any time that I really needed to get to the grass-roots level, why, I could always give either Sam or Tim a call, depending on the issue, and they both have the unique character that I could consult with one better on some issues than the other, and correspondingly, the other one would be my best counselor on another type issue.

Tim, I can recall, for example, again, right in there with the chaplains on those times when you felt the whole world was against you and that everybody in the Department of Defense was willing to roll, and therefore, if you were not, there must be something wrong, Tim would be my . . . I would give Tim a call, and he would really kick his father in the fanny and send him back into combat.

So they were inspirational, I guess, because of what they were and because I could see in them the generation that was coming up in the Corps, and I could sense the goodness of the generation, even at times when you read the Black Book with all the criminal things that do go on in our Corps, even within the officer corps, not extensive, but there are some very bad

things that are done by Marines from time to time, and even when you waivered on, gee, I wonder if we are coming apart, I could always kind of do a check with one of them or just talk to them a little bit, and I knew that the Corps fundamentally was in good shape because that echelon of the Corps was solid.

I think I should probably stop there, and again, I may enter . . . at the time that we edit this, I may write some into there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, now, is it fair for me to ask you to name the three, four, or five largest influences on your life?

GEN MUNDY: Throughout the Marine Corps, are we talking about, and the influence in the Marine Corps?

BGEN SIMMONS: Yes.

GEN MUNDY: I think that it is a fair question, and I only hope that I get it right. But I think that with regard to Commandants, Barrow has to be . . . you know, I have always said, when he would arrive, humorously, he always kind of viewed my humor with a wry eye, I think. Sometimes he would laugh and sometimes he would not. But I would always announce to whatever gathering that we have a real Commandant on board when Barrow was around.

So I always thought that he epitomized the qualities of a Marine officer and that he certainly epitomized, in my judgment, what a Commandant ought to look like, comport himself like. And to this day, I mean, Barrow continues to be an awesome character, an awesome personality.

We sit on a committee in the Center for Naval Analyses together here, and I can assure you that though it is ringed with greats in the Navy and senior officers and diplomats and everything else, that the most ringing, the most down-to-earth and the most get-to-the-heart-of-the-issue voice that ever speaks is Robert Hilliard Barrow, and people listen. Gen Barrow never says anything where somebody is turned around talking to his neighbor beside him. They always stop when Barrow says, as is his usual Louisiana introduction, “Well, now, let me ask you this,” and then you know that you are going to hear something that is worth hearing. So I think that Barrow did.

Again, I would say . . . I have already put Keith Smith on that list as being certainly someone who inspired me, continued to inspire me, and still does today.

Going beyond that becomes very difficult because they are hard to sort. I would certainly, as we talked about earlier, Gene Arnold would go on that list. And so perhaps I ought to leave it at that and just say that those are three that would definitely be there. I will, when we finish this, have guilt feelings about why I did not say you or why I did not say any number of other names that should be there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Fair enough.

Every life has its peaks and its valleys. The high points of your career are obvious: your promotions, your selection for posts of increasing importance. But there have to have been some low points. Now, what were they? Was there ever a time when you said to yourself, "Hey, I'm in the wrong job. I'm going to get out of here"?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I guess there were some frivolous times. There may have been a serious time. But I recall that we talked earlier about—or perhaps a little later—about early tours of sea duty and their impact, and I will not dwell on that here except to say that you leave sea duty with many impressions, and one of them that I left with was a very practical one, and it was that, gee, if I am going to have to do much of this in the Marine Corps, I really did not sign on to sail around and smell stack gas out of a Mark-37 gun director up under the stack of a cruiser or an aircraft carrier, nor did I sign on really to serve my career with sailors. Even if there were 40 or 50 or 60 Marines in the detachment, fundamentally, you were serving with the Navy.

So I came off sea duty, I think, a little bit demoralized, I suppose. I went to The Basic School, fortunately, from there and was instantly revitalized and came back to my roots, and that may happen to many when they go outside the Marine Corps to serve, that you get on somewhere serving a joint tour or serving a tour with another service, and while it is interesting, you really miss your own service. So that would be an early one.

The other time is when I was at the MCCDC in those days as the protocol officer—I think we have spoken of that earlier—that was an absolute low point. I could not believe this had happened to me. I think that probably God was seeking to teach me humility. I probably did have a big head. I had come back as a very successful battalion commander. Colonel Dutch Schultz had asked me to come out and be the S3 of The Basic School, and here I was jammed into the protocol job at MCCDC Headquarters, and I could not believe this. It was sort of one of these, I

cannot deal with this rationally because I cannot conceive it happened to me.

But I tried to get out a couple of times. It finally worked, but it did not work on the first two, and so I can recall that I . . . I said this will ruin my career. I will soon be on 20. That was 1975. I would be coming up on 20 in 1977, and I said, if I am still here and still doing this, you know, that is it, I am out here. That did not happen, due to factors that we have discussed before. So that probably was, professionally, a low point for a senior officer.

I do not think . . . this perhaps relates to something that we will talk about subsequently, and that is Linda's impact, so I will not talk to that here. But when I was deployed as a BLT commander with the 31st MEU . . . in fact we were in Hong Kong over Christmas in 1972—yes, 1973—and my daughter Betsy was involved in a fairly serious automobile accident, and the bottom line was, was thrown out of the car with some pretty significant injuries, face down into a puddle of water and almost drowned, you know, was unconscious, so we very nearly lost Betsy there.

As I will perhaps comment later here, I never knew that because . . . well, I will talk about why later, but because my wife understood the necessity of morale at the front, I guess, but I did not know it until Betsy was safe and sound, you know, and safe in the hospital and out of any threat of being lost.

But I think at that point, the thing that hit home to me is, here I am out here sailing around, you know, in fact at that point going on liberty in Hong Kong . . . we were on hold to stand by at least to evacuate Phnom Penh, which we never did, but we sure swung on the hook a long time waiting to do it. But I thought, this is a hell of a thing. I mean, what is important here? I have a daughter at home with critical injury; I am a deployed BLT commander; I cannot in good conscience abandon my post and leave and then have the battalion landing team committed to possible conflict, or at least this evacuation thing. And yet there is my family at home.

So I really . . . I must admit that for a few days there, I said, "This is it. You know, I've got to go home and look after my family." But, fortunately, as was always the case, you know, you come out of that, and my wife handled things, as she always has and still does, so wonderfully at home that I did not get out. But that would have probably been the most serious low point at which I really felt like I was not being true to my family.

BGEN SIMMONS: I want to go back to your sea

duty. You had the opportunity to serve at sea as a detachment commander, something that was, once upon a time, part of the apprenticeship of every Marine Corps officer, and it gave every Marine Corps officer a naval stamp to his personality and his career.

So I do not want to put words in your mouth, but while this did not turn out to be the romantic Dick Powell scene, across-the-fantail kind of experience that you might have expected, I still believe it was very valuable to you because, very early in your career, you gained an inside knowledge of the Navy and what made it tick.

GEN MUNDY: I would agree completely, and I would hope that I have said that before. If not, why, I would certainly say it here. The sea duty was disappointing only in the sense of being away from your own, even though there was a Marine detachment, that you were in a sea of sailors, and so it was away from your own.

But it was the romanticism of Dick Powell dancing across the fantail because, to put it in a more mundane sense, I remember detaching from sea duty, and I think I have maybe commented on that, but the USS *Little Rock*, swinging from there . . . we were in the Caribbean, taking the officers' motorboat ashore, you know, coxswain mate at the fleet landing, going up to the club in Guantanamo Bay, playing ship, captain, and crew, with dice, rolling for drinks, 10 cents for a Cuba Libre, you know, large steaks, surf and turf, all of those sorts of things. And that continued as a lieutenant colonel into Olongapo. I mean, those were adventurous times.

But the *Little Rock*, anyway, coming out of the Caribbean ports, swinging into St. Thomas, not even dropping anchor, just dropping a boat over the side, two rings of the bell, ding ding, first lieutenant, United States Marine Corps, departing, and over the side I went with my sea chest into the boat and headed ashore. Those were romantic times. They were. . .

GEN MUNDY: . . . Decks to be holystoned and whites, you know, spiffing white canvas to stand under, and lines, boatswain's knots all over the railings and things like that, I mean, a wonderful experience to be at sea; gunfire shoots, you know, the blue of the ocean and that sort of thing.

All of that romanticism put aside, the fact is that you were still serving with an element not your own. And while, indeed, it did place a naval stamp on me, and throughout my tenure as Commandant, I believed that I would repeatedly state that I am a naval officer,

and I am very proud of that. But that said, I think there was an early impression made on me. I certainly became more knowledgeable of the Navy and of life aboard ship and of the functions of the Navy, and I always felt very comfortable around the Navy.

But I also had a feeling that the Navy was not the professional organization that I wanted to be a part of, and whether it had to do with the repeated efforts of trying to get a sailor to salute a Marine first lieutenant or something, which was not a habit of many sailors in those days . . . and there is an element of humor in there. But it was just not, for a Marine who viewed, among other things, military professionalism be one of the highest marks of a military professional . . . I had many, many friends among the Navy officers but none of whom I really thought much of professionally.

Now, I am sure they were very capable in their occupational specialties. They were good pilots, they were good navigators, they were good gunnery officers. But beyond that, professionalism was lacking. And so my early impression of the Navy, not just life aboard ship but my early impression of the Navy, was an outfit that was rather slovenly.

BGEN SIMMONS: I am going to get very personal. Was there ever a time when Linda said to you, "You can't always put the Marine Corps first. It's time for you to think of your family"?

GEN MUNDY: That is not at all personal, and I would answer you simply with saying that never, ever occurred. Without a doubt, each of us have . . . the operative term today is "spouse." I don't like it very much; I still tend to use the term "wives" because I think the military wife is a supporter in a way that a male spouse can never be to a military person. That is Mundy judgment, and somebody can take that apart in years to come.

But Linda was a girl of the fifties and the forties. Just as I was a product of World War II, she was a product of the same upbringing, the same values. No one, to this day, has ever had to remind Linda Sloan to stand when the flag passes by or to . . . I have never told her that she should put her hand over her heart because it would look good because she is the Commandant's wife. And yet you can look anywhere and see wives that are wondering why we are standing up here.

To this day, without me ever telling her—I have never told her—Linda will, almost, I think, sometimes humorously, probably to amuse me, but, you know, when we stand for the service songs and the

service hymn, the “Marine Hymn,” Linda will stand. But when the “Marines Hymn” is played, her thumbs will go along the seams of her skirt, I guess, and she will stand to attention out of pride in the Marine Corps.

I think that Linda understood . . . she came from a generation in which we sent the men off to war, and it was the duty of those who remained behind to bear the loneliness and to bear the burdens and to keep the morale up at the front.

Going back to our discussion just about Betsy and about one of the low . . . about my daughter and the low points when she was almost killed, Linda never conveyed that to me until it was safe to do so. I could tell when Linda’s spirits were down a little bit at home, from letters, or in later years, tapes that we would exchange. And she would complain about the car when it broke down and she could not get it fixed, or some teacher was not doing well by our children or something like that. But she bore her responsibility—that responsibility being to bear the loneliness, and so on—totally. Never did she say to me, “Look, I want you out of there to come home and carry your half of this burden here, or your majority of this burden.” So she understood that.

The other thing about her is that . . . you have mentioned that we were childhood sweethearts. We joined the church together. We were fourth graders. I pulled her pigtailed. I had known her for a long, long time. And so, in part, perhaps, in growing up together and in maturing together and then in partnering and getting married, Linda knew me, and she knew literally what . . . she knew the drum beat that was in my inner being.

And so I do not think that she . . . she knew that among her responsibilities . . . you know, all of us are mothered, by our mothers and/or by our wives. We are inspired; we are told to stand up and try it again, and so on, and Linda fulfilled that role with me and still does to this day.

So she is the classic . . . for me to say military wife, I would say yes, but for me to say she is the classic American lady whose primary role in life was twofold. One was to support her husband in whatever way it took to do it, and the other one—and I am not putting these necessarily in order—the other one was to raise her children and instill them with values.

What she was able to do, probably more than me, because I was gone a lot of the time, but the fact that we have two sons in the Marine Corps today, that is not unique. I mean, there are people who have more kids in the Marine Corps than we have, and there are a lot of people that have sons in the Marine Corps.

But Linda instilled in our children their father’s pride in what he was, probably more than I did, and I think that they would tell you that. I think all three of them would tell you that.

So, no, Linda Sloan Mundy never even hinted to me that I should get out, and indeed, in those moments when I would falter or when we would be at home on leave, you know, when I was a captain or something, and we would watch . . . our friends were now moving into brick homes and establishing and running for office in the town or something like that, becoming leaders in the community, and I would have a flittering, “gee whiz, what if I got out and came back here, and we would not be living in Whiskey Gulch with the pipes running down the wall or something; why don’t I do that?”

But, really, Linda would listen, and Linda would never, ever interrupt and jump in and say, “No, you don’t want to do that.” But, over the next day or so, Linda would put me back on course and would say, “Well, why don’t we go back to Quantico and think about that for a while?” And, of course, as soon as I got back to Quantico, that thought left my mind. Or when I was ready to quit, any time, any job, or anything, Linda would always just say, “Well, let’s think about it for a day or two.” Or she would say nothing, and a day or two later, she would say something that put me back on course.

So she has truly been inspirational, and this is not just the classic testimonial of give your wife a bouquet of flowers when you retire or change command and say something nice about her. But, indeed, she is, I am sure, not unique, but she is certainly classic among what a military wife should be, wife and mother should be.

BGEN SIMMONS: Some of your early assignments were not exactly choice. You seem, nevertheless, to have made the most of them, 4th ANGLICO, for example, and used them as useful building blocks. Would you comment?

GEN MUNDY: Sure. When I was at The Basic School, I had come off again out of the FMF, off to sea duty, back to The Basic School, was a captain, had put on my railroad tracks, feeling my oats, was feeling like somebody, and I got a call that said, “You are going to OSO duty.”

That was a letdown for me, because I kind of thought, boy, that is . . . you know, do “real” Marines do that? I mean, am I going to go out and walk around college campuses? I am not sure that I wanted to do that.

But in that, and succeeding cases where I thought this is really a lousy tour of duty . . . even the protocol assignment, as we talked about earlier, turned into a pot of gold because I wound up, out of that assignment, being made the chief of staff as a lieutenant colonel, and for whatever that was worth, that was fact.

So I learned a lot on OSO duty that assured me that I could independently, when placed even in charge of something as small as an officer selection team, but with nobody around you for reinforcing power as much—it was you, you know, you either made it or you did not—after making it and then after leading the Nation for a year or a couple of years—I cannot remember whether it was two or not—you gained great confidence in your ability to operate on your own. That was formative.

The ANGLICO job . . . remember that I started out as a reservist, so I had some affection for the Reserve, but it had probably waned over time as I became an officer and got in the regular Marine Corps, but going back to 4th ANGLICO taught me that Reservists are among our most professional organizations. So I would not say that I learned a lot about the technical aspects. I do, I knew how fire support teams worked, and brigade support teams, and I understood the ANGLICO functioning.

But the real thing that I came to understand is that you could take businessmen who were in civilian clothes or who were plumbers or who were fire captains, which the CO of the unit was while I was there for a period of time—one was an insurance salesman, the other one was a captain in the Miami fire department—and you could put them in a Marine uniform and bring them on duty, and they were pros, they were professional. They knew their business.

So I came to gain a tremendous appreciation and understanding and admiration of the Reserves, which again served me well into my tenure.

So I think that all of the jobs that I had that one might characterize as the bad jobs, all of them turned out, like many of our lessons in life . . . you know, if you want to be the chairman of Waste Management Corporation of America, probably a good place to start as a youngster is on a garbage truck collecting garbage. You can learn a lot about what goes on.

So all of my off-line assignments . . . recruiting as MR when I was a brigadier general and General D'Wayne Gray called and said, "The Commandant wants you to be a recruiter," and I said, "Why me?" I mean, why would I want to do recruiting? I mean, I can be a brigade commander, I can be an ADC, I can be a lot of things. Why recruiting?

Well, the "why" is very easy now to understand, that I was . . . some higher order was grooming me to understand recruiting for that time when I would become the head recruiter of the Marine Corps as the Commandant. So I learned a lot in all of those jobs, and they were of great value in my career.

BGEN SIMMONS: What do you consider to be the most important switching points, the forks in the road, so to speak, in your career?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think, undoubtedly, having been called by Lew Walt to be his aide when I was coming back from Vietnam . . . I was headed to go over to the Officer Procurement Section in Headquarters, Marine Corps. That was my slated assignment, and I was pleased with that because it would be going back to something familiar, that I knew. But as the pattern was to evolve, very rarely was I ever given anything familiar to do, until I became the Commandant, and that may sound egotistical a little bit, but what I mean is that the PP&O job truly prepared me to step in and become the Commandant later. So I came back to a very comfortable environment as the Commandant.

But I think when Lew Walt brought me up to be his aide, that for me was . . . I understood the higher echelons of the Marine Corps. I was dipped in the oil of what the generals did and how the system worked and how the Commandant functioned and how the Headquarters functioned, that sort of thing. So that definitely was a fork in the road.

I think that the other part of that—and I hope that ambition does not shine through here as the basis for my statement; I do not think it was, because I never really felt that at the time—but it was visibility. You cannot help but be an aide to one of the senior officers in the Marine Corps, and particularly to a flamboyant character like General Lew Walt, without gaining, without people knowing who you are, whether they be the Ed Simmonses or the Fred Hayneses or the Barrows or the Fegans or whoever they are; you gain some visibility.

That visibility probably resulted in my becoming a battalion commander. It probably resulted in my being a regimental commander. I do not know. So that was a fork in the road.

The other fork in the road, when I came out of the Naval War College, I sought to go into the Manpower Department, wanted to be a monitor because I thought that was something that I could do well, and my good friend, then LtCol, now MajGen (Retired) Tony Studds, called down to say, "You're not going to the

Manpower; you are going to the Plans Division.” And I said, “Tony, Plans is the rear echelon. I mean, Operations is up front.” Planners are people that can’t pass the PFT in the division or something, in my judgment of what I was going into.

I was thrust into that, as I have described earlier in this session and previously, at a very, very tense time for the Marine Corps, because there were people who were fundamentally trying to change the Marine Corps, if not indeed do away with it. Where does the Marine Corps go from here? Marty Binkin and Jeff Record. Do we really need a Marine Corps, and what can a Marine Corps do in Europe, and the demise of amphibious warfare, all those sorts of things, were issues that I was thrust into that I really did not want to go into, and yet they built me to be what I subsequently did for the rest of my career. So that was one of the real forks in the road.

I guess a fork in the road that I have not spoken of, I do not think, earlier—and if I have not, it is because it maybe just was not a subject—but when I was a lieutenant general, when I was at Headquarters and Gen Al Gray became the Commandant, I remember that I had just come up from Little Creek, and I was certainly on the, I guess one would say, on the Gray team . . . I mean, he had been my division commander, he had been my force commander. I learned an awful lot from him. I was certainly a Gray admirer and a Gray advocate, and I was delighted when he became the Commandant.

But, at any rate, he came up. He established a policy which I perpetuated, and I thought and still do think is a good one, and that is that in order to keep the blood flowing in the senior ranks, that when you were appointed to lieutenant general, that you should, 18 months thereafter, submit your letter indicating your willingness to retire, and that that would give him, then, the flexibility to say, “No, stay,” or, “No, I’ve got another assignment,” or what have you, or to say, “Yes, thank you, I need for you to step aside so someone else can move up.” So I understood the policy, and I respected it, and I still think it is a good one.

At that point in my career where I had reached, was approaching the two-year mark, we had spoken before, but that was a very tense time between the . . . I guess it would probably be factions of generals in the Corps, but certainly between a lot of the senior general officers in the Corps and the Commandant. Gen Gray was doing things that will go down as the best way to do them in the Marine Corps at the time, but there were great fissures in the general officer corps, and there were great stresses there.

But, nonetheless, I prepared my letter to send up to

the Commandant and was beset upon by three people, really, when I let it be known, and the way that I let it be known is one day my friend, LtGen John Hudson, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, was in the office. We were talking about matters in general, and because he was manpower, I just said, “Hey, John, I am making my letter to send in,” and he said, “Don’t do that.” And I said, “Well, wait a minute, John. We got a *Green Letter* that says do this.” And he said, “Don’t touch that with a ten-foot pole.”

Within a matter of two days, I got a call from Gen Barrow that said, “If you’ve written that letter, tear it up. If you haven’t written it, don’t you dare write it. Don’t do that.” Then Gen Joe Went, the Assistant Commandant, brought me into his office and said, “Don’t do that.”

So, to make a long story short, that was probably a fork, because at that time, I think, Gen Gray was sizing up who he wanted to be the contenders to be the next Commandant, and while I think that, once again, whatever our rapport may have been, he had written me out of that lineup, and he had some people that he thought would be better, and I think, to the very end, he thought they were better choices than me to be his successor. But he was, you know, after the fact, he was supportive of me and still continues to be so.

But, at any rate, I think that three of them knew that if I turned in my letter, it probably would be taken. I did not listen to that advice all the way. I must admit that I delayed and fumbled around with it for a while, and then, in my sense of what is right and what is wrong, I nonetheless pulled out the *Green Letter* again, and there was a letter in there to me and all the generals from the Commandant of the Marine Corps that said turn in your letter at a given point.

So I did write my letter. It was, I think, at that point, I was beyond the two-year mark somewhere. I had delayed for six months or so. I did write my letter and deliver it to the Commandant and said, “I am sorry that I am late getting this in, but here it is.” He took it, and Gen Gray was not non-committal by saying, “Oh, shucks, here, take it back” or anything. He took it, and what I later was told, at least, by Secretary Larry Garrett was that in fact the letter was delivered or discussed or presented and that Secretary Garrett said, “No, I am not going to accept that. I want him to be one of the contenders.”

So that was probably a fork in the road. I still took the left fork instead of the right one, but it turned out to be counsel that was pretty . . . that at least alerted, I guess, maybe people that would have been concerned that I might have been retired at that time. Those are forks.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very, very interesting.

If you were asked to list the ten most important traits for a Marine Corps officer to have, what would they be?

GEN MUNDY: I think that I would probably . . . though the words or the definitions of the words that I might use will be the same as many of the leadership traits that we will teach in The Basic School or something, I may use different words, because I think that, over my time in the Marine Corps, we tended to focus on leadership traits that really were designed with the thought in mind to lead in combat. And there is no question but that the traits that will lead in combat, depending on how they are applied, will also lead out of combat, or vice versa, to some degree.

But the fact is that we, while we may call ourselves warriors or we may think of ourselves as professional killers or whatever it fancies people's minds to think about the military service, a career as a Marine officer sees precious little time in combat or leading in combat. You of the World War II generation probably had a heavier—and Korea—heavier dose of that than certainly has my generation.

So I think, therefore, that the leadership traits that are important to me are those that are important all the time in the many facets, which may be political assignments or which may be troop leadership assignments.

You have asked me to list them. I would list . . . and some of these may not be in an exact priority as I would list. The top one is, and it is integrity, not surprising. I think that is what probably most people would expect you to say. But integrity to me means absolute honesty, absolute honesty, not only outwardly but with yourself. I have said lightly before that I almost wish the Internal Revenue Service would audit me some day so I could make a little money back from the government or something.

I say that light-hearted, but I have used that so many times in leadership discussions to try to emphasize to people that, you know, you will never go wrong being honest. You will never go wrong. I mean, it may hurt a little bit at the time, but you will never go wrong. And my career proved that over and over and over to me. So I believe that a leader, whether it be a lance corporal leader or whether it be a President leader or whether it be a king, absolute honesty is at the top, integrity.

Fidelity, a good Marine Corps word, but I mean in that truthfulness, and I mean in that a commitment to obligations, is the way I would probably refer to that; and, also, an acceptance of the implications of respon-

sibility. I think that is fidelity.

I have never understood, and I have never been too gentle on, if I have been aware of it, how you could swear an oath of allegiance to the United States or swear an oath of allegiance to the Marine Corps and swear an oath of allegiance to your wife and then run around on her when you were on liberty on a foreign shore. I cannot factor that. That, to me, is a lack of . . . I mean, that is infidelity. But you cannot be a little bit faithful; you have to be faithful all the time. And I am not being moralistic here.

I think that, to me, fidelity again, truthfulness—that probably flows from integrity—it is the acceptance of responsibility. My youngest son just published, and gosh, I hope he got it from me—he did not attribute me and I do know whether he did or not—but just published in the *Naval Institute Proceedings* this month an article that he wrote when he was in school, but it has to do with the acceptance of responsibility, the admission of error when you make an error, when you foul up, to say, “I fouled up” to those below you or to those above you.

And that is what I am saying about the acceptance and the implications of responsibility. Always be prepared to say, “I fouled this one up. I should have been smarter, or I should have done it, but it is my fault. Here's my back. Lay the lash on it.” And I think, when you do that, very rarely is the lash laid upon you. It has not been on me. I have been bitten a few times for that, and I have been given a band-aid to go back out and try it again.

Selflessness, I think, is dedication to the organization above self. I wrote about that in *Leading Marines*, and I think that that is a very fundamental factor for a leader, because if others see that you truly believe in the organization above your own self-interests, they will emulate that and they will follow you because they will know that your interest is the welfare of them, because they are the organization and the organization.

Humility. That may be, “Aw, shucks” from time to time, but I think humility is the recognition on the part of any leader that you would not be there if it were not for somebody else, and that you would not stay there if it were not for other people, and that, you know, as you add stars to your collar, you really do not get much smarter.

People, as I have lightly . . . somebody said to me one time, “You have to remember that you will probably say the same things that you used to say, but the difference is that people write them down.” And so you are no bigger, you are no smarter, than you ever were.

I used to use the reference in speech-making and so on, if I was talking to younger officers or younger Marines, in particular, that it is always important that you remember that without privates there would not be any reason to have generals or admirals or anyone else. Without people, we would not need a President. So any leader in a high place that ever forgets, that ever loses sight of the fact that the only reason you are there is not because of the vertical pronoun but it is because somebody taught you and boosted you—all the things we have been talking about—molded you and groomed you and elected you or appointed you or nominated you. That is the only reason you are there. So humility.

Passion and humanity, and what I mean by that is a belief in, a fervent belief, a fervent confidence in and a devotion to, the team. The team is the organization.

The team are the people that make up the organization. The team is the family. The team is whatever you want it to be. But you have to believe passionately, I believe, in what it is you are all about. If you are only in it for the pay check, you know, there are a lot of pay checks around, but there is only one profession to which you will be notably successful, and that is the one that you believe in the most. So passion.

Trust. I would term that as an outgoing trust. In other words, the willingness to empower subordinates. It sounds like currently popular top-quality leadership or whatever we choose to term it. But that is to place trust in people, and then going back to accountability, to be accountable for what they do. This is right out of maneuver warfare, it is right out of Deming management or anything else, but it is the willingness to say, "Go for it," and then the willingness, when he or she does not make it, to say, "I didn't make it. It's not them. I didn't. I lead this outfit. I'm responsible for what goes on around here. Hang that horse around my neck."

Exemplification of professional standards sounds like some kind of bureaucratic gobbledygook, I guess, to say it that way, but I mean, people will tell you that they admire, you know, someone who is . . . you know, what does a shoe shine matter or what does a haircut matter? That is not important, or how you look in uniform. It does. To the military officer, it does. It may or may not as much on the outside, though I think it does, but it may or may not.

But there, going back to my analogy with chaplains. "Chaplain, you may be the greatest preacher in the world. You may save people's souls. You may have a real message to convey. But, at least in the Marine Corps, if you look like a slob in your uniform, people aren't going to come to church to hear that

message." So if you want to lead your flock, or if you want to lead your platoon, you have got to exemplify what they believe a leader in the Corps is all about, and that would be not just in your uniform but in many of the things that we have been talking about.

BGEN SIMMONS: Actions and appearance.

GEN MUNDY: Actions and appearance.

A broad knowledge of your profession. I think that one of the leadership traits that we teach at any level would be know your profession. So often we . . . you know, know your stuff, know your job, and so often we equate that to the technical aspects of your job, that if you are a machine-gunner, you have to know everything there is about a machine-gunner. That is true. We want you to do that.

But in the broader context, I think that understanding thoroughly your profession in the sense of why you are or why it is, why do we have a Marine Corps, what is it that the Marine Corps does? It is important at the time and place to understand exactly how to do a night attack, but it is far more important to know in the broader context that the Marine Corps does night attacks and does them effectively and can do that, that that is within our realm of capabilities.

That may not be the best example that I can think of, but I think that so many tend to think that to be an effective Marine leader, for example, at the current time because it is our doctrine, you have got to be an expert on maneuver warfare, what I am trying to say is, you need to understand the concepts and the fundamentals of maneuver warfare. You may or may not be the expert in it, but you have got to be able to understand that it is a part of what makes your organization go, and therefore, whether you can stand up and give the best lecture on maneuver warfare or the best lecture on overhead imagery or intelligence systems or something, so long as you understand that the organization as a total depends on having the capability that is brought by that, I think that that is what I would characterize as broad knowledge.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think you are establishing a difference between a professional and a technician.

GEN MUNDY: That is a very good analogy, and a lot of our technicians, a lot of people would categorize them as a professional. "Boy, he is a red-hot pilot. That guy is a real professional." Well, he is a professional at that technical ability, but if he does not know or understand or appreciate what that airplane's place is in the overall makeup of the organization of which

he is a part, then he will not be the most effective leader, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: We frequently misuse the word “professional”. . . .

GEN MUNDY: Yes, right.

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . when we are complimenting someone.

GEN MUNDY: Right.

Courage, moral and physical. I do not need to lecture on this. I mean, military leaders have got to stand up when it is time to stand up, whether it to be to crawl out of a trench in World War II or whether it to be to stand up around town here when it is time to stand up and call a spade a spade.

That is very, very difficult in the political military world in which a senior leader in Washington lives, because as we, I think, have talked perhaps too much through this oral history, but to clearly understand . . . you could even apply what I was saying earlier about the broad knowledge of your profession and the courage and so on, you apply that to a service chief, whether it be the Commandant or anybody else.

You have to understand the broad knowledge that the profession that you are in is that you serve, you really serve three constituencies. One of them is your Commander in Chief, one of them is the organization that you are a part of, and one of them is the people of the United States; i.e., the Congress or the people, however you want to think about them. And sometimes there will be . . . you will have to take a stand with one or the other which does not seem right to people who will judge purely that your job is to take orders and be professional in carrying those out. So, anyway, enough said on that.

Steadiness, I think, the ability to inspire others under pressure. One of my early readings, and I could not even tell you the book, but I can remember that it was about the British down in Africa, probably during the Boer War or sometime, but I can remember the officer standing there with his swagger stick or his umbrella and taking a rifle shot, and his sergeant rushing up and saying, “Colonel, you’re wounded!” and him saying, “Don’t let the men know; it will be bad for their morale.”

A lot of people do not understand that on the outside. But the steadiness, the ability to . . . you know, when the whole outfit, I mean, when it seems like things are going to hell in a handbasket, even though you may feel that more than anyone else around, you

have to convey a positive outlook and inspire others around you to pull themselves up out of that morass, or simply to come to work every day, to walk into the office.

I guess I would even characterize that as my last point here, would be good nature. I think it is very difficult to lead if you — you know, if you cannot say “Good morning” to people in the morning when you come in, then not all of them will follow you as well, if you cannot be a little bit positive during the day, if you cannot remember to maybe say “Good night” at the end of the day or, “Thanks for what you did for me,” or something like that. That all counts, I think, in leadership.

Those are 10 or 11 or so, and again, I probably could sit down and define some more, but that would be my list.

BGEN SIMMONS: A very fine list. How many of these traits come naturally or are limited by genetics, and how many are acquired or can be acquired? In other words, can leadership be taught? Can leadership be gained by example, or is it something that has to be inborn?

GEN MUNDY: It has certainly been the case with me. It may be that physical courage is inborn. It may be that the absolute devil-may-care, I’m going to stand up here, I don’t care whether they shoot me or not, you know, that may be an element of your make-up. It may be an element of how rapidly the blood flows to your head when you get, or the adrenaline pumps through your veins. That may be physical.

But I think that, for the most part, the things that I have outlined here are things that can be taught. They certainly were things that were taught to me. But they go back so far. When I have said good natured or relating to people in whatever form, I mean, at the earliest stages that I can remember, my mother would never have walked down the street without saying “Good morning” to everybody she met. She just would not. And so I was probably either being pushed along in a stroller or dragged along by the hand listening to her, and I came to realize . . . you know, I don’t know that I consciously realized it, but, you know, to this day, generally, if you say “Good morning” to somebody walking down the street, why, they will look up and say “Good morning” back to you, and they are probably less likely to mug you or shoot you or I don’t know.

So I think those things can be inbred. I think that the characteristics that I have talked about, at least on my list here, of trust in people, you learn to place trust

in people when the Dave Twomeys of the world or when the coaches or whoever they have been along the way have said to you, "You know, this is your job. I trust you to do it. Go out and do it." Those things cannot be taught.

BGEN SIMMONS: We are leading into my next question. You have given a lot of thought to leadership through the years, and you have some very definite ideas of how it is developed. What are some of those ideas in the development of leadership?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, I think that there are many traits that, outside of the Marine Corps, that would serve well anywhere; in fact, there are so many cases . . . and I am increasingly, even more than I was when I was in uniform, now dipped into the fact that I meet so many people that will say to me, "Gee, if I had never been a Marine."

I had a call yesterday from Larry Gatlin, who for record purposes here is a current very popular country music singer, and he has just gotten back from a tour of Okinawa and Korea and what not over Christmas for the USO, and Larry Gatlin called me from his truck in Texas and said, "I'm on my way deer huntin'. But," he said, "I wanted to tell you, I took my father over to Okinawa with me. He was a PFC in World War II, and I said I have never seen my father the same before, and I doubt that I will ever see him the same since. He was a Marine again."

So I think that there are things that . . . I have drifted off the point here. I guess I am . . . leadership is developed through experience. My ideas are that if you choose something you want to be a part of, and again, you learn about that, you are inspired by it, that is why we teach history and traditions in the Marine Corps, is to inspire the next generation that is coming along. How important is it for you to know that the quatrefoil on the top of an officer's barracks cap was put there however it was put there? You probably have several renditions. But whether we liked it because the French did it or whether we did put a white cross on the tops of our caps . . . I have heard the rendition, we marked the X on the cap so you could see the officer directing the fire. And then the other tale is the troops put the X on there so they could shoot it when the first volley went off.

But whatever the source of our traditions, you have to know your organization; you have to believe in it. That inculcates you with the pride and with the feeling of why you are a part of it, and then you watch those around you, and you listen to the teachings and

you learn from the role models. You are coached along the way.

So those are, you know, as far as some of the ideas on how leadership is developed. My ideas are, again, more the . . . it is developed as you go along rather than that you just step forward with it.

BGEN SIMMONS: To a large extent, you have captured your ideas on leadership in the field manual FM/FM1-0, *Leading Marines*. As you say in the foreword, "This manual comes to life through the voices, writings, and examples of not one person but many," end of quote.

The manual has three chapters, and I will read into our interview the chapter headings and subdivisions: Chapter 1 is entitled "Our Ethos." It includes sections on the "U.S. Marines," "Every Marine a Rifleman," "Soldiers of the Sea," and "The Marine Tradition."

Chapter 2 is called "Foundations." It includes sections on "The Unique Obligation of Marine Corps Service," "Establishing and Maintaining Standards," "Setting the Example," "Individual Courage," "Unit Esprit," and "Being Ready."

Chapter 3 is "Challenges," and its sections are "Friction," "Moral Challenge," "Physical Challenge," "Overcoming Challenges," "Adaptability," "Innovation," "Decentralization and Will," and "Fighting Power and Winning."

This essentially is an outline of the manual. Now please tell me a bit more concerning the creation of the manual, how it came about, what you hoped to achieve, and are you satisfied with the results.

GEN MUNDY: You have, of course, summarized the content of the *Leading Marines*. How it came about?

When I became the Commandant, the Corps was probably at an operational peak. We were just coming out of Operation Desert Storm. We had won. You know, the Marine Corps stood out like a beacon with its successes there, tremendous leadership. A generation of generals had been trained operationally by Gen Al Gray. That is the truth. All of us had been trained, and many of the successes that occurred were the product of his teachings and his training of us.

That said, the Marine Corps, as is often the case when you swing the pendulum back and forth, the pendulum had swung all the way over, and we had focused on matters operational. We had. . . .

GEN MUNDY: . . . We were at an operational peak in terms of training, education, all the things that Gen Gray had set out to achieve, probably had not achieved them all, and for that matter, they are still

evolving out there. But in terms of the operational peak, we were at it.

Now, what that had wrought, through no intention of Gen Al Gray . . . if you ever wanted to look at a Marine whose trousers were exactly the right length and whose shoes were shined and brass was polished and hair was cut and all of the above, why, Al Gray certainly was there. But in attempting to turn the Marine Corps away from where it was at the time that he became the Commandant and to focus it on operational matters, we had literally gone to where the utilities were the uniform of the day, and many of the things, many of the standards . . . we were warriors. And while that is a good philosophy to be espoused from the top, the fact is that junior Marines oftentimes do not know how to interpret that.

Shortly after I became the Commandant, I went down to Quantico to a Basic School mess night. Now, I had been there many times before, and since, but I went to a Basic School mess night. It was a near rout. I was embarrassed. I was embarrassed by the conduct not just of the student officers but of the captains. I was embarrassed that the colonel of The Basic School sat there through this whole thing and laughed at the very unprofessional antics, very unprofessional.

It was a women officers' class. I mean, today, perhaps then, but today we would have major sexual harassment charges across the pages of the newspaper here if we had allowed the same things.

The standards that young officers were being taught, the values, the respect, the traditional values of the Marine Corps, were sadly wanting, I think, in many areas, but that would be illustrative.

So to me, one of my early recognitions was that I wanted to, that the Marine Corps needed and that I wanted to reinstalled some of the traditional values.

I do not dispute, for example, the term "warrior" that Gen Gray used to great effect in creating that mind-set. That won the Gulf war, you know, that mind-set that Marines in fact . . . what is the reason we exist? We exist to fight. We are warriors. We are the best of anybody in that profession. And he did that masterfully.

But in order to do that, he so used "warriors" that we were warriors, and what I wanted people to realize is that Marines have always been warriors. So you are a Marine, and implicit in being a Marine is you are a warrior, not the other way around. Warriors are Marines. Marines are warriors. I wanted that turned around.

So we wanted to turn back to saying being a Marine has certain standards. Being an officer of Marines has standards. And if you are going to be a lieutenant of

Marines, you are going to learn those standards. I do not mean we are going to necessarily teach you which fork to eat with or anything, but we certainly . . . we had to evolve, for example, to teaching people how to dress, teaching them what civilian and formal is all about, walking in and saying, "This is a suit that you would wear out to an evening affair. You would not go in your boots and your levis."

But in the warriorism syndrome, without any intent, again, from the 29th Commandant, I would offer, but the Corps had gone that route. So it was important to me to correct that and to bring us back to our roots of the professionalism, the elan, the personification of everything that is military, to include killing people, but also, you know, to include the many, many times when you are not in combat and when you have to be professional. It was that probably that led me toward the fact that we needed to espouse standards, values, tradition.

And so, as I worked my way through that into, really into my final year, because I did not spend a lot of time at it, but I continued . . . many of the articles that we are going to talk about perhaps subsequently here, and so on, that I did were aimed at that, or that was my direction to those that would prepare them and help me prepare them. That was where we wanted to go.

Then in my final year, or before my final year, LtGen Krulak, then at MCCDC, sent up to me a group of captains from the Amphibious Warfare School whom he had chartered to put together their thoughts on leadership and their thoughts on where we should be going. And while their thoughts were understandably more along the lines of the fundamentals of leadership, the leadership traits, the things that we talked about earlier here today, and while that was very useful to talk about these are important traits—honesty, integrity, and so on—my thought was back to what we had spoken about earlier, that we have to put together something that sets down in bedrock for people to understand through a fairly simple reading what the Marine Corps is all about and what our ethos is, and that we are naval in character, as we talked about earlier, that we do come from the sea. We should know and understand that.

So I sought to then create something without title at that point but that would say, here is what we are, here is how we make Marines. Marines are unique. I thought, when we finally got around to saying this should be on leadership, leadership applies to everybody, but leading Marines is uniquely adapted to our Corps. So that was the genesis of the how, if you will, how it got started.

What I hoped to achieve, I think I pretty well

expressed here. I hoped to set down something that, once and for all, would serve as a supporting document, really, for what Gen Gray had set down so well in *War-Fighting*. FM/FM-1, that is a masterful document, and it says so much. But my concern was not at all with that publication, but it was with, again, the fact that if we were in the mind-set that had existed before, and if you read *War-Fighting*, indeed, you would take care of your people; indeed, you would get people to generate ideas from the bottom; indeed, you would give mission guidance, and all of those sorts of things, and you would have mutual respect and father-son, teacher-scholar, all of that; but unless you really understood what we were all about and where we come from and what it is that makes the heart of a Marine beat, that we could once again drift off into the . . . what was that thing we used to call ourselves? Marines, before we became warriors. I knew that Gen Gray did not intend that, and I wanted to set down something to complement that.

Am I satisfied with the results? Well, if you want to ask me, do I like the book? . . . I guess, as much as anyone, you probably, every writing that you ever finished, as you go back and read it, you probably say, "Gee, I wish I had said this," or, "I wish I had said that differently in here." So I could probably go back and wish that.

Am I satisfied with the results? No, not totally. And here is why, and this is not a pout at all. I do not think the publication caught on. I do not think it caught fire. I do not think that I . . . and I do not know why, because, to me, it does, but then I am probably more romantic and more passionate than many are about the Marine Corps, and so when I can read something about . . . you know, it is, to me, to know that the only service that has a hymn, not a song, is the Marine Corps is deeply meaningful. It is not just casually meaningful. It really grabs me.

I am not sure, but maybe the passion may not grab others, or they may read it and think, boy, this is . . . I wonder if this is pretty heavy stuff; I am not going to talk about this.

So I guess I am a little disappointed that it did not catch fire, and it may never catch fire. That said, I am glad it is out there because I think that it captures from the many voices—and I did intend that it capture from many voices—it captures in a single document, I hope, what the essence of being a marine, not necessarily what being a warrior but being a marine is all about.

BGEN SIMMONS: How much of this manual is personally written by yourself?

GEN MUNDY: I was assisted in this. The principal assistant was LtCol John Lehockey. John had been on the Commandant's staff group. We finally broke him free, sent him down to Quantico, where he was a senior instructor, I think, at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. But John had a tremendous touch when it came to being able to put into words the thoughts that I had or the direction that I had.

We have spoken earlier during, I think, some of the roles and missions days and during the, quote, articulating the Corps, unquote, days, about the group that was known as the Road Warriors. John was among those. He was one of those who put together many of the articles based on where we were, the momentum we were trying to gain. And so John knew where I wanted to go and knew my language and knew how I would talk. So I brought him back up from Quantico to assist me in doing this.

It would be fair to say that the primary framing of the book was done by John. I had told him to use the writings that we had done in some of the *Gazette* articles, and so on, earlier, use those as a foundation. We had used speeches that I had used over time, principally using those . . . my thoughts, I think, about the Marine Corps. But John would write those down, give them to me, I would take them and do a fairly extensive rewrite on it.

I think its fair to say that, you know, if we wanted to count the number of words that were written by me or written by somebody else, probably the majority were written by John Lehockey. But the thought, the thrust, the corrections, the changing around, the deleting of this example and the putting in of another example, that was all book-building by me. So I was personally involved in every chapter and every edition, and it took us many rewritings to get it right, so to speak.

BGEN SIMMONS: During the course of our interviews, we have discussed at considerable length your oral skills in communicating. We have also discussed your relations with the media. We have talked, too, about your writing skills and the things that you prepared or had prepared for publication.

Two vehicles that you have used as a venue to a considerable extent are the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* and the *Marine Corps Gazette*. The first is generally considered to be the quasi-official professional journal of the Navy, and the second is the comparable professional journal of the Marine Corps.

I have compiled copies of your articles from both magazines and would like you to discuss some of the

individual titles, such as, first, the *Marine Corps Gazette*. The first article with your by-line that I can find is “Enlisted Recruiting Update,” published in the July 1984 issue. You were then a brigadier general. What did you try to accomplish in that piece?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I tried to accomplish just exactly what the title was. Recruiting, it will be recalled, had undergone some very hard times, and I do not need to, I think, walk all the way back through that again. But suffice it to say that we had finally gotten it right. That really was no thanks to me much. I had been there. This was a July article, so in fact I was ending my tour from 1982 to 1984 there, and I guess maybe I wanted to beat my own chest a little bit. But many others before me had set recruiting into the right mold, and we were making it work.

But there had been a lot of concern about the effectiveness of our recruiting and whether we were getting quality and that sort of thing, and I had by this time become dipped in the oil of, again, understanding the broad context of recruiting and understanding its importance and understanding its fragility, which I have remarked about before.

So I wanted to communicate what it was all about, how systematic recruiting, that which was developed by then BGen A.P. McMillan, who headed recruiting, how that had really revolutionized Marine Corps recruiting and how, in effect, today, if you look at recruiting statistics today, all bets are that no service would be making it, but the Marines are leading the way today, and that is a remarkable achievement for Gen Krulak and for Gen Jack Klump who is running recruiting today.

I wanted to try to explain that recruiting is not just standing around on a work pickup corner waiting for somebody to walk by and then sending him to San Diego or Parris Island.

LtCol Jim Murphy assisted in that. As I was reviewing the article, I noticed that we have that down here indicated, because that article came shortly after an article of criticism in the *Gazette* by an officer—I do not know his name now—but, anyway, who had written to say that all the generals never publish anything except what is written for them by their staff, and, you know, and that the staff did not get any credit for it, and the general gets all the credit, and he probably did not even read the manuscript. So I went out of my way to make sure that it said that I was assisted in the preparation by Jim Murphy, LtCol Murphy, my recruiting plans officer at that time.

That was the intent, was just to give an awareness, increase knowledge of, and signal some confidence-

building in the way our recruiting was going.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will suggest that this tour, your first as a brigadier general, was a switching point; that you were selected by Gen Barrow, and although you were several echelons under him, you performed well for him in a task which he was very much interested in, and that was building a quality Marine Corps by first getting quality recruits. So, as evidenced by this article and also our previous discussion, I think this was very important in your career.

GEN MUNDY: I would agree.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next *Gazette* article appeared in the September 1985 issue. Its title was “Training in Arctic Warfare.” What was the purpose of this article?

GEN MUNDY: Well, much the same as the preceding one. Marines had . . . if we go back . . . let me digress for a moment and remember that I was a planner for operations in northern Norway, that I had been the officer charged with planning for the prepositioning of equipment for a Marine brigade up there, so I had long been associated with planning, and then I was sent down to command the 4th Brigade, and that was the Arctic brigade.

So we had been off to Norway, and while the Marine Corps had been criticized both internally—that is to say, there were those who thought this was idiotic, that we should not be up there in the first place—and had been criticized externally for its first few forays into the Arctic, in which we were equipped in the prescribed cold-weather clothing that, while it would keep you warm, was not really designed for mobile arctic operations but was designed for static, Korea-like defensive positions, you know, a boot that would keep your feet warm just by standing around in it all night but which would tear your feet up if you tried to hike a few miles in it.

So, after we had gone off to northern Norway for exercise in 1984 led by BGen Norm Smith, who was then commanding the brigade, and then later by me in the cold winter of 1985, which was sort of a watershed exercise for the Marine Corps . . . Col Harry Jenkins was commanding the RLT-2, 2d Marines, at that point, and we had gone out of our way to prepare ourselves. To the Norwegians and many of our European critics, focus on the ability to ski, for the individual to ski, as whether or not the Marine Corps was ever going to be successful in arctic warfare. . . you could talk about fire support coordination, you

could talk about air support, you could talk about helicopter mobility, but to them, the essence of being an arctic warrior was skiing.

And so we put great emphasis into getting a battalion ski trained, and as is always the case, there are some people that fall down every time they stand up. But in the exercise, the Marines skied through the hills, skied out of the hills, overran the Royal Marines who were the touted world's finest arctic warriors, but we really found out were no better than we were, and not as good in many respects.

So this was an exercise in which literally we out-shot them, we outmaneuvered them, and we impressed everybody that was over there. The Norwegians were very impressed with this.

So I wanted to write this article as a confidence-building measure. People are criticizing that, you know, you do not return the same Marines. You have got to go, you have got to stay cold all the time or you cannot fight in the Arctic, things like that, that we were dispelling notions of, and it was, as much as anything, a statement inside the Marine Corps to say we can do this and we are doing it. And then, also, anything that you write, of course, gets sent overseas, so it was also kind of a summary to the Norwegians and/or the Brits that the U.S. Marines were coming along well in arctic warfare, and we have since.

BGEN SIMMONS: Does your present-day interest in skiing as a winter sport stem from your Norwegian experience?

GEN MUNDY: No, it does not, not at all. In fact, military skiing is cross-country skiing, and until we got smart enough, after my watch and toward the end of my watch and then on into my successors behind me, Gen Caulfield and Gen Sheehan and Gen Jenkins, in fact, who commanded the MAU, we did not buy the right kind of equipment, so we were afflicted with the NATO skis, which are these wide, non-maneuverable, very difficult-to-operate-in skis, and I was not at all taken with that form of cross-country skiing. I learned to cross-country ski as the brigade commander, but I was not taken with it.

No, my like for Alpine skiing, downhill skiing, comes from a few years before that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next *Gazette* article, entitled "Perspective on the Corps," appeared in the August 1991 issue immediately after you became Commandant. It is really your answers to a series of questions on fundamental issues posed by the Senate

Armed Services Committee during your confirmation hearings.

What were some of the fundamental issues raised by the committee, and in retrospect, are you satisfied with your answers?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I am satisfied with them, and you are exactly right that, really, this was just a reprint of questions for the record that are submitted beforehand. Increasingly, the nomination process involves your answering questions for the record as well as going up to testify, and usually the questions that are put to you in testimony are different from the questions that you get for the record.

They serve a purpose—I am getting into the politics of government now—but they serve a purpose of not so much . . . there may be value in the answer that you give, but the real purpose, for example, in asking you, "Do you support the defense reforms mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Packard Commission, and the special operations and low-intensity conflict reforms?" well, could you imagine a Commandant that would put "No" to that and would go up and expect to be confirmed?

What they really are doing is having you take vows, and they have you on paper as having said, "Yes, I submit those," and all of your rationale. And then if, during your tenure, somehow you drift off the mark and should become a critic of Goldwater-Nichols or a critic of the Special Operations Command or something, presumably, if the Senate wanted to, they could call you to task and say, "Wait a minute. We have you on record here. You were confirmed based on this answer. You are no longer confirmable," I guess would be one thought.

So it is, as much as anything, to lock you in on a few issues that are important to the Senate in the confirmation process.

That said, it also gives you a chance to espouse your philosophy, and some of the questions are sufficiently, liberal that you could say about anything you wanted to. For example, "From your personal perspective, what are the key lessons that are emerging from Operation Desert Shield and Storm, and as part of your answer, please address specifically the issues that have arisen in the area of Marine night-fighting capabilities, mine warfare, and the role and types of amphibious operations."

What is sought there is that usually there will be congressional interest in inadequacies, perhaps, that were determined in night-fighting capabilities, and they will again want you to convey to them formally what you plan to do about this or what your views are

or the direction that you will go.

So it is substantive in the sense that, in order to answer, for example, “What do you understand the role of the Commandant to be under the Goldwater-Nichols Act relative to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the combatant commanders?” what it means is you have to study your lessons to know what the law says where the Commandant fits into that, and then you write back and tell them.

“What role does the Commandant of the Marine Corps have with respect to planning for and execution of military operations?” That is more of the same. The CinCs plan military operations, the service chiefs would raise, equip, train, provide forces. That is what they are looking [for], to get you on record, so if you begin to be too demanding about “By gosh, you know, I’ll send Marines here,” or “I won’t send Marines there,” they just want to remind you who calls the shots.

BGEN SIMMONS: In a way, it is your contract with the Congress.

GEN MUNDY: That is a very good way of putting it. It is a contract with the Congress, and it is also sort of a commitment, and there are pet rocks in here. For example, the Marine Corps Reserves. Well, it happens to be the case that the staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee was Col, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Arnold Punaro at that time, who has been a tremendous asset to the Corps in that position for years.

So you get questions on the Marine Corps Reserves: “Do you intend to explore innovative ways of using the Marine Corps Reserves to achieve Marine Corps goals and to ensure a robust Marine Reserve is retained?”

BGEN SIMMONS: You are not going to say no.

GEN MUNDY: Now, you know, if you expect to merely get by the staff director, much less the committee, you had better think of some innovative things you are going to do with the Reserves. So there are pet rocks in there, too, that come from various constituencies.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the October 1991 issue, you began a series called “Command Report.” Your first article was called “Continuing the March, Part I: Defining the Course.” What was the thrust of this article?

GEN MUNDY: Well, the article was intended for . . . really, the primary purpose was to inform the Corps of what we were doing, of what the initiatives were that were being taken fairly early in my tenure; for example, the Force Structure Planning Group that had been put together. We told them that that had been put together; here was the charter for it. And we talked about the various things that were going on in the Corps. That was the real purpose of it, was to say “here is where we are going.”

Now, the sub-purpose of it was . . . recall, if you will, that the selection process of the 30th Commandant, to include the period even up to and including confirmation and after my assumption of command of the Marine Corps, had been filled with this fragmented, maneuverist, I will say clique that sought to characterize me as someone who would abandon everything that Gen Al Gray had begun, would turn it around, would reverse it, you know, never understood it, never appreciated it, and would do my best to turn the clock backward.

And so, as a result, enough hype had been generated in primarily . . . I am not sure how much was in the Marine Corps—there may have been a few people in the Marine Corps but not too many, I do not think—but external to the Marine Corps, many of the Marine Corps supporters, civilians and the retired Marine contributors to the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation, Marines who were on the Hill . . . Senator John Glenn, for example. One of the early sessions I had with John Glenn was him telling me, “Now, I hope that you are really not going to turn around everything that Al Gray did,” and then he continued to tell me how many good things he had done, and I said, “Well, Senator, Roger, I’ve got that. Let me tell you some more of the good things he has done.”

But I had to dispel, I had to defeat this kind of guerrilla subculture that was principally the Bill Linds of the world, the Col Mike Wiley, people of that ilk who again saw me as a threat to what they had been able to engineer along with Gen Gray in the Corps.

And so the theme, Continuing the March, had been, just as Gen Krulak used it when he and I turned over, I went out of my way in my early days in the Corps to affirm that Commandants generally pick up from their predecessors and continue the march, and that that is exactly . . . I intended to adapt to the things that Gen Gray laid down before me.

So part of this was assurance-building, and the real intent was genuine information on where we are going and how we expect to get there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Your next “Command Report”

was in the January 1992 *Gazette* and had the title “Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection into the 21st Century.” This was a reprint of your speech to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which we discussed earlier. As we have said, you gave many variations of this speech during those years.

GEN MUNDY: This was principally a derivative that I guess maybe I never really stopped using throughout of my foundation piece in my naval force hat, if you will, which was a Forrestal Lecture that I gave at the Naval Academy to the brigade of midshipmen and others entitled “The Golden Age of Naval Forces.”

The thesis had many purposes to it. One of them was my belief—fervent then and remains fervent today—that we had fought the last desert war we were going to fight, that we had fought the last major engagement. It was not the last potential place. You know, North Korea is still not settled. But I could not see on my horizon that we were ever really going to go back and refight the Korean War.

So it was very clear to me that, in the future, if the nation did it right, we would represent our interests and respond to conflicts overseas in the future just as we had in the early part of this nation’s history with naval forces.

So my thesis was that the golden age of naval forces is here and that the era of Marines is back, and those were continuing themes, although they may have not been stated exactly that way in here.

I did that at the Naval Academy, and I have spoken of that earlier, and caused the CNO a little bit of mild discontent there because I was saying we had better turn the submariners into surface sailors and things like that.

This was more of the same. This was at a Fletcher School-sponsored conference up in Boston. And so I delivered this to that group. It was made up primarily of Marines and sailors, so it was sort of like preaching to the choir. But it enabled me to lay down . . . remember that during this same time frame, November of 1991, I was still about the business of trying to convince the CNO that we needed to define a very clear concept and forward-looking force structure and that sort of thing for the Navy.

So I was trying to send messages both to the Fletcher School but, equally importantly, back to Washington for the Navy to hear, and indeed, for others in the defense establishment to hear. So this and “The Golden Age of Naval Forces” and many companion speeches and writings and what not were designed to do that.

It is interesting that I would mention in this that I drew some flak, because in trying to talk jointness in this particular article, I wrote—and I am searching for it here, so I will not dwell on this—but, anyway, I wrote that we had to think a little bit more jointly but that we had to realize that naval forces would be out there on watch and that naval forces would open the door, and then we would, more likely than not, composite with a brigade out of the 82d Airborne and things like that, things that we had always done with a MEU and with forces.

Well, in the printing of the thing, however it happened, the MEU was stripped out of there, so what I had in here was the compositing on a foreign scene of an aircraft carrier battle group, of an amphibious group and a brigade of the 82d Airborne, and immediately, of course, there appeared Bill Lind in the next issue of the *Gazette*, you know, this is an extraordinary thing for a Commandant of the Marine Corps to say, still nibbling away at me. But I would report for history that if you will look at the manuscript submitted and the article printed that Marines were well represented in there.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the April 1992 *Gazette*, there was a reprinting of two official documents. The first was the Department of the Navy 1992 posture statement, nominally prepared by the Secretary of the Navy, then Lawrence Garrett, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. How valuable are these posture statements?

GEN MUNDY: To be candid, I do not think they are very valuable at all. They probably make the Secretariat or the Secretary feel better than anybody else because it is a statement, his picture is on it, it is the team going up, and it is increasingly printed up now in colored books and what not. It used to just be your typed statement, what you intended to present, and then we went to this composite statement.

Now, this one is a watershed, or history might record that it was a loss, but it was a watershed in the sense that, when I got there, Secretary Garrett wanted very badly to put out a consolidated statement. Remember that the Department of the Navy in general, the Navy to a large degree, and the Marine Corps to an accompanying degree were being criticized as having drifted apart. The Marines had gotten too heavy and had become a second land army. The Navy and the Marines, at least to the critics, had parted ways and the Department of the Navy really was not in control. Those were some of the themes in those days.

Secretary Garrett wanted very badly to put out a single posture statement, as opposed to what had been characterized, that the Department of the Navy posture statement had long been the SECNAV and the CNO, the Navy posture statement, and then the Marine Corps posture statement was a separate standing document.

I worked hard and frustrated many nights worrying whether or not this signalled the absolute demise of the Marine Corps and came to the conclusion that it would not, on the same thesis that you have just entered, and that is that as I asked around on the Hill and to others, you know, "What really happens to the posture statements?" most of them lie on coffee tables because they look nice, but they are not of great value.

The thing that is of great value for the Marine Corps—and then the Navy began to, the Navy tried to pull us into a singular book on that, and we did not succumb to that on my watch, and I don't think Gen Krulak has; I don't know—but the Concepts and Issues book that is put out annually by the Marine Corps is what the Congress uses, and it focuses them on Marine Corps programs. This focuses on . . . I used to use the reference that it is very easy for Marine programs to get lost in the shadow of an aircraft carrier, because you put out a statement like this, and it talks all you want to about the various programs that are important, but when you are talking about some ten million dollar Marine Corps program that is very important to the Marine Corps, compared with a four billion dollar aircraft carrier acquisition issue, guess what gets the biggest picture?

Now, over time, I think that the document has become very ecumenical. In fact, the one that Secretary Dalton, Gen Krulak, and Adm Boorda put out last year, I thought, was absolutely superb. It could not have been any more supportive of a true team representation. I think, even in the aviation part of that, that the first aviation program mentioned was a Marine aviation program, which is extraordinary, so there has been forward momentum.

But, that said, the value of the posture statement lies in two things. One, it makes the Secretary feel good, and number two, it is very likely a pre-POM or a pre-budget session for laying down how hard over each of the services is going to be again. For example, in the posture statement development, if the Navy continued to resist too much inclusion about the V-22 aircraft, for example, then the signals were that you were really going to have an uphill fight in the development of the budget that was then taking place. If they were acquiescent, and yes, we will say the V-22

is good, then you knew you were going to be in pretty good shape on the V-22.

So it may serve the staffs some utility to kind of drum through this thing, but as far as the impact of it on the Hill, as far as the use of it around the Headquarters, Marine Corps, or elsewhere, I do not think it has much use.

BGEN SIMMONS: Also in the April 1992 issue are your preliminary remarks as given to the various congressional committees during the course of the February-March hearings. Is there any part of these remarks you would like to emphasize?

GEN MUNDY: Well, this was the beginning of the . . . it was not the beginning, I guess it was the . . . it was the . . . it was one of the audacious moves in moving for the increased end strength of the Marine Corps. I really put my heart and soul into this one, and when I finished . . . we testified before the Senate first that year, and Col Punaro, or Mr. Punaro, the staff director, came down after it was over and just said, "You really put wood on the ball," because, for the first time, I really wanted to let the Congress know that the reduction in the size of the Marine Corps was hurting and was going to hurt.

And so this gave me the means of talking about the operating tempo of the Marine Corps: nothing has changed, it has gone up, you know, I do not see anything on the horizon that is going to change it. As our end strength comes down, we are going to ride them hard, put them away wet. And I was able to use some fairly dramatic charts, which I do not think I used charts again . . . I may have on one occasion, but ordinarily I did not, and ordinarily the service chiefs did not. But I did use charts this time to show them what the Marine Corps had done in the force structure plan that the administration had decreed, that it would take away 50 percent of our tanks and 30 percent of our artillery and all that sort of thing.

So I was treading delicately, because I was up testifying about what a good job we had done planning for the base force that the administration had decreed while at the same time sending, or hoping to send—and in fact, I did send—the signal that this was going to emaciate the Marine Corps. So it was one of my opening shots in the force structure battle.

BGEN SIMMONS: I will make an obvious point there. These were not articles prepared for the *Gazette*; they were official papers reproduced by the *Gazette* to give them wider distribution. Is there an established procedure by which the *Gazette* is told to

publish such official papers?

GEN MUNDY: There is not, or there was not at this time. Now, I think I have probably read in the *Gazette* testimony of the Commandant at various times, or the aviation issue always includes this, a lengthy oration by the Deputy Chief for Aviation. But we had nothing.

I told Col Pete Metzger, "Send that down to Col John Greenwood and suggest that he print it in the *Gazette*, because it will be useful to the Corps to know what the themes are going to be." By operating tempo, declining end strength, no change in the threat, you are going to have to adjust us upward if we keep doing for you what we have done in the past.

So there is not a defined procedure. We just sent it down and said, "Here, John." And he has generally, needless to say—I do not mean to be flippant about that—but generally speaking, the editor of the *Gazette* is eager to print words that the Commandant has sent down.

Many of them, you will testify but you really do not want to print it because, after you come to learn the art of testimony, you realize that you are playing to the audience on the Hill, and so you have to testify in such a way that you get your programs through there, but the sergeants and the captains and the lieutenants might or might not understand the nuances and the delicacy of the political maneuver that goes on here in town. So I did not print every time that I testified.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the May 1992 *Gazette*, you have another "Command Report." This one is called "Reflections on the Corps: Marine Tactical Aviation." I think the root thought of this piece is "the essential role that Marine aviation plays as an integral element of a combined arms system." That is a quotation from the piece. Is that the point you wished to make?

GEN MUNDY: That is the point that I wished to make, and plus that, if you check other references during that period, you will find that the *Proceedings* had published a piece written by a Marine officer saying it is time to give the F-18s away; we don't really need those around anymore; we can do without them.

And remember that during this time frame, the Navy was making a massive run at . . . I will say at me, I will personalize it. It would be more appropriate to say at the Marine Corps, but it really was focused at me because I was in my first year, and both the Secretary and the CNO, as we have discussed in another issue, wanted to—I will use the unglamorous term—roll me on the subject of Marine aviation and

to, in effect, have the Marines either get out of the F-18 business or put all of our squadrons into Navy air groups and be done with it.

So I was beginning to have to now justify Marine aviation. This was one of the early efforts at that. I had now brought in to work with me on the Commandant's staff group one of the absolutely finest men and brightest officers . . . in fact, I should go back and record him as one of those names. . . .

GEN MUNDY: . . . arguably the best officer in the Department of Aviation at that time, anyway, and still a high-flying Marine officer.

What I was doing with Phil was causing him to go back and, probably like Keith Smith had done with me years before, learn more about Marine aviation than he already knew, in the philosophical sense as much as in the practical sense, because again, in keeping with my earlier testimony to Keith Smith, who taught me that if a ground officer could not justify aviation, we would lose it, indeed, he had prepared me well for this moment in history.

And so, between LtCol Shutler and me, we began to generate this offensive defense of Marine aviation. There followed, for example, one of the booklets that were developed in articulating the Corps that I hope you have somewhere on record, and I am sure you do here, and in the papers. But one of the booklets was called *Flying Leathernecks*, and it went back to the origins of Marine aviation and told the story of all the things that Marine aviation had done over the years, but in terms that are more than just, you know, we flew so many sorties here and there; pioneering close air support, all of that sort of thing.

So I was trying here, also, to educate the Marine Corps, because as we were about the business of drawing down the Marine Corps, there were in a number of quarters, understandably, people who said, why don't we just do away with the F-18s like the Navy wants; then we could turn those guys into infantrymen and keep more infantry battalions, or keep more artillery or something?

The point that they missed, of course, is that if you gave up a squadron, it went away, and the Marines that you had in it went away, too. There were not many tradeoffs in those days, nor would I have traded them off.

But that was it. So this was . . . the reason it came early in my tenure was because I wanted to make a statement on behalf of Marine aviation. I had drawn a line in the sand in responses to the *Proceedings* article simply to say the F-18s will stay. And so I repeatedly would say to the then ACMC, Gen Jack Dailey,

and to LtGen Bash Wills, “Gentlemen, the strongest attack on me right now is on Marine aviation, so I’ve got to have the best we can do.” And it was for that reason that I was given LtCol Shutler to come up and help me with that, and he did it magnificently.

BGEN SIMMONS: I liked the way you tied into this article your 50th anniversary stopover at Wake Island.

In addition to your *Gazette* articles, you have had a number of articles in the *Naval Institute Proceedings*. I am going to fit them in chronologically with your *Gazette* articles. The first one that I am aware of appeared in the Naval Review 1992 issue—that would be May 1992—entitled “Redefining the Marine Corps Strategic Concept.” I think that what I see in this article is that you were laying the groundwork for a restatement of a maritime strategy in which the Marine Corps would be a full partner with the Navy. Am I right, or am I reading too much into this?

GEN MUNDY: In part, in part, you are right, and that does not mean you are not mainly right, perhaps. But I think I used the quote in that article that I picked up from Dr. James Schlesinger that was a quote from a Harvard professor in which he said, “If a service does not possess a strategic concept”—in other words, if it cannot explain itself to the people and to the representatives of the people—“it can hardly expect to gain the resources of the Nation to sustain itself.”

I learned that at the Center for Naval Operations during a session early in my tenure, and I would want to say perhaps September or October of 1991, and that became my understanding of how we were going to need to explain the Marine Corps and justify, or rather, in sequence, legitimize and justify the Marine Corps, was through its strategic concept. It was that, then, that drove us, as part of the articulation of the Force Structure study group, to go back to our roots, if you will, back to the laws that created us, and draw from them those words and those concepts—First to Fight, Force and Readiness, all that sort of thing—and what it was that the lawmakers of the nation intended when they structured and created the role and mission for the Marine Corps. And that was our strategic concept.

So the play on the strategic concept was both, again, a continuing legitimization of our quest for end strength of the Marine Corps. If this is the concept, if the Marines are supposed to be the force that is most ready when the nation is generally demobilized, if people understand that, then down-size somebody else and do not mess with us, because we have a legitimate strategic rationale for being; let’s hear the oth-

ers. And there is none, I mean, except to fight the nation’s wars. That is a very significant concept.

But to fight the nation’s wars and to have an army that can fight the nation’s wars does not implicitly mean to reshape the Army between the nation’s wars to be another Marine Corps. And yet our strategic concept says, have a Marine Corps that can do all that stuff between the wars and then have a Marine Corps that can stand alongside the Army and help fight the nation’s wars. We have legitimacy in having the capabilities not of a standing second land army—a second land army is heavy and fights the Nation’s wars—but we have legitimacy in the division and the wing structure to fight major engagements, and we have primacy in the role of being the peacetime force in readiness for the nation.

So it is a thesis that, unfortunately, you can say that. It is nice to hear a Marine say it. But at the same time that we are saying that, there is an Army officer somewhere realizing that if the Army is to remain of any size at all, that they are going to have to figure out something useful to do, and therefore, we will redefine the Army and reshape the Army to do kind of what the Marines do, except we will do by getting there in airplanes instead of getting there on amphibious ships. That would be a philosophy.

So I was fighting, I guess, knowing that roles and missions was coming, knowing that the chairman’s report was coming, knowing that we had the end-strength battle to contend with, knowing that we had to reshape the Navy, to make it a power projection, a littoral-oriented organization, I was articulating the rationale for doing all of those three things. So, yes, you are right, but there is more.

BGEN SIMMONS: Next to appear in the *Gazette* was the text of the White Paper entitled “From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services.” This was in the November 1992 issue. The same paper also appeared in the November 1992 issue of the *Naval Institute Proceedings*.

As we discussed earlier, this paper was co-authored by the Secretary of the Navy, then Sean O’Keefe; Chief of Naval Operations, then Adm Frank Kelso; and yourself. It was really the cornerstone for the new naval strategy, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: It was, and again, keeping in mind placing for historical purposes credit where credit is due, remember that it was the Marine Corps, as I discussed in an earlier lengthy session and that other writings in my papers will show, it was the Marine Corps, recognizing that we had to turn the Navy, who

put together the naval force planning effort that I talked about and do not mean to reiterate here. If that went cold, we could not get the second phase of that put together, and only when Secretary Sean O'Keefe came down with very clear directions from on high to get the Navy moving, only then did the paper reappear.

I think, as I have commented before, that while it was Adm Leighton Smith with whom I worked very closely to bring about the CNO's acceptance of the need to do the force planning that generally begot, eventually, at least, the "From the Sea," that it was in fact VAdm Bill Owens, who had just become the NA8, and who was a very close confidante of Secretary Sean O'Keefe . . . Owens, I think, probably came with a mandate from the Secretary of Defense, whom he had served before going out to command the Sixth Fleet, and certainly O'Keefe came with a mandate to get the Navy relevant.

And so it was O'Keefe, undoubtedly, although Bill Owens was always plausibly deniable, but it was O'Keefe in the background with Bill Owens that I think reinitiated this, and certainly to credit Adm Kelso, it was a good work, it was a good piece of paper. We worked it jointly, and I think that Adm Kelso then, you know, came to realize the value of putting this out.

But it was driven by Secretary O'Keefe as a revitalization of the naval planning effort which had gone cold when we briefed through the first session and could not get the Navy then to move on with defining the force structure to implement the concept, and that was where Secretary O'Keefe was going, and that is where Adm Owens was going, and that is what Adm Kelso signed onto.

BGEN SIMMONS: Either you or the editor of the *Marine Corps Gazette* must have decided that "Reflections on the Corps" was a better title for your running series of articles than "Command Report." In January 1993, under "Reflections on the Corps," we have your piece, "Every Marine a Rifleman." I think we see here a preliminary draft of that section by the same title that appears in *Leading Marines*, do we not?

GEN MUNDY: You do, exactly. You may notice that there is a pretty good gap between the original "Command Report," which was my first promulgation of here is where we are going, and then after that, there were, as you have suggested, the reprintings of things rather than any writing or articulation from me.

"Every Marine a Rifleman," yes, that began the

thesis that we talked about just a minute ago on why *Leading Marines*, why did we get into that. Well, this was the warm-up phase to that, although at that time this was not being written with the thought in my mind that this would be chapter 1 or chapter 2 or some part of an eventual manual. It was simply that I wanted to put together what being a Marine was all about.

Now, again, keep in mind that everything that I wrote—and this is probably not common just to me—but while it might be directed internally at the Corps, which is very easy to do with the *Gazette*, remember that all of that is reprinted and circulated around the Hill or it is circulated over in the Pentagon.

So, oftentimes, going back to my point that not everything that you testify you want to print and send out to the Marine Corps, not because there is anything wrong with it, but there are times when articles are as much for internal use in the Marine Corps as they are for external use, and this was also . . . this was a continuing part of the reaffirmation of the value of the Marine Corps, the strategic concept of the Marine Corps, the reason the Nation has a Marine Corps, and the uniqueness and, indeed, elite character of the Marine Corps. That series of articles dealt with all of that plus leadership and standards reinstallation.

BGEN SIMMONS: The February 1993 *Gazette* had your next "Reflections on the Corps." This one had the title "Naval Expeditionary Forces: Stepping Lightly." I think we see here a further development of "From the Sea" strategy, do we not?

GEN MUNDY: You do. You do. In other words, with naval expeditionary forces, which we were characterizing as amphibious forces reinforced with carrier battle groups, which was "From the Sea" strategy, but with that, that you do get the ability to do things without the large logistics buildup ashore.

We have not learned these lessons yet. As recently as the—recent within the past two months or so, three months, maybe—conflict in Nigeria where we were about to introduce American forces while there was a Marine expeditionary unit offshore, and it is a good way into Nigeria, but nonetheless, there were Marines offshore that had the ability to reach, we have not yet learned the lesson as a nation that we were going to, because it is important right now in a quadrennial defense review in a roles and missions context, it is important to use the paratroop battalion that we have had long stationed over in Venezia, Italy, because, otherwise, they are simply landlocked forces.

So you have the Commander in Chief of the European Command, who is an Army officer—noth-

ing wrong with that, and a very fine one—but his option goes to use the paratroopers to send down into Nigeria, at a cost to sustain them there, once they are there, to sustain them and get them there, of \$10 million a day. That is the cost to the nation.

You could, with the cost that is already sunk in the amphibious force offshore, you could use Marines for that. But we have not yet learned that lesson well enough.

BGEN SIMMONS: He may have been listening to his French friends, too, because they have repeatedly used paratroopers in Africa.

GEN MUNDY: Paratroops, and that is fine. Those are light forces. You can fly them in there. But, of course, when you send in light forces . . . I mean, I do not say this as an element of criticism, but nothing the Army does is light. It is just not characteristic of the Army to be light. It is characteristic of the Marine Corps to step light. It is characteristic of the Marine Corps to be able to do with a company, because of the flexibility and the rapid reinforcement and all of that sort of thing, we could do with a company what we would put no less than an Army battalion into.

It has only to do . . . back to my original thesis. We have forces that are built to fight the nation's wars, and we have forces that are built to put out the brush fires around the world, and we misuse the former in the role of the latter throughout the history of our nation.

BGEN SIMMONS: "Reflections on the Corps," by the Spring of 1993, were appearing regularly in *Gazette*. In the March issue, the title is, "What is it that Makes Marines?" I think there is again an obvious connection between this piece and the content of *Leading Marines*. We have already discussed this. In a way, "Reflections on the Corps" became trial balloons which took final form in *Leading Marines*, although you may not have been conscious of it at the time.

GEN MUNDY: I was not conscious of it at the time.

These were convenient, to go back and grab them, because I felt so strongly about them at the time that we put them forth.

Now, in all fairness, remember that while I was attempting here to set a direction of focus, to review standards and that sort of thing, the group that was doing this for me, as we have spoken of earlier, we called the Road Warriors down in Quantico.

I had my own Commandant's staff group, which I

had at this point reduced from . . . originally, there were three officers in there, and then we trimmed it down to two, and for a while it was one. But they were people that would help me put my thoughts together, and as I have commented earlier, they were of great use to me because they were hand-picked, sharp young majors; they had great minds; they were mature enough to help you think; and yet they had not been burdened yet by the bureaucracy of getting into the programming world and all of the things that make Washington run.

And so they would come up with me, and some of the most useful sessions I would have would be simply me and them, usually Gen Krulak, but not always. Sometimes it was just me and these three or four young majors and my own aides and military secretary that would get into a room, and we would bounce ideas, and they would tear me apart on a number of issues. I mean, when I say tear me apart, I would say, "Okay, well, let's talk about whatever we were talking about, and I want you to work me over on this." These young folks would get right into you on making you think about what you needed to think about.

So, with them, I had talked about what we wanted, the direction that we wanted to go in rebuilding the Marine Corps and strengthening our fiber, and so on, and they were very responsive to that. They would come back with a straw man. I would flex around with it a little bit and go back. They would bring it back up. We would talk through it. Have we got the right message here? Who are we communicating to? All that sort of thing. And then I would say, "Go with it." Much of the penmanship for this series of articles was done by the Road Warriors.

BGEN SIMMONS: For obvious reasons, I like the way you used historical examples to underpin your "Reflections on the Corps." In the April 1993 *Gazette*, the piece is entitled "Paradox of the Corps: Such Other Duties as the President May Direct." Now, what is the root thought of this article?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, I go back to the sub-reasons for many of the things that I was doing. At about this time—and I may be off—but remember that the Chairman's roles and missions report, which was expected to make great changes . . . there were working groups in the joint staff; there were certainly Marines on those working groups, and Gen Powell was most ecumenical in the way that he produced this report and that we helped him produce this report.

But remember that the Marine Corps was already fighting the roles and missions battle to come. We

were fighting for legitimacy. We were fighting for resources at this particular time, and we were educating a new administration. This is April of 1993. We have a President who has been in office for two months now. We have a new Secretary of Defense. We have new defense members coming in, and we have got to educate a new generation of policymakers.

Many of these were appointed, again, internally, because it was good fuel for Marines to know, but they were appointed externally. This was to say, for those who again at that particular point wanted to more narrowly define roles and missions and say that Marines would only be detachments aboard ship and what not, this was to remind them that if Marines had been just detachments aboard ship, why, the Pusan Perimeter would have caved in, and the Army divisions or any of the ROK divisions that were in there would have been doing Dunkirk; that it was the 7th Marines that came in, the 1st Marine Brigade, that came in and ejected the Naktong Bulge penetration.

This was to say, yes, we do naval things. It was to tell the Navy, yes, Navy, we do all these naval expeditionary force things with you. But as you try to reshape the Marine Corps not to have its own aviation, as you try to reshape it to get rid of tanks, as you try to reshape it once again in your perspective of ships detachment; or, as Adm Paul Miller, who was then again—we were alive in the force substitution business, the adaptive joint force planning—as we try to shape the Marines down to somebody else's notion, remember that occasionally we have to fight major conflicts, and over history, as the Marine Corps has, it generally has been your winning team. So you do not want to ever abandon that. So we are not going to shape ourselves as the admiralty might like to have us shaped purely for naval purposes and to form company-sized units to go on aircraft carriers and maybe MEWs and nothing bigger than that, because we also have to do Miryangs occasionally.

BGEN SIMMONS: In May 1993 your "Reflections on the Corps" dealt with "Ships and Marines: At the tip of the Spear." What are you getting at in this article? Or you may have already covered it. I think you were approaching it in your last remarks.

GEN MUNDY: More of the same. "Ships and Marines" . . . again, the subtleties in here rested on many things. The Navy . . . this was about the time that—no, this was not—the Navy at this particular time was going through the throes of decommissioning ships. The amphibious ships were being decom-

missioned. We were now, with the adaptive joint force planning that Adm Miller was pressing on, we were attempting to get down to where we could have a single amphibious ship that would comprise what we know today as a MEU instead of the four or sometimes five that it required at that time, now three because we have newer and larger and more modern ships.

But the Navy was really working overtime to try to come up with an arrangement. I do not think they willingly . . . I mean, every admiral still to this day likes to have a Marine driver and likes to have a Marine on the gate outside his house. But without any knowledge of what they were doing, the Navy was working over time to enable the Army to take over largely what the Marine Corps could do.

And so were making statements. We were not only . . . we were educating the Corps, maybe that, too. But we were making statements on the utility of having ships and enough Marines, maybe not said in here, but implicitly, what we were saying to the Navy is you have to have credible amphibious capability out there, as well. So we need ships and we need Marines, and we need them at the tip of . . . we need them forward deployed. We do not need them sitting back in Norfolk waiting to surge as an adaptive joint force building package at some time. We need them there when the crisis breaks out, not two weeks later.

BGEN SIMMONS: In this same May issue, there is a reprinting of an abridgment of the 1993 posture statement. It seems to have as its theme the restructuring of maritime strategic thinking, a progression from the "From the Sea . . ." White Paper. Was Adm Kelso not beginning to chafe a little over this changing drumbeat?

GEN MUNDY: No, I do not think so. Again, Adm Kelso was very supportive of this, and when I say after the fact, I would really want to be recorded as one who, to this day, thinks a great deal of Adm Frank Kelso, one of the most compassionate and one of the finest men, and a Navy CNO who bore a weight and burdens that many before and many after him have not. Remember, at the time of this publication, he was indeed the Acting Secretary of the Navy because Secretary Garrett had been relieved of duty.

So Frank Kelso bore that burden for an extensive period of time. He was not chafing under it. He was, if anything, I think, appreciating the fact that this was answering questions on the Hill, that it indeed gave the Navy a direction and a focus and a purpose. Adm

Owens was still around and was programming the Navy to do what was set forth in these theses, these concepts, this new doctrine, and that was being well received on the Hill.

There was still a submarine constituency or whatever constituency, but it was being well received on the Hill that the Navy has a direction in mind, and they are building the Navy to support a concept, as opposed to building a Navy just to have X number of ships, which had theretofore been the only rationale: We've got to have a 600-ship Navy. For what? Made up of what? Shaped how? To do what?

The Navy could tell you, and I think that many in the Navy, not all in the Navy but many in the Navy, understood, perhaps, the type Navy that they needed to have. But they had never explained it and articulated it, and since then there have been some very fine articulations of the Navy's capability and structure.

The Marines were trying to get in that, along with the Navy, through the naval expeditionary fleet concept. We tried to get that into doctrine, we tried to get into that the thinking of the Navy, that you have to be thinking about building the deploying structures as a naval expeditionary fleet. To be candid, I think anyone around would say, "Well, wait a minute. We were deploying carriers with the amphibians, weren't we?" And most certainly we were. But we had not yet gained the linkage between the two, the communications capability.

We were beginning to work, as I think some of my subsequent writings would show, and we worked hard in the joint, in the Naval Doctrine Command, to try to convey what I understand today is being written into the new revisions of naval doctrine, and what Gen Tony Zinni did off Somalia, and that is that a naval expeditionary force, under given circumstances, might most appropriately be commanded by a Marine general, at sea and ashore. You know, that is a thesis that many of us have worked very hard.

We are not trying to gain command of the Navy or anything else. It is much more fun to ride the ships than it is to stay up all night on the bridge up there in stormy weather keeping from running aground or bumping into something. I mean, it is a very difficult job to maneuver ships at sea.

But the employment of a force in the new context of from the sea, forward from the sea, naval expeditionary force, maneuver from the sea, all of those things that are the current doctrines that are emerging have got to be broad enough to encompass the fact that, in a given scenario, maybe you want to transit all the way over there under Navy command, but when you get to a certain line, even before you transition as-

shore, it chops to a Marine commander, who, after all, is a naval officer; why should we worry so much about that?

And instead, then, of making an admiral in charge of a landward operation because we are still in this littoral sea-based context, we would have the general in charge. We did that in Somalia with Gen Tony Zinni, and it worked splendidly.

BGEN SIMMONS: And we did it in Operation Sea Angel in the . . .

GEN MUNDY: . . . Sea Angel, yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: Talking about Adm Arthur, a Seventh Fleet commander, being the joint task force commander, and suddenly it changed to Stackpole. . .

GEN MUNDY: And Stackpole became that. In a joint sense, you can do that, and it will be done. And since then, of course, that being a good idea, we have then put LtGen Hank Shelton, Henry Shelton, on a carrier and sent him off to Haiti as . . . in effect, that would be a joint expeditionary force commander, but commanded from the sea. I am not too high . . . I mean, I like him, think the world of him, and so on.

BGEN SIMMONS: That was sort of a flawed experiment.

GEN MUNDY: But, very frankly, you know, one might offer the argument that if a Marine has spent half his life learning about operations from the sea, that the commander you would want to put in charge in a case like that would be a Marine. Now, there are counter-arguments to that, and there is counter-logic, and some of them are very good.

But at any rate, all of this momentum was what we were trying to move, shape the Navy, focus the Navy, educate whatever constituency we were talking about, make people aware of the Marine Corps—the utility, the origins, the underpinning, the strategic concept, the justification for air-ground team, therefore the justification for F-18s, the legitimacy for an end strength to enable us to execute the strategic concept—all of those things were inseparably wired together as a forward motion at that point.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the June 1993 *Gazette*, your "Reflections on the Corps" is entitled "Enabling America's Global Reach." What are you getting at in this article?

GEN MUNDY: Remember, again . . . well, partly the same. I guess I should say same-o, same-o. But we are attempting to legitimize the forward positioning, not forward positioning but forward deployment, of mobile, versatile, useful naval expeditionary forces.

I know, as it will be recorded, I know this will sound like more of the same, and it is more of the same. But once again, at this point, the nation was beginning to experiment with, as it turned out to be, a bad thing, but it is an enormously expensive one. We were beginning to preposition afloat for the Army. That is all right. It is not bad at all to have prepositioning for the Army, and I never thought that.

But because people do not understand prepositioning afloat and do not understand the nature of the maritime prepositioning force as opposed to depot ships afloat with hundreds of tanks in them that you cannot use in a Bangladesh operation or you cannot use in the Philippines, you cannot use for humanitarian assistance, that you cannot rapidly offload . . . they are a floating depot. The maritime prepositioning force was different, developed by Marines, thinking by Marines, put together, well oiled.

So there was in all of this a . . . you know, because we talk about the MPF force a little bit in there, there is sort of hoping to bait the question of do we need to spend the 11 billion dollars that we were going to spend at a time when people were taking uniforms off their backs to survive, to preposition heavy brigades afloat when we have 13 ships out there already to do this.

That sort of thinking, again the amphibious, you know, the forward thinking, and the fact that much of the Marine Corps' legitimacy of our end strength fight, which had not been settled at this point, much of the legitimacy for that was based on the high operating tempo and forward deployment.

If you brought all of the ships or all of the Marines or all of the aircraft in the Air Force or whatever back home and just sat here and waited until the next war erupted, we could have far fewer of them. But to continue to do what I thought was a very viable national strategy of forward presence, forward engagement, forward deployment of forces, you had to have a bigger rotation base to do that.

So I guess I was combatting the Navy, who was trying to take us down programmatically. I was combatting still, though to a lesser degree, because the elections had now already been held, and so, as soon as those were held, I said, "Don't ever mention 159,000 again," and we did not, but now we are teaching the Aspin team, we are teaching the Clinton Administration, about the utility of naval forces, as

well as inside the bet. It is part of the continuing campaign.

BGEN SIMMONS: Right. And your piece in the July 1993 *Gazette* is entitled "Dial 9-1-1, for Marines: One Call Gets It All." Again, what are you getting at? Are we seeing the uses of redundancy in your ringing these various changes in the emerging strategy?

GEN MUNDY: You are seeing the uses of redundancy. I am trying hard to keep a continuing drumbeat of the utility of Marines, the responsiveness; and implicitly, if we are going to do a bottom-up review, and if we are going to down-size the Armed Forces even further, down-size somebody else, because the most useful instrument you have is Marines.

So, yes, more of the time, while at the same time, as I have said, you know, teaching ourselves about us, because not all Marines understand everything about the Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: And not all Marines see every issue of the *Gazette*, either.

GEN MUNDY: Right.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is a change of approach and format in the September 1993 *Gazette*. There is a collection of pieces under the general title, "Focus on the Military Family." Yours is the lead piece, entitled "Fifth Leg of the MAGTA." Most of the remaining seven articles are by the wives of Marine generals, including your wife Linda. Where did the idea for this collection originate?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it came from me because . . . now, again, to reflect on the passion of the previous discussions here, now we had won the end strength fight. The bottom-up review has been completed. The Marine Corps has been legitimized at an end strength at which we can still, not as much we would like to have kept, but an end strength that we will be able to continue to be effective at, so we have sort of been able to take that back on.

Gen Powell's report is done. We are past that point, the roles and missions report. So we are a little bit out from under the pressure. However, regardless of that fact, as a Marine, you have to continue to debate roles and missions every day of your senior officer life.

But the think that, over time, we had put considerable work into was making use of this very useful . . . comes free with the deal that we get out of Marine . . . I am going to say again wives principally, and I am

sure that as we evolve it will become spouses, because there will be more of them out there, I would say more male spouses of uniformed Marines. I hope not, but, you know, maybe that is the way that we are destined to go.

But at any rate, the Marine wives, we learned—we talked earlier about this—we learned that before Desert Storm, we learned with deploying battalions going out, and squadrons . . . Keith and Shirley Smith put in, when he was down in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, they developed to a high standard of perfection the key wife network that supported deploying squadrons. We did it over on the division side as well but not quite . . . you know, it was kind of a loose . . . it kind of depended on what the CO's wife wanted to do, really. We did not have a program for it.

When we deployed to Desert Storm, and I among other sat back here and watched the war go on while I nursed that two-thirds of the Marine Corps family who are the wives and the dependents of the Corps, with their Marines gone off to war, we came to realize that, number one, we were going to have to develop a mechanism to manage this, and number two, that we have a tremendous resource already bought and paid for in the Marine wives if we organize them.

So this goes back a few years. But we organized, we brought it forth, and now what I am trying to convey to the Marine Corps is that your family and the programs that have been put together are very important, because when we began to do that, far fewer Red Cross messages went out, more Marines stayed forward deployed, fewer Marines had to return home to take care of the bank account which somebody else could not manage, because we now had in place a structure to do that.

So the fifth leg of the MAGTF was that base which enabled the MAGTF to deploy while maintaining the home front, and that was the whole basis. And it was to give our spouses some of the publicity that they deserve.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the November 1993 *Gazette*, you have a historical piece entitled "Perspective on Khe Sanh." This was a transcript of the remarks at the 2 July dedication of a monument in Arlington Cemetery commemorating those who served at Khe Sanh, was it not?

GEN MUNDY: It was, yes, the 25th anniversary of Khe Sanh.

BGEN SIMMONS: In the January 1994 *Naval Institute Proceedings*, you had an article entitled

"Getting It Right: From the Sea." This is sort of a forerunner to a reexamination of the "From the Sea" White Paper, is it not? It seems to be.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, it is. And in certain of these articles, in that one, for example . . . many of these articles would be developed jointly by the Navy and the Marine staff, and they would . . . in some cases, the Navy would come in and say, "The CNO really wants to go forward with this," and we would support that effort, or co-author something. So, yes, "Getting It Right," yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: There is another White Paper in the October 1994 *Gazette* entitled "Forward From the Sea" and jointly authored, or at least signed by, Secretary Dalton, Adm Boorda, and yourself. This, in effect, was the latest edition of the 1992 paper, "From the Sea." Why was a fresh iteration needed? What are the key points or differences of this paper?

GEN MUNDY: In my judgment at the time, a fresh iteration was not needed. This is a very passionate thesis that Adm Boorda brought with him when he became the CNO. He truly wanted to emphasize the fact that, to be effective, naval forces had to be deployed forward.

Adm Mike Boorda came back, I think, with the eagerness and with—and because he had been forward as the commander of naval forces in southern Europe, and very effective in the Bosnia operations and so on—he came back with the recognition that if we ever acceded to, for example, Adm Miller's joint force adaptive stuff, if we ever moved naval forces back and started deploying fewer ships forward, that we would have fewer ships to deploy forward. I mean, we all know that it would work that way.

So he, in the same context, when he became the CNO—and we talked in our early discussions—he said, "I'm going to do exactly what you did with regard to the force structure study. I've got to legitimize the size of the Navy because we don't have a legitimacy right now for X number of ships." So he began to beat the forward presence thing, and that continued throughout his tenure.

I thought that it would be ill advised to issue yet another White Paper so soon after we had issued "From the Sea," because, presumably, a White Paper is supposed to be a fairly baseline, longstanding, visionary piece, and if you come up in a year and change your White Paper, it indicates that it is really nothing more than a thought piece, rather than a White Paper.

So one of the theses . . . so I had some reservations about that, but Adm Boorda felt strongly about it. He was new. The Secretary acquiesced to it. I wanted to be supportive of a new CNO coming in, so we did it.

Now, the thing that was done there, also, for the Navy for a purpose, but which I did not like then and do not like now, the Navy had been criticized for not putting enough resources into the support of littoral warfare; i.e., of the "From the Sea" doctrine. In other words, the doctrine was good, but the people on the Hill were saying, "Show us your money. You've written this nifty new concept, but you're still pouring your money into the same areas that it was going before." So Adm Boorda wanted to demonstrate to them that more resources were being put toward the doctrine.

So there are charts in there, for example, that will show the Department of the Navy top line, money line, history—in other words, appropriations—and would show, for example, that in 1989 the Navy budget was in the approximate amount of about 115 billion dollars a year, and that here we are in 1994. . . .

GEN MUNDY: I was saying, I was describing two of the charts. The chart that I was making reference to showed that there was a decline by almost half in that 10-year period or that 8-year period in the Navy's total obligational authority for their money, their resources being allocated.

But, of course, as all Navy charts tend to do in the programmatic world, it shows that the Department of the Navy top line is coming down but that the Marine Corps line is remaining constant at the bottom.

So there are two messages here. Number one, implicitly, we are spending more on littoral warfare in the Marine Corps if Marines are remaining relatively stable and everything else is coming down. The other message from Navy programmers is, hey, we are cutting the Navy; the Marine Corps is not taking its fair share. And, therefore, when this chart is shown in the hallowed halls of the Pentagon, you can convince a DOD staffer that the Marines ought to take a hit.

Then, similarly, the second chart that was used showed the Department of the Navy's support of littoral warfare, and it shows the Navy, it shows that the Marine Corps' total obligational authority since 1989 had been growing from about 10 percent of the total TOA of the Department up to about 13 percent projected by 1999.

It shows, also, that the Navy's portion of expenditures within the Department was tracking that and was going up from about 20 percent in 1989 to about projected to be 30 percent in 1999. So it is a convenient

chart to say to the Congress, "Look, we are spending more money on littoral warfare." But it also, again, has the backswing effect of giving the Navy something to beat the Marines over the head with.

The fact is that the Congress and the Department of Defense chose to keep the Marine Corps at a certain level. The Navy got smaller. There is no other way that the arithmetic could work than that the Marine Corps line would go up. Even though the Marines did not gain any more money, the line would go up because the line was coming down overall.

So it had a backswing effect, and it was—these charts—used effectively perhaps before the Congress, were used to represent inside the building by Navy programmers that the Marines were eating the Navy's lunch and getting too big a share of the pie.

BGEN SIMMONS: The November 1994 *Naval Institute Proceedings* published an interview with you entitled "The Golden Age of Naval Forces Is Here." Who conducted this interview? Do you recall?

GEN MUNDY: It was Fred Rainbow, the managing editor, and beyond that I am not certain.

BGEN SIMMONS: Was there anything about that interview you would like to. . . .

GEN MUNDY: Well, it is a nice . . . you know, it is a friendly publication, somewhat like the *Gazette*; in other words, you know that you are not going to be attacked on some unpalatable issue that the *Defense News* or somebody might come at you, or *Armed Forces Journal*. So it is rather nice, in the form of an interview, to enable you to get forth the various theses that you want to. And so I am reiterating the same thing that I have been saying for the past two and a half or three years there.

BGEN SIMMONS: In April 1995, the *Gazette* once again published the posture statement, this time for 1995, which really means for the fiscal year 1996 budget hearings. In that same April 1995 issue are your remarks made at the 19 February Iwo Jima ceremony, which we discussed in considerable detail in an earlier session.

Your last *Gazette* piece that I have noted is in the August 1995 issue. These are the remarks that you made at the mess night that joined the third Basic class of 1957 and the third Basic class of 1995. That was on June 15. I believe we have already discussed that occasion.

GEN MUNDY: We have.

BGEN SIMMONS: After your retirement, your piece, "Navy-Marine Corps Team: Equalizing the Partnership," appeared in the December 1995 *Naval Institute Proceedings*. The editors used the typographical device in the title of printing "NAVY" in very large capital letters and "marine corps" in quite small, lower-case letters. In this article, you sort of stuck it in the eye of the Navy, did you not?

GEN MUNDY: I suppose that I did. But I had left . . . one of my parting gifts, if you will, from the Department of Defense was Mr. Bill Lynn—now this is L-Y-N-N, not L-I-N-D—Bill Lind, the reformist and Bill Lynn, the program assessment and evaluation assistant Secretary of Defense with DA&E. Bill Lynn, whom I had hounded for, I guess, the previous year, both he and Mr. John Hamre, who was the comptroller of the Department of Defense to break out the Marine Corps, and my thesis with them was that until . . . when you guys publish a Department of the Navy budget or program and it has broad statements in it about how well we are doing something or other, what you are really in most cases getting is what the Navy is doing. If you look at housing, if you look at anything else—at the time, I was hounding him on this—you will find that it is not equal, that we do not get the same percentage applied to Marines as we do to sailors.

Now, the rebound from that within the Department of the Navy would be, well, the Commandant makes those choices. He can apply his resources wherever he wants to. But the fundamental fact is that if the Secretary is going to provide one level of support for sailors, he ought to provide the same level for Marines, and that should be secretarial dollars; my theses always were, those would be gray dollars. All of this money belongs to the Secretary. It is not a matter of the Navy buying some stuff for the Marine Corps, not at all.

Okay, so I was at least . . . I guess I was complaining enough until where, in the final briefing that Bill Lynn did before the Defense Resources Board on our budget reviews, major budget issues, and so on, just before I left, Bill Lynn came over to see me and said, "I wanted you to see these. I have broken out the Marine Corps." And so he had separated the Marine Corps in a number of areas from the Navy, and the briefings were presented, albeit as a review, as an analysis of the Department of the Navy's program, it was presented as a, here is the Navy part and here is the Marine Corps part; that, to my knowledge, at least,

for the first time in history.

And what it did is to cause people to say, "My goodness!" not least of whom was the Secretary of the Navy, who suddenly had laid before him in public that it is not an equal playing field. And so that was a success.

Notwithstanding that, when you are serving, it is fanciful to believe that men and women in senior positions can serve cohesively together as a team while viscerally attacking each other, in this case, for inequality.

The Commandant has got to get along with the CNO—there is no question about that—even though the Commandant is usually always outside the box because the nature of the being of the Marine Corps causes him to be that. But the two of them have to get along, and indeed, the CNO, the man himself, is not always the cause of the difficulties.

The Navy is a very, very, needless to say, large and stovepiped organization, and the CNO certainly sets the course and presides loosely over that series of stovepipes. One of those stovepipes, viewed by many other segments of the Navy, is the Marine Corps. And so while the CNO may himself be a very supportive CNO, there are a thousand Navy programmers out there who are attempting to emaciate the Marine Corps. So we have to break out the Corps.

I wanted to part amicably from active duty. I did not want to . . . in my last few months, history may recall that Gen Tony McPeak, one of my very close friends, a man that I think a great deal of, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, but left his post trying to take things away from the other services in his roles and missions profession. Now, Tony was very sincere in what he wanted to do. But it left a very, very soured impression of that very fine Air Force leader maybe for decades to come.

I did not want to do that. But neither did I want to leave without making the statement that there is a longstanding inequality in the resourcing of Navy and Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, and equally important to that, if not more so, is that the Marines oftentimes are not the spokesmen for their own requirements.

That is to say that a Marine can say, "We need it," but it winds up being advocated and articulated or not advocated and not articulated by a Navy spokesman or by someone in the Navy that will decide that instead of buying the Marines, quote, good friends of mine who are Navy admirals—not Adm Kelso, the CNO, not Adm Boorda—but good friends who are recorded on, "Hey, the Marines don't need a solid amphibian vehicle, even though every Marine says

we do. We will buy them the Bradley fighting vehicle, and they can make do with that.” Well, that is not a Navy officer’s call. They have no basis, no legitimacy, no cause, no requirement to do that.

So this is one of my more passionate beliefs, is that Goldwater-Nichols broke the Marine Corps out, because it said the services shall be co-equal in the unified command chain, and the senior service officer there shall be the service component commander to that CinC. That means that the Marine Corps got a full place at the table, legitimately, under Goldwater-Nichols. The Commandant is no longer the assistant to the CNO in the tank, but he is, rather, a full-fledged member of the JCS.

All of those things have come to pass except that, within the Department of the Navy, we still, we yet have to achieve a situation in which the Secretary truly controls and allocates the resources between the two services on a basis of equality.

So resource determination by Marines, for Marines, allocation of the departmental resources to support departmental programs rather than apportionment by Navy officers to the Marine Corps of an amount of money that they represent to the Secretary as adequate for the Marine Corps.

It can be argued that the Commandant can go in and argue all he wants to, but, unfortunately, he does not own the computers and the files; he is hard-pressed, really, to make the final adjustments in the books in the resources of the Department.

Now, moving from my therefore rather critical and, as you said, stick-it-in-the-Navy’s-eye article, moving forward from that, I believe that progress was being made on my watch. Adm Kelso certainly tried, bent over backwards to be fair with the Marine Corps. But, once again, the CNO is not totally in possession of what goes on at the Navy, and there were others who were not.

Secretary Dalton tried hard to be. So progress was being made. Adm Bill Owens wanted to be completely fair and supportive of the Marine Corps. So there are many that were blue-suiters with broad gold stripes around the arms that wanted to be supportive of the Marine Corps.

That has moved forward, I think, continually. I think that Gen Krulak has picked up that baton and taken it forward, and Adm Johnson and Adm Boorda before him both were moving in that direction, and today it continues, I think, to move in a direction of greater equality.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, apparently, at the time, Adm Kelso thought you were off base. He wrote a

lengthy comment on your article that appeared in the January 1996 *Naval Institute Proceedings*. What were Adm Kelso’s chief points?

GEN MUNDY: Adm Kelso, once again, my esteemed Navy colleague—and he is that, and my good personal friend—but he missed the point of the article, in my judgment. His argument was right back to the programmatic. Here is how we do business in the Department. I think that, regrettably, I think that he took my article to be personally representing his lack of support for the Marine Corps. It was not that.

Again, Adm Frank Kelso was arguably more supportive of the Marine Corps than most CNOs had been.

But I think he read it as . . . his thesis, as I recall it, was that I have read this many times, and it comes down, bottom line is that the Marine Corps ought to get more of the resources of the Department of the Navy. And then he continued to say that he had supported a Marine Corps end strength, and he recounted a lot of the things that he had done to take down the Navy.

But the point was completely missed that that is right, that was consistent with the changes in the national strategy. It was not me who lobbied either in the building or within the Department to decrease the number of submarines by half in the Navy. It was VAdm Bill Owens, the second senior submarine officer in the Navy, in his role as N8, who recognized that the role of submarines was not there in the future.

. . . If you reduce your submarine force by half, certainly you reduce the size and the numbers and the total obligational authority. Certainly you reduce the Navy. Adm Kelso was absolutely right in reciting the fact that he had presided over the significant downsizing of the Navy. That, in and of itself, has absolutely nothing to do with the fair and equitable determination of requirements and allocation of resources for the Marine Corps based on needs.

So I think, again, that Adm Kelso missed the point there, and undoubtedly—and I regret that again—felt perhaps personally indicted because I had made reference to four-star admirals who had made statements. Neither of those four-star admirals that I made reference to were Adm Frank Kelso. Neither of those four-star admirals at the time they made those statements were working for Frank Kelso. Both of them were in joint assignments. So Adm Kelso did not control them.

When I said the ones who said the V-22 is not necessary or four Commandants could be wrong, those were admirals that were at that time working outside

the Navy but were arrogant enough to assume that because they were admirals, they knew enough about the Marine Corps to discount the Commandant's stated top war-fighting requirements. And that is fundamentally wrong. So that was the thesis.

BGEN SIMMONS: Retired RAdm Riley D. Mixon also commented at length on your "Equalizing the Partnership" article. His comments appeared in the February 1996 *Proceedings*. What was. . .

GEN MUNDY: Riley Mixon is a good old Georgia boy that I have known for a long time. In fact, his son, his Navy Ltjg son and my Marine 1stLt son were in the same battalion in the desert during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. We were acquaintances down in Norfolk. He is a fine fellow, and we are to this day good friends. He is retired from the Navy, and Riley Mixon took some undeserved hits in his retirement connected with the fact that naval aviation was under attack for Tailhook purposes and that sort of thing. But he is a good man and a good friend.

I think what he tried to say there, and needed to say there, as part of my "Equalizing the Partnership" thesis, I made reference to the fact that we were programming in the Department of the Navy to buy the F-18 E&F aircraft, which is a wonderful aircraft, but we were programming to buy 1,000 F-18 E&F aircraft, which three years, two years even, three years before they were programmed, the Navy had no inclination whatsoever to buy. The Navy was not after that aircraft. It was only that they grabbed for that aircraft as an interim fix between the ill-fated A-12 aircraft, which dropped out on them; the failing F-14 aircraft; the decommissioning, deactivating, wearing-out A-6 aircraft; in other words, naval aviation was in a hum. But then naval aviation was in no more of a hum, and not even in as much of a hum, as is Marine Corps aviation on the rotary wing side.

So, on the one hand, while we are supporting within the Department of the Navy a program that would limit the number of Marine Corps V-22s, it would be, here in development, to replace the oldest flying machine in the Department of the Navy, the CH-46 helicopter, we are prepared to go forth and spend billions of dollars on the F-18 E&F, which is acknowledged to be simply a gap filler in the Navy, stepping us from where we are today, giving us some extended range and some extended capacity and some extended black box capability, but stepping us toward the joint strike fighter of the future, which the Navy intends to be a deep-strike aircraft like the A-12 was intended to be. And that is fine. That is fine. We can go ahead

and develop in that direction.

But, to me, it was an absolute outrage that we would constrain the Marines' most needed requirement, while pouring every dime the Navy could find into the F-18 E&F at a cost of . . . you know, at the same time the Navy was saying we cannot afford the V-22, which is going to cost somewhere in the 40 to 60 million dollars apiece range, at the time we are still introducing brand-new off-the-production-line F-18 C&D fighter aircraft, which will shoot anything out of the skies that flies today, which will get to bomb probably about any place we need to make it, which is one of the finest aircraft around, we are going to introduce the extended model, if you will, the extended-range model of that aircraft in enormous numbers at an enormous expense as a gap filler, and let the Marines continue to fumble along on the CH-46. It is just patently not right.

I believe that Adm Kelso's reclama indicated that the Marines, that the decision, at the time that decision to build the V-22, which he had supported, to his credit, and which Adm Owens had engineered within the Department of Defense, and which a lot of other, massive political pressure from the Congress and elsewhere had caused the Secretary of Defense to sign onto, but in the early phases of that program decision, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, had said, "Okay, we will build it, but we will build it at a production rate of about 1 billion dollars a year as we were going through the final development processes, and put a cap of about five billion dollars on it." That was a decision based on the continued development of the V-22 and its introduction.

Now, after the election, at which time the Clinton Administration strongly endorsed the V-22, sent Sean O'Keefe down to make the deal to build the V-22, to get the Texas vote for President Clinton, rather for the . . . yes, for President Clinton . . . I am sorry, for the congressional race in which the Democratic Congress was at issue . . . after all of those chips had been played, that cap on top of the building of the V-22 implicitly went away because we were going to build the aircraft for the special operations forces as well as for the Marines.

So the building rate at which the Deputy Secretary approved then implicitly removed that cap. This was after Adm Kelso's watch. This was on Adm Boorda's watch, and I do not think that Adm Kelso was aware of that, so his point in there about, look, the Navy did not do it, the Secretary of Defense capped it, that was an argument that was right for its time but was not applicable at the time that my article was written, because the rules of the game had changed and the

Navy could have produced the V-22 at whatever rate we would have represented that within the Department of Defense and would have funded it within the Department of the Navy.

So again, going back and beating this dead horse to death, the point is that even the Secretary of the Navy, while we all want to be loyal to the Secretary, we all want to be supportive of the Secretary, but you cannot have a Secretary that is sitting there holding in place a program for Marines which has been fought over for the past 15 years and the top war-fighting priority of now four, now five, Commandants, you cannot hold that in place and then invent a new program which is going to cost you 80 to 100 million dollars a copy for 1,000 aircraft that are only gap fillers leading to the next generation of strike aircraft. That is patently wrong, and I would argue that case anywhere with anyone that wanted to.

Now, back to Adm Mixon's thesis, then. His thesis contended more or less on the aviation side, to say, "Wait a minute, here is all the money that has been spent on Marine aviation in past years." Not mentioned in there is the fact that a lot of the expenditures in the naval aviation budget were, for example, on the A-12 aircraft, which was a failure. And so all of those monies that were spent on it were lost, and when the program was canceled, the dollars that had been programmed for the Navy for that program went away.

So, yes, the obligational authority or the resources program for the Department of the Navy went down because the A-12 failed, not because the Marines ate the Department of the Navy aviation budget. It is a very difficult thing to wend your way through, and you can produce charts or graphs or arguments or you can cite statistics about how much money the Department of the Navy spent on submarine, aviation programs. It has no relativity unless you understand the total Department of the Navy aviation effort.

So I think that Adm Mixon was trying very hard, because the F-18 E&F is very important to the Navy, and I understand that. But I do not understand that 1,000 of those are more important than getting the Marines equipped real quickly. Adm Mixon wanted to ensure, I think, that somebody can read this article and figure that maybe we ought to start canceling the F-18 E&F program for the Marines. So that was my take on his recount of my article.

BGEN SIMMONS: Since our last interview, we have had the tragic suicide of the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Jeremy Boorda. Do you have any thoughts on this that you would like to include in your

oral history?

GEN MUNDY: My thoughts are only that I never knew Adm Boorda well. I think probably both of us tried to, and while I always felt that somehow or other I could not fashion a close personal relationship with him, he was very supportive of Marines as Chief of Naval Operations.

I said to Mike Boorda on more than one occasion, to include our mutual efforts in the roles and missions commission effort, I said, "Mike, you probably have said the word 'Marine' more times in your first six months as the CNO than the rest of CNOs throughout history have said in their whole four years, and some of them have been appropriately supportive of the Marine Corps." But Adm Boorda was definitely . . . he sided with us on the adaptive force packaging issue. He sided with us on amphibious deployment. As I mentioned earlier, he was passionate on the subject of forward deployment, and remember that before he became CNO the Marine Corps had been advancing the thesis of the importance of forward deployment. So Adm Boorda was, indeed, a friend of the Corps.

One wishes that we could have formed close enough personal relationships to have enabled a man under great pressure to come to a friend and say, "I'm under great pressure, and I think I'm beginning to fracture a little bit." Unfortunately, service at the top does not allow you to do that. Remember back to my earlier comment: "Don't let the men know I'm wounded; it's bad for their morale."

So Dr. Mundy might offer the thought that once you reach the echelons that service chiefs are in, that it is not possible to ask for help, simply because to do so is to let the men know that you are wounded, and a military leader is just loathe to do that. We struggle to stand alone and to be the leader and to take the shots, take the spears, bear the burden.

Adm Boorda was evidence of that, and the burdens simply came too heavy for him based on, I think, his personality, and under the circumstances I might . . . I do not mean that I . . . I certainly hope that I would have asked for help, but I think I bore a fair share of fairly intense weight for several times that I can think of during my tenure.

But I think that Adm Boorda was probably bearing the burden of Tailhook, which he had no . . . he was not there; he had no responsibility for that other than that he thought he had the responsibility for it. He was bearing the burden of attacks on the Navy across a broad quarter, of failures at the Naval Academy that he took to be his personal responsibility, and that is an admirable quality in the man, that he accepted that

responsibility.

But, unfortunately, he reacted to it in a way that none of us would ever hope that he would, but in a way that maybe he had no other alternative if he could not stand the pressure. He could not just quit and walk away and be the leader that he knew he had to be.

BGEN SIMMONS: As you know, as part of the preparations for your oral history, then LtGen Charles Krulak and MajGen Tom Wilkerson, two of your closest associates, prepared papers reflecting on your Commandancy from their respective perspectives. Gen Krulak entitled his lengthy paper "Force Structure Decisions." Gen Wilkerson's much shorter paper is entitled "Stewardship of the 30th Commandant."

For the benefit of future researchers, copies of both are in your personal papers. Both papers were invaluable to me as I prepared the questions for our earlier sessions. I would now like to take a closer look at some of the points these two distinguished officers have made concerning your performance as Commandant.

The first section of Gen Krulak's paper concerns the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG). He notes that by late July 1991, in your first month as Commandant, most of our forces had returned from Southwest Asia. He says that you gathered your three-star general officers at Camp Lejeune to discuss your vision for a road map for the Corps. He says that you called this the "Gathering of your Politburo."

There were many issues discussed, such as command screening, command selection a commander's course, quality of life, and so on. But the overriding issue was how to address the problem of a Bush administration decision down-sizing the base force to 159,000 Marines.

You had also sent out letters to all general officers, including some retired general officers, asking the questions, "Why should there be a Marine Corps," and "How should the Marine Corps be organized?"

From all of this, says Gen Krulak, you decided to establish a Force Structure Planning Group. The group would have three fundamental tasks: 1) To build the most capable force that could be organized with an active Marine Corps of 159,100 Marines; 2) To evaluate that force against the requirements of the national military strategy; 3) If a 159K Marine Corps could not meet the requirements of the national military strategy, to construct a Marine Corps that could. Your instructions were to build this force from the bottom up.

Gen Wilkerson's paper says much the same but in much terser terms. He says that when you came into office, the Marine Corps was in, and I am quoting, "an uncontrolled freefall," end quote, to a base force of 159,000.

Are you in agreement with what I have said so far?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I certainly am with regard to Gen Krulak's presentation. He has accurately laid out the specific guidance that was given. Gen Wilkerson's, the "uncontrolled free-fall," I will allow others to interpret the meaning that they will attach to that.

I would mention that I think that the fact is that Gen Gray before me, for the same reasons that I somehow would not have accepted it, Gen Gray simply would not accept that we were going to take the Marine Corps down, and yet it was coming down. And so his guidance had been hold the line but not what to do if the line failed. And, indeed, at the end of your tenure, maybe that is not the time that you are capable of really making up that type of guidance.

But as a result, I would say that probably the Wilkerson categorization that we were in an uncontrolled free-fall might be a little bit strong. I think we were in, we were sliding down the slippery slope—it would be fair to say that—and we did not have a plan for how to stop our slide, and we did not at that point have anything . . . we did not see any bushes or twigs sticking up from the slope that we could grab hold of.

So maybe that means free-fall, but I think free-fall implies that you are completely out of control, and the Marine Corps was not out of control. Gen Gray had tried very hard to hold the line and had just stonewalled it, but he had had to take some actions as a result of that or had taken some actions, for example, to reprogram monies toward end strength that would just absolutely cripple the Marine Corps.

And so there was . . . when I came in, a lot of the generals were very concerned that we had to do something to find a root or a bush to grab hold of going down, and the FSPG sought to do that.

BGEN SIMMONS: You named then BGen Krulak to be the director of the Force Structure Planning Group, and you authorized him to pick about 18 young colonels and lieutenant colonels from among the, quote, best and the brightest, end quote. Who were some of these best and brightest?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again, I believe—perhaps I have mentioned them before—but then Col Marty Steele was among those; Col Russ Appleton was

among them. We, of course, had Col . . . Wilkerson was still a very viable source of information because, while he was selected for brigadier general and was still. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: You said Phil Wilkerson? Tom Wilkerson.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, Wilkerson.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tom Wilkerson.

GEN MUNDY: Yes, BGen . . . yes, Tom Wilkerson, Col Tom Wilkerson. LtCol Mike Strickland was one of those. I must admit that at this point my memory grows a little bit vague. But I think that is an important point to record, and I will certainly make sure that those names are recognized as we go through.

BGEN SIMMONS: You issued a charter that laid out exactly what you expected of the group. This charter was widely distributed not only internally to the Marine Corps but also externally to the Department of Defense and the other Services. Why was this done?

GEN MUNDY: Well, it was done because perhaps one of the factors that figured in my being nominated to be the Commandant was the belief in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy and probably with the Chairman that I would take down the Marine Corps; in other words, I think there was concern that perhaps another nominee, whoever that might be . . . make it Gen Bob Milligan, another great of our Corps, but that he was very much a disciple of Gen Gray, and a very effective one, but I think that there was probably concern that he would hold the same line, and maybe thinking that I would take down the Marine Corps.

And there was good reason for that, because when I was the Deputy Chief of Staff for PP&O and Gen Powell came in as the new Chairman and gave his vision for the future, it was very clear to me that he intended to take down the Armed Forces significantly, or to get them taken down, or to try to take them down.

I wrote a memo, I personally authored a memo at that time to Gen Gray that said, "Here is what I see coming," and what I saw coming—we are not there yet, but I am not so sure that I do not still see it coming in certain areas—and that was that I could envision us going down to a force level of perhaps five to eight Army divisions, that I could see us going down to a carrier level of six to eight aircraft carriers, and so

on, and the Air Force was in there, and what I said was, "I believe that we should sit down in our own house and plan—i.e., do the FSPG—plan our own future and make doggone sure that we have a plan for reducing the Marine Corps if we are directed to do that and/or implicitly to legitimize what it would show." And any time you write anything in Washington, it goes around. So perhaps there was legitimacy in their believing that here comes . . . we will get Mundy in, and he will take down the Marine Corps.

When I became the Commandant, I was given many, I would say, I will use the term "lectures." They were very general, very professional lectures, by Secretary Garrett as he welcomed in his new Commandant and as we worked together. He was very explicit in telling me that loyalty counted and that the Marines were working the V-22 behind Secretary Cheney's back and that he expected me to be loyal and that 159 had been decreed and he expected loyalty there. So I was given many loyalty lectures.

So one means of saying to the Cheneys and to the Garretts and to everybody else out there, "Okay, we are going to build your 159K Marine Corps, and boy, is it going to be good for what it is! It may not be good enough, but when we build it, it is going to be good. But stand by, because I am going to tell you if it is not good enough."

That was my purpose, was to say to them, you have my salute, I am doing what I have been told to do, but I am also going to tell you if you are wrong. And so I was kind of serving notice at the same time as I was acknowledging my direction.

BGEN SIMMONS: I hope there is a copy of the charter in your personal papers. If not, we are going to have to find one.

The group went into literally around-the-clock session at Quantico for the next nine weeks, seven days a week, 16 hours a day. Gen Krulak reported to you at the end of each day by e-mail. You also visited the group frequently, giving, quote, rudder orders and guidance, end quote. You decided to make the FSPG's draft report the centerpiece of your first General Officers' Symposium. The general officers gave the draft a thorough scrubbing. The group reworked its draft and submitted its report to you, which you signed on 16 December 1991.

The key conclusion was that a base force of 177,000 was needed to meet the national military strategy. You would now have to articulate this requirement in convincing terms to the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and the Congress. Do I have

it right?

GEN MUNDY: You have it right.

BGEN SIMMONS: Paralleling the effort with the active Marine Corps, there was also a Reserve Force Structure Planning Group. It was chaired by Reserve MajGen John Cronin. This group proposed a radical and very logical change to the mission of the Organized Reserve. Instead of preserving the somewhat mythical mission of providing a division and a wing that would fight as entities, the group recommended an augmentation and reinforcing role for the Reserve. This was completely consistent with the Total Force concept, and a marriage of the active and Reserve forces.

To make this change in mission clear and the full partnership of the Reserve obvious, you authorized the stand-up of Marine Forces Reserve in the fall of 1994. Marine Forces Reserve would then be equated to Marine Forces Atlantic and Marine Forces Pacific. Do I have it right?

GEN MUNDY: You do, with one minor, perhaps insignificant, historical note, and that is that when that was stood up initially as Marine Reserve Force, and it was at this point—I believe that this was in 1993 as Marine Reserve Force—MajGen Jim Livingston, who had been sent down as the CG of the 4th Division, was made Commanding General, Marine Reserve Forces, or Marine Reserve Force, and we used for the first time Reserve generals to command the Reserve formations of the division and the wing. We had previously had a Force Service Support Group brigadier Reservist, but the Reserve generals had always been understudies to regular generals that commanded the 4th Division and Wing. So that was a change.

Now, the next year, then, as you accurately portrayed, there was a tracking fix to, in effect, give the Reserve side of the house or that. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: . . . Marine Reserve Force, Marine Force Reserve, the flip-over in the two titles?

GEN MUNDY: And I believe that I had reached a point of saying that it was redesignated as Marine Force Reserve, even though that semantically might not sound exactly right. But it was to give credence to the, in effect, component status of the Marine Force Reserve.

I would mention as an afterthought on that that I know that I am privileged: Gen Krulak forwards to me his end-of-year updates, and just last night I was reading his update for 1996, and his last point in there

was, “Where have the Reserves gone?” as a question.

They had gone away. Marine Forces Reserve is indistinguishable from the other component, Reserve Forces. So I think that is a great statement to the Total Force fact of the Marine Corps.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another parallel effort was the Recruiting Force Structure Planning Group. I think the largest result to come out of this group’s efforts was the creation of a Marine Corps Recruiting Command, which stood up in the summer of 1993. Do you want to elaborate on that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, yes. There had been an on-again, off-again persuasion in the Marine Corps to establish a Marine Recruiting Command. Remember that I was a product of the Personnel Procurement Division of the Manpower Department, the Code MR days, and it worked pretty well there. And so there was a persuasion to keep it the way it was under the thesis—and one to which I personally subscribe—that if the Commandant of the Marine Corps ever loses the feeling that he is in fact the chief recruiter of the Marine Corps, then we will never be as good. We would not do it like with an independent, as the Army or as the Navy does, independently. The Commandant has got to be involved in that very, very critical issue.

So I was rather reluctant to do that—even though I directed that we do a study as to how we could do it—I was reluctant to do it because I did not want to lose direct control of it. Some of the original thoughts were that we would establish a command and we would put it at Quantico, and it would report through the CG of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command because, after all, recruiting of the resources to make Marines, to build combat capability, et cetera, et cetera, could be inferred to be a combat development process.

I did not want to lose direct control of it. I guess Gen Barrow had schooled me well enough on that that I wanted to keep my hand on the throttle there.

But, nonetheless, it made sense to stand up a Recruiting Command for a lot of reasons, and so I approved that, and we were prepared to establish it when MajGen Dick Davis, Richard Davis, Dick Davis, who was the first commander of the Recruiting Command, came in to tell me that we were preparing one of the sets of quarters at Parris Island and that we were preparing a building at Parris Island to receive the Recruiting Command.

And to be very candid about it for historical purposes, I got cold feet. I was prepared to stand up the

Recruiting Command, but I was not prepared to send it all the way south and not be able to see them on a day-to-day basis. So, with one of those unfortunate things that occurred in Gen Davis' career, I literally . . . his personal effects were on the shipping dock, packed and ready to go, and I said, "No, Dick, we are going to stay right here." So he re-rented the house he was in and stayed in Washington for another year, and we created the command at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

I worried about that, because I thought it really does not make much sense to have a command established right here in the Marine Headquarters, and I do not know why that is a big problem, but it just did not seem to me to be right. But I wanted to make sure that we kept it close to the Commandant's awareness, because out of sight can become out of mind, and with the recruiting business, we can go downhill very quickly if we begin to rely on others than the Commandant to have a daily focus on the importance of that function.

BGEN SIMMONS: Tell me about the briefing or "road show" that you developed to sell the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Congress on the need for a 177,000-person Marine Corps.

GEN MUNDY: Well, it grew in quality over time, and it was pretty rough to begin with, and very frankly, it probably did not convey too well the impact of building down the Corps in its initial forms, but that got refined over time and over time.

The briefing was put together as a product . . . in part, it was Gen Krulak's briefing to me of what had been done. Now, I chose then to put it into more colorful and meaningful exhibits. For example, I remember on the part where we were talking about the supporting establishment and what we were taking down there in terms of base structure and in terms of the Marine security guards and things like that, that we actually listed those things and then built a white picket fence around those elements of the Corps that had been fenced.

I had fenced HMX-1. I had fenced the Marine Security Guard Battalion, because we had to guard embassies. I did not want to go playing around with . . . the operative term would be "gold watches," like saying to somebody, "Okay, I guess we are going to take out the President's helicopter squadron." That was not going to play.

So I fenced those functions that I thought we could not do away with, and then we made reductions in the

others, in the supporting establishment, and over on the side of it, we put a turnip and had the turnip dripping a drop of blood, to imply that we had really squeezed the supporting establishment as hard as we could.

So we colored it up like that and made it what I thought was a fairly good briefing, except for the assessment at the end in which we were trying to explain what we could not do at that structure, and we did not get it right the first few times, and in fact it was that briefing that I used with both Gen Powell and Secretary Cheney, and for that matter Secretary Garrett and the Secretariat, and it probably was the sleeper part of the briefing.

But what we did was to put together a briefing, and then I personally was the briefer, and I briefed Secretary Garrett in the small conference room called the Blue Room over in the Pentagon there, briefed him there with Adm Kelso present and with, I think, the Under Secretary. I think that Dan Howard was there, and there were undoubtedly two or three others. I wanted the whole Secretariat, and it may have been the whole Secretariat.

But, anyway, I briefed them, and they were very excited to learn how the Marine Corps was going to build itself to 159,000. We took out some aviation squadrons—that obviously appealed to them—and took down the other things, and I showed them the impact.

But the point is that when you are briefing people who have no awareness of what it takes to make up an organization, the taking it down does not have the same impact as the briefing. So being able to articulate what this means and what this inflicted on the Marine Corps and what capability we would have was very difficult.

Now, at this phase of the briefing, remember that I was giving a positive briefing: Here is the new Marine Corps that we have built at 159,000. This is what it will look like. But it will have taken out 50 percent of this and 30 percent of that and 25 percent of this, and so there was a dual communication. One was you tasked me to take it down; here it is. And for what it is worth at 159,000, it will be a good Marine Corps. But, we will take out all these things, and therein was the subliminal hope of saying, "Gee, this is really hard."

And then we assessed it against the national military strategy, we checked with the Joint Staff, we checked with OSD, we checked with the CinCs, everything else, and here is what we will not be able to do, and here is what we will be able to do. And the deficiencies we showed them the first time as a circle that was

colored like a cup that would be half full or partially full. You know, we can do all these, too, at that level, but we can only do half of this, like forward deployment. We would only be able to keep one MEU out, and also, in order to come down to this level, we will have to close a Marine Corps installation, and the most right one to close would be Kaneohe Bay in the mid-Pacific. That was not guised that way; that was the only one that we really could close, but we would have to do that to get the supporting structure back.

However, as it turned out, of course, that meant facing the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Dan Inouye, face to face and telling him that you were going to pull 10,000 Marines and close down a base on Hawaii, and that I knew was not going to be received easily or well. So I thought that maybe that gave us a little bit of leverage, and it did give us some leverage.

We then briefed that, again, to the Secretary of the Navy. I, with his permission, told him that I intended to go brief . . . I guess I never really requested the Secretary's permission, because I did not want him to tell me no, so I just told him that I would then be briefing the Chairman, and he could not deny me that, because, again, remember the duality of the JCS member versus a Service Chief member role. So I told him that I would be briefing the Chairman, and after I had briefed the Chairman, I came back and debriefed the Secretary and told him that Gen Powell had listened to the briefing and had said, "Okay, that's it. I will promise you that the Marine Corps will go no lower, and if I can, I will help you get some back," because I think that Powell had never been educated on what the implications of just a 25 percent wipe would do.

I then scheduled and briefed the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, Mr. Cheney, Mr. Atwood, and the Defense staff, and took Mr. Garrett with me for that. Unfortunately, I think, as I recounted before, that briefing was scheduled, as I recall it, about 3 in the afternoon, and any of us, all of us are human . . . wrong time of the day to undertake an hour-and-a-half-long briefing in that much detail. So I think probably I did not convey what I intended to as implicitly as I had intended to with the Secretary of Defense.

Having briefed him—I must admit this would show me somewhat out of line—I did not request permission to brief anybody else, but I briefed congressional staffers. I would not have. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: You had already briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee?

GEN MUNDY: I had not.

BGEN SIMMONS: You had not at this point?

GEN MUNDY: No.

BGEN SIMMONS: You described it, but you did not . . . I want to make sure I get the sequence right. First, it was to the Secretary of the Navy in company with the CNO. Then it was to the Chairman. Then it was to the Secretary of Defense. And only then did you take it outside the Pentagon to the Congress.

GEN MUNDY: That is exactly right, and I took it to the congressional staffers. I briefed no members at that point. However, that, of course, was an electrifying event, because as we discussed previously, when I briefed the staffers, I then left, came back and was content that I had given a good briefing, and it was a good briefing by that time. But somebody sprang the *Washington Post* in on me, and immediately front page on the *Washington Post* was a picture of me, saying that I was over briefing the Hill against the President's force structure plan. So we have been through that saga before, me then going to see Secretary Cheney, you know, holding out my wrist, which never got slapped, and so on.

BGEN SIMMONS: What is the time frame here now?

GEN MUNDY: The time frame here is. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: From your initial briefing of the Secretary of the Navy to taking it to the Hill. What is the elapsed time?

GEN MUNDY: Oh, January. The Secretary of the Navy, November-December time frame; after Christmas over the Hill when the staffers came back; and then, of course, we then were made headlines, and then everybody wanted to receive it, and so I gave it to two or three newspapers and to some professional journals and. . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: There were no classified portions of this?

GEN MUNDY: No, there were no classified. But again, the message in it was, here is the 159K Marine Corps. Here it is. We have done the best we can. It was a positive briefing. However, comma, you are

not going to have the same capabilities that you had before. You can still, you can reduce the Army and reduce the Air Force and still meet all the CinCs requirements. You cannot meet the CinCs requirements with a 159K Marine Corps.

I believe that I have gone through the saga of Secretary Cheney saying, “Well, you know, price it out, what would it cost,” and bringing in the CinCs and asking them to define their requirements, and they had higher requirements than even 177. It would take 185, as I recall, to meet their requirements.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Wilkerson makes the point that there were two watershed decisions underlying the development of the 177,000 minimum goal. One was to, quote, pursue both wartime and peacetime requirements as force structure builders, end quote. What did he mean by that?

GEN MUNDY: Well, I think that he means that . . . one of the weaknesses at that time in Washington was that we were still laboring under the Cold War methodology—and it is still here to some point today—the Cold War methodology of figuring how many forces we needed to fight a given scenario of conflict. War begins in the Middle East, moves to Europe, becomes a NATO conflict, becomes a global war, spreads into the Pacific. So, therefore, we are now fighting the Soviets out of Vladivostok; we are now bombing the Kola Peninsula; we are exercising a maritime strategy and going around to get the Soviet northern fleet; we are fighting in Southwest Asia. And how many divisions do you need to do that?

That is how we had structured forces in the past, because most of the people who deal with these things are set-piece folks. In other words, they think in terms of how many divisions or how many wings or how many submarines or how many carrier battle groups.

What they had no awareness or no appreciation of was that you might have enough to fight a battle, but that might not give you the sustaining base to do forward deployments that naval forces do, nor could you simply say 177,000 Marines . . . let’s see, a division is about 19,000 Marines, a wing is about 14,000; that means about 33,000 times 3, 99,000 Marines ought to be enough to equip the Marine Corps. That was the simplicity of the analyses that were going on in those days.

Nobody could understand that within 159,000, about 16 percent of that on a day-to-day basis was going to be tied up at Parris Island, San Diego, or in the schools somewhere; that we were flying the

President with a 700-person helicopter squadron; that we had, you know, whatever the number was at the time, about 1,300 Marines defending the State Department, the embassies around the world. So by the time you pulled all those out, you did not have three divisions of Marines, and you could not rotate forces overseas.

This logic was lacking big time among those who were attempting to come to grips with how to down-size the Armed Forces. And the Navy was in the same boat. As we down-size the Navy, we will get down to a point where we would not have enough ships to keep forward deployed.

It was this foundation that then drove both me and, secondarily, Adm Boorda, to keep banging the forward presence mission and the requirement for forces to be able to support forward presence. Pretty soon the Air Force bought onto it and began to sing the same song, because they came to find out that as we had left Air Force squadrons, for example, in Saudi Arabia to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq, that the Air Force was now in the rotation business, and they had never thought about this.

The Army, when the Army has gotten into Bosnia, or as the Army has sent the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia, they have now learned that you cannot . . . that it is nice to have a war and pick up the division and go fight it and come home, but that, short of that, it will take you more than a division to support simply having one brigade overseas somewhere. So everybody now understands that rotation, but no one did in those days.

BGEN SIMMONS: The second major decision, in Gen Wilkerson’s mind, was your personal involvement in the process, and I think we have seen that throughout this session. Your attainment eventually of an end strength or “bottom-up-review” force of 174,000 has to be regarded as your greatest accomplishment as Commandant. Would you agree?

GEN MUNDY: I would agree. I mean, I think that is . . . you know, there are many things as I look back that I wish that I might have done as the Commandant, and under other circumstances I might have found myself emphasizing a lot of different things. But the fact is that about all of the energies and the resources and about all of the fistfights that I could undertake during my tenure had to deal fundamentally with keeping the size of the Marine Corps up, because no matter which way you turned, the Corps was under attack from non-comprehending people who really did not wish us ill but had no idea

at all how to size the Armed Forces.

BGEN SIMMONS: Even so, you had to cover the same strategic obligations with a force of 174,000 that were being covered with a force of 196,000. That is a difference of 22,000 Marines. To find part of the solution, you had the Force Structure Planning Group examine the MidPac and WestPac Marine requirements. This was rather politically sensitive, was it not? You have already referred to Senator Inouye.

GEN MUNDY: It was really politically sensitive because I had, after I had briefed and had gone to the Congress, for those who . . . we have talked before about how you do business in Washington . . . but I went to see Senator Inouye and said, "Senator, I will try every way that I can to avoid this, but I need your support in sustaining the size of the Marine Corps, because without it, I have no alternative but to take down Kaneohe Bay, and he was very concerned about that.

So I had consistently the Pacific Senators—that is, Inouye and Stevens, Senator Ted Stevens—and that is the chairman and the minority chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which are two very, very powerful men and senior senators. So we had good support for the Marine Corps from those two, not outspokenly so, but very definitely Senator Dan Inouye is . . . the Marine Corps owes him a debt. Now, he owes us one because we stayed there. We helped each other.

So the MidPac force structure study was based essentially on the fact that we had to leave a coherent force in Kaneohe Bay. We could not draw down aviation in the rotation pipeline and for other reasons and for actually base support reasons, we could not maintain the airfield, so we were going to have to draw down the airfield, and to cut our operating tempo, we were going to have a forward base in Okinawa and Japan some squadrons permanently.

Senator Inouye conveyed through Mr. Richard Collins, his staff assistant, that the idea, as the United States was drawing down its forces, the idea of drawing forces out of United States bases and increasing the basing overseas in Japan was not something that was going to fly on the Hill. So we had to come up with a means of accommodating Senator Inouye's need to keep Kaneohe Bay open and to keep adequate, reasonably adequate, numbers of Marines out there, while at the same time withdrawing because we could not operate the airfield with fixed-wing squadrons out there as we had at the time.

So that is what the MidPac study was all about: How do we posture ourselves, and second to that was

we considered a lot of variations that still have viability perhaps for the future.

For example, as we scaled down in Okinawa, which we did, however you want to call it—we are down to about a brigade strength there, still call it a division, but we have one infantry regiment and the artillery, the 12th Marines, but, you know, they are very reduced—as we scaled down, we considered, for example, putting the 3d Division colors on Hawaii and calling the 3d Marine Regiment the 3d Marine Division, and indeed, even putting the division headquarters there and leaving a brigade headquarters to do what the MEF currently does out there. All of those things were notions, plus many, many other ideas.

But we eventually settled upon a means by which we could leave the regiment in place in Hawaii. We would put all of our CH-53D aircraft, to include the training squadron, at Kaneohe Bay. That does not have the same requirements as does a fixed-wing operating base with F-18s and C-130s and things out there, so we would be able to operate thus a representative helicopter community; we would be able to maintain a regiment. Yes, the numbers of Marines came down, but to make a long story short, it was a reasonable arrangement that did not operationally deconfigure us completely and that met Senator Inouye's need to maintain Marine forces.

BGEN SIMMONS: Did it continue as the 1st Marine Brigade?

GEN MUNDY: It did not. We furled the colors of the 1st Marine Brigade when we pulled out the fixed-wing aviation and when we pulled the brigadier general out of there. Now, we have since returned it. We have changed that position from Commanding General of the 1st Brigade or I MEF was changed to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Hawaii, and he now becomes, in effect, the base commander of both Camp Smith and Camp Butler.

BGEN SIMMONS: That is an administrative command rather than a tactical command.

GEN MUNDY: It is, yes. There is not an operational command element there.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another approach to making up the short-fall in personnel was the substitution of permanent change-of-station units for those units which were then on the unit deployment program. Primarily, we are talking about feeding battalions and squadrons

into the Western Pacific; that is, to Japan and Okinawa. How is this working out?

GEN MUNDY: Okay. Well, the permanent change-of-station units were really aviation units because we found that, one, as we agreed with the Navy to position Marine squadrons, some Marine squadrons, aboard aircraft carriers periodically for deployment, we had to cut down our operating tempo, and so we needed to move an F-18 squadron out permanently into Marine Aircraft Group 12 in Iwakuni, and we needed to permanently station some helicopters, a helicopter squadron out there. That took a long time to do.

Gen Krulak also took the measure, which I salute, of withdrawing the Harriers, I believe, from the Western Pacific because of the high operating tempo of that particular community. Not unique. The aviation community has borne even a heavier operating tempo than have many elements on the ground because of the high rotation of units on unit deployment and then on new deployments and combined arms exercises and the Marine aviation weapons/tactics training courses. We really use helicopter and the AV8-B community very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: Are we still rotating infantry battalions to the Western Pacific?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we are, and artillery batteries and reconnaissance platoons.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think it was very interesting in the Persian Gulf War that we sent two battalions plus assorted squadrons to fill in Okinawa from the Reserve.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: They did well.

GEN MUNDY: They did very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: In your effort to “articulate the Corps,” Gen Krulak says that you came up with the idea of the Road Warriors. We have spoken about those before, a sort of modern version of the Chowder Society which had defended the Marine Corps during the post-World War II unifications battles.

Now, one point I would like to make clear for future generations of readers, the Chowder Society was a conspiratorial society. The “Road Warriors” were just the opposite. Just like you laid out the charter for

your Force Structure Group and made it available to everyone, you played all your cards from the top of the table.

GEN MUNDY: I think so. In context, I think so. That is not to say, as I was just talking about with Senator Inouye . . . you know, you deal with the Congress as you . . . it is the way that we make American laws, and you go over and you make deals with the Congress.

I do not think that I ever made a deal in the sense of force structure that I would feel that I was in any way undercutting . . . I certainly asked privately and off-line and, if you will, from under the deck, if you want to consider it that way, for the support of the Congress and individual congressmen in supporting the size and structure and the capabilities of the Marine Corps and the programs, the V-22 programs. But then that is how it is done, and the Marine Corps would never have survived to this day were it not done that way.

However, in terms of open-facedly saying to the Secretaries, “Here is what I am going to do,” yes, I feel that I was completely open. In fact, later in my tenure—I think I am maybe getting ahead of the force structure—but Senator John McCain took up a habit, because he was very concerned about the draw-down in forces, of sending out a letter to each of the service chiefs asking for very candid views on the state of readiness, the state of preparedness.

You know, I do not know, frankly, why I did not get my chain pulled or get slapped down or something. But I pulled no punches with that; I was absolutely candid. But I always sent a copy of my response to Senator McCain. Even before it got to the Hill, I sent it to the Secretary of the Navy. In the latter cases, when I felt like the OSD was . . . that I was not going to be able to survive in terms of modernizing the Corps because I had dealt so vigorously and personally with Secretary Deutch on that, I sent him a copy, as well, because I said in there that we were promised money by the Secretary of Defense that has not been forthcoming, and I cannot tell you, Senator, other than that it is going to cripple us.

So, yes, I would say that I was up front, and maybe that goes back to . . . we were talking about leadership qualities, and so on. I do not mean to characterize myself as some sort of an extraordinary leader, but I mean that the qualities of being honest, forthright, open, above board never, never hurt me badly. Sometimes they stung a little bit, but I was never slapped down for that.

BGEN SIMMONS: Now let’s talk about command

screening. Gen Krulak says that the politburo meeting at Camp Lejeune reached a consensus that command screening was a concept whose time had come.

All the other services did it. Some others have said that you have taken away some of the prerogatives of the force commander, the division commanders, wing commanders, et cetera. Why did you think command screening was important, and how did you implement it?

GEN MUNDY: It is important to make a refinement here. The other Services did command selection. The significance is that LtCol Joe Smith, United States Army, at the Army War College is selected to command the 2d Battalion of the 25th Infantry in Hawaii, or Navy Cdr So-and-So is selected to be the executive officer of the fleet or to be the commanding officer of the USS *No Name*.

In the case of the Marine Corps, what we sought to do was to screen officers that were considered to be the most fit to command Marine formations of various types, and we categorized them as to people who . . . for example, a colonel that would be especially qualified to command a Marine Corps district probably was a colonel who had had a very successful tour as a major, as a recruiter, and. . .

BGEN SIMMONS: You were distinguishing between command screening and command selection.

GEN MUNDY: Yes. Well, perhaps I have done that well enough, because I have lost track. But I think I was trying to make the point that the Marine Corps wanted to screen officers who were the best qualified that we could for command within a certain framework, and I had said that there were criteria we would screen. If you were going to be a district commander, for example, probably the credentials we would want would be a successful recruiting major, maybe a district operations officer as a lieutenant colonel or something, as opposed to a regimental commander or a MEU commander with other credentials.

And then we also went into the supporting establishment, because we wanted to make sure that command counted as command, as opposed to, if you have not commanded a regiment or an aircraft crew for a MEU, you really are not a commanding colonel.

We wanted to make sure that if you commanded the Marine Corps Finance Center in Kansas City as a colonel, that that was command, and that had all the empowerment of command along with it.

So we screened, and then we provided the lists of those officers screened to commanding generals.

When the monitors had determined, we intend to send these officers to the 2d Marine Division, we would consult with the force commander and/or the division commander and let them . . . they could make the assignment to a battalion, a regiment, a squadron, whatever it is, but we had screened to make sure that we had the best quality.

Now, the problem for the Marine Corps in that—it would not be unique to us, but it maybe is more applicable to us than others—is that the fact is that most Marine officers are so good, and most Marine officers want to command. I do not think that is true in every other sister Service.

BGEN SIMMONS: Not 100 percent.

GEN MUNDY: But most Marine officers aspire to command, and so it really hurts when you come to the recognition that, yes, you may be a lieutenant colonel, you may have come along very well in your career, or you may be a colonel, but that the Corps is not going to sort you out and send you to command.

There have been, as you know, many articles in the *Gazettes* and much yeeing and hawing over whether this is right or whether it is wrong, despite the fact, as you mentioned, that some of the division commanders maybe felt that they should be able to do that. Those, I believe, were really in the early stages, about the first year.

BGEN SIMMONS: All right, I am Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.

GEN MUNDY: Yes.

BGEN SIMMONS: I need a chief of staff, I need a G-3, I need two regimental commanders. I get four colonels. How much latitude do I have in sorting out those four colonels?

GEN MUNDY: Since we did not include the G-3 or the chief of staff, what the monitors would essentially expect is that you are going to move one of the regimental commanders that you are relieving with a new one that has been screened to command coming in up to be your G-3 or your chief.

It does not work perfectly, does not always work that way exactly. But the intent is not simply to say, "Oh, you have two staff jobs and two command jobs coming open; here are four colonels; sort them out." The intent is to say, these two have screened for command, and they are being sent to you, and they should command in the . . . well, 2d Division, they will com-

mand in the FMF. For force commander, these will command posted station, these will command in the FMF, because of their . . . this is done by a board; this is not done by the monitors, but the screening is done by a board.

The product has been, however it may be inflamed in the *Gazette* from time to time . . . and I do not mean just to wash that away, because, indeed, it bothered me to . . . I liked the system whereby you could go to a division, and if you performed well as the G-3 . . . you know, I went down there as the G-2 of the 2d Marine Division. I was never screened for command. I guess if I had not caught Gen Twomey's eye or had his confidence, he would have never assigned me to the 2d Marines.

So it gave you a sense of accomplishment that I have earned my regiment or I have earned my battalion. But at the same time, we had battalion commanders and regimental commanders that had been relieved, squadron commanders, for incompetence, for lack of satisfactory tactical performance, and the feeling from what has been characterized . . . I think "politburo" is really Gen Krulak's term. It was never a Mundy term of reference. Gen Gray used it. I did not . . . I was being brought up to fight the Communists, not to adopt their style, so I never used that.

But, that being as it may, the three-stars were fairly strongly convinced that we needed to do something to get quality commanders in. So there was unanimous feeling that we needed to do that. We did it the first time, we learned some things from it, and we have kept doing it, and I think that the Marine Corps has benefitted in having officers of superb qualifications to do the most important thing that we have, and that is to lead Marines.

Now, the other aspect of it was, remember, if you will, that, deserved or not, Gen Gray . . . let me just say that the Gray era ended with a really bubbling-hot feeling of "bubbaism." That was the term used. People would talk about the "bubbas." If you were one of the "bubbas," you got to do this. There probably is some unfairness in this, because we all have confidantes and lieutenants that we like to lean upon.

But there was a feeling that, number one, that there were "bubbas" that belonged to the Commandant, and there was a feeling, also, that was of great depression to many very fine officers that, when they would get a set of orders to say, for example, you are going to the 2d Marine Division, that you would say, "Oh, my gosh, I don't know Gen Simmons," and so there was this quick rush to go down and try to curry favor with the division commander, begging him, in effect, for a job.

And the reverse of that was that then division commanders tended to favor their favorites, a reasonable thing to do, and that in turn was "bubbaism" in another form, that if you were one of the general's "bubbas," you were going to command a battalion or you were going to command a regiment. If you were not, you were going to be the G-4 or the G-2. You might get something, but not if you did not know him.

And so we sought to behead that monster by saying, "Well, okay, in the future it will be a selection board up here comprised of generals that will sit around and determine who is going to go to command, and then we will let the commanding generals have some latitude in assigning them, but we will determine who is going to command."

I think the overall effect of that is healthy in the sense of the leadership of the units. It may still be a little bit unhealthy in the sense of what do you do if you have been tremendously successful and you do not screen for command. It is a tremendous morale shock.

BGEN SIMMONS: As a corollary to command screening, you decided that there should be a Commander's Course so that new commanders would be as well prepared as possible. Now, how was this implemented?

GEN MUNDY: Well, to be candid, the Army had a very good one, and as we looked around, we said, "Boy, the way the Army does it is the way we want to do it, to include the spouse involvement in the Commander's Course." But we phased it in.

The Commander's Course, though, it was expensive. I mean, it cost money. It cost travel money and per diem to bring them back here. But we concluded that it was worth the investment to do that, and so the way it was implemented was that, once a year, we ran the Commander's Course, and . . .

BGEN SIMMONS: Where?

GEN MUNDY: At Quantico. And that was set up by LtGen Krulak, who now had gravitated, by the time we implemented it, had gravitated to Quantico. And so we set up the Commander's Course and the Spouse's Courses to go along with that. The Commander's Course, as I recall it—I think I am right—is about three weeks in duration, or less, two and a half weeks or something. We brought the spouses in, the wives in, essentially—I do not recall seeing a spouse, a male—but we brought them in for about one week at that period. And there was some

social interactivity.

But we designed it at Quantico. We used the principals, staff principals. I would go down and address them. Linda would go down and address them. We used the three-stars and the senior Headquarters professionals, and then, of course, you had generals at Quantico that did that. So the general officers trained the lieutenant colonels and colonels going into command at the Commander's Course.

BGEN SIMMONS: As Gen Krulak brings out, and as we have discussed somewhat in earlier sessions, one of your major successes was the establishment of FMFLant and FMFPac as Marine Force Atlantic and Marine Forces Pacific. For the benefit of future readers, what was the distinction? Why was "componency" important? Didn't we already have de facto component status? And how was. . . .

GEN MUNDY: may have had de facto componency status, but it was junior partner componency status, because if you stop and think about it, while we did not want to break the linkage with the Navy fleet commanders, the perception was that a Fleet Marine Force commander was a Navy-type commander. The Navy categorizes their commands that way. In other words, the Surface Force Atlantic Fleet, the Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, the Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet, the Minesweeper, the Seabee, whatever it is, those are type commands, each commanded, or not each one of those, but commanded by a three-star. So Fleet Marine Force Atlantic was viewed by the Navy as a type command.

So, despite the fact that because Marines are Marines or because there has always been an element of difference or independence, the Marine would generally hold access to the unified commander in chief, but he did not have formal access.

Gen D'Wayne Gray, when he was Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, became very aggravated and agitated by what he called the "velvet rope syndrome." We may have spoken to this before. But what that came from is that when the President was coming to visit in Hawaii, the CinC—I think it was Adm Ron Hays at that time; they were good friends—but CinC put out a directive, or his staff did, that the component commanders would stand with the CinC in greeting the President when he arrived, and that the subcomponent commanders would stand behind the velvet rope, and D'Wayne Gray grabbed on that, because, since he was not a formally designated component commander, he stood behind the velvet ropes, kind of like the signing of the Japanese

surrender on board the *Missouri*. There were not any Marines standing around there at the time, but everybody else was there.

So it may have been de facto, but it was not legitimate. At FMFPac, the fact was that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and the Commanding General, FMFPac, were in the same building, so it made it very easy that they saw each other, they would eat in the same mess, maybe, or were there together, so there was great access, but while CincPac Fleet, the fleet commander, was down the hill.

All right, in the Atlantic, you had not a dissimilar . . . you had FMFLant in the CinCLant compound, but that was with CinCLANT Fleet and COMSUBLant and, let's see, AIRLant was not in there, but SURFLant was. So you had de facto component status, but not really.

Goldwater-Nichols said you are the component. The senior Marine officer in any unified command is the component commander. We had legitimacy from Goldwater-Nichols to go for componency then.

So when I briefed Secretary Garrett on that, he winced, because he saw this as a further fractionation, if that is the right term, of the Marine Corps, fragmentation or something of the Marine Corps moving further away from the Navy. And I said, "No, Mr. Secretary. It is two naval votes at the CinC's table instead of one naval vote with a junior partner nodding his head vigorously."

He still was worried about it. Adm Kelso was in on my second briefing for Secretary Garrett on that, and Adm Kelso said, "Well, I really don't have . . . I guess I don't have any problem with that."

And so, while Secretary Garrett never really said yes, I just went out and did it on the heels of that meeting at which Adm Kelso had said, "I don't have any problem," and Secretary Garrett did not say anything. And so I executed.

We then began to work our way in the Joint Staff toward getting the directives rewritten, and so on, having the Fleet Marine Force commanders . . . I sent out a message telling the CinCs, here is, we are going to have a MARFOR for you, and it is a good deal for you; you get your own Marine Corps out there for a change. And we assured the fleet commanders that Marine forces for employment with the fleet—i.e., MEUs, MEFs, whatever it was, anything that we were going to assign to the fleet commander—would very clearly be chopped by the Marine force commander, by the Marine component commander, to the Navy component commander for employment as a naval element under the Navy component command.

That is why, for example, among other things, you

would see in Desert Storm . . . this was before we had gotten there, but in Desert Storm, Gen Boomer had operational command of the Marine forces assigned to him on the ground, but the naval component commander, Adm Arthur, had Gen Jenkins and later the 5th MEB—I have lost the MEF commander—under his OPCON.

So we maintained the fleet relationship of Marines serving under the operational authority of Navy commanders when embarked for naval . . . but when serving on the ground and for normal day-to-day unified command planning and discussions and representation, competency was full scale and the Marine commander spoke with full authority, not through the Navy.

BGEN SIMMONS: I never saw an activation date for that. It just sort of happened. Suddenly I heard Marine Force Atlantic, Marine Force Pacific. Was there a definite activation date?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we did, and I cannot tell you at this point. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific redesignated U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, 31 July 1992. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic redesignated U.S. Marine Force, Atlantic, 14 July 1992.

BGEN SIMMONS: I would like to find out.

GEN MUNDY: But we redesignated that, and I cannot tell you how or when. But, of course, I worked that personally, phone call with Adm Miller. I worked it in a phone call with Adm Larson, who had gone west to the Pacific at that time and was a fleet commander, told them what we were intending to do, sent them a message, and then they came back and said okay. I guess it was . . . no, it was Adm Kelly, Adm Barney Kelly, that was out there. Barney Kelly did not like it because he saw it as a grab for Marine Corps power. Barney Kelly was an advocate of taking out Marine aviation. You know, he is a good guy, but he did not want to do anything that strengthened the Marines' hand.

But we did it, anyway, because we got to the CinC and also told Adm Larson we were going to do it, and then in Europe it was welcomed. They were delighted to do that. And, ultimately, of course, what that manifested itself in was moving the now-designated Marine Forces Europe nucleus up to Stuttgart at the right hand of the CinC instead of being stuck down in London. It is a nice place to be, but too far from the scene of action. And as a result of that, Marines have had dynamically more impact on the unified com-

mand decision making process.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Krulak addresses "Tailhook" in a section of his paper. We have already discussed "Tailhook" in considerable detail. You appointed Commanding General MCCDC, Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, as the central disposition authority for all Tailhook cases, and this became Gen Krulak. I think we can say that the Marine Corps portion of Tailhook went far more smoothly than the Navy's portion, can we not?

GEN MUNDY: Yes, we can certainly say that. The Navy appointed VADM Paul Reason, who was Commander Surface Force Atlantic down in Norfolk. But that is difficult, and it is difficult, among other things, for community purposes. You had appointed a surface admiral to be the central disposition authority for the transgression of naval aviators, and that just is not something that makes aviators happy.

I do not criticize the decision. I do not criticize Adm Reason, because I think a great deal of him, and he is a four-star admiral today, and I know him personally and think very highly. I understood why the Navy did it, but I think it was hard for the naval aviation to swallow. As a result, it was not easy for him adjudicating that.

The Navy aviators that were involved were, because they were far more involved than were the Marine aviators, the Navy aviators were much more outspoken and much less disciplined in the process because they were, in effect, in something of a minor revolt against authority because of the injustice of Tailhook, and the injustice was there.

The Marines . . . what shall I say, more disciplined? Less involved? The infractions of Marines, in the main, were . . . there were accusations. There certainly was the accusation by Lt Coughlin that the officer who had grabbed her from the rear and all that sort of thing had been a Marine officer, but that simply did not hold up in any evidence on anybody's part, including hers, when it came to pass.

So Gen Krulak, being the compassionate man and the detail man that he is, took a great amount of time—he probably took as long hearing a case as we have taken in this session here today—on each one of the cases, and then pored over it and then studied it and thought about it, and he would contact me and say, "I'm really having trouble." I mean, I was not in the chain, and we did not discuss the details, but he would really think about it hard. So I think that those who were disposed of by him, I think, felt that they were getting good handling.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Krulak gives you great credit for articulating and refining Gen Gray's vision of the combat development process and the organization of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico. A key player in this was then Col Martin Steele, who headed up a study to delineate the roles and functions of, to give the acronym, MCCDC. Could you summarize this effort and your many actions?

GEN MUNDY: Gen Gray, in order to get things moving, when he came in as the Commandant, in the direction that he wanted to go—probably not a bad thing to do, but it ripped us apart for a while—came in and declared that we would stand up the Command Development Command, plant the flagpole on the 10th of November, and away it would go. And I am not sure that I have those dates right.

BGEN SIMMONS: I think you do.

GEN MUNDY: The 10th of November. Anyway, you know, we would pick up the pieces later. Well, it took us a long time to pick them up. As a lieutenant general, I think I recorded earlier that I was one, with LtGens Bill Etnyne, Chuck Pittman, and others in a Headquarters working group that tried to come to grips with how to fashion MCCDC or what the relationship between the Headquarters and Quantico would be, because it was very difficult simply to tear a chunk out of the Headquarters and say, "Go to Quantico and function." Officers who had done very specific things in Washington and had interfaced with a very specific system in the Pentagon now found themselves at Quantico working generally in related areas but not in every case.

So how to bring that to bear vis-a-vis what the Headquarters had to do in Washington was very difficult, very difficult. We tried and we struggled, we messed around with it, and we came up with, here is the way we will do it, and that was tried for a while, and then as any learning process goes, you learned lessons and some of it worked and not all of it did.

So, all right, now then, along comes the Gulf War, and MCCDC really turned into a very focused organization in which what is the Systems Command, the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, MCRDAC at that time, MCRDAC turned in really to [be] almost focused explicitly on supporting the forces in the Gulf, and did it very well. But it was not what MCRDAC really primarily would have to do in the future.

MCCDC turned into a lessons learned, into a mobile training team, into concept development. It did a lot of the things that we would want it to do in wartime. So we ran into a war and it disrupted the smooth transition into the MCCDC that we have today.

When I was named the Commandant and was making up my slate then, I called Gen Walt Boomer, the most at least recently experienced MEF commander that we had, and said, "I am going to bring you back to Quantico to be CG MCCDC," and he said, "Why are you doing this? I just got back to California." And I said, "Walt, I need you back there because of the experience you bring," and because of what I knew of Walt Boomer, which was a tremendously logical, good business mind, good operational mind.

So I brought him back, anyway, and among the other things that I charged him with was to undertake this. You know, I want to get MCCDC functioning, I want to define the relationships between the two. Walt did, with Marty Steele's help, and others, a magnificent job of that. He came in with a good, sound plan. It cost us a lot of people, and that was a bitter pill to swallow, because at the same time that MCCDC was making a demand for, as I recall it, about another 35 or 40 officers, principally majors and lieutenant colonels, here we are drawing down the end strength of the Marine Corps, and we just did not have them to give. But we gave them. We came up with them for the most part.

The result of that was that we now had enough quality in terms of officers and enough staffing in the various echelons of Quantico to be able to do pretty much what Gen Gray had intended. We also reorganized what he had set up. As the first blush, we destructured a little bit. We changed MCCDC around, not to have a designated war-fighting center that was separate from the rest of the command, but we put in a deputy commanding general MCCDC who oversaw that function, and then we carved it up, and we put doctrine into, blended it in there, and requirements, and all that sort of thing.

So, again, that is thanks to LtGen Walt Boomer, and appropriate recognition should be given to him for . . . it was my tasking, yes, and I wanted to get that done.

Walt Boomer did it, and then Chuck Krulak went down and perfected it, because Marty Steele was still there. He had been an architect of this. He was selected to be a brigadier general, was promoted, and we made him the base commander at Quantico, but what he really did at Quantico was to continue to work on refining the combat development process.

And so Gens Krulak and Col, later BGen Steele, took the Boomer refinement of the Gray concept as

tasked by Mundy, if you will, and brought that to fruition. And it became a model. It really has. We have sent . . . when we were grooming in the last administration, we sent Dr. Perry and Dr. Deutch and everybody else we could find around the Pentagon, we would send them south to have, at that time, Gen Krulak and Steele and crowd to brief them on the Marine Corps concept-based requirements system, and they love it, and it is a superb system.

So the thanks, I guess, to me, or the acknowledgment to me in my tenancy was simply that I wanted to complete that initiative of Gen Gray and issued the tasking to do it, and others did it and made it work.

BGEN SIMMONS: Very good.

Gen Krulak also devotes a section to your actions with respect to gays in the military. We have discussed this at considerable length in earlier sessions. I will quote from his paper, and I am quoting: "There was absolutely no question which service chief took the point, bore the torch, and carried his shield for the barring of gays in the military. It was the 30th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Gen Mundy. Although Gen Mundy was at odds with his Commander-in-Chief, he was at odds in a very professional manner." Any comment?

GEN MUNDY: Well, that is very nicely written. That is a very nice attribution to a very tense and difficult time as characterized, because I really wanted to do the right thing and I wanted to be fair, but it was something that could not be done, the open admission of being homosexual in the Armed Forces.

I will not say more about that. That is a nice attribution to me. I think we have talked about that earlier in my oral history. I suppose maybe that is true.

I think, if anything, that experience, however, may have established a unique relationship between President Clinton and me. He went out of his way the day that he came over to announce the don't ask, don't tell, which I have never agreed with . . . that is a Senator Sam Nunn term, but I do not agree with that necessarily, the definition or the description, because the policy is far more than that.

But the day that the President announced that, he physically, visibly, and emotionally went out of his way to stand and talk with me on stage about that, and we forever, to include the day that I checked out of the White House with him on the 29th of June 1995, our rapport, that between Mrs. Clinton and the Mundys, between President Clinton and me, was always a . . . I do not know how to describe it. It was kind of a special one, and I think that the reason for that perhaps

lay in the fact that maybe some of these qualities that I talked about here, that I was open and that I was candid and that I never defamed the President or anyone around him, but I felt I needed to stand on not only my convictions but, more importantly, on the convictions of the Marine Corps.

It was very clear to me from Marines that they expected the Commandant to go down in flames on this one or to go right onto the point of his sword, and painful sometimes as it was to feel that pricking you in the chest, I guess I was prepared to do that more out of institutional conviction than perhaps even personal conviction. So that is a very nice compliment by Gen Krulak.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Krulak also gives you high marks for renewing the traditions of the Corps, marking as a beginning your dissatisfaction with that mess night that you discussed. In Gen Krulak's words, you embarked on a strong campaign to reintroduce the Corps to its traditions and to its ethos. Any comment on that?

GEN MUNDY: I think we have talked about that. You know, core values was an early one that came out of all the hazing incidents that we experienced, that we needed to reinforce the core values of our courage and commitment and then we need to reinforce, exactly as you have said it. So I do not have anything to amplify.

BGEN SIMMONS: Another problem area that Gen Krulak discusses is your handling of minority accessions, particularly your use of a Quality Management Board, QMB, to address this problem. What came out of this?

GEN MUNDY: Well, again for history, since probably by the time anybody gets around to reading this, there will not be such things as QMBs around, that is a top-quality leadership term that was in vogue, but a Quality Management Board was simply an element of study and decisionmaking.

I was, from the first year of my tenure, I was concerned about our minority accessions, about our minority promotions. But then, in all fairness, so that I do not come out as a bright light on this, I had been concerned about that since my days on OSO duty, I mean, when I was given missions to go get so many minorities in and we had difficulty doing that.

So this issue had been around for a long, long time. We recognized, Gen Chapman did, that we had a race problem in the Marine Corps, and we worked our way

through that. But it never . . . I mean, we really did not work our way through it. So I remain concerned about fairness and equality of qualified people. I was adamant that we were not going to simply advance color for the sake of numbers, because our track record was that that did not work. They fell out at the first selection board.

We convened the QMB, and unfortunately, this whole evolution of really looking at this problem and trying to figure out what it was that the Army was doing—we did not know that the Army was doing right—but what were the factors that caused us to be like we were in terms of our deficiencies in retention and acquiring and retaining and promoting minorities.

It took a couple of years to work through that. It took a long time. And, unfortunately, as we discussed in earlier sessions, right in the middle of that comes along the *60 Minutes* episode, which was probably the low point in handling and execution in my tenure. But the unfortunate thing about that—it has nothing to do with me personally—but the unfortunate thing about that is that you had an administration of the Marine Corps at that time—and that was more than just me—but an echelon, an effort in the Marine Corps really to correct an issue that we saw as an issue.

It may be that there will be generations of minorities that will never know that the Marine Corps was solidly, sincerely, and with great conviction about the process of coming to grips with our minority problems at the time that *60 Minutes* came.

So what I imagine is that history will probably record, if it is of significance to record, that *60 Minutes* bit the Commandant and got him moving and that immediately we began to correct the problem. It will be one of the unfortunate misperceptions of history, because we had things going and were moving forward and, I would like to believe, would have moved forward had *60 Minutes* never occurred. But that is for someone else to do.

BGEN SIMMONS: Gen Wilkerson makes the point that the revised naval strategy, “From the Sea,” and its refinement, “Forward from the Sea,” was a repudiation of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s long-held theory of sea power and that this was a bitter pill for the Navy, particularly in the person of Adm Kelso, to swallow. We have already discussed this, at least lightly. Do you wish to add anything?

GEN MUNDY: Only to again say that is . . . Gen Wilkerson has a tremendous philosophical and intellectual grasp; that it was a rejection of Mahanian the-

ory, I guess you could argue that, but that the fact is that the times have changed and that we did not . . . the battle fleets banging away with each other at sea.

But I think that he mischaracterizes Adm Kelso’s reaction. I do not know where he draws that from. It may be that because he was involved with the force planning effort as a member of the force planning effort team, and because the Navy hierarchy in general, the admiral that was directing it, many of the admirals that were watching it, because they had great apprehension that it was going to denude the Navy of some of the historic blue-water orientation, it may be that he inferred that that was Adm Kelso.

I never saw Adm Kelso in that role. I felt that he was supportive, he was willing. Adm Kelso was not an activist, either in starting this or in getting it done. He was a willing participant who was brought along into it. And as I said, the only hiatus was when we got to that point after the concept had been laid down and the study group said “All right” . . . now, this was a Navy captain briefing . . . “now our next step that we feel necessarily is to lay down the force structure now that will enable us to accomplish this concept.”

That is when Adm Kelso balked, and I can recall that he said, “I don’t want to . . . you know, if we lay down a force structure, they will use it on the Hill to beat us to death with.” And so his mind went back to where, generally speaking, I think, to the things that drove Adm Kelso and that drive most of the admirals in Washington, and that is the programmatic. What will this do to the carrier-building program on the Hill? That is a hard question, and it would be a difficult one for a naval leader to in fact step forward because the force structure might have concluded that we did not need as many of one thing or another, and then the Navy would have been caught with an, “Oh, my goodness, we have a structure study that says we only need eight carriers.” I think it would have come out to be 14 or 16 carriers, but it could have come out to be something less than what the Navy hierarchy was driving toward at the time, and that would have been threatening, to have a study on the street, even though not published by the Navy, but even have it in the Pentagon, that structured the Navy in a fashion differently from the way it was programmed to be fashioned.

And so I can understand the Kelso reluctance to give the green light on that. And yet it was the mind, it was the programmatic mind over the conceptual movement toward the future mind, I think.

BGEN SIMMONS: Is there anything else in the Krulak or Wilkerson papers that you would like to

develop further?

GEN MUNDY: No, there is not. I think they both, as I have scanned their writings, they both have been very generous, and I think they have given you good food for thought to build our discussions on.

I would only say the two of them . . . I need not say of Gen Krulak; obviously, he is my successor . . . but both men were extraordinarily strong supporters of me, and when I say supporter, I do not mean in a political sense. I mean that they probably were two of my strongest right arms during my tenure. I relied on them a great deal.

So I asked them before, in fact I asked them several months before I retired, back in the fall of 1994, I asked them, at their own leisure, to put down their thoughts, not to be seen by me or delivered to me but to put down their thoughts so that we could objectively record what went on during my tenure, and I think they have done that very well.

BGEN SIMMONS: And Gen Krulak delivered to me the paper when we were in flight to Iwo Jima when he was. . . .

GEN MUNDY: Yes. He tried to get me to read it on the flight, and I said, "I don't want to read about me here yet," so I read it only now in preparation for this session.

BGEN SIMMONS: Well, if you have nothing further to add, sir, I think this is a very fitting place for us to conclude your oral history.

GEN MUNDY: Well, the only thing that I would add is probably to copy Big Foot Brown and to say, "Dear God, how I wish I could go back and do it all over again."

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