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SUBMISSIONS

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). MCH is a scholarly, military history periodical published twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps History Submission.”

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Hill of Angels
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1967 to 1968
Colonel Joseph C. Long, USMCR (Ret)

Hill of Angels examines Marine Corps and North Vietnamese actions throughout the region that became known as “Leatherneck Square.” More than a dozen Marine operations occurred during the Battle of Con Thien. This account covers those from mid-1967 to early 1968.

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Since September 2016, the History Division has been happily ensconced in the new Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center. This long awaited relocation places the division in its final home at Quantico, Virginia. Our new facility enables the division to create some synergy by having the Historical Reference Branch and Archives together in a single location creating a “one stop shop” for Marine Corps historical research. In addition, the bookstore makes complimentary copies of all History Division and MCU Press titles available on the first deck. The public is encouraged to visit. If you are coming to conduct research, please make an appointment in advance so the reference historians can anticipate your needs.

This issue of Marine Corps History is again full of interesting articles on the history of our Corps. The lead article by former Leatherneck editor, Colonel Walt Ford, USMC (Ret), is a continuation of his work from the last issue. Colonel Ford’s knowledge and expertise on the Marine Corps in World War I is especially appreciated as we begin to close on the centennial anniversary of the end of the “Great War.” Next, retired Chief Warrant Officer Alexander F. Barnes writes about a heretofore largely ignored period of Marine Corps World War I history—the occupation duty in the German Rhineland that followed the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918. After the occupation story is the third and final installment by Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret), on medical doctrine for the Marine Corps during the interwar years, 1936–39. We are grateful to Captain Oreck for his expertise on military medicine and his analysis about how the Marine Corps envisioned its
application during amphibious operations. Following the military medicine article, Christopher J. Martin writes an investigative history about the graves registration policy during World War II. This is a timely article in light of a number of forgotten World War II graves (including the grave of posthumous Medal of Honor recipient, First Lieutenant Alexander Bonnyman Jr., USMC), which have been recently discovered in places such as Tarawa. Finally, active duty Major Michael Kappelmann explains the importance of writing a good command chronology. This is a long neglected subject, and one that is important for the future writing of Marine Corps history.

As usual, the magazine contains a number of excellent book reviews on the latest scholarship in military history. The majority of the books focus on World War I history. The Marine Corps History Division is looking forward to the publication of its fourth issue of Marine Corps History—our shift to a scholarly magazine continues to be a resounding success. With the centennial anniversary of American involvement in World War I fast approaching, I strongly encourage outside authors to submit articles on this particular subject. ♦1775♦
The U.S. Marines in World War I

PART III: THE U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE COMES TO THE FORE

by Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

The Marine Corps Reserve (Female)

As with the advent of the Marine Corps Reserve, the U.S. Navy led the way for women in the Marine Corps Reserve.

The Navy’s significant expansion, resulting from the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, demanded more manpower quickly. While volunteers and the draft brought about growth in personnel, the Navy needed more men in the fleet, and while the act did not specifically mention women in the Reserve, it did not preclude their service. So, with a secretary of the Navy interpretation and decision, that same act opened the doors for women to volunteer and serve. The Navy began recruiting female yeomen in March 1917.

Seeing the Navy’s success, the Marine Corps quickly realized the benefit of opening its rolls to women in clerical positions at its stateside headquarters, recruiting stations and supply depots, freeing men for the frontlines in Europe and other expeditionary efforts in support of national defense commitments. The demand for trained clerical staff was particularly great, and civilian women with those skills were seen as a capable source. Just four months after the Navy acted to bring in women on 2 August 1918, Major General Commandant George Barnett wrote the secretary of the Navy seeking authority to enlist women in the Marine Corps Reserve, specifically for clerical duty. The secretary, in concurring wrote:

*This article, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the First World War, is published for the education and training of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, as part of the Marine Corps’ observance of the centennial anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

1 Nathaniel Patch, “The Story of Female Yeomen during the First World War,” Prologue Magazine 38, no. 3 (Fall 2006).
To: The Major General Commandant  
Subject: Enrollment of women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty.  
Reference: Letter of Major General Commandant, August 2, 1918.

1. Referring to letter of the Major General Commandant as per above reference and in particular to the statement contained in the second paragraph thereof, that it is thought that about 40 per cent of the work at the Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, can be performed as well by women as men: authority is granted to enroll women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty at Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., and at other Marine Corps offices in the United States where their services may be utilized to replace men who may be qualified for active field service with the understanding that such enrollment shall be gradual.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,  
Secretary of the Navy

Anticipating the secretary’s approval, the Marines enlisted the first female, Opha May Johnson, who was working as a civil service employee at Headquarters Marine Corps, into the Marine Corps Reserve on 13 August 1918. Johnson was assigned as a clerk in the office of the Quartermaster. Later in August 1918, Marine recruiting offices received the following guidance on enrolling females in the Reserve:

1. Women to be enrolled as privates in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4, for a period of four (4) years, and the requirements to be the same as for men, except as modified by the “Circular Relating to the Physical Examination of Women” prepared by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department.

2. To be between the ages of 18 and 40, but an applicant slightly under 18 years of age, who is in every respect very desirable, to be enrolled with the consent of her parents, after authority from the Major General Commandant.

3. Women to be enrolled to be competent stenographers, expert bookkeepers, accountants, or typists.

4. No enrollments to be made without specific authority of the Major General Commandant.

5. All applicants to be informed that they will be subject to the rules and regulations that apply to enlisted men and that if their services or behavior are unsatisfactory they will be summarily disenrolled.

6. Pay and allowances while detailed as clerks to be the same as privates in the Marine Corps Reserve ($110.00), in addition to which articles of uniform clothing are issued gratuitously.

7. Women enrolled to be entitled to the same privileges as enlisted men in the regular service regarding family allotments and insurance.

8. Opportunity for promotion to noncommissioned rank, with corresponding increase in pay, open to those who prove capable and industrious.

The uniforms for Reserve female Marines were designed by the Marine Corps Quartermaster’s Office and tailored for each woman from material similar to the men’s uniforms. The issued items, described in the May 1936 article by former Corporal Lillian C. O’Malley, included “a specially designed skirt and coat, overcoat, chambray shirt, regulation tie, overseas cap, and campaign hat. The overseas cap, both in winter field and khaki, was the preferred head gear and the one usually worn by all women in uniform.”

Initially, each female reservist was issued one green wool jacket and skirt for the coming winter. The standard issue later became two winter and three summer khaki uniforms. The uniform issue consisted of jackets and skirts, six shirts, one overcoat, two neckties, and a pair of brown high-topped shoes for winter wear and low-cut oxfords for the summer khaki uniform. There was no dress uniform, and raincoats, gloves, and purses were not issued. The Marine Corps

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4 O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 30, 31.
5 Ibid., 31.
emblem and appropriate chevrons were also issued. The female Marines were noted to be "very impressive with their 'trim and snappy appearance.'"

There was no boot camp or recruit training for these new female Marines, who were called “Marinettes” in both civilian and War Department news releases and in photograph captions. However, officials at Headquarters Marine Corps disapproved of the nickname, as did many of the female reservists who preferred to be called simply “Marine.” Training for the female reservists consisted of clerical work and close order drill. The drill, conducted by experienced male Marine noncommissioned officers (NCOs), took place in Potomac Park on the White House Ellipse. The new Marines, under the tutelage of the demanding male NCOs, became sufficiently proficient to be included in numerous parades and ceremonies in Washington, DC. The Major General Commandant reviewed them on parade at the Ellipse on 3 February 1919, and the “entire unit was included in the guard of honor, facing the Presidential Reviewing Stand at the White House, for a parade of troops just returned from the front,” in early summer 1919.

**Women Reservists by the Numbers**

Thousands of women stepped forward to be screened for enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve in those first weeks after its authorization. In New York City, 2,000 women lined up at the recruiting office to be screened. After dictation and typing tests winnowed the line somewhat, interviews were conducted and only five were chosen.

Faced with the challenge of all the enlisted women entering at the rank of private, some more mature women received early appointment to a higher rank. The September muster roll for Headquarters Marine Corps indicates that, on 11 September 1918, with just less than one month on active duty, Opha M. Johnson was appointed to sergeant, making her not only the first female reservist but the Corps’ first female NCO.

Florence Gertler, one of the five applicants from New York City, was enrolled as a private on 3 September 1918 and assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps. She rose in rank quickly: promoted to private first class in November, corporal in February 1919, and sergeant in April 1919. Also promoted to sergeant in April 1919 were Violet Van Wagner and Florence M. Weidinger (enlisted 17 August 1918), Helen M. Mull (enlisted 29 August 1918), and Margaret L. Powers (enlisted 19 September 1918).

Another female enrollee, Sophia J. Lammers, en-
listed on 4 November 1918 and reported for active duty at Headquarters on 9 November 1918.\textsuperscript{14} She had the distinction of being immediately appointed to sergeant due to her qualifications: a 1911 University of Nebraska graduate, former reference librarian for the university, and a reference librarian at the Library of Congress when in the Marine Corps Reserve (F), listing source materials for a history of the Marine Corps. As such, this previous education, training, and work experience made her highly qualified to research and assist in writing Marine Corps history.\textsuperscript{15}

Another female accepted for enlistment was Martha L. Wilchinski. In August 1918, the Marine Corps Recruiting Publicity Bureau in New York City enrolled Wilchinski as a private.\textsuperscript{16} With a degree in journalism from New York University, she was well prepared for service in the Publicity Bureau. During her active duty, several of her articles about service in the Corps were published in various newspapers and magazines, and she frequently appeared in publicity photographs. Wilchinski went on to become the editor of \textit{Variety} magazine.\textsuperscript{17}

Wilchinski rose to the rank of sergeant by July 1919 and was transferred to the Assistant Adjutant and Inspector Office, San Francisco, California, that month.\textsuperscript{18} There, Wilchinski was discharged from active duty, but remained as an Inactive Reserve until her enlistment obligation was completed in August 1922.\textsuperscript{19}

Women applicants surged into the New York recruiting office when the announcement was made that the Marine Corps was enrolling qualified women for clerical work as members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

\textsuperscript{14} Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, December 1918, Roll 0156, Ancestry.com.
\textsuperscript{16} Marine Corps Recruiting Publicity Bureau, MRoll, August 1918, Roll 0147, Ancestry.com.
\textsuperscript{17} Hewitt, \textit{Women Marines in World War I}, 27.
\textsuperscript{19} Marine Corps Reserve Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, July 1922-September 1922, Roll 0216, Ancestry.com.
Another impressive female enlistee who attained the rank of sergeant outside of Headquarters was Lela E. Leibrand. She enlisted on 31 October 1918 at the recruiting station in New York City and began her service as a clerk in the Adjutant and Inspector Office on 8 November. Muster rolls show her on “Special Temporary Duty” with the Publicity Bureau in New York City, during 11–17 March 1919 and again in 17–21 May 1919. She then transferred to the Central Recruiting District, Kansas City, Missouri, on 25 May 1919. Leibrand continued on the inactive Reserve list until discharged at the rank of sergeant in December 1922.

While assigned to the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau, Leibrand did routine office work but also produced articles published in the Recruiters’ Bulletin, Leatherneck newspaper (it later became Leatherneck magazine) and The Marines Magazine. She had been a Hollywood scriptwriter in 1916 prior to entering the Marine Corps. Her talents, honed in the burgeoning movie business prior to active duty, proved very useful for the Marines. Among her credits as a Marine is one of the first training films, “All in a Day’s Work.”

While with the Publicity Bureau, Leibrand’s articles provided insight into life as a female reservist at Headquarters. Her article, “The Girl Marines,” tells of the Navy Department taking over the Vendome Hotel in downtown Washington to house the women away from the men. She describes drill, beginning early in the morning on the Ellipse behind the White House, with each female company having a Marine NCO in charge. She recorded the names of these early drill instructors for the female leathernecks: Sergeant Arthur G. Hamilton, Corporal Edward E. Lockout, Corporal Guy C. Williams, and Private Herbert S. Fitzgerald.

Leibrand returned to the film industry after the war, first working at Fox Studios in New York City, but eventually making a name for herself and promoting her daughter’s career. Although married more than once, she was well known by the last name: Rogers. Her daughter, Ginger Rogers, gained fame in the movie and entertainment industry.

With assignments restricted to clerical-type duties, even with the expanding need for manpower, the numbers of Marine female reservists were small. By 1 September 1918, there were 31 women enlisted; as of 1 October there were 145; and by 1 November, there were 240 female reservists. In July 1919, when disenrollment from active duty began, there were 226 reservists. At its greatest strength, the Marine Corps Reserve (F) numbered only 305.

While the numbers were few, the impact was significant. As early as mid-September 1918, the Major General Commandant was able to authorize the transfer of men “at Marine Corps Headquarters in staff offices, and in recruiting offices, employed on clerical or other routine duty and who were classified under selective service regulations, provided, of course, their service could be spared without det-
riment to the government service and the women clerks available were competent to fill their places."

With the majority of the female Reserve billets at Headquarters by January 1919, there were 88 female reservists assigned to the Adjutant and Inspector’s Office, 53 in the Quartermaster’s Office, and another 28 in the Paymaster’s Office.

Release From Active Duty

On 11 November 1918, when the Armistice began, there were 277 women in the Marine Corps Reserve (F). With the war over, Sergeant Opha M. Johnson, the first female to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) and the Corps’ first female NCO, was discharged on 28 February 1919. She had etched her name solidly into Marine Corps history. However, the need for additional administrative support was not over. The clerical demands of bringing the Marines home, ensuring the accuracy of pay records, and accounting for the supplies while drawing down the force required the skills of the women reservists for several additional months. The Naval Appropriations Act for the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1919 called for “placing on inactive duty within 30 days of all female members of the Marine Corps Reserve, but also provided for the retention of such that were necessary and whose service was satisfactory, in the capacity of temporary civil service appointments, and about 75 percent were retained under this arrangement.”

By July 1919, the urgent need for experienced

29 Ibid.
30 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 27.
31 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 76.
clerical staff had diminished, in spite of the fact that most of the Marine ground forces would not return until August 1919.\(^{34}\) So, in July, to comply with the congressional direction, the Major General Commandant ordered “all reservists on clerical duty at Headquarters . . . to inactive status prior to 11 August 1919.”\(^{35}\)

As is traditional in the Marine Corps, a farewell ceremony, including speeches from the Major General Commandant and secretary of the Navy, was conducted in honor of the female reservists departing active duty. The grand event, recognizing the service of the women Marine Reserves in time of great need, was held on the White House lawn. Both the Major General Commandant and the secretary applauded their commitment and performance.\(^{36}\)

Based on their service, the female reservists earned several lifelong benefits. In addition to the option of burial in a national cemetery, these included:

1. Eligibility for government insurance.
2. $60 bonus on discharge and World War Adjusted Compensation at the rate of $1.00 a day for home service performed during the period from April 5, 1917, to July 1, 1919. Some states also provided a bonus for legal residents.
3. Medical treatment and hospitalization under the regulations of the Veterans Administration for service connected disability.
4. Five per cent added to earned rating in examinations for entrance to classified service under Civil Service Regulations.\(^{37}\)

The women who remained in the Reserves in an inactive status, serving out their enlistment, received a $1 monthly retainer pay until discharged at the end of their four-year enlistment. In addition, they were awarded a Good Conduct Medal and World War I Victory Medal when they were discharged from the Inactive Reserves.\(^{38}\)

Once a Marine

The saying “Once a Marine, Always a Marine” was certainly ascribed to by female reservists. Although no longer a part of the uniformed Marine Corps, some women remained in government service working for the Marine Corps. One was Jennie F. Van Edsinga. Van Edsinga joined in September 1918 and was released from active duty to complete her enlistment as a corporal in the Inactive Reserve on 31 July 1919.\(^{39}\) Corporal Van Edsinga changed her name to Jane F. Blakeney in 1921 after marrying Arthur Blakeney, a fellow Marine, while she was still in the Inactive Reserve.\(^{40}\) Before retiring from civil service, Jane Blakeney rose to head the Marine Corps’ Decorations and Medals Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps.\(^{41}\)

Blakeney’s reference book, *Heroes*, first published in 1957 and dedicated to her late husband Major Arthur Blakeney, remains a significant source of information on Marines earning medals for valor from the Civil War era to 1955 and includes histories and facts about the highest military medals awarded by our country.\(^{42}\) With this book, her contributions to Marines, their families, and historians, which began in 1918, continue through today.

Another of the original female reservists who remained with the Marine Corps was Private Alma Swope. She worked in the Supply Department for more than 44 years. She was the last female reservist from World War I who worked in the civil service to retire. When she retired in 1963, General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, personally congratulated Swope on her service to Corps and country.\(^{43}\)

Two of the World War I female reservists, Lillian O’Malley Daly and Martrese Thek Ferguson, came back into the Corps for World War II.\(^{44}\) One of these two, Martrese Thek Ferguson, ordered to the Divi-

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\(^{34}\) McClellan, *United States Marine Corps in the World War*, 78.


\(^{36}\) Ibid., 40, 41.

\(^{37}\) O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 45, 46.

\(^{38}\) Hewitt, *Women Marines in World War I*, 43.


\(^{41}\) Hewitt, *Women Marines in World War I*, 43


\(^{43}\) Hewitt, *Women Marines in World War I*, 43.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 43, 44.
Marine Corps Reserve, Headquarters Marine Corps, in April 1952 for training, extended her active service into the Korean War era.\textsuperscript{45}

Lillian O’Malley Daly, then Lillian C. O’Malley, enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) in November 1918, moved to an Inactive Reserve status as a corporal on 31 July 1919, and remained in the Inactive Reserve until her four-year enlistment period was complete. She was discharged on 8 November 1922.\textsuperscript{46} Later married, she came back into the Marine Corps as a reservist with a direct commission to captain, one of only eight women who entered the recently authorized Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (MCWR) as an officer in early 1943, straight from life as a civilian. Daly was assigned as the West Coast liaison officer for the MCWR.\textsuperscript{47}

As the West Coast liaison officer, Daly represented the Marines at various civilian functions.\textsuperscript{48} By January 1944, she was the adjutant for the Women Reserve Battalion, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego area.\textsuperscript{49} She transferred to the East Coast as a major in January 1945, assigned to the Women’s Reserve Battalion at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.\textsuperscript{50} The end of World War II found her assigned to 3d Reserve District, Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, New York.\textsuperscript{51} Daly was listed in the Officers Volunteer Reserve, 4th Marine Corps Reserve District, as a major in 1952, promoted to lieutenant colonel on the Inactive Status Personnel list in October 1952, and last noted on the October 1957 roll “Inactive Status List, Officer Volunteer Reserve, 4th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting District, Philadelphia,” while a lieutenant colonel.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{45} Company C, Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Unit Diary (UD), 7 April 1952, Roll 0251, Ancestry.com.
\textsuperscript{46} Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, November 1918 and July 1919; and Marine Corps Reserve Division, HQMC, MRoll, October–December 1919, Rolls 0154, 0174, and 0219, Ancestry.com.
\textsuperscript{47} Hewitt, \textit{Women Marines in World War I}, 45.
\textsuperscript{48} “Detachments: San Diego,” \textit{Leatherneck}, September 1943, 68.
\textsuperscript{52} 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Roll 2040; 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Inactive Status Personnel UD, 26 October 1952; and 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Inactive Status Personnel UD, 31 October 1957.
There was no indication she served in an active-duty status during the Korean War-era, although she was carried on the Reserve rolls in an inactive status.

Martrese Thek enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) on 7 September 1918 in New York City and was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps. When released from active duty, she returned to civilian life, married, and as Martrese Thek Ferguson, reentered the Corps as a cadet in the newly formed MCWR in April 1943. That same month, she graduated first in the initial women officers’ course conducted at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts.

By the end of the war, she was a major and commanding 2d Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Virginia. In March 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson was again on the Marine Corps’ muster rolls, now called the Unit Directory (UD), as a reservist in Company C, Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Virginia, in the Office of the Division of Reserve. She was transferred to the “Inactive Status List” in 1956.

### Making Their Mark

While the active duty for those women who labored so intently to serve the Marine Corps and the nation in time of war was limited to not quite one year, it was impactful. In his annual report to the secretary of the Navy, prepared for Congress in 1919, the Major General Commandant noted, “The termination of hostilities on Nov. 11, 1918, precluded the practical working out of the principal idea in enrolling women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty, namely, that of releasing for active service in

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53 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, September 1918.
55 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 44.
the field practically all the enlisted men who had been and were being utilized in the performance of such duties. However, the majority of the women so enrolled rendered capable and efficient service, and about 75 per cent of them have elected to remain on in a temporary civil status as provided by the Act of July 11, 1919, so that the working efficiency of those headquarters and the staff and recruiting offices outside of headquarters at which women were stationed has not been interfered with by the sudden demobilization of the female reserve.”

It would be 24 years and another great world war before the Marine Corps once again turned to women to meet wartime manpower needs.  

59 “Annual Report of the Major General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1919,” in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919, 2637, 2638.
One of the more unusual missions in Marine Corps history took place from November 1918 to August 1919. The idea of Marines performing as police and civil administrators was certainly nothing new. This time, however, it was not taking place in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or Nicaragua but in the heart of Europe, specifically the German Rhineland. Also unique to this situation was the size of the Marine contingent—specifically, a fully equipped brigade that counted among its members five future Marine Corps Commandants as well as a number of other Marines who later became legends of the Corps. In spite of the size of the force, the importance of the mission, and the celebrity status of some of the participants, the Marine brigade’s service in the occupation of Germany is unknown by many and virtually unappreciated.

The 4th Brigade’s service, as part of the U.S. Army’s 2d Division in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), has been well covered elsewhere so this epoch begins where those histories end—on 11 November 1918. Just days previously, on the night of 30–31 October 1918, the 4th Brigade moved into the front lines south of Landres-et-Saint Georges. The brigade had enjoyed a short respite from battle, but now was joining the rest of the AEF in the massive Meuse-Argonne Campaign. The American offensive began on 26 September 1918, and many of the original attacking divisions were roughly handled by the Germans. With a good number of them now requiring rest and refit, other divisions, such as the 2d Division, received the call to join the fight. Early on the morning of 1 November, the brigade began its final combat operation of the war. By 1100 on the morning of 11 November 1918, the Marines had advanced 30 kilometers and, after conducting attacks across the Meuse River, were set in positions on the opposing bank.

The Armistice
As the guns fired their last shots that November morning, the western front went silent for the first...
time in more than four years. The German Army was unable to continue fighting due to the collapse of its government, the strength of the Allied offensive, and the revolution flaring up all over the fatherland. The hastily selected German representatives to the Armistice negotiations had little choice but to accept the Allied peace terms, which included two bitter pills: occupation of the Rhineland and a war reparations program. The Armistice document, signed in a railcar near Compiègne, France, put into effect a tentative peace and led the Americans and their allies into the unusual circumstance of occupying large portions of Germany. While much of the world celebrated the end of the war, the staffs of the American, British, French, and Belgian armies were hurriedly trying to figure out how they would administer the peace. The AEF found itself transitioning from a combatant force into an administrative organization now responsible for the governmental and economic control of 2,500 square miles of the German homeland, which included a potentially hostile population.

General John J. Pershing’s directions to the Third Army were deceptively simple in wording, yet high in complexity: cease current combat operations, assemble the Army, move it from the combat zone in France through Luxembourg and into Germany, establish an occupation in conjunction with the armies of three other nations, accept war reparations from the defeated enemy, and be prepared to resume combat operations at any time. Any one of these operations would be significantly difficult; together they were a real challenge. Keeping in mind that the Armistice of 11 November was not the actual end of World War I, but merely a truce to allow peace negotiations to take place, the mission of the occupying forces was quite complex and challenging.

Pershing addressed the soldiers and Marines of the Third Army:

There remains now a harder task which will test your soldierly qualities to the utmost. Succeed in this and little note will be taken and few praises will be sung; fail, and the light of your glorious achievements of the past will sadly be dimmed. . . . Every natural tendency may urge towards relaxation in discipline, in conduct, in appearance, in everything that marks the soldier. Yet you will remember that each officer and each soldier is the representative in Europe of his people. . . . Whether you stand on hostile territory or on the friendly soil of France, you will so bear yourself in discipline, in appearance and respect for all civil rights that you will confirm for all time the pride and love which every American feels for your uniform and for you.1

One of the key objectives of the American force was the seizure and control of all access to the Rhine River bridges within its sector. These included a pontoon bridge and a railroad bridge at Coblenz, as well as the railroad bridges at Engers and Remagen in Germany. To the north, the British Army and troops from their empire were similarly assigned to control the five bridges in the Cologne and Bonn area. The French Army would do likewise for the crossings in the area around Wiesbaden and Mainz. These same bridges were the starting points for the German invasion of Belgium and France in 1914, so the Allies recognized the need to secure them. As was proven in World War II, the Rhine serves as the natural western barrier in and out of Germany. Only an army in control of bridges across the river can easily traverse this barrier. Should the Paris peace negotiations break down, the Allies could use their strongly defended bridgeheads across the Rhine to swiftly deploy additional forces into the heart of Germany. The occupation zones also were designed to serve as the administrative areas for the acceptance of war materials required by the Armistice to be turned over to the Allies by the German Army.

The American Zone

Under terms of the Armistice, an area of western Germany with a million inhabitants was assigned to the United States for occupation duty. The Third Army set up its positions in a sector running from the Luxembourg border to a semicircular section on the east side of the Rhine River, soon known simply as the Coblenz Bridgehead. The area of Germany the Americans occupied was predominantly conservative in politics and Roman Catholic in religion. There were only two large towns in the American zone: Trèves with a population of 45,000 and Coblenz with 65,000. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg also fell under American control for a short period.

Originally, only the French and Belgian governments insisted on the occupation of an area of Germany as a key provision of the Armistice. Following much debate and discussion, the Americans and British finally agreed and directed their military staffs to participate in the planning. Meanwhile, after intense negotiation among the Allied representatives, the terms of the Armistice, which now included the occupation of the Rhineland by the victorious forces, were finally agreed upon. Paragraph V of the 11 November 1918 Armistice agreement stated that “the [portion of Germany on] the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation.”

Historically, the United States’ colonial experiences in the Philippines, Mexico, and the Caribbean had shown that the supervision of a civil government by an occupying force may be either strict or loose, depending on the level of compliance or hostility of the local population. In the case of the German Rhineland, the original intent was to follow a loose style of supervision because of America’s earnest desire to not interfere with German customs or institutions. However, as with the leaders of the other occupying armies, the security and safety of American troops was just as important as their administrative duties in the zones. If mistakes were made, the Allies were determined to err on the side of safety to protect their troops.

Strict rules against fraternization were published and enforced by the military police. Due to the very nature of military and civil administration of the occupied areas, the Third Army soon found it impossible to avoid interference in local matters that were not strictly within the realm of “security.” What was not clear or precise in the Armistice was the definition of “local authorities.” Equally unclear was the meaning of “under control.” These ambiguities led to complications of many kinds and, at times, almost set the two sides back at war with each other. Making a bad situation even worse, each Allied nation had its own national agenda, and therefore, a differing approach on exactly how to conduct an occupation.

After some 19 months of war, the German and American people had reached some conclusions.

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about each other; now they were going to meet, not separated as before by the barbed wire of no-man’s-land, but face to face in the very heart of Germany’s historic Rhineland. As a Third Army civil affairs officer noted simply: “The average soldier looked forward with curiosity to seeing Germany.” First, however, they had to get there.

**Organization of Third Army**

When the AEF commander, General Pershing, received notification of the occupation requirement, he selected his occupying force from among the 29 intact combat divisions in the AEF.6 Realizing the potential for danger and the inherent complexity of the operation, he chose the best units, specifically, four Regular Army divisions: the 1st, the 2d with its Marine brigade, the 3d, and 4th. From the National Guard divisions, he selected the 42d Division (Rainbow Division) and the 32d Division from Michigan and Wisconsin, whose members became known as the “Gemütlichkeit boys” because so many of them spoke German.7 From the National Army divisions, he added the 89th Division, originally formed with men from Missouri, Kansas, and Colorado, and the 90th Division, whose men were drawn primarily from Texas and Oklahoma. These eight divisions now comprised the Third Army, commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman.8 Their distinctive patch, designed for the Third Army, was a capital letter “A” inside the letter “O,” symbolizing the “Army of Occupation.”

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5 Ibid., 18.  
6 On paper, Pershing had 42 divisions in France of which 13 had been converted to depot divisions to provide support or had been skeletonized to provide replacements for the frontline units.  
7 Translates literally to coziness or good times.  
Receiving notification of their new mission as part of the Third Army almost immediately after the end of the fighting on 11 November, the selected divisions had only a few days to prepare for the move. Some of the units, those farthest from the intended occupation zone, would have to travel some 300 kilometers. Other units had shorter distances to cover, but for all participants, it was going to be a long march. Following on the heels of the retreating German Army, Third Army units began their advance toward Germany on 17 November 1918 and crossed the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. Soon the roads between France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Coblenz were filled with 250,000 American doughboys and all of their equipment. To the north, elements of the British Army marched toward Cologne, and the Belgian Army advanced toward Aachen. To the south of the Third Army, the French forces headed toward their sector, which was centered on the cities of Wiesbaden and Mainz. Under the guiding provisions of the Armistice, the victorious armies moved in stages, conscious at all times of the potential for renewed warfare. The Armistice did not permit crossing the German border until 1 December, and this allowed the units to take organized pauses to rest their animals, care for their sick soldiers, and refurbish some of their equipment.  

To the Rhine

As the Third Army crossed into Luxembourg, AEF headquarters announced a policy of noninterference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy. Shortly thereafter, a French general in Luxembourg City was placed in charge of all troops in the Grand Duchy by the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Pershing issued instructions that

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this order did not apply to his U.S. troops, and they would not be subject to French control. Maintaining American independence of command in the Grand Duchy was extremely important because, not only would the Third Army’s route of march and logistical support pipeline run through Luxembourg, some U.S. forces—the 5th and the 33d Divisions—were to remain within its borders protecting that pipeline.

Marshal Foch, in response to the action by Pershing, resolved the issue by placing the entire Grand Duchy in the American zone.10 Meanwhile, the march continued, and the daily reports from the Third Army back to AEF headquarters in Chaumont highlighted the problems advancing forces were having. Being unable to accurately fix the location of the German forces and the confusion caused by the revolution that was sweeping throughout Germany made it difficult to provide a clear picture of the movement. The 18 November 1918 U.S. Army report noted:

The march of the Third Army to the Rhine has been resumed one day in advance of the pre-arranged schedule owing to the lack of established authority in the region being evacuated by the enemy. The latter is having difficulty in complying with the terms of the armistice because of the limited number of roads available for his withdrawal across the MOSELLE and SURE [Sûre or Sauer] Rivers.11

In addition to the German Army having problems moving its units out of the occupation zones, some Germans also went out of their way to make it more difficult for the advancing Americans by cutting telegraph lines and shooting holes in water tanks.

As the various units of the American force passed slowly through France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the doughboys were pleasantly surprised by the warm welcome they received. The areas previously occupied by the Germans were particularly festive. Once across the German border, however, the march took a different tone altogether. Victory flags and pretty girls waving from the windows of the liberated towns of France and Luxembourg gave way to shuttered windows and deserted streets.

By 26 November, most of the Third Army’s advance units reached the German border and stopped. The Allied troops previously decided to cross the German border on 1 December simultaneously. The pause was welcomed by the soldiers and Marines as it gave the supply sections a chance to bring up badly needed cold weather clothing and rations. It also allowed medical personnel to treat some of their sick rather than evacuate them to hospitals.

At 0700 on 1 December 1918, with the 5th Regiment commanded by Colonel Logan Feland in the lead, the Marines of the 4th Brigade crossed the Sauer River near the town of Neidersgegen into Germany. Now fully aware that they were on enemy soil, the previously cased regimental colors and guidons were unfurled to allow the Germans to see who was marching through their country.

For the most part, the advancing Third Army passed through seemingly deserted small towns and villages as most of the Germans chose to remain inside, perhaps fearful of drawing attention after the rumors spread by defeated German soldiers. Some of the disorganized German units retreating earlier along these same roads had "taken a considerable quantity of foodstuffs without paying for it, excusing their actions by saying: ‘The Americans, who are the biggest robbers in the world, will take it anyway when they come.’"

With both Americans and Germans appearing to be on their best behavior, the march continued on a wide front through the Moselle Valley west of the Rhine. One Marine of the 6th Regiment wrote home: "I don't know just where [we are] but can guess close enough. Ten of us are staying tonight in an old lady's house. We had nice feather beds with clean sheets and everything . . . she set out a huge bowl of beef soup, a large platter of fried spuds, liverwurst about a yard long, good old rye bread [and] coffee. We sure did eat." In spite of the good conditions, the Marines remained aware of the fact that they were in enemy country. The Marine ended his letter by saying he had to close because he had to go on guard duty for the night.

Once past Trèves, the terrain became more difficult, and the combination of frozen roads and heavy loads took their toll on the troops. Usually marching for 10 hours a day, with hourly 10-minute breaks, the Marines of the 4th Brigade managed to keep the required separation zone between the German forces

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14 Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Mrs. William H. Peck, 5 December 1918, private collection.
and themselves. By the time the Americans were 80 kilometers inside Germany, the troops in the lead divisions were feeling the strain of hiking through rain and snow on frozen roads. Adding to the distance was the fact that there were few straight roads due to the Moselle Valley geography. Instead, curving, switchback roads were the norm, and the troops marched much farther than the straight-line distance on a map would indicate. Later reports commented negatively on what appeared to be a straggling problem in the Marine brigade. Approximately 1,000 replacements intended for the 4th Brigade joined their units during the march. Unfortunately, many of these men had arrived recently in France and were not prepared for the arduous journey to Germany. An observing officer noted at the time that “more men fell out on this hike than on any other. Most of these men were new replacements who had joined the brigade in and near Arlons, Belgium.”

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Matthews, assigned to the 2d Division staff, later wrote that the replacements had made a daylong march just to catch up to the Brigade and that the replacements had no equipment other than the personal equipment of the soldier and their reserve rations . . . after a conference at Division Headquarters, it was decided on account of the foot-sore condition of the replacements, to send back machine gun trucks and ambulances to bring up the replacements so that they might join their organizations and be ready to resume when the march was again taken up. . . . During the 19th a number of machine gun trucks from the Fourth Machine Gun Battalion and ambulances from the Sanitary Train were utilized to bring up the Marine replacements, repeated trips being necessary to effect this. By the evening of the 19th all the replacements had been turned over to the Fourth Brigade and resumed the march . . . the morning of the 20th.

Another Marine officer, Major Franklin B. Garrett, the 2d Division staff officer in charge of the mission to pick up the replacements and take them to the brigade, gave a more detailed version. After receiving his orders, Garrett quickly found out that even the brigade headquarters did not know “which of the many roads the replacements had taken.” Finally getting in contact with the lead element of the replacements, he found the detachment “strung out all along the line for many miles back.” After gathering the replacements in a central location, Garrett made an assessment of their condition. Many of the men were so exhausted or had such bad foot problems that they were unable to continue the march. Contacting the 4th Brigade Headquarters, he reported to Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, the brigade commander, “of the condition the men were in and suggested that transportation be furnished as [he] did not think these men would ever catch up by hiking.” A short while later, the trucks from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion and the ambulances from the sanitary train arrived to carry the men forward.

Garrett later reported that “the spirit of these men was wonderful. Their one desire seemed to be to join up with the [4th Brigade] column. For green replacements they had covered a remarkable distance. . . . Many of them had continued hiking with feet so badly bruised that only Spartan courage and Marine grit could have brought them as far as they had come.”

Significantly, another Marine officer mentioned having to find accommodations for the replacements prior to them joining up with their assigned units in the 4th Brigade. He stated that he “finally made arrangements with a local priest to put 800 of the men in a convent” and the remainder in a local school. Due to the massive movement of U.S. forces through the area during this period, the officer further explained that billets were so difficult to obtain that he, himself, “was unable to get a billet and slept on a table in a café.”

Still the Third Army continued, making staggered stops and starts, but always pushing eastward with the 1st, 2d, and 32d Divisions leading the way. These

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15 Strott, Medical Department of the United States Navy, 135.
16 LtCol Hugh L. Matthews and Maj Bennet Furyyear Jr. to MajGen John A. Lejeune, 9 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Matthew’s quote references the trucks of the “4th Machine Gun Battalion” but should have said “6th Machine Gun Battalion.”
17 Maj F. B. Garrett to MajGen John A. Lejeune, 15 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
18 Unidentified U.S. Marine Corps officer to Maj Bennet Furyyear Jr., 13 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
three divisions, under control of III Corps, were the lead elements and had the farthest distance to travel. Ultimately, their trek led them over the Rhine to sectors on the far side of the river. As the 2d Division moved eastward, the 5th and 6th Regiments alternated serving as flank guard and advance guard. Early in the march, the left flank was covered by French Army units, but they soon moved southward and headed for their occupation sector near Mainz. Their place was taken by British soldiers, who maintained liaison with the Americans the rest of the way to the Rhine.

The 330 kilometers from the Argonne that some of the units travelled was a struggle for the doughboys in the second echelon also. Following the lead divisions, they were able to occupy previously used billets, but found the roads even more torn up by the passage of the leading units. Army Sergeant Bert A. Fidler, an experienced combat veteran from the 39th Infantry Regiment, wrote his father that “I will not mention the fourteen days hike from the Argonne woods to Coblenz, making anywhere from twenty to fifty-four kilometers a day with full field equipment. I couldn’t begin to express my feelings.” Others in the 4th Division were not so reticent, referring to what they called the “Hobnail Express,” where “everyone agrees that it was a corker from any point it might be considered.”

Ironically, Marine Private Clinton Vann Peck, one of Sergeant Fidler’s best friends from Syracuse, New York, was making the same hike as part of the 6th Regiment. In a hurriedly written letter to his mother, Peck wrote: “I suppose you read much now days about the Victorious march to the Rhine. It is much nicer to read about than to do as we are now doing. It is sure tough hiking. We march all day and then stop overnight in barns and houses.”

As noted, one requirement of the Armistice was to keep 25 kilometers between the advancing Allied forces and the retreating German Army. Maintaining this interval was a struggle for the Americans because they seldom knew the exact location of the German Army to their front. As German forces withdrew from the western front, they were required to pass certain delineated, numbered geographic lines on definite dates. These “phase” lines and the dates for reaching them were written into the Armistice documentation and had been determined by staff officers in the comfort of warm and dry headquarters buildings. However, with road conditions deteriorating quickly due to the weather and heavy traffic, meeting the published march schedule proved to be a difficult task for both sides.

As the American Army crossed the German border, some of the second and third echelon units dropped out of the march and set up in their assigned sectors. The other units continued on through the rain and mud toward the Rhine.
The Watch on the Rhine

On 11 December 1918, all of the Allied forces reached the Rhine. After another short reorganization period, they crossed the river in large numbers on 13 December to establish positions on its eastern shore. The Marine brigade, still serving as the extreme left flank of the Third Army, crossed the Rhine led by the 5th Regiment via the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen, a site that assumed even greater significance in the next world war. On their left flank, the Marines made contact with the Canadian Corps, which represented the extreme right flank of the British zone.

When the main U.S. force arrived, the headquarters of the Third Army was established in Coblenz in a large German government building complex located on the waterfront on the west bank of the Rhine. Crossing to the east side of the Rhine, the U.S. III Corps, comprised of the 1st, 2d, and 32d Divisions, took up positions within a large semicircle, 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) in radius, guarding the Rhine River bridges they had crossed.

To keep the Allied armies and the German Army apart, a 10-kilometer (6.2 miles) strip was established. It ran from the Netherlands to the border of Switzerland and served as the demilitarized zone between the Allied zones and unoccupied Germany. This region was designated as the neutral zone. Germany was allowed to keep civil police forces in the towns of the neutral zone; however, they were not allowed to make any infrastructure changes or improvements. This meant the Germans were not allowed to fix roads, upgrade railroads, or run telephone lines without permission from the French, who were the nominal overseers of the entire neutral zone. The German Army was allowed to enter the zone in small numbers, if necessary, to assist local police with riot control. No recruiting for the German Army was allowed in either the neutral zone or in any of the Allied occupation areas. In addition to these restrictions, hunting and fireworks also were forbidden. Obviously, the Allies feared the danger of sneak attacks coming out of the zone and so the Armistice terms included these restrictions to ensure they did not happen.

One potential problem for the Allied armies during the occupation was the presence of a very large, unoccupied Germany just to the east on the other side of the neutral zone. There were still many proud and angry Germans who believed the war should not have ended as or when it did. Therefore, aggravating or provoking the Allies and their occupation armies served as a viable and valid means to continue the conflict. Maintaining oversight of their portion of the neutral zone to keep potential troublemakers out of the American zone soon became an important part of the Marine brigade’s mission.

West of the Rhine

Remaining on the west bank of the Rhine was IV Corps with the 3d, 4th, and 42d Divisions. The U.S. VII Corps, made up of the 89th and 90th Divisions, occupied the Moselle Valley from Trèves west to the Luxembourg border. As expected, the arrival of the U.S. Third Army was a cause for uncertainty in the local population because the attitude of the Americans toward the Germans was unknown. General Pershing attempted to alleviate the local citizens’ fears by proclaiming, “The American Army has not

23 Ironically, the French brought in recruiters from the French Foreign Legion into their own zone to sign up unemployed German veterans.
come to make war on the civilian population. All persons, who with honest submission act peaceably and obey the rules laid down by the military authorities, will be protected in their persons, their homes, their religion and their property. All others will be brought within the rule with firmness, promptness and vigor.”

Along that same line, just before the arrival of the first American forces, Coblenz’s Burgomaster (Mayor) and Police Director Bernhard Clostermann announced to the German population: “We are informed by the American Commission that the civil life will not be disturbed. Under the condition, however, that not the slightest disturbance to public order and security occurs.” Despite these assurances from the U.S. Army, American forces soon issued regulations for their occupation zone that banned public gatherings, severely restricted long-distance telephone communications and outdoor photography, censored the press, and even required detailed reports from the owners of carrier pigeons. With these edicts, General Dickman and his staff regulated a broad range of social and economic aspects of life for the occupiers and the occupied in the American zone. The Americans were determined to let everyone know who was in charge in the Coblenz Bridgehead.

Although preliminary planning had been quite limited, the AEF had wisely decided that officers designated for civil affairs duty would accompany and assist the commanders of combat units into their designated zones of occupation. This freed the unit commanders to focus their attention on the disposition of their units and to make preparations for combat operations should that be necessary. Operating in the towns and local regions of the American zone, the officers in charge of civil affairs had responsibilities that far outstripped any training they received. Their administrative duties eventually included supervision of the German police and local jails, liaison with the local government officials, the conduct of provost marshal courts, control of the movement of all civilians in their area, and responding to complaints by local civilians against the military. Other duties included the surveillance of local food and fuel supplies, supervision of public utilities, and oversight of the local political scene.

For their part, the soldiers and Marines of the 2d Division were kept in a constant state of vigilance and training in which “outpost positions and patrols were established, and a strict guard maintained.”

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25 Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, Germany: From December 8, 1918 to May 22, 1919 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1921), 79.
26 Proclamation by Oberbürgermeister Bernhard Clostermann, 7 December 1918, in Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, 75; and Rules and Regulations, 9 December 1918, in Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, 81–83.
27 Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 86.
28 Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year, 1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1920), 119.
Almost immediately after arrival in their designated sector, the Marines of the 4th Brigade conducted a series of training exercises to maintain their hard-won combat skills, while integrating the new Marines into their units. Construction of a rifle range also was high on the list of priority projects and was quickly completed. Another group of Marines was assigned to mail duty and served in the 2d Division’s APO 710 Mail Detachment on the east side of the Rhine.  

The Rhine River Patrol

During this period, the Marines also drew a mission that was greatly to their liking. Known as the Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, Third Army Water Transportation Service, they were assigned to work for the Inter-Allied Waterway Commission. An original agreement between the Allied Armies had called for the British and French to maintain the river patrol for all of the occupied zones. Subsequent discussion led to the agreement being rescinded and the Americans were assigned to patrol a portion of the river. Thus, the Marines drew the assignment.  

Estimates of German commercially operated boats on the river ranged at more than 12,000 vessels, including a number of sailing ships and barges. At any given time, there were almost 35,000 sailors working on these boats. Some ocean-going cargo ships were able to navigate the Rhine as far south as Remagen before the river became too shallow for them to operate. Obviously a workforce this large, operating vessels that could sail from Rotterdam in the north all the way through the Allied occupied zones to Mannheim in the south, would require strict monitoring and military oversight.  

One of the clauses of the Armistice forbade German policemen in the four occupied zones from carrying weapons. The need to maintain the blockade of Germany, the threat of river pirates and armed smugglers, as well as fear of Bolsheviks using the river to transport weapons, meant that an armed force would be required. The obvious solution was to establish the river patrol by using armed Marines in confiscated German patrol boats. Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were assigned as boat crewmen manning the deck cannons and machine guns. Using these boats, they regulated river traffic, performed courier and escort duty, and arrested smugglers on the 30-mile stretch of river from Rolandseck in the north down to the Horchheim railway bridge, which was just south of Coblenz. The French Rhine River Patrol was responsible for the section of river from Horchheim down to the southernmost part of their sector near Mainz. However, the section of river from

29 Military Post Office (MPO) refers to all post offices operated by the U.S. military departments. Army/Air Force Post Office (APO) and Fleet Post Office (FPO) is used when addressing mail.
30 Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 52.
Horchheim to Bingen was under the nominal command of American forces, although the French ships patrolled it. Therefore, French patrol boats were a common site in Coblenz.

The American Rhine River Patrol fleet consisted of 14 boats, manned by 8 officers and 190 enlisted Marines (table 1). From 18 December 1918 to 1 March 1919, Captain Robert H. Shiel commanded it. He was succeeded by First Lieutenant (later Captain) Lloyd A. Houchin, who led the detachment until 8 July 1919. Perhaps the most unique member of the American river patrol was not a Marine, but a 16-year-old American named Joseph Frengar. Originally from Lincoln, Nebraska, Frengar had been trapped in Germany during a visit with German relatives at the outbreak of the war. He eventually encountered the American Army near Trèves as they marched into Germany in 1918. At first a mascot of

The Mosel, under the command of Capt Gaines Moseley, was a real workhorse for the Marine river patrol. It featured several mounted machine guns, and its crew included several Marines from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion.

The bridge of the Mosel with Capt Moseley on the left, Capt A. G. Chase in the center, and 2dLt Vernon Bourdette on the right. On the deck below them stand two enlisted members of the crew: Pvt J. F. Hoffman and Pvt H. S. Yarbrough.
a military police unit, he ended up in Coblenz after their redeployment to the United States. The Red Cross representative in Coblenz introduced him to the executive officer of the Rhine River Patrol, Lieutenant Houchin, who added him to the crew of the SS Rheingold.31

The largest of all the boats was the SS Preussen, formerly the official vessel of the Rhineland überpräsident, the Rhineland’s equivalent of governor. The Preussen was used by Major General Dickman on his inspection tours of the bridgehead.32 The Preussen had a working crew of 29 Marines and six Germans and was heavily armed with two 37mm cannons and six machine guns. In addition, the Preussen was noted for having “graceful lines and [an] elaborately laid out and beautifully paneled saloon, cabins and dining room.” Among the first things the Marine crew did, after cleaning her “filthy spaces” was to repaint her to “battleship gray.”

The SS Mosel (Moselle) was the second largest of the vessels and was the first boat of the Marine patrol to fly the American flag on the Rhine River. Its trial run was conducted on 20 December 1918 and performed well enough to be accepted by the Third Army for use on the river.33 Also armed with machine guns, the Mosel carried “a sufficiently strong body of men to cope with any disturbances ashore.” It was primarily used as a supply boat for carrying provisions for the patrol stations and troops stationed along the river. The SS Mainz (1904) was used by the members of the Inter-Allied Waterway Commission in the performance of their regulation of commercial river traffic. There was a houseboat, usually stationed at Andernach, which served as the brig or guardhouse for lawbreakers brought in by the river patrol. The city of Andernach also served as the central headquarters for the Marine patrol; it shared a building with the 3d Division’s post office a short distance from the river. At the time, Andernach had one of the best-equipped river port complexes with

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31 Originally known as the International Committee of the Red Cross, what is now known as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was created after World War I. “River Patrol Has American Lad as Official Mascot,” AMAROC News, 8 June 1919.
32 “Marines Afloat Once More, Man Fleet on Rhine,” Stars and Stripes, 31 January 1919. The überpräsident of the Rhineland was the U.S. equivalent of a state governor with a great deal of administrative power in his region.
33 This information came from an unsigned, typed single-page history of the Rhine River Patrol provided in March 2016 to the Marine Corps History Division by the granddaughter of Capt Gaines Moseley. While the original author of this document is unknown, they appeared to be intimately involved with the patrol, and the information contained deemed credible.
its series of warehouses and five cranes for loading and unloading cargo.

In addition to the eight vessels named above, six other vessels were used, though unnamed, known simply by their hull numbers. Two of them had steam engines while the others were gasoline driven. Using these vessels, the Marines monitored most aspects of river traffic, including their most controversial arrest in January 1919.

The headquarters for the Marine patrol was located in this building in Andernach on the west side of the river. The first commander of the headquarters detachment was 2dLt Louis Cukela, a Medal of Honor recipient and legendary figure in Marine Corps history.

It all started simply enough; two German citizens, Mathias Scheid and Jacob Ring, attempted to smuggle 700 cases of contraband cognac worth $1 million by boat from Oppenheim am-Rhein into Coblenz. They hid their illegal cargo under what appeared to be a full shipment of rocks and gravel. Unfortunately for the two, the Marines regulating traffic on the river that day grew suspicious. Very quickly, the Marines removed the layer of camouflage and found the bottles of cognac, as this alcohol was forbidden in the U.S. zone. After being arrested, the two pleaded not guilty to a number of smuggling and fraudulent documentation charges. They were found guilty after four days of hearings and were sentenced to hard labor for a year and a fine of $250,000. The punishment was later reduced by the Third Army commander, Major General Dickman, to six months hard labor and a $100,000 fine. Their trial was such a major event that it even received coverage in the 23 May 1919 *Stars and Stripes* published in Paris.

Scheid and Ring were two of the wealthiest citizens in the American bridgehead area, and their arrest and subsequent trial were meant to show that the law was being applied equally to rich and poor. Viewed from a German perspective, it was seen as

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34 The $ (pfennig), or German mark, is a former coin or note used as the official currency from the ninth century until 2002 when the euro was introduced.
just another example of the harshness of American justice. One German wrote that “the American is very fond of large fines. I saw copies of the ‘Coblenzer Zeitung’ in which the lists of fines covered columns. No fines were less than 100 marks, and many of them mounted into the thousands. Two respectable merchants were given two years imprisonment and 200,000 marks fine for smuggling cognac and this sentence was ‘mercifully’ commuted to six months imprisonment and 100,000 marks fine.” Obviously, the nationality of the observer tended to color the spin put on the story. Nonetheless, the commander of the Third Army had decreed that no cognac would be sold in his zone, and the two smugglers received a six-month sentence in jail to let that message sink in.

One of the more notable events took place in February when all of the Marine patrol vessels were assembled for the first time for a review by General Dickman. Joining Dickman on the Andernach reviewing stand was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the Navy. To maximize the effectiveness of the review, all the ships were filled with doughboys in Coblenz on R&R, providing them with a Rhine cruise and a chance to see their commanding general at the same time. Adding to the excitement, a squadron of aircraft from the nearby Weißenthurm airfield performed aerial maneuvers over the fleet. Among the aircraft were two German Etrich Taube (pigeon) planes, flown by U.S. Army pilots, providing for many of the doughboys their first view of enemy aircraft since the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.

In spite of the continually inclement Rhineland weather, the Marines spent a great deal of time outdoors, securing the neutral zone and practicing to repel any attacks from unoccupied Germany. A member of the 4th Brigade commented on his living conditions by saying that “we, four of us, have a good billet now. The [German] people here are very good to us. . . . The old man here has a fine collection of [animal] horns. In our room there [are] 15 pairs and in the front parlor there are about 20 or more all sizes, also [stuffed] hawks, ducks, cranes, woodpeckers and a fawn . . .” By April, life in the Marine sector was good. The German Army had completed its demobilization and much of the postwar tension had dissipated; although, it would prove to be only a short reprieve. Soon, the 2d Division would find itself again preparing for war.

**The Treaty of Versailles**

The period of lessened tension lasted only until late May 1919 when reports from the Paris peace negotiations indicated that the German government seemed to be dragging its feet about signing the final surrender documents. By this time, almost half of the original American occupation force had departed, leaving only the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Divisions in Germany and the 5th Division in Luxembourg. The problem was quite simple: many German government officials considered the surrender documents and the peace treaty being negotiated in Versailles to be a second capitulation to the Allies. Fearing for their reputations and in an increasingly angry and violent postwar Germany, their lives, they were understandably hesitant to sign the documents. They

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36 “Army General Reviews Own Fleet,” *Stars and Stripes*, 14 February 1919. Gen Dickman later wrote in *The Great Crusade* (242) that the order of the procession was “Preussen (flagship), Borussia, Frauenlob, Stadt Dusseldorf, Albertus Magnus, Mosel, and six smaller vessels.” Dickman’s memory was in error as *Stadt Dusseldorf* was not the name of any of the vessels; most likely, he meant the *Elsa* or the *Rheingold*.

37 Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Mr. William H. Peck, 3 July 1919.
chose instead to try to drag out the negotiations in hopes of obtaining less harsh terms.

This strategy became apparent to the Allies in May 1919. Just the opposite of Germany, they needed to settle these issues quickly so they could demobilize their armies which were consuming many of the resources necessary to restore their war-weakened economies. The Allies also needed to focus and redirect their energies to reshaping Europe’s map as the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Imperial Russian Empire had created a number of violent border disputes in Central Europe. Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the newly merged country of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland, just to name a few, all sought more land and population at the expense of their neighbors. Several of these flare-ups required the deployment of Allied troops to separate the warring factions. Equally draining were the Allied expeditionary forces that had been sent to Siberia and northern Russia to confront the Bolsheviks. Clearly then, to the Allies, something had to be done quickly before their own military strength melted away completely. Most of the 2 million U.S. soldiers of the AEF had already returned to camps in the United States for demobilization. Many of Britain’s soldiers had demobilized as well.

Due to German foot dragging, on 20 May 1919, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the overall military commander for the Allied armies, directed the staffs of the French, British, Belgian, and United States armies to prepare operational plans that would move their forces out of their occupation zones and into unoccupied Germany. General Pershing’s headquarters instructed Third Army headquarters in Coblenz to begin the planning phase, and on 22 May, each of the five American divisions still on occupation duty received instructions that included the wording:

Should the enemy refuse or decline to sign the Treaty of Peace presented to him, the Allied and Associated Powers will renounce the present Armistice and resume the march of their armies into the enemy’s territory. . . . The purpose of this advance would be: to separate northern and southern GERMANY by the occupation of the valley of the MAIN; to reduce the enemy’s resources by the seizure of the RUHR industrial district; and to threaten his seats of government—WEIMAR and BERLIN. . . . All arrangements will be made to begin the advance by crossing the present outer limits of the bridgehead on or after May 30.

The basic operational plan for the Americans was simple in design. Since the 1st and 2d Divisions were already occupying the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Rhine, they would lead the American forces through the neutral zone into unoccupied Germany. The 3d Division, centered near Andernach on the west side of the Rhine, would move by foot, vehicle, and rail over the Rhine. One reinforced brigade (consisting of the 30th and 38th Infantry Regiments with associated engineers and machine gun battalions) of the 3d Division was detached from divisional command and placed directly under Third Army control. This brigade would move strictly by train and once across the Rhine would be used as a mobile force to support the advance. The 4th Division would remain on the left bank of the Rhine to maintain security of the river crossings. A French cavalry division would pass through the American zone and cross the Rhine to act as the link between the British Army and the American forces.

Soon after the plan was drawn up, Third Army also provided direction to III Corps and the leading divisions:

The corps will advance with its leading division transported on trucks in two main columns to reach the line FRANKENBERG-KIRCHHAIN on the first day of the advance. These columns will advance in combat formation well covered and connected by armored cars and motor patrols armed with rifles and machine guns. This division will seize and leave guards over all principal railway stations and junctions, important telephone and telegraph centrals, and all other sensitive points on the lines of communication.

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38 Message from Marshal Foch, General Headquarters, Allied Armies, to General Pershing and the commanders of the British, French, and Belgian occupation armies, 20 May 1919, DGCRA Order No. 8618, original copy in author’s personal file.
39 This information was forwarded to the units of the Third Army via G-3, GHQ, AEF (Germany, Third Army HQ), Folder no. 278 with the title, Preparation for Advance into Germany, 22 May 1919, in American Occupation of Germany, 117. At the time of receipt, the 2d Division was assigned to the U.S. III Corps along with the 1st Division and the French 2d Cavalry Division.
east of the RHINE River. These guards will be as small as is consistent with safety so that the greatest possible strength of the division will be with the advance available for combat. The civil population of country passed over, especially those engaged in operating public utilities, will be required to remain in place and continue their functions.  

Thoughts of a renewed war were put on temporary hold in the Marines’ sector during the first week of June, when there was an unusual and deadly episode involving two Marines from 17th Company (commanded by First Lieutenant Augustus Paris), 5th Regiment. Privates Albert D. Dupree and Lauren W. Collier, two Marines with somewhat checkered pasts, became fed up with occupation duty and decided to see what was on the other side of the neutral zone. They loaded up their packs with field gear and a supply of soap and cigarettes. Avoiding the guard post, the two slipped through the demilitarized zone and then rode a train eastward until the first stop. After spending the night in a German hotel, they encountered three Germans who wanted to purchase some of their blankets. During the course of negotiations, one of the Germans asked the Marines if they had a pass allowing them to be outside of the American sector. The two privates responded by tapping their holsters, saying, “This is our pass.” One of the Germans then grabbed Private Dupree and wrestled with him as he attempted to take his .45 automatic pistol out of its holster. After a short struggle, the two men fell down a flight of stairs to the ground floor of the hotel. Collier followed the two men down the stairs and fired into the air to scare away any other onlookers. Unfortunately, the German managed to get control of Dupree’s pistol and shot him. Hit twice, Dupree fell into the hotel kitchen and died. The German then turned the pistol on Collier and shot him in the arm. German authorities arrived quickly on the scene, and after a telephone call between them and the American authorities, the wounded Marine and his deceased friend were transported back to the American sector. The Germans later reported that “the men complained of army life and said they were through with it all and were going to Berlin for a good time.”  

On 9 June 1919, the Third Army received another message from AEF headquarters, which again indicated the rising tension between the Allies and the Germans:  

The enemy has refused to sign the Treaty of Peace presented to him. The Armistice has been renounced by the Allied and Associated Powers, effective at H [hour] of D day. The enemy occupies with one corps of approximately 10,000 second class troops, the territory through which this army will advance. His forces are scattered and are not prepared to offer an organized resistance. Resistance from stubborn detachments of a battalion or less may be expected. No troops have been reported as moving from the east to reinforce this corps. The attitude of the enemy civil population will probably be passive. The British Army of the RHINE on the left, and the French Tenth Army on the right, advance abreast of our army.  

To the soldiers and Marines of Third Army who had fought their way through the Argonne against German soldiers, the statement from higher headquarters that they would only be facing 10,000 second-class troops was probably greeted with some skepticism. They had learned the hard way what a few German soldiers behind a Maschinengewehr (MG08) machine gun, nicknamed the “devil’s paintbrush,” could do to advancing American troops. The MG08 was so respected by the Americans of the Third Army that they had equipped the Marine patrol boats with MG08s instead of their own organic weapons. As tensions between the governments increased, the previously friendly relationship between the Americans and the Germans took a sudden downturn. Arguments and street fights increased, and there were several violent incidents leading to injuries and fatalities on both sides. As German hesitation continued to deadlock the peace treaty signing, Marshal Foch finally decided on a date for the operation to commence—20 June 1919 would be D-Day. Prior to this, the Allied forces had been

40 Chief of Staff, Third Army, to Commanding Generals, III Corps and 3d Division (Germany, Third Army HQ), 22 May 1919.
41 “German Slays Marine, AWOL on Way to Berlin; American’s Comrade Wounded in Scuffle,” AMAROC News, 6 June 1919, 1.
42 Plans in Case Germany Refuses to Sign Peace Treaty, Field Orders 193-32.1, No. 9 (France: Third Army, AEF, 17 June 1919).
43 LtGen Liggett, Plan of Communication, Supply and Evacuation, Annex No. 3 (France: Third Army, AEF, 19 June 1919).
told that the day, three days before the actual operation, would be known as J-Day. Once J-Day was announced, all participants would know that they were now in the three-day window prior to the operation and to proceed with their initial troop movements. This planning information was so important in ensuring the transportation requirements for the attack were met that French Lieutenant Colonel Jean Marcel Guitry, the president and senior member of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission, personally telephoned Major Gornusy Courtillet, the French liaison officer in the Third Army Coblenz office, on 16 June to ensure that he and his American counterpart were aware of the impending announcement. At this point, however, H-Hour had not yet been determined, and while the subsequent J-Day (17 June) Third Army message provided further movement instructions for the American units, the exact time for the attack remained a mystery.44

As is so common in military operations, the very next day, 18 June 1919, Third Army received a change: D-Day was now set for 23 June 1919. Along with the date change, there was more information on the enemy situation and follow-on maneuvers:

As no great resistance to our forward movement is expected, we may, by a rapid move-
“concentration of our troops having been completed this date, the American Third Army is prepared to advance eastward.” Third Army also informed the 1st and 2d Divisions in their jump-off positions that H-Hour was now set for 1900 on 23 June.46

The Americans received word that the British forces to the north were ready and in place as were the French to the south. A clear indication of the French influence on the language of the American Army is evident in the 20 June report that stated “camions [trucks] for the forward movement of the 1st Division have been assigned to all units and have reported at designated entrucking points.” With this notification, all eyes turned to the clock. The Third Army logisticians continued to refine their plans. They received the welcome news that they would be provided 25 trucks with drivers to move the Inter-Allied Railway Commission on D-Day because it had been decided that the commission staff would accompany the frontline troops to take immediate control of key railheads. Rations, gasoline, and forage for the animals in the combat units were scheduled to be delivered to designated forward railheads. Ammunition was to be resupplied from stockage maintained at the ammo depot in Neuwied. Evacuation hospitals were loaded on trains and staged at the Coblenz railhead, awaiting movement orders. Resumption of the Great War was now less than 36 hours away.

Tension increased almost to the breaking point on 21 June, when news arrived that the German fleet’s warship crews, who were interned at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands since the Armistice, scuttled their own ships rather than have them taken over by the Allies. Before they could be stopped, 74 warships were sitting on the bottom of the harbor. Some nearby British warships fired on them in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the destruction, killing eight German sailors.47 The next day in Versailles, France, the German delegation indicated they might be willing to sign the treaty, except for the clauses that held Germany responsible for starting the war, and asked for an extension to the signing deadline. Still angry at the report of the German warships being scuttled, the Allies rejected this request and informed the Germans that the deadline remained 23 June 1919.

At 1800 on 22 June, Third Army reported that “the American Third Army is awaiting orders for forward movement.”48 War was now only 25 hours away, and the Marines of the 6th Regiment were hunkered down in the area around Herschbach awaiting the word to advance. Likewise, the soldiers of the 28th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division, were at Mährren watching the clock. With the possibility of renewed combat looming, events outside the occupation zones now took a sudden turn in rapid succession. In Berlin, the German cabinet and its leader, Reichs Chancellor Phillip Scheidemann, who had taken a strong stand against signing the peace terms, resigned from office. They were almost immediately replaced by a new coalition government formed under the new chancellor, Gustav A. Bauer, a former trade union leader. When the senior German Army leaders were summoned by this new government and asked if they could defend their homeland from an Allied attack, their only reply was that the situation was “hopeless.” In light of this revelation, the German government notified the attendees at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–20) of their intention to sign the peace treaty as written. As a result, at 1000 on 23 June, the Third Army sent a message to its units.

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army
To: Commanding General, III Corps

1. The preliminary operations directed by letter June 19, to begin at 19 h., June 23, are suspended until further orders.49

War was averted with just nine hours to spare. Soon after, another message was sent from Allied Headquarters.

The German Government having indicated its intention of signing the Treaty of Peace, the units of the Allied Armies, while maintaining the alert, are being so disposed as to increase

48 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 50 (France: Third Army, AEF, 22 June 1919). The closer the operation came to being put into action, the shorter the messages became, which is a significant difference between then and today’s operational environment where guidance and last-minute instructions are sometimes overwhelming.
49 Third Army to CO III Corps, June 1919, Folder no. 27923 (Germany, Third Army HQ).
the comfort of men and animals; the divisional areas being extended and certain units withdrawing somewhat from the advance line pending the actual signing.50

On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hatenfels, occupied the most advanced position ever occupied by Marines in Germany. During the course of the next few days, the Marines of the 4th Brigade made the hike back to their regular duty stations near Leutesdorf, Boppard, and Höningen. With the crisis over, the members of the brigade and the entire Third Army could begin preparations for what was going to be a memorable Fourth of July celebration in the American occupation zone.

The Fourth of July and the Composite Regiment

In April 1919, the Regular Army divisions in the Third Army received orders to establish a company-size element in each of their infantry brigades, which would represent their division in the postwar celebrations. They would also serve as the U.S. representative to the many ceremonies that would take place. The Composite Regiment was composed of a headquarters detachment with a band and 12 infantry companies as follows:

- 1st Battalion: Company A, 1st Division; Company B, 1st Division; Company C, 3d Division; and Company D, 3d Division.
- 2d Battalion: Company E, 4th Brigade (USMC); 2d Division, Company F; 3d Brigade, 2d Division; Company G, 5th Division; and Company H, 5th Division.
- 3d Battalion: Company I, 4th Division; Company K, 4th Division; Company L, 6th Division; and Company M, 6th Division.

One aspect of 2d Division culture had to be changed to accommodate uniformity requirements of the Composite Regiment: the shoulder patch. The 2d Division had previously chosen an Indianhead imposed on different shapes and with varying colors to represent the individual units. For the Composite Regiment, the background design was replaced by a star, thereby presenting a uniform appearance for the Army and Marine representatives in the regiment.

Unlike many military directives that often provided a unit the opportunity to remove malcontents or troubled soldiers, the composite units were formed from among the very best and most combat-experienced men. After selection, the companies from all the divisions reported to Third Army headquarters at Coblenz, where they were formed into

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50 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 54 (France: Third Army, AEF, 26 June 1919). The actual signing ceremony for the Treaty of Versailles took place on 28 June 1919. Ironically enough, while all the other main participants accepted and signed (except Russia), President Woodrow Wilson was unable to convince the U.S. Congress to ratify the treaty due to political infighting and a growing “isolationist” movement in the country. As a result, the United States would remain, technically, at war with Germany until the Treaty of Berlin was signed by both countries in August 1921.
the three battalions of the Third Army’s Composite Regiment. The Marine officers chosen to lead the 4th Brigade were well known figures among Marine Corps lore. The commander of the 4th Brigade contingent (now Company E, 2d Battalion, Composite Regiment) was Captain Clifton B. Cates. His second-in-command and executive officer was First Lieutenant Merwin H. Silverthorn. Both would go on to illustrious Marine Corps careers.\footnote{Barnes, In A Strange Land, 282-301.} Cates would later recall in an oral history interview how the Marines for the unit were chosen: “We had I think about 12 or 14 lieutenants and about 400 enlisted men that were already handpicked. The first requirement was they had to be 5 feet 10 inches tall, and they had to have been in combat operations, and they had to be in good shape physically.”\footnote{Gen Clifton B. Cates intvw with Benis Frank (Oral History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA), x, 38.}

Now assembled with the finest soldiers from the other Regular Army divisions, the Marines and doughboys from the 2d Division drilled with a vengeance. In late May and June, while the rest of the Third Army’s infantrymen were cleaning weapons and preparing to go back to fighting, the members of the Composite Regiment continued drilling. Their first official appearance outside the American zone had to be postponed because of the German delay in signing the Treaty of Versailles. They were scheduled to accompany General Pershing to London for a victory parade, but Pershing decided to cancel his appearance and instead stayed at his headquarters in the event hostilities began. As a result, the regiment remained encamped on Carnival Island near Coblenz.\footnote{Carnival Island near Coblenz along the Rhine River was one of the most developed areas created by AEF, which included an athletic field and track for Third Army competitions.} To keep their skills sharp,
the regiment paraded every other day through the streets of the city. On 24 May 1919, American Army of Occupation (AMAROC) News reported that the marching soldiers and Marines were “picked for size and appearance, with every man in new clothing and equipment, they look [like] soldiers [to] the last man . . . marching in line of half companies, two platoons abreast, with the 3rd Division band in the lead.”

As the treaty crisis was being resolved, the Composite Regiment departed Coblenz for Paris via train. Known now as “Pershing’s Own,” the Composite Regiment made its first public appearance at the Inter-Allied Games being held in Pershing Stadium. During the opening ceremonies on 22 June, the regiment was reviewed by General Pershing and French Premier Georges B. Clémenceau. The unit performed guard and escort duties during the athletic competitions. This was followed by Independence Day ceremonies on 4 July, and 10 days later, the French Bastille Day ceremony. These were proud moments for Cates and 100 of his Marines as they marched in the parades. Although the regiment was at reduced strength on these occasions, the order of march was the same. The Marines fell in just behind the massed colors and standards of the regiments of the Third Army as they passed through the Arc de Triomphe de l’Étoile and down the Champs-Élysées to the Place de la Concorde.

After the victory parade in Paris, Cates’ Company E accompanied General Pershing to London. Enjoying a few days in Britain, which included an inspection by the Prince of Wales in Hyde Park, they marched in the Empire Day victory parade. The Marines then crossed the English Channel again to embark on the USS Leviathan (1913) and returned home with Pershing. On 19 September 1919, Company E was detached and transferred to the Marine Barracks Washington, and on the 20th, Cates paid his men and discharged those who had decided not to remain in the Corps.

While the Composite Regiment was drilling and marching, the rest of the Third Army back in the occupation zone prepared for the Fourth of July celebration. Starting early in the day, concerts were held by all of the units’ bands and at noon there was a 48-gun salute in honor of the 48 states. One of the culminating events was a baseball game between the 3d Division and the 2d Division. Most of the other units followed suit, and the American zone turned quickly into a hotbed of athletic competition.

Following the full day of concerts, sporting events, pie-eating contests, and boxing matches, all the inhabitants of the zone eagerly awaited the arrival of darkness. Shortly after 2100, two signal guns were fired from on top of Ehrenbreitstein Fortress, and the grand finale began. The 17th Field Artillery, stationed in the fortress, shot off the 10,000 captured German signal rockets and flares it had in storage. As the sky lit up with multicolored streamers from the flares, the 4th Division to the north of Coblenz pitched in, launching their own supply of captured pyrotechnics. The show continued until midnight, when the massive stockpiles were finally exhausted. The New York Times reported the next day that “the Americans have just finished a Fourth of July celebration the memory of which will live long in the Rhineland, and it will not soon be forgotten by the hundred thousand soldiers who staged it. In the doughboys’ slang, it was a ‘beaucoups show.”

The timing of the celebration was particularly appropriate because the Third Army was quickly shrinking; on some days, up to 8,000 soldiers left the occupation zone for the United States. After it was over, all who witnessed it agreed that they had successfully brought the excitement of the American holiday to the German Rhineland.

Homeward Bound

With the departure of the Composite Regiment from the Coblenz area en route to their full schedule of appearances in London and Paris and the conclusion of the Fourth of July celebration,
water mark of the Third Army had been reached. Very shortly thereafter, the Third Army was renamed the American Forces in Germany and a new commander, Major General Henry T. Allen, took over. The 4th Division departed the American zone on 12 July and the 2d Division began to leave a short while later on 21 July. The 3d and 1st Divisions left on 11 and 12 August, respectively.

In the 4th Brigade, the Marines were well aware of this movement; Vann Peck wrote his mother on 3 July that “I expect to walk to Leutesdorf tomorrow and then go up to Neuwied or Coblenz for it may be the last chance I get. . . . The way things look we will sail this month.”

The westward journey was a marked change from the original march to the Rhine. Instead of hiking, the now well-fed and well-dressed soldiers and Marines of the 2d Division were divided into train-size contingents and dispatched to the transit camps outside the port of Brest in mid-July. General Lejeune, his staff, the 4th Brigade headquarters, the 5th Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 6th Regiment sailed on the USS George Washington (ID 3018) and arrived in the United States on 3 August. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion sailed on the USS Santa Paula (ID 1590) and arrived on 5 August, while the remainder of the 6th Regiment sailed shortly thereafter on the USS Rijndam (ID 2505) and the USS Wilhelmina (ID 2168). The Marine contingent of the Composite Regiment arrived on 8 September, still serving as the escort for General Pershing. While the ocean voyage was more pleasant than their previous trip, the 2d Division still had one more mission before they could demobilize—a parade in New York City on 8 August and then a review by the president in Washington, DC, just

A key part of each victory parade was the marching of the AEF units. Here, the 6th Regiment receive a warm welcome as they march down 5th Avenue in New York City on 8 August 1919.

58 Pvt Peck to Mrs. Peck.
four days later to celebrate their well-deserved victory. With the parade and review completed, the Marines of the 4th Brigade returned to Quantico, Virginia, on 12 August. Their final duties consisted of being fitted for and issued new green uniforms as well as drawing their closeout pay and a train ticket home.²⁹ The 4th Brigade, brought to life to serve in the AEF’s 2d Division on 24 October 1917 at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France, was deactivated on 13 August 1919, its mission complete. ¹７⁷⁵ ²⁹

²⁹ Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Fred H. Peck, 10 August 1919, courtesy of the Peck family. During this short period, some 6,677 enlisted men were discharged from the Marine Corps or transferred to inactive status as reported in Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2015, reprint), 139.
For the U.S. Marines, 1936 started with a controversy that could have derailed all of the plans and effort of the Corps to transform in line with a new mission. In 1935, the Joint Action of the Army and Navy had removed the language inserted in 1927 that had made amphibious warfare the main Marine Corps mission. The U.S. Army was focused elsewhere and was not interested in becoming involved with amphibious assault. In 1928, Army Colonel William L. Mitchell had predicted that air forces would devastate any amphibious assault fleet before a landing, and in the early 1930s, General Douglas MacArthur, then chief of staff, had indicated the Army had “extreme reluctance” to undertake amphibious operations.

The Navy and Marine Corps mounted a vigorous response to this change, with the acting Secretary of the Navy, William H. Standley, sending a letter to the Joint Board urging in the strongest way that this action be reversed: “In the seizure and temporary defense of advanced bases, the Marine Corps can, it is believed, make its most valuable contribution to a naval campaign. The Marine Corps considers this functions [sic] its primary mission . . . .”

The amphibious mission was promptly reassigned to the Marines, and they would remain the lead Service in this area. It is worth noting that, when the amphibious mission was taken from the Marine Corps in 1935, it was not given to anyone else. Though it has been suggested that the change represented a “Parthian Shot” from General MacArthur as he left his position. MacArthur, like many senior Army officers who had been in France during World War I, harbored resentment against the Marines for the publicity they had garnered during that conflict. Although this episode may have increased inter-Service resentment, its prompt resolution prevented any significant change in Navy and Marine transformation efforts.

In the early winter of 1936, Fleet Landing Exercise (FLEX) 2 was held in and around Culebra, Puerto Rico. The 1st Brigade surgeon, Lieutenant Commander John B. O’Neill, USN, submitted a detailed report on the exercise, and Colonel G. I. McKinney, an Army medical observer, also made a report. Lieutenant Commander O’Neill had significant experience as a junior medical officer (lieutenant) with the Marines during the Second Nicaragua Campaign, and had been awarded the Navy Cross twice for valor for his actions in that campaign.

Additionally, the overall report from the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) contained a section analyzing medical aspects of the FLEX.

1 Joint Board, “Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1927,” Chapter 1, Section VII, Historical Amphibious File, Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center (GRC), Marine Corps University (MCU), Quantico, VA.
3 W. H. Standley to Joint Board, 18 May 1936, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
4 Atwater, “United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 85. During WWI, Gen Pershing had a policy that individual units were not to be identified in press releases so that credit could be attributed to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) as a whole. It was initially thought that a well-known reporter, Floyd Gibbons, had been killed covering the Belleau Wood action, and his fellow reporters identified the Marines and the action as a tribute to him. In actuality, the reporter was wounded but survived. Pershing was furious about this episode, and Army officers attributed the violation to deliberate Marine publicity seeking. Harry S. Truman, who had been an Army artillery officer in France, as president complained about the Marines’ “publicity machine.”
The report of the brigade surgeon followed the pattern established in FLEX 1, which was to become basically a template for future reports. The actual medical care delivered to achieve the overall health of the force was good. However, when it came to the purpose of the exercise—simulated assaults—the shortcomings were obvious. Lieutenant Commander O’Neill distilled the biggest problem down to a single comment: “The operations ashore demonstrated the outstanding fault of the medical service—lack of personnel. A secondary fault was inadequacy of training.”

The table of organization (T/O) for medical personnel attached to units participating in the exercise was inadequate, even for peacetime needs. The T/O was not filled for the exercise, with shortages particularly of corpsmen. Furthermore, approximately 50 percent of the corpsmen reported with little or no experience or training in field operations, and there was insufficient time between when they reported and when they departed for the exercise to remedy this fault. Equipment was also deficient. What equipment they had was too bulky, and while Lieutenant Commander O’Neill wanted changes, he urged more experimentation and trials before any new equipment was procured.

The report of the Army observer, Colonel McKinney, echoed the analysis of Lieutenant Commander O’Neill. Colonel McKinney noted that the overall number of medical personnel assigned to the brigade was inadequate and that there was no collecting company. Those medical personnel who were present were neither adequately trained nor integrated into the units they supported or the medical detachments. Colonel McKinney recommended a publication by Navy Captain William L. Mann Jr. on joint operations—the division of responsibility between Navy and land components for medical care was the same for both Army and Marine landings. That is, the Navy and the attack force surgeon were responsible for the casualty collection stations on the beach or beach evacuation stations, and transport of the wounded to the appropriate ships and care once they were on board. The land component and its senior medical officer were responsible for all medical issues forward of the beach.

The overall Marine Corps after action report on FLEX 2 contained a section on medical aspects. Again, a major issue presented was the lack of sufficient medical personnel and the fact that many of those assigned arrived late and had no training prior to the exercise. Recommendations were made to increase the number of enlisted medical personnel in the brigade to 76, to establish permanent brigade medical staff (officer and enlisted), and to send some personnel to the Army field medical school as soon as possible. Arriving with the signature of the commanding general of the 1st Marine Brigade, this report carried a great deal of weight.

In July 1936, Commander Joel T. Boone, USN, arrived in San Diego to assume the position of FMF surgeon. Commander Boone was experienced, well known, and well connected. He joined the Navy in 1914 and served in Haiti prior to service with the Marines in France during World War I, where he was awarded the Medal of Honor. Subsequent to the war, he was the physician assigned to the presidential yacht, and following that assignment, attended an advanced course at the naval medical school in the early 1930s. Dedicated, a man of action, and unafraid to use his influence for a good cause, Commander Boone was just the sort of Navy doctor to organize and develop medical support for the FMF. When he arrived, he found no job description, no files, and for

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7 Col G. I. McKinney, USA, “Extract from a Report on Fleet Landing Exercise No. 2 (CONFIDENTIAL),” 1 September 1936, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
8 To approximate the T/O for Marine support, medical personnel (officer and enlisted) would be detached from their normal duty stations, clinics, or hospitals for temporary duty during an exercise. Typically, they were detached from their parent unit as late as possible; and if they had never served with the Marines before, they had no training in medical care in the field or with a specific type of field medical unit. Thus, while these personnel might be well qualified medically, they were totally unqualified for field duty, absent at least minimal training. When they came at the last minute, time that should have been spent doing the exercise was needed to train them to a minimal standard simply to be safe in the field environment.
better or worse, was confronted with a *tabula rasa*, or blank slate. One of Commander Boone’s first actions was to study the reports on Gallipoli.

Boone wasted no time in beginning to cover the blank slate with writing. In August 1936, he sent a letter to Rear Admiral Percival S. Rossiter, the surgeon general of the Navy, on the subject of FMF medical organization. Unsurprisingly, he requested an increase in the strength of the assigned personnel and urged that the appropriate officers and enlisted men be assigned as quickly as possible to allow for unit integrity. Also in August, Boone received a letter from Captain George F. Cottle, (MC) USN, the Pacific fleet surgeon and an old friend. Besides welcoming Commander Boone to San Diego and his new job, Cottle pointed out the new landing manual and suggested that Commander Boone review it and make recommendations to improve the medical section. Cottle also mentioned that Boone should review the lectures on field medicine by Captain Mann. This communication illustrates the relatively small circle of Navy medical officers dealing with the issue of amphibious warfare, and the prominent position of Mann in the center of that circle.

One of the issues that the Marines had to deal with during the 1930s was a lack of interest by most of the Navy line in amphibious warfare. The struggles of the Marines to get the Navy to support amphibious shipping in both the right quantity and the right design, and the uphill struggle to acquire proper landing craft, has been well presented by such authors as Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, Allan R. Millett, and others. In conjunction with Captain Cottle, Commander Boone presented lectures to the Navy line staff of the Pacific Fleet on amphibious operations and the medical aspects thereof. One might expect a lecture by a Medal of Honor recipient on any subject to be attractive to a military audience, however, the line staff was described as “bored” at the first lecture, although showing somewhat more interest at the second.

Throughout the fall of 1936, Commander Boone worked closely with Captain Cottle to get the medical service of the FMF on a sound basis. One of the junior medical officers in the FMF, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Manion, (MC) USN, had produced the most detailed plan for the medical service of the FMF to date. Twenty-two pages long with 68 attached tables, this analysis set out the T/O and proposed table of equipment (T/E) for the brigade medical organization and defined the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of medical staff (battalion, regimental, and brigade surgeons). A sample medical annex to the field order was included in the plan, as well as a discussion of the actions of the various medical units from embarkation through the assault until there was a hiatus in combat. Commander Boone forwarded a summary of this to Captain Cottle and strongly urged the adoption of the concept of four smaller, 66-bed field hospitals for the FMF rather than one larger one, citing the ease of combat loading, lighter weight of each unit, and the added flexibility with this scheme. Commander Boone used Cottle as another advocate to get the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and the Navy line command to make the changes that those medical officers working with the Marines saw as necessary and urgent. He was able to do this and remain cognizant of the chain of command because of the change made several years prior that designated Marine expeditionary forces as the Fleet Marine Force. By adding another direction to the line of attack, Boone was attempting to overcome inertia and disinterest in Washington.

As 1936 drew to a close, all indications showed that the letters and reports forwarded to Washington by Commander Boone and others had some effect. In December 1936, Boone received a letter from Captain G. E. Thomas, (MC) USN, at BUMED, which was very supportive of his efforts. Captain Thomas agreed with the concept that medical officers with the FMF should be there for a full cruise

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16 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, to Capt George F. Cottle, (MC) USN, 11 December 1937, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
(i.e., a regular tour of duty) and not temporarily assigned. He also supported the development of an FMF/Marine Corps field medical course for corpsmen, who would attend a two-week course following graduation from the Hospital Corps School in San Diego, California. Captain Thomas urged Commander Boone to develop and submit a curriculum for this course to BUMED. The support of BUMED was encouraging and also illustrated that higher authorities in the Navy and Marine Corps, whether medical or line, basically had given the medical officers with the Marines, like Commander Boone and his compatriots, free rein to devise solutions. It was also clear that Washington was not supplying much if any guidance, and that the efforts to devise doctrines and solutions for medical support of Marine Corps amphibious operations would have to be done on an informal and ad hoc basis, in stark contrast to the way the Marines had gone about devising the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934).

Early in 1937, the Navy and Marines conducted FLEX 3 in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, with the landings taking place on San Clemente Island, California. For the Marines, and the exercise as a whole, the rougher surf of the Pacific compared with the Caribbean and the less friendly beaches of San Clemente highlighted the inadequacies of standard ships’ boats for landing. For the medical personnel, difficulties moving personnel and equipment onto the beach only indicated how challenging moving stretcher cases off the beach would be using the current boats.

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill, as brigade surgeon, once again submitted a detailed after action report. He described routine medical care as adequate, and that care had been stressed by the explosion of a gun on the USS Wyoming (BB 32), resulting in several deaths and serious injuries. O’Neill noted that only the proximity of the exercise to onshore medical facilities had allowed the most seriously wounded to be transported to facilities that could provide needed care in time. Many of the organizational and equipment-related themes highlighted in FLEXs 1 and 2 were again stressed by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill. stretcher-bearers needed to be assigned and trained prior to the exercise. A medical detachment needed to be ashore with the beach detachment early on to relieve the battalion medical staff of having to care for wounded awaiting evacuation—a task that impaired their ability to do their primary mission. Once again, equipment packs needed to be lightened, modularized, and waterproofed. Finally, Lieutenant Commander O’Neill urged that a type C field hospital be included in the next exercise to test the ability to land it, set it up, and provide care in the field.

Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert S. Snyder, (DC) USN, submitted a report on the dental activities during FLEX 3. This was the only dental report found in the archives, and it is notable for two observations. The dental field equipment was not landed during the exercise as had been scheduled because it was too bulky and difficult to transport, and Lieutenant Snyder also requested that an enlisted dental technician be assigned to the dental officer to provide needed assistance. The equipment and personnel issues of the medical officers were very much the same for the dentists. In a prescient analysis, Snyder described his view of how the dental officer would function during the assault phase.

Considering these landing operations carried out against an actual enemy in position, the dental surgeon would take over the duties of a battalion medical officer or assist the regimental medical officer until the desirable enemy positions had been secured. After these positions have been secured the dental officer could then revert back to the duties of the dental officer and place the dental field equipment in position and perform his prescribed duties.

In two sentences, this junior dental officer had defined the role of dental officers during the early phases of an amphibious assault, and this doctrine persists to the present day.

Commander Boone performed the most com-

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19 At this point in time, all field hospitals were tent based; Lcdr John B. O’Neill, (MC) USN, “Medical Department Activities of First Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, Report of [FLEX 3],” 26 February 1937, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
plete analysis of FLEX 3. In his memoirs, Commander Boone described his feelings as he prepared to supervise medical aspects of this exercise: “Amphibious operations were understood but rather nebulously. There was much to learn how they should be executed.”21 In his 13-page report, Commander Boone supported and expanded upon the comments made by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill, reiterating the recurrent personnel issues. The T/O was inadequate, and enough personnel were not assigned to even fill the inadequate T/O. The issue of stretcher-bearers had yet to be solved, and Commander Boone was very clear that stretcher-bearers could not be corpsmen because using highly trained medical personnel in that role was a misuse of scarce resources. The medical officers assigned to the beach party were both inadequate in number and training. A more pointed set of comments highlighted what Commander Boone felt was a lack of interest and commitment on the part of the Navy to this exercise. He emphasized that the fleet medical officer did not attend the exercise, the designated attack force medical officer cancelled his appearance due to other commitments, and no other medical officer had been assigned to the staff of the transport group commander even though it had been mandated by the landing manual.23 Commander Boone went on to state that the Navy needed to understand that the wounded were not disposable but repairable and that conservation of the trained personnel, who would need to be replaced from bases far away during amphibious operations, was an important task. He lamented, “There is reasonable apprehension that too little thought is being given by our naval officials to the greatest of military assets—manpower conservation.”23

Commander Boone enumerated the need for a permanent FMF medical staff, as had others. This staff needed to be included in all aspects of the planning for an exercise or an actual assault. In typically strong language, Boone described the shortage of personnel, especially the enlisted corpsmen: “In the event of hostilities, a marked expansion of medical enlisted requirements would be urgently necessary. The present corpsman quotas barely meet actual [peacetime] need.”24

Commander Boone also echoed the comments of Lieutenant Commander O’Neill concerning equipment. Medical equipment for the FMF needed to be man portable as much as possible, put together in smaller containers, and properly waterproofed. Lightweight collapsible stretchers needed to be provided for the assault phase. There was a need for a lightweight field hospital that could be landed through the surf, as opposed to being only capable of landing ashore once more formal docking facilities could be seized by the landing force. Another note was the need for experimentation, the need to try out any new equipment before buying it. The Marines were not immune from criticism; they were faulted for failing to provide a complete field uniform issue to the assigned Navy personnel, which not surprisingly caused difficulties and dissatisfaction. This last point, although seemingly minor, was yet another example of the problems that were caused by the medical personnel assigned to the Marines existing in two worlds, but not fully part of either.

Commander Boone did not simply identify failings without offering constructive suggestions. He recommended that medical personnel not be sent ashore in their own boats but be dispersed among the troops they were to care for. Proposals were laid out for improving the entire evacuation chain from the point of injury to the hospital ships, which he felt should be present for the exercise. Once again, Commander Boone emphasized the need for training and practice: “Unless thorough, complete and long training is provided, care of casualties and their evacuation will be woefully deficient.”25 While the overall state of medical support for amphibious operations and the level of expertise actually demonstrated at FLEX 3 was not encouraging, the Navy medical officers assigned to the Marines were developing a good idea of what was workable, where the major

22 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, “Report of Medical Officer on U.S. Fleet Landing Exercise No. 3,” HQ FMF MCB San Diego, CA, 12 March 1937, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
problems were, and an outline of how to solve those problems. Looking back in his memoirs then-Vice Admiral Boone commented:

I had learned during World War I overseas that medical contingents serving with the Marines must be an integral part of them. Without those discouraging and tragic days, as they seemed then, on San Clemente, it would be most depressing to contemplate what would have happened when World War II came upon us.²⁶

The state of the medical support might be best visualized through photographs taken during those exercises.

Following FLEX 3, the task was to incorporate the lessons learned into the doctrine and move forward. Commander Boone used the network of like-minded doctors and corresponded with Captain Mann on the East Coast, where he was still post surgeon at Quantico. Captain Mann agreed with Commander Boone concerning equipment issues and again stressed the need to lighten and modularize equipment; he also was convinced that the issue of medical evacuation, especially the shore-to-ship and ship-to-ship movements, was an unsolved problem. Captain Mann illustrated the utility of using the network of Marine and amphibious-oriented medical officers when he said: “I am very glad to see the interest you are taking in such matters, and it is best for the service that we interchange ideas as much as practicable so all can pull towards a common objective.”²⁷

The month following this exchange with Captain Mann, Commander Boone wrote an article for the BUMED medical newsletter that is distributed to all Navy medical officers. He intended this article to not only inform other medical officers about field medicine and amphibious operations but also to inform all fleet medical officers about their connection to this special area and their obligation to get involved. Boone attempted to not only interest “non-Marine” medical officers in amphibious warfare but also to solicit their ideas. He described field medicine as a specialization within military medicine and emphasized that, no matter what billet they held, naval medical officers needed to be aware of the greater military aspects of their situation. He listed several sources of information, including the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and the Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–18, which detailed the medical errors and overall failure at Gallipoli.²⁸ Commander Boone had loaned his copy of the Australian Army medical history to Captain Mann for his use in researching medical care for amphibious operations.

Captain Mann was coauthor with Lieutenant Col-

The regulation of moving casualties off the beach and between ships. The authors also stressed the need for proper loading and unloading plans for medical equipment and field hospitals, as well as ensuring medical troops were dispersed among the boats with the forces they were supposed to support.

The bibliography of this work gives insight into the scholarly approach taken by the authors. The earliest article the authors cite comes from Benjamin Rush about military medical organization and duties in 1777. All other works, however, are from the twentieth century, with the bulk being post-1918. Most of the titles focus on the British experience at Gallipoli, though the book by General Erich von Tschischwitz on combined German operations in the Baltic Islands is also cited—Gallipoli and the Baltic Islands being the two modern amphibious campaigns.

Gallipoli was repeatedly studied by the medical officers devising Navy/Marine amphibious doctrine because it was used by their line counterparts as a comprehensive guide on what not to do and mistakes to avoid. In the fall of 1937, the Navy embarked upon a review of the medical equipment for Marine Corps support with special emphasis on the aid stations. Captain Mann was president of this board, and shortly thereafter, probably at his request, Commander

Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, and LtCol Edgar Erskine Hume, (MC) USA, “Medical Tactics of Combined Operations of the Army and Navy,” Naval Medical School, 1937, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.

The book by von Tschischwitz was written in 1931 and translated in 1933 by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, see Michael B. Barrett, Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 233.
Boone was also appointed to the review board. At about the same time, Lieutenant Commander O’Neill was appointed to the Marine Corps Equipment Board to provide input on items that impacted the medical service. These officers and other doctors attached to the Marines hoped that these actions would result in much needed changes being made. Rearmament, in particular naval rearmament, was beginning to pick up steam, and there were expectations that funding to solve these long-standing equipment issues might be secured by the Navy and Marines.

The action on the part of the BUMED to conduct a thorough review of field-related equipment may have been helped along by Commander Boone’s willingness to light fires in sensitive places. He worked with Brigadier General Louis M. Little, the FMF commanding general, to write a memo that the Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, eventually endorsed. In this memo addressed to Rear Admiral Rossiter, the surgeon general, the Marines complained that supply and evacuation were not being adequately stressed by the Navy medical command and that requests for changes and increases in both supply and assigned personnel had gotten nowhere. These deficiencies, the Marines averred, had caused the readiness of the medical elements of the FMF to lag.

In December 1937, in anticipation of FLEX 4, Commander Boone wrote yet another strongly worded letter to BUMED. He requested eight medical officers and 48 enlisted corpsmen to cover the landings as well as a “skeletonized” type C field hospital, which they would staff and use to treat both real and simulated casualties. In his own words and quoting Captain Mann, Commander Boone reemphasized the need for realistic training to expose shortcomings in doctrine and equipment. He stated his understanding of and sympathy for the shortage of doctors and corpsmen, but claimed that the FLEX was a vital exercise. In spite of increasing budgets and the beginnings of rearrament, the habits of parsimony died hard among the bean counters. Commander Boone argued strongly, and eventually successfully, for Captain Mann to receive funding to attend FLEX 4 in light of both his acknowledged expertise and his position as president of the board reviewing medical equipment for Marine Corps use. That it took this level of effort to get the minimal funding necessary for Captain Mann to attend the FLEX, while not surprising, is indicative of the lack of any sort of urgency or priority given to the issue of medical support for the Marines.

In preparation for FLEX 4 to take place in the Caribbean, Lieutenant Commander O’Neill had been corresponding with Commander Boone to develop plans for the exercise. Commander Boone as FMF surgeon was in charge of the medical arrangements and planning. Commander Boone was impressed with Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s ideas and considered them very good. In his memoirs, Boone described Lieutenant Commander O’Neill as “[a] very experienced medical officer serving with the Marines,” and adding, “The Marines thought he was really one of them.”

Prior the 1938 winter fleet exercise, FLEX 4, Commander Boone prepared the medical Annex G to the operations order for the exercise. This set out the general parameters for the exercise but did not go into great detail. This exercise was to see three significant figures involved: Captain Mann was the attack force surgeon, Commander Boone was the FMF surgeon, and Lieutenant Commander O’Neill was the 1st Brigade surgeon. Their time together was cut short as Commander Boone became very ill with a case of food poisoning, which led to his evacuation back to the United States. The illness was quite serious and required a long convalescence, and fortunately, Commander Boone’s relief as FMF surgeon was Captain Mann, putting the Navy’s foremost expert in the area of field medicine in just the right spot at just the right time.

31 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-205-06.
32 Ibid., XXV-196-97.
33 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, to BUMED, 11 December 1937, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
34 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-218. The Marines have always regarded highly the Navy medical personnel assigned to support them, because for the Marines to consider a medical officer or corpsman “one of them” is considered a high compliment by both the Marines and the “adopted” Navy individual.
This unfortunate illness put an end to Commander Boone’s service with the Marines, although he would stay in the Navy and rise to great heights. An entry in his memoirs from late 1938, however, illustrates once again the web that bound this group of Navy physicians together. Boone mentions the graduation of Commander Walter A. Vogelsang from the Naval War College and his assignment as battle force surgeon and refers to him as a friend. Commander Vogelsang had a long experience with the Marines and was another member of this small group of medical officers considered experts in field medicine.

Due to his illness and premature departure, Commander Boone did not submit an after action report, although both Captain Mann and Lieutenant Commander O’Neill did so. FLEX 4 made less use of constructive units than the previous exercises, and there was some actual casualty evacuation training involving shore-to-ship movement. Certain specialized transport equipment and hoisting devices for the wounded were tried for the first time. Unfortunately, from a medical standpoint, the exercise was another example of trying to decide if the glass was half empty or half full. Both Captain Mann and Lieutenant Commander O’Neill highlighted problems that had been identified with proposed solutions in the previous exercises. One can almost see Lieutenant Commander O’Neill biting his tongue to restrain himself as he wrote his report. The same personnel problems occurred: the total number of personal was inadequate and most of the personnel reported too late to receive any training before they needed to board ship. While the type C field hospital was added to the exercise as requested by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill and Commander Boone, the lack of adequate numbers of medical personnel meant that the personnel from the field hospital became a pool for assignment to other areas, such as line units. Naturally, robbing Peter to pay Paul had the predictable result of reducing the ability of the field hospital to perform its duties and to participate fully in the exercise as a unit.

Convening the equipment review board of the Navy and assigning Lieutenant Commander O’Neill to the Marine Corps equipment board had not yet produced any results. Equipment issues persisted, and as Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s comments make clear, the issues had not changed appreciably.

As has been reported previously, this equipment is excellent for certain types of medical work, but many of the units are quite unfit for use in landing operations as they are too heavy, too bulky, not waterproofed, contain many superfluous or obsolete items, and lack a unit designed for care of chemical casualties.

When Lieutenant Commander O’Neill was on the Marine Corps equipment board, the minutes for 1938–40 have only one mention of a piece of equipment for medical use.

Two important tactical errors were described by O’Neill as well; both concerned medical activity on the beach while the beach was still under heavy fire. First, wounded were evacuated by forward units to the beach before the beach was relatively secure, and medical stations were established by the Marines on the beach when and where they were subject to heavy fire. While complete freedom from enemy fire on the beach was not a requirement for establishing collection points or medical stations, doing so too soon needlessly exposed medical personnel and their equipment to destruction, without a corresponding benefit to the wounded. Second, medical facilities were needed ashore early but not too early. This sort of timing was something that needed to be learned and internalized with experience.

Captain Mann submitted a detailed report, and many of his points coincided with Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s. The tone of Captain Mann’s comments was more on the level of concepts than the

39 The T/O for a type C field hospital at this time was six commissioned officers (five doctors, one dentist), one warrant officer (pharmacist), 40 USN enlisted, and 14 USMC enlisted.
41 “Minutes, Marine Corps Equipment Board, 1938, 1939, 1940,” Marine Corps Equipment Board Meetings and Reports, Box 1, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
specific of the brigade surgeon’s. Coordination and command and control had worked well, and he stressed this function as an absolute necessity, including quotes from the Australian Gallipoli experience.\textsuperscript{42} He created numerous enclosures, including detailed recommendations for equipment, manning levels for various units, proper preparation for gas casualties, and improved dental care.\textsuperscript{43}

In May 1939, shortly after Captain Mann had taken over as FMF surgeon, the Navy board began studying the proposed equipment the Marines promulgated in its report. This highly detailed report went through the Navy equipment tables for medications and equipment and made numerous recommendations for change. The set for the battalion aid station (BAS) was defined in the report and specified to be highly portable. The Navy’s own history of the medical department acknowledged the lack of proper equipment for Marine Corps support as war approached. This equipment was more than 15 years old, was bulky and improperly packaged, and had proven to be inadequate during the FLEXs. As a result of this board, new equipment sets were designed by the BUMED and a budget allocated for them; however, these new sets were not issued to units until 1941.\textsuperscript{44} The board also made a recommendation to increase the number of corpsmen in an infantry battalion—between 16 and 20—not the first time this increase in the T/O had been recommended.\textsuperscript{45}

Captain Mann continued his dialogue with BUMED about FMF reorganization. In September 1938, he forwarded further suggestions for changes in the T/O and T/E. The proposed medical staff for a regiment of 2,258 men was to be 8 medical officers and 57 enlisted corpsmen.\textsuperscript{46} It appears that Captain Mann felt his voice and the voice of the Marine Corps medical needs was finally being heard at BUMED, and changes were afoot as he said in the same letter:

Your letter was most receptive after four years of useless discussion and little progress. Believe we will get somewhere now. Field medical service is one of the most important subdivisions of naval medicine since it must be maintained in a state of IMMEDIATE READINESS at all times.\textsuperscript{47}

This is a key point: the medical service, supporting the Marines, must be ready in all respects at all times. The deployment of the Marines cannot depend on taking time to make up significant medical deficiencies, and absent adequate medical support, deploying the Marines absent adequate medical support is not acceptable.

In August 1938, the Navy promulgated Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP-167), \textit{Landing Operations Doctrine}. The Navy and Marines derived FTP-167 from the \textit{Tentative Manual for Landing Operations}, and the tentative manual was ordered withdrawn by the Marines from circulation in November 1938.\textsuperscript{48} This foundational publication, with relatively minor changes, was the controlling document for amphibious planning at the beginning of World War II and the basic source for planning for the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) in August 1942. FTP-167 was modified slightly by the Army to fit its terminology and units and was issued as the Army’s operational guide for amphibious operations in 1940. Consequently, this document was what Army planners used for their components of the invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942 (Operation Torch).

In replacing the tentative landing manual, FTP-167 was, at least in theory, the product of combined
Navy and Marine Corps thinking and represented a doctrine accepted and understood by both Services. Some sections of the document were highly detailed, and others, such as medical, less so but even less detailed areas were not glossed over.

In spite of what might be considered rather skimpy coverage, several important doctrinal points were established in FTP-167. The very beginning of the section, paragraph 955 (Medical Plans), lays out the issues that must be determined in advance of the operation—at least on the Navy side. The responsibilities of the attack force surgeon (in paragraph 956) are clearly laid out in the document: moving the wounded from the beach evacuation station (BES) seaward including the actual evacuation, assigning the wounded to appropriate ships for treatment, recommending placement of casualty receiving ships, and more. Unfortunately, the duties of the senior medical officer of the landing force (landing force surgeon) are not defined. The verbiage implies that everything forward of the BES is his responsibility, but not defining this properly represents a potentially significant oversight. The writers of FTP-167 possibly felt that it is incumbent upon the Marines to define the scope of authority of the landing force surgeon who would be serving on a Marine general staff; however, this is a joint document, and the landing force surgeon’s duties should have been as well defined as the attack force surgeon. In fact, the landing force surgeon is never specifically mentioned in the medical section of FTP-167.

Although the duties of the landing force surgeon are not defined, the responsibilities of the BAS, regimental aid station, and collecting station, all of which are part of the landing force, are defined. Additionally, the distribution and function of corpsmen within the battalion are defined. The organization schema, duties, and casualty flow, proposed for a landing, closely follow the work and recommendations of Mann, Boone, O’Neill, and others. One potential issue was that FTP-167 assigns company corpsmen just prior to the assault, whereas as noted previously, most of the medical officers who had discussed this issue emphasized the need for corpsmen to be well-integrated into their assigned line unit. Fortunately, this particular issue was solved by the medical officers in the unit, well before any assault, by making these assignments early on, thus assuring unit integrity.

FTP-167 contains extensive discussion about supply issues, but none regarding control and movement of medical supplies. Supplies for the corpsmen and initial issue for units such as the BAS are mentioned, but the entire issue of medical replenishment or replacement for lost or damaged supplies and equipment is absent from FTP-167. This was a significant oversight for it points to the issues of how to determine how much resupply might be needed, who is responsible for procuring such supplies and equally important allocating space on transports for those supplies, and who controls them both afloat and ashore. If something is not assigned as somebody’s responsibility, then it is likely to end up as nobody’s responsibility with negative consequences.

Another area of potential friction concerns base hospitals. These facilities are larger medical units of more robust capability that are scheduled to be landed and set up as the campaign progresses. Paragraph 967(b) defines these units, and is clear that “the medical personnel of the Fleet Marine Force is not adequate to establish or operate a base hospital.” Left unanswered are several questions: who decides how many of these units are needed, who decides where they are to be located (especially if they are in the combat zone), and who has operational control of these units? Even as recently as Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, there was significant contention over the answers to these questions.

In spite of the shortcomings of FTP-167 in some areas of medical doctrine and tactics, overall, it represented a tremendous leap forward. It codified and made official the experiences and work of more than 15 years by naval medical officers who made amphibious warfare an area of interest and study. Although in war nothing is certain, by following the doctrine set forth in FTP-167, the amphibious force

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49 Medical support in FTP-167 is in chapter 9 (Logistics), the last chapter of the publication, and medical is the last section of that chapter and consists of 8 pages (of the 238 total pages) of which 3 were illustrations.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
could avoid the sort of medical catastrophe typified by the Gallipoli landing. The weaknesses identified in FTP-167, if recognized during the planning stage, could be overcome by some extra staff work. The fact that the current doctrine and planning for amphibious (and expeditionary) assault follows along the same basic lines as FTP-167 testifies to its intellectual and doctrinal solidity, and the changes wrought by experience and technology have not made the basic concepts of FTP-167 obsolete.

In the winter of 1939, FLEX 5 was the last when the world was at peace. The Navy decided to conduct these exercises in the Caribbean, in spite of the fact that the FMF and most of its units were in California, because of a concern that the Pacific Coast would be more exposed to Japanese espionage activities. In several minor exercises, the Army became involved but still depended on the Marines to provide training. Lieutenant Commander W. T. Brown was now 1st Brigade surgeon, and his report indicated that many of the problems reported from past exercises had not yet been solved. He recommended an increase in the number of corpsmen in an infantry battalion (once again) to a minimum of 24 from the current 16 (Army infantry battalions had 20 medics), doubling the number of collecting companies and associated personnel and adding a medical officer to the collecting company, and increasing the size of the medical company. Equipment portability remained an issue.53

By the time the war began in September 1939, the foundation and most of the structure that would constitute medical doctrine for amphibious warfare was well established. More practice was needed in the two years that America had before the conflict finally engulfed the entire world. Like the Higgins Boat and the Alligator, medical equipment suitable for the needs of the Marines was slowly being developed and procured by BUMED. Medical manpower still presented a severe bottleneck, and civilians, even physicians, could only be turned into trained field medical personnel so quickly. In 1940, the Navy published Medical Service in Joint Oversea Operations, which was basically a refinement of the 1937 publication by Captain Mann and Lieutenant Colonel Hume. As noted, the first tests of amphibious assault came in 1942 at Guadalcanal by the Marines and in North Africa by the Army. Learning, refining, and improving continued throughout the war, but the work of a small group of naval physicians had created the doctrine that sustained these and future assaults. That these physicians “labored in the wilderness” and that their efforts seemed to have been officially forgotten is best illustrated by this statement from the official Navy history of the medical department during World War II:

It should be mentioned here that planning for amphibious warfare became a real necessity, and it was at an early point in 1942 that the Medical Department of the Navy, in conjunction with the Marines and certain Navy components, began thorough training in this peculiar form of warfare.54

Only when BUMED, following the shock of Pearl Harbor, realized that medical readiness for amphibious warfare was an urgent necessity, did the official history of medical doctrine for amphibious warfare begin. All of the work done by the small group of physicians prior to 1942 to develop doctrine, techniques, and equipment for medical support of amphibious operations seems to have been completely omitted in the official history.

**Conclusion**

Military doctrine has to be appropriate to the circumstances that surround a potential conflict. Many factors define the total picture of the circumstances. These factors include the resources available for the military, the geographic position of your country and of any potential enemies, the internal politics of your country, and the presence or absence of religious or ethnic factors that could cause internal disunity. Doctrine also has to adapt to the terrain of combat: mountains, deserts, sea, or sky. Similarly, every subset of the overarching doctrine has to be appropriate for the circumstances. Medical doctrine is no exception; it must be appropriate to the circumstances where it will be employed. Amphibious warfare, and in particular amphibious assault, represents a very

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53 Lcdr W. T. Brown, (MC) USN, “Medical Activities, Report No. 17 (Restricted),” 5 March 1939, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

54 U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941-1945, 4.
special military environment that requires an equally specialized medical doctrine.

As we have seen over the three parts to this article, there is no better example of the consequences to inadequate medical doctrine for amphibious warfare than Gallipoli. Certainly, doctrinal failure was complete in almost every respect, but concentrating on the failures of medical doctrine is highly illustrative for our purposes. Failure to understand the need for proper doctrine, and then the planning and training such doctrine would have mandated, led to immense preventable suffering and increased morbidity and mortality amongst the wounded, especially in the assault phases of the operation. The Navy physicians who worked in the interwar period to create medical doctrine for amphibious warfare were determined not to repeat these errors.

While the Marines, and at least certain elements of the Navy, realized the need for a systematic approach to developing doctrine and to dealing with issues related to amphibious warfare, this systematic approach did not quite extend to medical concerns. Naval line officers attached to the Marines for the development of doctrine and equipment for amphibious assault were no more attuned to the need for development of medical doctrine than were their Marine counterparts. The general tendency of the line officers to ignore medical issues until they became a problem was not unique to the interwar Navy and Marine Corps. Both Union and Confederate forces put medical issues to the side at the beginning of the Civil War and only began to address them when they became overloaded and dysfunctional. Even U.S. involvements in the last 20 years have seen medical issues much more of a last-minute fix than it should have been.

The role of medicine in the military and in wartime has always been somewhat ambiguous. How does one find a military role for a profession dedicated to saving life and alleviating suffering in the midst of an organization that is, at its core, dedicated to generating death and destruction? However, to say that this role is to only alleviate suffering and prevent death is incomplete; it ignores the military role of the medical officer. The military physician, on the other hand, must be two people with a dual “personality.” He (or she) must be skilled in both the healing and the military arts, and know when to call on which personality. These naval medical officers who developed this amphibious medical doctrine understood this truth and knew when to call on which side of their inner selves.

All of the key physicians in the development of medical doctrine had distinguished records and experience with the Marines, serving in the field and in combat. Joel Boone and John O’Neill received high decorations for valor in the field at the risk of their own lives while providing care to the Marines. All of these physicians made the decision to accept further duty with the Corps. Continuing assignments with the Marines or assignment to senior leadership posts, such as brigade surgeon, post surgeon at Quantico, or FMF surgeon, happened because the officers that requested these assignments had demonstrated abilities for such roles. Compared with most peacetime jobs in Navy medicine, these posts represented extra work and hardship, and the fact that these individuals sought them out testifies to their dedication. The reports from exercises and the end product of amphibious medical doctrine speak to their intellectual qualities.

As much as these officers worked separately, they also worked together. The naval medical community of the interwar period was not large, and the subset of those who spent a significant proportion of their careers with the Marines was smaller still. Doctors like Mann, Boone, Vogelsang, O’Neill, and others were not strangers. At a minimum, they knew each other by reputation, and more often than not called each other friend. The surviving correspondence illustrates how they consulted each other, bounced ideas back and forth, and shared resources all in aid of the same goal—to develop a doctrine for medical support of amphibious warfare that would be effective. Washington, DC, Quantico, and later San Diego encompassed the geography where these men would work. The headquarters, medical facilities, quarters, and officers’ clubs enclosed these doctors in a relatively small world where interaction was inevitable. Thus, the environment these naval officers worked in was conducive to the formation of networks and their shared desire to produce the solutions for medical care in an amphibious Marine Corps resulted in a system that worked for more than 20 years.

Unlike the Marines who worked within a formal structure and command directive to produce the
overall military doctrines for amphibious warfare, these doctors worked without the benefit of a tasking order. When such an order is given, it also carries with it the unspoken promise that there will be some sort of guidance, which will hopefully be of benefit, and also funds and other assistance to ease the task. For the development of medical doctrine, no such tasking order was given by the Marines or BUMED, no funding or administrative support flowed to those who created this doctrine, and for better or worse, there was little if any guidance from above.

It was not that the Navy, or BUMED in particular, was totally unsympathetic to the needs of the Marines. Some, perhaps many, of the medical officers at BUMED had served with the Marines or personally knew the medical officers who were submitting the reports and suggestions. Unfortunately, until the very end of the interwar period, resources of both men and materiel were severely constrained. Medical supplies and equipment in a warehouse ready to be deployed in support of potential operations represent a cost without a clearly obvious benefit, unlike a ship steaming away to show the flag or a Marine carrying a rifle. Similarly, medical personnel, always a limited quantity and expensive in a classroom or in the field learning the craft of field medicine, represented an opportunity cost. To provide the care that they could have been providing were they not in the classroom or field training requires the expense of either having more personnel to cover these absences or contracting this care to an outside source and incurring more expense.

In tension against the personnel and financial costs of medical readiness was the reality quoted by Captain Mann as FMF surgeon: medical support needs to be ready at all times. During the Spanish-American War, the shortcomings of military medicine in sanitary and preventive aspects as well as care during combat were so scandalous that Congress set up a special committee to investigate the problem. In World War I, there was time, before U.S. involvement to consider plans and a period after the declaration of war in April 1917 when U.S. forces were being created and few forces were engaged in actual combat, that allowed the creation of an expanded military medical establishment. In World War II, American forces were significantly engaged immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other American military entities. Yet, even though the United States had two years to anticipate and prepare for war, the official history shows that medical doctrine and preparedness for amphibious warfare was not a hot button item at BUMED until early 1942.

The network of doctors did not have to work against the Marine command structure either. Although, in most cases, the doctors were not included in major planning meetings, the Marines were comfortable with them and trusted their collective judgment. When medical issues came up, the Marines generally deferred to and supported the recommendations made by these officers. The Marines recognized that the “docs” had expertise in a field about which they knew next to nothing, the particular doctors proposing these ideas had a proven track record with the Marines, and the solutions made sense and did not make unreasonable demands on the system. Since the medical doctrine developed during the interwar period was only partially tested in exercises, it is not surprising that the doctrine needed to adapt and evolve during World War II. Fortunately, the first two amphibious assaults at Guadalcanal and North Africa were not strongly resisted on the beaches and did not produce large numbers of casualties immediately to stress the system. Given the problems at Guadalcanal with inappropriately loaded transports, the failure to unload all supplies before the transports had to leave due to threats from the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the medical struggles during the “land” campaign, there was significant potential for complete or at least partial failure from a medical standpoint had the Japanese resistance been similar to what was seen later in the Pacific campaign.

Had medical doctrine not been developed in parallel with the overall amphibious doctrine, it seems

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53 One of the more difficult concepts for a physician, newly assigned to a field command, is the system of priorities and command. Within a clinic or hospital, solutions that optimize medical efficiency and outcomes are the goal, and the appropriate members of the medical staff make the decisions about what is required to achieve these goals, allocate personnel and resources, etc. When attached to the Marines, a doctor must understand (and completely internalize) the reality that the optimal solution from a medical standpoint will take second place to mission accomplishment, and the unit commander will make that call, not the doctor. The experienced medical staff officer will jump ahead and present the commander with options that he (or she) knows will fit within the margins of mission accomplishment first.
clear that there would have been a high price to pay. The record is clear that the bulk of Army doctrine for amphibious warfare was taken almost word for word from FTP-167, and similarly, the medical doctrine for naval amphibious warfare also was taken from the above Navy/Marine document. In fact, as the joint operations publications made clear, a significant portion of the medical doctrine and care for an amphibious assault was a Navy responsibility—the BESs, shore to ship evacuation, and care afloat. There is no evidence to suggest that Army medical personnel spent any significant amount of time working on amphibious medicine until 1939–40 at the earliest.

We can conclude that, at least for the first two years of World War II, there would have been a very steep learning curve for amphibious medical doctrine had these Navy doctors not developed the basics of such doctrine during the interwar period of 1920–39. The result of such a steep learning curve would have certainly increased suffering, morbidity, and mortality among the sick and wounded of any amphibious operation. The effect of raising the human cost of the early operations is hard to determine. At a minimum, it would have made planners more cautious in the use of amphibious operations, and in cases where there was no alternative, the expectation of a high casualty cost would necessitate the gathering of more troops (and the ships to carry them) for any operation, thus slowing the overall pace of the Allied advance during the war. Exactly how much slower and what effect that might have had on the outcome of the war is impossible to know. In this example, if D-Day had been delayed three months, even if we assume the post invasion scenario proceeded at the same pace, that could have produced significant changes in the postwar picture, though the eventual defeat of Germany probably would not have been affected.

A truism of military medicine is that surgeons have to relearn the principles of combat surgery, which differs significantly from even civilian trauma surgery, with every war. For our purposes, the same holds true for medical support in general. In 1959, a course module prepared by the Marine Corps Schools was entitled “Medical Service in Modern Amphibious Operations” and stated: “Un fortunately, however, precepts of landing force medical service have not been clearly established as such and, therefore, are not generally well recognized and understood; consequently, planning for medical support in the FMF often lacks the positive direction of military tactical planning.” Coming after all the experiences of World War II and the Inchon landing in Korea, one wonders how this statement found its way into an instruction syllabus. Other doctrinal and Navy medical publications of the same period show that the efforts of the interwar period and the lessons of World War II had not been lost.

Doctrine does not stand still. Use of the helicopter for both assault and medical evacuation and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against an amphibious force were factors in 1959, but not present in 1939. The basic concepts of medical support for amphibious warfare were established by the physicians during the interwar period, and these principles, if not in every specific detail, were validated in every theater of operations during the World War II.

Military history is no longer just about the great generals, the tactical details of a given battle or campaign, or the technology of warfare. Not that these facts and understanding them is unimportant, but rather that what might be considered nontraditional factors are recognized as being important within the field of military history. Logistics, from the tactical details of getting beans to the troops to the understanding of how economic capacity of a nation can determine the outcome of a conflict, is one area. Social and political issues, questions of gender, and underlying cultural norms are other examples of nontraditional factors now being examined for their effect on military history. While some interest has always been present over the years in the history of military medicine, it has been primarily an interest of doctors (usually with military experience) and usually focused on strictly medical issues. Medical doctrine, the blending of the military and medical halves of the military physicians mind, has been much less examined.

Military medical services and medical doctrine will not win a battle or a war, although it can contribute to victory. However, failure to have adequate and appropriate medical doctrine can cause defeat at any level from the tactical to the strategic. Medical doc-

56 “Medical Service in Modern Amphibious Operations,” 1959, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
trine is not just about managing the wounded from the battlefield but also recognizing the risks presented by the environment of the campaign and mitigating those effects to preserve the force. As Joel Boone noted, the commanders must recognize the value of the soldiers, and then the doctors must use this support to preserve those soldiers. Military historians should understand and analyze medical doctrine and its effects on battle as they would any other factor.

Almost immediately following World War II, Walter Vogelsang and William Mann retired from the Navy, Vogelsang as a captain and Mann as a rear admiral. Joel Boone retired as a vice admiral for medical reasons in 1950, and subsequently served for several years as director of medical services for the Veterans Administration. John O’Neill was the youngest of the group developing medical doctrine and the only one to serve with the Marines during World War II; Captain O’Neill spent all of that war with the Marines in one capacity or another. As a captain, he became the corps surgeon for the V Amphibious Corps and the senior medical officer for the invasions of Saipan and Tinian. There, he displayed the intellectual flexibility demonstrated during the 1930s when he established the largest air evacuation system to date when rough seas prevented the evacuation of the wounded from Tinian to Saipan. Following these actions, he continued with the V Amphibious Corps and was the senior medical officer for the invasion of Iwo Jima for which he received the Legion of Merit with combat “V.” He retired as a rear admiral in 1947.

The Navy medical officers who worked between 1920 and 1939 to create a viable medical doctrine for amphibious warfare had a very large stone to push uphill. The only guide they had—Gallipoli—was a treasure trove of information on what not to do but did nothing to suggest what to do. They had moral support from the Marines and to some extent from BUMED but little if any financial or administrative support, lacking even a tasking order creating a board or study group. What they did have was a realization that there was a need for medical doctrine to suit the new amphibious warfare doctrine and the intellectual curiosity to research the subject. They established a network that operated not so much against or outside the existing system but in parallel with it. This network functioned in wardrooms on board transports, in letters that passed from one base or command to another, and probably in informal conversations at one “O” club or another.

The basic concepts of medical amphibious doctrine—definition of command relationships for medicine, control of medical evacuation, general capabilities of various Marine medical units, and more—remain in place today. Even with the modifications in the past 70 years due to advances in medicine and changes in technology, these naval doctors would recognize their handiwork in current operational manuals. By minimizing the human cost of amphibious warfare, these officers contributed to victory, and many of those who participated in amphibious operations during World War II and their descendants since then owe a great deal to these men.

On the morning of 7 August 1942, personnel from the 1st Marine Division scrambled onto their landing craft and began the invasion of Guadalcanal, the first step by Allies to retake the Solomon Islands from forces of the Japanese empire. Mountains of material have been written on these legendary battles, from books by historians such as Richard B. Frank and Eric M. Hammel to memoirs from individual Marines who took part in the conflicts on Bougainville, Guadalcanal, and New Georgia. However, none of these works discuss what happened to the remains of those Marines who did not survive these encounters with the Japanese or determine how many Marines may still lie in unmarked graves on the Solomon Islands or remain unidentified in American cemeteries and why many of these Marines were not able to be properly identified after the end of World War II. The Marines killed in the Solomon Islands who remain unrecovered or unidentified remain so because a lack of trained graves registration personnel and a policy decision to inter their remains on the battlefield either rendered their burial site lost to history or their remains too decomposed for identification.

How Many Marines Remain Unidentified?

After the conclusion of World War II, the Memorial Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General (OQMG) created the “Rosters of Military Personnel Whose Remains Were Not Recovered, 1951–1954.” “The Rosters” is an electronic list created by the Department of the Army in 1954 of military personnel whose remains were not recovered or identified during or after World War II. The list is arranged alphabetically by surname of the deceased and lists rank, branch of Service, date of death, and the geographical area in which the servicemember died. “The Rosters” used a system of “geographic codes” to detail not only the theater in which an individual was lost—the “area code”—but, in cases of Service personnel from the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy, the individual country using a “pinpoint code.” Unfortunately, the original key to these codes does not accompany the copy of “The Rosters” held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and it is not known which organizations originally assigned the area and pinpoint codes. The NARA data file of World War II prisoners of war (POWs) provided initial information on the codes associated with individual theaters.

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and countries. Historians at the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), renamed the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) in 2015, analyzed a sample of individual deceased personnel files (IDPFs) created for each U.S. servicemember lost during World War II. Through the use of IDPFs and other documents held by NARA, the historians were able to determine that 08 is the primary area code, and 3H is the primary pinpoint code used in “The Rosters” to indicate Marine Corps losses in the Solomon Islands.

In 2007, DPAA released the “Service Personnel Not Recovered Following World War II” list of more than 78,000 U.S. Service personnel whose remains were not recovered or identified from that conflict. Using this data revealed that 798 Marines were not recovered or identified whose geographic codes place their area of loss in the Solomon Islands. The names of each of those Marines were compared with individuals on lists of personnel buried at sea and personnel lost in the sinking of U.S. Navy ships. Per these two lists, 48 Marines were buried at sea and 71 were killed when their ship sank during one of the many battles between the United States and the Imperial Japanese Navies in the Solomon Islands. Lastly, because of an error in coding, the individual deceased personnel file of 15 Marines include area and pinpoint codes that indicate they were lost in the Solomon Islands when in fact they were lost elsewhere in the Pacific theater. Removing those Marines buried at sea, lost in the sinking of Navy ships, and mistakenly included in the overall number of Marines unrecovered from the Solomon Islands leaves approximately 663 Marine Corps personnel still deserving of a proper burial.

The Military Establishes a Graves Registration Service and Learns from World War I

After the United States’ entry into World War I in August 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker Jr. issued War Department General Orders No. 104, which authorized the creation of a graves registration services. By the end of the war, 19 graves registration companies were created by the Quartermaster General and sent to Europe. During the war, one of the most important duties of the GRS was, “the deployment of units and groups along the entire line of battle, so that they might begin their work of identification of bodies and marking of graves immediately upon the beginning of hostilities in any given sector.” The policy of deploying graves registration units as quickly as possible, sometimes even while hostilities were ongoing, resulted in successful identification of 96.5 percent of the 79,129 U.S. military deaths in World War I. According to OQMG historian Edward Steere, the experience of World

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4 For more information about the history of these agencies, see “Our Transformation,” Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency.
5 Area codes 0E, 015, 03A, 02, 03, 08, and pinpoint codes 3H, 3A, 3G, and 57 are also associated with U.S. Service personnel losses in the Solomon Islands. A review of individual deceased personnel files for Marines unrecovered from the Solomon Islands later revealed the instance of two Marines unrecovered or unidentified from the Solomon Islands recorded with the pinpoint code 3G and three with the area code 08 but without a pinpoint code.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 13; and J. Dell, “Historical Notes Prepared on Graves Registration Service,” RG 92, NARA, College Park, MD, 3.
9 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, and Dell, “Historical Notes Prepared on Graves Registration Service.”
War I resulted in the emergence of a “theater graves registration service, with its operating units in close support to combat.”

During the 1920s, many of the policies established during World War I were codified in Army regulations. In February 1924, the War Department published the AR-30 series of Army regulations (AR) that governed graves registration responsibilities during the first half of World War II, until their replacement by a new set of AR-30 regulations in 1943. One of these regulations, known as AR-30-1810, established strict procedures for the registration of unmarked graves, the care and disposition of unburied remains, and the identification of individual remains. According to AR-30-1810, burials of military personnel during wartime were to be conducted and supervised by “detailed burial officers and commanding officers under the general supervision of the graves registration officer of the command.” These regulations also heavily discouraged the use of isolated burials, which were defined as a group of less than 12 graves because, as AR-30-1810 noted, “Every isolated burial renders liable the loss of a soldier’s body.”

**Graves Registration on Guadalcanal**

Prior to World War II, the AR-30 regulations anticipated that, upon a declaration of war, four graves registration companies would be activated, which would have “served as a nucleus for expansion” of the graves registration service. However, the surprise Japanese attack against the American base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 gave the U.S. military no such opportunity for slow expansion, and with it adequate training. According to Steere, “under the accelerated training program of wartime there was no unit training.” Only seven complete graves registration companies were active in August 1942 at the beginning of the invasion of Guadalcanal, and none of them were fully trained. The Army estimated that each graves registration unit needed three months of training to adequately perform its function in the field. It was not to be until early 1943 that an adequate training program was available for graves registration units. The 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, which later served on Guadalcanal in postwar search-and-recovery operations, became the first graves registration company to complete a training course at Vancouver Barracks Unit Training Center in Washington State.

The lack of fully trained graves registration personnel heavily influenced the graves registration policy pursued by the Marine Corps during operations in the Solomon Islands. The Marines modeled their graves registration doctrine using a recent example of an operation conducted without the benefit of graves registration personnel—the U.S. Army’s long retreat down the Bataan Peninsula on the island of Luzon, Philippine Islands, in 1941. During the retreat, Army troops were forced to develop their own graves registration service using untrained personnel and to perform burials wherever possible instead of waiting to inter their fallen comrades at a central cemetery. Facing the same lack of trained personnel in mid-1942, the Marines simply copied the Army’s policy used on Bataan and improvised a graves registration service staffed by combat personnel under the direction of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Burial policy prior to the invasion held that, “a necessary concession to conditions of combat” would have to be made, and initially, Marines killed on Guadalcanal would be buried on the battlefield and not taken to a central collection point for proper

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11 Ibid., 16.
12 *Quartermaster Corps Burials on Field of Battle*, AR-30-1810 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1924); and *Army Regulations (1920-1947)*, 30-1675 (October 1925) to 30-2215 (December 1946), Box Files, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 43.
17 BGen R. G. Moses to Quartermaster General, 18 August 1942, Box 167, RG 92, ROQG, 1774-1985, NARA, College Park, MD.
18 Ibid., 19.
19 Ibid.
identification and burial. The Marine Corps directed a platoon of combat personnel selected for graves registration duties to follow the main combat invasion force ashore. A postwar critique of this unit stated that it “confined its activities almost entirely to emergency burial on the battlefield.” Plans for the invasion of Guadalcanal stated that, once the main combat objectives were accomplished, it would then be feasible to establish a cemetery on the island. It was not until the arrival of the U.S. Army’s Americal (23d Infantry) and 25th Infantry Divisions in November and December 1942 that a provisional island graves registration service was established. Plucked out of the artillery and transferred to the Quartermaster Corps because he worked as a mortician prior to the outbreak of the war, Warrant Officer (later First Lieutenant) Chester E. Goodwin headed this new effort to improve graves registration operations on Guadalcanal. Under Goodwin’s leadership, GRS personnel immediately began to bring the haphazard layout of the cemetery on Guadalcanal into conformity with specifications approved by the OQMG.

On 18 February 1943, the 1st Platoon, 45th Graves Registration Company, became the first graves registration unit in the Solomon Islands. However, they were not given motor transport or enough labor personnel to enable Goodwin to initiate a program to disinter and collect the remains of the Marines buried on the battlefields around the island. Goodwin’s unit only consisted of six enlisted personnel and native laborers. U.S. Army Colonel Joseph H. Burgheim of the Quartermaster Service Command, New Caledonia, wrote to Army Major General (later Lieutenant General) Edmund B. Gregory, Quartermaster General, shortly after the activation of the 1st Platoon, 45th Graves Registration Company, and stated that

No attempt has been made to date, to move battlefield casualties to the cemetery owing to the battered condition under which these bodies were interred and the rapidity with which decomposition takes place in the tropical climates, and these bodies must wait for a considerable time before they can be exhumed and reburied in proper cemeterial plots.

According to Steere, “Lacking trained personnel and motor transport, essential to the operation of a collecting point system, any persistent effort at evacuating bodies to a centrally located burial place only tended to defeat the utilitarian purpose sought in first removing the dead.” Records of the OQMG indicate that burial of the dead by graves registration personnel in the combined U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps cemetery on Guadalcanal occurred as early as January 1943. However, none of the Marines buried in the cemetery during that month had been disinterred from a battlefield grave and reburied in the cemetery; all of the burials were of Marines killed in late 1942 and early 1943. Unfortunately, the location of the consolidated cemetery on Guadalcanal does not appear on any map created by either the Marines or Army troops from the OQMG. The second and third pages of the burial plot chart for the cemetery in the holdings of NARA states “See Page 1” for its location; however, page one of this plot chart is missing. The likely location of this cemetery was near Henderson Field. According to Marine Corps Chaplain W. Wyeth Willard, the cemetery was “out past Henderson Field.” When Willard and the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Division, departed Guadalcanal on 15 December 1942, the cemetery consisted of 650 graves. This number of graves is sufficient for less than half of the 1,769 Marines and Army soldiers killed on Guadalcanal.

Battlefield Burials on Guadalcanal

Burial information for Service personnel killed during World War II was recorded on OQMG Form

21 Ibid., 44; and interviews and statements of officers of the 1st Marine Division of the Guadalcanal operations, compiled by Col B. Q. Jones, 5 December 1942–1 January 43. Document is cited and quoted by Steere; however, the document has not been located at NARA.
22 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 44.
23 Ibid., 44–45; and Col J. B. Burghem to MGen Edmund B. Gregory, 24 February 1943. Document is cited and quoted by Steere; however, the document has not been located at NARA.
24 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 46.
28 Ibid. There were 241 Marines lost in ground actions on Guadalcanal who remain unrecovered or unidentified.
On or around Guadalcanal. These losses encompass at least 48 different loss incidents; 19 of the losses occurred in a variant of the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber (the SBD-3, SBD-4, or SBD-5) and another 18 occurred in a variant of the Grumman F4F Wildcat aircraft (the F4F-1 or F4F-4). Identifying the location of air losses is a tricky one, however, because only the last known location of the aircraft can be identified. In some cases, the last known sighting of the aircraft occurred when it took off from Henderson Field. Therefore, the actual location of the crash can be anywhere between Henderson Field and the intended target location—either on Guadalcanal, at sea, or another island.

Adherence to Established Prewar Policy Leads to Fewer Unidentified Marines

Elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, the policy of battlefield burials without relatively quick disinterment and reinterment in the local cemetery does not

371, “Data on Remains Not Yet Recovered or Identified,” which was completed for each servicemember’s IDPF. The exact coordinates where burial occurred on the battlefield were recorded for 82 of the 137 Marines who were killed on Guadalcanal. These coordinates were determined using a Marine Corps map known as “Map 104, North Coast of Guadalcanal, Lunga Area,” which used an arbitrary 1,000-yard system to divide the map into grid sections. It is unknown which Marine organization drew the original map, but the creation of a map fitting its description is discussed by Navy Captain William H. Whyte in his memoir, A Time of War. According to Whyte, “[Lieutenant Colonel William McKelvy] instructed [Corporal] Wilke to draw up a battalion map. It was a handsome affair. The lettering was especially impressive, ‘North Coast of Guadalcanal–Lunga Area.’” These deaths and the burial locations generally follow the course of the lengthy battle for Guadalcanal.

In addition to the Marines known to have been buried on the battlefield, 86 Marine airmen were lost


30 Whyte, A Time of War, 53.

31 Plotting each burial on this map reveals that the Marines appear to have created ad hoc cemeteries on Guadalcanal where they buried remains near each other. Near Point Cruz on the north coast of Guadalcanal, there are 28 burials recorded in one grid square, including 20 in the same exact location. In the adjacent grid square, there were an additional seven burials. In a third grid square to the southwest of Point Cruz and to the west of the Matanikau River, the Marines buried another 21 individuals, 9 at the same coordinates. The burials in each of these grid squares also occurred largely around the same time during the fighting on Guadalcanal. Six of the seven burials near Point Cruz occurred in October 1942. Beginning on 6 October, the Marines crossed the Matanikau River to mount an attack against the Japanese forces massed beyond the river. During this three-day engagement, the 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, buried five Marines in this grid square. Nineteen of the burials in the adjacent grid square, all from the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, occurred on 1 November 1942 after the opening day of a Marine offensive designed to push the Japanese back from Henderson Field. Of the 19 Marines buried that day, 12 are from C Company. Another seven Marines also were buried in the same grid square during 21–25 November 1942. Marines killed in the grid square southwest of Point Cruz and west of the Matanikau River also were buried largely on or around the same day. Two were buried on 10 October and another 16 during 21–24 November, including 10 on 22 November.
appear to be a widely accepted practice. Just prior to the invasion of New Georgia, the 43d Infantry Division ordered that burials were to be confined to those at sea or in shore cemeteries.\(^{32}\) Because the New Georgia invasion did not begin until 20 June 1943, Goodwin also was afforded the time to train provisional graves registration units.\(^{33}\) According to Steere, “Bodies were removed from the battlefield and, whenever possible, carried to task force or island cemeteries.”\(^{34}\) These provisional units were reinforced by the 109th Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon, which arrived on 3 August 1943.\(^{35}\)

In addition to recovery and identification operations, the 109th began building the permanent cemetery on New Georgia in September 1943.\(^{36}\) There is evidence that graves registration troops from New Zealand assisted in the effort to recover casualties from the battlefield.\(^{37}\) According to Steere and fellow Quartermaster historian Thayer M. Boardman, “New Georgia Island underwent a rather thorough search during the wartime American occupation, but construction work either covered or wiped out many graves.”\(^{38}\)

In total, 33 Marines are still not recovered or identified from action on New Georgia. The vast majority of these Marines are airmen lost in attacks against the Japanese airfield at Munda on 1–2 February 1943. Unfortunately, not all of these aircraft are potentially recoverable. According to the IDPFs of their occupants, four of these aircraft are known to have crashed into the ocean. Overall, 17 Marine airmen, whose area of loss is New Georgia, are currently not recovered or identified; these 17 losses occurred in nine separate loss incidents. Eleven of the 17 airmen currently not recovered or identified were lost while flying a Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bomber, another 3 in an F4F-4 Wildcat, and 3 in an SBD-4 Dauntless dive bomber. Out of nine separate loss incidents, five TBF-1 Avengers, three F4F-4s, and one SBD-4 crashed on and around New Georgia. Of the 15 Marines known to have been lost on the ground in New Georgia but have not yet been recovered or identified, only 5 are known to have been buried on the battlefield. The majority of the Marines not recovered or identified, including the only Marine buried on the battlefield with exact burial coordinates recorded in his IDPF, were lost on the same day, 20 July 1943, during a Marine attack on Japanese positions at Bairoko Harbor.\(^{39}\)

The ground loss statistics for Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, are similar to those on New Georgia. However, as with the invasion of Guadalcanal, the invasion of Bougainville illustrates the impact the absence of trained graves registration personnel in the invasion force had on the number of unrecovered or unidentified Marines. Even though the Marines had been bombing and harassing the Japanese garrison and airfield on Bougainville since the arrival of airplanes to Henderson Field on Guadalcanal in 1942, the actual land invasion of Bougainville did not begin until 1 November 1943. Unfortunately, trained graves registration personnel from the 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, did not arrive on Bougainville until 8 November 1943.\(^{40}\) Of the 39 Marines lost in ground action on Bougainville and still not yet recovered or identified, 10 were lost on 1 November 1943 and another 4 on 7 November, before the arrival of graves registration personnel. However, evidence exists that the 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, did conduct wartime search-and-recovery operations. Per the unit history, Sergeant Jakob O. Christofferson received the Bronze Star for recovery of the remains of U.S. Service personnel killed in an

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\(^{32}\) “Annex 4 to F.O. No. 1,” Headquarters New Georgia Occupation Force, 16 June 1943, Box 1004, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office (RAGO), 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Steere, *Graves Registration Service in World War II*, 48.

\(^{35}\) “Unit History of the 109th Graves Registration Platoon,” September 1945, Box 22959, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) “Operations of the 25th Infantry Division in the Central Solomons,” 22 July–29 October 1943, Box 6932, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD.


\(^{40}\) Headquarters, 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, to the Adjutant General, “Unit History 1 April to 30 June 1944,” 30 June 1944, Box 22526, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD.
aircraft crash beyond American lines. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Zisk also received a commendation for outstanding service for directing the removal of remains from temporary burial plots and their reinterment into the cemetery on Bougainville.

By far, the largest number of Marine airmen not recovered or identified have Bougainville as their area of loss; for example, 65 Marine airmen are not recovered or identified from action over or around the island. As with the action elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, some of these losses undoubtedly occurred over deep water and the exact location of the aircraft crash may never be known.

**Postwar Graves Registration in the Solomon Islands**

After the end of World War II, in addition to providing burial and identification services on the battlefield, the American GRS (AGRS), under the direction of the OQMG, identified and repatriated the remains of U.S. servicemembers killed during the war in the Pacific. The responsibility and authority for these operations was assigned to the commanding general of American forces in the western Pacific. Three subordinate sector commands were also established: MIDPAC (mid-Pacific) sector, WESPAC (western Pacific) sector, and JAP-KOR (Japan-Korea) sector. The Solomon Islands, because of the geographical broadness of the area, were assigned to both MIDPAC and WESPAC sectors, with the northern Solomon Islands assigned to WESPAC and the southern Solomon Islands assigned to MIDPAC.

There apparently were operations undertaken in the southern Solomon Islands to search and recover remains of U.S. military personnel immediately following the surrender of Japan and then again in July 1946. Unfortunately, the organizations that conducted these operations and their results remain a mystery. Operational plans were laid out for a third search-and-recovery operation of isolated burials in the Solomon Islands to begin on 15 May 1947 and conclude three months later. Prior to the beginning of this third recovery operation, an estimated 277 U.S. personnel potentially were recoverable from isolated burials in the southern Solomon Islands, including 268 on Guadalcanal. As we have seen, the AGRS woefully underestimated the number of potentially recoverable Marines on Guadalcanal. However, the AGRS did their best to recover the low number of Marines they estimated were yet to be recovered.

On 15 July 1947, the 1st Platoon, 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (QM GRC), left Hawaii on board USS LST 711 en route to the South Pacific to conduct search-and-recovery operations. A detail of 33 men and 5 officers were to search Guadalcanal while the rest of the company continued operations elsewhere because, “A number of men lost during the heavy fighting in the fall of 1942 and early spring of 1943, had never been recovered and in view of time elapsed [of] four years, rapid growth of jungle covering the area where these men fell would entail a great amount of work in searching.” After LST 711 arrived back at Guadalcanal on 18 October 1947, the 604th QM GRC began an intensive area search of Guadalcanal during 19–24 October. According to the unit history, “As most of all the fighting on Guadalcanal covered an area starting at Henderson Field and extending west for approximately six miles and to an average of three miles inland, this area was concentrated on.” In addition to trained graves registration troops, the 604th QM GRC also enlisted the aid of natives on Guadalcanal in the area search. The specific details of any recoveries made by the company on Guadalcanal are unknown. However, the 604th QM GRC did re-

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41 Headquarters, 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, to the Adjutant General, “Unit History 1 July to 30 September 1944,” 30 September 1944, Box 22526, RG 407, RAGO, 1917-[sic], NARA, College Park, MD.

42 Ibid.


44 “Search and Recovery Activities, AFWESPAC Sector,” 20 November 1946, Box 3, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–1962, NARA, College Park, MD.


46 “Operational Plan for Search and Recovery of Isolated Burials within AGFPAC Area,” undated, Box 3, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–1962, NARA, College Park, MD.

47 Ibid.
cover certain remains and also knowingly left others unrecovered, possibly because these remains were in locations that made them simply impossible to recover. For example, on 1 November, a team from the 604th ascended Mauru Peak on Guadalcanal to recover remains from the crash of a Douglas C-47 Skytrain, which caused the loss of 12 U.S. Service personnel, including the Marine pilot and crew. The team only recovered the remains of eight individuals, “leaving four unrecoverable.” On 6 November, the 604th QM GRC investigated losses on the west bank of the Matanikau River without success. According to Chief Warrant Officer John R. McBee, the area to the west of the river, which he had fought through during World War II, had changed significantly, and he recognized very little.48

The 604th QM GRC also investigated losses elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, not just on Guadalcanal. On 26 November and 1 December 1947, the company investigated losses on New Georgia, specifically those which occurred at Munda Point. Specific details of this investigation are unknown; however, the unit history specifically states that this investigation did not result in any recovered remains. Natives reported that remains had been removed previously from New Georgia and that they did not know of any other aircraft crashes or isolated burials. During 12–19 December, the 604th extensively investigated losses that occurred on the island of Bougainville. Little detail is known about the identity of individual remains the 604th QM GRC attempted to recover during these investigations. Per the unit history, the company recovered two sets of remains from Bougainville and that the cases of several other U.S. Service personnel lost on Bougainville were sent for further investigation by an unknown higher authority.49

Consolidation of cemeteries in the southern Solomon Islands (as well as from Espíritu Santo, Efate, New Hebrides) to the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps cemetery on Guadalcanal occurred in September 1945.50 From November to December 1947, the 9105th Technical Services Unit (TSU) operated a mausoleum on Guadalcanal and was charged with identifying the dead consolidated into the cemetery and preparing their remains for shipment.51 The majority of more than 3,000 remains processed by the 9105th TSU were skeletal and not casketed.52 Therefore, the possibility exists that a large number of these remains were unable to be identified and were later buried as unknown remains. The USAT Cardinal O’Connell transported all the remains from Guadalcanal to Hawaii in January 1948.53

Remains from cemeteries on Rendova and Bougainville Islands were consolidated in the cemetery on New Georgia and then removed to Finschhafen, New Guinea; though, little is known about the con-

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49 Ibid.
50 Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 398.
51 F. O. S. No. 5, 9105th Technical Services Unit to Commanding Officer, 9105th TSU, AGRS, PAC, “End of Operations Historical Report, 22 December 1947,” Box 22876, RG 407, RAGO, 1917-[-sic], NARA, College Park, MD.
52 Ibid. For the number of remains processed by the 9105th TSU, see Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 537.
53 The Cardinal O’Connell has taken on several iterations in its history, including SS Cardinal O’Connell in 1945 and USNS Cardinal O’Connell in 1950 after it was acquired by the U.S. Navy. For our discussion in 1948, it was part of USAT or Army Transportation Service. Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 538.
solidation of cemeteries from the northern Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{54} However, the dates these operations were undertaken and the organizations involved is unknown. In May 1947, operations began to remove remains from cemeteries in Finschhafen to their ultimate burial destination, the Manila American Cemetery and Memorial in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{55} The removal of all remains from Finschhafen was completed and the temporary cemetery closed 22 March 1948, thus ending the journey to a final resting place for U.S. Service personnel recovered from the Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{56} While the recovery effort by the graves registration personnel involved was noble and herculean in task, if the military had followed its own established procedures following World War I, and been better prepared for war, those ships could have carried more identified Marines out of the Solomon Islands. ♦ 1775 ♦

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 369. 
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 413. 
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 414.
Managing a U.S. Marine Corps Unit’s Command Chronology

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In late March and September each year, the leadership of many Marine Corps units scrambles to complete command chronologies in time for the end of a reporting period. Despite the efforts of even the best staff historians, many of the entries received are late, poorly written, and filled with irrelevant data and unsubstantiated opinion. Any deliverable collated by staff historians from these entries is consequently ineffective, resulting in a product that provides little historical value and serves the organization as not much more than a paperwork drill.

This trend is nothing new. In 1969, historian Jack Shulimson characterized some of the command chronologies coming out of Vietnam as “not worth the price of scrap paper.” As recently as 2012, Annette Amerman of the Marine Corps History Division more tactfully expressed that well-written and effective chronologies are the exception rather than the rule.

This does not have to remain the case. The previous works of Colonel Frank C. Caldwell and Ms. Amerman describe the purpose of command chronologies and their value as primary historical documents. Indeed, a well-researched and well-written chronology has significant potential as a single source for factual data that organizational members may use for writing investigations, unit and personal awards, fitness reports, veteran’s benefits, and other deliverables requiring research. Additionally, command chronologies are often a unit’s only enduring record of its activities during a given period from which historians may later write insightful works, such as those in Marine Corps History. However, like any product, a command chronology is only as good as the staff process that generates it.

This article is intended to build on the works of Caldwell and Amerman to provide not only a greater understanding of this program’s value but also some specific prescriptive measures for staff historians and operations professionals. First, an historical case study illustrates a chronology that failed to meet its potential. Second, the article provides 12 recommendations for improving a unit’s process at the local level. Third, three additional measures focus on maintaining the process once in place. Finally, the article addresses two arguments often heard that attempt to justify inaction but serve only as obstacles to effectiveness. The end state desired is an effective, simple, and sustainable process for unit command chronologies that not only meets the demands of the Marine Corps order but also contributes meaningfully to their organizations.

* The author is a Bell UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) pilot, historian, and Lean Six Sigma (LSS) black belt. The best practices discussed in this article resulted from an LSS project conducted at Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 (HMLA-267) from July 2013 to January 2015.
† A command chronology is a documented report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps covering the significant events of designated Marine Corps organizations. It is retained on the Commandant’s behalf in the Archives Branch, History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. For more information on the Marine Corps’ command chronology program, see “Command Chronology Program Overview,” Library of the Marine Corps Research Portal, http://guides.grc.usmcu.edu/5750.
Case Study: Los Angeles Riots

While a good chronology can improve planning or orientation of personnel, a poor chronology may represent lost opportunities for the same. For example, in the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the Marine Corps formed Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Los Angeles (SPMAGTF-LA) to support the exhausted civil authorities in restoring order. In July 2013, the author was researching utility helicopter support for this operation and found that Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169) provided a detachment to support civil efforts. What follows is that squadron's entire command chronology entry on the subject:

On 1 May, rampant civil unrest erupted in Los Angeles. For a period of 11 days, HMLA-169 UH-1N’s [sic] provided the command and control platforms for [SPMAGTF-LA], commanded by BGen Marvin T. Hopgood. Viper aircrews provided around the clock support for the Marine contingency force, ensuring success during this crisis. HMLA-169 distinguished itself by providing the only naval aircraft employed during the joint services operation.7

A full analysis of this entry, in terms of what information it provides, or fails to provide, could fill an article alone. First, careless errors about the facts are present. Contrary to what the passage states, civil unrest had erupted in Los Angeles on 29 April, not on 1 May (elements of SPMAGTF-LA arrived in the greater Los Angeles area on 1 May). Also, HMLA-169 did not provide the only naval aircraft for the operation; a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron also participated with a detachment of Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knights.

Second, unsupported opinions are used throughout, such as this detachment’s “ensuring success.” Several Marine Corps infantry battalions were involved in securing property and augmenting the police, and as such, stating that a small detachment of helicopters involved in command and control was the decisive element would be difficult to prove at best.

Third and most importantly, almost nothing in this passage would aid in planning a similar mission in the present day. It does not speak to what facilities the detachment used in or near Los Angeles or what logistical arrangements the squadron made to sustain its aircraft, aircrew, and support personnel. The passage does not speak to mission specifics, challenges encountered, or lessons learned with respect to such unusual activities as tactical flight in heavily urban terrain or coordination with civil authorities. It does not name the detachment officer in charge, who could possibly still provide an interview, and it does not give the reader amplifying information on the existence of an after action report or any other supporting documentation, which might likewise have more details. The paragraph does not even provide information as basic as how many aircraft and personnel were part of the detachment.8

In short, support of SPMAGTF-LA was unique and arguably the most important activity in which this unit was involved during the reporting period in question, yet this command chronology states very little about the operation that might be useful to future readers.

Improving the Process

Building an effective staff process involves three concepts already familiar to Marines: leadership, planning, and setting standards. That said, what follows are 12 simple prescriptive measures that should get an organization on track to an effective process.

1. Build your team early. Identify and designate the staff historian and representatives of each subordinate element and functional area at the beginning of a given reporting period. All too often, individuals receive word of this responsibility the week their entries are due, and the quality of their work reflects the late notification. Further, many of the below recommendations proceed from an assumption that the command chronol-

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6 For a timeline of this event, see “Los Angeles Riots Fast Facts,” CNN Library, 8 April 2016.
7 HMLA-169, Command Chronology (ComdC), 1 January-30 June 1992, Marine Corps University (MCU), History Division Archives Branch (HD), Quantico, VA, 7.
8 Section III of this command chronology later indicates that the detachment consisted of two Bell UH-1N Twin Hueys, but provides no additional information on personnel. See ibid., 9.
ogy team is involved in the process for the full period. Maximizing the staff process means leveling the workload over the entire six months. Staying on top of research, recording, and writing is not particularly onerous—usually no more than a few minutes per week—but it is continuous.

2. **Take advantage of local talent.** Unused or underused human resources constitute waste that keeps any staff process from meeting its full potential. Another common practice in respect to command chronologies is for unit leadership to assign writing duties to the most junior members present, without any regard to their background or ability. Many officers have earned bachelor’s degrees in history and other liberal arts disciplines; consequently, they often have more experience writing at an undergraduate level. Use these assets. The better the initial entries are, the less time staff historians will spend editing and collating with a deadline closing in. Also, infantry battalions are notorious for assigning staff historian duties to one of the air officers. While aviators on temporary orders make convenient targets for collateral duties, a permanently assigned member of that unit is likely to be more invested as a stakeholder in the organizational history, particularly if infantry is their occupational specialty.

3. **Generate buy-in and enthusiasm.** This step is where a little leadership can have a disproportionate effect—positive or negative. If an operations officer acts as if the command chronology is a meaningless requirement, then so will everyone else involved in the process. The results inevitably will be late, rife with errors, and add nothing insightful to the unit’s shared history. To secure the commitment of team members, not merely their compliance, organizational leadership must take the time to stand in front of its team and express the purpose, essential tasks, and end state desired. A key element of this activity is explaining the team’s personal stake in the outcome. One day, every member of a team will likely have a project involving organizational research, such as writing a unit citation, and they will personally benefit from a single source of factual information that is accurate, relevant, and well written. Leadership must also clear up any misconceptions of the commander’s role in this process. Team members must understand that the commander is not the customer for this product but rather the author of it. Capturing this fact will mitigate some of the other common errors discussed below.

4. **Establish a local unit template.** Many of the guidelines present in the Marine Corps order are intentionally broad and vague. This grants units maximum flexibility to build chronologies that reflect a myriad of missions and cultures. Consistent with the unique aspects of each unit, establish a template for how the command chronology is organized in Section II. This includes the order of individual subsections, how information is presented within each subsection, and the minimal required information of each subordinate element or functional area. One best practice is to provide a detailed narrative for the entire organization (written by the staff historian) at the beginning of Section II, then have each subordinate element and functional area subsection provide amplifying information for the facts already presented. As a rule, the more specific guidelines representatives have, the better and more consistent with each other their entries will be. A solid template is also an essential element of sustaining the process once the desired standard is achieved.

5. **Quantify accomplishments.** The organization as a whole and each individual functional area should have numeric data by which they measure effectiveness and performance. For an aviation unit, that might include flight hours completed and ordnance expended. An S-1 (manpower or personnel) may calculate the number of travel vouchers processed. An S-4 (logistics) may measure the metric tons embarked. In combat, numeric data could represent the number of patrols conducted, kinetic strikes, and enemy casualties confirmed. The team needs to define these

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11 Staff functions within the Marine Corps typically fall within either G or S prefixes. G denotes a general staff section within headquarters commanded by a general officer with a chief of staff to coordinate actions; an S denotes executive staff sections within headquarters commanded by a field grade officer.
metrics up front, continuously track them, and record them in their entries.

6. **Reduce redundancy and unnecessary variation.** Once again, the commander is effectively the author of the chronology, and though composed by multiple writers, the final product must read as if from the commander's point of view. This means that the staff historian must eliminate repetitive information prior to the final draft. For example, if the main narrative already states that the unit “supported Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) 2-17 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms, California, from 10 January to 20 February,” then the S-4 subsection can omit information already stated and focus on the specific logistical support that the department provided for this exercise. The staff historian must also ensure that, once the entries are collated into a single document, it reads as if written by a single person. Another best practice is to direct team representatives to write their entries exclusively in the third person, past tense, active voice (as opposed to passive), and in a formal tone (as opposed to a casual tone more appropriate for a unit newsletter to family members).

7. **Express only relevant facts and (when necessary) unpleasant facts.** Another common error (as illustrated in the case study) can be seen in entries replete with flowery and opinionated language. As previously discussed, this usually corresponds to a misunderstanding of the role of the commander. If representatives perceive their commander as the customer, then they may be inclined to present their entries as if writing an award or fitness report for their particular functional area. For example, a team member may write that his or her department performed a certain function in an “outstanding manner.” The better practice is to state in crisp, professional language exactly what the department accomplished (quantifiable data), and let these facts speak for how effective and efficient the work was. While a command chronology may (and should) serve as a primary source for awards, fitness reports, or investigations, a command chronology is not itself intended for that purpose. Further, keeping future readers in mind, the writers should restrict the expression of facts to those most relevant. For example, the S-4 should not focus on the precise number of toilet paper rolls consumed in a given period; a unit member would neither find such data pertinent to writing an award nor would a future historian doing research for a book or journal article. Finally, the writers should not omit negative facts simply because they may be embarrassing. One of the specific stated purposes of the command chronology is to identify problems, especially recurring problems, to mitigate their future repetition.

8. **Be specific.** This measure highlights a point already made by Amerman. To the extent possible, a command chronology should be precise with dates, names, locations, and (as previously stated) metrics. For example, it is not enough to write that the unit “supported Exercise Dawn Blitz in August”; instead, state specifically “from 12 to 18 August.” The entries should also identify key personnel, such as lead planners or officers in charge, by their rank and full name (including middle initials). This information could assist a future researcher in tracking down key personnel for an interview if necessary. Furthermore, at first mention, locations should be identified by their full formal name and the country or state in which they are located, such as “Fort Leavenworth, Kansas” or “Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.” When producing these chronologies, keep future readers in mind. Most members of the organization in the present day may already understand who Captain Smith is and where El Centro is, but a researcher 20 years from now may not.

9. **Eliminate jargon.** Just as organizations must be mindful of future readers, they also should not assume that the reader was ever part of that organization or one similar to base a frame of reference. A future historian may have had a different occupational specialty, been part of a different Service, or have never been in the military at all. The Marine Corps consists of a variety of

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13 Ibid., chapter 5, 4–5.
units, operating in different locales, with unique operational histories and cultures. Consequently, there are many examples of slang and technical terminology that might be difficult to understand outside of the military, a certain Service, or even the unit in question. That being the case, writers should use plain language to the extent possible when describing personnel and events. For example, you should refer to Marines in accordance with their specialties, such as “machine gunner,” “technician,” “mechanic,” “clerk,” or “analyst,” in contrast to such slang as “trigger puller” or “wrench turner.” Also, unit members should avoid using nicknames, such as “Viper aircrew” in the above case study. To the uninformed, “Viper” could mean a number of things, while writing “squadron aircrew” is unambiguous. Finally, an undefined acronym is just another form of jargon. Those in common use today may have disappeared in a few years, so always define them with the first use.

10. Exercise a logical order within subsections. A strict chronological order is not necessarily the most effective means of conveying information. Instead, consider (as part of the previously mentioned template) a logical order, meaning to organize paragraphs by related topics instead of listing dissimilar events in the order that they occurred. For example, an S-4 subsection may be organized first with a paragraph that describes changes in leadership (the department head, chief, battalion surgeon, etc.), followed by a paragraph about embarkation data, then a paragraph covering medical information, and so on. One particularly poor (but common) practice is a month-to-month narrative in which subsection paragraphs begin with “in January,” “in February,” “in March,” and so on. This style of narrative is problematic not only because it fences the writer into a strict chronological order but also because it generates a natural tendency to be vague with dates. For instance, a writer who began a paragraph with “in July” may be reluctant to write that a certain exercise occurred “from 10 to 18 July” to avoid sounding repetitive. Additionally, some activities, such as an ITX, cross over two or more months. Furthermore, writers who exercise a month-to-month narrative tend to include vague or irrelevant information just to put something down for a given period during which no significant events occurred.

11. Set intermediate deadlines. Much of the command chronology can be completed well in advance of the reporting period’s end. A 90-percent solution going into the last two weeks can significantly reduce the staff historian’s final workload and increase the quality of the end product. To level out the research, documentation, and writing over the full period, leadership should assign intermediate deadlines where representatives submit entries that are current up to that date. In addition to increasing the staff historian’s ability to generate a first-pass deliverable on time, intermediate entries grant leadership an early opportunity to assess and adjust if necessary. If representatives are falling behind in their duties, the staff historian can take immediate corrective action, instead of hours before the commander expects to see the final draft. When leadership should set these deadlines may vary, depending on the unit’s mission. Recommendations include a week following the completion of a major exercise or operation (while data and lessons learned are still fresh) or the first week of the final month of a reporting period.

12. Use supporting documentation. This measure echoes another important recommendation from Amerman.\textsuperscript{16} Section IV of command chronologies should contain a list of all supporting documents, such as after-action reports, letters of instruction, or higher headquarters fragmentary orders.\textsuperscript{17} Despite the fact that these documents can provide additional clarity and completeness, and preclude lengthy or redundant writing, staff historians often fail to take advantage of this option. Supporting documents can further build understanding in future readers by connecting them to additional primary sources. If such a document is already properly archived at the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), then note that in Section IV next to the document in ques-

\textsuperscript{16} Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: The Sequel,” 79.
\textsuperscript{17} Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 5.
tion. If not, then units should provide digital copies along with their submissions. Finally, if a source of information is classified, such as the results of operational testing, then specify the document’s classification level and which agency is responsible for securing it. If necessary, future readers can search for it themselves, provided they possess the appropriate clearance and have a need to know.

Sustaining the Process

Once a command chronology meets the Marine Corps’ and the individual unit’s goals, work is not done. Arguably, the bigger challenge lies ahead: the battle against entropy. Naturally, operations officers, staff historians, and subsection writers will not hold their present duties forever, and soon, an entirely new team will be in place. Like any process improvement, if an organization desires to make its gains permanent, then certain control measures are necessary to keep future members on the same track. This article offers three additional prescriptive measures for sustaining improvements to your unit’s command chronology.

1. **Host working groups.** Periodically set up team meetings to discuss current progress and the way ahead. This is also the staff historian’s opportunity to explain the results of the previous deliverable; pass down guidance, such as directing the S-6 (communications or IT) representative to capture a certain software upgrade in that subsection; and assign the intermediate deadlines discussed above. These meetings do not have to take place more frequently than every two months, depending on the unit’s mission, and do not need to last more than 30 minutes. The staff historian should also compile and publish meeting minutes, which at a minimum list the topics discussed and any specific assignments. This published record serves as a key enabler to ensure team members are accountable for their responsibilities.

2. **Make a comprehensive checklist.** An execution checklist is an outstanding tool for codifying the specific standards on effectiveness and performance. This checklist should include general items that apply to all team members, such as “The text spells out all acronyms for their first use” or “The text correctly spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as Exercise COBRA GOLD or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.” Also, each subsection should have its own specific checklist items. For example, the S-1 would include “describe all major challenges . . . confronted, including but not limited to tracking travel vouchers and government travel charge card payments and any measures taken to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals.” While the S-4’s list might say, “include information regarding funds received and spent if it exceeds the standard amount allotted from [higher headquarters] each quarter.” With a comprehensive checklist, team members begin the reporting period with an understanding of what is expected of their entries, and then they have a means of reviewing their own work for compliance once they have finished their initial drafts.

3. **Write a unit directive.** In the Marine Corps, best practices are simply good ideas until the commander makes them part of a formal order. Once the unit has an acceptable and sustainable process, consider drafting a directive that, while nested within the Marine Corps order and any guidance from higher headquarters, specifies how the unit executes this tasking consistent with its unique mission and culture. Include any procedures for conducting working groups and execution checklists (as an enclosure). Another important element of such an order is a description of the staff historian’s authority. All too often, the staff historian is junior to many of the representatives tasked with providing entries. The order should specify that the staff historian has the delegated authority of the commander to call meetings, set deadlines, and return entries for revision. Otherwise, operations officers will be more involved

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20 Ibid., enclosure 2, 3.
21 Ibid., enclosure 2, 5.
than necessary when team members fail to meet their requirements.

**Eliminating the Excuse Matrix**

The command chronology is every Marine Corps unit’s direct contribution to the historical record. The governing order characterizes these documents as the single most important body of historical records created, collected, and archived by the Marine Corps. Nevertheless, in many cases, units submit products deficient in terms of their utility and authority as historical primary sources. Part of this deficiency likely results from a failure to understand the program’s importance, as previously discussed. Another issue that acts as an obstacle to effectiveness is a pervasive attitude that nothing important happens during normal, peacetime operations, and therefore, cost-benefit analysis does not support a great deal of effort on the command chronology. Amerman characterized this as a “mistaken belief that the report is a frustrating and burdensome requirement that is less important in the big picture.”

Colonel Caldwell’s essay directly addressed the importance of peacetime recordkeeping. Before the establishment of the command chronology requirement in July 1965, the Marine Corps’ historical program had been concerned almost exclusively with combat operations. As a result, the Marine Corps has large gaps in its historical record prior to the Vietnam War.

If Caldwell’s words are not sufficiently persuasive, this section offers two additional explanations for why a sound process matters, even when units are not in combat conditions. First, information that seems of low importance today may prove insightful in the coming years, including testing new tactics, techniques, and procedures, even if the results are not particularly striking at the time. A historical example can be seen in much of the doctrinal writing and experimentation the Marine Corps conducted with amphibious operations between the world wars. Those within the Service understand this subject at a high level because of the hard efforts of the historians who put it together. Their work may have been less arduous and more comprehensive had a command chronology program been in place during the 1920s and 1930s.

Second, units must also build habits during peacetime that they expect to carry into war. The Marine Corps recognizes that combat naturally generates more activities and events of significance as well as a greater need to record them. This is why units must submit a chronology once a month, instead of every six, while serving under combat, contingency, or other special conditions. For the same reason that commanders require their Marines to wear full armor during training, even when safety is not a legitimate factor, staffs must likewise exercise the same detailed processes. A unit will not magically develop the ability to generate a command chronology as soon as it is in harm’s way.

A second obstacle to effectiveness is a belief that units should adopt a wait-and-see approach before implementing any improvements, because many of the rules governing submission of command chronologies are about to change. Indeed, the Marine Corps Electronic Command Chronology Reporting System (ECCRS) will soon be fully functional across the operational forces. This system is designed to streamline the submission process between reporting units and History Division, which archives all command chronologies as well as provides a more efficient means to hold units accountable for making required submissions. Some units already have received direction to submit via ECCRS, and many others continue to use the traditional method, pending the program’s full implementation. However, most of the prescriptive techniques discussed in this article will assist units in improving and sustaining their command chronology processes regardless of the submission method. That being the case, there

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22 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 4, 1.
24 Caldwell, “Every Marine an Historian,” 34.
is nothing for units to gain in waiting until ECCRS is functional before making positive changes to the way they conduct business.

**Conclusion**

The words of Colonel Caldwell and Ms. Amerman deserve our attention and reflection as much today as when they were written. The command chronology can be an outstanding tool for future planning and orientation of personnel, or it can be a worthless document that wastes the time of all involved. The difference relies strictly on leadership. If staff historians and operations professionals make the effort to implement some of the suggestions above, their processes will improve, and more effective and better-written chronologies will certainly follow.

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**SQUADRON ORDER 5750.1H**

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA)

To: All Hands

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1H

Encl: (1) Command Chronology Standardization Project Paper

(2) Command Chronology Checklist

(3) Command Chronology Submission Example (Jul-Dec 14)

1. Situation. Between July 2013 and January 2015, HMLA executed a project to improve, standardize, and control the process by which it generates its command chronology. This Order implements the recommendations of encl (1) and provides policy and procedural guidance for authoring the Squadron command chronology in accordance with ref (a).

2. Mission. In accordance with the reference, sets specific policy and guidance for constructing the Squadron command chronology in order to standardize and control the means by which the Squadron records and archives its history.

3. Execution
   
   a. Commander’s Intent and Concept of Operations

   (1) Commander’s Intent

   (a) Purpose. To maintain a single, streamlined, and uniform process for the preparation, approval,
and archiving of the Squadron command chronology. An ancillary benefit of improving this process will be the development of the professional writing and communications skills for those personnel who participate in the process.

(b) Essential Tasks

1. Publish Squadron guidelines for authoring the command chronology consistent with the provisions of ref (a).

2. Educate Squadron leadership and Historical Program functional area representatives on the contents of this Order.

3. Establish and maintain control methods for sustaining improvements to the process.

4. Establish and maintain a digital database for Squadron command chronologies, signature pages, and supporting documentation.

(c) End State Desired. Squadron command chronologies are complete, informative, legible, and representative of the professionalism and precision that have traditionally characterized [insert unit label] in accordance with ref (a).

(2) Concept of Operations. The execution of this Order shall occur along four lines of effort (LOEs):

(a) LOE 1 – Effectiveness. A measure of effectiveness (MOE) is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. In other words, effectiveness is a function of conducting the correct set of actions. In terms of this Order, an effective command chronology is a complete, informative, and useful product that fully documents the Squadron’s history during a given reporting period. The MOEs for a Squadron command chronology are as follows:

1. Does not deviate from the established template except through consultation with the Staff Historian or by direction of the Commanding Officer.

2. Written with future readers in mind and does not assume the reader has context for ongoing events or an understanding of HMLA operations.

3. Exercises plain-language descriptions versus jargon or slang; a future reader with little or no military experience would understand exactly what the text means.

4. Specific as possible in terms of dates, places, personnel, nomenclature of equipment, and quantifies wherever appropriate.

5. Expresses only facts; the only opinions present are direct quotations, such as from a general officer or member of Congress, which would lend weight to the historic importance of a fact in question.

6. The facts listed have potential relevance and could possibly aid a future reader with planning, orientation, or the authoring of awards, fitness reports, investigations, and journal articles.

7. Does not omit facts of a negative nature.
8. Spells out all acronyms for their first use.

9. Uses full names, including rank and middle initial, of individuals for their first mention (e.g., Capt John E. Snow) for the first use; the text uses last name and rank (Capt Snow) in follow-on references.

10. Uses full location names, including city and state or country, for their first mention (e.g., Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center [MCAGCC] Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Air Station [MCAS] Futenma, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan).

11. Where applicable, references and includes supporting documentation that may clarify or provide amplifying information to the text; examples of such documentation include after-action reports, awards, and journal articles.

12. Includes no specific facts of a classified nature but references where a reader with an appropriate clearance may acquire such details if necessary.

13. The text follows a logical order, broken down by functions or programs within departments, versus a strict chronological order; at no time does the text follow a month-to-month narrative.

(b) LOE 2 – Performance. A measure of performance (MOP) is a criterion used to assess Squadron actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. In other words, performance is a function of conducting a given set of tasks correctly. In terms of this Order, performance refers to a Squadron command chronology that is professionally written. The MOPs for a Squadron command chronology are as follows:

1. Exercises proper grammar, including appropriate punctuation, subject-verb agreement, etc.

2. Exercises crisp, professional language appropriate for a historical document, as opposed to warm, informal language more consistent with an award or newsletter.

3. Exercises an active voice only, emphasizing the subject of a given sentence (for example, “The Squadron conducted a mishap drill” instead of “A mishap drill was conducted”).

4. Reads in a past tense, third-person voice as if written entirely from the perspective of the commander.

5. Uses apostrophes to demonstrate possession, not as an incorrect means to indicate plurality (Incorrect: 11 UH-1Y’s; Correct: 11 UH-1Ys).

6. Spells out numbers one through nine and uses digits for numbers 10 or higher (with understood exceptions, such as Twentynine Palms, VX-9, or UH-1Y).

7. Hyphenates compound modifiers, such as “on-station time” or “six-barreled weapon.”

8. Properly abbreviates units (such as 3d MAW for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing) and ranks, dependent on the service of the individual (such as Capt [USMC/USAF], CPT [U.S. Army], and CAPT [USN]).

9. Spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as Exercise COBRA GOLD or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

10. Uses a dating convention of day, abbreviated month, two-digit year (e.g., 25 Dec 14); no zero is present for the first nine days of the month (e.g., 1 Jan, not 01 Jan); the year is not present if already implied.
(c) LOE 3 – Standardization. Standardization is the minimization of unnecessary and unpredictable variation between like products. In terms of this Order, standardization refers to Squadron command chronologies that are as uniform as possible with respect to construction, format, and language.

(d) LOE 4 – Control. Control refers to those means and ways for developing and implementing a plan to institutionalize a new process or design in order to sustain improvements. This LOE employs three methods of control:

1. Directive. This Order serves as published guidance to codify the procedures for generating the Squadron command chronology within the scope of ref (a) and based on the findings of encl (1).

2. Checklist. Encl (2) provides a comprehensive checklist for the Staff Historian and Historical Program functional area representatives to confirm that their entries meet Squadron standards and do not omit reportable facts.

3. Working Group. This order gives instructions for constituting a process-control working group for the purpose of leveling out research, documentation, and writing over the course of a reporting period as well as providing a forum for further improving the process.

b. Subordinate Tasks

(1) Staff Historian

(a) Perform specified duties in accordance with ref (a), ch. 5.

(b) Plan and lead a working group to take place at least once every two months for the purpose of passing research, documentation, and writing guidance to the functional area representatives; following the meeting, author minutes that specify any conclusions and tasking, and distribute these to the Operations Officer and all functional area representatives.

(c) Write the main narrative and S-3 (Operations) narrative for the command chronologies in accordance with the specific requirements listed in encl (2).

(d) Coordinate with the Tactics Officer and Ground Training Officer to receive inputs related to Tactics and Ground Training accomplishments.

1. Tactics Officer. Provide the Staff Historian with factual information related to Tactics initiatives and accomplishments during the reporting period.

2. Ground Training Officer. Provide the Staff Historian with factual information related to Ground Training accomplishments during the reporting period.

(e) Edit and collate the entries of the Squadron functional area representatives into a comprehensive document that reads as if written entirely from the perspective of the Commanding Officer.

(f) Assign internal Squadron deadlines and standards in accordance with this Order, higher headquarters guidance, and ref (a).

(g) Return entries for corrections to the functional area representatives when the entries are not in compliance with Squadron standards.
(h) Comply with higher headquarters deadlines.

(i) Archive approved command chronologies, signature pages, and supporting documentation in a designated area of the Squadron SharePoint.

(2) S-1 (Manpower or Personnel)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write S-1 entries.

(b) Comply with S-1 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Adjutant and Legal Officer to receive inputs related to awards and legal activities.

1. Adjutant. Provide the S-1 representative with factual awards information in accordance with the template present in encl (3).

2. Legal Officer. Provide the S-1 representative with factual legal information in accordance with the template present in encl (3).

(3) S-2 (Intelligence and Security)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and author S-2 entries.

(b) Comply with S-2 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(4) S-4 (Logistics)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write S-4 entries.

(b) Comply with S-4 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Squadron Flight Surgeon to receive inputs related to the Medical subfunction.

(5) Squadron Flight Surgeon

(a) Provide the S-4 representative with factual information related to Squadron medical readiness and accomplishments during the reporting period.

(b) Review portions of the S-4 entry related to the Medical subfunction prior to its submission to the Staff Historian.

(6) S-5 (Human Affairs)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write S-5 and Family Readiness entries.
(b) Comply with S-5 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Family Readiness Officer to receive inputs related to Family Readiness.

(7) Family Readiness Officer

(a) Provide the S-5 representative with factual information related to Squadron Family Readiness accomplishments during the reporting period.

(b) Review the Family Readiness entry for accuracy and comprehensiveness prior to its submission to the Staff Historian.

(8) S-6 (Communications or IT)

(a) Attend command chronology working groups and write S-6 entries.

(b) Comply with S-6 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(9) Department of Safety & Standardization (DOSS)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write DOSS entries.

(b) Comply with DOSS specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(10) Maintenance

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write Maintenance entries.

(b) Comply with Maintenance specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(11) Operations Officer

(a) Oversee the execution of this Order, including the compliance of functional area representatives with Staff Historian requirements.

(b) Serve as the initial and primary level of review and quality assurance for the command chronology with respect to effectiveness, performance, and standardization in accordance with this Order.

(12) Executive Officer. Serve as the final level of review and quality assurance for all Squadron directives with respect to effectiveness, performance, and standardization in accordance with this Order.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Research and Documentation

(a) Research and documentation of functional area accomplishments shall be continuous throughout the reporting period.
(b) Functional area representatives shall keep detailed notes over the course of the reporting period in the event they have to turn over their duties prior to submitting entries.

(2) Formatting and Template

(a) Use Courier New typeface, 10-point font.

(b) Organize into four sections in accordance with ref (a).

(c) Organize Section II by Squadron functional areas in accordance with the example provided in encl (3).

(d) Each functional area entry in Section II follows the below general template in accordance with encl (3):

1. Mission Statement

2. Enduring Tasks

3. Numeric Data (bullet form)

4. Department Narrative

(e) Functional area representatives shall not amend or omit approved portions of the mission statement, enduring tasks, or numeric data bullets without the prior approval of the Staff Historian.

(f) The Staff Historian shall return any functional area entries that are not in compliance with Squadron standards, and the functional area representatives shall make the required corrections prior to resubmission.

(2) Working Group

(a) Functional area representatives shall attend a command chronology working group, hosted by the Staff Historian, to take place at a minimum once every two months.

(b) This working group shall serve as a forum to pass guidance, discuss lessons learned, and build consensus on what information should be present in the next command chronology.

(c) An additional purpose of this working group will be to level out the efforts of research, documentation, and writing over the full course of a given reporting period versus doing so during the final weeks before a submission is due to higher headquarters.

(3) Department Head Review. Department Heads should review the inputs of their representatives for accuracy and comprehensiveness prior to their submission to the Staff Historian.

4. Administration and Logistics. Squadron personnel desiring to make recommendations concerning the contents of this Order may do so by forwarding a request to the Commanding Officer via the chain of command.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command
(1) This Order is applicable to all Squadron personnel.

(2) Higher headquarters (Marine Aircraft Group 39 when the Squadron is based at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, California) sets the external submission deadline and is the sole authority for approving an extension.

(3) The Commanding Officer is effectively the author of the command chronology and is the final approval authority prior to submitting to higher headquarters.

(4) In accordance with ref (a), only the Commanding Officer is authorized to sign the Squadron command chronology.

(5) The Operations Officer is the Portfolio Manager for all S-3 programs, including the Squadron Historical Program.

(6) The Staff Historian is the Squadron Historical Program Manager.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.

I. M. COMMANDER
Command Chronology Checklist

1. Effectiveness (All Entries)

- The narrative portions do not deviate from the established template except through consultation with the Staff Historian or by direction of the Commanding Officer.
- The text is written with future readers in mind and does not assume the reader has context for ongoing events or an understanding of HMLA operations.
- The text exercises plain-language descriptions versus jargon or slang; a future reader with little or no military experience would understand exactly what the text means.
- The text is as specific as possible in terms of dates, places, personnel, nomenclature of equipment, and quantifies wherever appropriate.
- The text expresses only facts; the only opinions present in the text are direct quotations, such as from a general officer or member of Congress, which would lend weight to the historic importance of a fact in question.
- The facts listed have potential relevance and could possibly aid a future reader with planning, orientation, or the authoring of awards, fitness reports, investigations, etc.
- The text does not omit facts of a negative nature.
- The text spells out all acronyms for their first use.
- The text uses the full name, including rank and middle initial, of individuals (i.e., Capt John E. Snow) for the first use in Section II; the text uses last name and rank (Capt Snow) in follow-on references.
- The text uses the full location name, including city and state or country, for its first mention (i.e., Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center [MCAGCC] Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Air Station [MCAS] Futenma, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan).
- Where applicable, the text references and includes supporting documentation that may clarify or provide amplifying information to the text; examples of such documentation include after-action reports, awards, and journal articles.
- The text includes no specific facts of a classified nature, but references where a reader with an appropriate clearance may acquire such details if necessary.
- The text follows a logical order, broken down by functions or programs within departments, versus a strict chronological order; at no time, does the text follow a month-to-month narrative.

This checklist comes from Squadron Order 5750.1H as revised 5 January 2015.
2. Performance (All Entries)

- The text exercises proper grammar, including appropriate punctuation, subject-verb agreement, etc.
- The text exercises crisp, professional language appropriate for an historical document, as opposed to warm, informal language more suitable for an award or newsletter.
- The text exercises the active voice only, emphasizing the subject of a given sentence (e.g., “The Squadron conducted a mishap drill” instead of “A mishap drill was conducted”).
- The text reads entirely in a past tense, third-person voice and as if written entirely from the perspective of the commander.
- The text uses apostrophes to demonstrate possession, not as an incorrect means to indicate plurality (Incorrect: 10 UH-1Y’s; Correct: 10 UH-1Ys).
- The text spells out numbers one through nine and uses digits for numbers 10 or higher (with understood exceptions, such as Twentynine Palms, VX-9, or UH-1Y).
- The text properly hyphenates compound modifiers, such as “on-station time” or “six-barreled weapon.”
- The text properly abbreviates units (such as 3d MAW for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing) and ranks, dependent on the Service of the individual (e.g., Capt [USMC/USAF], CPT [U.S. Army], and CAPT [USN]).
- The text correctly spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as Exercise COBRA GOLD or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
- The text uses a dating convention of day, abbreviated month, two-digit year (e.g., 25 Dec 14); no zero is present for the first nine days of the month (e.g., 1 Jan, not 01 Jan); the year is not present if already implied.

3. Main Narrative

- The first paragraph of the main narrative following the introduction paragraph describes major turnovers in Squadron leadership, specifically the CO, XO, and Sergeant Major; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received.
- The main narrative describes all major Squadron activities, including but not limited to deployments for training (DFTs), named operations or exercises supported, and changes in facilities; as appropriate, the text also names the leadership involved and lists quantitative data associated with this support, including flight hours, sorties, training and readiness syllabus events completed, etc.
- The main narrative describes any nonroutine support the Squadron provided during the reporting period, such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
- The main narrative describes any Squadron contributions to development of HMLA doctrine, including advances in tactics, techniques, or procedures (TTPs).
- The main narrative names all individuals who have earned the AMOS (additional military occupation specialty) of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (7577) or Forward Air Controller (7502), including their date of designation and (in the case of FACs) their follow-on assignment.
- The main narrative describes any major Squadron awards or accomplishments, including but not lim-
• The main narrative describes any major initiatives, programs, or policy decisions taken by the Command that are intended to have an effect on the whole Squadron (not merely one specific functional area) and may serve as lessons learned or best practices to other units.

4. Administration (S-1) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-1 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-1 leadership: the S-1 Officer in Charge, S-1A, Chief, Legal Officer, and Adjutant; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the Legal Officer Course, including location and dates, and any individual augment (IA) billets by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-1 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main narrative, such as total funding for a given exercise.

• The S-1 narrative describes all major challenges that the S-1 confronted, including but not limited to tracking travel vouchers and government travel charge cards payments and any measures taken to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals. The text also names the leadership involved in the instigation of these plans and measures.

• The S-1 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-1 supervision.

5. Intelligence (S-2) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-2 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-2 leadership: the S-2 OIC and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-2 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main narrative, such as flight briefs, post-mission debriefs, and video exploitation support.

• The S-2 narrative describes any intelligence training that S-2 personnel attended as well as describes any intelligence specific exercises, conferences, or working groups that occurred during the reporting period.

• The S-2 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-2 supervision.

6. Operations (S-3) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-3 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in operations leadership, specifically the Operations Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, and Operations Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of any key schools, including locations and dates:
- Anti-Terrorism & Force Protection (AT/FP) Course
- Reconnaissance, Surveillance, & Decontamination (RSD) Course

Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

The S-3 narrative describes all major challenges that the Operations Department confronted, including but not limited to aircraft availability challenges, flight hour assignments, tactical training requirements, ground training objectives, and the measures taken to achieve these. The text also names the leadership involved in the instigation of these plans and measures.

The S-3 narrative contains a Tactics summary, describing any initiatives from the Tactics office, including but not limited to training plans, Stinger University, operational plans (OPLANs), academic classes, and linked simulator initiatives.

The S-3 narrative lists significant improvements to the ready room by the Ready Room Officer that aided in efficiency or accountability.

The S-3 narrative names all individuals who have earned flight qualifications that are Attack or Utility Helicopter Commander (AHC or UHC) and above.

The S-3 narrative names all individuals who have earned Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) Black Belts or instructor qualifications and who their instructor was in obtaining those qualifications.

The S-3 narrative describes CGI results as well as any initiatives to improve CGI programs under its supervision.

7. Logistics (S-4) Narrative

The first paragraph of the S-4 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in S-4 leadership: the S-4 OIC, S-4A, and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

The following paragraph(s) describes all major embarkation operations that the shop conducted in support of Squadron events. This includes but is not limited to deployments, DFTs, Family Day Events, and any aircraft recovery operations. Each event shall include number of personnel supported, number, type, and source of vehicles required, amount of pounds transported, as well as any challenges or deficiencies encountered in the process.

The S-4 narrative includes information regarding funds received and spent if it exceeds the standard amount allotted from MAG-39 each quarter.

The S-4 narrative contains a Medical summary, including any turnover of the Squadron Flight Doctor, any initiatives and data regarding Squadron Medical Readiness, and any challenges encountered. This paragraph includes the percentage of Squadron Overall Medical Readiness at the beginning and end of reporting period with reasons for substantial increase or decrease.

The S-4 narrative includes a summary of any initiatives to improve the Squadron spaces, including objectives, costs involved, and lessons learned.
• The S-4 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-2 supervision.

8. Human Affairs (S-5) and Family Readiness Narratives

• The first paragraph of the S-5 and Family Readiness narratives, following the introduction paragraphs and numeric data, describe any turnover of the S-5 OIC and Family Readiness Officer (FRO); in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph (in the S-5 narrative) also describes the successful completion of the following courses, including names, dates, and locations:
  - Equal Opportunity Representative (EOR) Course
  - Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO) Course
  - Education Officer Training
  - Family Advocacy Officer Training
  - Family Readiness Officer Training

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-5 or Family Readiness support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main narrative, such as expeditionary food sales, cookouts, and Squadron social events in support of DFTs.

• The S-5 narrative describes Squadron social events, such as the Birthday Ball, Mess Nights, and Hail & Farewells, including amplifying information about dates, locations, funds expended, and approximate number of attendees.

• The S-5 and Family Readiness narratives describe major challenges confronted, including but not limited to lack of funds, logistical support for major events, command support for family personnel and welfare, and the measures taken to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals.

• The S-5 narrative describes any non-routine activities or support the departments provided during the reporting period, such as the MAG-39 “Octoberstache Officer Social.”

• The S-5 and Family Readiness narratives describe CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under respective department supervision.

9. Communications (S-6) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-6 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-2 leadership: the S-6 OIC and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the following courses, including names, dates, and locations:
  - SharePoint Course, Levels I, II, and III
  - OOMA Data Administration
• Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-6 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main narrative, such as deployment of computers and any efforts to maintain connectivity while deployed for training.

• The S-6 narrative describes any new updates to software or hardware that affect Squadron operations, measures taken to implement the changes, and any associated challenges with the process.

• The S-6 narrative describes all major challenges confronted, including insufficient hardware or software requirements, external support, updates to policies and the measures taken to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals. The text also names the leadership involved in the instigation of these plans and measures.

• The S-6 narrative describes commanding general’s inspection (CGI) results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-6 supervision.

10. Department of Safety & Standardization (DOSS) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the DOSS narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in DOSS leadership: the Director, Aviation Safety Officer (ASO), Ground Safety Officer (GSO), and Standardization Officer; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the following courses, including names, dates, and locations:

  • ASO Course
  • GSO Course

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any individual augment billets (IAs) begun or completed by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes initiatives that the shop conducted in support of the Squadron, such as nonroutine periods of instruction and mishap drills.

• The DOSS narrative includes a summary of any Hazard Reports submitted, changes to Squadron standard operating procedures (SOP), and Read & Initials.

• The DOSS narrative includes a mishap summary, describing all aviation and ground mishaps that occurred during this period. This paragraph includes dates, locations, and a description of involved personnel by department but does not include the affected individual's name if the event was strictly within the realm of safety (and did not involve criminal activity, for instance).

• The DOSS narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under DOSS supervision.

11. Maintenance Narrative

• The first paragraph of the Maintenance narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in Maintenance leadership: the Aviation Maintenance Officer, Assis-
tant Aviation Maintenance Officer, and Maintenance Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the Aviation Maintenance Officer Course, including location and dates, and any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

- The following paragraph(s) describes all Maintenance support to major Squadron events. This includes but is not limited to Deployments, Deployments for Training (DFTs), Family Day Events, and any aircraft recovery operations. Each event includes number and type of aircraft involved.

- The Maintenance narrative includes a summary of all aircraft and transferred or received, to include type/model/series (T/M/S), Bureau Number (BUNO), date of transfer, the unit transferred to or received from, and the reason for the transfer. This summary also describes significant equipment received or transferred and any new or updated equipment or software changes.

- The Maintenance narrative describes Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) Inspection results and any initiatives to improve CNAF programs.
BOOK REVIEW

Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Campaign in Soldiers’ Words and Photographs

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Winston A. Gould, U.S. Air Force
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Richard van Emden interviewed more than 270 Great War veterans in the course of writing 16 books pertaining to World War I. Stephen Chambers has written five Great War books, including four battlefield guides on Gallipoli. Both gentlemen are passionate about World War I with a keen interest in Gallipoli in particular. In Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Campaign in Soldiers’ Words and Photographs, van Emden and Chambers provide a refreshing, personal look at the campaign. The title is interesting because one could argue that the casualties on both sides were horrendous, and therefore, the Dardanelles Campaign was a disaster for both the Allied forces and the Turks.

“By combining harrowing, moving and sometimes darkly humorous personal accounts written by soldiers on both sides, with more than 130 photographs taken by servicemen themselves, most previously unpublished, the Gallipoli campaign is made real to us in a way that has not been achieved before” (dust jacket). As advertised, van Emden and Chambers provide a realistic, personal look at the Dardanelles Campaign. The book is divided into six chapters, each based on a significant part of the campaign. From “Forcing the Straits of Dardanelles,” the opening Allied moves, to the “Defeat” and subsequent withdrawal from the peninsula, the book provides adequate background material and context for those not familiar with the Dardanelles Campaign. This framework allows the personal recollections to make sense with regard to the events unfolding at sea and on the beachheads.

Gallipoli is unique in that it provides personal recollections from both Allied and Turkish personnel, from junior privates to the most senior leaders. A sampling of personnel includes Sapper Geoffrey Robbin, 1st Field Company, Australian Engineers; General Sir Ian Hamilton, Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF); Lieutenant Mehmed Fasih, 47th Regiment, 16th Ottoman Division; and General Askir Arkayan, Ottoman Howitzer Battery. Diary entries from Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Headquarters, 19th Ottoman Division, are also included. After the war, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) would eventually become the president of Turkey.

The book reiterates one theme of the Dardanelles Campaign—that it was a second-rate expedition doomed to fail. The western front was the primary theater during World War I. The Dardanelles

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Campaign was undertaken to knock Turkey out of the war and open a second front. "If ever a campaign was doomed from the start, then the year-long slog in the Dardanelles was the case in point. Anyone who believed otherwise was blinded by over-optimism and had never stood on the region's baked and arid ground or been privy to more than could be discerned from a stretch of trench" (p. 2). Time and again, the reader travels though the campaign and sees the impact on the average soldier and sailor partaking in the operation, as well as junior, midlevel, and senior leaders.

Van Emden and Chambers’ sources include published memoirs, unpublished diaries, letters and memoirs from private collections, other books, and Gallipoli Association journals. Allied and Turkish archives were also consulted. This variety of sources no doubt enabled the authors to write such a richly diverse account of the events that occurred on the Gallipoli peninsula. Each account is credited to the particular individual by annotations in the margin. This innovative method allows for a highly readable account that meets the mark. The reader would gain from reading one or more of the excellent operational histories of the Dardanelles Campaign listed in the “Other Books” section, which would provide more context to the personal accounts provided by Van Emden and Chambers.

Gallipoli should be mandatory reading for any World War I historian and those interested in personal accounts of the Great War, especially the Dardanelles Campaign. The reader is drawn into gritty, first-hand accounts from both sides of the campaign, which personalizes the battle while providing an operational context to the successes and failures of the Allied and Turkish forces. ✽ 1775 ✽
BOOK REVIEW

The Somme

Reviewed by John Grady
Military writer


Although only a little more than a decade old and reissued for the centennial of this months-long battle where so many British lives were lost, especially for so little gain by either side, Robin Prior’s and Trevor Wilson’s The Somme is a classic, weaving together the political, the military, and the personal threads of this epic struggle. These Australian historians, both originally at the University of Adelaide, have made careers out of mining the records and archives for a series of histories about World War I—a war that to most Americans is distant in time and eclipsed in memory by the even deadlier war that followed a generation later.

What the British high command, including Field Marshals Sir John D. P. French and Douglas Haig, and other leaders in the British government led by Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and almost all members of the Parliament’s War Committee, did not grasp or chose to ignore was that on the western front, “modern weaponry was bestowing on defence a marked superiority over offence” (p. 6). In hindsight, with hundreds of thousands of British casualties in the fighting that spanned July to November 1916, this deadlock could not be broken by high-explosive shells—even if they existed in sufficient numbers—and piecemeal attacks, even division-size, against line after deeper line of trenches that were interconnected to provide multiple exits if overrun and were fronted by barbed wire and machine guns.

What had originally been intended as a French offensive with British support on land changed even before the stalemate at Verdun, when the German attack, launched in February, was finally blunted by the French in July. Even so, fighting from shell hole to shell hole in a grinding counterattack at Verdun continued into December.

The War Committee clearly realized before the impasse at Verdun that “Britain’s allies were going to lose the war on land unless Britain agreed to contribute mightily in that sphere also.” The Royal Navy’s blockade of Germany lasted through the war. From the unfolding of the Gallipoli fiasco against the Ottoman Empire, to the pressure the Russians were feeling along their fronts, to the Italians bracing for an Austrian offensive, the situation was looking dire (p. 9).

Prior and Wilson do a magnificent job of following the divided War Committee through its twists
and turns with decisions that are not carried out and ideas that are translated into military action because no one holding office stomped their feet, jumped from their chair, and shouted, “No!” Particularly illuminating is the role David Lloyd George, who succeeded Asquith as prime minister, played in “causing their offensive to happen” (p. 31).

The committee was clearly not alone in this line of thinking, as Prior and Wilson make clear. “Britain by the end of 1915 possessed a mass army undergoing extensive military training and an industrial and financial base in the process of being converted to the generation of unprecedented (if not necessarily sufficient) volumes of weaponry and ammunition” (p. 10).

General Henry S. Rawlinson, commanding the army for this Somme offensive, would fight “in a region of gently undulating hills with green fields and woods still in evidence behind the [original set of] trench lines. There were no precipitate rises . . . It had no industrial wilderness such as the British had encountered at Loos. Nor had it yet suffered the effects of continuous fighting” (p. 37).

From the start of the planning, Prior and Wilson create a sense of foreboding without signaling they know how events will play out. A 3 April plan sent to Haig, who could be blindly single-minded, called for an attack on a front of 20,000 yards that would “kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves.” This was a sure-fire prescription for a battle of attrition (p. 41).

As he would do throughout the Somme Campaign, Haig all but ripped Rawlinson’s plan to shreds because it “made no attempt to achieve surprise; it was too cautious; it paid no attention to the need to assist the French; and there was no role for the cavalry.” Assuming command of the British Expeditionary Force in late 1915, Haig called for, among other things, bombardment on a much longer front that reduced the amount of shells falling on the area to be assaulted. Although this bombardment plan was worked out, Haig never stopped “thinking in Napoleonic terms” when it came to fighting a battle, carrying out a campaign, and waging a war. He “wished away” realities of the war he was in. The battle he was fighting was the Somme, not Jena (pp. 43, 44, 51).

Even more astounding from the first day of infantry combat, and a deadly fact that was repeated later on: “For many [British] soldiers the ‘race to the parapet’ was actually a race to their own parapet, and it was a race that they lost.” The German artillery and machine gun emplacements were not taken out by the early bombardment. The Tommies in X Corps never made it to “No Man’s Land” (p. 89).

That first day, the British suffered approximately 60,000 casualties to gain three square miles of territory. Through mid-September, they suffered 126,000 casualties to gain six square miles. “The Germans counter-attacked on no fewer than 90 occasions” even if the ground they fought over was without “any tactical value.” Rawlinson’s battle of attrition was grinding on relentlessly (pp. 188, 190).

Only Winston Churchill, forced to leave the admiralty after Gallipoli and now holding a minor post, seemed to have a handle on the truth of the fighting early on. “We have not conquered in a month’s fighting as much ground as were expected to gain in the first two hours.” Worse yet for the British and Allies, “the Germans had still not been deprived of strategic initiative on all fronts” (p. 196).

Not even the British introduction of tanks to the Somme changed the equation. Haig might have favored their introduction and a plan of how to use them, but Rawlinson had never seen one. The Mark I also had major drawbacks. In addition to being prone to breakdowns and vulnerable to artillery fire, “its maximum speed over average . . . was just 2 miles per hour, which made it slower than a walking infantryman.” Should they go before the infantry or after? Among the British, “The arrival of the tank in this instance was causing confusion where none had existed before.” The arrival of the tanks did not cause German morale to collapse (pp. 216, 219, 224).

Now into the fall with only casualties to show, the War Committee did not step back and order the military to work with the French to find another way to disrupt German operations in this campaign, all across the western front and against Russia. “We must keep going,” were the words of Sir Edward Grey, the foreign minister, because to their collective mind there really was “nothing else to be done” (p. 280).

This reviewer agrees with the authors’ assessment that all the criticism of the soldiers in Haig’s armies “can be largely discounted,” and they were anything but an “unthinking Tommy plodding to his doom on 1 July” (pp. 303, 307).

Topping that assessment was the combat perfor-
mance of the British New Army, largely draftees, and soldiers from the Dominions: They “were quite capable of outfighting the German defenders” in “grim, intense, close-quarter fighting” (p. 259).

The deficiencies of the Somme campaign lies with Haig and the other commanders led by Rawlinson for their “inadequate planning for the impossible objectives set for the infantry” and then their self-serving cover for their own fatal errors. In Haig's case, he did not lack imagination as some of the others did. “He had too much. He could envisage cavalry sweeps and decisive battles in keeping with Napoleonic conception than with industrial war” (pp. 303, 307).

“The final arbiter of the British fortunes at the Somme was the civilian War Committee. It is melancholy to report that this group of generally intelligent men carried out their tasks with no more understanding of the imperatives which face them than did Haig” (p. 307).

The authors correctly added the lesson that must be drawn: The soldiers who were wounded and killed “in their hundreds of thousands fought well in a good cause. But they deserved a plan and competent leadership as well as a cause” (p. 309).

This reviewer was stunned years ago to see on one of the seven volumes of the “Roll of Honour” the illustrated list of names of men and women who died in World War I, open for inspection at St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin, Ireland. For the first time, it brought home the cost of that war to the British, the French, and the Germans.

For that alone, The Somme is a remarkable work of history.

At the cathedral this year, a newly unveiled 18-foot-high steel “Tree of Remembrance” with 16 bare branches surrounded by faux barbed wire sits in the north transept where the roll is displayed. The tree marks the battle’s centennial as part of its Lives Remembered Project. Closer to home, the National World War I Museum and Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, will commemorate in its main exhibit hall the battles of the Somme and Verdun as highlights of “They Shall Not Pass: 1916” that will run through 2017. ♦ 1775 ♦
BOOK REVIEW

German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I

Reviewed by Staff Sergeant Matthew E. Paisie


When discussing the American role in the First World War, battles such as Belleau Wood and the Argonne Forest typically take pride of place. Chad Fulwider argues, however, that the most important campaign was fought on American soil and was far less bloody than the engagements in Europe—the competing propaganda struggle waged by the Germans and the British for influence over the United States. This was a war of words and public statements, propaganda pictures, and political clout. As may be presumed from the title of the book, Dr. Fulwider has chosen to focus on the German efforts to alter the course of American politics with regard to the war in Europe, arms shipments, and related military or economic issues.

Rather than a strict chronological list of events with associated names, the book’s narrative shifts from one group or policy concept to another, such as “German Professors Defend Germany” (p. 75) and “Legislative Opinions and Public Awareness Campaigns” (p. 105). Times and dates are noted frequently, but Fulwider is more concerned with discussing relevant ethnic, social, political, economic, and cultural issues than an extensive temporal ordering of places and personalities. This enables him to discuss said issues in-depth and to make his points about each as discrete items, but also creates a sense that the narrative is moving forward and backward in time. Incidentally, the reader would be well-advised to learn the basics about the sinking of the RMS Lusitania and the Zimmermann Telegram as the author alludes to both without going into much detail about either, which may confuse readers unaware of their importance. Despite any mild confusion about these events or the narrative’s timeline, the material covered makes fascinating reading.

The Lusitania’s sinking may be the most famous event related to America’s entry into the war, but Fulwider argues that the United States had already given up its neutral position by the time the ship sank. “Pro-German interests had suffered a severe setback on 21 August 1915, when [President T. Woodrow] Wilson reversed his position on large loans to allow the Allies to continue to purchase munitions. In theory, the Germans could also have applied for loans, but they were already unable to ship the materials previously purchased” (p. 109). It seems unlikely that Americans never noticed the Royal Navy’s dominance of the Atlantic, and there was no forceful American action to ensure that Germany, as well as its Austro-Hungarian ally, received any sort of equal treatment concerning trade or shipping. This is just one of numerous incidents outlined in the
book wherein the United States chose to pursue an economic policy that benefited the Allies over the Central powers, well before American troops were committed to European battlefields.

The author makes eminently clear, however, that these pro-British policies did not originate out of thin air. In his assessment of the British and German campaigns to influence American opinion, he assigns plenty of justly deserved blame to the Germans and German-Americans for self-defeating practices and counterproductive decisions. “The German-language propaganda effort in the U.S., however, was hampered by linguistic barriers from reaching those outside the German-American community, especially those unused to reading the Germanic script of most newspapers during this era. . . . Furthermore, one can argue that the German-language newspapers went to the wrong people—they were effectively preaching to the choir, while the rest of the country slept through a sermon they neither understood nor cared to hear” (p. 34). The Germans routinely focused on the German-American community, operating under the completely misguided impression that they constituted a single monolithic block and that there was no need to try to reach Americans who were not of German descent.

Additionally, the German government displayed little, if any, understanding of the importance of public opinion in the United States, choosing instead to “fully place their faith in reason and logic, believing that Americans would respect the ‘truth’ as preached by professionals and academics over the ‘yellow journalism’ of the American newspapers” (p. 60). The British did not make this mistake and ensured that their propaganda campaign was aimed at as many Americans as they could target. This book includes 19 pictorial reproductions of war-related material during this era, two of which are German-language propaganda pieces that consist of dry facts and figures. These German propagandistic materials were likely ineffective in the United States compared to the lurid British and American depictions of vicious monsters, ravaged women, war crimes, and warnings against lurking spies and saboteurs.

A theme that runs through this book, and which is highlighted in both the conclusion and the appendix, is the position of the German-American community and how the rest of America acted toward it. Internally divided by a variety of issues and fundamentally misunderstood by the Kaiser’s government, many German-Americans chose loyalty to the United States over Germany and worked harder to assimilate, in some cases changing their names, even as cities and states were banning German language instruction in public schools. Dr. Fulwider does not claim that World War I totally and singlehandedly destroyed the German-American community, demonstrating that assimilation had already been occurring ever since immigrants arrived in America, but he assigns it a vital role in accelerating and finishing the process for most of the German-American community.
BOOK REVIEW

Kleinkrieg:
The German Experience with Guerrilla Warfare, from Clausewitz to Hitler

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash
Historian, History Division
Marine Corps University


When one examines Germany’s historical record of counterinsurgency warfare, especially through the lens of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, one would expect to encounter little beyond the rigid application of ancient Roman “scorched-earth” methods—best summarized by Galgacus’ [Caledonian chief who fought against the Romans in North Britain, AD 83–85] phrase, “They make a solitude and call it peace.” Indeed, Germany’s record of combating guerrillas, partisans, and franc tireurs [civilian or guerrilla fighters] from the mid-nineteenth century until 1945 reveals a history of brutality and legal single-mindedness, rivaled only by that practiced by the Caesars, who sought at all costs to protect their vast empire against uprisings by various Germanic tribes, Jewish zealots, Caledonians, and other tribes. Few practitioners of counterinsurgency today, then, would expect to learn anything useful from Germany’s record, at least according to modern conventional wisdom.

Long buried in U.S. government archives and only recently declassified, two previously translated German theoretical and doctrinal works dealing with the subject of counterinsurgency have been rediscovered and combined into one volume and edited by Charles D. Melson, the former chief historian of the Marine Corps History Division and a retired Marine Corps major. The two primary works—Arthur Ehrhardt’s Kleinkrieg (Guerrilla Warfare), published in 1935, and Bandenbekämpfungen (Fighting the Guerrilla Bands), published by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command) as Directive 69/2 on 6 May 1944—display a surprising amount of insight and ingenuity in understanding and addressing counterinsurgency. In fact, the latter document, according to one source from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, was the foundation for the Army’s first doctrinal counterinsurgency publication, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (Field Manual 31-20). Published in 1951, this manual became the standard text for the Army’s fledgling Special Forces organization for a decade. Indeed, some portions of it appear to consist entirely of translated passages from the German original.

A review of these two publications, each preceded by a section by the editor that provides historical context as well as examples of German counterinsurgency operations during World War II, illustrates...
how the _Wehrmacht_, _Schutzstaffel_ (SS), and police units put theory and doctrine into practice, often successfully. The first section of the book consists of Arthur Ehrhardt’s 1935 classic, _Kleinkrieg_. Though directly translated as “small wars,” Ehrhardt makes it clear that he is writing about counterguerrilla warfare and not the kind of small wars fought by the Marine Corps in the 1920s and 1930s, though there are parallels between the two different types of conflict. A highly decorated veteran of World War I’s _Kaiserheer_ (Imperial Army), Ehrhardt was a retired German officer who, during the early 1930s, chronicled Germany’s history of fighting against indigenous guerrilla or insurgent forces. He also accurately predicted the role that this kind of _volkskrieg_ or “people’s war” (as theorized by the great German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz) would play in future conventional wars between two modern industrial powers.

For example, Ehrhardt foresaw how modern guerrilla movements might capitalize on radio communications, aircraft, and motor vehicles to effectively strike targets in an occupying army’s rear area. He also gave some thought as to how modern media might be mobilized to rally the population to provide popular support to guerrilla armies. Conversely, Ehrhardt discussed a variety of ways and means to be employed by an occupying power (e.g., Germany) to effectively counter and destroy an insurgent or guerrilla movement. However, despite his well-argued assertion that Germany needed to prepare to fight such a war in the immediate future or even to wage its own guerrilla campaign should its territory be occupied, his entreaties were ignored by his contemporaries as well as by younger officers of the newly formed _Wehrmacht_. In the late 1930s, Hitler’s legions were preparing to fight a modern mechanized war, and its leaders had little time to consider something that many considered as being beneath them; guerrilla warfare was something “un gentlemenly,” a dirty kind of war fought by criminals or brigands.

When Germany began the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, it soon found itself having to administer thousands of square miles of occupied territory, which sheltered large numbers of bypassed Soviet troops who began waging guerrilla war against the Germans as early as the summer of 1941. Hitler’s occupation forces in the rear areas were soon called upon to support the SS and police in combatting a nascent insurgency and soon found themselves poorly equipped doctrinally to understand and respond to this growing threat. Harsh methods of reprisal were instituted, including the execution of innocent civilians and the destruction of entire villages. Though these methods had proven effective in the nineteenth century, they now tended to reinforce the Soviet-sponsored partisan movement’s call to the civilian population to help them wage all-out war against the German occupiers.

As a partial remedy to this situation, _Kleinkrieg_ was republished in 1942 and again in 1944. Though primarily a theoretical work, Ehrhardt’s book, ignored in the 1930s, now served as a touchstone for German counterinsurgency practitioners who understood that other ways were needed than mere brute force to effectively pacify Nazi Germany’s vast European empire. Still, theory was not enough—more was needed to translate Ehrhardt’s theories into practice. Existing doctrine and tactical directives were insufficient to address the need, though field commanders immersed in fighting partisan or guerrilla “bands” rapidly began to accrue a store of hard-won lessons learned.

Ehrhardt, who was reactivated in 1939 to serve as a captain in Germany’s counterespionage service, the _Abwehr_, was transferred to Heinrich Himmler’s dreaded SS in early 1944 to become that organization’s premier counterinsurgency expert with the rank of SS major. In an organization dedicated to genocide and harsh repressive measures toward occupied populations, Ehrhardt sought to moderate these tendencies, which he saw as counterproductive, by drafting guidelines for the SS and _Wehrmacht_ counterinsurgency leaders to effectively fight the partisan bands. These guerrilla groups had became a thorn in Germany’s side from 1942 onward, and by mid-1944 had become large and growing movements that tied down hundreds of thousands of German troops in occupied Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, by mid-1943, Germany’s scorched-earth tactics had depopulated vast reaches of Belarus and Russia, killed millions of Soviet citizens, and brought about economic ruin to the very areas that Hitler’s armies had depended upon for food and fodder. Ehrhardt and others saw these tactics as counterproductive; they sought alternate ways to achieve
the same goal without leaving a wasteland. After much thought and review of recent experiences, the German Armed Forces High Command published *Bandenbekämpfungen* in May 1944 to replace a previous, less encompassing directive published two years earlier. Its authors, though unknown but most including Ehrhardt, sought to strike a balance between theory and practice by encapsulating the accumulated knowledge of lessons learned, backed up by explanations of why certain practices produced greater success than other methods. This publication arrived in the field at an opportune time when the fortunes of war began to turn decidedly against Germany and when counterguerrilla operations began to assume greater prominence.

This salient document, picking up where Ehrhardt had left off in 1935, reads like a commonsense guide that not only examines the guerrilla phenomenon in detail, but also describes a number of various tactics, techniques, and procedures that could be applied to combat these movements. For example, sections are dedicated toward patrolling, local security, population and resource control, and cooperation with the air force. More impressive is a portion of the document that focuses on the importance of treating the local population fairly and devising measures to gain their trust with the aim of securing their cooperation in fighting the insurgents—ideas that are still valid today; see, for example, the current Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.01, *Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency*, which is analogous to *Bandenbekämpfungen*, while Ehrhardt’s *Kleinkrieg* has more in common with Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.

*Bandenbekämpfungen* directive was widely circulated throughout the Wehrmacht and SS during the last years of the war. It was considered by German practitioners of counterguerrilla warfare as an excellent primary source for guidance on how to conduct these types of operations. According to one general officer, counterinsurgency was a type of combat for which conventionally trained officers had little or no experience, a gap that led to German excesses in the field, which in turn were quickly followed up by guerrilla reprisals. Special schools were established during 1944 to train *Wehrmacht* and SS leaders in counterguerrilla techniques and procedures, and specialized SS units, the so-called *jagdverbände* (hunter-killer groups) were organized to track, locate, identify, and eliminate partisan bands. Though these units became highly proficient at their task, it was a classic example of too little, too late.

By late 1944, Nazi Germany had managed to alienate if not turn entire subjugated populations against them, and the crimes and incompetency of Nazi officials in the occupied areas during the first several years of the war could never be made good. Though recognized by the U.S. Army after the war as being an extremely useful doctrinal work, *Bandenbekämpfungen* by its very essence illustrated the conflict between practitioners who sought to effectively wage counterguerrilla war, and a cruel, ideologically driven totalitarian government that seemingly did everything possible to give rise to guerrilla movements. These diametrically opposing goals could never be reconciled, and most of Ehrhardt’s initiatives resulted in failure, though he never stopped trying.

The end of the war found Ehrhardt employed in establishing and organizing the stay-behind SS *Werwolf* resistance organization that was supposed to carry on guerrilla warfare against the occupying Allies after May 1945. That movement never really took off, though not due to a lack of effort on Ehrhardt’s part. Imprisoned briefly after the war with those who had served in the SS, Ehrhardt resumed his writing career after the war. He became involved in various Pan-European movements that sought to influence politics in postwar West Germany and was the founder of a major right-wing publishing firm, Nation Europa. He died in 1971 at the age of 75. Ironically, *Kleinkrieg* received very little recognition at the time outside of Germany, but his thoughts about how modern industrial nations could fight a counterguerrilla war were picked up by a small circle of counterinsurgency theoreticians, such as Walter Laqueur, who were concerned with addressing the challenge posed by contemporary Communist-influenced guerrilla movements then metastasizing throughout Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

This new edition of these two classic works seeks to redress the lack of German sources on counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. It is an accessible, easy-to-read resource that practitioners or students of counterinsurgency warfare can reference as they study the various insurgent groups operating throughout the world today. Replete with dia-
grams and illustrations from the original versions, the text has been meticulously edited and, in parts, footnoted to provide additional context. Of note, the editor has provided a closing chapter that sums up both works and uses them as a filter to analyze modern Germany’s current counterinsurgency doctrine, which surprisingly uses much of the same World War II terminology, such as *bandenkampf*, partisan, and *kleinkrieg*, in describing the methods to be used by today’s *Bundeswehr* (German Federal Armed Forces) to address reoccurrences of this phenomenon they might face, as they have in Afghanistan. Though the study of counterinsurgency in its various modern forms may not be in vogue at the moment, as the various U.S. Armed Services seek to regain traditional warfighting competency, this book deserves to be on the bookshelf of anyone interested in the subject or for those who must devise methods to effectively combat future insurgencies, whatever form they may take. ✦1775✦
BOOK REVIEW

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Don Thieme
Professor of writing
U.S. Naval War College

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance. By Adam Rayski. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 408. $35.00 cloth; $25.00 paperback.)

“In order to understand historical reality it is sometimes necessary not to know its outcome.”

~Pierre Vidal-Naquet

This is a story of humans facing a great challenge: that of the population of France and the French Jews during World War II. Rayski’s book was first published in 1992 as Le choix des Juifs sous Vichy: Entre sousmission et résistance, and the English version of this authoritative and poignant chronicle was published in 2005. Adam Rayski (1913–2008), a Jew from Bialystok, Poland, immigrated to France after World War I. He survived the Nazi and Vichy regimes in France, and spent his life after the war thinking deeply about the lessons of war, morality, and the frailty of the human condition.

Frequently, books written by direct participants lack a broad-spectrum perspective, as well as the multidimensional detailed analysis to reconstruct a more accurate version of what happened, much less the ability to discern the drivers of human choice and actions. These weaknesses in investigatory writing are usually made worse by the passage of time and the fading of memory. Such is not the case with this book. Rather, based on newly accessible records, and with a zealous passion for precision, Rayski carefully constructs a detailed and nuanced view of the agonizing dilemmas the French faced as citoyens [citizens] and in the subdivisions of Gentile and Jew.

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy appears partly as a response to the seminal publication by Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (1981). Rayski traces the timeline of events in much the same way, but whereas Marrus and Paxton focus on a more chronological narrative, Rayski returns time and again to the human element as reflected in the title: choice. He does not spare Pierre Laval, Marshal Pétain, and other French leaders. Instead, he focuses on the divisions in the French Jewish population between those who considered themselves as French (i.e., as in the France of 1789) and those who were interlopers or recently arrived foreign Jews. Rayski highlights the ability of the Nazis and their French puppets to divide the French from...
the Jews and then “native” Jews from “foreign” Jews. In this complex milieu, three social groups had to make choices, and Rayski pays close attention to the details of these nuances. First were the French and their choice—whether to collaborate, accommodate, tolerate, or resist. Many French were willing to sacrifice, at least to some degree, their own ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité to preserve a sense of greater France. Rayski considers the difficulty of this choice even as he condemns the apparent ease with which at least some sectors of French leadership enabled Nazi policies. The second group was “native” French Jews. Their choice was narrower: flee, go underground, actively resist, or partially collaborate in hopes that “foreign” Jews would fulfill the victim role. The final group, “foreign” Jews like Rayski himself, faced even starker choices: flee, go underground, or resist.

In navigating the moral and ethical choices of the protagonists, perpetrators, bystanders, and victims, Rayski carefully delineates the Byzantine structure of Nazi occupying forces, French organizations in occupied France, Vichy French organizations, and the many Jewish organizations. While the book would benefit from a set of charts to visually portray these bureaucratic relationships, the point that Rayski makes is plain: it was maddeningly difficult for any French citizen—Jew or Gentile—to even know where to look for information, guidance, or assistance. Furthermore, the relationships between occupation administration, Nazi Germany, occupied France, and Vichy France were in constant flux. At the same time, the Holocaust continued to evolve, especially in 1942, as Nazi policies toward Jews took an exterminationist turn, roundups and deportations increased in the “Greater Paris” region, and the Nazis occupied the whole of France in November 1942.

Despite the confusion, chaos, and complexity of it all, Rayski shows that “if the Jews were victims they were by no means passive ones” (p. 3). He spares neither Chief Rabbi of France Isia Schwartz nor Jacques Helbronner (president of the Israelite Central Consistory of France, 1940–43). He makes it clear that the decision makers of 1942 could not know the consequences of three years of war by 1944: their decision making must be viewed in light of the facts as they were known at the time. The collaborationists in Paris thought that the Vichy administration was too soft on the implementation of the anti-Semitic policies of the Nazis; those in the Vichy administration thought that the Parisians were too compliant with those same policies. In the middle of this were the Jews—as well as those who wished to aid them—who had to make theological, pragmatic decisions in the face of significant obfuscation and chaos.

The physical movement of Jews was nearly as convoluted as Nazi-Vichy policy making. Drancy initially served as a “reassembly center” during a period of policy drift and improvisation. In the end, roughly 67,000 of the 75,000 Jews deported to Auschwitz had departed from Drancy. The intermittent stop at the Vélodrome d’Hiver was only another part of the complex maze that all French (Jew and Gentile) navigated under increasingly challenging conditions, especially after November 1942.

In addition to the more than 200 camps that “blemished the French countryside” (p. 102), Rayski focuses on the human element of the nearly four-year occupation. The Judenrat (Jewish council) was charged with the horrific task of “screening” registered Jews to “try to retain those whom we judge indispensable and to abandon those whom we expect to die shortly . . . it’s awful” (p. 112). The effects of social actions—relentless Nazi efforts to uncover and expose underground movements and hiding schemes, recruit collaborators, and foment societal distrust—were deeply divisive and destructive to French civil society. Even as the Henri Pétain-Pierre Laval government turned over nearly 25,000 Jews, others resisted in positions great and small. Rayski lays out the efforts to move and hide Jews in Italy, a scheme that worked as long as the Nazis did not fully occupy Italy.

Rayski’s analysis of the “People of the Shadows” is the greatest strength of this book. Using information from archives not previously investigated, and carefully moderating his own perspective and memories, Rayski observes that: “until now, this human experience, this unique reality in history, has passed largely unstudied by historians and sociologists” (p. 163). Noting the positive, he stresses that “the humanitarian tradition made many French immune to antisemitism and racism” (p. 167) and that “nothing can diminish the gallantry of the population of the plateau” of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon (p. 184).

The author addresses the resistance of the Jews, quoting Marek Edelman that “our only morality: to
kill him who is killing us” (p. 221). Rayski outlines the actions Jews took to defend themselves against a tyranny unique in the history of Europe; this is another great strength of the work. The fight against the Milice (French paramilitary organization) as well as the struggle against other French organizations that were complicit in various degrees with carrying out the Endziel (ultimate goal) of the Nazis in France was a centerpiece of Jewish action during the long night of German occupation. As in other parts of occupied Europe, the Jewish scouting movement answered the call with organization, diligence, courage, and resilience. He tackles the complex arguments of Yehuda Bauer and others, noting that the value of resistance was, sui generis, the resistance itself.

Rayski concludes with a powerful testimony of the power of resistance, struggle, and survival. Writing near the end of a long, vibrant life (he died shortly after the English version was published), he stated that his purpose was to look back, reflect, and remember that time and address “the poorly known phenomenon of clandestinity, ‘people going underground’” (p. 314). Carefully considering the complex tapestry of the horrific choices of the Jews—and other French citoyens—during the occupation, Rayski concludes that if France was the country that, alongside Germany, most persecuted the Jews, “it was at the same time a country where nearly three-fourths of the Jews survived” (p. 315) with “pride, courage, and moral strength” (p. 320).
BOOK REVIEW

Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for Iraq

Reviewed by Jeremy Maxwell
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What makes a Marine? Are there any enduring qualities that make a Marine different from any other enemy on the battlefield? How does the Marine perceive combat? These are some of the questions that John Pettegrew endeavors to answer in Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for Iraq. More specifically, Pettegrew argues that U.S. military force in the Iraq War was projected through the lens of the Marine on the battlefield, or what he terms the *optics of combat*. Comparing the technology available during the Gulf War and the war in Iraq in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, he underscores the increasing accuracy and availability of visual-based guidance systems and combat gear that make killing the enemy a simpler task. In this era of supertechnology, the *optics of combat* is quite literally the blending of ability to see everywhere with the Marine belief that “if a target can be seen, it can be killed.” The phrase *light it up* then, describes the dual meaning of being able to illuminate any target and the subsequent use of force that destroys the enemy.

As the phrase optics of combat suggests, heavy emphasis is placed on how the enemy is perceived. Pettegrew offers a thorough analysis of how the Marine perception has been enhanced by digital technologies, effectively separating the shooter from the target. He discusses key issues, such as how risk of bodily harm is eliminated for the remote warrior, while discussing how the achievement of reality-based combat video games blur the line between simulated play and fighting. Such games are so effective that the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense spend vast sums of money to fund the development of gaming software that provide Marines with real-time training in urban warfare based upon veteran experiences. The theory behind the technology is, of course, that if Marines are exposed to the situations they will be facing prior to deployment, they will be far more effective when in-country.

Pettegrew’s analysis of Marines in Iraq is comprehensive, encompassing discussions about shock-and-awe airpower, war porn and pleasure killing, ludology and the “first to fight” mentality in Fallujah, counterinsurgency and the ability to “turn off the killing switch,” and the idea of posthuman warfighting. The discussion of a vast array of subjects is incredibly effective in portraying not only the differences between the Marines in Iraq and the enemy they faced, but also the shifts in mission goals that forced Marines to adapt from their historic identity as an amphibious force in readiness. The development of

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counterinsurgency doctrine and force projection are key components in conveying that message, as the manner in which Marines were deployed in Iraq was atypical of the purpose they were previously tasked to serve.

Once their invasionary mission had been fulfilled, Marines had to turn off what Pettegrew so poignantly terms the *killing switch*. Using the oral testimonies of veterans of the war in Iraq, Pettegrew discusses the changes in rules of engagement that took place and the hardships that combat Marines encountered while transitioning to an occupying force. Counterinsurgency was a complete reversal of conventional warfare, where Marines had to adapt from the shock-and-awe show of force to a humanitarian-based approach. Destruction was no longer the methodology employed. Rather, the new modus operandi was winning the support of the inhabitants of the villages they secured or occupied, and thus, hoping that the villagers would provide actionable intelligence.

The development of new technology, doctrine, and force projection, coupled with the experiences of Marines in combat, provided a more complete picture of the nature of the Iraq War. The experiences of Marine veterans were extremely valuable in portraying the feelings that arose as a result of combat. Equally valuable was Pettegrew’s use of material gleaned from interviews with retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who had seen combat and been involved with the development of Marine Corps doctrine since the Vietnam War. As a former commander in chief of the United States Central Command, Zinni also was involved with the discussion and planning of much of the Marine Corps’ mission in Iraq. By incorporating these testimonies into the discussion and defining the role of Marines in the Iraqi conflict, Pettegrew presented one of the most comprehensive analyses of what it means to be a Marine in modern warfare.

John Pettegrew is an associate professor of history and director of the American Studies Program at Lehigh University who teaches and writes about the modern United States, specializing in the history of thought, culture, war, and visual culture. He has authored a number of significant works including *Brutes in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890–1920* (2007), an examination of the putatively male instinct of aggressiveness as constructed in modern U.S. social science, law, literature, and sports and military cultures. Given his background with such topics, Pettegrew is highly qualified to address the issues presented in *Light It Up*, a fact that is evident in his superior analysis of the hyper-masculine attitudes exemplified by Marines in Iraqi combat. While his analysis might be beyond the comprehension of the average reader, *Light It Up* definitely belongs on the shelf of military history enthusiasts, particularly those interested in the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Pettegrew’s analysis would prove very useful for military academies and command and staff colleges as a tool of introspection and means of conveying the modern trends in force projection and adapting to new mission objectives.
Submissions

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). MCH is a scholarly, military history periodical published twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps History Submission.”

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

Training and Education, 2000–2010

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine Corps. The initial fighting during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how it trained and educated Marines in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This book recounts the work of Marines and educators in the field and at home at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, and at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.
This anthology and bibliography presents a collection of 37 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This History Division publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign can be completed. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available.