The Ottomans, Britain, Sectarianism, and the Sudanese Army
1899–2019

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Abstract: Using a historical and a partially institutional approach, this article examines the relationships between religious politics and imperialism in the formation of organized military forces in Sudan. It examines the policy of using paramilitary forces, as well as its ideological sources. The article argues that the Popular Defence Forces and other paramilitaries are a threat to the regular Sudanese Army. The article also addresses some of the human rights issues in (North) Sudan and concludes with thoughts concerning its ongoing revolution.

Keywords: Sudan, Egypt, Sudanese Armed Forces, Popular Defence Forces, British Empire, Ottoman Empire, religious politics

Introduction

Currently undergoing extreme political turbulence and a revolution, Sudan is a deeply troubled state. The ongoing Sudanese revolution represents a methodological challenge to this work, which the author hopes can be addressed through an examination of history. The united Sudan was once the largest state in Africa and had a population in excess of 40 million at the time of its partition in 2011. Since its independence on 1 January 1956, united Sudan was engaged in civil wars for all but 9 years of its 55-year existence. Sudan gave up its monopoly on violence to private militias and forces

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that have their own methods and objectives. Specifically, the origins of the decline can be traced back to the decisions of the Sudanese military to take over power in 1958 and to pursue politics of forced Arabization and Islamization. These two policies were part of Sudan's attempt at creating a unified national identity independent of Britain and at the same time acceptable to British-influenced Egypt. They were implemented shortly after independence in part as a response to the Torit mutiny, heralding the First Sudan Civil War. Curiously, these were not policies that came as a result of votes in an elected parliament but rather as edicts from a military dictator emerging from an army rooted in Ottoman military tradition.

The Sudanese Army remains one of the least-studied institutions in international affairs, and aside from a short piece on demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, there are no recent articles on the Sudanese Army on digital academic libraries for journals and monographs or other scholarly research databases.[1] The focus here is on its decline, but there is more to the Sudanese Army than mere decline. First, we must consider its historical context, which spans from the army's creation in the nineteenth century to its loss of the monopoly of legal violence to paramilitary forces in the late twentieth century. Critical within this discussion is the role of General Ibrahim Abboud's regime, a key transitional period during decolonization, in creating a permanent sense of crisis between the country's Arab and Muslim communities on the one hand and non-Muslim and non-Arab peoples on the other. Second, we must explore the history and operations of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and other pro-government paramilitaries to properly frame the erosion of the Sudanese state. This article will conclude with some thoughts concerning the reversal of the erosion of the Sudanese state and how such a reversal might be realized.

This article is not an effort to enter the debates concerning fourth generation warfare, the revolution in military affairs, or some of the other discussions that have dominated security and military studies in Western capitals during the last 20 years. It is also not an attempt to enter into debates concerning the role of today's Turkey in Sudan or about the origins of the various pro-regime militias. The focus here is the Sudanese Army and how its loss of the monopoly on violence has damaged it and the state. Suffice it to say that many of these discussions were shaped by the rather sudden Western introduction to Middle Eastern violent extremism after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Cold War strategies, such as the perceived need to use religious conservatives against leftists in the region, permitted extremist ideologies to expand. Methodologically, this article uses history by comparing two points of time: one related to the 1958 Abboud coup and the other related to the formation of the PDF. The country changed dramatically due to these two events and, in many ways, these choices sealed the fate of a united Sudan. The two successor states are locked in

what appears to be a near permanent war with their respective lesser-integrated regions.

The Sudanese Defence Forces: An Anglo-Egyptian Creation with Ottoman Roots

The Ottoman Empire's Khedivate of Egypt conquered the independent states of Sennar, Metamma, Dongola, and eventually Darfur between 1825 and 1879, creating a united satellite state it called "the land of the blacks"—Sudan. Ottoman laws continue to inform life in Sudan to this day. In particular, its legacy affects customs surrounding religious community membership and what one is permitted or forbidden to do outside of any given particular religious community.[2] As such, it is important to emphasize that the Sudanese Army's ultimate origins are found not in the 1925 organization of the separate Sudan Defence Force, but in the Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian Ottoman Khedival Army.[3]

The British establishment of the Sudan Defence Force within the British Army simply meant the transfer of Sudanese units in the Egyptian Army into a British structure, with both an autonomous identity and a "native" uniform pattern. The Ottoman nature of the force is further underlined not only with the continuation of the use of the Turkish ranks but also with the force's continued reliance on Egyptian officers. Before 1914, Sudanese soldiers owed their ultimate allegiance to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, like their Egyptian colleagues; consequently, the Sudanese Army's roots are thoroughly Ottoman. It is important to address the significance of the Ottoman legacy. After all, the modern Turkish Army shares these same roots and was for decades a secularist, modernist force deeply invested in its alliances with the West. However, readers should use caution when examining the implications of the word *Ottoman* and its meaning. Historically, and with a few notable exceptions, the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire reflected a single religious confession and were legitimated on the basis of religion. These Ottoman traditions were practiced in both Egypt and Sudan. There, the military service was called *al jihadiya*—conscription and volunteer military service were seen as a fulfillment of a religious duty by young men. So strong was the affiliation between religion and military that the Egyptian soldiers would forcefully conscript southern Sudanese animists into their ranks and convert them to Islam.[4] It was into this sort of military that General Abboud began his military career.

Toward a Separate Sudanese Force

The status of Sudan and of its military forces was peripheral, as long as the British and Ottoman Empires were at peace and in a de facto alliance. The real trouble came with the relationship between Egypt, an autonomous dominion within the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire. For all intents and pur-

poses, the British Empire controlled Egypt between 1882 and 1892, but it did so without a formal takeover of the country. Britain ruled Egypt and was allied with the Ottoman Empire as a legacy of the Crimean War (1853–56). Consequently, the divergence between de facto and de jure colonial rule could be papered over until the Ottomans went to war on the side of Germany in 1914. As a result, the British Empire formally took over Egypt and made it into a protectorate, then an independent sultanate, and finally an independent kingdom under its former vice regal dynasty. Anomalously, Sudan was a dependent state under joint British and Egyptian (and thereby formally Ottoman) sovereignty. Sudan was a dependency of a dependency—Egypt—as well as a dependency of the British Empire.[5] Therefore, it was logical that its military forces should fit into a structure separate from those of the Egyptian Army. The change in Egypt's status ultimately informed the status of Sudanese military forces. Nevertheless, a more pressing reason to separate the Sudanese units in the Egyptian Army was the revolt of the White Flag League in 1919. The revolt was led by a southern Sudanese lieutenant in the Egyptian Army, Lieutenant Ali Abd al-Latif. The revolt reflected a unique form of Nile Valley nationalism that hastened British plans to separate Sudanese forces. Ibrahim Abboud had been commissioned as a lieutenant in the Egyptian Army the previous year, meaning that he was contemporaneous with Lieutenant Abd al-Latif. Despite his rebellious colleagues, Abboud remained a reliably pro-British officer until his 1958 coup.[6]

From Establishment to Independence

The new Sudan Defence Force emerged as a 4,000-man unit in 1925, bolstered with both British and Sudanese-Egyptian officers. The disappearance of Ottoman Egypt, the Egyptian decision not to treat Sudan as a series of regular Egyptian provinces, the White Flag League revolt, and finally the presence of a dual sovereign made it necessary to have a separate Sudanese military with formal allegiance to the Egyptian sovereign but integrated within the British Army. During World War II, the Sudanese Defence Force proved a useful ally in the British East African campaign against Italy, which controlled Eritrea and occupied Ethiopia. Sudan shouldered the costs of its own war against Italy in East Africa and was able to make compensatory gifts to Britain for the intervention of the Royal Air Force against the Italian Air Force in Eritrea and Ethiopia.[7] After the war, the position of the British Empire had significantly declined and inevitable change was awaiting the country. The next steps in Sudan's history were made more complex by the unusual presence of two external sovereigns sharing the territory of what had, since 1899, amounted to a vassal state.

In line with the preexisting British policy of co-opting Muslim elites, there was no attempt to seriously alter the nature of the Sudan Defence Forces during

the 30 years between 1925 and the Torit mutiny in 1955. Britain sought to prevent the use of Islam as a tool against it by co-opting Muslim Sufi leaders. These Sufi leaders included the descendants of the Mahdi, whose Ansar Sufi movement formed the basis of the Umma (National) Party.[8]

It also sought to establish Islam as the religion of Sudan as early as 1901. There was a policy of treating the south, with its animist population, differently. Christian churches were allowed to operate there but not in the north. While Sudan had Christians and animists in its population, it was to become a Muslim state. The second British governor general of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Sir Frances Reginald Wingate, established a Muslim religious scholars board to advise him:

> This Board constitutes an advisory board to which Government is able to refer questions of a religious nature. . . . The Board has been appointed with the object of enabling Government to deal with these religious questions, as, ostensibly, the approved agents of orthodox Mohammedanism, rather than as a Government acting on its own initiative. The attitude of Government towards the religion of the Country is visibly strengthened in being supported in its measures by the highest orthodox religious opinions in the land.[9]

Far from marginalizing Islam in Sudan, the British Empire enshrined it at the center of the state. The Sudan Defence Forces were inevitably also affected, with Egyptian and Sudanese Islamic clerics functioning in them as well. But, Britain's time in the Nile Valley was very limited. In 1952, Egypt experienced a coup that brought a clique of Arab nationalist officers into power. Led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, the officers eroded Egypt's alliances with Britain. This put the Sudanese leadership in a crisis. Clearly the British, Egyptian, and Sudanese visions for the future of the country were contradictory. To complicate matters further, the southern Sudanese feared that the departure of the British would mean the integration of the country into Egypt and the handover of command to northern Sudanese officers.[10] Subsequently, the southern troops of the Sudan Defence Force mutinied in Torit in 1955 against the transitional Azhari government.[11]

Decolonization: Egypt versus Britain

Sudanese independence came as a result of deep coordination between Britain, represented by Governor General Sir Alexander Knox Helm, and the incoming Sudanese government led by Chief Minister Ismail al-Azhari. The laws governing Anglo-Egyptian Sudan gave the elected chief minister the powers of the governor general in the latter's absence. Helm took a vacation and told al-Azhari to unilaterally declare independence on 1 January 1956, with the assurances

of British recognition. Most British troops had left Sudan in November 1955, and Helm had partially suppressed the Torit mutiny by issuing pardons to mutineers. However, not all mutineers accepted the pardon, and so the insurgency continued after independence.

Furthermore, the coordination between al-Azhari and Helm effectively excluded Nasser, who retaliated by continuing his policy of intervention and attempts to subject Sudanese interests to those of Egypt. A central concern for Nasser was the allocation of Nile waters along lines that favored Egypt. Using a combination of economic sanctions and support for sympathizers in Sudan itself, Nasser destabilized Sudanese politics and undermined al-Azhari, who was replaced by Abdullah Khalil.[12] The Sudanese government found itself in a stalemate. The traditional method that pre-independence elites had used to secure their own interests as well as the country's was to try and reverse the colonialists' game of divide and rule. They would do this by exploiting the preexisting divisions between Egypt and Britain. In the ensuing crisis, the Sudanese military conducted its first entry into politics by overthrowing the elected government and placing General Abboud into power.[13]

Making Religion the Focus of the First Civil War

Abboud's approach to the civil war subtly altered the nature of the Sudanese state in unanticipated ways that may have directly led to the partition of the country. For Abboud, the civil war with the Southern rebels did not have a territorial or national dimension. He gave the conflict a religious and an ethnic dimension. If we consider the relatively peaceful and heterogeneous makeup of Ottoman Sudan, homogeneity was not a necessity. Abboud isolated and excluded southern troops and officials, including those who were loyal to a united Sudan. He also tried to break ties with the southern elite and the southern populations by attempting to impose Islam. He did this through a policy of Christian missionary expulsion and forced Islamization. For example, southern students were forced to formally convert if they wished to receive public education. These measures intensified the civil war and backfired terribly. Instead of converting the south's traditional religionists and Christians to Islam, Abboud's policies ironically strengthened the Roman Catholic Church, which subsequently became a locus of southern resistance to his policies.[14]

> Lieutenant [*sic*] General Ibrahim Abboud became the first Sudanese leader to conceive and implement programs of Islamization and Arabization in the Southern Sudan. . . . But the various Southern Sudanese ethnic groups continued to resist conversion to Islam, and by the time the Abboud administration ended in October 1964, only a small number of Southern Sudanese people had converted to Islam.[15]

The mutiny and the ensuing civil war have become objects of academic dispute, particularly in terms of the importance of religion, but this article will not enter those discussions. In many ways, the forced Islamization policies of the late Ottoman Empire and Abboud's policies in the south betray a striking kinship. The idea that the state should reflect Islam and that non-Muslims are not full citizens and thereby not entitled to equal treatment is a late Ottoman idea that finds no clear precedent in previous Islamic states, including the Ottoman Empire itself before the Hamidian era. General Abboud was overthrown by a popular uprising in 1964. However, the civil war that he fomented lasted for another eight years and claimed about half a million lives. In 1972, Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri's regime signed the Addis Ababa Agreement and ended the conflict for a period.

The Popular Defence Forces

Government precedents for the Popular Defence Forces include the colonial-era Gideons and Gazelle Forces, as well as the armed sections of the Umma National Party, the political arm of the Mahdist Ansar Sufi movement, which generally reflected a conservative-nationalist and democratic orientation. These antecedents can rightly be called partisan forces. Traditionally, partisans were irregular forces dependent on regular armies for support, arms, and training. These forces have been used extensively, particularly by poorer states and actors throughout world history. The German *Landwehr*, the Confederate and Union rangers, and tribal levies of various states are all examples of such a precedent. Under normal circumstances, these irregular forces do not threaten the structure of the state. Partisans, while not as professional and extensively trained as the regular forces, are embedded in the political and military chains of command of the state. They typically reflect the state's policies and are subject to its military justice and accountability systems. The Sudanese Popular Defence Forces, however, fed the erosion of Sudanese state power, as exemplified in the career of a former commander, Sheikh Musa Hilal. To understand how this transpired, this section discusses the formation of the PDF, their training, involvement in human rights violations, and transformation into an opposing force to the very government they were formed to protect.

Giving Away the Monopoly on Violence: Establishing the Popular Defence Forces

The immediate antecedents of the PDF in Sudan were tribal militias recruited by Sudan's Umma National Party government during the mid-1980s. These partisan forces were used as part of the war effort against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in areas where northern and southern populations were intermixed (e.g., South Kordofan). The regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

regarded them with suspicion and argued against the government's support of these forces. A central theme of this article is that their concerns proved to be correct in the long term:

> On 20 February 1989 SAF commander-in-chief General Fathi Ahmed Ali, issued an ultimatum signed by 150 senior officers that called on the government to give greater support to the regular armed forces. . . . The so-called Popular Defence Forces bill, recommended by the committee, was proposed to the Constituent Assembly but resoundingly rejected.[16]

After the June 1989 coup, the new government set aside the institutional objections of the military. The deeply ideological new regime was composed largely of junior officers led by a brigadier general, Omar al-Bashir. The new government supported the idea of the PDF, and by November of the same year, the Sudanese parliament adopted the Popular Defence Forces Act. The legislation came at the recommendation of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, which remains the name of Bashir's government. The act formally established the tribal militias within Sudanese law.[17] Pro-government tribal and party militias were then merged into the Popular Defence Forces and naturally brought their particular local agendas into the force.[18]

Training

The current government slowly imposed the ideology of Sudan's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, then called the National Islamic Front (NIF), into all aspects of the government. The NIF elite, led by Bashir and the late Hassan al-Turabi, would extend this ideology into the PDF after purging the older military elites. In contrast to the old guard in the military who preferred negotiated outcomes, the NIF preferred a military solution followed by the forced Islamization of the country's Christians and animists. Given that the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood used anti-Western narratives in Arabic throughout its history in its appeals to the Sudanese public, Bashir and al-Turabi could not openly align Sudan with Western powers.

Their takeover also occurred before the collapse of the Soviet Union, so it was not possible to turn to the Eastern Bloc, due to the ideological distance related to the state atheism of Eastern Bloc Communist countries. Therefore, the new regime was limited in its allies to fellow Islamic states. These states included Iran, who helped its new partners in Sudan with paramilitary force training. Iranian cooperation and training began in December 1991, following a state visit by the Islamic Republic of Iran's president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (*Pasdarn*) training camps were set up in north Sudan, and all Sudanese males resident in the country older than

age 16 became eligible for service. Although military service remained voluntary, the state used the Iranian model developed in the war against Iraq, wherein mosques and television programs promoted self-sacrifice through military service.[19]

Human Rights Violations

With many of its units originating from tribal formations, the Popular Defence Forces became quickly embroiled in Sudan's interethnic and intertribal conflicts. They violated human rights on a vast scale in the early years of the PDF. The violence was most extreme in the Nuba Mountains region and the Darfur region. Those targeted included non-Arab tribes, and in the case of the Nuba Mountains, the local Christian community

In addition to the burning of villages and the disappearance of civilians, a large-scale plan of forcible relocation was implemented by the government. Tens of thousands of Nuba are now scattered in small camps all over northern Kordofan. Many other thousands were taken hundreds of miles from home and abandoned. The scale of the killings and relocations reached the level of genocide. In October 1993, First Lieutenant Khalid Abdel Karim Salih, who was in charge of security in Kordofan and was a personal bodyguard to the governor of Kordofan (who is also his brother) from May 1992 to February 1993, made a statement in a press conference in Bern, Switzerland. He announced that, during a seven-month period, the army and the PDF had killed 60,000–70,000 Nuba. He stressed that these ethnic-cleansing operations made no distinction between Muslims and Christians. Churches and mosques, missionary centers, and Quranic schools were all shelled indiscriminately.[20]

The violence in the Nuba Mountains took an unusual turn. In traditional Islamic thinking, it is unfathomable for a Muslim government to shell and destroy mosques. However, the NIF government was no traditionalist Islamic government. In its own narrative, the rejection of its authority was tantamount to apostasy, and in its conception of Islam, that was a crime deserving of severe punishment. Mosques in the Nuba Mountains jihad were desecrated by government troops, who covered them with graffiti, instructing Muslims to come and pray in the government garrisons, destroying zakat (tithe) grain, and tearing up copies of the Qur'an.[21]

The government's "equal" treatment of Muslims and Christians in the Nuba Mountains was in line with its ideology. It was neither Westphalian nor a reflection of military needs. If Sudan's problems had a colonial origin at all, they more closely fit late Ottoman imperialism rather than any other colonialism. A similar pattern quickly emerged in Darfur:

> In late September, a U.S. official reported that 574 villages had been destroyed and another 157 damaged since mid-2003. Satellite images

> show many areas in Darfur burned out or abandoned. The majority of the attacks have occurred in villages where the rebels did not have an armed presence; Khartoum's strategy seems to be to punish the rebels' presumed base of support—civilians—so as to prevent future rebel recruitment.[22]

A sad debate emerged about the events in Darfur, and its focus was the applicability of the term *genocide* to the problem. Unfortunately, the presence of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) troops and International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants against the suspected authors of the massacres did not help end the crisis. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the vote on whether the region would be composed of one or several states within Sudan did not end the crisis either. The very same militias that supported the government during the war in the south against the SPLA and later against the uprising in Darfur created a domain independent of government control in central Darfur.

Musa Hilal

The Sudan Liberation Movement and Army, led by Suliman Arcua Minnawi, was one of the signatories of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. As part of the transition, he was appointed a special assistant to the president in Sudan. That appointment, and its associated benefits, may have led the government's own supporters to look at rebellion as a means to gaining money and wealth. In late 2013 and early 2014, Musa Hilal, a leader in Darfur's pro-government Arab militias, formed his own political movement, the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC). Hilal, who is accused of being a war criminal, argued that the Sudanese government is failing to meet its promises to supporters. Through its spokesman, Ahmed M. Babiker, SARC placed the blame on the government for Darfur's ills and argued that it is seeking "a civic and democratic order under the rule of law."[23]

Hilal's discourse correlated with his new role as an independent actor. In particular, he adopted the narrative of the Darfur rebels, specifically the Justice and Equality Movement, which shares some Islamist roots with him. His openness toward working with the secular Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) was also a major shift. His troops clashed with militias that remained under the government's direct command and his overall stance caused confusion among the Darfurian armed opposition, who had fought his forces during the war in Darfur.[24] He argued that he would like to see Darfur Arabs and non-Arabs reconcile and the SARC aims to speak for all the ethnic and tribal communities of the region.[25] By January 2017, the government accused Hilal of rebellion. It endorsed the United Nation's assessment that Hilal and his armed group are

looting Darfur's gold ores and smuggling gold. Hilal's group had charged artisan prospectors a per-bag fee for ore mined and had benefited from the withdrawal of the regular Sudanese Army from the Jebel Amir area to consolidate direct control over the gold-rich region. The Sudanese Army troops withdrew after Hilal's groups began skirmishes with them. Hilal controlled about 400 gold mines.[26] Despite the clear collusion of some officials in moving Hilal's gold to the United Arab Emirates through the airport in Khartoum, along with the Central Bank of Sudan's money laundering, then-Minister of Interior Ismat Abdel Rahman Zein al-Abdin spoke against Hilal and his group. He accused Hilal of using foreign forces to undermine government authority in Darfur and called for military intervention against him.[27] In November 2017, the Sudanese government moved against Hilal. He was taken into custody, but some of his followers were released in June 2018.[28]

The Army and the Militias

Given the historical record discussed above, the Sudanese Army was fully aware of the dangers that the paramilitaries posed to its role in the state and tried, as an institution, to prevent their legalization. Nevertheless, political and ideological considerations triumphed at the expense of institutional legitimacy, minority identities, and traditional Sudanese expressions of Islam. During the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–72) before and after Abboud, the fighting was conducted by regular Sudanese troops on both sides. Even the rebels were mutineers from the SDF. The situation remained much the same until the formation of tribal, pro-Umma National Party units that eventually became the Popular Defence Force with the advent of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2004). These new forces were not military and were not subject to the regulations that govern the SAF. In addition to the Popular Defence Forces, a variety of affiliated tribal and ideological militias appeared on the government's side. On the various rebels' sides, the forces simultaneously became more diverse; they were no longer composed of the original mutineer units. The war was characterized with the appearance of hitherto unseen formation in independent Sudan's military of northern Muslim rebel paramilitary forces, the SRF, which was drawn largely but not exclusively from non-Arab communities in Darfur, southern Kordofan, and the southern Blue Nile Province. The SRF lacks direct origins in the regular military and is unusual in terms of being a Muslim force that espouses secularism.

Despite the importance of sectarianism, much of the religious fervor that accompanied the Sudanese civil wars was staged and not sincere. For example, the "celebrations" of martyrdom that the PDF held for their deceased members at homes of their next of kin were outside Sudanese Arab and Muslim cultural funerary traditions and helped bring about the marginalization of the force.

While it may have been permissible for Musa Hilal to lead his tribal forces against other tribes and ethnic communities in acts of self-defense or existential wars for water access during droughts, it was unthinkable that the *Abbala*—Hilal's tribal confederation—would have endorsed seizure of townships and gold mines for the purpose of Hilal's personal enrichment. The case of Musa Hilal should serve as a warning to any country considering handing out weapons to militia forces.

Conclusion: Implications for Revolutionary Sudan

Convenient policies of arming paramilitary forces, tribal and otherwise, helped contain the SPLA, but the long-term cost to Sudan was realized by SARC and its activities. Worse yet, the slow erosion of the Sudanese state is creating space for external actors keen to use Sudan as a base for their own wars against enemies, both real and imagined. If Sudan is to avoid the fate of Somalia and Mali, the state apparatus must reassert itself. To do so, the militias must disappear as soon as possible and the state army must again become the sole legitimate instrument of violence within its societies. While it remains to be seen whether such a refounding is possible, Sudan needs to evaluate the relationship between the state and religion. The events in Darfur and the troubles caused by Musa Hilal strongly suggest that religious homogeneity, when imposed by the state or achieved through partition, is unlikely to solve the fundamental problem of nation building. Ironically, a professional, all-national army may be a better foundation for nation building than outdated Ottoman ideas of exclusivity and reserving the military for a single religious community.

The present revolutionary movement in the current rump state of "Northern" Sudan is backed by a diverse array of social forces. A rump state is the remnant of a much larger state. The revolutionaries targeted the headquarters of the Sudanese military because they understood that the power of the Bashir/Muslim Brotherhood regime rests in its control of the military. The removal of Bashir by the military does not solve some of the problems the revolutionaries are facing. First, there is a dilemma concerning religion and the state. Broadly speaking, the revolutionaries are demanding what they name a *civil state*, which in practical terms implies a separation of religion and the state in a Sudanese context. In essence, they are demanding the reversal of a policy instituted by General Wingate decades ago. Second, they face a dilemma concerning the military's monopoly on legal violence as required by the civil state; the current military is Islamist not only due to Wingate and Abboud but also due to its takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood, along with nearly all civic, economic, and political structures in the country in 1989. Finally, the Sudanese revolutionaries would not have been able to dethrone Bashir without the army. The National Congress Party, an offshoot of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood,

controlled the internal security apparatus and had independent militias as well. Without the military, the revolution would not have displaced Bashir. However, the military embodies values at odds with those demanded by the revolutionaries. The recent crackdown embodied that division, and it remains a serious problem facing the revolutionaries, the army, and the country as a whole.

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