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The institutional reputation of the U.S. Marine Corps has been one of adaptation since its creation in 1775. The same can certainly be said of university presses and the academic journals they produce—a constant evolution of scholarly publishing practices and content to meet the needs of readers and authors. In 1970, the Marine Corps' Historical Division began producing the first predecessor to *Marine Corps History—Harumfrodite*, a term derived from a Rudyard Kipling poem referring to “a soldier and a sailor too.” *Harumfrodite*’s objective was to provide the historical community with a periodic survey of the Service museum’s research collections as well as other features to stimulate scholarship in military affairs in general and the Marine Corps in particular.¹

Only four issues later, in 1972, *Harumfrodite* was replaced by *Fortitudine*.² The term *fortitudine* first appeared on an 1812-era hat plate and was adopted as the title for the newsletter, which stood as a hallmark of the Historical Division’s communication with the broader Marine Corps for the next four decades. The publication offered Marines, historians, and the general public quick bites of events taking place, particularly within the historical program, but also about the development of what would later become the National Museum of the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps History Division, and the Marine Corps archives.

The creation of Marine Corps University in 1989 by then-Commandant Alfred M. Gray had a lasting, though mostly invisible, impact on *Fortitudine*, as this newest element of American professional military education became the home of the History Division in 2002 and of the Marine Corps University Press in 2008.³ Redesigned and reorganized to align with the processes of an academic publisher, the magazine of the division morphed once again from a seasonal periodical to a scholarly journal with the creation of *Marine Corps History* in summer 2015. This shift represented significant change for authors and readers; an editorial board of subject matter experts was selected to serve as a steering committee to guide the mission of the publication, and a double-blind peer review process was instituted to further support the high-quality research presented in each issue.⁴ The fully matured publication is now aggregated by CrossRef using its digital object identifier (DOI) system and is further promoted by the open access platform ProjectMUSE.

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² *Fortitudine* 2, no. 1 (Summer 1972).
⁴ The publication’s acquisitions requirements can be found at www.usmcu.edu/HDpublishing.
Marine Corps History offers readers valuable insights on a variety of topics within the long history of the Corps. Authors will find a unique venue for their research that is supported by the academic rigor they expect in a scholarly journal, and the Marine Corps will find in these pages a method to preserve and present its history to the world.

In this issue of Marine Corps History, the editors present the history of the Corps dating back to World War I and then forward to the Service's participation in the Vietnam War. The first article by Dr. Richard S. Faulkner, “Doughboy Devil Dogs: U.S. Army Officers in the 4th Brigade in the Great War,” explores Marine activities with the 4th Brigade and the unit’s relationship with the U.S. Army officers who often led the fight. The piece illuminates these officers’ contributions, which have become obscured with the passing of time, and offers some suggestions for why these “doughboy devil dogs” largely disappeared from the narrative of the brigade’s service in World War I.

From the battlefields of the European theater, our next article transports the reader to the island of São Miguel. Dr. Sérgio Rezendes’s article, “The American Naval Base in Ponta Delgada, 1917-19,” offers the reader an often-overlooked aspect of the American presence in the Azores during World War I and the lasting impact of the temporary naval base installed at Ponta Delgada. The article details how the base’s two Marine Corps units, most notably the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, and the naval forces stationed there defended the port. They also supported Allied vessels in their passage to Europe, serving as a U.S./Europe border that was critical to protecting British and American military and commercial shipping and denying Germany a base of operations in the region.

Jessica Colon’s article, “Marine Corps Boot Camp during World War II: The Gateway to the Corps’ Success at Iwo Jima,” considers just how well service-members were prepared for the intense battles in the Pacific and the critical role that boot camp played in training Marines for the realities of war. The Marine Corps’ emphasis on the fundamentals during boot camp proved the necessary ingredient for victory, argues Colon. Her article examines the efficacy of boot camp, replacement training, and unit training, and asserts that boot camp provided an elemental gateway to Marines’ success on Iwo Jima.

Dr. Ismaël Fournier’s article, “Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam: The U.S. and South Vietnamese Success against the Viet Cong Insurgency,” evaluates how the reliance on conventional warfare led to more effective counterinsurgency strategies during the conflict. Fournier’s article opposes conformist studies and, through the analysis of U.S. and Communist documents, suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists’ tactical approach to hybrid warfare, skillfully synchronizing regular warfare with counterinsurgency and ultimately defeating the Viet Cong insurgency by 1972.

Finally, Dr. Mike Morris’s article, “Fighting the Phantom: 1st Viet Cong Regiment in I Corps,” continues the presentation of the Corps’ history in the conflict in Vietnam. This article focuses specifically on the regenerative capabilities of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment and how American forces used both conventional and irregular techniques to try to address the threat. Morris examines how the regiment’s impressive operational resilience illustrates, in microcosm, how and why the allied counterrevolutionary strategy failed to win in Vietnam.

The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on American military history. We invite readers to contribute to the discussion and submit an article for consideration. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these topics and to your future participation as an author, reviewer, or reader. Join the conversation and find us online on our LinkedIn page (https://tinyurl.com/y3800xnp5), at MC UPress on Facebook, MC_UPress on Twitter, and MCUPress on Instagram, or contact us via email at MCU_Press@usmcu.edu.
Doughboy Devil Dogs
U.S. ARMY OFFICERS IN THE 4TH BRIGADE IN THE GREAT WAR

by Richard S. Faulkner, PhD

Abstract: World War I was the first conflict where the U.S. Marines truly entered the American consciousness, particularly through the 4th Brigade’s accomplishments at Belleau Wood in June 1918. What is generally missing from the Marines’ story is the large number of U.S. Army officers who led Marine platoons in the brigade and often paid a heavy price for their service. This article examines how Army officers came to be assigned to the 4th Brigade and the backgrounds and performance of these “doughboy devil dogs” in the unit. It also offers some suggestions for why they largely disappeared from the narrative of the brigade’s service in World War I.

Keywords: American Expeditionary Forces, AEF, Marines in World War I, Army–USMC relations in World War I, 2d Division, 4th Brigade, 5th Regiment, 6th Regiment, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, officer selection and training

On 1 June 1918, the 2d Division was thrown into battle west of Château-Thierry, France, to shore up the waver ing Allied lines in the wake of the Germans’ Operation Blücher. On 27 May 1918, the German attack between Soissons and Reims had shattered the French defenses and pushed the Allies back more than 22 kilometers (km) as it surged toward the Marne River. Between 1 and 5 June, the 2d Division’s soldiers and Marines fought off repeated German attacks before the commander of the French XXI Corps, General Jean-Marie Degoutte, ordered the Americans to counterattack to push the Germans back. The division’s commander, Major General Omar Bundy, ordered the 4th Brigade to seize the German positions running from Hill 142 through Belleau Wood to Bouresches. Despite months of training and having served in a quiet sector of the French lines, the division’s troops were not truly ready for their unsparing introduction to modern war. The Marines’ frontal attacks against dug-in German infantry and machine guns were generally ill-supported by artillery and the green Americans paid a heavy price for their audacity.

Losses were heaviest among the 4th Brigade’s officers. On 6 June alone the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, lost roughly 90 percent of its commissioned ranks as it fought across open ground to take Hill 142. Among the dead was Second Lieutenant William Chandler Peterson. The 23-year-old graduate of the University of Illinois was just beginning his career as a Chicago architect when the United States entered the Great War. He was killed by machine-gun fire while leading his platoon in the 49th Company forward in the early hours of the attack.¹

Although 6 June 1918 would hold the dubious distinction of being one of the bloodiest days in the

Marine Corps’ history, the 4th Brigade’s ordeal was far from over. For 18 more days, the Marines battled to capture Belleau Wood from its tenacious German defenders. And for 18 more days, the enemy took a disproportionate toll of the brigade’s officers. Second Lieutenant James Timothy, who had attended Vanderbilt University and the District of Columbia’s Catholic College, was killed as he led a platoon in the 6th Regiment’s 80th Company on 14 June. Some of the deaths from the battle were longer in coming. Second Lieutenant Laurence H. Gray was severely wounded by shellfire on 13 June while commanding a platoon in the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Gray, a 1915 graduate of the University of Missouri Law School, never fully recovered from his wounds. He died on 26 January 1920, with his demise “being hastened by an impaired vitality sustained in service.”

Although it is well and good to speak of Tun Tavern, the Halls of Montezuma, and the Shores of Tripoli, it was not until the Battle of Belleau Wood that the Marine Corps truly entered the American consciousness. Marines are justly proud of their accomplishments in the battle and its lasting legacy on the Corps, but this action, and the sacrifices that it entailed, are not wholly a Marine Corps story. Peterson, Timothy, Gray, and approximately 15–20 percent of the platoon leaders in the 4th Brigade at Belleau Wood, were U.S. Army officers. This article will examine how Army officers came to be assigned to the 4th Brigade and the backgrounds and performance of these “doughboy devil dogs” in the unit. It will also offer some suggestions for why they largely disappeared from the narrative of the brigade’s service in World War I. Although the article will focus only on the Army line officers in the brigade, it must be noted that more than 100 Army doctors, veterinarians, chaplains, enlisted signalmen, and other technical specialists also served in the unit during the war.

As might be expected with any project of this magnitude, Thacker also made mistakes. He noted that a Lieutenant John A. Burgess served with the 5th Regiment’s 67th Company, but the U.S. Army Transport Service passenger lists for 1917 and 1918 do not show any officer by that name sailing to or from France. However, the passenger lists do show a Sergeant John D. Burgess serving in Company D, 67th Company, 5th Regiment, during the war. At times, Thacker simply got his details wrong. For example, he states that Captain Mortimer A. O’Hara served as the 6th Machine Gun Battalion’s dentist from 1 April to 8 August 1918, yet passenger lists show that he did not sail for France until 26 July 1918, and 2d Division Special Orders 228 did not assign him to the unit un-

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2 “Nashville Gives Another Son in Freedom’s Cause,” Nashville Tennessean, 28 June 1918, 1; and History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps, 85.

til 2 September 1918. O'Hara did appear on the battalion's muster rolls for April, July, and August 1919, so Thacker may have simply made a transcription error in the years. Despite these minor issues, Thacker's list provides a good starting point for examining the extent that Army doughboys contributed to the 4th Brigade.4

4 2d Division, Special Orders 228, 2 September 1918, file “Army Personnel Attached to the Marines,” box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA. Much of the personal information used to fill in the biographical information for the soldiers involved in this study and to verify their service in the 4th Brigade comes from the U.S. Army Transportation Service passenger lists for 1910–39, draft registration cards from 1917 and 1918, Marine Corps muster rolls from 1917–18, and the federal census information from 1900, 1910, and 1920. All of these records have been digitized under a partnership between NARA and Ancestry.com and accessed via Ancestry.com. The U.S. Army Transport Service Passenger Lists report that O’Hara sailed for France on 26 July 1918 on board the SS Finland (1902) and sailed for home on 24 July 1919 on the USS Saint Paul (1895). Entry for Capt Mortimer A. O’Hara, U.S. Army Transport Service Passenger Lists, Ancestry.com.

Before examining the reasons that Army soldiers served in the 4th Brigade, it is first important to establish the extent to which they contributed to the unit. Although Thacker’s list names 198 Army officers, when one filters out those who served with the Marines for short periods of training or temporary duty, the roll shortens considerably. For example, Thacker listed 27 officers from the 28th Division’s 110th Infantry and the 4th Division’s 58th and 59th Infantry who were attached to the 4th Brigade for training. Most of these officers were only assigned to the Marine regiments for less than a week of service in early July 1918. Sometimes, Army officers assigned to the 4th Brigade were simply transferred to other units so quickly that they made little to no impact on the unit at all. Second Lieutenants Fern M. Gumm, Edward R. Harris, and L. R. Hettick were with the Marines for less than a month when they were reassigned to the Services of Supply (SOS) Director of Transportation at Tours in
March 1918. The insatiable manpower demands of the expanding SOS, rather than poor performance, seems to have been the reason for these infantry officers’ hasty departure.5

After removing those officers whose time with the Marines was fleeting or whose information in Thacker’s list was too incomplete and could not be verified through passenger lists and other sources, at least 90 Army line officers (not including chaplains or medical personnel) who served at least three months in the 4th Brigade or whose service was less than three months due to death or wounds while fighting with the Marines may be identified. All of these officers except one, Signal Corps Second Lieutenant George L. Townsend, were infantry officers. Of the 90 officers, 35 (38.8 percent) served in the brigade for three months; 12 (13.3 percent) served for four months; 17 (18.8 percent) for five months; 4 (4.4 percent) for six months; 10 (11.1 percent) for seven months; and 12 (13.3 percent) served for eight or more months. The average length of service for Army officers in the brigade was five months.

At first glance, it appears that Army officers spent a relatively short amount of time with the 4th Brigade, but it should be kept in mind that the brigade’s wartime life, from its formation on 23 October 1917 to 11 November 1918, was just over 12 months. Although 35 of the officers served fewer than three months with the Marines, 7 of these men were killed in action during this period and 14 others left the unit due to wounds, gas poisoning, or shell shock. Thus, 60 percent of those with short periods of service had their time in the unit curtailed due to combat injuries. On the other end of the scale, three officers served for more than a year with the Marines. Captain Elliott D. Cooke was with the 5th Regiment for more than 14 months while Second Lieutenant Frederick G. Wagoner served in the 6th Regiment for 15 months. The Army officer with the longest service in the 4th Brigade was First Lieutenant Frederick J. Scheld, who was in the supply company and several of the line companies of the 6th Regiment from 5 February 1918 to 1 July 1919.

Why Assign Army Officers to the 4th Brigade?
But why were Army officers serving in what was ostensibly a Marine Corps brigade? The answer to this question is rooted in the challenges that the Marines faced in their wartime mobilization. When the United States entered World War I in April 1918, the Corps was a miniscule force of 462 commissioned officers, 49 warrant officers, and 13,725 enlisted. By the Armistice in 1918, the Corps had expanded to 2,174 commissioned officers, 288 warrant officers, and 70,489 enlisted.6 Although the Army experienced an even greater degree of expansion during the war, it was better positioned institutionally in the spring and summer of 1917 to cope with the challenges of a mass mobilization of officers than was the Marine Corps.

As early as 1913, Army chief of staff Leonard Wood had raised the need to start planning for a wartime expansion of the officer corps. He warned, “If we were called on to mobilize to meet a first-class power, we should require immediately several thousand officers; where are we to get them?”7 The Army’s experience operating the prewar “Plattsburg” citizen’s military camps of instruction in 1915 and 1916 gave the Service some limited insights into selecting and training a large number of officer candidates.8 The

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5 Listings for Rubin, Washburn, Moakley, Gumm, Harris, and Herrick, “Master List.” For an example of an officer assigned only for training, see the listing on the “Master List” for Lt R. A. Bringham of the 56th Infantry, 4th Division, who was attached to the 5th Regiment for 3–7 July 1918, “Master List.” While it was the responsibility of the U.S. Navy to provide Marine units their chaplains and medical personnel, the rapid wartime expansion of the Navy and the need to replace physicians and chaplains due to wounds, leave, or schooling, often led the 2d Division to temporarily make up these shortfalls with Army officers. For example, 1st Lt Herman Rubin served as the regiment surgeon for the 5th Regiment for 27 June–8 August 1918 and James I. Moakley served briefly as the chaplain of the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment.

6 Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 11–13, 18. This work was updated and reprinted in 2014 by Marine Corps History Division as part of the division’s World War I commemorative series.


8 In 1915 and 1916, the Army trained approximately 20,000 civilian volunteers at Plattsburg Barracks, NY, and a handful of other locations. The civilians who attended the camps were under no obligation to join the Army and received only limited military training. The volunteers viewed their attendance as a means of raising the public’s awareness of the nation’s lack of military preparedness.
camps also highlighted the inadequacy of the Plattsburg training program in New York and led the Army to develop and test a three-month training course for officer aspirants at Fort Leavenworth in late fall 1916. With a tried-and-tested course in hand, the Army was able to quickly establish 16 officer training camps (OTCs) across the nation by 8 May 1917. Although the training at these camps was woefully insufficient to prepare their graduates for the realities of modern war, they were generally successful in filling combat units with junior officers with the basic skills to begin the training of the ever-expanding ranks of volunteers and draftees. What the OTCs lacked in realism, they made up for in numbers. On 11 August 1917, the first OTCs commissioned 21,000 officers, and a second round of OTCs produced another 17,237 officers in November 1917. In other words, each of these two camps commissioned more officers than the total strength of the Marine Corps on 6 April 1917. By the end of the war, the total number of officers that the Army commissioned for the conflict was more than double the total number of Marines in the ranks at the time of the Armistice.

While the Army experimented with ways to expand its officer corps from 1913 to 1916, the Marine Corps devoted little thought to this issue. This failure to plan for a large-scale mobilization was influenced by the Corps’ prewar missions, its operational commitments in the years leading up to the war, and its traditional approach to officer procurement. From the 1890s to the brink of the Great War, the Corps fought hard to establish a clear-cut role in the nation’s security as it countered powerful voices within the Navy that questioned its utility in the emerging age of long-range fleet engagements. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Corps had embraced the role of being a landing force to fight small-scale contingency operations and as an advanced base force to seize and/or defend the overseas ports and facilities vital to the U.S. Navy’s operations. The decade prior to the American entry into the war was also an exceptionally busy one for the Corps. It was actively engaged in stability, security, and occupation duties in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guam, Samoa, the Philippines, and Beijing; had landed forces to seize Vera Cruz in 1914; participated in advanced base exercises; and provided detachments on more than 50 Navy ships. As historian Allan R. Millett observed, “Like the nation it served, the Marine Corps was too absorbed with its own problems to believe that it would someday fight in France.”

Given the size, missions, and operational commitments of the Marine Corps in the years leading up to the United States entering the war, it is little wonder why it devoted almost no thought or planning to the selection and training of a large number of officer candidates. In fact, an 11 July 1916 memorandum from Commandant of the Marine Corps Major General George Barnett to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels shows that the Commandant was more concerned with how the Corps would fill the increase in officer strength from 344 to 597 under the pending congressional authorization bill than with any possible wartime expansion. Barnett noted that it would take the Corps 13 months to bring in the 203 additional officers that the bill allowed, but that the time could be cut to three months “under war conditions.” Nowhere did Barnett envision a major increase in the Corps’ strength or the challenges of leader procurement that such a mobilization would entail. Despite this reality, when it became clear that the United States would send a large expeditionary force to France, the

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12 Commandant, USMC, to secretary of the Navy, memo, “Mobilization Plan-Marines,” 11 July 1916, box 389, RG 127, entry 18, NARA. A later memo to the Commandant summarized the Marines’ mobilization efforts from 1913 to 1918 and highlighted the lack of any major concern for a mass mobilization prior to the war. HQ USMC Planning Section to Commandant, memo, “Training and Preparation for War,” 15 March 1920, box 389, RG 127, entry 18, NARA.
Marines fought hard to be part of the contingent. However, the expansion that such a commitment entailed caught the Corps flat-footed without a system and infrastructure for officer candidate training.

In early May 1917, while the Army was receiving thousands of candidates into its newly established OTCs, the Corps was scrambling to purchase land at Quantico, Virginia, to serve as the site of its officer school, replacement battalion mobilization cantonment, and Overseas Training Depot. Barnett’s decision to build a Marine-only training base was the result of hard experience. The Corps’ previous junior officer schools had been constantly relocated at the whims and needs of the Navy. Unfortunately, the time it took to build the Quantico base from the ground up delayed the start of its officer school until July 1917. Those officers who had flocked to join the ranks before that date were temporarily assigned to the Marine rifle range complex at Winthrop, Maryland; Mare Island and San Diego, California; or Parris Island, South Carolina, to receive a very basic level of indoctrination and training. The Corps later sent most of the Marines attending these camps to Quantico once the facilities there were up and running. However, to meet the pressing need to bring the 5th Regiment up to strength so it could deploy to France in June 1917, the Corps chose to send some newly commissioned officers to the regiment with only the barest of training. Most of these officers seem to have been graduates of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the Citadel, or other distinguished military colleges and thus were presumed to have undergone a degree of military instruction. One such officer, Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., chose to enter the Marine Corps after failing to receive one of VMI’s allocations for Army commissions. He admitted that his training prior to sailing for France consisted only of two weeks of rifle instruction at Parris Island. When he arrived in France, he had only been in uniform for a month and a half.

Although the rapid commissioning of men like Shepherd covered the Corps’ most pressing need for officers, the Corps still faced a long-term systemic challenge in producing junior leaders. Delays in getting the Quantico schools operational and the limited numbers of candidates that the new post could accommodate slowed the commissioning of new Marine officers. As the Marine regiments assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) had to mirror the organization of Army companies and battalions, the ballooning size of those echelons required even more junior officers, and thus exacerbated the Corps’ personnel problems. Despite these issues, the Quantico OTC still commissioned 300 officers on 15 July 1917 and another 91 on 15 August 1917. As their officer training was only two months in duration (rather than the three months required in the Army), many of these officers remained at Quantico until the spring of 1918 undergoing further instruction in the Overseas Depot or in the replacement battalions forming at that station. High officer casualties that summer led the Corps to hold a second OTC at Quantico in August 1918, but its 432 graduates were not commissioned until after the Armistice.

The other factor that delayed the commissioning of Marine officers in 1917 was Commandant Barnett’s decision to change how the Corps would select officers for the remainder of the war. On 4 June 1917, he directed that “owing to the unusually large number of men of excellent education and fine attainment who have enlisted in the Marine Corps since the outbreak of the war all vacancies occurring during the war will be filled by appointment of meritorious noncommissioned officers who distinguished themselves in active service.” As J. Michael Miller, the former lead histo-

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rian of the Marine Corps History Division, noted, Barnett’s “fateful order altered the influx of Marine officer candidates from across the United States and slowed the training of officers for the Marine Brigade in France. . . . The ensuing shortfall [of officers] eventually resulted in army officers commanding Marine platoons in 1918.”

When the 5th Regiment landed in France in late June 1917, the AEF was in the midst of a massive restructuring of its organizations. While a full-strength prewar Army infantry regiment contained 51 officers and 1,500 soldiers, by early 1918, the regiment had grown to 112 officers and 3,720 soldiers. As the Marines had to conform to the Army’s regimental organization, the delays in commissioning new Marine officers left the 5th Regiment short of leaders to fill these new requirements. It is unclear from the existing record if the 5th Regiment requested Army officers to fill its ranks, or if the staff of the 2d Division saw the unit’s shortfall and proactively addressed the Corps’ personnel issue, but on 11 November 1917 the 2d Division assigned 30 Army Reserve officers to the regiment.

The 6th Regiment faced similar shortages of officers as it slowly formed over the fall of 1917 and winter of 1918. On 15 January 1918, the commander of the 4th Brigade, Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, directed the 5th Regiment to “transfer half of the Army Reserve Officers now on duty in your Regiment to the 6th Regiment.” Although the 5th Regiment only sent nine Army lieutenants to its sister regiment, these officers would not be the lone doughboys in the 6th Regiment for long. The 2d Division allocated the 6th Regiment 16 additional Army Reserve lieutenants on 12 March 1918 and 20 more on the 27th. The last unit formed in the 4th Brigade, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, also received its fair share of Army officers. On 27 March 1918, the 2d Division assigned four Army Reserve lieutenants to the unit, and five more doughboy officers followed shortly thereafter.

It seems that the Army officers generally fit in well with the Marines. Wallace Leonard Jr., a graduate of the Amherst College Class of 1916 and the 2d Plattsburg Barracks OTC, was particularly taken with his new comrades. In a letter to his parents, he proclaimed

> These are the finest soldiers in the world. The more that I see of my Marines the fonder I grow of them. They are a cocky lot, but every man is a soldier. They are as proud as Lucifer, but their equipment always shines.

Leonard’s high opinion of the sea soldiers was also shared by an Army machine-gun officer identified only as “Wayne.” He wrote home shortly after the Battle of Belleau Wood

> These Marines are epic fighters. . . . Back in the towns they would growl like bears at busted bunks or the quality of the beer, but take them upon the line, work them day or night under shell fire, on bum food for a month, and you never heard a word. They will get tired and strained and swear like the Devil, but growl or shirk when called to duty, they don’t, these Marines.

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17 5th Marines, Regimental Order 10, 14 November 1917, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

18 Commander, 4th Brigade, “Memorandum for Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment,” 15 January 1918; 6th Marines, Special Orders 70, 12 March 1918; and 2d Division, Special Orders 80, 27 March 1918, all box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

19 “Lieut Leonard Is Cited for Bravery,” Boston (MA) Globe, newspaper clipping, no date, Wallace Minot Leonard Jr. file, Amherst College Alumni Collection, Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, MA.

20 Letter from “Wayne” to “Dear Folks,” 1 July 1918, box 54, file 3d Bn Replacements and Casualties, 18 June 1918, RG 120, entry NM–91 1241, NARA, College Park, MD, hereafter “Wayne” letter to “Dear Folks.” The writer noted that one of his Culver Military Academy classmates died in the fighting. This means that the writer was 2dLt Wayne Perkins, who graduated from Culver in 1916, and served with the 81st Company, 6th Machine Gun Battalion. “Life Memberships,” Minute Man: The Sons of the Revolution in the State of Illinois 14, no. 6, October 1924, 3.
At least two of the Army Reserve officers were so taken with the Marines that they requested transfers to the Corps. On 4 March 1918, Second Lieutenant Calvin L. Capps asked to be commissioned in the Corps. Capps, who was one of the officers transferred from the 5th Regiment to the 6th Regiment on 17 January 1918, made a favorable impression on the three company commanders under whom he served. All endorsed his transfer, with First Lieutenant W. A. Powers noting that Capps “has the ability to handle men, a very good understanding of the work and is able to impart what he knows to those under him. In my opinion he would make an excellent Officer for the Marine Corps.” Although the 6th Regiment’s commander, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, recommended approving the transfer, on 16 April 1918, the AEF adjutant general informed the I Corps commander that the headquarters had denied the move, stating, “There is no apparent reason why this transfer is necessary in the best interest of the service.” Despite this setback, Capps continued to soldier on well with the 6th Regiment until he died of wounds sustained at Belleau Wood on 12 June 1918.21

The other Army Reserve officer seeking to transfer Services was Second Lieutenant Herbert Jones, who had been assigned to the 6th Machine Gun Battalion on 28 March 1918. In his 30 June 1918 transfer request, Jones stated, “Having seen service with the Marines in their recent operations in the trenches near Verdun, and in their present operations in the Château-Thierry sector, I would like to remain with them.” His company commander, Captain George H. Osterhout Jr. recommended that the Commandant approve Jones’s request, noting that during the Belleau Wood fighting the lieutenant had “acquitted himself with great gallantry, and I believe he would make a good Officer for the Corps.” Before any action could be taken in the matter, Jones was killed in action near Soissons on 19 July 1918.22

Army Reserve Officer Backgrounds and Training

The Army officers assigned to the 4th Brigade arrived in France in three waves. Twenty-six (28 percent) landed in September 1917, 59 (66 percent) arrived in January 1918, and 5 (6 percent) landed in February 1918. The vast majority of these officers arrived as “casuals”—soldiers not assigned to a specific unit. As they were assigned to France relatively early in the formation of the AEF, it is not surprising to discover that all of the officers whose training camps could be identified graduated from the first two iterations of the Army’s OTCs. Thirty-three (47 percent) were commissioned from the first OTC in August 1917, and 37 (53 percent) graduated from the second OTCs in November 1917. Although the officers who were later assigned to the 4th Brigade attended nine different training camps, 75 percent of them had been commissioned from only two camps: Fort Sheridan, Illinois (51 percent of total), and Plattsburg Barracks, New York (24 percent of total).23

The early arrival and commissioning training of the officers assigned to the 4th Brigade is important for two main reasons. The men commissioned out of the first two OTCs tended to be taught by a greater percentage of regular Army instructors than the OTCs held in 1918, and the candidates themselves

21 2dLt Calvin L. Capps to Commander, 6th Marines, memo, “Transfer,” 4 March 1918; lstLt W. A. Powers to Commander, 6th Marines, memo, “Statement,” 6 April 1918; and AEF GHQ Adjutant General to Commander I Corps, memo of 6th endorsement, 16 April 1918, all box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA. Capps, from Wake, NC, departed for France on 13 September 1917 and was first assigned to the 5th Regiment on 11 November 1917 and later transferred to the 6th Regiment on 17 January 1918. While serving with the 5th Regiment, Capps and Lemuel Shepherd became close friends. In the entry for 13 November 1917 of his diary, Shepherd noted that he “had grown fond of the Army Reserve officers attached to the Company.” On 7 December 1917, he recorded, “LT Capps and I have become great friends and I like him very much.” Copy of Diary Kept by Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Lieutenant U.S.M.C. during World War I,” Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. Papers, VMI Archives.

22 2dLt Herbert K. Jones to Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, memo, “Request for Transfer into Marine Corps,” 30 June 1918, with endorsement from G. H. Osterhout on same date, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA. The information on the arrival dates of the officers comes from the U.S. Army Transport Service Passenger Lists for 1917 and 1918, digital records of NARA, Ancestry.com. Of the officers with three months or more of service in the 4th Brigade, or who were killed or wounded prior to three months service, it was possible to find the OTC attendance of 70 of the 90 soldiers. It is not surprising that Fort Sheridan and Plattsburg Barracks provided most of the 4th Brigade’s Army officers. Unlike most of the other OTCs, neither of these posts was the site of a division mobilization. This meant that their graduates served as officer “fillers” to serve the needs of the Army.
underwent a more rigorous selection process and had higher levels of education than in subsequent camps.\textsuperscript{24} Ralph B. Perry, the secretary of the War Department Committee on Education and Special Training, observed that the graduates of the first OTCs were of the highest quality in physique, intelligence and spirit. They were put on their mettle through being made to feel up to the very last moment that their commissions were doubtful. Most important of all, they were under close observation and could be selected for [their] personal qualities.\textsuperscript{25}

He further noted that their “education, experience and natural aptitude” made them “especially qualified for leadership.”\textsuperscript{26}

Perry’s assertions about the qualities of these early graduates are borne out in the available statistics on the educational background and prewar occupations of the 90 Army line officers in the 4th Brigade. Of the 56 cases where it was possible to discover the educational background of the officers, 30 were college graduates, 24 had some college or were college students at the time they entered the OTC, and two were educated at public schools. Many of the college students or graduates had attended some of the nation’s most prestigious institutions, such as Harvard, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Tufts, and Columbia Universities, and Dartmouth and Amherst Colleges. Although it was possible to uncover the educational backgrounds of only 62 percent of the officers, the occupations that they held prior to the war (table 1) indicate that the vast majority of them were from solid middle- or upper middle-class backgrounds. Given these occupations, it is safe to assume that in many of the cases where the officers’ education level was unknown, they possessed at least a high school or some degree of higher education.\textsuperscript{27}

Another reason that the officers’ early arrival in France was important was because it afforded them the opportunity to attend one or more of the schools that the Allies and the AEF established to close the wide doctrinal and technological gaps between what the officers had learned in the United States and the realities of combat on the western front. Pershing and his staff were well aware that stateside training in 1917 was often hamstrung by shortages of automatic rifles, grenades, machine guns, and other key weapons that had emerged during the war, as well as their understanding that a simple lack of knowledge and realism had plagued much of the instruction of the novice officers. Most of the Army officers in the 4th Brigade first attended one or more of the AEF’s schools before reporting for duty with the Marines. For example, after Second Lieutenant Calvin Capps arrived in France in September, he attended the 1st Army Infantry Officers School and courses with the British Army on bayonet fighting, sniping, and the Stokes mortar. Likewise, Army Reserve officers assigned to the 6th Machine Gun Battalion attended AEF machine gun schools before reaching the Marines.\textsuperscript{28}

Although faith in American know-how and methods at times weakened the effectiveness of the AEF’s schools, a number of officers who later served with the Marines benefited from the direct tutelage of the French or British. One such officer was First Lieutenant Wallace Leonard Jr. Upon arriving in France, Leonard reported to the French infantry officer’s

\textsuperscript{24} Faulkner, \textit{The School of Hard Knocks}, 31–33, 69–71.
\textsuperscript{26} Perry, \textit{The Plattsburg Movement}, 202.
\textsuperscript{27} The statistics on the education levels and occupations of the 90 officers comes from the records of the 1910 and 1920 Federal Census, New York Abstracts of Military Service in the World War, State National Guard and militia rolls, city business directories, and college yearbooks from the digital records of NARA, Ancestry.com. One of the best sources for occupational information was the draft cards that the officers submitted in 1917, also from the digital records of NARA, Ancestry.com. Given the number of graduates of the Fort Sheridan OTC in the group, the \textit{History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps} was also a key source of the officers’ biographical information. The Selective Service Act of 1917 required all males between the ages of 21 and 31 to register for the draft, this included men already attending OTCs.
\textsuperscript{28} Capps, “Transfer.” Four of the nine who would serve with the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were assigned to the unit on 27 March 1918 immediately upon their graduation from II Corps machine gun schools. 2d Division, Special Orders 80, 27 March 1918, NARA.
The education levels, backgrounds, and training experiences all indicate that there was little to no difference between the quality of the newly commissioned Army officers and their Marine comrades in the 4th Brigade. This counters an assertion made by historian Peter F. Owen, who maintains that the aforementioned Leonard “was unpopular with some of the marines, an unfortunate situation aggravated by the fact that Leonard was an army reserve officer.” Owen explains Leonard’s presence in the 6th Regiment by noting, “While marine lieutenants attended schools, army officers of mixed quality were often assigned to 2/6 [2d Battalion, 6th Regiment] as temporary replacements.” The Marines at the time were not so quick to discount the ability of their Army peers. On 22 February 1918, Second Lieutenant Clifton Cates, a platoon leader in the 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, and future Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote home, “We have a new lieutenant assigned to our company; a Lieut. Capps, from the U. of N.C. He seems to be a nice fellow and is very good, as he has been over here for six months.” Leonard also had his supporters. His company commander, Captain Randolph T. Zane, commended him for leading the 79th Company’s second platoon on Bouresches on 6 June 1918, noting that he advanced his unit “through the most intense artillery and machine gun fire to a position about three hundred yards beyond the town, having only ten men left, intrenched [sic] and remained until

Table 1: Prewar occupations of Army officers serving in the 4th Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College student</td>
<td>21 (24.4%)</td>
<td>Real estate broker</td>
<td>2 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>10 (11.1%)</td>
<td>Editor/publisher</td>
<td>2 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>10 (11.1%)</td>
<td>Supervisor of the mails</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant/bookkeeper/clerk</td>
<td>10 (11.1%)</td>
<td>Superintendent of public schools</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business manager/supervisor</td>
<td>7 (7.7%)</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>6 (6.6%)</td>
<td>Government radio technician</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>4 (4.4%)</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker/stock broker/loan officer</td>
<td>4 (4.4%)</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman/business owner</td>
<td>3 (3.3%)</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional engineer</td>
<td>3 (3.3%)</td>
<td>Army enlisted</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by Richard S. Faulkner

“Lieut Leonard Is Cited for Bravery.”

30 Peter F. Owen, To the Limit of Endurance: A Battalion of Marines in the Great War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 75. This book is a well-researched and excellent account of the battalion’s experience in the war. This author only takes exception to Owen’s characterization of the Army Reserve officers.

31 Clifton Cates letter, “Dear Katherine and Protho,” 22 February 1918, Clifton Cates Papers, Historical Resources Branch, Marine Corps History Division (MCHD), 3.
the remainder of the company entered Bouresches an hour or so later.” Upon Leonard’s transfer from the unit, Zane wrote a letter of recommendation to his gaining command, stating that he “could not speak too highly of the courage, coolness, professional abilities, and attractive personality of this officer.” Zane went on to note, “Having him under [my] command was a great satisfaction and pleasure, and his loss to the company was most sincerely regretted by officers and men alike.”

While it was true that the training of Army officers was far too short and unrealistic to adequately prepare them for what they faced in France, there was little difference in the wartime instruction of officers between the two Services. In 1918, Commandant Barnett reported to the secretary of the Navy that “the training at the camps has been most intensive and thoroughly competitive.” This was not a view shared by the Marine officers themselves. Second Lieutenant Robert Blake was critical of the depth and quality of his training at Quantico officers’ school, describing it as “very primitive, principally boot camp drill” with “some class work.” He remembered that one of the officers running the Quantico school, Captain Charles Barrett, later confessed to him that while “he received

32 Capt R. T. Zane, commanding, 79th Company, 6th Marines, “Copy of Official Record of Lieut. W. M. Leonard, Jr.,” box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA. Peter F. Owen is correct in stating that some of Leonard’s troops did not like the officer. In 1979, Glen H. Hill wrote a short account of his experiences at Belleau Wood in which he criticized Leonard’s leadership. Glen G. Hill letter to G. M. Neufield, head of the Reference Section, Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 17 January 1979. Hill’s criticism was not echoed by other members of the company who wrote closer to the event. In an article published in Marine’s Magazine, Romeyn P. Benjamin described Leonard smiling and smoking during the 6 June attack. Benjamin admitted that he “laughed at him” when Leonard walked between the unit’s half-platoons while smoking but also noted that it was not until he heard Leonard call “All right—2nd platoon, stick with me,” to begin the attack that Benjamin “recovered his wits” in the confusion of battle and moved forward. Romeyn P. Benjamin, “June 1918,” Marine’s Magazine, July 1919, 6–7. The author thanks Owen for providing copies of the Hill letter and the Benjamin article. Letters sent home by Sgt John P. Martin in July 1918 also contain no hint of criticism of Leonard’s leadership. In fact, in correspondence that Martin wrote to Leonard’s father after hearing of the young officer’s death, the sergeant indicates his high regard for the deceased. John P. Martin, letter, “Dear Mother and Father,” 8 July 1918; and correspondence between Martin and Wallace Leonard Sr. in 1919, John P. Martin Papers, Historical Resources Branch, MCHD.

33 Annual Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1918, 5.

34 MajGen Robert Blake, USMC, Oral History Transcript, 26 March 1968 session, Benis M. Frank interviewer, Historical Resources Branch, MCHD, Quantico, VA, 1972, 3.

35 On 29 June 1861, Abraham Lincoln attempted to calm MajGen Irvin McDowell’s fear that his army was too inexperienced and untrained to attack Confederate forces by noting, “You are green, it is true; but they are green, also; you are all green alike.” 63d Congress, 3d Session, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1863), 38.

Officers of the U.S. Reserves doing duty with the Regiment were ordered here for the purpose of instruction. Battalion commanders will please see that these officers are afforded the same opportunity for instruction in theoretical work and practical in command of platoons and companies as afforded officers of like rank in the Marine Corps. These young officers will probably be scattered throughout the service and the organization to
which they were attached for instruction will be judged by the efficiency.\textsuperscript{36}

Both the 5th and 6th Regiments initially seemed to have viewed the assignment of Army Reserve officers to their units as temporary arrangements, but both units took the mission of training them seriously.

War Department General Orders 83 required that all officers “not reported on organizational returns” on duty in France or Britain were required to submit a monthly report to AEF Headquarters detailing “the duties on which [they were] engaged.” From the reports, it is possible to see the variety of instruction that the Army Reserve lieutenants received in the early months of their service with the Marines. Second Lieutenant Benjamin Brown, who served with the 5th and 6th Regiments from November 1917 until August 1918, reported in December 1917 that he received “instruction in a very practical and thorough nature” in “maneuvers in the French style of attack and defense” at the regimental to platoon level, the “many varieties of liaison,” and the “actual occupation of a company sector of trenches with drill in entering and leaving the trenches, and responding to the ‘alert’.” Second Lieutenant James Cooper likewise reported a diverse array of training. In between studying map reading, field sanitation, and the control of venereal disease, he also spent time under the watchful eyes of French officers learning “attack formations, advancing in connection with barrage fire,” and “directing the course of an attack by use of compass.” One focus of instruction, “storming a machine gun post using hand and rifle grenades,” would later come in handy at Belleau Wood. Like any of his fellow Army officers, Cooper believed that his training was “highly practical and instructive and the time well spent.”\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Headquarters, 6th Marines, memo, 23 December 1917, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

\textsuperscript{37} “Report of Duties for the Month of December 1917, in Compliance with General Order N. 83, War Department, July 6, 1917,” for 1st Lt Herman Allyn, 4 January 1918; 2d Lt James Brewer, 4 January 1918; Benjamin Brown, 5 January 1918; and James Cooper, 5 January 1918, all box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

Role and Service of 4th Brigade Army Officers

The confusion over the status of the Army Reserve officers was also evident when the 2d Division directed the 4th Brigade to temporarily assign some of its Army officers to assist in the training of the 32d Division. The division directed that the 5th and 6th Regiments send six Army officers each for this mission. However, when the officers returned to the 4th Brigade, the 6th Regiment questioned their reassignment to the regiment. On 17 May 1918, Major F. E. Evans, the adjutant of the 6th Regiment, wrote to the 2d Division assistant adjutant:

Six (6) U.S. Reserve officers who formerly served with this organization have been ordered to rejoin it from the 32nd Division. . . . As we have been advised that all the reserve officers were to be transferred from this organization to other organizations. . . . [and] it is requested that if possible you advise me by memorandum whether the order in regard to replacement of reserve officers has been cancelled.\textsuperscript{38}

The 5th Regiment took a different approach and chose not to ask a question of the division to which they did not want to know the answer. Its commander never questioned the return of the officers to the unit or having them command the regiment’s platoons. The 5th Regiment seemed to have taken the mission of training the 32d Division seriously for they sent some of their best Army Reserve officers (Joseph Brady, Jerome Goldman, Robert Lineham, John Revelle, and Arthur Tilghman) to the 32d Division. Despite a flurry of orders at the time directing the regiment to send Army Reserve officers to serve as instructors in the United States or to transfer them to other 2d Division units, the 5th Regiment chose to retain all five of the officers in the regiment when they returned from the 32d Division. One of the officers, Joseph Brady, a

\textsuperscript{38} “Memorandum for Captain Pearson, Assistant Adjutant, 2nd Division,” from F. E. Evans, 17 May 1918, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.
former journalist, was gassed on 7 July 1918 and, on his release from the hospital, remained with the 5th Regiment until it returned to the United States in August 1919. For four others, the regiment’s decision proved more fatal. Less than three weeks following their return to the 5th Regiment, two of the officers were killed (Goldman and Peterson) and two others were wounded (Lineham and Tilghman) in the fighting at Belleau Wood.  

Although the official status of the Army Reserve officers was open to debate, what is clear from the record is that the units of the 4th Brigade assigned them to important positions within their organizations. On 29 May 1918, as the 4th Brigade was hurrying to the front to fill holes in the French lines, its war diary reported that the unit had 278 officers present for duty. On that date, there were 75 Army Reserve officers assigned to the brigade. Assuming that these officers were included in the war diary numbers, Army officers made up nearly 27 percent of the brigade’s commissioned strength. Unfortunately, neither the brigade’s surviving records nor the unit muster rolls from the period offer a complete picture of what assignments these officers held. However, the existing reports give some indication of their responsibilities. The commander of the 5th Regiment’s 55th Company (in which Lemuel Shepherd served as the company executive officer) reported that when his unit went into action at Belleau Wood, half of his platoon leaders were Army officers. The company’s 3d platoon was commanded by Second Lieutenant Arthur Tilghman, and the 4th platoon was led by First Lieutenant Robert Lineham. While he jumped at the opportunity to seek an Army commission, Tilghman was no stranger to the sea Service. Prior to the war, he served two years in the U.S. Navy and left the Service as a petty officer to become an office manager in a Chicago insulation company. During the vicious fighting around Lucy-le-Bocage, both officers received serious wounds. Both also briefly returned to the 5th Regiment after recovering from their injuries. Lineham was ultimately transferred to the 23d Infantry in August 1918. Tilghman returned to the Marines in time to participate in the Aisne-Marne campaign. During the fighting in late July, he was gassed with phosgene and had his left forearm shattered by shrapnel. After three months in the hospital, the Army determined that he was unfit for further combat service, and he ended the war commanding the 1st Prisoner of War Escort Company. Unfortunately, Tilghman’s wounds also weakened his health. After a case of influenza gave way to cerebrospinal meningitis, he died in Tours, France, on 12 February 1919.  

In other cases, the records noted that Army Reserve officers served as platoon leaders or were otherwise commended for leadership in combat. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick M. Wise, the commander of the 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, recommended that Second Lieutenant R. H. Loughborough be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his gallantry at Belleau Wood. Wise noted that on 13 June “after all the other officers of his company had become casualties, [Loughborough] assumed command and by his personal example of extraordinary heroism led his men forward and assisted in capturing many machine guns.”

Loughborough was not the only Army officer to rise from platoon leader to company commander during the fighting at Belleau Wood. First Lieutenant Elliott Cooke was transferred from the 18th Company and assigned to command the 55th Company after most of that unit’s officers had become casualties. As company commander, “He handled it in a manner which demonstrated absolute control of new men, with excellent results in checking the enemy.” Colonel Harry Lee, the commander of the 6th Regiment, was so impressed with the performance of First Lieutenant Frederick Wagoner at Belleau Wood and other operations that he recommended him for promotion

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39 2d Division, Special Orders 91, 8 April 1918; Adjutant, 6th Marines, to Capt Pearson, Assistant Adjutant, 2d Division, memo, 17 May 1918, both box 51 RG 127, entry 240, NARA; and Joseph Agustin Brady, 1917 Draft Card, Ancestry.com.  
41 Commander, 55th Company, “Memorandum for Major McClellan,” undated, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA (Tilghman’s name is misspelled Tillman in the text); and The History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers’ Training Camps, 159.  
42 Commander, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, award recommendation for R. H. Loughborough, 31 December 1918, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.
to captain. Lee based his recommendation on the fact that Wagoner had performed well as both a platoon leader and as second in command of the 76th Company in combat. Lee reported that “he has at all times distinguished himself by the able way in which he handled his men under fire” and that “he has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to command a company and is the type of officer of whom you can expect results when he is given a mission to execute.”

Reports explaining the deaths of officers in battle also tended to list the positions that the Army Reserve officers held when they became casualties. The commander of the 5th Regiment’s 43d Company reported that at the time of his death on 11 June 1918, Second Lieutenant Robert S. Heizer was leading members of his platoon against German machine guns that were firing into the flank of his unit. His commander noted that Heizer’s efforts “were eminently successful, the machine gun nests being completely destroyed and the crews killed or taken prisoner,” and thus “this dangerous advantage on the part of the enemy was eliminated.” At age 30, Jerome L. Goldman was older than most of his junior officer peers, and this maturity led his company commander to select him to serve as his second in command. Goldman was killed by machine gun fire on 12 June while “leading his men in the attack” on the hunting lodge in the northwest of Belleau Wood. His commander would later write that Goldman’s “efforts contributed to the measure of success that crowned the efforts of the Marines at that place to a large degree.”

Based on the available records, it is possible to make a conservative estimate that 15 to 20 percent of the platoon leaders in the 4th Brigade in the first two weeks of fighting at Belleau Wood were Army officers. Their service as leaders was also evident in their sacrifice. Five of the Army Reserve officers serving with the 5th Regiment and four serving with the 6th Regiment were killed in action or died of their wounds during the Belleau Wood fighting. Another 24 Army officers were wounded, with three more being gassed, and two “shellshocked” during the fighting. In all, 38 of the 75 (50 percent) Army lieutenants who went into the battle became casualties. Three more Army Reserve officers would later die while leading platoons during the Aisne-Marne and Saint-Mihiel campaigns.

Although references to the officers are rather scarce in the narratives of the war’s Marines, the passages where they do appear tend to be positive of the officers’ leadership and sacrifices. Don V. Paradis noted the sadness that his company felt at the loss of the Army Reserve officer killed while assigned to his unit. Paradis noted that “he was surely a brave man and was already well liked by the whole company” and added that the Marines commended to “pick off any moving Germans in exchange for the lieutenant’s death.”

Removal of Army Reserve Officers from the 4th Brigade

Despite the Army Reserve officers’ service and sacrifice with the Marines, the 2d Division and some senior Marine officers had worked steadily to purge them from the ranks of the 4th Brigade. The push to reassign the Army officers from the unit had slowly gained momentum in the two months prior to the start of the fighting at Château-Thierry. In the winter of 1918, the AEF Headquarters agreed to send “seasoned” AEF officers to serve as instructors and leaders in the divisions undergoing training in the United States. The Army Reserve officers of the 4th Brigade

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43 Cooke, Elliott D. Capt., personnel note card number 3, undated; Cooke, Elliott D. National Army Attached to U.S. Marine Corps; and Commander, 6th Marines to Commander, 2d Division, memo, “Recommendation for Promotion,” 1 November 1918, all box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.


45 The Army Reserve officers killed at Belleau Wood were James Brewer, Harry Copping, Jerome Goldman, Robert Heizer, and William Peterson of the 5th Regiment and Calvin Capps, Henry Eddy, Harold Mills, and James Timothy of the 6th Regiment. Fred Becker (5th Regiment) and Herbert Jones (6th Machine Gun Battalion) were killed in the Aisne-Marne fighting, and Emmon Stockwell (6th Regiment) was killed at Saint-Mihiel.

46 “Memoirs of Don V. Paradis, Former Gunnery Sergeant USMC,” in Don V. Paradis collection, Historical Resources Branch, MCHD.
were easy pickings for these transfers. In compliance with the headquarters and 2d Division directives, on 2 April 1918, the 4th Brigade transferred eight of its officers to the states and in May ordered another eight of its Army lieutenants to return home. All of the selected officers had “completed a course of instruction at corps schools, A.E.F. and having had a tour of duty at the front” were well suited “to assist in the training of organizations” in the states.\(^47\)

Perhaps the most unfortunate and controversial transfer of Army Reserve officers from the 4th Brigade came in June 1918 in the midst of the fighting at Belleau Wood. On 8 June 1918, the brigade’s commander, Army brigadier general James G. Harbord, noted that “heavy losses of officers compared to those among the men are most eloquent as to the gallantry of our officers” but went on to caution his subordinates that “officers of experience are a most valuable asset and must not be wasted.”\(^48\) Despite his admonishment to his commanders to conserve their experienced leaders, Harbord and the staff of the 2d Division were rapidly transferring combat-tested Army Reserve officers from the brigade. Part of this was due to the AEF’s ongoing drive to rotate veteran officers back to the states. Thus, in compliance with headquarters and division directives, on 4 June 1918, the 4th Brigade ordered eight Army officers to return home.\(^49\)

If Harbord was so concerned about the loss of leaders in the brigade, one wonders why he did nothing to protest these transfers. One explanation for his lack of action may have been pressure from his own senior Marine officers. After decades of fending off the Army and Navy’s attempts to absorb or abolish them, the Marines had developed a driving desire to cement their place in the nation’s defense establishment. Heather Venable recently argued that in the decades prior to World War I the Marine Corps “de-liberately crafted” a public image of itself as an elite fighting force that provided the nation with a vital and distinct military capability. Commandant Barnett and his senior subordinates viewed the Marines’ service in the Great War as essential to solidifying this image by keeping that service in the public’s mind to ensure the Corps’ long-term existence.\(^50\) Having Army officers leading Marine platoons certainly did not mesh well with Barnett’s vision.

In the two weeks prior to the Belleau Wood battle, Colonel Albertus Catlin and his adjutant were particularly active in advocating for the removal of Army Reserve officers from the 6th Regiment. On 17 May, Catlin informed the division commander of his understanding that “all Army reserve officers will be detached and their place filled by Marine officers.” The same day, Catlin’s regimental adjutant pressed the 2d Division assistant adjutant on the status of the officers in his unit and reminded him that he was ready to have their “vacancies filled by Marine officers from [the] replacement [depot].”\(^51\) Between late February and early May 1918, the Marine Corps sent three replacement battalions to France to provide the 4th Brigade with officers and enlisted troops to replenish its anticipated combat losses. With the arrival of these battalions, Catlin seems to have grasped the opportunity to transfer as many Army Reserve officers as possible to make room for the newly arrived Marine officers, even when this meant replacing Army leaders.

\(^{47}\) War Department Cablegram No. 704-R, 28 January 1918; AEF GHQ Special Order 92, 2 April 1918; 2d Division Special Order 92, 2 April 1918; 2d Division Special Orders 124, 4 May 1918; Commander, 6th Marines to Commander, 2d Division, memo, “Officers for Return to United States,” 17 May 1918; and Adjutant, 6th Marines, memo, 24 May 1918, all box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

\(^{48}\) Headquarters 4th Brigade, memo, 8 June 1918, in Records of the Second Division, vol. 6.

\(^{49}\) 2d Division Special Orders 155, 4 June 1918, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.


\(^{51}\) Commander, 6th Marines, to Commander, 2d Division, memo, “Officers for return to the United States,” 17 May 1918; and “Memorandum for Captain Pearson, Assistant Adjutant, and Division,” from E. E. Evans, 17 May 1918, both box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.
who had trained and fought with the 6th Regiment with green platoon leaders.52

Being pulled out of action to return to the states was bewildering to the officers involved. Leonard informed a reporter from the Boston Globe, “I couldn’t have been more surprised if they’d ordered me to be shot at sunrise. . . . Imagine starting for home at a moment’s notice from a cellar in Bouresches. I won’t say the thought of going home hurts me any, but well, I’d rather have stuck around and seen this thing through.”53 It is interesting to note that while the 6th Regiment transferred 11 Army Reserve officers to the states or other units in the 2d Division during the Battle of Belleau Wood, the 5th Regiment only transferred four of its Army leaders during the period and somehow managed to delay the order to send its quota of four officers back to the states until after the fighting.

The arrival of the Marine officer replacements and casualties in both the 4th Brigade and the 2d Division’s 3d Brigade in June, July, and August of 1918 began the rapid decline of the number of Army Reserve officers serving with the Marines. Table 2 illustrates the fates of the 63 officers who survived their service with the 4th Brigade.

The 5th and 6th Regiments each had three Army Reserve officers (a total of 9.5 percent) who remained with them into 1919. On 7 August 1919, the 2d Division ordered that all of the remaining Army officers in the 4th Brigade be relieved from duty with the Marines and report to the divisional adjutant for reassignment.54

The officers transferred to the 2d Division’s 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and the 4th and 5th Machine Gun Battalions generally performed well in their new assignments. Thirteen of these 22 officers were awarded Silver Star Citations and the French Croix de Guerre for their leadership and bravery in combat. Two of them were also awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), the United States’ second-highest award for valor. Second Lieutenant Charles Heimerdinger earned his DSC, a Silver Star Citation, and a Croix de Guerre on 2 November 1918 at Landres-et-Saint-Georges for leading a patrol that destroyed enemy machine guns and personally fighting off the enemy to enable his wounded to be removed from the battlefield. First Lieutenant Joseph W. Starkey’s combat record after leaving the Marines was even more impressive. The Tennessee native was awarded a Silver Star Citation at Château-Thierry and two more while serving with the 9th Infantry at Soissons. He was awarded the DSC and a Croix de Guerre with bronze palm for being cited in Army dispatches and was made a Chevalier of the Legion d’Honneur by the French government for extraordinary heroism at Mont Blanc. On 8 October 1918, despite being wounded and “regardless to danger to himself,” Starkey led his men through heavy machine-gun and artillery fire in a successful attack against the German line. In the process, he suffered a second wound. It should be noted that 21 other officers received awards while still serving with the Marines.55

Although the majority of the officers performed satisfactorily in the 4th Brigade, as can be expected, not all of them consistently covered themselves with

52 BGen A. W. Catlin, With the Help of God and a Few Marines (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1919), 5–14, 18, 24–25, 159. Throughout the work, Catlin is unrelenting in his pride and boosterism of the Marine Corps. As with Barnett, he was driven to ensure the long-term survival of the Corps and as such consistently set out to demonstrate the superiority of the Corps’ personnel, training, and performance during the war. It is not much of a stretch to argue that his desire to preserve the Corps colored his views on the Army Reserve officers. He mentioned them only six times in the book, with three of those cases being in his roll-up of this regiment’s citations. The kindest thing he noted of the Army officers was, “They became practically Marines in short order, some of them being killed or wounded in the subsequent fighting.” Catlin, With the Help of God and a Few Marines, 29.


54 Headquarters, 4th Brigade Marines, memo, 7 August 1919. These numbers are based on the service dates in the “master list” and various other reports in the file Army Personnel Attached to the Marines in box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.

Table 2: Disposition of Army Reserve officers after Belleau Wood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to other 2d Division combat units</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not return to unit after being wounded</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to United States to serve as instructors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(17.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left 4th Brigade, later status unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to a non-2d Division unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by Richard S. Faulkner

On 3 May 1918, the commander of the 2d Division directed that Colonel Catlin reprimand Second Lieutenants Robert L. Renth and William H. Osborn for their failure to properly supervise their platoons during a gas attack on 13 April 1918. The attack resulted in the deaths of 23 Marines, scores more wounded, and the relief of the commander of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment. The division commander warned the two Army Reserve officers that “unless their attention to duty shows immediate and marked improvement, steps will be taken to terminate their commissions.”

Renth and Osborn were not alone in their failings. In May 1918, the commander of the 6th Marine’s 83d Company, Captain A. R. Sutherland, reported that Second Lieutenant Benjamin Brown “did not have the necessary requisites to command men due to his inability to hold the attention and to command the respect of those under him. Also, that he had the unfortunate quality of antagonizing all men he tried to instruct.” Although Sutherland recommended that Brown be removed from the regiment, his replacement, Alfred Noble, asked Catlin that the Army officer be given a second chance. Noble noted that upon taking command of the company, he reasigned Brown to “details such as checking on property, supervision observation posts, and such other details which called for mathematical calculations and perseverance.” Noble recommended that while he would “never recommend him to command troops,” Brown had proven himself “persistent, earnest, and reliable” in his new duties and would serve ably as the assistant battalion quartermaster. Catlin was unmoved by Noble’s plea and recommended that Brown be moved to the Services of Supply or sent before an elimination board. Fortunately for Brown, the 6th Regiment entered the fighting at Château-Thierry before Catlin’s recommendation could be implemented. During the fighting, Brown served as the 3d Battalion’s quartermaster and “showed marked ability in the work assigned.” The battalion commander, Major Berton Sibley, reported that he “personally superintended the delivery of rations . . . into the line, and through his efforts the 3rd Battalion did at no time suffer from the non-delivery of supplies.”

Although Brown’s commanders accurately deduced his strengths and weaknesses, the case of Second Lieutenant Fred Becker demonstrated that the first impressions of the Marine Corps officers were not always accurate. Becker was the first All-American football player to come out of the University of Iowa, but he left college soon after the war began to enroll at the 1st Officer Training Camp at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Becker was two months shy of his 22d birthday when he landed in France and was assigned to the 5th Regiment in September 1917. Becker had a rough time in his early months with the unit. On 1 May 1918, his company commander reported that the young officer “has not the proper sense of responsibility and lacks the proper judgment to handle situations which a platoon commander must handle independently.” Although Becker was removed as a platoon leader, high officer casualties in the June fighting quickly led to his reinstatement. Becker seems to have rebounded from
his early lackluster performance. He was wounded during the Belleau Wood fighting on 11 June, and on his recovery returned to the 18th Company to serve as a platoon leader. On 18 July, during the Second Battle of the Marne, Becker was killed after he advanced alone to destroy a machine gun nest that was holding up the Marines’ advance near Vierzy. For this action, he was posthumously awarded the DSC and the Croix de Guerre with a silver star for being cited in division dispatches for “extraordinary heroism” that prevented “the death or injury of many men of his command.”58

Army Reserve Officers’ Place in 4th Brigade History

The last major issue to address is why the Army Reserve officers have largely disappeared from the historical narrative of the 4th Brigade. Even historians who offered sympathetic portrayals of the Army officers, such as George Clark and J. Michael Miller, tend to only mention them in passing. Part of the issue was that the officers themselves left few written accounts of their service with the Marines—except Elliott Cooke. Cooke was an excellent soldier with a swashbuckling background that appealed to the Marines. He allegedly ran away from home at age 14 to serve as a hired gun for the United Fruit Company in Central America and served as a mercenary in the Mexican Revolution before enlisting in the U.S. Army in 1914. His sterling combat record while serving with the 5th Regiment from November 1917 to February 1919 earned him a regular Army commission after the war. In 1937 and 1938, Cooke published two articles on his wartime experiences in *Infantry Journal*. In 1942, Edward S. Johnston included Cooke’s articles in his compilation *Americans vs. Germans: The First AEF in Action*. This exposé, the ease of locating his account, and the fact that Cooke rose to the rank of brigadier general during World War II, ensured that he has been included in most of the secondary histories of the 4th Brigade.59 No other Army Reserve officers seem to have published memoirs, and their existing letters and other records are scattered across numerous state and university archives.

Another reason for the near anonymity of the officers was that the 4th Brigade’s wartime personnel records were either incomplete or cobbled together. Only half of the 90 Army line officers who served at least three months in the 4th Brigade or whose service was less than three months due to death or wounds while fighting with the Marines are listed on any of the unit’s wartime muster rolls. Seventeen of the 45 (37.7 percent) only appeared on an addendum roll from June 1919 that sought to reconcile the unit’s muster rolls with its casualty lists. Even those officers whose names were on the normal monthly muster rolls only appeared sporadically. For example, Cooke was listed on the 51st Company muster roll for November 1917, but does not reappear until he is listed on the 67th Company muster roll for November 1918.60 On 14 August 1918, the 6th Regiment published a list of the 23 Army Reserve officers who had been assigned to the regiment since 31 May. The list illustrates some of the challenges that the Marines faced in maintaining accurate records in wartime. Three of the officers listed were actually Marine Corps rather than Army officers. The 14 August roster also did not contain the names of 14 other Army officers that the master list indicates served with the regiment during the period. Most, but not all, of the officers missing from the August roster had been transferred from the 6th Regiment to stateside assignments or to other units in the 2d Division in early or mid-June.61

One of the notable names missing from the August list was Lieutenant Blythe M. Reynolds. As with many of the young men who sought commissions in 1917, the 23-year-old Reynolds’s interest in military af-

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58 Commander, 18th Company, to Commander, 5th Marines, memo, “Transfer of officer,” 1 May 1918; 2dLt Fred Becker entry, “Master List,” both box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA; and Congressional Medal of Honor, and the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal Issued by the War Department since April 6, 1917, up to and Including General Orders, No. 126, War Department; November 11, 1919, 207.


61 Headquarters, 6th Marines, memo, “An audit of U.S. Army Officers Attached to the 6th Regiment, Marine Corps for Duty or Instruction, Since May 31st, 1818,” 14 August 1918, box 51, RG 127, entry 240, NARA.
fairs predated the nation’s entry into the war. He spent the summer following his 1916 graduation from Clarkson College of Technology attending the civilian military training camp at Plattsburg. Upon his graduation from the 2d OTC at Fort Niagara, New York, he arrived in France on 16 January 1918 and was assigned to the 76th Company of the 6th Regiment. Reynolds suffered a gunshot wound to his right leg during the regiment’s 19 July 1918 attack on La Râperie during the Aisne-Marne offensive. In recognition of his bravery and leadership, he was awarded a Silver Star and a Croix de Guerre with palm for being cited in Army dispatches. After a long recovery from his wounds, he returned to the 6th Regiment and sailed back to the United States on 17 February 1919 with the 74th Company. As the 6th Regiment were involved in a nearly unbroken string of operations from June through August, it is perhaps understandable that Reynolds and the other officers were missing from the list.\(^62\)

Another possible explanation for the absence of the Army Reserve officers from the historical narrative returns to the arguments that historian Heather Venable has made on the crafting of the Marines’ “brand.” Many of the primary or secondary works on the 4th Brigade in the Great War were written by Marines or those closely associated with the Corps. These authors rightly viewed the war in general, and the Battle of Belleau Wood specifically, as key events in the founding myths and lore of the Service. Simply stated, having too many Army faces in the narrative muddied the historical waters and somewhat undercut the exclusivity and exceptionality claimed by the “Marine” brigade.

When Second Lieutenant Wayne E. Perkins wrote home upon leaving the Belleau Wood battlefield on 1 July 1918, he was still 11 days shy of his 22d birthday. The 1916 graduate of the Culver Military Academy had dropped out of the University of Illinois a month after the United States entered the war to attend the 1st OTC at Fort Sheridan. After assuring them that he still retained his “good health, good looks and happy disposition,” he proudly informed his parents,

> Yesterday we came out of the line (not trenches) after 28 days of hell. Some day some one will tell the story as it should be told. How the Marines met the French retreating, met the Huns drunk with victory, and hurled them back. I am convinced that had it not been for the United States Marines, Paris would surely have been taken…. It has been an honor to serve with them.\(^63\)

Although Perkins left the battle unscathed, his luck would not hold. Eighteen days after posting the letter, his left leg was shattered by a machine-gun bullet during the Allied attack to reduce the Soissons salient. He was far from being alone in his misfortune and most of the members of his platoon were killed or injured in the assault; an Army officer and his Marines united in their suffering and loss. Perkins spent the next six months recovering from his wound.\(^64\)

This article is neither meant to downplay the sacrifice, valor, and accomplishments of the Marines in World War I, nor is it intended to exaggerate or to shine an unmerited light on the service of the Army Reserve officers who fought with them. However, as Perkins and the other doughboy devil dogs often paid in blood for their service with the Marines and enabled the 4th Brigade to overcome its shortages of key leaders, it is important—as Perkins noted—to “tell the story as it should be told” and add them to the unit’s narrative.


\(^63\) “Wayne” letter to “Dear Folks.”

\(^64\) “Wayne” letter to “Dear Folks”; and “Life Memberships,” 3.
**The American Naval Base in Ponta Delgada, 1917–19**

*by Sérgio Rezendes, PhD*

**Abstract:** This article derives from a master's thesis about the consequences of World War I in the Azores archipelago that included a chapter dedicated to the U.S. Navy facilities at Ponta Delgada on the island of São Miguel. With its two U.S. Marine Corps units, U.S. Naval Base 13 defended the port, a British wireless station near Ponta Delgada, and support structures for the assigned or passing naval units. This article offers a vision of Naval Base 13 as a U.S./Europe border during World War I that was critical to the protection of British and American military and commercial shipping and denying Germany any base of operations in the region from which to launch attacks on Allied forces.

**Keywords:** Ponta Delgada, World War I, Azores, Naval Base 13, Azores Detachment of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet

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**Introduction**

With two U.S. Marine Corps units (1st Marine Aeronautic Company and another comprising a mix of infantry, artillery, and services corps), U.S. Naval Base 13 in the Azores defended the port of the island of São Miguel, a British wireless station near Ponta Delgada, and support structures for the assigned or passing naval units during World War I. This article offers a vision of Naval Base 13 as a U.S./Europe border during the war, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt studied during World War II and remembered from his visit to the archi-

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1 The Azores are located between latitude 36º55'43'' N and 39º43'02'' N, and between longitude 24º46'15'' W and 31º16'02'' W. Ponta Delgada is on São Miguel Island, the major city of the Azores archipelago of Portugal. The Azores are nine islands divided into three widely separated island groups in the North Atlantic: the eastern group consists of São Miguel, Santa Maria, and the Formigas islets; the central group consists of Pico, São Jorge, Terceira, and Graciosa; and the northwestern group consists of Flores and Corvo. See “Units Composing, and the Commanding Generals of, the Second Division–Verdun Operations,” in Maj Edwin N. McClellan, *The United States Marine Corps in the World War* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1968; revised/reprinted by Marine Corps History Division in 2014), 38.
pelago on 16 July 1918, using these islands as a starting point for a higher contribution to the unit’s history.² By translating and sharing his research among predominantly Portuguese sources, the author hopes to promote future works about the Azores Detachment of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s Navy and Marine Corps presence in the archipelago.

**Portugal in World War I**³

At the beginning of World War I, the young Portuguese Republic had been in existence for less than four years.⁴ Optimistic in their ability to solve the political, economic, and social problems as a result of the end of its monarchy, a succession of governments and two Azorean presidents of the republic would try to stabilize a regime, but the context of international war did not help. Six days after the beginning of the war, the Portuguese Parliament would support England without denouncing Germany.⁵ In a society on the edge of a civil war, two opposing political positions were formed: one in favor and the other against Portugal’s intervention. The main argument for the intervention was the need to maintain sovereignty over Portugal’s African territories and the necessity to affirm the young republic’s place in the international community, enforcing the alliance with England at a time when Spain was considered dangerous.⁶

Due to incidents in Africa since 1914, an agreement was made between Portugal and Britain by which the Royal Navy would assume the defense of Madeira and the Azorean sea. The Portuguese Navy remained responsible for the defense of the mainland coast, especially the harbors, and for escorting merchant vessels to the islands of Madeira and the Azores and to Africa. In September 1914, the first Portuguese expeditionary forces left for Angola and then for Mo-

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³ For more, see all entries for Portugal, 1914–1918, Online International Encyclopedia of the First World War (website), accessed 5 October 2020.


zambique, where the Portuguese colonies’ borders were under German attack. In Europe, the Portuguese presence in the trenches was a logistical and operational problem for Britain. Under their alliance, in December 1915, Britain requested that Portugal hand over the German ships interned at Portuguese ports, which Portugal accepted in late February 1916. As a result, Germany declared war on Portugal on 9 March 1916.

The Azores and World War I
Rear Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, first commander of U.S. naval forces stationed at the U.S. Naval Base at Ponta Delgada, delineated clearly the strategic value of the Azores and of Ponta Delgada and Horta’s (on Faial Island) harbor capacities to provide ship supply as a coaling station or for ship repairs.7

These islands—the “half-way point between America and Europe”—were vitally important in our naval operations, and soon after war was declared, we began negotiations with Portugal for permission to establish an American naval base at that strategic point . . . . “The occupation of the Azores,” said Admiral Dunn, “was of great strategic value from the mere fact that had it been in possession of the enemy, it would have formed an ideal base for submarines, and as our convoy routes passed north and south of the islands an enemy base would have been a very serious obstacle for the successful transport across the ocean of troops and supplies.”8

Traditionally friendly to America, the Azores hosted the first American consul in the world and

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8 Josephus Daniels, Our Navy at War (Washington, DC: Pictorial Bureau, 1922), 276–78. The Azores had two excellent harbors: Horta at Faial Island and Ponta Delgada at São Miguel Island. While Horta is considered a better harbor in terms of winds, sea, and orientation, Ponta Delgada is larger and more populated.
during the late nineteenth century provided whale-hunting grounds to U.S. sailors.\(^9\) The first emigration cycle to the United States began around that time, as American interests in a submarine telegraph communication cable by the Commercial Cable Company yielded the contract for the first cable between New York and the Azores in 1899.\(^{10}\) With a central geo-strategic location in proximity to Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa, and North America, the submarine cable communication centered in Horta represented a new era that the two world wars would

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\(^{10}\) José Vilela, Datas e Factos de Cabo Submarino em Portugal (1855–2015) (Lisbon: Fundação Portuguesa das Comunicações, 2016). The pioneers of the submarine cable and wireless telegraph communication centers in the archipelago are the British.
provide to the Portuguese archipelago, an important role that persists even now.11

From a secondary geostrategic position, the first economic signs of the First World War appeared at the end of summer 1914 and resulted in the restriction of Azorean exports to the traditional markets, now at war.12 The presence of surface squadrons in Azorean waters marked the daily lives of people in towns such as Ponta Delgada, a situation that was reversed after the Battle of Jutland and the neutrality of ports such as Ponta Delgada or Horta, open for the protection of German merchant ships.13

The first signs of the presence of German submarines appeared in 1915, which intensified fear among Azorean military authorities, although their presence had already been communicated to the Portuguese Ministry of War and the Navy at the beginning of the conflict.14 Defenses on all the islands were weak or nonexistent. On 3 December 1916, the German U-boat SM U-83 (1916) bombed the harbor of Funchal on Madeira, increasing these fears and generating a precipitation of events that climaxed with the bombing of Ponta Delgada by SM U-155 (1916) on 4 July 1917, possibly attempting to destroy a coal depot mainly used by U.S. ships.15

Portugal’s entry into World War I in 1916 had generated strong apprehension among the military and civilians in the Azores. The operational materiel situated there were antiquities left over from the second half of the nineteenth century, with the exception of two machine guns located in São Miguel and Terceira, which had already been modified from their original purpose. Concerns about the possibility of rapid excursions of the Germans for supplies to the British-held islands of Jamaica, Bermuda, and the Antilles had been transmitted to the Ministry of War, urging the government to improve the archipelago’s meager means of defense, given their antiquity, short-age, and malfunction. The British Royal Navy felt that it could not release units due to submarine activity on the coast of England and the fighting in Europe. Britain, which had been an ally of Portugal since the fourteenth century, did not have sufficient naval forces available to protect the Portuguese island seas.16 The Allies left this defense to the United States, without consulting Portugal about the change of interests. The United States, after an agreement with Britain, assumed the defense of the Azorean sea. It was crucial to defend the Azorean sea, not only to protect ships crossing from the United States to Europe or to the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa, and the island ports, but also to protect the Azores’ important coal and fuel deposits, telegraph cable hubs and wireless stations, a German prisoner-of-war camp, and the population itself.17 The Portuguese military tried to match the number of weapons to the number of recruits that were incorporated.

The U.S. Navy collier USS Orion (AC 11) had arrived in Ponta Delgada on 18 June 1917 to establish a

12 José Medeiros Ferreira, Revista Histórica da Participação de Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial–a Dimensão Ibérica Insular (Angra do Heroísmo, Portugal: Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira, 1987).
14 Comando Militar dos Açores, Correspondência confidencial recebida, Pastas de notas, 1915, Centro de Documentação da Zona Militar dos Açores (CDZMA), FIA, 1092.
17 Robert O. Work, Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004); C. Valentim and P. Costa, coord., A Marinha Portuguesa na Grande Guerra: o afundamento do Caça-minas Roberto Ivens (Lisbon, Portugal: Comissão Cultural de Marinha, 2018); and Tad Fitch and Michael Poirier, Into the Danger Zone: Sea Crossings of the First World War (Cheltenham, UK: History Press, ebook, 2014). In early 1916, England’s lack of vessels led to Portugal confiscating German boats docked at its ports, instigating Germany’s declaration of war. This act would lead to the reformulation of German civilians’ status in Portugal, forcing those of military age to stay in prisons like São João Baptista in Angra do Heroísmo, Terceira. The prisons housed 715 prisoners of war, some with their families, by August 1918. Within the international war context, the Portuguese government sought to provide the best possible conditions, a complicated task due to the lack of medical support, food, water, and vaccinations. With the signing of the peace treaties, Portugal repatriated the remaining 536 ex-prisoners of war to Germany, after a short passage through Madeira and Lisbon. For more, see Sérgio Rezendes, Depósito de Concentração alemães na ilha Terceira—A História de uma reclusão forçada (1916–1919) (Casal de Cambra, Portugal: Caleidoscópio, 2019).
charcoal depot for refuelling. The United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917, and after the German attack on Ponta Delgada, the Azores occupied part of America’s attention in the Atlantic, as well as the Portuguese government’s. Thanks to the impression of security generated by Orion and the Portuguese artillery’s defense during the German attack on Ponta Delgada, the population welcomed the Allies and helped them to build the U.S. facilities. This response created an atmosphere for trade and a lasting friendship that remains today. 18

Naval Battle between USS Orion and U-155, 4 July 1917

The Azores had two advantageous harbors in Horta and Ponta Delgada that refueled the warring countries, and islands like São Miguel were topographically known by the German Navy. 19 After the first attack on Funchal, prevention and observation of the sea became essential while waiting for the Portuguese state to promote the defense of the Azores. The feared attack occurred on 4 July 1917 at about 0500. The city awoke at dawn to a bombardment by German U-boat SM U-155’s 105mm grenades under the direction of Captain Lieutenant Karl Meusel. A telegram informed the minister of war, Colonel Eduardo Agostinho Pereira, military commander of Ponta Delgada, that a large enemy submarine was bombarding land repeatedly and intermittently, reaching up to approximately 4 kilometers (km) from the coast. 20 The civil governor of Ponta Delgada, Ricardo Salgado, informed the minister of the interior that “a submarine appeared in front of this port. The American transport ship at anchor is attacking an enemy along with a land battery.” 21 The naval artillery caused damage

19 Luís M. Vieira de Andrade, Os Açores e os Desafios da Política Internacional, Assembleia Legislativa Regional dos Açores, EGA, Ponta Delgada, 2002.
20 Rodrigo Álvares Pereira, Esboço Histórico do Batalhão de Caçadores n.º 11 mais tarde Regimento de Infantaria n.º 26 (Ponta Delgada, Portugal: Artes Gráficas, 1927).
21 Sérgio Rezendes, Ponta Delgada e a I Guerra Mundial—No centenário de todas as mudanças (Ponta Delgada, Azores: Câmara Municipal de Ponta Delgada, 2017), 156.
in two rural settlements, resulting in one death and injuring four people. The Portuguese battery recently installed at Mãe de Deus hill and the USS Orion, in maintenance in the port of the city, responded to the enemy’s fire.22

U-155 attacked southwest of the city, opening fire with eight shots to which the Orion responded with 15 100mm shots and the Portuguese battery Armstrong (10/28) with four 100mm shots. The rapidity of the American response was possible because the telegraph operator of the Portuguese wireless in nearby Nordela, in their usual scan for new communication records with ships, detected the approaching German submarine. Given the radio alert, the Orion, guided by Lieutenant Commander John H. Boesch, responded by raising the alert level and returning the German fire shortly after the first shots.23

After the intense exchange of fire, U-155 retreated to a safe zone, keeping within range to possibly renew the attack. Meanwhile, Captain Lieutenant Meusel interrogated the crew of a coastal vessel, trying to get more information about the unknown American ship in the port. Salgado informed the minister of the interior and his counterparts in Horta and Angra do Heroísmo (on Terceira Island) that the Portuguese artillery had been insufficient to protect the city, which left to Orion the victory of repelling the enemy. The concept behind the positioning of the Portuguese 100mm coastal artillery battery in Mãe de Deus hill could have worked, if—as it had in Funchal—the sub-


marine headed for the bay of the port; but it did not. The obsolete Armstrong’s artillery was no match for U-155. The German submarine, with around 20 crew members, was spotted heading south in the late morning. However, it was expected to return, so the Portuguese infantry was positioned along the city coast, preventing the population from leaving or entering the city. The Portuguese artillery was ordered to combine its fires with Orion’s, using red flags during the day and flares at night. Meanwhile, the west wing of the city (Santa Clara) was reinforced with three 70mm artillery cannons (obsolete) with orders to wait until the last minute to fire. National and foreign forces were in high alert and civil society paralyzed, even at night with public lights extinguished. In the following days, the military believed that U-155 was responsible for several torpedo attacks in the Azorean sea. The submarine positioned itself between the two Portuguese archipelagos and Gibraltar, returning at the end of the month and remaining in activity until 7 August.

On 8 July, by way of the American consul, the island’s authorities saluted the crew of Orion, and a very friendly atmosphere for the American presence emerged in the city. In the subsequent months, the name Orion would be attributed to breweries, cigarettes, cookies, and even to children. The mayor of Ponta Delgada offered Lieutenant Commander Boesch a silver cup, and several years later the U.S. Navy unit, officers, and crew were distinguished by the Portuguese Republic with the government decoration Torre e Espada (the Military Order of the Tower and the Sword). Later, in the Portuguese Parliament, some deputies presented the proposal that the city of Ponta Delgada receive the War Cross, generating a debate that was quickly abandoned until the present day.

The attack and subsequent German predations by U-155 exposed the lack of surveillance and control of that part of the Atlantic, traditionally associated with the Portuguese Navy, which at the time lacked modern ships, or with Britain, which withdrew farther north after the Jutland battle. Following military recommendations, the civil governor prohibited all public events and popular gatherings, even requiring citizens to stay away from windows. Gunpowder storage was removed from the city and fishermen were kept from their work, generating complaints that were reinforced in the media, which condemned the Portuguese First Republic.

The Orion left Ponta Delgada a little more than one week after the German attack. The American presence was conditioned by Portuguese bureaucracy to access to its own coal deposits and Portuguese law limited the supply to ships that did not carry out of the port, and the delay could have serious consequences for the assembly of the American facilities in Ponta Delgada. During the week of 21 July, eight steam ships were sunk by a U-boat off Santa Maria, some by U-155, causing a new flow of castaways.

The following week, the newspaper Açoriano Oriental 25


25 “USS Orion (AC-11),” NavSource Online Service Ship Photo Archive, accessed 6 October 2020; and Entidades Estrangeiras Agraciadas Com Ordens Portuguesas, Ordens Honorificas Portuguesas, Presidência da República Portuguesa (website), 6 accessed October 2020. The Torre e Espada was bestowed on the Orion’s crew on 20 January 1922.

26 Rezendes, Ponta Delgada e a I Guerra Mundial.

announced the arrival of the American destroyers that formed the U.S. Navy's division in the Azores. Its mission was to cover the maritime area of the Azores, preventing enemy access and assuring help to shipwrecked or otherwise distressed vessels. In the same week, some media reported that for the Germans, the islands were important logistically to dominating the North Atlantic.  

From this date on, shipwrecks along the coast, especially of American ships, became common. In early August 1917, the American consul asked the civil governor of Ponta Delgada for a numerical list of the officers and crews landed on Santa Maria to “be able to appreciate the accounts sent by the administrator of Vila do Porto municipality with the costs of hosting Americans, as well as the duration of stay.” Across the archipelago, the fear of a new attack was permanent, a result of the bombings of Ponta Delgada and Funchal and the growing number of German submarines spotted. On 7 August 1917, the military commander of Horta warned the military commander of the Azores of the presence of U-boats and a probable refueled ship near Fayal and Pico Islands and requested the defense of those two islands and of Flores and Corvo. The four islands’ mayors were insistent on behalf of the people. The Portuguese Army and Navy had to reinforce defenses in all the nine islands, but the Portuguese Republic was unable to provide the resources to do it. Despite few means and multiple conflicting demands, the military command of the Azores created detachments in the nine islands, largely symbolic, and the future American sea patrols helped to transmit security to all of the Azorean population.

Coincident to the establishment of the U.S. Navy facilities at Ponta Delgada, citizens reported unidentified submersibles around the islands. In January 1918, they were spotted near São Miguel, for example, and sometimes artillery shelling was heard. Materials and shipwrecks from different nations proved that not all the sighted vessels were American, causing problems among shore-bound sailors of different nationalities.

Patrolling cruisers, destroyers, and submarines conducted reconnaissance between islands, Madeira and probably Canarias, followed by seaplanes along São Miguel’s and Santa Maria’s coasts in a clear demonstration of the capacity of the American patrols, but without any success.

The German Navy attacked isolated ships, but there was no further confrontation between the German and U.S. navies, frustrating the U.S. Marines operating out of Ponta Delgada, despite all American naval maneuvers. For example, SM *U-179* (1917) attacked two Portuguese steam ships on 14 October 1918. The first one, the steamer *Sã Miguel*, was a civilian transport and the second, the NRP *Augusto de Castilho* (1915), its escort. After a two-hour fight, the *Sã Miguel* achieved security with the NRP *Ibo* (1911), and by the time the U.S. Navy vessels reached the contact point, the *Augusto de Castilho* had been sunk and part of the crew lost.

### The U.S. Detachment and the High Commissioner of the Republic for the Azores

Meanwhile, fear and rumors characterized Azorean society. After the second attack on Funchal on 12 December 1917, the population were discouraged and goods were in scarce supply. The development of total submarine warfare discouraged the Azorean and Portuguese merchants from risking imports and exports, stopping regular trade between the archipelago and the mainland and generating a situation that was aggravated by governmental insensitivity to the specific needs of the islands for products, such as matches. The economy was stagnant without imports, markets, ships, or alternatives, which were suffering from

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29 Rezendes, *Ponta Delgada e a I Guerra Mundial*, 160.
30 Walter S. Poague, *Diary and Letters of a Marine Aviator* (n.p.: Facsimile Publisher, 2016), 141.
31 “NRP Augusto Castilho,” Associação Commandante Carvalho Araújo (website), accessed 29 May 2021.
heavy war costs on the few existing transports. The shortages created by the lack of importation led to the hoarding of goods such as eggs, chickens, and lobsters and even put pressure on clandestine trade, resulting in commercial stagnancy or attempts to inflate prices even more. In addition to hunger and war, an influenza pandemic occurred in 1918, aggravating the social and political instability that characterized the First Portuguese Republic.\(^\text{31}\)

In this context, the presence of a U.S. naval base was welcomed and the creation of a Portuguese High Commission of the Republic for the Azores in 1918 represented an effective solution to coordinate the joint effort between national and foreign, military and civilians.\(^\text{34}\) The First Republic would try to match this, even if symbolically, by sending more (obsolete) artillery materiel and attempting, without practical and concrete results, the establishment of an airborne unit in Horta, with a detachment in Ponta Delgada, or even the first aerodrome in Terceira Island.

With the evolution of the conflict, the crisis would generate economic or ethical disruptions for administrative authorities. With an agricultural calendar linked to climate conditions and with the worsening of transportation, in 1918 wheat was requisitioned parish by parish, provoking popular riots and military intervention that, without mechanized support, could take many days to reach multiple destinations. Supported by the American allies and with the high commissioner of the republic already in Ponta Delgada, the situation would change. The U.S. Marine Corps were always available to assist on land or at sea, namely in connection with the United States or in the interisland supply of foodstuffs.


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The American Naval Base 13 in Ponta Delgada and the Portuguese Powers, 1917–19

With the establishment of the Americans on our island, navigation of the Atlantic Ocean was guaranteed against enemy invaders and protected from espionage; this complemented the naval strategy of the Allies with actions along the coast on the continent.\(^\text{35}\)

This was the Azorean feeling when the American naval base was established during the summer of 1917, after the attack on Ponta Delgada. Many locals hoped that a permanent base would defend the coastline and protect small, isolated ships and supplies intended to support the war effort. It was a critical year for the outcome of the war. Germany had less strength on the western front, but seemed willing to gamble with submarine warfare tactics, believing that it could win control of the North Atlantic Ocean, over England, even if that meant the entrance of the United States into the conflict.\(^\text{36}\) The risk of an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign had detrimental effects on a large zone of the Atlantic and caused America to enter the war in April that year.\(^\text{37}\) The seas surrounding the Azores were no longer on the periphery of the operations, rather they had become an important arena for the destruction of Allied ships, specifically in the triangle between the Azores, Europe, and Africa, and


a refueling point for submarines.\textsuperscript{38} In this context, the Azorean sea became one of the principal American preoccupations in the defense of its own coasts and transport of reinforcements, but was also of interest to the British to control access to their own harbors.\textsuperscript{39}

The German attack on 4 July confirmed the American theory regarding German interest in the Azores. By the end of July 1917, the American naval transport USS Panther (1889, later AD 6) and five old steam-powered destroyers arrived in Ponta Delgada.\textsuperscript{40} This group would be later designated as Destroyer Division One and went on to form the core of U.S. Naval Base 13, Azores, but without official status.\textsuperscript{41} The Azores became an intermediary point for small ships crossing the ocean from the United States, whether on their way to France or for vessel recovery. The mission of Destroyer Division One was to cover the general area of the Azores, to impede enemy action, and to assist shipwrecks and sea rescue missions. By the end of August 1917, the division was ordered to advance to France and was relieved by a new force, which included the monitor tender USS Tonopah (M 8), three destroyers, and a submarine division.\textsuperscript{42} This force also could extend to the neighboring archipelago of Madeira, southwest of Portugal, and almost to the Canary Islands of the northwest coast of Africa.

About three weeks after the Ponta Delgada attack and during a period of strong German submarine action in the Azorean sea, the local media announced the presence of five American destroyers, two of which had already stopped in Ponta Delgada and one in Santa Maria, the neighboring island, for rescue missions.\textsuperscript{43} The following week, various conflicts broke out between the locals and the Americans, which scared the peaceful population of the city. A shooting left people injured and a melee was stopped only by firing a round of dry gunpowder artillery. After these episodes, the authorities began to reinforce military discipline.

On 25 August 1917, Colonel António Germano Serrão dos Reis, the military commander of Ponta Delgada, sent a telegram to the military commander of the Azores in Terceira, Colonel António Veríssimo de Sousa, which announced the presence of Americans in the harbor.\textsuperscript{44} The Portuguese Navy commander began a series of visits to the American warships to determine their intent. The American presence on the island had become a cause of concern for the Portuguese authorities because of the lack of official authorization. To remedy this and to provide better conditions for the troops, the American government officially requested that Portugal allow a Navy base within Ponta Delgada, which would provide a better defense of the harbor and the city.\textsuperscript{45} Portugal approved the action on 8 November 1917 and the chief of U.S. naval operations, Admiral William S. Benson, appointed Rear Admiral Herbert O. Dunn as commander of this newly approved American base in the Azores.\textsuperscript{46} The U.S. Navy also ordered sufficient U.S. Marines and seaplanes to defend the coast, to patrol the Azorean seas, and to protect the harbor.

By the end of November, supply posts had been established for the foreign vessels. The media denounced the situation as annoying, saying that the business of the island was stymied by the high taxes the customs office applied for those who had come to defend the island.\textsuperscript{47} By the end of September, Júlio Milheirais, Ponta Delgada's naval port commander,

\begin{itemize}
  \item[38] António José Telo and Augusto Salgado, A Grande Guerra no Atlântico Português, vol. 2 (Lisbon: Fronteira do Caos Editores, 2018).
  \item[41] Telo, “Os Açores e as Estratégias para o Atlântico,” 217–64.
  \item[42] The Tonopah (M 8) was originally launched as the USS Connecticut on 24 November 1900, was renamed Nevada in January 1901, and was commissioned on 5 March 1903. The ship was then renamed Tonopah on 2 March 1909 to allow Battleship No. 36 to be named Nevada. “M-8 USS Nevada,” NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive, accessed 10 October 2020.
  \item[43] “Destroyers Americanos,” Açoriano Oriental, no. 4,289, 28 July 1917.
  \item[44] Comando Militar dos Açores, Correspondência sobre a base naval americana/relatórios, Pastas de notas, 1919, CDZMA, FIA 15.
  \item[46] “Herbert Dunn, RADM—Military Timeline,” TogetherWeServed.com, accessed 10 October 2020; and RAdm Herbert O. Dunn, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Based in the Azores to VAdm William S. Sims, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, 3 February 1918, NHHC, hereafter Dunn to Sims, 3 February 1918.
  \item[47] “O caso da alfândega e os destroyers americanos,” Açoriano Oriental, no. 4,294, 1 September 1917. For example, the price of a chicken (750 reis or $194.95US 2019) would cost an additional 675 reis on board.
\end{itemize}
had received the Portuguese Navy minister’s consent to authorize the American request to install gasoline in warehouses, guarded by the Portuguese Army. However, the Portuguese military commander also was preparing his transfer from Terceira to Ponta Delgada on 23 November 1917.48

By 25 November, the military commander of the Azores would concede all facilities to the U.S. Navy to improve the logistics of ships in transit.49 The Portuguese war minister authorized the placement of a U.S. Marine Corps aviation unit on the island. The U.S. naval contingent consisted of Admiral Dunn, 3 other officers, 90 sailors who would patrol the seas in the region, and 50 sailors to guard existing warehouses on land. Above all, the minister of war gave instructions to all Portuguese authorities to avoid delays in the American initiatives. However, the authorization was only for their presence on Ponta Delgada and did not allow similar concessions on the other islands without Portuguese government permission.50

By mid-December 1917, intense American naval activity dominated the area. On 16 December, the commander of the U.S. Navy Detachment, Azores, Lieutenant Commander Hugo W. Osterhaus, requested that the military commander of the Azores and the captain of the Ponta Delgada port advise the population about the military activities around the harbor.51

Rear Admiral Dunn arrived in Ponta Delgada on 9 January 1918 with a force of 150 riflemen, 10 seaplanes, two land cannons to defend the port and the new British wireless telegraph station, a division of submarines, a small number of coastal patrol boats, some logistical ships, one or two naval transports, and one or two destroyers, both on a temporary basis.52 At the core of these diplomatic events, both international and local, the president of the First Portuguese Republic (and war minister), Sidónio Pais, wanted to balance the different foreign influences in Ponta Delgada.53 Though he had accepted the Americans’ presence, he did not trust them. Some of these pressures were felt locally, as society was divided among those favoring the Americans, the British, or the Germans. In this volatile context, with a foreign force commanded by an official general within its national territory, the solution implemented was to create a new military position, above the pro-German Portuguese high navy commander, Admiral Augusto E. Neuparth. This new post of high commissioner of the Republic for the Azores centralized all military and civilian functions by someone receptive to the Allies, especially the British. General Simas Machado, the former commander of the 2d Division of the Portuguese Expeditionary Forces in the north of France, was selected.54

The impact of the American presence in São Miguel strengthened during January 1918. On 4 January, President and Minister of War Pais gave orders to the military commander of the Azores, Colonel de Sousa, to cooperate with Rear Admiral Dunn in matters of defense—always safeguarding the independence of the military commander of the Azores—and to assist the Portuguese Navy in tactical matters.55 In this phase, the American forces were not allowed to disembark. However, they could use supplies, upon request.

Preparations for the disembarkation of the American forces soon began. On 17 January, they began working on the installation of two barracks on

48 The military commander of the Azores’s headquarters was transferred from Angra do Heroísmo (Terceira Island) to Ponta Delgada (São Miguel Island) from 12 December 1917 to 27 December 1918. This change was temporary and only for indispensable people and services dealing with foreign forces. The centralization of the Portuguese commands by one individual on an equal basis with the American admiral was deemed more critical.
50 Rezendes, A Grande Guerra nos Açores—Memória Histórica e Património Militar (2014).
51 For more information, see Naval Investigation: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Sixty-sixth Congress Second Session, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), 136–38.
52 RAdm Herbert O. Dunn, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Based in the Azores to VAAdm William S. Sims, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, 15 February 1918, box 23, NHHC; and Dunn to Sims, 3 February 1918.
the grounds around São Bras Fortress, next to the harbor. On 21 January, the Americans obtained the authorization to come ashore. The local authorities and the American consulate spoke with Rear Admiral Dunn to prepare for their arrival the next day. On 24 January, the American consul questioned the possibility of constructing repair facilities by the guard houses of Corpo Santo beach, along the eastern walls of the São Bras fortress. On 27 January, the public disembarkation of the USS Hancock (1879, later AP 3) began with official military honours. Dunn and his staff arrived first, followed by the Marine aviation corps and a guard of 50 armed and equipped Marines. Dunn was visited by Colonel de Sousa, who informed him of the Portuguese concessions. In response, the admiral informed de Sousa that he had brought two of the latest 7-inch seacoast guns to defend the harbor and the British telegraph station in Feteiras, a small town located a few kilometers from Ponta Delgada.56

The authorized forces unloaded a significant amount of materials through 31 January. The goods, including grenades, airplane engines, sacks of cement to make platforms for the artillery, material for airplane repair, two trucks, two cars, and a large quantity of food were placed in warehouses around the city. Separately, more than 4,410 pounds of gunpowder were placed in small bags in the Ponta Delgada army storage room. The rest of the materials for the aviation company were unloaded in the Pedreira da Doca, an area less than 1 km west of the fort. The other explosives were unloaded at the fort and later moved to the newly constructed bunkers on the Serra Gorda mountain about 7 km from Ponta Delgada under the guard of a small detachment of the Portuguese 26th Infantry Regiment.

Meanwhile, construction continued around the fort, as the ancient boat ramp area of the beach was transformed into a concrete ramp to create facilities to repair the planes and the submarines, as well as lodgings for the submarine garrisons. Initially, there had been some confusion among the local, national, and American authorities due to the use of military areas; but this time, the work was carried out within the framework of mutual understanding between the American and Portuguese commands, while maintaining Portuguese national sovereignty and prudent diplomacy.

Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Dunn approached the Portuguese authorities with offers of extra manpower and equipment. On 2 February 1918, a meeting was held in de Sousa’s office regarding the placement of the two cannons, which was attended by a Portuguese Army lieutenant colonel engineer and major, an American lieutenant, and a British officer.57 One cannon was intended to defend the harbour of Ponta Delgada and the other to defend the new British telegraph station. The admiral would furnish two 45-caliber, 7-inch rapid fire guns, as well as the labor and materials for construction of their respective concrete platforms. The Portuguese officers offered to help with the construction, but it was declined.58

Before Dunn agreed to move ahead, he wanted to review the selected locations. The leaders first considered the British telegraph station at the base of the hill of Vigário. The admiral chose a southern position by the sea on a 650-foot-tall cliff, but in a depression. The Portuguese had hoped that this cannon would not only protect the station but also Ponta Delgada and the harbor; however, this was not the admiral’s intention.

Dunn also was shown a location in Santa Clara, just on the western outskirts of the city center, where codfish was normally dried. A cannon in this position could protect the western half of the city. Both choices were accepted by the Portuguese commission with reticence: if the cannon in Feteiras had been placed a little more to one side, it would have better protected the city, but Dunn would not budge. The cannon in Santa Clara was to be installed between a recently constructed battery of two Portuguese AE 150mm P

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56 Dunn to Sims, 3 February 1918.
57 LtCol Virgilio Júlio Sousa (engineer) and Lt Carlos David Calder (artillery). The Portuguese major was José Pedro Soares, and the British officer is unknown. In a second meeting, Capt Holmes, USN, (infantry) was present. Rezendes, A Grande Guerra nos Açores (2017).
(MK) cannons. The Portuguese engineer agreed to do this, knowing that the American cannon was of higher caliber and rapid fire, which would be fundamental in defense of the island against attack.

The cannons were placed in position as quickly as possible. The authorization for the implementation of the telegraph station defenses in Feteiras was approved on 1 March 1918. One cannon would protect the British telegraph station and the other in Santa Clara would protect the city port.

1st Marine Aeronautic Company in the Azores

The activities of the Corps’ 1st Marine Aeronautic Company in the Azores are not widely known, but some studies may help to understand the framework and mission in the Azores. By examining historians António Godinho’s and Hugo Cabral’s research, it is possible to gain some insights into the dynamics and results of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company. Marine Corps aviator Walter Smith Poague’s diary entries from October 1918 form the basis of Godinho’s work. Poague started writing on 6 April 1917, when Marine Aviation was an experimental unit—Marine Aeronautic Company—with only 7 officer aviators and 43 enlisted Marines. It was just a section of Naval Aviation, operating with four Curtiss AH hydroaeroplanes. After his enlistment, Poague trained at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, where he was later commissioned as a second lieutenant. Basic flight training lasted 10 weeks.

Lieutenant Poague was sent to Cape May, New Jersey, in October 1917 and stationed at the Aviation CAC3252, Coleção Museu Carlos Machado

60 In position on 6 April 1918. RAdm Herbert O. Dunn, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Based in the Azores, to VAdm William S. Sims, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, 6 April 1918, NHHC. This letter mentions some of the principal U.S. ships at Ponta Delgada harbor.

61 Godinho, “Marines in the Azores Islands in World War I,” 25–33. This piece was produced for the 100th Marine Corps Aviation anniversary.
62 Walter S. Poague was born in Chicago, IL, on 21 August 1891, into the city’s high society. After graduating from the University of Chicago in 1914, he worked as a sales manager at the real estate mortgage department of the Woodlawn Trust and Savings Bank, where his father was the director. In June 1917, he decided to enlist in the Marine Corps and was sent to the Azores.
Department Flying Field. On 12 October, Marine Aeronautic Company was split into the 1st Aviation Squadron (24 officers and 237 enlisted Marines) and the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company (10 officers and 93 enlisted Marines). On 14 October, 1st Aeronautic Company was transferred to Cape May, where it was equipped with two Curtiss R-6 floatplanes with the mission to carry out antisubmarine patrol duty along the coast.\(^{61}\) Lieutenant Poague was assigned to this unit, which was commanded by Captain Francis T. Evans, a skilled pilot who was the first to successfully execute a loop with a Curtiss N-9 seaplane in 1917. The spin-recovery maneuver of the loop became a basic element of aviation safety and earned Evans (retroactively) a Distinguished Flying Cross in 1936. Second in command was Captain David L. S. Brewster; the other officers included First Lieutenant Harvey B. Mims and seven other second lieutenants, including Poague.

In December 1917, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company received orders to depart for Naval Base 13 at Ponta Delgada. Its mission was antisubmarine patrols, using 2 Curtiss N-9 and 8–10 R-6 seaplanes.\(^{64}\) On 9 January 1918, the Hancock left Philadelphia carrying the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company with 13 officers and 122 sergeants and enlisted. Poague and his fellow Marines were transported to the archipelago by the Hancock, an 8,500-ton transport ship.\(^{65}\) Under Evans’s command, after a stormy trip and stop at Horta to refuel, the Hancock and its escorts arrived in Ponta Delgada on 23 January. The unit was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Dunn, who reported to Vice Admiral William S. Sims, chief of naval operations in Europe. After three weeks and up to May 1918, the company began an operational career related to the qualification of pilots. When the aeronautical company arrived in the Azores, only 3 pilots had their wings; the 10 others earned them in the theater of operations.\(^{66}\) In May, having made their first solos, these untrained pilots were conducting patrols offshore, and by the beginning of June they had their final tests as naval aviators.

According to Poague’s diary, after the initial flights, an intense instruction period started for the seven second lieutenants, from flight practice in their new environment to operational aspects of their flying. They were the backbone of the unit’s operation. The weather was the main obstacle for the Marine aviators, learning how to operate in the seas and winds around the Azores.

By the end of July 1918, the submarine menace was considered under control by the chief of naval operations, and at this time the 1st Marine Aviation Squadron arrived in Brest, France. Only Squadron D remained in Miami, Florida. With almost all of Marine Aviation deployed overseas, skilled pilots were needed to continue building and sustaining the major unit and several were transferred back to the United States, including Captain Evans (with a total of 4.3 scouting flight hours), First Lieutenant Mims (3.8 hours); Second Lieutenants Hill (22.1 hours), Sel-lon (29.5 hours), and Boyton (1.0 hour); and Gunnery Sergeant Carl Ehlers, who also logged only one scout flight.\(^{67}\) At the officers school, the admittance terms where changed, giving priority to the personnel who were in the ranks.

The reduction of the number of pilots did not affect the number of scouting flights. The first patrol was carried out on 12 April and then whenever the weather permitted. At least two patrols were performed daily: one at sunrise and one at sunset. However, there were also days when four or five patrols were made. The duration of these flights gradually increased. Until the


\(^{64}\) The aircraft were very similar in design being both biplanes with two seats; the main difference was that the R-6 had a more powerful engine at 200 horsepower and had two main pontoons, while the N-9 had a 100-horsepower engine with only one main pontoon. Godinho’s work reported the R-6s at 10, while Cabral’s counted only 8. Godinho, “Marines in the Azores Islands in World War I”; and Cabral, “1st Marine Aeronautic Company—A primeira dos Marines, a primeira nos Açores,” 25–34.

\(^{65}\) One interesting note is the setup of operations for flights compared with a similar setup with Curtiss HS-1s at Pauillac, France. At Ponta Delgada, the Marines installed their facilities (from tents to machinery shops) in 25 days; in France, with facilities already in place, it took 20 days.

\(^{66}\) Strange by current standards, at the time, a Marine only earned their wings as a naval aviator after completing basic instruction, integrating the operational units, and concluding the final tests.

\(^{67}\) Godinho, “Marines in the Azores Islands in World War I,” 33.
end of April, they were approximately 30 minutes. In May, they lengthened to an hour, and from there the length of patrols stabilized to an average duration of one and a half hours. Poague reported that flights were made off Ponta Delgada up to a distance of 25 km and with the island in sight. Without radio aid or wireless, and sometimes not even a compass, patrols occasionally went wrong when planes ran out of gas (the planes did not have fuel gauges) or got lost in the fog that usually covers the island of São Miguel. In July 1918, the flights totalled 104, of which 82 were for scouting (78.9 hours). The small decrease of flights, compared to the previous month, could be justified by four days of bad weather. In a month with good weather, the total scouting hours were around 80 hours—the maximum that they could sustain. However, keeping up with this operational tempo resulted in an increase of accidents due to materiel fatigue.68

After a short time, the Marines noted that the Azores were not often harassed by U-boats, so it seemed unnecessary to keep such a large military presence there. In July 1918, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company was reduced to 6 officers and 75 sergeants and enlisted, almost half of the original personnel. Captain Brewster commanded the company from 21 July.

On 2 September, three new Curtiss HS-2L flying boat patrol planes arrived to replace the dated R-6s and N-9s. The new aircraft had much more potential and durability for operations in Azorian waters.69 Unfortunately, engines were not loaded on the ship, a situation resolved later. Although the daily reports are not clear, it seems that the flying boats only started to operate at the beginning of October, but there is no doubt that the old R-6s operated until the end, as there are many records of aerial and maintenance activity of these planes. During the 1918 influenza pandemic, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company lost four pilots, so October represents a drastic drop in patrols as a result of the lack of both personnel and good weather. On 1 November, there were only nine pilots in the hospital and the company attempted a return to normal activity.70

Despite the quality of Glenn Curtiss’s engines and seaplanes, like any other air unit, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company had accidents. The seaplanes eventually became too fragile to operate under the sea conditions around Ponta Delgada; waves were a constant in the artificial port, battering the seaplanes. In addition, the port was constantly crowded with ships, boats, and buoys, obstacles that sometimes became visible to pilots too late to avoid. The first accident occurred as early as 15 March, when Second Lieutenant Mims’s plane (A-208, a Curtiss N-9) ran out of fuel just outside the harbor. Although it was towed, the cable gave way and the aircraft drifted until it was destroyed against the rocks on the coast.71

Similarly, plane A-334 (a Curtiss R-6) crashed 13 km from Ponta Delgada on 19 June. The pilot, Gunner Sergeant Ehlers, only had a few abrasions, but the plane sank to the bottom. On 9 October, First Lieutenant Poague’s A-328 (a Curtiss R-6) lost power shortly after taking off and Poague maneuvered to avoid a metal buoy. As his Curtiss R-6 skidded, the wings and the floats broke. Poague and Gunner Sergeant Walton B. Ziegler (the mechanic) had to swim and wait for assistance, but the aircraft was recovered. On 10 October, plane A-337 (a Curtiss R-6) had a power failure, forcing First Lieutenant William Embry to make an emergency landing in rough seas. The masts of the left float gave way and the propeller cut the tips of the floats, which caused the hydroplane to half-sink with its nose submerged. The crew suffered no injuries, but the plane’s wings broke during its recovery and the aircraft was considered unrecoverable.72

However, the most dramatic accident occurred on 5 November, less than a week before the Armistice. At 0600, Poague and Ziegler boarded the A-335 (a Curtiss R-6) for the first patrol of the day. The aircraft overturned on take-off in Ponta Delgada bay, and Ziegler, while working to free himself, could not save Poague. Poague’s remains were transported back

68 Godinho, “Marines in the Azores Islands in World War I,” 33.
69 In addition, it had a new 330 horsepower Liberty engine, which were unlike the V4 (200 hp) or OXX3 (100 hp) engines to which they were accustomed.
70 Poague, Diary and Letters of a Marine Aviator, 138–47.
71 Poague, Diary and Letters of a Marine Aviator, 43.
to the United States by the cruiser USS Chicago (1885, later CA 14) on 21 November 1918 and he was buried in Oak Woods Cemetery in Chicago on 21 December 1918.73 During nine months of operations in the Azores, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company lost one aviator and five planes in accidents, in addition to numerous incidents that were not recorded.74 These figures may seem daunting by current standards, but considering the intense aerial activity, the fragility of the planes, and the operating conditions, and comparing it with other contemporary units, it seems that 1st Marine Aeronautic Company was very lucky.

Poague and Ziegler’s 5 November flight was the company’s last patrol attempt. As of 11 November, a large part of the company’s activity was limited to packing its materiel. Interestingly, the only air activity after Poague’s accident was the assembly of and three test flights on the Curtiss HS-2L (belonging to the Portuguese) with plane A-1362, which according to Major Brewster’s reports was assembled on 7 November. It is important to clarify that this Portuguese HS-2L did not belong to 1st Marine Aeronautic Company. Portuguese Navy archive documents confirm the purchase of four American seaplanes to equip the Horta Maritime Aviation Center in June 1918.75 However, after the Armistice, the Americans proposed that the Azorean authorities buy three or four seaplanes, a motorboat, and various machinery from 1st Marine Aeronautic Company for approximately 48,000 escudos ($525US 2021). First Lieutenant Adolfo Trindade, responsible for the Horta Portuguese Navy Center, was required to carry out the purchase, but due to the bureaucracy and anarchy of the time, the first response from Lisbon arrived too late: the ship carrying the seaplanes had already set sail for America five hours earlier.

The company detached from the Azores on 24 January 1919, arriving at the Marine Flying Field in Miami on 19 March, probably the last day of 1st Marine Aeronautic Company’s existence. The flying beach and its Ponta Delgada facilities were used by the Portuguese to install the Azores Maritime Avia-

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75 Cópia da ata nº19 do Conselho Técnico, 18 February 1921, box 4183, Biblioteca Central de Marinha, Arquivo Histórico, Direção da Aeronáutica Naval; Tradução do Acordo entre os governos dos Estados Unidos e Portugal, para o estabelecimento de centros de aviação maritima em Ponta Delgada e na Horta, 14 June 1918, Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Regional de Ponta Delgada (BPARPD); and “Processo de aviação Marítima,” (Agreement between the United States and Portugal for the Establishment of Naval Air Stations in Ponta Delgada and Horta), BPARD, Administração Central Delegada, Governo Civil de Ponta Delgada—Alto Comissário da República nos Açores, Repartição de Gabinete—Gabinete Militar 00021.
tion Center, which was closed two years later without experiencing the air activity of its predecessors.

**Naval Base 13’s Social Effects and Demobilization**

During his command of the U.S. facilities in Ponta Delgada, Rear Admiral Dunn introduced himself to the social life of the island in February 1918 by helping the poor. He was even given a welcoming party at the Teatro Micaelense with the local VIPs and the British telegraph commission.76

Economic development rapidly expanded, even in February, as verified by the fact that new hotels appeared and the local press referred to the period as an opportunity for financial gain.77 The annual Mardi Gras celebration was limited because of the war, but included a “battle” of flowers to honor the visitors. The following month, festivals were announced to raise funds for the Portuguese Red Cross and films—made during training exercises as seaplanes flew over Ponta Delgada—were exhibited to show the southern coast of the island. New restaurants were opening and even the popular language was affected by the American presence. For example, one of the most important restaurants in the city was named the Washington. On 11 March, the Azores detachment of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet invited the military commander of the Azores to assist in the cannon test in Santa Clara.78 And on 28 March, exercises took place southeast of the village of Povoação, with the gun-


77 Ferreira, “Os Açores nas duas Guerras Mundiais.”

78 Comando Militar Dos Açores, Ofício americano sobre exercícios navais, Pastas de notas, 1917, CDZMA, FIA 1230.
boat USS *Wheeling* (1897, later PG 14) and an American patrol boat. In April, there were festivities at the naval club of Ponta Delgada, with friendly competitions between American and Portuguese sailors. At this time, the American ships helped the local businesses by providing necessary supplies from the United States, such as malt for the beer factory, which in turn would provide ice for the hospital.79 The admiral was greatly admired for his good works in Ponta Delgada, such as the soup kitchen for the local poor and theatrical productions to benefit the Red Cross. On 3 July 1918, seven days after the Portuguese Red Cross delegation opened in Ponta Delgada, its president, Luís de Bettencourt de Medeiros e Câmara, thanked the admiral for sending a donation of 890 escudos ($10US), the largest contribution at that time.80 Rear Admiral Dunn’s efforts reinforced the good image of the base and provided a vehicle for economic development in the region, surpassing the local patrons of good works.81 This image was reinforced during the influenza pandemic that autumn, when he offered his assistance and the support of the American Red Cross to the island. Upon his death many years later, the local newspaper, *Correio dos Açores*, reported the admiral’s demise in terms of a person who had greatly helped the population as a benefactor to the poor. He had worked to deliver grain to the various islands, imported American flour, and given gasoline to the local authorities so doctors could provide medical care during the pandemic. He had even sent a destroyer to Gibraltar to obtain medicine. Dunn was considered one of the principals responsible for keeping the death rate from influenza below 2,000 people in São Miguel.82

Despite Dunn’s efforts to convince Vice Admiral Sims of the importance of maintaining the American naval base in Ponta Delgada, demobilization began on 20 January 1919 with the embarkation of most of the Marines and planes on the USS *Nereus* (AC 10).83 However, minimal services were maintained on the island until September 1919 to support the small ships that were returning to the United States after the war. In March 1919, the Americans gave the Portuguese the two mounted 175mm cannons, as well as two 75mm cannons and some crated seaplanes. On 14 April, Dunn transferred the command to Rear Admiral Richard H. Jackson and returned to the United States.84

With the war over and new technology in place, the first transatlantic aviation crossing was successfully completed. On 19 May 1919, Navy lieutenant commander Albert C. Read and his crew arrived in the Azores in their Curtiss NC-4 flying boat from Newfoundland, Canada. Three planes attempted the crossing, but only one was successful. With the help of the Ponta Delgada naval base for refueling, the plane reached Lisbon in 27 hours.85

On 23 August 1919, Rear Admiral Jackson announced his plan to leave and to demobilize the base. He gave orders to dismantle the American hospital and to give the barracks to the Portuguese. With the Americans’ departure during the week of 20 August, Naval Base 13 was officially closed.86 The base was quickly disassembled. It had only ever been considered temporary protection for the coal supplies in the harbors and the Azorean seas from the Triple Alliance.

**Final Considerations**

The final demobilization of Naval Base 13 on Ponta Delgada began in March 1919 with the order to withdraw defense vessels, reducing the mission of the detachment to support of small escorts returning to the

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79 “Ofícios 44 a 46 de 28 de Julho de 1917,” in Livro 356 do Governador civil de Ponta Delgada: Correspondência expedita por este Governo Civil a diversas autoridades e pessoas, 1ª Seção, BPARPD, Fundo do Governo Civil de Ponta Delgada (FGCPD), 123–26.
81 RAdm Herbert O. Dunn, commander, Azores Detachment, letter to VAdm William S. Sims, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, 14 October 1918, NHHC.
84 “Azores Naval Base Made for Allied Naval Victory.”
85 Livro 342 do Governador civil de Ponta Delgada: Correspondência expedita por este Governo Civil a diversas autoridades e pessoas, 1ª Seção, BPARPD, FGCPD.
86 Demobilization Plan—Memorandum No. 2, 14 November 1918, RG 45, entry 517B, NHHC.
United States. Admiral Dunn delivered the artillery and some materiel to the Portuguese authorities and departed on 14 April 1919. The departure of the last Marines took place the week of 20 August 1919.

The rapid demobilization of American forces was a reflection of how the United States always viewed the Azores Detachment of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet in Ponta Delgada: temporary. Its existence represented security to the population of São Miguel and generated confidence in the rest of the archipelago, especially in the nearest islands, and also for isolated ships crossing the sea between Bermuda and Gibraltar. The details of the base’s operability are not well known, however it was not very intense. Naval Base 13 was involved in regular exercises and sea and air patrols in the area between the Azorean sea (almost to the Bermuda Sea), Madeira, Lisbon, Gibraltar, and nearly to the Canarias sea, and that the most dangerous moment could have been contact with a possible U-boat that submerged, wreaking confusion among the Marine aviators on 11 September 1918. But the mission was, in part, accomplished: access to the Azores was denied to the enemy and the Azorean sea was secure. The main route between the United States and southern Europe, passing by Bermuda and the Azores, especially for nonconvoy ships, was more secure, and ships could be sure of secured harbors for refueling and repairs. With the support of the U.S. radio facilities in Ponta Delgada, Dunn could prepare their passage, escorting them if necessary.

The legacy of the United States’ presence in the Azores, however, would remain in the collective memory for the help in preserving public order, goods, and free transportation to and from the United States, as well as for the dynamism of trade and technology.

The existence of an Allied admiral led to a response from the Portuguese state by naming an officer with a rank equivalent to that of a U.S. Navy rear admiral and in the face of possible diplomatic instability, a pro-Allied leadership with vast civil, military, and diplomatic powers. Like the American presence, the transition from the military command of the Azores from Terceira to São Miguel between December 1917 and 1918 would be provisional—but indispensable—in representing the Portuguese government until a provisional high commissioner of the republic arrived in the region.

The American military presence extended to helping the local population, including providing support during the influenza epidemic. Internally, far from enemy action, the island and its American naval hospital provided a valuable resource as a secure refuge for all that crossed the Atlantic, providing medical care or assistance in death, at an important halfway point of the route. The American military base in the Azores provided logistical support, doctors, and administrative services, which were primary concerns. This was important for all 38 cases of death, and perhaps more importantly, for all those who survived because of these resources.

Although the U.S. Marines in the Azores did not see as much action as their aviator comrades who served in France, they provide the best demonstration of the Marine Corps’ ability to quickly mobilize an aviation unit and keep it on expeditionary service for a long period of time. This unit’s activities can be said to have contributed to the maintenance of a modest aerial component in the Corps until the Second World War. While monotonous, the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company’s service was not free of danger, as the few injuries and deaths show. The reduction of the company’s personnel is probably attributable to the lack of results and flexibility and use of materiel, as well as the fact that only half the planes shipped were used; many were cannibalized for spare parts.

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Resilience and adaptability are two important characteristics of those who stayed in the Azores working on new solutions or producing developments like the first scouting flight in the Azores (16 February 1918) and air-to-ground transmission in that region of the Atlantic, or even helping the Portuguese Navy to assemble the HS-2L plane that First Lieutenant Adolfo Trindade acquired from the United States for the Portuguese air center in the Azores (Centro de Aviação Marítimo dos Açores), as the counterpart of the U.S. Navy facility.\(^91\)

Additional research may prove that the U.S. commands in the Azores and Europe remained open until planes gained sufficient ability to cross the Atlantic without stopping. The first transatlantic crossing completed in the Azores was not attempted simply to show off technological advancements but to advance commercial interests. Between the two world wars, Horta and Ponta Delgada continued to support naval and other pioneers of international aviation, including pilots from Portugal, Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Poland.

Indeed, the First World War was not the end of America’s presence in the Azores. The U.S. Air Force installed facilities on Santa Maria Island at the end of World War II, then moved to Terceira Island in 1946. Between 1939 and 1945, Portugal was again forced to defend the strategic importance of the Azorean sea, first as neutral then after supporting the Allies in the Azores.\(^92\) Both sides of the conflict saw in the islands the possibility of establishing harbors and airfields to support their military plans. The safeguarding of communications and the passage of sea convoys in the Atlantic as well as aerial cover of the routes were excellent reasons to invade the Azores, providing a starting point for the various belligerent expansionist projects, with or without the consent of the Portuguese state.

Portugal’s fascist prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar declared the country’s neutrality in World War II, reinforcing the 1939 Iberian Pact with Spain and the military power in the three most important islands, preparing them to receive the government. Again isolated in the North Atlantic, the Azores suffered a new struggle for the domination of the seas. The interaction between civil and military authorities imposed by outside pressures shows the vulnerability of the Azorean people during World War II. The islands underwent serious difficulties to sustain the presence of a large Portuguese military contingent.\(^93\) With an economy that was dependent on others, the Azores was even more exposed to factors such as the economic blockade and the submarine warfare. The Azoreans again experienced many insecurities during the war due to both internal and external pressures, including lack of materials, food, and transport; inflation; reduced capacity for import and export, creating a black market; the drop in purchasing power; and the possibility of riots. Controlled by a fascist government with exceptional and authoritarian powers, the balance between the authorities, the military forces, and the Azoreans would work again, especially after 1943. To control the Azores Gap, the British (in 1943) and the Americans (in January 1944) requested use of the Portuguese government facilities in Terceira and Santa Maria Islands and support in São Miguel and Faial Islands.\(^94\) The establishment of permanent U.S. facilities in Santa Maria and the change to Terceira in 1946 prove that Rear Admiral Dunn’s view of the Azores’ strategic importance was correct and works until today.\(^95\)


The Cold War reinforced the importance of the archipelago not only by the American facilities at Lajes Air Base (Air Base 4) on Terceira but also by the NATO harbor on São Miguel and a communications center on the same island. The visits by U.S. presidents to the archipelago, sometimes for international summits, are proof that even today the Azores are the first line of the U.S. Atlantic defense.

On 8 February 1927, Rear Admiral Dunn appeared before the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) to suggest the building of a modest memorial at Ponta Delgada “to commemorate the services of the American Navy in that vicinity during the World War. On the motion of Colonel Markey, it was decided that the Commission should erect a monument at Ponta Delgada.” The chairman of the ABMC, General John J. Pershing, requested authorization from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to construct a monument to the memory of the World War I-era U.S. detachment in the Azores. The U.S. embassy forwarded the request to the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministry, which approved the plans and directed the Internal Affairs Ministry to collaborate with the ABMC and informed the local authorities. Unfortunately, while a design for the memorial was selected, the plan to build it was eliminated for economic reasons.

Today, the process for a World War I memorial has been initiated again with the ABMC by the author and the U.S. consulate in Ponta Delgada, with the support of the U.S. embassy in Lisbon. It is the last effort to celebrate this common history after the 100th anniversary of the attack on Ponta Delgada and the first flight in the Azores. Both countries should work together to build this unique memorial to the U.S. Navy’s operations in the Iberian Peninsula during World War I.

96 Today, it is home to the 65th Air Base Wing of the U.S. Air Force.
98 Record of 23d meeting, 8 February 1927, RG 117 entry 2, box 12, binder 2, American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) Archives, 67.
99 Record of 33d meeting, 1 December 1930, RG 117, entry 2, box 12, binder 2, ABMC Archives.
100 “Ponta Delgada assinala os 100 anos do bombardeamento da 1.a Guerra Mundial,” 5 July 2017, Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, video, 1:50 min; and “Cem anos depois do primeiro voo nos Açores,” 17 February 2018, SIC Noticias, video, 1:28 min.
Marine Corps Boot Camp during World War II

THE GATEWAY TO THE CORPS’ SUCCESS AT IWO JIMA

by Jessica Anderson-Colon

Abstract: Was the Marine Corps’ success at Iwo Jima a matter of leadership, bravado, or fundamental training? This article examines the efficacy of boot camp, replacement training, and unit training as it relates to the success of the U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima. During World War II, the exploits of the Marines on Iwo Jima have been commended, but the reality of wartime exigencies inevitably placed a strain on the quality of men slated for the Service. However, the Marine Corps’ emphasis on the fundamentals during boot camp proved the necessary ingredient for victory. Beyond leadership or lore, this article asserts that Marine Corps boot camp provided an elemental gateway to success on Iwo Jima.

Keywords: Marine Corps, boot camp, World War II, Pacific campaign, recruit training, replacement training, Iwo Jima, 3d Marine Division, 4th Marine Division, 5th Marine Division, V Amphibious Corps, Parris Island

Introduction

U.S. Marine heroics on Iwo Jima have been commended time and again in both academic and popular histories.¹ This is not surprising since more than one-quarter of all the Marine Corps’ World War II medals of honor were earned during action on that tiny, sulfurous island. Marines faced a ferocious Japanese underground defensive network that was never seen before or after on such terrain, resulting in more than 2,400 Marines killed or wounded the first day of the assault. The exploits on 19 February 1945 solidified the Marine Corps’ legacy and eulogized the operations on Iwo Jima as iconic.² The reported exemplary combat performance and ultimate capture of Iwo Jima led to the assumption that the Marines

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² Iwo Jima was highly praised by Navy Fleet Adm Chester W. Nimitz on 16 March 1945: “Among the men who fought on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” See also Nalty and Crawford, *The United States Marines on Iwo Jima*, for information on Joseph Rosenthal’s “Flag Raising on Iwo Jima” photograph in newspapers from 1945 such as *The Decatur (IL) Daily Review*, *The Lincoln (NE) Star*, *The Honolulu (HI) Advertiser*, *The New York Times*, and *Time* and *Life* magazines in February and March 1945.
who attacked the island were expertly trained.\textsuperscript{3} Due to the draft, the high replacement rate, and the need for manpower in multiple theaters of war, a shortage of time and quality instructors alongside substandard methods underscore where these assumptions begin to falter. It is unclear precisely what training these Marines received prior to what Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl describe as “throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete.”\textsuperscript{4} Missing from the discussion is how the Corps was able to mass-produce men, using a limited wartime schedule to function under heavy fire and enormous casualties. An examination of the Marine Corps’ basic training, reserve troop training, and unit training will show that the latter two were deficient. Operation reports such as ones from the \textit{3d Marine Division Reinforced: Iwo Jima Action Report} and the Task Force 56 G-3’s planning report for Iwo Jima state that the troops were not consistently in an advanced state of training, and the training application was inconsistent and immeasurable.\textsuperscript{5} Boot camp remained the only steadfast, principal training acquired by the troops headed to Iwo Jima.

The American public was quickly losing morale when it came to the duration of World War II. The war affected nearly every individual in one way or another, and heavy losses took a toll on the public’s opinions of the necessity versus cost involved in further Pacific campaigns.\textsuperscript{6} As the fighting began on Iwo Jima, the Marines raised a symbol of hope in the form of an American flag from the top of Mount Suribachi. This became a source of encouragement for troops fighting in the Pacific and for the American people and their faith in the U.S. Marine Corps. Iwo Jima was part of the original Japanese prefecture, and the eventual capture would be a great victory for not only American determination but also a huge psychological blow to the Japanese.\textsuperscript{7}

Although the Marines’ heroics were immediately memorialized by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in March 1945 when he said, “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue,” limited attempts have been made to dissect how “uncommon valor” became such a “common virtue” among the Corps.\textsuperscript{8} Few detailed reports on the methodology or strategies for creating this trait exist, mostly schedules, goals, and end results. Scholarship focuses on battle details of Operation Detachment, the code name given to the battle for the Japanese-held island of Iwo Jima, and the numerous acts of patriotism and loyalty among the Marines, but lacks in-depth analysis of what made the Marines behave this way.\textsuperscript{9} Was it the basic indoctrination received in boot camp, or can more credit be given to the training received during pre-embarkation exercises? How

\textsuperscript{3} Joseph Alexander argues that “the troops assaulting Iwo Jima were arguably the most proficient amphibious forces the world had seen.” Joseph H. Alexander, \textit{Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima} (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1994), 3.
\textsuperscript{4} George Garrand and Truman Strobridge make the closing argument that the success of the Marines on Iwo Jima is “proof of the latter’s courage, highly advanced state of training, and the soundness of amphibious doctrine that had become an integral part of Marine Corps tactics.” George W. Garrand and Truman R. Strobridge, \textit{History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II}, vol. 4, \textit{Western Pacific Operations} (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1971), 737.

\textsuperscript{7} Breanne Robertson, ed., \textit{Investigating Iwo: The Flag Raising in Myth, Memory, and Esprit de Corps} (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2019), 85–90.
\textsuperscript{9} The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War details specifically troop training, embarkation, and rehearsals. These details include rehearsals beginning in the fall of 1944. It also looks at the evolution of amphibious doctrine and its training implementation up until the attack on Iwo Jima. Isely and Crowl, \textit{The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War}, chaps. 3 and 10. Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II provides detailed lists of recruit training to include major subjects, rifle range periods pre-World War II, and the changes made during World War II. It gives hours spent on each subject and goals in each skill, but it does not detail specifically how the instructors were supposed to administer these sections or how esprit de corps was/should be established among the new recruits. Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, \textit{Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II}, 12–30, 158–94.
did the Marine Corps train the men who volunteered or were drafted to possess such uncommon valor, and did the Marine Corps’ training differ from other Service branches? This study will grapple with those questions and analyze enlisted Marine basic training, Marine combat performance, and individual heroics providing a comparison to establish the source of the Corps’ success. This article argues that the core values instilled during basic training were enough to overcome the challenges encountered at Iwo Jima. Consequently, it was through their initiative in small-unit combat that the battle was won.

**Historiography**
Generally, the major themes encompassing the literature on Iwo Jima fall into three basic categories: training, planning, and implementation; battle narrative; and individual acts of valor. Most of the accounts comment on leadership, the efficacy or fault involving the use of coordinated arms, and amphibious doctrine and its contribution to the victory at Iwo Jima.

In *Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II*, Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, and Edwin T. Turnbladh argue that the early success of the Marines was due to recruit training conducted during peacetime. Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, who wrote or edited multiple works for the Historical Branch of the Marine Corps, focus more on the objective subjects of the training that aided in the Corps’ successes during World War II. Their examination is based primarily on the records of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Schools. Each assessment of the periods and types of training proposes recommendations and conclusions based on the after action reports provided by the Marine Corps as well as the authors’ analysis of these recommendations and conclusions and the benefit of retrospection. While very detailed regarding time frames and subject areas of training, these authors fail to break down the methodology used by drill instructors or give specifics on how recruits are trained in the subject matter, performance corrections, or the instruction modes that established the motto First to Fight and nicknames such as leathernecks and devil dogs, that remain an integral part of the Marines’ bearing. In *Western Pacific Operations*, authors George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge’s primary focus is on Marine Corps leadership and how they translated their experience in World War I to the planning for Iwo Jima. They formulate their argument beginning with the expertise of the leaders and planners of the battle. Many of these leaders served in World War I and had extensive experience with amphibious doctrine. Garand and Strobridge argue that victory on Iwo Jima was achieved through the leadership’s careful planning and preparation, the coordination of supporting arms, and an advanced state of training. Garand and Strobridge state: “That the island could be taken at all in view of the strength of its defenses and the casualties incurred by the attacking Marines is proof of the latters’ courage, highly advanced state of training, and the soundness of amphibious doctrine that had become an integral part of Marine Corps tactics.” This argument is problematic due to the shortcomings experienced in the training in addition to the operation reports stating that the troops were not consistently advanced in training as purported. It also does not adequately address the heavy casualties incurred by officers and command leaders throughout operations in the Pacific or how this affected the small units in the absence of their leadership.

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12 It is stated in the special action report that “our battle casualties were some 30 per cent of the entire Landing Force. In the infantry regiments, however, those casualties counted to an average of 75 per cent in the two assault divisions and 30 per cent in the 3d Marine Division, of the original regimental strength. Furthermore, the loss in key personnel, particularly leaders, was even higher.” *V Phib Corps Landing Force Report on Iwo Jima Campaign* (San Francisco, CA: Headquarters V Amphibious Corps, 1945), 1-12.
Corps reports, so it is noteworthy that the failures experienced in training are not thoroughly discussed. There is a possibility that the discrepancies between the reports and actual troop readiness were the authors’ attempt to disguise the limitations experienced by leadership or the force, either to avoid appearing inefficient or in acknowledgement of wartime limitations. Conversely, the 3d Marine Division Reinforced: Iwo Jima Action Report states that the status of combat training of the 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts were found to be “badly deficient,” and only simple exercises in ship-to-shore movement were conducted early in the training schedule. It was also reported that two to four weeks of recruit training formed the full extent of their combat training.

Isely and Crowl also evaluate the Marine Corps’ shortcomings when it comes to amphibious doctrine and implementation. They take a systematic approach to assessing the role of amphibious training and operations during the Second World War, providing one of the most comprehensive looks at the contribution of amphibious warfare that characterized the Marine Corps. Like many historians, they assert that “the capture of Iwo is the classical amphibious assault of recorded history.” Isely and Crowl in addition to Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh place a great deal of emphasis on the significance of amphibious training conducted before Iwo Jima. Their discussions dedicate considerable portions to the analysis of landing tactics, amphibious vehicles, and coordinated support. These authors’ analyses summarize how amphibious doctrine paved the way for an effortless attack on any heavily fortified islands. According to the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force report on the Iwo Jima campaign, the battle replacements arrived late and there was insufficient time to train them in their shore duties or for use as replacements within the division. Many of the pre-embarkation rehearsals were also deficient. At times, amphibian tractors were missing or, because of crowded beach conditions during ship-to-shore rehearsals, battalions and companies were not landed. During the second week of January 1945, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions conducted rehearsals off Maui and Kahoolawe Islands, Hawaii, but they lacked realism because coordinated naval and aerial joint fires support was still in the Philippine region. Rehearsals in the Mariana Islands were also impaired by weather that prevented any troops from landing. While amphibious doctrine paved the way, the rehearsals were insufficient, and a successful beach landing was only one element of the attack on Iwo Jima.

Another ineffective strategy the Marine Corps used, as noted by Isely and Crowl, was the employment of replacements in a one-for-one system. A report filed 31 March 1945, from the Headquarters Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, G-4 Report of Logistics Iwo Jima Operation, stated, “Prior to embarkation these troops were trained to be with the regular division shore parties and during initial phase of assault, were to function as service troops of the shore party upon completion of their mission with the shore party or when called for by the divisions, they were released as combat replacements for assault units.” Even if they were highly trained, it would have still proved challenging to function efficiently as a cohesive member of the force. According to Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, the training that began in December 1942 at the Replacement Training Depot established in Samoa was “far from satisfactory. Instructors were inexperienced and, in a few cases incompetent. Schedules had not been prepared in advance and had to be improvised day to day depending upon the availability of

Recruits being dispatched from the Replacement Training Depot received reports similar to the previous one made by the commanding general of the 2d Division on Tarawa Atoll. Reports stated that they lacked knowledge regarding simple first aid or field sanitation; few replacements, if any, had ever dug a foxhole; and there was little to no time devoted to combat firing. These outcomes were due to the high number of replacement troops needed and inconsistencies within the training. Some were unable to complete the full eight-week schedule and were sent to the division immediately following boot camp. The need for manpower created the dangerous situation of sending highly inexperienced troops into battle. Additionally, due to embarkation dates and inconsistent training schedules, the replacement troops headed to Iwo Jima would have only received a portion of the new training centered around bunker problems and not on the previous focus of jungle warfare.

Enlisted Marine Basic Training

During peacetime, training for all recruits lasted for eight weeks at either Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, or San Diego, California. The training comprised the fundamentals of military life, including “discipline, military courtesy, close order drill, and interior guard duty.” Intense physical conditioning and an emphasis on rifle mastery and accuracy on the range was elemental. The new recruit also received “elementary instruction in infantry combat subjects such as digging foxholes, using bayonets and grenades, chemical warfare, map reading, and basic squad combat principles.”

Beginning on 1 June 1939, before President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s authorized increase, the eight-week schedule would be reduced to four weeks. This shortened training included two weeks of indoctrination and basic instruction in the ways of the Marine. Weapons training would occur during week three, and the fourth week would consist of further instruction or demonstration of other infantry weapons. Predictably, this four-week training schedule produced a measurable decrease in the caliber of the recruits graduating from boot camp. In January 1940, once the Marine Corps reached its strength of 25,000, the recruit training was increased to a six-week course (table 1). Once the United States joined the war effort, Marine Corps boot camp implementation would only continue to struggle under a restricted and erratic schedule. Even with this restricted schedule, the weeks spent in boot camp provided the necessary transition from civilian to military life. These recruits might not have been as efficient within the unit as those produced without wartime exigencies, but this instruction produced a basic Marine that was able to survive on the battlefield. The rest was on-the-job training.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Marine boot camp remained similar in content to boot camp conducted during the short-of-war period. An additional increase was authorized on 16 December 1941, bringing the Marine Corps strength up to 104,000 troops. This required the depots to train an average of 6,800 troops between December and February. On 1 January 1942, the recruit depots instituted a five-week training schedule in which three weeks were spent at the main station and the following two weeks were conducted at the rifle range. When enlistments began to decline, the schedule settled at a seven-week course on 1 March (table 2). When compared to peacetime recruit training, the most notable difference was an increased emphasis on combat readiness. Physi-

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24 This Replacement Training Center was originally in New River, NC, and then moved to Samoa until July 1943, at which point it was moved to Camp Lejeune, NC. It was not until 21 July 1944 that the replacement training centers omitted jungle warfare and replaced it with bunker problems with an emphasis on assaulting heavily fortified islands. However, very few replacements would have participated in this training before their embarkation date. See Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 183; and V Phib Corps Landing Force Report on Iwo Jima Campaign, 2.
cal training was altered to include contact exercises such as “boxing, wrestling, judo, hand-to-hand fight-
ing, and swimming.” In July 1944, leadership insti-
tuted additional reforms affording the Marine Corps a steady schedule of eight weeks of training for a total of 421 hours of instruction that included an additional 36 hours of weapons training (tables 3 and 4).

Other Service branches’ training organizations, such as the Army’s, did not function similarly to the Marine Corps. The Army, from 1940 through 1945, in-
ducted 8.1 million troops. To facilitate this expansion, the War Department designated a parent division to the new divisions being formed. These new divisions received 13 weeks of basic training as part of a 44-week training cycle. The 13-week basic training included 572 hours of instruction in subjects such as marches and bivouacs, individual tactical training, hand grenades, and bayonet training. Based on commanders’ reports and combat experience, there was a need to alter the 13-week basic training schedule by increasing it to 17 weeks in 1943. The most notable changes between the 13- and 17-week training schedules for the Army was the increase in weapons familiarization from 0 to 46 hours and physical training from 15 to 40 hours, respectively. There were disruptions throughout this training due to unique competition within the Army. They lost soldiers to the Army Air Force, Officer Candidate School, or Army Specialized Training Program.30

While the intention of this article is not to com-
pare the branches of Service and the basic training/ boot camp those Services provided during World War II, there are some similarities and differences between the Army’s basic training and the Marine Corps’ boot camp that can be discussed for clarity. However, an objective comparison cannot be made about whether one Service’s boot camp better equipped its recruits for battle over the other. The author believes it is actu-
ally the subjective qualities—the esprit, brotherhood, lore, and psychological aspects—of Marine Corps boot camp that led to Marines’ success on Iwo Jima, and therefore, a comparison should not be made in the context of this study.

The Army faced a set of unique obstacles dur-
ing World War II. It not only had the largest influx of draftees and volunteers but also managed the Nation-
al Guard integration and faced competition from specialties within the Army, such as the Army Air Force, Officer Candidate School, and the Army Specialized Training Program. The Army’s share of the total armed forces strength of 12,350,000 was 8,300,000. The Marine Corps did not face this large influx of individuals to train and did not experience significant competition for specifically qualified individuals within the Corps.31

Another difference can be found in the Marine Corps boot camp and Army reception centers. At the Army reception centers or induction stations, the newly enlisted soldier would receive a physical and psychiatric exam and then return for additional reception. The recruit reception centers were responsible for “the processing of recruits, that is, issuing uniforms, classifying them, and routing them to the replacement training centers which were maintained by the separate branches of the Army. At the latter installations, basic military training was given; and, on completing it, the men were sent to specialist schools.”32 The training intended was 44 weeks. The first four weeks were designated for organization and receipt of personnel, followed by 13 weeks of “actual training.”33 The 13 weeks of basic training was broken down into one-month sections. The first month con-
isted of military courtesy, discipline, sanitation, first aid, map reading, individual tactics, and drill. The second month focused on specialty training, physical

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30 Conrad C. Crane et al., Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army’s Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918–2019 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Heri-
conditioning, bayonet courses, rifle ranges, and grenade courses. The last month was dedicated to weapons qualifications and individual and squad exercises.34 Because of the large number of new recruits slated for the Army, the Army required more training centers compared to the two (Parris Island and San Diego) needed for Marine Corps boot camp stations. Training was also divided into the replacement centers that were under the instruction of distinct branches of the Army, such as armored, infantry, and coast artillery.35 The Army reported that there were problems with the “replacements enroute to the theater of operations. Shipped as individuals, without unit organization or strong leadership, they were moved from one agency to another—depot to port, transit to receiving depot, and then a myriad of intermediate agencies within the theater. Often spending months in transit, replacements became physically soft, discipline slackened, and skills eroded.”36

The Army’s basic training and Marine Corps’ boot camp did experience similar struggles during World War II. Both branches experienced a shortage in drill instructors and had to pull from often inexperienced instructors.37 Both branches received reports from overseas stating that the replacements “were found to have little or no training in advanced school of the soldier, guard duty, use and care of equipment, weapons,” etc.38 Soldiers and Marines alike reported they received less than the reported or assigned length of basic training/boot camp before they entered the theater of war.

The subjects of instruction and difficulties experienced during Army basic training and Marine Corps boot camp were not dissimilar. However, there is no way to objectively compare the Army basic training to Marine Corps boot camp during World War II due to wartime exigencies, the draft, and any errors in reporting. It is also impossible to confidently state that one branch prepared its recruits more successfully than the other. Missing from the cited sources and other primary documents regarding the Army’s basic training schedules and documents is the discussion of the psychology and methodology of how the desired result of esprit was established and maintained among Army recruits and the resulting efficacy on the battlefield. It is this psychology, methodology, lore, and establishment of esprit de corps examined during Marine Corps boot camp that the author believes is the key in the success of the Marines who fought on Iwo Jima.

The weekly boot camp schedules offer quantitative information regarding how Marines were trained, but there is little recorded evidence that contains the underlying philosophy employed to achieve the psychological shift from civilian to Marine. Recruits, volunteers, and conscripts ranged from a bellhop and a forest ranger to a college football player and a cowhand. The Marine Corps drill instructor’s job was to strip each civilian “of his identity as he learns how to drill, how to shoot, and above all, how to subordinate himself to the overall purpose of winning the war.”39 “Boot Camp,” published in Leatherneck in May 1942, provides an example of what the seven-week recruit training program generally entailed (tables 1 and 2). Mornings of the first week began with calisthenics under arms and close order drill without rifles. In

34 Spickelmier, “Training of the American Soldier During World War I and World War II,” 100; and W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, Men in Planes (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), chap. 16, provide an hourly breakdown of the basic training received at Jefferson Barracks in October 1940. They note that “two observations are pertinent—the emphasis on infantry subjects, and absence of weapons training” regarding the Army basic training at that time. Crave and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, 530.
36 Spickelmier, “Training of the American Soldier during World War I and World War II,” 104.
38 Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 49: Basic Military Training in the AAF, 1939–1944, 82. See article for a similar statement made about Marine Corps replacement training.
39 Cpl Gilbert P. Bailey, USMCGR, Boot: A Marine in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 1. There is a possibility that this work contains some Corps propaganda, but the author found no evidence to suggest it is not factual. While it was published by Macmillan in 1944, not Headquarters Marine Corps, the photographs it includes were taken by Cpl Edward J. Freeman and PFC John H. Birch Jr. in cooperation with the Public Relations Office, Parris Island, SC. However, there is no other mention of the book being published with affiliations to the Marine Corps and it is a personal account of its author’s experience in boot camp.
the afternoons, Marines attended lectures, performed police work, and practiced more close order drill or boondocking. Boondocking is described as close order drill conducted in the sand above the recruit’s ankle.40 Corporal Gilbert P. Bailey explains “policing-up” in Boot: A Marine in the Making, as the drill instructor’s way of dealing with the psychological hierarchy present when the war brought in a diverse group of young recruits. Discipline and unit cohesion relied on the young recruits working together without undervaluing each other due to socioeconomic status. Bailey believed the shared hardships and mundane tasks were intended to bond the group so that “you feel like one of the boys not a damn bit too good to fight.”41 By analyzing the articles published during the prewar and early war years that relate the schedules, activities or subjects, treatment, and methodology or psychology used during Marine Corps training between 1942 and 1944, along with personal memoirs, the details (beyond the calculable hours and subjects) of how the recruits were being trained to work as a group and establish their pride of place in the Marine Corps are illuminated.42

When assessing the relationship of boot camp to the Marines’ overall efficacy on Iwo Jima, the elements of discipline and training were elemental in overcoming the challenges of the battlefield. The drill instructors were stern, quick to correct, and expected discipline above all else. Retired Major General Wal

41 Bailey, Boot, 75.

### Table 1. Six weeks training schedule: Recruit Depot, Parris Island, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major subjects</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drill</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoctrination and military courtesy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior guard</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet training</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of instruction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes: Marches, scouting, patrolling, testing, first aid, sanitation, chemical warfare, combat principles, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) 13th – 30th days conducted on range; includes: instruction, demonstrations, fires, with grenade, rifle grenade, .22-cal. rifle, .30-cal. rifle, .45-cal. pistol, BAR, machine gun. No training-hour breakdown available.


### Table 2. Seven weeks training schedule: Recruit Depot, San Diego*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major subjects</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical training</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drill</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior guard</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military courtesy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet instruction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musketry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle instruction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes: Patrolling, scouting, hikes, marches, signals, first aid, chemical warfare, cover and concealment, combat principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) 1st – 8th days at depot, 19th – 36th at range, and 37th – 42nd at depot. (***) Unfortunately, the schedule did not include a breakdown of range instruction hours. (1Dec41, 7 wks schdl, RD, MCB, SD, 1975-60-20-10.)

Source: Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 22.

Table 3. Proposed eight week schedules (1944 reforms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Number of hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms and equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 rifle mechanical training</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 carbine mechanical training</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand and rifle grenades</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry pack</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical warfare</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry drill</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior guard duty</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches, camps, bivouacs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military courtesy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military sanitation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization, classification, indoctrination</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parades and ceremonies</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical training</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle range instruction</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective measures</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of compass and maps</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care and marking of equipment and clothing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter tents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat principles (squad)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technique of rifle fire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual emplacements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: These subjects probably covered at rifle range.

Source: Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 171.

Greatsinger Farrell attended Parris Island between August and October 1917 and remarked that his “drill instructors would carry ‘swagger sticks made of swab handles, and they used them freely.’” William Manchester, the author of Goodbye Darkness, who attended boot camp in spring 1942, said it was common to see a drill instructor bloody a man’s nose. Despite this, Robert Leckie in Helmet for My Pillow asserts that “the man who has it roughest is the man to be most ad-

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43 Krulak, First to Fight, 167.
44 William Manchester, Goodbye Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1980), 120.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Seven weeks Parris Island</th>
<th>Seven weeks San Diego</th>
<th>Eight weeks HQ Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was a strong emphasis on the paternal drill instructor and little aversion to “rigorous physical punishment.” Major General Farrell commented that “by the time they were finished with me, I knew the meaning of instant obedience, and I understood the importance of loyalty up and down.” Eugene B. Sledge, who attended boot camp in 1943, commented that his drill instructor, Corporal T. J. Doherty, was a “strict disciplinarian, a total realist about our future, and an absolute perfectionist dedicated to excellence.”

It was this reliance on strict discipline, instant obedience, and loyalty that provided the skeletal structure and muscle for Marines to do their duty on Iwo Jima. Without the ability to quickly react and follow orders without question, many may have remained in their foxholes or been unable to advance positions, sometimes without leadership direction. The Marines who participated in World War II were accustomed to harsh experiences and believed the rigors of boot camp prepared them to withstand the mental and physical challenges they would experience during the war.

After training at the main station concluded, the rifle range offered some much-needed respite from drill but operated in a different capacity to change a recruit into a Marine. As Corporal Bailey later wrote, “The most binding of rules—every Marine must be a potential fighting man. He must drill; he must shoot.” Corporal Bailey fully supported all Marines becoming effective riflemen, stating, “The idea works, it saves lives.” Therefore, desk duties and cooks also shot for record on the range. The first week at the rifle range was spent “snapping-in,” “learning proper sight setting, trigger squeeze, calling of shots,” and other essential principles. Even working the targets under the “buttmaster” served a purpose. The live ammunition firing overhead eventually became commonplace, so it would not distract troops from their objective in a theater of war. E. B. Sledge summarized the experiences at the Marine Corps recruit depot, writing, “At the time, we didn't realize or appreciate the fact that the discipline we were learning in responding to orders under stress often would mean the difference later in combat—between success or failure, even living or dying.”

Historic literature assesses the hourly and weekly schedules as well as subjects and skills to be mastered...
in boot camp, but there is minimal exploration on the psychological aspects and specific methods used to achieve this measurement of success.  

Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II dedicates chapter 2 to recruit training, giving the eight-week breakdown of peacetime training such as fundamentals of military life, elementary instruction in infantry combat, squad combat principles, and more. It also follows the changes in recruit training at the beginning of World War II, listing hours, such as the required 147 hours of rifle range training at Parris Island compared to 112 hours of rifle range training at the San Diego depot and the required marches to and from the range. However, these hourly logs and itemized training lists do not detail how these subjects were achieved. Many historians quote veterans to demonstrate these sentiments but fail to provide any cause-and-effect analysis. Exploring the psychological aspects of boot camp reveals that training in hand-to-hand combat prepared Marines for the enemy falling into one’s fox hole; constant boondocking prepared them for the terrain they would encounter on Iwo Jima and instilled the mental fortitude to trudge on; and bayonet practice trained them how to kill in close quarters. These hardships, sleepless hikes, repetition of Marine Corps lore, and reliance on their cohort were part of the methodology used to indoctrinate the Marine Corps ethos. While valued as a stepping stone to more elaborate training, boot camp is undervalued for creating the ethos, duty, and fighting spirit of the Marine so elemental to the success of Iwo Jima.

Replacement Training

After the training at either the recruit depot in Parris Island or in San Diego was complete, new Marines would head to their assigned units; but during World War II, the high casualty rates and rapidity of Pacific campaigns necessitated the transfer of some troops to replacement depots. Due to lessons learned in previous campaigns, a new feature of the Iwo Jima operation was to employ replacement battalions and attach them to the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions to be used in assault shipping. Prior to embarkation, the intention was to train troops to seamlessly integrate into the regular division shore parties during the initial phase of assault, and if called on by the division, released as a combat replacement within the assault units. On 1 September 1943, the first infantry replacement training consisted of two weeks of physical conditioning. Shortly after, subsequent battalions began an eight-week course, including 68 hours of basic training, 97 hours of tactical training, and 171 hours of technical training (Browning Automatic Rifle [BAR], machine gun, rifle, mortar, and intelligence). Following enlisted recruit training, these Marines ordinarily would have received instruction that furthered skills and technical proficiency in a specific field. Replacement training was inconsistent and did not foster unit cohesion, and wartime exigencies placed a strain on the additional training received after boot camp.

To address reports returned from the Pacific stating that replacements were unprepared, the training centers attempted to alter the replacement training course’s realism. A combat reaction course was added in August 1943 as well as swimming, field sanitization, and demolitions. This schedule of training broke down into two four-week periods. The first four weeks were dedicated to basic individual training with weapons and individual and squad technical and tactical training. During the second period, training comprised offensive and defensive small unit exercises in jungle warfare. The schedule was again modified when the commanding general of the 2d Division commented that the replacements he received

59 Van Riper, Wydo, and Brown, An Analysis of Marine Corps Training, 176.
60 Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 186–82.
for Tarawa were “most unsatisfactory.”\textsuperscript{61} It was not until 21 July 1944 that the replacement training omitted jungle warfare and replaced it with bunker problems, emphasizing assault of heavily fortified islands. Very few replacements would have received this new training by the time they embarked for Iwo Jima. Replacement training should have provided additional experience beyond boot camp, furthering the skills of the Marine, but action reports oppose the assumption that the replacement training maintained proficiency and mastery in the unit specialty needed for the replacement unit. The reports stated that the instructors were inexperienced, that each instructor used unique methods, and that the training schedule was unreliable. Combat veterans were preferred as infantry instructors, however, this was difficult to accomplish because combat veterans were also direly needed in the field.\textsuperscript{62}

**Unit Training**

Assessing the unit training of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, conducted from activation (reactivation) to embarkation provides a more complete picture of what this additional experience provided in preparation for the battle on Iwo Jima.

The 3d Division was reactivated on 16 June 1942, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and was made up of mostly recruits who attended boot camp at Parris Island, South Carolina.\textsuperscript{63} In May 1943, the division left New River and arrived in Samoa, where unit leaders focused on small group training with eight months of intensive field exercises. In August, 3d Division units were stationed on Guadalcanal to rehearse the Bougainville operation. Beginning on 1 November 1943, the division spent two months fighting against a strong Japanese enemy at Bougainville.\textsuperscript{64} The division was able to implement some lessons learned from Guadalcanal, such as individual camouflage (dyeing their white undershirts green, applying green and yellow paint to equipment and uniform, and using vegetable powder to stain skin green). After action reports recognized this as an important factor in reducing casualties.\textsuperscript{65} After the transfer of command in January 1944, the division returned to Guadalcanal and began training for the next campaign.

The last phase of their training before embarking to Guam was spent on board ships practicing landings for nine days. Unfortunately, most of the infantry battalions suffered heavy losses during the battle on Guam, and many of the troops headed for Iwo Jima were mainly composed of replacements received shortly before embarkation.\textsuperscript{66} Once the division’s mission was assigned, they began training for the various phases a reserve unit would pass through in landing and moving to an assault role. They did not perform an assault landing rehearsal since the division was not expected to be used in that capacity. The combat training of the 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts was found to be badly deficient, so in response, their training was devoted to individual and small unit training. Small unit training comprised simulating assault and reduction of emplacements using the flamethrower and rocket launcher. In the last week of December 1944, two replacement drafts joined the division whose training status consisted of only two to four weeks of recruit training.\textsuperscript{67} The additional training implemented after boot camp was struggling under casualties from previous engagements, shortages of equipment, and training inconsistencies within the reserve units. Recruit training was still the principal training received by all Marines headed to Iwo Jima.

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\textsuperscript{61} Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 186.
\textsuperscript{62} Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II, 186–90.
\textsuperscript{63} By the end of 1942, 3d Marine Division included the 9th, 12th, 19th, 21st, and 23rd Marines; the 3d Special Weapons Battalion; the 3d Service Battalion; the 3d Medical Battalion; and the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion. All were located at Camp Elliott in San Diego, except the 21st and 23d Marines, which were at New River, NC. The 3d Marine Division and Its Regiments (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1983), 1.
The 4th Marine Division’s training was similar to that of the 3d Marine Division’s. In January 1943, the 23d Marines spent 15 days practicing amphibious maneuvers in the Chesapeake Bay. The majority of their training from September 1943 to January 1944 involved amphibious practice. While stationed at Camp Pendleton, California, they conducted bayonet practice, conditioning hikes, moving-target range practice, pillbox assaults, rubber boat landings, and combat swimming. On 21 January 1944, the majority of the division anchored off Maui, Hawaii. By 22 January, the convoy left and headed for the Marshall Islands to assault and capture the Roi-Namur Islands. They returned to Camp Maui by the end of February, however, by 13 May, troop loading finished and the 4th Division headed to Saipan.68 The troops were then slated to arrive in Tinian on 24 July and return to Maui by 14 August. The period on Maui between the return from Tinian and leaving for Iwo Jima was spent recuperating, hiking, practicing on the pistol range, live grenade practice, as well as using the Army facilities such as the infiltration course, jungle training center, and the village fighting course.69 During 15–30 November, the 4th Division conducted amphibious exercises in the Maalaea Bay area of Maui. The division’s combat engagement provided hands-on experience for the troops, observing how the enemy operates, and working together as a unit, but it also came at a price. They experienced 6,400 casualties on Saipan and Tinian, necessitating more replacement troops and delaying resupply materials for Iwo Jima. The division finally received its organic replacements on 22 November, but embarkation began only 36 days later. This left no time for the replacement troops to successfully integrate into the division or achieve any significant, needed training related to the operation.70

The gaps in troops were mostly filled by replacement troops or troops directly from recruit training. Their location, farthest from the objective, also necessitated that they ship out earlier than the other divisions. With a division made up of battle-fatigued veterans, replacements, and Marines directly from boot camp, the experience going into Iwo Jima was not standardized, except for the recruit training received at Parris Island or San Diego. Because of that common elemental training, this motley force of Marines was still able to function effectively against the Japanese on Iwo Jima.

The 5th Marine Division was activated 11 November 1943 and began its squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regimental training shortly after 8 February 1944, when division commander Major General Keller E. Rockey assigned the complete training schedule. This division was created with Operation Detachment as its immediate goal and wholly untested in battle. The primary training goal assigned to the 5th Marines by the master training schedule was the familiarization of the individual Marine with the tools of war (rifles, carbines, pistols, BAR, machine guns, tanks, and artillery). Once the Marines understood their individual weapons, the infantrymen began to operate in fireteams and drill in the assault tactics of squads and Platoons. In April 1944, company commanders took their units to the field for unit training that consisted of firing practice with live ammunition, mock night operations, tactical marches, and three-day bivouacs.71 From 1 August to 30 September 1944, the division entered the Troop Training Unit commanded by Brigadier General Harry K. Pickett, which would train the Marines in the standards of amphibious warfare. An article published in the Marine Corps Gazette in August 1944 described unit training that included landing operation exercises, dry mock-ups, wet mock-ups, landing exercises in a landing craft, cargo net, and landing craft training. The completion of the two-week active training ended with actual landing exercises with and without supplies.72 Similar to the other divisions, only a few of the troops participating in the assault on Iwo Jima would have been able

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70 Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 460.
to attend this course. On 12 August, Major General Rockey and the 5th Marines sailed to Camp Tarawa in Hawaii. Once on board ship, the ability to conduct practical training diminished, and the Marines were reduced to conducting calisthenics, inspections, ship drills, and intelligence briefings. At Camp Tarawa, they began a review of basic small unit landing and team combat training that lasted until the end of 1944, culminating in amphibious maneuvers.

On 16 December, the 5th Marines left for Pearl Harbor to practice takeoffs and landings on the landing ship, tank (LST), and by 10 January 1945, the entire division was waterborne. More rehearsals were conducted in Maui in the form of debarkation drills and landing the craft on the beaches, running ashore, then reembarking. On 11 February, the 5th Marines reached Saipan with a one-day invasion rehearsal; however, the assault waves were not landed.73 During the second week of February, the final rehearsals in the Mariana Islands included ships and aircraft, Task Force 52, and the Gunfire and Covering Force, Task 54. This was primarily to test coordination between the support force and attack force.74

Scholars place heavy emphasis on how well the scheme of amphibious training prepared the Marines for Iwo Jima, and for many Marines, these were the last rehearsals conducted before embarkation.75 The Japanese, however, did not assault the Marines upon landing, as anticipated. There were other limitations concerning the amphibious training conducted in the pre-embarkation phase of training. A V Amphibious Corps report recounted two full-scale rehearsals in the Hawaiian area involving all available major elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force. In the first rehearsal, the landing beaches were approached, but no troops were disembarked.76 A 13 May 1945 report from Commanding General Graves B. Erskine to the Commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, regarding the V Amphibious Corps landing force stated that the rehearsals held in the Hawaiian area 11–18 January were insufficient due to the absence of amphibian tractors. Two battalions of cargo tractors and one armored amphibian battalion only received two days of training with the units.77 The 4th Tank Battalion was not present because of delayed loading of landing ships, medium (LSMs), and no six-wheel-drive amphibious DUKWs (officially designated as a landing vehicle, wheeled) were launched because of a need to prevent corrosion and deterioration of preloaded ammunition. LSTs were not beached due to the conditions of the reef.78

The replacement and unit training provided to Marines leading up to Iwo Jima was sporadic and varied. To summarize the unit training above: the 3d Division’s 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts were deficient in combat training and additional replacements had only received two to four weeks of recruit training. The 4th Division experienced heavy casualties throughout its training, and the training conducted after November 1945 was mostly amphibious related. The division comprised mostly replacements or troops directly out of boot camp. The 5th Division focused heavily on amphibious training during summer 1944, but when it came to final practices, equipment was missing, and troops were not landed. At the time of Iwo Jima, the replacement drafts “attached to the 5th Marine Division, the 27th, had received eight to 10 weeks training and the 31st only five to six weeks. The 3d Replacement Draft received only four of the prescribed 12 weeks infantry training and the 28th [Marines] departed for the Pacific with training deficiencies in almost all infantry subjects.”79 Most of the reports from division commanders state that their troops were in a satisfactory state of training when embarked, but reports submitted regarding the troops’ readiness in action differ.80

73 Conner and Rockey, _The Spearhead_, 19–23.
75 Garand and Strobridge, _Western Pacific Operations_, 737; and Isely and Crowl, _The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War_, 432.
troops, high casualty rates, inconsistent instructors, and revolving operations in the Pacific narrowed the window of opportunity for Marines designated for the Iwo Jima operation to participate in and benefit from these additional training opportunities.

**Marine Combat Performance on Iwo Jima**

Plans were initiated to land the 4th Marine Division led by Major General Clifton B. Cates and the 5th Marine Division led by Major General Rockey on Iwo Jima the morning of 19 February 1945. The 3d Marine Division under the command of Major General Graves B. Erskine would remain as Expeditionary Troop Reserve. Fleet Admiral Nimitz estimated that, in the hands of the Marines, the capture of Iwo Jima would take 14 days. Once on shore, the Marines were to proceed with their assigned missions, one regiment of the 5th Marine Division to capture Mount Suribachi, and the 4th Marine Division would continue to Motoyama Airfield No. 1. These objectives were expected to be accomplished on the first day and then consolidated forces were to drive north over the Motoyama Plateau.

Information in documents captured from Saipan implied that the Marines should expect to meet with enemy attempts to destroy their forces before they had established a beachhead, however, the first wave was met with negligible opposition. The enemy did not attempt a major counterattack but instead remained hidden in heavily fortified positions. The intelligence previously provided regarding the consistency of the sand was also incorrect. Once landed, the Marines found it was composed of loose, coarse, volcanic ash, which hindered most movement from jeeps or tanks and sunk a person’s feet up to the ankles. When the troops made it beyond the first terrace, they were seared by machine-gun and rifle fire while simultaneously being hit by mortar and artillery fire. The waves landed at five-minute intervals, but vehicles were damaged, destroyed, or stuck, which made unloading the following waves difficult. After advancing only 150–300 yards, movement was reduced. By noon, the enemy reaction was immense. Marines of the 23d Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, had managed somehow to push their lines to the base of the airfield while the 25th Marine Regiment kept pace toward the north. *The Fourth Marine Division in World War II* expands on the use of the word “somehow” as a “vague word and can be explained only in terms of countless acts of individual bravery working within the collective will of the whole unit.”

Enormously high casualties and loss of equipment, ammunition, and supplies, in addition to continuous Japanese fire, further hampered forward progress of all the divisions involved. The Marines on Iwo Jima trudged on for 36 excruciating days on that “devil’s playground,” clearing a relentless, hidden Japanese force. The assault of Iwo Jima did not materialize the way planners envisioned. The terrain proved markedly more difficult, favoring the defender and providing little to no cover for the attacking Marines. It also froze elemental tanks and trucks where they landed, creating a situation that proved extremely difficult to unload and distribute ammunition and supplies. The number of Marines landed made it harder for the Japanese to miss their targets. Conducting extensive amphibious rehearsals was advantageous, but only to a certain extent. Training was conducted with the expectation that the planned heavy naval bombardments would destroy the majority of the fortified enemy positions, but no one could have foreseen the extent of the Japanese tunnels, or how ineffective the bombardment would be. Therefore, the divisions that landed on Iwo Jima had to improvise and adapt.

Though it seemed improbable, the Marines assaulting Iwo Jima slowly defeated the Japanese entrenched on that 8.1-square-mile island. Once the U.S.

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forces realized that the aerial and naval bombardment before troops landed did not effectively reduce the Japanese pillboxes, the Marines customized the necessary scheme of maneuver. They had to rely on the individual Marine and small combat troops to break up enemy fortifications to advance. The Marines involved in the victory on Iwo Jima either came directly from boot camp, had received reduced or ineffective training, or were already worn down by combat. However, every Marine on Iwo Jima had received boot camp training that made them effective riflemen, regardless of their specialty or occupation, and equipped them with the tools to withstand the rigors of war.

**Individual Heroics, Institutional Training, or Both?**

Historians appropriately recognize the heroics of the individual Marine in the assault on Iwo Jima. What is neglected is an analysis of why or how such a diverse group of Marines with inconsistent training could produce such a positive outcome. Iwo Jima’s narrative is rife with stories of individual acts of valor that assisted in the advance of a company or a battalion or saved the life of one fellow Marine or a whole unit. For each story recorded, there are numerous acts of bravery that have gone unrecognized. As discussed, Iwo Jima was overtaken and the Japanese enemy removed by individual Marines advancing their units. The Medal of Honor and Silver Star citations received for service during the battle of Iwo Jima corroborates this style of maneuver and highlights a few of the men who applied the strategy of individual and small combat movement, to break up enemy fortifications and to advance, and succeeded.

For example, Private First Class Douglas T. Jacobson, 4th Marine Division, received the Medal of Honor for commanding a bazooka after its operator was killed and covering his unit while they climbed Hill 38. He also destroyed machine-gun positions, attacked a blockhouse and multiple rifle emplacements, and assisted an adjacent company in advancing. He destroyed 16 enemy positions and killed approximately 75 Japanese.86

Corporal Harry C. Adams, 5th Marine Division, was awarded the Silver Star Medal for advancing through heavy fire and destroying an enemy strongpoint with a demolition charge, allowing his company to advance.87

Private Wilson Douglas Watson, 3d Marine Division, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on Iwo Jima. Private Watson single-handedly pinned down an enemy pillbox, allowing his platoon to advance to its objective. His platoon was again stalled at the foot of a hill, so Watson advanced alone, fighting off Japanese troops for 15 minutes, allowing his platoon to scale the slope.88

From arrival at boot camp until graduation during World War II, the enlisted Marine was conditioned for the rigors of war. Because of wartime exigencies, this may have been the only training a Marine received. Each training objective served a purpose to desensitize and acclimate recruits for the extreme conditions they would face on the battlefield. Colonel Ardant du Picq, before the Franco-Prussian War, remarked that “the aim of discipline is to make men fight, often in spite of themselves.”89 Bill D. Ross, a Marine Corps correspondent assigned to Iwo Jima, believed that success or failure hinges on the “first critical moments and the attack can go either way, all depending upon the training and discipline of the troops.”90 General Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch wrote in *Coral and Brass* that “Marines believed themselves to be the greatest fighting force because it was drummed into their heads since the day they signed up. . . . Building the Marine esprit de corps began with boot camp which was painfully tough . . . no Marine

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ever forgot his boot camp hitch.”

Captain Bonnie Little, who was killed in action on Tarawa and awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart, remarked that the “Marines have a way of making you afraid; not of dying, but of not doing your job.”

In an article for *Journal of Contemporary History*, Hew Strachan remarked that training is an enabling process that creates self-confidence. He believed that the type of training the Marine Corps implemented during boot camp created the psychological capacity to elongate peak phases and surmount low phases. According to Strachan, this is completed through repeated drills and strict discipline. That way, when rational thought is impossible due to exhaustion, individuals react without thinking. Strachan also discusses the effectiveness of training with the bayonet. While not responsible for as many deaths as a firearm, this method of training provided the recruit with the ability to overcome the principal blocks to combat effectiveness.

Regarding bayonet training and hand-to-hand combat using judo or jujitsu received in boot camp, Stephen Stavers wrote that

> a commander can hardly expect a real offensive spirit or an unhesitant assault if most of his men, lacking faith in their hand-to-hand combat effectiveness, feel more secure the farther they are from the enemy. . . . If the man laying prone in the jungle is as confident in his ability to fight hand to hand with knife, club, bayonet, or bare hands as he is in his ability to shoot, it is less likely that he will be frightened by noises or other distractions into firing blindly and giving away his position.

Repeated boondocking prepared the Marines assaulting Iwo Jima for the unique terrain. After landing on Iwo, they had to exit the ramps and trudge through ankle-deep water amidst volcanic sludge; boondocking primed them for this unique obstacle. The rifle range acquainted the Marine with their weapon and taught them its extreme importance, making it an extension of the Marine and ensuring they would never be left without it. Also, the experience working the targets desensitized recruits to the sound of live fire, giving them the ability to function on the battlefield without being overwhelmed by noise. Each boot camp training element taught the recruit to overcome a new challenge or hardship by adapting, learning to rely on their fellow Marines, and accomplishing things previously thought impossible.

While partially successful, the pre-embarkation training pointed to the need for equipment and cohesive participation, the discontinuity of the number of troops who participated, the incongruity of instruction, and the dissimilar amount of training actually received by those slated for Iwo Jima. Rehearsals lacked realism, and replacement training was overwhelmingly described in the after action reports as prodigiously unsatisfactory. There is difficulty assessing what percent of troops received replacement training or any additional training after boot camp due to inconsistencies in reports and variations in length of training and instructors’ experience. Boot camp, however, was received by the overwhelming majority of Marines. The crucial elements of discipline, close order drill, sense of duty, and esprit de corps had been instilled in every Marine destined for Iwo Jima. The additional training did not make a Marine tactically superior on the battlefield. It is the initial boot camp training that made each Marine willing to keep fighting no matter what.

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Conclusion
In conclusion, boot camp training proved more essential than the replacement or specific training conducted prior to Iwo Jima. This concept changes the understanding that Marine Corps training was standardized at all echelons. The training the Marine Corps conducted changed with instructors and locations and varied within units, platoons, companies, and battalions. It opens up the study to multiple questions about whether or not this situation is characteristic of the Marine Corps. If so, did this prove to be the case in other engagements such as Peleliu, Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa? It also brings into question whether this condition was unique to World War II or if it can be applied to other wars in which the Marines were involved. Lastly, it provides an opportunity to juxtapose the Marine Corps alongside other branches of the military to determine if basic indoctrinations among the Services are similar or if Marine Corps boot camp is distinctive.

Historiography references only a few studies that place quantitative value on boot camp’s contribution, but personal testimonies from Marines demonstrate the vital importance it played in their battle readiness. It imbued a sense of duty and created essential rifleman merits that produced enough individuals to overcome the detrimental effects of fire on the Iwo Jima battlefield. Concerning the specific operational training designed for Iwo Jima, the amphibious rehearsals were incomplete, lacking realism, and the enemy did not react the way planners had conceived. Replacement training was unsatisfactory due to inconsistencies with instructors, instruction, and the schedule. The training received during boot camp was more important to the efficacy of the Marines fighting on Iwo Jima. It was the discipline and esprit de corps instilled in the recruit that imparted the will to overcome insurmountable obstacles and steadfast dedication to each other and their Corps.

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Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam

THE U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUCCESS AGAINST THE VIET CONG INSURGENCY

by Ismaël Fournier, PhD

Abstract: In the past decades, most conformist studies dedicated to the Vietnam War were overly critical of the U.S. military’s so-called reliance on conventional warfare in a country deemed to be plagued by an insurgency. Counterinsurgency programs were labeled weak and powerless to shift the Americans’ momentum against the Viet Cong, which outsmarted the U.S. military. This article opposes these theories and suggests that by 1969, the U.S. force’s reliance on conventional warfare against the guerrillas progressively morphed into a strategy that fully supported the military’s counterinsurgency initiatives. Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanoi’s conventional forces. Through the analysis of U.S. and Communist documents, this study suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists’ tactical approach to hybrid warfare. As they skillfully synchronized regular warfare with counterinsurgency, the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces succeeded in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency by the spring of 1972. Keywords: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, CORDS, Central Office for South Vietnam, COSVN, counterinsurgency, hybrid warfare, insurgency, North Vietnamese Army, Phoenix, Viet Cong

Introduction

Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, orthodox historians have highly criticized the U.S. armed forces’ strategy in Southeast Asia. Writers have frequently blamed the military for its tendency to favor conventional military tactics in a country deemed to be plagued by an insurgency. Author John A. Nagl claimed that the U.S. Army “resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency” but preferred to treat Vietnam as a conventional war. Andrew F. Krepinevich stated that the U.S. military’s approach to Vietnam was “unidimensional” and that a traditional approach to warfare was adopted in Vietnam with conventional war doctrines. Lewis Sorley underlined how U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam’s (USMACV) commanding officer, General William C. Westmoreland, marginalized counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war tactics. Max Boot branded the conventional war effort as “futile” in Vietnam and claimed that the Americans’ defeat was mainly the result of “a military establishment that

Ismaël Fournier served 19 years in the Canadian armed forces. He enlisted as an infantryman with the Royal 22d Regiment in 2000 and deployed to Bosnia the following year. He then joined the regiment’s airborne company, part of the 3d Battalion, and deployed to Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2007. Severely wounded in an improvised explosive device explosion in Kandahar, and after multiple restorative surgeries, Fournier made a professional change to the military intelligence branch. His fourth and final deployment was in Kuwait in 2016, where he worked as a targeting analyst during the air operations against the Islamic State. Since then, he completed his PhD in history at Laval University in Quebec, Canada, and retired from the military. He is currently employed by the Department of National Defence as a civilian intelligence analyst. https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2021070104

tried to apply a conventional strategy to an unconventional conflict.”

Douglas Porch went further when he stated that counterinsurgency could not work in Vietnam and that it “often made the problem worse in the view of the population.” Two military foes threatened the U.S. forces on Vietnam’s battlefield: the regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which exploited a conventional form of warfare, and the National Liberation Front, also known as the Viet Cong, which used guerrilla warfare tactics coupled with conventional doctrines. Although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops cooperated and occasionally conducted joint operations, they usually operated in different areas. The NVA operated in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Central Highlands, and near the borders of Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong deployed its main force in the populated areas located in South Vietnam’s lowlands. Vietnam was an unorthodox battlefield compared to the U.S. military’s previous wars in Korea, the Pacific, and Europe. Given the critical role played by its regular and irregular military actors, the Vietnam War remains the most prominent example of a hybrid warfare battlefield in modern military history. While the term hybrid warfare may seem better suited to describe twenty-first-century conflicts, it is entirely justifiable to use it to describe Vietnam. In the book Hybrid Warfare, the term refers to a conflict that involves a “combination” of conventional military forces and irregular units, which may include “both state and nonstate actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”

In Vietnam, the NVA and Viet Cong guerrillas both fought for a common political and strategic purpose: South Vietnam’s unification with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). However, such a common goal did not imply that Hanoi’s politburo and Viet Cong members were united under a single banner, a subject that will be addressed later. Several schools of thought identified similar branches or types of warfare that can also be associated with Vietnam. For instance, a group of U.S. Marine Corps officers introduced the theory of fourth-generation warfare in 1989. In essence, they assessed that “the nature of warfare has transformed via three main generations: (1) manpower, (2) firepower, (3) manoeuvre.” The so-called fourth generation emerged in the late twentieth century and is described as “an evolved form of insurgency” that exploits the political, social, economic and military systems to persuade an enemy that its strategic objectives are unattainable. Such a form of warfare can also be linked to Hanoi’s overall strategy against Washington in Vietnam. Later in the 1990s, Thomas Uber elaborated the theory of compound warfare, characterized by what he termed the “simultaneous use” of regular and guerrilla forces against an opponent. The relationship of these forces is symbiotic in nature: the guerrilla forces “enhance” the efforts of the regular units with intelligence, provisions, and combatants while conventional troops assist the guerrillas with training, supplies, combat support, and political leverage. Uber went further when he presented the fortified compound warfare theory in which the regular forces will have access to a “safe haven” and will be allied with a “major power.”

With actors such as the NVA, the Viet Cong, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the presence of the Laotian and Cambodian Communist bases, it is no surprise that Uber used Vietnam as a reference for such a form of warfare. He also cited the American Revolution, the Peninsular War (1808–14), and the Soviet Afghan War (1979–89) as examples. It could also easily be applied to the French Indochina War (1946–54) that opposed the French to the Vietminh. In more recent years, the term hybrid warfare was used to describe how Hezbollah fought the Israeli Army in 2006 and how the Russian military operated in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. As technology evolves, so do

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8 Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 24–26.
9 Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 26.
the tools available to wage war. With cyber warfare, signal intelligence, drones, and other advanced technologies being mixed with guerrilla and conventional military elements on the modern battlefield, it may be tempting to restrict the term hybrid warfare to twenty-first-century conflicts. However, regardless of technology and modern forms of warfare, the basics of hybrid conflicts and their variants are centuries old. They can be linked to the French and Indian War, the American Revolution, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Indochina War, the Vietnam War, and many other conflicts. In Vietnam, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. battalions were targeted through asymmetric and regular tactics. As it fought against one of the finest conventional militaries of the time, USMACV had to develop a counterinsurgency plan to simultaneously neutralize what was perhaps the most efficient and battle-hardened insurgency of the twentieth century. The U.S. Marine Corps launched its own program called the Combined Action Platoons (CAP). It aimed at deploying Marine squads in villages alongside paramilitary forces. The initiative managed to cut off the Viet Cong guerrillas from the rural population and reinstated security and stability in several areas of northern South Vietnam. While the program was a tactical success, it was limited in its scope and severely hindered by the conventional military threat posed by the NVA near the DMZ and by the 1968 Tet offensive.

In 1967, the Americans and South Vietnamese launched the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which aimed to curtail the Viet Cong's influence in the rural villages and pacify the countryside. While some of the CORDS and CAP programs' achievements are acknowledged by Krepinevich, Nagl, and Boot, their overall assessment is that such initiatives had a limited strategic impact on the battlefield and that pacification efforts were too little and too late. In The Insurgents, Fred Kaplan wrote that CORDS was a “mixed success at best.”

In Counterinsurgency, Douglas Porch branded CAPs and CORDS as “promising initiatives” that were “underresourced” and “developed too late” to alter the course of the war. Porch also stated that “the U.S. Army lacked a mindset and institutional structure to ‘learn’ and adjust its doctrine and tactics to achieve success.” These historians’ most common argument regarding CORDS is that while the initiative was commendable, it was ultimately overshadowed by USMACV’s overreliance on firepower and conventional military doctrines against the guerrillas. This article goes against these theories and suggests U.S. and South Vietnamese forces soundly defeated the insurgency, militarily and politically, through both the CORDS program and the support of regular military units. When confronted with a hybrid threat, military commanders must synchronize the operation of their conventional and nonconventional forces to prevent the enemy from using its guerrilla and conventional units as a force multiplier on the battlefield. This article will show that from 1969, conventional warfare and firepower were by no means the centerpiece of USMACV’s way of conducting counterinsurgency. At this point in the war, conventional doctrines and intelligence were used to better support USMACV’s counterinsurgents, which drastically improved CORDS’s ability to neutralize the insurgency. CORDS was a system that embodied all the fundamentals of counterguerrilla warfare as it should be conducted. Through the cooperation of multiple civilian, military, and intelligence agencies, CORDS achieved its main operational goals by the spring of 1972.

Concretely, these goals were to destroy the Viet Cong’s political influence, establish a proficient and self-reliant security force in the villages, separate the civilians from the guerrilla forces, and reestablish the government of Vietnam’s control in the contested villages. To do so, U.S. advisors attached to CORDS mentored and supervised their South Vietnamese counterparts without being excessively involved, which enabled the South Vietnamese to progressively become self-reliant and autonomous. Such a course of

10 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 27.

11 Porch, Counterinsurgency, 207.
action is essential if any counterinsurgency hopes to succeed in the long term. While the U.S. Marines’ CAP program was in many ways a textbook counterinsurgency strategy, it lacked this particularity as the South Vietnamese became too reliant on the Marines for support. With CORDS, the U.S. maximized the use of host nation security forces while founding the proper balance between hard power and soft power. In 1972, the Viet Cong was effectively defeated by a proper equilibrium of counterinsurgency and regular warfare.

The Communists’ Political Infrastructure and the Corps’ Counterinsurgency Initiative

The U.S. military leadership’s three main strategic targets in Vietnam were the NVA divisions, the Viet Cong units, and the insurgency’s shadow government (figure 1). While Hanoi and the Viet Cong were allies in their struggle against Washington and Saigon, they still had their differences. There was a high degree of rivalry and distrust between the Lao Dong (Workers’) Party leaders in Hanoi and Communist leaders in the South. The National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) was created in 1960 and consisted of Hanoi’s response to peasant uprisings against the South Vietnamese government. From Hanoi, North Vietnamese leader Le Duan closely monitored the insurgent movement in the south through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which superseded the Viet Cong in authority and acted as the organization’s main headquarters.

Le Duan appointed one of his most trusted military commanders, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, as leader of the COSVN. Le Duan sought to ensure his control of insurgent operations and stifle any opposition to his policies. For instance, many Viet Cong members resisted Le Duan’s wishes to turn the insurgency into a conventional fighting force. The differences between the two groups were also ideological in nature. As explained by senior Viet Cong defector Truong Nhu Thang, many southerners were more Nationalist than Communist. While directed and supported by Hanoi, the Viet Cong could rely on its whole political infrastructure to oppose Saigon. The infrastructure was active at the regional, provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels in South Vietnam (figure 1). Its political cadres sought to control every facet of the peoples’ lives toward the insurgency’s support and competed with Saigon to control the population. In the areas dominated by the Viet Cong, the infrastructure acted as an official government. In contested areas, it led a propaganda and terrorist campaign to undermine the government’s control and credibility. If U.S. and South Vietnamese forces hoped to win the fight against the Communists, destroying Hanoi’s NVA and the COSVN’s Viet Cong battalions would not be enough; they also had to neutralize their enemy’s well-elaborated political infrastructure. The U.S. Marines were the first to apply a doctrine that maximized the chance of neutralizing the Communist shadow government in the villages.

The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) operated in I Corps and was led by General Lewis W. Walt. His forces were subordinated to Westmoreland’s USMACV, whose units operated in II, III, and IV Corps (figure 2). At first, Walt expressed his desire to minimize conventional search-and-destroy missions against large Communist units to maximize counterinsurgency operations. Westmoreland was highly critical of the Marine Corps, which, according to him, should have set its focus on conventional war. Much literature has been dedicated to Westmoreland’s views on how the war had to be fought. Lewis Sorley criticized Westmoreland’s so-called reluctance in executing counterinsurgency in *Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam*. On the other hand, revisionist historians such as Gregory Daddis emphasized that USMACV’s commanding officer was fully aware of

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the importance of pacification and conceptualized his battleplan accordingly.\textsuperscript{16} The U.S. Army general was not a stranger to counterinsurgency doctrines. While he had no field experience in counterguerrilla warfare, his lack of practical knowledge did not detract from his interest in the matter. While serving as director of the West Point Military Academy in New York, he initiated a training program focused on insurgency principles and counterinsurgency warfare for cadets. When he served as deputy commander of USMACV under General Paul D. Harkins, he led a mission to Malaya to study British counterinsurgency tactics.\textsuperscript{17} During a visit to Hong Kong in the early 1960s, Westmoreland met David Galula, a French military officer who served in the Algerian War. Galula is one of the most renowned counterinsurgency experts of the twentieth century and was even nicknamed the “Clausewitz of Counterinsurgency” by General David H. Petraeus.\textsuperscript{18} Westmoreland was impressed with Galula’s theories and invited him to the United States to instruct the military on counterinsurgency dynamics.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{19} Matthias, \textit{David Galula}, 173.
Moreover, a thorough analysis of Westmoreland’s papers clearly shows that the U.S. Army general had, indeed, a solid battle plan that aimed to conduct counterinsurgency alongside conventional operations in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{20} However, proper execution of such a plan was the problem given the threat posed by fully armed Viet Cong regiments and battalions. In early 1965, approximately 47 of these Viet Cong battalions were operational in South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{21} While these


units were mainly on the move, they had a highly developed network of campsites and bivouacs that they used as staging areas. Villages were also part of this network. Communist forces occupied the peoples’ houses, dug up trenches, and set up defensive positions that several companies could occupy.\textsuperscript{22} Such a situation resulted in multiple firefights in the vicinity of rural villages. In one highly publicized instance, a whole Viet Cong infantry company entrenched in the village of Cam Ne ambushed a Marine patrol, resulting in casualties among both the Marines and the vil-

\textsuperscript{22} Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 158–64, 163.
Figure 2. Provinces and military regions (Corps) of South Vietnam.

lagers.\textsuperscript{23} Events such as these exposed the urgency of deploying counterinsurgents in the villages to disrupt the Viet Cong’s operation within the rural population. While Westmoreland underlined that he believed in pacification, he claimed that he did not have enough troops to carry out a program similar to that of the Corps across South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{24} Despite Westmoreland’s criticism, the Fleet Marine Force’s commanding officer in the Pacific, General Viktor H. Krulak, gave his blessing to General Walt, who authorized the initiation of the CAP program in 1965. The CAPs aimed to protect the rural population against insurgents by permanently deploying a squad of Marines alongside a South Vietnamese paramilitary platoon of the Popular Force to fortified villages.

The Corps’ overall mission encompassed six objectives: 1) destroy the village’s Viet Cong political infrastructure; 2) protect residents and maintain public order; 3) protect village infrastructure and development; 4) defend the area and the lines of communication on the village’s perimeter; 5) organize an intelligence-gathering network among the civilian population; and 6) participate in civic actions and conduct psychological operations to turn the civilian population against the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{25} Interestingly, these objectives were very similar to those promulgated by David Galula in his manifesto Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.\textsuperscript{26} Krulak stated that by denying the insurgents access to the civilian population, the Viet Cong would lose its survival source, as guerrillas relied on civilians for food, recruits, and intelligence.\textsuperscript{27} Sir Robert Thompson, one of the masterminds behind the successful British counterguerrilla campaign in Malaya and a counterinsurgency advisor to presidents Ngo Dinh Diem and Richard M. Nixon, described in detail the Communist cadres’ \textit{modus operandi} in the villages (figure 3). Under the local district committee’s leadership, the Communist political cadres (A) embedded with the population are responsible for increasing the insurgent group’s control over the villagers. Such control by the cadres is enforced with smaller or larger local fighting units (B and C). As they control the population, the political cadres (A) are responsible for providing food, logistics supplies, recruits, and intelligence to the district committee and combat units (B and C). The more the Communist cells geographically spread, the more the flow of recruits, logistics supplies, and combat-capable units increases. The ensuing chain reaction results in platoons rapidly growing into companies. If the process is unopposed, these companies will morph into battalions that will grow into a whole combat regiment (figure 4).\textsuperscript{28}

Thompson explained that most military commanders instinctively focus their targeting operations on units B and C given that militarily, they are the most attractive targets. Such a decision results in “large scale military operations” based on flawed intelligence, according to Thompson, which usually allows the guerrillas to avoid contact with the enemy. Should the insurgents be caught in the open and sustain heavy casualties, any loss suffered by units B and C will be replaced by the political cadres who will promote B members to the C category. The cadres will then recruit new fighters among the population under their control to refill unit B ranks.\textsuperscript{29} In many ways, this was the crucial mistake USMACV committed in the populated areas of South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. The U.S. Army’s leadership was obsessed with units B and C while neglecting the political cadres (A) that allowed the insurgency to thrive and remain operational. This explains why U.S. troops constantly had to secure the same area on multiple occasions. Targeting the fighting units was justified but useless if the insurgency’s political arm was not incapacitated in the villages. The Marine Corps’ CAP initiative was designed to avoid falling into such a trap. Marines’ actions in the villages denied the cadres the ability to

\textsuperscript{27} Corson, \textit{The Betrayal}, 184.
\textsuperscript{29} Thompson, \textit{Defeating Communist Insurgency}, 31.
support the fighting units by obstructing their access to the population. Communist cadres were rapidly compromised, and Viet Cong units were regularly targeted and ambushed by the Marines and Popular Force. Once they felt genuinely safe, villagers provided intelligence to the Americans on Viet Cong movements, ambush preparations, and booby traps, which facilitated Marine ambush operations and force protection.\(^3\) The situation became precarious enough for one captured Viet Cong cadre to admit that the Marines had constrained their troops to focus their operations on non-CAP villages.\(^3\) However, the threat posed by the regular NVA battalions near the DMZ forced thousands of Marines toward the northern border, which limited the expansion of the program.

Although the CAP system proved effective in a guerrilla war context, the situation became quite different once conventional military forces came into action, especially during the Tet offensive in 1968. One of the prime targets of Communist troops in I Corps during the Tet campaign was none other than the CAPs. Several Marine villages were overrun by entire NVA and Viet Cong battalions, necessitating the urgent deployment of conventional forces to assist the counterinsurgents.\(^3\) Had Vietnam been a war theater similar to the Malayan insurgency of the 1950s for the British, attacks of such magnitude against CAP villages would have been unlikely. However, given the hybrid nature of the Vietnam War, such a scenario remained a constant sword of Damocles hanging over the head of every counterinsurgent. The South Vietnamese went through the same ordeal in 1964 when Westmoreland convinced ARVN commanders to di-

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30 Modification to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the RVN, 19 December 1968, box 119, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps 1775–, RG 127, NND 9841145, NARA, C-9–C-10.


32 Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam by LtCol W. R. Corson, USMC, 23.

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39 Courtesy of Ismaël Fournier, based on a chart in Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), 30.
vide their forces into small detachments to ensure the protection of Binh Dinh Province’s villages. While the initiative did increase the government’s control of the population, the Communists acted rapidly to curtail the plan. The Viet Cong deployed combat battalions that attacked and retook control of every village. South Vietnamese detachments were overwhelmed and routed by the Communists. Small platoon units conducting counterinsurgency are not suited to confront heavily armed battalions supported by artillery and mortar fire. While such attacks by regular forces against CAP villages mainly occurred during the Tet offensive, it remained an indicator of the program’s vulnerability should it be deprived of rapidly deployable conventional forces to support its counterinsurgents.

Additionally, another problem associated with CAP eventually emerged: the program’s overreliance on the Marines and their assets. An introspective report from the Marine Corps assessed that the Popular Force remained dependent on the Marines despite the training and mentoring provided by the Americans. Casualty analysis shows that the Marines carried the bulk of combat activities on their shoulders inside the CAPs. Overall, the Corps’ losses were 2.4 times greater than those suffered by the Popular Force.

![Figure 4. Order of battle of a Viet Cong (and NVA) regiment and battalion](image)

*Courtesy of Ismaël Fournier, based on the orders of battle described in J. W. McCoy, Secrets of the Viet Cong (1992), 37.*

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Furthermore, the fighting that involved the Popular Force during the Tet offensive showed the Americans that paramilitary forces, supported by their resources alone, could not ensure CAP’s survival. The situation exposed an apparent flaw in the program’s execution: Americans were the CAP initiative’s main protagonists. While the Marines’ role was central, the program’s main objective was to create the conditions for “an orderly phase-out” of the Americans once the Popular Force improved sufficiently to take over the mission by themselves. Thompson emphasized that foreign agencies must “resist the temptation to take over” the host nation actors’ function, thinking they will do a better job. Doing so would result in the failing of the foreign force’s main task: build up the local government’s administrative machinery and the experience of the individuals meant to take over the campaign.

Should the Marines have been more in the background rather than directly involved with the Popular Force in CAP, the program would probably have been through additional setbacks in the short term. However, it would have pushed the South Vietnamese to be self-reliant and less dependent on their Marine counterparts. The system worked admirably in Malaysia, where the British trained hundreds of thousands of local Home Guard soldiers who were the leading counterinsurgents in the field. They were supervised and led by British and Australian officers. The CORDS initiative was better adapted than CAP for Vietnam. Aside from special forces assigned to the Phoenix Program, most U.S. personnel and advisors attached to CORDS were in the background and seldom directly participated in combat activities alongside South Vietnamese paramilitary forces. They limited their involvement to supervision, mentorship, general support, and intelligence sharing and exploitation.

37 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 161.
38 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 100.
39 The controversial Phoenix Program, sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, aimed to identify, undermine, and dismantle the Communist insurgency in Vietnam. For more, see pg 78.

Birth of the Office of CORDS: Original Obstacles and Setbacks
The Office of CORDS was officially launched in May 1967 and put under the responsibility of USMACV. Robert W. Komer, a civilian member of the intelligence community who had no superior other than Westmoreland, was put in charge of the project. Komer was at the head of a program that brought under a single umbrella every military and civilian organization charged with carrying out pacification in South Vietnam. The program had offices in all the country’s provinces and districts (figure 5). The concept was similar to what British field marshal Gerald Templer conceptualized when he managed the war effort against the Communist insurgency in Malaya. Former CORDS advisor Stephen B. Young describes the program as follows:

[A] joint venture among the United States military, American civilian agencies, South Vietnamese government, South Vietnamese elected political officials in villages, provinces and in Saigon, and South Vietnamese citizens in villages, religious organisations, businesses, and social networks.

CORDS managed to attain the “middle ground” between the exploitation of “hard power” and “soft power.” That middle ground was embodied by what Young calls “associative power.” The program used hard power to protect the villages and disrupt the Viet Cong’s infrastructure, economic power to support civic actions, and political power to conduct elections. Soft powers focused on the cultural outreach of the Viet Cong and the gathering of intelligence on insurgents who operated in the villages. Young stated that a “good counterinsurgency campaign builds partnerships with local communities and their leaders.” These partnerships will thrive to become “lo-

41 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 12.
42 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 19.
cal institutions of self-government, self-defense, and self-development. CORDS aimed to achieve these objectives with host nation officials and security forces as the project’s main protagonists. U.S. advisors would be dispatched to advise the South Vietnamese administrators and cadres of the Revolutionary Development (RD) group charged with the supervision of pacification efforts. While the plan seemed fine on paper, CORDS’s first 15 months of operations did not go smoothly. The events that unfolded in the Cu Chi District epitomize the overall problems encountered when CORDS became operational. Given the large geographical area that came under CORDS’s responsibility, it would be impossible to outline all the problems encountered by the program’s staff in each district. However, following the analysis of hundreds of pages of CORDS reports, Cu Chi provides an excellent example of what happened in most of the South Vietnamese areas during the first 15 months of the program. Two central problems plagued CORDS: the lack of discipline of several of its members and the threat posed by larger Viet Cong units.

While a whole paper could be written on the discipline problems related to CORDS when Komer launched the program, this article focuses on the threat posed by the large guerrilla formations. Hybrid warfare implicates more than dealing with small insurgent units. CORDS counterinsurgents would unavoidably be targeted by fully armed regular Viet

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43 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 19.
Cong battalions and possibly by the NVA, a fact that Komer anticipated in the early stages of the program’s development. In 1967, he participated in a veritable bureaucratic struggle to force military planners to better coordinate their efforts to properly support the paramilitary forces and government cadres deployed in rural South Vietnam.44 Earlier in 1966, during the Manila Conference, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his South Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Van Thieu agreed that ARVN forces should shift the bulk of their efforts to support pacification.45 Some U.S. and ARVN battalions assigned to assist the counterinsurgents managed to keep large Viet Cong units at bay. However, it was not so in every district. Before the deployment of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division to Cu Chi in 1966, 10,769 insurgents dominated the district.46 The 7th Viet Cong Battalion and local guerrilla units carried out combat operations with impunity until the division’s arrival. The Americans established a base of operations and initiated a succession of search-and-destroy offensives, forcing large Viet Cong formations to take refuge in isolated areas. These conventional military operations alleviated the pressure on paramilitary forces, who could now focus their attention on local guerrillas and political cadres in the villages.47 However, when the U.S. division left the district, not a single unit remained behind. The Viet Cong influence regained its momentum, pushing the paramilitary forces back on the defensive. The problem was widespread in much of South Vietnam.

Many end-of-tour reports written by U.S. advisors and CORDS briefings to the White House bemoaned the absence of proper support for the paramilitary forces. They simply could not perform their duty with large enemy formations on their backs. Even the North Vietnamese military acknowledged U.S. conventional forces’ disturbing effects when they supported the counterinsurgents. A captured report belonging to the 95th NVA Regiment specified that the Communists, who controlled 260,000 civilians out of 360,000 in the Phu Yen area at the end of 1965, only controlled 20,000 in May 1967. The NVA attributed this situation to the synchronization of USMACV’s conventional and counterinsurgency operations in the area.48 The NVA also reported that the coordination between Communist regular and insurgent troops was dysfunctional. The relationship between guerrilla war and regular mobile warfare was not properly exploited, which disrupted the insurgents’ ability to properly execute their mission in the villages.49 In such a hybrid warfare scenario, all sides (U.S. forces, ARVN, and Communists) had to synch their conventional and nonconventional military unit operations if they hoped to increase their prospect for victory. When the 25th Infantry Division left Cu Chi without leaving a single battalion to support the paramilitary forces, the Viet Cong’s reemergence was unavoidable. In the heart of the villages, RD cadres that would usually dismantle the insurgency’s political infrastructure were too frightened to operate in the district’s hamlets proactively.50 No elections occurred in the villages controlled by the Viet Cong. Although elections were held in the disputed village of Trun Lap, none of the elected officials were bold enough to spend the night in their hamlet. Fear only increased the lack of discipline, ethics, and commitment observed among many RD cadres. However, a key event was on the verge of shifting the battle’s momentum in favor of CORDS. The Tet offensive and its aftermath allowed Komer to enforce some changes, which enabled the counterinsurgents to reassert the government’s control of the countryside.

44 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 128.
47 A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District, 1–2, 10–11.
48 “Problems of a North Vietnamese Regiment,” docs. 2–3, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes Series: Translation and Analysis of Significant Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Documents, October 1967, microfilm, reel 1, frame 0131, 26, ProQuest folder 003233-001-0131.
49 “Problems of a North Vietnamese Regiment,” 4.
50 A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District, 4.
CORDS’s Revival after Tet and the Viet Cong’s Road to Defeat

Half of the 84,000 Communists deployed during the Tet offensive were killed in action or captured following the campaign. Furthermore, subsequent spring offensives dubbed “mini-Tet” inflicted more heavy casualties on the Viet Cong. Communist losses amounted to 240,000 killed and wounded in 1968, which included many political cadres who were exposed and neutralized during the fighting. These devastating losses created a huge political and control vacuum in South Vietnam’s villages. To take advantage of the situation, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), an expansion of the CORDS program, was launched in November 1968. The initiative was first proposed by Komer and his deputy, William E. Colby, who would become Komer’s successor as the head of CORDS. They both understood that to gain the initiative and negate the Viet Cong’s political influence, government officials had to take the offensive and retake the legitimate control of the contested areas. Colby also stressed the importance of dispatching conventional forces to assist the counterinsurgents in the eventuality of the deployment of large Communist formations.

Colby presented a four-phase plan to General Creighton W. Abrams, Westmoreland’s successor as the head of USMACV. The first phase aimed at dispatching conventional units to push away the enemy’s large battalions from populated areas. The second phase intended to deploy paramilitary forces and government officials in areas still under threat of guerrillas. Phase three aimed at strengthening the populated centers and lines of communications. Finally, the fourth phase sought to oppose the “Communist dictatorship” by launching elections in the villages, according to Young. Following Colby’s briefing, Abrams gave his full approval and support to the initiative, which was also approved by President Thieu. The latter took the APC very seriously and regularly inspected the villages with his prime minister to assess the program’s progress. Colby noted that the neglect observed in the previous year was, by the end of 1968, a thing of the past; South Vietnamese officials realized that Thieu was serious about enforcing the APC. Henceforth, there would be accountability to the president if there was a lack of rigor in implementing the program. Colby submitted reports from his American subordinates to Thieu or cabinet members, who would bring to order leaders who were not implementing the program as directed. Changes were also implemented among the regular military units. Under General Abrams’s leadership, USMACV’s focus would not be on firepower but instead on Vietnamization—which aimed at progressively letting the ARVN take over the lead in the war—and small unit operations. Abrams set in motion a battle plan in which conventional forces would track down and eliminate large Communist formations; at the same time, small unit operations, including patrols and ambushes against Viet Cong guerrilla units, would be initiated. Unfortunate cases such as that of General Julian J. Ewell, an officer who disregarded counterinsurgency and maximized firepower in two provinces of the Mekong Delta, did not exemplify how USMACV managed the war from 1969.

Abrams was a staunch defender of counterguerrilla warfare and believed in combining conventional war and counterinsurgency in Vietnam’s hybrid context. There are many debates on Abrams’s actual influence on the U.S. military strategy in Vietnam. Lewis Sorley claims that Abrams adapted the military’s battle plan to such an extent that the United States was on the verge of winning the war on the battlefield. On the other hand, Gregory Daddis states that Abrams’s approach was more a continuity than an actual change in strategy. Analysis of U.S. military operations from 1969 indicates that much more focus and seriousness were put on counterinsurgency under Abrams. For

51 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 132.
54 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 132–33.
57 Daddis, Withdrawal, xii.
instance, in 1969, the U.S. Army’s 173d Airborne Brigade launched a counterinsurgency campaign in Binh Dinh that was an exact replica of the Corps’ CAP. In Quang Ngai, U.S. Army units launched the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, another copy of the CAP. While it remains speculative, it is unlikely that Westmoreland would have gone so far as to allow a whole U.S. infantry brigade to emulate the Corps’ CAP system. Back on the battlefield, a large new Viet Cong offensive launched during the 1969 Tet holiday resulted in such catastrophic losses that COSVN leaders issued an order that put an end to conventional military offensives. Guerrillas were instructed to redirect their focus to subversive operations as in the insurgency’s first days. However, as in the previous Tet offensive of 1968, the insurgents’ losses during the fighting galvanized CORDS’s momentum. Communist conventional forces could no longer afford to assist the guerrilla cadres and fighters in the villages. As with the CAP, South Vietnamese paramilitary forces and RD cadres choked the guerrillas in the vicinity of the villages.

In the summer of 1969, security around the Mekong Delta was improved to such an extent that it was possible to travel unescorted during daytime from one provincial capital to another. Each hamlet now benefited from the protection of a platoon of paramilitary forces assisted by village militias. Across the whole country, control of Communist cadres over the rural population collapsed to 12.3 percent, then to 3 percent. Villagers cultivated 5.1 million metric tons of rice without the Viet Cong being able to benefit from it. About 47,000 Communist soldiers and cadres joined the South Vietnamese ranks through CORDS’s Chieu Hoi defector program. In 1967, 400,000 civilians were forced to leave their villages due to combat operations. In 1969, the number of refugees fell to 114,000 for the entire country. During that same year, another counterinsurgency initiative was attached to CORDS. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Phoenix Program, initially launched in 1967, was now under CORDS’s responsibility. For decades, Phoenix had a poor reputation as it was frequently labeled a torture and assassination program. The analysis of this long-lasting controversy is beyond the scope of this study. Authors like Mark Moyar and Phoenix veteran Lieutenant Colonel John L. Cook both set the record straight regarding Phoenix. Targeting an insurgency’s political infrastructure is a crucial aspect of counterguerrilla warfare. It also was one of David Galula’s central tenets.

Phoenix’s primary objective was to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Members of the VCI embodied the political arm of the insurgency. They were supported by security forces that ensured their protection, cadres in charge of finances and taxation, and other members whose mandate consisted of ensuring the civilian population’s management and control. Phoenix’s operational control within the districts and provinces was formally vested in their respective chiefs. Tactical management of the program fell under American and South Vietnamese intelligence officers (S2). This responsibility was shared by the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinat-

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62 USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 1, Phuong Hoang Division, General Records 1603-03A: PRU Correspondence 1979 thru 1603-03A: Reports—VIET CONG/NVN Propaganda Analysis 1970, Memorandum GVN 1969 Pacification Development Plan, 60. Phoenix’s primary objective was to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Members of the VCI embodied the political arm of the insurgency. They were supported by security forces that ensured their protection, cadres in charge of finances and taxation, and other members whose mandate consisted of ensuring the civilian population’s management and control. Phoenix’s operational control within the districts and provinces was formally vested in their respective chiefs. Tactical management of the program fell under American and South Vietnamese intelligence officers (S2). This responsibility was shared by the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinat-
ing Center (DIOCC). The DIOCC’s primary function was to collect relevant intelligence that could be used to plan operations against the Communist cadres at work in the districts’ villages. The task of neutralizing VCI members in the field fell to U.S. special forces operators, South Vietnamese special forces of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), government officials, RD cadres, and paramilitary forces. Human intelligence remained Phoenix’s key asset. By recruiting multiple informants in villages and through information collected from numerous Viet Cong defectors and prisoners of war, Phoenix operators caused severe damage to an already weakened insurgency. Back in 1967, according to USMACV estimates, about 80,000 Communist cadres were operating in areas still under Viet Cong influence. In the first 11 months of 1968, U.S. reports claim that Phoenix neutralized 13,404 cadres. In Quang Tri Province, PRU actions caused such damage to the VCI that the Communists deployed a special commando unit specifically trained to destroy a PRU operating base.

A COSVN report complained about the significant damage inflicted on them by the PRUs and the Chieu Hoi defector program. The COSVN admitted that VCI defection increased by 49 percent in the second half of 1968. Communist reports also indicated that a significant number of cadres were unable to operate freely or enter their area of responsibility, even after dark. Phoenix’s attrition rate on VCI members forced the COSVN to deploy new, inexperienced cadres, totally lacking their predecessors’ expertise. A single cadre was assigned responsibilities normally allotted to two or three of their peers in several cases. In 1969, USMACV assessed that 19,534 more cadres were neutralized due to Phoenix. Although Phoenix figures are known not to be 100 percent accurate (many Viet Cong fighters were mistakenly designated as VCI), the attrition caused to VCI was reflected in COSVN reports, the drastic drop in insurgent recruitment activities, and the testimony of Communist defectors. A VCI deserter admitted that the Viet Cong feared Phoenix, which was trying to “destroy its organizations” and denied its cadres access to the civilian population. He also stated that insurgents who did not have to deal with villagers received very specific instructions: contacts with the population were prohibited due to Phoenix agents’ overwhelming presence in rural areas. The defector also said that Viet Cong commanders warned their subordinates that Phoenix was “a very dangerous organization” of the South Vietnamese pacification program. Another Communist report complained about Phoenix agents’ ability to target cadres, noting that the program’s members were “the most dangerous enemies of the Revolution.”

The same report insists that no organization other than Phoenix could cause the Communist struggle so many problems and difficulties. North Vietnam’s leader, Ho Chi Minh, admitted that he was much more worried about the U.S. military successes against the VCI than those obtained against his regular forces. When peace talks began between Washington and Hanoi in Paris, Communist officials demanded


68 Col Andrew R. Finlayson, Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, 1966–1970 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2009), 15–16.


74 Finlayson, Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, 1966–1970, 27.

75 Finlayson, Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, 1966–1970, 27.
the cessation of all operations related to the Phoenix Program.\textsuperscript{26} While Phoenix was indeed dreaded by the insurgents, the program’s successes were far from instantaneous. Much like CORDS at its inception, Phoenix was plagued by discipline problems. Furthermore, Phoenix and regular military forces’ intelligence analysts seldom shared intelligence, which was counterproductive for both entities. However, as with CORDS, the program drastically improved after Tet. The change was mainly due to William Colby, who refocused the program’s priorities. Henceforth, Phoenix would have offices in the country’s 244 districts, with every single intelligence and security agency present to support the program against the VCI. Phoenix administrators would send a corps of specially trained U.S. advisors to each of these offices to work with the South Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, several regular unit commanders sent their S2 (intelligence) and S3 (operations) officers to meet with CORDS advisors. These meetings aimed to provide regular units with the latest intelligence reports and encourage cooperation from CORDS/Phoenix agencies and tactical units.\textsuperscript{26}

In II Corps, the G2 established a branch specifically dedicated to collecting and analyzing intelligence related to the VCI.\textsuperscript{79} In I Corps, the intelligence gathered by CAP Marines greatly supported Phoenix’s efforts against the VCI. Concurrently, Marines requested Phoenix’s blacklists (VCI suspects) as well as situation reports on weapons caches and Viet Cong activities to support their operations.\textsuperscript{80} In 1970, Colonel James B. Egger, the U.S. Army coordinator assigned to Phoenix in III Corps, stated that cooperation between the combat units and Phoenix was “outstanding.”\textsuperscript{81} Such cooperation supported both counterinsurgents and conventional forces in Vietnam. As regular units worked hand in hand with their counterinsurgent counterparts, they severely disrupted the guerrillas’ attempts to regain control of rural South Vietnam. In July 1969, the COSVN published Resolution 9 for its members to counter the adverse effects of USMACV and Saigon’s counterinsurgency campaign. The resolution ordered guerrilla forces to focus their targeting operations on pacification personnel in rural areas. A few months later, confronted with its subordinates’ inability to follow the directives of Resolution 9, the COSVN published Resolution 14, which insisted again on the need to revert to a guerrilla warfare concept to overcome the enemy’s pacification program. It also criticized the slowness of guerrilla and local force movements and the low level of progress in regaining control of rural areas. Resolution 14 also denounced the party committee’s and military commanders’ failure to increase pressure on counterinsurgency forces and their inability to gain the civilian population’s support.\textsuperscript{82}

Other seized documents exposed the Communists’ growing loss of rural area control. Viet Cong Party committee members in charge of the region surrounding Saigon claimed that “revolutionary forces” were under much pressure, a consequence of the loss of senior cadres in the districts, as well as the anemic population pool still accessible for recruitment. They also criticized Communist units’ inability to achieve a significant victory. The committee admitted that their forces were “poor in quality and quantity” and unable to establish contact with the population. Also mentioned was the incapacity of larger battalions to operate near populated areas and local guerrillas’ ineffectiveness in their attempts to convince the people to support their operations. Viet Cong leadership further stated that their units “continue[d] to suffer

\textsuperscript{26} GVN INSP RPTS 1970 MACCORDS Realignment of Phuong Hoang Management Responsibilities, 1.
\textsuperscript{77} Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory, 245.
\textsuperscript{79} Remarks of Col James B. Egger, 15.
\textsuperscript{81} USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 2 Phoenix Hoang Division, General Records 204-57: Quang Nam Correspondence 1969 thru 204-57: Rifle Shot Operations 1969, Memorandum, Subject: CAP Participation in Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program, box 5, Records of the U.S. Forces in South East Asia, 1950–1975, NND 974306, RG 472, entry 33104, NARA.

losses” and remained unable to renew their strength. Political groups aimed at indoctrinating civilians were labeled “weak,” small, and “incompetent.” The committee recognized the control exerted by government forces over the civilian population while criticizing its forces’ inability to reverse the situation.83 CORDS analysts observed that from 1968 to 1970, terrorist incidents related to Viet Cong activities continued to drop. The same was true for the number of civilians killed, injured, or abducted by guerrillas.84 William Colby explained that regular troops managed to drive large Communist formations away from rural areas, which supported the pacification program’s progress. At the beginning of 1970, CORDS achieved most pacification objectives, with 90 percent of the population living in hamlets enjoying “acceptable security” and 50 percent living in areas considered “completely secure.”85 During rural elections in 1970, 97 percent of populated areas could vote freely with no significant Viet Cong interference.86

In 1971, terrorist acts declined by 75 percent in more secure areas and 50 percent in areas classified as less secure.87 The inaccessibility to the people, defections, desertion rates, and the inability to operate freely in the countryside drastically hampered the Viet Cong’s ability to remain combat effective. Sir Robert Thompson, who was President Nixon’s counterinsurgency special advisor for Vietnam, indicated that in most of the insurgency’s areas of responsibility, 70–80 percent of the Viet Cong’s military forces was composed of regular NVA soldiers. Thompson stated that “Allied operations” had “almost completely eliminated” the Viet Cong’s military threat and that pacification efforts had “dried up their recruiting base” among the civilian population.88 Following one of his last inspection tours to Vietnam in 1971, Thompson forwarded a letter to the president’s national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger. He wrote that “there is a great disparity between the situation in South Vietnam and what many in the U.S. believe it to be.” He added, “This is no longer a credibility gap but a comprehensibility gap.”89 The year 1972 marked the end of the Viet Cong as an effective guerrilla force. As stated by CORDS veteran Stephen Young:

> A remarkable success in the development of associative power to defeat a powerful insurgency was achieved [with] the CORDS program. . . . Its success in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency was accomplished in the Spring of 1972.90

At this point of the war, Vietnam transitioned from a hybrid warfare theater to a conventional warfare battlefield. The North Vietnamese regular forces, far from being decimated like the Viet Cong, took charge of military operations and launched the spring offensive, a major multidivisional blitzkrieg campaign designed to destroy the ARVN and regain the initiative following U.S. combat forces’ departure from South Vietnam. The invasion failed when entire NVA battalions were mauled by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers. As the NVA reorganized its forces, it prepared for the final offensive to invade South Vietnam. The once-powerful insurgency would assume no significant role in what was to bring about the fall of South Vietnam. In the spring of 1975, the NVA launched a new multidivisional campaign with new Soviet-supplied tanks and artillery. The ARVN was routed by the North Vietnamese military, which took Saigon on 29 April 1975.

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90 Young, The Theory and Practice of Associative Power, 17.
Conclusion

When U.S. combat forces were deployed to South Vietnam in 1965, the country was on the verge of total collapse. In the first years of its combat involvement, USMACV acted instinctively as it tracked the large Communist battalions while it neglected to target the insurgency’s shadow government. Until the end of 1968, conventional forces paid little attention to the counterinsurgents who struggled to accomplish their tasks when confronted with fully armed Communist battalions. For many orthodox historians, the way the U.S. military waged war between 1965 and 1968 is the norm by which they assess the overall military performance of the United States in Vietnam. While they timidly acknowledge the efforts of pacification initiatives and USMACV’s switch to small unit operations, they mostly ignore how USMACV genuinely morphed its strategy to sync its intelligence and combat operations with the efforts of U.S. and South Vietnamese counterinsurgents. As for CORDS, its major operational impact on the battlefield against the Viet Cong insurgency is outrageously marginalized.

The hybrid war in Vietnam was the consequence of Hanoi’s strategy, which exploited both conventional and unconventional warfare tactics, requiring a symmetrical U.S. military response. Such a course of action requires time to perfect, especially for a military force bred to fight against Soviet divisions. Vietnam was definitively a new form of war for the Americans and mistakes were unavoidable. Although it took several years of adjustments coupled with multiple setbacks, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces undeniably defeated the Viet Cong insurgency in 1972. USMACV managed to balance its approach to hybrid warfare by creating a joint military and civilian pacification program mainly implemented by the South Vietnamese and supervised by U.S. advisors. Like CAP, the office of CORDS targeted the Communist cadre system Thompson described. Counterinsurgents denied the insurgents’ ability to rely on their cadres, who struggled to operate in their designated areas of operations. This situation required the intervention of large Communist battalions, a course of action the 95th NVA Regiment also urged. Without the support of regular units to engage the large Viet Cong battalions with conventional military doctrines, regaining control of the countryside would have been impossible for CORDS. The same can be said had U.S. forces ignored the large NVA divisions that roamed the Central Highlands and border areas of the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia. When the guerrillas’ struggle was compounded by the massive losses their regular battalions sustained in 1968 and 1969, they failed in their attempt to rebuild the insurgency by reverting their efforts to subversive activities, an art they excelled at in the previous decades. Consultation of multiple Communist reports written between 1968 and 1971 exposes the COSVN’s obsession with the South Vietnamese pacification campaign, which is repeatedly labeled as the strategic target of the insurgency.

If the Communists had avoided their costly offensives in 1969, they would have been in a much better position to execute subversive operations supported by guerrilla fighting forces. However, the Viet Cong’s losses against conventional military forces ruined the COSVN’s prospect for success. U.S. regular units shielded the counterinsurgents from the remainder of the insurgency’s battalions, leaving the guerrillas to fend for themselves. At this point, Viet Cong leadership acknowledged that it was incapable of regaining the initiative against the counterinsurgents and admitted that government forces had the upper hand. In retrospect, the South Vietnamese success with CORDS should not come as a surprise. Under South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, the Viet Cong lost the initiative when ARVN and paramilitary forces moved parts of the rural population into reinforced villages called strategic hamlets. The concept was similar to the British doctrine in Malaya and the CAP concept. Not unlike CORDS, the initiative struggled heavily at its debut. However, with the mentorship of CIA officer Edward G. Lansdale and a British advisory mission led by Thompson, the program was drastically improved. In 1963, it gave the upper hand to the South Vietnamese, a fact later acknowledged by Communist sources.91 The program

fell apart when Diem was assassinated following a military coup tacitly approved by the Americans, a move that even Ho Chi Minh could scarcely believe and described as “stupid.”

Unlike Diem’s strategic hamlet campaign, CORDS was allowed to stay the course, and it ultimately achieved its objectives against the insurgency. Following CORDS’s success in 1972, the Viet Cong was no longer an indigenous organization. It was filled with North Vietnamese soldiers who may have excelled at conventional warfare but failed as guerrilla fighters. The U.S. and South Vietnamese managed to incapacitate one of Hanoi’s hybrid warfare organs when it defeated the insurgency. However, given the South Vietnamese Army’s poor state in 1975, the prospect of an ARVN victory against fully trained and supplied NVA divisions was hopeless. In the end, with the insurgency’s demise, any hope of achieving a military victory was contingent on one’s ability to defeat their opponent on the conventional battlefield.

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28 Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 286.
Fighting the Phantom

1ST VIET CONG REGIMENT IN I CORPS

by Mike Morris, PhD

Abstract: The 1st Viet Cong Regiment engaged in a series of costly clashes with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and allied forces in Vietnam's I Corps from 1964 to 1967. A veritable phoenix, this Communist Main Force unit was destroyed in battle 13 times in that brief span and yet repeatedly regenerated its battered formations to fight again. This article assesses how that was possible, the nature of the Communist insurgency in I Corps, and how the U.S. Marines understood and responded to its dual political and military perils. This case study underscores the challenges inherent in hybrid warfare and suggests keys to simultaneously addressing conventional and irregular threats. The 1st Viet Cong Regiment's impressive operational resilience illustrates, in microcosm, how and why the allied counterrevolutionary strategy failed to win in Vietnam.

Keywords: Vietnam War, 1st Viet Cong Regiment, Ba Gia Regiment, III Marine Amphibious Force, hybrid war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, I Corps, Operation Starlite, Operation Harvest Moon, Communist infrastructure, North Vietnamese Army, NVA, Viet Cong Main Force units, punishment and prevention strategies, pacification, search and destroy operations, Ho Chi Minh Trail, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, ARVN.

During their first three years in Vietnam, U.S. Marines battled the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in a series of hard-fought actions. Despite a string of tactical victories, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), the senior American headquarters in Saigon's five northern provinces, failed to destroy this tough and elusive Communist foe. This article examines the regiment's origins and composition, surveys its military achievements, and assesses what its story conveys about the larger conflict. The 1st Viet Cong Regiment's impressive resilience illustrates, in microcosm, how and why the allied strategy failed to win the war.

Strategic and Operational Context

The Cold War between the United States and its Communist rivals turned Indochina into the deadliest arena of superpower strategic rivalry. America replaced France as the principal Western power in the region following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and their subsequent withdrawal from the newly established South Vietnam. Despite expanding American economic and military assistance between 1955 and 1962, Saigon struggled to control its territory against increasingly effective internal and external opposition. After President Ngo Dinh Diem's assassination in a military coup in 1963, the south's fortunes further waned. A series of ineffective national governments, plagued by growing Communist political and military attacks, wavered on the brink of collapse. By 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson determined that without U.S. military intervention, Communist forces would soon conquer South Vietnam; this he refused to allow.

Existing U.S. war plans anticipating a Chinese invasion of South Vietnam called for Marine Corps units to defend the country's northern region while Army forces protected the Central Highlands, the approaches to the capital, and the vital Mekong rice basin. In March 1965, 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
deployed to Da Nang to guard American aircraft flying bombing missions into North Vietnam and free Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units to focus on offensive operations. Two months later, the Marine brigade expanded into a force (corps-level) headquarters. Its mission soon morphed from a defensive to an offensive orientation, pursuing enemy units beyond the initial beachhead.

The region’s rugged terrain dictated many of the tactical challenges the Marines experienced during the next six years. Roughly the size of Maryland, this part of Vietnam rose from a narrow strip of cultivated lowlands along the sea through a forested piedmont zone to the jungle-clad Annamite mountain chain, with some peaks exceeding 5,000 feet, along the area’s western boundary with Laos. This forbidding environment gave ample cover and concealment to the Marines’ North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong enemies. The international borders that adjoined the Marine sector made the challenge of hunting skilled foes even more challenging. When hard-pressed by MAF and ARVN forces, Communist units could slip into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to rest and replenish.

While Americans viewed the war as a defense of a nascent democracy against Communist aggression, Hanoi saw the conflict as a bid to destroy an illegitimate government and restore its people and territory to the rightful sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Between 1955 and 1965, Ho Chi Minh’s Communist party consolidated control of its newly won territory in the north while building the army it needed to conquer the south. In September 1964, the politburo decided to dispatch NVA units to the south to help defeat its enemy before the Americans could intervene. Some of these units entered the locale where III MAF arrived just a few months later. The Communist regulars sought to help southern insurgents destroy ARVN forces, seize South Vietnamese territory, control the area’s people, and collapse Saigon’s regional political power. The young recruits who marched to free the south had been thoroughly indoctrinated for the mission. In the words of Ho Chi Minh, approvingly cited in the NVA’s official history, our armed forces are loyal to the Party, true to the people, and prepared to fight and sacrifice their lives for the independence and freedom of the Fatherland and for socialism. They will complete every mission, overcome every adversity, and defeat every foe. . . . Our armed forces have unmatched strength because they are a People’s Army, built, led, and educated by the Party.

In the struggle to reunite the “fatherland,” the partners of these North Vietnamese troops were the indigenous Communists of the south. Both northern and southern soldiers played an important role in the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s activation and subsequent combat actions.

The Viet Cong Insurgency

The 1955 Paris Peace Accord separated Vietnam into northern and southern states. In the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Lao Dong (Workers’) Party supported Hanoi’s goal of unifying both Vietnamese states under Communist rule. The party worked in concert with remnants of the Viet Minh resistance still living south of the new demilitarized zone that partitioned the two countries. Communist cadres remaining in the

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2 Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 137–38. The official title of Hanoi’s army was the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). This article employs the term North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which non-Communist organizations, agencies, and leaders more commonly used at the time.
3 Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 150. For a better understanding of how thoroughly the party brainwashed North Vietnam’s children, see Olga Dror, Making Two Vietnams: War and Youth Identities, 1965–1975 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556664. Some of these young northern troops experienced cognitive dissonance when they encountered better political, economic, and social conditions in the south they had come to “liberate.”
4 The South Vietnamese government dubbed its internal Communist adversaries Viet Cong. U.S. and other allied forces adopted the moniker to describe both political and military elements of the insurgency. The insurgent movement formed the National Liberation Front in 1960. Its military wing became the People’s Liberation Armed Forces. This article uses Viet Cong because it was the term RVN and allied forces most frequently employed to describe insurgents during the conflict.
south established the Viet Cong in 1956 to advance the party’s political and military goals. With its southern clients suffering from a successful Saigon crackdown on rebels between 1955 and 1958, Hanoi authorized a more militant response to President Diem’s regime in 1959.5

The fledgling insurgency was especially strong in three South Vietnamese provinces: Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. They occupied the lower extremity of what Saigon dubbed I Corps (figure 1), a sector that encompassed the top quarter of the republic’s 1,000-mile-long (1,609 kilometers [km]) territory. Near the end of III MAF’s tour in Vietnam, these three provinces (of 44 total) still accounted for 16.3 percent of the south’s total clandestine insurgents. Quang Nam’s share of the overall Viet Cong infrastructure remained the highest of any province in South Vietnam. This hotbed of Communist insurrection served as the birthplace of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment.6

The southern insurgency featured both political and military dimensions. The former comprised the more dangerous of the twin threats because its social organizations generated and sustained the armed resistance. The Communist infrastructure served as a shadow government, clandestine in regions ruled by Saigon and overt in areas the Communists controlled. This alternative bureaucracy collected taxes, resolved legal disputes, redistributed land, gathered supplies for its troops, sponsored subversion, assassinated political opponents, enlisted recruits for military service, organized social groups, distributed propaganda, and collected intelligence. The National Liberation Front, a “united front” designed to camouflage Hanoi’s hand in directing the insurgency’s policies, plans, and actions, duped many observers both in and out of Viet-

6 Thomas C. Thayer, War without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 207. I Corps (later renamed Military Region 1) was a political and military zone formed by South Vietnam’s five northernmost provinces. This area, 265 miles (426 km) long and 30–70 miles (48–113 km) wide, held approximately 2.6 million citizens in 1965. The ARVN fielded a military corps also called I Corps in the same sector. In addition to their military duties, the ARVN I Corps commanding general served as the region’s top civil government official.

nam about the entirely indigenous roots and nature of the rebellion. Yet, Hanoi directed the front and its subversive minions. The Communist party’s extensive organizational structure controlled life in Viet Cong strongholds and contested government authority elsewhere. Together, the party’s political and military dau tranh (“struggle”) movements sought to undermine and then overthrow the Saigon regime.7

The insurgency’s military wing encompassed three levels. Paramilitary militia forces, called the Popular Army, furnished local security for Communist hamlets and villages. These ubiquitous black pajama-clad guerrillas, farmers by day and fighters by night, remain an iconic image of the Vietnam conflict. One step up the military chain, Communist regional or territorial forces provided full-time but still geographically restricted security services. These local troops normally served within their own district and seldom ventured farther afield. Main Force units, on the other hand, roamed across their home provinces and sometimes moved across province lines in support of regional offensives. They constituted the best-trained and -equipped insurgent formations and were designed to engage ARVN elements on equal terms in conventional battle. Insurgent fighters could be promoted, or conscripted, into higher level Viet Cong units. Whether advanced for meritorious service or drafted against their will, hamlet militia often augmented local district forces, who in turn furnished troops to casualty-depleted Main Force units.8 III MAF’s experience tracking and fighting a specific Communist Main Force unit, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, illustrates the military and political challenges posed by these insurgent formations.

8 Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces, 2d ed. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 81–82; and Pike, Viet Cong, 234–39.
Figure 1. South Vietnam’s I Corps (Military Region 1)

Rise of a Regiment

The 1st Viet Cong Regiment formed in February 1962. Initially, its rolls listed three infantry battalions (60th, 80th, and 90th Battalions) and one artillery battalion (400th Battalion). In July 1963, the regiment received a battalion-size draft composed of troops infiltrated from North Vietnam, the first of many such reinforcements imported from outside South Vietnam. Viet Cong Main Force battalions numbered approximately 450 troops until 1968, when their numbers dropped precipitously and never again recovered. A full-strength regiment, with three infantry battalions and a heavy weapons battalion (deploying mortars, recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns) plus a headquarters element, typically numbered about 2,000 soldiers.9

Throughout 1964 and the first half of 1965, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment operated in I Corps’ Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces and quickly demonstrated its combat proficiency. In July 1964, the 60th Battalion successfully ambushed a South Vietnamese engineer company. The next month, the 90th Battalion conducted a similar ambush on an ARVN detachment of armored personnel carriers. In October, the 40th Battalion (formerly the 80th) captured an ARVN company-size camp, scattering its defenders and destroying two light artillery pieces. The regiment conducted two battalion-level attacks on ARVN units in February 1965. Two more battalion assaults on South Vietnamese security forces followed in March and another in April. The latter attack marked the regiment’s eighth battalion-size operation in just 10 months.10

The 1st Viet Cong Regiment conducted its first regimental-size offensive on 19 April 1965, destroying a company of South Vietnamese troops. The second such attack targeted the 51st ARVN Regiment at Ba Gia Village, 20 miles (32 km) south of Chu Lai in Quang Ngai Province. After extensive sapper reconnaissance of the objective, the enemy regiment commenced a clash that extended through the last three days of May. Several hundred ARVN troops captured in this engagement underwent Communist reeducation and retraining and later fought for the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The regiment struck Ba Gia again on 5 July, overrunning (again) the reconstituted 1st Battalion of the ARVN 51st Regiment, killing or wounding several hundred troops, and capturing two 105mm howitzers. Both the May and July battles represented epic triumphs, for which the victors assumed the title Ba Gia Regiment, but the two costly encounters also foreshadowed future pyrrhic struggles. The regiment’s 40th Battalion lost an entire company (with only one unwounded survivor) in the first fight and the rebuilt Viet Cong battalion was similarly damaged in the second engagement (where one company lost all but two soldiers dead or wounded).11

The Marines’ first contact with the Ba Gia Regiment took place in August 1965. III MAF’s intelligence section received multiple reports from a variety of sources that the Viet Cong regiment was staging a few kilometers south of the Chu Lai airstrip and possibly planning an attack on the Marine base.12 A Viet Cong deserter and fresh signals intelligence soon confirmed the enemy regiment’s location in a village just 12 miles (19 km) south of the airfield.13 General Lewis W. Walt immediately tasked 7th Marine Regiment to plan and

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conduct a spoiling attack on the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The enemy battalions were spread out across a 36-square-mile (58 square km) sector of rice paddies and rolling hills, sprinkled with two dozen small hamlets, and flanked on the east by the South China Sea.

The operation, code named Starlite and launched on 18 August, encompassed a Marine rifle company that moved by truck to block the northern portion of the targeted zone, a heliborne battalion that landed to the west of the enemy’s anticipated location, and a second battalion that came ashore over the beach to link up with the air mobile assault element and then drive the insurgents back toward the sea, where the guns of the fleet and a third amphibious battalion waited to complete their destruction (figure 2).14 The attack surprised and damaged two of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s infantry battalions and elements of its weapons battalion.15 In the ensuing battle, the Marines counted 614 dead insurgents, captured 9 prisoners, and detained 42 suspects.16 The 2,000-strong 1st Viet Cong Regiment lost 30 percent of its strength in this engagement. By doctrinal standards, the unit was destroyed.17 Yet, it lived to fight another day—and that day was not long in coming.

In September, III MAF located, via aerial photographs of new fortifications, what it assessed as remnants of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment eight miles (13 km) south of the Operation Starlite battlefield. In a three-day combined ARVN/Marine operation (Piranha), again under 7th Marines’ control, American reports noted 178 Viet Cong dead and 360 detained suspects. Despite the damage done, the bulk of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment escaped the area a day before Piranha kicked off.18 In November, just three months after Starlite, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, reinforced with a new influx of North Vietnamese regulars, destroyed the ARVN post at Hiep Duc in Quang Nam Province. The headquarters of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) ordered General Walt to strike the enemy lair in the Que Son Valley before the Communists could exploit their latest victory. III MAF intelligence reports estimated the regiment’s rebuilt strength at 2,000 soldiers with another four unaffiliated Viet Cong battalions in the area for a total Communist force of approximately 4,700 fighters.19

The MAF assigned a Marine unit of brigade strength (Task Force Delta), reinforced by a similar-size ARVN unit, to fix and destroy the cagy Viet Cong. Lacking solid intelligence on the specific location of the enemy, the Marine plan (Operation Harvest Moon) directed South Vietnamese troops to advance to contact, then hold the Communists in place while two U.S. battalions deployed by helicopter to attack from the rear and cut off their retreat to the western mountains. Rather than being trapped, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment mauled the advancing ARVN regiment in an ambush. Marine ground forces, slow to assist, engaged elements of the 60th and 80th Battalions (the first from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, the other an independent battalion) for a day and a half, then spent the next 10 days in mostly fruitless pursuit of the enemy. Though the intermittent fighting produced, according to American records, 407 Viet Cong killed in action at a cost of 164 ARVN and Marine dead, Harvest Moon did not achieve the intended destruction of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. Instead, it foreshadowed how difficult it would be in I Corps to capture or destroy insurgents

15 The 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s four subordinate units were now numbered the 40th, 60th, and 90th Viet Cong Infantry Battalions and the 45th Heavy Weapons Battalion. Communist units sometimes changed their names and numbers to confuse allied intelligence collection efforts. Prebattle Marine intelligence indicated the 40th and 60th Battalions and the regimental command were present along with parts of the 90th and 45th Weapons Battalions. The Communist regiment’s command post was actually located 10 miles (16 km) south of the battlefield, along with the rest of the weapons battalion and 90th Battalion. Andrew, The First Fight, 10; and Lahrack, The First Battle, 64.
19 Nicholas J. Schlosser, In Persistent Battle: U.S. Marines in Operation Harvest Moon, 8 December to 20 December 1965, Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2017), 7–9. III MAF intelligence reported that NVA regulars were integrated into Viet Cong units after Starlite to boost shaken morale. III MAF Command Chronology, September 1965 (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 6. 
Figure 2. III MAF’s Operation Starlite, August 1965

Map adapted by Marine Corps History Division, Col Rod Andrew Jr., The First Fight: U.S. Marines in Operation Starlite, August 1965 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2015), 25.
who chose when and where to fight. Harvest Moon marked the allies’ final major contact with the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in the first year of the U.S. ground war. Table 1 summarizes known and estimated casualties (killed and captured) the Ba Gia Regiment suffered in 1965 alone.

Throughout 1966 and 1967, ARVN, Marine, U.S. Army, and South Korean troops repeatedly pursued and engaged the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. In February 1966, a major combined operation (Double Eagle II) located but failed to destroy the ghostly formation in the old Harvest Moon area of operations. The following month the Ba Gia Regiment destroyed a South Vietnamese regional force company at An Hoi in Quang Ngai Province. In response, the Marines and ARVN launched Operation Texas/Lien Ket 28 in March, which engaged the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s 60th and 90th Battalions fighting from fortified villages. The allies killed 264 insurgents in four days, but the bulk of the enemy forces escaped in the night each time they were cornered. In April 1966, the ARVN and 7th Marines conducted Operation Hot Springs/Lien Ket 36 in the Chu Lai area, killing 349 more members of the 1st Viet Cong. Despite those casualties, III MAF intelligence reports still assessed the 1st Viet Cong at full strength (2,000 troops) in June. Throughout the latter half of 1966, the enemy regiment remained relatively quiet, avoiding major operations and contacts. The following year proved particularly punishing for the Ba Gia Regiment. In February 1967, it attacked a Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine company and engaged elements of the 2d ARVN division in Quang Ngai Province, losing more than 800 dead in the course of several weeks’ fighting. The next month, the Viet Cong unit ambushed a company-size South Vietnamese irregular patrol near Minh Long. In August 1967, another Marine operation, Cochise, killed

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20 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 101–11; and Schlosser, In Persistent Battle, 10, 38–47. III MAF carried the 1st Viet Cong at half strength in its order of battle assessments after Harvest Moon. III MAF Command Chronology, December 1965, Significant Events (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 2. Early in the operation, Gen Nguyen Chanh Thi, commanding ARVN’s I Corps, angrily withdrew his forces from what had been designed as a classic “hammer and anvil” operation because he concluded that Task Force Delta had been tardy in coming to his troops’ rescue after the 8–9 December ambushes. It was 26 hours from the initiation of the first Viet Cong attack before Marines linked up with ARVN remnants on the ground, even though 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was less than 29 miles (47 km) by road from the ambush site and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was 36 miles (58 km) by road when the first ambush started on 8 December. Both battalions flew in on 9 December. It was just 18 miles (29 km) by air for 2d Battalion from Tam Ky and 13 miles (21 km) by helicopter for 3d Battalion from the logistics base located 3 miles (5 km) north of Thang Binh, where it had moved from Da Nang by motor march on the morning of 9 December.


23 Despite those casualties, III MAF Command Chronology, April 1966 (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 4, 6, and 8. Hot Springs, targeting the Viet Cong regimental command post and two of its battalions, was triggered by reports derived from a defector from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. III MAF, January–June Intel Reports, COLL/5348, Vietnam War Command Chronologies, MCHD, 25; and III MAF Command Chronology, April 1966 (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 4, 6, and 8. Hot Springs, targeting the Viet Cong regimental command post and two of its battalions, was triggered by reports derived from a defector from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. III MAF, January–June Intel Reports, COLL/5348, Vietnam War Command Chronologies, MCHD, 179.

24 “III MAF VC/NVA Order of Battle, I Corps Area, 1 June 1966,” III MAF Command Chronology, June 1966, Enclosure 9: III MAF VC/NVA Order of Battle, I Corps Area (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 5. These estimates were confirmed by multiple sources and carried the 1st Viet Cong headquarters strength at 800 with three battalions (60th, 80th, and 90th) fielding 400 troops each. Note that the 40th Battalion was again listed as the 80th Battalion.


26 This was a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) unit. These forces included ethnic minority groups, mostly Montagnard tribesmen from the Central Highlands, who teamed with U.S. Green Berets to screen NVA incursion routes and strike vulnerable enemy forces. III MAF Command Chronology, March 1967 (Quantico, VA: MCHD), 22.
Table 1. 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s major operations and losses, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates (all 1965)</th>
<th>1st Viet Cong Regiment operations</th>
<th>1st Viet Cong Regiment casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28–31 May</td>
<td>Regiment destroys 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, as Ba Gia Regiment fights ARVN battalion, ARVN Ranger battalion, and RVN Marine battalion relief force</td>
<td>ARVN claims 556 KIA but only 20 weapons recovered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–6 July</td>
<td>Regiment overruns ARVN’s Ba Gia garrison force</td>
<td>Heavy, but total numbers unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–19 August</td>
<td>Two battalions vs. Marines at Operation Starlite</td>
<td>614 KIA, 9 POW, 42 suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–9 September</td>
<td>Elements of regiment vs. Marines in Operation Piranha</td>
<td>178 KIA, 360 POW/suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October–November</td>
<td>Regiment largely avoids nine allied search-and-destroy operations</td>
<td>34 KIA, 27 POW, 158 suspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17–19 November</td>
<td>Regiment vs. ARVN at Hiep Duc</td>
<td>141 KIA, 300 additional estimated KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–20 December</td>
<td>Regiment vs. ARVN and Marines in Operation Harvest Moon</td>
<td>407 KIA, 33 POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Composite losses</td>
<td>1,374 confirmed KIA, 856 estimated KIA, 629 POW/suspects, 2,858 Viet Cong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: KIA = killed in action; POW = prisoner of war.

156 and captured 13 Ba Gia soldiers. The 1st Viet Cong Regiment suffered similar casualties in September in a combined Marine/ARVN operation (Swift/Lien Ket 116). Between 24 and 26 September, the U.S. Army’s Americal Division (23rd Infantry Division) piled on the punishment, inflicting another 376 casualties in battles northeast of Tien Phuoc in Quang Nam Province. Thoroughly battered and judged combat ineffective by October 1967, the Ba Gia Regiment played little role in the 1968 Tet offensive.

Assessing the 1st Viet Cong Regiment

The III MAF intelligence shop, exploiting ARVN, USMACV, and national assets as well as its organic collection capabilities, tracked the 1st Viet Cong Regiment closely. This Main Force unit appeared in almost every Marine intelligence summary produced during the war. These reports listed updates on unit locations, strengths, casualties, movements, morale, tactics, training, leaders, health, and alias titles used for deception purposes.
The *Ba Gia Regiment* suffered catastrophic losses in the two and a half years following America’s entry into the war. In 1965, it suffered, according to American counts, 1,340 confirmed dead in the Starlite, Piranha, Hiep Duc, and Harvest Moon battles. In 1966, it lost another 753 dead or taken prisoner in Operations Double Eagle II, Texas, and Hot Springs. The following year was worse, with 1,535 killed or captured in a series of battles against allied forces between February and September. Given its consistent 2,000-man organizational strength, these figures represent losses of 67 percent in 1965, 38 percent in 1966, and 76 percent in 1967.

These casualties were even worse than they sound. The numbers do not include wounded, assessed by USMACV at a 1:1.5 killed-to-wounded ratio for the Viet Cong and NVA.\(^3\) They also do not reflect estimates of additional deaths killed by supporting arms or those who died of wounds but whose bodies could not be recovered. Using the USMACV formula, the projected wounded alone would have added another 5,442 casualties to the regiment’s total losses during the 30-month period. The 30 percent doctrinal destruction threshold, if applied to the *Ba Gia Regiment* and counting only confirmed dead and prisoners, resulted in a unit that was destroyed twice in 1965, once in 1966, and twice more in 1967. Incorporating estimated wounded into the total losses ascribed to the unit meant that it was “destroyed” 13 times during that short period. A veritable phoenix, the *1st Viet Cong Regiment* incredibly continued to reconstitute, strike, and evade allied forces for the rest of the war. It fought in the final 1975 Communist offensive that ended the conflict.\(^3\)

The *1st Viet Cong Regiment* lost many battles against the Marines, but it persevered as a force in arms to contest Saigon’s control of the region. The unit helped

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\(^3\) Pribbenow, *Victory in Vietnam*, 392.
defeat the American strategy of attrition by waging an effective recruiting and replacement campaign. The regiment initially gathered most of its soldiers from the local villages. The stirring Ba Gia victories of 1965 likely made it easier to convince the already strongly pro–Viet Cong inhabitants of the region to enlist, but any such enthusiasm was doubtless tempered by the 50-percent losses suffered by 40th Battalion during the Ba Gia campaign. Subsequently, the regiment de-emphasized voluntary enlistments and ordered district and village guerrilla units to provide replacements for its Main Force battalions. After Operation Starlite, the Communists were forced to rely more on coercion and began to recruit women to strengthen the 1st Viet Cong Regiment.33

The 195th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, which joined the regiment in early December 1965, illustrated the other way the 1st Viet Cong Regiment replaced its battle losses. Both whole units and periodic manpower replacement drafts infiltrated from the north via the Ho Chi Minh Trail.34 Members of the 45th Heavy Weapons Battalion, for example, also hailed largely from North Vietnam. It was common for machine gun and mortar units to feature northern soldiers since it was difficult to provide recruits appropriate training on these systems in I Corps during the early days of the war.35 As time passed, more replacements from North Vietnam came into Viet Cong units to fill out the depleted ranks of the supposedly southern insur-


35 Col Nguyen Van Ngoc, NVA (Ret), Quang Ngai City, SRVN, in interview with author, 9 April 2000, hereafter Van Ngoc interview. The author met Col Van Ngoc in 2000 when he accompanied a group of American students from the Marine Corps Staff College walking the Starlite battlefield. Col Van Ngoc participated in that fight as a young man. Only fragmentary notes from those conversations remain, with much of his doubtless intriguing personal story and his role in Starlite and subsequent battles lost to history.

gent formations. By July 1967, allied intelligence reports indicated the regiment’s 60th Battalion contained mostly North Vietnamese regulars who infiltrated into the RVN via the Ho Chi Minh Trail.36 After the 1968 Tet offensive, it was not uncommon for two-thirds of the soldiers in Viet Cong formations in I Corps to be North Vietnamese.37

Ba Gia Regiment recruits from the north attended a 15-day training course near Binh Giang in the Red River delta, where they received basic military and political instruction. Heavy emphasis was placed on the latter so the new soldiers would understand why they were fighting. Trainees mastered only rudimentary combat skills. Upon completion of the initial school, graduates joined an element of the regiment; there they completed further training under the tutelage of their new leaders. This was where they learned the unit’s standard operating procedures and the advanced skills necessary to compete on an equal footing with ARVN and the Americans. Live-fire training was particularly difficult to accomplish in I Corps due to the need for concealment from government and allied forces. Soldiers selected to attend subsequent specialist instruction, such as squad leader, sapper, and crew-served weapons courses, had to travel farther afield to secure zones in the RVN’s remote mountains, cross-border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, or inside North Vietnam. The unit’s training system, though unsophisticated, proved adequate. Only three months after Operation Starlite, the regiment had recuperated

sufficiently to destroy an ARVN battalion at Que Son and bloody a Marine battalion at Ky Phu.\[^{38}\]

Most of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical supplies were either brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail or captured from ARVN forces. Uniforms were imported from the north. The local population provided food and other logistic support, including limited nursing care and porter services when required. Southern peasants did not always provide this support, particularly the rice tax, willingly. Nonetheless, the regiment managed to sustain itself throughout the heavy fighting of 1965.\[^{39}\]

While few NVA soldiers deserted once they reached the south, approximately 150,000 Viet Cong abandoned the Communist cause between 1965 and 1969.\[^{40}\] Communist soldiers who fled the 1st Viet Cong Regiment mirrored the profiles of other disillusioned insurgents who surrendered across the south. Analysis of those who capitulated country-wide in early 1966 (11 percent of whom were in I Corps) painted a dim view of life as a rebel. Almost all (90 percent) cited poor medical care while one-third mentioned that malaria was rampant among the ranks. Few were well educated, with 70 percent having three years or less of schooling. Half of the Communist deserters had been drafted (they were not volunteers), while 20 percent were forced to join the Viet Cong. Almost two-thirds (61 percent) fled because of terrible living conditions. Fully half of the enemy soldiers claimed no knowledge of what the war was about, noted that food for Communist troops was scarce, and observed that southern peasants gave little voluntary support to the Communist cause. More than one-third quit because of moral or ideological dissatisfaction with the Communists’ actions.\[^{41}\] Ralliers (Viet Cong soldiers and political cadre who surrendered to allied forces) from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment consistently cited low morale, poor healthcare, and little food, though no shortage of ammunition.\[^{42}\] Such insights gave analysts a good sense of the regiment’s strengths and weaknesses, but the continuous scrutiny did not enable allied forces to fix and finish their wary and weary foe.

Main Force units like the Ba Gia Regiment comprised the most lethal but not the most numerous Viet Cong opposition in I Corps. In the spring of 1967, III MAF identified 29,000 full-time enemy soldiers in the region, including Main Force and Local Force units. But the G2 intelligence analysts also listed 75,000 irregulars serving as hamlet and village militia, civilian supporters, and political infrastructure.\[^{43}\] Unlike the Main Force units that gained a steadily increasing proportion of NVA regulars throughout the conflict, the part-time soldiers and their civilian supporters were primarily native South Vietnamese. Initially, the III MAF estimates of enemy strength included the part-time guerrillas, but not their unarmed assistants.

Two years into the war, these local civilian supporters of the Viet Cong finally found a place on the Marine roster of enemy forces. Reflecting the contentious debate between USMACV and the CIA/State Department on enemy combatant numbers, III MAF order of battle reports began in February 1967 to incorporate additional types of militia forces into the total tally of I Corps enemy. The new categories included supporting forces such as self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. These affiliated Viet Cong sympathizers, not previously counted as enemy because they were seldom armed or directly confronted allied forces.

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\[^{39}\] Van Ngoc interview. The colonel claimed the local peasants provided willing support to the regiment. For a countervailing assessment, see Lanning and Cragg, *Inside the VC and the NVA*, 125–33; and the Rallier Reports summarized below.

\[^{40}\] Wilkins, *Grab Their Belts to Fight Them*, 214; and Lanning and Cragg, *Inside the VC and the NVA*, 44.


\[^{42}\] See for example, III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 44, 4 December 1966, October–December 1966, B-2 to B-3; III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 45, 11 December 1966, October–December Intelligence Reports, B-1 to B-2; III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 3, 22 January 1967, January–February 1967, B-1; and III MAF Periodic Intelligence Report 9, 5 March 1967, February–April 1967, C-1 to C-2, all COLL/5348, Vietnam War Command Chronologies, MCHD.

forces, were henceforth included for completeness’s sake. This data added more than 50,000 personnel to the aggregate I Corps enemy, though the MAF report explained that this change was an accounting modification, not an addition to the number of armed enemy forces that had been operating in the region.\textsuperscript{44}

The new reporting standards, however, did not indicate a new MAF emphasis on the guerrilla menace. From the beginning, Marine commanders took the guerrilla and political portion of the hybrid conventional-irregular war seriously. They initiated a balanced intelligence and operational approach, featuring a wide variety of actions designed to protect the South Vietnamese population from village-level insurgent political and military threats. The five I Corps provinces represented a Viet Cong organizational stronghold, so the “small war” for control of the rural population remained a bitter and strongly contested affair throughout III MAF’s tenure in Vietnam. Fully 20 percent of total American combat fatalities in the war, for instance, occurred in the area around Da Nang where the 1st Viet Cong Regiment spent much of its time.\textsuperscript{45}

Like its USMACV counterpart, the Marine intelligence directorate expanded and developed its collection and assessment capabilities as the war progressed. The MAF’s order of battle analysts tracked the insurgent threat closely. There is less evidence that senior Marine leaders appreciated or acted on what the information gathered meant for the MAF’s regional operational approach or USMACV’s theater strategy. The data they collected suggested two explanations for the amazing recuperative abilities of the enemy’s Main Force units such as the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first was access to a rural population that could be persuaded or coerced to send its sons and husbands to fight under the Communist banner. The second was a steady resupply of fresh regular troops infiltrated from the north. Together these manpower reservoirs enabled savaged Viet Cong battalions and regiments in I Corps to reform and continue to fight.

Along with their Main Force comrades, local forces and militia proved equally resilient during the first three years of the war. The continued regeneration of all types of Communist military forces, despite their regular mauling by superior allied firepower, indicated that General William C. Westmoreland’s attrition strategy, coupled with the aerial interdiction effort, had not attained the promised crossover point beyond which the enemy could no longer make good their losses. Nor had the punishment strategy, exemplified by the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against the north, convinced Hanoi to cease its efforts to conquer the south. The resiliency of the various Viet Cong formations in I Corps also underscored the pacification strategy’s failure to secure South Vietnam’s countryside, convince all its people to support the Saigon government, and refuse to join Communist military units.

### Hybrid War Implications

The 1st Viet Cong Regiment case study illustrates the challenges of winning in a hybrid war environment

\textsuperscript{44} The wartime debate between USMACV and CIA/State Department intelligence analysts was never fully resolved. A truce of sorts ensued in the fall of 1967, when the agencies settled on a new compromise strength figure for the contested categories. These included the Viet Cong Administrative Services and Irregulars composed of the political infrastructure, guerrillas, self-defense forces (active in Viet Cong controlled locales), and secret self-defense forces (unarmed old men, women, and children who gathered information for the Viet Cong in RVN-controlled areas). It took two years for the allied intelligence effort to begin to understand this component of the intelligence puzzle.

For the background of this divisive conflict among the nation’s intelligence agencies that later spilled over into the Westmoreland vs. CBS libel lawsuit, see Davidson, Secrets of the Vietnam War, chaps. 2 and 3, for the USMACV defense and Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968 (Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1998), ep. 3, for the CIA challenge. The most recent, comprehensive, and credible analysis of the intelligence arguments over the 1964–69 enemy order of battle is found in Edwin E. Moise, The Myths of Tet: The Most Misunderstood Event of the Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017). https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1x07zgd. Moise concludes that USMACV senior leaders did, in fact, purposely limit the estimated numbers of enemy insurgents to buttress the Johnson administration’s arguments that the war was being won.

The important point here is that the Viet Cong militia forces in I Corps totaled more than division size in strength while its supporting components equated to three divisions’ worth of personnel. In short, the level of armed and unarmed opposition, not even counting NVA and Viet Cong Main/Local Force units, was very high in the III MAF sector.

that blends nonmilitary means with conventional and irregular combat operations. The Vietnam conflict represented a revolutionary struggle in which the north, aided by elements of the southern population, sought to destroy the government of the south. Saigon’s counter-revolutionary campaign (and by extension America’s) incorporated social, economic, political, informational, psychological, and military dimensions. The allied military role was two-fold: (1) buttressing the Saigon government’s legitimacy by protecting its citizens; and (2) coercing its Communist opponents to give up the struggle. In simple terms, this equated to defending the South Vietnamese people from Communist attack and political control. These goals required defeating both the persistent Viet Cong insurgency and continuous NVA invasions.

Military options available to achieve those objectives included: search and destroy operations to attrite enemy ground forces inside South Vietnam; pacification operations to turn or “rally” homegrown opponents and secure the political and military support of the south’s populace; interdiction of infiltration routes to slow or block the arrival of reinforcements; punishment of the north via bombing and blockade; and invasion to force Hanoi’s capitulation. Washington ruled out invasion. Intermittent allied bombing campaigns of varying scale failed to pressure the north to cease its attacks on the south. Naval blockade commenced only in 1972, when it helped convince Hanoi to accept America’s offers to withdraw from the conflict, but a naval quarantine was not used earlier or more aggressively to coerce Hanoi to make a real peace. Aerial interdiction of critical supply lines via bombing proved ineffective, as it had when tried in Italy during World War II and throughout the Korean War.46 American presidents also disallowed stationing U.S. troops across Laos to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Given the reduced military menu of choices, General Westmoreland opted to emphasize search-and-destroy operations with the goal of killing more Communists than could be generated internally or infiltrated from the north.47 This tactic failed for three reasons: (1) land infiltration routes remained unblocked; (2) enemy units could retreat when necessary to sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam, returning when ready to renew the fight; and (3) pacification operations diminished but never dried up the supply of southern recruits. The saga of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, bruised but defiant, thus underscores in microcosm the strategic dilemma that led to Saigon’s defeat. Too weak to protect its people from dual insurgent and conventional threats even with the assistance of more than half a million allied troops, the south was doomed once American forces departed.

If a decisive offensive against the primary source of Communist aggression was politically impossible, only a combination of the punishment, prevention, and pacification strategies afforded a reasonable chance to successfully defend the south. An earlier and stronger emphasis on pacification, akin to the operations CORDS conducted between late 1968 and 1972, promised to simultaneously protect the South Vietnamese people and deny the enemy critical local support.48 Ground interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a prevention strategy, offered the strongest potential to degrade or deny the primary external avenue of aid for insurgent Main Force units in I Corps.49 Both local Viet Cong and infiltrated NVA units depended on, and would have faced far greater challenges without, these internal and external sources of supply. Strategic

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bombed the heart of the north, naval blockade, and search-and-destroy operations inside South Vietnam, all variations of a punishment strategy, complemented but could not replace the other options. In classical mythology, Hercules defeated the multiheaded Hydra only by cutting off its heads and cauterizing its necks. In Vietnam, victory required the south to cut off its enemy’s access to the people and to outside sources of supply. Failure to do both left Communist units such as the 1st Viet Cong Regiment free to regenerate and strike repeatedly.

Within the north’s *dau tranh* strategy, the primary purpose of insurgent military forces was to protect and project its own political infrastructure. The party’s shadow government enacted the social, economic, and political policies and directed the organizational web that exerted control over the population. It represented the insurgency’s beating heart, its “center of gravity” in Clausewitzian terms. Main Force units like the Ba Gia Regiment, as well as smaller local forces and militia elements, engaged ARVN and American troops to defend and extend the Communist infrastructure. Destroying a Main Force regiment damaged the military protective shell but did not undermine the political core it shielded. Allied efforts to attack the infrastructure directly via the Phoenix program did not gain momentum until after the 1968 Tet offensive and never completely uprooted the shadow government’s complex social and political network in I Corps.

At the tactical level, U.S. and ARVN attacks on the 1st Viet Cong Regiment proved costly. In most cases, allied forces encountered the regiment’s soldiers in hastily prepared defensive positions. Main Force units were as well armed with assault rifles, machine guns, and light mortars as their free world foes. Attacking allied forces accordingly paid a steep price to pry Ba Gia soldiers from their trenches and bunkers. Allied superiority in artillery and airpower reduced friendly casualties, but closing the final hundred yards to a fortified position still required costly exposure to deadly direct fire. While superior American training, marksmanship, and firepower reduced the impact, infantry combat in I Corps nonetheless produced casualty ratios that ranged from 10 to 70 percent of the high losses attributed to the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. By 1969, a myriad of these recurring clashes across the south translated even this uneven exchange rate into an aggregate cost the American public proved unwilling to pay. Meanwhile, Hanoi’s politburo refused to blink as the war ground on.

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93 *Free world* was a term commonly used at the time to describe anti-Communist forces supporting South Vietnam. The phrase is descriptive, not ideological, in intent. While 1960s-era South Vietnam, South Korea, the Philippines, and even the United States were not without fault if judged by contemporary ideals of representative government, accountability, or respect for civil rights, the allies certainly merited the *free world* title far more than their Communist rivals in the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam.

94 U.S. forces were criticized during and after the war for inflated body counts based on inaccurate or unavailable information as well as driving up the numbers by including losses among (or even targeting) innocent civilians. Hanoi admitted after the conflict that its total military losses were roughly twice the 550,000 estimated by U.S. authorities. Woodruff, *Unheralded Victory*, 215, 217. Historian Guenter Lewy devotes half of his work on the war to a consideration of the war crime charge. He concludes that U.S. tactics in Vietnam did not violate international law, seek to destroy the civilian population as a matter of deliberate policy, or generate civilian casualties at rates disproportionate to other twentieth-century wars. Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 305.

Conclusion

Hybrid wars feature conventional and irregular tactics, either of which can prove fatal to a victim facing both threats. The 1st Viet Cong Regiment case study suggests that it is not enough for a government’s armed forces to destroy enemy military units, even many times over, if wartime policies allow a foe cross-border sanctuaries and unblocked invasion routes. This case also highlights the importance of engaging early, effectively, and directly the infrastructure that insurgent armed forces exist to protect. The longevity and regenerative strength of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment reflected the strength of the Communist political organization in the south, the dogged endurance of its military wing, and the failure of allied punishment strategies that did not destroy the enemy’s infrastructure and stop repeated NVA incursions into Saigon’s territory.

The fierce fighting spirit and resilience of the Ba Gia Regiment did not prevent the unit’s tactical defeat at Starlite and in many subsequent encounters with allied forces. During the American phase of the conflict, of course, battlefield victory and defeat did not prove decisive. The north absorbed far higher losses than the allies, but its will to unify Vietnam under Communist rule remained unbroken. America withdrew in 1973 and abandoned its ally. Saigon fell in 1975 to a conventional NVA invasion abetted by the enervating effects of a lingering, if debilitated, insurgency. The phantom 1st Viet Cong Regiment survived, and Hanoi won the war, because allied strategy failed to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure and prevent NVA armies from flooding the south.

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21 May 1801
To Yusuf Qaramanli,
Pasha and Bey of Tripoli

Great and respected friend,

We have found it expedient to detach a squadron of observation into the Mediterranean sea, to superintend the safety of our commerce there & to exercise our seamen in nautical duties . . . [and to] rest the safety of our commerce on the resources of our strength & bravery.¹

With this missive, Thomas Jefferson, third president of the United States, hoped to avert open war with the Barbary state of Tripoli. In March 1801, Jefferson had received dispatches from American diplomats in Tripoli warning that its pasha was preparing to resume raiding American merchant ships, in violation of a standing peace treaty, unless the U.S. government handed over monstrous sums of cash. This problem had plagued the presidents before him, and Jefferson had had enough. “I am an enemy to all these douceurs, tributes and humiliations,” he stated after his inauguration. Jefferson forwarded this letter—backed up by an American naval squadron—to make clear his resolve to the pasha.² But Jefferson’s final attempt at peace, unbeknownst to him, was already overtaken by events; only a week earlier, Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli had ordered the American flag at the U.S. consulate in Tripoli cut down, thus declaring war on the United States.³ When Commodore Richard Dale and his squadron arrived in Gibraltar Bay on 1 July 1801, he was sailing into a war zone.⁴

A reproduction of Jefferson’s missive is also the first item to greet those interested in recreating the U.S. Navy’s war against the Barbary states (or sending Barbary corsairs rampaging against unsuspecting merchant ships, from the Tripolitan perspective) in the new tabletop wargame, The Shores of Tripoli, developed by Fort Circle Games. While game designers have created no shortage of titles focused on historic Marine Corps battles (with the Second World War an especially saturated topic), no one has gamed out this very early episode in American military history until now.

The timing for this new Marine Corps-centric game is fortuitous, given both General David H. Berger’s emphasis on wargaming as an educational tool in his Commandant’s Planning Guidance, and reinforced in the more recent tri-Service maritime strategy Advantage at Sea.⁵ But timing aside, two questions require deeper examination before recommending this game

⁴ Toll, Six Frigates, 171.
as a potential educational tool worthy of Marines’ attention: Is *The Shores of Tripoli* historically accurate; and as a wargame, is it any good?

This reviewer is pleased to answer both questions in the affirmative. The work Fort Circle Games put into the design and mechanics of *The Shores of Tripoli* reflects a high level of research married to a ruleset that is relatively simple to learn. The game provides a great deal of replayability inside the historical framework, and both the American and Tripolitan players are faced with challenging strategic choices in which poor decision making can be ruthlessly exploited by the other side. *The Shores of Tripoli* is an elegant introductory wargame that allows Marines to better learn about their own history while exploring the decision-making challenge faced by every military professional as they prepare for future conflict: the eternal question, What if?

The game starts players off in the spring of 1801, with Tripolitan corsairs scattered across the Mediterranean and three American frigates at Gibraltar, ready for tasking. This mirrors President Jefferson’s first deployment of forces—a squadron centered on the frigates *President* (1800), *Philadelphia* (1799), and *Essex* (1799). Jefferson’s decision to use military force was a clear break from the previous American approach to dealing with the predations of the Barbary states—a mixture of shaky treaties, expensive tribute, and (largely empty) threats. Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli had a centuries-old habit of piracy and slave-trading in the Mediterranean Sea. European nations either enjoyed sufficiently deep treasuries that tribute payments impacted them little or had navies powerful enough to protect their own merchant ships. The United States had neither. So it was that Jefferson decided the status quo was no longer viable. In early 1801, he received word from U.S. consul James L. Cathcart that Qaramanli, in violation of a peace treaty signed in 1796 and guaranteed by the Bey of Algiers, was demanding a huge cash payment immediately and annual tribute thereafter, or Tripolitan corsairs would attack American shipping in the Mediterranean. Jefferson sent his letter and a fleet, instead.

The first two squadrons sent to tame Tripoli (1801–2, under Commodore Richard Dale, and 1802–3, under Commodore Richard V. Morris) accomplished little; indeed, Morris’s performance was so mediocre that he was relieved of command and stripped of his commission upon returning to the United States. American diplomats became concerned that the impotence exhibited by the first two squadrons would more deeply undermine American prestige than simply paying off the Barbary states. William Eaton, American consul in Tunis, noted in August 1802 that “operations of the last and present have produced nothing in effect but additional enemies and national contempt. If the same system of operations continue, so will the same consequences.” In the same month, Albert Gallatin, Jefferson’s treasury secretary and long-time foe of national debts in general and naval expenses in particular, considered giving tribute to Tripoli “no greater disgrace” than annuities given to other, less impactful Barbary factions. Gallatin asked Jefferson whether as a “mere matter of calculation . . . the purchase of peace is not cheaper than the expense of a war.” In May 1803, when Jefferson asked his cabinet “shall we buy peace with Tripoli?” the response was an unambiguous “yes.”

But the president would not bend. A third squadron, deployed from 1803–4, enjoyed more ships, more firepower, and most importantly, a much more aggressive commander in Commodore Edward Preble. Preble blockaded Tripoli, patrolled the Mediterranean to keep the other Barbary states quiescent, and practiced gunnery while awaiting the arrival of shallow-draft gunboats that would allow him to penetrate

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the harbor of Tripoli and threaten Qaramanli and his corsairs directly.

However, a disaster in October 1803 threatened to undermine Preble’s progress. While pursuing corsairs into the harbor of Tripoli, the frigate USS Philadelphia, commanded by William Bainbridge, grounded hard on an uncharted shoal. All efforts to free the Philadelphia failed, and Bainbridge was forced to surrender the ship and its crew. Qaramanli was ecstatic, expecting a rich ransom for the prisoners in addition to the prospect of adding a frigate to his corsair fleet. Preble was furious; but while there was little he could do for Bainbridge and the Philadelphia’s crew in the near term, he would not suffer the indignity of having an American frigate turned against him. Using intelligence Bainbridge smuggled out of his prison, Preble approved a daring plan to destroy the Philadelphia at anchor. On the night of 16 February 1804, a captured Tripolitan ship—renamed USS Intrepid (1798) and commanded by Stephen Decatur—bluffed its way into Tripoli’s harbor and disgorged a boarding party onto the captured American ship. Intrepid’s crew secured the ship, set it afire, and escaped cleanly as the Philadelphia burned under the impotent guns of Tripoli’s fortifications.

Determined to keep the pressure on Qaramanli and now augmented by gunboats, Preble launched a number of incursions into Tripoli’s harbor in late summer. He aimed to blast away at Tripoli’s fortifications and the corsair fleet until the pasha released Philadelphia’s prisoners. But despite Preble’s persistence, Qaramanli refused to release the American captives; and with late-season weather worsening and promised reinforcements not yet arrived, Preble made one last effort to force Qaramanli’s hand. Intrepid was re-configured as a fireship or floating bomb, packed with enough explosives to destroy the Tripolitan fleet at anchor—if it got close enough. After several abortive attempts, on 3 September it finally made its approach to the harbor under cover of darkness. Though sentries spotted Intrepid’s approach, the vessel appeared to have successfully navigated the harbor entrance. But for reasons unknown, the fireship exploded prematurely, killing its own crew but causing no damage to the harbor fortifications or corsair fleet. Five days later, the fourth squadron, under the command of Commodore Samuel Barron, arrived off Tripoli to relieve Preble’s fleet.

It was Barron’s squadron that would secure the endgame against Qaramanli, and The Shores of Tripoli concludes its gameplay in this timeframe as well. In addition to fresh frigates, Barron also brought with him a new plan. For several years, American diplomats in the Mediterranean had talked with Qaramanli’s exiled brother, Hamet, who promised that if the United States gave him arms and money, he could raise an army to seize the cities of Derna and Benghazi, and then march to attack Tripoli through its weaker inland defenses. Hamet would replace his brother on Tripoli’s throne, and America need no longer worry about Tripolitan corsairs. Under Barron, this plan would go forward. He detached one ship to take former U.S. consul Eaton to Alexandria, Egypt. Eaton sealed the arrangement with Hamet, delivering the promised money and munitions. In turn, Hamet raised his army and in March 1805, he left Alexandria for Derna, accompanied by Eaton and a small contingent of U.S. Marines. On 27 April, Hamet’s force, supported by the guns of three American ships, assaulted and captured Derna. It was here that Marine lieutenant Presley N. O’Bannon raised the Stars and Stripes for the first time over foreign soil, a feat immortalized in the “Marines’ Hymn”—and in The Shores of Tripoli game. The road to Benghazi then Tripoli, seemed open, but to Eaton’s bitter disappointment, Derna was as far as his force would go. Diplomacy had overtaken him; Qaramanli, seeing the writing on the wall with the fall of Derna and suffering under continuous blockade, agreed to return the captives of the Philadelphia and

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14 Fremont-Barnes, The Wars of the Barbary Pirates, 46–49; Armstrong, Small Boats and Daring Men, 56–62; Toll, Six Frigates, 190–211; and McKee, Edward Preble, 179–199.
cease attacks on American shipping in exchange for a modest ransom. Qaramanli signed the treaty on 3 June 1805, and the U.S. Senate ratified it in April 1806. This phase of the Barbary Wars was over.16

The Shores of Tripoli mirrors these events and allows the players to relive the key decisions made by both sides quite well. The board, game components, and ruleset are well-crafted, elegant, and simple, but not so simple that the game feels unchallenging. Indeed, both players will find that, despite its relative simplicity, the game forces hard choices in terms of force deployment and overall strategy. The choices are so varied, in fact, that even after playing through several times, players will not have exhausted all the options available to them.

As mentioned above, The Shores of Tripoli opens in spring 1801, with the first U.S. squadron anchored in Gibraltar, Tripolitan corsairs present in both Gibraltar and Tripoli, and Tripolitan ground forces in each of its cities. The remaining Barbary cities of Tangier, Algiers, and Tunis are at peace, at least in the beginning. The game board is divided into harbors, patrol zones, and open water. Much of the gameplay is a cat-and-mouse challenge of the American player trying to bottle up Tripolitan corsairs and Tripoli poking holes in the blockade. The Tripolitan player wins by pillaging sufficient tribute with its corsairs, sinking four American frigates, or destroying Hamet’s army once it is deployed. The American player can win by repeating history—isolating Tripoli from its Barbary neighbors and capturing Derna—or via an interesting “what if” scenario that follows Hamet’s original plan to capture Derna, Benghazi, and finally Tripoli itself.

The Shores of Tripoli covers 1801–6, the years across which President Jefferson deployed his four naval squadrons until Qaramanli capitulated. Each year is divided into four seasons; in each season, both players have the option to move existing ships on the board, recruit new ones, or play “event” cards that offer unique actions. The game provides a few guardrails to ensure that the broad outlines of history hold true; American frigate deployment, for example, begins with only a few ships available, but with each passing year more frigates come into play, matching Jefferson’s increasing commitment over time. Another example is that certain event cards cannot be played until the year they actually happened—the U.S. player cannot recruit Hamet’s army until 1804, reflecting the amount of time (and multiple trans-Atlantic crossings) it took for that diplomatic effort to bear fruit.

What makes the game unpredictable and replayable is that many other historical events can be played at any time. The Tripolitan player’s event card The Philadelphia Runs Aground can be played any time the American player has a frigate in the Tripoli patrol zone, potentially allowing Tripoli to capture that frigate toward its victory conditions. In reality, Philadelphia ran aground in fall 1803, but American frigates had patrolled Tripoli since 1801, and it is entirely possible that another frigate, pursuing corsairs, might have encountered an uncharted shoal earlier on. A Show of Force can be played by the American side at any point a Tripolitan ally threatens to join the fight and prevent them from doing so; again, while it was Preble whose aggressive patrolling kept the other Barbary states passive, other American commodores might have found themselves compelled to do so.

However near or far the players cleave to history, The Shores of Tripoli still presents realistic choices to each faction that mirror their side’s interests and obstacles. Tripoli initially enjoys significant freedom of action to raid, as historically the American blockade was haphazard until Preble’s squadron arrived. An aggressive Tripolitan player, pillaging tribute or sinking American ships, can, by mid-game, confront the American player with the inflection point Jefferson himself faced by 1803, when it was the overwhelming opinion of his diplomats and cabinet that the military solution to the Barbary problem was simply not worth the cost incurred by the American taxpayer. Should the American player survive to the later part of the game, however, the additional military resources brought by Preble and Bannon make things much more challenging for the Tripolitan player, who must contend with the increased

numbers and firepower of the U.S. Navy squadrons and the new threat of Hamet’s army bearing down on them by land.

All this said, the best way to assess the game is playing through its mechanics. American forces are blue; Tripolitan forces are red; Tripoli’s allies are orange; and the American player has an option to use a limited number of Swedish frigates, which are yellow. The United States begins 1801 with Dale’s squadron, represented by three blue frigate pieces, anchored in Gibraltar. Tripoli starts with several corsairs in Tripoli; ground forces in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Derna; and two corsairs in Gibraltar (they share an anchorage with American ships, but Great Britain is enforcing neutrality in its key Mediterranean harbor).

Here is a synopsis of the reviewer’s play. The American player first deployed their frigates from Gibraltar to the patrol zones around Tangier, Algiers, and Tunis; they also played a card that deployed two Swedish frigates to the Tripoli patrol zone. The Tripolitan player launched several corsair raids from Tripoli that were modestly successful in sinking a few merchantmen, but more critically, damaged a U.S. frigate, forcing it out of the Mediterranean for a year to be repaired. Come winter, the United States was beginning to recruit gunboats in Malta, but despite garnering only a small amount of tribute, the Tripolitan player was optimistic about their position, especially since the American player had left Tripoli’s corsairs in Gibraltar unguarded.
In 1802, the American player decided to build up their presence rapidly, gaining not only the frigate scheduled for that year (along with the frigate damaged on the previous turn), but also playing a card that allowed the early deployment of the frigate slated for 1803. Tripoli countered by having Morocco and Tunis declare war, which mobilized corsairs in those respective harbors. Despite the extra hulls, the American player would still have a hard time covering all the patrol zones in any strength and so opted to play a tribute card that bought peace with Tunisia, at the cost of putting more coins in the Tripolitan player’s coffers. With more coins added from successful raids by the remaining corsairs, Tripoli was feeling good about winning before the American player could meet the historical triggers to launch a ground campaign.

The American player opened 1803 by reinforcing the Tangier patrol zone and recruiting more gunboats in Malta. The Tripolitan player decided to play the card that removed the Swedish frigates from their patrol on Tripoli, gaining more tribute in the process. More successful corsair raids were bringing Tripoli very close to victory. However, in the final phase of 1803, the American player—in a doubling-down quite analogous to Jefferson’s decision to keep fighting rather than pay Tripoli to make the war go away—launched a massive naval attack on Tripoli harbor with all of their frigates and gunboats. They sank a number of corsairs while...
the Tripolitan player failed to score a single hit on their fleet in return. The 1803 turn closed with Tripoli’s treasury almost full enough to declare victory but with a reduced corsair fleet and the U.S. Navy about to gain another frigate the following year.

Both players knew the game could be won or lost this turn, fall 1804; this was also the year Jefferson continued his bolder, more aggressive strategy, and Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli sensed that his position was in real jeopardy. The American player began the year by deploying yet another frigate and playing the Constantinople Demands Tribute card, which reduced the tribute in Tripoli’s treasury. This reflected history in that the Barbary states were nominal vassals of the Ottoman Empire, though direct Ottoman control was quite loose. Still, one could argue that, had the Ottomans decided to execute their feudal privilege in 1804, Qaramanli—beset by the most powerful American naval squadron yet deployed and facing the threat of his elder brother mustering an army in the east to depose him—would have paid Constantinople its due rather than create another enemy.

The Tripolitan player followed by having Algiers declare war and muster its own corsairs to increase the chances of regaining tribute, but the American player immediately responded with the clear intent to push into the endgame. They played Hamet’s Army Created, which put a large infantry force in Alexandria. It was now a race to see if Tripoli could impose sufficient financial cost on the American before they...
could capture enough Tripolitan cities by land to trigger their own victory conditions.

The Tripolitan player responded with corsair raids that were modestly successful, but not enough to win. But, as they feared, the next American card played was *General Eaton Attacks Derne* [sic], which moved Hamet’s army and three frigates for a joint assault on Derne. The American player augmented their assault with the special battle card *Lieutenant O’Bannon Leads the Charge*, which greatly increased the firepower of the lone Marine infantry unit in the attack. Tripoli’s defending infantry stood little chance; the frigate bombardment destroyed half, and the Marines destroyed the other half. Derne had fallen.

Tripoli was watching the window of opportunity for victory by raiding shrink. The player launched an all-out raid with the event card *Yusuf Qaramani*, which puts 10 corsairs from Tripoli and its allies to sea uncontested. But that weight of numbers proved insufficient, as the corsairs sank only one merchant. The American player could now take another step closer to victory—and did. Hamet’s army, supported again by American frigates, easily assaulted and captured Benghazi. One more corsair raid as paltry as the previous one, and Tripoli could expect the next ground assault to fall against its own walls. But in the winter of 1804, fortune smiled on the Tripolitan player one last time. A final corsair raid from Tripoli gained the tribute of three merchant ships, sufficient to win the game before Hamet’s army came knocking on Tripoli’s fortifications.

The game was close. Different frigate deployments by the American player earlier in the game might have intercepted and sunk enough of the Tripolitan’s corsairs to emaciate Tripoli’s treasury, which would have required more aggressive—possibly reckless—raids on Tripoli’s part later in the game, but against a much stronger U.S. squadron. Moreover, one of Tripoli’s game options each turn is recruiting new infantry units in its cities. The player recruited none, focusing instead on bringing Tripoli’s allies and their corsairs into the fight. (It seemed a wise investment at the time.) But when the American player mobilized Hamet’s army and turned it against the opponent’s cities and Tripoli still had not gained enough tribute to win, Tripoli’s cities fell rapidly and Tripoli was one unsuccessful corsair raid away from having to fight to death in its capital under the guns of a massive U.S. Navy bombardment.

Several iterations of *The Shores of Tripoli* have been played since, and it is a testament to the game’s balance and replayability that victory is never a given for either side. And as mentioned above, players are not locked into the historical avenues of victory. The American player can pursue a strategy to achieve the real victory (capturing Derne while meeting other conditions) or pursue the pasha of Tripoli to his backyard and unleash the full might of Jefferson’s squadron to batter down the harbor walls. The Tripolitan player can do as was described above, filling the treasury with the booty of corsair raids, or pursue a more directly confrontational strategy of sending American frigates to the bottom of the Mediterranean. Each player has a host of card options that can mix these strategies and bring them to bear earlier or later in the game as desired, limiting decision-making avenues only to the imagination of the players.

This goes back to another point mentioned earlier: *The Shores of Tripoli* is an elegant game in how it combines a multitude of player options with a low barrier to entry. This drives to the need for “reps and sets” that General Berger argued in his *Planning Guidance* were key to inculcating habits of decision making.

Players can quickly get into the rules, get into the game, and start making decisions on how to defeat their opponent. The reviewer taught his 14-year-old son the rules in about 20 minutes; it takes about an hour to play one session through to its finish. In an increasingly complex world of competition with other powers requiring broader training and deeper education, the time available to military professionals for wargaming reps and sets, however mandated, is constrained. There is something to be said for gaming mediums where rules of conflict can be learned in minutes and the scenario played in an hour. That is a lot more reps and sets than offered by massively com-

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plex systems that take weeks to set up, days to learn, hours to teach, and many more hours to play (and that is apart from the need for expensive hardware, networks, and power sources to run them).

When time is at a premium but Marines still need to develop those decision-making habit patterns, games like *The Shores of Tripoli*—with elegant mechanics and a low barrier to entry—can provide vital wargaming touchpoints to Marines outside the confines of a formal classroom. As for *The Shores of Tripoli* itself, it has much to recommend it to Marines. The game captures a historical event that other game designers have not explored, when the new-born American Navy (and a few Marines) showed the world that the United States would not submit to “tributes and humiliations.” Sailors and Marines alike had to grapple with a determined adversary, far from the support of home, with only the resources around them and their own decision-making the difference between victory and defeat. It is a scenario that echoes our operating environment today. To prepare for it, *The Shores of Tripoli* is as good a tool as any for getting in those mental reps and sets.
This book relates a unique perspective of air combat in Vietnam, that of a Marine radar intercept officer (RIO), the back-seater in the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom aircraft. A RIO is a branch of naval flight officers (NFOs) that support military aircraft other than pilots or naval aviators. Other NFOs include Grumman A-6 Intruder bombardier/navigators and Northrup-Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasure officers. All are vitally important for the operation of tactical jet aircraft. The F-4 RIOs' primary job was operating the air-to-air radar in the Phantom to spot enemy aircraft and “lock” them up with automatic radar tracking so that the F-4’s weapon system could produce a firing solution for its guided missiles. While tracking an enemy aircraft, the RIO gave verbal direction to the pilot to maneuver the aircraft into firing position for the F-4’s missiles. While that was their main job, the RIO also handled communications, shared navigation responsibility and flight planning. The RIO was also another set of eyes, valuable in air-to-air combat (dogfighting) to keep sight of the enemy aircraft. The RIOs backed up their pilots throughout each flight, monitored instruments, and advised on safety hazards. In the 1986 movie Top Gun, the character Goose depicts a RIO’s role in a combat scenario, although he was in a Grumman F-14 Tomcat not the F-4.

Unlike U.S. Air Force F-4s, which had flight controls in the back seat, the Navy/Marine Phantoms did not. The Navy and Marine Corps’ view was that the RIOs had a distinct and important duty. They were not copilots. They were at the mercy of the pilot flying the plane. Fortunately, Marine pilots were extremely professional and RIOs performed their role with well-founded confidence in the person in front. RIOs did, however, have one final say over their destinies: the lever in the back, which could be set for single eject or command eject. If a RIO saw that the aircraft and crew were in imminent danger of crashing, they could eject either themselves or the pilot too. This feature saved many lives.

RIOs were tactically important, and as time went along, they gained even more responsibility for a flight’s conduct. RIOs were expected to not only master routine flight conduct but also tactical flight. They were expected, through verbal communication with a pilot, to maneuver the aircraft in aerial combat, low-level navigation, close air support, and air-to-ground ordnance delivery. Their importance in the conduct of all F-4 missions was recognized, and RIOs went through all the tactical training that pilots did: air combat tactics instruction, Topgun, and Weapons, Tactics Instructor course. Once trained and qualified, RIOs could be designated section leader (two aircraft), division lead (four aircraft), or mission commander (responsible for mission planning and execution of a mission flown by any number of aircraft). RIOs eventually commanded squadrons, aircraft groups, and aircraft wings, and one RIO, General William L. Nyland, became Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. A good RIO was a master at situational awareness, tactical prowess, and a unique sort of leadership skill that, through communication in and outside the cockpit, effectively supported mission safety and success.

Dr. Fred H. Allison managed the Marine Corps History Division’s Oral History Section for 19 years. He is a retired Marine Corps Reserve major, a native of Texas, and earned his PhD in history from Texas Tech University in 2003.
There are many books about F-4 Phantom pilots combat flying in Vietnam. There are very few, if any, on RIOs’ or weapon systems officers’ experiences. Terry L. Thorsen’s book, *Phantom in the Sky*, focuses on his experience as a RIO flying in Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons 232 and 334 (VMFA-232 and VMFA-334) in 1969. The reader is treated to the entire experience of training for a Marine officer, from Officers Candidate School (OCS) through flight school and tactical training before deploying to Vietnam. Since this reviewer traveled the same road seven years later (with the exception of deploying to Vietnam), he can attest that Thorsen’s experiences as related are accurate and well told. Thorsen, by entering service as an aviator during the Vietnam War, missed the six-month infantry officer training at The Basic School on Marine Corps Base Quantico because of the urgent need for aviators.

Thorsen is a good storyteller and keeps the reader engaged as he describes the stages of training and then moves into combat. The reader learns of the challenges and demands of OCS and flight school. Thorsen struggled tremendously with airsickness and his story captures that deeply personal and embarrassing experience and relates it to the reader in a compelling manner. Flying in high-performance fighters was extremely physically demanding, in the high g (gravity) maneuvers and unusual attitudes one was placed. A RIO was subject to these with little control over the situation, while the pilot could mentally compensate or relax the maneuver if they felt airsickness coming on. Many RIOs got sick occasionally, but for some like Thorsen, it was more frequent and therefore a real struggle. It is extremely challenging to keep up with the F-4 during even an administrative flight while puking one’s guts out. Thorsen overcame his airsickness and became a tactically astute and competent RIO.

Thorsen’s account of Vietnam combat flying is well-written and engaging. His combat tour was abbreviated to only about 3 months instead of the standard 12 months, as he was transferred to another squadron that displaced to Japan. Despite this, he managed to accumulate 123 combat sorties, 10 Air Medals, and a Bronze Star. Ultimately, he chose to quit flying the Phantom, no doubt due to continued problems with airsickness, and got out of the Marine Corps. He was disillusioned by his Vietnam experience and did not believe he had accomplished a lot. He joined the Marine Corps Reserves later and flew the F-4 for a Reserve squadron in Dallas, Texas.

This book is a quality read and provides a look at an important and overlooked segment of Marine aviators, naval flight officers, and all crew on military aircraft. Their role in successful operations in combat in Vietnam should be preserved and detailed for future generations as Thorsen has done in this work.
Andrew Milburn’s *When the Tempest Gathers* explores his 31-year career in the U.S. Marine Corps, organized into three broad sections: the Baptism, the Harsh-est School, and the Reckoning. Milburn’s “baptism” begins with his deployment to Somalia as a platoon commander during Operation Restore Hope in 1992, learning his trade as a junior officer on the chaotic streets of Mogadishu. His tenure as a student of the “hardest school” encompasses his participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, his later service as an advisor with Iraqi forces in Fallujah, and the Iraqi Intervention Force in Mosul. In these latter assignments, Milburn’s experiences provide a sobering exploration of the complex and dangerous nature of being an advisor to Iraqi forces, dealing with reluctant or often incapable Iraqi personnel, and the occasional scorn and ignorance of American forces toward them—not to mention the instances of advisors being fragged by their erstwhile allies. Milburn then narrates his experiences with the battalion command in Karma, where he witnessed the first actions of the emerging ISIS. Milburn’s “reckoning” covers his command of the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Regiment, which is subsequently directed to support operations against ISIS after their conquest of a substantial portion of Iraq, culminating with his command of a multinational special operations task force bringing him back to Mosul again.

The literary horizon is awash in modern times with veterans’ memoirs of duty, sacrifice, and triumph. Many seek to tell the “real” story, set the record straight, or pass the buck. The works of Generals H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley K. Clark, and Tommy Franks, come to mind. Others use the literary platform to critique political leadership; the plethora of memoirs that emerged after Somalia serve as one such example. Where does Milburn slot in? Reading *When the Tempest Gathers*, one might be reminded of Andrew J. Bacevich’s *The New American Militarism* (2005), as Milburn’s account includes tacit reflections by a member of the shrinking “warrior caste” lamenting a country whose population is both disconnected from, yet fascinated with, war. There is almost no political commentary here, though. Milburn limits himself to simply suggesting that the lack of public interest or congressional oversight of conflicts is symptomatic of military service only affecting a small percentage of Americans, and that the well-meaning but glib “thank you for your service” should be coupled with a fervent interest from the public and government to ensure the military is used wisely.

From the outset, Milburn makes clear that this book is neither a vehicle to promote change nor a critique of political or military leadership. It is “simply the story of what it is like at the sharp end, told from one Marine’s perspective.” As such, Milburn does not make any seismic intervention. Neither the

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Jonathan Carroll is a former infantry officer in the Irish Defence Forces and is currently a PhD candidate in military history at Texas A&M University, researching the multinational military intervention in Somalia from 1992–95.

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3 Milburn, *When the Tempest Gathers*, x, 312.

4 Milburn, *When the Tempest Gathers*, xi.
contentious debate surrounding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nor the charged issue of the efficacy of counterinsurgency doctrine are commented on, and this is one of the refreshing key strengths of When the Tempest Gathers. Many memoirs are told through the lens of individuals from the perspective at which they retired from the Service. Consequently, one often finds that a senior officer writing about their experiences as a junior officer unintentionally recalls and delivers those perspectives colored by the wisdom, hindsight, and experience of the entirety of their career. In a break from this growing trend, when Milburn relates his time as a junior officer in Somalia, there is no wider discussion of Restore Hope; he provides only the compartmentalized perspective of a brand-new platoon commander on his first deployment. During the invasion of Iraq, only the narrow field-grade officer’s perspective on engagements in then-unknown cities like Fallujah and an-Nasiriyah is presented. It is only with his command of a task force fighting against ISIS that the broader strategic picture is explored, again a perspective relative to appointment.

Throughout this account, his experiences are laid out, warts and all, without commentary on the broader issues that have come to dominate public and academic discourse. The reader is largely left to decide for themselves as to matters of import. As such, for those expecting a wider discussion on the past two decades of American warfare, there will be disappointment. For those military practitioners and academics seeking a window into the realities of service as a Marine officer, Milburn has much of value to offer. He considers how “you recount personal experiences of the emotional trauma that combat leaves in its wake without sounding self-piteous, self-indulgent or just dreadfully clichéd?” (p. 311). Milburn accomplishes this by being candid, sometimes surprisingly so, coupled with good writing, structure, and flow. To his credit, there is none of the Hackworthian constant self-confidence bordering on arrogance, nor the convenient thinking of a solution just in the nick of time. When the Tempest Gathers lies on the other end of the spectrum. Instead, Milburn’s experiences are replete with self-doubt and constant grappling with the tangible impact military service can have on the psyche and on one’s personal life, especially for those in command appointments. This is not a statement against the war in Iraq, but a stark appraisal of the realities entailed in command during high-tempo counterinsurgency operations. For this reason, Milburn’s objective of conveying “what it is like at the sharp end, told from one Marine’s perspective” is very effectively achieved, and persuasively communicated. The marketing on the cover, suggesting that this is “the finest memoir to emerge from the last two decades of constant fighting,” may not be too far off the mark.

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Anthologies of articles provide unique perspectives on a subject. Oriented around a theme or topic, the various authors often present different, singular perspectives, yet together they reveal the various facets of a complicated subject, revealing it to be what amounts to a sculpture in the round. In this case, Hal M. Friedman has edited an anthology of papers all focused on the United States and the Pacific. In *War in the American Pacific and East Asia, 1941–1972*, Friedman unites some fascinating and somewhat divergent perspectives on the American experience in Asia. Each of the seven chapters of this text are penned by gifted scholars who bring a great deal of experience and skill to their tasks. Meticulously researched and documented, these chapters present different often ignored or unknown aspects of the American experience in the Pacific—an experience that is often overshadowed by the Second World War. Backed up by an introduction and conclusion written by equally accomplished scholars, this text gives the reader fascinating windows into topics and areas that reveal just how complex the situation was in Asia both during the war and after.

The challenge with anthologies, however, is that they present such differing aspects of a subject that it is often difficult to assess and review them. This book is certainly no exception. With topics ranging from the development of the U.S. Army’s communication network by Rebecca Robbins Raines through cultural invasion of the island of Pohnpei in Micronesia by Josh Levy, to the inter-Service rivalry over atomic bomb testing at Bikini Atoll by Dr. Hal Friedman, and a discussion of military and media relations on Okinawa from 1945 to 1972 by Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, each of these chapters provides unique and fascinating avenues into the overarching subject. Without revealing the entirety of the book, a couple of examples will suffice to indicate the scope and value of this work.

Rebecca Robbins Raines’s chapter “Theater of War: The U.S. Army’s Command and Administrative Communication Network in the Pacific, 1940–1950” presents a fascinating understanding of the scale and complexity of communications across the Pacific. Looking specifically at the Army communications system, and how it evolves over time to adjust to the increasing demands and complexity of the situation, Raines provides an interesting discussion blending technological evolution with a discussion of the importance of the system. Relying on her extensive background, Raines presents a compelling and incredibly unique understanding of communications in the most trying of situations. While it really is not surprising that this communications system became as complex as it did, it is the development and evolution of it that is not well known. The inclusion of new transmission centers, encoding technology, repeating systems, and of course capacity is what made the system so robust and capable both for the war and in the immediate years after. It played a role in working out the surrender of the Japanese, in the occupation of Japan, and in the tumultuous years right after the war.

Equally as fascinating are the second chapter, “Here’s Your Air War: Popular Culture Depictions of Land-Based Air Power in the Pacific” by Steve Call, and chapter four, “Yams, Rice, and Soda: Food and the U.S. Navy on Pohnpei, 1945–1951” by Josh Levy. While
both deal with military issues indirectly, their real importance is examining how the military impacts culture. The first explores how American pop culture was shaped by the concepts of airpower during the war. Specifically focused on issues like the Doolittle Raid, the Flying Tigers, and air power theorists, Call demonstrates how popular media of the period, both print and movies, conveyed to Americans the importance of airpower in the Pacific. Fighting the image presented in Europe, the Pacific was so spread out and so complex that airpower’s role was at risk of being lost. Popular media was used to keep this image alive by airpower enthusiasts. Levy’s chapter presents a different understanding of culture: that it is an invasive and damaging thing when it came to the lives of the native people of Pohnpei, a culture with very defined social constructs around food and the perceived value of it as a gift within their culture. The American presence on the island at the end of the war has in many ways fundamentally changed this social construct. While not necessarily intentional, the United States did have a significant cultural and dietary impact on the local population. In some ways, it is an argument that shares distinct similarities to Michael Hunt’s work and introduces a very different impact of the war. Sadly, Levy’s chapter does not connect with Hunt’s writings on how ideology and culture impact. This would have been a fascinating addition to the text and would have strengthened the chapter.

On the whole, the variety of perspectives in this book and their incredible uniqueness make this text extremely valuable. Through it all, America in the Pacific remains the central theme but only as a venue into the greater complexity of the social, cultural, and human experience of the subject. Certainly, this is a strength of great value. The one main negative for the reviewer, outside of the failure to include literature in Michael Hunt’s work, is that the book is so short. Seeing seven different aspects of America’s footprint in Asia and the Pacific makes this reviewer wonder about how vast this topic is and the complex web of history that we are not seeing. Hopefully, this work will inspire the next generation of scholars to use it as a way point for their own research. Maybe it will encourage them to look at the subject area from different perspectives. This will produce a far more complete image of the sculpture of America in the Pacific and augment research into other areas.

This text is highly recommended to anyone with an interest in the Pacific war, Asia, or American history. It will certainly benefit anyone looking at the footprint of the United States on the world. This text would definitely be an asset to anyone working at the post-secondary or graduate level, both for potential personal research and as a teaching aid. It would be an excellent addition to any history course in related areas.
The end of the Second World War was undoubtedly one of the most difficult periods in world history. Marking a transition point from a world war to a peace that became haunted by the shadow of the Cold War, 1945 set the foundation for the political, economic, military, and ideological structure of the next 50 years and beyond. It naturally has drawn the attention of a great many scholars who often look for the origins of the Cold War or the failures of Harry S. Truman in this period. A very recent and welcome addition to this literature is Dr. Marc Gallicchio’s new book *Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World War II*. Examining this critical period, Gallicchio’s book uses the issue of the unconditional surrender of Japan as a window into the political conditions of both the United States and Japan. In the process, he highlights many of the issues that became critical points in the early Cold War. Gallicchio brings a wealth of experience and knowledge to this work. Holding the position of both the chair and a professor of history at Villanova University, he is widely published in the history of the Pacific war and has produced some groundbreaking and truly gifted works. He brings his exceptional skills and experience to bear on one of the most complex periods of American history.

*Unconditional* focuses on the simple issue of unconditional surrender and how it impacted the United States and Japan through a very difficult political transition. Spanning six chapters and supported with an introduction and conclusion, *Unconditional* reveals the truly fragile nature of American politics in this period. The introduction rightly begins by setting up the understanding of the book’s context, the goal of the unconditional surrender of both Germany and Japan, by focusing on the role of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was Roosevelt who first announced this policy at the end of the Casablanca Conference of 1943, making it clear that the Allies were not going to accept a negotiated peace and possibly a repeat of Versailles. Roosevelt maintained this position and kept Americans focused on the war effort. In the process, he often skated over issues that indicated that all was not well. The Soviet position on security in Eastern Europe and the secret negotiations that happened here, domestic division along partisan lines due to the New Deal and his big government methods, domestic desires to return to more civilian production, the atomic bomb, and of course his own health are all examples of this. Very secretive, Roosevelt kept all these cards very close to his chest, not even telling Vice President Harry Truman or the State Department about them.

The remainder of the text provides a masterful threading together of the various themes into a chronological discussion of both the domestic and international issues, taking the reader from Roosevelt’s death through the defeat of Japan and its occupation. Chapter one deals specifically with Truman and the need to transition into the position of president. Faced with a steep learning curve, Truman had to find his way internationally with the conflicting pressures of dealing with the Soviet Union on one hand and the defeat of Japan on the other along with the domestic pressures of a very unstable country. The conflicting domestic pressures from industry and the Republican party and the need to defeat and properly punish the Japanese seemed to directly clash around the issue of...
unconditional surrender and its implication for Asia. It did not stop Truman from clearly standing behind Roosevelt’s policy of unconditional surrender.

Chapters two and three track the opposing pressures to end the war in the period leading up to the Potsdam Conference (1945) within both the United States and Japan. Chapter two includes a discussion of the Japanese domestic and military situation and the rise of those seeking to end the war in the face of militants who were willing to fight to the end rather than surrender or allow the imperial family to be eliminated. In the United States, this was matched by Republicans like former president Herbert Hoover and some in the State Department who were willing to adjust the term unconditional surrender if it meant peace sooner without Soviet involvement in Asia. Yet, many in the United States, including the State Department and the military, insisted that adjusting the war aims was unacceptable. The result is a clearly partisan feel to the discussion and an increased sense of internal debate. Chapter three reinforces the internal debate within the United States and the challenges that Truman faced here.

Chapter four focuses on Potsdam and the U.S. position for getting the Soviets involved in Asia. It also lays out the options available to the president in forcing an end to the war in the Pacific. While a siege or invasion were possible, Truman was not happy with the idea of prolonging the war if he could end it quicker. Here, the bomb enters the discussion as a means of ending the conflict. Chapter five breaks down the final days more carefully, still highlighting the pressures on the president, the use of the bomb and eventual Japanese surrender, and plans for a post-war Japan. Chapter six starts with the occupation of Japan and the role of the emperor, followed by an examination of the conflicting views of the end of the war. Roosevelt and the “liberals” are blamed for dragging out the end of the war, allowing Soviets to get their fingers in Asia and Japan. In an early version of the Red Scare, General Douglas MacArthur, Hoover, and others saw a great Communist plot attacking Roosevelt and Truman for the policy of unconditional surrender. The bomb inevitably enters the discussion here as well. The conclusion naturally assesses Truman and his handling of the issue of unconditional surrender. It also is clear that the surrender of Japan reflected the ideological struggles taking shape at home.

Gallicchio does an incredible job detailing the pressures and forces at work on Truman. From the domestic perspective, there were many: the strong desire by big business to get back to normal civilian production as soon as the war in Europe was over; ignoring the continued struggle in the Pacific; public hostility to Japan and support for unconditional surrender; and the fear that a negotiated peace with Japan would blow back on the president as it did to Woodrow Wilson in 1919. As Gallicchio demonstrates, these pressures were directly impacted by the personalities surrounding the president. When overlaid with partisan politics and the overwhelming hostility that Republicans felt toward Roosevelt and the New Deal, Truman was clearly under siege on the home front. It did not help that even members of his own administration were divided over the issue of unconditional surrender. Here again, partisan political struggles appear when Republican leaders and many experts in the State Department pushed for an easier peace with Japan by changing the language of unconditional surrender to allow Japan to keep its emperor, not out of a desire to save American lives but out of fear of Soviet intervention in Asia. Likewise, the military and many within the administration remained committed to Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender policy. Even the atomic bomb was pulled into these discussions, pushing for its use to either end the war quickly and thus save American lives and/or to scare the Soviets. The result was a bewildering, almost continual debate around the president, all focused on the issue of unconditional surrender and how it impacted individual goals and ambitions.

When matched by international concerns, such as a potential Soviet threat and probable problems in Eastern Europe, the fear that a Soviet entry into the Pacific could seriously destabilize Asia was real. But there was also the pressure on the president to save American lives. The need for a Soviet entry in the Pacific to end the war against Japan was a seri-
ous one and something that Truman had to consider. The atomic bomb therefore inevitably took on greater significance. Truman, learning on the fly, is presented as an incredibly thoughtful and careful thinker who asked questions and listened to opinions but kept his own council until it was time to act. A man thrust into a very difficult position, Truman came through this as a true leader.

It is equally interesting to see what was going on across the ocean. The internal debate in Japan, the role of the military and political leaders like Suzuki Kantaro, Shigenori Togo, and of course Emperor Hirohito in some ways shadow the U.S. internal crisis. The window into the internal workings of the Japanese government at the end of the war provides a fascinating counterpoint to the Truman administration that is often ignored by many authors. In the process, it provides balance and, to some extent, clarity about why the Japanese failed to surrender earlier.

The issue of the atomic bomb was an expected inclusion into the discussion regarding American options for forcing Japan to surrender. The author lays out the options clearly and, more importantly for the reader, how they evolved over the course of the spring and summer of 1945. This includes the inevitable debate between blockading Japan, invasion and its manpower costs, and the use of the bomb. It also demonstrates how challenging any discussion of the bomb was considering how few were even aware of its existence. In several instances, it was clear that discussion around the president would have been different if the bomb was part of the conversation. With an unenviable set of options before him, Truman found the path for America that he thought was acceptable. Debate will ever continue to swarm around the decision to use the atomic bomb, but certainly Gallicchio’s book provides a solid context for consideration.

One of the other great strengths of the text is that Gallicchio shows how these issues and emotions impacted the historiography. Inevitably, as chapter six demonstrates, the writing of history took up these forces and further polarized the events in many eyes. Much of this polarization is certainly questionable. The backlash of Republican and right-wing forces regarding Japan is perhaps best epitomized by Hoover, MacArthur, and General Bonner F. Fellers. They worked really hard to spin the story that Hirohito was ready to surrender earlier but that the position of unconditional surrender prevented it. Sadly, the evidence is really not there. But they do manage to vilify Truman and even blame Roosevelt for all of this. Wherever MacArthur is concerned, there is inevitably more myth than there should be. In this case, the author points out several incidents when MacArthur was clearly passing on falsehoods, but again, he was never held to account for it as the cult of personality cleared him of such things. The writings of New Left authors throughout the 1960s and 1970s have further polarized these discussions by overlaying events with their own narrative, which is often hostile toward American foreign policy and decision making. The writings of Gar Alperovitz are a perfect example of this.

The one area of this postwar analysis of unconditional surrender that was most disappointing in the book revolves around the issue of the bomb. Gallicchio inevitably brings in Gar Alperovitz’s 1965 book *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* into his narrative, as it directly challenges the reasons for America’s use of the atomic bomb. It is understandable that it is brought in, as it helps shape what is called the New Left thinking about the bomb and Truman. What is disappointing is that Gallicchio failed to bring in the incredible criticism that this book has produced. Many issues with the text have been pointed out by authors like Robert Maddox that indicate the many failings of *Atomic Diplomacy*. The debate about it among academics certainly discredits Alperovitz in many eyes, and it would have been interesting to this reader to see how that criticism fits within the historical narrative that Gallicchio presents and his assessment of how history has seen Truman’s use of the bomb.

Despite this small criticism, Gallicchio’s *Unconditional* is an outstanding book that is a must for anyone interested in the early Cold War, the end of the Second World War, or politics in the United States. It certainly raises Truman as a truly unique president and makes him appear, at least to this reader, far more aware and in control of his administration.
than history has often depicted. This work’s value to anyone trying to understand the impact of this war, the atomic bomb, and the internal debate this produced is beyond expression. This will be a favorite book for undergraduate and graduate courses in early Cold War, military, and diplomatic history, as well as in courses aimed at presidential history.

•1775•
Stephen M. Younger’s *Silver State Dreadnought* tells the story of a ship and its crew through two world wars. Launched on 11 July 1914, the USS *Nevada* (BB 36) was sunk by the U.S. Navy on 31 July 1948, laying to rest a vessel that survived not only two global conflicts but two atomic bombs tested at Bikini Atoll. During the ship’s career, it served with the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, withstood the attack on Pearl Harbor, and participated in the invasions of Normandy, Southern France, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. This fascinating book describes not only the life of a battleship, but the emergence of the United States as the world’s leading naval power.

*Nevada*’s epic began with its design in the years preceding the First World War. This was the age of the dreadnought, when the great powers competed to build the biggest, fastest, best-armed and -armored battleships afloat. Even the neutral United States got into the act, and this set the stage for the American Navy’s arrival as a force to be reckoned with in the First World War. *Nevada* had a starring role in the drama, serving with a squadron of American battleships supporting the British Grand Fleet and escorting convoys. Between the wars, *Nevada* survived the treaty restrictions imposed on the world’s leading navies (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States), undergoing modernization between 1927 and 1930. The only battleship that managed to get underway at Pearl Harbor, *Nevada* survived bomb and torpedo hits by grounding itself to prevent sinking. Refloated, repaired, and refitted, the battleship served in both the Atlantic and Pacific during the Second World War, escorting convoys and providing gunfire support to amphibious landings in the Aleutians, France, Iwo Jima, and finally, Okinawa. Deemed obsolete after the war, it served as a test subject for atomic weapons at Bikini Atoll in 1948. The sturdy ship survived two blasts, its distinguished career ending not due to enemy action, but to friendly fire by everything from the 16-inch guns of the battleship USS *Iowa* (BB 61) to torpedoes from Navy aircraft. The author quotes a former crew member as saying, “It seemed that we of the *Nevada* had lost a dear friend—more than that, a family member—indeed, a surrogate mother. The ship had never been an impersonal thing to us; she was always an entity, emitting power, pride and security to all those, friends or enemies, who came into contact with her” (p. 263).

The author, president of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, handles the technical side of *Nevada*’s story excellently, with enough detail to satisfy the enthusiast described in terms comprehensible to the layman. This is in many ways a biography of a ship, but it is also the story of the people who served aboard *Nevada*, and Younger writes in an engaging manner that brings events to life. The book is generously illustrated with numerous excellent photographs that complement the text superbly. Insightful and informative, the reader will gain a greater appreciation of the Navy in the first half of the twentieth century.

Marines will find the chapters dealing with Iwo Jima and Okinawa especially interesting. In the former battle, *Nevada* earned the nickname “Sweetheart of the Marine Corps” for the intense and accurate naval gunfire support it provided. When *Nevada* replenished...
ished its ammunition at Ulithi on 19 March 1945, it loaded “700 rounds of 14-inch high capacity shells, 400 rounds of 14-inch armor-piercing shells, more than 10,000 5-inch shells of various types, nearly 56,000 rounds of 40-millimeter shells, and more than 250,000 rounds of 20-millimeter shells” (p. 213). *Nevada* engaged all manner of targets, from hardened bunkers to personnel, saving the lives of innumerable American troops in the process. The action was not all one way, however. Off Okinawa, *Nevada* sustained casualties from both enemy artillery ashore and kamikazes. One of the latter killed 9 sailors and wounded 47. The text and accompanying photographs describing this event are graphic and grim, bringing the reality of war home to the reader.

In conclusion, *Silver State Dreadnought* is an outstanding book. Students of naval architecture and history, social historians interested in the lives of sailors, and Marines wanting a Navy perspective on the employment of naval gunfire in amphibious operations will enjoy it. It is engagingly written, well-illustrated, and finely balanced in its coverage of both the technical and human aspects of *Nevada’s* long, colorful, and distinguished career. It is recommended for academics, military professionals, naval enthusiasts, and the general reader.
Most of the discussion of U.S. naval history, and indeed of naval history more broadly, centers around grand matters—major battles and blue-water (deep water and oceans) operations and strategy. Ever since the late nineteenth century, the story of American naval history and naval policy has been, first and foremost, the story of big ships and big fleets. Though brown-water (rivers and near shore) ships and small-unit operations have always formed a part of American warfare, their role had often been understated and underemphasized.

This is a gap that Benjamin Armstrong seeks to remedy with *Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy*. Armstrong focuses on naval irregular warfare, or rather a specific branch of naval irregular warfare—small-craft and small-unit raiding operations in wartime. Armstrong also uses the term *guerre de razzia*, or war by raiding. Other forms of irregular maritime warfare (e.g., privateer actions) are omitted from the book’s scope.

*Small Boats and Daring Men* covers the use of maritime raiding by the Continental Navy and civilian vessels (from small boats crewed by brave citizens to privateer vessels) in the American Revolutionary War, continues through commerce raiding in the Quasi-War and raiding operations on the Barbary Coast, and raiding actions and torpedo warfare (what would later be termed *sea mining*) in the War of 1812 (to which two chapters are dedicated) and then moves on to the counterpiracy operations of the West Indies squadron and the Sumatra expeditions.

Throughout the book, Armstrong skillfully combines accounts of the political and legislative realities underlying the conflicts he covers and detailed, well-written descriptions of naval actions from each period that are both easily accessible and yet provide a clear explanation of how the actions were fought. Armstrong leverages contemporary accounts and internal communications of the Department of the Navy to give the reader a profile of the commanding American officers in each engagement and the decision making behind their actions.

The author uses these accounts to illustrate common features of successful irregular warfare operations and those officers best fit to command them. Those officers, Armstrong holds, had to be brave, aggressive, and capable of independent action, while still remaining fully aware of the broader strategic context in which they operated, with the aggression of junior officers being steered by senior officers—similar to the concept modern military experts sometimes refer to as *mission-oriented tactics*. The actions covered are reminiscent of irregular warfare actions on land (whether those carried out by Rogers’s Rangers in the French and Indian Wars or those seen in more modern conflicts). Just as in land-based irregular warfare, detailed intelligence of the target, deception, and stealth, followed by rapid and aggressive action are the key to the operations described in *Small Boats and Daring Men*.

While Armstrong does cover the operations of civilian volunteers (privateers or militias), particularly during the War of 1812, it is clear that he does not view them as wholly distinct or separate from the Navy’s operations. Armstrong argues that the civilians often received funding, weapons, or guidance from the Navy, and their actions should be seen as ancillary to the efforts of the American commanders in the theater. Where they failed, he states, their failures are due to their lack of training or the untried nature of
the improvised bombs or Fulton torpedoes they used, and are not to be seen as a mark against irregular naval warfare in general.

In his discussion of irregular warfare actions—whether raids against the British on Lake Erie or anti-piracy operations on the coast of Sumatra, Armstrong stresses the importance of strategic context. The irregular actions described in Small Boats and Daring Men might have been small in scope and might have sometimes failed to achieve a strategic effect, but were, in Armstrong’s view, always directed toward such an effect. The boats may have been small but the context was not. The key to success in irregular warfare, Armstrong holds, is maintaining a strict link between the mission plan and the strategic effect.


Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy rides the line between military history and military policy. Armstrong puts forth his case for irregular warfare eloquently, and it is well-illustrated both with primary sources and a wealth of references to works of military theory. The book’s sole weakness—one that does not much undermine it—is the author’s decision, perhaps a deliberate one, not to define his subject within the scope of special operations history and theory. It remains, despite this, a valuable addition to the body of literature on brown-water and irregular maritime actions.
Dr. Joseph Arthur Simon has written a biography of General John A. Lejeune that has added significantly to the scholarship on this renowned Marine. Simon first wrote about Lejeune in 1965 when he wrote his master's thesis on him, when there was no biography yet written on this legendary Marine. The author began an extensive research phase funded by a retired Reserve Marine, Brigadier General Walter McIlhenny of the Tabasco Hot Sauce Company. Simon also began correspondence more than 50 years ago with both of Lejeune's daughters. He was able to copy Lejeune's personal papers and move them to the Louisiana State University (LSU) Archives. In 2003, Simon retired from his job in higher education and began this book project. He was “convinced that it was Lejeune’s leadership in the Marine Corps that had created the new mission of amphibious assault that resulted in the modern day Marine Corps, as evidenced by the corps’s [sic] performance in the Pacific in World War Two” (p. iii). Simon pieces together Lejeune’s experiences, decisions, and focus, all leading to the new mission of the Marine Corps in the twentieth century. Although born in the nineteenth century, Lejeune was very much a twentieth-century man who led significant reforms and a focus on education and leadership that contributed to the successes on the battlefield in World War II. He also demonstrated a keen appreciation for the American public, as well as civil-military relations with the secretary of the Navy and the U.S. Congress.

Simon follows Lejeune from his rural roots in Louisiana to his formative years in the Corps of Cadets at LSU and his appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy. One notable incident was Lejeune’s sea duty on the USS Vandalia (1876) in Samoa during a hurricane in 1889. The near-sinking of the ship in port highlighted the unforgiving nature of sea duty. These early years are illuminated by family and personal correspondence and show that great character was formed in this leader at an early age. His resiliency and attention to duty in the catastrophic hurricane in American Samoa led him to choose a commission in the Marine Corps rather than the U.S. Navy. In his early career, Lejeune straddled the missions of traditional ship- and shore-based security, with turns in colonial policing (including the Vera Cruz, Mexico, expedition) and later to the transition of advanced base operations and the genesis of the amphibious assault. Lejeune was both a progressive and a reformer as he strove to promote education for all Marines by establishing the Marine Corps Schools and educating Congress and the secretary of the Navy on merit-based promotion to build a crop of younger leaders for the coming fight with Japan. Lejeune was the only Marine general officer to command an Army division in World War I. This experience led him to conclude that the Marine Corps must be better prepared for the next large-scale conflict and that experimentation is a way to create doctrine, tactics, and justifications for programs when transitioning to a large-scale conflict. He also supported advanced base operations’ transition to the amphibious assault because of the ominous
Simon shows Lejeune's very human side. His interest in the development of his Marines, and especially younger officers, was a first-class demonstration of mentoring and coaching the next generation. Even after Lejeune's tenure as Commandant was completed, his visionary example laid the foundation for success in World War II. The character study of Lejeune the leader shines brightest in Simon's work. The examples the author provides illuminate Lejeune as a man of action but not devoid of intellect, and they show why even today his leadership model of the relations between officers and men (teacher and scholar), and his traditional Marine Corps birthday message is read on 10 November. After retiring from the Marine Corps, Lejeune became the superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, where he continued his interest in education, but he also supported his relief as Commandant by writing and testifying to Congress on programs that had begun during his tenure. His sense of duty ensured he still assisted his beloved Corps. He was able to see the development of the Fleet Marine Force and expansion of the Marine Corps before he passed away in November 1942, while the Guadalcanal campaign was fought.

This book comes at a significant time as the Corps again seeks closer integration with the Navy and a return to its Fleet Marine Force mission. The lessons in the book show a Commandant who developed excellent relations with the Navy, Army, and Congress, paving the way for the Marine Corps of World War II. This reviewer highly recommends it to other Marines and sailors. It should be considered for use by the Lejeune Leadership Institute at Marine Corps University, and it should be nominated for inclusion in the Commandant's Professional Reading List.
In *Flamethrower*, author Bryan Mark Rigg has produced a work of such extraordinary depth and color that it should rightfully be considered one of the classic accounts of the Pacific War. The book represents a rare accomplishment for a number of reasons.

First, Rigg manages to weave meticulous research into a compelling story. Despite the scale of his canvas, there is not a dry or boring page in this book. Rigg combines a novelist’s eye for pace and drama with a historian’s determination to tell things as they actually happened. From the opening pages as Rigg and his son accompany veterans, Americans and Japanese, on a 2015 visit to the same islands for which they fought so bitterly, to the conclusion in which Rigg provides a masterful perspective on that campaign, the author pulls the reader into the narrative as only the best writers can.

Second, Rigg’s research led him to overturn some of the firmly entrenched myths of the Pacific campaign and the Iwo Jima battle, in particular; and yet he does so with empathy and balance. Despite the determination of Medal of Honor recipient Woody Williams and his family to silence Rigg’s account of the controversy surrounding his award, Rigg goes to some lengths to describe Williams’s actual achievements during and after the war. Similarly, Rigg’s research brings him to the conclusion that General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the commander of Japanese forces at Iwo Jima, was nothing like the sympathetic figure portrayed in the 2006 movie *Letters from Iwo Jima* but an unrepentant war criminal guilty of committing atrocities that are shocking even by the standards of the Imperial Japanese Army. Nevertheless, Rigg’s portrayal of the Japanese side is scrupulously fair and—where justified—unusually sympathetic.

Third, Rigg relates a compelling personal narrative that allows the reader to experience at ground level and from both sides what it was like to fight one unremittingly savage battle after another for islands that amounted to nothing more than a few square miles of coral and sand but that were, in their aggregate, of great strategic importance. Rigg is able to explain this strategic perspective seamlessly without ever losing direction or momentum—an exceptional skill.

Finally, Rigg brings to this work the sagacity of an accomplished historian and the practical experience of a Marine officer—a rare combination, and one that he uses to great effect to deliver a true masterpiece.
During World War II, there were nine individuals who achieved the rank of five stars: George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, Omar N. Bradley, William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey. Of all these great leaders, Omar Bradley is, by far, the least written about. But author Steven L. Ossad, the recipient of a General and Mrs. Matthew Ridgway Military History Award and an Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award, has given a superb account of Bradley’s life in his book *Omar Nelson Bradley: America’s GI General, 1893–1981*. He does an excellent job of covering Bradley’s personal history, not just during World War II, but before and after in detail without shying away from the faults that led Bradley to make some questionable decisions throughout his life.

The author has done due diligence in writing this tome by using primary source reference materials. The main source during the early part of the book is Bradley’s own autobiography, which he wrote later in life. While Ossad has realized that time can change the way events are perceived to have happened, he uses secondary sources to verify the truth. This is important to ensure the credibility of the history. Another major source used by the author was that of Major Chester B. Hansen, Bradley’s principal aide during the war. Major Hansen was exposed to all of the Allied principals during the war and he kept a personal diary that was more than 2,000 pages long. The author also used the diary of Major Thomas S. Bigland, the British liaison between British general Bernard Montgomery and Bradley. These references help the author to paint a vivid picture of Bradley and the influences on his decision making during World War II.

The author highlights what this reviewer regards as key details of Bradley’s life. The first was Bradley missing out on duty in France during World War I. While most of the leaders that were in France during the war came home with the military doctrine developed through trench warfare, Bradley, as much as he wanted to be in France, was developing his own doctrine that “stressed familiarization with and use of infantry weapons, especially the latest innovations such as machine guns, automatic rifles, and mortars,” which led to the concept of open warfare with vehicles used in offensive combat (p. 62). This concept was resisted by World War I veterans but would serve Bradley well in the future.

Another detail the author explored was Bradley’s relationships with his fellow soldiers, especially with Marshall, who was instrumental in getting Bradley into key positions. This was a direct result of the doctrine he developed, and Marshall was able to see the development. There were also the relationships with Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Montgomery. These relationships were instrumental in molding Bradley into one of two five-star generals to come out of West Point’s class of 1915, commonly known as the “class the stars fell on.”

Ossad also argues that, as respected as Bradley was and as high as he would go, he did have flaws, notably deflecting responsibility for situations that arose. The book’s prologue details an account in which Bradley got on first base in the later innings of a close baseball game. After being warned about the pitcher’s move to first, Bradley proceeded to get picked off first base, and the West Pointers would lose the game.
While being picked off was clearly Bradley’s fault due to his inability to recognize the need for caution, he spent the rest of his life blaming the umpires, coaches, or anybody other than himself for the incident. There would be other such incidents in his life with much more cataclysmic results after which he attempted to shift blame.

One of those incidents happened during Operation Cobra (July 1944). The Allies were bogged down in France after the D-Day landings due to the large hedgerows and the German resistance. The breakout plan called for the area to be carpet-bombed to break down the resistance and destroy the hedgerows, providing an alley for the Allied attack. Army Air Corps commanders resisted because the attacking force was too close to the area to be bombed. Bradley chose to ignore their recommendation, which resulted in the worst friendly fire accident in U.S. history. This incident killed Bradley’s friend Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the highest-ranking loss in the entire war. Bradley deflected responsibility, blaming the Air Corps for the loss.

Another incident that occurred with cataclysmic results was in December 1944. Believing the German Army was becoming a less than formidable foe, and with less than reliable intelligence, Bradley lowered his guard. The author argues that this led to the near-breakthrough of the German Army during the Battle of the Bulge. This was one last-ditch effort by Adolf Hitler to break through and divide the Allied forces. The main attack by elite German Panzer divisions forced Bradley’s forces to retreat while he still believed this was a feint attack and that the main attack would occur in Montgomery’s area of operation. Before they realized what was happening, the German Panzer divisions had driven nearly 60 miles into the rear of the Allies. While this all occurred in Bradley’s area of operations, he again took no responsibility, instead trying to place the blame on Montgomery and Eisenhower.

The author does not use these events to belittle Bradley but to shape a well-rounded view of him as a great leader. In fact, throughout the book Ossad goes into great detail about Bradley’s leadership abilities. Starting with the Louisiana maneuvers, where many participants rose to high rank, and moving into World War II, the author focuses on this quiet, unassuming man’s leadership. The author goes so far as to make the case that Bradley and his leadership abilities were responsible for the defeat of German general Johannes Rommel in North Africa, not General Patton.

As the Allied forces moved into Italy, with Bradley commanding the II Corps, war correspondent Ernest Pyle wrote, “I make no bones about the fact that I am a tremendous admirer of General Bradley. I don’t believe I have ever known a person to be so unanimously loved and respected by the men around and under him” (p. 138). This would follow Bradley throughout his career as he led the largest army ever assembled at the Battle of the Bulge, restructured the Veterans Administration after the war as millions of veterans were requiring their services, and went on to become the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Harry S. Truman and Eisenhower.

While the author does not gloss over any of Bradley’s failures, he does provide us with a very useful study in command. This would be a very useful book for all officers in our nation’s military to read.
Colonel Aaron O’Connell, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve


When U.S. Army lieutenant colonel Gregory A. Daddis arrived in Baghdad, he was more prepared than most for understanding the political and social complexities of Iraq and counterinsurgency warfare. A career Army officer, he had already served in combat in the 1991 Gulf War and later earned a doctorate in history from University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, where he wrote his dissertation on American military strategy in the Vietnam War. He had read the popular and scholarly works, spoken to countless veterans, and spent months in the relevant archives. And so, when he returned to Iraq in 2009, he was surprised to see that of all the books his fellow officers were reading, the most common one on the Vietnam War—and indeed, the only one listed on the corps commander’s required reading list—was Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (1999).

The reasons why Sorley was so in vogue in the Iraq of 2009 makes some sense in hindsight. Unlike the many historians who framed Vietnam as unwinnable, here was a soldier-scholar arguing the exact opposite: thanks to a new commander and a bold change in strategy, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) had actually achieved its military objectives in Southeast Asia but sadly, a fainthearted Congress, a hostile media elite, and unpatriotic war protesters had already decided to quit. The result was a good old-fashioned Dochschloß (a stab in the back) by civilians whose hopeless negativity eventually snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Was this a warning from the past and a lesson for those still fighting in Iraq in the present? For those who had watched the country descend nearly into civil war and then ascend to a period of relative (and, it now seems, temporary) peace, the answer was an unequivocal yes. The United States may not have appreciated the benefits of strategic patience in Vietnam, but with Sorley’s book as counsel, the nation would learn its lesson and make certain that hidden lessons of Vietnam’s “better war” would provide a roadmap to peace in Iraq.

Daddis found those linked sets of assertions dubious, and in his follow-on tours as a professor of history at West Point, he pored over the sources to test whether Sorley’s triumphalist arguments on post–Tet tactics and strategy could withstand close scrutiny. His answer, which forms the core argument of Withdrawal, is a resounding no.

At the heart of Sorley’s better war narrative is a robust defense of General Creighton W. Abrams, who took over command of the war in July 1968 and ran it until mid-1972. These were the years of the great unacknowledged turnaround, and in Sorley’s telling, Abrams’s leadership was the key. His first move was to abandon General William C. Westmoreland’s failing strategy of attrition and replace it with “pacification,” known today as population-centric counterinsurgency. Abrams also purportedly shifted focus away from unhelpfully targeting conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units with search-and-destroy operations or using body counts as a useful metric of progress. Most important, Abrams unified all of the United States’ major lines of operation into a “one war” strategy that gave equal attention to defeating conventional units, rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure, securing the population, and training the South Vietnamese Army. These changes in tactics and strategy are what produced the “unacknowledged
victories” that American policy makers tragically ignored.

Withdrawal convincingly dismantles each of Sorley’s major arguments—and a few others in addition. Daddis begins with the myth that Abrams’s predecessor, Westmoreland, had focused primarily or exclusively on attrition, body counts, and search-and-destroy operations until Abrams wisely shifted to pacification. This is not true, claims Daddis. In fact, as early as 1965, Westmoreland worked to balance resources for main force war and pacification. By 1967, his command guidance called prioritizing action against “the full spectrum of enemy elements—main forces, local forces, supply system, guerrillas, and the VC [Viet Cong] infrastructure” (p. 28). When Abrams took over in July 1968, he issued memoranda that continued—rather than deviating from—Westmoreland’s earlier approach, as did Abrams’s 1969 combined campaign plan. While Abrams did call for a more unified effort, and reorganized USMACV to a degree to accomplish that goal, these were only adjustments to “the operational emphasis,” ones that, in Daddis’s opinion, “hardly constituted a revolutionary change in strategy” (p. 43).

Nor did Abrams’s “one war” approach abandon search-and-destroy tactics or body counts. Reporters may have spoken about how Abrams magically shifted strategy when he took command, but for Daddis, the changes were more rhetorical than substantial. In fact, Abrams proved himself equally—if not more—aggressive than Westmoreland in urging troops to seek out enemy main forces and “then pursue them and destroy them” (p. 41) and continued to use attritional metrics, to the point of bragging in mid-1969 (almost a year after assuming command), that “our kill ratio is spectacular” (p. 63). And, when it came to airpower, Abrams was even more aggressive than Westmoreland, with Boeing B-52 Stratofortress sorties more than doubling between the six months before he took command and the six months that followed. As late as 1971, one Army major general noted that search-and-destroy operations were still “habitually employed,” even though they were “essentially unproductive” (p. 229).

Marine readers will naturally want to know what Daddis makes of their Service’s efforts in I Corps, and the Corps’ innovative Combined Action Program (CAP), in particular. According to the much-beloved Marine memoir by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, the mixed U.S.–South Vietnamese CAP units that harnessed local knowledge with the Marines’ greater tactical abilities were a potential secret weapon that might have made all the difference had they been scaled up around the country. In Krulak’s telling, that did not happen because of the Army’s longstanding antipathy to the Marines and senior Army leaders’ mistaken focus on attritional warfare and conventional operations.

Is this a fair characterization of Army–Marine tensions and the possible strategic effects of CAP? Daddis does not think so. While there was significant inter-Service friction in I Corps, Daddis finds Krulak’s depiction of the attrition versus pacification debate far too reductive. In fact, both the Army and Marines recognized the importance of conducting both types of warfare simultaneously. Disagreements over CAP were not really a debate about strategy, but over priorities in a resource-constrained environment. Moreover, the idea that CAP units did have—or could have had—major, lasting effects seems farfetched to Daddis, and he quotes CAP Marines to make the point: “The VC [Viet Cong] infrastructure was too deeply entrenched literally as well as figuratively in some places. They had more than 20 years to win hearts and minds before we blundered onto the scene.” As a result, the CAP concept may have been “innovative” but it “never prospered” (p. 21).

Did Abrams make any progress in the war, and if so, why, in the end, did American efforts fail? Here, Daddis is at his finest as a military historian, and his counsel is important for today’s ongoing wars. Abrams did at least two things right in the war’s final years. First, he worked tirelessly to craft a military strategy that supported President Richard M. Nixon’s decisions to shift to Vietnamization, negotiations, and withdrawal; and second, he forced USMACV to adapt to the political reality that after Tet, the war had be-
come a military stalemate. These were smart moves, but they were never enough to win the war, because the military efforts were always just one element in a broader struggle over the meaning of South Vietnam. “In the end, no amount of American military muscle, bombing or otherwise, could resolve the fundamental issue of whether South Vietnam was a viable nation capable of effective governance” (p. 195).

Daddis believes Sorley’s better war narrative misses this key point. General Abrams did not craft a war-winning strategy that was foolishly jettisoned by weak-kneed politicians. He crafted an appropriate military strategy for President Nixon’s utterly contradictory political goals, which sought to force change inside both North and South Vietnam while removing U.S. troops at the same time—all while excluding the South Vietnamese from the peace talks. That Nixon’s effort failed says more about how presidents should match military and nonmilitary tools to achieve political end states and less about how Congress or the American people should react to costly and unpopular wars.

Anyone who has served in or pays attention to Iraq or Afghanistan today should see that Withdrawal’s arguments are relevant for the present. Accusations of congressional backstabs and a perfidious public may offer comfort to veterans that gave so much in Southeast Asia and gained so little in return, but they did not provide a path to peace in Vietnam and probably will not do so in today’s wars either. If there is a lesson of Vietnam for the present, Withdrawal offers one deserving far more consideration: “Only the Vietnamese could resolve the deep political and social difference around which their civil war revolved,” and as a result, “the final US troops withdrew from South Vietnam not as victors, but as interlopers in a war that was never theirs to win or lose” (p. 16).

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David S. Nasca sets ambitious goals for his book *The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945.* He traces how and why “the modernization of amphibious warfare positioned the United States to become the most powerful nation in the world and, ultimately, established the foundations of an international system shaped under American leadership” (p. 6). Later in his introduction, Nasca posits that “while military technology transformed the conduct of war, its application to amphibious warfare changed the balance of power in the international system. . . . By creating a new world order in the aftermath of World War II, the United States became the indispensable power on earth” (p. 9). He writes in a narrative style punctuated by analyses or commentary by historical actors or scholars.

A brief introduction reaches back to antiquity to find the roots of amphibious warfare before turning to modern theories about technology and strategy. Nasca then divides his book into four substantive chapters that flow chronologically from 1898 to 1945. His wide-ranging conclusion provides a summary of chapters and takes the reader through the Cold War into the twenty-first century.

The chapter on the Spanish-American War explains how this conflict helped the United States become a global power. Nasca makes the salient points that amphibious operations not only played roles in fighting in Cuba and the Philippines but also remained significant components supporting American strategic plans in the Caribbean and Pacific thereafter. He also provides commentary on amphibious operations and technology in the American Civil War (1861–65) and the War of the Pacific (1879–84) as precursors to the Spanish-American War.

Nasca then turns to 1900–18 in his second chapter. The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902), and ongoing American occupations in Latin America become case studies in how the United States military used amphibious operations to exercise its newfound great power status. Nasca highlights the amphibious campaigns of Gallipoli, Cameroon, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa in 1915, as well as in the Baltic in 1917 as examples of failures or successes in doctrine, planning, and execution. The cautionary tale of Gallipoli, in particular, provided a wealth of lessons to be learned in the postwar years.

The next chapter focuses on the pivotal interwar years that saw the United States and other nations grapple with formulating doctrines and procuring landing craft to make successful assaults on enemy beaches possible. Nasca details the political and diplomatic backdrops for the evolution of amphibious warfare in the 1920s and 1930s. These elements influenced the American participation in the Washington Naval Conference (1921–22), the evolution of the War Plan Orange, and the transition into the Rainbow Plans. As seen in Nasca’s observations and his evidence, the U.S. Marine Corps also solidified its propensity in innovating amphibious capabilities in anticipation of potential hostilities in the Pacific.

Nasca’s final substantive chapter examines the Second World War. He presents balanced narratives of German amphibious operations in Norway and Crete and of Japanese assaults on Wake, Hong Kong,
the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. These Axis successes occurred early in the conflict before the Allies launched their own amphibious operations in their grinding counteroffensive strategy. These assaults started with Guadalcanal in the Southwest Pacific and Operation Torch in North Africa in 1942, evolved over time, and culminated in Operation Overlord in France in 1944 and Operation Iceberg at Okinawa in 1945. Nasca makes the direct connection between the doctrines laid down by the U.S. Marine Corps in Tentative Manual for Landing Operations in 1934 and the successful amphibious campaigns in the Pacific theater in the Second World War.

Nasca’s book contains several major shortcomings in research, analysis, and tone that mar his arguments and conclusions. Although no single volume can be expected to include all relevant documentation, readers have reasonable expectations for the seminal historical studies and key archival sources to be consulted. Those references become road maps for future inquiries. Nasca’s notes and bibliography contain several significant reports and manuals; however, he gives no citations to key U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, or Army manuals dealing with amphibious warfare, nor are references made to the evolving strategic war plans between 1898 and 1945. Among the books absent from Nasca’s citations are The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, Utmost Savagery by Joseph Alexander, Guadalcanal by Richard Frank, and Omaha Beach by Adrian Lewis.

Technological innovation stands as a central theme in Nasca’s book, but several scholarly studies in the history of military technology are also missing. Terms like strategy, operations, and warfare are coupled with amphibious throughout the book, but Nasca makes no careful dissections regarding what these word combinations mean in various contexts. Lastly, fewer than 40 books, articles, and online sources in the entire 22-page bibliography were published more recently than

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5 For a matrix of detailed explanations of amphibious warfare at the tactical, operational, strategic, and grand strategic levels, see the introductory and concluding essays in D. J. B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel, eds., Amphibious Warfare: 1900–1970 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003).
These gaps in research in Nasca’s book contribute to his faulty analysis. In ongoing efforts to highlight amphibious warfare’s connections with technological innovations and military strategy, he conflates the three categories and overplays his point. Yes, he correctly observes that the U.S. military, including the Marines, used amphibious capabilities to achieve strategic goals. However, Nasca does not explore how and why these capabilities rested at the lower operational and tactical levels of war as a means, albeit critical, to achieve those higher-level strategic goals. For example, Edward S. Miller’s book War Plan Orange contrasts the Navy’s “thruster” admirals (who favored a fast-moving offensive campaign across the Pacific against opposing Japanese naval forces) with the “cautionary” (admirals who believed a slower, more deliberate campaign could defeat the Japanese). However, because Nasca does not cite Miller, he missed the opportunity to demonstrate how and why amphibious operational capabilities—both offensive and defensive—fit so intricately into American strategic plans.7

Nasca correctly argues that the Marine Corps’ development of ambitious doctrine, landing craft, and force structure related to technological development. Even so, the emergence of practical landing craft in the late 1930s, for instance, could be better described as the Marines’ adaptation or improvisation of existing civilian and Japanese designs, rather than the innovation of new vehicles. The relationship among technology, doctrine, and mission followed a progression: the Marines needed to fulfill an amphibious assault mission, so they needed to create the proper force structures, doctrines, and vehicles. That mission drove the process. On the contrary, aircraft and tanks constituted innovative weapons systems and vehicles that required contentious debates in the U.S. Army and Navy to identify the best missions, force structures, and doctrines for them. These contrasting case studies also point to the Marine Corps’ distinctive organizational culture as a critical component in the maturation process of amphibious doctrines, force structures, and vehicles from 1898 to 1945.8 Nasca neither contextualizes nor disentangles technological innovation or adaptation.

Apart from conceptual problems and missing scholarly perspectives, Nasca writes in a triumphalist tone. According to his introduction, “This power enabled the United States to establish the foundations of a new international system that was shaped by American political, social, and economic values” (p. 9). He next tries to make amphibious warfare an essential factor in the nation’s post–World War II hegemony by stating, “Therefore, America’s continued use of amphibious capabilities, as well as other power projection abilities, would not only shield the Western Hemisphere from outside powers, but also serve as tools for maintaining international peace” (p. 9). Nasca asserts that these same principles extended into the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, he cites a wide range of authors like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Kissinger, Max Boot, Victor Davis Hanson,

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John J. Mearsheimer, Andrew J. Bacevich, and Howard Zinn but Nasca makes no concerted effort to filter their ideologies or situate them in their respective historical contexts. This creates confusion for anyone seeking nuanced interpretations. Finally, the conclusion to Nasca's book states that “it was because of the influence of technology on amphibious warfare that the United States' victory in World War II brought the American republic to superpower status” and that the United States “rose to become a superpower that would champion capitalism, a free market economy, and liberal democracy throughout the world” (p. 248). With these quotes as bookends and without any criticism of sources, Nasca's applications of the past's lessons to the present and future are problematic at best.

In closing, David S. Nasca's arguments need to be leavened with other scholarly studies.

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Retired Army colonel Robert W. Black is rightfully considered one of the foremost historians of the modern U.S. Army Rangers. He is also the founding president of the Association of Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) of the Korean War and a highly decorated Army Ranger veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, his recent foray into the turbulent waters of American Civil War history has produced not a new perspective on irregular warfare in the Civil War but instead a rehash of the trite and often thoroughly debunked romantic myths surrounding Confederate soldiers. While his book is well-researched, it is apparent he has not consulted recent work in the field, and the book is rife with unsupported opinion and uncited assertions. Regrettably, this book cannot be assessed as scholarly and should be approached by the reader with a critical eye and firm grounding in recent American Civil War scholarship.

Black makes extensive use of primary sources, including memoirs, regimental histories, and the book series *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (1880–1901). However, it does not appear that he critically evaluated some of the sources and was simply content to take much of the materials at face value. This is unfortunate, since many of the Confederate memoirs written after the war that he cites were, on the whole, self-serving and published to further the lost cause mythology used as propaganda to reassert Southern political identity. A prime example is this quote about Confederate cavalryman Turner Ashby:

> His passionate love of his cause and his men was known to both sides. His dark appearance made him seem like a Saracen knight of Saladin from centuries past. His boldness was infectious. To serve with Turner Ashby was an adventure. Men responded to his romanticism. They were eager to serve in his command. In turn, Ashby was totally devoted to Stonewall Jackson. (p. 49)

This passage hits all the lost cause talking points: bold cavaliers with ties to the idealized romantic image of the medieval knight popular during the nineteenth century; devotion to cause and comrades; young men gallantly dashing about the battlefield engaging in adventures; and unwavering loyalty to martyred Confederate heroes. Black cites Douglas Southall Freeman’s *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (two volumes), published in 1943, as his source for this passage.

A more recent description of Ashby in S. C. Gwynne’s 2014 biography of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson paints a more nuanced portrait of him. He acknowledges the romantic image of Ashby but also the darker side of the warrior, such as the mutilation of Union soldiers’ corpses earlier in the war. While Ashby may have been “devoted” to Jackson, he was also head of an independent command and thus shielded from Jackson’s wrath over his inability or unwillingness to discipline his troopers. His undisciplined

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Michael Westermeier was a U.S. Army field artillery officer from 2004 to 2011 and later worked as a park ranger at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, VA, after receiving a master’s in military history from Norwich University, Northfield, VT. He served as a historian with the Marine Corps History Division from 2017 to 2020 and currently is the exhibit curator at the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

command fought effectively in combat but in many instances failed to perform critical operational tasks, such as destroying supplies or bridges, as ordered by Jackson. When Jackson personally attempted to establish order within Ashby’s command, Ashby resigned in a huff and angrily confronted Jackson. Even after Jackson backed down and Ashby resumed command, Jackson continued to work quietly to influence the Confederate War Department to assert some sort of control over Ashby’s units. It would have been refreshing for the author to present more nuanced depictions of the Confederate and Union “Rangers” instead of repeating the old romantic stories that have often provided a shiny varnish to what in reality was a brutal internecine conflict.

The greatest problem with this book is that the author seems to apply the definition of Ranger to a wide variety of Civil War units and personalities, primarily Confederate, without regard to how they were categorized at the time. Black states:

What makes a Ranger is the power of will, extraordinary training, and the tactics they routinely practice. An American Ranger is a highly trained volunteer who has the courage, confidence, and ability to spearhead attacks and invasions and operate behind enemy lines. Rangers are select troops who excel in intelligence gathering and are masters of the ambush and the raid. To develop knowledge, stamina, and strength of will, the Ranger is tested and proven in the most trying circumstances. (p. xii)

What special training did the Confederate Rangers receive over other Confederate or Union cavalry? Cavalry units on both sides in the American Civil War performed the same missions that the Rangers did, such as scouting, patrolling, skirmishing, and raids behind enemy lines. By this definition, the cavalry that rode for Confederate generals J. E. B. Stuart and Joseph Wheeler would be every bit the Ranger as the ones who rode with John S. Mosby, Turner Ashby, John Imboden, Elijah White, and the McNeills.

The 1st and 2d United States Sharpshooters were two Union regiments that required volunteers to already be elite marksmen before they were admitted into the regiment, armed with special weapons (in this case 1859 Sharps breech-loading rifles), and specially instructed in light infantry tactics and sniping. Using their specialized tactics, they were able to capture an entire Confederate regiment at Catherine Furnace, Virginia, during the second day of the Battle of Chancellorsville. These two regiments meet the author’s and many contemporary definitions of Rangers but are absent from this book. Unionist guerrilla Dave Beaty employed tactics similar to Elijah White and John Mosby as he fought a vicious border war against Confederate guerrillas in Tennessee and Kentucky. Why is he not worthy of inclusion as a Ranger?

The book contains action-packed vignettes about “Yanks” and “Rebels,” however the Yankees are given rather short shrift. The Confederate chapters occupy 61 percent of the book while the Union forces receive 39 percent. However, one chapter in the Union section is devoted to the short military career of Abraham Lincoln with a Ranger unit in the Black Hawk War. It is interesting, however, it does not have much to do with Rangers in the American Civil War as the Black Hawk War was fought from April to August 1832. Another chapter in the “Yank” section covers Native Americans fighting for the Union or Confederacy, or in the Lakota Sioux Uprising in Minnesota, and thus is not solely dedicated to Yankee Rangers. If one subtracts those two chapters, then the portion of the book dealing with Union special operations is only 34 percent. There is no mention of many famous Union special operations, such as the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren raid (1864), Grierson’s Mississippi raid (1863), and Navy Lieutenant William B. Cushing’s spectacular naval raids, just to name a few of the “Yank” exploits that might have been explored.

The most interesting parts of the book for this reviewer were the chapters on the Confederate raid

\[\text{Gwynne, Rebel Yell, 261–62.}\]

\[\text{Gwynne, Rebel Yell, 263.}\]
on Saint Albans, Vermont, and Confederate efforts to
set fire to New York City before the 1864 elections. These two missions were planned to have a strategic
impact and required a high degree of skill and dar-
ing to attempt, much like modern special operations.
The Confederate government demonstrated that it
was quite willing to try new and innovative meth-
ods to wage unconventional war against the Union.
An expansion of these two chapters along with the
inclusion of Confederate operations, such as the sub-
mersible SS Hunley and the cloak-and-dagger war of
Union and Confederate agents in London, would be
quite interesting and beneficial to readers unfamiliar
with the covert aspects of the American Civil War.

Yank and Rebel Rangers offers an exciting read,
full of daring feats and romantic rides through enemy
lines. However, it cannot be considered a scholarly
work since it is primarily a recitation of idealistic war
stories about a side of the American Civil War that re-
cent scholars have shown was far from romantic. Black
has written an exciting book, but readers seeking
scholarly study on irregular warfare in the American
Civil War would be better served to look elsewhere.

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