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From the Editors

EDITORIAL NOTE: the Spring issue of MCU Journal was coordinated in partnership with the MCU Press advisory board and MCU’s Asia-Pacific expert, Christopher D. Yung. This issue’s “From the Editors” section was written by Yung to discuss how Washington might handle the end of the Barack H. Obama administration and the near future with the arrival of the Trump administration. How would Obama’s Rebalance to Asia policy fare in the face of so many policy unknowns?

The increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific—economically, politically, and militarily—was one reason that the editors of MCU Journal decided to dedicate the spring issue to that region. An early foreign policy decision by the administration of President Barack H. Obama had been to refocus its efforts on the region through what eventually became known as the Rebalance to Asia, and that region has been in the purview of the new administration as well. The Asia-Pacific is a complex region with a diverse set of political and security challenges. The vastness of the region also poses some unique operational challenges. These challenges and the strong likelihood that students of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC) would be returning to this area of responsibility in some future assignment were but two of the reasons why the organizers of the CSC capstone exercise, Nine Innings, chose the region as the subject of the scenarios of the exercise. Eric Shibuya and Lieutenant Colonel Micheal Russ, in “Anticipating and Understanding the Rebalance,” describe the origins of Nine Innings, provide the intent on what the exercise is meant to accomplish, and describe how the exercise organizers meet that intent. Note-worthy is the fact that the exercise involves extensive support from the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), both in terms of the USPACOM staff helping to shape the exercise plan and USPACOM personnel participating as advisors in the exercise; that it involves extensive interaction between the students and Asia-Pacific subject-matter experts, and student representatives of Asian countries; and that the final product of the exercise is presented to a senior principal at USPACOM.
In his article, “America’s Pivot to Asia,” Douglas Stuart reviews the history of American foreign policy and strategic objectives in the region, describes how those interests were pursued in the Rebalance policy, evaluates how effective the policies were and then assesses how likely the different components of the policy are to survive in President Donald J. Trump’s administration.

Although the Rebalance to Asia policy was never entirely about China, the architects of the policy had in mind the need to affect Chinese behavior. In “A Pivot of Their Own,” Christopher Yung takes a closer look at how Chinese scholars have evaluated the Rebalance to Asia policy, what they had to say on the policy’s intent and effectiveness, and how these scholars think a Trump administration will affect U.S.-China relations.

While tangentially related to the Asia-Pacific, the second part of this spring issue focuses on the broader issues of doctrine, tactics development, and the emerging security environment. “Identity Crisis between the Wars,” by Rebecca W. Jensen and Colonel Keil Gentry (Ret), provides two historical case studies of doctrine development that had a significant transformative impact on the U.S. Marine Corps. In the first case, the authors describe the tactics developed for conducting an opposed amphibious landing against an enemy’s advanced base, which were then documented in the Tentative Landing Operations Manual (TLOM). It is not an overstatement to say that the TLOM was essential to the Marine Corps’ effectiveness during the Second World War. In the second case, the authors describe the history of the development of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, which served as the foundational doctrinal document that transformed the Marine Corps into an organization emphasizing maneuver over attrition, while maintaining amphibious capabilities. The authors state that the effort to develop doctrine in these two cases went beyond the simple writing down of tactics, techniques, and procedures; they note that the experience of thinking through these warfighting issues ended up being transformational for the Corps. Interestingly, even subjects as specialized as these have an Asia-Pacific angle to them. In the case of the former, the tactics and operations developed for the TLOM were executed in the Central Pacific campaigns; in the case of the latter, Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, was one of the philosophical inspirations guiding the development of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps.

T. X. Hammes, in “Expeditionary Operations in the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” paints a picture of the future security environment. In it, Hammes notes the technological trends that are now upon us and are likely to have significant impacts on the operational environment. Hammes points to the arrival of additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), electronic miniaturization, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, the prevalence of drones, and the convergence of these technologies as leading to a number of outsized strategic
effects. Insofar as this future security environment is related to the Asia-Pacific, Hammes notes that these emerging technological trends—if used properly by the United States and its allies—could work to the nation’s advantage in a potential conflict with China over defense of the first island chain.

As in previous issues of *MCU Journal*, the book review section offers the reader perspectives on recent releases in scholarly publishing. This extensive selection covers topics pertinent to academics, policy makers, and military leaders alike: the impact of the global village and technology; how preventive force is transforming modern warfare; compellent threats and weak states; and the changing state of the U.S. military.

The editorial staff and the journal’s advisory board work each season to bring readers topics that encourage further discussion and advance scholarship. Your feedback is important, so please visit the MCU Press Facebook page and Twitter feed to comment. Copies of the newest *MCU Journal* are always available in the General Simmons History Center bookstore and online.
Anticipating and Understanding the Rebalance
Exercise Nine Innings, USMC Command and Staff College

Lieutenant Colonel Micheal Russ and Eric Y. Shibuya

Abstract: Marine Corps University’s Exercise Nine Innings prepares students and faculty for challenges faced during times of peace and war. Nine Innings partners a combatant command with military and civilian faculty, subject-matter experts, and advisors to conduct campaign planning. The exercise provides U.S. and international field-grade officers and civilian students the opportunity to think critically about complex regional security challenges and to create solutions aligned with regional trends and norms in an environment where forward thinking and campaign planning coincide. Nine Innings equips future leaders and commanders to exercise discernment in decision making in an uncertain and ambiguous future.

Keywords: USMC, theater campaign planning, Asia-Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM, professional military education, PME, Command and Staff College, training, education, Exercise Nine Innings, regional security challenges

The Marine Corps University (MCU) prepares military officers and civilians for the many challenges they will face when leading the nation during times of peace and war. Exercise Nine Innings is the capstone
event at MCU’s Command and Staff College (CSC), an extraordinarily challenging event involving military and civilian faculty, subject-matter experts, and advisors in campaign planning. Together, they set the conditions for students to develop a forward-thinking, regionally based security campaign plan, culminating 10 months of instruction in security, warfighting, leadership, and the history of war.¹

Nine Innings, since its inception, has provided annually more than 200 U.S. and international field-grade military officers and civilian students with the opportunity to think critically about complex regional security challenges and to produce solutions aligned with regional trends and norms. In recent years, campaign planning has focused on the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of operations, which has allowed students to discuss, debate, and understand the environment and challenges surrounding the region and its countries, such as China, Japan, and North Korea, among others. Nine Innings enhances students’ ability to incorporate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) capabilities when seeking whole-of-government and multinational approaches to mitigating conflict, and it enhances their ability to prevail should conflict occur. Accordingly, as the culminating academic event, Nine Innings is the premier venue for arming students with the know-how for

- understanding security environments and the contributions of all instruments of national power;
- anticipating, recognizing, and responding to surprise, uncertainty, and change while thinking critically and strategically;
- operating on commanders’ intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding; and
- making ethical decisions while leading our servicemembers in combat and training.²

Developing leaders ready to address the complexities posed by twenty-first century challenges is critical for today’s and tomorrow’s force employment (figure 1).

Instituted in academic year 2004–5 by Marine Corps Lieutenant General John A. Toolan Jr., then-director of CSC, Nine Innings anticipated and addressed a combination of factors influencing the study of future military operations. The term *nine innings* is regularly associated with the American sport of baseball and defines the standard length of one game. In 2003, General Anthony C. Zinni noted that, when fighting a war, one had to be ready to fight all “nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody’s going to declare victory . . . whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don’t follow it up with understanding what victory is.”³ This seemed especially appropriate for
the name of the exercise, considering that war—with complicated strategies, operations, and outcomes—had become a reality for the United States. As a result of the wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, members of the MCU student body experienced combat that forecasted the potential character of future wars, indicating that planning for singular, kinetic operations was becoming less relevant in a modern sense. Moreover, the changing demographic of the CSC student body (becoming more joint, civilian, and international) foreshadowed the necessity for relationships and partnerships that mattered and for shared understanding, as these students would most likely be working in JIIM environments in the future. In essence, professional military education had to keep up with the tempo of the evolution of warfare in the twenty-first century.

Knowing and understanding how to plan for and incorporate a wide range of operations within multifaceted theaters of operation was required and increasingly considered fundamental for future military officers and civilians. Steady-state activities, in addition to understanding the effects of ongoing deliberate operations existing in differing phases of execution, gained greater interest among education commands, the Marine Corps, and joint leadership. Therefore, Nine Innings evolved to become the forum linking the study, thought, and reflection about various types of operations and activities for CSC students, especially in regard to geographic operating forces and their ongoing operations and activities.

**Exercise Nine Innings Evolution**

Initially focused on fighting a joint campaign in Iraq, Nine Innings grew in scope and evolved in academic year 2007 to incorporate the aspects of theater
campaigning, focused primarily on planning for operations in the Philippines. The Philippines, a theater treaty partner, was familiar to both faculty and students possessing considerable experiences working with the Philippines and having deployed to or lived in the USPACOM region on numerous occasions (figure 2). This switch was possible because two faculty members joined CSC from USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), bringing subject-matter expertise from USPACOM and facilitating contact with other experts still operating in Asia (i.e., leadership in the field) who could advise students in planning. The conjoining of these two phenomena not only increased the linkages between education and the operating forces (USPACOM in this case), but also opened connections that increased cooperation and engagement between CSC, USPACOM, and the Philippine government.

Starting in academic year 2009 and carried into 2010, Nine Innings shifted focus to Panama and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Collaboration with the operating force (USSOUTHCOM in this case) afforded CSC the advantages of proximity, time, and communication with the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs); both Quantico, Virginia, and Miami, Florida, being in the eastern time zone made real-time communication significantly cas-
ier. While easier in some ways, a Nine Innings focused on the USSOUTHCOM area of operations and primarily the country of Panama lacked the quality required to elevate student understanding of theater-wide challenges. Indeed, there was a lack of robust resident knowledge in the CSC faculty regarding USSOUTHCOM and Panama; yet using Panama provided a challenge for a different reason.

Specifically, Panama did not confront significant security or other political problems that would necessitate broad shifts in current actions by the U.S. government writ large or by USSOUTHCOM in particular. Without strong resident knowledge to go deeper into the problem, the Panama exercises proved somewhat frustrating, as students (and many faculty) felt that any adjustments made were miniscule at best, which did not provide the best environment for learning the broad range of responses possible.

To improve the quality of the evolution, faculty inevitably incorporated USSOUTHCOM scenarios developed by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab as fictional, real-time injects to test students’ ability to respond to crisis and create solutions. Though the injects tested several potential scenarios that could happen in the region, they took away from the ability of the students to conduct real-world/real-time research, as information regarding fictitious scenarios did not exist in open sources. Therefore, in anticipation that students would be required to command and plan for operations at the highest levels of the nation, CSC leadership expanded Nine Innings’ scope of study.

While most GCCs expressed interest in having CSC students research, explore, understand, and outline the problems of their areas, most were challenged by the inability to spare members from their staffs to temporarily assist CSC for the two-week exercise. Therefore, the reformation that occurred centered on changing the focus of planning for military operations in a single country to a rendition in one geographic command. Thus, students could then develop a whole-of-government, theater-wide campaign plan and explore potential scenarios and responses backed by legitimate research (see sidebar). Both U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and USPACOM expressed interest, but USPACOM emerged as the region of choice. The prior contact among the faculty with USPACOM and the ability of that command to provide support during the exercise were the most im-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theater Campaign Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop attributes describing USPACOM theater campaign plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop theater campaign plan for security cooperation and engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contingency planning:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop level 2 base plan shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weave into security cooperation and engagement plan</td>
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portant logistical reasons for the choice, but there also was a philosophical driver that emerged because of conversations between one of the current authors and then-CSC Deputy Director Colonel Michael Carter. Dr. Eric Y. Shibuya, professor of strategic studies at CSC, and Carter, both with significant experience in the Asia-Pacific, recognized and agreed that Marines would most likely be returning to the Pacific theater, under some capacity, over all other options.

**Exercise Nine Innings Today and Beyond**

Focusing on the Pacific region and partnered with USPACOM, Nine Innings is contextually set in the real world. Its execution takes the better part of 11–12 days and is unbounded in a completely unclassified, open-source environment where senior mentors, resident faculty, and various subject-matter experts mentor student-led staffs and planning teams. In Nine Innings, students develop comprehensive approaches to steady-state engagement and contingency mitigation when creating the shell for USPACOM’s theater campaign plan. This planning exercise literally draws in and connects the instruction from CSC’s four courses of curriculum (Warfighting, Leadership, Security Studies, and War Studies). By this, CSC students discern regional challenges and develop a five-year theater campaign plan aligned with trends in security and contingency response and evolving U.S., regional, and international interests (figure 3).

Exercise Nine Innings facilitates students’ understanding by encouraging them to translate policy, strategy, and objectives at the combatant command level into operational plans that support a whole-of-government approach to campaign planning. Students apply joint planning processes to develop operational-level plans that weave military, cultural, and historical factors into operational plans that are joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational in character and address ill-structured problems. In Nine Innings, there are no “Road to Crisis/Road to War” briefs, no “Master Event Scenario Lists,” and no fictional injects. The Nine Innings environment is centered on understanding the real world and forecasted changes in the Pacific region. Therefore, Nine Innings—the synthesis and incorporation of 10 months of education—challenges students’ abilities to reason critically, generate solutions, and act decisively as if they were planning for operations in the Pacific region.

When creating the theater campaign plans, students assume roles to simulate the conditions under which military and civilian officers develop plans for approval by senior leaders. By the end of the planning exercise, students—who have been separated into two different planning staffs—develop shells for their teams’ versions of the five-year theater campaign plan. Since Nine Innings deliverables are created for the USPACOM commander, his or her staff, and component commanders, some students are detailed to operate in positions that, today, are occupied by general/flag officers, such as three- and four-star gener-
als from all of the Services, and senior executive service (SES) members, such as the secretary of defense. This simulates the real-world environment in which students lead their peers in creating campaign plans and subsequently present their plans to student and faculty leadership, who then provide feedback from an operational- and Service-level perspective. It is both competitive and collaborative; the two commanders and their respective teams see the successes and failures of their plans and reorganize them for the next versions.

Other students are tasked to operate in the roles of directors and action officers to conceive courses of action and recommendations for informed decision making when campaign planning. Regardless of their positioning, students depart CSC with an appreciation for what it takes to form a campaign plan and with a functional understanding of the Service component’s role in planning and operations.

In essence, the campaign plan is the students’ perspective of the theater as it is and as it could be. Students use this perspective to shape the outline of a se-
security cooperation and engagement (SC&E) plan that is whole-of-government, integrated with multinational capabilities and capacities, and respects and acknowledges the operations of other organizations in theater (table 1). The purpose of developing the SC&E plan is to suggest how USPACOM develops partner capacity, promotes mutual understanding, increases speed of response to contingency or crisis, and increases confidence-building measures to prevent conflict from occurring.

SC&E and contingency planning are linked further in a formative construct that forms the shell of a five-year, theater-level campaign plan for the Pacific region. Concurrently, students take the perspective and develop Level 2 base plans for USPACOM-suggested contingency scenarios. Contingency planning addresses potential conflict to understand the root cause of conflict and to craft a plan for preventing conflict from developing (particularly from a misunderstanding or accident), or to be best positioned to prevail should

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>Marine Forces Pacific</td>
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<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<td>Army Pacific</td>
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<td>Pacific Fleet (Navy)</td>
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<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>Pacific</td>
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<td>Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Red Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Intelligence Activity</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group</td>
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<td>Marine Corps University</td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
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<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>Joint Military Attaché School</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>National Intelligence University</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>Islamic Relief USA</td>
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<td>Team Rubicon</td>
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conflict occur. Finding ways to create options to prevent the vertical and horizontal escalation of a potential conflict is integral to understanding flexible deterrent options for preventing conflict while introducing confidence-building measures to understand how conflict could be mitigated or prevented.

Service component planning teams also generate Service-specific supporting plans for the USPACOM theater campaign plan, in addition to participating in planning that occurs at the USPACOM student-staff level. The development of Service component supporting campaign plans is critical to the process. It fosters the understanding of how operational mission tasking given to Service components is inextricably linked to Title 10 Service-level responsibilities of organizing, training, and equipping forward-deployed forces for military operations (figures 4 and 5).

Nine Innings also is reliant upon expert advisors who provide adequate vectors for planning at this level, enriching the student experience. Nominally,

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**Figure 4.** Joint operation planning activities, functions, and products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational activities</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Execution</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planning functions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic guidance</td>
<td>Concept development</td>
<td>Plan development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR A</td>
<td>IPR C</td>
<td>IPR F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plan assessment</strong></td>
<td>Review cycle</td>
<td>IPR R</td>
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<tr>
<td>(refine, adapt, terminate, execute)</td>
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- **Level 1**: Commander’s estimate
- **Level 2**: Base plans (IPRANs)
- **Level 3**: Concept plans (CONPLANs)
- **Level 4**: Operation plans (OPLANs)

**Planning products**

- Approved mission
- Approved concept
- Approved plan

**Warning order**
- Planning order
- Alert order
- Operation order
- Deployment order
- Global force management allocation plan
- Execute order

*Note: IPR = in-progress review; IPR A = strategic guidance; IPR C = concept development; IPR F = plan approval; and IPR R = plan assessment. Courtesy of the authors, adapted by MCUP.*
Nine Innings incorporates representation from the USPACOM and Service component staffs to guide the students in all things regarding the command. Moreover, students also are advised, assisted, and assessed in their performance by resident CSC military faculty and other subject-matter experts at MCU. Notably, Nine Innings incorporates the expertise of retired general and flag officers, ambassadors, and SES members who are physically present at the site of the exercise, mentoring the students throughout. It takes this level of expertise and advising to ensure that the students’ perspectives on planning for operations at this level is enlivened and enriched.

Nine Innings, combined with USPACOM, also provides a broader opportunity for students to explore contentious issues facing Asia today; that is, Nine Innings incorporates the regional cooperation of a body such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with military operations, balanced with diplomacy, economics, and third-party engagement. By replicating such entities as ASEAN within the exercise and using the skills and knowledge of the international students at CSC, Nine Innings, in all respects, is relevant, mod-
ern, and forward thinking. Moreover, this exposes students to the challenges experienced by a regional combatant command, which must balance agency, Service, and international differences into the decision-making process. The Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the most cooperative and contentious organizations and environments in the world; this is a place where consensus and noninterference are dominant (but not dogmatic) principles of behavior, but also where tension and mistrust are fueling potential conflict.

Ultimately, CSC graduates benefit when professional military education is paired with the operating forces to study and understand global (theater) challenges and when they are given the ability to generate and present potential solutions to a GCC commander. Nine Innings, in essence, offers the commander of USPACOM an alternative perspective of issues surrounding the region, and an annual affirming and anticipatory outlook on the value of the Pacific region to the United States and global environment. Beyond the evolution of the exercise, putting an entire combatant command’s resources toward an academic exercise that provides a holistic look at theater campaign planning is ultimately value-added to the profession of arms in the near and long term. Currently, no other intermediate-level professional military education institution in the United States conducts an exercise of this type. Developing leaders who will be charged with addressing the complexities posed by evolving twenty-first century security environments is necessary; they need to be armed with the know-how to think, discern, and act—critical abilities for decision making today and tomorrow. Nine Innings, therefore, prepares future leaders and commanders by empowering them with the ability to discern and make decisions about real-world matters using a palette of techniques and abilities to lead in an uncertain and ambiguous future.

Figure 6. Command and Staff College class photo and Nine Innings participants, 2017

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo.
Notes

1. Exercise Nine Innings is a whole-of-faculty effort, and every member plays a role in development and execution. The authors acknowledge the contributions of those who had a significant role in the development of Exercise Nine Innings: Dr. Charles McKenna, Col Curt Ames (Ret), Dr. Christopher Jasparro, Dr. Erin Simpson, Col Michael L. Carter, LtCol Patrick Simon, and LtCol Jeff Tlapa.

2. Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), A-2–A-3.


4. Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), xvii. “The GCC’s [geographic combatant commander] theater campaign plan is the primary document that focuses on the command’s steady-state activities, which include operations, SC [security cooperation], and other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states.”

5. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is a direct reporting branch of the Department of Defense that specializes in building relationships with military and government professionals from around the USPACOM/Pacific region.

6. The terms for Security Studies and War Studies were previously Culture and Interagency Operations and Operational Art, respectively. They were changed officially during academic year 2015.


8. While justifiably proud of anticipating the Rebalance to Asia, the authors recognize that this was hardly a shocking policy move. Indeed, a great number of policies in the Rebalance were in fact initiated during the George W. Bush administration, and it is likely that without the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terrorism, the shift toward Asia would have happened much earlier. See Benjamin M. Jensen and Eric Y. Shibuya, “The Military Rebalance as Retcon,” in Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance Toward Asia, ed. Hugo Meijer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 81–106.
America’s Pivot to Asia
A Eulogy or an Interim Report?

Douglas Stuart

Abstract: When Barack Obama designated the Indo-Asia-Pacific region as his top strategic priority, it was considered an ambitious foreign policy initiative. Between 2011 and 2015, Obama’s “pivot to Asia” was quite successful, but by the end of his term in office the pivot had lost some of its momentum and direction. This study begins by placing the Obama pivot in historical context. Next, it presents an audit of the successes and setbacks of the Obama pivot. The article then discusses the prospects for a renewal of the pivot to Asia by the Donald J. Trump administration, arguing that restarting the pivot will be difficult but worth the effort.

Keywords: Pivot to Asia, Open Door, San Francisco system, Nixon Doctrine, collective self-defense, defensive modernism, trustpolitik, proactive deterrence, terminal high altitude area defense, THAAD, Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, JAM-GC, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, Chinese defense spending, Thucydides Trap, Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD, One China policy

Former President Barack H. Obama’s designation of the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region as his top strategic priority will be remembered as his most ambitious foreign policy initiative. It represented an appropriate response to the global shift in economic power from West to East, and between 2011

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and 2015 this “pivot to Asia” was relatively successful. By the end of President Obama’s term in office, however, the pivot campaign had lost some of its momentum and direction. It will be up to President Donald J. Trump to decide whether to invest the time and effort needed to restart the pivot. This article surveys the successes and setbacks of the Obama pivot and makes the case that the IAP region still deserves to be America’s top priority.

**America as a Pacific Power**

The Obama pivot is the most recent stage in a process of American adjustment to its Pacific identity that has been ongoing since the late nineteenth century. During the initial stage in this process, U.S. policies were guided by the Open Door doctrine, which put the major European powers and Japan on notice that, as Secretary of State John M. Hay wrote in 1899, “what is ours we shall hold; what is not ours we do not seek” in the Western Pacific.\(^1\) The idea of the Open Door was actually sold to Washington by Great Britain, as a key element of London’s campaign to obtain the support of the United States for its global responsibilities.\(^2\) While the Open Door was usually explained in terms of American access to markets and resources, it was also a form of insurance against any great power, or combination of great powers, obtaining control over a substantial portion of what Sir Halford J. Mackinder described as the Eurasian “Heartland.”\(^3\) As noted by the other great geopolitician of this period, Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Open Door is but another way of expressing Balance of Power.”\(^4\)

The fragility of the Qing government in China posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests in Asia during this period. Without a direct and influential American presence in the region, China was in danger of being carved up by the imperial powers. This concern contributed to the U.S. decision to hold on to the Philippines as a military staging area in the Pacific. It also contributed to the decision to deploy U.S. troops in response to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and to send a deterrent message to European and Asian governments in the form of the Great White Fleet (comprising 16 American battleships) in 1907–9. During the next three decades, the logic of the Open Door led U.S. policy makers to focus on the threat posed by Japan, culminating in an American campaign of quarantine in 1937 and, ultimately, war.\(^5\)

Since the end of World War II, American involvement in the IAP has gone through four phases. The first phase was a brief period of adjustment, which ran from the American occupation of Japan until the creation of the San Francisco system of bilateral and trilateral alliances in September 1951. The victory of the Chinese Communist forces in 1949 was the most consequential development during this period, because it overturned postwar American assumptions about the relative security of the Western Pacific. Prior to the establishment
of the People’s Republic of China, U.S. policy makers had viewed China as a secure platform for threatening Russia along its southeastern border, thereby taking pressure off of Western Europe. With Mao Tse-tung’s victory, however, Washington not only lost its so-called fist in Russia’s back, it also had to deal with a vast and militantly Communist enemy with a geographic reach that extended from Northeast to Southeast Asia and deep into South and Central Asia. For many U.S. defense planners, this new Communist threat was more immediate and more alarming than the Soviet Union—an opinion that was confirmed by the direct involvement of Chinese forces in the Korean War in October 1950.

The loss of China and the start of the Korean War set the stage for the second phase in U.S. involvement in the IAP from 1951 until 1973. This was the era of militarized anti-Communist containment and the quest for American dominance in the Western Pacific. The three most important American policies during this period were the establishment of the aforementioned San Francisco system’s network of alliances, the Korean War, and most important, the Vietnam War. In 1951 in San Francisco, the United States signed the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, and the ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand. Over the next 65 years, the hub-and-spokes San Francisco network of defense agreements underwent significant changes, with additions (South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]) and deletions (Taiwan, the Philippines, and SEATO), but it has survived. Like the motto of Paris, France, the U.S.-sponsored alliance network has been “tossed by the waves but never sunk.” The durability of the San Francisco system was first tested by the Korean War and then by America’s slide into war in Vietnam.

The human and economic costs of the Vietnam War, and the damage done by that war to the American psyche, set the stage for the third phase in America’s involvement in Asia, from 1973 until the end of the Cold War. The most important development during this period was the Richard M. Nixon administration’s extraordinary reversal of the U.S. position with regard to China. “What the opening to China accomplished,” according to Henry Kissinger, “was an opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent and to mitigate differences where they existed.” By normalizing relations with China, the United States reduced the regional threat level, making it possible for Washington to scale back its obligations and shift more of the burden of extended deterrence to its Asian allies, a strategy that became known as the Nixon Doctrine. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been adapting to the dramatic rise in the importance of Asian governments within the international system. Special attention has been accorded to China’s changing position in the global economy during this period. Kurt Campbell notes that, in a period of 20
years, Beijing went from being the 10th largest economy in the world in 1990 to the 6th largest in 2000, then grew to 2d largest in 2010. Each American president since the end of the Cold War has pursued policies designed to influence China’s decisions about the management and application of its growing economic power, but it was not until the arrival of the Obama administration that the United States developed a comprehensive strategy for influencing Chinese behavior, marking the fourth phase of America’s involvement in the IAP. At the core of this strategy was a two-pronged approach to the IAP: seeking opportunities for bilateral cooperation with Beijing while working with China’s neighbors to create both an encouraging and a cautionary environment for Chinese regional behavior. As Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton noted at the start of the Obama presidency, “China is the big story, no doubt. But for us to be successful, we’re going to have to work with others more effectively. We’ve got to embed our China policy in a larger Asia strategy.”

Obama’s Pivot
Obama’s advisors began to plan for the pivot before the president was inaugurated, but they recognized that the administration could not make the pivot the centerpiece of its foreign policy until it had addressed more immediate economic problems associated with the financial crisis of 2007–8. By 2011, the administration had concluded that the domestic economic situation was sufficiently under control to allow a shift in focus to the IAP. The Obama team understood that to influence the strategic decisions of key IAP governments they would have to use all the elements of U.S. national power, but they also realized that the nation was at a considerable disadvantage in terms of diplomatic and economic power in the IAP. Many regional governments doubted Washington’s will and ability to keep its focus on the IAP over the long term, and most IAP states were especially critical of the United States for what they viewed as Washington’s responsibility for both the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007–8 economic collapse. Under these circumstances, U.S. policymakers had to place their emphasis on military instruments of power, including the massive resources of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the formal and informal defense agreements with IAP governments.

The Obama team also recognized that for the pivot to succeed it would need to accord top priority to the two anchor points of the San Francisco security network—Tokyo and Seoul. As the host to 85 American military facilities, including the headquarters for the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet and the III Marine Expeditionary Force, Japan is America’s most important Pacific ally. It is not surprising that under these circumstances Washington began to lay the groundwork for enhanced security cooperation with Tokyo one month after President Obama took office. U.S.-Japan security cooperation increased
significantly following the election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012. Prime Minister Abe has committed his nation to increased coordination with the United States in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defense, and maritime security. He has backed up these commitments with significant improvements in his nation’s military capabilities, including plans to purchase 42 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft and an offer to host a squadron of American Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early warning aircraft. In accordance with his government’s new concept of collective self-defense, Abe also has agreed to extend the range of U.S.-Japan security cooperation to the IAP region. He is also the first Japanese prime minister to visit all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in an effort to bolster Tokyo’s regional influence. The most controversial manifestation of this new activism is the participation of Japanese maritime patrols in the South China Sea. At least part of the rationale for Japan’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is that it reinforces Tokyo’s credibility in its dispute with Beijing over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Robert Cooper coined the term defensive modernism to describe the process by which a nation grudgingly abandons an unsustainable foreign policy that eschews the use of hard power instruments to protect or advance its national interests. Washington can be encouraged by Abe’s campaign to adjust Japanese foreign policy to the demands of defensive modernism, but the United States must also remain alert to the possibility that Tokyo will mismanage its actions toward China or North Korea as it relearns the game of hard power politics. There is also a risk that as Japan becomes more assertive it will be harder for the United States to encourage cooperation between Tokyo and other IAP governments that still harbor suspicions against Japan that date back to the Second World War. Finally, Washington must remain aware that Abe has not yet convinced the Japanese public of the merits of a campaign of defensive modernism, and it is possible that key elements of this campaign will be reversed by Abe’s successors.

Because of its distinct geographic situation and its history, South Korea has responded differently from Japan to the American pivot campaign. With a dangerously unpredictable enemy to its north, Seoul must assess the merits of the American pivot in terms of its impact on a 24/7 deterrent posture. Under these circumstances, any significant doctrinal change by the United States poses the risk of raising doubts about the priority that Washington accords to South Korean security. South Korean policy makers must be constantly on guard about a replay of the so-called Acheson problem—the 1950 statement on U.S. defense policy in Asia by then-Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, which did not mention the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a strategic priority and is viewed as a contributing factor in the North Korean decision to invade.
South Korea. Furthermore, because of its geographic proximity to China, Seoul views its relations with Beijing differently from Washington. China is already South Korea’s largest trading partner, and in June 2015, the two nations entered into a new free trade agreement that will eventually eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of the goods that are traded between them. Seoul also recognizes that no real progress in North-South Korean relations can be achieved without the support of Beijing.

Edward Luttwak has cited Chinese-South Korean cooperation to support his claim that the ROK is an “unfit” ally of the United States. This is an unfair judgment against a nation that faces extraordinarily complex strategic challenges and has proven itself to be a reliable security partner for the United States for more than six decades. Recent ROK defense plans call for improved missile capabilities, acquisition of advanced aircraft, and the transformation of “a largely coastal patrol force into a blue-water navy.” According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, the ROK Army is also undergoing significant improvements and “is finally obtaining unqualified advantage over the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in terms of modern weapons, widespread mechanization, and net-centric command, control, communications, and information (C3I), thereby permitting non-linear maneuver warfare as an alternative to the historical, bloody war of attrition in the mountains along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).”

It is not surprising, however, that Seoul has often responded to its multiple security challenges with complex—and at times contradictory—policies. Under President Park Geun-hye, Seoul attempted to pursue a trustpolitik campaign of outreach toward Pyongyang while at the same time sustaining a proactive deterrence posture toward North Korea. Likewise, in its relations with Beijing, the South Korean government has pursued both diplomatic and economic forms of cooperation, while incurring Chinese anger for its decision to host a terminal high altitude area defense, or THAAD, battery and for its participation in annual military exercises with the United States. The bilateral exercises, which took place in March 2016, were the largest ever, involving 300,000 South Korean and 17,000 American troops.

Between 2011 and 2015, the pivot campaign achieved some impressive results, not just in terms of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK relations but throughout the larger IAP region. Key regional actors responded positively to Washington’s policies of reassurance and recruitment, including the announcement of plans for reposturing 60 percent of its naval and air assets to the IAP “in a steady, deliberate and sustainable way” by 2020. Washington also began work with regional allies on “the four biggest construction projects since the Cold War” to diversify and harden regional military facilities in accordance with the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons.
strategy of playing to its strength as a military power was rewarded not merely with expressions of support but also with new security commitments from key allies and partners. These included Canberra’s offer to host up to 2,500 U.S. Marines in northern Australia on a six-month rotational basis, Singapore’s offer of base access for American littoral combat ships, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and Manila, which provided for U.S. access to five Philippine military bases.

The Obama administration also made steady progress in defense cooperation with India, in recognition of the two nations’ shared interest in maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region and a mutual concern about the rise of China. President Obama described the U.S.-India relationship as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century” and backed up his rhetoric with diplomatic, economic, and military activities designed to overcome New Delhi’s traditional preference for strategic autonomy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi rewarded Washington for its efforts by signing a major defense cooperation agreement with the United States in August 2016. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement provides for mutual access, on a case-by-case basis, to each other’s facilities for supplies and repairs. The two governments also predicted that the agreement will “facilitate additional opportunities for practical engagement and exchange.” The prime minister also has pursued his Act East campaign of defense cooperation with various governments in the IAP region in ways that support the American pivot strategy.

President Obama also made progress in terms of diplomatic and economic engagement with IAP governments, most notably the U.S. signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the members of ASEAN. Signing the TAC made it possible for Washington to become a member of the East Asia Summit, which is an increasingly important institution in the IAP. The most important diplomatic and economic accomplishment of the Obama team was the successful negotiation of the 12-nation TPP agreement. Sean Mirski observed at the time that “the TPP is not just about economics, and that it has the potential to be a pillar of American grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.”

The Obama team’s plan was to weld the disparate elements of the pivot campaign into a single multifaceted strategy that would be accepted by a large number of IAP governments and would “make room for China” on U.S. terms. Between 2011 and 2015, the president made measurable progress toward this goal. Arguably his most notable success was in his management of the contradictory demands of containment of and engagement with China. The United States maintained a posture of confident resolve in the face of double-digit increases in Beijing’s defense spending, making modest improvements in American military capabilities in the IAP region, while at the same
time cultivating new forms of defense cooperation with and among its Asian security partners. Washington also continued to walk on two legs in its relations with Beijing, constantly looking for opportunities for cooperation with Beijing while hedging against a growing Chinese threat.28

By the end of 2015, however, the pivot began to lose some of its momentum and its coherence. Beijing had become increasingly assertive in its claims to territory in the South China and East China Seas. Washington had lost its ability to prioritize the IAP region as a result of several developments, including Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine and tensions within NATO about issues of burden sharing. In spite of Obama’s efforts to keep the Middle East at arm’s length, developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria had dragged the United States back into that region.29 The Obama administration also found it necessary to engage in a globalized foreign policy in response to Beijing’s ambitious campaign of soft power diplomacy in South Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

As the Obama team began to lose its focus on the IAP region, some Asian governments started to hedge their bets about the pivot. The most damaging reassessment took place in Manila with the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in May 2016. Prior to Duterte’s election, the Philippines was one of the most important elements in the American pivot campaign. The Philippines holds a special place in U.S. littoral defense plans because it represents a geostrategic bridge between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Under these circumstances, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, was a major accomplishment for U.S. diplomacy. As noted by Julio Amador III, the agreement cleared the way for the two governments “to undertake high-impact and high-value security cooperation exercises, joint and combined training activities that promote interoperability, and capacity building.”30 All of this U.S.-Philippines cooperation has been cast into doubt as a result of Duterte’s election. The Philippine president has hinted that he intends to cut the cord with Washington. He also informed his Chinese hosts during a visit in October that “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world.”31

The dramatic downturn in U.S.-Philippines relations was preceded by another setback to the pivot in Southeast Asia, when Washington found itself caught between a desire to sustain and expand defense cooperation with Thailand and its commitment to democratic principles. Washington felt compelled to impose sanctions on Thailand following a military coup in May 2014. The United States also scaled back its annual Cobra Gold military exercises with Thailand following the coup. Even before these actions, Bangkok was more inclined than most of its neighbors to favor China, but this tendency has in-
creased since the coup. As Kitti Prasirtsuk and William Tow have noted, “Bangkok no longer regards China as a probable national security threat and, unlike other ASEAN members, it neither shares a contiguous border with China nor does it entertain territorial claims that involve Chinese counter-claims.”

The setbacks to the pivot in the Philippines and Thailand took on special significance because these are Washington’s two formal treaty allies in Southeast Asia. But the most serious setback to the pivot campaign occurred within the United States itself in 2016, when both of the candidates for president announced plans to oppose the aforementioned TPP trade agreement. The Obama team accorded high priority to the negotiations that culminated in February 2016 with the approval of TPP by 12 Pacific Rim governments. The TPP was a key soft power element of the pivot, designed to reestablish Washington as a regional economic leader. Prime Minister Abe’s statement that “success or failure [of TPP] will sway the direction of the global free trade system and [shape] the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific” now seems like a particularly disturbing prophecy.

**President Trump’s Options**

In spite of the military, diplomatic, and economic problems that the United States confronted in the last two years of the Obama presidency, the balance sheet of the pivot strategy was still positive when President Trump entered the White House. China was increasingly capable of projecting power across the region and increasingly inclined to engage in a diplomacy of command toward its neighbors. On the other hand, most IAP governments still recognized the value of working with the United States to gulliverize China. It remains to be seen, however, whether Trump will be willing to put in the effort required to sustain this regional support. Indeed, it is not yet certain that Trump is willing and able to engage in long-term strategic planning. His general approach toward foreign policy appears to be alarmingly neo-isolationist, with a decisional style that is reactive, tactical, and transactional rather than strategic. But it will require a willful disregard of reality for Trump to not pay attention to the risks and opportunities in the IAP region, and it will be especially difficult for the new president to disregard China as a regional and global actor.

In the months leading up to his inauguration, Mr. Trump’s statements and actions cast doubt on the incoming president’s commitment to three of the four foundational elements of the Obama pivot: he appeared to be spoiling for a fight with Beijing; he reinforced his campaign commitment to scrap the TPP; and he made comments that indicated a willingness to renegotiate America’s alliance relationship with Japan and South Korea. The only statements by Trump during this period that built on the efforts of his predecessor in the IAP region were in the area of defense modernization. Since taking office, he has made
some encouraging adjustments in his policies toward Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, but he also has delivered on his promise to reject the TPP.

Prior to his inauguration, Mr. Trump’s statements regarding China were starkly confrontational. The president-elect accused Beijing of “raping our country” with its economic policies, and he described China’s trade with the United States as the “greatest theft in the history of the world.” During his confirmation hearings, Rex W. Tillerson, Trump’s candidate for secretary of state, stated that Beijing’s development of islands in the South China Sea will not be permitted: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands [is] also not going to be allowed.” Tillerson did not offer any advice about how the United States might or should accomplish these policy goals.

It is certainly true that Beijing poses more of a threat to its neighbors and to American national interests than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Chinese defense spending, as a percent of GDP, has slowed as a result of the nation’s economic downturn. But it still grew by 7.6 percent in 2016 (to $146 billion) according to official Chinese government sources. These funds have been used, in part, to support the most ambitious reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the 1950s. According to the 2016 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, these changes will improve the PLA’s “capability to fight regional conflicts at greater distances from China through integrated joint operations.” The annual report also notes that “China’s ability to conduct conventional strikes against U.S. regional facilities reached an inflection point in 2015 with the fielding of new intermediate-range ballistic missiles able to reach Guam, providing a benchmark for evaluating China’s expanding A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] buildup.” Beijing also has made significant improvements in its ability to back up its diplomacy of command in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas with hard power.

China’s increased regional assertiveness, combined with its rapidly modernizing military, have led the authors of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Strategic Survey 2016 to conclude that “it has become increasingly apparent that their [Beijing’s] long term goal is to displace American power in the Western Pacific, to establish China as the new regional hegemon.” China would prefer to accomplish this without war, and to this end it has been pressing the case for an alternative to the U.S.-led security community in the IAP, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. Although the United States has observer status in this organization, Chinese spokespersons have made it clear that Beijing’s goal is to replace the San Francisco alliance network with a new security architecture that is conducive to Chinese interests and influence. The challenge for the Trump administration will
be to preserve regional support for the San Francisco system while avoiding gratuitously provocative actions toward Beijing that might convince some of America’s regional security partners that it is safer to side with China.

To reassure its regional friends and allies, the United States will have to undertake selective enhancements of its military forces in the IAP region. President Trump is committed to increasing U.S. defense spending, and since 60 percent of U.S. naval and air assets will be in the IAP in the future, this region will be the principal beneficiary of a comprehensive effort at military modernization. Defense improvements capable of offsetting China’s A2/AD capabilities should be given priority. However, the recent Rand Corporation report, War With China, is correct that “a heavy dose of common sense is needed in contemplating such preparations.” The report warns that threatening Chinese A2/AD assets in the first stage of a conflict “could undermine crisis stability, predispose the Chinese toward preemptive strikes, and heighten the danger of automaticity and inevitability of fierce fighting from the outset.” With this in mind, the Rand study recommends that the Department of Defense accord priority to “improving the ability to sustain severely intense military operations” and “shifting toward more-survivable platforms” in the IAP region.42

At the same time that it is bolstering its military presence in the IAP, the Trump administration must not lose sight of the fact that the greatest threat to peace is an inadvertent conflict between the United States and China that neither party seeks. This is the most important lesson of the now-famous Thucydides Trap, which warns of the historically confirmed likelihood of conflict between a rising power and a dominant status quo power, even in situations where both parties make an effort to cooperate.43 Avery Goldstein’s assertion in 2013 that the U.S.-China relationship “might be even more dangerous” than the U.S.-Soviet Cold War standoff is even more true today, for three reasons.44 First, the two sides have fallen into a pattern of mutual provocation over the territories that have been developed by Beijing in the South China Sea. Second, both capitals are experiencing domestic pressures that may lead to rash decisions. In Beijing’s case, the Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping must manage the relative decline in the Chinese economy while preparing for a potentially contentious 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fall. Both of these factors could encourage nationalistic behavior to bolster domestic support. In Washington’s case, the new president will be under some pressure to back up his anti-Chinese rhetoric with actions to pump up his public opinion ratings.45 Third, both China and the United States may find themselves being pulled into unwanted confrontations as a result of the actions of junior partners who are becoming more assertive, aggrieved, or simply unpredictable.

North Korea poses the most immediate threat of a spillover crisis that
could lead to war between Washington and Beijing.\textsuperscript{46} North Korean leader Kim Jong-un accelerated both his nuclear testing and his test launches of ballistic missiles in 2016, and his regime has already attempted to provoke the Trump administration by launching intermediate-range missiles into the Sea of Japan. The president has stated that Pyongyang’s development of a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States “won’t happen,” but he has given no guidance about what the country might do in response to this challenge.\textsuperscript{47} To date, neither bribes nor sanctions have convinced Mr. Kim to abandon his nuclear ambitions. In light of North Korean intransigence and the acceleration of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Doug Bandow has identified two options: first, “a grand bargain” with China that might involve the removal of U.S. forces from the peninsula and the creation of a unified Korean state that would be militarily neutral; second, a game of “international poker” involving the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Seoul and Tokyo to intimidate Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{48} Bandow is to be commended for forcing the Washington policy community to face the fact that neither positive nor negative inducements have been successful with North Korea. But neither of his extreme policy recommendations should be seriously considered by the Trump administration. Instead, the new administration should sustain its predecessor’s policy of \textit{strategic patience} while working with Tokyo and Seoul to achieve the goal proposed by Jonathan Pollack: “To disabuse Pyongyang of any belief that its capabilities provide it added advantage or protection from the consequences of future actions that it might contemplate.”\textsuperscript{49}

The Trump administration also will have to find a way to work with Beijing to manage the North Korean situation. Nor is this the only issue that will require U.S.-China cooperation. The president would be wise to build upon the modest progress that has already been made in bilateral cooperation. A recent report by China’s State Council Information Office notes that the two nations have been able to work together on a wide range of political and security issues, including “climate change, the Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, Syria, and Afghanistan.” The report also lists examples of Sino-American military cooperation, including mutual-confidence-building mechanisms, high-level meetings among military leaders, and Chinese participation in the 2016 Rim of the Pacific exercises. The Information Office concludes that Beijing is willing to “work with the new U.S. administration to follow the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation.”\textsuperscript{50} In spite of Beijing’s growing assertiveness, it is in America’s interest to continue to cultivate these and other areas of cooperation with China.

It is therefore unfortunate that Mr. Trump sent such unnecessarily confrontational messages to Beijing prior to his inauguration. The president-elect’s
hint at a fundamental change in the American position regarding the One China policy was the most provocative and ill-conceived example of this behavior. When Trump broke with decades of U.S. policy by engaging in a phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing attempted to soft-peddle the issue by interpreting it as a diplomatic error by a foreign policy novice. But the president-elect doubled down on the phone call by stating, “I fully understand the ‘One China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘One China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” Since his inauguration, President Trump has informed President Xi in a phone conversation that he now accepts the One China principle, but having raised this issue in public it is likely to hover in the background during future U.S.-China negotiations. If the president views the One China policy as a card to be played to obtain leverage with Beijing in future trade talks, he is laboring under a fundamental misreading of how China regards its national interests as well as a dangerous miscalculation of American national interests.

President Trump also has made his job harder by cancelling the TPP within the first week of his presidency. By removing the United States from the 12-nation trade agreement, he has abandoned the field to President Xi on issues of regional economic cooperation. China can now move forward with its campaign in support of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed 16-nation free trade agreement that will involve 30 percent of the world economy. Since President Trump has explained his rejection of TPP as the first step in a more ambitious campaign of opposition to multilateral trade agreements in general, he may already have cleared the path for Beijing to replace Washington as the leader of the global economy. Xi demonstrated his readiness to take on this role in his recent keynote address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The Chinese leader also has backed up his rhetoric with nine ambitious infrastructure projects under the auspices of the 57-member Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Since President Trump has made it clear that he intends to focus his efforts on bilateral trade negotiations, he would be well advised to start with Japan, the world’s third-largest economy. The TPP was an essential component of Prime Minister Abe’s campaign of economic liberalization, so he is likely to be interested in trade talks with Washington that preserve key elements of the TPP agreement. If managed properly, Abe also can present aspects of these negotiations—in particular, Japanese reductions in nontariff barriers—as a positive response to U.S. calls for increased burden sharing by its most important IAP ally.

During his first weeks in office, President Trump has been looking for
ways to smooth over some of his more critical comments about Japanese and South Korean free riders. But like his comments on the One China policy, his preinauguration criticisms will not be forgotten by America’s Northeast Asian allies. As Mira Rapp-Hooper recently argued, “Trump was apparently unaware of the fact that Japan and South Korea are the least expensive places in the world (including the United States) to base U.S. forces because of Tokyo and Seoul’s financial contributions.” It is to be hoped that some of the president’s key national security advisors will convince him of the strategic value of these two anchor states in the San Francisco system. It is encouraging in this regard that Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis’s first official overseas trip was to Tokyo and Seoul.

Continued careful cultivation of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK relations are essential, since both Asian nations are dealing with difficult domestic and international situations. In Japan’s case, Abe’s campaign of defensive modernism has not yet taken root among the Japanese public. A 2016 survey of three polls concluded, “Strikingly, as the debate [over reform of Japan’s pacifist constitution] gains more momentum . . . the percentage of opposition to constitutional revision in all three surveys marked the highest this year.” Abe will also have to deal with the fact that some of Tokyo’s neighbors are still ambivalent about the prospect of a more active and assertive Japan. Both the domestic political debate over Japan’s defense identity and the regional responses to a Japan that seeks to become a “more normal” diplomatic and military actor will be influenced by the policies pursued by the Trump administration.

The direction of South Korean domestic politics and foreign policy is also likely to be greatly affected by Washington. President Trump comes to office at a time when South Korean politics have been turned upside down by the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. President Park’s impeachment paved the way for the election of center-left Democratic Party candidate Moon Jae-in, a former human rights lawyer who is deeply committed to the ultimate goal of North-South Korean reunification. He also has expressed support for a parliamentary review of South Korea’s commitment to host the aforementioned THAAD system. The Trump administration will have to work closely with President Moon on these issues. Both Washington and Seoul must also remain alert to the possibility that Pyongyang will take advantage of an unstable political situation in South Korea to engage in the kind of provocative behavior that took place in 2010.

**Conclusion**

President Obama’s pivot to the IAP region was a play in four acts: good intentions, limited capabilities, distractions, and mixed results. Will there be a fifth act? Obama’s successor comes to the presidency with a relatively clean slate.
in the IAP region. If he chooses to restart the pivot campaign, he will have to accord a great deal of time and attention to the formulation of a coherent and comprehensive strategy for the IAP region. Based on his comments to date, he does not seem to be interested in such an effort. Whether he chooses to reset the pivot or not, however, President Trump will confront the same reality that his predecessor had to deal with: an IAP region that is increasingly demanding of American attention and increasingly indispensable in world affairs. As Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner have noted, “The history of the twenty-first century will be written largely in the Asia-Pacific.”

**Notes**

2. Ibid., 356–57.
6. The city motto in use since at least 1358, from the Latin: *fluctuat nec mergitur*.
9. Ibid., xxi.


23. These and other positive developments are discussed by the author in Douglas T. Stuart, *The Pivot to Asia: Can It Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2016).


28. Mao Tse-tung introduced the concept of walking on two legs in 1958 to explain the Great Leap Forward’s attempt to reconcile industrialization and improvements in agricultural production.


40. Ibid., 490.


42. David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafalo, *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2016), xv–xvi, 70.

43. *2016 Report to Congress*.


59. The North Korean attacks on the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan in March 2010 and the subsequent attacks by North Korea against Yeonpyeong Island in November are discussed in Stuart, *The Pivot to Asia*, 24.

A Pivot of Their Own
China Reassesses the Rebalance to Asia Policy, and What that Means for the Trump Administration’s Asia Policy

Christopher D. Yung

Abstract: The Rebalance to Asia was the Obama administration’s foundational policy initiative meant to address the challenge of China’s rise. The Chinese press and official PRC government policy statements characterized the policy as a thinly disguised containment policy. This article examines the Chinese academic assessment of the Rebalance to Asia policy. The author reviewed the writings of five Chinese intellectuals known for their close connections with different parts of the Chinese government. It identifies common themes among the assessments and points out key differences between them. The article concludes with an examination of how the new Trump administration may have altered these Chinese assessments and provides speculation on how changed Chinese perspectives might affect the future U.S.-China relationship.

Keywords: Rebalance, Pivot to Asia, Asia, China, Asia-Pacific, Trump, containment, foreign policy, Chinese academics, Chinese intellectuals, perspective

The Rebalance to Asia policy introduced by the Obama administration in 2011 has had more than half a decade to take hold and ferment. As the central guiding strategy for U.S. policy on Asia during the Obama
years, it will obviously be the center of scrutiny for an incoming Trump administration that has made no bones about fundamentally altering the policies of its predecessor. In fact, the Trump administration has already declared its predecessor’s Rebalance to Asia policy to be over. It will thus be tempting for the new administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater. One of the important pieces of analysis that needs to be done before deciding on the fate of the policy components of the Rebalance is to evaluate to what extent it had a significant effect on China. Although American government officials insisted that the Rebalance was not just about China, certainly an important element of the policy was designed to have an effect on Chinese behavior, long-term Chinese policy, and the willingness of the Chinese to cooperate with the United States about regional and global security issues.

Previous scholarly works have examined the Chinese reactions to the Rebalance. The best Chinese examination of this subject, for instance, by Peking University Professor Wang Dong, engaged in a comprehensive examination of Chinese reactions to the Rebalance.\(^1\) American scholarly works also have studied the policy objectives of the Rebalance, taken note of specific actions the U.S. government pursued in support of the Rebalance policy, and provided some initial evaluations on whether the Rebalance was having an effect on the region and on the Chinese based on public pronouncements and other measures of effectiveness.\(^2\)

This article takes a decidedly different approach to evaluating how the Chinese may have reacted or thought about the Rebalance. Given that the Chinese government enlists the support of specific institutions to help it think through the implications of emerging international trends, the author of this article examined the writings of five Chinese scholars, all of whom are associated with institutions that have traditionally had a significant impact on official Chinese policy in the past. The writings selected for this research effort had to specifically be dedicated to the Rebalance policy, each had to involve an in-depth analysis of what the author believed the United States was trying to accomplish with this policy, each had to have an examination of the policy’s effectiveness, and each had to provide guidance on what the Chinese government response or long-term strategy should be in response to the Rebalance. In examining what the Chinese academics wrote of the Rebalance, one of the objectives of this article was to explore the common assumptions shared by each of the scholars; and by contrast, it also examined where these scholars differed in their assessments and why. Based on this examination, the author speculated on how the arrival of the Trump administration, with different policy goals and assumptions about the Asia-Pacific than its predecessor, might have an impact on each of the conclusions of these various scholars.
The Scholars
Although China has no shortage of intellectuals who research and write on the United States, it was important to select scholars who were associated with institutions with a known connection to the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party. It was also important that this research take into account that different institutions have different institutional interests in advancing one line of argument against another. It was therefore important to select scholars and institutions that served as intellectual feeders to different parts of the Chinese system. As a consequence, the institution selection process centered around scholars who had done work for or were connected with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of State Security (the intelligence community), the State Council, and the Central Military Commission (the military). The selected scholars are: Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University; Wang Zaibang, former vice president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Zhu Feng, current director of the Maritime Studies Institute of Nanjing University and former professor of the School of International Studies, Peking University; Major General Chen Zhou, senior director of National Defense Policy Research Center, Academy of Military Science (AMS), and author of the Chinese defense white papers; and Qi Dapeng, deputy director and master supervisor at the Institute for Strategic Studies, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University.

Some Caveats
Before getting into the heart of the research and the author’s findings, it is necessary to be explicit about what an analysis of this type does not provide the reader. First, all of the writings upon which the research for this article is based are in the public domain. These essays, then, were obtained either through the U.S. government’s Open Source Center, were published in books or journals the author obtained during periodic visits to China, or were found online. This means that, while the content of the writings can be considered quasi-authoritative, it cannot be taken as representing official policy or what the Chinese have decided behind closed doors. The best that an analysis of this kind can offer is the likelihood that it represents Chinese perspectives being discussed at academic and official ministry levels. Second, although the scholars listed in this work are or have been associated with universities and research think tanks that have had powerful connections and influenced policy in the past, it cannot be said with any certainty that the views expressed in their essays truly reflect the views of their institutions. Third, an article that purports to take a sample of Chinese academic writings that represent schools of thought and divisions of academic opinion in China on the Rebalance’s implications
for China is bound to reflect the bias (unintentional or not) of the author and analyst doing the selecting. In other words, the process by which this researcher selected Chinese scholars ultimately is marked by selection bias. It is certainly possible, and even likely, that a Chinese professor from one of China’s finest academic institutions or another American China specialist might choose a different list of scholars from which to compare and contrast views.

The Essays

The essays examined in this article were published in a variety of publications. One of the essays was published by Peking University Press in the book, *New Type of Great Power Relations: Opportunities and Challenges*. The content of the essay examined in this volume, “Will China and U.S. Go Their Separate Ways or Will They Head in The Same Direction?” by Wang Jisi, was primarily theoretical and reflected an academic’s treatment of the subject. Another essay, “U.S. Rebalancing Strategy Towards the Asia-Pacific and the Political Prospects of East Asia” by Qi Dapeng, was published by the Military Science Publishing House of the PLA National Defense University and is largely a policy analysis of the strategic environment. The essay by Wang Zaibang, “A Review and Reflection on the Epoch-Making Transformation of China-US Relations,” was published in the policy journal *Contemporary International Relations*, by the CICIR. Although a policy journal, *Contemporary International Relations* is considered a publication platform for regional, theoretical, and policy analysis scholars being trained by CICIR, which in turn serves as a feeder of analysts to China’s Ministry of State Security (China’s version of a combined FBI and CIA). It is therefore not surprising that this essay had more of a theoretical approach to studying this problem than a policy maker’s approach.

Another academic journal, *China International Strategy Review 2012*, published by the Foreign Language Press, ran Zhu Feng’s “The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia and Sino-U.S. Relations.” Zhu’s essay is less theoretical and more policy prescriptive. Finally, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) report, *Strategic Review 2012*, has an entire section devoted to the Rebalance. Entitled “The Strategic Adjustment of the United States,” it is credited to the faculty and specialists of AMS; nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the editor overseeing the report is Chen Zhou, the author of the annual China defense white paper. As should be expected, this assessment is largely a military analysis of the Rebalance and interpretations of U.S. motives and the sustainability of the Rebalance. It should not be surprising that it was heavily influenced by a military intelligence and professional military education point of view.
What the Authors Had in Common

In examining similarities among the authors’ essays, we can establish some common assumptions and frameworks from the Chinese perspective. The first of these commonalities is the idea that the long-term objective of the United States is to remain the global and regional hegemon and will do everything in its power to keep it that way. Zhu Feng writes that “the ‘rebalancing’ strategy is one that seeks a ‘century’s leadership’ for the United States, comprehensively strengthening its dominant role in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States will intensify its input into this region’s politics, economy and diplomacy, and play a leadership role for the 21st century while taking the responsibility for regional security and stability.”9 Chen Zhou and his colleagues at AMS write that “the U.S. is speeding up the implementation of its ‘rebalancing’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific, counter-balancing the growth of Asian-Pacific emerging powers, ‘controlling’ the effect of China’s development, grabbing and sharing the opportunities and dynamics of the regional economic development, maintaining its dominating position in the region so as to strengthen its global hegemony.”10

Even Wang Jisi, the most liberal minded of the authors discussed here, admits that the United States sees China as a challenge to its dominance of the international system. He writes,

The West sees the rise of China as a challenge to their values and regime model. Therefore, the West has intensified their strategies to westernize and divide China, and to use the internet and other channels to infiltrate China. China must remain vigilant at all times about the ideology battle at home and abroad. . . . The aggressive posture of the West, as well as the West’s insistence on continually criticizing China’s political system, internal economic policies, social policies, culture, and traditions, have tarnished China’s reputation, and have instilled a “strong West versus weak-self” mentality within China.11

A second commonality is that each essay asserted that the following served as instruments of the Rebalance: (1) adjustments to military force posture or deployment patterns in the Asia-Pacific; (2) enhanced economic statecraft; (3) reinvigorated alliances and partnerships in the region; (4) increased diplomatic activities, especially by America’s highest political leadership; and (5) the heightened use of legal norms and instruments to advance American interests in the region. Wang Jisi writes that
in order to strengthen its economic competence, explore overseas markets, and retain the right to make rules, the Obama administration has eagerly endorsed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which mainly cover the liberation of capital, state-owned enterprises, labor criteria, protection of intellectual property rights, and other issues. When China expressed its tentative desire to take part in the TPP, U.S. officials stated that China would only be welcome when negotiation talks with Japan, Australia, and some ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries are concluded. In terms of military and security, the U.S. and its allies Japan and South Korea, have established a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). In addition, a Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) is also under development. These moves are considered responses to China’s increased military power. The competitive stances of the two can also be seen on the rise within the Asia-Pacific diplomatic area.

Zhu Feng writes that “despite pending defense budget cuts, the U.S. will not decrease its military presence in the region. Conversely, it will further strengthen the U.S. military’s strategic influence through pivoting toward Asia, setting a basic political tone for the promotion of a new military strategy. In its ‘Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’ released on January 5, 2012, the Obama administration clearly identified the U.S. military’s strategic ‘rebalancing’ in the Asia-Pacific region as a core link for future adjustments in military power, its optimization of global strategic deployments, and the affirmation of new major military tasks in response to rising threats.” Zhu adds, “The ‘rebalancing’ is a rules-based strategy under which the United States urges Asia-Pacific nations to ‘abide by’ as well as create rules for the region’s security hotspots. The core of this strategy is that the U.S. wants to use international norms and rules to regulate and guide China. In addressing China-related issues the United States will collaborate with other countries in the region to handle China through a rule-making and rule-application framework as opposed to a simple bilateral framework.”

Finally, Qi Dapeng notes that a cornerstone of the political dimension of the U.S. rebalancing strategy is that “the United States attaches great importance to strengthening relationships with existing alliances.” It will go to great lengths to work out cooperative security programs with its current allies, as well as develop a new network of political partnerships with countries in the region who have not traditionally been allied with the United States, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Zhu Feng observes in his essay that “the Asian Pivot
Strategy is a deeper, wider U.S. presence and participation in the diplomacy and the politics of the Asia-Pacific. Particularly, the United States will promote long-term strategic interests through greater involvement in this region’s multilateral mechanisms, relying on cooperation with allies and partners to settle regional issues and give expression to U.S. long-term interests.”\(^\text{16}\) Chen Zhou and his colleagues at AMS echo the theme of strengthening the alliance relationships when they write “[through the Rebalance] the U.S. traditional alliances are strengthened. Facing the dramatic changes of the regional force landscape and the relative decline of the U.S. power, the U.S. pays more attention to enhancing the internal cohesion of alliances, strengthening the power of the allies and expanding the duties and responsibilities of the alliances.”\(^\text{17}\)

A third commonality is that each author asserted that the United States suffered either a setback, a miscalculation, or a shortcoming of some kind necessitating a course correction in U.S. policy. Chen Zhou and his AMS colleagues note that the Rebalance is really meant to correct a misallocation of resources, and overemphasizing some parts of the globe at the expense of others. They write, “The core points (of the Rebalance) . . . is to . . . change the past imbalanced state of focusing too many strategic resources on the Greater Middle East and laying too much emphasis on dealing with non-conventional threats.”\(^\text{18}\) Wang Jisi, in his essay, observes that “the strategic adjustment and correction of the Obama administration is, in essence an attempt to correct the country’s deviation from its development path.”\(^\text{19}\) According to Wang,

Since Obama took office, especially since his second term, the “internalization” trend has become very much apparent. Fiscal balance, economic rebound, enlarging employment, political polarization, medical reform, gun control, the anti-drug campaign, and migration policy, are all on top of the Obama administration’s agenda. Therefore the U.S. has to take a defensive stance on foreign relations, in order to heal the wounds from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as those from the financial crisis. This has resulted in the U.S. being more cautious to think twice before making any moves on the international stage, especially with regards to international military intervention.\(^\text{20}\)

Zhu Feng notes that “owing to a consistently high financial deficit, the U.S. military will inevitably enter an era of belt tightening, and reductions in military spending. The pivoting toward Asia represents . . . the Obama administration’s measures to tighten military budgets.”\(^\text{21}\)

Qi Dapeng observes in his essay that “ever since the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, U.S. economic recovery could hardly pick up strength, the unemployment problem has aggravated, and U.S. national debt has repeatedly exceeded the upper limit prescribed by Congress.” He continues,

In 2011, U.S. national debt outnumbered its total GDP; in 2012, its debt reached the record high of $16 trillion. The depressed domestic economy has directly resulted in the declining international reputation of the dollar. . . . The population below the poverty line has exceeded 50 million, a new height for over half a century; while the richest 10% of the population own 80% of the total wealth in the United States. Therefore, it is obvious that the United States is facing severe domestic political, economic and social difficulties. . . . As the new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry indicates, in the face of the financial crisis, the United States “can’t be strong in the world unless we’re strong at home.”

A fourth commonality is the idea that the specific tipping point leading to the Rebalance was the American realization that it had to do something about China's rise. Therefore, despite years of American insistence to the contrary, the selected Chinese authors all believed that the Rebalance is largely an effort to contain, suppress, or manage China’s rise. The United States perceived China as a threat either (1) to its global stature, (2) to its ability to dominate the Asia-Pacific Region for the purposes of shoring up its economy, (3) to its control over the international system, or (4) to its military preeminence. Qi Dapeng notes that “the rapid rise of China’s power and influence and its geopolitical advantage of locating in the central of Asia, will probably grant it enormous power to lead the Asia-Pacific—the world’s economic center. This undoubtedly portends the end of U.S. global hegemony. Therefore, in the face of China’s rapid rise, the United States has regarded China as a direct challenge to its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and even in the world at large, and has thus been gripped by great anxiety. This forces the United States to count China as it main target to balance and conduct global strategic adjustment.”

Wang Zaibang has argued in his essay that American decline has been gradual but unmistakable and that U.S. policy makers simply do not want to accept reality that America's position is being overtaken by China's. He writes, “Even though an epoch-making transformation of China-U.S. relations is at hand, Americans particularly elites and politicians, cannot accept the harsh reality of U.S. decline. . . . It needs time for the U.S. to truly recognize both the landslide of change and the sincerity of China’s peaceful development policy.” He continues that “this . . . transformation was ignited by the financial crisis and
marked iconically by the Beijing Olympic Games. Relations today have entered the most complex, subtle stage of transformation. . . . The U.S. is practicing exclusion, containment, and squeeze on China.”

Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the authors in these essays advocated a hard line as a response to the Rebalance. Each of the authors advocated a New Type of Major Power Relationship as the overarching framework to properly respond to the U.S. policy, and none advocated a harder, more assertive, and military-oriented policy as a response. Some of the authors differed in emphasis on the specific actions that needed to be taken underneath an umbrella of the New Type of Major Power Relationship, and these will be discussed at length as we explore the differences among the essays. Each argued, however, that the correct Chinese response was the New Type of Major Power Relationship, which has been Beijing’s carefully crafted effort—five years in the making—to properly manage the power transition between the United States and China.

**How Some Authors Differed**

As will be seen from this research, the differences between the various authors reveal departures in assessments of what underlying motives caused the United States to embark on the Rebalance policy, how successful the Rebalance policy was perceived to be by the various scholars, what role or responsibility China should bear in bringing about the Rebalance to Asia policy, and what specifically China should do about the Rebalance policy under the umbrella of a New Type of Major Power Relationship.

**Underlying Motivations for the United States to Launch the Rebalance**

The Chinese theses explaining what ultimately motivated the Obama administration to embark on the Rebalance appear to fall into three camps: the domestic political-economy camp, the balancing resources for hegemony camp, and the operational adjustment camp. Wang Jisi, for example, observes that, as Richard Haas has written, “foreign policy begins at home”; and in his essay, he notes that “a country’s [economic] development path determines how it defines its national interests, as well as the general direction of its foreign policy.” For the United States, Wang writes, “In the era of globalization, the stability of global trade, investment and finance is indispensable to the prosperity of the U.S. economy. Safeguarding the financial order under the hegemony of the U.S. dollar, fair trade, the protection of intellectual property rights and other norms of capitalist market economy, and ensuring the acquisition of overseas resources, are the core objectives of the economic portion of the U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy.” Wang continues that “the U.S. cannot safeguard its national security, advance its overseas interests, enhance international competency, and
augment its global influence unless it takes measures to consolidate its infrastructure, improve educational levels, amend its outdated immigration policy and liquidize its debts.”28 The underlying logic behind the Rebalance strategy, according to Wang Jisi, is that it is meant to shore up the American leadership role in the international system. That role ensures that the material and economic benefits of the system continue to accrue to the United States, enabling it to address domestic economic challenges. This is especially the case since the Asia-Pacific is widely recognized as the future engine of global economic growth. To summarize, Wang writes, “For the U.S., China does not pose any threat to its own state system, political system, polity, national unification, or territorial integrity. The main concern for the U.S. is that China, with its growing power and influence in the world, poses a challenge to the U.S.’ status in the world and the international order that it advocates.”29

A competing school of thought is the balancing resources for hegemony camp. Qi Dapeng, in his essay, writes that

the Obama Administration’s rebalancing strategy towards the Asia Pacific epitomizes that the United States has a realistic understanding of its own limited strength after tasting the bitter fruit of over-expansion brought on by a decade of war on terror. As a result, the U.S. has to strike a balance in the following four respects: it has to balance recovering the domestic foundation of hegemony, namely its domestic economy against maintaining world hegemony; it has to balance global strategic contraction against a buildup of strength in the Asia-Pacific; it has to make use of Asian countries to balance a rising China; [and] it has to strike a balance between competition and cooperation with China.30

It should not be surprising that a third camp, led by the military intelligence community, argues that the underlying motives of the Obama administration’s Rebalance are less political-economical and hegemonic-resource based but largely military-strategic in nature. Chen Zhou and his colleagues at AMS write that

the core points [of the Rebalancing Strategy] include accelerating the shift of the U.S. strategic focus to the east, adjusting its strategic layout focusing on the Western Pacific, reinforcing the Navy and Air combat forces in the Western Pacific, and optimizing the deployment structure, so as to enhance their ability to respond to “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) chal-
lenges, as well as the ability to win information-based high-end conventional war. The essence is to shorten the battle line, concentrate on key points, change the past imbalanced state of focusing too many strategic resources on the Greater Middle East and laying too much emphasis on dealing with non-conventional threats, and in the context of tightening defense budgets, continue to maintain military superiority of the United States.31

How Successful Was the Rebalance?
Since the authors made different arguments about the motivations for the Rebalance policy, it only makes sense that they would differ on how to measure success of the policy. Chen Zhou and his colleagues note that the United States has successfully revitalized the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance relationships; the United States has successfully deepened its partner relationships with the countries in the region (e.g., Vietnam, India, and Singapore); and the United States has successfully arranged for a number of joint bilateral and multilateral exercises with the countries of the region.32 Zhu Feng essentially sides with this interpretation of American success when he writes, “For the first time in the 20 years since the Cold War ended, the United States has markedly expanded its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, promoting new military expansion at any cost, and deepening and intensifying reactions to regional security situations brought about by its perception of China’s rise.”33

Wang Zaibang, arguing that a tectonic shift in the international system has already occurred, and that the Rebalance has been a last-ditch effort for the United States to stave off the inevitable, essentially argues that the policy has been a grand failure. He writes,

China does not have to keep awake nights when facing outside challenges, threats or pressures [i.e., the Rebalance]. No country or country groups can publicly threaten China, let alone contain it if China does not bully the weak and make enemies around its borders. China yet needs advanced diplomatic concentration and wisdom but now is gaining strategic confidence. Although the U.S. does not officially accept it, China should have confidence in the new type of relationship that is epoch-making for both. China will continue to win more countries’ support, and China and the U.S. come to better understand each other at the strategic level.34
Qi Dapeng notes that the Rebalance policy has largely been counterproductive. If the intent of the policy was to balance the resource requirements for hegemony, then the policy has failed, and will continue to fail in the long run. He writes, “The core political task of the U.S. for a certain period in the future is to consolidate the domestic foundation of U.S. hegemony, namely promoting domestic reforms and recovering domestic economy, all of which depends on China’s rapidly expanding domestic economy, all of which depends on China’s rapidly expanding domestic market. This fact determines that the United States cannot be in outright confrontation with China.” Practically speaking, this has not been the case. He notes that “over the past few years, the ‘rebalancing strategy towards the Asia Pacific’ has produced a series of negative effects.” Qi quotes American China expert, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, in noting that “the Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing Strategy Towards the Asia Pacific’ enhances rather than reduces negative security outcomes.” Additionally, Qi notes, “For other East Asian countries, they do not want to see the confrontation occur between China and the U.S. where they would be forced to choose a side. . . . If the United States does not change its course of action, more countries will become vigilant against the United States.”

**How Self-Aware Are the Chinese?**

Most of the essays discussed in this article were written as if China’s peaceful rise had been accepted by most of the countries of the region, and that it was the United States, with its desire to cling to hegemony and dominance in the region, that has caused the possibility of conflict there.

Wang Zaibang writes, “The U.S., not directly a concerned party in the South China Sea disputes, set aside its public policy of non-interference in sovereignty disagreements and seized upon navigation freedom as the excuse to make trouble out of nothing and exert influence. Future Sino-U.S. games will develop in a more balanced direction given China’s increasing power.” In his essay, Qi Dapeng writes,

By initiating the “rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific,” the Obama administration has introduced security competition into East Asia. . . . [The] U.S. . . . has brought about important changes in the nature of international relations in the region, i.e., shifting from “emphasizing economy, making light of strategy” to “emphasizing strategy, making light of economy.” And this change also forces China to shift its focus from the original economic level to the military and strategic level. At present, the theme of development in East
Asia has been watered down; security competition has risen to the surface.39

Surprisingly, two essays displayed a remarkable sense of awareness that China’s rise actually could be perceived as a threat by some of the countries in the region and by the United States. Wang Jisi writes, “China’s national defense expenditure is increasing rapidly. And the growth of Chinese military power has attracted a large amount of attention, while the U.S. has been forced to cut down its own national defense budget.”40

Zhu Feng similarly writes that the U.S. policy shift was inevitable given the perceived threats posed by a rapid rise in China. He writes,

With China’s rise, North Korean nuclear impasse and new orientations in the Asia-Pacific security, it is inevitable for the United States to update and expand its Asia-Pacific security strategy. . . . Several factors account for this policy shift. First, the U.S. assessment of China’s threat has changed from traditional bilateral, ideological and structural disputes concerning Taiwan and Tibet, to greater challenges arising from China’s new capabilities and intentions. Second, as China rises, traditional U.S. allies and defense partners in the Asia-Pacific have begun to doubt American security commitments and strategic capabilities in the region. The Obama Administration needs to reaffirm its strategic advantages and its resolve in the Asia-Pacific, and regain strategic dominance within the region.41

Differing Chinese Foreign Policy Responses to the Rebalance

Perhaps owing to the fact that by 2012 the Chinese Communist Party had already declared that the official response to the challenge of U.S.-China relations was going to be the umbrella concept of a New Type of Major Power Relationship, all of the essays discussed here noted that the proper Chinese response to the Rebalance had to be the New Type of Major Power Relationship. However, because these essays offered different underlying causes prompting the United States to embark on the Rebalance to Asia strategy, these authors offered different foreign policy remedies. Wang Jisi, for example, writes that “the key to building a new type of China-U.S. relations is to comprehend the different thoughts and expectations for the future, to pinpoint where their interests will cross, and to avoid clashes. Only when the U.S. respects and does not challenge China’s fundamental political system or its domestic order subjectively, can China come to respect and accept U.S. leadership in the world and the international order it [the U.S.] presides over.”42 He continues, “For various rea-
sons, including a misunderstanding of China’s key concerns, the U.S. has never explicitly expressed its respect for the Chinese political system, domestic order or development path. Yet, the U.S. continues to ask China for cooperation on major international issues."\textsuperscript{43} The key to the proper Chinese response should be to negotiate for greater respect and to strongly advocate American respect for and noninterference in China’s domestic political system. For Wang, the central element of China’s response to the Rebalance is a political and diplomatic response centered on a negotiation or a persistent strategic interaction with the United States.

Not surprisingly for the Chinese Military-Intelligence Community, the Chinese response to the Rebalance centers around coming to negotiated agreements with the United States following the U.S. realization that it must form a balance of power with China in the region. Chen Zhou and his AMS colleagues write, “Although the U.S. strategic focus has shifted to the east, which added a lot of variables to the Sino-U.S. relations, the possibility of all-out confrontation between the two countries is still thin. It is still possible to shake off historical fate and build a new type of relationship between [the] major power[s].”\textsuperscript{44} Chen argues that the New Type of Major Power Relationship is realized when the United States concludes that “first the United States is unable to pull up an international union to contain China. . . . Second, the overall stability of the Sino-U.S. relations is the highest common divisor of the countries in the region. China, the United States and China’s neighbors are expected to form a plurality of triangular relationships, which hold each other up. . . . A stable relationship with China is seen [by the U.S.] as a necessary condition to avoid the Asian-Pacific situation going out of control, and it is also a key factor in dealing with important international topics and responding to global challenges.”\textsuperscript{45} Additionally, Chen and his AMS colleagues note that “from the perspective of maintaining the balance between big powers, many of China’s neighboring countries would like to see the United States continue to stay in Asia, but do not want the United States [to] take policies too adventurous which may upset China and will not join any alliance to contain China.” Finally, “China’s strategic capability of curbing crises and wars has been improving, which can help prevent the Sino-U.S. resolutions from deviating from the normal track. . . . [T]he modernization of China’s armed forces has also been steadily progressing at their own pace. The ability to maintain peace and deter wars has been steadily progressing at their own pace. The ability to maintain peace and deter wars has achieved great improvements so that the Chinese military is increasingly a staunch force to maintain the regional stability.”\textsuperscript{46} For Chen, then, the key to implementing a New Type of Major Power Relationship lies in continuing the effective modernization of the Chinese military to address China’s emerging national security concerns and to form a stable balance of power.
with the United States; subsequently, once in a position of strength, China and the United States can come to agreements on a wide range of security and political issues. America’s allies and partners in the region, not wanting to take sides in a Sino-U.S. competition, will encourage dialogue and negotiated settlements between the powers.

For thinkers like Qi Dapeng, who emphasize the natural evolution of the system away from American dominance and unipolarity toward one of multipolarity, the key to managing the Sino-U.S. relationship is to encourage the continued evolution of the system through carefully prodded foreign policy actions. He writes, “The regional power structure in East Asia is being characterized by checks and balances. America’s ‘rebalancing strategy towards the Asia Pacific’ undoubtedly singles out China as its prime target to balance. . . . In the meantime, most East Asian countries actually have their own balance strategies. They would like to seek a proper balance of power between China and the United States in order to expand their own national interests. ASEAN countries, for example, are influenced by the Western-dominated international opinion and harbor doubts about China’s rise.” At the same time, Qi believes the natural evolution of the international system appears to be toward a multipolar balance of power. He writes,

The check and balance power structure in East Asia is also reflected in various mechanisms that are mutually constraining. Given its network of alliances in East Asia, the U.S. possesses a strategic advantage on security issues over China, which adopts a policy of non-alignment. However, the ASEAN Plus Three and ASEAN Plus One mechanisms in which China participates help the country possess a strategic advantage on economy issues over the U.S. In order to dominate the Asia-Pacific economic integration, the U.S. has been promoting the construction of TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]; while China naturally joins the RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership] mechanism.

Qi notes that there may be a natural evolution toward multipolarity—a natural evolution that China should consider focusing its foreign policy efforts on. “This simply means that more regional mechanisms will arise, thereby weaving various forces in East Asia into a network founded upon a variety of mechanisms. As a result multipolar balance may become the basic political form in East Asia, or even the Asia-Pacific region.” Practically speaking, Qi’s foreign policy approach suggests initiatives that encourage fielding competing institutions to the U.S. structures of power (e.g., the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank). This approach has been labeled by other Chinese analysts as indirect or “soft power balancing” activities, which include eroding American institutional power with competing Chinese institutional power, such as by the creation of alternative institutions to compete with U.S.-dominated institutions.50

Up to this point, this article has pinpointed the academic response to the Rebalance to Asia policy. In particular, it has examined themes that the Chinese academy has identified as shaping the effective foreign policy response to the challenges posed by the Rebalance policy. Is there any evidence that the official Chinese foreign policy response has reflected these academic views? The short answer is yes. To date, Chinese foreign policy has elements of all of the themes put forward by the Chinese academics discussed in this article. First, the Chinese use of diplomacy and direct negotiations with the United States to generate mutual understanding and respect between the two major powers has been well documented. This includes the entire New Type of Major Power Relations diplomatic effort, the informal discussions over a possible G-2 formulation between the United States and China, Chinese support for high-level strategic dialogues including the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, and Chinese support for continued military-to-military relations.51

Second, the Chinese military academic suggestion that ongoing military modernization would continually place China in a position to negotiate or advance its interests gradually with the United States is illustrated by PLA activities for the past half decade. Moreover, there is no debate among the analytical community within the United States that Chinese military modernization has continued apace. Within the past decade, in fact, we have witnessed: (1) the announcement of the acquisition of an aircraft carrier; (2) the continued modernization of China’s submarine and surface combatant fleets; (3) the development of fourth generation aircraft; (4) the continued improvement of China’s nuclear forces including recent announcements of creating multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles out of China’s Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles; (5) the Chinese naval capability to operate out of area, in particular to escort ships through the Gulf of Aden; (6) the acquisition of modern amphibious ships (Type 071 or landing platform docks [LPDs]); and (7) the demonstrated ability to attack satellites or space assets. All of these military modernization efforts have taken place while the Chinese military has been in direct negotiations and discussions with its American counterparts on a wide range of security issues.52

Third, the Chinese academic suggestion that China can compete successfully with the United States indirectly through soft power balancing or the creation of competing institutional organizations, which can serve to further Chinese economic and political interests both within the region and outside
of it, has been demonstrated recently by: (1) the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; (2) the proposal for RCEP as a direct competitor to the TPP; (3) the One Belt, One Road initiative as a Chinese Marshall Plan; and (4) China’s creation of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a direct competitor to NATO.53

That all of these elements of Chinese foreign policy have been manifest over the past half-decade suggests that Chinese foreign policy makers and strategists have not embraced one foreign policy approach over another, but have either synthesized them into a combined approach or are hedging their policy initiatives to broadly mitigate or offset the effects of the Rebalance to Asia policy.

**How Does Trump’s Asia Policy Change the Conversation?**

At present, it is too early in the Trump administration’s term to discern fully the oncoming changes to the Obama administration’s Rebalance policy; however, even at this early stage, there have been some noticeable changes that might serve as a clue to what is to come. For instance, the immediate rejection of the TPP by the then-newly elected president was an early sign of policy trajectory.54 A second sign was the then-president elect’s public comments questioning the utility of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances, particularly in the sufficiency of those countries’ material contributions to the alliances.55 This questioning of the state of the alliances may have been counteracted by the subsequent visit to the Asia-Pacific by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, who, in meeting with Japanese and Korean allies, insisted that the alliances were strong and the United States was still fully committed to them.56 A third sign has been the creation of a White House National Trade Council, whose apparent purpose is to ensure that American interests come first in trade and international economic transactions.57 A fourth sign has been the president’s commentary on his support for the military, particularly an interest in increasing the military’s budget and an intention to increase the Navy’s force structure.58 A fifth sign was a firm signal sent from both the incoming secretary of state and the Trump administration’s press secretary, Sean M. Spicer, that the United States was likely to be more forceful in managing maritime territorial disputes with China—the former going so far as to state at his confirmation hearing that the United States might be willing to blockade or impede Chinese naval supplies to its garrisons in the South China Sea.59 Finally, the president’s initial communications with the People’s Republic of China appeared to call into question the foundations upon which the two countries have interacted bilaterally for four decades (e.g., taking a direct phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and then publicly questioning the validity of the One China policy).60 The latter sign may have been mitigated by subsequent comments from the president, who publicly
stated that he supported a continuation of the One China policy and downplayed the significance of his phone call with President Tsai.\(^{61}\)

Some of the authors discussed in this article have explicitly written about what some of these developments might mean for U.S.-China relations. Da Wei, head of Institute of American Studies, CICIR, interviewed in *The Diplomat*, noted that “the year 2017 will be a testing time for the China-U.S. relations, and Trump’s presidency will likely create a great number of challenges. China should be mentally prepared for such difficulties and work out comprehensive contingency plans. When the circumstances call for it, China needs to have the courage to react and defend its interests and should not eschew paying the necessary price.” Wang Jisi, in the same interview, said, “Deng Xiaoping once said that China and the U.S. eventually will have to get along. President Xi Jinping has also reiterated on several occasions that common interests between China and the U.S. outweigh their differences. Rather than tactful diplomatic words, these are strategic assessments based on objective circumstances.”\(^{62}\)

By contrast, Zhu Feng has taken note of the increasing tension between the two major powers and the politicization of the most sensitive of U.S.-China issues—the South China Sea. His views are cited in *Time*: “Zhu Feng, professor of international relations at Nanjing University, says the South China Sea will now remain an ‘essential component’ of Washington’s Asia-Pacific Security Strategy. ‘The entire U.S.-China relationship is a minefield,’ he tells *Time*. ‘There’s not one place to stick your foot.”\(^{63}\)

Shen Dingli, associate dean at Fudan University, has observed that some of the actions of the Trump administration have largely reflected a complete reversal of past U.S. political positions and appear to be at odds with previous American foreign policy positions that have, in the past, served U.S. interests. “Trump’s initial play of the Taiwan card,” he writes, “has branded his administration with unpredictability. Such uncertainty undermines the US reputation to conduct international relations, and is detrimental to its own fundamental interests. As the Chinese side has made clear that its core interests are non-negotiable, Washington has to be prepared for a major collision with Beijing on this issue, destabilizing the entire Pacific and the world.”\(^{64}\)

Wang Dong, an associate professor of international studies at Peking University, notes that “this is a wake up call for Beijing—we should buckle up for a pretty rocky six months or year in the China-U.S. relationship. There was a sort of delusion based on overly optimistic ideas about Trump. That should stop.”\(^{65}\)

Although many of the scholars covered in this article have not had time to digest fully the implications of a new Trump administration, it is possible to identify some developing policy themes coming out of the new American administration and speculate on the effect these policy themes will have on their views of the United States and subsequently on China’s American policies.
First, the authors put forward the thesis that the United States, under Obama, used four very explicit tools to advance American interests in the region. These tools, including diplomatic, legal, economic, and military instruments, do not appear to all be in play under the Trump administration. The Chinese have already taken advantage of this lapse in the use of all of America’s instruments of power. Immediately after the TPP had collapsed as a U.S. initiative, President Xi Jinping called for the continuation of a free trade regime under RCEP, and China’s president subsequently announced at the World Economic Forum that China is willing to step in as the new leader of the global international economic order.

Second, if there has been a debate among these Chinese academics as to what the underlying rationale for the Rebalance was under Obama, the underlying rationale for U.S. engagement strategy in the Asia-Pacific for the Trump administration appears to be explicit: balancing resources domestically and externally for the specific purpose of continuing American hegemony. This is illustrated by the new administration’s “America First” mantra; its fixation on trade agreements that have cost American jobs; its fondness for protectionist trade policies; and an eagerness to pressure allies to pay a greater share of alliance upkeep. Although the Chinese have not yet explicitly exploited this development, the apparent exposure of the naked rationale that the United States appears to really be in it only to shore up its domestic economy and its global dominance at the expense of the international economic order and the well-being of other countries in the system will ultimately play into China’s long-term efforts to separate the United States from its allies and partners in the region.

Third, although the Rebalance to Asia is now expected to display less of the economic, diplomatic, and legal instruments of power, there is no question that it is the intent of the Trump administration to be able to increase and use more of the military instrument of power in the region. Whereas under Obama, the Rebalance was an effort to build up and revitalize the other elements of national power, sometimes at the expense of the military instrument, under Trump the military instrument will be paramount and central to exerting American influence in the region. This, no doubt, will lend credibility and weight to those Chinese scholars and policy advisors, largely from the military-intelligence camp, who counsel relentless development of Chinese military capabilities, the continued militarization of Chinese positions in the South China Sea, and less cooperation on a range of global security issues in the absence of explicit American concessions.

Fourth, although this administration has explicitly called into question the utility of investing time, resources, and political capital in the liberal economic trading order, the Chinese authors recognize that the intent of the Trump administration does not differ markedly from the Obama administration’s policy
objectives for the region. That is, although differing in tactics and strategy, the Trump administration still intends to shore up domestic economic difficulties through its interactions in the Asia-Pacific and its interactions with China in particular. Although the Obama administration did not make trade deficits and trade disputes in general, currency manipulation, corporate espionage, and bilateral investment agreements the centerpieces of American China policy, these were still concerns. The Chinese recognize that these issues now get moved to the forefront of the priorities of the new administration. That means, as Wang Dong noted previously, that the Chinese are gearing up for a fight on many of these fronts and that the U.S.-China relationship will be in for a rocky ride.

**Conclusion**

When it was announced, the Rebalance to Asia policy convinced many Chinese—in government, in academia, and the average man on the street—that the policy was largely a containment strategy of some kind in disguise. As the Chinese academy studied it, Chinese intellectuals were not disabused of this initial notion; however, they came to develop what they thought was a deeper understanding of what motivated the United States to initiate the policy. These motivations included efforts on the United States’ part to shore up its domestic economic problems with the spoils of dominating the Asia-Pacific and the international system; balancing U.S. domestic economic and social ills with the requirements of being a hegemonic power; or operationally adjusting America’s strategic focus to correct a misallocation of resources to the Middle East or an overemphasis on nontraditional threats.

The Chinese academy correctly identified the tools of the Rebalance to be: (1) a reposturing of U.S. military forces in the region; (2) reinvigorating the alliances the United States had in the region and developing new partnerships there as well; (3) reemphasizing U.S. economic statecraft; (4) using international legal norms as instruments of power and control in the region; and (5) high-level political visits to the region to protect American interests in Asia. The Chinese academy and Chinese government came to recognize these as consistent instruments of power the United States was utilizing to ensure its interests were being served in the region and could vigorously compete with expanding Chinese interests.

Recognizing the Rebalance to Asia as a blueprint for American strategic competition with China as it rose economically, politically, and militarily, both the Chinese academy and Chinese government derived corresponding foreign policy responses to the challenges posed by the Rebalance. These included direct initiatives to negotiate China’s interests with the United States; the development of coercive military capabilities for the purposes of enhancing China’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States and the other countries of the
Asia-Pacific; and the use of indirect, soft-power balancing of American institutional power in the region. For the most part, it was probably the case that over the last half decade or so, the Chinese were satisfied with the outcomes of the strategic interaction between China and its superpower competitor.

The arrival of the Trump administration seems to have thrown this calculus completely or mostly off. To Chinese puzzlement, the new U.S. administration appears to have relinquished a few of the instruments of power in its toolkit (e.g., renunciation of TPP and possibly leadership of the international liberal economic order). The Chinese have promptly taken advantage of this development by promoting the Chinese free trade initiative, the RCEP, and have announced China’s willingness to take the lead in managing the international economic order. Nonetheless, U.S. willingness to reenergize the military instrument as the central means of exerting American power in the region must spell trouble for Chinese foreign policy specialists and strategists. Similarly, American willingness to emphasize economic issues—currency manipulation, trade disputes in general, bilateral investment treaties, trade deficits—which normally are not front and center in Sino-U.S. relations, must also spell trouble for Chinese policy makers.

If you are a senior U.S. government official perched in the Old Executive Office Building, the E-Ring of the Pentagon, the seventh floor of the Department of State’s office, or even in the Oval Office, the thought of Chinese discomfort at the emerging, somewhat disruptive policies of the Trump administration overturning the policy foundations set by the Obama Rebalance to Asia might not be a major concern. In fact, that discomfort might even be cause for satisfaction. Whatever positive effects the Rebalance generated in the region, it also was predictable, and apparently, as this article has demonstrated, its intentions and desired effects were assessed correctly by Chinese analyses. This allowed China to formulate policies that were meant to neutralize or mitigate the effects of the Rebalance. Whether the Chinese policy response succeeded in doing so would be the subject of another study entirely. One way of interpreting the history of Sino-U.S. relations over the past five years is that the Chinese ate our lunch and the Trump administration is going to take corrective measures to reverse that trend. Another way of interpreting the dynamics of the relationship is that the two superpowers achieved a policy and balance of power equilibrium that permitted an orderly management of international relations, both in the Asia-Pacific and globally, at least for the near to midterm. If the Trump administration is assuming the former, then the Chinese are quite correct: we are in for a rocky ride.

Notes

1. Wang Dong and Yin Chengzhi, “China’s Assessments of U.S. Rebalancing to Asia”
(conference paper, 7th Berlin Conference on Asian Security, Germany, 1–2 July 2013),


3. The sinologist Michael Swain coined the term quasi-authoritative to represent content that has a link to institutions with sufficient authority to make policy decisions or at a minimum to influence policy decisions.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid., 18–19.


20. Ibid., 135.


23. Ibid., 39.


25. Ibid., 34.


27. Ibid., 133–34.

28. Ibid., 136.

29. Ibid., 138.


32. Ibid., 19–23.


36. Ibid., 47.

37. Ibid.


43. Ibid., 139.
44. Chen, Strategic Review 2012, 27.
45. Ibid., 27–28.
46. Ibid., 28.
48. Ibid., 48–49.
49. Ibid., 49.
51. Ibid.
Identity Crisis between the Wars
How Doctrine Shaped the Marine Corps
after World War I and Vietnam

Rebecca W. Jensen and Colonel Keil Gentry (Ret)

Abstract: Doctrine is developed to serve as a template for military operations. The effect of doctrine is to influence how military Services and members think about, and fight, wars. In the U.S. Marine Corps, two significant doctrinal publications, the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* (1934) and *Warfighting* (1989), were written to change Service culture in a manner that reflected external and internal pressures on the Corps. This article examines these two publications against existing definitions of effective doctrine, and considers the role doctrine played in shaping Service culture in the Marine Corps using the landing manual and *Warfighting* as examples.

Keywords: Marine Corps, doctrine, military adaptation, Service culture, maneuver warfare, amphibious warfare, peacetime military change, drivers of military change, military operations, *Warfighting*, *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, TLOM, professional military education

As the Vietnam War was winding down, military historian Michael Howard wrote that he was “tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, they have got it wrong.” He went on to argue that this was not of great concern, as even more important than having the right doctrine was having the ability to adapt when peacetime doctrine
was applied in war. He concluded that “it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too badly wrong.”

This suggests that the characteristics of good doctrine are not only that it should be robust in practice, but also that it promote flexibility so that armies and commanders can adjust when the specifics of the doctrine prove not to be robust. For doctrine developed in an interwar period to be good enough, it must account for a range of military operations and guide militaries to build the right capabilities to meet that range. Good Service doctrine will also help define the roles and missions of an individual Service within the joint force. Implicit in the recognition of a distinction between the formulation of doctrine in an age of relative peace and its implementation is that doctrine is essentially a conceptual undertaking. How can doctrine deal with abstracts and yet be applicable in the decidedly concrete world of warfare?

This article examines two seminal doctrinal publications of the United States Marine Corps: the Tentative Landing Operations Manual (TLOM), developed in the early 1930s; and Warfighting, developed in the late 1980s. Using these two manuals as examples, the authors argue that Marine Corps doctrine has a specific style that lends itself particularly well to clearly defining its role in national defense, in part, because of a streamlined, centrally directed writing process. While each doctrine was written in response to exogenous drivers—including potential external threats and the seemingly never-ending threat to the Marine Corps as a Service distinct from the U.S. Navy or Army—each also was driven by endogenous factors as well, in particular the desire to create or change institutional identity and culture. In the case of the landing manual, Marines correctly saw the need for an amphibious doctrine that provided for education and training should the nation go to war in the Asia-Pacific, and the proponents of maneuver warfare again positioned the Marine Corps to remain viable despite the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In both cases, the Marine Corps was able to create doctrine that justified its existence as a separate and distinct Service during periods of change and develop a Service culture and identity that suited its skills and heritage.

**Doctrine in History and Historical Doctrine**

Just as specific doctrines discussed here have historical context, so too does the concept of doctrine; and it has evolved. The idea of doctrine, if the term denotes officially promulgated beliefs about how to fight, goes back to the Roman Empire and its infantry tactics and structure as epitomized by the phalanx and the legion. If it refers only to written doctrine, there are military manuals dating roughly to the origins of the printing press in the fifteenth century, which allowed them to become more common from that point on. Arguably, modern doctrine flows from the Napoleonic Wars with the writings of Antoine-Henri Jomini and
Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz in particular began a serious attempt to study and codify how the mental domain should be treated in war. Both authors influenced how militaries should fight, think, and be organized. Within this context, J. F. C. Fuller, a nineteenth-century military historian, described doctrine as “the central idea of an army . . . which to be sound must be based on the principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit to mutation in accordance with change in circumstances.” As so many historians and military professionals have done, Fuller and authors like him applied their understanding of the past to understanding recent or future conflicts.

Doctrine is also about belief; it is not coincidence that the two groups that use the concept are religions and militaries. In 1903, Marshal Ferdinand Jean Marie Foch said that the regulations he published for the French military, which are in fact doctrine, were his staff’s “most sure guide, and one to be followed with sincere conviction and entire faith.” While the vast majority of the writing in most doctrine manuals is concerned with tangibles, it is the underlying assumptions about the nature and purpose of fighting that give doctrine value and make it something to believe in, not merely to understand.

While for much of history military professionals have written and promulgated doctrine, more recently scholars in the field of strategic studies have added their voices to the conversation. Two different schools of thought on the purpose of doctrine emerged, and the authors argue that rather than presenting a dichotomy, they represent two roles for doctrine, both of which are fulfilled by Marine Corps doctrine, in general, and by the TLOM and Warfighting, in particular. One school is argued by Harald Hoiback, who combines both academic and military experience and sees doctrine as a positive response to an external threat. Hoiback’s writing presents doctrine in realist terms, as something that is effective because it shapes behavior. In a seemingly contrasting perspective, Jan Ångström and J. J. Widén suggest that doctrine can be viewed in an entirely different way: as a source of belief and identity. These two war studies professors assert that doctrine is a normative response to an internal challenge to identity.

To expand on Hoiback’s ideas, it is important to note that he sees three ideal types of doctrine; of course, these ideals do not exist, yet each of these three types is present in almost all doctrine to some degree. As a military professional, however, Hoiback focuses on the concrete (i.e., doctrine) which, from a functional perspective, serves three different purposes. First, doctrine is a tool of education. It instructs officers how to apply the skills they have acquired at the tactical level to problems at higher echelons as they advance in their careers. Doctrine represents the template of how wars ought to be fought, sometimes at the highest and most theoretical levels, but also on granular and pragmatic issues. This role for doctrine corresponds to formal ongoing education and
published best practices for all professions, and it complements apprenticeship, on-the-job learning, experience, and training.

Second, doctrine is a tool of command, in part because of its role in the intellectual formation of officers. In this sense, doctrine serves to prescribe the default actions of commanders in the field and to provide the boundaries within which they may improvise when necessary. In this capacity, doctrine makes the military predictable, which is useful for coordination within war as related to repeatable procedures and for reducing friction and counterbalancing the unpredictability of the enemy and political leadership. Third, doctrine can be a tool of change. This can be in response to new external circumstances, such as interests, alliances, or transformative technologies. It also can be in response to failure, driving conceptual changes to how to fight. The U.S. Army’s FM 100-5, *Operations*, can be seen as an example of this, as an attempt to steer rapid change from the top in the wake of failure and effect a systematic change in how the Army thought about fighting. Overall, Høiback examines doctrine through the lens of both the academic and the military professional, which focuses attention on the practical application of doctrine: fighting the next war better.

Ångström and Widén take a different tack, looking to understand doctrine’s larger institutional purposes. In their article for *Journal of Strategic Studies*, they explicitly describe doctrine as religion. Doctrine provides ontological security by giving meaning to the decisions and actions required in war. Like religious doctrine, it describes reality for believers. Good doctrine, if viewed in this light, is doctrine that shapes and transmits identity. Ångström and Widén challenge the validity of evaluating doctrine by its influence on military effectiveness, because utilitarian assessment of doctrine lacks a “feedback mechanism that can provide clear and concise quality standards.” If performance in war is such a feedback mechanism, it is not useful, because war is an “interactive (and often rare) phenomenon,” with unknown variables, including the identity of the enemy. Because it is hard to test doctrine under realistic circumstances, and because in a war there are too many factors to isolate doctrine in order to evaluate its quality, they suggest a constructivist framework within which to assess the degree to which doctrine as a set of beliefs shapes military identity.

Within the context of this recent work, this article incorporates elements of both schools of thought in considering the TLOM and *Warfighting*. While a monocausal explanation of military effectiveness is seldom convincing, or even defensible, the degree to which doctrine shapes behavior, and serves as a tool of education, command, and change, can in fact be measured by examining how militaries act during both peace and war. At the same time, these two manuals were written not only to change how the Corps trains for and fights wars, but also to shape its perception of warfare and of effectiveness in war.
The degree to which they shape belief and identity is therefore a significant measure of both their quality and their success.

For the purposes of this article, doctrine is either the entirety or one part of the official published, normative statements about how a military organization ought to prepare and fight for war. Official sources exclude writings by others on the same topics, however insightful, because while they do influence how the military thinks, they are external. Moreover, published sources exclude collective and received wisdom, speeches, or statements, because while they are internal, they are not necessarily coherent or binding. The term normative allows us to focus on the prescriptive element of doctrine, excluding descriptive writings that include the lessons learned from retrospective work. Reference to prepare and fight means that we have the opportunity to discuss attitudes, training, leadership in peacetime, and institutional culture, not simply the fighting of wars.

Existing theories of military change typically identify disruptive technologies, the threat of defeat, civilian intervention, and bureaucratic dynamics as drivers of change. Without discounting the importance of these factors, this article suggests that doctrine can be an endogenous source of military change, not simply a reaction to it or an effect of it. Two Marine Corps doctrinal publications, separated by half a century, the Tentative Landing Operations Manual and Warfighting illustrate this.

The Tentative Landing Operations Manual

The Tentative Landing Operations Manual was written and edited by the faculty and students of the Marine Corps Schools, during the academic year 1933–34, based on a decade of an experimental, but deliberate, program of training. Drawing upon history and theory and upon the range of experience reflected among the group, they generated a document that was refined and approved by the commandant of the Marine Corps Schools and then by the Commandant of the Corps. In 1938, the manual was adopted and adapted by the U.S. Navy and became the basis for planning amphibious operations.

The original TLOM is nearly 500 pages long, divided into five chapters, although the edition adapted and published by the Navy in 1938 includes additional chapters. The first chapter of the manual sets out the necessity for a doctrine on landing operations and the defense of territories so gained. Chapter 2 describes ship-to-shore movement and the role played in the landing by aviation, artillery, intelligence, communication, and other technical measures, such as smoke or chemicals. The third chapter (which subsequently was revised and published as the Tentative Manual for the Defense of Advanced Bases) describes the role of all those capabilities in sustaining and defending operations after a successful landing. Chapter 4 details how staffing must support opposed land-
ing operations. The fifth chapter addresses logistics for all of these phases, as well as the logistics for a withdrawal from an unsuccessful landing and the use of an advanced base to provide logistical support to efforts further ahead. There also are appendices addressing orders and training.

Without specifying any particular threat or theater, the manual argues that overseas war requires advanced bases; yet at the time, leadership inside and outside of the Corps understood that the Asia-Pacific region was a likely area of operations in the future. Inasmuch as the role of the Marine Corps is to advance the mission of the Navy, it must be capable both of seizing such bases and of defending them until either Army forces take over the task or the base becomes unnecessary. Advanced bases can have “most, if not all, of the characteristics of a main outlying base except permanency.” The manual also allows, at the other end of the spectrum, for the establishment of minor bases chosen for particular advantages, which serve as stepping stones as the fleet advances toward a distant theater.

Also addressed are the peculiar intricacies of command relationships in a landing operation, in which the flag officer commanding the naval attack force (including all forces participating) and the commander of the Fleet Marine Force have overlapping areas of responsibility. A parallel with ground operations is established, in that a landing operation is, in essence, an assault that substitutes, at least in the initial actions, naval gunfire and carrier-based aviation for artillery and ground-based aviation. While the landing force is tasked with supporting fleet operations, during a landing operation “it must be thoroughly understood that the landing force is engaged in the main effort and all other naval arms during that critical period are acting in support of” the landing force.

Chapter 2 addresses the mechanics of the landing, considering variables ranging from selection of landing area, timing, and attacking simultaneously or in waves, with diagrams illustrating various shorelines and possible approaches. It includes extensive discussion of how responsibilities must be broken down in both the naval and land force components during the crucial ship-to-shore phase of the assault, and explicitly recommends close contact between the two groups and their commanders, including while in transit to the theater, to develop familiarity and improve communication during the subsequent assault. It also provides detailed, illustrated guidance for how to diagram the landing, deployment, and debarkation of personnel and materiel. While recommending extensive and explicit planning for the process of transitioning from ship to shore, however, the manual states that, since the terrain will be unfamiliar and information about the position and condition of other units will be poor, “detailed methods of executing the scheme of maneuver on shore should not be prescribed.” Rather, subordinate commanders should be given sufficient information about their own objective and those of neighboring units, along with
as much knowledge as possible about the geography and goal of the assault, and then entrusted to use their initiative to these ends.

This chapter also addresses how naval forces in the area are to support efforts once the landing force is ashore, including communications, salvage work, and delivering additional ammunition. The manual stresses the importance of careful coordination of naval gunfire with field artillery and aviation to support the ground element with both scheduled and on-call fires. The use of aviation in all phases of the attack is addressed, as are technical details of the movement and employment of field artillery, the role of intelligence and communication, and the use of chemical weapons both against personnel and to create smoke to cover movement, particularly in the ship-to-shore movement.

Chapter 3 discusses the holding of captured bases. In the wake of Gallipoli—when the gains made by Allied forces were lost due either to failure to press the advantage or lack of reinforcements—the subject was of central importance to any attempt to craft a sustainable approach to opposed landings.15 The chapter begins by discussing the types of defense best suited to various topographies, the disposition of troops and defenses, and defense against air, surface, and submarine attacks. The role of aviation in reconnaissance, communications, and repelling enemy naval forces is discussed, as is close air support in defending against an amphibious attack, building on the work of the first director of Marine Corps Aviation, then-Major Alfred A. Cunningham, among others.16 Conversely, the defense against enemy aviation is included in this chapter. While chapter 3 is quite technical, without explicit implications for strategy, its treatment of aviation as part of broader doctrine was, in its context, a novelty. Moreover, the very brief chapter 4 (on staff) mandates a specific billet under the F-3 (operations officer) for naval gunfire, but not for air support.

Chapter 5 (on logistics) is another technical portion of the doctrine and includes specific guidance for various landing craft, with tables and loading diagrams. Informed by the Corps’ experiences in similar missions, this material is prescriptive and detailed. Even within the discussion of logistics, though, can be found a gesture toward the complexities of sustained amphibious operations on a large scale: the manual recommends that naval personnel necessary to operate the small craft involved be integrated into teams with ground personnel as early as possible and be trained as teams. Discussion of logistics and local civilian populations reflects the reality in which this doctrine, while not developed for any identified theater, was likely to be put into practice.17

Taken together, this doctrine was particularly significant given how amphibious warfare was perceived in the wake of the First World War. Alfred T. Mahan, a then-popular naval historian whose works underpinned the Navy’s strategic thought, considered joint operations to be ineffective and needlessly dangerous.18 While English naval historian Sir Julian S. Corbett saw value in
In his article, Jensen and Gentry discuss the historical background of amphibious operations, emphasizing the role of naval support in military operations. They note that naval support was seen as feasible only once command of the sea had been secured, rather than as a complement to or requirement for that achievement. Influenced by Gallipoli, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, another soldier-historian, concluded in the 1930s that while fighting and landing simultaneously had always been difficult, in the face of the weaponry of the day, it was nearly impossible. The insight that amphibious operations could enable—rather than be constrained by—the reach of naval forces, combined with the determination to develop an approach that mitigated the risk of these operations on a large scale, was transformative. This principle was embodied in the TLOM and later adopted by other militaries.

As well as the losses suffered by Allied forces in opposed landings during the First World War, another external driver was the perceived need to capture and defend advanced naval bases in future conflicts. The concept of having Marines aboard ship, surplus to the requirements of the fighting ships themselves, was proposed by Admiral George Dewey in 1900, and Commandant Charles Heywood shortly thereafter assigned personnel to develop procedures for taking advanced bases. While this capability was put into use in the early years of the twentieth century, as the First World War loomed on the horizon and then became the primary priority for the U.S. military, amphibious operations were given significantly less attention, with respect to doctrine, planning, and training. As early as 1920, though, the rise of Japan prompted Commandant John A. Lejeune to charge Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis with developing a plan for the Marine Corps in a future war in the Pacific, which became the basis for the Marines’ role in War Plan Orange.

Institutional pressures also drove the creation of the TLOM in the 1930s. As Assistant Commandant, Lieutenant General John H. Russell Jr. felt that the constabulary and counterrevolutionary missions with which the Corps had been associated were not a good fit for either the needs of the nation or those of the Corps. Further, since he considered an amphibious capability to be strategically vital, he proposed that the development of a manual accessible to naval officers would ensure more appropriate support for this Marine Corps’ mission. This identity balancing, in which the Corps defined for itself the need to be differentiated from the Army while maintaining both autonomy from and a connection to the Navy, is characteristic of doctrinal and institutional innovation in the decades that followed the publication of the TLOM.

The development of a doctrine for opposed landings in the wake of the First World War reinforced an amphibious identity for the Marine Corps that had been partially forgotten by its land actions in Europe. It also marked the beginning of a distinct approach to close air support. While the Marines had used aviation as a substitute for artillery in many encounters in the 1920s,
the landing manual introduced organic support, which led in practice to low-altitude strafing and attack in support of landings. Part of the legacy of the TLOM was to more concretely embed amphibious operations into the culture and identity of the Corps, to such an extent that a focus on other missions has arguably been hampered where those missions conflicted with this role.

The context of the manual’s creation presented many challenges for the Corps. In the interwar period, Congress cut the budget and along with it funding for the Marine Corps at a time when the number of Marines increased. Military aviation was making a transition from being a fairly auxiliary part of combat, useful chiefly for reconnaissance, to its role in World War II and after, in which it took on tremendous strategic and tactical importance. Institutional-ly, the Corps was in search of a new role, after decades as a constabulary force in the so-called Banana Wars and then its experience in World War I as very nearly a second land army. Under constant pressure to justify its budget, and sometimes its existence, the Corps needed a role that built upon its relationship with the Navy and made clear its different value proposition from the Army.

The TLOM contains much that is more properly characterized as a set of techniques, tactics, and procedures, rather than doctrine, but there are three major elements that address the philosophy of fighting and preparing to fight that were transformative. The first is the recognition that the ground and sea components of an amphibious attack must work together closely, not only during the operation itself, but in training, as far in advance of the operation as possible and ideally as a default. Opposed landings on a massive scale required new relationships between the land and naval commanders and between the commanders and their subordinates, which were described in the manual. Remarkably, while the role of the Corps, as stipulated in the manual, was to support the mission of the Navy during a landing, all elements present were to make the landing their highest priority—essentially a time-bound reversal of the relationship.

The second is the codification of an organic relationship between the landing force and both naval gunfire and air support. These relationships were built into the Corps’ landing operations by designating staff positions for these elements, as well as mandating training together as early as possible in the planning process, ideally as a matter of routine. In the amphibious attacks of the Second World War and beyond, air and naval gunfire were key elements for all the Services; but the recognition that these elements must, in landing operations, be integrated with, and in support of, the landing forces was both a novelty at the time and the seed of the much later structural innovation in the official codification of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (often referred to as the MAGTF), finalized in 1963.

The third is the linkage drawn between opposed landings and their subse-
sequent defense—one lesson of Gallipoli being that provisional gains could be quickly nullified without both an immediate push further inland and supporting forces. The landing manual includes chapters on the defense of the island or littoral area, including the logistics needed to cope with local populations and the establishment of the infrastructure needed to support naval forces in the region. These portions of the manual were later published separately, as the Tentative Manual for the Defense of Advanced Bases in 1936.28

**Warfighting**

The *Warfighting* manual originated in 1989 as Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), and in 1997, it was redesignated as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1). According to *Warfighting*, the document “describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps.”29 It describes the tenets of maneuver warfare, which boils down to applying strength against weakness or forcing an opponent to a weak position that can be exploited. In less than 100 pages of text, *Warfighting* describes the nature of war, the theory of war, preparation for war, and how the Marine Corps conducts war. The philosophy contained in this slim tome shapes everything from how Marines lead to the development of operational concepts that guide how the Marine Corps organizes, trains, and equips the force, at least in theory.

Maneuver warfare is an approach to warfighting concerned with the disruption of the adversary’s decision cycle, the agility of the warfighter’s decision cycle, and the exploitation of opportunities and vulnerabilities created by this mismatch. It is not confined to any particular domain or era of fighting, and it emphasizes adaptability, spontaneity, and flexibility, and accordingly requires delegating decision making to the unit or individual in contact with the adversary. This approach is built on a specific institutional culture, in which trust and the flow of information permeate the lines of communication at all levels. It also necessitates a different ethos of training, education, and thinking about war, one that emphasizes intent over explicit direction and flexibility in execution over dogged application of well-drilled tactics.

Although all of the Services include tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as part of doctrine, in practice, the Marine Corps differentiates between TTPs and doctrine.30 TTPs describe the basic blocking and tackling of operations. They are the well-drilled tasks that are orchestrated at the point of contact. Doctrine, on the other hand, allows one to create a spirit of collaboration among elements of the MAGTF to create a dilemma for the enemy.31

General James N. Mattis has often referred to doctrine as the “last refuge of the unimaginative.” In a recent interview, however, he also stressed that Marines must know doctrine cold and then improvise like a jazzman.32 An unimaginative following of doctrine, for example, would have limited Task Force
58 operations to the littorals rather than 350 nautical miles from the sea, an operation Mattis executed in Afghanistan in 2001. At the time, the doctrinal employment of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was up to 200 nautical miles inland. Moreover, doctrine provided little guidance when forming command relationships. Typically, the two MEUs would have been commanded by a Marine brigadier general, designated the commander, landing force, and the two Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARGs) would be commanded by a Navy rear admiral, designated the commander, amphibious task force. The two commanders would have a supported and supporting relationship. Breaking with doctrine, then-Brigadier General Mattis was placed in charge of Task Force 58, which comprised 15th MEU (Special Operations Capable or SOC) and the Peleliu ARG with the 26th MEU (SOC) and Bataan ARG. This illustrates Mattis’ assertion that “in the Marine Corps, doctrine is descriptive rather than prescriptive and the culture of the Marine Corps doesn’t reward the unimaginative application of doctrine.”

The publication of Warfighting on 6 March 1989 marked the official adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine in the Marine Corps. Warfighting was a synthesis of the strategic concepts of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, written in such a way as to be meaningful for all Marines from the enlisted to the highest-ranking officers. Warfighting is as much philosophy as doctrine. In the foreword, General Alfred M. Gray Jr. wrote, “This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the Marine Corps’ doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight.” The ideas underpinning maneuver warfare had been circulating throughout the Corps for about a decade, spurring discussion and innovative solutions for both the practical aspects of the Corps’ role among the Services, as well as its identity building in the post-Vietnam era. Gray had used maneuver warfare while he was a commander at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and by the time he signed the final document, he had become Commandant of the Marine Corps. By 1989, Warfighting officially dictated how the Marine Corps would approach tactics, operations, strategy, roles, and missions. Warfighting helped the Marine Corps regain its identity, purpose, and confidence after being battered by its Vietnam experience, where it had suffered by using attrition warfare-type tactics without having a stunning victory. The glory days of World War II had long been over, and the nation and the Corps smarted from the experience in Southeast Asia. The Marine Corps once again embraced its identity as an amphibious and expeditionary force after a protracted ground war. The Marine Corps finds itself in a similar position today as it emerges from long ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in his initial guidance, the current Commandant directed the Corps to “reinvigorate a Maneuver Warfare mindset for the 21st Century” and to “serve as a maritime-based expeditionary force.”
Three factors drove the formulation of maneuver warfare as codified in *Warfighting*. The first was a profound dissatisfaction with how professional military education had failed officers during Vietnam. The heavy emphasis on attrition-type warfare had ill prepared that generation of officers. In Vietnam, the military tried to win the war “by accumulating tactical victories, accepting battle wherever and whenever offered.” In the end, that approach failed. In the period immediately after Vietnam, the Marine Corps concentrated on recruiting the right people and getting its equipment back in shape. By the mid-1970s, the Marine Corps was focused on operations, and maneuver warfare ideas began to surface. Additionally, the Marine Corps sought to return to its amphibious roots after fighting ashore for a decade.

The second factor driving the development of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps was the Cold War. In 1981, the year Major General Gray took command of the 2d Marine Division, the United States was engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the Marine Corps anticipated fighting against a numerically superior enemy if that war turned hot. General Gray realized that an attritionist approach to fighting the Soviets or their proxies was a recipe for disaster. In a letter to the division, he wrote, “Historically, maneuver warfare has been the means by which smaller but more intelligently led forces have achieved victory.” In a 1982 address to the officers of the division, General Gray stated maneuver warfare was the official doctrine of the 2d Marine Division. His declaration was striking, because the Marine Corps had not fully embraced maneuver warfare. In 1983, the Marine Corps responded to a House Armed Services Committee query on maneuver warfare by stating that the “Marine Corps does not subscribe to any exclusive formula or recipe for warfare,” but that “the concepts of maneuver warfare are evident throughout the Marine Corps” and that efforts are being made “to further integrate the concepts of maneuver warfare and amphibious warfare.” The third driving factor was that as an amphibious force, the tenets of maneuver warfare resonated with the Marine Corps.

The manner in which *Warfighting* was written is extraordinary. Captain John Schmitt wrote it for the Commandant, and it was never staffed. In nearly every other case, doctrine and other Marine Corps-level publications went, and go, through extensive review at the action officer, colonel, and general officer levels across numerous organizations. The result is a consensus product that often lacks the power of a single voice. One of the few other publications that was not staffed is *Leading Marines*, written for the 35th Commandant, General James F. Amos.

Captain John Schmitt arrived at the Doctrine Center aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico in 1986. At that time, the Doctrine Center was a backwater. Early on, Schmitt wrote Operational Handbook 6-1 (OH 6-1), *Ground Combat Operations*. As a former member of the 2d Marine Division under General Gray,
Captain Schmitt was a maneuver warfare zealot. As such, he laced the early drafts of *Ground Combat Operations* with references to maneuver warfare. At the time, there was opposition to maneuver warfare, since one of the key proponents of maneuver warfare voices in the debate was William S. Lind, who was antagonistic and had written several articles critical of the Marine Corps and senior leaders. Many critics dismissed Lind’s arguments, which included numerous examples drawn from the German approach to war (to include terminology associated with *blitzkrieg*—literally lightning war—such as *schwerpunkt*), since Germany had lost the war. Additionally, maneuver warfare was facing extinction with the expected retirement of its main proponent, Lieutenant General Gray; Captain Schmitt was directed to remove references to maneuver warfare in *Ground Combat Operations*. However, when the dark-horse candidate, Gray, instead of retiring was announced as the next Commandant, Schmitt was directed to put maneuver warfare back in.

Shortly after General Gray assumed his duties as Commandant, Schmitt briefed him on *Ground Combat Operations*, which was more of an encyclopedia or reference manual than a philosophy. What Schmitt did not realize at the time was that the briefing was an audition to write *Warfighting*. Up to this point, everyone assumed the author would be a colonel. With the passion of a zealot, Schmitt told the Commandant that it was all well and good to write a manual on maneuver warfare, but that if the Commandant were not willing to make the institutional investment in personnel, education, and training, it might as well be tossed in the trash. At this point in the conversation, Schmitt tossed his copy of *Ground Combat Operations* over his shoulder, where it landed—to his surprise—in a nearby trash can. Schmitt is convinced that is why he was selected to write *Warfighting*.

The Commandant and Captain Schmitt met only twice over the 4–5 months it took to write *Warfighting*, but they were long sessions (one lasted 13 hours). During one discussion, Schmitt said he would, of course, start with the principles of war. General Gray asked him to which principles he was referring. Flabbergasted, Schmitt responded with MOOSEMUSS, the mnemonic device every Marine officer uses to remember the nine principles of war: mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, and simplicity. General Gray responded, “Oh, those principles.” During that exchange, Schmitt realized he would need to be more creative and less conventional than regurgitating J. F. C. Fuller’s principles of war. General Gray never gave Captain Schmitt direct guidance; instead, he gave his intent in the form of stories. Giving intent without directing how to accomplish the mission is in keeping with the concept of maneuver warfare. In writing *Warfighting*, Schmitt codified the results of years of discourse on the subject of maneuver warfare.
Given its unconventional creation, it is natural to wonder about the quality of a doctrine that, in its printed form, measures 5.5 inches by 8 inches and is only 88 pages long (10 of which are endnotes). By either the realist or constructivist approach to evaluating doctrine discussed previously, *Warfighting* was successful.

According to Høiback, doctrine serves as a tool of education, a tool of command, and a tool of change. As a tool of education, *Warfighting* is touched on in whole or in part throughout the Marine Corps’ continuum of professional military education (PME). It is used to teach junior Marines initiative, junior officers how to give intent, and senior officers strategy. One of the reasons *Warfighting* permeates PME is its applicability across the range of military operations. Since *Warfighting* focuses on how to think about war, rather than what to think, its concepts can be applied to both state-on-state conflict and counterinsurgency. Its applicability to state-on-state warfare is clear, since part of its genesis was to address the challenge of a smaller Marine force achieving victory over a larger Soviet force. What may be less clear to the casual reader is the applicability to military operations other than war. Captain Schmitt explained the applicability to counterinsurgency in a discussion of identifying critical factors: “Sun Tzu captured it very succinctly: ‘Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.’ The basic idea is the same. Attack the thing that will hurt the enemy most. ‘Attacking’ in this sense need not necessarily be destructive. It may actually be a constructive act, such as the Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam.”

In a recent example, General Mattis, recognizing the 1st Marine Division faced a different kind of fight in 2004 than it faced nine months before during the drive to Baghdad, applied *Warfighting* principles to how he organized, prepared, and employed the division in Iraq. In an example of reorganization, he created a primary staff section that was responsible for information operations, civil military operations, and fire support. He prepared his commanders and staff by issuing clear guidance on dealing with the Iraqi people, conducting a counterinsurgency symposium, and tailoring training to counterinsurgency. One of the many adjustments to TTP while conducting combat operations involved modifying counterbattery processes to limit civilian casualties when responding to indirect fire attacks.

As a tool of command, *Warfighting* stresses the importance of clearly articulating intent, whether it be in mission-type orders or including purpose with every task. References to *Warfighting* are ubiquitous. It is referred to in the guidance promulgated by subsequent Commandants; in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 6-11), *Leading Marines*; and is quoted or mentioned in countless command philosophies.
As a tool of change, Warfighting achieved its initial purpose of transitioning the Marine Corps from an attritionist mindset to one of maneuver. Although the island-hopping campaign of World War II was maneuverist at the strategic level, tactical amphibious operations relied heavily on attritionist principles. Before landing, U.S. forces attempted to attrite the enemy through naval gunfire bombardments and air strikes. Once ashore, Marines and soldiers suffered tremendous losses, as they defeated the enemy largely through sheer numerical advantage.

By adopting maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps changed its approach to amphibious operations. The influence of Warfighting is clearly evident in Marine Corps Concept Paper 1 (MCCP 1), Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), dated 4 January 1996, and in Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), dated 25 July 1997, both of which apply the tenets of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations. The principles of Operational Maneuver from the Sea nest well within Warfighting:

- OMFTS focuses on an operational objective.
- OMFTS uses the sea as maneuver space.
- OMFTS generates overwhelming tempo and momentum.
- OMFTS pits strength against weakness.
- OMFTS emphasizes intelligence, deception, and flexibility.
- OMFTS integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.

When one applies Ångström and Widén’s constructivist approach to assess doctrine in “reinforcing military identity and providing believers with ontological security,” Warfighting fares quite well. The Marine Corps lost part of its identity as an amphibious, expeditionary force as it fought a protracted ground war in the mature theater of operations of Vietnam. Warfighting helped restore clarity to the identity (roles and missions) of the Marine Corps as an amphibious, expeditionary force. Amphibious operations, by their very nature, are all about maneuver. Tactically, amphibious forces seek to maneuver from ship to objective and bypass enemy strengths. Operationally, amphibious forces are well suited to serve as part of a campaign or as a theater reserve. Strategically, amphibious forces buy the national command authority decision space and give the nation its only sustainable joint forcible entry capability.

Warfighting is effective at providing Marines with ontological security. This effectiveness is due in large part to General Gray approaching Warfighting as a philosophy. The ability of Warfighting to permeate the Marine Corps without being staffed is due to the prominence of the position of its Service chief. The Marine Corps is unique among the armed forces of the United States.
it is because there are only two four-star generals, the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, or perhaps it is due to Service culture—but when the Commandant speaks, the Corps speaks with the same voice. In the other Services, there are multiple four-stars representing multiple constituencies, which can result in a cacophony of voices.

*Warfighting*’s prominence is due in part to how the Marine Corps organizes its doctrine. When Lieutenant General Van Riper assumed command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, he discovered there were more than 300 doctrinal publications, many of which had nothing to do with doctrine. Colonel Robert K. Dobson Jr. developed a tiered system of doctrinal publications in the Marine Corps. At the top were high-order doctrinal publications (MCDPs); the next tier covered tactics, techniques, and procedure (Marine Corps warfighting publications and an unlimited number of Marine Corps reference publications). As the preeminent doctrinal publication, *Warfighting* was redesignated MCDP 1 when it was rewritten in 1997.55

The Marine Corps had a long history of rich intellectual activities in developing doctrine in small wars, amphibious operations, and helicopterborne operations. During Vietnam and in the immediate years afterward, the Marine Corps passed through its version of the Dark Ages. *Warfighting* was the product of an intellectual renaissance that took place at Quantico. This renaissance was in part a function of its time, as General Gray described during a filmed February 2015 panel discussion: “When there’s no money available and it is really difficult fiscally, like it is going to be here in the coming years and like it was in 1970s; during the Carter administration we had no money in the Marine Corps. We had little to none after World War II, and we had little to none after Korea. Yet that is when some of our greatest innovative ideas took place, because it doesn’t cost any money to think.”56

*Warfighting* helped restore clarity to the identity, roles, and missions of the Marine Corps as an amphibious expeditionary force after a protracted ground war in the mature theater of operations of Vietnam. *Warfighting* also resonated with the Corps’ identity as an organization that carries out operations other than war. While its genesis lay in state-on-state warfare against a numerically superior foe, it was by design applicable to stability and counterinsurgency operations.

**Commonalities**

While separated by half a century and shaped in very different geopolitical, technological, and fiscal realities, these two seminal works—the TLOM and *Warfighting*—have a number of features in common. Both doctrines were personally supervised and championed by the Commandant. While the landing manual was written not by a committee but by an entire school under the di-
rection of the commandant of schools, its development was monitored and the doctrine ultimately put into its final form with the guidance of Commandant Russell and the then-commandant of Marine Schools, Brigadier General Thomas Holcomb. *Warfighting* was even more directly linked with Commandant Gray, who—with Captain Schmitt—largely cocreated the manual. This approach is not typical of the doctrine creation process more broadly, which tends to take place over longer periods and to be conducted by committees and staffs.57

Both doctrines were crafted in response to a need for an institutional role, not simply in response to changes in the global environment or new threats. In the early twentieth century, the Marine Corps was threatened with the loss of a differentiating role. Its original mandate as shipborne infantry at the command of naval captains, and to assault from ship to ship, was becoming less relevant; and during the First World War, Marines were increasingly tasked as a second ground force.58 The delineation of an amphibious role in the TLOM, within the context of a new strategic vision, gave it a place that was not only complementary to the capabilities of the Navy and Army, but also essential to victory. *Warfighting*, similarly, arose from a response to the nominal role of the Corps in the European theater in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which called for it to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s flanks in a possible war with the Soviets. While the early debate centered on choosing between remaining a strictly amphibious force—which would have little relevance in such a conflict—or *heavying up* by adopting tracked armor and guns—which would risk redefining the Corps as a second army—maneuver warfare proposed retaining the amphibious capability while adopting a doctrine that would make the Corps’ comparative lack of heavy metal an asset.59

The TLOM and *Warfighting* are capability oriented, not threat oriented. While particular geostrategic issues informed the thinking of the doctrine writers, their products are meant to be valid across time and space, and not in one specific theater. To a large extent this has been the case. Principles from the TLOM informed the creation of the MAGTF, as well as amphibious operations in Korea and Vietnam; *Warfighting* has informed both the operations and the critique of the Iraq War.60 Both emphasize the importance of the autonomy of local and junior leaders, and what could be called mission command, or mission tactics, although the specific terminology is not until the latter manual, and the explicit communications described in the TLOM are in part considered, optimally, to be implicit in *Warfighting*.

**Legacy**

The TLOM created an identity for the Corps as expeditionary and amphibious, linked with, but not intrinsic to, naval operations, and quite distinct from the
role of the Army. Warfighting led to the entrenchment of maneuver warfare at all levels of training in the Corps and furthered this institutional identity. The TLOM succeeded in shaping the culture of the Corps to the extent that one analyst suggests it may have stymied mastery of other roles, drawing a connection between the inability to institutionalize Commandant Charles C. Krulak’s reforms in the late 1990s and their tension with the amphibious role. The extent to which maneuver warfare informed Marine Corps operations in the twenty-first century is still contested. In the publications, instruction, and rhetoric of the Corps, it has left a clear and lasting imprint. One recent indication of the legacy of these two publications upon identity, as well as operations, is in the recently published Marine Corps Operating Concept (2016), in which language and concepts from manuals published in 1989 and 1934 often appear verbatim and fit seamlessly.

Notes
8. Ångström and Widén, “Religion or Reason?,” 201.
12. Ibid., 1-34.
13. Ibid., 1-32, italics original.
14. Ibid., 2-212.
15. Cecil Faber Aspinall-Oglander and A. F. Becke, comps., Military Operations: Gallipoli (London: William Heinemann, 1932). It should be noted that the ideas described in the TLOM’s chapter 3 were developed prior to World War I.


31. Gen James Mattis (Ret), interview with Keil Gentry, 24 June 2016. At the time, Mattis was the Davies Family Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., 79–81.

35. Mattis interview.


39. Van Riper interview.


44. Clover, “Maneuver Warfare,” 54.

46. In the context of maneuver warfare, *schwerpunkt* is the German term for the point of main effort aimed at the center of gravity to achieve a decisive result.


48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


51. After a couple months in theater, he moved information operations and fire support back under the G-3 (operations).

52. Gentry interview.


54. Ångström and Widén, “Religion or Reason?,” 205.


56. Ibid., 00:20:14


Expeditionary Operations in the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Colonel T. X. Hammes (Ret)

Abstract: The Fourth Industrial Revolution is changing every aspect of life. Advances in task-specific artificial intelligence, robotics, and additive manufacturing are diffusing military power to smaller states and nonstate actors. These potential enemies will develop much deadlier weapons systems, but U.S. naval forces must still conduct expeditionary combat operations. In considering how these operations will be executed, this article discusses the types of conflicts involved and who future opponents might be; considers how the convergence of various Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies are changing the battlefield; and discusses the major implications for the Marine Corps. While relying on planning and big platforms is easier within acquisitions and logistics, the Marine Corps must rely on its core strengths: adaptability, flexibility, and responsiveness to the demands of war.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, 3D manufacturing, robotics, drones, nonstate actors, power projection, Fourth Industrial Revolution, Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD, insurgents, terrorists, hybrid warfare, gray zone, nanotechnology, explosively formed projectile, mobilization, Marine Corps, joint

While the Marine Corps is often best associated with its amphibious past—from guarding Navy ships in the early republic to landings during World War II—much of its actual fighting has been expeditionary. Since the Vietnam era, the Corps has served this function, distinguish-

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ing itself from the Army by its ability to be a light, flexible force in readiness, quick to enter the fray and adapt along with the needs of the particular demands of battle. This has been especially so in the period after 11 September 2001, with Marines fighting against insurgencies in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq and working alongside international forces. It seems this is a trend that will continue, yet in the near future, expeditionary operations will become more complicated, uncertain, costly, and vulnerable.

The convergence of the technologies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution is shifting power to small states, insurgents, and even individuals. U.S. forces will go from today’s happy situation of secure rear areas to an environment where the enemy will be able to strike throughout the nation’s lines of communications from units in contact all the way to out of theater logistics systems. Units in contact also will face greatly increased risk from guided indirect fire systems and intelligent drones. Obviously, these increased threats will not relieve naval forces of the requirement to conduct expeditionary operations. In fact, the United States’ splendid geographic isolation means the vast majority of U.S. deployments are thankfully outside of the continental United States. It is essential that the U.S. forces, and the naval team in particular, figure out how they will deal with these new threats.¹

This article is organized into three parts. In thinking through how U.S. expeditionary forces will execute these operations, we have to start with the types of conflicts involved and who future opponents might be. After that discussion of what and who, this article will consider how the convergence of various Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies are changing the battlefield.² The author concludes with a discussion of the major implications for the Marine Corps. Overall, it seems that while relying on planning and big platforms is easier within the civilian and military world of acquisitions and logistics, the Marine Corps must rely on what it has done best in the past—being adaptable, flexible, and responsive to the demands of war as it is, not as anyone would like it to be.

**Dealing with the Unknown**

It is a virtual certainty that the United States will fight again. Unfortunately, the historical records show that U.S. national security institutions are not good at predicting the next conflict. The U.S. government actually excluded Korea as an area worth fighting for early in 1950, less than six months before it found itself in a major war there. In the early 1960s, most analysts did not believe the United States would get involved in Vietnam beyond advising. Five years later, there were more than 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. In the late 1980s, almost no one was predicting Iraq would invade Kuwait, and in early 2001, no one predicted the United States would commit major forces to Afghanistan or Iraq. In
short, odds are very good that the United States will not predict the place, time, or opponent for the next fight. The 1990s serve, however, as a very specific caution against predicting a single future. During that decade, the Pentagon’s fascination with technology and its success in Operation Desert Storm led it to spend the entire decade preparing for a short, high-tech war. Of course, what it got in the 2000s were decade-long insurgencies. As a result, the Services were badly prepared for the wars they actually had to fight. To prepare for the future, the Corps has to consider the full range of future opponents and consider how concepts and technology will affect efforts to conduct expeditionary operations. Although why organizations fight each other is critical to geopolitical discussion for military planners, the how is more important. As always, it will be the interaction between the contestants—the who—that defines the why and how of the fight.

**A Widening Spectrum of Conflict**

Despite academic assertions to the contrary, war is not disappearing. If anything, it is increasing in frequency and duration. Armed conflict will remain central to relations among states and nonstate actors. It will also remain a contest of human wills and thus the domain of uncertainty, compounded by human passions, friction, and fog. Technology will not bring clarity or brevity. Century after century, political and military leaders have embarked on wars confident that they understood the situation and would win a short and decisive war and subsequently paid the price for ignoring the true nature of war.

In contrast to the unchanging nature of war, the character of war—how it is fought—changes continually. Today, we are at the dawning of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, changing the technology of warfare dramatically. Yet despite our American love of technology, how people fight wars will remain based more on the social, economic, and political aspects of their societies. Each society will use the emerging technologies in unique ways. Further, conflict will not be based solely on those aspects of one society but the interactions of all the societies in the conflict. Thus, the conflict will not be defined by the technology but by the people using it, including state and nonstate actors.

**State Actors**

As most U.S. forces came out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) faced a changed international security situation. When we went into Afghanistan in 2001, we had no near-peer competitor and major conventional conflict seemed a thing of the past. Today, the United States has to consider how to deal with state actors that can challenge it in a variety of ways. State actors are capable of engaging in conventional war or using surrogates. Having observed U.S. forces in Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi
Freedom, states are actively seeking ways to neutralize America’s demonstrated strengths. Thus, states will employ a range of approaches from conventional to subconflict gray zone techniques to overcome their disadvantages. Among state actors, China has taken the lead and has either demonstrated or is developing a wide range of capabilities that the Pentagon has lumped into the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) arena. Many of these A2/AD systems are already proliferating. Russia, Iran, and North Korea are purchasing and building systems to keep American forces at a distance. Further, as these capabilities become cheaper, smarter, and more numerous, we can be sure these states will expand their capabilities in this area, and that many will migrate to smaller states.

States will also employ surrogates to keep their own forces off the battlefield. We have seen Iran use Hezbollah and Pakistan use the Taliban to pursue their strategic interests without committing their own forces to the conflicts. More recently, the Russians made use of “little green men” as surrogates in a gray zone approach. Contractors are another form of surrogate that states have used in numerous conflicts for a variety of reasons. States have used even criminal organizations to execute a range of activities from cyber to propaganda to kinetic attacks. In short, states will use a wide variety of methods and resources to neutralize the United States’ conventional military power as they strive to attain their strategic goals. Thus, even in a state versus state conflict, the who may not be easily defined. Complicating the task of preparing to meet states and their surrogates is the growing variety and capability of nonstate actors.

Nonstate Actors
As some nations employ new methods or technologies to gain advantages in asymmetric political and military situations, the world has seen a combination of state and nonstate actors working together. Nonstate actors fall into three major categories—insurgents, terrorists/superempowered small groups, and criminal organizations—who work on their own at times or ally with more powerful nation states that can provide resources or cover. Organizations of these types have been greatly empowered by the information revolution and will benefit even more from the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The United States has extensive, if not particularly successful, experience in such conflicts, yet each future conflict will provide a unique challenge based on the political, economic, and social conditions of that conflict.

Insurgents
Insurgencies are not new and will continue, but the insurgents of the twenty-first century will be driven by different goals than in the past. Such efforts will still be about self-governance but now will add a desire to change borders.
In the post-World War II era, insurgencies were primarily driven by a desire to throw off imperial power. Once the colonial powers withdrew, the primary driver became determining which local group would control the new nation. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s (MPLA) long war against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is a prime example. After a multidecade conflict, the MPLA won. It now rules over a nation whose borders remain essentially the same as the colony previously controlled by the Portuguese until the 1970s.

More recently, insurgents are often fighting to redraw boundaries to align with social, cultural, or religious boundaries that preceded the colonial era. Re-alignment has been accomplished in places such as the former Yugoslavia and Sudan (partially). Somalia—while not de jure separated—comprises three de facto political entities today. Members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fought hard to redraw boundaries across the region. Baluch (Iranian Plateau) and Kurd movements are fighting to create new states without regard to existing borders. The mismatches between the borders drawn by imperial powers and the desires of separated people to create or recreate single ethnic-based nations will reinforce other drivers of insurgency, especially corruption, government incapacity, failure to address minority needs, and resource scarcity.

This desire to change borders will have significant impact on U.S. counter-insurgency efforts. Current U.S. doctrine calls for supporting the host nation government against the insurgents. If an insurgent movement crosses international borders, such as the Pashtuns (who straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan border), there is no single host nation. Thus, the United States will have to work with two or more nations in most counterinsurgency efforts. The problem will come when the contending nations have irreconcilable strategic objectives. The fundamental differences between the strategic goals of Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example, have prevented effective cooperation against the Taliban insurgents. A variety of insurgent and terrorist groups based in the Pashtun regions have taken advantage of this fact. We must expect this to be the norm in insurgencies that strive to redraw international borders.

We are seeing the same issue in the American conflict with ISIS. The governments of Iraq and Syria, as well as the various insurgent groups, have different strategic objectives—and each draws external support from several actors. Those outside actors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Persian Gulf states, and the United States—all have different objectives too. Today’s insurgencies are often a mix of the angry, who seek redress for a perceived injustice, and the opportunistic, who simply seek wealth. Thus, U.S. doctrine for and experience with both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare (support to an insurgent) are inadequate to these circumstances.

Insurgencies that focus on unifying ethnic or religious identities, in short,
are attempting to build nations that transcend traditional, often Western, definitions. They are doing so both across international boundaries and within existing states. These movements present a much more complex challenge than insurgencies focused on maintaining current boundaries. Historically, such efforts at nation formation have taken decades or centuries. Achieving relative political stability in these cases will take much longer and be a more difficult process. An understanding of the long timelines must inform any decision to become involved and then guide the subsequent commitment. It also may force the planner to think in terms of containing the damage rather than in solving the problem. If history is a guide, many of these conflicts will only be solved when all sides are exhausted.

**Terrorists**

Unfortunately, despite the fact terrorists have caused very little actual damage, they have to be considered a separate category of threat simply because of the enormous resources the West is using to protect itself from these small groups. It is a certainty that terrorists will continue to attack in the name of various causes from a variety of locations globally. Still, while high-profile attacks such as 9/11 and Paris will continue, it is essential to keep the risk in perspective. With more than 32,000 deaths per year in auto accidents, roughly the same number of Americans die every month on our highways as died in the Twin Towers. Since 2000, almost 200 times as many Americans have died in traffic accidents as in terrorist attacks, including 9/11. Thus, while the violent loss of life by terrorism is heinous, the U.S. response should be appropriate. However, political realities ensure the United States will continued to devote a disproportionate amount of national security resources, particularly intelligence resources, to deal with the threat. The key issue for military leaders is how to meet the political demand signal without too seriously disrupting preparations for conflict.

**Criminals**

Criminal organizations will continue to challenge governments worldwide. These organizations take various forms, from street gangs to drug cartels to transnational criminal networks and will deal in a variety of commodities, from guns to drugs; resources, from people to counterfeit consumer items; and less tangible areas, from identity theft to cybercrime. With the exception of first-generation street gangs, these criminal organizations have a common motivation: profit. While some commentators dismiss them as a law-enforcement problem, criminal organizations have demonstrated the ability to both ally with insurgents (Columbia) and seize and rule territory within a state (Mexico). Cybercriminals are suspected of having provided the expertise for Russia’s
attacks on Georgia. Criminal organizations also have informally allied themselves with the United States to keep business going smoothly. Some Afghan drug cartels are closely associated with U.S.-supported Afghan officials simply because these associations allow them to continue to grow and process their products. Thus, criminal organizations can have an impact on the security of the United States, and our response may well go beyond law enforcement.

**Hybrid Warfare**

As if these challenges were not enough, we also will see the merging of state and nonstate actors in hybrid war. With Russia’s 2014 occupation of the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the concept of hybrid warfare became a major topic of discussion. Unfortunately, it also led to major confusion on what hybrid warfare is. Yet, in 2007, Frank Hoffman had provided a clear definition of the threat: “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” Both state and nonstate actors have used this type of warfare. These “multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.” As Hoffman notes, the “effects can be gained at all levels of war.” Whether used by state or nonstate actors, hybrid strategies force the defenders to deal with the full range of challenges in the same battlespace. Moreover, it can be used to obscure agency and allows state actors, regulated by international bodies and the law of war, to take action while hiding behind a virtual smokescreen. In short, the Marine Corps cannot focus on a single type of war.

**Gray Zone Challenges**

Recent events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have led to a great deal of discussion about gray zone conflict. Unfortunately, it has often been lumped with hybrid war, which confuses rather than clarifies the problem. Many discussions accept the definition of gray zone as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.” This includes everything in hybrid except conventional war and so serves no useful purpose in the discussion. Further confusing the definition is the fact that this is only one of many different definitions and is overly broad since most conflicts and wars fall short of “traditional war.” This article is too short to discuss the variety of definitions in detail, but the most frequently cited examples are the Russian actions in Crimea and the Ukraine. Yet, as scholars at
the Aleksanteri Institute of Finland’s University of Helsinki noted, the Ukraine was highly vulnerable due to a weak government and the presence of a large number of Russians. They question whether the gray zone tactics would work more generally.16 Like all conflicts, gray zone conflicts will be based on the social, economic, political, and technical conditions of the combatants.

**Technology Converges, Power Diffuses**

Having discussed the actors the United States might have to fight and the various forms of warfare that they might employ, we now transition to an exploration of the implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which will significantly impact who fights, how they fight, and even where they fight. Economist and engineer Klaus Schwab states that the Fourth Industrial Revolution means the world is on “the brink of a technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the way we live, work, and relate to one another. In its scale, scope, and complexity . . . [it] will be unlike anything humankind has experienced before.”17 This revolution will alter the political, social, and economic structures of our world—and thus the character of warfare.

Technological advances are already changing the political, economic, and social structures of society, and thus how those societies apply technology to war. The convergence of revolutionary improvements in electronic miniaturization, additive manufacturing, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, space-like capabilities, and unmanned systems (drones) will dramatically change the character of conflict in all domains. Of particular concern, this convergence is making capabilities available to almost all states and even some nonstate actors—capabilities that were once the preserve of superpowers. These advances will continue to evolve over the next decade or two, but their effects are being felt on global battlefields today.

**Electronic Miniaturization**

We have watched electronic miniaturization transform almost every aspect of our personal lives. So it is not surprising that miniaturization is revolutionizing command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, as well as bringing smart technology to smaller and smaller weapons systems. Today, even very small, cheap drones are capable of limited autonomous navigation and target selection. As 3D printing of circuit boards matures, ever cheaper and smaller computing components will be widely available and used in an increasing range of commercial products, making them easily available to small states and even nonstate actors.18 Manufacturers have even begun printing circuits hardened against radiation that will protect the electronics against some types of directed energy weapons.19
Additive Manufacturing
Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is more than 30 years old. In the last 20 years, it has been a very useful tool for rapid prototyping to allow designers to see their final product in three dimensions. In the last few years, AM has exploded. It has evolved from an interesting hobby to an industry producing a wide range of products from an ever-growing list of materials. AM is dramatically increasing the complexity of objects that people can produce while simultaneously improving speed and precision. United Parcel Service (UPS) has created a factory of 100 printers with room to increase to 1,000. It accepts orders, prices them, prints them, and ships them the same day from the adjacent UPS shipping facility. Printing speeds depend greatly on the materials used, the part being printed, and the printing process employed. Yet, regardless of process, the last few years have seen steady increases in the speed of 3D printing, varying from 10 to 100 times faster. In April, Dr. Joseph DeSimone released his Carbon3D printer, which has achieved speeds 100 times faster than previous methods. DeSimone has set a goal of printing 1,000 times faster while providing higher quality than current methods.

Nanotechnology
Established in 1981, nanotechnology is science, engineering, and technology conducted at the nanoscale, which is about 1 to 100 nanometers. For comparison, a sheet of newspaper is about 100,000 nanometers thick. At this scale, materials act very differently and, thus, provide opportunities in chemistry, biology, physics, materials science, and engineering. For the purposes of this article, nanotechnology is advancing in two areas of particular interest for the military: energetics and materials. As early as 2002, nanoenergetics (explosives) reportedly were capable of generating twice the power of conventional explosives. Since research in this field is now close hold (considered sensitive if not classified), it is difficult to say what progress has been made since then. Even if twice the power is as good as it gets, a 100-percent increase in the destructive power of any weapon is a massive increase. Continued major improvements in the power of explosives will steadily reduce delivery system requirements, which will favor smaller states in adversarial positions. Using unclassified sources, a recent book, Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity, states nanoexplosives have reached between 4 and 10 times the explosive power of conventional explosives. When nanoexplosives come into commercial use, they will also be available to nonstate actors.

The second area is that of nanomaterials. This field has not advanced as far as nanoenergetics, but numerous firms are applying nanomaterials to the production of batteries and to increase their storage capacities. In fact, a recent accidental discovery may triple battery power storage and increase battery life.
by a factor of four. At the University of California, San Diego, researchers have found a cheap way to coat products with a super-thin, nonmetal material that manipulates radar waves, which has the potential to provide inexpensive stealth coatings for missiles and aircraft. These improvements in energy storage, materials, and explosives will lead to increases in range, payload, and stealth for a wide variety of vehicles, to include cheap drones.

**Space and Space-like Capabilities**

Until recently, cost and technology requirements limited the number of nations that could venture into space. This provided a great advantage to those few countries that could do so. Not the least of these advantages was the ability to see any location on the globe. The addition of cheap, persistent space-based and air-breathing surveillance will soon provide small states and even nonstate actors access with a full suite of space and space-like capabilities. They will be able to surveil American forces from their home stations in the United States through theater hubs all the way to their frontline positions. Furthermore, they will be able to communicate with their people globally and perhaps even attack other satellites in space. The DOD has acknowledged the threat and is taking steps to protect U.S. space infrastructure.

While some states, particularly China, are steadily improving their own space capabilities, the democratization of space is being driven by private companies. Several companies are deploying cube satellites, or CubeSats, today. Already CubeSats (university-class spacecraft) with basic payloads can be purchased for less than $125,000 with a lead time to build of only a few months. New Zealand’s Rocket Lab is proposing to conduct weekly launches specifically for CubeSats to provide a rapid, cheap launch capability, and the Indian Space Research Organization just launched 104 satellites on a single rocket. If an organization cannot afford to launch its own cheap satellites, Planet, created when Planet Labs bought Google’s Terra Bella, plans to image the entire planet daily and take taskings for half-meter-resolution as well as high-definition imagery, including interpretation of what the buyer is seeing. Using this service, a buyer, perhaps posing as a shipping company, could track port, airfield, road, and rail system activity in near real time. Other companies are duplicating space capabilities with systems that remain in the atmosphere. Balloons—such as those launched as a part of Project Loon (by X, formerly Google X)—and drones, such as the Global Observer drone and solar-powered follow-ons, will provide space-like communications and surveillance capabilities at much lower costs.

It remains impossible to predict which technology will eventually win out. But it is fairly clear that the space capabilities formerly limited to superpowers will now be available to a wide range of customers via commercial
sources. It means that soon expeditionary forces will not be able to “disappear” at sea. Even hastily established expeditionary bases will be quickly found and imaged.

**Artificial Intelligence and Drones**

Two areas of artificial intelligence are of particular importance in the evolution of small, smart, and cheap weapons: navigation and target identification. In fact, widely available systems have attained limited autonomy based on these capabilities. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) has proven satisfactory for basic autonomous drone applications, such as the Marine Corps Lockheed Martin/Kaman K-MAX helo-drone in Afghanistan.\(^{32}\) GPS will be insufficient, however, for operations in narrow outdoor or indoor environments, dense urban areas, and areas where GPS is jammed. Academic and commercial institutions are working hard to overcome the limitations of GPS to provide truly autonomous navigation for drones. Inertial and visual navigation are advancing rapidly and are already cheap enough to use in small agricultural drones.\(^{33}\) Clearly, the commercial applications for navigating in agricultural areas and inspecting buildings in urban areas can be adapted for military uses. Such a system would serve to get a drone to the target area but will not ensure it can hit a specific target. To select a specific target, there are already commercially available optical and multispectral recognition technologies in use today that allow autonomous drones to attack specific classes of targets and perhaps specific individual targets.\(^{34}\) And they are cheap.

Of particular concern, autonomy means drones will be highly resistant to jamming and will be able to operate in very large numbers. They also can be programmed to wait patiently prior to launch or even proceed to the area of the target and then hide until a specified time or a specified target is identified.

Drone usage has spread widely. Many discussions about drones have focused on large, highly capable, and expensive drones, such as the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, used primarily by the Air Force, or Northrop Grumman X-47B, used primarily by the Navy.\(^{35}\) Too little discussion has considered the impact of small drones in all combat domains. While small drones can carry a limited payload, this limitation can be overcome with three approaches. First is to think in terms of *bringing the detonator*. In this case, the objective is to simply detonate the large supply of explosive material provided at the targets—aircraft, vehicles, fuel, chemical facilities, and ammo dumps. Against these targets, even a few ounces of explosives delivered directly can initiate a much larger secondary explosion or release of toxic material.

The second approach is the use of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).\(^{36}\) EFPs, weighing from as little as a few ounces to a few pounds, will allow even small drones to damage or destroy armored and protected targets. In Iraq,
Coalition forces found EFPs in a wide variety of sizes, some powerful enough to destroy a General Dynamics Land Systems M1 Abrams tank. Others were small enough to fit in the hand—or on a small drone—yet still punch though one-half inch of steel using only about 30 grams (.07 pounds) of explosive. And, of course, nanoexplosives can at least double the destructive power of these weapons. The primary limitation on Iraqi EFP production was the requirement for high-quality curved copper disks that form the penetrators when the charges are detonated. This type of production required a skilled machinist with high-quality machine tools. Today, additive manufacturing can print copper. Anyone with a 3D printer capable of using copper will be able to print an EFP disk. Thus, we can expect small- and medium-size drones to pack a significant punch against protected targets. The improvised explosive devices of the future will not simply sit and wait. They will be intelligent, inexpensive, long-range, and active hunters.

One can argue that long-range autonomous drones will be difficult for nonstate actors to obtain for the next few years. That may be true. But today, Aerovel sells the Flexrotor drone, which has a maximum range of 3,400 km, for $200,000 or about the average operating cost of a single Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II or F-22 Raptor training mission. For shorter-range missions, there are a large variety of commercially available cheaper drones that have a range of 20–500 km. Moreover, ISIS has been employing a variety of drones in Iraq and Syria.

The third approach is to employ swarms of small drones to magnify their impact. Drones will not be limited to attacking soft targets. The U.S. military is actively exploring the use of swarms for both air and naval applications. These programs are consistently and rapidly increasing the number of drones they are able to employ. The recent dramatic cost reductions in each of the needed technologies will increase the number by orders of magnitude. Three years ago, researchers used old 3D techniques to print a complex drone in a single day, then added an Android phone to produce an $800 autonomous system. This is less than the cost of an RPG-7 (rocket-propelled antitank grenade launcher) with one round. A small factory with only 100 DiSimone Carbon 3D printers could potentially produce 10,000 such drone bodies per day. The limitation is no longer the printing but the assembly and shipment of products. The Marine Corps has to start thinking about this type of drone as expendable rounds of ammunition. How do we protect our air bases, headquarters, maintenance facilities, and supply centers in theater against potentially thousands of autonomous drones? Even if the U.S. military can protect such fixed sites, how will it protect its vehicles, in particular soft-skinned vehicles such as fuel and ammunition trucks, when they are moving?

Cheap drones also will not be limited to the air. In 2010, researchers at
Rutgers University launched an underwater “glider” drone that crossed the Atlantic Ocean unrefueled. Such drones are being used globally and cost about $100,000. In 2013, the U.S. Navy launched its own underwater glider that harvests energy from the ocean thermocline, or differences in water temperature at different depths. It can patrol for weeks, surfacing only as needed to report and receive new instructions. In short, small-sea platforms have demonstrated the capability of achieving intercontinental range while producing very little in the way of signatures. Engineers at Michigan Technological University plan to reduce the cost of oceanic gliders to about $10,000. It will not take a great deal of development to turn these into self-deploying torpedoes or smart naval mines. Current versions are launched by hand from small boats or the shore. They could be modified for launch from warships and larger commercial ships.

**The Implications of Convergence**

The convergence of new technologies discussed above may allow these small, smart, and cheap weapons based on land, sea, or air to dominate combat in these domains. Over time, the technology has become cheaper, more reliable, and more widely employed. We are seeing this with the explosive growth in commercial drones. The Federal Aviation Administration predicts sales of unmanned aircraft to grow from 2.5 million in 2016 to 7 million units in 2020. This may well be a low estimate. Commercial demand is driving costs down while dramatically increasing capabilities. Advanced manufacturing techniques will soon make them cheap enough for small companies, or even individuals, to own a large swarm of simple, autonomous, powerful drones.

Obviously, a key question is: How will forces make the transition to this new generation of weapons and, even more important, how fast? History provides numerous examples. Two demonstrated the same pattern: firearms replacing pikes in ground combat during the sixteenth century, and the modern carrier and its aircraft replacing the battleship as the key weapon for naval combat in the Pacific during WWII. In each case, the new technology started out as an experiment and was initially deployed as a novelty. As the inventors and military innovators worked together, they figured out how the new technology could assist the old—musketeers initially operated on the flanks of the Spanish tercio, and aircraft became the eyes of the fleet. As the technology improved, it became a partner with the old—muskets were integrated into the tercio formation, and aircraft became another striking arm of the fleet. Technology continued to improve until it replaced the existing system—muskets with fixed bayonets replaced the pikes completely, and aircraft carriers replaced battleships.

The time required for these two transitions varied greatly from more than a century for the musket to about two decades for the aircraft carrier. As Klaus
Schwab has noted, however, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is happening faster than any previous revolution; thus, we should expect the new generation of small, smart, and many to quickly replace the old generation of few and exquisite weapons.

It is useful to consider where the various technologies are on the path from assistant to partner to replacement. Clearly, the mission of long-duration surveillance in a low-threat environment has been assumed by drones. In high-threat environments, CubeSats are becoming partners in the surveillance and intelligence missions. Ballistic and cruise missiles are already full partners with strike aircraft and, in some situations, are replacing manned aircraft. Less expensive drones are beginning to appear in various conflict areas for tactical observation and even strike. For air superiority, drones are being considered as partners with the F-35 and may provide an alternative approach by destroying enemy aircraft on the ground. Each technology will develop at its own pace, but will likely replace most of our legacy systems within the next two decades.

**Strategic Implications**

Technological convergence will accelerate over the next decade or two. It will have direct strategic impact on the United States in four principle ways: the loss of immunity to attack, the tactical dominance of defense, the return of mass, and a requirement to mobilize.

**Loss of Immunity to Attack**

The United States has enjoyed immunity from attack along its lines of communications and at its intermediate staging bases. Until recently, no potential enemy had the ability to track U.S. movements in real time or the long-range strike necessary to intervene. America has already lost its monopoly on long-range, precision strikes. China and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated this capability. Soon, long-range, relatively cheap, autonomous drones will provide this capability to many states, and even insurgent or terrorist groups. These vehicles will provide the capability to strike air and sea ports of debarkation and, perhaps, embarkation. Commercial space imagery will allow small states, insurgents, and terrorists to track U.S. movements in near real time. Global secure communications will allow them to coordinate and execute actions even at intertheater ranges.

In short, the United States will no longer be able to project power with impunity. This could create major political problems in sustaining a U.S. effort, both domestically and internationally. Barring a direct attack on American soil, will the public support distant actions if they result in a significant threat to the nation’s security or its economy? The small, smart, and many revolutions will allow enemies to undermine the U.S. economy. Even a few self-deploying
mines in key overseas container ports would drive up maritime insurance rates and, hence, the cost of imported and exported goods.\textsuperscript{50}

Internationally, opponents can threaten intermediate bases. For instance, a great deal of U.S. support for Iraq flows through Kuwait. Suppose ISIS strikes an aircraft sitting at Kuwait International Airport. Is the United States prepared to provide the level of defense required to protect such targets throughout the nations that are providing facilities in the Middle East and Europe? Will it expand the protection to all key targets in those states? Will those states trust America’s ability to do so? If not, will those states accept risk to their commercial assets to support U.S. actions?

**Tactically Dominant Defense**

While these systems create a genuine threat to all nation states, they and their descendants will provide a significant boost to anyone’s defense. In state versus state war, this may create a situation similar to that between 1863 and 1917, where any person in range moving above the surface of the ground could be cheaply targeted and killed. The result was static trench warfare. Drone swarms may again make defense the tactically dominant form of warfare in ground, air, and sea domains and be able to attack the physical elements of the cyber-domain. Able to reach out thousands of miles in the surface, subsurface, and air domains these systems—augmented with cruise and ballistic missiles—may render older air and sea systems obsolete.

For their part, nonstate actors can use these systems to dramatically increase the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in a combat theater. The small size of many of these systems makes them ideal weapons for attacking U.S. airfields and base camps. Easy to hide, transport, and operate, cheap drones with even limited autonomy will require massive investment in the protection of American logistics facilities and lines of communication in a tactical environment. Proponents of directed energy weapons (e.g., lasers and microwave systems) suggest these systems will defeat such swarms and, thus, return offense to the tactical battlefield. Unfortunately, these systems are still expensive and power hungry. Moreover, they are subject to defeat by relatively inexpensive countermeasures.

While the DOD must continue to develop these systems, politicians and military planners also must be aware that they put this nation on the wrong side of cost competition with cheap drones. And like all weapons systems, directed energy weapons can be neutralized. It is imperative that these systems be tested against a thinking, reacting, simulated enemy that employs countermeasures, such as autonomy, smoke, and electromagnetic shielding. If such systems become capable of defeating thousands of drones, they also may be able to defeat the much smaller number of conventional aircraft, guided bombs, and
missiles the United States can deploy. This would reinforce the dominance of the defense.

At this point, it is impossible to tell which systems will dominate. Thus, it is essential that the DOD run rigorous experiments to understand the character of such conflicts. If the experiments show the defense will become tactically dominant, DOD will have to determine how U.S. forces can exploit this situation to achieve their inherently offensive operational and strategic missions. A key question that must be explored is whether land power—by making use of the advantages of complex terrain, unlimited magazines, massive power networks, and ever-increasing range and speed of land-based weapons—will come to dominate the air, sea, and space domains.

The Return of Mass to the Battlefield

Since the 1980s, U.S. forces have bet on precision to defeat mass.\textsuperscript{51} Precision helped numerically smaller Coalition forces defeat Iraq's much larger army as well as initially drive al-Qaeda and the Taliban out of Afghanistan. Technological convergence, however, is pointing to the revival of mass (in terms of numbers of weapons) as a key combat multiplier. Current manufacturing techniques mean states can manufacture thousands of drones. How will our forces, which are dependent on a few, exquisite platforms—particularly air and sea platforms, such as jets and carriers—deal with the small, smart, and many? Will the United States have to respond by creating its own mass of small, smart, and many?

The Return of Mobilization

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States abandoned the concept of mobilization. The immediate threat had disappeared and mass mobilization was no longer seen as necessary. At the same time, the new weapons systems we were fielding, such as the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber and F-22, were so complex that only a single company built each; and those companies could not rapidly expand due to the special equipment and training necessary to build these systems. The painful fact is the U.S. defense industry today lacks the surge capacity to rapidly equip a mobilized population. Mobilization in World War II was possible because civilian industry could rapidly convert to military production. By 1990, the complexity of modern military weapons systems and limited capacity to produce them made rapid mobilization impossible. As Richard Danzig noted in \textit{Driving in the Dark}, modern manufacturing has been changing this situation.\textsuperscript{52} Additive manufacturing (AM) may radically change it. AM is inherently flexible, since the product produced depends only on the materials the printer can use, the design of the printer, and the software that is loaded. With a change of software, these printers can
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go from producing commercial products to producing weapons. Thus, as AM assumes a greater role in industry, the possibility of industrial mobilization will reemerge. Successful mobilization, however, is not just about producing the weapons. The Pentagon and the Marine Corps also must be prepared to enlist and train new personnel, build them into coherent units, and then move those units and the weapons to an overseas battlefield. Professor Eliot Cohen noted successful mobilization will require significant peacetime planning, but the Pentagon is not even thinking about the issue. Failure to do so means it will take that much longer to exploit the new technology to build and deploy the large number of weapons needed in a fight with an enemy who focuses on small, smart systems in very large numbers. In short, it may mean our forces are overwhelmed by numbers.

Implications for Power Projection

The implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution for modern expeditionary operations ashore, including power projection, will vary depending on the enemy and location of the fight. Keep in mind these technologies are still in their infancies but, within a decade, will have a major impact and, within two decades, are likely to dominate the battlefield.

This article considers conflict with a near-peer competitor, a smaller nation state, an insurgency, and social disorder. The most capable near-peer competitor is obviously China. Fortunately, against China, the dominance of the defense can actually work for allied forces if the United States chooses a strategy of holding the first island chain while denying Chinese use of the waters inside the first island chain or access to the ocean beyond. Land-based systems already have a wide range of advantages against attacking air and sea forces, and that advantage will grow significantly as the Fourth Industrial Revolution unfolds.

Defenders can build such systems as the U.S. Navy’s experimental Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) launcher or the Chinese Harpy multiple launchers into commercial 20-foot containers. Advances in 3D printing will allow massive numbers of these systems to be produced. With the addition of a container, every commercial truck and virtually every seagoing vessel can become a weapons system. It will be impossible to find such mobile systems in the complex, cluttered terrain of the first island chain or cluttered harbors and inshore waters where smaller, ocean-going fishing boats can hide. Thus, preemption by the attacker is not an option. Reinforcing the advantage of land forces are the fact they will have much larger magazines and access to massive power infrastructure to power potential directed energy weapons when they are developed.

Naval forces will play several key roles in such a conflict. First, amphibious
forces can either seize or hold key islands near a strait. Much like the Marine defense battalions of World War II, these units, using autonomous air and sea drones supported by land-based, antiship cruise missiles, can create defended zones in the air, sea, and subsurface (e.g., Teledyne Slocum Glider-type mines) for key points in the defense. These forces could be forward deployed or move into theater to fall in on preposition assets or as part of an amphibious task force. The key is to move before the enemy can establish defenses in the area. Once ashore, the landing force must very quickly establish layered air and sea defense of the surrounding area. These forces, along with any allied forces in the first island chain, will provide anchor points for naval forces to execute additional missions, blocking penetrations of the island chain, periodically project striking power into the China Seas, and contributing to the necessary blockade of commercial traffic.

Obviously, the Corps will require considerable reorganization and reequipping to fulfill the defense battalion role. In addition, the joint force is going to have to get serious about mine warfare, both seeding and clearing. Offensively, U.S. Pacific Command is leading the effort to use relatively inexpensive target detection devices (fuzes) to turn any MK80 series low-drag general-purpose bomb body into a Quickstrike smart sea mine. These air-dropped mines can quickly establish a minefield at the outbreak of hostilities. The DOD should then also invest in developing self-deploying mines based on the Slocum Glider drones. If developed, these mines could be delivered by virtually any ocean-going vessel and even be deployed from shore.

Essentially, this concept recognizes that A2/AD works both ways. The East and South China Seas will be heavily contested with the advantage going to the side operating under the cover of land-based systems. Numbers will count. Both sides will look for creative ways to increase the number of weapons systems as well as ways to clutter the tactical picture. The fact that China has almost 200,000 ocean-going fishing vessels, most large enough to carry 20-foot containers, provides an idea of the magnitude of the problem. As part of a first island chain defense, the allies will have to develop the ability to deal with massive numbers of potential attackers. They have about a decade to develop and demonstrate that ability.

The situation with Iran is very different. The fact remains that the world economy runs on oil and the Middle East provides 17 million of the 97 million barrels the world consumes daily. If the Iranians close the Strait of Hormuz, the world economy will crash. Currently, the United States and its allies have the capability to reopen the strait, and quickly. It is essential, however, that the Pentagon wargame the impact of Iran obtaining cheap sea, air, and subsurface drones to close the strait. How will we have to modify operational and tactical approaches? As the Iranians develop long-range precision systems, the Unit-
States will have to consider how it structures and protects key facilities in friendly states throughout the region. Here again Marine defense battalions could be very useful.

If the national command authority determines that U.S. forces have to land in Iran, the best option for amphibious forces may be to take to the operational offensive but tactical defensive. If we cannot quickly solve the problem of masses of smart, small weapons, then assuming the tactical defensive may be the only viable option. For example, the amphibious force could get astride a key line of communication, then dig in quickly and force the Iranians to attack. Getting dirt overhead as well as reducing unit signatures will make the amphibious forces much less vulnerable to the wide variety of smart, mobile weapons systems being developed today. In contrast, Iranian forces will be above ground and moving and, hence, vulnerable.

As noted earlier, current doctrine will not work against the insurgencies emerging from failed states across Africa and the Middle East. The United States will have to develop new political, diplomatic, strategic, and operational approaches to deal with this type of instability. Whatever approach the nation chooses, the Marine Corps will have to overcome new tactical challenges if it is going to operate in these environments. The biggest challenge will be maintaining fixed facilities and lines of communication. Even relatively small and poorly funded insurgent groups will be able to afford large numbers of autonomous weapons with ranges in excess of 40 km. They will have access to smaller numbers of systems with ranges from 500 km to the Flexrotor’s 3,400 km. Some will be remotely controlled and, therefore, vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, but others will be autonomous and, thus, harder to defeat.

This directly challenges one of the traditional U.S. strengths. Since the Civil War, the United States has established major supply depots at varying distances from the front lines. In counterinsurgency campaigns, we have even established platoon and company patrol bases inside enemy-dominated areas. These bases provided the lavish logistics that have characterized the American way of war. In the very near future, defending these facilities will be expensive and difficult. The Corps must continue its efforts to minimize logistics requirements even as it builds significant self-defense capabilities into its logistics units. Even when the Corps masters these challenges, it will still face the challenge of protecting high-value host nation targets. Everything from political leaders to public gatherings to economic infrastructure will be vulnerable to attack. Since the fundamental function of Marine units or advisors is to establish a secure environment for the government, protecting these types of targets will be an essential part of the mission.

Even one of the historic Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) tasks—non-
combatant evacuation operations—will be much more challenging. We have seen cheap drones used in Syria and Ukraine. Marine forces must expect drones in situations where different factions are fighting for control of a capital city (the driving cause of many previous evacuations). Soon all factions will acquire inexpensive drones and, thus, pose a threat to U.S. evacuations. Currently, MEUs have sufficient resources to deal with the limited threat likely from this type of enemy. Tacticians simply must add them as another planning factor. This situation, however, will change quickly and the Corps must start thinking about how a MEU can execute future missions in unstable regions.

In all cases, logistics is the key vulnerability of U.S. forces. Fixed bases, forward logistics sites, and logistics systems moving into the battlespace will be the most exposed parts of the power projection force. The Corps will have to join the other Services in figuring out how they will move forces into an area, protect them, and then support them without resorting to numerous fixed bases.

**Where to from Here?**

The Corps needs to experiment with and test new concepts as well as rethink its operations, tactics, and force structure. To develop and test new concepts, the Marine Corps must initiate wide-ranging research and supporting analysis as well as intensive wargames and live exercises to address key questions. Like the shift to amphibious operations, this transition should be led by the Corps’ educational institutions. The Basic School led the way in experimenting with drones. The Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, and the War College should lead the intellectual effort to understand the Fourth Industrial Revolution and its implications for expeditionary operations.

Operationally, the Corps will have to carefully consider if and when the tactical defensive will become dominant and what to do about it. Geography means the United States must be on the operational offensive to have any impact outside of the country. Thus, the Corps has to consider how to exploit the growing advantages of the tactical defense through the application of operational art. For instance, maritime prepositioning operations remain the fastest way to deploy a large, capable Marine force. How will we keep this option viable in an era when ports will be imaged several times a day and threat will arrive by air, sea, and subsurface routes? Clearly, it will require a layered defense employing all joint assets. Who pays for the development, procurement, and deployment of such a defense? How is it employed in a power projection operation? The Corps, and the joint force as a whole, will have to carefully consider the mix of prepositioned equipment (both sea and land), forward-deployed forces, and home-stationed forces in light of the changing threat environment. Amphibious forces may be uniquely suited to exploit these changes. They have the range and flexibility to seize a line of communication or a lightly defended
key enemy asset before an enemy can respond. The objective will be to force the enemy to either give up a key asset or conduct offensive operations in an effort to regain control of that asset.

Tactically, the Corps has to figure out how to protect every system in its inventory from guided rockets, artillery, missiles, and mortars and small, smart drones that are increasingly maneuverable and longer ranged. In particular, it must protect its highly vulnerable logistics elements, air bases, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), and lines of communication from repeated swarm attacks as well as persistent individual or small group attacks. Providing sufficient overhead cover will go a long way toward protecting fixed facilities, but that still leaves the incredibly complex problem of protecting mobile assets. Tactical adaptation will not be enough. The Corps will have to work hard to reduce its logistics requirements across the board. Keep in mind that the logistics chain can be threatened throughout its length.

Fortunately, there is time to develop and implement the changes. Like all major shifts in history, the Fourth Industrial Revolution will be phased in, but it will not be an easy process with clear decision points. If the development of this new generation of weapons mirrors our past experiences, it will take place over a decade or two. The new systems will first support our legacy systems, then the legacy systems will support them, and finally the new systems will completely supplant our legacy systems. Compounding the difficulty of deciding when to shift investment is the fact that we plan to use the weapons we are buying and developing today for decades. Will manned aircraft, dominant when we started developing the F-35, be dominant or irrelevant in two decades? While an extremely difficult question to answer, this transition represents one of the critical investment decisions facing Pentagon planners. And all decisions will have to deal with the political issues integral to cancelling or reducing any program of record. Thus, organizational change will be both difficult and risky.

Ground forces, specifically Marine artillery, were the first to explore the use of drones to augment their existing systems. Today, Marine ground units are aggressively exploring how both air and ground drones—to include unmanned systems—are changing the battlefield. An element of these experiments must consider how a new generation of cheap drones can be employed as rounds of ammunition to replace traditional ground weapons systems and alter the composition of maneuver units.

Logistically, the Corps is already using the K-MAX and drones to replace manned aviation for some missions. Driverless trucks and small craft obviously have enormous potential. The Corps also has excellent initiatives for reducing the logistics burden of providing expeditionary power and water production.

Aviation faces much greater challenges. The X-47B drone shows the potential for high-end and expensive drones. And the increasing proliferation of
less expensive drones for reconnaissance, logistics, and communications links show a small part of the potential the Fourth Industrial Revolution will produce. Is the current plan of purchasing a few extremely capable platforms, such as the F-35, viable in a world where cheap, smart weapons in large numbers will actively hunt those exquisite platforms? In the November 2016 *Marine Corps Gazette*, a team of officers highlighted how badly current Marine Corps investment is skewed toward the F-35 when compared to similar investments in ground forces. The article did not even take into account the fact the Corps will have to invest a great deal more to protect the F-35 bases, FARPs, and maintenance facilities against the emerging threat. Even today, relatively inexpensive drones have double the operational range of the F-35. There is little possibility of increasing the F-35’s range, but vast potential for increased range in cheap drones.

Furthermore, wide-area persistent surveillance is likely to reveal the locations of F-35 bases to include distributed facilities. The Corps has bet the future of Marine aviation on an increasingly vulnerable and expensive platform that will provide little help against a rapidly evolving generation of small, smart, and cheap attackers. It needs to explore how a family of less expensive, and often autonomous, drones can assume many of the functions of Marine aviation.

**Summary**

The purpose of this article is to begin to frame the problem of future warfare as a basis for the numerous changes Marines must be prepared to make if they are to be ready for an uncertain future. The implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution for the Corps are too complex to lay out in a single article. But it is clear that, whether forward deployed or deployed in a crisis, the increased vulnerability of U.S. forces to stand-off attacks will dramatically impact the U.S. force structure. The era of uncontested movement and air dominance is rapidly drawing to a close. The needed changes will be comparable to the interval between WWI and WWII, when the Corps had to completely rethink its mission, organization, and tactics. Two prime organizational traits of the U.S. Marine Corps—learning and remembering—did not, and must not, change. To learn about its possible role within the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Corps must aggressively experiment, challenge, and test our concepts and doctrine. Fortunately, forward-thinking leaders in our Corps are pushing innovative solutions, from the introduction of cheap drones in our company-level exercises to the experimental battalion to the K-MAX supply helicopter to sea basing major combat elements. If history is an example, the hardest part will be using what the Corps learns to change its programs of record.

Just as important as learning, Marines must remember and hold onto the key cultural elements that make Marines who they are. This combination has
carried the Corps through the challenges of adapting to brigade operations in World War I, developing the amphibious techniques essential for World War II, remaining ready for the Korean War despite deep cuts across the Service, recovering from the Vietnam War, and adapting to the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. They can carry the twenty-first century Marine Corps into the Fourth Industrial Revolution too.

Notes

1. This article will focus on expeditionary combat operations but will exclude routine deployments for peacekeeping, monitoring, or development projects. Combat environments bear little or no resemblance to the peacetime environment where these operations take place.


20. Eddie Krassenstein, “CloudDDM—Factory with 100 (Eventually 1,000) 3D Printers


24. Del Monte, Nanoweapons, 11.


50. Despite the fact there had been no attacks or even threat of attacks on Syrian ports, London’s Maritime Insurance Market added Syria to a list of high-risk ports and raised rates. To date, there have still been no attacks on Syrian ports but traffic is down more than 50 percent. It is impossible to tell what the impact of a ship hitting a mine would
be, but one can assume it would be more than the mere threat of potential action has had in Syria.


58. Coxworth, “Fuel-cell Drone Is Good to Go for 10 Hours.”

Patrick Porter’s *The Global Village Myth* earns a place on the mantelpiece because it challenges orthodox wisdom regarding the globalist rhetoric that is pervasive in both U.S. national security policy and the 24-hour news cycle. The introduction begins with the statement “Ours is an age of anxiety.” From this declaration, Porter proceeds to describe the enduring notion of both policy makers and parents everywhere: the world is more dangerous today than ever before, and therefore, we should be compelled to do something about it. In *The Global Village Myth*, however, the author provides a contrasting argument: the world is neither more violent today than in the past, nor is the world in which we live getting smaller. The advent of technology-driven globalization has not turned the globe into a diminutive piece of real estate we must render completely safe. To be sure, Porter affirms that technology has improved the ways in which we operate across the physical space outlined on traditional maps. Yet, in this book, he bolsters the tenets of classical realism by contending that these same technological advances have not bridged the gaps in strategic space, which he defines as the medium whereby a group may project power affordably across the globe. In other words, although today’s tourists can get to their destinations faster, this ability does not necessarily translate to the ease with which a state or military can project power and influence given the same distance. As our Navy would tell us, the oceans are as vast as they ever were, and water remains a formidable barrier.

Physical space concerns itself with geography, whereas strategic space is rooted in geopolitics. Porter argues that the distinction must be made between the two spaces in the formulation of national security policy. Human beings naturally view the world in neat mental maps that both simplify how we view the world and, in many ways, support the assumptions we hold regarding the security of it. Policy makers that erroneously presume that the ease of travel or communication over great distances translates fully to low-cost projection
of power and influence into the chosen area are doomed to find themselves mired in unintended consequences. Nowhere is this confusion of spaces more prevalent than in the globalist’s mind. To the globalist, the world is shrinking, and by extension, once-distant threats now appear to be closer and more menacing. But Porter offers what he calls the “five suspicions of globalism,” giving the reader a reason why it may be dangerous to presume globalism as fact when pursuing national security objectives (p. 42). First, globalism is based on the premise that the world is shrinking. To accept this as an objective fact, Porter contends the individual has to view geography (a stable condition) and geopolitics (dynamic human perception and interaction) as the same thing. Second, the “remedies offered by globalism are as disturbing as the disease they claim to address” (p. 43). The promise of security at home through the liberation and pacification of other countries is also the cause of many wars and conflicts, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, globalization reflects an interpretation possessed by relatively few cosmopolitan elites who enjoy a life that causes this view to be self-evident. Moreover, the vast majority of the world’s population is localized and does not travel or consume luxury goods. Fourth, globalism is unnecessarily reductionist in presuming that other theories are inherently isolationist, creating a false binary choice between one view and the other (p. 47). Finally, Porter contends that “globalization theory as it is applied to security questions ignores countervailing tendencies in international politics” (p. 48). The world does not, in fact, contract over time. Rather, societies integrate and break apart in cycles, as empirically shown by quantifying historical numbers in trade, foreign direct investment, communication, and immigration, among other measurable data, all of which have ebbed and flowed over centuries.

Subsequent to the major points related to the weaknesses of the globalist approach, Porter augments his argument by speaking to the real effects of modern material technology. In short, the range, precision, and lethality of modern weaponry tempts us to buy into the notion of a new era of “offensive dominance” over the traditional advantage of a defensive force holding a piece of remote terrain (p. 156). The trepidation that distance is rendered meaningless through the development of new technology, however, is in fact not new, and harkens back to the development of steamships and railways, as well as modern intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addition, we tend to ignore the strengthening of the defensive position by technological development, perhaps because it is always more difficult to prove a negative. Defenses are never flashy; they do not go “boom” until they are under attack. Perhaps it is for this reason that throughout time new improvements in technology have been accompanied by a false belief in a corresponding feeling of offensive dominance. Nevertheless, consider which prevailed in the two major invasions of Russia in
the last century: The offensive force with superior technology? Or the defense of arduous terrain and severe conditions?

Porter’s five densely written and well-researched chapters further explore the net effects of technology coupled with the history of the globalist approach and its use by U.S. policy makers in recent history. His research design uses *process tracing* to answer whether initiatives born to the creators of U.S. strategy match his theory’s predictions. Porter’s argument is straightforward: that technology has not compressed space as a dimension of strategy, armed conflict, and the pursuit of security to the point where distance is significantly downgraded. He establishes his argument by exhibiting three case studies. Porter begins with the notion of *netwar,* and tests the theory that revolutions in information technology can render numerically inferior organizations and nonstate actors (e.g., al-Qaeda) potent against strong nation-states, such as the United States. Second, Porter examines the challenges associated with amphibious operations, using a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan by China to test his argument. Third, he examines the effects on conflicts brought about by the introduction of remotely piloted vehicles (*drones,* or unmanned aerial vehicles) coupled with the advent of cyberwarfare. Finally, the audience arrives to a potent conclusion with a lesson in the geopolitics of hubris.

Porter’s work is significant for today’s military leadership and civilian policy makers. He illustrates the precarious cycle of viewing any threat in the so-called global village as fundamentally dangerous. If we presume that every incident in this “shrinking world” has existential implications for the United States, and presume that we can defeat each threat with our (offensive) technological advantage, we will inevitably become mired in unresolvable foreign disputes that sap hard-to-replace national resources. This precarious cycle seems to be the trap that befalls nations who presume extraordinary privilege and power and fail to respect the very real and difficult implications of strategic space. From the U.S. Marine Corps perspective, we are trained to think of future scenarios in terms of combating the most dangerous courses of action our adversaries may pursue. The most dangerous consideration most often replaces the most likely scenario when it comes time to brief the civilian leadership. Why is this so? The military is charged with the protection of people, the homeland, and national interests. It is not only natural for the military leader to focus on the existential threat, however unlikely it is to transpire; the military leader is often biased to do so. By reading Patrick Porter’s work, we can regain a more balanced perspective on the world than what the mainstream media and political pundits would have us generally believe. As military officers, the more dangerous we perceive the world to be as an operational environment, the more likely we are to brief responses to the most dangerous of possible scenarios, rather
than offering counters to more likely (and generally less extreme) adversarial contingencies. The more dangerous one perceives something as being, the more likely one is to overreact to it.

Similarly, in American foreign policy, a fear-driven overreaction to events overseas most often involves some sort of U.S. military action. Despite popular views that the world is shrinking, members of the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps team will seldom require a reminder that the oceans are vast and difficult to operate from. Amphibious assaults, whether conducted as forcible entries or something less, are complex endeavors. Military operations throughout the conflict continuum, from the delivery of supplies for humanitarian assistance to the delivery of munitions in a combined arms attack, will always have a cost. Physical space should always be deeply linked to strategic space for the military leader operating at the tactical and operational levels. But in the realm of policy making, the consequences of military overreaction, due to its extremely tangible and destructive nature, is more lasting than anything less impactful or temporary, such as economic sanctions. The globalist view, then, taken with the notion that every threat in a shrinking world is a threat to the existence of the United States, lends itself to increasingly interventionist national security policies and militarized statecraft. The Pottery Barn Rule (“you break it, you own it”), commonly attributed to then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, applies here. Intended or not, this disrupts the international equilibrium by overriding state sovereignty and wasting precious national resources through perpetual and sustained conflict. No amount of technological advancement will ever allow for total projection of authority and control across the globe, no matter how powerful and ambitious the hegemon.

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The civil war in Syria was growing increasingly bloody in August 2012 when American President Barack H. Obama made a startling assertion. If the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were to mobilize or use chemical weapons against the Syrian people, President Obama claimed, then that would cross a red line, with the potential to fundamentally shift U.S. foreign policy. This use
of the term red line was widely understood to signal that the use of chemical weapons would prompt direct U.S. military action in Syria. After much back and forth among the various civilian officials, from intelligence to the Department of Defense, the president decided against ordering the military into Syria and preferred to put it to a congressional vote. Obama’s comments about the matter underscore the vital role Congress can play in shaping the U.S. armed forces. Colton C. Campbell and David P. Auerswald’s recent edited volume, Congress and Civil-Military Relations, attempts to illustrate how the federal legislative branch and U.S. military have interacted through history.

Part I of Campbell and Auerswald’s work addresses the policy instruments available to Congress to influence the armed forces. Jordan Tama’s chapter is notable for its examination of congressional oversight. Tama refreshingly points out that ad hoc oversight commissions are often set up to serve both political and practical ends. Some of these themes are echoed in Chapter 6, in which Alexis Lasselle Ross assesses how Congress has influenced the growth of so-called military entitlement programs, such as Tricare. One of the key themes that emerges from Part I, unsurprisingly, is that it is difficult to disentangle partisan politics from policy in analyses of congressional decision making.

The second half of Congress and Civil-Military Relations explores the tensions Congress faces in balancing local and national interests in support of the armed forces. Chuck Cushman’s discussion of these tensions merits special attention in light of their impact on significant defense initiatives. For example, during U.S. Senate deliberations on the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a vote was called on whether to fund the production of a second engine for the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. Senators from states where the second engine would have been produced lobbied hard to keep funding for the second engine included in the 2013 NDAA. Ultimately, however, their efforts failed. The Senate did not authorize funding for a second F-35 engine.

Arguably the most controversial chapter in Congress and Civil-Military Relations is Louis Fisher’s analysis of the Obama administration’s failure to close the U.S. detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Fisher shows convincingly that had White House aides consulted Congress in advance of former President Obama’s signing of Executive Order 13492, which directed the closure of the facility, the administration’s efforts to shutter Guantánamo might have succeeded. Now that Obama’s term has ended, Guantánamo’s fate continues to evolve. President Donald J. Trump has signaled that he wants to continue to send enemy combatants to Guantánamo and does not want to authorize the release of any additional detainees, either.

Campbell and Auerswald’s work delivers a helpful overview of the evolution of congressional influence in the armed forces, yet the book sits against a
backdrop of declining congressional relevance in actually making war. It is true that the Obama administration sought congressional authorization for the use of military force in Syria, however, this should be viewed as an exception to an otherwise strong pattern of unilateral executive action during the Obama years. For its part, the Trump administration has thus far given no clear indications about how inclined it might be to seek congressional approval for military engagements.

On paper, Congress’s role in shaping the U.S. armed forces is not likely to disappear anytime soon. It is noteworthy, however, that Franklin D. Roosevelt was the last U.S. president to seek a formal declaration of war from Congress—in 1942. Subsequent presidents, such as George W. Bush, have requested and used optional—but-politically helpful congressional authorizations to make war that do not rise to formal declarations of war.

Members of Congress often face tremendous political pressure to be seen as supporting the commander in chief and the armed forces, especially during times of conflict. Legislators may naturally lean in favor of backing authorizations for the use of force and increasing defense budgets, for doing otherwise might be seen as going against the national interest or being unpatriotic. Both of these labels are potentially toxic to legislators’ careers. Congress may continue to hold great sway over the armed forces, but it is the president’s nearly unfettered ability to make war today, without consulting Congress, that has more of a profound impact on the everyday lives of servicemembers.

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Historian Eric D. Weitz, in A Century of Genocide, meticulously examines the nature of nationalism within the context of four of the twentieth century’s most devastating instances of genocide. Having done extensive research on each case study, Weitz provides a comparative historical account of how the ideas of race and nation were central to the political and social actions of leaders and populations in the Soviet Union under Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, Nazi Germany, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, and the former Yugoslavia. He
posits that certain factors are present in every modern genocide: “an exclusionary ideology that defines a particular group as unworthy . . . and threatening; a crisis of the political and social order . . . and war [or wartime settings] which erases the bounds of normal human interaction and creates a culture that permits excessive violence” (p. xiv).

In this new edition of the 2003 original publication, Weitz provides a historiographic background for the intellectual arguments that were still ongoing during his original research and writing. He notes that debates surrounding the comparative approach he used had not been settled, the central role of communism still persisted, the very definition of genocide was still under debate, and the inclusion of the Armenian and Rwandan genocides were still being discussed. Weitz clearly states that his work “was (and still is) a deliberate challenge . . . to think beyond the Holocaust without trivializing its enormous dimensions” (p. xii).

Weitz grounds his comparative work in the modern idea of nationalism in the West, comprised of race and nation, both nineteenth-century ideas that migrated into the twentieth century. His first full chapter analyzes the historical development and context of these concepts, necessary to “organizing human differences,” so that superiority of moral and cultural standing could be defined and applied (p. 17). Rather than placing race and nation in a confined, twentieth-century context, Weitz examines these two ideas in a historical and global framework. The depth and breadth with which he studies the historiographic narratives, competing ideologies, and cultural significance makes this chapter perhaps one of the most useful of the entire text. Weitz leads the reader through the various notions and developments of race and nation, both separately and in concert, which coalesced into the modern ideologies and justifications under which twentieth-century genocides took place.

Weitz begins his comparative analysis of twentieth-century genocides with the pervasive outcomes of World War I. Race thinking and nationalism, according to Weitz, were central to the conflict, intensified by the full mobilization of all aspects of society for waging war. “Total war required total victory,” a slogan of the Great War, became an embedded ideology throughout the rest of Weitz’s investigation of state-sponsored genocide. The propaganda of total war required total dehumanization of the enemy. Racial characteristics were hierarchical, inheritable, and immutable; they were physical as well as moral and intellectual. The outcomes of World War I included settlements that affirmed the rights of some states over others, establishment of a new model of an interventionist state that managed everything, and violence on massive new scales. Weitz brings these concepts together and carries them forward as vital components of his four case studies. The Bolsheviks came to power during
vast popular discontent with the deprivations of war. The Nazis rose to power in the wake of World War I reparations and the Great Depression. The Khmer Rouge gained power in the wake of the Vietnam War, and the Serb government acted in the midst of the Balkan wars and collapse of the Soviet Union. Each regime devalued human life; accepted massive scales of destruction and killing; adopted a powerful, interventionist state committed to political violence as a means of social progress; and based its actions on the ideologies of race and nation.

The author provides a detailed historical account—and through his sources, an exhaustive historiography—of these four cases. His chronological account of the individual genocides may lead a reader to assume historical connections and conclusions. Weitz is proficient, however, at catching the reader at those moments, pulling him or her back from interpreting them as inevitable historical actions or clean-cut connections. The author recognizes the unique historical complexities of each case, while also pointing out similarities that support his thesis of race and nation as fundamental components of genocide in the twentieth century. Members of each movement and regime envisioned a utopia that required disciplining the entire population, implementing collective politics on immense scales, and purging large portions of the existing population that did not meet the accepted notions of race and nation, thus requiring the classification of people by race and nation. The practice of genocide resulted from these ideologies and actions, including identification and documentation, forced deportations, and mass killing. These activities required a powerful state with security forces and mobilized populations that transformed the conditions of life and society in ways that tolerated, accepted, and reinforced atrocities in the name of human progress and societal perfection. Weitz also allows for historical precedence, noting Stalin and Hitler were well aware of the Armenian genocide, Pol Pot harkened back to Soviet and Chinese actions, and Slobodan Milosevic and his lieutenants followed both Soviet and Nazi practices.

While marking the similarities of the four regimes, Weitz recognizes significant differences in the goals and actions of each, repeatedly noting that none of the actions were inevitable. The Soviets claimed to be creating an egalitarian future for everyone, requiring the destruction of the old elites and institutions. The Nazis desired a racial order presided over by Aryans, transformed from within by the traditional elite. The Khmer Rouge, using radicalized Communist policies, sought immediate change through massive collectivization, and the destruction of both urban and rural structures of organization. Serb nationalists demanded that their new state be cleansed of any and all “foreign” elements, ironically building upon the old Communist elite and egalitarian ideas while remaking Serbian society in the image of a “pure” racial nation. While
each regime mobilized the people to do its political will, the reasons why people accepted genocidal policies varied. Some were ideologically and politically committed to the new regimes, which would pull them from disparate social or economic situations. Communists supported a worldwide egalitarian and prosperous future. The ideal of a racially pure society resonated with Germans and Serbians who felt economically and culturally oppressed. Followers of the Khmer Rouge had lived as outcasts in a colonial state. People acceded to the regime’s commands to obtain basic resources, professional advancement, and social mobility.

Weitz’s examination demonstrates that the political and social components of genocide arose in the context of twentieth-century governments, technology, and a coalescence of national politics. Moreover, people also clung to science-based racism and could hide behind the veil of institutional bureaucracy as means to justify or ignore culpability. In examining these cases of twentieth-century genocide, Weitz asks if it is “possible, then, to move beyond the brutal and corrupting nature of these events, to envisage a world without genocide?” (p. 252). Perhaps this is Weitz’s overarching contribution: to examine the context and nature of the perpetrators of genocide; to see the ideologies of politics, economics, and social structure that support mass violence; and to engage with people, institutions, and governments to protect political liberties and human rights for state and international communities.

At times, Weitz’s comparative approach can feel forced. He imposes similarities to fit his comparisons. He points out the differences, and then reasserts the similarities in broad strokes. This was particularly the case for the Khmer Rouge regime and the Serbian “utopia.” These later genocides had deep origins in Communism and Cold War politics, yet still harkened back to race and nationalistic ideologies of the nineteenth century. Especially for these last two case studies, the reader is strongly urged to investigate the sources and documents Weitz provides. The age-old question of “lessons of history” is apparent in Weitz’s analysis. If we learn lessons, then comparative history is possibly valid. If each event is unique, then comparative history is questionable.

In his introduction, Weitz admits that he “violated one of the historian’s cardinal rules: to work only on areas where he or she knows the language of the people and has access to the primary sources” (p. 13). The sources bear this out. His use of primary materials is pulled almost entirely from secondary works, and his narrative is deeply rooted in the analysis and historiography of experts for each regime and time period. Weitz does an admirable job, however, of providing a useful introduction to four of the most widely known genocides of the twentieth century. Researchers, students, and instructors can use this as a springboard for investigating details in their own writing or classroom use.
Those who are more versed in any one of the case studies will appreciate the breadth of Weitz’s analysis, while also noting the four historical cases have their own unique depth and complexities.

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Choosing War is an excellent dissection of the decisions made by American presidents in the wake of the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents. Choosing War, in great detail, shows that naval incidents are very often a precursor to greater conflicts on land, on sea, and in the air. Douglas Carl Peifer also reaffirms a need for the historical perspective, short and long term, in regard to contemporary matters. These contemporary matters are often thought to be the exclusive domain of political scientists and policy analysts, but Choosing War shows that historians can add just as much, if not more, to current policy debates.

Proceeding chronologically, Choosing War details the historical context in and around 1898, 1915, and 1937, using a fine mix of scholarship and popular history. Each period saw different administrations confronted by different naval incidents. The author documents how advisors and key players aired many different viewpoints but also how the ultimate response to such calamities came from only one individual: the president of the United States.

These presidents, especially William McKinley, are shown to be thoroughly human and conflicted over various courses of action. McKinley was initially against the public sentiment that demanded war after the destruction of the USS Maine (ACR 1), but this was not possible as time went on, especially when a naval inquiry blamed a mine that was, ostensibly, Spanish. Later, Woodrow Wilson deliberated over how to respond to the destruction of large vessels and the deaths of many Americans. Wilson was able to keep America out of World War I for two more years after the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, though public opinion did not call for a declaration of war after that attack. It took the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on the part of Germany to make that happen. Like Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt did not want war, but knew
war was coming and labored over the correct, timely response to the Japanese assault on the USS *Panay* (PR 5). These presidential decisions were shaped by political realities that were driven by public opinion.

History is not a collection of isolated events, but rather a river with many tributaries flowing into it. The subsequent American reluctance to get involved in war during most of the 1930s, including after the *Panay* attack, was directly related to the American experience in World War I that, in effect, commenced with the sinking of the *Lusitania*. This was the most destructive of wars, until a generation later, and it collectively traumatized Americans, with the past injecting itself on their present. Yet the chart of history often leads to new waters, and the troubles running up to World War II were even greater than the first. The American public did not want to think about war in the 1930s. This was a case in which the lessons based on recent past memories and public opinion were clearly wrong. The politicians and the public would have done well to remember not just the calamity of World War I, but why the nation had been pushed into it in the first place. As assistant secretary of the Navy during World War I, future President Roosevelt saw President Wilson’s decision-making process. Roosevelt also knew the horrors of war through his tour on the seas and the western front. Roosevelt knew he had to proceed slowly following Axis aggression, to amend and ultimately repeal the constricting Neutrality Acts after the *Panay* incident.

The attack on the *Panay* is not well remembered, though in many ways it was the opening salvo for American involvement in World War II. The *Panay* incident was overshadowed by another Japanese naval-air attack four years later: the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Prior to that, most Americans, including Roosevelt, felt if there was to be a war involving America it was likely to have been with Germany. In fact, the United States was already fighting an undeclared naval war against Germany in the Atlantic Ocean months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Even after 7 December 1941, the strategy America employed was still “Germany first.”

While these incidents are somewhat dated, their relevance, and the subsequent decision-making processes surrounding them, continues to be felt today. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, the attack on the USS *Stark* (FFG 31), the attack on the USS *Cole* (DDG 67), China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea, and the most recent U.S.-Iranian naval incident show that naval events continue to be closely intertwined with policy decisions.

The author is a professor of history and strategy at the U.S. Air Force Air War College, and his well-documented contribution to the literature proves that history and strategy indeed go hand in hand. It is a unique book that is written clearly enough to serve as popular history, yet *Choosing War* will also serve as a
great reference to American military figures, geopolitical strategists, and their publicly elected leaders.

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It has been argued that armed drones have provided the United States with a riskless tool for warfare, which has resulted in the country violating the sovereignty of foreign nations and applying force preventively—which has traditionally been regarded as illegitimate and illegal—rather than preemptively in response to a more immediate threat or in reaction to attack. This collection of 11 essays explores these issues, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of armed drones, legal and ethical debates around targeted killing, and the impact of the use of preventive force. It makes a number of contributions to the debates over the U.S. use of armed drones and preventive force more broadly. Furthermore, it presents a diversity of opinions, with essays that argue both sides of a number of the topics that have been raised.

Preventive force is the use of force in anticipation of a potential, but not necessarily an imminent, threat. Preemptive force describes force used against an imminent and substantial threat, and is associated with the international legal principle of anticipatory self-defense, which is rooted in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United States employed preventive force in the 2003 Iraq War against a potential weapons of mass destruction threat. The George W. Bush administration initially characterized the Iraq War as a preemptive use of force, but after the war’s start stated that Iraq had not posed an imminent threat to the nation. The United States also has been using preventive force on an ongoing basis for more than a decade in its drone campaign against terrorist groups in areas outside of traditional battlefields, such as Yemen.

A couple of essays in the book contribute to the dialogue around preventive force by proposing a specific relaxation of the legal standard permitting the use of force by nations for self-defense. They refer to this approach to self-defense as “Caroline plus” in reference to the existing standard that stemmed from an incident involving a U.S.-owned steamboat, the Caroline, during a Canadian rebellion against British rule in the nineteenth century. The Caroline in-
cident helped establish the norm of an imminent threat requirement for the self-defense justification to be applicable, while the Caroline plus standard relaxes this requirement in a way its proponents argue is more practical given the current global environment.

Legal scholar David Glazier, in his chapter, makes a number of pertinent observations related to the legality of U.S. actions. For instance, he notes that in spite of the controversy around the U.S. government's 2011 targeting and killing of an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, with a drone strike in Yemen, Awlaki's citizenship was irrelevant under the laws of war. He also notes, however, that because the United States described Awlaki only as a “radical Muslim cleric” in the time leading up to his killing, that status should have afforded him protection under the laws of war due to his role being strictly a religious one. The U.S. government described his role as operational only shortly before his killing, which, as Glazier notes, calls into question the United States’ good faith and compliance with the laws of war. While Glazier's analysis focuses on actions taken by the United States, C. Christine Fair's essay provides a strong critique of Stanford’s and New York University’s law schools’ oft-cited report, *Living Under Drones*, which condemns the U.S. drone campaign in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Fair points out conflicts of interest, problems with the selection of interviewees, and the use of forensic materials as evidence, although no forensic or munitions experts were included on the research team. She goes on to challenge researchers to implement a number of specific practices to increase scientific rigor moving forward.

While this compendium adds substantially to the current dialogue around the United States’ use of force, it is not without weaknesses. Numerous pages are devoted to rehashing established arguments against American policies and practices, and some arguments confuse important and pertinent legal points. Two erroneous legal claims are notable. At one point, an author states that the U.S. government has never made it clear whether it views its drone campaign to be within or outside of an armed conflict, when the Barack H. Obama administration was explicit that it saw these engagements as a component of an armed conflict. In a later chapter, another author puts forth a curious claim that during war, combatants who do not pose an immediate threat are not liable to attack, and furthermore that attack is only permitted under circumstances of a “reciprocity of risks—that is, if [soldiers] stand in a position of mutual risk with their opponents” (p. 320). If an opposing armed force has been declared hostile by U.S. officials, there is no requirement that enemy combatants be in imminent preparation of an attack in order that they be lawfully targeted. Accordingly, these claims are not correct statements of American law and policy in this area.

In addition, several chapters exhibit significant bias and make controversial
statements without justification. For example, one author suggests, with little evidence, that the growth of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is due to the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen. Another states that for targeted killings outside of traditional battlefields, “the window of opportunity to kill is much larger than the United States perceives it to be in most cases,” and therefore, that the United States should use stricter standards for the imminence of a threat than it does currently (p. 275). Later authors assert: “It is a short journey between the practice of targeted killings and government assuming the power to assassinate at will” and that “Poverty, deprivation, and humiliation in our world of radical inequity are the chief reasons for the tensions and resentments that lead to hostilities” (pp. 360, 328).

More substantively, these essays offer numerous critiques of current U.S. actions and policy but few alternatives, and those alternatives appear to be at least as problematic as the ones they aim to replace. Indeed, several authors discuss Michael Walzer’s notion of *jus ad vim*, a legal framework proposed to govern the use of force in *in between* areas; in this instance, these areas are not warzones but places where law enforcement does not function properly and that present threats, albeit perhaps not imminent ones. Yemen, for example, has seen such circumstances in recent years. Under this proposed framework, the targeting of enemy forces would be permitted, but only after public indictment or a trial for the accused in absentia, in an attempt to provide a measure of due process and allow the targeted individual to surrender. This is likely impractical for a number of reasons. It could result in significant delays if any parties offered a defense or an appeal. Presenting evidence related to a terrorist attack in a public indictment could lead to additional operational setbacks, such as intelligence sources being exposed and greater difficulty in stopping an adjusted attack if the publicized attack had not yet been carried out. In another essay, the author proposes implementing a conflict mitigation strategy referred to as “just peace,” which seems to entail the unconditional provision of development aid and unspecified changes to the global institutional architecture toward equity and inclusiveness. This proposal lacks both specifics as well as an analysis as to why we might expect it to work.

This book, even with its shortcomings, serves to highlight that the modern use of preventive force and armed drones raises numerous important and difficult issues that have yet to be resolved. It furthers the dialogues about these issues and raises a number of points that are worthy of attention.

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In *Cheap Threats*, Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, research fellow at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, studies a fascinating phenomenon: weak states resisting compellent threats from the United States. Throughout her work, she analyzes in great detail the United States’ use of compellent threats and considers why these threats often fail to coerce weak states. Pfundstein Chamberlain defines *compellent threats* as “a demand that the target change its behavior and a promise to inflict military force if it does not comply” (p. 62). Students, scholars, and general readers should find the work useful, while policy makers should pay particular attention to the book’s implications for diplomacy. The author’s purpose is to explore a significant pattern and answer a related question: “The United States has consistently demonstrated that it is willing and able to execute military threats against its opponents. How, then, can we explain this inability of the world’s most powerful state to coerce many of the world’s weakest targets?” (p. 1). As Pfundstein Chamberlain deftly demonstrates, this inquiry is all the more important because the United States regularly has carried through on its compellent threats.

To support her thesis, the author employs a wide array of methods, including congruence and *process tracing*, and incorporates insights from a range of academic disciplines, including game theory. To her credit, she also compares her own theory, *costly compellence*, with competing explanations, including such theories as *reputation*, *preponderant power*, and *expansive demands*. Pfundstein Chamberlain applies a case-study approach, evaluating four instances where the United States issued threats with differing results. In addition to policy documents, academic books, and journal articles, she scrutinizes a wide-ranging data set from 1945 to 2007 that outlines the nation’s use of compellent threats over six decades, including more than 60 crises involving the United States. The data set demonstrates two things: first, the United States has used compellent threats more after the Cold War than before; and second, those same threats have been less effective since 1990. This situation occurred in spite of the United States’ proven record of carrying out its compellent threats.

Pfundstein Chamberlain organizes her book into six chapters framed by an introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1, “The Logic of Costly Compellence,” explores a conundrum: “The costly compellence theory asserts that it is the very fact that the United States is so powerful that makes its compellent threats less likely to be effective” (p. 19). Throughout the chapter, she develops her new theory while exploring alternative explanations. In chapter 2, “US
Compelling Threats, 1945–2007,” the author creates and applies a new data set to test costly compellence theory. Chapters 3–6 explore relevant case studies, including the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the 2011 Libya crisis, and the 1991 and 2003 threats against Iraq. In her conclusion, Pfundstein Chamberlain provides a persuasive answer to her opening question: “Why do leaders of weak states resist compellent military threats issued by the United States? In short: because cheap threats do not signal that the United States cares enough to do more than drop a few bombs on the target state” (p. 213). The implications of her conclusion are especially relevant for policy.

Throughout her work, the author considers the costs of compelling threats, including such human, political, and financial ones as conscription, mobilization of reserves, employment of ground troops, taxation, and unilateral action. She argues that when policy makers publicly minimize these costs, they reduce the ultimate credibility of compelling threats, thereby making them less successful. Pfundstein Chamberlain contributes unique insights, including the differentiation between immediate and ultimate credibility, the challenge of costly signaling, and their relationships to threat effectiveness. Most important, she contributes a new theory, costly compellence, which highlights how cheap threats are not advantageous primarily because their lower costs fail to signal significant state resolve. As she explains, “The costly compellence theory thus reveals a paradox: Efforts to make the use of force easier and more efficient erode the utility of force as a coercive instrument before war. By making the use of force cheaper and thus making threats more likely to fail, these strategies also make it more likely that force will be used” (p. 225). In the end, Cheap Threats extends analysis of compelling threats beyond credibility toward motivation, providing fresh revelations into state resolve.

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The African Union (AU) replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2001 and has met semiannually since then to provide a continental body to focus the efforts of the 55 nations that make up the place that most people refer to as Africa. Considering the continued crises and conflicts that fragment the
populations living there, it is understandable why the authors chose to look at the organizational body tasked with providing unity and protecting African sovereignty.

The author, Dr. Rita Kiki Edozie is a professor of international relations and African affairs at Michigan State University, and she wrote this book with the help of Keith Gottschalk, who was the head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa, prior to becoming a Fulbright Scholar.

Following a rigorous academic approach, the authors’ thesis and scope succeed in unveiling the rationale behind the AU. The organization’s strategic objectives and structures are put in perspective to offer the reader a clear picture of the role and influence of the African body in the context of a global environment. Their core thesis is “that the AU exists, functions, and acts today as one of two global emerging suprastates that has embodied the collective will of Africans” (p. xl). In a broader scheme, Edozie and Gottschalk encourage Western decision makers, planners, operators, scholars, and students to reflect on the meaning of the concept of African solutions for African problems, a fundamental principle that shaped the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2002. It still “drives the organization’s contemporary political dynamic and behavior” (p. xxxii).

Organized along three parts, this easy-to-read book also includes an informative appendix, comprehensive notes, and a rich bibliography. Part 1 analyzes the concept of globalization and global governance to illustrate “the AU’s impact as a global actor on behalf of African nation-states and societies” (p. 23). In times of major political and security challenges in many places on the continent, it is the organization’s ambition to be recognized as an undisputed actor and partner for the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. Parts 2 and 3 offer a detailed picture of the evolution of the architecture of the AU; the impact of the ideals of Pan-Africanism on the functioning of the organization; its identity and culture; and its prospects and challenges in national, regional, and global environments. The final chapter of part 3 used Mali as a case study to demonstrate the AU’s strengths and limitations.

The value of the book is twofold. First, the historical overview of the AU’s design highlights the structural complexity of a body that comprises more than 50 member states. Hence, it also reflects on Africa’s diverse national identities, ideologies, and values. Herein lies one of the challenges facing the organization. Indeed, to become credible on the global stage, the AU must improve its ability to effectively implement its policies in Africa. Often it has been unable to overcome the diverging national interests of its many member states. In January 2016, the fallback in the current crisis in Burundi demonstrated the limits of the AU as a leading political body of Africans, as already seen in 2015.
when Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria failed to cooperate against Boko Haram, a militant Islamist terrorist group wreaking havoc across borderlines. In short, in spite of significant progress in the past decade, African affairs are still structured around national biases instead of the continental unity that was the original intent of the organization. As Edozie noted, “Pan-Africa’s pluralism has been a bedrock as well as a challenge for African unity” (p. 73).

Second, Edozie and Gottschalk insist on the value of the ideals of Pan-Africanism as a cultural marker for the AU. “Two continental leaders—the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, and the late leader of Libya Muammar Gaddafi—personified the Pan-Africanism that drove the emergence of the AU” (p. 71). This was echoed at the 26th AU summit, when President Robert G. Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s head of state and outgoing chairman of the AU, adamantly criticized the United Nations for not opening a permanent seat on the security council for an African country. Walking in his footsteps, President Idriss Déby, Chadian leader and newly elected chairman of the organization, condemned the International Court of Justice of The Hague for being biased and disproportionately prosecuting African citizens. Both critics prompted a standing ovation among the African audience.

In reality, however, this ideal of Pan-Africanism is often held back by an “us-versus-them” reaction from the sovereign states themselves. In that regard, the recent crises and conflicts in Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan offer striking examples of the limit of the Pan-African solidarity when the national interest of sovereign states is at stake. In the authors’ words, “Developing policy frameworks for collective African security has been riddle with setbacks, stalemates, and continuous challenges to achievement and implementation” (p. 134).

Nevertheless, as also underscored by the authors, the responsibility taken by the AU in the past decade to address conflicts in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic should be lauded. The general outcome of these events met the strategic objective set in 2002 in the Constitutive Act of the African Union to mobilize Africans to solve African problems.

In considering Africa’s postcolonial moment, of primary interest for the reader is the focus on the AU’s clause of nonindifference in chapter 5: “Nonindifference is an African equivalent of the UN’s ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine and it permits Africans (through the AU) to intervene into the political affairs of sovereign African nations undergoing conflict, when criteria are met” (p. 135). The authors see the Nonindifference Clause as “a first step toward the AU’s achievement of a self-determined, continent-wide security policy as it makes way for African member states to give up their sovereignty—albeit temporarily—in circumstances of heinous conflict, violence, and war” (p. 135). The 2016 crisis in Burundi, when President Pierre Nkurunziza rejected any AU
interference with the country’s domestic affairs, has shown the challenge of implementing the Nonindifference Clause.

Overall, *The African Union’s Africa: New Pan-African Initiatives in Global Governance* is an important contribution to the understanding of the challenges that the AU faces to become both a global actor and a regional forum for Africans. A robust structure is in place that already actively promotes economic development, social stability, and peace. Whether the political will and the national interest of all of the African member states will allow the organization to meet its strategic ambition remains to be seen.

Edozie and Gottschalk’s work is tightly organized and written in clear prose. This is a study that should be read by every decision maker, planner, operator, scholar, and student who wants to gain a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of the AU as a global organization in the realm of security and conflict resolution in Africa.

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This is a superb primer offering a sober, if preliminary, assessment of the decision making and conduct of the two lengthy and consequential American military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The editors—who themselves are eminently qualified—assemble an all-star team of academics representing a wide spectrum of expertise in history, international relations, security studies, and law to consider these conflicts from a number of different perspectives, all in the hope of offering important insights for future U.S. policy makers. This book is wildly successful in providing well-researched, thoroughly documented, and balanced assessments of the strategic challenges and shortcomings associated with America’s Global War on Terrorism as operationalized in these two politically contentious military campaigns. While traditional historians may be skeptical of the analysis of contemporary events, this book serves as an excellent first draft of this important history in a highly readable and easily digestible account.

One of the many strengths of this book is its structure as a compilation of insights by individual experts organized by topic area. As a result, readers can
be selective about which chapters to read and in which sequence. This organization will benefit the foreign policy practitioner who must quickly delve into the narrow, substantive issue of the day and the busy citizen who is attempting to better understand what has gone right and wrong in these campaigns.

Those most interested in the international and domestic contexts in which these wars originated can conveniently start at the beginning. Michael Reynolds, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, explains how “fundamental social changes” and the history of “geopolitics of great power and regional rivalries” fostered conditions conducive to the rise of violent extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, dedicated to attacking American interests regionally and globally. Of course, it was for this purpose that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were dedicated. These attacks delivered a searing psychological blow to the American public and it was within this domestic context that President George W. Bush formulated and initiated what came to be known as the *Global War on Terrorism*. Terry H. Anderson, author of the book *Bush’s Wars* (2011), expertly summarizes the key developments here in his chapter “9/11: Bush’s Response,” including important milestones such as the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act, the establishment of (more or less) permanent detentions at Guantánamo Bay, the renditions of suspected terrorists to secret black sites overseas outside the reach of traditional U.S. legal authorities and purview, and the approval of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques (characterized by critics as torture). He also catalogues the Bush administration’s flawed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) case against Iraq, which he concludes “dragged the United States into the greatest foreign policy blunder in American history” (p. 72).

The next section of the book is aptly titled “The Possibilities and Limits of American Military and Diplomatic Strategy” and includes chapters on intelligence, the strategic choices confronting President Bush in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the military strategies pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan, and human rights. Anyone who follows these topics will immediately recognize the authors of these chapters as being among the most qualified experts in these fields. These chapters in particular should find a ready home in the curriculum for students of strategic studies at civilian universities and military institutions alike. It is also here where the insights most valuable to contemporary policy makers are to be found (more on this when discussing the final chapters of the book). While not absolving the intelligence community of its many shortcomings (e.g., a systemic overreliance on signals and imagery intelligence at the expense of building human intelligence capabilities, especially traditional spy networks and the misleading National Intelligence Estimate in 2002 that overinflated the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programs), Immerman usefully reminds policy makers that the best they can expect from U.S. intelligence
is to provide them a slight edge in decision making. Intelligence analysts are not responsible for the decisions taken, and Immerman clearly holds policy makers accountable for “the grief that befell the United States in both Iraq and Afghanistan” (p. 77). Those looking for a defense of the Bush policies in Iraq and Afghanistan will find a modest degree of consolation in the chapter authored by Stephen Biddle and Peter D. Feaver. These two scholars consider the range of American strategic options for dealing with a post-9/11 world and ultimately conclude that the counterinsurgency strategies pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan represented an intermediate option and best “choice among unattractive alternatives: tolerate some terrorist violence against innocent American civilians, or invest enormous sums in blood and treasure” (p. 117). While Biddle and Feaver focus attention at the level of grand national strategy, Conrad C. Crane delves more deeply into the issue of the military strategies adopted during different stages of these campaigns. Crane’s critique of the failure to adequately plan for the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq (Phase IV) is especially strong. He also faults both the Bush and Obama administrations for inadequately resourcing their counterinsurgency strategies (the classic mismatch between strategic ends and means). As he writes, “Words without resources and commitment are meaningless” (p. 136). Crane also delivers a particularly relevant insight for policy makers contemplating future counterinsurgency campaigns: “the success of any such campaign hinges upon the possibility of establishing a legitimate indigenous governing authority to leave behind” (p. 143). The last chapter in this section explores the implications of President Bush’s effort to weaponize human rights in the effort to build public support for the wars. Jonathan Horowitz interestingly points out that one of the unintended consequences of such an effort was to undermine America’s credibility globally and regionally as these public pronouncements contrasted so sharply with Bush policies that effectively dismissed “the protections that international law afforded detainees in times of war” (p. 158). Horowitz also points out, as have others, that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and civilian casualties inflicted in raids and drone strikes have had the effect of bolstering recruiting prospects for terrorist groups.

The third part of this book assesses the personal costs of these wars borne by the 2.6 million Americans who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as servicemen and women. The chapter by Lisa Mundey assembles informative statistics and draws on individual experiences to illuminate and compare the human consequences of these wars fought by an all-volunteer force with those who fought in earlier conflicts. Other chapters in this segment analyze the small and ultimately ineffective antiwar movement within the United States; consider the role played by modern media; and explore how movies, television, music, literature, and video games shaped public perceptions of these conflicts.
The final two chapters of the book are at once the most important and yet somewhat unsatisfying (perhaps unavoidably so) contributions to this worthwhile and commendable project. These authors seek to distill the “lessons and legacies” of these ongoing and unfinished campaigns. Unfortunately, an authoritative rendition of the most important lessons to be learned is likely to be decades off, when the benefits and costs of these wars can be more definitively and clearly tallied. Nonetheless, these concluding chapters offer useful, if contingent, insights for contemporary U.S. policy makers. Robert K. Brigham, author of *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (2006), in his chapter accurately tabulates the costs of the Iraq conflict and judges the campaign to be a failure when measured against its professed goals of creating a democratic, representative, and stable ally in the region. More important, he argues convincingly that the primary legacy of America’s heavy investment in Iraq may well be to demonstrate the limited ability of U.S. military power alone to significantly impact the fundamental trajectory of foreign societies. The United States simply needs to devote more resources to a genuinely whole-of-government approach to strategic problems.

Aaron B. O’Connell offers a similarly sober assessment of the campaign in Afghanistan, placing the blame not only on American policy makers but also on the shoulders of local authorities, such as then-president of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai (2001–14), who all too often pursued narrowly sectarian and personal agendas at the expense of the interests of the country as a whole. Even more poignantly, he notes how little U.S. policy makers have learned from history, whether from America’s war in Vietnam or earlier British and Russian campaigns in Afghanistan itself. He appropriately ends this book with an exhortation for American policy makers and civilians alike to learn from history and to seek a deeper understanding of the past for better outcomes in the future. This book is a valuable and important step in developing just such an understanding of America’s long, costly, and unfinished campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II spoke for many people when she asked how the
global financial crises of 2008 could have occurred without warning from any of the world’s economists. That series of disasters focused a great deal of speculation on what economists were doing and what they ought to be doing. Robert Chernomas and Ian Hudson, economists at the University of Manitoba, note that recent criticism has centered on the increasing perception that economics as a discipline has “lacked realism and used technique as an end in itself, instead of engaging with concrete economic realities” (p. 3).

The authors agree with that judgment. They identify and analyze the group of rising economists who represent the new direction that mainstream economics is taking. Further, they critique the new mainstream, not only questioning its conclusions but especially the methodologies used to reach those conclusions. Just as important, they criticize the assumptions that they argue are informing the work of the new mainstream.

The stars of new mainstream economics are economists who have, from 2001 to 2013, won the John Bates Clark Medal (JBC). This award is, according to the authors, second only to the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences and sometimes is seen as a preliminary to actually winning the Nobel. As of 2016, the work of this group of Nobelists, or potential Nobelists (winners of the JBC), is a good indication of the direction economics will take in the near future.

One argument, and the main criticism that Chernomas and Hudson develop, is that the new mainstream operates without a realistic context of social and political power and an appreciation of the effect of that power, particularly on the range of choices open to individuals. The economists of the older mainstream held certain basic assumptions that have been adopted by the new mainstream—but in an uncritical manner, especially the role of rational and free choice by individuals. In addition, the new economists’ lack of context also does not take into account that capitalism is different in every country. The authors clearly state that, when discussing economics, the United States is the exception and not the rule. It possesses significant differences compared with capitalism as practiced by other leading nations.

After the introduction, chapter 2, “Development and Growth,” discusses work done by the winners of the JBC on the choices and actions in the economies of developing nations. What characterizes the work of economists in this field, according to Chernomas and Hudson, is an assumption that individuals in developing nations possess a great deal more freedom in making choices than is the case.

Income and income inequality in the United States, not surprisingly, have engaged the attention of this group more than any other topic and is the subject of chapter 3. Again, the authors question the premise that individuals have a wide range of choices when in fact they are constrained by factors beyond
their control. Specifically, they note that the labor market in the United States is the result of a situation in which “conflicting interests of powerful employers contest with those of employees dependent on wage income for their livelihood” (p. 51). Individuals have lost power of choice because of their need to keep jobs, which places employers in a powerful position.

Chapter 4, “Health, Healthcare, and the Individual,” opens with the assertion that health care in the United States is the most expensive in the world with the worst health indicators among highly industrialized nations. Again, they emphasize that elements of power, in this case doctors and for-profit insurance companies, decide what the choices are, and that factor is not taken into consideration by those winners of the JBC who have written about the topic.

Chapter 5, “Crime,” features the work of Steven Leavitt (perhaps best known as the coauthor of *Freakonomics*), who has proposed that the increased availability of abortions was a factor in the decrease in street crime. Again, context is the issue as they point out that Leavitt’s theory neglects other factors in determining the crime rate and that, like capitalism, crime varies from nation to nation. They also note the fact that none of the JBC winners have written about corporate crime, which the authors believe to be as important as street crime.

Aside from the information presented in the introduction, chapter 6, “Two Kinds of Crises,” may be the most critical section. What is most significant here is not what has been done by the winners of the JBC so much as what they have not done in studying either environmental or economic crises; Chernomas and Hudson note that they have done very little in these two areas. In other words, to answer Queen Elizabeth’s question, no one predicted the global economic crisis because no one was really studying it. The authors conclude the book in chapter 7, summarizing and evaluating the work of these economists and what seem to be the priorities of their interests.

*Economics in the Twenty-First Century* is not light reading, but it is still accessible and amply repays the effort expended in reading it. The authors have described the major work being accomplished by leading economists on the most important topics today. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the authors’ conclusions, the descriptions of what economists are doing and the criticisms of their work are informative.

John Maynard Keynes famously took his peers to task for their tendency to couch their studies in terms of *the long run*. In the long run, he said, we are all dead; economics should focus on determining and implementing means that create benefit in the short run. Chernomas and Hudson are doing something similar in calling on their fellow economists to bring the study of economics within a context grounded in the power exerted by entities that one way or another restrict individuals’ economic choices. More than drawing attention to
that one aspect of analysis, however, they point out that nothing occurs in a contextual vacuum—a useful principal to keep in mind not only in economics but in any of the social sciences used as part of the policy-making process.

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Initially published in 2005, in the wake of what looked like the impending dissolution of al-Qaeda, this second edition was updated when the Islamic State appeared to be unstoppable. David Cook wrote a valuable book, but one that suffers from unfortunate timing, which at times detracts from contextual understanding. Cook does, despite some minor flaws, however, attempt to unravel the muddled historical, intellectual, and political definitions of the term jihad. Unlike many current writers, this author dives deeply into Arabic sources, much of them religious commentaries by early and medieval Muslim scholars, as well as definitions from the Koran and Hadith as referenced in the various madhabib, referring to Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Jafari schools of theological jurisprudence (p. 21). This gives real credibility to Cook’s exploration of what jihad is and the various meanings attributed to what jihad actually means, yet it leaves more work to be done.

Just to say the word jihad today can create arguments, cause claims of prejudices, and prevent intellectual exploration of what it means, as briefly delineated in the author’s introduction. The author provides a short discussion of the spiritual notion of jihad but does not mention the possibility of amendment by modern Muslims in the usage of the term, thus forgetting to put this in context; there are 164 verses in the Koran that mention jihad, simultaneously defining the term while also providing an injunction against amending it.

In chapter 1, “Qur’an and Conquest,” jihad is put into historical Muslim context, and the author explores the language of the Koran as a contractual covenant. This is an important aspect of his book, but unfortunately the author does not demonstrate a thorough understanding of the important concept of Naskh, (abrogation, also referred to as Mansukh doctrine and acknowledged by both Sunni and Shia, although rejected by the “heretical” Ahmadiyya). Sura (chapter) 9 of the Koran (The Repentance, also frequently referred to as the
“Chapter of the Sword”) “is said to abrogate all other verses in the Qur'an on the subject of war and peace” (p. 10). Thus, it becomes clear one must pay attention to the fact that early verses “revealed” to Muhammad in Mecca are superseded by later verses “revealed” to Muhammad while in Medina. Abrogation is vital in understanding how the term jihad can be misunderstood or even used deceptively, and it is specifically noted in the Koran.

Chapter 2 is one of the best sections of the book and should be mandatory reading for all military officers within the Department of Defense. Covering the issue of greater jihad (the internal struggle to cleanse one’s soul) versus lesser jihad (in essence sacred warfare, commonly termed holy war), the author, citing original sources and modern modifications, clearly points out that the entire greater jihad theme is essentially a fallacy and one that is pushed hard as propaganda or dissimulation. Here the author makes no apologies as he outs Western scholars who are either intentionally or unintentionally engaging in dissimulation or outright deception. The author's points might have been made clearer by using Judeo-Christian references to give the readers better insight. For example, in the concept of the greater jihad, one may see analogies to the Catholic concepts of confession, absolution, and the attainment of a state of grace. Thus, the greater jihad is the Muslim equivalent of being in a state of grace, which is something desired before engaging in actual warfare. The correlation is not perfect, but it would put the reader in the religiously doctrinal ballpark as an explanation. Nonetheless, the second chapter is useful for readers who need to understand the differences between extremist and mainstream Islam.

To provide a better understanding of jihad, the author also explains the differences between offensive and defensive jihad (chapter 3) as well as fard ayn and fard kifaya, which concerns obligatory jihad on the individual vice the community. Despite a good treatment of these types of jihad, a few critical omissions were made that would help illuminate issues raised in the chapter 4 discussion of nineteenth-century jihad (i.e., modern usages and misusages of jihad). Those types of jihad are jihad bil saif (justifiable war against infidels), jihad al naifas (self-martyrdom missions), jihad bi al mal (struggles or war fought using finances), jihad bi al qalam (struggle or warfare by the pen), jihad bi l hijra (struggle or warfare by immigration, both internally and abroad), and jihad bi al lisan (struggle or warfare by the tongue, e.g., preaching, debating, dialoguing, proclaiming).

Chapters 5 and 6 are very well done, giving a wealth of information on the rise of what could be termed modern jihadism. It is here one sees the strain-
Poole Brothers; Hezbollah; the secular Palestine Liberation Organization and its antithesis, Hamas; and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—all are included here, with chapter 6 developing many of the tactical issues worked up by the previously noted groups.

Poor timing makes chapter 7, “The Rise of Jihadi States,” problematic. When the author first published this book in 2005, the abrupt rise of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was still in the future. ISI, termed al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, as an organization had only begun to emerge in 2006. As ISI, it seized Fallujah and Ar Ramadi (and was subsequently bloodily repulsed by Coalition forces); it operated until 2013. Again the name was changed, this time to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also often referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Unfortunately, poor timing met the second edition’s publication as well. In mid-2014 the Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS/ISIL, rose to prominence, with widespread alarm in the Middle East at its apparently unstoppable progress in early 2015. The author could not make the connection between the Islamic State and ISIS/ISIL for the readers. It is not a lack of due diligence on the author’s part in the last chapter; rather, it shows the dynamics of trying to publish on developing events.

Overall, this book is a worthwhile resource on the examination of the meaning of jihad, the development of the concept, its historical and theological roots, and how it developed through the passage of time and encounters with non-Muslim cultures as well as the fractured Muslim societies. It is only because the author wrote so well that one is able to see what else of value should or could be developed.

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National and military strategies have historically focused on what academics and military practitioners commonly refer to as conventional wars between nation-states. These strategies, much like the Geneva Conventions, reflect the Western experience during two world wars. For the past 15 years, our nation has struggled to grapple with the reality that what we have collectively considered
conventional is the exception to the norm in respect to armed conflict. Consequently, doctrine has gradually captured this through concepts such as the spectrum of conflict and the range of military operations. Over the course of eight chapters, Derek Reveron takes this ball down the field further by making the strategic case for security cooperation and its benefits that include increased global access and the promotion of a favorable balance of power. The author takes a holistic view of the contemporary security environment, looking at major powers in interstate competition, along with state and substate actors. Moreover, Reveron discusses how the military has embraced security cooperation over the past three decades and depicts our nation’s recent enlightenment in this area by discussing the increase in status of forces agreements (SOFAs) over the past 15 years from 40 to 117. SOFAs facilitate American interests in “securing access to reliable sources of energy, protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world” (p. 2).

One of the salient points that Reveron makes throughout the book is that the United States seeks to reduce security deficits through partnership and security cooperation. This point is striking because, as Reveron states, “Without security, educated professionals emigrate, foreign direct investment disappears, and economic development stalls” (p. 11). In chapter 1, “Beyond Warfare,” the author provides the rationale for security cooperation and its purpose within U.S. strategy toward five ends: improving international image, strengthening the state sovereignty system, preempting “localized violence from escalating into regional crises,” deterring regional competitors, and protecting U.S. national security by addressing the conditions that lead to violent extremism (p.17). Here he makes the case for security cooperation through the lens of international relations (IR) theory. It is an even-handed discussion of America’s place in the geopolitical balance of power. Reveron argues that the behaviors of state competitors to the United States—such as Russia, India, and China—do not suggest the IR realist’s concept of military balancing within balance of power politics, but rather integration (p. 20). Reveron makes the case that the United States should use soft power, “better thought of as attractiveness or magnetism,” to influence state and nonstate actors; he then moves the discussion beyond “interstate coercion” to make the argument that security cooperation can enable other governments to more adequately address nonstate actors (p. 23). Reasonable minds can and do disagree, but for Reveron, U.S. military actions are not that of an empire or a hegemon, because such actions are “inconsistent with American values” (p. 25). He again ties his argument to security deficits that “exist when countries cannot independently preserve national security and rely on another country through alliance or military cooperation to confront
subnational, transnational, and regional challengers” (p. 27). Americans have a balance of realist and idealist motivations for engaging in security cooperation. “These operations attempt to preempt violence on the United States, but they also follow American idealist thinking to make the world safer” (p. 33).

In chapter 2, “Military Engagement, Strategy, and Policy,” the author depicts how U.S. “military strategy shifted from containment to engagement” with a discussion about NATO and the changes to its composition and mission (p. 43). Reveron highlights that one of the primary goals of engagement is to reduce the drivers of conflict, and that the United States accomplishes this through partnership rather than dominance. One form of security cooperation he takes from the *Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014* that illustrates this form of partnership is preventive engagement with countries in the Asia- and Indo-Pacific and in Africa (p. 61).

Reveron also examines the opposition to engagement in chapter 3, “Resistance to Military Engagement,” where he first looks at civilian opposition to security cooperation due to issues such as manning disparity between the Departments of Defense and State. He then turns to military opposition through the prism of three military schools of thought: traditionalist, modernist, and irregular. Do we sacrifice deterrence by focusing on low- to mid-intensity conflict? On the other hand, should the defense budget and strategy shift away from its conventional focus to more adequately address security deficits? In chapter 4, “Demilitarizing Combatant Commands,” he discusses how combatant commands, specifically U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Africa Command, and Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), get after security cooperation in accordance with the Unified Command Plan and addresses some of the challenges involved. Reveron throws another dart against the idea of U.S. hegemony before moving on to “Security Cooperation” in chapter 5, in which he provides a buffet of options for combatant commands. This chapter, in particular, may be useful for staff members that are new to planning and executing security cooperation. In my own experience at CJTF-HOA, understanding the pivotal role of the security defense official/defense attaché, which this chapter addresses, greatly enhances the responsiveness and effectiveness of operations that fall under this umbrella. Chapter 6, “Promoting Maritime Security,” goes into issues related to fishing, piracy, drug trafficking, and how the United States partners to address those issues and also do things such as provide humanitarian assistance. Chapter 7, “Implications for the Force,” speaks to some of the doctrinal and planning issues that come with models currently in use. The phasing model of military operations, which consists of five phases that may be used sequentially, can create the perception that all U.S. military operations linearly lead to invasion by U.S. forces in Phase III (dominate the enemy). In practice, a particular military operation may not require five phases,
and Phase III may be unnecessary. This chapter supports increased situational awareness of state, substate, and group-level actors through the use of frameworks like political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems (PMESII). It also makes the point that “military commanders build trust and the habits of cooperation as part of wider U.S. efforts to achieve common security goals” (p. 182). Of particular use to military practitioners is the illustration of Leahy vetting in Nigeria. The Leahy amendment operates as a forcing function for foreign governments to espouse universal values, such as human rights, and to hold foreign government officials accountable when they act outside of those values.

Finally, in chapter 8, “From Confrontation to Cooperation,” the topic punctuates Reveron’s case for security cooperation, highlighting the shared interest of a world order secured through partnership, rather than domination by the United States. Measures of effectiveness are a critical part of the refining process, as these measures allow the United States to choose the appropriate course of action to address the issues underlying the symptoms of security deficits.

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