
MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL REFERENCE PAMPHLET

**MOBILIZATION OF THE
MARINE CORPS RESERVE
IN THE
KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1951**



HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION
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MOBILIZATION OF THE MARINE CORPS
RESERVE IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT,
1950-1951

by

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FOREWORD

"Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean conflict, 1950-1951" is a concise narrative of the major events surrounding not only the call-up of reserve units and individuals but also the policies affecting service.

This publication is intended to provide staff officers with a ready source of reliable information on a reserve mobilization that was well executed. Marine commanders will find some of the material herein useful for training and profitable for professional and recreational reading. A final purpose of this pamphlet is to provide a source for answers to many questions received from the general public about mobilization of the reserve for Korea.

R. L. Murray

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MOBILIZATION OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1951

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Documentation Note

Material utilized in the preparation of this publication was taken from numerous documents held at Headquarters Marine Corps by the G-3 Division, the Personnel Department, and the Division of Reserve. Information about specific sources can be obtained from the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.

REGULAR AND RESERVE SITUATION
30 JUNE 1950

Introduction

United Nations intervention in Korea, following the Communist aggression of 25 June 1950, found the United States forces in the Far East inadequate both in numbers and training. Initially, indeed, the United States was hard-pressed to maintain a foothold on the Korean peninsula. A bitter struggle of several months ensued before the North Korean invasion was contained, then crushed. The subsequent Chinese Communist invasion won some swift preliminary successes, but it was also contained early in 1951.

The role of the Marine Corps as a whole in Korea has been widely publicized. Not so well known, however, is the essential part played by the Marine Corps Reserve in such operations as the Inchon amphibious assault, the capture of Seoul, and the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir.

Experience is an excellent instructor, and many lessons have been learned from the conflict, but there is no precept more valuable to the Marine Corps than the one prescribing the vital importance of a large, readily available and high quality reserve. The significance of the reserve contribution to Marine achievements in Korea may be measured by citing just a few facts:

1. At the time of the Inchon-Seoul operations, 15 September to 7 October 1950, there were more Marines in the Far East than there had been in the total Fleet Marine Force two and a half months earlier, and 20 percent of these were reservists only six to eight weeks removed from their civilian pursuits;

2. The first United Nations force, which early in November 1950 inflicted a first decisive defeat on a Chinese Communist division, was a Marine regiment including about 34 percent reservists;

3. By the end of March 1951, although the Marine Corps had meanwhile almost tripled its active duty strength of 30 June 1950, reservists comprised 45 percent of the Marine Corps total active duty strength.

4. By the end of April 1951, the reserve had hit its peak strength during the Korean conflict--85,538 reserves on active duty.

Regular Situation

The nature of these accomplishments becomes increasingly clear when one considers the situation of the Marine Corps and its reserve components on 30 June. On this date, five days after the North Korean People's Army had begun invasion of the South, the strength and disposition of the Marine Corps Regular Establishment and its reserve organizations may be briefly summarized as follows:

The Marine Corps had 74,279 Marines on active duty, or approximately 97 percent of its authorized strength, 76,921. The personnel were distributed as follows:

1. The Operating Forces, which participate directly in carrying out the assigned missions and tasks of the Marine Corps, 40,364;

2. The Supporting Establishment, comprising those organizations that furnish the life-blood of the Operating Forces--trained personnel, supplies, and administrative guidance--, 24,552.

3. Special & Other Assignment, including all personnel serving with organizations outside the Regular Establishment, 3,871;

4. Non-Availables, made up of personnel hospitalized, confined, or in travel status, 5,492.

Within the Operating Forces, The Fleet Marine Forces had a strength of 27,656 and the security detachments had 11,087; afloat were 1,574 Marines.


Within FMFPac there were 11,853 Marines, a great majority of whom were serving in the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) (7,779) and in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (3,733). In FMFLant there were 15,803 men; of these 8,973 were serving in the 2d Marine Division (Reinforced) and 5,297 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Both ground and air units were organized on a peacetime table of organization, and the obvious inadequacy of military forces so organized to meet a strong and premeditated threat is graphically illustrated by a comparison between the peacetime and wartime tables of organization.

The planned peacetime strength of a Marine aircraft wing was approximately 7,670 men, including three air groups of approximately 1,250 men each. At its war strength, a Marine aircraft wing normally functions with a complement of approximately 12,000 men. It also possesses three aviation groups, each having an approximate strength of 2,000. Under both tables

of organization, a Marine aircraft group can support two or more squadrons; plans contemplate that it support four--circumstances sometimes permit only three.

The marked differences between a war strength and peacetime Marine division may best be seen in the following two charts.




Key:

- M - Marine officer - enlisted
- N - Navy officer - enlisted
- () - Indicates the figure is part of the regimental total.

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Key:

- M - Marine officer - enlisted
- N - Navy officer - enlisted
- () - Indicates the figure is part of the regimental total.

During the post-World War II years, the nation steadily decreased the strength of the Marine Corps, which placed a correspondingly heavier reliance on a strong Marine Corps Reserve as a complement to the Regular Establishment.

Strength of Regular Establishment as of 30 June*

1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
155,592	92,222	83,609	79,103	74,279

Strength of Reserve Components as of 30 June**

1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
19,807	45,536	111,122	123,817	128,959

* Includes Regulars and Volunteer Reservists on active duty.

** Includes Organized Reservists, Fleet Reservists, and Volunteer Reservists not on active duty.

It was essential, therefore, that this reserve have three important characteristics:

1. Large size, given the small size of the Regular Establishment;
2. Capability for quick employment, since any future war was certain to have the characteristic of suddenness of attack;
3. High quality, for reservists were to be integrated into regular units and would have to measure up to the traditional standards of Marine fighting forces.

Reserve Situation

The Marine Corps made every effort to create such a reserve. Subsequent events have proved the soundness of the concept and have fully justified the faith that the nation and the Marine Corps had placed in the conception and administration of the reserve program, and in the caliber of its potential accomplishment.

By 30 June 1950, within the limits of the appropriation allotted to the Marine Corps for the development of its reserve program, all Organized Reserve units, aviation and ground, had been activated and a substantial actual strength achieved. The

Organized Reserve (Ground) stood at a strength of 33,527 or approximately 77 percent of its authorized strength, while the Organized Reserve (Aviation) had a strength of 6,342 or 94 percent of its authorized strength.

The Organized Reserve (Ground) personnel were distributed among the following units:

- 21 Infantry Battalions
- 4 155mm Howitzer Battalions
- 1 155mm Gun Battalion
- 7 105mm Howitzer Battalions
- 1 90mm AAA Gun Battalion
- 3 Amphibian Tractor Battalions
- 2 Tank Battalions
- 1 Engineer Battalion
- 16 Rifle Companies
- 2 40mm Gun Batteries
- 1 Amphibian Truck Company
- 15 Engineer Companies
- 6 Signal Companies
- 1 Signal Company (Supplementary)
- 13 Women's Reserve Platoons

The Organized Reserve (Aviation) strength was distributed among 30 Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMF) and 12 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadrons (MGCIS).

Thus, with a total authorized strength of 50,156, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve had an actual strength of 39,869 or approximately 80 percent of its authorized strength.

By far, however, the largest potential source of personnel was the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. On 30 June, there were 89,920 men and women in the Volunteer Reserve as compared with the 39,869 in the Organized Reserve. Of these, 2,265 Volunteer Reservists were on continuous active duty with the Regular Establishment of the Marine Corps, and approximately 5,000 were voluntarily training in approximately 200 Volunteer Training Units. Finally, there were 1,316 men in the Fleet Reserve.

By totaling the strength of the various Marine Corps Reserve components, less Volunteer Reservists on active duty, we arrived at the figure, 128,959--almost double the actual total strength of the Regular Establishment on 30 June. Obviously, therefore, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve loomed large in any projected wide-scale expansion of the Regular Establishment.

BUILD-UP AND MOVEMENT OF MARINE FORCES
TO KOREA, RESERVE CONTRIBUTION

1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced)

By 1 July the North Korean invasion had progressed to a point where the great disparity in strength, equipment, and training between the opposing forces became apparent; an impartial glance at the balance revealed that it weighed heavily in favor of the North Korean army. To unprejudiced eyes and judgments, it was obvious that even with the commitment of the then contemplated United Nations forces, additional units would be needed if the tide were to be stemmed. The choice logically fell on the Marines, as yet uncommitted in Korea.

To this end, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) was activated at Camp Pendleton on 7 July, with the 5th Marines of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and MAG-33 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as the basic elements. Seven days later, the brigade, composed of approximately 6,500 well-trained aviation and ground regulars, weighed anchor for Kobe, Japan. But while still at sea, on 25 July, the brigade ground elements were diverted from Japan and ordered to land in Korea, where reinforcements were urgently needed.

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)

By the latter part of July, the United Nations position in Korea had deteriorated to such an extent that the signal was given to execute the tentative plan to commit the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) with appropriate air support to the struggle.

The need for a war-strength Marine division was a real one, which had to be confronted.

Aside from the international considerations prevailing in Korea during July, time, tide, and the tactical situation conspired to give the build-up and the transportation to Korea of a war-strength Marine division and a two-group Marine aircraft wing an urgency unequalled since the first months of World War II. By this time, it was apparent that the Korean conflict had taken on the character of a young but lusty war, entailing the employment of war-strength divisions and all the techniques inherent in a war of fronts, including amphibious assault. Fortunately, General MacArthur had already planned an amphibious counterattack at Inchon, which if successful, would relieve the Pusan perimeter, facilitate the seizure of Seoul, and above all, sever the heart of the North Korean army communications net from its body.

In such an operation, time was the open sesame to success, for hydrographic conditions at Inchon are truly unique. Low seas are the general rule from August through May, and undesirable high seas prevail from October through March. Since it was physically impossible to mount the counterstroke in August, the following month, a transition period, was the logical choice. During September, only on the days 15, 16, and 17 can large bodies of troops be landed satisfactorily, for on these days only do the tidal range and the extensive mud flats adjacent to Inchon Beach permit the close approach of LSTs and landing craft.(1) Any decision to postpone the landing, therefore, would have dictated in turn that the delay be for no less than a month, when tidal conditions would have been favorable once more. But during this month of grace the enemy would have had the opportunity to capture Pusan and to improve his defenses in the vicinity of Inchon; and improved defenses, if created, would have increased the cost in lives--always very important to Americans--and diminished the possibility of a successful assault.

And here it should be noted that had the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division.

During July, General MacArthur had repeatedly requested a war-strength Marine division with appropriate air support for employment in Korea, and as a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Commandant how much time the Marine Corps would require to create a third regimental combat team for the 1st Marine Division. The Commandant could only reply that the Marine Corps did not possess enough personnel to form an additional regimental combat team without calling Marine reservists to active duty. The step was authorized by the President, with Congressional sanction, on 19 July. The die was cast!

At Headquarters Marine Corps, the scene became one of feverish activity with staffs burning midnight oil to ensure the most orderly mobilization possible under the limitations imposed by time. Now, previously made plans began to pay off. Within a period of two hours, a mobilization team had gone into action and recommended four important preliminary steps. Reserve district directors were warned that the Organized Reserve would shortly be ordered to active duty. The Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, was told to expect approximately 21,000 Organized Reservists in the near future. The Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune, was told to expect approximately 5,800. And the Commandant, with Secretary of Navy approval, ordered that the practice of discharging Marine Corps Reserve personnel at their own request be discontinued.

Events now moved rapidly. On 20 July, 22 units with a total strength of 4,830 were ordered to extended active duty with a delay of ten days. During the next 15 days (21 July-4 August), the entire Organized Ground Reserve was ordered to active duty on a schedule that took into account the state of readiness of the various units, their proximity to scheduled stations of initial deployment, and the facilities available to receive and care for them. In all, orders were issued to 138 units with a total strength of 1,880 officers and 31,648 enlisted Marines. By 11 September, in a period of 53 days, all of these units had reported for active duty, and this component had, de facto, ceased to exist.

Before the first reserve units arrived at their initial stations of deployment, however, four important events occurred:

1. On 25 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Marine Corps to build the 1st Marine Division, less one RCT, to war strength. On the same day, a 10-15 August date of departure for the Far East was set.
2. On 25 July, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized a 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within the continental limits of the United States, making additional regular Marines available for the 1st Marine Division.
3. Two days later, Congress passed legislation authorizing the President to extend for one year all enlistments, regular and reserve, that were to expire prior to 9 July 1951. This law made it possible for the Marine Corps to rely on a stable body of regulars and reservists.
4. On 31 July, even as the first reservists were arriving at Camp Pendleton and approximately 6,800 regular Marines of the 2d Marine Division were mounting out of Camp Lejeune to join the 1st Division, the Joint Chiefs directed the Marine Corps to expand the 2d Division to war strength and increase the number of Marine tactical squadrons from 16 to 18.

The problem posed is at once apparent. Obviously, both divisions could not be built up simultaneously, and in view of the pending commitment of the 1st Division, it was mandatory that this unit receive top priority. It was in the building up of the 1st Marine Division that reservists made their first important direct contribution.

On 31 July, the first Organized Ground Reserve units began to stream into Camp Pendleton. That day saw the arrival of the 13th Infantry Battalion of Los Angeles, the 12th Amphibian Tractor Battalion of San Francisco, the 12th Signal Company of Oakland, and the 3d Engineer Company of Phoenix.

The flow soon became a torrent, and within a week, one would have been justified in terming the influx a flood. Also contributing was a steady stream of regulars: approximately 3,600 Marines from 105 posts and stations had poured into Camp Pendleton by 4 August. By 6 August, during one 96-hour period, approximately 6,800 Marines (from the 2d Marine Division) and 350 Navy personnel had arrived at Camp Pendleton. All the while, reservists continued to report.

Fortunately, even before the arrival of the first reservists, an extensive survey had been conducted of the facilities and supplies at Camp Pendleton. On the basis of this survey, estimates had been made of the increased facilities and supplies that would be needed to support the vastly increased strength of the post. As rapidly as possible, measures were taken to expand facilities and augment supplies, with the result that all new arrivals were properly fed, housed, and clothed, even if many Marines had to be taken off one train and immediately set to helping prepare for the arrival of the next.

Headquarters Marine Corps planned the arrival dates on a staggered schedule to facilitate the reception and care of each arriving increment before the appearance of the next. Even so, and despite the extensive planning and the 24-hour, 7-day working week instituted at Camp Pendleton, the rate of daily arrivals taxed facilities to the limit, and over, but an essential job had to be and was being done.

As rapidly as reserve units arrived, they were billeted, processed, and classified. In the process, units were disbanded and the personnel utilized wherever the need was greatest. Every effort was made to assign reservists to tasks that would best realize their training and skills.

Those reserve Marines not assigned to the division rendered assistance in almost every function at Camp Pendleton. They served in the service and administrative organizations, in training with and serving on the staff of the Training and Replacement Regiment, and in working parties that assumed many of the mounting out responsibilities of the 1st Marine Division, so that it might receive the maximum amount of training before shipping out for combat operations.

The assignment of newly mobilized reservists to a combat unit in such a short space of time was contrary to both the desires of the Marine Corps and the previously established plans, which called for extensive periods of training. The decision was reached only after close consultation and much soul-searching among high-ranking Marine officers, but the harsh realities of a highly demanding war offered no choice, and the decision was made.

Basically, the problem was to select those reservists that by virtue of previous training or military experience were best qualified for inclusion in the 1st Marine Division. It was in the vital interests of both the division and the individual reservist that the task be performed with the minimum degree of error. An inadequately trained man is too often a liability in a combat situation, endangering his own life and those of his fellows, and lowering the combat efficiency of his unit.

Since the urgency for the 1st Marine Division departure did not permit the usual deliberative process of analyzing all training records, interviewing the men and their officers, and of giving practical tests, certain criteria that would compromise a rapid selection, the means available, and the standards of selection with the task to be performed were established for the selection of reservists. Accordingly, two general categories, Combat-Ready and Non-Combat-Ready, were set up.

Combat-Ready was defined as applying to those reservists that had been members of the Organized Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills or two summer camps and 36 drills, or, that were veterans with more than 90 days service in the Marine Corps. Non-Combat-Ready was applied to all reservists that did not meet these standards. It had a subdivision called Recruit Class, which applied to all that had less than one year's service in the Organized Reserve or had poor drill attendance records. The establishment of these standards was neither hastily nor lightly considered, but represented the collective professional judgment of some of the most experienced field commanders in the Marine Corps.

Even so, the Combat-Ready standard fell short of representing an optimum Marine Corps goal for training; it could be said, however, that these reservists, while certainly not so well trained as the Marine Corps would have liked them to be, nor so well trained as they would have been if more time had been available, had the training required for a combat assignment.

Serving to increase the problem of selecting Combat-Ready reservists was the fact that although the majority of the reserve units reported with their records in excellent shape, many either became separated from their records in the hurried movement or were unable to complete them. By itself, this lack would not have resulted in a serious situation, but coupled with the narrow time limitations, it created a problem that had unfortunate repercussions. For example, the margin of error in the selection of reservists for combat assignment was increased, MOSs were scrambled, and the payment of some personnel was delayed by as much as two months. In addition, the dearth of reliable records imposed a severe handicap on the already strained administrative staffs of both Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division at a time when efficiency and dispatch

were at a premium.

To help overcome this deficiency, staff personnel interviewed reservists before the commander decided whether or not the reservists qualified for the Combat-Ready category. In these interviews, reservists often manifested a strong desire to be classified as Combat-Ready, and this desire influenced many of them to present an overly optimistic picture of their previous training. A reservist's statement to the effect that he considered himself qualified for combat was not accepted as proof of his fitness, however, and his unit officers were questioned as to the qualifications. At the same time, any reservist that felt he needed more training, and so suggested, was at once removed from further consideration for immediate assignment to combat duty with no prejudice.

Reservists falling into the Non-Combat-Ready category, but not into the Recruit Class, generally were assigned to the Continental Security Forces to help restore the 50 percent reduction in those forces; to replace regulars in overseas security detachments on a man-for-man basis and thus make additional regulars available for combat; and to the Training and Replacement Regiment, where they could make up their training deficiencies and themselves become available for combat as replacements for the 1st Division. Approximately 30 percent fell into this category.

Those reservists falling into the Recruit Class, approximately 20 percent, were generally assigned to recruit training; some were temporarily placed with administrative and service organizations.

Approximately 50 percent of the Organized Reservists, including all officers, fell into the Combat-Ready category, and 2,891 of these were assigned to the 1st Marine Division.

However, as the 1st Division, less one RCT, approached war strength, it received instructions to activate the 7th Marines (Reinforced), its third regimental combat team, and to embark the regiment not later than 1 September. To make the achievement of this deadline possible, the Commandant ordered virtually all of the little remaining effective combat strength of the 2d Division, the 6th Marines, at peace strength of less than two battalions, to Camp Pendleton for the purpose of serving as cadres in building up the new regiment, but of the total number of Marines involved in this transfer, approximately 50 percent were Combat-Ready Reservists.

Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Division, while engaged in the process of mounting out, transferred approximately 1,000 of its men into the division rear echelon to be utilized in the build-up of the 7th Marines. To provide additional regular troops for this regiment, Marine Corps posts and stations and

security forces within the continental limits of the United States again furnished increments, while 800 Marines of 3/6 were detached from shipboard duty in the Mediterranean and ordered to proceed to the Far East via the Suez Canal to join the regiment upon its arrival.

By so drawing Marines from widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines (Reinforced) on 17 August. The units of the 6th Marines were redesignated, and as soon as personnel became available, new units were formed. However, once again Combat-Ready Reservists were called upon to bring these units, on the eve of their departure for combat operations, to the strength commensurate with the missions for which they were designed. The reservists' contribution to the strength of the 7th Marines is graphically illustrated by the fact that the 1st Battalion absorbed 805 reservists, and the 2d Battalion 433; the 3d Battalion of that regiment was composed almost entirely of reservists.(2) In all, there were 1,809 reservists in the regiment on the date of its departure.

Meanwhile, the 1st Division, less the 7th Marines, sailed for the Far East. The first cargo vessels weighed anchor on 10 August, followed on 14 August by the first attack transport. Loading was completed on 21 August, and the last ship sailed on the 24th; and a week later, on 1 September, the 7th Marines (Reinforced), less one infantry battalion, shipped out, close on the heels of its parent organization.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Men of the Marine division that stormed ashore at Inchon on 15 September had the comforting knowledge that they would be supported by their fellow Marines of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, who, in the post-World War II years, had made development of close air support techniques and skills a must. Two carrier-based regular Marine VMF (fighter) squadrons rendered excellent air support during the initial assault. A week later, while Kimpo airfield was still under intermittent enemy fire, two additional VMFs, newly arrived in the Far East, began operating from that field, adding their weight to the drive on Seoul. By 28 September a third VMF squadron had arrived at Kimpo.

What the reservists in the 1st Marine Division probably did not know, however, was that a large fraction of the newly-arrived VMFs was composed of Organized Aviation reservists, who like themselves, had been plucked but seven weeks earlier from the normal civilian pursuits of young Americans.

Once more, the Marine Reserve had played a vital role in a noteworthy achievement of the Marine Corps. During this 7-week period, 937 aviation reservists had moved from civilian life in the United States to combat operations in

Korea. Although this is by no means the end of the story of Marine aviation in the present emergency, neither is it the beginning, for the story goes at least as far back as the first days of the Korean conflict.

The outbreak of hostilities on 25 June, and the increased Marine Corps commitments, which soon followed, found Marine aviation in an enviable position as compared with Marine ground forces. Since the initial demands upon the 30 VMFs and 12 MGCISs of the Organized Aviation Reserve were comparatively small, the needs of Marine aviation were filled quickly and easily. Even when demands increased sharply, it never became necessary to drain completely the Organized Aviation Reserve pool.

On 23 July the first demand came; three Reserve VMF and six MCGI squadrons received orders to active duty in order to provide trained Marines for the 1st Wing, which had furnished the units and personnel of MAG-33; of the total 1,474 reservists ordered to extended active duty, approximately 1,400 actually reported at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, on 1 August.

The arrival date of these personnel initiated a month of feverish but efficient activity at El Toro. In rapid succession, a new tactical air control squadron and a new ground control intercept squadron were activated, orders were received to move the rear echelon of the 1st Wing to the Far East, and MAG-15, including VMF-212, was transferred from Cherry Point to El Toro.

In short order, the necessary unit transfers and personnel joinings were made and the authorized composition and strength of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing achieved. Units of the 1st Wing mounted out and sailed for the Far East on 17 and 24 August, and the remaining units, including an augmentation detail for MAG-33 containing 60 percent reservists, sailed on 1 September. By 17 September, all these units had arrived at their destinations.

Their timely arrival more than doubled Marine aviation strength in the Far East, and the number of VMFs available for the Inchon-Seoul operation was increased from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 6. Of the six VMFs, five participated directly in the operation and rendered valuable air support to ground elements.

Recapitulation

With the arrival of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) and the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, on 21 September, the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) achieved a strength of approximately 24,000 Marines and 1,145 Navy personnel. By the same time, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had increased its strength to approximately 3,800 Marines and 90 Navy personnel.

By 15 September, the Marine Corps had a total of approximately 28,000 Marines and 1,235 Navy personnel in the Korean theater of operations--a striking force that made its weight felt on that very day at Inchon.

As commander of the 1st Marine Division, Major General Oliver P. Smith was uniquely qualified to measure the value of the reserve contribution, and he has said:

Without the reserves, the Inchon landing on September 15 would have been impossible....They needed no particular refresher course to renew the amphibious skills they had learned during World War II....Reserves were quickly integrated into the division and they all became Marines with as splendid a Marine spirit as the regulars.

It is pertinent at this point to recapitulate a few of the outstanding features of this achievement. In exactly one month from the date of its activation in California, 7 July, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) was engaged in combat operations in Korea. The 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), less one reinforced regiment, from a 31 July strength of 3,386 men, achieved war strength in 16 days, and one month later, on 15 September, launched a highly successful amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea. In another week, the 7th Marines (Reinforced) was ashore, and the 1st Division, at war strength was smashing at the gates of Seoul. A month after their departure from San Diego, Marine fighter planes of MAG-12 moved into Kimpo Airfield immediately after it had been secured by the 1st Marine Division, and began combat operations while the airfield was still under intermittent fire.

An aggressive and trained fighter without the means to fight serves little or no purpose; only by furnishing him with high quality weapons and equipment and adequate supply can his combat capacity be fully exploited. Viewed in this light, the importance of the 98.3 percent material readiness of the 1st Division and the 95.6 percent material readiness of the 1st Wing on 30 June 1950 needs no elaboration.

To enumerate all the noteworthy accomplishments inherent in the achievement of this striking force is beyond the scope of this narrative, so only some of the salient features that made this effort both possible and successful are noted here:

1. An efficient reserve program with a high percentage of combat experienced and trained reservists.

2. The emphasis that the Marine Corps placed on the maintenance of a Regular Establishment wherein Marines, both inside and outside of the Fleet Marine Force, complete a high standard and uniform instruction and training program.

3. The subordination of all interests and missions of Marine Corps Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, service and supply units, troop training units, and security detachments to the task of furnishing Marine forces for Korea.

4. The inclusion within the Fleet Marine Force of Marine aircraft wings highly trained in close air support and carrier operations.


5. Not only the overall soundness of the command structure of Fleet Marine Force units but also the command relations existing among elements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, appropriate units of the Pacific Fleet, and the entire Marine Corps supporting establishment.

6. The intensity, diversity, and realism of the amphibious training performed by both regular and reserve units.


7. The maintenance of Fleet Marine Force organizational equipment in a ready-to-go status and the similar maintenance of supplies by local Marine and Navy supply depots.

Perhaps above all the contributing factors was the patriotism, vigor, and cooperation manifested by all.


PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES
TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA
25 APRIL 1951




PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA 31 MAY 1951



PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA 30 JUNE 1951




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


PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA


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
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PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES
TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA
31 AUGUST 1951




PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES
TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA
30 SEPTEMBER 1951




PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA

31 OCTOBER 1951




- IN KOREA -




PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA

30 NOVEMBER 1951




- IN KOREA -



PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REGULARS AND RESERVES TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN KOREA

31 DECEMBER 1951



- IN KOREA -

* Includes 19.9 percent inductees

CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY

The Organized Ground Reserve

During the perilous post-World War II years, the Marine Corps made every effort to create and maintain a strong and military proficient Organized Ground Reserve readily available for mobilization in the event of a national emergency or war. The storm clouds gathering on the horizon gave a sense of urgency to these efforts, and by 30 June 1950, there were 2,657 Marines of the Regular Establishment, including reservists on continuous active duty, devoting full time to the reserve program. Should the storm clouds unleash the hurricane of war, the Marine Corps wanted to be ready with the maximum possible number of trained and available reservists for rapid integration into the depleted Regular Establishment.

Through the reserve districts, which were responsible for defined geographical areas, a close check was kept on the performance of reserve units. Inspector-Instructor staffs were constantly available for consultation and help; and when corrective action was indicated to improve performance, this action was taken. All units in existence for more than six months were required to submit monthly reports of drill attendance, and within the units, a constant selection and weeding-out process was carried on so that they might increase and preserve their vitality.

By 10 August, all Organized Reserve ground units had been activated, standing at a combined strength of 33,527, or approximately 77 percent of their authorized strength, 43,471. That a higher strength was not achieved at this time is explainable by the Marine Corps policy of constantly sifting out personnel that did not meet the high established standards of the Organized Reserve to ensure the services of ready-to-serve and best-fitted reservists.

Traditionally, when Marines were required, they were needed without delay, and they had to be of high caliber; therefore, the Marine Corps emphasis on the training and quality of its Organized Reserve could hardly be labeled an exaggeration. When their services were needed, Organized Reservists were ready, and the Marine Corps had the comforting knowledge that they would not be found wanting.

The need for trained and ready reservists was not long forthcoming. Five days after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the President received Congressional authorization "to order into active service any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces." In anticipation of orders to come,

Headquarters Marine Corps on 14 July, instructed the directors of all Marine Corps Reserve Districts within the continental limits of the United States to discreetly take all steps possible to prepare for the mobilization of the Organized Reserve on short notice.

Five days later, on 19 July, the President authorized the Defense Establishment to call units and individuals of the reserve components to the colors. Within a matter of hours, a warning order was dispatched to the Reserve District Directors informing them that Organized Reserve units would shortly be called to extended active duty in excess of 30 days. Simultaneously the whole Marine Corps mobilization team moved into action.

Meanwhile, a survey and evaluation of previous Marine Corps studies on the percentage of availability of the on-board strength that could be expected in the Organized Reserve had been made, (3) and an 80 percent expected availability was confirmed.

On 19 July, therefore, upon receipt of authorization to call reservists to active duty, the Commandant alerted the Commanding Generals of the Marine Barracks at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune to expect 21,000 and 5,805 reservists, respectively, commencing on 1 August. On the next day, 20 July, 22 Organized Reserve ground units (4,830 men) were ordered to report for extended active duty with a ten day delay. (4)

With this step, a period of extensive planning, swift action, and pure hard work was initiated, a pattern that was to persist for some time to come. At Headquarters Marine Corps, planners established a schedule of reporting dates, which took into consideration the state of readiness of the various reserve units, the proximity of these units to their initial station of deployment, and the means available to receive and care for them. In addition, the arrival dates of the reporting units were staggered to avoid the overtaking of available facilities as much as possible and eliminate much of the confusion and hardship that would have resulted from the arrival of very large numbers of Marines at camps where the influx of personnel was normally much lower.

At Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, facilities and supplies available for the billeting, feeding, training, and processing of the incoming Marines were carefully reviewed. Measures were taken to expand facilities and increase supplies in proportion to the new demands.

Meanwhile, orders to Organized Reserve units were being issued at established intervals. On 22 July, 25 units were ordered to active duty; on 24 July, 23 units; on 25 July, 18 units; on 26 July, 13 units; on 27 July, 6 units; on 3 August,

MOBILIZATION OF ORGANIZED RESERVE(GROUND)

DATES ORDERS ISSUED	NUMBER OF UNITS RECEIVING ORDERS	ACTUAL STRENGTH OF UNITS ORDERED	DATE REPORTED	ACTUAL PERSON- NEL REPORTING
20Jul50	22	4,830	31Jul-2Aug50	4,370
22Jul50	25	5,980	4Aug-11Sep50	5,488
24Jul50	23	5,628	10Aug-25Aug50	4,970
25Jul50	18	5,157	15Aug-31Aug50	4,544
26Jul50	13	3,756	12Aug-31Aug50	3,344
27Jul50	6	1,601	18Aug50	1,452
3Aug50	5	1,617	23Aug-11Sep50	1,450
4Aug50	25	4,903	31Aug-11Sep50	4,509
10Aug50	1	56	21Aug50	56
TOTAL				30,183

5 units; and on 4 August, 25 units. Delay for these units varied from 10 days to a month. In all, orders were issued to 138 separate units with a combined 30 June strength of 1,880 officers and 31,648 enlisted, or a total officer and enlisted strength of 33,528.

Ten days before the last remaining Organized Reserve ground unit was ordered to active duty on 10 August, the first ordered units began flowing into camp. This flow had its beginning at Camp Pendleton with the arrival, on 31 July, of the 13th Infantry Battalion of Los Angeles, the 12th Amphibian Tractor Battalion of San Francisco, the 12th Signal Company of Oakland, California, and the 3d Engineer Company of Phoenix, Arizona.

At Camp Lejeune, the trail was blazed by the 5th Infantry Battalion (including companies at Lynchburg and Charlottesville, Virginia, and Cumberland, Maryland) of Washington, D. C.; B Company, 6th Infantry Battalion of Reading, Pennsylvania; and C Battery, 1st 105mm Howitzer Battalion of Fort Lee, Virginia, all of which arrived on 1 August.

Thereafter, units continued to arrive in a steady stream. By 11 September, all ground units of the Organized Reserve had reported for active duty, and the vital reserve component had, de facto, ceased to exist. Now the Marine Corps could tally the number of Organized Reservists that had actually reported, and it was with a feeling of gratification and a sense of justification that the Marine Corps discovered that instead of the estimated 80 percent availability of the Organized Ground Reserve, a 90.02 percent availability had actually been realized. Of the 33,528 Organized Reservists that had been ordered to active duty, 30,183--1550 officers and 28,633 enlisted--actually reported with their units on the date specified. This high availability assumes added significance when one notes that by 6 September approximately 1,619 delays in reporting for active duty had been granted to individual Organized Reservists.

Finally, it is pertinent to cite that this complete mobilization of the Organized Ground Reserve was effected in a period of 53 days, 20 July to 11 September, and on 15 September, approximately 5,800 Organized Reservists were playing, or were about to play, an important role in the victorious Inchon-Seoul operation as part of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The Organized Aviation Reserve

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea found the Organized Aviation Reserve in a comparatively enviable position in contrast with the Organized Ground Reserve. With 30 VMF and 12 MGCI Squadrons generally up to peacetime strength, the Aviation Reserve was ready to fill the gaps created by the sudden

MOBILIZATION OF ORGANIZED RESERVE (AVIATION)

DATE ORDERS ISSUED	NUMBER OF UNITS RE- CEIVING ORDERS	ACTUAL STRENGTH OF UNITS ORDERED	DATE REPORTED	ACTUAL PERSONNEL REPORTING
23Jul50	6 VMF 3 MGCI	1,271 203 <u>1,474</u>	1 Aug 1 Aug	1205 187 <u>1,392</u> Total
3Aug50 12Aug50	9 MGCI 2 VMF	643 492 <u>1,135</u>	4 MGCI 21Aug 5 MGCI 6Sep 2 VMF 18Sep	584 583 <u>1,167</u> Total
13Sep50	3 VMF	559	16 Oct	528
OCTOBER	Name Orders	172	13,16Nov50 & 9Jan51	169
NOVEMBER				
DECEMBER				
11Jan51 12Jan51	6 VMF 3 VMF	1,160 740 <u>1,900</u>	1Mar51 1Mar51	<u>1,637</u> Total
				4,893 Grand Total

emergency to increase the strength of Marine air promptly. Seldom, if ever, has the mobilization of a reserve component functioned so smoothly or served to justify so well the expenditure of energy and funds inherent in the maintenance of reserve components.

The circumstances surrounding this mobilization were almost ideal. Approximately 95 percent of the 1,589 officers were combat-experienced in their then current billets; of the 4,753 enlisted, virtually all staff noncommissioned officers were skilled technicians, and only approximately 10 percent of the personnel in the lower ranks were in need of basic training. In addition, the Organized Aviation Reserve was tapped over a comparatively long period of time to meet specific demands as the need for aviation personnel and units developed and increased.

The first demand arose when it became necessary to build up to war strength the units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which had been partially stripped to furnish the best possible personnel for MAG-33. Accordingly, on 23 July, the Marine Corps ordered the personnel of six reserve fighter squadrons, -111, -123, -141, -213, -221, and -241, and three Marine ground control intercept squadrons, -16, -18, and -22, to report for extended active duty at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California. Of the 1,474 aviation reservists affected by these orders, 1,392 actually reported on 1 August.

Meanwhile, by the end of July, Marine Aviation had been authorized an increase of one tactical air control squadron (TACS), one MGCIS, and two VMFs in its regular units. The TAC and MGCI squadrons were activated at El Toro on 3 August, and on the same day, the remaining nine Reserve MGCI squadrons, -15, -17, -19, -20, -21, -23, -24, -25, and -26, were ordered to active duty. Nine days later, Reserve VMFs -232 and -235 were also ordered to active duty. The VMFs were ordered to report as units, preserving their squadron designations and increasing the number of VMFs to 18.

Thereafter, for a period of one month, no additional calls for aviation reservists were issued; but on 13 September, with the Inchon landing and the commitment of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing only two days off, the personnel of seven more Reserve VMFs were ordered to active duty with a reporting date of 16 October. Within two weeks, however, the Inchon-Seoul operation had proved an outstanding success and a battered enemy was on the run. Therefore, the demands of Marine aviation diminished appreciably, and on 30 September, the orders of four of the seven VMFs ordered to active duty on 13 September were cancelled. Of the 559 men in the three VMFs unaffected by this cancellation, 528 actually reported on 16 October.

In the following weeks, the military situation developed favorably, and no small measure of the credit was earned by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Inchon-Seoul was soon followed by the Wonsan landings and the move northward towards the Manchurian border. North Korean forces were swiftly crumbled and the remnants of the once confident and deadly North Korean army fled in the direction of the Manchurian sanctuary. The end of the Korean conflict seemed close at hand.

Therefore, during October and most of November, the need for Marine air units continued to diminish, and no further aviation reservists were ordered to active duty, with the exception of a small number, who were called by individual orders.

Early in November, however, Chinese Communist forces entered the struggle, and before the end of the month had streamed across the Manchurian border in great numbers. On 3 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the Marine Corps to increase the number of its fighter squadrons from 18 to 21.

Eight days later, nine Reserve VMF's were ordered to report for active duty. Six of these, VMF's -112, -143, -144, -215, -234, and -321, were mobilized as personnel, and three, -121, -251, and -451, as units preserving their squadron designations. Of the 1,900 aviation reservists affected by these orders, 1,637 actually reported at their home stations on 1 March, and as of that date, Marine aviation had 21 VMF's in active service.

Thus, by 1 March, 20 of 30 reserve fighter squadrons and all 12 of the reserve ground control intercept squadrons in existence on 30 June 1950 had been mobilized. Of the 6,342 Marines in the Organized Aviation Reserve, a total of 5,240 had been ordered to active duty; of these, the impressive number of approximately 4,900, or 93.5 percent, actually reported to their initial stations of deployment.

Impressive as this availability may be, the contribution of the Aviation Reserve has a deeper significance. At the time of the Inchon landing, approximately 24 percent of the 1st Wing strength was made up of reservists. Yet, only six and a half weeks earlier, these reservists had been following the normal civilian pursuits of young Americans. In addition, had it been necessary to do so, the number of aviation reservists serving in the Far East conceivably could have been increased by from 400 to 500 percent with little or no loss in combat efficiency. Significantly, in April 1951, 51.5 percent of the officers and 36.5 percent of the enlisted Marines in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were reservists.

In review, the record of the Organized Aviation Reserve mobilization is enhanced by two allied factors, which are equally

noteworthy. First, this branch of the reserve not only met the demands of Marine aviation fully and promptly but also produced a high percentage of well qualified reservists ready for almost immediate employment in the field. Second, even after having met all the demands over a period of more than seven months of extensive combat operations, Marine aviation was still able to maintain ten well-trained fighter squadrons in the reserve pool.

Volunteer Reserve

On 30 June 1950, the Volunteer Reserve was by far the largest component of the Marine Corps Reserve. Indeed, the Volunteer Reserve, with 87,655 Reservists on inactive duty, exceeded the strength of the Regular Establishment by 13,382. In addition, it should be noted that the strength of the Regular Establishment included 2,265 Volunteer Reservists serving on continuous active duty.

Although the Volunteer Reserve was designed primarily for individuals that desired affiliation with the Marine Corps but whose personal activities did not permit them to participate in the more demanding Organized Reserve program, the Marine Corps nevertheless considered the Volunteer Reserve an important source of manpower. That the Volunteer Reserve actually proved to be so is attested to by the statistics. At the end of March 1951, 51,942 of the 84,821 reservists on active duty were Volunteer Reservists, and approximately 99 percent of the officers and 77.5 percent of the enlisted were veterans of World War II. Thus, Volunteer Reservists were important not only because of their numbers, but because the vast majority had already proved themselves to be the "Marine type" by all the selection methods, training, and combat tests the term implies.

When, in the first week of August, a review of Marine Corps-assigned and -projected commitments revealed that the number of immediately available Marines, including the total Organized Reserve (Ground), was inadequate to meet demands, plans were initiated to tap the Volunteer Reserve. On 5 August, the Commandant advised the Marine Corps reserve districts that approximately 60 percent of the Volunteer Reserve would shortly be called to active duty.

In the succeeding days, a group of officers representing the interested divisions and sections at Headquarters Marine Corps worked on a draft of the administrative instructions, which were vital to a wide scale mobilization of the Volunteer Reserve. This draft was substantially complete by the second weekend in August, and on 12 and 13 August the instructions were studied by a group of reserve district directors, which had been ordered to report to Headquarters for consultation. Several valuable recommendations resulting from this conference were

incorporated. In addition, a Headquarters representative visited the reserve district directors not previously consulted to request assistance in ironing out any problem of interpretation, omission, or execution that they anticipated. Once again, constructive suggestions were received, and the Headquarters representative immediately forwarded these to Washington. After careful but rapid evaluation, Headquarters modified the already released administrative instructions where justified.

Meanwhile, the last Organized Reserve ground units had been ordered to active duty and the 1st Marine Division was building up to war strength before mounting out. The need for additional personnel still existed, however, and Marine Corps Headquarters, in the administrative instructions of 15 August, directed that "all male enlisted members of the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve in the ranks of Sergeant and below...." be ordered to active duty with a delay of 15 days. Thus, shortly after the departure of the last elements of the division from Camp Pendleton on 1 September, the first of these Volunteer Reservists began arriving.

Reserve districts had, meanwhile, been informed on 18 August that the Marine Corps was in need of approximately 2,650 company grade officers with combat specialties and that certain staff noncommissioned officers would shortly be ordered to active duty by name or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) number. Even as enlisted Volunteer Reservists were beginning to flow into Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Headquarters on 6 September ordered the first large group of Volunteer Reserve officers to active duty. On the next day, Headquarters also directed that quotas of Volunteer Reserve staff noncommissioned officers, with or qualifying for certain specified MOS numbers, be ordered to active duty by reserve district directors.(5)

Thereafter, for a period of approximately five months, Volunteer Reservists were ordered to active duty only on the basis of individual orders, with the exception of a quota of aviation staff noncommissioned officers, who on 29 September were ordered to report to Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro. Following the Chinese Communist intervention and the 1st Division withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, however, Marine Corps Headquarters on 8 February ordered that an additional quota of staff noncommissioned officers be summoned to active duty. This was the last large body of reservists called, and in the succeeding weeks and months the need for reservists diminished steadily until by May 1951 merely a trickle of Volunteer Reservists was ordered to duty, and these were almost exclusively reservists whose delay period had expired, who volunteered for active duty, or who were ordered to duty to fill specific billets.

During the period in which Volunteer Reservists were called to active duty, they made the largest contribution to the expansion of the Regular Establishment. The measure of this contribution is best illustrated by a brief statistical review of Volunteer Reserve mobilization. Commencing on 31 July with 2,381 Volunteer Reservists on active duty and 88,269 on inactive duty, the strength of Volunteer Reservists on active duty increased to 52,305 and that of those on inactive duty fell to 34,043 by the end of May 1951. In the one peak month of October, 21,343 Volunteer Reservists reported for active duty; of these, 1,010 were newly enlisted. It is worth mentioning as an illustration of the influence a notable feat of arms has on American youth, that following the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from 877 in December to 3,477 in January.

The large number of Volunteer Reservists that reported for active duty performed two general functions. One, they participated in carrying out virtually all the missions and tasks of the Marine Corps; two, they engaged in intensive training in the 2d Marine Division and at training camps. Thus, if the Korean match had touched off a wide conflagration, the Marine Corps would have been able to move swiftly and in ample numbers wherever the interests of the United States dictated.

Overseas, Volunteer Reservists that had arrived at camp too late to participate in the build-up of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Wing made up the bulk of the replacement drafts that joined these organizations during the fall and early winter of 1950. They also made possible the release of regulars from overseas security forces for service in Korea by relieving these regulars on a man-for-man basis.

On the domestic scene, members of the Volunteer Reserve fleshed out the skeletonized 2d Division, in which there were 19,895 reservists by 31 December, and at least 80 percent of these reservists were Volunteers. By the same date, Volunteer Reservists made up a substantial part of the 2,945 reservists that were taking up the slack left by the departure of regulars from the domestic security forces. They also assumed important duties in the training and replacement commands, recruit training, maintenance, and a myriad of specialized tasks, and their availability was instrumental in making it possible for the Marine Corps to be the first of the Armed Forces to initiate a rotation program for the benefit of personnel with the longest service in Korea.

Statistics alone do not tell the whole story, for no statistical column can describe the attitude displayed and sacrifice often suffered by those ordered to active duty. It is an unqualified tribute to the Volunteer Reserve as a whole that the Marine Corps was able to realize better than 80 percent

VOLUNTEER RESERVES
OFFICERS AND ENLISTED

1950	Total <u>Active</u> <u>End of Mo.</u>	Total <u>Inactive</u> <u>End of Mo.</u>	<u>Accessions to Act. Duty</u>	
			<u>New En-</u> <u>listments</u>	<u>From</u> <u>Inactive</u>
June	2,393	85,893		
July	2,381	88,294	75	9
August	4,951	87,517	2,352	253
September	13,776	81,046	1,196	7,939
October	33,518	62,028	1,010	20,333
November	40,911	52,528	821	8,370
December	43,940	47,587	877	3,405
<hr/>				
1951				
January	47,760	44,445	3,477	2,726
February	50,950	40,165	1,650	2,153
March	51,942	36,824	1,464	2,010
April	52,746	35,515	649	1,425
May	52,305	34,043	423	536

of those originally ordered.(6)

Physical Examinations

There was, however, another aspect of mobilization that logically should be treated here; 6,583 reservists were disqualified for active duty for physical reasons upon initial examination and 4,384 were rejected at their stations of deployment and subsequently returned home. At first glance, the fact that such a number of reservists was rejected after having passed examinations at or near their home stations seems to indicate serious shortcomings in the execution of physical examination in the reserve districts. Closer study, however, reveals that on the whole a creditable job was done by these examining stations.

The urgency of the need for reservists resulted in the processing of unprecedented numbers through examining centers at a rapid rate. Thus, when the flow of Marine reservists reporting for physical examinations was swelled by substantial numbers of Naval reservists, the available medical facilities became overtaxed. Despite the unstinting efforts of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (Navy Department), both the lack of standby facilities, including equipment, and the shortage of qualified medical personnel made it impossible to give thorough physical examinations and still maintain the required flow of reservists through the examining centers. Examinations were, therefore, of a preliminary nature aimed at screening out those obviously unqualified. Approximately 66 percent of these were screened out, time schedules were met, and the reporting of reserve units to their first duty stations was achieved at the appointed time. Unfortunately, in the process a severe hardship was imposed upon many of the remaining 34 percent. Having passed their initial physical examinations, these reservists believed that they were embarking on an extended tour of active duty, and made their plans accordingly. Many sold their homes, gave up their jobs, interrupted their educations, relocated their families, and made many other plans and arrangements, which were disrupted.

TOTAL MARINE CORPS RESERVE STRENGTH

ACTIVE & INACTIVE

Jul 50-Mar 51

	31 July 1950	31 Aug 1950	30 Sept 1950	31 Oct 1950	30 Nov 1950	31 Dec 1950	31 Jan 1951	28 Feb 1951	31 Mar 1951
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TOTAL MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Total Marine Corps Reserve (Active and Inactive)	132,252	135,860	136,673	135,426	132,039	129,572	129,654	128,408	125,497
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
EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY

Extended Active Duty, Total	10,637	29,079	48,039	67,195	73,847	76,456	79,934	82,847	84,821
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INACTIVE RESERVE

Inactive Reserve, Total	121,615	106,781	88,634	68,231	58,192	53,116	49,720	45,561	40,676
Organized Reserve	32,002	16,054	6,278	4,916	4,379	4,250	4,002	4,139	2,611
Volunteer Reserve	88,294	89,408	81,046	62,028	52,528	47,587	44,445	40,165	36,824
Fleet Reserve	1,319	1,319	1,310	1,287	1,285	1,279	1,273	1,257	1,241

MARINE CORPS STRENGTH
 REGULAR & RESERVE, ACTIVE & INACTIVE
 30Jun50 - 31Mar51



INVOLUNTARY SERVICE, RESIGNATION, AND DISCHARGE

Advantages and Obligations of Reserve Membership

Following World War II, Congress made service in the reserve components of the Armed Forces more attractive. Existing benefits were increased and new ones added, so that by 1950, members of the reserve were receiving opportunities and privileges never previously paralleled in United States reserve history.

Specifically, the Marine Corps offered to Organized Reservists longevity pay, and commensurate with their grade or rank, increased pay not only for service performed during each two-hour weekly drill but also for participating in the annual 15-day active duty training program, which the Marine Corps executed in the summer months. During training periods, Organized Reservists received instruction in current Marine Corps techniques and operated up-to-date equipment. In addition, the Marine Corps offered these reservists the opportunity to acquire specialized skills having civilian as well as military application. The Marine Corps Institute, which had long offered reservists the opportunity of obtaining high school and college credits through correspondence courses, expanded its curriculum to include a wide variety of technical courses.

Enrollment in the Marine Corps Reserve was also enhanced by the initiation of a retirement program and a more generous promotion system.

Less specifically, but nevertheless implicit in affiliation with the Organized Reserve, reservists were given opportunities to develop and maintain social contacts with like-minded men in a purposeful environment, to engage in a wide range of athletic activities designed to improve physical fitness, and to enjoy the extensive recreational facilities available to members of the Organized Reserve. Of a less tangible nature, but also implicit in affiliation with the Organized Reserve, was the patriotic satisfaction and pride of serving in a "ready-to-fight" organization of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The extension of benefits, training programs, and privileges obviously entailed a large outlay of funds and a considerable expenditure of the physical and material resources of the Marine Corps. In return, Organized Reservists committed themselves to call for active duty in conformance with the established mission of the Organized Reserve--"to provide units effectively organized and trained in time of peace for immediate mobilization in the event of a national emergency."

The Volunteer Reserve, too, played a vital part in the planning and execution of the Marine Corps Reserve program. Designed primarily for members that desired affiliation with the Marine Corps but whose personal activities or location did not permit them to participate conveniently in the activities of an organized unit, the Volunteer Reserve nevertheless provided a reliable source of trained manpower.

Since its peacetime contribution to the Marine Corps Reserve program was substantially less than that of the Organized Reserve, the Volunteer Reserve compensation was proportionally lower. Volunteer Reservists, with the cooperation and assistance of the Marine Corps, had the opportunity to organize and maintain volunteer training units, which pursued group study while preserving their Marine Corps affiliation. Although Volunteer Reservists did not receive remuneration for training activities performed at home, they could volunteer for annual Volunteer Reserve active duty training, and if selected, they received the full pay and allowances of their grade or rank. In addition, they were given also the opportunity to amass retirement credit points. The number of points acquired by the Volunteer Reservist was dependent upon his membership in the Volunteer Reserve and the degree of his participation in the various Marine Corps activities available to him; namely, volunteer training units, active duty training, Marine Corps Schools extension courses, and Marine Corps Institute correspondence courses. In return for these advantages, the Volunteer Reservist, like the Organized Reservist, obligated himself to serve on active duty in time of war or national emergency. Volunteer Reservists were to be assigned a definite and important role in the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. This function of the Volunteer Reserve also is best described by its mission--"to provide the Marine Corps with the minimum requirement of trained personnel, including specialists and technicians, for complete mobilization...."

Serving to further encourage enrollment in the reserve was the assurance, in provisions of Congressional legislation, that a reservist would not be called to active duty without his consent except for war or the declaration of a national emergency. Equally documentable was the provision that a reservist would be discharged or allowed to resign upon his own request except during war or a period of national emergency.

Normally, the procedure followed in calling reservists to active duty was **for the various Armed Forces, having determined** their personnel requirements in a given situation, to request the authority necessary to call the specific numbers of reservists needed to increase their strengths in proportion to their assigned and projected commitments.

Pre-Korean Policy

Prior to 30 June 1950, the Marine Corps, in matters pertaining to active service resignations and discharge, was guided by the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, which stated in part that a member of the Marine Corps Reserve:

...may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the Navy in time of war or when in the opinion of the President a national emergency exists, and may be required to perform active duty throughout the war or until the national emergency ceases to exist; but in time of peace ...a Reservist may be ordered to or continued on active duty with his consent only.

In the implementation of this legislation, the Marine Corps Manual, issued in accordance with naval regulations, and with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, prior to 19 July 1950, stated that members of the Marine Corps Reserve may be assigned to continuous active duty with their consent only. The manual further stated that "When not on active duty, no officer of the Marine Corps Reserve shall be discharged in time of peace, except upon his own request or for full and sufficient cause, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy" and that an enlisted Reservist "...will be discharged upon his own request, except USMC-V personnel obligated for service...."

Proceeding from these premises, the Marine Corps gave reservists dual assurances:

1. That they would not be called to active duty without their consent except in case of war or national emergency;

2. That they would be discharged or allowed to resign upon their own request. These pledges were honored until well after the commencement of hostilities in Korea and the active participation of United States forces in that conflict. Then new legislation and increased commitments resulted in legally sanctioned new policies.

Change in Policy

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea on 25 June, new forces and new considerations were immediately brought into play. With the President's decision, on 26 June, to employ United States military forces in Korea, an emergency of serious proportions presented itself as an easily definable threat to American security.

In view of the general unpreparedness of the Armed Forces, Congress acted swiftly to increase the strength and effectiveness

of the Military Establishment. Four days after the President's announcement of 26 June, Congress approved The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950. This measure in effect nullified the guarantee that reservists would not be called to active duty except in time of war or national emergency. The pertinent part of The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 reads:

Until July 9, 1951...the President shall be authorized to order into the active military or naval service of the United States for a period not to exceed twenty-one consecutive months, with or without their consent, any or all members and units of any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States...."

The President chose, however, to delay the invocation of this new authority until a later and more practical date.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces conducted rapid but extensive surveys of their material and manpower resources in preparation for the eventuality that sizable American military forces would be committed in the Far East. As a result, the Department of Defense and its subordinate military departments arrived at certain basic conclusions, which thereafter contributed to the decisions and events affecting the mobilization of the reserve components.

Prominent among the resulting decisions was the resolution that, in the interest of an expeditious and effective mobilization, voluntary separation from the reserve components should be suspended except in unusual cases. The first measure taken to implement this decision came on 15 July, when the Chief of Naval Personnel ordered that the discharge of Naval reservists upon their own request held in abeyance.

Four days later, the President, in a message to Congress entitled, "Situation in Korea," underlined the seriousness of the Far Eastern conflict and the measures that had to be taken, first to mitigate and then to terminate the crisis created by the North Korean invasion. With regard to the increased requirements for military manpower, the President stated:

I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength of military personnel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force,... I have also authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required.

The date of the President's message, 19 July, was a day of importance not only to the nation as a whole and the military generally but also to the Marine Corps in particular, for on that date the Marine Corps, with the approval of the Secretary

of the Navy, put into execution its plans for limited mobilization. In the implementation of these plans, two events of particular significance to Marine reservists occurred:

1. The Commandant issued the following order: "Effective Immediately, Discharges Marine Corps Personnel at Own Request Pursuant Para 10354 MarCorps Manual Discontinued until Further Notice. SecNav Approves.

2. The Organized Marine Reserve was alerted for extended active duty.

The next day, the Secretary of Defense issued to the Secretary of the Navy a memorandum that read, "By direction of the President, you are hereby authorized to order to active duty such units and individuals of the Marine Corps Reserve as may be required. This delegation of authority confirms our prior oral discussions of this subject." On the same day, the Secretary of the Navy, cognizant of the immediate personnel requirements of the Marine Corps, directed the Commandant to order all Organized Reserve ground units to extended active duty.

The decision to mobilize the total Organized Ground Reserve necessarily imposed other considerations upon Marine Corps planners--how many reservists were needed to meet the immediate requirements of the Marine Corps? and what percentage of those Marines ordered to active duty, (allowing for resignations, discharges, delays, and physical disqualifications), would be found qualified for extended active duty?

On the basis of a study performed at Marine Corps Headquarters, it was estimated that approximately 80 percent of the 33,527 members of the Organized Ground Reserve would be available for actual mobilization. But under the newly proposed and eventually approved personnel ceiling of 138,013 men, even a 100 percent availability of the Organized Ground Reserve would have left the Marine Corps far short of the target strength. It was necessary, therefore, to make every effort and take every possible legitimate action to increase the potential availability of the Reserve.

Obviously, it was impractical to order reservists to active duty, and at the same time, to continue the policy of discharging reservists at their own request. To have done so would have been to deplete a vital source of manpower at a time when the Marine Corps needed all of its available Organized Ground Reserve and would soon be in need of most of its Volunteer Reserve. Such a policy would have, in addition, created an administratively impossible task at a time when administrative efficiency and expedition were at a premium.

Confronted with the necessity of utilizing as many reservists as possible, the Marine Corps originally applied a rigid standard

to the new policy bearing upon the discharge requests of enlisted reservists. Those requests that had been approved and delivered by 19 July were deemed valid, but those requests not yet processed and delivered were not completed.

As the administrative load of Marine Corps Headquarters decreased and the apparent injustice imposed upon those reservists that had requested discharges prior to 19 July became clear however, the Commandant approved a Marine Corps policy change, which made it mandatory that discharges be effected in cases where reservists had requested discharges in good faith prior to 19 July.

Motivated by substantially the same reasons as those that had prompted the suspension of voluntary discharges, the Commandant on 20 July directed that transfers from the Organized Reserve be suspended, and on the same day, ordered the first Organized Reserve units to report for extended duty with a delay of 10 days.

Four days before the first Organized Reserve units reported for active duty, however, Congress passed Public Law 624 giving the President authority to extend the enlistments of all military personnel in the Armed Forces. This new and important legislation, like the one that had authorized the calling of reservists to active duty, was a reflection of the gravity with which the leaders of the nation viewed the Korean crisis.

The President, in turn, lost no time in acting upon this new authority. He ordered immediately an extension of 12 months for "all enlistments in the Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, including the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, and any component of the Air Force of the United States which shall expire at any time after the date of this order and prior to July 9, 1951." And on the next day, 28 July, the Secretary of the Navy gave practical effect to the President's order by releasing ALNAV-72 in execution of the Chief Executive's will.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps took another step in its effort to make the Marine Reserve a stable and easily employable organization when on 28 July, the Commandant ordered that the policy of accepting resignations and discharges in order to permit Marine reservists to enter another reserve or regular component of the Armed Forces be discontinued. At the same time, however, exception was made for doctors, dentists, applicants for entry into the Chaplains' Corps, and enlisted personnel that were to receive a commission or were to be assigned to a service school leading to a commission.

With the execution of this step, the most essential preliminary measures necessary to make the Organized Reserve a stable and easily employable body were accomplished facts. On

31 July, the first Organized Marine Reservists reported to their initial station of deployment.

A happy feature of the Marine Corps experience with its preliminary mobilization of the Reserve was the high availability of Organized Reserve officers. No problem was anticipated in the utilization of Organized Reserve officers and none developed. The number of Organized Reserve officers that submitted resignations for consideration was so small that one is justified in terming it insignificant.

By the middle of August, however, plans had been made to call to active duty in the near future approximately 2,650 Volunteer Reserve officers. The Secretary of the Navy's letter of 14 August directed the Commandant to disapprove resignations submitted by inactive reserve officers except in specific cases where it was determined that the services of the officer concerned would not be necessary to meet mobilization requirements. Accordingly, the Marine Corps, in conformance with the policies of the Department of Defense and the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, revamped its existing policy and procedure for processing resignations submitted by inactive reserve officers, and the Commandant approved the new policy on 9 September. Henceforth, resignations submitted to the Commandant were not to be accepted automatically, but were to be closely examined to determine whether or not they fell into certain established categories of exception. Those resignations that met this test were forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy with the recommendation that they be approved; those resignations that failed to meet the test were processed and filed.

The categories of exception were as follows:

1. Women officers that acquire or have acquired, by birth or adoption, children under 18 years of age, or that have become stepparents of children under 18 years of age that are either pregnant or residing with the woman officer.

2. Ordained ministers or priests.

3. Theological students whose status is such that they cannot remain a member of the military service. (Documentary evidence required.)

4. Conscientious objectors and pacifists. (Documentary evidence required.)

5. Officers specified as poor security risks. (If indicated by reports from the FBI, ONI, etc.)

6. Officers attending medical, dental, and theological schools. (These reservists may accept superseding or probational

appointments in the Naval Reserve.)

7. Officers that have enlisted or accepted appointment in, or those inducted by, another branch of the Armed Forces, Public Health Service, or Coast and Geodetic Survey.

8. Resignations from selected officers requesting resignation for purpose of accepting an appointment in another branch of the Armed Forces. In general, neither requests for resignations nor statements of acceptance of resignations were approved when received from officers whose specialties were usable by the Marine Corps.

9. Cases, disapproval of which constitute extreme personal hardship. (Documentary evidence required.)

10. Cases of those granted a delay in assignment to active duty where the nature of the delay in the assignment to active duty indicates that availability for mobilization is highly questionable.

Approved as a part of this new policy also was the recommendation that "the foregoing exceptions apply equally to the discharge of enlisted reservists when it is determined they fall within these categories."

As the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve proceeded, it became evident that the hardship imposed upon enlisted reservists with four or more dependents was often out of proportion to the sacrifice normally expected of reservists. In many cases it was discovered that a reservist's continuance on active duty created a hardship classifiable as extreme, and therefore, often impaired the reservist's capacity to perform his duties with the singleness of purpose and will, which the Marine Corps considers highly desirable in its personnel. Financial difficulties were usually found to be at the root of the preoccupations that weighed upon these reservists, and the majority of such cases were those of enlisted reservists in the lower pay grades. Consequently, the Marine Corps added a new category to its discharge eligibility list, and effective on 12 October, enlisted reservists having four or more dependents were given the prerogative to choose between remaining on active duty and being discharged.

The Disability Compensation Problem

There was, however, one problem not directly related to involuntary service, resignation, or discharge, but falling within the purview of reserve mobilization, which deserves citation. This was the issue resulting from the ordering to active duty of reservists receiving disability compensation from the Government of the United States.

Prior to 1946, the Annual Appropriations Act contained a provision that no part of the appropriated funds was to be used for pay or allowances of any member of the reserve components of the Armed Forces that was receiving a pension, disability compensation or allowance, or retired pay from the Federal Government.

That year, however, this provision was removed from the annual appropriations legislation and enacted into permanent law as Section 10 of Public Law 604, approved by the 79th Congress on 2 August 1946. Under this act and a Comptroller General's opinion relating thereto, a reservist in receipt of a pension could not legally waive the pension in order to receive active duty pay, nor could he draw pay for active duty training and then reimburse the Government for the amount of the pension or authorize checkage of his pay in the amount of his pension. The reservist could only "renounce" the pension entirely, and then following his period of active duty, request reinstatement by reexamination and requalification.

Under this law, the Marine Corps had no recourse but to pronounce the policy that no reservist would be ordered to active duty until he had certified that he was not receiving a pension, disability compensation, disability allowance, or retired pay from the Government.

In the Appropriation Act for the Fiscal Year 1950, however, a provision was included to authorize a reservist in receipt of a pension to waive his pension during any period in which he was entitled to draw pay as a member of the reserve. But owing to the limited funds available and the large numbers of reservists applying for active duty training, the Marine Corps adhered to its previous policy, and did not select reservists in receipt of pensions for active duty training. An important factor influencing this decision was the Marine Corps desire to train and maintain a reserve composed of members that were the most qualified for unrestricted active duty in the event of mobilization. Obviously, other factors being equal, reservists drawing a physical disability compensation were not considered to be so well qualified as those not in receipt of such monies.

Unfortunately, by the time of the Korean invasion and the resulting mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, the Fiscal Year 1950 Appropriation Act, and the included provision authorizing waiver of pension, had expired, and the Fiscal Year 1951 Appropriation Act had not yet been enacted. Thus, the full force and effect of the pertinent legislation fell upon Public Law 604. Accordingly, in the mobilization instructions issued to both the Organized and Volunteer Reserves, Marine Corps Headquarters informed reservists that no active duty pay or allowances would accrue to those reservists that were in receipt of pensions, disability compensation or allowance, or retired pay from the Federal Government, unless such compensation

was discontinued and a certification of this discontinuance was executed.

On 27 September 1950, however, the Act of 2 August 1946 was amended by Public Law 844, 81st Congress. This new legislation provided that when serving on active duty, a member of the reserve entitled to receive retired pay, pension, or disability compensation might elect to receive on the one hand the retired pay, pension, or disability compensation to which he was entitled, or on the other hand active duty pay. Under no circumstances, however, was a reservist to be permitted to receive both active duty pay and a pension. To receive active duty pay, it was compulsory that a reservist in receipt of a pension either waive or relinquish his pension.

It was at this point that the problem became aggravated--whereas approximately 1,100 of the reservists entitled to disability compensation but found qualified for active duty waived their pensions, 57 did not.(7) Those reservists that refused to waive their pensions did so in direct contradiction to a provision of their enlistment contracts, by virtue of which they had agreed to waive disability compensation in the event of call to active duty. With one exception, all those that refused to waive their pensions would have received a larger income from their active duty pay than from their pensions. Therefore, it was difficult to understand the reason for this refusal. Originally, a misunderstanding on the part of these reservists about the limits of their rights and privileges and the scope of the Marine Corps legally sanctioned powers undoubtedly contributed to the problem. One aspect of the issue did prove almost unassailable. This was the problem stemming from the difference between the Veterans' Administration physical examination standards qualifying veterans for disability compensation and the Marine Corps physical examination standards qualifying personnel for active duty.

The VA examination was based on the physical condition of a veteran at the time of entrance into service. Therefore, if during his tour of duty a reservist's physical condition was impaired even moderately, he became entitled to disability compensation. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, considered only the physical condition of personnel at the time ordered to active duty. If at that time a reservist met the rigid examination standards, he was judged to be fit for active duty and for all the tasks and duties that entailed. Thus, it was perfectly possible, and often the case, that reservists in receipt of disability compensation when ordered to active duty, passed thorough physical examinations with no disability noted. At least some reservists felt that in the long run they had more to gain from a disability pension than from a higher but temporary active duty income.

The 1,100 reservists that waived their pensions were utilized wherever their services and skills were needed most; many served in Korea and some became casualties in the performance of their duties, and others made important contributions to various domestic functions of the Marine Corps. The remaining 57, however, created problems far greater than their small number would indicate. Since they had refused to waive their pensions, the Marine Corps could not legally reimburse them for active duty service or pay their transportation costs. These Marines could only be utilized at their initial stations of deployment. Since these stations were primarily training facilities whose major task was preparing Marines for field operations, it would have been poor manpower utilization indeed to utilize these reservists for duties in which they would have developed or improved skills that the Marine Corps had little or no hope of utilizing in the field or at other camps. Accordingly, many of the reservists that had refused to execute waivers were assigned to administrative tasks or casual details, where they could assume the duties of other Marines whose future service was not so restricted. The Marines relieved by these reservists were then assigned to duties where they might acquire or increase skills that could be realized in the execution of more vital Marine Corps tasks.

Irrespective of whether or not these reservists subsequently executed a waiver, they were placed in the priority release category for which they qualified and no consideration was given to their refusal to waive. By December 1951, only two known cases of reservists falling in this category were still serving on active duty.

DELAY POLICY

(8)

Evolution of Delay Policy

Beginning on 20 July, the ordering to active duty of Marine reservists entailed the promulgation of detailed instructions pertaining to personnel, supply, and administrative matters. These instructions, issued in conformance with established Marine Corps procedure, played an essential part in the execution of an orderly mobilization of the reserve and in ensuring that uniformly fair consideration would be given to the multitude of problems that inevitably arise in an operation of this nature.

Of particular concern to the purpose of this project was the problem encountered by the Marine Corps in attempting to reconcile its pressing need for a maximum realizable availability of its reserve, the civilian requirements of the national interest, and the desire to prevent undue hardship from weighing upon those reservists called to active duty. Since the national interest was often served, and undue hardship forestalled, by the granting of delays, a close examination of the evolution of delay policy and its application by the Marine Corps is clearly in order.

Fortunately, the Korean crisis and the subsequent decision to call reservists to active duty found the Marine Corps ready to cope with the need for an equitable and readily employable delay policy. When, on 19 July, the Marine Corps received authorization to call its reserve to active duty, the Division of Plans and Policies immediately drafted a delay policy based on its mobilization plan, and on the next day this policy was dispatched as part of the administrative instructions to the first Organized Reserve ground units ordered on 20 and 21 July to active duty.

These instructions, consolidated on 22 July, subsequently became the basic policy reference with regard to the mobilization of the Organized Marine Reserve. The following information, essential to an understanding of Marine Corps delay policies, was taken from the administrative instructions of 22 July 1950:

(4) BASIC POLICIES FOR DEFERMENT OF INDIVIDUALS OF ORGANIZED RESERVE UNITS:

(a) Inspector-Instructors will, preceding actual assignment to active duty, interview each Reservist initiating deferment request in writing. Strict application of the below criteria will be applied to any reservist

35 years of age or under; liberal application of the below criteria will be applied to reservists 36 years of age and above.

(1) This interview will determine status of individuals in the following categories:

(a) If the individual is employed by a firm principally engaged in production of obviously unessential products or services to the national security.

(b) If the individual is employed in a critical industry (considering present status of utilization of industry for national security) or in the field of scientific research important to national security.

(c) If the individual is sole owner and operator of a business establishment.

(d) If the individual is pursuing education in the fields of scientific research, medicine, or dentistry and has satisfactorily completed undergraduate work.

(e) If the individual is enrolled in an educational institution and has one semester or less to complete for a diploma or degree. (High School or College)

(f) If the individual is employed in civilian status in another service or Department of Defense.

(g) If the individual is a member of the Platoon Leaders Class in good standing and has satisfactorily completed either the Junior or Senior course of summer training or is now participating in such training.

(b) The Inspector-Instructor will not defer anyone in category (a) above.

(c) The Inspector-Instructor may defer from call to active duty, awaiting instructions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, individuals in category (b) under the following conditions:

(1) The individual's employer certifies in writing:

(a) That the individual occupies a key position that cannot be sustained by an alternative, such as, job breakdown or simplification or modification of production process.

(b) That the employer includes a justification to the Inspector-Instructor's satisfaction why the above cannot be accomplished.

(d) The Inspector-Instructor may defer from call to active duty awaiting instructions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, individuals in category (c) under the following conditions:

(1) If the individual proves to the Inspector-Instructor that without a doubt his business or establishment cannot operate in his absence without additional time to make necessary arrangements.

(e) The Inspector-Instructor may defer from call to active duty, awaiting instructions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, individuals in categories (d) and (e) under the following conditions:

(1) That the individual obtain a written letter from the institution in which he is matriculating stating that he is in good standing and meets the requirements established for these categories.

(f) In case of category (f) the Inspector-Instructor will contact the Commanding Officer of the facility or establishment and have the Commanding Officer certify that the individual occupies a key position that cannot be sustained by alternatives, such as job breakdown or simplification or modification of production process.

(g) The Inspector-Instructor will defer those individuals in category (g).

(h) Urgency of civilian work being performed by the Reservist will be weighed in urgency of military job to be performed by the Reservist.

(i) The Inspector-Instructor will mail via Air Mail all requests and supporting correspondence for deferment direct to Headquarters, Marine Corps CODE DA for final decision and disposition.

(j) All persons deferred for a specific period or awaiting deferment action by the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be transferred to Class II from the unit to the appropriate District Headquarters prior to departure of the unit for the station of initial deployment.

Subsequently, however, the Secretary of Defense directed that a committee be convened to evolve a delay policy for implementation of all the Armed Services. This committee was convened in the last week of July. As an indication of how

well adapted the Marine Corps plan was to the exigencies of the reserve mobilization, it is pertinent to note that the Marine Corps policy was adopted in toto except for minor modifications. On 1 August, the Department of Defense promulgated its delay policy, the most relevant portions of which are set forth here:

CRITERIA FOR DELAY IN CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY

1. Members of the Civilian Components employed or engaged in critical civilian occupations or essential activities and who are needed for immediate utilization by the military services. Such members will be considered for delay in call to active duty only if the following criteria are met.

(1) The member is principally engaged or employed in a civilian occupation appearing on the Department of Labor List of Critical Occupations; and in a highly essential activity necessary to the national health, safety, or interest as defined in the Department of Commerce List of Essential Activities; or

(2) The member is otherwise engaged or employed in a key position in a highly essential activity necessary to the national health, safety, or interest as defined in the Department of Commerce List of Essential Activities.

(3) It is established after careful consideration of the member's or his employer's written request that the member in fact complies with the criteria of 1 or 2 above, and that there are unique circumstances surrounding the member's employment or work which give him essential knowledge or experience not possessed by any available replacement possessing the same skill.

2. Members of the Civilian Components Occupying Critical Key Managerial Jobs.

The following applies only in the case of a member occupying a critical key managerial position not otherwise accounted for in the Department of Labor List of Critical Occupations. Such member may be authorized delay in call to active duty by the military department concerned only if all the following criteria are met:

a. The member's call to active duty would cause material loss in production, services, or research necessary to the national health, safety or interest.

b. Written representation is submitted giving specific justification for delay in call to active duty.

c. The urgency of the civilian work outweighs the need of the armed forces for his services.

d. Request for delay in call to active duty of men under 26 years of age will be considered only in exceptional cases.

3. Members of Civilian Components enrolled in educational institutions or engaged in research and scientific activities.

Call to active duty of a member enrolled in an educational institution may be delayed until completion of the school term in which the member is then registered. A member pursuing a professional graduate course or engaged in research in a technical or scientific field of primary interest to the Department of Defense should be granted delay in call to active duty. Such delay will be based upon the merits of the individual case.

The Department of Defense, however, did furnish three important documents, which proved of inestimable value in the execution of delay policy. These were the Memorandum on Mobilization Assignments of Key Civilian Personnel within the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce List of Essential Activities, and the Department of Labor List of Critical Occupations, which provided delay standards and lists of occupations deemed essential to the civilian defense effort.

Initial Problems Encountered in Execution of Delay Policy

In the execution of the Marine Corps policy instructions issued on 22 July, the most immediate and emphatic public reaction was concerned with the calling to active duty of those Organized Reservists with more than one semester to complete for their diplomas or degrees. Since the majority of the reservists in this category were high school students, and, for the most part under 18 years of age, an understandable protest was engendered by the parents and friends of these Marines.

The typical protest read as follows:

My son, Private John Doe, USMCR, is a member of an Organized Marine Corps Reserve unit ordered to active duty. He is 17 years old and has two semesters to complete before he receives his high school diploma. To interrupt my son's education now would probably mean that he will never complete his high school education. When I gave my consent to his enlistment, I understood that he would not be called to active duty without his consent. Therefore, I protest the singling out of these young boys who have not completed their secondary school education to do the

work of trained and mature men.

In response to such correspondence, the Marine Corps, fully cognizant of anxieties and sacrifices inherent in the mobilization of Reserve components, could reply only that:

1. Membership in the Organized Reserve, from the cessation of World War II hostilities to 19 July, was purely voluntary and any reservist's request for discharge during that period was honored.
2. Those reservists over the age of 17 years, but less than 18, were enlisted with the consent of their parents or guardians and that, if the enlistment contract of a reservist falling in this age group was signed without parental consent, a discharge for the Marines concerned could be, (or could have been) effected, provided that the discharge is (or was) requested within 90 days after the date of enlistment.
3. Marine reservists ordered to extend active duty were afforded the opportunity to complete their high school studies through correspondence courses offered by the Marine Corps Institute and the United States Armed Forces Institute.
4. It has been and always will be insofar as practicable, the policy of the Commandant of the Marine Corps not to send Marines into combat until they have received proper training.

Usually unstated, but equally pertinent to the issue raised by the rapid and widely inclusive character of the mobilization, were other important, indeed vital, considerations. The most prominent of these were:

1. The pay, cost of training, and benefits of 17 year old reservists were the same as those of older Marines of the same military background.
2. Experience has proved that young Marines, after proper training, make excellent combat troops. To deprive the Marine Corps of this source of personnel, already trained or partially trained, would have meant a marked reduction in the availability of reservists, the breaching of the established mission of the Organized Reserve, and the jeopardizing of the Marine Corps capacity to carry out promptly its assigned and projected commitments.
3. The formulation of Marine Corps personnel policies is circumscribed by, and functions in conformance with, the policies laid down by the Defense Department. It is only within narrow limits, and with the approval of

the Secretary of the Navy, that the Marine Corps may initiate a policy that is unique within the Military Establishment.

The relevant provisions of the Secretary of Defense policy relating to members of the reserve states that "Call to active duty of a member enrolled in an educational institution be delayed until the completion of the school term in which the member is then registered" and "Requests for delay in call to active duty of men under 26 years of age will be considered only in exceptional cases."

The Marine Corps, however, in its implementation of this policy, went a step further, limiting delay for student reservists to those with one semester or less to complete for their diplomas or degrees. Included in this provision were added reservists that still had a semester to complete for their diplomas or degrees but not yet enrolled for the fall semester. On the other hand, the other Armed Forces in adapting the Defense Department delay policy to their needs were able to adopt a more lenient interpretation. The Air Force authorized delay for all registered student reservists who desired delay; the Army did not call up reservists in the 17 year old age group; and the Navy did not call to active duty pay grades E-1 and E-2, the two lowest pay grades and the ones in the comparatively high proportions of 17 year old high school reservists.

This difference in implementation made it difficult for the Marine Corps to justify its delay policy. Inevitably, a comparison between the Marine Corps policy and that of the other Armed Forces resulted, which often crystallized into sharply expressed displeasure with the Marine Corps policy. In many cases, complaints were channeled through Congressmen; this routing evoked considerable Congressional interest. The gist of the correspondence was that the Marine Corps delay policy was less lenient than that of the other Armed Forces. This conclusion has merit and inspires no contradiction.

The justification of Marine Corps delay policy has at least equal merit considering increased commitments of the Marine Corps and the important potential contribution of 17 year old reservists to the successful fulfillment of these commitments; the Marine Corps had no reasonable alternative. In the last analysis, the choice lay between the interests of the citizen Marines, who had knowingly obligated themselves for possible extended military service, and the interests of the nation, which are always paramount, especially in time of national peril.

It was certain that for some, the mobilization of reserve components resulted in economic dislocation, personal inconvenience, and hardship. Although the Marine Corps expected that some sacrifice would necessarily be imposed upon a portion

of the reservists called to active duty, it was not the intention of the Commandant that any reservist should endure an extreme hardship if it could be avoided. Accordingly, on 28 July, which was three days prior to the reporting date of the first reservists, the Commandant authorized all Inspector-Instructors to defer from call to active duty cases involving extreme hardship and to await instructions from Marine Corps Headquarters.

Execution of Delay Policy

At about this time, a Board to Consider Requests for Delay in Assignment to Active Duty, composed of eight field grade Marine officers, was created. This Board, meeting daily, considered all requests forwarded by the Inspector-Instructors of the various reserve districts. Fully cognizant of the delay policies of the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps implementation of these policies, the members of the Board applied the established eligibility criteria to these requests, weighing each case in terms of hardship or the national interest against the immediate requirements of the Marine Corps.

On 15 August, two weeks after the convening of the board, the Marine Corps, still far below the strength required and approved for its new commitments, ordered the directors of all Marine Corps reserve districts within the continental limits of the United States to order all male enlisted members of the Volunteer Reserve in the ranks of sergeant and below to extended active duty. Consequently, new instructions were issued incorporating the most recent personnel policy decisions. The new delay policy instructions were substantially the same as those issued for the Organized Reserve.

In the instructions of 15 August, the Commandant delegated the granting of delays for enlisted Volunteer Reservists for periods up to six months to reserve district directors, who were in a better position to investigate and evaluate the merits of the individual requests. To assist in evaluating requests for delay, the directors were further instructed to establish a review board composed of two officers in each district. The function of these boards was to consider the statements and documentation submitted in support of requests for delay and to make appropriate recommendations to the director whether a delay was warranted under the provisions of the instructions. Copies of the promulgated personnel policies statements of the Department of Defense, including the List of Essential Activities prepared by the Department of Commerce and the List of Critical Occupations compiled by the Department of Labor, were furnished to each district to serve as a guide in determining the legitimacy of delay requests.

In addition to the forms set forth by the Department of Defense, the Commandant established other or more specific eligibility categories falling within the intent of the Department of Defense or the Marine Corps. These categories largely duplicated those previously promulgated in the administrative instructions issued to the Organized Reserve with three exceptions:

1. If an extreme hardship existed.
2. If an individual was enrolled in the Platoon Leader's Class or had been accepted for the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps or the Naval Aviation Cadet Program.
3. If the Reservist was under the verified age of 17 years.

In the cases of reservists under the age of 17 years, the district directors were further instructed to initiate discharge proceedings. The discharging of personnel, regular or reserve, falling in this category had long been Marine Corps policy. By 15 August, however, with the question of calling 17 year olds to active service already assuming the stature of an important issue, the Commandant deemed it advisable to spell out the policy pertaining to reservists under the verified age of 17 years.

Meanwhile, Marine Corps plans for the utilization of male Marine Volunteer Reserve officers had proceeded to a point where, on 18 August, instructions and information for calling this previously untapped source of personnel to active duty were issued to reserve district directors.

In the new instructions, reserve district directors were directed to delay reserve officers for a period of 15 days. If, however, in the opinion of the district director the circumstances of individual officers warranted further delay, the district director was authorized to grant an additional delay of up to 15 days. In all cases, where more than the additional 15 days delay was requested, the delay criteria set forth in the administrative instructions of 15 August were to be applied. To assist in determining whether or not the delay request met these criteria, the directors were instructed to utilize the services of the newly created reserve district review boards. In addition, district directors were empowered to disapprove without reference to the Commandant those requests that failed to meet the criteria. In cases where delay requests did meet the established criteria, the directors were further instructed to modify the orders of the officers concerned to delay assignment to active duty pending decision by the Commandant. Finally, requests meeting the criteria were to be forwarded to the Commandant with the appropriate recommendations and all

supporting documents.

At Marine Corps Headquarters, meanwhile, the Commandant replaced the Board to Consider Requests for Delay in Assignment to Active Duty with the Board to Consider Appeals for Delay in Assignment to Active Duty. The primary function delegated to this new board was to review appeals by enlisted Volunteer Reservists whose delay requests had been denied by district directors. In addition, the board was empowered to consider all original requests for delay from Volunteer Reserve officers and Organized Reserve personnel, officer and enlisted, ground and aviation.

With the taking of this measure, the basic procedures and policies governing delay in reporting for extended active duty were complete. Reaching the end did not, however, preclude a continuing examination and re-evaluation of delay policy by the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps. Consequently, on 1 September, the Marine Corps pronounced the following changes in existing instructions for calling to active duty male members of the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve:

1. District directors were authorized to process all enlisted requests for delay in accordance with the established eligibility criteria.
2. A new eligibility category was created to make reservists enrolled in the advanced course, senior division, Reserve Officer Training Corps or Air Reserve Officer Training Corps, eligible for delay.

Even this relaxation of eligibility standards created a source of some difficulty for the Marine Corps, for the other Armed Forces ~~included~~ also in this category reservists enrolled in basic courses. While the authority to include reservists engaged in basic officer training courses also fell within the purview of the Marine Corps, once again, the requirements of the Marine Corps made it inadvisable to embrace a wider range of eligibility in the new category. Once more, the Marine Corps was exposed to charges that it was interpreting delay policy to rigidly.

That the Marine Corps policy in this case, as well as in the case of the limitation upon delay for reservists enrolled in educational institutions, was both proper and necessary is demonstrated by the Department of Defense Personnel Policy Board memorandum issued at a later date. This memorandum stated that:

1. Members of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps and members of the Advanced Course, Senior Division, of the Army and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps programs should be delayed during satisfactory progress in

such programs. The Navy and Marine Corps may delay members of their Reserve Officer Candidates and Platoon Leader Class programs respectively.

2. High school students should normally be delayed while in good standing until completion of high school, unless manpower requirements necessitate their call to active duty. The Department of the Army and the U. S. Marine Corps cannot comply with this policy due to present manpower requirements.

By the first week of September, with the total Organized Reserve (Ground) ordered to active duty, the Marine Corps was in position to analyze the results of its delay policy. This study made at Headquarters Marine Corps revealed the following:

1. Total requests for delay from Organized Reservists--1,722.

2. An objective sampling of cases, considered by the Board to Consider Requests for Delay in Assignments to Active Duty over a period of 10 days, revealed the following results:

- a. Some delay granted - 94%
- b. No delay authorized - 6%
- c. Delays were granted in varying amounts for the following reasons:
 - 1. To complete education - 17%
 - 2. Sole owner, operator of business - 9%
 - 3. Medical and dental school students - 1%
 - 4. Key position in essential industry - 14%
 - 5. Extreme hardship - 46%
 - 6. Miscellaneous - 7%

Modifications of Delay Policy

In the succeeding weeks, the execution of Marine Corps delay policy functioned smoothly. This policy was adaptable to the changing exigencies of Marine Corps commitments, and,

as soon as practicable, the existing delay policy was modified to better serve the interests of reservists not yet ordered to active duty.

Thus, on 25 October, the Commandant ordered that henceforth, all Volunteer Reservists would be granted a minimum of 30 days between receipt of orders and assignment to extended active duty in lieu of the previously authorized 15 days.

But the question of reservists enrolled in educational institutions continued to provide the principal source of pre-occupation with delay policy. Therefore, with the military situation in Korea on a favorable tack by the end of October 1950, the Marine Corps authorized the reserve district directors to grant delays to all Volunteer Reservists enrolled in educational institutions until the completion of the current semester.

On 1 November, the Commandant took another step designed to alleviate some of the sacrifice that reservists were called upon to make. This step in the form of an order by the Commandant required district directors to ensure that no reservist would be required to depart from his home in execution of extended active duty orders between the inclusive dates of 17 and 25 December.

Encouraged by the improved military situation in the Far East, the Marine Corps began to think in terms of long range objectives instead of the immediate and compelling objectives, which had been the rule. Accordingly, on 8 November, the Commandant ordered that reservists, officer and enlisted, that were to be called to active duty in accordance with existing plans, would be notified by 31 December. Thereafter, those reservists not so notified, would be given at least four months advance notice, insofar as practicable, before assignment to active duty.

Unfortunately, the arrival of December was accompanied by an unexpected and rapid deterioration of the United Nations' position in Korea, including the Marines' fighting withdrawal from an advanced position in northern Korea. The execution of this dramatic "attack in a different direction" was accomplished at no little cost, though the gains achieved in terms of the casualties inflicted upon the enemy and in the stimulus administered to American military and civilian morale outweighed the price. Nevertheless, the price exacted was high enough to give rush priority to new strength requirements. Consequently, the Commandant, on 6 January 1951, suspended the policy of giving four months advance notice to Reservists not yet ordered to active duty.

Also in the first week of January, the Commandant, to ensure uniformity in granting delay, ordered reserve district directors to grant delays to reservists enrolled in educational

institutions if the reporting date for physical examination in the original orders to the reservist fell after the commencing date of the second semester. This measure ensured a uniformly just consideration of reservists enrolled in educational institutions, giving to reservists not ordered to active duty prior to the commencement of the spring semester the assurance that they would not be required to interrupt their education during the course of a semester. In this manner, the Marine Corps achieved the best compromise possible between its need for active duty reservists and the interests of student reservists.

On 10 January, the Marine Corps, in accordance with its own and the other Armed Forces long range plans for officer procurement, authorized the reserve districts directors to delay from active duty those enlisted members of the Reserve eligible for enrollment in the Platoon Leaders Class or another type officer candidate program for which college seniors and recent college graduates would be eligible. Those reservists that were found to be eligible and who had submitted requests for such delay might be delayed until the close of the academic year.

The general requirements to qualify for delay under this authority were set forth as follows:

1. Be enrolled in good standing in a four (4) year baccalaureate degree-granting college or university that is accredited by a regional or national accrediting association, or be a graduate of such an institution.
2. Be pursuing a course of study, or hold a degree in a field of study, other than medical, dental, or theological.
3. If a freshman, sophomore, or junior, be less than twenty-five (25) years of age on 1 July of the year in which scheduled to receive a degree.
4. If a college graduate, or a college senior scheduled to graduate at the end of the present academic year, be less than twenty-seven (27) years of age on 1 July 1951.

In February 1951, with the military situation in Korea again on a favorable course, there occurred two events that effectively eliminated the bulk of the problems raised by delay policy. The first was the Commandant's order of 6 February, issued in conformance with the Secretary of the Navy's instructions to delay from assignment to active duty all reservists that had not reached the 19th anniversary of their birthdays unless they requested active duty in writing. In another order, released the same day, the Commandant also directed that all reservists that fell in this category and who had been ordered

to active duty subsequent to 1 February 1951, were to be issued orders returning them to their homes, and upon arrival thereat, they were to be released from active duty.

Thus, at a stroke, two principal sources of preoccupation for the Marine Corps and inconvenience for reservists were annulled:

1. The ordering to active duty of 17 year old reservists,

2. The ordering to active duty of high school student reservists less than 19 years of age.

Another event of particular interest to reservists was the Commandant's decision on 10 February 1951, not to order to active duty a reservist whose enlistment contract would have expired on or after 28 February 1951 and prior to 9 July 1951 except for the one year involuntary extension of these enlistments by the Secretary of Navy. The Commandant also directed that his policy be applied equally to reservists in a delay status.

The intent of the Commandant's order was to prevent the ordering to active duty of reservists with less than one year's obligated service. Obviously, the contribution of reservists who served less than one year would have been of limited value. Another equally important consideration was the inconvenience or hardship imposed upon them in leaving their civilian responsibilities. Accordingly, the Commandant acted to prevent such a development.

Survey of Delay Requests

In March 1951, with a portion of the Volunteer Reserve officers, and both the total Organized Reserve excepting ten aviation units and substantially all enlisted Volunteer Reservists, ordered to active duty, another study was conducted at Headquarters Marine Corps for the purpose of evaluating delay in the light of eight month's experience.

This study took the form of a survey of the action taken on requests for delay from both Organized and Volunteer Reservists. The survey revealed that by the last week of March, 1951, 13,203 reservists had submitted 14,799 requests for delay. Of the 13,203 reservists that submitted requests, 1,865 were officers and 11,338 were enlisted men. In addition, on the basis of an analysis of 2,595 delay requests selected at random, percentages in terms of approved and disapproved requests, were arrived at in various delay categories. These percentages when applied to the total number of requests in three general categories, revealed the following:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Percentage Applied</u>	<u>Number (approx.)</u>
Delay approved for compassionate reasons	25	466
Delay approved for students and teachers	22	410
Delay approved for key employees	34	634
Delay (or further delay) disapproved	<u>19</u>	<u>355</u>
TOTAL	100	1,865

<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Percentage Applied</u>	<u>Number (approx.)</u>
Delay approved for compassionate reasons	26	2948
Delay approved for students and teachers	24	2721
Delay approved for key employees	32	3628
Delay (or further delay) disapproved	<u>18</u>	<u>2041</u>
TOTAL	100	11,338

Total number of delays approved 10,807 (estimated)
Total number of delays disapproved 2,396 (estimated)

That this estimate was remarkably accurate is illustrated by a study of reports submitted in March 1951 by reserve districts in conformance with a Headquarters Marine Corps request for mobilization information.

An analysis of these reports reveals the following:

Number of reservists granted delays in the following categories and the average length of deferments:

1. Extreme hardship 4381 - 3 months
2. Pursuing education in the field of scientific research 90 - 5 months
3. Enrolled in educational institution with less than one semester to complete 513 - 4 months
4. Delayed to complete current school semester 1324 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ months
5. Those enrolled in fields of primary interest to the National Defense 532 - 4 months

6. Employed in the Department of Defense 166
- 5 months

7. Enrolled in Platoon Leaders Class, NROTC, or
Naval Aviation Cadets 184 - 5 months

8. Others 3793 - 2 months

The total number of delays granted was 10,893, or 86 more than the estimated survey.(9) It is safe to assume, therefore, that the number of disapprovals estimated, 2,396, was also substantially accurate.

These studies not only serve as illustrations of policy in action but also illustrate that the number of reservists involved were many and the problem of delay a sizable one. It would be erroneous, however, to foster the impression that Marine reservists were reluctant to live up to their obligations. The vast majority of reservists received their orders to report for active duty with little or no debate. That the requests for delay were not a maneuver by reservists to postpone or avoid carrying out their obligations is attested by the fact that although delay criteria were applied strictly, approximately four out of every five delay requests were approved.

Such an attitude on the part of reservists was deserving of every consideration, and the Marine Corps did its utmost to ensure that this consideration would be given to reservists. Despite these efforts, it is undoubtedly true that some cases of real hardship did occur, and that some mistakes were made, notwithstanding the study, labor, and advance preparations of Marine Corps planners, administrators, and executors.

One of the features that clearly emerges from a close study of the mobilization is the unstinting effort exerted by the Marine Corps to reconcile its obligations to national security with the strong desire to give just and impartial consideration to the problems of reservists.

ROTATION

Rotation Planning

The Marine Corps did not commence planning for the rotation of Marines in Korea until well after the commitment of Marine units to the combat operations. This departure from policy is explainable by the rapid deterioration of North Korean opposition after the Inchon-Seoul operation. All indications pointed to a "short" war, and the outlook for the transfer back to the United States of the bulk of Marine forces in Korea was bright. Therefore, the development of a rotation policy in the early autumn of 1950 seemed pointless.

The massive Chinese intervention, which took place in the end of November, rapidly changed the complexion of the Korean conflict, however, and the "short" war had become a "long" one. Accordingly, Headquarters Marine Corps began at once to consider a rotation plan for implementation and execution as soon as practicable. During December, plans were made to augment replacement drafts scheduled to join the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing by approximately 1200 men so that personnel in excess of the authorized strengths might be rotated back to the United States. But even before Headquarters Marine Corps could implement this policy, the low percentage of casualties suffered by Marine forces in Korea during the latter part of December and January made it possible to commence rotating personnel upon the arrival of the next replacement draft.

At the suggestion of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, the decision was made by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and thereafter concurred in by the Commandant, that the first Marines rotated would be the original members of the brigade, who had been actively engaged against the enemy, off and on, for a period of six months. To prevent a deterioration in the combat efficiency of the units most directly affected, however, and in consideration of the favorable effect upon morale, the decision was made to include 25 percent of non-brigade personnel in the first rotation group.

Returning Rotation Drafts

With the arrival of replacements in the second week of February, 77 officers and 1,090 enlisted, including 30 officers and 600 enlisted class "B" (convalescent) and twice wounded casualties, were transferred back to the United States, arriving at San Francisco on 5 March.

Meanwhile, even as the first rotation group was arriving at San Francisco, another replacement draft arrived in Korea, and as a result, an additional 99 officers and 1,439 enlisted were embarked as rotation personnel, they arrived at Oakland, California on 22 March.

Commencing in April 1951, replacement drafts were dispatched to the Far East with augmentation personnel for the express purpose of effecting relief for Marines eligible for rotation. Also in April, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific pronounced a definite rotation policy for application by the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as follows:

BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ROTATION

a. Rotation will be effected when to do so will not adversely affect the combat efficiency of the unit concerned.

b. Individuals will be selected for rotation on the basis of:

1. The availability of suitable relief.
2. Length of service in the combat zone.
3. Comparative proficiency in the performance of duty, in the opinion of the immediate commanding officer, among individuals qualifying equally under the two preceding principles.

SECONDARY FACTORS

Only the above basic principles will be considered except where the number qualifying equally thereunder exceeds the number to be rotated, in which case consideration will be given to any secondary factors deemed pertinent by the immediate commanding officer. Examples of such factors which might be considered in specific cases are length of current overseas tour, wounds, nature of duties and conduct record, personal or family hardship.

During the months of April and May, the military situation in Korea continued to reflect a favorable bent, with the result that the monthly and slightly oversize replacement drafts exceeded casualties considerably. Therefore, the Marine Corps was able to continue rotating Marines back to the United States substantially in excess of augmentation personnel. By the end of April, 1,398 more Marines had been rotated back to the United States and by 25 May an additional 1,858.

Commencing in June substantial numbers of separation personnel also began to leave Korea, thus accentuating the problem of finding adequate relief for rotation personnel. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps, convinced of both the importance and justice of the rotation program, made a special effort to continue the program. This effort was successful, for in June, 1,477 Marines returned to the United States on rotation and in July, an additional 1,140. Barring increased operational commitments and unforeseen circumstances, plans called for a determined effort to continue rotation of Marines in Korea through all ranks and MOSs, for the importance of rotating those Marines, who are carrying the fight to the enemy with such vigor, is well-known. Rotation served the extremely useful purposes of not only returning combat-experienced Marines, who could then teach the lessons of that war, but also of maintaining the fighting Marines' morale at a high pitch. Of at least equal importance were the facts that the task they had performed, and the manner in which they carried it out, made them undeniably deserving.

RELEASE OF RESERVISTS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

Background of Release Plan

While the optimistic situation prevailing in Korea following the successful invasion at Inchon might be said to have delayed planning for rotation, by the same token it may be stated that the favorable tactical situation gave a sense of increased urgency to Marine Corps plans for the phasing out of reservists. In the latter part of September 1950, Headquarters Marine Corps began considering a priority release plan based on the World War II point system, which gave credits for active service, service overseas or afloat, battle participation, decorations, and dependents.

Further study revealed, that while the point system had merit, a new release plan would better meet the exigencies of the service and ensure a more equitable basis for an orderly return of reservists to civil life.

One of the new factors that had to be taken under consideration by the Marine Corps was the Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended, which prescribed the criteria that exempted certain civilians from liability under the draft, because of age, dependency conditions, or because the Selective Service obligation was met by prior service.

Although this Act gave credit for age (26 years or over) and prior service, it did not include recognition for reserve service, combat awards, overseas service, battle participation, or dependents. At first glance, a release plan based on draft liability would seem difficult to justify. A close study of the alternative point system plan, however, revealed certain inequities and several factors that would make it virtually unworkable. Briefly stated, the objections gravitating against the adoption of a point system may be summarized as follows:

Although the giving of credit for combat decorations had much to recommend it, this consideration was eliminated, for many points would have stemmed from World War II and not from operations in Korea. This method placed an additional administrative burden upon units and adversely affected an orderly phase-out.

Credit for overseas service was also ruled out because during the relatively short period that reservists would be on active duty involuntarily, the hardships of overseas duty (other than in Korea) were not considered sufficiently great to warrant special consideration.

Substantial numbers of reservists were serving in Japan and Hawaii, and a few at other overseas posts. Service at these duty stations could hardly be compared to the demanding duty in Korea. Therefore, it would have been necessary to divide the overseas credit category. But these were excellent reasons why even the eminently deserving reservists in Korea could be set aside for special consideration. Reservists serving in Korea would have benefited from two of the originally contemplated credit categories, overseas service and battle participation. Since World War II service was included in active service credits, the inclusion of credit for duty in Korea would have made virtually all reservists serving in Korea the first to be released. The impracticability of such a step is easily recognized when one considers that by the end of February, approximately 31% of the officers and 40% of the enlisted personnel serving in the 1st Marine Division and 1st Aircraft Wing were reservists. The combat efficiency of Marine units in Korea would have been drastically reduced, and even the furnishing of adequate numbers of replacements would have been almost impossible. In addition, a very large relief of reservists in Korea would have adversely affected the rotation opportunities and morale of Marines remaining in Korea, many of whom had longer combat duty in Korea.

Release Plan

In view of the foregoing, Headquarters Marine Corps decided to adopt a release system based on draft liability, for such a system would not only be more easily administered, but would also equalize the total contribution required of reservists to the defense of their country. This method would, in addition, conform with the intent of Congress as set forth in the Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended, and would also ensure additional training for the least trained reservists and give them, at the same time, the opportunity to discharge their Selective Service obligations, making them draft exempt except in case of total mobilization.

In March of 1951, a preliminary plan for the release of reservists on active duty based on draft liability had been worked out, and all Marine Corps units were asked to classify reservists in age and active service categories. Approximately one month later, the Marine Corps promulgated its release plan.

To be considered for release from active duty, a reservist was to have completed a minimum service of one year in his current tour of duty. Provision was made for the waiving of this requirement, however, during the early months of the release program. Plans envisioned the release of the first reservists in less than a year from the date on which the original

calls to reservists were issued, and by the end of June 1952, the Marine Corps anticipated that all reservists desiring release, approximately 5,704 officers and 58,487 enlisted men, would have been released, except for a few.

The plan finally effected was as follows:

ENLISTED (See also Appendix A.)

First priority for release was given to those enlisted reservists falling into the following categories:

AA. Members of the Volunteer Reserve that served on active duty for 12 months or more between 7 December 1941, and 2 September 1945.

A. Those Marines that served for a period of 90 days or more between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, or in the service of any country allied with the United States in World War II.

b. Those Marines, not in category AA or A, that served for a period of 12 months or more between 16 September 1940 and 24 June 1948 in any of the services listed in category A.

C. Those Marines, not in category AA, A or B, that completed three years or more active duty prior to 1 July 1951.

D. Those Marines, not in category AA, A, B, C, or F, that will be 26 years of age or over prior to 1 July 1951.

Second priority was given to category E as follows:

E. Those Marines not in any other category herein defined. (Marines with some service, but not qualifying for categories AA, A, B, or C, that would be less than 26 years of age prior to 1 July 1951, and who had not enlisted but had received orders to active duty prior to 16 August 1951.)

Third (and last enlisted) priority was assigned to category F as follows:

F. Those Marines with no prior service who had enlisted and had received orders to active duty subsequent to 16 August 1951.

OFFICERS (See also Appendix B.)

All officers, except second lieutenants, in categories AA, A, B, or C illustrated above, were to be released in chronological order of date assigned to active duty. All other officers, including second lieutenants, were to be released upon completion of 21 months of current active duty tour. Those second lieutenants in categories AA, A, B, or C subsequently promoted to first lieutenants, however, were also released with other officers in these categories.

Commencing in June 1951, the plan was put into execution and by the end of the month a total of 2,016 enlisted reservists and 77 reserve officers had been phased out. Most of these reservists had been ordered to active duty in the latter part of July 1950; their releases had been effected in approximately 11 months from their dates of reporting for active duty.

Despite a shortage of personnel, by the end of September 1951, a total of 408 reserve officers had been released from active duty and by 2 November, 23,510 enlisted reservists had been phased out.(10) Barring a drastic change in the manpower requirements of the Marine Corps, there was every reason to expect that the release of reservists would follow according to plan. And so it was, for by November 1952, another 4,211 officers and 51,112 enlisted men had been phased out, and most of these had gone by 30 June 1952. By the end of the active fighting in Korea in July 1953, reserve strength on active duty had been pared to about 21,000 Marines.

APPENDIX A

PLAN FOR RELEASE OF ENLISTED RESERVISTS

Month Assigned Extended Active Duty	Month of Release		
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Jul 1950 Aug 1950 Sep 1950	Jun 1951 Jul-Aug 1951 Aug-Oct 1951	Jan 1952 Feb-Mar 1952 Mar-Apr 1952	May 1952 May 1952 May 1952
Oct 1950 Nov 1950 Dec 1950	Oct-Dec 1951 Dec 1951 Dec 1951 Jan 1952	Apr 1952 Apr-May 1952 May 1952	May 1952 May 1952 May 1952
Jan 1951 Feb 1951 Mar 1951	Jan 1952 Feb 1952 Mar 1952	May 1952 May 1952 May 1952	May-Jun 1952 Jun 1952 Jun 1952
Apr 1951 May 1951 Jun 1951	Apr 1952 May 1952 Jun 1952	May 1952 May 1952 Jun 1952	Jun 1952 Jun 1952 Jun 1952

APPENDIX B

PLAN FOR RELEASE OF RESERVE OFFICERS

Month Assigned Extended Active Duty	Month of Release			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3	Priority 4
Jul 1950 Aug 1950 Sep 1950	Jul-Dec 1951 Jan 1952 Feb 1952	Jul-Dec 1951 Jan-Mar 1952 Mar-Apr 1952	Dec 1951 Jan 1952 Feb 1952	Apr 1952 May 1952 Jun 1952
Oct 1950 Nov 1950 Dec 1950	Mar 1952 Apr 1952 Apr 1952	Apr 1952 Apr 1952 Apr 1952	Mar 1952 Apr 1952 May 1952	Jul 1952 Aug 1952 Sep 1952
Jan 1951 Feb 1951 Mar 1951	May 1952 May 1952 Jun 1952	May 1952 May 1952 Jun 1952	Jun 1952 Jul 1952 Aug 1952	Oct 1952 Nov 1952 Dec 1952
Apr 1951 May 1951 Jun 1951	Jun 1952 Jun 1952 Jun 1952	Jun 1952 Jun 1952 Jun 1952	Sep 1952 Oct 1952 Nov 1952	Jan 1953 Feb 1953 Mar 1953

APPENDIX C

INITIAL RESERVE ENLISTED PHASEOUT

1951	(A) Released To Inactive	(B) Discharged To Reenlist in USMC	(C) Discharged and not Reenlisted	Total Reserve Phaseout
8Jun-30Jun	1322	137	557	2016
1Jul-27Jul	2721	226	677	3624
28Jul-31Aug	2831	617	1435	4883
1Sep-28Sep	4854	492	1746	7092
29Sep- 2Nov	3975	611	1309	5895
8Jun-2Nov TOTAL	15703	2083	5724	23510

APPENDIX D

INITIAL RESERVE OFFICER PHASEOUT

1951	Releases in accordance with Phaseout	Other Releases from Active Duty	Separation
June	50	4	23
July	50	35	19
August	50	44	10
September	47	64	12

Total of Reserve Officers Phased out by 30 September 1951 - 408

NOTES

1. October, too, was a possibility, but a less desirable one since it offered a greater likelihood of high seas.

2. Upon the joining of 3/6, which became 3/7, the battalion was completely reorganized, however, and the reservists of Company I were distributed among all battalion units so that an approximately equal proportion of reservists to regulars would exist.

3. As early as 24 November 1947, a study of Reserve availability indicated an 80 percent availability of the Organized Reserve.

4. To facilitate mobilization and to make the maximum possible number of reservists available for active duty, the Commandant on 19 July ordered the cancellation of active duty training for all Organized Reserve ground units and suspended active duty training for Volunteer Reserves (Ground). On 21 July, the Commandant also issued instructions transferring all "continuous active duty" personnel to "extended active duty" and ordered the suspension of active duty training for Volunteer Reserves (Aviation).

5. A small number of Volunteer Reservists had previously been ordered to active duty to fill specific billets.

6. Of the 20 percent non-available, 12-15 percent were physically disqualified and the remainder discharged or delayed for their own convenience or that of the Government.

7. No officer in receipt of disability compensation, ordered to active duty, refused to waive such compensation.

8. During the early days of the mobilization, the words DEFERMENT and DELAY were often used interchangeably. However, in November 1950 DEFERMENT was officially defined as "The authority granted to an individual not a member of the reserve forces of the armed services, postponing the reporting date from military service under existing Selective Service laws." DELAY was defined as "The postponement of the reporting date specified in the initial orders to active duty for members of the reserve forces." For the purposes of this project, the word DELAY will be used throughout, except in cases of quotations.

9. It should be noted that a considerable number of requests were for an extension of the original delay granted. Since in the cases of requests for extension, delay criteria were applied more rigidly, the percentage of disapprovals shows an appreciable increase over that of September 1950.

10. Refer to Appendixes C and D for tabulations of officer and enlisted phaseouts for these periods.