From the Editors 3

ARTICLES
Pacific Conquest: 5
The Marine Corps' Role in the U.S. Acquisition of Guam
Dwight Sullivan

Finding the Gaps: 25
Littoral Obstacles during Operation Galvanic
Major Matthew Scott, Australian Army

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in Military Operations 42
Other than War, 1990s
Major Fred H. Allison, USMCR (Ret)

IN MEMORIAM
General Alfred M. Gray Jr., USMC (Ret), 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps: 22 June 1928–20 March 2024
Charles P. Neimeyer, PhD

Remembrances of Commandant General Alfred M. Gray Jr. 83
Allan R. Millett, PhD

Charles R. “Rich” Smith: 2 October 1943–6 January 2024 85
Paul Westermeyer

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
Lincoln Takes Command: The Campaign to Seize Norfolk and the Destruction of the CSS Virginia, Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864, and Appomattox 1865: Lee’s Last Campaign Reviewed by Thomas Zakharis 87

BOOK REVIEWS
The U.S. and the War in the Pacific, 1941–45 89
Reviewed by Robert S. Burrell, PhD

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II 91
Reviewed by Bradley Cesario, PhD
MCUP TITLES ON THE COMMANDANT’S PROFESSIONAL READING LIST

Call Out the Cadets: The Battle of New Market, May 15, 1864
Reviewed by Noah F. Crawford

To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the Marine Environment, and the Cartography of Empire
Reviewed by Aaron D. Dilday, PhD

The Sailor’s Bookshelf: Fifty Books to Know the Sea
Reviewed by William Edmund Fahey, PhD

At the Dawn of Airpower: The U.S. Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps’ Approach to the Airplane, 1907–1917
Reviewed by Sarah Jameson

Command: How the Allies Learned to Win the Second World War
Reviewed by Frank Kalesnik, PhD

On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo
Reviewed by Lieutenant General Robert Kirchubel, USA (Ret), PhD

U.S. Go Home: The U.S. Military in France, 1945 to 1968
Reviewed by Tamala Malerk, PhD

Autumn of Our Discontent: Fall 1949 and the Crises in American National Security
Reviewed by Anthony Marcum, PhD

Mavericks of War: The Unconventional, Unorthodox Innovators and Thinkers, Scholars, and Outsiders Who Mastered the Art of War
Reviewed by Lawrence Provost

Containing History: How Cold War History Explains US–Russia Relations
Reviewed by Phil W. Reynolds, PhD

Keeping the Peace: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 during the Cold War 1946–1991
Reviewed by Chad E. Shelley, PhD

New Principles of War: Enduring Truths with Timeless Examples
Reviewed by H. Allen Skinner Jr.
Remembrances of Commandant General Alfred M. Gray Jr.

By Allan R. Millett, PhD

In life or death, General Alfred Gray is unforgettable. I think I met him in the late 1970s when he had become a brigadier general and a public figure for his command of the air and ground Joint forces that evacuated Saigon and Phnom Penh. I do know that I knew him when I commanded 3d Battalion, 25th Marines (1980–81), and we went to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for annual training duty. As a major general, he had become commanding general of the 2d Marine Division, and he visited our command post during the week-long exercise to see how we were doing. He knew that my history of the Marine Corps, Semper Fidelis, had just been published (1981), and he had already read it. I had dined at his quarters the week before, so we had already talked about the book, which he liked. At our second meeting, he complimented our battalion on its operational competence and enthusiastic training. The spiritual lift helped since the 4th Division commander had just reamed me out for protesting the transfer of my best and largest rifle company, Lima of western Pennsylvania, to make up Manning shortfalls in the 4th Service Support Group. The change had been made without
my consultation, but I was being blamed for allowing my battalion to fall short of its manning requirements. I was mad, and it showed. The commanding general had dressed me down in front of my staff for challenging his decision. Who was I, a mere lieutenant colonel, to challenge the wisdom of the 4th Marine Division commander and his staff? (I had already been selected for colonel, which the commanding general ignored.) General Gray reassured me that his evaluators, headed by Colonel Carl E. Mundy Jr., thought we were doing fine. My reputation did not rest solely on my writing.

Duly promoted, I returned to Quantico for a second tour on the Marine Corps Command and Staff College adjunct faculty and to write operational doctrine guidebooks. I worked on the first version of Warfighting, FMFM-1 (1988), and then fleetted up to be deputy director, Marine Corps History and Museums Division (Mobilization Designate), and officer in charge, Mobilization Training Unit DC-4, whose members did a brilliant job covering the Gulf War (1990–91). In 1987, General Gray, now Commandant, asked me to form a group of Reserve colonels to work with the Commandant’s Special Study Group, a high-powered collection of Headquarters Marine Corps senior officers answerable only to the Commandant and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were Generals Louis H. Buehl and Thomas R. Morgan. As the senior officer of the Special Projects Reserve Component, I received tasking assignments for our group from the Commandant. My regular counterpart was then-colonel James L. Jones.

During those three years, I served General Gray as well as I could, and I learned nothing that diminished my respect for him. He soldiered on despite his reservations about the Joint Chiefs, the secretary of defense, Navy budgeting, and Washington politics. The fact that he thought out loud did not help with inter-Service politics. He missed the troops and traveled as much as he could. He never wavered in his love of Marines, and he looked constantly for ways to make the Marine Corps better for Marines. He despaired when Marines abused their families, cheated their troops, and quit trying to excel in their operational assignments. He wanted the Marine Corps to be as good as it boasted it was to others. Washington service drains even the best officers, ambitious or not, and Gray did not fancy many of the duties that came with being Commandant, especially in taking congressional inquiries and demands seriously.

The Al Gray I knew never allowed his demanding tour as Commandant to diminish his desire to help Marines be more professional and dedicated and to be winners on the battlefield. He was never a poster Marine, and he knew that “good Marines” came in all shapes and sizes. He wanted performance and selflessness beyond human reality, but I know his leadership made many of us want to be better Marines. That is his enduring legacy.