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13 Sept 2019

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations Pacific-MCB Camp Butler and Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Japan

To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations Command

Subj: MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS PACIFIC 45-DAY ASSESSMENT

1. Purpose. To provide the Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM) with my initial assessment of Marine Corps Marine Corps Installations Pacific-MCB Butler (MCIPAC-MCBB) and to lay out our way ahead.

2. Personnel. MCIPAC-MCBB has a seasoned leadership team. The Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, and principal section heads are all Colonels or GS-15 civilians. The MCBB H&S Battalion and five installation Commanding Officers are competent leaders. The ~11,000-strong diverse staff of Marines, Sailors, civilian Marines, and host nation employees are dedicated and capable. As you are already familiar with the results of the recent IGMC inspection and Environmental Compliance Inspection, those will not be covered in this assessment.

3. Center of Gravity. The *strategic centers of gravity* for MCIPAC are the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Security Alliances that underpin both our forward-employed capabilities and our operational flexibility. Our *operational center of gravity* are the Marines, Sailors, civilian Marines, and families within MCIPAC who make the six installations function effectively in support of forward-deployed, forward-engaged naval expeditionary forces.

4. Critical Vulnerabilities. Our *strategic critical vulnerability* is an accumulation of incidents and/or mishaps (exploited informationally by our adversaries) that undermines trust and confidence in our country’s political and military alliances. Our *operational critical vulnerabilities* are: (1) our ability to *sustain the transformation* in our young Marines and offset the potential for personal misconduct (often fueled by alcohol) inconsistent with our Corps’ ethos and values, and (2) our ability to enable and support execution of challenging naval expeditionary operations. Failure to guard against these two vulnerabilities could, over time, have a disproportionately negative effect on our host nation relationships and degrade our forward-employed expeditionary readiness. Our most dangerous risks are twofold: (1) a heinous crime committed by a service or SOFA member against a local national that cuts to the very heart of our alliances, and (2) a surprise missile and/or terrorist attack against one of our installations. Our *most likely* risk is a significant mishap (aviation or tactical vehicle) that undermines the political sustainability of our capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. In this same vein, we must become experts at countering the *most likely* continuing intrusion and disruption caused by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) – a potential threat that’s not going away.

5. Future Focus Areas. The below six focus areas have MCIPAC impact and are listed in priority order as I currently see them. These could change in the months ahead.

a. FY-20 Budget FY20 (BSS1). The MCIPAC FY-19 to FY-20 BSS1 budget controls look similar at $275M, but there are challenges underneath these numbers that need to be addressed. First, we’re still working though the consequences of the utility shortfall in the FY19 budget. This shortfall drove across-the-board cuts to our BSS1 Other Than Labor (OTL) programs and prevented new hires to our Manage to Payroll (MTP) threshold. Our FY20 utilities requirements will be higher than in FY19 (more on this below, especially due to changes in MCB Hawaii) and if the projected budget for utilities in FY20 is not addressed, we expect to see a utility shortfall of approximately $21M. There could be cascading negative effects to our installations as we work to mitigate this shortfall, especially at the onset of the fiscal year.

Second, our funding for MTP in FY20 is inadequate. The “Contractor to GS conversions” originally identified in FY16 at a 50% ratio are programmed to occur in FY20. However, our total contracts reported in FY16 for conversion to GS included DPRI contracts that *were not* an asset of MCIPAC. This will cost MCIPAC OTL resources in FY20 without actual contract offsets. Moreover, MCICOM has cancelled several centrally managed contracts (e.g. IP and GF) where MCIPAC must hire a GS to replace a departing contractor. Replacements for contractors are planned to be phased in over two years (FY20 and FY21) while the optimal solution would be to fund the entire requirement in FY20.

Third, our Total Force Management Board (TFMB) recently validated 25 new civilian billets across MCIPAC for hiring once MTP funding becomes available. Half of these are high-priority billets that should be actioned for hiring immediately, but our projected MTP in FY20 will not support this. We are currently working with your team to develop a solid way-ahead to address these budget challenges, and we fully appreciate that utilities funding is a challenge across the MCICOM enterprise.

b. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). The FRF is one of the twin Keystones (the other being the Guam build-out) for successful execution of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Per our earlier information paper, there are several challenges to successful completion of the FRF. First, recent geotechnical surveys of Oura Bay have indicated a higher clay content than originally anticipated. This finding will require soil improvement measures that were not included in the original landfill permit, thus requiring approval from the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG). The OPG has already indicated they will reject this request, likely resulting in further litigation against the GOJ. This could delay Oura Bay construction, which is directly tied to the FRF’s completion. Though not publicly announced, the current bilaterally agreed upon schedule for completion of construction is Mar 2030 with commissioning and relocation complete by Jan 2032. To meet this schedule, Oura Bay construction will need to begin by Aug 2020, which will be difficult in the current political environment.

Additionally, the current Program of Record (POR) design for the FRF lacks the operational capability to support Marine aircraft beyond a tilt rotor / helicopter base. The usable portion of the runway will be 3900', which is 2000' too short for KC-130 or OSA (C-12/UC-35/C-40) operations. An F-35B can operate from the planned runway distance in short takeoff and landing mode (STOVL), but in order to support sustained operations without damaging its lifespan, the runway would need to be constructed with hardened concrete. With your, CG III MEF, and CG MARFORPAC concurrence, we would like to commission a detailed study to look at the FRF design capability within the context of the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance* (CPG) and the potential for joint and combined operations. I look forward to discussing you (and possibly DC I&L) at a future date.

c. Marine Corps Base Camp Butler (MCBB) Garrison Mobile Equipment (GME). One of our *critical vulnerabilities* are tactical vehicle mishaps on Okinawa. These left-hand drive vehicles are massively oversized for Okinawa’s small roads. Accidents involving tactical vehicles invariably have a disproportionately adverse effect on our host nation relationship. However, III MEF units are frequently using tactical vehicles for routine movement of people and supplies that should be done by GME vehicles. We need to substantially invest in the GME fleet. Although we have ~2,400 GME assets, our GME fleet has 220 fewer vehicles today than it had 5 years ago (with the remaining fleet rapidly aging) even though we now have *more* Marines on Okinawa. The MCBB Class C GME motor pool has only 20 vehicles and serves a population of over 20,000 Marines. Moreover, because of their poor condition, 14 of the 20 GME motor pool vehicles are currently in maintenance. To address this challenge, $4.4M in procurement funding has been provided by MCICOM to MCIPAC to address the most pressing GME shortfalls, including cargo (box) trucks and 11 passenger vans (thanks for your support!). A total of $10.5M will be needed to revitalize and reconstitute the MCBB GME fleet in the long term, and we look forward to working with your team on a way ahead.

d. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCASF) Facilities. Because it will be returned to GOJ when the FRF stands up, MCASF facilities have not seen significant investment in the last decade. As a result, MCASF has the lowest aggregate Facility Condition Index (FCI) in MCIPAC at 74.28 (all other installation FCI are above 80). However, because of delays to the FRF (which are expected to continue), it’s likely that MCASF will continue to operate for another 10-15 years. Moreover, MCASF with its 9000 ft. runway, is a strategically important installation supporting the bulk of III MEF tilt rotor / helicopter assets. It also has a significant role in several plans and has a designated United Nations Contingency Mission. And as noted above, the potential for an aircraft mishap in Ginowan is another critical vulnerability. Aircraft maintenance and operations depend on first-rate facilities to ensure safety of flight, and we *must* develop some type of sustainment plan to keep MCASF running efficiently and safely past 2030.

In the 2016 Joint Committee (JC) agreement, GOJ agreed to fund an MCASF Refurbishment program consisting of 19 total repair projects valued at approximately $125M. This plan includes six hangars (four operational aircraft hangars and two maintenance hangars) but has recently been stalled due to all potential contractors over-bidding. Safe and efficient operations at MCASF is a *strategic imperative* and we have to maintain pressure on GOJ to move these refurbishment projects forward. We will raise MCASF refurbishment with the Joint Committee at the 13 September meeting (and Deputy USFJ, MajGen Mahoney, is aware of this), and will keep you posted on progress. It’s also worth noting that CG III MEF raised the issue of Futenma refurbishment with the Japanese Minister of Defense during his visit to MCASF last week, and the MinDef appeared to support this idea and even added that he would like to see Japanese and Marine MV-22 pilots training together in Japan. *This is an opportunity for us.*

e. Training Ranges. Our current range control workforce, consisting mostly of FAPS sourced by III MEF, is inadequate for maintaining professional 24/7 operations. In the short-term, MCIPAC-MCBB obligated $1.5M of OTL BSS1 funding the last two FYs to execute a local Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) service contract to source 13 range contractors. However, this solution will not meet the requirements of MCO 3570.1C, Range Safety, and MCO P3550.10, Range Management. We desire to "professionalize" our ranges by converting the FAP and contractor billets to civilian (GS) structure in line with CONUS ranges. Adopting this construct would standardize and professionalize range services, relieve the OPFOR of a large FAP burden, and provide the required safety backstop for III MEF. A recent TECOM OPT concluded that an additional 39 GS positions at MCBB and 23 GS positions at MCBH would eliminate the FAP and contractor requirement for range control while bringing MCIPAC into compliance with existing orders. The twin benefits of this option would be the return of more than 60 Marines back to III MEF for duty and a professional range force able to adapt and expand range capabilities to keep pace with new force design requirements.

f. Guam Build-Out. The second keystone of DPRI execution is the Guam build-out. Facilities construction has started on Guam to accommodate the relocation of 5000 Marines from Okinawa; this build-out is an enormous MILCON investment. A recent draft of Marine Corps Bulletin 5400 to establish the standup of Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz (MCBCB) in September 2020 has been circulated at the staff level. This envisions MCBCB under the administrative control of MCIPAC and operational control of Joint Region Marianas (JRM). Much work is required to solidify command relationships between MCBCB, MCIPAC, and JRM. In addition, a supporting / supported relationship will need to be established between MCBCB and the Guam DPRI PMO. MCIPAC is ready to participate as we develop a way forward. We should also consider fleeting up and installing a slated colonel commander *now* to prepare for the September 2020 IOC date. I’ll look forward to discussing this with you in person.

6. Installation Challenges. In addition to the above concerns, each MCIPAC installation has challenges unique to its location. I’ve visited each location except Hawaii (although I was there in May 2019 as MCU President) and will communicate in greater detail on these in the coming months. Here’s where we are now:

a. MCB Camp Butler. MCBB is comprised of six Camps run by five dual-hatted OPFOR commanders and our MCIPAC-MCBB H&S battalion commander. The non-contiguous nature of MCBB requires a duplicate Camp Services structure at each camp and poses multiple physical security challenges across the camps; e.g., only 3 of 38 ECPs are UFC compliant, frequent s-UAS incursions at Camp Schwab, and a near continuous protester presence. Camp Schwab had 140 UAS incursions last year and already has 159 this year (it would thus be an ideal location for MCWL to conduct commercial CUAS testing, similar to what’s happening in Miramar). The Provost Marshall’s coverage area in the most extensive in the Marine Corps in terms of square miles and politically the most challenging.

b. Camp Mujuk. The current T/O has a LtCol and 1stSgt as the command’s leadership, but we have a (non-slated) Colonel Commanding Officer and a First Sergeant because of the increase in personnel and the complexity of the political and bilateral environment. The recent acquisition of Yecheon and Pohang Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) along with construction of new barracks (x3), warehouse, and MAGTF Expeditionary Ops Center will quadruple the Plant Replacement Value (PRV) of Camp Mujuk to approximately $450M. The DOTMLPF-C study requests 65 additional personnel, including 27 more Marines / Sailors. The MAGTF Ops Center will also need MILCON approved for a SCIF.

As it stands now, the command structure at Camp Mujuk is incongruent: we have a post-command Colonel serving as commander with a new First Sergeant (straight from the drill field) who’s never led a company of Marines before. Moreover, Mujuk has significant command climate issues that will need to be addressed as the ongoing investigation is completed. But there’s also an opportunity here: the incorporation of the Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) at Pohang and Yechon; the addition of the three new barracks and MAGTF Expeditionary Operations Center; and the presence of a substantial Navy detachment conducting countermine / sea denial operations presents us with an imperative to put Camp Mujuk on a sustainable footing. As noted in the Options Paper, *Camp Mujuk is a strategic location on the Korean peninsula and an important one to the Marine Corps’ future in the Indo-Pacific*. I look forward to discussing this with you and DC I&L next week.

c. MCAS Futenma. In addition to the refurbishment challenges noted above, MCAS Futenma operates in one of the most challenging political environments in the Marine Corps. After half a century of encroachment, it is a frequent target for noise complaints and protests. Originally slated to close well over a decade ago, station infrastructure has been neglected. While incremental improvements have been made, there are challenging security and safety concerns. The runway at MCASF is open to vehicles crossing the approach end of runway 06; a solution for this would be to reroute the current road at a significant expense. There is also a lack of appropriate flight-line GME gear to facilitate the loading/unloading of large aircraft that could be needed in contingency operations. The five year rule for civilian Air Traffic Controllers results in a sub-optimal turnover rate.

d. MCAS Iwakuni. MCAS Iwakuni is the Marine Corps’ most important strategic installation, with the U.S. Navy’s 5th Carrier Wing, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and Japanese Coast Guard aircraft, ANA commercial aviation and 1st MAW’s aircraft as tenant units. There are two immediate challenges that need to be addressed for MCAS Iwakuni: CUAS and bird strikes. First, MCAS Iwakuni requires a robust and layered CUAS system(s). Last year, MCASI had 56 UAS incursions while there have been 7 this year. We believe obtaining a COTS CUAS solution *now* vice waiting for an additional USMC Program of Record solution is the optimal solution. I can provide more details on SIPR on where we are now. Second, there have also been two bird strikes on F-35s this year, causing millions of dollars of damage to two engines. MCAS Iwakuni requires the aviation industry’s best Bird / Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard prevention program to prevent further damage to both military and commercial aviation. Col Lewis and his team are moving out on this guidance and we expect to have concrete measures in place within 90 days. I would also like to discuss with you the current command structure at MCAS Iwakuni within the context of CMC’s ongoing efforts at Force Design and discussions I’ve had with CG III MEF. *I believe we could have another strategic opportunity at MCAS Iwakuni*.

e. CATC Camp Fuji. During a recent visit to Camp Fuji, we saw there are untapped opportunities for more modernized training that could further develop emerging concepts from the CPG. The CATC Camp Fuji Commanding Officer is proposing to host a “Fuji Working Group” this fall for III MEF to bring together representatives from across the MAGTF to see what’s possible. I see this “Fuji Working Group” as a critical enabler and key step for the Marine Corps' main effort (III MEF) to begin practical implementation of the CPG, and have discussed this with CG, 3rd MarDiv (who’s in full support). More to follow as this develops.

f. MCB Hawaii. MCH Hawaii has the lowest FCI in MCIPAC after MCASF. Unlike the other installations we have, MCBH gets no host nation assistance, so all construction is either MILCON or FSRM funded. MCBH is also looking for additional land to accommodate the influx of 2700 Marines under DPRI while battling encroachment on training areas, including the pending decision on site location of the Missile Defense Agency’s radar (ACMC has formally objected to the selected site in the Kahukus Training Area). *There’s also potential for an 80% increase in utility costs due for military facilities on Hawaii’s leeward side due to NavFac changing their funding arrangement*. This obviously has significant implications for DPRI and the DL, and I owe you more information on this as well as appropriate mitigation options.

7. Way Ahead. This is a dynamic and exciting period for MCIPAC. We expect to be fully compliant with all inspection findings (IGMC and ECI) by February 2020 and are getting after the challenges noted above immediately. Modernizing and properly manning our installations will better prepare the force for the challenges and expectations laid out in the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance*.

